

---

Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019

---

2015

## Reconciling Ex Ante Expectations with the Ex Post Reality: A Look at the Effectiveness of Third-Party Diplomatic Interventions in Civil Wars

Matthew Benchimol  
*University of Central Florida*



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#)

Find similar works at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd>

University of Central Florida Libraries <http://library.ucf.edu>

This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [STARS@ucf.edu](mailto:STARS@ucf.edu).

---

### STARS Citation

Benchimol, Matthew, "Reconciling Ex Ante Expectations with the Ex Post Reality: A Look at the Effectiveness of Third-Party Diplomatic Interventions in Civil Wars" (2015). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019*. 55.

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/55>



RECONCILING EX ANTE EXPECTATIONS WITH THE EX POST REALITY: A LOOK AT  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL  
WARS

by

MATTHEW DEAN BENCHIMOL  
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2011

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts  
in the Department of Political Science  
in the College of Sciences  
at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term  
2015

© 2014 Matthew Benchimol

## **ABSTRACT**

Research has begun to focus on the role third-party diplomatic intervention plays in the length of civil conflicts. Diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor are assumed to help resolve or alleviate violence over time. Is this really the case? Hypotheses relating to these aspects of civil wars are proposed to test this long-standing assumption. This thesis uses statistical analysis to observe the relationship between diplomatic interventions and civil war duration and then observe the relationship between duration and civil war violence. The data incorporates approximately 150 civil wars from 1945 to 1999, 101 of which had outside interventions. This thesis finds that, contrary to *ex ante* expectations, diplomatic interventions are a significant contributing factor to civil war length. Furthermore, longer civil wars are not associated with more civil war intensity in the aggregate, suggesting that longer civil wars do not mean more violent or intense ones.

For my dad who taught me to think deeply, for my mom who showed me to think honestly, for my brother who thinks resiliently, and to my partner and significant other for all her patience, intelligence, and support. To all my family and friends who have given me the courtesy of their unfaltering commitment. You shouldered the burden and guided me as close as you could. I promise I will go the rest of the way.

*Prediction is difficult for us for the same reason that it is so important: it is where objective and subjective reality intersect. Distinguishing the signal from the noise requires both scientific knowledge and self-knowledge: the serenity to accept the things we cannot predict, the courage to predict the things we can, and the wisdom to know the difference.*

*-Nate Silver*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES .....	ix
INTRODUCTION .....	1
Introduction to Topic.....	1
Solidifying the Claim; Examining Alternative Arguments.....	5
Significance of Research.....	7
Literature Review and the Topic in the Literature .....	8
Organizational Design.....	8
CHAPTER 1: BARGAINING IS BULLETS: CIVIL WARS AS THEY ARE.....	10
Diplomacy vs. Diplomatic Interventions .....	10
What are Diplomatic Interventions and What do They Signal?.....	11
Mediation in Civil Wars More Specifically .....	12
The Peace-Process as a Bargaining Problem .....	15
Recalling an Ambassador as a Form of Diplomatic Intervention .....	17
Conclusion.....	19
CHAPTER 2: THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS .....	20
Introduction .....	20
Descriptive Modeling Using Expected Utility Theory .....	20
Why Expectations of Diplomatic Interventions Occur As They Do.....	22
A New Model of Expectations in Civil Wars .....	25
CHAPTER 3: ASSUMPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS, AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .....	30
Introduction .....	30
What is a Civil War? .....	30
Civil War Duration.....	34
Regan and Aydin (2006): Third-Party Interventions, Duration, and Violence in Civil Wars ..	38
What is Violence in Civil Wars and How Do We Study It? .....	40
Variation in Violence in Civil Wars.....	42
Time and Violence: The Unconnected Connection .....	44

Conclusion.....	45
CHAPTER 4: FRAMEWORK .....	47
Theoretical Framework .....	47
Data and Methods.....	49
Definitions and Operationalization .....	52
Methodological Limitations .....	53
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .....	54
Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors and Civil War Length .....	54
Civil War Length's Effect on Intensity.....	58
Summary of Results .....	61
Implications.....	61
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS .....	63
Limitations .....	63
Conclusion.....	63
APPENDIX A: LIST OF CIVIL WARS FROM 1945-1999 .....	66
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATISTICS .....	71
APPENDIX C: CODING SCHEME FOR CONTROL VARIABLES .....	73
REFERENCES .....	75



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – Total Amount of Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Length in Years by Year ...	1
Figure 2 - Total Amount of Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Length in Years by Year....	2
Figure 3 – Sisk’s (2009) Peace-Process Model .....	15
Figure 4 – The Peace-Process as a Bargaining Problem.....	16
Figure 5 - Probability of Third-Party Intervention Being Successful When Incumbent Government and Rebel Group Want an Agreement by Utility of Decision to Intervene.....	29
Figure 6 – Distribution of Violence Committed in Civil Wars from 1945-1999 .....	60

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Reasons Third-Parties Intervene in Civil War .....	13
Table 2. Current Third-Party Decision-Making Model: The Expectation.....	23
Table 3. New Third-Party Decision-Making Model: The Reality .....	26
Table 4. Linear Regression – An Isolated Look at Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors in Civil Wars from 1945 to 1999 .....	55
Table 5. Linear Regression – Controlling for Endogeneity: Looking at Durations effect on Diplomatic Interventions .....	56
Table 6. Linear Regression – A Look at Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors in Civil Wars from 1945 to 1999 with Typical Civil War Duration Literature Controls .....	57
Table 7. Linear Regression – A Look at the Effect Duration has on Selective Violence Intensity with Typical Controls in the Literature.....	59

# INTRODUCTION

## Introduction to Topic

From 1945 to 1999, there have been approximately 150 civil wars, 101 of which had outside interventions. Since 1945, the length of civil wars has been steadily increasing (Fearon 2002). So, too, has the amount of diplomatic interventions in civil wars (see Figure 1).

According to Figure 2, these two phenomena are linearly correlated. This thesis seeks to understand the connection between these two phenomena and therefore discuss the implications of this connection to variations in violence across civil wars. Principally, this thesis seeks to understand whether diplomatic interventions are responsible for the length of a civil war and, if so, if outside diplomatic interventions intensify violence over time to the contrary of ex ante expectations by policy-makers and scholars.




Figure 1 – Total Amount of Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Length in Years by Year




Figure 2 - Total Amount of Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Length in Years by Year  
 Source: Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset (Regan 2012)

Current empirical research focuses on the effect that diplomatic, military, and economic interventions by external actors have on the duration and termination of civil conflicts (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; 2008; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2000, 2002, 2006). However, no empirical research looks at the effect diplomatic interventions have on the intensity of violence in civil wars over time. In order to establish which way the causal arrow primarily points in both of these instances, however, there must be a cursory examination and explanation of what would make the arrow point logically in one direction more than the other.

“Civil wars tend to last a long time when neither side can disarm the other, causing a military stalemate. They are relatively quick when conditions favor a decisive victory (Fearon 2002).” In this perspective, any variable that does not add to decisive victory will increase the likelihood the conflict will endure for longer periods of time. Also in this perspective, interventions by external actors that do not create conditions for a decisive victory by favoring one side over the other will result in civil wars that endure longer.

In order to understand intervention relative to civil war, it is important to understand why they exist in the first place (Regan and Aydin 2006). To Regan (2000; 2002; 2006), interventions were primarily created to manage conflict. In this view, the *ex ante* expectation is that interventions should serve to terminate or, at the very least, lessen the duration of a conflict. The goal in managing conflict in civil wars is to create stability in the immediate or future time frame – sometimes both. There are different forms of intervention in civil wars to do this, including: military, economic, and diplomatic interventions.

The difference between these types of interventions is based in their intentions (Regan 2000; 2002; Regan & Aydin 2006). In a civil war, a military and economic intervention takes either the side of the incumbent government or the rebel group. A diplomatic intervention, on the other hand, takes neither side, as a resolution to end violence cannot be brokered if the diplomatic intervention is seen to be biased towards one side or the other. This is the key difference between interventions that are military or economic and interventions that are diplomatic.

Diplomatic interventions attempt to create conditions that make peace possible through brokered negotiations and agreements, using mediation, international forums, and other forms of non-violent diplomacy, such as recalling an ambassador. Because diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor do not create conditions for decisive victory for either the incumbent government or rebel group, diplomatic interventions should be a significant contributing factor in the duration of a civil war. This would lend credence to the first intuition in this thesis that finds diplomatic interventions responsible for longer civil wars.

But, why does the effect that diplomatic interventions have on duration matter in studying civil war? An assumption by policy-makers and scholars suggests that by ending a civil war or by decreasing the amount of time a civil war lasts it will decrease the intensity in a civil war. It logically follows that diplomatic interventions are meant to decrease violence in civil wars either immediately or over time. If Fearon's (2002) established assumption is correct, then diplomatic interventions by third-party actors do the opposite of their intended purpose. Meaning, they do not create conditions for a decisive victory on either side. If diplomatic interventions do the opposite of their intended purpose or do not achieve their intended purpose – which is to lessen

the duration of civil wars and thus the violence in those civil wars – then they are ineffective policies. If diplomatic interventions are successful in reducing the duration of a civil war – and only if lessening this duration will lessen violence over time – then they achieve their intended purpose. This is an important aspect to the study of civil wars that has yet to be connected and tested.

The effect duration has on intensity is seemingly obvious and yet there have been no studies that look at this relationship to date. This thesis intends to bridge this gap. This thesis also attempts to reconcile the ex ante expectations of diplomatic interventions with the ex post reality. Meaning, on one hand policy-makers expect that diplomatic interventions will decrease duration and thus lessen violence over time. The question becomes whether or not this is the reality.

#### Solidifying the Claim; Examining Alternative Arguments

The main alternative argument is that the length of a civil war causes an increase in the amount of diplomatic interventions and not the other way around. Essentially, this suggests that diplomatic interventions are reactionary. Once the civil war has initiated, diplomatic interventions will occur primarily after the situation becomes extremely hostile and there is call to intervene by the international community or by public opinion. There is not much literature that looks at duration causing a significant increase in external interventions in civil wars – much less diplomatic ones. There is an argument regarding “a CNN Effect” that suggests that the horrible nature of a war – interstate or intrastate – will increase the likelihood of a third-party intervention (Bahador 2007). This does not look, however, at the effectiveness of those interventions based on expectations vs. realities. The alternative argument provided above is a very real foil to the first argument and intuition in this thesis. However, it does nothing to truly

challenge the core argument in this thesis regarding the ineffective nature of diplomatic interventions in civil wars. Diplomatic interventions may not increase the length of a civil war but they can still be responsible for an increase in violence over time – contrary to policy-maker and scholarly expectations.

According to previous research (Regan and Aydin 2006), the timing of diplomatic interventions matters in understanding how duration will affect diplomatic interventions in civil wars – and vice versa. In this view, controlling for the timing of diplomatic interventions can significantly lessen problems regarding endogeneity. When endogeneity is lessened – to the maximum extent that it can be lessened – the question is then raised: is the effect that diplomatic interventions have on duration or the effect that duration has on diplomatic intervention more logical? According to much of the literature (Fearon 2002; 2004; Regan 2002; Regan and Aydin 2006; Ohmura 2011), the effect duration has on diplomatic intervention is not as logically expected as the effect diplomatic interventions have on duration. This is primarily because diplomatic interventions are proactive and not reactive policies – although there are certainly outliers. As diplomatic interventions do not cost as much in political capital as military or economic interventions (as these interventions usually signify a choice by the third-party actor of one side over the other in a civil war), diplomatic interventions are usually the first option chosen by external actors when they do decide to intervene in an active conflict. As a result, this thesis does not concern itself to a major extent with the effect that duration has on diplomatic interventions and instead focuses on the effect that diplomatic interventions have on duration.

According to Figure 1 and Figure 2, there is at least a correlative relationship between civil war duration and diplomatic interventions that should be investigated. According to Fearon



(2002; 2004) and Regan and Aydin (2006), it is clear that there is a solid, logical foundation for suggesting that diplomatic interventions by third-party actors significantly contribute to duration – and not the reverse. Furthermore, that even if duration contributes to a portion of diplomatic interventions it is not necessarily impossible to reconcile these differences in statistical analysis (Regan and Aydin 2006). In the following sections, the importance of this relationship and connection will be discussed and tested.

