Academic-intelligence relationships: opportunities, strengths, weaknesses and threats

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ABSTRACT

Academics and practitioners interact on the basis of formal and informal mechanisms. This article examines these mechanisms as opportunities for collaboration, identifies their key strengths and weaknesses, and discusses the threats that make academia a sensitive ground for exploitation. The first section is focused on the contributions of academia to the intelligence profession and is organized around the primary functions identified in the intelligence cycle. The second section is focused on the contributions of the intelligence profession to academia, and is organized around four themes, namely the education of professors and students, the education and training of future intelligence professionals, public debate and the development of a disciplinary body of knowledge. The final section discusses threats that endanger the independence, integrity and freedom of academia.

Introduction

The relationships between academia and intelligence agencies have waxed and waned since the Second World War, but even in their worst moments never entirely disappeared (Gearon, 2020). Naturally, the form, content and extent of these relationships have varied enormously throughout that period, with spikes in innovation being noticed by Vogel et al. (2017) in the aftermath of 9/11 to this day. What sustains these relationships in a common pursuit of knowledge is a simple quid pro quo: on the one hand they benefit intelligence agencies in the fulfilment of their mandate while on the other hand they validate values pursued by academics (such as personal satisfaction and rewards) and their institutions (financial and, where appropriate, reputational gains).

Academics and practitioners interact on the basis of formal and informal mechanisms. This commentary examines these mechanisms as opportunities for collaboration, identifies their key strengths and weaknesses, and discusses the threats that make academia a sensitive ground for exploitation. The first section is focused on the contributions of academia to the intelligence profession and is organized around the primary functions identified in the intelligence cycle (Phythian, 2013). The second section is focused on the

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contributions of the intelligence profession to academia, and is organized around four themes, namely the education of professors and students, the education and training of future intelligence professionals, public debate and the development of a disciplinary body of knowledge. The final section discusses threats that endanger the independence, integrity and freedom of academia. The mechanisms discussed in this commentary are drawn from the highly Anglo-centric literature on intelligence-academic relations and my own personal experience as an intelligence professional, who in 2012–2013 acted as the Program Manager of the Canadian federal government's Intelligence Analyst Learning Program within the Privy Council Office.

Academic contributions to the intelligence profession

1. *Intelligence planning and direction* (IPD). Conceptually the first step of the intelligence cycle, IPD is actually a continuous and adaptive process that aims at providing national-level decision makers with relevant and timely intelligence (United States, 2013). Intelligence leaders and planners identify and prioritize intelligence collection requirements through analysis and consultations with stakeholders. They also develop collection and analytic plans and obtain resources for, and manage and coordinate, their execution.

    a. *Academic opportunities*. While the majority of IPD activities are internally conducted without the assistance of academics, the planning efforts surrounding the identification of future threats and situations affecting the national interest or the international order are not within the exclusive purview of intelligence services. Academics engage in foresight and surveillance activities on their own and report their analyses, conclusions and recommendations through scholarly publications and public engagements of various kinds (newspaper op-eds, general interest articles, testimonies before parliament, television interviews, etc.). In carrying out these activities, they position themselves to influence the thinking of intelligence leaders and planners. However, any actual influence on the identification and prioritization of intelligence collection and analytic requirements may simply be fortuitous. To better benefit the intelligence profession in the IPD process, academics can be directly engaged by intelligence services in at least two ways: they could work at developing and validating foresight techniques to map out the range of possible future threats and contingencies, or they could contribute subject-matter expertise in foresight exercises conducted by intelligence services. In domains of knowledge where academics have a comparative advantage over intelligence professionals, they are well positioned to offer valuable contributions. In its periodical analyses of future global trends, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the United States has certainly reached out to the best expetise academia has to offer (Landon-Murray & Caceres-Rodriguez, 2020). After all, as Miller (2010, p. 696) quipped with respect to global economics, 'How well equipped […] is the U.S. [or any other] intelligence community to analyze the security implications of the global recession, which are not secret, without taking recourse to outside expertise?'

