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THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG HFACS LEVELS AND ANALYSIS OF HUMAN

FACTORS IN UNMANNED AND MANNED AIR VEHICLES

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY May 2014

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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG HFACS LEVELS AND ANALYSIS OF HUMAN FACTORS IN UNMANNED AND MANNED AIR VEHICLES

Veysel Yesilbas Old Dominion University, 2014 Director: Dr. T. Steven Cotter

This dissertation analyzes the structural relationships among the Human Factors Accident Classification System levels for unmanned air vehicle and manned air vehicle accidents and the common relationships between unmanned air vehicle and manned air vehicle accident causes. The study acquired DOD HFACS accident classification data from 347 United States Air Force Class A accident reports for the years between 2000 and 2013.

The dissertation utilized a set of analysis that is considered to contribute substantially to the respective domain of the study. The correlations found among categorical levels were applied to HFACS taxonomy based on the Reason Model via path analysis – structural equation modeling. The study concluded the presence of statistically significant paths at both UAV and MAV accidents and common partial paths of those aircraft types within the framework of DOD HFACS taxonomy. The study also suggests that accident data can be utilized to test and improve the failure model of an organization through identification of significant effects such as technology and structural changes in the organization.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people that I need to acknowledge whose help, encouragement and belief in me made this dissertation possible. First of all, I want to thank my advisor, Dr. Steve Cotter, commitment and his knowledge that he shared with me during this journey. I am sincerely grateful for the opportunity to learn from and work with him.

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude and appreciation to each member of my dissertation committee for their valuable contributions; Dr. Resit Unal. Dr. Holly Handley, and Dr. Gokay Sursal. They provided numerous valuable comments and suggestions during my doctoral study under significant time constraints. Without their constructive criticism and advice, this thesis would have not progressed as smoothly as it did throughout its completion.

I would like to thank to Dr. Souza-Poza for his advice and direction during this study. I should not forget the faculty's academicians, Dr. Adrian Gheorghe and Dr. Maria Pilar Pazos-Lago, who helped me in this study. I would also like to thank to experts of the inter-rater reliability study for their willingness to give up hours of their valuable time. Their experience contributed to improve the reliability of the analysis.

I would especially like to thank my lovely wife, who has passionately supported me without ever complaining. Throughout this Ph.D. endeavor, she gave me a wonderful gift: my daughter. My son, accept my apologies for not having played with you as much as I wanted. I hope I can make it up to you some day, and I hope this determination in the study encourages you in future school life. I would also like to thank my parents for their love and unconditional support over my life. I have always felt my mother's prayers blessing me.

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NOMENCLATURE

- UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle
- MAV Manned Air Vehicle
- HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Accident investigation and evaluation has been an important part of military and commercial aviation since its beginning. Investigators and researchers seek to understand the root causes leading to accidents, exploit the reasons behind root causes, and improve flight safety by presenting safety recommendations that can be used by other researchers. educators, managers of airline or military organizations, and aircraft manufacturers.

Among aviation accident investigation tools, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has been used by the United States Department of Defense (DOD) since 2005 as well as by commercial aviation sectors and countries worldwide. The taxonomy of HFACS has been used not only in aviation domain but also studied for its application to accident investigation in different sectors such as maritime shipping, mining, and commercial traffic. While the need for humans in operating environment is decreasing, the expectation for human performance quality in aviation and industrial sectors is increasing.

This research applies a quantitative *ex post facto* approach to test the relationship among the HFACS taxonomy levels using data from 347 United States Air Force Accident Investigation Board (AIB) summaries and reports between the fiscal years of 2000 and 2013. This research analyzes the structure of causal paths among HFACS levels by applying the structural equation modeling (SEM) methodology and then compares the common significant paths between unmanned and manned air vehicle accident causes by applying path analysis for unmanned and manned accidents.

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Armed Forces, Department of Defense, or Government or those of any other NATO nations and their Armed Forces.

1.1 Background of the Study

Based on James Reason's (1990) "Swiss Cheese" model of accident causation, the HFACS was designed to define the "holes in the Swiss Cheese" and to facilitate the application of Reason's model to accident investigation and analysis (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The taxonomy of the HFACS has been used by the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) throughout its services with slight changes made through the levels and sublevels. The structure of HFACS levels and the causes of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) accidents have not been studied in the way of comparison with manned air vehicles (MAV) accidents. In other words, the structure of HFACS levels and the relationship of human factors between UAV and MAV accidents has not been thoroughly evaluated using empirical multiple regression causal models.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The rapid rise in UAV employment (Department of Defense, 2011) has been accompanied by increased attention to their high accident rates which are greater than MAV (Menda et al., 2011). Such high rates had negative implications for UAV affordability and mission effectiveness. According to a study conducted by the US Air Force, human causal factors are 68 % of all UAV accidents in the US Armed Forces. As aircrafts and systems become more reliable and steadfast with the help of technological developments, human factors in aviation accidents comes to the forefront as a vital point in terms of human life and enormous cost. Being used in the military aviation and studied widely in the literature, the utility, validity, and reliability of HFACS has also been assessed to gain a better usage and understanding of human factors in accidents. As these assessments and studies help to improve the validity of accident causation systems, further evaluation studies from different perspectives are needed to contribute to HFACS. Although being sufficient as a reporting and investigation tool, HFACS needs to be tested and evaluated for significant common causal paths among its levels and for correlation of common causal paths between unmanned and manned air vehicle accident causes.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to analyze the structural relationships of accident causes among HFACS levels in comparable UAV and MAV and to analyze the common paths between UAV and MAV accident causes.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Given the inherent risks, economic impacts, and potential negative consequences associated with deficiencies in support personnel and pilot skills, decisions, judgments, and perception errors, decreasing accident rates is crucial to military and commercial aviation and industrial organizations, which all suffer from budget constraints. In order to mitigate the potential for aviation accidents, it is important to ensure that accidents are investigated and evaluated in an appropriate methodology and taxonomy so as to understand the causes for individual and all cases as well. This understanding requires testing of HFACS taxonomy that is used widely in both aviation and other sectors. As O'Connor, Walliser, and Philips (2010) recommend, organizations must evaluate the reliability and validity of mishap coding systems, as applied by the proposed end-users, prior to the widespread adoption of a system. Therefore it is imperative to have a tested and evaluated taxonomy or analyses system by a variety of perspectives so as to augment the external and internal validity. In that context, evaluation of the HFACS itself, used by all DOD services, is vital since it constitutes a basis from which to understand. intervene, and take necessary precautions throughout the organizations. This study's analysis of causal paths within the structure of HFACS can be regarded as contributing to the evaluation of external validity of the system.

1.5 Research Contributions

The taxonomy of HFACS is tested for significant paths among HFACS levels through structural equation modeling within the context of two different aircraft type, UAV and MAV. The contribution to Reason's (1990) model and Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), HFACS is that the study analyzed the structure of realized HFACS levels. This methodology also tested for significant covariance of accident causes between UAVs and MAVs in terms of human factors. Similar analyses can be used in other areas that have critical effect of human factors such as mining, shipping, or other type of industries.

The methodology that set forth the path(s) among HFACS levels and sublevels can be applied to other domains and organizations that use HFACS taxonomy by the mean of analyzing the secondhand accident investigation reports.

1.6 Delimitations

The most important reason that formed the delimitations of the study was the available data. The accident reports of UAVs and MAVs analyzed in this study were limited to ones used in the United States Air Force. The intended testing of accident causation system was the DOD HFACS since most of the reports are evaluated with this model. The accidents examined were only the Class-A accidents of US Air Force UAVs and MAVs, and the time frame covered the fiscal years from 2000 to 2013. The accident reports that did not find any human factors as the accident cause and accident reports for which root causes were not determined were excluded. The study also classified the accident reports and the aircrafts according to their use of concept rather than a variety of aircraft; UAV and MAV. No latent variable such as mission type, accident phase, was included in the study. The base version of DOD HFACS published in 2005 was used to assess and classify the accident causes of the summarized reports. Even though there were different types of unmanned and manned aircrafts, the reports were classified within the context of unmanned and manned aircrafts.

1.7 Definitions of Key Terms

UAV - Unmanned Air Vehicle.

MAV - Manned Air Vehicle

UAV/MAV Mission is a period including taxi to runway, take-off, flight, landing, and taxi back for a specific purpose.

Class A Accidents are the accidents that result in fatality or total permanent disability, loss of an aircraft, or property damage of \$2 million or more (USAF Accident Investigation Boards, 2012).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Reviewing the literature helps to understand the theoretical basis for and the background of the study and also assists in establishing the scope of the study. The literature review for this study is organized in two major sections and four sub-sections that helps to analyze the structure of HFACS levels and the relationship between UAV and MAV accident causes. The first part constitutes the ground for HFACS that is human factors in aviation, accident causation taxonomies and the Reason (1990) model. The second part consists of review of previous studies, which are HFACS adaptation to various areas, exploratory studies of HFACS, and testing/evaluation studies of HFACS.

2.1 Human Factors and Accident Causation in Aviation

The new era of technology and operation environment has led to aviation development of various types of air vehicles for a variety of purposes. The mounting interest for aviation is a direct result of their tested and proven capabilities in many fields. These developments, caused by many effects, have brought out substantial issues that are related to human factors. In aviation, human factors play an important role, because human factor effects are vital to protecting human life and minimizing organizations' expenditures. As aircrafts become more reliable with the help of technological developments, human factors in aviation accidents come to the forefront as a vital point.

Human factors are steadily seen as a major cause of manned aircraft accidents. According to Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), the percentage of accidents that implicate human error ranges from 70% to 80%. In addition, the percentage of accidents related to human error has increased relative to those attributable to equipment failures over the past 40 years (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Rash, LeDuc, and Manning (2006) advocate that knowledge of human-related factors is necessary for the successful formulation of countermeasures to prevent these types of accidents, and such understanding can be achieved by the application of accident analysis techniques to existing accident databases.

There have been many studies toward the development of accident causation models and frameworks due to the desire for decreasing human errors in aviation accidents that result in fatalities and cost a great amount of resources in terms of investigation time, loss of aircraft assets, and litigation. According to Senders and Moray (1991), the aviation sector had witnessed a proliferation of human error frameworks twenty years ago. This proliferation during 1990s resulted from the overall accident rate declining over the last half century, but reductions in human error-related accidents have not kept pace with reductions in accidents related to mechanical and environmental factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). A study by Wiegmann, Rich, and Shappell (2000) summarizes more than 100 research and technical articles that either directly presents a specific human error or accident analysis system or use error frameworks in analyzing human performance data within a specific context or task.

2.2 Reason's Accident Causation Model and the HFACS

Reason's (1990) Accident Causation Model is a theoretical model that aims to explain how accidents occur in organizations and among its levels. The main assumption of the theory is that accidents occur in such a way that the causes have relationships with other levels of the organization. A second assumption of the model is that the components of organizations need or are obliged to function together at least to prevent accidents. From these assumptions, Reason theorizes that most accidents can be traced to active and latent human failures that result from prior latent human failures at higher organizational levels. Combinations of latent errors pose the greatest threat to safety of a complex system.




Figure 1. Reason's (1990) Model

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), originally adapted from Reason's (1990) model to military aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), identifies four levels within an organization at which latent and active human errors can occur: Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts. Among other aviation accident investigation tools, HFACS has been used by the U.S. Department of Defense since 2005 with some changes especially at the levels of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Acts. The taxonomy of HFACS has been studied not only in the aviation domain but also in a variety of sectors such as maritime shipping, mining, and traffic accidents. Furthermore, HFACS has been studied in many countries such as India (Gaur, 2005), China (Li & Harris, 2006), and Australia (Olsen & Shorrock, 2010). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the four layers of the HFACS taxonomy.




Figure 2. The "Swiss Cheese" Model of Human Error Causation (Reason, 1990) Adapted for the HFACS Taxonomy by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003).




Figure 3. DOD HFACS Model (2005) Adapted from HFACS. (Each of the boxes breakdown to respected nanocodes of human error)

The taxonomy used in the reports of this study was the United States Department of Defense DOD HFACS (DOD, 2005). The DOD HFACS is an adapted version of the HFACS with changes at the levels of Preconditions and Unsafe Acts. The U.S. Department of Defense started using the DOD HFACS by a memorandum in 2005 among its services. Figure 4 illustrates a comparison of the original HFACS and the DOD HFACS levels.




Figure 4. Schematic comparison of HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) and DOD HFACS (DOD, 2005)

2.3 Previous Studies

Numerous studies of the HFACS can be found in the literature. It is possible to cluster these studies in order to see the big picture and locate this study into the appropriate cluster: (1) HFACS application and adaptation to various areas, (2) exploratory studies of HFACS, and (3) evaluation and testing of the HFACS. This study is aimed to contribute to the last two clusters. Most of the literature regarding HFACS consists of exploratory analysis aiming to exploit human factors in aviation. Testing or evaluation studies of HFACS are the least found in the literature.

2.3.1 HFACS Application and Adaptation to Various Areas

Although HFACS is being used mainly by aviation organizations and especially by military domain, it has been also used for a variety of areas such as human error in maintenance (Krulak, 2004), shipping (Celik & Cebi, 2009), motor vehicle accidents (Iden, 2012), and mining (Lenné, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012). This wide usage and adaptation of the HFACS concludes that humans persist as the critical element or factor to safety, although the technology has been improving in an accelerated manner.

An investigation of human error in shipping accidents by Celik and Cebi (2009) is an example of HFACS adaptation to different sectors other than aviation. Celik and Cebi generated an analytical HFACS based on Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) in order to identify the role of human factors in shipping accidents. This study furthers HFACS by using a decision making process, FAHP, to quantify human contributions to shipping accidents. Among the adaptations of HFACS to mining, Lenné, et al. (2012) aimed to provide an analysis of the systematic factors involved in mining accidents and to examine organizational and supervisory failures that are predictive of sub-standard performance at the operator level. The main finding in this study was to direct few critical categories at the higher levels.

Another HFACS application to a different area is the analysis of motor vehicle crashes in the U.S. Military. Iden (2012) aimed to provide a greater understanding of the causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personnel motor vehicle crashes for military service members with the goal of preventing future losses. This study used archival narratives from Class A and Class B off duty motor vehicle crashes in the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

2.3.2 Exploratory Studies of HFACS in Aviation

Many studies seek to gain knowledge of accident causation in organizations by analyzing historical or second hand data. Even though many studies analyze the accidents of services within the U.S. Department of Defense, there are also many studies that analyze accident causes within general aviation from different countries.

In a study of HFACS applied to "Civil Aircraft Accidents in India," (Gaur, 2005) evaluated 48 accident reports that occurred between 1990 and 1999. While the aim was to identify the causal factors, the classification was based from the reports by the author and independent assessor. The study found that one or more human factors contributed to 37 of the 48 accidents.

In another example of a HFACS study, Li and Harris (2006) analyzed 523 accident reports in the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force between 1978 and 2002. They sought to quantify the relationship between the levels and components in the HFACS taxonomy. The study described the common paths between categories at four levels in the HFACS and suggested that active failures were promoted by latent conditions in the organization. The main focus of the study was to determine any pathway throughout the accidents in terms of HFACS rather than testing the structure.

The study "Human Factors in Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations" by Tvaryanas, Thompson, and Constable (2006) analyzed 221 remotely piloted aircraft mishaps within the U.S military services over 10 years. In reviewing the reports and coding human factors using the DOD HFACS, they sought to analyze the distribution and determinants of operator errors. Suggesting that latent failures at the organizational level were most common and were associated with operator error and mechanical failures, the results revealed that 60.2% of mishaps involved operation-related human casual factors.

Another study by Tvaryanas and Thompson (2008) identified recurrent pathways within an accident database using the HFACS. They used exploratory principal component analysis to assess the structure within the set of crew member-related mishaps for the MQ-1 Predator remotely piloted aircraft. A total of 95 mishap reports for the period October 1996 to September 2005 were reviewed and 433 causal human factors were identified for further analysis. Using exploratory factor analysis, the mishap dataset was reduced to eight factors while still accounting for 72% of the variance in the original dataset. The authors found that "…perception and skill-based error pathways shared common latent failures and collectively were responsible for the majority of crewmember related mishaps. Common latent failures were observed in HFACS categories of resource/acquisitions management, organizational processes, and technological environment" (pp. 528-529). This study, by presenting the linkages between active and latent failures and associated probabilities, demonstrated an example of structural approach for a greater understanding of a mishap database. The study suggested that mathematically linking human performance failures to systemic factors furthers the descriptive approach to a more structural approach. The majority of accidents were caused by latent failures involving organizational factors and technological environment.

O'Connor, Cowan, and Alton (2010), examined the results of two different methods, identifying human factors safety concerns in U.S. Naval Aviation. The first method was the analysis of 47 F/A-18 and 16 H-60 mishaps using DOD HFACS taxonomy. The second method was an analysis of the responses of 68 squadrons to a survey regarding the human factor issues that were considered as the most important concern. The study revealed that the concerns of the squadrons and the results of the DOD HFACS analysis were different. The DOD HFACS nanocodes were not seen as major concerns among squadrons. The study recommended that HFACS needed to be improved in terms of findings and interpretation.

2.3.3 Evaluation/Testing of HFACS

As the HFACS is used in a variety of areas, there have been some studies to evaluate or test the HFACS taxonomy from different aspects.

O'Connor (2008) evaluated the internal validity, external validity, and utilitarian criteria of DOD HFACS by identifying the human factors causes of two aviation mishap scenarios with the help of 123 naval aviators. The main concern of the study was to evaluate the reliability of the nanocodes that were considered to be causal of mishaps. The study concluded that mutual exclusivity, training, and parsimony were required to use DOD HFACS effectively.

The studies of HFACS Evaluation by Trained Raters (O'Connor, et al., 2010) and by Simulated Mishap Boards (O'Connor & Walker, 2011) focused on the level of agreement on the factors that caused accidents. The studies included a limited number of mishaps, one and two respectively, that scrutinized the reliability of nanocodes. The studies found that there were high levels of agreement regarding the factors that did not contribute to the accidents while the level of agreement on the factors that did cause the accident as classified using DOD HFACS were low. The former and the latter studies found that the level of agreement on the factors that did cause the incident as classified using DOD HFACS were low. The former and the latter studies found that the level of agreement on the factors that did cause the incident as classified using DOD HFACS were lower than desirable. Agreement of 50% or greater between raters that a particular nanocode was causal was found only a mean of 22.5% and 14.6% of selected nanocodes respectively. The latter study also found that the acceptable levels of reliability were only achieved for 56.9% of nanocodes.

Another study by Olsen and Shorrock (2010) evaluated adaptation of HFACS in the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to classify factors that contribute to incidents in the context of a particular air traffic control (ATC) unit. According to study the ADF adaptation of HFACS is unreliable for incident analysis at the ATC unit level and may therefore be invalid in this context. Thus, the evaluation of HFACS in this study was about assessing inter-coder consensus between many coders for incident reports.

Walker, O'Connor, Phillips, Hahn, and Dalitsch (2011) applied lifted rule probabilities at the nanocode level within HFACS to identify common linkages within the DOD version of HFACS. The study focused on utilizing HFACS as both an accident investigation and reporting tool. They established the relationship between identified Unsafe Acts and the latent conditions preceding that action by applying Lifted Association Rules to *a priori* probabilities. The authors reported that the most significant lift was in Skill-Based Errors Breakdown in Visual Scan to Preconditions Channelized Attention. Other significant relationships were between Skill-Based Errors Procedural Error to Organizational Process Procedural Guidance/Publications and between Skill-Based Errors Over-control/Under-control to Preconditions Restricted Vision. Overall, there were seven significant lifts between Unsafe Acts and Preconditions, two significant lifts between Unsafe Acts and Supervision, and one significant lift between Unsafe Acts and Operational Influences. There were no significant lifts involving all four layers of the HFACS.

2.4 The Gap Analysis

HFACS has been used to analyze accidents especially in aviation. Based on Reason's model of human error, HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) is a commonly used analytical framework to evaluate the effect of human factors in aviation accidents. There are many studies exploiting human affects in aviation accidents using the HFACS taxonomy. Nevertheless, the structural relationships of accident causes among HFACS levels in comparable UAV and MAV accident causes have not been studied. This study tested for and modeled significant paths among HFACS levels and sublevels in UAV and MAV accidents and evaluated the significant common paths between UAV and MAV accident causes. A potential contribution of this study was to test the application of accident coding within the structure of the HFACS versus the four levels within an organization in which latent and active human errors are hypothesized to occur by Reason's Accident Causation Model (Figures 1 and 2). Evaluation studies of HFACS have been generally based on the level of agreement on the factors that caused or contributed to accidents. In other words, the coding or classification of causes is the focus area that has been discussed for in prior testing or evaluation. The structure or the HFACS model as used in practice has not been studied. This type of testing may contribute to revision of the accident coding practices and procedures or to revision of the HFACS model itself.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research methodology can be regarded as the style of establishing connection among the literature review and data type. This chapter explains the data source and analysis framework for the research. A quantitative *ex post facto* approach, analyzing U.S. Air Force Accident Investigation Board (AIB) reports between the years of 2010 and 2013, are used to test for significant paths within the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy and for common significant paths between UAV and MAV accident causes.

The data for this study came from United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site. This database (USAF Accident Investigation Boards, 2012) contained a list of Class A aerospace and ground mishaps (or accidents) and their corresponding summaries and full narratives from the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) of USAF reports between the years of 2000 and 2013. These accidents involved aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft, space systems, and missiles. An accident report is listed on this site after approval of Accident Investigation Board of the USAF. Class A accident reports are used as they have the most comprehensive information and are prepared with a high level of expertise.

The US Air Force conducts aerospace accident investigations of all Class A accidents involving Air Force aircraft, UAVs, missiles, and space systems or equipment, unless they result in damage solely to government property, in which case the accident investigation is discretionary (USAF Accident Investigation Boards, 2012). Aerospace Accident Investigation Boards (AIBs), which collect, evaluate and release the accident

data are convened under the authority of "Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations" (2010) document.

This U.S Air Force legal document includes the data collection arrangements and the regulations of report contents as well. The report, arranged by Aerospace Accident Investigation Boards and prepared in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations (2010), includes three main sections: The Executive Summary, the Summary of Facts, and the Statement of Opinion. Appendix A includes a AIBs report's cover, executive summary and outline.

Human Factors Analysis, conducted in the "Summary of Facts" section of the AIBs report, discusses human factors that directly relate to the mishap using the DOD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (DOD HFACS) definitions in AFI 91-204 Attachment 5 and may include the following: perceived crew or maintainer complacency, overconfidence, under-motivation or over-motivation to succeed, distraction, disruption, pressure, channelized attention, uncharacteristic mistake, or other degradation that may have led to the accident (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations, 2010).

The United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site database presents summary and detailed accident reports based on the investigation findings including human factors. The timeframe included 14 fiscal years, 2000-2013, of the accident reports. The majority of the reports in the database include only the executive summaries of the accidents, which may be due to the information being classified and not intended to be shared with the public. This study acquired HFACS accident classification data from 347 reports of which 75 detailed accident reports were available for the years between 2010 and 2013.

3.1 Establishment and Verification of Rater Reliability for this Research

Given that 272 of the accident reports are summaries and require classification by the researcher, the issue of classification reliability had to be addressed. This section sets forth the methodology used to establish and verify researcher rater reliability.

The fundamental sampling question to address is the accuracy and repeatability with which the rater classifies each of the remaining 272 accident summaries within the HFACS system relative to the known classification by the panels of "experts" in the 75 detailed accident reports. The first issue addressed was the sampling plan and design. As with all attribute classification sampling problems, the researcher had control of only the misclassification difference to detect between any two raters and the sample size necessary to achieve a stated $1 - \alpha$ confidence in the difference to detect. The first decision criterion for sampling plan selection was whether or not the required $1 - \alpha$ confidence can be met, or, if not met, how close the resultant confidence approaches the required confidence. The second decision criterion is the resultant sampling resolution. In general, the selected sample size resulted in a tradeoff between confidence in the difference to detect the lower the resultant confidence but the greater the sampling resolution as rater reliability approaches 100%.

For this study, rater reliability was established by comparing the researcher's classifications to those of two other expert pilots of a sample subset of the 75 detailed

accident reports with known HFACS accident classifications by panels of "experts." Since the 75 HFACS detailed reports had known classifications, there were no defective classifications in the population, and, therefore, the Hyper-geometric sampling distribution did not apply. Thus, the binomial sampling distribution, B(n, p) applied under the assumption that a countable large number of combinations, C_N^n , exist for the selected sample size *n*. from the population of N = 75 detailed accident reports. The following methodology was applied to select a sample size sufficient to achieve a stated 1 – α , confidence in the difference to detect between any two raters.

- 1. Given that the O'Connor, et. al. (2010) study indicated only a 55% agreement among raters, it was reasonable to assume in this study that with no prior training the researcher and two expert pilots would randomly agree only 50% of the time. Thus, p = 0.50 joint agreement represents the base random assignment case. Joint agreement of the researcher and two expert pilots with the classifications made by the panels of "experts" is a matter of bias assessment in attribute agreement analysis and training and retraining was included in the design in order to approach or exceed the 55% agreement observed by O'Connor, et. al.
- 2. Next, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was set up to assess the tradeoff between confidence in the difference to detect and the sampling resolution over a range of sample sizes. (The output of the spreadsheet analysis and description of formulas used in set forth in Appendix B.) A summary of the analysis is presented in the following table.

Sample Size, n =	20	25	30	35	40
LCL(0.5-0.4,0.92)	0.0000	0.0087	0.0254	0.0384	0.0488
LCL(0.5-0.3,0.93)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0167	0.0303	0.0413
LCL(0.5-0.2,0.99)	0.0000	0.0016	0.0276	0.0478	0.0641
LCL(0.5-0.1,0.999)	0.0000	0.0396	0.0710	0.0954	0.1151
Resolution (bins)					
p(Misclass) = 0.5	11	14	15	16	17
p(Misclass) = 0.4	11	13	14	15	16
p(Misclass) = 0.3	11	12	13	14	15
p(Misclass) = 0.2	10	10	12	12	14
p(Misclass) = 0.1	7	8	9	9	10
p(Misclass) = 0.05	5	5	6	7	7

 Table 1.
 Summary Analysis Results of Sample Size Selection Criteria

Sample sizes in increments of 1 were considered in the range of n = 20 to n = 40.

The LCL (0.5 - p_i, confidence level) is the lower confidence limit for the stated difference in misclassification proportions at the stated confidence level = (1 - α).

$$LCL = (0.5 - \hat{p}_i) - Z_{\alpha} \sqrt{\frac{0.5(1 - 0.5)}{n} + \frac{\hat{p}_i(1 - \hat{p}_i)}{n}}$$
(1)

Selection criterion: LCL > 0 indicating the ability to detect the stated difference ($p_i = 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.05$) at the indicated confidence level.

Resolution (bins) is the number of misclassification bins with
 P(misclassification = x) ≥ 0.005. For example, for p = 0.5 and n = 20,
 there were 11 misclassification bins as shown in Table 2.

Number(Misclassified)	p(Misclassified = x)
5	0.0148
6	0.0370
7	0.0739
8	0.1201
9	0.1602
10	0.1762
11	0.1602
12	0.1201
13	0.0739
14	0.0370
15	0.0148

Table 2. Number of Misclassifications p = 0.5, n = 20

Based on this analysis, a sample size n = 30 was selected as jointly providing $\ge 90\%$ confidence in detecting differences between any two raters from the p = 0.50 base random assignment case to reduced misclassification rates of p = 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, 0.10, and 0.05 respectively and providing intermediate sampling resolution comparable to that of larger sample sizes. Allowing for all possible sample combinations of n = 30 out of the population of N = 75 HFACS detailed reports, $C_{40}^{30} = 1.1496 \times 10^{11}$ assuring that the binomial sampling distribution applies.

The sampling design to establish and verify rater reliability was as follows:

- 1. The sample of n = 30 detailed accident reports were randomly selected from the population of N = 75 detailed reports. The remaining 45 detailed reports were randomly assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing.
- 2. The researcher and two expert pilots jointly established classification criteria from the 10 training detailed accident reports.

- 3. The researcher and two expert pilots independently classified accident causes from the summaries of the 10 testing accident reports in accordance with the established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates.
- 4. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted on the classifications. If the measurement metrics Each Appraiser versus Expert Standard > 50%, All Appraisers versus Expert Standard > 50%, and Between Appraiser agreement > 50%, the researcher would proceed to Step 5. If any one of the measurement metrics < 50%, the remaining 45 detailed reports would be randomly re-assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing. Step 2 would be repeated updating the joint classification criteria to include new information. Step 3 would be repeated on the new set of 10 testing reports. Attribute agreement analysis in this step would be conducted evaluating for all measurement metrics > 50%.
- 5. The researcher and two expert pilots independently classified accident causes of the summaries of the n = 30 detailed accident reports in accordance with the established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted evaluating for Each Appraiser versus Expert Standard > 50%, All Appraisers versus Expert Standard > 50%, and Between Appraiser agreement > 50%. If this set of criteria was not met, the process would return to Step 1 and the remaining 45 detailed reports would be randomly re-assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing. Steps 1 to 5 were iterated until the set of criteria

was met. As this set of criteria was met, the researcher proceeded to classification in Step 6.

- 6. The researcher classified accident causes of the remaining 272 summary reports in accordance with established HFACS criteria.
- 7. Upon completion of the classification, a random sample of n = 30 was selected from the 272 summary reports classified by the researcher. Using the established classification criteria, the n = 30 summary reports were submitted in random order to the researcher for re-classification. The n = 30 summary reports were submitted in random order to the two expert pilots who independently classified accident causes in accordance with the established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted and meeting the set of criteria in Step 5 indicated acceptable classification by the researcher.

3.2 Methodological Design and Rationale for the Design

Apprehending human errors causation path in UAV and MAV accidents can reveal important findings to understand the required interventions for UAVs and MAVs. However, it is impossible to manipulate human errors in order to investigate their potential influence on UAVs for some certain reasons. This study is based on the analysis of human errors contribution to accidents in unmanned and manned types of aircrafts. The *ex-post facto* method was used for the design of the research. In this design, the events were the Accidents, Class A Mishap, that had already occurred. These data were analyzed for significant paths among HFACS Categorical levels in manned or unmanned types of aircraft by the means of factor analysis and for commonality of identified significant paths between UAV and MAV accident causes by means of structural equation modeling (SEM).

Factor analysis, attempting to find latent variables which cannot be observed (Cox, 2005), is a technique for exploring any number of linearly interrelated variables to a reduced number of unobservable variables. In this study, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to identify any potential statistically significant paths of relationships between HFACS categorical levels using the correlation matrix.

Structural equation modeling is a technique that combines factor analysis (the measurement model), which relates sets of directly observable variables to underlying conceptual (latent) variables, with path analysis of the relationships among those conceptual variables (Harris, 2001). To this end, factor analysis was conducted first to exploit the possible paths among the category level of DOD HFACS. Having the factors or components, paths were tested for their statistically significant causation.

Path analysis, results from the estimation of a causal model from correlations, was developed by Wright (1934) as a flexible means of relating the correlation coefficients between variables in a model to the functional relations among them for the purpose of examining genetic studies. This subject was followed by the studies of Turner and Stevens, Tukey in the 1950s (Wright, 1960) and many researchers recently. Path analysis, one of the applications of structural equation modeling and known also as causal analysis, is an extension of the regression model, used to test the fit of the correlation of causal models. The analysis was grounded on the estimation of the relationships in the hypothesized model by the researcher. The three rules of path analysis, known as Wright's Rules (Loehlin, 2004), are based on the idea that if a situation can be presented as a proper path diagram, then the correlation between any two variables in the diagram can be expressed as the sum of the compound paths connecting these two points. As in having some rules to be followed, path analysis also has some assumptions that should be taken into account cautiously and prudently to prevent any misinterpretation of the model and analysis. Given that direct effects in a path model were found to be statistically significant, as Kline (1991) states. the researcher must be aware of the fact that global goodness-of-fit indices provide limited information about the adequacy of path models: they reflect only the "average" fit of a model. He also expresses that a fit index can imply satisfaction even when the proportions of the model clearly do not match sample data. Any proposed model can be revised to fit the data by reducing the degrees of freedom. The conditions necessary to establish causal relations include time precedence and robust relationship in the presence of other variables (Lei & Wu, 2007).

As Everitt and Dunn (1991, p. 304) articulate the myths and realities of causal models and latent variables, they state that even though any convincing, respectable, and reasonable a path diagram may appear, any causal inferences extracted are rarely more than a form of statistical fantasy as path analysis deals with correlation, not causation of variables.

Consequently, a researcher dealing with path analysis must be aware of fact that the numbers neither tell every aspect of model nor confirms the model hypothesized. An investigator needs additional evidences to imply causality in a path analysis. As Kline (2011) articulates, among plausible models with equal or near-equal fit, the researcher must explain why any one of them may actually be correct. He must directly acknowledge the existence of equivalent or near-equivalent models and describe what might be done in future research to differentiate between any serious competing models.

As all the causal effects in this study were unidirectional, the models analyzed are recursive. According to Kline (2011), the use of an estimation model other than Maximum Likelihood requires explicit justification. As an assumption, the exogenous variables, established at first main level of DOD HFACS, were considered to be measured without error. There are two options for the analysis of recursive path models, which are multiple regression or estimation with an SEM computer program (Kline, 2011). Maximum likelihood estimation as the default model in AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structures) software program was used for SEM analysis of the hypothesized path models to obtain the standardized total effects and goodness of fit statistics.

According to Miller and Salkind (2002) the prospective outcomes of "natural" experiments such as *ex-post facto* research design discovers and exposes causal relationships under controlled conditions; thus, statements of greater rigor are made possible and increased validity of social treatments or program is demonstrated.

Tvaryanas and Thompson's (2008) and Walker, O'Connor, Phillips, Hahn, and Dalitsch's (2011) observations of no complete paths through the HFACS taxonomy corresponding to Reason's (1990) "Swiss Cheese" model implies that this research should test for all possible combinations of incomplete and complete paths through the DOD HFACS taxonomy as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. All Possible Covariance Paths of the HFACS Taxonomy

The general mathematical structural equation model for the all possible paths model would be:

$$P(Act_i) = \Sigma j = 1-3 \Sigma k = 1-4 \Sigma l = 1-3 (\beta_{AP} X_{P,j} + \beta_{AS} X_{S,k} + \beta_{AO} X_{O,l} + \beta_{AS,P} X_{P,j} X_{S,k} + \beta_{AO,P} X_{P,j} X_{O,l} + \beta_{AO,S} X_{S,k} X_{O,l} + \beta_{AO,PS} X_{P,j} X_{S,k} X_{O,l})$$

$$X_{M,n} = 0,1$$

 $\Sigma_i P(Act_i) = 1.0, i = 1-4$ (2)

This research, however, elected to use dummy variables as "pass through" paths when a given HFACS level was not specified in an accident report. This simplified the model to that shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Hypothesized Covariance Paths of the HFACS Taxonomy using **Dummy Variables**

This yielded a simplified structural equation model conforming to Reason's original (1990) "Swiss Cheese" model.

$$P(Act_i) = \Sigma j = 1-4 \Sigma k = 1-5 \Sigma l = 1-4 \beta_{AO,PS} X_{P,j} X_{S,k} X_{O,l}$$

÷ -

$$X_{M,n} = 0,1$$

 $\Sigma_i P(Act_i) = 1.0, i = 1-4$ (3)

The simplified model provided additional information on the significance of inclusion or lack of inclusion of latent human failures at higher organizational levels.

3.3 Research Questions

The main purpose of first and second question was to test for significant paths among HFACS levels within the context of UAV and MAV accidents. The main purpose of the third question was to identify common paths between the UAV and MAV accidents within the context of HFACS levels.

- What is, or are, the causation path(s) model for MAV accidents among the categorical levels of HFACS?
- 2. What is, or are, the causation path(s) model for UAV accidents among the categorical levels of HFACS?
- 3. Are there any common paths between UAV and MAV accident path(s) in terms of HFACS categorical levels?




Figure 7. Methodological Design of Research Questions

While vertical dark grey arrows stand for the Research Questions 1 and 2, horizontal light grey arrows stand for the Research Question 3.

UL4: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-4 which is Organizational Influences.
UL3 UAV Accidents HFACS Level-3 which is Supervision
UL2: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-2 which is Preconditions
UL1: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-1 which is Unsafe Acts
ML4: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-4 which is Organizational Influences
ML3: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-3 which is Supervision
ML2: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-2 which is Preconditions
ML1: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-1 which is Preconditions

The HFACS, developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) and based on organizational model of human error of Reason (1990), provides a hierarchical structure that differentiates between various levels within an organization in which an error might occur: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) Organizational Influences. (Walker, et al., 2011)

3.4 Proposed Hypotheses for the Factor Analysis and SEM Models

H1₀: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in MAV accidents.

FOR MAV ACCIDENTS: $\beta_{AP} = \beta_{AS} = \beta_{AO} = \beta_{PS} = \beta_{PO} = \beta_{SO} = 0$

 $H1_a$: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in MAV accidents.

FOR MAV ACCIDENTS: β_{AP} OR β_{AS} OR β_{AO} OR β_{PS} OR β_{PO} OR $\beta_{SO} \neq 0$

H2₀: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in UAV accidents.

FOR UAV ACCIDENTS: $\beta_{AP} = \beta_{AS} = \beta_{AO} = \beta_{PO} = \beta_{PO} = \beta_{SO} = 0$

H2_a: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in UAV accidents.

FOR UAV ACCIDENTS: β_{AP} OR β_{AS} OR β_{AO} OR β_{PS} OR β_{PO} OR $\beta_{SO} \neq 0$

H3₀: There is no common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accident paths in terms of HFACS Categorical levels.

 $H3_{s}$: There is at least one common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accidents paths in terms of HFACS levels.

3.5 Data Analysis

For the first two research questions, having identified number of accident error nanocodes in each respective category of HFACS levels in UAV and MAV accidents from the reports of "USAF Accident Investigation Boards" (2012), a factor analysis was conducted. This factor analysis provided correlation information on the potentially statistically significant paths among HFACS category levels. Given the statistically significant correlations identified by factor analysis, four SEM path models were hypothesized for each aircraft type at $\alpha = 0.05$ and 0.10 significance levels. Each model was created and tested in the SPSS/AMOS software in order to determine model fit and confirm the significant paths within DOD HFACS taxonomy. This concluded the testing for significance of the β coefficients in hypotheses H1₀, H1_a and H2₀ and H2_a.

