

EMPIRE BY DESIGN: RAILWAYS, ARCHITECTURE, AND URBAN PLANNING
IN TOKYO, TAIPEI, AND SEOUL

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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Doctor of Philosophy

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This dissertation examines the spatial and built forms of Japanese power. As it sought to consolidate control of new territory, the Meiji government followed a design forged in Tokyo as it attempted to build legitimacy through public works projects, namely railways, Western-style architecture, and urban improvements.

The first half of the dissertation traces the emergence of hegemonic urban space in Tokyo from the initiation of the Ginza Bricktown project in 1872 to the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914. Chapter II shows how popular resistance to the Ginza Bricktown project led to a more pragmatic urban planning system in Tokyo. Thereafter, rather than imposing preformed cityscapes onto the city, Japanese urban planners would attempt to reduce costs and avoid popular resistance by strategically widening streets and improving urban infrastructure when and where possible. Chapter III illustrates how the lessons of the Ginza Bricktown paved the way for the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital. As the discussion of Tokyo Station – the so-called “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” – demonstrates, it was the cooperation of government planners, architects, and local forces that ultimately produced imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital.

The second half of the dissertation demonstrates how Japanese colonizers attempted to establish hegemony in the colonies through manipulation of the natural and built environments of Taiwan and Korea. As Chapter IV argues, Japan pursued railways in Korea from the mid-1890s in an effort to validate Japanese claims to Korean territory. Chapter V shifts the focus to consideration of the built environment in Japanese colonialism. As in Meiji Tokyo, Japanese planners sought to project Japanese imperial power in the colonial urban built environment through programs of Urban Planning (*Shiku Keikaku*) in Taipei in the 1900s, and Urban Improvement (*Shiku Kaishū*) in Seoul over the next two decades. Learning from the opposition such projects incited in Tokyo, colonial planners in Taipei and Seoul pragmatically adjusted their plans to make implementation more feasible. As the case study of Seoul will demonstrate, the centerpiece of these projects was the production of imperial space.

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Driving across the United States from Oregon to Maine during the summer of 2014, I covered a lot of ground – and a lot of road. With an itinerary traversing sixteen states, each state border was cause for celebration symbolizing progress on my long trip. While state borders were often indicated by roadside “Welcome!” signs, I quickly realized that these otherwise invisible lines on the map were denoted by a much more palpable marker: the sharp “thud” my car made as it crossed each state line, caused by changes in surface paving materials or by the gaps between newer and more worn road pavements. Presuming that this resulted from better road surface maintenance in one state than another, I could not help comparing states based on how well they kept up their highways. In doing so, I found myself sharing the reaction of those Japanese Meiji government leaders who visited the United States and Europe in 1871-1873 on the Iwakura Mission. As they toured the Western world, the official travel diary of the mission records, the Iwakura ambassadors saw road conditions as the first indicator of the relative prosperity of whatever nation they were visiting, not to mention the quality of its government. For the Meiji leaders on the Iwakura Mission, this observation was a lesson that Japan must exert as much effort on improvement of the urban built environment as it did on institutional and political reform if it wanted to demonstrate its modernity to the rest of the world. For me, this shared reaction was the fitting culmination of a dissertation project that, in its own way, took the long road to arrive at its destination and passed a few thuds and gaps along the way.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: URBAN SPACE AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY

Over two nights in September 2014, thousands of anxious onlookers crowded into the plaza fronting Tokyo Station in downtown Tokyo to watch one of six performances of “Tokyo Station Vision,” an elaborate 10-minute 3D light and music show projected onto the facade of the recently renovated station building.¹ Commissioned by the JR East Railway Company to commemorate the completion of preservation and restoration work on the station, the show was meant both to evoke the past and anticipate the future of the site with the theme, “a trip through space-time (*Jikū wo koeta tabi*).” According to organizers, the show would address “station, railway, people, and town,” with imagery and music reminiscent of different generations in the history of the station – from a triumphal martial fanfare, to a pop music-style re-mix of a commuter train departure bell.² At the end of the light show, to the delight of the spectators, the station was fully illuminated, unveiling the results of over four years of renovation work to restore the building to its original 1914 appearance. The restoration project was part of the larger “Tokyo Station City” development initiated by Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō and the JR East Railway Company in 1999. Incorporating the station building, the luxurious Tokyo Station Hotel, several office skyscrapers, and sprawling shopping complexes both underground and within the station, Tokyo Station City was designed as “the only

¹ The video is available on the internet at <http://www.nhk-ep.co.jp/gekiteki/>. NHK Enterprises, Inc., *Gekiteki*, <http://www.nhk-ep.co.jp/gekiteki/>.

² East Japan Railway Company, *Tōkyō Eki Marunouchi ekisha hozon, fukugen kansei kinen ibento ‘Tokyo Station Vision – Tōkyō Suteishon Bijon’ no kaisai ni tsuite* [Concerning the holding of the Tokyo Station Marunouchi station building preservation and restoration memorial event, “Tokyo Station Vision”], <https://www.jreast.co.jp/press/2012/20120906.pdf>.

station-city” in the world – a space “blending history, tradition, culture, art, science, business, and advanced technology,” in the words of organizers.³ The intricate digital light show was thus a fitting celebration of the urban space of downtown Tokyo: a global city popularly seen as hi-tech, futuristic, and a center of the world economy.

Yet aside from the envisioned commercial function of Tokyo Station City as a hub of transportation and urban consumerism, the restoration of Tokyo Station and the surrounding space had a more symbolic purpose. As Governor Ishihara explained to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in 2008, the restoration project was the centerpiece of an attempt to “develop the area around Tokyo Station under a comprehensive concept of design that befits the front gate of the capital.”⁴ As the project neared completion in 2012 in the midst of Tokyo’s bid to host the 2020 Olympics, Ishihara expanded on the contribution the new station made in attempts to “construct a stately city suitable as the Japanese capital.” “Significant progress has bee[n] made in the redevelopment of Tokyo Station and the surrounding Marunouchi area, which serve[s] as the gateway to the nation’s capital,” Ishihara addressed the assembled lawmakers. “[*Gyōkō-dōri*] Avenue which connects Tokyo Station and the Imperial Palace has been developed into a highly dignified street conveying a rich history,” Ishihara continued, “and next month, the restoration of the section of Tokyo Station that was destroyed by air-raids in World War II will be completed, allowing the building to recapture its original appearance for the

³ Tokyo Station Management Council, *About TSC*, <http://www.tokystationcity.com/en/tsc/>

⁴ Ishihara Shintarō, “Policy Speech by the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, at the First Regular Session of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 2008,” February 20, 2008, transcript, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Governor’s Policy Speeches, <http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/GOVERNOR/ARC/20121031/SPEECH/2008/fgi4e102.htm>.

first time in 67 years.” According to Ishihara, the restoration of Tokyo Station and the redevelopment of the road linking the station to the Imperial Palace was an important component in “molding” Tokyo “into an elegant city in order to boost its presence as the capital of Japan.”⁵ As it seems, Tokyo Station was once again the focus of efforts to produce urban space in Tokyo suitable to its status as the Japanese capital. Remarkably similar rhetoric was used to herald the original Tokyo Station when it opened in 1914 as the gateway to Tokyo. Notably, at that time, the urban space framed by Tokyo Station and its station-front plaza marked the Japanese capital not as a hub of global trade and consumerism, but as the Imperial Capital of a colonial empire that spread to Taiwan and Korea. It was a space, then, not of consumerism, but of colonialism.

East Asia today remains littered with physical remnants of Japanese colonial rule, of which Tokyo Station is only the most prominent. Across the former Japanese empire, the railway networks, public buildings, and urban plans completed by Japanese rulers during the colonial period remain intact. Even in cases where such remnants were purposefully demolished – such as in Seoul, South Korea, where public sentiment led to the destruction of the former Japanese Governor General Headquarters building in 1995 – other remnants remain, such as the Japanese-constructed Seoul Railway Station and Seoul City Hall building. As with Tokyo Station, these monumental projects were the centerpieces, and therefore the prime symbols, of Japanese colonialism. The symbolic renovation of Tokyo Station and its imperial environs, added to the continued existence

⁵ Ishihara Shintarō, “Policy Speech by the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, at the First Regular Session of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 2012,” February 22, 2012, transcript, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Governor’s Policy Speeches, <http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/GOVERNOR/ARC/20121031/SPEECH/2012/fgm57102.htm>.

of similar physical manifestations of the colonial experience throughout East Asia, call for historians to revisit the role of urban space and architecture in the Japanese empire.

This dissertation examines Japanese assertions of power in space, particularly power as mediated in the built forms of railways, architecture, and urban planning. By surveying Japanese public works projects in the metropole and the colonies, this dissertation argues that cultivation of power through the manipulation of the natural and built environments was a prime component of Meiji state-formation and empire building. As it sought to consolidate control of new territory, both domestic and foreign, the Meiji government attempted to build legitimacy through public works. Railways, Western-style architecture, and urban improvements were particularly handy tools in concretizing Japanese power because they served material as well as conceptual benefits: improving mobility for troops and trade, reinforcing Japanese claims to territorial ownership through cultivation and improvement of the environment, and differentiating the “modern” Japanese regime from its “premodern” or precolonial predecessors. Already reifying the Japanese ability to manipulate the environment, these built forms of power framed spaces that were designed to further project Japanese power. Space, therefore, was not only a product of power, but was also an agent in the production of even greater power.

Four points can be made about Japanese assertions of power in space. First, put simply, Japanese rulers in the metropole and the colony alike attempted to rule through modern space – in other words, spaces in both capital and countryside that had been refashioned to fit Meiji Japanese notions of “modernity” and “civilization.” For early Meiji leaders and urban planners, “modernity” was as much a lived condition defined by particular accoutrements, such as locomotives, paved streets, gas lamps, sidewalks, and

brick buildings, as it was an ideology or temporal period. Whether it was by laying tracks through the countryside, or installing sewer pipes, paving streets, and erecting imposing structures in the city, Japanese planners attempted to construct built forms of “modernity” in order to project Japanese power and culture. Because this was done in the name of attaining popular subservience and garnering international recognition of Meiji rule, space was wielded as a tool of Japanese cultural hegemony.

Secondly, the focus of these Japanese spatial manipulations was the capital cities of Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul. Much as Japan’s 19th century leaders had striven to re-create Tokyo as the “imperial capital” of a unified nation, its 20th century colonial leaders ventured to create imperial spaces in the colonial capitals. Because each city was the public representative of its respective territory and the model for the surrounding countryside, Japanese planners in all three areas carried out programs designed to transform the cities into suitable capitals. For Meiji Japanese planners, this meant cities that were not only “modern” in appearance, but also commercially prosperous. It was only after a city boasted a “modern” cityscape and thriving commerce was it said to “live up to” its role as the capital. Planners therefore focused on street improvements to simultaneously improve urban mobility while modernizing the aesthetics of the city. Just as buildings displayed the objectives and aims of their designers, the urban built environment – the public face of the Japanese empire – revealed the goals and intentions of the Japanese government, as well as how the leadership wished Japan to be perceived by foreign, domestic, and colonial observers. In both metropole and colony, planners were concerned with constructing the visage of a recognizable “civilized” cultural landscape and enforcing expectations of “civilized” public behavior.

Thirdly, Japanese manipulations of space in the natural and built environment of the Japanese landscape forged a model that guided later projects in the colonies. The proximity of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea resulted in a high degree of personnel exchange and continuity between the metropole and the colonies, binding the Japanese empire into a tight-knit web of colonial public works bureaucracy. As Japanese planners and engineers arrived at the colonial worksite, they responded to problems they saw in the natural and built environments by drawing on their experience and training in the metropole. Because many of these “operatives of empire” were trained in the Japanese Imperial University System and held public works jobs in Japan before transferring to colonial positions, they embarked on their colonial jobs with a shared archive of engineering knowledge. Not surprisingly, urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul consequently exhibited a number of conceptual and technical similarities to projects in Tokyo – from the rhetoric used to justify the projects, to the focus on streets and urban infrastructure.

It is important to note, however, that while based on Tokyo models, urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul were by no means perfect copies. Instead, the fourth important point of Japanese assertions of power in space was that they flexibly adapted to local conditions. Even Tokyo Station – so warmly embraced when re-opened in 2012 – was widely ridiculed when it first opened in 1914. It was too big and out of proportion, critics wailed, and it turned its back on the heart of the city located to the east. Needless to say, rarely do such large projects proceed without opposition. This was a lesson Japanese planners learned the hard way when they tried to impose a Western urban space onto the urban fabric of Tokyo in the Ginza Bricktown project following the Ginza fire of

1872. This convinced Japanese planners to take a more programmatic and integrative approach to urban improvements. Only by reducing costs and avoiding popular resistance by working from within the existing built environment could planners accomplish public works projects in capital and countryside.

In making the argument that the Japanese nation-state and empire were built following a common design of spatial power, this dissertation seeks to make two contributions to the study of Japanese history: one theoretical, and one historiographical. First, this dissertation views urban space as both a product and a tool of power. In this regard, this study benefits from the work of critical geographers and scholars of architecture and urbanism, particularly architectural critic Kim Dovey. In his book *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*, Dovey describes how the built environment of the city “mediates, constructs and reproduces power relations” through the literal and discursive “framing” of the spaces of everyday life. “In the literal sense,” Dovey writes, “everyday life ‘takes place’ within the clusters of rooms, buildings, streets and cities we inhabit. Action is structured and shaped by streets, walls, doors and windows; it is framed by the decisions of designers.” At the same time, “As a form of discourse,” Dovey continues, “built form constructs and frames meanings.” Dovey coins the term “framing” to capture the way that the design of built form can both “shape” and “enclose” daily action, while also providing the “context” for everyday life – or, “both the construction of a world and of a way of seeing ourselves in it.”⁶ Designers and planners, then, attempt to frame space by designing and planning in ways that reflect and

⁶ Kim Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1-2.

advance their interests, values, and worldview.

In Meiji Japan, planners framed everyday urban space with what they identified as the tangible elements of urban modernity: the western architecture, sidewalks, sewers, roadside trees, and paved streets of the modern cityscape. It was by wielding such “instruments of modernity,” as Jeffrey E. Hanes has argued, that Meiji modernizers crafted a frame of “modern, exploitable space” for the new Japan.⁷ By constructing these tangible forms of modernity in the city, Japanese planners hoped to demonstrate the power of the Meiji government while impressing the ideas of civilization and culture onto the population. Modern urban sites therefore became “hegemonic spaces” – spaces that embodied the discursive project of modernity and transmitted power. In *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, Prasenjit Duara explains his definition of the term “the modern” as a noun as an attempt to “highlight the idea of the modern as a set of temporal practices and discourses that is imposed or instituted by modernizers.” “As such,” Duara concludes, “it is a hegemonic project among other temporal practices, rather than a preconstituted period or a given condition.”⁸ For Japanese modernizers, “the modern” was indeed a hegemonic project, but it was one that was reified as a given (urban) condition.

Japanese strategies of spatial power were hegemonic in two regards. Japanese modernizers sought to transmit Japanese power through the production of modern urban space. This meant the introduction of built forms that embodied Japanese ideas of

⁷ Jeffrey E. Hanes, “Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji Japan,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam L. Kern (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 488, 491.

⁸ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 6 n.6.

progress and civilization. The Ginza Bricktown, of course, was the most famous example of the government's attempt to re-create Tokyo as a "showcase" in this way.⁹

Modernization of the built environment was therefore an attempt to solidify and transmit Japanese power by concretizing in the built form of the city what Japanese planners saw as an advanced Japanese culture. City streets were especially important components in this project. From the early Meiji period, Japanese modernizers and planners viewed streets as the basis of a triangular relationship between transportation infrastructure, commercial function, and international prestige. Nowhere is this clearer than in the official records of the Iwakura Mission, which toured the United States and Europe over the years 1871-1873. As the diary kept by scribe Kume Kunitake reveals, the Iwakura Mission members quickly recognized a correlation between the state of a nation's roads and streets and its overall level of economic development. As Kume reflected, "When you enter any country [for the first time] you can tell immediately, by looking at the road surfaces, whether the government is efficient or not and whether the citizens are likely to be rich or poor."¹⁰ Later, writing that roads and waterways are as vital to commercial enterprises as are "arteries and veins to the human body," Kume elaborated on this point in the volume on Western Europe. "We found that as we traveled through a particular country," Kume recorded, "*the condition of its roads would reveal to us immediately whether the national government was vigorous or in decline and whether the industry*

⁹ Henry D. Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought Until 1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 1 (1978), 53.

¹⁰ Kume Kunitake, *The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1:200.

and commerce were active or lethargic.”¹¹ With this relationship between economic performance and road quality in mind, Kume fastidiously recorded “instructive” street construction techniques wherever the Mission travelled.¹² In addition to frequently jotting down road widths, remarking on the use of sidewalks to separate vehicle and pedestrian traffic, and admiring the planting of roadside trees to provide shade, Kume described in great detail tar-macadam and woodblock paving techniques in Washington D.C.¹³, “tile”-like closely laid stone paving in London¹⁴, gravel and cement paving in Paris¹⁵, and the use of sand to keep the dust down on streets in Western Switzerland.¹⁶ As these observations reveal, Meiji government leaders and planners recognized the importance of quality streets for producing cities that were both commercially vibrant and modern in appearance. For this reason, street improvements became a common component of urban redevelopment projects throughout the Meiji period.

But what makes city streets conduits of power? As Dovey notes, what ties the practice of spatial framing to power is that “most people, most of the time, take the built environment for granted...The more that the structures and representations of power can be embedded in the framework of everyday life, the less questionable they become and

¹¹ Kume Kunitake, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 2:179. Italics in original.

¹² Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 5:178-179; As Kume wrote, “The careful attention paid to the paving and maintenance of streets is a fine custom in industrialized countries and instructive to contemplate...,” in Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 1:197.

¹³ Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 1:197-198.

¹⁴ Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 2:41.

¹⁵ Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 3:34-35.

¹⁶ Kume, *The Iwakura Embassy*, 5:52.

the more effectively they can work.” This is truer for some elements of the built environment than for others. It is hard for large edifices to hide within the city. The symbolic demolition of the Japanese-built Government-General Building in Seoul in 1995 demonstrates that certain mediations of power in the built environment can be deconstructed when they fail to become anonymously embedded in the urban fabric. It is much easier for streets, on the other hand, to strengthen and preserve their hegemonic function by quietly passing into the level of the taken-for-granted. Dovey borrows from Pierre Bourdieu to conclude, “It is the ‘complicitous silence’ of place as a framework to life that is the source of its deepest associations with power.”¹⁷ Once laid, streets form a framework that defines the surrounding built environment, transforms urban space, and directs the movement of people through the city. Building heights are often restricted by the width of the street they front, roadbeds demarcate public space, and streets determine the route taken from point A to point B, all the while being highly regulated by traffic signs, stop lights, and lane markings. Although street surfaces are frequently repaved, the street itself is rarely rerouted. The clearing of new streets through the city therefore has the power to forever dramatically alter the make-up of the neighborhood.¹⁸ Even as the buildings lining the street are torn down and rebuilt, the street itself remains largely the same. City streets are therefore the most insidious and lasting articulation of spatial power.

¹⁷ Dovey, *Framing Places*, 1-2.

¹⁸ Marshall Berman’s discussion of the impact of the construction of the Cross-Bronx Freeway on the neighborhoods of the South Bronx in New York City comes to mind. See Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), esp. 290-311.

Another way in which Japanese strategies of spatial power were hegemonic was that they attempted to garner popular consent by flexibly adapting to local conditions and demands. As Antonio Gramsci theorized, the hegemony of the ruler was impossible without the consent of the ruled. Gramsci wrote that the social hegemony of the ruler requires the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.” For Gramsci, this spontaneous consent resulted from “the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.”¹⁹ As Japanese modernizers attempted to construct cultural hegemony, they also carefully tried to manufacture consent. Although the built forms framing modern urban space – the railways, the buildings, and the streets – were rigid structures, they were part of a flexible model that could be fit into available spaces. Rather than bulldozing through existing neighborhoods to open new thoroughfares or clear building sites, Japanese planners slowly transformed the built environment of the city through gradual street improvement projects to extant streets and the construction of buildings on repurposed government-owned land. On one hand, this had the pragmatic economic benefit of reducing costs associated with land purchase and removal of obstructive buildings. On the other hand, this had the more insidious result of ensuring the measured success of the projects and reducing public opposition. That is to say, adapting to local conditions did by no means enervate the hegemonic power of the

¹⁹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 145; and Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (1975): 353.

produced spaces, it only made the projects more surreptitious in their casting and distribution of Japanese power into areas it otherwise would not have reached.

The second contribution to the study of Japanese history this dissertation seeks to make is historiographical. By arguing that the Japanese nation-state and empire were built with the same strategy of spatial power, this study echoes not only scholars of Japanese history who stress the “duality” of the Meiji state, but also scholars of colonialism who have argued for a more integrative analysis of metropole and colony. Ethnologist Umesao Tadao has suggested that in Japan “the construction of a nation-state was indeed the building of an empire.”²⁰ Likewise, Kurimoto Eisei has written that the transformation of the national army into an overseas army “was parallel with the process of state building that resulted in modern Japan; while the Japanese were trying to build a nation-state, they began to construct an empire.”²¹ Finally, Yamamuro Shin’ichi has pointed out the “duality” of the Meiji state, “namely, that it held colonial possessions while in the process of becoming a nation-state and itself became a colonial empire.”²² Scholars of colonialism, likewise, have sought to break down the dichotomies of “metropole/colony” and “colonizers/colonized,” and instead to focus on the close

²⁰ Umesao Tadao, “Keynote Address: Comparative Studies of Civilization with regard to the Formation and Transformation of the Nation-State,” in *Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire*, ed. Umesao and others (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 5.

²¹ Kurimoto Eisei, “Nation-State, Empire, and Army: The Case of Meiji Japan,” in *Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire*, ed. Umesao and others (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 106.

²² Yamamuro Shin’ichi, “The Evolving Meiji State: It’s Dual Character as a Nation-State and Colonial Empire,” in *Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire*, ed. Umesao and others (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 11.

interrelationship between these groups.²³ In his pointed assessment of the historiography of Japanese imperialism, Andre Schmid points out that “much of the literature is marked by a top-down, metrocentric approach that renders colonial history tangential to the main narratives of the modern Japanese nation and, in some instances, comes precariously close to reproducing versions of Japanese colonial discourse.” Arguing further that studies of Japanese history and colonialism tend to reproduce the “division between home and abroad captured in the colonial phrases *naichi* (internal lands or Japan proper) and *gaichi* (external lands or outlying colonies),” Schmid writes that studies of Japanese imperialism have produced a “style of nation-centered history, where as the primary subject of the study of the past, the nation is neatly separated from the colonies and seen as developing independently.”²⁴ Picking up where Andre Schmid left off, Sandra Wilson explicated the impact on Japanese history of recent trends in the study of imperialism. “There is now much greater consciousness among historians of Japan that any colonial relationship is a two-way affair,” Wilson writes. She then lists three implications this realization has for studies of Japanese colonialism: “One implication is a greater recognition that the colonial relationship is shaped by the responses of the colonised as well as the intentions and actions of the colonisers.” “Another,” Wilson adds, “is that life in the metropolis itself is seen as affected deeply by its colonies: the ‘mother’ country is no longer accepted as the modern, civilised nation that on the one hand imposes its will

²³ Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 15.

²⁴ Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (2000): 952, 954.

abroad through its colonial agents, and on the other continues along its own, independent historical trajectory.” Finally, “A third implication,” Wilson concludes, “is an acknowledgment that mainstream studies of Japanese history should include consideration of the colonies as a matter of course: all or most topics in modern Japanese history will be relevant to the colonies, and vice versa, and colony and metropolis should no longer be in separate baskets.”²⁵

Following in the footsteps of recent scholars of colonialism, this dissertation will attempt to merge the narratives of Japanese state-formation and empire building by tracing Japanese mechanisms of spatial power from the metropole to the colonies in order to illustrate that, indeed, similar strategies used to construct the state were used to build the empire. As such, this dissertation will survey the formation, alteration, and adaptation of Japanese construction projects and urban planning initiatives in order to illuminate ways that Japanese modernizers and colonizers attempted to harness and transmit power in the urban space and built forms of the city. Colonial cities can provide a particularly instructive lens for illuminating power relationships, especially those mediated in the built environment. According to Anthony D. King, colonial cities are one of the best venues for analyzing the physical and spatial arrangements of urban development as “unique products of a particular society and culture, operating within a given distribution of power.”²⁶ Nezar AlSayyad agrees. “Dominance is not exclusive to

²⁵ Sandra Wilson, “Bridging the Gaps: New Views of Japanese Colonialism, 1931-1945,” *Japanese Studies*, 25, no. 3 (2005): 288.

²⁶ Anthony D. King, *Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment* (Boston: Routledge & Paul, 1976), xii; Anthony D. King, *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

colonial cities,” AlSayyad argues, “but the use and manifestation of dominance in the colonial context is particularly blunt.” For this reason, analysis of architecture and urbanism in the colonial city can provide insight into the mechanisms and workings of power in built form. “Analysis of the forms of dominance deployed in colonial cities may point the way to a better understanding of the power of architecture and urbanism in general,” AlSayyad writes. “In particular, we may see that, while politics necessarily plays a role in architectural and urban form through the choice of goals, styles and techniques, it is not the specifics but the *implementation* of such a program that is all important.”²⁷ That is to say, close examination of the execution of public works projects can illuminate the “tactics and strategies of power” at work.

The survey of Japanese assertions of power in space unfolds over four chapters in the dissertation, first examining the development of Japanese strategies of spatial control in the metropole before shifting focus to the colonies to demonstrate how this model was deployed overseas in order to integrate new territory into the expanding empire. Chapters II and III trace the emergence of imperial space in the imperial capital – that is, the production of hegemonic urban space in Tokyo from the initiation of the Ginza Bricktown (*Ginza Rengagai*) project in 1872 to the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914. Chapter II introduces the urban space of 1870s Tokyo as a performative space where the political conflicts of the early Meiji period were acted out in the built environment. Following the Ginza fire of 1872, the Meiji government saw an opportunity to reconstruct Tokyo as a modern capital that would demonstrate Japan’s newfound modernity,

²⁷ Nezar AlSayyad, “Urbanism and the Dominance Equation: Reflections on Colonialism and National Identity,” in *Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise*, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (Brookfield: Avebury, 1992), 5.

consolidate political rule of the emerging nation, and concretize the power of the Meiji state. The Meiji government therefore responded to the fire by imposing a Western-style modern urban space from above with the Ginza Bricktown project. This meant the construction of a modern streetscape, including straight, paved streets, sidewalks, roadside trees, and western-style buildings. But these central government attempts to impose urban space on the city were vehemently resisted and redirected by other groups expressing politics in space: the Tokyo municipal government and the residents of Ginza, whose combined efforts forced the central government to scale back and then cancel the project. Japanese urban planners responded to the failure of Ginza Bricktown by developing a more pragmatic approach to urban improvements. Rather than trying to impose preformed cityscapes onto the city, planners thereafter attempted to reduce costs and avoid popular resistance by strategically widening streets and improving urban infrastructure whenever and wherever possible. In this way, the tenuous political situation of the early Meiji Period not only shaped the urban space of Meiji Tokyo, but also defined Japanese urban planning policy.

Chapter III illustrates how the lessons of the Ginza Bricktown paved the way for the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital. Focusing on the planning and construction of Tokyo Station as a case study, the chapter will chart changing perceptions of the role of Tokyo and the collective production of imperial space by government planners, architects, and local officials. Following the failure of Ginza Bricktown, Japanese planners focused on street improvements in order to produce the economic prosperity necessary to transform Tokyo into the “greatest capital in Asia” – prestigious not for its urban aesthetics, but for its commercial function. Perceiving a triangular

relationship between the city's infrastructure, commercial prosperity, and international status, Tokyo planners in the Home Ministry initiated the Tokyo Urban Improvement (*Shiku Kaisei*) projects of the late 1880s, calling for railway extensions and citywide street improvements. Yet, as a discussion of planning rhetoric will demonstrate, planners began to call for more comprehensive improvements over the course of the 1880s as more planners became involved in the planning process. Finally, following victories in war over China and Russia, and the acquisition of Taiwan as a colony, Tokyo planners and residents alike sought to produce spaces suitable for the emerging empire. As the discussion of Tokyo Station – the so-called “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” – will demonstrate, it was the cooperation of government planners, architects, and local forces that ultimately produced imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital.

The second half of the dissertation shifts the analytical lens from the metropole to the colonial periphery in order to examine Japanese efforts to cultivate cultural hegemony in the colonies by manipulating natural and built environments. When Japanese defense strategists perceived a threat of Western encroachment, Japanese diplomats schemed to seize control of peripheral territories by initiating public works projects. This started with railways. As Chapter IV shows, Japanese efforts to spread imperial influence into the peninsula by constructing railways in Korea dated back to the mid-1890s. In the minds of Japanese diplomats and businessmen, ownership and operation of railways in Korea would not only facilitate Japanese economic advancement, it would also validate Japanese territorial claims. That is to say, Japanese leaders believed that “enlightened exploitation” of the natural environment entitled the cultivator to ownership of territory and justified claims to cultural superiority. Railway construction was therefore perhaps

the most significant means of solidifying territorial rule through cultivation of the natural environment.

Finally, Chapter V pairs development of the natural environment with improvement of the built environment in Japanese attempts to assert colonial rule. As in Meiji Tokyo, Japanese planners sought to project Japanese imperial power in the colonial urban built environment through programs of Urban Planning (*Shiku Keikaku*) in Taipei in the 1900s, and Urban Improvement (*Shiku Kaishū*) in Seoul over the next two decades. Whereas colonial planners in Taiwan emphasized culture, those in Korea stressed economic development. Nevertheless, projects in both cities were based on the production of modern urban space through the improvement of city streets and urban infrastructure. Learning from the opposition such projects incited in Tokyo, colonial planners in Taipei and Seoul pragmatically adjusted their plans to make implementation more feasible. In this regard, colonial urban improvements should be seen as part of what colonial planner Gotō Shimpei called “military preparation in the guise of civilization,” or “*bunsō bubu*.” In this light, Gotō’s celebrated “scientific colonialism” was an attempt to secure local consent while asserting Japanese cultural hegemony. Colonial planners in both cities, meanwhile, strategically adjusted their plans to more closely reflect local demands, topographical conditions, and the existing built environment, in order to secure consent and achieve successful implementation. In this way, modification of plans did not weaken or undermine the power of imperial space, rather alteration made that power more responsive and flexible. As the case study of Seoul will demonstrate, finally, the centerpieces of these colonial urban networks of power was the production of imperial space.

As this dissertation will attempt to show, Japanese rulers cultivated control of new territory by deploying a flexible model of spatial manipulation designed in Tokyo. In the final analysis, Japanese state-formation and empire building were driven by the same fears and motivating ideologies, championed by a small group of government leaders, built by civil engineers with the same training, and constructed with the same design.

CHAPTER II

POLITICS IN SPACE: RUPTURE AND RESISTANCE IN GINZA BRICKTOWN

The half-mile from Kyōbashi to Shimbashi is known locally as the “Brick Street” because all the buildings are constructed in brick. According to one person, “this area must be indeed just like some Western country!”...There is no place other than Ginza Street where one can truly understand Tokyo's prosperity at first glance.
– *Shinsen Tōkyō Jitchi Annai*, 1893¹

On the afternoon of the 26th day of the second month (Wednesday, April 3), 1872, a great fire erupted in Japan's new capital, Tokyo.² Carried by strong winds, the fire quickly spread southeast from its starting point in the army barracks located in the former Aizu compound outside the Wadakura Gate of the Imperial Palace. It then jumped the outer moat of the palace in central Tokyo before blazing over 230 acres through Kyōbashi, Sukiyabashi, Owarimachi, Ginza, Kobikichō and all the way to Tsukiji on its way to displacing over 20,000 residents. Counted among the over 5,000 buildings destroyed by the fire were the compound of the Governor of Tokyo, Yuri Kimimasa, and the famous Tsukiji Hotel.³

¹ KDL: Kunshidō, ed., *Shinsen Tōkyō Jicchi Annai* [New practical guide to Tokyo] (Tokyo: Kunshindō, 1893), 29.

² The date of the Ginza Fire was 1872.2.26 in the lunar calendar. Japan switched to the Gregorian calendar starting in 1873, when 1872.12.2 was followed by January 1, 1873.

³ Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu: Shiku Kaisei no Tansho* [Construction of Ginza Bricktown: the beginning of urban improvement] (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1955), 17; Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed., *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi* [Records of Tokyo Roads] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1939), 288; Ishida Yorifusa, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen* [100 Years of Japanese Modern Urban Planning] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 1987), 33; Noguchi Kōichi, *Ginza Rengagai to Shuto Minken* [Ginza Bricktown and popular rights in the capital] (Yūshisha, 1992), 24; Ogi Shinzou, *Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū* [History of the daily life of the common people of Tokyo] (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1979), 93; Hiyamuta Junji and Kawakami Hidemitsu, “Meiji 5-nen taika-go no

With visions of London and Paris in mind, a group of progressive Japanese government leaders including Ōkuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, and Shibusawa Eiichi quickly set about unilaterally reconstructing the area from the ground up. Bemoaning traditional building forms as outmoded, conducive to fires, and detrimental to wealth and prosperity, government leaders called for the reconstruction of “fireproof” buildings in brick and the widening of streets as firebreaks. These improvements, together with prohibition of fire-prone traditional buildings in the burnt areas, promised to make the district more resistant to the disastrous fires that frequently swept through the city. Yet the introduction of entirely new modern, Western building forms and improved street infrastructure had a second, much more political purpose. As André Sorensen describes, Ginza was rebuilt as “an impressive and fire-resistance district suitable for the imperial capital.”⁴ To this end, the central government hired a foreign architect to design the new buildings, and improved the streets of Ginza with the most up-to-date engineering and paving techniques. The resulting district came to be known as Ginza Bricktown.⁵ With macadamized street surfaces, brick-paved sidewalks, enclosed stone sewers, roadside trees, and even gas streetlamps, Bricktown formed a modern urban space comparable to

Ginza Rengagai no kensetsu jigyō ni tsuite” [Concerning the construction of Ginza Bricktown after the great fire of 1872], *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū* 54 (October, 1956): 661. More detailed first-hand accounts of the damage caused by the fire can be found in the April 6, 1872 and April 13, 1872 issues of the *Japan Daily Mail*. Amazingly, there were only 8 fatalities.

⁴ André Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 61.

⁵ It is worth noting that “Bricktown” was merely a popular moniker, and government documents consistently refer to the district not as the “Bricktown” but as “The Burnt Areas South of Kyōbashi,” as in “Regarding the construction of brick buildings and the widening of roads in the burnt areas south of Kyōbashi...”

Regent Street in London or the Rue de Rivoli in Paris. Situated adjacent to Shimbashi Station and designed in recognition of its relation to the imperial palace, moreover, the Ginza Bricktown took on imperial significance as a spatial link between two symbols of Meiji state-formation: the railway network and the emperor system. In this way, the Ginza Bricktown synthesized railways, Western architecture, and urban planning to produce an imperial space at the heart of the new imperial capital.

As an imperial space designed to project Japanese power and modernity, the Ginza Bricktown denoted a sharp rupture in the urban planning of Tokyo. From this point forward, Japanese planners would devise improvements in the city in accordance with Tokyo's role as the herald of the new imperial regime, and the new Japan. Just as Henri LeFebvre wrote that ideology requires spaces to which it can refer and therefore creates the spaces that guarantee it will endure, "modern" Japan needed spaces that would define and characterize it as a modern nation.⁶ The imperial capital was that space, and the Ginza Bricktown was the first project in producing it. It was as if the burnt areas of Ginza provided the Meiji leaders with a blank canvas on which to paint the model of a modern imperial capital.

Of course Ginza was not a blank canvas, and local residents, not surprisingly, were not so happy with the disruptions caused by the government's project. Those residents whose plastered warehouses had survived the flames had to watch as their houses were later razed or moved at the hands of government planners to make way for new brick buildings. Other residents were forcibly relocated as street-front property was

⁶ Henri LeFebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1991), 44. LeFebvre poignantly illustrates this point by rhetorically asking, "What would remain of the Church if there were no churches?"

expropriated to accommodate the widened roads. As a result, the central government's attempt to unilaterally refashion the space of the city met stiff local opposition, which redirected these attempts to impose an imperial space onto the capital. As the planners of the Bricktown quickly found out, strong-armed imposition of urban space provoked an equally tenacious reaction from a municipal government and local residents who were already antipathetic towards the Meiji regime. Firstly, not only did Tokyo Governor Yuri protest the expensive brick buildings on behalf of Tokyo residents, the Tokyo government used what political power it possessed to alleviate the financial burdens of Bricktown by petitioning for allowances in building regulations, rent deferrals, and tax reprieves. Secondly, local residents voted with their feet, erecting makeshift shelters in the wake of the fire that interfered with planned construction. Then, as the new brick buildings were completed, Tokyo-ites made no attempt to hide their contempt for the unfamiliar structures. Although the powerful early Meiji government was able to dictate the construction of Bricktown, it certainly could not compel the residents of Tokyo to inhabit it. Occupation of the uncomfortable new buildings was therefore slow, forcing the government to compromise by approving several "vacant house counter-measures" (*akiya taisaku*) to attract tenants, including the allowance of traditional houses on backstreets, rent deferrals, and tax exemptions. Even this last concession, which undermined the political message of the entire project, was not enough to ensure that Ginza Bricktown would be completed.

In the end, because the government was unable, or unwilling, to reconcile conflicts, Ginza Bricktown was scaled back dramatically just one year after construction commenced. Central government attempts to unilaterally produce the urban space of

Tokyo through the wholesale imposition of a modern Western built environment onto the existing city, then, were effectively countered and undermined by local political maneuvering and popular disinterest. In the end, Japanese government leaders and city planners had little choice but to change how they planned urban improvements. Only by incorporating these lessons of the Ginza Bricktown would it be possible to move forward with the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital.

This chapter will examine the Ginza Bricktown as a venue where the larger political contests and power struggles that characterized the early Meiji period were performed in the urban space of Tokyo. By tracing the conflicts over the production of Ginza Bricktown, this chapter will outline the uneven power relationships that shaped the built form of the capital. Part 1 of the chapter views the Bricktown from the perspective of central government planners, arguing that these elite officials approached the project as a point of rupture as they sought to produce an imperial capital that would announce the arrival of the new Japan. Following a review of the threefold significance of the Bricktown in international, domestic, and “internal” government politics, the chapter surveys the location, architecture, and street layout of the Ginza Bricktown to chart how it constituted an “imperial space.”

Part 2 then turns to the local perspective of the municipal government and district residents, examining how Bricktown became a battlefield for proxy political wars between factions of the ruling elite, their allies in the municipal government, and independent-minded local residents. First, Tokyo municipal government opposition to Bricktown will be interpreted as the local extension of a widening rift in the Meiji regime. Secondly, analysis of several series of government petitions and inquiries will

illustrate how local residents – already disgruntled for a number of reasons with the new government – were able to hamper the execution of the Bricktown project, and ultimately cause its early termination. Finally, the conclusion to the chapter will appraise the central government’s response to these local efforts and trace the legacy of the Ginza Bricktown in the urban planning of city and the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital, *Teito*.

Part1: Ginza Bricktown as Rupture: Imperial Space from Above

The central government moved quickly after the Ginza fire to direct the reconstruction of the district. While the ruins smoldered the day after the fire, the Tokyo government suspended the reconstruction of houses in the district.⁷ Two days after the fire, the Public Works ministry began surveying the burnt areas in preparation to widen streets in the district. Three days later, on the 30th, the Council of State (*Dajōkan*) of the central government declared that buildings in Tokyo “shall all be gradually rebuilt in brick.”⁸ Going on to order that this should be carried out with the cooperation of the Finance Ministry, the *Dajōkan* made clear that the reconstruction of Tokyo was not just a

⁷ NAJ, “*Kōbushō Kyōbashi i’nan shōshitsu sokuryō ni tsuki ruishō machimachi zanjī kasaku wo tomu*” [Temporary ban on housing construction in burnt neighborhoods for the purpose of Public Works Ministry survey of burnt areas south of Kyōbashi]. This entire document is reprinted with the heading “*Sekizōgai kenchiku kettei*” [Decision to construct brick houses] in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Shikō Shigai-hen* [Manuscripts of Tokyo history: the urban area], vol. 52 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1962), 838-841. Fujimori Terunobu argues that the delay in the decision to rebuild the area in brick indicates that, while there was agreement on widening roads in the area, there was considerably more debate on fireproof construction. See: Fujimori Terunobu, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku* [Urban Planning of Meiji Tokyo] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 5.

⁸ NAJ, “*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu*” [Decision to construct houses in brick]. The *Dajōkan* order to the Tokyo government is reproduced in Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 29.

municipal issue. Rather, the planning and implementation of Ginza Bricktown would be carried out on the national level by the central government.

The reason for central government intervention in the urban space of Tokyo was explained to residents in the Brick Construction Decree (*Renga Kenchiku Rei*) on the 2nd day of the third month, six days after the fire. “To begin with,” this pronouncement declared, “the Tokyo of today has changed; it has become the Home of the Emperor (*renkoku no moto*).” Therefore, the decree went on, “in the recently burned areas, the roads shall be widened, and construction of all buildings in brick shall commence immediately.”⁹ As this pronouncement indicated, the Ginza Bricktown (*Ginza Rengagai*) marked a distinct turning point in Tokyo urban planning: for the first time, improvements were carried out in recognition of the city’s new role as the home of the emperor, the Imperial Capital.¹⁰ Certainly, Tokyo continued to exhibit the identifiable markings of indelible Edo urban legacies – including land usage patterns, traditional construction techniques, and plot layouts.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Bricktown project represented a concerted attempt to renew and transform the built environment of Tokyo. If there was any question as to the goals of the project, a clear answer was provided by Vice-Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru. The “grand project” of the Ginza Bricktown, Inoue proclaimed,

⁹ NAJ, “*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.*” *TSS*, vol. 52 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1962), 841-845 and Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 62, also contain the full text of the Decree.

¹⁰ Referring to the same portions of the announcement, Matsuyama Megumi makes a similar argument in Matsuyama Megumi, “*Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū*” [Urban history of Edo Tokyo during the modern transition], Chapter 3.

¹¹ Much work has been done in both Japanese and English on the continuities between Edo and Tokyo. See, for example, Jinnai Hidenobu, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology*.

was nothing other than a “shortcut (*shōkei*) to civilization and enlightenment (*kaimei*).”¹²

With this in mind, planners imposed what Carola Hein has referred to as a “unified cityscape” of Western urban forms and improved streets into the urban fabric of Tokyo.¹³ Symbolically united with railways, the Ginza Bricktown framed imperial space.

This quick reaction by the central government raises several questions, especially since the great fire that destroyed Ginza at the end of the 2nd month, 1872 was not the first in Tokyo following the Meiji Restoration – nor even the first in Ginza. Prior to 1872, over three-dozen fires had devastated different parts of the city, destroying an average of just over 3,000 houses per year from 1868.¹⁴ In 1872 alone, three major fires had already razed over 500 houses, the latest conflagration coming just over one month earlier when 77 houses were destroyed in the adjacent Kyōbashi District neighborhood of Hiyoshichō on 1.14.¹⁵ Yet none of these numerous fires saw the same kind of dramatic reconstruction that occasioned the Ginza fire. From a financial perspective, furthermore, the timing was not ideal for such a large project. Central government coffers, already strained by the Bōshin War, were emptied out by the decision to have the new regime cover the stipends of the increasingly frustrated former samurai. So why would the government choose this

¹² Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 34. The wording of the petition in this source is slightly different in TSS, vol. 52, 820-822. The petition can also be found in Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshishi-teki Kenkyū,” 83.

¹³ Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo: Land Development and Planning Practice in the Early Modern Japanese Metropolis,” *Journal of Urban History* 36, no. 4 (2010): 461.

¹⁴ Average calculated from statistics reproduced in Ogi, *Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū*, 91.

¹⁵ Ogi, *Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū*, 93.

particular fire to embark on such a massive rebuilding campaign? In other words, why now? Why Ginza? Why this design? And why such a top-down project?

Answering these questions requires first examining the political context of the Bricktown project. Such an investigation reveals that the political situation of the early Meiji period conditioned the timing, location, design, and force of the project. In the end, the Ginza Bricktown was a product of the right group of politicians being in the right position at the right time to take advantage of a fortuitous opportunity to produce a space suited to their goals. In this way, the politics of the early Meiji period influenced the planning of the Ginza Bricktown and therefore shaped the urban space of Tokyo. Examination of 1) the geographic location of Ginza; 2) the architectural style of the Ginza Bricktown, and 3) the technical details and layout of the new improved street network will show how central government planners attempted to craft Ginza into an imperial space. Each of these contributed one element of imperial space: railways, architecture, and urban planning. Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of reasons for the government's forceful imposition of the project, setting up a discussion of the popular response in Part 2 of the chapter.

Space in Politics: The Context and Meaning of Bricktown

When Meiji leaders surveyed the damage of the Ginza fire in early 1872, they had been in power for fewer than five years. As they strove to consolidate central political control of the emerging modern Japanese nation, the Meiji government still faced the threat of foreign interference. Consequently, planners of the Ginza Bricktown saw in the project much more than merely an opportunity to fireproof the built environment of Tokyo. The

project represented the Meiji leaders' attempt to present the capital of Tokyo, and by extension the Meiji government and Japan as a whole, as a modern nation. Eventually consuming nearly 4% of the national budget, the Ginza Bricktown took on an importance far larger than that befitting a local fire reconstruction effort.¹⁶ Instead, as Noguchi Kōichi points out, the Ginza Bricktown was “a neighborhood of Meiji Government national policy” – a project carried out in a complicated political context that ultimately shaped the timing, location, and design of the district.¹⁷ The political context of the Bricktown can be visualized as three concentric rings. Proceeding centripetally from the outermost ring, the Ginza Bricktown was simultaneously influenced by politics at the international, domestic, and “internal” levels.

Firstly, on the international level, the destruction of Ginza occurred at a time when Meiji government leaders were beginning to realize a need to create a suitable capital for the new Japanese nation that would “showcase” Japanese modernity to the rest of the world.¹⁸ Emerging onto the world stage in 1868 after being “opened” to the West by an American naval mission led by Commodore Mathew Perry in 1853, Meiji Japan found itself in the midst of the age of New Imperialism of the late 19th century. Not only were European imperialist powers competing over colonies in Africa and Asia, these imperialists were embroiled in an intense rivalry to create the most splendid imperial

¹⁶ Hiroshi Watanabe, *The Architecture of Tokyo* (Stuttgart: Axel Menges, 2001), 59.

¹⁷ Noguchi, *Ginza Rengagai to Shutominken*, v. Noguchi goes on to point out that, as the home of newspapers and other organizations such as the Aikokusha-affiliated Kōfuku Anzen Sha, Ginza later became the center of the anti-government Popular Rights Movement.

¹⁸ Henry D. Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 1945,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 1 (1978): 53-54.

metropolises. According to Evelyn Schulz, monumental capital cities were the “physical representations of the power and wealth of the nation-states then competing with each other.”¹⁹ “In the age of imperialism,” Schulz adds, “capital cities were regarded as symbols of the progress of mankind and as the embodiment of modern civilization.”²⁰ As Takashi Fujitani observes, “in that age of rising nation-states a sort of international rivalry in the display of national power and prestige through urban architecture and space swept through Paris, Madrid, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and Washington.”²¹ Finally, as famously described by Carl Schorske, liberals in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna fashioned the Ringstrasse in order to demonstrate their values in “stone and space.”²² As Schorske argues, such abrupt modernization of urban space was one example of the disruptive “a-historical” cultural transformations and rejections of past forms that marked the advent of modernity.²³

Tokyo was suddenly thrust into this international competition of modern capital cities when it was designated the home of the emperor and the new seat of government several months after the beginning of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. At that time, an imperial decree entitled “Decree Renaming Edo as Tokyo and Moving the Capital”

¹⁹ Evelyn Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future: Kōda Rohan’s Thoughts on Urban Reform and the New Citizen in Ikkoku no Shuto (One Nation’s Capital),” in *Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power, and Memory in Kyoto, Edo and Tokyo*, ed. Nicolas Fiévé and Paul Waley (London: Routledge, 2003), 286.

²⁰ Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future,” 286.

²¹ Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 32.

²² Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 24, 62.

²³ Schorske, *Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, xviii.

ambiguously announced, “...the place known as Edo will henceforth be [the “Eastern Capital”] Tokyo.”²⁴ Even before the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868, several government leaders, especially Ōkubo Toshimichi, felt it was necessary to move the capital in order to extract the emperor from Kyoto and the undue influence of court aristocrats. Ōkubo’s first choice was the port city of Osaka.²⁵ Others, such as Etō Shimpei, however, preferred Edo. “Since Edo is the center of the nation,” Etō argued, “it should become established as the permanent national capital in the future.”²⁶ Edo had several benefits as a site for the capital: first, it was located in the middle of the country; second, the estates of the Tokugawa bureaucracy and supports could be seized for the use of the new government ministries and officials; and finally, the former shogun’s castle could be repurposed as the Imperial Palace.²⁷

The renaming of Edo as the “Eastern Capital,” Tokyo, gave new urgency to its urban condition. Not only was Tokyo now the home of the emperor and the seat of the Meiji Government, but it was also designated as a treaty port, meaning it would host large numbers of foreign ambassadors, dignitaries, and traders. As the modern capital of a modern nation, Tokyo was expected to demonstrate Japan’s modernization and Westernization, and, as Toshio Watanabe argues, show that Japan was a modern nation

²⁴ Translated in Edward Seidensticker, *Low City, High City: Tokyo from Edo to the Earthquake* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 26.

²⁵ Masakazu Iwata, *Ōkubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck of Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 117-118.

²⁶ Quoted in M. William Steele, *Alternative Narratives in Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 79.

²⁷ Iwata, *Ōkubo Toshimichi*, 118-119. For more on the transition of Tokugawa lands under the Meiji regime see Kanaya Masataka, “Edo kara Tōkyō ni okeru Tenkanki no Kenkyū” [The transition from Edo to Tokyo], MA Thesis, Hōsei University, 2012.

“worthy of being treated as an equal among other developed nations.”²⁸ Or, as William H. Coaldrake writes, Tokyo was expected to garner Japan “international recognition and acceptance as a modern nation.”²⁹ This required modernizing the built form of the capital in order to produce spaces that Westerners would recognize as “modern” and “civilized.” The Bricktown marked the first major attempt to produce a capital that would announce the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji and Japan’s arrival at world modernity.

Concretizing the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji in the built form of the imperial capital had a second, domestic significance, as central government leaders attempted to politically consolidate and ideologically unite the nation. In addition to international pressure, several domestic troubles faced the fledgling Meiji regime in 1872. The last of the Tokugawa holdouts from the Bōshin War had only recently been defeated in mid-1869, and the abolition of old domains and establishment of new prefectures (*Haihan Chiken*) had occurred only several months earlier in the summer of 1871. The bureaucratic structure of the central government, furthermore, was in flux as factions within the Meiji elite vied for control. In this context, the re-creation of Tokyo as a national capital was one of several major projects, along with construction of the national railway network, undertaken by the nascent Meiji state in the process of centralizing and standardizing the emerging nation-state.³⁰ By reconstructing Edo into a

²⁸ Toshio Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” *Art Journal* 55, no. 3, *Japan 1868-1945: Art, Architecture, and National Identity* (1996): 22.

²⁹ William H. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), 208-209.

³⁰ For more on this, see Tristan R. Grunow, “Tracks to Teito: The Tokyo Train Network and the Meiji Quest for Domestic Hegemony and International Recognition,” MA Thesis, University of Oregon, 2008.

visibly modern Tokyo, the Meiji regime could unmistakably distance itself from its Tokugawa predecessors. The Ginza Bricktown would become the first step in this effort.

As Ishizuka Hiromichi argues:

The new government, at the time the sole ruler representing Japan internationally, was in the process of becoming the sole unified ruler domestically as well. As such, the first undertaking in the project of establishing an imperial capital suitable for a centrally unified nation was the construction of Ginza Bricktown.³¹

In addition to the importance of political consolidation, ideological unity was an essential element of Meiji state-formation. As Gavin Shatkin has argued, the first political function of capital cities is to “present an ‘argument’ for the legitimacy of [the national government’s] policies and programmes [*sic*] by presenting the capital as a symbol of progress that represents a template for the rest of the nation to follow.”³² In this regard, the quick action taken by the government to halt the traditional pattern of reconstruction before it could begin suggests that government leaders saw an opportunity to rebuild the district as a symbol of “civilization and enlightenment” (*bunmei kaika*) for the capital, and the nation beyond. Indeed, as Fujimori Terunobu writes, for the Japanese government, “the door to *bunmei* was in Ginza.”³³ In a similar vein, David Howell has argued that behind central government attempts to drive out common “uncivilized” public practices, such as public urination and mixed bathing, lay “a more profound effort

³¹ Ishizuka Hiromichi, “Meiji-ki ni okeru toshi keikaku – Tōkyō ni tsuite,” in *Toshi-kōzō to Toshi-keikaku*, ed. Tōkyō-toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyūkai-hen (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968), 486.

³² Gavin Shatkin, “Colonial Capital, Modernist Capital, Global Capital: The Changing Political Symbolism of Urban Space in Metro Manila, the Philippines,” *Pacific Affairs* 78 (2005-2006): 579.

³³ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 3.

to encourage the Japanese people to internalize new notions of civilization while at the same time preventing them from moving in uncontrollable directions.”³⁴ This attitude towards “uncivilized” habits was echoed in the government’s criticism of fire-prone traditional housing practices following the 1872 Ginza fire.³⁵ In this way, the introduction of a westernized urban space in the Ginza Bricktown was part of the larger centralization and westernization policies initiated by a central government intent on driving out the “evil customs” of the past and uniting the nation under the banner of “civilization and enlightenment.”

Lastly, at the internal government level, the Ginza Bricktown served as an arena where competing factions jostling for political power within the central government waged their battles. As works by Michio Umegaki, David Howell, and Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth point out, despite being like-minded members of a political elite loathe to letting power slip from their hands, the Meiji oligarchs were by no means monolithically united in their political views or even their visions for the direction of the new country.³⁶ Umegaki, for example, writes that after the Restoration the activists “continued their mutual and often debilitating suspicion and jealousy in addition to competing among themselves on policy issues.” “Their earlier engagement in the common cause of creating the emperor’s government,” he adds, “had not made them a

³⁴ David Howell, “Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan,” in *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 95.

³⁵ See NAJ, “*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.*”

³⁶ Michio Umegaki, *After the Restoration: The Beginning of Japan’s Modern State* (New York: New York University Press, 1988); Howell, “Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan”; Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, *The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

community of the equally committed.”³⁷ Instead, differences of opinion, factionalism, suspicions of power-grabbing, and simple pragmatic trial-and-error left the early Meiji regime in a state of administrative flux with frequent shifting of bureaucratic jurisdictions and personnel.³⁸ The Three Offices (*San Shoku*) of government established on the day of the Meiji *coup d'état* in the first month of 1868 were quickly replaced by the Seven Departments (*Shichi Ka*) one month later and the Eight Bureaus (*Hachi Kyoku*) in turn two weeks after that, before the quasi-constitutional *Seitasho* system was established in mid-1868. This too was short-lived and was replaced by the Council of State (*Dajōkan*) system in August 1869.

In the midst of this political jockeying for power, the Finance Ministry (*Ōkurashō*) emerged as the strongest organ of government in the first few years of the Meiji period. At first charged with reversing the rapid inflation caused by Yuri Kimimasa's ill-advised attempt to stimulate local manufacturing by circulating irredeemable paper currency known as *Dajōkansatsu*, the bureaucratic reach of the Finance Ministry increased greatly in the government restructuring of August 1869. Subsuming the Bureau for Trade and Commerce from the Foreign Affairs Ministry (*Gaimushō*), the Finance Ministry was also given jurisdictional control over the affairs of the Civil Affairs Ministry (*Minbushō*), effectively combining the two. As a result, the two ministries shared ministers, vice-ministers, and deputy vice ministers. The Finance Ministry grew so powerful that Umegaki has termed the ministry at this time a

³⁷ Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 109.

³⁸ The most detailed account of these administrative changes is Robert Arden Wilson, *Genesis of the Meiji Government in Japan, 1868-1871* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

“government within the government.”³⁹ Although Matsudaira Yoshinaga and then Date Munenari held titular leadership of the Finance Ministry, real power was wielded by the energetic Vice-Minister of Finance and Civil Affairs, Ōkuma Shigenobu, and his Kido Takayoshi-supported allies, Deputy Vice-Minister Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru.

Under Ōkuma’s strong leadership, the Finance Ministry quickly became the center for aggressive modernization and reform projects. As Sakata Yoshio explains, these reforms were mainly intended to consolidate political rule of the country. “It was among these bureaucrats in the Finance Ministry that allegiance to one’s own domain (*jihan ishiki*) was first overcome by national consciousness (*kokka ishiki*),” Sakata notes, “therefore they shared the goal of making Japan a modern, centralized nation in the image of the Western countries.”⁴⁰ Umegaki agrees, writing that the reforms carried out by these progressives “were inspired by the need to protect the fragile Imperial government as a whole, particularly against any doubt of its legitimacy by the foreign powers.”⁴¹ Gathering progressives into the Reform Office (*Kaisei Kakari*), chaired by Shibusawa Eiichi, Ōkuma and Itō sponsored a number of reforms meant to consolidate Meiji rule by standardizing nationwide coinage and trade. More importantly, the Finance Ministry followed up these efforts to centralize monetary policy with major construction projects that would spur the production of private capital while modernizing the nation,

³⁹ Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 114.

⁴⁰ Sakata, “Nihon ni okeru Kindai Kanryō no Hassei” [Origins of Modern Bureaucracy in Japan], *Jinbun Gakuhō* 3 (1953): 6.

⁴¹ Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 113.

including the construction of lighthouses, telegraphs, model factories, a mint, and finally the Tokyo-Yokohama railway.⁴²

But these aggressive reforms came at a cost. “The new cadre of intellectuals [in the Reform Office] constituted the most progressive group in the government,” Motoyama Yukihiro writes, “Not even the *Dajōkan* could restrain them in their zeal to built a methodical foundation for their vision of a ‘prosperous country’; and they themselves paid no heed to the conflict they provoked with those in other ministries or regional administrations who held more realistic or conservative views.”⁴³ Not surprisingly, the radical reforms and bureaucratic power of Ōkuma, Itō, and Inoue in the Finance Ministry quickly upset other members of the Meiji regime.⁴⁴ Conservatives, and those who sought to retain a clear divide in the decision-making and administrative functions of government between the *Dajōkan* and the ministerial bureaucracy, were especially concerned. An overly active ministry threatened to blur the separation of administrative powers. As Albert Craig sums up the situation, “[the Finance Ministry] was too progressive for mossbacks from Satsuma, and it had too much power...The

⁴² Sakata, “Nihon ni okeru Kindai Kanryō no Hassei,” 8.

⁴³ Motoyama Yukihiro, *Proliferating Talents: Essays on Politics, Thought, and Education in the Meiji Era* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 143.

⁴⁴ Junesay Iddittie compares the influence of Ōkuma at this time to that of Julius Caesar, panegyrically writing: “Though Lord Date was the nominal head Okuma was master of the house. He commanded an army of young, valiant soldiers, officered by such able captains as Ito, Inouye, and Shibusawa. The commander led his legion forth and went to conquer new lands in the shape of telegraph and railway, of lighthouse and mint. No wonder the senators should have felt uneasy, for Caesar after his conquest of Gaul might cross the Rubicon and march up to the walls of Rome.” Junesay Iddittie, *The Life of Marquis Okuma Shigenobu* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1956), 129.

details are complicated, but the main story line is one of clique struggles and disagreements over goals.”⁴⁵

Starting in the summer of 1870, Ōkubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomi worked together to limit the power of Ōkuma and the reformers in the Finance Ministry. Eventually a compromise was found that would assuage both conservatives and those who feared that the ministries had usurped the authority of the Dajōkan. The Civil Affairs Ministry was detached from Finance in August 1870, placed under Ōkubo’s ally Ōki Takato, and given control of railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, and iron manufacture. In exchange, Ōkuma was promoted to Councilor (*sangi*) in the Dajōkan a month later in September. Although proposed by Kido, Ōkubo acquiesced to this idea in the hopes that it would weaken the Finance Ministry and restore the balance of power between the Dajōkan and the ministries. What followed next was a confusing back-and-forth of shifting jurisdictions as Ōkubo and Kido competed for influence while Kido went to work, slowly stripping the newly re-established Civil Affairs Ministry of its responsibilities. When Ōkubo took office as Minister of Civil Affairs in September 1870, Kido managed to have jurisdictional control of commerce transferred from Civil Affairs back to the Finance Ministry. Then in December, Kido maneuvered to have the Public Works Ministry (*Kōbushō*) created under Gotō Shōjirō and Itō Hirobumi, taking over control of many of the responsibilities of Civil Affairs, including railways, telegraphy, lighthouses, iron manufacturing, and mining. Greatly weakened, the Civil Affairs Ministry was abolished the next year in September 1871 and its remaining

⁴⁵ Albert M. Craig, “The Central Government,” in *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji*, ed. Marius B. Jansen, and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 56.

responsibilities passed once again to Finance. Not to be outdone, Ōkubo in turn put himself in the best position possible to control the power of the Finance Ministry, that of Finance Minister, in August 1871.⁴⁶

It was in the context of these international, domestic, and internal political factors that Meiji government leaders responded to the destruction of Ginza in 1872. As Japanese government leaders surveyed the damaged areas, they sensed a need and an opportunity to immediately construct a new capital that would project the modernity and power of the new regime both internationally and domestically. Yet this still does not explain the timing or force of the project. While this political context conditioned the Meiji leaders response to the fire, ultimately it was the timing of the fire that determined the final form of Ginza Bricktown.

Space of Politics: Why Now? Ginza Bricktown as Political Expedience

When the Ginza fire broke out at the end of the second month of 1872, nearly three months had passed since half of the ruling Meiji elite had left the country as part of the Iwakura Mission to the West. As Iwakura Tomomi, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, and Itō Hirobumi travelled overseas, guidance of the government was entrusted for the time being to the so-called “Caretaker Government,” made up of conservatives Saigō,

⁴⁶ This discussion is based on Wilson, *Genesis of the Meiji Government in Japan*, 78; Richard L. Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Restoration* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 23-24; and Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 111-123. See also W.G. Beasley, “Meiji Political Institutions,” Chapter 10 of *Cambridge History of Japan 5: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Craig, “The Central Government”; and George Akita, *Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). For a much different perspective that interprets this reshuffling as politically expedient consensus-building by Ōkubo, see Iwata, *Ōkubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck of Japan*.

Itagaki, and progressives Ōkuma and Vice-Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru. With the absence of Iwakura and Ōkubo, in particular, Ōkuma and Inoue saw an opportunity to push reforms, including the reconstruction of Ginza.

Ōkuma's opponents had badly miscalculated in 1870 when they assumed that naming him Councilor would weaken his influence. While they had succeeded in temporarily restoring the balance of power between the Dajōkan and the ministries, they ironically elevated Ōkuma to a position where he would have even more ability to influence policy and institute reforms. When the central government underwent further reshuffling in August 1871, following the resignation en masse of the Dajōkan upon completion of the “dissolution of domains and placement of prefecture” (*Haihan Chiken*) program, Ōkuma's was named one of only 4 Councilors in the new Dajōkan. Under the new system, the Dajōkan was reformed into a three-chamber system presided over by the Central Chamber (*Sei'in*), a six-person assembly made up of the prime minister (*Dajōdaijin*), the minister of the right (*Udaijin*), and four councilors (*Sangi*). In an attempt to retain a consensus, these positions were split between conservatives and progressives. Sanjō, who had supported Kido's bid to name Ōkuma councilor, kept his position as prime minister. Iwakura stayed as minister of the right. Saigō Takamori and Itagaki Taisuke, meanwhile, joined Kido and Ōkuma as councilors, balancing the “Big Four” domains of Satsuma, Tosa, Chōshū, and Hizen, respectively.⁴⁷

In his position as Councilor, Ōkuma had a hand in the planning and implementation of two major projects that were crucial to the centralization and modernization of the Japanese nation. The first was the “dissolution of domains and

⁴⁷ Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 164.

placement of prefectures” (*Haihan Chiken*) in August 1871. Although the program was originally planned by Kido Takayoshi, Ōkuma was instrumental in bringing his native domain of Hizen into the fold. The second was the Iwakura Mission. It was Ōkuma whom the government ordered in May 1871 to investigate the feasibility of sending a mission to the West to pursue treaty revision.⁴⁸ The idea had apparently come from Guido Verbeck, the famous instructor of Western law who counted among his pupils Ōkuma, Ōkubo, Itō, and Soejima Taneomi. Ōkuma’s official biographer concludes that Ōkuma latched onto the idea as a convenient way to send conservatives in the government as far away from Japan as possible where they would be unable to block his reform efforts.

While it is questionable whether Ōkuma orchestrated the Iwakura Mission for this purpose, it is undeniable that the departure of the Mission granted him a level of power in the central government that he had not possessed since 1870. The absence of Iwakura and Kido left Sanjō Sanetomi, Saigō Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke and Ōkuma as the only present members of the Central Chamber of the Dajōkan. Of these four, Ōkuma quickly emerged as the main decision-maker. As Ōkuma later recalled, the other members took little interest in their official duties:

Those who constituted the core of the central government were Sanjō, Saigō, Itagaki and I. Of them, Sanjō stayed in the government simply because of his fame and status; in practice, he was merely another number in the government. Saigō and Itagaki had won their distinction at the time of the Restoration. However, they had secluded themselves in their home domains for most of the years since then and rarely involved themselves in central administration.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Donald Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 206.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 166.

Ōkuma also noted that Saigō and Itagaki were largely absent from deliberations:

Saigō and Itagaki, when the lunch break came, would hurriedly retreat to the anteroom [for cabinet members]. Thereafter, they would pass the time engrossing themselves in nonsensical conversation and never return to the cabinet meeting. Rarely would they show up again when someone was sent to call them back for the meeting. What they invariably conversed about were stories of battle, which always fascinated both men, or of sumo wrestling, or else of hunting and fishing...They would spend the rest of the day simple indulging themselves unconcernedly in such tête-à-tête chatting.⁵⁰

Finally, as Umegaki notes, after *Haihan Chiken*, government leaders who had previously relied on the support of their domainal troops for political influence – most notably Saigō and Itagaki – suddenly found themselves on the outside looking in at government decision-making.⁵¹ This in effect gave Ōkuma and Inoue a free hand in central government decision-making. As they later recalled, they did “70 to 80 percent of the business of the administration” during this time.⁵²

Ōkuma and Inoue lost little time in reinstating the program of progressive reform projects to modernize and centralize the nation under Meiji rule that had been interrupted two years earlier when power was wrested from their hands with the dissolution of the Civil Affairs-Finance Ministry. Although the caretaker government had signed a written pledge prior to the departure of the Iwakura Mission not to make any drastic changes in policy, they still managed to implement several far-reaching reforms and major laws. As Joyce C. Lebra catalogues, reforms enacted by the Caretaker government included: “legal abolition of the *eta* (pariah caste), legal abolition of prostitution, prohibition of wearing

⁵⁰ Quoted in Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 166.

⁵¹ Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 122.

⁵² Quoted in Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 122.

swords, liquidation of *han* [domain] debts, exchange of *han* currencies for a national currency, and plans for amortisation [*sic*] of samurai pensions through bonds and cash payments.”⁵³ Add to this list new laws on national banks, compulsory education, military conscription, and a new land tax, in addition to a series of sumptuary reforms on hairstyles, clothing, and the calendar.⁵⁴ Many of these reforms were passed over the objections of conservatives in the government, and without seeking the permission of the vacant Iwakura ambassadors. As Ōkuma proclaimed, “We can reform everything without consulting them because world civilization is known everywhere.”⁵⁵

Another major project that should be included in the list of reforms enacted by Ōkuma and Inoue in the absence of the Iwakura Mission is Ginza Bricktown. Seeing a chance to create the imperial capital they had in mind, with the blessing of councilor Ōkuma, Finance Ministry officials Inoue and Shibusawa commandeered the reconstruction of Ginza from the Tokyo municipal government. In the immediate wake of the fire, Tokyo Governor Yuri Kimimasa had followed the typical protocol for reconstruction in case of fires in Edo: widen streets to create firebreaks. This explains the prohibition of housing construction on the 27th and orders for the Public Works ministry to survey the burnt areas on the 28th in preparation for street widening. At this point, progressives in the Finance Ministry stepped in to take over the reconstruction of Ginza. Three days after the fire on the 29th, Finance Ministry official Shibusawa Eiichi went

⁵³ Joyce Lebra, *Ōkuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Japan* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 23.

⁵⁴ Marlene J. Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31:4 (1972): 794.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Lebra, *Ōkuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Japan*, 23.

before the *Dajōkan* and urged them to take this opportunity to reconstruct buildings in the district in brick. “To prevent sorrowful conflagrations such as this,” Shibusawa pleaded, “we must act quickly to widen streets and rebuild all the houses in the capital in brick so that they may be saved from fires.”⁵⁶ Because this would be extraordinarily expensive, Shibusawa – ever the businessman – proposed the establishment of a private company to construct and manage the buildings on behalf of the central government. Shibusawa also indicated that he had discussed these plans with Tokyo Vice-Councilor (*gonsanji*) Mishima Michitsune the previous evening and had found him to be entirely in agreement. As will be discussed further in the next chapter, Yuri, however, was not so easily swayed. When approached by Shibusawa and Mishima, Yuri countered by arguing that brick buildings would be too expensive for local residents and that the government should follow the traditional protocol of widening streets and leaving building reconstruction to landowners.⁵⁷ For now, Ōkuma, Inoue, and Shibusawa would use the power of the *Dajōkan* to overrule Governor Yuri’s objections to brick buildings as they endeavored to construct a modern urban space in Tokyo. On the 30th, the day after Shibusawa’s visit, the *Dajōkan* ordered the Tokyo municipal government to rebuild the destroyed in brick in cooperation with the Finance Ministry.

By going before the *Dajōkan*, Shibusawa was putting into action a plan already concocted by Ōkuma, Inoue, Itō, and himself. As Inoue later recalled, the idea for Ginza Bricktown had been hatched during a meeting at Ōkuma’s compound in the Tsukiji

⁵⁶ NAJ, “*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.*”

⁵⁷ The topics discussed during Shibusawa’s visit to the *Dajōkan* are summarized in a Finance Ministry report included with the *Dajōkan*’s order for brick construction. The report can be found in: NAJ, “*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.*”

district. As an influential member of the Meiji ruling elite, Ōkuma often hosted like-minded reformers, including Inoue, Itō, and Shibusawa. According to politician Ozaki Yukio, Inoue even lived in a house on Ōkuma's estate at one time. As Ozaki noted, because of the frequent meetings between Ōkuma and younger officials in the Finance Ministry, Ōkuma's residence came to be known as the Tsukiji Ryōzanpaku – named after the legendary Chinese bandit hideout, Liang Shan Po.⁵⁸ It was at one of these meetings that the group decided to take the opportunity to widen roads in the district since Ginza was certain to thrive in the future because of its location.⁵⁹ This collusion is evident in two nearly identical funding petitions filed by Inoue and Shibusawa on consecutive days the week after the fire. While Inoue petitioned the Central Board of the Dajōkan, Shibusawa sent his to the Tokyo government.⁶⁰ According to Shibusawa's diary, he had discussed the project finances with Inoue, and then filed this petition and received approval from the Central Chamber (*Sei'in*) "in Inoue's name."⁶¹ With Ōkuma's strengthened position on the Central Chamber of the Council of State, there was little doubt that the Bricktown scheme would succeed when put into action after the Ginza fire. As Inoue wrote in his petition, "Fortunately...the view of the Central Chamber is that the

⁵⁸ Ozaki Yukio, *The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in Japan*, trans. Fujiko Hara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 47. In Japanese, the term Ryōzanpaku denotes a place where extraordinary men gather.

⁵⁹ Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 28. In Inoue's telling, the plan was discussed by Ōkuma, Itō, and himself. Itō, however, was not in Japan at the time of the Ginza fire, arriving for a temporary stay in the fifth month before travelling back to the United States to rejoin the Iwakura Mission.

⁶⁰ The two petitions can be found in *TSS*, vol. 52, 820-822.

⁶¹ Shibusawa Seien Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed. *Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō* [Documents from the life of Shibusawa Eiichi] (Tokyo: Shibusawa Seien Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, 1955), 3:323-326.

layout of districts affected by this recent fire should be fixed and residences should be rebuilt in brick.”⁶² Clearly Ōkuma, who believed in the universality of a “world civilization” that was known everywhere, saw the Ginza fire as an opportunity to bring modernity home to Japan.

That this would have been the view of the Central Chamber had the Iwakura Mission members been present was not guaranteed. Although he became a proponent of Westernization upon returning from the Iwakura Mission, Ōkubo had, Sidney D. Brown notes, “displayed annoyance at, and sometime opposed outright, the innovations of the young clique of Westernizing bureaucrats assembled by Ōkuma Shigenobu in the Finance Ministry in 1870 and 1871,” before going overseas.⁶³ Other members of the Iwakura Mission, even Kido, meanwhile, expressed displeasure upon hearing of what they saw as superficial reforms passed behind their backs by the Caretaker Government. Returning to Japan in 1873, for example, Iwakura Tomomi lamented to British ambassador Harry Parkes what he saw as reckless attempts at modernization:

The changes are not to my mind satisfactory. Much is said about progress but I find our progress is more superficial than real and that our recent administration is wanting in earnestness and permanence. Our measures must be better adapted to the actual condition of our people. It is a mistake to think that Japan is as present fitted to take rank with the nations of England and America.⁶⁴

⁶² Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 34. The wording of the petition in this source slightly different in *TSS*, vol. 52, 820-822. The petition can also be found in Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū,” 83.

⁶³ Sidney Devere Brown, “Ōkubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in Early Meiji Japan,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 21, no. 2 (1962): 189.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873,” 795-796.

Such criticisms raise doubt about whether or not the Ginza Bricktown project would have been undertaken had these elder statesmen been running the show.

The timing of the Ginza Bricktown, therefore, can be explained as the right group of political leaders being in power at the right time. When provided with the perfect geographical setting, progressives in the Finance Ministry quickly and forcefully took advantage of the opportunity to impose a modern urban space that satisfied several political goals. In this way, Ginza Bricktown was planned as the first step in re-creating Tokyo as an imperial capital that would simultaneously: 1) facilitate treaty revision; 2) concretize the political hegemony of the Meiji regime; 3) and solidify the bureaucratic power of the Finance Ministry. To accomplish each of these goals, Meiji leaders needed an imperial space marking the arrival of Japanese modernity. This would require a modern urban space that would symbolically unite the symbolic power of railways, architecture, and urban planning. Ginza provided the perfect setting.

Space as Politics: Why Ginza? Shimbashi Station and the Gateway to the Capital

For planners looking to design an imperial capital that would satisfy multiple international and domestic political goals, there could have been no better setting than Ginza. As scholars have frequently noted, Ginza was bordered by the new Shimbashi railway station adjacent to the south, the Imperial Palace to the west, and the foreign settlement in Tsukiji to the east. This meant that visitors making their way to Tokyo from Yokohama via railway would emerge from Shimbashi Station directly into the Ginza Bricktown. For foreign visitors, especially, this meant that they would walk

through the Bricktown on their way to their lodgings in the Tsukiji Foreign Settlement or to various ministry buildings located near the imperial palace.⁶⁵

The proximity of Ginza to Shimbashi Station was especially beneficial for politicians intent on creating an imperial space to project the modernity and power of the Meiji regime. Constructed adjacent to Japan's first railway station, the Ginza Bricktown was symbolically linked to the railway network and the national integration it represented. Indeed, the flames of the Ginza fire would have been visible to the laborers just across the Shiodome River driving the last stakes on the Tokyo-Yokohama railway line, or putting the finishing touches on the Station. Planned by Ōkuma Shigenobu and Itō Hirobumi in 1869 at the height of the Finance Ministry's power, this line was constructed as the first leg of an envisioned national railway network. Despite military concerns that such a line would allow invading foreign troops quick access to the capital, this route was constructed first because of the potential trade benefits it promised by connecting the Tokyo market to the Yokohama port. Such considerations also went into the placing of stations at either end of the line. Ultimately, Shimbashi was chosen for the Tokyo terminus, with the terminus in Yokohama located at Noge Kaigan. Both sites were chosen because they were close enough to the urban areas and foreign settlements to facilitate trade, yet distant enough from the city center to make land prices cheaper and

⁶⁵ Similar points are found in Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan*, 61; Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 54; Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 30; and Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 32.

limit the range of perambulating foreigners.⁶⁶ As a result, Shimbashi was to become the new entryway into the capital.

To design suitable terminal stations on both ends of the line, the government hired R.P. Bridgens, a freelance American architect. Bridgens' design for both stations – two large French neo-Renaissance-inspired two-story balustraded pavilions flanking a smaller, one-story pedimented offset central pavilion – owed a debt to the larger Gare de l'Est in Paris, as architectural historian Dallas Finn has noted.⁶⁷ Construction of Shimbashi terminal proceeded in the third month of 1871 from the outer stone walls of the flanking pavilions, with the metal roof and glass fanlight of the central pavilion finished by the fourth month of the next year. The painting of the train platform's metal roof and pillars in the sixth month of 1872 marked the completion of the entire station building.⁶⁸ The opening ceremony for the station and the new railway line was then held in the presence of the Meiji Emperor and assorted foreign diplomats and dignitaries during the ninth month of 1872.⁶⁹ “We earnestly pray (*koinegau*),” the Meiji Emperor intoned at the ceremony, “that this enterprise [of railways] will expand, and this line will

⁶⁶ Aoki Eiichi, “The Dawn of Japanese Railroads,” *Japan Railway & Transport Review* 1 (1994): 28; Harada Katsumasa, “Railroads,” section of Chapter 2, “Transportation in Transition (1868-1891),” in *Technological Innovation and the Development of Transportation in Japan*, ed. Hirofumi Yamamoto (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1993), 18.

⁶⁷ Dallas Finn, *Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan* (New York: Weatherhill, 1995), 46.

⁶⁸ Tetsudōryō, “Tōkyō-shimbashi kara Yokohama Nogeura ni itaru Tetsudō shokenchiku kasho-wake hiyō kōmoku” [Details of expenses for construction of the railway from Shimbashi Tokyo to Nogeura Yokohama], *Kenchiku Zasshi* 230 (1906): 93-105.

⁶⁹ *TSS*, vol. 53 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1963), 459-485.

spread like a vine (*manpu*) across the whole country.”⁷⁰ As the national railway network grew over the ensuing decades, Shimbashi became the symbolic heart of a railway network consolidating central control over the periphery. Anchored by the soon to be completed Shimbashi station as the point of disembarkation, Ginza provided the perfect setting for the Meiji government to construct a new Western-style gateway to the city, one that would impress visitors, both foreign and domestic, with the modernity of the new Japan.

Because Shimbashi Station would bring a large number of foreign and domestic visitors to the city, Tokyo city officials had recognized the need for an impressive gateway to the city located in the Ginza area even before the 1872 fire. Just after construction commenced on Shimbashi Station in mid-1871, the Tokyo government proposed street improvements aimed at impressing foreign visitors to the Shimbashi, Ginza, and Tsukiji areas – or as the proposal described, “roads where foreigners generally pass” (*gaikokujin ōyoso tsūkō michi*).⁷¹ The proposal, entitled “Inquiry Regarding the Repairing of Roads in the Capital” (*Fuka Dōro Shūzen no Gi ni tsuku Ukagaisho*), anticipated later road improvement projects in Tokyo by decrying the dangerous and inefficient conditions of road traffic in the city caused by narrow roads and uneven surfaces, and by suggesting the separation of sidewalks and carriageways as a solution.⁷²

⁷⁰ Hara Takeshi, “*Minto*” *Osaka tai “Teito” Tōkyō: Shisō toshite Kansai Shitetsu* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998), 20.

⁷¹ Ishizuka, “Meiji-ki ni okeru toshi keikaku – Tōkyō ni tsuite,” 486; Ishizuka Hiromichi, *Nihon Kindai Toshiron – Tōkyō: 1868-1923* [Modern Japanese Cities, Tokyo: 1868-1923] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), 41. The full text of the proposal can be found in Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 11-12.

⁷² Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 11-12, 13.

Although the project was not carried out, this proposal confirms that planners recognized a link between railways and streets as elements of modern urban space. The government now turned its attention to the built form of the district.

“Buildings Like London”: The Architecture of Ginza Bricktown

The introduction of Western architecture was a clear signal that the Bricktown was meant to convey a political meaning. As William H. Coaldrake proclaims, “Architecture was charged with a mission of the highest national significance: proclaiming loudly on every city block and street corner Japan’s assurance and authority as a modern state.”⁷³ The adoption of western architecture also demonstrated a sharp break from both traditional built forms and existing political institutions. As Toshio Watanabe argues, western buildings embodied the “authority of a central government that aimed to rule far more directly than did the previous Tokugawa government.”⁷⁴ Watanabe continues:

Large, imposing modern edifices would impress upon the Japanese people the power and stability of the new regime. Western styles were clearly different from anything Edo culture could offer and, above all, provided an image of modernity. The public could see for itself that the new government was progressive rather than retrogressive like the old one. By using Western styles the governmental patrons of such buildings could make their political intentions visible. Additionally, Western-style buildings looked grand and imposing, a rare quality in Edo-period architecture. Multistory stone or brick buildings gave the impression of solidity, permanence, and authority, all qualities the young Meiji government was striving for. The Western style fit the bill perfectly.⁷⁵

⁷³ Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, 209-210.

⁷⁴ Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” 22-23.

⁷⁵ Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” 23.

As Watanabe's description suggests, Western architecture was the perfect medium for the deployment of what David Harvey calls the "myth of a radical break."⁷⁶ In this vein, Meiji officials introduced Western building forms in an attempt to affirm the transition between Edo and Tokyo, Tokugawa and Meiji, or traditional and "modern" Japan.⁷⁷

In order to achieve the desired Western cityscape, the central government surveyed no fewer than 5 foreign architects and civil engineers either already in the employ of various government ministries or working privately in Japan at the time. Among those solicited for opinions on the future district were Louis Felix Florent, John Smedley, Richard Henry Brunton, and Colin Alexander McVean.⁷⁸ The central government eventually hired Irish engineer Thomas J. Waters to design the brick buildings and supervise construction of the new district.⁷⁹ *The Japan Weekly Mail*

⁷⁶ David Harvey, *Paris: Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 10.

⁷⁷ Carol Gluck describes how an invented conception of traditional Japan, which came to be encapsulated under the name "Edo," became a "mirror of modernity" utilized by the Meiji government to distinguish and differentiate itself from its Tokugawa predecessor, in Carol Gluck, "The Invention of Edo," in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, ed. Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 262-284.

⁷⁸ Tsukada Kei and Tsuchimoto Toshikazu, "Dōro Kisoku no Keisei: Bakumatsu Meijiki Yokohama ni okeru Toshi Kaizō ni kansuru Kenkyū" [The Development of Road Codes: A Study of Urban Improvement of Yokohama in the Late Tokugawa and early Meiji period], *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Keikakukei Ronbunshū* 575 (2004): 169. In addition to being remembered as the father of Japanese lighthouses, Brunton had previously been involved in improving the Foreign Settlement in Yokohama after it was destroyed by fire in 1866, resulting in Japan's first macadamized street, known as *Bashamichi*, or "horse carriage street." Brunton describes his involvement in the rebuilding of the Yokohama Foreign Settlement in Richard Henry Brunton, *Building Japan, 1868-1876* (1906. Reprint, Sandgate, Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1991), 30-33. Thereafter, the term "*bashamichi*" became a Meiji-era catch-all name for Westernized streets, or those that were macadamized or paved.

⁷⁹ These advisors were Louis Felix Florent, John Smedley, Colin Alexander McVean, and Richard Henry Brunton. More will be said about them in the next section. Waters was

reported 6 weeks later that Inoue had “arranged with MR. WATERS for rebuilding the houses and laying out fresh streets” as early as the day after the fire.⁸⁰ As the Weekly Mail report suggests, the choice of Waters probably owed to his close personal acquaintances with Ōkuma, Inoue, and Itō. Waters, after all, was already retained by the Finance Ministry to design the Osaka Mint and its Tokyo branch location, as well as the Takebashi barracks.⁸¹

Waters’ main responsibility was to draw up building designs (*Kaoku Kenchiku Hōhō*; lit. Housing Construction Procedures) and construction rules (*Rengaseki Kenchiku Hōhō*; lit. Brick Construction Procedures) for the buildings.⁸² When released to the public just over two weeks after the fire on 1872.3.13, Waters’ designs satisfied government leaders who had hoped to replicate a modern, Western-style cityscape in Tokyo, although on a much-reduced scale. Waters proposed 4 classes of structures. First class buildings facing the widest streets would be three-stories tall and rise as high as 40 feet, with building heights decreasing for each lower class structure. Waters also

hired effective 1872.3.24, or May 1, 1872 in the Gregorian calendar. Strangely, this was 11 days after Waters’ building designs were released to the public on the 13th. At Waters’ behest, two more advisors were hired: his brother, Albert Waters, and E. Shillingford. Other stipulations in the contract included a monthly salary of ¥350, one month of vacation per year, two months of sick time, and free housing. As Governor Yuri informed Inoue, these two additional advisors were employed effective 1872.4.27. See: Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 30; and *TSS*, vol. 52, 905.

⁸⁰ The Japan Weekly Mail, May 18, 1872, 1. May 18, 1872 was 1872.4.11 in the lunar calendar.

⁸¹ Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 35; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 7-9.

⁸² Matsuyama Megumi raises a similar question, pointing out the discrepancies between Waters’ plans and for individually massed buildings and the completed row houses in Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū,” 85.

suggested parapets to protect the eaves of the buildings.⁸³ Architectural historian Fujimori Terunobu has described Waters' design for Bricktown buildings as the "King George" style, typified by Tuscan columns, pediments, and symmetrical designs. As this particular style was popular at the time in London, Fujimori surmises that Waters' design for the buildings was inspired by his "nostalgia for the fatherland."⁸⁴ Because construction would be carried out by Japanese craftsmen unfamiliar with bricks as a building material or with western architecture in general, Waters' designs included detailed diagrams of brick patterns for walls, wall foundations, and roof joints for each class of building. Beyond these basic requirements, the exterior design of the building was left to each owner. Knowing this, Waters attempted to ensure design uniformity and quality control, advising the Tokyo government to stipulate: "All persons wishing to erect brick buildings must first submit their plans to the Tokiofu [the Tokyo government] board of Works and receive its stamp otherwise the building cannot be proceeded with."⁸⁵

Despite Waters' attempts to maintain uniformity, period images and artistic depictions of the completed district reveal differences between Waters' designs and the finished buildings. For the most part, these changes depended on whether the structure in question was financed and constructed by the government, or by private individuals.

First, whereas Waters intended for first class buildings along the main streets to be three stories, upon construction they were lowered to only two. While the reason for this is not

⁸³ For Waters' building plans, including heights and description, see Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 70-71. For "built cheaply as possible," see Waters' handwritten "Estimate for Brick Houses" reproduced in Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, plate between 76-77.

⁸⁴ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 31.

⁸⁵ Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, frontispiece.

clear, it is notable that foreign experts Florent, Brunton, and Smedley all recommended that buildings should be limited to only 2 stories because of the frequent earthquakes in Tokyo.⁸⁶ Secondly, although Waters' planned for buildings to be individually massed, they were instead constructed in a row to provide an unbroken streetscape. As Tokyo public works official Takaishi explained to Inoue 1872.4.3, this was because "even with the designs presented by Waters, [whether] the houses are stand-alone *machiya* or row-houses (*ren'ya*) is up to the financier."⁸⁷ Again, this may have been influenced by one of the foreign advisors, Richard Henry Brunton, who suggested row houses. Thirdly, not all buildings had the planned pedestrian arcades: some featured individual details on windows, parapets, and entrances, such as the Westernized *karahafu* typical of early Meiji-period *giyōfū* (Western-"style") architecture; some were stuccoed; and others were left in naked brick. Since final say in building design was left to the owners, and construction was carried out by Japanese craftsmen, these stylistic changes can be reasonably explained as rearticulations of Waters' designs into more familiar vernacular forms. Buildings constructed by the central government, notably, stayed closest to Waters' original designs.⁸⁸

Despite these slight alterations, the Ginza Bricktown fulfilled the Finance Ministry's hopes for a beacon of Japan's progress and modernity. As one contemporary

⁸⁶ These were Florent, Smedley, and Brunton. See *TSS*, vol. 52, 882-894.

