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Going beyond the divides: coalition attempts in the follow-up networks to the Gezi movement in Istanbul

Gözde Pelivan 

ABSTRACT

As the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey faded, they were replaced by a flurry of solidarity and defence groups across Istanbul, opening up new coalition-building opportunities for previously fragmented social movement networks. This paper problematizes the coalition-building attempts by these follow-up networks in the face of neoliberal urbanism under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Looking into such attempts by three networks, namely the Kadıköy City Solidarity (KCS), the Beyoğlu City Defense (BCD) and the Northern Forest Defense (NFD), the paper discusses the potentials and limitations of the post-Gezi networks as loci for coalition-building among the ‘dispossessed’ and the ‘alienated’ in Istanbul. Building on ethnographic research, it is argued that coalition-builders do not neatly fit into the categories of ‘the dispossessed’ and ‘the alienated’, but manifest themselves in many fusions, displaying diverse motivations. It is argued that the divergent priorities of diverse groups put a strain on coalition attempts with mixed results: a disjuncture between collective neighbourhood interests and individual monetary interests in the KCS case; rapid operationalization of colossal projects and pressure from macro-politics precluding a long-term alliance in the NFD case; and a relatively more successful alliance in the BCD case where material and sociocultural priorities converged.

KEYWORDS


neoliberal city; urban social movements; Gezi movement; post-Gezi networks; coalition-building

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INTRODUCTION

The accelerated neoliberal transformation of the Turkish society and economy under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) rule since the early 2000s has been manifest primarily through spatial restructuring (Akçalı & Korkut, 2015; Alonso, 2015; Gürcan & Peker, 2015; Uncu, 2016), and Istanbul has been at the forefront of this change (Gündoğdu, 2013). Spatial interventions in Istanbul were the most visible manifestations of the AKP’s rampant agenda for growth. These included reorganization of the built environment via urban renewal projects and the expansion of the housing market as well as organization of urban spaces in peripheral areas through large-scale urban projects (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014; Erensü & Karaman, 2017). These processes generated specific forms of grievances, ranging from increasing rents

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and loss of commonly shared areas to the displacement of local communities in both central and peripheral urban areas, ‘materially depriv[ing]’ some, and ‘intellectually and socially alienat[ing]’ others (Marcuse, 2009, p. 195). While similar resistances were prevalent both in the pre-AKP era, and up until the 2013 Gezi protests throughout all the AKP terms, the post-Gezi period saw new attempts at alliance-building between networks spread across Istanbul, despite their differences. The neighbourhood forums that emerged in several localities following the 2013 protests constituted loci for encounters and negotiations among activists at the grassroots level.

The spontaneous convergence of diverse protestors in May 2013 and the Gezi Park occupation has received extensive scholarly attention (e.g., Karakayalı & Yaka, 2014; Kuymulu, 2013; Özkaynak et al., 2015). Some have explored the activists’ class background (e.g., Yörük & Yüksel, 2014), while others have looked into the strategies and tactics that contributed to the sustenance of diverse activists within the movement (e.g., Örs & Turan, 2015). However, the emergent networks that mobilized following the end of the core episodes of the movement have received little scholarly attention.¹ More particularly, their capacity to include diverse social and political actors and to form alliances across a range of networks have remained understudied. Locating these follow-up networks in the context of neoliberalism with its particularities in the Turkish context, and exploring the extent and nature of alliances between them, are the primary objectives of this paper. This paper thus raises questions as to what extent the Gezi movement has opened up new alliance-building opportunities in its later phases, and whether those ‘dispossessed and disenfranchised by the neoliberalizing city’ (Mayer, 2013, p. 13) have attempted to go beyond the oft-reported divides between them. It uses Mayer’s (2013) framework relating to the coalition-building attempts in the ‘privileged Western cities of the global North’ between the austerity victims and the relatively privileged radical activists. Following on from Mayer’s observation that going beyond the divides between the dispossessed and the alienated is a condition for successful urban activism under neoliberalism and its ‘exclusivity’, it explores urban activist networks that flourished in Istanbul after the 2013 Gezi protests. The paper argues that the divergent priorities of the diverse groups of activists put a strain on coalition-building attempts and brought about mixed results: a disjuncture between collective neighbourhood interests and individual economic interests in the Kadıköy City Solidarity (KCS) case, rapid operationalization of colossal projects and pressure from macro-politics precluding a long-term alliance in the Northern Forest Defense (NFD) case, and a relatively more successful alliance in the Beyoğlu City Defense (BCD) case where material and sociocultural priorities converged. Despite the seeming failure of these attempts to instigate change in the macro and formal institutional power balances, they have opened new ways to forge ties at an everyday level between secular and educated urban activists who are concerned about the changing patterns in their lifestyles and lower income groups in peripheral areas who have concerns over their livelihood, as well as small business owners (particularly, *meyhane*,² or bar owners) who have been vulnerable to dramatic spatial changes in their neighbourhood.

What follows first explores the particular manifestations of neoliberal urbanism in Istanbul against the backdrop of the AKP’s conservative neoliberalism and recent urban contestation in the face of the neoliberal city. The paper then presents the findings regarding coalition attempts undertaken to address particular local grievances throughout the ‘latent phases’ (Melucci, 1996) of the Gezi movement by considering three emergent networks, namely the KCS, BCD and NFD, originally located in the Kadıköy and Beyoğlu districts. The reason for the choice of networks based in these two major districts was that they were the centres of concentration for these networks as well as being cultural and commercial centres of Istanbul where major struggles over space took place.

Neoliberal urbanism and urban social movements in contemporary Istanbul

Manifestations of neoliberalism are neither sufficiently homogeneous to be observed in the identical form within different contexts, nor are they sufficiently relative (unique in their own right) to

exhibit a distinct and incomparable pattern. Brenner et al. (2010, p. 330) hold that while structuralist approaches take neoliberalism as an 'all-encompassing hegemonic bloc', poststructuralist readings emphasize the 'contextual particularity of neoliberalizing regulatory practices'. Instead, they formulate neoliberalization as 'an unevenly developed pattern of restructuring that has been produced through a succession of path-dependent collisions between emergent, market-disciplinary projects and inherited institutional landscapes across places, territories, and scales' (p. 342). Neoliberalism is a geographically uneven, hybrid, historically specific process (pp. 330–332) that involves excessive state intervention in the restructuring of the market (Bruff, 2016, p. 109), so that capital accumulation can continue. According to this account, neoliberalism as a framework does not homogenize particular forms of empirical reality which are manifested in variegated forms in diverse contexts. Neither can it overemphasize the distinctiveness of a specific manifestation, since no matter how different its forms are from one another, overall a certain pattern can be observed.

