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# Following the creative capital model: the social consequences for urban and suburban counties

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**Following the creative capital model: The social consequences for urban and suburban counties**

by

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A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

Many cities have tried different solutions to develop the city economically. The creative capital model of economic development is gaining acceptance as a viable model of development for city planners and mayors (Dreher 2002; Kratke 2010; Long 2009; Peck 2007; Ponzini and Rossi 2010). According to Florida (2002) a city should attract what he termed creative people to aid the city's economic development. These creative class individuals will bring their creative ideas to the city, which will then attract businesses to the city. The arrival of businesses and creative class individuals should create an economic and social panacea for the city. Many studies have examined the economic benefits of the creative capital model (McGranahan and Wojan's 2007; Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004; Ward 2007), but few studies have examined how the social aspects of life would be affected by the creative capital model. The current study used data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the FBI Uniform Crime report to examine the effects of creative capital on social development. Urban and suburban counties were examined with age structure, creative segregation, creative exposure, and crime. The findings indicate that the creative capital model produces segregation along class lines, exposure to creative class ideas has been overstated by Florida, and the age structure of the city affects the creativity in the county. Crime may be reduced in creative areas, but with increased segregation some areas may experience an increase in crime.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Whirlpool announced that it was closing its manufacturing plant in Newton, Iowa, which employed 1,000 workers. The closure came after Whirlpool acquired the Newton plant from rival manufacturer Maytag. In October 2009, Electrolux announced that the company would close all manufacturing plants in Iowa. Electrolux closed a plant in Jefferson in 2010, and a plant in Webster City stopped operations in 2011. Electrolux moved the plants to Juarez, Mexico along with the 850 jobs the plants had employed in Iowa.

Closures of manufacturing plants are a common occurrence as the United States has begun a shift in its economy from manufacturing to service (Cooke 2002; Rutten 2003). With this shift, cities throughout the United States have had to adjust to the new work economy. In 2007, the United States experienced the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression. This served to compound the problems caused by plant closures. The Great Recession set in, and many people lost their jobs and homes. Americans across the country could no longer live in the same manner they had in the past.

The current recession has a large impact for many communities around the country. The suburbs, once a safe haven from the negative social ills of the city, are now becoming more like the cities from which they have tried to isolate themselves. One of the consequences for many suburbs is increased crime. For instance, suburbs of Charlotte, North Carolina have experienced a significant increase in crime in recent years:

Charlottes' crime rates have stayed flat overall in recent years – but from 2003 to 2006, in the 10 suburbs of the city that have experienced the highest foreclosure rates, crime rose 33 percent. Civic organizations in some suburbs have begun to mow the lawns around empty houses to keep up the appearance of stability. Police departments are mapping foreclosures in an effort to identify emerging criminal hot spots. (Leinberger 2008)

Citizens of Tampa and St. Petersburg are expecting similar increases in crime due to the increased foreclosure rates.

The foreclosure crisis engulfing neighborhoods across the Tampa Bay area is a sign to most people of a distressed economy. But to the law enforcement officers who patrol these neighborhoods, the empty homes represent something else entirely: a haven for crime. Scattered in the central neighborhoods of St. Petersburg and Tampa, or in the zombie subdivisions that dot the exurbs of Hillsborough and Pasco counties, abandoned homes provide a place for thieves to stash their stolen goods and for addicts to get high, authorities say. (Van Sickler and Thalji 2010)

Florida was hit the hardest by the economic downturn, with a foreclosure rate of nearly 20 percent, which was the highest in the country (Christie 2011).

To combat the growing crime problem in the suburbs, some banks have begun to simply knock down foreclosed homes (Florida 2010). The banks believe that they will lose money because housing values in the neighborhood will plummet due to the homeless sleeping in empty homes and vandals breaking fixtures in the foreclosed homes. To prevent the loss of falling housing prices, the banks knock down the empty homes and hope to sell the land.

In addition to concerns about communities as a whole, specific groups of individuals have suffered from the economic downturn. For instance, uneducated workers may be particularly hard hit by the recession. According to Censky (2011) “in 1980, workers with a high school diploma earned about 71% of what college-educated workers made. In 2010, that number fell to 55%.” Today, a college education can mean the difference between stagnant wages and a foreclosed home, or achieving the American Dream. The downshift in the economy has left many uneducated people unable to achieve the material success that is at the core of the American Dream. As Messner and Rosenfeld (2001: 68) noted, “a strong achievement orientation, a commitment to competitive individualism, universalism, and, most important, the glorification of material success – have their underpinnings in the economy”. People without a



college degree are being shut out of the material success to which the educated worker has more access.

Those that can attain a college degree are now separating themselves both economically and socially. The educated are now working in jobs that Richard Florida (2002a) calls *creative jobs*, and Robert Reich (1991; 2002) calls *symbolic-analytic services*. These jobs are knowledge based, require a high level of skill, and are high paid. For example, engineers, accountants, artists, and professors are symbolic-analytic service occupations. Some cities have seen an increase in the employment of creative workers, by providing creative jobs and thus attracting highly educated people to their communities.

Meanwhile, at the other end of the work spectrum, the uneducated are losing jobs in manufacturing. Traditionally, manufacturing jobs have been unionized and have provided good pay and good benefits to their workers. However, these jobs have been moving to other countries or have been rendered obsolete because of technological advances. Service work is now replacing manufacturing work in the United States (Beauregard 1993). Whereas manufacturing jobs provided good income and benefits, service work is typically low paying and does not provide satisfactory benefits.

Florida (2002; 2005; 2008) has suggested that not only do workers have to adjust to the new economy, but cities must reinvent themselves as well. Cities that have not been able to attract creative industries will instead see an increase in low end service jobs, such as cashiers, hotel employees, and taxi drivers. This divide between creative cities and service cities has large consequences not only for the people of the United States, but for the cities and regions that comprise the country.

## **The Tale of Two Cities**

With gently rolling hills, 17 lakes, and 125 miles of biking, hiking, and running trails Eden Prairie, Minnesota – a suburb of Minneapolis – seems like to perfect place to settle down. Eden Prairie also boasts excellent public schools, low unemployment, and safe streets. Sitting on the banks of the Mississippi River, St. Louis, Missouri also seems like a picturesque city. Post cards often show the St. Louis Arch and the Old Courthouse as the sun sets in the background. Even though both cities present themselves as great places to live, they are likely perceived very differently by the public. Eden Prairie was named the “Best Place to Live in America, 2010” by CNN (Braverman, Crews, Lee, Levine, Mangla, Richardson, Rosato, and Van Noordennen 2010), and St. Louis was named the most dangerous city in the United States (CQ Press 2010).

Lists that rank cities on various characteristics, such as those described above, are very easy for the general public to read and understand and are prevalent in the media. This may be why Richard Florida’s (2002a) concept of the creative class (2002a) has become so popular. The quantification of economic and social factors, along with the “tabling of cities” performance on these measures contributes to the popularity of Florida’s theories (Berry 2003; Glaeser 2004; Lewis and Donald 2010; Peck 2005, 2007). Moreover, the public image of many cities is affected by these rankings in Florida’s tables (Berry 2003; Glaeser 2004; Lewis and Donald 2010; Peck 2005, 2007) and by inclusion on such lists as the “Best Places to Live in America.” Cities across the world have begun to adopt Richard Florida’s model of development, such as Wollongong in Australia (Barnes, Waitt, Gill, and Gibson 2006), Copenhagen in Denmark (Bayliss 2007), and Austin (McCann 2007) and Milwaukee (Ward 2007) in the United States.

Scholars have been rating cities on a number of factors for years. The ratings can range from indications of which cities are in the best economic position to which city has the best

school systems. Often these ratings end up in lists in non-academic articles that are posted on websites such as Yahoo.com. Although reading the lists of top party cities (Murphy 2008) or best city for singles (Hunt 2010) may be fun to do for entertainment, the lists are often generated from larger studies and do have implications. Mayors and city planners often take steps to make their city appear on the lists of best cities in the United States and best places to raise a family, while trying to avoid making lists such as the 25 most dangerous cities (CQ 2010) and seven cities about to sink (Weiner 2010).

A step that some have taken to enhance the image of a city has been to try to attract the creative class to the city. For instance, former Governor of Iowa and current United States Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack launched a “Great Places Initiative” with the hope of turning Iowa into the creative capital of the Midwest (Iowa Arts News 2005). With help from Richard Florida, Governor Vilsack held conferences and workshops designed to change Iowa from a state that loses jobs and people into a destination area for new businesses and educated people to work and live.

In fact, increasing the number of creative jobs in a city does seem to have implications for the image of the city. As noted above, Eden Prairie, Minnesota and St. Louis, Missouri are perceived very differently in the media. One big difference between Eden Prairie and St. Louis is the difference in number of creative jobs. Minneapolis, of which Eden Prairie is a suburb, has fared well in obtaining creative jobs while St. Louis has not been able to attract creative jobs to the city. As Lewis and Donald (2010: 32) stated “cities that are successful in attracting creativity will continue to do so and cities that are not have limited chances of reversing their fate”. According to Florida (2002a), this is because educated people are flocking to cities like Austin, Washington D.C., and Minneapolis. Meanwhile, the uneducated are living in cities like St.

Louis, Detroit, and Buffalo, which are often described as declining or decaying cities. Economic opportunities are low in these cities, and this lack of opportunity may lead to decay, crime, and other social ills.

Scholars in the past have stated that the wealthy will always move away from the poor within a city. Banfield (1968: 23) stated that:

If the distribution of wealth and income is such that some can afford new housing and the time and money to commute considerable distances to work while others cannot, the expanding periphery of the city must be occupied by the first group (the “well-off”) while the older, inner parts of the city, where most of the jobs are, must be occupied by the second group (the “not well-off”).

In the past, uneducated workers could enjoy a certain level of comfort because manufacturing provided a good salary and benefits. A worker in the Maytag or Electrolux plant could afford to live in a neighborhood where those with higher levels of education, such as teachers or lawyers, also lived. Today, the low level service worker is no longer able to afford to live in the same neighborhood as higher end service workers. Thus, cities are experiencing segregation based on those who are in creative jobs and those who are not.

### **Economic Versus Social Development**

Many of the ratings of cities are based only on economic factors. Former Governor Vilsack’s idea to turn Iowa into the creative capital center of the Midwest is guilty of using only economic factors to determine the health and vitality of his state. Economic development is not social development. There are many measures that can describe the health of a city or state that are not measurable in economic terms. Thus, when solely economic factors are considered, it is not clear what this type of development means in terms of social factors for the people who live in the city and state.

For example, Moore and Daday (2010) argued that economic development in a sample of sub-Saharan African countries was not aiding the social development in those countries. Scholars argued that one of the reasons countries in sub-Saharan Africa were not developing as quickly as other countries was because the educational system was not as advanced in Africa. Thus, scholars argued that an increase in funding for schools would drastically increase development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Moore and Daday (2010) demonstrated that no development would occur by increasing funding to schools. There were social problems in the region that needed to be addressed before this type of economic development were to work. For instance, social issues that would be difficult to measure economically but that were affecting the region included land tenure issues, poor government choices, and disease. Therefore, social development must be taken into account when developing any plan to increase the health of a country, state, or city.

Moreover, scholars have pointed out that many of the lists that Richard Florida creates on which to rank cities seem to favor large metropolitan areas (Lewis and Donald 2010). It is unclear if smaller cities could become creative centers that can attract the creative class to them. Small cities might not be able to attract creative industries to their area. Donald and Morrow (2003) stated that Canadian cities tend to market the creative areas of the city while ignoring budget problems, poor quality of life for the poor, and inequality within the city. Thus, focusing on increasing creative jobs or attracting creative individuals might result in neglect of the social concerns of cities.

Even with the flaws in his theory, Richard Florida remains a highly popular scholar for many urban planners and mayors. Ponzini and Rossi (2010: 1040) stated “despite being criticized by academics both in theoretical terms and in terms of their urban and regional

applications, the creative city and class theory and discourse have been greatly successful, particularly amongst policy-makers and urban leaders.” Therefore, the present study examines the impact of Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class on cities.

In this study, crime is used to examine the effect creativity has on a city. Richard Florida (2002, 2005a, 2008) has continually stated that social and economic problems will be solved by development based around creativity. Other studies have examined faults in Florida’s model (Bontje and Musterd 2009; Darchen and Tremblay 2010; Kratke 2010; Lewis and Donald 2010; Long 2009; Martin-Brelot, Grossetti, Eckert, Gritsai, and Kovacs 2010; Ponzini and Rossi 2010; Rutten and Gelissen 2008), but no studies have examined how crime may be affected by.

Florida (2002a) suggested that one reason why all people within a city benefit from creative workers is the interaction creative people will have with each other. Florida asserted that creative workers love to talk and interact with people, and this is precisely how creative people generate new ideas. However, Florida (2002a) provided no evidence that this is the case. Moreover, there is no evidence that demonstrates that creative workers are interacting with noncreative workers. The present study used an educational exposure measure to examine if Florida’s assertion was accurate.

Finally, as the creative class workers move to cities, it is not clear what this movement means to urban and suburban areas. Florida (2002a) suggested that creative workers are a great economic and social boom for a city, but this has not been proven. Florida (2002a) goes to great lengths in his book to explain how cities that attract the creative workers to them will be the best cities in the United States, both economically and socially. However, it is not clear where creative class workers are living within the cities. It is possible that creative class workers do move to trendy downtown districts, but it is also feasible that creative class workers are moving

to suburban areas with large houses and big yards. Moreover, it is not clear if creative class workers are living along with noncreative workers, or if the creative class workers are segregating themselves within the city. The current study used a segregation measure to explore these possibilities.

The current study serves as an examination of the movement from manufacturing to service work, and its impact on urban areas. Using Richard Florida's concept of the creative class, the study will explore (1) where the creative class are moving, (2) if crime is prevalent in creative class cities, (3) if creative class workers do interact with each other and with noncreative workers, and (4) if the creative class workers have segregated themselves from the noncreative class workers. Data was gathered from the United States Census Bureau and the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. The different time periods were used to examine the movement of the creative class over time. Urban and suburban counties were examined along with the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to view if any differences existed between the two areas.

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORY

### Creative Capital

According to Richard Florida (2002a), the nature of work has changed in the United States and for all countries of the West. The changed economy has created a new development model: the creative class. Florida (2002a) has suggested that for cities to be viable and to be able to grow in the future, they must develop along the guidelines that he has set out. However, as will be discussed in this chapter, Florida has not provided a clear definition of the creative class, and he has not provided any relevant path for researchers and policy makers to follow.

Florida pointed out that manufacturing jobs and other blue collar work are now leaving the United States for countries in the Global South. These countries in the Global South can produce the same goods as the United States, but for less money. “There can be little doubt that the age we are living through is one of tremendous economic and social transformation” (Florida 2005a: 3). What has replaced the blue collar jobs is what Florida has labeled creative capital.

According to Florida, the creative capital model is the best model to follow because other economic and social models of development are outdated. Researchers need to understand and acknowledge the shift in the economy to produce better models of development. Traditional models have focused on social bonds and networks, such as social capital, but for Florida these older models are no longer useful. Florida (2005a: 31) states:

The kinds of communities both that we desire and that generate economic prosperity are different than those of the past. Social structures that were important in earlier years now work against prosperity. Traditional notions of what it means to be a close, cohesive community and society tend to inhibit economic growth and innovation.

Past models suggested that people wanted strong civic connections in their communities.

However, today’s people want a more loosely based community where an individual can have anonymity, and the neighbors do not ask questions about others’ activities.



The shift in the economy from manufacturing to service has produced employees who often work by themselves or from home. This increased individualism makes communities based on social capital or networks overwhelming for the creative class. According to Florida (2002: 235), “centers of the Creative Class are more likely to be economic winners”, while “Working Class centers tend to be economically stagnant” and service class centers may be growing but “many of these are low-wage dead-end jobs.”

The creative class is made up of two groups: the super-creative core and the creative professionals. The super-creative core is made up of workers, such as “scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects” (Florida 2005a: 34). Florida (2005a) went on to state that problem solving and analytical work are the bases of the jobs of those in the super-creative core. The type of work included in the creative professional category are workers who “work in a wide range of knowledge-intensive industries such as high-tech sectors, financial services, the legal and health-care professions, and business management” (Florida 2005a: 34).

Cities based around knowledge-intensive creative work attract the creative workers, because creative class people are choosing where to live and what areas of the country are creative enough for them to remain there. Florida stated “the U.S. working population is resorting itself geographically along class lines” (2002: 241). The creative class attracts jobs and businesses, as the creative class are determining where to live and what amenities each city has. Cities that are able to attract the creative class are the cities that ultimately will offer the best standard of living, according to Florida.

Florida’s concept of creative capital has become widely popular among urban planners, mayors, and has even gained traction in other countries (Kratke 2010; Ponzini and Rossi 2010).

While academics and researchers have pointed out many problems with Florida's concept of creative capital, "in popular media, however, the outpouring of praise has squelched any mention of scholarly criticism" (Long 2009: 210). Long (2009: 210) stated that Florida has "achieved near rockstar status", and Dreher (2002: 1) suggested that Florida has attracted "the type of attention usually garnered by salacious fiction or celebrity tell-alls." In Florida's book *Who's Your City* (2008) Florida has endorsements from Cybill Shepherd and Chef Mario Batali. These celebrities stated how the creative class and Florida's theory can aid a community to become vibrant and growing. Despite criticism from scholars, cities and states are following Florida's creative capital model and developing "hipsterisation strategies" and are undergoing "creativity makeovers" (Peck 2007: 37). In fact:

It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of Richard Florida's notion of the creative class on urban and regional economic development strategies across the USA. Many large cities in the USA now have some form of talent attraction strategy in place, in some cases involving extensive place marketing aimed at promoting a cosmopolitan and vibrant place to live... This thinking is percolating across the Atlantic to the UK and beyond, boosted by Florida's high-profile visits to Europe (Houston, Findlay, Harrison, and Mason 2008: 135).

### **What is Creative Capital?**

Creative capital can be "considered as a complementary approach to the human capital model" (Darchen and Tremblay 2010: 256). Human capital theorists (Glaeser 2004) have argued that if the education level of individuals is increased, economic growth will result. Human capital is "any form of acquired skills or knowledge that could be used to improve the individual's ability to perform productive work must be considered capital investments" (Abrokwa 1999: 653). Sachs (2005: 244) pointed out that human capital is the "health, nutrition, and skills needed for each person to be economically productive."

To acquire the skills and knowledge needed for individuals to be economically productive, it is essential that the state, city, or neighborhood develop a robust educational system (Grosse, Harttgen, and Klasen 2008; Hage, Garnier, and Fuller 1988; Nwonwu 2008). Moore and Daday (2010: 285) explained “in theory the development of human capital will then produce a population that is attractive to multinational corporations. The multinational corporations will then produce employment opportunities, which will raise the standard of living in the country.” The research on human capital has yielded mixed results, with many scholars pointing out both the positive and negative results of human capital on development (Jaffe 1998; Nwonwu 2008; Oketch 2005; Sachs 2005; Sommons 1979).

Florida (2002a) differs from human capital theory by looking at “precise categories of human capital” (Darchen and Tremblay 2010: 226). According to Florida, specific types of people are needed to aid in economic and social development, namely, the creative class. He has stated that individuals being trained and educated in fields that are not creative will not aid in economic and social development. On the other hand, the human capital approach considers all training and education as positive, even noncreative education and training. Secondly, Florida (2002; 2008) focuses on locational decisions for the creative class. The creative classes choose where to live and then move according to their desires. Thus, cities, states, and countries need to provide amenities that will attract these creative people to the area. In contrast, human capital theory does not claim that the educated will simply leave once a city expands its educational system. The idea behind human capital is that the area that increases its education level will benefit, not areas that can provide creative amenities. Finally, Florida’s creative capital model differs from human capital in its focus on other factors that drive development. For instance,

Florida asserted that tolerance – a large foreign born and a thriving homosexual population – will increase the social and economic standing of an area.