For the third research question; three different comparisons were made to establish the base for common paths between UAV and MAV accidents. The first comparison was made between the factor analysis, using the Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at the two significance levels of the two aircraft type, UAV and MAV. The second comparison was made via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The third comparison was conducted via applying MAV data to UAV model and at the two significance levels to identify similar paths within the context of DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to the MAV model due to insufficient degrees of freedom from the sample size. In this comparison, the total effects of the respective analysis are compared to contrast the common paths. This comparison concluded the testing for significance of the β coefficients in hypotheses H3₀ and H3_a for common significant paths between UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS categorical levels. All of statistical tests are performed at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels. Table 3 shows the methodological design of the analysis.

Research Question	Data Collection	Data Collection Reference	Data Analysis Methods	Data Analysis Tool	Expected Outputs	Relationship to Research Questions
Pre- Analyze	Rater reliability to be established by comparing the researcher's classifications to those of two other expert pilots.		Attribute Agreement Analysis	Minitab	To ensure the rater reliability to extend what previous studies presented.	Establishment and Verification of Rater Reliability for this Research
1 and 2	Coding and normalization of the accident causes according to	USAF Accident Investigati on Boards	Factor Analysis Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (Path Analysis)	SPSS SPSS /AMOS	 The paths among of HFACS Category levels. See the UAV and MAV models whether they fit to HFACS. 	Test the paths in UAVs and MAVs accidents in terms of human factors.
3	HFACS		Structural Equation Model (Path Analysis)	SPSS /AMOS	3. Compare UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS taxonomy.	Contrast the common paths between UAV and MAV accidents

3.6 Internal and External Validity of the Research

Experimental design and the research methods are considered to be the tools of establishing the internal validity. In this study, structural equation modeling was used to test the structure and identify the statistically significant paths among the levels of DOD HFACS taxonomy in two aircraft types, UAV and MAV at 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels.

The question of "... can the results obtained reasonably be used to make generalization about the world beyond that specific research context?" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013, p. 17) addresses the issue of external validity. The methodology of this study can be used to test other structures of HFACS adaptations and accident causation taxonomies as well. The external validity of a research study is the extent to which the conclusions drawn can be generalized to other contexts (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The conclusions of the study address the issues regarding the critiques of HFACS. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2013), there are three commonly used strategies that enhance external validity: A real-life setting, a representative sample, and replication in a different context. Considering these three commonly used strategies:

- The setting is real life since the samples are taken from actual aircraft accidents and tested in an *ex post facto* approach.
- Representative Sample the U.S. Air Force is considered to be one of the biggest air forces in the world from very different perspectives, and the usage of the UAV as well as MAV is the most frequent within the U.S. Air Force.

 The timeframe includes 14 fiscal years of the accident reports. Earlier accident reports related with old aircrafts might not depict the current technological developments.

The results of this study, which aim to exploit the covariance among the variables within the levels of HFACS and type of aircrafts, can be replicated in a different (generalization and applicability) air force, commercial aviation or sector.

Analyzing the research questions, a methodology can be found to tailor the HFACS being used in military aviation or adapted it to other domains other than aviation. Since most of the evaluation studies of HFACS are concerned about the inter-rater reliability and level of agreement on the factors that caused or contributed to accident, which can be regarded as internal validity of HFACS, it is vital to analyze the structure of the HFACS itself, which is external validity. The validity of the study and validity of HFACS are used in two different settings.

3.7 Research Protocol

A protocol is an essential part of any study as it outlines in detail the study rationale and methodology and provides a plan of action for the investigators to follow (Noyes, 2008). Consequently, the author ensures a distinctive understanding into the designated methods of the study. Holloway and Mooney (2004) articulated that both a systematic review and a piece of original research require a carefully considered methodology called a protocol before you can begin; how to construct a protocol is one of the most difficult tasks asked of anyone beginning this type of work. The data for this study originated from MAV and UAV accidents in the United States Air Force. The time frame is from fiscal years of 2000 to 2013. It was collected by Unites States Legal Operations Agency that can be considered as a reliable source since it is an official governmental institution. The US Air Force conducts aerospace accident investigations of all Class A accidents involving Air Force aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missiles, and space systems or equipment, unless they result in damage solely to government property (in which case the accident investigation is discretionary). Aerospace Accident Investigation Boards (AIBs) are convened under the authority of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations (USAF Accident Investigation Boards, 2012).

Structural equation models were constructed in the SPSS/AMOS software package to test the structure of HFACS levels in both accident types. MAV data were fit to the UAV model to determine if any significant accident causal paths were common between UAV and MAV accidents.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The main objective of this study was to analyze the structural relationships of accident causes among DOD HFACS levels in comparable UAV and MAV and to analyze the relationship between UAV and MAV accident causes paths. For the first two research questions, structural equation models were constructed in the SPSS/AMOS software package to test the structure of DOD HFACS levels in both MAV and UAV aircraft types. For the third research question, three different comparisons were made to establish a base for common paths between UAV and MAV accidents. The first comparison was made between the results of factor analysis. The second comparison was made via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The third comparison was made via applying MAV data to UAV model at two significance levels to identify similar paths within the context of DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to MAV model due to insufficient degrees of freedom from the sample size. In this comparison the standardized total effects of the respective analysis were compared to contrast the common paths. All analyses were conducted at two different p values, 0.05 and 0.10.

The DOD HFACS describes four main tiers, named as main levels in this study, of failures/conditions explained in the previous sections. The next layers following the "level" are named as category and nanocodes in DOD HFACS. This study used four tiers as main levels, categories and sub categories as "categories", and nanocodes. As the main purpose of the study was concerned about the structure rather than internal content, this arrangement was established to conduct the analysis in a simple and a functional technique. The levels and the respective categories and abbreviations used in the analysis are shown in Table 4.

LEVELS	CATEGORIES	ABBREVIATIO N	Number of HFACS Nanocode s
	Resource/Acquisition Management	ORG	9
Organizational	Organizational Climate	OC	5
Influences (O)	Organizational Processes	ОР	6
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Dummy Variable	ODMY	1
Total Nur	nber of Nanocodes in Organizationa	I Influences	20+1
	Inadequate Supervision	SI	6
	Planned Inappropriate Operations	SP	7
Unsafe Supervision (S)	Failed to Correct Known Problem	SF	2
Supervision (S)	Supervisory Violations	SV	4
	Dummy Variable	SDMY	1
Total	Number of Nanocodes in Unsafe Sup	ervision	-19+1
	Environmental Factors	PE	19
Preconditions	Condition of Individuals	РС	55
for Unsafe Acts (P)	Personal Factors	PP	18
(1)	Dummy Variable	PDMY	1
Total Numb	er of Nanocodes in Preconditions fo	r Unsafe Acts	92+1
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Skill-Based Errors	AEI	6
	Judgment & Decision-Making Errors	AE2	6
Acts (A)	Misperception Errors	AE3	1
	Violations	AV	3
	Dummy Variable	ADMY	l
	16+1		
Total number	of DOD HFACS Nanocodes and Du	mmy Variables	147+4

Table 4.Levels, Categories, Respective Number of Nanocodes and
Abbreviations used in the Analysis

4.2 Inter-rater Reliability

The attribute agreement analysis is used to measure and evaluate the accuracy of subjective ratings by people. In general, it is more likely that subjective ratings are accurate and useful if there is a substantial agreement in measurements among appraisers. For this study, rater reliability was established by comparing the researcher's classifications to those of two other expert pilots of sample subset executive summaries of the 48 detailed accident reports with known DOD HFACS accident classifications by panels of United States Air Force "experts".

As no human subject information was part of the crash data and the experts provided information only about the crash data that does not include any human subject data about themselves, the study was judged to be exempt from review by the Old Dominion University Institutional Review Board (IRB).

At the beginning of the inter-rater reliability study, the researcher and two expert pilots, having a diverse experience in aviation, jointly studied the DOD HFACS taxonomy together with detailed reports. The training and subsequent phase of the interrater reliability analysis provided raters with a common understanding of DOD HFACS and its contents. Each phase of this study improved the understanding of the system and the raters' accident coding causes or factors. The design to establish and verify rater reliability was divided into mainly three sections: Training, Testing and Evaluation.

4.2.1 Training

The initial training included the joint review of the study's purpose and DOD HFACS taxonomy including some sample detailed accident reports. The other part of this training consisted of reviewing ten detailed accident reports jointly. While some reports included "causal", "contributory", "non-contributory" classification, most of the detailed reports provided all relative causes with respective nanocode(s). As the executive summaries of the reports did not include the "non-contributory" factors, it would not be possible to infer any cause. To this end, the raters decided to classify the all human errors found as causal factors without making any further sorting as "causal" or "contributory." The presence of any cause was assigned a nanocode within a respective category. For the reports in which a nanocode was not assigned a letter D was entered to the respective level as dummy variable.

4.2.2 Inter-rater Reliability Testing

The second section of the rater-reliability analysis, named as testing, consisted of three rounds by the three raters. The researcher and two expert pilots independently classified accident causes of the summaries of n = 48 detailed reports in accordance with the established DOD HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates for each round. Round 1, Round 2 and Round 3 included 10, 10, and 28 executive summaries respectively of detailed accident reports. Minitab® Statistical Analysis (16.2.1) software was used for inter-rater reliability of Each Appraiser versus Standard, All Appraisers versus Standard, and Between Appraisers. Although the analysis was executed at nanocode and category level, the latter one is used in this study, since the structural equation models were constructed and statistical analyses were conducted at the categorical level.

4.2.2.1 Round One Attribute Agreement Analysis

At the DOD HFACS category level path, the preliminary percentage of agreement results of round one showed acceptable Within Appraisers repeatability of 96.15%, 82.69%, and 69.23% respectively and acceptable between appraisers agreement of 50.0%. However, for Each Appraiser versus Standard, raters one and two exhibited acceptable agreement at 73.08% and 63.46% respectively. Rater three agreed with the standard only 44.23%, which was less than the specified 50% average. After these results, the raters reviewed the same accident reports to identify the differences in code assignments, agree on the correct assignment per report, and the criteria for each assignment. The results of Round One analysis are presented in Table 5.

ROUND 1 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS OF HFACS CATEGORY LEVEL Assessment Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % CI Agreement 52 Rater 1 50 96.15 (86.79, 99.53) Rater2 52 82.69 (69.67, 91.77) Within Appraisers 43 52 Rater3 36 69.23 (54.90, 81.28) Rater1 52 38 73.08 (58.98, 84.43) Each Appraiser vs. Rater2 52 33 63.46 (48.96, 76.38) Standard Rater3 23 44.23 (30.47, 58.67) 53 **Between Appraisers** 52 50.00 (35.81, 64.19) 26 All Appraisers vs. Standard 52 22 42.31 (28.73, 56.80)

 Table 5.
 Attribute Agreement Analysis of Round 1

Two factors were identified as the causes for this low level of agreement. First, it was the initial part of independent study, and the raters did not think that they had sufficient understanding of the HFACS classification code definitions. Second, they thought that including as many nanocodes as possible would contribute in finding the causes of the accidents. However, including more nanocodes than required decreased the level of agreement.

4.2.2.2 Round Two Attribute Agreement Analysis

The raters performed round two attribute agreement analysis on an additional 10 randomly selected accident summaries classifying two replicates with approximately a one week interval between replicates. The Assessment Agreement results of round two are shown in Table 6. The Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus Standard, Between Appraisers, and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above the specified 50% average.

ROUND 2 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSES OF HFACS CATEGORY LEVEL										
Assessment Agreement Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % Cl										
	Rater1	57	54	94.74 (85.38, 98.90)						
Within Appraisers	Rater2	57	53	92.98 (83.00, 98.05)						
	Rater3	57	48	84.21 (72.13, 92.52)						
	Raterl	57	50	87.72 (76.32, 94.92)						
Each Appraiser vs. Standard	Rater2	57	51	89.47 (78.48, 96.04)						
Standard	Rater3	57	47	82.46 (70.09, 91.25)						
Between Appraisers 57 44 77.19 (64.16, 87.2										
All Appraisers vs. Standard 57 43 75.44 (62.24, 8										

Table 6.Round 2 Attribute Agreement Analyses

4.2.2.3 Round Three Attribute Agreement Analysis

Twenty eight executive summaries of detailed accident reports were randomly selected and rated in two replicates by the raters with approximately a one week interval

between replicates. The Assessment Agreement results of round three are shown in Table 7. The raters' Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus Standard, Between Appraisers, and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above specified 50% average.

ROUND 3 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS OF HFACS CATEGORY LEVEL Assessment # Inspected Appraiser # Matched Percent 95 % Cl Agreement 88.34 (82.40, 92.83) Rater 1 163 144 Within Appraisers Rater2 163 152 93.25 (88.25, 96.58) Rater3 163 84.05 (77.51, 89.31) 137 163 Rater1 133 81.60 (74.78, 87.22) Each Appraiser vs. Rater2 163 135 82.82 (76.14, 88.27) Standard 163 Rater3 126 77.30 (70.10, 83.49) 163 117 71.78 (64.21, 78.54) **Between Appraisers** All Appraisers vs. Standard 109 163 66.87 (59.08, 74.04)

Table 7.Round 3 Attribute Agreement Analyses

The results from Round Three were assessed to be sufficient to continue evaluating the remaining reports which do not have detailed reports.

4.2.3 Evaluation of the Remaining Reports

All the remaining reports having no detailed accident information were rated by the researcher in accordance with round three. After all reports were rated, thirty executive summaries of reports having no detailed information were randomly selected and rated in two replicates by the raters with approximately a one week interval between replicates. The round four inter-rater attribute agreement analysis results are shown in Table 8. The raters' Within Appraisers and Between Appraisers agreement percentages were all above specified 50% minimum.

ROUND 4 ATTRI	BUTE AGRI	EEMENT ANA LEVEL	ALYSIS OF H	IFACS CATEGORY
Assessment Agreement	Appraiser	# Inspected	# Matched	Percent 95 % CI
	Raterl	180	142	78.89 (72.19, 84.61)
Within Appraisers	Rater2	180	167	92.78 (87.97, 96.10)
	Rater3	180	142	78.89 (72.19, 84.61)
Between Appra	aisers	180	95	52.78 (45.21, 60.25)

 Table 8.
 Round 4 Attribute Agreement Analyses

The results of Round Four were assessed to be sufficient to utilize the classifications for exploratory factor analysis, structural equation modeling, and statistical analyses of path effects.

4.3 Data Arrangement

The data of this study, 347 Class A accident reports, were acquired from United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site. This website contains a list of Class A aerospace and ground mishaps or accidents and their corresponding summaries and full narratives from the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) of USAF reports.

The study acquired accident classification data from 347 reports of which 75 are detailed and classified in accordance with DOD HFACS taxonomy for the years between 2010 and 2013. Arrangement of the available accident reports with respect to years, aircraft type, and report form is presented in Table 9.

YEAR		PORT IBERS	TOTAL REPORTS	FORM OF THE	
	MAV	UAV	IN YEARS	REPORT	
2000	21	2	23		
2001	27	3	30		
2002	30	9	39		
2003	32	5	37	272	
2004	18	5	23	EXECUTIVE	
2005	17	5	22	SUMMARIES	
2006	18	5	23	IN 10 YEARS	
2007	15	5	20		
2008	21	8	29		
2009	17	9	26		
2010	6	6	12		
2011	12	16	28	75 DETAILED REPORTS IN	
2012	12	10	22	4 YEARS	
2013	8	5	13		
SUM	254	93			
TOTAL			347		

Table 9. Classification of Accident Reports

An accident database was prepared in a Microsoft Excel workbook and each report's accident cause was entered to its respective nanocode as 1 for occurrence versus 0 for nonoccurrence. Since the majority of reports did not classify mishap or accident impacts as major, minor, or contributory in terms of human injury cost or aircraft cost, no weighting system was employed. All causes or factors found in the accident reports were entered as having an equal weight of 1, regardless of the impact of the respective mishap or accident. The 0-1 non-occurrence versus occurrence entry created a Poisson process by HFACS nanocode, category, and category level. As the study is concerned with the structural evaluation of DOD HFACS taxonomy, fourteen (14) DOD HFACS categories and four (4) dummy variables as set forth in Table 4 were used in this study. To reduce the total number of cells, nanocode(s) found at each report were aggregated to into their respective HFACS category level. Eighty four accident reports were assigned no DOD HFACS nanocode by the USAF AIB and were excluded from the analysis. The numbers of excluded reports for UAV and MAV were 33 and 51 respectively. The detailed numbers of the reports assigned DOD HFACS nanocodes are depicted in Table 10.

	MAV Accident Reports	UAV Accident Reports	TOTAL
All Reports	254	93	347
Reports Including DOD HFACS Nanocode	203	60	263

 Table 10.
 Accident Reports Containing HFACS Nanocode

4.4. Sample Size

The sample size for factor analysis and structural equation modeling was assessed within the same context for the two different set of data, UAV and MAV. According to Kline (2011), a sample size of less than 100 is considered to be small, between 100-200 medium, and bigger than 200 cases are considered large. In that context the sample size for UAV of n = 60 can be concluded as small and MAV of n = 203 can be considered as a large sample size for the analysis. Another consideration for sample size is the complexity of the structure or model (Kline, 2011). As the proposed model includes no latent variable and linearity or single-direction between the categories, it can be concluded that the model hypothesized doesn't have a complexity in terms of paths or correlations.

4.5 Data Normalization

Normalization can be considered as a method for producing a set of appropriate relations that support the data requirements of an analysis. To normalize the mishap and accident occurrence data, each report's nanocode counts were aggregated within categories and divided by the total number of nanocodes, plus one for the dummy variable within each category level to yield Poisson occurrence rates. For example, if an accident report was assigned three nanocodes in Personal Factors (PE) category under Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (P) main level of DOD HFACS, it was divided by its respective sum of total nanocode, 93 (Table 4), yielding a Poisson occurrence rate of 0.0322581 per report. The normalization to Poisson occurrence rates standardized the data for subsequent exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and structural equation modeling.

4.6 Descriptive Analysis of the Data

The exploratory findings regarding UAV and MAV accidents in terms of DOD HFACS Category and main levels are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. The total DOD HFACS nanocodes found in 60 UAV accident reports was 234, and the number for 203 MAV accident reports was 676. The nanocode rate per accident was 3.9 and 3.3 for UAV and MAV respectively.




Figure 8. UAV and MAV Accident Rates in Terms of DOD HFACS Category Levels

The accident rates in terms of the DOD HFACS main levels are depicted in Figure 9. The rates of UAV and MAV accidents can be considered to be close and consisent in terms of the DOD HFACS main levels. The rates of O and P levels in UAV are higher than MAV respective levels, whereas the rates of S and A levels in MAV are higher than UAV respective levels by slight percenteges.




Figure 9. UAV and MAV Accident Rates in Terms of DOD HFACS Main Levels

The descriptive statistics were obtained using IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS version 21) program. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 11 and Table 12.

Variable Name	Mean	S.D	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis
ORG	0.011	0.024	0.001	2.333	6.141
OC	0.000	0.005	0.000	9.999	98.960
ОР	0.010	0.022	0.000	2.182	4.127
ODMY	0.032	0.022	0.001	-0.728	-1.484
SI	0.007	0.020	0.000	3.007	8.882
SP	0.006	0.019	0.000	3,194	10.132
SF	0.001	0.006	0.000	8.102	64.284
SV	0.001	0.006	0.000	8.102	64.284
SDMY	0.039	0.021	0.000	-1.385	-0.082
PE	0.003	0.006	0.000	3.032	12.127
PC	0.010	0.014	0.000	2.653	11.740
PP	0.003	0.006	0.000	2.746	9.979
PDMY	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.501	-1.766
AE1	0.050	0.050	0.002	0.734	-0.063
AE2	0.015	0.033	0.001	2.066	3.401
AE3	0.006	0.018	0.000	2.916	6.565
AV	0.003	0.013	0.000	4.460	18.073

 Table 11.
 Descriptive Statistics for MAV Accident Reports

 Table 12.
 Descriptive Statistics for UAV Accident Reports

Variable Name	Меап	S.D	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis
ORG	0.009	0.019	0.000	1.679	0.846
OC	0.002	0.009	0.000	5.334	27.360
OP	0.018	0.029	0.001	1.377	0.873
ODMY	0.025	0.024	0.001	-0.068	-2.065
SI	0.008	0.019	0.000	1.835	1.413
SP	0.005	0.020	0.000	4.169	17.083
SV	0.002	0.009	0.000	5.334	27.360
SDMY	0.038	0.021	0.000	-1.294	-0.339
PE	0.005	0.006	0.000	0.859	-0.258
PC	0.009	0.016	0.000	1.810	2.643
PP	0.004	0.010	0.000	2.720	7.616
PDMY	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.895	-1.241
AE1	0.047	0.055	0.003	0.989	0.212
AE2	0.026	0.044	0.002	2.024	4.719
AE3	0.006	0.019	0.000	2.736	5.671
AV	0.001	0.008	0.000	7.746	60.000

Since the category Supervisory Failure (SF) category of UAV accidents had a zero assignment rate, it was eliminated from factor analysis and structural equation modeling. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the remaining variables.

Fundamental research findings are presented within the context of analysis executed during study, including factor analysis and path analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) respectively. The study was based on 347 Class A accident reports of USAF Accident Investigation Board (AIB) between the years of 2000 and 2013. The following findings are summarized from the descriptive analysis of the reports:

- Eighty four (84) accident reports out of 347 contained no DOD HFACS nanocodes. Thirty three (51) MAV reports and fifty one (33) UAV reports contained no DOD HFACS nanocodes. The remaining 263 reports had at least one nanocode assigned.
- A total of 234 DOD HFACS nanocodes were assigned to 60 UAV accident reports, and 676 nanocodes were assigned to 203 MAV accident reports. The nanocode rate per accident was 3.9 and 3.3 for UAV and MAV respectively.
- The rate of nanocode assignment to each main category level was as follows:
 - "Organizational Influences" was 15.4% for UAV and 13.5% for MAV,
 - o Unsafe Supervision (S) was 7.7% for UAV and 8.9% for MAV,
 - Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (P) was 44% for UAV and 42.3% for MAV,
 - o Unsafe Acts (A) was 32.9% for UAV and 35.3% for MAV.

- "Condition of Individuals" (PC) had the highest accident rate among the category level of DOD HFACS in both types of aircraft, 22.2% and 26.6% for UAV and MAV respectively. Skill-Based Errors (AE1) had the second highest accident rate as 19.2% and 24%% for UAV and MAV respectively.
- Out of 147 HFACS nanocodes, ninety seven (97) nanocodes were assigned to MAV accident reports and sixty seven (67) were assigned to UAV accident reports. In other words 66% of the available nanocodes were used to classify MAV accident causes and 46 % for UAV accident causes.

From the above summary, the number of the nanocodes assigned per accident report displayed close values among the HFACS category and main levels in terms of UAV and MAV aircraft types.

4.7 Factor Analysis

An exploratory factor analysis was performed using SPSS to explore the potential for dimension reduction. The Pearson correlation matrix, that provides the pattern of relationships, and its associated significance matrix for MAV and UAV are presented in Appendix C and Appendix D respectively. The correlations found statistically significant at $p \le 0.05$ and $p \le 0.1$ levels among MAV DOD HFACS category levels are presented in Tables 13 and 14 and among UAV DOD HFACS category levels in Tables 15 and 16 with their correlations values. When determining the statistically significant correlations, those found at the same category level are collinear, and were excluded from subsequent path analysis, since this study was focused on the relationships among the levels. In other words, any statistically significant collinear relationship within the same DOD HFACS category level was eliminated as out of scope of the study and research questions. The numbers in Tables 13, 14, 15 and, 16 are the correlation values of the respective categories.

FROM		-	L	OWER L	EVEL			
ODC	SI	SF	PC	PDMY	AEI	AE2	ADMY	
ORG	0.162	0.272	-0.201	0.249	-0.268	-0.181	0.422	
ос	SI	SP	SV	SDMY	PC	AEI	AE2	AE3
UC	0.216	0.224	0.401	-0.190	0.388	0.151	0.239	0.144
ОР	SI	SV	SDMY	AEI	ADMY			
Or	0.140	0.122	-0.153	-0.154	0.230			
ODMY	SI	PDMY	AE1	AV	ADMY			
ODMIX	-0.125	-0.229	0.243	0.151	-0.451			
19	PP					-		
SI	0.132							
CD.	РС	РР	PDMY	PE				
SP	0.241	0.233	-0.127	0.125	1			1
SF		No s	atistically	significan	t correlatio	on found		
<u>617</u>	AE1	AE2						[
SV	0.134	0.176						
ODMU	РР							
SDMY	-0.241							
PE		No si	atistically	significan	t correlatio	on found		
DC	AEI	AE2	AE3	ADMY				
PC	0.204	0.284	0.317	-0.217				
РР		No si	atistically	significan	t correlatio	on found		
PDMY	AE2	ADMY						
L DIAL I	-0.135	0.126			ŀ			

 Table 13.
 Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p <= 0.05 among DOD</th>

 HFACS Categories of MAV Accidents

Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant relationships at p value <= 0.05 in Table 12 suggested the following potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

 $OC \implies SP \implies PC \implies AE1 \implies Mishap/Accident$

OC	⇒	SP	⇒	PC ⇒	AE2 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SP	⇒	$PC \Rightarrow$	AE3 ⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SP	⇒	$PDMY \Rightarrow$	AE2 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident

Other statistically significant relationships at p value ≤ 0.05 in Table 12 suggested the following additional MAV accident causal paths containing non-statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

ORG	⇒	SI	⇒	РР	 >	ADMY	\Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SF	\rightarrow	PDMY	->	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	\rightarrow	SDMY	>	PC	⇒	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	\rightarrow	SDMY	\rightarrow	РС	⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	\rightarrow	SDMY	\rightarrow	PC	⇒	AE3	\Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ORG	\rightarrow	SDMY	\rightarrow	PDMY	⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SI	⇒	РР	\rightarrow	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SP	⇒	РР	\rightarrow	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	sv	\rightarrow	PDMY	->	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SV	\rightarrow	PDMY	\rightarrow	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SDMY	⇒	PP	→	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SDMY	->	PC	⇒	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SDMY	→	РС	⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SDMY	\rightarrow	РС	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SP	⇒	PE	⇒	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident

OP	⇒	SI	⇒	PP	→	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ОР	⇒	sv		PDMY	\rightarrow	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OP	⇒	sv	\rightarrow	PDMY	→	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OP	⇒	SDMY	⇒	PP	\rightarrow	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY	(⇒	SI	⇒	PP	\rightarrow	ADMY	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY	(→	SDMY	′ →	PDMY	⇒	AEI	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY	< →	SDMY	′→	PDMY	\rightarrow	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident

Table 14.	Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p <= 0.1 among DOD
	HFACS Categories of MAV Accidents

FROM		LOWER LEVEL							
ORG	SI	SP*	SF	PC	PDMY	AEI	AE2	ADMY	AV*
	0.162	-0.103	0.272	-0.201	0.249	-0.268	+0.181	0.422	-0.10
00	SI	SP	SV	SDMY	PC	AE1	AE2	AE3	
OC	0.216	0.224	0.401	-0.190	0.388	0.151	0.239	0.144	
ОР	SI	SV	SDMY -	PDMY*	AEI	AE2*	AV*	ADMY	
UP	0.140	0.122	0.153	0.111	-0.154	0.095	-0.096	0.230	
ODMY	SI	PP*	PDMY	AE1	AV	ADMY -			
ODMT	-0.125	0.097	-0.229	0.243	0.151	0.451			
SI	PP	AEI*							
51	0.132	0.103							
SP	PC	PP	PDMY	PE	AE1*	ADMY*			
- 51	0.241	0.233	-0.127	0.125	0.115	-0.099			
SF		· ·	No statis	tically sign	ificant cor	relation fou	nd	1	
sv	AE1	AE2	AE3*			[
54	0.134	0.176	0.105						
SDMY	PP	AE1*				{			
301/11	-0.241	-0.103						_	
PE	ADMY*								
ГС	104								
РС	AE1	AE2	AE3	AV*	ADMY				
r.	0.204	0.284	0.317	0.091	-0.217				
PP	AV*								
r r	0.102								
PDMY	AE2	AE3*	ADMY						
FUMIT	-0.135	-0.101	0.126						

* Statistically significant correlations at p value = 0.10.

Additional statistically significant correlations at p value ≤ 0.10 in Table 13 suggested the following additional MAV accident causal paths containing statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PC	⇒	AEI	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PC	⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PC	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PC	⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PP	⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PDMY	⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SP	⇒	PDMY	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SI	⇒	РР	⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SI	⇒	PP	⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC								
	⇒	SP	⇒	PC	⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ОР	îî îî	SP SI	⇒ ⇒	PC PP	↑ ↑	AV AV	⇒ ⇒	Mishap/Accident Mishap/Accident

Likewise, additional statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.10 in Table 13 suggested the following additional MAV accident causal paths containing non-statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

ORG	⇒	$SP \Rightarrow$	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1 ⇒	Mishap/Accident
OP	⇒	SDMY \rightarrow	$PDMY \Rightarrow$	AE2 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ОР	⇒	$SDMY \rightarrow$	PDMY ⇒	AE3 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident

OP	⇒	SDMY		$PDMY \rightarrow$	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ORG	⇒	SI	\rightarrow	PDMY \rightarrow	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SI	->	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OP	⇒	SI	\rightarrow	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY	Y ⇒	SI	\rightarrow	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SP	⇒	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ОР	⇒	sv		$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OC	⇒	SDMY	\rightarrow	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
OP	⇒	SDMY	\rightarrow	PDMY \rightarrow	AEI	⇒	Mishap/Accident

Table 15.Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p <= 0.05 among DOD
HFACS Categories of UAV Accidents

FROM	LOWER LEVEL								
ORG	PC -0.255	PDMY 0.254	AE1 -0.260	ADMY 0.265					
OC		No stat	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	1 found			
ОР	SI 0.233								
ODMY	SI -0.283	SDMY 0.255	PC -0.234	PDMY -0.240	AE1 0.336	AE2 0.246			
SI	РР 0.290	AE3 0.298	AV 0.291	ADMY -0.247					
SP		No stat	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	ı found			
SF	No	statistically	y significa	nt correlat	ion and n	anocode fou	nd		
sv	AE3 0.557	AV 0.701							
SDMY	PP -0.226	AV -0.236	ADMY 0.256						
PE		No stat	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	found			
РС	AE1 0.479	AE2 0.00.524	ADMY -0.241						
РР	AE3 0.278								
PDMY		No statistically significant correlation found							

Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.05 in Table 15 suggested the following potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

OP	⇒	SI	⇒	PP	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODM	$Y \Rightarrow$	SI	⇒	РР	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODM	Y⇒	SDMY	′ ⇒	PP	⇒	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident

Other statistically significant relationships at p value <= 0.05 in Table 14 suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing nonstatistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling:

$ORG \rightarrow$	$SDMY \rightarrow$	$PC \Rightarrow$	AE1 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ORG →	$SDMY \rightarrow$	$PC \Rightarrow$	AE2 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
$OP \Rightarrow$	SI →	$PDMY \rightarrow$	$AV \Rightarrow$	Mishap/Accident
$ODMY \Rightarrow$	SI →	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AV ⇒	Mishap/Accident
$ODMY \Rightarrow$	SDMY \rightarrow	PC ⇒	AE1 ⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY ⇒	$SDMY \rightarrow$	$PC \Rightarrow$	AE2 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ODMY →	$SV \rightarrow$	$PDMY \rightarrow$	AE3 \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
$ODMY \rightarrow$	$SV \rightarrow$	PDMY \rightarrow	AV \Rightarrow	Mishap/Accident
ORG →	SDMY \rightarrow	$PC \Rightarrow$	ADMY ⇒	Mishap/Accident
$ODMY \Rightarrow$	SI →	$PDMY \rightarrow$	ADMY⇒	Mishap/Accident
$ODMY \Rightarrow$	SDMY \rightarrow	PC ⇒	ADMY⇒	Mishap/Accident

FROM			LO	WER LEV	'EL		·
ORG	PC	PDMY	AE1	ADMY			
UKG	-0.255	0.245	-0.260	0.265		- .	
OC	· .	No sta	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	found	
<u></u>	SI	SV*	SDMY*	AE1*		/**•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	T
OP	0.233	0.188	-0.171	-0.197			ļ
ODM	S1	SV*	SDMY	PC	PDMY	AE1	AE2
ODMY	-0.283	-0.192	0.255	-0.234	-0.240	0.336	0.246
SI	PP	AE3	AV	ADMY			
51	0.290	0.298	0.291	-0.247			
SP	:	No sta	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	found	
SF	No	statisticall	y significar	nt correlat	ion and na	nocode for	und
6 17	AE3	AV		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·····	
sv	0.557	0.701					
SDMV	PC*	PP	AE3*	AV	ADMY		
SDMY	0,167	-0.226	-0.210	-0.236	.256		
PE		No sta	tistically si	gnificant c	orrelation	found	•
nc	AE1	AE2	ADMY				
РС	0.479	0.524	-0.241				
DD	AE3	ADMY*					
PP	0.278	-0.199					
DDMV	AE1*	AE2* -	ADMY*				
PDMY	-0.188	0.184	0.181				}

 Table 16.
 Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p <= 0.1 among DOD</th>

 HFACS Categories of UAV Accidents

* Statistically significant correlations at p value = 0.10.

Additional statistically significant relationships at p value ≤ 0.10 in Table 16 suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

OP	⇒	SDMY	⇒	PC	⇒	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODMY	\rightarrow	SI	⇒	РР	⇒	ADMY	∕⇒	Mishap/Accident

Likewise, additional statistically significant relationships at p value ≤ 0.10 in Table 16 suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing non-

statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.

OP	⇒	sv	\rightarrow	$PDMY \Rightarrow$	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ОР	⇒	sv	\rightarrow	PDMY ⇒	AV	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODM	Y ⇒	SDMY	′ →	PDMY \rightarrow	AE3	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODM	Y⇒	SDMY	· →	$PDMY \Rightarrow$	AE1	⇒	Mishap/Accident
ODM	Y ⇒	SDMY	′ -→	PDMY ⇒	AE2	⇒	Mishap/Accident

4.8 Structural Equation Model (SEM) and Path Analysis

Given the statistically significant correlations identified by factor analysis, four SEM path models were hypothesized for each aircraft type at both significance levels. Each model was created and tested in the SPSS/AMOS software in order to determine model fit and confirm the significant paths within the DOD HFACS taxonomy.

This study applied the following four goodness of fit measures and their recommended criteria for testing model fit: the chi-square (CMIN), the chi-square divided by the degree of freedom (CMIN/DF), Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The AMOS goodness of fit measures (Arbuckle, 2010) are set forth in Table 17.

Table 17.AMOS Fit Measures

AMOS Fit Measures	Acceptable Criteria
The chi-square dividing by the degree of freedom(χ^2 / df)	$1.0 < \chi 2 / df < 3.0$
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.95 ≤ CFI
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)	0.9 ≤ GF1
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)	RMSEA around 0.05

As the standardized total effect of one variable on another approximates the part of their observed correlation due to presumed causal relations (Kline, 2011), total effects are also discussed with the perspective of fit indices, maximum likelihood estimates, model, and factor analysis.

The path models presented in the figures in this chapter were fit to covariance matrices from the normalized raw data of MAV and UAV accident reports by the mean of SPSS/AMOS 21 software (Arbuckle, 2012). All the fitted models converged to an admissible solution. The factor "Accident" loading on ADMY variable was constrained to 1 and its error variable was pruned to establish the scale for estimates of path coefficients and their corresponding statistics needed for path analysis. The findings from this analytical approach are also discussed together with the model fit indices in a holistic approach to provide a comprehensive analysis.

4.8.1 MAV Model,
$$(N = 203, p \le 0.05)$$

Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at $p \le 0.05$ in Table 13, three models were analyzed for MAV accidents for potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths. The first MAV model (A) yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second MAV model (B) at p < 0.05 level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY and OP-ODMY and the error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The covariance selected according to modification indices were all related to dummy variables of the first three levels. This circumstance was consistent with the value of indices as well as the feature of

the dummy variables, since they were assigned an indicator value of 1 at the absence of any error within the respective categorical level. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first MAV model (A) at $p \le 0.05$ level are presented in Appendix E.

The second model (B) of MAV at $p \le 0.05$ level yielded better goodness of fit indices. The path diagram of the second MAV model (B) at $p \le 0.05$ level is presented in Figure 10. The detailed AMOS output of the second model (B) is presented in Appendix F.




Figure 10. Path Diagram of Revised MAV Model (B) at p <= 0.05 Level

The third model (C) was constructed according to the $p \le 0.05$ level of regression weights of the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships. OP-SV, ODMY-SI, ODMY-SDMY were pruned to improve the second model in terms of goodness of fit results. This third model (C) presented similar fit statistics with the second model (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned model (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the second model (B) was retained as the actual one to be utilized in the model assessments and path analysis. The detailed AMOS output of the third (C) model is presented in Appendix G. The goodness of fit indices of MAV model at $p \le 0.05$ level for three models are presented in Table 18.

MAV <i>p</i> < 0.05	Model	
<u>01.' /10</u>	A	8.637
Chi-sq/df ($1.0 < \chi^2 / df < 3.0$)	В	3.722
$(1.0 < \chi^2 / d1 < 5.0)$	C	3.667
<u></u>	A	0.242
CFI $(0.95 \le CFI)$	В	0.741
$(0.95 \leq CP1)$	C	0.740
ápt	A	0.707
GFI (0.9 ≤ GFI)	В	0.831
$(0.9 \le 0.11)$	C	0.829
	A	0.194
RMSEA	В	0.116
(around 0.05)	C	0.115

Table 18. The Goodness of Fit Indices of MAV Models at $p \le 0.05$ Level

In model B, the loadings of Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically significant at $p \le 0.05$. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.055 and

standard error of 0.033 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -1.669 for a 9.5% significance level. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.081 and standard error of 0.043 yielding a CR of -1.890 for a 5.9% significance level. Since both Reason's Swiss Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an accident results and since the significances levels of AV and AE3 fell within the 90.0% to 94.9% confidence interval, both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for subsequent comparability with the MAV ($p \le 0.10$) and UAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.123 and standard error of 0.097 yielding a CR of -11.575 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.281 and standard error of 0.078 yielding a CR of -3.590 for a significance of less than 0.1%.