This definition provides the basis for the neoliberal city and surrounding discussions herein, as the narrative of the making of the modern city, over approximately the last 100 years, is, at the same time, the story of the *modus operandi* of capital, of how it changes form, and shapes the mechanisms of government and patterns of everyday life.

Today, many big cities are permanent construction sites. Not only are their horizontal boundaries contested by the urbanization of the periphery but also their volume expands vertically mostly through redevelopment projects, at times including skyscrapers and apartment blocks. Large-scale urban projects also play a significant role as handy instruments of rapid economic growth, while they minimize democratic participation in urban governance (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Under the conditions of neoliberalism, the city is simultaneously a site and a product of neoliberalization processes, enveloped 'within an increasingly market-dominated governance regime' (Brenner & Theodore, 2005, p. 103).

The city, however, is also, inevitably, a site of contestation. Relatedly, urban movements are a reaction to, and an immanent part of, the neoliberalization process (Leitner et al., 2007, pp. 8–10). In the social movement literature, coalition-building within and across social movement networks has been widely explored particularly in relation to specific circumstances, such as the availability of resources (e.g., Zald & McCarthy, 1987), small number of identity-related differences among mobilizing actors (e.g., Lichtenman, 1995), political opportunities and threats as facilitators of alliance-building (e.g., McCammon & Campbell, 2002). However, this paper argues that these organization or political-context-based perspectives, do not fully appreciate the embeddedness of social movements in broader historical and structural contexts (Smith & Fetner, 2007). Mayer (2013) provides one such framework that historicizes the formation of alliances within the larger historical terrain of the development of neoliberalism. This provides a wider context to make sense of when and why alliances occur (cf. Van Dyke, 2003). Not only does Mayer point to coalition-making in the present state of movements in the Global North, but also sees it as a necessary condition for the future success of urban activism.

Several scholars have discussed how urban activism after the 2000s has come to be characterized by particular forms of actions and agendas in different settings in the context of neoliberal cities (Leitner et al., 2007; Mayer, 2007, 2013). In the context of this recent transformation, the gap between the 'alienated/culturally disconnected and the dispossessed/excluded' groups has been occasionally bridged through coalition-building among disparate groups (Mayer, 2013, p. 7). While the alienated are members of the creative classes who react to the privatization of public spaces, destruction of the commons, deterioration of their quality of life, and environmental degradation, the dispossessed broadly includes the victims of neoliberal urbanism who lose property, as well as their means of subsistence or land. Such alliances between alienated urban radical activists and dispossessed austerity victims are significant in that larger networks may offer better prospects for successful urban activism. More particularly, such alliances make

austerity victims' grievances and demands more visible; the coordination of campaigns amplifies local struggles, and activists feel that they are contributing to broader national and international movements (p. 15). Although there are significant mismatches between Mayer's periodization and developments in Turkey, the last phase of neoliberalization globally is more or less characterized by debt-financed urban transformation; if anything, this was more accentuated in the Turkish case. Therefore, this paper explores attempts to link the struggles of the dispossessed and the alienated in the post-Gezi period in İstanbul, while at the same time taking into account the particularities and the specificities of these attempts and explaining the divergence between the conceptual framework borrowed from Mayer and the empirical findings of this paper. In other words, the coalition-building attempts, as will be demonstrated below, do not generate neat relations between the dispossessed and the alienated, but manifest themselves in various combinations, with diverse motivations on the part of activists.

The manifestation of neoliberalism itself in Turkey exhibits characteristics that match overall global patterns in that it is based on a state-directed growth and accumulation strategy. And yet, it has exhibited some specific properties. The first neoliberal experiment in the Turkish context took place as early as the 1980s under the military junta and the post-coup civilian government (Öktem, 2011). Despite similar market-oriented reforms having been implemented during these years in both Western Europe and Turkey, the Turkish case had its own peculiarities. Despite a seeming break from neo-liberalism in the early years of AKP rule, as Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010, p. 1484) put it, from the early 2000s on, governance of urban space increasingly changed from a populist to a neoliberal model.

The AKP rose to power in late 2002, following the 2001 financial crisis, which saw a massive depreciation of the Turkish lira. As an offshoot of the political Islamist Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP), the AKP represented its more reformist leanings. Following its so-called 'golden age' between 2002 and 2007, marked by democratization reforms including a civilianization of political rule through the gradual removal of military influence over politics, recognition of minority rights, European Union (EU) harmonization packages and economic growth, the ruling AKP gradually adopted more authoritarian measures, accompanied by rampant neoliberal growth (Öniş, 2015, pp. 23–24). This growth, primarily based on the construction sector, helped the AKP consolidate its power.

Within this general context, the Former Mayor of İstanbul (1994–98) and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underlined both the political and economic significance of İstanbul several times (e.g., *Hürriyet Daily*, 2013; Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, TRT News, 2018). As a 'brand' city, İstanbul has been subject to dramatic change as a result of the planned (re)organization of urban space.

Several macro-level state policies further facilitated the neoliberal urban transformation in İstanbul. First, along with the abovementioned urban regeneration processes, the housing market was further restructured via institutional instruments such as the Housing Development Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi – TOKİ) (Karaman, 2013a, p. 3418). Founded in 1984, TOKİ was reinvented by the AKP government in the early 2000s in order to plan and carry out large-scale housing projects. Reporting directly and solely to the prime minister, it played a key role in spatial restructuring (Loving & Türkmen, 2011).

Second, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Urban Planning were merged in 2011, thereby facilitating the acceleration of the planning and implementation of the aforementioned projects. These institutional changes aimed at the expansion of the housing market were also supported extensively by the state with credit guarantees for big construction companies, the opening up of previously protected natural and historical sites to urban development,³ and state support for mortgagors. The Urban Transformation Act for the Areas under Disaster Risk has been used to legitimize urban transformation in areas allegedly facing earthquake risk in İstanbul, as well as other cities. In effect since 2012, the Act has been used in the mapping

of redevelopment projects and has resulted in rent increases and the displacement of the lower classes (Elicin, 2014).

Third, Turkey has seen a series of colossal infrastructure projects under the AKP. The third airport,⁴ a third suspension bridge across the Bosphorus Strait, the Marmaray underwater rail tunnel connecting the European and Asian sides of Istanbul, and the Eurasian tunnel have been the most controversial among these.

