Review of International Political Economy

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrip20

Exclusive expertise: the boundary work of international organizations

Matthias Kranke

To cite this article: Matthias Kranke (2020): Exclusive expertise: the boundary work of international organizations, Review of International Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2020.1784774

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1784774

© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

View supplementary material

Published online: 27 Aug 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 779

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rrip20

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1784774

Exclusive expertise: the boundary work of international organizations

Matthias Kranke

Institute of Political Science, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

ABSTRACT

Scholars of global governance tend to agree that international organizations (IOs) enjoy expert authority because they provide applicable specialist knowledge for policymaking. This view implies that IOs' expert status rests more on the contents than the presentation of their knowledge. Integrating the sociological concept of 'boundary work' into a Goffmanian symbolic-dramaturgical perspective, this article articulates a competing interpretation that recovers the relational and performative aspects of expert authority. I argue that, in settings where spheres of authority overlap, boundary work by IOs serves two loosely coupled functions: demarcation and cooperation. While IOs demarcate their jurisdictions on the 'frontstage' to craft perceptions of exclusive expertise, they closely cooperate on the 'backstage' to mitigate internal resource constraints. I illustrate this argument by examining the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank (or Bank) around the joint Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Based on elite interviews and relevant documents, the analysis shows that the IMF's frontstage boundary work entailed promoting FSAP reforms and launching a new surveillance initiative without the World Bank. Yet while demarcation can augment an IO's expertise, it risks poisoning inter-organizational relationships.

KEYWORDS

Boundary work; expertise; Financial Sector Assessment Program; global governance; International Monetary Fund; inter-organizational relations; World Bank

Introduction[1]

International organizations (IOs) thrive on their reputation as experts on transnational issues. As a large constructivist literature demonstrates, IOs furnish authoritative knowledge that guides activities in various political arenas (Best, 2014; Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Hannah et al., 2017; Littoz-Monnet, 2017). However, much scholarship implicitly follows an instrumentalist logic in attributing 'expert' qualities to IOs for the practical utility of their knowledge. According to a highly influential view, IOs' expert authority derives from 'the use of socially recognized relevant knowledge to carry out tasks' (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 24). Such

CONTACT Matthias Kranke matthias.kranke@uni-kassel.de Institute of Political Science, University of Kassel, Kassel 34109, Germany.

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1784774

© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

a perspective obscures how knowledge becomes and stays 'socially recognized relevant knowledge'. The mechanisms through which IOs gain and maintain their expert status are thus left under-researched.

This article explores the workings of one such mechanism – 'boundary work' (Gieryn, 1983) – under conditions of overlapping mandates, which are likely to fuel authority battles between IOs as knowledge providers. In the sociology of professions, *boundary work* denotes actors' efforts to establish jurisdictional prerogatives over certain issues vis-à-vis others but also to facilitate engagement with (possibly those same) others (Bos-de Vos et al., 2019; Liu, 2018; van Bochove et al., 2018). Identity-based approaches similarly conceptualize boundary work as a collection of practices that serve to sharpen or soften perceived differences between groups (Ellis and Ybema, 2010; Hofius, 2016). I harness this open-ended concept of 'boundary work' for an analysis of institutionalized interactions between IOs, which encompass both inclusionary practices of cooperation and exclusionary practices of demarcation. Exploring the link between these diverging practices, I argue that regular inter-organizational cooperation blurs jurisdictional boundaries, which can prompt an IO to publicly position itself as *the* lead authority for a particular global problem. Claims to exclusive expertise through demarcation necessitate imbuing knowledge with distinctive social meaning – that is, presenting it as impossible to obtain elsewhere (Starbuck, 1992, p. 737).

The argument stresses the symbolic and dramaturgical requirements of claiming expert authority in organizationally dense global governance settings. IOs operate under institutional and practical constraints that induce them to cooperate. Like other social groups, organizations can enhance their diagnostic capacities and gain access to scarce resources through cooperation (Liu, 2018). But as conspicuous cooperation would discredit claims to exclusive expertise, IOs strategically move between what Erving Goffman (1959) describes as 'frontstage' and 'backstage' (but more frequently calls 'front' and 'back region', respectively). On the frontstage, an IO can perform jurisdictional demarcation to cast itself as the only or most authoritative expert on a particular transnational issue. But on the backstage, the same IO may cooperate regularly with another, thereby piercing the very boundaries that its own performance has erected. By decoupling frontstage demarcation from backstage cooperation, it can reduce this tension.

I substantiate these claims through an in-depth case study of interactions between the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank (or Bank) in the area of financial sector surveillance. Drawing on elite interviews and official documents, I examine the IMF's boundary work regarding the joint IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Piloted in 1999–2000 in response to the Asian financial crisis, the FSAP was designed as a cooperative instrument involving joint field missions and reporting to national authorities. Following the 2007–08 global financial crisis, the IMF faced political pressure to ratchet up its surveillance capacities. Fund staff – especially in the Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM) Department – advocated a reform that would sharpen jurisdictional boundaries and increase operational flexibility in FSAP operations. World Bank officials, who preferred soft jurisdictional boundaries, ultimately failed to thwart the plans of MCM staff. However, one of the reform's main effect was not a steep decline in cooperation on FSAPs but a dramaturgical loosening of the

link between backstage and frontstage. Decoupling enabled the IMF to pursue jurisdictional demarcation and still continue cooperation with the World Bank.

The article makes important theoretical, conceptual and empirical contributions. Theoretically, I develop a novel framework, grounded in sociological institutionalist thinking, for understanding why performances of IO expertise are particularly challenging in inter-organizational contexts. In contrast to inter-organizational accounts that show how the supply of expertise affects the inclination toward cooperation (Busuioc, 2016; Gest and Grigorescu, 2010) or how IOs quarrel over concrete policies or rules (Lütz and Kranke, 2014; Margulis, 2018), my account specifies the relational and performative dimensions of expert authority. It underscores that IOs are well versed in decoupling not only their promises from their operations (on the Fund, Kentikelenis et al., 2016; on the Bank, Weaver, 2008) but also their claims to exclusive expertise from their inter-organizational activities. Conceptually, I extend the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' boundary work (O'Kane, 2018, p. 67) by developing two subtypes of the latter. Reforms can redraw boundaries around organizational jurisdictions in both these ways. Empirically, I present a widely unknown case of engagement between two well-known contemporary IOs. The analysis reconciles the seeming opposition between findings of neoliberal policy convergence and frequent turf battles in this case, hinting at a more general inference: if cooperating IOs agree on major policies, they are more inclined to frontstage minor disagreements. Differences between organizational cultures can be leveraged for boundary work, rather than obstructing cooperation as is commonly assumed by practitioners and scholars alike (Momani and Hibben, 2015).

The article proceeds as follows. The first section introduces a framework that theorizes the interplay between frontstage demarcation and backstage cooperation. The next two sections develop the case study, which documents how the IMF combined direct and indirect boundary work to renegotiate its relationship with the World Bank around the FSAP. Demarcation was achieved through three complementary moves: (1) making cooperation with the World Bank selective (direct); (2) developing a trademark repertoire for the surveillance of 'systemically important' financial markets (indirect); and (3) building an additional partnership (indirect). The fourth section assesses the impact of the IMF's demarcation efforts. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and reflects on their implications.

Boundary work: beyond an instrumentalist understanding of IO expertise

Constructivist scholarship has reconfigured our conception of how IOs shape world politics. A major insight from this body of work is that IOs exercise enormous influence through the generation and diffusion of knowledge despite commanding material capabilities eclipsed by those of most states (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Littoz-Monnet, 2017). For issues as diverse as 'state fragility' (Rocha de Siqueira, 2014) and pesticides in soft drinks (Quark, 2016), IOs provide critical epistemic input into policymaking processes. Yet constructivist IO research has not fully abandoned instrumentalist assumptions about expert knowledge, which are widespread in rationalist accounts (Boswell, 2008, p. 471). While constructivists reject essentialist claims about expert knowledge as having permanent features, their analyses highlight intersubjective agreements about which actor

has earned expert authority by controlling certain bodies of knowledge. A primary reason for this form of instrumentalism is scholars' strong loyalty to single-IO studies, which tend to mask how expert authority is produced within a wider institutional environment. To counter this shortcoming, two steps are helpful.