### Significance of Research

The significance of this thesis to the field of peace and conflict resolution research is broad in its scope. Are diplomatic interventions by external actors effective in civil wars? This is an important question that needs to be addressed in order for policy-makers and scholars to understand the nature of intrastate wars and how to best influence them. Furthermore, there is need to reconcile expectations between scholars and policy-makers and, furthermore, to reconcile differences between those expectations and reality. To this end, this thesis isolates the effect diplomatic interventions have on the length of a civil war and observes the relationship length has on variations in violence across civil wars. To do this, this thesis tests the core assumptions behind the existence and use of diplomatic interventionist policies by policy-makers and scholarly literature on whether or not decisive victory conditions are an important aspect to civil war duration. Lastly, this thesis will test the unconnected connection between time and violence by looking at the distribution of violence throughout civil wars from 1945 to 1999 and by observing the relationship between the length of a civil war and violence in this same time frame. This will provide a more detailed and nuanced viewing of intrastate wars.

## Literature Review and the Topic in the Literature

This thesis consists of a combination of two types of civil war literature: duration and variations in violence across civil wars. Each of these studies have been traditionally separated and bringing them together poses challenges as there is certainly a reason why these two studies have been separate and distinct for this long. However, in combining these two aspects of civil war into one comprehensive viewing there is an opportunity towards a synthesis that is greater than the sum total of its parts.

Civil War literature is wide in its scope and, as a result, there is a large amount of competing views regarding not only duration and variations in violence across civil wars but on what constitutes a civil war in the first place. A thorough examination of competing views in the literature review will provide a broad thematic understanding of civil wars in order to organize the subject under study.

A review of the literature will also devote an entire chapter to differences between diplomacy and diplomatic intervention, what the components of a diplomatic intervention are in a civil war, and some inherent problems regarding the use of these policies in the civil war peace-process. This is important because it describes the reasoning and the logic behind why these policies exist, what the expectations are for their existence, and if the expectations of these policies – in the literature – match the realities of their practice.

## Organizational Design

This thesis consists of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. The first chapter discusses diplomacy and diplomatic interventions in civil wars. Furthermore, it will

provide an extensive look at diplomacy and the diplomatic process used in and throughout civil wars. The second chapter will use decision theory to model these expectations to see why these expectations exist in civil wars and use expected utility theory to provide the calculus for why an intervening third-party chooses to do something vs. nothing in civil wars. The third chapter details relevant literature on the subject of civil wars, looking at trends and exposing some gaps that need to be bridged. The following chapter details the framework behind this study, including the theoretical framework, constructed dataset, and the methodology being employed. In this same chapter, definitions, operationalization of concepts, and methodological limitations will be addressed. Next, the fifth chapter looks at an analysis of the hypotheses and either accepts or rejects and provides an in-depth viewing into what either of these scenarios means for policy-makers. Lastly, a concluding chapter discusses problems with the research, subjects for future development, and an overall review of the subject under study.

## CHAPTER 1: BARGAINING IS BULLETS: CIVIL WARS AS THEY ARE

*“... our concepts and tools for analysis are haunted by outmoded and inaccurate concepts and approaches to conflict resolution that fail to recognize the integral nature of political violence as a bargaining tactic.”*

*-Sisk*

### Diplomacy vs. Diplomatic Interventions

Before any semblance of a study can be conducted, it is necessary, if not mandatory, to discuss what diplomacy is generally and what diplomatic intervention is more specifically. In essence, why are they different?

According to R.P. Barston (1988, 1), modern diplomacy is concerned with “the management of relations between states and between states and other actors.” This suggests that diplomacy is a process of shaping and implementing foreign policy through exchanges between individuals that formally represent the state. Barston (1988) believes that diplomacy is often viewed as being concerned with peaceful activity but that this is actually not its core mission. In essence, diplomacy can be used to engage in the pursuit of violent policies, even if it is not typically used in this way. Furthermore, Barston (1988) suggests that diplomacy is just a means to accomplishing a policy end. There are some inherent limitations of this definitional classification when looking at the use of diplomacy in a conflict environment and this specificity is key. In essence, while diplomacy may sometimes utilize violent recourse from a policy standpoint (Barston 1988), the point of diplomacy in a conflict is not to continue policies that prolong violence but rather to find policies that end it.

According to Wolff (2012, 303), “Diplomatic interventions normally precede other forms of intervention and aim at either averting violent escalation of a conflict or establishing

conditions conducive to de-escalation.” In this view, while diplomacy may be concerned with shaping and implementing foreign policy, diplomatic intervention is concerned with finding and managing a peaceful resolution once the conflict has already been initiated (Wolff 2013). The key difference between diplomacy and diplomatic interventions, in this view, is that a diplomatic intervention attempts to end fighting or to stop and inhibit violence whereas diplomacy attempts to manage relations between actors sometimes using violence or the threat of violence.

Diplomacy is a broadly used process (Barston 1988). Diplomatic intervention is a specifically used process (Wolf 2012). Both are similar in their competencies and terminology but different in their scope. This is an important distinction.

#### What are Diplomatic Interventions and What do They Signal?

Diplomatic interventions by third-party actors, according to Walter and Snyder (1999) and Regan and Aydin (2006), are widely characterized by a process called mediation. In civil wars, mediations are a negotiation that occurs after the pre-war and initiation phase of the bargaining process among the incumbent government and rebel group to resolve a discrepancy or perceived ill (Sisk 2009) – a term dubbed by Sisk (2009) a political settlement. Diplomatic interventions by third-party actors also include a process called international forums and recalling an ambassador. International forums are mediations done by the international community through international organizations such as the UN. Recalling an ambassador is exactly what the name implies. The intervening third-party actor is removing diplomats until the violence has abated. This move by the intervening third-party actor threatens the legitimacy of the state and, more specifically, the incumbent government who was formerly the stable and governing body of the area that is now in question.

But, why are diplomatic interventions thought of in this way? There are many types of interventionist schemas, including military and economic interventions. Unlike military and economic interventions, however, diplomatic interventions do not involve much commitment by the third-party actor – at least comparatively. This is a purposeful tactic meant to provide the third-party with more options to exit the conflict if political realities become too poignant to handle. This commitment problem is part of the reason diplomatic interventions get their namesake as an economical and potentially highly rewarding enterprise – or, at the very least, seen as potentially high-rewarding by policy-makers and scholars (Sisk 2009). In attempting to manage civil war conflict in this way, however, diplomatic interventions become defined by this dynamic, leading to the overuse of these policies and perceptions by others as to the nature of the third-party actor’s true commitment to resolving the civil war in a given country. In essence, spending a marginal amount of political capital for the possibility of high reward by using diplomatic interventions gives the impression that the third-party is detached and irresolute. Fearon (1997, 71) calls these “part-way signals” and suggests that the problem “with ‘part-way’ signals is that the potential challenger is apt to conclude that ‘if they were truly serious, they would have signaled that they would *surely* fight.’” The use of military and economic interventions, however, signals the contrary. Military and economic interventions firmly signal to the incumbent government or the rebel group (whichever one the third-party wishes to advantage) that the third-party actor is committed to resolving the instability.

### Mediation in Civil Wars More Specifically

In civil wars, there are two types of mediation, both representing differing dynamics of the same specifically used process. There are mediation's done by third-party actors and there are

mediation's done by the international community through the UN. The first, for clarity's sake, will be dubbed simply mediation and the second will be dubbed international mediation (Sisk 2009). For the purpose of this analysis, they have been lumped together but there are different arguments for why both types of mediation exist and which one is more effective than the other. This thesis is attempting to make an argument about all mediation types so it does not assume or make claims that one is more effective than the other.

First and foremost, mediation is, according to Regan and Aydin (2006), an attempt by a third party actor to manage conflict. In essence, the third-party actor overseeing the mediation is attempting to facilitate a successful conclusion to the internal violence within a given state. Regan and Aydin (2006, 741) says that the "... key element of mediation is that it involves an explicit attempt to transform a conflict from one of hostility to one of cooperation" and denotes a motivational component by the intervening third-party. This is part and parcel for what makes mediations a part of the interventionist schema. A third-party will not oversee or engage in mediation unless the third-party has an inherent interest – self-serving or moral – in ending it in the first place. An abridged version of Sisk’s (2009) model on this dichotomy is represented below.

Table 1. Reasons Third-Parties Intervene in Civil War

Interest-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diffusion and escalation of violence to surrounding states</li> <li>• Displacement of individuals within and outside the state</li> <li>• Costs of humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Trade considerations</li> <li>• Environmental and infrastructure degradation</li> </ul>
Normative-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1948 Convention on Genocide</li> <li>• Violations of UN Charter on Aggression</li> <li>• Human Rights</li> </ul>

According to Sisk (2009), mediations during a civil war follow a similar bargaining process to mediations that occur before a civil war. The exception is that in a civil war violence has become a tactic either the incumbent government or rebel group uses to spoil the negotiations or gain leverage in the negotiations to reach a more advantageous political settlement. The key difference, then, between mediation's that occur before a civil war has initiated and mediation's that occur once it has initiated is the prioritization of violence in the equation. In peacetime mediation, violence is the last resort as a bargaining chip. In wartime mediation, violence is, more often than not, the first resort. The reason why violence becomes the first resort in wartime mediation is twofold. First, the incumbent government and rebel group are attempting to project power to gain a better agreement in the bargaining process and violence has now become the easiest and least costly method to accomplish this end. Secondly, the reason why a third-party becomes interested in a civil war conflict to begin with is because violence has greatly affected the ability of the state in conflict to operate. Thus, violence is the reason that the third-party has invested and continues to invest in taking an interest in the civil war.

There are a small amount of scholars and policy-makers that argue that mediation is desired but that mediation is simply ineffective and so it does more harm than good. According to Sisk (2009, Loc. 265), this school of thought neglects the fact that third-party actors have “both the moral and common-interest mandate to become involved” and that doing something is better than doing nothing. This is one philosophical discrepancy this thesis attempts to bridge. Is it truly better to do something rather than nothing in the case of civil wars? This is a claim that has yet to be tested and validated and to which this thesis provides some empiricism.



### The Peace-Process as a Bargaining Problem

According to Sisk (2009, Loc. 893), the peace-process is formally defined as “a series of step-by-step, reciprocal, and self-reinforcing actions that are taken to steadily move a conflict away from violence toward regularized, consensual non-violent rules of interaction.” This definition implies that the peace-process takes time and Sisk (2009, Loc. 892) suggests that this is because of the fact that there are “too many players, too many issues, and too much accumulated animosity for quick, easy, imposed, or one-off solutions.” Because of this, iterated bargaining is essentially the end all be all of the peace-process during civil wars and this same successive bargaining can last for decades, as was the case in southern Sudan where talks continually broke down and only after 21 years of civil war was a solution able to become a reality.

The peace-process contains most of the same problems characteristic of any bargain. Parties involved in the peace-process can minimize negative payoffs and increase positive payoffs by collaborating. Furthermore, mutual interaction between the parties involved – usually defined as the process – and a mutually beneficial outcome must occur for there to be progress (Sisk 2009). In this view, the process and the outcome run parallel to one another. They are mutually inclusive, as the process will define the outcome and the outcome will suggest what process occurred to get there in the first place. A simplified, conceptual model is below.




Figure 3 – Sisk’s (2009) Peace-Process Model

According to Sisk (2009), the framework for analyzing the peace process is based on two premises. One, there is a life cycle of conflict escalation and de-escalation. Two, this same life cycle can be studied linearly by observing events from the initiation of violent conflict to its resolution. The bargaining problem in the peace process involves activities that occur not only at the table but beyond the table. Because of the extent of the internal political disagreement, violence and bargaining are inherently inseparable in a civil war. Holl (1993, 277), for instance, suggests that intensity and duration of violence may continue or be inordinate because the incumbent government and the rebel group values the shape of the settlement (which involves using violence as a tactic for shaping the settlement) more than the potential negative payoffs of the disagreement or lack of settlement. In order to change their expectations in this regard, it may take a substantial amount of concerted effort – and more importantly time – by the third-party mediator. A conceptual model of this is below.




Figure 4 – The Peace-Process as a Bargaining Problem

In this respect, during civil wars when the peace-process is underway, violence is used as a bargaining chip in order for one party or the other to gain a bargaining advantage in negotiations (Sisk 2009). To compound this, in some instances violence may not be calculated or strategic and thus may represent the problematic inheritance of war violence that is uncontrollable by either the incumbent government or the rebel group – as splinter organizations

may occur during the course of the civil war that engage in violence separate from the main belligerents. This is currently the case in Syria and this was the case for the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Fearon 2011). Either way, the use of violence as a tactic for shaping bargains by spoiling bargains or by using violence as leverage makes negotiations – and thus mediation's – a distinctly difficult prospect. Hence, there is a very real bargaining problem that occurs in civil wars to achieve peace.