Spatial reorganization under the AKP has also been ideologically buttressed by 'a cultural legitimization strategy' based on Islam (Blad & Koçer, 2012, pp. 50–51), manifested in practices such as the naming of the colossal urban projects,⁵ the destruction of the Atatürk Cultural Centre in Taksim (AKM) (once a popular venue for opera, theatre and concerts, and a cultural symbol of the secular republic), the ongoing construction of the Taksim Square mosque, etc. As is evident in all these examples, Istanbul has always been at the forefront in the implementation of socio-economic and ideological strategies.

The AKP's growth-oriented, culturally conservative spatial strategies, particularly its so-called mega-projects, have been 'used to generate consent through a powerful developmentalist discourse', while simultaneously alienating some groups (Paker, 2017, p. 103). These included well-educated urban populations who could no longer engage in a particular form of social reproduction, that is, cultural activities, nightlife and similar practices, framed within the Turkish context as a 'secular' lifestyle. Therefore, the alienated in the Turkish, and specifically the Istanbul, context were not 'radical activists', unlike 'the alienated' that Mayer (2013) describes within the Western European context. However, it is also a fact that the discontent, rooted in the making of the neoliberal city, was not limited to this group; it cut across diverse groups with various class and cultural backgrounds. It is in the context of the latterly accelerated neoliberalization that the massive series of protests referred to in the introduction, known as the Gezi protests, took place in 2013. In the aftermath of Gezi, these actors formed alliances within wider segments of society, including the victims of urban transformation, shopkeepers and villagers on the periphery. However, in some instances, differences in collective and individual interests have formed fault lines between these groups.

As space is socially produced, this social production of space does not solely arise from state policies and neoliberal spatial interventions. As elsewhere, resistance against these were not uncommon in the Turkish context and particularly in Istanbul, both before and after the Gezi protests. In the initial phase of the movement, Gezi Park, and the neighbouring Taksim Square, were occupied and the composition of the activists cut across disparate categories including class, ideology and self-ascribed identities. This 'heterogeneity' (Karakayalı & Yaka, 2014) remained the most remarkable characteristic during the first wave of contention. This and the following waves can be periodized, as follows, on the basis of the gradual loss of public attention and of the participating actors in the follow-up networks that have punctuated the years since May 2013:

- The first chapter (28 May–16 June 2013), during which Gezi Park was occupied and widespread protests and/or occupations of public parks took place across the country.
- The second chapter (17 June 2013–late 2013), during which the park forums scattered around Istanbul functioned with the participation of a relatively large number of Istanbulites (initially and primarily in Yoğurtçu Park in the Kadıköy district and Abbasağa Park in the Beşiktaş district).
- The third chapter (early 2014–mid-2015), when the forums transformed into smaller neighbourhood solidarity groups and forums with fewer participants, particularly in major districts such as Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Kadıköy, Şişli and Bakırköy.
- The fourth chapter (mid-2015–today), throughout which all major park forums in Istanbul disappeared, and the emergent networks that had appeared in the third phase split into new forms of networks such as consumer cooperatives (e.g., Kadıköy Consumer Cooperative) and

neighbourhood collectives (e.g., Neighbour's Door), as well as locally based small solidarity groups (e.g., KCS, Sarıyer City Solidarity, Islands Defense Group).

In different localities the timing of this fragmentation varied, although forums in districts such as Kadıköy, Beyoğlu, Şişli and Beşiktaş more or less shared a similar trajectory. Overall, a complex set of processes coming into play in the neoliberal restructuring of Istanbul has been reflected in a wide range of grievances, which generated new possibilities for different groups to mobilize and collaborate. What follows presents an account of alliances among diverse activists in various local contexts in Istanbul which proliferated in the 'latent phases'⁶ of the Gezi movement.

This reorganization of urban space and the coalition-building practices among its discontents in Istanbul following the 2013 Gezi protests were not unprecedented. Gentrification in Istanbul began in the early 1980s with the emergence of gentrifiers at the same time that run-down neighbourhoods became available for gentrification. While at the beginning, gentrification was the undertaken by individual actors, institutional intervention became prevalent in the 2000s (Islam, 2006). There has also been a scale jump in terms of spatial intervention by the government since 2008. In accordance with urban transformation trends in the Global South, large-scale projects characterized urban transformation from the 2000s onwards (Karaman, 2013b). These have mostly bypassed democratic, as well as legal processes in the case of judicially contested urban plans. State-led urban regeneration projects in low-income housing neighbourhoods, such as Tarlabası (Islam & Sakızlıoğlu, 2015; Oktem Unsal, 2015), Sulukule (Karaman & Islam, 2012; Somersan et al., 2011; Uysal, 2012), Başbüyük (Karaman, 2014) and historical and inner-city deprived neighbourhoods such as Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (Şentürk, 2011) saw some of the major projects, resulting in displacement and dispossession of their low-income residents before 2013. In the case of these regeneration projects, groups from different socio-cultural and educational backgrounds forged alliances. This oppositional front not only included academics and attorneys with a critical perspective on the urban process working against the interests of low-income urbanites and representatives from the Chamber of Architects and Urban Planners, but also political activists. These actors primarily provided locals with guidance regarding legal procedures and helped them find a voice in media outlets and other organizational platforms. The contact between them was sustained through neighbourhood associations (e.g., in the cases of the Tarlabası Association for the Support for Property Owners and Tenants, the 'Emek is Ours, Istanbul is Ours' Platform, and the Cihangir Association, among others). From the 2000s onwards, three forms of intervention into urban space figured in the formation of local oppositional fronts: the loss of cultural heritage (e.g., the destruction of the Emek Cinema in Beyoğlu), the loss of public urban space (through attempts to destroy the Roma Garden in Cihangir), and spatial exclusion and dispossession of the urban poor (through the regeneration projects in Sulukule, Tarlabası and Balat). These grassroots experiences mixed with the forces that generated Gezi in 2013.

ENCOUNTERS AND ALLIANCES ACROSS ISTANBUL

Spatial interventions into urban space in Istanbul in the last decade have diversified in form. While urban renewal projects leading to gentrification spread across the inner city and associated housing-related grievances emerged, large-scale urban projects (e.g., the Third Bridge, the metro and metro-bus lines) have changed the topography of the city as well as the everyday lives of Istanbulites. In contrast to preceding periods, the scale of spatial (re)organization has markedly expanded across Istanbul over the last decade. In the face of these variegated forms of neoliberal spatial restructuring, two currents of opposition have emerged: lower class sectors mobilizing for their housing rights and people coming from middle-class backgrounds mobilizing against the disappearance of common spaces.