The first step is to acknowledge that expertise is an inherently relational attribute – that is, a social status accorded to actors for their superior command of specialist knowledge relative to other actors making similar claims (for a more networked view, see Eyal, 2013). Typically, actors operating in the same field compete most directly for recognition as experts. As Cornel Ban, Leonard Seabrooke and Sarah Freitas (2016, p. 1026) emphasize, IOs strive for uniqueness within spheres of overlapping authority, which makes 'the view that IOs can be studied in isolation' untenable. Indeed, analyses of the IMF and the World Bank overwhelmingly miss the relational dimension by studying only one of the two organizations. Even works attentive to institutional co-evolution downplay this aspect by placing them alongside, rather than relative to, each other (Best, 2014; Blackmon, 2008; Clegg, 2013; Woods, 2006; cf. Fabricius, 2007; Kranke, 2020; Momani and Hibben, 2015). Put differently, this strand disregards boundary work by and between IOs. Recent applications of the concept in the wider International Relations literature have reproduced the single-IO format, whether the organization in question is the lead actor (Hofius, 2016) or a discursive reference point for other actors' boundary work (Quark, 2016).

The second step is to not take prevailing authority relations for granted but, instead, to conceive of boundary work as an ongoing performance of constructing meaningful difference. Boundaries around jurisdictions are always open to renegotiation and battles for the authority to govern never settled (Abbott, 1995). Intense demarcation is thus not confined to phases of issue area formation (Sending, 2015) or institutional consolidation (Borowy, 2019), but can also occur in post-crisis moments, as the FSAP case illustrates. In the words of E. Summerson Carr (2010, p. 21): '… would-be experts must continuously work to authenticate themselves as experts as well as to authenticate the objects of their expertise.' Expert authority is judged against not only whether actors act competently but also whether they speak competently about their actions (Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 28). Organizations therefore (pro)actively display their skills to relevant stakeholders (Treem, 2012). At the extreme, they pose as authoritative experts by deploying 'material representations—visible objects, texts, or actions—that demonstrate and signal expertise' (Treem, 2016, p. 508) even when such self-portrayals lack substance.

Taken together, IOs perform their expert authority through demarcation vis-à-vis other actors, especially fellow IOs, to protect or gain jurisdictional prerogative. They monopolize certain bodies of knowledge 'in-house' while ignoring others. As Nils Brunsson (2009, p. 2) puts it:

> If we want others to believe that we are describing an organization, we have to claim that our organization has a clear identity; organizations have clear boundaries and special characteristics.

Establishing lines of distinction is critical to contexts in which IOs cooperate regularly. In global governance, where institutional duplication is viewed with suspicion, an organization that cannot be fitted into an empty niche is unlikely to be created (Clarke, 2014; Cohen, 1998). And when a new organization enters the field,

existing ones usually respond by repositioning themselves (Borowy, 2019, p. 104). Boundaries around jurisdictions are intensely fought over because they institutionalize certain ways of treating interrelated issues and of expressing collective identities (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Bucher et al., 2016). Demarcation affects not only what an organization does, but also what it is perceived to represent.

Demarcation efforts must be visible to be dramaturgically effective. In this respect, they resemble the 'frontstage' performances in Goffman's (1959, pp. 116–119) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Similar to how front-line hotel staff aspire to conform to guests' expectations of service quality, the rationale behind demarcation by IOs is to retain control over one's jurisdiction. Yet our IMF-World Bank story also unfolds on the 'backstage', where the everyday demands for inter-organizational cooperation render things messier. What happens backstage could, if disclosed, undermine the frontstage craft of demarcation. As Goffman (1959, p. 118) explains in the hotel example, kitchen doors facilitate restaurant services while temporarily exposing the gap between the hotel's prepared frontstage and unpolished backstage. For those running a restaurant or working in inter-organizational contexts, frontstage and backstage need to be disconnected as much as possible. Keeping up this separation is a key technique of 'front region control' (Goffman, 1959, p. 138).

Sociological institutionalists have made similar arguments from a macro perspective about how 'decoupling' resolves a stark institutional trade-off. Organizations must officially convey principled adherence to standards prevalent in their environment to garner legitimacy, but the everyday routines required to ensure organizational survival contravene such a commitment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 357). Formal conformance then boils down to 'symbolic adoption' (Bromley and Powell, 2012, p. 497), which signals that external standards are met although informal practices diverge from them. For Goffman (1959, p. 56), micro-level plays are similarly structured by audience expectations, which reflect macro-level norms about social roles: '… the impression of reality fostered by a performance is a delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps.' Flawed performances can contaminate the backstage or the frontstage. The exposure of backstage activities considered inappropriate could delegitimise frontstage displays, which is a common concern in inter-state practices of 'limited war' (Carson, 2016) and 'face-saving diplomacy' (Nair, 2019, p. 677). The excessive purification of performances can yield similar effects, as is evidenced by stress tests that fail to fail any bank (Coombs, 2020). In summary, I approach Fund-Bank relations from a symbolic-dramaturgical perspective that illuminates how IOs construct and maintain relatively crisp jurisdictional boundaries to decouple frontstage demarcation from backstage cooperation.

Figure 1 visualizes the basic logic of this theoretical framework. The two circles labelled 'IO1' and 'IO2', respectively, represent organizational jurisdictions. The two arrows pointing outwards in the upper Venn diagram indicate demarcation whereas loose coupling is depicted as the dashed line between the upper and lower diagrams. The intended effect is the difference in size between the darkly shaded area in the upper diagram (frontstage) and that area in the lower one (backstage). Successful boundary work shrinks the (perceived) overlap between IO jurisdictions without jeopardizing backstage cooperation. It is important to note that the contrast between the two stages is never as pure in inter-organizational practice, where IOs occasionally frontstage cooperative activities. Used as a heuristic device,



Figure 1. Frontstage and backstage boundary work in inter-IO relationships.
Source: Author.

however, it captures a fundamental dynamic, which might be at play in other inter-IO constellations, dyadic or otherwise, as well.

In what follows, I present findings from a case study on IMF-World Bank interactions to illustrate how boundary work operates in inter-organizational practice. The data stem from a multi-case research project, which involved extensive fieldwork during two stays in Washington, DC, in 2015 (three months) and 2017 (one month). Between 2015 and 2019, I conducted a total of ninety-seven semi-structured interviews, including six follow-ups in March 2017, in person, by telephone or by Skype.[2] Nine more unstructured background conversations with stakeholders in 2015 provided additional information. Finally, I received feedback from six IMF staff members on a work-in-progress presentation at IMF Headquarters on 10 March 2017. In this article, I draw on a subset of seventeen interviews with current and former IMF and World Bank officials in which FSAP issues were discussed (see Tables A.1–3 for details). The analysis is complemented by case-specific documentary evidence contained in reports, staff papers and Executive Board minutes. The interviews help to interpret the official paper trail, which conceals the rift between Fund and Bank officials over the appropriate institutional framework for the FSAP.

The interviews did not follow a strict sequence of questions but remained flexible to accommodate respondents' professional experiences. A normal interview covered some or all of the following aspects: the historical evolution of the FSAP, including recent institutional reforms; common operational practices, such as the delivery of joint missions; and major lines of inter-organizational conflict, such as over policy preferences or the rules of interaction. As part of the larger project, I also interviewed member state representatives (seventeen Executive Directors, Alternates and advisors). By comparison, these conversations addressed a broader

range of topics in less depth, which reflects an institutionalized epistemic mismatch within both organizations: staff members, managers and consultants are responsible for designing and implementing policies while country delegates sitting on the Boards depend on them for operational information. In the case of Fund-Bank interactions, this disadvantage is compounded by the need to gather additional information about the other organization's relevant activities.

This institutional setting offers permissive conditions for savvy boundary workers. As the interviews revealed, the Fund-Bank relationship is characterized by a combination of what Frank Schimmelfennig (2002) calls 'high interaction density' and 'common ethos'. State delegates hold strong shared expectations, which, however, are internally inconsistent: they want the two organizations to cooperate as closely as possible *and* each organization to remain distinct. When stakeholders, such as Fund and Bank Executive Directors in this case, exercise oversight with limited operational insight, symbolic action can generate the favorable impression that the organization does what it is supposed to do (Brown, 1994, p. 864; see also Boswell, 2008). Expressing attachment to higher principles, decision-making processes are replete with symbolism (March, 1991, pp. 110–111). Few organizational decisions take the frontstage as compellingly as do reforms because they promulgate 'dramatic one-off changes' (Brunsson, 1989, p. 219). After the financial crisis, Fund staff indeed proposed reforms that served to demarcate their organization's jurisdiction for financial surveillance against the World Bank's, though in a way that respected the fundamental principle of cooperation. Far from merely addressing technical matters, such as the formal division of labor, their plans communicated what they saw as ideal jurisdictional boundaries.