Scholars have criticized Florida because he has not clearly operationalized his concept of creative capital. Ponzini and Rossi (2010: 1040) stated:

Richard Florida avoids providing detailed prescriptions about how his theory should be applied to specific contexts of urban policy: his work is deliberately open to any kind of translation and application in the policy field. He does not enter, therefore, the complex sphere of urban policy and spatial planning and does not attempt to scrutinize the multifaceted relationships existing among actors, resources (political, legal, economic) and the set of socio-spatial practices co-existing in the urban field.

However, from Florida's writings it is clear that creative capital is made up of what Florida calls the "Three T's": Technology, Talent, and Tolerance. Communities that are able to acquire large amounts of the Three T's will have increased economic and social development.

Technology is defined by Florida (2002) as the number of patents produced by a city. Thus, Boston, which produces a large amount of patents in the United States (Strumsky and Lobo 2011), has a large amount of technology. According to Florida, areas with a large amount of technology will have an inventive culture in the area. Therefore, inventors and entrepreneurs can bounce ideas off of each other and learn from all the technology around them. For instance, if a creative person produces a great idea, another creative person can then take that idea and build upon it.

With a large amount of technology present, the community will then be able to attract talent to the area. Talent is operationalized by Florida as the percentage of bachelor's degrees in the city. According to Florida, the highly educated people drive creativity. Cities that have a large base of people with college degrees will be able to attract jobs. Businesses will move to these cities because these cities has a large base of educated people ready to work without

requiring much additional training. Thus, as the talent level increases the employment options also increase.

Finally, Florida has suggested that tolerance is of great significance to urban and community growth. Florida (2005) stated that tolerance is the most important part of the Three T's. Other scholars have pointed out that values do produce economic growth (Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang 1996; Harrison and Huntington 2000), but Florida differs from previous scholars in his conception of tolerance. When Florida discussed the role of diversity (what he refers to as tolerance) he does not mean diversity in terms of people with differing racial/ethnic groups and socioeconomic status. Florida operationalizes tolerance in a number of ways, but all his definitions of tolerance include the percentage of foreign born residents and the percentage of homosexuals in the community.

The city of Memphis has a large African American population, and many researchers would agree that it is a diverse city. However, Florida ranked Memphis as one of the lowest in creativity. In *The Flight of the Creative Class* (2005b) Florida explained that a large foreign born population is one of the best indicators of economic and social growth. A large number of immigrants come to the United States to go to college, and upon graduation will stay in the United States to work. Cities that are able to attract the educated immigrants will see increases in technology and talent as new ideas are brought to them. Cities that cannot attract educated immigrants will have the same ideas as before and cannot grow as quickly.

To Florida, a large homosexual population is a sign of a city's openness to different groups of people, as many different groups of people will feel comfortable in a city where a large homosexual population is accepted. Immigrants and youth will want to move to a city that is accepting of differences. Moreover, Florida stated that cities with a large homosexual population

will have a more vibrant social life. His reasoning was that this is because the city will have areas that cater to many different people. Whether one is heterosexual or homosexual, born in the United States or an immigrant, and regardless of one's race or gender, such a city will have a creative social life for each individual.

### **Problems with Creative Capital**

Many critics of Richard Florida have suggested that the concept of creative capital is simply elitism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Maliszewski 2004) because the thesis behind Florida's creative class is that communities need to attract highly educated people who work in creative jobs (i.e. white collar jobs). Zimmerman (2008: 233) called Florida's work a "highly readable exercise in yuppie self-indulgence."

First, as cities develop creative centers to attract the creative class, the poor are pushed out to other areas of the city. Moreover, the focus of development on the upper-middle and upper classes has led some to argue that the poor are completely ignored in Florida's creative class thesis (Wilson and Keil 2008). Richard Florida (2005b) responded to this criticism by stating that all workers are creative, and the country needs to find a way to tap all the creativity for all workers (Florida 2005b). By ignoring the creativity in manufacturing and low-end service work, the United States is losing ground in the global marketplace to countries that have been able to bring creativity to other employment areas (Florida 2005b).

Second, critics have pointed out that Florida's creative class is not a real social class (Kratke 2010). Florida simplified class distinction into the creative class, manufacturing class, and the service class. However, at other times he has simply divided classes into the educated creative class and the uneducated class. The concept of social class has traditionally been cloudy at best, with arbitrarily defined categories based on occupational groups, social status, and

income (Anderson 1974; Milios 2000), but Florida has muddied the waters even further (Kratke 2010). Florida lumped together engineers, artists, writers, politicians, professors, athletes, accountants, businesses owners, photographers, and any other creative worker into one single class. Rutten and Gelissen (2008: 987) explained that “the only thing that these people have in common professionally is that they get paid to solve problems of all sorts using their creativity.” Florida never discussed how an accountant, professional athlete, and politician have economic and social interest in common. It is assumed that all creative people will work for the betterment of a city, simply because they are creative.

Long (2009) stated that Florida’s concept of the creative class provides strategies and guidelines that are followed by mayors, city councils, and urban planners, and Vanolo (2008) wrote that these plans are inexpensive, low-risk, and modest. However, critics have pointed out that the definition of creative capital is unclear. Creativity is difficult to define and is a subjective concept (Boden 2004; Lewis and Donald 2010). Who determines what is creative? A writer may say his work is creative, but is that true or do other people need to acknowledge that his writings are creative? Moreover, because of the ambiguous concept of creativity, many studies have been riddled with selective choice of data and a lack of connection to any policy application (Markusen 2003). Much of the research is characterized by boosterism and mimicry rather than with any thoughtful planning based on social and economic welfare (Lewis and Donald 2010).

Third, some scholars have pointed out that many of the factors which Florida describes as part of the creative class are overwhelmingly found in large cities (Donald and Morrow 2003; Lewis and Donald 2010). Small cities are left out of the creative market simply because they do not have the ability to attract creative jobs and immigrants as easily as larger metropolitan areas.

Hyndman, Schuurman and Fiedler (2006) found that immigrant concentration is related to the size of urban areas. Findings such as this question the relevance of the creative capital model for smaller cities. Furthermore, creative jobs are common in large cities where communication companies and software companies concentrate (Lewis and Donald 2010). Small cities with high concentrations of people writing music, performing in a band, and doing other creative work outside of the defined creative class occupations that Florida has designated are not being included in the current measurement of creative capital (Lewis and Donald 2010).

Finally, Richard Florida (2002a) pointed out that cities that have the highest level of creative capital also have the highest income inequality. When stating this in *The Rise of the Creative Class* Florida was less than forthcoming about this finding. He mentioned this finding very briefly in an appendix (Appendix B) of the book. In another section of the book, he stated “that the high-tech regions had higher incomes, more growth, more income inequality, and more scientists, engineers and professionals than their low-tech, but higher social capital counterparts” (Florida 2002a: 274). Florida did not go on to discuss this finding, and it is curious as to why he mentioned income inequality along with positive outcomes. Others have noted how deceptive Florida has been on this issue by stating that “Florida’s engagement with the subject is cursory; he simply highlights it as a danger sign of growing creative economies, noting the emergence of regional have and have nots – a self-perpetuating tale of two classes and two geographies” (Lewis and Donald 2010: 33).

### **Creative Class and Social Development**

While it may be easy for Florida to demonstrate through tables and charts that cities with a large amount of creative capital are economically viable, the social implications of creative capital remain unclear. Florida asserts that his theory of the creative capital will make cities that



are high in creative capital better socially as well. Yet, there is no evidence that supports this assertion. To investigate the social implications of creative capital, the current study will examine three areas that might provide information about the social outcomes of creative capital development: crime, segregation, and educational exposure.

Creative class centers are more likely to attract creative people to them, which in turn, should make cities much safer and better places to live. These cities are better and safer because people in these cities have a large competitive advantage to other areas. The schools, police force, and other social services will be well funded because the creative class has more income to be taxed. Also, the creative classes are well educated and, thus, less likely to engage in violent activities.

Florida never addressed the issue of crime in his book *The Rise of the Creative Class*. He stated that by becoming leading creative centers, cities will be in a better position to solve any social problems that arise. According to Florida, economic development leads to social development. Cities that are able to attract highly educated and highly paid people to them will have the resources to address any social problems that arise.

Florida never attempted to address what it means for the people already living in a city when the creative class moves in. If an increase in numbers of the creative class causes rent to increase in the neighborhood, poorer residents will be forced to move. This may lead to high levels of segregation within the city. Yet, Florida never addressed this potential outcome. In fact, Florida seemed to insinuate that the creative class will live alongside anyone, because this open-mindedness is what makes the creative class unique. Florida acknowledged that the creative class people are isolating themselves in certain cities or “around a dozen or two mega-

regions” (Florida 2005: 25); therefore it is not inconceivable that creative class people are segregating themselves within a city.

Finally, Florida stated that once an area is creative, it is likely to increase in creativity in the future. Creative class people will interact with each other as well as with noncreative people in the neighborhood. This interaction will raise the intellectual level of the neighborhood, and soon noncreative people will be producing creative ideas. Once again, Florida provided no evidence for this theory. Readers are simply left to assume that Florida understands the behavior of the creative class.

### **Research Purpose**

The current study attempts to examine the movement toward creative capital in cities within the United States. Cities that have been able to shift away from manufacturing to high-end service employment – or creative employment as Florida calls it – are in a better economic position today. Yet, the effect of creative capital on social outcomes for cities is unclear.

Cities that have not transitioned from manufacturing to higher-end employment as smoothly as the creative cities are looking for ways to attract creative workers. While scholars and researchers have continually pointed out problems with Florida’s creative capital theory (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Donald and Morrow 2003; Kratke 2010; Lewis and Donald 2010; Maliszewski 2004; Wilson and Keil 2008; Zimmerman 2008), urban planners, mayors, and city councils have widely accepted Florida’s model. Cities are setting up creative marketing campaigns and gentrifying urban space to attract these creative workers. Bridger and Alter (2006: 6) explained why cities are quick to adopt economic development over social development by stating:

When leaders and citizens face a threat to the existence of their community, they are likely to be more concerned with maintaining a favorable business climate than with

issues such as social justice, equity, or environmental protection. After all, there is almost certainly another community willing to offer investors a more enticing incentive package.

Despite the scholarly criticism, Florida suggested that the movement toward creative capital will be a panacea for urban areas. As evidence of this, he pointed out that creative cities are more open to diversity and more tolerant. He suggested that creative cities will have higher economic growth as they accumulate talent and technology. Moreover, these areas will continue to advance while the noncreative cities fall behind. Florida (2008) referred to his “spiky” world concept as evidence of the success of the creative capital theory. He charted all of the positive economic and social factors on a map, and spikes in the map were associated with creative cities, while the areas that were not spiked were associated with the noncreative cities. Florida (2006: 25) stated “in order to make it in the world today, you had better get yourself onto one of those peaks, because the distance between the peaks and the valleys is growing wider every day.”

Based on the previous information, the current study has the three following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1:*

Suburban counties have more creative capital than urban counties.

*Hypothesis 2:*

As areas increase in creative capital, segregation within the city will increase.

*Hypothesis 3:*

As areas increase in creative capital, educational exposure will increase.

*Hypothesis 4:*

As areas increase in creative capital, crime will increase.

## CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

### The Industrial Revolution

Richard Florida (2002, 2008) has stated that the world has moved from an industrial economy based on manufacturing to an economy based on service. Florida has identified two different types of service jobs. There are low end service jobs, such as a cashier at a local grocery store or a waiter at a restaurant, which are typically low paid and do not require a lot of skill. Next, there are the service workers at the high end of the socioeconomic scale. These workers include professors, accountants, and engineers, and are highly paid and require a high level of skill (Florida 2002a). Florida (2002a) called these high end service workers the creative class. Florida did acknowledge that there are still workers in manufacturing, but he stated that these jobs are leaving the United States. Moreover, these jobs are low skilled, and Florida lumped manufacturing work into his classification of noncreative workers.

The next pages will provide a discussion of the shifting economy in the United States. While there are many factors that led to the change (Cooke 2002; Moss 1998; Rutten 2003), it is beyond the scope of this study to explain all the nuanced details of the change. Scholars have acknowledged that a shift has occurred (Cooke 2002; Rutten 2003), and the present study examines what this change means to urban areas based on Richard Florida's creative class model.

The Industrial Revolution ushered in a new form of work around the world. The change to manufacturing happened slowly, with small merchants adopting small-scale production to their crafts (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). Prior to the Industrial Revolution, craftsmen were constrained by the availability of resources around the workplace, which inhibited economic production (Goldstone 2002). With the advent of manufacturing, many technologies

began to increase production. For instance, the steam engine, invented by James Watt, came on line in the late 1780s and was quickly used for cotton spinning, iron smelting, grain milling, brick making, and for transport in locomotives and sea-faring vessels (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). Moss (1998: 107) explained “during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, industrialization gave rise to manufacturing plants and factory towns, while the steam engine led to the growth of seaport cities and a system of railroads that linked cities and towns across North America.”

As the new technologies made manufacturing more efficient, the world saw a change in the workplace from small craftsmen to large industrial manufacturing. The commercial landowners, craftsmen, financiers, and merchants developed into the commercial class, which began to accumulate wealth and power within cities in the industrial era (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). The change to manufacturing had a large effect on cities around the world.

While wealth was accumulating in the hands of the commercial class, a new class of wage laborers emerged. Wage laborers had “no hope of attaining the status of either master craftsman (which implied ownership of one’s own shop) or even journeyman (which did not), factory workers grew in number – and, many argued shame and degradation” (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009: 71). As manufacturing took root in England many began to see the impact that industrialization was having on the wage laborers. Engels wrote the classic *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1993 [1845]) in which he described the horrendous conditions and squalor that workers experienced. There was widespread use of child labor, a lengthening of the workday, wages which were barely enough for survival, and many other social ills produced by this new kind of work.

The rise of the Industrial Revolution occurred for many different reasons, and new technologies undoubtedly had a large effect (Moss 1998). The steam engine, discussed above, is

just one example of a new technology replacing an older, more inefficient form of work.

Although a variety of factors can be named as reasons for this change, the fact is that a change in the workplace has occurred (Cooke 2002; Moss 1998; Rutten 2003; Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). Many people were displaced as their jobs became obsolete. Others found new employment opportunities. The commercial classes developed as the dominant class, and the wage laborers became the working class.

### **Wal-Mart and Today's Working Conditions**

Wal-Mart – the largest retailer in the United States – many not be thought of as the same as the large industrial plants of the 1800s, but Wal-Mart is an example of work in the United States today. The service industry has changed work in the United States. As manufacturing plants leave, cities are left adjusting to a new form of work. This new form of work had had a similar effect as the adjustment cities had to make when the economy shifted from agricultural production to manufacturing.

The new form of work can be best explained by the example of Wal-Mart and Sam Walton, who portrayed himself as a folksy embodiment of the American Dream. Walton instilled team work and company pride in his workers. The hard work would increase the profits of the company, and all the workers would benefit from the success of the company. However, for all the success of Wal-Mart, not all the employees have experienced the same success as Sam Walton. Mander and Boston (1996: 339) stated “most ‘associates,’ as the company calls its employees, are given only part-time work so that the company can avoid paying the benefits full-time workers must receive.” Full-time workers do not seem fare much better, as Mander and Boston (1996: 339) continued “the average annual income for a full-time worker at Wal-Mart in

the United States, even with a well-publicized profit-sharing plan, hovers around \$12,000 – well below the poverty line.”

The effect of the service economy on communities has been great. Mander and Boston (1996: 337) pointed out that “Wal-Mart leads to a net loss of jobs, decreased income for the community, and a decline of the central shopping areas.” It is not just communities in the United States that have experienced negative outcomes associated with Wal-Mart. Mander and Boston (1996: 336):

Shrewd manufacturing, mass purchasing, and an automated inventory and distribution system that eliminates the middle man made Wal-Mart a dominant force in North America and will help Wal-Mart achieve its global dreams. The result may be that the small, diverse, family-run neighborhood stores, which are the economic and cultural backbone of communities throughout Asia, Europe, and South America, will soon give way to the mighty, homogenizing global retailer.

Exploring the effect of Wal-Mart stores in communities, Goetz and Swaminathan (2006) examined the locational impact of stores opening in counties. The study found that “the presence of Wal-Mart was unequivocally associated with smaller reductions in family-poverty rates in U.S. counties during the 1990s relative to places that had no stores” (Goetz and Swaminathan 2006: 223). This suggests that the new service economy not only hurts individual workers, but can have a negative impact on communities as well.

Wal-Mart is just one example that is representative of today’s workplace. Many other large retailers are guilty of the same practices. What the example of Wal-Mart does show is how the workplace has changed today. No longer do social scientists describe the awful working conditions found in manufacturing plants. Instead, the shift from manufacturing to service work has had the same effects on people and communities as the Industrial Revolution, which will be discussed next.

## **The Changing Workplace**

The shift from manufacturing work to service work in the United States has had a profound impact on how communities function (Cappellin 2007; Powell and Snellman 2004; Schlichtman 2009). Globalization has allowed many manufacturing companies to send work to other countries, where lower wages can be paid. Communities all across the United States have been affected by this movement. Service work, such as the jobs provided at Wal-Mart, have replaced the manufacturing jobs in the United States.

Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton (2009: 181) described service work as “among the lowest paid in the labor force.” Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton (2009: 181) continued “low wages and, in some cases, lack of opportunity for full-time work combine to keep these workers’ earnings at or below the poverty level.” Richard Florida (2002; 2008) pointed out this change by stating that there are two different groups of workers in the United States: those who are employed in creative jobs and those workers employed in service work. Florida maintains that cities need to attract the creative class to them. If cities cannot attract the creative workers, the city will be left with poorly paid service work, which will not help the city develop economically.

Former United States Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1991; 2002; 2008) studied the impact that globalization had on employment in the U.S, and he stated that there are only three types of jobs in the United States today: routine production services, in-person services, and symbolic-analytic services. Routine production services refer to jobs which require repetitive tasks, such as manufacturing. According to Reich, these jobs are being moved to other countries at a rapid pace. People in the United States and other industrialized nations can no longer count on large segments of their population working in manufacturing. In the 1990s, routine



production services accounted for about 25 percent of all jobs, but Reich stated that this percentage is expected to continue to decline.

In-person service jobs are replacing routine production services jobs. Food preparation workers, daycare workers, bus drivers, elder care employees, and hair stylists are all examples of in-person service jobs. These jobs will never be exported to other countries because they require that a person be present to complete the service. According to Reich, in the 1990s in-person service jobs accounted for about 30 percent of all employment, and this percentage was expected to increase, as workers who get laid off from routine production services enter this sector. However, these jobs are decreasing in pay, as more people flock to this type of work. Companies such as Wal-Mart provide the bulk of in-person service work.