The fieldwork for this research was carried out between January and December 2016 and combined semi-structured interviews with participant observation. The author interviewed people who had participated in the public park forums for at least a month after the Gezi protests and who had remained active in the emergent networks until completion of the field research. Thirty-seven interviews, adopting a snowballing method, were conducted with activists from their early 20s to their 60s (with some later follow-ups); 23 were male and 14 female.⁷ Questions focused on the interviewees' political engagement before the Gezi protests, their self-description as a participant, their coordination with other forums and coalition-building attempts. The author had the opportunity to gain an insight into both the individual experiences of the activists and the organizational practices of 13 different groups (variously self-referred to as a forum, solidarity group or defence group). The author also carried out participant observation in settings that included direct actions, movement-related meetings and other types of gatherings in several localities where forum meetings were held in Istanbul.

The post-Gezi follow-up networks can be categorized according to the geographical limits circumscribing the activists' demands. There are networks that target local issues in a particular district such as KCS, BCD, Beşiktaş City Solidarity, Beykoz City Solidarity, Sarıyer City Solidarity, the Islands' Defense group, the Maltepe Forum, the Maçka Forum, and the Şişli Merkez Mahallesi Forum. Two networks, namely the Istanbul City Defense group and the NFD group, are larger networks in terms of the spatial scope of their agenda; the former functions as a hub for smaller networks to exchange ideas about mobilization topics and action plans, and engages on a scale of Istanbul as a whole; the latter, originally formed as a defence network against the establishment of the third airport (which was eventually built in the largest forested area in the northern part of the city) publicizes problems concerning geographically peripheral green areas which are relatively beyond the reach of the majority of Istanbulites (such as military areas).⁸ Additionally, locally based collectives such as the Neighbour's Door (Komşu Kapısı), which emerged from the Maçka Forum, and the Kadıköy Consumer Cooperative (Kadıköy Tüketim Kooperatifi), an offshoot of forums and neighbourhood solidarity groups in central Kadıköy, are examples of other networks that belong to the 'latent phases' of the Gezi movement. Here the focus is on three of these post-Gezi networks: the KCS, BCD and NFD.

Local encounters and a failed coalition of interests: the KCS group

Fragmentation and the subsequent emergence of local organizations are inevitable processes for most urban social movements today. On the one hand, localization is criticized in social movement literature for the constraints it poses (Uitermark et al., 2012); for instance, the assumption that 'the local scale is more democratic' is claimed to be wrong and that, contrarily, the local may present a 'trap' for social movements (Purcell, 2006, p. 1921). On the other hand, it can be considered useful for the sustenance of democratic forums, because local agenda items are more tangible. They may function as common ground bringing together people sharing the same neighbourhood. The larger the scope of the issue, the more 'abstract' and 'distant' the problems/solutions may become in people's perception; relatedly, the problem may be perceived as a matter concerning institutional politics. Overall, the local scale offers both limitations and opportunities in the 'latent' phases of urban movements.

Kadıköy is among the districts where several post-Gezi local networks flourished. The shift of the arena of demonstrations from Taksim Square to Kadıköy in 2013 was the result of heavy-handed police interventions in Taksim Square and neighbouring streets, which constituted a battleground for protestors and which had been used as the main location for demonstrations for decades. Kadıköy is also known as one of the secular and liberal fortresses of Istanbul, with high percentages of Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP) votes in both general and local elections.

Furthermore, the highest percentage of Gezi occupants (13.4%) stated that they came from Kadıköy (KONDA Gezi Report, 2014, p. 14).

In the second phase of the Gezi movement, primarily neighbourhood-based forums and solidarity groups were formed, from the two major park forums, namely the Abbasağa Park and Yoğurtçu Park Forums on the European and Asian sides of the city, respectively. In the Kadıköy district, where the Yoğurtçu Park Forum was located, many neighbourhood-based solidarity groups such as the Caferağa, Yeldeğirmeni, Osmanağa, Acıbadem, Göztepe, Koşuyolu solidarity groups emerged from the Yoğurtçu Park Forum. Also, several post-Gezi squats emerged in the area. The issues addressed by these groups varied from noise in the streets, where bars and residential units are juxtaposed and frequent traffic accidents in certain locations, to, among others, the defence of commonly shared areas including parks and shared open spaces.⁹

Based in this district, KCS¹⁰ was one of the many offshoots of the Yoğurtçu Park Forum, which transformed into several sub-networks and completely disappeared as a forum around mid-2015. Concurrently, a core group of activists remained as the Yoğurtçu Park Forum and organized events and forums in the park until late 2015. Coming out of this later phase of the Forum, the KCS works as a campaign-oriented organization and its agenda items are related to local concerns in the Kadıköy district: for instance, frequent traffic accidents at specific locations, urban development projects such as the mosque project¹¹ planned to be built in central Kadıköy, the rehabilitation project prepared for Kurbağaldere (a small river running through the district, notorious for its pollution),¹² as well as the increasing commercialization of urban space with the recent mushrooming of cafés, bars and restaurants which have either replaced residential areas or penetrated into them.¹³ The group organize petitions, demonstrations and is quite visible on social media. This extends their reach when it comes to publicizing their agenda items. The members hold weekly public meetings with five to 10 people attending regularly, and local matters can all form part of their agenda as long as they concern the everyday lives of Kadıköy residents. The regular members are mostly well-educated individuals from middle-class backgrounds, being either university students or urban professionals, and they reside in the central part of Kadıköy district, which is inhabited by relatively well-off urban secular people that may match Mayer's (2013) privileged activists, or the alienated. Therefore, they tend to prioritize larger public/collective interests over their individual interests.

