2015

Environmentalism and Environmental Constitutional Ballot Initiatives in Florida: The Elements of Support for Amendment One in 2014 in the Context of Current Environmental Attitudes.

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ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL BALLOT INITIATIVES IN FLORIDA: THE ELEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR AMENDMENT ONE IN 2014 IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
Environmental Politics Track
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term
2015

ABSTRACT

Americans express support for "the environment" with environmental support cutting across political and demographic differences and cleavages. In the past 15 years, however, period effects, political sorting, and the emergence of a powerful anti-environmental movement have lessened the generalized levels of environmental support. Using the 2012 CCES survey, the expressed attitudes regarding multiple environmental issues found significant differences in levels of environmental support nationally by party, Tea Party attitudes, ideology, and certain demographic characteristics. For Floridians, the differences between the most pro-environmental respondents and the most anti-environmental are narrower; partisan identification itself is not significant in environmental attitudes; but ideology, Tea party support, and to a lesser degree, gender and race are associated in explaining variances in environmental attitudes. Voting decision behavior previously observed only for certain environmental issues appears to be influenced by multiple environmental positions. The significance of age on environmental attitudes remains perplexing with evidence for both younger and older respondents' support for environmentalism, as compared to the support expressed by persons aged 40-59. Support and opposition for a specific Florida constitutional ballot proposition on environmental land conservative acquisition reflect partisan and gender divides, and the impact of attitudes regarding an unpopular elected national official. Environmentalism appears to be further evidence of the "Big Sort" in American politics, increasingly likely to be used as an interparty wedge issue and for intraparty base mobilizations. The need for further research and the implications for environmental activists conclude this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the generosity of Cherry Communications, Inc. and the Florida Chamber of Commerce for sharing their September 2014 survey data regarding Amendment One. Without their generosity, no exploration into the elements of Amendment One support would have been possible.

I thank my committee (Dr. Peter Jacques, Chair; Dr. Jonathan Knuckey; and Dr. Aubrey Jewett) for approving this thesis topic; offering excellent suggestions and guidance; and avoiding all impulses to micromanage this effort. I am grateful to all professors in all classes for the opportunity to dive back into political science as an academic pursuit after a 35-year absence from scholarship. The wisdom and good humor of my colleagues in the Masters Program added immeasurably to making this entire journey meaningful. I am forever indebted for the love and support of my family and friends. Numerous coffee shops contributed the atmosphere and caffeine essential to writing. Any and all mistakes are solely my own.

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INTRODUCTION

Major statewide Florida partisan elections in the 2010's were closely contested. President Obama won Florida's 29 electoral votes in 2012 by 74,309 votes, less than one percent of all votes cast for President.[1] Rick Scott was reelected governor in 2014 by 63,145 votes, only slightly more than one percent of all votes cast for governor.[2] In the same election in 2014, Florida voters overwhelmingly approved the Water and Land Conservation Amendment, commonly called Amendment One, by a margin of over 2.8 million votes,[3] well in excess of the 60% approval threshold required for Florida constitutional amendments. Approximately 95% of the voters who cast a ballot for governor in 2014 also cast a ballot on Amendment One. For Amendment One to pass by such a wide margin, a significant number of Republican Rick Scott voters voted in favor of Amendment One. Republican identifiers are becoming increasingly more skeptical of environmental measures, and less supportive of environmental issues and spending. Florida voters in 2014 did not demonstrate this same partisan split, at least with regard to Amendment One. Three-fourths of voting Floridians approved required levels of spending on land and water acquisitions, albeit from a specified fee source and not from general revenues or new taxation. This specific environmental issue seemed to cross partisan and ideological lines, to garner widespread, generalized support for environmental spending. This thesis will examine general environmental attitudes in Florida; and, analyze the circumstances and conditions under which partisan Republican voters in Florida will vote contrary to their party's general environmental issue opposition to support specific ballot proposals regarding environmental programs. Simply put, why did over one million Republicans vote for the environment?[4]

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The Moral and Ethical Roots of American Environmentalism

From the first moment early humans looked to the heavens, their feet remained planted firmly in the environment. The environment gave the sustenance and materials for life; while at the same time was the source of fear, threat, and danger. The human search for immediate survival and eternal meaning inextricably linked the physical with the metaphysical; the heavens with the earth. The environment was both an object of wonder, and a demon to be subdued.

In some Judeo-Christian teachings, wilderness became an evil, immoral place; the residence of the devil and not of God. The duty of humans was to subdue and have dominion over nature. This dominion theology influenced early Americans and early American environmental attitudes. If wilderness were evil and corrupting of humans, God required the subjection of wilderness. Applying this same religious belief system, pioneers moving west viewed wilderness as something fearful to be subdued and to be converted from evil to a use that would beneficial to humans (Nash 2001 [1967]: 15, 17, 31, 35, 262). As Americans turned to the arid west, as part of this country's manifest destiny to settle the entire continent, the same dichotomous view of the environment colored their views of the desert. The desert was both an empty area to subdue, and a specific environment with its own unique beauty (Worster 1985: 70-73).

Different religious and philosophical thought provided a counterbalance to the dominion and subjugation impulses. The wilderness and the environment were the source of awe, wonder, and spiritual fulfillment. In Deist thought, God's majesty and power were revealed directly in wilderness, unaltered by cities and civilization. Romanticists were attracted to the wild, believing

happiness increased with less civilization. Transcendental thinkers such as Thoreau and Emerson rejected the Calvinistic concept that humans were inherently sinful and would run amok in the wilderness. To Thoreau, a person had to enter wilderness (an outward journey), to develop inwardly. Individuals needed both wilderness and civilization to be fully human (Nash 2001 [1967], 46, 47, 86, 91, 93-94). The split in beliefs between a religious view (in the sense of conservative domination dogma) of the environment and a more spiritual holistic view of the environment remains observable in modern times. A view of the environment as a place to find "god in nature" lessened the rates of adherence and support of traditional religious denominations (Ferguson & Tamburello 2015: 12-15).

The conflicting views of environment as a resource to be managed and used, or the environment to be set aside and protected, influenced early American environmentalism. The conservationists were interested in the managed use of resources. Resources that ultimately must be depleted, such as minerals, coal, and oil should be used (and ultimately depleted) in the most efficient means possible to last the longest time possible. Renewable resources, such as timber and water, required management to assure sufficient use for the present and availability in the future. The conservationists represented a very utilitarian view of resources use (Pinchot 1947, excerpted in Nash 1990: 73- 79). The second group, the preservationists, wanted portions of the environment completely set aside and not used, free from human incursion or use. The human presence in nature threatened nature, and therefore portions of nature should be protected from humans (Marsh 1864, excerpted in Nash 1990: 40-44). The precious and irreplaceable properties such as wilderness and the beauty of nature should be set aside and not used by anyone, regardless of the value of resources located within the preserved lands (Leopold 1949, excerpted in Nash 1990: 171-174). Pinchot and the conservationists, as part of the Progressive Era, with the

strong support of President Theodore Roosevelt, prevailed in federal governmental actions. While the Wilderness Act did set aside lands for preservation, this preservationist legislation passed only in 1964, and was applicable to select lands (Stegner 1960, excerpted in Nash 1990: 175-180; see also Nash headnote 1990:175). The American National Park system and National Forest system conserved land for recreational use and availability, while permitting some economic use. The Florida land purchase program, for which Amendment One provided specific funding, followed this federal conservation land acquisition and use model for protection of lands with an expressed utilitarian purpose. Florida conservation lands purchased must be environmentally sensitive and important, but also must be available for recreational purposes.

These conflicting views of nature as evil or good, of the environment as a resource for humans or as something of independent sacred worth, of humans possessing dominion or exercising stewardship over the environment, of utilitarian conservation or radical preservation, remained strong in American environmentalism. The American environmental dualism expanded to consideration of the proper role of government in numerous policy matters, as a source of political decisions, beliefs, and actions, will be explored in more detail in the following sections of the research review. Dominion theology drives current conservative religious attitudes regarding environmentalism. Economic interests and power elites call for opening of national parks and wildernesses for even more resource utilization. Different groups view the environment differently. The battle today may well be characterized as a fight between the descendants of the managed conservations of the Progressive Era and those who for economic and ideological reasons want immediate and total use of all available resources. The environment for the environment's sake, as an object of reverence and appreciation is all very well and good. Americans generally "support" the environment. But such sentimentality and indeed long-range

concerns about environmental difficulties frequently yield to more immediate issues and controversy, to period effects, and to the ideological dispute as to the proper role of government regarding environmental matters challenging any attempt to drive political action based upon environmental concerns.

Environmentalism in Florida

Florida has a long history of bipartisan environmental support. Florida's tourism economy and attractiveness to business and new residents depend on the environment. To protect Florida's important but fragile environment, Florida's legislature has been willing to pass comprehensive laws designed to protect Florida's environment and manage its resources. Legislation included the 1972 Water Resource Act to create five water management districts; and gave those districts ad valorem tax authority in 1976 (MacManus, et al., 2011: 417). The Growth Management Act in 1985 required local authorities (counties and municipalities) to create growth management plans and established the Department of Community Affairs to approve and regulate these plans. Developers paid impact fees; and any new development must assure governmental authorities that infrastructures and services were in place to handle any increased population or traffic (MacManus, et al., 2011: 412, 431-432). The Healthy Beaches Program was enacted in 2002 (MacManus, et al., 2011: 421). Floridians may even choose from three different wildlife automobile license plates; the proceeds from which go to protect these threatened or endangered species (MacManus, et al., 2011: 427).

Preservation of sensitive and environmentally significant lands has been a 50-year Florida legislative priority, beginning with the 1963 creation of the Land Acquisition Trust Fund (deHaven-Smith 1988: 283). The legislature created the Environmental Endangered Lands

program, and voters approved a constitutional bond referendum to fund the program in 1992 (Farr & Brock 2006: 35-36). The legislature revised the land acquisitions legislation in 1980 by enacting the "CARL" program, Conservation and Recreational Lands. First Preservation 2000 and then Florida Forever expanded and revised the CARL program. Preservation 2000 stabilized the source for environmental land acquisition funding (Farr & Brock 2006: 42). The current Florida Forever program, enacted in 2000 (Farr & Brock 2006: 35-38; MacManus, et al., 2011: 419), created a new governmental board for management, set performance measures, and focused on urban and community parks in addition to more rural lands (Farr & Brock 2006: 38). Florida created a trust fund for the acquisition and administration of environmentally sensitive public lands. The lands were obtained for environmental reasons, but also for recreational purposes, confirming a strong conservative management ethos in Florida regarding acquired lands. Further land acquisition programs such as Save Our Coast and Save Our Rivers, and specific bond funding for each program, targeted purchases of land in coastal and river areas (Farr & Brock 2006: 36-27).

Republican governors as well as Democratic governors supported this environmental legislation (Farr & Brock 2006: 35). Preservation 2000 was a program of Republican Governor Bob Martinez (Farr & Brock 2006: 37). Even Governor Jeb Bush, an early leader in the implementation of conservative right to life and defunding Planned Parenthood issues (which remain strong conservative issues in the 2016 Republican presidential primary), took pro-environmental positions notwithstanding his general social conservatism. The Florida Forever program was a major initiative of Governor Bush (Farr & Brock 2006: 38). Current Republican Governor Rick Scott seems to be breaking from this bipartisan governmental environmental tradition in Florida. In his first term, Governor Scott championed legislation to weaken the

Growth Management Act and essentially eliminated the Department of Community Affairs (MacManus, et al., 2011: 432-433). The current legislature and Governor Scott reduced funding for the Florida Forever land trust in multiple legislative sessions (MacManus, et al., 2011: 419). These cuts in funding for the land acquisition trust fund led to the 2014 Amendment One constitutional ballot initiative to require that one-third of revenues from documentary stamps charged to real estate buyers for all real property purchases be utilized by the Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund.

Environmentalism as a Generalized American Belief

Events of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in 1962 and Earth Day 1970, heralded the start of the modern American environmental movement. Early research established widespread environmental support in many groups, often only weakly associated with demographic and political variables. By the end of the 1980's, multiple public opinion studies summarized by Dunlap (1991) showed generalized support for environmental positions. Polling revealed general support for increasing government spending on the environment (71%), increasing governmental regulation of the environment (65%), increasing environmental protection regardless of the cost (75%), and a general belief that environmental regulation has not gone far enough to protect the environment (54%) (Dunlap 1991: 10, 12). With opposition to these various propositions at only 4% to 16%, the environment became essentially a consensus issue in American politics (Dunlap 1991: 12). The increased belief that environmental conditions locally and globally were declining from increasing threats to health and human life not simply quality of life matters, and a belief that only limited efforts had been made in improving the environment, encouraged environmental

support (Dunlap 1991: 14-15). This increasing environmental support could also have been in response to the perceived anti-environmentalist of the Reagan Administration (Dunlap 1991: 13-14). Notwithstanding the anti-environmentalism of the Reagan Administration, a strongly pro-environmental electorate reelected President Reagan in the second largest electoral landslide in history. Environmental position was not important in vote choice (46% said it made no difference). For respondents who indicated that candidate environmental positions made a difference in individual voting choice, the environment usually was not an important factor in voting choice (Dunlap 1991: 31-32).