b. *Strengths and weaknesses.* Intelligence services cannot cover all potential future threats and contingencies. Despite having access to exclusive sources of information and a wide range of experts, they have gaps in knowledge and collection in many areas, such as epidemiology, environmental science, medicine, geology, demography and a host of other disciplines relevant to the forecast of global trends. Academics with needed subject-matter and methodological expertise and access to additional sources of information could help close these gaps and widen the range and horizons of planning activities. As the IPD process is continuous, timeliness may not be as big a problem as long as academics have the right incentives to clear their agenda for such work. Depending on the level of effort required, academics may work pro bono, or be paid via negotiated contractual agreements. Their engagement may be task specific and strictly limited in time, or extended over time through paid or unpaid consultation arrangements. Given the nature of foresight and long-term surveillance activities, it is not likely that academics would require, or be provided, access to very sensitive intelligence. Should that not be the case, the cost of their engagement would go up to cover the expenses related to background investigations and the protection of classified information.

2. *Intelligence collection, processing and exploitation.* Once priorities are set and plans formulated, the physical collection of intelligence (whether it is information of any kind or something else) and its conversion into forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts or other stakeholders occur. This is done through a wide range of literal (access to human thought processes) and nonliteral (observations and measurements) collection assets and systems (Clark, 2014) and processes such as decryption and translation.

   a. *Academic opportunities.* Academics can be involved in the collection of intelligence process in a variety of ways. First, they can be direct sources of intelligence as their data and scholarly output are generally openly available and can easily be mined by collectors. Epidemiological, geological, demographic and economic data are prime examples. When they have knowledge, views or material that are not openly available (such as, for example, their personal and intimate impressions of individuals encountered abroad; or sensitive and export-controlled technologies of their own making), they can be queried by intelligence services individually or through the hosting of seminars or conferences. Second, they can be voluntarily recruited as one-time or serial collectors themselves or as intermediaries between the intelligence services and those individuals, presumably domestic and foreign students or other academics, needed for specific collection purposes due to their access to specific collection targets. Third, academics can be important sources of innovation in the research and development and exploitation of nonliteral collection systems (mapping, sensing, measuring, etc.). This expertise extends to all science, technology, engineering and mathematical domains.

   b. *Strengths and weaknesses.* Partnerships with academia in specific areas have proven particularly fruitful to intelligence services (for instance in the area of systems engineering) (US Congress, 2002, p. 8). Selected academics can help intelligence collectors evaluate the information they gathered, interpret what

they have seen, read or been told but not necessarily understood, and develop follow-up questions for further collection (Vogel & Dennis, 2018, p. 851). They can provide in-depth research that collectors cannot undertake either because they have a better and unfettered access to data or, comparatively, more expertise and fewer constraints. However, while the use of academics for passive collection can be rather innocuous, the direct collection tasking of academics can lead foreign actors to consider their assigned tasks as nothing but spying. The consequences of such categorization can be severely harmful to academics, especially when travelling abroad, where they would not benefit from diplomatic protection. Many academic institutions, therefore, see the recruiting of sources on campus as immoral (Pfaff & Tiel, 2004, p. 1). The protection of sources and methods in the context of intelligence collection is paramount (Lefebvre, 2018), especially for academics involved in the research and development and exploitation of nonliteral collection systems and those directly tasked to collect specific intelligence. Some academics may be reluctant to sign confidentiality agreements or obtain security clearances. The risks and costs of engaging academics in these collection efforts while worthwhile because of the benefits accrued must be carefully weighed by both parties.

3. *Intelligence analysis*. Once the intelligence collection process has harnessed sufficient information to answer a priority requirement, intelligence analysts make sense of what they now have by developing judgments as to its meaning and implications. Analysts must watch for cognitive biases, disinformation and deception, account for the credibility of the information, and identify information gaps that may still exist. Analysts add value to this process by using their substantive knowledge of the issue at hand and comparing their judgments with the judgments of others, including, where relevant, academics. The intelligence analysis process is not dissimilar to the academic production of knowledge. Whitaker (1999, p. 9) compares them as follow:Intelligence and academia are both in a sense the same business: the systematic and organized collection, analysis, and interpretation of information—and the construction of theories to explain the facts thus processed. […] Both […] tend to labor within frameworks that structure and sometimes limit their capacity to understand changing or disconsonant reality.

a. *Academic opportunities*. Accepting Whitaker's comparison implies that academics are well positioned to make a marked difference. This is compounded by the fact that there are intelligence analysts (such as in the US intelligence community) who have no choice but to leverage outside expertise (United States, 2008) through analytic outreach activities (Landon-Murray & Caceres-Rodriguez, 2020, p. 4). The mechanisms available to academics to build analytical relationships in the United States and elsewhere are therefore numerous. They include direct one-on-one and small group professional relationships (consumed over coffee, informal get togethers and electronic exchanges), positions on part-time or short-duration advisory panels, sabbatical or summer employment, internships (for students), participation in intelligence-sponsored seminars or conferences, scholar-in-residence and post-doctoral programs, fellowship and scholarship opportunities, and even financing the writing of official histories and the operation of centres of analytical excellence within academia.