Demonstrating that demarcation tactics drove the Fund's proposal for FSAP reform requires evidence that substantive concerns were not decisive. One indication is that, prior to the crisis, the FSAP had been evaluated rather positively by the organizations themselves (IEG, 2006; IEO, 2006), as well as the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration (IMF and World Bank, 2007, p. 25). An urgent need for reform cannot be inferred from these appraisals. Moreover, senior MCM officials pursued two major objectives in proposing FSAP reform: a formalization of organizational responsibilities and selectivity for members in requesting FSAP 'updates' (that is, assessments after a country's first one). However, a relatively clear division of labor was already observed in operational practice, whereby the IMF handled the stability dimensions of members' financial markets while the World Bank covered their developmental aspects. In fact, staff closely coordinated their joint mission work according to a well-rehearsed script: from a scoping mission to the submission of the aide-mémoire to the country authorities (Interviews 050, 066). As I discuss in more detail below, greater flexibility in conducting updates did little to relieve the organizations' difficulties in meeting demand from their members.

Finally, policy differences between the organizations – commonly referred to as the 'Bretton Woods institutions' as though they were one entity – were generally too small to whet appetite for major institutional reform. They have long shared a political agenda centered on economic liberalization, which encompasses financial market integration and deepening (Babb, 2013, p. 274; Woods, 2006). After the financial crisis, their policies again moved along similar paths (Güven, 2018) even as new rules rendered Fund-Bank cooperation less mandatory not only on FSAPs

Table 1. Direct and indirect boundary work.

Type	Subtype	Description	Example
Direct	—	IO 1 vis-à-vis IO 2	Joint IMF-World Bank FSAP reform (2009)
Indirect	*From within*	IO 1 alone	IMF FSAP reform (2010)
	Via a third party	IO 1 with another actor	IMF's partnership with the FSB

Source: Author, drawing on O'Kane (2018, p. 67).

(Kranke, 2020). Differences have nonetheless arisen more over the means by which to achieve ends, rather than the ends themselves. A common trade-off in financial sector work is between the IMF's preference for solvent financial institutions (a stability concern) and the World Bank's promotion of universal financial access (a development concern). For example, the Fund views capital concentration in a few large financial institutions as guaranteeing stability whereas the Bank regards capital dispersion to many smaller ones, including subsidiaries, as conducive to economic development (Interviews 033, 067(1)).

Table 1 provides an overview of the IMF's boundary work in post-crisis financial surveillance, which fell into two broad categories as recently introduced by management scholar Conor O'Kane (2018, p. 67): 'direct' and 'indirect'. Direct boundary work involves the actor at which demarcation is targeted. This type describes the IMF's activities vis-à-vis the World Bank surrounding the 2009 FSAP review and the ensuing joint reform, which altered the rules of engagement under the program. Indirect boundary work, by contrast, reconfigures an inter-organizational relationship at a distance and involves weaker discursive demarcation than expected by many researchers (Allen, 2000; Bos-de Vos, Lieftink and Lauche, 2019; Gieryn, 1983). In the case at hand, indirect boundary work took two specific subforms: (1) *from within*, specifically through a 2010 IMF-only reform that made FSAPs mandatory for 'systemically important' financial markets; and (2) *via a third party*, specifically through closer cooperation with the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an IO specialized in financial oversight. The next two sections explain how the IMF combined these strategies.

The IMF's direct boundary work: making cooperation with the World Bank selective

The 2009 joint FSAP review marked a new phase in the relationship between the Fund and the Bank. Previously, the IMF had typically assessed 'advanced' – that is, high-income – countries alone, but the organizations had executed all other FSAPs, whether initial ones or updates, jointly. The key innovation – and most controversial aspect – in the review was the two-pronged 'modular' update as an alternative to 'full' updates for all non-'advanced' economies: a 'stability module' to be run by the Fund and a 'development module' to be run by the Bank. Except for this change on updates, the IMF retained its exclusive mandate for all FSAPs in 'advanced' economies while both organizations continued to have equal responsibility for (the few) outstanding initial assessments (IMF Archives, 2009b, pp. 32–33). As interviewees from both sides made abundantly clear, the IMF had emerged victorious in the battle over the modular update; the World Bank eventually gave in.

Accordingly, recollections of the reform process and assessments of its implications diverged between interviewed Fund and Bank officials. IMF staff campaigned

for a sharper division of labor. In a representative statement, Dimitri G. Demekas, a senior MCM official at the time, remarked: 'Good fences make good neighbors' (Interview 002). Several colleagues praised the new arrangement for providing operational flexibility for each organization and heightening the IMF's capacity to detect risks to financial stability (Interviews 014, 066, 086). For IMF staffers, the reform erected a fence that would guarantee constructive neighborhood, with each organization tending its own turf. Financial sector specialists at the World Bank, by contrast, disliked the idea of a fence, criticizing what they regarded as an artificial separation between stability issues on the one hand and development issues on the other. They reasoned that the quality of assessments would suffer if these two dimensions were no longer considered together (Interviews 016, 050, 073, 085) – a concern already amply expressed in a 2008 stocktaking paper (de la Torre and Ize, 2008, pp. 12, 24–25, 30). Indeed, Bank staff did not give up prematurely but informed management of their concerns when the reform blueprint had been hatched out. Because IMF First Deputy Managing Director, John Lipsky, backed its key elements, the protest was ultimately to no avail (author's email correspondence with Interviewee 002, 11 March 2017, 3 April 2017 and 16 September 2019).

At least on paper, both sides later seemed to agree that the reform had yielded tangible benefits. The IMF's 2014 review commented: 'The roles of the two institutions in the FSAP are now clear and aligned with their respective mandates' (IMF, 2014a, p. 20). The Bank's parallel review noted 'greater clarity on the responsibilities of the two institutions and greater flexibility to launch assessments' (World Bank Group, 2014, p. 34). Yet it was revealing that, for the first time in FSAP history, each organization ran a separate review of a joint program. The review process itself was fraught with tensions. Though described as a mere facilitator (IMF, 2014a, p. 8; World Bank Group, 2014, p. 1), the staff-level Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC) helped to forge a coherent official message across the two reviews. One World Bank staff member recalled arm-twisting and interventions by IMF staff at the FSLC to defuse negative statements contained in the Bank's first draft (Interview 087).

Resistance at the Bank was in part fueled by a reversal of organizational roles. The idea of a joint FSAP originated at the Bank, where Kenneth Lay was instrumental in translating discussions about integrated financial sector surveillance into a concrete framework (Interview 087). The Fund drew heavily on Bank staff during the program's early years because its Central Banking Department (CBD) employed few staff specialized in matters of private banking at the time (Interviews 002, 004). Over time, the Fund became increasingly assertive vis-à-vis the Bank (Interview 019), beginning to position itself as the preeminent FSAP expert in international fora already before the crisis (Interview 041). Today, financial sector assessments have considerable traction within the IMF. For example, staff use them to gain comparative insights into the functioning of national financial systems (Seabrooke, 2012). As CBD's successor, MCM reflects in both name and orientation this more comprehensive occupation with banking activities. Financial sector issues are comparatively marginal to the Bank's business model (Interview 019).

Even though the reform made Fund-Bank cooperation on FSAP updates optional, the revised framework exhibited institutional continuity in three fundamental respects, which indicates that the IMF primarily sought to generate impressions of jurisdictional demarcation. First, as staffers from both organizations



Figure 2. Joint and modular FSAP updates for non-'advanced' countries, FY 2010–18.
Note: 'FY' refers to the financial year in the World Bank Group, which lasts from 1 July to 30 June (in contrast to the IMF's financial year, which lasts from 1 May to 30 April).
Source: Breakdown based on an internal World Bank document obtained by the author.

explained, the distinction between stability and development modules formalized lines of responsibility that had already crystallized in inter-organizational practice. Long before the reform was enacted, stability issues were covered by Fund teams and development issues by Bank teams (Interviews 002, 086). The reform moved this division of labor from the backstage onto the frontstage. Second, the reform promoted incremental institutional change. As the joint staff proposal insists, comprehensive joint updates are still considered 'the norm for initial assessments and for "full" updates in developing and emerging market countries' (IMF Archives, 2009b, p. 33). Modular updates are thus designed to 'provide the flexibility to address specific country needs and circumstances between full updates' (IMF Archives, 2009b, p. 33). Third, mission teams for modular updates would in many cases be mixed anyway. Just as Fund staff would accompany Bank missions on development modules, Bank staff would join Fund missions on stability modules in small numbers (IMF Archives, 2009b, p. 33). While IMF officials confirmed that the reciprocal inclusion of staff members on modular update missions was common (Interviews 002, 086), a World Bank manager was skeptical and also complained about insufficient communication from the IMF on stability modules (Interview 085).