Guber (2003) also finds national public opinion strongly "pro-environment." Floridians share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011: 414-415). Guber found large majorities state concern for a wide range of specific environmental issues such as global warming or species eradication. Generalized support and future concerns regarding the environment did not translate to current voting action (Guber 2003). There was no significant support for an environmental "Green" party in the United States. Environmental concerns were viewed as something that could be "put off" until the future. To open ended "what's the most important issue" or "what's the worse problem" questions, for present concerns, responses regarding the environment were low. Environmental policy did not reach the level of issue salience significant to become a significant determinative factor in a voting choice in these studies. However, environmental harms were the highest expressed concern for the future (Guber 2003; Yeager, et al., 2011: 2, 21; Daniels, et al., 2012: 462, 467).

Even in the heady days of environmental awareness following Earth Day, other factors were expected to cause ebbs and flows in levels of environmental support (Downs 1972). When policy options or potential costs for environmental programs were considered with regard to

specific environmental concerns, the high levels of generalized environmental support decreased significantly. Factors such as support for tax cutting, concerns about government regulation, and the costs of implementing environmental protection significantly reduce public support for a specific environmental policy proposal (Guber 2003). When considered in relation to other issues, such as crime or economic issues, environmental concerns were less salient than other issues. Even before the partisan divide on environmental issues became pronounced, as discussed below, the generalized environmental support lessened when actual policy choices are presented (Guber 2003; Fisher, et al. 2013; Downs 1972). Period effects, including changes in economic conditions or security concerns, also affected the level of support for environmental issues (Scruggs & Benegal 2012; Daniels, et al., 2012: 470). During times of general economic well being, there may be increased support for governmental expenditures for environmental protection. Initial enthusiasm for environmental concerns after Earth Day 1970, including public opinion polling showing environmental quality as the top voter priority, lessened significantly as a result of the 1974 energy crisis and oil embargo (Lake 1983). Intensity of environmental support decreased from 2000 to 2006, as a result of the intervening issue salience of the 9/11 terrorist events and subsequent war in Iraq (McCright and Dunlap 2008). Varied levels of media concern over time affected the salience of an issue at any particular time. Increased media coverage of an environmental issue, such as pollution, increased the level of support for spending on environmental issues (Elliot et al., 1995). Conservative media outlets may encourage conservative political action including the rise of Tea Party support (Williamson, et al. 2011: 29-30). Tea Party support is discussed below as one factor in the increasing anti-environmentalism in the Republican Party. Considerations of policy options and costs, salience of other issues, period effects, and media coverage affected the levels of environmental support.

Environmentalism therefore may be described more properly as a consensus social movement (characterized by general societal acceptance, but with other more immediate concerns determining political actions such as voting), with the possibility of personal and political action, rather than an ideology (which would be a compelling basis for actions such as voting) (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996: 1629, 1633; McCright and Dunlap 2008).

Environmental concern and action may also indicate a postmaterialistic worldview. Postmaterialism posits that once material and security needs were met for an individual and a country in general, respondents would be socialized in a materially secure country and develop a worldview emphasizing quality of life issues. Inglehart created an initial scale based on four questions (respondents were asked to chose national goals of two of four possible responses: (1) maintain national order (2) more input into governmental action (3) protect free speech or (4) maintain a high rate of economic growth); and subsequently expanded the question sets to create a materialism/postmaterialism scale from a series of four option questions (Inglehart & Abramson 1999). Environmentalism indicated a concern with the quality of life, and therefore was more likely a trait of postmaterialists (Inglehart 1995; Kidd & Lee 1997, 5-6, 8-9 Table 1 and Table 2). Other researchers have found strong environmental support in poor economic countries as well as in wealthier more industrialized countries (Dunlap & York 2008, 542, 550), calling into question the link between postmaterial values and environmental support.

Even widespread consensus movements, such as environmentalism, create the conditions for a countermovement to arise. Conservative supporters of the existing political and economic power and social structures were likely to oppose environmental actions (McCright and Dunlap 2013: 215, 223; Dunlap and Van Liere 1984: 1015). The political and economic elites took actions to protect the dominant power structure (McCright & Dunlap 2010), including funding

conservative think tanks to attack the science of environmental issues such as global warming, to undermine the need for policy and lifestyle changes necessary to mitigate and adapt to climatic change and other environmental issues (Jacques, et al. 2008; McCright & Dunlap 2012, 215). These political and ideological changes have been the underpinnings for the countermovement of the anti-environmentalists (Meyers and Staggenborg, 1996: 1633). This countermovement then promoted the rise of anti-environmentalism as an immediate political force, lessening the generalized pro-environmental attitude of American respondents. The results found by both Dunlap (1991) and Guber (2003) did not anticipate the effects of this anti-environmental countermovement.

Partisanship and American Environmentalism

Partisan identification has emerged in recent research as the strongest explanation for variance in levels of environmental support. Ideology, rather than party identification, previously explained variance in environmental support in a megastudy of environmental research. Liberal ideology was strongly associated with environmental support, while party identification was at best weakly associated (Dunlap 1980: 191-192). An early study found that environmental voters indeed trended conservative and Republican in California (Lake 1983). Over the past ten years, the previous consensus found on environmental support which cut across other voting cleavages such as party identification and ideology (Guber 2003; Guber 2001b; Dunlap 1991) has given way to sharp partisan divides on support for environmental propositions (Dunlap & McCright 2008; Uyeki & Holland 2000). Most recent studies have found a robust relationship between Democratic identification and strong environmental support (Uyeki & Holland 2000). Partisan identification is now the strongest explanatory variable in determining environmental support

(Coan & Holman 2008). Guber's finding of generalized support (2003) and her statement that no candidate will come out against environmental concerns (2001: 466) may no longer be true in this more highly charged and divided political milieu with marked partisan differences on environmental issues and with an active countermovement attempting to lessen consensus attitudes regarding the environment.

Public opinion polling for 30 years showed increasing levels of belief in scientific consensus, human causes for climate changes, and feeling personally "very worried" about climate change (consistent with the findings of Dunlap 1991), until 2008, when all levels of public support for environmental positions dropped precipitously (Scruggs & Benegal 2012). Gaps in level of support for environmental beliefs, driven by party identification, have emerged for the belief that global warming is already happening (Democrats support this proposition by 34 points more than Republicans), the belief that media coverage of global warning is exaggerated (Republicans support this proposition by 42 points more than Democrats), whether there is a consensus among scientists regarding the causes of climate change (Democrats support this proposition by 24 points more than Republicans), and whether there are human causes for climate change (Democrats support this proposition by 32 points more than Republicans) (Dunlap & McCright 2008).

Guber's most recent research indicated that the previous generalized consensus regarding environment is lessening. Studying Gallop poll results in ten-year intervals (for years 1990, 2000, and 2010), Guber found that partisan differences existed on environmental beliefs, including the human causation effects on global warming, air pollution, loss of tropical rain forest, and other environmental issues. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents expressed similar levels of concern regarding the six environmental issues in 1990, but an interparty divide

in levels of support emerged in 2000 and grew larger in 2010 (2013: 103 Figure 2, 103, 104). The partisan divide on environmental issues was larger than on other economic and policy issues (Guber 2013: 95, 105, 106 Figure 3). General concern regarding the environment was declining, perhaps as an issue period effect (Guber 2013: 100 Figure 1, 101; cf. Downs 1972). Guber's OLS multivariate regression of levels of environmental support showed that partisanship and ideology were significant in 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls generally were not significant in 1990 and 2000; but by 2010, statistically significant increased levels of environmental support expressed by non-whites existed; with decreased levels of environmental support stated by male and higher income respondents (Guber 2013: 104 Table 1). Environmental support that previous cut across other cleavages appeared increasingly identified with certain groups. This divide will lessen the ability to achieve consensus on environmental values, reducing the previously generalized "pro-environmental" attitudes of the American public (Guber 2013: 108).

Partisan differences have emerged in other aspects of political behavior, campaign activities, and elite actions. Although not studying environmental voting or activism, *per se*, Dolan demonstrated the identification of environmental policy with party choice and ideology (2005). For both female and male Democratic candidates, the environment was the fifth issue mentioned on campaign websites. Environmental issues were not listed for either male or female Republican candidates. Gender alone does not explain the difference as female candidates acted like male candidates in the same party. The party identification and ideology of the candidate determined whether or not the candidate took a pro-environmental stance. Presumably, the Democratic candidate would express a general policy preference of "protecting the environment" and the Republican candidate would express a general policy preference "against government regulation" and to avoid costs to businesses and taxpayers for such regulations. Voters expected

the Democratic candidate to mention environmental issues. Candidates listed environmental issues to attract those voters who ideological positioning includes environmental policy as part of their ideology (Dolan 2005). Elite partisan differences on environmental issues have long appeared. Northern Democratic members of the 92nd Congress supported roll-call environmental measures; northern Republican members in the same Congress did not. Party identification, not regional differences, explained environmental support (Dunlap and Allen 1976).

It may, however, be too simplistic to view the partisan divide on environmental attitudes and issues as strictly a Democratic versus Republican divide. The emergence of strong Tea Party influence within the Republican Party (Williamson, et al., 2011), based both upon a deep seated mistrust of governmental action and the intentional conservative think tank attacks on science, especially climate science (Jacques, et al., 2008: 356, 357), have polarized support regarding environmental issues. Tea party members are among the most conservative Republicans (Skocpol & Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011). Compared to non-Tea Party supporters, those with a favorable opinion of the Tea Party voted overwhelming Republican even when generally distrustful of the Republican Party as being too cooperative with Democrats (and especially President Obama); strongly identified themselves as conservative; and were more likely to support the 2011 government shutdown than non-Tea Party Republicans or Independents (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 27-28). Tea Party Republicans expressed higher and more vocal levels of mistrust of Obama. Ninety-one percent of Tea Party members expressed an unfavorable opinion of President Obama, compared with 68% of non-Tea Party Republicans (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 210 n25). A split of opinion within the Republican Party, therefore, may drive the difference in environmental support between Democratic and Republican identifiers.

The differences between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans may explain a significant portion of the variance in levels of support for environmental concerns between Republicans and Democrats (Hamilton & Saito 2015). Partisan identification has been measured as a three point self-identification scale (Democrat, Republican, Independent), or on a seven point scale derived from a follow up question designed to develop the strength of partisan identification (strong or weak identifier) and the partisan leaning of respondents initially self-identifying as "independent" (lean Democrat, lean Republican). The seven point scale has been called more reliable, as "leaner" independents often behave similar to strong identifiers, and that the changes in partisan identification are better understood as short-term changes in intensity responding to period events rather than long-term changes in actual partisan identification (Magelby, et al., 2011; Rice & Hilton 1996). Hamilton & Saito considered the three-point partisan identification scale as reliable as the seven-point scale for predicting environmental support (2015: 213). Hamilton & Saito argue, however, that a four-point partisan identification scale may be more accurate than the traditional three-point partisan identification scale to explain variances in environmental support. Tea Party supporters are primarily Republican identifiers (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 223) and among the most conservative Republicans (Williamson, et al., 2011: 26-27). Among Republican identifier respondents, Tea Party identifiers have lower levels of support for climate change questions, while non-Tea Party Republicans have support levels similar to Independents on most environmental issues. Republicans are further from Tea Party Republicans than Republicans are from Independents on policy positions (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 219, 221, 224). Tea Party support within the Republican Party therefore performed as a fourth partisan identification explaining some of the variance in environmental responses between Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 224).

Florida Tea Party supporters also may differ with non-Tea Party Florida Republicans in respect to environmental attitudes. Rick Scott was elected with Tea Party support (Skocpol & Williamson 2012:168, 192; Williamson, et al., 2011: 34-35). In Florida polling conducted in 2011 and 2014 [not the part of any particular study], very conservative respondents in Florida were more likely to approve of Scott, and express the willingness to vote for him in 2011 and in 2014 than levels expressed by somewhat less conservative respondents. [The 2011 results: approval: 46% somewhat conservative, 65% very conservative; vote again: 56% somewhat conservative, 81% very conservative. The approval gap between somewhat conservative and very conservative narrowed in September 2014 (63% and 83%) and even narrower in November 2014 at election time when all Republicans would be expected to express support for the party nominee (64% and 75%).] Differences regarding disapproval of President Obama expressed within conservatism were not as pronounced as differences regarding Governor Scott, but still observable. [The 2011 results: somewhat conservative 74% disapproval, very conservative 84% disapproval; September 2014: 79% and 94%; November 2014: 80% and 85%.] (Public Policy Polling, March 29, 2011; Public Policy Polling, September 9, 2014; Public Policy Polling, November 2, 2014). While being "very conservative" or viewing President Obama unfavorably do not measure directly Tea Party approval, as Tea Party supporters are among the most conservative Republicans and most strongest opponents of President Obama (Skocpol & Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011), the observable differences in approval levels for Governor Scott and President Obama between somewhat conservative and very conservative Floridians hinted at possible Tea Party divisions within the Republican Party in Florida. Further empirical studies should be undertaken to determine if this observable difference in attitudes is driven by differences in levels of Tea Party approval.