⁸⁷ *TSS*, vol. 54 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1963), 911.

⁸⁸ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 13, 19, 29; Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 134.

observer declared, “Here one feels as if one were in a foreign country for a while.”⁸⁹ Hattori Bushō, author of the *New Tales of Tokyo Prosperity (Tōkyō Shin Hanjōki)* published between 1874-1876, points to the “Kyōbashi Brick District,” as he calls the Ginza Bricktown, as one of the symbols of civilization and enlightenment in the city. “To lift the darkness and spread knowledge,” Hattori writes, “there is nothing like showing the actual scene with the real thing.”⁹⁰ Another Tokyo resident lyrically praised the Bricktown, putting Tokyo on a par with more famous European capitals: “The tall two-story buildings, towering into the blue sky one after the other as high as mountains; its grandeur is such that it completely imitates Western buildings!...The stone buildings, in other words, are like those of London, the English capital; the streets are like those in Paris, the French capital.”⁹¹

“Streets like Paris”: Street Improvements in Ginza Bricktown

As the poetic Tokyo-ite quoted above reminds us, the new brick buildings were only one part of Ginza Bricktown. While the district came to be known foremost for its fireproof Western-style brick buildings, an equally important part of the project was the improving of the existing street infrastructure. Not only would widened streets act as firebreaks to help prevent the spread of future conflagrations, improved street infrastructure – with paved street surfaces and sidewalks, gutters, and roadside trees – was necessary to create

⁸⁹ Julia Meech-Pekarkik, *The World of the Meiji Print: Impressions of a New Civilization* (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 92.

⁹⁰ Quoted in Maeda Ai, *Text and the City: Essays on Japanese Modernity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 80-81; Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea,” 54.

⁹¹ Quoted in Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 148.

a modern urban space. As early plans to improve streets in the Ginza area confirm, government leaders were concerned about how the appearance of the Tokyo streetscape would reflect on the entire nation of Japan. For this reason, planners supplemented their Western-style buildings with improved streets by seeking out the advice of foreign engineers active in Japan, setting the width of Ginza streets based on Western examples, and then introducing amenities seen in the West – sidewalks, gutters, roadside trees, and modern paving. With Western-influenced buildings and streets, this “unified cityscape,” as Carola Hein has aptly termed it, produced the modern urban space the Meiji leaders hoped for.⁹² Because the layout of the entire district was based on the imperial palace, moreover, this space was intended to project imperial symbolism. In this way, improved streets provided the final element for producing imperial space.

At the same time Waters was sketching his designs for the brick buildings, the Public Works Bureau set about planning the new street network for Ginza Bricktown. The foreign architects and engineers solicited for advice on the reconstruction of the district also had plenty to say about streets in the city. The message from all of these “experts” was resoundingly clear: Tokyo’s streets were too narrow and excessively winding. Florent, for example, advised that the most important things to be done were: 1) the straightening of blocks and the widening of roads, and 2) the setting of building

⁹² Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 461.

codes.⁹³ McVean, meanwhile, recommended a road network consisting of 5 classes of streets, the widest with roadways of 60 feet and sidewalks of 12 feet on both sides.⁹⁴

Japanese planners also looked to examples of street widths in the West to plan the streets of Ginza. According to the recollections of Tokyo Governor Yuri, the widths of the widest roads in London (25-ken, ~150ft.), New York City (24-ken, ~140ft.), and Washington DC (24-ken, ~140ft.) were brought up for consideration in discussions about the appropriate street width for the new district.⁹⁵ Inoue, however, later revealed that

⁹³ *TSS*, vol. 52, 882; translations of the plans submitted by each architect can be found in Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 48-58; and *TSS*, vol. 52, 882-904.

⁹⁴ As Ishida Yorifusa convincingly demonstrates, McVean was most likely involved with the surveying of the burnt districts following the Ginza fire. See: Ishida Yorifusa, *Nihon Kingendai Toshi Keikaku no Tenkai: 1868-2003* [Development of modern and contemporary Japanese urban planning, 1868-2003] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 2004), 25. For McVean's recommendations for Ginza, see: *TSS*, vol. 52, 897. Not surprisingly these were the exact widths recommended by famous fellow Scottish engineer William John Macquorn Rankine in both the 1862 and 1871 edition of his *A Manual of Civil Engineering*. Although he cautions "no general rule can be laid down" for street widths in populous areas, Rankine adds that where "the traffic is greatest, the width of carriageway is about 50 feet, with a pair of footways, each from 10 to 15 wide" (William John Macquorn Rankine, *A Manual of Civil Engineering* [London: Griffith, Bohn, and Company, 1862], 625). Rankine's *Manual* would later become a central part of the core civil engineering curriculum at the Imperial College of Engineering (*Kōbu Daigakkō*), and its successor, Tokyo University, under the direction of headmaster Henry Dyer, a student of Rankine's at Glasgow University. See: "An Engineering College in Japan," *Nature* 7 (1873): 430. Incidentally, a search of the University of Tokyo's library catalog reveals four editions of Rankin's *A Manual on Civil Engineering*, from 1871, 1877, 1885, and 1900, in addition to a fascinating Japanese translation from 1880, *Rankin-shi Doboku-gaku*. For more on Henry Dyer, see Graeme J.N. Gooday and Morris Low, "Technology Transfer and Cultural Exchange: Western Scientists and Engineers Encounter Tokugawa and Meiji Japan" *Osiris: 2nd Series* 13 (1998): 99-128; W.H. Brock, "The Japanese Connexion: Engineering in Tokyo, London, and Glasgow at the End of the Nineteenth Century Presidential Address, 1980," *The British Journal for the History of Science* 14:3 (1981): 227-244"; and David Allsobrook and Gordon Mitchell, "Henry Dyer: Engineer and Educational Innovator" *Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education* 33, no. 2 (1997): 433-457.

⁹⁵ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 11. One *ken* is 1.818 meters.

Yuri had scoffed at such widths, saying “Why the hell would we make the roads so wide (*Anna baka-na hiroi machi wo tsukutte dō suru tsumori ka*)?!?”⁹⁶ Inoue’s recollections of Yuri’s pessimism are corroborated by Mishima Michitsune – second in charge in the Tokyo government as Chief Advisor (*Kensanji*) at the time – who recalled in 1885 that Governor Yuri had initially argued for roads only 8-*ken* wide, typical for streets during the Edo period. Yet, “Around that time,” Mishima explained, “we received a report from a person staying overseas on the actual conditions of roads in foreign countries, explaining that their width is almost always more than 25-*ken*. As a result, it was argued that the width of Shimbashi Road [Ginza Main Street] should be made 20-*ken*, but it ended up being only 15-*ken*.”⁹⁷

With the width of the axial main street determined, the plan for the future road network was completed on the 17th day of the 3rd month, just 4 days after Waters’ building plans were announced. Although the Ginza area already had a grid street network, the new plan called for 4 classes of widened roads to distinguish thoroughfares,

⁹⁶ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 12.

⁹⁷ *TTKSS, (Meiji Taishō hen)*[Collection of Tokyo urban planning documents (the Meiji and Taisho periods)] (Tokyo: Hon no Tomosha, 1988), 31:21 back-22 front. While the specifics of this report or the identity of its sender are yet to be determined, it is worth remembering that the Ginza fire and subsequent planning for the Bricktown project coincided with the Iwakura Mission’s sojourn in Washington D.C. Moreover, after spending over one month in Washington, D.C., Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi had temporarily left the Mission, having departed before the Ginza fire and arriving back in Japan in the midst of Bricktown planning on 1872.3.24. The reason for Ōkubo and Itō’s brief return to Japan was to receive the official plenipotentiary powers necessary to negotiate for treaty revision. The rest of the Mission had arrived in Washington, D.C. on 1872.1.21 (February 29, 1872), from where Ōkubo and Itō departed on 1872.2.12 and 13 (March 20, and 21) respectively, arriving in Japan on 1872.3.24. Ōkubo and Itō left Japan on 1872.5.17 (June 22), and rejoined the Mission in Washington, D.C. one month later on 6.17 (July 22). Fujimori Terunobu surmises that this figure of 15-*ken* (~90 ft.) was a middle-ground compromise between Inoue and Yuri in Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 12-13.

feeders, and local access streets, as well as sidewalks to separate vehicle and pedestrian lanes. As agreed, the width of the axial main street would be widened to 15-*ken*, with 8-*ken* (~50ft.) of dedicated traffic lanes and 3.5-*ken* (~20ft.) set aside on both sides for pedestrian sidewalks.⁹⁸ At these widths, vehicles such as ox carts, rickshaws, horse-drawn carriages, and later even horse-drawn street trolleys, would be able to pass each other two abreast with room to spare.⁹⁹ The main east-west cross street, meanwhile, was designated as a second-class road, with a roadbed of 10-*ken* (~60ft.) and sidewalks of 2.5-*ken* (~15ft.). The rest of the grid was made up of third-, and fourth-class streets, with roadbeds of 8-*ken* (~50ft.) and 3-*ken* (~20ft.), respectively, and sidewalks of 2-*ken* (~12ft.) on the third-class roads.¹⁰⁰ Surveys to mark off new road widths for the main street were completed by the 27th, one month after the fire.¹⁰¹

Widening streets and laying sidewalks was only the groundwork; creating a presentable modern urban space required amenities to beautify the roadside environment. This included introducing modern street surface and sidewalk paving techniques, planting roadside trees, and erecting gas lamps to make the district more comfortable and aesthetically pleasurable for the large number of anticipated users. In order to provide a sturdy surface for the expected carts, rickshaws, and carriages, the street surface of Ginza Main Street was paved using the most up-to-date techniques. Using a simplified

⁹⁸ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 287.

⁹⁹ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 287; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 11; Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 38.

¹⁰¹ TSS, vol. 52, 876-877 indicates that street surveys would commence the following day on the 19th. See also Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 35, 37; Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 68, 132.

macadam-style paving, workers first removed the old road base down to the subgrade and then piled a new base to give the road surface a crown of 1 *shaku* (1 ft.) in order to drain rainwater away to the gutters on either side of the road. Gravel (*sareki*) was then spread on top and rolled flat with a stone roller to harden the surface.¹⁰² To provide firm footing for pedestrians, sidewalks were paved in one of two ways: either with paving stones (*ita'ishi*); or with bricks laid rowlock (*kobadate*) – laid horizontally on the longer edge – on top of 1 *sun* (~2.4in.) of sand with more sand as mortar between the bricks. Not only was this the first example of brick paving in Japan, it was the first time sidewalks had been seen in the capital.¹⁰³ So new was this feature that the Tokyo government felt it necessary to publicize the rules of the road when the main street was fully opened to the public on February 2, 1874, nearly two years after the Ginza fire. “Vehicles and pedestrians have been completely separated with vehicles in the center and pedestrians on the sides,” the government cautioned sightseers, “This must be absolutely understood so

¹⁰² Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 290; Ishii Ichirō, *Nihon ni okeru dōro gijutsu no hattatsu* [Development of Road Technology in Japan] (Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō Daigaku, 1979), 19; Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 151. One *shaku* is 30.3cm. There has been some confusion in the English scholarship as to the composition of road surfaces in the Ginza Bricktown. The most technically precise descriptions of road surface construction in the Bricktown are those found in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 290, and Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 151. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, in turn cites an unknown source described as Volume 4 of *Tōkyō Chiri Shiryō* [Documents of Tokyo Geography]. The above description updates a statement previously made in Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State-Formation in Meiji Japan,” in *Trains, Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails*, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 244. The road surfaces were not in fact paved in brick originally, rather, it was only some sidewalks that were paved in brick.

¹⁰³ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 287.

that there are no accidents henceforth.”¹⁰⁴ The separation of vehicles and pedestrians was reinforced by gutters and “visual walls” of trees planted in the roadbeds: pines on all four corners of each intersection, and maple and *sakura* cherry trees spaced every 40 feet in-between. In addition to improving safety, these roadside trees formed a canopy that shaded the commuters and crowds of curious onlookers below while enhancing the aesthetic environment of the district.¹⁰⁵ So that Ginza Bricktown could be enjoyed even after dark, gas lamps spaced every 165 feet along the main street illuminated the district starting in 1879.¹⁰⁶

Yet Ginza Bricktown was designed to be more than a comfortable place to take a leisurely stroll. It was designed to project imperial authority and power in space and built form. The symbolic connection between the urban space of Ginza Bricktown and the imperial system was concretized in the layout of the street network. “Considering that it has been decided to at this time gradually improve all roads and regulate all dwellings in the city, starting with the areas burned recently,” the Tokyo government explained the

¹⁰⁴ This announcement was made on February 2, 1874, when the Tokyo government announced the opening of the new road. See: *TSS*, vol. 56 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho 1965), 180; and Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 151.

¹⁰⁵ For street trees as “visual walls” and the multifarious benefits of roadside trees, see: Dan Burden, “22 Benefits of Urban Street Trees,” *Walkable Communities*, 8-9. By the time the main street was fully opened to the public on February 2, 1874, 148 trees had been planted. As Amano Kōichi and Shinohara Susumu note, possibly because of hindrances the trees posed to horses, the pine and maple trees were replaced with *sakura* cherry trees as they died starting in 1875. Even these *sakura* trees did not blossom, however, and all trees were replaced with willows in 1877. See: Amano Kōichi and Shinohara Susumu, “Ginza Dōri ni okeru Gairo Keikan no Hensen” [Changes in the street scenery of Ginza Main Street], *Nihon Dobokushi Kenkyū Happyōkai Ronbunshū 2* (1982): 76.

¹⁰⁶ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 287; Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 68, 150-152; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 24.

planning of the street layout to the Dajōkan on 3.17, “With the goal of the general implementation at a later date, the location of roads large and small is being determined with the imperial palace as the origin (*moto*).”¹⁰⁷ Although the former Shogun’s palace had been occupied by the emperor upon arrived in the new capital in 1869, the central government had still not declared exactly what constituted the “imperial palace.” Nor had it determined a permanent residence for the organs of the central government. The emergence of Ginza Bricktown, however, made this a high priority. “The old keep (*moto honmaru*), Ninomaru remains, and first Nishimaru Fukiage gardens [of Edo Castle] have been designated as the Imperial Palace (*kōkyō*),” the Dajōkan proclaimed twelve days later on 3.29, “As for the areas outside Nishimaru (*Nishimaru-shita*) [Marunouchi], it has been decided to construct the Dajōkan and other various government and ministry buildings here.”¹⁰⁸ Given Ōkuma Shigenobu’s elevated influence in the Dajōkan and his central role in the planning and execution of the Ginza Bricktown project, it is hard to see this as mere coincidence. Either way, it is clear that the layout of Ginza Bricktown was no accident. It was designed in the context of the location of the imperial palace and politico-geographical planning of the imperial capital.

What this meant on the ground is less straightforward. The Tokyo government had plainly stated that the road network was planned “with the imperial capital as the origin,” but examination of a series of maps of the Ginza neighborhood before and after the fire (Figures 1-5) reveals only very minor changes (see the Appendix for all figures).

¹⁰⁷ NAJ, “*Shōshitsu-ato Dōro no Ichi wo Sadamu ni tsuki Dōchi Kai-age narabini Rengashi Kenchiku Hōhō*,” Call#: *honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100*. This portion of the document is reprinted under the heading “*Dōro Kaisei*” in *TSS*, vol. 52, 876).

¹⁰⁸ Dajōkan, ed., *Dajōkan Nisshi, Meiji 5-nen, Dai 1-18 gō*. Entry dated 3.29. Accessed through KDL, Doc.#000000440339, Slide #130. Reprinted in *TSS*, vol. 52, 926.

As Carola Hein summarizes the differences, “it appears that the government’s actual urban planning intervention concentrated on block and lot reduction, the creation of new streets, and street widening while using public land alongside the moats for partial compensation.”¹⁰⁹ Indeed, as visible in Figure 1, the district in 1871 already had a grid-like block system built on the frame of the Tōkaidō highway running north-south through the district and bisected by a crooked east-west street that connected Hitotsunohashi bridge on the east side and the Yamashita gate on the west. As with the road leading to the Sukiya-bashi Gate, the irregularities in the rigid grid can be explained by the location of bridges. As Hein notes, this “slight asymmetry in the grid and the orientation of the streets toward the bridges reflected practical needs.”¹¹⁰

As noticeable in Figure 2 of the new Bricktown street layout, however, planners subordinated the practical need for bridge access to the maintenance of a rigid grid structure. Also evident by comparing the two Figures is that, more than just straightening and widening the streets and making the blocks uniform, the Bricktown road plan changed the east-west cross street that formed the backbone of the grid along with the Ginza Main Street, as that section of the Tōkaidō highway was called. Whereas the focal point of the major cross street before was the Yamashita gate, in the Bricktown plan the main east-west thoroughfare would now focus on the Sukiya-bashi Gate. Certainly, although this street existed before, its elevated status in the Bricktown plan as the new crosstown street is apparent in that it was designated as Class 2, and widened to 10-ken, while the old route to the Yamashita Gate was only a Class 3, or 8-ken road.

¹⁰⁹ Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 462-463.

¹¹⁰ Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 465.

As the most direct access from Ginza to the Imperial Palace was via the Sukiwabashi Gate, this urban design of a perpendicular axial alignment of the Imperial Palace, the Ginza Main Street, and Shimbashi Station, is what was meant by using the Imperial Palace as the “origin” for the district layout. This perpendicular axial layout focusing on the Sukiwabashi Gate can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. The spatial significance of the intersection of these axes, moreover, was emphasized by its octagonal shape, which resulted from the beveling of the four surrounding block corners.¹¹¹ In figure 6, especially, it is easy to envision a visiting foreign diplomat or dignitary disembarking the train at Shimbashi station and being directed towards the Shimbashi Bridge by the landscaping in front of the station. Crossing the Shimbashi Bridge into the Ginza Bricktown, the visitor would make their way down the Ginza Main Street to the central intersection of the Bricktown before turning towards the Imperial Palace or government ministry offices located in Marunouchi.

Once the modern space had been created, it was necessary to ensure that it would remain presentable. For that reason, shortly after the completion of the Ginza Main Street in late 1872, the Dajōkan bewailed the neglect of street sweeping in Tokyo, ordering that roads must be swept at least once every three months and especially after heavy winds or rain, and that trees uprooted by wind or snow should be cleared immediately so as not to impede traffic.¹¹² The Tokyo Government, meanwhile, ordered in January 1874 that snow should be plowed to the gutters and not piled in the center of

¹¹¹ Waters appears to have had a hand in this beveling. See: Tokyo Metropolitan Archives, Doc.#: 604.B2.04, “Kyōbashi inan ruishō ikken” [Matters relating to the burnt areas south of Kyōbashi slide], slide 129.

¹¹² *TSS*, vol. 53, 678-679.

the street.¹¹³ Later that year, the Tokyo government once again admonished District mayors to redouble efforts to perform regular street sweeping and weed removal, particularly on roads used for imperial progressions and foreign diplomatic visits to the palace.¹¹⁴ Such efforts to keep roads clear were also supported and carried out by private sector groups. One reason was that the Tokyo government relied on the participation of residents to maintain streets, as announced in February 1874. With the central half of the road repaired by the government using vehicle taxes, landowners of street-front property were responsible for repairing the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ of the road on either side with money provided by the government.¹¹⁵ Yet another reason for this cooperation was that local residents also appreciated quality streets. Because of the detriment damaged roads could have on business, in late 1873, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce financed the hiring of several dozen “poor people” per District to patrol the streets, buckets of gravel in hand, removing debris and repairing potholes were necessary.¹¹⁶ Yet not all residents of the city were eager to cooperate with the project.

Part 2: Ginza Bricktown as a Performative Space of Resistance

The central government’s imposition of Ginza Bricktown from above was vehemently resisted from below. From the beginning of project, central government plans were challenged and redirected by the Tokyo municipal government and local residents.

¹¹³ *TSS*, vol. 56, 22.

¹¹⁴ *TSS*, vol. 53, 8-9.

¹¹⁵ *TSS*, vol. 56, 212-213.

¹¹⁶ *TSS*, vol. 53, 184-185.

Analyzing this opposition reveals how social contestation influenced the production of Ginza Bricktown – and, more specifically, how the elite/non-elite and center/periphery power relationships of early Meiji were mediated in the urban space of Meiji Tokyo.

The municipal government and local residents voiced their opposition by their own means. Tokyo Governor Yuri Kimimasa argued against brick houses because they would be too expensive for Tokyo residents, and then attempted to find a method for funding the project that would limit the financial burden on residents. The residents of Ginza, meanwhile, resisted the central government's Bricktown plans by ignoring injunctions against housing construction, openly criticizing and refusing to inhabit the new brick buildings, and calling for rent deferrals. In each case, deeper political motivations lay beneath the surface of these protestations. While Yuri's reluctance to impose financial difficulties on local residents was by no means disingenuous, his resistance to Finance Ministry plans was intensified by political factors. Likewise, the reluctance on the part of local residents to embrace Bricktown derived from a more general disaffection for Meiji rule. This opposition eventually forced the central government to alter its plans for Ginza Bricktown, and yield to Tokyo municipal government attempts to alleviate pressure on residents. In the end, the Meiji government was forced to adopt a hardline exit strategy to ensure even the measured success of the project. In this way, the urban space of Tokyo was a stage on which the political dramas of the Meiji state were played out.

This part of the chapter will chart how political contestation shaped the production of the built environment of the Ginza Bricktown. First, Yuri's opposition to Ginza Bricktown will be traced back to a series of political disputes that were personified

in his conflict with Vice-Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru. The second section will chart how this background led to the contested implementation of the Ginza Bricktown as Yuri actively resisted the Finance Ministry's plans for the project until he was removed from office. The third section will survey the response of local residents to the Bricktown, finding that popular reactions to the project were informed by discontentment with Meiji rule. Finally, the last section will discuss how these two forces joined together to rearticulate central government intentions for the Bricktown into a space that was more livable for local residents, and ultimately forced the cancellation of the project altogether.

The Caretaker Government, Seikanron, and the Inoue/Yuri Conflict

Before the flames of the Ginza fire had even been extinguished, implementation of the Ginza Bricktown project was hindered by a smoldering antagonism between Inoue Kaoru and Yuri Kimimasa.¹¹⁷ This mutual dislike stemmed from several political factors. First, the conflict between Yuri and Inoue was but one skirmish in a larger battle between prefectural governments and the Finance Ministry over local autonomy. Secondly, this conflict manifested at the municipal level when Inoue and Yuri clashed over banking policy. Finally, the disagreement between the two was the local extension of a partisan dispute within the ruling elite over factional control of the central government that threatened to tear apart the new regime. This complicated political background conditioned Yuri's response to the Ginza fire in 1872 and his reaction to the Bricktown plans of Inoue and the Finance Ministry.

¹¹⁷ The background of the conflict between Inoue and Yuri is also explored in Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 106-118.

The friction between Inoue and Yuri was representative of a widening factional schism within the Meiji regime in the early 1870s. As a former samurai from Chōshū, Inoue belonged to a small group of mainly Satsuma and Chōshū samurai who held the reins of government in the early Meiji Period, including Ōkubo Toshimichi (Satsuma), Kido Takayoshi (Chōshū), Itō Hirobumi (Chōshū), and the outlier Ōkuma Shigenobu (Hizen). Hailing from Echizen, on the other hand, Yuri had been one of the few non-Satsuma or Chōshū samurai to be included in the inner circle of conspirators who carried out the Meiji Restoration in 1868. As a student of influential intellectual Yokoi Shōnan, Yuri had not only played a leading role in the drafting of the Charter Oath, but was also responsible for establishing the economic and financial policy of the early Meiji state as head of the Bureau of Commerce (*Shōhōshi*), the forerunner to the Finance Ministry.¹¹⁸ As Wenkai He describes, after being forced to resign in March 1869 as a result of the rampant inflation caused by his unsuccessful attempt to issue paper currency known as *Dajōkansatsu*, Yuri was replaced by Ōkuma Shigenobu.¹¹⁹ Because of Yuri's ignominious past experiences with government finances, moreover, Inoue actively opposed attempts by Yuri's patron, Saigō Takamori, to place him in the Finance Ministry.¹²⁰ Yuri therefore gravitated towards a second group of elites, including Itagaki

¹¹⁸ Harry D. Harootunian, *Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 325-326; W.G. Beasley, "Councillors of Samurai Origin in the Early Meiji Government," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 20, no. 1/3 (1957): 101-102; Wenkai He, *Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 84; Umegaki, *After the Restoration*, 111.

¹¹⁹ He, *Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State*, 84.

¹²⁰ Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 108-109.

Taisuke (Tosa), Gotō Shojirō (Tosa), and Etō Shimpei (Hizen), who feared Satsuma and Chōshū (*Sat-chō*) domination of the government and exclusion of non-Sat-chō voices.

The growing hostility between these two groups came to a head in the famous *Seikanron*, or “Punish Korea,” debates of 1873, which pitted the conservative “*Seikan*” or “War” party of Saigō Takamori, Itagaki, Gotō, and Etō, against the more progressive “Peace Party” of Iwakura, Ōkubo, Kido, Itō, Ōkuma, and Inoue.¹²¹ While the immediate point of argument was whether or not to send a punitive mission to Korea as revenge for a perceived Korean slight to the new Meiji emperor, this debate was a proxy for a number of other serious issues confronting the early Meiji state: samurai disgruntlement, discontentment with radical reforms and Westernization, fear of Western encroachment in East Asia, and suspicions of Sat-chō oligarchic nepotism and exclusion of non-Satchō voices from government. Not surprisingly, the two parties were split for the most part along Satchō and “non-Sat-chō” lines, with the exception of Saigō. Although from Satsuma, Saigō was dissatisfied with what he saw as an increasingly intrusive central government, loss of samurai status and virtue, and public moral decline as a result of reckless Westernization.¹²² The defeat of the War Party in 1873, following the return of Iwakura, Kido, and Ōkubo from the Iwakura Mission, ultimately led to the resignation of many of its members, including Saigō, Itagaki, Gotō, and Etō. The latter three joined

¹²¹ For more on the *Seikanron*, see Nobutaka Ike, “Triumph of the Peace Party in 1873,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1943): 286-295; Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy”; and Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), esp. Ch. 1.

¹²² Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” 811-812. For more on Saigo’s life and political career, see Mark Ravina, *The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2004).

with Itagaki, Soejima Sanetomi, Furusawa Uruō, and Komuro Shinobu the following year to form the Patriotic Party (*Aikoku kōtō*). Together, they petitioned the government for more inclusive representation and an elected national assembly as an attempt to curtail the expanding administrative control of the Kido-Ōkuma-Itō faction.¹²³ This group grew into the Patriotic Society (*Aikokusha*), which attracted disaffected samurai from all over the country. By the late 1870s, the Patriotic Society had emerged into a force for popular rights and more inclusive government.¹²⁴ As Stephen Vlastos writes, despite being rejected, the 1874 Patriotic Party petition “raised for the first time a liberal challenge to the incumbent leadership and signaled the opening round of what became a decade long campaign by a socially and political diverse coalition known as the ‘People’s Rights Movement’ (*Jiyū Minken Undō*).”¹²⁵ Among the founding members of the Patriotic Party and signers of the petition sparking the People’s Rights Movement in 1874 was none other than Yuri Kimimasa.¹²⁶

With powerful Satchō faction leaders Iwakura, Ōkubo, Kido, and Itō out of the country on the Iwakura Mission, this “non-Satchō” faction saw an opportunity to expand their influence as keepers of the “caretaker government.” At the same time as Ōkuma and Inoue pursued their own progressive reform program, conservatives in the caretaker

¹²³ Noguchi, *Ginza Rengagai to Shuto minken*, 3-4.

¹²⁴ Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, *The Politics of Oligarchy*, 23-24.

¹²⁵ Stephen Vlastos, “Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885,” Chapter 6 of *Cambridge History of Japan 5: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 238.

¹²⁶ Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation*, 44. For more on the People’s Rights Movement: Akita, *Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan*.

government promoted new Councilors (*Sangi*) and even began considering sending Saigō as an ambassador to Korea to either diffuse the diplomatic tension or ignite hostilities in the event he was killed. This controversial promotion of Councilors was a response by the Non-Satchō faction to the actions of Inoue Kaoru. As acting head of the Finance Ministry in 1872 in the absence of Minister Ōkubo, Vice-Minister Inoue was charged with keeping the Meiji government financially solvent as it was burdened by the samurai stipends taken on with the dissolution of the domains. For this reason, on top of the Caretaker Government's pledge, Inoue strongly resisted proposals by Justice Minister Etō to institute a new civil code and court system, and by Education Minister, and Etō protégé, Ōki Takato to establish a universal elementary education system with 50,000 new schools. Not only did Inoue denounce these proposals, he sought to cut the budgets for both the Justice and Education Ministries by almost half in late 1872.¹²⁷ As an attempt to counteract what was seen as the increasing power of Inoue, the Finance Ministry, and the Satchō faction in general, Etō and Ōki were promoted to Councilor in late 1873.¹²⁸

Named Governor of Tokyo in 1871, Yuri was positioned to come head to head with Inoue over the Ginza Bricktown. As Fujimori Terunobu describes, the rivalry between the zealous younger Inoue and the veteran statesman Yuri and was a product of the longer rivalry between the two dating back to differing political views on financial policy when Yuri was a member of the Dajōkan.¹²⁹ Yet because Yuri was a member of

¹²⁷ Ravina, *The Last Samurai*, 173-174.

¹²⁸ Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation*, 33.

¹²⁹ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 18-21.

what, for lack of a better term, can be called the “People’s Rights” faction, his conflict with establishment-member Inoue took on an added level of political significance. In this way, the Ginza Bricktown can be seen as an allegorical space for the performance of one of the most heated political debates of the early Meiji period.

Politics in Space: The Contested Implementation of Ginza Bricktown

From the beginning of the project, Yuri’s political disinclination towards Inoue manifested in opposition to the Finance Ministry’s plans for Ginza Bricktown. Yuri voiced his opposition to the project in a number of ways: 1) by opposing plans for brick buildings; 2) by challenging Finance Ministry attempts to redirect money donated to assist survivors of the fire to convert to brick construction; 3) by resisting Inoue and Shibusawa’s plans to establish a private company to administer the project; and 4) by maneuvering to secure concessions from the central government designed to alleviate the disruptions caused by the Ginza Bricktown. Ultimately, Yuri was removed from office when he became too much of a problem, allowing the Finance Ministry to take complete control of the Ginza Bricktown. But, as they soon found out, eliminating one performer from the stage only created room for others to walk on.

As Governor of Tokyo, it was Yuri’s responsibility to lead the relief and reconstruction efforts immediately following the Ginza fire. Yuri later took credit for the Ginza Bricktown project, recounting “rebuilding the burnt houses in either wood or brick would have been fine, but I wanted brick houses no matter what...so I exaggerated by saying I wanted everybody’s help in building the Imperial Capital (*renkoku no moto*)...that’s when even the Dajōkan said, ‘That sounds great. Do it!’ (*soreha*

omoshiroi, yare yare)...and that is when I came up with what is called ‘Urban Improvement’ (*shiku kaisei*).”¹³⁰ Despite Yuri’s boasting, it is clear that he anticipated a reconstruction effort more in line with traditional practices and resisted attempts to make the district overly Western. Indeed, he responded to the fire with reconstruction protocols long practiced in Edo under the Tokugawa: food relief and street widening to clear firebreaks. Losing his own house to the flames, Yuri “made a personal inspection of the scene of the fire, congratulating those who had escaped and condoling with those who were homeless,” the *Japan Daily Mail* reported.¹³¹ As a demonstration of benevolent rule, the Tokyo government distributed 50 *koku* (~2,400 gallons, or ~17,400 pounds) of rice daily to aid the more than 20,000 survivors burnt out of their houses.¹³² Yuri also began planning for the widening of streets, placing a temporary hold on housing reconstruction and authorizing surveys of the burnt areas in the following days. When he was approached two days after the fire by Shibusawa Eiichi and Tokyo Deputy Councilor (*gon sanji*) Mishima Michitsune, Yuri expressed reservations about their visions for the reconstruction of the district. While initially agreeing with the need to widen streets to act as firebreaks, he later scoffed at the idea of making them the same width as streets in Western cities. Moreover, he adamantly opposed the idea of brick construction. Requirements to rebuild houses in brick, he told Shibusawa, would limit residents’ “freedom” and impose unnecessary difficulties. Instead, the government

¹³⁰ Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 26.

¹³¹ *Japan Daily Mail*, April 6, 1872, 187-189. See 189 for quote.

¹³² *Japan Daily Mail*, April 13, 1872, 1. See also Jordan Sand, “Property in Two Fire Regimes: From Edo to Tokyo,” in *Investing in the Early Modern Built Environment: Europeans, Asians, Settlers and Indigenous Societies*, ed. Carole Shammas (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 40-41.

should follow past precedent and allow residents to freely rebuild their houses.¹³³ Despite his efforts on behalf of local residents, Yuri's objections were overruled by the Dajōkan when they announced on 2.30 that Ginza would be rebuilt in brick. Despite this setback, Yuri did not give up his efforts to redirect the Finance Ministry's attempt to impose a preformed urban space onto the city on behalf of residents.

Unable to block the order to rebuild houses in brick, Yuri attempted to make sure the more than ¥30,000 donated for disaster relief found its way into the hands of people who needed it most. Private donations, both foreign and domestic, had started flowing in soon after the fire. An opportune meeting at Ōkuma's estate three days after the fire between Shibusawa, and William Cargill and Joseph Russell of the Oriental Bank of Yokohama (*Tōyō Ginkō*), had led to a grant of 1,000 Mexican dollars (about ¥1,000 at the time) to assist the victims of the disaster and finance the reconstruction efforts.¹³⁴

Another foreign resident who had donated a large sum of money – just over ¥500 – was William Elliot Griffis, a famous instructor at the *Daigaku Nankō*, the forerunner to the University of Tokyo.¹³⁵ Inoue also expected the Americans in Yokohama to reciprocate Japan's \$5,000 donation to Chicago recently delivered by the Iwakura Mission to assist the rebuilding from the Great Chicago Fire of 1871.¹³⁶ As he noted to the Central

¹³³ The topics discussed during Shibusawa's visit to the Finance Ministry are summarized in a Finance Ministry report to the Dajōkan. The report can be found in: NAJ, "*Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.*"

¹³⁴ This meeting is indicated in a report issued by Shibusawa informing the Dajōkan of the contribution, and containing a copy of Russell's letter written to Shibusawa, as found in *TSS*, vol. 52, 828-829.

¹³⁵ *TSS*, vol. 52, 832-833.

¹³⁶ Brunton relates this fact in his description of "The Great Embassy to the Treaty Powers," in Brunton, *Building Japan*, 117.

Chamber in a report on 3.4, “I have heard that even among the foreigners of all countries living in Yokohama, there is a desire to give assistance to each of the areas affected by the recent fire, just as in the case of the Chicago fire.”¹³⁷ The foreign residents of the Yokohama settlement, however, were not as forthcoming as Inoue had hoped. Despite forming a committee to discuss such assistance – which the *Japan Weekly Mail* described as “the natural fruit of that kindly sympathy which distinguishes European races, and does their civilization so much honor” – the foreign residents concluded that the fire was not damaging enough to warrant any aid. The *Japan Weekly Mail* reported the next week, “In view of the above facts the Committee do not think it necessary to take further steps, but again wish to express their deepest sympathy with the authorities and with the sufferers in Yedo from this calamity, which happily on more careful enquiries has proved to be of a less serious nature than at first represented.”¹³⁸

Fortunately, Japanese sources were more generous with funds. Not to be outdone by the American bankers, a group of Japanese merchants in Yokohama pooled together the substantial sum of ¥3,000 to contribute to the cause.¹³⁹ Shibusawa himself donated ¥100 as a private resident. Other Japanese entities, including the imperial court, government offices, and private companies all pitched in. The Meiji Emperor and Empress contributed ¥2,000 and ¥1,000, respectively, while all central government officials – except those who lost property in the fire – chipped in according to their court

¹³⁷ *TSS*, vol. 52, 822.

¹³⁸ *The Japan Weekly Mail*, April 6, 1872, 1; *The Japan Weekly Mail*, April 13, 1872, 1.

¹³⁹ *TSS*, vol. 52, 830-833; Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 39.

rank: ranging from ¥200 for 2nd rank officials to ¥2 for those of the 15th rank.¹⁴⁰ Other sizeable contributions from various Japanese sources included: ¥2,000 from the Mitsui bank, nearly ¥2,000 from the Hokkaidō Development Commission (*Kaitakushi*), approximately ¥2,000 from the Central Chamber, almost ¥2,000 from the Justice Ministry, and about ¥1,500 from the Tokyo Government. Finally, appropriate to their leading role in the project, the two largest donations were provided by organizations with close ties to Ōkuma and Inoue. The Tokyo Exchange Bank (*Kawase Kaisha*), organized under Ōkuma's leadership at the Finance Ministry, donated ¥5,000, while the Finance Ministry made the largest single donation of ¥6,289. As a result, the grand total of donations including all sums was just over ¥30,000.¹⁴¹ For comparison, the daily wage of a day laborer later hired to pave Ginza Main Street was 20 *sen*, or ¥0.2.¹⁴²

Disagreements soon broke out between the Finance Ministry and Tokyo government over the allocation of this ¥30,000 in relief money. Despite being earmarked for “relief of the poor,” Inoue and Shibusawa wanted to use the donated monies to fund the planned brick buildings in an attempt to limit the financial burden on the already cash-strapped central government. As Inoue and Shibusawa were well aware, the Meiji government was already saddled with debt from the Bōshin War and from taking over samurai stipends – not to mention other reforms and large public works projects initiated

¹⁴⁰ *TSS*, vol. 52, 832 for the donations of the imperial family; *TSS*, vol. 52, 822-823, and 827-828 for court officials' donations.

¹⁴¹ These amounts and totals can be found in *TSS*, vol. 52, 832-833.

¹⁴² *TSS*, vol. 55 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1964), 310.

by the Finance Ministry.¹⁴³ As Inoue explained his reasoning to the Dajōkan, “not all of the burned-out residents are truly destitute (*kasai no shimin nokorazu kinkyū no mono nomi ni kore naki*). Besides, if we just distributed money to anybody, then naturally they would waste it all on drinking parties (*shushoku*, lit. “liquor and food”).”¹⁴⁴ Instead the best way to console the survivors, Inoue and Shibusawa believed, was to build new brick houses for them. Yuri and the Tokyo government, on the other hand, wanted the money to be personally distributed to survivors in cash. As they appealed to the Sei’in on 4.18, using the donation money for brick houses would not serve its intended purpose of aiding the survivors of the fire. Some residents, they noted, had found it more convenient to move elsewhere. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the people who would eventually move into the new brick houses had actually suffered losses from the fire in the first place.¹⁴⁵ The Finance Ministry was unswayed, replying on 5.7: “Those burnt out residents who move elsewhere and do not return to live in the new houses clearly do not understand the benefits of the brick construction, and will make the mistake of missing out on the so-called progress of civilization.”¹⁴⁶ In the end, Yuri was unable to prevent the Finance Ministry from misappropriating relief money to finance construction of Ginza Bricktown.

¹⁴³ Upon resigning as Vice-Minister of Finance in 1873, Inoue caused a shock when his budget listing the Japanese national debt at ¥140,000,000 found its way into the hands of the international press.

¹⁴⁴ *TSS*, vol. 52, 822.

¹⁴⁵ This petition can be found in *TSS*, vol. 52, 831-832.

¹⁴⁶ *TSS*, vol. 52, 825.

Although unsuccessful in his first two attempts to deflect the Finance Ministry's imposition of the Bricktown, Yuri's luck began to turn when it came to questions of how construction and financial responsibilities would be divided. While the ¥30,000 of disaster relief donations was enough to get the project off the ground, it was a far cry from what would be needed to finance the Ginza Bricktown. According to a ledger for the entire project calculated by the Tokyo municipal government in the fifth month of 1872, the Bricktown as planned would cost over ¥1.8 million yen, or nearly 4% of the entire national budget. By far the largest portion of this amount, ¥1.7 million, would go just to the construction of the brick buildings. Also included in this cost was over ¥8,000 for purchasing necessary lands, and nearly ¥60,000 to remove surviving plastered warehouses (*dozō*).¹⁴⁷ In order to finance construction after all this relief money was used up, Inoue and Shibusawa proposed the establishment of a private company called the "Rental House Construction Company" (*Shakuya Zōei Kaisha*) that would erect the brick buildings after acquiring a loan from the central government for half the cost of the construction. The loan would then be repaid over 15 years through rents collected from tenants.¹⁴⁸ Ideally, construction would spread beyond Ginza and continue on to the rest

¹⁴⁷ *TSS*, vol. 52, 918; *TSS*, vol. 54, 813-814. *Dozō* is a reference to a type of nonflammable warehouses construction most common in eastern and northeastern Japan known as "*dozō-dzukuri*" in which walls were constructed of either mud or stucco. It is identifiable by its ornate cornice moldings and number of small shuttered windows on the second floor (Kojima Ayano and others, "Nuriya-dzukuri machiya no gaikan bunrui to sono bunpu ni kan-suru Kenkyū" [Exterior differences and distribution of plastered warehouses], *Rekishī Toshi Bōsai Ronbunshū* 4 (2010): 2-4).

¹⁴⁸ Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 78-81; Ishida, *Nihon Kingendai Toshi Keikaku no Tenkai*, 26.

of the capital beyond. Planning for the company proceeded as far as the writing up of provisional articles of incorporation and a charter delineating rental procedures.¹⁴⁹

Yuri enlisted the support of wealthy merchants in the Town Council (*machi kaisho*) to quash the Finance Ministry's plans to establish the Rental House Construction Company. Also referred to as the "city savings association," the Council had been set up to provide welfare for the poor in 1792 in response to a series of severe riots in Edo in the 1780s.¹⁵⁰ With money and stocks of rice from the so-called "seventy-percent reserve fund" (*shichibu tsumikin*), the Council provided disaster relief and social welfare throughout the Edo period. By the beginning of the Meiji period, the Council had grown into a formidable social force in the city. As Sheldon Garon documents, in 1868 alone, the Council provided relief for 941,686 Tokyo residents, or nearly 20% of the city's population.¹⁵¹ It was a significant blow to the Finance Ministry, therefore, when the Town Council came out against the ministry's plan for the Rental House Construction Company. As the Council explained, they opposed the plan because it would cause even more unnecessary complications in the already delayed relief efforts. "It is already 30 days since the fire, with the surveying of the district taking a lot of time;" the Council lamented on 3.28, "now people have erected temporary dwellings and reluctantly gone

¹⁴⁹ These can be found in *TSS*, vol. 54, 795-808.

¹⁵⁰ Takashi Katō, "Governing Edo," in *Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern Era*, ed. James L. McClain and others (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 62.

¹⁵¹ Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 30, 35. As Garon notes, the Council became so popular that the Tokyo government finally shut it down, fearing that "they could not hope to compete for the 'loyalty' of the people if the 'wealthy merchants of the city' continued to oversee the provision of poor relief," (Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds*, 35).

back to work, exposing old and young alike to the wind and the rain and making it difficult even for those in their prime to carry on their household business on sunny days.” “It is truly the most distressful situation imaginable,” the Council concluded.¹⁵²

With the Town Council on his side, Yuri saw an opportunity to force the Finance Ministry to alter its plans for the Bricktown. The prohibition on housing construction had been issued, the order for reconstruction in brick given, the burnt areas surveyed, Waters’ designs for the brick buildings released, the layout of the new street network drawn up, and the purchasing of necessary lands carried out. But no ground could be broken on the brick buildings as long as the company was still up in the air. As Yuri understood, the longer the project was delayed, the more pressure there would be on Inoue to start construction or face the failure of the project altogether. Yuri saw an opening. With the added support of the Town Council, Yuri would now urge the immediate implementation of the project. One day after the Town Council announced their opposition, Yuri petitioned Inoue complaining about the delays. Echoing the concerns of the Council, Yuri sounded a note of caution concerning the success of the project: “More than 30 days have already passed since the fire, but without any compensation for bricks or timber the people have begun to lose interest.” “Until the Housing agency is established,” Yuri concluded, “the Tokyo Government will pay for bricks and other necessary materials with donated money and will transfer them to the Housing Agency

¹⁵² Tōkyō-to, ed. *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 92.

later.”¹⁵³ To drive their point home, four days later on 4.3 the Tokyo government requested ¥50,000 to begin construction on nearly 4,700 buildings in Ginza.¹⁵⁴

By taking a more assertive role in the implementation of the Ginza Bricktown, Yuri and the Tokyo municipal government were able to manipulate the Finance Ministry into making two concessions designed to make the project more palatable for local residents: 1) financing the reconstruction through central government funds; and 2) allowing traditional structures on the backstreets of Ginza. First, in his petition to Inoue on 3.29, Yuri proposed a new division of the financial burden of construction. While the Tokyo government borrowed money from the central government to start construction on buildings, the central government would pay for land purchases and building removal. This caught Inoue in a bit of a tight spot. Limited finances were not the only problem facing the Finance Ministry. Time was also a factor, as the Iwakura Mission members would return to Japan before long. As leader of the project, Inoue therefore had to find a way to produce the Bricktown as cheaply and as quickly as possible. When responding to Yuri two weeks later, Inoue indicated that he was willing to compromise on the issue of the Company in the name of speedy implementation of the Bricktown. “Wasting all our time on empty buildings and delays will cause us to lose the support of the public and will lead to serious troubles,” Inoue conceded. Agreeing to Yuri’s offer of a compromise, Inoue requested “a detailed report delineating the division of expenses for publicly-financed road improvements and for...privately-financed building

¹⁵³ *TSS*, vol. 52, 911.

¹⁵⁴ This request can be found in *TSS*, vol. 52, 911-912.

construction.”¹⁵⁵ The Tokyo government delivered the requested breakdown the next day. Public funds would be used to finance all aspects of the street improvements: purchasing lands for widened roadbeds, removing obstructing buildings, constructing new bridges, installing gutters and drains, and paving the road surface. The building of houses, meanwhile, would be completely financed with private money.¹⁵⁶ As a result, Yuri was successful in compelling the Finance Ministry to give up its plans for the Rental Housing Construction Company so that the project could move forward.

Once building construction was placed solely into the hands of private financiers, Yuri saw a chance to secure allowance of vernacular building types. At the end of the 4th month, the Tokyo government submitted a new plan for the Bricktown to the *Dajōkan*.¹⁵⁷ After “consulting with Waters” and considering the “current status of the townspeople” the Tokyo government proposed a compromise. Only brick buildings would be permitted fronting Ginza Main Street, but financiers of the buildings would have final say on designs and methods on all other streets. Specifically, fireproofed traditional structures – such as “storefront-style” warehouses (*misekura*)¹⁵⁸ and “winged” warehouses (*sode dozō*)¹⁵⁹ – that had survived the fire would be allowed on all streets other than the Ginza

¹⁵⁵ *TSS*, vol. 54, 811-812.

¹⁵⁶ *TSS*, vol. 52, 916; *TSS*, vol. 54, 812-813.

¹⁵⁷ Matsuyama Megumi points to this failed petition as evidence both that the Tokyo government advocated for an alternative plan for the Bricktown, and that the final Bricktown buildings were not produced exactly as designed by Waters, in Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū,” 85-86.

¹⁵⁸ *Misekura* were simply *dozō* warehouses used as stores.

¹⁵⁹ *Sode dozō* appears to be a reference to warehouses with so-called “*sodekabe*,” or “wing walls” (*sodekabe*), essentially party walls projecting under the eaves on each side

Main Street, and new ones could be erected on streets less than 3-ken.¹⁶⁰ In effect, the Tokyo offered to accommodate the central government's desire to create a modern streetscape on the Ginza Main Street in exchange for allowing less expensive traditional fireproof buildings on backstreets. Only two changes were made before this new plan was announced. First, the final plan clarified that financiers had final say in design and methods provided they privately financed and constructed the houses, rather than having the government construct it on their behalf. The second change was even more telling. Whereas the first plan proposed the allowance of traditional structures on all roads other than Ginza Main Street, the final version required that buildings fronting both the Main Street and 10-ken streets would be made of brick.¹⁶¹ Recalling the street layout for the new Bricktown, this was a significant change. As it was a 10-ken road that bisected the Ginza Bricktown as the main cross-street providing the most direct route between the government district and imperial palace, and the Tsukiji foreign settlement, this change ensured that the building frontage along this route would be Western in appearance. As seen in Figure 5 of Bricktown progress as of 1875, construction proceeded first along these routes.

This new protocol was retained when the Finance Ministry took over bureaucratic responsibility for the construction from the Tokyo government on 1872.7.9. "For *dozō* warehouses on roads of 8-ken or more, it was announced in 1872 that there shall be absolutely no warehouses moved in from other locations or no newly reconstructed

of a warehouse to provide protection from flames in neighboring buildings (Kojima and others, "Nuriya-dzukuri machiya no gaikan bunrui," 2-4).

¹⁶⁰ *TSS*, vol. 54, 815-817.

¹⁶¹ *TSS*, vol. 54, 815-817.

houses,” the Construction Board noted on February 5, 1873¹⁶², before the first buildings were completed. “But at this time, upon consideration,” the Board decided, “it has been now decided that other than the Main Street and roads 10-*ken* and wider, buildings are not limited to brick, and existing *dozō* warehouses and self-financed brick architecture will be allowed as long as it will withstand fires.”¹⁶³ Inoue begrudgingly forwarded this to the Tokyo government, putting a paternalist spin on things. These new allowances were made, Inoue explained, because “the number of destitute people south of Kyōbashi who cannot withstand repeated fires on their own is by no means small.”¹⁶⁴

Yuri scored a political victory by successfully compelling Inoue and the Finance Ministry planners to alter their visions for the district not even two months after the Ginza fire. But he paid for this with his job. Just two weeks after the compromise plan was announced, Yuri was rewarded for his efforts by effectively being removed from office when the *Dajōkan* dispatched him to Europe to join the Iwakura Mission on 1872.5.2. In Europe, Yuri would have an opportunity to realize firsthand the benefits of brick housing in Paris and London before being unceremoniously relieved of his position as Governor of Tokyo two months later.¹⁶⁵ With Yuri out of the way, Inoue and the Finance Ministry thought they had cleared all obstacles hindering the success of the

¹⁶² It should be noted that Japan adopted the Gregorian calendar starting January 1, 1873.

¹⁶³ *TSS*, vol. 54, 302.

¹⁶⁴ *TSS*, vol. 54, 301.

¹⁶⁵ For Yuri sent to Europe, see: *TSS*, vol. 53, 1-2; for his dismissal from office, see: *TSS*, vol. 53, 147-149. According to Yuri’s account recorded herein, he learned of his dismissal while in London. Years later he heard that the reason for his dismissal was that with so many foreign ambassadors in Tokyo, the governor of the capital could not be away for so long.

Ginza Bricktown. Just two months after Yuri was removed, the Finance Ministry assumed responsibility for building construction from the Tokyo government in the 7th month of 1872. In doing so, the Finance Ministry placed itself in charge of both building construction and street improvements. With the Tokyo Government left to handle public relations and rent collection, Inoue and the Finance Ministry would have total control of the Ginza Bricktown project from here on out.¹⁶⁶ Or so they thought, at least. As it turned out, the show was just getting started.

The Edokko Response to Ginza Bricktown

Disgruntled residents began to demonstrate their displeasure with the Ginza Bricktown even as surveyors were still at work demarcating building plots in preparation for construction. Lacking representation in the central government or involvement in the planning process, the residents of Ginza resisted the imposition of the Bricktown by whatever means they could. Ignoring injunctions against housing construction, openly criticizing and refusing to inhabit the new brick buildings, and calling for rent deferrals, the residents of Ginza voiced their opposition to not only the central government's Bricktown, but also to the autocratic Meiji regime in general. In this way, the Ginza Bricktown served as an outlet for popular frustrations with the new government. As such, the conflict over the Bricktown can be seen as a proxy for the center/periphery power struggles in the early Meiji period, as documented in works by James Baxter,

¹⁶⁶ For transfer of construction to the Finance Ministry, see *TSS*, vol. 53, 144; for division of responsibilities between Finance Ministry and Tokyo government, see *TSS*, vol. 53, 115-116.

Philip C. Brown, Michael Lewis, Brian Platt, Neil Waters, and Kären Wigen.¹⁶⁷ What is especially notable about local resistance to the Ginza Bricktown is that it suggests Meiji policies were no more popular or ungrudgingly received at the center than they were on the periphery.

Following the Ginza fire in the 2nd month, the residents of the district attempted to move on with their lives as the dispute between Inoue and Yuri delayed the start of housing construction. With nowhere else to go for shelter, residents inevitably ignored the injunction on housing construction in the burnt districts and erected temporary homes amidst the brick buildings under construction. The obstructions posed by these makeshift dwellings forced the Finance Ministry Construction Board to plead to the Tokyo Government on 1872.9.29 to prevent such hindrances. Despite the order to suspend housing construction, the Board protested, “the number of people who...have erected houses in these areas is not small.” The Board even subtly threatened that impeding houses would be torn down, hinting “tearing down a house that required many expenses to build, so that a brick house may be erected, is extremely pitiable.” But at this point,

¹⁶⁷ James Baxter, *The Meiji Unification Through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Philip C. Brown, *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Philip C. Brown, “Local History’s Challenge to National Narratives,” *Early Modern Japan: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 8, no. 2 (2000): 38-48; Michael Lewis, *Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Brian Platt, *Burning and Building: Schooling and State Formation in Japan, 1750-1890* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Neil Waters, *Japan’s Local Pragmatists: The Transition from Bakumatsu to Meiji in the Kawasaki Region* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); and Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

they had no recourse other than requesting the Tokyo government to issue a second prohibition of housing construction.¹⁶⁸

The problem of structures impeding roadways was especially acute when construction work began on streets to the east of the Sanjūkenbori River (today, Shōwa Dōri) more than a year and a half after the Ginza fire. With that much time between the fire and the start of construction work, it was inevitable that the area would have been rebuilt before long. As the Public Works Bureau head Ono Gishi reproached Tokyo Governor Ōkubo on November 9, 1873: “If the unburned buildings and warehouses impeding the roads are not immediately vacated, this will cause serious problems in the project.” “Houses have gradually been rebuilt impeding the roads, and many repairs have been made on houses that are to be removed, causing great inconveniences,” a frustrated Ono complained, “We hereby intervene to request that you resolutely stop this.”¹⁶⁹ This was followed by a more forceful notification the next February, sternly ordering that “*dozō* and houses impeding roads should be immediately removed.”¹⁷⁰ When the Tokyo government dragged its feet in executing evictions and tearing down impeding structures, the central government stepped in to set a deadline for residents to vacate their houses and to put an end to any insubordination. Writing in early May, 1874, the central government ordered that impeding houses “must be withdrawn by the 20th of this month,”

¹⁶⁸ *TSS*, vol. 54, 818.

¹⁶⁹ *TSS*, vol. 55, 661.

¹⁷⁰ *TSS*, vol. 56, 215.

adding: “In addition to the above, any flexibility in housing demolitions granted out of kindness shall furthermore be arranged with us.”¹⁷¹

Residents of Ginza performed their opposition to the Bricktown not only with their feet, but also with their voices. After the announcement of the Bricktown plans, district residents were quick to vocalize their opposition by publicly criticizing the proposed buildings and spreading rumors demeaning the project. The Tokyo Government was assigned public relations control in response to such resident complaints. As instructed by the Finance Ministry, it was the Tokyo Government’s responsibility to “ensure compliance by explaining the particulars of the motives of the improvements and the benefits of the new houses.”¹⁷² The Tokyo Government had their hands full with this job, as indicated by an announcement just two months after the fire on the 20th day of the 4th month. This proclamation went so far as threaten “strict treatment” (*genjū no shochi*) of “those who, clinging to old customs, recklessly ridicule the newly regulated construction, and spread groundless rumors to incite the people.” The decree even invoked imperial loyalty, admonishing residents to “reverently and humbly respect the imperial government’s wishes and carry them out with absolutely no misunderstandings.”¹⁷³

After the first buildings were completed in May 1873, district residents found little reason to embrace the project, as the buildings did not inspire great confidence. Not only were the brick buildings unfamiliar, they were unsuited to the Japanese climate and

¹⁷¹ *TSS*, vol. 56 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1965), 576-577.

¹⁷² *TSS*, vol. 53, 116.

¹⁷³ *TSS*, vol. 54, 817-818.

consequently not a very pleasant place in which to live. As Edward Seidensticker explains: “They were found to be damp, stuffy, vulnerable to mildew, and otherwise ill adapted to the Japanese climate, and the solid walls ran wholly against the Japanese notion of a place to live in.”¹⁷⁴ Even worse, as the *Shimbun Zasshi* reported the next month in June, the construction standards left much to be desired and even posed potential losses to the shops inside:

Several days of continuous rain has caused the roofs of the brick houses in Ginza to spring leaks and the plaster to run down the walls, causing enormous losses to business merchandise... Was not the construction of the brick houses not merely for sprucing up the appearance of the city, but also to prevent the damages from rainwater and fires? Despite the large sums of government money expended on construction, the houses will certainly receive a reputation that they cannot even withstand 4 or 5 days of rain if government officials are not careful about skimping in construction... To lose the trust of the common people because of such stories would be extremely regrettable.¹⁷⁵

While unfamiliar design, uncomfortable interiors, and shoddy construction were all certainly understandable reasons to criticize the project, the tenacity of popular opposition to the Ginza Bricktown suggests that underneath these protestations and complaints lay a more political motive. Residents were no doubt disgruntled by delays in the rebuilding of the area and the forced demolition or relocation of traditional structures that survived the fire. Yet local resistance to the Ginza Bricktown was fueled by general antipathy the residents of Tokyo had held towards the new Meiji regime since its founding less the five years earlier. As M. William Steele documents, the residents of Tokyo, at the time known as Edo, had expressed anti-imperialist sentiments from even before the Meiji Restoration. As the imperialist armies advanced on the Shogun’s capital

¹⁷⁴ Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, 61.

¹⁷⁵ *TSS*, vol. 55, 585.

in early 1868, Steele describes, one cartoon lampooned the imperialist Satsuma and Chōshū forces by sardonically ascribing their victory over the Tokugawa army at Toba-Fushimi “to superior farting power.”¹⁷⁶ Not that “*Edokko*,” or “children of Edo,” were necessarily pro-Tokugawa, they were just none too excited about their city being overrun by people they saw as uncouth “country-bumpkin” samurai from the western provinces who spoke a rough-language.¹⁷⁷ Certainly some within the city were sympathetic towards the Tokugawa, such as newspaperman Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, but many inhabitants simply resented any form of established authority. Following the Restoration and the change in reign name to “Enlightened Rule,” (*Meiji*), for example, the *Edokko* showed the new imperial regime the same deference they had accorded their previous Tokugawa overlords. “Those bums from Kyoto (*Kamigata Zeiroku-domo*) came and made Edo into this ‘Tokyo,’” quipped a popular joke from the early Meiji period, “From above, they talk about things like ‘Enlightened Rule’ (*Meiji*), but from below, we read it as ‘ungoverned by anybody’ (*osamarumei*).”¹⁷⁸ Likewise, Ogi Shinzou points out that following the move of the capital to Tokyo and the renaming of Edo, recalcitrant residents intentionally mispronounced the name of the city as “Tōkei” out of contempt for the Meiji government and its far-reaching reforms.¹⁷⁹ This extended even to confusion in the *kanji* characters

¹⁷⁶ Steele, *Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History*, 66.

¹⁷⁷ Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, 28; Steele, *Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History*, 61.

¹⁷⁸ Ogi, *Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū*, 22; Steele, *Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History*, 82.

¹⁷⁹ Jeffrey E. Hanes, “Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji Japan,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 489; Ogi, *Tōkei Shomin Seikatsu-Shi Kenkyū*, 21-23.

used to write the name “Tokyo,” resulting in 4 different variations in the pronunciation and orthography for the name of Japan’s new “Eastern Capital.”¹⁸⁰ In this way, the new Meiji regime was not able to compel full compliance even at its very center.

With this negative publicity and popular contempt for rulers, it is not surprising that residents of Ginza were hesitant to embrace a project imposed upon them by the central government. They simply refused to move into the new brick buildings. A Public Works department report dated 1872.11.28, for example, gave the status of 324 planned buildings: future tenants had been secured for only 84 of the buildings under construction, another 49 buildings would sit empty after completion, and the remaining 191 were vacant houses waiting to be constructed.¹⁸¹ Even from the time of the very first “handing over” of 2 finished buildings on May 9, 1873, an additional 7 buildings lay empty.¹⁸² These vacancies were not entirely unexpected, however, as planners preferred to knowingly construct buildings that would sit empty upon completion rather than delay the project too for fear that they would lose the support of an increasingly frustrated public. “The Ginza Bricktown is not something that can be built all at once,” cautioned Public Works department head Ono Gishi while reporting the completion of the first buildings, “it is something that must be completed by steadfastly continuing construction sequentially one area after the next, without concern for vacant houses.”¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the financial problems caused by a lack of occupants forced the central government to

¹⁸⁰ Ogi Shinzou, *Tōkei Jidai: Edo to Tōkyō no Hazama de* [The Tōkei period: between Edo and Tokyo](Tokyo: Kōdansha Gakujutsu bunko, 2006), 22-23.

¹⁸¹ *TSS*, vol. 54, 885.

¹⁸² *TSS*, vol. 54, 774.

¹⁸³ *TSS*, vol. 54, 772.

reconsider its plans for the district, and, in order to salvage the project, to permit certain concessions proposed by the Tokyo municipal government intended to lessen the financial burden on district residents.

Countermeasures, Concessions, and Cancellation of Ginza Bricktown

Facing pressure from below on two fronts, the Finance Ministry was eventually forced to curtail the Ginza Bricktown project. Separately these two acts of resistance were not enough to completely deter the central government. The central government had permitted the retention of traditional building types on the backstreets the Bricktown, but Governor Yuri was conveniently sent overseas when he posed too much of a hindrance to the project. Residents, too, were forcibly pushed aside when their temporary dwellings impeded brick buildings and their houses torn down when they obstructed street improvements. It was not until these two forces created a united front against the Finance Ministry that they were able to force the central government to yield to Tokyo municipal government attempts to alleviate pressure on residents. Armed with petitions submitted by the residents of Ginza, the Tokyo municipal government deployed its bureaucratic influence to enact a series of “vacant house counter-measures” (*akiya taisaku*). First, the Tokyo government maneuvered to arrange 12-month rent deferrals for residents moving into brick buildings. Secondly, it followed up on this success by orchestrating tax exemptions for residents of the Bricktown. These countermeasures worked because they were advantageous for all parties interested: residents secured cheaper housing through the good offices of the Tokyo government, and the Finance Ministry was able to fill empty houses with residents, ensuring the measured success of the project. In the end,

the central government was unable to prevent the premature cancellation of the Bricktown.

Shortly before the first buildings were completed, the Tokyo government was given the responsibility of collecting payments from tenants occupying government-owned buildings.¹⁸⁴ Taking over this responsibility from the Public Works Bureau Construction Department, the Tokyo government saw another opportunity to alleviate the financial burdens on those residents who moved into the new brick houses. Quickly putting this new power to work, the municipal government unilaterally granted rent deferrals, countermanding Finance Ministry directives in the process. In June 1873, the Tokyo government proposed payment deferrals of 10 of 12 months as a way to help residents “having trouble paying their rents” while also encouraging tenants to move into the Bricktown.”¹⁸⁵ The Construction Board responded several months later in September, indicating that they had no objections to this idea, with the exception of those who had already occupied houses.¹⁸⁶ The Tokyo government instead announced a universal 12-month rent deferral for residents moving into brick houses in September 1873. Disregarding the objection of the Construction Board, the government noted, “for those already moved in...if they are truly having trouble with their payments, then depending on the circumstances, the same will apply to them.”¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ *TSS*, vol. 54, 391.

¹⁸⁵ *TSS*, vol. 55, 480.

¹⁸⁶ *TSS*, vol. 55, 480-481.

¹⁸⁷ *TSS*, vol. 55, 479-480.

This breach of protocol was put to the test a few months later in December when the Tokyo government again petitioned the Construction Board, this time forwarding a memorial submitted by several residents of the Bricktown, including Anzai Jūbei of the famous Ginza Daikokuya:

Anzai Jūbei of the Owarichō Shinchi neighborhood and 7 other people have submitted the following petition for delaying the payment of rents for houses that have been occupied, as forwarded by the above District manager. While such things have quite naturally been heard, and each application has its own context, none of the people concerned have been granted the rent deferral until December of next year. Consequently, based on the order from this September, while we are considering instructing a 12 month postponement from the time each purchase is completed and that payments should be made in cash, because it concerns people to whom the Construction Board has also issued orders, we are checking with you just in case. If there is no disagreement, upon notification, we intend to issue a directive to the applicants along the above lines. We request an answer as to whether this is approved or not.
December 4, 1873¹⁸⁸

The Construction Board responded several days later, indicating that they would have to forward the petition up the chain of command to the Finance Ministry.¹⁸⁹ Seeking to hasten the process, Tokyo Governor Ōkubo Tadahiro (Ichiō) personally appealed to new Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu one week later in mid-December, lamenting the “considerable difficulty and hindrances in conducting business” that residents had encountered upon moving into the houses as a result of street improvement work outside. Adding that the Construction Bureau had not responded to its inquiry regarding the 12-month rent deferral, Governor Ōkubo requested Ōkuma’s “speedy instruction.”¹⁹⁰ With his hands tied by the Tokyo Government’s earlier unilateral action, Finance Minister

¹⁸⁸ *TSS*, vol. 55, 481-482.

¹⁸⁹ *TSS*, vol. 55, 482.

¹⁹⁰ *TSS*, vol. 55, 482-483.

Ōkuma was forced to reluctantly affirm the 12-month payment deferrals for district residents. Responding to Ōkubo at the end of December, Ōkuma had no choice but to acquiesce: “because this has already been granted by the Tokyo government to applicants who have taken receipt of houses, a 12-month postponement will be generally allowed for all residents upon occupation.” “Beyond this,” he admonished Governor Ōkubo, “collection of payments should be made with no further delays.”¹⁹¹

Having securing rent deferrals for residents moving into the brick buildings, the Tokyo government further lessened the financial burden on landowners by arranging tax exemptions for 4 months. In some ways financial problems were even tougher for private landowners than they were for residents of government-owned brick buildings, Tokyo Governor Ōkubo explained to Ōkuma in a letter dated November 10, 1873. For example, “there have been complaints about a lack of renters since the fire of last spring;” moreover, “Now that construction is about to start, negating all rents when residents have to move out, it will be difficult [for landowners] to pay land taxes and other District fees (*Ku’nyūhi*)¹⁹².”¹⁹³ In order to help out landowners, Ōkubo proposed two courses of action. One option was for the temporary purchase of all necessary lands at the prohibitive price of ¥363,265 for all of the required plots in the two “Small Districts” (*Shō-ku*)¹⁹⁴ that

¹⁹¹ *TSS*, vol. 55, 483.

¹⁹² “District fees” (*ku’nyūhi*) were fees paid by property owners to the district to finance administrative salaries and fund other public projects such as street improvements.

¹⁹³ *TSS*, vol. 55, 775.

¹⁹⁴ Towards the end of 1871, Tokyo was divided into 6 “large districts” (*Dai-Ku*), which were then in turn divided into a total of 97 “small districts” (*Shō-Ku*). As depicted in the Meiji 4 (1871) *Meiji Tōkyō Zenzu*, in today’s geographical terms the boundaries of #1 Big Ku, of which Ginza was one part, were: the Shiodome River from Shimbashi to Tsukiji as the southern border; the old outer moat and current railway line north to

comprised the Ginza Bricktown. It is hard to imagine that Governor Ōkubo actually believed that the Finance Minister would accept such an expensive proposal. In this regard, it appears that Ōkubo's goal was to encourage Ōkuma to choose his alternative plan. "If the purchasing of land plots as described in the document is difficult," Ōkubo offered as a second option, "then we request that land taxes be exempted during construction and District fees covered."¹⁹⁵ Just as Ōkubo had hoped, Ōkuma decided relieving landowners of both land taxes and their obligations to pay residence fees was the more prudent course of action. "It is difficult to arrange the purchase of private estates for the construction of brick buildings as in the forwarded document," Ōkuma responded matter-of-factly two months later. Instead, "Landowners will be exempt from paying property taxes for four months from the time of building construction and District fees will be waived."¹⁹⁶

It is difficult to believe that the veteran politician Ōkuma would have been taken in by such a thinly veiled political trick. Rather, Ōkuma had his own reasons for agreeing to the rent and tax concessions proposed by the Tokyo government. By the end of 1873, the combined pressure of the Tokyo municipal government and the residents of Ginza forced the Finance Ministry to scale back the Ginza Bricktown. Ōkuma placed the blame

Yūrakuchō, including the imperial palace outer gardens, continuing north through Ōtemachi and Kanda to the Kanda River as the western border; following the Kanda River to the east as the northern border; and finally the Sumida River as the eastern border, including Shinkawa and the beginnings of Tsukishima. Number 8 Small Ku was the northern end of the Bricktown, which corresponds roughly to today's Ginza 1 through 4-*chōme*; #9 Small Ku was the southern half, which was made up of Owarichō Shinchi (today Ginza 5-*chōme*), Owarichō 1-2-*chōme* (Ginza 5-6-*chōme*), Takegawachō (Ginza 7-*chōme*), and Izumochō and Minami-Kinrokuchō (Ginza 8-*chōme*).

¹⁹⁵ *TSS*, vol. 55, 775.

¹⁹⁶ *TSS*, vol. 55, 773-774.

squarely on the recalcitrance of Tokyo residents, rationalizing that the new brick buildings were “completely unsuited to a popular sentiment that steadfastly adheres to the ways of the past (*shujū*¹⁹⁷ *kochaku no minshin*),” and expressing frustration that “people grow weary that the costs at hand so far exceed those of the old [housing] regulations, resulting in various incidents delaying construction.”¹⁹⁸ As a result, construction of brick buildings was suspended to the east of Kobikichō. The improvement of canals and streets, however, continued as planned for the time being. Ōkuma’s petition to cancel the Bricktown project was approved by the Dajōkan on December 25th, 1873. Not surprisingly, Ōkuma withheld his earlier defamation of Ginza residents when informing the Tokyo government of this development.¹⁹⁹

As Ōkuma indicated, the protestations of the Tokyo residents and the agitations of the Tokyo Government succeeded in forcing the central government to reconsider the Bricktown. Realizing the entire project was moribund, the central government abandoned aspirations of gradually fireproofing the entire city of Tokyo and redoubled efforts to produce the modern urban space they had set out to create in the first place.

Leaving Ginza

Continuing to face major financial crises on the national level as a result of subsuming former samurai stipends, the central government was looking for a way to exit the Ginza Bricktown. Attempting to salvage the project, the government had approved several

¹⁹⁷ Ōkuma uses the Buddhist word “*shujū*,” which indicates the karmic influence of good and evil actions accumulated over previous existences.

¹⁹⁸ *TSS*, vol. 55, 810-811.

¹⁹⁹ *TSS*, vol. 55, 811.

“vacant house measures” to attract new tenants, including allowance of traditional structures, rent deferrals, and tax exemptions. But at the same time, they wanted to make sure that the district would satisfy their goal of creating an imperial space in Tokyo. The solution for the central government was to more stringently require brick construction on the main streets of Ginza proper. Once this was complete, the central government could withdraw from the project, satisfied with the space produced.

This more hardline exit-strategy adopted by the central government is evidenced in its response to yet another series of petitions filed by the Tokyo municipal government on behalf of local citizens. Perhaps seeking to capitalize on their earlier successes or maybe buttressed by earlier central government concessions, the Tokyo Government submitted an ambitious revision plan authored by the two district managers of the Ginza Bricktown regarding the construction of buildings in the backstreets of the district.²⁰⁰ Although the District managers had delivered their plan on December 14th, the Tokyo Government did not forward it to the central government until December 25th – the same day that building construction east of Kobikichō was cancelled. The managers appealed:

While there have been repeated instructions for people to move out of their houses for this reason, there are many people of low social status in the areas in which construction is about to begin. So even if brick buildings are built, or if they want to reside elsewhere, it is hard for them to do so on their own. If it unavoidably comes to the point where they have to live elsewhere, then there will naturally be repeated delays.

The managers proposed several measures designed to assist people who could not afford to relocate or construct brick houses. First, for houses on the 10-*ken* streets, they suggested that the government pay for construction, and that rents would be deferred for

²⁰⁰ These were #1 Big District, #8 Small District Manager Iketani Mitsuhiro and #1 Big District, #9 Small District Manager Tomizawa Noriyoshi.

2 years and reduced to 1/5 of the normal price. Houses on 8-ken roads, meanwhile, would receive the same 2-year deferral, while rent payments for houses on 3-ken roads would be deferred for 3 years. “If such lenient measures are granted,” the managers appealed, “then even the people of low social standing will not have to disperse. If they are able to live on their former property in peace, they will be overcome with gratefulness, complaints will cease, and the process of construction and moving out will proceed smoothly.”²⁰¹ Ōkuma had already affirmed the 12-month rent deferrals already granted by the Tokyo Government, but now the district managers were attempting to double or even triple that number in addition to requesting that the central government construct all of the buildings at no cost to the residents.

These were concessions that Ōkuma was not inclined to agree to, especially after the central government was forced to scale back the Bricktown project. Ōkuma’s lack of a response compelled Tokyo Governor Ōkubo to push the issue by sending him a reminder the following February, including copies of all of the original paperwork. To this second petition, Tokyo Governor attached a plea relaying the frustrating bureaucratic runaround that had stifled the original proposal. While this runaround can be partly explained by confusion resulting from the recent replacement of the Public Works Ministry by the Home Ministry, the cold shoulder shown to Tokyo Governor Ōkubo can be perhaps also explained by central government planners’ changed attitude towards the Ginza Bricktown. Facing the real possibility of the Ginza Bricktown being nothing more than a total waste of money with only a few brick buildings to show for it, the central government was reluctant to allow further concessions from the original plan. This new

²⁰¹ *TSS*, vol. 56, 298-299.

stance is evident in the directive finally handed down by the Finance Ministry in May 1874 in response to Ōkubo's entreaties. Responding with cold rationale, the Finance Ministry explained that it was not a matter of sympathy. "While we understand the situations of the emotional appeals and the desires of the Tokyo government," the Finance Ministry explained, "from the time that decision was made, resources and materials for the construction of 2nd and 3rd class houses have all already been gathered and stored and some houses have even already been started here and there. Furthermore, with the 3rd class houses there are no extreme differences just from a small change in housing price as there is with *dozō* warehouses." Rather, it was a matter of pragmatic cost-effectiveness: "changing regulations now will not only cause various problems in the process, it will also leave many of the materials and the empty lands unused," the ministry rationalized, "For that reason they would be wasted expenses, and we cannot possibly afford such vast losses." Emphasizing that "rapidly completing things in the current form is what would be the most expedient for the peaceful lives of the common people," the ministry flatly concluded, "There must be absolutely no revision to the plan." As for housing payments, rent deferments would be kept at the previously agreed 12 months, but rents would be reduced for both the 2nd and 3rd class houses.²⁰²

As this directive suggests, now that the Bricktown plan would be limited to Ginza proper, the central government decided to cut its losses by focusing on brick construction wherever possible. Yet renters continued to have trouble paying for their new dwellings, and the buildings continued to be difficult to fill. Some tenants who moved into the houses found themselves falling several months behind in their rent payments and having

²⁰² *TSS*, vol. 56, 300.

no choice but to request that their contracts be cancelled. Finance Minister Ōkuma ordered that these requests should be granted so that new tenants who could actually pay their rents could be brought in.²⁰³ As a result of these continued difficulties, the central government suspended all government-funded construction on March 27, 1875, blaming “residents of the district [who] do not understand the plan.”²⁰⁴

Attached to this announcement was the map reproduced as Figure 5, which depicts the status of the Bricktown at the time of this announcement. As visible in this map, having at least ensured that the streetscapes fronting the main thoroughfares would form a modern urban space, the central government withdrew from the Ginza Bricktown.

Conclusion: The Bricktown Legacy

Over the course of the arduous Ginza Bricktown project, planners realized that unilateral attempts to impose new urban space on an existing city were bound to provoke resistance at the local level. Although the Bricktown was built – replete with modern urban amenities and infrastructure, such as fireproof dwellings, roadside trees, paved sidewalks, and improved roads and water systems – the project failed to attract tenants. In fact, only about a third of the planned buildings were completed by the time the entire Bricktown project was declared finished on May 28, 1877.²⁰⁵ The project also failed as a model to inspire an organic grassroots modernization of the city by private individuals: while nearly 1,000 Western-style buildings were eventually constructed in the Kyōbashi

²⁰³ *TSS*, vol. 56, 997.

²⁰⁴ *TSS*, vol. 57 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1965), 346.

²⁰⁵ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 22; Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 43; Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, 59.

District, which included Ginza, there were fewer than twenty brick buildings in the rest of the city by the time the project was finished.²⁰⁶

So what, then, was the legacy of the Ginza Bricktown, and what influence did it have on later urban improvement projects? Firstly, the Ginza Bricktown project established a standard procedure for rebuilding areas destroyed by fire that would be followed over the next decade, and that would ultimately contribute to the development of a wider-scale master plan to guide urban improvements. On one hand, the failure of the project convinced planners that Government-led attempts to immediately transform the city by installing urban spaces entirely from the top down were not feasible. As Carola Hein points out, the Ginza Bricktown was “the first and last attempt to transform Tokyo into a metropolis that aesthetically resembled major European cities.”²⁰⁷ Indeed, the Ginza Bricktown was the Meiji Government’s first – and only – attempt to construct a preform modern urban space in Tokyo. In other words, the Ginza Bricktown was an attempt by the Meiji government to reproduce the axiomatic “if you build it, they will come” approach to urban development that the Iwakura Mission had observed in San Francisco. Yet the people did not “naturally come and settle.” Not only were the financial demands of the brick buildings of the Ginza Bricktown unsustainable, the people of Tokyo – as intrigued as they were by the Western building forms – proved unwilling to reside in them.

²⁰⁶ Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, 59.

²⁰⁷ Carola Hein, “The Transformation of Planning Ideas in Japan and its Colonies,” in *Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans*, edited by Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait (London: Wiley-Academy, 2003), 57.

On the other hand, government officials in Tokyo did not by any means give up on efforts to fireproof the city. Rather, the small-scale government purchasing of lands to widen streets and enact building construction guidelines (*kenchiku seigen*) requiring such non-flammable materials was frequently carried out following major fires. One such example was the response to the devastating Kanda Kuromonchō fire that broke out on the evening of March 17th, 1878. Destroying over 4,300 buildings from Kuromonchō (just south of the Kanda River) down to Kanda Kajichō (near today's JR Kanda Station), this conflagration was even larger and more costly than the 1872 Ginza fire that led to the development of the Bricktown. Demarcating several “important places to be protected from future conflagrations²⁰⁸,” Tokyo Governor Kusumoto Masatoshi requested that the Home Ministry “temporarily purchase these areas, enact housing construction regulations, and instruct (*kyōyu*) each landowner to use the money from the sale as capital for the construction of brick, stone, or *dozō* inflammable buildings.”²⁰⁹ As a result of Kusumoto's proposal, Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi authorized the lending of over ¥32,000 for the construction of brick houses, and in the meantime the new construction regulations were announced to the residents of the affected areas.²¹⁰ As this shows, the Bricktown procedure of temporarily purchasing the burnt areas in order to implement fireproofing was continued in the case of the Kanda Kuromonchō fire. Moreover, instead of imposing a preformed space onto the city, planners instead allowed residents to choose

²⁰⁸ The locations indicated were the Kanda neighborhoods of Kajichō, Mastudachō (today Kanda Kajichō 2-chōme), Tomiyamachō, Nishi-Fukudachō, and Higashi-Imagawachō (today Kanda Iwamotochō 1-chōme).

²⁰⁹ *TSS*, vol. 61 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1969), 69-71.

²¹⁰ *TSS*, vol. 61, 71-75.

their own building forms. While not ideal, this piecemeal approach to urban reform – taking advantage of areas destroyed by opportune fires in order to implement improvements – was the only option open to government planners for the time being. The result, however, was that the urban area would become an uneven patchwork of isolated islands of planned districts amongst a sea of unplanned traditional neighborhoods. Moreover, lacking a master plan, even these improved urban islands would be unsystematic and non-standardized in comparison to one another.

Secondly, while short-term reconstruction and fireproofing projects such as that in Kanda Kuromonchō continued for the time being, urban planning officials mainly connected to the Home Ministry searched for a more pragmatic approach to long-term urban planning. Learning from the experience of the Ginza Bricktown, planners from now on would focus on street improvements carried out gradually in order to lay the framework for lasting urban redevelopment rather than hasty wholesale transformation of the entire built environment. In fact, this strategy worked well in the long run in Ginza. For example, “Strolling the Ginza” (“*Ginbura*”) became a trendy pastime, especially after gas lamps were installed on the Main Street in 1879.²¹¹ Moreover, by the 1880s, the Ginza area had become the commercial and intellectual center of Tokyo. In this way, what at first was simply an exit strategy from a moribund project ultimately provided an effective *modus operandi* for future projects. Although it may have happened slower than the planners of the Bricktown had hoped, all the government had to do in the future was to provide the built frame of urban infrastructure and wait for the private sector to fill

²¹¹ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 287; Tōkyō-to, ed., *Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu*, 68, 150-152; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 24.

it in. Because quality streets were something that even local groups could support, focusing on street improvements with this more pragmatic and piecemeal approach would allow planners to avoid the limitations of lukewarm public support while modernizing the built environment of the city.

Thirdly, the Ginza Bricktown set a pattern that would be followed in later urban improvement projects in Tokyo, and even colonial programs in Taipei and Seoul: that is, the deployment of the built environment – particularly railways, architecture, and urban planning – to produce imperial space. Onto this framework of improved streets, planners would strategically place monumental buildings in order to create modern urban spaces. Of course, the brick building architecture of the Ginza district is well known, but the urban planning element of the plan, in the form of street improvements, should not be overlooked. Nor should it be forgotten that the Bricktown was purposely located adjacent to the railway gateway to the city, Shimbashi Station – also Western in design. In this regard, it is telling to recall that the first plans to improve streets in the Ginza area, the Inquiry Regarding the Repairing of Roads in the Capital from the fourth month of 1871, was proposed just one month after construction began on Shimbashi Station. Furthermore, this early street improvement proposal illustrates an early recognition of the relationship between streets, urban appearance, and international prestige, not to mention commercial activity and economic prosperity. This focus on streets as conveyors of prosperity and prestige would continue to inform urban improvement projects throughout the 1880s. In this way, the lessons learned from the Ginza Bricktown would be applied as planners in the Home Ministry promoted a series of urban plans emphasizing

improvements to transportation infrastructure as the basis for refashioning Tokyo as “the greatest capital in Asia.” These plans are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

POLITICS OF SPACE: TOKYO STATION, URBAN IMPROVEMENTS, AND THE EMERGENCE OF IMPERIAL SPACE

Tokyo Station – Located in Marunouchi, Kōjimachi District, and towering like a mountain over the Mitsubishi field, it goes without saying that this large building is the greatest railway station in all of Asia. It is an ideal train station whose beauty and form in both its interior and exterior cannot be found even in foreign countries.

– *Saishin Tōkyō Meishō Annai*, 1918¹

In this way, our Imperial Capital Tokyo symbolizes Our Empire as a modern and strong nation, perfectly representing the status of Our Empire in the world, and is surely to only become more and more developed and prosperous over the years.

– *Seinen Gakkō Kyōkasho*, 1936²

“The grand spectacle of the opening, the brilliance of a triumphant return!” the Tokyo Asahi newspaper trumpeted on the morning of December 19, 1914. The event that occasioned such an exclamation was none other than the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station – “the largest station in Asia,” as the Asahi pointed out. Yet it was not only the opening of the station that was celebrated that day. With the countries of Europe distracted by World War I, Japan used its alliance with England to justify occupying German possessions on the Shandong peninsula in China, including the colony of Qingdao (Kiaochow). As the Asahi reported, a day earlier nearly 1,500 revelers gathered into the plaza in front of Tokyo Station to “welcome back to the Imperial Capital after

¹ KDL: Kyō Toyokichi, ed., *Saishin Tōkyō Meishō Annai* [Latest guide to the sights of Tokyo](Tokyo: Kōshūdō, 1918), 16.

² KDL: Teikoku Seinen Kyōiku Kenkyūkai, ed., *Seinen Gakkō Kyōkasho* [Youth school textbook](Tokyo: Seikabō, 1936), 97.

their grand and triumphant military expedition” the “triumphant generals” (*gaisen shōgun*) of the Shandong occupying force, Army General Kamio Mitsuomi and Navy Admiral Katō Sadakichi. Arriving on the ceremonial first train into the new “Gateway to the Imperial Capital,” General Kamio and Admiral Kato were paraded through the celebratory “Great Green Arch” and “Green Pyramidal Towers” erected in front of the station on their way to the Imperial Palace to report their victories to the Emperor. The assembled crowd in the plaza and lining the appropriately named “Triumphal Return Boulevard” (*Gaisen Dōro*) hailed the commanders with rising sun flags and a resounding chorus of “Banzai!” as fireworks exploded overhead.³ As William Coaldrake has noted, this orchestrated arrival of the triumphal military figures indicated a “clear connection in the public mind between Tokyo Station and the growing Japanese empire.”⁴ To put it another way, the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station doubled as a celebration of Japanese empire.

Tokyo Station occupied an important place in Tokyo. Located just to the east of the imperial palace, the station’s setting had both geographic and symbolic significance. Built adjacent to the “One Block London” Mitsubishi business district and nearby Hibiya

³ Harada Katsumasa, *Nihon no Kokutetsu* [Japanese government railways](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), 59-61; Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., *Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi* [History of Tokyo Station](Tokyo: Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, 1973), 30-31: 34; Tōkyō Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Tōkyō Hyakunenshi* [100 years of Tokyo history](Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1979), 4:738-739; Nakagawa and others, *Tōkyō-Eki Tanken* [Exploring Tokyo Station](Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1987), 96-103. Newspaper quotes are from Uchikawa Yoshimi and Matsushima Eiichi, ed., *Taishō Nyū-su Jiten*, vol., 1, *Taishō 1-nen – Taishō 3-nen* [Encyclopedia of Taishō News, Vol. 1, 1912-1914](Tokyo: Maichi Komyunike-shonzu, 1986), 563; translation is from William H. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), 230.

⁴ Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, 230.

Park and Ginza Bricktown, Tokyo Station capped the latest of several sites in the city center framed by western built forms. With its western-style design, the station building mediated “civilization and enlightenment” and projected Japanese progress and modernity; as a rail depot, the station symbolized the national integration conveyed by the railway network; as the personal station of the emperor, it embodied the ideological unification manifested in the emperor system.⁵ Situated at the focus of the city’s road and rail transportation system, moreover, the central station tied the urban space of the city to the national rail network – a symbolic coupling of capital and countryside. In this sense, Tokyo Station was the capstone of Meiji efforts of state-formation. But it was also more than that; it was a building of empire to concretize Japanese empire-building, an empire-building to celebrate the building of empire as rail lines carried Japanese imperial influence from Tokyo via rail ferry to Korea, Manchuria, and beyond. Tokyo Mayor Sakatani Yoshirō reflected on these multiple roles of the station in his celebratory address at the opening ceremony in 1914: “With such a magnificent scale and being the most grand of all the splendid buildings in the city, while still presenting an artistic effect of solemnly prostrating itself to the nearby imperial palace, Tokyo Station does not only live up to being the center of the national railways, but it is also Japan’s link to the world transportation network.” “It is more than sufficient,” Sakatani proclaimed, “for being the

⁵ This role of Tokyo Station in the state-formation of Tokyo is further explained in Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” in *Trains, Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails*, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 235-262.

pride of the imperial capital.”⁶ In saying this, Sakatani was only reaffirming what the crowds at the celebration already knew: Tokyo Station marked a space of empire.

Like Tokyo Station itself, imperial space took several decades over the course of the Meiji Period to gradually emerge in the Imperial Capital. Plans for an axial rail line through the city center connecting Tokyo’s northern and southern rail termini to a new “central station” had been a focal point of city-wide transportation infrastructure improvements first proposed in 1884. But, at first glance, the lack in these early plans of any overt imperial symbolism like that seen at the opening ceremony thirty years later is striking; in fact, no mention is ever made of the central station being the main point of embarkation for the emperor or of the station containing a special entrance reserved for the imperial family. Instead, the plans focused on the practical industrial and commercial benefits such a rail link and station would provide: allowing unimpeded rail transit and shipping between the two termini, and accelerating the movement of goods and materials from areas of manufacture in the north to merchants in the bustling Tokyo market and foreign traders in the port of Yokohama to the south. Intentionally placed close to the prosperous commercial areas of Nihombashi, Kabutochō, and Kyōbashi to its east, the central station was originally intended to serve as a convenient loading and unloading point for the merchandise of the area’s storekeepers. Because it was designed as a through station and not a terminal, it was hoped, the station could quickly service the trains and then let them continue on their way to destinations in the north or the south.