Involvement in these kinds of mechanisms allow academics to consult with intelligence analysts as well as review and critique their work, assist with the development, applications and evaluation of analytical methodologies, recommend new lines of analysis or research areas, and highlight new research undertaken within academia or the private sector. With respect to the evaluation of analytical methodologies in use within the U.S. and other intelligence communities, academics have taken a solid lead and produced results that should be heeded by professional intelligence analysts to avoid errors through misuse or misundertanding of the limitations of particular methodologies (Chang, Berdini, Mandel, & Tetlock, 2018; Coulthart, 2017; Dhami, Belton, & Mandel, 2019; Mandel, 2020). As Miller (2010 , p. 709) notes, the U.S. intelligence community 'has wisely sought out the expertise and research acumen of many in the academic world who can devise new analytic techniques and methodologies.' After all, he adds, 'it is they, as resident scholars or ad hoc consultants, who also can often spot the frailties and potholes in the community's analytic culture and processes from the standpoint of an objective, observant outsider.'

b. *Strengths and weaknesses*. Intelligence analysts and academics differ on several points (Lefebvre, 2004). Intelligence analysts have access to secret information not available to the academic, while academics make their work accessible to all. The work of intelligence analysts is intended for only a small, selected number of policy consumers, while academics seek the broadest possible audience. Intelligence analysts deal with problems whose consequences could be dire, while academics generally work simply for the cooperative pursuit of knowledge. Intelligence analysts work under considerable time constraints on topics required by decision makers, while academics typically select their subject matters and sets their research, analysis and production schedule at their own discretion (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, pp. 55–56; Whitaker, 1999, p. 10). Accepting these differences as valid implies that the academics engaged in the analytical process do not displace professional intelligence analyst *but rather augment their analytical capabilities by adding rigour, knowledge and innovation*. Vogel and Dennis (2018, p. 853) makes this point forcefully in the context of science and technological development and diffusion:[…] there is a need for STS [science and technology studies] engagement with intelligence to rectify poor models of S&T [science and technological] development and diffusion. Because it seems that dated models of S&T are commonly accepted within intelligence, we would encourage more targeted interventions—for example, the creation of a set of educational modules and regular workshops ("bootcamps") for intelligence practitioners (likely, new analysts or those with strategic portfolios)—that would cover some basic concepts from STS and related fields about science, technology, and weapons drawn from detailed historical and contemporary case studies.In its decadal survey of the social and behavioural sciences [SBS] and intelligence analysis, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2019, p. 292) supported their assertion, noting that intelligence analysts may not be fully aware of methodological and technological breakthroughs in areas of the SBS terrain other than political science and

international relations. But even with respect to the latter domains, Landon-Murray (2011, pp. 494, 500, 504) has noted that U.S. intelligence analysts do not have sufficients 'foundations in social science research and analytic methods (quantitative and qualitative) […] to understand and model complexity and nonlinearity' and recommended that academics take a more active role in fixing this gap (Landon-Murray, 2013–2014, p. 758).Even if intelligence analysts, most of whom are university trained, 'draw on the works of professors and policy experts outside the government' (Burris, 1993, p. 298) in carrying out their work (something which has not yet been empirically studied [Coulthart, 2019, p. 822]), they remain free to reject any academic viewpoints, theories or methods available to them as they 'may easily perceive that they, more than anyone else, really know what is going on; how dangerous the threat really is' (Bruneau, 2001, p. 328). This reflects a kind of hubris and narrowness in thinking that I regularly encountered as an intelligence professional and that was observed by Vogel and Dennis (2018, p. 847):intelligence analysts believe they already know how to do analysis. This is likely true—analysts are rigorously trained and rewarded to conduct analysis in ways that fit into the rules, procedures, practices, culture, and legal restrictions of their own bureaucracy. So, from our reading, this problem of hubris is not necessarily an issue of individual pride but reflective of institutional culture, bureaucratic conformity, and rewards. Therefore, even if analysts take training courses or go to talks, they may not apply any insights gleaned into their own daily work because this new thinking does not fit into their current workflows or work culture. Intelligence analysts need simple, practical methods for incorporating new knowledge into their work practices. Furthermore, intelligence managers must be educated to support analysts using these new approaches.Despite the existence of successful academic-intelligence relationships, these are not universally welcome on campuses, usually on moral and ethical grounds (Drake, 2019). Academics themselves are often ambivalent and reluctant to obtain security clearances to access classified information so as not to endanger their ability to publish freely in the future (Vogel & Dennis, 2018, p. 846). Depending on the nature of the relationship, cost can be an issue as well as some relationships require significant sources of funding to deliver the expected results. Overall, the inclusion of academia into the analytical process must be carefully planned, coordinated and managed by both parties. The benefits can be important and significant, but the pitfalls sources or irritants and scandals.