The estimated path coefficient and its corresponding standard error for each path were needed to assess the statistical significance of the respective path on Accident outcomes. Current structural equation modeling software is not programmed to provide path coefficients and their standard errors in terms of the HFACS accident cause assignments. As can be seen in structural path models in Figures 11 through 15, in order the model HFACS paths within the SEM framework, each path had to be decomposed into $O \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow A$ estimates and the A \leftarrow Accident loading. Current SEM software, SPSS/AMOS included, provide estimates of unstandardized regression weights, standard errors, and critical ratios for direct effects, standardized regression weights for direct effects, and unstandardized and standardized total, direct, and indirect effects. To overcome this limitation, this work applied the principle of the variance of the product of independent random variables from mathematical statistics. This principle is applicable, because the covariance matrix provides independent estimates of SEM direct effect coefficients between HFACS categorical levels. Thus, each HFACS path is composed of independent random variables of SEM direct effect coefficients and their standard errors. Correspondingly, each path effect on Accident outcome is the $\beta = \beta_0 \times \beta_S \times \beta_P \times \beta_A \rightarrow$ Accident product. From mathematical statistics, it is known that if random variables X₁, X₂, ..., X_n (β_0 , β_s , β_P , and β_A for this analysis) are independent, the variance of the product is

$$Var(X_{1}...X_{n}) = \prod_{n} (var(X_{i}) + (E[X_{i}])^{2}) - \prod_{n} (E[X_{i}])^{2}$$
(4)

If the means of the random variables are zero, $Var(X_1 ... X_n) = \prod_n var(X_i)$. Application of the principle of the variance of the product of independent random variables provided the two estimates of path standard errors, path β coefficient not equal 0 and equal 0, by which to test statistical significance of the path effect. Both cases were applied in this work to test for significant path effect from mean model effect. Since the potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths were hypothesized from factor analytic correlation analysis of individual inter-categorical pair wise relationships at $\alpha =$ 0.05 or $p \le 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.10$ or $p \le 0.10$ and each path is comprised of the joint product of four β direct relationships, the joint α for judging path significance must be adjusted to

$$\alpha_{\text{path}} = 1 - (1 - \alpha)^4 \tag{5}$$

For the paths hypothesized at correlation $\alpha = 0.05$, this yields $\alpha_{path} = 1 - (1 - 0.05)^4 = 0.1855$ or $Z = \pm 1.324$. For paths hypothesized at correlation $\alpha = 0.10$, this yields $\alpha_{path} = 1 - (1 - 0.10)^4 = 0.3439$ or $Z = \pm 0.947$.

Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations from Table 13 at p value <= 0.05 suggested the twenty six potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths to be tested in path analysis. Table 19 presents the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects, standardized effects and statistically significant paths at p value <= 0.1855 level for both the path β coefficient equal 0 and not equal to 0.

From Table 19, three paths for the $\beta \neq 0$ case were found statistically significant at p value ≤ 0.1855 . These paths are OC>SP>PC>AE3 with CR = -1.3499, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with CR = -1.7194, and OC>SP>PC>AE1 with CR = -1.7738. With development of an optimal path pruning process (similar to empirical modeling best subsets regression), the potentially retained unstandardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect relative to the mean effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0823 and CR = 1.3034, OC>SP>PE>ADMY with effect 0.0194 and CR = 1.2025, OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect 0.0177 and CR = 1.2025, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0141 and CR = 1.1328. The paths with the most negative effect relative to the mean are OC>SP>PC>AE1 with effect -0.1947 and CR = -1.7738, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0419 and CR = -1.7194, OC>SV>PDMY>AE1 with effect -0.0099 and CR = -0.318, and OC>SP>PC>AE3 with effect -0.0071 and CR = -1.3499. The standardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AE1, ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1, OC>SP>PE>ADMY and OC>SDMY>PC>AE2. The standardized paths with the most negative effect on accidents

are OC>SP>PC>AE1, OC>SV>PDMY>AE1, OP>SP>PC>AE2 and OC>SP>PC>AE3. For the $\beta = 0$ case, four paths were found statistically significant at *p* value <= 0.1855. These were OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 with CR = 3.921, ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with CR=1.3446, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with CR = -2.747, and OC>SP>PC>AE1 with CR = -9.209. The observation that OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 with CR = 3.921 and ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with CR=1.345 were statistically significant for the $\beta = 0$ case but with CR = 1.3034 and CR=1.328 respectively, were not statistically significant for the $\beta \neq 0$ case supports the supposition that development of an optimal path pruning process will reveal more statistically significant paths in a reduced model.

									Unstd.	SE	+			
				PATHS					Effects	β≠0	СК	SE 3=0	CR	Std. Effects
ос	\$	SDMY	^	PC	~	AEI	¥	Accident	0.0823	0.0631	1.3034	0.021	3.921	0.0045
8		SDMY	^	PC	~	AE2	Ŷ	Accident	0.0177	6€10'0	1.2769	0.0151	111	0.0023
8	÷	SP	\$	PE	~	ADMY	¥	Accident	0.0194	0.0161	1,2025	0.0373	0.52	0.0033
ORG	^	SDMY	<	۶C	^	AEI	×	Accident	0.0141	0.0124	1.1328	0.0105	1.345	0.0039
ORG	^	SDMY	٨	PC	~	AE2	¥	Accident	0:003	0.0027	1.1133	0.0076	0.401	0.0019
α	\$	SDMY	^	PC	~	AE3	×	Accident	0.003	0.0028	1.0739	0.0076	0.396	0.0013
ORG		SDMY	<	PC	\$	AE3	v	Accident	0.0005	0:005	0.9574	0.0038	0.136	0000
8	\$	SP	~	РР	~	ΥDMY	¥	Accident	0:0066	0.0129	0.5108	0.0442	0.15	0:001
OP	\$	SDMY	~	РР		ADMY	×	Accident	0.0012	00:0	0.4177	0.0255	0.049	10010
ORG	Â	SF	^	PDMY	<	ADMY		Accident	100'0	0.0024	0.4058	0.0187	0.052	0.0008
8	\$	SDMY	~	ЪР	<	АДМУ	۷.	Accident	0.0052	0.0159	0.3266	0.0606	0.086	0:0009
œ	\$	SP	~	PDMY	\$	AE2	¥	Accident	600010	0.0056	0.1582	0.0154	0.057	0.0001
8	\$	SI	\$	РР	<	ADMY	¥	Accident	10010	0.0087	0.1189	0.0441	0.023	0.0002
ORG	Ŷ	SI	~	РР	^	ADMY	V	Accident	00003	0.0024	0.1177	0.0244	0.012	0.0002
Q,	\$	SI	\$	РР	^	ADMY	\$	Accident	0:002	0.0019	0.113	0.0249	0:00	0.0002
ODMY	\$	SI	~	РР	~	ADMY	×	Accident	0.0002	0.0022	0.11	0.0286	0:00	0.0002
ODMY	\$	SDMY	^	PDMY	^	AEI	~	Accident	0:0001	0.0046	0.0179	0.0126	0.007	0
ORG	^	SDMY	^	PDMY	\$	AE	×	Accident	0	0.0005	0.0076	0.0078	0.001	0
YMGO	Ŷ	SDMY	~	РДМҮ	٨	۸۷	×	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.0235	0.0035	100:0-	0.0001
භී	\$	SV	^	PDMY	\$	AF2	¥	Accident	0	0.0002	-0.0832	0.0058	-0.003	0
8	\$	SV	4	PDMY	^	AE	*	Accident	-0.0006	0.0049	-0.1289	0.0449	-0.014	-0.0001
e B	\$	SV	^	PDMY	~	AEI	४	Accident	-0.0003	0.0015	-0.2005	0.0081	-0.036	-0.0001
8	\$	SV	^	PDMY	<	AEI	∛	Accident	-0.0099	0.0311	-0.318	0.0559	-0.177	-0.0054
8	\$	SP	\$	к	^	AE3	×	Accident	-0.0071	0.0053	-1.3499	0.0077	-0.93	-0.0031
ß	\$	SP	\$	PC	~	AF2	¥	Accident	-0.0419	0.0244	-1.7194	0.0153	-2.747	-0.0053
8	ŝ	КР	^	PC	\$	AEI	¥	Accident	7961.0-	0.1098	-1.7738	0.0211	-9.209	-0.0107

Table 19.Total Effects and Significance of MAV Paths at $p \le 0.1855$ Level

٨					_					0.088	71	0.016		42
PDMY						Ľ					-0.071	0.0		0.042
PC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0.192	0	0.292	0.317	0.223
ЬÞ	0	0	0	0	٥	0	0	0	0	0.036	0	0	0	0
PE	0	0	0	0	0	0	ò	0	0	0.123	0	0	0	0
Accident	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.961	-0.116	-0.235	-0.125	-0.618
SI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.023	0	0	0.001	0	0	0	0
SDMY	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0.13	0.167	0.004	-0.036	0	0.049	0.053	0.037
SP	0	0	0	0	0	0.125	0.146	0.348	-0.132	-0.058	0.009	0.1	0.11	0.072
SV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.053	0.005	-0.004	0.001	0	0.002
SF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.036	0.003	-0.003	0.001	0	0.002
OP	0	0.055	0	-0.22	0.222	0	0.034	-0.037	0.002	0.008	0	-0.01	-0.012	-0.008
ORG	0.272	0	0	-0.17	0.314	0	0.029	-0.028	0.009	0.007	-0.001	-0.008	-0.009	-0.006
oc	0	0.393	0.224	-0.197	0.229	0.028	0.063	0.045	-0.01	-0.004	100.0	0.013	0.014	0.01
ODMY	0	0	0	-0.206	0.246	0	0.032	-0.034	-0.001	0.008	0	-0.01	-0'01	-0.008
	SF	SV	SP	SDMY	SI	РE	ЪР	PC	PDMY	ADMY	AV	AE2	AE3	AEI

Table 20.Standardized Total Effects of MAV Model at p <.05 level</th>

As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category ORG has significant correlations with SI (0.162), SF (0.272), PC (-0.201), PDMY (0.249), AE1 (-0.268), AE2 (-0.181), and ADMY (0.422). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, ORG had total effects on SI (0.272), SF (0.314), SDMY (-0.17), PC (-0.028), PDMY (0.009), PP (0.029), AE1 (-0.006), AE2 (-0.008), AE3 (-0.009), ADMY (0.007). Table 21, extracted from Table 19 presents the test statistics of paths emanated from ORG category level DOD HFACS. Six paths were tested and one path, ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1, was found statistically significant at $p \le 0.1855$ value. The path ORG>SDMY>PC>AE2 was noted above as having the potential for being retained as statistically significant under an optimal path pruning process.

				PATH	S				Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0141	Sig	0.0039
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0030	No	0.0019
ORG	>>	SF	>	PDMY	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0010	No	0.0008
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0.0005	No	0.0011
ORG	>>	SI	>>	PP	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0,0003	No	0.0002
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0000	No	0.0000

Table 21.ORG Category Level of MAV Paths

OC

As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category OC had significant correlations with SI (0.216), SP (0.224), SV (0.401), SDMY (-0.190), PC (0.288), AE1 (0.151), AE2 (0.239) and AE3 (0.144). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, OC had

total effects on SI (0.229), SP (0.224), SV (0.393), SDMY (-0.197) PC (0.045), AE1 (0.010), AE2 (0.013) and AE3 (0.014). Table 22, extracted from Table 19 presents the test statistics of paths emanated from OC. Thirteen paths were tested and four paths were found statistically significant at $p \le 0.1855$ value. Path OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 was found statistically significant for the path $\beta = 0$ case. Three paths OC>SDMY>PC>AE2, OC>SP>PE>ADMY, and OC>SDMY>PC>AE3 were noted above as having the potential for being retained as statistically significant under an optimal path pruning process.

				PATH	IS				Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
OC	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0823	Sig	0.0045
OC	>>	SP	>>	PE	>>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0194	No	0.0033
OC	>>	SDMY	~	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0177	No	0.0023
OC	>>	SP	>>	PP	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0066	No	0.0011
OC	>>	SDMY	>>	PP	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0052	No	0.0009
OC	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0.0030	No	0.0013
OC	>>	SP	>>	PDMY	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0009	No	0.0001
OC	>>	SV	>	PDMY	>	AE2	<<	Accident	-0.0006	No	-0.0001
OC	>>	SP	>>	PC	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0071	Sig	~0.0031
OC	>>	sv	>	PDMY	>	AE1	<<	Accident	-0.0099	No	-0.0054
OC	>>	SP	>>	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	-0.0419	Sig	-0.0053
OC	>>	SP	>>	PC	>>	AE1	<<	Accident	-0.1947	Sig	-0.0107
OC	>>	SI	>>	PP	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0010	No	0.0002

Table 22.OC Category Level of MAV Paths

OP

As presented in Table 13, OP had significant correlations with SI (0.140), SV (0.122), SDMY (-0.153), AE1 (-0.154) and ADMY (0.230). As standardized total effects

presented in Table 20, OP had total effects on SI (0.222), SV (0.055), SDMY (-0.220), AE1 (-0.008), and ADMY (-0.008). Table 23, extracted from Table 19 presents the test statistics of paths emanated from OP. None of the four OP originated paths were found statistically significant at $p \le 0.1855$ value.

	•••			PAT	HS				Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
OP	>>	SV	>	PDMY	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0003	No	-0.0001
OP	>>	SDMY	>>	PP	7	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0012	No	0.0010
OP	>>	SI	>>	PP	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0002	No	0.0002
OP	>>	sv	>	PDMY	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0000	No	0.0000

Table 23.OP Category Level of MAV Paths

ODMY

As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category ODMY had significant correlations with SI (-0.125), PDMY (-0.229), AE1 (0.243), AV (0.151), and ADMY (-0.451). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, ODMY had total effects on SDMY (-0.206), SI (0.246), PP (0.032), PC (-0.034), PDMY (-0.001), ADMY (0.008), AE1 (-0.008), AE2 (-0.010), and, AE3 (-0.011). Table 24, extracted from Table 19 presents the test statistics of paths emanated from ODMY. Three ODMY originated paths were tested and none of them were found statistically significant at p < 0.05 value.

				PATHS					Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
ODMY	>>	SI	>>	₽₽	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0002	No	0.0002
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	PDMY	>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0001	No	0.0002
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0.0000	No	0.0001

Table 24. ODMY Category Level of MAV Paths

4.8.2 Additional Paths for MAV model at $p \le 0.10$

Observing Table 14, ORG-SP, ORG-AV, OP-AE2, OP-AV, OP-ADMY, ODMY-PP, SI-AE1, SP-AE1, SP-ADMY, SV-AE3, SDMY-AE1, PE-ADMY, PC-AV, PP-AV and PDMY-AE3 were found to have additional statistically significant correlations in MAV model at $p \le 0.10$ level. Applying these correlations to path diagram, twenty four more paths were suggested as potentially statistically significant paths in addition to twenty six MAV paths at $p \le 0.05$ level.

Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at $p \le 0.10$ in Table 14, three models were analyzed for MAV accidents for potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths. The first MAV model (A) at $p \le 0.10$ level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second MAV model (B) at $p \le 0.10$ level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the same as in MAV model (B) at $p \le 0.05$ level; the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY and OP-ODMY and the error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices,

model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first MAV model (A) at $p \le 0.10$ level are presented in Appendix H.

The second model (B) of MAV at $p \le 0.10$ level yielded better goodness of fit indices. The path diagram of the second MAV model (B) at $p \le 0.10$ level is presented in Figure 11. The detailed AMOS output of the second model (B) is presented in Appendix I.




Figure 11. Path Diagram of Revised MAV Model (B) at p <= 0.10 Level

The third model (C) was constructed according to the $p \le 0.10$ level of regression weights of the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships that were utilized in the path analysis. Based on these assessments a path, OP-SV, was pruned to improve the second model in terms of goodness of fit statistics. This third model (C) presented similar fit statistics with the second model (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned model (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the second model (B) was selected as the actual one to be utilized in the model assessments. The detailed AMOS output of the third (C) model is presented in Appendix J. The goodness of fit indices of MAV model at $p \le 0.10$ level for three models are presented in Table 25.

MAV p < 0.1	Model	
01-1 (16	Α	8.972
Chi-sq/df $(1.0 < \chi 2 / df < 3.0)$	В	3.806
$(1.0 < \chi^2 / \text{ ur} < 5.0)$	C	3.760
	A	0.242
CFI (0.95 ≤ CFI)	B	0.745
	C	0.745
	A	0.708
GFI $(0.9 \le GFI)$	B	0.834
(0.9 2 011)	C	0.834
	A	0.199
RMSEA (around 0.05)	В	0.118
	C	0.117

Table 25. The Goodness of Fit Indices of MAV Models at $p \le 0.10$ Level

In model B, the loadings of Accident on AV was not statistically significant at $p \le 0.1$. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.053 and standard error of 0.033 yielding a CR of -1.613 for a 10.7% significance level. Since both Reason's Swiss Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an accident results AV was retained in model B for comparability with the MAV $(p \le 0.05)$ and UAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.122 and standard error of 0.097 yielding a CR of -11.563 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.281 and standard error of 0.078 yielding a CR of -3.596 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE3 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.081 and standard error of 0.043 yielding a CR of -1.884 for a significance of 6.0%.

Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the additional 24 paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.10 suggested the fifty potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths to be tested in path analysis. Table 26 presents the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths at p <= 0.10 level.

From Table 26, eight out of fifty paths for the $\beta \neq 0$ case were found statistically significant at *p* value <= 0.3439. The unstandardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect relative to the mean model effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0847 and CR = 1.3111, OC>SDMY>PDMY>AE1 with effect 0.0224 and CR =

0.4953, OC>SP>PE>ADMY with effect 0.0190 and CR = 0.9313, OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect 0.0177 and CR = 1.2741, ORG>SP>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0167 and CR = 1.0882, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0102 and CR = 0.8741. The paths with the most negative effect relative to the mean model effect are OC>SP>PC>AE1 with effect -0.1990 and CR = -1.7931, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0416 and CR = -1.7164, OC>SI>PDMY>AE1 with effect -0.0264 and CR = -0.5492,

OC>SV>PDMY>AE1 with effect -0.0220 and CR = -0.5156, and OC>SP>PC>AE3 with effect -0.0081 and CR = -1.3452. Paths OC>SP>PC>AE1, OC>SP>PC>AE2, and OC>SP>PC>AE3 were statistically significant in the MAV ($p \le 0.05$) model. The paths OC>SP>PC>AE1 and OC>SP>PC>AE2 are statistically significant exhibiting the most negative effect. The standardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AE1, ORG>SP>PC>AE1, OC>SP>PE>ADMY, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1. The standardized paths with the most negative effect relative to the mean are OC>SP>PC>AE1, OC>SP>PC>AE2, OC>SP>PC>AE3 and ORG>SI>PDMY>AE1.

For the case of $\beta = 0$, eight paths were found statistically significant at *p* value <= 0.3439. The observation that OC>SI>PDMY>AE1 with CR=-1.2422 and OC>SV>PDMY>AE1 with CR=-1.270 were statistically significant for the $\beta = 0$ case but with CR = -0.5492 and CR=-0.5156 were not statistically significant for the $\beta \neq 0$ case supports the supposition that development of an optimal path pruning process will reveal more statistically significant paths in a reduced model.

		-	PATHS (fm	$\operatorname{rom} \operatorname{MAV}_p <= 0.05 \operatorname{model})$	= 0.05 model	()			Unstd. Effects	SE β⊭0	ck	SE β≓0	g	Std. Effects
00	\$	SDMY	^	PC	~	AEI	~	Accident	0.0847	0.0646	11111	0.021	4.015	0.0047
ос	~	SP	\$	PE		ADMY	≥	Accident	0.019	0.0204	0.9313	0.045	0.423	0.0033
ORG	^	SDMY	^	PC	~	AEI	~	Accident	0.0102	0.0116	0.8741	0.011	0.92	0.0028
ω	~	SDMY	^	PC	~	AE2	~	Accident	0.0177	0.0139	1.2741	0.015	1.165	0.0023
8	~	SDMY		PC	~	AE3	~	Accident	0.0034	0.0032	1.0701	0.008	0.418	0.0015
ORG	<	SDMY		PC	~	AE2	~	Accident	0.0021	0.0025	0.8578	0.008	0.267	0.0014
VMGO	~	SDMY	\$	PDMY	_	AEI	~	Accident	0.0052	0.0113	0.4591	0.015	0.356	0.0013
oc	~<	SP	\$	РР	>	АДМҮ	~	Accident	0.0053	0.0124	0.4287	0.044	0.12	0.0009
ORG	<	SDMY	~	PC	~	AE3	~	Accident	0.0004	0.0005	0.7593	0.004	0.096	0.0009
op	~	SDMY	\$	ЬР	~	ADMY	¥	Accident	000	0.0029	0.3547	0.026	0.04	0.0008
oc	\$	SDMY	~	ЬР	<	ADMY	~	Accident	0.0042	0.0118	0.3584	0.05	0.085	0.0007
ж	~	SP	\$	PDMY	~	AE2	~	Accident	0.002	0.0035	0.0523	0.016	0.011	0.002
ORG	\$	SI	\$	РР	~	ADMY	~	Accident	0.002	0.0023	0.1019	0.024	0.009	0.0002
0DMY	\$	SI	~	РР	<	ADMY	≯	Accident	0.0002	0.0021	0.0952	0.029	0.007	0.0002
8	ŝ	SI	^	ЬР	^	ADMY	≯	Accident	0.0008	0.0082	0.103	0.044	0.019	0.0001
Ъ	\$	SI	Â	РР	<	ADMY	~~	Accident	0.0002	0.0018	0.0978	0.025	0.007	0000
ORG	_	SDMY	_	PDMY	~	AE2	~	Accident	0.0002	0.001	0.1646	0.009	0.018	0.0001
YMGO	\$	SDMY	^	PDMY	~	AV	×	Accident	0	0.0002	0.1253	0.004	0.004	0.0001
OP	~	SV	^	PDMΥ	~	AE2	~	Accident	0	0.0003	-0.1326	0.006	-0.007	0
org	\$	SF	^	PDMY	.^	ADMY	~	Accident	-0.0001	0.0019	-0.0374	0.019	-0.004	-0.0001
OP	~	SV	^	ΡDMΥ	^	AEI	~	Accident	-0.007	0.0021	-0.3114	0.008	-0.081	-0.0002
8	^	SV	^	PDMY	Ŷ	AE2	~	Accident	-0.0014	0.0068	-0.2069	0.012	-0.112	-0.0002
8	^	SV	٨	PDMY	^	AEI	¥	Accident	-0.022	0.0427	-0.5156	0.017	-1.27	-0.0012
8	\$	SP	\$	R	Ŷ	AE3	×	Accident	-0.0081	0:006	-1.3452	0.008	-0.982	-0.0035
8	\$	SP	\$	R	\$	AE	¥	Accident	-0.0416	0.0243	-1.7164	0.015	-2.739	-0.0053
8	^	SP	Â	PC D	Â	AEi	♦	Accident	661.0-	0.11	-1.7931	0.021	-9.437	110.0-

Table 20. Total Milet's and Significance of MAT Taus at $p \ge 0.5457$ here:	Table 26.	Total Effects and Significance of MAV Paths at p <= 0.3439 Level
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		PATHS (additional p	aths from M	AV <i>p</i> <	10 model)			Unstd. Effects	SEβ≠0	CR	SE β=0	CR	Std. Effects
ORG	>>	SP	>	PC	>>	AE1	~~	Accident	0.0167	0.0153	1.0882	0.0094	1.7746	0.0046
ORG	>>	SP	>	PC	>>	AE2	~~	Accident	0.0035	0.0033	1.0633	0.0068	0.515	0.0022
ORG	>>	SP	>>	PC	~	AB	~~	Accident	0.0007	0.0007	0.9188	0.0037	0.1847	0.0015
ORG	>	SP	>	PC	>>	A۷	~	Accident	0.0001	0.0001	0.5776	0.0028	0.0295	0.0003
ORG	>	SP	>	PP	>>	AV	~	Accident	0	0.0001	0.5209	0.0028	0.0128	0.0001
ORG	>>	SP	>	PDMY	>>	AE2	<	Accident	0	0.0004	-0.0441	0.0073	-0.0021	1000.0-
ORG	>	SP	>	PDMY	>>	AE3	<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.1231	0.0039	-0.0028	-0.0002
ORG	>>	SI	>>	РР	>	AV	×	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.1425	0.0035	-0.0053	-0.0001
oc	>>	SI	>>	PP	>	A۷	×	Accident	-0.0001	0.0005	-0.1439	0.0063	-0.0108	-0.0001
oc	>>	SP	>	PC	>	A۷	~	Accident	-0.001	0.0013	-0.737	0.0063	-0.1571	-0.0008
<u>oc</u>]	>>	SI	~	PP	>	۸۷	~~	Accident	-0.0001	0.0005	-0.1439	0.0063	-0.0108	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	Si	>>	PP	>>	AV	~~	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.133	0.0041	-0.0039	-0.0001
ORG	>>	SP	>>	PDMY	>	AEi	~~	Accident	-0.0002	0.0024	-0.1001	0.0101	-0.0242	-0.0007
OP	>>	SDMY	>>	PDMY	>	AE2	~~	Accident	0.0003	0.0017	0.1982	0.0092	0.0376	0.0002
90	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AE	~~	Accident	0.0002	0.0004	0.6413	0.005	0.0485	0.0005
OP	>>	SDMY	>>>	PDMY	>	٨٧	~	Accident	0	8.0002	0.1322	0.0038	0.0052	0.0001
ORG	>>	SI	>>	PDMY	>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0072	0.0133	-0.5423	0.0117	-0.6122	-0.002
OC	>	SI	>	PDMY	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0264	0.0481	-0.5492	0.0213	-1.2422	-0.0015
OP	>>	SI	>	PDM Y	>	AE1	<	Accident	-0.0055	0.0106	-0.5146	0.012	-0.4556	-0.0014
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0062	0.0125	-0.4978	0.0138	-0.4534	-0.0016
<u>oc</u>	>>	SP	>	PDMY	>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0029	0.0244	0.1189	0.0226	0.1285	0.0017
OP	>>	SV	>	PDMY	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.3921	0.0032	-0.0093	-0.0001
OC	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0224	0.0453	0.4953	0.0249	0.901	0.0012
OP	>>	SDMY	>>	PDMY	>>	ΛΕΙ	~<	Accident	0.0054	0.0111	0.4897	0.0127	0.4257	0.0014

4.8.3 UAV MODEL, (N = $60, p \le 0.05$)

Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at $p \le 0.05$ in Table 15, three models were analyzed for UAV accidents for potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths. The first UAV model (A) at $p \le p$ 0.05 level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second UAV model (B) at $p \le 0.05$ level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY and OP-ODMY and the error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The covariance selected according to modification indices were all related to dummy variables of the first three levels. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first UAV model (A) at $p \le 0.05$ level are presented in Appendix K. Since no path was founded to be pruned, the second model (B) was selected as the actual one to be utilized in model assessments. The path diagram of the second UAV model (B) at $p \le 0.05$ level is presented in Figure 12.




Figure 12. Path Diagram of Revised UAV Model (B) at p <= 0.05 Level

The second model (B) of UAV at $p \le 0.05$ level yielded better goodness of fit indices. The detailed AMOS output of the second (B) are presented in Appendix L. The goodness of fit indices of UAV model at $p \le 0.05$ level for two models are presented in Table 27.

UAV $p < 0.05$	Models	
Chi-sq/df	A	4.865
$(1.0 < \chi^2 / df < 3.0)$	В	2.252
CFI	Α	0.243
$(0.95 \le CFI)$	В	0.769
GFI	A	0.625
$(0.9 \le GFI)$	В	0.748
RMSEA	Α	0.256
(around 0.05)	В	0.104

Table 27. The Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Models at $p \le 0.05$ Level

In model B, the loadings of Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically significant at $p \le 0.05$. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.022 and standard error of 0.038 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -0.571 for a 56.8% significance level. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.132 and standard error of 0.084 yielding a CR of -1.584 for an 11.3% significance level. Since both Reason's Swiss Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an accident results both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for subsequent comparability with the UAV ($p \le 0.10$) and MAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.108 and standard error of 0.174 yielding a CR of -6.377 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was

statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.545 and standard error of 0.159 yielding a CR of -3.428 for a significance of less than 0.1%.

Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.05 that suggested fourteen potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths were tested in path analysis. Table 28 presents the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in UAV accidents at $p \le 0.1855$ level.

From Table 28, none of the fourteen paths were found statistically significant at *p* value <= 0.1855 for both the $\beta \neq 0$ case and the $\beta = 0$ case. That is none of the path effects statistically differed from the model mean effect on accidents. Within the range of model effects, the unstandardized and standardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect on accidents are ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect 0.0366 and CR = 0.7917 and ODMY>SI>PP>AE3 with effect 0.0017 and CR = 0.6033. The unstandardized and standardized paths with the most negative effect within the range of model effects are ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0241 and CR = -0.9089, ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect -0.0113 and CR = -0.2689, and ODMY>SDMY>PC>ADMY with effect -0.0099 and CR = -0.7019.

									Unstd.	SE	E	51 0-0	E	
				PATHS					Effects	β≠0	LK	se p=u	č	Dig. Effects
ODMY	^	SDMY	^	PC	^	AEI	~	Accident	0.0366	0.0462	0.7917	0.0286	1.2802	0.0103
YMOO	^	SI	\$	ЬЪ	~	AF3	~	Accident	0.0017	0.0028	0.6033	0.0157	0.1073	0.0036
YMGO	*	SI	^	PDMY	~	ADMY	~	Accident	0:007	0.0107	0.0689	0.0681	0.0109	0.0007
VMOO	\$	IS	^	PDMY	~	AV	~	Accident	0	0.0001	0.0299	0.0069	0.0005	0.004
OP	Ŷ	SI		PDMY	^	AV	~	Accident	0	100010	-0.0224	0.0062	-0.0002	-0.002
VMOO	\$	SDMY	~	ЬР	\$	AE3	~	Accident	-0.0002	0.0022	-0.0834	0.015	-0.0124	-0.0004
ODMY	^	SV	^	PDMY	~	AE	~	Accident	-0.001	0.0006	-0.0961	0.0105	-0.0057	-0.001
YMGO	^	SV	^	PDMY	~	AV	~	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.1821	0.0047	-0.0035	-0.0019
ORG	^	SDMY	~	PC	2	ADMY	≫	Accident	-0.002	0.0092	-0.2227	0.0568	-0.036	-0.0013
ORG	^	SDMY	~	PC	~	AE2	~	Accident	-0.005	0.019	-0.2632	0.0264	-0.1892	-0.0014
ORG	~	SDMY	^	PC	>>	AEI	∻	Accident	-0.0113	0.0421	-0.2689	0.0314	-0.3602	-0.002
ор	~	SI	*	Ьр	>>	AE	×	Accident	-0.0007	0.0017	-0.4193	0.014	-0.0515	-0.0017
VMOO	\$	SDMY	~	PC	~	ADMY	~	Accident	-0.009	0.0141	-0.7019	0.0517	-0.1908	-0.0089
VMGO	\$	SDMY	^	РС	~	AE2	×	Accident	-0.0241	0.0265	-0.9089	0.0241	-1.0026	-0.0095

Table 28.Total Effects and Significance of UAV Paths at $p \le 0.1855$ Level

	ODMY	ОР	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	РР	РС	PDMY
sv	213	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDMY	.307	.000	.044	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sı	233	.110	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	065	.034	.001	.000	.026	.314	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.052	.000	.007	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDMY	010	003	.002	.137	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADMY	010	.000	001	.015	025	003	.969	.000	1 79	,112
AE3	016	.009	.000	003	.005	.079	196	.249	.000	022
AV	.001	.000	.000	012	004	.002	074	.000	.000	086
AE2	.027	.000	.004	.003	.090	001	348	.000	.528	.023
AE1	.024	.000	.003	001	.079	.000	564	.000	.468	006

Table 29.Standardized Total Effects of UAV Model at p <= 0.05 Level</th>

ORG

HFACS DOD category ORG had significant correlations with PC (-0.255), PDMY (0.245), AE1 (-0.260), and ADMY (0.265), presented in Table 15. As standardized total effects presented in Table 29, ORG, had effects on SDMY (0.044), PP (0.001), PC (0.007), PDMY (0.002), ADMY (-0.001), AE2 (0.004), and AE1 (0.003). Table 30, extracted from Table 28, presents the test statistics of paths emanated from ORG category level. Three paths were tested and no paths were found statistically significant at $p \leq =0.1855$ value.

				PAT	Г HS				Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	-0.0050	No	-0.0014
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0113	No	-0.0020
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0020	No	-0.0013

Table 30. ORG Category Level of UAV Paths

OP

HFACS DOD category OP has significant correlations with only SI (0.233)

presented in Table 15. As standardized total effects presented in Table 29, OP had effects on SI (0.110), PP (0.034), PDMY (-0.003), AE3 (0.009). Table 31, extracted from Table 28, presents the test statistics of paths emanated from OP category level. Two paths were tested and no path was found statistically significant at $p \le 0.1855$ value.

Table 31. OP Category Level of UAV Paths

				PA	тня				Unstd. Effects	p <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
OP	>>	SI	Š	РР	Ķ	AE3	Å	Accident	-0.0007	No	-0.0017
OP	>>	SI	ý	PDMY	Ķ	AV	~	Accident	-0.0000	No	-0.0002

ODMY

As presented in Table 15, the HFACS DOD category ODMY in UAV accidents has statistically significant correlations with SI (-0.283), SDMY (0.255), PC (-0.234), PDMY (-0.240), AE1 (0.336), and AE2 (0.246). SV, located at the second main level of DOD HFACS, did not have any statistically significant correlation with the exogenous variables present at the first level, ORG, OP, ODMY. To this end a path from ODMY to SV was drawn to exemplify the Reason model. As standardized total effects presented in Table 29, ODMY had effect on SV (-0.213), SI (-0.233), SDMY (0.307), PP (-0.065), PC (0.052), PDMY (-0.010), ADMY (-0.010), AE3 (-0.016), AV (0.001), AE2 (0.027), and, AE1 (0.024). Table 32, extracted from Table 28, presents the test statistics of paths emanated from ODMY category level. Nine paths were tested and no paths were found statistically significant at $p \le 0.1855$ value.

				PATHS	}				Unstd. Effects	<i>p</i> <= 0.1855	Std. Effects
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0366	No	0.0103
ODMY	>>	SI	>>	P₽	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0.0017	No	0.0036
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	РС	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0099	No	-0.0089
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	-0.0241	No	-0.0095
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0007	No	0.0007
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0.0000	No	0.0004
ODMY	>	SV	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0.0000	No	-0.0019
ODMY	>	SV	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0001	No	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0002	No	-0.0004

Table 32. ODMY Category Level of UAV Paths

4.8.4 Additional Paths for UAV model at $p \le 0.10$

Observing Table 16; OP-SV, OP-SDMY, OP-AE1, ODMY-SV, SDMY-PC, SDMY-AE3, PP-ADMY, PDMY-AE1, PDMY-AE2, and, PDMY-ADMY were found as additional statistically significant correlations in UAV model at $p \le 0.10$ level. Applying these correlations to path diagram seven more paths were suggested as potentially statistically significant paths in addition to fourteen UAV paths at $p \le 0.05$ level. Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at $p \le 0.10$ in Table 16, three models were analyzed for UAV accidents for potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths. The first UAV model (A) at $p \le 0.10$ level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second UAV model (B) at $p \le 0.10$ level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the same as in UAV model (B) at $p \le 0.05$ level; the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY, OP-ODMY and error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first UAV model (A) at $p \le 0.10$ level are presented in Appendix M.

The second model (B) of UAV at $p \le 0.10$ level yielded better goodness of fit indices. The path diagram of the second UAV model (B) at $p \le 0.10$ level is presented in Figure 13. The detailed AMOS output of the second (B) is presented in Appendix N.




Figure 13. Path Diagram of Revised UAV Model (B) at p <= 0.10 Level

The third model (C) was constructed according to the $p \le 0.10$ level of regression weights of the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships that were utilized in the path analysis. Based on these assessments a path, OP-SV was pruned to improve the second model in terms of goodness of fit results. This third model (C) presented similar fit statistics with the second model (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned model (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the second model (B) was selected as the actual one to be utilized in the model assessments. The detailed AMOS output of the third (C) model is presented in Appendix O. The goodness of fit indices of UAV model at $p \le 0.10$ level for three model are presented in Table 33.