⁶ Tokyo Metropolitan Archives, Doc.# 301.E4.9, Shi Dai 3-29(545-993), “Tōkyō Teishajō Kaijōshiki. Kamio Katō ryōshōgun Kangeikai,” Slide 267.

Popular conceptions of both Tokyo Station and the urban space it framed, however, changed dramatically by the time of the opening ceremony of the station in 1914. The same can be said about the urban space of Tokyo. Although planners had recognized Tokyo as the “Home of the Emperor” (*Renkoku no Moto*) as early as the 1872 Ginza Bricktown project, there was less agreement on how this symbolic role of Tokyo should be mediated in the built form of the city. Over the course of the 1880s, planners’ views of the imperial capital shifted from a functional space of streets and commercial prosperity, to a more monumental space of imperial power. This chapter will chart the emergence of this imperial space in the imperial capital by examining how urban planners’ conceptions of public space changed over the course of the Meiji period through the lens of the evolving relationship between Tokyo Station and successive urban improvement plans. This gradual shift is most visible in a series of competing urban improvement plans released over the decade of the 1880s that culminated in the 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei*), which produced the most significant urban reforms in the capital prior to the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Plan (*Teito Fukkō Keikaku*) following the massive 1923 Kantō Earthquake. Close examination of these plans reveals three themes of Meiji-era Tokyo capital city planning. Firstly, there was a constant recognition after 1868 of Tokyo’s new role as the home of the emperor; that is to say, Tokyo’s new role consistently informed urban planning initiatives as planners called for improvements to the built form of the city in the name of its role as the Imperial Capital. Secondly, the impact this recognition had on urban space changed over the course of the Meiji period, as the rhetoric of city planners’ views of the city changed. What resulted was a symbiotic relationship between the gradually

elevating rhetoric that planners used to describe the city and the steadily increasing monumentality of their plans. At first, planners in Tokyo during the 1880s considered commercial prosperity and economic function to be the requirements for international prestige. As a result, they focused on street improvements, believing that quality streets would necessarily bring commerce and wealth. Later, planners turned their attention to producing monumental spaces to project Japanese imperial power. The third theme of Meiji-era planning was of the fluid relationship between the status of Tokyo on the national scale, and the involvement of Tokyo officials and residents in the planning of their own city. As the rhetoric of Tokyo as the imperial capital elevated, the planning of the city passed from the more public local level to the national level, where it was dominated by central government planning committees. Yet as more participants became involved in the planning process, it became clear that for any planning system to be effective it would have to respond to local needs while it advanced national goals.

The chapter will explicate these themes over 4 sections. The first section discusses how and why urban planners in Tokyo in the 1880s saw streets in particular as the necessary groundwork for transforming Tokyo into a world-renowned Imperial Capital. Not only would street improvements produce pleasant urban spaces to convey Japanese modernity, they would facilitate the mobility of people and products required for commercial prosperity and concomitant international prestige. The second section deconstructs the planning discourse of the 1880s to demonstrate how planners gradually expanded their improvement gaze beyond streets to the city as a whole as they came to read the urban space of the capital in increasingly symbolic terms. The third section traces the organic co-production of a more pragmatic and flexible planning system

emerging from a complicated mix of competing visions of Tokyo urban space and impulses for reform at both the national and local levels. Finally, the fourth section closely examines Tokyo Station as a case study tangibly illustrating how each of these themes shaped the built environment of Imperial Capital Tokyo to frame imperial space.

Infrastructure, Prosperity, and Prestige: Street Improvements in Meiji Tokyo

One of the most common refrains among historians of urban planning in Japan is that mid-Meiji planning initiatives lacked “imperial symbolism” or a desire to make Tokyo into a capital suitable for empire. Discussing a plan presented by Tokyo Governor Matsuda Michiyuki in 1880, for example, André Sorensen pointedly argues, “One final aspect of these early plans for the new capital that should be noted is that they displayed a revealing lack of concern for the symbolic project of creating a great imperial capital.”⁷ What scholars see instead are transportation and infrastructure improvement programs focusing on economic growth and commercial function while disregarding the monumental urban aesthetics they would expect to see in European-style grand imperial capitals. Shun’ichi J. Watanabe, for example, downplays the symbolism of the plans proposed in the 1880s, writing of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Planning Ordinance: “Japanese planners tend to consider this programme as Japan’s first modern planning, but it was only a large-scale, fairly systematic public works programme in the national’s capital.”⁸

⁷ André Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 65.

⁸ Shun’ichi J. Watanabe, “Planning History in Japan,” *Urban History* 7 (1980): 65. A similar statement is made in Shun’ichi Watanabe, “Metropolitanism as a Way of Life: the Case of Tokyo, 1868-1930,” in *Metropolis, 1890-1940*, ed. by Anthony Sutcliffe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 411.

In this vein, even the symbolic importance of the Ginza Bricktown has been belittled by scholars. Takashi Fujitani, for instance, notes: “Yet Matsuda and those who had earlier directed the Ginza project had completely ignored the idea that the regime’s power should be represented on the face of the city, either by an imperial palace or other government buildings. To be sure, the Ginza project had created a modern shopping district at the city’s gateway; but it stopped there. And the core area in Matsuda’s plan – made up of Kanda, Nihombashi, Kyōbashi, and Shiba Wards along with a section of Asakusa Ward – was the center of the city’s economy, not of the national polity.”⁹ Fujitani concludes by calling into question not only the foresight of Tokyo planners, but also their emphasis on infrastructure. “Nevertheless, officials of Tokyo’s prefectural government acted as if they were unaware of how urgent the city’s reconstruction was; and they still had no concrete designs,” Fujitani writes, “Instead, they set about constructing waterways, gas lines, railways, and bridges in a piecemeal fashion with no overall plan.”¹⁰

Such criticism of the lack of monumentality in early plans for Tokyo overlooks an important point about urban planning in the mid-Meiji period. Tokyo planners from as early as 1872 did indeed consistently speak in terms of Tokyo’s role as the imperial capital as the main reason for implementing urban reforms; the difference was that these planners did not believe entirely that a “regime’s power should be represented on the face of the city, either by an imperial palace or other government buildings” as Fujitani maintains. Instead, based on their observations of the western capital cities during the

⁹ Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 72.

¹⁰ Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 72.

Iwakura Mission, urban planners during the mid-Meiji steadfastly believed that a “regime’s power” would be represented not only by an imperial palace or government buildings, but by its commercial prosperity. Visiting capitals such Paris, London, and Washington D.C. from 1871 to 1873, Meiji government leaders learned firsthand that what made Western capitals “grand” was not only their aesthetics but also their economic function. The diary of the Mission kept by scribe Kume Kunitake, reveals that the Mission members quickly recognized a triangular relationship between the built environment, economic function, and international prestige of the city. “Paris is thus the market-place for all the countries of Europe,” Kume transcribed, “it is revered far and wide as the pinnacle of urban elegance...France has always been held in respect throughout Europe with Paris as the hub of civilisation [*sic*].”¹¹

Aware of this connection between streets, prosperity, and prestige, Tokyo planners throughout the late 1870s and 1880s emphasized street improvements as the main component of increasingly comprehensive urban reforms. For them, Tokyo as the “greatest capital in Asia” did not mean a grandiose capital with wide-open plazas, lavishly opulent public architecture, or grand urban design; it meant a bustling city that was commercially vibrant and economically prosperous. They believed international prestige would directly derive from and immediately follow the economic prosperity generated by improved transportation and infrastructure.

¹¹ Kume Kunitake, *The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-1873: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe*, ed. Graham Healey and Chūshiki Tzuzuki (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3:42.

Perhaps the best example of how this conceptual link between transportation infrastructure, economic function, and international prestige shaped urban planning thought in mid-Meiji Tokyo was the 1884 Urban Improvement Statement presented by Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa.¹² Commissioned by Governor Yoshikawa and drawn up by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute-trained civil engineer Haraguchi Kaname¹³, this so-

¹² The entire plan is reproduced in Fujimori Terunobu, ed., *Tōkyō Toshi Keikaku Shiryō Shūsei (Meiji Taishō hen)* [Collection of Tokyo urban planning documents (the Meiji and Taisho periods)], vol. 30 (Tokyo: Hon no Tomosha, 1988), and with annotations in Fujimori Terunobu, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku* [Cities and architecture] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), 60-85.

¹³ Born in 1851 in Nagasaki, Haraguchi had entered the *Daigaku Nankō* – a forerunner of the University of Tokyo – in 1870 to study English, before being selected as one of several promising students to pursue an education overseas. Both Fujimori and Mikuriya mistakenly identify Haraguchi’s school in the United States as “Troy University.” See: Fujimori Terunobu, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku* [Urban Planning of Meiji Tokyo] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 121; and Mikuriya Takashi, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru* (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2007), 337. In actuality, Haraguchi entered Rensselaer in 1875 along with Hirai Seijirō (later Railway Bureau Chief) and Matsumoto Sōichirō (later railway engineer). A history of Rensselaer notes: “There were also three Japanese students, all in the class of 1876, although only one, Souichiro Matsmoto [*sic*] of Ogaki, actually graduated in 1876, at twenty-five years of age, the first of his nationality to do so. Two other Japanese students, Haraguchi and Hirai [Seiji-ro], graduated in the class of 1878, from among others who dropped out.” See: Samuel Rezneck, *Education for a Technological Society: A Sesquicentennial History of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute* (Troy, NY: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1968), 179-180.

Upon graduating with a civil engineering degree in June 1878 after submitting his graduation thesis, “Review of the Pumping Engines and boilers of the Albany City Water Works for raising water from the Hudson River to Bleeker Reservoir,” Haraguchi led a distinguished career as a civil engineer employed in bridge and railway construction. Haraguchi apprenticed on a water system improvement project in Troy, NY, a sewer reconstruction project in New Haven, CT, and the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City, NY. Perhaps because of his work on the Brooklyn Bridge, Haraguchi was hired as an assistant engineer by the Delaware Bridge Company in New York in September 1878, where he was said to have been involved in the designing of almost 30 bridges. Haraguchi was then transferred to the company’s steelworks in Pittsburgh, PA where he oversaw steel production for several bridges of his own design. While in Pittsburgh, Haraguchi caught the attention of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, who hired him away from the Delaware Bridge Company in September 1879 to direct the surveying and construction of an extension of the company’s West Chester Branch. US

Census records for 1880 find one 23-year old civil engineer named Haraguchi Kaname here, registered in Tredyffrin, Chester, Pennsylvania in the house of Daniel J. Lucas, also listed as a civil engineer in the same census records. Incidentally, an 18-year old civil engineer named “Taro Ishigro” [*sic*] is listed in the same 1880 census in Tredyffrin, but at a different household. An “Ishigro Taro” [*sic*] also graduated with a civil engineering degree from Rensselaer in 1881. Resigning in June 1880 following the completion of the West Chester Branch line, Haraguchi embarked on a four-month survey of England, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Haraguchi then returned to Tokyo in October 1880, where, according to an 1887 official history of Rensselaer alumni, he was named “city engineer of Tokio, Japan, in charge of general public works of the metropolis and its suburbs” in November 1880. He was then promoted to chairman of the Investigation Board in 1883, where he spent the next two years “for the purposes of investigating improvements, surveying [the city] in extreme detail and drafting a plan demarcating the positioning of the urban areas,” in addition to sounding the harbor, planning road, river, and canal improvements, and designing new bridges. Reflecting the importance of his role in drafting plans for the city, by May 1883, Haraguchi was promoted to a “consulting engineer” for the city of Tokyo, a position he held while simultaneously serving as Railway Bureau “assistant commissioner and civil engineer” in charge of the Tokyo-Yokohama trunk line. Later, in August 1884, Haraguchi was again promoted to “general superintendent of public works” for Tokyo, and was awarded the ceremonial Junior Sixth Court Rank (*Jūrokui*). Moreover, his efforts garnered a “reward for services rendered” (*irōkin*) of ¥200-worth of *chirimen* kimono silk crepe, nominated by then-Tokyo Governor Takasaki Goroku in May 1886. In his endorsement of the reward, Home Minister Yamagata poetically lauded Haraguchi especially for “braving the wind and the waves, undeterred by neither cold nor heat” in surveying the harbor.

This short biography of Haraguchi is compiled from a number of sources: KDL: Hanabusa Yoshitarō and Yamamoto Genta, *Nihon Hakushi Zenden* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1892), 267-268; J.M. Rhoads, *Stepping Forth Into the World: The Chinese Education Mission to the United States, 1872-81* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 128; and Henry B. Nason, ed., *Biographical Record of the Officers and Graduates of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1824-1886* (Troy, NY: William H. Young, 1887), 485-486. Finally, an 1881 directory lists Haraguchi, along with fellow engineer and future Railway Minister Sengoku Mitsugu, amongst the “Official Appointees, Associate Junior Officials” (*Goyō-gakari Jun-hannin*). See: KDL: Tōkyō-fu, *Tōkyō-fu Shokuinroku, Meiji 14-nen 1-gatsu kaisei* [Tokyo municipal government personnel directory, revised January 1881](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 1895), 18-19. Nason lists the date of Haraguchi’s promotion as May 1883, while NDL “*Tetsudō Shōgichō Haraguchi Kaname*” records April. A May 1883 directory reflects the promotion, listing Haraguchi as a *Goyō-gakari* with the title “Vice-Chief Engineer of the Public Works Ministry” (*Kōbu Shōgichō*) on the first page for the first time, rather than among a longer list towards the back of the directory. The May 1883 directory is also the first to include the recently appointed Governor Yoshikawa. See: KDL: Tōkyō-fu, *Tōkyō-fu Shokuinroku, Meiji 16-nen 5-gatsu kaisei* [Tokyo municipal government personnel directory, revised May 1883](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 1895), 1. Haraguchi’s new court ranking is included for the first time in the April 1884, Tokyo personnel directory. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054357200, “Shokuinroku Meiji

called Yoshikawa Plan was informed by dissatisfaction with the existing transportation system resulting from the urban legacy of Edo and the premature cancellation of the Ginza Bricktown. Because the forerunner of Tokyo, Edo, had been originally designed as the Tokugawa Shogun's castle town, Yoshikawa described in the plan, "most places [in the city] became points of defense." "As for the planning of the urban areas," he continued, "other than certain individual places, this was neglected as if it was not been paid any attention at all. For this reason, the urban blocks were narrow and the roads meandering, making the passage of vehicles inconvenient. At the time, this made for a strategic location, but those things that were called benefits [at the time] have all today become disadvantages and inconveniences."¹⁴ This situation was exacerbated, Yoshikawa explained, by the coming of Western civilization. "As Western civilization has recently gradually spread eastwards, reaching a today where carriages, rickshaws, telegraphs, and horse-powered trolleys travel in abundance," Yoshikawa argued, "the previously existing roads have already become unbearably narrow and crowded; the passing pedestrians only exacerbate the extreme danger, tripping this way and that, likely

Jūnana-nen Shi-gatsu Shokuinroku Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)" [Personnel directories; April 1884; revised personnel directory (Tokyo municipal government)]. For awards for Haraguchi, see NAJ, "Tetsudō Shōgichō Haraguchi Kaname Tōkyō-fu Goyō-gakari kenmu-chū doboku kōji wo kantoku shi shiku torishirabe iinchō to nari koto-ni Shinagawa chikkō ni jūji benrei ni tsuki irōhin wo kashi su" [Rewards to be bestowed upon assistant railway engineer Haraguchi Kaname for supervising public construction projects while appointed to the Tokyo municipal government and especially for diligent service concerning the Shingawa port as chairperson of the urban improvement board]. Call #: honkan-2A-011-00; rui00254100; Doc.# 15; Microfilm reel #003400; slides #0888-0891).

¹⁴ Yoshikawa made these statements in the first meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee. See *TTKSS*, 1:1 back-2 front.

to be trampled under foot by a horse carriage.”¹⁵ Planners had attempted to alleviate these problems in the Ginza Bricktown, Yoshikawa noted, but the project’s termination meant that problems remained. The Ginza Bricktown was the “starting point (*kōshi*) of street improvements in the capital,” Yoshikawa acknowledged, but “because it just addressed temporary local needs and did not come from a plan extended to the entire city, the roads are still uneven, winding, and confusing.” Yoshikawa furthermore criticized the piecemeal fire reconstruction efforts seen after the Bricktown as “makeshift” and “nothing more than sectionalized construction projects (*ikkyokubu no kōji ni tomari*).” What was needed Yoshikawa concluded, was a plan “to improve the city as a whole.”¹⁶

With this dissatisfaction in mind, Yoshikawa’s first priority in the Urban Planning Statement was to develop a systematic program for improving the city’s entire transportation network in order to facilitate mobility in the capital for both goods and people.¹⁷ To accomplish this, the Yoshikawa Plan proposed wide-scale street improvements along with the digging of 15 new rivers and canals, the building of 4 new bridges, the laying of a new railway through the city center from Shimbashi to Ueno, and the construction of a new central railway station. Of these, street improvements were by far the biggest component. To alleviate traffic problems, the Plan called for the widening

¹⁵ *TTKSS*, 30:1 front-1 back. For “sprouting” comment, see *TTKSS*, 1, 2 front.

¹⁶ *TTKSS*, 30:1 back, 3 back.

¹⁷ As Yoshikawa later explained, “I quickly realized that there was not a single day to neglect for [carrying out] these reforms, and I immediately ordered subordinates to first start with a survey of the highs and lows of the city’s topography and then to finally draft an Urban Planning Statement,” (*TTKSS*, 30, 1 back-2 front). As Fujimori Terunobu notes, this “subordinates” appears to be referring to Harguchi Kaname (Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 61). But as will be discussed later, based on statements made during later committee meetings, it appears that Tokyo municipal engineer Itō Masanobu played a substantial role in the development of at least the road plans.

and straightening, or occasional clearing, of at least 42 roads (lower class roads were said to be “too numerous to list each individually”) for a total of 956,843.81 *tsubo* or about 780 acres of new street surfaces.¹⁸ Routes of 5 different classes – with class 1 roads split into type-1 and type-2 – formed a network comprised of streets with widths of 90, 72, 60, 48, 36, and 24 feet (See Table 1).

Class	Street Width	Vehicle Lane Width	Sidewalk Width	# of Routes
1A	15 <i>ken</i> (~90 ft.)	9 <i>ken</i> (~54 ft.)	3 <i>ken</i> (~18 ft.)	1
1B	12 <i>ken</i> (~72 ft.)	7 <i>ken</i> (~42 ft.)	2.5 <i>ken</i> (~15ft.)	9
2	10 <i>ken</i> (~60ft)	6 <i>ken</i> (~36ft.)	2 <i>ken</i> (~12ft.)	22
3	8 <i>ken</i> (~48ft)	5 <i>ken</i> (~30ft.)	1.5 <i>ken</i> (~9ft.)	10
4	6 <i>ken</i> (~36ft.)	6 <i>ken</i> (~36ft.)	N/A	???
5	4 <i>ken</i> (~24ft.)	4 <i>ken</i> (~24ft.)	N/A	???

As Haraguchi described, the basis for the widest of these roads was the Ginza Main Street, improved during the Ginza Bricktown project.¹⁹ In order to prevent traffic accidents, all but the two narrowest classes of roads would be outfitted with sidewalks dividing the uses of the street between vehicles and pedestrians. Whereas wider sidewalks and trees planted directly in the roadbed impeded vehicle lanes on Ginza Main Street, Haraguchi and Tokyo public works official Itō Masanobu²⁰ explained, in the

¹⁸ *TTKSS*, 30:16 back; also 41-front for calculations. One *tsubo* is equivalent is 3.31 square meters, or 3.95 square yards.

¹⁹ *TTKSS*, 31:24 back.

²⁰ Itō was a rising star in the Tokyo municipal government. His name first appears in archival records as a mid-level *kendai-zoku* official of the Tokyo government from the fourth month of 1872, shortly after the Ginza fire. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054279200, “Shokuinroku Meiji go-nen roku-gatsu kan’in zenshokai [Tōkyō-fu]” [Personel directories; June 1872; all personnel directories revised]. As seen in succeeding Tokyo government directories, Itō rose steadily through the ranks of Tokyo officials, achieving Ninth Class (*kyū-tō-zoku*) by 1876, Third Class (*santō-zoku*) by 1877, Second Class (*nitō-zoku*) by 1879, and First Class (*ittō-zoku*) by 1881, a position he held until 1885. See

Yoshikawa Plan vehicle lanes would be widened and given precedence in the name of mobility.²¹ Additionally, rails for horse-powered trolleys (*basha tetsudō*) could be laid on roads of 48 feet or wider, with double tracking permitted on streets of at least 72 feet.

personnel directories for 1876 (JACAR A09054289500); for 1877 (JACAR A09054292200); for 1878 (JACAR A09054299200); for 1879 (JACAR A09054305400); for 1880 (JACAR A09054315000); for 1881 (JACAR A09054326400); for 1882 (JACAR A09054336800); for 1883 (JACAR A09054345400); and for 1884 (JACAR A09054357200). While the directories do not indicate the position held by each official, it is clear that Itō was head of the Tokyo government Public Works Department (*Doboku-ka*) during the time the Asakusa Kuramae road improvement projects were carried out in 1883 from a discussion in the Urban Improvement Committee in which Yoshikawa deferred to “the head of the Public Works Department at that time, namely [committee member] #18 [Itō],” (See *TTKSS*, 1:36 front). Perhaps it was this position he held when brought in as a special guest (*bangai*) on the Tokyo Fifteen Ward Assembly Special Committee (*Tōkyō Jūgo-ku Rinji Iinkai*) convened by Governor Matsuda in 1881 to discuss improvements to Kanda Hashimotochō, one of Tokyo’s most notorious slums during the Meiji period, after it had been destroyed by fire in January 1881. The transcript from the first meeting of this special committee indicates that Itō was often called upon to provide information on the intent of the plan and to provide detailed information on the physical conditions of the affected area (The transcript for this meeting is reproduced in Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 7-36). By January 1883, Itō also served as Executive Secretary (*kanji*) of the Fire Prevention Architecture Survey Board (*Bōka Kenchiku Chōsa Inkyoku*) formed by Governor Yoshikawa in September 1881 (For the establishment of this Board, see: *TSS*, vol. 65 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1973), 518-519; for the final report from the Board listing Itō as *kanji*, see *TSS*, vol. 67 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1975), 144-145). As a result of his long career in the Tokyo government and involvement in these planning efforts, Itō was eventually promoted to president of Nihombashi Ward, and served in that role from August 1885 until November 1891. See: Tōkyō Nihombashi Kuyakusho, ed., *Shinshū Nihombashi Kushi* [Revised History of Nihombashi Ward](Tokyo: Tōkyō-shi Nihombashiku, 1937), 2:50. Meanwhile, Itō sat on the Examination Committee in 1885 as a municipal government official before being named Nihombashi president later that year. While on the Examination Committee, the committee often looked to Haraguchi, Itō, and fellow Tokyo public works engineer Watanabe Takashi, to provide descriptions and explanations for the details of the Yoshikawa plan.

²¹ As Itō explained:

It is extremely desirable for roads to be wide, and so from the beginning the roads were planned to be as wide as possible. But for financing purposes, finally the current Ginza Main Street was made the basis. However, as we all know, because the Ginza Main Street today has wide sidewalks, the vehicle lane is even narrower, so in this plan the sidewalks

By eliminating the traffic congestion strangling the economy through these street improvements, Yoshikawa believed, Tokyo would freely grow into a commercially prosperous capital. “Before we know it,” he explained in his 1884 plan, “we can expect [Tokyo] to exhibit a magnificent and splendid sight...one where the urban areas are organized and the streets are flat so that pedestrians going and vehicles coming do not run into each other, so that horses galloping and cows running do not injure each other, and where thousands of customers gather and hundreds of kinds of goods converge.” In other words, he concluded, “[a Tokyo] that will become the greatest capital in Asia.”²²

Following the Yoshikawa Plan, Tokyo planners not only continued to focus on street improvements as the main component of urban planning, they subsequently expanded Yoshikawa’s envisioned network. Taking up the issue in 1885, the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shinsakai*) increased both the number of routes improved and the width of each road class after a debate that saw support for wider streets from aesthetic, military, and hygienic perspectives. Arguing for Western-style aesthetics, for example, Kusaka Yoshio recalled from his time in Europe as a member of the Iwakura Mission, “Roads in Berlin are 65 meters, which is equivalent to 36-ken, 1-shaku...Even if we do not make them exactly like in London or

will be changed to 3-ken making the vehicle lane 9-ken...Actually, we tried to make all Class 1 roads 15 ken wide, but considering the sound produced in the back streets, and considering actual implementation, we made Class 1.2 12-ken, and Class 2 10-ken. When it came to rejection or adoption in the end we leaned towards frugality.

To this, Haraguchi added: “Currently the trees are planted in the roadways, but now the idea is to put them in the sidewalks, so the roads will be 6-shaku (6 feet) wider,” (*TTKSS*, 31:26 front).

²² *TTKSS*, 30:9 back.

Paris, as long as we are improving roads we must make their scale as large as possible.”²³ Enthusiastically agreeing with this idea was Mishima Michitsune, the former Tokyo Chief Councilor (*Kensanji*) who had played an integral role in the Ginza Bricktown. Now head of the Home Ministry Public Works Bureau (*Doboku-kyoku*), Mishima seconded the idea for widening streets in Tokyo, because “today we all feel the narrowness of [Ginza Main Street].” As Mishima suggested, Tokyo’s streets should be widened to a scale “like those in London and Paris.”²⁴ Army gunnery colonel Kuroda Hisataka, meanwhile, noted that wider roads would make it easier for the military to move artillery through the streets.²⁵ Home Ministry secretary Sakurai Tsutomu added, “As our Japan gradually advances in civilization, making improvements in all sorts of things – such as hygiene and military – having wider roads has many conveniences.”²⁶ Iwakura Mission member and German-trained hygiene expert Nagayo Sensai concurred, confirming Sakurai’s point about hygiene. Arguing that wider streets would lead to the elimination of back-alley tenements, Nagayo pleaded: “it would be terrible for the backstreets to become full of small tinderbox (*hiuchi bako*) houses that act as factories of infectious diseases after the urban improvements, just like with the Brick Street.”²⁷ The only opposition to the idea was voiced by the practical Shibusawa Eiichi, who cautioned, “not wanting [Tokyo] to be inferior to London or Paris is completely natural, but not

²³ *TTKSS*, 31:21 front.

²⁴ *TTKSS*, 31:22 front.

²⁵ *TTKSS*, 31:25 front-25 back.

²⁶ *TTKSS*, 31:27 back.

²⁷ *TTKSS*, 31:28 front.

everything can be exactly like in those countries.”²⁸ Despite Shibusawa’s objections, the Committee voted²⁹ to increase street widths to 120, 90, 72, 60, 48, and 36 feet. In order to keep the vehicle lanes as wide as possible, sidewalks all retained their previous widths. Whereas the Yoshikawa Plan had listed 37 routes for improvement, the Examination Committee specified 148 (See Table 2).

Class	Street Width	Vehicle Lane Width	Sidewalk Width	# of Routes
1A	20 <i>ken</i> (~120ft.)	14 <i>ken</i> (~84 ft.)	3 <i>ken</i> (~18 ft.)	9
1B	15 <i>ken</i> (~90ft.)	10 <i>ken</i> (~60ft.)	2.5 <i>ken</i> (~15ft.)	19
2	12 <i>ken</i> (~72ft.)	8 <i>ken</i> (~48ft.)	2 <i>ken</i> (~12ft.)	21
3	10 <i>ken</i> (~60ft.)	7 <i>ken</i> (~42 ft.)	1.5 <i>ken</i> (~9ft.)	61
4	8 <i>ken</i> (~48ft.)	5 <i>ken</i> (~30ft.)	1.5 <i>ken</i> (~9ft.)	38
5	6 <i>ken</i> (~36ft.)	6 <i>ken</i> (~36ft.)	N/A	???

The number of routes in the improved street network was increased even further under the auspices of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance. Released by the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee the next year in 1889, the so-called “Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans” (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Sekkei*) outlined the building or widening of 316 streets along with a number of other infrastructural improvements such as the digging or improving of 30 canals and rivers, the connection of the northern and southern rail termini, and the construction of a “central station” as called for in Yoshikawa’s original plan (Figure 7). When increasing financial difficulties threatened

²⁸ *TTKSS*, 31:23 front.

²⁹ All Committee decisions were made by simple majority vote. Mishima’s proposal to widen roads passed 7 votes to 6, with Masuda presumably casting the deciding vote. The records do not indicate who voted which direction. Inoue, Yamazaki, and Sawa were absent from the Second Meeting and so did not tally a vote. Yoshikawa, as Chairman, did not cast a vote. Based on their statements, it can be surmised that those approving Mishima’s proposal included: Mishima, Kusaka, Nagayo, Sakurai, Itō, Kuroda, and Masuda. This would leave Ozawa, Shinagawa, Onoda, Watanabe, Haraguchi, and Shibusawa as the naysayers.

to disrupt the projects, the Improvement Committee responded by identifying the improvements requiring immediate completion in the “New Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shin-sekkei*)” announced in 1903 (Figure 8). In effect, this New Plan was a dramatic scaling-back of the Old Plans meant to expedite new projects. As a result, the number of roads designated for improvements was reduced from 316 in the Old Plans to 86 in the New; river and moat improvements from 30 to only 7; and parks from 49 to 22, while the overall land area of markets, crematoriums, and cemeteries changed only slightly. Later, 37 more routes were added, raising the number marked for improvements to 123.³⁰

Implementation of street improvements had commenced in the meantime in 1888, working from areas that saw the most traffic jams or that had been destroyed by fire while trying to fit in as much construction work as the annual budget would allow. As a result of these constraints, the order of projects was necessarily opportunistic and unsystematic, and did not appear to follow any consistent or designated policy. Nevertheless, perusal of construction records shows that projects were at first mainly focused around the more crowded, northeastern “*Shitamachi*” neighborhoods of the city, especially Kanda, Ueno, and Asakusa, before later rotating counter-clockwise around the imperial palace to the upland “*Yamanote*” areas of Ushigome, Yotsuya, and Akasaka.³¹ Projects for the most part consisted of the widening and straightening of existing streets according to their designated class in order to alleviate traffic and improve commercial circulation by making streetlines more uniform, eliminating traffic bottlenecks, and

³⁰ *TTKSS*, 33:1-2, 103-112.

³¹ A list of individual construction project and work dates can be found in *TTKSS*, 33:148-164.

clearing access to bridgeheads (See examples in Figures 9-10). This entailed the expropriation of necessary street-front properties and the removal of obstructing buildings in order to clear land for the new roadbeds. Procedures for the acquisition of private property were set by law in 1889, designating the Home Minister as final arbiter of purchase price in case of disagreements between the landowner and the Tokyo government. As Suzuki and Ishida have demonstrated, this law was based on the 1852 décret that cleared rights-of-way for Haussmann's famous Parisian boulevards.³²

Once rights-of-way had been secured, construction of the modern streetscape could begin. The attention planners paid to improving both the function and aesthetics of the street indicates that street improvements were not meant merely as a public works program. Rather, by producing streetscapes that were functionally efficacious and aesthetically pleasing, planners sought to improve both the commercial activity and outward appearance of the capital. As Chairman Yoshikawa reminded Home Minister Yamagata in an 1890 petition for placing electrical wires underground, "While it goes without saying that the main purpose of the urban improvement projects is to facilitate shipping and transportation, the projects must at the same time garnish the beauty of the

³² This law was the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Disposition Codes (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku*). See: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020033999, "Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji nijūni nen, Chokurei dai go-gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1889, Imperial Ordinance No.5, Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Disposition Regulations]. For background and analysis of this law, see: Suzuki Eiki and Ishida Yorifusa, "Tōkyō Shikukaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku no Seiritsu ni tsuite" [Concerning the establishment Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Disposition Regulations]. *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Keikaku-kei Ronbun Hōkokushū* 376 (1987): 86-94.

central capital (*chūō tofu*) with ornamentation.”³³ Because the built environment was seen as the most immediate indicator of civilization, it was not enough to merely widen and straighten urban streets. Instead, it was important that streets convey progress and modernity equally through their quality, orderliness, and appearance. This added new importance to the otherwise taken-for-granted peripheral structures and fixtures of the street – surface pavement, sidewalks, roadside trees, curbs, gutters, sewers, manholes, streetlights, electric and gas poles, telephone and telegraph wires – all of which were accordingly placed under the planning purview of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee.³⁴ In constructing the street surface, for example, after laying subterranean sewer, water, and electrical pipes where called for, workers paved street surfaces either in crushed stone (*saiseiki*) using an adaption of the Telford and Macadam paving techniques, or in “normal gravel” depending on road class.³⁵ Tests carried out on Babasakimon Street in 1883 had determined this macadamized “crushed stone” paving material to provide the hardest, most durable, and most pleasant street surface. This method was adopted as the standard pavement for improved streets in Tokyo until the Taisho Period, when the city

³³ *TTKSS*, 3:76 back.

³⁴ For example, the Police Bureau had retained jurisdiction over street use, including construction and fixtures, since the Tokyo urban street regulations (*gairo torishimari kisoku*) were codified in 1878. Upon petition by the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee in 1890, the Police Bureau agreed that any requests to erect electric poles should be negotiated with the Urban Improvement Committee (For Committee discussion of electric poles see *TTKSS*, 3:65 front-66 back; for Police Bureau response see *TTKSS*, 3:101 front-101 back).

³⁵ Itō Masanobu, mayor (*ku-chō*) of Nihombashi Ward at the time and former head of the Tokyo Public Works (*Doboku*) Department, explained road construction techniques in the second meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee on October 8th, 1888. In response to a question concerning the different costs associated with each class of road, Itō explained that the cost differential was because the classes had different construction methods (*TTKSS*, 1:28 back).

undertook another series of paving projects to convert crushed stone into more modern paving materials, such as concrete, wood blocks, brick, and asphalt.³⁶ Only after the

³⁶ The Tokyo city government had used central government funds to conduct surface paving tests ten years before the completion of the Mitsubishi Ichigō-kan and the start of the famous “One Block London” in the same area. The city tested several different paving materials and techniques: concrete, gravel mixed with cement or lime, and crushed stone. Results showed that macadamized crushed stone provided the hardest and most sturdy surface, and was also the simplest technique. Crushed stone was then adopted for surface improvements to be carried out in 1885 on all streets designated as “main routes.” A survey to determine which route should be paved first settled on Asakusa Kuramae Street, from the foot of the Suga Bridge (*Sugabashi*) to Hachimanchō (Kuramae 1-chōme today), because the road averaged a width of 12 *ken*, lacked sewers, and would be the easier project. Before construction, engineers travelled to Yokohama to observe the macadamized Bashamichi Road constructed in the Foreign Settlement. A Tokyo Public Works Department summary of the Asakusa project summarized the lessons learned from the observation of Bashamichi Road: “The so-called “macadamized street” is a perfect [paving] method, yet the quality of the stones (produced in Zushū [Izu]) is not what would be called ‘hard’. As a result, while it is convenient for making for a pleasant walk, in places where vehicular traffic is extremely busy there is much wear and tear, making the economic advantages and disadvantages irreconcilable,” (*TSS*, vol. 69 [Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1977], 453). Applying these observations to the crushed stone technique tested at Babasakimon, engineers constructed the Asakusa Kuramae Street road surface by laying a foundation of 3 *sun* (~15cm.) of broken stone (*wariguri-ishi*), hardening it with iron rollers, then laying 2 *sun* (~6cm.) of broken stone on top and hardening it once more with iron rollers. See: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi* [Records of Tokyo Roads](Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1939), 290-291. Because components for the necessary steamrollers were not available in Japan, they had to be procured from the United States at great expense (*TSS*, vol. 70 [Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1977], 504). Some sources record that the road surface was a total of 6 *sun*, of which 5 *sun* was hard stone, and the top 1 *sun* was loosely spread crushed stone manufactured by prison labor at the Ishikawajima Prison. For more on this prison, including information on inmate labor, see Daniel Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). Sewers were also installed in between the pedestrian sidewalks and vehicle lanes (*TSS*, vol. 69, 453). This technique was made the standard for all new or repaired state roads by the 1886 Home Ministry Road Construction Guidelines (Home Ministry Instructions #13, 5/8/1886). See: Ishii Ichirō, *Nihon ni okeru dōro gijutsu no hattatsu* [Development of road technology in Japan](Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō Daigaku, 1979), 20; Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 30-31; Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, *Nihon Dōro-shi* [History of Japanese roads](Tokyo: Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, 1977), 342, 354, 1072. Presumably, this same method was then used to construct and pave the road surfaces for at least the first class roads of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Projects. Most roads in the city, however, remained gravel. It was not until 1910 that the city undertook surface

street surface had been completed would sidewalks, stone curbs, drainage ditches, and roadside trees be installed as stipulated in the plans.³⁷ Overall, all 123 streets slated for improvements were completed, for a total of approximately 109 miles.³⁸ In addition, nearly 50 miles of sidewalks and 6,448 roadside *sakura* cherry, willow, maple, oak, paulownia trees to “garnish the beauty of the city” were installed by 1905.³⁹

With this emphasis on streets over the course of the Meiji period, it is not surprising that expenses for urban improvements over the 30 years of the Tokyo Urban Improvement projects from 1888 to 1918 were dominated by costs associated with street improvement costs. According to the calculations of Ishida Yorifusa, of the approximate total 42.1 million yen spent on the projects, street improvements accounted for nearly 26 million (61.7%) of all expenses. Of this amount, 24.5 million yen went to the purchase of land and the removal of existing structures, with the remaining 1.5 million yen funding

improvement projects to convert gravel roads to more durable broken stone. Even then, not until the mid Taisho-period did Tokyo start to see widespread paving in concrete, wood blocks, asphalt, and brick; eventually, 3/5ths of the city had been paved with such materials by 1939 (Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 149, 292-293).

³⁷ As stipulated in the plans, brick-paved sidewalks lined all streets in Classes 1-3, and stone sewers were installed in the gutters between the vehicle lanes and the sidewalks. Class 4 and 5 roads had sidewalks only if the local topography permitted. See: *TTKSS*, 1:28-back; and Tōkyō-shi, ed., *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 149, 292-293.

³⁸ *TTKSS*, 32:1 front-back; Tōkyō-shi, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 141.

³⁹ The 1899 “Bylaws for the Planting of Roadside Trees” (Tokyo City Council Resolution #14341) stipulated that only *sakura* cherry, willow, maple, oak, paulownia, and other trees that “garnish the beauty of the city” (*shigai no bikan wo soeru*)” would be allowed along streets. Bylaws specified that trees should be spaced every 3 to 5 *ken* (~20-50ft.), planted using city funds on sidewalks over 2 *ken* (~12ft.), and placed in the gutters of the sidewalks. With these bylaws in place, by 1905, 6,448 *sakura* cherry, willow, maple, pine and other trees had been planted in Tokyo. See: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. *Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi*, 453-455; and Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, *Nihon Dōro-shi*, 359.

actual construction.⁴⁰ The rest of the outlay was split among the fresh water system (22.7%), sewer system (6.8%), canals (4.5%), rivers and moats (3.6%), bridges (0.6%), and finally parks (0.1%).⁴¹ From these statistics, Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa concur that the emphasis on street improvements system was for purely political purposes, namely “for improving the urban area in Tokyo into the Imperial Capital appropriate to the Meiji State.”⁴²

As Yoshikawa’s aspirations for the city suggest, despite their focus on systematic transportation improvements, planners in no way disregarded Tokyo’s imperial significance. Instead, it was through transportation improvements that they attempted to make Tokyo into a capital appropriate for nation and emperor. To reiterate, Japanese visitors to Paris on the Iwakura Mission had been just as impressed with its commercial function as the “market-place of Europe¹” and “hub of civilization” as they had been with the aesthetics of its famous urban visages. Therefore, when planners in the mid-Meiji period imagined imperial capital Tokyo, they envisioned a city that was renowned first and foremost for its commercial prosperity and only secondly for its monumentality. Street improvements in particular were seen as an efficient way to accomplish both, as improved street infrastructure would expedite circulation while also beautifying the city.

⁴⁰ *TTKSS*, 33, page 5 of prefatory “Tōkyō-shikukaisei Jigyō Seiseki Gaiyō,” and 132-133.

⁴¹ Ishida Yorifusa, *Nihon Kingendai Toshi Keikaku no Tenkai: 1868-2003* [Development of Modern Japanese Urban Planning] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 2004), 64.

⁴² Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa, “Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and Its Urban Development,” in *Tokyo: Urban Growth and Planning, 1868-1988*, ed. the Center for Urban Studies (Tokyo: Center for Urban Studies, 1988), 13.

A City by Any Other Name: Discourse and Nomenclature in Tokyo Planning

Tokyo was a city known by many names during the Meiji period. Even after the initial confusion of the pronunciation of the two characters assigned for its new name, “Eastern Capital,” had been cleared up, a number of colloquial monikers were still used to signify the city. Whether it was “national capital” (*tofu/shufu/shuto*), “home of the emperor” (*renkoku no moto*), “imperial capital” (*Teito*), or “capital of the emperor’s realm,” (*kōkoku no hōki*),” each appellation for the city reaffirmed its importance in relation to the rest of the nation. The names became even more meaningful after the acquisition of empire. But while there was acknowledgement of Tokyo’s role as the capital, what exactly it was the capital of in the popular consciousness, and the frequency of these denominations shifted over time. How this recognition affected the urban space of Tokyo, moreover, also gradually changed over the course Meiji period. As discussed in the previous chapter, already in 1872, planners had referred to Tokyo as the “Home of the Emperor” (*renkoku no moto*) in justifying the Ginza Bricktown project. Yet, as capital city planning steadily passed from the hands of local leaders to those of central government officials after 1880, a symbiotic relationship emerged between the heightening rhetoric used to describe Tokyo – not only in nomenclature but also regarding the city’s status and role in the nation – and the increasing comprehensiveness and monumentality of urban improvement plans. By no means did one name for the city come to dominate the discourse, nor did certain appellations replace others entirely. Frequently, speakers and writers would alternate their nomenclature and use different words for “capital” in the same paragraph, if only to reduce rhetorical redundancy and increase word variation. The only name that appears to have lost fashion was “*renkoku*

no moto,” which seemed to phase out by the 1890s as the comparable “*Teito*” ascended in popular usage. Nevertheless, there is an appreciable increase in the frequency that terms with imperial resonance are used by planners, commensurate to the expanding reach and magnified monumentality of the plans those planners produced. Examining the relationship between the language used to describe capital city Tokyo and the improvements proposed in plans produced over the half-decade between 1879 and 1885 reveals how this discourse framed planners’ views of urban space in Tokyo, and ultimately shaped the built form and space of the city.

But first, what *is* in a name? Each of the aforementioned terms is laden with differing levels of imperial symbolism. None of the first three terms, “*Tofu*,” “*Shufu*,” or “*Shuto*,” have much association with the imperial presence, and therefore could be said to contain only minimal imperial symbolism. Instead, they designate the geographical place of the political administration. “*Shuto*,” or “head-capital,” Evelyn Schulz writes, was introduced during the Meiji period and reflected an ideological shift in the West whereby “the brain was now regarded as the most important part of the body and it became a central metaphor in social and political thought.”⁴³ In contrast to these terms, the unfamiliar 18th-century compound “*Renkoku no Moto*,” translates literally as “beneath the imperial palanquin” and therefore signifies the “home of the emperor.” Despite the reference to the palanquin, by no means did this term imply a “mobile” capital, one that would follow the emperor whenever he set out on an imperial progression. Rather, it

⁴³ Evelyn Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future: Kōda Rohan’s Thoughts on Urban Reform and the New Citizen in Ikkoku no Shuto (One Nation’s Capital),” in *Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power, and Memory in Kyoto, Edo and Tokyo*, ed. Nicolas Fiévé and Paul Waley (London: Routledge, 2003), 293-294.

referred to the city where the emperor's permanent residence was located. Likewise, the name "*Teito*" was a classical term from the Nara period indicating the same. As Henry D. Smith has explained, "*Teito*" became popular around the time of promulgation of the imperial constitution in 1889, and represented a Tokyo "viewed less as a city than as a symbol of the nation" and thus "far more saturated with political than with cultural connotations."⁴⁴ Despite its early origins, Tokyo as "*Teito*" was certainly most ubiquitous from the 1920s through the end of World War II, at a time when Japan's formal empire in Taiwan and Korea made Tokyo the "imperial capital" in both name and reality. Perhaps the most well known usage of Tokyo as "*Teito*" was the so-called "Imperial Capital Reconstruction Plan" (*Teito Fukkō Jigyō*) championed by Gotō Shimpei to rebuild the city following the 1923 Kantō Earthquake, but it is notable that references to the city as "*Teito*" appear in the urban planning discourse as early as 1884. The last name, "*kōkoku no hōki*," translates most literally as "the capital region of the country ruled by the emperor." It could be said that the changing usage of these terms represented evolving popular conceptions of the role of the capital. Analyzing what terms government-level planners used to refer to Tokyo in their urban plans will reveal how this changing conception of the capital was reflected in urban planning thought.

Tokyo Governor Kusumoto Masataka set the tone for later official urban improvement discourse in the capital in 1879. After serving in the Tokyo metropolitan government from 1875 and as governor since 1877, Kusumoto was set to retire in 1879.⁴⁵ Before leaving office, however, he left detailed instructions for his successor. "Among

⁴⁴ Henry D. Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 1 (1978): 55.

⁴⁵ *TSS*, vol. 57, 814.

the 15 urban districts, 6 counties, and 7 islands [that make up Tokyo],” Kusumoto emphasized to the next governor, “the 15 urban districts are where the government (*seifu*) is located, and where people from all places come to gather. It is the foremost capital city in the entire nation (*zenkoku dai-ichi no tofu*).”⁴⁶ Kusumoto’s view of Tokyo as the capital, then, was noticeably provincial. The city was important because it was the location of the national government, but it was not the “national” capital. Instead Kusumoto delimited the reach of Tokyo’s importance to its administrative boundaries, and even rhetorically left open the possibility of there being other capital cities in Japan at a time when Kyoto would have still been seen as the traditional center of Japanese culture. As he explained in the “instructions” left for his successor, Kusumoto had initiated three local administrative reform and urban planning initiatives during his tenure in office that the next governor should continue.⁴⁷ While the first of these had been

⁴⁶ Kusumoto uses the term “*seifu*” to refer to the central government. While “*seifu*” generically means “government” and the term “*chūō seifu*” would more properly indicate the “central government,” it is believed that Kusumoto had the central government in mind because references to the Tokyo municipal government more commonly utilized the metonym “*fuchō*,” a term close to “city hall.” For Kusumoto quote, see: Tokyo Metropolitan Archives, Doc.#: 610.B5.16, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho (Kusumoto Masataka yori, Matsuda Michiyuki ni tsugu, 1-gō yori 19-gō ni itaru) Meiji 12-nen 12-gatsu” [Documents of continuing government business (Kusumoto Masataka followed by Matsuda Michiyuki, #1-19), December, 1879], 140; and Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 3.

⁴⁷ TMA, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho,” 139-142. Kusumoto’s instructions are reproduced in *TSS*, vol. 63 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1971), 106-109; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 83; and with annotations in Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 3-6. TMA, Doc.#: 604.B3.16, “Kukaku Kaisei ni Kan-suru Shitashirabe Shorui (Kukaku Kaisei In)” [Documents relating to urban district revision investigations (District Revision Committee)], 337. For administrative reforms, Kusumoto commissioned a District Revision Committee in 1876 to reorganize the city’s municipal boundaries and replace the “Big-Ku/Small-Ku System.” The plan produced by the Committee in early April 1878 was called the “Tokyo District Revision Plan” (*Tōkyō Fuka Kukaku Kaisei An*) and called for areas under the administration of the Tokyo government to be revised into two zones, designated “urban” (*kakunai*) and “rural” (*kakugai*). The urban area was then

related to the raising of local capital, the remaining two dealt with urban reforms: 1) upgrades to the fresh water supply system⁴⁸; and 2) block realignment, and road and canal infrastructure improvements.⁴⁹ Kusumoto counseled the digging of canals in order to improve transportation as well as delineate the “Outer City” (*Gaichō*) from the “Inner City” (*Naichō*), where gas lamps would be installed to encourage commercial activity. Kusumoto then emphasized urgency in the setting of a plan for these and other projects:

For Tokyo urban improvement projects (*shigai kairyō no jigyō*), lasting success cannot be expected unless a plan is first established. As for the projects – starting with the demarcation of the Inner City and Outer City, whether it is new canals to be dug or modified, new roads to be opened or altered, areas where water systems are to be extended, where gas lines are

divided further into four “near districts” (*kinku*) and twelve “far districts” (*enku*) for the purposes of determining the order of implementing improvements and administrative measures when necessary. Not surprisingly, the “near districts” were comprised of the most populous urban areas east of the palace including Ginza, Kyōbashi, Nihombashi, and Asakusa. The “near districts” are listed as: Kita-Shiba, Yushima, Soto-Kanda, and Minami-Asakusa; the “far districts” are listed as: Minami-Shiba, Azabu, Akasaka, Yotsuya, Koishikawa, Komagome, Shitaya, Kita-Asakusa, Honjo, Mukōjima, Kami-Fukagawa, and Shimo-Fukagawa. Kusumoto identifies sixteen of the total 21 districts. The status of the five missing districts is unknown.

⁴⁸ Kusumoto established the Tokyo Water System Improvement Committee (*Tōkyō Suidō Kaisei Iinkai*) in 1877, consisting of several planners who would later play significant roles in Tokyo urban improvement planning, including Matsumoto Sōichirō, Itō Tōru, and Watanabe Takashi. The committee released a report entitled “Summary of Tokyo Water System Repairs” (*Tōkyō Suidō Kaisetsu no Gairyaku*) in August 1877. See: Tōkyō-fu Suidō Kaisei Iinkai, ed., *Tōkyō Suidō Kaisetsu no Gairyaku* [Summary of Tokyo water system repairs](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 1877).

⁴⁹ TMA, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho,” 140-141; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 83. According to Kusumoto, the upland “Yamanote” area of Tokyo was suited more for government buildings, schools, hospitals, or villas for the nobility than it was for shops or merchants because of the transportation inconveniences. Likewise, the areas east of the Sumida River were more suited for wholesale markets, warehouses, and factories than residency because transportation was convenient and the land low and damp and the well water dirty. As a result, the areas most appropriate for a commercial district were the so-called “Shitamachi” areas earlier identified as the “near districts”: Nihombashi, Kyōbashi, the eastern part of Kanda, the southern part of Asakusa, and the northern part of Shiba.

to be installed, where fire-prevention lines are to be established, or where shorelines are to be filled in and wharfs constructed – while they cannot of course be designed overnight, if they are not planned in advance then projects carried out first could become obstacles later. Then if the course of later projects loses direction, we will have certainly lost our chance to succeed.⁵⁰

The language of a link between the built environment and international prestige of the imperial capital was amplified by the next governor of Tokyo, Matsuda Michiyuki. Putting Kusumoto's advice into action soon after taking office as governor on December 12, 1879, Matsuda ordered several officials within the Tokyo government to investigate potential urban improvements and port construction.⁵¹ Matsuda seems to have been

⁵⁰ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 86; Fujimori, *Toshi Kenchiku*, 4-5.

⁵¹ Tōkyō-to, ed., *Shikukaisei to Hinkai Chikkō Keikaku* [Urban improvement and the Shinagawa port construction plans](Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1976), 12; Mikuriya Takashi, *Meiji no Kokka wo Tsukuru* [Constructing the Meiji state](Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2007), 326. In the course of their research, the Board borrowed materials on roads and building regulations from the Home Ministry library on February 28th and for blueprints from the Tokugawa Shogunate's earlier aborted plan to construct a harbor at Tsukudajima in Tokyo Bay on March 3rd from the Home Ministry Public Works Bureau. See Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Shikō Kōwan-hen* [Manuscripts of Tokyo history, ports] vol. 3 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1926), 912-914. For a more detailed discussion of the drafting, contents, and various historical interpretations of the Matsuda plan, see Ishida Yorifusa, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai' ni tsuite*” [On the “Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues”], *Sōgō Toshi Kenkyū* 7 (1979): 15-34. The officials dispatched by Matsuda appear to have been former Public Works Office (*doboku kakari*) head Watanabe Takashi, later Geography Department (*chiri-ka*) head Kodama Harufusa, and Kawade Ryōji. According to Tokyo government organization charts available on the Tokyo Metropolitan Archives website, Watanabe was Public Works Office head in 1877, and Kodama was Geography Department head in 1885. The involvement of these three individuals is evident from a drafting note – cited in Ishida – signed by Itō Tōru and three members of a so-called “Urban Improvement Committee” (*Shiku Kaisei Iin*), dated May 21, 1880, and attached to this May 21st version of the Matsuda plan. Ishida writes that the signatures appear to be those of Watanabe, Kodama, and Kawade (Ishida, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei*,” 30, n.12). Curiously, there is no committee of that name listed in the official Tokyo government organization directory for 1880. Furthermore, as reproduced in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Shikō Kōwan-hen*, vol. 3, 912-913, the 1880.3.3 request from the Tokyo government for information from the Home Ministry Public Works Bureau on the Tsukudajima harbor project is signed by Itō (Tōru?) and four other

spurred to action by the particularly large December 26th, 1879, Nihombashi Hakuchō fire, which destroyed 10,613 houses. Fires, of course, had been a major urban planning problem for the city ever since the Edo period, when they were referred to as the “Flowers of Edo.” As discussed in Chapter 1, it was a large fire in 1872, after all, that had led to the first major urban improvement project in Tokyo in the Meiji period, the Ginza Bricktown. Matsuda would also see several more large fires while in office: particularly the December 30th, 1880, Kanda Kajichō fire, which razed 2,188 houses, and the Kanda Matsuedachō on January 26th, 1881, which, consuming most of Kanda before jumping the Sumida river to burn through Honjō and Fukagawa on its way to incinerating 10,637 houses, was the most devastating of all Meiji Tokyo fires.⁵² The winter of 1880-1881 was a particularly costly fire season as hearth and cooking fires in the bitter cold of the winter set off a series of conflagrations, with first the Kajichō and Matsuedachō fires in December and January, respectively, and then the Kanda Yanagichochō fire destroying another 7,751 homes on February 11th and another fire on the 21st burning another 1,499 homes in the western suburb of Yotsuya.⁵³ Despite the passage of ordinances delineating fireproofing zones and establishing nonflammable roofing construction restrictions following these fires, these were limited to the most-heavily populated central areas of Kanda, Nihombashi, and Kyōbashi, meaning fires continued to be a problem during the

members of a Urban District “Management” Committee (*Shiku Tori-shimari In*). See also, Tōkyō-to, ed., *Shikukaisei to Hinkai Chikkō Keikaku*, 15; and Mikuriya, *Meiji no Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 326.

⁵² Tōkyō-to, ed., *Shikukaisei to Hinkai chikkō keikaku*, 13.

⁵³ Tōkyō-to, ed., *Shikukaisei to Hinkai chikkō keikaku*, 13-14; Ishida Yorifusa, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen* [100 Years of Japanese Modern Urban Planning](Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 1987), 53-54.

mid-to-late 1880s.⁵⁴ It was perhaps because of the continuing problem of large fires in the city that Matsuda felt compelled to elevate his rhetoric.

In any case, Matsuda presented his urban improvement plan, called the “Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues” (*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai*), to the members of the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly in early November 1880.⁵⁵ Whereas his predecessor had waivered on Tokyo’s national role, Matsuda unequivocally and emphatically declared at the beginning of the plan: “The land of Tokyo is where the central government (*chūō seifu*) is located, it is where people of all classes, foreign and domestic, come to gather; in other words, it is the capital of the entire nation (*zenkoku no*

⁵⁴ Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 58-59.

⁵⁵ After several months of research, Matsuda’s committee produced a draft entitled “Reasons for Tokyo Central District Realignment” (*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kaikaku no Gen’yū*) on May 21, 1880. As Ishida Yorifusa explains, this draft plan underwent two rounds of revisions, presumably by either or both Governor Matsuda and/or Tokyo Assistant-Secretary (*Shō Shokikan*) Tanuma Ken, before being arriving at its final form as the “Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues” (*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai*). At this time, there were two “secretaries” immediately below the Tokyo governor differentiated as either “*dai shokikan*” or “*shō shokikan*.” Rather than translating these titles literally as “large” or “small,” Chief-Secretary and Assistant-Secretary are more appropriate. In 1880, Senda was Chief Secretary while Tanuma Ken was Assistant-Secretary. Senda transferred to Hiroshima in April 1880 where he was later involved in the planning of the Ujina port in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1884. Governor Matsuda delivered these so-called “Demarcation Issues” first to the Police Bureau on October 30 before distributing them to important businesses and the assembly. As Ishida Yorifusa describes, one major difference between the plans as a result of the revisions was “the wide scale deletion and simplification of the sections expressing the necessity of a port and concerning a specific ‘image’ of the port,” (Ishida, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei*,” 18). As a result, Ishida concludes, “the port was weakened from ‘port plans’ in the planner’s first draft (*kisōsha sōan*) into ‘port location’ related to the location of central urban districts in the published ‘Demarcation Issues’,” (Ishida, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei*,” 18-19). Ishida furthermore explains that, after editing, the report was ready by June of 1880, but other matters, such as tensions over the budget of fire prevention, prevented its distribution until November.

shufu).⁵⁶ After explaining how the population of Tokyo had decreased dramatically after the end of the Edo period leaving the city empty and inactive economically, and how the remaining residents suffered the problems of recurring fires, outbreaks of contagious diseases, and the mixing of the rich and the poor (*hinpi zakkyo*), Matsuda repeated:

The so-called Tokyo is where the central government is located; it is where people of all classes, foreign and domestic, come to gather. If we do not act now to make the improvement of this [city] an objective, then it will have a great effect on the reputation (*taimen*) of our entire nation.⁵⁷

As Matsuda made clear, not only were improvements to the built form of the city necessary because of the city's role as the national capital, they were vital since the appearance of the city was directly tied to Japan's international prestige. The number and reach of urban reforms that Matsuda proposed echoed his elevated description of the city's importance. First, with outward appearances in mind, Matsuda proposed delineating a central district into which the successful businesses and wealthy landowners of the city should be concentrated, while the urban blight of poorer residents would be removed.⁵⁸ Continuing Kusumoto's focus on urban infrastructure, Matsuda then called

⁵⁶ *TTKSS*, 29:1 front. The reprinted volume retains the original *genkōyōshi* page numbering of counting the front and back of each folded sheet as one page, referenced pages will therefore be cited including the sheet number and either "front" or "back." Matsuda's plan is also reproduced in several locations, including: *TSS*, vol. 64, 210-213; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 85-86; and Ishida, "Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei." See Ishida, "Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei" for an extended discussion of the different versions of the statement available in different sources.

⁵⁷ *TTKSS*, 29:1 back-2 front.

⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, these "central districts" were roughly the same areas earlier identified by Matsuda's predecessor, Kusumoto Masataka, in his 1878 "Tokyo District Revision Plan." Matsuda described the demarcations of the "central districts" as: the outer moat at Kajibashisuji on the west, the Kanda river to the north, or perhaps including one part of Asakusa, Ōgawasuji (the Sumida) to the east, and to Shimbashi or Kanesugigawa (Hamamatsuchō) in the south; or eliminate part of the northwest, making Nihombashi the

for planning for installation of new water systems, gas lines, roads, bridges, and rivers. Finally, despite stating that there were “a countless number of things to be reformed, too many to be listed individually,” Matsuda enumerated almost 50 separate items for consideration, including placement of government buildings, post offices, and other municipal facilities; the enactment of fire prevention measures, house building codes, and fire insurance rate zones; the zoning of various factories, warehouses and markets; and at last the construction of major port facilities to promote city commerce and trade, allowing “countless profits and the central districts to become a gathering place for wealthy merchants (*gōshō fukusō*).”⁵⁹ “By doing such things,” Matsuda concluded, “[Tokyo] will assuredly for the first time live up to being [*lit.* not be embarrassing as] the capital of the entire nation (*zenkoku no shufu*).”⁶⁰

The Matsuda plan marks the high point of local Tokyo involvement in Tokyo capital city planning. Matsuda had been a career bureaucrat in the Home Ministry, even leading the integration of Okinawa as governor of the newly created prefecture, but he had resigned his spot in the central bureaucracy when he took office as governor of Tokyo. While in office in Tokyo, Matsuda ensured that the planning of Tokyo would be as open to the public, and involve as much local input, as possible. First, in order to stimulate popular support for the projects, Matsuda distributed copies of the “Tokyo

boundary, and extending to Shiba Tamachi in the southeast depending on the location of the port. *TTKSS*, 29:3 front-3 back.

⁵⁹ *TTKSS*, 29:2 front-2 back; Ishida, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei*,” 22-23. The term *fukusō* combines the ideograms for “wheel spokes” and “gather,” and carries a literal meaning of either “convergence” or “overcrowding” and “congestion.” I have tried to imply both by translating it as “gathering.”

⁶⁰ *TTKSS*, 29:2 back.

Central District Demarcation Issues” report to major newspapers, and even took out an advertisement on November 9th announcing the establishment of a special committee to investigate the plans and soliciting public responses. “A number of intelligent citizens and government officials have been made committee members for the sole purpose of carrying out surveys,” the advertisement announced before adding, “We welcome those with opinions concerning this project in general to personally come to the bureau to present their opinion, or to submit it in on paper.”⁶¹ Secondly, the mix of 12 government officials, military officers, and prominent businessmen Matsuda appointed to the Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board (*Tōkyō Shiku Torishirabe Iinkyoku*) were mostly longtime residents of Edo/Tokyo. Ōtori Keisuke, for example, was a former Tokugawa official who had led the Tokugawa holdouts in the Battle of Hakodate, Hida Hamagorō⁶²

⁶¹ The text of the announcement reads in whole:

Recently the Tokyo government distributed a provisional map of the central districts of Tokyo along with a related plan – as seen in various newspapers. While the plan was presented only in order to finally stir up public opinion, nevertheless, a real plan cannot be achieved without taking into consideration the current topography and without making the goals as far-reaching as possible. For this reason a special investigation bureau has been created in the Tokyo government, and a number of intelligent citizens and government officials have been made committee members for the sole purpose of carrying out surveys. We welcome those with opinions concerning this project in general to personally come to the bureau to present their opinion, or to submit it in on paper. The above is advertised. November 9, 1880. Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board.

Ishida, “*Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei*,” 18; the newspaper advertisement is reproduced on page 23. This newspaper advertisement is also reproduced as part of a notification to the same effect to the offices of each ward and county in Tokyo Prefecture made the next day on the 10th in *TSS*, vol. 64, 208-209.

⁶² Hida was a shipbuilder and former Tokugawa and Meiji government official who had devised the aforementioned Tsukudajima port plans for the Shogunate, and then notably traveled to the United States along with Fukuzawa Yukichi on the 1860 Embassy and also participated in the Iwakura Mission. After rising to the rank of Chief of Estates Bureau in the Imperial Household Ministry, Hida suffered a fatal accident when he

had designed the aborted Tsukudajima port facilities for the Tokugawa, and Fukuchi Gen'ichirō had been a well-known newspaperman in Edo. Shibusawa Eiichi, Hirano Tomiji, and Eda Heigorō, meanwhile, were all prominent businessmen in the city.⁶³ To provide engineering and planning expertise, the Investigation Board also included the Rensselaer-trained engineer Haraguchi Kaname, who had just returned to Japan after his work in the United States.⁶⁴

With this strong local influence the Board understandably determined to focus on improvements deemed most important by residents of the city, and quickly decided to

unsuccessfully attempted to jump aboard a departing train at Fujieda station on the Tōkaidō line after he had disembarked to use the restroom. As the *Japan Weekly Mail* reported on May 4, 1889: “It is scarcely necessary to observe that this sad event emphasizes a point to which we drew attention in the autumn of 1887, namely, the insufficiency of the accomodation at stations on Japanese railways. Since that time great improvements have been effected, and we believe that the Authorities intend to run carriages with closets on all lines of any length. It is an essential measure, not alone in the cause of public decency, but also because, with things as there are now, such accidents as that recorded above are liable to happen at any moment. Despite the great care usually exercised by the railway officials, passengers will rush to catch a train in motion when, like Mr. Hida, having been obliged to alight at a by-station, they see themselves in danger of being left behind,” (*The Japan Daily Mail*, volume 12, 422; GoogleBooks, 1/12/2013).

⁶³ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 96-97. Ōtori would later become ambassador to Korea in the 1890s. The 12 members were: Matsuda Michiyuki, Haraguchi Kaname (Home Ministry), Ōtori Keisuke (Public Works Ministry), Akamatsu Noriyoshi (Navy), Arai Yūnosuke (Home Ministry), Hida Hamagorō (Navy), Asai Michihiro (Army), Shibusawa Eiichi, Eda Heigorō (Mitsubishi), Hirano Tomiji (Ishikawajima Boat Company), Nonaka Mansuke (Tokyo Rice Exchange), and Fukuchi Ōchi (aka Genichirō).

⁶⁴ Hanabusa Yoshitarō and Yamamoto Genta, *Nihon Hakushi Zenden* [Catalogue of Japanese PhDs](Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta-, 1990), 267-268; multiple sources indicate that Haraguchi joined the Board to fulfill a “promise” to Matsuda, without divulging further detail; while this may have been simply a personal agreement between Haraguchi and Matsuda, perhaps obligatory employment in the Tokyo municipal government upon return was a condition of government sponsorship of Haraguchi’s studies in the United States.

redirect the emphasis of the plans at the first meeting.⁶⁵ Noting that focusing improvements in the central districts was too narrow of a goal, they decided to expand plans to the entire city. The discussion then turned to whether or not defensive preparations should be considered in the planning of the city, “as in the urban areas of Paris,” but the Board ultimately decided to plan Tokyo as an “entirely commercial city.” Because of the influence of Shibusawa, Hida, and representatives from the navy, the Board decided to revive the issue of port construction. Only then would the urban area be considered. Planning for the new port proceeded to the point where the Dutch Home Ministry foreign advisor Anthonie Thomas Muldor was hired to conduct a survey and design a port.⁶⁶ Yet the port project, and the planning mission of the Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board, ended abruptly when Governor Matsuda died suddenly from illness at age 44 on July 6, 1882, leaving improvements to his successor, Yoshikawa Akimasa.

The unexpected death of Matsuda not only prompted the premature cancellation of the port project, but also marked the beginning of increasing central government control over Tokyo capital city planning under Governor Yoshikawa. Whereas the

⁶⁵ The limited available minutes of the meeting are reproduced in Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 97; a description of Matsuda’s urban improvement activities delivered by the board to newly appointed Governor Yoshikawa can be found in *TSS*, vol. 66, 495-498. Similar accounts of the meeting can also be found in *TSS*, vol. 66, 499-504; *TSS*, vol. 64, 213; and *TSS*, vol. 64, 388. *TSS*, vol. 64, 388 curiously names the Board the *Tōkyō-shikukaisei Iinkyoku*. This appears to be mistaken for two reasons: 1) earlier in the same source document – although omitted from this particular segment – the board is referred to as the *Shiku Tori-shirabe Kyoku*; and 2) it appears that no body with the exact name *Tōkyō-shikukaisei Iinkyoku* ever existed.

⁶⁶ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 100. Muldor prepared two separate designs: one for a “shallow” port located on the banks of the Sumida River, and the other for a “deep sea” port located off the coast of Shinagawa. Muldor’s plans were later adopted by Governor Yoshikawa and submitted as part of his 1885 Port Plans, and therefore can be found in *TTKSS*, 30.

previous governors, Kusumoto and Matsuda, had been former Home Ministry officials who resigned when they took office as governor, Yoshikawa was the first sitting governor to simultaneously hold a position as an active Home Ministry official. As political historian Mikuriya Takashi points out, in contrast to the previous local government experience of his two predecessors, Yoshikawa was a “technocrat” who had made his career entirely in the central government.⁶⁷ Working in these ministries, Yoshikawa developed personal ties with powerful oligarchs Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru, with whom he would maintain personal correspondence throughout his life. His simultaneous appointment as Tokyo Governor and Assistant-Vice Minister of the Home Ministry in July 1882 was the first time he held a position in the Home Ministry. As Mikuriya argues, this concurrent appointment as Tokyo Governor and Home Ministry official was meant to overcome Yoshikawa’s lack of governing experience, while also allowing him to powerfully guide the Tokyo government with the background support of the Home Ministry.⁶⁸ Another way to read this dual appointment is that, through the person of Yoshikawa Akimasa, the Home Ministry was attempting to take control of

⁶⁷ Born in 1842 in Tokushima domain, Yoshikawa’s first major position was in the Printing Bureau of the Finance Ministry in 1871, rising to become its head by the next year. Promoted to fourth in charge (*daijō*) of the Public Works Ministry (*Kōbushō*) and named head of the telegraph bureau in 1874, Yoshikawa was sent to London for two years starting in 1878 to represent Japan at the 1879 London International Telegraph Conference. Returning to Japan in 1880, Yoshikawa was named Assistance Vice-Minister (*shōfu*) first of the Foreign Ministry, and then of the Public Works Ministry (*Kōbushō*) the next year. See *TSS*, vol. 66, 387-390 for a timeline of Yoshikawa’s appointments.

⁶⁸ Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 344n. 2, 337-338. Mikuriya further interprets the nomination of Yoshikawa as Governor of Tokyo by Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and Sanji’ in President Yamagata Aritomo as part of a political move to strengthen the position of the Home Ministry vis-à-vis the prefectural assemblies (Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 336-338).

Tokyo capital city planning. With Yoshikawa presiding over two successive urban improvement committees in the 1880s, the Home Ministry was undoubtedly the most powerful force behind urban reform initiatives in the city during the Meiji period. During his tenure as governor until 1885, and then as Vice-Home Minister, Yoshikawa oversaw the production of no less than four successive urban plans that laid the framework for major improvements in Tokyo for over three decades years from 1884 to 1919, starting with his 1884 Urban Planning Statement.⁶⁹

In any event, Yoshikawa's appointment as governor abruptly changed the direction of Tokyo urban planning, starting a trend whereby planning rhetoric, monumentality, and central government involvement intertwined in an upwards spiral. Soon after taking office, Yoshikawa disregarded the recommendations of Matsuda's Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board, and instead refocused efforts on transportation and infrastructure improvements. In the detailed summary report of their actions presented to Yoshikawa, the Board had suggested "first set[ting] plans for port construction and then afterwards moving on to the urban areas." Notably, the Board repeated Kusumoto and Matsuda's language of Tokyo's role as national as the reason for improvements. "The land of Tokyo" the report parroted, "is the location of the central government, it is where people of all classes, foreign and domestic, come to gather. In

⁶⁹ The four plans devised under Yoshikawa are: 1) 1884 "Urban Improvement Statement" (*Shiku Kaisei Ikensho*), often called the "Yoshikawa Plan"; 2) the 1885 "Report on Matters Concerning the Construction of a Port in Shinagawa" (*Hinkai Chikkō no Gi ni Tsuku Jōshin*); 3) the 1885 "Revised Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan" (*Tōkyō-shikukaisei Shūsei-an*), often called the "Examination Committee Plan" (*Shinsa-Kai An*); and finally 4) the 1889 "Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee Decisions Report" (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai Ketsugi Fukushin*) – also known as the "Committee Plan" (*Iinkai-an*), which formed the basis for the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Sekkei*).

other words it is the capital of the entire nation (*zenkoku no shufu*).” In this vein, the Board named the construction of a port as the most pressing future project. Considering Tokyo’s ideal location situated in the center of the country, indeed the center of the entire Pacific, the report argued, “with such disorganized urban areas, and without the construction of a quality port, how can we ever promote our national commercial rights?” “If we do not immediately establish a grand plan for urban improvements, or determine a master plan for a new port,” the Board proclaimed, “it will not only have a great affect on the reputation (*taimen*) of this one capital, but it will also have a great impact on the interests of the entire country.”⁷⁰ These remonstrations fell on deaf ears.

While in office as governor, Yoshikawa commissioned two influential urban improvement plans. First, after dispatching Haraguchi to conduct an updated study of urban conditions as a first step in devising a master plan, Yoshikawa submitted his “Urban Improvement Statement” (*Shiku Kaisei Ikensho*) to Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo on November 14th, 1884, just over two years after taking office.⁷¹ As discussed

⁷⁰ This report can be located in *TSS*, vol. 66, 495-498. Because Matsuda was of course already deceased, Tokyo government official Tanuma Ken compiled relevant reports to provide Governor Yoshikawa. Incidentally, Tanuma would later go on to serve as governor of Yamanashi Prefecture, a position previously held by Yamazaki Naotane (1887.3-1888.6), and later by Sakurai Tsutomu (1896.8-1897.5), and Onoda Motohiro (1898.6-1899.8), all of whom were members of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee).

⁷¹ The original document included an introductory “Report Concerning Matters of Urban Improvements” (*Shiku Kaisei no Gi ni Tsuku Jōshin*) signed by Governor Yoshikawa, along with an “Urban Improvement Statement” (*Shiku Kaisei Ikensho*), six illustrative maps, eight statistical graphs, a detailed speculative budget, and an “Urban Improvement Statement Appendix” summarizing the contents of the entire plan. Because the schematics were prepared on the orders of the governor, both are accredited to Yoshikawa. This first set of reports has come to be commonly referred to collectively simply as the “Yoshikawa Plan” (*Yoshikawa-an*). While the reports may have actually been written by subordinates such as Haraguchi Kaname, because the reports were

in the previous section, in describing the dramatic effect street improvements would have on the city, Yoshikawa argued that Tokyo would become “the greatest capital in Asia” (*tōyō no ichi-dai tofu*).⁷² This plan has received much criticism because of Yoshikawa’s focus on transportation to the detriment of other desperately needed projects, such as water and sewer system improvements. These objections apparently arose from the language Yoshikawa used to delineate the sequential order in which improvements were to be implemented. Explaining why water and sewer systems were not included in his first plan, Yoshikawa argued that “roads, bridges, and canals are the beginning (*hon nari*); water systems, houses, and sewers are the end (*matsu nari*).” “Once the plans for the foundational (*konpon taru*) roads, bridges, and canals have been determined,” he clarified, “it will be possible to decide the others with natural ease.”⁷³ What Yoshikawa

submitted in Yoshikawa’s name, analysis of the texts will assume the author’s voice is that of Yoshikawa.

⁷² *TTKSS*, 30:9 back.

⁷³ *TTKSS*, 30:9 front. The statement that “roads, bridges, and canals are the beginning, and water systems, houses, and sewers are the end” has sparked much debate on Yoshikawa’s intentions. On one hand, the statement has been interpreted to suggest that Yoshikawa was placing the importance of transportation and commerce over the concerns of urban social issues. The strongest proponent of this interpretation has been Ishizuka Hiromichi, who has argued that Yoshikawa’s focus on the transportation network revealed a primary concern for military preparedness and the flow of commercial goods while ignoring social problems such as water-borne disease and fires. See: Ishizuka Hiromichi, *Nihon Kindai Toshiron – Tōkyō: 1868-1923* [Modern Japanese Cities, Tokyo: 1868-1923](Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigakku Shuppankai, 1991), 43-48; and Ishizuka Hiromichi, “19-seiki kōhan ni okeru Tōkyō toshi kaizōron to chikkō mondai ni tsuite” [Tokyo urban reform debates and the port construction issue in the latter half of the 19th century], in *Toshi Kankyō Seibi Kenkyū Hōkoku 6: Toshi no Seiritsu to sono Rekishi-teki Tenkai*, ed. Tōkyō Toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyū Iinkai (Tokyo: Tōkyō Toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyū Iinkai, 1972), 14-19. Ishida Yorifusa and Fujimori Terunobu, on the other hand, see the statement as merely indicating the procedural order of the projects. Ishida, for example, focuses on the sentence following the “beginning...end” proclamation, pointing out that since building heights are limited by road widths, the roads would have to have been planned before any building codes could

meant was that only after the framework of streets had been determined could subsidiary projects, such as sewers and water lines be planned. Thus, Yoshikawa's preference for transportation at the expense of social problems was the result of a pragmatic attempt to set a feasible order of projects rather than of a complete disregard for social problems.

Indeed, Yoshikawa was aware of the limitations of his plan and attempted to rectify them in a second plan submitted in February 1885. This second plan called for the construction of a major commercial port along with the improvements that had been excluded from his first plan.⁷⁴ Noting that cities prospered from a combination of politics and commerce, Yoshikawa lamented in the plan, "while there are bays [in Tokyo], because they are extremely shallow, they are insufficient for large ships; while there is canal transport, it merely serves the northeastern areas."⁷⁵ Posing a rhetorical question for emphasis – "does that mean then that even if Tokyo were, for example, to get rid of

be set (Ishida, *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen*, 92-93). Mikuriya Takashi, meanwhile, has taken a more compromise position, arguing that while Yoshikawa may have meant the statement as merely setting the procedural order, as Ishida and Fujimori maintain, the political context suggests that the Yoshikawa plan was actually part of a larger Home Ministry and Public Works Ministry attempt to place Tokyo at the center of the growing national transportation infrastructure network (Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 364).

⁷⁴ The actual titles of these reports are: "Report on Matters Concerning the Construction of a Port in Shinagawa" (*Hinkai Chikkō no Gi ni Tsuku Jōshin*) and "Port Construction Explanation" (*Chikkō Kōji Kaisetsusho*)

⁷⁵ The Port Plan begins with a revealing comment on the source of urban prosperity:

Upon consideration, what makes a city prosper, more or less, derives from two things: politics and commerce (*tsūshō*). Those [cities] that rely on the first experience extreme ups and downs (*eiko*) based on the gathering and distribution (*shūsan*) of political power (*seiken*). Those that arise from the second are related solely to the thriving of foreign trade (*bōeki*), and it is not surprising, then, that they too should be influenced by the gathering and distribution of political power (*TTKSS*, 30:62 front)

its maritime transportation it would be nothing more than a political capital, and [the city] could not possibly become a commercial capital? I say ‘No!’ (*iwaku iya*)” – Yoshikawa then painted his broader picture for the city, making the role of Tokyo as capital of the entire nation as clear as possible:

Tokyo is the capital (*shufu*) of all the lands of our great country (*waga ōyashima*), it is not merely the capital (*shufu*) of Musashi province⁷⁶; not to mention that it has even been designated as a place for trade with foreign countries. For this reason, as much as possible, we must facilitate the coming and going of ships by dredging and deepening (*shunsaku*) the rivers and harbors, allow the free passage of vehicles by improving roads, advance the health of the people by updating water and sewer systems, prevent damages from disastrous fires (*shukuyū*) by rebuilding dwellings, and comfort the spirits and please the eyes and ears by improving entertainment districts and installing parks...[by doing these things] it will be possible for Tokyo to become an increasingly prosperous region not just through the power of political policy but through a combination with commercial benefits.⁷⁷

As he did with the earlier Urban Improvement Statement, Yoshikawa concluded by arguing that carrying out such improvements on both land and sea would “combine the benefits of both politics and commerce,” allowing Tokyo to be forever “the greatest capital in Asia (*Tōyō no ichi-dai tofu*).”⁷⁸

At this point, there was a noticeable shift in the nomenclature used to refer to Tokyo. Up to now, the planners signified “the capital” using terms arguably devoid of imperial resonance. Certainly there was an appreciable increase in the rhetoric regarding

⁷⁶ Yoshikawa uses two older geographical terms: 1) for Japan, Yoshikawa uses “*ōyashima*,” which is a reference to “*Ōyashima-no-kuni*,” the name by which Japan was called in the *Kojiki*; and 2) for the geographic region surrounding Tokyo, Yoshikawa uses “*Musashi-no-kuni*.” As part of the “*haihan-chiken*” reform, Musashi province was split into Tokyo-fu and the prefectures of Saitama and Kanagawa in 1868.

⁷⁷ *TTKSS*, 30:63 back-64 front.

⁷⁸ *TTKSS*, 30:65 front.

the national role of Tokyo – from being “the foremost capital city in the entire nation” for Kusumoto, to having a “great effect on the reputation of our entire nation” according to Matsuda, and finally to becoming “the greatest capital in Asia” in the eyes of Yoshikawa. And, to be sure, there was a commensurate broadening of the breadth and scale of improvements proposed in each of the plans – from infrastructure improvements and wharf construction for Kusumoto, port construction and a “countless number” of reforms for Matsuda, to Yoshikawa’s call for urban facilities designed to “comfort the spirits and please the eyes and ears” of residents of a fireproof capital that combined political and commercial benefits. Nevertheless, each of these planners all used neutral terms such as “*Shufu*” and “*Tofu*” to name the capital.

This shift in the planning discourse of Tokyo is most evident in the endorsement that Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo made to the central government Council of State on behalf of Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa’s transportation and port plans. Although these endorsements were generally nothing more than brief summaries of the attached proposals, the language Yamagata used to support the plans was revealing. First endorsing Yoshikawa’s Urban Improvement Statement in November 1884, Home Minister Yamagata echoed Yoshikawa’s language tying transportation to the commercial prosperity and prestige of the city. Yet whereas Yoshikawa used the term “*Tofu*” to indicate the capital, Yamagata expressly changed this appellation to one with more imperial significance. Urging the approval of the Yoshikawa Plan, for example, Yamagata stressed that the “welfare of Tokyo and its politics are greatly felt on the national scale (*dai ni zenkoku no kibo ni kan-shi*),” because of its status as “the residence of the Emperor (*renkoku no moto*) and the capital of the entire country” (*kaidai no shufu*).

By adopting such a plan for future projects, Yamagata continued, “we can look forward to the limitless prosperity of both national strength (*kokusei*) and the Imperial Capital (*Teito*).”⁷⁹ Yamagata used similar language when later endorsing Yoshikawa’s port plans in February 1885: “As Tokyo is the residence of the emperor (*renkoku no moto*), the capital of the entire country (*kaidai no shufu*), and because it is furthermore the location for trade with foreign countries and the place where goods of all kinds converge,” Yamagata appealed, “the convenience of imports and exports is well worth special consideration.” “By planning a policy of such improvements at this time,” he repeated, “we can look forward to the limitless prosperity of the Imperial Capital (*Teito*).”⁸⁰

How to explain this steady elevation in rhetoric regarding the role of Tokyo and the commensurate expansion in the improvements envisioned? Certainly, one explanation could be that the Tokyo governors were shrewd politicians looking for a way to secure national financial support for their projects. More improvements meant more costs, and if they could convince the central government that the urban improvement of Tokyo was a matter of national concern, and therefore a program to be undertaken and funded by the central government, then they could defray the financial burden placed on Tokyo itself. In this view, language of Tokyo as the “imperial capital” was more a cynical ploy to access the imperial coffers. While this was undoubtedly one factor, it does not seem to be the whole story. Governor Matsuda, after all, had used similar language to justify urban improvements in 1880 even while firmly locating his planning system at the local level. Another explanation could be that over the years between 1878

⁷⁹ *TTKSS*, 30:53 front-53 back.

⁸⁰ *TTKSS*, 30:84.

and 1884, the view of Tokyo as the undisputable imperial capital became universal. This would be in line with the transition of Tokyo from “Temporary Court to Imperial Capital,” described by Takashi Fujitani, whereby the Meiji government came to view the city of Tokyo as a permanent “symbolic and ritual center,” as represented by the construction of a new imperial palace starting in 1884.⁸¹ While certain government leaders had recognized Tokyo’s role as the national capital and home of the emperor as the reason for improvements as early as the 1872 Ginza Bricktown plan, by 1884 this recognition solidified in the minds of the central politicians and local planners alike. After 1885, moreover, this view of Tokyo space became concretized in the built form of the city as planners at the national level began to see Imperial Capital Tokyo in competition with grand capital cities worldwide.

Local to National, and Back Again: The Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans

Once Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo’s endorsed the Yoshikawa Plan to the central government, the capital city planning of Tokyo officially passed from the local level to the national level. As seen in earlier the Ginza Bricktown project, the rebuilding of the imperial capital was too important to leave to municipal forces. Of course, on the flip side, this meant that planning would reflect imperial needs and goals, rather than municipal ones. Still, even at the national level, planners remained deeply divided over exactly what those needs and goals were. This is most evident in the tortuous development of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance and the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans. The half-decade following the submission of the Yoshikawa

⁸¹ Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 68, 82.

Plan in 1884 saw the production of rival urban plans by two separate government-level planning entities, the Home Ministry's Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shinsakai*) and the Foreign Ministry's Special Architecture Bureau (*Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku*). While both of these entities sought to make Tokyo into a suitable imperial capital, it is easy to see their approaches to capital city planning as mutually incompatible. Planners associated with the Home Ministry can be described as "Functionalists" because of their attempts to gradually improve the commercial function of the city through transportation and infrastructure improvements in order to garner international recognition and prestige. In contrast, Foreign Ministry planners can be categorized as "Europeanizationists" because they envisioned immediate transformations of the built form of Tokyo in order to produce a built environment that would mimic the grand European capitals.⁸² But these were not the only participants involved in Tokyo capital city planning. Further complicating the planning process were the "commercialist" desires of non-governmental business elites involved in planning decisions, and the "populist" demands of non-governmental, non-elite local Tokyo residents. Yet, rather than irreconcilable views of the city, each of these groups represented impulses that framed the discourse of Tokyo capital city planning. At a time when the profession of town planning worldwide was still emergent, "planners" in Tokyo in the late 1880s were often civil or railway engineers, architects, and more frequently career bureaucrats who had spent a good amount of time overseas. For this reason, as more individuals became involved in the planning of Tokyo as the capital city, plans changed in response to the collective designs, desires, and demands of disparate groups

⁸² Watanabe, "Metropolitanism as a Way of Life," 408.

of people, whether they be engineers, politicians, businessmen, or local residents. What eventually materialized was a pragmatic planning system designed to strategically react as much as possible to the wants and needs of these groups. In other words, even as Tokyo planning became a national issue, local concerns could not be ignored. As the following section will demonstrate, although codified at the elite national level, Tokyo capital city planning was nevertheless by no means the unilateral product of a monolithic planning entity. Instead, debates within, rivalries between, and outside forces acting upon competing planning entities shaped the urban space of Tokyo as Functionalist, Europeanizationist, commercialist, and populist inputs coalesced to form the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan. A closer look at these two competing planning entities – the Home Ministry’s Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee and the Foreign Ministry’s Special Architecture Bureau – will show how central government attempts to standardize the planning process instead led to more variation as new participants became involved and introduced new elements to the discourse. Examining these negotiations over the purpose of urban improvements, we can see how differing conceptualizations of the city merged to charge the urban space of the imperial capital with political meaning.

As Tokyo capital city planning passed to the national level, the central government attempted to dominate the planning process. Looking at the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee established in 1885 to review the Yoshikawa Plan, two ways the central government tried to assert central control of planning stand out. First, the central government ordered that urban improvement plans for the capital be drawn up by a committee located in the national bureaucracy, not the local Tokyo government. To be sure, in his endorsement of the Yoshikawa Plan, Home Minister

Yamagata had used rhetoric stressing Tokyo's importance to the rest of the nation. But in this petition, when requesting an examination committee to deliberate the plan, Yamagata imagined that any such committee would be located at the municipal level. Indeed, Yamagata recommended that the committee members be comprised of "appropriate officials" (*tōgai kanri*) – which admittedly could indicate either municipal officials or central bureaucrats. More importantly, the Tokyo governor would be made chairman, and the committee itself would be established "within the Tokyo government" (*fuchō ni oite*), placing it under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo municipal government.⁸³ Regardless, the central government had different ideas. In its approval of the petition, the central government ordered that, rather than being established within the Tokyo government, the new committee would be placed "in the Home Ministry" (*sono shō ni oite*), locating it firmly at the national level.⁸⁴

Secondly, the central government stocked the committee with central government bureaucrats. As Prime Minister Sanjō Sanetomi ordered, four members of the committee would come from the Home Ministry, while the Public Works Ministry, the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, the Army Ministry, and the Police Bureau would each send 2 members of their own.⁸⁵ Two additional members were later added from the Navy Ministry in order to discuss port construction plans.⁸⁶ In all, of the 19 members sitting on

⁸³ Keeping in mind that the Tokyo governor at the time, Yoshikawa Akimasa, was also a standing Home Ministry official, it could arguably be said that Home Minister Yamagata had no intention of the committee being a municipal body.

⁸⁴ *TTKSS*, 30:53 front-54 front.

⁸⁵ *TTKSS*, 30:54 front, 57 front.