The peace-process in terms of civil war mediation entails considerable time to de-escalate violence through stages of bargaining via negotiations. In this way, in civil wars, the peace-process in terms of mediation is seen through a lens of progresses and not successes. The question is thus begged: is the time it takes to achieve these small victories in bargaining – when taking into account the complexity of potential bargaining problems – worth the gains? This thesis does not intend to answer this question but instead intends to provide an evaluation of a tool used by policy-makers to help solve civil wars via their belief structure on this exact sentiment. For a majority of policy-makers, there is a strong perspective that doing something is better than doing nothing (Sisk 2009; Toft 2010). Is this truly the case? This thesis looks at diplomatic interventions to not only evaluate their effectiveness but to partially – even if not fully – address this broader, more philosophical question. A descriptive model is constructed in chapter two to verify whether or not there is any basis to the claim that doing something is better than doing nothing.

#### Recalling an Ambassador as a Form of Diplomatic Intervention

First and foremost, what does recalling an Ambassador entail? According to Regan and Aydin (2006, 746), the “recall of an ambassador (or the ranking representative in the country)

occurs when the intervening government calls home – either permanently or for consultations – the ranking diplomat and the recall is explicitly tied to the behavior of the state in its internal conflict.” This is usually part of a signaling process. For example, in the case of the Syrian Civil War, recalling an ambassador by a third-party actor in response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons on its people could signal that the Syrian government needs to stop before more decisive intervention – like military or economic intervention – occurs. Furthermore, recalling an ambassador could signal to the opposing side – the rebel group – that the international community no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the incumbent government which, in turn, could allow the rebel group to secure access to allies and funding.

As stated before, diplomatic interventions represent a commitment problem by third-party actors. With one foot in the door and the other foot out, third-party actors seem to want it both ways: to influence the civil war but also to be able to exit when the going gets tough. Recalling an ambassador represents this dynamic. This tool used by foreign policy-makers is intended to provide consequences in civil wars when the main belligerents do not even attempt to negotiate the phases of the bargaining peace-process and reach a settlement to end violence. These consequences, like the interventionist strategies embedded in diplomatic intervention, are meant to show commitment on one hand but also to allow for a quick exit if the third-party deems it politically pertinent. As it pertains to recalling an ambassador, it signals a threat for a more decisive intervention in the form of military or economic intervention. But, what happens when the bluff for the threat is called? With the one foot out the door approach to diplomatic intervention, when a bluff is called the third-party actor attempting to manage the conflict will back down. This lends credence to the ineffective nature of the policy.

## Conclusion

Policy-makers expect that the use of diplomatic interventions are worth it because doing something – especially when there aren't many costs associated with its use – is better than doing nothing (Sisk 2009; Toft 2010). This represents an expectation by policy-makers that there are no consequences to the use of diplomatic interventions. Furthermore, according to Regan and Aydin (2006), there have been, in total, 403 diplomatic interventions in civil wars since 1945 to 1999. Of that total, “332 were mediations, 5 were recalls of diplomatic representation, 23 involved multilateral forums, and 43 reflect offers to mediate that were not accepted by all parties” (Regan and Aydin 2006, 746). It is apparent that policy-makers have decided that diplomatic interventions play an effective role in civil wars. Because research has not focused on diplomatic interventions (Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Bercovitch and Regan 1999), current research has not established the relative effectiveness of diplomatic interventions in alleviating violence in civil wars. This thesis has decided to reconcile whether or not these ex ante expectations match the ex post reality. Reconciling policy-maker and scholar expectations with reality will provide an account of the effectiveness of diplomatic interventions in civil wars.

## **CHAPTER 2: THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS**

### Introduction

This chapter intends to model decision-making by a third-party when they determine to intervene in a civil war using decision theory. This model suggests that third-party's engage in interventions based on the expectation that doing something is better than doing nothing (Sisk 2009; Toft 2010). In the first model, this expectation is assuredly the case. However, this chapter also constructs a new model for viewing decisions by a third-party on whether or not to intervene in a civil war. This chapter purports that while the expectations in the first model of doing something is associated with no risk and high reward, the expectations in the second model of doing something is associated with high risk and very little reward. In essence, doing nothing is better than doing something. Before moving into the inner workings of these models, a discussion of what exactly a model is when using decision theory and how it can be applied as a basis for studying phenomenon will be discussed.

### Descriptive Modeling Using Expected Utility Theory

According to Morrow (1994), the key difference between game theory and decision theory is in the model being constructed. In game theory, there are two players that are separate entities in a game, attempting to outplay one another. To do this, they anticipate the chosen actions of the other player in the game (Morrow 1994; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). In decision theory, a model being constructed has only one player and the other player(s) are fixed positions. Meaning, the state of the world determines their positions. They are not allowed to anticipate or create strategies based on the other player. While decision theory has its limitations,

decision theory is as close to creating a parsimonious model as possible when it comes to modeling decisions by a third-party to intervene in a civil war. This parsimony is important. According to Morrow (1994), "... the appropriate level of complexity is a critical question in the design of any model. Set the level of complexity too high, and the results are intractable. Set the level of complexity too low, and the results are trivial." Furthermore, because an intervening third-party in a civil war is making decisions on what actions to take and the other player(s) – in this case the incumbent government and the rebel group – are unaware of this strategic process, decision theory is doubly applicable.

Most derivations of decision theory center on expected utility theory created by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). According to expected utility theory, there is a set of preferences all individuals or entities have when making decisions. For instance, a business makes a list of preferences that says: \$500 is better than \$250 and \$250 is better than \$0. Expected utility theory, to model these choices, separates the process into three concepts: actions that can be taken by the decision-maker, states of the world that the decision-maker has no control over, and consequences (or outcomes). Based on these criteria, a model for decisions can be constructed that suggests the "axiomatic preference" (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953) of the decision-maker. In essence, what decision the decision-maker is more likely to make given the potential state of the world, the possible actions that can be taken, and the consequences of those actions.

This chapter will now, using the principles above as a foundation, go into creating two models using decision and expected utility theory – one based on the current expectations and one based on the reality – that showcases the possible decisions of a third-party when intervening

in a civil war. This will define which decisions are more logically preferable by a third-party based on the decision to do something or do nothing.

### Why Expectations of Diplomatic Interventions Occur As They Do

When civil wars occur, a third-party has the available action of helping the incumbent government and rebel group come to an agreement or staying out of the civil war. However, the third-party doesn't know for sure if, based on the state of the world, the incumbent government and rebel group want to come to an agreement. The first action, therefore, is for the third-party to do something ( $A_1$ ). The second action by the third-party is to do nothing ( $A_2$ ). If the third-party selected  $A_2$ , there will be no intervention, the incumbent government and rebel group will still not reach an agreement, and the civil war will continue until it fizzles out or other factors intervene. Call this consequence  $C_2$ . If the third-party selects  $A_1$ , the outcome will depend on how the incumbent government and the rebel group respond to the intervention. If the incumbent government and rebel group want an agreement (call this  $S_1$  for the first state of the world), the assumption is that an agreement will be made. Call this consequence  $C_1$ . If a misinterpretation of the situation occurred, and the incumbent government and rebel group do not want an agreement ( $S_2$ ), then no agreement will be made and the civil war will continue. Call this consequence  $C_3$ . Table 2 arrays the actions available, the states of the world, and their consequences below.



Table 2. Current Third-Party Decision-Making Model: The Expectation

		States	
		Wants Agreement ( $S_1$ )	Wants No Agreement ( $S_2$ )
Acts	Do Something ( $A_1$ )	Incumbent government and rebel group come to the table; agreement reached ( $C_1$ )	Talks break down; no agreement; war continues ( $C_3$ )
	Do Nothing ( $A_2$ )	No brokering of agreement; no agreement; war continues ( $C_2$ )	No brokering of agreement; no agreement; war continues ( $C_2$ )

Note: The abbreviations A, S, and C stand for Actions, States of the World, and Consequences respectively. Ranking Consequences (C) follows this methodology: Preferable (P), Relatively more Preferable (R), and Indifferent (I). If P, then one consequence or outcome is more preferable to the other. If R, then one consequence or outcome is only relatively more preferable to the other. If I, then the consequence is the same as the other.

In the eyes of a third-party intervening to stop a civil war, the consequence preferences rank in this order:  $C_1PC_2IC_3$ . This suggests that an intervening third-party would rather the  $C_1$  outcome over the  $C_2$  and  $C_3$  outcome and feel indifferent between the  $C_2$  and  $C_3$  outcome. A third-party, therefore, would prefer an agreement is reached between the incumbent government and the rebel group but if an agreement is not reached doing something and failing is better than doing nothing at all. There are no risks and only gains using this conceptual framework. In order to create a formal model of this framework for better understanding, we must take the ranked consequences above and assign them numbers. This will create numerical preferences from the ordinal preferences above. Therefore,  $u(C_1) = 1$ ,  $u(C_2) = .4$ , and  $u(C_3) = .4$ . Now, if we assume that both the incumbent government and rebel group in a civil war prefer an agreement over no agreement, then we assign both states of the world a number that when summed equals 1 (states of the world are exhaustive categories that must be equal to 1). Let's assume that  $p(S_1) = .8$  and  $p(S_2) = .2$ , as any third-party that is willing to intervene makes the assumption that the

incumbent government and rebel group want or can be coerced into wanting an agreement or the third-party would not have intervened otherwise. The calculation of these expected utilities, derived according to Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1953) utility function, is below.

$$EU(A) = \sum_{\text{all } S} p(S)u[C(S,A)]$$

$$EU(A_1) = p(S_1)u(C_1) + p(S_2)u(C_3) = (.8)(1) + (.2)(.4) = .88$$

$$EU(A_2) = p(S_1)u(C_2) + p(S_2)u(C_2) = (.8)(.4) + (.2)(.4) = .32 + .08 = .4$$

This means that  $EU(A_1) > EU(A_2)$ ,  $A_1PA_2$ . In essence, doing something is preferable to doing nothing. However, the problem inherent in this model is one of complexity. Is this descriptive model truly representative of civil wars? For one, this model is geared towards termination and, when looking at termination in civil wars, the odds will always be in favor of the doing something vs. the doing nothing approach. This is because if outcomes are thought of as a dichotomy, then it can only be one or the other. In the case of civil war termination, the outcome is either civil war continues or civil war ends. However, it is important to see civil wars on a continuum with multiple layers. Meaning, adding variables to the equation are like ripples in a pond. If you make a ripple in a pond, it will echo throughout the pond's entirety. In this case, if a third-party intervenes in civil wars to manage conflict the continuum changes. This suggests a state of the world that the intervening third-party, the incumbent government, and the rebel group cannot control. The next model, then, will be proposed in this thesis to replace the old model of thinking about civil war intervention. This model takes into account a lens of duration and not of termination.

### A New Model of Expectations in Civil Wars

When civil wars occur, a third-party has the available action of both helping the incumbent government and rebel group come to an agreement or staying out of the civil war. However, the third-party doesn't know for sure if, by doing so, they are increasing tensions or lessening them. The first action is for the third-party to do something ( $A_1$ ). The second action is for the third-party to do nothing ( $A_2$ ). If the third-party selected  $A_2$ , there will be no intervention, the civil war will continue, and there will be no additive effects of an intervention – negatively or positively. Call this consequence  $C_3$ . If the third-party selects  $A_1$ , the outcome – like in the previous model – will depend on how the incumbent government and the rebel group respond to the intervention based on the state of the world in two categories. The first category represents what both the incumbent government and rebel group want and thus can control – an agreement ( $S_1$ ) or no agreement ( $S_2$ ). The second category represents the situation that both the incumbent government and the rebel group find themselves in and thus cannot control – tensions ( $s_1$ ) or no tensions ( $s_2$ ). If the incumbent government and rebel group do not want an agreement ( $S_2$ ), it does not matter whether the situation is tense or not because there will be no agreement. However, the situation could elevate to become tense as a result of any failure to reach a settlement. This will be consequence  $C_4$ . If the incumbent government and rebel group want an agreement ( $S_1$ ), the assumption is that an agreement will be made if there is no tensions ( $s_2$ ). This will be consequence  $C_1$ . However, if both sides want an agreement ( $S_1$ ) and there are tensions between the incumbent government and rebel group ( $s_1$ ) then this does not necessitate an agreement. This represents consequence  $C_2$ . Table 3 arrays the actions available, the states of the world, and their consequences in a multi-level model below.