UAV	Model	
<i>p</i> <= 0.10	A	5.038
Chi-sq/df	В	2.322
$(1.0 < \chi^2 / df < 3.0)$	C	2.291
~ D	A	0.245
CFI (0.95 ≤ CFI)	В	0.768
$(0.93 \leq CPI)$	С	0.770
~~~	Α	0.631
GFI (0.9 ≤ GFI)	В	0.750
(0.9 <u>2</u> 011)	C	0.749
	Α	0.262
RMSEA (around 0.05)	В	0.150
	С	0.148

Table 33. Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Models at  $p \le 0.10$  Level

In model B, the loadings of Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically significant at  $p \le 0.10$ . Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.026 and standard error of

0.038 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -0.687 for a 49.2% significance level. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.134 and standard error of 0.084 yielding a CR of -1.585 for an 11.3% significance level. Since both Reason's Swiss Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an accident results both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for comparability with the UAV (p<= 0.05) and MAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.130 and standard error of 0.174 yielding a CR of -6.502 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.550 and standard error of 0.160 yielding a CR of -3.430 for a significance of less than 0.1%.

Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.10 that suggested the twenty one potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths were tested in path analysis. Table 34 present the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in UAV accidents at  $p \le 0.10$ level.

From Table 34, none of twenty one paths were found statistically significant at p value <= 0.3439 for the  $\beta \neq 0$  case. One path was found statistically significant at p value <= 0.3439 for the  $\beta = 0$  case. The unstandardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect within the range of the mean model effect on accidents are ODMY>SI>PP>ADMY with effect 0.0118 and CR = 0.6903, and ODMY>SI>PP>AE3

with effect 0.0023 and CR = 0.6251. For the  $\beta$  = 0 case, the path

ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE1 is statistically significant. The paths with the most negative effect within the range of the mean model effect are ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect -0.0689 and CR = -0.7863, ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0286 and CR =

-0.7574, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AE1 with effect -0.0197 and CR = -0.3451.

PATHS (first 14 UAV $p \le 0.05$ model; last 7 UAV $p \le 0.10$ model)									Unstd.	SE	CR	SEβ=0	CR	Std. Effect
	- <u></u>		· · · ·			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·		Effects	β≠0				
ODMY	>>	SI	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0.0023	0.0037	0.6251	0.0167	0.1365	0.004
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0008	0.0117	0.0684	0.0719	0.0112	0.000
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	~~	Accident	0	0.0001	0.0333	0.0073	0.0006	0.000
OP	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.0172	0.007	-0.0002	;
ODMY	<b>&gt;&gt;</b>	SV	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0006	-0.0135	0.0126	-0.0006	i (
ODM Y	>>	sv	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.1395	0.0057	-0.0021	-0.000
ODMY	>>	<b>SDM Y</b>	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0003	0.0036	-0.0785	0.0203	-0.0138	-0.000
OP	>>	SI	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0007	0.0024	-0.2844	0.016	-0.0429	-0.001
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0034	0.0119	-0.2839	0.0636	-0.053	-0.002
ORG	>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AE2	<<	Accident	-0.0082	0.0243	-0.3361	0.0298	-0.2742	-0.002
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0118	0.0195	-0.6049	0.0694	-0.1698	-0.010
ORG	>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0197	0.057	-0.3451	0.0353	-0.5569	-0.003
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AE2	~	Accident	-0.0286	0.0378	-0.7574	0.0326	-0.8791	-0.011
ODMY	>>	<b>SDMY</b>	>>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0689	0.0876	-0.7863	0.0386	-1.7853	-0.01
ODM Y	>>	SI	>>	<b>I</b> PP	>>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0118	0.0172	0.6903	0.0605	0.1958	0.010
OP	>	SV	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	0.1213	0.0054	0.0017	0.000
ODM Y	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0014	0.005	0.0202	0.0003	
OP	>	sv	1>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0005	0.0118	0.0121	0.0005	
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AEI	~	Accident	0	0.0281	-0.0012	0.0494	-0.0007	
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>>	AE2	~	Accident	-0.0003	0.011	-0.0246	0.0416	-0.0065	-0.000
OP	>	SDMY		PC	>	AE1	<<	Accident	-0.0105	0.0522	-0.2019	0.0343	-0.3072	

Table 34. Total Effects and Significance of UAV Paths at p < 0.3439 Level

## 4.9 Comparative Model Analysis

This part of the analysis is conducted for the purpose of answering the third research question of whether there is a common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS categorical levels. These two aircraft types are compared in three different ways to examine the findings. The first comparison is made with factor analysis, using the Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at two levels of the two aircraft type, UAV and MAV. The second comparison is made via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The third comparison is conducted via fitting MAV data to the UAV model at two significance levels to identify similar paths within the context of DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to the MAV model due to insufficient degrees of freedom from the sample size.

4.9.1 First Comparison: Common Correlations Extracted from Factor Analysis

The first comparison is made based on the results of the factor analysis using the Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at two levels for the two aircraft types, UAV and MAV. Table 35 presents the common correlations among DOD HFACS levels within the context of UAV and MAV accidents extracted by the means of factor analysis at two significance levels.

FROM	LOWER LEVEL										
ORG	PC (-)	PDMY	AE1 (-)	ADMY							
OP	SI	SV*	SDMY* (-)	AE1* (-)							
ODMY	SI (-)	PDMY (-)	AEI								
SI	PP	<b>_</b>									
SDMY	PP (-)										
SV	AE3*										
PC	AEI	AE2	ADMY (-)								
PDMY	AE2* (-)	ADMY*									

 Table 35.
 Common Correlations between UAV and MAV Accidents

* Common statistically significant correlation at *p* <= 0.10 level (-) Negatively correlated

### 4.9.2 Second Comparison: Common Paths Extracted by Path Analysis

The second comparison of this part is conducted via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The results extracted in accordance with the path analysis are compared in two significance levels. No statistically significant path was found as common between UAV and MAV accidents at  $p \le 0.05$  and  $p \le 0.1$  levels.

# 4.9.3 Third Comparison: Model with Reciprocal Data

The third comparison is conducted via applying MAV data to UAV model at two significance levels to contrast similar statistically significant paths within the context of DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to MAV model due to insufficient degrees of freedom from the sample size. In this comparison the standardized total effects of the respective analysis are compared to contrast the similar paths. As discerning criteria for similar paths between the two different models, the statistically significance paths in UAV model are compared with "UAV Model with MAV Data".

4.9.3.1 UAV Model with MAV Data at  $p \le 0.05$  level (N = 203)

Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at  $p \le 0.05$  in Table 15, two models were analyzed for "UAV model with MAV data" for potentially statistically significant UAV accident correlations using MAV data. The first "UAV model with MAV data" (A) at  $p \le 0.05$  level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second model (B) at  $p \le 0.05$  level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY, OP-ODMY, and error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The covariance selected according to modification indices were all related to dummy variables of the first three levels. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first "UAV model with MAV data" (A) at  $p \le 0.05$  level are presented in Appendix P. Since the UAV models at both levels used the second model (B), this analysis utilized the second model for the purpose of comparison. The path diagram of the second "UAV model with MAV data" model (B) at  $p \le 0.05$  level is presented in Figure 14.




Figure 14. Path Diagram of Revised "UAV Model with MAV Data" (B) at p <= 0.05 Level

The second model (B) of "UAV model with MAV data" at  $p \le 0.05$  level

yielded better goodness of fit indices. The detailed AMOS output of the second (B) is

presented in Appendix Q. The goodness of fit indices of "UAV model with MAV data" at

 $p \le 0.05$  level for two models are presented in Table 36.

UAV model with MAV data p < 0.05	Model	Value	
Chi-sq/df	A	10.466	
$(1.0 < \chi 2 / df < 3.0)$	В	3.784	
CFI	A	0.201	
$(0.95 \le \text{CFI})$	В	0.779	
GFI	A	0.713	
$(0.9 \le \text{GFI})$	В	0.867	
RMSEA	A	0.216	
(around 0.05)	В	0.117	

Table 36.Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Models With MAV Data at p <= 0.05</th>Level

In model B, the loading of Accident on AV was not statistically significant at  $p \le 0.05$ . Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.057 and standard error of 0.032 yielding a CR of -1.778 for a 7.5% significance level. Since both Reason's Swiss Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an accident results, AV was retained in model B for subsequent comparability with the "UAV model with MAV data" ( $p \le 0.10$ ). Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.100 and standard error of 0.096 yielding a CR of -11.432 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.290 and standard error of 0.077 yielding a CR of

-3.769 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.098 and standard error of 0.044 yielding a CR of -2.225 for a 2.6% significance level.

Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.05 that suggested the fourteen potentially statistically significant "UAV model with MAV data" accident causal paths were tested in path analysis. Table 37 presents the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in "UAV model with MAV data" accidents at  $p \le 0.1855$  level. From Table 37, none of the fourteen paths were found statistically significant at p value <= 0.1855.

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PATHS										SE β≠0	CR	SE β=0	CR	Std. Effects
ORG	>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AEI	~~	Accident	0.0037	0.0071	0.5253	0.0087	0.4245	0.001
ORG	>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AE2	~	Accident	0.0006	0.0012	0.5026	0.0063	0.096	0.0004
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	0.0036	0.0074	0.4822	0.0099	0.3595	0.0009
ORG	>>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	ADMY	~	Accident	0.0011	0.0024	0.4798	0.0211	0.054	0.00
ODMY	>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE2	~~	Accident	0.0006	0.0013	0.4621	0.0072	0.0812	0.0004
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	ADMY	~~	Accident	0.0011	0.0025	0.4417	0.024	0.0457	0.0009
ODMY	>	SI	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	0.2965	0.0042	0.0101	0.000
OP	>>	SI	>	PDM Y	>	AV	<<	Accident	0	0	0.0392	0.0026	0.0005	(
OP	>>	SI	>>	PP	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.0278	0.0038	-0.0005	. (
ODMY	>>	S٧	>	PDMY	>	AV	~~	Accident	0	0	-0.3158	0.0023	-0.004	(
ODMY	>	SI	>	PDMY	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0007	0.002	-0.3488	0.0255	-0.0278	-0.0006
ODMY	>	sv	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.4335	0.0151	-0.0029	-0.000
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.4361	0,0029	-0.0094	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>>	РР	>>	AE3	<<	Accident	-0.0003	0.0004	-0.7565	0,0201	-0.0137	-0.000

4.9.3.2 UAV Model with MAV Data at  $p \le 0.10$  level (N = 203)

Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at  $p \le 0.10$  in Table 16, two models were analyzed for "UAV model with MAV data" potentially statistically significant UAV accident correlations using MAV data. The first "UAV model with MAV data" (A) at  $p \le 0.10$  level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The second model (B) at  $p \le 0.10$  level was constructed according the modification indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY, OP-ODMY, and error variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first "UAV model with MAV data" (A) at p  $\leq = 0.10$  level are presented in Appendix R. Since the UAV models at both levels used the second model (B), this analysis utilized the second model for the purpose of comparisons. The path diagram of the second "UAV model with MAV data" model (B) at  $p \le 0.10$  level is presented in Figure 15.




Figure 15. Path Diagram of Revised "UAV Model with MAV Data" (B) at p <= 0.10 Level

The second model (B) of "UAV model with MAV data" at  $p \le 0.10$  level yielded better goodness of fit indices. The detailed AMOS output of the second (B) is presented in Appendix S. The goodness of fit indices for two models are presented in

Table 38.

UAV model with MAV data $p < 0.1$	Model	
Chi-sq/df	A	10.837
$(1.0 < \chi 2 / df < 3.0)$	В	3.837
CFI	Α	0.207
$(0.95 \le \text{CFI})$	В	0.781
GFI	A	0.715
$(0.9 \le \text{GFI})$	В	0.870
RMSEA	Α	0.221
(around 0.05)	В	0.120

Table 38.Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Model with MAV Data at p <= 0.1</th>Level

In model B, the loadings of Accident on AE1, AE2, AE3 and AV were statistically significant at  $p \le 0.10$ . Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.102 and standard error of 0.096 yielding a CR of -11.471 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.288 and standard error of 0.077 yielding a CR of -3.743 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -.099 and standard error of 0.044 yielding a CR of -2.245 for a 2.5% significance level. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.058 and standard error of 0.032 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -1.808 for a 7.1% significance level. Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation of Reason's Swiss Cheese model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p value <= 0.10 suggested the twenty one potentially statistically significant "UAV model with MAV data" accident causal paths to be tested in path analysis. Table 39 presents the path Pareto analysis of unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in "UAV model with MAV data" accidents at  $p \le 0.3439$  level.

From Table 39 none of twenty one paths was found statistically significant at p value <= 0.3439.

PATHS										SE β≠0	CR	SEβ=0	CR	Std. Effects
ORG	>	SDMY	>>	PC	>>	AEI		Accident	0.0018	0.0044	0.4078	0.0093	0.1914	0.0005
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>	ADMY	~~	Accident	0.0007	0.0018	0.3848	0.0224	0.0303	0.0006
ORG	>	SDMY	>	PC	>	AE2	<<	Accident	0.0004	0.0011	0.4127	0.0067	0.0658	0.0003
ODMY	>>	SDMY	»	PP	<b>&gt;&gt;</b>	AE3	~	Accident	0	0.0004	0.0675	0.005	0.0051	0
ODMY	>>	SI	»	PP	»	AE3	«	Accident	0	0.0001	0.2058	0.0043	0.0057	
OP	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	~	Accident	0	0.0001	0.39%	0.0029	0.0079	0.000
ODMY	>>	S٧	>	PDMY	>	AV	~	Accident	0	0	-0.0648	0.0025	-0.0006	(
ODMY	>>	sv _	>	PDMY	>	AF3	<b>~</b>	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.0863	0.0035	-0.0022	
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	AV	~~	Accident	0	0	-0.2843	0.003	-0.0046	-0.000
OP	>>	SI	>>	PP	>>	AEJ	<<	Accident	0	0.0001	-0.2844	0.0043	-0.0097	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AE2	~~	Accident	-0.0001	0.0012	-0.0457	0.0084	-0.0065	
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>	ADMY	~~	Accident	-0.0001	0.002	-0.043	0.0281	-0.003	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0002	0.0048	-0.0452	0.0116	-0.0189	-0.0001
ODMY	>>	SI	>	PDMY	>	ADMY	<<	Accident	-0.0004	0.0016	-0.2705	0.0263	-0.0167	-0.0003
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AEI	~	Accident	0.0001	0.0041	0.0291	0.013	0.0092	0
ODMY	>>	SI	>	pp	»>	ADMY	<<	Accident	0.0001	0.0008	0.1096	0.0226	0.0037	0.000
OP	»	SV	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0.0001	0.0001	0.4539	0.0035	0.0171	0.0001
OP	>>	SV	>	PDMY	>	A۷	<<	Accident	0	0	0.3275	0.0025	0.0049	6
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AE2	<<	Accident	0	0.0007	0.0116	0.0093	0.0008	6
ODMY	>>	SDMY	>	PDMY	>	AE3	<<	Accident	0	0.0003	-0.0641	0.0049	-0.0035	(
OP	>>	SDMY	>	PC	>	AEI	<<	Accident	-0.0035	0.0073	-0.4839	0.0105	-0.3356	-0.0009

Table 39. Total Effects and Significance of "UAV Model with MAV Data" Paths at p <= 0.3439 Level

### 4.10 Comparative Goodness of Fit Statistics

All the first models (A) of the respective aircraft type and significance level had low levels of fit within the context of ( $\gamma 2$  / df), RMSEA, GFI, CFI statistics. Applying covariance to the second models (B), the results improved in fit indices. The third models were constructed to improve models according to respective regression weights of the second models (B) and statistically non-significant relationships that were utilized in the path analysis. However; the results of the third models (C) presented similar fit statistics with the second models (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned models (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the second models (B) were selected as the actual models to be utilized in the analysis. The third models (C) were not applicable to UAV model at  $p \le 0.05$  level and "UAV model with MAV data" at both significance level. All the second (B) models of that utilized in analysis did not exactly fit but presented close satisfactory results in terms of goodness of fit indices. The second UAV (B) models at both levels depicted fit measures in terms of  $\chi^2$  / df measures. The comparative measures of goodness of fit of all models are presented in Table 40.

AMOS Fit Measures	Acceptable Criteria	Model	MAV at p < 0.05 Level	MAV at <i>p</i> < 0.1 Level	UAV at p < 0.05 Level	UAV at p < 0.1 Level	UAV with MAV Data at p < 0.05 Level	UAV with MAV Data at p < 0.1 Level
Chi-square dividing by the	1.0 <	А	8.637	8.972	4.865	5.038	10.466	10.837
degree of freedom	$\chi^2/df$ < 3.0	В	3.722	3.806	2.252	2,322	3.784	3.896
$(\chi^2/df)$	< 3.0	С	3.667	3.76	-	2.291	•	-
	0.95 ≤ CF1	А	0.242	0.242	0.243	0.245	0.201	0.207
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)		В	0.741	0.745	0.769	0.768	0.779	0.781
		С	0.74	0.745	-	0.770	-	-
	0.9 ≤ GFI	А	0.707	0.708	0.625	0.631	0.713	0.715
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)		В	0.831	0.834	0.748	0.750	0.867	0.870
		С	0.829	0.834	-	0.749	-	-
Root Mean	DI (OD )	A	0.194	0.199	0.256	0.262	0.216	0.221
Square Error of Approximation	RMSEA around	В	0.116	0.118	0.213	0.150	0.117	0.120
(RMSEA)	0.05	С	0.115	0.117	-	0.148	-	-

 Table 40.
 Comparative Goodness of Fit Statistics

# 4.11 Results of the Hypothesis

Three main analyses, MAV models, UAV models and comparisons, were conducted to answer the three research questions. According first two main analyses, there were statistically significant causal paths at two levels,  $p \le 0.1855$  and  $p \le 0.3439$  among MAV DOD HFACS Category levels shown in Tables 19 and 26. There were no statistically significant causal paths at  $p \le 0.1855$  among UAV DOD HFACS Category levels as shown in Table 28. There was one statistically significant causal path at  $p \le 0.3439$  among UAV DOD HFACS Category levels for the case  $\beta = 0$  as shown in Table 34. For the third question, there were no common statistically significant causal paths at two levels,  $p \le 0.1855$  and  $p \le 0.3439$ , as shown in Tables 37 and 39. In that context:

H1₀: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in MAV accidents.

 $H1_{s}$ : There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in MAV accidents.

**Conclusion:** Based on critical ratios in Tables 19 and 26, statistically significant path effect coefficients were observed at joint  $\alpha = 0.1855$  ( $\alpha = 0.05$  individual direct effect coefficients) and joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  ( $\alpha = 0.10$  individual direct effect coefficients) under both cases path  $\beta \neq 0$  and  $\beta = 0$  for MAV accidents. Reject H1₀ of no statistically significant causation path leading to MAV accidents and conclude that one or more statistically significant accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis.

H2₀: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in UAV accidents.

 $H2_a$ : There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels of HFACS in UAV accidents.

**Conclusions:** Based on critical ratios in Table 28, statistically significant path effect coefficients were not observed at joint  $\alpha = 0.1855$  ( $\alpha = 0.05$  individual direct effect coefficients) under both cases path  $\beta \neq 0$  and  $\beta = 0$  for UAV accidents. Fail to reject H2₀ of no statistically significant causation path at joint

 $\alpha = 0.1855$  leading to UAV accidents and conclude that no statistically significant accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis. Based on critical ratios in Table 34, statistically significant path effect coefficients were not observed at joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  ( $\alpha = 0.10$  individual direct effect coefficients) under the case of path  $\beta \neq 0$  for UAV accidents. Fail to reject H2₀ of no statistically significant causation path at joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  for the case of path  $\beta \neq 0$  leading to UAV accidents and conclude that no statistically significant accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis. Conversely, based on critical ratios in Table 34, one statistically significant path effect coefficients) under the case of path  $\beta = 0$ for UAV accidents. Reject H2₀ of no statistically significant causation path at joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  ( $\alpha = 0.10$  individual direct effect coefficients) under the case of path  $\beta = 0$ for UAV accidents. Reject H2₀ of no statistically significant causation path at joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  for the case of path  $\beta = 0$  leading to UAV accidents and conclude that statistically significant accident causation path at joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  for the case of path  $\beta = 0$  leading to UAV accidents and conclude that statistically significant accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis.

**H3o:** There is no common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accident paths in terms of HFACS categorical levels.

H3a: There is at least one common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accidents paths in terms of HFACS levels.

**Conclusion:** Based on critical ratios in Tables 37 and 39, statistically significant common path effect coefficients were not observed at joint  $\alpha = 0.1855$  ( $\alpha = 0.05$ individual direct effect coefficients) and joint  $\alpha = 0.3439$  ( $\alpha = 0.10$  individual direct effect coefficients) under both cases path  $\beta \neq 0$  and  $\beta = 0$  for MAV accident data fit to UAV accident models. Fail to reject  $H1_0$  of no statistically significant common causation paths between UAV and MAV accident paths and conclude that no statistically significant common accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis.

### **CHAPTER 5**

### **RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter discusses results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research from this investigation of USAF MAV and UAV accident causes.

## 5.1 Introduction

The main objective of this study was to analyze the structural relationships of accident causes among DOD HFACS levels in comparable UAVs and MAVs and to analyze any potential common relationships between UAV and MAV accident cause paths. In the pursuit of these objectives, this work developed two types of analyses that are considered to contribute to the study MAV and UAV accident causes. The first analytical contribution was the structuring DOD HFACS accident codes such that they can be analyzed by attribute agreement analysis for inter-rater reliability estimates. The second analytical contribution was the normalization of DOD HFACS accident code data such that it can be analyzed for path effect and statistical significance within the structural equation modeling (SEM) methodology. These two analytical methods are discussed separately in order to establish their contributions to the analysis of accident causes within the aviation domain and suggest their application to the analysis of accident causes in other industrial, service, and governmental domains.

### 5.2 Inter-rater Reliability Results

The main contribution of this study to inter-rater reliability analysis of the assignment of HFACS codes in MAV and UAV accident reports was the development of the inter-rater reliability attribute agreement analysis study methodology in Section 4.2.

Typically, attribute agreement analysis is applicable to units that require subjective assignment to one of a few categories. For example, the assignment of a unit of finished product to one of categories grade A, grade B, rework to the next higher grade, sell to third world, or scrap. Another example would be classification of loan applications to very low, low, medium, or high risk or to reject categories. The entire unit is assigned to the category based on its cumulative characteristics. Given that there are three "Organizational Influences" categories, four "Unsafe Supervision" categories, three "Preconditions for Unsafe Acts" category level, there are  $4 \times 5 \times 4 \times 5 = 400$  path classifications for each MAV or UAV accident under the HFACS. This number of path classifications can be multiplied further, since USAF experts assign category codes that create partial paths and multiple paths within the same accident report. Thus, assignment of an accident report to a discrete path classification is not always possible.

The attribute agreement analysis inter-rater reliability method developed as part of this work overcame this need for discrete path classification by:

- Treating each HFACS categorical level as an independent assignment. This decomposed each path by Reason's Swiss Cheese model to four independent classification problems.
- Adding a dummy variable to each HFACS categorical level as a pass through category for accidents in which USAF investigators did not make code assignment for the given level.
- Normalizing the data into a Poisson process by dividing the number of nanocode assignments within a respective category by the total number of

nanocodes within the categorical level plus one for the introduced dummy variable.

These modifications allowed each path to be treated as arising from a multiplicative process of independent variables for subsequent SEM analysis.

The inter-rater reliability procedure developed in Section 3.1 was designed to verify the individual rater's reliability before and after rating the 272 accident summaries. The first step was to establish the measurement standard for acceptable inter-rater agreement. To this end, this work relied on a prior study by O'Connor, et. al. (2010) indicating only a 55% agreement among raters of aircraft accident reports. This study set the standard for between rater agreement and all raters' agreement to experts' classification at greater than or equal to 50% average or 50/50 odds of random assignment classification.

The second step was the tradeoff analysis between confidence in the difference to detect and the sampling resolution over a range of sample sizes to select a sample size that provided  $\geq$  90% confidence in detecting differences between any two raters from the p = 0.50 base random assignment case.

The third step was development of the seven step rater reliability method in Section 3.1. Step One decomposed the 75 detailed accident reports into ten training, 20 pre-classification testing, and 30 inter-rater testing categories and randomly assigned each detailed accident report to each category. The three raters studied the ten training reports to develop their own classification scheme based on their observations of USAF expert investigator HFACS code assignments. The three raters were then tested on a random sample of ten reports out of the 20 pre-classification testing reports for HFACS

category assignment agreement in two rounds of attribute agreement analysis. The three raters achieved the greater than 50% average agreement for between raters and all raters' agreement to experts' classification on the second round. The first inter-rater reliability testing was conducted next on the 30 detailed reports and confirmed the greater than 50% average agreement for between raters and all raters' agreement to experts' classification. This pre-classification and inter-rater testing attribute agreement analyses can continue for multiple rounds until the between raters and all raters' agreement to experts' classification achieve the average agreement rating standard. The pre-classification and inter-rater testing attribute agreement analyses established the rater's reliability a priori to rating the 272 accident summaries. After rating of the 272 accident summaries, the post inter-rater testing of 30 random samples from the 272 classified accident summaries by the three raters showed between rater agreement greater than the 50% average criteria establishing confidence that the summaries had been classified at a rate greater than 50/50 odds random assignment and approaching the 55% agreement in prior studies by O'Connor, et. al. (2010).

Finally the categorical level classification scheme developed for this work transformed the HFACS classification data into a format suitable for attribute agreement analysis. Each categorical level was assigned multiple rows, one for each category assigned within the level. This allowed for multiple category assignments within a category level. In addition to the category codes and the dummy variable code, a code of "N" was assigned to show disagreement between raters within a categorical level or of a rater with himself between replicates. This classification scheme is illustrated in Table 41.

Report	Rater 1	Rater 1	Rater 2	Rater 2	Rater 3	Rater 3
M0020_F-16C-O	D	D	D	D	D	D
M0020_F-16C-S	D	D	D	D	D	D
M0020_F-16C-P	N	N	PC	PC	N	PC
M0020_F-16C-P	D	D	N	N	D	N
M0020_F-16C-A	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB
M0020_F-16C-A	Ν	N	N	JD	N	N
M0020 F-16C-A	MI	MI	MI	N	MI	MI
M0604_C-5-O	D	D	D	Ð	D	D
M0604_C-5-S	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI
M0604_C-5-P	PC	PC	PC	PC	PC	PC
M0604_C-5-A	N	SB	N	N	N	N
M0604_C-5-A	JD	JÐ	JD	JD	dL	JD
M0710 V-16C-O	D	D	D	D	D	D
M0710_V-16C-S	D	D	D	D	D	D
M0710_V-16C-P	PC	N	N	N	N	N
M0710 V-16C-P	N	N	PP	PP	PP	PP
M0710_V-16C-P	N	D	N	N	N	N
M0710_V-16C-A	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB
M0710 V-16C-A	N	JD	N	N	N	N

 Table 41.
 Accident Categorical Level Classification Scheme

## 5.3 Factor Analysis and Path Analysis

An exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce the number of possible 400 path classifications to the few potentially significant paths represented by the statistically significant inter-categorical Pearson correlations. The combinations of significant correlations from the from the "Organizational Influences" level to the "Unsafe Acts" level of DOD HFACS variables were used to structure the hypothesized paths among the DOD HFACS category levels. As a result of this analysis, 39 and 24 statistically significant correlations of MAV and UAV accidents respectively were extracted at  $p \le$ 0.05 significance level. The numbers of the correlations found at  $p \le$  0.10 levels were 54 and 33 for MAV and UAV accidents respectively. From these correlations, 26 MAV paths and 14 UAV paths at correlation significance of  $p \le$  0.05 level and 50 MAV paths and 21 UAV paths at  $p \le 0.10$  level were hypothesized for subsequent testing by the means of path analysis.

Current structural equation modeling software is not programmed to provide path coefficients and their standard errors in terms of the HFACS accident cause assignments. Current SEM software, SPSS/AMOS included, provide bootstrap estimates of unstandardized regression weights and standard errors. A contribution of this work in applying SEM analysis to DOD HFACS accident report classifications was the recognition that, because the covariance matrix provides independent estimates of SEM direct effect coefficients between HFACS categorical levels, each HFACS path is composed of independent random variables of SEM direct effect coefficients and their standard errors. Correspondingly, each path effect on Accident outcome is the  $\beta_{path} = \beta_0 \times \beta_S \times \beta_P \times \beta_A \rightarrow$  Accident product, and from mathematical statistics the principle of the variance of the product of independent random variables was applied to provide the two estimates of path standard errors by which the  $\beta_{path} / SE_{path}$  statistical significance could be tested.

Fifteen models for the two aircraft type, UAV and MAV at both significance levels, were hypothesized and six models were selected for structural equation modeling and path analysis. All the first models (A) of the respective aircraft type and significance level had low levels of fit statistics within the context of  $\chi^2$  / df, RMSEA, GFI, CFI values. All second SEM models (B) showed significantly improved fit indices. Third models were constructed according to respective regression weights of the second models (B), but all third models did not show substantial improvements in fit indices. Thus, second models (B) were retained for path analyses. According to Byrne (2010), fit indices yield information bearing only on the model's lack of fit and are unable to reflect the extent to which the model is plausible. The judgment of plausibility rests squarely on the researcher.

In the MAV model, three paths, including no dummy variable, emanated from category OC were found to be statistically significant at  $p \le 0.1855$  and  $p \le 0.3439$  levels:

OC>SP>PC>AE1 OC>SP>PC>AE2 OC>SP>PC>AE3

Seven additional paths, five emanating from category OC, were found to be statistically significant at  $p \le 0.3439$  level.

OC>SDMY>PC>AE1 (for  $\beta=0$  and  $\beta\neq0$ ) OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 (for  $\beta=0$  and  $\beta\neq0$ ) ORG>SP>PC>AE1 (for  $\beta=0$  and  $\beta<\neq0$ ) ORG>SP>PC>AE2 (for  $\beta\neq0$ ) OC>SDMY>PC>AE3 (for  $\beta\neq0$ ) OC>SV>PDMY>AE1 (for B=0) OC>SI>PDMY>AE1 (for B=0)

Thus for  $\beta \neq 0$ , it can be observed that at the "Organizational Influences" HFACS categorical the OC, organizational climate, was the main contributor to MAV accidents.

At the "Unsafe Supervision" level, SP, planned inappropriate operations, was the main contributor. At the "Preconditions for Unsafe Acts" level, PC, condition of the individual, was the main contributor. At the "Unsafe Acts" level, AE1 skill based errors, AE2 judgment and decision making errors, and AE3 misperception errors all contributed to accidents with AE1 having the largest effect with coefficient -1.108, AE2 the next largest effect with coefficient -0.545, and AE3 the least effect with coefficient -0.132.

In the UAV model, one path was found to be statistically significant at the  $p \le 0.3439$  level.

## ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE1

Thus, it can be observed that the organizational causal mechanisms that lead to UAV accidents are different from those that lead to MAV accidents. MAV accident causal paths involve all organizational levels, whereas UAV accident causes are located in the "Preconditions for Unsafe Acts" and the "Unsafe Acts" organizational levels. The commonality is that PC, condition of the individual, AE1, skill based errors are the main causal contributors to both MAV and UAV accidents.

Three different comparisons were conducted for the purpose of the third research question whether there is a common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS categorical levels. The first comparison was made between the results of factor analyses, the second comparison was made via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft type, and the third comparison was conducted via applying MAV data to UAV model at two significance levels to contrast common paths within the context of DOD HFACS.

The first comparison was made according to factor analysis and yielded thirteen common correlations at the  $p \le 0.05$  level and nineteen common correlations at the  $p \le 0.10$  level between MAV and UAV. The second comparison was based on contrasting the results of path analysis of two aircrafts. As reported above, no common statistically significant paths were identified.

The third comparison was conducted applying MAV data to the UAV models at two significance levels to contrast common statistically significant paths within the context of DOD HFACS. As reported in Chapter 4, applying MAV data to UAV models and comparing the results with UAV model showed no statistically significant common paths under the constraint of Reason's Swiss Cheese model requiring full paths through all organizational levels. As noted above partial common paths exist at the "Preconditions for Unsafe Acts" and the "Unsafe Acts" organizational levels.

In conventional organizations, each level is generally responsible for its respective and lower levels. While it is difficult or not possible to amend or correct the higher level decisions or errors, end-users are not always able to detect these errors originated from the top level. The problem to be addressed within the context of organizational management is finding out the structure of the accident paths from the top levels to end users. Organizations concerned with accidents and human factors can utilize this methodology and find the respective failure model.

Another point is that each sector or domain may have different type of failure models. While Reason's failure model can be appropriate for traditional organizations, the model might not be suitable for organizations having low hierarchy or technology driven-complex structures. As Bar-Yam (2004) states, the complex mission is one that has a large number of possible unsuccessfull actions. Flight, the core activity of aviation, can be considered as a complex mission and an air force as a complex organziation. Considering the Reason's model as a base structure, HFACS and the structural assessments presented in this study can be utilized to identify the failure model of an organization. Accurate identification of the failure model of an organization can provide enhanced interventions and improvements in system safety in terms of human factors.

Originally developed for the nuclear power industry, Reason's model is adapted to aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) and has been studied in different types of domains such as maintenance (Krulak, 2004), shipping (Cclik & Cebi, 2009), motor vehicle accidents (Iden, 2012), and mining (Lenné, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012). These studies utilized HFACS taxonomy as a framework to adapt the Reason model to their respective organization or domain. Considering differences of these areas and the type of technology operated, the failure models can be different from the Reason's approach, suggesting more dynamic and complex structures or activities.

The levels set forth by Reason can be customized to a variety of organizations according to their decision making process, hierarchical structure, and technology being used. In that context, HFACS can be used as the mean of determining the failure structure by classifying and analyzing the accidents, mishaps, or near misses. Improving and adapting Reason's model (1990) by the means of adapted HFACS taxonomy can contribute to organizations ability to comprehend the failure structure and elaborate a variety of intervention strategies.

Given the identification of significant causation paths of an organization by the methodology set forth in this study, new failure models can be tested and improved in terms of human factors. As this type of failure model study allows identification of the significant paths and consequently the accident model it can be named as a "dynamic failure model". Obviously, there should be an optimum definition of a failure so that it can be assessed in analysis to identify the significant causation paths and failure model of an organization or a structure. In this study, Class A accidents that occurred in USAF between the Flight Years of 2000 and 2013 were used as "failures".

Knowledge of statistically significant paths and structural relations of causes is necessary for successful interventions to prevent human related accidents and improve the safety of the organization's activities. Besides this fact, since UAV and MAV have different concepts in terms of personnel training mission types, interventions at organizational level should be in accordance with these differences. Decision makers of the respective organization can utilize the differences of accident paths between MAV and UAV while deciding on wide-scale interventions.

## 5.4 Limitations of the Study

The majority of the reports in the USAF Accident Investigation Boards database include the executive summaries of the accidents. Given that 347 reports of which 272 of the accident reports were summaries and required classification by the researcher, the issue of classification reliability had to be address through rater reliability assessment.

The samples size of UAV accidents (N = 60) was another limitation of the study. However; as the proposed UAV model had only single-direction paths between the categories, the model hypothesized was considered not to have a complexity in terms of paths or correlations. The narrative and detailed data available was for the years between 2000 and 2013. Since UAV usage and its accident analysis are not as common as manned aircrafts, there is a limited interval of time for the analysis. However, this time is considered to be sufficient to analyze UAV and MAV accidents.

### 5.5 Recommendations for Future Studies

The inter-rater reliability study methodology developed in this work can be conducted to establish and improve assessment reliability for any aviation organization applying the HFACS directly or any organization in another sector adapting the HFACS system to its sector. Other sectors will have to develop their own respective accident categorical level classification schemes and adapt the methodology for assessment and possibly certification of raters.

