

THE MODEL CITY: CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, AND THE
REVOLUTION OF URBAN POLITICS IN PORTLAND, OREGON

by

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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In recent decades, scholars have praised Portland as a model for urban planning and citizen participation. This thesis complicates Portland's rose-colored image by situating it within recent histories on the long civil rights movement in the West, the Black Panther Party, and civil rights and metropolitan space. The history of Portland's Black Panthers represents an important moment for the black freedom struggle in Northeast Portland's Albina district and for the city's approach to urban planning. Excluded from politics, spatially confined, and subjected to destructive urban renewal projects by the 1960s, blacks in Albina experimented with innovative forms of political participation. These approaches ranged from moderate demands for neighborhood involvement with urban planners to radical, separatist opposition. Although the Panthers' vision of socioeconomic uplift and community control declined, a citywide revolution in politics co-opted their approach, responded to moderate voices, and dismantled much of the undemocratic planning structure in the 1970s.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

URBAN PLANNING AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE CITY OF ROSES . . . AND PANTHERS

The first time I set foot in the Albina district of Northeast Portland in September 2010, I had no idea of the neighborhood's history. In fact, I was there only to attend a concert at Memorial Coliseum in the southwest corner of the district along the Willamette River. Arriving by train at Union Station downtown, I looked east across the river dividing the eastern and western portions of the city. On the far side of the river, the immense complexes of Memorial Coliseum and Rose Garden Arena in the Rose Quarter, as well as the towering glass spires of the Lloyd Convention Center rose up from behind the seemingly chaotic junction of Interstates 5 and 84 slightly to the south.

After disembarking, I left Union Station on foot, walking north across the immense red steel structure of the Broadway Bridge leading into Northeast Portland. Reaching the eastern terminus of the bridge, I strolled along Broadway for a few blocks into Albina until I reached southbound Vancouver Avenue. One block beyond Vancouver is Williams Avenue, which runs north past the small city parks of the planned but never completed Emanuel Hospital expansion, through the heart of Northeast Portland's modern African American community, and all the way to the Columbia River and the former predominately-black wartime housing project of Vanport. Turning south, I walked along Vancouver for two blocks until I reached the Rose Quarter, where I broke

off from the road and continued along the pedestrian walkway between the immense, clear glass cube of Memorial Coliseum and the sleek, rounded, modernly designed concrete Rose Garden Arena. Before the late 1950s, neither of these two buildings existed. Instead, this area had housed the highest concentration of African American homes and businesses in the city. That was before city planners labeled the neighborhood as "blighted" and decided to level it so that the land could be used for purposes that were more profitable. Oblivious to this history, I marveled at these incredible feats of architecture.

At the southern end of the Rose Quarter, I turned towards my hotel and the twin glass spires of the nearby convention center as I crossed under the Interstate 5 overpass. A group of three homeless black men sleeping by the street next to one of I-5's immense concrete support columns served as the only indicator that this space had once been the center of a now-exiled community. Before the arenas, the convention center, and the interstate highways, this had been the only part of Portland in which blacks had been allowed to live. The only scrap of land that the city's whites had thought was good enough for them.

But no one walking around me on their way to the bustling shops and restaurants seemed to remember any of this.

Or maybe, like me, they just didn't know.

Or maybe, like the city's urban planners who leveled Albina, they just didn't care.

In recent decades, Portland, lauded by its moniker of the "City of Roses," has been the subject of numerous studies of city planning and urban history among scholars

in a diverse array of fields. Although frequently held up as a model for regional and urban planning, specifically on issues of transportation, citizen involvement and activism, environmental protection, and land use policies, scholars have largely neglected the historical role of Portland's relatively small yet centralized black community in Northeast Portland's Albina district in their discussions.¹ Likewise, with the exception of Karen Gibson's 2007 article, "Bleeding Albina," scholars who focus on the history of African Americans and the struggle for civil rights in Portland have only tacitly acknowledged the important connection between urban planning policies in Albina and their effects on the black community and localized civil rights efforts.² Those who have recognized this connection, however, have still failed to explain the relationship's effect on the development and trajectory of radical social protest movements during the 1960s and 1970s. This thesis begins to address that oversight through a case study of the local chapter of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP), which operated in Portland from 1969 until the mid-1970s.

In framing the historical context of the Black Panther Party in Portland, this thesis works within the conceptual framework of the "long civil rights movement," also referred to as the "Long Movement," popularized by twentieth century African American

¹ See the works of Carl Abbott, notably *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), and *Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific Northwest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); as well as other scholars' works, including Connie P. Ozawa, *The Portland Edge: Challenges and Successes in Growing Communities* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2004); and Eliot H. Fackler, "Protesting Portland's Freeways: Highway Engineering and Citizen Activism in the Interstate Era" (MA thesis, University of Oregon, 2009).

² Karen J. Gibson, "Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940-2000," *Transforming Anthropology* 15.1 (2007): 3-25. For other literature on the black freedom struggle in Portland, see Stuart J. McDerry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998); *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993); *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).

historians, sociologists, and political scientists in recent decades.³ This approach, which expands the geographic and chronological boundaries of the struggle for civil rights beyond the South and the narrow postwar timeframe of the 1950s and 1960s, has pushed historians to understand and appreciate both the localized nature of the black freedom struggle as well as the diverse yet continuous nature of the movement. While there are potential shortcomings to this approach, including blurring the generational, ideological, and regional differences among activists and organizations in the struggle, framing the history of the Portland Panthers within this larger context is the best approach to understanding the rise and fall of the Black Panther Party in the city.⁴ To view the growth of the Portland Panthers in the isolation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, or even only within the context of the postwar Civil Rights Movement, diminishes the group's importance and obscures the underlying reasons for its existence. Furthermore, such a narrow perspective relegates the emergence of the Portland BPP to a nationally simplified expression of 1960s radicalism instead of the outgrowth of decades of socioeconomic and political civil rights struggles in the city.

Moreover, by adopting this broader chronological and geographical approach, this study contributes to a growing body of literature on civil rights in the urban West and Pacific Northwest. Although scholars have produced numerous case studies in recent decades on western US cities ranging from Los Angeles and Phoenix in the Southwest to Seattle in the Pacific Northwest, Portland remains a major West Coast urban center that

³ See Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," *Journal of American History* 91.4 (March 2005): 1233-1263; Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, *Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008); Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North* (New York: Random House, 2008).

⁴ For critiques of the "Long Movement," see Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, "The Long Movement as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies," *The Journal of African American History* 92.2 (Spring 2007): 265-288.

historians have largely neglected.⁵ This study seeks to fill in that gap in the historiography of the long civil rights movement in the western cities by examining one of the largest West Coast cities with comparatively the smallest black population. On a related note, it is important to remember that West Coast cities like Portland, Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland, tend to be highly multiethnic and multiracial given their history in relation the United States' western expansion and their geographic proximity to Latin America as well as the Pacific Rim. This diversity became even more pronounced in the period following the Hart-Cellar Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which coincides with the temporal focus of this study. Consequently, in studying this period, recent historians and political scientists have increasingly tried to develop more racially and ethnically complex, inclusive, and dynamic approaches to their studies.⁶ Moreover, any study that presents race relations solely within a black-white dichotomous framework is inherently incomplete. However, as Stuart McElderry noted in his 1998 dissertation on the Civil Rights Movement in Portland between 1945 and 1966, throughout the postwar era and well into the late twentieth century, Portland remained unmistakably divided— demographically, rhetorically, and, as I suggest, spatially—along a black-white color line. To ignore such a divide ignores the entire way

⁵ A few examples of recent urban West studies include Quintard Taylor, *The Forging of a Black Community: Seattle's Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994) and "The Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in Seattle, 1960-1970," *Journal of Negro History* 80.1 (Winter 1995): 1-14; Matthew C. Whitaker, *Race Work: The Rise of Civil Rights in the Urban West* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Scott Kurashige, *The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁶ See Scott Kurashige, *The Shifting Grounds of Race*; Claire Jean Kim, "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," *Politics and Society* 27.1 (March 1999): 105-138.

in which blacks and whites in Portland viewed racial dynamics at the time.⁷ As a result, this thesis utilizes the black-white dichotomy in order to present a more focused perspective at the expense of a broader and more inclusive approach. Nevertheless, I encourage readers and other scholars to make further comparisons with other racial and ethnic groups in and around Portland during the same timeframe to create a more detailed and holistic understanding of the period.⁸

In addition to its contribution to the history of the long civil rights movement, this thesis also builds on an already rapidly growing and diverse array of localized case studies on the Black Panther Party that have emerged in the last decade. Historians of the late twentieth century had a tendency to view the Black Panther Party through a very narrow lens, focusing predominately on the organization's main branch and headquarters in Oakland as well as larger branches in other major cities like Chicago and New York. In addition, these histories frequently emphasized well-known leaders like Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale, Fred Hampton, David Hilliard, and others. Over the last two decades, however, a fresh wave of historians, most of whom are not old enough to remember the Black Panther Party, have uncovered and explored the histories of many of the BPP's more than forty frequently noted yet rarely described branches.⁹ While these

⁷ McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line," 12-13.

⁸ See, for example, Glenn Anthony May, *Sonny Montes and Mexican American Activism in Oregon* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2011).

⁹ In 2007 and 2010, Judson L. Jefferies compiled two volumes of recent articles on Black Panther Party branches in cities across the United States from Cleveland, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Houston, and New Orleans, to Milwaukee, Des Moines, Los Angeles, and Seattle. See Judson L. Jefferies, ed. *Comrades: A Local History of the Black Panther Party* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), and *On the Ground: The Black Panther Party in Communities across America* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010). For other recent literature on the Black Panther Party, see also Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, *In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

studies have revealed a previously unappreciated diverse yet loosely unified coalition of semi-autonomous organizations, several branches have gone unexamined. Most notable among these unexplored branches is the Portland chapter of the BPP. With the exception of Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies' article on media portrayals of the Portland Panthers and Martha Gies' article on the history of the Portland Panthers' dental and medical clinics, the larger social and political history of the Portland branch has remained untouched and unexamined.¹⁰

Finally, drawing on the work of historians who have framed the history of civil rights and the Black Panther Party within the history of space and urban planning, this study builds, in part, on the work of Robert Self and his 2003 book, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland*, on urban development and the BPP in Oakland. By linking the history of modernist urban planning and urban space with the history of civil rights and other political and social struggles, Self contends that historians can better develop a more meaningful understanding of the history of place and nation. Specifically, he perceptively states, "Civil rights, black power, and . . . [other] political movements did not call for rights in abstract terms and ill-defined places. They called for very specific things in relation to very specific places. Space is not the whole story, but it would be a strange and incoherent one without it."¹¹ From this perspective, an intricate and nuanced history of the Portland Black Panther Party requires both the larger

¹⁰ Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves: The Portland Chapter of the Black Panther Party and the Local Media Response," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 111.3 (Fall 2010): 278-311; Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," *Reed Magazine*, Winter 2009, http://web.reed.edu/reed_magazine/winter2009/features/radical_treatment/index.html (accessed June 22, 2011).

¹¹ Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 17.

historical context of Portland's localized black freedom struggle as well as the history of the physical and spatial urban environment of the black community in Albina.

By situating this study within these three arenas—the long civil rights movement, the history of the Black Panther Party, and the history of urban planning and metropolitan space—a larger story of political exclusion, spatial conflict, and social and political experimentation within the city of Portland emerges. The relatively short rise and fall of the Portland Black Panther Party, this thesis contends, marks an important turning point in the civil rights struggle for the black residents of Albina as well as for the City's approach to urban planning and development. After decades of systematic exclusion from the political arena, spatial confinements and relocations, and urban renewal projects that destroyed black homes and businesses, blacks in Northeast Portland fought back in a variety of ways. Excluded from traditional political routes for determining the future of their own neighborhoods and communities, African Americans had to develop new and creative approaches for finding a voice within city politics and urban planning. These alternative forms of political experimentation ranged from demanding greater input and consultation with urban planners to openly hostile opposition to city government and a demand for complete control over their own community. The Portland Black Panther Party represented the latter. Although their vision of community control and socioeconomic uplift ultimately lost out by the mid-1970s, the Panthers were instrumental in putting pressure on the city government to respond to moderate voices within the African American community, like the Model Cities Citizen Planning Board, and to dismantle the undemocratic and insular power of the city's urban planners.

In tracing the chronology and narrative arc of this argument, this thesis consists of four parts. The first part, Chapter II: "Building and Rebuilding Albina," examines the growth of Portland's African American community in the city's northeast Albina district and its struggle for civil rights between the early 1900s and the mid-1960s. In addition, the chapter outlines the ways in which Portland's city government and urban planners excluded African Americans from political participation in the early 1900s, conceptually spatialized and constructed Albina as a black urban ghetto after World War II, and developed urban renewal projects that destroyed the center of the black community during the 1950s and 1960s.

Chapter III: "Defending Albina," reveals the various tactics that the black community used to fight back against the City of Portland's vision for the future of Albina in the late 1960s. Specifically, in this chapter, I argue that the Portland Black Panther Party, officially chartered in 1969, emerged as a new form of black political experimentation and as one adversative response to the Portland Development Commission's (PDC) top-down Model Cities plan to revitalize the Albina district. On the one hand, the PDC envisioned a reconstruction of Albina rooted in capitalizing on the location and commercial potential of the land, regardless of their plans effects on the black community's homes and businesses. On the other hand, the Portland Panthers vision emphasized giving communities complete control over their neighborhoods and promoting social programs aimed at socioeconomic uplift rather than physical urban renewal projects. These two views for the future of Albina represented two competing and diametrically opposed conceptions of Albina that necessitated a middle path, or political compromise, in order to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Portland.

The rise of citizen activism and neighborhood control of the Model Cities program as well as the decline of the Portland Black Panther Party by the early 1970s, discussed in Chapter IV: "Losing the Battle," reflected the emergence of this compromise. While the PDC lost control of the Model Cities program to local citizen boards and planning committees, their continuation with the Emanuel Hospital renovation and expansion project still leveled a large portion of the black community's homes and businesses. Moreover, combined with the concentrated efforts of local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the PDC's hospital project reduced the Portland Black Panther Party to a small and nearly powerless organization by the mid-1970s. In the end, however, the PDC's continued dominance in urban planning, much like the Portland Panthers, was short-lived.

Finally, Chapter V: "Winning the War?" explores the spread of citizen participation and neighborhood activism throughout Portland in the 1970s, the election of Mayor Neil Goldschmidt and his attempts to reorganize the city's power structure and urban planning apparatus, and the rise of African American political leadership in Portland and the state of Oregon more broadly. In the end, the leadership of Mayor Goldschmidt, along with moderate activist voices within Albina's black community, stripped the PDC of its power and helped bring a small component of the Portland Panthers' antithetical vision of community control and socioeconomic uplift into mainstream politics by the mid-to-late 1970s. Still, the legacies of more than one-hundred years of social, political, economic, and spatial discrimination and exclusion left an indelible legacy of poverty that both the black community in Albina and the city

government could not easily eradicate over the course of a single decade of community-led planning and development.

To begin this historical narrative with the decline of the postwar Civil Rights Movement and the rise of the Portland Black Panther Party in the late 1960s would not be sufficient to contextualize the organization's historical roots or purpose. In order to tell this story properly, in order to appreciate the deeply rooted nature of the political, spatial, and socioeconomic exclusions of African Americans in Portland, and in order to understand exactly what the Portland Panthers fought for, we must begin at least two generations before the emergence of the organization. Only by beginning with considering the dawn of the long civil rights movement in Portland during the early 1900s can we start to understand the complex factors that led to the rise and decline of the Portland Panthers.

CHAPTER II

BUILDING AND REBUILDING ALBINA: THE ORIGINS OF THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN PORTLAND, 1900-1966

For two days in the summer of 1967, young African Americans, most of them in their teens and twenties, rioted in and around the area of Irving Park in Northeast Portland. Defying attempts by police as well as local black ministers and community leaders to quell the riots, Portland's black youth attacked, vandalized, and looted local businesses and threw rocks and bottles at passing whites. Unlike many of the more than 150 other race riots that spread across American cities during that long hot summer of 1967, the Portland riots resulted in no deaths, though one man was shot and more than 50 African Americans were arrested over the two days.¹ Like their contemporaries in Oakland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, New York, and other cities, this generation had grown up in the cradle of the modern American urban crisis. Many of these young African Americans were just infants and young children during the Vanport floods that washed away black homes after the Second World War, and they grew up witnessing the destruction of black neighborhoods to make way for highways, sports arenas, and hospital renovations. At each turn, local white politicians and business leaders in Portland ignored the plight of the African American community and willingly destroyed poorer neighborhoods in the name of urban renewal.

¹ *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 124.

Throughout the twentieth century, and especially in the years following the Second World War, African Americans gradually achieved legislative victories in their long struggle for civil rights in Oregon. Despite these breakthroughs, Portland—like many other major metropolitan areas of the United States—experienced the worst race riots in the history of the city during the late 1960s. As city officials and local African American community leaders searched for inventive ways to curb the disturbances, many of Portland's citizens were left to wonder why these riots were happening.

Historians of the struggle for civil rights in Portland have been similarly unsuccessful in constructing a complete and fully explanatory narrative of the roots of this rise in radicalism, violence, and discontent that emerged within the city's African American community by the late 1960s. While a wide variety of secondary historical literature exists on civil rights in Oregon, historiography on the subject is fragmented, misleading, and incomplete. Consequently, through a synthesis of research on Portland by urban historians as well as civil rights historians, this chapter combines works on early twentieth century, World War II, and postwar civil rights efforts as well as literature on urban development and renewal to present a brief articulation of the long civil rights movement in the city of Portland. With the black freedom struggle placed into this larger historical narrative, our understanding of the major turn in civil rights during the late 1960s becomes more understandable and less surprising. Moreover, this approach further emphasizes the problem of presenting the black freedom struggle in the West and Pacific Northwest—as well as the broader United States in general—through traditional and limited postwar narrative. Ultimately, this perspective suggests that the turn towards black power and radicalism was not a deterioration of the postwar Civil Rights

Movement; instead, such sentiments were the culmination of a century of racial discrimination, political neglect, and spatial isolation, as well as the unresolved socioeconomic problems that these policies produced.

Between 1900 and the late 1960s, blacks in Portland managed to achieve only the most basic civil rights victories, including the repeal of voting bans and exclusionary language in the state constitution as well as the passage of bills providing for public accommodations, fair employment practices, and open housing. However, a century of discrimination, neglect, and community destruction in the name of urban development and renewal undermined the socioeconomic foundation of Portland's African American community. Portland's inherently undemocratic city political system, which was ironically rooted in Progressive Era values and political thought, ultimately ignored the needs of African Americans and created an urban ghetto in the Albina district through the government's unwillingness to pass substantive civil rights legislation as well as misguided and destructive postwar urban renewal efforts. From the early years of the twentieth century through the 1960s, Portland's African American community developed slowly in comparison to other major West Coast cities like Seattle, Oakland, and Los Angeles; nevertheless, this relatively small black population in Albina gave birth to one of the longest and most difficult struggles for civil rights in the urban West.

The Growth and Development of Portland's Black Community and Civil Rights

As early as the 1850s, small numbers of African Americans had begun to settle in the city of Portland despite a constitutional exclusion clause banning blacks and many other minorities, particularly Chinese, from residing in the state. As a result, prior to

1900, blacks composed less than one-quarter of one percent of the city's population. However, as the black community grew and changed in demographics in the years after the Civil War and the first four decades of the twentieth century, so too did a vigorous although protracted and often unsuccessful civil rights movement among blacks and white progressive political allies.

The restructuring of Portland's city government at the beginning of the twentieth century reshaped the trajectory of Portland politics for the subsequent decades and effectively eliminated, perhaps unintentionally, the potential for African American participation in the city's political process. With the adoption of a new city charter in 1903 and major reforms to the charter in 1913, Portland entered a period of substantial growth and urban development as well as rampant political corruption. Based on progressive ideals and a widespread belief that the mayor needed more authority to improve the social environment of the city, the charter granted Portland's mayor more power than previous mayors had possessed by eliminating independent city boards and replacing them with a civic commission and executive board selected by the mayor. Moreover, the charter stipulated that while ten of the city's fifteen council members must be elected from wards, five members were to be selected through at-large elections.²

Increasing corruption under the new political system by the early 1910s, especially under the leadership of Mayor Joseph Simon, led Portlanders to revise the city's charter in 1913.³ Following a scathing report on corruption in Portland's city

² Jewel Lansing, *Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-2001* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2003), 250-251.

³ Portlanders also approved numerous progressive political reforms leading up to the new charter, including more direct election of U.S. Senators, a process for recalling elected officials, and the passage of women's suffrage. *Ibid.*, 271.

government published by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in April 1913, Portlanders revised their city's charter. In an effort to eliminate corruption and inefficiency, the city placed new limitations on the power of the mayor, reduced the size of the city council, and eliminated the ward-based system of city council representation with an entirely at-large system, where all council members were selected by a citywide popular vote.⁴ Although a coalition of political progressives intended this new system of city governance to reduce competition between neighborhood interests, the new political structure also resulted in the elimination of the voice of minority neighborhoods and communities. According to urban historian Carl Abbott, this change in Portland city politics "undermined the indigenous democratic socialism and put government firmly in the hand of the middle class."⁵ Despite underlying concerns with the new system, Portlanders defeated two measures to repeal and abolish the new system in 1917.⁶ Without district- or ward-based representation, the new structure of Portland politics removed the city's small yet gradually growing black population from the political process and forced them to rely on the support of white progressive leaders in the city government and state legislature in order to advance civil rights efforts throughout much of the twentieth century.

Because of the nature of Portland politics, African Americans had little success in reforming civil rights issues in the first decades of the twentieth century. According to Elizabeth McLagan, an historian of African American history in Portland, "Oregon,

⁴ Lansing, *Portland*, 289-292.

⁵ Carl Abbott, *Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific Northwest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 87.

⁶ Lansing, *Portland*, 303.

progressive in many ways, resisted the necessary legislation which would correct historical inequalities in the treatment of blacks and other minorities. In the absence of a significant black population before 1940 that could [affect] legislation, it remained a West Coast ecological paradise with a peculiar resistance to change."⁷ In addition to outdated constitutional restrictions on black settlement that were nullified after the Civil War, the Oregon State Supreme Court established a legal basis for segregation in Oregon movie theatres in the 1906 case of *Taylor v. Cohn*, which quickly carried over to restaurants and other private businesses.⁸ In addition, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) across the United States by 1920 was particularly strong in Oregon, and the Klan quickly became the largest social and political organization in the state. Unlike California and Washington, which passed laws barring KKK members from wearing hoods or engaging in some intimidating behavior, Oregon allowed the Klan to operate without interference.⁹ Consequently, the KKK became a powerful voice in Oregon electoral politics and served as a major obstacle towards the passage of civil rights legislation until the organization's decline from internal conflicts and political corruption during the mid-1920s.¹⁰

Nevertheless, African Americans were not passive victims of segregation and discrimination; instead, they actively pursued civil rights legislation despite their numbers and lack of representation under the at-large political system. Early black

⁷ Elizabeth McLagan, *A Peculiar Paradise: A History of Blacks in Oregon 1788-1940* (Portland: Georgian Press, 1980), 172; *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995), 25.

⁸ *Cornerstones of Community*, 26.

⁹ McLagan, *A Peculiar Paradise*, 172.

¹⁰ *Cornerstones of Community*, 29.

Oregonians—through organizations like the short-lived New Port Republican Club—worked with white progressive allies in the state government for new legislation improving access to public accommodations and removing discriminatory language from the state constitution, including outdated exclusion clauses as well as bans on voting and interracial marriage.¹¹ However, although the legislature eventually passed amendments to the state constitution regarding the exclusion and voting bans on numerous occasions by 1915, the public narrowly defeated each measure when brought to a popular vote for ratification. As a result, prior to 1920 and the presence of a sizable black population, the Oregon legislature failed to enact even the most basic civil rights legislation.

The movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into major urban centers in the North and the West during the early decades of the twentieth century, commonly known as the Great Migration, dramatically altered the population and demographics of Portland's black community and laid the foundation for social, economic, and political changes. Between 1900 and 1920, Portland's African American population grew slowly in comparison to other major West Coast cities. During that twenty-year period, the African American population in Portland doubled from 775 to 1,556, yet blacks remained the smallest of the three major minority communities, behind the Chinese and Japanese. Even so, African Americans became the fastest growing non-white community in the city while the Chinese population declined rapidly from 7,841 to 1,846 and the Japanese population, which increasingly transitioned from wage-labor jobs in the city to business ownership and rural farming, grew from 1,189 to 1,715 during the

¹¹ McLagan, *A Peculiar Paradise*, 157.

same period.¹² Still, compared to other West Coast cities, the increase in Portland's African American community was relatively small. Los Angeles and Oakland experienced a rapid increase in black population. The number of African Americans in Oakland increased from 1,026 to 5,489 over the same two decades, while Los Angeles' black population exploded from 2,131 to 15,579. Similarly, though not as extreme, Seattle's black population grew at a much faster rate than in Portland, expanding from 405 in 1900 to 2,894 by 1920. San Francisco is the only major West Coast city comparable to Portland, which experienced a comparatively mild growth of 1,654 to 2,414; but this change seems less surprising in light of the dramatic expansion of the African American across the bay in Oakland (See Appendix B: Table 2.1).¹³

Despite this relatively slower growth of Portland's black community, the sudden increase of the African American population in the city resulted in distinct changes in the community's social, cultural, spatial, and economic demographics. Prior to the Great Migration of the early twentieth century, Portland's black population was largely male, and most of the jobs in which they worked were in the menial service sector, including cooks, waiters, janitors, servants, chauffeurs, and—most importantly—railroad porters. According to census data from 1910, roughly 70 percent of all employed black males worked one of these service jobs, with 29.5 percent of the population working as porters in particular. Similarly, the relatively small population of black women tended to have no occupation, and the few who did worked as domestic servants, cooks, or

¹² William Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society: Portland, Oregon, 1900-1924," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 17.3 (Spring 1998): 64.