Finally, Reich described symbolic-analytic service jobs, which are what Richard Florida refers to as creative class jobs. Reich stated that scientists, engineers, writers, attorneys, and management consultants are example of symbolic-analytic service jobs. Symbolic-analytic service jobs are increasing in the United States. Highly educated people work in this sector, which is based around knowledge, problem solving, and strategic thinking. In the 1950s, symbolic-analytic service jobs accounted for less than 10 percent of the employment in the United States. According to Reich, by the 1990s, symbolic-analytic service jobs increased to around 20 percent. Significantly, the wages of the workers in symbolic-analytic service jobs have also increased. As Florida has pointed out, the skills and knowledge of the creative class, or symbolic-analytic service workers, are in high demand for employers. O'Toole and Lawler III (2006: 4) explained the implications of this increase in wage inequality by stating that "the average CEO in a Fortune 500 company takes home over 400 times the pay of the average employee (in 1973 the ratio was 40 to 1)." Describing the gulf that has developed between the

creative and service worker in the United States, O'Toole and Lawler III (2006: 4-5) stated "a seventy-year old "retired" American accountant starts a new career as a financial consultant to a small, start-up business in Asia. He is "greeted" at Wal-Mart by a part-time employee his age who is still working because she doesn't have sufficient savings to retire."

O'Toole and Lawler III described three types of companies which indicate that companies have adapted to the new American economy. These three types of companies are low-cost operators, global competitor corporations, and high-involvement companies. Low-cost operators are large grocery, fast-food, and discount stores. These stores are often referred to as big box stores, such as Wal-Mart, Target, and Best Buy. Low-cost operators have developed a model to continuously reduce the cost of operation, whether it be reducing wages to employees or closing unprofitable stores. The discussion of Wal-Mart above is an example of how low-cost operators try to reduce costs. Hiring employees as part-time employees reduces the cost to Wal-Mart because the retailer does not have to provide benefits. However, such cost-saving techniques can have enormous impacts on people and communities:

Because there is little opportunity for workers who are at the bottom in LC companies to make a good living or to do interesting work – much less to make a career – these jobs mainly attract employees who cannot find other jobs; retirees, young workers and students (particularly those living with their parents and covered by their health insurance), less-educated workers with fewer options, immigrants with limited English-language skills, and those who are unable or unwilling to take jobs requiring more responsibility. (O'Toole and Lawler III 2006: 11).

Global competitor corporations are large international corporations. These companies employ workers in pharmaceuticals, biomedicine, finances, telecommunications, and other industries. There is little or no stability in employment for people in global competitor corporations. Often employees are employed on a contingent basis while lower-level workers watch their jobs move to other countries. The management positions are highly paid, but the

main goal of a global competitor corporation is to make a quick profit. Thus, if Mexico offers lower wages, then companies will move plants from the United States to Mexico. If wages rise in Mexico global competitor corporations would then look for another country that offers lower wages.

High-involvement companies offer workers a large amount of input in the management of the company. These companies experience low worker turnover and rarely lay off workers. These companies promote mainly from within, and there is a clear sense of company pride. Companies like Google, Facebook, and Yahoo are examples of high-involvement companies. These companies often offer daycares, schools, employee housing, and other amenities aimed at making the employees happy. These amenities also allow many of these companies to pay less than some of their competitors as employees weigh the cost of daycare, schooling, and other social services to an increased salary at another company. The amenities offered at high-involvement companies are similar to the amenities, or soft factors as Martin-Brelot et al. (2010) described, that cities are offering to attract the creative class to them.

Global competitor corporations and high-involvement companies are the jobs of the creative classes. Global competitor corporations often pay high wages to consultants and other creative workers. They are “constantly searching for talent – for individuals with the skills needed for today’s challenges – and pay top dollar to get them” (O’Toole and Lawler III 2006: 13). High-involvement companies may not pay as much as global competitor corporations, but they are still high-paying jobs. The employees take slightly less pay for more stability.

Conley (2009) described how these workers are no longer simply company men or the organizational man described by Whyte (1956). Company men took a job at a company and remained there until retirement. The company men went to work and then came home to their

families. However, today's worker will likely change jobs many times, as is the case for workers in global competitor corporations. Workers today view themselves as free agents looking for the best deal. This observation was backed up by Hoyman and Faricy (2009: 314), who stated that "modern workers have much different utility functions" than workers in the industrial past. Therefore, some creative workers are comfortable being contingent workers for global competitor corporations, while other creative workers are more comfortable in high-involvement companies.

Moreover, according to Conley (2009) employees no longer work on fixed schedules as did the company men of the past. The invention of email, Blackberries, and the Internet have allowed employees to work virtually anywhere at any time. For instance, a consultant at a global competitor corporation can work on a project at 2 a.m. or 4 p.m. The employee of today works whenever his or her creativity is at its height. The same is true for workers in high-involvement companies because daycares, schools, hair stylists, and the other amenities are aimed at keeping the worker happy so that the creativity can be maximized. Creative workers can work from home, a coffee shop, or the office. The key to making creative workers happy is providing options.

This new work in the United States has benefitted the creative class. Workers at global competitor corporations and high-involvement companies can work anytime and anywhere most of the time. However, this work does have some drawbacks. For example, this type of work sometimes results in a blurring of the line between work and family. Moreover, employees in low-cost operators still work on set schedules and receive low pay for their work.

When Florida discussed what cities can do to attract the creative class, he has suggested that cities need to attract high-involvement companies and global competitor corporations

because these types of corporations and companies provide jobs to the creative class. An example of attracting the creative class can be found in Charlotte, North Carolina. Charlotte has been able to develop a creative class by attracting global competitor corporations and high involvement companies:

Charlotte, North Carolina, the third-largest banking center in the United States (after New York and San Francisco), is an example of a city that has thrived as its major commercial banks have expanded their operations and geographic scope of activities. Charlotte is thriving precisely because the technological innovations have expanded the geographic reach and role of interstate banking. (Moss 1998: 122)

Moss (1998) went on to explain that cities like Austin, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco have done a great job embracing technology and the Internet. Moss (1998) and Florida (2002a) have pointed out that these cities are growing and striving for. On the other hand, cities like Detroit, Houston, Miami, and New Orleans have not moved to the new technology- and computer-driven economy, and have been classified as stagnant and dying. In this new economy, cities that do not attract the global competitor corporations and high-involvement companies will not attract the creative class.

However, as Reich pointed out, in-person service jobs are increasing. As cities experience an increase in jobs in global competitor corporations and high-involvement companies (symbolic-analytic services), low-cost operators (in-person services) follow to take care of the service needs of the creative class. When Richard Florida (2002: 354) stated “there is a strong correlation between inequality and creativity: the more creative a region is, the more inequality you will find there” he was describing how noncreative workers are needed to take care of the creative class.

Examining the impact of the noncreative workers in Spain, Bernardi and Garrido (2008: 310) pointed out that “unskilled service workers’ share of employment is currently 14 per cent.”

The authors argued that this had led to a new class of workers in Spain. A similar phenomenon is likely to occur in cities that follow the creative class model. Moving toward the creative class model will lead to increased income inequality because the need for in-service (noncreative) workers increases. The increase in income inequality can result in negative social consequences, such as segregation and crime.

### **The Rooted and the Mobile**

With the rise of the new creative economy, people choose where to live, (Florida 2002; 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2008, 2010) rather than simply moving to a neighborhood, planting roots, and staying there, as was often the case in the past. Today people are highly mobile and to “create a growth region, you need the kind of place that people want to come to and can easily get to, where they can lead the lives they want and express themselves freely” (Florida 2006: 26).

This increased mobility leads to an increase in isolation as many mobile people do not know how to meet new people. As Florida (2008: 169) stated “it’s ironic that a by-product of a globalized world is increased isolation.” The change to the creative economy has changed the way in which people are connected to their communities. According to Florida, there are currently two types of people: the rooted and the mobile. Rooted people do not move far from where they grew up and are less educated; less motivated, and will make less money than the mobile. As Florida (2008: 85) stated “many of the rooted have relatively little education or money and relatively low professional aspirations or personal expectations.”

Rooted people often must settle for the jobs that are available in the city in which they live. Therefore, if a city’s economy is based on manufacturing, these are the types of jobs the rooted will have to take. Moreover, the rooted might not have aspirations of moving to a different city because the rooted have everything they want in their current neighborhood. On

the other hand, the mobile determine where they would like to live. If a city has excellent employment opportunities, then the mobile will move to that city. However, the mobile do not base their decisions on where to live simply on the jobs available in a city.

Many factors influence where the mobile choose to live. Florida pointed out that moving to a city for a job might not be as important as other factors to the mobile. As Florida (2008: 84) suggested:

This common pattern suggests three important things. First, people tend to orient their job searches around particular places. Second, where one's friends reside also matters. Third, and arguably most telling, we wouldn't move just anywhere for a job.

The city must present the mobile with creative structures that will lure the mobile to the city. Florida (2008: 84) pointed out that “a 2002 survey by Next Generation Consulting found that three-quarters of recent college graduates choose where to live, *then* look for a job in that market.”

The mobile have a large impact on communities. Florida argued that cities must attract the creative class (the mobile) to their cities. To do this, communities must provide creative jobs, attractions, and a night life that will make it a destination for the mobile. Cities like Austin, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. have been able to attract the mobile to them, while cities like Buffalo, Detroit, and Cleveland have not been able to become creative centers which attract the mobile. This is also why cities like Milwaukee and Austin have implemented strategies to lure the creative class (the mobile) to them (Long 2009; Zimmerman 2008).

While Florida may be correct in his analysis of what makes a city creative and how the mobile will choose to live in a creative community, it is unclear what this means in terms of social benefits to the city. Moore and Daday (2010) demonstrated that while Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland took steps to increase the human capital, ultimately these steps failed. This

failure was due to the countries having structural problems that denied human capital development. If cities in the United States attempt to cater to the creative class without the necessary structure in place, what will happen is unclear; or, as in the case of Milwaukee, the outcome may be negative (Zimmerman 2008), because the social problems of the city were not solved by the movement to the creative class.

The lack of knowledge of the consequences of increasing the creative capital in a city is a large omission for city leaders who are following Florida's creative class concept. However, Florida's model continues to be used by city planners even with these omissions. Florida (2008: 130) explained "I know Memphis well – we hosted the Memphis Manifesto Summit there, a major national conference devoted to rebuilding cities along creative lines. I've worked with community leaders in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Louisville, Lexington, Tulsa, and Oklahoma City, and am impressed with all of those cities too." As Florida (2008: 213) explained "regional leaders must become more aware of how their region's collective personality shapes the kinds of economic activities that it can do and the kinds of people it can attract, satisfy, and retain."

In *The Rise of the Creative Class* Florida ranked Memphis 132, Cincinnati 68, Cleveland 118, Louisville 171, Lexington 50, Tulsa 154, and Oklahoma City 93 on his Creative Index measure. The higher the number on the index, the less creative is the city. Hence, these cities that are working with Florida to try to become creative are the cities in the poorest position to become creative (Bontje and Musterd 2009). It is apparent that cities are listening to Florida's call to become more creative. Because Memphis invited Florida to their city to speak about creative opportunities, it is important that city leads and policy makers in Memphis understand the outcomes that implementing plans to bring in the creative class might have for the social development of the city. Florida (2002: 354) stated "there is a strong correlation between



inequality and creativity: the more creative a region is, the more inequality you will find there.”

In another book, Florida (2008: 211) stated “the very strengths that make places diverse and creative seem to damage our social capital and community commitment.” “It may very well be that creative cities have higher concentrations of people whose basic personality makeup is doing their own thing” (Florida 2008: 210). If city leaders were made aware of this acknowledgement, it might offer pause to cities that are trying to increase their creativity. However, the increase in income inequality is not discussed in examinations of how to attract the creative class to a community.

**Table 1: The Top Ten and Bottom Ten Creative Cities**

<b>Top Ten Creative Cities in the United States</b>		
	<b>Creativity Rank</b>	<b>Creativity Index Score</b>
Austin, TX	1	0.963
San Francisco, CA	2	0.958
Seattle, WA	3	0.955
Burlington, VT	4	0.942
Boston, MA	5	0.934
Raleigh-Durham, NC	6	0.932
Portland, OR	7	0.926
Madison, WI	8	0.918
Boise City, ID	9	0.914
Minneapolis, MN	10	0.900
<b>Bottom Ten Creative Cities in the United States</b>		
Mansfield, OH	267	0.147
Victoria, TX	268	0.145
Sheboygan, WI	269	0.144
Danville, VA	270	0.138
Houma, LA	271	0.135
Youngstown, OH	272	0.130
Lima, OH	273	0.128
Sumter, SC	274	0.116
Joplin, MO	275	0.095
Gadsden, AL	276	0.058

\*The list is based on the data from *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002) by Richard Florida

Florida and Tinagli (2004) argued that technology and talent are highly mobile commodities that cities could use to attract the creative class. Cities could offer the creative

class soft amenities (i.e., a great housing market or a fun cultural scene) that would attract creative class individuals (Musterd, Bontje, Chapain, Kovacs, and Murie 2007). However, Florida may be incorrect regarding the mobility of the creative class. Examining the movements of the creative class in a sample of European cities, Martin-Berlot et al. (2010: 859) found that “the majority of respondents had been living and studying in the city before they started their professional careers.” “The overwhelming majority of respondents simply stayed in the city where they were born or graduated” (Martin-Berlot et al. 2010: 860). In that study, it was found that most creative class individuals lived in cities where they grew up and chose to live in that city not based on amenities like bike paths and coffee house (as Florida has suggested), but based on family and friends living in the city.

### **Changing the City Environment**

By following Florida’s model, cities are determining the outcomes of their cities. The consequences of choosing Florida’s path can mean the difference between a thriving community and a decaying one. If creative capital is the wrong path, cities could be dooming their residents to failure because of lack of job opportunities.

Florida is not the first person to point out that culture has a large impact on urban and regional spaces (Ponzini and Rossi 2010). Storm (2004) examined the representations of the cultural as an ensemble of cultural and artistic activities taking place at the city and neighborhood levels. Scott (1998) and Landry (2000) both explained that an urban renaissance would come about by the economic and social externalities generated by the local artistic and creative activities of the city. Scott (2000) continued this line of thinking by explaining that certain cities and countries are engaged in cultural economies where cultural-product industries are exporting culture to other areas.

Rutten and Gelissen (2008: 986) argued that Florida's theory can "be seen as an elaboration of the milieu of innovation literature." Innovation is the result of making improvements on an old idea or developing a new form of knowledge (Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004; Thanawala 1995). Innovative environments foster development by bringing together entrepreneurs and creative people to interact (Oerlemans, Meeus, and Kenis 2007). This innovation leads to competitiveness, which has been found to lead to economic development (Best 2001; Porter 1990).

Before the emergence of the creative capital concept, Moss (1998: 107) stated:

Today, new and emerging telecommunications technologies are transforming the economic role of cities and their pattern of physical development. Many cities have lost their roles as corporate headquarters and manufacturing centers, while others have attracted information-intensive activities, such as bank offices, customer service centers, and research and development laboratories.

Darchen and Tremblay (2010: 227) pointed out that "certain professional occupations have more impact on regional development than others, for example education and healthcare have little effect, compared with occupations like computer science, engineering, management and business operations." Sassen (2009a: 8) argued that cities in today's global economy are specializing in a particular area and stated that "firms thrive of the specialized differences of cities, and it is this that gives a city its particular advantage in the global economy."

This is the argument that Richard Florida puts forth as to why certain urban areas are thriving while other areas are declining. Creative cities have been able to attract the occupations that foster economic development. Long (2009: 210-211) explained that "given the apparent disconnect between academic opinion and popular support, it is evident that extensive empirical scholarship is needed to better comprehend the effect of the "creative city" phenomenon."

Richard Florida (2008: 247) hinted at some of the problems with moving to a creative capital society by stating “what we are witnessing, for better or for worse, is the growing stratification of communities, countries, and the world at large,” and continued “for every young person who moves into an urban mosaic or hipster haven, it is likely that a lower-income family, or part of that family, has been driven out.” The process of changing communities can have negative consequences for the people living in the community. In *Naked City*, Sharon Zukin (2010) described the process of high-income people displacing low-income residents by explaining what happened when the creative classes moved into areas once thought to be poverty stricken and crime ridden.

Harlem was once the center of African American culture, with a rich history of music, people, and community (Zukin 2010). Harlem has also been viewed as a ghetto by outsiders, because the area has experienced high poverty and crime rates. Yet Zukin (2010) argued that Harlem is no longer a ghetto and is becoming a middle class neighborhood. Zukin (2010: 69-70) stated:

If for many years Harlem embodied the dual racial consciousness of African Americans that W. E. B. Du Bois described at the turn of the twentieth century, today it represents what Henry Louis Gates Jr. calls blacks’ *social class* hyphenation. On one side, you have new high-rise office and residential towers, million-dollar brownstone townhouses, and rosemary focaccia: the cultural signs of the “new Harlem Renaissance.” On the other side, you have old high-rise public housing projects, social service agencies, and “chicken shacks”: the dark ghetto’s *terroir*.

As the community becomes more middle class and more million-dollar brownstone townhouses are built, the older residents are displaced. Over time, the area begins to resemble every other middle class community (Zukin 2010).

A similar process took place in the neighborhood of Soho in New York City. Zukin (2010) pointed out that Soho used to be gritty, and a place for alternative culture. However,

today Soho is known for shopping, with stores such as the Banana Republic and Louis Vuitton replacing the older, authentic places. As neighborhoods change, new social problems will arise. For Zukin (2010), the loss of authentic places is of foremost concern, but what Zukin (2010) and Florida have not addressed is what the change means for the city, the residents of the city, and for crime within the city.

The transition of Soho and Harlem to middle class communities is not necessarily a bad outcome. Many of the residents may be able to stay in the community and benefit from increased employment opportunities. Moreover, the increased tax base could go toward improving schools, police forces, and other infrastructure. However, we do need to know if the changes are having an adverse impact on other communities. As people move from Harlem to other areas, crime, poverty, and unemployment may rise in these other areas of New York City. Understanding this change can inform city officials about the new areas where they might need to move social services and other programs.

Similar arguments have been made by scholars about the movement to the creative economy and creative capital. Sassen (2009b: 59) pointed out that:

The growth of a high-income professional class and high-profit corporate service firms becomes legible in urban space through the growing demand for state-of-the-art office buildings and all the key components of the residential sphere and consumption. This growing demand leads to often massive and visible displacements of more modest-income households and modest-profit-making firms, no matter how healthy these may be from the perspective of the economy and market demand. In this process, urban space itself reproduces economic and racial inequality.

Cities that are focusing on creative development are displacing middle and lower-class residents (Bradford 2004; Gertler 2004; Scott 2006). Hyndman et al. (2006) demonstrated that cities in Canada which followed the creative economic development model also ranked the highest in socioeconomic inequality.

Bontje and Musterd (2009) have pointed out that cities that are in the poorest position to move toward a creative capital model are typically the ones that try to do so. For example, Memphis is the home of Federal Express, which is a “\$33 billion company serving 220 companies and handling more than 7.5 million shipments daily” (Katz 2010: 71). Federal Express is a major corporation and employs numerous residents in Memphis. However, Federal Express does not provide creative work for its employees. There may be a number of positions for managers and engineers within the company, but the company mainly provides work based around service, with employees working in call centers, handling packages, and placing the packages on airplanes. If Memphis were to move to a more creative economy, Federal Express might not be in the long-term plans of the city. If Federal Express left Memphis, many people would be suffer from the increased unemployment and poverty. At the same time, it is not certain that creative companies like Google, Facebook, or Yahoo would be interested in opening locations in Memphis. The move to the creative economy may be easier for some cities but might not be a real option for others.

Moreover, although Memphis may have universities located within the city, the lack of creative employment opportunities likely means that many of the workers will move to other cities after graduation. Florida ranked Memphis 132 in *The Rise of the Creative Class* because of these factors, while nearby Nashville (42), St. Louis (68), Lexington (50), and Knoxville (80) were ranked higher. These cities could potentially rob Memphis of the people who are in the creative class.