Table 3. New Third-Party Decision-Making Model: The Reality

		States			
		Wants Agreement ( $S_1$ )		Wants No Agreement ( $S_2$ )	
		Tensions ( $s_1$ )	No Tensions ( $s_2$ )	Tensions ( $s_1$ )	No Tensions ( $s_2$ )
Acts	Do Something ( $A_1$ )	Incumbent government and rebel group come to the table; May or may not come to agreement ( $C_2$ )	Incumbent government and rebel group come to the table; agreement reached ( $C_1$ )	Talks break down; no agreement; war continues ( $C_4$ )	Talks break down; no agreement; war continues; situation becomes tense ( $C_4$ )
	Do Nothing ( $A_2$ )	No intervention; no addition or subtraction of tensions in civil war; civil war continues at current rate ( $C_3$ )	No intervention; no addition or subtraction of tensions in civil war; civil war continues at current rate ( $C_3$ )	No intervention; no addition or subtraction of tensions in civil war; civil war continues at current rate ( $C_3$ )	No intervention; no addition or subtraction of tensions in civil war; civil war continues at current rate ( $C_3$ )

Note: The abbreviations A, S, and C stand for Actions, States of the World, and Consequences respectively. Ranking Consequences (C) follows this methodology: Preferable (P), Relatively more Preferable (R), and Indifferent (I). If P, then one consequence or outcome is more preferable to the other. If R, then one consequence or outcome is only relatively more preferable to the other. If I, then the consequence is the same as the other.

According to this model, an intervening third-party should look at civil wars with much less certainty about actions taken and thus outcomes conferred by those actions. Instead of a high reward, no risk model (as was the case in the previous model), in this model the third-party finds themselves in a higher potential domain of risk. A rank of consequences from this model would follow in this order:  $C_1PC_2RC_3PC_4$ .  $C_1$  represents the biggest return for an intervening third-party in that doing something is better than doing nothing, providing a successful termination of the civil war. However,  $C_2$  neither necessarily succeeds nor necessarily fails so it is only relatively more preferable to the  $C_3$  outcome. Lastly,  $C_4$  represents outcomes in the domain of losses. Meaning, both of these outcomes are far less preferable than doing nothing at all. When

comparing the simplicity of the first model with this model, it is clear to see that intervention – based on expected utility theory and the parameters of the game constructed – is an uphill battle with more risks than rewards.

But, let's create a formal model of this framework for quantifiable understanding. First, we take the ranked consequences (ordinal preferences) above and assign them numbers to create numerical preferences. Therefore,  $u(C_1) = 1$ ,  $u(C_2) = .3$ ,  $u(C_3) = 0$ , and  $u(C_4) = -.5$ . Now, if we assume that both the incumbent government and rebel group in a civil war prefer an agreement over no agreement then we assign both states of the world a number that when summed equals 1, representing a preferable outcome. By this,  $p(S_1) = .6$  and  $p(S_2) = .4$ . Now, let's assume that the third-party, incumbent government, and rebel group all prefer no tensions over tensions. By this, using the same numbers to keep parity,  $p(s_1) = .6$  and  $p(s_2) = .4$ . The calculation of these expected utilities, derived according to Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1953) utility function, is below.

$$EU(A) = \sum_{all\ S} p(S)u[C(S, A)]$$

$$\begin{aligned} EU(A_1) &= pS_1[p(s_1)u(C_2) + p(s_2)u(C_1)] + pS_2[p(s_1)u(C_4) + p(s_2)u(C_4)] \\ &= .6 [(.6)(.3) + (.4)1] + .4 [(.6)(-.5) + (.4)(-.5)] \\ &= .6 [(.18) + (.4)] + .4 [(-.3) + (-.20)] \\ &= (.6)(.22) + (.4)(-.23) \\ &= .132 + (-.092) \\ &= .132 - .092 \\ &= .04 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
EU(A_2) &= pS_1[p(s_1)u(C_3) + p(s_2)u(C_3)] + pS_2[p(s_1)u(C_3) + p(s_2)u(C_3)] \\
&= .6 [(.6)(0) + (.4)(0)] + .4 [(.6)(0) + (.4)(0)] \\
&= .6 [0 + 0] + .4 [0 + 0] \\
&= .6 + .4 \\
&= 1
\end{aligned}$$

This means that  $EU(A_2) > EU(A_1)$ ,  $A_2PA_1$ . In essence, in terms of third-party intervention, doing nothing is preferable to doing something in civil wars. In fact, the probabilistic threshold for a third-party intervention to provide utility – meaning, that an incumbent government and rebel group want an agreement and can reach one even with no underlying tension in the conflict – suggests that a third-party intervention will only payoff or provide limited utility. This suggests that even when a third-party is successful in its decision to intervene, it will be short-lived or other factors have the potential to sway the incumbent government and rebel group back to fighting. Below is a sensitivity analysis (Figure 5) of the numerical preferences created in the formal model above.




Figure 5 - Probability of Third-Party Intervention Being Successful When Incumbent Government and Rebel Group Want an Agreement by Utility of Decision to Intervene

But, how can these models help us understand third-party diplomatic interventions? First and foremost, by modeling expectations of an intervening third-party, there can be an understanding of why actions in civil wars come to fruition. The way that a third-party creates strategies on when to intervene is based on fallacious expectations when compared to a more complex multilevel model. Thus, the scope of the thesis is based on a solid foundation when it suggests that diplomatic interventions should not help but rather hurt when used in civil wars. In the next chapter, an examination of civil war literature will provide a more nuanced understanding of where these models fit in the literature.

## **CHAPTER 3: ASSUMPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS, AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

### Introduction

In order to assess whether Fearon's (2002) assumption regarding decisive victory conditions is established in civil war duration literature, it will be important to view literature on civil war duration generally. More specifically, it will be important to view the core assumptions in these studies to showcase trends in duration literature. Next, it will be important to discuss how variation in violence across civil wars has been explained and whether or not duration has been a core focus throughout the literature in explaining variation in violence across civil wars.

In the following sections, literature on what authorities have to say regarding civil wars will be examined. Then, the main discussion will shift its focus to look at what major authorities have to say on civil war duration and intensity (variations in violence).

### What is a Civil War?

While there are many complexities associated with the concept of a civil war, there are inherent definitional competencies across the literature. Meaning, there are specific qualities that characterize most civil wars and can provide, at the very least, some semblance of organization for the subject under study.

According to Gersovitz (2013, 160), civil wars are "politically organized, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country principally among large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical force within the country." This suggests that before the civil war initiated the incumbent



government was in control of their geopolitical space. It also suggests that civil wars must be based in large-scale violence, as war usually suggests, and sustained for a specific duration with a politically organized goal by those challenging the incumbent government.

According to Fearon (2007, 5), a civil war is "a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies." This definitional classification is useful in that it suggests that the rebel group and incumbent government do not want to settle for anything less than substantive change within the given geopolitical space. This substantive change can either be in the form of pressuring the incumbent government to modify policies or in taking complete control, loosely dubbed power by Fearon (2007). In this definition (Fearon 2007), there is no real threshold in a civil war regarding the level of violence, contrary to Gersovitz (2013). This is problematic. According to Fearon's (2007) schema, minor violent uprisings and protests that have organization but have no real ability to challenge the incumbent government could be considered a civil war. Despite this, Fearon (2007) provides a specific aspect that must be accounted for: in order to be considered a civil war, there must be a goal in mind by the incumbent government's rival – in this case the rebel group.

According to Sambanis (2004), most definitions of a civil war will fall short of their intended objective. This is not because there are not core competencies for what constitutes a civil war. Rather, because in order to define civil wars the lines blur between coding, operationalization, and the definition itself. These concepts are usually separate in any proposed research but are, according to Sambanis (2004), seemingly impossible to separate in the case of

civil wars. Sambanis (2004) does not suggest that a definition for a civil war is not possible but rather that any definition will need to be clearly delineated and understood through this lens.

In doing this, Sambanis (2004) looks at the “cumulative death criteria” that is used in most, if not all, established research on civil wars. The cumulative death criteria proposes that there is a threshold of violence in civil conflict that, when eventually reached, will determine whether or not a civil conflict has become a civil war. According to Sambanis (2004, 818), “the cumulative death criteria introduces some problems” in the form of three questions that must be addressed by all civil war researchers: “What level of violence qualifies as a civil war? Should this be an absolute or relative level? Should we only count battle deaths or also civilian deaths? (Sambanis 2004, 820).” Current empirical research focuses on a cumulative death criteria of 1,000 battle deaths (Sambanis 2004). After this threshold is reached, a civil conflict becomes a civil war.

Kalyvas (2001) also proposes a definition of civil wars. Instead of suggesting that civil wars are similar across time, however, he suggests that civil wars should be segregated into old and new. According to Kalyvas (2001), old civil wars are about grievances and new civil wars are about greed. A grievance is a discrepancy between the incumbent government and rebel group that has reached the point of violence. Greed suggests that the civil war has been stimulated by a third-party in order to gain some advantage (economic or otherwise) from having instigated the civil conflict in the first place (Kalyvas 2001; Fearon 2011). According to Kalyvas (2001, 102), an old civil war is about a grievance, has broad popular support, and controlled violence. Also according to Kalyvas (2001, 102), a new civil war is about greed, does not have broad popular support, and has gratuitous violence. In this view, to be considered a civil war a

researcher must look at levels of violence – reminiscent of the cumulative death criteria (Sambanis 2004) – but, most importantly, whether or not there is popular support.

Kalyvas (2001) suggests that it is not possible to delineate core competencies of civil wars throughout long time periods because there are temporal effects that will dictate what a civil war is in one context and environment and what it is in another. While the reasoning presented here is unique and provides a unique understanding, Kalyvas (2001) provides no empirical verification behind this logic and instead provides a subjective evaluation of the old vs. new civil war dichotomy. Along with Gersovitz (2013), Fearon (2007), and Sambanis (2004), Kalyvas (2001) does, however, provide some core competencies to construct a loose understanding for what constitutes a civil war. Kalyvas suggests that a civil war can be distinguished by its motivations (grievance vs. greed), level of popular support, and levels of violence. In doing this, Kalyvas (2001) differentiates himself from previous authors in suggesting that popular support is a defining factor behind identifying what is and is not a civil war.

According to much of the literature, civil wars are characterized by their domesticity, large scale violence, volatility, popular support, and a political goal by both the incumbent government and rebel group. Furthermore, the rebel group must be a legitimate challenger to the incumbent government (Gerosovitz 2013; Fearon 2007; Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2001). Domesticity is defined as whether or not violent transgressions occur within the territorial or geopolitical boundaries of the country. Large scale violence is based on the cumulative death criteria. A high amount of casualties during the conflict – usually an author dependent numerical judgment – will determine the threshold of when a civil war has been reached. This number in

traditional research has been 1,000 battle deaths (Sambanis 2004). Volatility suggests that there was a substantive issue between the incumbent government and rebel group that led to violence and unstable conditions (Gerosovitz 2013; Fearon 2007). Popular support defined as whether or not the challenger to the incumbent government poses a direct and ever-present threat to the incumbent government's popular legitimacy (Kalyvas 2001). Meaning, could the rebel group be a legitimate alternative to the incumbent government? A political goal is the motivation behind the civil war. Was the civil war for power or pressuring the government to change its policies (Fearon 2007)?

While many of these definitional competencies may not be able to be objectively measured, this is a starting point for what constitutes a civil war that will be elucidated on in more depth in the data and methods section.

### Civil War Duration

There is a great deal of literature on the subject of civil war duration. In this thesis, a discussion of previous academic work will be broad in its scope in order to showcase academic trends and core assumptions in the literature. First and foremost, civil war duration literature can be segregated into three types. One focuses on economic arguments and another focuses on politically-oriented arguments. Lastly, there is a group of arguments in civil war duration literature that centers itself on bargaining problems. In essence, that if bargaining was successful the length of a civil war would not be as long.

First and foremost, there is a wealth of economic arguments in civil war duration literature. This literature review will focus on Fearon (2003) and Collier, Hoeffler, and

Soderbom (2004). Both of these arguments suggest similar premises facilitated in opposing processes. Fearon (2003) states that rebel access to contraband finance, such as mineral wealth and opiates, is a significant conditional factor for the length of civil wars. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004) state that the increased price of key commodities drives the length of civil wars. Both of these arguments deal with the fact that there are resources unique to that region that will extend the length of a civil war. However, Fearon (2003) views contraband finance as lessening the ability of the incumbent government to terminate a conflict quickly and sufficiently. It focuses specifically on the rebel group gaining an advantage that makes them strategically equal. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004) view civil wars as a method to destabilize the state so that external actors can gain economic advantages from their instability. At the core of this argument, external actors must be able to gain some type of advantage from the civil war in order to have an inherent interest in prolonging it. According to Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004), the interest lies in the price of the key commodity of that region.

The key difference between these arguments is in their scope. Fearon's (2003) argument focuses primarily on the interaction between the incumbent government and rebel group, whereas Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004) focus primarily on the interaction between the third-party actor(s) and the incumbent government and rebel group. A common thread between each of these arguments, besides their economic orientation, is that nothing is allowing the incumbent government and rebel group to have an advantage over the other. Even in the case of contraband finances, the advantage the rebel group is receiving only places it on an even playing field with the incumbent government, allowing for no overall strategic advantage. In this view, a civil war becomes a stalemate and this stalemate is responsible for longer durations.