¹³ Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society," 42. Population demographics compiled from the *Twelfth Census of the United States* (1900) and the *Fourteenth Census of the United States* (1920).

waitresses.¹⁴ As a result, the majority of Portland's blacks resided in the northern part of downtown, located west of the Willamette River near Union Depot and the hotels and restaurants where they worked.

Given the black community's relatively small population compared to Asian communities in Portland in the early decades of the twentieth century, historian William Toll notes that the "general though subdued anti-Asian xenophobia" allowed for a gradual proletarianization of Portland blacks in service jobs without mass resistance from white Portlanders during the Great Migration.¹⁵ As the population of African Americans grew by 1920, blacks increasingly found jobs as laborers, skilled trade workers, and even business owners and managers, while the percentage of African Americans working as porters dropped to 17.5 percent. Likewise, the percentage of black women without an occupation fell below 50 percent for the first time in the census record as more women moved to the city and found work as domestic servants, hairdressers, and various small business jobs within the black community.¹⁶ Regardless of these employment opportunities and the growth of black businesses, like W.D. Allen's Golden West Hotel near downtown, which became a major hub for the black community, Toll notes, "blacks nevertheless found themselves shunted into traditional service jobs on the fringe of the urban working class. . . . Portland's employers were not willing to admit blacks to higher paying jobs . . . and blacks lacked the numbers and power to start banks of their own or to challenge discrimination through the political system."¹⁷ Instead, major advances in

¹⁴ Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society," 45-47. Data collected from Federal Manuscript Censuses, Multnomah County, Oregon, 1910.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 45-47. Data collected from Federal Manuscript Censuses, Multnomah County, Oregon, 1920.

employment opportunities for Portland's African Americans did not improve until the latter half of the twentieth century.

The slow decline of the black community's strict dependence on railroad work and the gradual increase in wage-labor jobs in Portland also resulted in distinct resettlement patterns and increased spatial segregation among African Americans and whites. While blacks had initially tended to settle in the northern part of downtown, many blacks, particularly those with families, could afford to relocate their families east across the Willamette River into houses in the Albina district (See Appendix C: Figures 2.1 and 2.2). However, the congregation of blacks in the Albina district was primarily the result of white popular opinion in favor of segregating communities, discriminatory real estate practices, and restrictive covenants rather than any premeditated intentions of African Americans to establish a black community in Northeast Portland.¹⁸ By 1920, 63 percent of blacks living east of the river in Albina were couples, more than half of which had children. In contrast, the "old" black neighborhood of northern downtown remained overwhelmingly single and male, with occasional relatives and boarders residing among the men.¹⁹ Similarly, in 1920, about 53 percent of black Albina residents owned their own homes, while an overwhelming 95 percent of blacks in the "old" downtown neighborhood were renters.²⁰ As a result, as Albina's African American population grew over the course of the twentieth century, the social and cultural heart of the black

¹⁷ Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society," 64-65; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 50; *Cornerstones of Community*, 32-33.

¹⁸ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 29; *Cornerstones of Community*, 47-48.

¹⁹ Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society," 51. Data collected from Federal Manuscript Censuses, Multnomah County, Oregon, 1920.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 55. Data collected from Federal Manuscript Censuses, Multnomah County, Oregon, 1920.

community, including churches and other social organizations, began to shift from northern downtown to east of the river.

Demographic and economic growth as well as changes in settlement patterns translated into the growth of new social institutions among Portland's blacks in Albina, including black newspapers, civil rights organizations, and churches. Newspapers, perhaps more than any other early institution, sought to improve literacy and education among the black population in order to agitate for civil rights and encourage self-determination.²¹ Until the 1930s, newspapers like *New Age* (est. 1896), *The Advocate* (est. 1903), and the *Portland Times* (est. 1918) continually emphasized civil rights agitation and activism among the black community. In particular, *The Advocate*, which was founded by E.D. Cannady and his remarkably influential and politically active wife, Beatrice Morrow Cannady, became the leading black newspaper and advocate for civil rights in Portland following the closure of the *New Age* newspaper in 1907. Beatrice, who served as the paper's assistant editor beginning in 1912, ultimately went on to become the first black female attorney in Oregon, helped found the Portland branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and launched an unsuccessful bid for state representative from Multnomah County in the early 1930s.²²

While newspapers provided an early foundation for the long civil rights movement in Portland, social and political organizations like the NAACP, local churches, and the Oregon Association of Colored Women's Clubs translated calls for civil rights into action. In 1914, a coalition of blacks and whites in Portland established a branch of

²¹ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 36.

²² *Ibid.*, 34-38.

the NAACP, making it the oldest continuously chartered branch of the organization west of the Mississippi River. Relying on the assistance of Portland's northeastern black churches, including the First African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Zion Church, Bethel AME Church, the First African Baptist Church, and Mt. Olivet Baptist Church, the NAACP quickly became the lead organizer in Oregon's civil rights struggle. While the organization's focus on legislation and court cases achieved little success in the 1910s, its presence was instrumental for civil rights advancements in Oregon during the 1920s and after World War II.²³ Similarly, other organizations—like the Oregon Association of Colored Women's Clubs, founded in 1917 following the merger of several women's civil rights, Christian temperance, and other progressive groups—worked to improve social conditions among Portland's blacks. In particular, the Oregon Association of Colored Women's Clubs sought to improve women's education and the social, economic, and moral welfare of the community, as well as develop black leadership and secure civil rights.²⁴ Together, these organizations formed the backbone of a rapidly emerging and socially active civil rights movement in Portland.

The growth of Portland's black population in Albina, the publication of black newspapers, and the establishment of the Portland branch of the NAACP and other organizations led to the first major breakthroughs in civil rights legislation in the state of Oregon during the 1920s. In 1925, Republican William F. Woodward of Multnomah County proposed a bill to repeal the exclusion clause from the state constitution, which finally passed both the state legislature and a statewide ratification in 1926 by a margin of 62.5 percent to 37.5 percent. Likewise, in 1927, Salem Representative John Geisy

²³ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 39-40.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

offered, and the legislature passed, an amendment to repeal the voting ban, which the public ratified later that year by a similar margin of 62.4 percent to 37.6 percent.²⁵ However, these measures lacked practical substance since neither constitutional clause had been enforced in more than two decades. Other civil rights measures met with less success. The removal of the ban on interracial marriage continued to meet fierce opposition from state representatives, who voted down the repeal in both 1893 and 1917. "Clearly," McLagan notes, "it was acceptable to modify the state constitution in order to affirm rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but the legislators of Oregon were not ready to grant additional rights to minorities, including the right to marry whom they pleased."²⁶ Ultimately, the intermarriage ban remained law until 1951. Similarly, although the Afro-American League of Portland led by McCants Stewart, Portland's first black attorney, originally presented a public accommodations bill to Oregon lawmakers in 1919, the legislature did not approve such legislation until 1953.²⁷ California and Washington, on the other hand, passed similar public accommodations laws in 1905 and 1909 respectively.²⁸

With the collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression by the early 1930s, economic opportunities and the growth of the black community in Portland stagnated. Without the capital to maintain their community, many black-owned businesses failed during the early 1930s; moreover, unemployed blacks struggled to find service jobs as business owners preferred giving work to

²⁵ McLagan, *A Peculiar Paradise*, 160-163.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 163-164.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 165-167.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 171-172.

unemployed whites. This employment discrimination, in turn, threatened the growth of Portland's small yet gradually emerging middle class of the 1920s. Moreover, after the Golden West Hotel closed in 1931 and *The Advocate* folded in 1933, most of Portland's major businesses and all of the black newspapers had gone out of business, striking yet another blow to the civil rights struggle. As a result, Portland's African American community grew very little and the population remained around 2,000 by 1940.²⁹ However, with the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1941, this lost decade of political and socioeconomic civil rights advancements became little more than a harbinger to the largest historical expansion of Portland's African American population and the strongest push for civil rights in the city in the twentieth century.

The Second World War and the Creation of the Albina Ghetto

By 1940, Portland had a small but stable African American community residing predominately in the northeastern Albina district of Portland. Still, the community hardly constituted an overwhelmingly black neighborhood prior to World War II. Although the district had quickly become home to the majority of Portland blacks' social and political institutions, the area was also home to many other people, mostly poorer whites. However, beginning with a major influx of African Americans into Portland during the Second World War, Albina rapidly transitioned from a multiracial community with an African American presence to a neighborhood that whites conceived of spatially as an urban ghetto. By 1950, Portland's black population swelled from roughly 2,000 to nearly 10,000, nearly half of which lived in Albina. At the end of the next decade, the

²⁹ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 54-55.

population of African Americans stood at roughly 16,000, with 73 percent of those individuals residing in Albina (See Appendix B: Table 2.2).³⁰ During this twenty-year period, Portlanders—mostly whites who were uncomfortable with the sudden and rapid growth of the city's black population and the prospect of integration—increasingly reconceived Albina spatially as a black neighborhood. This new conception of Albina, in turn, created a self-fulfilling prophecy of economic and racial inequality and triggered a new phase in the civil rights struggle by the early 1950s.

The bombing of Pearl Harbor and the United States' entry into the Second World War dramatically increased the presence of wartime industries in Portland as well as along the Willamette and Columbia rivers. In Portland, Henry J. Kaiser founded the Oregon Shipbuilding Company, also known as the Kaiser Company, in early 1941 in order to supply ships to the British, but the entry of the United States into the war led to a rapid expansion in facilities and production. Since Portland was unable to provide a large enough workforce to fuel Kaiser's ship industry, workers from across the country poured into Portland by early 1942.³¹ Moreover, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802 in June 1941 prohibited racial discrimination in the national defense industry and enabled a large number of African Americans to move to the city and work in wartime industries. As a result, for the first time in Portland's history, African Americans found themselves with the opportunity to work in large numbers as industrial laborers rather than service workers.³² However, because this major migration occurred after the 1940

³⁰ Diane Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," *Blacks in Oregon: An Historical and Statistical Report*, ed. William A. Little and James E. Weiss (Portland: Portland State University Black Studies Center and the Center for Population Research and Census, 1978), 37.

³¹ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 57-58.

³² *Cornerstones of Community*, 58; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 59.

census, and a large number of African American workers left the city before the 1950 census, it is difficult to know with exact certainty how many blacks migrated to Portland over the decade. Still, most historical scholars estimate that between 20,000 and 25,000 blacks travelled to Portland for employment in wartime industries, and their numbers constituted roughly 25 percent of the total number of new workers.³³

The first significant obstacle that African American migrants encountered after arriving in Portland was a shortage in housing as well as conflicts over how much housing whites wanted to make available to black migrants. Initially, many blacks continued to move into the Albina district where Japanese Americans had vacated housing following their deportation and internment in 1942.³⁴ But such housing quickly reached its limits, and local whites grew increasingly vocal in their opposition to allowing large number of blacks to settle in the city. By September 1942, the *Oregonian* reported, "several thousand Negroes have moved into Portland, taxing the housing facilities of the Albina district, center of the city's colored population. . . . Previous population of the eastside Negro colony ranged from 1500 to 2000 . . . but in recent months it has increased to about 5,000."³⁵ Many of Portland's whites, who had long been ambivalent to the relatively small presence of blacks in the city, spoke out forcefully against the permanent integration of new African American migrants into the city and opposed the proposed construction of housing projects in Albina. In particular, white civic leaders and neighborhood organizations relied on racial stereotypes to prevent the construction of

³³ Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," 40.

³⁴ Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 121.

³⁵ "New Negro migrants worry city," *Oregonian*, 23 September 1942.

new housing projects, suggesting that African Americans were primarily responsible for increasing crime rates in U.S. cities.³⁶ Even J.E. Bennett, a former city commissioner, publicly stated that the city should "actively discourage" large numbers of black workers from migrating into the city.³⁷ Fearing a massive public backlash, city officials quickly abandoned their plans to construct housing for blacks and other migrants within the city.³⁸

As housing for new workers became scarce in the city, the Kaiser Company and the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP), which the City created in December 1941 with the sole purpose of resolving the foreseen housing crisis, were forced to construct housing projects on the outskirts of Portland and across the Columbia River near the city of Vancouver. The largest and most historically significant of these housing projects was Vanport City, more commonly known as Vanport. Following HAP's failures to build new housing within the city of Portland by late 1942, Kaiser and HAP worked quickly, quietly, and without the consent of the City Council or Planning Commission to establish the temporary wartime city, which was located on the northern outskirts of Portland near the heart of the shipbuilding industry along the Columbia River.³⁹ By June 1943, Vanport already had 25,088 residents, of which 2,156—or roughly 8.6 percent—were black. In June of the next year, the African American population of Vanport had increased to 3,818 and represented 14 percent of the total population. Moreover, by the time of Vanport's last census in May 1945, the number of blacks in Vanport totaled 6,317

³⁶ *Cornerstones of Community*, 63.

³⁷ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 60.

³⁸ Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," 44.

³⁹ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 64.

and constituted more than 20 percent of residents (See Appendix B: Table 2.3).⁴⁰ At the end of the war, nearly three times as many African Americans lived in Vanport than had lived in the entire city of Portland just five years earlier. Based on population data collected from Vanport, most of the city's black population migrated from states on the western fringe of the South, including Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Louisiana, as well as from larger northern and western cities in states such as Illinois, California, and New York.⁴¹ As a result, by the end of the war, the black population in Portland and the state of Oregon was different in size and demographics than it had been the 1920s and 1930s (See Appendix C: Figure 2.3).

Although HAP regularly, although unofficially, practiced spatial segregation in their assignment of Vanport homes and other temporary housing projects, these new communities provided some blacks with employment opportunities that were unheard of prior to 1940. For example, before 1945, there were no black teachers in any Portland schools; however, by 1945, the Vanport school system employed seven African American teachers, and two of those teachers, Leota E. Stone and Robert G. Ford, went on to become the first black teachers in Portland. Similarly, Vanport hired two black sheriffs, Bill Travis and Matt Dishman, both of whom later became Multnomah County Sheriffs. In addition, several African Americans owned and operated small businesses, most of which catered predominately to Vanport's black community.⁴² While these types of jobs were rare, such opportunities undoubtedly represented a breakthrough in the lives

⁴⁰ William A. Little and James E. Weiss, ed., *Blacks in Oregon: An Historical and Statistical Report* (Portland: Portland State University Black Studies Center and the Center for Population Research and Census, 1978), 59.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴² *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 69-72.

of many African Americans who, for the first time, found jobs outside of the service sector.

Despite the new social and economic opportunities that wartime industries seemed to provide, African Americans in and around Portland faced another civil rights struggle with their ability to gain access to local unions. The Boilermakers Union, which dominated the shipbuilding industry, limited their membership to whites only and refused to allow African Americans to join.⁴³ As a result, in late 1942, a group of African Americans workers, most of who had been recruited from New York to work for Kaiser in Portland, formed the Shipyard Negro Organization for Victory.⁴⁴ Outraged over unfulfilled promises of equal rights and fair treatment, the organization threatened to go on strike and issued a public statement that received widespread attention in the media:

We, the Negro people employed by the Kaiser Company, maintain that under false pretense we were brought from east to west to work for defense, and we demand, with due process of law, the following rights: 1) to work at our trades on equal rights with whites; 2) to go to vocational school or take vocational training on equal rights with whites.⁴⁵

In response, the federal government launched an inquiry into the Boilermakers Union as well as the Kaiser Company's practices and demanded substantial reforms. Ultimately, the Boilermakers created a secondary union for black members that collected dues but lacked the benefits and job security afforded to white union members.⁴⁶ Consequently, by the end of the war in 1945, African Americans were struggling to both keep their jobs as industrial workers and find permanent housing within the city.

⁴³ *Cornerstones of Community*, 53-54.

⁴⁴ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 62.

⁴⁵ "Negro crisis given airing," *Oregonian*, 6 October 1942.

⁴⁶ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 62-63.

As the war ended, African Americans found themselves in a precarious and fragile social situation. The lack of job security and the evaporation of wartime jobs compelled most blacks to return to service work, but the overall growth of Portland's population in the 1940s offered blacks greater access to these jobs than they had had during the 1920s and 1930s. Likewise, housing projects like Vanport, which were never meant to be more than temporary wartime housing, persisted well after the end of the war due to the continuing housing shortage in Portland. Although roughly half of the African Americans that had migrated to Vanport and Portland left after the war for opportunities in booming postwar industries in West Coast cities like Seattle and Los Angeles, a large percentage of blacks stayed in their temporary Vanport homes while searching for housing in the city (See Appendix B: Table 2.4).⁴⁷

However, on May 30, 1948, one of the dikes holding back the Columbia River along the western edge of Vanport broke and, in little more than thirty minutes, a flood wiped out the city of Vanport. Estimates vary, but the flood displaced roughly 5,000 African Americans, who had come to represent more than one-third of Vanport's population, and forced them to crowd into Albina's neighborhoods where the community's black churches and social organizations struggled to provide jobs and housing for the sudden influx of refugees from the flood.⁴⁸

In response to the mounting housing crisis in Portland, a coalition of whites and blacks—similar to the progressive coalition that had helped found the NAACP decades

⁴⁷ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 74.

⁴⁸ The exact number of African Americans residing in Vanport at the time of the flood is somewhat unclear due to the suddenness of the event; however, most historians agree that blacks represented a larger portion of the city than they had at any point leading up to the disaster. Abbott, *Greater Portland*, 70; *Cornerstones of Community*, 63; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 76-79.

earlier—founded a branch of the Urban League in Portland in 1945. While historians have noted that the original purpose of the Portland Urban League was to find ways for blacks to emigrate from the city, black leadership within the organization redirected their efforts towards finding ways to integrate blacks into the city.⁴⁹ In particular, Chicago-born Edwin C. "Bill" Berry, the Portland Urban League's first executive director, worked to open new job and housing opportunities for Portland blacks for more than a decade until his departure in 1956.⁵⁰ Likewise, other leaders within the African American community campaigned to increase public support for settling and integrating new African American migrants into Portland. In particular, black leaders believed that housing limitations and the increasing ghettoization of Albina were the primary obstacles to African American social and economic success. In a 1945 report by the Portland City Club, one of the city's most prominent black physicians, civil rights advocates, and co-founder of the Portland Urban League, Dr. DeNorval Unthank, stated, "For the safety factor in Portland, we should avoid a definitely segregated area which in the long run would prove a bad thing for the city."⁵¹ Unfortunately, the flood of Vanport in 1948 combined with white spatialized conceptions of Albina as a black neighborhood to create a postwar urban ghetto by the late 1940s. According to the 1950 census, half of Portland's black population resided within two census tracts of Albina. However, in this

⁴⁹ Darrell Millner, *On the Road to Equality: The Urban League of Portland, A 50 Year Retrospective* (Portland: Urban League of Portland, 1995), 12; Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," 48.

⁵⁰ *Cornerstones of Community*, 54-55; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 90-91.

⁵¹ Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," 47.

supposedly black neighborhood, whites still outnumbered nonwhites by a ratio of two to one (See Appendix C: Figure 2.4; Appendix B: Table 2.4).⁵²

By 1950, Albina had transformed into a neighborhood that the broader white community conceptualized spatially as a black urban ghetto, but—like many other cities in the United States—this transformation was never inevitable. In the conclusion to her 1978 report for Portland State University on African Americans in Portland during and after the war, Diane Pancoast placed the onus for the creation of a black ghetto on Portland's white population. "From my interviews and other sources of information," she contended, "whites considered Albina to be a black neighborhood much earlier than blacks did."⁵³ Moreover, she suggested, "it seems clear that whites rather than blacks created Albina and the blacks have suffered as a result while whites have profited. . . . The recent development of black pride, whatever its merits, has tended to obscure, to some extent, the origins of our ghettos, at least to whites who are looking for an escape from responsibility."⁵⁴ As a result, regardless of the successes of half a century of the civil rights struggle, Portland's African American community found itself facing devastating socioeconomic conditions that were just as bad, if not worse than they were in the past.

Despite the problems caused by the ghettoization of Albina, Portland's African American population had reached a critical mass to the point that community leaders believed they could launch an effective social and political assault on the underpinnings of racism and prejudice at the core of Portland's social, political, and economic climate.

⁵² *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 86-87.

⁵³ Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," 53.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

Through organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League, blacks felt they had the tools to improve their social and economic standing in the city, regardless of their lack of representation within the political process. Unfortunately, over the course of the next two decades, city government and urban planners attempted to rebuild the Albina district through costly and destructive urban renewal efforts rather than address the underlying social causes of the economic and racial inequalities that built the Albina ghetto. Once again, African Americans met these misguided policies with resistance. Ultimately, the resulting postwar Civil Rights Movement marked the most important turning point in the century long struggle. That movement's successes and failures laid the foundation for the next phase of the black freedom struggle and shaped the course of Portland's history for the remainder of the twentieth century.

Postwar Civil Rights and Urban Renewal in Albina

Between the early 1950s and the mid 1960s, Portland, along with the rest of the nation, entered a period of rapid civil rights reforms that historians commonly describe as the postwar Civil Rights Movement. By 1960, the black population of Portland exceeded 15,000 and comprised 4 percent of the city's permanent population, and for the first time civil rights became a prominent issue in the city's political discourse. According to historian Stuart McElderry, whose dissertation constitutes the most detailed analysis of this postwar moment in Portland's civil rights, the movement's success in the areas of public accommodations, employment, housing, and public education rested on the formation of a strong and effective coalition of black organizations, specifically the NAACP and the Urban League, and white progressives. But, as McElderry notes, by

1965 the ideological grounds of racial liberalism on which this coalition had formed began to fall apart.⁵⁵ While McElderry correctly attributes a distinct shift in racial ideology as part of the basis for the coalition's collapse, his analysis neglects to identify one of the most fundamental reasons for the shift: urban renewal. Frustration among African Americans in response to destructive urban renewal policies within the Albina district, including the destruction and displacement of hundreds of African American homes and businesses for events centers, highways, and other large public works projects, bred resentment towards public officials and shifted the trajectory of the classical period of postwar civil rights by the late 1960s. Consequently, the city's negligent assault on the physical and spatial constructs of the African American community in Albina eventually undermined the legislative successes of the postwar coalition and culminated in the abrupt and violent end to the postwar Civil Rights Movement in the summer of 1967.

In 1953, proponents of civil rights in Portland and the state of Oregon achieved their first major legislative breakthrough since the 1920s with the passage of the Public Accommodations Bill. In 1950, the Portland City Council passed an ordinance concerning public accommodations that, in effect, made discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin illegal in all public places and temporarily overturned the state's ruling in *Taylor v. Cohn* more than forty years earlier. Following a petition campaign to place the ordinance on the ballot, the public resoundingly repealed the measure in November 1950. Nevertheless, under the leadership of NAACP President Otto Rutherford, Representative Mark Hatfield of Salem, as well as a coalition of other

⁵⁵ Stuart J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998), 1-15.

civil rights organizations that included the Urban League, the Portland League of Women Voters, and local churches, the state legislature finally passed the Public Accommodations Bill in 1953. Despite efforts by groups like the Civic Freedom Committee, which sought to delay the enactment of the bill until the passage of a public referendum in 1954, Representative Hatfield was successful in garnering support for the bill and defeating opposition movements through a closely coordinated public campaign with the NAACP.⁵⁶ Although public discrimination continued in parts of the city for decades after the bill's passage, blacks in Portland now had a solid political and legal defense for combating discrimination as well as a strong, albeit temporary, political coalition for advancing civil rights legislation.⁵⁷

Following the passage of the Public Accommodations Bill, organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League turned their attention to three major civil rights issues that continued to plague Portland's African American population: housing, employment, and education. The most pressing issue of the postwar Civil Rights Movement centered on resolving the housing crisis. For the first time, civil rights groups believed that they had the numbers and political support to challenge the unwritten though well-known practices of spatial discrimination that had been in place since African Americans first began arriving in Oregon during the mid-1800s. In particular, the NAACP and the Urban League targeted discriminatory real estate practices like redlining, which sought to limit African American homebuyers to specific neighborhoods. Until the early 1950s, the Portland Realty Board publicly maintained that the presence of African Americans in a

⁵⁶ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 96-97.

⁵⁷ *Cornerstones of Community*, 68-69; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 101. For more detailed information on the passage of the Public Accommodation Bill, see Chapter IV of Stuart McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line."

neighborhood resulted in depreciated property values, an idea that many increasingly saw as nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁵⁸ Eventually, the Oregon legislature passed the Fair Housing Law in 1957 that allowed many blacks to relocate outside the Albina district into formerly all-white neighborhoods. Like the Public Accommodations Bill, the effects of the law were not always immediate and many white neighborhoods resisted the relocation of black families into their communities with threats and destruction of property. In addition, with the gradual opening of the suburbs to Portland's black middle class, many African Americans left behind an increasingly impoverished black inner city population that lacked the social and economic resources to improve their community.⁵⁹

By the early 1950s, jobs became another major concern of the postwar Civil Rights Movement. Although service jobs were plentiful in Portland after the war, blacks continued to struggle to open new avenues for skilled, non-service employment outside of the growing business center of the black community along N Williams Avenue. Moreover, unlike Los Angeles and Seattle, where new aircraft industries continued to produce jobs well after the end of the war, the loss of shipbuilding and the lack of postwar industries limited new job opportunities for African American workers who had migrated to the city in the 1940s.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, civil rights organizations, most prominently the Urban League, worked tirelessly to break down the color line in employment after the war. After an initial defeat in 1947, the state legislature passed the

⁵⁸ Millner, *On the Road to Equality*, 20; *Cornerstones of Community*, 70-73; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 86-88.