With the benefit of hindsight, inter-organizational realities have turned out less stark than many within the Bank had initially suspected. As envisaged in the review, most updates for non-'advanced' countries are still discharged jointly. According to an internal World Bank document obtained by the author under assurance of confidentiality, almost two-thirds of the eighty-six updates (that is, fifty-seven) in the 2010–18 period were full ones; World Bank development modules (seventeen) accounted for just under twenty per cent and IMF stability modules (twelve) for approximately fourteen per cent. Only in FY 2013 were there more modular than regular updates, as shown in Figure 2.

The IMF had no desire to destruct the FSAP backstage shared with the World Bank. While most IMF Executive Directors during the relevant Board meeting on 21 September 2009 sided with the staff's preference for a sharper formal division of

labor, none aimed to erode the basis for cooperation. The Swiss chair went furthest in declaring that the planned cross-participation of staff in modular updates might not improve results but waste resources (IMF Archives, 2009d, p. 46). Staff from MCM explicitly charted a middle way. MCM Director José Viñals reaffirmed that modules would serve 'as a complement rather than as a substitute for fully-fledged FSAPs', and Demekas advocated 'forming a holistic view of the financial sector, particularly in low-income and emerging market countries' (IMF Archives, 2009d, pp. 78, 81).

Moreover, divisions over the appropriate focus of updates had predated the 2009 reform. As the 2006 FSAP evaluation report by the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO, 2006, p. 24) reveals, Fund staff opposed Bank staff's call 'for a larger scope' and instead wanted updates organized around 'core issues from the earlier FSAP'. The idea of more selective cooperation on assessment missions was also anything but new. The 2003 review broached the subject of 'focused updates', 'to be coordinated jointly by the Bank and the Fund and implemented by the Bank, the Fund, or jointly' (IMF Archives, 2003, p. 31). The idea disappeared from the inter-organizational debate for a few years: it was not raised in the 2005 review only to resurface in the form of the modular update in 2009.

Seen in a longer-term perspective, the global financial crisis boosted the appeal of demarcation strategies. Organizations often retrieve old solutions from the 'garbage can' and apply them to new problems (Cohen et al., 1972). Although more selective cooperation had been on the agenda for longer, it was the crisis that opened a window of opportunity for IMF staff to sell the modular update to the Executive Board. IMF staff quickly seized the initiative, not least to overcome memories of the pre-crisis period as marked by a loss of organizational mission, a decline in personal motivation and a scramble for severance packages (Interview 067(2)). However, if we consider that modular updates have not been in high demand and recall that existing responsibilities were merely formalized, changing inter-organizational practices may not have been the reform's only objective. The IMF's post-crisis jurisdictional strategy rested on claims that it was doing financial sector work differently from the Bank, its FSAP partner organization. A complementary move, as I argue in the next section, was to convey this message indirectly.

The IMF's indirect boundary work

Indirect boundary work from within: developing a trademark repertoire

The Fund quickly followed up the 2009 joint FSAP reform with a solo reform, which obliged twenty-five members with 'systemically important' financial sectors to be assessed every five years. Even though by the time the first reform was endorsed the 2010 reform was not yet in the making, insiders agreed that the former made the latter possible (Interview 086; author's email correspondence with Interviewee 002, 11 March 2017). The reform was a visible response to external and internal critics of IMF surveillance (Blustein, 2015; IEO, 2011). For example, the IMF had not reprimanded Iceland for the disproportionate size of its financial sector in successive surveillance operations, namely the 2007 Article IV consultations and the 2008 FSAP (IEO, 2011, pp. 13, 15). The argument that participation needed to be mandatory for certain parts of the membership diverted attention from such oversights. Instead, much blame was placed on the FSAP's design, which had allowed the U.S. financial

sector, despite being at the heart of the financial crisis, to go unassessed for so long (IMF Archives, 2010b, p. 6; see also IMF Archives, 2009a, p. 6). The reform thus built on the newly gained greater operational independence from the World Bank to develop a trademark repertoire for financial sector surveillance.

The IMF's FSAP reform further weakened the link between the two organizations. According to Etienne Wenger's (2008, ch. 2) practice theoretical approach, social groups are held together by a combination of 'mutual engagement', 'joint enterprises' and 'shared repertoires'. After the 2009 reform, mutual engagement in FSAP operations was slightly reduced and the World Bank's belief in a truly joint enterprise dented. But the shared repertoire was still firmly in place as assessments continued to be conducted under a unified inter-organizational framework: despite distinctive operational priorities and practices, both organizations had to treat all national sectors equally without regard to their size or level of global integration and could carry out an assessment only upon a member's request.

Through its solo reform, the IMF crafted a new FSAP repertoire and layered it onto the established repertoire shared with the World Bank. The reform signaled an intended specialization in financial surveillance at a time when the regulation of high-income countries was becoming a salient issue on the international reform agenda. Although members deemed 'systemically important' had informally been under closer scrutiny before (IMF Archives, 2003, p. 5), under the new rules they could effectively no longer shirk participation in FSAPs. Targeting high-income countries and emerging economies with large, deeply integrated financial sectors, the reform in fact created 'demand' in excess of 'supply'. Voluntary requests for assessments from the rest of the IMF membership were to be subordinated to the formal obligations of 'systemically important' members. The draft 2010 Board paper unmistakably announced the new hierarchy of goals:

> In case the resource envelope for the program remained unchanged at the level of the FY2008–2010 annual average, conducting financial stability assessments in the countries with systemically important financial sectors every three years [as per the staff's original proposal] … would imply reducing the number of voluntary FSAPs the Fund could deliver by almost half (IMF Archives, 2010b, p. 22).

In an uncommon move, the Executive Directors did not approve the staff's proposal of a three-year assessment frequency (IMF Archives, 2010c). The eventual compromise for a five-year interval somewhat eased the shortage of assessments available for members outside the 'systemically important' group. An update in 2013 made it again more acute by raising the number of jurisdictions from twenty-five to twenty-nine (IMF Archives, 2013). Except for the U.S. and China, all 'systemically important' countries, some of which were hard hit by the crisis, already had a respectable track record of voluntary participation in assessments. After the reform, their participation rates even went up (see Table 2). Yet much to the chagrin of World Bank officials, low-income countries repeatedly had to wait until the IMF could accommodate their requests (IMF, 2014a, p. 43; World Bank Group, 2014, p. 8).

Each organization soon developed its own solution for that problem. World Bank officials proposed taking over the stability component whenever their IMF counterparts could not commit to running full updates outside 'systemically important' countries, especially low-income countries. Fund staff members, however, were adamant that this option was off limits. When a Bank team addressed stability-related aspects in an FSAP for an African country, Fund staff were

Table 2. FSAP participation by 'systemically important' countries, FY 2000–18.