Next, there is a set of arguments represented by Montalvo and Querol (2010) and Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) that says that political realities are responsible for the length of a civil war. Montalvo and Querol (2010) state that ethnic polarization increases the political commitment of both the incumbent government and the rebel group in the given civil war. In turn, this is why ethnically polarized regions that are engaged in civil war are associated with longer civil war lengths. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) also believe there are political realities that condition the length of a civil war. In their perspective, interstate rivalries against the incumbent government are responsible for the length of a civil war. In this view, aid from the interstate rival to the rebel group is enough – even if it never reaches the rebel group – to change the rebel group’s calculation of victory. This then leads the rebel group to reshape the conditions for a settlement with the incumbent government. Both Montalvo and Querol (2010) and Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) represent arguments where the politics of the region will define the civil war conflict environment, especially as it relates to the length of a civil war. The key difference between their arguments is in the internal vs. external political dynamic. For Montalvo and Querol (2010), endogenous (internal) political realities are responsible for the length of a civil war. For Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005), exogenous (external) political realities are responsible for the length of a civil war. What both of these arguments have in common, however, is that these political realities increase the likelihood that the incumbent government and rebel group do not have an advantage over the other and thus reach a stalemate. This stalemate is the specific condition responsible for the length of a civil war, even if there are differing ways to achieve this specific condition.

Lastly, there is a set of arguments that focuses on bargaining as the major point of civil war length. This will be represented by the arguments of Thyne (2012) and Ohmura (2011). Thyne (2012) views civil wars as occurring for a longer duration because the flow of information between rebels and the incumbent government is limited. When the incumbent government and rebel group come to the bargaining table, they are unwilling to commit to a settlement because both the incumbent government and rebel group are attempting to gauge the shape of the settlement outcome. When they cannot gauge the shape of the settlement accurately, expectations are not met and a bargaining problem occurs, showcased by the fact that no settlement has been agreed to or reached. What follows is a stalemate between the incumbent government and the rebel group. According to Thyne (2012), this results in the increased length of civil wars. Where Thyne (2012) focuses on the settlement phase of the bargaining process as a bargaining problem, Ohmura (2011) focuses on the enforcement phase of these settlements. Ohmura (2011) does not view the failure to reach a settlement as an inherent problem in civil war length but rather the lack of enforcement behind these settlements when a settlement is reached. This view suggests that diplomatic agreements are not enforced by third-party actors and so they do not hold real weight among the incumbent government and rebel group. They then are broken subsequently and a stalemate once again recurs, resulting in the increased conditions for the length of a civil war. In the context of Thyne's (2012) and Ohmura's (2011) argument, bargaining problems – whether in terms of reaching a settlement or being able to enforce a settlement – are responsible for the length of a civil war.

The studies here showcase Fearon's (2002) assertion that if conditions are not set to advantage one side over the other then a stalemate will occur – and decisive victory cannot be

achieved once this stalemate occurs. What does this tell us about civil war duration? First and foremost, according to civil war duration literature, stalemates between the incumbent government and the rebel group are associated with longer civil war. Secondly, stalemates occur when neither the incumbent government nor the rebel group has an overall strategic advantage over the other.

Regan and Aydin (2006): Third-Party Interventions, Duration, and Violence in Civil Wars

This thesis takes substantial guidance from a study done by Regan and Aydin (2006) titled “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars.” This study was used as a template and so it must be discussed with a level of detail and deliberation atypical of literature reviews. It is important to do so and therefore the literature review goes against its typical, formal paradigm in this respect. In this section, there is a summary synopsis of Regan and Aydin's (2006) study. Following this, there will be a detailed review of claims made by Regan and Aydin (2006) and differences between their research and the research proposed in this thesis.

First and foremost, Regan and Aydin (2006) looked at the effect third-party military, economic, and diplomatic interventions have on civil war duration. They suggest that third-party military and economic interventions tend to extend expected durations rather than shorten them, whereas diplomatic interventions tend to dramatically reduce the expected duration of a civil war when used in conjunction with military and economic interventions or more complex strategies involving timing. According to Regan and Aydin (2006), “diplomatic interventions have their greatest effect at the time they are implemented, and this influence declines at a decelerating rate.” Furthermore, “diplomatic interventions increase the likelihood that a civil war ends in the next month, but as the period of time from the point of the diplomatic effort increases, the effect



of the diplomatic effort decreases.” In essence, concerted, consistent, and continuous effort by the third-party actor – coupled with quick and adaptable timing of that effort – can dramatically lessen the expected length of a civil war.

This poses the question: to what extent are complex strategies and concerted effort by third-party actors possible to engage in during a civil war? Complex strategies by external actors suggest perfect information and no commitment problems. This is an ideal situation but it is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, Regan and Aydin’s (2006) core argument is that military and economic interventions by third-party actors are not effective at reducing the duration of a civil war, according to previous research, but that when used in conjunction with diplomatic interventions they become effective. This leads to the question posed in this research: to what extent are diplomatic interventions effective when used alone without other interventionist strategies? This is an aspect to interventionist strategies by third-party actors in civil wars that has yet to be tested and to which this thesis intends to provide a comprehensive analysis.

Regan and Aydin (2006) also do not provide a causal logic behind why this model is accurate in going against established civil war duration literature. In this study, economic and military interventions increase civil war duration. According to decisive victory conditions (Fearon 2002), this does not logically follow, as economic and military interventions advantage the incumbent government or the rebel group. Also according to civil war duration literature, diplomatic interventions do not give either side an advantage and therefore should be associated with longer civil wars. This thesis attempts to bridge this gap.

Furthermore, a policy meant to decrease violence cannot be deemed effective till violence has been taken into account. Duration in this argument is assumed to increase violence over time. Is this truly the case in civil wars? This is another aspect to third-party interventions that needs to be tested in order for a conclusion to be made on the effectiveness of any interventionist policy.

As is evident, Regan and Aydin's (2006) work leaves more questions than answers on the particular subjects of diplomatic intervention, duration, and violence in civil war.

### What is Violence in Civil Wars and How Do We Study It?

"It may be an intuitive concept..." but in academic study "...violence is a conceptual minefield" (Kalyvas 2006, 19). There are many competencies of violence for many different fields – some which even extend so far as to consider mental abuse a form of violence. This thesis will take a very specific definition for violence that only takes violence of the physical kind into account. According to Kalyvas (2006, 19), at its most basic level "violence is the deliberate infliction of [physical] harm on people." Part of this definition takes into account the methodical, specific, and purposeful nature of individuals or groups that use violence in civil wars.

Using Kalyvas' (2006) definition as a template, let us explore what civil war violence is and is not in the literature and in the context of this thesis. In civil wars, it is nearly impossible to determine when the incumbent government or the rebel group purposefully targeted civilians on the battlefield or when they were accidentally caught in the cross-hairs. Violence is therefore separated into two categories for study: selective and indiscriminate (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007). According to Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007), selective violence is the purposeful

infliction of harm done on combatants and indiscriminate violence is the purposeful infliction of harm done on noncombatants and combatants – as its namesake implies – indiscriminately. This thesis focuses on the former (selective) and not the latter (indiscriminate) archetype of violence.

Violence in civil wars can also be indirect. There are cases of civil war or internal conflict where famine or other indirect forms of violence have occurred, like in Sudan. These forms of violence will also not be taken into account in this thesis. Because of this, there is certainly an argument or a subject for future development that suggests that while diplomatic interventions may not be effective at ending selective violence they may be truly effective at ending indiscriminate or indirect violence. This thesis, however, will not delve into this particular subject matter as there are data limitations in this exact area.

Now that violence in civil wars has been delineated the question is posed: should violence be studied part of or apart from civil war? Kalyvas (2006) states that when studying violence in civil wars it is important to study violence and war as separate and distinct phenomenon. For Kalyvas (2006, 20), “Obviously war causes violence. However, a considerable amount of violence in civil wars lacks conventional military utility and does not take place on the battlefield.” Unlike Kalyvas (2006), this thesis does not separate or treat violence and war separately. All war is violence but not all violence is war. One is impossible without the other and so they are mutually constituted when the threshold for war has been reached – which is the case when an internal civil conflict becomes a civil war. Kalyvas (2006, 21) also suggests that the same conflict can “exhibit substantial variation in violence,” which he believes is also a reason why violence should be “analytically decoupled” from war. While this thesis does agree that variation in violence exists in war, this thesis does not concern itself with decoupling

violence and war because, as mentioned earlier, the sum total of studying war and violence concurrently provides more holistic understanding than the separation and study of its parts.

Lastly, violence in peace is different than violence in war. The main difference between violence in peace and violence in war is based in the manner of commitment by the incumbent government and rebel group and therefore the potential degree (Kalyvas 2006). In peace, violence is used sparingly as a tactic because the commitment to war is shaky and thus the degree of violence attempts to straddle the line enough to make full use of violence but not carry over to war. In war, especially civil war, violence is used often as a tactic because the commitment to war is final and thus the degree of violence can be implemented unlimitedly.

This thesis takes the view that selective violence in civil wars is a deliberate and discriminate act perpetrated on the main belligerents by the main belligerents to inflict harm on combatants for the purpose of winning a conflict, taking from Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007) in this regard.

### Variation in Violence in Civil Wars

Most literature on the subject of variation in violence in civil wars tends to focus on either variation in violence across civil wars or variation in violence within a civil war. This thesis looks at variation in violence across civil wars using aggregate-level data. The difference between these two approaches is in their level of analysis. Variation in violence across civil wars goes from the general to the specific, whereas variation in violence within a civil war goes from the specific to the general. Variation in violence across civil wars takes a statistical account of common and key variables throughout civil wars regarding violence. Whereas, variation in

violence within a civil war looks at specific cases of civil wars and thus does not necessarily view the common thread applicable to all civil wars but just those under study. The following approaches will be represented by Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007). Kalyvas (2006) represents the variation in violence within a civil war approach to establish his theoretical model. Weinstein (2007) represents the variation in violence across civil wars approach to establish his theoretical model.

At the base of his argument, Kalyvas (2006) separates civil war violence into being about information and control. In this, he creates a generalized theory about violence in civil wars from the Greek Civil War of 1946. Depending on the relative amount of information and control in a given region by the incumbent government and the rebel group, a different mode of violence will be selected (selective or indiscriminate). This choice is based on a cost-benefit analysis. When Kalyvas (2006) tested his specific theory devised from the Greek Civil War of 1946 across civil wars, only two major aspects to his theoretical modeling carried over. First, violence in a civil war is a functional condition of previous feuds between the local populace. Secondly, the degree of control by either the incumbent government or rebel group will determine the mode of violence selected. Kalyvas' (2006) model came from examining variation in violence within a civil war and then extending it to apply to all civil wars, contrary to the next major authority on the subject of variation in violence in civil wars.

Contrary to Kalyvas (2006), Weinstein (2007) states that the key factor to variation in violence across civil wars is based on the conditions of recruitment for personnel. Weinstein (2007) believes that the factors associated with raising or lowering barriers to either the incumbent government or rebel group in a civil war will "shape the types of individuals who

elect to participate, the sorts of organizations that emerge to fight civil wars, and the strategies of violence that develop in practice.” In essence, variation in violence across civil wars is the product of the main type of people who join the organizations that compose them. Weinstein’s (2007) findings suggest that rebel groups emerging from regions with natural resources or external support by third-party actors tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence, whereas rebel groups that grow without many resources are responsible for far fewer abuses, employing violence “selectively and strategically.”

### Time and Violence: The Unconnected Connection

The studies reviewed here, while having been particularly acute at guiding this thesis from a theoretical standpoint, do not examine the effect duration has on variations in violence across civil wars. This thesis intends to bridge this gap. But, first and foremost, the question must be raised: why is this connection important to the study of civil war duration and civil war violence? In order to answer this question, a summary synopsis of the literature above and the expectations that have been created as a result must be examined.

First and foremost, a core assumption made by policy-makers in their use of diplomatic interventions is that doing something is better than doing nothing. In essence, using diplomatic interventions is better than not using them. Secondly, using diplomatic interventions in civil wars will help terminate them or, at the very least, lessen their length. Thirdly, by lessening the length of a civil war, one can lessen the selective violence (or battle-related deaths) impacting the civil war. This goes to reason because if selective violence is assumed by policy-makers to be normally distributed throughout a civil war conflict then it operates on a bell-shaped curve. This would allow for the possibility that selective violence in a civil war could be stemmed – from a

probabilistic perspective – at any point in the conflict if only the proper and effective policy was implemented.