⁵⁹ *Cornerstones of Community*, 74. For more detailed information on housing and civil rights, see Chapters VI and IX of Stuart McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line."

⁶⁰ Abbott, *Greater Portland*, 139.

Fair Employment Practices Act in 1949, which made discrimination in job hiring illegal. Moreover, Portland's Urban League, under the leadership of Edwin "Bill" Berry (1945-1955), William Boone (1955-1959), and E. Shelton Hill (1959-1973), made employment its highest priority during the 1950s.⁶¹ Some success stories during the 1950s included the first African American Deputy Commissioner for the Oregon Bureau of Labor, a member of the Portland Fire Department, a faculty member at Reed College, a sports writer for the *Oregonian* newspaper, non-custodial employees for Sears and Montgomery Ward, and many others.⁶² However, the NAACP and Urban League developed an increasingly confrontational approach towards the gradualism and tokenism of employment integration by the early 1960s, including the adoption of public protests and picketing. Such confrontations marked the first major signs of erosion within the black-white postwar Civil Rights Movement's coalition.⁶³ Ultimately, while civil rights groups were quick to emphasize their successes in breaking through discriminatory hiring practices, changes had not come quickly enough to improve the economic livelihood of the black community in Albina.

The third concentrated effort of the postwar Civil Rights Movement came in the realm of public education and the integration of Portland schools. Unlike southern states, where segregation was the result of legal or *de jure* segregation, the division between whites and people of color in Portland schools was the result of the preexisting spatial settlement patterns, or *de facto* segregation, which were the product of housing

⁶¹ Millner, *On the Road to Equality*, 5-13; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 94-95.

⁶² *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 99-100.

⁶³ McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line," 273.

inequalities. Therefore, the Supreme Court's 1954 landmark ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* had little effect on the composition of the city's school system. For example, even as late as the 1964-1965 school year, three elementary schools in northeastern Portland—Boise Elementary, Eliot Elementary, and Humboldt Elementary—all had more than 90 percent black enrollment.⁶⁴ As a result, challenging segregation in Portland required breaking down spatial arrangements more than legal blockades. Having made progress with housing by the early 1960s, the NAACP began pressuring the local city council to address school segregation. After the emergence of a strong public opposition to busing among Portlanders, the city developed a small "pilot relocation assistance project" in 1964, which provided financial assistance to twenty-five African American families in order to relocate and switch schools.⁶⁵ However, a special commission appointed by the city council ultimately decided on a policy whereby the city would close schools within the African American community in Northeast Portland and evenly redistribute black students throughout neighboring school districts. In addition, schools that had previously been nearly all white sought to hire more African American teachers as black student enrollment increased. Ultimately, though well intentioned and successful in some ways, many blacks families in Albina increasingly came to resent this approach to integrationist policies by the late 1960s, and they began to push for new methods that would not, as many perceived it, divide and weaken their own social and cultural community.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Virginia C. Michell and William A. Little, "Black and White Students Enrollment in Secondary Education in Oregon," *Blacks in Oregon: An Historical and Statistical Report*, ed. William A. Little and James E. Weiss (Portland: Portland State University Black Studies Center and the Center for Population Research and Census, 1978), 88.

⁶⁵ *Cornerstones of Community*, 75-77.

While housing, employment, and education have comprised the three areas of focus for studies of the postwar Civil Rights Movement, historians of civil rights in Portland have neglected the importance of a fourth overarching element of the movement: urban renewal. Like many cities in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, Portland began to adopt urban development and renewal policies that focused on tearing down older, supposedly unsalvageable neighborhoods in order to improve urban infrastructure and downtown attractions. Moreover, the City Planning Commission took little or no interest in the voices and opinions of local citizens or neighborhood organizations in the construction of their renewal policies.⁶⁷ As a result, the City's efforts to remake and thereby revitalize the Albina district through demolition, rezoning, and the construction of new buildings in many ways limited the overall success of all three of the postwar Civil Rights Movement's goals. These policies forced members of the black community to relocate once again while helping feed a new generation of resentment and disillusionment within the movement. In particular, the construction of Memorial Coliseum and Interstate 5, the city's proposed Central Albina Plan, and the Emanuel Hospital renovations all had devastating effects on the black community in Northeast Portland.

The first phase of urban renewal in Albina moved quickly during the late 1950s and focused primarily on the construction of Memorial Coliseum and I-5, both of which the City carved out of the highly concentrated black neighborhoods of Albina. After receiving public support to build a war memorial events center and sports venue in

⁶⁶ *Cornerstones of Community*, 78. For more detailed information on public education and integration, see Chapters VII and X of Stuart McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line."

⁶⁷ Abbott, *Portland*, 186-188.

November 1956, Portland's Planning Commission selected the east bank of the Willamette River across from downtown for the building's location. The clearance of the area selected for Memorial Coliseum, which comprised the densest concentration of African Americans in the Albina district, contained 476 homes, the majority of which were non-white residences. The renewal project effectively wiped out large portions of African American homes south of Broadway Street and required the destruction and relocation of many of the black community's most important landmarks and institutions, including the medical office of Dr. DeNorval Unthank, the Bethel AME Church, as well as many other black owned shops and businesses.⁶⁸ Similarly, even before the completion of Memorial Coliseum in 1960, Portland's Planning Commission approved and began additional urban renewal projects in the Albina district, including the construction of I-5 in the late 1950s. Like the construction of Memorial Coliseum, the expansion of Highway 99 into I-5 required the demolition and relocation of 125 homes and businesses, including—once again—the recently opened new medical offices of Dr. Unthank.⁶⁹ In both instances, the displaced black population, which received no assistance from the city government, was forced to relocate into already overcrowded neighborhoods or further northeast to the area around Irving Park, where white flight and new housing opportunities gradually expanded the boundaries of the "black neighborhood" east of Williams Avenue.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ *Cornerstones of Community*, 86-87; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 104.

⁶⁹ *Cornerstones of Community*, 87.

⁷⁰ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 104.

By the early 1960s, urban renewal projects in Albina had produced devastating social and economic results, but no project appeared more threatening to African Americans than the city's Central Albina Study in 1962. In 1958, an approved amendment to the city charter created the Portland Development Commission (PDC) under the leadership of Mayor Terry Schrunk (1957-1973). The amendment gave the new commission almost limitless and unchecked urban renewal powers to "promote industrial expansion and location and acquire such property, real or personal . . . inside or outside the city, as the Commission . . . may find appropriate or convenient in accordance with comprehensive zoning and development plans."⁷¹ In November 1962, the PDC published its Central Albina Study, a report that defined an urban renewal plan for a 3.4 square mile area in Central Albina, known as the Eliot Neighborhood (See Appendix C: Figure 2.5). Ultimately, the area, which contained 12,844 African Americans, or roughly 80 percent of the city's total black population, was designated as a region in "an advanced stage of urban blight" that could not be revitalized.⁷² In particular, the report concluded, "urban renewal, largely clearance, appears to be the only solution to, not only blight that presently exists in central Albina, but also to avoid the spread of that blight to other surrounding areas."⁷³ Moreover, the report further emphasized the usefulness of the neighborhood's location for city infrastructure and noted that the area was "unusually well suited to transportation, distribution, and service industries."⁷⁴

⁷¹ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 110.

⁷² Portland Development Commission, "Central Albina Study," (Portland: City of Portland, 1962).

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

If the Central Albina Plan had been fully implemented, at least one-third of the entire city's black population would have had to relocate. However, following widespread public resistance spearheaded by NAACP President Mayfield K. Webb and the Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project (ANIP), the PDC retreated from some, but not all, of its proposed renewal plans in Albina. In 1961, one year prior to the Central Albina Study, the PDC had set aside a small 35-block ANIP area just north of Fremont for its first urban renewal project in the area focused on revitalization rather than demolition (See Appendix C: Figure 2.6).⁷⁵ Over the course of twelve years, the ANIP successfully rebuilt dilapidated homes, repaired streets, established a tree-planting program, and created a five-acre park named after Dr. DeNorval Unthank. During the mid-1960s, Albina was also selected to receive federal funds from President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty program. These funds created the Albina Citizen's War on Poverty Committee in 1964, which led to the creation of a local Head Start program and the Low Income Family Emergency (LIFE) Center.⁷⁶ However, despite these early successes and petitions by more than one thousand Albina residents to expand the project in 1967, the local leaders of the ANIP were unsuccessful in their attempts to push the boundaries of the project south of Fremont Avenue. The PDC's rejection of these efforts resulted in the continuation of the Central Albina Plan and further clearances and displacements throughout the 1960s. As a result, by the mid-to-late 1960s, large portions of Portland's black population had been driven out of the lower southeast Albina district to the north of Fremont and west towards Irving Park (See Appendix C: Figure 2.7).

⁷⁵ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 113-115; Abbott, *Portland*, 189.

⁷⁶ *Cornerstones of Community*, 91-92; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 117-120.

After two decades of frustrating and often devastating relocation and urban renewal efforts by the city of Portland, the decision to expand Emanuel Hospital in the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the minds of many African Americans living in northeastern Portland. In order to expand its facilities to meet the increasing needs of Portland's growing population, the City and the PDC granted the hospital, located on the western edge of N Williams Avenue, ten blocks surrounding the complex under the Central Albina Plan. The hospital then proceeded to demolish another 188 businesses and residences, forcing its residents to relocate. Once again, the majority of these shops and homes had belonged to African American residents. To make matters worse, federal budget cuts eventually forced an abrupt end to the hospital's expansion and temporarily left the land vacant.⁷⁷ For many African Americans living in Albina, especially younger individuals who had grown up in the crucible of Vanport, Memorial Coliseum, I-5, and the Central Albina Plan, the Emanuel Hospital renovations marked the last straw in a long chain of civil rights and urban renewal abuses. By the end of the 1960s, the hospital expansion displaced more than half of the population of the Albina district's Eliot neighborhood over the previous two decades.⁷⁸

Despite the passage of state legislation as well as the federal Civil Rights Act in 1964 and Voting Rights Act in 1965, the history of the long civil rights movement in Portland was far from over. By 1967, African Americans had made important, although sometimes minimal, improvements in their long struggle for civil rights. Still, even after the Great Migration of the early twentieth century, the rapid influx of African Americans

⁷⁷ *Cornerstones of Community*, 90; *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 111.

⁷⁸ *The History of Portland's African American Community*, 109.

into Portland during WWII, and the postwar Civil Rights Movement, blacks in Portland lacked district representation in city politics and were forced to rely on a fragile and often ineffective coalition of black civil rights advocates and white progressives to enact reforms. By the end of the postwar era, African Americans achieved their greatest legislative victories, but concrete solutions to visible socioeconomic problems in Albina remained elusive. The passage of the Public Accommodations Bill, Fair Housing Law, and Fair Employment Practices Act, as well as attempts to reform the segregation in public education that had resulted from settlement patterns all met with mixed results of successes and setbacks in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, urban renewal policies, the flight of wealthier blacks from the Albina district to the suburbs and other parts of Portland, and the integration of blacks into Portland schools through the dissolution of black majority schools in Albina combined to limit the perceived successes of the postwar Civil Rights Movement. Indeed, by the summer of 1967, the struggle for civil rights and black empowerment in Portland and other major cities across the United States would take a disturbingly chaotic turn. With this new phase of black activism and radicalism came a search for new solutions to the old problems of urban neglect and social indifference. The face of this new generation of young leaders and radical activists in search of solutions would ultimately help re-imagine and redefine Portland politics and urban development, as well as our modern social and political landscape in the United States since the late 1960s.

CHAPTER III

DEFENDING ALBINA:

MODEL CITIES AND PANTHERS IN NORTHEAST PORTLAND, 1966-1970

In October 1966, two events, which at first glance appear completely disconnected, set in motion a series of events that ultimately converged on Portland in the late 1960s, radically redefined the city's political power structure and urban planning policies, and altered the trajectory of the local black community's long struggle for civil rights. On October 20, in the halls of congress in Washington, D.C., the United States Senate narrowly passed the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act. The act, which had been championed by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Democrat allies in congress as a necessary component for reviving American cities, provided federal grants through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to assist cities with comprehensive and locally planned urban renewal and infrastructure improvement projects.¹

Just four days earlier, on the other side of the country in Oakland, California, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale officially founded the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP). Rooted in Maoist and Black Power political ideologies with an emphasis on armed defense and rebuilding black inner city communities, the Panthers became a household name by 1967 when members of the organization appeared outside of the California State Legislature brandishing guns and wearing their iconic black jackets, berets, and sunglasses. In their highly publicized *Ten-Point Platform and Program*, the

¹ Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754 (1966).

BPP's founding declaration, the Panthers demanded the right to self-determination, employment, housing, education, an end to police brutality and black economic exploitation by whites, exemption from military service in Vietnam, and the immediate release of all blacks from federal, state, county, and city prisons.² Relying on a nationwide yet frequently weak and semi-autonomous network of BPP chapters, the organization quickly sprung up in nearly every major city across the United States, including Portland, Oregon, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Although these two events were a nation apart and seemed, at best, only loosely related, their interconnectedness became apparent in Portland by 1970. Under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, the leadership of Mayor Terry Schrunk and PDC Chairman Ira D. Keller, the City of Portland developed its Model Cities program. Approached by the PDC as another urban renewal project, this new program once again targeted the Albina district. While the leaders of the Model Cities program made a more concentrated effort than the city government had in the past to engage with the needs and opinions of Portland's African American community, the PDC initially continued to offer blacks nothing more than token representation in minor planning positions as well as forums for expressing their opinions. As a result, Portland's black community became openly hostile towards the emergence of the Model Cities program in Northeast Portland during the late 1960s, as it was immediately perceived of as a continuation of the city's destructive urban renewal policies in the region. As African Americans experimented with new and diverse methods of resisting the city government and the PDC's urban renewal plans, the PDC lost control of the Model Cities

² Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed January 9, 2012, <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bpps.html>. See APPENDIX D for full text of the document.

program. In this increasingly radical atmosphere, the Portland BPP emerged in 1969 as a new form of black political experimentation in a city that had effectively stymied their community's political voice throughout the twentieth century.

The Model Cities program, as originally envisioned by the PDC, and the Portland Black Panther Party represented two polarizing, competing, and extreme visions of space in Northeast Portland. For the city government and leadership of the PDC, Albina was a potentially valuable part of the city plagued by urban blight, lacking the ability to cure itself, and requiring further renewal and revitalization efforts by city planners to reach its full potential. For the Panthers, Albina was *their* community, *their* land, and they were going to defend it, *by any means necessary*.

Model Cities and Rebellion in Albina

When the citizens of Portland elected Terry Schrunk to the first of his four four-year terms as Mayor of Portland in 1956, they did so under campaign promises that he would govern as a self-described "moderate progressive" with a policy platform of citywide urban renewal. Defeating the one-term incumbent mayor, Fred Peterson, in both a nine-candidate primary and a run-off election later that fall, Schrunk came into office with a strong mandate to consolidate Portland's previously existing disparate urban planning agencies. In a sweeping overhaul of the system in early 1958, he replaced the frequently conservative and ineffective leadership of HAP, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Bureau with political allies like John Kenward and Lloyd Keefe. He then gained permission from the state legislature to place each of these semi-autonomous agencies under the authority of a single new agency that had almost total control over all

urban renewal and redevelopment policies—the Portland Development Commission. After gaining public approval for the PDC by a narrow margin of 52 percent to 48 percent in the summer of 1958, Schrunk quickly appointed Ira Keller, a powerful Portland business executive who originally hailed from Chicago, as the PDC's chair. Throughout the late 1950s, Mayor Schrunk and Chairman Keller oversaw several major urban renewal projects, including the construction of Memorial Coliseum in the Albina district and the South Auditorium renewal project south of downtown.³

During Terry Schrunk's tenure as mayor from 1957 to 1973, Portland's urban planners, under the control of the PDC, embraced an ideology of urban renewal that favored the clearance of blighted neighborhoods throughout the city, but especially in the predominately-black Albina district of Northeast Portland. Guided by the city's 1958 *Comprehensive Development Plan* and later the 1966 *Community Renewal Program*, the PDC operated under the assumption that the decline of inner-city neighborhoods was inevitable and that city planners offered the best vision for revitalizing these regions. Consequently, Keller and the PDC took a top-down approach to urban renewal that neglected to engage with the voices of the very neighborhoods and communities they sought to change.⁴ But the Model Cities program, initiated by the PDC in late 1966 and early 1967, changed everything. Though initially proposed by the PDC as a way to receive federal funds to continue the city's approach to urban renewal in Northeast Portland, a backlash against the program by the African American community in Albina between 1967 and 1970 derailed the PDC's strategy. Through a combination of radical

³ Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 169-171.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 186-188.

resistance and an effort to wrestle some control of urban planning away from the PDC through the creation of the Citizens' Planning Board, Portland's black community helped force a distinct shift in postwar urban planning that set the stage for significant social and political changes in the 1970s.

The passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act in October 1966 ushered in yet another phase of urban renewal in Northeast Portland. More commonly known as the Demonstration Cities Act, congress designed this piece of legislation with the intent to support "locally prepared programs for rebuilding or restoring entire sections and neighborhoods of slums and blighted areas by the concentrated and coordinated use of all available Federal aids together with local, private, and governmental resources." The act consisted of federal assistance in two stages. First, HUD would provide assistance in the development of demonstration plans during the early half of 1967. Then, after July 1, 1967, HUD would offer \$400 million in federal funds to selected programs in 1967, and another \$500 million the following year. The act also stipulated several specific standards that any city applying for funding had to meet. In particular, it stated that "programs must be designed to . . . renew entire slum neighborhoods by combined use of physical and social development programs, . . . make marked progress in reducing social and educational disadvantages, ill health, underemployment and forced idleness, and contribute toward a well-balanced city." In other words, the Demonstration Cities Act required cities to address the social—not just the physical—problems of urban decay.⁵

In late November 1966, only a month after the passage of the Demonstration Cities Act, the PDC drafted its *Report and Recommendations on Demonstration Cities*

⁵ Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754 (1966).

Program for the City of Portland. The report, which highlighted most of Northeast Portland as the region of the city in the most advanced stages of blight, proposed a project that would establish "a model community for urban living" by "upgrad[ing] badly run-down sections in declining areas . . . as part of creating an overall model neighborhood" in Albina. "Without a doubt," the PDC's proposal claimed, "the area extending north from Memorial Coliseum and Lloyd Center to the City limits . . . fulfills [the Demonstration Cities Act conditions] and many more criteria."⁶ This area included the Eliot, Boise-Humboldt, Irvington, King-Vernon-Sabin, and Woodlawn neighborhoods of the Albina district, which stretched from east-to-west from I-5 to NE 22nd Avenue and south-to-north from Broadway Street to the boundaries of the city (See Appendix C: Figure 3.1). After fine-tuning their proposal, the City of Portland submitted their official planning grant application to HUD in late April 1967. Over the next few months, the City of Portland and the PDC promoted this new urban planning project, which they increasingly described as "Model Cities." Shortly thereafter, the *Oregonian* newspaper began publishing a series of articles touting the commercial benefits of the project for Northeast Portland.⁷

After submitting their request to HUD, Portland's Model Cities program was among a select few projects that the federal government began to consider for funds. However, even as the city and the PDC moved forward with urban development plans and the selection of a head for the Model Cities program, the PDC's project was met with

⁶ City Auditor's Office, City Planning Commission, and Portland Development Commission, *Report and Recommendations on Demonstration Cities Program for the City of Portland*, 1966, box 13, folder 3, Stella Maris House Collection, Oregon Historical Society (OHS) Research Library, Portland.

⁷ "Model City plan bold in assault on blight," *Oregonian*, July 3, 1967; "City seeks planning funds for blight area job," *Oregonian*, July 4, 1967; "Model Cities program may become permanent," *Oregonian*, July 5, 1967.

resistance from the African American community in Albina. Sensing the possibility of a backlash to another urban renewal project, HUD's regional office in San Francisco responded to Portland's Model Cities program in early July 1967 with concerns over the City's potentially haphazard and precarious implementation of its urban renewal project in Northeast Portland. Specifically, HUD questioned the PDC's administrative machinery for carrying out the program, its ill-defined neighborhood area, and the lack of citizen input and participation in the planning process. Of these three issues, the report expressed its greatest concern with regard to citizen participation, noting, "Although Portland has established a coordinating, planning, and policy-making body, there is no explanation of how the neighborhoods will have any influence over its decisions . . . Portland's citizen participation proposal is mostly at the level of informing residents rather than involving them."⁸ In other words, HUD had finally called out the City of Portland and the PDC on their decade-long approach to urban development whereby the city made urban renewal plans and required citizens to go along with them without the local community's input.

Drawing on the lessons from recent riots in cities across the United States, HUD's response to the City of Portland and the PDC's proposed Model Cities plan in many ways both echoed and foreshadowed further African American resistance to the proposed plan in Albina. Two years after the devastating Watts Riots in Los Angeles during August 1965, large violent clashes had broken out between African Americans and city police in several U.S. cities in June in 1967, including Atlanta, Boston, and Cincinnati. The following month, New York City, Birmingham, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, and many

⁸ Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Discussion Paper—Portland, Oregon," 1967, Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folder 4, OHS Research Library, Portland.

other cities erupted in violence in what has come to be known as the long hot summer of 1967. Despite these warning signs, however, the City of Portland careened towards a similar fate.

After decades of social and political neglect as well as devastating urban renewal projects, the simmering tensions between the Portland city government and the black community in Albina exploded in Irving Park on the evening of July 30, 1967. Earlier that day, a large "Sunday in the Park" rally had been held under the pretense of building unity among the community and voicing opposition to racist employment, housing, and urban renewal practices. During the week leading up to the demonstration, rumors had even circulated throughout the black community that radical political activist Eldridge Cleaver, author of *Soul on Ice* and one of the leading figures of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, would give a speech.⁹ However, as the day progressed, the rally in the park turned violent. Blacks began throwing rocks and glass bottles at whites walking on the sidewalks or driving by in cars, and a few individuals started attacking and vandalizing businesses. According to the *Oregonian*, within a matter of hours, "Roving bands of Negroes, most of them teen-agers, surged through the streets," and Portland police arrived shortly thereafter to put down the rioters. In an attempt to regain control as night fell, police imposed a curfew and sealed off a thirty-block area around Irving Park. That night, more than twenty fire alarms were reported throughout the area as rioters looted and firebombed several buildings and businesses. Police arrested nineteen individuals who they suspected of throwing rocks and bottles, but were hesitant to move directly

⁹ *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 124-125.

against the crowd in the park.¹⁰ By morning, a brief but temporary calm had fallen over Northeast Portland, but more than two-hundred African Americans continued to occupy Irving Park and surrounding areas.

The next night, things turned ugly again. Targeting the very machines of urban renewal and city government, the Morris Yards northwest of the park, which housed various types of city equipment, burst into flames after unknown culprits set fire to fuel trucks and firebombed the building. While firefighters raced to contain the massive blaze, Mayor Schruck ordered police to move past the barricades that they had assembled the previous day around Irving Park, clear the park, and arrest anyone they suspected of being a rioter.¹¹ After two nights of vandalism, fires, and confrontations with law enforcement, police had shot one man and arrested almost one-hundred people, the overwhelming majority of whom were black. More than a quarter of those who the police arrested were juveniles.¹² As the sun rose the next day over the smoke-filled air, looted shops with broken windows, burned-out buildings, and glass-strewn streets of Northeast Portland, people awoke to the realization that the city had just experienced its worst race riot to date.

Preferring to portray the riot as an abnormal occurrence or fluke, city leadership and the local media framed the riots as the product of "outside" agitators and emphasized local blacks' firm opposition to violence and the Black Power political ideology.

Selecting specific interviews with African Americans who had not participated in the riot,

¹⁰ Stan Federman, "Negroes break windows, set fires: Police move to put down disturbances," *Oregonian*, July 31, 1967.

¹¹ John Guernsey, "Portland police put down scattered violence: Rowdies dispersed at park," *Oregonian*, August 1, 1967.

¹² Robert Olmos, "Peace returns after 2 nights of disorder," *Oregonian*, August 2, 1967; *History of Portland's African American Community*, 125-126.

the *Oregonian* confidently reported, "Negroes in the Albina area have failed to buy the Black Power revolution theory," and they emphasized unsupported rumors that blacks from outside of the state had come to Portland with the intent to cause a disturbance and were responsible for the chaos.¹³ Portland police, however, were never able to offer any substantial evidence to confirm such rumors.¹⁴ Similarly, Governor Tom McCall and Mayor Schunk were at a loss to explain the violent outburst in Albina, suggesting a possible but unlikely connection between the riots and the failed passage of a school levy for Northeast Portland in a local election.¹⁵ Ultimately, both the media and elected officials refused to recognize the underlying persistent social problems that caused the riot.

Nevertheless, the *Oregonian* did tacitly acknowledge the neglect of socioeconomic problems in Albina and noted the growing anger among African American teenagers in response to these conditions; however, these articles were buried deep within the newspaper and were hesitant to suggest the riots were the direct product of these legitimate issues. The morning after the second day of the riot, which received the main headline on the cover page of the *Oregonian*, page sixteen of the paper contained a small article on E. Shelton Hill and the Urban League's call to create more employment opportunities for black youth in Albina, but the public largely ignored these comments.¹⁶ Likewise, statements by black teenagers in Albina in the days after the riot,

¹³ Stan Federman, "Albina adults deplore strife, help police rout gangs," July 31, 1967; "Portland Negro leader claims 'outsiders sparked Albina youth's disorder,'" July 31, 1967; Robert Olmos, "Negro leaders declare Albina refuses to accept Black Power theory," *Oregonian*, August 1, 1967

¹⁴ Stan Federman, "Police fail to confirm 'outside agitator' rumor," August 2, 1967.

