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Sub-State Nationalism/Autonomy: An African Perspective

Can the insights of the current literature on sub-state nationalism be enhanced by adapting social movement theory to study the political frames shaping sub-state movements for political autonomy in Nigeria?

Contents

Acknowledgements

'We shall not cease from exploration,
And the end of all our exploring,
Will be to arrive where we started,
And know the place for the first time.' – *T. S. Eliot*

'Preoccupation with the national narrows the mind and the heart.' – *Adrian Hastings*

'Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats
and our police to see that our papers are in order.' – *Michel Foucault*

Abstract

This work was conducted with the aim of advancing our understanding of the modern and political nature of nationalism as a social phenomenon. To this end it has proposed an understanding of nationalism as contextually linked to the governmentalisation of the state. As such, it sets out to do three things: *a*) Explore the nature of nationalism not from the perspective of the state, but from the perspective of self-styled nationalist movements and their relationship to the state; *b*) To reflect on the relationship between nationalist movements and states as linked to questions of government, and; *c*) To offer some avenues for research into the links between nationalism, national questions – on representation, autonomy and self-determination – and 'questions of government'. In order to achieve these ends without proposing some teleological narrative to the governmentalisation of the state this work focuses on contemporary Nigerian politics. It is by exploring a contemporary example that we can identify and highlight the multiple governmentalities influencing our political and social aspirations. These multiple governmentalities present a variety of political contexts in which national questions and nationalism arise. It is the conclusion that every 'nationalism' is highly contextual and linked not only to different forms and processes of governmentality, but to the inter-action and contact between different governmentalities. Government – material and idea – represents the political and legal concern over questions of life (economic, cultural, etc.), thus setting the grounds for national questions of representation, autonomy and self-determination.

Introduction

The purpose of this work is threefold: to apply social movement theory to the study of nationalism; to explore recent analytics on sub-state autonomy movements and the 'nationalities question' in Nigeria; and to conceptualise the political nature of nationalism through a governmental framework. The concluding element of this study will be to explore some of the implications this governmental and social movement approach brings to the study of nationalism more broadly.

The fundamental issue at the heart of this work is that of the relationship between 'questions of nation' – national-identity, autonomy and self-determination – and the government of states and societies. It is in order to introduce a framework by which the relationship between national questions and government can be brought to the analysis of nationalism that this work will consider the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. Understanding this concept as a tool for historical-sociology, this work embarks upon a case study of Nigerian sub-state national/ethnic/autonomy movements, and the rise of the 'nationalities question' in relation to federal government. However, before we can consider Nigerian sub-state autonomist and nationalist movements as politically linked to governmental frames, it is first necessary to shift nationalism to a more explicitly movement orientated sphere of analysis. It is for this reason that the introduction of social movement theory to the study of nationalism will be conducted first.

During the latter part of the twentieth century and increasingly over the last twenty years there has been increasing interest in minority nationalist/regionalist movements both within nation-states and across their boundaries. This interest transects both academic and policy circles as 'minority' social movements calling for political autonomy and cultural protection for have grown. Given that the most pronounced of these claims stem from the Québécois in Canada, Catalonians in Spain and Scottish in the United Kingdom, a large part of the academic literature has followed both the policy options of respective national governments and the structure of these minority political movements. Corresponding to this increased analysis of such 'new nationalisms' has been the move away, in academic circles, from viewing the interpretation of nationalism as a purely political search for statehood and power – either for personal gain (individual-security), or in search of social-cultural protection (collective-security). Guibernau in particular is keen to adopt an understanding of nation and nationalism that emphasises process and change on the parts of groups, something which leads her analysis into direct contact with social movement theory. While this provides a great example of the advancement of academic arguments in tandem to the altering nature of social movements and their demands, the understanding of such movements could be enhanced by a more explicit use of social movement theory and conceptualising the deeper link between national question and the politics of government.

This work sets out to explore the potential for a governmental reading of nationalism through the study of social movements for political autonomy in Nigeria. Nigeria provides a great opportunity for a new analysis as many of these movements have achieved sustained academic interest, particularly in the field of social movement theory. Despite this, there is a perceivable gap in addressing such autonomy movements, sometimes explicitly seeking to

fit into the wider sphere of contemporary understandings of nationalism and ethnic and cultural rights, as linked to both the literature and actions of such movements in Europe or Canada. Furthermore, there are a number of features to Nigeria: its federated structure, its great ethnic diversity, the economic disparity, corruption and ethnic dominance, alongside the deeper colonial legacy and oil-based economy that make it a prime choice. This analysis is not structured by an attempt to create an overarching analytic which applies equally to the Québécois, Catalonian and Scottish cases as it does to Nigeria. Each of these depends on the governmental frames of politics they emerge within. Despite this, it is noteworthy that some movements in Nigeria have attempted to articulate themselves globally using a similar discursive framework to these European and Canadian movements, serving as an example of how our understanding of this 'new nationalism' need not necessarily be limited to the west.[1] However, this work sets out to develop an analysis of Nigerian social movements from which we can then draw lessons on the political nature of nationalism and its connection to processes of governmentalisation.

The particular emphasis on a social movement theory form of analysis is warranted for its potential dual focus; both on the specifics of certain movements and the embedded nature such movements have in the wider structures of socio-political context. As such, it is possible to negate any specific focus on either the functional or overarching structural analysis or the narrow focus on particular agents' involvements. Seeking a holistic approach that balances 'political opportunity structures' and the actions of those who manage to grasp such opportunities allows us to say more about both the structure and the agents who

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[1] Bob, C. 'Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest among Nigeria's Ogoni Minority', in, *Social Problems*, Vol.49, No.3 (2002) p.402

always operate together in the dynamic relationship that is political action. Neither sits still, and it is the dynamism of a reciprocal interaction between the two that is at the heart of understanding social movements in particular and wider political action in general. These are the lessons that can be enhanced and profitably brought to our understanding of nationalism. Governmentality, understood as a tool for historical-sociology that seeks to understand the inter-relation of *a*) material structures of government and *b*) resistances/theories as critical arts of government through *c*) historical processes of governmentalisation, is particularly profitable to enhancing our analysis of nationalisms political nature.[2]

The structure of this work will follow rather conventional form. The *first chapter* will offer a brief overview of theoretical approaches and important texts in the study of nationalism since the late 1950s. This overview will set the scene for the *second chapter* which considers the challenges presented by recent studies on sub-state nationalism to the conceptual frameworks emerging out of the preceding fifty years of theorising. These challenges present a case for applying the recent insights of social movement theory, expanded through applying the (Foucauldian) governmentality framework to the study of sub-state nationalism. In order to undertake such an application, the *third chapter* provides a case study of Nigerian sub-state ethnic and national autonomy movements. Nigeria presents a viable and productive case study for three reasons: being outside the 'western'/ European context, being heavily studied in terms of social movement theory, and providing a fascinating example of the evolution of national/autonomy goals in relation to governmental structures. All these issues come to a head in the *fourth* and *concluding chapters* which tie together the implications of a governmentality theory of social

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[2] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009) p.108

movements to the study of nationalist movements, nationalism, and the state/society relations these concepts imply. At the *conclusion* of this work is not a neat and resolved picture of nationalism and national movements, but some tentative steps towards a new methodology for their study in the field of historical sociology. This work is an opening up, not a closing down of decades of preceding research. Such an opening entails a vast array of questions that cannot be answered here. But it is the nature of social theory to ask new questions or often old questions in new ways; driven by the processes of the societies that it attempts to explain or change. We should embrace rather than fear questions which blur or confuse our conceptual clarity; it shows that the world in which we live has not stagnated into repetitive schematics and structures.

Nationalism: A Literature Review

Before we can delve into the question of sub-state nationalism and the application of social movement theory to such phenomena, it is first necessary to set out a picture of the general study of nationalism. This will enable us to plot a series of debates and issues that have arisen for and shaped the development of both Guibernau and Keating's works. No social theory emerges in a vacuum and analysing them depends on exploring the circumstances in which they emerges. It is with this in mind that we trace the history of 'nationalism' as a historical-sociological question from the late 1950s to the present day.

The outline of the field reflects, perhaps unsurprisingly in many respects, the shifts and transformations of social theory more broadly. While there were an initial series of works wholly focused on the 'modernity', largely from a structural-functionalist approach; these have been challenged by more recent accounts fitting under the broad heading of social-constructivism. These latter accounts emphasise the importance of culture in the construction of society and social concepts. As such, they trace the emergence of nationalism as a cultural phenomenon and, more specifically, its roots in pre-modern culture. Exploring this possibility while still emphasising the specifically modern characteristic of nationalism, Anthony Smith has advanced a pluralist approach labelled ethno-symbolist. His approach and the critiques emanating from anthropology and critical-constructivism form the foundations to contemporary studies of nationalism. A foundation from/against which theorists like Guibernau and Keating have developed their accounts of sub-state nationalism.

The studies of nationalism considered here as key developments toward the contemporary shape of the field emerged in the late 1950s. Instrumental to the (re)emergence of this much older question in the post-war era was Kedourie's 1960 work *Nationalism.* In this piece Kedourie traces nationalisms' history and origin to the nineteenth century, placing it at the feet of Kant's philosophy. Understanding nationalism as an extension of Kant's principle of self-determination by philosophers such as Fitch, Kedourie dates it to the emergence of Enlightenment and Romantic philosophy.[3] As such, nationalism is treated as a political-ideology; and a specifically modern one at that. In this way Kedourie set the scene and the parameters for the re-emergence of nationalism as question for historical-sociology. This historical-sociology naturally took as its point of departure the challenge of understanding what it was that was so specific about modern society and enlightenment philosophy that led to the emergence of nationalist ideologies.