When explaining how Milwaukee followed the creative capital model, Zimmerman (2008) described that the outcome was not positive for the city. Milwaukee had a net job loss

when the city moved to a creative capital model, with unemployment rates highest among minorities (Zimmerman 2008). Zimmerman (2008: 241) explained the outcome by stating:

The marriage of Florida's ideas with municipal action in Milwaukee did support a celebrated resurgence in the comparatively tiny downtown area, but it did nothing to forestall the economic disintegration of the remainder of the city. It therefore ultimately brought into even sharper relief what was already one of the most economically and racially polarized cities in the United States.

Long (2009) pointed out that even the widely celebrated creative city of Austin could experience negative outcomes from following the creative capital model. Long (2009) asserted that the influx of the creative class has led to the loss of Austin's soul. As creative people moved to Austin, the city became a wealthy paradise; however, many of the long-term residents saw Austin as being overly commercialized. Residents stated that Austin lost its uniqueness and is now homogenized (Long 2009), which is the same process that Zukin (2010) described in Harlem and Soho.

Bringing in creative industries and becoming a creative city cannot happen out of thin air (Hall 2004). There are a large number of factors that lead to certain industries being in certain regions and cities. Innovation cannot be spurred simply by local conditions but is more dependent on local assets that are connected to the global economy (Simmie 2005; Stroper and Venables 2004).

### **Individualism and Social Capital**

America has become more individualistic (Florida 2002a; Twenge 2006), and has experienced a loss of social capital (Besser 2009; Putnam 2000). The individualistic ethos of today's society has major implications for communities and has been linked to the high crime rate in the United States as compared to other countries (Braithwaite 1989). As Florida (2008: 210) stated "it may very well be that creative cities have higher concentrations of people whose

basic personality makeup is doing their own thing.” Even if the creative class interacts with each other for ideas, it is not clear that creative class individuals interact as much as Florida has suggested. Moreover, if those in the creative class segregate themselves from the noncreative class, this would negate the benefits of the educational exposure that Florida has presented as a major benefit of the creative class model.

Individuality is championed in many different ways in the United States. For example, the United States Army changed its slogan in 2001 to “An Army of One” (Twenge 2006). “Get a Piece of the Rock” was changed to “Be Your Own Rock” by Prudential (Twenge 2006). In 2004, Britney Spears was asked what her priorities in life were and she stated “Myself, my husband, and starting a family” (Twenge 2006: 51). Notice the very individualistic trait of listing herself first.

According to Twenge (2006), the change from a collective society to an individualistic society began around 1975. Twenge argued that as the baby boom generation had children, they taught them to identify with individualistic traits. “Generation Me” has become the most individualistic generation in history.

This shift to a more individualistic society has had a profound impact on communities and the United States. Twenge (2006) pointed out that there are some negative aspects to this shift. One negative is that “Generation Me” does not value social relationships. Young adults are more likely to email, text, or post a message on Facebook rather than actually interacting face to face. While many young adults may have a large network of “friends” on Facebook, these likely do not represent true friendships. Twenge (2006: 238) stated:

You will be much happier if you make the extra effort needed to see friends and family. E-mail and the phone are great, but person-to-person contact is better. It goes against our instincts, but we should try to make those little social gestures that came so naturally to



previous generations: welcoming a new neighbor, having friends over for dinner, joining a club.

Twenge (2006) went on to explain that Generation Me also does not participate in community affairs. Generation Me has an outlook on life that nothing can be changed and that outcomes have much more to do with a given situation than hard work. Thus, young adults think question the point to trying to change a situation because it is fate, and one cannot change fate.

Young people do not vote in high rates because of the idea that they cannot change anything.

Twenge (2006: 157) wrote:

The consequences for society as a whole are alarming. If everyone believes that nothing can be changed, that prophecy is likely to be self-fulfilling. And if we blame others for our problems, we might never make the changes we need to improve as a people.

The move toward a more individualistic society may be associated with a number of social ills for cities. Neighborhoods that are characterized by social networks and social capital have more charitable contributions (Leonard, Croson, and Oliveira 2010), which indicates how important social interactions are to communities. Individuals in neighborhoods where people did not join groups and clubs were less likely to give to charities that would aid in fixing the neighborhood's social ills.

Furthermore, neighborhoods with less social networks had less trust in their neighbors (Leonard et al. 2010; Uslaner 2010). Neighborhoods with diverse social networks which crossed racial and economic social lines experienced higher levels of trust in neighbors (Uslaner 2010). Segregation might have the worst effects on trust in a neighborhood (Uslaner 2010) and may increase the rate of crime found in the neighborhood (Ousey and Lee 2010). According to Ousey and Lee (2010), communities with high civic involvement have lower crime rates. They also found that racial disparities in arrests lessen when the community has high social capital.

Therefore, any model of development which might increase individualism and segregation may increase social problems in the city.

The creative class model is based on individualism. Cities are supposed to attract the creative class by offering trendy coffee shops, night clubs, restaurants, and other amenities. There is no sense of community in this form of development. Instead, the creative class individuals are being courted by cities with the express idea of being as individualistic as possible. When describing the attraction of Austin for the creative class, Long (2009) stated that it was the uniqueness of the city and the ability for people to be themselves. However, after the influx of the creative class, residents said that Austin is no longer cool, but instead is homogenized like every other city (Long 2009).

The movement from the young individualistic Generation Me to the upper class of the United States was best described by David Brooks, who Florida acknowledges as one of his influences in creating the creative class model. Brooks (2000) demonstrated how young creative people now dominate the upper classes of society and are now pushing their agendas. The Bourgeois Bohemians or “Bobos,” as Brooks calls the new upper class, are different than those in previous generations.

In the 1960s and 1970s, young adults attending colleges and universities across the United States experienced protest over racial issues, gender issues, and the Vietnam War. As a result of this social environment, many of the students took on bohemian identities. As time passed, the bohemians from the protests of the 1960s and 1970s became the bourgeois group as they entered corporate America. However, the bohemians held on to their alternative and individualistic roots, which created Bobos.

Currently, there are many examples of Bobos running corporations. No longer do workers wear a suit and a tie to work. Instead, dress is casual and part of a person's self-expression while at work. Companies allow their workers to bring dogs to work, offices are replaced with open spaces, and people can ride a scooter around the office floor. This bohemian influx into work is what Florida describes as creative. Creative people want to express themselves individually.

Bobos have brought many changes to communities Bobos have held on to their bohemian identity and still desire to live in the trendy areas of the city. It is the Bobos who Zukin (2010) described as moving into Harlem and Soho, and who Long (2009) explained moved to Austin. The Bobos wanted to live in the gritty, cool areas of the community because that is how they view themselves. However, the Bobos are not the alternative group anymore. They are the upper class (creative class) in the United States. When the Bobos move to poor communities because of the authenticity of such communities, the poor will eventually be driven out of that community because of rising housing prices. Eventually, the neighborhood begins to resemble an upper class community with high end businesses.

The Bobos are the creative class that Florida covets as the basis for community development. Unfortunately, the Bobos are individualistic, and this has negative implications for neighborhoods (Leonard et al. 2010; Ousey and Lee 2010; Uslander 2010). As the Bobos, or creative class, search for the gritty authentic community, they often destroy what it is they like about the community.

### **Educational Exposure**

With the possibility of more segregation and individualism in the creative class model, Florida has argued that the exposure the creative class provides for the city outweighs these

negative aspects of the model. He has asserted that when the creative class moves into a city, there will be knowledge spillovers. The ideas and knowledge of the creative class is passed on to the noncreative class (Stolarick and Florida 2006). The knowledge spillover, in turn, leads to innovation and creates new ideas as artists, students, and other creative class individuals work together (Landry 2000). New firm creations and the share of high technology employment within a city lend support to the exposure effect (Florida 2002b; Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004).

Cities that have attracted the creative class have seen a larger increase in economic growth from 1990 to 2000 (Wojan, Lambert, and McGranahan 2007). Schlichtman (2009) illustrated how a city could become a “niche” city based around creative capital. By becoming a niche city, High Point, North Carolina was able to grow in the global marketplace. Cities, such as Flint, Michigan, were not able to change and attract creative capital; thus, Flint declined in the global marketplace.

To Florida, the exposure of the creative class far outweighs any negative aspects of the creative capital concept. Florida argued that the creative class is open to all people and is tolerant, and this will spur economic and social growth. Twenge pointed out that “Generation Me” is more accepting of race and ethnicity than previous generations. “Generation Me” had the highest rates of interracial dating and marriage, and the presidential election of 2008 demonstrated the generation’s openness to race by electing the first African American to the White House. The election of Barack Obama was inconceivable to previous generations, yet for Generation Me the election of an African American was not a big deal.

For Richard Florida, the openness to sexual orientation and race is a key component of what makes a community creative. The Tolerance Index, which includes a measure of openness to gays and lesbians, is one of the components that makes up the creative capital index. Being

open to all people is one of the traits that the creative classes possesses that other classes may not. Other scholars have confirmed that tolerance does predict innovation. Chirot (1994) described how innovation often occurs in areas that were not at the center of power, but in areas where many different people mixed. According to Chirot (1994: 49) “the most innovative and dynamic parts were not just little states on the edge of the civilization, but merchant cities.” These merchant cities were areas where people from all over the world came to trade. The mixture of different people in one area produced new ideas, concepts, and inventions. Merchant cities were the areas that drove change in society by adapting to new ideas.

Merchant cities are what Sassen (2006) called global cities. Today, a handful of cities dominate world trade. Cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong control financial markets and are the leading innovative cities in the world (Sassen 2006). Global cities have become the leaders in many industries because of the influx of different people into such cities. As more people go to these global cities to trade more ideas are shared, thus merchant/global/creative cities become the most diverse cities in the world by the exposure of different people found in these cities.

Zachary (2000) described how diversity correlates with economic development. According to Zachary (2000), areas with large populations of “hybrid” people are the most advanced countries. As countries become more diverse, people in these nations start to inter-marry and create inter-racial populations. However, it is the flow of ideas that is the key to development. More diverse populations have more innovations due to the influx of new cultures and ideas. The correlation Zachary explained between people inter-marrying is similar to the Tolerance Index described by Florida.

Rutten and Gelissen (2008) tested Florida's creative capital model by examining 94 European regions. They found that diversity (tolerance) was related to the regional wealth. Regions with greater diversity did have greater wealth than areas with low levels of diversity. Moreover, Rutten and Gelissen (2008) found that the level of diversity increased the levels of technology and talent in the region.

### **Segregation**

Even with Florida's assertion that exposure to the creative class will make any negative social ills moot, sociologists and other social scientists have demonstrated that segregation has many negative consequences (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Yinger 1998). One consequence of segregation is higher crime rates and victimization rates in segregated neighborhoods (Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison 1995; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). One reason that segregation may lead to higher levels of crime is because the neighborhoods lack social capital. In poor neighborhoods, residents are often continually moving in and out of the community. The high level of residential turnover does not allow social bonds to develop. Shaw and McKay (1942) suggested that a high rate of residential turnover decreased community social control and increased institutional disruption. Sampson (1985) found that increased residential mobility was positively related to violent crime. Even controlling for neighborhood factors, Sampson found that residents of highly mobile neighborhoods experienced double the rates of violent victimization as compared to residents in low mobility neighborhoods. Similarly, Smith and Jarjoura (1988) found that robbery and assault increased as residential mobility increased.

In her book *Social Sources of Delinquency* (1978), Kornhauser argued that the poor who live in diverse neighborhoods and move frequently will always experience more crime.

Reviewing a large number of empirical studies, Kornhauser concluded that residents who move frequently cannot form social bonds with other residents and institutions. The loss of these bonds allows delinquents to act in negative ways toward the community.

Bursik and Webb (1982) focused on Shaw and McKay's residential mobility concept and studied its effects on crime. Neighborhoods with high total population turnover remained high crime areas when new ethnicities moved to them. When an immigrant group moved out of the neighborhood, the new immigrant group maintained the high delinquency rates as the previous. Meanwhile the immigrant group that left the high crime neighborhood saw a decline in their delinquency rate. Moreover, Bursik and Webb found that when neighborhood populations stabilized, crime decreased. African American neighborhoods with low residential mobility had crime rates similar to other races, but African American neighborhoods with high residential mobility had higher crime rates than other groups.

The studies mentioned above all point to the implications of communities lacking bonds. People living in neighborhoods with high residential mobility do not get to know each other and share a common vision of what the community could and should be. This has led to what Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) have termed collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is "the linkage of mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene for the common good" (Sampson 2002a; 232). The idea behind collective efficacy is that the residents in a community will engage with each other to form a common idea of what the neighborhood will be like. Residents in a community will have shared expectations of what is correct behavior and what is incorrect behavior. As the residents in a neighborhood agree on the expectations of the neighborhood, crime will decrease as residents will stop deviant behavior or call the police when a deviant act is taking place.

To test whether collective efficacy has an effect on crime Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) surveyed 8,782 residents in 343 Chicago neighborhoods. The survey consisted of questions aimed at measuring the collective efficacy of the neighborhood. The respondents were asked to measure how likely it would be for a neighbor would intervene in various behaviors in the community and how willing the neighbor would be to help. Controlling for concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, foreign born population, age, race, socioeconomic status, and home ownership, the authors found that collective efficacy reduced the amount of violent crime in the neighborhood. Neighborhoods with high collective efficacy had lower rates of violent crime than neighborhoods with low collective efficacy.

Collective efficacy is similar to what Putnam has termed social capital. Crime increases as social capital, or collective efficacy, decreases. Vold, Bernard, and Snipes (2002: 130) explained:

Because of this low social capital, neighbors are not able to exert effective control over public or common areas, such as streets and parks, and so these areas are free to be taken over by criminals. In addition, local teenagers have considerable freedom because of the anonymity of the neighborhood means that they and their friends are unknown to adults even though the teenagers may be only a short distance from their homes.

Research has found that unsupervised peer groups led to a number of negative outcomes, including increased delinquency (Haynie and Osgood 2005; Osgood and Anderson 2004), heavy alcohol use (Osgood, Wilson, O'Mally, Bachman, and Johnston 1996), and an increased number of sexual partners for youth (Browning, Burrington, Leventhal, and Brooks-Gunn 2008). Sampson (2002b) provided evidence that collective efficacy reduces the amount of unsupervised peer groups in the community. Intervention is also more likely in a community with a high level of collective efficacy when teenaged peer groups are hanging out or loitering (Sampson 2002b).



Mazerolle, Wicker, and McBroom (2010) found that collective efficacy reduced crime in Australia, which demonstrates the effectiveness of collective efficacy in other countries.

Urban areas in the United States are still segregated along racial and ethnic lines (Farley and Squires 2005; Fischer 2003; Roscigno, Karafin, and Tester 2009). However, some researchers have begun to argue that class segregation is now the dominant form of segregation (Fischer, Stockmayer, Stiles, and Hout 2004). In the past, segregation was not due to class differences, but to racial and ethnic differences (Brooks 2011; Kain 1968). Today, there are still some effects on segregation which are based on race (Adelman 2005; Fischer 2003), but class lines are now being drawn in many cities.

The link between economic conditions and crime is well established among criminologists (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes 2002). However, the link is not as easy to figure out as one might assume. Many other factors are involved when examining poverty. As Shaw and McKay concluded, economic status does seem to be correlated with crime, but so do a host of other social ills. It is unclear which factor is causing crime to increase.

Criminologists have found that a disproportionate amount of homicides occur in areas with a high concentration of poverty (Beasley and Antunes 1974; Bensing and Schroeder 1960; Bullock 1955; Mladenka and Hill 1976). Blau and Blau (1982) examined the 125 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. They found that economic inequality and racial income inequality had the strongest effect on crime. As the economic inequality in the city increased, crime in the city increased. Furthermore, Blau and Blau argued that racial income inequality increased crime. Blau and Blau (1982: 126) stated:

High rates of criminal violence are apparently the price of racial and economic inequalities. In a society founded on the principle "that all men are created equal" economic inequalities rooted in ascribed positions violate the spirit of democracy and are likely to create alienation, despair, and conflict. The hypothesis derived from this

assumption, which is also deducible from a general sociological theory, is that racial socioeconomic inequalities are a major source of much criminal violence.

Another study attempting to examine the link between poverty and crime was a study done by Loftin and Hill (1974). Loftin and Hill (1974) created a “structural poverty” index, which included measures of infant mortality, low educational attainment, one-parent families, and income. The study found that there was a very strong correlation between the structural poverty index and state homicide rates. Using data for 121 central cities in the United States in 1990, Lee (2000) found that concentrated poverty was much more important in predicting homicides than the overall poverty level. In other words, when a neighborhood is segregated from people of other socioeconomic statuses, homicides increase.

John Hagan (1994) examined high crime areas in the United States and Canada. He found that areas characterized by concentrated poverty were more likely to have high crime rates. Hagan stated that these neighborhoods had a large amount of disinvestment from businesses and government agencies. The disinvestment in the neighborhood guaranteed that the neighborhood would never be able to develop economically, because no businesses would move to the area to provide jobs. Further, government agencies refused to address the problem of poverty in these areas. Instead, residents in these concentrated poverty areas found alternative means to making money, such as selling illegal drugs and prostitution.

Demonstrating how employment can affect crime, Reid (2003) examined the labor market of Boston and Atlanta. Reid stated that Boston raised the number of high-skilled service sector jobs and experienced a decrease in crime. Atlanta increased the number of low-skill service sector jobs and experienced an increase in crime. Reid argued that the low-skill jobs found in Atlanta did not reduce poverty in the city, thus, Atlanta saw an increase in crime. On

the other hand, by bringing in high-skill jobs, which pay more money, Boston saw a decrease in crime.

This is a small sample of the studies that have found links between crime and poverty. However, it should be clear from reading these studies that there are many problems with linking poverty and crime. If crime is influenced by economic conditions, then when there is an economic depression one would expect to see crime increase. Conversely, during an economic boom, it would be expected that crime would decrease. However, this is not the case. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States experienced an economic boom, and crime increased during this period. During the 1990s, crime decreased during a similar economic boom (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes 2002). Thus, crime has been associated with both increases and decreases in crime during economic booms. Additionally, Long and White (1981) demonstrated that during economic downturns, the rate of crime did not increase.

Segregation is not only linked to higher crime rates, but it has been shown to be linked to reduced educational attainment, poorer educational quality, decreased high school graduation, unemployment, and decreased income (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Yinger 1998). Cutler and Glaeser (1997) argued that many of the negative outcomes of segregation were due to decreased educational exposure for the people in segregated areas.

If the creative class segregate themselves, similar outcomes could be expected along creative and noncreative class lines. Creative class people will send their children to better schools, whether it is public or private high schools. Creative class parents have the money to do so, as well as the opportunity to live in neighborhoods that provide excellent education to their children.

Furthermore, creative class children are more likely to attend more prestigious universities, which only widens the gap between the creative class and everyone else. Because the creative class can afford to send their children to private schools or live in areas with good public schools, the creative class children will be better prepared for college. Writing in 1961, Conant explained that as the president of Harvard he did not admit many lower income individuals and children from slum areas to his university. He stated that this low admittance was not due to racism or any ill will toward the people in slum areas, but because the children had fallen so far behind that it was impossible for them to meet the standards to be admitted to Harvard.