4. *Intelligence dissemination*. The timely dissemination of intelligence products to stakeholders who could directly benefit and make use of them is the last step of the intelligence cycle. Recipients of unclassified products may include academics due to their professional or personal interest in certain subjects.

   a. *Academic opportunities*. Academics can help address and resolve hard technical problems related to the electronic dissemination of intelligence products, for instance by designing or improving knowledge management systems. Other academics can help students and a variety of audiences critically interpret and

understand particular intelligence products released to the public. Landon-Murray and Caceres-Rodriguez (2020, p. 5) have captured this role well:well-informed academics can act as intelligence accountability stakeholders and help keep the public informed about intelligence in the context of conspiracy theories and misinformation. Thus, scholars can identify actual problems or shortcomings (publicly or directly to IC [Intelligence Community] partners), but also correct politicized, baseless accusations against intelligence agencies made by politicians and others. This has been a continuing role for academics, but arguably one that is getting more difficult and important.

b. *Strengths and weaknesses*. While they may directly help intelligence services when providing technical solutions and educating students and the public of intelligence matters, academics also may hinder the message of intelligence services by taking lines contrary to their advice to decision makers. The latter is inevitable as there cannot be any compromise of the freedom of speech of academics (unless, of course, they use classified information without authorization).

Intelligence professionals' contributions to academia

1. *Contributing to the education of professors and students*. Universities can appoint qualified intelligence professionals as contract instructors, adjunct faculty members, professors of practice or scholars-in-residence to teach intelligence-related courses (or, alternatively, courses specific to their analytical area of expertise), sit on thesis committees or perform other scholarly duties. Intelligence professionals can also participate in university life at a much lower cost as guest speakers, seminar leaders, commentators on students' presentations or panelists at university-organized events. In carrying out these activities, intelligence professionals would use their knowledge and experience to assist professors and students better understand what intelligence is all about, including its successes and failures, capabilities, limitations and accountabilities. Landon-Murray and Caceres-Rodriguez (2020, pp. 9–10) aptly observe in this regard that 'just as the IC can learn from academic research, scholars can learn from research done in the IC. […] Practitioner research can help enrich the work of academics, providing grounded views of intelligence.' As government representatives, intelligence professionals can play an important role in explaining the duty of governments to engage in intelligence gathering. As Pfaff and Tiel (2004, p. 4) argue, this is a moral duty that must be understood by citizens:governments have a duty to determine what threats lie on the horizons for their citizens, a duty which offers a moral justification—even stronger—a moral requirement for intelligence-gathering. To fail to engage in intelligence-gathering would be to shirk a moral duty lying at the core of a government's responsibility, for without timely information as to a potential enemy's capability and intentions, civic defense is impossible.Of course, understanding the legitimate role of intelligence does not imply to 'allow it to run rampant' (Bruneau, 2001, p. 333). Intelligence professionals involved in academic activities must therefore be prepared to be critiqued and even see their views entirely dismissed, while acknowledging that in properly functioning democratic

polities the oversight and review of intelligence activities is important and of value to intelligence services.