Mehmet, a senior member of the KCS who has been active since 2013, noted that the need for park forums emerged after June 2013, and subsequently diverted attention to local matters. Mert, another active member of the KCS and a university student, described Gezi as being 'flagless' (i.e., not having political affiliations for the sake of being more inclusive). Referring to the KCS, he stated: 'This [being "flagless"] is what we have tried to transmit into what we do today ... it is certainly not possible to repeat Gezi, or reach the numbers at Gezi,' but 'we want to reach as many people as we can, and publicize common problems.' According to his account, the transformation of the Gezi movement from park forums to neighbourhood solidarity groups indicates a move from abstract political grievances to concrete demands in given localities:

The critical distinction between the forums and the city and neighbourhood solidarity groups was the fact that the solidarity group engaged with the concrete problems of the public, while the forums were more about the abstract problems of the public. The forums had neither a plan/program, nor a goal actually. Ok, let's discuss; people discussed. It was necessary, but it was not necessary every day. People came to the forum and discussed something about their own politics, some talked about Lenin, others about Marx, some about Atatürk, yet another one talked about Kurds and then the polarization began.

After the establishment of the KCS, the issues that the activists engaged with became more 'concrete' and local. This suggests that the KCS engaged with 'immediate' local issues concerning the everyday lives of Kadıköy residents, rather than with 'macro' politics.

According to Mehmet, one of the major agenda items in 2015 was the redevelopment projects in Kadıköy's Fikirtepe neighbourhood, located relatively close to central Kadıköy, and populated by low-income residents. This neighbourhood was a *gecekondu* area¹⁴ in a high-value urban area, eyed by major developers and local and national officials alike due to its proximity to major transportation hubs and the unlikelihood of a backlash from residents, who would potentially appreciate an increase in the value of their properties. At the time, the urban transformation project in this neighbourhood was a major threat; therefore, initially activists from the Fikirtepe neighbourhood attended the meetings of the KCS. The KCS members agreed to embrace the struggle against the urban transformation of Fikirtepe, not least because of their concerns regarding the social fabric of the neighbourhood, based on population increases in the area, newly emerging transportation networks and the consequential changes to the patterns of the everyday lives of residents. The anticipated hike in population in an already congested Fikirtepe would inevitably bring about more problems for Kadıköy in general. However, after a few months, according to another member, Ozan, the activists from the Fikirtepe neighbourhood raised their 'individual' concerns over their property rights in the new buildings that were to be constructed by contractors, who had promised them renewed apartments. As in most other redevelopment projects in Turkey, contractors usually offer apartments to property owners in return for their share in the area to be redeveloped. The number of apartments that contractors offer depends on a variety of factors including the projected value of the apartments in the new building, the property owner's share of the redeveloped area, the number of shareholders and the number of floors permitted in each apartment block. This last point had a significant impact on the individual foci of the residents of Fikirtepe. As a district of smaller houses, Fikirtepe would transform into a high-rise district resulting in a change in lifestyle for the residents. Furthermore, it meant that the number of apartments each property owner would receive from the redevelopment projects depended on individual bargaining with the contractor. In time, the urban transformation in Fikirtepe dropped off the KCS's agenda as members increasingly found that their primary motivation diverged from that of the KCS, and subsequently activists from Fikirtepe stopped attending meetings. The transformation project is still ongoing after many years and there are platforms voicing various legal violations that Fikirtepe residents have been subjected to throughout this period. Connections established between the local residents of central Kadıköy and the peripheral Fikirtepe neighbourhood did not yield solid outcomes.

The KCS activists' desire to establish a coalition addressing the problems of central Kadıköy and the more peripheral Fikirtepe neighbourhood fell short of generating a unified and resilient opposition front, which could have problematized both individual and collective interests, and brought together the alienated and the dispossessed beyond a limited period for solid outcomes. Urban transformation in Fikirtepe has resulted in a large number of displaced locals and the violation of rights, as some of the projects have come to a halt at different stages due to lack of financing and due to the wider economic problems that Turkey has recently encountered. Fikirtepe residents have formed their own organizations to claim their rights through lawsuits, and in June 2018 they set up tents in the area to protest the unfinished projects. On the other hand, the KCS has become a long-lasting body voicing the collective interests relating to shared urban spaces and related matters in central Kadıköy. The KCS activists' concerns regarding urban space were oriented towards collective needs in the more central areas in Kadıköy. The divergent priorities in these respective networks' agendas have hindered their long-term alliance.

A matter of lifestyle, a matter of livelihood? Activist groups in Beyoğlu

Beyoğlu is one of the places where social-spatial change in Istanbul has become the most visible. The central areas such as Taksim Square, Istiklal Street and the Galata neighbourhood used to be particularly popular with secular Istanbulites, particularly the 'creative class', due to a concentration of major venues for entertainment and nightlife, as well as the arts. In recent years, for its previous

regulars, the Beyoğlu district has lost its allure as a centre of attraction. Tourists who are mostly interested in souvenir shops, restaurants and cafés have replaced the former habitués. This transformation has also seen the end of some local businesses; the bar owners, especially, in the area have suffered financially to a considerable extent, which has led to bankruptcies in some cases.

In 2011, before the Gezi Protests, the local government's regulation of chair and table use outside pubs and cafés in the neighbourhood was one of the issues creating opposition in the locality. The decision to limit that use, enforced by the local municipality only in this district, was perceived as a partial outdoor alcohol ban.¹⁵ Furthermore, one of the dramatic outcomes of this regulation was the dismissal of many bar and café workers who were employed by the small businesses in the area due to a decline in patronage (The Globe and Mail, 2011). The pedestrianization of Taksim Square including the ongoing construction of a mosque immediately opposite the Atatürk Cultural Center, which itself was demolished in March–April 2018, and other redevelopment projects including the restoration of the Emek Cinema, the historic Narmanlı Han, and the building of new shopping malls and large chain stores on İstiklal Street are some of the most obvious examples of spatial reorganization manifesting the neoliberal conservatism of the AKP governments.¹⁶ The spatial transformation of these areas generated resistance by locals with varying demands, as well as generating alliances among them. In the face of this twofold ideological and economic transformation, some of the Gezi follow-up networks flourished in the area. The BCD has drawn energy not only from well-educated actors from middle-class backgrounds who are concerned about maintaining their socialization patterns in given localities, but also from local business owners whose businesses have come under threat. They voice demands through street protests and press statements as well as through gatherings in the threatened areas. They are primarily interested in protecting the historical heritage, environment, and small businesses of Beyoğlu against the drive to redevelop the district.