Future research will be required to implement SEM code to estimate path coefficients and standard errors using accepted bootstrap estimate methods. This work estimated path coefficients and standard errors as the product of independent random variables based on the observation that the covariance matrix provides independent estimates of SEM direct effect coefficients between HFACS categorical levels

Future research is needed to develop optimal path pruning methods similar to backward and forward stepwise regression and best subsets regression in empirical modeling. Such pruning methods will have to consider the tradeoff between improved model fit and magnitude of total path effect in terms of the size of its coefficient. As can be observed in Tables 19, 26, 28, and 34 of this study, there were paths that were not statistically significant and eligible for pruning but had path coefficients that were larger in magnitude than the coefficients of statistically significant paths.

USAF investigators did not always assign accident codes to each HFACS level. This was the reason that dummy variables were implemented for structural equation modeling in this study. This strongly suggests that either USAF investigators are not following the intent of Reason's Swiss Cheese model in applying the HFACS or that Reason's Swiss Cheese model does not strictly hold for MAV and UAV accident causes. In either case, the structural equation modeling methodology developed in this study will have to be modified to admit partial paths in order to relax the assumptions underlying Reason's model. It is uncertain at this time as to whether or not such partial paths or under what missing partial path conditions will yield positive definite covariance matrices. Future research will be required to develop partial path structural equation modeling.

In the future, different services of Armed Forces, having aviation departments or sectors other than aviation using HFACS, can be analyzed with the structural equation modeling methodology developed in this work. Furthermore, a more complex study may include the human errors not just in one service but also throughout armed forces and other sectors.

The methodology that set forth the path(s) among HFACS levels and sublevels can be applied to other domains and organizations that use HFACS taxonomy by the mean of analyzing the secondhand accident investigation reports. The integration of such secondhand data will require additional research to assure rater accuracy and understand the implications of the structural equation modeling process, assessment, and interpretation.

Since differing organizations and sectors have different structures and processes the relationship among HFACS levels and sublevels found in this study are unlikely to have the same path(s). The knowledge developed is not only the HFACS path(s) in USAF UAV and MAV accidents but also the analytical methodology, which can be applied to other aviation or industrial organizations as well. Additional research will be required to develop the name of the holes together with relationships among the Swiss Cheese pieces, which are HFACS levels and sublevels.

The HFACS taxonomy can be reviewed and tested regularly with the data to capture the effects of technology and structural changes of the organization. Since no latent variable such as mission type or accident phase was used in the study, further studies may include this kind of latent variables as well to observe the effect.

# 5.6 Conclusion

Decreasing accident rates is crucial to military and commercial aviation and to industrial organizations, especially those concerned with human factors, working under budget constraints. In order to mitigate the potential for aviation accidents, it is important to ensure that accidents are investigated and evaluated in an appropriate methodology and taxonomy so as to understand the causes for individual and all cases as well. This study conducted a set of analysis to identify statistically significant paths of UAV and MAV accidents and common paths between UAV and MAV accidents within the context of DOD HFACS taxonomy based on Reason's (1990) Accident Causation Model. The correlations found among the variables, categories were applied to HFACS taxonomy based on the Reason Model via path analysis. In other words, the results of correlation matrix were applied to four layered- structure based on the Reason model via multiple regressions. The study concluded the presence of statistically significant paths at both UAV and MAV accidents and common partial paths of those aircraft types within the framework of DOD HFACS taxonomy. The study also suggests that accident data can be utilize to test and improve the failure model of an organization to apprehend any significant effect such as technology and structural changes in the organization.

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### APPENDICES

# APPENDIX A. COVER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OUTLINE OF AN AIBs REPORT

This appendix includes the cover, executive summary and outline of an AIBs report.

# UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT



MQ-1B, T/N 06-3175

196th Reconnaissance Squadron 163d Reconnaissance Wing March Air Reserve Base, California



LOCATION: Kandahar AB, Afghanistan DATE OF ACCIDENT: 3 October 2009 BOARD PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Colonel Todd G. Chase Conducted IAW Air Force Instruction 51-503, Chapter 11

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

#### MQ-1B, T/N 06-3175, MARCH JOINT AIR RESERVE BASE 3 October 2009

At 0353 Zulu (Z) / 0723 Local, Afghanistan on 3 October 2009 (2053 Pacific Daylight Saving Time on 2 October 2009), after normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA) taxied and departed from Kandahar Air Field for a reconnaissance mission. There were two mishap crews involved in this mishap, as the mishap occurred shortly after crew swap. Mishap Crew 1 (MC1) consisted of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1) and Mishap Sensor Operator 1 (MSO1). Mishap Crew 2 (MC2) consisted of Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) and Mishap Sensor Operator 2.

During the flight, MC1 received a direct tasking from the Combined Forces Air Component Commander to provide close air support to United States and Afghan ground forces under attack by Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF). At the time of the tasking, AAF carried out a large, coordinated attack against U.S. and Afghan ground forces at two remote outposts. Several U.S troops were killed during the attacks. Given the circumstances of the AAF attack and the immediate and urgent need for CAS, both Mishap Crews (MCs) were consumed with a high-degree of urgency.

While en route to the tasking, MC2 assumed control of the MRPA at approximately 09052. At approximately 0918Z, despite efforts by MC2 to avoid the terrain at the last minute, MC2 failed to prevent a Controlled Flight Into Terrain of the MRPA. The impact completely destroyed the MRPA.

The Accident Investigation B oard President determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mishap was the result of pilot error caused primarily by MP2's channelized attention away from flying the MRPA and an inattention to the high terrain in the MRPA's immediate vicinity. Furthermore, inattention by both MP1 and MP2 resulted from a perceived absence of threat from the environment. Specifically, they both failed to appreciate the need for a significant increase in altitude required to safely overfly the mountainous terrain located between the MRPA and the target.

### SUMMARY OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF OPINION

### MQ-1B, T/N 06-3175 3 October 2009

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### APPENDIX B. HFACS SAMPLE PROBABLITIES OF MISCLASSIFICATION

# FOR VARIOUS SAMPLE SIZE EXPECTED MISCLASSIFICATION RATES

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0.05	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
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4	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21
5	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16
6	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	80.0	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11
7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	10.0	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06
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# MATRIX

								COR	CORRELATION	NOI								
	ORG	oc	OP	VMGO	ŝ	SP	SF	SV	SDMY	PE	РС	dd	PDMY	AEI	AE2	AE3	٨٧	ADMY
ORG	-	-0.046	0.135	-0.664	0.162	-0.103	0.272	-0.057	0.005	-0.05	-0.201	-0.067	0.249	-0.268	-0.181	-0.006	-0.1	0.422
ပ္ပ		-	0.171	-0.142	0.216	0.224	-0.012	0.401	-0.19	-0.04	0.388	0.038	-0.078	0.151	0.239	0.144	-0.021	-0.064
ЧO			-	-0.638	0.14	0.072	0.034	0.122	-0.153	-0.04	0.047	-0.065	0.111	-0.154	0.095	0.01	-0.096	0.23
<b>VMGO</b>				-	-0.125	0.016	-0.088	-0.088	0.038	0.046	0.075	0.097	-0.229	0.243	0.05	-0.002	0.151	-0.451
SI					1	0.141	0.265	0.06	-0.659	-0.04	0.03	0.132	0.01	0.103	0.073	-0.021	-0.075	0.024
SP						1	0.275	-0.04	-0.626	0.125	0.241	0.233	-0.127	0.115	-0.01	-0.014	-0.071	-0.099
SF							Γ	-0.015	-0.233	0.019	-0.083	-0.057	0.073	-0.02	-0.058	-0.038	-0.026	0.012
SV					-			-	-0.233	-0.05	0.073	-0.057	-0.012	0.134	0.176	1	-0.026	-0.078
SDMY								-	-	-0.02	-0.045	-0.241	0.066	-0.103	-0.027	0.08	0.113	0.047
ΡE										-	0.202	-0.026	-0.338	-0.01	-0.038	-0.044	-0.051	0,104
PC											1	0.059	-0.528	0.204	0.284	0.317	0.091	-0.217
ЬР						-							-0.366	0.066	-0.045	-0.058	0.102	-0.042
PDMY													I	-0.069		-0.101	-0.07	0.126
AEI														-	0.025	0.014	-0.005	-0.641
AE2											-					0.25	-0.01	-0.301
AE3																1-	0.101	-0.2
AV																	1	-0,138
ADMY																		-
								Sig	Sig. (1-tailed)	(þ								
ORG		0.255	0.028	0	0.01	0.073	0	0.209	0.475	0.262	0.002	0.172	0	0	0.005	0.467	0.077	0
SC				0.022	0.001	0.001	0.431	0	0.003	0.27	0	0.296	0.134	0.016	0	0.02	0.38	0.183
ЧO				0	0.024	0.154	0.317	0.042	0.015	0.267	0.254	0.179	0.057	0.014	0.089	0.442	0.085	0
γMdO					0.037	0.412	0.107	0.107	0.297	0.257	0.144	0.083	0.001	0	0.239	0.488	0.016	0
SI						0.023	0	0.197	0	0.279	0.336	0.03	0.445	0.071	0.149	0.383	0.145	0.37
SP							0	0.284	0	0.038	0	0	0.035	0.051	0.445	0.424	0.157	0.079
SF								0,416	0	0.395	0.121	0,208	0.152	0.387	0.207	0.294	0.354	0.435
SV									C	0.226	0.151	0.208	0.435	0.029	0.006	0.067	0.354	0.133
SDMY										0.365	0.26	0	0.174	0.071	0.354	0.128	0.054	0.252
ΡE											0.002	0.355	0	0.445	0.294	0.268	0.234	0.069
PC												0.2	0	0.002	0	0	0.097	0.001
рр													0	0.174	0.264	0,206	0.073	0.276
PDMY														0.162	0.027	0.076	0.161	0.037
AEI															0.363	0.422	0.469	0
AE2	_															0	0.444	0
AE3																	0.075	0.002
٨٧																		0.025
YMCIA	Ĺ															-		

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# APPENDIX D. UAV ACCIDENT REPORTS PEARSON CORRELATION

# MATRIX

							COF	RELAT	IONS							
	ORG	ос	OP	ODMY	SI	SP	sv	SDMY	PE	РС	PP	PDMY	AEI	AE2	AE3	AV
ORG	1	-0.088	-0.228	-0.49	0.019	-0.011	-0.088	-0.044	0.018	-0.255	-0.028	0.254	-0.26	-0.161	-0.014	-0.062
OC		1	0.188	-0.192	-0.083	-0.047	-0.034	0.102	-0.144	0.082	-0.086	0.081	-0.053	0.022	-0.062	<u>-0.024</u>
OP			l	-0.652	0.233	-0.021	0.188	-0.171	-0.146	-0.094	-0.018	0.126	-0.197	-0.142	-0.027	0.132
ODMY				l	-0.283	-0.008	-0.192	0.255	0.094	0.234	0.003	-0.24	0.336	0.246	-0.011	-0.135
SI					1	-0.113	0.415	-0.811	0.053	-0.145	0.29	0	-0.026	-0.011	0.298	0.291
SP						1	-0.047	-0.458	0.03	-0.035	-0.023	-0.074	0.024	-0.092	-0.084	-0.033
sv							1	-0.337	-0.144	0.017	-0.086	0.081	-0.053	0.022	0.557	0.701
SDMY								ŀ	-0.066	0.167	-0.226	0.017	0.023	0.048	-0,21	-0.236
PE									l	-0.073	0.072	-0.508	0.017	0.05	-0.06	-0.101
PC										1	0.261	-0.393	0.479	0.524	0.146	0.102
PP												-0.303	0.112	0.15	0.278	-0.06
PDMY												1	-0.188	-0.184	-0.097	-0.085
AEI													1	0.396	0.032	-0.112
AE2														I	0.282	0.11
AE3															l	0.391
AV																ļ
							Si	g. (I-tail	ed)							
ORG		0.252	0.04	0	0.442	0.467	0.252	0.369	0.446	0.025	0.416	0.025	0.022	0.109	0.457	0.32
OC	-			0.071	0.264	0.361	0.397	0.218	0.136	0.268	0.257	0.269	0.342	0.432	0.319	0.427
OP				0	0.037	0.437	0.075	0.096	0.134	0.238	0.446	0.169	0.065	0.139	0.418	0.157
ODMY					0.014	0.475	0.071	0.025	0,239	0.036	0.491	0.032	0.004	0.029	0.466	0.153
SI						0.195	0	0	0.343	0.135	0.012	0.5	0.423	0.467	0.01	0.012
SP							0.361	. 0	0.41	0.395	0.43	0.288	0.427	0.243	0.261	0.401
S٧								0.004	0.136	0.448	0.257	0.269	0.342	0.432	0	0
SDMY									0.309	0.1	0.041	0.448	0.432	0.359	0.054	0.035
PE										0.29	0.293	0	0.448	0.351	0.325	0.221
PC											0.022	0.001	0	0	0.132	0.218
PP												0.009	0.197	0.127	0.016	0.324
PDMY													0.075	0.079	0.231	0.259
AE1														0.001	0.404	0.196
AE2															0.015	0.201
AE3																0.001
AV																

## APPENDIX E. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL A (p < 0.05)

#### Analysis Summary

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

### Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total								
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15								
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0								
Unlabeled	36	0	18	0	0	54								
Total	51	0	18	0	0	69								
Models Computation (	of degrees of	freedom (Default m	iodel)											
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) Number of distinct sample moments: 171														
Number of d	istinct para	meters to be estin	nated:			54								
Degrees of fi	reedom (17	1 - 54):				117								
Result (Defaul	t model)													
Minimum wa	as achieved													
Chi-square =	1010.570													
	_													

Degrees of freedom = 117

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	′ <	OP	237	.064	-3.711	***par_1
SI	<	ORG	.264	.056	4.709	***par_2
SI	<	OC	.970	.282	3.434	***par_3
SP	<	OC	.925	.283	3.263	.001par_4
SDMY	′ <	OC	811	.298	-2.721	.007par_5
SI	<	OP	.201	.060	3.335	***par_6

ODMY	.229	.059	3.866	***par_7
ORG	108	.059	-1.829	.067par_14
OC	.503	.083	6.089	***par_17
OP	.015	.018	.852	.394par_18
ODMY	214	.063	-3.417	***par_19
ÓRG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_22
SP	046	.019	-2.464	.014par_8
SP	.254	.049	5.160	***par_13
SDMY	005	.017	293	.769par_15
SV	018	.061	304	.761par_20
SI	.007	.020	.354	.723par_23
SP	.047	.022	2.136	.033par_24
SDMY	041	.020	-2.051	.040par_25
SDMY	.119	.044	2.691	.007par_26
SP	.039	.022	1.786	.074par_28
SF	.099	.060	1.655	.098par_35
PC	.738	.220	3,355	***par_9
PC	.635	.142	4.467	***par_10
PC	.374	.076	4.913	***par_11
PDMY	.097	.396	.245	.806par_12
PDMY	.380	.612	.620	.535par_16
PDMY	164	.162	-1.016	.310par_21
PDMY	.452	.343	1.319	.187par_27
PC	362	.123	-2.940	.003par_29
accident	1.000			
accident	055	.033	-1.669	.095par_30
accident	081	.043	-1.890	.059par_31
	ORG OC OP ODMY ORG SP SP SDMY SV SI SV SI SP SDMY SDMY SDMY SP SDMY SP SDMY SP SDMY PDMY PDMY PDMY PDMY PDMY	ORG      108         OC       .503         OP       .015         ODMY      214         ORG       .069         SP      046         SP       .254         SDMY      005         SV      018         S1       .007         SP       .041         SDMY      041         SDMY       .041         SP       .047         SP       .047         SP       .041         SDMY       .119         SP       .039         SF       .099         PC       .374         PDMY       .097         PDMY       .164         PDMY       .452         PC       .362         accident       .005	ORG108.059OC.503.083OP.015.018ODMY214.063ORG.069.017SP046.019SP.254.049SDMY005.017SV018.061S1.007.020SP.047.022SDMY041.020SP.047.022SDMY.041.020SP.043.020SP.047.022SDMY.119.044SP.039.022SF.099.060PC.738.220PC.374.076PDMY.097.396PDMY.164.162PDMY.164.162PDMY.452.343PC.362.123accident1.000accident.033	ORG108.059-1.829OC.503.0836.089OP.015.018.852ODMY214.063-3.417ORG.069.0174.011SP046.019-2.464SP.254.0495.160SDMY005.017293SV.018.061304SI.007.020.354SDMY018.061304SI.007.020.354SP.041.020-2.051SDMY041.020-2.051SDMY.0442.691SP.039.0221.786SF.099.0601.655PC.738.220.3355PC.374.0764.913PDMY.097.396.245PDMY.380.612.620PDMY.164.162-1.016PDMY.452.3431.319PC.362.123-2.940accident1.000

accident	281	.078	-3.590	***par_32
accident	-1.123	.097	-11.575	***par_33
PP	.152	.218	.695	.487par_34
PE	.538	.224	2.403	.016par_36
	accident accident PP PE	accident -1.123 PP .152	accident -1.123 .097 PP .152 .218	accident-1.123.097-11.575PP.152.218.695

Probability level = .000

Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDMY	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PDMY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDMY	214	811	108	237	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.011	.084	.006	.011	.000	.000	.047	041	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	025	.138	013	028	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDMY	.001	048	.007	.001	.099	018	046	005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADMY	.011	039	.009	.012	.045	008	085	052	.001	1.000	.538	.152	362	.452
AV	.000	.008	-,001	.000	016	.003	.008	.001	.000	055	.000	.000	.000	164
AE2	016	.083	007	018	.010	002	.157	.075	.000	281	.000	.000	.635	.097
AE3	010	.052	005	011	.000	.000	.095	.045	.000	081	.000	.000	.374	.000
AEt	018	.084	007	020	.038	007	.170	.086	.000	-1.123	.000	.000	.738	.380

# Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OC	ORG	ОР	SF	sv	SP	SDMY	SI	accident	PE	₽P	PC	PDMY
<b>S</b> F	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.224	. <b>0</b> 00.	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDMY	221	176	118	240	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.239	.212	.291	.206	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000

PP .038	.063 .024 .04	10 .000 .000 .14714	.025 .000	000. 000. 000.	.000
PC039	.0440210	42 .000 .000 .337 .17	6 .000 .000	000, 000, 000.	.000
PDMY .004	043 .033 .00	04 .11402117002	000, 000. 09	000. 000. 000.	.000
ADMY .009	007 .008 .03	0 .01000206204	2 .001 .968	.124 .036199	.089
AV .000	.003002 .00	00008 .002 .012 .00	.000116	.000.000.000.	071
AE2012	.0130060	13 .002 .000 .098 .05	2 .000234	.000 .000 .300	.016
AE3013	.0150070	14 .000 .000 .110 .05	7 .000125	.000 .000 .327	.000
AEI009	.0080030	10 .005001 .070 .03	9 .000614	.000 .000 .229	.042
Direct Effects	(Group number	l - Default model)			
ODMY	OC ORG OP	SF SV SP SDM	IY SI accident	PE PP PC	PDMY
SF .000	.000 .069 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.	.000.000	.000.000.000.	.000
SV .000	.503 .000 .015	.000. 000. 000. 000.	.000.000	000, 000, 000,	.000
SP .000	.925 .000 .000	000. 000. 000. 000.	.000. 000.	000. 000. 000.	.000
SDM Y214	811108231	000, 000, 000, 000	.000. 000.	000, 000, 000,	.000
SI .229	.970 .264 .201	000. 000. 000. 000.	.000. 000.	000. 000. 000.	.000
PE .000	.000. 000. 000.	.000 .000 .039 .000	.000.000	000, 000, 000.	.000
PP .000	.000. 000. 000.	.000 .000 .047041	.007 .000	000. 000. 000.	.000
PC .000	.000. 000. 000.	.000 .000 .254 .119	.000. 000.	000. 000. 000.	.000
PDM .000 Y	.000. 000. 000.	.099018046005	.000. 000.	000, 000, 000.	.000
ADM .000 Y	.000. 000. 000.	.000. 000. 000. 000.	.000 1.000	.538 .152362	.452
AV .000	.000. 000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	.000055	000. 000. 000.	164
AE2 .000	.000. 000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	.000281	.000 .000 .635	.097
AE3 .000	.000. 000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	.000081	.000 .000 .374	.000
AE1 .000	.000. 000. 000.	.000. 000. 000. 000.	.000 -1.123	.000 .000 .738	.380
Standardized	Direct Effects (Gi	oup number 1 - Default	model)		

Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

 
 ODMY
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SV	.000	.393	.000	.055	000. 000.	.000	.000	000.000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000.	000. 000.	.000	. <b>000</b> .	000.000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	
SDMY	221	176	118	240	000. 000.	.000	.000	000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	
SI	.239	.212	.291	.206	000. 000.	.000	.000	.000.000	000, 000, 000, 000,	
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.	.125	.000	.000.000	000. 000. 000. 000.	
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000.	000, 000.	.147	143	.025 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
РС	.000	.000	.000.	.000	000. 000.	.337	.176	.000.000.	000. 000. 000. 000.	
PDMY	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.114021	170	020	.000.000	000. 000. 000. 000.	
ADMY	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.	.000	.000	.000 .968	.124 .036199 .089	
AV	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000. 000.	.000	.000	.000116	.000 .000 .000071	
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000.	000. 000.	.000	.000	.000234	.000 .000 .300 .016	
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000. 000.	.000	.000	.000125	.000 .000 .327 .000	
AE1	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000. 000.	.000	.000	.000614	.000 .000 .229 .042	
Indirect I	Effects (G	roup	numb	er 1 -	Default mo	del)				

#### Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	$_{\rm Y}^{\rm ODM}$ oc	ORG OP	SF S	V SP	SDM SI Y	accident	PE PP	PC	PDMY
SF	.000 .000	.000. 000.	.000 .0	000. 000	000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
sv	.000, 000.	000, 000,	0. 000,	000. 000	000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
SP	.000. 000.	.000. 000.	.000 .0	000. 000	000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
SDMY	.000. 000.	.000. 000.	.000 .0	000. 000	000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
SI	000, 000,	.000. 000.	.000 .0	000. 000	000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
PE	.000 .036	.000. 000.	.000.0	000. 000	.000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
РР	.011 .084	.006 .011	.000.0	000. 000	.000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
PC	025 .138	013028	0. 000.	000. 000	.000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000.00	.000
PDMY	.001048	3.007.001	.000 .0	000. 000	.000. 000.	.000	.000 .00	000.00	.000
ADMY	.011039	0.009 .012	.0451	.008085	052 .001	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000
AV	.000 .008	001 .000	016 .0	.008 003	.001 .000	.000	.000 .000.	000.00	.000
AE2	016 .083	007018	.010	.002 .157	.075 .000	.000	.000 .00	000, 00	.000
AE3	010 .052	005011	.000 .0	000 .095	.045 .000	.000	.000 .00	000. 00	.000

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	<b>S</b> F	sv	SP	SDM	YSI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>00</b> 0.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	¹ .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.038	.063	.024	.040	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	039	.044	021	042	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDN Y	¹ .004	043	.033	.004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADN Y	⁴ .009	007	.008	.010	.010	002	062	042	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.003	002	.000	008	.002	.012	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	012	.013	006	013	.002	.000	.098	.052	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	013	.015	007	014	.000	.000	.110	.057	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
AE1	009	.008	003	010	.005	001	.070	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

### Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODM	¥ 4.080	.000
ORG	<>	ODM	Y 89.027	.000
OP	<>	ODM	Y 82.267	.000
OP	<>	OC	5.926	.000
e2	<>	e3	21.006	.000
e2	<>	e4	4.428	.000
e5	<>	e3	10.595	.000
e5	<>	e4	6.222	.000
e5	<>	e2	75.379	.000
el	<>	e3	9.486	.000
el	<>	e5	84.190	.000
resl	<>	ODMY	39.245	.000
resl	<>	ORG	29.671	.000
resl	<>	OP	12.185	.000
e6	<>	OC	25.719	.000
e6	<>	ORG	6.045	.000
e6	<>	e14	5.888	.000
e8	<>	ODMY	79.792	.000
e8	<>	ORG	8.223	.000
e8	<>	e14	21.757	.000
e8	<>	e7	23.608	.000
e8	<>	e6	51.059	.000
e10	<>	OC	4.088	.000
e10	<>	OP	4.389	.000

ell	<>	e10	4.462	.000
e9	<>	el	4.590	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.014	.000
e9	<>	ell	6.811	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

# Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)


			M.I.	Par Change
SF	<	SP	19.967	.094
SF	<	SDMY	10.828	062
SF	<	SI	9.138	.057
SV	<	SP	4.206	041
SV	<	SDMY	4.938	040
SP	<	SF	16.371	.894
SP	<	SDMY	65.726	499
SDMY	<	SF	9.814	728
SDMY	<	SV	5.241	534
SDMY	<	SP	71.605	610
SDMY	<	SI	64.903	525
SI	<	SF	8.787	.653
SI	<	SDMY	71.398	519
accident	<	ODMY	39.245	507
accident	<	ORG	29.671	.417
accident	<	OP	12.185	.288
PE	<	PC	5.661	.069
PE	<	PDMY	21.049	373
PP	<	PDMY	24.524	405

PC	<	OC	25.719	1.030				
PC	<	ORG	6.045	099				
PC	<	SF	4.179	324				
PC	<	PE	5.79 <b>7</b>	.376				
PC	<	PDMY	52.737	-1.320				
PDMY	<	ODMY	( 9.792	051				
PDMY	<	ORG	8.223	.044				
PDMY	<	PE	21.419	274				
PDMY	<	PP	22.548	274				
PDMY	<	PC	43.921	164				
ADMY	<	ODMY	( 28.798	328				
ADMY	<	ORG	17.214	.240				
ADMY	<	OP	7.791	.173				
AE2	<	OC	4.088	.866				
AE2	<	OP	4.389	.192				
AE2	<	SV	4.744	.730				
AE2	<	AEI	7.407	116				
AEI	<	AE2	11.134	269				
AE1	<	AE3	5.978	364				
Model Fit Summ CMIN	агу							
Model			NPAR	CMIN	]	DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default model			54	1010.570		117	.000	8.637
Saturated mod	el		171	.000	(	0		
Independence	model		18	1331.327	]	153	.000	8.701
RMR, GFI								
Model			RMR	GFI	AGF	ΊP	GFI	


	Default model	.000 .707 .5		571	.484			
	Saturated model	.000 1.000						
	Independence model	.000 .614			569	.549		
	<b>Baseline Comparisons</b>							
	Model	NFI RFI Deltal rho1			IFI Delta	2	TLI rho2	CFI
y	Default model	.241	.00	7	.264		.008	.242
	Saturated model	1.000			1.000			1.000
	Independence model	.000	.000	)	.000		.000	.000
	Parsimony-Adjusted Measures							
	Model	PRATIC	O PN	FI	PCFI			
	Default model	.765	.184	4	.185			
	Saturated model	.000	.00	0	.000.			
	Independence model	1.000	.00	0	.000			
	NCP							
	Model	NCP		LO	LO 90		HI 90	
	Default model	893.570		795	.750		998.83	9
	Saturated model	.000		.000	0		.000	
	Independence model	1178.32	7	106	5.473		1298.6	19
	FMIN							
	Model	FMIN	F0		LO 9(	) F	HI 90	
	Default model	5.003	4.424		3.939	4	.945	
	Saturated model	.000	.000		.000		000	
	Independence model	6.591	5.833		5.275	6	.429	
	RMSEA							
	Model	RMSEA	LO 90	)	HI 90	Р	CLOSE	
	Default model	.194	.183		.206		000	

Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.000	
AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC	BI	C	CAIC
Default model	1118.570	1129.78	33 129	97.483	1351.483
Saturated model	342.000	377.508	908	8.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.06	54 t42	26.964	1444.964
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	5.537	5.053	6.059	5.593	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELT .05	ER HOI .01	ELTER		
Default model	29	32			
Independence model	28	30			

МАV р <0.05



MAV p <0.05



### APPENDIX F. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL B (p < 0.05)

#### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive. Sample size = 203 Parameter Summary (Group number !)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	eans Intercepts		
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15	
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Unlabeled	36	5	18	0	0	59	
Total	51	5	18	0	0	74	

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 171

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 59

Degrees of freedom (171 - 59): 112

#### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 416.844

Degrees of freedom = 112

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate		C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	{ <	OP	199	.075	-2.633	.008par_1
SI	<	ORG	.264	.086	3.058	.002par_2
SI	<	OC	.970	.282	3.434	***par_3
SP	<	OC	.925	.283	3.263	.001par_4
SDMY	{ <	OC	834	.288	-2.898	.004par_5
SI	<	OP	.201	.090	2.230	.026par_6

SI	<	ODMY	.229	.118	1.943	.052par_7
SDMY	′ <	ORG	143	.072	-1.982	.047par_14
SV	<	OC	.503	.083	6.089	***par_17
SV	<	ОР	.015	.018	.852	.394par_18
SDMY	′ <	ODMY	191	.099	-1.940	.052par_19
SF	<	ORG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_22
PDMY	′ <	SP	035	.023	-1.536	.124par_8
PC	<	SP	.254	.061	4.189	***par_13
PDMY	⁷ <	SDMY	.001	.023	.048	.962par_15
PDMY	' <	SV	.046	.052	.882	.378par_20
PP	<	SI	.007	.032	.224	.823par_23
РР	<	SP	.047	.032	1.499	.134par_24
PP	<	SDMY	041	.040	-1.043	.297par_25
PC	<	SDMY	.119	.059	2.007	.045par_26
PE	<	SP	.039	.022	1.786	.074par_28
PDMY	′ <	SF	.031	.051	.611	.541par_35
AE1	<	РС	.738	.267	2.767	.006par_9
AE2	<	PC	.635	.173	3.681	***par_10
AE3	<	РС	.374	.079	4.753	***par_11
AE2	<	PDMY	.097	.468	.208	.836par_12
AEI	<	PDMY	.380	.723	.525	.599par_16
AV	<	PDMY	164	.163	-1.010	.312par_21
ADM	(<	PDMY	.452	.404	1.119	.263par_27
ADMY	{ <	РС	362	.149	-2.428	.015par_29
ADMY	( <	accident	1.000			
AV	<	accident	055	.033	-1.669	.095par_30
AE3	<	accident	081	.043	-1.890	.059par_31

AE2	<	accident	281	.078	-3.590	***par_32
AE1	<	accident	-1.123	.097	-11.575	***par_33
ADMY	<	PP	.152	.216	.702	.483par_34
ADMY	<	PE	.538	.224	2.404	.016par_36

Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	SPSDMY		SDMY SI		accident	PE	PP	PCF	PDMY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
sv	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
SDM Y	191	834	143	199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
PP	.010	.085	.008	.010	.000	.000	.047	041	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
PC	023	.136	017	024	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
PDM Y	.000	011	.002	.000	.031	.046	035	.001	,000,	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
ADM Y	. <b>0</b> 10	021	.008	.010	.014	.021	080	049	. <b>0</b> 01	1.000	.538	.152	362	.452		
AV	.000	.002	.000	.000	005	008	.006	.000	.000	055	.000	.000	.000	- 164		
AE2	014	.085	011	015	.003	.004	.158	.076	.000	281	.000	.000	.635	.097		
AE3	009	.051	006	009	.000	.000	.095	.045	.000	081	.000	.000	.374	.000		
AEI	017	.096	012	017	.012	.017	.174	.088	.000	-1.123	.000	. <b>0</b> 00.	.738	.380		
Standa	rdized To	tal Effec	ts (Grou	p numbe	er 1 - Def	auit mod	lel)									
	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	SDMY	\$I	accident	PE	PP	PCP	DMY		
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		
SDM Y	206	197	170	220	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		

SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.032	.063	.029	.034	.000	.000	.146	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	034	.045	028	037	.000	.000	.348	.167	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	001	010	.009	.002	.036	.053	132	.004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.008	004	.007	.008	.003	.005	058	036	.001	.961	.123	.036	192	.088
AV	.000	.001	001	.000	003	004	.009	.000	.000	116	.000	.000	.000	071
AE2	010	.013	008	011	.001	.001	.100	.049	.000	235	.000	.000	.292	.016
AE3	011	.014	009	012	.000	.000	.110	.053	.000	125	.000	.000	.317	.000
AEI	008	.010	006	008	.002	.002	.072	.037	.000	618	.000	.000	.223	.042
Direct	Effects (G	froup nu	mber I -	Default	model)									

	ODM Y	ос	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	SPSDMY		accident	PE	PP	PCF	PDMY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SV	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	191	834	143	199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	,000,	.000	.000
SI	.229	. <b>97</b> 0	.264	,201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.047	041	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.031	.046	035	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	,000,
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.538	.152	362	.452
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	055	.000	.000	.000	-,164
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	281	.000	.000	.635	.097
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	081	.000	.000	.374	.000
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.123	.000	.000	.738	.380

#### Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	ос	ORG	ОР	SF	sv	SP	SDMY	S	SI a	ccident	PE	PP	PC	PDMY
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	206	197	170	220	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.00	0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.146	130	.02	3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.348	.167	.00	0	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.036	.053	132	.004	.00	0	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>0</b> 00	.00	0	.961	.123	.036	192	.088
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	116	.000.	.000	.000	071
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	235	.000	.000	.292	.016
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	125	.000	.000	.317	.000
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0	618	.000.	.000	.223	.042
Indirect	t Effects (	Group n	umber I	- Default	t model	)									
	ODM Y	OC	ORG	ОР	s	F	sv	SPSD	MY	SI	acciden t	PE	PP	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0.0	000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0.0	000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0.0	000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.00	0.0	000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
\$I	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	0.0	000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.00	0.0	. 00	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.010	.085	.008	.010	.00	0.0	. 000	000 .	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	023	.136	017	024	.00	0, 0	. 000	000 .	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

PDM Y	.000	011	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>00</b> 0.	.000	.000	
ADM Y	.010	021	.008	.010	.014	.021	080	049	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
AV	.000	.002	.000	.000	005	008	.006	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
AE2	014	.085	011	015	.003	.004	.158	.076	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
AE3	009	.051	006	009	.000	.000	.095	.045	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
AEI	017	.096	012	017	.012	.017	.174	.0 <b>88</b>	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Standar	dized lnd	irect Eff	ects (Gro	սթոսած	er 1 - De	fault mod	jel)								

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	SDMY	SI ⁸	acciden t	PE	₽₽	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	. <b>0</b> 00.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	<b>.000</b> .	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.032	.063	.029	.034	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	034	.045	028	037	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	001	010	.009	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.008	004	.007	.008	.003	.005	058	036	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.001	-,001	.000	003	004	.009	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	010	.013	008	011	.001	.001	.100	.049	. <b>0</b> 00.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	011	.014	009	012	.000	.000	.110	.053	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	008	.010	006	008	.002	.002	.072	.037	.000	.000	.000	.0 <b>0</b> 0.	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODMY	4.350	.000

ORG	<>	OC	4.060	.000
e3	<>	ODMY	7.136	.000
e3	<>	ORG	4.127	.000
<b>e</b> 2	<>	e3	21.139	.000
e2	<>	e4	44.613	.000
e5	<>	e4	52.542	.000
eł	<>	e3	12.457	.000
el	<>	e4	30.906	.000
res1	<>	ODMY	4.857	.000
e6	<>	OC	28.552	.000
e6	<>	e7	7.142	.000
e8	<>	e14	15.483	.000
e8	<>	e7	31.038	.000
<b>e</b> 10	<>	OC	4.088	.000
e11	<>	e10	4.462	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.014	.000
e9	<>	e11	6.811	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

.

M.I. Par Change

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
SF	<	SP	19.967	.094
SF	<	SDMY	12.834	074
SF	<	SI	10.648	.067
SV	<	SP	4.206	041
sv	<	SDMY	5.853	047
SP	<	SF	17.403	.640

.


SP	<	sv	37.352	940
SDMY	<	sv	44.261	828
SI	<	SF	11.538	.504
SI	<	SV	26.034	760
accident	<	ODMY	43.062	556
accident	<	ORG	29.671	.417
accident	<	OP	12.185	.288
PE	<	PC	6.046	.074
PE	<	PDMY	21.303	377
PP	<	PDMY	24.819	410
PC	<	OC	28.552	.926
PC	<	РР	6.469	328
PDMY	<	ODMY	10.603	047
PDMY	<	ORG	5.454	.031
PDMY	<	ОР	5.517	.033
PDMY	<	PE	15.243	198
PDMY	<	PP	28.739	263
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.598	359
ADMY	<	ORG	17.214	.240
ADMY	<	OP	7.791	.173
AE2	<	OC	4.088	.866
AE2	<	ОР	4.389	.192
AE2	<	SV	4.744	.730
AE2	<	AE1	7.498	118
AE1	<	SI	4.617	.270
AE1	<	AE2	11.249	272
AE1	<	AE3	6.019	367


Model	Fit	Summary
		/

CMIN

·····						
Model	NPAR	CM	ЛIN	DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default model	59	416.	844	112	.000	3.722
Saturated model	171	-	000	0		
Independence model	18	1331.	327	153	.000	8.701
RMR, GFI						
Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGF	Ĩ	
Default model	.000	.831	.741	.54	4	
Saturated model	.000	1.000				
Independence model	.000	.614	.569	.54	9	
<b>Baseline Comparisons</b>						
Model	NFI Deltal	RFI rhol		IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Model	Denar	1101	L	Jenaz	1102	CII
Default model	.687	.572		.750	.647	.741
Saturated model	1.000			1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures						
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCI	FI		
Default model	.732	.503	.54	43		
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000			
Independence model	1.000	000. 000. 0				
NCP						
Model	N	ICP	Ι	0 90		HI 90
Default model	304.	844	24	6.101	3	371.167
Saturated model		000		.000		.000
Independence model	1178.	327	106	5.473	12	298.619

FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	2.064	1.509	1.218	1.837	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	6.591	5.833	5.275	6.429	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	
Default model	.116	.104	.128	.000	
Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.000	
AIC					
Model	AIC	BC	CC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	534.844	547.0	95	730.323	789.323
Saturated model	342.000	377.5	08	908.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.0	64	1426.964	1444.964
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	2.648	2.357	2.976	2.708	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELTE .(	ER HOEI 05	LTER .01		
Default model	(	67	73		
Independence model	-	28	30		





### APPENDIX G. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL C (p < 0.05)

#### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

### Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances 1	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	34	5	18	0	0	57
Total	49	5	18	0	0	72

### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 171

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 57

Degrees of freedom (171 - 57): 114

### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 421.205

Degrees of freedom = 114

Probability level = .000

### **Maximum Likelihood Estimates**

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	′ <	OP	120	.063	-1.899	.058par_1
SI	<	ORG	.135	.057	2.391	.017par_2
SI	<	OC	.886	.285	3.110	.002par_3
SP	<	OC	.925	.283	3.263	.001par_4

SDMY <	OC	783	.289	-2.710	.007par_5
SI <	OP	.074	.061	1.217	.224par_6
SDMY <	ORG	064	.060	-1.061	.289par_13
SV <	OC	.515	.083	6.224	***par_16
SDMY <	ODMY	050	.066	749	.454par_17
SF <	ORG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_20
PDMY <	SP	035	.023	-1.536	.125par_7
PC <	SP	.254	.061	4.189	***par_12
PDMY <	SDMY	.001	.023	.048	.962par_14
PDMY <	SV	.046	.052	.886	.376par_18
PP <	SI	.007	.032	.224	.823par_21
PP <	SP	.047	.032	1.499	.134par_22
PP <	SDMY	041	.040	-1.043	.297par_23
PC <	SDMY	.119	.060	1.998	.046par_24
PE <	SP	.039	.022	1.786	.074par_26
PDMY <	SF	.031	.051	.611	.541par_33
AE1 <	PC	.738	.267	2.767	.006par_8
AE2 <	PC	.635	.172	3.681	***par_9
AE3 <	PC	.374	.079	4.753	***par_10
AE2 <	PDMY	.097	.468	.208	.836par_11
AE1 <	PDMY	.380	.723	.526	.599par_15
AV <	PDMY	164	.163	-1.010	.312par_19
ADMY <	PDMY	.452	.404	1.119	.263par_25
ADMY <	PC	362	.149	-2.429	.015par_27
ADMY <	accident	1.000			
AV <	accident	055	.033	-1.669	.095par_28
AE3 <	accident	081	.043	-1.890	.059par_29

AE2 <	accident	281	.078	-3.590	***par_30
AE1 <	accident	-1.123	.097	-11.575	<b>***</b> par_31
ADMY <	РР	.152	.216	.702	.483par_32
ADMY <	PE	.538	.224	2.404	.016par_34

Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.515	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	050	783	064	120	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.886	.135	.074	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.002	.083	.004	.006	.000	.000	.047	04}	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	006	.142	008	014	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	010	.002	.000	.031	.046	035	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
AD MY	.002	024	.004	.006	.014	.021	080	049	.001	1.000	.538	.152	362	.452
AV	.000	.002	.000	.000	005	008	.006	.000	.000	055	.000.	.000	.000	164
AE2	004	.089	005	009	.003	.004	.158	.076	.000.	281	.000	.000	.635	.097
AE3	002	.053	003	005	.000.	.000	.095	.045	.000	081	.000	.000	.374	.000
AEI	004	.101	005	011	.012	.017	.174	.088	.000.	-1.123	.000	.000	.738	.380
Stand	lardize	d Tota	l Effec	ts (Gra	oup nu	mber l	- Defa	ault m	odel)					

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SF	accident	PE	PP	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.401	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	00. (	0. 00	000. 00	.00	000. 0
SDM Y	054	186	076	134	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	00. (	0.00	000. 00	.00	000. 0
SI	.000	.210	.162	.082	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	<b>)</b> .00	00.00	000. 00	.00	000. 0
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	000. (	.125	.000	.000	.00	00. 00	000. 00	.00	000. 0
₽₽	.007	, <b>06</b> 1	.014	.019	.000	.000	.146	130	.023	.00	00.00	000. 00	.00	000. 0
PC	009	.047	013	022	.000	.000	.348	.166	.000	00. (	00.00	000. 00	.000	000. 0
PDM Y	.000	009	.010	001	.036	.053	132	.004	.000	) .00	0.00	000. 00	.000	000. 0
AD MY	.002	004	.004	.005	.003	.005	058	036	i .001	.96	ii .12	.036	192	2 .0 <b>88</b>
AV	.000	.001	001	.000	003	004	.009	.000	.000	)[]	6 .00	000. 00	.000	0071
AE2	003	.014	004	006	.001	.001	.100	.049	.000	)23	5 .00	000. 00	.292	2 .016
AE3	003	.015	004	007	.000	.000	.110	.053	.000	)12	.00	000. 00	,311	7 .000
AEI	002	.010	002	005	.002	.002	.072	.037	.000	)61	8 .00	000. 00	.222	3 .042
Direct	t Effect	s (Gro	up nui	mber l	- Def	ault mo	odel)							
	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	SV	SP ^S	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	РС	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.515	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>000</b> .
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	050	783	064	120	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.886	.135	.074	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.039	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.047 -	.041 .0	007	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	254	.119 .(	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM	.000	.000												

AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000.	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.538	.152	362	.452
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000	000	.000	.000	.000	055	.000	.000	.000	164
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	. 000.	000	.000	.000	.000	281	.000	.000	.635	.097
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000	000	.000	.000	.000	081	.000	.000	.374	.000
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	. 000	000	.000	.000	.000	-1.123	.000	.000	.738	.380
-							_	_						

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Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
```