⁸⁶ *TTKSS*, 30:88 front.

the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee, only 4 represented local Tokyo interests, and this was only after committee chairman Yoshikawa awkwardly wrote to the Governor of Tokyo – himself – formally requesting the inclusion of two members from the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce (*Tōkyō Shōkōkai*) in order to secure the support of the influential chamber.⁸⁷

Several significant characteristics stand out about the members of the committee. First, the presence of a number of significant names among the list of committee members reaffirmed the importance of Tokyo capital city planning. Counted among the members were such prominent individuals as Nagayo Sensai, Home Ministry Public Works Bureau chief and later Police Bureau Chief Mishima Michitsune, Public Works Vice-Minister and Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru, local businessmen Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takashi, the Rensselaer-trained engineer Haraguchi Kaname, and even later Governor-General of Taiwan Rear Admiral Kabayama Sukenori. Secondly, the committee membership underlined the drastic departure from the earlier planning efforts of Governor Matsuda, whose municipal-level Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board was comprised of several longtime residents of Tokyo. Not only were Shibusawa and Haraguchi the only members retained from the earlier Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board, only one of the 15 central government bureaucrats on the committee, Navy representative Yanagi Narayoshi, was even from Tokyo.⁸⁸ A third point that stands

⁸⁷ Mikuriya Takashi argues that Yoshikawa's inclusion of Masuda and Shibusawa was an attempt to secure the support of the Chamber of Commerce (See: Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 348).

⁸⁸ The complete list of committee members, with their bureaucratic affiliation and place of birth in parentheses, is listed alphabetically as follows: Haraguchi Kaname (Public Works, Hizen), Inoue Masaru (Public Works, Yamaguchi), Itō Masanobu (Tokyo,

out when examining the list of committee members more carefully is that many shared one trait: experience in the West. Of the 19 members, 11 had visited the West, either as part of the Iwakura Mission (Nagayo Sensai, Yamazaki Naotane, and Kusaka Yoshio), as students (Inoue Masaru and Haraguchi Kaname), or as members of other official embassies or inspection tours (Yoshikawa Akimasa, Sawa Tadashi, Onoda Motohiro, Ozawa Takeo, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda Takashi).

Despite central government efforts to guide the planning process, the Examination Committee was in no way an entirely monolithic assembly of like-minded individuals sharing a unanimous vision of the city. Instead, from the very first meeting, committee members drew on their knowledge of Western cities to push the Home Ministry plans beyond their original Functionalist focus on transportation to include more comprehensive urban facilities designed to refashion Tokyo as a monumental imperial capital. In addition to Mishima Michitsune's proposal to widen streets, Yamazaki Naotane argued that Tokyo should be rebuilt like Paris, Nagayo Sensai urged the inclusion of parks and squares to improve city sanitation and hygiene, and Shibusawa Eiichi insisted on adding markets and a stock exchange. Because of these differing viewpoints, Fujimori Terunobu has described the deliberations of the Examination Committee meetings as a competition between two visions of the city – Tokyo as an

Tokyo), Kabayama Sukenori (Navy, Kagoshima), Kuroda Hisataka (Army, Shizuoka), Kusaka Yoshio (Communications, Aizu), Masuda Takashi (Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, Niigata), Mishima Michitsune (Home, Satsuma), Nagayo Sensai (Home, Nagasaki), Onoda Mitsuhiro (Police, Gumma), Ozawa Takeo (Army, Kokura), Sakurai Tsutomu (Home, Hyōgo), Sawa Tadashi (Police, Sendai), Shibusawa Eiichi (Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, Saitama), Shinagawa Tadamichi (Agriculture and Commerce, Hizen), Watanabe Takashi (Tokyo, Tokyo), Yamazaki Naotane (Home, Fukuoka), Yanagi Narayoshi (Navy, Tokyo), and Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa (Home, Tokushima).

“Imperial Capital” (*Teito*) championed by Yamazaki Naotane, versus Tokyo as a “Commercial Capital” (*Shōto*) advocated by Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takashi – in which the “Imperial Capital” side won.⁸⁹ Rather than one view trumping the other, in the end these differing ideas merged together to produce an increasingly monumental urban improvement plan for Tokyo.

Members of the Examination Committee challenged the Home Ministry’s singular emphasis on transportation from the very first meeting in February 1885. Calling the committee to order, Chairman Yoshikawa attempted to focus the discussion on the general outline of the plans. Pointing out that the basic idea was to “follow actual conditions on the ground and ‘the old’ as much as possible, while changing as little of that form as necessary,” he reminded the assembled committee members, “after all, it is not as if we are constructing a new capital in the middle of an empty field!”⁹⁰ Other committee members had other ideas, however, and quickly made their voices heard. The member who spoke out most forcefully was Home Ministry Accounting Bureau (*Kaikeikyoku*) Chief Secretary Yamazaki Naotane.⁹¹ Taking the floor, Yamazaki belittled the limited scope of the Yoshikawa plan, remarking, “this ‘urban improvement’ (*shiku kaisei*) is really just a ‘road-widening’ argument...I feel that the things that we are here

⁸⁹ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 145. Mikuriya Takashi calls into question the accuracy of Fujimori’s “Imperial Capital” versus “Commercial Capital” structure, arguing instead that various impulses were unified in the final plans. See: Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 384.

⁹⁰ *TTKSS*, 31:1 front-1 back; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 88.

⁹¹ Yamazaki held a number of concurrent official posts: Home Ministry Accounting Bureau Chief Secretary, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Finance Ministry Chief Secretary. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054350400, “Shokuinroku, Meiji Jū-nana nen ni, hachigatsu, shokuinroku (Naimusho) aratame” [Personnel directories; February, August 1884; revised personnel directory (Home Ministry)], slide 46.

discussing today are narrow in scope, as they are nothing more than rerouting streets, and digging new canals.” Because “it would not be an exaggeration to call *Shiku Kaisei* the improvement of Tokyo,” Yamazaki observed, “building construction, water system improvements, sewer flows, and especially the construction of a port” should all be concluded in future plans. “Even if roads are constructed, if the water system is incomplete and houses are not fireproof, then there is no benefit.”

After criticizing the Home Ministry’s limited focus on transportation, Yamazaki, who had studied in Paris nearly two decades earlier, argued that Tokyo should be rebuilt as a European-style capital.⁹² Receiving Chairman Yoshikawa’s permission, Yamazaki presented a prepared statement quoting a translated selection on the history of Paris from the French history textbook *Historie de la France, 1867* authored by prolific scholar and one-time Ministry of Education advisor Gustave Ducoudray.⁹³ Then harking back to his time as a student in Paris in the 1870s and as a participant of an official mission to France in 1882, Yamazaki regaled the Committee with vivid examples of what he had in mind: the streets could be remade like the well-known Parisian boulevards, Asakusa and Shiba parks would be rebuilt like Park Monseau, the Honganji temple should be reconstructed like the San Jacques Cathedral, and the areas around the imperial palace might be remodeled like the Louvre. If Paris was not enough, in a later meeting Yamazaki even suggested that the entire outer moat of the old Edo Castle could be widened and

⁹² Fujimori Terunobu notes that Yamazaki had spent much time in Paris as a member of the Iwakura Mission in 1871 in Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 93. Yamazaki also traveled to Europe in 1880 along with Itō Hirobumi on an official mission to study European political systems.

⁹³ Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 94.

converted into a park comparable to Vienna's famous Ringstrasse.⁹⁴ For Yamazaki, the reason for such a dramatic transformation of the built form of Tokyo was the city's role as the imperial capital. "Our Tokyo, the Imperial Capital (*Teito*) of the entire country," Yamazaki reminded the Committee, "is the seat of the government." "As Tokyo is the home of the Emperor (*Renkoku no Moto*), the seat of the national government, and the center of and the center of institutions, culture, and development," Yamazaki continued, "the urban improvements of Tokyo are the model (*mohan*) for all cities in the empire, large and small, and truly a project for the advancement of our civilization and enlightenment."⁹⁵

Yamazaki's grandiloquent descriptions elicited delighted approval from the assembled Committee members. Mishima Michitsune expressed his agreement saying he hoped for a capital that "without being overly ostentatious, would surpass even London and Paris in its aesthetic beauty."⁹⁶ Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce official Shinagawa Tadamichi added, "For me, too, as a long-time resident of Tokyo and as a Japanese person, making our capital in no way inferior to London or Paris is a desire that I am unable to suppress."⁹⁷ Encouraged to provide more concrete examples, Yamazaki again took the floor to lay out the specific plans he had in mind:

First, various government buildings should be gathered into one place, all should have the same design and built in gorgeous Western architectural styles...Walls should be erected around the estates of banks, companies,

⁹⁴ Yamazaki made this suggestion during the third meeting of the committee on March 10, 1885. *TTKSS*, 31:46 back.

⁹⁵ *TTKSS*, 31:8 back-9 front; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 96-97.

⁹⁶ *TTKSS*, 31:10 front; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 98.

⁹⁷ *TTKSS*, 31:11 back; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 99.

and wealthy individuals, and only proper architecture – no ugly small houses (*koya*) or restored traditional row houses (*nagaya*) – would be permitted inside. As for a theater, if was one was to be eventually built beside the Rokumeikan, then it should be built in beautiful architecture. And as for hotels, they will be allowed if they are built along the lines of the “Grand Hotel” [in Paris].⁹⁸

As a result of his rousing speech, Yamazaki was put in charge of drawing up plans for a theater to be built in central Tokyo. Without fail, Yamazaki argued for the construction of a theater along the lines of the famous Parisian “Opera,” noting “In all the countries of Europe and America, be they empires, monarchies, or republics, they all have a ‘imperial,’ ‘royal,’ or ‘national’ ‘theater’ where the emperor, the empress, and all the officials and gentlemen come face to face.”⁹⁹ Following the example of “civilized countries” (*bunmei shokoku*) of the West, the final Examination Committee Plan proposed, a theater should be located in a “suitable, central” site of Tokyo and constructed in a manner appropriate to being the theater of the Japanese capital. Doing so, the Plan concluded, would “complete the aesthetic beauty of the imperial capital (*teito no bikan wo mattō seshimuru ni ari*).”¹⁰⁰

Yamazaki’s soliloquy inspired the committee to further push the parameters of the original Yoshikawa Plan by introducing their own designs for the capital. Next to speak up was physician and Home Ministry Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo Sensai, who argued for the inclusion of parks.¹⁰¹ Staying on in Berlin after the Iwakura Mission, Nagayo had

⁹⁸ *TTKSS*, 31:14 front-14 back; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 102-103.

⁹⁹ *TTKSS*, 31:176 back; Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, 136.

¹⁰⁰ *TTKSS*, 30:93 front.

¹⁰¹ For a more detailed analysis of the development of park plans in the Tokyo Urban Improvement plans, along with Nagayo’s activities in the Examination Committee, see Ryōhei Ono, “Meijiki Tōkyō ni okeru Kōkyō Zōen Kūkan no Keikaku Shisō,” *Tōkyō*

been perfectly situated to have his finger on the pulse of Western medical trends, including the most up-to-date German ideas of “public health.” As Ann Bowman Jannetta explains, “This concept reached far beyond the traditional practice of medicine, with its focus on the individual relationship between doctor and patient, into the realm of public works, which was the responsibility of the state.”¹⁰² With this background in European public health, Nagayo made his first appearance during the second meeting of the Examination Committee and quickly proposed the installation of a number of “squares” and parks in order to improve air quality in the city and open up evacuation zones for use in times of emergency. “Even if the importance of parks is not yet recognized in Japan,” Nagayo stressed, “they are so important that there is no country in Europe whose capital has no parks.” To emphasize this point, Nagayo drew the attention of the committee to Hyde Park and the Kensington Gardens in London, the Tiergarten in Berlin, and even the Champs Elysees in Paris, provided detailed statistics for the ratio of residents to urban parks in London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.¹⁰³ In Japan, on the other hand, the lack of urban parks had led to “excessively docile” traditional “Japanese recreations” so “unhealthy for civilized society” – such as “watching plays, playing Go, performing tea ceremony, chanting ballads, and especially ‘Pin the tail on the Geisha’ [*lit*: ‘pinching the buttocks of the Geisha’].” “If there are even the slightest gentlemanly

Daigaku Nōgakubu Enshūrin Hōkoku 103 (2000): esp. 138-154, and Paul Waley, “Parks and Landmarks: Planning the Eastern Capital along Western Lines,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 31 (2005): 1-16.

¹⁰² Ann Jannetta, “From Physician to Bureaucrat: The Case of Nagayo Sensai,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kerr (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 159.

¹⁰³ *TTKSS*, 31:54 front-55 back.

pastimes in this country,” Nagayo continued, “if there is no place to restore one's spirits, it would be humiliating in contrast to foreign countries.”¹⁰⁴ Nagayo therefore suggested the inclusion of several parks and squares. Nagayo’s motion for parks was seconded by Sakurai Tsutomu and further endorsed by Police Bureau official Onoda Motohiro, who added that he had also intended to suggest that the Committee consider adding recreational parks. Gunnery colonel Kuroda Hisataka voiced his approval, noting that plazas were desirable in times of emergency from a military standpoint. With this level of support, Chairman Yoshikawa put the issue to a vote and the motion passed with 10 of the 14 present members standing in approval.¹⁰⁵ Ultimately, the Committee approved 10 large parks and 45 small parks, explaining in the final plans, “In the civilized capitals of the West, parks are always placed proportionately to population.” “While in Tokyo we already have 2 or 3 parks,” the plan reasoned, “because we still have not achieved our hygienic goals, it is necessary in the long run to install several dozen large and small parks based on population.”¹⁰⁶

Finally, Shibusawa Eiichi championed the inclusion of commercial facilities in the plans. In his concurrent role as President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, Shibusawa officially presented Chairman Yoshikawa and the Examination Committee with a document laying out the Chamber’s own urban improvement proposals. Among the items listed in this document were port construction, river improvements, the reversion of Marunouchi to town areas, and the judicious widening of roads done

¹⁰⁴ *TTKSS*, 31:34 front-34 back.

¹⁰⁵ *TTKSS*, 31:33 back-36 front.

¹⁰⁶ *TTKSS*, 30:91 front-92 back. The proposed parks are discussed and listed in *TTKSS*, 31:161 front-170 back.

carefully so as to avoid causing too much destruction to existing areas.¹⁰⁷ Since his time on Matsuda's Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board starting in 1880, Shibusawa had advocated the construction of a major port in Tokyo to compete with the larger port to the south in Yokohama. Aside from the obvious commercial benefits for the city of Tokyo, an additional reason for Shibusawa's persistence on the port issue may have been that he owned a substantial amount of land in the Kabutochō neighborhood to the east of Nihombashi, where he opened the Daiichi Bank and kept his own residence. Placing a port on the nearby Sumida River, therefore, would greatly increase the commercial importance, and therefore the value, of his land. For this reason Shibusawa questioned the need for the proposed rail link between the northern and southern rail termini in Ueno and Shimbashi. Instead, he argued, priority should be given to port construction and river improvements. In this regard, Shibusawa can be grouped with fellow businessmen Masuda Takashi and Taguchi Ukichi as "Commercialists" who called for projects designed to facilitate the commercial activity of the capital, such as markets and the port. Taguchi was a prominent entrepreneur, railway speculator, and newspaperman whose 1880 series of editorials entitled "Theses on Tokyo" (*Tōkyō Ron*) were especially influential in spurring public discussion of urban reform and starting a dialogue on port construction. As Taguchi's *Tokyo Keizai Zasshi* newspaper reported in late 1884, "No matter how beautiful the buildings, or how organized the streets, if commerce is not accumulated, then Tokyo can become neither the Paris nor the London of the East!"¹⁰⁸ Advancing similar arguments in the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee,

¹⁰⁷ *TTKSS*, 31:207 front-211 back.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 365.

Shibusawa was placed in charge of drawing up proposals for meat and produce markets, slaughterhouses, and a new chamber of commerce building and stock exchange. The Committee adopted each of these proposals without alterations, pointing out in the final plans that it was important to relocate Tokyo's current markets and slaughterhouses to the edges of the city as was done in the "great European capitals" because of their unsanitary and unhygienic conditions. The chamber of commerce building and stock exchange, meanwhile, should be located in the "central and most convenient locations" so that they might "most easily captivate the gaze of onlookers" and constructed in "magnificent architect" that would "both demonstrate commercial prosperity and provide ornamentation for the capital."¹⁰⁹ Because of Shibusawa's influence, both buildings were placed in Kabutochō, where they still stand.

In this way, the Examination Committee broadened the scope of Yoshikawa's original Functionalist transportation-based plan over the course of thirteen meetings to incorporate more comprehensive urban facilities, including the European-style theater and parks suggested by Yamazaki and Nagayo, and the Commercialist port, markets, slaughterhouses, stock market, and chamber of commerce building proposed by Shibusawa. Because all of these facilities were based on Western examples, it is clear that they were intended to place Tokyo on an equal footing with the grand Western capitals. As Yoshikawa reported in his summary report, all of these facilities were based on careful examination after "looking far and near, investigating Western examples, while considering domestic conditions."¹¹⁰ In this regard, the expanded coverage of the

¹⁰⁹ *TTKSS*, 30:92 front-92 back.

¹¹⁰ *TTKSS*, 30:90 back.

Examination Committee Plan denotes a significant increase in the monumentality with which Tokyo planners viewed the urban space of the capital. As Yoshikawa wrote in his introduction to the Committee's final plan, "If we are ever to make Tokyo live up to its name as the capital of the emperor's realm (*kōkoku no hōki*) and the place of domestic and international trade, then we must reform antiquated customs and make the scale of reforms expansive."¹¹¹ After listing the proposed facilities, the plan noted that simultaneously carrying out urban improvements and construction of a port "will be the best plan for the lasting prosperity of the Tokyo area" and the best way to "improve the city to make it the greatest capital in Asia."

Yet, the plans still lacked a Populist component. Up to this point, facilities had been introduced mostly for their aesthetic quality and mainly for the reason that the Japanese capital should have all the same urban attributes of the grand western capitals. This is why each proposal for new amenities was supported by Western examples. It was as if local Tokyo planning was being based not on the conditions of the Japanese capital, but rather on those of cities halfway around the world in Europe. Ironically, the inducement for planners to turn their attention to domestic conditions rather than foreign models came from Special Architecture Bureau (*Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku*), chaired by Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru. When the Home Ministry's Examination Committee was dismissed by the central government in December 1885, planning power shifted to the Foreign Ministry and Inoue Kaoru until the passage of the Tokyo Urban Improvement

¹¹¹ *TTKSS*, 30:90 front.

Ordinance in 1888.¹¹² Historians frequently present the story of the two groups as a rivalry and competition between the Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry over political control of the Tokyo urban planning. There is certainly some truth to this. The widening political rift between Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo and Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi undoubtedly influenced Itō's decision to favor the project of his ally Inoue

¹¹² Home Minister Yamagata had immediately endorsed the Examination Committee plans to the central government and recommended the creation of a Tokyo Urban Improvement Bureau (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Kyoku*) to implement the plans, but the only response from the Central Chamber had been to dismiss the Examination Committee on December 8, 1885. It is interesting to note the similarity between this proposed committee and the later Special Architecture Bureau chaired by Inoue. The Tokyo Urban Improvement Bureau had been first suggested by Yamazaki Naotane during the first meeting of the Examination Committee. Describing how a single government body in France and Austria planned all “civil” architecture resulting in aesthetic consistency, Yamazaki had insisted during his famous soliloquy that in Japan, too, urban reform of Tokyo should be undertaken as a national project and implemented by a new entity “called a Supervisory Bureau (*Kantokukyoku*) or Examination Bureau (*Shinsakyoku*).” Taking the floor in the second to last meeting on June 30th, 1885, Yamazaki had then resubmitted this motion:

Just as I mentioned in the first meeting, I'd like to talk about the establishment of a Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Bureau. From the beginning these urban improvements were meant to be the foundation for the next hundred years or so, and once these resolutions are enacted, the main objectives will not change even if the responsible authorities do. In order to maintain this goal, we must establish a single bureau to control and supervise [the projects]...Incidentally, saying the projects should not be viewed as the affairs of one locality is to say that they should be seen as a special temporary (*rinji*) project of the central government, just one that will last longer. Once actual implementation finally gets underway, a permanent Examination Bureau will be necessary to control and supervise finances and architectural specifics, and determine procedures for various other matters. For that reason, a single Bureau should be created within the Home Ministry, with the Vice-Home Minister as the Chairman, the Tokyo Governor as Vice-Chairman, with a board of directors made up of 10 or so engineers and economists.

Receiving the approval of the Committee, Yamazaki was appointed to draft a proposal for exactly such a committee before it would be submitted in Yoshikawa's name (*TTKSS*, 31:206 front.)

Hirobumi over that of Yamagata's second-in-charge, Vice-Minister Yoshikawa. Scholars also emphasize the clear ideological differences between the two programs, noting that Inoue's plans for an "European-style" grand imperial capital were incompatible with the Home Ministry's plans for a gradual improvement of the city's commerce through infrastructure. When Inoue's Europeanizationist image for the city eventually fell through once again, the Special Architecture Bureau nevertheless introduced a Populist element to the expanding Tokyo urban improvement plans.

Without question, Inoue's intention for the Special Architecture was to transform Tokyo into an imperial capital that would appear no less splendid than Paris or London. As early as September 1884, a full two months before Yoshikawa submitted his initial Yoshikawa Plan, Inoue had commissioned Tokyo Imperial University architecture professor Josiah Conder to design various government offices including a new Imperial Diet building, carry out site inspections, and supervise construction.¹¹³ Inoue had earlier retained Conder to design the famous Deer Cry Pavilion (*Rokumeikan*), completed in 1883, so it was no surprise that he would again turn to Conder. Inoue was preparing for a scheduled May 1886 treaty renegotiation conference with Germany and Great Britain, and much as he had done in the Ginza Bricktown project over a dozen years earlier, he hoped the construction of a grand Western-style capital – replete with a western-style National Diet, modern prisons, and impressive ministry buildings – would aid the treaty

¹¹³ Fujimori Terunobu, "Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: Sono 1 Hottan yori Bekkuman rainichi made" [Research on Ende and Böckmann's plans to concentrate government offices, 1: from the beginning until Böckmann's arrival in Japan], *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū* 271 (1978): 133.

revision process.¹¹⁴ In this way, he too was attempting to rectify what he saw as the biggest failure of the Ginza Bricktown, namely that the project had been stopped before it could re-create Tokyo completely into a Western-style capital. But for Inoue, Tokyo as the “greatest capital in Asia” meant a city that visually mimicked the idealized urban aesthetics of nineteenth-century European capitals: broad boulevards, opulent Baroque urban design, and monumental buildings. Now with the Special Architecture Bureau, Inoue intended to spread the Ginza Bricktown and the *Rokumeikan* to the rest of Tokyo.

Undoubtedly, Inoue’s vision of Tokyo as a Western-style capital was indicated by group of the leading architects and western-trained engineers he gathered to form the Special Architecture Bureau in February 1886.¹¹⁵ The importance of this Bureau, and its focus on architecture, is clearly evident in the list of personnel who would be affiliated with it: architects Josiah Conder, Tatsuno Kingo, Tsumaki Yorinaka, Matsugasaki Tsumunaga, Watanabe Yuzuru, Kawai Kōzō, and planners Mishima Michitsune, Yamao Yōzō and Aoki Shūzō, would all be members of, or advisors, to the Bureau before it was finally dismissed in 1890. Inoue also commissioned a series of foreign engineers and architects to produce a succession of opulent plans for the capital that came to be known as “Plans to Concentrate Government Offices” (*Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku*). In addition to retaining the longtime foreign advisor Conder, Inoue hired German civil engineer James

¹¹⁴ Horiuchi Masaaki, “Ōka seisaku no yume no ato: Hibiya Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku” [After the dream of Europeanization policies: the plan to concentrate government offices in Hibiya], in *Mikan no Tōkyō Keikaku: Jitsugen Shinakatta Keikaku no Keikakushi*, ed. Ishida Yorifusa (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1992), 11; William P. Ker, “Treaty Revision in Japan: A Survey of the Steps by Which the Abolition of Foreign Privilege was Accomplished in the Island Empire,” *Pacific Affairs* 1, no. 6 (1928): 2.

¹¹⁵ NAJ, “Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku no Shokunin wo Sadamu” [Special Architecture Bureau personnel named], Doc. # *honkan-2A-011-00.rui00250100*; *TSS*, vol. 70 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1979), 433.

Hobrecht, and most famously the German architectural firm of Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann to sketch designs for the central government district and several buildings, including the National Diet building.¹¹⁶ Eventually, a total of a dozen German architects would be hired to assist Ende and Böckmann, and 20 more Japanese engineers would be sent to Germany for training.¹¹⁷

Yet Inoue's control of Tokyo capital city planning with the Special Architecture Bureau lasted only about 1½ years from the founding of the Bureau in February 1886 to Inoue's resignation in August 1887. When Inoue's failure to secure new treaties led to calls for his resignation, inflamed by public demonstrations protesting Inoue's willingness to compromise with the foreigners, Inoue attempted to deflect this backlash away from the Special Architecture Bureau by resigning as Foreign Minister in August 1887 and then Chairman of the Bureau in September.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Ende revealed in his diary that following Inoue's departure "he [Ende] could no longer see the enthusiasm the government once had for the plans. Our plans came to be seen as wasteful, and that having them built by foreigners with complete control would be anti-nationalistic."¹¹⁹ Following the resignation of Inoue, the Special Architecture Bureau was transferred from the Foreign Ministry to the Home Ministry and placed under a new chairman, Vice-Home Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa, where it was reduced to a mere administrative entity and

¹¹⁶ The most detailed account of Ende and Böckmann activities in Japan is found in Horiuchi Masaaki, *Meiji no Oyatoi Kenchikuka: Ende & Bekkuman* [The foreign architectural advisors of Meiji: Ende and Böckmann](Tokyo: Inoue Shoin, 1989).

¹¹⁷ Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 230-231.

¹¹⁸ Michael R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 19.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Horiuchi, "Ōka seisaku no yume no ato," 24.

finally disbanded in 1890.¹²⁰ With the dissolution of the Bureau, it would seem on the surface that Inoue's efforts to effect a dramatic transformation of central Tokyo were a total failure. Certainly, the famously grandiose plans produced under the aegis of the Bureau never materialized. Brought to Japan by the Bureau in April 1886, for example, Wilhelm Böckmann had presented an opulent Baroque-inspired urban plan for central Tokyo along with elevations for a imposing Imperial Diet building. For the government district layout, Böckmann had called for an elaborate triangular plaza opening from a central station and framed by two broad ceremonial avenues, appropriately named Emperor Avenue and Empress Avenue, which merged into Japan Avenue and leading to the Imperial Diet Building.¹²¹ But such a transformation would have required destruction of much of the existing built environment south of the imperial palace, including demolition of nearly three-quarters of the Ginza Bricktown, and enormous building costs. As a result, Böckmann's plans were scaled back by Ende as quickly as they were introduced. Later plans drawn up by Hermann Ende and German civil engineer James Hobrecht called for grouping the various ministry buildings into a square-shaped

¹²⁰ NAI, Doc.#: *honkan-2A-018-00.ninA00129100*, "Naimu jikan Yoshikawa Akimasa Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku jimu toriatsukai no ken" [Matters of Vice-Home Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa taking over the affairs of the Special Architecture Bureau]; Fujimori Terunobu, "Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: Sono 3 Haikyoku he" [Research on Ende and Böckmann's plans to concentrate government offices, 3: towards the dissolution of the Special Architecture Bureau], *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū* 273 (1978): 141.

¹²¹ Arriving in Tokyo in April 1886, Böckmann surveyed Tokyo from atop the German Embassy and was shown around the city by members of the Special Architecture Bureau, with translation provided by Matsugashima Tsumunaga, who had stayed on in Germany to study architecture after the Iwakura Mission (Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 228; Horiuchi, "Ōka seisaku no yume no ato," 14-15).

arrangement surrounding a large plaza in the Hibiya parade grounds immediately south of the imperial palace. Yet soil excavations quickly determined that the east half of the grounds were too unstable to support the planned large and heavy brick structures, a vestige of the marshy Hibiya Inlet reclaimed by the early 1600s. The poor soil quality, compounded by Inoue's resignation as Foreign Minister around this time, led to the further scaling back of even these already truncated plans. In the end, only two of the buildings designed by Ende and Böckmann were eventually erected following revisions by Japanese engineer Yamao Yōzō, the recently restored Ministry of Justice building and the demolished Supreme Court building.¹²²

Despite the short tenure of the Special Architecture Bureau, the Bureau nonetheless had a far-reaching impact on the direction of future Tokyo urban improvement planning. For example, when finally built several decades later, the Imperial Diet building sat in almost the exact site atop a natural rise in Nagatachō proposed in Böckmann's original plans. Also, following Yamao Yōzō's revisions of the German plans, the eastern half of the Hibiya parade grounds were set aside as a park in the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans. This park would be opened in 1903 as Hibiya Park, "the first park in any Japanese city," Paul Waley explains, "to be modeled explicitly on the European concept of an urban park."¹²³ More significantly, the Special Architecture Bureau made an aggressive intervention into Tokyo urban planning role as it began to rethink its bureaucratic mission. At first, as its name indicated, the Bureau had been established specifically to investigate and plan the construction of ministry

¹²² Fujimori, "Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: Sono 3," 141-144.

¹²³ Waley, "Parks and landmarks," 11.

buildings. But on the advice of Böckmann, who stressed that building construction should only begin after urban improvement plans were finalized, the Bureau began to take on the responsibility of a more all-encompassing planning entity.¹²⁴ Widening the Bureau's initial focus on architecture to incorporate streets improvements and more general public works, Inoue brought into the Bureau as Vice-Chairman (*Fuku-Sōsai*), Mishima Michitsune to provide planning experience.¹²⁵ Not only had Mishima been party to the planning of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872 and a member of Home Ministry's Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee in 1885, he had also earned the nickname "Public Works Prefect" (*Doboku Kenrei*) for insistently pushing rail, road, and building construction projects while he was in office as governor of Shizuoka, Yamagata, and Fukushima Prefectures during the interim.¹²⁶ In an attempt to seize urban planning power from the Home Ministry, Inoue and Mishima urged Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi

¹²⁴ Böckmann urged the importance of systematic planning and street improvements:

As the construction of the various ministry buildings is greatly related to the Tokyo Urban Improvement (*Shiku Kaisei*) projects, to start construction of the buildings while the Urban Improvement plans have not yet been settled would be to mistake the order of the plans. If construction were to start [on the buildings] today, only to give rise to obstacles to urban improvements later, then the advantages of both projects will be lost in the end. Therefore only after the urban improvement plans are first fully completed can the locations for the buildings set and construction started (Quoted in Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 232)

¹²⁵ The position of Vice-Chairman was created within the Special Architecture Bureau by imperial decree on July 24th, 1886 (NAJ, "Rinji Kenchikukyoku Fuku Sōsai wo Oku" [Vice-chairperson placed in the Special Architecture Bureau], Doc.# *honkan-2A-011-00.rui00249100*; TSS, vol. 70, 433; Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 455-457).

¹²⁶ While governor, Mishima had also garnered the derisive nickname "Devil Governor" (*Oni Kenrei*) for his heavy-handed crushing of the *Jiyūtō* political party and its People's Rights advocates in Yamagata and Fukushima. For more on Mishima as "Devil Governor," see Roger W. Bowen, *Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), esp. Ch. 1.

in December 1886 to reject the plans produced by the Home Ministry Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee and place the Bureau in charge instead.¹²⁷

Criticizing the Examination Committee plans as nothing more than a “street revision plan that for the most part follows the old streets in accordance with the existing conditions (*kotai*),” Inoue and Mishima argued that planners should instead “view the urban areas of Tokyo as if they were open lands to be exploited (*kaitakuchi*),” and be “as decisive and resolute (*kadan*) as possible” in their transformation of the city.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: A03022953300, “Rinji Kenchikukyoku sōsai Inoue Kaoru, dō fuku-sōsai Mishima Michitsune kengi” [Proposal by Special Architecture Bureau chairperson Inoue Kaoru and vice-chairperson Mishima Michitsune]. This proposal, known as the “Secret Proposal” (*Himitsu Kengi*), is believed to have been drafted by Mishima. In reality, it was not “secret” at all because it was officially submitted to Prime Minister Itō on December 26th, 1886. As submitted, the proposal contained two plans: the first was an implausibly expensive plan to move the capital to the countryside; the second was to transform Tokyo. The first proposal was presumably a ploy to make the second appear more attractive. Originals can be found in Mishima Michitsune, *Mishima Michitsune Kankei Bunsho*, Book 86, Doc.#: 522-7, “Kengi II – Rinji Kenchikukyoku sōsai Inoue Kaoru, fuku-sōsai Mishima Michitsune, Itō Hirobumi sōri daijin ate Meiji 19-nen 12-gatsu” [Proposal #2 – from Special Architecture Bureau chairperson Inoue Kaoru and vice-chairperson Mishima Michitsune, to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, December 1886], 134-142, obtained from the National Diet Library Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room (*Kensei Shiryōshitsu*). This source contains three copies of the original – two of which were seemingly penned by Inoue and Mishima – in addition to two copies of draft versions, again apparently written personally by Inoue and Mishima. A reprinted and annotated version of both proposals can be found in Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku* as Document #8, entitled “Secret Proposal (*Himitsu Kengisho*),” 145-162. As Fujimori explains, the document is known as the “Secret Proposal” because the only extant copy, discovered in the papers of Temporary Architecture Bureau engineer Tsumaki Yorinaka, was located inside a Police Bureau envelope inscribed with “Secret Proposal” that had been delivered to Tsumaki’s house. As Fujimori notes, it is believed that the proposal was the work of Mishima since the document delivered to Tsumaki was contained inside a Police Bureau envelope – Mishima was Police Commissioner at the time. Fujimori further speculates that the need for secrecy was because the proposal bluntly laid out Inoue and Mishima’s plan to seize planning power from the Home Ministry (Fujimori, ed., *Toshi Kenchiku*, see notes on 144, 151).

¹²⁸ Mishima proposed the rejection of the Examination Committee plans in Item 2 of the Proposal. In its entirety, it reads:

By far the most lasting contribution the Special Architecture Bureau made to Tokyo Planning was to further expand the scope of urban improvement planning to include Populist demands for facilities not included in the earlier Home Ministry plans, most importantly fresh water and sewer systems. Like the more well-known “flowers of Edo,” or fires that periodically razed through the city, Tokyo was afflicted throughout the

Item #2: The decisions of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee shall be rejected. As to these matters, although examinations were already completed in the Examination Committee after exhausting all arguments, now after careful reconsideration, to put it simply, the plan is nothing more than a street revision plan that for the most part follows the old streets in accordance with the existing conditions (*kotai*). Tokyo is without argument the capital of the entire Japanese nation. It is the place where all the people of the nation stay (*todomaru*), where all kinds of goods come together (*atsumaru*), and where foreigners pass through. If we do not carry out improvements, that will all cease. If we attempt improvements in the slightest but are off-target, because it is not easy to rise from a fall, we will only pass down our regrets to all generations. This is the reason that the responsible authorities must be especially cautious. Therefore if we want to carry out this great project, then we must be as decisive and resolute (*kadan*) as possible. If we want to be decisive and resolute, then we must revise the plans and conduct another examination. If we want to revise the plans and conduct another examination, then more than anything else, we must first view the urban areas of Tokyo as if they were open lands to be reclaimed (*kaitakuchi*). Secondly, we must do away with small and trifling matters. Thirdly, to achieve the happiness of the multitudes, we must not worry about the poverty of the few. Fourthly, in planning the foundation for the ages, we must not be concerned about temporary difficulties. Fifthly, we must have the *oyatoi* Böckmann carefully examine the ground surveys and the quality of the plans. Nevertheless, supposing that even if we carry out these five items, who knows how the results will actually turn out? That is the reason that we must be as decisive and resolute as possible. That is the reason why we are requesting that the decisions of the Examination Committee be rejected.

The transformations Inoue and Mishima had in mind were for four boulevards radiating out from the imperial palace, cutting through the existing city in each of the cardinal directions: towards Senjū in the north, Kiba in the east, Takanawa (Shinagawa) in the south, and Shinjuku in the west. In other words, the Ginza Bricktown on a citywide scale, at least in four cardinal directions. Continuing the common refrain, they justified such decisive action by noting: “Tokyo is without argument the capital of the entire Japanese nation (*Nihon zenkoku no shufu*). It is the place where all the people of the nation visit, where all kinds of goods come together, and where foreigners pass through. If we do not carry out improvements, this will all cease.”

Meiji period by recurring outbreaks of waterborne diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, and typhoid fever. Tokyo's fresh water supply dated back to a sophisticated system first laid under the Tokugawa in the early 1600s drawing water from the Inokashira spring and the Tama River in the high grounds to the west of the city to the low-lying coastal commoners districts, but after 200 years the underground pipes of wood, bamboo, and stone were in need of repair.¹²⁹ Drainage and sewage disposal systems, to make matters worse, were almost nonexistent, perhaps because night soil was such a "hot commodity," David Howell notes, for rural farmers, who would pay to haul it away to use as fertilizer on their fields. As a result, major outbreaks of cholera, in particular, recurred roughly every 5 years, peaking in 1879, 1882, 1886, 1890, and 1895.¹³⁰ Each occurrence understandably amplified public demands for sewers and upgrades to the water system. Despite cholera alone claiming nearly 2,000 lives in 1879 and over 5,000 in 1882, the Examination Committee had nonetheless refused to include water works or sewer improvements in its final plans.¹³¹ As a member of the Examination Committee, Home Ministry Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo Sensai had broached the issue of water and

¹²⁹ Susan B. Hanley, "Urban Sanitation in Preindustrial Japan," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18: no. 1 (1987), 6-7.

¹³⁰ Ishizuka Hiromichi compiles statistics for waterborne disease casualties in Tokyo and nationwide into a table in Ishizuka Hiromichi, "Tōkyō-shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū josetsu: jōsuidō kairyō jigyō to shikai, burujowaji- no ugoki wo megutte" [Introduction to the history of Tokyo urban improvement projects: fresh water system improvement projects and the activities of the city council and bourgeoisie], *Toshi Kenkyū Hōkoku* 55 (1975): 26-27.

¹³¹ For more on hygiene-related issues in Tokyo city planning, see: Ishizuka, "Tōkyō-shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū josetsu," 23-35; and Ishizuka Hiromichi, *Tōkyō no Toshi Suramu to Kōshū Eisei Mondai* [The urban slums of Tokyo and the public hygiene issue] (Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō Daigaku, 1981).

sewer systems several times in committee meetings, but to no avail.¹³² As Mikuriya Takashi suggests, it is possible that committee chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa, who in fact acutely recognized the need for such improvements, had nevertheless been reluctant to take up the issue of sewers because it would have required coordination with the fiscally cautious Tokyo Urban Council (*Tōkyō-fu Kubukai*), a municipal legislative body who maintained oversight of Tokyo sewers and had already in 1885 cut the municipal street repair budget by 25%, from ¥103,000 to ¥77,000.¹³³ Yet when the largest cholera outbreak in the Meiji period struck in the summer of 1886, killing over 10,000 Tokyo residents and more than 100,000 people nationwide, the problem became too big to sidestep because of politics. In an attempt to popularize the activities of the Special Architecture Bureau, Chairman Inoue responded to popular demands for new systems by enlisting the German civil engineer James Hobrecht – architect of Berlin’s sewer system and designer of the 1862 Berlin urban use plan – to draw up water and sewer

¹³² In the 6th meeting, for example, Nagayo suggested that if river and canal improvements were to be cancelled, then funding could be diverted to water and sewer systems. Again in the 9th meeting, Nagayo requested that the committee take up the issue of water and sewer systems during the next meeting, adding that he had proposals already drawn up. Chairman Yoshikawa, however, responded that the next meeting would discuss the port plans. See *TTKSS*, 31:121 front-121 back, 183 back. It is possible that the proposals Nagayo referred to had been prepared by Hygiene Bureau official Gotō Shimpei, who had already produced several proposals for sewers by June 1886. The Gotō Shimpei papers (*Gotō Shimpei Kankei Bunsho*) located in the National Diet Library Modern Japanese Political Documents Room contains several of these plans.

¹³³ The Tokyo Urban Council (*Tōkyō-fu Kubukai*) was a municipal legislative body of elected representatives from each of Tokyo’s 15 wards within the larger Tokyo Prefectural Council (*Tōkyō Fukai*, later *Tōkyō-shikai*). The companion Tokyo Suburban Council (*Tōkyō-fu Gunbukai*) represented Tokyo’s 6 rural counties (*gun*) within the prefectural council. According to Mikuriya Takashi, the Council in the mid-1880s was heavily populated by members of the Rikken Kaishintō, known for its support of the Popular Rights Movements and deflationary policies (Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 348, 355).

improvement plans.¹³⁴ As a result, the Hygiene Bureau became tied to the Special Architecture Bureau as Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo guided Hobrecht around Tokyo after arriving in the city in late March 1887.

Thus the Populist demands for water system improvements initiated by the Special Architecture Bureau merged with the expanded Europeanizationist and Commercialist facilities called for in the Examination Committee plans when the Home Ministry reclaimed planning power in 1888. In the meantime, the Home Ministry had slowly continued street improvements by requesting national subsidies to carry out construction work following the Examination Committee plans each time there was a fire in the city.¹³⁵ In order to provide more consistent financing for the Home Ministry's

¹³⁴ Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 468-469; Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 238-239. For more on Hobrecht's planning activities in Germany, see: Brian Ladd, *Urban Planning and Civic Order in Germany, 1860-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. 80-81; and Claus Bernet, "The 'Hobrecht Plan' (1862) and Berlin's Urban Structure," *Urban History* 31, no. 3 (2004): 400-419.

¹³⁵ Following fires in Kanda Moto-Sakumachō, Kanda Sanbanchō, and Akasaka in 1886, the Home Ministry had successfully requested national funds (*kokko kurikae*) earmarked to finance road improvements according to the Examination Committee plans (Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 470). Despite this precedent, in May 1887 the Finance Ministry refused a Home Ministry request to allow additional funds to carry out fire reconstruction in the Rōgetsuchō and Shibaichō neighborhoods of Shiba District. This prompted Tokyo Governor Takasaki Goroku to write to Home Minister Yamagata, pleading that this refusal amounted to "an abolition of improvements." See: *TSS*, vol. 72 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho: 1981), 244. Home Minister Yamagata, in turn, forwarded this appeal to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, taking the opportunity to press his case for a final resolution of the Examination Committee plans. It is interesting to note a significant change in Yamagata's language in this petition as compared to his earlier endorsements of the Yoshikawa plans. "Regardless of whether or not Tokyo is the national capital," Yamagata cautiously entreated to the central government, "the roads are narrow causing injuries to vehicles, horses, and people; the rivers and canals are clogged and muddy, causing boats to be disorderly. For these reasons especially the air of the capital is polluted." In this way, not only did Yamagata tone down his rhetoric in anticipation of opposition from those who considered the original plans too superficial, too Western, or too narrowly focused on transportation, but he also revealed the influence of social

urban improvement efforts, Home Minister Yamagata presented the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei*) to the government in early 1888 with the support of Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi. Over the objections of Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and the Chamber of Elders (*Genrōin*), Yamagata and Matsukata pushed the bill through the Cabinet and into law on August 6th, 1888.¹³⁶ After half a

demands for improvements to civic hygiene: “Whether looking at it from the perspective of transportation, or from that of hygiene, we certainly cannot leave it this way,” Yamagata concluded, “For this reason, I request a timely cabinet discussion concerning the previously submitted plans and their immediate adoption,” (*TSS*, vol. 72, 241-242). Mikuriya provides a more thorough analysis of the political circumstances behind this petition in Mikuriya, *Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru*, 492-495.

¹³⁶ Article 1 of the Ordinance established a “Tokyo Urban Planning Committee” (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Inikai*) in order to “determine a plan for the improvement of the Tokyo urban area and which projects are to be carried out during each fiscal year.” Articles 3 and 5, meanwhile, specifically delineated how financing for the projects planned by the Committee would be secured. According to Article 3, funds would be raised through various taxes on land, commerce, and housing. Once again following the example of Paris, an additional tax would be levied on all liquor – in the case of Tokyo, “refined sake” – brewed or sold within, or transported into, the urban area. These miscellaneous taxes were supplemented by a special “national business tax” beginning in 1902 to provide extra income for projects (JACAR, Ref.#: A03020538000, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei ni yori Tokubetsuzēi Shitei” [Special tax levy pursuant to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance]). In addition, Article 5 provided for the granting of all unused central government-owned river and canal embankment property located within Tokyo to the city free-of-charge and tax-free, provided that it be used for urban improvement projects. Only in unavoidable situations, and only with the approval of the Home Minister, could these properties be sold or transferred. As required by Article 7, the amount of money raised through these two means must not be below ¥300,000 or exceed ¥500,000 annually. As the number of projects increased over the years, these limits were increased to a ¥500,000 minimum and ¥1,000,000 maximum in 1902 (JACAR, Ref.#: A03020519200, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei-jū Kaisei Tsuika” [Amendment to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance]). Concerning the order of projects to be carried out, Article 8 stipulated that funds would be allocated first for projects improving areas destroyed by fire; any remaining funds could then be applied to other planned projects. This stipulation was rescinded just two years later in 1890 by imperial edict (JACAR, Ref.#: A03020077000, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei Dai-hachijō sakujo” [Nullifying article 8 of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance]). Finally, Article 15 declared that a law would be passed delineating methods for the handling of lands and buildings related to improvements. This law followed shortly after, promulgated by Imperial Edict #5 on

decade of contestation over the meaning of urban improvements in the capital, the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee chaired by Yoshikawa Akimasa released the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans responding to these various demands, calling for 315 streets, 49 parks, 8 markets, 5 crematoria, 6 cemeteries.¹³⁷ Plans for a new fresh water system were deliberated by the committee, approved by the central government in May 1890, and announced to the public in July the same year.¹³⁸ Also reflecting a recognition of the need to incorporate as many viewpoints as possible in planning decisions, the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee was split nearly evenly between central government bureaucrats and local Tokyo representatives in an attempt to balance central and local interests.¹³⁹ Of the 30 members on the committee in addition to the chairman, 10 came from the Tokyo Urban Council, two from the Tokyo municipal government, and 2 more represented the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce.¹⁴⁰ Joining Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa

January 28, 1889 as the Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Acquisition and Disposal Codes (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Tochi Kenbutsu Shobun Kisoku*).

¹³⁷ Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan*, 71; Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa, “Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and its Urban Development,” in *Tokyo: Urban Growth and Planning, 1868-1988*, ed. Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa (Tokyo: Center for Urban Growth Studies, 1988), 13.

¹³⁸ NAJ, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Suidō Sekkei wo Ninka su” [Tokyo urban improvement water system plans approved], Call#: *honkan-2A-011-00.rui00513100*; and NAJ, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jigyō no uchi Suidō no Sekkei wo Sadamu” [Water system plans determined as part of the Tokyo urban improvement projects], Call#: *honkan-2A-011-00.rui00513100*.

¹³⁹ The makeup and jurisdiction of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee was codified on August 17th, 1888, by Cabinet Decree (*Kakurei*) #14, entitled “Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee Organization and Jurisdiction” (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai Soshiki Kengen*). *TTKSS*, 33:50-51.

¹⁴⁰ Among the more notable names sitting on the committee when it first convened included: Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa, Nagayo Sensai, Sakurai Tsutomu, Furuichi

were a number of familiar faces from his earlier Examination Committee and even from Governor Matsuda Michiyuki's investigation board: Nagayo Sensai, Sakurai Tsutomu, Itō Masanobu, Haraguchi Kaname, Fukuchi Gen'ichirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda Takashi. Other notable members of the committee included Furuichi Kōi, Taguchi Ukichi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Matsumoto Sōichirō. The imperial edict authorizing the Ordinance endorsed this more comprehensive coverage of facilities introduced and inputs considered, declaring: "We hereby approve and promulgate the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance for the purpose of planning the lasting commercial, hygienic, fire-prevention, and transportation benefits of the Tokyo urban area."¹⁴¹

Tokyo Station, Railways, and Imperial Space

The best example of how the perceived importance of streets, the heightening rhetoric and elevating monumentality of the urban improvement plans, and the confluence of planning participants all came together to shape the urban space of Tokyo is the development of Tokyo Station and the station-front plaza/processional boulevard.¹⁴²

Planning for this space began as early as 1884 when the Yoshikawa Plan called for a new

Kōi, Itō Masanobu, Taguchi Ukichi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Fukuchi Gen'ichirō, Matsumoto Sōichirō, Haraguchi Kaname, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda Takashi.

¹⁴¹ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020025200, "Goshomei Genpon, Meiji 21-nen, Chokurei Dai 62-gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1888, Imperial Edict No.62, Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance].

¹⁴² Today, this boulevard is officially registered as Special Road 404, but known colloquially as "Imperial Progress Boulevard" (*Miyuki Dōri*). The characters for *Miyuki* can also be read "*Gyōkō*" meaning "imperial progress" or "imperial visit." This *Miyuki Dōri* should not be confused with a second so-called "*Miyuki Dōri*" located near Ginza that has recently been redeveloped as a high-end shopping street.

railway link through the city center and a new central railway station. But it is important to note that this rather inchoate description of a rail line and station bore only the most superficial resemblance to the space that was eventually produced. Although located in the same geographic vicinity as envisaged by Yoshikawa, the purpose and perception of the station and its surrounding space changed dramatically over the 30 years between its inception in 1884 and its completion in 1914. As with the street and canal improvements in the rest of the Yoshikawa Plan, the main purpose of this proposed rail link and central station was to facilitate the movement and distribution of goods throughout the city in order to spur commercial prosperity. Yet as demonstrated by the celebration of empire that occasioned the opening ceremony in 1914, the urban space consisting of the rail link, station building, and processional boulevard had taken on much more imperial significance by the time it was completed. As the following section will demonstrate, the imperial space framed by Tokyo Station and its environs organically emerged as the mutual byproduct of actions performed by government actors, national politicians, and local planning participants. While it was government urban planners who initiated the project in the 1880s, their designs were altered by the intervention of politicians in the 1890s. Following the acquisition of colonies and Japan's emergence as a world power, previously antagonistic forces allied to produce a space that projected Japanese imperial power. Finally, it was these central and local forces that charged Tokyo Station as an imperial space.

Reflecting planners' view of the city in the 1880s, the urban rail link and central station first envisioned by Yoshikawa served purely commercial purposes. As Yoshikawa lamented in the Plan, "with existing railways lines reaching from Shimbashi

to Yokohama, and from Ueno to Jōmō Takasaki, and now with plans [for a line] along the Nakasendō to the Western Capital (*Saikyō*; Kyoto), that these lines are interrupted right in their center, the Tokyo urban area, is regrettable.” While admitting the completion of the Shinagawa line between Shinagawa and Kawaguchi (today’s Yamanote Line) currently under construction would greatly improve shipping between the northeastern regions and the port of Yokohama, Yoshikawa noted that this had little effect on the urban area of Tokyo. Because the most prosperous commercial areas in Tokyo – indeed the place where all goods traded into or out of Tokyo would pass – were around Nihombashi, such a rail line was of little use to merchants located in these areas. As it stood then, the number of goods shipped by rail from these areas did not compare to that of the areas around the Ueno and Shimbashi termini. A rail link between the two termini was all the more important, the Plan argued, because future port construction plans would cause an exponential increase in shipping, overwhelming the current system of horse carriage transport of goods throughout the city. For this reason, the plan concluded, in addition to the rail link, “a central station should be located in Kajibashi, and another station placed to the north of the Kanda River, in order to improve the convenience for transportation and the shipping of goods.”¹⁴³

The proposed location of these two stations boosted their intended commercial function. Placing a station near the Kanda River (today’s Akihabara Station) would provide a convenient transfer point between the rail network and Tokyo’s still vibrant river and canal shipping, which was sure to further expand with the canal improvements proposed by the Yoshikawa Plan. This would allow freight to be shipped by train all the

¹⁴³ *TTKSS*, 30:21 front-21 back.

way to the banks of the Kanda River and to be unloaded directly onto waiting canal barges, rather than being first unloaded at Ueno terminal and then transported by horse carriage to their destination. Kajibashi, likewise, was an ideal location for a central station. Not only was it located immediately to the west of the thriving central commercial areas of Nihombashi and Kyōbashi, Kajibashi in 1884 was government-owned property that could be acquired at little to no cost. Located inside the outer moat (*sotobori*) of Edo castle, the Kajibashi area had been seized by the Meiji Government along with many other former *daimyō* lands in the city upon taking possession of the city following the Meiji Restoration. Many of these seized lands were put to use as residences for government officials or as grounds for various government ministry offices, and Kajibashi was no different. At the time the Yoshikawa Plan was drawn up in 1884, the grounds where the central station would be located were home to many of the capital's juridical and legal institutions: the Supreme Court of Judicature of Japan (*Daishin'in*), the Tokyo Court (*Tōkyō Saibansho*), the Tokyo Appellate Court (*Tōkyō Kōso Saibansho*), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Justice Law School, the Police Bureau, and finally the Kajibashi Prison. Placing the central station in this area, therefore, would be a cost-effective way to construct a commercial depot to service the nearby business areas to the east, especially with a new road leading directly from the station to the planned port at Tsukiji. Together, the two stations would join the repurposed Shimbashi station as the principal freight links between the national railway network and Tokyo's two primary means of intra-urban shipping: the Kanda River station connected to canal and riverine transport; the central and Shimbashi stations coupled to the street network.

Tokyo planners were by no means unanimous in their support for the proposed rail line and stations. In the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee, for example, a number of committee members spoke out against the line and the central station, raising issues of costs, disruptions such a line would cause to the urban areas, and the practical need of such a line at all. Speaking on behalf of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, Shibusawa Eiichi pointed out the financial difficulties a new rail line would present and questioned the reasoning behind it. “After all,” Shibusawa quipped, “the reason for this line is so that freight and passengers from the northeast can reach Yokohama directly from Shimbashi, but is not the whole point of these urban improvements and port construction to transfer Yokohama’s business to Tokyo?”¹⁴⁴ Fellow businessman Masuda Takashi initially agreed with Shibusawa, pointing out that a railway through the middle of the city would cause all sorts of inconvenience, not only from a cost standpoint, but also from the disruption this would cause in street traffic. Onoda Motohiro jumped in, arguing, “I don’t see the need for a railway through the center of the city. Maybe it’s necessary in a city like Amsterdam, but if we place a station in Manseibashi, then it would be just a short distance from Shimbashi. Such a short distance would not be that inconvenient for horse carriages.” Railway advocates Sakurai Tsutomu and Haraguchi Kaname spoke up to address each of these doubts. Sakurai pointed out that laying the line along the outer moat of the palace and through government-owned land in Marunouchi would reduce expenses, while Haraguchi noted that elevating the tracks on brick arches above street level would avoid traffic disruptions. Finally, both called on Western precedents to justify the expansion of the urban railway

¹⁴⁴ *TTKSS*, 31:63 back.

network and the construction of the central station. “Looking at the example of England,” Sakurai argued, “where more and more railways are laid everywhere in all directions above ground and below, it is unmistakable that the laying of railways becomes more vital as society progresses (*yō no susumu ni shitagatte sono fusetsu wo yō suru ni sōi nashi*).”¹⁴⁵ “It is becoming commonplace lately for capital cities to pass railways through the city center,” Haraguchi added, “in England, they are increasing every year.”¹⁴⁶ As for the central station, he observed, “In America, all the railways split off from central stations. In Europe, too, it is a general rule [to build central stations] when capitals are built anew.”¹⁴⁷ These explanations satisfied those unsure of the plan, and the committee unanimously approved the line.

Although initial disagreements over the rail line were settled, opinion remained divided over the proposed central station. One major issue was the station’s orientation; critics complained that it was facing the wrong way, away from the commercial districts it was meant to service and turning its back on the actual center of the city in Nihombashi. In fact, as Haraguchi Kaname explained in the Examination Committee, the original plan was to have entrances on both sides of the station.¹⁴⁸ As planning for rail lines in the city progressed, however, it quickly became clear that this would be impossible. In 1889 the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee increased the number of rail lines included in the plans to include several new urban railways envisioned by committee member Taguchi

¹⁴⁵ *TTKSS*, 31:64 back.

¹⁴⁶ *TTKSS*, 31:65 front.

¹⁴⁷ *TTKSS*, 31:67 back.

¹⁴⁸ *TTKSS*, 31:69 back.

Ukichi. As drawn up by railway engineers Haraguchi and Matsumoto Sōichirō, classmates at the Rennselear Polytechnic Institute, the new network would include 6 new lines in addition to the link between Ueno and Shimbashi, making use of as much government-owned property along the outer moat of the imperial palace as possible to reduce land acquisition costs.¹⁴⁹ Yet integrating these lines into a coherent system would require the station unavoidably to face west. Otherwise, railway engineer Hirai Seijirō explained to the Committee, the tracks for the shorter distance urban railways would have to cross those for long-distance freight railways, leading to unnecessary traffic complications and needless danger.¹⁵⁰ One option considered for an entrance from the east side of the station was a tunnel underneath the tracks, but this was cancelled later in 1903 on account of expenses.¹⁵¹ Ultimately, a rickety pedestrian bridge was constructed to allow access from the east.

By no means did critics of the station go away over the coming years as planning for the line progressed, even while consensus emerged on the need for the rail line. Preliminary surveys for the line began in 1890, but construction was delayed by the opening of hostilities with China in 1894 in the Sino-Japanese War. Because the line would connect the terminals of both the government line and the Nippon Railway Company, the line south from the proposed station would be built by the government,

¹⁴⁹ The proposed lines are as follows: 1) the “Central line” from Shimbashi to Ueno; 2) the “Sotobori line” from Akihabara to Ushigome and Akasaka; 3) the “Koishikawa line” from Kanda Misakichō to Sugamo and Itabashi; 4) the “Ichigaya line” from Ichigaya to Shinjuku; 5) the “Azabu line” from Akasaka Tameike to Roppongi; 6) the “Honjo line” from Akihabara to Ryōgoku; and 7) the “Senjū line” from Ueno to Senjū. Descriptions of the lines can be found in *TTKSS*, 2:250 front-252 back.

¹⁵⁰ *TTKSS*, 9:42 back-43 front.

¹⁵¹ *TTKSS*, 15:4 back.

with the line north to Ueno being built by Nippon Railway.¹⁵² Shortly after being placed under the jurisdiction of Home Ministry in 1890, the renamed Railway Agency (*Tetsudō Chō*) had been ordered by Home Minister Yamagata to conduct surveys of its half of the line.¹⁵³ The Nippon Railways followed with a survey of their own portion in 1893, hiring German engineer Herman Rumshöttel.¹⁵⁴ Critics continued to challenge the orientation of the station and, indeed, question the need for the station at all. As late as 1897, members of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee continued to press Hirai for explanations of why an entrance could not be installed on the east side of the station. Several members even proposed the formation of a special committee to investigate the possibility of creating an entrance on the eastern side of the station, but this motion failed to receive the majority of votes needed to pass.¹⁵⁵

Opposition to the plans for the central station were also voiced on the floor of the 9th Imperial Diet in 1896, where the central station issue commanded lengthy discussion in both general Diet meetings and special budget appropriations committees. In that year, the Communications Ministry introduced into the budget of fiscal 1896 a line item for “Improvement of Existing Government Railways” (*Kansetsu Kisei Tetsudō Kairyō*) as a

¹⁵² Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, *Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shashin-shi* [Pictorial history of 100 years of Japanese government railways](Tokyo: Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, 1972), 157.

¹⁵³ Tetsudōin Tōkyō Kairyō Jimusho, *Tōkyō-shigai Kōka Tetsudō Kenchiku Gaiyō* [Summary of the construction of the Tokyo elevated urban railway](Tokyo: Tetsudōin Tōkyō Kairyō Jimusho, 1914), 1. The government survey was conducted by railway engineer Sengoku Mitsugu.

¹⁵⁴ Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., *Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi* [History of Tokyo Station] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, 1973), 25.

¹⁵⁵ *TTKSS*, 9:106 front-117 back.

6-year project for the enormous sum of over ¥26.5 million, appropriating ¥4,500,000 on average annually to carry out construction work. As the Ministry explained, these funds would be used for several projects: double-tracking the as yet single-tracked Tokaidō Line in order to accommodate an expected increase in shipping and rail traffic following the Sino-Japanese War, extending a railway line to the city of Naoetsu in Niigata Prefecture on the Japan Sea coast, and constructing the planned elevated railway line and “central station” in Tokyo. The priority for the first year, the ministry clarified, would be the central station. From the time the government submitted the draft budget to the Diet, representatives of areas outside of Tokyo spoke out against the projects in the capital on a number of grounds. Learning that the station and rail line alone would consume ¥3,500,000 of the ¥4,500,000 allotted for the first year, Yamagata representative Shigeno Kenjirō opposed the plans, stressing that devoting so much money to the construction of a central station in Tokyo was unnecessary, especially considering that it would only benefit the residents of the capital while so many places around the country had yet to even receive railways or telephones.¹⁵⁶ Although disagreeing with Shigeno’s “regionalist” argument, Gumma representative Kusakari Shimmei also opposed the central station and elevated rail line, referring to them as “non-essential public works (*fukyū no doboku*).” Pointing to the distance of track that would be laid between Shimbashi Station and the new central station, furthermore, Kusakari accused the

¹⁵⁶ The central government submitted the budget to the Diet during the third general meeting on January 9th, 1896. Shigeno first denounced the central station during the first Communications Budget Committee meeting held four days later on January 13th, and then in several later meetings, including the 4-6th Communications Budget meetings on January 16, 17, and 20. Railways and telephones were two major components of the Communications ministry budget.

Communications Ministry of deviously attempting to circumvent the necessary Diet approval for new railway lines required by the 1892 Railway Construction Act by duplicitously casting the projects as “improvements” even though they were obviously “expansions.”¹⁵⁷ Finally, Kagoshima representative Kawashima Atsushi made a last ditch effort to nix the plans prior to the final budget vote in the general meeting of the Imperial Diet on February 4th, arguing that available funds should instead be devoted to the construction of a port in Tokyo and continuing urban improvements.¹⁵⁸ Such concerns over necessity and financing led the special committee charged with overseeing the Communications Ministry budget to reduce funding for the central station and rail line from the requested ¥4,500,000 to ¥3,500,000 yen in January 1896.¹⁵⁹ A compromise was

¹⁵⁷ Indeed, article 2 of the 1892 law stipulated, “changes to, or the addition or subtraction of” railway routes delineated in the law “shall be made only with the authorization of the Imperial Diet.” Kusakari made this accusation in the sixth meeting of the Communications Budget appropriations special committee on January 20th, 1896. See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee, 6th meeting, January 20th 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-rokugō*), 17-18.

¹⁵⁸ The statements of Kawashima and Kusakari are found in the records of the 19th meeting of the 9th session of the House of Commons on February 4th, 1896. See Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th General Meeting, February 4th, 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō*).

¹⁵⁹ This vote occurred in the seventh meeting of the Communications Budget Committee meeting on January 22nd, 1896, and was reported to the Diet general assembly by Budget Committee chairman Hoshi Tōru in the 16th general meeting on January 31st. Notably, Hoshi specified that the budget of the central station itself had been reduced from ¥4,500,000 to ¥3,500,000. It appears that most of this money was earmarked for construction of the rail line. See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee, 7th meeting, January 22th 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-nanagō*), 17-18; and for Hoshi’s report, see: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 16th General Meeting, January 31st, 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūrokugō*), 3.

later reached in the general session of the Diet, when the Diet voted to restore funding to its original level while adding an additional year to the project to spread the ¥26.5 million over 7 years.¹⁶⁰

Opposition to the station quickly faded as its status became increasingly tied to the image of Imperial Capital Tokyo as the metropole of the expanding Japanese colonial empire in the early 20th century. Two events in particular caused major shifts in the perception of the station: victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the nationalization of over half of all private railways in Japan shortly thereafter in 1906-1907. Not only did victory over Russia foster popular support at home for imperialist expansion abroad, Japan left the costly war primed to expand its railway network more deeply into the Asian mainland. Decades of Japanese consternation over Russian eastward expansion and rivalry between the two countries over influence in Korea and Manchuria had exploded into war with the Japanese attack on the Russian naval stronghold at Port Arthur in February 1904. After a nearly year-long siege, the port had fallen to Japanese troops in January 1905, and only a short time later the Russian Baltic fleet had been annihilated at the hands of Admiral Tōgo Heihachirō in the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905. Defeated on both land and sea, Russia agreed to the mediation of American President Teddy Roosevelt, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth

¹⁶⁰ For Diet up-down vote, see: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th General Meeting, February 4th, 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō*), 12-13. For 1896 budget, see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020265200, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji nijūkyū-nen, Yosan Sangetsu jūsannichi, Meiji nijūkyū-nen sanyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini dōnendo kakutokubetsu kaikei sanyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1888, March 13th budget, 1896 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1896 budget of special accounting revenues and expenditures].

in September 1905. Although the fighting had severely exhausted the Japanese military, sensationalist media coverage of the war had led the Japanese public to believe the nation had won an outstanding victory over a major European power. When the Treaty of Portsmouth failed to award Japan any major war spoils or a sizeable indemnity, outraged Tokyoites took to the streets to protest the treaty. As an agitated crowd of 30,000 spread from an anti-treaty rally in the recently completed Hibiya Park in central Tokyo on September 5th, police lost control of the city for three days as rioters ran rampant through the city, looting almost three-quarters of police boxes, setting fire to 15 street cars, and attacking the headquarters of the pro-government Kokumin Shimbun newspaper, the police headquarters, and several ministry buildings. By the time martial law was declared and order restored in the city by army troops, nearly 500 police and firemen had been injured, 311 protestors had been arrested, and 17 people killed in the chaos.¹⁶¹

Although not to the satisfaction of the disappointed public – who apparently expected Japan to acquire all Russian territory east of Lake Baikal – the Treaty of Portsmouth did indeed grant Japan control of several territories, including the southern half of Sakhalin, a leasehold in Southern Manchuria, and a free hand to declare Korea as a protectorate. As stipulated in article 6 of the treaty, more significantly, Russia agreed to relinquish to Japan ownership of the Manchurian railway between Changchun and Port Arthur.¹⁶²

Japan followed this up by quickly forcing the “Manchurian Remedial Protocol” (*Manshū*

¹⁶¹Gordon, Andrew, “Social Protest in Imperial Japan: The Hibiya Riot of 1905,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 12:21 No. 4 (2014): 3.

¹⁶² *The New York Times*, “Text of the Treaty: Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of Russia,” October 17, 1905, page 6.

Zengo Jōyaku) on the Qing Government in December of the same year to recognize Japanese control of the railway.¹⁶³

Victory over Russia and the acquisition of the railway line in Manchuria marked a significant turning point in Japanese railway development that saw a major restructuring in nationwide railway ownership, administration, and finance. First, anticipating an economic boom and concomitant increase in shipping following the Russo-Japanese War, the government resurrected the issue of private railway nationalization. Government purchase of private railways had been a frequent topic of debate ever since the Meiji government had authorized the establishment of Japan's first private railway, the Nippon Railway Company in 1881. Arguing against the establishment of private railways as early as 1883, for example, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru had written to Itō Hirobumi warning of the "harmful effects" of entrusting railways to private companies and insisting that "the government itself should undertake railway enterprises."¹⁶⁴

Thereafter, calls for nationalization had ebbed and flowed in relation to the success of the private railway business during two "Railway Manias" that swept across Japan in 1885-

¹⁶³ Andō Hikotarō, *Mantetsu: Nihon Teikoku Shugi to Chūgoku* [The South Manchurian Railway: Japanese imperialism and China](Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1965), 37.

¹⁶⁴ Stephen J. Ericson, *The Sound of the Whistle: Railroads and the State in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 118-120. For original, see Tetsudō Daijin Kanbō Bunshoka, ed., *Nihon Tetsudōshi* (Tokyo: Tetsudōshō, 1921), 1:394. As Ericson summarizes the "harmful effects" of private railways envisioned by Inoue: "(1) because private firms are profit-driven, railroad companies would refuse to build unremunerative lines even if they were necessary from the standpoint of national policy; (2) reluctant to expand their capital, private railroads would refrain from making necessary improvements; (3) they would tend towards hypercompetition by duplicating each other's lines; (4) the local orientation of small railroads would hamper nationwide railway planning; (5) private lines with local monopolies might harass the residents of the areas they service by refusing them transportation; and (6) in a national emergency, they might try to gain excessive profits by raising rates."

1890 and 1893-1897. While struggling private railways went bankrupt or merged with competitors during a recession in 1890, the Cabinet submitted a bill for nationalization in 1891 that ultimately led to the promulgation of the 1892 Railway Construction Act. Calls for nationalization resurfaced following the collapse of the second railway mania amidst recession in 1898, when no fewer than 15 companies were dissolved through mergers and absorption, reducing the number of private railways to 66 in 1897 and to 39 by 1906.¹⁶⁵ When the two bills for nationalization presented to the Imperial Diet in 1890 both failed, the government responded with the Private Railway Law and Railway Operations Law. Following the Russo-Japanese War, the central government once again presented a Railway Nationalization Law to the Imperial Diet in 1906 in order to reduce costs, to facilitate operational convenience through standardization and by eliminating needless redundancies, and to prevent foreign investors from controlling the railways.¹⁶⁶ Amended by the Upper House of the Imperial Diet, the number of railways to be nationalized was reduced from 32 to 17. Still, 17 railways was nearly half of the 39 private lines operating in Japan at the time. The bill finally passed the Diet after all opposing lawmakers walked out of the in protest, and was promulgated by the Meiji Emperor on March 30st, 1906 as the Railway Nationalization Law (*Tetsudō Kokuyū hō*).¹⁶⁷ When purchase of all 17 lines

¹⁶⁵ Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan: Ten Years Progress Under State Management, 1907-1908 to 1916-1917* (Tokyo: Tsukiji Type Foundry, 1919), 4-5.

¹⁶⁶ Aoki and others, *A History of Japanese Railways: 1872-1999* (Tokyo: East Japan Railway Culture Foundation, 2000), 40.

¹⁶⁷ Mitsuhide Imahiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads and Dispute over Reconstruction to Standard Gauge.” *Japan Railway & Transport Review* 4 (1995): 43. The Railway Nationalization Law was promulgated as law number 17. See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020656100, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji sanjūkyū-nen, Hōritsu dai jūnana-gō,

was finalized in October 1907, the percentage of government railways in relation to private lines nearly tripled, from 30% of the national total to almost 90% of national trackage.¹⁶⁸

While the Japanese government was consolidating control of railways at home, it was also extending the reach of Japanese railways overseas as a means of expanding Japanese colonial influence. As a Japanese Government railway report later explained in retrospect, “overseas expansion of Japanese railways” was possible because of two factors: “the nationalization of railways and the Continental expansion of the Empire after the successful campaign with Russia.”¹⁶⁹ Solidifying the link between railway nationalization and colonial expansion, on the same day that the government promulgated the Railway Nationalization Law, a second law authorized the government to purchase the Keifu Railway Company in Korea. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the Keifu Railway Company was the product of years of negotiations between Japan and Korea over railway concessions in the peninsula dating back to the 1890s. Finally established by Japanese investors including Shibusawa Eiichi, the Keifu Railway Company operated the Keifu Line between Seoul and Pusan and the Keijin Line between Seoul and Inch’ŏn. Through the so-called “Keifu Railway Purchase Law,” the Japanese government took possession of all lines, structures, and properties formerly belonging to

Tetsudō Kokuyū hō” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, law #17, railway nationalization law].

¹⁶⁸ W. Dean Kinzley, “Merging Lines: Organising Japan’s National Railroad, 1906-1914,” *The Journal of Transport History* 27 (2006): 41-42. For a detailed chart of nationalized railway companies, along with railway mileage, purchase price, and date of purchase, see Ericson, *The Sound of the Whistle*, 361.

¹⁶⁹ Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 93.

the company.¹⁷⁰ After announcing the purchase of the Keifu railway in March 1906, the government established the South Manchurian Railway Company by imperial decree in June to operate the rail line acquired from Russia. According to the decree, shares of company stock were to be limited to the governments of China and Japan and nationals of both countries. The Japanese government, moreover, reserved the right to invest in all assets and coal mines associated with railways in Manchuria.¹⁷¹ There are several reasons to see the railway company as a Japanese vehicle for gradually colonizing Manchuria. First, the company was the recommendation of the Manchurian Administration Examination Committee (*Manshū Keiei Chōsa Inkai*), which was chaired by Kodama Gentarō, the Governor-General of Taiwan.¹⁷² Secondly, Kodama famously admitted that the railway company was merely a cover for building other facilities that would expand Japanese territorial control. “The sole point of postwar administration of Manchuria will be to don the public mask of railway management (*yō ni tetsudō keiei no kamen wo yosoi*),” he wrote in a proposal for Manchurian administration policy, “while secretly

¹⁷⁰ See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020656200, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji sanjūkyū-nen, Hōritsu dai jūhachi-gō, Keifu Tetsudō Kaishū hō” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, law #18, Keifu Railway purchase law].

¹⁷¹ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020674400, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji sanjūkyū-nen, Chokurei dai hyakuyonjūni-gō, Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushikikaisha ni Kansuru ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, Imperial Edict #142, matters regarding the South Manchurian Railway Company]; and Malcolm W. Davis, “Railway Strategy in Manchuria,” *Foreign Affairs* 24, no. 4 (1926): 500; Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 93.

¹⁷² JACAR, Ref.#: A03023063000, “Manshū no Keiei ni tsuki hōkoku no ken” [Report concerning the administration of Manchuria]; and Ando, *Mantetsu*, 31-32.

establishing all kinds of facilities (*in'ni hyappan no shisetsu wo jikkō suru ni ari*).¹⁷³

Finally, Kodama hand picked as the first president of the South Manchurian Railway his subordinate in the Taiwan Government-General, Gotō Shimpei.

Reflecting the heightened importance of railways in the growing empire, railway administration and financing underwent significant changes designed to reduce budgetary reliance on the central government and bureaucratic oversight. First, following soon after the promulgation of the Railway Nationalization Law, railway financing was made independent of the general budget by the Imperial Railway Finance Law (*Teikoku Tetsudō Kaikei Hō*) in April 1906, and later revised by the 1909 Imperial Government Railways Accounting Regulations (*Teikoku Tetsudō Kaikei-Kisoku*).¹⁷⁴ The idea was that all expenses for railway expansion and improvement would be funded only through surplus profits from imperial railways operations in an attempt to make the railways more self-sufficient and reduce the burden they placed on state coffers. Nevertheless, the central government continued to supplement the Imperial Railways with funds from the imperial treasury in the form of transfers to the tune of ¥26 million in 1907 and just over ¥30 million in 1908 to continue work on improvement of existing government lines.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ando, *Mantetsu*, 31-32. Kodama made this recommendation in a proposal entitled “Outline of Manchurian Management Policy” (*Manshū Keieisaku Kōgai*), found in the Gotō Shimpei papers.

¹⁷⁴ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020658100, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji sanjūkyū-nen, Hōritsu-dai sanjūnana-gō, Teikoku Tetsudō Kaikei Hō Seitei Kansetsu Tetsudō Kaikei Hō Haishi” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, Law #37, enactment of the Imperial Railways accounting law, annulment of the Government Railways accounting law].

¹⁷⁵ For line items in 1907 budget, see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020737100, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjū-nen, Meiji yonjū-nen sainyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini dōnendo kaku tokubetsu kaikei sainyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1907, 1907 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1907 budget of special accounting revenues and expenditures], slide #57; For 1908, see: JACAR, Ref.#:

Secondly, in addition to reducing reliance on government financing, administration of railways was reorganized to limit bureaucratic oversight. Reflecting the imperial reach of Japanese railways, the Railway Operations Bureau (*Tetsudō Sagyōkyoku*), responsible for constructing, maintaining, and operating the government-owned railways, was given a more regal moniker as the “Imperial Government Railways” (*Teikoku Tetsudōchō*) in March 1907, and placed under the direct supervision of the Communications Minister.¹⁷⁶ Then, in December 1908, administration of railways across the empire, which by now included the Imperial Government Railways (*Teikoku Tetsudō*) in the Japanese mainland, Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto, and the South Manchurian Railway Company, were consolidated under a new cabinet level organization called the Railway Agency (*Tetsudōin*). With the endorsement of Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and then-Communications Minister Gotō Shimpei, railway supervision was removed from the Communications Minister and elevated to directly under the Prime Minister.¹⁷⁷ The first director of the Railway Agency was none other than Gotō Shimpei.

A03020779400, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūichi-nen, Yosan Sangetsu Jūsannichi, Meiji yonjūichi-nen sainyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini Meiji yonjūichi-nendo kaku tokubetsu kaikei sainyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, 1908 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1908 budget of special accounting revenues and expenditures], slide #58.

¹⁷⁶ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020704100, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjū-nen, Chokurei dai nijūroku-gō, Teikoku Tetsudōchō Kansei Seitei Tetsudō Sagyōkyoku Kansei Haishi” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, Imperial Edict #26, establishment of the Imperial Government Railways, and the dissolution of the Railway Operations Bureau]; Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed., *Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan Taikan: Meiji Taishō Tetsudō Hattatsu-shi* [General survey of imperial railways: development of railways in the Meiji and Taishō periods](Hara Shobō, 1984), 4. The Communications Minister at this time was Yamagata Isaburō.

¹⁷⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020776600, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūichi-nen, Chokurei dai nihyakukyūjūroku-gō, Tetsudōchō Kansei Seitei Teikoku Tetsudōchō Kansei Haishi” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, Imperial Edict #296, establishment of the

All of these changes greatly affected the design and planning of the central station in Tokyo. Whereas the original plans for the central station in the 1884 Yoshikawa Plan had been for a commercial rail depot, the years of delay between then and the breaking of ground for the railway yard in 1902, the laying of the foundation in 1908, and the actual start of construction of the station superstructure in 1911 allowed plenty of time for perceptions of the station to change. As Fujimori Terunobu points out, there did not seem to be a connection between the central station, Marunouchi as a business district, and the imperial palace at the time the central station was planned.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, the first western-style buildings of the nearby Marunouchi “One Block London” were not completed until 1894. Before being sold to the Mitsubishi Corporation four years earlier, in fact, Marunouchi was nothing more than a vacant army parade ground overgrown with weeds.¹⁷⁹

As Tokyo became a capital of both emperor and empire following the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, planners began to see the need for a symbolic central station at the heart of the imperial capital for two reasons. First, planners began to place the station in the context of famous monumental train stations around the world. As early as 1896, railway engineer Matsumoto Sōichirō had defended plans for the station in Imperial Diet budget committee meetings by drawing attention to the fact that people had

Railway Agency, and dissolution of Imperial Government Railways]; and Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed., *Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan*, 5; Aoki and others, *A History of Japanese Railways*, 41.

¹⁷⁸ Fujimori Terunobu, “Tōkyō-Eki Tanjōki” [Birth story of Tokyo Station], in *Tōkyō-Eki no Sekai*, ed. Kanō Shobō (Tokyo: Kanō Shobō, 1987), 44.

¹⁷⁹ Ishizuka and Ishida, “Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan,” 10; Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan*, 73.

at first been opposed to Victoria Terminal in Bombay, India, too, but now largely approved of the terminal. Large stations, Matsumoto added, were being erected in major cities across Europe and America.¹⁸⁰ Indeed, the symbolic importance of the planned station building was magnified as Japanese officials started to view Tokyo's central station in competition with iconic railway stations around the world. Victoria Terminal, London's St. Pancras, Berlin Station, Amsterdam Central, Paris's Gare De'est, and Grand Central Terminal in New York City were all symbols of their cities. On floor of the 9th Imperial Diet, Diet member Wada Hikojirō accordingly emphasized the need for a station to represent the Japanese capital, lamenting that riders on Japan's trunk railway from the northeast could only go as far as Ueno, and those from the southwest only as far as Shimbashi.¹⁸¹ As these arguments show, politicians and planners recognized that the "central station" would come to represent the capital. Secondly, planners began to view the central station as the personal station of the emperor. The timing of this shift is harder to pinpoint, but it is notable that no mention is made prior to the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 of the station's propinquity to the imperial palace or the possibility of its use by the imperial family as a justification for its construction. This is underscored by the persistence of complaints about the station's orientation away from the commoner districts of the city. This is perhaps not surprising for urban planners who tied international prestige primarily to economic function and less to monumental

¹⁸⁰ See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee, 5th meeting, January 17th 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-gogō*), 8.

¹⁸¹ See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th General Meeting, February 4th, 1896 (*Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō*), 264.

architecture. Nevertheless, it is clear that sometime after 1898 planners recognized the possibility of the emperor's personal use of the station. This date can be determined as the year the government hired German engineer Franz Baltzer to design the elevated rail line. In addition to schematics for the elevated line, Baltzer also sketched the first elevations for the station building. After being dismissed in 1903, Baltzer returned to Germany and published his designs in the German engineering magazine *Zeitschrift des Vereines deutscher Ingenieure*. Notably, two significant similarities can be seen between these plans and the later Tokyo Station. Baltzer separated departures and arrivals into two separate pavilions, as was common in German railway stations to ease congestion. In between the two passenger pavilions, Baltzer also planned an individual building for the emperor that he called the "Kaiser Pavilion." While this Kaiser Pavilion is often used as evidence that Baltzer oriented the station towards the imperial palace, it is clear from debates in the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee over a decade earlier that the station's direction was a product of the railway design and had been determined much earlier. It is unclear, however, whether Baltzer included the Kaiser Pavilion under his own initiative or whether he was instructed to do so. Regardless, the station took on the role of personal station of the emperor and a pavilion reserved for the imperial family was retained in the plans.

The growing symbolic importance of the station greatly affected its architectural design. With the station's new imperial roles in mind, the government a building that would make a suitable architectural statement. Baltzer had initially envisioned Tokyo Station as a grouping of several Japanese-inspired buildings featuring stone walls uneasily capped by traditional *karahafu* pediments. As William Coaldrake describes,

Baltzer's designs were "entirely in keeping with Japanese traditions of architecture and authority, but it was entirely out of step with the intention of the Meiji imperial state to represent its new authority as a modern, Westernised nation."¹⁸² Hired in 1903 to replace Baltzer, Japanese architect Tatsuno Kingo likewise later criticized what he saw as a foolhardy attempt to replicate Japanese architectural style. Baltzer's design, Tatsuno pejoratively wrote, was like the "Western-beauty-with-a-Shimada-Haircut Style" (*Shimada-mage no Yō-bijin Shiki*) of a Western woman who comes to Japan and awkwardly dons Japanese hairstyle and dress. "While she may happily think that she is rare," Tatsuno mused, "to Japanese eyes she is exceedingly unsightly and unbalanced, as inedible and indigestible as Japonesque food with too much seasoning."¹⁸³ Baltzer's designs were not only lacking in the preferred architectural style, they did not fulfill the Japanese government's hope for an appropriately modern and monumental station for the Japanese imperial capital. As Tatsuno wrote: "It appears that [Baltzer's original plan] was not for a long, continual building as it is now, but...rather to line up individual buildings along the railway line. But that is nothing more than lining up small houses, and was said to be too shabby (*misuborashii*) for the central station of the Imperial Capital (*Teito*)." The government therefore instructed Tatsuno to design a more magnificent station. "I received a request from the head of the Railway Operations Bureau at that time, Hirai [Seijirō]," Tatsuno recalled, "to make the building continuous and to emphasize the magnificence of the building."¹⁸⁴ Clearly, Hirai and Tatsuno

¹⁸² Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, 232.

¹⁸³ Tatsuno Kingo, "Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku" [The architecture of the central station], in *Tōkyō-Eki no Sekai*, ed. Kanō Shobō (Tokyo: Kanō Shobō, 1987), 219.

¹⁸⁴ Tatsuno, "Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku," 218.

understood the symbolic importance of the building that would become Tokyo Station. Hirai, for one, was a classmate of Haraguchi Kaname's at Rensselaer, and had traveled extensively in Europe.¹⁸⁵ Tatsuno, for his part, knew that Tokyo Station would be compared to the iconic central stations of the great capitals of the world. "All of the great cities of Europe," Tatsuno wrote in an article describing the design of the station, "even London, even Berlin; they all have central stations."¹⁸⁶ Finally, the Railway Bureau directed Tatsuno to place the imperial entrance in the middle of the station.¹⁸⁷

In addition to instructing Tatsuno to design a fittingly Western-style station, the government also ordered the building plans to be expanded to match the increasing importance of the Railway Agency. Serving at the time as Communications Minister and Railway Agency director, Gotō Shimpei famously urged the building of "a station that befits a Japan that defeated the great power Russia; one that will shock the world."¹⁸⁸ Consequently, after the establishment of the Railway Agency, two significant changes were made to the existing station plans even after the commencement of foundation work in 1908. First, because the station would serve as the Railway Agency headquarters, it was necessary to design a station large enough to accommodate the required office space, not to mention reflect the Railway Agency's importance as a cabinet-level department in charge of railways stretching across the empire. For this reason, as Tatsuno described, plans for the station, which had at first only been one story, were expanded to two floors,

¹⁸⁵ Rezneck, *Education for a Technological Society*, 179-180.

¹⁸⁶ Tatsuno, "Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku," 218.

¹⁸⁷ Tatsuno, "Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku," 223.

¹⁸⁸ Tokyo Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., *Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi*, 27.

and then later to three. Second, as the size of the station expanded, so too did its construction budget. From an original estimate of ¥420,000, the cost of the building soared over 600% to a final price of ¥2,800,000.¹⁸⁹ The impact of these changes is unmistakable over the three generations of Tatsuno's elevations for the station. First produced in 1904, Tatsuno's initial design for the station featured individually massed central and octagonal flanking pavilions connected by shorter bays, each accentuated by an intermediate projecting pavilion. The first plan was heavily ornamented, with ox-eye dormers, domed turrets accenting the corners of each pavilion, slender lanterns jutting from roofs of the central pavilions, and ribbed domes capping each flanking pavilion. The most striking change in the second generation of plans was the replacement of the short lantern over the central pavilion in the first plan with a much taller pyramid-capped tower in the second. Other noticeable changes were the elimination of projecting pavilions in the intermediate bays, and addition of characteristic lunette-shaped curved open pediments in the cornice of each pavilion, bringing the flanking pavilions close to their finished form. Some within the government were concerned that such a high tower over the central pavilion would "look down" on the imperial palace. The final generation of plans, completed by December 1910, took into consideration the instructions of the Railway Agency and the increased budget of the central station. The high tower over the central entrance was replaced by a shorter hipped crested roof that more suitably acknowledged the station's location facing the imperial palace. The intermediate bays

¹⁸⁹ The architect of Tokyo Station, Tatsuno Kingo, later recalled that at the time he joined the project, the budget of the station building was a mere ¥420,000 (Tatsuno, "Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku," 219-220). The final price frequently cited for the building is ¥2,800,000 (Tokyo Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., *Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi*, 27).

were also raised to give the station a more continuous massing, with each bay adorned with Corinthian pilasters and interrupted by a projecting square pavilion capped by a concave curved roof. The frame of the building was steel, as reflected in the crisscross pattern of the façade ornamentation and interior coffered ceiling, and the building was constructed in red brick, which had become a symbol of “civilization and enlightenment” after the Ginza Bricktown. The curved pediments, ribbed domes, and front portico gave the station a strong Italianate or Neo-Renaissance form, while its red brick accented by white ornamental quoins, pilasters, and stringcourses, produced an unmistakable Queen Anne Revival appearance. Built in this trademark “Tatsuno Style,” Tokyo Station fit in perfectly with the similar buildings of Marunouchi, or even London, where Tatsuno had studied before designing the station.