Question framing may also contribute to the partisan divide in environmental attitudes. Schuldt, et al., used the 2009 American Life Panel randomized internet survey, alternating the climatic question to reference that the temperature was "going up" with resulting global warming with a question referencing that temperature was "changing" resulting in climate change (2001, 118). When the issue was categorized as "climate change" instead of "global warming," the partisan divide on whether or not the phenomenon existed decreased from 42.9% for "global warming" to 26.2% for "climate change" (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 120). This decrease in the partisan divide resulted from the unacceptability of the term "global warming" to Republicans (44.0% of Republicans believed "global warming" is real compared to 60.2% who believed "climate change" is occurring). Independents had observable slightly lower percentages of support than Democrats, but no statistically significant variance in responses regardless of the question phrasing (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 122). This difference in the observable divide between Republicans and Democrats depending on question wording was driven by the conservative think tank attacks on global warming and its science discussed above. Conservative think tanks attack the phrase global warming, making that term an anathema to Republicans (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 117; *cf*. Jacques, et al., 2008). Global warming also implied human causation requiring adaptive and mitigation responses opposed by economic elites. Climate change seemed to be a natural phenomenon and therefore not threatening to the elites, as policy changes could not affect what is caused naturally (McCright & Dunlap 2010: 120). Villar and Krosnick similarly found that Independents considered "climate change" and "global warming" equally seriously, Republicans perceived "climate change" as more serious than "global warming," and Democrats believed "global warming" was more serious than "climate change" (2011: 4-5).

Regardless of the cause of the observable and measurable difference in Democratic and Republican attitudes regarding the environment, the question remained as to whether these differences in environmental support were associated with vote choice. In presidential elections, respondents perceived Democratic Party policies as better able to care for the environment (Guber 2003). Thirty-one percent of Republicans indicated that the Democratic Party was better able to handle environmental matters. However, identification of the Democratic Party as the "pro" environmental party did not cause any shift of Republicans voting for Democrats, notwithstanding strong environmental concern. This result was consistent with findings that the intensity and depth of environmental support, partisan identification, more pressing immediate issues, and beliefs regarding the role of government, influence national elections (Guber 2003). Guber studied the 1996 presidential election, and found that environmental issues did not influence presidential voting choice because of: (1) the low salience of environmental issues; (2) no perceived differences between the candidates on the environment in 1996; and (3) the generalized environment support which cuts across other voting cleavages such as party identification and ideology (Guber 2001b). Guber's (2001b) methodology and findings have been challenged (Davis & Wurth 2003).

Guber measured environmental support (2001b) using the 7-point Likert scale question regarding environment versus jobs as her independent variable. Respondents selected whether the environment or the economy were more important, or took a position somewhere in between. Davis & Wurth used a question of "should governmental spending on the environment increase/decrease/remain the same" as the independent variable (Davis & Wurth 2003). Davis & Wurth, unlike Guber (2001b), found that voters in the 1996 presidential election did consider the candidates' environmental positions in evaluating the candidate and in making presidential vote

choice. Davis & Wurth found that responses regarding levels of governmental environmental spending were (a) significant in predicting the feeling thermometer evaluations of candidates; and (b) significant (.01 level) in predicting presidential votes (2003). Using a different independent variable developed the concept of "buying" a clean environment, not measuring simply the trade-off between environment and jobs as mutually exclusive positions.

Expanding presidential vote choice analysis beyond just the 1996 presidential election studied by Guber (2001b) and Davis & Wurth (2003), Davis, et al., studied presidential elections from 1984 to 2000 (2008: 526). Davis, et al., also used the "spending on environment" question as their independent variable (2008: 530) with the candidate feeling thermometer as the dependent variable. Support for increased environmental spending was statistically associated with a higher rating for the Democratic candidate in all five elections. For Republican candidate ratings, the rating for George H.W. Bush in 1988 was positive, but for the other four Republican candidates, those who supported environmental spending rated the Republican candidate lower (Davis, et al., 2008: 531). With vote choice as the dependent variable, environmental positions were statistically significant in vote choice in four of five elections - all elections studied except 2000 (Davis, et al., 2008: 534). In 2000, environmental spending opinions were significant in candidate evaluation, but not in voting choice. (Davis, et al., 2008: 534) Davis, et al., found what Guber (2001b) did not: the ability to discern a difference between candidates on environment, the importance of the environment as an issue, and a belief that a candidate supported or opposed environmental spending thereby explaining the variance in the impact of environmental positions on presidential voting (Davis, et al., 2008: 539). As expected, partisanship and, to a lesser degree ideology, explained a substantial portion of the variance in vote choice. The environmental spending issue, however, was the third most explanatory issue affecting voting decisions, after

economics and abortion (Davis, et al., 2008: 532, 540). Davis, et al., concluded that there was in fact an environmental vote (2008: 541). The environmental vote was not a separate Green Party, but entrenched at least as to some issues within the Democratic Party.

The Effect of Demographics – Environmentalism by Subgroup

The findings regarding the effects of demographic variables such as age, race, income, education, and gender have been mixed. Most studies finding environmental attitude association with various respondent characteristics also found a strong association with ideology or partisan identification, making references to ideology and party identification (discussed in more detail in the section above) unavoidable when discussing the demographic variables. Many studies include a variety of demographic aspects as control variables, often finding one or more demographic variables significantly associated with environmentalism, while similar studies with similar demographic variables find other characteristics significant. Variables are discussed individually, to the extent possible. Exploration of the literature regarding demographic variables often necessitates discussion of multiple variables within the study as that study is discussed, rather than discussing each variable one by one.

Dunlap (1980) provided an early theoretical framework as to why a particular demographic variable may be significant in explaining levels of environmental support:

- Younger respondents are more environmentally supportive either as being less invested in the economic system, or as being socialized during times of increased environmental awareness of concern. Age should therefore be inversely related to environmental support.

- Education, income, and occupation prestige, as indicators of higher social classes, should be positively associated with environmental support; either from increased knowledge and interest, or increased time and resources for participation; essentially a Postmaterialist view of environmentalism.
- Residence of the respondent, with urban persons more environmentally concerned having more direct exposure to environmental hazard, and rural residents less environmentally supportive being dependent for personal livelihood on the ability to use environmental resources without regulation for agriculture, and in the extractive industries of mining and timber.
- Party Identification and ideology, with Democrats and liberals being more environmentally supportive.
- Gender. Males could be more environmentally supportive having the education and resources to be politically active. Alternatively, men could be concerned about jobs and economic growth, and therefore less environmentally supportive. [Remember, this is research from before 1980!]

(Summary of literature review; Dunlap 1980: 182-186, theory organization by Dunlap). In his synthesis and review of previous literature, Dunlap found general but not complete support for the age thesis, some support for increased education levels increasing pro-environmental attitudes, contradictory findings regarding income, only moderate support for occupational prestige, residence most associated with localized environmental concerns, inconclusive evidence on gender, only a modest and weak correlation for party identification, and strong support for ideological differences in environmental support (Dunlap 1980: 189-192, summarized in Table 1: 186-187). The age thesis, part of the Postmaterial thesis regarding

education, and ideology seemed supported by the research reviewed by Dunlap (1980) with only limited support at best for the other theories.

The studies finding generalized environmental support, such as Guber (2003), hypothesized that certain variables would affect environmental support. However, age, income, education and race were not significant in explaining the variance in levels of support for the environment. All groups seemed to be favorable to environmental concerns. Only partisanship and ideology seemed to have significance, but only explained a limited amount of variance in levels of environmental support. Voters have partisan and ideological differences of views of government activism, not any real difference in the underlying concern for environment. Black and poor respondents may be slightly more aware of environmental impacts; but performed environmentally related participatory actions less frequently. Therefore, it seemed that environmental concern may be not be elitist, but the ability to take action (as in multiple policies realms) may be elitist (Guber 2003).

Other studies of the impact of demographic variables regarding variance in levels of environmental support and political choices have provided mixed results. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980), for example, found a moderate association between age, education, and political ideology with environmental concern. Several other studies, however, have not found a strong partisan correlation, or significant correlations with demographic attributes. Utilizing results from a 1974 poll of 548 respondents in Wisconsin, Buttel and Finn (1978) did find some positive correlation between identification as a Democrat and support for environmental policy; and a negative correlation for support for environment from Republicans. The demographic variables were not significant.

Early studies showed no gender differences in environmental concern and support for environmental politics (van Liere and Dunlap 1980). Theories developed for gender differences on environmental support include (1) simple gender socialization, with women raised to be concerned and caregivers; (2) a more complex gender socialization based upon knowledge, with women having less scientific knowledge and confidence in scientific ability than men, and therefore perceived more risk; or (3) the social roles of women (McCright 2010: 68-72). Utilizing annual Gallop Polls taken each March in 2001-2008, inclusive, McCright created two dependent variables (an additive scale of three scientific knowledge questions and an additive scale of three questions regarding concern about climate change). Using gender as the independent variable, and controlling for ideology, party identification, education, age, race, and annual income (2010: 73, 75), McCright found that women had more actual knowledge than men, while men THINK they have more knowledge; and women expressed higher concern regarding the environment than expressed by men. There was a small but statistically significant difference regarding climate change concern between the genders at the .001 level. Increased knowledge was also associated with education, being liberal, and Democratic Party identification. Increasing age and being black were negatively associated with knowledge. Religiosity was negatively associated with knowledge (.05 confidence) but not significant regarding concern about the environment (McCright 2010: 76, 77, 81). McCright rejected the extended socialization theory because of increased knowledge, and found social role variables (employment, parenthood, and/or homemaker) did not reach statistical significance in regressions with party identification, ideology, knowledge, age, race, and education. McCright therefore found support only for the simple socialization theory that women were more caring (concerned) and therefore expressed higher levels of environmental support. Feminist theory

posited that gender differences in levels of environmental support may not be based on biological or socialization aspects of gender, but rather on whether a respondent's ideology was influenced by a critique against the dominate portions of society (Somma & Tolleson-Reinhart 1997: 162-163). Both women and the environment were considered to be in subjugation to the dominant social and power elites, who tended to be male. Any increased difference in levels of environmental support by women compared to men therefore resulted because more women than men expressed a feminist worldview.

Racial disparity in environmental attitudes may result from (a) a "hierarchy of needs" in the Maslow understanding, in which poor and minorities have more immediate survival needs, and do not have the time or resources to support less immediate concerns such as environmentalism; or (b) "environmental deprivation" in which those most immediately affected by environmental hazards have higher levels of environmental concern while wealthier (and white) persons could live away from immediate impacts and would be more concerned with long range environmental concerns (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435). The Maslow hierarchy underlies the Postmaterialism theory that people in more highly industrialized and wealthier societies removed from the immediate survival struggle focus on matters considered "postmaterial" such as environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 426).

In the General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1973 to 1990, race was not significant in predicting environmental concern (Jones & Dunlap 1992). Blacks and whites were focused upon different environmental concerns (Mohai & Bryant 1998). Baldassare and Katz (1992) indicated that a perception of environmental threat to the respondent was a more likely predictor of support for environmental actions (such as recycling and driving less) than party identification, or the demographic factors of age, gender, education or income. General concern levels between white

and blacks are often similar (Mohai 1990). Whittaker, et al., used 21 years of survey data (1980 through 2000, inclusive) from California Field Polls to determine differences in racial and ethnic groups to six environmental issues (2005: 439). The six issues were: (1) Are you extremely concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not concerned at all regarding water pollution; (2) levels of concern of protecting the state's environment; (3) levels of concern regarding toxic waste; (4) should spending be increased, remain the same, or decreased for environmental spending: (5) whether the respondent self identified as an "environmentalist;" and (6) support or opposition to offshore drilling (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 440 Table 1). On the concern for water pollution, protecting the state, and toxic waste questions, Latino concern started low and increased over time. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 442-443). African Americans showed similar levels of support as whites, except African Americans showed higher levels of support for environmental spending. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 444) Party identification, ideology, and gender were statistically significant for all six environmental support measures (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 445, 443 Table 2). In summary, white respondents tended to be trending away from environmental support, while minority support was increasing over time. The high level of minority concern argued against the hierarchy of needs and Postmaterial theories; with the highest levels of minority support on the direct matters such as toxic waste. There was a decline in all groups in self-identification as environmentalist perhaps because of the negative attacks on environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 445-446). A later study indicated that race also was correlated to perception of environmental threat, with African Americans perceiving more environmental threat when other variables are controlled (Jones and Rainey 2006).