Melis, a BCD member in her early 30s and a photographer, is concerned over the loss of her lifestyle built around her everyday habits in the Beyoğlu district. The area used to be a recreational place for her family on weekends, when she was a child. She feels emotionally connected to the place, not only through her social ties, but also because she works in the area. She had already felt concern about recent changes, and after the Gezi protests, she joined the BCD. For her, the main issue for the BCD is urban transformation and the small business owners running the bars and *meyhanes* in the neighbourhood are among those who are suffering the most. Some small business owners, who had already been attending the meetings of the BCD, formed the Beyoğlu Small Business Owners Solidarity group (Beyoğlu Esnaf Dayanışması – BSBOS) and the network has grown wider. They primarily focus on keeping small businesses in business. They also have connections to the wider network of the BCD. As some members join the meetings of both networks, as Melis stated, the two networks were informed of each other's agendas and the supportive actions taken by each. She pointed out that small business owners in the area needed to become organized in the face of, for instance, limitations on the use of tables and chairs outside cafés and restaurants.

Among others, this particular factor, in the context of Beyoğlu, has played a role in bringing together alienated urban activists and small business owners, as state repression has directly translated into a change in lifestyle for the inhabitants and habitués of the area. Their collaboration has also been based on other concerns peculiar to this locality, including the transformation of a school into an İmam-Hatip school¹⁷ and the destruction of historic buildings in the neighbourhood. Likewise, the BCD took action against transformations in neighbouring areas such as the planned destruction of the Cihangir Roma Urban Garden (Cihangir Roma Bostanı) and Maçka Public Park, as well as the new pier project for the Kabataş neighbourhood known as the Martı Project (a giant seagull-shaped pier under construction in Kabataş, currently shelved due to financing problems). For her, issues such as the restoration of the historic Narmanlı Han indicated that the change was not only about losing local 'history', but also about the transformation of everyday life.

While Melis voiced the collective interests of residents and regulars, Mahir, as a BSBOS member, was mainly worried about the loss of customers. He runs a *meyhane* in one of the small streets near Taksim Square. He claimed that the turning point for the decline of his business was the Gezi protests in 2013. Yet, other events, such as the bombing on İstiklal Street in March 2016 and the coup attempt in July 2016, have led to an even more dramatic drop in the number of visitors to the area and consequent loss of business. He noted that he genuinely did not care about the nationality of visitors, but stated that today it was mostly tourists from Arab countries who were not interested in places such as bars and *meyhanes*. He has been engaged in politics with left-wing leanings, but he has never fully immersed himself in full-time activism. However, the changing circumstances especially regarding his business have motivated him to engage in social activism in his own locality. He explains what the agenda items are for BSBOS:

BSBOS members talk about everything in its meetings including what is on the national agenda, but as its name suggests ... its constituents are small business owners and it is clear which social class they belong to ... the priority for this solidarity then is making money, in a way keeping the business going to carry on with life. ... But of course none of these are separate from the national agenda.

Mahir drew attention both to the class position of the members and their wider interests beyond doing business, such as taking action against the transformation of a school into an İmam-Hatip school. He added: 'because we are in Beyoğlu, anything related to the area becomes an agenda item for us'. According to another *meyhane* owner and a member of the BSBOS, Yaşar, what holds them together is neither politics by itself nor Beyoğlu alone or their common financial interests. It is a combination of all three. Thus, he also underscores their motivation to stand against the socio-cultural transformation in the area.

The vulnerable groups in the area also included small shop owners on İstiklal Street, who have been tenants in their shops for a long time and who have recently been forced to evacuate their shops due to new regulations in the context of a 2012 change in the 'Law of Obligations', which have stipulated that real-estate owners can force tenants to leave if the duration of the contract exceeds 10 years. The 90-year-old Kelebek Corset Shop and the İnci Pastry Shop¹⁸ were closed in 2015 and 2012, respectively, pursuant to this new regulation. The BCD and the shop owners took different forms of joint action, including street protests and petitions, to publicize the situation on the grounds that these shops were part of the neighbourhood's historical legacy.

The Beyoğlu case demonstrates the intertwined links between economic and socio-cultural change. On the one hand, the central neighbourhood in the district is losing its character as a cultural centre and a major spot for nightlife; on the other hand, a different type of commercial landscape is emerging in consequence. In general, the chain stores of global brands and souvenir shops that have mushroomed in recent years are catering to the interests and needs largely of Middle Eastern tourists, who are mostly not interested in nightlife, unlike the former regulars of the area. This sort of urban change has enabled an alliance between small business owners and more educated sectors of society, who, especially, oppose the socio-cultural change. The alliance between the BCD and BSBOS is based on cross-membership and their collaboration is usually determined by the specific issue at hand. The BCD is mostly composed of members from educated and secular backgrounds and collective interests are the primary targets of their agenda. However, their collaboration with small business owners, including bars and other businesses, is based on concerns that the neighbourhood has been a crucial locus for the social reproduction of, especially, secular and educated sectors of society. In brief, socio-cultural concerns and material interests have coincided in the Beyoğlu case.

Forging bonds between the centre and the periphery in the defence of the Northern Forest

'The third airport' project (the new Istanbul Airport) was contracted out on 3 May 2013, despite there being three more days until the deadline when the local public could have legally raised objections to the environmental impact assessment report. A partnership of five conglomerates, namely Cengiz, Kolin, Limak, Kalyon and Mapa,¹⁹ widely known for their intricate connections with the ruling AKP, won the bid. On 6 June 2014, the project was inaugurated in Istanbul by then Prime Minister Erdoğan. Some farming and residential areas in several northern villages in Istanbul were subjected to 'urgent nationalization'.

The AKP's colossal urban projects, or 'crazy projects', as President Erdoğan and other government officials refer to them, have received immense criticism. Most of these projects have been aimed at enlargement of the city towards the northern region where there are still unexploited spaces. Yet, Istanbul Airport has, perhaps, resulted in the most disastrous environmental impacts. The project has been carried out at the expense of the cutting down of around 13 million trees according to the NFD.

One of the significant coalition efforts has been observed in the case of the NFD group against the project. The NFD was formed following the Gezi protests through the combined efforts of two separate groups of activists. One of these groups was composed of cyclists who initially wanted to raise their voice against the construction of the third bridge²⁰ connecting the European and Asian sides of the city. The other group, 'Life, not a Third Bridge', was composed of environmental activists and representatives of certain professional chambers. The connection between these two was made initially through the Internet, when the first group was organizing a demonstration involving a cycling tour and a march to the construction area, which the groups ended up carrying out together. Subsequently, the NFD was formed through the collective efforts of several these activists.