Beyond the confines of the campus, tremendous opportunities exist for intelligence professionals to share their knowledge and experience to the benefit of professors and students. They can attend, present papers or act as discussant at local, regional, national or international conferences, the annual meetings of academic associations (the International Studies Association, for instance, is well attended by retired and serving intelligence professionals), or smaller, invitation-only gatherings of academics. They can also attend classes as graduate students toward a master's or doctorate degree, or simply complete short executive training sessions (for example, the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government's Senior Executives in National and International Security 2-week seminar) to upgrade specific skills and extend their networking.

Pursuing one or several of these opportunities, while at face value beneficial to both parties, comes at a cost. Financial (e.g. for travel, graduate education, conference fees) and time commitments may preclude intelligence services from selecting or authorizing, depending on the activity at hand, a large number of participants. While many of these opportunities can be confined within the walls of academia, their substantive contents can easily move to full public court. To prevent public controversies (such as being accused of politicizing the intelligence profession), intelligence professionals may therefore not be as candid as they would wish to be, thus diminishing somewhat the value of what they bring to academia through their academic engagement.

2. *Contributing to the development of a disciplinary body of knowledge.* Serving intelligence professionals can write and publish peer-reviewed academic work of quality or of policy relevance, either under a pseudonym or their own name if authorized. Few, however, do. The reasons are diverse and culturally contextual, but generally involve a lack of time, resources or the support of their own intelligence service. Those who do must comply with additional standards, largely security-related, which make the task slightly more cumbersome than in academia. If they are not in a position to write and publish, they can help academia generate disciplinary bodies of knowledge in other ways, for example by granting interviews to academic researchers, responding to academic queries or making scarce research materials available (for instance, to have the history of specific intelligence services written). More importantly, intelligence services and associated bodies can fund individual academics and basic and applied research programs at universities and think tanks that would benefit both their short and long-term interests. However, the conditions upon which funding is provided (i.e. overtly or covertly) can be extremely contentious and must be carefully thought out by both parties. Once retired, some intelligence professionals (in larger numbers than serving ones) write memoirs or accounts of particular intelligence activities, episodes or actors. These publications contribute to the bodies of knowledge on intelligence and history by providing rare and sometimes exclusive insights, but they are of uneven quality (Johnson, 1990, p. 215). As academics do not have a monopoly on knowledge creation, and as there are knowledge gaps with respect to intelligence, the active engagement of intelligence professionals in

academic efforts at knowledge generation should be welcomed and encouraged, notwithstanding the constraints noted above.

3. *Contributing to the education and training of future intelligence professionals*. This refers to the funding of centres of academic excellence and the involvement of intelligence professionals as professors of practice (or any other applicable terms of employment) in offering vocational and specialized training to prepare students for specific employment within a country's intelligence community. While students in these programs arguably benefit from a well-rounded education, the educational focus is weighted in favour of practical knowledge and skills that could quickly be employed in a working intelligence setting. As the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to the teaching of intelligence are well covered in Johnson (2020) and Landon-Murray and Coulthart (2020), it is worth adding that long-term intelligence funding and technical support to centres of excellence dedicated to that task have helped build long-term positive partnerships with colleges and universities. These educational institutions have graduated highly-qualified and motivated individuals with core skills that align with intelligence requirements. While research intensive universities would not and have not favoured such an approach to the teaching of intelligence, colleges and teaching universities have found this opportunity rewarding and worth the effort.

4. *Contributing to public debate*. This is a contentious subject. On the one hand, intelligence professionals are expected to stay clear of politics and public controversies, while on the other hand they are expected to be accountable for their actions. While debating political choices is out of the question in advanced democratic polities, intelligence leaders can still engage in broad terms with important issues impacting the nation. They can do that in the course of parliamentary testimonies, speeches at conferences or other public events and media interviews. Their intervention would help politicians of all stripes and the general public understand what intelligence is all about as well as account for specific activities carried out by their respective intelligence service. Academics can play a useful role in helping intelligence leaders participate in public debates. They can act as moderators in questions and answers sessions, invite intelligence leaders to speak at public events, or interview them in podcasts or other media. While the participation of serving intelligence professionals and leaders in public debates is largely contingent on a country's national and intelligence cultures, the participation of retired intelligence officials in these activities is not as restrained. Hence, it is now more common than ever before for retired intelligence officials to play the role of public intellectuals in media or academic settings. Here, Bruneau (2001, p. 334) is correct to write that[public] debate serves numerous important functions: (a) It demythologizes intelligence, thereby allowing outsiders to more realistically assess its necessity and value to the country; (b) it creates legitimate positions for civilians who want to become intelligence specialists; and (c) it puts pressure on the government to be more transparent.The downsides to participating in public debates, however, are potentially serious and can be damaging to the reputation and integrity of intelligence organizations. For instance, the more open intelligence professionals are about intelligence activities, the more subject to political pressures they are going to be. Their intervention in public debates can be used to embarrass the governing political party or scandalize the public, leaving aside anything of