Two of the biggest names to first take up these questions were Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm. In differing ways both of these authors offer accounts of the rise of nationalist ideologies out of the radical social transformations the shift to modernity entailed. Both accounts offer the emergence of print-capitalism, antecedent and facilitating factor to a modern – mass language – society, as the structural foundation for the birth of nationalism. For Anderson it was print capitalism that enabled the emergence of an 'imagined community' because, in conjunction with the decline of 'script language', hierarchical/monarchical social ordering, and the rise of 'history' over 'cosmology', it provided the means and space for a new social imagination.[4] Driven by capitalist demands, printing provided the means by which in the eighteenth century, through books and

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[3] Kedourie, E. *Nationalism*, Fourth Edition (Blackwell, London, 1994) pp.137-142
[4] Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities*, Revised Edition (Verso, London, 2006) pp.6-7, 12, 36

newspapers, people could imagine themselves as members of large vernacular language communities.[5] It was in just such communities that the principle of self-determination could make sense. However, Anderson viewed this as the product of the anti-imperial struggles in the Americas, later transferred to European philosophy.[6] Expanding on Anderson's analysis and taking it in a different direction, Hobsbawm sought to draw attention to the key role of the state. Operating as the means by which a vernacular language can become a printed language and then form the base for mass education and administration, the state facilitates the fixing and protection of a language.[7] This close connection to the state explains nationalism as a claim for statehood – as a source of linguistic promotion and security.[8] As such, nationalism as a political ideology, imaging communities into existence, is tied to the modern state: the potential decline of state-powers will also signal the decline of nationalism.[9]

Hobsbawm is not alone in paying attention to the state as a key variable; John Breuilly's account of nationalism is wholly centred on the state. For Breuilly each state sets the scene for each nationalist movement that emerges. This role he ascribes to the state because he views nationalism as a political movement that can only emerge in the *modern* social ordering which holds a distinct line between state and society. Nationalist political movements seek to remove the line between state and society that is at the heart of modernity.[10] Furthermore, the choice of 'nationalism' by such movements is a purely

[5] Ibid., pp.24-5, 39-40
[6] Ibid., p.65
[7] Hobsbawm, E. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1790: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Canto Edition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991) pp.59-63
[8] Ibid., pp.63, 164
[9] Ibid., pp.181-3
[10] Breuilly, J. *Nationalism and the State*, Second Edition (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993) pp.14, 390

instrumental one; as a means to challenge the legitimacy of the state's representation of society and seek to undermine and take its power.[11]

While Breuilly took the modernist analysis to new political depths by raising the important relation between state and nationalism, Gellner incorporates all of the above in a macro-scale explanation. In true structuralist-functionalist form Gellner's work represents the bringing together of many of these modernist themes – state-society relationships; capitalism and the nation; education, language, and the imagined community – into one unified theory through the injection of one key variable: *industrialisation*. His core premise is that the demands for a homogenised and individualised society by industrial *modes of production* fed the emergence of state produced mass education.[12] The modern mass education society is one in which people are individualised and only able to survive through their immersion in mass culture.[13] Thus, nationalism becomes the cultural lifeblood of modern mass industrial society, a culture only the state has the resources to (re)produce – built on 'any old shred and patch' facilitated by series of 'arbitrary historical inventions'.[14] In this manner, Gellner's work opens up the crucial importance of culture, while adamantly shutting down its importance as a vector for study – national-culture is a consequence of industrialism: the causal variable. It is against this almost casual dismissal of culture's analytic worth, and the declaration that 'genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions', that a number of authors have sought to develop cultural analyses.[15]

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[11] Ibid., pp.397-8
[12] Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism,* Second Edition (Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006) pp.31-32, p.36
[13] Ibid., pp.36-7
[14] Ibid., p.50, 55
[15] Ibid., p.54

One of the key points that marks the modernist understanding of nationalism outlined so far has been that there is no analytical distinction between understanding nationalism as societal structure or as resistance movement. For the modernist accounts the nation emerged out of the structure and functioning of modernity, while nationalist movements are explained as means, either instrumental-power or cultural-ethical, to achieve security through gaining independent access to the structural heart of modernity – the nation state. The nation-state forms the imagined community of industrial culture; gaining such a structure is the logical goal of nationalist movements. As such, only one model is required to explain both structure and movement aspects of nationalism. It is against this kind of reasoning that the first of the cultural analyses explored here is articulated.

Hutchinson's work is almost exclusively given over to understanding nationalism as a movement. In doing so he also explores such movements as being of two types: political and cultural. While the former are movements for state-hood as described by the logics of modernist accounts, the latter form a different type concerned with the revival and promotion of a culture against the state. [16] Underpinning this focus on culture is the belief, antithetical to the modernists, that ethic groups pre-exist and functions in many ways as the precursors to national groups.[17] Although each author considered here offers a differing account of the dynamics by which the ethnic-to-nation transformation is undertaken, this question is more one of seeking the continuities and discontinuities that surround such a transformation, rather than assuming modern society and nationalism emerged out of a complete rupture with the old order. Hutchinson's focus is led to consider the ethnic

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[16] Hutchinson, J. *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1987) pp.4, 9-10, 12-13

[17] Ibid., p.2-3

precursors to nationalism by his concern with cultural revivalist movements in Ireland. Seeking to explore the operations and dynamics of such movements, and their relationship to political nationalists, Hutchinson's interest naturally focuses on how culture and tradition's revival is undertaken.[18] Against the 'invention of tradition' position of the modernists Hutchison argues that both tradition and culture's revival is more difficult than a mere process of invention.[19] How such processes work in Hutchison's analysis will be considered in further detail in the following chapter; suffice to say for now that Hutchinson problematised the assumption that the past could be easily and instrumentally deployed to create a national culture.

At the more general scale, and challenging both the modernist accounts of the emergence of nationalism and its relationship to the pre-modern to modern transition, are the works of Liah Greenfeld and Adrian Hastings. Both of whom place England at the heart of such a transition, albeit in differing ways. Liah Greenfeld's account holds that modern, industrial and mass-education/media society is only possible once the principle of nationalism has emerged.[20] She introduces the English aristocracy as the crucial origin of the fundamentally egalitarian principle of the nation – a concept taken from its ecclesiastical-monastic origin – designating an elite community. This egalitarian principle of the elite community became the answer to a crisis of status the English aristocracy experienced during the Wars of the Roses.[21] Subsequently, this principle, which was both elitist-individual and egalitarian-communal laid the foundations for nationalism; and it was the individualist-egalitarian dialectic that allowed the capitalist-industrial structure of modern

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18 Ibid., ; Hutchinson, J. 'Cultural nationalism, elite mobility and nation-building: communitarian politics in modern Ireland', in, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.38, No.4 (1987) pp.482-501

19 Hutchinson, *The Dynamics*, p.20

20 Greenfeld, L. *Nationalism: five roads to modernity* (Harvard University Press, London, 1992) p.487

21 Greenfeld, L. *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture* (Oneworld, Oxford, 2006)pp.70-72

society to emerge.[22] Based on the crisis of status in the late middle ages, nationalism carried this into the modern age as the foundation for society. For Greenfeld, modern society is anomic and both the societal whole and modern individuals face a constant series of crises of identity.[23] Such crises lead to nationalist movements as a solution, a solution which, paradoxically, leads back to the formation of new anomic societies. It is also the individual-communal dialectic of nationalised modernity that leads to two forms of nationalism: liberal-democratic (civic) and totalitarian-communal (ethnic).[24] This issue will be returned to below.

Against the dating and also the pessimism of Greenfeld, Hastings' account of nationalism is both more ancient and less deterministic. Also dating the emergence of nationalism to England, Hastings' work goes directly against all the above considered by placing nationalism as both religious in origin (as opposed to a product of secularism) and peculiar to Christianity.[25] Providing the 'original model of the nation' Biblical Christianity was the heart of the 'cultural and political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism [...] developed.'[26] It was through the vernacularisation of the bible in English that local communities gained access to the biblical model of the nation.[27] Specifically, for Hastings this occurred both before printing really took hold and the advent of mass education. Indeed, the printing of bibles developed out of existing translations, translations imparted to communities through the educational apparatus of Christian pastoralism – the

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[22] Ibid., p.76, 82, 85, 88
[23] Ibid., pp.212-214
[24] Ibid., pp.76-77
[25] See particularly: Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind*, p.68 ; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.12 & Hutchinson, *The Dynamics*, p.3; for accounts of nationalism as a result of secularism.
[26] Hastings, A. *The Construction of Nationhood* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) p.4
[27] Ibid., pp.12

precursor to modern mass education.[28] It was thus under the influence of Christian pastoralism – radically changed by the interrelated processes vernacularisation and the Reformation – that the image of an English nation emerged. This nation, as the leading force of capitalist-industrialism, provided the model for all subsequent nations and nationalisms.[29]

What the above has revealed are a series of shifts. From Kedourie's initial imperative to understand nationalism as an ideology; to Anderson and Hobsbawm's moves to link this ideology to certain dynamics of modernity; to the narrowed structural account of Gellner in industrial modernity as causal variable; back to ideao-cultural understandings which now emphasise a pre-modern nature to nationalism. Attempting to explore nationalism in both pre-modern and modern terms Anthony Smith has advanced his ethno-symbolist synthesis of modernist-structuralism and cultural analyses. This most prominent and prolific author on the issues surrounding nationalism has both instrumented and indicated ethnic-cultural questions that challenged modernist structural-functional accounts; while simultaneously wishing to keep some of these structuralist elements. Smith's ethno-symbolism emerges as a call for studying nationalism holistically. As we shall see in the next chapter, Guibernau's work is directly built, with critical reflection, in answer to this call.

Smith's initial exploration of ethnic-cultural issues emerged in his seminal book *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* in 1986. It was this book, alongside Hutchinson's *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* in 1987, which signalled the arrival of a 'cultural turn' in the study of nationalism. What Smith sets out in his book is the introduction of the concept of the *ethnie* as the communal precursor to nationalism. While for Smith nations emerge through the triple revolution of capitalism, bureaucratisation and mass education; these revolutions

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[28] Ibid., pp.24-5, 193
[29] Ibid., p.6

transform already existing *ethnies* into nations.[30] What the nation represents in his analysis is a specifically modern form of *ethnie*. As such, it is crucial to explore nationalism as a modern phenomenon, while to understand the ethnic-cultural factors it deploys demands an exploration of pre-national *ethnies*.[31] Key here is the notion, central to all cultural analyses, of two forms of nationalism: ethnic and civic. While the former is predicated on the principle one ethnicity one nation, the latter is based on a legal-territorial complex – contemporarily the modern state.[32] Offering a variety of explanations, cultural accounts have become fixated on this point.