	ODM Y	ос	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	₽E	የዋ	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.401	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	054	186	076	134	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.210	.162	.082	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.146	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>0</b> 00.	.34 <b>8</b>	.166	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.036	.053	132	.004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.961	.123	.036	- 192	.088
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	116	.000	.000	.000	071
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	235	.000	.000	.292	.016
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	125	.000	.000	.317	.000
AE!	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	618	.000	.000.	.223	.042

# Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	DMY	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC ¹	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.002	.083	.004	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	006	.142	008	014	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	010	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.002	024	.004	.006	.014	.021	080	049	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.002	.000	.000	005	008	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	004	.089	005	009	.003	.004	.158	.076	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	002	.053	003	005	.000	.000	.095	.045	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AEI	004	.101	005	011	.012	.017	.174	.088	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	ardized	Indire	ct Effe	cts (Gr	оир пи	mber 1	- Defa	ult mo	del)					

Stanua	nuizeu Indirect	teneres (Group i	aute mouch)	
	ODM			

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SPS	SDMY	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PDM Y
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	. <b>0</b> 00.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.007	.0 <del>6</del> 1	.014	.019	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	009	.047	013	022	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	009	.010	001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.002	004	.004	.005	.003	.005	05 <b>8</b>	036	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.001	001	.000	003	004	.009	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.	.000
AE2	003	.014	004	006	.001	.001	.100	.049	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000

AE3	003	.015	004	007	.000	.000	.110	.053 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AEI	002	.010	002	005	.002	.002	.072	.037 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODMY	4.350	.000
ORG	<>	OC	4.060	.000
e3	<>	ODMY	7.136	.000
e3	<>	ORG	4.127	.000
e2	<>	e3	21.139	.000
e2	<>	e4	44.187	.000
e5	<>	e4	52.360	.000
e1	<>	e3	14.058	.000
el	<>	e4	31.780	.000
res1	<>	ODMY	4.857	.000
e6	<>	OC	28.552	.000
e6	<>	e7	7.142	000,
e8	<>	e14	15.483	.000
e8	<>	e7	31.038	.000
e10	<>	OC	4.088	.000
e11	<>	e10	4.462	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.014	.000
e9	<>	<b>e</b> 11	6.811	.000

# Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)


M.I. Par Change


SF	<	SP	19.967	.094
SF	<	SDMY	12.950	074
SF	<	SI	10.744	.068
SV	<	SP	4.075	040
SV	<	SDMY	6.413	050
SP	<	SF	17.403	.640
SP	<	SV	37.077	933
SDMY	<	SV	43.935	<b>8</b> 21
SI	<	SF	13.021	.538
SI	<	sv	26.667	769
accident	<	ODMY	43.062	556
accident	<	ORG	29.671	.417
accident	<	OP	12.185	.288
PE	<	PC	6.046	.074
PE	<	PDMY	21.303	377
РР	<	PDMY	24.819	410
PC	<	OC	28.552	.926
PC	<	PP	6.471	328
PDMY	<	ODMY	10.603	047
PDMY	<	ORG	5.454	.031
PDMY	<	OP	5.517	.033
PDMY	<	PE	15.243	198
PDMY	<	PP	28.749	263
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.598	359
ADMY	<	ORG	17.214	.240
ADMY	<	OP	7.791	.173
AE2	<	OC	4.088	.866

AE2	<	OP	4.389		.192		
AE2	<	sv	4.709		.725		
AE2	<	AEI	7.498		118		
AE1	<	SI	4.658		.272		
AEI	<	AE2	11.249		272		
AE1	<	AE3	6.019		367		
Model Fit Summ CMIN	ary						
Model			NPAR	CMI	N DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default model			57	421.20	05 114	.000.	3.695
Saturated mod	el		171	.00	0 00		
Independence	model		18	1331.32	27 153	.000	8.701
RMR, GFI							
Model			RMR	GFI A	GFI PGF	1	
Default model			.000	.829	.743 .55	2	
Saturated mod	el		.000	1.000			
Independence	model		.000	.614 .	.569 .54	9	
Baseline Compa	risons						
Model			NFI Delta 1	RFI rhol	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model			.684	.575	.748	.650	.739
Saturated mod	el		1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence	model		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adju	sted Mea	sures					
Model			PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI		
Default model			.745	.509	.551		
Saturated mode	el		.000	.000	.000		

Independence model	1.000	.000	.000		
NCP					
Model	]	NCP	LO 90		HI 90
Default model	307	.205	248.171	3	73.818
Saturated model		.000	.000		.000
Independence model	1178	.327	1065.473	12	98.619
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	2.085	1.521	1.229	1.851	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	6.591	5.833	5.275	6.429	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	8
Default model	.116	.104	.127	.000	)
Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.000	)
AIC					
Model	AIC	BC	C	BIC	CAIC
Default model	535.205	547.04	41 724	4.057	781.057
Saturated model	342.000	377.5	08 90	8.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.0	64 1420	6.964	1444.964
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90 N	MECVI	
Default model	2.650	2.357	2.979	2.708	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELTE .(	ER HOE	LTER .01		

Default model	68	73
Independence model	28	30





# APPENDIX H. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL A (p < 0.1)

**Analysis Summary** 

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	41	0	18	0	0	59
Total	56	0	18	0	0	74

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 171

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 59

Degrees of freedom (171 - 59): 112

### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 1004.826

Degrees of freedom = 112

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	<	OP	237	.064	-3.711	***par_1
SI	<	ORG	.264	.056	4.709	***par_2
SI	<	OC	.970	.282	3.434	***par_3
SP	<	OC	.907	.282	3.215	.001par_4
SDMY	<	OC	811	.298	-2.721	.007par_5

.

SI	<	OP	.201	.060	3.335	***par_6
SI	<	ODMY	.229	.059	3.866	***par_7
SDMY	( <	ORG	108	.059	-1.829	.067par_14
SV	<	OC	.503	.083	6.089	***par_17
SV	<	OP	.015	.018	.852	.394par_19
SDMY	( <	ODMY	214	.063	-3.417	***par_20
SF	<	ORG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_23
SP	<	ORG	076	.056	-1.352	.176par_35
PDMY	( <	SP	049	.019	-2.631	.009par_8
PC	<	SP	.254	.049	5.158	***par_13
PDMY	( <	SDMY	010	.017	611	.541par_15
PDMY	( <	SV	022	.061	363	.717par_21
РР	<	SI	.007	.020	.355	.723par_24
PP	<	SP	.047	.022	2.136	.033par_25
PP	<	SDMY	041	.020	-2.052	.040par_26
PC	<	SDMY	.119	.044	2.692	.007par_27
PE	<	SP	.039	.022	1.784	.074par_29
PDMY	<u>/</u> <	SI	006	.017	329	.742par_36
PDMY	{ <	SF	.103	.060	1.706	.088par_41
AE1	<	PC	.770	.221	3.490	***par_9
AE2	<	PC	.643	.142	4,521	***par_10
AE3	<	PC	.433	.076	5.686	***par_11
AE2	<	PDMY	.121	.395	.307	.759par_12
AEI	<	PDMY	.476	.612	.777	.437par_16
AE3	<	PDMY	.294	.211	1.394	.163par_18
AV	<	PDMY	.037	.160	.232	.816par_22
ADMY	í <	PDMY	.351	.344	1.019	.308par_28

ADMY <	PC	393	.124	-3.167	.002par_30
ADMY <	accident	1.000			
AV <	accident	053	.033	-1.613	.107par_31
AE3 <	accident	081	.043	-1.884	.060par_32
AE2 <	accident	281	.078	-3.596	***par_33
AE1 <	accident	-1.122	.097	-11.563	<b>***</b> par_34
ADMY <	PE	.538	.224	2.404	.016par_37
AV <	РС	.081	.058	1.395	.163par_38
AV <	рр	.189	.135	1.404	.160par_39
ADMY <	PP	.125	.219	.568	.570par_40

Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
sv	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SP	.000	.907	076	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SD MY	214	811	108	237	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000, 000.
SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PE	.000	.036	003	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
РР	.011	.084	.003	.011	.000	.000	.047	041	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PC	025	.134	032	028	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PD MY	.001	053	.010	.001	.103	022	049	010	006	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
AD MY	.012	042	.015	.013	.036	008	090	056	001	1.000	.538	.125	393 .351
AV	.000	.025	002	.000	.004	001	.028	.001	.001	053	.000	.1 <b>89</b>	.081 .037
AE2	016	.080	019	018	.012	003	.157	.075	001	281	.000	.000	.643 .121
AE3	011	.042	011	012	.030	006	.095	.048	002	081	.000	.000	.433 .294

AE1 -.019 .078 -.020 -.021 .049 -.010 .172 .087 -.003 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476 Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	ΡE	РР	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SP	.000	.220	092	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.
SD MY	221	176	118	240	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SI	.239	.212	.291	.206	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PE	.000	.027	012	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
РР	.038	.063	.011	.040	.000	.000	.147	143	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
PC	039	.043	052	042	.000	.000	.336	.176	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000.
PD MY	.004	047	.047	.004	.117	025	181	043	023	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
AD MY	.010	007	.013	.011	.008	002	066	045	001	.966	.123	.029	216 .069
AV	.000	.010	003	.000	.002	.000	.044	.002	.002	112	.000	.098	.097 .016
AE2	012	.012	015	013	.002	001	.099	.052	.000	234	.000	.000	.304 .021
AE3	014	.012	015	015	.011	002	.109	.061	002	122	.000	.000	.372 .091
AE1	009	.008	010	010	.006	001	.071	.040	001	612	.000	.000	.239 .053
Direc	t Effects (	(Group	numbe	r 1 - De	fault n	nodel)							
	ODM	~~	<u></u>	<b>^</b>	<b>6 F</b>	~ • •		SDM					DO PD

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	РР	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
sv	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SP	.000	.907	076	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SD MY	214	811	108	237	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000

PE  $.000 \ .000 \ .000 \ .000 \ .000 \ .000 \ .000 \ .000$ 000.000.000.000.000.000. P₽ .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 000.000.000.000.000.000. PD .000 .000 .000 .000 .103 -.022 -.049 -.010 -.006 000.000, 000.000.000.000. MY AD 1.000.538.125 -.393.351 MY AV 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. -.053.000.189 .081.037 AE2 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121 AE3 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000. -.081 .000 .000 .433 .294 -1.122.000.000 .770.476 Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	$PC \frac{PD}{MY}$
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SV	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SP	.000	.220	092	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SD MY	221	176	118	240	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SI	.239	.212	.291	.206	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.147	143	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	000	.000	.336	.176	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
PD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	117	025	181	043	023	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.966	.123	.029	216 .069
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	112	.000	.098	.097.016
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	234	.000	.000	.304 .021

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.011	.084	.003	.011	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	025	.134	032	028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PD My	.001	053	.010	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000
AD MY	.012	042	.015	.013	.036	008	090	056	001	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000
AV	.000	.025	002	.000	.004	001	.028	.001	.001	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000
AE2	2016	.080	019	018	.012	003	.157	.075	001	.000	.000	.000 .	000	.000
AE3	011	.042	011	012	.030	006	.095	.048	002	.000	.000	.000 .	000	.000
AE	019	.078	020	021 .	.049	010	.172	.087	003	.000	.000	.000 .	000	.000
Stand	iardized I	ndirect	t Effects	(Group	numi	ber 1 - [	)efault	model)						

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.

SI	.000	.000	.000	.000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PE	.000	.027	012	.000.	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PP	.038	.063	.011	.040 .0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PC	039	.043	052	042 .0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PD MY	.004	047	.047	.004 .0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AD MY	.010	007	.013	.011 .(	008 -	.002	066	045	001	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AV	.000	.010	003	.000.	002	.000	.044	.002	.002	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.	
AE2	012	.012	015	013 .0	002 -	.001	.099	.052	.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AE3	014	.012	015	015 .0	011 -	.002	.109	.061	002	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.	
AE1	009	.008	010	010 .0	006 -	.001	.071	.040	001	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
Modi	Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)										

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODMY	4.080	.000
ORG	<>	ODMY	89.027	.000
ОР	<>	ODMY	82.267	.000
OP	<>	OC	5.926	.000
e2	<>	e3	21.197	.000
e2	<>	e4	4.762	.000
e5	<>	e3	10.595	.000
e5	<>	e4	6.222	.000
e5	<>	e2	76.060	.000
el	<>	e3	9.486	.000
el	<>	e5	84.190	.000
resl	<>	ODMY	39.767	.000

resl	<>	ORG	29.889	.000
resl	<>	OP	12.455	.000
e6	<>	OC	25.719	.000
e6	<>	ORG	6.045	.000
e6	<>	e14	5.888	.000
e8	<>	ODMY	9.951	.000
e8	<>	ORG	8.317	.000
e8	<>	e14	21.795	.000
e8	<>	e7	23.588	.000
e8	<>	e6	50.403	.000
e10	<>	OC	4.097	.000
e10	<>	ОР	4.397	.000
e11	<>	e10	4.484	.000
e9	<>	e1	4.630	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.033	.000
e9	<>	e11	6.869	.000

# Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change


Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)


			M.I.	Par Change
SF	<	SP	20.004	.094
SF	<	SDMY	10.828	062
SF	<	SI	9.138	.057
sv	<	SP	4.214	041
sv	<	SDMY	4.938	040
SP	<	SF	19.633	.974
SP	<	SDMY	66.410	500

SDMY	<	SF	9.814	728
SDMY	<	SV	5.241	534
SDMY	<	SP	71.740	612
SDMY	<	SI	64.903	525
SI	<	SF	8.787	.653
SI	<	SDMY	71.398	519
accident	<	ODMY	39.767	510
accident	<	ORG	29.889	.419
accident	<	OP	12.455	.291
PE	<	PC	5.654	.069
РЕ	<	PDMY	20.892	370
РР	<	PDMY	24.340	402
PC	< <b></b> -	OC	25.719	1.030
PC	<	ORG	6.045	099
PC	<	SF	4.179	324
PC	<	PE	5.797	.376
PC	<	PDMY	52.341	-1.310
PDMY	<	ODMY	9.951	051
PDMY	<	ORG	8.317	.044
PDMY	<	PE	21.456	274
PDMY	<	PP	22.520	274
PDMY	<	PC	43.306	162
ADMY	<	ODMY	28.846	328
ADMY	<	ORG	17.231	.240
ADMY	<	OP	7.814	.174
AE2	<	OC	4.097	.867
AE2	<	OP	4.397	.192

AE2	<	SV	4.738		.730		
AE2	<	AE1	7.386		116		
AE1	<	AE2	11.123		269		
Model Fit Summ CMIN	ary						
Model			NPAR	CM	IN DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default model			59	1004.8	26 112	.000	8.972
Saturated mode	el		171	.0	0 000		
Independence	model		18	1331.3	27 153	.000	8.701
RMR, GFI							
Model			RMR	GFI A	AGFI PGI	FI	
Default model			.000	.708	.554 .46	53	
Saturated mode	el		.000	1.000			
Independence	model		.000	.614	.569 .54	19	
Baseline Compa	risons						
Model			NFI Deltal	RFI rho I	IFI Delta2	TL1 rho2	
Default model			.245	031	.268	035	.242
Saturated mode	el		1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence	model		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adju	sted Mea	sures					
Model			PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI		
Default model			.732	.180	.177		
Saturated mode	el		.000	.000	.000		
Independence i	model		1.000	.000	.000		
NCP							
Model			N	СР	LO 90		HI 90

Default model	892	.826	795.179	9	97.921
Saturated model		.000	.000	)	.000
Independence model	1178	.327	1065.473	12	98.619
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	FO	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	4.974	4.420	3.937	4.940	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	6.591	5.833	5.275	6.429	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSI	(f)
Default model	.199	.187	.210	.00	0
Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.00	0
AIC					
Model	AIC	BC	С	BIC	CAIC
Default model	1122.826	1135.07	7 131	8.305	1377.305
Saturated model	342.000	377.50	8 90	8.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.06	4 142	6.964	1444.964
ECVI					
Modei	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	5.559	5.075	6.079	5.619	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELTE .(	R HOEI 05	LTER .01		
Default model	2	28	31		
Independence model		28	30		





MAV р <0.1

### APPENDIX I. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL B (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	41	5	18	0	0	64
Total	56	5	18	0	0	79

### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 171

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 64

Degrees of freedom (171 - 64): 107

### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 407.286

Degrees of freedom = 107

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	<b>S</b> .E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	<	OP	199	.075	-2.633	.008par_1
SI	<	ORG	.264	.086	3.058	.002par_2
SI	<	OC	.970	.282	3.434	***par_3
SP	<	OC	. <b>9</b> 07	.282	3.215	.001par_4
SDMY	<	OC	824	.287	-2.867	.004par_5

SI SI	< < { <	OP ODMY	.201 .229	.090 .118	2.230 1.943	.026par_6
			.229	118	1.042	
	( <	OD C		.110	1.743	.052par_7
SDMY		ORG	099	.079	-1.249	.212par_14
SV	<	OC	.503	.083	6.089	***par_17
SV	<	OP	.015	.018	.852	.394par_19
SDMY	( <	ODMY	191	.099	-1.940	.052par_20
SF	<	ORG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_23
SP	<	ORG	076	.056	-1.352	.176par_35
PDMY	( <	SP	006	.026	244	.807par_8
PC	<	SP	.254	.060	4.197	***par_13
PDMY	( <	SDMY	.051	.031	1.642	.101par_15
PDM	{ <	SV	.082	.052	1.590	.112par_21
PP	<	SI	.007	.032	.224	.823par_24
РР	<	SP	.047	.032	1.492	.136par_25
РР	<	SDMY	041	.040	-1.044	.297par_26
PC	<	SDMY	.119	.059	2.007	.045par_27
PE	<	SP	.039	.022	1.784	.074par_29
PDMY	( <	SI	.051	.023	2.210	.027par_36
PDMY	( <	SF	003	.051	052	.959par_46
AEI	<	PC	.770	.271	2.844	.004par_9
AE2	<	PC	.643	.175	3.684	<b>***</b> par_10
AE3	<	PC	.433	.093	4.634	***par_11
AE2	<	PDMY	.121	.464	.261	.794par_12
AE1	<	PDMY	.476	.719	.661	.508par_16
AE3	<	PDMY	.294	.248	1.187	.235par_18
AV	<	PDMY	.037	.188	.198	.843par_22
ADM	( <	PDMY	.351	.404	.868	.385par_28

ADMY <	PC	393 .152	-2.581 .010	par_30
ADMY <	accident	1.000		
AV <	accident	053 .033	-1.613 .107	'par_31
AE3 <	accident	081 .043	-1.884 .060	par_32
AE2 <	accident	281 .078	-3.596 ***	par_33
AE1 <	accident	-1.122 .097	-11.563 ***	par_34
ADMY <	PE	.538 .224	2.405 .016	par_37
AV <	PC	.081 .071	1.136 .256	par_38
AV <	PP	.189 .133	1.418 .156	par_39
ADMY <	PP	.125 .217	.574 .566	par_45
Total Effects (G	roup number 1 - Default mod	del)		
ODM Y (	OC ORG OP SF SV	V SP SDM S	l accident PE PP	PC PD MY
SF .000 .0	000.000.000.000	000, 000, 000, 0	000. 000. 000.	.000. 000.
SV .000 .5	503 .000 .015 .000 .000	000, 000, 000, 0	000. 000. 000.	.000 .000
SP .000 .9	007076 .000 .000 .000	000, 000, 000, 0	000. 000. 000.	.000.000
SD MY1918	324099199 .000 .000	000, 000, 000, 0	000. 000. 000.	.000 .000
SI .229 .9	970 .264 .201 .000 .000	000, 000, 000, 0	000. 000. 000.	.000.000
PE .000 .0	036003 .000 .000 .000	0.039.000.000	000, 000, 000,	.000.000
PP .010 .0	084 .002 .010 .000 .000	0 .047041 .007	.000.000.000	.000.000
PC023 .1	32031024 .000 .000	0 .254 .119 .000	000, 000, 000, 000	.000.000
PD MY .002 .0	043 .009 .001003 .082	2006 .051 .051	000, 000, 000.	.000. 000.
AD MY .0110	007 .014 .011001 .029	9075034 .019	1.000 .538 .125	393 .351
AV .000 .0	028002 .000 .000 .003	3 .029 .004 .003	053 .000 .189	.081 .037
AE2014 .0	990019015 .000 .010	0 .162 .083 .006	281 .000 .000	.643 .121
AE3009 .0	070011010001 .024	4 .108 .066 .015	081 .000 .000	.433 .294

AE1 -.017 .122 -.020 -.018 -.001 .039 .192 .116 .024 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476 Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SP	.000	.220	092	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SD MY	206	196	118	220	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PE	.000	.027	012	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
PP	.032	.063	.009	.034	.000	.000	.145	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PC	034	.044	052	037	.000	.000	.348	.166	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PD MY	.008	.038	.039	.006	003	.093	023	.189	.191	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
AD MY	.009	001	.012	.009	.000	.006	054	025	.014	.961	.123	.029	208 .070
AV	.000	.011	003	.000	.000	.002	.047	.006	.005	112	.000	.099	.094 .016
AE2	2010	.014	015	011	.000	.002	.102	.053	.004	235	.000	.000	.296 .021
AE3	012	.020	015	013	.000	.009	.125	.079	.01 <b>8</b>	124	.000	.000	.367 .094
AEI	008	.012	010	008	.000	.005	.080	.049	.010	617	.000	.000	.233 .054
Dire	ct Effects	(Grou	ւթ ոստ	<b>ber 1 -</b> i	Default	t mod	el)						
	ODM		0.7.0	<b>6 B</b>	<b>~ P</b>	~ • •	an	SDM			~ ~		ng PD

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF SV	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	РР	$PC \frac{PD}{MY}$
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
sv	.000	.503	.000	.015	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000.
SP	.000	.907	076	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SĐ MY	191	824	099	199	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000

SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000 .000	.000	.000.000	000.000.000.000.000.	
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.039	000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.047	041 .007	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.254	.119 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
PD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	003 .082	006	.051 .051	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.	.000	.000. 000.	1.000 .538 .125393 .351	
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.000	000. 000.	053 .000 .189 .081 .037	
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	000.000.	281 .000 .000 .643 .121	
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000 .000	081 .000 .000 .433 .294	
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000.000.	-1,122.000.000 .770.476	
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)									

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF SV	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	рр	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
sv	.000	.393	.000	.055	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.
SP	.000	.220	092	.000	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SD MY	206	196	118	220	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.
SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.145	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.348	.166	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	003 .093	023	.189	.191	.000	.000	.000	000.000.
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.961	.123	.029	208 .070
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	112	.000	.099	.094 .016

 AE2
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 Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
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	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	РР	PC	PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.010	.084	.002	.010	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	023	.132	031	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PD MY	.002	.043	.009	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	,000,	.000	.000	.000	.000
AD MY	.011	007	.014	.011	001	.029	075	034	.019	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.028	002	.000	.000	.003	.029	.004	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	2014	.090	019	015	.000	.010	.162	.083	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE	3009	.070	011	010	001	.024	.108	.066	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE	017	.122	020	018	001	.039	.192	.116	.024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)														

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF S	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	0.000.0	000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SD MY .0	000. 000. 000	000. 000. 000.	000. 000. 000.	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.
SI .0	000. 000. 00	000. 000. 000. 000.	000, 000, 000, 000,	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.
PE .0	.027012	000. 000. 000. 000.	000.000.000.	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
PP .0	032 .063 .009	.034 .000 .000	000, 000, 000.	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
PC0	.044052	037 .000 .000	000. 000. 000.	000, 000, 000, 000, 000.
PD .0 MY .0	08 .038 .039	.000. 000. 600.	000. 000. 000.	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
AD MY .0	09001 .012	- 000.000.000	.054025 .014	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
AV .0	.001003	.000 .000 .002	.047 .006 .005	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
AE20	.014015	011 .000 .002	.102 .053 .004	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
AE30	.020015	013 .000 .009	.125 .079 .018	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
AE10	08 .012010	008 .000 .005	.080 .049 .010	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
Modificat	tion Indices (Grou	ip number 1 - Defai	ult model)	

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODMY	4.350	.000
ORG	<>	OC	4.060	.000
e3	<>	ODMY	7.136	.000
e3	<>	ORG	4.127	.000
e2	<>	e3	21.311	.000
e2	<>	e4	45.233	.000
e5	<>	e4	52.542	.000
e1	<>	e3	12.457	.000
el	<>	e4	30.906	.000
resl	<>	ODMY	4.930	.000
e6	<>	OC	24.926	.000

<b>e</b> 6	<>	e7	8.179	.000
e8	<>	e14	14.785	.000
e8	<>	e7	31.875	.000
e10	<>	OC	4.097	.000
e11	<>	e10	4.484	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.033	.000
e9	<>	e11	6.869	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)


M.I. Par Change


			M.I.	Par Change
SF	<	SP	20.004	.094
SF	<	SDMY	12.905	074
SF	<	SI	10.648	.067
SV	<	SP	4.214	041
SV	<	SDMY	5.885	048
SP	<	SF	19.739	.680
SP	<	SV	37.780	944
SDMY	<	SV	44.261	828
SI	<	SF	11.538	.504
SI	<	SV	26.034	760
accident	<	ODMY	43.634	560
accident	<	ORG	29.889	.419
accident	<	ОР	12.455	.291
PE	<	PC	6.045	.074
PE	<	PDMY	20.466	362
РР	<	PDMY	23.845	394

PC	<	OC	24.926	.849
PC	<	РР	7.505	347
PDMY	<	ODMY	8.855	043
PDMY	<	ORG	4.526	.028
PDMY	<	OP	5.058	.031
PDMY	<	PE	14.555	192
PDMY	<	РР	29.821	266
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.651	360
ADMY	< <b>-</b>	ORG	17.231	.240
ADMY	<	OP	7.814	.174
AV	<	SDMY	4.753	.092
AE2	<	OC	4.097	.867
AE2	<	OP	4.397	.192
AE2	<	SV	4.738	.730
AE2	<	AE1	7.501	118
AE1	<	SI	4.661	.271
AE1	<	AE2	11.255	272
AE1	<	AE3	6.035	367
Model Fit Sum CMIN	mary			
Model			NPAR	CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default mode	: <b>l</b>		64	407.286 107 .000 3.806
Saturated mo	del		171	.000 0
Independence	e model		18	1331.327 153 .000 8.701
RMR, GFI				
Model			RMR	GFI AGFI PGFI
Default mode	:1		.000	.834 .735 .522

Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.000	.614	.569 .54	49
Baseline Comparisons				
Model	NFI Deltal		IFI Delta2	
Default model	.694	.563	.755	.636 .745
Saturated model	1.000		1.000	1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures				
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI	
Default model	.699	.485	.521	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000	
NCP				
Model	1	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	300.	286	242.152	365.993
Saturated model		000	.000	.000
Independence model	1178.	327	1065.473	1298.619
FMIN				
Model	FMIN	FO	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	2.016	1.487	1.199	1.812
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	6.591	5.833	5.275	6.429
RMSEA				
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.118	.106	.130	.000.
Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.000

AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC		BIC	CAIC
Default model	535.286	548.576	74	47.331	811.331
Saturated model	342.000	377.508	9(	)8.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.064	142	26.964	1444.964
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	2.650	2.362	2.975	2.716	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
	HOELTE				
Model	.(	05	.01		
Default model	ć	56	72		
Independence model		28	30		





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### APPENDIX J. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV MODEL C (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive. Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	15	0	0	0	0	15
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	39	5	18	0	0	62
Total	54	5	18	0	0	77

#### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 171

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 62

Degrees of freedom (171 - 62): 109

### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 409.806

Degrees of freedom = 109

Probability level = .000

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

			Estimate	<b>S</b> .E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	· <	OP	199	.075	-2.633	.008par_1
SI	<	ORG	.264	.086	3.058	.002par_2
SI	<	OC	.970	.282	3.434	***par_3
SP	<	OC	.925	.283	3.263	.001 par_4
SDMY	· <	OC	834	.288	-2.898	.004par_5

SI	<	OP	.201	.090	2.230	.026par_6
SI	<	ODMY	.229	.118	1.943	.052par_7
SDMY	! <	ORG	143	.072	-1.982	.047par_14
SV	<	OC	.515	.083	6.224	***par_17
SDMY	{ <	ODMY	191	.099	-1.940	.052par_19
SF	<	ORG	.069	.017	4.011	***par_22
PDMY	( <	SP	006	.026	245	.807par_8
PC	<	SP	.254	.061	4.189	***par_13
PDMY	( <	SDMY	.051	.031	1.642	.101par_15
PDMY	<	SV	.082	.051	1.596	.111par_20
рр	<	SI	.007	.032	.224	.823par_23
РР	<	SP	.047	.032	1.499	.134par_24
РР	<	SDMY	041	.040	-1.043	.297par_25
PC	<	SDMY	.119	.059	2.007	.045par_26
PE	<	SP	.039	.022	1.786	.074par_28
PDMY	( <	SI	.051	.023	2.208	.027par_34
PDMY	( <	SF	003	.051	052	.959par_44
AE1	<	PC	.770	.271	2.844	.004par_9
AE2	<	PC	.643	.174	3.685	***par_10
AE3	<	PC	.433	.093	4.635	***par_11
AE2	< <b>-</b>	PDMY	.121	.464	.261	. <b>79</b> 4par_12
AE1	<	PDMY	.476	.719	.662	.508par_16
AE3	<	PDMY	.294	.248	1.187	.235par_18
AV	<	PDMY	.037	.188	.198	.843par_21
ADM	Y <	PDMY	.351	.404	.868	.385par_27
ADM	Y <	PC	393	.152	-2.581	.010par_29
ADM	Y <	accident	1.000			

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AV	<	accident	t			053	.0.	33	-1.61	3	.107p	oar_30	
AE3	<	accident	ŧ			081	.04	43	-1.88	4	.060p	0ar_31	
AE2	<	accident	1			281	.0	78	-3.59	6	***F	oar_32	
AEI	<	accident	t			-1.122	.09	97	-11.56	3	***p	oar_33	
ADN	4Y <	PE				.538	.22	24	2.40	5	.016p	oar_35	
AV	<	PC				.081	.07	71	1.13	7	.256p	oar_36	
AV	<	PP				.189	.1	33	1.41	8	.156p	oar_37	
ADN	<b>1</b> Υ <	₽₽				.125	.2	17	.57	4	.566p	ar_43	
Total	Effects (G	roup numb	er 1 - E	)efault	mode	I)							
	ODM	OC ORG	ОР	SF	sv	SP	SDM	SI	accident	PE	РР	PC	PD M
SF	. 000.	000 .069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SV	. 000.	515 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000 .	925 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SD M	1911	834143	199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.229 .	970 .264	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000 .	036 .000	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000
PP	.010 .0	085 .008	.010	.000	.000	.047	041	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	023 .	136017	024	.000	.000	.254	.119	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PD M	.002 .0	043 .006	.000	003	.082	006	.051	.051	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AD	.011	008 .010	.011	001	.029	075	034	.019	1.000	.538	.125	393	.351
AV	.000.	029 .000	.000	.000	.003	.029	.004	.003	053	.000	.189	.081	.037
AE2	014 .0	092010	015	.000	.010	.162	.083	.006	281	.000	.000	.643	.121
AE3	009 .0	071006	010	001	.024	.108	.066	.015	081	.000	.000	.433	.294
AE1	017 .	125010	018	001	.039	.192	.116	.024	-1.122	.000	.000	.770	.476

## Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM	SI	accident	PE	РР	PC	PD M
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SV	.000	.401	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SD M	206	197	170	220	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000	.000	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.032	.063	.029	.034	.000	.000	.146	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	034	.045	028	037	.000	.000	.348	.167	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PD M	.008	.038	.027	.001	003	.093	023	.190	.191	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AD	.009	001	.009	.009	.000	.006	054	025	.014	.961	.123	.029	208	.070
AV	.000	.011	.001	.000	.000	.002	.047	.006	.005	112	.000	.099	.094	.016
AE2	010	.014	008	011	.000	.002	.102	.053	.004	235	.000	.000	.296	.021
AE3	012	.020	008	013	.000	.009	.126	.079	.018	124	.000	.000	.367	.094
AEI	008	.013	005	009	.000	.005	.080	.049	.010	617	.000	.000	.233	.054

### Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF SV	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	РР	PC PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.069	.000	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
sv	.000	.515	.000	.000	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.
SP	.000	.925	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000. 000.
SD MY	191	834	143	199	.000. 000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.
SI	.229	.970	.264	.201	.000.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000. 000.

PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.039	.000 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.047	041 .007	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
РС	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.254	.119 .000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.
PD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	003 .082	006	.051 .051	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000. 000.	1.000 .538 .125393 .351
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000	.000	.000.000	053 .000 .189 .081 .037
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	.000 .000	281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	.000	000. 000.	081 .000 .000 .433 .294
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.000.	.000	.000.000	-1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476
Standa	ardized	Direct	Effects	(Grou	p number l	- Defau	it model)	

	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	$PC \frac{PD}{MY}$
SF	.000	.000	.272	.000	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SV	000.	.401	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SP	.000	.224	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
SD MY	206	197	170	220	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
SI	.246	.229	.314	.222	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000, 000.
PE	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	000, 000.
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.146	130	.023	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.348	.167	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000
PD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	003 .	.093	023	.190	.191	.000	.000	.000	.000.000
AD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	.961	.123	.029	208 .070
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000	.000	.000	.000	112	.000	.099	.094 .016
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	000	.000	.000	.000	235	.000	.000	.296 .021

 AE3
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	ODM Y	oc	ORG	OP	SF	sv	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PE	.000	.036	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.010	.085	.008	.010	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	023	.136	017	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
PD MY	.002	.043	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AD MY	.011	008	.010	.011	001	.029	075	034	.019	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.029	.000	.000	.000	.003	.029	.004	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	014	.092	010	015	.000	.010	.162	.083	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	009	.071	006	010	001	.024	.108	.066	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	017	.125	010	018	001	.039	.192	.116	.024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Stand	Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)													

	ODM Y	OC	ORG	OP	SF	SV	SP	SDM Y	SI	accident	PE	PP	PC	PD MY
SF	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SD MY	.000	.000	.000	.000 .00	0.000	.000	.000 .000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	000. 0	.000	.000 .000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
PE	.000	.028	.000	.000 .00	000. 0	.000	.000 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000.	
PP	.032	.063	.029	.034 .00	0.000	.000	.000 .000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
PC	034	.045	028	037 .00	000.0	.000	.000.000	000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
PD MY	.008	.038	.027	.001 .00	000.0	.000	.000.000	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AD MY	.009	001	.009	.009 .00	0.006	054	025 .014	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AV	.000	.011	.001	.000 .00	0 .002	.047	.006 .005	000. 000. 000. 000. 000.	
AE2	010	.014	008	011 .00	0 .002	.102	.053 .004	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
AE3	012	.020	008	013 .00	0 .009	.126	.079 .018	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
AE1	008	.013	005	009 .00	0 .005	.080	.049 .010	000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,	
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)									

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OC	<>	ODMY	4.350	.000
ORG	<>	OC	4.060	.000
e3	<>	ODMY	7.136	.000
e3	<>	ORG	4.127	.000
e2	<>	e3	21.139	.000
<b>e</b> 2	<>	e4	44.187	.000
e5	<>	e4	52.360	.000
el	<>	e3	12.457	.000
<b>e</b> 1	<>	e4	30.798	.000
resl	<>	ODMY	4.930	.000
e6	<>	OC	24.926	.000

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e6	<>	e7	8.179	.000
e8	<>	e14	14. <b>78</b> 5	.000
e8	<>	e7	31.875	.000
e10	<>	OC	4.097	.000
e11	<>	e10	4.484	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.033	.000
e9	<>	e11	6.869	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

			M.I.	Par Change
SF	<	SP	19.967	.094
SF	<	SDMY	12.834	074
SF	<	SI	10.648	.067
SV	<	SP	4.075	040
SV	<	SDMY	6.355	049
SP	<	SF	17.403	.640
SP	<	sv	37.077	933
SDMY	<	SV	43.935	821
SI	<	SF	11.538	.504
SI	<	sv	25.843	754
accident	<	ODMY	43.634	560
accident	<	ORG	29.889	.419
accident	<	OP	12.455	.291
PE	<	PC	6.046	.074
PE	<	PDMY	20.476	363
PP	<	PDMY	23.856	394

PC	<	OC	24.926	.849
РС	<	PP	7.501	346
PDMY	<	ODMY	8.855	043
PDMY	<	ORG	4.526	.028
PDMY	<	OP	5.058	.031
PDMY	<	PE	14.555	192
PDMY	<	PP	29.806	265
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.651	360
ADMY	<	ORG	17.231	.240
ADMY	<	OP	7.814	.174
AV	<	SDMY	4.726	.092
AE2	<	OC	4.097	.867
AE2	<	OP	4.397	.192
AE2	<	SV	4.703	.724
AE2	<	AEI	7.501	118
AEI	<	SI	4.661	.271
AEI	<	AE2	11.255	272
AE1	<	AE3	6.034	367
Model Fit Sum CMIN	mary			
Model			NPAR	CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default mode	1		62	409.806 109 .000 3.760
Saturated mod	iel		171	.000 0
Independence	model		18	1331.327 153 .000 8.701
RMR, GFI				
Model			RMR	GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model	1		.000	.834 .739 .531


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
Saturated model	.000	1.000			
Independence model	.000	.614	.569 .54	49	
Baseline Comparisons					
Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rhol	IFI Delta2		
Default model	.692	.568	.754	.642 .745	
Saturated model	1.000		1.000	1.000	
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000 .000	
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI		
Default model	.712	.493	.531		
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000		
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000		
NCP					
Model	1	NCP	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	300.	806	242.542	366.647	
Saturated model		000	.000	.000	
Independence model	1178.	327	1065.473	1298.619	
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	2.029	1.489	1.201	1.815	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	6.591	5.833	5.275	6.429	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	
Default model	.117	.105	.129	.000	
Independence model	.195	.186	.205	.000	

AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC		BIC	CAIC
Default model	533.806	546.680	73	9.225	801.225
Saturated model	342.000	377.508	90	8.558	1079.558
Independence model	1367.327	1371.064	142	6. <b>96</b> 4	1444.964
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	2.643	2.354	2.969	2.706	
Saturated model	1.693	1.693	1.693	1.869	
Independence model	6.769	6.210	7.364	6.787	
HOELTER					
	HOELTE				
Model		05	.01		
Default model	ć	67	73		
Independence model	2	28	30		

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## APPENDIX K. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL A (p < 0.05)

#### Analysis Summary

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 60

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	24	0	14	0	0	38
Total	36	0	14	0	0	50

#### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 38

Degrees of freedom (105 - 38): 67

#### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 325.983

Degrees of freedom = 67

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	<	ORG	.122	.144	.848	.396par_1
SI	<	OP	.054	.080	.673	.501par_5
SI	<	ODMY	179	.098	-1.836	.066par_6
SDMY	<	ODMY	.273	.111	2.450	.014par_7
sv	<	ODMY	072	.048	-1.503	.133par_22
PDMY	<	SDMY	.012	.030	.392	.695par_2

PC	<	SDMY	r		.123	3	.093	1.3	26	.185par	·_3
PP	<	SI			.161	l	.066	2.4	56	.014par	-9
PDMY	{ <	SI			.000	)	.035	.0	000	1.000par	·_10
PDMY	{ <	SV			.054	ŧ	.071	.7	'54	.451 par	_13
PP	<	SDMY	7		.012	2	.056	.2	208	.835par	_14
AE1	<	PDMY	7		061	1	.257	0	48	.962par	·_4
AE2	<	PDMY	T		.197	7	.969	.2	203	.839par	·_8
AE3	<	PDMY	7		084	Ļ	.475	1	76	.860par	_11
AV	<	PDMY	<del>,</del>		138	3	.210	6	58	.511par	_12
AE1	<	PC			1.628	1	.396	4.1	11	***par	_15
AE2	<	РС			1.463	ł	.307	4.7	68	***par	_16
AE3	<	PP			.479	)	.236	2.0	29	.043par	_17
AE1	<	Accide	nt		-1.108	;	.174	-6.3	77	***par	18
AE2	<	Accide	ent		545	i	.159	-3.4	28	***par	_19
AE3	<	Accide	nt		132	!	.084	-1.5	84	.113par	_20
AV	<	Accide	nt		022	2	.038	5	71	.568par	_21
ADM	Y <	PC			326	j	.225	-1.4	50	.147par	_23
ADM	Y <	PDMY			.641		.725	.8	85	.376par	_24
ADM	Y <	Accide	nt		1.000	)					
Total E	ffects (Gr	oup num	ber 1 - De	fault mo	del)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV :	SDMY	SI	Ac	cident	PP	PC F	PDMY
SV	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.273	.000	.122	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	026	.009	.001	.000	.012	.161		.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.034	.000	.015	.000	.123	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

PDM Y	001	.000	.001	.054	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	011	.000	004	.034	033	.000	1.000	.000	326	.641
AE3	012	.004	.001	005	.005	.077	132	.479	.000	084
AV	.000	.000	.000	007	002	.000	022	.000	.000	138
AE2	.049	.000	.022	.011	.182	.000	545	.000	1.463	.197
AE1	.055	.000	.024	003	.199	.000	-1,108	.000	1.628	061
Standar	dized Tots	l Effects	Group	number	1 - Defau	ilt model	)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
sv	192	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.302	.000	.105	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	232	.085	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	063	.026	.003	.000	.026	.305	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.051	.000	.018	.000	.170	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	003	.000	.005	.098	.051	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	010	.000	003	.011	025	.000	.977	.000	180	.113
AE3	016	.006	.001	002	.005	.076	195	.250	.000	022
AV	.000	.000	.000	008	004	.000	074	.000	.000	085
AE2	.027	.000	.009	.002	.091	.000	347	.000	.526	.022
AE1	.024	.000	.008	001	.079	.000	564	.000	.468	006
Direct E	ffects (Gro	oup num	ber 1 - D	efault m	odel)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDM Y	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
SV	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.273	.000	.122	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.054	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	326	.641
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	132	.479	.000	084
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	022	.000	.000	138
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	545	.000	1.463	.197
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.108	.000	1.628	061
o										

## Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDM Y	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDMY	
SV	192	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
SDM Y	.302	.000	.105	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
SI	232	.085	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.026	.305	.000	.000	.000	.000	
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.170	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.098	.051	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.977	.000	180	.113	
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	195	.250	.000	022	
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	074	.000	.000	085	
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	347	.000	.526	.022	
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	564	.000	.468	006	

## Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	026	.009	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.034	.000	.015	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	011	.000	004	.034	033	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	012	.004	.001	005	.005	.077	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	007	002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.049	.000	.022	.011	.182	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.055	.000	.024	003	.199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standar	rdized Indir	ect Effe	cts (Group	number	1 - Defaul	lt model)	)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	063	.026	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.051	.000	.018	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	003	.000	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	010	.000	003	.011	025	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

AE3	016	.006	.001	002	.005	.076	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	008	004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.027	.000	.009	.002	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.024	.000	.008	001	.079	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OP	<>	ODMY	25.066	.000
ORG	<>	ODMY	14.158	.000
e5	<>	e4	4.760	.000
el	<>	e4	8.456	.000
el	<>	e5	37.083	.000
resl	<>	e5	5.860	.000
resl	<>	el	6.015	.000
e6	<>	e7	6.031	.000
e8	<>	ORG	4.168	.000
e8	<>	e7	5.219	.000
e8	<>	e6	9.960	.000
e11	<>	e4	20.439	.000
e12	<>	e4	27.485	.000
e12	<>	ell	10.225	.000
e9	<>	e12	5.339	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

### M.I. Par Change

### Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	4.912	118

231


SV	<	SI	8.180	.178		
SDMY	<	sv	4.585	632		
SDMY	<	SI	34.398	845		
SI	<	SV	8.144	.738		
SI	<	SDMY	34.008	630		
Accident	<	SDMY	4.945	.370		
Accident	<	SI	4.840	428		
PP	<	PC	5.857	.188		
PP	<	PDMY	5.921	594		
PC	<	РР	5.373	.475		
PC	<	PDMY	9.496	-1.244		
PDMY	<	ORG	4.168	.071		
PDMY	<	PP	4.735	143		
PDMY	<	PC	9.671	128		
ADMY	<	SDMY	5.382	.278		
ADMY	<	SI	4.697	303		
AE3	<	SV	20.194	1.150		
AE3	<	AV	10.095	.912		
AV	<	SV	29.010	.621		
AV	<	SI	4.475	.119		
AV	<	AE3	8.111	.158		
AE1	<	AV	5.271	-1.370		
Model Fit Sumi CMIN	mary					
Model			NPAR	CMIN DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default mode	1		38	325.983 67	.000	4.865
Saturated mod	iel		105	.000 0		

Independence model	14	433.3	00 91	.000	4.762
RMR, GFI					
Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI	
Default model	.000	.625	.412	.399	
Saturated model	.000	1.000			
Independence model	.000	.521	.447	.451	
Baseline Comparisons					
Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho l	[] Delta	FI TLI 12 rho2	CFI
Default model	.248	022	.29	028	.243
Saturated model	1.000		1.00	0	1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.00	000. 00	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIC	) PNFI	PCFI		
Default model	.730	5 .182	.179		
Saturated model	.000	000. 0	.000		
Independence model	1.000	000. 0	.000		
NCP					
Model	N	СР	LO 90	HI 9	0
Default model	258.9	83	206.441	319.05	8
Saturated model	.0	00	.000	.00	0
Independence model	342.3	00	281.240	410.89	3
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 9	0 HI 90	
Default model	5.525	4.390	3.49	9 5.408	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.00	000. 00	
Independence model	7.344	5.802	4.76	6.964	


RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.256	.229	.284	.000
Independence model	.252	.229	.277	.000
AIC				
Model	AIC	BCC	В	IC CAIC
Default model	401.983	427.892	<b>48</b> 1.5	68 519.568
Saturated model	210.000	281.591	429.9	06 534.906
Independence model	461.300	470. <b>8</b> 46	490.6	21 504.621
ECVI				
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	6.813	5.923	7.831	7.252
Saturated model	3.559	3.559	3.559	4.773
Independence model	7.819	6.784	8.981	7.980
HOELTER				
Model	HOELTE	ER HOEL 05	TER. .01	
Default model		16	1 <b>8</b>	
Independence model		16	18	
Execution time summary				
Minimization:	.004			
Miscellaneous:	1.517			
Bootstrap:	.000			
Total:	1.521			

UAV p <0.05



UAV p <0.05



### APPENDIX L. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL B (p < 0.05)

### Analysis Summary

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 60

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	24	4	14	0	0	42
Total	36	4	14	0	0	54

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 42

Degrees of freedom (105 - 42): 63

Result (Default model) Minimum was achieved Chi-square = 141.906 Degrees of freedom = 63 Probability level = .000

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	<	ORG	.051	.140	.361	.718par_1
SI	<	OP	.071	.090	.794	.427par_5
SI	<	ODMY	165	.112	-1.473	.141par_6
SDMY	<	ODMY	.246	.116	2.123	.034par_7
SV	<	ODMY	072	.043	-1.678	.093par_22
PDMY	<	SDMY	.010	.049	.198	.843par_2

РС	<	SDMY			.123		.094	1.	312	.190 <del>p</del> ar	_3
РР	<	SI			.161		110	1.	465	.143par	_9
PDMY	<	SI			007		053		134	.893par	_10
PDMY	<	SV			.075		.065	1.	162	.245par	_13
PP	<	SDMY			.012		.098		120	.905par	_14
AE1	<	PDMY			061	1.	358		045	.964par	_4
AE2	<	PDMY			.197	1	.047		188	.851par	_8
AE3	<	PDMY			084		473		177	.859par	_11
AV	<	PDMY			138		209		662	.508par	_12
AEI	<	PC			1.628		431	3.	777	***par	_15
AE2	<	PC			1.463		334	4.	381	***par	_16
AE3	<	РР			.479		237	2.	021	.043par	_17
AE1	<	Acciden	nt		-1.108		174	-6.	377	***par	18
AE2	<	Accide	nt		545		159	-3.	42 <b>8</b>	***par	_19
AE3	<	Accider	nt		132		084	-1.	584	.113par	_20
AV	<	Accide	nt		022		.038	÷.	571	.568par	_21
ADMY	<	PC			326		245	-1.	332	.183par	_23
ADMY	<	PDMY			.641		781	,	821	.412par	_24
ADMY	<	Accide	nt		1.000						
Total	Effects (Gr	onb unul	ber 1 - De	efault mo	dei)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Acc	cident	РР	PC P	DMY
SV	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.246	.000	.051	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	165	.071	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	024	.011	.001	.000	.012	.161		.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.030	.000	.006	.000	.123	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

PDM Y	002	001	.000	.075	.010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	011	.000	002	.048	034	005	1.000	.000	326	.641
AE3	011	.006	.000	006	.005	.078	132	.479	.000	084
AV	.000	.000	.000	010	001	.001	022	.000	.000	138
AE2	.044	.000	.009	.015	.182	001	545	.000	1.463	.197
AE1	.049	.000	.010	005	.199	.000	-1.108	.000	1.628	061
Standa	rdized Tota	al Effect	s (Group	o number	r I - Defa	ult model	)			
I	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	рр	PC	PDMY
SV	213	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.307	.000	.044	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	233	.110	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	065	.034	.001	.000	.026	.314	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.052	.000	.007	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	010	003	.002	.137	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	010	.000	001	.015	025	003	.969	.000	179	.112
AE3	016	.009	.000	003	.005	.079	196	.249	.000	022
AV	.001	.000	.000	012	004	.002	074	.000	.000	086
AE2	.027	.000	.004	.003	.090	001	348	.000	.528	.023
AE1	.024	.000	.003	001	.079	.000	564	.000	.468	006
Direct <b>H</b>	Effects (Gr	оир пип	nber 1 - I	Default n	nodel)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv ^s	SDM Y	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDMY
SV	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.246	.000	.051	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SI	165	.071	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.075	.010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	326	. <b>64</b> 1
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	132	.479	.000	084
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	022	.000	.000	138
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	545	.000	1.463	.197
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.108	.000	1.628	061

Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDM Y	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
SV	213	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.307	.000	.044	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	233	.110	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.026	.314	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.1 <b>68</b>	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.137	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.969	.000	179	.112
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	196	.249	.000	022
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	074	.000	.000	086
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	348	.000	.528	.023
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	564	.000	.468	006

# Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	024	.011	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.030	.000	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	002	001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	011	.000	002	.048	034	005	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	011	.006	.000	006	.005	.078	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	010	001	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.044	.000	.009	.015	.182	001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.049	.000	.010	005	.199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	rdized Indi	rect Effec	ets (Group	o numbe	r 1 - Defai	ult model)				
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC ¹	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	065	.034	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.052	.000	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	010	003	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	010	.000	001	.015	025	003	.000	.000	.000	.000

AE3	016	.009	.000	003	.005	.079	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.001	.000	.000	012	004	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.027	.000	.004	.003	.090	001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.024	.000	.003	001	.079	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
ell	<>	e4	20.439	.000
e12	<>	e4	27.485	.000
e12	<>	e11	10.225	.000
e9	<>	e12	5.339	.000


Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)


M.I. Par Change

			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	5.017	121
SV	<	SI	7.806	.170
Accident	<	SDMY	5.051	.378
Accident	<	SI	4.619	408
PP	<	PC	5.860	.188
PP	<	PDMY	5.852	588
ADMY	<	SDMY	5.498	.283
ADMY	<	SI	4.482	289
AE3	<	sv	20.012	1.140
AE3	<	AV	10.094	.912
AV	<	sv	28.748	.616
AV	<	SI	4.271	.114

AV	<	AE3	8.113		.15	8		
AE1	<	AV	5.270		-1.37	0		
Model Fit Summ CMIN	ary							
Model			NPAR	CM	IN DF	Р	СМІ	N/DF
Default model			42	141.9	906 63	.000		2.252
Saturated mode	el		105	_(	0 000			
Independence	model		14	433.	300 91	.000		4.762
RMR, GFI								
Model			RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI		
Default model			.000	.748	.580	.449		
Saturated mode	el		.000	1.000				
Independence	model		.000	.521	.447	.451		
Baseline Compa	risons							
Model			N Delt	IFI RF al rho		IFI elta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model			.6	72 .52	7	.787	.667	.769
Saturated mod	el		1.0	00	1	.000		1.000
Independence	model		.0	00. 00	0	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adju	sted Mea	sures						
Model			PRAT	IO PNF	I PCF	I		
Default model			.6	92 .46	6 .533	3		
Saturated mode	el		.0	00. 00	00.00	)		
Independence i	model		1.0	00. 00	00.00	)		
NCP								
Model			]	NCP	LO 9(	)	HI 90	
Default model			78	.906	48.138	3 1	17.403	

Saturated model	.0	00	.000	.000
Independence model	342.3	00 28	1.240	410.893
FMIN				
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	2.405	1.337	.816	1.990
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	7.344	5.802	4.767	6.964
RMSEA				
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.146	.114	.17 <b>8</b>	.000
Independence model	.252	.229	.277	.000
AIC				
Model	AIC	BCC		BIC CAIC
Default model	225.906	254.543	313.	.869 355.869
Saturated model	210.000	281.591	429.	.906 534.906
Independence model	461.300	470.846	490.	.621 504.621
ECVI				
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVÍ
Default model	3.829	3.307	4.481	4.314
Saturated model	3.559	3.559	3.559	4.773
Independence model	7.819	6.784	8.981	7.980
HOELTER				
Model	HOELTE	ER HOEL 05	.TER .01	
Default model		35	39	
Independence model		16	18	





# APPENDIX M. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL A (p < 0.1)

#### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 60

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	27	0	14	0	0	41
Total	39	0	14	0	0	53

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 41

Degrees of freedom (105 - 41): 64

### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 322.441

Degrees of freedom = 64

Probability level = .000

### Maximum Likelihood Estimates

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	′ <	ORG	.367	.143	2.572	.010par_1
SI	<	OP	.054	.080	.673	.501par_5
SI	<	ODMY	179	.098	-1.836	.066par_6
SDMY	′ <	ODMY	.537	.110	4.866	***par_7
SV	<	ODMY	045	.048	946	.344par_22
sv	<	OP	.034	.039	.863	.388par_26

SDMY	{ <	ОР			.216	.09	2.384	.0	17par_2	.7	
PDMY	{ <	SDMY			.012	.02:	5.466	.6	41 par_2	2	
РС	<	SDMY			.123	.07	8 1.580	.1	14par_3		
РР	<	SI		.161		.06	5 2.451	.0	.014par_9		
PDMY	{ <	SI			.000	.03	5.000	1.0	)00par_1	0	
PDMY	( <	SV			.054	.072	.748	.4	54par_1	3	
РР	<	SDMY			.012	.04	7.247	.8	05par_1	4	
AE1	<	PDMY			062	1.25	7049	.9	61par_4	ŀ	
AE2	<	PDMY			.196	.96	.203	.8	39par_8	:	
AE3	<	PDMY			052	.47:	5110	.9	13par_1	1	
AV	<	PDMY			138	.21	)658	.5	10par_1	2	
AE1	<	PC			1.627	.39	4.136	*	**par_l	5	
AE2	<	PC			1.463	.30:	5 4.797	*	**par_l	6	
AE3	<	РР			.532	.23	2.229	.0	)26par_1	7	
AE1	<	Acciden	it		-1.130	.174	4 -6.502	*	**par_l	8	
AE2	<	Accider	ıt		550	.16	-3.430	×	**par_1	9	
AE3	<	Acciden	it		134	.084	4 -1.585	.1	13par_2	20	
AV	<	Acciden	it		026	.03	3687	.4	92par_2	1	
ADM	Y <	PC			283	.222	-1.278	.2	.01 par_2	3	
ADM	Y <	PDMY			.450	.719	.626	.5	32par_2	.4	
ADM	Y <	Acciden	ıt		1.000						
ADM	Y <	РР			411	.26	-1.562	.1	18par_2	:5	
Total E	ffects (G1	oup numb	er I - Def	ault mod	el)						
	ODMY	ОР	ORG	sv s	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY	
SV	045	.034	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
SDM Y	.537	.216	.367	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	

SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.	.000	.000	.000
РР	023	.011	.004	.000	.012	.16	000.	.000	.000	.000
PC	.066	.027	.045	.000	.123	.000	000.	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.004	.004	.004	.054	.012	.00	000. (	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	008	010	013	.024	034	066	5 1.000	411	283	.450
AE3	012	.006	.002	003	.006	.080	134	.532	.000	052
AV	001	001	001	007	002	.000	026	.000	.000	138
AE2	.097	.040	.067	.011	.182	.00	550	.000	1.463	.196
AE1	.107	.043	.073	003	.199	.00	-1.130	.000	1.627	062
Standar	dized Tot	al Effect	s (Group	number	1 - Defau	lt mode	1)			
(	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
SV	121	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.499	.245	.264	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	232	.085	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	055	.033	.008	.000	.031	.305	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.101	.049	.053	.000	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.018	.026	.016	.097	.061	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	007	011	008	.008	031	044	.974	143	158	.079
AE3	016	.009	.002	001	.008	.084	194	.276	.000	014
AV	002	002	001	008	005	.000	089	.000	.000	085
AE2	.054	.027	.028	.002	.108	.000	346	.000	.528	.022
AE1	.047	.023	.025	001	.094	.000	570	.000	.470	006
Direct E	Effects (Gr	оир пип	ıber 1 - D	efault m	odel)					
	ODMY	ОР	ORG	SV S	DM	SI	Accident	РР	PC PI	OMY

* *	
×2.	

SV	045	.034	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.537	.216	.367	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.054	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	411	283	.450
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	134	.532	.000	052
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	026	.000	.000	138
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	550	.000	1.463	.196
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.130	.000	1.627	062
Standardi	ized Dire	ct Effect	ts (Grou	io numb	er I - D	efault n	nodel)			

Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDM Y	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
sv	121	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.499	.245	.264	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	232	.085	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.031	.305	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.201	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.097	.061	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.974	143	158	.079
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	194	.276	.000	014

AV	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	00. 000	0	089	.0	00	.000	085
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	00. 000	0	346	.0	00	.528	.022
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	00. 000	0	570	.0	00	.470	006
Indirec	et Effects (G	roup nu	mber 1 -	Default i	nodel)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Acc	ident	PP	PC	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	023	.011	.004	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.066	.027	.045	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.004	.004	.004	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	008	010	013	.024	034	066		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	012	.006	.002	003	.006	.086		.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	001	001	001	007	002	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.097	.040	.067	.011	.182	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.107	.043	.073	003	.199	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	rdized Indi	rect Effe	cts (Gro	ւթ ոստե	er 1 - Defa	uit model)	)				
	ODMY	ОР	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accic	lent	PP	PC ^I	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	•	000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-	000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		000	.000	.000	.000
РР	055	.033	.008	.000	.000	.000		000	.000.	.000	.000

PC

.101

.049

.053

.000

.000

.000

.000. 000. 000. 000.

PDM Y	.018	.026	.016	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	007	011	008	.008	031	044	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	016	.009	.002	001	.008	.084	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	002	002	001	008	005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.054	.027	.028	.002	.108	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.047	.023	.025	001	.094	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OP	<>	ODMY	25.066	.000
ORG	<>	ODMY	14.158	.000
e5	<>	e4	4.175	.000
el	<>	e4	8.518	.000
el	<>	e5	36.124	.000
resl	<>	e5	4.356	.000
res1	<>	el	4.545	.000
e6	<>	e7	6.031	.000
e8	<>	ORG	4.168	.000
e8	<>	e7	5.219	.000
e8	<>	e6	9.960	.000
e11	<>	e4	20.916	.000
e12	<>	e4	27.113	.000
e12	<>	e11	10.230	.000
e9	<>	e12	5.927	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

			M.I.	F	Par Chang	e		
SV	<	SI	7.999		.17	6		
SDMY	′ <	sv	4.062		59	5		
SDMY	′ <	SI	33.924		83	2		
SI	<	sv	8.287		.75	1		
SI	<	SDMY	23.943		- 44	4		
PP	<	PC	5.787		.18	6		
PP	<	PDMY	5.914		59	4		
PC	<	РР	5.375		.47	5		
PC	<	PDMY	9.485		-1.24	2		
PDMY	′ <	ORG	4.168		.07	1		
PDMY	′ <	PP	4.737		14	3		
PDMY	′ <	PC	9.555		12	6		
AE3	<	sv	20.523		1.16	9		
AE3	<	AV	10.075		.91	]		
AV	<	sv	29.314		.62	9		
AV	<	SI	4.475		.11	9		
AV	<	AE3	7.999		.15	6		
AEI	<	AV	5.838		-1.43	0		
Model I CMIN	⁷ it Summ	агу						
Model				NPAR	СМ	IN DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Defaul	t model			41	322.4	41 64	.000	5.038
Saturat	ed mode	el		105	.0	0 000		
Indepe	ndence i	model		14	433.3	00 91	.000	4.762
RMR, (	GFI							
Model				RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI	


Default model	.000	.631	.394 .	384	
Saturated model	.000	1.000			
Independence model	.000	.521	.447 .	451	
<b>Baseline Comparisons</b>					
Model	NF1 Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.256	058	.300	074	.245
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIC	) PNFI	PCFI		
Default model	.703	3.180	.172		
Saturated model	.000	000. 0	.000		
Independence model	1.000	000.	.000		
NCP					
Model	N	СР	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	258.4	41 2	06.093	318.317	
Saturated model	.0	00	.000	.000	
Independence model	342.3	00 2	81.240	410.893	
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	5.465	4.380	3.493	5.395	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	7.344	5.802	4.767	6.964	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	
Default model	.262	.234	.290	.000	

-


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Independence model	.252	.229	.277	.00	0
AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC	-	BIC	CAIC
Default model	404.441	432.396	5 49	0.309	531.309
Saturated model	210.000	281.593	l 42	9.906	534.906
Independence model	461.300	470.846	5 49	0.621	504.621
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	6.855	5.968	7.870	7.329	
Saturated model	3.559	3.559	3.559	4.773	
Independence model	7.819	6.784	8.981	7.980	
HOELTER					
	HOELT				
Model		.05	.01		
Default model		16	18		
Independence model		16	18		
Execution time summary					
Minimization:	.047				
Miscellaneous:	1.719				
Bootstrap:	.000				
Total:	1.766				

UAV p <0.01



UAV p <0.1



# APPENDIX N. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL B (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive. Sample size = 60 Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	27	4	14	0	0	45
Total	39	4	14	0	0	57

#### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 45

Degrees of freedom (105 - 45): 60

# Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 139.308

Degrees of freedom = 60

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	· <	ORG	.084	.177	.476	.634par_l
SI	<	OP	.054	.116	.466	.641par_5
SI	<	ODMY	179	.126	-1.421	.155par_6
SDMY	´ <	ODMY	.294	.211	1.398	.162par_7
SV	<	ODMY	045	.062	732	.464par_22
sv	<	OP	.034	.057	.598	.550par_30

SDMY	{ <	OP			.045		.167	.2	71	.786par_	31
PDMY	{ <	SDMY	•		.010	)	.049	.1	98	.843par_2	2
PC	<	SDMY	,		.123	· .	.094	1.3	08	.191par_3	3
PP	<	SI			.161		.110	1.4	70	.142par_9	9
PDMY	{ <	SI			007		.053	1	35	.893par_	10
PDMY	( <	SV			.075		.065	1.1	61	.246par_	13
PP	<	SDMY			.012		.097	.1	20	.904par_	14
AEI	<	PDMY	*		062	1	.358	0	45	.964par_4	4
AE2	<	PDMY	•		.196	1	.047	.1	87	.851 par_3	8
AE3	<	PDMY	•		052		. <b>47</b> 2	1	10	.912par_	11
AV	<	PDMY	•		138		.209	6	62	.508par_	12
AE1	<	PC			1.627		.431	3.7	77	***par_	15
AE2	<	РС			1.463	1	.334	4.3	81	***par_	16
AE3	<	РР			.532		.240	2.2	21	.026par_	17
AE1	<	Accide	nt		-1.130	' ·	.174	-6.5	02	***par_	18
AE2	<	Accide	nt		550	· .	.160	-3.4	30	***par_	19
AE3	<	Accide	nt		134		.084	-1.5	85	113par_2	20
AV	<	Accide	nt		026	· ·	.038	6	87	.492par_2	21
ADM	Y <	PC			283		.243	-1.1	67	.243par_2	23
ADM	Y <	PDMY	,		.450	· ·	.775	.5	80 .	562par_2	24
ADMY	Y <	Accide	nt		1.000						
ADMY	Y <	РР			411		.264	-1.5	55 .	120par_2	29
Total E	ffects (Gi	oup num	ber I - De	fault mo	del)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	DMY	SI	Ace	cident	PP	PC F	PDMY
sv	045	.034	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.294	.045	.084	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	025	.009	.001	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.036	.006	.010	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.003	.001	.075	.010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	004	003	.034	035	070	1.000	411	283	.450
AE3	014	.005	.000	004	.006	.086	134	.532	.000	052
AV	.000	.000	.000	010	001	.001	026	.000	.000	138
AE2	.053	.009	.015	.015	.182	001	550	.000	1.463	.196
AE1	.059	.009	.017	005	.199	.000	-1.130	.000	1.627	062

Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	OP	ORG	svs	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PCI	PDMY
sv	134	.109	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.369	.062	.073	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	253	.083	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	070	.028	.002	.000	.026	.313	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.062	.010	.012	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.004	.015	.003	.136	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	004	002	.011	027	047	.970	142	156	.079
AE3	019	.007	.000	002	.006	.087	194	.275	.000	014
AV	.000	001	.000	012	004	.002	089	.000	.000	086
AE2	.033	.006	.007	.003	.090	001	348	.000	.528	.023
AEI	.029	.005	.006	001	.078	.000	570	.000	.468	006

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	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDM Y	SI	Accident	РР	PC P	DMY
sv	045	.034	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.294	.045	.084	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.075	.010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	411	283	.450
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	134	.532	.000	052
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	026	.000	.000	138
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	550	.000	1.463	.196
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.130	.000	1.627	062
Standa	rdized Dir	ect Eff	ects (Gr	oup nu	mber 1 ·	Default r	nodel)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDM Y	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
sv	134	.109	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.369	.062	.073	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	253	.083	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.026	.313	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.136	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.970	142	156	.079

AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	)0	194 .2	275	.000	014
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	)0	089 .0	000	.000	086
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	)0	348 .0	000	.528	.023
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.00	00	570 .0	000	.468	006
Іпdire	ct Effects ((	Group n	umber I	- Defa	ult ma	odel)					
	ODMY	OP	ORC	G 5	sv si	DMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	0. 0	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	0. 0	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	0. 0	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	025	.009	.001	0. 1	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.036	.006	.010	0. 0	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.003	.001	I .0	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	004	003	3.0	34	035	070	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	014	.005	.000	)0	04	.006	.086	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	) -,0	10	001	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.053	.009	.015	5.0	15	.182	001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AEI	.059	.009	.017	70	05	.199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	ardized Indi	irect Eff	ects (Gr	oup nu	mber	1 - Defa	ault mode	el)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	S	V SE	ΜΥ	SI	Accident	PP	pc ^f	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.00	00	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.00	)0	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

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SI

PP

262

PC	.062	.010	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.004	.015	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	004	002	.011	027	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	019	.007	.000	002	.006	.087	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	001	.000	012	004	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.033	.006	.007	.003	.090	-,001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.029	005	006	- 001	078	000	000	.000	000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
e11	<>	e4	20.916	.000
e12	<>	e4	27.113	.000
e12	<>	e11	10.230	.000
e9	<>	e12	5.927	.000


Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)


M.I. Par Change

			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	5.061	121
SV	<	SI	7.655	.168
PP	<	PC	5.861	.188
РР	<	PDMY	5.853	588
AE3	<	SV	20.017	1.140
AE3	<	AV	10.074	.911
AV	<	SV	28.590	.614
AV	<	SI	4.283	.114

AV <	AE3	8.002		.156				
AE1 <	AV	5.837	-	1.430				
Model Fit Sum CMIN	mary							
Model			NPAR	CMI	N DF	Р	СМП	N/DF
Default mode	el		45	139.30	08 60	.000	:	2.322
Saturated mo	odel		105	.00	0 0			
Independence	e model		14	433.30	0 91	.000		4.762
RMR, GFI								
Model			RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI		
Default mode	el		.000	.750	.563	.429		
Saturated mc	odel		.000	1.000				
Independenc	e model		.000	.521	.447	.451		
Baseline Comp	parisons							
Model			NFI Delta1	RFI rho l		IFI elta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default mode	el		.678	.512		.788	.649	.768
Saturated mc	del		1.000		1	.000		1.000
Independence	e model		.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Ad	justed Measu	res						
Model			PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI	[		
Default mod	el		.659	.447	.507	7		
Saturated mo	odel		.000	.000	.000	)		
Independenc	e model		1.000	.000	.000	)		
NCP								
Model			NC	Р	LO 90	)	HI 90	

Saturated model	.00	00	.000	.00	0
Independence model	342.30	00 28	1.240	410.89	03
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	2.361	1.344	.826	1.994	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	7.344	5.802	4.767	6.964	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOS	Ε
Default model	.150	.117	.182	.00	00
Independence model	.252	.229	.277	.00	)0
AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC	2	BIC	CAIC
Default model	229.308	259.99(	32	3.554	368.554
Saturated model	210.000	281.59	1 42	9.906	534.906
Independence model	461.300	470.846	5 49	0.621	504.621
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	3.887	3.368	4.536	4.407	
Saturated model	3.559	3.559	3.559	4.773	
Independence model	7.819	6.784	8.981	7.980	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELTE	ER HOEI 05	.TER .01		
Default model	:	34	38		
Independence model		16	18		





# APPENDIX O. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL C (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 60

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances I	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	26	4	14	0	0	44
Total	38	4	14	0	0	56

### Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 44

Degrees of freedom (105 - 44): 61

#### Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 139.735

Degrees of freedom = 61

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

		Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY <	ORG	.084	.177	.476	.634par_l
SI <	OP	.054	.116	.466	.641par_5
SI <	ODMY	179	.126	-1.421	.155par_6
SDMY <	ODMY	.294	.211	1.398	.162par_7
SV <	ODMY	072	.043	-1.678	.093par_22
SDMY <	OP	.045	.167	.271	.786par_30

***		0514	* *			010	0.40	100	0.41		
PDMY	( <	SDM	Y			.010	.049	.198	.843	3par_2	
PC	<	SDM	Y			.123	.094	1.308	.191	par_3	
PP	<	SI				.161	.110	1.470	.142	2par_9	
PDMY	{ <	SI				.007	.053	135	.893	spar_10	
PDMY	( <	sv				.075	.065	1.162	.245par_13		
PP	<	SDM	Y			.012	.097	.120	.904	lpar_14	
AE1	<	PDM	Y		-	.062	1.358	045	.964	lpar_4	
AE2	<	PDM	Y			.196	1.047	.187	.851	lpar_8	
AE3	<	PDM	Y		-	.052	.472	110	.912	2par_11	
AV	<	PDM	Y		-	.138	.209	662	.508	3par_12	
AEI	<	PC			1	.627	.431	3.777	***	par_15	
AE2	<	PC			1	.463	.334	.334 4.381		***par_16	
AE3	<	РР				.532	.240	2.220	.026	5par_17	
AE1	<	Accio	lent		-1	.130	.174	-6.502	***	*par_18	
AE2	<	Accio	lent		-,	.550	.160	-3.430	***	'par_19	
AE3	<	Accid	lent		-,	.134	.084	-1.585	.113	3par_20	
AV	<	Accid	lent		-	.026	.038	687	.492	2par_21	
ADM	Y <	РС			-	.283	.243	-1.167	.243	3par_23	
ADM	Y <	PDM	Y			.450	.775	.580	.562	2par_24	
ADM	Y <	Accio	lent		1	.000					
ADM	Y <	РР			-	.411	.264	-1.555	.12(	)par_29	
Total E	ffects (G	roup nu	mber I -	Default	model)						
	ODM Y	OP	ORG	svs	DMY	SI	Accident	PP	РСР	DMY	
sv	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
SDM Y	.294	.045	.084	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	

PP	025	.009	.001	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000 .0	00.00	00
PC	.036	.006	.010	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000 .0	00 .00	00
PDM Y	001	.000	.001	.075	.010	007	.000	.000 .0	00.00	00
ADM Y	.000	005	003	.034	035	070	1.000 -	.4112	83 .4	50
AE3	013	.005	.000	004	.006	.086	134	.532 .0	0003	52
AV	.000	.000	.000	010	001	.001	026	.000 .0	00 -1	38
AE2	.053	.008	.015	.015	.182	001	550	.000 1.4	63 .19	96
AE1	.059	.009	.017	005	.199	.000	-1.130	.000 1.6	2700	62
Standa	rdized Ta	tal Effec	ts (Grou	p numbe	er I - De	fault mode	el)			
i	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	y SI	Accident	PP	PC F	PDMY
SV	213	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.369	.062	.073	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	253	.083	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	070	.028	.002	.000	.026	5 .313	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.062	.010	.012	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	007	.000	.003	.137	.04	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	006	002	.011	027	7047	.970	142	156	.079
AE3	019	.008	.000	002	.006	5 .087	194	.275	.000	014
AV	.001	.000	.000	012	004	.002	089	.000	.000	086
AE2	.033	.005	.007	.003	.090	.001	348	.000	.528	.023
AE1	.029	.005	.006	001	.078	.000	570	.000	.468	006
Direct	Effects (C	Group nu	mber 1 -	Default	model)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv ^s	SDM Y	SI	Accident	РР	PC 1	PDMY

SV	072	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.294	.045	.084	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	179	.054	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.161	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	. <b>00</b> 0.	.000	.000	.123	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.075	.010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	411	283	.450
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	134	.532	.000	052
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	026	.000	.000	138
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	550	.000	1.463	.196
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.130	.000	1.627	062

Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	$\mathbf{sv}$	SDM Y	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDMY
sv	213	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.369	.062	.073	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	253	.083	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	.026	.313	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.168	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.137	.041	027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.970	142	156	.079
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	194	.275	.000	014
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	089	.000	.000	086
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	348	.000	.528	.023

AE1	.000	.000	.000 .	000 .00	00. 00	0	570 .0	00	468	006
Indirec	t Effects (G	roup nui	mber 1 - I	Default m	odel)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	025	.009	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.036	.006	.010	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	005	003	.034	035	070	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	013	.005	.000	004	.006	.086	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	010	001	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.053	.008	.015	.015	.182	001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.059	.009	.017	005	.199	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	rdized Indi	rect Effec	cts (Grou	p number	·1 - Defaul	t model)				
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	РР	РС	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	070	.028	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.062	.010	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	007	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