As the magnificence of the station building design intensified, so too did the monumentality of the surrounding streetscape. Notably, these monumental street plans came not from the imperial government, but from local planning forces in the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee, which after 1898 was split equally between Tokyo representatives and central government officials.¹⁹⁰ Through a series of plan changes,

¹⁹⁰ Revisions to the organization of the committee were passed in 1896 and 1898. After 1898, of the 28 regular members of the committee, 13 (plus the Chairman) were central government bureaucrats. The remaining 14 were from the local Tokyo government: 1 “high official” from the prefectural government, 1 official from the city government, 2 from the City Advisory Council (*sanjikai*) and 10 from the City Council (*shikai*). For 1898 changes, see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020354900, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji sanjūichi-nen, Chokurei dai nihyakugojū-gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Inkai Soshiki Kengen Dai-ichi jō Dai-ni jō kaisei.” Further revisions were made in 1911 to include a representative of the Imperial Household Ministry and the Railway Agency, and to add another Tokyo official. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020913000, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūyon-nen, Chokurei dai nihyakuyonjūnana-gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Inkai Soshiki Kengenjū kaisei.”

streets around the station were redesigned to form a large station-front public plaza (*hiroba*). In a city that lacked large parks, truly open, public space was rare. As Jinnai Hidenobu explains, in Edo, bridgeheads had functioned as *de facto* plazas, if only because they were the largest public spaces where residents could convene in large numbers. Such plazas had also traditionally been important as places of evacuation and refuge during conflagrations, although by 1914 fires had ceased to be the constant threat they were in previous decades. Thus, the plaza fronting Tokyo Station served an entirely different purpose. Planning for the Tokyo Station plaza began as early as 1897. The Examination Committee had in 1885 called for a 15-*ken* road to be placed through the middle of the grounds set aside for the central station, but this conflicted with the Railway Board's designs for the location of the station building. Plans for the road were consequently removed at the request of the Communications Ministry in 1897 in order to create room for the future station.¹⁹¹ As construction of the building neared completion, planners wanted to make sure the plaza would be ready for the scheduled opening festivities. First, the Railway Board petitioned the Urban Improvement Committee in December 1913 to change to the planned route through the plaza to deviate around the station and to urge its immediate completion. The committee, on the other hand, decided that it was "not appropriate (*tekitō narazaru*)" for a road to bisect the station front plaza and cancelled the road altogether, enlarging the plaza. Secondly, the Committee unanimously approved a plan to add street gutters on the approaches to the plaza for immediate completion as a supplementary project. As Home Ministry representative to the Committee Horita Mitsugu explained, construction on the station building was being

¹⁹¹ *TTKSS*, 9:105 front-117 back.

expedited in order to be completed in time for “this year’s big festivities (*honnen no o-daiten*).” So this road plan had been added just that day and should also be completed as quickly as possible.¹⁹²

Perhaps the most monumental aspect of the plaza design was the clearing of a new processional boulevard leading from the front of the station directly to the imperial palace. Planning of this link dated to 1908, when the Improvement Committee approved a motion by newly appointed member Aki Toratarō to nominate a special committee to propose additional routes to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans. Aki was a Tokyo City Council member who was making his first appearance in the Committee with a number of other council members. Taking the floor, Aki lamented the crooked boundaries of the city of Tokyo, and proposed the committee as a way to install roads to clearly demarcate the city limits. Presenting a more formal petition in the following meeting, Aki emphasized the need to expand the range of urban improvements because the city had expanded significantly in the two decades since the plans were first codified in 1889.¹⁹³ As a result of the petition, a 9-member Road Planning Enquiry Committee was formed to investigate and report their recommendations. Returning two years later, the committee recommended 20 changes to the existing plans, including alteration of 2 planned routes and the introduction of 18 entirely new roads. One of these new routes was a ceremonial link between the Wadakura Gate of the Imperial Palace and the planned central station.

¹⁹² Discussion of these projects spread over two meetings, #266-267. See *TTKSS*, 25 for transcripts of the meetings.

¹⁹³ Aki voiced this motion during his first Committee Meeting after being assigned by the Tokyo City Council (*Tōkyō-shikai*) on September 10th, 1908. The motion passed during the next meeting on November 4th, 1908, and 9 members were assigned to the Road Planning Enquiry Committee (*Dōro Sekkei Chōsakai*) chaired by Tokonami Takejirō. See: *TTKSS*, 20:9 back-12 front; 20:4 front-8 front.

Not surprisingly, the stated purpose of this route was to enhance the monumentality of the station. “With the growth of the Imperial Capital, there are many unsatisfactory parts of the current Urban Improvement Plans,” Improvement Committee executive secretary (*kanji*) Toki Kahei justified the route selection. One in particular was “the lack of a road leading to the central station.”¹⁹⁴ Unanimously approved by the Improvement Committee, this route was added to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans with a length of 121 *ken* (~720 feet) and a width of 40 *ken* (~240 feet), making it the widest street in Tokyo.¹⁹⁵ Construction of this new axial boulevard commenced from December 1911, just months after the construction of the Tokyo Station superstructure got underway, and was completed in time for the opening ceremony of the station in 1914 (See Figure 11).¹⁹⁶

With a ceremonial station-front plaza matching its monumental Western architecture, Tokyo Station capped an urban space that united railways, architecture, and urban planning to project imperial power. Through both its function as a railway depot and its Western “Renaissance”-style façade, Tokyo Station symbolized modernity and civilization. As a product of the Tokyo Urban Improvement projects and situated within a monumental streetscape, meanwhile, Tokyo Station – the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” – tied the national railway network to the urban fabric of the city. As the personal train station of the emperor, moreover, Tokyo Station embodied the emperor system. Not only did the station directly face the imperial palace, its ornately decorated central pavilion was reserved for the imperial family. If the two symbols of progress in

¹⁹⁴ *TTKSS*, 22:11 front.

¹⁹⁵ *TTKSS*, 33:135; *TTKSS*, 20:9 back.

¹⁹⁶ *TTKSS*, 33:163.

Meiji Japan were the monarch and the locomotive, they were conjoined in Tokyo Station, the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital.”¹⁹⁷ The urban space framed by Tokyo Station and its surrounding streetscape thus symbolically linked the various mechanisms of Japanese modernity and power: the emperor system, railways, and the modern built environment. Thus, after 30 years, the stage was set for the opening ceremony that doubled as a celebration of the empire – the spark that charged this urban place as an imperial space.

Conclusion: Politics, Space, and Ideology

How different the December 1914 opening ceremony of Tokyo Station was from scenes that had often played out in central Tokyo in recent years. Just several months earlier in February of 1914, riots had broken out in the streets of the capital over four days from the 10th to the 14th as news of the Siemens naval scandal and rumors of tax increases reached the public. Saber-wielding police clashed with a mob of stone-throwing protesters outside the Imperial Diet on the 10th leading to the arrest of over 200 hundred protestors and several newspaper editors accused of inciting the revolts, but not before rioters smashed rickshaws and streetcars, looted pro-government newspapers and police boxes, and stormed the Diet building.¹⁹⁸ Even more deadly and damaging riots had occurred nearly one-year to the day earlier in February 1913. Protestors outside the Diet overturned the rickshaws of fleeing parliament members on the 5th, and stoned Prime

¹⁹⁷ Carol Gluck writes that the monarch and the locomotive were two ubiquitous “symbols of ‘civilization’,” in Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 101.

¹⁹⁸ For details, see: *The New York Times*, “Riots in Tokio; Many are Injured,” February 11, 1914; *The New York Times*, “Tax Riots in Tokio,” February 14, 1914; *The New York Times*, “To Curb Tokio Rioters,” February 15, 1914.

Minister Katsura Tarō as he fled on the 10th after resigning and dissolving the cabinet as a result of the protests. The situation grew more serious when police gunfire killed one of the demonstrators. In response, mobs once again set fire to the pro-government *Kokumin Shimbun* newspaper headquarters in Ginza and a number of streetcars. By the time the military was called in to disperse the rioters and re-establish control of the city, 38 police boxes had been destroyed, 168 people including 110 policemen had been injured, 253 protestors had been arrested, and 6 people had been killed.¹⁹⁹

As these contrasting examples illustrate, the urban space of Tokyo was contested terrain during the late-Meiji period. On the one hand we have what appears to be a conflation of space and imperialism, a celebration of the power of space. On the other hand, in the riots, we have what could be seen as the total resistance to and blatant subversion of spatial power by forces opposed to the producers of space. Yet, perhaps these two seemingly incongruous spatial practices were not so different. As Andrew Gordon points out, riots in 1905, 1913, and 1914, after all, had been pro-imperial. “To honour the nation and the emperor,” Andrew Gordon notes, “the crowd wanted Japanese hegemony in Asia and equality with the west.”²⁰⁰ Crowds celebrating empire in the station-front plaza or taking to the streets outside the Imperial Diet were both reaffirming the power embedded in that urban space. These sites were chosen specifically because they were already imbued with power – power that was reified by the participation of local residents. As Gordon adds, “The belief that the streets and public places belonged

¹⁹⁹ For details, see: *The New York Times*, “Katsura Censured by Diet,” February 6, 1913; *The New York Times*, “Riots Alarm Tokio,” February 11, 1913; Andrew Gordon, “Social Protest in Imperial Japan.”

²⁰⁰ Andrew Gordon, “The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan: Tokyo 1905-1918,” *Past & Present* 121 (1988): 163.

to the people was widely held.”²⁰¹ Indeed, the public had every right to rearticulate for their own purposes the power of the space in which they moved, because they had been active participants in its production.

Following the failure of the Ginza Bricktown, urban visionaries and reformers in Tokyo remained frustrated with the conditions of the city. The forestalled project had failed to satisfy those who saw Ginza as the jumping-off point for the westernization of the city, as well as those who saw it as merely the beginning of longer-term efforts to fireproof buildings and widen streets throughout the capital. Yet it had also left these planners even more motivated than ever to enact reforms. As government planners set about transforming Tokyo into a suitable capital, they worked from the steadfast belief in a triangular relationship between the city’s transportation network, commercial prosperity, and international prestige. For this reason, transportation infrastructure improvements – specifically the construction of “improved streets,” (*kaisei dōro*) indicating streets that had been widened, straightened, and paved – became the common element of increasingly comprehensive urban improvement plans in Meiji Tokyo. As the Meiji period progressed, these planners’ functionalist goals for the city were stretched and expanded by various inputs from participants at all levels of society. Whether it was opulent European-style urban amenities, necessary commercial facilities, or popular demands for sanitation, these various inputs formed a planning milieu that contributed to the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans. That is to say, the eventual plans were not produced by a single actor as much as they materialized through the collective efforts of several participants. The example of Tokyo Station, furthermore, demonstrates how

²⁰¹ Gordon, “The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan,” 165.

these various impulses for reform merged to reshape a commercial depot into a monumental space of emperor and empire at the heart of the imperial capital.

In this regard, shifts in the perception of the urban space of Tokyo mirrored the development of Meiji imperial ideology over the course of the late Meiji period. As Carol Gluck and Sheldon Garon have noted, imperial ideology was not unilaterally imposed from above by a monolithic state onto a passive Japanese population. Rather, for Gluck, Meiji government hegemony and national orthodoxy emerged from a “congeries of ideologies,” and while fraught with “areas of shared agreement, as well as those of tension,” was nonetheless accepted because it resonated with ideas that already existed in society and fulfilled practical needs.²⁰² Moreover, Gluck notes, “the strongest views – the hard line – often came from outside the government, from the *minkan*, as it was called, from ‘among the people,’” that is, from the “journalists, intellectuals, and public figures” who joined the bureaucratic ideologues in furthering the reach of imperial ideology.²⁰³ Garon, similarly, argues that private groups in Japanese society enthusiastically cooperated with central government “social management” in order to advance their own causes. “Japanese officials and groups within society,” Garon notes, “frequently interacted in formulating and implementing programs to manage society” through various moral suasion campaigns.²⁰⁴

The emergence of imperial space in Tokyo was no different. This was best seen in the local involvement in the planning of the monumental processional boulevard and

²⁰² Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 16.

²⁰³ Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 9-10.

²⁰⁴ Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds*, 6.

plaza fronting Tokyo Station and the opening ceremony of the station. Ultimately, various groups participated in the production of modern urban space because it satisfied their own needs and desires: quality streets and markets for commerce, sewers and fresh water systems for hygiene and sanitation, and monumental urban design for city pride. In this regard, it seems all groups, including the State, benefitted. Just as with the production of imperial ideology, where “the strongest views” came “from outside the government,” the creation of imperial space was as much the result of local forces as it was central state actors. With this in mind, perhaps we can speak of the marches of the rioters in Tokyo not as emancipatory “pedestrian speech acts,” as de Certeau theorized, but instead as the performance of a “spatial practice” tying mutually produced urban space to disciplinary control.²⁰⁵ In this light, the protests can be seen as Gluck’s

²⁰⁵ No social processes are unidirectional or carried out without being part of a dynamic dialectical interaction, whereby different actors and factors share in the final product. This is as true for the (uneven) social production of space, as demonstrated by urban theorists Henri LeFebvre and Michel de Certeau, and critical geographers David Harvey, Edward Soja, and Manuel Castells, as it is for the production and spread of urbanism, as argued by Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait. That is to say, urban residents – whether they are citizens, colonial subjects, or citizen-subjects – are always already active agents in the production and definition of the urban space of the cities, by necessity including even the power relations immanent in and mediated through the built environment. Following Louis Althusser’s accusation of the proletariat’s complicity in the reproduction of the labor and material conditions for capitalism, then, the agency of the urban dweller in the production of urban space must also extend to participation in the reproduction of this power in built form. This was equally true for de Certeau’s “voyeur” at the top of the World Trade Center, as it was for Benjamin’s flâneur strolling the arcades of Paris, or for Jane Jacob’s dancers in the “ballet” of the sidewalk. Finally, Althusser writes, it is the performance of the practices of ideological state apparatuses that interpellates individuals as subjects of the ideology of that apparatus. If we view urban space as being heavy with the ideology of power, then participation in “spatial practices,” even protesting, can thus be said to be a mechanism for reifying the power of space, and making urban residents subjects to spatial power. See Henri LeFebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1991), and *The Urban Revolution* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); David Harvey, *Limits to Capital* (Chicago:

“areas...of shared tension” within Meiji ideology. Although violent and targeted at specific political parties or individual politicians, the frequent riots during Tokyo’s “era of popular violence” never sought to undermine Meiji imperial ideology or challenge Japanese imperial expansion. As Japanese colonial officials sought to cultivate imperial hegemony in the colonial capitals of Taipei and Seoul, they would deploy the flexible and responsive planning system forged in Tokyo in an attempt to foster the same type of coproduction of imperial space seen in the imperial capital.

University of Chicago Press, 1982), and *The Urban Experience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (New York: Verso, 1989); Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); and Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait, *Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans* (London: Wiley-Academy, 2003); Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in *Lenin and Philosophy: and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 130-131; Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999); Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961),

CHAPTER IV
THE GROUNDWORK OF EMPIRE: THE SEOUL-PUSAN RAILWAY AND
JAPANESE INFORMAL EMPIRE IN KOREA

If there came a day when Korea was divided by the
great powers, the existence of a railway belonging
to us would be good reason for the maintenance of
our rights in any distribution of territory.
– Maejima Hisoka, 1896¹

In early May 1905, a diverse groups of dignitaries – Japanese and Korean royalty, government officials from both countries, and diplomats from the United States, England, France, and Germany – gathered in the plaza in front of Namdaemun Station in Seoul to celebrate the opening of the Keifu Railway between Seoul and Pusan. Pronouncements by Japanese Prince Fushimi-no-miya Hiroyasu and Korean Prince Yi Jae-gak both expressed hopes that the new line would lead to greater transportation, commerce, and amity between the two countries.² The presence of royalty and central government officials from these several countries at the ceremony gave the event a palpably dignified air, far more than expected for the opening of a rail line owned and operated by a private railway company. What the wide range of attendees at the ceremony indicated was that the rail line required the cooperation of a large number of private and public actors, not only limited to Japan and Korea, but also including the United States.

¹ Quoted in Janet Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the Seoul-Pusan Railway, 1894-1906,” *Modern Asian Studies* 11, no. 4 (1977): 580.

² Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudōshi* [History of railways in Korea], vol. 1, *Sōshi Jidai* [The beginnings](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu Tetsudōkyoku, 1915), 338-339. Notably, the president of the Keifu Railway at the time of its opening was Furuichi Kōi, former member of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee, who had taken over as president from Shibusawa Eiichi.

For Japan, the ceremony marked the culmination of over a decade of tortuous and often contentious diplomatic negotiations between the governments of Japan and Korea over the funding, building, ownership, and management of the railway. Indeed, this final segment signaled the consummation of attempts since 1872 to pry open the “hermit country” and extend Japanese imperial influence into the Korean peninsula. Built to secure lines of logistical support for military actions on the continent, fix efficient shipping lanes for commercial interests, and anchor Japanese claims to ownership of Korean territory, the Keifu Railway represented more than just an overseas investment opportunity. As Japanese Communications Minister Ōura Kanetake proclaimed at the opening ceremony: “Hereafter, the railways of our two countries will be separated by only a narrow strip of water, and our national capitals set apart by only a few days’ travel. It goes without question that this will be of use in times of emergency.” “As a result of this railway,” Ōura continued, “we can now make international friendships more intimate, promote industrial development, and anticipate drastic changes (*isshin*) in politics and economics.”³ As Ōura suggested, the railway was the backbone of a deliberate policy of Japanese informal empire in Korea intended to demarcate a defensible, profitable, and internationally recognized buffer space between the Japanese home islands and western imperialist incursion in Asia.

Opening ceremonies of railways and train stations were important events in Meiji Japan; so important, in fact, that the most significant ceremonies were presided over by members of the imperial family. The 1872 opening of Shimbashi Station, the northern terminus of Japan’s first railway between Yokohama and the imperial capital of Tokyo,

³ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudōshi*, vol. 1, 343.

was one such occurrence. Addressing the assembled Japanese officials, subjects, and foreign representatives inside the station building, none other than the Meiji Emperor himself expressed his hopes for railways in Japan. “At this time, We announce the completion of our country’s initial railway,” the Emperor proclaimed to the assembled officials: “Looking forward to the wealth and prosperity of our nation, we celebrate the opening of the railway for the sake of all the officials and people of the nation.” Turning to his gathered subjects, the Emperor voiced his benevolent wishes for their well-being. “We personally open the Tokyo-Yokohama railway,” the Emperor pronounced, “Henceforth, may the benefits of the railway make trade increasingly thriving and the people all the more rich and prosperous.”⁴ While the Meiji Emperor spoke in terms of the increasing wealth and prosperity of his people, railways played an equally substantial role in the geographical integration, political centralization, and ideological unification of the modern Japanese nation.⁵ Thereafter, as the Meiji emperor encouraged at the opening ceremony, railways in Japan “spread like a vine across the whole country” during two “railway manias” in 1885-1890 and 1893-1897 as a result of the combined efforts of the Railway Bureau and private railway companies, such as the Nippon Railway Company

⁴ Tōkyō Shiyakusho, *Tōkyō-shi Shikō Shigai-hen* [Manuscripts of Tokyo history: the urban area], vol. 53 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1963), 463-464; and Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” in *Trains, Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails*, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 239-240.

⁵ See Tristan R. Grunow, “Tracks to Teito: The Tokyo Train Network and the Meiji Question for Domestic Hegemony and International Recognition,” MA Thesis, University of Oregon, 2008; and Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan.”

established in 1881.⁶ From the 18-miles of the Tokyo-Yokohama Line opened in 1872, the national railway network quickly grew to over 1,000 miles by 1889, and to nearly 4,750 miles by 1906.⁷ With rail lines extending central rule to all parts of the archipelago, each railway or train station opening marked one more link in the progress of Japan's growth as a modern united nation, each ceremony a celebration of the maturing state.

As Japanese territory expanded, the locomotive followed the flag: first to Hokkaidō and then to Taiwan. After asserting Japanese control over the island of Ezochi and renaming it Hokkaidō, the Meiji government built the Horonai Railway in 1869 to lay the infrastructure for the development of the new territory. Continuing the practice of imperial presence at important railway opening ceremonies, the opening ceremony of the Horonai Railway was attended by Prince Komatsu-no-miya Akihito.⁸ Acquiring the island of Taiwan from China nearly two decades later in 1895 as Japan's first formal colony following the Sino-Japanese War, colonial officials undertook repairs of existing railways and the construction of new lines. Mirroring opening ceremonies in the mainland and Hokkaidō, the 1903 opening ceremony of the northern segment of the

⁶ Quoted in Tristan R. Grunow, "Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan," 239-240; *TSS*, vol. 53, 463-464; Aoki Eiichi, "Expansion of the Railway Network," *Japan Railway & Transport Review* 2 (1994): 34-35.

⁷ Aoki, "Expansion of Railway Network," 34-35; Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan Railway Nationalization in Japan: Ten Years Progress Under State Management, 1907-1908 to 1916-1917* (Tokyo: Tsukiji Type Foundry, 1919), 2, 4-5; Harada, *Technological Independence and Progress of Standardization in The Japanese Railways* (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1981), 11.

⁸ Tetsudōshō, ed., *Nihon Tetsudōshi* [History of railways in Japan](Tokyo: Tetsudōshō, 1921), 1:310.

improved trans-insular railway denoted the important role of railways in colonial rule. With over 500 distinguished guests assembled amongst the “Great Green Arches” erected in front of Miaoli Station in central Taiwan, Japanese colonial rulers emphasized the political importance of railways. “It goes without saying,” Director of Public Affairs Gotō Shimpei told the assembled crowd of Japanese colonial officials and Taiwanese subjects, “that the development of railways reflects a nation’s prosperity and culture, as well as its national strength, to the rest of the world.” Yet there were also more immediate benefits of railways, Gotō noted: “The influence of this railway for the culture of this island is by no means insignificant.”⁹ Not only did railways serve industrial and military purposes, they had added benefits as conveyors of colonial power. Whether by bounding territory or by forging progress, rails of steel were deployed as tools of Japanese hegemony. Governor-General of Taiwan Kodama Gentarō clearly denoted this connection between railways, culture, and hegemony at the same opening ceremony. “The development of humanity, the promotion of industry, and the mobility of the military all largely rely on railways,” Kodama told the gathered crowd, “My greatest hope is that by protecting and riding this railway, you will stay devoted civilized imperial subjects (*seidai bunmei no tami*).”¹⁰ In this regard, each station or line opening signaled another step in Japan’s emergence as a colonial power, each ceremony a celebration of the expanding empire.

Yet in Korea, it was the flag that followed the locomotive. In May 1905, Korea was not yet a colony of Japan. It would be another 6 months before Japan compelled the

⁹ Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, ed., *Taiwan Tetsudōshi* [History of railways in Taiwan](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, 1910), 1:454.

¹⁰ Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, ed., *Taiwan Tetsudōshi*, 458.

Korean government to sign the infamous Protectorate Treaty (also known as the “Eulsa Treaty”), making Korea a protectorate of the Japanese empire and establishing the Resident-General to control Korea’s foreign diplomacy. Nevertheless, the similarities between the opening ceremonies in Japan, Hokkaidō, Taiwan, and Korea represent Japanese leaders’ similar view of railways in each territory: as tools for expanding Japanese hegemony into new areas in response to perceived outside challenges. It is notable in this regard that railway construction by Japanese companies in these areas – one the Japanese mainland, one more a newly claimed territory, another a formal colony, and the other a foreign country – proceeded simultaneously. Once laid, the Keifu Railway later provided the jumping off point for a Japanese-constructed and -controlled railway network that spanned the Korean peninsula and provided the infrastructure for Japanese colonial rule after annexation of the peninsula in 1910. As early as 1902, the Japanese Cabinet declared, “Railway management is the true essence [*lit.* “marrow”] of our political platform towards Korea (*waga tai-Kan seikō*).”¹¹ Once the line was opened in 1905, Army Minister and later Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake, used a similarly corporeal metaphor, gloating to Foreign Minister Katsura Tarō: “With the completion of the Keifu Railway, coupled with the military railway between Seoul and

¹¹ This statement was included in a proposal submitted by Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō and adopted by the Cabinet on October 2nd, 1902. See Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho* [Chronology and principle documents of Japanese foreign diplomacy], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965), 207; and Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* [Japanese diplomatic documents], vol. 35 (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 1957), Doc.#: 268, Komura-Katsura, 498-503. Also quoted in Takahashi Yasutaka, *Nihon Shokuminchi Tetsudō Shiron: Taiwan, Chōsen, Manshū, Kahoku, Kachū Tetsudō no Kei’eishi-teki Kenkyū* [History of Japanese colonial railways: a study of railway management in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, northern China, and central China](Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1995), 63-64.

Sinŭiju, the backbone (*kikan*) of railways traversing Korea is hereby completed.”¹² With this backbone in place, Japanese railways in Korea, nationalized in 1906 and placed under the administration of the Resident-General in 1907, expanded radially from Seoul towards Sinŭiju in the northwest, Wŏnsan in the northeast, and Mokp’o in the southwest.¹³ Centering on the capital, these lines together produced the characteristic “X”-shaped pattern of Japanese controlled trunk railways bounding the Korean peninsula. While these railways undoubtedly served economic purposes, Japanese officials also saw locomotives as engines for expanding the empire. For this reason, colonial officials encouraged and aided the growth of Japanese-controlled railways. With this support, railway mileage increased rapidly after annexation in 1910, nearly doubling in ten years from 674 miles in 1910 to 1,157 in 1920, reaching 1,777 miles two years later in 1922.¹⁴

As discussed in Chapter 3, it was the acquisition of these new territories and colonies that put the finishing touches on Tokyo Station as an imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital. As the regal 1914 opening ceremony of the so-called “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” demonstrated, railways were integrally linked not only to the space of the Japanese capital but also to the expansion of the Japanese empire beyond. In other

¹² JACAR, Ref.#: B04010942300, “*Chōsen Tetsudō Fusetsu Kankei Zakken*” [Miscellaneous documents of railways in Korea], 4.

¹³ The first railway in Korea had opened in 1900 between Seoul and Inch’ŏn, operated by the Kei-Jin Railway Company. Against the wishes of the Korean government, the concession to construct this railway, which had been originally granted to an American, was sold to a group of Japanese investors funded by Japanese government subsidies. The Resident General Railway Management Bureau was in charge of railways. The chairman of the Bureau was former Keifu Railway Company president Furuichi Kōi. See: Takahashi, *Nihon Shokuminchi Tetsudō Shiron*, 73-74.

¹⁴ Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1922-1923* (Keijo: Government-General of Chosen, 1924), 151.

words, the ideological shift over the mid-to-late Meiji period that transformed the “home of the emperor” into the “imperial capital” was fulfilled with the procurement of colonial possessions. Chapters 4 and 5 will now shift the analytical lens from the metropole to the colonies to examine how Japan asserted hegemony overseas by exploiting colonial space – first in the natural environment, and then in the built environment. Whether by constructing railways or by improving the built form of the native city, Japanese pre-colonial agents and colonial administrators followed models forged in the metropole as they attempted to assert claims of territorial ownership and project Japanese power in the colonies.

This chapter will take up the issue of Japanese attempts to cultivate imperial hegemony through manipulation of the natural environment, namely in the form of railways. Nearly a decade before Japanese colonial officials in Korea began organized forest planting programs in 1906, Japanese agents broke ground on construction of railways cutting through the Korean countryside.¹⁵ Not only did these railways plow through existing rice paddies, but they also had a massive environmental impact on the mountains and fields of Korea. Railways caused considerable transformations of the natural environment to provide straight and level passages for the train. Mountainside cuttings, tunnels, bridges, and embankments all required the demolition, clearing, or moving of vast amounts of earth. Track beds themselves were formed from earth subgrade and stone ballast, not to mention the wooden railway ties and iron rails laid on top to form the tracks. Even before any of this earth moving or construction could be

¹⁵ See: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Nature of Empire: Forest Ecology, Colonialism and Survival Politics in Japan’s Imperial Order,” *Japanese Studies* 33, no. 3 (2013): 225-242.

done, however, there was an equally appreciable amount of diplomatic and financial groundwork necessary. In this regard, the awarding of railway concessions was only a turning point; the 1905 opening of the Keifu Line and its nationalization by the Japanese central government in 1906 marked the culmination of Japanese government efforts to solidify and demonstrate its power in the natural environment of the Korean peninsula – not necessarily as a precursor to formal colonization and annexation in 1910, but as a means to establish Korea as a protective buffer from perceived Western threats.

As early as 1894, Japanese diplomatic “men on the spot” and commercial “patriotic capitalists” in Korea acted in concert to secure Japanese rights to construct railways in Korea as the primary goal of a larger program of internal reforms.¹⁶ The actions of these Japanese actors was informed by the fear that an underdeveloped and unstable Korea would attract the intervention of Western imperialists, which would in turn potentially threaten Japanese national security and commercial interests. Driven by these concerns, Japanese strategists looked to the example of Hokkaidō as they sought to develop the Korean borderland into a defensible buffer, by force if necessary. This required first releasing the peninsula from the suzerainty of the Qing Empire by securing international recognition of Korean independence. Japan therefore sought to foster Korean modernization by supporting the efforts of Korean progressives and sponsoring reforms intended to remove the China-leaning ruling party from power. But when internal reforms did not proceed at a pace they deemed sufficient, Japanese diplomats took the more direct action of conspiring to incite a Japanese-led coup d’état that would

¹⁶ “Patriotic capitalists” from Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, “‘Railpolitik’: An Introduction,” in *Railways and International Politics: Paths of Empire, 1848-1945*, ed. T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson (London: Routledge, 2006), 8.

install a Korean government more favorable to modernization, reform, and – not to mention – Japan itself. In this way, reforms were merely a pretext for increasing Japanese control of Korea.

Amidst this push for reforms, one persistent goal of Japanese diplomats was the securing of “material advantages,” specifically railway and telegraph concessions. These were desirable because they would facilitate control of the peninsula and garner Western recognition of Japanese dominance in Korea. Not only would transportation and communication infrastructure improve military logistics and increase commercial profits through expedited trade and shipping, the necessary land grants and concessions would permit Japanese ownership and exploitation of Korean territory. When international incidents undermined diplomatic attempts to secure Japanese control of Korean railways, the business community stepped in to pick up where the diplomats left off. As Peter Duus argues, Japanese expansion into Korea was the symbiotic result of “two separate but interlinked processes,” one political and the other economic. “Symbiotic ties linked the two processes,” Duus explains, “Each was propelled by an independent energy, yet each nourished the other: the sword was the servant of the abacus, the abacus the handmaiden of the sword.”¹⁷ Following policies dictated by the Foreign Ministry, private commercial interests acted as government proxies advancing Japan’s informal empire into the Korean peninsula.

Securing railway concessions was only one half of the story; the other half was building the railway. In addition to the negotiations to secure the railway concession and

¹⁷ Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 24.

the necessary financing, construction of the lines required land for the right-of-way and a large labor force to transport materials to the work sites, move earth to make way for the trains, and to lay the iron tracks. The Seoul-Pusan railway therefore required the cooperation of a number of actors on both sides of the Korea/Tsushima Strait: Japanese diplomats and businessmen to secure the railway concession; Japanese entrepreneurs and engineers to operate the railway; the Korean government to donate the right-of-way; Korean laborers to make up the work force; and the Japanese government to provide emergency funds. The laying of the Keifu Railway in particular is thus a prime example of how the cooperation of multiple participants – the Japanese government, Japanese capitalists, foreign diplomats and capitalists, the Korean government, and Korean laborers – was required to produce spaces of empire.

After considering the concept of “informal empire,” the first section of the chapter will outline the development of Japan’s foreign policy towards Korea as articulated by Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo. The idea of “enlightened exploitation” will be introduced in the second section in order to explain why railways in particular made for an effective engine of informal empire by solidifying Japanese claims of “cultivator’s rights” to Korean territory. The remaining three sections of the chapter will then detail how various actors worked together to lay the infrastructure of empire.

Informal Empire, Western Imperialism, and Early Meiji Foreign Policy

In an influential 1953 article and 1961 book, John Gallagher and Ronald E. Robinson argued that the defining feature of British overseas expansion in the mid-19th century was the establishment of “informal empire” through the “imperialism of free trade.” Arguing

against the orthodox view of mid-Victorian *laissez-faire* and anti-imperialist “disinterest,” Gallagher and Robinson asserted that Great Britain still consolidated new territories into a British-dominated global economic system by imposing treaties of free trade and friendship onto weaker territories through “gunboat diplomacy.” In doing so, Great Britain was able to spread their empire by “extending formal control informally if possible and formally if necessary.”¹⁸ As a result, “the formal empire of rule was but a part of the informal empire of trade and influence. Commercially speaking, colonies were the lesser part of the iceberg visible above the water-line.”¹⁹

The scholarly response to the concepts of “imperialism of free trade” and “informal empire” was mixed. Not surprisingly, Gallagher and Robinson’s provocative interpretation of British expansion sparked heated responses from historians of economics and imperialism. One of the most forceful came from D.C.M Platt, who maintained that Victorian *laissez-faire* attitudes were indeed “faithfully reflected overseas.”²⁰ Years later, no less a scholar of imperialism than Ann Laura Stoler

¹⁸ Robinson and Gallagher first proposed their alternative theory of European imperialism in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” *The Economic Historical Review* 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15, and then refined it in Ronald E. Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961). Building on this original theory, Robinson later argued in a series of article that imperialism was as much the result of European “push” as it was Non-European “pull.” See: “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), 117-142; and, “The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire,” in *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 267-289.

¹⁹ Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, 8.

²⁰ See D. C. M. Platt, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 21, no. 2 (1968): 296-306, and Platt, “Further Objections to an ‘Imperialism of Free Trade,’ 1830-1860,” *The Economic History*

dismissed the idea of informal empire, saying that it and the related concept of “indirect rule” were nothing more than “unhelpful euphemisms, not working concepts.”²¹ Yet other scholars have found the concept a useful framework for analyzing imperialist expansion. Jürgen Osterhammel, for example, suggests that informal empire is an apt framework for analyzing the uneven economic relationship between Great Britain and China following the First Opium War and the signing of a series of treaties including the Treaty of Nanking (1842), Treaty of Tientsin (1858), the Peking Convention (1860), and the Chefoo Convention (1876).²² Similarly, Japan was arguably threatened by Western informal empire following the “opening” of the country in 1853 by the American Commodore Mathew Perry and the signing of the Treaty of Shimoda in 1854. The more formal Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed in 1858, was quickly followed thereafter by other so-called “unequal treaties” with Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Russia that gave each of these countries extraterritoriality rights on Japanese soil while severely limiting Japan’s power to control tariffs on imported goods. It was in response to this foreign pressure that Japanese formulated its foreign policy, and eventually

Review, New Series, 26, no. 1 (1973): 77-91. For an overview of the writings Gallagher and Robinson, critical responses, and thoughtful commentaries, see William Roger Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976). For quote from Platt, see “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations,” 305.

²¹ Ann Laura Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006): 136.

²² Peter Duus, “Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview,” in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*, ed. Peter Duus and others (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), xv; Jürgen Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Toward a Framework of Analysis,” in *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 290-314.

channeled informal empire onto its Asian neighbors.

In adopting the concept of “informal empire,” this chapter follows the definition of Osterhammel, who explains that “informal empire” was an effective way for imperializers to secure access to foreign markets and sources of raw materials without establishing permanent colonies, especially in areas where “colonial rule would have been too costly and would have involved unwanted responsibility.” Instead, Osterhammel explains, “Governing was left to Anglophile indigenous rulers, who, however, were rarely enthusiastic ‘collaborators’.”²³ What resulted, was a situation of “quasi-colonial control” where the weaker state “remain[ed] intact as an independent polity with its own political system” and conducted its own foreign policy, but the stronger state was able to gain favorable trading rights and extraterritoriality through pressure by diplomats, consuls, and settler communities.²⁴ Peter Duus has also provided a useful distinction between traditional international economic relations and informal imperialism. “What distinguishes informal imperialism from nonimperialistic trading relationships...is the use of coercive methods,” Duus notes. “Normal trading relationships between modern societies presumably rest on mutual consent and a shared sense of advantage. The will of one party is bent to the other not by force or threat of force but by persuasion.”²⁵

As will be discussed in this chapter, Japan used railways in an attempt to assert informal empire over Korea as early as 1894. Actions by Japanese diplomats and

²³ Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 19.

²⁴ Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 20-21.

²⁵ Duus, “Introduction: Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview,” xvi.

commercial agents seeking railway concessions in Korea in the mid-1890s can certainly be classified as “coercive methods.” Although always couched in terms of transportation and commerce, it was not only economic concerns that propelled Japan’s drive for informal empire in Korea. That is to say, Japanese imperialism in the mid-1890s was not “economic imperialism.” Instead, capitalism and economic motivations merged with concerns over strategic interests in the East Asian region to propel Japanese expansion.²⁶ As a “latecomer to the contest for overseas empire,” Hyman Kublin argued, Japan’s foreign policy was founded largely on “fear.”²⁷ As Kublin saw it, the defensive Meiji regime was intent on the “ultimate abolition of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’, and a modest expansion aimed at the promotion of the national security.”²⁸ For Kublin, then,

²⁶ The question of whether or not Japanese expansion was conditioned by economic factors has been a major point of contention among scholars of Japanese imperialism. The debate was for a long time framed by Lenin’s interpretation of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. As this theory holds, imperialism was the inevitable outcome of capitalism as entrepreneurs in the metropole monopolized domestic markets and therefore needed new markets in which to invest capital and obtain raw materials and markets of consumption. Peter Duus has helpfully reminded scholars not to “brush aside the question of economic impulses entirely” or “ignore the economic context of expansion.” Carefully eschewing Marxian overtones, Duus convincingly showed that Japan was “driven by a sort of economic ‘necessity’ to expand its economic activities in the peninsula.” “If the Japanese economy were to continue expanding,” Duus rightly noted, “it had to find markets for its exports.” As Duus admits, “there is little evidence in the diplomatic documents or in the papers of the statesmen to indicate that economic advantage was the *primary* concern of the decision makers or that they were heavily influenced by the lobbying of private business interests.” But for Duus, economic conditions added to an expansionist impulse that had other motivating factors. As Duus acknowledges, “The primary goal of the advance into Korea was to deny control to any other power lest Japan’s own strategic position in the region be weakened.” See: Peter Duus, “Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The Case of Korea, 1895-1910,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 129, 161).

²⁷ Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 1 (1959): 67, 73.

²⁸ Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” 73.

rather than economic forces or internal political rivalries, Japanese expansion was propelled by a desire to secure “unqualified acceptance as a great power.” “Japanese leaders may well have feared that,” Kublin suggested, “if they failed to respond to the challenges which empire posed, admission to the ranks of the world’s élite might be delayed.”²⁹ Similarly, in *The Abacus and the Sword*, Peter Duus argues that Meiji expansionism was “preemptive,” and was practiced in a game where the rules stated, “if one’s own country did not establish dominion over a particular territory, then a rival or enemy would.” Given this precarious international situation, Duus argues, “It is not surprising that the Japanese leaders, aspiring to join the great game, became caught up in this peculiar psychology.” Put more specifically: “If Korea or China were to fall under the dominion of the Western imperialist powers, Japan would find itself increasingly vulnerable to Western pressure. In this sense, the late Meiji impulse to expand was aimed as much at denying territory to others as in acquiring it for Japan.”³⁰

Emerging onto the world scene in the latter half of the 19th century, Japan formulated its foreign policy in the midst of, and in response to, an imperialist race for territorial control. Coming to power in 1868 after Japan had been forcefully “opened” to the West by American gunboats in 1853, the Meiji Government acutely recognized the pressure of “foreign threats.” From the Japanese perspective, the scene was especially dire as Western imperialists continued to inch closer and closer to East Asia. As Duus writes: “Throughout the 1870s and 1880s a series of events – Russian encroachments on the Chinese border, French seizure of Indo-China, British expansion in to Burma and

²⁹ Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” 76.

³⁰ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 17-18.

Malaya – reminded [the Japanese leaders] that an aggressive Western imperialism was on the march in Asia.”³¹ Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru lamented the dire political situation in an 1887 memorandum:

The [European] countries are all devoting their power more and more to the colonization and development of overseas territories...In India, Cambodia, Cochin-China, and elsewhere, the weak become prey for the strong...During the past three or four years the European countries have expanded their power into Asia and Africa more than ever before, and they are brandishing their power in the Far East as well. Ah, the continent of Africa and Asia are about to become the cockpit of conflict among the Europeans.³²

Russian eastward expansion was particularly worrisome for Japanese policymakers, and had preoccupied defensive strategists since even before the Meiji Restoration. Russia had first appeared on Japanese shores in 1792 when Russian diplomat Adam Kirillovich Laksman showed up in the northern island of Hokkaidō. This was followed two decades later by Admiral Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtern’s arrival at Nagasaki in 1804, carrying the Russian ambassador Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov. Rebuffed by the Tokugawa Shogunate, the frustrated Rezanov ordered two Russian naval officers to lead attacks on several Japanese possessions on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands in 1807.³³ Later, Russia was one of the western countries to “open” Japan in 1853, when an expedition led by Admiral Evfimii Putiatin sailed into northern Japanese waters the same year as Mathew Perry’s better-known arrival.³⁴ Thereafter, Japanese

³¹ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 16.

³² Quoted in Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 17.

³³ Brett L. Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island: Cartography and Empire,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 33 (2007): 297.

³⁴ Sho Konishi, “Reopening the ‘Opening of Japan’: A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress,” *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 1 (2007): 103.

defense strategists had continued to eye Russia with increasing trepidation. Army Minister Yamagata Aritomo cautioned the Emperor in 1874 that Russia continued to pose a military risk on Japan's northern frontier. "We have achieved our independence," Yamagata warned, "but still the lack the power to oppose threats from abroad, particularly the Russian threat from the north."³⁵ Suspicion of Russia was exacerbated by rumors of the planned Trans-Siberian Railway. Writing even before construction of the railway had started, Yamagata anticipated the revolutionary impact the line would have on the balance of power in Eastern Asia when completed. In an 1886 statement that would not leak to the public until 1888, Yamagata wrote that the railway would "strengthen connections between all the important places in Russia and Siberia and facilitate transportation to the Pacific coast, thereby allowing the transport of troops to the Port of Vladivostok in just few days time should a need arise in the east." As a result, Yamagata added, "This railway completely changes Russian military strength and solidifies the Russian position in Asia."³⁶ These fears became all the more real when word reached Japan that construction had started on the line in 1891. Yamagata reiterated to the Emperor the impending crisis this posed in 1893:

Russia is unable to use force in the direction of the Balkans, and so she will turn singlemindedly [*sic*] her eyes to the East and will want to give full play to her bestial greed. Such things as the establishment of the Siberian railway are to this end. The progress of these works will indeed hasten a crisis in the Far East...After ten years from now, with the completion of the Trans-

³⁵ Quoted in Roger F. Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 75.

³⁶ Yamagata's manuscript is reprinted in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū: Meiji Jidai* [Research in Japanese diplomatic history: the Meiji period](Tokyo: Yūshindō, 1957), 186-192. The original is held in the Mutsu Munemitsu papers of the National Diet Library Political Documents Collection.

Siberian railway, Russia will be in a position to invade Mongolia, and who cannot tell that in the future she will not reach right into China?³⁷

The task of formulating Japanese defense policy in response to this threat of Western incursion fell to Yamagata, one of the most prominent Japanese generals and politicians in the Meiji period. As Chief of the Army General Staff, it was Yamagata's duty to prepare Japanese military strategy, and personally memorialize the emperor as the chief advisor for defense matters. Position papers presented by Yamagata represent a shift in Japanese foreign policy in response to continuing Western threats: whereas the first impulse was to consolidate internal hegemony, once this was secured with the quelling of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 Japanese strategists began eyeing external extension of Japanese influence. Yamagata consistently pressed the urgency of expanding the military in order to ensure Japanese national security, establish a dominant position within East Asia, and maintain territorial buffers to Western encroachment. After personally leading troops in 1877, Yamagata turned his strategic gaze from the Meiji government's domestic rivals to potential foreign enemies. Yamagata's first step in determining Japanese defense needs was dispatching numerous officials to investigate conditions in northern China and Korea in 1878. As Roger Hackett relates, these secret fact-finding missions produced a number of studies on "The Military Preparedness of Neighboring Countries," and "The Geography of China."³⁸ These reports led Yamagata to argue that Japan needed to expand its military in order to assert its position as the regional hegemon of East Asia. As Yamagata argued in a policy proposal in 1882, "The nation with which our country must be concerned and must compete in terms of strength

³⁷ Quoted in Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy," 575.

³⁸ Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo*, 82.

is not a remote country but one situated closeby.” “If we fail now to recover our martial spirit, expand the army and navy to make a veritable floating fortress of our Imperial nation, extend our strength to all corners of the state in the spirit of steadfast valor,” Yamagata concluded, “our nation, which in the past has experienced troubles with nations in the immediate vicinity, will unquestionably suffer again from weakness.”³⁹

An unpublished position paper penned in 1886 provides a revealing glimpse into how the precarious international situation refocused Yamagata’s strategic gaze outwards. Continuing his crusade of military preparation and expansion, Yamagata wrote this paper to urge military readiness in order to defend the Japanese homelands in case of war in East Asia. As Yamagata argued, the Panama Canal, Trans-Canadian Railway, and Trans-Siberian Railway would cause chaos in the balance of power in East Asia by shortening British shipping routes and expediting Russian troop movements. Moreover, as Yamagata continued, “Because Russia’s intent is to invade, as soon as the Siberian railway is completed, they will turn towards opening inroads into Korea or India.” In the event war broke out between Russia and England as a result, Japan would be forced to either remain neutral or to join the war itself. Even if Japan were to remain neutral in case of war between Russia and England, Yamagata urged, it must make military preparations so as to prevent the belligerents from encroaching on Japanese neutrality. “Naturally, the same is true,” Yamagata advised, “whether we are to remain neutral or are to take a belligerent stand ourselves.”⁴⁰

³⁹ Quoted in Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo*, 87-88.

⁴⁰ This document is found in *NGK*, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 183-203. For quote, 188.

For Yamagata, the key to East Asian stability, and in turn Japanese self-defense and independence, was Korea. Moving beyond urging military preparation, Yamagata argued that Japan must develop a calculated defense policy in case of emergency in East Asia. This was necessary, he insisted, because a war between Russia and England would have far-reaching effects on all countries in the region. Although any battles in such a war would most likely be staged on the Korean peninsula, Yamagata cautioned that Korea would not be the only country to suffer in case of bloodshed between Russia and England. Rather, a war would also cause a breakdown in relations between China and Japan. “For this reason,” Yamagata advised, “we must determine in advance whether or not we can really remain neutral in a time of emergency in the East.”⁴¹ In the context of potential military conflict in East Asia, Yamagata tellingly wrote of the need to secure Korean independence from Western colonization in the name of Japanese self-defense:

Our national policy is to completely detach Korea from relations with China and make it an autonomous, independent country so that a strong European power will be unable take advantage of the situation and move in to occupy it. Korea’s location dominates the situation for all of East Asia, and so for a [European] power, especially, to occupy Korea would be a direct disadvantage for our country. Consequently, starting long ago we dispatched diplomats to Seoul in order to exhaust efforts to sign a treaty with the various Western powers recognizing Korean autonomy and independence, and we have now started to achieve increasingly favorable results.⁴²

It was policy statements such as this that led William Beasley to conclude, “It appears that what Yamagata had in mind was an international agreement on the subject of

⁴¹ *NGK*, “Yamagata Ikencho,” 188.

⁴² *NGK*, “Yamagata Ikencho,” 188.

Korea.”⁴³ Certainly, Yamagata spoke of an international acknowledgment of Korean independence, but it was premised on concerns for Japanese national security. The fear was that if Korea stayed under Chinese influence it would fall into the hands of a European power, thereby placing Japan in danger. Yet it is also important to point out that at this point there does not appear to be any indication of ideas or support for actions more aggressive than maneuvering for the international diplomatic recognition of Korean autonomy and independence.

The Japanese attitude toward Korea grew decidedly more hawkish by the time Yamagata announced the official government policy towards Korea during his first tenure as Prime Minister from 1889-1891. In his opening address to the first National Diet on December 6, 1890, Yamagata laid out his proposals for Japan’s future defense policy, again highlighting the need to bolster Japanese military preparation. “If we wish to maintain the nation’s independence among the powers of the world at the present time,” Yamagata proclaimed to the Diet, “it is not enough to guard only the line of sovereignty; we must also defend the line of advantage...For this reason, it is necessary to make comparatively large appropriations for our army and navy.”⁴⁴ Explaining this in

⁴³ W.G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 46.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan*, 138. For more on this speech, see: Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan*, 138-139 and Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 118. Joseph Pittau writes that Yamagata’s speech was written by Inoue Kowashi, and was entitled “Plan to Defend the Sphere of National Interest,” in Joseph Pittau, “Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895: And the Formation of Modern Japan,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 24, no. 3/4 (1965): 273. The terms Yamagata uses for “line of sovereignty” (*shuken-sen*) and “line of advantage,” (*rieki-sen*) have alternately been translated in various ways by different historians. Pittau uses “sphere of

more detail in a written opinion earlier submitted to the Cabinet in March of that year, Yamagata insisted that there were two “paths” to Japanese “independence and self-defense”: 1) defending a “line of sovereignty (*shuken-sen*)” and not allowing its violation by others; and 2) protecting a “line of interest (*rieki-sen*)” and not losing strategic territories.⁴⁵ If there was any uncertainty about what territories were encircled by his envisioned “line of interest” and what threats challenged it, Yamagata stated bluntly:

The focal point of our nation’s “line of interest” is surely Korea. The Siberian railway has already progressed into central Asia, and when it is completed in a few years, Russians will be able to water their horses in the Amur River just a dozen or so days after leaving the capital. We must not forget that the completion of the Siberian railway will, in other words, be an eventful time in Korea. And we also must not forget that this eventful time in Korea, in other words, will be an opportunity for a great fluctuation in East Asia. If there is any guarantee for preserving our line of interest, then this is it: the independence of Korea. Is this not the thing that provokes the sharpest impetus?⁴⁶

Responding to what they saw as constant threats of Western encroachment on Japanese national security, Meiji government leaders and defense strategists began to look outwards with increasing trepidation. Korea looked especially vulnerable from across the Tsushima Straits, as Japanese leaders viewed the peninsula as a culturally underdeveloped political vacuum that posed a danger to Japan. Writing in 1920, Nitobe Inazō acknowledged the cultural debt Japan owed to the Korean peninsula throughout history, comparing it to a “phial from which was poured milk and honey into the mouth of Japan.” “As long as Korea remains a really independent country, strong and well

sovereignty” and “sphere of interest”; Duus opts for “cordon,” in Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 64.

⁴⁵ NGK, “Yamagata Ikencho,” 193.

⁴⁶ NGK, “Yamagata Ikencho,” 193.

governed, it may well be a buffer State;” Nitobe concluded, “But when it is now under China, and now under Russia, there can be no security for peace in the Far East nor safety for Japan.” Citing a much-quoted phrase, he went on to add: “We can easily change the geographic metaphor, and liken the Peninsula to a sword-blade aimed at the heart of a Japan.”⁴⁷ Although Korea was ruled at the time by an Yi Dynasty that had been in power for over 500 years, Japanese leaders feared that instability on the peninsula would invite the intervention of the approaching Western imperialist powers. In the worse case scenario, Western colonization of Korea would threaten Japanese national security by breaching its “line of interest” and encroaching on its “line of sovereignty.”⁴⁸ As Itō Hirobumi explained to the Diet in the midst of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894: “From the close proximity of Korea to our shores, it follows that her tranquility or disorder, her prosperity or decline, have most important bearings upon this country’s welfare.”⁴⁹ The Japanese government went one step further in 1903, asserting its paramount interests in Korea because of its geographic propinquity to the peninsula:

Korea is an important outpost of Japan’s line of defense and Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other powers. Those interests and influence Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Nitobe, “Japanese Colonization,” *The Asiatic Review* 16, no. 45 (1920): 117.

⁴⁸ Pittau, “Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895,” 273; Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 64

⁴⁹ Quoted in S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 328; and in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 593.

For this reason, Japanese leaders decided that it was in Japan's national interest to act proactively to prevent the western colonization of Korea by extricating the peninsula from the grasp of China and placing it firmly under that of Japan. Searching for a promising avenue for securing inroads into the peninsula, Japan looked to railways.

Engines of Empire: Railways and "Enlightened Exploitation"

As the Meiji government reacted to perceived threats of Western imperialist encroachment, their first response was not outward, but inward. In either direction, the Japanese government attempted to establish central power in peripheral regions through programs designed to develop new territories. Seeing a need to defend Japanese sovereign national territory from Western imperialism, the Japanese government found it necessary first to demarcate national borders. After all, a government cannot protect its borders if it does not know where they are. But it was not enough to merely delineate national boundaries. "Once the borders were defined," Marius B. Jansen succinctly stated, "the problem was to become master within them."⁵¹ For this reason, the Japanese government initiated programs of "domestic colonization" to establish hegemony within its territory and consolidate the far reaches of the nation. This entailed the cultivation of undeveloped lands and the construction of myriad modern facilities, such as railways, telecommunications, schools, banks, and post offices. For Japanese leaders seeking to

⁵¹ Marius B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan," in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 171.

cordon off zones of Japanese domain from Western colonialism, it was this exploitation of land that lay at the root of claims of territorial ownership.

The case of Hokkaidō is illustrative as an example of a new land forcefully and unevenly integrated into the Meiji state in response to fears of Western expansion. Historically a borderland between mainland Japan and indigenous Ainu inhabitants, the island known as Ezochi had been only loosely tied to the Japanese Tokugawa polity prior to 1868. Yet, after the Meiji Restoration, the new Meiji Government fulfilled earlier Tokugawa attempts to incorporate the island into the Japanese sphere by quickly asserting ownership over the island and renaming it “Hokkaidō” in 1869.⁵² As the famous scholar of Japanese colonialism and one time Under-Secretary of the League of Nations, Nitobe Inazō, wrote in 1920, “the colonization of the long-neglected island of Hokkaidō” arose from the “necessity of protecting our northern frontiers” from “the Muscovite Power,” who, “like a huge avalanche, was steadily descending southwards from its Siberian steppes, crushing everything on its way.”⁵³ On one hand, integrating the new territory required conceptually redefining what “Japan” was, both in terms of geography and identity, as David Howell has argued. Like the inhabitants of the Ryūkyū Islands to the south, the indigenous peoples of Ezochi to the north, Howell argues, underwent acculturation into Japanese imperial subjects through “ethnic negation” as their native identities were stripped away while their homelands were integrated into the

⁵² As Brett Walker describes, the Tokugawa had reacted to Russian intrusion by dispatching cartographers in the early 1800s to survey and define Japan’s coastline and surrounding territories in an attempt to “guard its national sovereignty and to anticipate empire” – particularly in the north (Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō and Japanese Exploration” 312).

⁵³ Nitobe, “Japanese Colonization,” 114.

Japanese empire as the prefectures of Okinawa and Hokkaidō.⁵⁴ On the other hand, integration of these new lands also required more tangible efforts of cultivation and development. For this reason, the Meiji government established the Colonial Department (*Kaitakushi*) in Hokkaidō to administer the settlement and exploitation of the island. Under Commissioner Admiral Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Colonial Department undertook wide-scale projects across the island to promote industry, mining, fishing, and education, in addition to encouraging the settlement of emigrant Japanese farmers to spread modern agriculture to Hokkaidō. Railways also played an important role in the exploitation of the newly acquired territory. In addition to the construction of the Horonai Railway to ship coal for industry, the government passed the Hokkaidō Railway Construction Act in 1896 authorizing a public loan to finance government construction of 6 additional lines encircling the island.⁵⁵

Hokkaidō provided an instructive example for Japanese strategists who saw Korea as an undeveloped territory to be cultivated as a defensive buffer to Western expansion. It was Japanese fears of Western intrusion into the Korean peninsula that propelled attempts to bolster Japan's "line of interest" by garnering international recognition of Korean independence as early as 1872. Borrowing a tactic deemed legal by Western

⁵⁴ David L. Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

⁵⁵ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020223800, "Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Nijūkyū-nen. Hōritsu Dai Kyūjūsan-gō. Hokkaidō Tetsudō Fusetsuhō" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1896, law #93, Hokkaido railway construction law]. For more on the relationship between Japan and Ezō and the Ryūkyūs, see Brett L. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Howell, *Geographies of Identity*; Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance, and the Ainu of Japan* (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Gregory Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

imperializers, Japan initiated its own “gunboat diplomacy” towards Korea when it sent a warship and two infantry platoons to “open” Korea in 1872.⁵⁶ Japan broke through two years later when the Japanese gunboat *Un'yō* manufactured an incident by traveling close enough to the Korean shore to draw fire from a coastal defense battery on Kanghwa Island.⁵⁷ Reinforcing the link between Hokkaidō and Korea as buffer zones in the eyes of Japanese strategists, the Meiji government sent Inoue Kaoru to negotiate a treaty with the Korean court, escorted by Hokkaidō Colonial Department Commissioner Admiral Kuroda, numerous officials from the Colonial Department, three gunboats, and 800 marines.⁵⁸ After several weeks of tense negotiations, the so-called “Treaty of Peace” – more commonly known as the Kanghwa Treaty – was signed on February 26, 1876. As Alexis Dudden describes, throughout the negotiations, the Japanese side were intent on basing the treaty in “international terms,” namely as an agreement between two equally independent and sovereign nations. This was significant because Korea at this time maintained a position whereby it was neither entirely independent, nor was it entirely a vassal state of the Qing empire of China. Article 1 of the treaty, however, stipulated: “Chosen [*sic*] being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan.”⁵⁹ As Dudden points out, Japan had an ulterior motive in urging Korea to declare itself an “independent” and “sovereign” nation. “Defined by Japan,” Dudden notes: “Korea’s

⁵⁶ Oh, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry in Korea, 1876-1885,” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 39.

⁵⁷ Oh, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry in Korea,” 42; and Alexis Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 51.

⁵⁸ Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, 52-54.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, 54.

independence allowed Japan to establish a colonial outpost in Korea, a privilege independent Japan could contract only with independent Korea.”⁶⁰ Reminiscent of the “unequal treaties” that had been thrust upon Japan by the Western imperializers prior to the Meiji Restoration, the Kanghwa Treaty allowed Japan access to two “treaty ports” in Korea – Inch’ŏn and Mokpo – and even granted Japanese soldiers and businessmen extraterritoriality in Korea. As will be discussed later in more detail, Korea’s “independence,” as established at Kanghwa Island, would be a major factor in Japanese actions towards the peninsula over the next several decades.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, 55.

⁶¹ Some scholars have characterized these examples of Japanese gunboat diplomacy merely as “mimesis” of Western imperialism parallel to the “mimesis of civilization” then at work in the formation of a modern Japanese identity. As Robert Eskildsen argues, “Mimesis of Western imperialism, in other words, went hand in hand with mimesis of Western civilization.” See: Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (2002): 389. Marius B. Jansen has similarly argued that “Japan’s drive for colonial control was an entirely reasonable approach to security” and that “Meiji Japan had every reason to pursue an imperialist path” considering the Social Darwinian struggle over essential resources and markets that characterized the New Imperialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But for Jansen, there was another reason that Japan would mimic western imperialism: “National policies premised on the necessity of emulating the countries that were Japan’s problem could not have been expected to overlook the expansive drive that was such a prominent feature of all modernizing states in the last decades of the nineteenth century.” As Jansen observed, “Japanese imperialism was readily explicable as the response to international examples by a generation that was modeling its behavior and polity on those of the world’s leading countries...” See: Marius B. Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75-76. Yet there is a difference between borrowing and deploying Western models in order to achieve specific Japanese goals, and copying them merely for the sake of copying. Such an interpretation downplays the fear the Meiji leaders felt when they surveyed the prevailing international situation, and furthermore impugns their ability to read and respond to the existing international order. Japanese leaders undoubtedly desired to demonstrate their modernity vis-à-vis the West by participating in the Western practice of imperialism, but they also had more practical benefits in mind as well – military, diplomatic, and economic. All of this is not to say,

With Korea “opened” to the outside world, Japanese agents searching for an avenue to insinuate Japanese influence further into peninsular affairs followed two tracks. Some influential Japanese figures such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Inoue Kaoru, for example, eagerly counseled Korean progressives and aided Korean efforts to modernize from within. Korean reformers in the “Enlightenment Party” (*Kaehwadang*), including Ŏ Yun-jung, Hong Yŏng-sik, Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, Sŏ Kwangbŏm, and Sŏ Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn), in turn, initially viewed Meiji Japan as an exemplar of successful Asian modernization in response to Western pressure.⁶² Other Japanese took a more direct approach, penetrating Korea diplomatically and commercially in order to cast Japanese imperial influence over the peninsula. Japanese settlers emigrated to Korea in large number from the 1880s, promoting Japanese commercial interests and links to the continent. In this way, Japan played an awkward

however, that early attempts to “open” Korea reveal long-held designs of formal colonization. On the other hand, that does not mean that Japan had no intention of forcefully extending its political and economic influence into these areas in the name of self-defense, either. Rather, what these actions indicate is that Meiji leaders felt compelled to react to what they saw as a precarious international political situation in East Asia.

⁶² Sent to Japan in 1881 by the Korean King Kojong as part of an observation mission, Ŏ Yun-jung and Hong Yŏng-sik became convinced that Korea should follow the blueprint of Japanese modernization. Reforms proposed by Ŏ in particular, inspired the efforts of the pro-Japanese “Enlightenment Party.” Strongly encouraged by Fukuzawa, this group initiated the bloody and failed Kapsin Coup in 1884 with the armed assistance of the Japanese legation in an attempt, Yŏng-ho Ch’oe writes, to “emulate the Meiji restoration and subsequent reforms in Japan.” See: Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, “The Kapsin Coup of 1884: A Reassessment,” *Korean Studies* 6 (1982): 105; and Donghyun Huh, “The Korean Courtiers’ Observation Mission’s Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern State Building,” *Korean Studies* 29 (2005): 40. For Fukuzawa’s role in inspiring the Korean reformers, especially Kim Ok-kyun, see: In K. Hwang, *The Korean Reform Movement of the 1880s: A Study of Transition in Intra-Asian Relations* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1978), and Harold F. Cook, *Korea’s 1884 Incident: Its Background and Kim Ok-kyun’s Elusive Dream* (Seoul: Seoul Royal Asiatic Society), 1972.

“double role” towards Korea, “being both a ‘sponsor of progress and independence’ and simultaneously an imperialist aggressor,” as Donghyun Huh has aptly noted.⁶³

Another track for extending Japanese influence into Korea lay along the railway line. As Daniel Headrick describes in a series of deftly titled works, the steamships of gunboat diplomacy were only one of several “tools of empire” that allowed technologically advanced Western countries to spread their “tendrils of progress” into overseas territories in order to attain “power over people.”⁶⁴ As Headrick argues, these tools made “imperialism possible where it was otherwise unlikely, or by making it suitably cost-effective in the eyes of budget-minded governments.”⁶⁵ In addition to steamships, it was medicine, rapid-firing rifles, telegraphs, and railways that allowed European countries to carve “spheres of influence” out of overseas territories and link these areas to the world market. But, as the “main engine of imperialism,” it was the locomotive that was the most powerful “tool of empire.”⁶⁶ Ronald E. Robinson succinctly describes the role of railways in the spread of the New Imperialism of the late 19th century, writing: “Industrialized Europe cast its imperial influence over much of a

⁶³ Huh, “The Korean Courtiers’ Observation Mission’s Views,” 35.

⁶⁴ See Daniel Headrick, “The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of Modern History* 51, no. 2 (1979): 231-263; Daniel Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and the European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Daniel Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Daniel Headrick, *Power Over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁶⁵ Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*, 12.

⁶⁶ Ronald E. Robinson, “Introduction: Railway Imperialism,” in *Railway Imperialism*, ed. Clarence B. Davis and Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 3.

still agrarian world in the half century before 1914 by building railways in other people's countries."⁶⁷ By laying railways in developing countries, the "conquistadors of steam" were able to spread their informal empires into by increasing control of foreign territory and indebting foreign governments.⁶⁸ As Robinson argues, "steel rails had a capacity for transforming the societies through which they ran and for spreading imperial influence in their domestic affairs."⁶⁹ George Lynch put it best on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War: "The path of Empire is along the railway track."⁷⁰

In Korea, Japanese leaders saw lines of steel as a means to solidify Japanese control over the peninsula. In a paper on Korean policy at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Army Minister Yamagata Aritomo urged Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi to pursue railways in Korea at all costs out of military necessity. "The need with the most pressing urgency at this time is the laying of railways in Korea," Yamagata intoned. "Not only will the success of railways in Korea greatly affect the future sovereignty of our country, it is an extraordinary inspiration for the outcome of the coming war. I cannot express enough how important it is for construction to begin immediately."⁷¹

Even after the immediate military need for railways to expedite troop movements passed

⁶⁷ Robinson, "Introduction: Railway Imperialism," 1.

⁶⁸ "Conquistadors of steam" from Nicholas Faith, *The World the Railways Made* (New York: Carroll and Graff, 1990), 145.

⁶⁹ Robinson, "Introduction: Railway Imperialism," 3.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Neilson and Otte, "Railpolitik: An Introduction," 7.

⁷¹ Tokutomi Ichirō, *Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den* [Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo](Tokyo: Yamagata Aritomo Kō Kinen Jigyōkai, 1933), 150-151; Quoted in Jae Jong Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai to Kankoku Tetsudō, 1892-1945* [Imperial Japanese colonial administration and Korean railways, 1892-1945](Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), 72.

after Japanese victory in the war, Japanese strategists continued to see railways a means for controlling Korea. “If the Keigi (Seoul-Sinūiju) Line is constructed by Japanese hands and is connected to the Keifu Line,” Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō pleaded to Prime Minister Katsura Tarō in a 1902 proposal adopted by the Cabinet for special budget allocations to fund various projects in Korea and China, “then a railway running straight through Korea will be entirely in the hands of our empire, placing all of Korea completely within the sphere of our power and influence (*waga seiryoku han’i*).”⁷²

More importantly, railways were seen as a way to solidify Japanese claims to ownership of Korean territory. As Maejima Hisoka observed in the journal *Taiyō* in 1896, Japanese construction of railways meant not only secured lines of logistics and shipping in Korea, but permanent ownership of physical territory on the peninsula:

...However the wielders of power [in Korea] may change, they can never violate the property of a private individual, and were the sovereignty of Korea itself to pass into the possession of another country the property of a Japanese national could in no way be violated...indeed, if there came a day when Korea was divided by the great powers, the existence of a railway belonging to us would be good reason for the maintenance of our rights in any distribution of territory.⁷³

Likewise, the *Tōkyō Keizai Shinpō* imagined the diplomatic benefits of a Seoul-Pusan railway: “from the diplomatic point of view, possession of this railway will act as a basis which must surely guarantee our strength in any future negotiations on the continent.”⁷⁴

⁷² See “Shin-Kan Jigyō Kei’eihi Yōkyū Seigi” [Detailed exposition of requests for funding for the management of projects in China and Korea] in Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho*, 1:206-207; Alternate translation in Nakano Akira, “Railway Network was Key to Japanese Army’s Control of Korea,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, Sept. 28, 2007.

⁷³ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 580.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 588.

Finally, lamenting Japan's weakened position in Korea following the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese politician Ozaki Saburō argued that Japan needed railways in Korea to solidify its position on the peninsula. "Without this Seoul-Pusan railway," Ozaki wrote in the *Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi* in September 1896, "Japanese interests will not be upheld, and there will be a decline of our position in the East."⁷⁵

As these statements indicate, Japanese colonial leaders began to conflate cultivation and development of land with rights of ownership. That is to say, in the mind of Japanese leaders, improvement of the existing terrain or environment entitled the cultivator to the rights and privileges of control. Alexis Dudden has described this thought-process as "enlightened exploitation," and has noted that it characterized much of Western imperialist ideology. As Dudden writes: "So-called civilized governments predicated their claims to legitimacy on conquering and ruling so-called barbaric ones...A regime was civilized only if it could claim to ability to transform an uncivilized people."⁷⁶ Robert Eskildsen points out that a similar idea had informed Japanese plans to colonize eastern Taiwan following the 1874 punitive expedition. In the case of Taiwan, Eskildsen argues, "the Japanese government's rationale for intervening in Taiwan rested on the colonialist logic that for any government – Chinese, Japanese, or Western – to claim sovereignty over eastern Taiwan, that government must bring civilization to the savages."⁷⁷ In the minds of Japanese diplomats and business, ownership and operation of railways in these areas would not only facilitate Japanese economic advancement, it

⁷⁵ Quoted in Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy," 582.

⁷⁶ Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 9.

⁷⁷ Eskildsen, "Of Civilization and Savages," 398.

would also validate Japanese territorial claims. That is to say, Japanese leaders believed that “enlightened exploitation” of the natural environment entitled the cultivator to ownership of territory and justified claims to cultural superiority.

For Japanese actors in Korea, bringing “civilization” meant improvement, first of the transportation network, and later, of the urban built environment. As the next chapter will argue, this idea led Japan to conduct urban improvement projects in Seoul following annexation. For now, Japan would start with railways. Japanese proponents of railway control in Korea frequently trumpeted their actions as altruistic attempts to advance civilization and enlightenment in a land that was, in the words of an 1899 *Taiyō* editorial, a “half-civilized, barbaric land.”⁷⁸ As Ozaki Saburō put it in 1896, “out of sheer kindness” Japan was “trying to improve the country, it was but a solicitude that we should put Korea on the road to becoming a civilized country.”⁷⁹ In 1899, the *Tōyō Keizai Shinpō* likewise admonished Japanese investors to support the fledgling Seoul-Pusan Railway by arguing that it was Japan’s duty to assist Korean advancement:

By and large, when people look at Korea, they think of it as an infirm and weak country whose sources of wealth have already all been exploited, but in fact it is rich in minerals and cereals and other natural resources...The only reason whereby Korean industry is today not greatly flourishing is largely that the Korean people are weak and lazy, and lacking the spirit of enterprise; also transport facilities are inefficient...Therefore, if we do something like build a railway, opening up for them the means of traffic and transport, and continue to encourage vigorous immigration from here, then Korean industry must surely immediately start to flourish.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 587.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 582.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 585-586.

This view of railways as bringing civilization to Korea was reinforced by a secret railway survey conducted by Japanese engineers in 1892. Travelling through the Korean countryside under the cover story that they were collecting rare bird samples for an American museum, Japanese railway engineers surveyed topographical conditions and charted potential rail routes through the mountainous peninsula with “imperial eyes,” as they envisioned future Japanese construction and control of the lines.⁸¹ The report issued two months later by railway engineer Kōno Tenzui accentuated the need for reliable transportation infrastructure in Korea. “There is probably no traveler to the interior of Chōsen,” Kōno proclaimed, “who is not first of all astonished by the danger of the roads, the flooding of the rivers, the scarcity of bridges, and the tardiness of stagecoaches. There are so many kinds of inconveniences of travel in the Korean interior, that there is not enough time to enumerate them all.”⁸² This report laid the foundation for railways planning for years to come. Four years later in 1896, Consul Murota Yoshiaya in Pusan forwarded Kōno’s report to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and urged him to push for the construction of a railway. While conditions in the interior displayed a need for

⁸¹ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkaikai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudōshi*, vol. 1, 28; Cover story of bird specimen collecting is found in Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 138. “Imperial Eyes” is a term coined in Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 9-15, quoted in Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island,” 298.

⁸² Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkaikai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudōshi*, vol. 1, 28. For quote, see: Gaimushō, ed. *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, vol. 29 (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai, 1954), Doc.#: 325, Murota-Mutsu, May 26, 1896, 629. Originals of Kōno’s report, complete with route survey maps, can be found in JACAR, Ref.#: B04010886900, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō senro hogo no tame junsu jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the Seoul-Pusan railway line], images 5-33.

infrastructural development, Murota wrote, the topography along the route was also favorable for a railway. “According to what [Kōno] said,” Murota relayed, “the middle road between Keijō and Pusan – namely, passing through Keishō (*Gyōngsang*), Zenra (*Jōlla*), and Chūsei (*Chungchōng*) provinces before reaching Keiki (*Gyōnggi*) province – has many flat areas, and is most appropriate ground for laying a railway.”⁸³

Inspired by concerns for national security and dreams of commercial profit, Japan trained its gaze on the Korean peninsula as an underdeveloped territory waiting to be opened and exploited. Railways provided a handy tool for nailing down Japan’s claims to influence and territorial rights in Korea. Observing Western imperialism in Africa and Asia, moreover, Japanese strategists knew they had to act quickly to secure railways in Korea before the other Western powers were able to carve out spheres of influence on the peninsula. As Maejima argued: “We now have a chance of spreading our limbs a bit, but if we take no notice and let it pass, it will immediately pass into the hand of some other country, and this opportunity, once gone, will be lost forever.”⁸⁴ Therefore, when internal rebellion in Korea provided cause for sending troops to the peninsula, Japanese agents on the ground seized the opportunity to insert Japanese influence into Korean affairs. When diplomatic attempts to secure concessions failed, Japanese officials turned to conspiracy and insurrection to attain railway rights.

⁸³ *NGB*, vol. 29, Doc.#: 325, Murota-Mutsu, May 26, 1896, 628. Original in JACAR, Ref.#: B04010886900, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken,” image 3.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 580.

Engineers of Empire: “Men on the Spot” and Diplomatic Efforts for Railway Rights

If there was a consistent logic informing Japan’s stance towards Korea in the late 19th century, it was that earlier articulated by Yamagata Aritomo: an underdeveloped Korea would invite the intervention of foreign powers. In the eyes of Japanese observers of the peninsula, Korea’s problems were primarily attributable to the lack of “modernization” in the “backwards” country. In the political calculus of Japanese strategists, then, internal reforms were necessary to ensure that Korea would grow strong enough to stave off the encroachment of Western imperializers – and by extension, to defend Japan’s “line of interest.” The problem, as they saw it, was that the Yi court, influenced by the pro-China Min family, was disinclined to reform, lest it weaken the political authority of the dynasty. But for Japanese strategists, the Korean peninsula was such a security issue to Japan that they had no hesitation in adopting the paradoxical position of directly intervening in Korean affairs to prevent foreign interference in Korean affairs. When presented an opportunity, Japanese diplomatic “men on the spot” in Korea took aggressive action to remove Chinese influence, induce the Korean court to reform, and secure Japanese rights to construct railways all at once.

The spark that led to more direct Japanese intervention in Korean affairs was the Tonghak Rebellion, an uprising of disgruntled peasants that broke out in the southwestern Korean province of Chölla in the spring of 1894.⁸⁵ The defeat of Korean government

⁸⁵ Led by the disgruntled official Chön Pong-jun, armed peasants rallied under the banner of the “Eastern Learning” (*Tonghak*) religion to oust the local governor in the name of eliminating government corruption. Some Korean “People’s” (*minjung*) historians have interpreted the Tonghak uprising as a revolutionary peasant movement to install a radically democratic and egalitarian government. This populist *minjung* interpretation of the Tonghak Rebellion is analyzed in Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

troops sent to quell the uprising led to fears that the rebellion would spread to Seoul and threaten the very existence of the Yi Dynasty. Although the rebels had already agreed to a cease-fire at the end of May to prevent foreign action, the Chinese minister to Korea, Yuan Shikai, and other pro-Chinese Min advisors prevailed on King Kojong to request the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea.⁸⁶ By urging King Kojong to request Chinese assistance in suppressing the rebellion, the Min faction inadvertently provided Japan exactly the opportunity it had been waiting for to expel China from the peninsula and more forcefully press for reforms within the Korean government. Following the disastrous 1884 Kapsin Coup in Seoul, China and Japan had signed the 1885 Treaty of Tianjin, which stipulated that both countries would withdraw troops from Korea and would provide prior notification if troops were to be sent to Korea in the future. Under this clause, when China dispatched 2,000 troops to Korea in early June at the request of King Kojong, Japan responded by sending 5,000-8,000 by the end of the month.⁸⁷

2007), 55-59. Other Korean scholars have seen different motivations behind the uprising. Young-Ick Lew, for example, has argued that rebellion was designed by the fundamentally conservative Chŏn and the Taewŏn'gun in an attempt "to restore the Taewŏn'gun to power at the expense of the Min faction regime," in Lew, "The Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising: A Reappraisal with Emphasis on Chon Pong-jun's Background and Motivation," *Journal of Korean Studies* 7 (1990): 153. Either way, most Korean scholars are in agreement that the movement quickly took on anti-imperialist and anti-foreign overtones. This has led scholars such as Chong-sik Lee to identify in the Tonghak uprisings the "seeds" of Korean nationalism in Chong-sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 22. Another point of agreement amongst scholars is that the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894 set the stage for the Sino-Japanese War.

⁸⁶ Rumors circulated at the time that the Taewŏn'gun was conspiring with the Tonghak rebels to oust the Min and return him to power. It may have been for this reason that the Min faction sought to rely on their Chinese benefactors for protection. See: Lew, "The Conservative Character of 1894," 161-165.

⁸⁷ Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 117.

As the usual story goes, the presence of troops from both China and Japan created a militarily volatile situation that soon led to war. Hostilities broke out off the southwestern Korean coast on July 25th, 1894, when the British warship the *S.S. Kowshing* – on loan to the Chinese government to ferry troops to Korea – was sunk by the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa* under the command of Tōgō Heihachirō, who later gained fame for routing the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Straits during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.⁸⁸ A formal declaration of war followed a week later on August 1st, which laid out the official Japanese cause for war:

Korea is an independent State. She was first introduced into the family of nations by the advice and under the influence of Japan. It has, however, been China's habit to designate Korea as her dependency, and both openly and secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs.⁸⁹

A closer look at events, however, reveals that the Sino-Japanese War was sparked by Japanese diplomats in Seoul, who used the presence of Japanese troops on the ground during the summer of 1894 as an opportunity to compel the Korean government to enact a number of reforms, including the granting of railway rights to Japan. For consulate officials Sugimura Fukashi and Uchida Sadatsuchi, namely, the presence of Japanese

⁸⁸ The sinking of the *S.S. Kowshing* was controversial for several reasons. Not only was the ship owned by a British company, the Indo-China Steamship Company, its sinking occurred before a formal declaration of war. Moreover, although the Japanese sailors were careful to rescue the majority of the 75 British crewmen after the ship went down, Japanese gunboats ensured that over 900 of the 1,100 Chinese soldiers onboard never made it to shore. As Douglas Howland points out, the sinking of the *S.S. Kowshing* led to a protracted legal battle, with the final judgment that the Chinese government was liable for British losses, and was required to repay the British owners of the ship. See: Douglas Howland, "The Sinking of the *S.S. Kowshing*: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese War," *Modern Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (2008): 673-703; and Douglas Howland, "Japan's Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)," *Journal of the History of International Law* 9 (2007): 179-201.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 135.

troops in Seoul seemed the perfect opportunity for Japan to attain a free hand in Korea, eradicate Chinese influence from the Korean court, and create room for the installation of a pro-Japanese government open to reform, in one fell swoop – even at the cost of war with China. On May 22, 1894, Sugimura sent notice of the Tonghak uprisings to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and first suggested that Japan should match any Chinese dispatch of troops in the name of protecting diplomats and residents and keeping the military balance between Japan and China.⁹⁰ Writing that “It would hard to plan any change in the future conditions of Korea in the event China does dispatch troops,” Sugimura recommended that a decision should be made in advance as to whether “we should also, for the time being, dispatch troops in the name of protecting our embassy until the riots are put down and Chinese troops withdrawn” or not.⁹¹ Word came on June 1st that the Korean government would indeed request the assistance of Chinese troops and then on the 4th that China would send 1,500 troops to Korea. “By all means,” Sugimura pleaded, “should we not also immediately dispatch Japanese troops?”⁹² In response, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu recommended that the Cabinet be prepared to match any Chinese dispatch of troops to Korea. Army Minister Yamagata added that a General

⁹⁰ *NGB*, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 497, Sugimura-Mutsu, May 22, 1894, 152-153. Also in Kim Chŏng-myong, ed., *Nikkan Gaikō Shiryō Shūsei* [Collection of documents of Japanese-Korean foreign diplomacy], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1967), 3-4.

⁹¹ *NGB*, vol. 27.2, Doc.#497, Sugimura-Mutsu, May 22, 1894, 152-153.

⁹² Sugimura wrote on June 1st that Chinese Ambassador Yuan Shih-kai had informed him that the Korean government requested troops. Referring to his suggestion to match troop movements, Sugimura advised that Foreign Minister refer back to his message from the 22nd (See *NGB*, 27.2, Doc.#: 500, Sugimura-Mutsu, June 1, 1894, 155; also in *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 3, 6). For message on June 4, see *NGB*, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 504, Sugimura-Mutsu, June 4, 1894, 158; also in *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 6, 9.

Headquarters (*Daihon'ei*) should be established to command troop movements.⁹³ The Japanese cabinet agreed, deciding on the 2nd to go ahead with preparations to send troops to protect the Japanese consulate and Japanese residents in Seoul.⁹⁴

As more and more Japanese troops arrived in Korea from the middle of June, Sugimura joined with other legation officials, including Uchida, Matsui Keishirō and Honno Ichirō, to implore Ambassador Ōtori Keisuke to take a stronger stance towards the Korean court. Writing in his own memoirs of the situation, entitled *Record of My Hardships in Korea in 1894-1895 (Meiji Nijūnana hachi-nen Zai-kan Kushin Roku)*, Sugimura severely criticized Ōtori's reluctance to capitalize on the favorable situation. "At that time," he recalled, "I secretly thought: 'Our government must have some ulterior motive for dispatching such a large number of troops. If that's the case, the Ambassador should also pursue that course of action without fail. So unconditionally refusing to allow our troops to land, using the excuse of the current conditions in Korea, is impermissible'."⁹⁵ Going over Ōtori's head, Sugimura wrote directly to Foreign Minister Mutsu on June 13th while in Inch'ōn away from the supervision of his boss. Japan should

⁹³ Conroy, *The Japanese Penetration of Korea*, 240-241.

⁹⁴ JACAR, Ref.#: A03023061500, "*Chōsenkoku nairan ni kan-shi heiin haken ni kansuru hōshin no ken*" [Policy regarding the dispatch of troops in response to the rebellion in Korea], 3-5.

⁹⁵ KDL: Sugimura Fukashi, *Meiji Nijūnana hachi-nen Zai-kan Kushin Roku Zai-kan Kushin Roku* [Record of my hardships in Korea in 1894-1895](Tokyo: Sugimura Yōtarō, 1932), 10-11. Conroy offers a slightly different translation in Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, 243-244. Also, Conroy writes that Sugimura "presumed, though he was not told," that the large number of troops dispatched by the Japanese cabinet "meant that the Japanese government had decided on a big action to 'sweep out Yuan, the Min clan, and the Chinese' from their dominant position in Korea," (Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, 246). In fact, rather than being merely Sugimura's supposition of the Japanese government's intentions, ousting Yuan and the Min at the same time was exactly what he had proposed to Foreign Minister Mutsu on June 13th.

capitalize on the current opportunity, the old Korea hand Sugimura urged, to expand Japanese influence (*sei'i*) in Korea while reducing that of China: first, Japan should refuse to withdraw its troops, and should instead force China to remove theirs; secondly, Japan should instigate internal reforms in Korea, drive away (*shirizoke*) the Min faction, and set up rivals of the Min or neutral individuals in the government. This had already started, Sugimura noted, with the recent troubles seen by Min Yong-jun and the reappearance at court of the Taewŏn'gun. Making these changes, he predicted, "would be to the future benefit of Korea, and consequently to the benefit of Japan." Finally, Sugimura added that stationing Japanese troops in the capital until reforms were completed was "80 or 90%" of achieving this final goal.⁹⁶ Sugimura was joined by other officials in the Japanese embassy in Seoul in his efforts to push Ōtori to take more severe action. As Sugimura relates, on the morning of June 17th, legation officials Matsui Keishirō and Honno Ichirō visited Ōtori to urge him to "abrogate the agreement with China to simultaneously withdraw troops," and to "settle the issue of Korean independence even if it means war with China."⁹⁷

Certainly the strongest advocate of capitalizing on the current situation was legation official Uchida Sadatsuchi, who went so far as to propose making Korea a "protectorate" of the Japanese empire. Writing in a lengthy memorial to Mutsu at the end of June, Uchida expanded on Sugimura's earlier arguments. While sending troops to protect the consulate and Japanese residents was an appropriate action, Uchida emphasized, "I believe we should without fail use the dispatch of this large number of

⁹⁶ Sugimura, *Zai-Kan Kushin Roku*, 12-13.

⁹⁷ Sugimura, *Zai-Kan Kushin Roku*, 14-15.

troops to achieve a goal of even higher benefit.” “What I mean by that,” he bluntly clarified, “is nothing other than making Korea into a protectorate nation of the Japanese Empire (*waga Nihon Teikoku no hogokoku*).” Uchida went on to assert that even though Japan had secured the independence of Korea and garnered international recognition of Korean independence, China still asserted suzerainty over the peninsula. The corrupt Min government, he added, welcomed Chinese protection and resisted reforms in order to stay in power. In language strongly echoing Yamagata Aritomo’s foreign policy statements from half a decade earlier, Uchida went on to note:

As far as I understand, the main idea of our political strategy of recognizing Korea as an independent nation over the years has, after all, been to prevent the intervention and invasion of another country (*takoku*) and to solidify Korea as a strong and enlightened nation in order to: 1) act as a defensive barrier (*hanpei*) for our country; and 2) to develop thriving trade with our country.

But instead of modernizing, Uchida bewailed, Korea had only regressed under the lasting Chinese suzerainty to the point where it threatened to not only “embarrass Japan’s national prestige,” but also to “tear down Japan’s defensive barrier (*hanpei*) and endanger the profits of Japanese merchants.” For that reason, Uchida asserted, Japan must move beyond the policy of merely recognizing Korean independence, and instead take actions to remove Chinese influence and then directly intervene to institute reforms. Various “fundamental great reforms” in the central administration and in the countryside were necessary, Uchida maintained, in order to preserve Korean independence by making the country wealthy and strong. The problem with all of this, he continued, was that the Koreans could not be relied on to succeed in carrying out the kind of reforms necessary. Another more promising option lay in the people affiliated with the King’s father, the Taewŏn’gun, but he was already over 70 years old, and there were questions about

whether or not he would be around to fulfill such revolutionary reforms that may take 10 or as many as 20 years to complete. Instead, it was Japan's responsibility, Uchida surmised, to support these reforms. "Doing these things and preserving Korea's honor as an undeniably independent Asian country in the face of China and the other great powers," Uchida exclaimed, "is the most honorable and safest policy for the Japanese empire." Uchida added emphatically: "Moreover, there is no better way to expand our imperial influence into the Korean peninsula."

Realizing the glaring contradiction of declaring Korean independence while working behind the scenes to intervene in Korean affairs to Japan's advantage, Uchida pointed out that it was important for Japanese actions in Korea to be sanctioned by treaty. Japan should therefore endeavor to sign a treaty with Korea to receive the protection of the Japanese empire and a special agreement for Japanese assistance in internal reforms. Conveniently, the presence of several thousand Japanese troops in Korea, Uchida noted, made the signing of such a treaty much easier. As an added benefit, such actions could disabuse the Chinese and Koreans of any misunderstandings about the strength of the Japanese military as a result of the ignominy they had suffered after backing down from Chinese troops in the Kapsin Coup of 1884. Finally, Uchida summarized his recommendations in his conclusion:

In summary, instead of losing this favorable opportunity of dispatching such a large number of troops to Korea, I think we should adopt a policy whereby: we advance beyond just protecting the consulate and Japanese nationals in Korea; we sign a treaty making Korea a protectorate of the Japanese Empire; and henceforth the Imperial government intervenes in Korean foreign and domestic affairs to institute reforms and direct Korea into a rich and wealthy region in order to 1) reinforce the defensive perimeter (*hanpei*) of the Empire, and 2) expand our imperial influence in

this country, while at the same time increasing the interests of Japanese merchants.⁹⁸

With such strong pressure from legation officials Sugimura and Uchida, the initially cautious Ōtori changed course to embrace aggressive action. At first, Ōtori had done what he could to prevent the crisis in Korea from escalating out of control. In addition to negotiating the mutual withdrawal of troops with Chinese Minister Yuan in an attempt to de-escalate the situation, Ōtori had exasperatedly questioned the need for the dispatch of more Japanese troops, and had deflected instructions from Mutsu to station the troops in Seoul. Finally giving in to the exhortations of both his superior and his subordinates, Ōtori laid before the Korean government a detailed 26-point internal reform program drawn up and approved by the Japanese cabinet calling for far-reaching reforms in court politics, government financing, taxes and currency, infrastructure, jurisprudence, the military, and education. The plan even delineated deadlines by which the above reforms must be carried out: as quickly as 10 days for some, 6 months, and finally 2 years for others. Notably, one of the reforms that must be announced within 10 days was the laying of railways between Seoul and important ports, and the construction of telegraphs

⁹⁸ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 379, Sugimura-Mutsu, June 26, 1894, 562-567. Peter Duus briefly discusses Uchida's petition in his work, *The Abacus and the Sword* (71-72). Duus rightly paraphrases Uchida's "bleak picture" of a politically corrupt Korean government, economically stagnant Korean countryside, and the need for reforms to revive the country. Yet this discussion falls in a section where Duus, albeit acknowledging that Japanese leaders thought reforms would "serve Japanese interest," argues that "the Japanese insistence on reform was too persistent, and in execution too politically inept" for reforms to be a "cynical cover for territorial and political aggression." Ultimately, Uchida was clearly not sorrowfully lamenting the poor state of the Korean countryside. Instead he was eagerly making a case for making Korea a Japanese protectorate, as Duus points out two pages later (74).