This may seem like the comment of an individual in an elite position looking down on the poor and suggesting that they cannot possibly compete with the Harvard students. But Conant enacted many policies while at Harvard to change the structure of not only Harvard but the entire university system. Conant “was alarmed by the thought that America might develop a hereditary aristocracy consisting of exactly the sort of well-bred young men he was training in Cambridge” (Brooks 2000: 26). To make sure this hereditary aristocracy did not develop, Conant changed from admitting only elite students to making admission based on merit. In 1952, the incoming verbal SAT score for freshman was 583 and across the Ivy League universities, the average score was around 500 (Brooks 2000). By 1960, the average verbal SAT score had jumped to 678 with math score of 695 (Brooks 2000). “The average Harvard freshman in 1952 would have placed in the bottom 10 percent of the Harvard freshman class of 1960” (Brooks 2000: 26).

In addition to the increased competition of getting into college, the cost of a college degree has been increasing steadily over the decades (Ehrenberg 2000). Today, for many lower class people a college degree is out of reach. The increase in tuition has guaranteed that many

children of service and working class backgrounds will remain there as they cannot afford to send their children to college – especially not a prestigious university to which the creative class will send their children to (Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg 1998).

Florida's creative class model may be segregating people along creative and noncreative lines. Cities that follow this model in order to develop economically may experience increases in crime, decreases in educational quality and attainment, and a host of other social problems. It is important to understand the social consequences for development along the creative class model.

## CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS

To begin to explore the possible outcomes of a metropolitan area's shift to creative capital, the current study examined creative capital in the metropolitan area as a whole, along with counties designated as urban and suburban. The designation of a county as urban or suburban was based on the Office of Management and Budget bulletin (2009) found on the U.S. Census Bureau's website. The bulletin lists counties together as part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). For example, the counties that comprise the MSA of Des Moines, Iowa are: Dallas, Guthrie, Madison, Polk, and Warren. Next, the county with the largest percentage of the population for the MSA was labeled as urban, while the other counties were labeled as suburban. From the previous example, in the Des Moines MSA, Polk County would be designated as urban, while the others would be suburban counties.

This labeling system was not perfect, as some cities have a large population in more than one county. In the circumstance that a large percentage of the population was distributed among two counties, both would be labeled as urban. An example of this was in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota MSA. This MSA is comprised of thirteen counties, with a large percentage of the population spread across Hennepin and Ramsey counties. Therefore, Hennepin and Ramsey counties were labeled as urban, and the other counties as suburban. The final sample size for this study was 345, with 207 urban counties and 138 suburban counties included in the study.

Next, data was gathered from the years 1990, 2000, and 2008 in order to gauge the impact that creative capital had on MSA, urban, and suburban counties. Selection of these time periods allowed the study to examine any changes that may have occurred over a 28-year period. Moreover, use of data from these years allowed the study to examine whether changes in economic circumstances affected the creative capital of an area. In 1990, the United States was

ending the Cold War, and was prosperous. The economic prosperity of the 1990s culminated in 2000 in a large economic boom for the country. Finally, 2008 began to capture the Dot.Com bust and the beginning of the Great Recession. Comparison of these years allowed the study to examine whether larger economic issues increased or decreased the rise of creative capital for which Richard Florida advocates.

The United States Census Bureau collected information for all counties in 1990 and 2000. However, in 2008 the Census Bureau only collected information for counties with a population of 50,000 or more. This restricted the sample size of the current study. However, many of the counties that could not be included in the current study were small, ex-urban counties. These counties are often a long distance from the urban core and have a small population. While these counties are changing, and in the future could provide important information, for the current study they may have obscured any findings. In 2008, these counties may have been more accurately considered to be rural, as they had not yet been fully developed. For instance, Washington County, Missouri is part of the St. Louis MSA. However, the population of the county was 24,304 in 2008. Thus, this county was not included in the current study. On the other hand, St. Louis County, a suburban county in the St. Louis MSA, had a population of 991,830 in 2008. St. Louis County was included in the study. A list of the counties included in the study can be found in Appendix A.

### **Creative Capital Variables**

The creative class measure was created from McGranahan and Wojan's (2007) study. McGranahan and Wojan argued that Florida's measure of the creative class was too simplistic. The authors recast Florida's creative class measure using standard occupational classifications from the Office of Management and Budget. According to McGranahan and Wojan, some of the

jobs included in the classification of creative class did not fit the concept of creative. Some occupations were proportional to the population, thus areas would score more creative than these counties actually were. For example, Florida included farm managers in his classification of the creative class. While farm manager may have a great deal of creativity, this occupation is not useful in explaining urban development. Moreover, McGranahan and Wojan excluded teachers from the creative capital measure. The authors argued that teachers are proportional to the population, which would skew how creative some areas are.

The current study used the same classification system as McGranahan and Wojan. However, McGranahan and Wojan provided information for 1990 and 2000 only. The current study recreated their measure for 2008. Occupations that comprise the creative class are listed in Table 2. From this classification system, three variables were created for this study: creative class, noncreative class, and art class. Creative class was the percentage of the population employed in creative class jobs. Noncreative class was the percentage of the population employed in noncreative jobs. Arts class was the percentage of the population employed in art, design, entertainment, sports, and the media, which Florida argued was a creative group that differs from the regular creative class.

Using McGranahan and Wojan's article as a guide, variables which could aid in our understanding of what comprises the creative class were then selected from the United States Census Bureau. Population density was used in the current analysis to gauge whether the creative class enjoys living in dense urban areas, which is what Florida argued. Percent of the population that was African American was also included in McGranahan and Wojan's study, and was included in the current study as well.



African Americans have been the most segregated group in the United States and may be being locked out of the creative class. Thus, this variable was used to understand whether the creative class segregates itself along race and ethnic lines. The percentage of the population that was foreign born was included by McGranahan and Wojan and was utilized in the current study as well. Richard Florida argued that the creative class is made up of foreign born residents, and that the creative class likes to live in areas with diversity. Hence, this variable was used to test Florida's assertion. Finally, three age structure variables were used in the current study: ages 17 and below, ages 18 to 44, and ages 65 and over. These age variables differ from the variables used by McGranahan and Wojan. The current study used these variables to explore whether the creative class lives in areas with children and the elderly. Florida described the creative class as young and college educated, but with the definition of the creative class being based upon occupations, it would follow that the creative class should be of working age. Thus, the study examined whether urban and suburban creative class are raising children and caring for the elderly. All variables were collected from the United States Census Bureau.

### **Creative Segregation and Creative Exposure**

Florida argued that the creative class loves diversity, and a large creative class will expose others to their ideas. He asserted that integration of the creative class into a city will eventually be an economic and social benefit to all, even those not in the creative class. However, Florida provided no evidence of this, other than his assertion of its truth.

To test Florida's assumption, the current study utilized Cutler and Glaeser's (1997) measures of housing segregation and educational exposure. Cutler and Glaeser were interested in investigating racial segregation, but for the current study, the variable of noncreative class is substituted for race. Therefore, a creative segregation measure and a creative exposure measure

**Table 2: Florida's Original Creative Class Occupations and the Creative Class Recast by McGranahan and Wojan**

STF4 occupation file	Florida	McGranahan and Wojan	Excluded
<i>Management occupations</i>	Summary		
Top executives	X	X	
Advertising, marketing, promotions, public relations, and sales managers	X	X	
Financial managers	X	X	
Operations specialists managers	X	X	
Farmers and farm managers	X		X
Other management occupations	X	X	
<i>Business and financial operations occupations</i>	Summary		
Business operations specialists	X		X
Accountants and auditors	X	X	
Other financial specialists	X		X
<i>Computer and mathematical occupations</i>	Summary	Summary	
<i>Architecture and engineering occupations</i>	Summary	Summary	
Architects, surveyors, and cartographers	X	X	
Engineers	X	X	
Drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians	X	X	
<i>Life, physical, and social service occupations</i>	Summary		
Life and physical sciences	X	X	
Social scientists and related workers	X	X	
Life, physical, and social science technicians	X		X
<i>Legal occupations</i>	Summary		
Lawyers	X	X	
Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers	X		X
Legal support workers	X		X
<i>Education, training, and library occupations</i>	Summary		
Post-secondary teachers	X	X	
Teachers, primary, secondary, and special education	X		X
Teachers, pre-school, kindergarten, elementary, and middle school	X		X
Teachers, secondary school	X		X
Teachers, special education	X		X
Librarians, curators, and archivists	X	X	
Other teachers, instructors, education training, and library occupations	X		X
<i>Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations</i>	Summary	Summary	
<i>Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations</i>	Summary		
Physicians and surgeons	X		X
Registered nurses	X		X
Therapists	X		X
Other health diagnosis and treating practitioners and technical occupations	X		X
Health technologies and technicians	X		X
<i>High-end sales: part of sales occupation summary category</i>			
Sales representative, services, wholesale and manufacturing	X	X	
Other sales and related occupations, including supervisors	X	X	

were created. The creative segregation measure allows the study to examine whether the creative class is segregated from the noncreative class. The creative exposure measure allows the study to explore whether the creative class does interact with the noncreative class, which would suggest that ideas then get passed on to the noncreative class.

The creative segregation measure was defined as

$$Creative\ Segregation = \frac{1}{2} \left| \frac{noncreative_i}{noncreative} - \frac{creative_i}{creative} \right|,$$

where  $noncreative_i$  is the population of the noncreative class in the county.  $noncreative$  is the population of the noncreative class in the MSA.  $creative_i$  is the population of the creative class in the county, and  $creative$  is the population of the creative class in the MSA. If the noncreative class is distributed evenly throughout the MSA, the absolute value for the county will be zero. If the creative and noncreative classes never reside in the same counties, the absolute value will be one.

The creative exposure variable was defined as

$$Creative\ Exposure = \left( \frac{noncreative_i}{noncreative} \right) \times \left( \frac{education_i}{population_i} \right) - \left( \frac{education}{population} \right),$$

where  $noncreative_i$  is the population of noncreative class in the county.  $noncreative$  is the population of the noncreative class in the MSA.  $education_i$  is the population enrolled in college or graduate school in the county, and  $education$  is the population enrolled in college and graduate school in the MSA.  $population_i$  is the population in the county and  $population$  is the population in the MSA. The creative exposure measure will be greater than zero if noncreative class people live in counties with more educated people, which Florida argued is one of the main traits of the creative class. The creative exposure measure will be less than zero if the noncreative classes do

not live in counties with educated people. All variables were collected from the United States Census Bureau for 1990, 2000, and 2008.

### **Crime and the Creative Class**

To examine whether the change for cities to creative capital, and the changing demographics associated with the creative class, has any effect on crime, the study followed methods utilized by Blau and Blau (1982). While Blau and Blau's study is older than the concept of the creative class, the study is a classic in examining metropolitan crime. The variables used in the current study were taken from Blau and Blau's classic examination of the structural causes of crime.

Crime data was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. The UCR began collecting data for crimes reported to the police in 1930 (Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips 2002). Today, the UCR collects data from around the United States for nearly 17,000 law enforcement agencies. The collection of crime data can be problematic. For instance, crimes reported to the police can be swayed by the community's feelings toward the police, and crimes can be classified differently in different areas (Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips 2002). However, the UCR is recognized by scholars as being the best source of data for crimes committed in the United States.

For the present study, the total number of crimes provided by the UCR was converted to rates. This was done by dividing the total number of crimes committed by the population of the state and then multiplying by 100,000:

$$Crime\ Rate = \left( \frac{crime}{population} \right) \times 100,000.$$

Converting the total number of crimes to rates makes comparisons possible. A county with a large population will naturally have more crimes committed because of the larger number of

people when compared to a smaller county. Rates control for the population of the county by illustrating how many crimes will be committed for every 100,000 people in the county.

Based on the Blau and Blau (1982) article, total crime, murder, and property crimes were used in the current study. Property crime consists of larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Property crime was included to examine whether lesser crimes increase as the creative class increases in an area.

Control variables followed as closely as possible to Blau and Blau. However, because the current study has a different focus, some deviation was needed. The population of the county was used as a control, and the percentage of individuals below poverty was used in the study to provide a control measure of poverty. The percentage of the population that was in the creative class and noncreative class was used as a variable to control for education. The percentage of married households in the county was used as a control, because marriage has been shown to decrease crime (Labouvie 1996; Warr 1998). Finally, because of the economic meltdown, the percentage of vacant housing and the unemployment rate of the county were used in the current study. All data was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.

## CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS

Basic percentages were examined to determine where the creative classes were more likely to live. For all counties in 1990, 22.46 percent of the employment was in the creative class. For all counties in 2000, the percentage of employment in creative jobs was 26.83 percent, and in 2008 it was 27.41 percent (see Table 3). There is a rise in the percentage of jobs in the creative class from 1990 to 2008. There was a 22.04 total percent increase in the percentage of creative class jobs from 1990 to 2008. However, a substantial disparity in growth was demonstrated within those years. The largest growth in creative class jobs was from 1990 to 2000, with a 19.46 percent increase. From 2000 to 2008 there was only a 2.16 percent increase in creative employment. This suggests that creative employment in the United States has stagnated since 2000.

**Table 3: Creative Class Percent and Art Class Percent for MSA, Urban, and Suburban Counties**

	1990 (min, max)	2000 (min, max)	2008 (min, max)
<i>Creative Class</i>			
All	22.46 (11.91, 39.72)	26.83 (14.19, 48.09)	27.41 (13.57, 49.44)
Urban	21.46 (12.68, 39.09)	25.37 (14.19, 47.88)	25.99 (13.57, 49.44)
Suburban	23.97 (11.91, 39.72)	29.03 (15.47, 48.09)	29.53 (16.07, 47.01)
<i>Art Class</i>			
All	1.15 (.54, 6.53)	1.17 (.50, 6.09)	1.17 (.19, 5.18)
Urban	1.17 (.54, 6.53)	1.19 (.50, 6.09)	1.18 (.19, 5.18)
Suburban	1.10 (.57, 3.17)	1.12 (.54, 3.68)	1.15 (.26, 3.44)

When examining urban and suburban counties in 1990, 21.46 percent and 23.97 percent of employment was in the creative jobs, respectively (see Table 3). Suburban counties were

found to have more creative employment, which is not the impression that Richard Florida gave in his explanation of the creative class. Moreover, the same pattern followed for the years 2000 and 2008. The percentage employed in creative class jobs for urban counties was 25.37 in 2000 and 25.99 in 2008. In suburban counties, the percentage employed in creative class jobs was 29.03 in 2000 and 29.53 in 2008. From 1990 to 2008, suburban counties increased creative class employment by 23.19 percent while urban counties increased by 21.11 percent. Again, a disparity in growth was found within the years examined. Most growth for urban and suburban counties took place between 1990 and 2000, with an 18.22 percent increase in urban counties and a 21.11 percent increase in suburban counties. Creative class job growth in suburban counties was much smaller from 2000 to 2008, with a 1.72 percent increase, while urban counties experienced a 2.44 percent increase.

When examining the artistic employment, there is an increase over time for all counties, from 1.15 percent in 1990 to 1.17 percent in 2008. However, this is a small increase of only 1.74 percent over this time period. Following the pattern of the creative class, art class employment had the largest increase from 1990 to 2000, which accounted for all 1.74 percent. From 2000 to 2008 the percentage of people employed in artistic jobs remained the same, at 1.17 percent. There was no increase in the percent of people employed in art class from 2000 to 2008.

When examining the art class employment for urban and suburban counties, an opposite pattern from that of creative class employment emerged. There was a larger percent of people employed in art class jobs in urban counties than in suburban counties. In urban counties in 1990, the art class employment accounted for 1.17 percent of the people employed. In 2000, the art class rose to 1.19 percent but then decreased to 1.18 percent in 2008. For suburban counties in 1990, 1.10 percent of jobs were in the art class. Suburban counties experienced an increase in

art class jobs, from 1.12 percent in 2000 to 1.15 percent in 2008. The higher percentage of the art class in urban areas may be the reason that the creative class is seen as an urban phenomenon. Art class employment is more likely to be seen as creative by the general public. Creative class jobs include doctors, lawyers, and engineers, while those in the art class are employed in the media, athletics, and art. People are more likely to associated art class jobs with being highly creative, and thus they might conclude that urban areas are where creative class people choose to live.

The opposite shift also occurred when examining the percentage of change of the art class over time. From 1990 to 2008, urban counties experienced a .85 percent increase in art class employment while suburban counties had a 4.54 percent increase. More art class jobs were being created in suburban counties. As more creative jobs move to urban areas, the art class seems to be moving to suburban areas.

### **Multiple Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA)**

To determine if there was a significant difference between urban and suburban counties in creative and art class employment, a MANCOVA was performed. MANCOVA compares categorical independent variables to mean group differences for the dependent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Therefore, the current study examined whether urban and suburban counties differed significantly in the percentage of people employed in the creative and in the art class. Covariates were added to the model to control for other factors that might make urban and suburban counties different.

The dependent variables in the model were the percent of people employed in the creative class and the percent of people employed in the art class. The independent variable in the model was county type, which was labeled 1 for urban and 2 for suburban (see the methods section for



the description of how counties were designated as urban or suburban). The percentage of the population that was African American, the percentage of the population that was foreign born, the population of the county, and the percent of individuals below poverty were added as covariates in the model. These covariates were included based on what Richard Florida described as being significant indicators of the creative class and based on past studies in community and urban development. A MANCOVA was run for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008.

Before beginning the MANCOVA, the assumptions of the model must be met. The first assumption is that there have to be independent observations or uncorrelated cases (Field 2009; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). There was no correlation for the variables in the model (Appendices K – S), thus, this assumption was met. The next assumption is that there must be equal group sizes. Urban had a sample size of 189 and suburban had a sample size of 132 for 1990. For 2000, the urban sample was 188 and the suburban sample was 132. Finally, for 2008, the urban sample was 180 and the suburban sample was 128. Hence, this assumption was violated. Therefore, examining the outcome of the MANCOVA is done with some caution. However, the study is justified in moving forward as the sample sizes were not extremely different, and the study cannot increase the number of suburban counties. The U.S. Census Bureau does not provide all the needed information for all counties in the year 2008 (as discussed in the methods section). Therefore, the current study could only include the counties for which the U.S. Census Bureau does provide data.

The next assumption is that there is a normal distribution for the dependent variables. The percent of creative class was normally distributed in all three years. However, the art class was not normally distributed for 1990, 2000, and 2008. To solve this problem, art class percent

was transformed using log<sub>10</sub> transformation, which then allowed the study to meet this assumption. Next, all outliers were taken out of the analysis for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. The final assumption is homogeneity of variance, which means that the variances in each group are roughly equal. Box's M Test was used to test for homoscedasticity. In 1990, Box's M Test was significant at the  $p < .001$  level, which means that the assumption was violated. Once again, the findings of the MANCOVA will be interpreted with caution. For 2000, Box's M Test was significant at the  $p < .05$  level as was the Box's M Test for 2008. Next the Levene's Test was used to examine which dependent variable was homoscedastic. For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the creative class measure was not significant, which suggested that this variable met the assumption for homogeneity of variance. The art class variable was significant at the  $p < .05$  level for 1990 and 2000, but was not significant in 2008. The percentage of the population employed in the art class is problematic for the assumption of homogeneity of variance.

After running the MANCOVA, Wilks' Lambda was examined to explore whether the creative class and art class were significantly different in percentage of people employed in urban and suburban counties. For 1990 and 2000, the county type was significant at the  $p < .001$  level. This means that there was a significant difference between the creative and art classes in urban and suburban areas. In 2008, Wilks' Lambda was not significant, which means that there was no difference between urban and suburban counties in that year. Examination of the K Matrix reveals that in 1990, creative class is significant at the  $p < .025$  level and art class is significant at the  $p < .001$  level. In 2000, the K Matrix reveals that the creative class is significant at the  $p < .001$  level and art class is significant at the  $p < .001$  level.