But, what do these expectations mean for the study of civil war duration and selective violence? Because this accepted logic has been so widely accepted, it has not yet been challenged and thus the effect time has on violence generally in civil wars has not been analyzed. Furthermore, because scholars tend to separate the study of major phenomena in civil war literature, there has not been work that has made an attempt to link these major phenomena together. This brings its own batch of problems. While “analytically decoupling” concepts from one another for study is important for the foundations of understanding, as Kalyvas (2006) suggests, it is also important to analytically “re-couple” these parts back together again for more holistic understanding when necessary. Sometimes, as this thesis suggests, there is an opportunity towards a synthesis that is greater than the sum total of its parts.

### Conclusion

There are plenty of intricacies associated with civil wars and so it is typical for civil war literature to specify terms accordingly. A review of assumptions, expectations, and civil war duration and civil war violence literature does exactly that. First off, the literature has provided a template for what constitutes a civil war (Gerosovitz 2013; Fearon 2007; Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2001). Second, it has provided a common theme to why civil wars last as long as they do, throughout the many structural arguments presented (Thyne 2012; Ohmura 2011; Montalvo and Querol 2010; Regan and Aydin 2006; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Fearon 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). Third, it has explained why current studies on the topic of third-party diplomatic interventions have failed to reconcile statistical analysis with this

common theme throughout civil war duration literature. Fourth, this review has examined what civil war violence is and is not (Kalyvas 2001), examining competing views for causes of violence in civil wars (Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006) and providing an example of a key unconnected connection – time – that must be discussed in relation to the phenomenon of violence in civil wars. Based on the literary and conceptual framework from Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3, it is apparent that there are some gaps that must be reconciled for future civil war study. In the chapter below, the theoretical and methodological framework for accomplishing this will be discussed.



## CHAPTER 4: FRAMEWORK

### Theoretical Framework

The first hypothesis proposed in this thesis concerns the effect that third-party diplomatic interventions have on civil war duration, according to scholarly expectations.

*H<sub>1</sub> – In a comparison of civil wars, a higher amount of diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor will be associated with longer civil war lengths in months.*

In this view, diplomatic intervention adds another variable to the civil war that wasn't there beforehand. If certain factors are already guaranteed in a civil war, like contraband finances for instance (Fearon 2003), then the end state is guaranteed to take a specific length of time. By adding more factors to the equation, especially ones that do not provide an advantage to either the incumbent government or the rebel group, there is a possible additive consequence that changes the end state farther into the future. This occurs through an inevitable stalemate between the incumbent government and the rebel group (Fearon 2002). Variables that do not provide a decisive advantage will be associated with a longer length and a longer duration in any conflict – specifically wreaking havoc on civil wars because of their fragility (Hegre 2013).

This hypothesis is well represented by the literature and thus represents scholarly expectations on the effect diplomatic interventions have on the length of a civil war. According to Fearon's (2002) established assumption on decisive victory conditions, if diplomatic interventions do nothing to change the conditions of stalemate for the incumbent government and the rebel group then the ex ante expectation is that diplomatic interventions should be associated with civil wars of increased lengths. This goes against policy-maker expectations, however.

Policy-makers have used diplomatic interventions 403 times from 1945 to 1999 to terminate or, at the very least, decrease the length of a civil war. The next hypothesis represents the side of international policy-makers:

*H<sub>2</sub> – In a comparison of civil wars, a higher amount of diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor will be associated with shorter civil war lengths in months.*

Furthermore, scholar and policy-maker expectations suggest that selective violence intensity – or violence that occurs by the main belligerents on the main belligerents per month – emerges in a mostly consistent and distributed manner throughout civil wars. Because of this, civil wars that endure for longer periods should be associated with more selective violence intensity. Meaning, increasing violence should be associated with increasing lengths in civil wars in a direct relationship. Thus, the third hypothesis is as follows:

*H<sub>3</sub> – In a comparison of civil wars, a longer civil war length in months will be associated with a higher amount of selective violence intensity in a civil war.*

Lastly, if longer civil wars are associated with a high amount of selective violence intensity then the distribution of selective violence intensity across civil wars should be associated with a bell-shaped curve. Based on policy-maker and scholar expectations, selective violence intensity in a civil war occurs in a normal distribution throughout the length of a civil war. This is why diplomatic interventions to terminate or decrease the length of a civil war are seen to be so effective. Because of the time needed for diplomatic interventions to be successful, selective violence in civil wars must operate on a bell-shaped curve and be normally distributed throughout the length of a civil war in order for diplomatic interventions to lessen selective

violence effectively. In essence, if the frequency of a majority of civil war conflict months are represented by a low amount of violence then the probabilistic likelihood that a policy would have to decrease violence goes down. This is primarily because on a normal distribution there will be more cases of moderate to high intensity and therefore there will be more chances to affect the distribution of violence and therefore engage in policies to domesticate violence. Thus, the last hypothesis is:

*H<sub>4</sub> – Selective violence intensity in civil wars will be normally distributed throughout civil war lengths and thus operate on a bell-shaped curve.*

The expectation of policy-makers regarding diplomatic interventions is that diplomatic interventions provide a peaceful resolution to war and violence or, at the very least, lessen the intensity of this selective violence over time. These hypotheses will test whether these expectations match the reality.

#### Data and Methods

Using this theoretical framework, this study will use quantitative analysis to observe the independent variables relationship to the dependent variables in three hypotheses.

In the first and second hypotheses, the dependent variable will be the length of a civil war conflict in months (*time, time*) and the independent variable will be diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor (*dipcount, diplomatic*). In the third hypothesis, the dependent variable will be the total amount of battle deaths (*intensity*) and the independent variable will be the length of a civil war conflict in months (*time*). The first and second hypotheses will observe the effect that diplomatic interventions by a third-party actor (*diplomatic*) have had on the duration or length of

civil wars (*time*) from 1945 to 1999. The third hypothesis will observe the effect that the length of a civil war in months (*time*) has had on the amount of battle deaths in a civil war (*intensity*) from 1945 to 1999. For the three hypotheses proposed, a linear regression will be used.

These hypotheses will be broken into three models. The first model, represented by Table 4 and Table 5, looks at the relationship between third-party diplomatic interventions and civil war duration. This model will be used to showcase the effect diplomatic interventions have on civil war duration in an isolated viewing with a number of controls specific to the quality of the diplomatic intervention, including: the timing of the diplomatic intervention, how long the diplomatic intervention lasted, whether it was unilateral, whether it was successful, and whether the diplomatic intervention was done by the US or internationally by the UN (Table 4). The purpose of Table 5 in the first model is to look at the effect duration has on diplomatic interventions in order to delineate possible endogeneity and determine confounding variable problems. Table 5 will include the same controls as Table 4 but will operate with civil war duration as the independent variable and the amount of diplomatic interventions as the dependent variable.

The second model, represented by Table 6, will look at the holistic relationship between third-party diplomatic interventions and civil war duration with typical civil war duration controls. This will determine the relative significance of diplomatic interventions as an indicator of civil war lengths from 1945 to 1999. These controls will include: whether the civil war was an ethno-religious conflict, whether gemstones or opiates were involved in the conflict, the total amount of economic, military and diplomatic interventions that occurred in the conflict, GDP, whether or not the intervention was an economic intervention, whether or not the intervention

was a military intervention, whether or not there were opposing third-party interventions in the same civil war conflict, and the size of the opposition in the civil war.

The last and final model, represented by Table 7, will look at the relationship between civil war duration and violence. With typical civil war literature controls, those used in the second model, there will be an analysis of whether or not policy-maker and scholarly expectations regarding duration's effect on the intensity of violence (battle deaths) matches the reality.

The variables *time*, *diplomatic*, and *intensity* will be drawn from a data set developed by Regan and Aydin for their paper "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," dubbed "Complex Interventions Data Set." The variables *time* and *dipcount* will be drawn from a data set developed by Regan, Frank, and Aydin labelled: "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset." Both datasets incorporate over 150 civil wars from 1945 to 1999, 101 of which had outside interventions. However, the two datasets differ in their unit of analysis and their combined use will allow for a robustness check. The "Complex Interventions Data Set" utilizes the conflict month as the unit of analysis whereas the "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset" utilizes the civil war as the unit of analysis. *Dipcount* and *diplomatic* will be coded as the total amount of third-party diplomatic interventions. The variables *time* and *time* will be coded as the total amount of months in the civil war. The variable *intensity* will be coded as the average number of battle deaths (selective violence) per month over the course of the conflict done by the main belligerents on the main belligerents in the civil war.

### Definitions and Operationalization

The variable *diplomatic* and *dipcount* will be operationalized via a definition originally proposed and created by Regan, Frank, and Aydin (2012). According to Regan, Frank, and Aydin (2012), third-party diplomatic interventions – among others – are mostly composed of negotiated agreements among rebel groups and the incumbent government with the assistance of one or more organizational entities. This assistance must either come in the form of mediation or international forums. Operationally, "mediation is a non-coercive, nonviolent, and non-binding form of intervention (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2012)." Those engaging in this form of diplomacy are entering into the conflict resolution process to change or influence the outcome. The mediator can also represent a state or a non-state actor. Operationally, an international forum is a formally organized meeting of representatives from several countries, where the outcome is similarly non-binding – this was dubbed earlier international mediation. Other aspects of diplomatic intervention measured in this variable include the recall of an ambassador or an offer to mediate. The recall of an ambassador (measured as the ranking representative in the country by the third-party) occurs when the intervening third-party calls their ranking diplomat back to their country of origin. Offers to mediate represent an explicit offer from a third party that was not accepted by at least one of the warring parties. They are recorded on the date of the offer. These variables will be coded as the total amount of diplomatic interventions in each civil war.

The variable, *time* and *time*, representing the length of a civil war, was originally operationalized by the University of Michigan's Correlates of War (COW) project. Regan (2006; 2012) has amended this operationalization. In order to be considered a civil war, the conflict had to occur within an internationally or generally recognized state, produce at least two hundred

deaths per year, involve the incumbent government as an active and willing participant, and operationally effective fighting from both the incumbent government and rebel group (Regan 2006). These variables will be coded as the civil war length in months.

The last and final variable, *intensity*, represents the selective violence dynamic. It is difficult to ascertain battle-related deaths in civil wars, as rebel groups may or may not wear identifying clothing and thus it may be more difficult for battle death reports to distinguish combatant fatalities from civilian collateral damage. As such, the variable *intensity* was operationalized on value-judgments from reported battle deaths (Singer 1983; Sarkees 2010) according to previous operationalization done by the Correlates of War (COW) project.

#### Methodological Limitations

The major methodological limitations in this thesis are an untimely sampling frame and its predictive capability. First and foremost, because the sampling frame only draws from civil wars from 1945 to 1999, there is a question as to the external validity of the research and policy implications presented here. There has been over a decade worth of civil wars since 1999 and this could change the trend substantially. Furthermore, there is the problematic hindrance of generational effects. Are civil wars across generations all similar? This is not necessarily the case, as Kalyvas' (2001) suggests through his old vs. new civil war dichotomy. Last, and most importantly, this thesis is retrospective and not predictive. This is both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, it provides insight into civil wars with as little assumptions about the world as possible – predictions need many more assumptions because there is much less absolutes in the data continuum. On the other hand, as mentioned a few sentences earlier, this creates additive consequences regarding its external validity.

## CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

### Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors and Civil War Length

Both the first and second statistical models, according to Table 4 and Table 6, showed that third-party diplomatic interventions were a significant indicator of civil war duration.

In Table 4, diplomatic intervention was isolated and aspects relating to potential endogeneity problems were controlled for to ensure the validity and robustness of the results and thus the analysis in this thesis. To this end, the independent variable, the amount of diplomatic interventions, was included with the following variables: whether the diplomatic intervention was successful, whether the diplomatic intervention was unilateral, whether there were opposing third-parties engaging in diplomatic interventions, how long the diplomatic intervention lasted, what month the diplomatic intervention occurred, and whether the diplomatic intervention was done by the UN or the U.S. Despite these controls, diplomatic interventions were a significant indicator of civil war duration at the 0.001 level with a coefficient of 1.02. This signifies that for every one diplomatic intervention in a civil war there is a one month increase in the conflict. This one to one ratio suggests a direct, positive relationship. Furthermore, the timing of the diplomatic intervention was significant at the 0.001 level, suggesting that Regan and Aydin (2006) were correct in stating that complex strategies are an important aspect of diplomatic interventions. The question of exactly how possible these complex strategies are to engage in, however, remains to be determined.