¹⁵ Andrew Mershon, "Partial blame placed on school levy loss," *Oregonian*, August 1, 1967; Harold Hughes, "Ivancie raps McCall idea," *Oregonian*, August 2, 1967.

which expressed concerns that the older black leadership in the city "won't listen to what we have to say and have lost all contact with people on the street," were relegated to page fifteen and ignored by the broader community as well.¹⁷ Despite the persistent existence of social concerns among young African Americans in Northeast Portland, the city simply decided to move on from the riots and sweep the problems stemming from the legacy of racism and urban renewal under the proverbial rug.

As the summer turned to autumn, tensions cooled a little in Albina during late 1967, but black leadership within the community kept pressure on the PDC to include the black community's voice in the Model Cities planning process prior to the federal government's approval of the project in December. During public meetings with members of the PDC at various locations throughout Albina in late 1967, hundreds of residents from the local neighborhoods in the district turned out to discuss, often heatedly, the need for citizen participation on all levels of the planning process.¹⁸ In particular, African Americans demanded representation in the form of a black director to the entire Model Cities program, offering E. Shelton Hill of the Urban League and Tom Vickers of the NAACP as possible candidates for the position.¹⁹ However, the PDC once again chose to ignore the black community's voice and, on December 21, selected Reverend Paul Schulze, a white Albina minister and head of the Church-Community

¹⁶ Charlie Hanna, "Need for more jobs for Negro youths cited by officials of Urban League," August 1, 1967.

¹⁷ William Sanderson, "Negro youths fear mayor missed the message of city hall discussion," August 2, 1967.

¹⁸ "Special Meeting Report: Model Cities Program," November 30, 1967, Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folder 4, OHS Research Library, Portland.

¹⁹ "'Black Man' to head Model City here focused," *Oregon Journal*, December 15, 1967.

Action Program (C-CAP), to head the program.²⁰ Immediately following the decision, Vickers, Hill, and other black leaders publicly lashed out against the choice of a white man to head the program in interviews with the *Oregonian* and *Oregon Journal*. Moreover, at the citizens meeting the following evening, the meeting's secretary recorded, "This was indeed a chaotic meeting with much shouting," as the approximately seventy residents in attendance expressed their exacerbation with the PDC's apparent stubbornness and intransigence.²¹

In the days following the selection of Reverend Schulze, members of the black community in Albina hit the streets with newsletters and flyers attacking Model Cities and the PDC under the leadership of Ira Keller. One widely circulated newsletter titled *The Spirithouse Rap*, which appears to have only consisted of one issue in late December 1967, called upon the residents of Albina and Portland:

To recognize that the Model Cities Program is one of those rare historic moments where the problems confronting a people comes into sharp focus. . . . The MCP, unless it is halted NOW—will follow other Urban Renewal (Negro Removal) programs in this city . . . like the Memorial Coliseum, where black people were forced out to build a 'palace' for them (whites) and an Emanuel Hospital addition for them (Emanuel Hospital is a place for black people to die, not to be cured).²²

Likening Model Cities to other previous urban renewal projects of the postwar era, the publishers of the newsletter viewed the selection of a white program director as another instance of neglect and indifference towards the will of the black community in Albina, even though Schulze was a resident of Albina. In addition, the writers encouraged members of the black community to support local black-owned businesses and attend

²⁰ "Minister appointed to coordinate Model Cities plan," *Oregonian*, December 21, 1967.

²¹ "Special Meeting Report: Model Cities Program," December 22, 1967, Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folder 4, OHS Research Library, Portland.

²² *Spirithouse Rap* (Vol. I, No. I, 1967), Stella Maris House Collection, box 5, folder 8, OHS Research Library, Portland.

upcoming public Model Cities meetings. Similarly, an anonymous flyer posted around the Portland State College (PSC) campus targeted the PDC as "a small group of self-selected volunteers from the rich friends of City Hall," and they described Chairman Ira Keller as a millionaire "outsider" who "came west from Chicago." Moreover, it claimed, "students, workers and community people must join together, fight back and win honest POWER TO THE PEOPLE."²³ In light of this sudden and intense backlash to Model Cities and the PDC, Portland's political leadership found itself in the middle of a quickly escalating conflict in Albina.

Despite blacks' disapproval of the choice of Reverend Schulze and their intense vitriol directed towards the PDC and Model Cities, Schulze focused the majority of his efforts on making Model Cities work for the people of Albina by bringing the black community's voice into the program.²⁴ At a meeting with Albina residents on January 4, 1968, Schulze attempted to placate angry citizens by constructing a temporary, handpicked advisory committee consisting of local black leadership and involved citizens, which included individuals ranging from Tom Vickers of the NAACP to local activists like Tom Wilson, a former member of the Albina Citizen's War on Poverty Committee. In addition, Schulze proposed that in March each neighborhood would have the opportunity to elect representatives to the Citizens' Planning Board (CPB), which would replace his original committee and assist him with the creation of Model Cities programs and policies.²⁵ On March 2, nearly 1,800 citizens from Albina turned out to

²³ Anti-PDC flyer, Portland New Left Vertical File, OHS Research Library, Portland.

²⁴ Abbott, *Portland*, 194.

²⁵ "Special Meeting Report: Model Cities Program," January 4, 1968, Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folder 4, OHS Research Library, Portland.

elect two individuals from each of the eight Albina neighborhoods to the sixteen-person CPB.²⁶ Then, between April and October of 1968, the CPB sent out weekly mailers across Albina to announce public working committees on topics ranging from housing and physical planning to health, education, and public safety.²⁷ On the one-year anniversary of the 1967 riots, the CPB even held a Model Cities rally in Irving Park to encourage citizen participation in the construction of education and neighborhood development plans.²⁸ As the residents of Albina increasingly found a voice in the CPB and working committees, Schulze happily reported to the *Oregonian* that the Model Cities program was finally engaging with the needs of Portland's black community and creating a new generation of black leadership within the city's government and urban planning apparatus.²⁹

Regardless of his increasing success with the Model Cities program within the black community, Reverend Schulze announced his resignation as director of the program in an interview with the *Oregonian* on October 29, 1968. In his departing interview, Schulze asserted that no one asked him to resign, but he stated, "I had the technical skills to do what has been done up to now. I don't feel I have the technical skills to put the thing together from here on out." While Schulze also expressed confidence that Mayor Schruck would eventually appoint an African American as director of Model Cities, he said that Albina residents "still feel that City Hall has been

²⁶ "Model Cities voter turnout of 1,781 picks 16 governing board members," *Oregonian*, March 3, 1968.

²⁷ See various CPB "Working Committee Flyers," Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folders 6 and 7, OHS Research Library, Portland.

²⁸ "Help Keep It Moving!" flyer, Stella Maris House Collection, box 13, folders 6, OHS Research Library, Portland.

²⁹ "Model Cities program chief claims Negro leadership emerging," *Oregonian*, July 11, 1968.

unresponsive to their needs," but that Mayor Schrunk was now "willing to deal" with these problems. Ultimately, Schulze noted, somewhat ominously, "Never again will key appointments be made without sufficient community advice. Important bridges have been built between the 'power structure' and the community, and I take pride in having been a part of that process."³⁰ While his ideas seemed reasonable at the time of his resignation, Schulze did not foresee the power struggle over Model Cities that would ensue over the next two years.

Following Schulze's resignation, the Model Cities program entered a period of uncertainty and instability as Mayor Schrunk and the PDC struggled to maintain the program's funding and find a permanent director of the program. On December 1, Kenneth Gervais, Assistant Director of the Urban Studies Center at PSC, became the temporary head of the program. Shortly thereafter, the program entered a period of crisis. When submitted to the city council on December 16, 1968, the *Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan* drafted by the Model Cities' CPB and the residents of Northeast Portland shocked and outraged the council members. The report specifically outlined the history of racial discrimination in Albina and targeted entities like the PDC for their destructive approach to urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s. Commissioner Francis Ivancie, who served Mayor Schrunk on the Planning Commission, was particularly appalled with the proposal, and he carefully edited the document to remove any reference to the word "ghetto" with regard to Albina.³¹ However, with the election of President Richard Nixon in November 1968, the City of Portland only had until January 20, 1969, to submit its final program proposal and gain federal approval before running out of

³⁰ "Schulze quits Model Cities post, cites lack of 'technical skills,'" *Oregonian*, October 29, 1968.

³¹ Abbott, *Portland, 194; History of Portland's African American Community*, 129.

funding under the Johnson administration. Consequently, the city council and the PDC found themselves pressed for time in resolving their differences with the Model Cities CPB and the PSC's Urban Studies Center.

Due to disagreements over Model Cities' data between city council members and the new leadership of the program at PSC's Urban Studies Center, Ira Keller delayed the vote on the proposal, and the city council announced it could not meet the deadline before the end of January.³² In the midst of the proposal and funding crisis, a rift developed between Keller and Professor Lyndon Musolf, head of the PSC's Urban Studies Center and Gervais' boss, after Keller accused Musolf and Gervais of "promoting dissidence and regional, local and racial jealousies" in the city to undermine the power of the PDC. Keller even went as far as to make a public demand for PSC Urban Studies Center President Gregory Wolfe to review the performance and necessity of Musolf and Gervais' "function" at the institute.³³ Ultimately, despite delays and concerns that the federal government under the Nixon administration might not continue to fund the project, HUD approved the Model Cities program proposal in February 1969 under the new direction of Chalmers Jones.³⁴ Still, the PDC and PSC had begun a two-year struggle to share control over the Model Cities program throughout much of 1969 and 1970. Despite the continued existence of the CPB, which the PDC now viewed as a threat to their control over planning in Northeast Portland, the voice of the citizens of Albina once again

³² "Councilmen disagree on Model Cities data," *Oregonian*, December 4, 1968; "Council can't meet Model Cities deadline, delays proposal's submission," *Oregonian*, January 3, 1969; "Portland Model Cities program to run out of funds in week," *Oregonian*, January 10, 1969; "Model Cities plan enters critical stage," *Oregonian*, January 12, 1969; Abbott, *Portland*, 195.

³³ "Studies Center under fire for Model Cities program," *Oregonian*, January 17, 1969.

³⁴ "Model City proposals approved," *Oregonian*, February 11, 1969.

became lost in the bureaucracy and power structure of the city as the district lacked a representative from the region to head the program.

The Early Years of Portland's Black Panther Party

The PDC's inability to steer the Model Cities program through a difficult transition or engage with the participation of Albina's black population on the meaningful level, like Reverend Paul Schulze had encouraged, resulted in yet another boiling point in the Albina district during the summer of 1969. In the early hours of June 14, violence once again erupted throughout the district after Portland police engaged and arrested large groups of black teenagers. What began as large groups of black youth congregating in isolated areas of Northeast Portland quickly escalated as police attempted to disperse the crowd. Exactly what caused things to get out of hand is unclear, but as police commanded loiterers to go home, blacks began attacking predominately white-owned businesses in the neighborhood, and within a few hours, the firebombing of businesses and clashes with police spread rapidly throughout the area.³⁵ For five days, scattered pockets of violence and structure fires engulfed parts of Northeast Portland as police struggled to put down rioters. Ultimately, on June 18, Portland police decided to withdraw their heavy patrol presence in the neighborhood to see if tempers would cool. As the police backed down, calm slowly returned in the area around the smoldering and wrecked shops and homes of the Albina district.³⁶

In the midst of the riots, the trajectory of urban planning and African American resistance to the PDC and the Model Cities program took an unexpected turn with the

³⁵ "Albina Violence Erupts," *Oregonian*, June 16, 1969.

³⁶ "Five blazes hit troubled Albina area," *Oregonian*, June 18, 1969.

seemingly innocuous arrest of one man on the final night of the riots in June 1969. In the dark, early morning hours of June 18, Kent Ford, a twenty-six-year-old bearded black man with an afro, was driving south down NE Union Avenue when a confrontation between police officers and a group of African American teenagers caught his attention. Curious, Ford stopped his car, walked over to see what was happening, and noticed one of the men sitting in the back of a police car while the police confronted the group of teens. From what he could see, the young men had been throwing dice in an empty restaurant parking lot. At that point, Ford made a quick and bold decision. He threw open the back door of the squad car and told the man inside to run. As the young man bolted, two officers, Stanley Harmon and Larry Kanzler, whirled around, tackled Ford, and arrested him as the group of young men cheered Ford's shocking action and shouted angrily at the police. As the police moved to handcuff Ford and force him into the back seat of the car, he quickly consumed some marijuana joints that he had in his possession, knowing that they would only give the police another criminal count with which to charge him. Outraged by his defiance, one of the officers threw the handcuffed Ford to the ground and proceeded to beat him mercilessly. Once thoroughly bloodied and subdued, Ford was taken to the police station downtown where he was charged with an attempt to "incite a riot."³⁷

This was not Ford's first arrest or confrontation with Portland police. Born in Louisiana in 1943, Ford's family moved to Richmond, California near Oakland in the

³⁷ This account comes primarily from two secondary sources, both of which are based on the authors' interviews with Kent Ford, as well as an account found in *The Militant*. Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves: The Portland Chapter of the Black Panther Party and the Local Media Response," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 111.3 (Fall 2010): 286; Clay Williams, "The Portland Black Panthers: Building the Local African-American Community from the Ground Up," BA thesis, University of Portland, 2008; "Portland Black Panther captain describes cop attack on ghetto," *The Militant*, August 1, 1969.

mid-1950s, where he went to high school and had few run-ins with the police. However, after graduating high school in 1961, Ford received a speeding ticket and spent three days in jail, which prompted him to leave the Bay Area and move north.³⁸ After moving to Portland, Ford kept a relatively clean police record, but starting around May 1968, Ford had been harassed, arrested, or cited by the police on numerous occasions for jaywalking, minor traffic violations including driving without license plate light, and possession of an unnamed illegal substance.³⁹ Prior to these series of arrests, Ford had founded the Portland branch of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), which later began to operate as the city's unofficial Black Panther Party before the organization gained full chapter status in 1969.⁴⁰ Clearly, Ford's growing role as a radical leader within the black community had earned him a reputation among the Portland Police Department, but these minor charges were just the beginning.

Following his release from Rocky Butte Jail a few days later on an \$80,000 bail, which was paid through large donations by local anti-Vietnam War activists and radical leftists, Ford emerged from the city police station to meet a small crowd of black and white supporters who had gathered to greet him upon his release. Standing on the steps of the city police station, Ford gave a brief yet eloquent declaration to a crowd. "If they keep coming in with these fascist tactics," Ford proclaimed, "we're going to defend ourselves."⁴¹ With these words, Ford renewed his mission to challenge the city's white

³⁸ Martha Gies, "A Father's Story," *Portland Monthly*, March 2005, 150.

³⁹ "Kent Ford Police Record," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 5, City of Portland Archives and Records Center (PARC), Portland.

⁴⁰ Interview with Kent Ford from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

power structure through radical resistance. By the end of the year, Ford's organization expanded quickly and received official charter membership from the BPP leadership in Oakland, giving birth to the Portland Black Panther Party.

In framing their vision for the future of the black community in Albina, the Black Panther Party of Portland operated in response to local issues as well as within the framework of the national *Ten-Point Platform and Program*. In particular, the Portland Panthers focused on the establishment of neighborhood social programs, such as medical clinics and a free children's breakfast program, as well as radical and often confrontational resistance to police brutality. However, due to the peculiar timing of the chapter's foundation, the Portland Panthers also operated with a distinct level of autonomy. Following the arrest and imprisonment of Huey Newton in 1967, the national BPP became somewhat fragmented as the leadership struggled to create a coherent national vision for the organization.⁴² During this period, new chapters continued to work with BPP headquarters in Oakland, but their goals often focused on local issues rather than a national platform. As a result, while the objectives of the Portland BPP, including social programs and opposition to police brutality, were similar to the national party, the tactics used to carry out these goals were distinctly local to Portland and shaped by the city's unique racial demographics. In particular, the Portland Panthers' localized vision for urban planning, while unspecific in its bureaucratic approach, was one that

⁴¹ This account comes from Martha Gies' interview with Kent Ford and published in her article, "We're going to defend ourselves," 286.

⁴² A large body of historical literature exists on the in-fighting and leadership fragmentation of the BPP under Bobby Seale, David Hilliard, and Eldridge Cleaver in the years after Newton's imprisonment. For more information, see Chapter 9: "The Trial of Huey Percy Hampton" and Chapter 10: "Dark Days, Bright Nights" of Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006); or Chapter 8: "Babylon" of Robert O. Self, *American Babylon.: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

started with community control in Albina and the improvement of socioeconomic conditions among black neighborhoods rather than capitalizing off the commercial potential of the land.

Despite the Panthers' popular reputation as being a radical, violent, and separatist organization, the group's primary objective in Portland was the establishment of community social programs that met the needs of the city's poor and neglected black population in Albina. This strategy was instrumental to the first point of the BPP's platform, which states, "We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community. We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny."⁴³ To this end, the Panther's first significant achievements between 1969 and 1970 centered on the formation of a free health clinic, dental clinic, and breakfast program for children. These programs, all of which were centered within the Albina district, carved out spaces of sanctuary for poor blacks against what the Panthers perceived as an unjust social and economic system by providing basic social necessities for breaking the cycle of poverty. During a visit with Panther leadership in Oakland in 1969, members of the BPP were particularly impressed with Ford's leadership and desire to expand the party in a city where the racial demographics did not initially favor the growth of a BPP chapter. Consequently, Ford's efforts aimed at improving the health and welfare of the black community in Albina ultimately earned his organization official chapter status.⁴⁴

⁴³ Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed January 9, 2012, <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bppp.html>.

⁴⁴ Interview with Kent Ford from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

For their first community program in Albina, Ford and the other early leadership of the Portland Panthers, including Tommy Mills, Sandra Ford, Percy and Patty Hampton, Floyd Cruze, Oscar Johnson, and Linda Thornton, focused their attention on the establishment of a children's free breakfast program. Beginning in the fall of 1969, the Panthers obtained the use of the dining room at the Highland United Church of Christ on NE Glisan Street and, shortly thereafter, began serving between 75 and 125 children every weekday from 7 am to 9 am.⁴⁵ For the Panthers, the breakfast program was an important element in breaking the cycle of poverty, unemployment, and lack of education among the black community in Albina. According to early brochures distributed by the NCCF:

They TELL US, you're hungry because you're poor . . . You're poor because you haven't got the best jobs . . . You can't get the best jobs because you're uneducated, and you're uneducated because you didn't learn in school because you weren't interested. And every time the teacher mentioned 5 apples or 6 bananas, your stomach growled. How can a person learn about remainders and quotients when his mind is concentrating on a very real and concrete problem?⁴⁶

From the perspective of the Panthers and many blacks in Albina, children whose parents could not afford basic food items were stuck in a self-fulfilling, perpetual, and vicious chain of poverty. Consequently, this cycle was one of the greatest obstacles facing their community and prevented any meaningful social and economic progress. Therefore, breaking this chain of poverty was central to any other significant neighborhood improvements. As the success and popularity of the program demonstrates, their efforts

⁴⁵ Interview with Kent Ford from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008; Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," *Reed Magazine*, Winter 2009, http://web.reed.edu/reed_magazine/winter2009/features/radical_treatment/index.html (accessed June 22, 2011), 2.

⁴⁶ "Breakfast for School Children Programs—NCCF," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

were remarkably beneficial to hundreds of young African Americans throughout the late 1960s and 1970s.

The second program that the Portland Panthers established was the health clinic. Technically, their health clinic began in a small building off N Union Avenue and Fargo Street in early 1968, well before the Portland Panthers had achieved chapter status, but the facility was entirely inadequate and lacked the necessary funds and volunteers to operate. However, following Ford's release from jail in 1969, Don Hamerquist, a white man who was a former member of the local Communist Party and had organized the fundraising for Ford's bail, approached the Panther leader with the name of an individual who could help: Jon Moscow. A former student at Reed College and also a writer for Portland's underground leftist newspaper—the *Willamette Bridge*—during the late 1960s, Moscow specialized in research on the Portland healthcare system and was well aware of the shortage of community clinics. By early 1970, Moscow, who like Hamerquist was white, had located an old doctor's office at 109 N Russell Street that would be perfect for the Panthers' clinic and filed the necessary permit paperwork to operate and solicit funds for the clinic.⁴⁷ Once the Panthers had the building, Jon Moscow, Kent Ford, and his wife, Sandra Ford, began looking for doctors who were willing to volunteer. They found, somewhat to their surprise, a number of white doctors, particularly those associated with the Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) in Portland, willing to both volunteer and help fund the clinic.⁴⁸ As a result, the Panthers were able to open their health clinic

⁴⁷ "Fred Hampton Memorial Clinic Application for Solicitation Permit," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

⁴⁸ Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," *Reed Magazine*, Winter 2009, http://web.reed.edu/reed_magazine/winter2009/features/radical_treatment/index.html (accessed June 22, 2011), 4-5; Interview with Percy Hampton from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

in early 1970, which they decided to name after Fred Hampton, the 21-year-old head of the Chicago chapter of the BPP who police had shot and killed while he slept in his bed during a raid on December 4, 1969.

Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the Fred Hampton Memorial Clinic became an integral part of the black community in Albina, especially among those who needed medical treatment but lacked health insurance. Once opened, the clinic operated with 27 volunteer doctors from across Portland—all of whom, with the exception of pathologist Bill Davis, were white—as well as a team of volunteer nurses and medical students. Open from 7 pm to 10 pm on weeknights, the clinic served roughly 25 to 50 patients every night and was willing to help any individual, regardless of skin color, who came to them for medical assistance.⁴⁹ In addition, the Portland Panthers, like many other Panther health clinics across the United States, distributed health brochures targeting African Americans and used the clinic as a way to raise awareness of specific medical conditions, notably high blood pressure, lead poisoning, and sickle-cell anemia, an illness that disproportionately affects people of Sub-Saharan African descent.⁵⁰

With the help of Moscow and his connections within OHSU and the Portland medical community, the Panthers also opened a dental clinic in 1970 located about a block away from their health clinic near the corner Vancouver Avenue and Russell Street.⁵¹ Like the health clinic, the Portland BPP named the dental clinic after another

⁴⁹ Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," 5.

⁵⁰ "Fast Facts about Sickle Cell Anemia," Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland; Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," 2. In addition, for more information on the BPP and their medical clinics in the United States, see Alondra Nelson, *Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight against Medical Discrimination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

fallen hero of the Black Power movement: Malcolm X. Once again, Moscow was able to convince Gerry Morrell, a white dentist and head of community outreach for the Multnomah Dental Society, to volunteer his time, expertise, and equipment in establishing the clinic. Moreover, Morrell successfully found other dentists who were willing to work in the clinic. Still, the short supply of funding and need for volunteers required that the Panthers themselves operate much of the day-to-day work in both clinics. Sandra Ford was particularly important in this effort, as she took on the role of receptionist and did all of the appointment scheduling for both the health and dental clinic.⁵² Ultimately, with the establishment of the Malcolm X Memorial Dental Clinic, numerous African Americans in Albina now had access to basic health and dental care who would otherwise have had none.

Although these programs clearly helped meet the previously neglected needs of the black population in Albina by providing spaces of social relief and community empowerment, the costs of these programs necessitated support from the people and businesses of Northeast Portland. According to Percy Hampton, the Portland circulation manager of the national *Black Panther Party* newspaper and a member on the board in charge of the clinics and breakfast programs, the Panthers were able to use the surplus funds from selling newspapers to help pay for their social programs. However, even at their peak distribution of 500-700 newspapers per week, these funds were nowhere near enough to cover operating costs.⁵³ As a result, the Panthers relied on donations from

⁵¹ Interview with Percy Hampton from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

⁵² Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," 5.

⁵³ Interview with Percy Hampton from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

businesses and local residents. In addition to receiving support from the volunteer doctors and dentists who worked in the clinics, Panther representatives, most frequently Linda Thornton, visited nearly every business in Albina with the hopes of raising funds and materials. According to police records, however, the tactics that Portland Panthers often used to elicit this funding and support walked a fine line between solicitation and extortion. In some cases, business owners gave willingly. For example, in February 1970, Kienow's grocery store proudly began providing the BPP with weekly food donations for their breakfast program.⁵⁴ However, according to police records, the Panthers also engaged in a typical pattern of veiled extortion against businesses that refused assistance:

A group of black subject approach a particular business with a female being the spokesman for the group. This group numbers four to six persons. While the female is engaged in conversation with the management of the business, the males mill around in a generally disruptive manner. If the demand for funds for the Program are not met, or if the persons soliciting the funds are put off or asked to come back at a later date, they attempt to set a firm time as a deadline for contributions. No direct threats are ever made, and as few names as possible with no introductions apparent other than the female solicitor, who usually identifies herself as one LINDA THORNTON.

Later that day, or the next day, an anonymous threatening phone call is then received with words used during the threat being generally to the same effect. 'You tell the man, or the manager, you're going to get bombed.'⁵⁵

The Panthers, however, were not the only ones who engaged in harassment. The police kept close records on which businesses were and were not willing to provide support to the Panthers.⁵⁶ In the case of those who offered money or food, the police verified that

⁵⁴ "Panther lauds grocer aid," *Oregon Journal*, February 17, 1970.