The violation of some assumptions means that the outcomes have to be viewed with caution. However, the results followed the same pattern as the percentages discussed previously.

For the years 1990 and 2000, there was a significant difference in the amount of people employed in creative class and art class jobs. As the percentages demonstrated, the largest growth was during this period. In 2008, there was no significant difference, which, again, followed the pattern of the percentages discussed earlier. From 2000 to 2008 there was slow growth in the creative class and art class. Also, the percentages seemed to demonstrate that there was a shift from growth of the creative class in the suburbs to the urban counties. For the art class, however, the growth shifted from urban to suburban. This may explain why there is no significant difference between urban and suburban counties in 2008, as the shift had decreased the difference between the two.

### **Creative Class Regressions for All Counties**

OLS regression allows a researcher to examine the effect an independent variable has on the dependent variable (Lewis-Beck 1980). Because the current study has more than one independent variable in the model, multiple regressions were used. This allows the researcher to get a “fuller explanation of the dependent variable, since few phenomena are products of a single cause” (Lewis-Beck 1980: 47). In the equation, the dependent variable is seen as a linear function of more than one independent variable.

$$Y = a_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \dots + b_kX_k + e$$

In the equation above, Y = the dependent variable, X = the independent variable, a = the intercept, b = the slope, and e = the error term. The intercept (a) is the value of the dependent variable (Y) when all independent variables (X) are equal to zero. The slope (b) is the average change in the dependent variable (Y) associated with a one unit change in the independent variable (X) when all other independent variables are held constant.

In order to have confidence in the outcome of the regression, assumptions need to be met. The first assumption of multiple regression is that there is no specification error (Berry and Feldman 1985; Lewis-Beck 1980). This means that it is assumed that in a population there is a specific way the set of independent variables influence the dependent variable (Berry and Feldman 1985). If this assumption is broken, it means that the wrong model has been estimated. This assumption was met, as there is theoretical justification for including all the variables in the models that were run. Moreover, the exclusion of some variables, such as percent African American, meant that the models were not overspecified.

The second assumption is that there is no measurement error. The measures used for this study were from the FBI Uniform Crime Report and the U.S. Census Bureau. The assumption was met in the current analysis because the measures have been used previously in a wide variety of numerous studies.

The third assumption is that the variables not be correlated. The current analysis ran a large number of regressions, but this was to ensure that this assumption be met. Different crimes are highly correlated with each other, so many regressions needed to be run to ensure that this assumption was met.

The fourth assumption is that there is linearity between the independent and dependent variable. This assumption means that for each independent variable, the amount of change in the dependent variable associated with a unit increase in the independent variable (holding all other independent variable constant) is the same. Scatterplots were examined before any models were run. Some variables displayed outliers. Berry and Feldman (1985) and Lewis-Beck (1980) suggested that to deal with outliers one could transform the variables. Variables that had outliers were transformed, which will be discussed later in the findings section.

To find out which characteristics make up a creative class community, multiple regressions were performed. First, a regression with the data from all counties for 1990, 2000, and 2008 was conducted. Next, data for urban counties from 1990, 2000, and 2008 were run. Finally, data for suburban counties from 1990, 2000, and 2008 were run. The data for all counties had a few variables that were nonlinear thus these variables were transformed by using the log<sub>10</sub> transformation (Berry and Feldman 1985). For the 1990 data, the percent of the population that was African American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign born, percent of the population that was 65 or older, and the unemployment rate were transformed using the log<sub>10</sub> transformation. For the 2000 data, the percent of the population that was African American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign born, percent of the population that was 65 or older, and the unemployment rate were transformed using the log<sub>10</sub> transformation. Finally, for the 2008 data, the percent of the population that was African American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign born, percent of the population that was 65 or older, and the percent of the population that was 18 to 44 were transformed using the log<sub>10</sub> transformation.

Furthermore, because of correlations between the percent of the population that was 18 to 44 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.733) for 1990, the percent of the population that was 18 to 44 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.734) for 2000, the percent of the population that was under 17 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.605) for 2000, and the percent of the population that was under 17 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.630) for 2008, separate regressions were run for each age category.

Examination of Table 4 demonstrates that in 1990 a number of variables were significant. The percentage of the population that was African American was significant at the  $p < .01$  level. This suggests that in 1990, counties with a higher percentage of African Americans were more creative than counties with a smaller percentage of African Americans. However, the percentage of the county that was African American was not significant for 2000 or 2008 (see Table 4). As creative class individuals moved to areas in 1990 that had a larger percentage of African Americans, the creative class individuals increased the cost of living in the area. A similar progression is seen over time with the percentage of the population that was foreign born. In 1990, 2000, and 2008 as the percent of the population that was foreign born increased, the percentage of the population in the creative class increased (see Table 4). Richard Florida emphasized the importance of foreign born residents and diversity for the creative class, the current results suggest that as the creative class individuals are more likely to live in areas with a larger foreign born population.

While diversity seems to thrive in areas that are creative, the population density of a community also plays a role in creative areas. As can be seen in Table 4, as the population density of a county increased, the creative class percent increased for the years under study. Florida suggested that creative class individuals prefer to live in densely populated urban areas. The data demonstrates that creative class individuals do increase the population density of the community. This is also representative of the authentic, gritty areas that Zukin (2010) described that rich hipster individuals strive to live in.

**Table 4: OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent All Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Black %	.14** (.00)	.09* (.00)	.12** (.00)	-.07 (.00)	-.09* (.00)	-.08 (.02)	-.06 (.01)	-.06 (.01)	.09 (.01)
Unemployment	-.69*** (.01)	-.60*** (.01)	-.62*** (.01)	-.65*** (.01)	-.61*** (.01)	-.60*** (.00)	-.49*** (.02)	-.49*** (.03)	-.43*** (.03)
Population Density	.12* (.00)	.12** (.00)	.15** (.00)	.22*** (.01)	.21*** (.00)	.23*** (.01)	.18** (.01)	.18** (.01)	.22*** (.01)
Foreign Born %	.34*** (.01)	.30*** (.00)	.32*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.26*** (.01)	.24*** (.01)	.31*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.22*** (.01)
Age 17 and Under	.00 (.00)			.05 (.00)			-.16*** (.00)		
Age 18 to 44		.24*** (.05)			.11** (.06)			-.07 (.03)	
Age 65 and Over			-.22*** (.01)			-.21*** (.00)			-.15** (.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	.52	.57	.57	.55	.56	.59	.38	.36	.37
N	344	344	344	344	344	344	333	333	333

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Counties that have lower unemployment rates have a larger percentage of creative class individuals (see Table 4). For 1990, 2000, and 2008 a decrease in the unemployment rate increased the percentage of the creative class in the county. The mobility of the creative class was discussed in Chapter III of the present study. Richard Florida's assertion that the creative class will move to areas and creative class jobs will follow seems to be supported by the current results. One cannot ascertain whether these counties had creative jobs and then the creative class moved to the area, or vice versa. However, counties that can sustain a higher employment rate see an increase in the creative class.

When examining the age structure of the county, the regressions demonstrate that the age of the county does play a role in the creativity of the county. In 2000 and 2008, the percentage of the population that was under 17 was significant and negatively related to the creativity of the county. In 1990 and 2000 the percentage of the population that was 18 to 44 was significant and positive, and in 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of the population that was 65 or over was significant and negative (see Table 4). Counties with larger percentages of young and elderly are less creative than counties with larger populations of 18 to 44. This finding validates Florida's assumption that creative class areas attract younger people. The working age population is the creative class, so counties tailored to the working population will attract the creative class. For counties that have large retirement communities and children, the creative class may pass them by.

### **Creative Class Regressions for Urban Counties**

Urban counties demonstrate a similar pattern when all counties were considered as a whole. The percentage of the population that was African American was significant for 1990, but for 2000 and 2008 was not significant (see Table 5). Again, this may suggest that as creative



class individuals move to urban counties the cost of living increases and drives out lower income groups.

The percentage of the population that was foreign born was significant for 1990, 2000, and for 2008 (see Table 5). This is the same pattern as was found above for all counties. Again, this suggests that immigrant groups play a significant role in the creativity of a community.

Population density was significant for 2000 and 2008 (see Table 5). As discussed above, the creative class may create areas that are the authentic and gritty areas that Zukin (2010) described. Therefore, creative areas become more densely populated over time because that is the living situation that creative class people want to emulate. Once again, the unemployment rate was significant and negatively correlated with creative class jobs for 1990, 2000, and 2008. Urban counties that can keep the unemployment rate low will see an increase in the creative class.

The age structure of urban counties followed the same pattern as for all counties (see Table 5). In 2000 and 2008, the percentage of the population that was under 17 was significant and negatively related to the creativity of the county. In 1990 and 2000 the percentage of the population that was 18 to 44 was significant and positive, and in 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of the population that was 65 or over was significant and negative. Once more, urban counties that cater to the working age population are more likely to attract the creative class. However, in the year 2008 the working age population was not significant. This may suggest that the economic collapse of 2008 had a significant impact on the occupation structure for the creative class.

**Table 5: OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent Urban Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Black %	.24** (.00)	.18** (.00)	.22** (.00)	.02 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.09 (.01)	.06 (.01)	.04 (.01)
Unemployment	-.55*** (.02)	-.44*** (.02)	-.35*** (.02)	-.57*** (.02)	-.52*** (.01)	-.59*** (.01)	-.43*** (.03)	-.42*** (.00)	-.39*** (.03)
Population Density	.07 (.00)	.08 (.00)	.09 (.00)	.17* (.01)	.17** (.01)	.21** (.01)	.09 (.01)	.17* (.01)	.17* (.01)
Foreign Born %	.36** (.01)	.25*** (.01)	.19** (.01)	.36*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.28*** (.01)	.39*** (.01)	.29*** (.01)	.24** (.01)
Age 17 and Under				-.13* (.00)			-.32*** (.00)		
Age 18 to 44		.38*** (.05)			.27*** (.06)			.09 (.03)	
Age 65 and Over			-.23*** (.02)			-.21*** (.01)			-.15* (.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	.39	.50	.46	.51	.55	.54	.38	.29	.30
N	206	206	206	206	206	206	200	200	200

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

### **Creative Class Regressions for Suburban Counties**

Suburban counties demonstrated that attracting the creative class to the suburbs is different than it is for urban areas. First, the percentage of the population that was African American was not significant for 1990 and 2000 (see Table 6). This finding may have been obtained because suburban areas have historically had a lower percentage of African Americans than urban counties. However, in 2008 the percentage of African Americans was significant and negative. As the percentage of African Americans increased the creativity in the suburban counties decreased. The creative classes in the suburbs do not seem to move to areas with diversity and then displace African Americans as was seen in urban counties.

However, a similar pattern as the urban areas emerged in the suburban areas regarding foreign born residents. As the percentage of the population that was foreign born increased, the creative class percent increased for 1990, 2000, and 2008 (see Table 6). Once again, immigrant groups play a significant role in the creativity of a community.

Population density was not significant for 1990 (see Table 6). However, population density was significant for 2000 and in two models in 2008. Thus, creative class residents in the suburbs may prefer densely populated areas, and thus create population density in housing choices over time.

The age structure of the suburban counties may shed light onto this finding. The percentage of the population that was under 17 was not significant for 1990, 2000, or 2008 (see Table 6). Suburban areas are more likely to cater to families, which may explain why the young do not seem to repel creativity like in urban areas. However, the age group 65 and over was significant and negative for 1990 and 2000. Over time the creative class may have driven the elderly populations out of the suburban areas that they choose to live. The percentage of the

**Table 6: OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent Suburban Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Black %	-.03 (.01)	-.04 (.01)	-.04 (.01)	-.09 (.01)	-.09 (.01)	-.09 (.01)	-.19** (.01)	-.17** (.01)	-.21** (.01)
Unemployment	-.72*** (.02)	-.67*** (.02)	-.67*** (.02)	-.68*** (.02)	-.67*** (.02)	-.63*** (.02)	-.57*** (.04)	-.56*** (.04)	-.53*** (.04)
Population Density	.01 (.01)	.09 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.19** (.01)	.16* (.01)	.18** (.01)	.14 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.17* (.01)
Foreign Born %	.36*** (.01)	.35** (.01)	.37*** (.01)	.22** (.01)	.22** (.01)	.22** (.01)	.27** (.01)	.26** (.01)	.24** (.01)
Age 17 and Under	.01 (.01)			.09 (.00)			-.03 (.00)		
Age 18 to 44		.14* (.08)			.04 (.11)			-.13* (.05)	
Age 65 and Over			-.13* (.02)			-.16** (.00)			-.17 (.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	.66	.67	.67	.61	.61	.63	.47	.49	.48
N	137	137	137	137	137	137	132	132	132

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

population that was 18 to 44 was significant and positive for 1990, but significant and negative for 2008. The age structure of the neighborhood is more complicated in suburban areas.

Yet again, as the unemployment rate decreased, the creative percent of the county increased (see Table 6). It seems that whether counties are urban or suburban, employment will increase the creative class.

### **Creative Segregation and Creative Exposure**

To examine the effects of creative segregation and creative exposure, regression models were conducted for 1990, 2000, and 2008. The equations for creative segregation and creative exposure can be found in Chapter IV. For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the variables of percentage of the population that was African American, population, and the percent of the population that was foreign born were nonlinear. Therefore, the log 10 transformation was used for each variable. In addition, the unemployment rate was transformed for the years 1990 and 2000.

The regression model for 1990 demonstrated that as creative segregation increased, the percent of the creative class increased (see Table 7). This finding suggests that creative class individuals are segregating themselves from noncreative class individuals. As a county becomes more creative, lower class workers move to other areas of the city. Moreover, the creative segregation variable was significant for 2000 and 2008 (see Table 7). Again, this demonstrated that the creative class are segregating themselves from noncreative workers.

The creative exposure variable was not significant for 1990, 2000, and 2008 (see Table 7). Exposure to educated people did not increase as creative class percent increased. While Florida stated that the creative class would expose others to their ideas, it is clear from the current findings that this assertion by Florida may be flawed. Because creative segregation is

significant, the creative exposure variable might be capturing that creative class individuals are exposing other creative individuals to their ideas.

**Table 7: OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent MSA Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)**

	1990	2000	2008
Black %	-.02 (.07)	-.08 (.01)	-.22** (.01)
Population	.16 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.00 (.02)
Unemployment Rate	-.76*** (.02)	-.64*** (.03)	-.54*** (.05)
Foreign Born %	.34*** (.01)	.34** (.01)	.23** (.02)
Creative Exposure	-.05 (.23)	-.11 (.14)	-.05 (.36)
Creative Segregation	.13* (.19)	.19** (.23)	.25*** (.27)
R <sup>2</sup>	.61	.60	.49
N	146	143	139

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

As in the creative class regression models discussed above, the unemployment rate, and the percent of the population that was foreign born were significant (see Table 7). Foreign born percent was significant for 1990, 2000, and 2008, which also differed from previous models. This may be due to the fact that only the largest cities in the United States had three or more counties. Immigrant groups often live in larger urban cities (Hyndman et al. 2006); therefore, these cities may have had a much larger foreign born population.

### **Crime and the Creative Class**

Some variables were nonlinear, therefore the log 10 transformation was used to correct for this violation. In 1990 the total crime rate, murder rate, property rate, percent of the population that was African American, population, percentage of individuals below poverty, the percentage of vacant housing, and the unemployment rate were all transformed using the log 10

transformation of the variable. In 2000 the total crime rate, murder rate, property rate, percent of the population that was African American, population, percentage of individuals below poverty, the percentage of vacant housing, and the unemployment rate were all transformed using the log 10 of the variable. In 2008 the murder rate, percent of the population that was African American, population, and the percentage of vacant housing were all transformed using the log 10 of the variable.

To examine the effect that creativity has on crime, regressions were run for 1990, 2000, and 2008 for all counties. In 1990 and 2000, the percentage of the creative class was not significant (see Table 8). However, in 2008 the percentage of the creative class was significant at the  $p < .001$  level for total crime rate, murder rate, and property crime rate. This result demonstrates that as the county becomes less creative, the rate of crime increases. The increased level of segregation discussed in the previous section may have an effect on crime over time. As the creative class first moves into an area, crime is not a factor. However, over time, as the creative class segregate themselves from the noncreative class, crime is significantly affected by the creative class. This may push crime to other areas of the city because segregated and socially isolated areas do not experience the same social benefits of creativity, such as creative exposure.

For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of married households was significant for total crime rate, and in 2008 for property crime rate (see Table 8). As the percentage of married households decreased in the county, the total crime rate increased. This suggests that the move toward individualism that the creative class exhibits may increase crime in a community. In communities with more married households, families can watch the neighborhood, which can lead to a form of social control in the community.

**Table 8: OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 All Counties**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property
Unemployment	-.16 (.18)	-.09 (.25)	-.19 (.18)	.17* (.09)	.10 (.17)	.13 (.10)	-.11* (.01)	-.07 (.02)	-.22*** (.01)
Black %	-.01 (.03)	.42*** (.04)	-.05 (.03)	.09 (.03)	.44*** (.05)	.07 (.03)	.05 (.02)	.33*** (.05)	.04 (.02)
Vacant Housing	.11* (.07)	.14** (.10)	.10 (.07)	-.06 (.07)	.03 (.12)	-.06 (.08)	.00 (.06)	.08 (.13)	.02 (.07)
Population	.12 (.05)	.12* (.07)	.09 (.05)	-.12* (.04)	-.08 (.07)	-.18** (.04)	.09 (.03)	.14** (.06)	.02 (.03)
Married Households	-.19* (.00)	.04 (.00)	-.14 (.00)	-.16* (.00)	-.02 (.00)	-.12 (.00)	-.35*** (.00)	-.16* (.00)	-.26** (.00)
Individuals Below Poverty	.26** (.12)	.42*** (.17)	.28** (.13)	.33** (.11)	.34*** (.19)	.27** (.11)	.18* (.00)	.26*** (.01)	.18* (.00)
Creative %	-.10 (.39)	-.08 (.54)	-.09 (.40)	.02 (.27)	-.01 (.48)	-.00 (.27)	-.26*** (.19)	-.15*** (.38)	-.30*** (.20)
R <sup>2</sup>	.18	.51	.11	.29	.47	.19	.38	.48	.30
N	342	322	342	304	284	304	304	294	304

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)



Surprisingly, the percentage of vacant housing was significant in 1990 for the total crime rate and the murder rate (see Table 8). With the economic collapse in 2008 the increase in vacant and abandoned homes was hypothesized to have an effect on crime. However, only in 1990 did vacant housing play a role in crime. An increase in the percentage of vacant housing in a county was related to increases in the total crime rate and the murder rate in the county for that year.

The percentage of individuals below the poverty rate was significant for all crimes and years (see Table 8). Again, as the previous section demonstrated, the creative class are segregating themselves from the noncreative class. As the noncreative class move to areas with increased poverty, there may be an increase in crime.

Next, regressions were performed for urban counties. A different effect for crime rates for urban counties was found than the effect observed when all counties were examined. The percentage of the creative class was not significant in any model (see Table 9). For urban creative class members, crime does not have an effect on where they choose to live. This lends support to Richard Florida's statement that that the creative class move to urban communities because of the authentic feel. Other scholars have pointed out that the creative class move to areas that are seen as real and gritty (Zukin 2010). However, becoming creative does not decrease crime for urban counties.