Environmental support among women and minorities may be a reflection of increased perception of risk of harm from environmental factors experienced by minorities and women; or

stated another way, the significantly lower level of perceived risk among while males, the "white male effect" (Satterfield, et al., 2004; Kalof, L., et al., 2002; Flynn, et al., 1994). Baldassare and Katz find that young respondents, women, liberals, and Democrats perceived a higher threat of environmental harm. These are the usual demographic groups associated with a higher concern for environmental issues (1992). The perception of environmental threat to the respondent (Baldassare & Katz 1992) may be a result of environmental injustice issues, such as the disproportionate placement of environmental risks in minority communities (Mohai, et al., 2009: 405, 406-7, 410, 422; Satterfield, et al., 2004: 116). Different theories have been developed for the reasons for disparate impacts in minority neighborhoods (Jones & Jacques 2014: 418-419; see also Mohai, et al., 2009 and Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435, 438, for the history of the environmental justice movement). Some studies asserted that non-minorities had more economic resources, were more mobile, and more likely to move from locations with environmental impacts (Pulido 2000), while other studies indicated that the environmental harms were placed in existing minority neighborhoods so that the disparate impact resulted from the initial siting decision (Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Mohai, et al., 2009: 417; Penderhughes 1996: 235-7, 243; Ringquist 1997: 818; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303; Ringquist 2005: 224, 233, 235, 241; Pastor, et al., 2001). The initial siting of environmental harms into minority neighborhoods increased, as environmental harms become more known (Mohai, et al., 2009: 413). Such placement led to institutionalized racism (Schlosberg 2013: 39). Minorities in Florida were also exposed to the environmental risk from environmental harm siting in minority neighborhoods. (Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303)

In the Satterfield, et al., study, white males consistently showed lower risk assessments from 19 activities. White women and non-white males conveyed almost identical increased risk

assessment, with the highest levels of risk assessment among non-white women (except for assessment of motor vehicle risk in which non-white female risk assessment was identical to that of white males) (2004: 118-119; 118: Figure 1). McCright & Dunlap (2012: 222) found lower risk concern expressed by conservative white males across eight environmental issues. Subjective feelings of discrimination and the personal evaluation of environmental justice issues also influenced assessment of risk, so that white males who perceived themselves as vulnerable and highly concerned with environmental justice, perceived the risks similarly to other groups (Satterfield, et al., 2004: 127-128, 127: Table IV, Table V). While gender and race remain significant explanatory variables in assessment of environmental risk, some portion of the "white male effect" may be explained because white males saw themselves less at risk (as part of the dominant social structure of which neither minorities nor women are a part) and may live in less stressed areas. Conservative white males drive the white male effect (McCright & Dunlap 2011). White males who are not conservative stated similar attitudes as did non-white males across various environmental issues. Overall, the conservative white males were less supportive of the environment (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 220-221). Age, income, fulltime employment, and parenthood were not statistically significant (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 221). Again, attitudes regarding the role of environment in response to environmental concerns affected levels of environmental support. Accepting that the environmental risk of climate change existed, for example, meant accepting government regulation and threatened the conservative white male's status in the power and elite structure (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 212). Conservative white males also made up a significant portion of the Tea Party identifiers (Williamson, et al., 2011: 27), potentially driving a significant portion of the Tea Party supporters' anti-environmental attitudes.

Age seems mixed in determining environmental attitudes. Some studies found that increasing age increased environmental support because of lower taxable income (and therefore less personal cost to achieve the generalized good of an improved environment or with less cost to obtain the environmental good from private purchase) and increased perception of health and other risks from environmental threat (Khan 2002). Other studies find that younger respondents were socialized with a general Postmaterialistic outlook after the modern environmental movement emerged; and therefore expressed higher levels of support for environmental matters (Inglehart 1981; Daniels, et al., 2012: 471).

Increased education was weakly correlated with environment support. Education effects on environmental beliefs may vary by partisan identification (Guber 2013). Gallop respondents with little information regarding global warming shared similar low levels of concern regarding global warming regardless of party identification. Obtaining information regarding global warming greatly increased concern about global warming for Democrats and somewhat for Independents; but being "well informed" about global warming decreased concern by Republicans (Guber 2013: 107 Figure 4). Guber suggested that the increased information included partisan cues regarding the different party positions on global warming (2013: 106). Therefore, this information may well increase the awareness of Democrats that they should be concerned about global warming and of Republicans that environmental concern would lead to unpalatable governmental regulation. Awareness both increased support among those who were ideologically predisposed for environmental concern, and triggered the opposition to environmental issues among those ideologically predisposed to oppose environmental measures, especially those from the government. [For every movement there is a countermovement!] Education was an important factor in causing the Tea Party attitudinal split within the

Republican Party (discussed above), with higher levels of education tending to decrease Tea Party support and increase environmental support (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 220-221, 222; Hamilton 2012).

Religious preferences also affected environmental voting. Conservative Christian ideology, religious tradition, and active participation in religious practices all have strong bi-variant negative correlation to support for environmental policy. In a multivariate analysis, possessing conservative religious beliefs was the strongest predictor of anti-environmental policy support (Guth, et al, 1995). Religion and theological beliefs have long influenced outlooks regarding the environment. Different religious beliefs influenced views of whether the environment should be feared, subdued, and conquered as the residence of evil and the devil (a dominion over nature theology, which influenced early Puritan views of nature, for example) (Nash [1967] 2001, p. 15, 17, 31, 35, 262); or appreciated both for human recreation and for its own beauty reflecting God's creation (the spiritual basis for efforts to establish National Parks and set aside wilderness, for example) (Nash [1967] 2001, p. 46, 88, 91, 194-95, 197). Religious influences upon environmental policy decisions have traditionally been theorized as negative, with a view of human dominion over nature and the belief in end times leading to opposition to environmental concerns (White 1967; Hand & van Liere 1984; Sherkat and Ellison 2007, p. 71; Barker and Bearce 2013, p. 268). The so called "Lynn White Thesis," that conservative religious beliefs have a negative impact on environmental support, has been challenged as not fully descriptive of the impact of religion on environmental support (Djupe & Hunt 2009). Evangelical anti-environmentalism may be weakening, especially among younger evangelicals (Djupe & Gwiasda 2010). Other theological impulses may actually lead to environmental concern and support (Kearns 1996). Individuals with liberal theological views use stewardship theology to

increase environmental support (Mockabee, et al. 2012). Congregational make up may also impact the effect of religious beliefs on environmental support (Djupe & Olson 2010).

Place of residence may affect levels of environmental support. The rural/urban split in political opinions, so significant in other areas (McKee 2008; Bishop & Cushing 2008), may also appear regarding support of environmental ballot initiatives (Alm & Witt, 1995). Residents of urban counties supported environmental ballot measures at a higher level as compared to rural counties (Lowe & Pinhey 1982). Possible explanations of the variance in environmental responses between urban and rural respondents included that urban voters observed the effects of environmental changes (the differential exposure theory), while rural voters saw the land as something to exploit and develop or were more likely employed in extractive mining or agricultural activities (extractive theory) (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 58; van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Other studies found variances in urban versus rural environmental support but find other demographic factors more significant in explaining variances in levels of environmental support (Salka 2003).

Environmentalism is not limited to blue states. Studying Nebraska, with a strong Republican Party and few Democratic office holders, Blankenau, et al., utilizing the telephonic-conducted 2003 Nebraska Conservation and Environmental Literacy and Awareness Survey, considered the effect of party identification (Republican, Democrat, and Independent) and place of residence (farm, rural, urban) on (1) environmental support on the question of trade offs regarding the economy and the environment; (2) the role of government in environmental education; (3) the environmental knowledge of respondents; and (4) the likelihood a respondent engaged in environmental friendly behavior (2008: 66). Republican respondents showed support for the environmental attitude questions, albeit at a lower level than Democrats. Partisan

identification was statistically significant in a multivariate analysis; but the partisan divide on environmental matters was not as large as the divide that existed regarding moral issues (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 68, 71). Urban or rural residence was not statistically significant, failing to provide support to either the differential exposure theory or the extraction theory (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 72). Age was inversely significant, with increasing age decreasing environmental support and knowledge, except for performing environmentally friendly acts where increased age increased environmentally positive behaviors, perhaps as a result of older respondents being socialized in the scarcity of the 1930's and 1940's (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 72-72).

Environmental Referenda Elections in America

One type of election in which environmental attitudes should be important in voting decisions is environmental referenda elections. Even in the time period in which environmental attitudes did not seem to influence vote choice, Guber (2003) found that statewide referenda on environmental issues passed about as frequently as statewide referendums on other matters. This result demonstrated that people were willing to vote in favor of an identifiable environmental proposal. Guber studied environmental referenda in multiple states, including polling of support during the course of the election cycle. Support for environmental issues was high when the referenda were announced reflecting the consensus opinion in favor of the environment. During the course of the campaign, organized opposition may have emerged. If the organized opposition engaged in negative advertising and raised concern about the costs of the environmental proposal, previous high levels of support were dramatically reduced during the course of the campaign, making passage problematic. Guber suggested that environmental referenda be limited in scope, making only small specific changes in environmental policy, so as to be less

likely to result in unified opposition. Major changes to environmental policy were more likely to be defeated by voters (Guber 2003). Ballot initiative framing may affect whether the initiative attracted broad and organized opposition. A ballot initiative was more likely to pass without strong opposition or spending in opposition. Negative information and spending generated by organized opposition about a ballot initiative initially supported because of generalized environmental support, decreased support for the environmental initiative (Guber 2001a: 124, 128-129).

Lake (1983), studying California environmental bond issues and ballot initiatives, found electoral success for environmental bond issues but less electoral support for environmental initiatives. Lake identified 13 statewide California environmental bond issues between 1970 and 1980. California voters were asked to approve bonds to pay for specific environmental proposals, including spending for parks and water pollution control. Non-environmental statewide bond referenda during the same time period were also studied as a control. Approximately 70% of the environmental bond issues passed, about the same passage rate as for non-environmental bond issues. Statewide environmental bond issues passed in 1978 on the same ballot as Proposition 13 (the tax roll-back proposition) and passed in the Reagan 1980 general election notwithstanding Reagan carrying California in a campaign with marked anti-environmental positions. Lake concluded that the success of environmental bond issues at the same rate of non-environmental bond issues demonstrated the willingness of voters to pay for the costs of environmental matters. In contrast to bond issues with an identifiable and limited funding source, voter initiatives in California on environmental issues during the 1970-1980 period did not pass at the same rate as environmental bond issues, or non-environmental initiatives. While environmental activists were able to obtain the signatures necessary to place an initiative on the ballot, such initiatives passed

at about a 25% rate, a significantly lower passage rate than for non-environmental initiatives. The environmental initiatives attracted organized opposition, which outspent the initiative proponents. Unlike bond issues with a determinable cost (the amount of the bonds, plus interest), environmental initiatives were attacked because of the alleged high and unknown costs to businesses and voters to implement the initiatives. Lake concluded that the environmental movement was strong enough to garner the grassroots support necessary to place a citizens' initiative on the ballot, but not powerful enough to pass such measures in the face of organized opposition and concern regarding the cost of such initiatives (Lake 1983). Kotchen and Powers (2006: 384-305) concurred that bond funding mechanisms and the funding rate determined the likelihood of success for environmental ballot initiatives. Coan and Holman studied 29 environmental initiatives in 13 states from 1994 to 2005, including six in Florida (2008: 1124, Table 1). Democratic partisanship explains most of the variance in levels of support, with income and education also significant (Coan and Holman 2008: 1125, 1128).

The partisan split discussed above also appeared in environmental referenda voting. Bell, et al. (2009) created an experiment to measure the willingness of respondents to pay a set amount each year in return for a specified improvement in water quality. Starting with a base line question of the respondent's willingness to pay $200.00 per year for a 20% improvement of water quality, subsequent questions were designed to determine mean values of the amount respondents willing to pay for increased environmental quality (demonstrating the respondent's willingness to pay for a public good) (Bell, et al., 2009: 659-661). Voters were willing to pay more than non-voters, perhaps from a willingness to promote public goods through voting; or from a willingness to vote when the respondent is interested in public goods. Mean responses were higher for Democrats compared to Republicans; and for Gore voters compared to Bush

voters (Bell, et al., 2009: 667-669, Table 4 and Table 5). Education, income, membership in an environmental group, living in the Northeast United States, and visits to a lake or river were significant in increasing the amount a respondent was willing to pay for environmental benefit preferences; but race, gender, and living in locations not in the Northeast United States were not significant (Bell, et al., 2009: 663 Table 1). The means were higher than median values (skewed in favor of the environment, as those who strongly support the environment were willing to pay more than others less favorable to the environment). Therefore, to attract the median voter, which will assure a majority of votes, Bell, et al., posited that environmental activists should craft environmental referenda and policies priced below the mean cost per voter (2009: 667).