Smith's ethno-symbolism both reveals and offers some explanation to this seemingly dual nature of nationalism. For Smith, nations are built on a complex mixture of ethnic and civic factors. This is because nation-building is often undertaken by a core-ethnie.[33] While they take it upon themselves to build a nation, such building is often civic in nature, involving a complex of territorial and legal institutions.[34] However, central to this process is also the conflation of ethnic and civic factors: the principles of law and territory must be built on existing culture and tradition.[35] This process of acquiring cultural-ethnic traditions, essential to the successful formation of a nation-project, is no easy task.[36] Hutchinson has drawn attention to this difficulty by describing a process of *overlaying*, through which pre-existing cultural-ethnic traditions are assimilated into the national project, rather than being invented.[37] Furthermore, it is a task which is never achieved once and for all. The nation as a

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[30] Smith, A, D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) pp.130-4
[31] Smith, A, D. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (Routledge, Oxon, 2009) p.26
[32] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, p.134-6
[33] Ibid., p.138-139
[34] Smith, A, D. *National Identity* (Penguin, London, 1991) pp.9-10
[35] Ibid., p.13 ; Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, p.149
[36] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, p.214
[37] Hutchinson, J. 'The Nation as Ethnic Overlay', in, Guibernau, M. & Hutchinson, J. (eds.) *History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics* (Blackwell, Oxford, 2004) p.121

civic and ethno-cultural community is always a project in which traditions must be moulded and applied to both the present and provide visions for the future.[38] The failure of certain western states to do just this is indicated by emergence of 'nations without states' in several developed Western states.[39] It this, in conjuncture with such movements' specific cultural demands, that means those studying them are drawn to Hutchinson's cultural approach and Smith's ethno-symbolist framework, while seeking to expand them into a more nuanced understanding of the inter-relation of culture and politics – something perceivably lost along the way in Smith's ethno-symbolism.[40]

Before turning to these studies and the specific focus on nationalism as a movement, two criticisms of Smith's approach must first be outlined for their instrumental value to such studies. The first of these, from Thomas Hylland Eriksen, draws attention to the crucial role of interaction to the emergence of ethnic identity. Any ethnicity only exists insofar as it defines itself against others of cultural difference. In this way, the study of ethnicity should not only focus on the self-identity of the group, but also the crucial role of other-distinction in this process of self-identity.[41] As such, the study of ethnicity and nationalism is the study of group interaction, not merely group properties. From a similar 'relational' perspective comes the criticism of Rogers Brubaker who demands that we critically reconsider the 'group' as the basis of our analysis. Extending the focus on relations down to the members of groups Brubaker challenges us to conceptualise 'ethnicity, race and nation' in 'processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms.'[42] Groups are the result of social construction,

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[38] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, p.212 ; Smith, *Ethno-symbolism,* p.109

[39] Guibernau, M. *Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age* (Polity, Cambridge, 1999) p.17

[40] Guibernau, M. 'Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: a critical assessment', in, Guibernau & Hutchinson, *History and National*, p.126

[41] Eriksen, T, H. 'Ethnicity, Race and Nation' in, Guibernau, M & Rex, J. (eds.) *The Ethnicity Reader*, Second Edition (Polity, Cambridge, 2010) pp.49-50

[42] Brubaker, R. 'Ethnicity Without Groups', in, Guibernau & Rex, *The Ethnicity*, p.36

not unquestionable basis for a study of society. Here he does not mean that these entities are not 'real', but that we should be attempting to understand how they become real – rather than explaining their reality merely by pointing to their existence.[43] In social analysis it is not enough to point to something's existence as proof of its reality; it is necessary to explore the dynamics and processes by which it achieves visible reality. With this in mind it is now possible to take up the question of sub-state nationalist *movements*.

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[43] Ibid., pp.36-37

Chapter Two

Sub-State Nationalism as Social Movement

The (almost too) brief account of the study of nationalism in the previous chapter will be given greater depth here in direction relation to the study of sub-state nationalism. Having outlined a conceptual map of the study of nationalism over the last 60 years or so, our attention now shifts to the new topographical horizons represented by Keating and Guibernau's works. The parting point of the last chapter – that the study of group dynamics, processes, and construction is a vital element to understanding those groups – should be kept in mind as we delve into the study of sub-state nationalist groups and movements. It is these critical points on the study of group dynamics that the second half of this chapter will develop in relation to applying a *social movement theory* approach to the study of nationalist groups and movements.

To summarise, the aims of this chapter are as follows. To first outline and explore the works of Keating and Guibernau on sub-state nationalist movements. In the relationship between macro-political structures and the micro-politics of such movements we find the space for an expansion of the field utilising social movement theory. It is for this reason that the second half of this chapter is devoted to outlining some of the key elements to social movement theory and its applicability to the study of nationalism. This chapter will conclude by pointing to what some elements of an adapted social movement theory might look like. Such a theory will be developed in the next chapter through a case study of Nigerian politics and autonomy movements.

The methods and direction of those works considered in chapter one, with the exception of Hutchinson, Hastings and Greenfeld, are those of 'social scientists developing theoretical frameworks, and then illustrating their generalizations with selected examples.'[44] It is against these generalisations and their building blocks that Brubaker and Eriksen's cautionary remarks were made. It is also through the use of 'empirical research' followed by 'broad conclusions' that the historical analyses of Hutchinson and Hroch (explored in this chapter) are differentiated from those other works considered.[45] In this light Smith's ethno-symbolism appears as an attempt to shore up the generalising frameworks of social theory against the particularist drive of historians and critical constructivists. In doing so he has sought to incorporate Hutchinson and Hroch's historical generalisations into his self-defined ethno-symbolist approach. Smith's ethno-symbolism is an appeal for the middle ground not only between the modernists and the culturalists, but also between historians, social constructivists, and structural-functional sociology. It is within these overarching processes of the field that the works of Keating and Guibernau emerged. It is immediately apparent that both of these authors are concerned with historical case-studies, from which they advance generalisations – in the manner of historical-sociology. Furthermore, these generalisations challenge the modernists not only in the analytical process, but in their conclusions. Studying the nationalism of 'nations without states' within a 'globalised era', both Keating and Guibernau refute the validity of modernist conclusions to large aspects of the modern era. Both Keating and Guibernau consider the nation-state that Gellner's industrial structuring account sought to explain as only applicable to post 1919 Europe, and only really approaching achievement with the

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[44] Hroch, M. 'From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation: the nation-building process in Europe', in, *The New Left Review*, Vol.198 (1993) p.3
[45] Ibid.

creation of the welfare state after 1945.[46] Furthermore, Keating emphasises that the nation-state is more of an aspiration and normative goal: its 'reality' emerges from the normative position it holds as the political goal of modernity.[47] The resurgence of sub-state nationalism in many western nation-states is indicative of the failure, both normative and material, to reach this goal.[48]

Building on the historical analyses and broad conclusions of Hutchinson and Hroch, Keating and Guibernau are interested in the particularities of these resurgent nationalisms. The internal structure and changing goals of these resurgent sub-state nationalisms and the broader socio-economic and political circumstances surrounding them, form the heart of these two authors' works. While Guibernau is concerned more with movements' structures and their impact on such movements' direction, Keating has given more space to analysing the socio-economic and political circumstances. This is a broad generalisation dividing their works; the overlap between their analyses is unsurprisingly large.

Both authors start by deconstructing the link drawn by modernists between the nation and the state.[49] This link, essential to modernist accounts, is viewed, in the light of globalisation and the shifting claims of nations without states (outlined below) as contingent. Its contingency is what makes nationalism such a political issue; it is through the activity of political negotiation and bargaining that nation and state are brought together.[50] Being bound to politics rather than the state means the relationship between nation and

[46] Keating, M. *Nations against the State*, Second Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001) pp.36-41 ; Keating, M. *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) p.12 ; Guibernau, *Nations without*, pp.150-1
[47] Keating, *Nations against*, p.28 ; Keating, *Plurinational Democracy*, p.135
[48] Guibernau, *Nations without*, p.17
[49] Ibid., pp.14-15 ; Keating, *Nations against*, p.21
[50] Keating, *Nations against*, pp.23, 50-51 ; Keating, M. *The New Regionalism in Western Europe* (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 1998) p.35, 184

state is a central but not fixed aspect of modern politics.[51] It is the act of putting 'forward specific political demands' that distinguishes the nation from an ethnic group.[52] Understanding nation and nationalism as highly political and politicised phenomena means studying their dynamics not in terms of an abstract model of the state, but as the processes of changing state-nation relationships. The basis of these relationships – territory and identity, movements for their change, and the large-scale socio-economic shifts globalisation brings to these – become the centre of analysis.

Understanding the political nature of nationalism as a formulation of the principle of self-determination does not lead either Keating or Guibernau to follow Hobsbawm, Breuilly and Gellner in equating nationalism to an argument for statehood. If nationalist movements have sought statehood it is more down to contextual factors. It is both a particular distribution of power, and teleological reasoning which leads to the conclusion that self-determination would be best achieved through a state.[53] The constantly changing context of politics and power means that the equation nationalism = statism is not universal.[54] The question then arises as to what different contexts and distributions of power entail for national aspirations of self-determination. It is this question that leads to an analysis of nationalist *social movements* and the context of globalisation. It should be noted at this point that the shift in analysis heralded by Keating and Guibernau is not merely due to an abandonment of old sociological models, but their perceived anachronism in relation to political and social shifts. Modernism sought to explain a particular form of socio-political

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[51] Ibid., p.271 & Guibernau, *Nations without*, p.15
[52] Guibernau, M. *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Polity, Cambridge, 1996) p.100
[53] Keating, *Nations against*, p.19 ; Keating, *Plurinational Democracy*, pp.10, 134
[54] Keating, *Nations against*, p.18 ; Guibernau, *Nations without*, p.17

framework and as such it should come as no surprise that it runs into difficulty when this framework shifts.

What the new globalised framework entails for both Keating and Guibernau is not the twilight of the state but some fundamental shifts in its political and economic position. No longer the only avenue by which aspirations for representation, autonomy, and self-determination can by negotiated and achieved, the state often becomes both increasingly decentred and de-centralised. [55] The increasing avenues that globalisation opens, particularly in Europe, lead to an increased ability to articulate concerns at both sub- and inter- state regional levels. 'Regionalism', as a political phenomenon bound up with globalisation, has a number of political functions affecting territorial definitions: with both localising and inter-state effects. It does not create a new 'level' but scrambles the clear logic of territorial hierarchy.[56] It is within this dual impact of globalisation that national interests have become re-articulated in nations without states.[57] Considering these re-articulated interests of nations without states', their goals and structuring, are important to developing a historically relevant sociology of nationalism. Before considering this, however, a cautionary note must be emphasised – the state has not disappeared with globalisation, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future.[58] What has occurred, rather, is that its image and position as the centralised body and authoritative source of political representation is increasingly fragmented and open to negotiation and discussion. Politics is becoming increasingly discussed in *relation to* the state, rather than in *terms of* state.

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[55] Keating, *Nations against* , pp.60-63, 75, 273, 275 ; Keating, *The New*, p.78 ; Guibernau, *Nations without*, pp.150-163

[56] Keating, *The New*, p.187 ; Keating, M. 'Is there a Regional Level of Government in Europe?', in, Keating, M. (ed.) *Regions and Regionalism in Europe* (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2004) pp.576-9, 585

[57] Keating, *Nations against*, p.18 ; Guibernau, *Nations without*, p.17

[58] Keating, *The New*, p.78 ; Guibernau, *Nationalisms*, p.112

Central to these (re)emerging discussions of the political relations between territory, identity, and the state has been the concept of national identity. Viewing national identity as comprised of 'psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political dimensions' and the nation as 'a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future while claiming the right to self-determination', Guibernau engages in an analysis of how national-identities are constructed.[59] In this construction she views five important elements: elites, antiquity, origin, history, and territory.[60] What her analysis entails is an understanding of nation and nationality that emphasises the politicisation of identity (both individual and collective), history (or time if we consider the future orientation of nation-images) and territory. It is through the relationship of identity to time and territory, understood by Guibernau's definition of identity by 'continuity over time and differentiation from others', that *national identity* offers a particular politicisation of territory and history.[61] It is the relationship of this politicisation process to the state that globalisation is shifting.