Özlem, a highly politically educated member of the NFD with a history of political engagement over decades, was involved in the creation of the NFD network from the outset. She has been contemporaneously active in a few networks, namely the Istanbul City Defense group and the Sarıyer City Solidarity group, in addition to the political organization in which she was involved. The NFD was established to draw attention to the changing topography of northern Istanbul. The possible environmental destruction that a third bridge and the new airport were expected to leave behind was the main motivation for the group to come together. Özlem expresses some of the limitations in reaching out to the people in the peripheral areas and campaigning with them:

people may get in touch for everyday interests. We experienced this in the NFD for instance. [Some villagers said] 'OK, let them build the third airport, but further away, not on my land'. I mean without standing against the project, ... or the neoliberal city, they say 'this land is ours, we are not against the state'; we sometimes build relationships [with the locals] like this ...

She also draws attention to the fact that a lack of previous organizational experience results in a tendency to fragment or an inability to sustain collaboration, and that they sought to turn these networks into a 'negotiation and interaction space':

The ideal form is [to turn] these networks into a negotiation/interaction space between the public and the defenders of the right to the city where they transform one another. This is the ideal form. If you ask whether we have been able to do this, well, we have been chasing after it.

The airport project also resulted in the expropriation of land in several villages in the surrounding area. Accordingly, the NFD became involved in the villagers' struggle to protect their farms.

A connection was established with the locals in the villages, who included farmers, some of whom owned a small piece of land and/or a house. Lawyers with connections to the network provided legal assistance. The connection established between the activists and the locals also brought the issue to public attention through the press. Through social media and newsletters published on the NFD's official website, activists drew attention to the direct losses in these farming villages, and the potential problems this would generate in the lives of Istanbulites. As another member, İpek, puts it: 'It is not only about farmers losing their villages, it is also a problem for people in Istanbul, because these are the villages which provide us with fresh vegetables.'²¹

Another member of the NFD, Metin, was motivated to get organized after more experienced members started holding meetings in his village, Ağaçlı. The last three generations of his family have lived in this village which had come under threat due to the third airport project:

Now they are trying to expropriate our village. ... We don't want this; we took it to the court. ... It has been ongoing for about three and a half years; there is no verdict yet ...

... My grandfather came to the village in 1870. We have *lived* there since. Why are you kicking these people out? ... We are not within the [designated] area of the airport; nor on the road to the third bridge. But now it is all about rent. They will kick us out for nothing. Say, they'll give 10 Liras instead of 100, and then they will fill up the area with residences ...

Metin pointed out the valorization of the areas surrounding the airport project (including Ağaçlı). Regardless of their inclusion in the project plan, these areas will draw significant numbers of residents and this demand will lead to an increase in rents and loss of agricultural lands. Overall, the airport project is expected to result in a dramatic expansion of the city towards the north. The expansion is likely to include housing projects and public transportation networks that will eventually replace the farming villages of today.

The NFD organized several forums in some of the villages, bringing the villagers and activists together for several months in mid-2016. The opposition led by the NFD has failed to interrupt or prevent the construction of the airport. Throughout the campaigns and protests, ties among the activists, both central and peripheral, have been temporarily forged. The NFD survived the construction of the airport and they have been in contact with other environmental networks voicing concerns in and outside Istanbul. The operational processes, associated particularly with the colossal projects, take place rather rapidly and this extends beyond the internal dynamics of a specific mobilizing group, involving a diverse set of individuals with diverse interests. In the case of the airport project, another temporary encounter between the alienated and dispossessed was observed. Yet again, this did not generate a solid ground for unified collective action, albeit for different reasons. First of all, external factors such as the scale of the urbanization project, as well as the rapid operationalization, generated pressure on the activists on both sides of the alliance. Furthermore, the extreme intolerance of the security forces against any form of social mobilization protesting these projects, the constant negative statements by leaders of the ruling party, the use of court cases against activists as deterrents, among other things, made organized responses by activists extremely costly, if not virtually impossible.

Moreover, these two groups had divergent priorities similar to the issues in the KCS case. The group of people at the periphery held that they would suffer from the consequences of large-scale urban transformation in the northern parts of the city on an individual basis due to the nationalization of their land. On the other hand, activists coming from the central areas prioritized the public grievance that Istanbulites would share collectively once the city extended to the north. These divergent perspectives have been among the challenges that the coalition builders on both sides have faced.

CONCLUSIONS

Istanbul's spaces are being remade along neoliberal lines and various issues have spread across its geography, each with their own particularities. This paper has raised the question as to the extent to which the post-Gezi networks have generated new alliance-building opportunities among seemingly disparate groups in the face of these diverse problems. The author has suggested that the follow-up networks from Gezi have become loci to go beyond divisions among diverse urban actors. These groups involve people from well-educated seculars with publicly shared interests, small business owners in central areas, people with lower incomes threatened by urban transformation projects in a *gecekondu* area surrounded by high-value urban areas, as well as farmers in the peripheral regions of Istanbul. Overall the multifaceted nature of neoliberal spatial reorganization in big cities gave rise to a fragmented body of social movements before the spread of the Occupy movements. Similar to the Occupy wave across the world, Gezi brought together activists from diverse backgrounds and with different self-ascribed identities, inspiring urban activists to form a united front within the urban movement scene over the ensuing period. This required the collaboration of the alienated and the dispossessed. While the context in which Mayer discussed the dispossessed and the alienated differed to a certain extent from the Turkish context, the framework has proven to be applicable to this case in several ways.

The empirical observations presented here show, first, that threats to livelihoods and to modes of social reproduction in a locale facilitated attempts at forming coalitions; second, that well-educated actors pursuing a form of 'secular' lifestyle have attempted to forge bonds in certain localities, as well as between the centre and the periphery of the city, with people different from them; and third, that through established bonds, local struggles have been brought to the attention of the wider public. Although these attempts at forming coalitions have not been successful in attracting large numbers of people or in triggering changes in macro and formal power balances, they have opened ways to forge ties at a micro-level among urban activists who are concerned about the changing patterns in their lifestyles, and people who have concerns over their livelihood in areas which are subject to socially subversive urban transformation. In this process, the 'local' has constituted a significant subject matter, tying and interconnecting diverse actors. The networks and groups analysed in this research have not drawn large crowds of activists within their localities. The encounters between the mobilizing groups in the respective stories of Kadıköy, Beyoğlu and the north-western region of Istanbul are only demonstrative of temporary alliances.