“so as to facilitate the means of communication.”⁹⁹ But entreaties for reform did not proceed well. First of all, the Korean government was hesitant to give Japan a free hand in railway and telegraph construction on the grounds that it could not allow a foreign country to undertake such work.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, as it soon became clear to Japanese leaders in Korea, two factors consistently inhibited Japanese attempts to gain influence: pro-Chinese factions within the Korean court, and the presence of conservative Chinese political advisers. As Ōtori complained to Mutsu on July 11th, reforms were unlikely because “[the] Korean Government really are not disposed for any reform, and because Chinese party is gaining greater power in Court.”¹⁰¹ With this Chinese influence over the Korean court, any hope for Japanese-led reforms was futile. Growing increasingly

⁹⁹ The entire reform plan is found in Kajima Morinosuke, *The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922*, vol. 1, *Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention* (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1976), 53-56. Some historians have seen these reform proposals as merely a pretext for Japan to inexorably infiltrate Korean politics by making the Korean government beholden to Japan for technical knowledge, financial assistance, and political advice. Mutsu himself provided fodder for such ideas when he revealed in his memoirs, *Kenkenroku*, “Naturally, I myself never saw any significance in the issue of Korea’s reform other than its being a matter of political necessity. Furthermore, I saw no need whatsoever to launch any crusade in the name of national chivalry.” See: Mutsu Munemitsu, *Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 29); also quoted in Duus, Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 70-71. Nevertheless, Peter Duus disagrees with those who might see reforms such as these merely as a “cynical cover for territorial and political aggression.” Instead, as he maintains, “the Japanese insistence on reform was too persistent, and in execution often too politically inept, to support this interpretation. Had the commitment to reform been cynical, the Japanese would have abandoned it early on,” (Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 71). No doubt, if the reforms were merely a pretext for political infiltration, then such a detailed program would be unnecessary. On the other hand, for saber-rattling legation officials in Korea such as Uchida Sadatsuchi, if not a “cynical cover,” then such reforms were at least a convenient vehicle for removing Chinese influence and justifying Japanese intervention towards a final destination of establishing Korea as a Japanese “protectorate.”

¹⁰⁰ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 397, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 10, 1894, 591.

¹⁰¹ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 400, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 11, 1894, 594.

frustrated, Ōtori and legation staff took drastic measures that would temporarily turn the table in their favor.

Bolstered by the presence of Japanese troops in Seoul and frustrated by Korean refusals, agents in the Japanese legation in Seoul conspired to incite a coup d'état in July 1894 designed to drive out the Min faction and install a Japanese-leaning, pro-reform government. Ōtori outlined his plans for a Japanese-led coup in "Classified Transmission #122," sent to Mutsu on July 10th, 1894.¹⁰² As Ōtori explained, the resistance to the reform program from certain conservatives in the Korean government made it an "urgent necessity" that Japan take "decisive measure[s]" in order to "compel them, directly or indirectly, to carry the reform into execution." Ōtori laid out two possible paths Japan could take for forcing the issue in case the Korean government refused Japan's recommendations for reform "either implicitly or explicitly." According to Part A, Japan would "threaten" the Korean court "with the force of arms," "under the plea" that the maladministration of Korea and the recurring disturbances and rebellions had "endangered the safety of our country" and Japan "cannot but urge Korea to undertake administrative reform" because of Japan's "close relationship with Korea, politically and in trade." "And the way by which we coerce the Korean Government," Ōtori clarified, "is to despatch our military guards to fortify the city gates of Seoul and protect the gates of the Royal Palace and to carry on relentless negotiations with the Korean Government until they consent to our recommendations."¹⁰³ Following Part B, meanwhile, Japan would demand the "termination of the relationship of a suzerain and a vassal" between

¹⁰² This message can be found in *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 398, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 10, 1894, 592-593; and in Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan*, vol. 1, 50-52.

¹⁰³ Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan*, vol. 1, 50-51.

Korea and China, and would claim, “on the ground of the most-favored nation clause,” all rights and privileges granted to Chinese nationals in Korea, including the right to lay telegraph lines. Until both demands were met, Ōtori added, “We should dispatch our soldiers to guard the gates of Seoul and the Royal Palace.”¹⁰⁴ Concluding, “if we do not resort to these exceptional measures there is little likelihood of our achieving satisfactory results,” Ōtori pointed out that both plans had drawbacks. Plan A, Ōtori said, “cannot be free from the criticism that it is a far too exceptional approach,” while Plan B “may appear to lack consistency because this measure is incompatible with the purposes of the reform.” Ōtori then stated his preference for Plan B, despite its glaring internal contradictions, because it was “less open to criticism.”¹⁰⁵

When the Korean government failed to meet a deadline arbitrarily imposed by Ōtori for responding to his reform demands, Ōtori took matters into his own hands. “There being no hope of our advice to be adopted,” Ōtori wrote to Mutsu on July 18th, “I am taking steps mentioned in part B of Classified Transmission #122 dated July 10, but I shall not besiege Royal Palace until your further instructions.”¹⁰⁶ In response, Mutsu, not wanting to make Japan appear to be the aggressor just days after he finalized a “revised treaty” with Great Britain, warned against taking “impolitic” violent action.¹⁰⁷ Ōtori,

¹⁰⁴ Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan*, vol. 1, 51.

¹⁰⁵ Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan*, vol. 1, 52.

¹⁰⁶ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 411, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 18, 1894, 604-605.

¹⁰⁷ Japan’s first “revised treaty” was signed with Great Britain on July 16th, 1894, and took effect 5 years later. Throughout negotiations and the ensuing war with China, Japanese diplomats were careful to avoid arousing the suspicions of the West. As Mutsu wrote in *Kenkenroku*, “At a time when the Western powers focused their attention on the measures we would implement on the peninsula, a single false step might well cause us to find ourselves surrounded by enemies,” (Mutsu, *Kenkenroku*, 30). As a result, it was

however, was undeterred. Japanese troops entered Seoul through the southern gate of the city around four in the morning on July 23, 1894 and took control of the Kyongbok Palace after limited resistance.¹⁰⁸ Ōtori explained the action to Mutsu, writing on the morning of the 23rd:

As the Korean Government gave very unsatisfactory answer to second demand mentioned in my telegram I have been compelled to resort to decisive means of besieging Royal Palace. I executed this measure early in the morning July 23 and Korean troops thereupon fired upon Japanese soldiers and some firing took place on both sides.¹⁰⁹

After taking control of the imperial palace, the conspirators set about installing a pro-Japanese government made up of progressive Koreans open to reform. In order to legitimize the new regime, the conspirators placed at the head of the new government Yi Huang, who was the regent and father of the reigning King Kojong and known by his court title “Taewŏn’gun,” or Grand Prince.¹¹⁰ This was truly a “marriage of

desirable to not appear as the aggressor in case any violence unfolded. “In the event a Sino-Japanese conflict occurred,” Mutsu continued, “we were determined to have the Chinese be the aggressors, while we ourselves assumed the position of the aggrieved party,” (Mutsu, *Kenkenroku*, 8). Also quoted in Louis G. Perez, *Japan Comes of Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1999), 157.

¹⁰⁸ For a more thorough and detailed discussion of this event see Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, 262-265.

¹⁰⁹ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 419, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 23, 1894, 617.

¹¹⁰ After being named regent to his adolescent son in 1864, the Taewŏn’gun had led a decade-long program of sweeping reforms in government organization, education, and taxes strategically balanced with traditional Confucian values, before being forced out of office by more traditional Confucian scholars and the rival Queen Min faction in 1873. This started a lasting competition between the Taewŏn’gun and the Min faction that led to his exile to China from 1882-1885, his house arrest upon returning to Korea in 1885, and two attempts on his life in 1892. Over the intervening years, the Taewŏn’gun strategically shifted alliances between the big three powers in Korea – China, Russia, and Japan – searching for a sponsor to assist his efforts to depose first Queen Min, and then his own son the King, in favor of his favorite grandson Yi Chun-yong. For more, see

convenience” for both sides.¹¹¹ By entertaining Japanese goals for reform, the Taewŏn’gun found in Japan a power eager to overthrow the sitting pro-Chinese government, effectively returning him to power and ousting the rival Min faction at the same time. By returning the Taewŏn’gun to office, meanwhile, the Japanese conspirators found a respected Korean court official who could champion Japanese reforms, lend their new progressive government a patina of legitimacy, and help Japan drive Russia and China out of the peninsula.¹¹² According to Young-ick Lew, the initially reluctant Taewŏn’gun’s decision to join the coup was “motivated both by his desire to eliminate his political enemies in the Min family and by his goal of carrying out gradual reforms in the government and cementing ties among China, Japan, and Korea.”¹¹³ With the

Ching Young Choe, *The Rule of the Taewŏn’gun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

¹¹¹ Young-ick Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics behind the Kabo-Ŭlmi Reform Movement, 1894 to 1896,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 3 (1981): 52.

¹¹² Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics,” 41-42.

¹¹³ Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics,” 79. When the conspirators beseeched him to participate in the coup, the Taewŏn’gun refused, adamantly declaring that foreigners had no right to interfere in Korean affairs. Only after extracting a written promise “in the name of your Emperor” from Legation Secretary Sugimura that Japan “will not demand a single piece of Korean territory,” did the Taewŏn’gun reluctantly agree to take part in the action (Quote from Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, 262). Soon after the coup, this “marriage of convenience” between Japan and the Taewŏn’gun quickly led to an inimical divorce as both sides realized they had rushed in a little too quickly. Less than a week after entering the palace, the Taewŏn’gun began revealing “his original nature as an obstinate conservative” by conspiring with Chinese forces, sponsoring anti-Japanese “righteous armies” (*ŭibyŏng*), and opposing Japanese reforms. See: Young-Ick Lew, “Minister Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts in Korea During the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895,” *Journal of Asiatic Studies* 7 (1984): 153. Quote from Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics,” 52. After being installed, the Taewŏn’gun – called “an old fox” by the next Japanese ambassador, Inoue Kaoru – solicited Japanese support to place his grandson to high-level positions (*NGB*, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 472, Inouye-Mutsu, October 29, 1894, 25). As Ōtori explained to Mutsu, the new reform government quickly “engaged in factious struggles” with “Taewŏn’gun and his grandson on one side and the

Taewŏn'gun on board for the time being, the new Deliberative Council (KRN: *Kun'guk kimuch'ŏ*; JPN: *Gunkoku Kimusho*) was established five days after the coup, Young-ick Lew argues, “as a vehicle to promote Japanese-oriented institutional reforms” and staffed with “the core of the pro-Japanese leadership” including Ō Yun-jung, Kim Ka-jin, Kim Hong-jip, Kim Yun-sik, and An Kyŏng-su.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, the Deliberative Council should not be seen merely as a puppet of the Japanese. Instead, Japanese diplomats left much of the planning of practical reforms to the Deliberative Council. As Lew noted, “the Korean reform movement was conducted mainly by Korean reform officials, with limited interference from Japanese authorities in Seoul.”¹¹⁵ Meeting daily for nearly a month, the Council passed over 200 sweeping reforms in governance, taxation, education, social policy, and the military.¹¹⁶ The dramatic and controversial reforms have subsequently been referred to as the Kabo Reforms from the name of the year in which they started.

pro-Japanese party on the other,” (*NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 448, Ōtori-Mutsu, September 18, 1894, 666). The Taewŏn'gun also encouraged Ōtori to send his grandson as an emissary (KRN: *Bobing Taesa*; JPN: *Hōden Taishi*) to Japan instead of Pak Jong-yang (*NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 451, Ōtori-Mutsu, September 29, 1894, 671). For their part, Japan refused to fulfill the Taewŏn'gun's desires to oust the King in order to enthrone his grandson. Ultimately, Japan forced the Taewŏn'gun to resign as a result of these irreconcilable differences.

¹¹⁴ Lew, “Minsiter Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts,” 149; and Young-Lew, “An Analysis of the Reform Documents of the Kabo Reform Movement, 1894,” *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 40 (1974): 34.

¹¹⁵ Lew, “An Analysis of the Reform Documents of the Kabo Reform Movement,” 30.

¹¹⁶ Kyung Moon Hwang, “Governmental Growth in the Taehan Empire Era: Origins of the Modern Korean State,” in *Reform and Modernity in the Taehan Empire*, ed. Kim Dong-no, John B. Duncan, and Kim Do-hyung (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006), 166-171.

With a favorable government in place, and the Min and the Chinese opponents no longer in the picture, Japan lost little time in achieving sought-after reforms. Rather than reprimand Ambassador Ōtori for his impetuous and potentially disastrous action upon learning of the events of the July 23rd coup in Seoul, Foreign Minister Mutsu encouraged the ambassador to not miss this golden opportunity to advance Japanese interests on the peninsula. “I am gratified of your success,” Mutsu wrote in a letter dated July 28, “Seize this opportunity to effect most radical reforms ~~for regarding~~ officials in Korean government in shortest time possible and give Taewŏn’gun every assistance in your powers and do your utmost to solidify this ascendancy so that it will last ~~at least one year~~ [sic].”¹¹⁷ Ōtori did not have to be told twice. He later enthused to Mutsu, “Japanese-Korean relations took a sudden turn with the incident on the 23rd of last month...it is of extreme importance that we not lose this opportunity to quickly conclude a temporary treaty between Japan and Korea and settle past and future relations.”¹¹⁸ Mutsu in turn beamed to the Japanese ambassador to Great Britain, Aoki Shūzō, after the coup: “Now our desired improvements after repeated refusal by China will be effected by the will of the King...Japanese government are no longer called upon to await concurrence of China.”¹¹⁹ This was a situation that Japan was willing to defend through war with China.

¹¹⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308500, “5 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 18-nichi kara Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 30-nichi” [July 18, 1894 to July 30, 1894], 20-21. This document is section 5 of JACAR, Ref.#: B03050307700, “Kankoku Naisei Kaikaku ni kansuru Kōshō Zakken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of miscellaneous documents relating to negotiations regarding internal reforms in Korea]. This message is also found in *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc #425, Mutsu-Ōtori, July 28, 1894, 632; and in edited form in Conroy, *Japanese Seizure of Korea*, 263-264.

¹¹⁸ *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109; and *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc. #: 428, Ōtori-Mutsu, August 1, 1894, 633-632.

¹¹⁹ JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308500, “5 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 18-nichi,” 25-26.

As Mutsu wrote to Ōtori on August 5th, after the declaration of war: “in order to firmly establish independence of Korea and to consolidate Taewŏn’gun government it would be necessary that Japan fight a decisive battle with China. For that purpose, it may happen that Japan send a large number of troops to Korea.”¹²⁰

Amidst the confusion of the Sino-Japanese War and the flurry of reforms promulgated by the Deliberative Council, Japanese diplomats methodically negotiated treaties with the new Korean government. At the top of the list were concessions for railways and telegraphs. After being instructed by Mutsu on July 10th to “endeavor to secure all possible material advantages such as railways, telegraphs, etc.,” Ōtori moved quickly to sign a favorable secret agreement concerning exactly these “material advantages.”¹²¹ The resulting agreement was called the Japan-Korea Temporary Joint Provision (*Nikkan Zantei Gōdō Jōkan*) and was signed by Ōtori and Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yun-shik on August 20, 1894, less than a month after the coup. The first article maintained the pretense of reform, stating: “The Japanese government desires internal reforms of the Korean government. The Korean government, in turn, aware of the urgency [of such reforms], guarantees that it will strictly enforce the recommendations of the Japanese government.” But the primary objective of the Provision was clear; the second article left no questions: “Concerning one of the internal reforms – the construction of a railways between Seoul-Pusan, and Seoul- Inch’ŏn – because the finances of the Korean government are as yet inadequate, a deal shall be made with either the Japanese government or a Japanese company to start construction at

¹²⁰ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 432, Mutsu-Ōtori, August 5, 1894, 639.

¹²¹ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc. #399, Mutsu-Ōtori, July 10, 1894, 593-594.

an appropriate time.”¹²² The Korean government immediately declared the Provision void on the grounds that they had been duped into signing it. Japanese diplomats, on the other hand, saw the Provision as a much more binding agreement, and continued to use it over the following years to assert the legitimacy of Japanese railway claims. As late as 1898 the *New York Times* reported “the Japanese Minister at Seoul, M. Kato Masuo will demand that the contract for the construction of the Seoul-Fusan Railway by Japan, under an agreement made in August, 1894, shall be signed without delay.”¹²³

The agreements included in the Provision were based on a draft originally made by Ōtori and Korean reformist party member Kim Ka-jin.¹²⁴ After a perfunctory “guarantee” in the draft that the Korean government would “adopt advice on internal reforms from the Japanese government, and take this opportunity to carry them out” in the first article, the second and third articles of this draft contained clauses providing the Japanese with concessions to build a railway and telegraph between Seoul and Pusan. As the second article stated, however, the concession was conditional: “If in the event that the finances of the Korean government are not sufficient to construct the Seoul-Pusan, and Seoul-Inch’ŏn railways, as in the reform proposal, a treaty shall be signed and conditions shall be set with either the Japanese government or a Japanese company to start construction.”¹²⁵ In return, the Japanese government would “guarantee” the

¹²² The text of the Provision can be found in Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 34-36. One of the more notable provisions stipulated that the two governments would “not pursue any matters regarding the accidental conflict occurring between troops of both countries in the royal palace on July 23rd.”

¹²³ *The New York Times*, “Japan’s Demand on Korea,” February 7, 1898.

¹²⁴ *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109; Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 81.

¹²⁵ *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109-110.

independence of Korea, as laid forth in the eighth article: “The Japanese government, from the beginning having assisted the independence of Korea and having desired the achievement of the goal of Korean self-rule, will separately establish a committee made up of members from both countries to decide all appropriate matters relating to guaranteeing (*hoshō*) the future independence of Korea.”¹²⁶ Mutsu, however, was concerned about the implications this promise to “guarantee” Korea’s future independence, and advised Ōtori to change the wording accordingly:

If eighth clause of provisional agreement...is intended to guarantee forever Corea’s independence by Japan it is very weighty matter and you should not make even provisional agreement. If so, strike out the clause. If not, replace words [guarantee] (*hoshō*) by some other suitable words so as to avoid to be taken in the sense of guarantee. Change title of agreement as we use [treaty] (*jōyaku*) only as equivalent of treaty. I understand the agreement to be kept secret between both parties.¹²⁷

As Mutsu suggested, regarding future Korean independence, the term “guarantee” was removed from the draft in favor of the less binding term “secure” (*kyōko*), and the title of the agreement was changed from “treaty” (*jōyaku*) to the less official “Provision” (*jōkan*).

Once the agreement was signed, the Japanese government decided that the negotiations for a railway treaty were too important to leave to the “old” and “indecisive” ambassador Ōtori Keisuke. Indeed, Ōtori’s earlier reluctance to capitalize on the presence of Japanese troops to take more aggressive action towards the Korean court had made Ōtori an unpopular figure in the Japanese embassy in Seoul. As early as July of that year, foreign ministry official Kurino Shinichirō had even broached the subject of replacing the ambassador with a more charismatic politician. Sent to Seoul by Foreign

¹²⁶ *NKGSS*, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, attachment, in *NKGSS*, vol. 4, 110.

¹²⁷ *NGB*, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 434, Mutsu-Ōtori, August 9, 1894, 641.

Minister Mutsu to hand deliver special instructions to Ōtori, Kurino was not sparing in his criticism of Ōtori's ambassadorial ability. "Ōtori[']s] manner of negotiations would not attain speedy result," Kurino chided in a telegram to Mutsu, "while keeping foolhardiness for indefinite period is not only very difficult but will cause several disadvantages." "Under these circumstances," Kurino recommended, "it seems to be highly recommendable that Japanese Government should send immediately special ambassador with extraordinary power to effect our object."¹²⁸ As a result, Ōtori was replaced in October 1894 by a more well-known politician with more experience in Korea, then-Home Minister Inoue Kaoru.¹²⁹

Appointed the new Japanese ambassador to Seoul, Inoue was charged with spearheading wide-ranging reforms of the Korean government. Inoue's real goal, however, was to secure railway construction rights. As Janet Hunter notes, Prime Minister Itō pressured Inoue soon after his arrival in Korea to secure a railway concession, "addressing the military need for Korean railways, and the general importance of Korea to Japan's future."¹³⁰ Once in Seoul, the more aggressive Inoue took advantage of the confusion of the Sino-Japanese War to redouble efforts to push through a formal treaty recognizing Japanese railway rights. In November, Inoue submitted to the

¹²⁸ JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308200, "2 Meiji 27-nen 6-gatsu hatsuka kara 1894 (Meiji 27)nen 7-gatsu, 12-nichi" [June 20, 1894 to July 12, 1894], 39.

¹²⁹ Inoue had been one of the main architects of Japanese informal empire in Korea, with his involvement in Korean-Japanese affairs extending back to 1876 when he had been the deputy Japanese envoy in negotiating the Kanghwa Treaty. As Foreign Minister in 1882, Inoue had also been responsible for the Treaty of Chemulp'o and personally signed the Convention of Seoul following the failed the Kapsin Coup in 1884. Lew, "Minister Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts in Korea," 151.

¹³⁰ Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy," 575-576.

Japanese government a plan drawn up by his predecessor, Ōtori. According to the plan, Inoue would negotiate for two railways – one between Seoul and Pusan and one between Seoul and Inch’ŏn – with three conditions: first, the two railways would be built by either the Japanese government, or a Japanese company; second, all expenses for acquiring land for the railways would be supplied to the Korean government by Japan; and third, until the Korean government completely repaid the Japanese government, either the Japanese government or a Japanese company would retain all rights of management of the two railways.¹³¹ As Chung Jaejeong points out, “Although this plan was later revised and supplemented through negotiations with the Korean government and was not enacted as is, it was significant as the basis for the 1898 Keifu Railway Agreement that ultimately allowed Japan to seize rights to construct the Keifu railway.”¹³²

As the Sino-Japanese War turned in Japan’s favor, Inoue feared he might lose the opportunity to press reforms and secure a railway concession. Concerned that the line might not be constructed as it lost logistical necessity, Inoue pressured Mutsu on January 8th: “Work of Seoul- Inch’ŏn railway must be begun before conclusion of peace negotiations. All the foreigners here seem to desire its speedy completion as it is not difficult road...I wish to see work begun and completed at the earliest possible date.”¹³³ Inoue was authorized two weeks later to commence secret negotiations with the Korean government for a potential “Japan-Korea Treaty” (*Nikkan Jōyaku*). Shortly thereafter,

¹³¹ Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai*, 75.

¹³² Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai*, 75.

¹³³ JACAR, Ref.#: B07080194700, “Bunwari 1” [Partition 1], slide 63. This document is one part of JACAR, Ref.#: B07080194300, “Tetsudō Denshin sono hoka ni kan-suru Nikkan Jōyaku Teiketsuhō Kōshō Ikken” [Matters relating to negotiations regarding the conclusion of a Japanese-Korean treaty for railways and telegraphs among others].

the Foreign Ministry issued Inoue an 8-point directive laying out Japan's objectives for these negotiations, all of which – except for two regarding telegraphs and the opening of ports – concerned rights to construct railways. Based on the earlier Ōtori-Inoue plan, the proposed treaty would prescribe that the Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Inch'ŏn railways be built and managed by either the Japanese government or a company chosen by the Japanese government until the Korean government repaid all expenses. Clearly revealing Japan's intent for long-term ownership and control, Korea would not be allowed to even begin repaying the loans until 50 years had passed from the opening of the railways.¹³⁴ Inoue was named Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary by order of the Meiji Emperor and granted authority to sign a treaty “concerning railways, telegraphs, and the opening of ports, as agreed in the Temporary Provision of August 20, 1894.”¹³⁵

Despite Inoue's high court rank and prestige, negotiations went nowhere. Suspicious of Japanese intentions and reluctant to allow Japan too much power, the Korean government attempted to strategically stall until the leverage the Japanese side gained during Sino-Japanese War subsided with the conclusion of peace. Claiming that they were not opposed to granting Japan a railway concession, the Korean government held out for retention of telegraphs. Attempting to speed the process, Inoue tried to compromise by proposing that the Korean government could retain control of the

¹³⁴ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 36-37.

¹³⁵ JACAR, Ref.#: A01200802400, “Chōsen ni okeru tetsudō denshin oyobi kaikō ni kansuru jōyaku teiketsu no tame Keijō chūtō tokumei zenken kōshi Inoue Kaoru he go-inin kafu seraru” [Commissioning Keijō resident minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary Inoue Kaoru for the purpose of concluding a treaty regarding railways, telegraphy, and the opening of ports in Korea].

telegraph, provided that Japanese were able to use it in times of emergency.¹³⁶ When even this did not break the deadlock, the Japanese government decided to separate the proposed railways. They now concentrated on only the less difficult Seoul to Inch'ŏn segment, leaving the much longer and more mountainous Seoul-Pusan section for later negotiation. A new draft for a treaty was drawn up and negotiations commenced in April, yet even these alterations were not enough to shake the Korean government before their calculated stalling tactics paid off.¹³⁷

Changing Tracks and Merging Lines: Co-Production of the Seoul-Pusan Railway

As Gallagher and Robinson argued, informal empire was only possible through the “inter-relation” between economics and politics. “Political actions aided the growth of commercial supremacy,” they noted, “and...this supremacy in turn strengthened political influence.”¹³⁸ The same applied to the acquisition of the Seoul-Pusan railway and establishment of Japanese informal empire in Korea. Regardless of the political developments over the previous year – the July 23rd Japanese-incited coup, the war with China, the tedious diplomatic negotiations, and the signing of the Temporary Union Provision – Japanese diplomatic negotiations for railway concessions were completely thrown off track by the Triple Intervention and the Assassination of Queen Min in 1895. In the wake of these unexpected events, Japanese attempts to secure railway construction rights would change tracks as private investors would step into to continue pick up where

¹³⁶ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 95-96.

¹³⁷ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 37.

¹³⁸ Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” 6.

diplomats left off. By no means, however, did the Japanese government officials no longer play a role in the acquisition of railway construction rights in Korea. Rather, the Japanese government actively supported the activities of the business community in Seoul, and even promised funding when it appeared lack of money would cause projects to fail. In the end, completion of the Seoul-Pusan Railway would take the contribution of various actors from several countries. While obtaining the concession for the line required the collaboration of Japanese and American diplomats and businessmen, construction of the line was possible only with the permission of the Korean government, the labor of Korean workers, and emergency funds provided by the Japanese government. But securing the concession agreement was only the halfway point; even after rights for the line were secured, it would take the equally vital participation of several performers before the opening ceremony of the Seoul-Pusan Railway could be held in 1905.

Japanese diplomatic negotiations for railway rights were joltingly derailed by two events in 1895: the Triple Intervention, and the assassination of Queen Min. The first came quickly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Following a string of convincing Japanese victories on land and sea, China had little choice but to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed April 17, 1895, concluding the Sino-Japanese War in overwhelming Japanese triumph.¹³⁹ As the terms of the treaty stipulated, China would

¹³⁹ With hostilities opened at the end of the previous July, Japanese army and naval forces routed their Chinese counterparts on both land and sea in the following months. Japanese victories on land at Pyongyang and at sea in the Battle of the Yalu River on consecutive days in September 1894, followed shortly thereafter by the Japanese crossing of the Yalu River at Juliancheng in November, had effectively driven China out of the Korean peninsula. Japan then pressed the offensive towards the Chinese capital of Beijing. After Japanese forces had occupied China's two most important naval ports, Port Arthur in November 1894 and Weihaiwei in February 1895, the matter was all but decided.¹³⁹ By

pay a large indemnity, recognize Korean independence, and cede to Japan a number of territories including the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores island chain, and the Liaotung Peninsula on the mainland.¹⁴⁰ Yet the idea of Japanese possession of the Liaotung Peninsula was too much for the western powers to bear. Only days after the signing of the treaty, Russia, Germany, and France strongly recommended that Japan return the peninsula in a diplomatic move known as the Triple Intervention. With this unanticipated development, what Japanese political leaders and diplomats in Korea had long feared – interference by the Powers in Japan’s actions in Korea – had finally come to pass. Japan had been careful not to provoke the Powers, but now Japan’s interests in the Far East had come head to head with those of the Western countries. Railways were one such point of conflict. On May 5, the same day Japan announced its intention to accept the demands of the Triple Intervention, the English, American, German, and Russian representatives in Seoul jointly advised the Korean government not to allow any one country to monopolize all rights for railways and telegraphs in Korea. Such a development, they warned, would be detrimental to merchants of all countries.¹⁴¹ As a result of the Triple Intervention and Western intervention in railway negotiations, Japan was forced to step back from taking

taking these two ports situated on either side of the entrance to the Bohai Sea, Japan had controlled the land and sea routes to Beijing.

¹⁴⁰ The specific provisions were: 1) China, but not Japan, would recognize the independence of Korea; 2) Japan would receive from China sizable indemnities, and would occupy the city of Weihaiwei until payment was completed; 3) four Chinese treaty ports would be opened to Japanese merchants, and Japan would be allowed to conduct trade in the Chinese interior; and most significantly, 4) China would cede to Japan the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores island chain, and the Liaotung peninsula Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 273.

¹⁴¹ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkaei, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 39; Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 97.

an active role in Korean reforms, especially regarding railway concessions. Two days after receiving the “advice” of Russia, Germany, and France to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula, Mutsu cautioned Inoue “not to resort forcible measures in dealing with the Korean government for the time being.”¹⁴² “As a result of the above,” the Cabinet agreed on June 4th, “we shall not interfere strongly in Korean railway and telegraph matters.”¹⁴³

The second event that sidetracked Japanese hopes for gaining railway concessions in Korea was the assassination of Queen Min by Japanese strongmen and Korean allies in the so-called Ŭlmi Incident of October 8th, 1895. Early that morning, Japanese soldiers escorted the Taewŏn’gun to the palace, where they were met by 30 Japanese in civilian clothing and about 20 Korean soldiers.¹⁴⁴ Dressed as Korean policemen, the attackers entered the palace, took King Kojong and his son prisoner, and then assassinated the Queen and two of her ladies-in-waiting. After identifying the Queen’s body, the attackers dragged it into the courtyard and set it afire. Adding insult to injury, the captive King was forced to issue a decree demoting the queen to commoner status.¹⁴⁵ The Queen’s assassination, as it later became clear, was part of a plot by the new Japanese minister to Seoul, Miura Gorō, and first legation secretary Sugimura Fukashi, to incite

¹⁴² Quoted in Lew, “Minister Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts,” 167.

¹⁴³ Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 576. Original document can be found in Gaimushō, ed., *Dai Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho* 1: 172; *NGB*, vol. 28.1, Doc.#: 298, Mutsu-Itō, June 3, 1895, 440-441; and *NKGSS*, vol. 4, 391-393.

¹⁴⁴ This information is provided in a report Foreign Minister Saionji sent to Ambassador to Russia, Nishi Tokujirō, on October 9, 1895, in *NGB*, vol. 28.1, Doc.#: 363, Saionzi-Nissi, October 9, 1895, 496-497.

¹⁴⁵ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 111; and C.I. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 88.

another coup in the Korea court. As in the earlier 1884 and 1894 coups, the goal was to again place the Taewŏn'gun at the head of a pro-Japanese government while driving the anti-Japanese Min faction out of the government. Despite Miura's attempts to conceal the involvement of Japanese, there had been several witnesses. Court ladies had seen the attackers dragging away the Queen's corpse, the American military adviser General William Dye had seen Japanese with swords drawn in the palace, and the American diplomat Horace Allen had seen a group of "evil-looking Japanese" running away from the palace.¹⁴⁶ When the roles of Miura and Sugimura in the plot were revealed, they were recalled to Japan and immediately put on trial along with forty-six other conspirators. All were later acquitted of any guilt. Together, these two events nearly eliminated Japanese influence in Korea, along with diplomatic channels to secure any railway concession. While the Triple Intervention forced Japan to take a less active diplomatic stance towards negotiating with the Korean court, the ill feeling towards Japan caused by the Ŭlmi Incident – not to mention the acquittal of the conspirators – hardened Korean government resistance to Japanese entreaties for the Seoul-Pusan railway.

As Japanese efforts to aggressively attain influence in the peninsula came to a halt, the Korean court accelerated efforts to modernize the country and establish Korean independence. Understandably fearful for his own life following the murder of the Queen and wide-scale riots after a recent government order to adopt Western hairstyles, King Kojong fled to the Russian legation in February 1896 under the protection of Russian marines dispatched to Seoul the previous day (an event known as the *Agwan P'achŏn*). Safely under the protection of the Russians in the Russian Embassy, where he

¹⁴⁶ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 111.

resided until February 1897, King Kojong promulgated death sentences for the pro-Japanese conspirators. Angry mobs executed these orders by assassinating Prime Minister Kim Hong-jip and Treasury Minister Ŏ Yun-jung, both of whom were longtime pro-Japanese reformers. This cleared the way for the Korean court to embark on the so-called Kwangmu reforms intended to affirm Korea's independence, while also undoing many of the Kabo reforms. Out from under the influence of both China and Japan, King Kojong declared the founding of the Great Han Empire (*Taehan Teguk*) after leaving the Russian embassy in 1897 and undertook these reforms as a way to legitimize the new empire. In addition to financial and legal matters, the reforms introduced several new tangible forms of modernity. The capital of Seoul, for example, underwent several projects intended to modernize the city, including street improvements, the laying of street trolleys, and the introduction of electricity.

One significant part of the Kwangmu reform program was the modernization of the national transportation network, including road and telegraph infrastructure improvements. Railways, of course, were a major focus of the program. In July 1899, the Korean court announced its intention to sponsor railway construction by promulgating new "railway regulations," which stipulated that the government intended to build lines to every part of the country to "facilitate the travel of the people and the shipping of goods," that all railways would follow the international gauge, and that all lines must conform to government standards of gauge, fares, and supervision. Finally, aware that railways could be the first steps towards colonization, the regulations dictated that, other than railway employees, no foreigners would be allowed to reside or open businesses within station lands in an attempt to prevent the use of railway lands for

colonial settlement.¹⁴⁷ In order to plan and coordinate railway development, the Korean court established a Railway Agency (JPN: *Tetsudōin*; KRN: *ch'ōldōwōn*) in April 1900.

The Korean court's desire to construct railways led to concessions being awarded to American and French interests. First, rights for a line between Seoul and the port of Inch'ōn were awarded to an American businessman active in Yokohama, James R. Morse. This arrangement was encouraged by Russian Minister Karl Ivanovich Waeber, who had made a deal with Morse whereby Morse would receive the railway rights in exchange for giving up his claims to a timber logging concession. Waeber then endorsed a plan by the French company Fives-Lille for a northwestwardly line from Seoul towards the city of Ŭiju and the Trans-Siberian Railway beyond. To the consternation of Japan, the Korean government signed an agreement for this concession two months later in July 1896. Indicating the Korean government's intention to retain control of the national railway network, the agreements between the Korean government and the Americans and French included a number of conditions. First, the Korean government would grant the company land necessary for track right-of-way and stations, warehouses, etc., in return for free transport of mail and Korean troops. Secondly, the concession stipulated that 90% of labor required to build the earthworks of the railway would be provided by Koreans. Finally, not only was the concession contingent on construction of the lines commencing within 1 year and being completed within 3 years, the Korean government reserved the right to repurchase the railway and all its properties after 15 years.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkaikai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 50-52.

¹⁴⁸ The concession agreement between Morse and the Korean government is reproduced in *NGB*, vol. 29, Doc.#: 345, Komura-Mutsu, April 23, 1896, 667-670.

While the Korean decision to construct railways was meant to strengthen the court, it had the unintended affect of providing a new track for Japanese interests to finally acquire rights to construct railways in Korea. Worried that it was falling too far behind the US and France, Japan used this announcement by the Korean government to jump back into the competition over railway concessions. On this point, Japanese diplomats and private entrepreneurs were united. In their mind, it did not matter whether railways were built or management by the Japanese government or a Japanese private company; the only thing that mattered was that they were Japanese. As a group of Japanese railway promoters trumpeted in the *Tōkyō Keizai Shinpō* in 1896:

Today, in the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line, we are not in the least concerned with the sort of distinction as to whether it will be a state or private enterprise. If only it can be constructed by Japanese hand, that's enough...The first thing is to gain something which is a previously granted right.¹⁴⁹

With concessions already awarded for lines to Inch'ŏn and Ŭiju, Japanese investors focused on the line between Seoul and Pusan. This line was of particular importance for Japanese commercial and strategic interests because it connected the Korean capital to southeastern city of Pusan, the closest large Korean port to Japan. The Army General Staff Headquarters (*Daihon'ei*) had sent assistant chief Kawakami Sōroku to Korea to investigate the logistical situation on the continent in 1892, resulting in the report submitted by Kōno Tenzui.¹⁵⁰ Considering Pusan to be the most likely port of disembarkation for Japanese troops in the event of deployment to the mainland,

¹⁴⁹ Quoted in Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy," 578.

¹⁵⁰ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 28.

Kawakami had recommended exactly such a line.¹⁵¹ Because of the importance of conveying military supplies during war, Kawakami had also stressed that the railway be built by Japan.¹⁵² The rail link between Pusan and Seoul became especially desirable during the Sino-Japanese War. In the midst of the fighting, the *Daihon'ei* had dispatched a team of 29 railway engineers including Sengoku Mitsugu – who had just completed surveying the elevated line in Tokyo – and Ishimaru Shigemi to draw up plans for the lines between Seoul and Pusan, in addition to a second line between Seoul and Inch'ŏn.¹⁵³ A rail link from the port at Pusan to Seoul and beyond to the Trans-Siberian Railway also piqued the interest of Japanese entrepreneurs. Even politicians such as Ōkuma Shigenobu, for example, recognized that the line promised great commercial potential for Japanese businesses. “We should extend railway lines either from Pusan to Seoul, then on to Pyongyang and Uiju, or from Pusan to Wonsan, through Hamgyong Province and on to the Russian border,” Ōkuma proclaimed, “In the future when the Siberian railway is completed, if we connect it from Korea to the Japanese Sanyō and Tōkaidō line, making it a world route, it would lead to great income.¹⁵⁴ With visions such as these in mind, Japanese merchants Takeuchi Tsuna, Ōmiwa Chōbei, and Ozaki Saburō presented to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi a plan in February 1896 to form a company to construct

¹⁵¹ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 138.

¹⁵² Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai*, 70.

¹⁵³ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 30-31; and JACAR, Ref.#: C06061211800, “11-gatsu, tsuitachi, sanbō sōchō Taruhito Shinnō-hatsu, rikugun daijin hakushaku Saigō Tsugumichi-ate, gishi kōfu Chōsen koku hahan ni tsuki kaku heitanbu he kunrei no gi” [November 1, Commander-in-chief Prince Arisugawa Taruhito to Army Minister Count Saigō Tsugumichi, orders to all commissariats regarding the dispatching of engineers and laborers to Korea].

¹⁵⁴ Quoted in Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai*, 73.

both lines, funded by a new Korean central bank established expressly for that purpose.¹⁵⁵ All three had been active in planning Korean railways prior to this proposal. Takeuchi and Ozaki had been employed by the Korean Mint Bureau (*Jŏnhwan'guk*) to plan a railway between Seoul and Pusan. Ōmiwa, meanwhile, had separately sketched another line from Seoul to Inch'ŏn along with another Japanese working in the Mint Bureau, Masuda Nobuyuki.¹⁵⁶

Spurred to action by the granting of concessions to the Americans and French in the summer of 1896, the Japanese government actively supported the efforts of private Japanese entrepreneurs to establish a railway company to build the desired Seoul-Pusan railway. Receiving approval from Prime Minister Itō, the trio of Takeuchi, Ōmiwa, and Ozaki started soliciting investors to form such a company. As a result of their efforts, 155 investors gathered at the Nihombashi Club in Tokyo in July 1896 to declare the foundation of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company. Among the assembled investors were several well-known government leaders and businesspeople, such as Shibusawa Eiichi, Maejima Hisoka, Ōe Taku, Inoue Kakugorō, and Masuda Takashi. At this first meeting, Shibusawa was elected chairman of a board of 8 titular “promoters” made up of Shibusawa, Ozaki, Takeuchi, Maejima, Ōe, Nakano Buei, Ōmiwa, and Inoue. As its first act of business, the company petitioned Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi for central government assistance in arranging an introduction to the Korean court.¹⁵⁷ Japanese

¹⁵⁵ Takeuchi Tsuna, “Takeuchi Tsuna Jijoden” [Autobiography of Takeuchi Tsuna], in *Meiji Bunka Zenshū: Zasshi hen* [Complete works of Meiji literature, periodicals], Vol. 22, comp. Yoshino Sakuzō (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1929), 448; Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 139.

¹⁵⁶ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Inkaei, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 30.

¹⁵⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: B04010886900, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken,” slides 47-52.

negotiators had been careful in their deliberations with the Korean government over the Japan-Korea Temporary Joint Provision to include language stipulating that the railway would be constructed by “either the Japanese government or a company designated by the Japanese government.” Now with a suitable company in hand, Japanese diplomats sought to make good on this agreement. Forwarding the company’s petition to Ambassador to Korea Hara Takashi (Kei) and instructing him to provide an introduction to the Korean court, Saionji highlighted the Japanese government’s desire to see a railway laid between Seoul and Pusan and reminded Hara of the wording in the Provision clearing the way for a private Japanese company to lay the line.¹⁵⁸ The Korean government, however, was reluctant to entertain proposals for a Japanese company to construct the line, citing unrest in the countryside that would be aggravated by the presence of a Japanese railway. A more pressing issue was Korean frustration over the acquittal of the conspirators in the assassination of Queen Min. As Ambassador Hara Takashi wrote to Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi in July 1896: “It is needless to say that the reason the Korean government will not allow the railway anytime soon is entirely because of the sentiment resulting from the October 8th Incident.”¹⁵⁹

When the Korean court denied these requests, it seemed that Japanese efforts to secure rail lines in Korea would hit a dead end. But then help came from an unexpected source in early 1897: the United States. Twice, American diplomats and businesspeople made deals with their Japanese counterparts that led to Japanese ownership of both the Seoul-Inch’ŏn and Seoul-Pusan railway lines in Korea. The first case concerned the

¹⁵⁸ *NGB*, vol. 29, Doc.#327, Saionji-Hara, July 19, 1896, 636-637.

¹⁵⁹ *NGB*, vol. 29, Doc.#329, Hara-Saionji, July 30, 1896, 638.

concession to the Seoul-Inch'ŏn line, held by American James R. Morse. Morse's agreement with the Korean government in 1896 had stipulated that the line must be completed by 1899, but his inability to secure financing from investors made it unlikely that he would fulfill this requirement. Looking for a way to recover his investment and turn a profit, Morse began shopping the concession around to the highest bidder. Seeing an opportunity for Japanese interests to take control of the line, Masuda Takashi propositioned to Morse that Japanese investors associated with the Seoul-Pusan Railway would be happy to take the concession off Morse's hands for the right price. Morse informed Shibusawa Eiichi that such a deal could be arranged. What made the final transaction come to fruition was the collaboration of politician Ōkuma Shigenobu, and businessman Shibusawa Eiichi. According to Shibusawa's recollections, Ōkuma thought it was a shame that the concession had fallen into the hands of a foreigner and that it was vital for the line to be constructed by Japan. If Shibusawa would organize a group of investors to form a company, then Ōkuma would do his part to provide government financial support.¹⁶⁰ As Shibusawa explained to a group of regional government officials at a fundraising event in 1900, he then set to work on his side of the bargain. Although he could not promise potential investors a return on their profits, Shibusawa appealed to their patriotism by saying it would be "regrettable" to leave the line to a foreigner and that even the smallest amount of money would help to ensure that the line was constructed by "Japanese hands." Yet because this would not be a "normal" company, Shibusawa decided that a "syndicate" of investors would be more appropriate.

¹⁶⁰ KDL: Shibusawa Eiichi, "Keifu Tetsudō Iken" [On the Seoul-Pusan Railway], in *Shibusawa Danshaku Jitsugyō Kōen* [Lectures on business by Baron Shibusawa], vol. 1, ed. Iguchi Masayuki (Tokyo: Teikoku Tosho Shuppan, 1913), 370-371.

Ultimately, the syndicate of 15 investors Shibusawa gathered from the ranks of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company promised to purchase the line from Morse for ¥2 million after construction had been completed. In the meantime, they would provide funds to assist construction.

It was then Ōkuma's turn to spring into action when the deal between Morse and Shibusawa's syndicate broke down in mid-1897, when Morse demanded triple the amount of start-up cash.¹⁶¹ Three times Ōkuma and the Japanese government stepped in to promise funding in order to make sure the concession was not scooped by another foreign power. First, Ōkuma arranged for the Yokohama Specie Bank to offer Morse a ¥1 million (\$500,000) loan, backed by the government, to continue construction on the line. Secondly, when Shibusawa's syndicate expressed concern that it might not be able to secure the ¥2 million necessary to purchase the finished line as agreed, Ōkuma and Matsukata circumvented a constitutional provision dictating that all national loans be approved by the Diet to earmark ¥1 million from the Sino-Japanese War indemnity from China to loan to the syndicate. Thirdly, the government intervened once more in early 1898 when Morse again attempted to "realize handsomely on his little investment" by shopping the concession around to Russia and Japan.¹⁶² In March 1898, Morse mentioned to the Japanese investment syndicate that a group of French entrepreneurs was willing to purchase the concession for ¥3 million. As before, the Japanese government scrambled to promise Shibusawa's syndicate a further no-interest loan of ¥800,000 on top of the previous ¥1 million. When the government finally came through on the promised

¹⁶¹ Shibusawa Eiichi, "Keifu Tetsudō Iken," 370-371.

¹⁶² Quoted in Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 144.

¥1.8 million loan, they did so on the condition that construction and operation of the line would be subject to oversight by officials from the Communications, Finance, and Foreign ministries. With this agreed, the syndicate finally purchased the Seoul-Inch'ŏn concession from Morse in May 1899 for \$1 million, or just under ¥1.75 million.¹⁶³ Construction on the line proceeded more rapidly after it passed into Japanese hands, and the entire line was completed just over one year later in 1900. Morse had broke ground on the line in the spring of 1897 on the Inch'ŏn end of the line, but his inability to secure financing slowed progress considerably. Construction started from the Seoul end when the Japanese investors led by Shibusawa stepped in to providing funding. With the influx of Japanese cash, work on the remainder of the line commenced in April 1899 and was completed in July. The opening ceremony was then held on December 12, 1900.¹⁶⁴

The second case of US-Japanese cooperation concerned the Seoul-Pusan railway. After Japan purchased the concession for the Seoul-Inch'ŏn Line from Morse, US Ambassador Horace Allen urged the Korean government to award Japan the rights to the Seoul-Pusan line. Allen's support had apparently been bought through a deal made with Foreign Minister Ōkuma whereby the American Minister would cooperate in return for Ōkuma's promise that "all material for the construction of this road would be ordered from America" and through the offices of the American Trading Company and its Yokohama agent, James R. Morse.¹⁶⁵ Final negotiations with the Korean court were

¹⁶³ Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 140-145; Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy," 585.

¹⁶⁴ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 282-285.

¹⁶⁵ This information is revealed in a letter from Morse to Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō dated July 11th, 1902. Morse was apparently writing to complain that despite this agreement, Japan had not made good on their side of the deal. See: JACAR, Ref.#: B04010887500, "Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō senro hogo no tame

completed by Ambassador Kato Masuō on the occasion of Itō Hirobumi's visit to Korea. As Peter Duus writes, "Itō's visit became a festival friendship, festooned with cordial speeches and a message of felicitations from the Meiji emperor to the Korean court."¹⁶⁶ Under this pressure, the Korean government finally relented and awarded the rights to the Seoul-Pusan railway on September 8, 1898.

Yet securing the rights to construct the railway was just the beginning. As lack of capital prevented the start of construction on the line, investors turned to the Japanese government for assistance lest the concession expire. As the investors appealed to Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo in November 1899, the concession for the line from the Korean government stipulated that construction must begin within three years or else the concession would become void.¹⁶⁷ The investors, however, were having trouble rounding up funds domestically as a result of an economic downturn in Japan. In response, the cabinet passed bills through the Imperial Diet in February 1900, urging the rapid completion of the Seoul-Pusan Railway and authorizing the government to provide "appropriate protection (*sōtō no hogo*)" of the company.¹⁶⁸ With this mandate to support the activities of the Seoul-Pusan Railway, the central government convened a committee charged with deliberating proper government procedures regarding overseas railways

junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki" [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the Seoul-Pusan railway line], slides 18-21.

¹⁶⁶ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 147.

¹⁶⁷ Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 170-171.

¹⁶⁸ See: Fourteenth Imperial Diet, House of Peers, 18th General Meeting, February 7th, 1900 (*Dai-jūyonkai Teikoku Gikai, Kizokuin Giji sokkiroku, dai-jūhachigō*), 350.

owned by Japanese nationals. Sitting on this committee were Vice-Minister of Finance Sakatani Yoshirō, Vice-Minister of Communications Furuichi Kō'i, Vice-Minister of the Army Nakamura Yoshijirō, and Shibusawa Eiichi. With the strong support of Army Minister Katsura Tarō and the endorsement of Communications Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa, the recommendations of the committee were promulgated into law. Passed in October 1900, these guidelines placed any company owned by Japanese nationals to operate railways overseas under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications and extended many domestic railway regulations to overseas companies.¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile, a month earlier in September 1900, the Japanese cabinet authorized the granting of emergency funds to the Keifu Railway Company, promising to guarantee a 6% return on investments for a period of 15 years.¹⁷⁰ The Imperial Diet provided the funds necessary for this in March 1901 by supplementing the 1901 budget with ¥90,000 earmarked for assisting the Keifu Railway Company.¹⁷¹ This was by no means enough to finance the entire 270-mile long railway, but it was sufficient to commence construction on the line and satisfy the requirements of the concession. With this cash in hand, the company held the groundbreaking ceremony for the Seoul-Pusan railway on August 20th, 1901.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020477800, “Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Sanjūsan-nen Chokurei Dai-sanbyaku rokujūroku gō. Gaikoku ni oite tetsudō wo fuzetsu suru Teikoku kaisha ni kan-suru ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1900, Imperial Edict #366, matters relating to Japanese companies constructing railways in foreign countries].

¹⁷⁰ For the rules, see Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 182-187; and Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 151.

¹⁷¹ See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020513700, “Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Sanjūyon-nen, yosan sangatsu nijūshichi-nichi, Meiji Sanjūyon nendo sainyū saishutsu sōyōsan tsuika” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1901, March 27 Budget, supplements to the 1901 general budget of revenues and expenditures].

¹⁷² Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Chōsen Tetsudō Shi*, vol. 1, 283-284.

Construction of the line was carried out according to terms of the 1898 concession between the Korean government and the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company. Modeled on the earlier agreement between the Korean government and James R. Morse for the Seoul-Inch'ŏn Line, the concession stipulated that land for the Seoul-Pusan line and all associated properties would be provided by the Korean government in exchange for free conveyance of Korean mail, troops, and military supplies. Article 6 of the agreement, moreover, prescribed that “Natives shall be given the preference, especially upon the earthworks, where not more than ten per cent (10%) of other nationals will be employed, unless native labor is held at such a high price as to render the importation of foreign labor advisable.”¹⁷³ As a result, according to Chung Jaejeong, there were no fewer than 10 Korean construction companies contracted to work on the railway.¹⁷⁴ For the Korean government, this provision was an attempt to limit the amount of foreign involvement in the construction of the railway, while also providing employment and profits for Korean labor managers. Not surprisingly, many of these contracted companies were founded by Korean government officials. For the Japanese Seoul-Pusan Railway Company, meanwhile, contracting Korean labor to lay the line had two main benefits. First, because Korean laborers were only paid half the wage of Japanese laborers, the company could hire twice as many Koreans to work on the line, presumably speeding completion of the railway. Secondly, the hiring of Korean laborers had the added benefit of popularizing

¹⁷³ JACAR, Ref.#: B04010887000, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō senro hogo no tame jūsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the Seoul-Pusan railway line], slides 27-28.

¹⁷⁴ Chung, *Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai*, 212-213.

the line while hopefully pacifying local insurgents by putting them to work on the railway. This had been relatively successful in Taiwan when colonial administrators had paid insurgents, referred to as “*dohi*” by the Japanese, to work on road construction projects or in camphor factories.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Japanese construction contractors gradually replaced Korean laborers as the prospect of war with Russia approached in the mid-1900s. At the urging of Army Vice-Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarō, the company was reorganized by imperial edict in late December 1903 and placed under the supervision of a government-appointed director.¹⁷⁶ On the same day, citing military necessity, the cabinet granted the company a ¥1.75 million subsidy to cover construction costs and guaranteed a ¥10 million bond on behalf of the company.¹⁷⁷ Already in effect a semi-governmental company, the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company was finally nationalized by the Japanese government in March 1906, making it an integral part of the Japanese imperial railway network.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Gotō Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in *Fifty Years of New Japan*, vol. 2, ed. Ōkuma Shigenobu (London: Smith & Elder, 1908), 539.

¹⁷⁶ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020584500, “Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Sanjūroku-nen, Chokurei Dai-nihyaku kyūjūni-gō, Keifu Tetsudō Kabushikikaisha ni kan-suru ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1903, Imperial Edict #292, Matters regarding the Keifu Railway Company]; Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 154.

¹⁷⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020584400, “Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Sanjūroku-nen, Chokurei Dai-nihyaku kyūjūichi-gō, Teikoku Kenpō Dai-nanajū-jō ni yoru zaiseijō hitsuyō shobun no ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1903, Imperial Edict #291, Matters regarding dispositions necessary for public finance pursuant to Article 70 of the Imperial Constitution]; Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 154.

¹⁷⁸ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020656200, “Goshomei Genpon. Meiji Sanjūkyū-nen, Hōritsu Dai-jūhachi-gō, Keifu Tetsudō kaishūhō” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, law #18, Keifu Railway purchase law].

In this way, the merging of public and private actions by self-interested actors from several countries was necessary to see the Seoul-Pusan railway to fruition. As Peter Duus concludes, “The Japanese success was the product of their ‘tenacity,’ but it was also the product of consensus among key figures in the Tokyo government, the military high command, and small group of domestic promoters and investors.”¹⁷⁹ Yet it is also important to note that the line required the choreographed participation of various actors from several different countries including Japan, Korea, and the United States. The line would not have been possible without the permission of the Korean government, the labor of Korean workers to build the earthworks necessary for track beds, the deals made by American diplomats and businesspeople, or funds provided by the Japanese government and private investors. Thus, if the opening of the Keifu-Railway in 1905 marked the foundation of Japan’s infrastructure of empire, the presence of dignitaries from Japan, Korea, and the United States highlighted the various forces that combined to construct spaces of Japanese hegemony in Korea.

Conclusion: Railways, Japanese Expansion, and Imperial Hegemony

Following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese government leaders felt a dire need to defend their country from Western imperialism. Policies of rapid industrialization and military expansion, political centralization, and ideological unification under the banners of “rich nation, strong army” (*fukoku kyōhei*), “increase production and industry” (*shokusan kōgyō*), and “civilization and enlightenment” (*bunmei kaika*) were all undertaken in the name of making Japan strong enough to catch up to and surpass the West. Railways

¹⁷⁹ Duus, *Abacus and the Sword*, 156.

contributed greatly to these Meiji efforts of modernization. Railways facilitated the mobility of troops – to great effect during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 – as well as the movement of raw materials necessary for industrial development. Economically, railways would not only facilitate domestic consumption and foreign trade by conveying goods from productive regions to major cities and seaports such as Yokohama or Kobe, private investment in the railway industry was a good way to spur private capital growth.¹⁸⁰ Ideologically, locomotives and railways symbolized progress and modernity, to the point where – as Carol Gluck famously argued – “two ubiquitous images gradually emerged as symbols of ‘civilization’: the monarch, and the locomotive.”¹⁸¹ One sometimes-overlooked, yet just as important, process in Japan’s emergence as a modern nation was geographic integration. Once again, railways played a significant role as local lines were built around the country in order to overcome the historic isolation of remote regions and firmly tie all parts of the nation to the capital city of Tokyo. When the Meiji government sought to assert territorial control over Hokkaidō in response to threats of Russian encroachment, it was railways that provided the infrastructure for commercial and industrial development of the island. As the example of Hokkaidō demonstrates, it was through cultivation of “unused” land that Japanese colonizers sought to assert ownership rights to territory.

This belief in “cultivator’s rights” remained unchanged as Japanese defense strategists turned their attention from shoring up Japan’s domestic borders to extending imperial influence overseas in response to a persistent Western threat. From the mid-

¹⁸⁰ See Stephen J. Ericson, *The Sound of the Whistle: Railroads and the State in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

¹⁸¹ Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, 101.

1870s, Japanese policymakers such as Yamagata Aritomo began stressing the need to define and create defensible buffers to Western encroachment. Because of its proximity to the Japanese mainland, Japanese defense strategists quickly identified Korea as a strategically important region. Concerned that what they saw as “maladministration” of the peninsula would invite the intervention of Western imperialist powers, Japan tried to self-servingly support Korean independence. By compelling Korea to declare itself independent of Chinese suzerainty in 1876, and then encouraging a fledgling native modernization movement within Korea in the 1880s, Japanese agents sought to foster Korean modern development. When these efforts did not proceed at a pace deemed acceptable by Japanese strategists, more aggressive actions were taken in the mid-1890s. If these attempts at modernizing Korea were at first sincere, they were always motivated primarily by Japanese national defense concerns. In the minds of Yamagata and other Japanese thinkers, the idea was that Korea must become a modern and powerful country in order to withstand Western encroachment, as Japan had done following the Meiji Restoration. As these Japanese strategists saw it, the problem was that Korea at the time was ruled by a regime that resisted modernizing reforms that would undermine their power, all the while relying on Chinese recognition and protection to prop up their regime. Thus began a complicated chain of logic whereby Korea as a defensive buffer to Western imperialism meant Korea as a sovereign independent nation, which required Korea becoming industrialized and wealthy, which could only be achieved by internal reform and modernization, which necessitated removal of the anti-reform regime, which finally entailed the expulsion of the Chinese. The complexity of these logical gymnastics was duly reflected in the internally contradictory position taken by Japan towards Korea

during the Sino-Japanese War, which can be summed up as: “infringing on Korean independence in order to protect it.” Perhaps no better commentary can be made on the inconsistency of this policy than that uttered by Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang Feng-zao when he officially rejected the Japanese proposal for a joint committee of Japanese and Chinese representatives to implement internal reforms in Korea. “We are sure that Japan has no more right to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea,” the Qing government communicated through Wang to Japan, “since you have from the first recognized her autonomy.”¹⁸² Only when keeping in mind that it was Japanese independence – not Korean – that was being protected in the end, does such a blatantly paradoxical policy begin to become comprehensible.

Motivated by security concerns, Japanese agents in Korea pursued railways in order to establish Japanese influence over colonial territory. As the series of railway opening ceremonies recounted at the beginning of the chapter indicates, Japanese railway construction proceeded simultaneously and following the same pattern in the mainland, the newly integrated territory of Hokkaidō, the recently acquired colony of Taiwan, and Korea. Although each of these lands had differing legal statuses, it is notable that railways were used to introduce and solidify Japanese influence in each case. In Korea, constructing railways was seen as a way to facilitate commercial trade while also securing solid claims of ownership of Korean territory. In Taiwan, Japanese colonizers touted the logistical benefits of railways while extoling the ability of locomotives to propel the advancement of civilization. Thus the infrastructure of empire was the same as the Japanese empire expanded, regardless of whether it was through formal or informal

¹⁸² Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan*, vol. 1, 38.

imperialism. It was by developing the natural environment through construction of railways in new territories that Japanese agents attempted to expand imperial influence. As the next chapter will argue, this attempt to cultivate Japanese imperial hegemony also extended to manipulation of the built environment.

CHAPTER V
CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN BUILT FORM: COLONIAL PUBLIC WORKS IN
TAIPEI AND SEOUL

I expected to find all the large towns in Formosa built like the ones in China...But I found all were built after the European style and had wide streets, as clean as the best in Tokyo. Some are even better than any to be found in Tokyo because they are properly macadamised.
Takekoshi Yōsiburō, 1907¹

In controlling a foreign race acquired through military force, the colonizer must by all means have in mind not only the objective of securing its own rights, but also the noble aims of proclaiming civilization and promoting the social welfare of humanity.
Mochiji Rokusaburō, 1912²

It may be hoped with reason that the measures adopted by the present Governor-General with a view to developing industries, imparting education, and improving the sanitary condition will lead the native population to appreciate the boons of the Japanese administration and to assimilate themselves gradually to the ways of civilized life.
Gotō Shimpei, 1902³

On the morning of October 1st, 1926, central Seoul's Kwanghwamun Street – the widest thoroughfare in the city – was crowded with automobile traffic as nearly 1,500 visitors made their way through a ceremonial archway leading to the massive Edwardian Neo-Baroque edifice presiding over the boulevard. On this day, none other than the 16th

¹ Takekoshi Yosaburo, *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 283-285.

² KDL: Mochiji Rokusaburō, *Taiwan Shokumin Seisaku* [Taiwanese colonial policy](Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1912), 432.

³ Gotō Shimpei, "Formosa Under Japanese Administration," *The Independent* 54 (1902), 1585.

anniversary of the beginning of Japan's colonial administration of Korea, Japanese military and civilian officials, Korean aristocrats, foreign dignitaries, and even the visiting Prince of Siam, gathered to celebrate the opening of the recently completed Government-General Building (JPN: *sōtokufu chōsha*; KRN: *ch'ongdokbu chōngsa*). As the distinguished guests assembled in the ornate marble-tiled hall at the heart of the building, the ceremony began with a traditional Shinto ablution (*shubatsu*) by the high priest of the Chōsen Shrine, a performance by Korean dancer Yi Dong-an, and the waving of a sacramental *hinoki* cypress tree branch by Governor-General Saitō Makoto. Turning to address the crowd, Saitō remarked that he was “overcome with happiness” that the event should be held on such a significant day for the Government-General.⁴

For Governor-General Saitō, architect of Japan's Cultural Rule (*bunka seiji*) policies formulated in response to the massive Korean anti-imperial 1919 March First Movement, the renovation of the Government-General Building denoted a far-reaching overhaul of the Japanese colonial administration. During the first decade of colonial rule in Korea, Japan had harshly governed the peninsula through sheer military force, with policies accurately characterized as “military rule.” No better illustration of the iron-fisted Japanese military rule of this period exists than Governor-General Terauchi Masatake's threat to those Koreans who dared to resist Japanese colonization. “I will whip you,” thundered Terauchi, “with scorpions!” Even “if the remark was apocryphal,” Mark Peattie notes, “the sentiment was not.”⁵ Governor-General Saitō, on the other hand,

⁴ KDL: Anonymous, “Sōtokufu Shinchōsha Rakuseishiki” [Ceremony for the completion of the new Government-General Headquarters Building], *Chōsen* 138 (1926): 104

⁵ Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Roman H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 18.

governed the peninsula through policies of cultural, rather than military, rule. Adopting a strategy of “divide and rule,” the Japanese Government-General under Saitō attempted to establish Japanese cultural hegemony with administrative policies that “co-opted nationalist leaders and channeled popular anti-Japanese sentiments into institutionalized forums.”⁶ As Michael Robinson explains, these policies were “designed to soften the appearance of repression while at the same time strengthening Japanese control...The goal was to make Japanese rule acceptable not only to world opinion, but to gain legitimacy within the colony as well.”⁷

To Saitō, the newly constructed Government-General Building symbolized the cultural emphasis of the reformed Japanese administration. “This new building, constructed and completed in a solid (*kenrō*) and magnificent (*kōsō*) style, is beyond criticism as the central government office of the peninsula,” Saitō proclaimed. Yet the building was only as meaningful as its occupants. “Just as the building has renewed its appearance,” Saitō continued, “it is my hope that those involved in governance, too, will surely achieve even more desirable results by being all the more sincere (*shisei*), selfless (*hōkō*), deferential (*kikkyū*), and diligent (*jinsui*), thereby giving meaning to the reconstruction of this building.”⁸ It was as if the Governor-General Building, despite its rigid ferroconcrete construction, embodied the flexible, co-optive structure of Japanese cultural rule Saitō hoped to implement after 1920. Indeed, the Government-General

⁶ Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, “Introduction: Rethinking Colonial Korea,” in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8.

⁷ Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 4.

⁸ Anonymous, “Sōtokufu Shinchōsha Rakuseishiki,” 104.

Building was the capstone of Japanese attempts to achieve cultural hegemony in built form in the colonies, namely through public works projects designed to improve the built environment of the colonial city.

Improvement of the built environment was paired with manipulation of the natural environment in Japanese efforts to solidify, validate, and profit from colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea. Alongside the cadastral surveys, topographical maps, and meteorological statistics carried out to render the colonial countryside legible to administrators and agricultural planners – as well as the road, river, and railway improvements undertaken to accelerate shipping and mobilize troops throughout the colonial hinterland, the port construction programs executed to expedite trade with the metropole – Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and Korea initiated massive urban improvement programs to produce spaces that would at once facilitate urban commerce, advance “primitive” local culture, promote sanitation and hygiene, and project Japanese culture and modernity. Working from within the preexisting built environment of Taipei and Seoul, Japanese planners sought to assert colonial power in the space of the city through public works: namely, street improvements, the promulgation of construction and street use codes, and the introduction of monumental urban design framed by streets and western architecture.

The cultivation of Japanese cultural hegemony in the colonial built environment through public works projects consisted of three processes. First, Japanese planners in Taipei and Seoul attempted to construct colonial difference in the built form of the city through the paving of “culture streets” as the groundwork for the development of “culture cities”. This meant widening, straightening, and paving city streets, installing sidewalks,

gutters, and sewers, and planting roadside trees in order to produce a streetscape that was sanitary and visibly “modern” – that is, ordered, regular, hygienic, and “civilized” in appearance. One reason for these projects was that Japanese officials assigned to the colonies and expatriate settlers desired familiar urban environments. Planners therefore selectively modernized the built environment of Japanese areas of the colonial city to suit Japanese values and expectations. Concentrating street improvement and sewer installation projects in areas of Japanese residence, planners created Japanese enclaves within the native city, such as Kyōmachi in Taipei, or Nihonmachi (“Japan Town”) in Seoul. In the minds of planners, these “modern” Japanese spaces would be juxtaposed to what they dismissed as the “primitive” indigenous neighborhoods, which in the eyes of the Japanese community were disorganized, unsanitary, and diseased. Secondly, Japanese planners attempted to frame colonial space and discipline public life through the promulgation of a number of building codes and street use regulations. By dictating building forms and Japanese expectations of “civilized” public behavior, such restrictions projected Japanese cultural hegemony beyond Japanese enclaves to the rest of the city. Finally, Japanese planners used urban design to concretize this cultural hegemony in the built environment by choreographing street improvements and architecture to reconfigure the urban fabric of the city and produce imperial space.

This chapter will chart Japanese attempts to cultivate cultural hegemony in built form through the construction of colonial difference, the enframing of public space and colonial life, and the designing of imperial space over three sections. Before addressing these issues directly, however, it is necessary to situate public works in Japanese colonial policy. As the first section of this chapter will argue, production of tangible “modernity”

in the colonies through civil engineering was a vital component of Japanese colonial “governmentality.”⁹ But public works projects could not be carried out without trained engineers to plan and execute them. The second section of the chapter will therefore examine the make-up of the Japanese colonial engineering bureaucrat. Only after understanding how public works fit into strategies of Japanese colonial rule – and examining the qualifications and experience of those who made these projects possible – can the discussion turn to the construction of cultural hegemony in Taipei and Seoul. As each section will demonstrate, Japanese planners carried with them practical lessons and technical knowledge acquired from earlier urban planning projects in Tokyo as they moved to the colonial worksite. Urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul were by no means identical to projects in Tokyo, and there was certainly no predetermined grand design that guided Japanese colonialism. Nevertheless, Japanese colonizers and civil engineers responded to local problems in their respective territories by drawing from a shared archive of knowledge acquired in the metropole. Identifying the similarities among Japan’s diverse colonies therefore reveals common strategies of colonial rule.

⁹ In analyzing the characteristics of the modern state, French philosopher Michel Foucault coined the term “governmentality” to signify the various strategies and institutions by which the population of a given nation became known to the state. According to Foucault, governmentality could be defined as: “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security,” also “the tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed ‘government’ – resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges.” See: Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in *Power*, vol.3 of *The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2001), 219-220.

Because Japanese colonizers frequently spoke in terms of constructing “modernity” and “culture,” similarities among the colonies can also illustrate how Japanese in the mid-Meiji period conceptualized these complicated ideas. Finally, if there was one commonality between the metropolitan and the colonial worksite, it was a pragmatic approach to urban improvements. Rather than attempting to impose preformed urban space onto the city, Japanese colonial engineers worked from within the existing built environment in both Taipei and Seoul in order to slowly transform the city. In the final analysis, it was this flexible approach to urban planning that allowed the construction of imperial space in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul.

Engineering Colonial Governmentality

Improving the natural and built environments of the colonies was just one of Japan’s strategies of colonial rule. Japanese colonizers in both Taiwan and Korea published voluminous amounts of material documenting their various efforts to administer the colonies. Published in the name of garnering acceptance and approval of Japanese achievements, these reports also archived for posterity the colonial governments’ systemic efforts to index and manipulate Taiwanese and Korean social life, institutions, and territory in the name of furthering Japanese knowledge of, and power over, the colonies. With titles such as *The Progress of Taiwan (Formosa) for Ten Years, 1895-1904*, *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa*, *Report on the Control of the Aborigines in Formosa*, and *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen [sic]*, and the *Annual Report on the Administration of*

Chosen [sic], these reports read as catalogues of Japanese micro-technologies of colonial rule.¹⁰

It is easy to see the projects and statistics indexed in these reports as mechanisms of colonial governmentality by which colonial administrators sought to engender “bio-power” over the colonial population. Annual reports issued by the Government-General of Korea starting during the Protectorate period (1905-1910) are especially instructive in this regard. Starting with the first issue, the *Annual Report for 1907 Reforms and Progress in Korea*, the reports covered reforms in: administration, the judiciary, defense, finance, currency, banking, commerce, communications, and education. Finally, a number of statistical tables were appended, cataloguing “Population and Domicile (Exclusively Koreans),” Korean government revenues, imports and exports, the number of schools, and the size of the Korean student population.¹¹ Later reports grew even larger as the government-general added programs of Shinto shrine administration, “charity and relief work,” and archeological excavation. Reflecting this expanded coverage, later issues contained even more statistical tables. The *Annual Report for 1921-1922*, for instance, included a total of 49 statistical charts and tables detailing Japanese surveillance of all aspects of life in Korea. From these statistics, we learn, for

¹⁰ See: Government-General of Taiwan, *The Progress of Taiwan (Formosa) for Ten Years, 1895-1904* (Taipei: Government-General of Taiwan, 1905); Okamatsu Santarō, *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa* (Kyoto: Commission for the Investigation of Old Laws and Customs in Formosa, 1900); Taiwan Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, *Report on the Control of Aborigines in Formosa* (Taipei: Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911); Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea)*(Keijō [Seoul]: Government-General of Chosen, 1911-1923); and Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen* (Keijō: Government-General of Chosen, 1923-1938).

¹¹ Government General of Chosen, *Annual Report for 1910-1911*, 255.

example: the total rainfall and average temperature for 14 different cities; the number of Korean families in the peninsula; the population by occupation; births, deaths, marriage, and divorce figures; detailed totals for agricultural, industrial, and forestry production; and the Korean student population.¹² Significantly, included among the projects detailed by the colonial government were civil engineering, forestry, agriculture and industry, and sanitation. All were mechanisms of engineering Japanese colonial governmentality in space.

Scholars of Japanese colonialism have long recognized the applicability of French philosopher Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality to analyze Japanese strategies of rule – particularly in Taiwan. In her discussion of Japanese “colonial engineering,” Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai analyzed the Taiwanese *hokō* (CHN: *baojia*) system of local land administration adapted by the Japanese colonial authorities from the traditional Chinese practice in order to “illustrate the insights – and also the limits – of Foucauldian governmentality in colonial studies.”¹³ As Ts'ai demonstrates, local *hokō* agents became transponders of social control as they were increasingly tied to local police stations and charged additional responsibilities. “In addition to local police work and documenting population movements,” Ts'ai notes, “they had to track infectious diseases and opium smoking, provide money for laborers for public works and community services, and the like.”¹⁴ Paul Katz, meanwhile, has included the *hokō* system along with regular censuses and the household registration system as policies of governmentality that exacerbated

¹² Government General of Chosen, *Annual Report for 1921-1922*, 260-274.

¹³ Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 95-96.

¹⁴ Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building*, 117.

Taiwanese anger at the colonial regime and fueled the widespread 1915 protests known as the Ta-pa-ni Incident.¹⁵ Finally, Yao Jen-to has examined colonial statistics, land surveys, censuses, and research of local customs to demonstrate how governmentality informed Japanese colonial rule.¹⁶

While building on this previous scholarship, this chapter will take a more spatial and material approach to governmentality and colonial power than have other scholars of early Japanese imperialism. As Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker have pointed out, “governmentality has a material as well as discursive dimension: relations of power are inscribed in physical space as well as social relations.” “Governmentality, in other words, has material effects;” Kooy and Bakker continue, “and material conditions play a role in constituting and/or contesting, government by constraining and shaping their form and effectiveness.”¹⁷ As a concrete example, Kooy and Bakker offer: “Differential access to water supply infrastructure was mobilized discursively by the colonial administration to deepen the differences between European and native (or, increasingly, ‘modern’ and ‘primitive’) urban residents.”¹⁸ Paul Rabinow and Gwendolyn Wright, likewise, explain

¹⁵ Paul R. Katz, “Governmentality and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan: A Case Study of the Ta-pa-ni Incident of 1915,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64, no. 2 (2005): 387-424.

¹⁶ See: Yao Jen-to, “The Japanese Colonial State and its Form of Knowledge in Taiwan,” in *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945*, ed. Ping-Hui Liao and David Der-Wei Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); and Yao Jen-to, “Governing the Colonised: Governmentality in the Japanese Colonisation of Taiwan, 1895-1945,” (PhD diss., University of Essex, 2002).

¹⁷ Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker, “Technologies of Government: Constituting Subjectivities, Spaces, and Infrastructures in Colonial and Contemporary Jakarta,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32, no. 2 (2008): 377.

¹⁸ Kooy and Bakker, “Technologies of Government,” 379.

in a perceptive analysis of Foucault's writings, that bio-power operated through a "modern synthesis of space, power, and knowledge."¹⁹

Manipulation of the natural and built environment through public works projects in both capital and countryside was one example of how the intersection of space, power, and knowledge contributed to colonialism. Expansion of railway networks, restoration of rural highways, improvement of rivers, construction of ports, redevelopment of major urban centers, and the laying of water and sewer systems were all designed to further colonial rule. Not only did such projects militarily consolidate, politically centralize, and economically integrate colonial territories into the empire, they also contributed to the colonizer's knowledge of, and power over, the colonial population and landscape. As scholars of the colonial built environment have pointed out, one way this was accomplished was by ordering colonial space and exposing it to governmental surveillance. Ambe J. Njoh, for example, argued that urban planning and public works in colonial Africa "were necessary to broadcast the authority and power of the colonial state over the colonial subjects."²⁰ In addition to reaffirming "preconceived notions of European supremacy and power," Njoh notes, "Colonial physical space was ordered to afford the colonial state total and inordinate control over the capital city, other cities, and the colonial territory as a whole, in that order."²¹ Through projects that would make colonial territory "ordered, sanitized, and amenable to regulations, and structured to

¹⁹ Wright, Gwendolyn, and Paul Rabinow, "Spatialization of Power: A Discussion of the Work of Michel Foucault," *Skyline* 4 (1982): 15.

²⁰ Ambe J. Njoh, *Planning Power: Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa* (New York: UCL Press, 2007), 11.

²¹ Njoh, *Planning Power*, 1, 229.

enhance the flow of economic activities such as trade and communications,” Brenda Yeoh adds, colonizers structured the built environment in order to “facilitate colonial rule and express colonial aspirations and ideals.”²² Clearly marked streets, sewers, parks, and open spaces, Yeoh argues, were all components of British attempts to construct a “legible system” in Singapore.²³

Yet in the case of Japanese colonialism, public works programs were designed less to increase territorial legibility and more to project Japanese modernity and culture. While there undoubtedly were commercial motives in mind as well, the desire to assert Japanese modernity drove the efforts of railway construction, street improvement, and urban sanitation, among all the others, undertaken by Japanese colonizers. In Meiji period Japan, imposing modernity meant introducing the forms and practices that Japanese saw as “modern” – primarily meaning “Western.” As a result, what was seen in the case of Japanese colonialism was attempts to buttress colonial power through the transposition of a borrowed culture onto the colonies.

For Japanese colonizers, the introduction of “modernity” was a means of securing control by winning the hearts and minds of the colonized population. This grew out of an unwavering belief in the cultural superiority of Japanese modernity and a naive faith in the proselytizing power of progress. “It may be hoped,” explained Taiwan colonial administrator Gotō Shimpei in a 1902 English-language article on the Japanese administration of Taiwan, that “developing industries, imparting education, and

²² Brenda S.A. Yeoh, *Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 12-13, 16.

²³ Yeoh, *Contesting Space*, 17.

improving the sanitary condition will lead the native population to appreciate the boons of the Japanese administration and to assimilate themselves gradually to the ways of civilized life.”²⁴ As Gotō indicated, the production of the tangible forms of modernity through public works were an integral part of what he called “scientific colonialism” (*kagakuteki shokumin seisaku*). “Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on principle of biology,” Gotō famously argued. “What are these principles? They are to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force.”²⁵ Part of these scientific principles included thorough research of local customs and adaptation of policies to suit local needs, rather than the hasty importation of laws and systems from the mainland. As E. Patricia Tsurumi relates, when asked to define what he meant by “biology politics,” Gotō replied: “To put it crudely, it is respecting customary usage, because, in any case, one cannot change a flounder into a sea bream right away.”²⁶

While Gotō may have talked in terms of assimilation, the real goal was solidifying control by securing consent. Another colonial theorist who held positions in both Taiwan and Korea, Mochiji Rokusaburō, closely linked culture and control in a 1912 treatise on colonial policy in Taiwan. “In controlling a foreign race acquired through military force,” Mochiji unequivocally stated, “the colonizer must by all means have in mind not only the objective of securing its own rights (*riken fushoku*), but also the noble aims

²⁴ Gotō, “Formosa Under Japanese Administration,” 1585.

²⁵ Quoted in Han-yu Chang and Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 22, no. 4 (1963): 438.

²⁶ E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Taiwan Under Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shimpei,” *Harvard Papers on Japan* 4 (1967): 107.

(*kōshō no mokuteki*) of proclaiming civilization (*bunmei no senden*) and promoting the social welfare of humanity (*jinrui fukushi no zōshin*).²⁷ What Mochiji had in mind, Michael Weiner describes, was a “reassurance and guidance” policy (*suibu keidō*), “which would gradually introduce the benefits of modern civilisation, discourage hostility to Japanese rule and safeguard the future welfare of the Taiwanese.”²⁸ This is a perfect illustration of what Gotō, Mochiji’s boss in Taiwan, meant when he advocated the principal of *bunsō teki bubi*, which is often translated as “military preparedness in civil garb,” but could just as easily be rendered as “military preparation under the guise of civilization.” In fact, considering the way Gotō himself defined the term, the latter might be more appropriate. “In short, colonial policy is [*bunsō bubi*];” Gotō explained, “it is carrying out the hegemon’s strategies under the flag of the kingly way.” “What facilities, then, are necessary to see it through?” he continued:

We have to implement a cultural invasion with a Central Laboratory, popular education for the resident populace, and forge other academic and economic links. Invasion may not be an agreeable expression, but [language] aside, we can generally call our policy one of invasion in civil garb.²⁹

While Gotō was admittedly talking specifically about his policy towards Manchuria in the early 1900s as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, this strategy of establishing colonial control through modern cultural institutions was exactly what he put into action during his tenure as Director of Civil Affairs in Taiwan.

²⁷ Mochiji, *Taiwan Shokumin Seisaku*, 432.

²⁸ Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 28.

²⁹ Quoted in Joshua Fogel, *The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 119.

The construction of “modernity” through public works programs was a vital element in the Japanese “cultural invasion” of the colonies. A 1929 Taiwan Government-General report of water systems in Taiwan made a clear connection between public works and colonial governance, explaining that urban development (*toshi setsubi*), promotion of industry (*sangyō shinkō*), “winning hearts and minds” (*min’i yūdō*), and the pacification and development of remote areas (*riban kaihatsu*) were all “stages (*kaitei*) endlessly confronted in the cultivation (*kaitaku*) of rule over the island.”³⁰ In practical terms, public works projects in Taiwan and Korea were meant to make both city and countryside sanitary, hygienic, and economically profitable by repairing gutters, installing water and sewers systems, constructing railways and ports, realigning city blocks, and improving urban streets. At the same time, these projects were designed to expand colonial power in three ways: 1) by justifying Japanese claims of ownership of colonial territory and of a right to rule through cultivation and improvement of the natural and built environments; 2) by announcing the arrival of the new Japanese colonial regime by concretizing the transition of rule by juxtaposing the urban modern with the vernacular “pre-modern”; and 3) by garnering acceptance and approval of Japanese colonialism from the colonized population, the Japanese expatriate community, and Western imperialists. As a 1930 report on public works in Taiwan reveals, Japanese colonizers drew a close connection between public works and notions of “civilization.” “When it comes to the development of colonies with low levels of civilization,” the report explained, “the first priority is to provide for the economic enrichment of the

³⁰ Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku, *Taiwan Suidōshi* [History of the Taiwan Water System](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Naimukyoku, 1929), 2.

people's lives. The most vital measure for achieving this is the completion (*kanbi*) of public works facilities, such as railways, roads, ports, urban planning, irrigation, and rivers."³¹ A 1937 report from Korea sounded a similar note: "For the development of humanity (*jinbun*) and the promotion of industry, public works (*doboku jiygō*) must never be neglected."³² As these reports demonstrate, in the minds of Japanese colonizers, "development," "civilization," and governance were all closely related concepts, and all were dependent on public works.

Giving projects in both colonies a level of nation-wide planning impossible in Japan even in the early Meiji period, colonial public works programs were planned by central committees. In Taiwan, the Taiwan Government-General Deliberative Assembly (*Taiwan Sōtokufu Hyōgikai*) was established by imperial decree in March 1896 and charged with advising the Governor-General on matters relating to annual budgets, public petitions, and the "planning of important public works."³³ Consisting of the Governor-General, the heads of the civil affairs and military affairs bureaus, and the department chairs of various departments, the Assembly considered a variety of perspectives as it deliberated items presented by the Governor-General, including the urban planning of Taipei. The more focused Taipei Urban Planning Committee (*Taihoku Shiku Keikaku*

³¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Dobokuka, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Shukan Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [Summary of public works projects carried out by the Taiwan Government-General Home Bureau Public Works Department](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Dobokukyoku, 1930), 2.

³² NDL: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed. *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made* [Records of public works projects in Korea: until 1928](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1937), 1.

³³ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020232900, "Go-shomei genpon, Meiji Nijūkyū-nen, Chokurei Dai Hachijūkyū-gō Taiwan Sōtokufu Hyōgikai Shōtei" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1896, Imperial Edict #89, charter of the Taiwan deliberative assembly].

Inkai) was formed as early as 1897 to plan hygienic facilities for the capital. Despite this objective, the committee consisted of a mix of engineers and military personnel of which only two had experience in public health.³⁴ New members with expertise in railways and architecture were added in mid-1899 as the Urban Planning Committee was granted unprecedented authority over urban design – including both street and building layouts – in the Japanese area within the city walls.³⁵ The purview of the committee was further expanded to cover planning of the nearby port city of Keelung in 1900, and was finally restructured in 1910 as the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee (*Taiwan Shiku Keikaku Inkai*) and charged with planning improvements in cities across the island.³⁶ Public works administration was more streamlined in Korea, where projects were planned by the Public Works Council (*Doboku Kaigi*) established within the Government-General by Imperial Edict just one month after annexation in 1910. This council in particular appears to have been modeled on a second Public Works Council (*Doboku-kai*) created

³⁴ The 14 members of this first committee were: Fujita Tsuguakira (Army), acquitted conspirator in the assassination of Queen Min of Korea in 1895 Kusunose Yukihiro (Army), Hashimoto Masaaki (Navy), Iwata Takeo (Tokyo, Electrical Eng., 1880), Oshima Kumaji (Tokyo, Law, 1888), Makino Minoru (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1886), Kaneko Yahei (journalist), Iida Kōsuke (Army), Kikuchi Suetarō (Civil Engineer), Katō Takashi (Hygiene engineer), Hamano Yashirō (Tokyo, Civ., Eng., 1896), Isobe Akimichi (Taipei city advisor), Takahashi Masashi (engineer), and Takahashi Ryota (finance).

³⁵ TWH: Doc. #437.24.7, “Taihoku Jōnai ni okeru Kanga oyobi Kōkyō Tatemono Shikichi ni kansuru ken” [Matters regarding government office and public building lots in the areas inside the Taipei city walls].

³⁶ See: TWH: Kunrei #91, “Taiwan Sōtokufu Shiku Keikaku Inkai Kitei hidari no tori aisadamu” [Regulations of the Taiwan Government-General Urban Planning Committee are determined as follows], in *Fuhō* #2948, May 3, 1910. The 12 members on this restructured committee were: Nagao Hanpei, Tamaki Tomoeda, Yamada Shin’ichirō, Takahashi Tatsujirō, Niimoto Shikanosuke, Mochiji Rokusaburō, Kawamura Takeji, Hamano Yashirō, Hazama Kenzai, Nomura Ichirō, Okada Yoshiyuki, and Sakakibara Kenori. For members on this committee, see: TWH: “Jonin oyobi Jirei” [Investitures, appointments, and dismissals], in *Fuhō* #2954, May 11, 1910.

within the Japanese Home Ministry in 1892 to plan nationwide maritime and riparian improvements.³⁷ In the case of the Public Works Council in Korea, however, the Council's purview was extended to "the inquiry and deliberation of the systems (*seido*), planning (*keikaku*), and provision (*setsubi*)" of public works across the entire peninsula, including: "rivers, roads, harbors, navigational beacons, railways, light railways, tramways, power supplies, and water and sewer systems."³⁸ The urban improvement of Seoul was a major component of this peninsula-wide effort to project Japanese power in colonial space. Of the 43 items covered by the Council before 1923, 12 concerned the Government-General's plans for improving the built environment of the colonial capital.³⁹

Still, it is important to keep in mind that none of these civil engineering projects would have been possible without a large number of Japanese bureaucrats and engineers

³⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: A03020126200, "Go-shomei genpon, Meiji 25-nen, Chokurei Dai-52-gō, Doboku-kai Kisoku" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1895, Imperial Edict #52, regulations for the Public Works Council].

³⁸ The Council was established by Imperial Edict #375, issued September 29 and taking effect November 1, 1910; see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020868800, "Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūsan nen, Chokurei Dai sanbyaku nanajūgo gō, Chōsen Sōtokufu Doboku Kaigi Kansei" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1910, Imperial Edict #375, the Korea Government-General Public Works Council].

³⁹ This figure includes: 6 items discussing the Keijō Urban Improvement Projects on June 29, 1911, August 10, 1912, May 15, 1913, January 11, 1917, and August 26, 1917; 2 items for water and sewer system improvements in Seoul on March 16, 1915; 2 items of road, bridge, and water system improvements between Seoul and Inchōn on July 14, 1915; 1 item concerning the reconstruction of Namdaemun Station on August 26, 1917; and 1 item on improvement of the Han River riverbank on May 5, 1917. See: KDL: Anonymous, "Kōtsū Kankei no Kenkyū Chōsakai no Jōkyō" [Current state of affairs of the investigative and survey council on transportation] *Chōsen* 102 (1923): 349-350; and Gotō Yasushi, "Nihon Tōjika 'Keijō' no Toshi Keikaku ni Kansuru Rekishiteki Kenkyū" [Historical research on the urban planning of "Keijō" under Japanese rule](PhD diss., Tōkyō Kōgyō Daigaku, 1996), 109.

to plan and carry out the projects. If public works concretized Japanese colonial power, the planners sitting around the drafting table and the workers on the construction site were the operatives who made it all possible.