ADM Y	.000	006	002	.011	027	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	019	.008	.000	002	.006	.087	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.001	.000	.000	012	004	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.033	.005	.007	.003	.090	001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.029	.005	.006	001	.078	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
ell	<>	e4	20.401	.000
e12	<>	e4	27.239	.000
e12	<>	e11	10.230	.000
e9	<>	e12	5.927	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)


M.I. Par Change


			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	5.042	121
SV	<	SI	7.828	.171
PP	<	PC	5.861	.188
PP	<	PDMY	5.852	588
AE3	<	SV	19.987	1.139
AE3	<	AV	10.074	.911
AV	<	sv	28.548	,613
AV	<	SI	4.283	.114
AV	<	AE3	8.002	.156
AEI	<	AV	5.837	-1.430

CMIN						
Model	NPAR	СМП	N DF	Р	CMR	N/DF
Default model	44	139.73	5 61	.000	2	2.291
Saturated model	105	.00	0 0			
Independence model	14	433.30	0 91	.000	2	4.762
RMR, GFI						
Model	RMR	GFI /	AGFI	PGFI		
Default model	.000	.749	.569	.435		
Saturated model	.000 1	1.000				
Independence model	.000	.521	.447	.451		
Baseline Comparisons						
Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	De	IFI elta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.678	.519		789	.657	.770
Saturated model	1.000		1	.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures						
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI			
Default model	.670	.454	.516	•		
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	)		
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000	ł		
NCP						
Model	NC	Р	LO 90		HI 90	
Default model	78.73	5	48.147		117.045	
Saturated model	.00	0	.000	ł	.000	
Independence model	342.30	0 2	281.240	)	410.893	

Model Fit Summary

FMIN				
Model	FMIN	FO	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	2.368	1.334	.816	1.984
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	7.344	5.802	4.767	6.964
RMSEA				
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.148	.116	.180	.000
Independence model	.252	.229	.277	.000
AIC				
Model	AIC	BCC		BIC CAIC
Default model	227.735	257.735	319	.886 363.886
Saturated model	210.000	281.591	429	.906 534.906
Independence model	461.300	470.846	490	.621 504.621
ECVI				
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	3.860	3.341	4.509	4.368
Saturated model	3.559	3.559	3.559	4.773
Independence model	7.819	6.784	8.981	7.980
HOELTER				
Model	HOELTE	ER HOEL 05	.TER .01	
Default model		34	38	
Independence model		16	18	





# APPENDIX P. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL WITH MAV

# DATA A (p < 0.05)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	24	0	14	0	0	38
Total	36	0	14	0	0	50

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 38

Degrees of freedom (105 - 38): 67

Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 701.235

Degrees of freedom = 67

Probability level = .000

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY	<	ORG	.046	.061	.749	.454par_1
SI	<	OP	.091	.063	1.445	.148par_5
SI	<	ODMY	054	.062	878	.380par_6
SDMY	<	ODMY	.067	.065	1.032	.302par_7

sv	<	ODMY	7		024	.019	) -1.:	251	.211par_	_22
PDMY	{ <	SDMY			.034	.018	3 1.9	905	.057par_	_2
PC	<	SDMY			031	.048	3(	647	.518par_	3
PP	<	SI			015	.022	24	6 <b>9</b> 0	.490par_	9
PDMY	Y <	SI			.025	.018	3 1.:	373	.170par_	10
PDMY	Y <	SV			.012	.061	!	194	.846par_	13
РР	<	SDMY			084	.021	-3.9	991	***par_	14
AE1	<	PDMY			.295	.613	3 .4	481	.630par_	4
AE2	<	PDMY			.073	.395	; .	186	.853par_	8
AE3	<	PDMY			455	.221	-2.0	056	.040par_	_11
AV	<	PDMY			162	.161	-1.0	002	.316par_	12
AEI	<	PC			.643	.227	2.5	838	.005par_	15
AE2	<	PC			.609	.147	7 4.	148	***par_	_16
AE3	<	PP			296	.180	) -1.0	643	.100par_	17
AE1	<	Accide	nt		-1.100	.096	-11.4	432	***par_	18
AE2	<	Accide	nt		290	.077	-3.7	769	***par_	19
AE3	<	Accide	nt		098	.044	-2.2	225	.026par_	_20
AV	<	Accide	nt		057	.032	2 -1.7	778	.075par_	21
ADM	Y <	PC			281	.127	-2.2	201	.028par_	_23
ADM	Y <	PDMY			.243	.349	).	695	.487par_	_24
ADM	Y <	Accide	nt		1.000	ļ				
Total E	ffects (Gi	roup num	ber I - De	efault mo	del)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
SV	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.067	.000	.046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

PP	005	001	004	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	002	.000	001	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.002	.002	.012	.034	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.001	.001	.003	.017	.006	1.000	.000	281	.243
AE3	.001	001	.000	005	.009	007	098	296	.000	455
AV	.000	.000	.000	002	005	004	057	.000	.000	162
AE2	001	.000	001	.001	016	.002	290	.000	.609	.073
AE1	001	.001	.000	.003	010	.007	-1.100	.000	.643	.295
Standa	rdized To	tal Effec	cts (Grou	p number	r 1 - Defa	ult mode	D			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
SV	088	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.072	.000	.053	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	061	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	017	005	014	.000	270	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	003	.000	002	.000	045	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.003	.010	.007	.013	.132	.095	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.000	.001	.001	.013	.005	.987	.000	150	.048
AE3	.002	001	.001	002	.012	008	152	113	.000	142
AV	.000	001	.000	001	009	007	124	.000	.000	070
AE2	001	.000	001	.000	011	.001	246	.000	.280	.013
AE1	001	.000	.000	.000	004	.003	614	.000	.194	.033
Direct	Effects (G	roup nu	mber 1 -	Default n	nodel)					
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV SE	ΟΜΥ	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
SV	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SDM Y	.067	.000	.046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.012	.034	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	281	.243
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	098	296	.000	455
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	057	.000	.000	162
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	290	.000	.609	.073
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.100	.000	.643	.295
Standar	dized Dire	ect Effe	cts (Gro	oup nun	aber 1 - D	efault mo	del)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
SV	088	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.072	.000	.053	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000,
SI	061	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	270	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000.	.000	.000	045	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.013	.132	.095	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.987	.000	150	.048
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	152	113	.000	142
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	124	.000	.000	070
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	246	.000	.280	.013
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	614	.000	.194	.033

# Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

l	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV	SDMY	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	005	001	004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	002	.000	001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.002	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.001	.001	.003	.017	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	.001	001	.000	005	.009	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	002	005	004	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	001	.000	001	.001	016	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000.
AE1	001	.001	.000	.003	010	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000
Standar	dized Ind	irect Effe	cts (Grou	p numbe	er 1 - Defa	ult mode	t)			
(	ODMY	ОР	ORG	sv s	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC ¹	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	017	005	014	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.
PC	003	.000	002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000.	.000	.000
PDM Y	.003	.010	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.000	.001	.001	.013	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000

AE3	.002	001	.001	002	.012	008	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	001	.000	001	009	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	001	.000	001	.000	011	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	001	.000	.000	.000	004	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
OP	<>	ODMY	82.267	.000
ORG	<>	ODMY	89.027	.000
e5	<>	e4	10.195	.000
e1	<>	e5	86.701	.000
res1	<>	ODMY	38.837	.000
resl	<>	OP	11.350	.000
resl	<>	ORG	30.634	.000
e6	<>	ORG	8.185	.000
e8	<>	ODMY	9.896	.000
e8	<>	ORG	11.093	.000.
e8	<>	e7	25.913	.000
e8	<>	e6	56.426	.000
e11	<>	e6	12.712	.000
e10	<>	OP	4.518	.000
e10	<>	e4	4.165	.000
e9	<>	el	4.678	.000
e9	<>	ell	6.211	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.739	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

# Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	10.670	067
SDMY	<	sv	10.116	763
SDMY	<	SI	88.532	687
SI	<	SDMY	84.499	616
Accident	<	ODMY	38.837	511
Accident	<	ОР	11.350	.281
Accident	<	ORG	30.634	.430
PP	<	PDMY	25.456	415
PC	<	ORG	8.185	120
PC	<	PDMY	54.747	-1.396
PDMY	<	ODMY	9.896	051
PDMY	<	ORG	11.093	.051
PDMY	<	PP	23.969	280
PDMY	<	PC	56.309	194
ADMY	<	ODMY	28.652	331
ADMY	<	OP	7.487	.172
ADMY	<	ORG	17.557	.245
AE3	<	PC	12.368	.286
AE3	<	AE2	7.379	.102
AE2	<	OP	4.518	.194
AE2	<	SV	4.558	.711
AE2	<	AE1	8.018	122
AE1	<	SI	4.600	.272
AE1	<	AE3	6.457	380
AE1	<	AE2	11.830	281

CMIN					
Model	NPAR	CMIN DF	Р	CMIN/DF	-
Default model	38	701.235 67	.000	10.466	5
Saturated model	105	.000 0			
Independence model	14	885.280 91	.000	9.728	3
RMR, GFI					
Model	RMR	GFI AGFI	PGFI		
Default model	.000	.713 .550	.455		
Saturated model	.000	1.000			
Independence model	.000	.639 .583	.554		
<b>Baseline Comparisons</b>					
Model	NFI Deltal	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.208	076	.225	085	.201
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIO	PNFI PCF	I		
Default model	.736	.153 .148	3		
Saturated model	.000	.000. 000.	)		
Independence model	1.000	.000. 000.	)		
NCP					
Model	NC	P LO 9(	)	HI 90	
Default model	634.23	5 552.911	72	3.006	
Saturated model	.00	000.	)	.000	
Independence model	794.28	0 702.634	l 89	3.374	


Model Fit Summary

285


FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	3.471	3.140	2.737	3.579	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	4.383	3.932	3.478	4.423	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	
Default model	.216	.202	.231	.000	
Independence model	.208	.196	.220	.000	
AIC					
Model	AIC	В	CC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	777.235	783.	331	903.137	941.137
Saturated model	210.000	226.	845	557.887	662.887
Independence model	913.280	915.	526	959.665	973.665
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	3.848	3.445	4.287	3.878	
Saturated model	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.123	
Independence model	4.521	4.067	5.012	4.532	
HOELTER					
Model	HOELTE .0		LTER .01		
Default model	2	:6	28		
Independence model	2	:7	29		

# UAV model with MAV data p <0.05

-



# UAV model with MAV data p < 0.05



# APPENDIX Q. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL WITH MAV

### DATA B (p < 0.05)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	24	4	14	0	0	42
Total	36	4	14	0	0	54

Models

Default model (Default model)

Notes for Model (Default model)

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 42

Degrees of freedom (105 - 42): 63

Result (Default model) Minimum was achieved Chi-square = 238.399 Degrees of freedom = 63 Probability level = .000 Group number 1 (Group number 1 - Default model) Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) Maximum Likelihood Estimates Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel

SI	<	ОР	.005	.062	.074	.941 par_5
SI	<	ODMY	108	.075	-1.445	.1 <b>48par_6</b>
SDMY	( <	ODMY	.126	.080.	1.576	.115par_7
sv	<	ODMY	024	.020	-1.194	.232par_22
PDMY	( <	SDMY	.037	.022	1.667	.095par_2
PC	<	SDMY	031	.048	651	.515par_3
PP	<	SI	015	.029	516	.606par_9
PDMY	{ <	SI	.027	.021	1.285	.199par_10
PDMY	( <	SV	.042	.051	.823	.411par_13
РР	<	SDMY	084	.028	-2.998	.003par_14
AEI	<	PDMY	.295	.725	.407	.684par_4
AE2	<	PDMY	.073	.468	.157	.875par_8
AE3	<	PDMY	455	.223	-2.045	.041par_11
AV	<	PDMY	162	.162	996	.319par_12
AE1	<	PC	.643	.267	2.408	.016par_15
AE2	<	PC	.609	.173	3.519	***par_16
AE3	<	PP	296	.181	-1.631	.103par_17
AE1	<	Accident	-1.100	.096	-11.432	***par_18
AE2	<	Accident	290	.077	-3.769	***par_19
AE3	<	Accident	098	.044	-2.225	.026par_20
AV	<	Accident	057	.032	-1.778	.075par_21
ADM	Y <	PC	281	.150	-1.867	.062par_23
ADM	Y <	PDMY	.243	.412	.589	.556par_24
ADM	Y <	Accident	1.000			
Tatal P	Hants 10	vous sumbor 1. Default m	(labo			

# Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	DMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
SV	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

SDM Y	.126	.000	.131	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	108	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	009	.000	011	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	004	.000	004	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.000	.005	.042	.037	.027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.000	.002	.010	.018	.007	1.000	.000	281	.243
AE3	.002	.000	.001	019	.008	008	098	296	.000	455
AV	.000	.000	001	007	006	004	057	.000	.000	162
AE2	002	.000	002	.003	016	.002	290	.000	.609	.073
AE1	002	.000	001	.012	009	.008	-1.100	.000	.643	.295
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)										
(	ODMY	OP	ORG	SVS	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC I	PDMY
SV	084	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.130	.000	.149	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	117	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	030	.000	041	.000	274	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	006	.000	007	.000	046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.003	.001	.022	.049	.146	.102	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM										
Y	.001	.000	.002	.002	.014	.005	.984	.000	149	.048
Y AE3	.001 .003		.002 .001	.002 007	.014 .010	.005 009	.984 152	.000 112	149 .000	.048 142
-	.003									
AE3	.003 .000	.000	.001	007	.010	009	152	112	.000	142

Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
sv	024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.126	.000	.131	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	108	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.042	.037	.027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	281	.243
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	098	296	.000	455
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	057	.000	.000	162
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	290	.000	.609	.073
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.100	.000	.643	.295
Standa	rdized Dir	ect Eff	ects (Gr	оир пи	mber 1 -	Default m	odel)			
	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
SV	084	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.130	.000	.149	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	117	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	274	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.049	.146	.102	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.984	.000	149	.048
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	152	112	.000	142

AV	.000	.000	.000 .0	0. 00	00.00	0	124	.000	.00	DO	070
AE2	.000	.000	0. 000.	0. 00	00.00	0	247	.000	.28	80.	013
AE1	.000	.000	.000 .0	0, 00	00. 00	0	617	.000	) .19	95.	033
Indirec	t Effects (0	Group (	umber 1 ·	Default	model)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Acc	ident	PP	PC	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	009	.000	011	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	004	.000	004	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.001	.000	.005	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.000	.002	.010	.018	.007		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	.002	.000	.001	019	.008	008		.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	001	007	006	004		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	002	.000	002	.003	016	.002		.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	002	.000	001	.012	009	.008		.000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	rdized Ind	irect Ef	fects (Gro	up numb	er 1 - Defi	ault mod	el)				
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Acc	ident	РР	PC	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	030	.000	041	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	006	.000	007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

PDM Y	.003	.001	.022	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.001	.000	.002	.002	.014	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	.003	.000	.001	007	.010	009	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	002	003	010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	002	.000	002	.001	011	100.	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	001	.000	001	.002	004	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.l.	Par Change
e5	<>	e4	11.841	.000
res1	<>	ODMY	4.716	.000
<b>e</b> 6	<>	e7	5.315	.000
e8	<>	e7	30.072	.000
e11	<>	еб	16.624	.000
e10	<>	e4	4.165	.000
e9	<>	ell	6.211	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.739	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change


Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)


			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	10.536	066
SDMY	<	SV	11.758	612
Accident	<	ODMY	42.614	561
Accident	<	ОР	11.350	.281
Accident	<	ORG	30.634	.430

РР	<	PDMY	25.748	42	0	
PC	<	PP	4.995	29	7	
PDMY	<	ODMY	<b>9.67</b> 1	04	5	
PDMY	<	OP	5.118	.03	2	
PDMY	<	ORG	4.638	.02	8	
PDMY	<	РР	28.265	26	0	
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.438	36	3	
ADMY	<	OP	<b>7.48</b> 7	.17	2	
ADMY	<	ORG	17.557	.24	5	
AE3	<	PC	12.367	.28	6	
AE3	<	AE2	7.406	.10	2	
AE2	<	OP	4.518	.19	4	
AE2	<	SV	4.561	.71	1	
AE2	<	AE1	8.073	12	3	
AE1	<	SI	4.573	.27	0	
AE1	<	AE3	6.456	38	0	
AE1	<	AE2	11.873	28	2	
Model Fit Sum CMIN	mary					
Model			NPAR	CMIN DF	Р	CMIN/DF
Default mode	1		42	238.399 63	.000	3.784
Saturated mo	del		105	.000 0		
Independence	model		14	885.280 91	.000	9.72 <b>8</b>
RMR, GFI						
Model			RMR	GFI AGFI	PGFI	
Default mode	1		.000	.867 .778	.520	
Saturated mod	del		.000	1.000		

Independence model	.000	.639	.583 .5	554	
Baseline Comparisons					
Model	NFI Delta l	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2		CFI
Default model	.731	.611	.787	.681	.779
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI		
Default model	.692	.506	.539		
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000		
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000		
NCP					
Model	NC	Р	LO 90	HI 90	
	175.39	9 1	31.815	226.560	
Default model	175.59		51.015	220.000	
Saturated model	.00		.000	.000	
		0			
Saturated model	.00	0	.000	.000	
Saturated model Independence model	.00	0	.000	.000	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN	.00 794.28	0 0 7	.000 202.634	.000 893.374	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN Model	.00 794.28 FMIN	0 0 7 F0	.000 202.634 LO 90	.000 893.374 HI 90	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN Model Default model	.00 794.28 FMIN 1.180	0 7 0 7 F0 .868	.000 202.634 LO 90 .653	.000 893.374 HI 90 1.122	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN Model Default model Saturated model	.00 794.28 FMIN 1.180 .000	0 0 7 F0 . <b>868</b> .000	.000 202.634 LO 90 .653 .000	.000 893.374 HI 90 1.122 .000	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN Model Default model Saturated model Independence model	.00 794.28 FMIN 1.180 .000	0 0 7 F0 . <b>868</b> .000	.000 202.634 LO 90 .653 .000	.000 893.374 HI 90 1.122 .000	
Saturated model Independence model FMIN Model Default model Saturated model Independence model RMSEA	.00 794.28 FMIN 1.180 .000 4.383	0 0 7 F0 .868 .000 3.932	.000 202.634 LO 90 .653 .000 3.478	.000 893.374 HI 90 1.122 .000 4.423	

AIC					
Model	AIC	BCC	I	BIC	CAIC
Default model	322.399	329.137	461.	553	503.553
Saturated model	210.000	226.845	557.	887	662.887
Independence model	913.280	915.526	959.0	665	973.665
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MEC	VI
Default model	1.596	1.380	1.849	1.62	29
Saturated model	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.12	23
Independence model	4.521	4.067	5.012	4.5	32
HOELTER					
	HOELTE				
Model		05	.01		
Default model		70	78		
Independence model		27	29		





### APPENDIX R. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL WITH MAV

# DATA A (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

### Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances 1	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	27	0	14	0	0	41
Total	39	0	14	0	0	53

Models

Default model (Default model)

Notes for Model (Default model)

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 41

Degrees of freedom (105 - 41): 64

Result (Default model)

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 693.587

Degrees of freedom = 64

Probability level = .000

**Maximum Likelihood Estimates** 

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

		Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY <	ORG	069	.060	-1.149	.251par_1
SI <	OP	.091	.063	1.445	.148par_5
SI <	ODMY	054	.062	878	.380par_6
SDMY <	ODMY	164	.064	-2.578	.010par_7

SV <	<	ODMY	004	.019	239	.811par_22
SV <	(	OP	.031	.019	1.594	.111par_26
SDMY <	( <b>-</b>	OP	240	.065	-3.695	<b>***</b> par_27
PDMY <		SDMY	.034	.017	1.966	.049par_2
PC <		SDMY	031	.047	668	.504par_3
PP <	(	SI	015	.022	689	.491par_9
PDMY <	<	SI	.025	.018	1.373	.170par_10
PDMY <	(	SV	.012	.061	.193	.847par_13
PP <		SDMY	084	.020	-4.121	***par_14
AEi <	(	PDMY	.293	.612	.479	.632par_4
AE2 <		PDMY	.073	.395	.186	.853par_8
AE3 <		PDMY	460	.221	-2.076	.038par_11
AV <	( <b></b>	PDMY	162	,161	-1.003	.316par_12
AEI <		PC	.642	.226	2.834	.005par_15
AE2 <		PC	.609	.147	4.148	***par_16
AE3 <	(	PP	306	.181	-1.691	.091par_17
AEI <		Accident	-1.102	.096	-11.471	***par_18
AE2 <		Accident	288	.077	-3.743	***par_19
AE3 <		Accident	099	.044	-2.245	.025par_20
AV <		Accident	058	.032	-1.808	.071par_21
ADMY <		PC	271	.128	-2.125	.034par_23
ADMY <		PDMY	.302	.349	.865	.387par_24
ADMY <	<b></b> _	Accident	1.000			
ADMY <		РР	.103	.218	.474	.635par_25
Total Effec	cts (Gro	oup number 1 - Default m	odel)			
0	DM					

SV	004	.031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	164	240	069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.015	.019	.006	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.005	.007	.002	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	007	005	002	.012	.034	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	002	002	001	.004	.010	.006	1.000	.103	271	.302
AE3	001	003	001	005	.010	007	099	306	.000	460
AV	.001	.001	.000	002	005	004	058	.000	.000	162
AE2	.003	.004	.001	.001	016	.002	288	.000	.609	.073
AE1	.001	.003	.001	.003	010	.007	-1.102	.000	.642	.293
Standar	dized To	otal Effec	ts (Grou	p numbe	er I - Dei	fault mod	lel)			
	ODM Y	ОР	ORG	svs	SDMY	SI	Accident	РР	PC	PDMY
sv	017	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

	-									
sv	017	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	172	247	077	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	061	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.051	.064	.021	.000	278	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.008	.012	.004	.000	047	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	030	023	010	.013	.136	.095	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	002	001	001	.001	.008	.005	.987	.025	145	.060
AE3	002	004	001	002	.013	008	153	116	.000	144
AV	.002	.002	.001	001	010	007	126	.000	.000	070
AE2	.002	.003	.001	.000	011	.001	245	.000	.280	.013

AE1	.001	.002	.000	.000	005	.003	616	.000	.194	.033
Direct Ef	fects (Gr	oup num	iber 1 - E	)efault 1	model)					

	ODM Y	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	S1	Accident	РР	PC I	PDMY
sv	004	.031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	164	240	069	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.000	.000	.000	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.012	.034	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.103	271	.302
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	099	306	.000	460
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	058	.000	.000	162
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	288	.000	.609	.073
AEI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.102	.000	.642	.293
<b>.</b>										

Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

	ODM Y	OP	ORG	svs	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC P	DMY
sv	017	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	172	247	077	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	061	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	278	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	047	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.013	.136	.095	.000	.000	.000	.000

ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000 .(	000	.987	.02	51	45	.060
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	. 000.	000	153	110	6.0	00 -	144
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000 .	.000 .0	000	126	.00	0.0	00 -	.070
AE2	.000	.000	.000	. 000.	. 000	000	245	.00	0.2	80	.013
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000 .0	000	616	.00	0.1	94	.033
Indire	ct Effects (	Group nu	mber l	- Default	model)						
	ODMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accid	lent	PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.(	000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.(	000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.015	.019	.006	.000	.000	.000	,(	000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.005	.007	.002	.000	.000	.000		000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	007	005	002	.000	.000	.000	.(	000	.000	.000.	.000
ADM Y	002	002	001	.004	.010	.006	.(	000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	001	003	001	005	.010	007	.(	000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.001	.001	.000	002	005	004		000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.003	.004	.001	.001	016	.002		000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.001	.003	.001	.003	010	.007	.(	000	.000	.000	.000
Standa	rdized Ind	irect Effe	ets (Gra	ար ոստե	er 1 - Def	ault mode	1)				
	ODMY	OP	ORG	i SV	' SDMY	SI	Acc	ident	РР	РС	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	000.
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	000.	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

PP	.051	.064	.021	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.008	.012	.004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	030	023	010	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	002	001	001	.001	.008	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	002	004	001	002	.013	008	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.002	.002	.001	001	010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.002	.003	.001	.000	011	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE1	.001	.002	.000	.000	005	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			<b>M.I</b> .	Par Change
OP	<>	ODMY	82.267	.000
ORG	<>	ODMY	89.027	.000
e5	<>	e4	10.424	.000
e1	<>	e5	85.393	.000
resl	<>	ODMY	38.787	.000
resl	<>	OP	11.335	.000
resl	<>	ORG	30.541	.000
e6	<>	ORG	8.185	.000
e8	<>	ODMY	9.896	.000
e8	<>	ORG	11.093	.000
e8	<>	e7	25.913	.000
e8	<>	e6	56.426	.000
e11	<>	e6	12.654	.000
e10	<>	ОР	4.487	.000
e9	<>	el	4.512	.000

e9	<>	e11	6.295	.000
e9	<>	e10	13.665	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

-		-		
			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	8.864	059
SDMY	<	SV	10.292	759
SDMY	<	SI	84.202	660
SI	<	SDMY	79.251	578
Accident	<	ODMY	38.787	511
Accident	<	ОР	11.335	.281
Accident	<	ORG	30.541	.429
РР	<	PDMY	25.435	414
PC	<	ORG	8.185	120
PC	<	PDMY	54.700	-1.395
PDMY	<	ODMY	9.896	051
PDMY	<	ORG	11.093	.051
PDMY	<	РР	23.860	278
PDMY	<	PC	56.301	194
ADMY	<	ODMY	28.589	331
ADMY	<	ОР	7.447	.172
ADMY	<	ORG	17.477	.245
AE3	<	РС	12.308	.286
AE3	<	AE2	7.344	.101
AE2	<	ОР	4.487	.194
AE2	<	sv	4.592	.715


2

AE2	<	AE1	7.955		12	1		
AE1	<	SI	4.440		.26	7		
AE1	<	AE3	6.409		37	8		
AE1	<	AE2	11.776		28	0		
Model Fit Summ CMIN	ary							
Model			NPAR	CM	IN DF	Р	СМІ	N/DF
Default model			<b>4</b> 1	693.5	87 64	.000	1	0.837
Saturated mode	əl		105	.0	0 000			
Independence i	model		14	885.2	<b>8</b> 0 91	.000		9.728
RMR, GFI								
Model			RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI		
Default model			.000	.715	.533	.436		
Saturated mode	el		.000	1.000				
Independence	model		.000	.639	.583	.554		
Baseline Compar	risons							
Model			NF Delta			IFI elta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model			.21	7114	4	.233	127	.207
Saturated mode	el		1.00	0	1	.000		1.000
Independence i	model		.00	00.00	)	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adju	sted Mea	sures						
Model			PRAT	TO PNF	I PCF	Ĩ		
Default model			.7	/03 .152	2.14	6		
Saturated mode	el		.0	00. 00	00. 0	0		
Independence r	model		1.0	00. 00	00. C	0		


NCP				
Model	NC	CP L	.O 90	HI 90
Default model	629.5	87 54	8.656	717.965
Saturated model	.0	00	.000	.000
Independence model	794.2	80 70	2.634	893.374
FMIN				
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	3.434	3.117	2.716	3.554
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	4.383	3.932	3.478	4.423
RMSEA				
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.221	.206	.236	.000
Independence model	.208	.196	.220	.000
AIC				
Model	AIC	BCC	]	BIC CAIC
Default model	775.587	782.165	911.	428 952.428
Saturated model	210.000	226.845	557.	887 662.887
Independence model	913.280	915.526	959.	665 973.665
ECVI				
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	3.840	3.439	4.277	3.872
Saturated model	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.123
Independence model	4.521	4.067	5.012	4.532
HOELTER				
Model	HOELTE .(	CR HOEL	.TER .01	

Default model	25	28
Independence model	27	29

# UAV model with MAV data p < 0.1



UAV model with MAV data p < 0.1



### APPENDIX S. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL WITH MAV

### **DATA B** (p < 0.1)

### **Analysis Summary**

The model is recursive.

Sample size = 203

Parameter Summary (Group number 1)

	Weights	Covariances	Variances	Means	Intercepts	Total
Fixed	12	0	0	0	0	12
Labeled	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlabeled	27	4	14	0	0	45
Total	39	4	14	0	0	57

Models

Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model)

Number of distinct sample moments: 105

Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 45

> Degrees of freedom (105 - 45): 60

### **Result (Default model)**

Minimum was achieved

Chi-square = 233.737

Degrees of freedom = 60

Probability level = .000

#### **Maximum Likelihood Estimates**

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	PLabel
SDMY <-	O	RG	.081	.070	1.158	.247par_1
SI <-	· 0	Р	.091	.078	1.172	.241 par_5
SI <-	0	DMY	054	.080	680	.497par_6
SDMY <-	0	DMY	010	.110	088	.930par_7
SV <-	0	DMY	004	.024	185	.854par_22

SV	<	OP			.0	)31	.024		1.292	.196pa	ar_30
SDM	Y <	ОР			1	61	.090	-	1.780	.075pa	ar_31
PDM	Y <	SDM	Y		.0	)37	.022		1.668	.095pa	ar_2
PC	<	SDM	Y		(	)31	.048		651	.515pa	ar_3
РР	<	SI			(	)15	.029		517	.605pa	ar_9
PDM	Y <	SI				)27	.021		1.287	.198pa	ar_10
PDM	Y <	sv			.0	)42	.051		.823	.411pa	ar_13
PP	<	SDM	Y		0	)84	.028	-:	3.001	.003pa	ar_14
AE1	<	PDM	Y		.2	293	.725		.404	.6 <b>8</b> 6pa	ar_4
AE2	<	PDM	Y		.0	)73	.468		.157	.875pa	ar_8
AE3	<	PDM	Y		4	60	.223		2.065	.039pa	ar_11
AV	<	PDM	Y		1	62	.162		996	.319pa	ar_12
AE1	<	PC			.6	542	.267	:	2.403	.016pa	ar_15
AE2	<	PC			.6	509	.173		3.519	***pa	ar_16
AE3	<	PP			3	306	.183	-	1.674	.094pa	ar_17
AE1	<	Accid	ent		-1.1	02	.096	-1	1.471	***pa	ar_18
AE2	<	Accid	ent		2	288	.077	-	3.743	***pa	ar_19
AE3	<	Accid	ent		0	)99	.044	-2	2.245	.025pa	ar_20
AV	<	Accid	ent		0	)58	.032	-	1.808	.071pa	ar_21
ADM	Y<	PC			2	271	.150	-	1.802	.072pa	ar_23
ADM	Y<	PDM	Y		.3	302	.412		.734	.463pa	ar24
ADM	Y <	Accid	ent		1.0	00					
ADM	Y <	РР			.1	03	.220		.470	.639pa	ar_29
Total I	Effects (G	roup nui	mber I - I	Default n	no <b>đel</b> )						
	ODM Y	OP	ORG	svs	DMY	SI	Acc	cident	РР	PC P	DMY
sv	004	.031	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000

SDM Y	010	161	.081	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.002	.012	007	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.005	003	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	002	002	.003	.042	.037	.027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	001	001	.001	.013	.011	.007	1.000	.103	271	.302
AE3	.000	003	.001	019	.009	008	099	306	.000	460
AV	.000	.000	.000	007	006	004	058	.000	.000	162
AE2	.000	.003	001	.003	016	.002	288	.000	.609	.073
AE1	.000	.003	001	.012	009	.008	-1.102	.000	.642	.293
Standar	dized To	tal Effec	ts (Grou	p numbe	er 1 - Def	ault mod	el)			
C	DDMY	OP	ORG	sv	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC	PDMY
sv	016	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	010	170	.092	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	058	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.005	.042	025	.000	274	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.008	004	.000	046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	008	009	.013	.049	.146	.102	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	001	.001	.003	.009	.005	.983	.025	144	.059
AE3	.001	004	.001	007	.011	009	153	115	.000	143
AV	.001	.001	001	003	010	007	126	.000	.000	070
AE2	.000	.002	001	.001	011	.001	245	.000	.280	.012
AE1	.000	.001	.000	.002	004	.003	618	.000	.195	.033

Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

(	DDMY	OP	ORG	sv s	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC I	PDMY
sv	004	<b>.03</b> 1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	010	161	.081	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	054	.091	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.000	.000	.000	.000	084	015	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	031	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.042	.037	.027	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.103	271	.302
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	099	306	.000	460
AV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	058	.000	.000	162
AE2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	288	.000	.609	.073
AE1	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.102	.000	.642	.293
Standar	dized Dir	ect Effec	ets (Grø	ар пит	iber 1 - D	efault mo	odel)			
(	DDMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accident	PP	PC I	PDMY
SV	016	.111	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	010	170	.092	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	058	.101	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PP	.000	.000	.000	.000	274	047	.000	.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.000	.000	.000	046	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.049	.146	.102	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.983	.025	144	.059
AE3	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	153	115	.000	143

AV	.000	.000	.000 .0	0. 00	0. 00	00	126	.000	.000	070
AE2	.000	.000	.000 .0	0. 00	0. 00	00	245	.000	.280	.012
AE1	.000	.000	.000 .0	0. 00	0. 00	00	618	.000	.195	.033
Indirect	Effects (C	Group n	umber 1 -	Default n	no <b>del)</b>					
(	ODMY	OP	ORG	SV S	SDMY	SI	Accide	ent PP	PC	PDM Y
sv	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
PP	.002	.012	007	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
PC	.000	.005	003	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
PDM Y	002	002	.003	.000	.000	.000	.0	00.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	001	001	.001	.013	.011	.007	.0	00.000	.000	.000
AE3	.000	003	.001	019	.009	008	.0	00.000	.000	.000
AV	.000	.000	.000	007	006	004	.0	00.000	.000	.000
AE2	.000	.003	001	.003	016	.002	.0	00.000	.000	.000
AE1	.000	.003	001	.012	009	.008	.0	00.000	.000	.000
Standar	dized Indi	irect Eff	ects (Grou	ıp numbe	er 1 - Defa	ault mode	el)			

	ODMY	ОР	ORG	SV S	DMY	SI	Accident	РР	РС	PDM Y
SV	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SDM Y	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
SI	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РР	.005	.042	025	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
РС	.000	.008	004	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

PDM Y	008	009	.013	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ADM Y	.000	001	.001	.003	.009	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE3	.001	004	.001	007	.011	009	.000	.000	.000	.000
AV	.001	.001	001	003	010	007	.000	.000	.000	.000
AE2	.000	.002	001	.001	011	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
AEI	.000	.001	.000	.002	004	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000

Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			M.I.	Par Change
e5	<>	e4	12.043	.000
res1	<>	ODMY	4.734	.000
<b>e</b> 6	<>	e7	5.315	.000
e8	<>	e7	30.072	.000
e11	<>	e6	16.544	.000
e9	<>	e11	6.295	.000
e9	<>	<b>e1</b> 0	13.665	.000

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

M.I. Par Change

# Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)


			M.I.	Par Change
SV	<	SDMY	9.332	062
SDMY	<	SV	11.866	612
Accident	<	ODMY	42.559	561
Accident	<	OP	11.335	.281
Accident	<	ORG	30.541	.429
РР	<	PDMY	25.751	420


РС	<	PP	4.995	29	7		
PDMY	<	ODMY	9.671	04	5		
PDMY	<	OP	5.118	.03			
PDMY	<	ORG	4.638	.02			
PDMY	<	РР	28.265	26			
ADMY	<	ODMY	31.369	363			
ADMY	<	OP	7.447	.17			
ADMY	<	ORG	17.477	.24	5		
AE3	<	PC	12.309	.28	6		
AE3	<	AE2	7.371	.10			
AE2	<	OP	4.487	.19			
AE2	<	SV	4.583	.71	3		
AE2	<	AE1	8.008	12			
AEI	<	SI	4.411	.26	5		
AE1	<	AE3	6.408	37			
AE1	<	AE2	11.820	28			
Model Fit Summary CMIN							
Model			NPAR	CMIN DF	Р	CMIN/DF	
Default model			45	233.737 60	.000	3.896	
Saturated model			105	.000 0			
Independence model			14	885.280 91	.000	9.728	
RMR, GFI							
Model			RMR	GFI AGFI	PGFI		
Default model			.000	.870 .772	.497		
Saturated model			.000	1.000			
Independence model			.000	.639 .583	.554		

**Baseline Comparisons** 

Model	NFI Delta l	RFI rhol	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.736	.600	.789	.668	.781
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures					
Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI		
Default model	.659	.485	.515		
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000		
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000		
NCP					
Model	NC	Р	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	173.73	7 1.	30.512	224.533	
Saturated model	.00	0	.000	.000	
Independence model	794.28	0 7	02.634	893.374	
FMIN					
Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90	
Default model	1.157	.860	.646	1.112	
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000	
Independence model	4.383	3.932	3.478	4.423	
RMSEA					
Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE	
Default model	.120	.104	.136	.000	
Independence model	.208	.196	.220	.000	
AIC					
Model	AIC	B	СС	BIC	CAIC

Default model	323.737	330.95	6 4	72.831	517.831
Saturated model	210.000	226.845 5		57.887	662.887
Independence model	913.280	915.52	26 92	59.665	973.665
ECVI					
Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI	
Default model	1.603	1.389	1.854	1.638	
Saturated model	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.123	
Independence model	4.521	4.067	5.012	4.532	
HOELTER					
	HOELTER HOELTER				
Model	.(	05	.01		
Default model	e	59	77		
Independence model	-	27	29		





### VITA

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### Education:

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B.S. in Electronics Engineering, Turkish Air Force Military Academy, Istanbul, Turkey, 1999

### **Professional Experience:**

NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation HQ Norfolk/VA, USA, NLR Staff Officer, 2011-2014

Turkish Air Force Military High School, Manager (Division Commander), 2009-2011

Lecturer (Introduction to Aviation), Bursa, Turkey, 2009-2011

Instructor Pilot, Bursa, Turkey 2009-2011,

Jet Pilot, Main Jet Base, Amasya, Turkey, 2002-2007

Jet Pilot, Main Jet Base, Ankara, Turkey, 2001-2002

Jet Pilot, Konya, Turkey, 2001

Student Pilot, Izmir, Turkey, 1999-2001