Environmental ballot initiatives may be strategically employed by political parties to increase party voter turnout. Smith and Tolbert theorized that political parties endorsed or opposed ballot initiatives, and provided financial resources to ballot initiative organizations, seeking to (1) increase turn out of party supporters; (2) drive wedge issues against the other party; and (3) for ideological reasons (2001: 741, 753). Using aggregate county data, Smith & Tolbert found that party identification levels in a county were associated with that county's vote on 77% of ballot initiatives in the 1998 primary and general election (2001: 746-747). Examining individual voter data from the Voter News Service Exit Polls for 1994 and 1996, partisan identification was the most salient factor to explain California vote choice for two ballot initiatives (one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1994, two ballot initiatives (one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1996, the 1994 California Gubernatorial election and the 1996 presidential election (Smith & Tolbert 2001: 749, 751 Table 3). Party identification drove both the partisan election candidate choice and the seemingly non-partisan referenda election decision. These results bolstered Dolan's (2005) research finding that

Democratic candidates utilized environmental positions on websites, while Republican candidates did not. To test the theorized effectiveness of political party activity and cuing on individual voting decisions, future research could include survey questions on whether the respondent was aware of party endorsement or opposition to environmental referenda, was aware of party activities in support or opposition of the initiative, and used such information in position taking regarding the environmental initiative.

Use of the county as the unit of study for referendum voting has been criticized for aggregation bias (Wu & Cutter 2011). Using census track data (median 4600 persons) and block level data (median 1300 persons) (smaller geographic units of study compared to countywide data), Wu & Cutter found that the more high income people residing in the census track, the lower level of support for environmental referenda (2011: 555, 557). Respondents with higher incomes may have more tax liability and therefore be adverse to the costs of such referenda, or may be able to purchase private goods to replace the public goods promoted by the environmental referenda (Wu & Cutter 2011: 560-561). The block level data, however, revealed a curvilinear effect for income. As the number of high-income persons increased in the block data, environmental support decreased, until a certain number of high-income persons were reached and then environmental support increased. Similar curvilinear results in the block level data occurred for the number of older persons, conservatives, and those engaged in agriculture or mining (Wu & Cutter 2011: 558 table 2, 559). Higher levels of education, youth, minority, population density, and high levels of urbanization were positively associated with higher levels of environmental support; while employment in agriculture or mining was negatively associated with higher levels of environmental support (Wu & Cutter 2011: 555).

The difference in results obtained by utilizing smaller population groups as compared to the results from countywide aggregate data suggests that individual beliefs and voting decisions may be an important level of analysis regarding environmental ballot initiatives. Branton (2003) studied individualized voting behavior in 50 ballot initiatives [not limited to environmental ballot initiatives] in 24 states over three election cycles (1992, 1994 and 1996). Using Voter News Service General Election state exit polls, Branton divided ballot initiatives into three broad categories "economic/financial" (which included several environmental initiatives), "term limits," and "moral/social issues" (2003: 369). The independent variable tested was whether the respondent took the conservative (coded 1) or liberal (coded 0) position for a particular ballot initiative. The conservative position was determined by analysis of various news sources as coded by 15 students, with the coding determined to be intra- and inter-coder reliable. The study measured partisan affiliation (the dependent variable) by two dummy variables: one coded 1 Democrat, 0 non-Democrat; and the other coded 1 Independent, 0 non-Independent. Demographic control variables were age, income, education, gender, and ideology (Branton 2003: 370). Partisanship was a significant predictor of individual voting behavior. Democrats voted statistically less conservatively than Republicans in 12 of the 13 economic/financial initiatives, in 12 of 14 of the term limit initiatives, and in 21 of 23 of the moral/social issue initiatives. Independents were less conservative than Republicans for economic/financial and moral/social initiatives (Branton 2003: 370-376). The age of respondents increased conservative voting in economic/financial referenda, was inconclusive regarding term limit initiatives, and increased conservative voting in moral/social issues (Branton 2003: 370, 372). Higher education levels affected conservative support (mixed on economic/financial, and less conservative on term limits and moral/social issues); and a liberal ideology decreased conservative support in all three

types of initiatives (Branton 2003: 370, 372). Gender and income did not seem to be related to individual voting behavior in all three categories of initiatives (Branton 2003: 376). Branton studied three 1996 environmental ballot initiatives, included the Florida Sugar Tax initiative, discussed in the section regarding Florida initiatives, below. The other two environmental issues studied were (1) a Montana water initiative, in which Democrats and Independents were significantly less likely to support the conservative position, and age increased conservative support; and (2) a Idaho initiative regarding radioactive waste (considered to be a moral/social initiative, not an economic/financial initiative) in which partisanship was significant, but no other demographic variable reached statistical significance (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1; 375, Table 3). In summary, partisan identification, even in elections without overt partisan labels or cues, affected individual voting behavior in a variety of initiatives in multiple states over time in the 1990s. Other demographic variables explained less variance in initiative voting behavior, or were not significant.

Environmental Referenda Support in Florida

Americans historically have supported "the environment" generally and voted in support of environmental referenda, especially with clear and limited funding such as exist in bond issues. Floridians share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011: 414-415). Various groups supported environmental proposals in Florida for a variety of reasons, leading deHaven-Smith to characterize Florida environmentalism as a coalition of different groups with a particular concerns, rather than a generalized movement (1998: 294). Florida attitudes overall on environmental questions were consistent with national averages. Floridians were within 2% +/- of national average of people who believed global warming is happening,

believed global warming was mainly human caused, believed that most scientists believed global warming was happening, and somewhat to strongly supported the regulation of CO_2 emissions (Howe, et al., 2015: 596 Figure 1). In Florida, factors such as income and education increased environmental support; but Republican partisanship and being under age 35 decreased environmental support (Salka 2003: 266, Table 4). In Florida, the expected increased support for environmental measures for younger respondents did not materialize. Salka (2003: 270) theorized that the "Green Migration Theory" may explain the unexpected increased environmental support by older respondents compared to younger residents in Florida. The Green Migration Theory developed by Jones, et al., (2003), posited people moved to Florida for the warm climate and other environmentally related reasons. These older migrants, choosing to live in Florida, were more likely to support environmental measures to protect the reasons for the choice of retirement location.

Citizen initiated ballot measures in Florida are limited to constitutional amendments. Florida does not have a citizen initiative provision to implement legislation or policy preferences. When the legislature failed to act in concert with general public opinion, as in the failure to fund the conservation and retirement land trust over multiple legislative sessions, Floridians could only change the state constitution to achieve the desired legislative and public policy. Advocates for a proposed constitutional change must obtain over 600,000 signatures of registered voters. The title, summary, and content of the constitutional amendment must be approved by the Supreme Court of Florida as being in conformity with constitutional requirements for such ballot measures. To pass, a supermajority of 60% of the voters must approve the constitutional amendment (Outler 2008). Historically, environmental constitutional initiatives in Florida have proven non-controversial, and passed by wide margins. Florida voters added to their state

constitution limits regarding use of fishing nets (1994 71.7% approval); approved requirements for Everglade polluters to pay for cleanup costs (1996 68.1% approval); created an Everglade Trust fund as part of Forever Florida (1996 58.3% approval); created the Fish and Wildlife Commission (1998 72.3% approval); approved property tax exempt status for land encumbered by perpetual conservation easement and property tax breaks for lands reserved for conservation purposes not permanently encumbered (2008 68.5% approval); and limited property assessment increases caused by adding renewable energy devices (2008 60.5% approval).

Certain specifically Floridian characteristics affected environmental support and voting for environment issues. Coastal counties attracted retiring Northerners, so coastal counties may be more supportive of environmental referenda than non-coastal Florida counties (Salka 2003). Panhandle respondents and non-panhandle respondents showed different levels of environmental support. On a county level, non-panhandle Florida counties had higher levels of support compared to panhandle counties for the proposition that global warming will cause moderate to a great deal of harm to humans. Non-panhandle counties also evidenced higher levels of belief that global warming is occurring (Howe, et al., 2015: 596, Figure 1). The urban/rural split in levels of environmental support was seen in other ballot measures such as support for anti-Gay Marriage ballot initiatives in Florida and California (Salka & Burnett 2012).

Branton's study (2003), discussed above in the section about referenda support generally, included one Florida environmental ballot initiative, the 1996 proposal for a sugar tax to pay for cleanup expenses in the Florida Everglades. Democratic partisans (and Independents) were significantly less likely than Republicans to support the conservative position (a no vote). Having a higher income and having less than a high school education were also significant in explaining

variance in support. The coefficient estimate for age was negative, as would be expected by the Green Migration theory, but only -.07, and not significant (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1).

Some Concluding Thoughts about American Environmentalism

Environmental concerns and pro-environmental attitudes and issue positions initially cut across cleavages in American politics and society. The period effects of terrorism and economic crisis of the 2000's, and the increasing mobilization of an anti-environmental countermovement during the same period, seemed to lessen this consensus support on the environment. Pro-environmentalism increasingly was associated with specific groups, with anti-environmental attitudes expressed by other groups. At the same time, referenda remained a viable mechanism for environmental issues to be enacted, especially as the federal system seemed deadlocked, and states varied in environmental responsiveness. In this increasingly polarized environmental milieu, Floridians seeking to pass environmental initiatives have to encourage multiple group support for the environmental referenda, especially because of the super majority requirement for referenda passage in this closely contested swing state. Current data should help first describe current environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida, and then give guidance to the factors that will help build support for passage of environmental initiatives in Florida.

HYPOTHESES

The Florida legislature seems unwilling to provide environmental funding, despite high levels of public approval for conservation and recreational land acquisitions. Effects of climate change, such as Sea Level Rise, are an increasing threat nationally and to Florida (Weiss, et al., 2011). Multiple possibilities for environmental action by government exist; but political and systemic barriers may lessen the effectiveness of certain political arenas to resolve environmental policy disputes. Federal action in the courts and in the Congress seems constrained by judicial decisions regarding proof of environmental impacts and by legislative intraparty gridlock (Jones & Jacques 2014). The current Democratic President and the federal agencies under his direction are receptive to environmental concerns. A change in party after the 2016 presidential election may foreclose this avenue of federal action. Non-profit environmental activists focus efforts in states to advance environmental policy at the state level, and to bring pressure for action at the federal level (Hall & Taplin 2010: 65, 68).

Florida government is not currently responsive to environmental concerns. Executive action in Florida on the environment seems unlikely under the current Republican administration in which ranching interests control supposed environmental boards, developers control the water management boards, and the mere mention of "climate change" is allegedly prohibited in executive agency reports. Florida has passed a fair district constitutional amendment, but absent court action, no redistricting will occur until after the 2020 census, making changes in the makeup of the current anti-environmental legislature unlikely. Environmental activists in Florida seemingly have no alternative but to turn to ballot initiatives to amend the Constitution of the State of Florida to enact environmental policies.

The initial part of this study, using 2012 survey data, will attempt to demonstrate the characteristics of individual respondents that shape environmental attitudes in Florida. Each of the three environmental questions in the CCES 2012 data will be considered separately, as different questions explore different aspects of environmental attitudes (Daniels et al., 2012: 469). Based upon previous research, Floridians are anticipated to have similar variances in environmental views as respondents nationally, with divisions based upon partisan identification, opinions regarding the Tea Party, educational and income levels, and to some degree by race and gender. Age effects of environmental support in Florida, however, may different than results nationally. Older Floridians, who moved to Florida for the favorable environment, may be more supportive environmental issues than older respondents generally. This study then attempts to analyze the factors leading to overwhelming support for Amendment One in 2014. Amendment One passed with 75% of voters supporting. Because of this widespread support, pro-Amendment One support should be expected in both parties and in all demographic groups. However 25% of Floridians voted against Amendment One.

In an attempt to understand environmental opinions in Florida generally and the elements of support for Amendment One, this study will test the following hypotheses:

H_1 Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally.

H_2 Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea Party will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party.

H_3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.

H_4 Although Amendment One ultimately passed with overwhelming voter support, certain characteristics will be associated with opposition to Amendment One:

H_{4A} Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One compared with Democratic identifiers.

H_{4B} The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects of Tea Party support measurable in the data regarding support for Amendment One, specifically opposition to President Obama and support of Governor Scott.

H_{4C} Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older.

H_{4D} Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female respondents.

H_{4E} Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than respondents who reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida.

Supporters and opponents to environmental policy positions need information regarding the groups most likely to favor the respective policy positions. Environmental activists must be strategic in determining the most effective forum to achieve the desired environmental policy. Understanding both the characteristics driving the support for Amendment One and the general analysis of national and Florida environmental attitudes should add to the knowledge of how

environmental concern, attitudes, and policy positions drive environmental beliefs; and the effect of environmental beliefs on political action, both nationally and in Florida. This analysis of Florida environmental attitudes in general, and specifically with regard to Amendment One support and opposition, should provide guidance to environmental activists and opponents in future constitutional ballot measures on environmental subjects; and in designing effective appeals for the support or opposition to environmental issues generally.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Utilizing two data sources, this thesis will examine environmental attitudes in Florida in 2012, and analyze more specifically the factors leading to support or opposition to Amendment One in 2014. The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) comprised 54,535 Internet interviews conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix in October 2012 and November 2012, weighted to reflect population demographics. The CCES included 3850 respondents from the State of Florida. The CCES contained approximately 120 questions to identify respondents by location, demographic attributes, questions on various issues and elections, and election-specific questions. This research utilizes the demographic information; party and ideological identifications; attitudes regarding environmental issues; approval of the Tea Party; approval of President Obama; approval of Governor Scott; and religious attitudes.