	FY 2000–09	FY 2010–18
Australia	2006	2012
Austria	2004, 2008	2013
Belgium	2005	2013, 2018
Brazil	2002	2012
Canada	2000, 2008	2013
China	—	2010, 2017
France	2004	2012
Germany	2003	2011, 2016
Hong Kong	2003	2014
India	2000	2011, 2017
Ireland	2000, 2006	2016
Italy	2005	2013
Japan	2002	2012, 2017
Korea	2002	2013
Luxembourg	2002	2011, 2017
Mexico	2001, 2006	2012, 2016
Netherlands	2004	2011, 2016
Russia	2002, 2008	2011, 2016
Singapore	2004	2013
Spain	2006	2012, 2017
Sweden	2002, 2009	2016
Switzerland	2001, 2007	2014
Turkey	2006	2011, 2016
U.K.	2002	2011, 2016
U.S.	—	2010, 2015
Total	**30 (10 years)**	**38 (9 years)**
	FY 2000–12	FY 2013–18
Denmark	2006	2014
Finland	2001, 2010	2016
Norway	2005	2015
Poland	2001, 2006	2013
Total	**6 (13 years)**	**4 (6 years)**

Notes: All types of assessments, including full and modular updates, are included in the list without specification. 'FY' refers to the financial year in the World Bank Group (1 July–30 June). The distinction between two periods based on financial years only serves illustrative purposes because there is not one right cut-off point. Most notably, although the decision about mandatory FSAPs for some members was made in the second half of 2010 (that is, in FY 2011), the U.S. financial sector had already been assessed in FY 2010. This situation indicates that the reform may have been internally anticipated. By the same logic, the inclusion of four more jurisdictions was approved in late 2013, but the final column in the table's lower segment starts with FY 2013.
Source: Breakdown based on an internal World Bank document obtained by the author. The list of 'systemically important' financial sectors is taken from the IMF (IMF Archives, 2010b, p.14; IMF Archives, 2013, p. 17).

disgruntled (Interview 067(1)). They instead sought to alleviate the shortage in non-'systemically important' countries by inventing a new technical assistance tool called 'Financial Sector Stability Review', which a Bank manager characterized as a poor substitute for an FSAP (Interview 085).

The vocabulary that surfaced with the reform symbolizes the IMF's trademark repertoire. A trademark repertoire consists of practices that an organization's stakeholders will recognize as both useful in practice and unique in style. Apart from the widely shared concern that a three-year assessment frequency was excessively taxing on members, Executive Directors generally adopted the language of 'systemic importance' to label a subset of financial sectors in their deliberations about the reform. Although some questioned the methods employed for determining this status, the strong reservations of the Indian delegation about distinguishing members

along these lines remained an exception (IMF Archives, 2010c, p. 21). Many Directors considered the introduction of mandatory assessments a meaningful extension of IMF surveillance in general and a fitting response to the crisis in particular. The Norwegian representatives, for example, lauded the proposal as 'a well-targeted initiative … [that] sharpens the much needed focus of the Fund's surveillance on systemic risks' (IMF Archives, 2010c, p. 16). The rationale behind the trademark repertoire appealed to most members, including those with 'systemically important' financial sectors, which would be more closely scrutinized.

An organizational repertoire becomes normalized when even outsiders begin to adopt its categories. Worried that the IMF would drastically reduce its involvement in low-income countries, the World Bank officials attending that Board session framed their statement around the distinction between 'systemically important' and other financial sectors (IMF Archives, 2010c, pp. 9–10). Although developments in subsequent years validated their concern, the Bank still used the language of 'systemic importance' in its 2014 review. It is revealing that Bank officials have adopted a repertoire that formally structures the Fund's FSAP work, but not their own.

Yet the World Bank is no stranger to trademark repertoires. A discussion in the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 2006 FSAP review illustrates the prevalence of bureaucratic turf battles in inter-organizational settings. The Fund's Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) and Bank's Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) are documents for internal reporting, both of which are derived from the main joint report submitted to the country authorities. Arguing that contents in FSSAs and FSAs seldom varied much, the IEG recommended the writing of a single integrated report for both Executive Boards. Fund and Bank staff were united in their opposition to this proposal (IEG, 2006, pp. 22–23; cf. de la Torre and Ize, 2008, p. 7). Bank management outright rejected the idea of basing the FSA on contents from the Fund's FSSA to ensure prompt reporting: 'IEG's suggestion to leverage the FSSA downplays the relevance of *the Bank's focus on development and poverty reduction*' (IEG, 2006, p. 56, emphasis added).

The anecdote highlights that trademark repertoires accentuate or exaggerate specialization attempts. As we have seen, the organizations still conduct about two joint updates for every modular one. They coordinate the delivery of modules, and staff members often participate in missions conducted by the respective other organization. The new trademark repertoire symbolically undergirds the IMF's growing attention to 'systemically important' financial sectors in high-income countries and emerging economies. The IMF amplified its claims to surveillance expertise by embarking on a cooperative relationship with another, highly specialized IO.

Indirect boundary work via a third party: building an additional partnership

Building a partnership with the FSB constituted another form of indirect boundary work undertaken by the IMF after the financial crisis. Beyond the substantive benefit of access to external resources, the choice of a partner organization has symbolic value: IOs prefer being known for interacting with esteemed peers (Biermann, 2017, pp. 350–351; Zaum, 2013, p. 224). Good reputation may be a necessary condition for cooperation, but it is not a sufficient one. As cooperation normally occurs between IOs that govern at least partially overlapping issues, the partner also needs to provide relevant expertise (Gest and Grigorescu, 2010). From the

IMF's perspective, the FSB, the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), fit that bill when closing data 'gaps' was a topical issue after the crisis (Interview 062).

Together with the FSB, the IMF has shaped debates about post-crisis financial regulation. Many of their recent activities in this realm have concentrated on the development of global standards for macroprudential policy (Kranke and Yarrow, 2019). Two joint IMF-FSB frameworks were initiated after the crisis at the behest of the G20: first, the Data Gaps Initiative (DGI) to ensure the availability of timely global financial data; and second, the Early Warning Exercise (EWE) to detect sources of systemic risks and prevent their build-up. The DGI is a multi-stakeholder policy initiative for which the two organizations have hosted annual meetings since 2009 to report back to the G20. The Fund occupies an elevated position because it also acts as the chair of the Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics responsible for follow-up and implementation (IMF, 2017).

As a visible interface for coordinated risk identification and analysis, the launch of the EWE expressed the IMF's surveillance ambitions. Not only did the EWE extend activities that the IMF had already been undertaking through its own surveillance operations (IMF Archives, 2010a, pp. 19–41), it also displayed responsiveness to urgent global economic problems by virtue of being a formal initiative. Strikingly, findings from the EWE are informally presented first to the IMF Executive Board and subsequently to its International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) but remain undocumented (IMF Archives, 2010a, pp. 11–12). Moreover, cooperation was an established, albeit rather informal, practice dating back to the FSF's beginnings in the late 1990s. It was even customary for an MCM staff member to serve on the FSF Secretariat on a permanent basis (IMF Archives, 2008, pp. 10–12). Again, the launch of the EWE formalized and frontstaged these existing inter-organizational connections. Three design characteristics of this joint IMF-FSB instrument are particularly noteworthy.

First, the EWE directs surveillance operations to 'a broad array of systemic risks and vulnerabilities as they evolve across advanced and emerging economies' (IMF Archives, 2010a, p. 10). A large part of the membership falls outside its purview, which underlines the intended focus of IMF surveillance on actors and activities of 'systemic importance'. By comparison, the reformed FSAP is more discontinuous and can still be performed on all IMF members – either at their request or as part of the new mandatory assessment routines. The EWE is completed on a semi-annual basis as input for the IMFC meetings at the IMF Annual and Spring Meetings, but each new round triggers extensive preparations before these events (IMF Archives, 2010a, p. 11). To carry out the EWE with the latest data, the IMF created a new Vulnerability Exercise for Advanced Countries as a complement to the Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Market Countries, which it had run since 2001 (IMF Archives, 2009c, pp. 7, 15–16). The underlying analytical work (modelling and measuring) makes the EWE a quasi-continuous initiative.

Second, the EWE is based on a relatively sharp division of labor. While the IMF assumes responsibility for 'macrofinancial' issues, the FSB's expertise lies in matters of international regulatory oversight and financial standard setting (IMF Archives, 2008, p. 11; IMF Archives, 2009c, p. 5). The organizations' diverging sizes and membership profiles make demarcation tactics less appealing. By the end of FY 2017–18, the FSB (2018a, p. 27) Secretariat operated on a tiny staff of thirty-three, compared to the nearly 2,750 staff employed by the IMF (2018, p. 78), more than

eighty per cent of whom were professional economists.[3] As an international standard-setting body, the FSB (2018b) specializes in assisting national regulators and supervisors, as well as other standard-setting bodies, to coordinate and align their policies with the overarching objective of financial stability.