However, it can also be observed that attempts at alliance have entailed challenges as a result of the divergent perspectives of different activist groups. As the experiences of the Fikirtepe residents and the people in the peripheral areas in the north of the city demonstrate, some parties felt the need to prioritize more immediate issues that concerned them at an individual level. Yet, activists based mostly in central areas differed from the former category in that they primarily based their actions on the common interests of city dwellers in general. These divergent perspectives were glossed over temporarily but have, in the long run, inhibited coalition-building. Furthermore, external factors, such as the scale of the urban transformation projects and the rapid operationalization of these colossal projects, have been among the factors that have hindered long-term coalitions.

In conclusion, the paper claims that while there were varying levels of success/failure in the attempts at coalition-building analysed, the reasons are specific to the individual dynamics in each instance. The divergence of positions between the KCS's prioritization of collective interests and Fikirtepe residents' focus on individual interests in the case of the KCS resulted in a failure to turn this into a broader neighbourhood movement and a consequent united and long-term alliance. In the BCD case, the local played a major role in the establishment of a common ground for collective action as the material interests pursued coincided with the socio-cultural concerns.

Although the NFD has remained active for other causes concerning spatial reorganization and environmental destruction, the rapid operationalization of the third airport project removed the necessity for ongoing contact with the urbanites in the northern periphery of the city, by making those involved feel powerless in the face of massive macro-political dynamics.

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NOTES

1. For some noteworthy exceptions, see Özen (2015) and Uncu (2016).
2. *Meyhane* is a bar-like restaurant peculiar to nightlife in Turkish culture where traditional food is served and mostly classical Turkish Music is played.
3. For a discussion of neoliberal policies paving the way for the renewal of historic urban space in Istanbul, see Dinçer (2011).
4. At first, this airport was commonly referred to as the Third Airport by the AKP leadership and supporters, but in time it became clear that it was intended to replace the primary international airport in Istanbul, that is, Atatürk Airport, and in April 2019, it fully replaced Atatürk Airport. There are now two functioning airports in Istanbul.
5. For instance, the third bridge connecting the Asian and European sides of Istanbul was named after Yavuz Sultan Selim, who is known for the Ottoman persecution of the Alevi minority in the late 15th and the early 16th centuries. The name of the bridge caused controversy especially among Alevis.
6. I suggest that the first two chapters are the 'visible' and the last two are relatively 'latent' phases of the movement (Melucci, 1996).
7. Not all the potential interviewees (whom were contacted using the snowballing method) accepted the request for an interview. The political scene in Turkey throughout this period was very tense, marked by several terror bombings in major cities and a coup attempt in July 2016.
8. In recent years, a controversial topic for environmentalists in Istanbul has been that the green areas officially owned by the Turkish military would be made available for 'public use' (which indirectly meant opening these areas to construction). After the coup attempt in July 2016, this issue occupied the environmentalists' agenda once again. The NFD held a press conference opposing such projects (<https://www.evrensel.net/haber/302560/kos-askeri-alanlar-kuzey-ormanlarinin-dogal-parcasidir>).
9. While local matters have been prioritized in the follow-up networks, some activists have also been active participants in election campaigns since 2013. However, these actions took place outside the local networks through the organization of groups in support of certain political parties. Therefore, the suggested networks here have not been completely isolated from macro-political agendas because they have also been energy pools for macro-political developments.
10. On its Facebook page, the KCS describes itself as 'an organization which functions on account of the right to the city. It is open to everyone who lives, works, and produces in Kadıköy'.
11. The Validebağ Mosque Project (completed in 2015), Central Kadıköy Mosque Project (plans have been publicized) and Taksim Square Mosque Project (construction underway) are clear indicators of the conservative tone of the AKP's spatial strategies. Mosque projects have both symbolic power by contributing to the AKP's consolidation of power, and they constitute a significant initial step in opening up spaces for further urban redevelopment.

12. Based on advice from civil engineers from the Turkish Association of Chambers of Architects and Engineers (or TMMOB), the KCS members claim that the project plan that was prepared by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (tied at the time to the AKP) needs revision.
13. While the Beyoğlu district has lost its popularity as a venue for nightlife as well as a stage for activists to become visible in the public eye through protests, Kadıköy has acquired a considerable significance both as a venue for nightlife and entertainment and as an arena for protests. This translocation has taken place gradually, following heavy-handed police interventions in several protests in Beyoğlu and Taksim since 2013.
14. *Gecekondu* areas are characterized by people building their own houses without any permission from the authorities.
15. Several protests took place in Beyoğlu against the ban on the use of chairs and tables in the streets by bars (<http://www.haberturk.com/haber/haber/665144-masa-sandalye-yasagi-le-monededa>). Small business owners organized a festival in the streets of Beyoğlu on the anniversary of the ban (<http://www.demokrathaber.org/guncel/turkiyede-tek-bir-ilcede-masa-sandalye-yasagi-var-h10194.html>).
16. On its official website, the Beyoğlu Municipality (tied to the AKP) calls the spatial reorganization of the district 'The Grand Transformation', which is allegedly planned to turn Beyoğlu into a 'center of attention' with 'renewed interest' (<http://www.beyoglubuyukdonusum.com/iletisim/detay/Bize-Ulasin/47/171/0>).
17. İmam-Hatip schools are secondary education institutions that were originally established to raise imams to be employed by government. Throughout the terms of the AKP, initially these schools proliferated; subsequently, regular secondary schools have been turned into İmam-Hatip schools, causing, in turn, controversy among secular sectors of society.
18. The Kelebek Corset Shop moved to another district after its evacuation in 2015. The İnci Pastry Shop was reopened on a different Street in Beyoğlu in 2013 after the building where it was originally located was demolished.
19. '9 Soruda Üçüncü Hava Limanı Projesi' [The Third Airport Project in 9 Questions]. *Diken* (Online Daily). Retrieved from <http://www.diken.com.tr/9-soruda-ucuncu-havalimani-projesi/>.
20. Despite criticism that the third bridge would double the burden on traffic in Istanbul and result in the destruction of a large green area, the bridge was built and opened for traffic in August 2016.
21. See the NFD's official website for the press release (29 May 2015) on the destructive effects of the third airport project on farming areas in the villages of Yeniköy and Ağaçlı. The banner says: 'Are we going to eat each other, if we all move into the city?' (<http://www.kuzeyormanlari.org/2015/05/30/hepimiz-sehre-gidersek-birbirimizi-mi-yiyecegiz-29-mayis-yenikoy-kuzey-ormanlari-eylemi/>).

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