The Florida Chamber of Commerce engaged Cherry Communications to poll likely Florida voters in 2014, including a question to gauge pre-election support for Amendment One. The Chamber has made available the data for some of the questions asked in its poll taken in September 2014, less than two months before the election. The poll of 813 likely voters (identified by voting records confirmed by 100% responding that they were extremely or very likely to vote) conducted by telephone interviews September 16-21, 2014, asked respondents for their position on Amendment One. The poll found that 75.5% definitely or probably would vote in favor of Amendment One, 13.25% probably or definitely against the amendment, and the remainder unsure or refused to answer (4 respondents. 0.49% of all respondents refused to answer). The margin of error was 3.5%. The poll accurately reported the ultimate election result in which 75% of voters supported Amendment One. The poll surveyed respondents' opinions

regarding approval of Governor Scott's job performance and approval of President Obama's job performance. Demographic questions included age, occupation, party identification, race, gender, and media market of respondent.

From these two data sets, a rich amount of analysis is possible. All analysis will be performed utilizing the "r" computer program. From the CCES data, demographic and attitudinal variables will assist in the creation of a profile of those persons more likely to express a pro-environmental attitude regarding three environmental issues. Models will show the national characteristics and the State of Florida characteristics. Two of the three environmental questions permit five responses: a highly favorable environmental position, a somewhat favorable environmental position, a neutral position with regard to the environmental issue, a somewhat unfavorable environmental position, and a strongly unfavorable environmental position. The third question is a yes or no question regarding support for the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation, in which the "no" response is the environmentally favorable position. Crosstab analysis (verified by Chi Square and p test) will identify characteristics leading to support and opposition in environmental matters. To test the initial characterizations of environmental support, nationally and in Florida these three questions will be the dependent variables in two models for each question, one for National respondents, and one for Florida respondents. As the dependent variable has multiple possible responses, OLS regression analysis will be employed to determine the variables significantly associated with environmental attitudes. The independent variable will be a three level party identification variable, considered as two dummy variables, with Democrats compared to Independents, and Democrats compared to Republicans. Control variables include gender; race; ideology; whether the respondent is "born again" (an evangelical); the importance of religion to the respondent; levels of approval of the Tea Party;

being retired; residence in the Panhandle (for the Florida models); approval levels of President Obama; approval levels of the Governor which for Florida would be then two-year incumbent Rick Scott; age (divided into two dummy variables, comparing respondents 18-39 and respondents over 60 with respondents aged 40-59, a variable necessarily created to be compatible with the age information available in the data regarding Amendment One); whether the respondent has children under the age of 18; homeowners compared to renters and others; education levels; and family income. The CCES data will also permit a side excursion into the debate between Guber (2001) and Davis & Wurth (2003) regarding the impact of environmental attitudes on presidential candidate selection in the 2012 election. CCES data regarding 2012 presidential election choice was transformed into a two option variable scored 0 for Romney and 1 for Obama (all other responses omitted). As this variable is a yes/no variable, logistic regression models were created for the effect of the three environmental questions on presidential vote choice, controlled for the same demographic, attitudinal and identification variables used for the OLS regressions on environmental attitudes. This analysis will help answer H_1 through H_3.

Similar analysis will explore demographic variables and attitudes characteristic of support or opposition to Amendment One in 2014. Crosstab analysis with appropriate Chi Square and p test verification will identify the characteristics potentially able to explain the variance in support and opposition to Amendment One. The Amendment One question permitted a four level response (likely to support, probably support, probably not support, definitely not supporting – all other responses omitted). OLS regression will determine if any of the observable differences in the crosstab analysis of all respondents reach statistic significance. If as anticipated, the opposition to Amendment One comes largely from Republican voters, the subset

of Republican voters will be analyzed again by OLS regression. Gender will also be studied separately, to ascertain any identifiable characteristics explaining any observed variance between the genders.

In all OLS regressions regarding Amendment One, the dependent variable will be the four option variable regarding levels of support or opposition to Amendment One. In Model One, party identification will be the independent variable, with the demographic and attitudinal variables as a series of independent/control variables to determine which variable or variables (party identification, age, gender, retired, race, panhandle, support of Governor Scott, opposition to President Obama, and a combined additive index of highly favorable to Governor Scott/very unfavorable to President Obama as potentially the most conservative respondents) are statistically significant in causing all respondents in Model One to oppose Amendment One. In Model Two, testing Republican respondents attitudes to Amendment One, gender will be the independent variable and the same demographic and attitudinal variables will serve as controls. Model Three, the subset of female respondents, will use party identification as the independent variable, and the same demographic (except obviously gender) and attitudinal variables will serve as controls. This information will help answer H_4, and its subparts; and give added information regarding the issues raised in H_1 through H_3.

Certain variables require further explanation for their use in this study. Age will be of particular interest in both data sets to determine if there is any support for the Green Migration Theory demonstrated by older voters expressing more environmentally favorable positions. Taking information regarding occupation, to create a dummy variable of retired or not retired will also test whether retired respondents express different environmental attitudes than others. By utilizing the Congressional District variable in the CCES data and the "Media Market"

variable in the Amendment One data, a dummy variable for panhandle residence will test whether the more conservative Florida panhandle demonstrates different environmental attitudes than the remainder of the State of Florida. Neither data set contained enough respondents in Florida to make meaningful analysis of attitudes of those in agriculture or extractive industries. There was also no ability to create an urban/rural variable.

Tea Party approval is tested directly in the CCES data regarding the three environmental questions. The Amendment One poll did not ask directly regarding respondents' opinions regarding the Tea Party, which would have permitted a direct analysis of the Tea Party/non-Tea Party national attitude split within the Republican Party found by Hamilton & Saito (2015) on environmental issues. Rick Scott was initially favored in the 2010 Republican Party primary election more favorably by Tea Party supporters than his primary opponent. As the faction of the Republican Party most likely to support Rick Scott early, it is reasonable to conclude that Tea Party members would continue to view Scott the most positively. Tea Party identifiers were also among the most intense critics of President Obama; and continued to hold that position. Strong anti-Obama sentiment was a strong predictor of Tea Party Support (Maxwell & Parent 2012; Maxwell & Parent 2013). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Republicans who most strongly oppose President Obama are more likely to be Tea Party sympathizers. In the Amendment One data, unfavorable opinions of President Obama's job performance and highly favorable approval of Governor Scott's job performance, and an additive index of those respondents most favorable to Governor Scott and least favorable to President Obama, will be utilized to measure at least some characteristics of Tea Party supporters on attitudes regarding Amendment One. If high levels of approval of Scott and/or high levels of disapproval of President Obama, or additive results of both variables, become a statistically significant

explanatory factor for why Republicans supported Amendment One (Model Two), there will be at least inferential support for the findings of Hamilton & Saito (2015) demonstrating a split within the Republican Party.

The CCES data and the Amendment One data are different surveys taken two years apart using different methodology and therefore not directly comparable. However, certain variables are common to both data sets. A final OLS regression for Florida respondents on the CCES environmental questions and the respondents regarding Amendment One, utilizing the variables available in both surveys, will compare the characteristics of all four environmental issues to ascertain if any commonality materializes.

FINDINGS

Both the CCES 2012 data set and the Amendment One data set provide multiple independent control variables. To assure that each variable utilized in this study measured distinct characteristics, the association between the independent variable and all control variables was calculated. Nationally, the Pearson's r measure of association between party identification and opinions regarding President Obama was .68. (Florida .69). Because of the extreme divergence of opinions regarding President Obama by partisans, this moderately strong association is not surprising. However, as the association is well below .80, each variable appears to be measuring a different characteristic. The association between importance of religion and being born again measured .50 nationally and in Florida. The correlation measure for ideology/party identification, party identification/Tea Party opinions, and ideology/Obama opinions were approximately .45 each. In Florida, those associations, and the association between Tea Party support and opinions regarding Governor Scott, were .42 to .46. No association between any other two variables exceeded .25. (Florida .35). In the Amendment One data, the correlation between party identification and opinions of Governor Scott was .62; again, a not surprising result. No association between any other two variables exceeded .33. Neither data set seems to have any significant multicollinearity concerns. [Full results not reported, but available for review.]

The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) included three questions relevant to develop the characteristics of respondents leading to environmental attitudes nationally and in the State of Florida. The questions tested three different aspects of environmental attitudes: (a) respondents' beliefs regarding climate change; (b) whether

respondents considered protecting the environment or protecting the economy as more important; and (c) respondents' support or opposition to a particular piece of federal legislation (to authorize the Keystone Pipeline). As these questions involve different aspects of environmental attitudes, each question is considered separately (Daniels, et al. 2012). The most pro-environmental position for each question is:

A. Climate change is "a serious problem and needs immediate action" (supported by 27% of Respondents nationally and 26% of Respondents in Florida).
B. We should "protect the environment even if we lose jobs or decrease the standard of living" (supported by 12% nationally and 11% in Florida).
C. Opposition to the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation (27% nationally; 24% Florida).

Table 1 sets forth the percentage of respondents in various groups who take the most pro-environmental position regarding the three questions. For all variables, the Chi-Square was generally robust and the p score was an exponentially low decimal fraction. [Results not shown, but available for review.] Only gender in Florida for attitudes on the environment/jobs trade off question (Chi-square 17.56, p score 0.002), gender in Florida for attitudes regarding the Keystone Pipeline legislation (Chi-square 9.94, p score 0.002), and those with children and those without children regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Nationally: 2.55, 0.1; Florida: 4.29, 0.04), show less robust results. At least initially, the observed difference within groups on environmental attitudes did not seem to be the result of random chance or measurement error.

OLS regression analysis of the five level response (unsure and no responses omitted) questions regarding climate change and the environment/jobs tradeoff are set forth in Table 2. Even though the Keystone Pipeline question has only a yes/no response, the OLS regression

results are set forth in Table 2, to permit direct comparisons among the three questions. [A logistic regression, not reported, of the Keystone Pipeline question found identical magnitude, direction, and significance in the results for each variable.] Possible responses to each of the three questions moved from the most pro-environmental position to the least pro-environmental position. A positive coefficient therefore shows lower levels of environmental support caused by a variable; and a negative coefficient shows higher levels of environmental support.

The extensive variables and number of respondents in the 2012 CCES permitted exploration of two areas regarding environmental attitudes that cannot be addressed in the Amendment One survey data discussed below. The CCES data of year of birth variable permitted the creation of an interval level age variable to examine the apparent increased environmental support for respondents aged 40-59 observed in the three part age cohort variable in both the CCES data and the Amendment One data. The CCES data also permitted the creation of a birth year cohort variable. Figure 1 sets forth the levels of support for the most pro-environmental position by age cohort for each of the three questions, nationally and in Florida.

The CCES data, complied in the 2012 election year, permitted the testing of the influence of various environmental positions on presidential candidate choice. The CCES included both the environment/jobs trade off question Guber (2001b) found not significant in presidential choice and a climate change opinion question. (Unfortunately there was no question regarding spending levels.) Further, as the OLS regressions show the powerful effect of Tea Party views and Obama opinion on environmental positions, 2012 would be the first presidential election after the 2010 emergence of the Tea Party and would reflect four years of opinion regarding the Obama Administration; both factors not relevant for either Guber (2001) or Davis & Wurth (2003). Voting for President Obama in 2012, the variable tested, was a no/yes question, so five

models of logistic regression measuring the predicted likelihood of voting for President Obama are set forth in Table 3. For all models, a negative co-efficient predicted less likelihood of voting for Obama and a positive coefficient predicted increased likelihood of voting for Obama.

Pre-election polling in September 2014 showed generalized support for Amendment One. In the overall population, 85% of respondents expressing an opinion on Amendment One supported Amendment One. Overall, 32.8% of respondents expressing an opinion, indicated that they would "definitely support" Amendment One. Different subgroups, however, appear to express different levels of support for Amendment One (Table 4). The chi-square and p score tests for all variables except race and occupation are initially significant. Table 5 sets forth the OLS regression for eight models measuring the impact of various variables on levels of support and opposition for Amendment One. A positive coefficient indicates more opposition to Amendment One. With regard to Republicans, only Republican women are statistically different in levels of support or opposition for Amendment One. Considering only gender and Obama attitudes, both were significant for Republicans. In the model of Republican respondents with all aspects considered, only gender was statistically associated with levels of Amendment One support (Table 6, Part A). The differences in levels of support of women for Amendment One are more complex. Party identification is associated with higher levels of opposition by women, except when considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican women opposition to Amendment One. In the full model of women respondents, age and race were significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part 4). Table 7 reports the similarities in Florida environmental attitudes reported in the CCES and the factors associated with support or opposition to Amendment One in OLS regressions utilizing the

variables comparable in both data sets. Using the information set out in the Tables and Figure, the Hypotheses in this thesis are addressed in the following analysis.

Environmental Attitudes Nationally and in Florida

> H_1 *Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally*.