The state's attempted monopolising grasp on the sources of national identity construction, for the large part never wholly achieved, becomes ever more slippery with the advent of globalised communication, media and economics.[62] It is within this context that new movements have emerged, seeking to grasp these sources and utilise them for the construction of national identities. Before giving an account of the vectors of such movements, it must be mentioned that those challenges facing the state's grasp on sources

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[59] Guibernau, M. *The Identity of Nations* (Polity, Cambridge, 2007) p.9, 11
[60] Ibid., p.9
[61] Ibid., p.10
[62] Guibernau, *Nations without*, p.175

of identity creation also affect those moving for the utilisation of such sources; perhaps even to a greater level, for they do not possess the resource base of the state.

Guibernau's account of such movements is based on expanding Hroch's three phase typology in which a *primary phase* of scholarly enquiring and dissemination is followed by a *secondary phase,* involving the winning over of the ethnic group, which in turn enables a *tertiary phase,* in which the movement becomes a fully political phenomenon with conservative, liberal and democratic wings. [63] The task at hand, therefore, becomes understanding both the processes by which such movements arise, and the environmental conditions in which they gain strength. To this end, the shift from secondary to tertiary phase is the central concern of Hroch's work; while Hutchinson is more focused on the emergence of cultural nationalist elites. Hutchinson's explanation involves the creation of an educated intelligentsia by the state in question, which then rejects their assimilation into administrative positions because of their cultural difference. [64] This alienated culturally different intelligentsia then seeks to emphasise the strength and positive value of their culture. In doing so, they emphasise both cultural alienation and cultural value but, being educated in the methods of statehood, they are drawn to this as a model for cultural revival. [65] Thus setting the scene for a wider body of political activists. As these political demands emerge, the cultural elements become subsumed and the movement shifts towards political demands for statehood. [66] In explaining this shift Hroch points to a number of conditions 'independent of the wishes of its actors': increasing 'social communication and mobility', 'nationally relevant conflicts of interest' (in which the national demands of the

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[63] Guibernau, *Nations without,* pp.96-7 ; Hroch, *From National Movement*, pp.6-7
[64] Hutchinson, *Cultural Nationalism*, p.487-489
[65] Ibid., pp.492-3, 497
[66] Ibid., p.497

movement coincide with wider political and cultural interest) and, a pre-existing cultural and linguistic community, 'sometimes accompanied by a memory of old 'national' statehood.'[67] Hroch does not consider the emergence of an ethno-cultural nationalist intellectual group, seeking to present only a causal framework for the shift to nation-building project. Hutchison's analysis of the emergence of cultural nationalism, however, emphasises not a uni-directional shift from cultural to political demands, but a cycle between the two. As cultural revival turns into demands for state-hood, new or alternative images of cultural heritage emerge either in support of the state, or as a response to failure of political movements for state-hood.[68]

Guibernau's work takes such starting points, in order to create a historically relevant causal analysis of national movements. In seeking to understand the contemporary social dynamics of nationalist movements Guibernau advances an extension of the historical generalisations of Hutchinson and Hroch. By exploring 'nationalism as a social movement' she considers the roles elites, class, and intellectuals play in such movements, as well as their moral, emotional, economic and political arguments deployed through media usage and portrayal.[69]. In making and giving poignancy to such arguments, she has considered crucial institutions such as the church, education and media establishments, as well as folk art and music movements and festivals, as tools for national revival and political promotion.[70] What appears is an incorporative analysis of the variety of social actors and relations within any social movement. This analysis is linked to the wider context of

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[67]Hroch, M. 'From Ethnic Group toward the modern nation: the Czech case', in, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.10 (2004) pp.95-96

[68] Hutchinson, *The Dynamics*, p.41-42 ; Hutchinson, *Cultural Nationalism*, p.483, 497

[69] Guibernau, *Nations without*, pp.89-113

[70] Guibernau, M. 'Between Autonomy and Secession: the accommodation of Catalonia within the new democratic Spain', *ESRC Working Paper 48* (2002) ; Guibernau, M. 'Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States', in, Guibernau & Rex, *The Ethnicity Reader*, pp.145-152

globalisation which gives such movements space for imagining and articulating political demands for cultural and economic self-determination without seeking a state. However, what is lacking from Guibernau's work is an overarching framework to understand the *processes* linking internal and external dynamics of movements. As such, these theories on nationalism are limited to the cases they consider, Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and the conditions of globalisation. The fragmentary manner of considering what may be apparent and important at any one time in the study of social movements is not a deficiency of Guibernau's approach, but of the wider sociological consideration and usage of the term, which also played a part in Hroch and Hutchinson's analyses. Against this fragmented and unstructured use of the term social movement a number of social theorists have created and advanced a *social movement theory.* The salience and structure of their theorising will now be considered as a relevant element for expanding our socio-historical awareness of national movements into a series of broader generalisations. Such generalisations are important if we are to advance a more detailed analysis of the effects different distributions of power have more generally and not just in regard to the emergence of globalisation.

Before presenting an outline of social movement theory we must summarise what the preceding outline of works on nationalism has revealed. What appears is the need for an inclusive approach, taking account of movements/resistances, structures, cultural frames, ideological frames, and above all the political *processes* linking these. Thus, in pursuit of a holistic framework, we turn to social movement theory.

The term *social movement* was first brought to social analysis in 1850 and was used thereafter rather haphazardly and inconsistently.[71] Its usage from the 1950s reflects shifts, in much the same manner as the study of nationalism, from competing Marxist-functionalist and (ir)rational-behaviouralist theories, to 'cultural turn' challenges (reflecting similar questions to those Brubaker and Eriksen have brought to the study of nationalism), to contemporary arguments for comprehensive analyses.[72] This contemporary development of social movement *theory* represents a series of attempts to increase the sociological value of this term. What follows here is a brief account and expansion of these unifying works; brief because it is the task of the rest of this work to flesh out such an expansion through its application.

Two of the most prolific and instrumental theorists on the concept of social movement have been Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. The typology of 'contentious politics' they have deepened over the last thirty years calls, in its contemporary form, for a holistic methodology. It was against their early comparative juxtapositioning in the study of revolutions as event/phenomena, treated apart the study of from 'normal' politics, that Tilly and Tarrow advanced a structured analysis of their place in relation to wider politics.[73] Their focus has shifted from single events and actors, to the processes and structuring frames surrounding and giving rise to them. Contentious politics, therefore, emerges as a

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[71] Tilly, C. Social Movements 1768-2004 (Paradigm Publishers, London, 2004) p.5 ; Tilly, C. 'Comment On Young: Buried Gold', in, *American Sociological Review*, Vol.67, No.5 (2002) p.689

[72] See: Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. *Social Movements: An Introduction*, Second Edition (Blackwell, Oxford, 2006) pp.5-20 ; Tarrow, S. *Power In Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Third Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp.17-28

[73] Tarrow, *Power In Movement,* p.7 ; McAdam, D. Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C. *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) p.307

framework for understanding not only events, processes, and structures, but above all calling for deeper understanding of their inter-relations.[74]

The term contentious politics is defined by Tarrow as 'collective actors join[ing] forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent.'[75] Furthermore, contentious politics is seen as a specifically modern invention, emerging 'between the 1760 and the 1830s', and linked to the structural effects of 'consolidating states' in a time of 'war, parliamentarization, capitalization, and proletarianization.'.[76] Social movements are a specific form of 'mounting, coordinating, and sustaining' this contentious politics, requiring a number of factors including, 'changing political opportunities', 'known repertoires of contention' and 'innovations at their margins', 'well-structured social networks' and 'culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols', to achieve their constitution.[77] Social movements cannot spring into existence or be created out of the heads of particular individuals. They are embedded in an entire range of social, cultural, symbolic, ideological, and above all politically structuring frames. Writing the history of a particular social movement requires an exploration of these structuring frames, their influence on the movement, and the crucial innovative moves made by movement 'entrepreneurs' 'tapping' into such frames. Here, the importance of 'deep-rooted' structuring frames is given as a reason for nationalism, ethnicity, and religion providing firmer groundings for social movements than 'categorical imperatives' such as class.[78]

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[74] McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, p.307
[75] Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p.4
[76] Tilly, C. *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) p.118 ; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p.265 ; Tilly, *Social Movements*, p.25
[77] Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p.6
[78] Tilly, *Social Movements*, p.152 ; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p.11

What is immediately apparent is that despite the term *social* movement, these are political phenomena. The designation of such movements as social rather than political is a reference to their participants rather than their goals. While contentious politics may involve the incorporation of institutional politics (parties, unions, etc.), the large majority of their members and the claims they make are unrepresented, unaccepted, or simply new.[79] Here we come across one of the central features of Tilly and Tarrow's *contentious politics*: that it is a form of politics distinct and opposed to institutional politics – and yet linked to institutional politics through processes of interaction.[80] Therefore, one of the goals for analysts of contentious politics, and social movements as a form thereof, is to explore the relationships between institutional and contentious forms of political action.[81] While distinguishing between different forms of political action is valid for revealing their differences, Tilly and Tarrow's analyses have become somewhat stuck on how they can expand an overarching framework to study contentious-institutional political relations from within their contentious politics framework. This framework has offered cogent arguments for considering the 'integrat[ive] environmental, cognitive, *and* relational mechanisms' but it has, as yet, offered only tentative steps towards understanding the processes linking these. Both authors have called for further works towards this goal.[82] It is in response to these calls for an overarching framework of contentious-institutional political *relations*, and the *processes* linking relations, both cognitive and environmental, that we now turn to the Foucauldian concept of 'governmentality'.

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[79] Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p.7
[80] Ibid., p.34
[81] Tilly, *Social Movements*, pp.11-12
[82] McAdam, *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, p.344

What is proposed here is that by embedding the concept of governmentality within Foucault's work we can see that the term contains both a historical narrative and methodology. In the first instance what we have is a historical account of the emergence of the 'question of government' in the West. This historical account is largely predicated on understanding how power's operation in modern society differs from the sovereign-monarchical model.[83] Foucault's historical account of the transformation of power within Western states starts with the 'problem of government' identified as emerging in the sixteenth century. In seeking to account for how this problem led to the governmentalisation of the state, Foucault proposed not only a historical understanding, but a new historical-sociological method to study that historical process.[84] This methodology is built on analysing power as a whole series of micro-effects and relations, rather than the grand structural analyses prevalent during the 1950s and 60s.[85] Foucault's definition of governmentality contains three related elements: institutions or apparatuses of government, knowledge apparatuses, or arts of government, the historical process of applying such institution and arts.[86] The method of studying governmentality is, therefore, to address the historical, ideal and material processes involved in developing governmentalities. He would later bring this methodology to the study of liberal and neo-liberal 'arts of government'.[87] It is this methodological usage of governmentality that is relevant to the study of social movements; bearing in mind that Foucault often saw his work as developing a series of tools, to be expanded and utilised by others.[88] No sentimental

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[83] See: Foucault, M. 'Part Five: Right of death and power over life', in, *The History of Sexuality Volume One: The Will to Knowledge* (Penguin, London, 1998) pp.135-145 ; Foucault, M. *Society Must Be Defended* (Penguin, London, 2004) pp.27-28

[84] Foucault, *Security,* pp.88-89, 109

[85] Foucault, *Society*, p.6

[86] Foucault, *Security*, p.109

[87] See: Foucault, M. *The Birth of Biopolitics* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008)

[88] Foucault, *Society*, p.2

attachment to the parameters of Foucault's historical analyses should be afforded. While the methodology Foucault advances is intrinsically linked to his historical analyses, its utility for social analysis should be expanded by moving it beyond Foucault's own usage. That said, we shall return to Foucault's historical analyses in the fourth chapter on theoretical implications.