Architects and Engineers of Empire: The Colonial Public Works Bureaucracy

To be sure, Imperial Japan did not have an organized “colonial service” like that seen in the Colonial Administrative Service or Indian Civil Service that staffed the British Empire. As Mark Peattie notes, even the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*Takumushō*) established in 1929 “served largely as a coordinating and reporting instrument” and never came close to the influence wielded by the British Colonial Office or the French Colonial Ministry.⁴⁰ Japan’s colonial officials were therefore largely left to their own devices when it came administering their territories, making the colonies nearly autonomous in their policymaking. With high-level officials appointed by the emperor, the absence of an organized colonial service meant that the various colonial governments across the Japanese empire were individually responsible for hiring the ground-level office workers, accountants, engineers, lawyers, doctors, educators, and agriculturalists that would make things run. In Taiwan and Korea, this number ran into the thousands: 12,000 in Taiwan, and 28,000 in Korea by 1926, making each as large as individual ministries in the Japanese central government.⁴¹ Given their relative autonomy from Tokyo and their large

⁴⁰ Mark Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” Chapter 5 to *The Cambridge History of Japan 6: The Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Duus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 244.

⁴¹ Matsuda Toshihiko, “Jō” [Introduction], in *Nihon no Chōsen, Taiwan Shihai to Shokuminchi Kanryō* [The colonial bureaucracy and Japanese colonial rule in Korea and Taiwan], ed. Matsuda Toshihiko and Yamada Atsushi (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan,

staffs, the colonies of Taiwan and Korea, in particular, were indeed what Edward I-te Chen poignantly referred to as “empires within an empire, contrary to the goal of political integration repeatedly proclaimed by the Japanese.”⁴² The lack of a central colonial apparatus, not to mention the lack of a regimented training program for colonial officials, helps explain why Japan never developed a well-articulated colonial policy or grand strategy of rule. In the final analysis, Japan practiced several different colonialisms – one for each of the colonies.

Despite the lack of central direction or coordination between Japan’s far-flung colonies, a closer look at public works projects reveals distinct similarities among Japan’s colonies and occupied territories. As Chen admits, “there were more similarities than differences” between the colonial political and administrative systems of Taiwan and Korea.⁴³ The same goes for the importance placed on public works in developing territory across the Japanese empire, not only in the more recognized colonies of Taiwan and Korea, but also in Hokkaidō, Karafuto, Manchuria, and the South Seas Mandate (*Nan’yō*). This is reflected in the numbers of engineers and architects employed by the colonial governments. Testifying to the importance of public works projects in Japan’s colonial strategy, 169 civil engineers were assigned to the Government-General of Korea in 1912 for “administering architectural and public works business.”⁴⁴ In Taiwan,

2009), 4. As Matsuda notes, at that time, the Communications Ministry consisted of 23,000 members, the Railway Minister 22,000, and the Justice Ministry 15,000.

⁴² Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970): 155-156.

⁴³ Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 155-156.

⁴⁴ Initially, only 7 special (*rinji*) engineers and 90 assistant engineers were assigned to the Government-General. Because of the large number of works planned, these numbers

meanwhile, the Special Public Works Department (*Rinji Dobokubu*) was established in 1896 with a staff of 100, including 98 engineers and assistants spread over sections of public works, architecture, and general affairs.⁴⁵ By 1919, the Public Works Department (*Dobokubu*) alone, not including the accounting or maintenance departments of the Public Works Office (*Dobokukyoku*), had grown to a staff of 114 engineers, assistants, and part-time employees.

Despite Japan's lack of an organized colonial service like those created by Britain and France, similarities in public works design across the Japanese empire can be explained by the existence of a pan-imperial human network of engineers and architects.⁴⁶ What set Japan's particular "colonial bureaucracy" apart from Western examples,

were increased two years later to 10 special engineers and 159 assistant engineers. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020868800, "Chōsen Sōtokufu Doboku Kaigi Kansei"); and JACAR, Ref.#: A03020926900, "Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūgo nen, Chokurei Dai nijūsan gō, kenchiku, doboku oyobi zaisan chōsa no jimu ni jūji seshimuru tame Chōsen Sōtokufu ni Rinji Shokuin secchi" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1912, Imperial Edict #23, appointment of temporary personnel to the Government-General to conduct examinations of public works and government-owned assets].

⁴⁵ JACAR, Ref., #A03020240900, "Go-shomei genpon, Meiji Nijūkyū-nen, Chokurei Dai hyakurokujūkyū-gō, Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseikyoku Rinji Dobokubu Kansei" [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1896, Imperial Edict #169, establishment of the Taiwan Government-General Civil Affairs Bureau Special Public Works Department].

⁴⁶ Some work has been done on networks of bureaucratic and architectural personnel in the Japanese empire. Okamoto Makiko has analyzed the colonial bureaucracy in Taiwan and Korea in *Shokuminchi Kanryō no Seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan Sōtokufu to Teikoku Nihon* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008). Nishizawa Yasuhiko has traced the activities of Japanese "architects who went overseas" to practice in Manchukuo and occupied northeastern China in the 1930s in *Umi wo Watatta Nihonjin Kenchikuka: 20-seiki zenhan no Chūgoku Tōhoku chihō ni okeru kenchiku katsudō* (Tokyo: Shōkokusha, 1996). Finally, Huang Chun Ming has examined the activities of Japanese architects in Taiwan in "Meiji-Jiki Taiwan Sōtokufu Kenchiku Gishi no Nenpu (1895-1912)," *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Taikai Gakujutsu Enkō Gaiyōshū F, Toshi Keikaku Kenchiku Keizai, Jūtaku Mondai, Kenchiku Rekishi, Ishō 1993* (1993): 1505-1506; and "Taishō-ki Taiwan Sōtokufu Kenchiku Gishi no Nenpu (1912-1926)," *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Taikai Gakujutsu Enkō Gaiyōshū F-2 Kenchiku Rekishi, Ishō 1995* (1995): 83-84.

Matsuda Toshihiko points out, was that it was characterized by a close human relationship between metropole and colony.⁴⁷ Indeed, two particular features stand out when examining the ranks of Japanese civil engineers and architects active in Taiwan and Korea in the early colonial period. First, many of the bureaucrats, architects, and engineers involved in the planning of colonial public works were trained in metropolitan programs, particularly at Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities. Because there was no preparatory course specifically for colonial service, graduates who took jobs in the colonies received the same training as graduates who went on to work in central government or other metropolitan positions. Even after the founding in 1900 of the private Takushoku University (literally, “Colonization” University) by former Governor-General of Taiwan, Katsura Tarō, specifically to train future colonial officials, the imperial universities continued to produce most colonial bureaucrats. Secondly, there was a high degree of personnel rotation between the metropole and the colonies, and even amongst the colonies. Although some colonial agents were hired by the governments-general right out of school and spent their entire careers overseas, most worked for several years in Japan before transferring to colonial worksites. A significant number used these positions in the colonies to gain experience and build their reputations before returning to fill prestigious jobs in the metropole or in other colonies. These two features made individual colonial bureaucrats vital transponders in a pan-imperial flow of ideas and techniques that led to significant conceptual and technical parallels between public works projects in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul. As a result, while there was certainly no

⁴⁷ Matsuda, “Shokuminchiki Chōsen ni okeru Kanryō,” 3-4.

grand strategy of Japanese colonial rule, this human network of colonial public works bureaucracy led to remarkably similar designs across the empire.

If there was any training program for Japanese colonial bureaucrats, it was the imperial university system. As Mark Peattie relates, colonial officials were mainly Japanese imperial university graduates, especially from Tokyo Imperial University, who had qualified for the civil service. “The thinking behind this arrangement,” Peattie explains, “seems to have been that it was better to have Japan represented overseas by individuals who had met the exacting and uniform standards of the Japanese bureaucracy than by brilliant innovators or those who had expertise in a particular colonial area.”⁴⁸ The same was true for the bureaucrats, engineers, and architects responsible for colonial public works. Many of these operatives of empire were trained at Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities; the remainder graduated from private technical schools specializing in engineering, such as Kōshugakkō (today, Kōgakuin University) in Tokyo. In Taiwan, the instability of the public works bureaucracy initially mirrored the frequent turnover of government-general officials – Taiwan had three Governors-General between 1895 and 1898. This began to change in 1898 when Tokyo Imperial University graduate Nagao Hanpei joined the department after working in a series of public works positions in Japan. Taking over as division chief (*kachō*) in less than a month, Nagao reformed the program to not only introduce more consistency, but also to bring in more engineers trained within the imperial university system as the bureau increased in size. During Nagao’s time as division head and then as office head (*kyokuchō*) between 1901 and 1910, a single group of one dozen trained engineers and architects generally held all public

⁴⁸ Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” 248.

works “engineer” (*gishi*) positions.⁴⁹ Eleven of these 12 were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University, 9 of them trained in the civil engineering program there, and 7 had actually been in school in Tokyo at the same time. This was not just a trend. Statistics meticulously compiled by Tsai Lung-pao show that the far majority of public works engineers in Taiwan were imperial university graduates. As Tsai calculates, of the 43 engineers between 1898-1924 whose school could be ascertained (there were 54 total), graduates of the three imperial universities commanded 79% of the total: 24 (56%) were from Tokyo Imperial University; 9 (21%) were from Kyoto; and 1 (2%) was from Kyushu Imperial University.⁵⁰ Assistant engineer (*gishu*) positions, meanwhile, were generally filled by graduates of the many metropolitan technical schools, such as the Kōshugakkō, which sent 128 graduates to Taiwan over the years 1895-1905, primarily to assist in land surveys.⁵¹

⁴⁹ After 1902, the public works department was moved from the Civil Affairs Bureau to an autonomous Public Works Bureau (*Dobokukyoku*), consisting of divisions of Public Works (*Dobokuka*), Maintenance (*Eizenka*), and Accounting (*Keirika*). Nevertheless, the same group of civil engineers continued to hold the highest positions in the bureau. The name of each (along with their program of graduation) are listed chronologically by date of graduation as follows: Nagao Hanpei (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1891); Takahashi Tatsujirō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1891); Togawa Yoshitarō (Sapporo Agricultural College, Engineering Program, 1892); Nomura Ichirō (Tokyo, Arch., 1895); Hamano Yashirō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1896); Tajima Sekizō (Tokyo, Arch., 1896); Tokumi Tsuneo (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1896); Kawakami Kōjirō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1898); Shimizu Ittoku (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1898); Yamagata Yōsuke (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1898); Ōgoe Taizō (Tokyo, Elec. Eng., 1898); and Yamaji Kaitarō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1899).

⁵⁰ Tsai, Lung-pao, “Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan Zongdufu zhi Jishu Guanliao – yi Tumu Jishi Weili” [The engineering bureaucracy of the Government-General of Taiwan during the period of Japanese rule: a case study of public works engineers], *Xingda Lishi Xuebao* 19 (2007): 319.

⁵¹ Tsai Lung Bao, “Meijiki Kōshugakkō Sotsugyōsei no Kaigai Katsudō: Taiwan wo Chūshin toshite (1895-1905),” *Nihon Kenkyū* 44 (Oct. 2011): 131-174. For a detailed chart of each of these individual engineering bureaucrats, see Tsai, “Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan Zongdufu zhi Jishu Guanliao,” 335-381.

The predominance of imperial university graduates in public works projects carried over to Korea. The *History of Public Works Projects in Korea until 1928* (*Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made*) published by the Government-General in 1937, which lists all past and present personnel related to all sections of the Government-General Public Works Office as of 1928, includes over 50 civil engineers attached to the Government-General. Cross-referencing this directory with records of graduates from the civil engineering departments of Tokyo (as of 1919) and Kyoto Imperial Universities (as of 1920) reveals at least 16 matches.⁵² The directory also lists 15 engineers stationed in the Government-General Public Works Keijō Branch Office, which was established in 1914 to carry out government-sponsored engineering projects in Seoul. Of these 15, nearly half (7) had graduated from either Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial Universities.⁵³

The second important feature of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy was the frequent rotation of personnel between the colonies and the metropole. As Edward I-te Chen notes, the position of Governor-General of Korea became known as “the stepping-stone toward the post of Prime Minister” because of the number of Japanese prime

⁵² See: KDL: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made* [History of public works projects in Korea until 1928](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1937). These 16 matches are listed as follows (with dates of graduation): Shimazaki Takahiko (Kyoto University, Civ. Eng., 1898); Sakaide Narumi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1899); Suzuki Hantetsu (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1901); Nakano Fukamaro (Tokyo, Civ., Eng., 1904); Okuyama Kiichi (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1906); Noguchi Kōichi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1907); Yashima Akira (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1908); Maruyama Yoshiki (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1909); Homma Takayoshi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1910); Yokoi Masuji (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1913); Hanai Matatarō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1913); Nakayama Chiaki (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1914); Nishi Yoshiichi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1915); Homma Tokuo (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1915); Tsuboi Toyohiko (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1916); and Matsuyama Yoshio (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1917).

⁵³ These 7 are: office head Shimazaki Takahiko; Suzuki Hantetsu; Noguchi Kōichi; Yashima Akira; Hanai Matatarō; Homma Tokuo; and Tsuboi Toyohiko. See: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, Appendix 1, 7-8.

ministers who also held the position of Governor-General.⁵⁴ Indeed, 5 of the 8 army generals named Governors-General of Korea ultimately held the position of Prime Minister: Terauchi Masatake, Saitō Makoto, Ugaki Kazushige, Koiso Kuniake, and Abe Nobuyuki. In Taiwan, although only Governor-General Katsura Tarō later became prime minister, several others held important cabinet positions. Governor-General Kodama Gentarō, for example, served as Minister of the Army and later as Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Education. Earlier Chief of the Metropolitan Police in Tokyo and navy admiral Kabayama Sukenori, likewise, held subsequent positions as Home Minister and Education Minister. Den Kenjirō and Minami Hiroshi also both later took cabinet positions as ministers. Finally, another, Ōta Masahiro had earlier served as Chief Executive of the Kwantung Leased Territory.⁵⁵ Granted, while illustrating the close personnel ties between political administration in the metropole and the colonies, this list mainly includes high-level officials who would not have been directly involved in the planning of public works.

Other lower level bureaucrats with ties to Tokyo were more directly involved in public works planning. In Taiwan, after restructuring in 1910, the 12-member Taiwan Government-General Urban Planning Committee included 9 graduates of Tokyo Imperial University, five of whom were trained civil engineers or members of the public works division: Nagao Hanpei, Takahashi Tatsujirō, Hamano Yashirō, Nomura Ichirō, and Niimoto Shikanosuke. Public works administration was an especially good career track

⁵⁴ Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 131-132.

⁵⁵ Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 132. A helpful list of Japanese cabinets from 1885 to 1984 can be found in Janet Hunter, ed., *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), appendix 5.

in Taiwan, where the Director of Civil Affairs was concurrent head of the public works office from 1909 to 1911. Although not trained engineers, bureaucrats Iwai Tatsumi and Ōshima Kumaji both rose from positions on the Taiwan Central Hygiene Committee and Taipei Urban Planning Committee to become Director of Civil Affairs. Finally, another director of Civil Affairs, Uchida Kakichi, also served as public works director and as a member of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee from 1911 before being appointed Governor-General of Taiwan in 1924. In Korea, meanwhile, the presence of Yamagata Isaburō drew a direct line between the Iwakura Mission, the Tokyo Urban Improvement Projects, and street improvement projects in Seoul. The nephew and adopted heir of Yamagata Aritomo, Yamagata had travelled to Europe as a member of the Iwakura Mission and stayed on for an extended study-abroad in Germany. Upon returning to Japan in 1882, he held a number of central government and prefectural positions before transferring to the Tokyo municipal government in 1893. While there, Yamagata applied his knowledge of western cities to the improvement of the Japanese capital as chief of the municipal Home Bureau (*Naimu-bu*) and as a member of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee (*Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Inkai*) for over a decade from 1893-1906. Yamagata finally served as chairman of the Improvement Committee from 1902-1906, before leaving to take office as Minister of Communications. Shortly before the annexation of Korea in 1910, Yamagata was appointed Vice-Resident General (*Fuku-Tōkan*) of Korea. Following annexation, Yamagata was promoted to Administrative Superintendent (*Seimu Sōkan*) in the Government-General, which put him effectively second in command of the Japanese colonial administration in Korea from 1910-1919.⁵⁶ One of Yamagata's

⁵⁶ Biography of Yamagata Isaburō compiled from JACAR, Ref.#: A06051176600,

primary duties as Administrative Superintendent was to sit as chairman of the Public Works Council, which deliberated Seoul street improvements 6 times during Yamagata's time, including each Government-General project.⁵⁷

For some public works bureaucrats, assignments in Taiwan or Korea were pathways that led to prestigious careers back in Japan. Three examples stand out: Hamano Yashirō, Nagao Hanpei, and Nakahara Teisaburō. Hamano was an 1896 civil engineering graduate from Tokyo Imperial University who held concurrent positions in the public works and hygiene divisions of the Government-General of Taiwan for over 20 years until 1919. During this time, Hamano sat on the Central Hygiene Committee, the Taipei Urban Planning Committee, the Taipei Hygiene and Public Works Survey Committee, and the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee. Hamano is perhaps best known for collaborating with William Burton in introducing water systems to Taiwan in the late 1890s. After over 20 years overseas, Hamano relocated to Kobe, where he held simultaneous positions as head of the Urban Planning Bureau and head of the Waterworks Department from 1920.⁵⁸ Better known than Hamano was Nagao Hanpei, who graduated from the Tokyo civil engineering program five years earlier in 1891.

“Yamagata Isaburō”; and *TTKSS*, 33:293, 299, 316. The 1921-1922 Annual Report gives the English title of *Seimu Sōkan* as “Administrative Superintendent.” See: Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen, 1921-1922*, 160.

⁵⁷ See: Gotō Yasushi, “Nihon Tōjika ‘Keijō’ no Toshi Keikaku ni Kansuru Rekishiteki Kenkyū,” 109.

⁵⁸ Fujii Hatsuo, *Doboku Jinbutsu Jiten* [Encyclopedia of civil engineers](Tokyo: Atene Shobo, 2004), 245. Chao-Ching Fu, “From Political Governance and Spatial Restructure to Urban Transformation and Architectural Achievements: Discourse on Architecture in the Japanese Colonial Period, 1895-1945,” in *Constructing the Colonized Land Entwined Perspectives of East Asia around WWII*, ed. Izumi Kuroishi (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 124.

After holding several public works directorships in Japan, Nagao took a position in Taiwan in 1898 as head of the Public Works Department in 1898. Named to the Taipei Urban Planning Committee in 1899, Nagao was later appointed head of the colony-wide Taiwan Urban Planning Committee in 1910. The next year, Nagao relocated to Japan, where he took a position with the Railway Agency. Nagao was then reunited in the Tokyo metropolitan government with his former boss, Gotō Shimpei, when he became head of the Tokyo Electrical Bureau in 1921.⁵⁹ Finally, the most prestigious of all three was Nakahara Teisaburō, an 1882 Tokyo Imperial University graduate who became the acknowledged head of the Japanese civil engineering profession. Starting his career as a military cartographer, Nakahara later took a position as public works supervisor in Kumamoto prefecture. Hired by the Resident-General of Korea in 1906 to supervise civil engineering projects, he directed road improvements in Seoul and Pyongyang before leading a prolific civil engineering career after returning to Japan. Placed in charge of river improvement projects in Osaka and Tokyo throughout the 1910s, Nakahara was named head of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (*Doboku Gakkai*) in 1923.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ See Huang Chun Ming, “Nagao Hanpei to Meiji-ki no Taiwan Eizen Soshiki,” *Dobokushi Kenkyū* 11 (1991): 281-288.

⁶⁰ JACAR, Ref.#: A04010148300, “Tōkanfu Shokikan Matsui Shigeru hoka, go mei Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” [Matters regarding salaries and other payments for Resident-General secretary Matsui Shigeru and five others requested by the Korean government, in addition to regulations applied to employed individuals]; and Fujii, *Doboku Jinbutsu Jiten*, 218. Also notable is the appointment during the same year of architectural advisor Kunieda Hiroshi, who would later supervise construction of the 1926 Government-General Headquarters Building. See: JACAR, Ref.#: A04010147700, “Tōkanfu Gishi Iwata Satsukimaro hoka ni mei Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” [Matters regarding salaries and other payments for Resident-General engineer Iwata Satsukimaro and two others requested by the Korean government, in addition to

Yet, ultimately, it was the officials who transitioned between overseas possessions that wove the Japanese empire into a tight-knit human network of colonial bureaucrats. The best example was Gotō Shimpei, who used positions in Taiwan and Manchuria to advance his career in the metropole. Beginning his civil service in 1883 as a low-ranking bureaucrat in the Home Ministry Hygiene Bureau under Nagayo Sensai, Gotō tirelessly penned proposals on a wide range of issues, including sewer and water improvements in Tokyo in the early 1880s. Rising to director of the Health Bureau by 1892, Gotō continued to propose hygiene policies for Taiwan in the late 1890s.⁶¹ As a result of these proposals, Gotō was appointed Director (*Minsei Chōkan*) of the Civil Affairs Bureau (*Minseibu*) of Taiwan in 1898, in which role he was effectively the *de facto* ruler of Taiwan due to Governor-General Kodama Gentarō's frequent absences from the colony. In addition to his responsibilities as director of civil affairs, Gotō was affiliated with a number of committees and departments dealing with engineering-related projects: the Deliberative Assembly, the Special Land Survey Committee, the Taiwan Central Hygiene Committee, the railway department, and the Special Keelung Port Office, among others. Because of his success over 8 years as a colonial administrator in Taiwan, Gotō's former boss, Kodama, nominated him as the first president of the South Manchurian Railway, a position that he took up in 1906. Gotō served in this role for two years before returning

regulations applied to employed individuals]. Nishizawa Yasuhiko also identifies University of Tokyo engineering graduates Iwata Satsuma (1904), Iwai Chōzaburō (1905), and Watanabe Setsu (1908) as attached to the Takushibu (Ta'kshibu) of the Resident-General. See: Nishizawa Yasuhiko, *Nihon no Shokuminchi Kenchikuron* [Japanese colonial architecture](Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2008), 39.

⁶¹ For Gotō's background, see Yukiko Hayase, "The Career of Gotō Shinpei: Japan's Statesman of Research, 1857-1929," PhD Diss., FSU, 1974, chapter 2. These proposals are all located in the Gotō Shimpei papers in the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research and the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room in the National Diet Library.

to the metropole to sit concurrently as Communications Minister and President of the Railway Agency from 1908. Later, Gotō drew on his experience as a colonial administrator when he was appointed President of the Colonization Office (*Takushokukyoku*). Finally, Gotō was mayor of Tokyo from 1920. Then as Home Minister from 1923, Gotō was chairman of the Imperial Capital Restoration Board charged with planning the reconstruction of Tokyo following the devastating 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake.

One final example, above all, illustrates the archetype of the Japanese “colonial bureaucrat”: Mochiji Rokusaburō, a Tokyo Imperial University-trained lawyer who was directly involved with public works and urban planning in both Taiwan and Korea over the years 1900 to 1923. Although he never achieved the high official appointments or international renown of his contemporaries in Taiwan, Gotō Shimpei and Nitobe Inazō, Mochiji nevertheless led a long overseas career as a bureaucrat and was more directly involved in colonial engineering projects than either Gotō or Nitobe. Dispatched on inspection tours of the American Philippines, Dutch Java, and British India and Egypt during 1907-1908, moreover, Mochiji was a respected scholar of international colonialism who published a lengthy colonial policy proposal entitled *Colonial Policy in Taiwan (Taiwan Shokuminchi Seisaku)* in 1912, in which he argued that Japan must view Taiwan not as a “colonie d’ exploitation” but instead as a “colonie mixed” or “colonie de peuplement” (settler colony).⁶² After graduating from the political science program of the law department of Tokyo Imperial University in 1893, Mochiji began his career as a

⁶² Mochiji, *Taiwan Shokumin Seisaku*, 15; Tsurumi, “Colonizer and Colonized in Taiwan,” 214.

professor at the Fifth Higher Middle School in Kumamoto (predecessor of Kumamoto University), where he taught alongside the famous Lafcadio Hearn. After a series of positions in the Ministry of Education between 1894 and 1900, Mochiji transferred to an administrative position in the Tainan, Taiwan prefectural office. Soon after arriving in Taiwan, Mochiji rose through the ranks of colonial policymaking starting as a member of the Deliberative Assembly from 1903 to 1906 alongside Gotō Shimpei. Mochiji's involvement with public works planning began in 1908 when he was assigned to the Taiwan Central Hygiene Committee and the newly founded Public Works Office Irrigation Division. Named head of the Communications Office in 1910 after the directing the general affairs division of the Construction Office, Mochiji became a member of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee. Mochiji later drew on his public works experience in Korea, where he headed the Government-General Public Works Bureau from 1912 to 1917. As chair of public works, Mochiji also sat on the Public Works Council.⁶³ Holding public works positions in both Taiwan and Korea, Mochiji was one of several colonial bureaucrats who formed a pan-imperial network that transmitted Japanese strategies of spatial manipulation across the Japanese colonies. With Mochiji seated at the planning table, designs of modern urban space adopted in Taipei were adapted in Seoul to produce imperial space.

Connections between the bureaucratic planning personnel and the educational background of civil engineers resulted in striking parallels between public works projects in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul. Colonial engineers and architects drew on lessons they learned from their education and experience in Tokyo as they constructed spaces of

⁶³ Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, Appendix 1, 2.

colonial difference and passed building regulations and street use codes to enframe urban space and discipline public life in Taipei and Seoul. In this way, Tokyo provided the design for the production of space that would project Japanese modernity and extend Japanese colonial power.

“Culture Streets” and “Civilized Cities”: Constructing Colonial Difference

As Partha Chatterjee writes in *The Nation and Its Fragments*, colonizers attempted to govern their territories through the “rule of colonial difference,” a tactic whereby the colonial state maintained a distinct separation between the colonizer and the colonized by “representing the ‘other’ as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly inferior.”⁶⁴ While noting, “the difference could be marked by many signs, and varying with the context, one could displace another as the most practicable application of the rule,” Chatterjee argues that, “race was perhaps the most obvious mark of colonial difference.”⁶⁵

Japanese colonizers most tangibly attempted to assert their power by constructing colonial difference in the built form of the city. This meant not only the building of “modernity,” but also the destruction of the “primitive” in order to emphasize the rupture between colonizer and colonized. “It is said that if we are to build a new age here in Korea, then the present must be destroyed,” wrote Tokyo Imperial University professor of ancient history Kuroita Katsumi in 1922. “But even that destruction is done for the

⁶⁴ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 33.

⁶⁵ Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, 20.

purpose of creation.”⁶⁶ Just as early Meiji Japanese planners had approached the Ginza Bricktown project in Tokyo as an opportunity for the Meiji government to differentiate itself from the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japanese planners would now utilize “creative destruction” as a tool in the colonies.⁶⁷ For Japanese colonial planners, the built environment was most visible “mark” of colonial difference. Streetscapes of straight, paved, and clean thoroughfares outfitted with sidewalks, sewers, and roadside trees, it was believed, would join with western architecture to frame modern urban spaces that dramatically contrasted with surrounding areas not yet improved. To Japanese planners who saw street conditions as the barometer of civilization, it was so-called “culture streets” (*bunka dōro*) and “civilized cities” (*bunmei toshi*) that would convey Japanese cultural hegemony.⁶⁸ With this in mind, Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and Korea carried out street improvements immediately after occupation of the colonial capitals of Taipei and Seoul. In doing so, these cities became what Park Chan Seung has referred to as

⁶⁶ Kuroita Katsumi, “Bunka to Kenchiku” [Culture and architecture], *Chōsen to Kenchiku* 1, no. 2 (1922): 3.

⁶⁷ In using the term “creative destruction,” David Harvey refers to both the radical man-made physical transformations to existing built forms and the conceptual tearing asunder of social organizations and pre-existing thought that intentionally gouged the chasm severing the modern from the premodern. That is to say – whether it was Haussmann destroying existing structures in order to install new thoroughfares, or embellishing Napoleon III’s and his own roles in the planning of Paris – if “modernity” is a myth, it is a myth purposely created in order to differentiate the new from what came before. See: David Harvey, *Paris: Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1.

⁶⁸ Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, *Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran* [Survey of public works in Taihoku](Taipei: Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, 1939), 8; and Taiwan Tsūshinsha, ed., *Taihoku Shi-shi* [History of the city of Taihoku](Taiwan Tsūshinsha, 1920), 55.

“dual cities,” drawing on the French colonial planning policies of Hubert Lyautey.⁶⁹

Describing the southwestern Korean port city of Mokpo, Park writes that “Mokpo thus bore the features of a dual city, where living spaces were ethnically divided and the urban infrastructure differed greatly according to ethnic groups.”⁷⁰ In Taipei and Seoul, likewise, street improvements and building codes were designed to produce spaces of colonial difference that would reify Japanese modernity and colonial power by vividly differentiating “modern” Japanese and “primitive” native space.

For the rule of colonial difference to work, there had to be appreciable contrast between the precolonial past and the colonial present. Only by demonstrating a dramatic transformation between “before” and “after” could such a strategy work. With this in mind, Japanese colonizers’ attempts to deploy the rule of colonial difference incorporated three components: saying, doing, and showing. In order to justify their programs and embellish their accomplishments, colonial planners and administrators first emphasized the unhygienic and disorderly conditions of the “primitive” precolonial city in their writings. In the process, they downplayed efforts of modernization that had taken place prior to the beginning of colonial rule. Simply claiming colonial difference was not sufficient, however: Japanese colonizers backed up their words with actions by carrying out key urban improvements. Although planners in Taipei in Seoul used slightly different rhetoric, projects in both cities focused on street repair, sewer installation, and roadside tree planting in order to produce modern urban space. Yet, it was equally

⁶⁹ Gwendolyn Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900-1930,” *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 2 (1987): 299-300.

⁷⁰ Chan Seung Park, “Colonial Modernity and the Making of Mokpo as a Dual City,” *Korea Journal* 48, no. 3 (2008): 106.

important that these programs not work too well. As Chatterjee points out, the overwhelming paradox of colonial power was that it was “destined never to fulfill its normalizing mission because the premise of its power was the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group.”⁷¹ To put that another way, normalizing colonial powers based on difference were only effective when they were able to sustain that difference. Constructing spaces of colonial difference therefore meant not only paving new streets and erecting new buildings, but also maintaining old ones in order to preserve a visible distinction between colonial and precolonial forms. For this reason, traditional structures were set aside and exhibited as historical remnants – often publicized in travel literature as “historical ruins” (*kyūseki*) that could be juxtaposed to the new modern built environment. Finally, these displays of colonial difference were advertised around the world as Japanese colonizers sought to garner international approval of Japanese colonialism with reports of urban “transformations” and dramatically staged photos.

⁷¹ Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, 18. Writing in 1988, Mark Peattie anticipated Chatterjee’s recognition of the paradoxical nature of colonial power. Japanese colonial policy, Peattie showed, was based on two “inherently contradictory” doctrines: 1) a “racially separatist approach to colonial rule” based on social Darwinism; and 2) practices of “assimilation” (*dōka*) “aimed at eliminating all differences between the colonial and the motherland,” encapsulated in catchphrases such as “same script, same race” (*dōbun dōshū*), “impartiality and equal favor” (*isshi dōjin*), and “extend the homeland” (*naichi enchō*.” See: Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” 238-240; and Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Roman H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 97-102. Of course, such claims of commitment to assimilation were only superficial. As Mark Caprio has demonstrated regarding assimilation efforts in Korea, for example, policy decisions never quite matched the Japanese rhetoric of colonial assimilation. See: Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 198. Yet, as Taylor Atkins, has argued, Japanese nevertheless felt an affinity for Koreans in particular, because of a belief in a joint ancestry. See: E. Taylor Atkins, *Primitive Selves: Koreans in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

The first component in constructing colonial difference was emphasizing the squalor and disorder of the “primitive” native city prior to Japanese street improvements. Not only did this serve to justify new projects, it exaggerated the before-and-after transformation they accomplished. In Taiwan, especially, the rhetoric of colonial officials was shaped by what George Steinmetz has called a “precolonial ethnographic discourse.” As Steinmetz argues in the case of German colonialism, the ethnographic “library” of depictions of indigenous inhabitants found in “travel accounts, fiction, visual images, and any other representations that claim to represent the culture or character of a community defined variously as an ethnic group, race, nation, community, or people,” was marshaled by colonial leaders and employed in the shaping of native policy following colonization.⁷² Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan was conditioned by a precolonial discourse that defined the island as unsanitary and diseased. Even before Japanese colonizers went ashore on the island of Formosa, as it was then called, the idea that Taiwan was dangerously unsanitary was widespread in Japan. “Formosa has been known as a very unhealthy land where none but adventurers would fain set their feet,” Gotō Shimpei informed a foreign audience in 1907. “The general conditions of the island before and just after its cession to Japan may be imagined by the fact that even in Taipeh, the capital, life was made disagreeable by an enourmous number of mosquitoes and flies [*sic*].”⁷³ Elsewhere, Gotō added: “Most people in Japan would consider Taiwan a very

⁷² George Steinmetz, *The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xiii, 2, 27.

⁷³ Gotō, “Formosa Under Japanese Administration,” 1583.

unhealthy place and would not dare to go and live there.”⁷⁴ Japanese politician Takekoshi Yosaburō made similar remarks regarding Japanese attitudes toward the tropical island: “The people of Japan imagined that Formosa must be a most unhealthy country. In addition to this, those Japanese who went to the island, but failed to succeed in the battle of life, brought back a bad report of the land which tallied all too well with the people’s already preconceived ideas.”⁷⁵

This “precolonial ethnographic discourse” of an unsanitary Taiwan shaped how Japanese residents and planners viewed the cities they encountered upon disembarking on the island. Takekoshi revealed his expectations for Taiwanese cities: “I expected to find all the large town in Formosa built like the ones in China,” he wrote, “with narrow streets 10 or 15 feet wide, swarming with young pigs, the streets overflowing with filthy water and laid irregularly with stones of all shapes and sizes, and all the drinking water mixed with sewage.”⁷⁶ As Takekoshi intimates, the idea of disorderly and unclean Chinese cities, and the difficulties they posed for Japanese, was widespread among Japanese in Taipei. “The main cities in Taiwan were all built during the time of Chinese administration,” Governor-General Kodama explained in authorizing the 1899 law that provided land for urban improvements, “and so cannot help but be defective in terms of both transportation and hygiene.”⁷⁷ Blaming the squalid conditions on the Chinese

⁷⁴ Gotō Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in *Fifty Years of New Japan*, Vol. 2, ed. Ōkuma Shigenobu (London: Smith & Elder, 1908), 550.

⁷⁵ Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, 284.

⁷⁶ Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, 284.

⁷⁷ This law was the clumsily entitled Law Regarding Land and Buildings in Areas Designated for Public or Government Use for the purposes of Urban Planning (*Shiku Keikaku-jō Kō-yō mataha Kan-yō no mokuteki ni kyō-suru tame, Yotei Kokuji shitaru*

became a common refrain. “Under the Chinese régime,” Columbia University historian Seiji Hishida wrote in the *Political Science Quarterly* in 1907, “sanitation in Formosa was altogether neglected and the island was generally regarded as a place unsafe for the abode of civilized people...Even Taihoku, the capital of the island, was in a chronic state of filth, and swarmed with flies and mosquitoes.”⁷⁸ Finally, a 1924 public works report lamented the condition of the built environment in Taiwan, describing it as follows: “Existing cities in Taiwan were all built in the Chinese style, so the urban streets were all exceedingly narrow and winding, and the houses all constructed without concern for ventilation or lighting. The roads were always damp, the gutters on either side had no covers, and the stagnated garbage was decayed enough to start epidemics.”⁷⁹

Urban improvements were seen as especially important in Taipei for two reasons: 1) Taipei was the political capital and economic hub of the colony; and 2) the area inside the city walls was early identified as a Japanese space where most of the institutions of governance and Japanese residents would be housed. As a 1939 report of public works in Taipei demonstrated, planners justified street improvement efforts by decrying the poor road and sanitary conditions of the city. “Even though it was the sole capital of this

Chiiki-nai ni okeru Tochi Tatemono ni Kan-suru Ritsurei). See: JACAR, Ref.#: A01200885200, “Taiwan ni okeru Shiku Keikaku-jō Kō-yō mataha Kan-yō no mokusuteki ni kyō-suru tame, Yotei Kokuji shitaru Chiiki-nai ni okeru Tochi Tatemono ni Kan-suru Ken wo sadamu” [Matters determined concerning the Law Regarding Land and Buildings in Areas Designated for Public or Government Use for the purposes of Urban Planning in Taiwan].

⁷⁸ Seiji Hishida, “Formosa: Japan’s First Colony,” *Political Science Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1907): 274.

⁷⁹ Taiwan Sōtokufu Dobokukyoku, *Taiwan Sōtokufu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [Summary of Taiwan Government-General public works projects](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Dobokukyoku, 1924), 246-247.

island,” the report lamented, “the streets of Taipei at that time were all narrow and dirty, and a foul stench hung over the city, incubating countless viruses.” Hygienic issues were not the only problem; planners also bemoaned the negative impact such conditions had on the appearance of the city. “Although Taipei thrived with the trading of foreign and domestic goods as the political and economic center of the island,” the same report complained, “its streets were narrow and sewers and gutters incomplete so that sewage would pool in the streets. Livestock roamed the streets, giving the impression that humans and animals were living together.” Once Taiwan came under Japanese colonial control, planners felt it was necessary to carry out improvements that would bring the urban area up to Japanese standards of living not only because it was the colonial capital, but also because Japanese residents desired comfort. “The most pressing issue,” the report made clear, “was to conform the city to the trends of civilization by placing the Government-General here, preserving the beauty of the city, completing hygienic installations, and smoothing transportation.”⁸⁰ These efforts were encouraged by Japanese residents in the city, who found themselves surrounded by potentially dangerous conditions. Petitioning Governor-General Kodama Gentarō in 1898 at the behest of the Taipei Christian church (*Taihoku Kumiai*), Congregation Executive Committee Chairman (*jōgiin kaigichō*) Yamada Kaizō wrote that Taipei, “was established by the Chinese government, but not only was the planning faulty (*fukanzen*), it was never fully carried out.” “Especially now that Japanese (*naichijin*), who have completely different manners and customs from the Chinese (*Shinjin*), have started to live here,” Yamada pleaded, “the inconveniences and disadvantages (*fuben furi*) are beyond dispute.” “The people all

⁸⁰ Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, *Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran*, 19-20.

desire the implementation of urban improvements.”⁸¹

Predictably similar rhetoric was used to lament the condition of precolonial urban areas in Korea. As an official history of public works projects in Korea recorded, “[In] the urban areas of Korea, as a rule, the streets are narrow and excessively winding, making the city blocks even more irregular; not only do they cause many hindrances in transportation, hygiene, and fire prevention, but they also cause many impediments in the development of the urban area.”⁸² Likewise, the “great inconvenience to communications, and sanitary and fire-brigade arrangements” posed by the “narrow, dirty, and crooked streets” of Korean cities was a common theme in the Government-General’s *Annual Reports*.⁸³ Planners also tied the improvement of streets to the development of civilization. A 1922 Government-General report asserted that urban planning was necessary in Korea because of its “current low level of civilization (*kaimei*)” and the need for “comparatively rapid future development.”⁸⁴ Later, the Government-General elaborated that street improvements were necessary because Korea was “still in the first stages of modernization in many ways” and “nothing [was] more

⁸¹ TWH: Doc.#330.3.4, “Shiku Keikaku iin no gi ni tsuki kengi, Taihoku kumiai jōgiin kaigichō Yamada Kaizō” [Petition from Taipei Christian church Congregation Executive Committee Chairman Yamada Kaizō regarding the urban planning committee].

⁸² Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, 1023.

⁸³ Quotes from Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1921-1922*, 162. Similar comments can be found in reports for 1918-1921, 1921-1922, 1922-1923, 1923-1924, 1924-1926, and 1929-1930.

⁸⁴ Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Sōtokufu Shisei Nenpō* [Annual report on the administration of the Government-General of Korea, 1922](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1923), 305.

keenly required” to “forward the sound development of a Korean town.”⁸⁵

Improving streets in Seoul, in particular, was seen as imperative for producing the commercial efficiency and modern appearance expected of the colonial capital. “Most of the streets, even in the city of Keijo [*sic*], the capital,” the Government-General lamented in 1912, “developed very irregularly, so that great inconvenience has hitherto been felt in street communications and sanitation.”⁸⁶ A 1935 Public Works report went further:

“Because of the outdated transportation system, the urban streets within Keijo, as seen in the back streets of the northern parts of the present-day city, are meandering and narrow, as if they were mazes.”⁸⁷ Engineer Iwamiya Noboru, meanwhile, tied street improvements to urban aesthetics, speaking in familiar terms, “because the streets in traditional Korean cities for the most part lacked any order and were so crooked, and their widths so narrow, they were so inconvenient that we could simply not leave them in that condition for the sake of [Seoul’s] transportation, hygiene, security, and appearance.”⁸⁸

Clarifying that “Keijo [*sic*], the capital, was no exception” to the “miserable state in which most Korean towns were before the Japanese authorities took in hand the improvement or reconstruction of their streets,” the Government-General explained that

⁸⁵ Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1922-1923*, 142-143; and Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1924-1926*, 140.

⁸⁶ Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1911-1912*, 120.

⁸⁷ NDLD: Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō: Shōwa 10-nen 5-gatsu 15-nichi genzai* [Summary of Keijō public works projects: as of October 15, 1935](Keijō: Keijō-fu, 1935), 5 back.

⁸⁸ Iwamiya Noboru, “Dorō Keikaku ni Tsuite” [On road planning] in *Chōsen Toshi Mondai Kaigiroku* [Minutes of meetings on urban problems in Korea], ed. *Keijō Toshi Keikaku Kenkyūkai* (1936; repr., Seoul: Kyōngin Munhwasa, 1990), 54. Page numbers refer to the 1990 edition.

street projects in Seoul were intended to “set an example to other towns.”⁸⁹

Japanese rhetoric of precolonial primitivity necessarily overlooked modernization efforts undertaken prior to the arrival of Japanese colonizers. Despite Japanese claims to the contrary, both Taipei and Seoul had seen improvement projects initiated by previous rulers. The city of Taipei had been founded in 1875 as the capital of the newly reformed northern province of the island, and city walls were erected between 1879-1882 to protect residents from raiders. Yet the area inside the walls did not urbanize until Chinese governor Liu Ming Ch’uan began improvement efforts soon after arriving in the city in 1884 to lead the Chinese defense of the island in the Sino-French War. Between 1884 and his retirement in 1891, Liu initiated a number of improvement projects designed to encourage settlement. In addition to laying out an urban plan for the area inside the walls, Liu introduced stone-paved streets and street lamps, erected new government buildings and public temples, and even laid a railway from Taipei to the coastal cities of Hsinchu and Keelung.⁹⁰

Whereas Taipei was a young city, Seoul had a much longer history of improvement efforts that dated back to its founding as the capital of the Yi Dynasty in 1394. Over this time, the city had seen a series of projects that effected a remarkable change in its appearance long before the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The famous world traveler Isabella Bird, for example, extolled the “extraordinary metamorphosis” she saw in the face of the city between her first trip to the city in 1894

⁸⁹ Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1923-1924*, 135.

⁹⁰ Harry J. Lamley, “The Formation of Cities: Initiative and Motivation in Building Three Walled Cities in Taiwan,” in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 167, 197.

and her return in 1896.⁹¹ “Seoul in many parts, specially in the direction of the south and west gates,” Bird exclaimed, “was literally unrecognizable.” Gone were the narrow alleyways and overflowing sewage ditches she had seen on her first visit. In their place were new streets “widened to 55 feet, with deep stone-lined channels on both sides, bridged by stone slabs.” “Seoul,” Bird concluded, “from having been the foulest is now on its way to being the cleanest city in the Far East!” She went on to attribute these improvements to the work of two people, British advisor to the Minister of Finance, John McLeavy Brown, and the governor of Seoul, Yi Ch’aeyŏn. Yi had visited Washington D.C. with the first Korean ambassador to the United States, Pak Chŏngyang, and this experience influenced his ideas for urban improvement.⁹²

⁹¹ First arriving in the city in 1894, Bird did not mince words describing the squalid conditions. “I thought it the foulest city on earth till I saw Peking,” she lambasted, “and its smells the most odious, till I encountered those of Shao-shing.” Adding, “For a great city and a capital its meanness is indescribable,” Bird wrote that Seoul was full of “labyrinthine alleys, many of them not wide enough for two loaded bulls to pass...and further narrowed by a series of vile holes of green, slimy ditches.” Returning two years later in October 1896, she could barely believe her eyes. Isabella Bird, *Korea and Her Neighbors* ([1897] London: KPI Limited, 1985), 40, 435-436. See Yi Tae-jin, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization in Korean History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 246-247, and Sohn Jung-mok, “Colonial City Planning and Its Legacy,” in *Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth & Change of the Last 100 Years*, ed. Kwang-Joong Kim (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), 434-435 for more discussion of Bird’s recollections.

⁹² Writing in 1990, urban planning historian Kim Kwang’u attributed these improvements to the efforts of the Independence Club led by Sŏ Chae’pil (*aka* Philip Jaisohn, publisher of *The Independent* newspaper), of which Yi was a founding member. Kim points to Interior Ministry Order No. 9, issued September 28, 1896, as evidence that the changes observed by Bird were part of larger, more systematic modernization efforts initiated by Yi and Pak. According to Kim, the Order called for the widening of streets in the capital to their original widths by tearing down houses impeding the roadways, the creation of a new road network of radial roads centering on the main gate of Kyŏng’un Palace, and construction of Western buildings along main streets (Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 247, 270-271).

Street improvements in Seoul specifically were part of an attempt by the Korean government to re-brand “the hermit kingdom” as a modern empire. In addition to contracting foreign investors to construct railways across the peninsula, the Great Han Empire (*Taehan Cheguk*) carried out a number of urban improvements in the capital. As Todd Henry has described, the government cleared stalls impeding the city’s main thoroughfares, installed new roads, and constructed several monuments in an attempt to “re-create the royal city of Hanyang into an ‘imperial capital’.”⁹³ Yi T’ae-jin, likewise, has asserted that the street improvements observed by Bird in the mid 1890s were undertaken at the behest of King Kojong as part of a larger attempt to “make Seoul into a suitable imperial capital” for a newly independent Korea starting in mid-1896.⁹⁴ As Yi argues, this included the reconstruction of Seoul into an imperial capital “befitting the new monarchical system.”⁹⁵ According to Yi, King Kojong ordered the relocation of the court from Kyōngbok Palace to the Kyōng’un Palace in early September 1896, and then initiated a massive urban redevelopment program centered on the new palace. As Yi notes, this explains the timing of the Interior Ministry Order No. 9 issued later that month.⁹⁶ Piecing together the admittedly limited historical record, Yi catalogues the improvements included in the plan as: 1) the laying or repair of roads and sewers, in addition to the clearing of new roads radiating from the Kyōng’un Palace; 2) the

⁹³ Todd Henry, “Respatializing Chosŏn’s Royal Capital: The Politics of Japanese Urban Reforms in Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919” in *Sitings: Critical Approaches to Korean Geography*, ed. Timothy Tangherlini and Sallie Yea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 20.

⁹⁴ Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 269-273.

⁹⁵ Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 250.

⁹⁶ Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 249-250.

construction of new buildings, including the Kyōng'un Palace and Independence Gate; 3) the opening of new parks, such as Independence Park and Pagoda Park; 4) the introduction of electricity, waterworks, streetcars, and railways; and 5) the designation of an industrial district in Yongsan and a city market near Namdaemun.⁹⁷ Yi concludes that these projects “visibly changed the city’s landscape,” but during the colonial period, “The Japanese systematically obliterated the physical landmarks of the urban development that had been implemented by the emperor beginning in 1896, and the project itself was eventually forgotten.”⁹⁸ Some scholars, such as planning historian Sohn Jung-mok, on the other hand, have been skeptical of these arguments, pointing out “although highly feasible, no concrete proof has been found to prove what Kim and Lee [Yi] suggested.”⁹⁹ There is also evidence indicating street projects by the Korean government may have started as early as the 1894 Kabo reforms.¹⁰⁰ In any event, Korean attempts to rebrand

⁹⁷ Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 275-276.

⁹⁸ Yi, *The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization*, 290-291.

⁹⁹ Sohn, “Colonial City Planning and Its Legacy,” 437.

¹⁰⁰ According to a diplomatic report filed in December 1896 by Japanese ambassador to Seoul, Komura Jutarō, the Korean government began planning urban improvements as early as after the “reformation of the year before last” (*issakunen no kaikaku*) – presumably the July 23rd 1894 Japanese-led coup and ensuing Kabo reforms. As Komura reported, it was another governor of Seoul, Yu Chōng-su, who called on the Japanese consulate on April 16, 1895 – the day before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed ending the Sino-Japanese War – to convey a prohibition on the building of houses that extended beyond the roadside gutters and encroached on the streets. As Komura explained, the stated purpose of this order was to prevent the building of structures that could not be torn down in preparation for processions by the King. Another legation official, Uchida Sadatsuchi, saw it another way. Writing in a January 1896 report, Uchida suspected that this order was targeted primarily at Japanese storeowners who had been gradually buying Korean houses leading to the Namdaemun and replacing them with Japanese-style buildings. Because solidly constructed Japanese houses could not be easily torn down on the occasion of a court procession, Uchida surmised, the purpose of the ban was to prevent the spread of Japanese-owned structures outside the settlement.

the city as an imperial capital continued beyond the turn of the century as two Americans were hired to install streetcars, electricity and telephone lines, street lamps, and water pipes in the city starting in 1898.¹⁰¹ Although Japanese colonizers downplayed the success of these reforms, they clearly also benefited from them when enacting their own projects following colonization in 1910.

Claiming colonial difference by emphasizing the poor conditions of the native city and exaggerating the lack of planning and urban development in Taipei and Seoul was only the first step. The actual street improvement work of breaking ground, moving earth, laying pipe, and rolling pavement was the next component of constructing colonial difference. By no means were these programs identical. Indeed, there were two marked differences between the projects in the two cities. First and foremost, Japanese colonial urban design went much more according to plan in Taipei than it did in Seoul.

After receiving the cooperation of the Japanese legation to ensure the compliance of Japanese residents, the Korean government commenced removing temporary structures in June or July of 1895. The plan, Komura detailed, was to widen streets and repair ditches on both sides of the street. Owners of houses that had been constructed before the April announcement, including Japanese residents, were to be compensated for destroyed houses, but not those who erected structures afterwards. As Komura noted, work proceeded until what he called the “Incident of August 8th” – that is, the assassination of Queen Min. The September 28, 1896 Interior Ministry order presumably restarted these stalled projects, eventually completing improvements in the areas that Komura identified as the Sodaemun [West Gate] and Taedong neighborhoods. Perhaps it was these two projects that achieved the great “metamorphosis” Bird noticed in the west gate area. For Uchida’s report, see: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. *Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no gi Zai Keijō Uchida ryōji yori hōkoku no ken, Meiji nijūjūnen ni-gatsu*” [6. Consul Uchida’s report of Deiken area road improvements, February 1896]. For Komura’s report, see: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364600, “7. *Keijō Nandaimon dōri hanro kaoku torikowasu kata chakuraku no tenmatsu guhō no ken, Meiji sanjūnen*” [7. Report relaying full details of arrangements regarding the tearing down of houses impeding Nandaimon Street in Keijō, January 1897].

¹⁰¹ Yi Tae-jin, “Seoul at the Beginning of the 20th Century: Urban Development Based on Western Models,” *Korea Journal* 39, no. 3 (1999): 111.

On one hand, this was because Taipei was a younger and less developed city than Seoul, granting Japanese planners in Taiwan much more freedom in shaping the city as it grew. On the other hand, planners in Taipei had few impediments in carrying out projects because they were able to take advantage of a local custom whereby the government could obtain land free of charge provided that it would be used for public facilities, such as roads or schools. In fact it was not until after 1905 that frustrated Japanese landowners forced the Government-General to pay for appropriated land, even if they only received half price.¹⁰² Projects in Korea, on the other hand, were jointly opposed by Korean and Japanese residents.¹⁰³ Secondly, there were notable differences in the order of urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul. Programs in Taiwan started with improvements to the water system and then transitioned to the streets, while in Korea the first priority was on transportation infrastructure. Taipei also saw the adoption of arcades typical in tropical climates but not seen in either Tokyo or Seoul, in addition to more opulent urban design with a number of rotaries whereas Seoul only had one. Also notable were the disparate architectural styles adopted for the design of the Tatsuno-style neo-renaissance

¹⁰² Taihoku Dobokuka, ed., *Taihoku Doboku Yoran* 1939, 37.

¹⁰³ Notably, Korean residents had also opposed street improvement projects carried out by the Korean court in 1896. The November 5th, 1896 issue of the Korean newspaper *The Independent* recorded:

The Governor of Seoul, Yi Chai Yun, has ordered that the houses and booths that have been built on the public streets throughout the city be torn down. The people in Jun-Dong petitioned to the Governor to rescind the order, but Mr. Yi explained to them that it is against the law of the country and the municipal ordinance to have houses built on the thoroughfare. It is not within the Government's power to ignore the law, hence he has to enforce the order under any circumstances. But the people, nearly fifty in number, followed him round wherever he went and sent up continual bursts by saying: "Let the law go to rest," "We don't want to have our houses torn down," etc. It seems the Governor is traveling on a rough road just at present ("Local Items," *The Independent*, November 5th, 1896).

Government-General of Taiwan building constructed in 1919, and the Edwardian Baroque Revival-influenced Government-General of Korea headquarters built in 1926. Yet it is also important not to let these differences obfuscate important similarities between the programs. In both Taipei and Seoul, Japanese colonizers initially localized improvements to primarily Japanese areas in order to construct spaces of colonial difference before expanding projects outward in order to encompass the entire city. Furthermore, in both cases, plans were pragmatically altered to fit into the existing built environment of the city. It was this pragmatic adaptation that made Japanese colonial urban planning feasible.

In Taipei, planners boasted of the street improvements that transformed what they saw as the primitive and diseased Chinese city into the “Little Paris of the Orient” (*Tōyō no ko-Pari*), as the 1938 travel brochure *Touring Taiwan (Taiwan no Tabi)* praised the city.¹⁰⁴ This was accomplished over 6 stages of urban improvements that began as soon as the Japanese occupied Taipei in 1895 and continued until 1945.¹⁰⁵ Already by August of 1895, only two months after entering the capital, the Government-General was in discussions with the Civil Affairs Bureau concerning the repair of streets and sewers in

¹⁰⁴ KDL: Kinkai Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha, ed., *Taiwan no Tabi* [Touring Taiwan](Taipei: Kinkai Yūsen, 1938).

¹⁰⁵ The 6 stages of planning as described by the *Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi* [History of 20 years of Taipei administration] were: 1) 1895-1896 – gutters outside the city walls; 2) 1896 – sewer improvements planned by Japanese Home Ministry advisor William K. Burton; 3) 1900.8.23 – street improvements inside the city walls announced by the Urban Planning Committee; 4) 1901.6.1 – street improvements south of the city walls announced by the Urban Planning Committee; 5) 1905.10.7 – city plan covering the entire city announced by the Urban Planning Committee; 6) 1932 – Taipei Urban Plan (*Taihoku Toshi Keikaku*) announced with 55 routes, 16 parks, and 4 bridges. See: Taihoku Shiyakusho, *Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi* [History of 20 years of Taipei administration](Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2011), 542-555.

the area inside and around the city walls, which had already been designated as the location of the institutions of Japanese rule.¹⁰⁶ As a result, “gutters” 30 feet wide and 5 feet deep were dug around the outside of the walls in order to collect rainwater, prevent flooding, and thwart the entrance of pathogens – a symbolic moat protecting the besieged Japanese inhabitants from the invading tropical environment, not to mention the guerilla raids by armed bandits who still resisted Japanese possession of the island.¹⁰⁷

Citywide street improvements were first announced by the Taipei Urban Improvement Committee in 1905 (See Figure 12).¹⁰⁸ An earlier plan calling for 6 classes of roads, the widest of which was nearly 60 ft. and large central park had been announced in 1900, but this plan was limited to the primarily Japanese-area inside the city walls (See Figure 13).¹⁰⁹ Improvements expanded to areas immediately outside the southern gate in 1901 (See Figure 14), but it was not until 1905 that the Urban Planning Committee adopted a citywide street plan. The 1905 plan retained the street widths and central park from the earlier 1900 plan, but for the first time planned the removal of the city walls and the extension of the street network to the rest of the city with over 50 miles of new

¹⁰⁶ TWH: Doc.#54.17.19, “Taihoku Jōnai oyobi sono fukin Dōro Kyōryō nado no Shūzen ni kansuru ken” [Matters regarding the improvement of roads and gutters within the city walls and surrounding areas in Taipei].

¹⁰⁷ Taihoku Shiyakusho, *Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi*, 542.

¹⁰⁸ Taihoku-chō, *Kokuji* #200, October 7th, 1905. This documents is reproduced as document #5, “Taihoku Jōnaigai Shikukeikaku,” in Huang Wu Dar, *Rizhi Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu Yanjiu: Shiliao Bian* [Examination of fundamental historical documents of the urban planning process in Taiwan during the period of Japanese rule: document collection](Taipei: Shili Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue Jianzhu ji Dushi Jihua Yanjiusuo), 1997.

¹⁰⁹ The 6 specified widths were 10 ken (~60 ft.), 8 ken (~48 ft.), 6 ken (~36 ft.), 5 ken (~30 ft.), 4 ken (~24 ft.), and 3 ken (~18 ft.).

streets, in addition to nearly 110 miles of new sewers, and almost 20 acres of new parks.¹¹⁰ As Taipei Urban Planning Committee member Nomura Ichirō described, planners had two things in mind when they designed the street layout. First, planners purposely resisted aligning streets perfectly east-west in order to prevent Taipei's predominantly easterly winds from stirring up dust, while also allowing adequate sunlight. Secondly, as much as possible, planners tried to follow the existing street pattern, particularly in the older areas of the city. "The Wanhua and Dadaocheng areas already have streets," Nomura explained, "so we couldn't just draw lines without taking these into consideration." As Nomura clarified, this was a choice made for economical reasons: "if we didn't take account of these existing streets," he wrote, "the necessary expenses would have been extraordinary." "As a result, the plan is to improve the older streets to a certain extent and for the most part to use the existing layout."¹¹¹ This adaptation to the existing street network in the area inside the city walls can be seen in a series of maps of Taipei drawn between 1895 and 1916 (See Figures 15-17). Gotō Yasushi has also helpfully charted a map clearly delineating routes in the 1905 plan that followed existing streets (See Figure 18).

The best example of the Japanese construction of colonial difference in Taipei was the development of the area inside the city walls as a modern Japanese space of sanitary and improved streets, and western architecture. Although this area had been established as the administrative center of the province during the Chinese administration, Japanese colonizers adopted it as the location for the many of their own

¹¹⁰ Taihoku Shiyakusho, *Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi*, 543.

¹¹¹ Nomura Ichirō, "Taihoku no Shiku Kaisei ni Tsuite" [Concerning the urban improvement of Taipei], *Kenchiku Zasshi* 378 (1917): 31.

institutions of colonial rule. Whereas city walls had originally encompassed the area, Japanese planners replaced the walls with another boundary more apropos of the Japanese vision of modernity: tree-lined boulevards. In the end, it was these tree-lined boulevards that became the biggest factor in Taipei's new "civilized" appearance. "Whoever it was that called Taipei the 'Little Paris of the Orient'," declared one history of the city, "must have been talking about these orderly roads and their streetscapes of beautiful greenery."¹¹² Gwendolyn Wright's analysis of the French construction of broad thoroughfares in Morocco is just as applicable to the parkways of Taipei: "These barriers marked the distinctions between two parts of a city, setting off two scales of construction, two periods of history, and often two races."¹¹³ Planning for the "3-lane boulevards" (*sansen dōro*) that made up this barrier zone began with the 1905 urban plan. A number of Baroque-inspired rotaries were planned: one for each corner of the rectangle, and more to lead circulation around 4 of the 5 main gates of the city walls. Ranging in width from nearly 150 feet on the north, east, and west sides of the rectangle, to over 230 feet on the south side, the boulevards were called "three lane boulevards" because the two vehicle lanes were separated by a shaded pedestrian parkway. Constructed between 1910-1913, these boulevards were heralded as markers of Taiwanese advancement. "Planted with unique tropical trees, and designed with circular and semicircular parks placed here and there," boasted a 1939 public works report, "the boulevards have an elegant scenery not seen elsewhere...they are the oldest two-lane 'culture streets' in all of Japan."¹¹⁴ The

¹¹² Taiwan Tsūshinsha, *Taihoku Shi-shi*, 109-110.

¹¹³ Wright, "Tradition in the Service of Modernity," 301.

¹¹⁴ Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, *Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran*, 8.

centerpiece of the Japanese area delineated by these “culture streets” was the Government-General headquarters building completed in 1919. Designed by Tatsuno Kingo-pupil Nagano Uheiji, the building displayed an updated form of the Italianate Neo-Renaissance “Tatsuno-style” seen in Tatsuno’s Tokyo Station, but also exhibited elements of more contemporary Edwardian architecture. But this building was only one of many elements that demarcated this area as Japanese. As a Taipei municipal public works report described this space:

Today, [the area inside the city walls] consists for the most part of Japanese (*naichijin*), with many of the most important buildings – the governor-general, the court, the military headquarters, the library, the museum, banks, and companies – all located here. The flat and paved improved streets, furthermore, crisscross the area, lined on both sides by tall buildings constructed in brick or ferroconcrete, the arcades and streets crowded with the traffic of pedestrians and vehicles (*jinba no kenma kokugeki*). This has all given the area inside the walls a characteristic atmosphere.¹¹⁵

To Japanese in Taipei, this space marked the advancement of Taiwanese culture for all to see. “The urban areas of Taipei have consequently progressed to their current prosperity by receiving the light of modern civilization (*atarashiki bunmei*),” reported an official city history. “Today...the cultured cityscapes (*bunkateki no gaikan*) are beautiful in their orderliness and indisputably live up to those of a civilized city (*bunmei toshi*).” More importantly, city officials believed the construction of such spaces and streets would advance the cultural development of the city. “Modern civilization constantly crosses the ocean from the homeland and from foreign countries to arrive in Taiwan, where it stimulates the human spirit and is harvested to advance Taiwanese culture, steadily producing remarkable progress in culture year after year,” the same history stated.

¹¹⁵ Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, *Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran*, 8.

“Undoubtedly, Taipei will grow into a grand civilized city (*bunmei toshi*) demonstrating splendid cultural advancement in as few as 100, or even 50 years.”¹¹⁶

Japanese efforts to construct spaces of difference in Seoul, meanwhile, started even before the beginning of formal colonial rule in 1910. As early as 1891, then-consulate official Sugimura Fukashi praised the “remarkable progress” seen in the Japanese areas of the southern part of the city, writing that the area around the consulate was starting to “take on the appearance of a Japanese village.”¹¹⁷ This was the product of Japanese emigrants, who had begun to reside in the city in large numbers from the early 1880s. At first, Japanese residents were confined to an area granted by the Korean government as the Japanese Settlement (*kyoryūchi*) on a hill at the foot of Mt. Namsan to the south. As the Japanese settlers quickly realized, this was not prime real estate. The area was known as “‘muddy town’ (*deiken* or *chinkōkai*)”¹¹⁸; Jun Uchida notes, and was “an area of relative neglect that had been inhabited by impoverished *yangban* elites and Chinese merchants in the Chosŏn period.”¹¹⁹ Sohn likewise relates the origin of the name for the area, quoting 18th century scholar Hong Ryang-ho: “It is a narrow low land, and

¹¹⁶ Taiwan Tsūshinsha, *Taihoku Shi-shi*, 55, 64.

¹¹⁷ JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364100, “2. Keijō Kyoryūchi Honpōnin Shoyū no Tochi narabini Kyoryūjin no tame Shōrai toru beki no Hōshin ni tsuki zai Keijō Ryōji gushin no ken” [Detailed report from the consul in Seoul regarding future policy for land possessed by Japanese nationals in the Keijō settlement area and for the benefit of settlers].

¹¹⁸ “*Deiken*” is the Japanese pronunciation of the two Korean Hanja characters for the name of the hill. In Korean, the characters can be pronounced either “*Yihyŏn*” or “*Nihyŏn*,” although “*Chinkokae (Jingogae)*” appears to be the common local reading. The *Keijō-fu Shi*, published by the municipal government in 1936, gives the reading of these characters in Hangul as “*Chinkokae*.” See: NDLD: Keijō-fu, *Keijō-fu Shi* [History of Keijō] (Keijō: Keijō-fu, 1936), 2:634.

¹¹⁹ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 71.

when it rains the water does not drain well and the roads get muddy causing trouble for passers-by. That was why the village there is called Jingogae [*Chinkokae*, or JPN: *chinkōkai*] meaning ‘a muddy hill.’”¹²⁰ Japanese residents understandably became frustrated with the area because of its muddy conditions, its isolated location, and the fact that they were not allowed to open stores in other parts of Seoul. As the Japanese consul in Seoul, Sugimura Fukashi, complained to Tokyo in 1891, the settlement was “stuck into a corner of Seoul,” which was bad for business. Chinese merchants, he noted by contrast, were free to open stores wherever they wanted in the city.¹²¹ Legation official Uchida Sadatsuchi echoed these frustrations in 1896, complaining, “Chinkokae is a backwoods (*hekichi*) part of Seoul, located at the foot of Mt. Namsan. Its roads are so narrow and steep that it is exceedingly difficult for people or animals to pass, not to mention carts or wagons.”¹²²

Unhappy with the poor conditions of the settlement, the Japanese consulate and residents in Seoul set about converting this muddy hill into a modern Japanese town by improving streets and removing Korean dwellings in the process. As Uchida Sadatsuchi described, this was done with the cooperation of the Korean government. To widen the street running through the area, the Korean government and Japanese legation agreed that Korean-owned temporary structures would be torn down and Japanese houses would be withdrawn to the new street line when remodeled. According to the deal, Uchida explained, the Korean government funded the removal of Korean structures: “In the end,

¹²⁰ Sohn, “Colonial City Planning and Its Legacy,” 437.

¹²¹ Sugimura’s memo, along with a map of Japanese holdings in settlement, can be found in JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364100, “2. Keijō Kyoryūchi Honpōnin Shoyū no Tochi.”

¹²² JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.”

we achieved our goal of widening the street without any Japanese spending even one dollar.”¹²³ Once the street widening was completed in the Japanese settlement area by May or June of 1895, the Japanese legation funded the digging of stone gutters on both sides of the street, leveling of the road surface, and the application of new gravel paving. The Japanese Settlement Assembly (*Kyoryūchi minkai*) – later called the Seoul Resident’s Association (*Keijō Kyorūchimindan*) – then determined plans for future road improvements and established a Road Improvement Committee to oversee their completion. To make the area more attractive to residents and shoppers alike, the association funded a garbage collection program and the installation of street lamps.¹²⁴ Several years later in 1901, the Assembly funded more street repairs in the settlement, at which point, according to a history of the Association, “the Settlement for the first time began to look like a Japanese village (*machi*).”¹²⁵ Uchida Jun points out that this had been the objective of the president of the organization, Nakai Kitarō, who even envisioned building two-storied brick houses lining the street, “just as the Meiji state had done along the streets of the Ginza.”¹²⁶

Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japanese colonizers expanded their gaze from the Japanese settlement to the entire city of Seoul. Over the years 1911-1937, the Government-General and Keijō Municipal Government carried out a series of

¹²³ JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.”

¹²⁴ JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.”

¹²⁵ Keijō Kyoryūmin-dan Yakusho, ed., *Keijō Hattatsu-shi* [History of the growth of Keijō](Keijō: Keijō Kyoryūmin-dan Yakusho, 1912; Tokyo: Ryūkei Shohsa, 2001), 75-76, 106. Page references are to 2001 edition.

¹²⁶ Quoted in Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 71.

concurrent programs to modernize the transportation network of the whole city. The most well known of these were the Keijō Urban Improvement (*Keijō Shiku Kaishū*) projects planned by the Public Works Council and implemented by the Government-General over 2 phases between 1912-1929. Notably, these street improvement plans were made at a time when the public works bureau was directed by former Taipei Urban Planning Committee member Mochiji Rokusaburō. As planners had done in Taipei, Mochiji used the rhetoric of culture and civilization to justify street improvements in Seoul. As Todd Henry explains, Mochiji “plac[ed] the city within the global contexts of modern imperialism and urban planning...In addition to being a transportation hub, the new colonial capital also served as a gauge for what Mochiji called the ‘country’s level of civilization’ and its ‘barometer of culture’.”¹²⁷ Not surprisingly, the optimistic plans for street improvements in Seoul exhibited several stylistic flourishes also seen in Taipei. Phase 1 of the Keijō Urban Improvement (See Figure 19), announced in November 1912, called for an opulent baroque-style grid network of streets traversing the entire city center, featuring radial boulevards focused on Hwangt’ohyōn Plaza and “Kōganechō Plaza” located in the center of the southern Japanese residential area.¹²⁸ Phase 2, which began in 1919, updated the total number of routes to be improved to 47 (See Figure

¹²⁷ Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 32.

¹²⁸ Initially, 29 routes were announced. See: NDL: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #78, “Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen hidari no gotoshi” [Routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program are as follows] in *Kanpō* #91, November 18, 1912. Two more routes were later added in 1917. See: NDL: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #24, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no tōri tsuika-su” [Additions will be made to the diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program in 1912 notification #78 as follows], in *Kanpō* #1335, February 9, 1917.

20).¹²⁹ As with Phase 1, this second plan also laid out an elaborate grid network of streets cast over the city center. Although the monumental rotary plazas from the first plan were absent from this Phase 2 plan, new radial boulevards accentuated the planned location of the future Government-General Headquarters Building directly in front of the historical Kyōngbok Palace. The grid of broad boulevards, plazas, and rotaries envisioned in these plans vividly illustrate what Baek Yung Kim has called the Japanese “panopticonization” of Seoul. By creating wide urban plazas, Kim argues, colonial urban planners increased the legibility of the urban area, making it more visible to the imperial gaze. To evade this surveillance, interestingly, Korean colonial subjects avoided these large plazas and instead traveled along older alleyways, especially in the northern, more traditional parts of the city.¹³⁰

Yet Japanese manipulations of the colonial built environment in Seoul did not stop with major thoroughfares or plazas. Rather, the Keijō city government

¹²⁹ Only 46 routes were initially listed in 1919. See: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #173, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” [1912 notification #78 will be revised as follows], in *Kanpō* #2072, July 2, 1919. Revisions in 1922, 1925, and 1928 raised the final number of routes to 47. For 1922, see: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #204, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” [1912 notification #78 will be revised as follows], in *Kanpō* #3047, October 28, 1922. For 1925, see: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #134, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no gotoku kaisei-su” [The diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program in 1912 notification #78 will be revised as follows], in *Kanpō* #3875, July 23, 1925. For 1928, see: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #264, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” [The diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program in 1912 notification #78 will be revised as follows], in *Kanpō* #483, August 6, 1928.

¹³⁰ Baek Yung Kim, “Shokuminchi toshi Keijō no Hiroba to Roji” [The plazas and alleys of colonial Seoul] in *Shokuminchi Chōsen to Teikoku Nihon: Minzoku, Toshi, Bunka*, ed. Chōng-wan Sō and Masuo Shin’ichirō (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010): 21-31.

supplemented Government-General projects by extending street repairs into backstreet areas with three phases of its own projects. First, the Keijō government took over execution of the Government-General's projects after 1929. With subsidies from the National Treasury, the city completed just over 5 miles of 10 uncompleted routes from the Government-General programs between 1930 and 1937.¹³¹ Before this, the city had again used national subsidies to improve and pave 3.5 miles of 11 separate trunk roads, including the major east-west thoroughfares of Chongno Road, Kōganechō Road, and Meijimachi Road between 1924 and 1930.¹³² Finally, spanning both of these projects, the Keijō government used city funds to carry out sectional improvements and paving of nearly 20 miles of 96 older backstreets located largely in the southern half of the city from 1917 to 1937.¹³³ As one public works report explained, “because these construction projects carry out sectional improvements in the especially unregulated backstreets of the old urban area, the results are remarkable.”¹³⁴ By accomplishing this seemingly innocuous paving of Seoul's backstreets, Japanese colonizers attempted to frame colonial urban space in order to demonstrate Japanese modernity. It could even be said that these paving projects in the backstreets of Seoul formed the “capillaries” circulating Japanese

¹³¹ These projects are designated the “Keijō Municipal Urban Improvements” (*Keijō-fu Shikō Shiku Kaishū*). See: Keijō-fu, *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō: Shōwa 13-nen* [Summary of Keijō public works projects: 1938](Keijō: Keijō-fu, 1938), 13, 19-20.

¹³² These projects are called “Trunk Road Improvement Projects” (*Kansen Dōro Kaishū Kōji*). See: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, 1045; Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1935], 12 front-13 front; Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1938], 13, 20-21.

¹³³ The projects are referred to as “Keijō Municipal Sectional Improvements and Street Surface Repair Projects” (*Keijō-fu shikō kyokubu kaishū oyobi romen kairyō kōji*). Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1938], 23-28.

¹³⁴ Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1935], 13 back.

imperial power further into the illegible backstreets and throughout the urban body of colonial Seoul.¹³⁵

With all of these projects, Japanese colonial planners in the Government-General and Keijō city government worked in concert to complete the widening and improvement of a total of 141 streets in the city, for a total length of just over 42 miles, of which 128 acres was paved, lined by 21 acres of paved sidewalks, and shaded by over 6,000 trees.¹³⁶ Upon completion, the Government-General frequently boasted that these streets improvements “[brought] about an extraordinary change in both the appearance and traffic efficiency of the city,” and “[added] one more step in the beautifying of the city and the convenience of traffic.”¹³⁷ The partial paving of the trunk streets in “tar macadam” and asphalt, especially, was said to “[add] to the modern aspect of the city.”¹³⁸ By improving “the modern aspect of the city” in the southern, Japanese half of the city especially, Japanese colonial planners attempted to create a Japanese enclave of urban modernity within the vernacular city. At one level, this was done to make Japanese expatriate settlers feel more at home by providing amenities to which they had grown accustomed in Japan. At a deeper level, however, the production of an organized,

¹³⁵Todd Henry, on the contrary, has argued that Japanese street improvements never achieved this “capillary” affect because they were restricted to arterial roads and were never able to penetrate into the interior of older Korean neighborhoods. See: Henry, *Assimilating Seoul*, 36-37. For the “capillary form” of power, see: Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 39.

¹³⁶ Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1938], 14; Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1935], 17 back-19 front, 20 back-21 back.

¹³⁷ Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1923-1924*, 135; and Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1929-1930*, 118.

¹³⁸ Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1924-1926*, 140.

hygienic, and visibly “modern” Japanese space in the city was intended to assert Japanese cultural hegemony to the colonial population. Japanese planners programmed these spaces to announce not just that Japan had the power to modernize the built environment, but that this represented a more advanced culture.

Amidst street improvements, Japanese colonizers in both Taipei and Seoul carefully preserved examples of vernacular “primitive” architecture in order to visibly display colonial difference in the built form of the city. Architectural historian Gwendolyn Wright has argued that such dramatic embrace of vernacular built form in the colonial setting was often an attempt to justify colonial rule and limit popular resistance by “temper[ing] the disruptions” of modernity on colonial societies.¹³⁹ Colonizers “sought specifically to mitigate the disruptions caused by modernist urban reforms,” Wright writes elsewhere, “by actively engaging traditional architectural forms and attuning themselves to the ways in which various cultural groups typically responded to the city.”¹⁴⁰ It was such adaptation to local form that made Morocco, in the words of one Parisian observer, “a laboratory of Western life and a conservatory of oriental life.”¹⁴¹ Writing about Seoul, Chon Uyong has similarly noted that such purposeful retention of “shabby” traditional structures juxtaposed to nearby modern buildings served as a reminder of the transition of power while also encouraging the association of the new

¹³⁹ Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9-10.

¹⁴⁰ Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 299.

¹⁴¹ Wright, *The Politics of Design*, 85.

buildings with the old structures of power.¹⁴²

In both Taipei and Seoul, the vernacular structures repurposed as artifacts of colonial difference were historical city gates. Many cities in Taiwan and Korea had been originally constructed following the Chinese model of cities encircled by city walls penetrated by several gates. The gates were therefore prime symbols of the pre-colonial city. Following colonization, Japanese occupiers demolished these city walls in the name of urban development, commercial mobility, and hygiene. “Although the Japanese authorities claimed that the deconstruction was intended to develop the city by removing obstacles,” Kim Il-Su poignantly notes about the removal of walls in the Korean city of Daegu in 1906-1907, “in actuality, it was for the purpose of securing commercial hegemony for the Japanese and ultimately restricting Daegu to suit the purposes of Japanese colonial rule.”¹⁴³

In Taipei, the city walls had been erected by Chinese administrators over the years between 1879-1882. These were originally penetrated by five gates: the North Gate (located in the northwest), the East Gate, the Small South Gate (located in the southwest), the South Gate (located in the southeast), and the West Gate. When Japanese colonizers arrived in 1895, they immediately recognized the walls and their narrow gates as impediments to transportation and the hygiene-focused urban improvements they had in mind. Destruction of the gates and walls therefore started in 1900. The plan was to use

¹⁴² Chon Uyong, “Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji to Bunka Genshō – 1920 nendai to Keijō” [The image of the colonial city and cultural phenomena: Keijō in the 1920s], in *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Hōkokusho* 3, *jō-maki*, ed. *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai* (Tokyo: *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai*, 2005): 220.

¹⁴³ Kim Il-Su, “Colonial Modernization of the Traditional City of Daegu,” *Korea Journal* 48, no. 3 (2008): 82.

stones from the gates and walls to construct walls surrounding government buildings and to line roadside gutters. Demolition started from the West Gate but was halted halfway by Gotō Shimpei, who ordered that the gates should be preserved. As an official history of Taipei from 1932 records, Gotō's idea was that the gates should be retained as “relics from the older generation” (*kyūdai no ibutsu*).¹⁴⁴ Although it was too late to save the West Gate, the four remaining gates became monumental centerpieces of parks forming stylistic rotaries – where they still stand today. Displayed as artifacts and surrounded by parks and boulevards, the gates became public spaces where tourists could visualize the colonial transformation of Taipei. As the 1940 travel brochure *Sightseeing Taipei* (*Kankō no Taihoku*) advertised, the gates were “even now preserved as historical ruins (*kyūseki*) evoking a bygone time.”¹⁴⁵

The preservation of city gates as artifacts of colonial difference was even more pronounced in Seoul, where Japanese urban planners carefully set aside and preserved the Namdaemun, the southern gate to the city. Starting in 1907, Japanese engineers attached to the Korean government used Korean government funds to tear down the city walls on either side of the gate, leaving the gate itself standing alone at the center of a newly constructed rotary. Because the existing route through the gate itself was only 3 *ken* (~18ft.) wide and “the inconvenience and danger for transportation could not possibly be concealed any longer,” new 8 *ken* (~48ft.) roads were constructed on both sides. The historical gate, meanwhile, was retained in order to “preserve the beauty of the city”

¹⁴⁴ Taiwan Tsūshinsha, *Taihoku Shi-shi*, 110.

¹⁴⁵ KDL: Taihoku-shi Kankō-kakari, *Kankō no Taihoku* [Sightseeing Taipei](Taipei: Taihoku-shi Kankō-kakari, 1940).

(*shigai no bikan wo tamotashime*).¹⁴⁶ Not only was the gate repurposed as an isolated ceremonial archway into the city, but, juxtaposed to the adjacent Namdaemun railway station, the historical city gate also became a stark sign of native primitiveness. Once the Western-style Keijō Station replaced Namdaemun Station in 1925, moreover, the Namdaemun became a site of Japanese cultural hegemony. Solidifying this link between the old gate and the neighboring train station, the existing road was widened into a 19 ken (~108ft.)-wide thoroughfare starting in 1910.¹⁴⁷ This exhibition of the Namdaemun was part of a larger Japanese design strategy in Seoul. As Todd Henry has argued, the difference between “dynamic” and “modern” Japanese southern parts of the city and the “‘quaint’ and ‘decrepit’ anachronisms of the northern part of the city” was a common theme in Japanese travel-guides of Seoul. “This discursive strategy worked to strip these areas of their precolonial significance as centers of kingly rule,” Henry notes about the former palace complexes in Seoul, “and their potential in the colonial present as rallying points of Korean nationalism.” “Instead, they were refashioned as archaic counterparts to the modern present and future of the city, converted into entertainment and tourist sites to be visited by Japanese and foreign travelers.”¹⁴⁸ The importance placed on the Namdaemun in this regard is revealed in the fact that its image graced the cover of the

¹⁴⁶ Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, 1023-1024.

¹⁴⁷ Construction on this road was started in 1907, the city walls were torn down in 1909, and a sidewalk of 2.75 ken laid on one side in 1910. This route was repaved in 1910-1911 and a sidewalk installed on both sides over the next year. See: Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1935], 9 front; Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, 1023-1024, 1041-1042; and Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report on Administration of Chosen 1921-1922*, 162-163.

¹⁴⁸ Todd Henry, “Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64, no. 3 (2005): 664.

1913 *New Guide to Seoul (Shinsen Keijō Annai)*(Figure 21). The Namdaemun was also frequently featured as the first stop on Seoul tourist itineraries, such as in the 1935 *Tour Guide to the Sights of Keijō (Keijō Meishō Yūran Annai)* or the 1940 *Keijō Sightseeing Guidebook (Keijō Kankō no Shiori)*, because of its proximity to Keijō Station.¹⁴⁹

Japanese colonizers sought an even wider audience for the display of colonial difference in built form by advertising urban improvement efforts worldwide with progress reports complete with photos staged to dramatically illustrate the success of their projects. Such publications were an attempt to solicit popular acceptance of Japan's claims to its "mission civilisatrice" in the colonies – especially from their Western imperialist counterparts. This was especially the case in Korea, where colonial authorities published large numbers of reports and books starting from the beginning of the protectorate period in 1905 boasting of the success of their multifaceted reform efforts. The Government-General's Japanese-language *Annual Reports* (or, *Shisei Nenpō*), for example, ostentatiously celebrated the success of Japanese-led reforms on the peninsula, complete with illustrations, charts, and graphs. The *Keijō Urban Improvement Projects: 20 Years of Memories (Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: Kaiko Nijūnen)* published by the Government-General Public Works Office in Seoul in 1930 is remarkable in this regard as a 100-page portfolio of dramatically staged before-and-after photos aggrandizing the modern transformation accomplished by Japanese urban improvement

¹⁴⁹ See: KDL: Keijō Takushii Yūran Basu Kakari, *Keijō Meishō Yūran Annai* [Tour guide to the sights of Keijō](Seoul: Keijō Takushii Yūran Basu Kakari, 1935); and KDL: Keijō Kankō Kyōkai, *Keijō Kankō Shiori* [Keijō sightseeing guidebook](Seoul: Keijō Kankō Kyōkai, 1940).

programs in Seoul.¹⁵⁰ Companion *Annual Reports*, meanwhile, were published in English and distributed to libraries worldwide in an attempt to legitimize Japanese rule in the eyes of the Western imperialist audience. With titles such as *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea)*, *Annual Report on Administration of Chosen*, and *Thriving Chosen: A Survey of Twenty-Five Years of Administration*, these reports publicized Japanese-initiated reforms, especially urban improvements in Seoul and other cities. Without fail, these reports proudly displayed the same before-and-after photos of the urban transformation of Seoul (Figure 22).

The construction of colonial difference in the streets of Taipei and Seoul was only one component of Japanese attempts to assert colonial rule through public space. Once the infrastructure of the city was laid, Japanese colonizers issued a number of building construction regulations and street use codes in order to enhance colonial power by shaping the built form of the city and conditioning public behavior. These codes worked in tandem with street improvements to produce colonial difference by fostering and regulating modern Japanese space in the city. Once those spaces were created, street use laws disciplined public life. In this way, colonial power was exercised both in space and on those who occupied that space.

Enframing Colonial Space and Public Life: Building and Street Use Codes

In the book *Colonising Egypt*, Timothy Mitchell analyzes how colonial space was disciplined and ordered through a strategy he terms “enframing” – defined as “a method

¹⁵⁰ Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, ed., *Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: Kaiko Nijūnen* [Keijō Urban Improvement Projects: 20 Years of Memories](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, 1930).

of dividing up and containing...which operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or volume called 'space'." Enframing served to discipline the colonized population, Mitchell argues, by divvying up neutral space into a series of "containers," into which life was broken down "into a series of discrete functions – sleeping, eating, cooking, and so on – each with a specific location." This strategy was most visible in the reconstruction of model villages, where, Mitchell points out, "the spacing that forms [the village's] rooms, courtyards, and buildings is specified in exact magnitudes, down to the nearest centimeter."¹⁵¹ For Mitchell, the purpose of this enframing of colonial space was to make the colonized population and urban environment legible for the purposes of disciplining the colonized population and increasing capitalist profits. "Egypt was to be ordered up as something object-like," Mitchell notes, "In other words it was to be made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation."¹⁵²

As in Mitchell's Egypt, Japanese colonial projections of power in built form were not limited to the physical structure of streets, but extended into the otherwise neutral urban space framed by the built environment. In areas under Japanese control, colonial urban planners followed up on street improvements by disciplining public space through a number of regulations on building construction and street use. As with in Mitchell's example of enframing in Egypt, these codes constituted the means by which colonial power was brought to bear on colonized individuals. Yet the difference from Mitchell's model in the cases of Taiwan and Korea, is that Japanese efforts to order the built

¹⁵¹ Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 44-45.

¹⁵² Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 33.

environment were not so much about rendering the colonial population legible as they were about imposing and enforcing Japanese notions of “modernity” onto the existing native city in both the appearance of the city and public behavior. For Japanese colonial planners, regulations on building construction and street use picked up where street improvements and spaces of colonial difference left off. While Japanese urban improvement efforts were initially confined to areas of Japanese residence, building regulations and street use codes were ultimately applied to colonial urban space as a whole. These codes, then, were ways through which colonizers attempted to legislate adherence to Japanese expectations of “civilized” life outside Japanese colonial enclaves. To be sure, such building codes were not limited to the colonies of Taiwan and Korea. Instead, as Nishizawa Yasuhiko points out, similar building regulations were also issued in Japanese-occupied territories in northeastern China, such as Dairen in 1905 and Manchuria in 1907.¹⁵³ With this in mind, this section will examine codes in Taiwan and Korea to show how Japanese colonizers used such codes in an attempt to “improve” native life – both to justify colonization and compel the assimilation of the colonial population.

Restrictive building codes and street use regulations in Taipei and Seoul can be seen as products of a “laboratory” of sorts in the cultivation of Civilization that would have been impossible to set up in the metropole. Indeed, scholars of Japanese urban planning often point out that the Japanese colonies were more advanced than the mainland in terms of planning laws and building codes. One famous example of this is the monumental urban design accomplished in the Japanese-constructed Manchukuo

¹⁵³ Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, esp. 300-340.

“puppet capital” of Shinkyō in the 1930s.¹⁵⁴ “Numerous innovative planning concepts were created and applied first in the colonies,” writes Carola Hein. “For example, the Provisional Taiwan Buildings Code was enacted in 1895, and the Taiwan Housing Regulation came into force in 1900 and was amended in 1912.”¹⁵⁵ By contrast, there was no nationwide Japanese urban planning or building code until 1919, with the City Planning Law (*Toshi Keikaku Hō*) and companion Urban Area Building Law (*Shigaichi Kenchikubutsu Hō*). This would seem to fit with the argument that colonies constituted laboratories and test grounds where frustrated metropolitan planning idealists could experiment with and enact policies impossible to introduce back in the mainland.

Yet a closer look at building construction and land use laws in Taiwan and Korea reveals two important features of these colonial ordinances. First, building codes and land use laws issued in Taipei and Seoul exhibited a striking resemblance to fireproofing codes and street use regulations seen in Tokyo as early as 1878 (See Table 3). As planners assigned to the colonies confronted problems in the city, they responded with measures crafted from their training and personal experience in the metropole. Considering that many of these planners were trained at Tokyo Imperial University, it is

¹⁵⁴ Bill Sewell, “Railway Outpost and Puppet Capital: Urban Expressions of Japanese Imperialism in Changchun, 1905-1945,” in *Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies*, ed. Gregory Blue and others (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 283.

¹⁵⁵ Carola Hein, “The Transformation of Planning Ideas in Japan and Its Colonies,” in *Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans*, ed. Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait (London: Wiley-Academy, 2003), 68.