Similar percentages of respondents in Florida and nationally expressed support for the most pro-environmental position in all three CCES environmental questions (Table 1). Democrats, liberals, those for whom religion is not important, those with a very negative opinion of the Tea Party, and who strongly approve of President Obama supported the most pro-environmental position at higher levels than the overall population. Republicans, evangelicals, conservatives, those with highly unfavorable opinions of President Obama, and strong Tea Party supporters expressed far lower levels of support for environmentalism than the entire population (Table 2). The trends hold consistent for the Florida respondents. However, the percentage gap between extremes (liberal versus conservative, Tea Party supporters and non-supporters, strongly approve and strongly disapprove of President Obama) was smaller among Florida respondents compared to national respondents (Table 1). This is perhaps an initial indication that the partisan and ideological split on environmental attitudes was not as strong in Florida, reflecting a vestige of the previous strong bipartisan consensus on environmental attitudes even during Florida gubernatorial administrations generally conservative on other issues.

Certain groups do not appear to demonstrate much difference regarding environmental attitudes. Men and women supported the most pro-environmental attitudes at about the same percentage as the general population. Other groups show splits in attitudes depending on the

question asked. Only Hispanics showed higher levels of environmental support. Blacks in Florida showed a split in environmental attitudes with lower than average support for climate change action, but higher than average support for protecting the environment over jobs and the economy. Retired persons nationally and in Florida expressed pro-environmental positions regarding climate change consistent with responses overall; but expressed lower than average support for protecting the environment over jobs/economy. Even though retired persons no longer work, concerns regarding fixed incomes and increased costs from protecting the environment may influence this result. Attitudes regarding the governor do not make much observable difference in environmental attitudes nationally, perhaps as a result of different states with different governors of various partisan and ideological beliefs. In Florida, the opinion regarding Governor Scott created a demonstrable difference in levels of environment support. Those respondents with a strongly favorable opinion of Governor Scott expressed lower levels of environmental support, while those with a strongly unfavorable opinion of Governor Scott expressed higher levels of environmental support. Persons with children under 18, who might be expected to be more pro-environmental from concern for preserving the environment for their children, expressed similar levels of support as those without children under 18.

The results for party and ideology were different nationally and in Florida. Compared to Democrats, Republicans nationally were significantly more likely to express anti-environmental views. In Florida, the party differences were not significant. Conservative ideology was also significantly associated with anti-environmental views nationally, with no significance in Florida. Views regarding the Tea Party and President Obama, however, have a consistent impact nationally and in Florida. As the favorability of the Tea Party decreased, environmental support increased; and as the favorability of President Obama decreased, environmental support

decreased. Attitudes regarding Governor Scott influenced environmental support in Florida. Nationally, differing levels in environmentalism displayed a partisan, ideological, Tea Party, and Obama split. In Florida, there was no party or ideological divides. The observable differences in environmental attitudes in Florida resulted from opinions regarding President Obama, Governor Scott, and the Tea Party.

Other variables were significant nationally, but not in Florida. Women nationally had significantly different views than men regarding environment issues. For two of the three environmental questions, women were more pro-environment than men. For the environment/jobs tradeoff question, however, women favored protecting jobs and economy over the environment. Non-evangelicals and those to whom religion was not important were more environmentally supportive nationally. Religious beliefs were not significant in Florida. Increasing levels of education made respondents nationally more environmental; but education was significant (at the 0.05 level) in Florida only in the environment/jobs trade off question. Race was significant in the environmental/jobs tradeoff nationally decreasing environmental support, and increasing environmental support (significance 0.1) in Florida; but otherwise was not associated with environmental positions. Florida panhandle residents, a generally conservative area, interestingly were more environmentally supportive regarding the environment/jobs tradeoff and regarding the Keystone Pipeline. (No similar variable could be created nationally, and therefore is omitted from the national regressions.) Being retired, having children under 18, being a homeowner versus a renter, and family income generally were not significant in explaining variance in environmental opinions.

Intertwined with the question of the significance regarding differences in environmental opinions between different groups, is the question of whether differences in environmental

opinions influenced political action. Studies regarding the effect of environmental opinions in the 1996 presidential election were mixed, with Guber (2001b) finding no significance and Davis & Wurth (2003) finding significance for environmental opinions in determining candidate choice. In 2012, however, attitudes regarding climate change, the environmental/jobs tradeoffs, and attitudes regarding the Keystone Pipeline, individually and collectively, were strongly associated with presidential vote choice nationally (Table 3). In Florida, climate change positions were strongly associated with presidential vote choice and environment/jobs tradeoff positions were weakly associated with presidential vote choice. All three environmental questions measured together had no statistical association with presidential vote choice in Florida. However, considering only climate change and environment/job trade off in Florida [not reported], climate change achieved significance (0.05) while the environment/jobs tradeoff remained associated with presidential vote choice at the 0.1 level of significance. Therefore, the lack of significance when considering all three environmental positions in Florida in Model Five (Table 3) seemed to be explained by the lack of significance in variation of opinion regarding the Keystone Pipeline in Model Four (Table 3). Two strong determinates of environmental positions - opinions of the Tea Party and opinions of President Obama – were not present in either the Guber (2001b) or the Davis & Wurth (2003) study, but were present by the 2012 election.

In 2012, differences in levels of support in a variety of environmental issues added to the ability to predict a presidential vote. Holding all other variables at their mean, for national respondents, the predicted probability [not reported but results available for review] of voting for President Obama for persons holding the most pro-environmental position regarding climate change was .84. The predicted probability for of voting for President Obama for persons holding the least pro-environmental position regarding climate change was .43. For Florida respondents

the respective probabilities were .81 and .29. Therefore measured across the full range of five possible positions climate change, negative climate change positions decreased the probability of voting for Obama by .41 nationally and by .51 in Florida.[5] For the environment/jobs tradeoffs, measured across the full range of five possible positions of environment versus jobs question, changing positions less favorable to the environment decreased the probability of voting for Obama by .25 nationally and .38 in Florida. Measured across the range of two possible positions regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation, supporting authorization of the pipeline decreased the probability of voting for Obama by .10 nationally. Therefore, knowing environmental positions helped predict the probability of voting for President Obama both nationally and in Florida. Interestingly, in a state with a history of bipartisan environmental support, anti-environmentalism had a larger decrease in the predictive value than demonstrated nationally. Overall, while Republican and Democratic differences were not significant in Florida, Tea Party opinions were significant. The difference in predictability of environmental attitudes in presidential vote choice was more pronounced in Florida. While there was some evidence of less divide between opposing groups in Florida compared with national results, at least in some respects, and contrary to H_1, environmental divides are emerging in Florida equal to or stronger than the divides on environmental issues nationally.

H_2 *Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea Party will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party*.

In Florida, controlling for Tea Party opinions, any observed difference in levels of Republican and Democratic environmental support did not achieve statistical significance. For Florida at least, the Tea Party/non-Tea Party split within the Republican Party explained the different levels in expressed environmental support between Republicans and Democrats.

Nationally, however, both party identification and opinions regarding the Tea Party were strongly associated with levels of environmental support. Perhaps the long bipartisan environmental support and the importance of the environment to the tourism economy in Florida had lessened the general anti-environmentalism expressed by Republicans nationally. Further study of the CCES data, by state, would determine if respondents in other states are similar to Florida; or if in other states there are both interparty and intraparty environmental divides.

> *H_3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.*

Nationally, environmental support decreased for all three questions as the respondents aged. In Florida, however, the middle cohort (ages 40-59) expresses the highest levels of pro-environmental support for climate change and for the environment as more important than jobs/economy. Only regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization did the national pattern of decreasing support by age emerge in Florida. Age cohorts were insignificant in explaining climate change opinions; and mixed but significant regarding the environment/jobs tradeoff and positions regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Table 2). The results for all three questions demonstrated that environmental support initially increased from the oldest cohorts, but beginning in approximately birth year 1970, declined so that fewer members of the younger cohorts expressed the most pro-environmental position than members of the immediately preceding cohorts (Figure 1). There is strong support for a "green migration" explanation of environmental support in Florida. Nationally and in Florida, generalized support for the environment among younger cohorts seems to be lessening in the most recent age cohorts,

possibility resulting from increasing anti-environmentalism socialization mitigating any effects of environmental awareness or postmaterial attitudes within certain groups and beliefs.

Amendment One Support

H_{4A} Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One compared with Democratic identifiers.

Republicans expressed lower levels of likely support for Amendment One and higher levels of oppositions than Democrats or Independents (Table 4). Republican identification was moderately associated with opposition to Amendment One, when controlling only for opinions regarding President Obama. Otherwise, Republican identification was uniformly strongly associated with decreased levels of support for Amendment One, regardless of other demographic or attitudinal attributes. (Table 5). Hypothesis H_{4A} is supported by the data.

H_{4B} The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects of Tea Party support measurable in the data regarding support for Amendment One, specifically opposition to President Obama and support of Governor Scott.

Respondents expressing low level of support Obama, those expressing high approval of Governor Scott, and those who expressed the lowest level of support for President Obama and highest level of approval for Governor Scott (expected to be the most conservative voters), all appeared to express more intention to vote against Amendment One (Table 4). As there is not a direct measure of Tea Party support in the Amendment One data, and because Republican identification remains significant (Table 5 and Table 6) in the Amendment One data (but not in the CCES data) in explaining opposition to Amendment One even controlling for opinions regarding President Obama and Governor Scott, some other aspect of Tea Party support – not measurable in this data – explained Republican opposition. Including variables to measure racial resentment and high levels of opposition to government, two other aspects of Tea Party support,

may explain why Republican identification remains significant in the Amendment One data, and not in the CCES data. There is, at best, only partial support for the hypothesis that aspects of Tea Party support explain any Republican opposition to Amendment One.

> *H_{4C} Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older*.

For age, both the youngest and the oldest cohort expressed more support for Amendment One than respondents aged 40-59 (Table 4); but the differences in support were significant only for the oldest cohort (Table 5). There was partial support for Hypothesis H_{4C} regarding Amendment One support; and further evidence in support of older retirees "green migration" explanation for environmental support in Florida.

> *H_{4D} Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female respondents*.

As shown in Table 4, men and woman expressed similar levels of definite support, but woman expressed lower levels of opposition (female 9.9%, male 19.9%). Females were strongly associated in explaining Republican support for Amendment One (Table 6). Analyzing the reasons for support or opposition to Amendment One by female respondents was more complex. Party identification was associated with higher levels of opposition by women, except when considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican women opposition to Amendment One. Differences among females in support or opposition to Amendment One had more causes. In the full model of women respondents, age and race were significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part B). The significance of the female support for environmental issues in Florida was confirmed in the comparison of Amendment One results with the environmental attitudes in the CCES 2012 study

(Table 7). Therefore, there is evidence in support of Hypothesis H_{4D}: male respondents were more likely to oppose Amendment One than female respondents.

> *H_{4E} Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than respondents who reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida*.

Although panhandle residents express less support for environmental matters than residents elsewhere in the State of Florida (Table 4; confirmed on other environmental issues in Table 1), such expressed differences do not reach statistical significance (Table 5; with similar results on other environmental issues in Table 2 and Table 7). Therefore, area of residence in the State of Florida does not seem to be an explanatory factor of different levels of support for Amendment One.

Amendment One Opposition in the Context of CCES Florida Environmental Attitudes

The CCES data predated the Amendment One vote by two years. CCES contained more variables to explain variation in environmental attitudes than are present in the Amendment One data. Direct comparisons of factors influencing Amendment One positions and environmental positions generally are constrained. Important potential explanatory variables such as ideology, education, and income are not available in the Amendment One data. However, party identification, gender, and Obama opinion responses are associated with all four environmental questions. Floridians reacted to Amendment One based upon the same characteristics that affected other environmental attitudes (Table 7).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The time of consensus environmentalism has passed. A concerted countermovement, challenging the science and values underlying environmentalism, has moved the discussion from competing ideas of the role of government and the costs to individuals and businesses notwithstanding an overall favorable opinion of environmentalism, to a world in which anti-environmentalism is a political asset. What Guber (2003) thought could never happen is the new reality: candidates now intentionally take anti-environmental campaign and policy stances, especially among candidates seeking Tea Party approval. Candidates are asserting specific environmental positions designed to mobilize voters; voters understand the differences in environmental positions; and voters are making candidate choices in part based upon environmental position taking. Any question in 1996 about the effect of environmental attitudes on presidential vote choice has been answered by 2012: knowing environmental positions of a voter does increase the ability to predict that voter's presidential vote choice. Environmentalism no longer cuts across ideological, partisan, and demographic cleavages in political society. The intensity of these differences regarding environmental support or opposition within groups may not be as pronounced in Florida, but still are evident. Environmentalism has become yet another cleavage in American politics and for politics in Florida.