The concept of governmentality, presented here as a historical-sociology tool, raises the question of how societies came into being, and are governed, as effects of 'arts of government'. Foucault uses the term 'arts' to distinguish from the mechanisms of government the question of government. Foucault sets out to show how the questions on the art of government come first and shape, and are subsequently shaped by, all those mechanisms and objects deployed from the search for answers – state, society, subject, etc.[89] At the heart of this is his understanding of how power in modern societies changes under these questions of government. Opposed to the classical sovereign-legal theories of power – as an entity to be 'held' and limited by questions of 'rights' – Foucault viewed governmental power as productive and creative.[90] The government of society and individuals involves a multitude of 'disciplining', but *not* disciplinary, processes which create and act upon these distinct categories by investing them with power to engage productively.[91] Power is not an entity held by any 'body', but is an entire series of relations which run between and across bodies, investing them with individuality and sociality.[92] Liberal arts of government, for example, do not involve forcing people into certain actions, but arranging a whole host of material and ideal factors so that they reach such actions of

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[89] Foucault, *The Birth*, pp.2-3
[90] Foucault, *The History*, p.94
[91] Foucault, M. 'The Subject and Power', in, *Critical Enquiry*, Vol.8 (1982) p.788
[92] Foucault, *Society*, pp.29-31

their own accord.[93] This is governmental power's productive drive. It is also the factor which

makes the process of government as much about material as ideal factors. A recurring

question of governmental arts is that of truth; or rather, of discourses of 'truth' around

which relations of power can accumulate and come into operation.[94] Modernity is saturated

with the search for the 'truth' in all micro relations; a search demanded and guided by the

drive for the 'best' art of government. Studying the government of self and others,

therefore, requires studying a whole host of micro-cosmic 'power-relations' and their

reliance of certain discursive 'arts of government'. Consequently, government 'institutions'

rely to a large extent on the existence of other institutions and on the deployment and

maintenance of multiple micro-power projects and the discursive arts which sustain such

images. It is this nature of governmental power which shapes resistances.

For Foucault, resistance is not something wholly distinct that springs up in the face

of governmentalised institutions of power. The two, power and resistance, are linked

together through the whole microcosm of power-relations. As such, Foucault's study of

micro power-relations and truth discourses proceeds from investigating the sites of

resistance that spring up within them. It is the fragmentary nature of resistances that

reveals the fragmented nature of power-relations that shape modern society.[95] Resistances

are not the binary opposite of power, but struggles within power-relations for position.

Power is thus understood as functioning through a series of strategies, acting on multiple

and continual resistance/power relations, and not an 'entity' held by a body against which

others struggle.[96] Instead of focusing on the demands of social movements *and* the

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[93] Foucault, *The Birth*, p.319
[94] Foucault, *Society*, p.24
[95] Foucault, *The History*, p.96
[96] Foucault, *The Subject*, p.780 ; Foucault, *Society*, p.29

institutional forms of politics, therefore, a Foucauldian approach entails understanding resistances/institutions as effects bound to governmental drives. In this manner both institutions and resistances are bound together through operations of governmental power. That 'contentious politics' often comes to operate in institutional manners is, therefore unsurprising, given that both are linked by a governmentalised frame in which they operate.

To summarise then: a governmental theory of social movements should search for how the material/ideal results of societies' government have shaped *both* institutional images of power *and* resistance movements. It should not, however, be predicated on the assumption that only one governmentality is in operation at any particular time. Societies are often crossed by competing material/ideal 'systems of thought' which in modern societies manifest as questions of government related to resistances.[97]

The above has posited only a very broad overview of the macro-scale elements of Guibernau, Keating, Tilly, Tarrow, and Foucault's analyses. What it has not explored in great detail is the manner in which studying the particularities of movements has proceeded in any of these works. This is because it is the contention here that, beyond a framework emphasising the *processes* of institutional-contentious *relations*, studying the particularities of each movement is highly contextual. It is only in contextual studies that we can expand social movement theory's 'everyday' implications. To this end, the task of the following chapter on Nigerian politics is to deploy the rough 'governmental' framework outlined above through an analysis of particularities. Nigeria has been chosen for three reasons. The first is instrumental: there are a great number of studies from the perspective of social movement theory to draw upon, allowing us to delve deeper into social movement theory.

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[97] Foucault, *The Birth*, p.313

The second is theoretical: it is only by expanding beyond the Western/European horizon that we can truly expand the parameters of broad theoretical frameworks on nationalism, social movements, and governmentality. The third is contextual: focusing on Nigeria's federated-state structure through a governmentality frame allows us to explore conclusions and normative arguments on federalism and nationalism by Keating.

Nigeria: A Case Study

The task of this chapter is to expand, through a case study of Nigerian politics, Guibernau's definition of the nation as the politicisation of existing ethnic/cultural issues. It was in search of an overarching framework by within which we might study such politicisation processes that the latter part of the previous chapter turned to social movement theory and Foucault's notion of governmentality. It is the contention here, and over the rest of this work, that the nation, national-identity, and nationalism are closely related to processes of governmentality the governmentalisation of the state. Nigeria provides a contextual case more beneficial to the exploration of this contention than seeking to apply it to the 'origins of modernity' because the origins of western modernity are so contested as to be approaching almost mythical status. It is also easier to study the dynamics, grievances and goals of contemporary social movements, and the image they reveal of governmentalised power. Therefore, in an attempt to offer some clean air this chapter presents a study of the Nigerian 'national question' as a question of government. The broad conclusions from this Nigerian case study can then be considered in the next chapter in relation to Foucault's historical account of the governmentalisation of the western state and its relevance to the study of 'the national'.

The structure of this chapter is determined by its application of Foucault's tripartite understanding of what governmentality means. This understanding presents us with three related vectors: institutions of government, resistances and critical 'arts of government', and the historical processes of governmentalisation resulting from their interaction. We

shall start, therefore, a historical account of the origin and shifts of Nigerian government. Such a historical account opens up and leads into an account of the inter-relation of institutions and critical arts of government. It is within these that the 'national question' has arisen in both social movements and Nigerian political theory, particularly since the constitutional crisis resulting from the abortion of the 1993 presidential election.

The formation of the Nigerian state can be easily dated to 1914 and the amalgamation of the North and South Nigerian colonies by the British.[98] British government of Nigeria had, by 1954, become federal in structure and divided Nigeria into three regions.[99] British federal administration utilised the division of Nigerian ethnic groups, allowing the 'indirect rule' British colonialism so often entailed. Indirect rule consisted of utilising the aspirations of local elites by incorporation of into the fabric of government, overseen by a small number of colonialists. This allowed a rising Nigerian elite to gain a sense of autonomy, while keeping British hands on the tiller of government institutions.[100] Interestingly, this is the context which Hutchinson's analysis of cultural-nationalism in Ireland is set within. We shall return to this in the next chapter. What federalism under British colonial rule meant was not the positive connotation it often assumes in other scenarios as a measure to incorporate varying different cultural, ethnic or national groups into one system. Rather, the federal system of Nigeria under British indirect colonialism resulted in playing off the different major ethnic groups, a form of divide and rule. This was a tactic to manage government with very small numbers over a vast, ethnically, linguistically

[98] Salami, Y. 'The Political Economy of Nigeria and the Continuing Agenda of Recolonization: A Challenge for Critical Knowledge Production', in, *The Journal of Pan African Studies,* Vol.3, No.3 (2009) p.132
[99] Sklar, R. 'Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question', in, Rotberg, R. (ed.) *Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges* (Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 2004) p.43 ; Suberu, R. 'Nigeria: Dilemmas of Federalism', in, Amoretti, U. & Bermo, N. (eds.) *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages* (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2004) p.328
[100] Osaghae, E. 'The State and Ethnic Autonomy in Nigeria', in, *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol.12, No.2 (2003) pp.87-88, 90 ; Suberu, *Nigeria*, p.330 ; Salami, *The Political Economy*, p.133

and religiously diverse territory – estimated to include between 250 and 374 different ethnic groups.[101] As such, there was no concerted colonial effort to unify or build a sense of Nigerian nationality or nation-hood to accompany the Nigerian state. And, if we follow the conclusions of Young, this is not unusual. He concludes that nationalism and nation-building projects in Africa are often anti-colonial projects for independence.[102] The question immediately arises, therefore, as to whether Nigerian independence contained a concerted effort at Nigerian nation-building.

When Nigeria gained independence in 1960 its governmental structure remained that of the colonial triple region system, with each region being run by the largest ethnicity: in the North the Hausa-Fulani, in the West the Yoruba and in the East the Igbo. Under the British it had been assumed that these large ethnicities, leading their regions through selected elites, would facilitate a degree of regional homogenisation and prevent the need for any further divisions.[103] The numbers alone point to the optimistic nature of this assumption. Even together, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo only make up 66 per cent of the population of Nigeria. In each region the respective ethnic group never accounts for over 30 per cent of the population. Furthermore, such groups are largely the result of colonial categorisation; each containing their own internal diversities and tensions.[104] Consequently, it would have taken the combination of all three ethnic groups, coupled with concerted efforts at internal group homogenisation, to even approach some semblance of a

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[101] Suberu, *Nigeria,* p.328 ; Salami, *The Political Economy*, p.133 ; Agbola, T. & Alabi, M. 'Political Economy of Petroleum Resources Development, Environmental Injustice and Selective Victimization: A Case Study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria', in, Agyeman, J. Bullard, R. & Evans, B. (eds.) *Just Sustainabilities: Development in an Unequal World* (London, Earthscan, 2003) p.274

[102] Young, C. 'Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Africa', in, Guibernau & Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism,* pp.165-166

[103] Suberu, *Nigeria*, p.330

[104] Ibid., p.328, 332

majority Nigerian body – particularly as the remaining 44 per cent of the population make up the bulk of the estimated 250-374 ethnic groups. Such an effort was not to emerge.

When the British left in 1960 what occurred was the replacement of a body of colonialists at the centre, who exploitatively managed ethnic rivalries, with a vacuum. Into this vacuum regional-ethnic politicians were promoted, turning the central federal government of Nigeria into an arena for regional-ethnic conflict and 'political warfare'.[105] This political war would not take long to spill over into an actual war.