When examining Table 9, it can be seen that urban counties are differed from suburban counties. For urban counties, the percentage of married households was only significant for the total crime rate in 2008. However, for all counties, the percentage of married households was a significant indicator of crime for many different types of crimes in multiple years. The percentage of vacant housing was only significant for the murder rate in 1990 for urban counties. Nevertheless, similar results were found for all counties considered together and for urban

counties for the percentage of individuals below poverty and effects on crime. However, in urban counties the variable's effect is more sporadic than in models with all counties.

The most revealing effect from Table 9 and Table 10 is that urban counties differ from suburban counties when examining crime. The creative class demonstrates contrasting outcomes for crime in urban versus suburban areas. This may be due to the different social structures found in urban and suburban areas.

When examining suburban counties, the percentage of the creative class was significant for total crime rate and property crime rate in 1990 and 2008 (see Table 10). However, in 2000 the percentage of the creative class was not significant. It is unclear why the 2000 sample would not demonstrate the same effect as the 1990 and 2008 sample. The effect on crime that the creative class has in suburban counties is on property and nonviolent crime. Creative class individuals are able to protect their social space in ways that urban dwellers cannot. Suburban homes have large yards where the homes can be defended through gates and other security devices. Urban dwellers often do not have large yards or may live in apartments. The close quarters leads to less ability to defend one's social space. Moreover, suburban homes often have garages protecting automobiles from vandalism. Therefore, the creative class in suburban areas is able to decrease property and nonviolent crimes in ways that urban residents cannot.

**Table 9: OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 Urban Counties**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property
Unemployment	-.04 (.25)	-.02 (.33)	-.07 (.25)	.13 (.12)	.11 (.20)	.05 (.13)	-.12 (.01)	.02 (.02)	-.28** (.01)
Black %	.02 (.04)	.41*** (.05)	-.01 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.46*** (.06)	-.00 (.04)	.09 (.03)	.46*** (.05)	.08 (.03)
Vacant Housing	.09 (.11)	.21*** (.14)	.07 (.11)	.04 (.09)	-.01 (.16)	.06 (.10)	.01 (.08)	.01 (.16)	.05 (.08)
Population	.05 (.07)	.16* (.09)	.01 (.07)	-.01 (.05)	.02 (.08)	-.08 (.06)	.06 (.03)	.16* (.07)	-.01 (.04)
Married Households	-.04 (.00)	-.01 (.00)	.04 (.00)	-.10 (.00)	-.07 (.00)	-.03 (.00)	-.24* (.00)	-.10 (.00)	-.12 (.00)
Individuals	.14 (.19)	.21* (.26)	.16 (.20)	.22* (.14)	.28** (.24)	.19 (.16)	.18 (.00)	.18* (.01)	.19 (.00)
Below Poverty	.05 (.58)	-.12 (.78)	.08 (.59)	.14 (.39)	-.02 (.65)	.12 (.42)	-.11 (.23)	-.09 (.47)	-.15 (.25)
R <sup>2</sup>	.04	.43	.02	.14	.48	.05	.18	.45	.13
N	204	195	204	180	173	180	182	178	182

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)

**Table 10: OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 Suburban Counties**

	1990			2000			2008		
	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property	Total	Murder	Property
Unemployment	-.28 (.28)	-.18 (.39)	-.28 (.28)	.33** (.18)	.06 (.35)	.38** (.19)	-.03 (.02)	-.29* (.04)	-.07 (.02)
Black %	.07 (.04)	.45*** (.06)	.03 (.04)	.19* (.04)	.43*** (.08)	.21* (.04)	.14 (.04)	.26** (.08)	.14 (.04)
Vacant Housing	.13 (.09)	.02 (.13)	.12 (.10)	-.14 (.10)	.04 (.20)	-.15 (.11)	-.06 (.11)	.11 (.23)	-.06 (.12)
Population	.21* (.07)	.12 (.10)	.19 (.07)	-.27** (.06)	-.25** (.12)	-.33*** (.07)	.09 (.06)	.12 (.12)	.02 (.06)
Married Households	-.31** (.00)	.15 (.01)	-.29* (.00)	-.12 (.00)	.11 (.01)	-.09 (.00)	-.24* (.00)	-.02 (.01)	-.18 (.00)
Individuals Below Poverty	.13 (.18)	.66*** (.26)	.10 (.18)	.22 (.17)	.27 (.33)	.10 (.18)	.07 (.01)	.40** (.02)	.02 (.01)
Creative %	-.34** (.51)	-.02 (.76)	-.34** (.53)	-.01 (.42)	-.09 (.79)	-.02 (.45)	-.36** (.35)	-.20 (.71)	-.42*** (.36)
R <sup>2</sup>	.28	.54	.22	.39	.38	.34	.34	.37	.27
N	137	126	137	123	110	123	121	115	121

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error)

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The current study examined many different aspects of the movement toward creative capital. Some of the hypotheses were confirmed, while others were rejected. The findings of this study do begin to shed light on what creative capital would mean for social development for cities and towns that follow the creative capital model. A brief discussion of the hypotheses and findings will follow.

### *Hypothesis 1:*

Suburban counties have more creative capital than urban counties.

Hypothesis 1 was supported. The MANCOVA results demonstrated that for the years 1990 and 2000 there was a significant difference between urban and suburban counties for the percentage of the creative class and the percentage of art class. Again, caution must be used while interpreting the MANCOVA results because of violation of some assumptions. However, the basic percentages of the creative class and the art class for 1990, 2000, and 2008 illustrate that there is a difference in where creative class jobs are located. In all three years included in the study, the percentage of the creative class was higher in suburban counties.

Yet, Richard Florida and other creative class advocates have argued that the urban center will be able to attract the creative class. Milwaukee attempted to upgrade the urban core and did not experience the social and economic boom that Florida has predicted (Zimmerman 2008). An explanation as to why the urban core receives so much attention from the advocates of the creative class is the presence of artistic individuals in urban centers. In 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of the art class was larger in urban counties. Artistic members of the creative class are more visible than other members of the creative class. Accountants, engineers, and professors do not visibly demonstrate the “urban mosaic or hipster haven” (Florida 2008: 247)

that comes to mind when thinking about the creativity of a city. On the other hand, artists, musicians, and sculptors can give an urban core a distinct feeling of creativity within the city. The accountants, engineers, and professors living in the suburbs do not give the suburbs the same creative feeling as the artists, musicians, and sculptors living in urban cores.

The failure to understand the growth of suburban areas is a fault in the creative capital model. Businesses have moved and are moving to suburban areas for a number of reasons (Glaeser and Kahn 2001; Maine State Planning Office 1997; Squires 2002). Suburban areas often have cheaper land. This allows businesses to move to less expensive areas and build large office parks. Moreover, as middle class families moved to the suburbs after World War II, businesses followed the workers to the suburbs. Creative class employment was most likely to follow the people to the suburbs. Glaeser and Kahn (2001: 33) explained that “it appears that manufacturing, and finance, insurance, and real estate” are more likely to move, while services are somewhat less mobile and more likely to stay in the city.” The financial and insurance industries are the creative class. The service industry, which Glaeser and Kahn are referring to, are low end service jobs.

Both Florida (2002a) and Glaser and Kahn (2001) pointed out that the people move to areas and then businesses follow. As people moved to suburban areas, businesses followed the people to the suburbs. Creativity and the creative class are now in suburban areas. Businesses and people in the suburbs have better access to ideas (Glaeser and Kahn 2001) because of this movement. Cities redeveloping along the creative class model should expect the suburbs to attract the creative class employment. Ideas and innovation will flourish in areas with a larger creative class, which are suburban areas. Glaeser, Kanh, and Rappaport (2000) demonstrated that newer developing cities have more wealth concentrated further from the city center. The

higher concentration of wealth in suburban areas is an indication of highly educated and highly skilled creative class workers choosing to live in the suburbs.

*Hypothesis 2:*

As areas increase in creative capital, segregation within the city will increase.

Hypothesis 2 was supported. As counties increased in creative capital, segregation increased. Creative class individuals are moving to areas of a city where other creative class people live. This has led and will continue to lead to segregation along creative and noncreative class lines. The creative class is highly mobile, highly educated, and highly skilled (Florida 2002a; 2008). This mobility, education, and skill have allowed the creative class worker to earn a larger income than noncreative workers. As the creative class moves into an area, the property value and rent will increase, which will drive out the noncreative class (Long 2009; Zukin 2010).

Segregation has led to many negative consequences (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Fischer 2003; Ryabov 2011; Yinger 1998). One consequence of segregation is the decreased educational attainment rates for groups that are segregated (Yinger 1998). Low-income students in segregated neighborhoods had lower levels of educational attainment than students in non-segregated neighborhoods. The creative class model is based on educational attainment. Cities following the model should proceed with caution as some groups may be locked out of any educational advancement.

Moreover, employment for segregated groups will be affected (Yinger 1998). Segregated groups will have less access to creative class employment. This will lock many low income residents of the city into jobs that guarantee that they will be part of the noncreative class for the foreseeable future. Lack of access to quality education and creative jobs will hamper any progress that cities attempt to have along the creative class model.

Segregation also leads to loss of social capital and trust in the neighborhood (Leonard et al. 2010; Ousey et al. 2010; Uslaner 2010). The loss of trust and social capital in the neighborhood creates negative social ills for the residents. Charitable giving decreases in neighborhoods characterized by low social capital (Leonard et al. 2010). Organizations that are designed to help individuals in segregated communities will be less likely to receive funds because of the loss of trust and social capital. Furthermore, social networks, which could help noncreative class individuals acquire the needed skills for creative work, are less likely to develop in low social capital neighborhoods (Uslaner 2010). All of these negative social ills are likely to increase for the segregated noncreative class in cities following the creative class model.

*Hypothesis 3:*

As areas increase in creative capital, creative exposure will increase.

Florida has suggested that the creative class will interact and spread innovation and creative ideas. These creative ideas will then increase the economic development of cities able to attract the creative class. The hypothesized relationship between the creative class and creative exposure was not supported. While this study was not able to demonstrate that creative exposure only occurs for the creative class, the outcome may be due to methodological constraints of the study. The creative class demonstrated that they were exposing others to creative ideas, but lower level data is needed to understand who the creative class is exposing to their ideas. Counties are too large to be able to identify the exposure to creativity from certain groups. The noncreative class may live in the same county as the creative class, but might not interact. Moreover, the creative segregation variable was significant, which indicated that the creative class are isolating themselves from the noncreative class. This segregation would lead to less interaction among the creative and noncreative class.



The relationship between creative exposure and the creative class should be explored further in the future. Many scholars have demonstrated that an increase in exposure to technology and ideas does increase economic development (Moss 1998; Schlichtman 2009; Wojan et al. 2007). In theory, the creative class model should provide creative exposure and allow cities to grow economically. However, Florida implied that all people, regardless of class, will be exposed to creative ideas. This assumption is not clear. If the creative class segregates themselves from others, then there will be no creative exposure to all people. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) illustrated that African Americans living in segregated neighborhoods were exposed to less educated people than in non-segregated neighborhoods. The same would hold true today of noncreative class individuals in segregated neighborhoods and their exposure to creativity.

*Hypothesis 4:*

As areas increase in creative capital, crime will increase.

The hypothesized relationship between creative capital and crime was not supported. However, this finding may be due to methodological issues with the data. Many scholars have demonstrated that segregation increases the likelihood of crime (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004; Mears and Bhati 2006; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Wilson 1987). Thus, crime would be expected to increase in areas that are segregated. The findings of this study demonstrated that as the percentage of the creative class increased, crime decreased. This could be due to the segregation of the creative class. The noncreative class is living in areas with more crime because of the deprivation of resources they experience on a daily basis.

Moreover, the loss of social capital in segregated neighborhoods leads to more crime (Browning et al. 2004; Ousey and Lee 2010). Therefore, scholars and researchers should

theorize that crime would increase due to the segregation that creative capital brings. Future studies should utilize new methods to test the relationship between creative capital and crime.

In conclusion, this study addressed a topic with both theoretical significance and practical implications. The creative capital model has experience enormous popularity among city planners and policy makers. However, the creative capital model may not be the best path for some cities to follow. Suburban and urban areas differ in their ability to attract the creative class. Also, the creative capital model is not fully understood. Florida continually explains how urban centers attract the creative class, but this study demonstrated that the creative class choose to live in suburban areas. Moreover, smaller cities may not be able to attract creative class occupations to their area. This will leave small cities at a disadvantage when attempting to develop along the creative capital model.

Moreover, the social implications of creative capital are not fully understood. Crime may decrease when creative capital is present in a city, but other factors may mask what is truly occurring. The creative segregation variable was significant in the current study. Segregation has been linked to crime, thus if creative class individuals segregate themselves crime may increase in communities that are noncreative. Florida also argues that exposure to creative ideas will aid the city to develop by passing creative ideas from one person to another. This may be the case for creative individuals, but if creative class individuals are segregated there will not be much exposure for the noncreative class. The creative class may increase inequalities in the city by segregating themselves and then exposing each other to new ideas creating a permanent underclass within the city. The creative capital model needs to be studied further before large scale implementation can occur.

## APPENDIX A

**Counties used in Study**

<i>State</i>	<i>County</i>	<i>County Type</i>
Alabama	Houston	Urban
Alabama	Jefferson	Urban
Alabama	Madison	Urban
Alabama	Mobile	Urban
Alabama	Montgomery	Urban
Alabama	Shelby	Suburban
Alaska	Anchorage	Urban
Arizona	Maricopa	Urban
Arizona	Pima	Urban
Arizona	Pinal	Suburban
Arkansas	Benton	Urban
Arkansas	Pulaski	Urban
Arkansas	Washington	Urban
California	Alameda	Urban
California	Contra Costa	Suburban
California	Fresno	Urban
California	Kern	Urban
California	Los Angeles	Urban
California	Marin	Suburban
California	Monterey	Urban
California	Orange	Suburban
California	Placer	Suburban
California	Riverside	Suburban
California	Sacramento	Urban
California	San Bernardino	Suburban
California	San Diego	Urban
California	San Francisco	Urban
California	San Joaquin	Urban
California	San Luis Obispo	Urban
California	San Mateo	Suburban
California	Santa Barbara	Urban
California	Santa Clara	Urban
California	Santa Cruz	Urban
California	Solano	Urban
California	Sonoma	Urban
California	Tulare	Urban
California	Ventura	Urban
California	Yolo	Suburban
Colorado	Adams	Suburban
Colorado	Arapahoe	Urban
Colorado	Boulder	Urban
Colorado	Denver	Urban

Colorado	Douglas	Suburban
Colorado	El Paso	Urban
Colorado	Jefferson	Suburban
Colorado	Larimer	Urban
Colorado	Weld	Urban
Connecticut	Fairfield	Urban
Connecticut	Hartford	Urban
Connecticut	Middlesex	Suburban
Connecticut	New Haven	Urban
Connecticut	New London	Urban
Connecticut	Tolland	Suburban
Delaware	New Castle	Suburban
Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.	Urban
Florida	Alachua	Urban
Florida	Brevard	Urban
Florida	Broward	Suburban
Florida	Collier	Urban
Florida	Duval	Urban
Florida	Escambia	Urban
Florida	Hillsborough	Urban
Florida	Lake	Suburban
Florida	Lee	Urban
Florida	Leon	Urban
Florida	Miami-Dade	Urban
Florida	Manatee	Urban
Florida	Marion	Urban
Florida	Orange	Urban
Florida	Osceola	Suburban
Florida	Palm Beach	Suburban
Florida	Pasco	Suburban
Florida	Pinellas	Suburban
Florida	Polk	Urban
Florida	Sarasota	Urban
Florida	Seminole	Suburban
Florida	Volusia	Urban
Georgia	Chatham	Urban
Georgia	Cherokee	Suburban
Georgia	Clayton	Suburban
Georgia	Cobb	Suburban
Georgia	De Kalb	Urban
Georgia	Fulton	Urban
Georgia	Gwinnett	Suburban
Hawaii	Honolulu	Urban
Idaho	Ada	Urban
Illinois	Champaign	Urban
Illinois	Cook	Urban

Illinois	Du Page	Suburban
Illinois	Kane	Suburban
Illinois	Lake	Suburban
Illinois	McHenry	Suburban
Illinois	McLean	Urban
Illinois	Madison	Suburban
Illinois	Peoria	Urban
Illinois	St. Clair	Suburban
Illinois	Sangamon	Urban
Illinois	Will	Suburban
Illinois	Winnebago	Urban
Indiana	Allen	Urban
Indiana	Hamilton	Suburban
Indiana	Lake	Suburban
Indiana	Marion	Urban
Indiana	St. Joseph	Urban
Indiana	Tippecanoe	Urban
Indiana	Vanderburgh	Urban
Iowa	Johnson	Urban
Iowa	Linn	Urban
Iowa	Polk	Urban
Iowa	Scott	Urban
Kansas	Johnson	Suburban
Kansas	Sedgwick	Urban
Kansas	Shawnee	Urban
Kentucky	Fayette	Urban
Kentucky	Jefferson	Urban
Kentucky	Kenton	Suburban
Louisiana	Caddo	Urban
Louisiana	East Baton Rouge	Urban
Louisiana	Jefferson	Suburban
Louisiana	Lafayette	Urban
Louisiana	Orleans	Urban
Louisiana	St. Tammany	Suburban
Maine	Cumberland	Urban
Maine	Penobscot	Urban
Maine	York	Suburban
Maryland	Anne Arundel	Suburban
Maryland	Baltimore	Suburban
Maryland	Carroll	Suburban
Maryland	Frederick	Suburban
Maryland	Harford	Suburban
Maryland	Howard	Suburban
Maryland	Montgomery	Suburban
Maryland	Prince George	Suburban
Maryland	Baltimore City	Urban

Massachusetts	Barnstable	Urban
Massachusetts	Bristol	Suburban
Massachusetts	Essex	Suburban
Massachusetts	Hampshire	Suburban
Massachusetts	Middlesex	Suburban
Massachusetts	Norfolk	Suburban
Massachusetts	Plymouth	Suburban
Massachusetts	Suffolk	Urban
Michigan	Berrien	Urban
Michigan	Genesee	Urban
Michigan	Ingham	Urban
Michigan	Kalamazoo	Urban
Michigan	Kent	Urban
Michigan	Livingston	Suburban
Michigan	Macomb	Suburban
Michigan	Oakland	Suburban
Michigan	Ottawa	Urban
Michigan	Saginaw	Urban
Michigan	Washtenaw	Urban
Michigan	Wayne	Urban
Minnesota	Anoka	Suburban
Minnesota	Dakota	Suburban
Minnesota	Hennepin	Urban
Minnesota	Olmsted	Urban
Minnesota	Ramsey	Urban
Minnesota	St. Louis	Urban
Minnesota	Scott	Suburban
Minnesota	Stearns	Urban
Minnesota	Washington	Suburban
Mississippi	Hinds	Urban
Missouri	Boone	Urban
Missouri	Clay	Urban
Missouri	Greene	Urban
Missouri	Jackson	Urban
Missouri	Jefferson	Suburban
Missouri	St. Charles	Suburban
Missouri	St. Louis	Suburban
Missouri	St. Louis City	Urban
Montana	Yellowstone	Urban
Nebraska	Douglas	Urban
Nebraska	Lancaster	Urban
Nebraska	Sarpy	Suburban
Nevada	Clark	Urban
Nevada	Washoe	Urban
New Hampshire	Hillsborough	Urban
New Hampshire	Rockingham	Suburban