⁵⁵ "Officer's Report: RE: Black Panther Breakfast Program," September 11, 1970, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

the businesses were not being forcibly coerced, and, if the businesses were not, the police pressed them to withdraw their support. Moreover, the police also worked with the Public Solicitation Commission in late 1970 to take away the Panthers' solicitation permit over small technicalities involving the address of the Panthers' headquarters and their submission of paperwork.⁵⁷

In the Portland Panthers' most prominent clash with local businesses that refused to support them the Panthers launched a boycott of a McDonald's fast food restaurant located at the corner of NE Union Avenue and Fremont Avenue during the summer of 1970. According to Al Laviske, the general manager of six McDonald's in Portland, Ford and Thornton approached him in late June at the Union Avenue McDonald's and demanded three \$100 contributions to each of the BPP clinics and the children's breakfast program. Following Laviske's persistent refusals, the Portland Panthers began a boycott of the McDonald's in early August over the company's lack of support for social programs in the black community as well as national accusations against the company for racially discriminatory hiring practices.⁵⁸ Ultimately, on August 14, Judge Phillip J. Roth issued an injunction against the Panthers to halt the picketing after reports of damage to personal property and anonymous threats of violence against the business. The next day, however, Judge Robert E. Jones decided that the Panthers would be allowed to continue their boycott as long as they only engaged in "informational picketing."⁵⁹ As a result, in

⁵⁶ "Business Firms Contacted with Negative Results," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 2, PARC, Portland.

⁵⁷ "Panthers fail to seek permit to solicit funds," *Oregonian*, October 8, 1970.

⁵⁸ "Officer's Report: Info Trespass/Possible Extortion," August 12, 1970, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 2, PARC, Portland; Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 293.

addition to carrying boycott signs in the parking lot, the Panthers distributed flyers that attacked McDonald's for their unwillingness to support the breakfast program and clinics. Moreover, the flyer also questioned the police's frequent use of the building's parking lot as a meeting point for transferring arrestees, noting, "McDonald's is used as a base area for PIG attacks on the BLACK COMMUNITY!"⁶⁰ Consequently, although the Panthers complied with the court's orders, their rhetoric remained distinctly antagonistic.

Then, around two o'clock in the morning on August 22, a bomb exploded in front of the McDonald's building and shattered the glass window at the front of the store. Although no Black Panther was ever charged in the incident, both the *Oregonian* and the *Oregon Journal* immediately connected the incident to the Panthers' picketing.⁶¹ The next day, Laviske announced the temporary closure of the restaurant until the damage could be repaired, and the court eventually issued another injunction against the Panthers and their boycott. However, the court found insufficient evidence to charge the Portland BPP with the bombing or a lesser charge of extortion against Laviske. Ultimately, Laviske also backed down and came to an agreement with Ford to provide the Panthers' breakfast program with 50 pounds of meat and 500 cups every week.⁶² As a result, the most widely publicized conflict between the Portland Panthers and local businesses over the funding of their community programs came to a somewhat amicable conclusion.

⁵⁹ Early Deane, "Judge requires mutual concessions in McDonald picketing," *Oregonian*, August 16, 1970.

⁶⁰ "Boycott McDonald's!" flyer, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 2, PARC, Portland.

⁶¹ "Picketed hamburger stand here bombed," *Oregon Journal*, August 22, 1970; "Blast shatters glass at McDonald's," *Oregonian*, August 22, 1970.

⁶² "Firm to aid Panther project," *Oregonian*, September 19, 1970; Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 294.

The Portland BPP's campaign against police brutality and their opposition to police presence in Northeast Portland exemplify the organization's second major effort to defend Albina against the intrusions of what they viewed as a racist and undemocratic system of city governance. Like their social programs, this campaign was a nationwide element of the Black Panther Party and drew on "Point Seven" of their platform, which states, "We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUATILITY and MURDER of black people. We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality."⁶³ In pursuit of this point, the Portland Panthers worked to raise awareness of episodes of police brutality against blacks, and they pushed for the removal of police officers whom they considered racist as well as for laws that would allow them to patrol their own neighborhoods. By responding to both national instances of injustice, such as the imprisonment of Huey P. Newton, and local cases of police brutality, including the trials of Kent Ford and Albert Williams, the Portland BPP undertook a massive public relations campaign to defend Albina's black community and expand their political network.

The Portland Black Panther Party's first efforts to raise awareness of the abuse of power by the police centered on the national movement to free Huey P. Newton from prison. On October 28, 1967, Newton shot and killed Officer John Frey of the Oakland Police Department after Frey attempted to arrest Newton. During the arrest, the two men wrestled with each other, shots were fired, and both men were shot. Frey died shortly thereafter, but Newton escaped to a hospital where police later arrested him. Following a

⁶³ Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed January 9, 2012, <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bpps.html>.

trial filled with contradictory testimonies, a jury convicted Newton of voluntary manslaughter in September 1968 and sent him to prison. In addition to the questionable circumstances surrounding Newton's imprisonment, the eighth point of the Black Panther Party's platform explicitly demands, "freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails . . . because they have not received a fair and impartial trial."⁶⁴ As a result, across the country, supporters of the Black Panthers began the Free Huey Movement with the aim of releasing Newton from prison.

During their work as the NCCF and the early months of official Black Panther membership, Kent Ford, the Portland BPP, and other leftist Portlanders made the Free Huey Movement the first element of their campaign against police oppression. Throughout 1969 and 1970, the Portland BPP held rallies and distributed flyers about Newton throughout Portland, especially in the area on and around PSC—which, in order to reflect its full university status, was renamed Portland State University (PSU) later in 1969. In particular, on May 1, 1969 the NCCF, PSU Black Student Union, Portland branch of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and other groups held a rally in Portland as a part of a nationwide "Free Huey" day in cities across the United States. Flyers distributed at the demonstration contained a full list of the BPP's platform and described Newton as "a political prisoner of the racist power structure of this country . . . [and] the symbol of the movement for liberation."⁶⁵ One year later, in May 1970, the California Appellate Court released Newton from prison due to problems with the initial

⁶⁴ Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed January 9, 2012, <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bppp.html>.

⁶⁵ "May Day—Free Huey" flyer, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 5, PARC, Portland.

trial, and, following two more mistrials, the state abandoned efforts to convict him.

While the newly created Portland BPP celebrated the victory, their efforts quickly turned to more localized concerns of police brutality in their own community.

While the Free Huey Movement increased the Panthers' notoriety in Portland, the trial and acquittal of Kent Ford on the charge of "inciting a riot" from the June 1969, as well as his successful lawsuit against the Portland police, put the Panthers and their anti-police brutality campaign in the city's spotlight. Prior to the trial, Hamerquist put Ford in contact with Attorney Nick Chaivoe, who successfully challenged the police's narrative that Ford had encouraged violence against police officers on the morning of June 18. Following Ford's nine-day trial in early February 1970, a jury ultimately acquitted Ford of the trumped up charge of "inciting a riot." In addition, because the police had beaten Ford after they arrested and handcuffed him, Chaivoe also filed a civil suit against the Portland Police Department.⁶⁶ In the months following Ford's acquittal, police stepped up their confrontations with the Panthers, including a second arrest of Ford in June 1970, when police charged him with "disorderly conduct by abusive language" after he yelled at two police officers, one of whom was an African American and was allegedly called a "nigger pig" by Ford.⁶⁷ This time, the court handed Ford his first ever-criminal conviction and sentenced him to six months of probation.⁶⁸ Still, the ruling did not affect Ford's lawsuit against the police. That September, a federal district court judge awarded Ford \$6,000 for "the indignity that [Ford] suffered," and offered a warning that "it is time that the community realizes that the police are not authorized to inflict punishment at

⁶⁶ Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 296-297; Gies, "Radical Treatment," 1.

⁶⁷ "Panther bail sets record," *Oregonian*, June 9, 1970.

⁶⁸ "Panther leader found guilty," *Oregonian*, September 19, 1970.

their own discretion."⁶⁹ With the acquittal of Ford in February and the successful lawsuit by September, the Portland Panthers had struck their first blow against the brutal behavior and tactics of the Portland police.

The Panthers used Ford's acquittal and lawsuit as another opportunity to further their campaign against the Portland police and to create new devices of community control over Albina. As was the case with the foundation of their social programs, the Portland BPP was willing to work with local whites to spread their message. On February 14, the day after Ford's acquittal, a large group of demonstrators headed by the Portland BPP leadership marched north from the Southwest Park Blocks near the PSU campus to the U.S. Courthouse downtown in support of a ballot initiative that would grant "community control" over the policing of neighborhoods. A photograph of that demonstration, which appeared in the following day's *Oregonian* above an article titled "Black Panther Claims It's Ballots or Bullets," illustrates the Portland BPP's efforts to assert black leadership while simultaneously engaging white supporters in the city, particularly leftist activists from PSU. Taken as the procession moved north past SW Columbia Street, the image emphasizes both the primacy of black leadership among the Portland Panthers as well as their willingness to enlist whites as secondary supporters. Prominently out front in the photograph are roughly a dozen African Americans, many of whom were in the leadership of the Portland BPP, including Sandra Ford and Percy Hampton. More interesting, however, beyond the first three rows of demonstrators, the crowd consists entirely of white college-aged men and women. One white man, just off-center and a few rows behind the Panthers, even holds his clenched fist high in the air, a symbol widely recognized as the Black Power salute, as a sign of solidarity with BPP

⁶⁹ "Portland," *Berkeley Tribe*, September 11, 1970.

leadership. Likewise, both blacks and whites carry signs with slogans like, "Free the Panthers—Jail the Pigs" and "Community Control of Police NOW." But the sharp racial divide in the image clearly reveals an underlying sentiment of the importance of maintaining black leadership in a city where blacks lacked substantial numbers compared to other West Coast cities.⁷⁰

Rallying on the steps of the courthouse, Kent Ford called on the mixed audience of whites and blacks to intensify their efforts against the police, proclaiming, "the people are running out of energy for picketing and marching. . . . We've got to attack on other levels . . . time is running out. It's got to be power to the people." Likewise, 19 year-old Freddy Whitlow, another Panther and one of the petition's sponsors, informed the crowd that they needed 26,000 signatures to get on the ballot. "If we don't get the ballot," the *Oregonian* reported Whitlow saying, "it has to be the bullet."⁷¹ In other words, without community control of police, the Panthers believed, violent shootings between blacks and white police would undoubtedly continue. Although their ballot initiative fell well short of the necessary number of signatures, the demonstration ultimately helped increase the Portland BPP's visibility in early 1970 and brought public awareness to the issue of police violence in Albina. Moreover, it provided members of the African American community in Albina with the knowledge that there was an organization willing to meet force with force and that blacks did not have to suffer silently from the actions of racist police officers.

While the national protests against Newton's imprisonment as well as Ford's acquittal and subsequent lawsuit against the Portland Police Department both received

⁷⁰ "Black Panther claims it's ballots or bullets," *Oregonian*, February 15, 1970.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

attention within the city of Portland, the shooting, arrest, and trial of Albert Williams, a 19 year-old black teen from Albina, became the focal point for the Portland Panthers' campaign against police brutality by late 1970. On February 18, 1970, Williams, who was not a member of the BPP, was visiting the BPP headquarters at 3619 NE Union Avenue with Freddy Whitlow when a police car driven by Sgt. Stanley Harmon, the arresting officer in the Kent Ford case, pulled up next to the two young men and claimed they had a warrant for Williams' arrest. Williams ran into the Panthers headquarters, and the police pursued him. After grabbing a rifle, a brief but tense standoff ensued.⁷² Eyewitnesses, who were primarily Panther members, stated that Williams' gun accidentally discharged after the Panthers inside the headquarters convinced him to put his weapon down. The shot, however, prompted Harmon to fire two shots, which hit Williams in his right arm and liver and left him in critical condition.⁷³ Less than two weeks later, a grand jury acquitted Harmon of any wrongdoing, but following a slight delay due to an initial mistrial, a jury ultimately convicted Williams of assault on October 20, 1970.⁷⁴

A comparison of the literature distributed by the Portland Panthers and the local newspaper coverage of the Williams trial reveals the stark contrast between differing perceptions of the trial and the Portland BPP. The flyers and pamphlets that the Panthers published and handed out in Albina, on the PSU campus, and at rallies in front of the courthouse during the trial were unsurprisingly one-sided in favor of acquitting Williams and bringing charges against Stanley Harmon. On one early flyer, which was distributed

⁷² Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 297.

⁷³ "Railroad: Free Albert Williams!" Black Panther Party Police Records, Pamphlet, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 3, PARC, Portland.

⁷⁴ Steve Erickson, "Jury clears policeman," *Oregonian*, February 28, 1970; "Jury convicts Williams of assault in shooting," *Oregonian*, October 21, 1970.

in late June prior to the start of Williams' trial, the Panthers led with an crudely drawn image of a chubby white police officer, adorned with a swastika badge while clutching a riot baton in one hand and pointing a revolver in the face of the reader with his other hand. Underneath his boot lay Lady Justice, struggling to hold up the scales of justice as the police officer weighs her down. In addition, the flyer provided a brief summary of the suspicious shooting and arrest of Williams. Specifically, they noted the delay in the police's decision to take Williams to the hospital in addition to witness reports that Harmon joyously shouted, "I got him! I finally got him!" after he shot Williams. The flyer also offered a short description of the BPP and their campaign against police brutality, particularly efforts to have Officer Harmon transferred to another precinct, as well as a sharp criticism of the lack of African Americans serving in the police force.⁷⁵

As the trial gained more attention, the Panthers' flyers and pamphlets became more elaborate. Throughout the trial in early-to-mid October, the Panthers held rallies and distributed similar literature in support of Albert Williams and the Portland BPP, and they encouraged supporters to attend the trial. In a four-page pamphlet from early October, the Panthers continued their criticisms of the police's handling of Williams' wounds, the behavior of Harmon in the incident, and the persistence of police violence towards the African American community in general. Moreover, the pamphlet also provided a page of accusations of a systematic attack on the Black Panther Party in Portland and throughout the United States, while another page outlined their social

⁷⁵ "Come See About Albert" flyer, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 3, PARC, Portland.

programs, clinic addresses, hours of operation, and where to send donations.⁷⁶ As a result, the distribution of these flyers and pamphlets served multiple purposes for the Portland Panthers. On the one hand, the Portland BPP was able to continue raising public awareness of police behavior in Albina. On another, more practical, hand, this literature also helped increase the Panthers' public visibility, particularly their community social programs and the city, state, and federal governments' efforts to subvert those programs.

Media portrayals of the Williams trial tended to be far less favorable towards both Williams and the Black Panther Party. Both in their depictions of Williams and their descriptions of events, newspapers tended to favor the narrative put forward by the police while subtly attacking the aims of the Portland BPP and the character of its members. The *Oregonian*, which provided the most extensive media coverage of the trial, consistently reiterated that the shooting took place at the BPP headquarters but neglected to mention that Williams was not actually a Panther. Moreover, especially towards the end of the trial, the *Oregonian* emphasized Williams' use of Seconal, a barbiturate, and his history as a drug user.⁷⁷ Likewise, in their coverage of the trial, the newspaper tended to lead with police accounts of events as fact while portraying the Panther narrative as unsubstantiated claims. For example, when Harmon testified on October 15, Steve Erickson of the *Oregonian* opened with: "Albert Williams yelled, 'Harmon, I'm gonna to kill you' before firing a shot at a Portland police patrolman in Black Panther headquarters last February."⁷⁸ In contrast, when Williams took the stand the next day, the Erickson

⁷⁶ "Railroad: Free Albert Williams!" Black Panther Party Police Records, Pamphlet, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 3, PARC, Portland.

⁷⁷ Janet Goetze, "Panther claims gunshot wounds caused his rifle to discharge," *Oregonian*, July 4, 1970; Steve Erickson, "Final Williams trial witness tells barbiturate effect," *Oregonian*, October 17, 1970.

⁷⁸ Steve Erickson, "Shooting in Panther headquarters described," *Oregonian*, October 15, 1970.

began, "A teen-aged youth charged with trying to kill a Portland patrolman last February testified Thursday that the officer had often threatened him."⁷⁹ In both of these articles, Erickson began by labeling Williams as the aggressor who attempted to kill Harmon, and he frontloaded the articles with a clear anti-Williams narrative. While this is only one example, popular media coverage of the trial, particularly in the *Oregonian*, was overwhelmingly one-sided and tended to favor an anti-Panther narrative that labeled Williams, who the paper conveniently neglected to mention in every article was not a Black Panther, as a cop killer and drug user.⁸⁰

In the first year and a half of their existence, the Portland Black Panther Party's establishment of community social programs and their anti-police brutality campaign, both of which sought to reclaim spaces for blacks in Albina, provided a more radical vision for Albina than any black civil rights organization in Portland had previously imagined. Rooted in the national BPP's *Ten-Point Program and Platform*, the Portland Panthers localized the national party's goals to fit the needs and issues surrounding neighborhood development in Northeast Portland. Through the children's free breakfast program, the Fred Hampton Memorial Health Clinic, and the Malcolm X Memorial Dental Clinic, the Panthers' offered the poor members of Albina's black community places where they could begin to break the cycle of poverty that had been an historical legacy of the city's discrimination and neglect. Similarly, their campaign to stop police violence against and gain local control over neighborhoods in Albina through highly publicized trials was successful in increasing the Panthers' public visibility and support.

⁷⁹ Steve Erickson, "Threats by patrolman claimed in Williams shooting trial," *Oregonian*, October 16, 1970.

⁸⁰ For a more detailed analysis of media portrayals and framings of the Williams trial, see Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 297-300.

Despite negative attention from the popular media, the existence of the Portland BPP was widely known throughout Portland by the end of 1970, and the organization had established a defensive position against what they viewed to be an evil and corrupt power structure within the city's government.

During the latter half of the 1960s through 1970, Northeast Portland was divided into two increasingly polarizing visions for the future of the Albina district. On the one hand, Mayor Terry Schrunk, Ira Keller, and the PDC envisioned a top-down policy of urban renewal that sought to revive blighted neighborhoods and to increase the value and livability of the city through the policies of urban planners. On the other hand, grassroots resistance to the PDC's vision of the Model Cities program represented an opposing view with varying degrees. While many within the African American community, though wary of the PDC's history of destruction and neglect, were willing to engage with the Model Cities program by participating in the Citizen Planning Board, others were not so willing. Instead, many younger African Americans in their teens and twenties who had grown up knowing nothing but the damaging legacy of urban renewal were more skeptical of the City and willing to embrace radical tactics to defend what they perceived to be threats to the black community. Acting as the face of this extreme opposition, the Portland Black Panther Party emerged in 1969 and 1970 as a fighting antithesis to the city's power structure. Their adversarial vision for Albina's development began at the grassroots level by attempting to address socioeconomic conditions and regain community control over neighborhoods. As a result, the BPP carved out social spaces of sanctuary within Albina, and attempted to combat discrimination and police brutality in

their neighborhood. These efforts, however, were just the beginning. As the 1970s progressed, the Portland Panthers would help spearhead the fight against the PDC's most damaging urban renewal proposal of the 1970s—the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project.

CHAPTER IV

LOSING THE BATTLE:

EMANUEL HOSPITAL, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FALL OF THE PORTLAND PANTHERS, 1970-1973

In the fall of 1970, the City of Portland's Model Cities program was still in the midst of searching for a permanent program director to replace Reverend Paul Schulze. After sifting through numerous applications, one individual stood out: Charles Jordan. Born in Longview, Texas, and raised in Palm Springs, California, Jordan was by all measures the definition of a well-rounded candidate. After graduating from high school in 1956, several schools offered Jordan scholarships to play basketball. At 6-foot-7, he had been an all-star in a variety of sports at Palm Springs High School and had the potential to be a dominant athlete for numerous universities on the basketball court. Ultimately, however, Jordan decided to attend Gonzaga University in eastern Washington, where he earned Bachelor of Science degrees in the fields of Education, Sociology, and Philosophy in 1961. During the 1960s, Jordan also served two years as an officer in the U.S. Army and later completed some graduate work in Education and Public Administration at various universities in the Los Angeles area before working in various administrative posts with the City of Palm Springs. By every measure, Jordan was an incredible applicant. But there was one specific thing his application neglected to mention—he was black.

In response to growing anger and increasing radical resistance among blacks to the PDC and Model Cities by 1970, Mayor Schrunk had recruited Jordan to apply for the position. Although the mayor knew who Jordan was, most of the twenty-seven members of the CPB in charge of selecting the new head had no idea he was an African American. Many of the council's older white members were actually shocked to discover that a black man had such an impressive résumé when he arrived for his first interview. Nevertheless, the council was excited by the prospect of having such a highly qualified African American in charge of the project, which they assumed would please the city's discontented and distrustful black population.

African Americans in Portland saw things a bit differently. Many, including members of the more radical and militant organizations like the Black Panther Party and a smaller yet somewhat independent offshoot of the Panthers known as the Black Berets, were not keen on the idea of the city government bringing in an outsider when there were plenty of qualified African Americans in positions of leadership already in the city. Just prior to Jordan's final interview with the citizens' board, Black Berets—under the leadership of R.L. Anderson, a large, stern-faced man with penchant for confrontation—challenged Jordan on his way into the interview and made it clear that they were not just looking for "a man with a black face" to head the program. Instead, they wanted someone who would defend the interests of their community. After the interview, when Jordan had left the room and the board had closed the doors to discuss his candidacy, Anderson and his small group of cadres kicked in the door, shouted at the members of the board, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the selection process. Anderson, in particular, demanded that the board hire someone who already lived in Portland.

Terrified of Anderson, many of the board's members fled the room without listening, leading the Black Berets to leave the building frustrated and unsatisfied with the board's decisions.¹

Ultimately, Charles Jordan was selected as the new head of Portland's Model Cities program in late 1970, a position that he held until 1973. During that period, the leadership of the Model Cities program worked harder to incorporate the voice of the black community in city politics and urban planning than any of the City of Portland's previous urban renewal projects. In fact, R.L. Anderson, the man who once confronted Jordan, eventually became one of his greatest supporters and, for a time, was even a valuable member of the program. The city's political leadership, however, still refused to give in or compromise on some of their most profitable plans. In particular, the PDC reserved its most contentious project from the jurisdiction and oversight of the Model Cities program: the renovation and expansion of the Emanuel Hospital.

This project, which chose to demolish hundreds of African American homes and businesses in the Eliot neighborhood without their input, became the focal point of the Portland Black Panther Party's battle against the city government, the police, and the PDC. But the Portland Panther's were no match for the goliath-like strength of the PDC and Portland's political leadership. In the end, the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project, along with a concentrated effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local law enforcement, undermined and destroyed the Portland BPP by the late 1970s and, in doing so, brought an end to the city's most prominent radical voice within Albina's black community. But even as the Panthers and their vision of neighborhood planning

¹ *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 131.

that emphasized community control and socioeconomic uplift were in the midst of decline, so too was the PDC's monopoly over urban renewal projects. Out of the demise of these two extreme visions, a new, broadly based, moderate middle path emerged through Model Cities that would influence the shape of citizen participation in city politics and urban planning policies since the 1970s.

Even as Portland's African American community was increasingly able to find its voice in the city's political and urban planning process through the Model Cities program, the city government and the PDC continued to find political loopholes when the desires of blacks in Albina clashed with the City of Portland's vision and economic plans for the region. Nowhere was this sentiment clearer than with the PDC's decision to remove the highly unpopular Emanuel Hospital renovation and expansion from oversight of the Model Cities program in order to bypass the will of the black community in Northeast Portland. In order to remain technologically state-of-the-art and large enough to meet the needs of Portland's growing population, city planners and hospital executives had been looking to expand the hospital's campus, located in the heart of the Eliot neighborhood just north of the Rose Quarter in the Albina district, since the proposed Central Albina Plan in 1962.² With the creation of the Model Cities program, proponents of expansion saw a new opportunity to develop the hospital. In 1967, the PDC proposed the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project as a component of the Model Cities program (See Appendix C: Figure 4.1). Under the condition that Emanuel Hospital and the PDC compensate displaced individuals for their property and that the two entities work closely

² *History of Portland's African American Community*, 138.

with the local community, the CPB approved the project early in the summer of 1968. Over the next two years, the hospital completed a new medical building as well as an extended care facility and had plans for further expansions to the medical buildings, including a large lecture hall, a senior citizen's residence, employee apartments, a laundry facility, and expanded parking.³ As a result, by the time of Charles Jordan's arrival in Portland in late 1970, the project was already well underway.

Shortly after becoming director of the Model Cities program, Jordan received a letter from HUD informing him that they would terminate funding for Model Cities unless the program demonstrated a clear direction with regard to planning and resolved internal conflicts with the PDC, including a dispute over whether or not to continue the Emanuel Hospital expansion. As a result, during his first months as program director, Jordan carefully navigated between the PDC and the CPB, its working committees, and Northeast Portland's black community. Following numerous public meetings and discussions with the residents of Albina, Jordan and the CPB looked for ways to make Model Cities work better for the community and drafted a number of specific planning proposals and revisions.⁴ In particular, the CPB's *Comprehensive Development Plan for the Model Cities District* from 1971, which was the product of Jordan's early months of leadership, noted that since the early proposals for the Emanuel Hospital expansion in 1966 and 1967, the social and political environment of the Eliot neighborhood had changed sharply in opposition to the hospital. "Many people, particularly the elderly,

³ Portland Development Commission, "Timetable," Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, folder 1, PARC, Portland; Portland Development Commission, *Final Project Report Application for Loan and Grant: Emanuel Hospital Project*, Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, PARC, Portland

⁴ "Citizen critics note lack of benefits from Model Cities programs funds," *Oregonian*, March 28, 1971; *History of Portland's African American Community*, 131-132.

want to remain," the report stated, "Rehabilitation and rebuilding of the Eliot neighborhood for residential purposes is consistent with a broad community goal of improving the variety and quality of housing opportunities."⁵ Consequently, Jordan, the CPB, and the citizens of the Eliot neighborhood and Northeast Portland encouraged the PDC to significantly alter or abandon the hospital renovation.