Table 4. Linear Regression – An Isolated Look at Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors in Civil Wars from 1945 to 1999

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable Length of Civil War Conflict in Months
<i>Amount of Diplomatic Interventions</i>	1.02*** (0.292)
<i>Timing</i>	0.862*** (0.021)
<i>Unilateral</i>	-7.50 (6.53)
<i>Duration</i>	-0.020 (0.063)
<i>Success</i>	-2.95 (4.90)
<i>UN</i>	5.26 (5.83)
<i>US</i>	-15.4 (7.30)
<i>Intercept</i>	26.1** (7.96)
<i>Observations</i>	365
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.840

Notes. Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001 in two-tailed tests.

In Table 5, duration was a significant indicator of the amount of diplomatic interventions at the 0.001 level. However, the coefficient of 0.032 is marginal. When the intercept is 0, this signifies that for every one month increase in a civil war there is a 0.032 amount of diplomatic interventions –meaning that approximately every thirty-one months there is one diplomatic intervention. Look below for the formula derivative when the intercept is 0.

$$\text{Diplomatic Intervention}(s) = 0.032 * \text{Month}(s) \text{ of Civil War}$$

$$\text{Diplomatic Intervention}(s) = 0.032 * \mathbf{32.25} \text{ Month}(s) \text{ of Civil War}$$

$$\text{Diplomatic Intervention}(s) = 1$$

This derivative suggests that duration's effect on diplomatic interventions is not necessarily nonexistent but rather that the impact of its effect – while significant – is negligible.

Table 5. Linear Regression – Controlling for Endogeneity: Looking at Durations effect on Diplomatic Interventions

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable Amount of Diplomatic Interventions
<i>Length of Civil Wars in Months</i>	0.032*** (0.0092)
<i>Timing</i>	-0.0037 (0.0090)
<i>Unilateral</i>	-0.88 (1.16)
<i>Duration</i>	-0.017 (0.011)
<i>Success</i>	1.64 (0.870)
<i>UN</i>	-0.824 (1.03)
<i>US</i>	-4.59*** (1.27)
<i>Intercept</i>	12.4*** (1.27)
<i>Observations</i>	365
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.163

Notes. Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  in two-tailed tests.

In Table 6, diplomatic interventions by third-party actors were included with typical civil war duration literature controls, including: whether the civil war was an ethno-religious conflict, whether gemstones or opiates were involved in the conflict, the total amount of economic, military and diplomatic interventions that occurred in the conflict, GDP, whether or not the intervention was an economic intervention, whether or not the intervention was a military intervention, whether or not there were opposing third-party interventions in the same civil war conflict, and the size of the opposition in the civil war. Despite these typical civil war duration

literature controls, diplomatic interventions by third-party actors were a significant indicator of civil war duration at the 0.001 level. With a coefficient of 32.3, when the intercept is 0, this signifies that for every one diplomatic intervention there is approximately 32 months of civil war conflict.

Table 6. Linear Regression – A Look at Diplomatic Interventions by Third-Party Actors in Civil Wars from 1945 to 1999 *with Typical Civil War Duration Literature Controls*

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable Length of Civil War Conflict in Months
<i>Amount of Diplomatic Interventions</i>	32.3*** (2.11)
<i>Timing</i>	0.501*** (0.033)
<i>Ethno-Religious Conflict</i>	23.6*** (1.80)
<i>Gemstones</i>	-16.5*** (1.79)
<i>Opiates</i>	83.2*** (2.19)
<i>Amount of Interventions</i>	0.464*** (0.059)
<i>GDP</i>	0.070*** (0.001)
<i>Economic Interventions</i>	14.3*** (2.48)
<i>Military Interventions</i>	-33.4*** (2.40)
<i>Opposing Interventions</i>	-9.31*** (2.67)
<i>Size of Opposition</i>	-.0002*** (.00002)
<i>Intercept</i>	-124.1*** (4.22)
<i>Observations</i>	13,243
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.31

Notes. Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  in two-tailed tests.

In Table 4, diplomatic intervention and the timing of diplomatic interventions were the only significant variables and were significant at the 0.001 level, representing 84% of the variance of civil war duration. In Table 6, diplomatic intervention and all of the controls were significant at the 0.001 level, representing 31% of the variance of civil war duration.

According to Table 4 and Table 6, diplomatic interventions by third-party actors are a significant contributing factor to the length of a civil war. This goes towards scholarly expectations, represented by hypothesis 1, and away from policy-maker expectations, represented by hypothesis 2. Thus, hypothesis 1 is accepted and hypothesis 2 is rejected.

#### Civil War Length's Effect on Intensity

Scholarly and policy-maker expectations expressed that longer civil war lengths will be associated with more selective violence. Hypothesis 3 represents this expectation. However, according to Table 7, shorter civil war lengths were associated with more selective violence contrary to these expectations and this relationship was significant at the 0.001 level. A coefficient of -2.47 signifies that for every 1 month increase in a civil war there is a -2.47 amount of selective violence intensity associated with that increase. Thus, hypothesis 3 is rejected. The ex post reality of civil wars is that policies to decrease the duration of civil wars do nothing to decrease selective violence intensity. It is important to understand that this may not be the case for more current civil wars. However, the results here represent an important aspect to civil war literature that needs to be expanded on.

Table 7. Linear Regression – A Look at the Effect Duration has on Selective Violence Intensity with Typical Controls in the Literature

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable Total Amount of Selective Violence
<i>Length of Civil War in Months</i>	-2.47*** (0.168)
<i>Amount of Diplomatic Interventions</i>	103.0** (41.7)
<i>Ethno-Religious Conflict</i>	533.9*** (35.4)
<i>Gemstones</i>	-626.9*** (35.1)
<i>Opiates</i>	112.5** (45.1)
<i>Amount of Interventions</i>	20.9*** (1.17)
<i>GDP</i>	-0.0913** (0.0269)
<i>Economic Interventions</i>	287.5*** (48.4)
<i>Military Interventions</i>	532.9*** (47.2)
<i>Opposing Interventions</i>	-343.6*** (52.1)
<i>Size of Opposition</i>	0.0112*** (0.0003)
<i>Intercept</i>	260.5** (85.09)
<i>Observations</i>	13,243
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.18

Notes. Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  in two-tailed tests.

Across civil wars, selective violence escalates to an extent, reaching a point where it peaks, and then begins to de-escalate or decline in a large majority of civil war instances. Instead of an equal or normal distribution across civil wars, selective violence operates on a power law distribution (also known as a Pareto Distribution). Meaning, civil war selective violence represents an 80-20 dynamic, where 80% of the cases of selective violence intensity fall into civil wars with less than 2,500 battle-related deaths (selective violence) per month and the other

20% of cases fall into civil wars with more than 2,500 battle-related deaths (selective violence). There is an extremely large amount of cases of low-intensity civil wars and an extremely small amount of cases of high-intensity civil wars. On a normal distribution curve, 68% of selective violence cases across civil wars should be 1 standard deviation from the mean. Then, there should be an equal percentage of cases to the left and right of this mean. However, this is not the case (Figure 6). A large majority of civil wars are not characterized by a moderate amount of violence per month.




Figure 6 – Distribution of Violence Committed in Civil Wars from 1945-1999

Contrary to policy-maker expectations, violence in civil wars does not operate on a bell-shaped curve or in a normal distribution. Hypothesis 4 is thus rejected. The reality of violence

across civil wars showcases the prominence of low-intensity civil war conflicts – and not the other way around.

### Summary of Results

According to Sisk (2009, Loc. 1286), there is a breaking point where a civil war goes from “escalation to [a] stalemate.” Zartman (1989) explains this as the condition where both the incumbent government and rebel group are unable to make the opposing side submit and thus it prevents it from winning and, even more importantly, believing that it can win. When this stalemate occurs, it is more likely for the main belligerents to come to the bargaining table. However, it is likely that this stalemate does not occur until after violence is on the decline. If the purpose of diplomatic interventions is to stop or inhibit violence in a civil war, it is clearly not effective towards this end, as the stalemate automatically signals that the intensity of violence in a civil war is on the decline. This suggests a major refinement to current civil war duration literature: stalemates signify longer civil wars but not intense or more violent ones. By bridging this gap in current civil war literature, there can be a discussion of policy effectiveness where ex ante expectations and the ex post reality converges.

### Implications

Over 80% of civil wars, according to the models, are low-intensity and associated with shorter lengths. Looking for a lasting peace by reducing violence in civil wars through policies that lessen duration may not be the best course available to policy-makers. Instead, there may need to be more focus on stopping civil wars before they start through preventative policies – and this may be the only time diplomacy is an effective policy in civil wars more generally. However, there is need for future research to look at the effect duration has on indiscriminate violence (violence done on both combatants and non-combatants). Furthermore, if the civil

conflict does turn into a civil war, the results here suggest that policy-makers may need to let civil wars run their course without the use of diplomatic interventions, as difficult as this may be.



## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

### Limitations

The most pressing limitation of this study is regarding potential information problems that could arise as a result of diplomatic bargaining that occurs out of the limelight. Meaning, some bargains may not occur within the lens of public scrutiny and thus the absence of this data may depress the findings and the relationship. A lack of significance therefore may only be a lack of complete information with which to measure the phenomena under study.

Another limitation of this study is that it is narrow in its scope. The civil wars observed in this proposed study do not include more recent civil wars. Therefore, an extrapolation of generalizability to more recent civil wars may be lacking.

### Conclusion

This thesis has reconciled some ex ante expectations in civil wars with the ex post reality. First and foremost, it has resolved the discrepancy between policy-maker and scholarly expectations regarding the effect third-party diplomatic interventions have on civil war length. It is clear that third-party diplomatic interventions are a significant indicator of civil war length. Essentially, the school of thought that international policy-makers ascribe to that suggests that it is better to do something rather than nothing may be doing more harm than good. This is primarily because third-party diplomatic interventions do nothing to provide a decisive advantage to either the incumbent government or the rebel group. This lack of advantage makes it more likely that the main belligerents in a civil war continue fighting, eventually creating the conditions for a stalemate. This stalemate has been shown in the literature to increase the length

of civil wars (Thyne 2012; Ohmura 2011; Montalvo and Querol 2010; Regan and Aydin 2006; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Fearon 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).

Secondly, this thesis has resolved both policy-maker and scholarly expectations regarding the relationship civil war length has on selective violence intensity in civil wars. The common expectation between both groups is that selective violence intensity operates on a bell-shaped curve or, at the very least, that selective violence operates mostly in an equal distribution throughout the duration of civil wars. Essentially, this expectation says that civil wars are associated with increasing or increased violence throughout the civil war. This is clearly not the case and gives rise to a core change in civil war assumptions: lessening the length of a civil war does not necessitate lessening violence or intensity. The two are mutually constituted phenomenon but they do not have a direct, positive relationship.

But, what is the importance of resolving these discrepancies in civil war expectations? This means that enactment of more complex interventionist strategies, to the maximum extent that these complex interventionist strategies are possible to engage in, like those suggested by Regan and Aydin (2006), will produce not only more sound policies but the sound usage of policies. Contrary to Regan and Aydin's (2006) work, however, their formal, predictive model does not represent the current reality. By not resolving these expectations with the reality and jumping straight to the prediction, a piece of the equation was missing and thus the analysis was flawed. Furthermore, since expectations shape perceptions of reality, by not bridging the gap between expectations and reality, decision-making suffers to a huge extent. By assessing the validity behind expectations, one can more accurately create policies that reflect reality and not their own perceptions. One example used in this thesis is that policy-makers desperately want to intervene in civil wars but want to do so without committing the full weight of their resources

and political capital. This does not necessarily lead to unsound policies but it does lead to the unsound usage or enactment of these policies which, in turn, creates flawed decision-making. As can be seen, it is important to ensure that expectations match reality and that predictions of future events – through modeling – are also based in reality.

Lastly, what can this thesis specifically tell us about current and ongoing civil wars? First and foremost, in the Syrian Civil War, for instance, it may be better for the intervening parties to pick a side and provide them with an advantage. If this is not possible, then third-parties need to stay out of the civil war completely. Negotiating a ceasefire or an armistice may have the unintended consequences of, if it fails, prolonging the conflict past its sell by date. It's the difference between slowly ripping off a bandage and ripping it off in one quick, fluid motion. One option will prolong the pain and the other will not. That said, whether a third-party intervenes through the use of diplomatic interventions has no effect on selective violence in the aggregate. Since this is the case, however, there is also no significant practical need for these interventions if they do not accomplish this objective. This further means that policies geared towards brokering lasting peace – like diplomatic interventions – need to separate from the belief they resolve the immediate or even the future violence in a civil war.