In 1967 the military government (the result of a *coup d'état* in 1966), in a bid to achieve both greater legitimacy and prevent the Igbo Eastern region from seceding, announced that Nigeria was to be divided into 12 states. Far from achieving the prevention of Igbo secession however, this led to them immediately declaring Eastern secession and the formation of the separate state of Biafra. What followed was three long years of bloody civil war which saw the repression of Biafran secession.[106] Ironically, the victory by the Nigerian military government was facilitated by the declaration of Nigeria's division into 12 states. The promise of more states, under the logic of greater autonomy and representation, led minorities in the Eastern region to support the military government.[107] The grievances these minorities had were issued against both an unrepresentative federal government and its regional structure. By playing on these grievances the military government presented, *prima facie*, a better political opportunity than participation in the Igbo state of Biafra promised.

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[105] Ibid., p.331
[106] Ibid., p.332
[107] Ikelegby, A. 'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria', in, *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, Vol.14, No.2, (2005) p.214

This move by the military government started a process labelled by Beckett, Young and others as 'Permanent Transition'.[108] What Permanent Transition entailed was a process by which the federal-state structure of Nigeria was continually expanded: from 12 in 1967, to 19 in 1976, to 21 in 1987, to 30 in 1991, and to the current 36 states in 1996.[109] The other face of this process was that increasing numbers of federal states actually meant further concentration of power in the central government. In Nigeria the principles of divided government and greater autonomy at the heart of federalism became a system of reliance on the purse-strings of central government. Indeed, by increasing the number of states the central government actually weakened all of them.[110] Enticing each state into a competition for central funds, the post-independence government has actually operated a similar model to the divide and rule strategy of the British. What this produced was both a reduction in chances and moves for secession, and convergence of political tensions around the competition for central government funds. However, a problem was looming around the corner for this system of economic control.

Nigeria's economy, between the late 1960s and 1990 became increasingly a mono-economy based on oil revenues.[111] While this created vast incomes and facilitated the ability of central government to play its economic divide and rule strategy over multiple states, it also presented a problem. This problem is based on the geographical nature of oil deposits. 80 per cent of Nigeria's vast oil reserves are concentrated 8 per cent of its territory:

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[108] Beckett, P. & Young, C. *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria* (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, 1997) pp.4-5
[109] Suberu, *Nigeria*, p.332
[110] Ibid., p.334 ; Khan, S. *Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) p.8 ; Forrest, T. *Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) p.5
[111] Khan, *Nigeria*, p.183

primarily in the Niger Delta and off its coast.[112] Consequently, the majority of Nigeria does not produce any oil, the commodity still accounting in 2010, for 85 per cent of state revenues.[113] This economic disparity fuelled the re-articulation of minority resentment. Resentment which grew when, in 1986, Nigeria found itself in sudden debt due to a plummet in global oil prices.[114] The money supporting the whole system of central control collapsed and minorities could no longer be easily bought off. Unease would simmer until it reached boiling point in 1993 when the military government annulled the presidential election widely seen as being won by a southern candidate. This furthered resentment, particularly in the South which saw the military government as an instrument of northern colonialism.[115] Since then the 'nationalities question' has become a key feature of Nigerian politics and political theory.[116] It is to these resentments, their goals, and their subsequent impact on Nigerian political theory that we now turn.

One movement in particular has captured the attention of wider audiences: The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). By providing a microcosm of political tensions and aspirations in Nigeria this is a perfect case for us to explore the resurgence of the 'nationalities question'. While this question has been present in Nigerian politics since the 1950s, the high profile of the MOSOP campaign between 1990 and 96 presented a new direction for such questions. This direction was directly related to 'the interface of' oil [resource inequalities] and minority politics.'[117] Beyond placing the question

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[112] Watts, M. 'Nature as Artifice and Artifact', in, Braun, B. & Castree, N. (eds.) *Remaking Reality: Nature at the Millennium* (Routledge, London, 1998) p.252

[113] Obi, C. 'Structuring Transnational Spaces of Identity, Rights and Power in the Niger Delta of Nigeria', in, *Globalizations*, Vol.6, No.4 (2010) p.473

[114] Khan, *Nigeria,* p.194

[115] Osaghae, *The State*, p.95

[116] Osaghae, E. 'The Ogoni Uprising: Oil politics, minority agitations, and the future of the Nigerian state' in, *African Affairs* Vol.94, No.376 (1995) p.326 ; Sklar, *Unity*, p.39

[117] Osaghae, *The Ogoni*, p.326

of minority politics firmly back on the agenda in a new context, MOSOP also presents an interesting case for theories of 'groupness' over ethnicity and nationality. When, in 1990, MOSOP leaders and heads of Ogoni clans presented the *Ogoni Bill of Rights* they were not only laying down a political challenge against the Nigerian state. What this bill also represented was the definition of the Ogoni as a separate ethnic nationality.[118] Many observers have pointed out that 'the Ogoni' are actually split, linguistically, into three distinct sub-groups. Furthermore, this group has no myths of common ancestry, often seen as a core component of 'groupness' – connecting historical and territorial foundations of identity.[119] What is apparent in the case of the Ogoni is, therefore, not so much an assertion of a historical-territorially defined group, but of a group defined contemporarily by territorial-economic exploitation. Theorists who wish to preserve the categorical rigidity of 'nationality' and 'ethnicity' may well at this point cry out that the Ogoni represent neither. The subjective nature of these terms is, however, the most interesting point about them, and drives us to consider them as highly contextual rather than universal or objective.

What interests us here is why, how, and who has used the term 'Ogoni' to designate a group and launch political resistances. These questions are intrinsically linked to the nature of their political resistances, themselves in turn linked to the federal government of Nigeria. Concerted efforts at the creation of Ogoni 'groupness' did not emerge out of the blue in the late 1980s, the creation of the Ogoni Central Union in 1945 can be seen as the first move in this direction. MOSOP represents only the most recent attempt at pan-Ogoni

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[118] Ibid.

[119] Ibid., p.328 ; Hutchinson, J. 'Nations and Culture', in, Guibernau, M. & Hutchinson, J. (eds.) *Understanding Nationalism* (Polity, Cambridge, 2001) p.75, Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism*, p.113 ; for a more critical analysis of 'origin-myths' see: Eriksen, T. 'The Case for Non-Ethnic Nations', in, Guibernau & Hutchinson, *History and National*, p.59 ; Eriksen, *Ethnicity, Race, Nation,* p.51

organisation by various elites. [120] Following Brubaker, it is organisations and their relationship to the group they claim to represent, and attempts to forge 'groupness' that we should be studying.[121] This organisation was led, from 1990 to his execution in 1995 by Ken Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa was a successful businessman and a prominent television producer; not himself a disadvantaged or marginalised victim of oil exploitation by the Nigerian state. Both Saro-Wiwa and other high level MOSOP leaders were politically-savvy or involved in the political running of the local *Rivers State* – created in the 1967 federal expansion.[122]

The demands MOSOP issued in the *Ogoni Bill of Rights* called for political autonomy, resource equity, and linguistic protection.[123] Importantly, while this bill defied the Ogoni as a distinct ethnic nationality, it did not detail any demands for secession or a separate state. As such, it marked the start of a new manner of political contestation in Nigeria:

> 'By demanding self-determination in these terms, the Ogoni bill, which resonated in other bills and declarations by other groups in the Delta - cf. the Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth Congress (1998), the Ogbia Declaration (1999), Ikwerre Rescue Charter (1999), and Urhobo Bill of Rights (2002) - signalled a fundamental shift in the autonomy politics of minorities.'[124]

What political autonomy and self-determination meant in the Ogoni Bill was tied up with the federal government of Nigeria. As with the categories 'ethnicity' and 'nationality', 'political autonomy' and 'self-determination' are highly subjective and contextual demands. Within Nigeria these demands have often been issued at, rather than against, the federal government. What is meant here is that political autonomy and self-determination are perceived as features of a federal system of government, the system which Nigeria is supposed to be run by. This has linked contentious politics to the federal government:

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[120] Osaghae, *The Ogoni*, p.329
[121] Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups,* pp.37-38
[122] Bob, C. 'Marketing Rebellion: Insurgent Groups, International Media, and NGO Support', in, *International Politics*, Vol.38 (2001) p.318
[123] Osaghae, *The Ogoni*, pp.326-7
[124] Osaghae, *The State*, p.98

rather than the principle of autonomy and self-determination leading to secessionist movements or claims for (international) statehood, they have become articulations against the machinations of Nigerian government. Political autonomy and self-determination, in the Nigerian context, are demands for governmental change, not for international statehood.

The demands issued at the federal government by MOSOP, and the entire campaign of contention in which they engaged, would undergo substantial crisis in 1995 when Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other MOSOP leaders were placed on trial and executed. This violent state reaction was undertaken because 'the Ogoni struggle crystallised for many other minority groups in Nigeria the stranglehold which the country's three dominant ethnic groups have on power.'[125] Rather than sending a signal of power and calming the situation this move signalled the start of a crisis in Nigerian politics, leading Beckett and Young to conclude in 1997 that 'the survival of Nigeria is at issue, with chilling scenarios of what a breakdown – or breakup – might bring in its wake, casting a long shadow over the entire region.'[126] In terms of the tactics used by minority groups, there has been an increasing rise in violent and criminal offshoots and conflicts, both with the state and with other minority groups.[127] Conversely, despite this, 'the emergent militant and uncompromising nationalism was not so much about creating new states [with the exception of some Ijaw groups], as it was about challenging majority hegemony and injustice at the centre, especially with regard to resource control.'[128] Even when manifest in violent form, minority resentment and movements have sought to issue their grievances to the state, rather than claim the right to independence or secession. The use of violent tactics here has not a signalled a fundamental

[125] Haynes, J. 'Power, Politics and Environmental Movements in the Third World', in, *Environmental Politics,* Vol.8, No.1 (1999) p.238

[126] Beckett & Young, *Dilemmas,* p.1

[127] Obi, C. 'Globalization and Local Resistance: The case of Shell Versus the Ogoni', in, Amoore, L. (ed.) *The Global Resistance Reader* (Routledge, London, 2005) p.325

[128] Osaghae, *The State*, p.98

shift in goal, but a perceived shift in tactics in the face of state willing to wield violence to silence the issue. Indeed, at the beginning of August this year (2012) a faction of MOSOP led by Goodluck Diigbo proclaimed political autonomy. Distancing himself from this, Ben Naneen's faction of MOSOP has declared that the Ogoni have not yet collectively decided 'to seek the path of sovereignty as a solution'.[129] The fractioning of MOSOP following Saro-Wiwa's death is an example of the crucial role elites often play in fostering 'groupness' from such organisations. Furthermore, what we also see that the representation and bringing together of 'the Ogoni' is still as much contested as 'Nigeria'.