The PDC, however, had already invested too much in the Emanuel Hospital project and was not about to throw away almost four years of investments. Therefore, in an attempt to resolve the conflicts within the Model Cities program that were blocking the approval of funding, the PDC quietly removed the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project from the Model Cities program during a vote at a session of the CPB. Despite growing opposition to the project within the Eliot neighborhood and throughout Albina, the CPB's quick and somewhat misleading vote during one sparsely attended public meeting, which few people in the community knew about in advance, reserved the project from the Model Cities planning. In doing so, the PDC made the hospital expansion its own separate project outside of the CPB and black community's control.⁶ However, with the cooperation of several other organizations, including the Emanuel Displaced Persons Association, the Model Cities CPB pressured the PDC and Emanuel Hospital to work closely with residents of the Eliot neighborhood. Specifically, in April 1971, the CPB signed an agreement with the PDC, Emanuel Hospital, and various local organizations aimed at resolving and preventing problems stemming from displacement, including

⁵ Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 195.

⁶ Abbott, *Portland*, 195-196; *History of Portland's African American Community*, 138.

increased poverty and homelessness.⁷ Still, the overall treatment of the displaced, many of whom were undercompensated or simply denied benefits to save city and federal funds, as well as the PDC's ongoing disconnect with the residents of Albina throughout the early 1970s continued to build tensions between the city government and the neighborhoods of Northeast Portland.⁸

Despite the continuation of the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project, the Model Cities program under the Jordan's two years of leadership became a productive and ultimately beneficial endeavor for many of Albina's neighborhoods. With the formation of the Neighborhood Development Plan (NDP) by the CPB in 1970, the citizens of Northeast Portland completed numerous neighborhood improvement projects under Jordan's guidance. Through the use of Model Cities federal loans and grants, city workers and local citizens planted more than 600 trees, expanded local parks by seven acres, improved five miles of streets that had fallen below standards, and rehabilitated nearly 2,000 housing units—especially in the area around Emanuel Hospital in order to accommodate displaced residents. In addition, each of the eight neighborhoods developed their own specific policy plans for community revitalization and planning through the NDP, but the city government and the PDC never adopted any of these plans.⁹

As Jordan and the CPB backed away from the PDC-dominated vision for Model Cities in the early 1970s and increased their focus on community revitalization, some black radicals gradually became more open to the community-led efforts of the program.

⁷ "Model Cities due for 'Second Action Year,'" *Oregonian*, April 6, 1971.

⁸ *History of Portland's African American Community*, 139-140.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 132-133.

However, the integration of ex-radicals into the fold came neither easily nor with widespread approval of the city or federal government. After becoming involved in the Model Cities program as the chair of law and justice committee, R.L. Anderson worked with the city's Police Bureau Community Relations Program to ensure closer communication and involvement between the neighborhoods of Albina and the Portland Police Department.¹⁰ A few months later, on February 18, 1971, Anderson was elected to a short and troublesome tenure as treasurer of the Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee (PMSC).¹¹ Established by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the late 1960s as a part of President Johnson's War on Poverty, the PMSC acted as the OEO's policy formation and implementation body for Portland. However, shortly after joining the committee, Anderson became a divisive political figure and a major source of controversy for the committee's future. With his background as the leader of the Black Berets, an organization that he dissolved before seeking the position as the PMSC's treasurer, the local media, specifically the *Oregonian* and the *Oregon Journal*, portrayed Anderson as a "black militant." Moreover, his criminal record, which included recent arrests and convictions for "assault with a deadly weapon" and "illegal possession of an firearm," as well as a long history of other charges, created problems for Anderson.¹² Most importantly, the OEO required that all members on the committee secure surety bonding in the amount of \$25,000, but the OEO's regular bonding company refused to back Anderson because of his criminal background. Without Anderson's bonding as

¹⁰ Robert Olmos, "Model Cities aid threatens to blow whistle on police shift," *Oregonian*, March 31, 1971.

¹¹ "Black militant wins OEO post," *Oregon Journal*, February 18, 1971; "Former 'Black Beret' leader takes OEO treasurer post," *Oregonian*, March 3, 1971.

¹² "Panel officer found guilty," *Oregonian*, February 27, 1971.

treasurer, the PMSC would not have access its \$6.2 million of annual federal poverty funds.¹³ Ultimately, Anderson's inability to secure the bond led him to resign on March 31, less than two months after his election to treasurer, in order free up federal funds for the PMSC.¹⁴

While many blacks in Northeast Portland, including radical activists, began to engage the city's political leadership and urban planning apparatus to enact reforms through the Model Cities' CPB, other radical elements of the black community, like the Black Panthers, continued to publicly criticize planning projects in Albina and push for neighborhood programs focusing on socioeconomic problems. The Panthers' public presence served as a constant reminder to the PDC and the rest of the city government of the perilous alternatives to ignoring the voice of the black community, especially after the riots of Northeast Portland in the summers of 1967 and 1969. Since the organization's emergence in late 1969, the Portland BPP had resisted the Model Cities program, which they viewed as yet another example of the city's costly and devastating urban renewal projects in Northeast Portland. Small numbers of Panthers attended early Model Cities meetings and sessions of the citizens' board, handing out literature that railed against the behavior of the city government, the police, and the PDC. On one particular single-page goldenrod flyer distributed at a public meeting in September 1969, the Panthers exclaimed, "once again the police department and city government have disregarded the rights and the will of the people." Likening the social, economic, and spatial

¹³ "Bonding key to job for black militant," *Oregon Journal*, March 22, 1971; "Steering panel hits snag on surety bond," *Oregonian*, March 21, 1971; "Anderson resignation frees city's anti-poverty money," *Oregonian*, April 1, 1971.

¹⁴ "Anderson resigns as committee treasurer," *Oregonian*, March 31, 1971; "Anderson resignation frees city's anti-poverty money," *Oregonian*, April 1, 1971.

discrimination of African Americans in Albina to a slave plantation, they encouraged blacks to refuse to participate in the program, stating, "The people of Albina have no business showing up at these meetings, because when you're on a slave plantation there's only the slaves and the masters and they know who the slaves are."¹⁵ While the Panther's refusal to engage with Model Cities was not universal among all or even a majority of the Albina's black residents, the existence and persistence of their organization exemplified an extreme end of the continuum of anger towards the city government and PDC. Still, with the growing representation and power of neighborhood activists in Model Cities, the Panthers also represented an increasingly isolated and fading vision for the future of community politics in Albina.

By the early 1970s, Jordan's leadership had won over much of the African American community, but the PDC's decision to withhold the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project from Model Cities gave the Portland BPP a specific high profile target on which to focus their attacks against the city's frequently undemocratic urban planning process. Shortly after the decision to isolate the Emanuel Hospital expansion from Model Cities in mid-1971, Kent Ford and the Panthers turned their focus to gaining employment for poor blacks in the project or stopping the renewal project altogether. In an interview with the *Portland Community College Bridge*, Ford explained, "I would like to see the people downtown stop trying to make a political thing out of everything. I'd like to like to see them really come down to the community level . . . so that [their projects] are

¹⁵ Black Panther Party anti-Model Cities flyer, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Portland Branch Records, box 16, folder 16, University of Oregon Library, Eugene.

meaningful for the people they should be serving."¹⁶ To Ford and other Panthers, the Emanuel Hospital project represented a continuation of the very ideology and policies that had destroyed much of their community since the 1950s and contributed to more than a century of social, economic, and spatial discrimination.

In response to the PDC's continuation of the Emanuel Hospital renovations, a coalition of black community activists, including militant leaders like Kent Ford and members of mainstream groups like the NAACP and Urban League, organized the Black Community Survival Committee in May 1972. The group's primary purpose was to hold a large rally in Irving Park during the summer of 1972 to raise public awareness of the project's detrimental impact on Northeast Portland and to demonstrate the community's united opposition. On the weekend of July 1 and 2, the group held a two-day rally in Irving Park called the Black Community Survival Conference, complete with live music, guest speakers, free food, and tests for sickle-cell anemia. Speakers included Tom Wilson, a veteran of the Model Cities program who was running for state representative, radical leaders like Kent Ford and R.L. Anderson, local ministers like Reverend Sam Johnson, various welfare and health clinic organizers, and faculty members and students from PSU.¹⁷ According to police reports, by Sunday afternoon, roughly 600 to 800 people had gathered in the park, leading to new concerns among the police that the event could quickly get out of hand.¹⁸

¹⁶ Bill Hedlund, "Panther leader tells of group goals," *Portland Community College Bridge*, December 9, 1971.

¹⁷ "Black Community Survival Conference Program," Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

¹⁸ "Black Community Survival Conference Intelligence Report," July 2, 1972, Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

Frightened by the memory of the riot sparked in Irving Park five years earlier, the police heavily monitored the progress of the Black Community Survival Conference in the days and weeks leading up to, during, and after the rally. In late May, the Portland police began a close surveillance of Tom Wilson and his home, where the rally's planners met, as well as Kent Ford and R.L. Anderson. In effect, police suspected that the rally could serve as a launching point for a movement to elect "radical" politicians or endorse "radical activities" in Northeast Portland. According to a report filed by Deputy Chief Robert Steele, the police initially speculated the event would "attempt to drift away from the BLACK PANTHER PARTY philosophies to a new [ideology] which will be a political power movement."¹⁹ The supposed nature of this "new" political philosophy is unclear from police reports; however, later reports from late June further emphasized the previous assumptions by the police about Panther motives, stating, "KENT FORD'S activities will be an attempt to use this meeting to sway feelings against the police and to keep the police out of the black community."²⁰ As a result, patrolling officers were instructed to maintain an active yet covert presence in Irving Park during the rally. However, with no major incidences to report over the two days and the crowd dwindling to fewer than forty people by late Sunday night, most of whom were involved in cleanup, police realized that their fears of riots and violence had been overstated.²¹

¹⁹ "Black Community Survival Conference Intelligence Report," May 25, 1972, Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

²⁰ "Black Community Survival Conference Intelligence Report," June 29, 1972, Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

²¹ "Black Community Survival Conference Intelligence Report," July 2, 1972, Black Community Survival Committee Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

The following year, the Panthers and other members of the black community stepped up their efforts to block the continuation of the project by organizing a picket line outside of Emanuel Hospital on March 21, 1973. Although the Black Community Survival Committee had ceased to exist in name by the end of the summer in 1972, the loose network of individuals and organizations opposed to the Emanuel Hospital project persisted, this time under the name of The Left Out Ones, Inc.—a reference to the predominately black population displaced by the project. Led by local activist Nate Proby with the support of Wilson and Ford, the group attacked the Emanuel Hospital project for its unwillingness to hire and train members of the local community for new construction and hospital jobs. In addition, they chastised the hospital and PDC leadership for their broken promises in funding the construction of new low-income housing for the displaced. In the week leading up to the demonstration, supporters posted and distributed flyers demanding that Emanuel Hospital develop, "in cooperation with various community groups, a plan to recruit minority students for their school for nurses." Likewise, they proclaimed the hospital "needs to keep the promises it has made to the community it has so drastically changed and to the people it has removed from their homes."²² Without the substantive inclusion of African Americans in the project, they believed, the Emanuel Hospital expansion would be nothing more than yet another destructive urban renewal plan for the people of Albina.

On the morning of the demonstration, roughly forty individuals, including Ford and other members of the BPP, gathered outside of Emanuel Hospital forming a picket line and expressing their opposition to the implementation of the project. Carrying signs

²² "Emanuel Breaks Promises," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 4, PARC, Portland.

reading, "Emanuel has no respect for Black and Poor People," and "STOP the Destruction Until You Hire Black People," protesters voiced their demands for jobs at the hospital and an end to the demolition of their homes and businesses. Intricately connecting the opportunity for jobs within their own community to the legacy of poverty, displacement, and discrimination, the demonstrators made it clear to Emanuel Hospital and the PDC that they saw this urban renewal project as another element in the perpetual cycle of poverty and discrimination in Northeast Portland.

Police patrolled the area around the hospital to ensure that everything was under control. But if the police expected violence, they were disappointed. The crowd in front of Emanuel picketed peacefully for hours and then adjourned in the late afternoon.²³ Despite their efforts to gain the public's attention, however, the combined resources and strategies of the Portland Panthers along with other black leadership and organizations ultimately had no effect in stopping the removal and destruction of black people's homes and businesses at the expense of the hospital's expansion.

That same spring, the expansion project struck a serious blow to the Portland Panthers use of space in Albina for social programs, particularly the Fred Hampton Memorial Health Clinic. When the Panthers first leased the building on Russell Avenue in 1969, they were well aware that the city planned to demolish the building for Emanuel Hospital.²⁴ Regardless of this fact, Ford and the Panthers selected the building for two reasons. First, it was an inexpensive location and the hospital and the PDC had assured

²³ "Inter-Office Memorandum: Demonstrations—Picketing, Emanuel Hospital," March 21, 1973, Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 5, PARC, Portland.

²⁴ "Parcel No. RS-4-7," Emanuel Hospital Property Identifications, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 2, folder 5, PARC, Portland.

them that they would be given time to vacate the premises when, and if, the building was to be destroyed. Second, and most importantly, by selecting a location within the expansion zone, the Panthers were once again expressing their defiance against the city's power structure and defending their vision for the black community's use of space.

When, in 1971, Emanuel Hospital and the PDC notified the BPP that they had to move their clinic, the Panthers agreed, but they demanded the same compensation that everyone else in the area had received. After a long period of intense negotiations, the PDC and the Panthers came to an agreement in 1973, when the PDC offered the Panthers a nearby building on Williams Avenue where they could operate, rent free, for five years.²⁵

Shortly after reaching an agreement with the BPP, the PDC filed a notice for immediate eviction from the Russell Avenue building and forced the Panthers to relocate the clinic by May 1, 1973. The Panthers felt duped. They described the new building as "just a shell, four walls and a roof that leaks. The only thing inside is a wall down the middle."²⁶ Moreover, the BPP quickly realized that, despite insinuations that the PDC would help cover the cost of some renovations, city planners claimed that the hospital project had no money to spare. Feeling that they had been tricked, the BPP posted a notice in the window of the clinic describing the PDC's deception and encouraging the community to protest Emanuel Hospital and the PDC's behavior. "We want Emanuel to live up to its responsibilities in this community," the Panthers' flyer contended. "After all, we do aid Emanuel in treating people who are unable to pay for medical attention."²⁷

²⁵ "Fred Hampton Medical Health Clinic," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 5, PARC, Portland.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

After months of trying to find a way to keep the clinic, Ford arrived at the clinic on the morning of May 1 with a moving truck and boxes only to find that the Multnomah County Sheriff and officials from the PDC were already there. They had broken into the clinic and were forcibly removing medical supplies, files, and equipment. During the process, the PDC and police ruined more than \$1,000 worth of vaccines and other medicines that required refrigeration. Outraged, Kent Ford shouted at Benjamin C. Webb, the PDC relocation chief who was at the scene. But the damage had been done. After loading the truck with their belongings, Ford drove away with a feeling of devastation and defeat. Although the Panthers eventually began to operate the clinic at their new location, the loss of their previously existing offices and medical supplies made it difficult for them to rebuild and renovate the new clinic from scratch or operate at the level they had prior to eviction.²⁸

Furthermore, after losing their clinic in 1973, the FBI and the Portland police engaged in what can only be described as a covert war to subvert and destroy the Portland Black Panther Party during the 1970s. On a national scale, the FBI, under the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover and his successors, sought to eradicate the BPP through a system of surveillance, infiltration, subversion, and cooptation known as the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Hoover viewed the BPP and similar radical and New Left organizations as subversive threats to the United States' national security. According to Hoover, the BPP was "the most violence-prone of all the extremist groups," and they needed to be eliminated in order to protect the social and political stability of the United States. Specifically concerned that BPP chapters were brainwashing and

²⁸ Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves: The Portland Chapter of the Black Panther Party and the Local Media Response," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 111.3 (Fall 2010): 290.

indoctrinating young and poor blacks in their local communities, he described programs like the free children's breakfast and health clinics as the most dangerous and subversive element of the Panthers on American society.²⁹ Even though the Portland BPP was small in comparison to other branches of the organization, the FBI targeted it along with all other chapters. In a 2008 interview, Kent Ford noted that whenever the leadership of local chapters met one another, they always had bizarre experiences to share about the FBI. "Each chapter in the United States . . . had one thing in common," Ford recalled, "we all had the same stories about the COINTELPRO operations."³⁰ In the late 1970s, when many FBI documents and memos on COINTELPRO became public, Bill Keller of the *Oregonian* revealed the extent of the FBI's actions in Portland. According to Keller, throughout 1970 and 1971, the FBI sent anonymous letters to doctors and dentists throughout Portland attempting to dissuade them from volunteering at or providing medical resources to the Panthers' clinics, much like the Portland police had done in 1969 and 1970 with local businesses that had supported the breakfast program. Likewise, they attempted to work with a few local doctors to convince the Multnomah County Medical Society to set up rival clinics in Albina to compete with the health and dental clinics, but these plans never developed or gained support.³¹

In addition to the FBI's efforts to subvert and co-opt the Portland Panthers' clinics, the FBI and Portland police kept detailed files and close surveillance on the Portland Panther leadership, most notably Kent Ford and Percy Hampton. FBI agents and

²⁹ Dolores Barclay, "Black Panthers prowl the streets no more," *Oregonian*, October 11, 1983.

³⁰ Interview with Kent Ford from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

³¹ Bill Keller, "Portland said 1970 target of FBI anti-Panther effort," *Oregonian*, February 26, 1978.

investigators sat outside the homes of Panthers, harassed their friends, families, and employers, and infiltrated their meetings. Even group members with no criminal history became the targets of surveillance.³² Percy Hampton, who along with his sister, Patty Hampton, was one of the Portland BPP's earliest and most involved members, stated that on multiple occasions two white men in suits and ties had come to the home of his mother and asked her, "Do you know that your children are involved in the Black Panther Party? You need to protect them from this because they're headed in the wrong direction." Furthermore, according to Hampton, after framing their argument against the Panthers in terms of the organization being a danger to her children, the officers then attempted to get whatever information about the Portland BPP that they could gather from his mother.³³

In another instance, Oscar Johnson, who had a clean police record and served as assistant to the organization's administrator of information, Floyd Cruze, recalled two members of the FBI coming to his place of work and trying to get him fired from his job. Then, one day, after returning home from work, he saw two white men in suits sitting in a car outside of his home. Slightly annoyed, he approached the vehicle. According to Johnson, "I knocked on the window and said, 'Hey, you guys want anything?' And the guys just drove off. . . . I wasn't doing anything illegal; I just wanted to help my community." They later approached him on several occasions and offered to take him to lunch, where they attempted to get information about the Portland BPP and offered him a

³² Interview with Kent Ford, Percy Hampton, Oscar Johnson, and Gary Clay from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

³³ Interview with Percy Hampton from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

job as an inside informant.³⁴ Ultimately, as Ford, Hampton, Johnson, and other members of the organization noted, the daily run-ins with the FBI and the police during the early 1970s made it difficult to go about their busy schedules of running the breakfast program, selling newspapers, operating the clinics, and working at whatever jobs they had to earn enough money to get by financially.³⁵

Meanwhile, at the same time as the Emanuel Hospital project and the FBI's COINTELPRO efforts of the early 1970s, the national Black Panther Party centered in Oakland was in the midst of infighting and decline.³⁶ Even as early as 1971, BPP chapters across the country began experiencing a sharp drop off in membership numbers from the previous year, and chapters in New York City, New Orleans, Seattle, and a few other major cities seemingly disappeared overnight as the headquarters in Oakland turned their attention to local politics. That same year, the Justice Department estimated that there were only 1,000 registered members of the Black Panther Party nationally, down from the roughly 2,000 to 5,000 members in the late 1960s.³⁷ After being imprisoned for four years for his supposed involvement in the riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago during the summer of 1968, BPP co-founder Bobby Seale was released from prison in 1973. That year, he launched an unsuccessful campaign for

³⁴ Interview with Oscar Johnson from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

³⁵ Interview with Kent Ford, Percy Hampton, Oscar Johnson, and Gary Clay from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

³⁶ The details of the ideological disputes within the national BPP are the source of significant debate among many historians and are too complex and detailed to explore in depth here. For example, see Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006); Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, eds., *In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); and Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

³⁷ "Serious ideological disputes threaten future of Black Panther Party," *Oregonian*, March 1, 1971.

Mayor of Oakland, only to have a major dispute with Huey Newton that resulted in a fight and Seale's resignation from the BPP. Shortly thereafter, in 1974, Newton fled to Cuba following his release in a criminal case concerning the murder of a prostitute. He did not return until 1977, when he was put on trial again for two counts of assault. Likewise, Eldridge Cleaver fled to Algeria to avoid criminal charges stemming from the assault of a police officer in 1968, but he returned in 1975 following a religious conversion and pled guilty to the charges against him.³⁸ In Newton, Seale, and Cleaver's absence, Elaine Brown became the first woman chair of the BPP in 1973, and she switched the party's focus from national resistance to community development and local electoral politics in Oakland. In doing so, Brown fundamentally helped shift the scope and national reach of the organization to focus more on local issues rather than a national agenda.³⁹ As a result, many branches of the BPP, like the Portland Panthers, continued to persist, but they did so with diminishing influence and increasingly smaller numbers. By 1980, when the few remaining Portland BPP members officially disbanded their fledgling organization and closed their last remaining clinic, the national Black Panther Party was practically nonexistent.⁴⁰

Following the failure to stop the expansion of Emanuel Hospital, the eviction and loss of the Fred Hampton Memorial Clinic, and the intensive efforts by the FBI and local law enforcement to crush the organization, the decline of the Portland Black Panther Party after 1973 was unavoidable. In a city where the demographics had never favored

³⁸ Dolores Barclay, "Black Panthers prowl the streets no more," *Oregonian*, October 11, 1983.

³⁹ See Chapter 8: "Babylon" of Self, *American Babylon*.

⁴⁰ Dolores Barclay, "Black Panthers prowl the streets no more," *Oregonian*, October 11, 1983; Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 291.

the emergence of a BPP chapter to begin with, the Portland BPP became increasingly irrelevant to the Albina district's voice in urban politics and city planning. After 1973, the Portland Panther's visibility further declined as the local newspapers abruptly ceased all coverage of the organization due to lack of major news and public interest.⁴¹ However, although their public presence disappeared rapidly, Ford and other Panthers continued to find ways to operate the free children's breakfast program and clinics, both of which ultimately transitioned to new leadership. Local public schools became more involved with providing free breakfast programs to economically disadvantaged students, while the OHSU took up the mantle of the Panthers and continued providing free health and dental clinics to people without health insurance in Northeast Portland.⁴² Ultimately, Portland's small and relatively short-lived yet active Black Panther Party, which stood as a radical, forceful antithesis to the PDC's vision for Albina, slipped silently into irrelevance and obscurity.

In the end, it would seem that the efforts by the federal government, along with the city's own power structure, defeated the Black Panther Party in Portland. Not only were the Portland Panthers unsuccessful in halting the expansion of Emanuel Hospital in the Eliot neighborhood, but that very same expansion project ultimately destroyed one of the Portland Panther's most valuable spaces: the Fred Hampton Memorial Health Clinic. Moreover, intensive efforts by the FBI and Portland police subverted the organization. Still, while the Portland BPP may have lost their battle with the FBI, the Portland police,

⁴¹ Boykoff and Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves," 291.

⁴² Interview with Percy Hampton from "Portland Black Panther Party," KBOO Community Radio, Portland, February 24, 2008.

and the PDC, the war they fought and many of the ideas they stood for did not cease with their decline. With the arrival of Charles Jordan as head of the Model Cities program, African Americans began to have a greater voice and involvement in city politics and urban planning than they had ever had before. Even as the BPP's size and influence deteriorated sharply in Portland after 1973, a much more powerful alternative that appealed to many Portlanders was rising in its place. Although the Panthers were gone, their vision of a community-led approach to politics, urban development, and social programs would sweep into every corner of the city by the mid-1970s, tear down the city's old political power structure, and usher in an entire new generation of political leadership that has defined Portland for decades.

CHAPTER V

WINNING THE WAR?

THE TRIUMPH OF COMMUNITY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF BLACK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN PORTLAND, 1970-1979

On the evening of Tuesday, May 23, 1972, Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt, a charming thirty-one year-old man with a bright, partially gap-toothed smile and slightly receding head of light curly hair became the 45th Mayor of Portland, the city's youngest mayor in more than one-hundred years, and the youngest mayor of a major US city at the time. Capturing 57 percent of the vote in a field of fifteen candidates in the primary election, Goldschmidt's overwhelming majority clinched the election and ensured that a runoff election in November would not take place.¹ Born and raised in Eugene, Oregon, Goldschmidt graduated from the University of Oregon with a degree in Political Science in 1963. Shortly thereafter, he traveled to the South during the summer of 1964, where he volunteered to work as part of the Mississippi Freedom Project registering black voters. After briefly returning to Oregon to recruit more students to assist in voter registration efforts, Goldschmidt enrolled at the University of California, Berkeley Law School. Earning his degree in 1967, Goldschmidt worked as a legal aid until his election to Portland City Council at the age of thirty.² A lifelong advocate of civil rights and community activism, Goldschmidt quickly emerged at the front of a growing generation

¹ John Painter, Jr., "Goldschmidt takes top city post: New mayor tallies 57% of total vote," *Oregonian*, May 24, 1972.

² Jewell Lansing, *Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-2001* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2003), 397.

of new, younger political leadership in Portland. During his almost seven-year tenure as Mayor of Portland between 1973 and 1979, Goldschmidt restructured the city government, specifically with regard to urban planning, transportation, and police, as he attempted to resolve the issues of neighborhood disinvestment and unrest that emerged from Portland's political leadership in the 1950s and 1960s.