substance they may have contributed to the debate. Once the involvement of intelligence professionals in public debate is outside the domain of academia and within the larger public domain, there is not much academics can do to mitigate negative effects. Intelligence leaders will therefore think carefully and seek advice from their political masters on the extent of their participation in public debate and whether it is even warranted. In the end, they ought not to engage in partisan debates or serve any particular political interest. Complete silence or a severe lack of openness is however not an appropriate solution in a democratic polity. As academics would benefit from the engagement of intelligence professionals in public debate, their assistance in devising rigorous and appropriate mechanisms to carry out public debates in meaningful, respectful and useful ways would be welcome.

Threats

While opportunities to further academic-intelligence relationships in positive ways abound, so are the threats to the academic side of *the* dyad. As Golden (2017) reported and recent court cases in the United States show, institutions of higher education, academics and students are prime targets of foreign intelligence services. Foreign students and professors can be used as collection sources of proprietary information and material subject to export or security controls (United States, 2019). Through influence activities (such as accepting foreign financial support followed by pressures to promote particular narratives or policies), students and professors of all origins can wittingly or unwittingly compromise their own integrity and further the national interests of a foreign nation (Golden, 2017; United States, 2019). The cyber domain is an important vector for these threats, but so is the openness of educational institutions and the lack of awareness of the professorial and administrative bodies of most colleges and universities. The opportunity for foreign intelligence exploitation is proportional to the effort of national governments to devise and implement an adequate counter-intelligence program, and of educational institutions to become aware of the threat to its members as well as academic integrity and freedom.

Intelligence services can help institutions of higher education develop and implement effective academic security awareness programs. To assist in this effort, in 2005 the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB). Unfortunately disbanded a couple of years ago, it was mandated to act as a forum for discussion of national security issues that would alert college and university administrators of threats facing their communities and facilitate any assistance the FBI or other agencies could provide at any campus nationwide. Now better sensitized to the intelligence threat they face, college and university associations are acting proactively to raise the awareness of their member institutions. The Association of American Universities (AAU) is a case in point. Its website contains a wealth of security resources and it seeks to maintain a government-university partnership in place in the absence of the NSHEAB (Association of American Universities, 2018). Similar associations within the Five Eyes circle of countries are now emulating the AAU.

To further promote the security awareness of foreign intelligence threats at colleges and universities, it would be useful if intelligence services could identify points of contact at the local level that would be available to provide technical advice and follow up on institutional progress. These points of contact could be part of or accountable to coordinators of

academic relations, who ideally serve at the coal face of academic intelligence partnerships. If intelligence agencies are not proactive on that front, it would then behoove the security staff at colleges and universities to seek out the appropriate intelligence or national security advisers to develop an adequate security awareness program. Their bigger challenge, however, could well be recalcitrant university administrators who would prefer to avoid any potential restrictions on academic freedom, even on the grounds of national security, which is not the business of institutions of higher education to act upon.

Conclusion

As Vogel and Dennis correctly observed, 'there is no "one size fits all" to academia–intelligence engagement' (Vogel & Dennis, 2018, p. 839). Each country is free to pursue the opportunities that best suit its requirements within the context of its national and intelligence culture. All the opportunities discussed in this article have been tried at one time of another and in some cases met with unmitigated success. In other cases, the success was ephemeral and similar efforts restarted at a later time. World events, budget levels, individual leaders and institutional interests all have at one time or another impacted the various relationships and forced them to go the way of oblivion or another direction. While opportunities abound, it remains that they must be carried out by individuals who have the motivation, the capacity and the interest to bring them to fruition in a way that would be beneficial to both parties while abiding with all applicable and relevant ethical and security norms. While the going may be tough, the rewards can be sizeable: the nation is safer and knowledge creation is significantly facilitated.

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