On the face of it, the support for federalism seems bizarre. Here we have a system created by a colonial power, continually exploited by a few to the disadvantage of many; and yet it is this system which is seen as the solution. All the elite groups in Nigeria support federalism and support amongst the general population runs between 58 and 87 per cent depending on region. Across Nigeria there appears a commitment to both groups and Nigeria, despite widespread dissatisfaction with what the federation linking these has actually meant.[130] Why so many Nigerians, elites, academics, and the general population should continue to view federalism as the solution to their problems directs us to view federalism, in Nigeria at least, as forming a governmentality. It is a governmentality in the sense that it: *a*) is linked to actual institutions of government, *b*) frames social movements/contentious politics and, *c*) has been at the heart of Nigerian political theorising on how to reduce conflict in Nigeria and achieve the 'best' form of government. Having

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[129] Ifowodo, O. 'The Ogoni, the North and the quest for political autonomy', in, *Vanguard Nigeria* (August 15, 2012): http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/the-ogoni-the-north-and-the-quest-for-political-autonomy/ (last accessed, 04/09/2012)
[130] Suberu, *Nigeria*, pp.350-1

considered both *a* and *b*, we shall now turn to *c* and the return of the 'nationalities question' that the last twenty years of contentions heralded.

It is *against* Watts' argument that the dual economic centralisation and political fragmentation has led to 'not nation building – understood in the sense of governmentality – or a particular style of imagining but perhaps its reverse; the 'unimagining' or deconstruction of a particular sense of national community.'[131] We shall return to the question of governmentality and nation-building in the following chapter. What is of issue now is the simplistic account Watts' portrays of nation-building as demanding a *mono-national* polity; against the possibility of more complex political scenarios as captured by the term '*plurnational*' used by Keating.[132] While it is true that Nigeria has so far not embarked upon any unified or concerted effort to create a Nigerian nation to match the Nigeria state, this does not mean that any sense of national community is lacking in Nigeria. What has emerged, rather, is a complex and putative series of links between group and state levels, between ethnic and legal categorisation, articulated by Nigerian political theorists in direct relation to federalism.

Nationality in Nigeria is a much more complex question than Watts' binary choice between nation-state and local-nationality presents; it is also a question which is inextricably linked to federalism. Representing this is the constitutional debate that rages in Nigeria over whether the federation should be based on ethno-linguistic divisions (termed *nationalities* by the 1990s), or not.[133] This debate encapsulates the complexities of the 'ethnic/civic' nationality/ism distinction and its contextual nature. Far from representing a

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[131] Watts, M. 'Resource Curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta', in, *Geopolitics*, Vol.9, No.1 (2004) p.74

[132] Keating, *Plurinational Democracy*

[133] Sklar, *Unity*, p.39

universal binary division between two forms of nationality, the ethnic/civic divide is better conceptualised as a spectrum ethnic-nation.[134] In Nigeria this spectrum does not present a clear competition of two visions of the Nigerian 'nation'. Instead there appears a series of debates within the larger question over Nigeria's federated structure: the civic-ethnic spectrum is shaped and related to questions of government.

A brief outline of three debates within the ethnic/civic question of federal constitutionalism will reveal its complex and multidimensional nature. There are the two old questions of north-south neo-colonialism and the need for a Sovereign National Convention (SNC) to bring Nigerians together in discussion over constitutional reform. Recently, however, another dimension has entered into the fray and served to reinvigorate these economic and constitutional debates. The arguments over and application of *Sharia* law in Northern Nigeria have added another complex layer to the 'nationalities question' and its relation to federal-constitutionalism.

What has been presented above already represents quite succinctly the image of northern neo-colonialism that southern Nigerians perceive as going on. It has also presented how the issue of autonomy has reverberated around social movements for the end of this neo-colonialism. The issue of autonomy, at the inter-communal and Nigerian scale, has frequently returned to the demands for, or necessity of a Sovereign National Conference/Convention. In contradiction to the conventional picture of a federal system, the Nigerian case has been one of continual struggle by states to wrest power off the federal government in the centre. This is a legacy of the military's concentration of power and patrimonial system by which economic and legal rights were distributed to states from

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[134] Smith, *National*, p.13

the centre.[135] It has taken recent Supreme Court rulings for federal states to gain legal and institutional powers off the central government.[136] What the calls for a SNC represent, in the recent flourishing form, are the old calls for all Nigerians to come together and debate openly the constitutional structure and legal division of powers within the federal system. Calls for this transcend social movements, academics, journalists, and state politicians – and its actualisation is seen as essential by many to initiate of the 'true federalism' under which Nigeria should be governed.[137] Since there has never been an open discussion over federalism in Nigeria since the British initiated it in 1914 these calls are give a certain poignancy.[138] It is into these calls that a new dynamic has emerged, *Sharia* law.

While the SNC and neo-colonial/economic debates have been largely shaped by a sense of north-south divide, disparity and neo-colonialism in Nigeria, the recent religious-legal debate over *Sharia* law runs across this divide. Ardent supporters of true federalism and reform in the South have supported the Northern Muslims' right to implement *Sharia* law, provided it is only applied to Muslims, under the name of ethnic autonomy within Nigeria. However, the issue is more complicated than this. Against the clear division between ethnic-civic nationalism, the support in the name of ethno-linguistic autonomy by groups for true federalism in the south, up to the level of different legal systems, presents a challenge to the legal base of the Nigerian constitution.[139] There is no longer the possibility of 'one-law, many ethnicities' and the situation and solution has become hotly contested.

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[135] Khan, *Nigeria*, p.8 ; Forrest, *Politics*, p.5
[136] Osaghae, *The State*, p.99
[137] Ibid., p.102 ; Ifowodo, *The Ogoni*
[138] Osaghae, *The Ogoni*, p.343
[139] Suberu, *Nigeria,* pp.335-40

Consequentially, Nigeria cannot be divided cleanly into north-south or Muslim-Christian dichotomies which only 'obscure the interests and values of Nigerian political actors.'[140]

This serves as a potent reminder of political-legal issues in Europe. As Keating points out, that the Union of Scotland and England kept two separate legal systems in each respective country; legal differentiation within a polity is, therefore, not an insurmountable problem.[141] However, as the protracted and bloody Thirty Years War should remind us, settling religious-legal disputes in multi-religious polities, even when they are two branches of the same religion, is no easy task. This is not an invitation for deterministic and pessimistic predictions of protracted civil war and the eventual collapse of Nigeria, as was the fate of the Holy Roman Empire. History is never so deterministic. What can be said, however, is that Nigeria is facing one of the deepest and most problematic legal-constitutional issues that government(ality) brings. Conversely, with the rise of questions over legal systems in Europe, both in the face of expansive 'European' law against state law, and the populairst fear and very real question posed by *Sharia* law's application to Muslims within the West, we are in no position to proclaim to have solved this issue.[142]

The continuing ability of Nigeria to flout expectations of whole-scale crisis, and avoid large-scale secessionist-nationalist movements, serves as an example of the power its federal governmental frames have had in the face of any assertions that might be made as to the inevitable outcome of ethnic, religious or nationalist conflict. A large part of the relative success of Nigeria (in not collapsing) is due to the perceived benefits amongst elites

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[140] Sklar, *Unity* p.52
[141] Keating, *Nations Against*, p.200
[142] See: Tibi, B. 'Euro-Islam: An Alternative to Islamization and Ethnicity of Fear', in, Baran, Z. (ed.) *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010)

and intelligentsia in single Nigeria playing on the international stage.[143] If Nigeria does manage to maintain and initiate a process of greater ethnic and legal pluralism in its federal structure it may indeed emerge as a powerful force in African, and international, politics. If it does so it will also bring valuable lessons on the accommodation of ethno/religious-legal divides under one polity. Nigeria is very much a 'watch this space' for political theorists, activists, and policy makers envisaging a more pluralised Europe. We can count Keating and Guibernau amongst these.

In short, the theoretical lessons that can be taken from the Nigerian 'case-so-far' are as follows. It is the governmentality of state and society, not the state that has been the referent frame for national questions in the civic-ethnic spectrum. The state enters this debated as the embodiment of government, as the conceptual term given to all the 'official' or 'legitimate' arms of institutional government. Government and the state are not synonymous save through the semblance of legitimacy the state offers to government, a legitimacy that is often challenged on the very terms of government. National-autonomy questions present one such challenge to states' legitimacy to govern as they are. It is to the question of this legitimacy that the state holds over government that the following and concluding chapters turn.

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[143] Suberu, *Nigeria*, p.352

Chapter Four

Theoretical Implications

Now comes the time to draw together the different threads which have each played their part in this work; to return to where we started in search of something new. What follows is a return to the question which has been gnawing away at theorising on nationalism and the state in Western political theory, the question of origins. We shall return to this question rather tangentially, allowing us to approach it 'side-on' and so avoid teleological propositions that the origin of nationalism and its link to the modern state were always leading to where we are today.

In order to achieve this we must retrace our steps back to the beginning through the case study of Nigeria. This case study has primarily shown that nationalism does not arise only from a concerted effort by the state to forge a nation or from resistances to these state nation-building moves. The nationalities question in Nigeria is inextricably linked to the federal system of government therein. Considering nationalism as linked to questions of government, and not to the state as some abstracted organ, allows us to consider nationalism as always a highly contextual phenomenon linked to the politics of government. The methodology for understanding government presented in this work was that of Foucault's 'governmentality' which drew attention to material-institutional factors, normative-resistances, and, above all, historical processes linking these two together. Understanding government via governmentality entails a study of the processes of institution/resistance interplay. It is by starting with British colonialism in Nigeria that we will trace governmentality back to where Foucault saw its origin. From this origin we can

raise the question for further research into why nationalism and (western-liberal) governmentality seem to go hand in hand. By way of a final conclusion, this work will offer some normative/methodological propositions for those engaging on such lines of research.

The formation of the Nigerian state was undertaken within a governmental framework of colonialism. This colonial-governmental framework was structured around the central premise of indirect rule. The basis for indirect rule, a pursuit of 'divide and rule' tactics and the recruitment of local elites to administrative positions was deployed by the British right across their empire. It is within this governmental framework that those cultural nationalist movements that Hutchinson studied emerged in Ireland. The tactics of power here involved raising doubts in the minds of those incorporated into administrative positions as to the value of their own traditions and cultures. Seeking to divide individuals from their localities and then employing them to administer the rule thereof was the standard practice for reducing local resentment. In Ireland, according to Hutchinson, it was through both a surplus of educated Irish and a shift against employing Irish in the administration of government that led to resentment. Educated in the principles of government, but barred from its institutions, these individuals sought to foster an alternative and specifically Irish tradition of government. In doing so they drew on already existing traditions and *overlayed* them onto principles of political theory inherited from their education. In this manner the principles of Irish cultural difference were articulated through a reformulation of British, governmental, political theory.[144] Thus, Irish culture became politicised and wrapped up in the principles of government. These principles, their emergence, and specifically their relation to England are all issues at the heart of the link between nation and governmentality.