Combined with the previous emergence of black community leadership during Model Cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Goldschmidt's emphasis on opening avenues for community control over planning and development helped the African American community in Albina direct the future of their neighborhoods. Furthermore, this period also witnessed the emergence of black electoral power on the state and local level as African Americans became state senators and city council members for the first time in Portland's history. Although political leaders and community activists in the 1970s attempted to address the same legacies of social, political, economic, and spatial discrimination that organizations like the Black Panther Party had sought to improve, a decade of opportunities and advancements for some blacks did not easily wash away the stain of the long history of inequity and exclusion. For as many successes as African Americans achieved under Neil Goldschmidt's mayorship, issues of socioeconomic inequality, education, and misguided planning projects—even those carried out under black leadership—continued to plague the black community in Northeast Portland.

Neil Goldschmidt and the Triumph of Community Politics

Beginning with the Albina district of Northeast Portland during the early Model Cities period of the mid-to-late 1960s, neighborhood activist organizations began to

spring up all over the city by the early 1970s to challenge what historian Carl Abbott described as the PDC's "ingrained disdain of accountability to the majority of citizens."³ As a direct reaction to the Model Cities program and local Albina residents' success in gaining control over the direction of that program, neighborhood organizations emerged quickly in Southeast and Northwest Portland by 1969 in response to proposed urban renewal and freeway construction plans by the PDC.⁴ Capitalizing off this rapidly expanding neighborhood movement, Neil Goldschmidt, a former community organizer himself, was able to build a coalition of neighborhood activists throughout the city. Under the leadership of Goldschmidt, at first as a city commissioner and later as mayor, Portland entered a new era of neighborhood-led urban planning that focused on restructuring the city government's urban planning hierarchy, developing solutions to the city's growing transportation concerns, and reorganizing the City's Police Department.

A former lawyer, advocate for youth programs, and head of the Albina Legal Aid office specializing in employment and housing discrimination cases, Goldschmidt was first overwhelmingly elected to the Portland City Council in 1970, where he served as a commissioner from 1971 to 1973. Prior to his arrival, older politicians and elite members of Portland's business community had dominated the city council, which had continued to operate as a council of commissioners selected under an at-large voting process since the early 1900s. After joining the council on January 1, 1971, Goldschmidt became the youngest person ever to serve as a city commissioner, and boldly told members of the

³ Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 176.

⁴ Abbott, *Portland*, 196-197.

media, "I'm not cut from the same mold as some members of the council 10 years ago."⁵ During his tenure on the council, Goldschmidt became a champion of neighborhood activists and an opponent of the PDC's negligent policies. Between 1971 and 1972, Goldschmidt became to only council member to vote against large, community opposed urban renewal projects south of downtown, in Southeast Portland along the Willamette River, as well as in the Buckman and Lair Hill neighborhoods.⁶ With his reputation as the voice of community organizations, Goldschmidt pushed for greater influence within the City of Portland's urban planning power structure. In February 1972, after careful lobbying, Goldschmidt successfully convinced Mayor Schrunk to move the Model Cities program under his jurisdiction of human resources and antipoverty programs in order to improve coordination, program management, and use of funds.⁷

Furthermore, on March 5, two weeks of receiving control over Model Cities, Goldschmidt announced his candidacy for Mayor of Portland in front of a crowd of more than 800 supporters at the Westminster Presbyterian Church. Promising that he was willing to "speak out, to treat no community problem as too small or insignificant to dignify a personal response, to help citizens to help me do the job they want done," Goldschmidt immediately struck a chord with neighborhood activists and who had become increasingly disillusioned with city politics and the PDC's urban planning.⁸ Shortly thereafter, Mayor Schrunk announced that, due to declining health, he would retire at the end of the year rather than seek an unprecedented fifth term as Portland's

⁵ Steve Erickson, "Neil Goldschmidt: I'm not cut from the same mold as some members of the council . . .," *Oregonian*, January 3, 1971.

⁶ Abbott, *Portland*, 176.

⁷ "Model Cities authority goes to Goldschmidt," *Oregonian*, February 15, 1972.

⁸ "Goldschmidt enters mayor's race," *Oregonian*, March 6, 1972.

mayor. As a result, Portlanders would undoubtedly have to elect their first new mayor since 1956. The election of a new mayor also meant the possibility of a new vision for urban planning. The following month, after fifteen other Portlanders declared their candidacy, Schrunk endorsed sixty-one year-old retired industrialist and favorite of Portland's business community, R.W. DeWesse, to be his successor.⁹ Goldschmidt, however, appealed to a rapidly emerging electorate of civic activists. On Sunday, May 7, the *Oregonian* publicly endorsed Goldschmidt for mayor, stating that he was "understanding and empathetic with the problems of youth, the poor, [and] the minorities, among whom he worked for several years." Moreover, joining with the growing chorus of civic activists throughout Portland, especially in Albina, the newspapers' editors noted his support among local inner-city communities, stating, "Upgrading the neighborhoods and removal of the barriers between people and their governments have priority in Goldschmidt's plans—and he is a planner, both for his city and his future."¹⁰

Despite spending more money than any other candidate, having the support of Portland's business community, and being endorsed by Mayor Schrunk, R.W. DeWesse only managed to garner roughly one-third of the total votes, while Neil Goldschmidt rode his community activist coalition to a comfortable electoral victory and the highest position of power in the city.¹¹ In addition to winning 460 of the city's 500 precincts, Goldschmidt won a near-unanimous victory in downtown and all of the surrounding neighborhoods, including Albina and greater Northeast Portland.¹² With this strong

⁹ Abbott, *Portland*, 175.

¹⁰ "Neil Goldschmidt for Portland's mayor," *Oregonian*, May 7, 1972.

¹¹ John Painter, Jr., "Goldschmidt takes top city post: New mayor tallies 57% of total vote," *Oregonian*, May 24, 1972.

mandate among core residents of the city, Goldschmidt embarked on an almost decade-long process of revolutionizing Portland's urban planning power structure and city governance.

During his first term as mayor, Goldschmidt focused his attention on a number of issues confronting the future of the city, but three areas in particular stand out. First, and most important, Goldschmidt set about reforming the City's high-minded though often misguided urban planning apparatus that had almost entirely excluded the voices of Portland's residents. In particular, he sought a new urban planning hierarchy that would focus on downtown revitalization and start at the grassroots with neighborhood organizations. Second, closely related to his vision for urban planning and the revival of downtown, Goldschmidt addressed Portland's infrastructure and transportation needs in an effort to create a city that was centered less on automobiles and suburbs and more on public transportation and the city's core. When combined, these two goals helped initiate several of the most successful community revolts against proposed freeway constructions anywhere in the country. Finally, addressing a specific concern among many neighborhoods like Albina, he made changes within the Portland Police Department to make the organization more accountable to the public and work more closely with local communities.

The primary focus of Goldschmidt's first term as Mayor of Portland was reconfiguring the city government's urban planning structure. After Mayor Schunk's assumption of power in the mid-1950s, the PDC eclipsed other disparate agencies like HAP, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Bureau. In consolidating power, the PDC had essentially dominated the direction and focus of all urban planning in Portland

¹² Abbott, *Portland*, 175.

for nearly a decade and a half. However, immediately after becoming mayor, Goldschmidt reorganized the council's control over planning bureaus and requested the resignation of the leadership of the PDC, HAP, and Planning Commission.¹³ Then, following a weekend retreat with city council members and local planners in April 1973, Goldschmidt laid out a working proposal for a new Office of Planning and Development (OPD) to oversee all other branches of urban planning.¹⁴ The OPD, an umbrella agency that Goldschmidt had supported since he was a commissioner, consolidated and reapportioned power among all of the city's previous existing planning and development branches and lessened the PDC's previous unchecked power. All of these agencies had to have their planning and development plans reviewed and approved by the OPD, which was given the task of making sure plans were compatible with local neighborhood organizations as well as general citywide plans. In addition to creating the OPD, Goldschmidt reorganized the Planning Commission into a reorganized Bureau of Planning with the task of creating urban development plans that the PDC would then carry out. Goldschmidt also carefully stacked both the OPD and Planning Bureau's leadership with political allies and neighborhood activists that had propelled him into office, thereby effectively limiting the PDC's power from above and below.¹⁵

Closely connected to issues of urban planning and citizen participation, the second major area of focus of Goldschmidt's plans for reshaping Portland involved changes to the city's infrastructure and public transportation. Drawing on concerns over

¹³ "Development Commission member quits," *Oregonian*, January 5, 1973.

¹⁴ Abbott, *Portland*, 167-169; Jewel Lansing, *Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-2001* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2003), 400.

¹⁵ Abbott, *Portland*, 177-179.

increased traffic, air pollution, suburban sprawl, and neighborhood destruction during freeway construction, Goldschmidt favored improving and expanding public transportation in order to preserve neighborhoods while also attracting commerce downtown. In theory, he believed preventing the expansion of freeways would slow the development of Portland suburbs by inflating housing prices and increase the necessity of making the city's core livable.¹⁶ In a June 1973 interview on NBC's *Meet the Press* with mayors attending the US Conference of Mayors as well as panelists from national newspapers, Goldschmidt explained his efforts to revive inner city housing, businesses, and public transportation as well as his unwillingness to expand freeways and the suburbs. Attacking Goldschmidt's vision for a less automobile-centered future for Portland, conservative columnist Robert Novak of the *Chicago Sun-Times* inquired, "Has there been the experience that if you don't build new freeways, the old freeways just get more and more crowded and you can't force the people off the freeways by not building them?" "Yes," Goldschmidt responded, "they will get crowded, our current freeway system, if we don't build new ones, unless we develop an incentive for people to be on another system and to make it convenient to do so."¹⁷ As incentives, Goldschmidt sought more affordable public transportation, including a fare-free zone downtown for Portland's Tri-Met bus system and an expansion of service routes. Moreover, he proposed a gas tax as a source of state revenue as well as a disincentive for using automobiles.¹⁸

¹⁶ Abbott, *Portland*, 180.

¹⁷ Interview with Neil Goldschmidt by Robert Novak, *Meet the Press*, National Broadcasting Company, San Francisco, June 17, 1973.

¹⁸ "Goldschmidt lists priorities for solving Portland's problems," *Oregonian*, January 28, 1973; Huntly Collins, "Goldschmidt and Ivancie: 'Poles apart' may be too narrow a distinction," *Oregonian*, April 12, 1976.

Though frequently challenged by his conservative rivals on the city council, particularly Commissioner Francis Ivancie, Goldschmidt's restructuring of the city's urban planning apparatus to include community input as well as his efforts to take infrastructure and transportation in a radically new direction led to three of the most significant and successful citizen movements in the United States by the mid-1970s. First, in 1968, the City of Portland created the Southeast Uplift program, which local community members of southeast neighborhoods initially proposed based on some of the perceived early success of the Model Cities program in Albina. After gaining approval from the city council, however, the PDC once again became the lead planning and policy development branch of the program. Following the lead of black citizens in Northeast Portland, the predominately-white population in Southeast Portland organized quickly and applied pressure on the city government and the PDC during the early months of the program to help direct future projects.¹⁹ In particular, the planned construction of the Mt. Hood Freeway through Southeast Portland over the objections of local residents triggered an angry backlash in the early 1970s. The proposed five-mile route, which the state and the PDC initiated plans for in 1955, would have destroyed more than 1700 homes and apartments, affecting six distinct neighborhoods.²⁰ Responding to the desires of the southeastern neighborhoods, Goldschmidt and the city council voted four-to-one to abandon the proposed highway in 1974. Instead, the council diverted previously

¹⁹ Abbott, *Portland*, 196-197.

²⁰ Carl Abbott, *Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific Northwest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 89.

earmarked funds for the project toward public transportation and the installation of a mass transit light rail line, known as MAX, along the preexisting I-84 route.²¹

At the same time that citizens in Southeast Portland were challenging the Mt. Hood Freeway, citizens of Northwest Portland were locked in a similar struggle over the construction of a new Interstate route, I-505. Local organizers in the Northwest District Association (NWDA), formed by the PDC in May 1969, quickly followed the lead of Model Cities and Southeast Uplift organizers, took control of the organization, and spent much of their first two years attempting to alter the proposed route along lines that best suited local neighborhoods. However, following a suspect and misleading environmental impact study by the state highway department, the NWDA and other groups in Northwest Portland sued to stop construction of the interstate route in 1971. After a drawn out litigation process, the city council abandoned the proposed I-505 route in May 1974, much as they had with the Mt. Hood Freeway, and similarly shifted the funds toward public transportation.²²

Finally, also in 1974, the push towards the a revitalization of Portland's core along with the creation of a less automobile-centric city culminated in the dismantling of Harbor Drive along the west side of the Willamette River near downtown to construct a waterfront park. Under the leadership of the mayor and Governor Tom McCall, who shared much of Goldschmidt's visions for downtown revitalization and citizen participation, the state reclaimed the land after more than a century of debate over proper access and ownership. Like the rejection of the Mt. Hood Freeway and I-505, the destruction of Harbor Drive and the creation of Tom McCall Waterfront Park further

²¹ Lansing, *Portland*, 405-406.

²² Abbott, *Portland*, 197-198.

emphasized Goldschmidt's commitment to making a livable inner city, stopping suburban sprawl, and finding new opportunities to expand public transportation. In response to this decision, in 1975—well before the opening of the first portion of the park in 1978—the Environmental Protection Agency labeled Portland, perhaps a bit prematurely, as the "most livable" city in America. In turn, this sentiment began to build Portland's modern reputation as a city with commitments to community activism, public transportation, and environmental protection.²³

In addition to addressing issues of urban planning, community development, and transportation, Goldschmidt focused on a third issue that had long been important to many African American activists, including the Portland Black Panther Party, during the late 1960s and early 1970s: the Portland Police Department. Recognizing the legacy of confrontations between white police officers and young African Americans in Portland and other major US cities throughout the late 1960s, he placed a greater emphasis on addressing social conditions in communities with higher crime rates rather than funneling more money into an inefficient centralized police system. After receiving control of Model Cities as commissioner in 1972, Goldschmidt received criticisms from HUD over the ineffectiveness of the program's Police Community Relations branch. While he defended the overall work of the Model Cities program, Goldschmidt recognized shortcomings within the program and the Portland Police Department in particular.²⁴

Shortly thereafter, the mayor-elect announced intentions to make changes within the

²³ Lansing, *Portland*, 406-407. For more detailed information on neighborhood organizations and the Mt. Hood Freeway in Southeast Portland, I-505 in Northwest Portland, and the dismantling of Harbor Drive, see Chapters Three and Four of Eliot Fackler, "Protesting Portland's Freeways: Highway Engineering and Citizen Activism in the Interstate Era," (MA thesis, University of Oregon, 2009).

²⁴ "Goldschmidt defends Model Cities work," *Oregonian*, August 31, 1972.

department. In his first year as mayor, he started at the very top with the resignation of Police Chief Donald McNamara in August 1973. Following a major reorganization that year, including the dissolution of the Police Community Relations unit in favor of a decentralized self-investigation system that responded to local residents, Goldschmidt hoped that the newly structured department would reduce crime and work closely with the needs of neighborhoods.²⁵ Although his approach drew criticisms from within the police department, Bruce Baker, Goldschmidt's newly appointed chief of police, noted that crime progressively decreased throughout the mid-1970s. Between 1974 and 1975 alone, robbery and burglary rates dipped four percent, while automobile theft dropped off by more than ten percent.²⁶

In the same 1973 interview on *Meet the Press* where he challenged Goldschmidt's transportation policy, Robert Novak also testily commented on Goldschmidt's stance on police. "You not only don't like freeways," Novak snidely remarked, "you don't like too many policemen either. . . . How do you account for your theory that you are going to fight crime by not adding policemen?" In response, Goldschmidt emphasized that his platform was not "against policemen," noted that data collected by the city showed that 60 percent of burglaries in Portland were committed by individuals under the age of eighteen, and suggested that funds spent on expanding police might be put to better use in education or delinquency prevention programs.²⁷ Ignoring Goldschmidt's response, Novak shifted his tactic, bluntly stating, "Mayor Goldschmidt, you have a very, very

²⁵ "Mayor-elect to take over police," *Oregonian*, December 21, 1972; "Mayor outlines future of Police Bureau," *Oregonian*, February 25, 1973; "Goldschmidt plans to appoint new police chief by fall," *Oregonian*, August 3, 1973.

²⁶ Huntly Collins, "Change has been Goldschmidt's forte," *Oregonian*, April 19, 1976.

²⁷ Interview with Neil Goldschmidt by Robert Novak, *Meet the Press*, National Broadcasting Company, San Francisco, June 17, 1973.

small black population in Portland. Would you perhaps suggest that in cities where there are racial tensions that your ideas about the police not being all that helpful in combating crime might not be as applicable?" Goldschmidt paused and was momentarily surprised that Novak had boldly broken all guise of subtly coding racialized language on the issue of law and order. "I don't think it is a racial issue," Goldschmidt replied coolly; "I feel very strongly that the City of Portland shouldn't be in a position of following the mistakes that other communities have made. I think we can learn some lessons in other communities, and I think we can—by the work we are trying to do now—help some other communities as well."²⁸ Sensing Novak was about to launch into a lengthy debate with Goldschmidt, moderator Bill Monroe of NBC turned the focus to another panelist and mayor, but the exchange reflected Goldschmidt's firm commitment to creating a social environment and police force that would foster a healthier relationship between city government and local communities.

Throughout his first term as Mayor of Portland, Goldschmidt also took direct action to root out corruption within the police force. Following a series of thefts by a reservist police officer, James Wesley Liming, in 1975, Goldschmidt criticized the police for lack of supervision, pushed for greater cooperation between officers, and called for less "isolation on the beat." Moreover, when the subsequent investigation revealed that a number of police had been receiving gifts from Liming and lying to investigators, Goldschmidt personally dismissed the officers from the police force.²⁹ Ultimately, Goldschmidt was uncompromising in his belief that an effective Portland Police

²⁸ Interview with Neil Goldschmidt by Robert Novak, *Meet the Press*, National Broadcasting Company, San Francisco, June 17, 1973.

²⁹ "Mayor criticizes police supervision," *Oregonian*, May 20, 1975; "Board backs Goldschmidt police firing," *Oregonian*, July 22, 1975.

Department was only useful in as much as it was trusted by and honest with the communities it sought to serve and protect.

By the end of his first term in 1976, Goldschmidt continued to hold the support neighborhood activists, and his successful efforts to revitalize downtown housing and commerce had won him favor among wealthier, more conservative neighborhoods that had opposed him in 1972. As a result, when Commissioner Francis Ivancie, a conservative with the support of the police unions, some local businesses, and former allies of Terry Schruck, challenged him for mayor in the 1976 election, Goldschmidt easily won the majority of voters in the May primary. Once again avoiding a general election runoff in November, Goldschmidt was elected to a second term with a strong public consensus.³⁰ Ivancie, the former protégé of Mayor Schruck and planning commissioner on the city council from 1967 to 1972, had run a confident campaign on a platform that assumed most Portlanders were not pleased with Goldschmidt's radical restructuring of Portland politics. His resounding defeat sent a signal to other critics that Goldschmidt's vision for the city's future, not the old PDC-centered approach, had broad public support. With the backing of neighborhood organizations and a strong mandate to pursue his transformative approach to city governance, Goldschmidt continued his community-centered, restructured approach to urban planning throughout the late 1970s until his departure in 1979.

³⁰ "Mayor warns police of hazards in political arena," *Oregonian*, February 10, 1976; Huntly Collins, "Goldschmidt, Ivancie clash from freeways to finance," *Oregonian*, April 12, 1976; Huntly Collins, "Goldschmidt stays in mayor's job," *Oregonian*, May 27, 1976; Abbott, *Portland*, 180-181.

African Americans and Portland Politics in the 1970s

During the period of Goldschmidt's leadership throughout the 1970s, African Americans in Portland made their greatest gains in the field of politics, urban planning, and community development during the twentieth century. A longtime advocate of civil rights, Mayor Goldschmidt was a vocal proponent for addressing the issues of Portland's black community. "We have serious racial problems in Portland," Goldschmidt told Early Deane of the *Oregonian*. "There are people who suffer from discrimination all the time. It's contaminating, contagious. In the city government, we must learn to be the peace-making faction."³¹ As a result, Goldschmidt, more than any of Portland's mayors before or since, did more to encourage and increase the presence of African Americans in city politics and urban planning. In particular, the ascendance of Charles Jordan, Executive Director of Model Cities, to the city council marked a significant turning point for black political representation. However, while blacks genuinely found a growing voice within city politics for the first time, a decade of increased representation and community involvement did not and could not erase the legacy of discrimination and spatial exclusion.

Although widely supported by neighborhood organizations throughout Portland, including Albina, many black leaders, particularly in the PMSC, were still initially hesitant or resistant to trust Goldschmidt and his proposed plans. Immediately after being given control of Model Cities in 1972, Commissioner Goldschmidt proposed consolidating organizations like the Model Cities CPB and the PMSC into a single Bureau of Human Resources. Though committed to promoting antipoverty programs and a community-centered focus to urban planning, he argued for a centralized, streamlined

³¹ Early Deane, "Goldschmidt committed to bettering city," *Oregonian*, September 25, 1977.

approach under a new bureau to improve efficiency. Cleveland Gilcrease, Executive Director of the PMSC, viciously attacked the proposal as an attempt to strip the PMSC of its power, emasculate the poor, and institutionalize community action rather than allowing for the development of grassroots movements. While a portion of the black community in Albina agreed with Gilcrease, others were more receptive. After some initial concerns and discussions with the mayor-elect, Charles Jordan along with the leadership of the Model Cities CPB came out in support of the new bureau and consolidation by late August. Still concerned with the allocation of poverty funds as well as the eventual execution and leadership of the Bureau of Human Resources, Jordan and community leaders in Model Cities believed the new bureau would give them a permanent voice within the city's power structure.³²

Likewise, while Portland's neighborhood activists frequently praised Goldschmidt's policies on police, the black community in Albina also expressed concerns with new policies and a perceived lack of action in some cases. For example, during the 1976 campaign, Goldschmidt proposed easing regulations on shotguns for the police department, a move that drew sharp criticisms from both African Americans concerned with the long history of police brutality and police seeking even greater firearm deregulations.³³ Seizing on an opportunity to divide Goldschmidt from African American supporters in Albina, far left mayoral candidate Cliff Walker further capitalized on the issue to accuse Goldschmidt of not investigating the deaths of five

³² Bill Keller, "Metropolitan Steering Committee leery of Goldschmidt plan," *Oregonian*, May 7, 1972; Peter Morgan, "PMSC charges Goldschmidt plan emasculates poor," *Oregonian*, August 24, 1972.

³³ "Portland police shotgun rule eased: 'Appropriate tool needed,'" *Oregonian*, January 3, 1976; Huntly Collins, "Change has been Goldschmidt's forte," April 19, 1976.

African Americans during a police altercation a few months prior.³⁴ Nevertheless, the majority of the black population in Albina still voted overwhelmingly to reelect Goldschmidt in the 1976 primary, namely because of his commitment to giving African Americans a voice in Portland's political arena.

Despite reservations and concerns held by many African Americans, Mayor Goldschmidt took major steps to increase the presence of Portland's black community in politics. In a move that would have opened up the first opportunity to strengthen the political power of the Albina district, he supported revising the city charter and the makeup of the city council to be more representative of local neighborhoods. Under a plan proposed in 1973, Goldschmidt advocated a restructuring of the charter that had existed since 1903 by offering a merger between the City of Portland and the greater surrounding area of Multnomah County.³⁵ Had the consolidation charter passed, it would have significantly strengthened the power of the mayor. Moreover, replacing the entirely at-large election of city council members, a new eleven-member council would have been established, with eight of the members elected by local districts and three other commissioners elected at-large. For the first time in the history of Portland, African Americans had a significant chance of having a consistent voice on the city council through district elections. However, through the combined opposition of conservative commissioners Ivancie and Mildred Schwab, businesses and the Chamber of Commerce, as well as police and fire unions—all of whom portrayed the move as a power grab by the

³⁴ Huntly Collins, "Seven mayoral candidates cover all points," *Oregonian*, April 22, 1976.

³⁵ "Goldschmidt speaks in favor of consolidation," *Oregonian*, February 22, 1973.

new mayor—the proposed Portland-Multnomah County consolidation charter failed in the 1974 primary election by a margin of 71 percent to 29 percent.³⁶

While the defeat of the consolidation charter initially dashed the hopes of blacks in Albina, that election year still proved to be pivotal for the emergence of elected African American leadership in Portland and the state of Oregon. Earlier that year, Portland City Council member Lloyd Anderson announced his resignation. In his place, Goldschmidt endorsed Charles Jordan to fill the vacancy on the council. In late 1973, shortly before recommending him to serve as commissioner, Goldschmidt had also tapped Jordan to head the City's new Bureau of Human Resources, a move that was widely supported among neighborhood activists who admired Jordan's work with Model Cities. By Model Cities' final year in 1974, when Goldschmidt incorporated it into his larger vision for community-led planning under the new Bureau of Human Resources, Jordan had successfully managed to make the program into a receptive and useful institution for Albina residents. In Model Cities' final yearly action plan for 1973-1974, the report noted, "Political consciousness among . . . residents is at a higher level than ever before, as demonstrated by increased voter registration and participation in local public affairs." Moreover, the report emphasized that more than 30 percent of the Albina's black population had attended or participated in Model Cities organizational meetings, working committees, or the CPB over the previous years.³⁷

Nevertheless, the final Model Cities action plan also outlined concerning social and economic trends with regard to Albina's commercial potential as well as black

³⁶ Lansing, *Portland*, 402-403.