Third, the design of the EWE helps IMF staff to learn from 'individuals in different economic and financial professions, ranging from market analysts to respected academics and senior policymakers' (IMF Archives, 2010a, p. 5). This group of financial sector experts extends beyond country authorities, who are routine points of contact for IMF staff. Because the EWE is an instrument for continuous multilateral surveillance, rather than occasional bilateral surveillance as under the FSAP, the IMF can present itself more credibly as a hub for comprehensive and multi-faceted global financial expertise. The IMF can utilize the EWE both for monitoring global risks and for showcasing its capacities in this area. Given that IMF staff members already interact regularly with private sector professionals on FSAP missions (Seabrooke and Nilsson, 2015), partnering the FSB is meaningful also for symbolic reasons. It sends a clear signal to internal and external audiences about the kind of organization that the IMF wants to be.

Recognition, resources and resentment: the potential effects of IO boundary work

A critical question has not been addressed so far: What impact did the IMF's boundary work have? It must be noted from the outset that a clear causal link between boundary work and particular outcomes cannot be established. The IMF's boundary work has had mixed effects at different levels. At the organizational level, demarcation generated considerable 'authority enhancement' for the IMF as a whole but limited 'material enhancement'[4] for MCM staff working on FSAPs; their recognition as experts grew while the FSAP budget stagnated in relative terms despite the new task of mandatory assessments of complex financial markets in high-income countries. At the inter-organizational level, demarcation impaired the relationship with the World Bank.

Authority enhancement is an intended outcome of demarcation strategies. The principal audience of IMF staff – that is, country authorities and Executive Directors as their agents – generally seemed to appreciate the boundary work undertaken. In a survey for the Fund's 2014 FSAP review, authorities rated stability assessments as more comprehensive, analytically stronger and more sensitive to country context than they had done in 2009. The evaluations by Executive Directors, who had not been surveyed in the previous review, tended to be even more positive (IMF, 2014a, p. 11). Moreover, three-quarters of them found that the FSAP was '[i]mproving the policy dialogue and support from the IMF'. Authorities concurred at a comparable rate of sixty-eight per cent and thus fourteen percentage points above the 2009 survey result on the same item. Only thirty-five per cent made such an affirmative response about World Bank FSAPs, which represented a marginal increase of one percentage point (IMF, 2014a, p. 24).[5] Even though these ratings possibly reflect factors unrelated to boundary work, the IMF received greater recognition for its surveillance expertise. Anecdotal evidence confirms this interpretation. As discussed above, most Executive Directors responded favorably to the staff's proposal to prioritize 'systemically important' countries.

The IMF soon gained wider recognition on surveillance issues. In early 2010, FSB (2010, p. 1) members advocated the principle of regular assessments, which became a blueprint for the IMF's reform later that year. The FSB's official position lent support to the staff's internally controversial reform plan. In the 2009 survey, more than two-thirds of country authorities stated a preference for keeping the FSAP voluntary (IMF Archives, 2009a, p. 59). However, the idea of mandatory assessments also caught on with the upgraded G20, which 'orchestrated' much policymaking on global financial issues after the crisis around the IMF (Viola, 2015, pp. 107–109). The declaration from the summit in Toronto in June 2010 still vaguely stated: 'We have strengthened our commitment to the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program … ' (G20, 2010a, p. 5). Yet at the Seoul summit in November 2010, the G20 (2010b, p. 5) countries retrospectively endorsed the IMF's meanwhile completed reform. Within the Fund itself, the strong link to the G20 was understood to have been vital to the organization's renaissance. One staff member explicitly attributed this close connection to strategic positioning efforts by then-Managing Director Strauss-Kahn after the crisis (Interview 67(2)).

Authority enhancement can induce material enhancement, such as a larger total budget or a larger share allocated to certain tasks. Boundary work dovetailed with the interests of MCM staff in attaining a more plannable assessment schedule and, ideally, a larger budget for FSAP operations. Yet authority enhancement did not translate into much material enhancement. As early as 2010, staff cautioned that mandatory assessments for 'systemically important' jurisdictions might crowd out voluntary assessments of other members (IMF Archives, 2010b, pp. 20–22). Their warning went unheeded. The 2014 review reported 'the average gap between FSAPs for non-systemic jurisdictions' as being '14–15 years' (IMF, 2014a, p. 46, fn. 18). Budget figures corroborate these claims. In FY 2008, MCM's budget of $68 million amounted to approximately 7.38 per cent of the overall budget; in FY 2018, the share was marginally lower at approximately 7.32 per cent although the department now had $80.8 million at its disposal.[6] Ironically, this situation can be interpreted as evidence of a successful frontstage performance that had strongly emphasized the Fund's reorientation toward 'systemically important' financial markets. Within an FSAP portfolio that was stable in relative terms, the IMF dedicated a larger share to those assessments (IMF Archives, 2013, p. 7; IMF, 2014a, p. 33).

However, the price that IMF FSAP officials paid for authority enhancement and partial material enhancement was an impaired relationship with their World Bank counterparts. Years after the 2009 FSAP reform, many at the Bank were still dissatisfied with the direction of change and alienated by the behavior of senior Fund officials (Interviews 073, 085, 087). For example, one Bank manager retrospectively likened the reform to 'a forced divorce' (Interview 085). A staff member had little hope that the relationship could ever be fully mended: '… that drive of doing it together, jointly, I think, it's dying out, I see it, I don't think we will recover' (Interview 087). To make matters worse, IMF staff refused to rule out further demarcation on FSAP matters. Echoing the 'Good fences make good neighbors' spirit, one opined during an interview in 2015: 'I think clearer boundaries would be helpful' (Interview 066). Support for this position was rare among World Bankers (Interview 079). These insights point to a more general lesson about boundary work: if done excessively, demarcation can spoil inter-organizational relationships even on the shared backstage.

In the case under study, the institutional context served as a powerful antidote to this risk. FSAP operations are embedded in a wider range of established inter-organizational routines, without which the conflict might have escalated further after the 2009–10 duo of reforms. Instead, it was merely bubbling under the surface. Overlapping memberships, which are institutionalized through the condition that membership in the IMF is a precondition for membership in the World Bank, place additional constraints on how far any one side could go with boundary work of the demarcation variant. Under these conditions, Fund officials trod carefully enough that their demarcation activities never threatened to end cooperation with the Bank on FSAPs.

Conclusion

This article has outlined a novel conceptualization of inter-IO relations as driven by complex boundary work, involving both demarcation and cooperation. Taking a symbolic-dramaturgical stance inspired by sociological institutionalist theory and Erving Goffman's work, I have defined demarcation as a frontstage strategy for distinguishing organizational jurisdictions and cooperation as a backstage routine for sharing resources on overlapping issues. To claim exclusive expertise while ensuring mutually beneficial resource exchange, IOs decouple frontstage demarcation from backstage cooperation. IMF-World Bank interactions around the FSAP exemplify this phenomenon. The IMF grasped the opportunity presented by the global financial crisis to more sharply demarcate its jurisdiction for financial surveillance against the World Bank's through both direct and indirect boundary work. The empirical record suggests that this strategy proved only partially successful: the Fund gained authority, but MCM officials, the most ardent boundary workers in this case, did not see the FSAP budget share increased; and the relationship with the Bank became strained.

Organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank perform their role as global experts by deploying a variety of boundary work techniques to present their knowledge as exclusive despite routines of cooperation. Boundary work practices thus deserve more attention from scholars wanting to understand how IOs accomplish mandate expansion (Hall, 2016) or prevent mandate retrenchment. A more complete understanding of boundary work dynamics in global governance presupposes treating what happens within IOs and what happens between them as equally important and as intertwined. Practices of providing expert knowledge rarely map neatly onto claims to exclusive expertise, which requires a delicate balancing of frontstage and backstage activities. How IOs present their policies, as well as themselves, is central to the politics of expertise in global governance.

The study of IO boundary work is still in its infancy. While the analysis has focused on a dyadic relationship around a formally joint initiative, future research could establish scope conditions for boundary work across different contexts, including those in which IOs and other types of organizations interact (Johnson, 2016; Steffek, 2013). Actors who transcend organizational lines, such as project-based consultants in IOs (Seabrooke and Sending, 2020) or 'governance clubs' with ties to certain IOs (Tsingou, 2015), further complicate the picture. Are such actors less predisposed to boundary work because they fall outside an organization's ethos, or more predisposed precisely because they seek to belong to the organizational in-group? Empirical and conceptual refinement could arise from comparisons with

other transnational boundary processes (Orsini et al., 2017). Ultimately, however, a larger question looms: If IOs are so adept at backstaging certain activities, how can we avoid taking their frontstage renditions at face value? Critical analyses of IOs' role as authoritative experts can hardly evade this question.