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[144] See: this work, pp.15-16, 28-29

In search of this link the following will briefly sketch out some points of interest that Foucault's historical account of the governmentalisation of the state presents for students of nationalism. In order to achieve this, a comparison between Foucault and Hastings' analyses is presented. It must be noted that this is not an exclusive account or a full comparison, as they are beyond the scope of this work. Rather, it is an indication and invitation to further research; an outline on some points in an area which was not the main concern here but which arose from this work as an interesting avenue for historical theorising on nationalism and the state.

Foucault's historical account of the governmentalisation of the state begins in the middle ages with pastoral Christianity. It was this form of Christianity which provided the model for theorising on government, theorising which, starting in the sixteenth century began to expand beyond the monastic walls and into the realm of political theory. Foucault offers a broad sketch of this as a gradual shift and, essentially, a theoretical one concerning statecraft.[145] Comparing this to Hastings' analysis of nationalisms roots in the Christian Biblical model we find a common referent point. For Hastings' this model became available in two different ways over the course of European history. In the first it was the Latin and universal nation of Christianity which this biblical model promoted, giving rise to the large and federated empire systems of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. In the second it was the vernacular translations of the bible which offered an alternative model point of reference for this biblical nation.[146] Thus, the nation is pre-modern and has always been a multi-faceted concept and normative goal.

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[145] Foucault, M. *The Subject* pp. 782-783 ; for a more detailed account see: Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*
[146] Hastings, *The Construction*, p.198-200

The second part of Foucault's history of governmentalisation: that of implication, is the history of how the legal apparatuses of the west shifted their focus from the monarchic-sovereign and his rights, to become an instrument of government.[147] Pastoral models of government in the sixteenth century had laid the grounds for a theoretical and institutional shift which emphasised the art of statecraft as the art of arranging and managing social relations to particular ends. Under the logics of government, the law shifted as an institution now wholly concerned life's promotion and functioning.[148] As such, aspects of both individual and collective life became politicised and legalised – setting the grounds for modern contestations over identity, autonomy and self-determination; often shaped as 'national' questions. Joseph has perhaps quite correctly emphasised that the initial focus of Foucault here is wrapped up with the rise of capitalism.[149] Certainly his account of the rise of liberal and neo-liberal forms of governmentality are closely linked to offering an alternative account of capitalism to those of Marxist-functionalism which was facing protracted crisis during Foucault's time. However, as the above has shown, governmentality as a theoretical tool is not reliant on the liberal and neo-liberalisms that concerned Foucault. Indeed, perhaps one of the most prominent questions that can arise from a combination of Foucault and Hastings' works is the depth and links that national questions have to the liberalism that arose in the west from Christian pastoral roots. Echoing Greenfeld it might be possible to look at liberal politics and society as fundamentally based on a national world-view inherited from pastoral Christianity. Greenfeld is particularly pessimistic about the outcomes of this basis for liberal thought, predicting cycles of anomie

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[147] Foucault, *The History*, pp.135-145

[148] Ibid.

[149] Joseph, J. 'The Limits of governmentality: Social theory and the international', in, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.16, No.2 (2010) p.229

and their potentially destructive consequences. [150] There is certainly an avenue for consideration on nationalisms link to western Christianity, pastoralism and the governmentalisation of the state. However, as this work has set out to show, there are multiple governmentalities and the manner in which national questions arise is largely contextual. We should not become too focus on a singular nationalism-liberalism link.

With these questions in mind we can now return, as promised in chapter three, to the question of governmentality and nation-building. It is not the state, as modernists such as Gellner and Breuilly thought, to which nation and nationalism are intrinsically linked.[151] Rather, it is the *governmentalised* state to which they are linked. A cautionary note must be issued here: echoing Keating's warning against regarding the nation-state as universal model, it must be emphasised that the governmentalised state in the abstract is not a universal model to go in search of.[152] Such a search would throw up all the contradictions that searching for historically homogenised nation-states has. The governmentalised state is, like the nation-state, as much a normative goal as it is a material framework. Furthermore, governmentality represents the normative and material manner in which debates, power struggles and resistance movements articulate themselves. The governmentalisation of the state does not represent a universal or abstract model of the state, but how it is that questions and contestations over government are related to the state in modernity.

Consequently, when we are looking for nation-building projects, of either state or resistance/social movement origins, we should be searching for how questions of

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[150] See: this work, pp.16-17 ; Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind*, pp.203-223
[151] See: this work, pp.13-14
[152] Keating, *The New Regionalism*, p.75

government – good government, equitable government, representative government, etc. – are articulated. Here we can adapt Osaghae statement that: 'Unless autonomy is analyzed from the two perspectives suggested here, that of the state and that of its challengers, it is unlikely that its complexities and problematics can be well understood.' [153] Indeed, autonomy and self-determination have always been considered essential elements of nationalism. Nationalism, like autonomy, cannot be studied only from the perspective of the state; such perspectives tend to end in self-referential arguments over nationalism equalling statism. It is only by analysing nationalism also from the perspective of social movements against the state, that we can understand its complexities and problematics. However, these are not questions necessarily linked to the state, but more to questions of government. It is within a governmentalised state the issues of autonomy and self-determination, communal and individual, rise to the fore.

It is only having outlined all of the above as cautions against teleology that we can now consider fully the question of the governmentalisation of the state. It is once the law becomes concerned with issues of 'life' that, for Foucault, governmentalisation occurs in the Western states. Specifically, it is when the legal apparatus is no longer deployed around the right of the sovereign to take life, but around the government of lives to a certain end, that we can speak of a governmentalised legal system occurring. [154] This legal system, as Foucault saw it, maintains its legitimacy and authority by reference to the centralised image of legal power being invested in one body – an inheritance of the medieval concept of sovereignty.[155] Interesting, and as an aside here, we might consider *sharia* law, in its modern form and usage, as a governmentality distinct from the liberal and neo-liberal

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[153] Osaghae, *The State*, p.103
[154] Foucault, *The History,* pp.261
[155] Foucault, *Society,* p.44

dominant forms in the West. Those wishing to take this line of questioning further would do well to remember, as emphasised by the Nigerian case studied here, that this is not determined to be a binary choice between liberal or *sharia* law. Either/or scenarios perhaps tell us more about dominant governmental frames which limit those rigidly embedded within them. Federalism, as a governmental frame in Nigeria, has allowed arguments to prosper in favour of *sharia* law from those who have no interest in living under it.[156] This serves to highlight that governmentality, and institutions of government are not reduced to legal structures. Governmentality is as much a normative-institution as it is material-institutional. Indeed, for Foucault the peculiarity of governmentalised law is that it shifts from the material manifestation of the right to kill, to the normative deployment of encouraging behaviour. The (liberal-governmental) law no longer requires displays of violence in order to achieve its ends; we have come to regard this as signifying a failure of normal law and a return to some last resort.[157]

Federalism, as normative and legal institution, presents perhaps a different avenue of governmentality that can accommodate difference. The term 'perhaps' is used here because it should be emphasised that governmentalities include a complex mixture of: *a*) institutions built on multiple and shifting power-relations, *b*) discourses on the arts of government that reflect their normative/mental power and, *c*) the historical process by which normative discourses and institutions interact with each other. The indication that federalism might provide a possible solution is not an invitation to apply it in abstracted and universal form, but an invitation to the start of long and protracted processes, in which there will be many power/resistance struggles, to try and achieve a governmental structure

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[156] See: this work, p.37
[157] Foucault, *The History,* pp.261, 265

in which different normative-legal-institutions can interact openly. The law, understood as a normative tool, should be considered as open to internal pluralism. It is against the arguments for multi-ethnic, mono-legal (civic) forms of multinationalism that this argument is made. Indeed, what we are following here is Keating's argument for plurinationalism; as a messy, unresolved and antagonistic ground from which we can at least try to face each other directly instead of hiding behind the conviction that mono-legal polities are the only option.[158]

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[158] Keating, *Plurinational Democracy*

Conclusion

The work here has been conducted in search of expanding Guibernau's definition of nationalism and the politicisation of culture and ethnicity. To do this it has set out to understand nationalism as highly politically contextual and specifically linked to modern politics understood as governmental politics. As such, this work has raised a number of avenues for further questioning, two of which are particularly prominent for future research on nationalism:

1) What effect does the level of political-knowledge have on the shape and aspirations of nationalist social movements?
2) How is it that the rise of the 'question of government' in the West also led to the rise of 'national questions'?

The first of these requires a prolonged and deep study of particular social movements, beyond the scope and intention of the work here, which has presented more of a rough framework for asking this question. The above has provided some outlines as to where a detailed analysis of the second question might start, but it is, again, beyond the scope and parameters of this work to do it justice. Both of these questions require further and more detailed research projects. What follows now, by way of a final conclusion, is some pressing normative/methodological considerations that must be held in mind while studying the connection between questions of government and national questions in general.

There are multiple governmentalities to which these nationality questions (identity, autonomy and self-determination) are linked in differing ways. These links are the result of historical processes of power/resistance struggles over questions of government. While

federalism may have so far proved an invaluable tool in Nigeria for preventing large-scale violent nationalism and secession, it is not an abstracted form of government that prevents this sort of nationalism, but a form of government in which national questions can be contested. This form of government can conceptually emerge from within the liberal-democratic governmentalities prevalent today, and Hastings work provides a very strong call for this.[159] However, as our understanding of federalism as a governmental frame, historical process, and legacy in Nigeria should reveal: the result is often a dynamic process of power/resistance within governmentalities. There is no singular answer to national questions; they are highly contextual to various governmentalities. It is for this reason that abstracted typologies of 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism are of little value beyond highlighting that national questions fall within a spectrum, peculiar to governmental state/society relations, which cannot divide legal and cultural-'life' conceptions of individuality/group identity. As such, we should be critical of the claims that any 'art of government' can remove these questions. Furthermore, by actively politicising and legalising culture and life, processes of governmentality forms the spark that engenders particular nationalism. Government and national questions go hand in hand and will continue to do so, not deterministically, but at the result of various power/resistance struggles within multiple governmentalities.

The question of government has brought the law into new avenues as a normative-institution; it is our task now and for the future to struggle not against the law but for the law to become a pluralistic normative-institution. The nationalisms' represented in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, as well as the 'nationalities question' in Nigeria have been directed at these politico-legal issues, and the rights they bring to economic, cultural and all other

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[159] Hastings, *The Construction of Nation-hood*

aspects of life. A system of one polity, one law has not reduced but perpetuated intra- and inter-cultural and ethnic conflict. It is against this legal-governmental system of legitimacy, inherited from the legal monism associated with sovereign-monarchic rule, that we must critique the legal fabric of our societies.[160] This is the only avenue open for addressing and incorporating national questions that does not perpetuate their potential for violence. Such questions will probably never go away, and reflect the normative aspect of a legal system built around governing life. It is not in search of removing these national questions' that we should proceed, a potential dead-end; but in search of new ways of asking and addressing these questions' interconnection as questions of government.

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[160] Foucault, *Society*, pp.34, 44

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