Table 3. Building Codes in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul

Building Codes in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul				
	Regulation	Tokyo	Taipei	Seoul
1	Building Materials	1870 - plaster; 1878 - plaster, stone or brick (Article 1)	1896 - stone, brick, mud brick, wood (Article 2); 1900 - stone, brick, metal, concrete, wood, earth brick (Article 1)	1913 - Wood buildings must have firewalls (Article 4)
2	Roof Tiling	1873 - tile; 1881 - metal, tile, stone, other (Article 4)	1896 - tile, nonflammable (Article 2); 1900 - tile, metal, nonflammable	1913 - nonflammable materials (Article 4)
3	Building Gutters	(1894) - all buildings facing streets, plazas, or alleys; drain to sewer (Article 63)	1896 - all houses along roads; drain to sewer (Article 2)	1913 - all buildings on public roads (Article 4)
4	Building Height	1878 - 15 feet (Article 2); 1894 - 50 feet (Article 34)	1900 - 12 feet or more (Article 5)	1913 - not to exceed 3 stories (Article 4)
5	Building Setbacks	1874 - 3 feet	1907 - 3 feet, 1.5 feet between buildings (Article 2)	1913 - 1.5 feet (Article 3)
6	Plot Coverage	(1894) - 1/5th open (Article 32)	1907 - 1/4 open (Article 1)	1913 - 1/5 open (Article 3)

Table 3. Continued.

Building Codes in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul

	Regulation	Tokyo	Taipei	Seoul
7	Foundations	1878 - at least 2 feet of gravel (Article 4)	1900 - Designed to support weight (Article 3)	None
8	Crawlspaces	1875 - floors raised off ground; (1894) - floors raised 1.3 feet (Article 42)	1896 - floors 2.5 feet above ground (Article 2); 1900 - floors 2 feet above foundation (Article 5)	1913 - 1.5 feet (Article 3)
9	Chimney Structure	1878 - stone or brick; plaster covering nearby wood (Article 18); (1894) - extend 3 feet above roof (Article 48)	None	1913 - 3 feet above roof; made of brick, metal; exposed flammable areas plastered (Article 3)
10	Light and Ventilation	(1894) - living quarters must have windows for ventilation (Article 56)	1900 - windows and doors for light and ventilation in living quarters (Article 7)	None
11	Kitchen Restrictions	(1894) - sinks and drains made of non-permeable materials; drain to sewer (Article 64)	1896 - sinks and drains made of non-permeable materials (Article 2)	1913 - proper sewage and water systems; fire-prevention (Article 3)
12	Toilet Restrictions	(1894) - ventilation (Article 60), non-permeable materials (Article 61, 62); 18 feet away from wells (Article 65)	1896 - nonpermeable materials; no smells entering house (Article 2); 1900 - 2 feet off ground (Article 10)	1913 - required in all residences, except longhouses; 18 feet from wells (Article 3); not allowed along roads without privacy wall (Article 4)

Table 3. Continued.

Notes:

Bold dates refer to the following building codes:

Tokyo

1870 - Fire Prevention Building Construction Restrictions (*Bōka-jō Kaoku Kenchiku Seigen*)

Source: *Tōkyōshi Shikō Shigaihen*, 51, 23

1873 - Burnt Areas Housing Roof Construction Regulations (*Ruishōmachi Machiya Okusei*)

Source: *Tōkyōshi Shikō Shigaihen*, 55, 786

1874 - Construction Standards (*Kenchiku Kijun Shirei*)

Source: : *Tōkyōshi Shikō Shigaihen*, 56, 644-645.

1878 - Building Construction Restrictions (*Kaoku Kenchiku Seigen Rei*)

Source: *Tōkyōshi Shikō Shigaihen*, 61, 71-73.

1881 - Firelines and Roofing Construction Restriction Codes (*Bōka Rosen narabini Okujō Seigen Kisoku*)

Source: Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 63-65.

(1894) - Tokyo Building Construction Ordinance (*Tōkyō-shi Kaoku Kenchiku Jōrei*)

- () indicates codes that were never enacted, but included in the 1894 draft ordinance

Source: Ishida Yorifusa, "Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō Tsumaki Bunko-jū no Kenchiku Hōki Kankei Shiryō," *Sōgō Toshi Kenkyū* 19 (1983): 169-189.

Taipei

1896 - Building Construction Codes (*Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku*)

Source: Archives of Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, Doc.#88.19.4 - *Taihoku-ken Kenrei Dai sanjūsan gō Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku*

1900 - Taiwan Building Construction Codes Bylaws (*Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku*)

Source: Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Fuhō* #829, 9/30/1900

1907 - Revised Taiwan Building Construction Codes Bylaws (*Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku Kaisei*)

Source: Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Fuhō* #2243, 7/30/1907

Seoul

1913 - Urban Area Building Control Codes (*Shigaichi Tatemono Torishimari Kisoku*)

Source: *Kanpō* #174, 3/1/1913, 3-4

not surprising that they should apply lessons learned in the metropole to the colonial worksite. This is also not to say that the Tokyo laws were imposed unilaterally on the colonial cities. Instead, the second important feature of colonial building codes and street use laws is that regulations from Tokyo were pragmatically adapted to address what planners saw as the most urgent urban problems in Taipei and Seoul. In tropical Taipei, Japanese planners identified hygiene and sanitation as the biggest problem, and revised their building codes accordingly. Planners in Seoul, meanwhile, saw conflagration as a bigger threat to the urban environment and therefore issued building codes more focused on fireproofing. In this way, colonial planners in Taipei and Seoul flexibly adapted an urban improvement model forged in Tokyo to local conditions. It was this flexible alteration of Tokyo models to fit local conditions in Taipei and Seoul that allowed colonial power to pervade and become so embedded in the built environment of the colonial city, and by extension into the daily lives of the colonized population.

Regulations on building construction and street use in Tokyo proceeded gradually from the early 1870s. While it is true that there were no building codes that applied universally to the entire country of Japan until the 1919 Urban Area Building Law, there were nevertheless a number of successive fireproofing ordinances, construction guidelines, and draft building codes passed in Tokyo from the mid-Meiji period that introduced elements of architectural control seen in later codes in Taipei and Seoul. As discussed in Chapter 1, the biggest problem facing Tokyo in early and mid-Meiji period was recurring conflagrations. Predictably, each fire resulted in new efforts to prevent the next one by widening streets to clear firebreaks (called “wide streets,” or *hirokōji*) and by issuing new construction guidelines. Responding to this primary threat of fire,

regulations starting in 1870 dictated various components of building construction and layout with an eye towards preventing and containing conflagrations by maintaining firebreaks and requiring fireproofing measures. The main problem with firebreaks was that over time they would lose effectiveness in the face of the never-ending cycle of what could be called “building creep.” To clear firebreaks, streets were widened to the stone-covered roadside drainage ditches that demarcated the extent of the roadbed. Following commercial custom, storeowners in the rebuilt buildings would place goods for sale under the storefront awnings. Over the years, the areas under these awnings would be enclosed and made an integral part of the building – and new awnings would be extended even further into the street. Such “building creep” slowly narrowed the street; that is, until the cycle would start all over again with another fire and the clearing of another firebreak. In an attempt to break this pattern, the Tokyo government prohibited buildings from encroaching on streets in 1870. These initial restrictions were strengthened in 1874 when the government not only required that stores be set back 3 feet from the gutters, but also stipulated that if store goods were displayed under the awnings then these spaces could be included in rent calculations.¹⁵⁶

Maintaining firebreaks through building setbacks was not enough to stop the spread of fires. In order to prevent fires from jumping firebreaks, additional codes were passed requiring the use of non-flammable materials in building construction. For example, houses fronting main streets were to be constructed in either plaster (1870)¹⁵⁷,

¹⁵⁶ For the 1874 Construction Standards (*Kenchiku Kijun Shirei*), see: *TSS*, vol. 56 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1965), 644-645.

¹⁵⁷ 1870 Fire Prevention Building Construction Restrictions (*Bōka-jō Kaoku Kenchiku Seigen*), Article 1. See: *TSS*, vol. 51 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1961), 23.

stone, or brick walls of a thickness of at least 1.5 bricks (1878)¹⁵⁸. Because most fires in Tokyo were sparked by embers flying from chimneys, moreover, the 1878 Building Construction Restrictions required chimneys to be made of stone or brick, and any exposed wood nearby to be covered in plaster. Finally, the comprehensive 1881 Fire Lines and Roofing Construction Restriction Codes (*Bōka Rosen narabini Okujō Seigen Kisoku*) expanded an earlier requirement for roofs to be tiled in porcelain (1873)¹⁵⁹ to allow metal, stone, or other non-flammable materials.¹⁶⁰ Most significantly, new rules set in 1881 established time limits for houses in designated areas to be re-constructed up to code. Houses with nonflammable roofs along firebreaks could rebuild in plaster, stone, or brick within 3 years. Others had only one year.¹⁶¹ Although it was not until the first decades of the 20th century that fires ceased to be a concern for city residents, fireproofing guidelines allowed government control to extend down to the level of the home in the name of the public good.

Fires were not the only problem plaguing Tokyo. Another problem spreading through the city was communicable disease. As construction guidelines limited the spread of fires from the mid-Meiji period, cholera and other waterborne diseases replaced

¹⁵⁸ 1878 Building Construction Restrictions (*Kaoku Kenchiku Seigen Rei*), Article 1. See: *TSS*, vol. 61 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1969), 71-73.

¹⁵⁹ 1873 Burnt Areas Housing Roof Construction Regulations (*Ruishōmachi Machiya Okusei*). See: *TSS*, vol. 55 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1964), 786.

¹⁶⁰ 1881 Firelines and Roofing Construction Restriction Codes (*Bōka Rosen narabini Okujō Seigen Kisoku*). Reprinted in Fujimori Terunobu, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku* [Urban Planning of Meiji Tokyo](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 63-65.

¹⁶¹ See Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 63-65; and Jordan Sand, “Property in Two Fire Regimes: From Edo to Tokyo,” in *Investing in the Early Modern Built Environment: Europeans, Asians, Settlers and Indigenous Societies*, ed. Carole Shammas (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 62.

conflagrations as the main threat to residents of the capital. Just as the city was getting over routine fires, it was periodically afflicted by increasingly serious outbreaks of cholera as victims of the disease increased rapidly from nearly 2,000 lives in 1879, to over 5,000 in 1882, and over 10,000 in 1886.¹⁶² As mentioned in Chapter 2, it was these outbreaks that finally led to the inclusion of water and sewer system improvements in the Tokyo urban improvement plans. Yet as Japanese urban reformers knew, another important element of sanitation and hygiene was housing construction. As Andre Sorensen describes, hygienic issues had motivated calls for a comprehensive Tokyo building code by reformers such as Taguchi Ukichi, Nagayo Sensai, and Mori Ōgai. Mori had even been named to a committee tasked with drawing up a draft building code to accompany the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance. Nonetheless, as Sorensen notes, the building code failed because of a number of factors, including political opposition from wealthy landowners who did not like the idea of stricter building codes and the limited popular political support resulting from the “lack of civic consciousness” in the mid-Meiji period.¹⁶³

Although efforts to pass a building code ultimately failed, a closer look at two drafts produced in the process reveals notable consideration of urban hygiene. The first draft, the Tokyo Building Construction Ordinance draft (*Tōkyō-shi Kaoku Kenchiku Jōrei*), was initiated by architect Yamaguchi Hanroku and completed by another

¹⁶² Ishizuka Hiromichi, “Tōkyō Shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū josetsu: jōsuidō kairiyō jigyō to shikai, burujowaji- no ugoki wo megutte” [Introduction to the history of Tokyo urban improvement projects: fresh water system improvement projects and the activities of the city council and bourgeoisie], *Toshi Kenkyū Hōkoku* 55 (1975): 26-27.

¹⁶³ André Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 69-71.

architect, Tsumaki Yorinaka, for the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee sometime in 1889.¹⁶⁴ As article 2 of this first draft makes clear, “the regulations put forth in this ordinance are not limited only the general appearance of the city and the hygiene of the populace, but extend to surveillance (*kanshi*) of all elements of architecture in order to maintain public peace (*annei*) for all house dwellers.”¹⁶⁵ While fireproofing was still a major concern, 13 of the 154 separate articles delineated in this draft were specifically devoted to hygienic regulations. Among these were detailed restrictions on the placement and structure of wells (Article 138), the construction of privies and toilets (Articles 139-144), and requirements for fresh water supply (Article 145) and inspection before inhabitation (Article 147). Because vaporous miasmas were thought to contribute to the spread of disease, other health related construction guidelines included proscriptions against the installation of doors or windows in buildings that produce noxious fumes facing neighbors homes (Article 33), requirements to leave crawlspaces under the floor and windows for ventilation of residential dwellings (Article 47), and to allow sunlight access (Article 79) and proper fenestration (Articles 81 and 82) for living quarters. The second draft code to be examined updated the first draft and further

¹⁶⁴ As Ishida Yorifusa explains, this draft plan is thought to be the one discussed in an October 1889 meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee, when Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa assigned 7 members, including Nagayo Sensai and Furuichi Kōi, to a special committee to discuss a draft code drawn up by Tsumaki. The whereabouts of the drafts were unknown until they were serendipitously discovered among Tsumaki’s papers in the archival collections of the Architectural Institute of Japan (*Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai*) during the institute’s 1982 relocation to its current headquarters in Tokyo. For a reprinting of two of the drafts found in the collection, see: Ishida Yorifusa, “Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō Tsumaki Bunko-jū no Kenchiku Hōki Kankei Shiryō” [List of Drafts of Building Ordinance for the City of Tokyo and Their Materials Found in Tsumaki Library Which is Now Owned by the Architectural Institute of Japan]. *Sōgō Toshi Kenkyū* 19 (1983): 169-189.

¹⁶⁵ Ishida, “Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō,” 180.

expanded on these provisions. Released by the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee in 1894, this second Buildings Code draft responded to the growing threat of disease by introducing two important construction guidelines. First, in an attempt to prevent the overcrowding that was thought to breed squalor, article 32 of the 1894 codes stipulated that buildings could only occupy 4/5th of the lot; the remaining 1/5th must be left as open space (Article 32). Secondly, requirements were added for kitchen sinks and drains to be constructed in non-permeable materials to prevent the spread of contaminated water.¹⁶⁶ While these codes were not enacted, they nevertheless represent the conventional wisdom of Japanese engineers and architects concerning hygienic building construction as early as the 1880s.

The construction codes used to enframe public space in Tokyo formed the juridical arsenal deployed to assert colonial control in Taipei and Seoul as Japanese engineers, architect, and planners moved from the metropole to the colonies to pursue new careers. Following precedents seen in Tokyo, planners in Taiwan announced several laws concerning building construction starting in 1896 with the Taipei-specific Housing Construction Regulations (*Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku*). This was followed by the colony-wide 1900 Taiwan Housing Construction Regulations (*Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku*), and the companion 1900 Taiwan Housing Construction Regulations Enforcement By-laws (*Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku*), later revised in 1906 and 1907. In Korea, meanwhile, building codes were streamlined with the single Urban Area Construction Control Codes (*Shigaichi Kenchiku Torishimari Kisoku*) issued in 1913. While each of these codes was based on the model of similar standards in Tokyo, all were

¹⁶⁶ Ishida, “Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō,” 175.

pragmatically adapted to respond to immediate concerns. In Taipei this meant confronting hygienic and sanitary conditions, while in Seoul this meant both sanitary regulations and fireproofing. For quick reference, Table 1 indexes common points between building codes in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul, including the year provisions were first enacted in each city. As the table shows, Tokyo precedents informed regulations Taipei and Seoul in one dozen different categories: building materials, roof tiling, gutters, height, setbacks, plot coverage, foundations, crawlspaces, chimney structure, lighting and ventilation, kitchens, and toilets.

In Taiwan, building codes were an integral part of colonial engineers' attempts to produce Japanese space within the city walls. These efforts were shaped by local conditions in two ways. First, only the northwestern corner of the area inside the city walls had seen much urban development. While certainly not a *tabula rasa*, the large undeveloped urban spaces available gave Japanese planners a certain amount of freedom in shaping the built form of the city as it grew, rather than responding to an existing built environment. Secondly, as a tropical city, Taipei was subject to a number of tropical diseases, especially malaria, unknown in mainland Japan, in addition to more familiar contagious afflictions, such as cholera, and dysentery. As Caroline Ts'ai notes, Taiwan even suffered bubonic plague from 1896 to 1917. Japanese military casualty figures confirm the toll that disease had on the Japanese population upon arriving to the island. According to Tsai, whereas only 164 Japanese soldiers died in battle during pacification campaigns, 4,642 soldiers died from disease and another 26,094 contracted some form of serious illness.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building*, 110.

Once Japanese planners identified the area inside the walls as the future “Japanese city,” they quickly issued building codes designed to produce a hygienic, sanitary, and aesthetically pleasing urban space. Just over a year after Japan took control of the city, the first building codes were enacted in the prefecture of Taipei in November 1896. In an effort to dramatically demonstrate the difference between sanitary, “civilized” Japanese life and unhygienic, “primitive” native dwellings, these first codes applied only to buildings constructed to house Japanese (*naichijin*)(Article 1). Because these codes were meant to reproduce Japanese space in Taipei, they predictably resembled building regulations from Tokyo. Standards for non-flammable building and roofing materials, provision of gutters and crawlspaces, and requirements for non-permeable construction of kitchen sinks, drains, and toilets (Article 2), all had precedents in regulations then in effect in Tokyo or proposed in the draft building codes. These 1896 regulations were expanded with the 1900 Taiwan Building Construction Codes and companion Bylaws, which applied to cities throughout the colony. Continuing the theme of hygienic and sanitary housing construction, these 1900 bylaws introduced requirements on sunlight access and room ventilation, building foundations, and detailed instructions for construction of toilets, cisterns, and septic tanks. As with similar standards for kitchen construction, the primary concern was containment of contaminated wastewater. As Article 10 stipulated, for instance, toilets were to be made of stone, brick, or concrete, joined with mortar, and lined with a non-permeable material.¹⁶⁸ Finally, the 1900 codes gave the local governor extraordinary power to order the remodeling, repair, or removal

¹⁶⁸ TWH: Furei #81, “Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku hidari no tōri sadamu” [The Taiwan building construction codes bylaws are determined as follows], in *Fuhō* #829, September 30, 1900.

of any existing structure that was deemed to be “dangerous,” “harmful to health,” or “necessary in the name of the public good,” (Article 3). As Nishizawa Yasuhiko concludes, this stipulation was meant to give the local governor the power to preserve the beauty of the city by removing “shabby” houses.¹⁶⁹ In other words, this provision effectively gave the local governor the legal right to remove “primitive” traditional houses in order to produce a modern, Japanese space.

Complicating colonial attempts to produce Japanese space in Taipei, the colonization of Taiwan presented one large new problem not seen in Tokyo. This required pragmatic adaptation of building codes to adapt to local conditions – in this case, specifically to thwart the spread of bubonic plague. Although Japanese engineers and architects were familiar with measures for combatting waterborne communicable diseases such as cholera and dysentery from the experience of Tokyo, bubonic plague required a much different response. Rather than contaminated water, the main culprit in the spread of plague was rodents, particularly rats. One method taken to control the spread of plague, Ts’ai describes, was rat extermination campaigns initiated by local governments from the early 1900s. Not only would city offices pay an award of ¥0.05 per rat killed, local governments would set rat quotas for each household in their jurisdiction and fine households ¥0.25 for every rat by which they missed the quota. By August 1912, Tsai notes, the government-general reported through the Taiwan Daily News a total of 41,923,644 rats caught through these campaigns.¹⁷⁰ Attempts to combat the spread of plague were also seen in new building construction codes. Of the 25

¹⁶⁹ Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, 303.

¹⁷⁰ Ts’ai, *Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building*, 110.

articles in the updated codes issued in July 1907, 6 included requirements to prevent rodent infestation in retaining walls (Article 7), building foundations (Article 11), ceilings (Article 13), interior walls (Article 15), ceilings (Article 17), and crawlspaces and drainage pipes, etc. (Article 18).¹⁷¹ Thus, “rat prevention” (*bōso*) joined the more common “fire prevention” (*bōka*) and “disease prevention” (*bōeki*) as the three major themes of construction codes in Taiwan.

Building codes functioned much differently in Seoul. Although the latest to be enacted, they nonetheless failed to include many of the restrictions seen in earlier codes in either Tokyo or Taipei. In fact, with 21 provisions spread over 9 articles, construction regulations in Seoul were the shortest and least specific of any of the codes under review. Perhaps the most significant reason for this was that it was not until 1913 that the Government-General gained the legal authority to issue the Urban Area Construction Control Codes. Prior to annexation in 1910, the Japanese Resident-General, while authorized to manage Korean foreign affairs, was legally restricted to advising the standing Korean government on domestic matters. As a result, by the time the codes were issued, Japanese expatriate settlers in Seoul had been carrying out gradual street improvements to the Japanese settlement for nearly 20 years since 1895 with the financial assistance of the Japanese consulate. Through these projects, Jun Uchida describes, Japanese agents in Seoul had already transformed the settlement “into a mini-Tokyo that they christened Honmachi,” or “Japantown.”¹⁷² Building codes in Korea were therefore

¹⁷¹ TWH: Furei #63, “Meiji 33-nen 9-getsu Furei 81-gō Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku hidari no tori kaisei-su” [1900 Furei #81, Taiwan building construction codes bylaws, is revised as follows], in *Fuhō* #2243, July 30, 1907.

¹⁷² Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 71.

not as much about fostering Japanese space in the city, as had been the case in Taipei, as they were about making the city more pleasant for Japanese residents.

The Seoul building codes enacted in 1913 gave only perfunctory attention to the issues of fireproofing and hygiene in the home, and were instead designed to improve the appearance of the city. Although providing detailed instructions for fireproofing chimneys (Article 3), and requiring the installation of nonflammable roofing, and lightning rods for building over 50 feet tall (Article 4), the codes did not demand fireproof materials for building construction. Rather, rowhouses (*nagaya*) constructed in wood were merely required to have firewalls every 120 feet (Article 4). One possible explanation for this was that brick and stone were relatively cheap in Korea, so dwellings were most often already built in nonflammable materials. Another reason is given in Article 3 of the codes. Accordingly, chimneys were to be nonflammable in order to “prevent damage to neighboring residences and buildings.” Sanitary restrictions were similarly directed outwards towards neighbors rather than inwards to living quarters. Five of the 21 provisions in the codes addressed sanitation, yet only two dealt with the interior of the house: requirements for “proper sewage and water systems” and toilets (Article 3). Other hygiene related provisions mainly concerned the appearance and health of the neighborhood as a whole: stipulations that drinking wells must be separated from excrement pits, sewage pits, and ditches by at least 18 feet, that excrement pits must be constructed in non-permeable materials (Article 3), and that public toilets should not be installed on public roads unless enclosed by privacy walls (Article 4).¹⁷³ Finally,

¹⁷³ NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Furei #11, “Shigaichi Tatemono Torishimari Kisoku hidari no tori sadamu” [The urban area construction control codes are determined as follows], *Kanpō* #174, March 1, 1913.

owners of large buildings were encouraged to take “all possible measures” to prevent rat infestation, and buildings that stored or handled goods that emitted “bad odors, noxious fumes, or dust” were not allowed to have any windows or doors facing public roads, buildings where large numbers of people would gather, or neighboring residences (Article 3). Missing were standards for foundations, sunlight access, and ventilation for individual living quarters.

Sanitary restrictions intended to improve the appearance of the neighborhood were reinforced by two construction regulations designed to present an aesthetic streetscape. First, building setbacks were implemented in an attempt to maintain building lines. As in Tokyo, streets in Seoul were gradually narrowed through the familiar cycle of “building creep.” Yet, rather than fires providing the impetus for restarting the cycle, in Seoul it was periodic progressions between royal palaces that led to government orders to widen streets to their original widths by tearing down commercial stalls impeding on the streets. Again, as in Tokyo, planners attempted to break the cycle of “building creep” in the 1913 building codes by requiring building setbacks from public streets. In Tokyo and Taipei, structures were required to be set back 3 feet from building lines, but were allowed to have awnings projecting a determined amount over building lines along streets of certain widths. In contrast, in Seoul, where streets were decidedly narrower, setbacks were only required to be 1.5 feet. The codes compensated for this reduced building setback by more strictly demanding that no eaves (*nokisaki*), gable rakes (*keraba*), pent roof awnings (*hisashi*), or modillions (*mochiokuri*) of any building, gate, or fence extend over the street (Article 3). The second construction code enacted to improve the appearance of the neighborhood was the restriction that buildings cover no more than

8/10th of building lots. This meant that 1/5th of the plot was to be left as open space, just as proposed in the failed 1894 Tokyo Building Construction Ordinance. As in Tokyo, open space requirements in Seoul were an attempt to improve sanitary conditions in the city by preventing the pestilence thought to spawn in overcrowded areas. In Seoul, they had the added function of putting a clean face on the city.

Japanese attempts to discipline the population did not stop at the front door; rather building codes went hand in hand with street use regulations in attempts to frame life and condition popular behavior both indoors and out. The colonized populace was expected to conform to Japanese dictated frames of home life by self-reporting and making certain all new construction, remodeling, or additions were up to code, at the risk fines of up to ¥200 in Taiwan or ¥100 in Korea for failure to report, lack of compliance, or for submitting false information. And this, at a time when colonial laborers could expect wages of less than ¥1 per day in Taiwan, and ¥1.5 to ¥2 a day in Korea when the codes were issued.¹⁷⁴ To make things worse, the colonized population was also required to comport itself according to Japanese prescriptions of “civilized” public behavior once they left the house. This was especially true in Korea, where street use codes were issued as early as 1913. As Todd Henry has argued, Japanese-led projects to sanitize Seoul and reform the public hygienic practices of the Korean population were major components of Japan’s strategy of colonial rule. As Henry explains, the colonial government forced both Korean and Japanese residents to pay a monthly service fee to support the garbage collection, sewage disposal, and general urban sanitation efforts of the Japanese-founded

¹⁷⁴ Information on wages from Mizoguchi Toshiyuki, “Consumer Prices and Real Wages in Taiwan and Korea Under Japanese Rule,” *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics* 13, no. 1 (1972): 56.

Seoul Sanitary Association.¹⁷⁵ It should be added, however, that the colonial government attempted to discipline public behavior in the form of these regulations on street use. In this way, colonial power extended not only to the built form of the house, but also to the body of the individual in the street.

The application of street use codes beyond their nominal purpose of regulating street traffic for the policing of public life was not unknown in Tokyo. After all, the Meiji government was only 10 years removed from the 1872 “customs regulations” (*ishiki kaii jōrei*) issued to cut down on “uncivilized” behaviors such as public urination and mixed bathing in order “to encourage the Japanese people to internalize new notions of civilization,” as David Howell has argued.¹⁷⁶ Street use regulations can be seen as an extension of such efforts. Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa Akimasa and then Police Chief Kabayama Sukenori (later, the first Governor-General of Taiwan) jointly issued the most comprehensive street use regulations in Tokyo with the 1882 Urban Street Control Codes (*gairo torishimari kisoku*). These 1882 codes built on regulations issued by the metropolitan police bureau under the same name four years earlier in early 1878. For the most part, the 17 articles of these 1878 codes were concerned with keeping city streets clear of impediments, such as store signs, banners, clothing (Article 1), storefront displays (Article 3), parked vehicles (Article 4), debris (Articles 10 and 11), children (Article 15), or non-vehicular traffic (Article 17). Still, these earlier codes went beyond limiting street traffic in the name of facilitating urban transportation to granting the

¹⁷⁵ Henry, “Sanitizing Empire,” 656.

¹⁷⁶ David Howell, “Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan,” in *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 95.

municipal police a supervisory role over construction of streets (Article 6) and public toilets (Article 7; repealed in 1880). Yet even the stipulation that the police were to be notified anytime streets would be blocked for any reason (Article 6) and the admonition not to erect storefront stalls or hold unapproved large gatherings (*hitoyose*)(Article 13) could still be seen as a measure to prevent unexpected traffic disruptions.¹⁷⁷

The updated and expanded 1882 codes, on the other hand, not only further extended police power over street use to public performance, but also introduced regulations governing public behavior. In addition to retaining each of the requirements from the earlier codes, the 1882 regulations added stipulations that any stages (*butai*), performance tents (*koyagake*), or parades of portable shrines (*mikoshi*), festival floats (*danjiri*), or the installation of any dancing stalls (*teodori*) or food carts (*yatai*) in the streets must be approved beforehand by the police (Article 4).¹⁷⁸ As urban historian Ishizuka Hiromichi argues, these restrictions on street use and public performance went together with “policing of civil customs” (*fūzoku keisatsu*) in Meiji government attempts to discipline and maintain order over the urban population of Tokyo, especially as impoverished farmers relocated from the countryside to look for work as the city industrialized over the late 19th century.¹⁷⁹ “The gradual narrowing and decline of the areas where street performers (*daidōgei*) could practice their craft, making the streets ‘open air theaters’ (*ao-zora gekijō*) where large numbers of spectators would gather,” Ishizuka notes, “was perhaps one part of the process of the ‘modernization’ of urban

¹⁷⁷ *TSS*, vol. 60 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1969), 878-885.

¹⁷⁸ *TSS*, vol. 66 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1974), 768-777.

¹⁷⁹ See Ishizuka Hiromichi, *Nihon Kindai Toshiron – Tōkyō: 1868-1923* [Modern Japanese Cities, Tokyo: 1868-1923](Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), ch. 3.

space.” “But, as restrictions were placed on street performance (*daidōgei*) and those activities were confined indoors, it was also the path down which the ‘free’ world of the *Sakariba*, where the people of the city could gather in urban space, was increasingly negated by power (*kenryoku*),” Ishizuka concludes.¹⁸⁰ The power over urban space that concerns Ishizuka included disciplinary power over public behavior. In the name of maintaining clean streets, for example, the codes assigned storeowners to maintenance of streets (Article 26) and gutters (Article 29) in front of their stores, prohibited the disposal of garbage or animal corpses in the gutters or streets (Article 34), and admonished residents and their children not to urinate in public (Article 35).

Restrictions on public behavior were even more stringent in the colonies, where Japanese colonizers expected colonial subjects to comport themselves according to “modern” Japanese standards of hygiene and decency. For the most part, regulations issued soon after the beginning of colonial rule in Taipei in 1896 (revised in 1918) and in Seoul in 1913 shared many similarities with earlier codes in Tokyo. All three cities, for example, had requirements for police permission for all billboards, public performances, parades, and public gatherings. Proscriptions on disposal of waste, garbage, or refuse in the gutters or streets, and warnings not to allow unaccompanied children – under 7 in Tokyo, or under 5 in Seoul and Taipei – to walk in the street were also common among all three cities. But what set apart codes issued in the colonies was the attempt to regulate public behavior. As part of colonial efforts to sanitize the city and improve urban appearance, the 1896 Street Control Codes (*gairo torishimari kisoku*) in Taiwan and the 1913 Road Control Codes (*dōro torishimari kisoku*) in Korea added strict standards for

¹⁸⁰ Ishizuka, *Nihon Kindai Toshiron*, 158.

public decency and discipline. Concerned about hygiene and public image, codes in both cities forbade letting cows or horses off-leash, outlawed dumping or scattering refuse, sewage, or nightsoil into the street, and prohibited the transportation of nightsoil containers without appropriate lids. Other codes specifically targeted public indecency and disruptive behaviors. The 1896 codes in Taiwan admonished residents not to remove their clothing, expose their genitals (Article 17), gamble (Article 18), or defecate in public on the street (Article 25).¹⁸¹ In Seoul, meanwhile, the display on or near the street of any advertisement or sign that “disturbs public safety or manners (*kōan moshikuha fūzoku wo midari*)” was strictly forbidden (Article 19). Article 20, meanwhile, criminalized playing (*yūgi*) in the street, loud singing (*hōka*), or excessively loud voices (*takagoe*) after being ordered to stop by the police or military. In both cities, anyone who failed to comply with these restrictions was subject to detention by the police or a fine. Modern streets, the colonial government seemed to be saying, required modern public behavior. Of course, enactment of codes and regulations did not guarantee their efficacy. Without enforcement, the codes carried little weight. Certainly, when out of eyesight or earshot of police patrols, residents in the streets were effectively beyond the law, and in a sense operating outside the reach of colonial power.

One street use restriction, in particular, was more able than others to compel continual and universal compliance: the designation of street traffic direction. The 1913 street use codes in Korea codified the then-current practice of travelling on the right side of the street, stipulating that pedestrians should walk on the right edge, while oxen,

¹⁸¹ TWH: Doc.#88.10.14, “Taihoku-ken Reikō Dai-Jūnana gō Gairo Torishimari Kisoku” Taipei prefecture legal precedent #17, street control codes].

horses, and various vehicles were to travel on the right side of the central area (Article 7). In a dramatic change that had the potential to completely transform colonial life, the Government-General declared on October 25th, 1921, that from December 1st of that year, traffic directions would be reversed to match those in the metropole: traffic would now flow on the left side of the street rather than the right.¹⁸² Thereafter, even out of sight of police patrols, the population of Seoul would be compelled to submit to Japanese colonial law or else rush headlong into oncoming traffic. Dictates on traffic direction were therefore more effective than other codes in compelling compliance through self- and mutual-enforcement. Notably, this regulation on street traffic came following the adoption of policies of “Cultural Rule” enacted in response to the 1919 March 1st independence movement. As Shin and Robinson argue, cultural rule was a “more effective strategy than naked repression” because it attempted to “‘colonize’ Korean culture and consciousness” through a strategy of “divide-and-rule.” “Colonial hegemonic policy,” Shin and Robinson continue, “while trying to ‘colonize’ Korean culture and consciousness, provided ‘space’ for groups to reconstruct their own being – some took an oppositional stance, others reformed, still others supported colonial hegemony.”¹⁸³ Put in this context, even as hegemonic “space” was opened, dictates on street traffic direction were concealed attempts to pervasively control public life.

¹⁸² NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Furei #142, “Dōro Torishimari Kisoku-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” [Road control codes are revised as follows] in *Kanpō* #2779, November 5, 1921.

¹⁸³ Shin and Robinson, “Introduction: Rethinking Colonial Korea,” 7-9.

Designing Imperial Space: Hegemonic Urban Planning in Colonial Seoul

Seoul provides a particularly instructive case study of how the pan-imperial Japanese colonial public works bureaucracy resulted in similar strategies of projecting power beyond spaces of colonial difference across the empire through the production of imperial space. Building regulations and street use codes had been issued in both Taipei and Seoul to protect Japanese enclaves within the city and foster the spread of modern space to outside areas. Now, Japanese architects, public works bureaucrats, and civil engineers who had planned the re-creation of Taipei as the colonial capital of Taiwan would be put to work in Korea to do the same in Seoul. Arriving in Korea, these operatives of empire would intentionally reroute Seoul's axis and symbolically situate monumental Western-style edifices at either end of a new axial boulevard in order to reconfigure the urban fabric of the capital. Japanese colonial urban planning was hegemonic in this case not only because it was meant to produce power or to normalize Japanese conceptualizations of modernity, civilization, and urban space, but also because it co-opted earlier improvement efforts and flexibly adapted to the existing built environment. It was through these pragmatic alterations that colonial planners were able to ensure the measured success of the project. The space produced was therefore imperial, not only because it was designed to project the cultural hegemony of the Japanese empire, but also because it was deliberately charged with imperial symbolism. In this way, Japanese colonial planners deployed a malleable frame of streets, architecture, and urban design in order to forge imperial space at the heart of the colonial capital.

Scholars of Korean history have long recognized Japanese attempts to alter the urban space of Seoul through "modern" planning and improvement programs. For many,

urban improvements were part of a Japanese scheme to destroy the Korean nation and people by disrupting *p'ungsu*, the geomantic principles on which Seoul, or Hanyang as it was then called, was founded in 1394.¹⁸⁴ Tae Hwan Kwan, for example, argues, “At the beginning of the colonial period, Japan destroyed Seoul to demote its symbolic significance as the capital of the Choson Dynasty.” “Japan established urban planning,” Kwan concludes, “to violate Confucian cosmic order and P'ungsu, therefore depriving the Choson Dynasty of legitimacy.”¹⁸⁵ Hae Un Rii agrees. “The Japanese colonial authorities tried to eliminate the Korean spirit and Seoul’s traditional culture by destroying historic Korean buildings,” Rii explains, “making new buildings and roads, and blocking the essential geomantic principles underlying the city’s design.”¹⁸⁶ As Rii continues, “the Japanese opened up the new road between the palaces in order to break

¹⁸⁴ As Changmii Bae describes, the first king of the Yi Dynasty, Yi Sung-gye, commissioned Confucian scholar-bureaucrat Chong To-jon to design a new capital and situate architectural elements and important public buildings, including the Kyongbok Palace, along geomantic guidelines. Nevertheless, topographical conditions forced several alterations: rather than the geomantic ideal of a square-shaped city consisting of a grid-network of roads oriented to true north, the city was circular as a result of the ring of hills surrounding the city; and rather than being aligned to true north, as were Chinese capitals, Seoul was slightly tilted towards the northeast as geography dictated. In fact, as *p'ungsu* spirits flowed from the northeast, it was this particular geographical arrangement that made the site especially propitious. The city could be situated with an auspicious landmark in each direction, and the Kyongbok Palace could be constructed in a line with Mt. Pugak to the northeast, the Kwanghwa gate in front of palace, and continuing through several smaller palaces through the city. Finally, the city spread laterally along the main east-west axial boulevard, called Chongno Road, and lacked an axial north-south boulevard traversing the city. Instead, Namdaemun Street connected Chongno to the main southern entryway to the city, while an off-center processional way linked Chongno to Kyongbok Palace. See: Changmii Bae, “The Symbolic Landscape of National Identity: Planning, Politics, and Culture in South Korea” (PhD diss., USC, 2002), 50-65.

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in Bae, “Symbolic Landscape,” 96.

¹⁸⁶ Hae Un Rii, “Seoul, Republic of Korea: Removing the Reminders of Colonialism,” in *The Disappearing ‘Asian’ City: Protecting Asia’s Urban Heritage in a Globalizing World*, ed. William S. Logan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 82

the geomantic basis of the area's planning and block the traditional spirits (*gi*) which, according to Korean geomantic notions, flowed from Bukak (North Mountain), towards the south."¹⁸⁷

To observers of Japanese colonialism in Korea, the rerouting of the central axis of Seoul and the placement of the Government-General Building constructed in 1926 at its head is often seen as the most egregious example of Japanese attempts to disrupt the geomantic spirits of the city and sever the spiritual ties said to link the Korean king to his people. As historian Hyungmin Pai explains the placing of the Government-General building, "In 1924, Kwanghwamoon [Kwanghwa Gate] was moved to the east of the Kyongbok Palace, and a domed, proto-Renaissance building was erected in front of the main pavilion of the palace." "The idea was that the new building would break the original, spiritual axis of the city, so carefully laid out during its foundation."¹⁸⁸ "By placing the new building directly in front of Korea's main royal palace," adds Ronan Thomas, "...the Japanese revealed a sadistic understanding of Korean psychology and the optimum way to disrupt the natural lines of harmony associated with Korean geomancy." "In opposing the concept of geomancy," he continues, "...the site of the new building was calculated to emphasize Japanese domination and reduce Korean popular resistance."¹⁸⁹ Finally, the National Museum of Korea, which itself had been housed in the Government-General headquarters building from 1986 to 1995, concluded in a 1997

¹⁸⁷ Rii, "Seoul, Republic of Korea," 83.

¹⁸⁸ Hyungmin Pai, "Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae'oon Sang'ga and Yoido," in *Culture and the City in East Asia*, ed. Won Bae Kim and others (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 110-111.

¹⁸⁹ Ronan Thomas, "The Capitol, Seoul," *History Today* 47, no. 1 (1998): 63.

publication that the building was designed “to [sever] *maek*, the vital artery of Choson, and to extinguish *chi*, the vital energy of the Choson Dynasty.”¹⁹⁰

Undeniably, Japanese colonial planners designed this axial route as a space intended to project Japanese imperial power. At one end of the boulevard sat the administrative offices of the Japanese colonial government, placed directly in front of the historical residence of the Korean king, Kyōngbok Palace. Although construction was not completed until 1926, the location for this building had been selected as early as 1912 – the same year Phase 1 of the Keijō Urban Improvement programs was announced.¹⁹¹ The boulevard was therefore clearly designed from the beginning with the Government-General Building in mind. At the other end of the boulevard, meanwhile, sat another monument of Japanese colonial control over Korea: Seoul Station. For Japan, the boulevard connecting the Governor-General building and the Seoul railway station was a symbolic link between two icons of Japanese domination over Korea, the colonial administration and the railway network. Because this new route replaced Namdaemun Road to the east as the main north-south route through the city and linked various symbols of Japanese colonial power, it is often regarded as the symbolic center of Japanese colonial power in Korea. As Todd Henry argues, the “main north-south axis – beginning at the Kyongbok Palace grounds, passing by the entrances to Namsan’s Chosen Shrine and Seoul Train Station, and terminating at the military boom town of Yongsan – was thus aimed at consolidating Japanese control over the Korean neighborhood of Chongno and clearing the way for the efficient circulation of goods and

¹⁹⁰ Quoted in Bae, “Symbolic Landscape,” 96.

¹⁹¹ Government-General of Chosen, ed., *Annual Report 1921-1922*, 167.

people necessary to facilitate the imperial development of the city and beyond.”¹⁹²

Upon closer examination, two important points stand out about even this most egregious example of Japanese colonial power mongering in the urban space of the colonial capital. First, the axial boulevard was the product of a flexible colonial policy designed to adapt to local conditions. Secondly, the imperial space framed by the axial boulevard, Keijō Station, and the Government-General Building was designed by public works operatives who had played important roles in the re-creation of Taipei as a colonial capital. Rather than forcefully clearing whole neighborhoods to carve a brand new street through the existing built environment, Japanese colonial planners followed streets that already existed. This can be charted in a series of period maps. First, Figure 23 is 1896 map depicting Japanese-initiated street improvements within the Settlement. As the map details, a second large street leading to the Namdaemun already existed in 1896. This street is also visible in a more detailed 1897 map of Japanese residences in the Settlement. Finally, the route is seen in a detail of the 1:10,000 scale *Complete Map of Keijō, Korea (Kankoku Keijō Zenzu)* published by the Japanese-owned Keifu Railway Company in 1903. As this map shows, the route of the future central axis is roughly discernible in the existing street pattern. The only major deviation is the zigzag around the Kyōun Palace (later renamed by the Toksu Palace), which served as the Royal Palace of King Kojong at the time (See Figure 24). Figure 25 shows a detail of the 1:10,000 scale map of Seoul published by the Government-General in 1917 based on a 1915 survey by the Government-General Cartographical Department.

Comparing these maps reveals how the axial T'aep'yōng Boulevard emerged

¹⁹² Henry, “Sanitizing Empire,” 662.

from the existing built environment through a series of surgically executed projects. First, zooming in on the main southern entrance to the city, the Namdaemun, in Figure 26, we can see that the city walls on either side of the gate have been torn down, leaving the gate itself standing alone at the center of a newly constructed rotary. As described above, this project had been carried out in 1907. Following the axis northwards from the Namdaemun Gate along T'aep'yŏng Boulevard Road (Figure 27), we see that the road was widened to a width of 15 *ken* (~90ft.) all the way to Hwangt'ohyŏn Plaza at the intersection with Chongno. Moreover, the zigzagging pattern of the existing street was eliminated by carving out a portion of the Toksu palace – perhaps too conveniently razed by fire the previous decade – shaping the new Taehanmun Plaza from the confluence of the existing streets. Carried out from 1911-1913, this project was planned by the Public Works Council as part of the Phase 1 Provincial Road Project (*Dai-ikki Jidō Jigyō*) in an attempt to tie Seoul more tightly into the peninsular transportation network.¹⁹³ We can also see that a new reinforced-concrete bridge was erected over the Ch'ŏnggye River, and existing structures were removed to widen Hwangt'ohyŏn Plaza. The widening of the plaza, in particular, was done at the surprisingly low cost of ¥1,600, as compared to over ¥700,000 expended on just these 1911-1913 projects.¹⁹⁴ The reason for this is unclear. One explanation may be drawn from earlier street widening projects that had carried out inside the Japanese Settlement in 1904, where “the cost of land and building purchasing was surprisingly only a small amount...naturally, it is said that police enforcement had a

¹⁹³ Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1935], 9 front; Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed. *Chōsen Doboku Jigyō-shi*, 1040-1041.

¹⁹⁴ Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1938], 17; Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed. *Chōsen Doboku Jigyō-shi*, 1041.

lot to do with this.”¹⁹⁵ Finally, Figure 28 is a detail of the Kwanghwamun processional way extending northwards from Hwangt’ohyŏn towards the Kyŏngbok Palace. The width of this route, already the widest street in Seoul at 30 *ken* (~180 ft.), was preserved when repaved by the Keijō city government over the years 1930-1931 as a continuation of the Government-General Keijō Urban Improvement projects.¹⁹⁶ As can be seen in this map, the historical Kwanghwamun Gate was removed, and the new Japanese Government-General Building was erected in its place directly in front of the former Kyŏngbok royal palace in 1926 (Figure 29).

As the focus on the Government-General Building displays, architecture played an important role in Japanese efforts at designing imperial space. Prior to annexation, the Japanese expatriate and consular community had paired street improvements with the construction of Western buildings in order to produce modern, Japanese spaces in the southern half of the city. The center of the Japanese settlement around the intersection of Nihyŏn Road (renamed Honmachi Road during the colonial period) and Namdaemun Road saw the completion of a number of Japanese-owned Western-style buildings: the Japanese consulate, Keijō Post Office, and Bank of Chōsen, among other administration offices.¹⁹⁷ Outside of this area, meanwhile, colonial leaders constructed various other official buildings such as the Court of Cassation, Tai-Han Hospital, Oriental Development Corporation Headquarters, the Communication Office, the Railway Office, Central Laboratory, Commercial Museum, and the Chosen Hotel, all in Western styles.

¹⁹⁵ Keijō Kyoryūmin-dan Yakusho, ed., *Keijō Hattatsu-shi*, 112 for paving, 130 for quote.

¹⁹⁶ Keijō-fu, ed., *Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō* [1938], 19.

¹⁹⁷ Chon, “Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji to Bunka Genshō,” 221.

By the time the Chosen Hotel opened in 1914, Japan had already constructed 92 new buildings for either the Government-General or its affiliated offices.¹⁹⁸ As Chon Uyong argues, “Because the large-scale buildings constructed by the early 1920s were generally government offices or the offices of semi-governmental companies and banks, the location and architectural design of these buildings clearly reflected the intent of the colonial power.”¹⁹⁹ By concentrating modern architecture into the southern – Japanese – half of the city, moreover, Japan succeeded in “making this area the most modern in Keijō and in all of Chosen.”²⁰⁰ “As a result,” Chon states, “[the southern half of the city] became the spatial center of colonial Keijō, along with becoming the cultural center by which the culture of the rest of the colony was tuned...Moreover, the new buildings were all similarly constructed in the same authoritarian Renaissance style, visibly projecting the coerciveness of the colonial power.”²⁰¹

The adoption of Cultural Rule following the 1919 March First Movement caused a new emphasis on colonial architecture. As the Government-General reported, prior to 1920, 2 to ¥3 million had been spent annually to build new provincial offices, police stations, courts, and prisons to replace those offices “housed in old Korean buildings, which were found very inconvenient for the dispatch of business.” After 1920, however, “on account of the introduction of a cultural policy,” the budget of building construction was raised to ¥9 million, with ¥700,000 annually designated for government offices

¹⁹⁸ Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report 1912-1913*, 120.

¹⁹⁹ Chon, “*Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji*,” 216.

²⁰⁰ Chon, “*Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji*,” 217.

²⁰¹ Chon, “*Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji*,” 217.

specifically.²⁰² Not only did the new policies change the type and number of buildings constructed, they transformed how planners viewed the role of architecture in the colony. Engineer Nakamura Makoto reflected on this shift in a 1922 article calling for a new direction in the field in *Chōsen to Kenchiku*. As Nakamura wrote, the first generation of buildings in the peninsula were all constructed in a “temporary” (*ōkyū-teki*) and “stopgap” (*bihō-teki*) manner, as could be seen in the “barrack style” of early government offices. The second generation of architecture, however, Nakamura characterized as “modern urban architecture based on scientific perspectives.” As examples of such architecture, Nakamura listed two buildings then under construction: the Government-General Building – “the representative of government office architecture” – and Seoul Station – “the starting point of transportation facilities in the capital and the gateway to Keijō.” But the completion of these buildings did not mean the job was done. Instead, Nakamura argued, architects should thereafter focus their efforts on the construction of buildings “most intimately related to urban life.” What he had in mind was the construction of a number of “cultural institutions characteristic of the modern city”: a library – “the center of modern education and acculturation of the populace (*minshū kyōka*)” – a museum, and scientific laboratories.²⁰³ While Nakamura’s calls for such installations went unheeded, the Government-General nonetheless constructed a number of buildings during the period of Cultural Rule that arguably fell within his idea of “cultural institutions.” As the Government-General later listed, these buildings included the Government-General offices (1926), the Chōsen Shrine (1925), and Keijō Imperial

²⁰² Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report 1922-1923*, 147.

²⁰³ Nakamura Makoto, “Toshi Kenchiku no Bokkō wo Nozomu” [Envisioning the rise of urban architecture], *Chōsen to Kenchiku* 2, no. 1 (1923): 29-31.

University (1924).²⁰⁴ The adoption of Cultural Rule, then, magnified the role of architecture as a tool of asserting Japanese culture.

With a redoubled focus on architecture as a tool of cultural hegemony, planning and construction commenced for the monumental buildings that would charge the new axial boulevard as imperial space. The first to be completed was Keijō Station. When opened in 1925, Keijō Station replaced the old Namdaemun Station built in 1900. Namdaemun Station had been relegated to a location outside the city walls, since purchasing land for the station within the walls was difficult as a result of the crowded conditions, and was called Namdaemun Station because of its proximity to the south gate (Namdaemun) of the city walls. At that time, “Seoul Station” referred to the terminus of the Kei-Jin Line, the station later called Sōdaemun Station because of its location near the West Gate (Sōdaemun).²⁰⁵ The importance of Namdaemun Station increased rapidly, however, with the completion and opening of the Kei-Fu Line in 1905, and the Kei-Gi Line in 1908. From this point on, Namdaemun Station came to be seen as the central station in Seoul. When Sōdaemun Station was finally closed in 1919, Namdaemun Station was officially renamed “Keijō Station” in 1921. The small wood station building was considered inadequate for the colonial capital, however, and construction of a more fitting station building commenced the following year.²⁰⁶ To design the station, the Government-General turned to Tsukamoto Yasushi, member of the selection committee responsible for the design of the Taiwan Government-General Building in Taipei. As a

²⁰⁴ Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report 1924-1926*, 144.

²⁰⁵ Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, 238-239.

²⁰⁶ Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, 240.

student of Tatsuno Kingo, Tsukamoto designs for Keijō Station displayed several similarities to Tatsuno's Tokyo Station. Most noticeably, Tsukamoto borrowed the trademark "Tatsuno Style" appearance of white ornamentation and red brick construction seen in Tokyo Station. As Nakamura Makoto wrote in an article in *Korea and Architecture*, "it is widely recognized that Keijō Station lives up to its role as the central station of Keijō."²⁰⁷ The station was completed in September 1925, only three years after the beginning of construction, and commenced operations from October that year. As the main station of the colonial capital, and the beginning of the main axis running through the city, Nishizawa Yasuhiko argues, Seoul Station "became the Gateway to the city."²⁰⁸

At the other end of this axial boulevard presided the Government-General Building. Drawing a direct link between hegemonic urban design in Taipei and Seoul, this building was the product of the efforts of two more colonial public works bureaucrats who had previously worked together in Taiwan: Mochiji Rokusaburō and Nomura Ichirō. It was after Mochiji took control of the Public Works Bureau in 1912 that planning began for a new headquarters to replace the dilapidated structures then housing the colonial administration.²⁰⁹ As the Government-General reported in the *Annual Report* for 1913-1914, the original offices of the colonial government were "those of the former Residency-General, built in 1907 as a temporary erection of wood." According to

²⁰⁷ Nakamura Makoto, "Keijō no Atarashii Tatemono ni Tsuite" [Concerning new buildings in Keijō], *Chōsen to Kenchiku* 5, no. 1 (1926): 22.

²⁰⁸ Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, 241.

²⁰⁹ As Iwai Chōzaburō explained in 1926, the first idea for relocating the Government-General offices came from accounting department head Kodama Hideo (son of former Governor-General of Taiwan, Kodama Gentarō), but nothing came of this idea until Mochiji's arrival. Iwai Chōzaburō, "Shin-chōsha no Sekkei ni Tsuite" [Concerning the design of the new headquarters building], *Chōsen to Kenchiku* 5, no. 5 (1926): 3-4.

Japanese colonial authorities, not only were these wooden structures “unsuited as offices of the Central Government in the Peninsula,” but they were also “located in an inconvenient place” in the southern half of the city.²¹⁰ Under Mochiji’s direction, the bureau dispatched an engineer to conduct inspection tours of government buildings in Europe and the United States, and conducted surveys for an appropriate location for the building. To design the building, the Government-General hired a German architect living in Tokyo, George de Lalande. For the site of the building, meanwhile, the Government-General selected the former Kyōngbok Palace, vacated by the Korean royal family in 1895 (after the assassination of Queen Min) and only recently acquired by the Government-General in 1912.

Mochiji Rokusaburō was only the first of two engineers of empire in Taipei who had a hand in designing the imperial space around the Government-General Building in Seoul. When German architect de Lalande died unexpectedly in 1914, the Government-General turned to Nomura Ichirō to lead the project. An 1895 architecture graduate of Tokyo Imperial University, Nomura had a long public works career in Taiwan between 1900 and 1913 where he was involved with both architecture and urban planning in Taipei. First, Nomura had been one of 7 members named to a committee charged with selecting the design for the Taiwan Government-General Building in 1907 after Gotō Shimpei announced a nationwide architectural design contest for the building.²¹¹ Consisting of a number of distinguished architects and engineers – Tatsuno Kingo,

²¹⁰ Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report 1913-1914*, 79.

²¹¹ Uta Aki, “Taiwan Sōtokufu Chōsha Shinchiku Sekkei no Kenshō Boshū” [New design contest for the Taiwan Government-General Headquarters Building], *Kenchiku Zasshi* 21, no. 245 (1905): 30-32.

Nakamura Tatsutarō, Tsumaki Yorinaka, Nagao Hanpei, Tsukamoto Yasushi, Itō Chūta, and Nomura – the committee had awarded first prize to Tsukamoto’s classmate at Tokyo Imperial University, architect Nagano Uheiji. Continuing the predominance of imperial university graduates in the colonial bureaucracy, seven of these 8 people, graduated from either Tokyo Imperial University or its predecessor, the Imperial College of Engineering (*Kōbu Daigakkō*).²¹² As head of the maintenance department of the Public Works Bureau, Nomura had been responsible for supervising construction of the building when work began in 1911. Secondly, in addition to being involved with the Government-General Building, Nomura also had a hand in the urban planning of Taipei when he and Mochiji were both named members of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee in 1910.²¹³ Called on to pick up where de Lalande left off on the design of the Government-General Building in Seoul, Nomura put the finishing touches on a design that borrowed heavily from the Edwardian Neo-Baroque style popular at the time in England. This produced an exterior style that, in the estimation of longtime colonial architect Iwai Chozaburō, was suited to the building’s role. “Government office buildings,” Iwai wrote in an article describing the design of the Government-General Building, “must, to the utmost, project a gravity befitting their role as government offices.”²¹⁴ The same idea went into designing the interior of the building. While the stout ferroconcrete exterior projected

²¹² The one exception was Tsumaki, who studies at the Imperial College of Engineering in 1878 before transferring to Cornell University. The graduate dates of the others were Tatsuno Kingo (Arch., 1879), Nakamura Tatsutarō (Arch., 1882), Nagao Hanpei (Civ. Eng., 1891), Tsukamoto Yasushi (Arch., 1893), Itō Chūta (Arch., 1892), Nagano Uheiji (Arch., 1893).

²¹³ TWH: “Jonin oyobi Jirei” [Investitures, appointments, and dismissals], *Fuhō* #2954, May 11, 1910.

²¹⁴ Iwai, “Shin-Chōsha no Sekkei ni Tsuite,” 6.

Japan's firm colonial rule, the palatial marble interior ornamentation attempted to overwhelm visitors with Japan's heightened culture and modernity (Figures 30-31). According to Iwai's colleague in the public works department, Fujioka Jūichi, it was this consideration for appearances that led to the peculiar alignment of the building with respect to the Kyōngbok Palace. Rather than aligning the building with the slightly slanted layout of the original palace grounds, the building was symbolically situated perpendicular to the existing processional boulevard. As Fujioka explained, the reason for the alignment was so that "down the beautiful modern road, one can gaze (*nagameraruru*) the majestic appearance (*iyō*) of the building."²¹⁵ A similar explanation was given by the Government-General: "aligning the location of the new Building to the center of the existing structures would be to deviate (*hanaruru*) from the center line of the street facing the building, and would prevent appreciation of the magnificence (*iyō*) of the building" (See Figure 32).²¹⁶

Built in this Western design, and placed at the end of an axial boulevard that linked to Keijō Station and the Japanese-controlled railway network beyond, the Government-General Building capped an imperial space in central Seoul linking the physical power of the railway station to the political power of the Government-General. As with the link between the imperial palace and Tokyo Station in the metropole, this axial boulevard in colonial Seoul united railways, architecture, and urban planning to project Japanese authority and imperial power. As the main station of the colonial capital, Keijō Station was the focal point of the X-shaped Japanese-controlled railway

²¹⁵ Fujiokoa Jūichi, "Shin-chōsha no Sekkei Gaiyō" [Outline of the design of the new headquarters building], *Chōsen to Kenchiku* 5, no. 5 (1926): 91.

²¹⁶ Quoted in Nishizawa, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron*, 91.

network cast over peninsula. In this regard, the station symbolized the physical control and economic integration Japan sought to achieve over Korea through the construction of railways. Linking Keijō Station and the Government-General Building, this axial boulevard frame a Japanese-constructed modern urban space running through the center of the colonial capital. Charging this urban place as imperial space, the Government-General Building contained an ornate throne room housing a portrait of the Japanese emperor (Figure 33).

Conclusion: Environments of Empire – Public Works and Japanese Colonialism

Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto was not far off when he spoke of the Government-General Building as the embodiment of Japanese colonial policy. Although Saitō was referring specifically to policies the Japanese administration in Korea would adopt after 1919, the building was nevertheless the product of Japanese colonial public works strategies common to both Taiwan and Korea as early as 1895. In colonies and other territories under Japanese rule, Japanese engineers carried out public works projects designed to render the colonial landscape legible, governable, and profitable. This applied to both the natural and the built environments. In rural areas, Japanese colonizers laid railways, improved rural highways, built dams, and constructed ports. In urban areas, Japanese engineers paved streets, installed sidewalks, buried water and sewer pipes, and erected Western-style buildings. All required immense manipulation of the environment. Massive amounts of earth had to be dynamited, cleared, and removed to lay railways and rural roads; enormous amounts of stone and gravel had to be quarried for rail bed ballast and street surface paving; vast stores of timber, granite, marble, and

brick had to be harvested for the construction of monumental Western-style structures. Through these projects, Japanese colonizers hoped not only to assert cultivators' rights to colonial territory but also to project Japanese power and modernity. As a result, Japanese colonial rule was therefore built as much on domination of the colonial environment as it was on harsh control of the colonized population.

In both Taipei and Seoul, Japanese colonizers attempted to rule through modern urban space. This meant constructing “modern” Japanese cityscapes juxtaposed to “primitive” native urban areas, issuing building regulations to and street use codes to enforce “civilized” built forms and public behavior while criminalizing those considered “primitive” in Japanese eyes, and finally deploying urban design to produce spaces charged with imperial power. Why did Japanese colonizers exert so much effort and spend so much money on colonial public works? By one count Japan expended \$8 billion on public works over 36 years in Korea alone.²¹⁷ In the minds of Japanese colonial engineers, such projects had material and conceptual goals. From a material perspective, public works were meant to benefit Japanese colonialism in three ways. First, especially in the colonial countryside, improvements to roads, railways, ports, and rivers, along with cadastral surveys, were designed to make colonialism profitable by facilitating the exploitation of the colonial landscape to the benefit of the metropole as agricultural, industrial, and commercial goods were shipped back to Japan. This was undoubtedly the case in Taiwan, where government investment in sugar, rice, and tea production, in addition to government monopolies in salt, camphor, and opium, led the

²¹⁷ Hong Yung Lee, “Introduction: A Critique of ‘Colonial Modernity’,” in *Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945*, ed. Hong Yung Lee and others (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 11.

colony to become completely independent financially from Tokyo just over a decade after colonization.²¹⁸ Secondly, transportation improvements had the added logistical advantage of expediting troop movements, both to pacify local insurrection and to dispatch armies in time of war. Troops were necessary in both colonies as Japanese garrisons were frequently called on to suppress “bandit” (*dohi*) uprisings in the mountains of eastern Taiwan, and “Righteous Army” (*Ŭibyŏng*) guerillas in Korea, in the early years of colonial rule. Thirdly, infrastructure and housing improvements in colonial cities were carried out first and foremost to make Japanese colonial officials and expat residents feel at home by re-creating “Japan Towns” within the colonial city, whether it was “Kyōmachi” in Taipei, or “Nihonmachi” in Seoul. As a result, efforts to produce modern streetscapes – the paving of streets, the digging of gutters, the laying of water and sewer systems, the planting of trees, the installation of street lamps and sidewalks, the construction of fireproof housing and Western-style buildings – were primarily localized to areas of Japanese residence, forcing native property owners out in the process.

While immediate material benefits were an important objective of colonial public works, Japanese colonizers executed extensive programs for a much more significant conceptual goal: legitimating Japanese colonialism. Aside from the aforementioned commercial, logistical, and corporeal advantages, public works were expected to further Japanese colonial hegemony in three related ways. First, as with development of the natural environment, Japanese colonizers saw improvement of the built environment as a means of validating Japanese claims to territorial ownership and affirming Japan’s right

²¹⁸ Gotō Shimpei boasts of his administration’s financial successes in Gotō, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” 530-553.

to rule. By cultivating land that earlier governors had failed to exploit, pacifying territory that the previous regime had been unable to rule, and sanitizing and ordering cities their predecessors had left unorganized, Japanese rulers thought they could build colonial authenticity. It was for this reason that Japanese colonizers sought to construct tangible “modernity” in the colonies by introducing the built forms and public behaviors that characterized “civilized” life in Japan. Secondly, the construction of “modernity” in Taiwan and Korea contributed to Japanese colonial rule by denoting the passing of the old regime and marking the arrival of the new. In the eyes of Japanese colonial engineers, there was no better way to demonstrate this rupture than by constructing spaces of colonial difference. This was not limited to the production of modern Japanese cityscapes by improving streets and erecting Western-style buildings, but also included the preservation of vernacular structures as historical artifacts exhibited to reify the difference between the “modern” Japanese colonizers and the “primitive” native colonized population. At the same time, building regulations and street use codes were issued to reinforce Japanese spaces while also enforcing Japanese expectations of “civilized” public behavior throughout the entire city. Finally, planners expected public works projects to legitimate colonialism by asserting Japanese cultural hegemony. Constructing modernity, reifying colonial difference – both were essentially means to this end. This was done with two targets in mind. On one hand, attempts to improve urban conditions and demarcate the arrival of the new regime were intended to impress the colonial population with the modernity, culture, and power of the Japanese empire, compel subservience, and encourage assimilation. On the other hand, improvements were carried out to garner the recognition and acceptance of Japanese colonialism in the

eyes of the international audience. It was for this reason that Japanese colonizers eagerly publicized their successes around the world with voluminous reports, statistics, and staged photographs.

Public works, then, played a vital role in Japanese colonialism. As Japanese imperialism spread to Taiwan and Korea, it was the Japanese civil engineers and architects who followed the flag overseas that made Japanese colonialism work. It was these operatives of empire – armed with gravel, brick, and mortar – who laid the foundation of Japanese imperialism and concretized Japanese colonial power. While the construction of cultural hegemony in built form was just one mechanism of Japanese colonial rule, it was a strategy that was common to cities around the Japanese empire, including Taipei and Seoul. Despite extremely divergent trajectories and legacies, Japanese colonialism in both Taiwan and Korea nevertheless shared one common premise: the manipulation of the natural and built environments through public works.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: EMPIRES OF SPACE AND POSTCOLONIAL SPACES OF EMPIRE

On August 15th, 1995, a large crowd gathered in the plaza in front of the Korea National Museum at the center of Seoul, South Korea. The anxious crowd gave a defiant cheer as the steel finial was plucked from atop the roof and set on the ground beside the building. The cheer built to a roar as wrecking balls crashed through the ferroconcrete walls of the imposing structure and proceeded to turn the building to rubble.¹ For an observer unfamiliar with the building's past, the scene would have been extremely odd: why were people cheering the destruction of a seemingly important national icon? But what this observer would not have known is that the building in question – which then housed the Korea National Museum and had earlier been home to the Korean national assembly – was an iconic reminder of Korea's colonial past. To many, the imposing Western-style stone structure was the most egregious and appalling remnant of Japanese colonial oppression in Seoul, if not all of Korea. When the Japanese constructed the building in 1926, it was to serve as the headquarters of an expanding colonial administration, the Government-General. For many in the anxious crowd gathered in front of the building in 1995, the destruction of this offensive edifice in the heart of the capital – symbolically staged on the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese empire at the end of World War II, no less – was a long-awaited expurgation of Japanese imperial power. The symbolic emancipation of this site, in particular, draws

¹ Changmii Bae, "The Symbolic Landscape of National Identity: Planning, Politics, and Culture in South Korea" (PhD diss., USC, 2002), 1-2.

attention to possibilities for postcolonial responses to spaces of empire and raises questions about the nature of power in space.

The destruction of the Government-General Building in Seoul in 1995 is a fitting place to conclude a study charting Japanese assertions of power in space across the empire, from Tokyo to Taipei and finally to Seoul. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the fledgling Meiji government faced a crisis of legitimacy on two fronts. Western imperialist nations lay in wait to see how successfully the new regime could escape from the legacy of its Tokugawa predecessor and subdue pro-Tokugawa holdouts. In the face of these international and domestic challenges, government leaders embraced Western “modernity.” Not only would this hopefully assist in the revision of the “unequal treaties,” it would also distinguish the new Meiji government from the old Tokugawa Shogunate. As many scholars have previously noted, Japan’s role as a late-developing nation and empire provided its leaders an opportunity to travel the world in search of state-of-the-art models to modernize all facets of Japanese society, from political organizations and government institutions, to industry, technology and the material goods of everyday life. Through the dispatching of Japanese students overseas, the wholesale importation of model factories, and the hiring of foreign advisors, the Meiji government adopted and adapted aspects of Western culture to the Japanese case as they set to work on a process of national unification and political centralization.

As part of this strategy, Meiji leaders assembled a “toolkit of modernity” filled with instruments of tangible modernity, such as railways, architecture, telegraphs, modern hygiene, and modern urban planning. As these tools suggest, the manipulation of geographic space played a major part in Meiji efforts to physically and ideologically

integrate the far reaches of the archipelago. Locomotives, for example, acted as engines of state-formation through centralization and standardization as the national railway network cast a net of central power over the periphery. As conveyors of goods and symbols of progress, railways provided economical, industrial, and ideological advantages.² Urban reform, meanwhile, revolutionized the built environment of the cities, affirming a break with the past and creating the modern spatial conditions necessary for the capitalist mode of production.

As Part 1 of the dissertation describes, it was in this context of state-formation that the Meiji government undertook the re-creation of Tokyo as *Teito*, the “imperial capital,” starting with Ginza Bricktown in 1872 and continuing through the Tokyo Urban Improvement Projects in the 1880s and 1890s. Although Japan was never directly colonized by Western imperial powers, western urbanism and culture was nevertheless imported into the city by an exogenous regime – the new Meiji government. Refashioning the Shogun’s city of Edo into the Emperor’s capital of Tokyo from the early 1870s, Meiji leaders employed Western architects and engineers, and deployed knowledge gained through firsthand observation of European and American cities, in order to modernize the urban built environment of the capital from the ground up – namely, by laying railways, erecting Western-style architecture, and implementing modern urban planning. No doubt, each of these individual improvements had practical benefits, especially for planners seeking to revive the commercial and economic prosperity lost as a result of the drastic population decline and concomitant economic

² This idea is developed further in Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” in *Trains, Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails*, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).

stagnation resulting from the suspension of the Tokugawa “alternate attendance” (*sankin kōtai*) system. Urban railways, for example, fostered commerce and industry by connecting urban markets to productive rural regions. Planners also hoped that “improved streets” (*kaisei dōro*) – that is, streets that had been widened, straightened, paved in the most up-to-date techniques, and for the most part outfitted with sidewalks to separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic – would invigorate the economic function of Tokyo by increasing urban mobility, thereby promoting efficient commercial shipping and transportation of goods. Widened streets also acted as firebreaks, which together with nonflammable Western brick architecture, combated the frequent conflagrations in the city, demonstrating the permanence of the new capital and its economic potential. Nevertheless, this modernization of the built environment was done not only in anticipation of the commercial prosperity expected of modern capital cities, but also in an attempt to concretize in the built form of the city what Japanese planners saw as an advanced Japanese culture.

Yet no social processes are unidirectional or carried out without being part of a dynamic dialectical interaction, whereby different actors and factors share in the final product. This is no doubt also true for the framing of urban space. Indeed, it was this consideration of, and adaptation to, local conditions that ultimately made urban improvements in Tokyo and Seoul more feasible. The overriding lesson of the Ginza Bricktown for Japanese planners was that the forceful imposition of power from above would elicit an equally tenacious and hostile resistance from below. In other words, planners learned that the imposition of a rigid frame of urban space was unlikely to succeed. What was needed instead was a more plastic structure, malleable enough to

conform to the existing built environment. Moving forward, therefore, Tokyo planners abandoned attempts to instantaneously transform the built environment, and instead more pragmatically focused on incremental transportation and infrastructure improvements, especially to urban streets, as the groundwork for producing imperial space. Finally, it was the channeling of competing visions of Tokyo and the emergence of a popular realization of Tokyo as the symbolic center of the expanding Japanese empire that led to the production of imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital in the form of Tokyo Station.

As Part 2 of the dissertation discusses, it was this strategy of manipulation of the natural and built environments that Japanese colonizers carried overseas in the 1890s as they sought to extend Japanese imperial influence to Korea and Taiwan. Although no longer under direct threat of foreign colonization, Japan still viewed Western advances into East Asia with trepidation. For Meiji leaders, such as Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (Prime Minister 1889-1891, and 1898-1900), Western intrusion in East Asia threatened Japanese national security by breaching its “line of interest” encircling Korea and encroaching on the “line of sovereignty” encompassing the home islands. In the name of national security, Japan attempted to prevent Western colonization of Korea by exerting its own influence and military might on the peninsula. Believing that cultivation and exploitation of the natural environment legitimated ownership of land, Japanese agents sought to secure Japanese rights to railway construction in the peninsula amidst the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. In the minds of Japanese defense strategists, diplomats, and businessmen, not only would railways provide Japan with military logistical and trade benefits, ownership of railways would justify Japanese claims to

Korean territory in the event of a colonial land grab amongst the Western powers. Japanese agents felt the situation so dire that they tried to forcefully seize rights to secure a railway concession – even inciting a Japanese-led coup d'état in 1894 and assassinating the ruling Queen of Korea a year later. In the end, laying the foundation of Japanese imperialism in Korea in the Seoul-Pusan Railway was not possible without the choreographed cooperation of Japanese diplomats and entrepreneurs, foreign diplomats and businessmen, and Korean courtiers and laborers. In this way, manipulation of the natural environment was one way in which Japan attempted to assert power in the colonies.

For Japanese colonizers, exploitation of the natural environment was only half of the equation of solidifying, legitimizing, and profiting from colonial rule. At the same time as colonial engineers undertook public works projects across the colonial landscape, other engineers of empire were dispatched to colonial cities to initiate urban improvement projects. Like the introduction of railways, rural highways, and river improvements in the countryside, the widening, straightening, and paving of urban streets, the laying of water and sewer pipes, the installation of sidewalks and roadside trees, and the construction of western-style buildings was all meant to justify Japanese colonial rule. As with the “enlightened exploitation” of the colonial countryside, improvement of the urban built environment served both material and conceptual benefits for Japanese colonialism. On one hand, urban improvements were meant to increase the commercial function of the city by reducing traffic and congestion, and to make the city more sanitary and hygienic. On the other hand, as the uneven distribution of improvements across the city attests, urban improvements were designed to construct “modern” Japanese spaces.

By marking a sharp contrast to “primitive” native spaces and customs, these “Japanese” spaces would demonstrate the modernity of the Japanese rulers and the superiority of Japanese culture. In the minds of Japanese colonial planners, such spaces would not only encourage the subservience and assimilation of the colonial population, but they would also garner the recognition and acceptance of Japanese colonialism in the eyes of the Western imperial powers. The Japanese empire, both as a nation-state and as a colonial empire, was therefore built on the production of imperial space through manipulation of the natural and built environments. In other words, it was an empire of space.

But what happens to spaces of empire following decolonization? The destruction of the Government-General Building in Seoul in 1995 discussed at the beginning of this conclusion represents one response to imperial space in the postcolonial context. Postcolonial Seoul in fact offers three illustrative case studies of the postcolonial spaces of empire: the Government-General Building, Seoul Station, and Seoul City Hall. Each building was handled differently following the fall of the Japanese empire in 1945. After 1945, many of the Western-style buildings constructed in Seoul by Japanese colonizers were re-appropriated by the South Korean government. The Government-General Building functioned as the National Assembly until 1975, and as the National Museum from 1985 until its destruction in 1995. Other reminders of Japanese colonialism still remain in the city. The Bank of Chosen, now the Bank of Korea, still fronts its plaza at the intersection of Namdaemun Road and Sogong-ro Road. Likewise, Keijō Station, renamed Seoul Station in 1947, still stands today as it looked when opened in 1925, even as its colonial counterparts were destroyed to purge Seoul’s colonial legacy. Finally, Keijō City Hall continued to serve as Seoul City Hall until 2008, when construction

started on a new building immediately behind the old Japanese structure. The Government-General Building was certainly the largest and most imposing of all colonial structures, and was especially detested for blocking the Kyōngbok Palace. It was for this reason that the destruction of the building carried such symbolic weight. As Chagmii Bae notes, “The demolition of the [building] signified the liquidation of Korea’s servile relationship with Japan and its rebirth as an advanced democratic nation.”³

The demolition of the Government-General Building contrasts sharply with two alternative postcolonial approaches to imperial space seen in Seoul. As a final mediation on the nature of power in space, this conclusion will close by considering the cases of Seoul Station and the Keijō City Hall, two colonial-era buildings that have been retained but for very different purposes. If demolition was one approach to the decolonization of imperial space, Seoul Station embodies a second: repurposing. When opened in 1925, Keijō Station – as it was then called – was the symbolic gateway into the Japanese colonial capital of Seoul, and marked the entrance of an imperial space presided over by the Government-General Building at the far end of a Japanese-constructed axis bisecting the city. After 1945, the station retained its role as the gateway to the city until 2004, when a new Seoul Station opened to service the KTX high-speed railway. In 2009, the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, and the Korea Crafts and Design Foundation initiated a project called “Culture Station, Seoul 284” to restore and repurpose the station. After a 21.3 billion won (about \$20 million) renovation, the station reopened to the public on August 9th, 2011, as a “cultural space” hosting “cultural events,

³ Bae, “The Symbolic Landscape of National Identity,” 2.

exhibitions, performances as well as seminars and conferences.”⁴ While retaining its Japanese-constructed exterior, Seoul Station was thus repurposed as a space of Korean cultural performance.

The treatment of the colonial-era Keijō City Hall, on the other hand, represents an even more dramatic re-articulation of Japanese imperial space. Rather than destroying the offensive remnant of Japanese colonialism as in the Government-General Building, or repurposing the structure for Korean cultural purposes as in Seoul Station, the former Seoul City Hall building has been completely co-opted as part of a new city hall complex. The building was originally constructed in 1926 as the offices for the municipal Keijō government. According to architectural historian Nishizawa Yasuhiko, the design and placement of the building reflected its purpose as a “civic center.” Rather than imposingly presiding over the space city, as did the Government-General Building, the Keijō City Hall sat at the heart of the city among the people it was meant to serve, adjacent to a large urban plaza. As Nishizawa explains, the architect of the building, Iwatsuki Yoshiyuki, was less concerned with creating an imposing appearance for the building than he was with ease of use. Offices handling the affairs of residents, for example, were located on the ground floor in order to make them easily accessible.⁵ As Hong Kal explains, the building design also reflected the more subtle “strategy of colonial pacification” seen in the Japanese policies of Cultural Rule adopted after 1919.

⁴ Claire Lee, “Old Seoul Station Restored as Culture Space,” *The Korea Herald*, July 14, 2011, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20110714000766&mod=skb>; and “Abandoned former Seoul Station to be revamped as exhibition and performance space,” *CNN International*, July 18, 2011, <http://travel.cnn.com/seoul/visit/old-seoul-station-change-269504>.

⁵ Nishizawa Yasuhiko, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron* [Japanese colonial architecture](Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2008), 94-95.

“Compared to the Government General building that was constructed in the same year,” Kal writes, “the City Hall was lower in height, smaller in size, and simpler in design.”⁶ As Kal relates, the question of whether or not to tear the building down in order to make way for a new city hall was heavily debated in the early 2000s by the Seoul municipal government and the South Korean central government’s Cultural Heritage Committee.⁷ Ultimately, the original Japanese-constructed building was retained and repurposed as a library. More significantly, a new city hall building was constructed immediately behind the older building at a cost of \$256 million.⁸ The visible contrast between the two buildings could not be more striking. Opposed to the squat, sturdy stone facade of the old Keijō city hall building, the new Seoul City Hall rises to 13 stories and forms a free-flowing shape akin to a large wave. The facade of blue-tinted glass only enhances the liquid appearance of the building. It is this stark contrast between the two structures that makes such a powerful architectural statement. By retaining the structure, if only to be symbolically inundated by a new projection of power in built form, South Korean planners were able to co-opt the power inherent in this Japanese-produced urban space far more effectively than if they had destroyed the building or merely renovated it for a new purpose. Originally a monument of the Japanese strategy of colonial difference in built form, the Japanese-constructed Keijō City Hall building has now been inverted as a lasting space of postcolonial difference.

⁶ Hong Kal, “Seoul Spectacle: The City Hall, the Plaza and the Public,” in *City Halls and Civic Materialism: Towards a Global History of Urban Public Space*, ed. Swati Chattopadhyay and Jeremy White (New York: Routledge, 2014), 278.

⁷ Kal, “Seoul Spectacle,” 286-287.

⁸ Kal, “Seoul Spectacle,” 276.

APPENDIX

FIGURES

Figure 1 – The Ginza district in 1871. Notice the irregular grid pattern of the streets, with axes connecting major gates and bridges. The image is a detail of the 1871 *Meiji 4-nen Tōkyō Dai-ezu Kanban*, published by Yoshidaya Bunsaburō. Source: *TSS*, vol. 52, attached map.




Figure 2 – Ginza Bricktown street layout plan, 1872. The dotted red lines indicate the extent of the Ginza fire. Notice the alignment of the new axes through the district. Whereas the earlier main East-West axis had connected the Yamashita Gate to the Hitotsunohashi Bridge, the new axis focuses on the Sukiwabashi gate leading to the Imperial Palace. Source: *TSS*, vol. 53, map between p. 144-145.




Figure 3 – Ginza in 1876. Source: *Meiji Tōkyō Zenzu* [Complete map of Tokyo in the Meiji period](National Archives of Japan) (<http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/gallery/view/category/categoryArchives/0000002129/0305000000>).



Figure 4 – Ginza in 1878. Source: *Jissoku Tōkyō Zenzu* [Survey map of Tokyo], surveyed in 1878 by the Home Ministry Geography Bureau, published in 1879. Included in Jinbunsha, ed., *Tōkyō Kindai Chizu Shūsei: Meiji Taishō Shōwa 1* (Tokyo: Jinbunsha, 1981).



Figure 5 – Ginza Bricktown as of 1875. As the color key indicates: the dark grey shading shows brick buildings already completed or currently under construction; lighter grey streets are roads that have undergone “complete improvements”; darker grey street shading indicates roads that have undergone only “provisional improvements”; and white denotes areas where housing construction and road improvements were cancelled. Source: *TSS*, vol. 57, map between p. 246-247.




Figure 6 –Ginza in 1884. The darker shading in the Ginza area – especially in block interiors – indicates traditional buildings. The lighter shading denotes brick buildings. Source: *Tōkyō-fu Musashi-koKu Kyōbashi-ku Kobikichō Kinbō*, in Nihon Chizu Senta-, comp., *Gosenbun no Ichi Tōkyō-zu sokuryō genzu* (Tokyo: Nihon Chizu Senta-, 1984).




Figure 7 – 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan. Image: *Tōkyō Shikukaisei Zenzu* [Complete map of Tokyo urban improvements](1889). Source: Fujimori Terunobu, ed., *Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō Shūsei* 34.




Figure 8 – 1903 New Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan. Image: *Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shin Sekkei* [New Tokyo urban improvement plan map]. Source: Fujimori Terunobu, ed. *Tōkyō Toshi Keikaku Shiryō Shūsei* 34.



Figure 9 – 1888 Azumabashi Bridgehead Project
 Eastern Portion of Class 1, Type 2 Route #9 (Old), #5 (New)
 Width: at least 15 *ken* (about 90 feet)
 Executed December 1888 with additional clearing in 1894.
 Source: Fujimori, ed., *Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō Shūsei 1*,
 plates between p. 241-242.





Figure 10 – 1888 Asakusa Tawaramachi Project
 Class 1, Type 2 Route #9 (Old), #5 (New)
 Width: at least 15 *ken* (about 90 feet)
 Executed November 1888
 Source: Fujimori, ed., *Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō Shūsei 1*,
 plates between p. 241-242.






Figure 11 – 1911
 Wadakura Gate Road
 Widening Project. Class
 1, Type 1, Route #10.
 Width: 40 ken (about 240
 ft.). Planned 1908;
 Executed Dec. 1911.
 Source: Fujimori, ed.,
Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō
Shūsei 22, meeting #248.




Figure 12 – 1905 Taipei Urban
 Plan (*Taihoku Shiku Keikaku*).
 Taipei Prefectural Announcement
 (*Kokuji*) #200. October 10, 1905.
 Source: Huang Wu Dar, *Rizhi*
Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua
Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha
yu Yanjiu: Shiliao Bian, Doc.#: 5.

Figure 13 – 1900 Taipei Inner City Urban Plan (*Taihoku Jōnai Shiku Keikaku*). Taipei Prefectural Announcement (*Kokuji*) #64. August 23, 1900. Source: Huang Wu Dar, *Rizhi Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu Yanjiu: Shiliao Bian*, Doc.#: 2.



Figure 14 – 1901 Taipei Outer City Southside Urban Plan (*Taihoku Jōgai Nanpō Shiku Keikaku*). Taipei Prefectural Announcement (*Kokuji*) #90. June 1, 1901. Source: Huang Wu Dar, *Rizhi Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu Yanjiu: Shiliao Bian*, Doc.#: 3.




Figure 15 – 1895 Taipei Inner City.
Source: *Rikuchi Sōryokubu, Rinji Sokuzubu*, 1:20,000 map of Taipei, 1895.




Figure 16 – 1898 Taipei Inner City
Source: *Taipei Shigai Zenzu* (Taipei: Okada Toyokichi, 1898).



Figure 17 – 1905 Taipei Inner City.
Source: *Taihoku Shiku Kaisei Zu* (Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Dobokukyoku, 1905), 1:5000



Figure 18 – Schematic of Retained Roads in Taipei inner city. Source: Gotō Yasushi, “Nihon Tōjika no Taihoku Jōnai no Gaiku Keisei ni kansuru Kenkyū,” 111.




Figure 19 – 1912 Seoul Phase 1 Street Improvement Map. Source: Government-General Notice (*Kokuji*) #78, date November 6, 1912, as reproduced in *Kanpō* #91, page 342, dated November 18, 1912. Accessed through the National Diet Library Digital Archive at (<http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/2952189>).




Figure 20 – 1919 Phase 2 Seoul Street Improvement Map. Source: *Chōsen Sōtokufu*, ed. *Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi*, plate between 1,022-1,023.

Figure 21 – Cover of 1913 *New Guide to Seoul*. Source: KDL: Aoyagi Nanmei, *Shinsen Keijō Annai* [*New Guide to Seoul*](Keijō: Chōsen Kenkyūkai, 1913).





Figure 22 – Seoul street improvement comparison photos. Japanese colonizers dramatically staged “before-and-after” photos such as these of Kwanghwamun Street in 1905 (above) and 1930 (below) to popularize urban improvements in Seoul around the world. Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, ed., *Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: Kaiko Nijūnen* [Keijō Urban Improvement Projects: 20 Years of Memories](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, 1930), 30-31.



Figure 23 – 1896 Detail of Street Improvements Inside Japanese Settlement in Seoul.
 Source: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no gi Zai Keijō Uchida ryōji yori hōkoku no ken, Meiji nijūjūnen ni-gatsu.”



Figure 24 – Central Seoul, 1903. Detail of 1903 *Kankoku Keijō Zenzu* [Complete Map of Keijō, Korea]. Source: KDL: Keifu Tetsudō Kabushikikaisha, *Kankoku Keijō Zenzu* (Keijō: Keifu Tetsudō, 1903)(<http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1089119>).




Figure 25 – Central Seoul, 1917. Detail of 1917 Government-General Map of Seoul.
Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Ichiman-bun Ichi Chōsen Chikeizu Shūsei* [1:10,000 topographical maps of Korea](Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1986), 33.



Figure 26 – Detail of the Namdaemun area from Figure 25.



Figure 27 – Detail of T'aep'yongno Road from Figure 25.



Figure 29 – The Government-General Building and Kyōngbok Palace. Source: Chon Uyong, “Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji to Bunka Genshō – 1920 nendai to Keijo” [The image of the colonial city and cultural phenomena: Keijō in the 1920s], in *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Hōkokusho 3, jō-maki*, ed. *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai* (Tokyo: *Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai*, 2005), 220.



Figure 30 – The Government-General of Korea Headquarters Building. Source: *Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu ch'ōngsa sinyōngji* [History of the reconstruction of the Government-General of Korea Headquarters Building](Seoul: Kungnip Chungang Pangmulgwan, 1995), 6.



Figure 31 – Interior of the Government-General Building. Source: *Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu ch'ŏngsa sinyŏngji*, 13, 15.



Figure 32 – Detail of the Government-General Building Alignment. Source: Gotō Yasushi, “‘Keijō’ no Gairo Kensetsu ni kansuru Rekishi-teki Kenkyū” [A Historical Study on the Construction of Street Network in “Keijō” (Seoul; at Present)], *Dobokushi Kenkyū* 13 (1993): 103.




Figure 33 – Throne Room in the Government-General Building. Source: *Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu ch'ŏngsa sinyŏngji*, 19.



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NAJ. “Kōbushō Kyōbashi i’nan shōshitsuseki sokuryō ni tsuki ruishō machimachi zanjī kasaku wo tomu” [Temporary ban on housing construction in burnt neighborhoods for the purpose of Public Works Ministry survey of burnt areas south of Kyōbashi]. Call#: honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100, Doc.#: 17.

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Tokyo Metropolitan Archives. Doc.#: 604.B3.16. “Kukaku Kaisei ni kan-suru Shitashirabe Shorui (Kukaku Kaisei Iin)” [Documents relating to urban district revision investigations (District Revision Committee)].

Tokyo Metropolitan Archives. Doc.#: 610.B5.16. “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho (Kusumoto Masataka yori, Matsuda Michiyuki ni tsugu, 1-gō yori 19-gō ni itaru) Meiji 12-nen 12-gatsu” [Documents of continuing government business (Kusumoto Masataka followed by Matsuda Michiyuki, #1-19), December, 1879].

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[Classified Archives of the Government-General of Taiwan] held by Taiwan Historica, accessed through the Taiwan Government-General Digital Archive at the Historical Records Room of the Archives of Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, and at the reading room of the Academia Historica in Taipei, Taiwan. Entries are listed numerically by their document number. Document numbers and titles for these documents refer to those found in the Taiwan Government-General Digital Archive. The second set of documents listed in this section are digitized versions of official gazettes (*Fuhō* or *Kanpō*, after 1942) issued by the Taiwan Government-General, accessed through the Taiwan Historica digital Archive of Taiwan Government-General Official Gazettes (<http://ds2.th.gov.tw/ds3/app007/>). These documents are listed numerically according to gazette number. URLs for individual gazettes are also included.

Doc.#: 54.17.19. “Taihoku Jōnai oyobi sono fukin Dōro Kyōryō nado no Shūzen ni kansuru ken” [Matters regarding the improvement of roads and gutters within the city walls and surrounding areas in Taipei].

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