Notes

1. This article, which is informed by but extends doctoral research undertaken at the University of Warwick in 2013–17 (Kranke, 2017, esp. ch. 5), has benefitted immensely from audience feedback on presentations given at the following events: the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Baltimore, 22–25 February 2017; Copenhagen Business School, 30 May 2018; and the Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Sofia, 11–14 September 2019. I am especially grateful to Cornel Ban, Michael Breen, André Broome, Philip G. Cerny, Ben Clift, Thomas R. Eimer, Ali B. Güven, Jacob A. Hasselbalch, Sebastian Knecht, Leonard Seabrooke, Eleni Tsingou, Antje Vetterlein, Wesley W. Widmaier and four anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier drafts. Conversations with John Berten have sharpened my thinking about transnational expertise. I finally thank all interviewees, as well as other practitioners, for generously contributing to this research.
2. I identified potential respondents through a combination of snowballing, referrals and desk research. The vast majority of interviewees were current and former IMF and World Bank Group officials: staff members, managers, consultants and member country representatives. To incorporate the views of organisational outsiders, I also interviewed a smaller number of civil society representatives, as well as current and former government officials. The six follow-up interviews – four with IMF staff members and two with World Bank officials – allowed me to probe the plausibility of my findings over time. While I carried out some interviews by telephone or Skype for practical reasons, most were done face-to-face ('personal') because this format tends to foster greater rapport. Unless otherwise agreed, the interviews, which typically lasted between thirty and seventy-five minutes, were recorded. I took adequate measures to protect interviewees' identities (see note to Table A.1).
3. In slight deviation from the IMF's accounting practices (see also note to Figure 2), the financial year in the FSB begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March.
4. I thank one of the reviewers for suggesting these two terms.
5. The IMF's (2014b, p. 73) background study reports a slightly different aggregate agreement rate of thirty-six per cent on this point.
6. These figures come from the IMF's Medium-Term Budgets (<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Search>, search last performed on 30 August 2019). Data for FY 2009–14 are not reported in the series while data for FY 2015–17 are provided only in full-time equivalents (FTEs), with the shares ranging between 7.4 and 7.7 per cent. The measure is admittedly imperfect because it does not specify what share of the MCM budget is allotted to FSAP operations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was generously supported by the University of Warwick under its Development and Alumni Relations Office doctoral scholarship scheme (2013–17) and the Leverhulme Trust under an Early Career Fellowship (#ECF-2018-506). Additional research funding was provided by the University of Warwick's Department of Politics and International Studies; as well as the American Political Science Association Centennial Center for Political Science and Public Affairs in Washington, DC, under the James Bryce Fund for International Political Science (2015, 2017) and the Ed Artinian Fund for Publishing (2015).

Notes on contributor

Matthias Kranke is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the University of Kassel, where he currently leads a project on the contribution of international organizations to post-growth debates. His broader interests lie in global economic and, increasingly, environmental governance with a focus on the politics of expertise and inter-organizational relations. His work has been published, among others, in *European Journal of International Relations, Global Policy, New Political Economy and Review of International Political Economy*.

References

Abbott, A. (1995). Things of boundaries. *Social Research*, *62*(4), 857–882. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/40971127

Adler-Nissen, R. (2014). Symbolic power in European diplomacy: The struggle between national foreign services and the EU's External Action Service. *Review of International Studies*, *40*(4), 657–681. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000326

Allen, D. (2000). Doing occupational demarcation: The "boundary-work" of nurse managers in a district general hospital. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, *29*(3), 326–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/089124100129023936

Babb, S. (2013). The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its origins, trajectory and likely successor. *Review of International Political Economy*, *20*(2), 268–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.640435

Ban, C., Seabrooke, L., & Freitas, S. (2016). Grey matter in shadow banking: International organizations and expert strategies in global financial governance. *Review of International Political Economy*, *23*(6), 1001–1033. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1235599

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Cornell University Press.

Best, J. (2014). *Governing failure: Provisional expertise and the transformation of global development finance*. Cambridge University Press.

Biermann, R. (2017). Legitimizing inter-organizational relations. In R. Biermann and J. A. Koops (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of inter-organizational relations in world politics* (pp. 337–364). Palgrave Macmillan.

Blackmon, P. (2008). Rethinking poverty through the eyes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. *International Studies Review*, *10*(2), 179–202. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00770.x

Blustein, P. (2015). Over their heads: The IMF and the prelude to the Euro-zone crisis. CIGI Paper No. 60. Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.60web.pdf

Borowy, I. (2019). Before UNEP: Who was in charge of the global environment? The struggle for institutional responsibility 1968–72. *Journal of Global History*, *14*(1), 87–106. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022818000360

Bos-de Vos, M., Lieftink, B. M., & Lauche, K. (2019). How to claim what is mine: Negotiating professional roles in inter-organizational projects. *Journal of Professions and Organization*, *6*(2), 128–155. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/joz004

Boswell, C. (2008). The political functions of expert knowledge: Knowledge and legitimation in European Union immigration policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *15*(4), 471–488. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760801996634

Bromley, P., & Powell, W. W. (2012). From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world'. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *6*(1), 483–530. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2012.684462

Broome, A., & Seabrooke, L. (2012). Seeing like an international organisation. *New Political Economy*, *17*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2011.569019

Brown, A. D. (1994). Politics, symbolic action and myth making in pursuit of legitimacy. *Organization Studies*, *15*(6), 861–878. https://doi.org/10.1177/017084069401500605

Brunsson, N. (1989). Administrative reforms as routines. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, *5*(3), 219–228. https://doi.org/10.1016/0956-5221(89)90028-6

Brunsson, N. (2009). *Reform as routine: Organizational change and stability in the modern world*. Oxford University Press.

Bucher, S. V., Chreim, S., Langley, A., & Reay, T. (2016). Contestation about collaboration: Discursive boundary work among professions. *Organization Studies*, *37*(4), 497–522. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840615622067

Busuioc, E. M. (2016). Friend or foe? Inter-agency cooperation, organizational reputation, and turf. *Public Administration*, *94*(1), 40–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12160

Carr, E. S. (2010). Enactments of expertise. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *39*(1), 17–32. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.012809.104948

Carson, A. (2016). Facing off and saving face: Covert intervention and escalation management in the Korean War. *International Organization*, *70*(1), 103–131. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000284

Clarke, W. (2014). Creating the Financial Stability Forum: What role for existing institutions? *Global Society*, *28*(2), 195–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2014.887559

Clegg, L. (2013). *Controlling the World Bank and IMF: Shareholders, stakeholders, and the politics of concessional lending*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Cohen, B. J. (1998). When giants clash: The OECD Financial Support Fund and the IMF. In V. K. Aggarwal (Ed.), *Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting* (pp. 161–194). Cornell University Press.

Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational choice. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *17*(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392088

Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). *Rethinking expertise*. University of Chicago Press.

Coombs, N. (2020). What do stress tests test? Experimentation, demonstration, and the sociotechnical performance of regulatory science. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *71*(3), 520–536. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12739

de la Torre, A., & Ize, A. (2008). Developmental issues in the FSAP: Taking stock and looking forward. Financial Sector Assessment Program Stocktaking Project policy paper, mimeo (on file with author). World Bank.

Ellis, N., & Ybema, S. (2010). Marketing identities: Shifting circles of identification in inter-organizational relationships. *Organization Studies*, *31*(3), 279–305. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840609357397

Eyal, G. (2013). For a sociology of expertise: The social origins of the autism epidemic. *American Journal of Sociology*, *118*(4), 863–907. https://doi.org/10.1086/668448

Fabricius, M. (2007). Merry sisterhood or guarded watchfulness? Cooperation between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Working Paper 07-9. Peterson Institute for International Economics. http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wp07-9.pdf

FSB. (2010). *FSB framework for strengthening adherence to international standards*. Financial Stability Board. http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_100109a.pdf

FSB. (2018a). *5th annual report*. Financial Stability Board. https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011218.pdf

FSB. (2018b). *About the FSB*. Financial Stability Board. http://www.fsb.org/about/

G20. (2010a). *The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration*. G20. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20_declaration_en.pdf

G20. (2010b). *The Seoul Summit document*. G20. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.pdf

Gest, N., & Grigorescu, A. (2010). Interactions among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm. *The Review of International Organizations*, *5*(1), 53–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9070-9

Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. *American Sociological Review*, *48*(6), 781–795. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095325

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Anchor Books.