New Jersey	Atlantic	Urban
New Jersey	Bergen	Suburban
New Jersey	Burlington	Suburban
New Jersey	Camden	Suburban
New Jersey	Gloucester	Suburban
New Jersey	Hudson	Suburban
New Jersey	Mercer	Urban
New Jersey	Middlesex	Suburban
New Jersey	Monmouth	Suburban
New Jersey	Morris	Suburban
New Jersey	Ocean	Suburban
New Jersey	Passaic	Suburban
New Jersey	Somerset	Suburban
New Jersey	Sussex	Suburban
New Jersey	Union	Suburban
New Mexico	Bernalillo	Urban
New York	Albany	Urban
New York	Bronx	Urban
New York	Broome	Urban
New York	Dutchess	Suburban
New York	Erie	Urban
New York	Kings	Urban
New York	Monroe	Urban
New York	Nassau	Suburban
New York	New York	Urban
New York	Niagara	Suburban
New York	Oneida	Urban
New York	Onondaga	Urban
New York	Ontario	Suburban
New York	Orange	Suburban
New York	Queens	Urban
New York	Rensselaer	Urban
New York	Richmond	Urban
New York	Rockland	Suburban
New York	Saratoga	Suburban
New York	Suffolk	Suburban
New York	Ulster	Urban
New York	Westchester	Suburban
North Carolina	Buncombe	Urban
North Carolina	Durham	Urban
North Carolina	Forsyth	Urban
North Carolina	Gaston	Suburban
North Carolina	Guilford	Urban
North Carolina	Mecklenburg	Urban
North Carolina	New Hanover	Urban
North Carolina	Wake	Urban

North Dakota	Cass	Urban
Ohio	Butler	Suburban
Ohio	Clermont	Suburban
Ohio	Cuyahoga	Urban
Ohio	Delaware	Suburban
Ohio	Franklin	Urban
Ohio	Greene	Suburban
Ohio	Hamilton	Urban
Ohio	Lake	Suburban
Ohio	Lorain	Suburban
Ohio	Lucas	Urban
Ohio	Mahoning	Urban
Ohio	Media	Suburban
Ohio	Montgomery	Urban
Ohio	Stark	Urban
Ohio	Summit	Suburban
Ohio	Trumbull	Urban
Ohio	Warren	Suburban
Oklahoma	Cleveland	Urban
Oklahoma	Oklahoma	Urban
Oklahoma	Tulsa	Urban
Oregon	Clackamas	Suburban
Oregon	Jackson	Urban
Oregon	Lane	Urban
Oregon	Marion	Suburban
Oregon	Multnomah	Urban
Oregon	Washington	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Allegheny	Urban
Pennsylvania	Beaver	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Berks	Urban
Pennsylvania	Bucks	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Butler	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Cambria	Urban
Pennsylvania	Chester	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Cumberland	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Dauphin	Urban
Pennsylvania	Delaware	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Erie	Urban
Pennsylvania	Lackawanna	Urban
Pennsylvania	Lancaster	Urban
Pennsylvania	Lebanon	Urban
Pennsylvania	Lehigh	Urban
Pennsylvania	Luzerne	Urban
Pennsylvania	Lycoming	Urban
Pennsylvania	Montgomery	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Northampton	Suburban



Pennsylvania	Philadelphia	Urban
Pennsylvania	Washington	Suburban
Pennsylvania	Westmoreland	Suburban
Pennsylvania	York	Urban
Rhode Island	Providence	Urban
South Carolina	Charleston	Urban
South Carolina	Greenville	Urban
South Carolina	Horry	Urban
South Carolina	Lexington	Suburban
South Carolina	Richland	Urban
South Carolina	Spartanburg	Urban
South Carolina	York	Suburban
South Dakota	Minnehaha	Urban
Tennessee	Davidson	Urban
Tennessee	Hamilton	Urban
Tennessee	Knox	Urban
Tennessee	Rutherford	Suburban
Tennessee	Shelby	Urban
Tennessee	Williamson	Suburban
Texas	Bell	Urban
Texas	Bexar	Urban
Texas	Brazoria	Suburban
Texas	Cameron	Urban
Texas	Collin	Suburban
Texas	Dallas	Urban
Texas	Denton	Suburban
Texas	El Paso	Urban
Texas	Fort Bend	Suburban
Texas	Galveston	Suburban
Texas	Harris	Urban
Texas	Hidalgo	Urban
Texas	Lubbock	Urban
Texas	McLennan	Urban
Texas	Montgomery	Suburban
Texas	Nueces	Urban
Texas	Smith	Urban
Texas	Tarrant	Suburban
Texas	Travis	Urban
Texas	Williamson	Urban
Utah	Davis	Suburban
Utah	Salt Lake	Urban
Utah	Utah	Urban
Utah	Weber	Suburban
Vermont	Chittenden	Urban
Virginia	Chesterfield	Suburban
Virginia	Fairfax	Suburban

Virginia	Henrico	Suburban
Virginia	Loudoun	Suburban
Virginia	Prince William	Suburban
Virginia	Chesapeake City	Suburban
Virginia	Norfolk City	Suburban
Virginia	Richmond City	Urban
Virginia	Virginia Beach City	Urban
Washington	Clark	Suburban
Washington	King	Urban
Washington	Kitsap	Urban
Washington	Pierce	Suburban
Washington	Snohomish	Suburban
Washington	Spokane	Urban
Washington	Thurston	Urban
Washington	Whatcom	Urban
Washington	Yakima	Urban
Wisconsin	Brown	Urban
Wisconsin	Dane	Urban
Wisconsin	Fond du Lac	Urban
Wisconsin	Kenosha	Suburban
Wisconsin	Marathon	Urban
Wisconsin	Milwaukee	Urban
Wisconsin	Outagamie	Urban
Wisconsin	Racine	Suburban
Wisconsin	Rock	Urban
Wisconsin	Waukesha	Suburban
Wisconsin	Winnebago	Urban

**APPENDIX B****Descriptive Statistics for 1990 All Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.119	.397	.225
Art %	.005	.065	.011
Black %	.077	65.843	.104
Unemployment Rate	2.100	14.300	5.652
Population Density	5.211	53126.286	1317.281
Foreign Born %	.800	45.10	6.132
Population	9646	8863164	472772.830
Vacant Housing %	2.700	42.600	8.240
Married Household %	26.120	76.070	57.326
Individuals Below Poverty	.030	.420	.106
Age 17 and Under	15.800	40.100	25.466
Age 18 to 44	29.300	59.600	44.342
Age 65 and Over	3.000	32.300	11.827
Creative Exposure	-.116	-.002	-.058
Creative Segregation	.000	.083	.016
Total Crime Rate	33.723	62367.821	1297.848
Murder Rate	.000	93.303	7.352
Property Rate	28.398	55079.826	1038.093

## APPENDIX C

**Descriptive Statistics for 1990 Urban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.127	.391	.214
Art %	.005	.065	.012
Black %	.077	65.843	.125
Unemployment Rate	2.900	14.300	6.123
Population Density	5.211	53126.286	1595.650
Foreign Born %	.800	45.100	6.191
Population	9646	8863164	528157.35
Vacant Housing %	2.700	42.600	8.743
Married Household %	26.120	73.230	54.135
Individuals Below Poverty	.060	.420	.128
Age 17 and Under	15.800	37.700	25.138
Age 18 to 44	30.200	59.600	44.481
Age 65 and Over	3.700	32.100	12.349
Creative Exposure	-.116	-.002	-.040
Creative Segregation	.000	.075	.023
Total Crime Rate	33.723	62367.821	1584.133
Murder Rate	.000	93.303	9.607
Property Rate	28.398	55079.826	1259.387

## APPENDIX D

**Descriptive Statistics for 1990 Suburban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.119	.397	.240
Art %	.006	.032	.011
Black %	.169	50.707	.073
Unemployment Rate	2.100	9.900	4.940
Population Density	21.672	11768.063	1293.534
Foreign Born %	.800	30.600	6.043
Population	57846	2410556	389696.060
Vacant Housing %	3.000	25.700	7.486
Married Household %	45.090	76.070	62.112
Individuals Below Poverty	.030	.220	.074
Age 17 and Under	17.700	40.100	25.959
Age 18 to 44	29.300	54.100	44.134
Age 65 and Over	3.000	32.300	11.044
Creative Exposure	-.093	-.036	-.066
Creative Segregation	.000	.083	.013
Total Crime Rate	53.124	2104.465	872.568
Murder Rate	.000	35.218	4.001
Property Rate	46.586	1896.671	709.358

**APPENDIX E**

**Descriptive Statistics for 2000 All Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.142	.481	.268
Art %	.005	.061	.012
Black %	.300	67.30	11.463
Unemployment Rate	.900	15.400	3.578
Population Density	32.200	66834.600	1464.077
Foreign Born %	.530	55.090	4.669
Population	31435	9519338	537907.060
Vacant Housing %	1.540	35.530	7.062
Married Household %	28.800	73.780	52.237
Individuals Below Poverty	2.117	35.871	10.582
Age 17 and Under	14.600	35.300	25.565
Age 18 to 44	26.700	54.200	40.463
Age 65 and Over	4.200	31.400	11.972
Creative Exposure	-.096	.249	-.048
Creative Segregation	.000	.083	.017
Total Crime Rate	44.740	21797.360	862.840
Murder Rate	.000	133.609	5.129
Property Rate	29.434	16577.064	646.135

## APPENDIX F

**Descriptive Statistics for 2000 Urban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.142	.479	.254
Art %	.005	.061	.012
Black %	.300	67.300	13.441
Unemployment Rate	1.200	15.400	3.841
Population Density	32.200	66834.600	1761.117
Foreign Born %	.530	26.890	4.492
Population	88787	9519338	593852.320
Vacant Housing %	2.320	35.530	7.776
Married Household %	22.800	69.830	48.973
Individuals Below Poverty	4.695	35.871	12.621
Age 17 and Under	14.600	35.300	25.043
Age 18 to 44	26.700	54.200	40.955
Age 65 and Over	5.400	31.400	12.390
Creative Exposure	-.083	-.002	-.035
Creative Segregation	.001	.076	.024
Total Crime Rate	44.740	2226.664	908.900
Murder Rate	.000	59.870	6.189
Property Rate	29.434	1549.444	669.495

## APPENDIX G

**Descriptive Statistics for 2000 Suburban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.155	.481	.290
Art %	.005	.037	.011
Black %	.400	62.700	8.497
Unemployment Rate	.900	6.200	3.183
Population Density	33.500	12956.900	1018.517
Foreign Born %	.540	55.090	4.937
Population	31435	2846289	453989.180
Vacant Housing %	1.540	24.390	5.991
Married Household %	36.900	73.780	57.133
Individuals Below Poverty	2.117	19.400	7.524
Age 17 and Under	19.200	35.200	26.347
Age 18 to 44	29.600	48.300	39.724
Age 65 and Over	4.200	26.700	11.344
Creative Exposure	-.096	.249	-.053
Creative Segregation	.000	.083	.015
Total Crime Rate	69.090	21797.360	795.606
Murder Rate	.000	133.609	3.581
Property Rate	63.934	16577.064	612.038



## APPENDIX H

### Descriptive Statistics for 2008 All Counties

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.136	.494	.274
Art %	.002	.052	.012
Black %	.190	63.920	12.056
Unemployment Rate	2.677	10.715	5.504
Population Density	31.623	71763.129	1545.212
Foreign Born %	.880	49.850	10.645
Population	98488	9862049	586910.020
Vacant Housing %	3.390	40.420	10.041
Married Household %	21.780	68.890	49.604
Individuals Below Poverty	2.270	29.883	10.579
Age 17 and Under	14.660	35.870	24.207
Age 18 to 44	11.750	49.550	20.325
Age 65 and Over	5.820	30.330	12.360
Creative Exposure	-.084	-.004	-.055
Creative Segregation	.000	.071	.017
Total Crime Rate	134.147	2225.414	772.413
Murder Rate	.000	29.913	4.135
Property Rate	115.532	1481.540	590.516

## APPENDIX I

**Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Urban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.136	.494	.260
Art %	.002	.052	.012
Black %	.190	63.100	13.580
Unemployment Rate	2.677	10.715	5.643
Population Density	31.623	71763.129	1846.995
Foreign Born %	.880	49.850	10.305
Population	98488	9862049	639334.580
Vacant Housing %	4.300	40.420	11.143
Married Household %	21.780	67.200	46.382
Individuals Below Poverty	5.429	29.883	12.506
Age 17 and Under	14.660	35.870	23.963
Age 18 to 44	11.750	49.550	21.446
Age 65 and Over	6.350	30.330	12.678
Creative Exposure	-.070	-.004	-.039
Creative Segregation	.001	.071	.024
Total Crime Rate	282.327	2225.414	880.911
Murder Rate	.000	29.913	5.280
Property Rate	226.696	1481.540	667.533

## APPENDIX J

**Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Suburban Counties**

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Creative %	.161	.470	.295
Art %	.003	.034	.011
Black %	.400	63.920	9.751
Unemployment Rate	2.822	8.720	5.296
Population Density	60.954	12744.635	1092.539
Foreign Born %	1.420	40.230	11.156
Population	104475	3010759	508273.190
Vacant Housing %	3.390	22.950	8.388
Married Household %	36.040	68.890	54.438
Individuals Below Poverty	2.270	15.442	7.688
Age 17 and Under	16.120	32.340	24.574
Age 18 to 44	12.550	44.110	18.643
Age 65 and Over	5.820	28.880	11.883
Creative Exposure	-.084	-.037	-.062
Creative Segregation	.000	.070	.014
Total Crime Rate	134.147	1881.558	610.948
Murder Rate	.000	16.808	2.431
Property Rate	115.532	1128.117	475.899

**Correlation Matrix Creative Class 1990**

	Creative %	Art %	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Population Density	Foreign Born %	Age 17 and Under	Age 18 to 44	Age 65 and Over
Creative %	1.000								
Art %	.562	1.000							
Black %	-.083	.055	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.548	-.131	.366	1.000					
Population Density	.080	.549	.311	.263	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.163	.353	.030	.273	.453	1.000			
Age 17 and Under	-.212	-.399	-.199	.176	-.217	-.139	1.000		
Age 18 to 44	.471	.284	.110	-.267	.075	.091	-.024	1.000	
Age 65 and Over	-.333	.005	.010	.192	.065	.015	-.587	-.733	1.000

**Correlation Matrix Creative Class 2000**

	Creative %	Art %	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Population Density	Foreign Born %	Age 17 and Under	Age 18 to 44	Age 65 and Over
Creative %	1.000								
Art %	.564	1.000							
Black %	-.096	.013	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.543	-.222	.126	1.000					
Population Density	.124	.544	.230	.141	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.089	.298	.057	.132	.293	1.000			
Age 17 and Under	-.081	-.377	-.054	.294	-.176	.040	1.000		
Age 18 to 44	.348	.251	.191	-.214	.170	.100	.033	1.000	
Age 65 and Over	-.368	-.014	-.052	.104	.001	-.056	-.605	-.734	1.000

APPENDIX L

**Correlation Matrix Creative Class 2008**

	Creative %	Art %	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Population Density	Foreign Born %	Age 17 and Under	Age 18 to 44	Age 65 and Over
Creative %	1.000								
Art %	.497	1.000							
Black %	-.102	-.012	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.458	-.111	.126	1.000					
Population Density	.136	.442	.207	.020	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.243	.310	.002	.134	.380	1.000			
Age 17 and Under	-.083	-.239	.042	.040	-.130	.145	1.000		
Age 18 to 44	-.037	.002	.073	-.094	-.038	-.082	-.173	1.000	
Age 65 and Over	-.307	-.013	-.090	.233	-.011	-.142	-.630	-.266	1.000

APPENDIX M

**Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 1990**

	Creative %	Unemployment Rate	Black %	Foreign Born %	Population	Creative Exposure	Creative Segregation
Creative %	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.548	1.000					
Black %	-.083	.366	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.163	.273	.030	1.000			
Population	.104	.204	.180	.523	1.000		
Creative Exposure	-.109	.216	.256	-.033	.410	1.000	
Creative Segregation	.072	.166	.319	-.015	.262	.373	1.000

APPENDIX N

**Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 2000**

	Creative %	Unemployment Rate	Black %	Foreign Born %	Population	Creative Exposure	Creative Segregation
Creative %	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.543	1.000					
Black %	-.096	.126	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.089	.132	.057	1.000			
Population	.112	.129	.105	.417	1.000		
Creative Exposure	-.125	.102	.147	.110	.193	1.000	
Creative Segregation	.154	.050	.276	.069	.288	.121	1.000



**Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 2008**

	Creative %	Unemployment Rate	Black %	Foreign Born %	Population	Creative Exposure	Creative Segregation
Creative %	1.000						
Unemployment Rate	-.458	1.000					
Black %	-.102	.126	1.000				
Foreign Born %	.243	.134	.002	1.000			
Population	.095	.149	.100	.524	1.000		
Creative Exposure	-.141	.179	.186	.031	.447	1.000	
Creative Segregation	.166	.118	.199	.042	.263	.379	1.000

**Correlation Matrix for Crime 1990**

	Creative %	Population	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Total Crime Rate	Murder Rate	Property Rate	Vacant Housing Rate	Married Household %	Individuals Below Poverty
Creative %	1.000									
Population	.104	1.000								
Black %	-.083	.180	1.000							
Unemployment Rate	-.548	.204	.366	1.000						
Total Crime Rate	-.004	-.005	.016	-.008	1.000					
Murder Rate	-.191	.231	.602	.420	.538	1.000				
Property Rate	.001	-.020	-.008	-.027	.999	.511	1.000			
Vacant Housing Rate	-.148	-.050	.102	.234	.101	.184	.093	1.000		
Married Household %	.061	-.281	-.618	-.429	.026	-.448	.054	-.088	1.000	
Individuals Below Poverty	-.464	.125	.451	.812	.034	.451	.015	.270	-.544	1.000

APPENDIX Q

**Correlation Matrix for Crime 2000**

	Creative %	Population	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Total Crime Rate	Murder Rate	Property Rate	Vacant Housing Rate	Married Household %	Individuals Below Poverty
Creative %	1.000									
Population	.112	1.000								
Black %	-.096	.129	1.000							
Unemployment Rate	-.543	.105	.126	1.000						
Total Crime Rate	-.099	-.019	.156	.117	1.000					
Murder Rate	-.166	.052	.434	.195	.840	1.000				
Property Rate	-.093	-.047	.129	.088	.994	.818	1.000			
Vacant Housing Rate	-.388	-.083	.107	.235	.052	.141	.039	1.000		
Married Household %	.153	-.198	-.621	-.161	-.167	-.339	-.128	-.154	1.000	
Individuals Below Poverty	-.454	.184	.458	.628	.173	.344	.136	.342	-.625	1.000

**Correlation Matrix for Crime 2008**

	Creative %	Population	Black %	Unemployment Rate	Total Crime Rate	Murder Rate	Property Rate	Vacant Housing Rate	Married Household %	Individuals Below Poverty
Creative %	1.000									
Population	.095	1.000								
Black %	-.102	.100	1.000							
Unemployment Rate	-.458	.149	.126	1.000						
Total Crime Rate	-.313	.043	.380	.170	1.000					
Murder Rate	-.221	.130	.640	.238	.579	1.000				
Property Rate	-.317	-.052	.301	.051	.937	.448	1.000			
Vacant Housing Rate	-.321	.014	.273	.373	.267	.363	.222	1.000		
Married Household %	.230	-.151	-.598	-.225	-.536	-.603	-.421	-.304	1.000	
Individuals Below Poverty	-.453	.339	.410	.094	.485	.517	.403	.347	-.680	1.000

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