## **APPENDIX A: LIST OF CIVIL WARS FROM 1945-1999**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Country Name</i>	<i>Total Amount of Diplomatic Interventions</i>	<i>Total Length of Civil War in Months</i>
1945	Greece	2	21
1946	China	5	6
1947	Paraguay	5	6
1948	Costa Rica	1	2
1950	Indonesia	5	7
1958	Lebanon	2	5
1961	Laos	2	24
1962	Algeria	1	2
1962	Yemen Arab Republic	5	3
1963	Vietnam, South	4	44
1963	Cyprus	6	1
1964	Congo, Kinshasa	8	55
1964	Ethiopia	2	10
1964	Laos	1	17
1964	Cyprus	6	9
1964	Vietnam, South	4	55
1965	Yemen Arab Republic	5	34
1965	Congo, Kinshasa	8	56
1965	Dominican Rep	5	3
1967	Yemen Arab Republic	5	61
1968	Nigeria	9	14
1969	Chad	1	53
1969	Nigeria	9	29
1970	Jordan	3	1
1972	Sudan	1	102
1972	Uganda	1	22
1974	Cyprus	3	2
1974	Zimbabwe	13	25
1975	Oman	1	55
1975	Zimbabwe	13	33
1975	Ethiopia	10	148
1975	Philippines	8	41
1976	Zimbabwe	13	46
1976	Philippines	8	63
1976	Lebanon	11	16
1977	United Kingdom	6	107
1977	Philippines	8	67
1977	Zimbabwe	13	57
1978	Lebanon	11	43
1978	Zimbabwe	13	73
1978	Iran	1	4
1978	Nicaragua	1	10
1979	Zimbabwe	13	82
1980	El Salvador	20	22
1980	Lebanon	11	67
1981	El Salvador	20	28
1981	Morocco	1	70

1982	Chad	1	51
1982	El Salvador	20	37
1983	Chad	4	5
1983	Sri Lanka	13	27
1984	El Salvador	20	70
1984	Lebanon	11	115
1984	Chad	4	17
1984	Mozambique	22	62
1984	Lebanon	11	117
1985	Sri Lanka	13	53
1985	Chad	4	23
1985	Uganda	1	55
1986	Guatemala	26	312
1986	El Salvador	20	91
1986	Sri Lanka	13	67
1987	El Salvador	20	104
1987	Nicaragua	5	70
1987	Sri Lanka	13	74
1987	Guatemala	26	324
1988	El Salvador	20	117
1988	Nicaragua	5	72
1988	Afghanistan	3	124
1988	Turkey	3	52
1988	Sudan	31	61
1989	Sudan	31	74
1989	Ethiopia	10	325
1989	Cambodia	1	129
1989	Mozambique	22	119
1989	Myanmar (Burma)	3	489
1990	Liberia	23	12
1990	Guatemala	26	355
1990	Afghanistan	3	152
1990	Nicaragua	5	97
1990	Ethiopia	10	332
1990	Papua New Guinea	2	21
1990	El Salvador	20	138
1990	Mozambique	22	135
1991	Liberia	23	23
1991	Ethiopia	10	342
1991	Yugoslavia	6	14
1991	Guatemala	26	369
1991	Mozambique	22	145
1991	Rwanda	18	13
1991	Sudan	31	94
1991	Somalia	20	11
1991	Papua New Guinea	2	27
1991	El Salvador	20	155
1991	Ethiopia	10	343
1992	Moldova	6	4
1992	Sudan	31	109
1992	Bosnia	16	10

1992	Angola	9	2
1992	Rwanda	18	24
1992	Guatemala	26	382
1992	Mozambique	22	157
1992	Yugoslavia	6	18
1992	Rwanda	18	26
1992	Liberia	23	37
1992	Somalia	20	16
1992	Rwanda	18	22
1992	Cambodia	2	9
1993	Azerbaijan	1	20
1993	Georgia	7	22
1993	Guatemala	26	396
1993	Angola	9	14
1993	Rwanda	18	31
1993	Sudan	31	120
1993	Somalia	20	28
1993	United Kingdom	6	300
1993	Bosnia	16	15
1993	Moldova	6	22
1993	Rwanda	18	35
1993	Liberia	23	48
1994	Rwanda	18	44
1994	Angola	9	18
1994	Tajikistan	11	31
1994	Yemen	3	3
1994	Rwanda	18	46
1994	Somalia	20	29
1994	Sudan	31	131
1994	Yemen	3	3
1994	Liberia	23	61
1994	Yemen	3	3
1994	South Africa	1	40
1994	Moldova	6	33
1994	Georgia	7	28
1994	Guatemala	26	409
1994	Somalia	20	31
1994	Bosnia	16	28
1994	Rwanda	18	46
1995	Moldova	6	40
1995	Afghanistan	16	44
1995	Moldova	6	46
1995	Angola	9	32
1995	Sudan	31	137
1995	Philippines	8	290
1995	Myanmar (Burma)	3	557
1995	Sri Lanka	13	167
1995	Liberia	23	69
1995	Algeria	2	37
1995	Guatemala	26	422
1995	Myanmar (Burma)	3	558

1995	Tajikistan	11	39
1995	Bosnia	16	45
1996	Philippines	8	301
1996	Somalia	20	63
1996	Indonesia	2	242
1996	Philippines	8	299
1996	Somalia	20	62
1996	Burundi	5	11
1996	Chad	1	53
1996	Tajikistan	11	58
1996	Moldova	6	51
1996	Angola	9	44
1996	Afghanistan	16	47
1996	Burundi	5	2
1997	Somalia	20	75
1997	Sudan	31	168
1997	Afghanistan	16	64
1997	Philippines	4	301
1997	Algeria	2	64
1997	Congo, Brazzaville	4	4
1997	Tajikistan	11	64
1997	Burundi	5	11
1998	Sudan	31	178
1998	Spain	5	365
1998	Afghanistan	16	73
1998	Spain	5	365
1998	Burundi	5	28
1998	Cambodia	2	72
1998	Somalia	20	83
1998	Congo, Kinshasa	7	4
1998	Yugoslavia	7	12
1999	Spain	5	370
1999	Yugoslavia	7	14
1999	Spain	5	370
1999	Colombia	3	189
1999	Indonesia	2	281
1999	Somalia	20	98
1999	Sudan	31	193
1999	Congo, Kinshasa	7	13
1999	Afghanistan	16	84



## **APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATISTICS**

Summary Statistics For All Variables

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Obs.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>
<i>time</i>	438	93.04	117.09
<i>dipcount</i>	438	13.52	8.83
<i>timing</i>	434	68.90	118.56
<i>unilat</i>	429	0.85	0.35
<i>duration</i>	379	12.73	38.35
<i>success</i>	386	0.36	0.48
<i>UN</i>	438	0.203	0.402
<i>US</i>	438	0.12	0.33

Source: Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War A New Data Set (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2012)

<i>intensity</i>	13,243	746.05	1815.55
<i>time</i>	13,243	100.81	101.39
<i>diplomatic</i>	13,243	0.23	0.38
<i>diptiming</i>	13,243	1.95	22.52
<i>ethnorel</i>	13,243	0.64	0.47
<i>gemstones</i>	13,243	0.23	0.42
<i>opiates</i>	13,243	0.14	0.35
<i>numbofint</i>	13,243	15.04	16.64
<i>GDP</i>	13,243	2,872.98	597.95
<i>economic</i>	13,243	0.21	0.34
<i>military</i>	13,243	0.45	0.42
<i>opposing</i>	13,243	0.17	0.34
<i>oppsize</i>	13,243	17,935.16	37,609.45

Source: Complex Interventions Data Set (Regan and Aydin 2006)

## **APPENDIX C: CODING SCHEME FOR CONTROL VARIABLES**

Coding Scheme for Control Variables

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Coding</b>
<i>timing</i>	The month of a conflict's duration in which there was an intervention
<i>unilat</i>	1 if the diplomatic intervention was unilateral, 0 otherwise
<i>duration</i>	The number of days the diplomatic intervention lasted
<i>success</i>	1 if the diplomatic intervention was coded as being successful, 0 otherwise
<i>UN</i>	1 if the diplomatic intervention was by the United Nations, 0 otherwise
<i>US</i>	1 if the diplomatic intervention was by the United States, 0 otherwise
	Source: Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War A New Data Set (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2012)
<i>diptiming</i>	Recorded in terms of the month in a conflict in which the diplomatic intervention took place
<i>ethnorel</i>	1 if the civil war conflict was an ethnic or religious conflict, 0 if it was an ideological conflict
<i>gemstones</i>	1 if the civil war conflict area had gemstones, 0 otherwise
<i>opiates</i>	1 if the civil war conflict area had opiates, 0 otherwise
<i>numbofint</i>	The total amount of diplomatic, military, and economic interventions in the civil war
<i>GDP</i>	Gross domestic product recorded in millions of U.S. dollars
<i>economic</i>	Binary variable denoting whether an economic intervention has taken place in the month of observation. Recorded at monthly intervals and deflated over time in accordance with diplomatic interventions
<i>military</i>	Binary variable denoting whether a military intervention has taken place in the month of observation. Recorded at monthly intervals and deflated over time in accordance with diplomatic interventions
<i>opposing</i>	Records whether the next intervention into a conflict was in support of the opposite participant to the support from the previous intervention. The coding is dichotomous. Opposing interventions are recorded in terms of interventions that take place in an offsetting sequence
<i>oppsize</i>	Reflects the estimated size of the opposition forces – ranges from the hundreds to the tens of thousands
	Source: Complex Interventions Data Set (Regan and Aydin 2006)

## REFERENCES

- Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Elizabeth Radziszewski. 2005. "Expectations, Rivalries, and Civil War Duration." *International Interactions* 31 (4) (Oct):349-74.
- Bahador, Babak. 2007. *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West Toward War in Kosovo*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (4) (12):615.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce. 2008. "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process." *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (3) (05):345-63.
- Barston, R. P. 1988. *Modern Diplomacy*. London; New York: Longman, 1988.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Paul F. Diehl. 1997. "Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation." *International Interactions* 22 (4) (04):299.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Patrick M. Regan. 1999. *The Structure of International Conflict Management: an Analysis of the Effects of Intractability and Mediation*. Formosa College.  
<http://ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41852865&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. "On the Duration of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3) (05):253-73.

- DeRouen Jr, Karl R., and David Sobek. 2004. "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3) (05):303-20.
- DeRouen, Karl, and Frida Möller. 2013. "The Short-Term Effects of Mediation on Low-Intensity Civil Wars." *Negotiation Journal* 29 (4) (10):413-38.
- Dixon, William J. 1996. *Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement*. The MIT Press.  
<http://ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.2704241&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2011. "Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War." *World Development* 39 (2):199-211.
- Fearon, James D. 2007. "Iraq's Civil War." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2) (Mar):2-15.
- Fearon, James D. 2002. "Why do some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3) (05/04):275-301.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.  
<http://ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.3118222&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands vs. Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1) (Feb): 68-90.

- Gersovitz, Mark, and Norma Kriger. 2013. "What is a Civil War? A Critical Review of its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences." *World Bank Research Observer* 28 (2) (08):159-90.
- Hegre, Håvard. 2004. "The Duration and Termination of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research*(3):243.
- Holl, Jane. 1993. "When War Doesn't Work." In *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. New York: New York University Press, c1993.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics*(1):99.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Montalvo, Jose G., and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2010. "Ethnic Polarization and the Duration of Civil Wars." *Economics of Governance* 11 (2) (04):123-43.
- Morrow, James D. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Ohmura, H. 2011. *Termination and Recurrence of Civil War: Which Outcomes Lead to Durable Peace after Civil War?*  
<http://ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswss&AN=000297573200004&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

- Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. 1994. *A Course in Game Theory*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1994.
- Regan, Patrick M. 2000. *Civil wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, c2000.
- Regan, Patrick M.. 2002. "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1) (02):55-74.
- Regan, Patrick M., and Aysegul Aydin. 2006. "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (5) (10):736-56.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6) (12):814-58.
- Nicholas Sambanis and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars" The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 2433, 2000.
- Sisk, Timothy D. 2009. *International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets*. London; New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Small, Melvin, and J. D. Singer. 1982. "Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980."
- Thyne, Clayton L. 2012. "Information, Commitment, and Intra-War Bargaining: The Effect of Governmental Constraints on Civil War Duration1." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2) (06):307-21.



- Toft, Monica Duffy. 2010. "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security* 34 (4):7-36.
- Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1953. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953 c1944; 3d ed.
- Walter, Barbara F., and Jack L. Snyder. 1999. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press, c1999.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Wolff, Stefan, and Oya Dursun-Özkanca. 2012. *Regional and International Conflict Regulation: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Interventions*. Routledge.  
<http://ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=79988167&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Zartman, I. W. 1989. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; Updated ed.