Güven, A. B. (2018). Whither the post-Washington Consensus? International financial institutions and development policy before and after the crisis. *Review of International Political Economy*, *25*(3), 392–417. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1459781

Hall, N. (2016). *Displacement, development, and climate change: International organizations moving beyond their mandates*. Routledge.

Hannah, E., Ryan, H., & Scott, J. (2017). Power, knowledge and resistance: Between co-optation and revolution in global trade. *Review of International Political Economy*, *24*(5), 741–775. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1324807

Hofius, M. (2016). Community at the border or the boundaries of community? The case of EU field diplomats. *Review of International Studies*, *42*(5), 939–967. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210516000085

IEG. (2006). *Financial Sector Assessment Program: IEG review of the joint World Bank and IMF Initiative*. World Bank. http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/fsap_evaluation.pdf

IEO. (2006). *Report on the evaluation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program*. International Monetary Fund. http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/01052006report.pdf

IEO. (2011). *IMF performance in the run-up to the financial and economic crisis: IMF surveillance in 2004–07*. International Monetary Fund. http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/Crisis-%20Main%20Report%20%28without%20Moises%20Signature%29.pdf

IMF. (2014a). *Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program—further adaptation to the post-crisis era*. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf

IMF. (2014b). *Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program—further adaptation to the post-crisis era—background studies*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814b.pdf

IMF. (2017). *Global Conferences on DGI*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Seminars/Conferences/DGI/global-conferences-on-dgi

IMF. (2018). *IMF annual report 2018: Building a shared future*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2018/eng/assets/pdf/imf-annual-report-2018.pdf

IMF and World Bank. (2007). *Report of the External Review Committee on Bank–Fund collaboration*. International Monetary Fund and World Bank. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2007/022307.pdf

IMF Archives. (2003). *Financial Sector Assessment Program—review, lessons, and issues going forward*. SM/03/77. International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

IMF Archives. (2008). *The Fund's response to the 2007–08 financial crisis—stocktaking and collaboration with the Financial Stability Forum*. SM/08/302. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2009a). *Financial Sector Assessment Program after ten years—background material*. SM/09/231, Sup. 1. International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

IMF Archives. (2009b). *Financial Sector Assessment Program after ten years—experience and reforms for the next decade*. SM/09/231. International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

IMF Archives. (2009c). *The Fund-FSF Early Warning Exercise—proposed procedure*. SM/09/17. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2009d). *Minutes of Executive Board Meeting*. EBM/09/98-1. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2010a). *The IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise—design and methodological toolkit*. SM/10/231. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2010b). *Integrating stability assessments under the Financial Sector Assessment Program into Article IV surveillance*. SM/10/235. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2010c). *Minutes of Executive Board meeting*. EBM/10/92-1. International Monetary Fund.

IMF Archives. (2013). *Mandatory financial stability assessments under the Financial Sector Assessment program—update*. SM/13/304. International Monetary Fund.

Johnson, T. (2016). Cooperation, co-optation, competition, conflict: International bureaucracies and non-governmental organizations in an interdependent world. *Review of International Political Economy*, *23*(5), 737–767. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1217902

Kentikelenis, A. E., Stubbs, T. H., & King, L. P. (2016). IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014. *Review of International Political Economy*, *23*(4), 543–582. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1174953

Kranke, M. (2017). *The politics of collaborative global governance: Organisational positioning in IMF-World Bank collaboration* [Doctoral thesis, University of Warwick]. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/101269/1/WRAP_Theses_Kranke_2017.pdf

Kranke, M. (2020). IMF-World Bank cooperation before and after the global financial crisis. *Global Policy*, *11*(1), 15–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12743

Kranke, M., & Yarrow, D. (2019). The global governance of systemic risk: How measurement practices tame macroprudential politics. *New Political Economy*, *24*(6), 816–832. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1545754

Littoz-Monnet, A. (2017). (Ed.) *The politics of expertise in international organizations: How international bureaucracies produce and mobilize knowledge*. Routledge.

Liu, S. (2018). Boundaries and professions: Toward a processual theory of action. *Journal of Professions and Organization*, *5*(1), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jox012

Lütz, S., & Kranke, M. (2014). The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries. *Review of International Political Economy*, *21*(2), 310–338. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2012.747104

March, J. G. (1991). How decisions happen in organizations. *Human-Computer Interaction*, *6*(2), 95–117. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327051hci0602_1

Margulis, M. E. (2018). Negotiating from the margins: How the UN shapes the rules of the WTO. *Review of International Political Economy*, *25*(3), 364–391. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1447982

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, *83*(2), 340–363. https://doi.org/10.1086/226550

Momani, B., & Hibben, M. (2015). Cooperation or clashes on 19th Street? Theorizing and assessing IMF and World Bank collaboration. *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, *6*(2), 27–43.

Nair, D. (2019). Saving face in diplomacy: A political sociology of face-to-face interactions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *European Journal of International Relations*, *25*(3), 672–697. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118822117

O'Kane, C. (2018). Technology transfer executives' backwards integration: An examination of interactions between university technology transfer executives and principal investigators. *Technovation*, *76-77*, 64–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2016.08.001

Orsini, A., Louafi, S., & Morin, J.-F. (2017). Boundary concepts for boundary work between science and technology studies and international relations: Special issue introduction. *Review of Policy Research*, *34*(6), 734–743. https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12273

Quark, A. A. (2016). Ratcheting up protective regulations in the shadow of the WTO: NGO strategy and food safety standard-setting in India. *Review of International Political Economy*, *23*(5), 872–898. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1242509

Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2014). Measuring and managing 'state fragility': The production of statistics by the World Bank, Timor-Leste and the g7+. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(2), 268–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.878131

Schimmelfennig, F. (2002). Goffman meets IR: Dramaturgical action in international community. *International Review of Sociology*, *12*(3), 417–437. https://doi.org/10.1080/0390670022000041411

Seabrooke, L. (2012). Pragmatic numbers: The IMF, financial reform, and policy learning in least likely environments. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *15*(4), 486–505. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2012.2

Seabrooke, L., & Nilsson, E. R. (2015). Professional skills in international financial surveillance: Assessing change in IMF policy teams. *Governance*, *28*(2), 237–254. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12106

Seabrooke, L., & Sending, O. J. (2020). Contracting development: Managerialism and consultants in intergovernmental organizations. *Review of International Political Economy*, *27*(4), 802–827. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1616601

Sending, O. J. (2015). *The politics of expertise: Competing for authority in global governance*. University of Michigan Press.

Starbuck, W. H. (1992). Learning by knowledge-intensive firms. *Journal of Management Studies*, *29*(6), 713–740. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1992.tb00686.x

Steffek, J. (2013). Explaining cooperation between IGOs and NGOs – push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle. *Review of International Studies*, *39*(4), 993–1013. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000393

Treem, J. W. (2012). Communicating expertise: Knowledge performances in professional-service firms. *Communication Monographs*, *79*(1), 23–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2011.646487

Treem, J. W. (2016). How organizations communicate expertise without experts: Practices and performances of knowledge-intensive firms. *Management Communication Quarterly*, *30*(4), 503–531. https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318916635750

Tsingou, E. (2015). Club governance and the making of global financial rules. *Review of International Political Economy*, *22*(2), 225–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.890952

van Bochove, M., Tonkens, E., Verplanke, L., & Roggeveen, S. (2018). Reconstructing the professional domain: Boundary work of professionals and volunteers in the context of social service reform. *Current Sociology*, *66*(3), 392–411. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392116677300

Viola, L. A. (2015). Orchestration by design: The G20 in international financial regulation. In K. W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal, & B. Zangl (Eds.), *International organizations as orchestrators* (pp. 88–113). Cambridge University Press.

Weaver, C. (2008). *Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of reform*. Princeton University Press.

Wenger, E. (2008). *Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity*. Cambridge University Press.

Woods, N. (2006). *The globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers*. Cornell University Press.

World Bank Group. (2014). *The Financial Sector Assessment Program: Addressing the needs of emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)*. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/253731468331801056/pdf/905370BR0SecM2090Box385319B00OUO090.pdf

Zaum, D. (2013). Conclusion. In D. Zaum (Ed.), *Legitimating international organizations* (pp. 221–230). Oxford University Press.