³⁷ Office of the Mayor, City of Portland, *Portland Model Cities Third Year Action Plan Extension—FY 73/74*, (Portland: April 13, 1973).

employment and education. According to the report, the continued destruction and rebuilding of black business centers had left a harsh legacy of economic inequity. Population decline, insufficient purchasing power of local residents, physical decay of the region, lack of off-street parking, poor street layouts, mixed-use areas of industrial and residential, and "visual clutter" in the form of trash and worn out signs all combined, the report suggested, to limit the potential for increased commercial success within various Albina neighborhoods. Likewise, the action plan noted a surprising decline in black education levels and the number of black teachers in public schools. Inversely, residential segregation continued to shift the demographics of local schools towards higher black populations. For example, seven out of eight elementary schools in the region had more than 50 percent black enrollment during the 1972-1973 school year compared to only five schools during the 1966-1967 year. Two of those schools, Boise and Humboldt, still had roughly 90 percent black enrollment. Moreover, black teachers represented more than one-fifth of the faculty in only three schools of these schools, and no school's faculty was more than one-quarter black. Finally, the action plan also noted that unemployment and poverty rates for blacks were two times higher than for whites living in the same area. As a result, it is not surprising that 45.7 percent of residents within the Model Cities boundaries felt that "their problems are not understood" by the Portland City Council.³⁸

Despite continuing problems of education and employment, as well as popular opinions that the Portland City Council still did not understand Albina's problems, Jordan remained very popular among Albina's residents and other community activists, leading

³⁸ Office of the Mayor, City of Portland, *Portland Model Cities Third Year Action Plan Extension—FY 73/74*, (Portland: April 13, 1973).

to his ten-year role as a Portland City Council commissioner. After receiving approval from the other commissioners in the spring of 1974, Jordan became the first African American to serve on the city council. A few months later, Jordan came in first place with 35 percent of the vote in the May primary and later won the runoff election November to become the first African American ever elected to the city council by the people of Portland. In a surprising move, Goldschmidt quickly transferred two important bureaus under the direction of Commissioner Jordan. First, Goldschmidt appointed Jordan to the position of police commissioner on the council, giving him authority over all of the police departments in the city. For the first time in Portland's history, an African American was in charge of the very police that had, only a few years prior, helped instigate the Albina riots of 1967 and 1969. Although instances of racial profiling and discrimination continued in Northeast Portland under Jordan's leadership, the appointment of a black commissioner marked an important starting point for a more representative and responsive police force. Early on in Jordan's tenure as commissioner, the Portland Police hired more black police officers, including Carmen Sylvester, the city's first African American woman police officer.³⁹

In addition to his role as police commissioner, Goldschmidt also assigned Jordan to head the newly created Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA). Within Goldschmidt's OPD-centered urban planning and development structure, the ONA acted as an arm of the Planning Commission. Specifically, the ONA assisted the Planning Commission by working with neighborhood activists and organizations, like the CPB in Albina, the NWDA, and similar groups in throughout Portland, to facilitate localized

³⁹ Lansing, *Portland*, 402-403.

planning and input. Between 1974 and the end of 1979, the number of neighborhood associations skyrocketed from 30, most of which had been formed within the previous five years, to more than 60. Under Jordan's guidance and oversight, the ONA worked with all of these organizations throughout the 1970s to help construct, review, and amend projects and policies developed by the Planning Commission.⁴⁰

Although Jordan played an integral role in the creation of Goldschmidt's new urban planning structure and neighborhood outreach, the two did not always get along. Between 1976 and 1978, Jordan became increasingly frustrated with the mayor's selections for members of the PDC. On January 12, 1978, after Goldschmidt appointed Jerry Jones to the PDC's redevelopment and planning agency board, Jordan publicly lambasted the decision. According to Jordan, for nearly three years Goldschmidt ignored all of his proposed PDC candidates and never placed a resident of Northeast Portland on the commission. "There are a lot of people being relocated from that area," Jordan contended, "and we need someone on the Portland Development Commission who is sensitive to that issue." However, Goldschmidt retorted that it would have been impossible to have every neighborhood represented on the PDC.⁴¹ Consequently, although Goldschmidt had taken major steps to increase the political voice of Portland's various neighborhoods, the residents of Albina—apart from Jordan—still lacked representation within the PDC and the higher echelons of urban planning.

Charles Jordan's service on the Portland City Council between 1974 and 1984, when he left Portland to administer public parks in Austin, Texas, was not the only major step forward for increasing a black voice in city and state electoral politics. Reminiscent

⁴⁰ Abbott, *Portland*, 200-201; Lansing, *Portland*, 404.

⁴¹ "Jordan blasts mayor on commission choices," *Oregonian*, January 12, 1978.

of the influential and politically active couple E.D. Cannady and Beatrice Morrow Cannady in the 1920s and 1930s, Bill and Gladys McCoy also climbed into positions of state and local political leadership. In 1968, McCoy launched an unsuccessful bid for city council in Portland. That year, Goldschmidt entered the realm of Portland politics as a campaign aide to McCoy, and the experience helped build the logistical foundation and networking for Goldschmidt's own run for city council in 1970.⁴² In 1974, the same year that Jordan became Commissioner, McCoy became the first African American ever elected to the Oregon State Senate after winning the election to represent the legislative seat for North and Northeast Portland. Serving in that position from 1974 until his death in 1996, Bill McCoy pushed the state finally to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as his first symbolic legislative act, became a major advocate for senior citizens and individuals with disabilities, and was overwhelmingly re-elected to the position for more than twenty years.⁴³ Gladys McCoy became equally prominent within Oregon politics. In 1970, Gladys McCoy was elected to serve on the Portland School Board, a position that she held until 1979, when she became the first African American elected to the Multnomah County Board of Commissioners. Seven years later, in 1986, voters elected her to chair the council, where she remained until her death in 1993.⁴⁴

Despite a small but emerging visibility in state and local politics, as well as a growing voice in local planning policies, this newfound influence had both positive and negative results on the development of the black community in Albina. By the mid-

⁴² Steve Erickson, "Neil Goldschmidt: I'm not cut from the same mold as some members of the council . . .," *Oregonian*, January 3, 1971.

⁴³ Nancie P. Fadeley, "Bill McCoy quietly made a difference," *The Register-Guard*, April 30, 1996.

⁴⁴ *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995), 81.

1970s, the PDC abandoned much of its proposed expansion of Emmanuel Hospital due to the loss of federal funds, but only after the city demolished significant portions of homes and businesses to the south and east of the hospital. Eventually, the city replaced the areas with public parks, but for many locals the razing of the center of black business along Russell and Union marked a devastating turning point for the economic future of the African American community in Albina.⁴⁵ In order to address the decline of black-owned businesses, local residents and the city government during the final year of Model Cities created and implemented the Union Avenue Redevelopment Plan to improve the neighborhood and attract business. However, the project resulted in unexpected and further damaging changes. Part of the redevelopment involved the construction of a landscaped meridian strip down the center of Union Avenue to decrease traffic accidents, but its construction removed on-street parking and had the unintended deleterious effect of further discouraging the patronization of local businesses.⁴⁶ As a result, even under the guidance of black community leaders, revitalization projects produced unforeseen negative results. Still, at the very least, African Americans could now take partial responsibility for both the failures and successes of their attempts to change their surrounding urban space.

Ultimately, the black freedom struggle in Portland during the 1970s made major progress with regard to political representation and involvement in urban planning; however, political freedom and inclusion did not necessarily translate into immediate success. While the rise of individuals like Charles Jordan, Bill McCoy, and Gladys

⁴⁵ *Cornerstones of Community*, 90.

⁴⁶ *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 133.

McCoy marked an important turning point, their political successes were not representative of socioeconomic conditions of the broader black community in Northeast Portland. Goldschmidt, both supported yet partially distrusted by African Americans in Portland, was only successful as far as he was able to bring community movements into the mainstream of city politics. He did not resolve the legacy of discrimination and exclusion by any means, but his vision for the future of Portland politics opened a brief window for genuine progress towards racial justice.

Neil Goldschmidt's revolutionary tenure as Mayor of Portland came to an abrupt end in August 1979, when he resigned to serve as Secretary of Transportation for President Jimmy Carter. Following his departure, a month-long power struggle ensued among city council members. Francis Ivancie, who had aspired to the office since the departure of Terry Schruck, had the backing of fellow conservative councilmember Mildred Schwab. On the other side, Connie McCready, a close ally of Goldschmidt, supported Charles Jordan. Deadlocked two-to-two for more than a month, Schwab proposed a compromise candidate: Jordan's city council predecessor, Lloyd Anderson. Jordan and McCready seemed receptive to the idea; however, before meeting with Anderson, Ivancie pulled a clever maneuver and chose instead to back his liberal political rival on the council, Connie McCready, as mayor. Jordan immediately put his support behind her and, with support from Jordan, Ivancie, and herself, Connie McCready became the 46th Mayor of Portland.⁴⁷ However, the move was little more than a political ruse. Forced to choose between Anderson and McCready, Ivancie believed that Anderson was far too popular to defeat in 1980 and thought that McCready would be less

⁴⁷ Lansing, *Portland*, 410-411.

well liked in an election. His gamble paid off. Though appealing to the same groups as Goldschmidt, McCready lacked the popularity and charisma of her predecessor.

Combined with the decline of Portland's decade-long economic boom in late 1979 and early 1980, Ivancie was able to consolidate support from local business leaders and working-class whites to defeat McCready in the May primary of 1980.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the citywide neighborhood movement that began with the CPB wresting control of the Model Cities program from the PDC in the late 1960s brought together a brief but powerful coalition of neighborhood organizations in the 1970s. During Goldschmidt's two terms as mayor, Portland's city government, urban planning and transportation structure, and police force changed dramatically. While his reforms were far from what radically transformative organizations like those that the Portland Black Panther Party's had envisioned, Goldschmidt's political revolution in Portland during the 1970s nevertheless aimed to address the concerns over neighborhood control, community uplift, and issues of poverty, discrimination, and spatial restrictions. Goldschmidt, a lifelong civil rights advocate, was able to draw on the power of neighborhood groups to reform the city's politics and urban planning apparatus. However, while it is true that neither Goldschmidt nor the citizens of Portland created this community activist movement out of thin air, African Americans' participation Model Cities during the mid-to-late 1960s triggered the growing national movement on a local level early on and found a receptive and quickly changing political environment in Portland. As a result, by the close of the 1970s, the City of Portland had done much to address the legacy of political and spatial exclusion as well as racial discrimination that had plagued the city's power structure throughout the twentieth century. Still, this brief

⁴⁸ Abbott, *Portland*, 181; Lansing, *Portland*, 414.

moment of progress was neither permanent nor universal among Portland's black population as the decades since the triumph of community activism and the ascendancy of Neil Goldschmidt continued to reveal the lasting socioeconomic legacy of discrimination and exclusion.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION:

LEGACIES OF THE PORTLAND PANTHERS

In November 2003, Judge Robert E. Jones, the same judge Kent Ford had stood before on several occasions during the 1960s and 1970s, sentenced Patrice Lumumba Ford, Kent's son, to eighteen years in a maximum-security federal prison. The sentence was the result of an investigation prompted by the United States' rapidly expanding surveillance and counterterrorism powers under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Lumumba, a Muslim convert named after the famous Congolese independence leader during the 1950s, stood accused of planning to travel to Afghanistan and fight alongside the Taliban against US soldiers. Arrested as a part of a series of raids across the United States in Detroit, Seattle, Portland, and New York on October 4, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft appeared before the nation on television and described the raids as "a defining day in America's war against terrorism."¹ Along with six other American Muslims referred to by the media as the "Portland Seven," Lumumba claimed that he and the others he knew had only planned to travel to China and then Pakistan to assist in the refugee crisis coming out of Afghanistan. Never publicly admitting to any wrongdoing, one-by-one the seven men agreed to deals that gave them prison sentences ranging from

¹ Martha Gies, "A Father's Story," *Portland Monthly*, March 2005, 148.

eight to eighteen years rather than going to trial and risking life sentences. Lumumba, the last to compromise, received the most severe sentence.²

Since Lumumba's sentencing, Kent Ford has committed his life to fighting for his son's freedom. In November 2004, Ford distributed hundreds of "Free Lumumba" leaflets at a major *Eid al-fitr* festival, the celebration of the end of Ramadan, at Memorial Coliseum. Although not a Muslim, he moved among a crowd of more than 3,000 members of Portland's Islamic community and attempted to raise awareness about his son's imprisonment. "It's the only thing I know how to do," Ford told freelance reporter Martha Gies, "the struggle's the only thing I ever did know." For his actions, in an overwhelming sardonic punishment given the place's history, police served Kent Ford with a citation that banned him from the premises for 90 days.³

The investigation, arrest, and sentencing of Patrice Lumumba Ford reinforces the legacy of Portland's long and continued history of discrimination, political and socioeconomic inequalities, and distrust between, on the one hand, the power of the federal, state, and city government and, on the other hand, what remains of Northeast Portland's black community today. Since the 1980s, socioeconomic and political opportunities for the African American community in Albina have not made as many strides as neighborhood organizers in the 1970s had hoped. In fact, the last three decades witnessed a continuation of neglect and disinvestment that further eroded the basis of the community and left a legacy of bitterness and poverty among many of the city's African Americans. Although the 1970s brought political advancements as well as increased homeownership and economic improvement for some blacks, financial disinvestment in

² Gies, "A Father's Story," 147-151.

³ *Ibid.*, 191.

the area under the mayorship of Francis Ivancie brought those gains to a halt. By the 1980s, when the last remnants of the Portland BPP's social programs ended, economic stagnation, declining population and home prices, the introduction of crack cocaine, and gang warfare combined to wreck havoc on the black community and the Albina District. By 1990, the black population of Albina dropped from 49 percent to 38 percent over the course of a decade. Following new city-led revitalization efforts in the early 1990s, however, property values and demographics in Albina began to shift dramatically. Reclamation, revitalization, and gentrification increased white homeownership and led to a gradual and ongoing black exodus from Albina and even Portland itself. In 2000, less than one-third of the city's total black population lives in Albina, and blacks now represent a smaller proportion of the city's population than whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Furthermore, over the past decade, for the first time since the ghettoization of Albina, none of the district's neighborhoods contains a majority of nonwhite residents yet racially segregated schools in the area remain a major concern.⁴ As a result, this modern process of gentrification and revitalization has come at the expense of the city's black community, much as it did in the 1950s and 1960s.

Percy Hampton, one of the Portland BPP's founding members, left the organization in 1973, but he, like Kent Ford, never left Northeast Portland. In 2011, he gave an interview to Anna Griffin of the *Oregonian* to discuss recent acts of vandalism and violence directed at the Portland police by black teenagers. Disenchanted by what he views as random acts of violence with no genuine or substantive program for social change, Hampton described the youth, stating, "These kids . . . they're just looking for an

⁴ Karen J. Gibson, "Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940-2000," *Transforming Anthropology* 15.1 (2007): 17-20.

excuse to break stuff."⁵ Echoing Robert Self's analysis of the connection between the history of urban space and political struggles, Hampton continued, "*We* were talking about holding the government accountable for poverty, for the lack of affordable health care, for the way urban renewal was eating away at the black parts of town, and especially for the fact that the cops weren't being held accountable for violence. . . . We talked about *specific things* that helped people *here*."⁶

The story of Portland's Black Panther Party inextricably links the long history of black social and political struggles in Portland to the city's history of metropolitan planning throughout the twentieth century. Systematically excluded from city politics since the early 1900s, confined to the Albina district, and forced to relocate for urban renewal projects that leveled black homes and businesses, the African American community in Northeast Portland fought back in a variety of ways in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Essentially barred from avenues of political representation and the right to determine the future of their own neighborhoods and communities, blacks in Albina developed alternative forms of political experimentation. These new and creative sociopolitical movements ranged from demanding greater input and consultation with urban planners, as demonstrated with the Model Cities CPB and the PMSC, to openly hostile opposition to city government and a demand for complete control over their own community, like the Black Panther Party and other black power groups. Consequently, the history of the relatively short-lived Portland Black Panther Party represented an

⁵ Anna Griffin, "Onetime Portland Black Panther Percy Hampton reflects on the movement, issues that remain today," *OregonLive*, February 19, 2011. Accessed June 22, 2011 from http://www.oregonlive.com/O/index.ssf/2011/02/onetime_portland_black_panther.html

⁶ Italics added for emphasis; Anna Griffin, "Onetime Portland Black Panther Percy Hampton reflects on the movement, issues that remain today," *Oregonian*, February 19, 2011.

important moment of uncertainty for the black freedom struggle as well as for the future of Portland's politics and urban planning. Although the Portland Panther's dream of complete community control was ultimately dashed, they played a pivotal role in pressuring the city government and the PDC to listen to moderate voices within the African American community, and later other Portland neighborhoods and communities, demanding urban planning reform.

Through this understanding of the significance of the Black Panther Party in the history of civil rights and metropolitan space, a number of historical misconceptions about Portland and black power organizations become clear. Specifically, this study draws three significant conclusions about the long civil rights movement in the West and Pacific Northwest, the complex and localized nature of the Black Panther Party during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the legacy of citizen participation and urban planning in Portland. First, it helps to paint a more complete picture of the long civil rights movement in the United States, particularly in the urban American West. Frequently ignored because of its relatively small black population, a more detailed study of Portland contributes a missing piece in the broader chronological and geographical understanding of the black freedom struggle in the urban West. With its unique size, location, and demographics, Portland reveals as interesting and distinct a narrative of civil rights in the West as do studies of Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Francisco, Oakland, and Seattle. In particular, the element of consistent yet ever-changing interracial coalitions between blacks and white liberals in Portland since the early 1900s, even among the seemingly most radical black power political organizations, makes the city's civil rights struggle an interesting case study. Although whites worked with civil rights and radical

organizations across America, the sustainability of civil rights efforts in Portland were predicated consistently on crucial coalitions with whites.

Second, this distinctive micro study leads to a more detailed understanding of the localized efforts of national social and political protest movements, like the Portland Black Panther Party. The Portland chapter of the BPP reemphasizes the findings of recent studies that the national organization was not as monolithic or hierarchical as historians popularly portrayed it. Although the headquarters of the BPP in Oakland dictated the organization's platform and ideological basis, the leadership of the chapters formed policies and protests on a localized level that responded to immediate issues, especially after the national leadership began to erode in the late 1960s. In addition to responding to specific urban planning and government policies in Albina, one unique feature about the Portland Panthers, compared to dominant Black Panther narratives, was Ford and other leaders' receptiveness to soliciting and accepting the help of local whites. Again, this support was common nationwide, but in Portland, where the black population never constituted as large a percentage of the population as other major West Coast cities, it was crucial. For an organization like the BPP to exist and build viable, successful social programs, the group's leadership had to work more closely with sympathetic white allies, such as local businesses, OHSU doctors, dentists, and medical assistances, PSU faculty and students, and others. Although it is possible that Portland represents an outlying or unrepresentative case study, further studies of BPP chapters in cities with smaller black populations or more racially diverse neighborhood demographics, like Portland, may reveal a continuum of interaction with local white liberals. Consequently,

the history of the Portland BPP hints at a more complex and distinctly localized picture of the Black Panthers nationally.

Finally, and most importantly, this study demonstrate that historians, sociologists, political scientists, and urban planners have overly idealized and mythologized popular perceptions of Portland as a model city for urban planning and citizen participation in recent decades. There is undoubtedly truth to the idea that the roots of Portland's community and neighborhood activism, inner city and public transportation revitalization, and environmental protection developed and evolved during the conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s that this study addresses. However, professional scholars, urban planners, and Portlanders frequently romanticize the city's commitment to those ideals. Instead, the history of Portland's black community in Albina reveals a population of citizens that the city government and white citizens excluded from politics in the early twentieth century, confined into a conceptually spatialized ghetto after World War II, and granted a minimal role in the city's political revolution during the 1970s. As a result, what remains of Portland's black community today is a group that did not equally share in benefits of the triumph of neighborhood activism.

The legacy of political, socioeconomic, and spatialized racial discrimination in the urban West, as well as the rest of the United States, remains at the core of questions surrounding problems facing community organizers and urban planners. Only one generation removed from the tumultuous years that gave birth to Portland's new urban politics, those who hold the city up as a model for urban planning and citizen participation would do well to remember its complex, deeply rooted, and destructive historical legacy of exclusion toward the black citizens of Albina. While Portland's

modern reputation is justifiable, it is important to see both the successes and shortcomings of our model cities. To acknowledge only the successes of Portland's urban planning model belies the still unresolved planning problems and historical struggles the city faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s that triggered the new urban politics and planning of Portland. Mayor Goldschmidt himself came to power on a platform of learning from and avoiding the failures of other urban communities.

The claim that local neighborhoods and communities knew how to develop, regulate, and uplift their neighborhoods better than high-minded and misguided urban planners was a crucial part of the struggles of Albina's African American community in the 1960s and 1970s. More importantly, it was central to the movement that mobilized Portland's political revolution in the 1970s and built the foundation for a city that politicians and urban planners hold in such high regard today. Perhaps the greatest contradiction of that period is the community that helped trigger the neighborhood activist movement in Portland during the late 1960s and 1970s still has farthest to go to overcome the legacy of racial discrimination, political exclusion, and spatial segregation. For Kent Ford, the imprisonment of his son as an enemy of the state is a daily reminder of that tragic and paradoxical legacy.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AME	African Methodist Episcopal
ANIP	Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project
BPP	Black Panther Party
C-CAP	Church-Community Action Program
COINTELPRO	Counter Intelligence Program (FBI)
CPB	Citizens Planning Board (Model Cities)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HAP	Housing Authority of Portland
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NCCF	National Committee to Combat Fascism
NDP	Neighborhood Development Plan
NWDA	Northwest Development Association
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity
OHS	Oregon Historical Society
OHSU	Oregon Health and Science University
ONA	Office of Neighborhood Associations
OPD	Office of Planning and Development
PARC	City of Portland Archives and Records Center
PDC	Portland Development Commission
PMSC	Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee
PSC	Portland State College
PSU	Portland State University (formerly PSC)

APPENDIX B

PORTLAND POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS, 1900-1970

TABLE 2.1:
Population of Racial Groups in West Coast Cities, 1900-1920

City	1900	1910	1920
<i>Portland</i>			
-White	80,614	198,952	252,961
-Black	775	1,045	1,556
-Chinese	7,841	5,699	1,846
-Japanese	1,189	1,461	1,715
<i>Seattle</i>			
-White	79,815	227,753	302,580
-Black	406	2,296	2,894
-Chinese	438	924	1,351
-Japanese	2,990	6,127	7,874
<i>San Francisco</i>			
-White	325,378	400,014	490,022
-Black	1,654	1,642	2,414
-Chinese	13,954	10,582	7,744
-Japanese	1,781	4,518	5,358
<i>Oakland</i>			
-White	64,788	141,956	204,004
-Black	1,026	3,055	5,489
-Chinese	950	3,609	3,821
-Japanese	194	1,520	2,709
<i>Los Angeles</i>			
-White	98,082	305,307	546,864
-Black	2,131	7,599	15,579
-Chinese	2,111	1,954	2,062
-Japanese	150	4,238	11,618

Source: William Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society: Portland, Oregon, 1900-1924," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 17.3 (Spring 1998): 42.

TABLE 2.2:
Population of Portland, 1930-1970

	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
Total	301,815	305,394	373,628	372,676	382,619
White (%)	296,177 (98)	299,707 (98)	360,388 (96)	353,757 (94)	352, 636 (92)
Black (%)	1,559 (>1)	1,931 (>1)	9,529 (3)	15,637 (4)	21,572 (6)
Other "Non-White" (%)	4,079 (1)	3,756 (1)	3,711 (1)	5,282 (1)	8,411 (2)

Source: Stuart J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998), 398.

TABLE 2.3:
Population of Vanport, 1943-1945

	Total	White (%)	Black (%)
January 30, 1943	6,016	4,840 (80.5)	1,176 (19.5)
June 30, 1943	25,088	22,932 (91.5)	2,156 (8.5)
January 30, 1944	31,093	28,160 (90.5)	2,159 (6.9)
June 30, 1944	27,082	23,232 (85.8)	3,818 (14.1)
November 1, 1944	32,622	26,656 (81.7)	5,808 (17.8)
May 1, 1945	30,842	24,525 (79.5)	6,317 (20.4)

Source: Portland City Club, *The Negro in Portland*, 1945.

TABLE 2.4:
Population of Williams Avenue and the Albina District, 1940-1960


	1940	1950	1960
Total	26,438	28,589	22,816
White (%)	24,999 (95)	23,215 (81)	11,013 (48)
Black (%)	1,161 (5)	5,064 (18)	11,431 (50)
Other "Non-White" (%)	278 (1)	310 (1)	372 (2)

Source: Stuart J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998), 399.

APPENDIX C


MAPS OF PORTLAND, 1890-1970

FIGURE 2.1:
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1890




Source: *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).

FIGURE 2.2:
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1930




Source: *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).

FIGURE 2.3:
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1945




Source: *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).

FIGURE 2.4:
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1955



Source: *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).


FIGURE 2.5:
Central Albina Study Area, 1962



Central Albina Study Area boundary

Source: *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 112.


FIGURE 2.6:
Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project, 1961



Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project Boundary


Source: *The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present* (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 116.

FIGURE 2.7:
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1965



Source: *Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History* (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995).

FIGURE 3.1:
Proposed Model Cities Boundary



Source: Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

FIGURE 4.1:
Proposed Plan for Emanuel Hospital, 1969



Source: Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, folder 1, PARC, Portland.

APPENDIX D

BLACK PANTHER PARTY TEN-POINT PLATFORM AND PROGRAM¹

October 1966

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community. We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people. We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community. We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment as currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over twenty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings. We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society. We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service. We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We

¹ Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed January 9, 2012, <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bppp.html>.

will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people. We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails. We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States. We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny. When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are

accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

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The Berkeley Tribe

The Militant

The Oregonian

The Oregon Journal

Portland Community College Bridge

The Register-Guard