Nationally, variations in levels of support for environmental issues are explained by partisan identification, support for the Tea Party, religious beliefs, and certain demographic variables including gender, race, and education levels. In Florida, however, environmental attitudes are not determined by partisan identification when other explanatory variables are available. Florida environmental opinion differences are strongly associated with ideology, and

opinions regarding the Tea Party and elected officials. Gender and race are weakly associated with Florida environmental attitudes. When considering environmental policy questions utilizing only the more limited variables available in the Amendment One data, partisan identification becomes statistically significant regarding environmental matters. These findings support the idea that environmental issues in Florida remain somewhat bipartisan; and that the differences in environmental support are more correctly identified as a split between Tea Party supporters and non-Tea Party supporters, rather than a split between Florida Democrats and Florida Republicans. Nationally, there appears to be a split both between Republicans and Democrats and between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans.

The results of this thesis have implications for further research, for political activists and candidates, and for environmental activists. Environmental support is increasing identified with particular groups or attitudes. The period effects of terrorism and economic decline, the emergence of the Tea Party, and the demonstrable effects of environmental attitudes upon political action since Guber's book-length study (2003) call for a new comprehensive analysis of environmentalism in America and in Florida. The finding that multiple environmental issues separately or together explain candidate choice indicates that there is an environmental vote. This aspect should be studied in future presidential elections, and expanded into statewide and local elections. The CCES 2012 data offers the opportunity to study multiple states with large numbers of respondents to see if the same cleavages exist in states without the same economy so based on the environment, as does Florida. Environmentalism seems to have become part of the "Big Sort" of American (Bishop & Cushing 2008) and Florida politics.

The proponents of the theory that environmentalism is a postmaterial value may well argue that effect of environmental opinions on presidential vote choice as found in this study

actually is a proxy measure of postmaterialism. Neither the CCES data set nor the Amendment One data include any of Inglehart's Materialist/Postmaterialist question sets, leaving the impact of postmaterialistic socialization and worldview on Florida environmental attitudes unresolved in this study. The cohort data in the CCES data, and the findings in both the CCES and Amendment One data that younger and older respondents both express higher levels of environmental support across multiple issues, hint at potential shortcomings in the Postmaterialist theory to explain environmental attitudes. As anticipated by the Postmaterialist analysts, levels of pro-environmental support increase in new cohorts, up to a certain point, after which the percent of highest levels of pro-environmental support decline. The even younger cohorts would be expected to show more impact of the socialization in a secure and affluent America. The declining levels of the highest levels of environmental support among the most recent cohorts indicates that other socialization forces, such as a concerned anti-environmental countermovement, reduce or even outweigh any Postmaterial worldview. A data set including the Materialist/Postmaterialist questions, as well as the extensive attitudinal and demographic variables in the CCES data would be beneficial to help answer whether there is a Postmaterialist explanation for variance in environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida.

Political activists from the two major political parties will be expected to draw clear lines on environmental issues. Environmentalism and anti-environmentalism may become increasingly a wedge issue, a base mobilization issue, and a voting cue. It will be increasingly risky for moderate and establishment candidates in Republican primaries to accept the science of climatic change or take pro-environmental positions for fear of a well-funded Tea Party- backed primary opponent.

Environmental activists should craft environmental constitutional proposals in Florida likely to pass without attracting a well-funded opposition; and generally mobilize environmental support more effectively at the federal, state, and local levels by appeals to those groups most likely to support environmental issues. Because of the limited number of control questions in the Amendment One data, this research, at best, describes only some "elements" (in honor of Strunk & White's *The Elements of Style*) but not all aspects of the coalition necessary to reach 60% voter support for future environmental constitutional amendments in Florida. In addition to the Democratic voters, largely expected to support a pro-environmental constitutional amendment, activists should target female and non-Tea Party Republicans, as those Republicans most likely to vote Republican on the partisan ballot but environmentally on the amendment ballot. Activists in Florida seem to continue to have initial support among all groups for environmental measures. A notable feature of the support in each subgroup for Amendment One is that approximately 50% of every group expressed "probable" support for Amendment One (Table 4). If any shadow of generalized environmental support remains in Florida politics, the uniformity in probable support (even in groups with lower levels of definite support and higher levels of opposition to Amendment One) demonstrates that the starting point for assessment of Amendment One was a desire to "support" the environment. Even with the political "Big Sort" and increasing divides nationally and in Florida on environmentalism, future limited Florida constitutional ballot amendments on generally popular and non-controversial environmental matters should expect voter approval. A constitutional ballot amendment mandating a 20% reduction in carbon emissions in Florida, on the other hand, would be expected to garner intense ideological opposition, and raise serious questions regarding the ability of proponents to obtain enough Republican support – Tea Party or not – to reach the 60% approval vote necessary to be adopted.

Nothing about Amendment One triggered any organized opposition willing to fund an extensive anti-Amendment One campaign. Amendment One did not create a new program; funding was not from general tax revenues but from a specific revenue source, paid only by persons purchasing real property. Opponents to Amendment One raised only esoteric arguments of keeping the Florida Constitution free of funding mandates and concerns that other groups would tie up future funding by constitutional mandate. Neither argument seemed likely to trigger the role of government or cost of program concerns that could have increased opposition and made achieving supermajority voter support more problematic. Opponents may well have overlooked a possible argument that would have reduced that generalized support for certain groups: that much of Florida land is already owned by the federal and state governments; and that Amendment One should be opposed for concerns of limiting private property rights and to avoid 'big government.' Currently for the 2016 ballot, there is a solar power constitutional amendment, proposed by business interests to oppose government regulation of solar energy. Another group is promoting another solar power related constitutional amendment with on-going governmental regulation. While neither proposal has yet achieved the required number of petition signatures to be placed on the ballot, both propositions on the ballot would make competing arguments and would be attempting to mobilize different segments of the Florida voting population.

Environmental attitudes and beliefs cannot be dismissed as simply personal behaviors, inconsequential for political action. Environmentalism has become one of many organizing and sorting influencing in American (and Floridian) civic and political society; and an important force in motivating and explaining political behavior.

END NOTES

[1] Official Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2012&DATAMODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.

[2] Official Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATAMODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.

[3] 4,238,739 FOR and 1,415,924 AGAINST, a margin of victory of 2,822,815 votes. Official Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATAMODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.

[4] Amendment One received 1,436,541 more favorable votes than votes received by Democrat Charlie Crist. Some of those additional Amendment One votes may have come from voters who did not support the two major party candidates for governor, and some Democrats may have opposed Amendment One. However, as will be developed in this thesis, supporters are expected to have much higher levels of support for environmental spending. Therefore, much of the increase in support for Amendment One compared to the support for Crist must have come from Republican voters. No Election Day exit polling regarding support of Amendment One exists that would answer more definitely exactly from where the increased Amendment One vote was derived.

[5] This wording reflects and is influenced by the wording for reporting differences in predicted probabilities suggested by Professor Pollock in Pollock, P. H., III. (2014). *An R Companion to Political Analysis*. CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications. Thousand Oaks, California; London; New Delhi; Singapore. Page 151.

APPENDIX A – AMENDMENT ONE LANGUAGE

Amendment One Language

Official Title

"Water and Land Conservation - Dedicates funds to acquire and restore Florida conservation and recreation lands"

Ballot Summary

"Funds the Land Acquisition Trust Fund to acquire, restore, improve, and manage conservation lands including wetlands and forests; fish and wildlife habitat; lands protecting water resources and drinking water sources, including the Everglades, and the water quality of rivers, lakes, and streams; beaches and shores; outdoor recreational lands; working farms and ranches; and historic or geologic sites, by dedicating 33 percent of net revenues from the existing excise tax on documents for 20 years."

Constitutional Text

SECTION 28. Land Acquisition Trust Fund.--

a) Effective on July 1 of the year following passage of this amendment by the voters, and for a period of 20 years after that effective date, the Land Acquisition Trust Fund shall receive no less than 33 percent of net revenues derived from the existing excise tax on documents, as defined in the statutes in effect on January 1, 2012, as amended from time to time, or any successor or replacement tax, after the Department of Revenue first deducts a service charge to pay the costs of the collection and enforcement of the excise tax on documents.

b) Funds in the Land Acquisition Trust Fund shall be expended only for the following purposes:

1) As provided by law, to finance or refinance: the acquisition and improvement of land, water areas, and related property interests, including conservation easements, and

resources for conservation lands including wetlands, forests, and fish and wildlife habitat; wildlife management areas; lands that protect water resources and drinking water sources, including lands protecting the water quality and quantity of rivers, lakes, streams, springsheds, and lands providing recharge for groundwater and aquifer systems; lands in the Everglades Agricultural Area and the Everglades Protection Area, as defined in Article II, Section 7(b); beaches and shores; outdoor recreation lands, including recreational trails, parks, and urban open space; rural landscapes; working farms and ranches; historic or geologic sites; together with management, restoration of natural systems, and the enhancement of public access or recreational enjoyment of conservation lands.

2) To pay the debt service on bonds issued pursuant to Article VII, Section 11(e).

c) The moneys deposited into the Land Acquisition Trust Fund, as defined by the statutes in effect on January 1, 2012, shall not be or become commingled with the General Revenue Fund of the state.

APPENDIX B - FIGURES

NATIONAL	FLORIDA
	
	





Source: 2012 CCES

Figure 1 - Levels of Pro-Environmental Support by Cohort. National and Florida.

APPENDIX C - TABLES

Table 1 – Most Pro-Environmental Response, by Group

	Climate Change is serious and needs Immediate action		Protect environment even if lose jobs/decrease standard of living		Oppose Keystone Pipeline Authorization Legislation	
	National	Florida	National	Florida	National	Florida
All Respondents	27.0%	26.0%	12.0%	11.0%	27.0%	24.0%
Party Id						
Democrat	42.3%	38.9%	16.8%	18.1%	37.2%	36.4%
Independent	27.9%	28.5%	12.1%	9.6%	27.6%	27.6%
Republican	7.7%	9.8%	3.9%	5.2%	12.4%	11.8%
Gender						
Male	26.1%	24.9%	12.2%	13.7%	25.0%	23.5%
Female	28.2%	27.9%	11.3%	10.7%	28.9%	28.3%
Race						
White	26.0%	26.1%	11.1%	10.1%	25.4%	24.3%
Black	28.0%	22.5%	13.1%	19.8%	32.2%	36.1%
Hispanic	32.8%	32.6%	12.6%	15.5%	29.3%	25.2%
Ideology						
Most Liberal	65.7%	51.8%	35.1%	37.4%	56.1%	51.0%
Most Conservative	7.2%	8.4%	3.9%	8.4%	14.1%	15.5%
Born Again						
Yes	17.4%	19.2%	8.4%	12.4%	19.8%	21.4%
No	32.3%	30.1%	13.5%	12.0%	30.8%	28.4%
Religion Important						
Very	21.3%	23.4%	9.8%	11.0%	21.4%	22.2%
Not at All	46.3%	41.9%	20.6%	19.8%	43.5%	42.1%
Tea Party						
Very Positive	4.8%	1.5%	1.9%	NA	5.9%	4.4%
Very Negative	52.1%	46.3%	21.5%	20.6%	22.3%	32.8%
Retired						
Yes	28.1%	27.8%	9.7%	8.5%	21.8%	18.3%
No	23.4%	22.0%	12.3%	13.2%	28.2%	28.3%
Obama Opinion						
Strongly Approve	46.8%	42.7%	21.2%	24.6%	40.5%	38.1%
Strongly Disapprove	8.2%	10.7%	3.6%	3.5%	12.0%	10.6%

Governor Opinion						
Strongly Approve	25.9%	9.8%	12.0%	8.4%	21.9%	9.6%
Strongly Disapprove	31.4%	29.0%	13.0%	17.9%	30.9%	38.9%
Age						
18-39	29.9%	27.0%	12.2%	12.5%	31.0%	34.8%
40-59	26.9%	30.0%	12.8%	15.0%	27.0%	25.7%
60+	23.7%	22.2%	9.8%	8.7%	21.1%	16.7%
Child Under 18						
Yes	25.4%	25.3%	11.8%	14.0%	26.5%	28.7%
No	27.8%	26.8%	11.7%	11.5%	27.2%	25.1%
Home						
Own	24.7%	25.0%	10.5%	9.5%	24.7%	22.6%
Rent	31.5%	27.9%	13.7%	15.6%	30.3%	30.4%
Other	27.3%	31.8%	14.4%	17.9%	31.4%	30.8%

Source CCES 2012 N: National 54,537; Florida 3850

Table 2 - Environmental Support by Political and Demographic Variables (OLS Regression)

	Climate Change		Envir v Jobs		Keystone Pipeline	
	National	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*
Intercept	1.928 ***	3.197 ***	2.534 ***	3.386 ***	1.726 ***	1.804 ***
	(0.077)	(0.429)	(0.79)	(0.338)	(0.033)	(0.131)
Party Id						
Independent	0.039 +	-0.134	-0.089 ***	-0.038	0.016	-0.022
	(0.021)	(0.099)	(0.025)	(0.097)	(0.011)	(0.042)
Republican	0.305 ***	0.076	0.092 ***	0.132	0.031 *	0.009
	(0.030)	(0.126)	(0.031)	(0.135)	(0.013)	(0.048)
Gender	-0.061 ***	-0.135	0.0833 **	0.052	-0.025 ***	-0.048 +
	(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.018)	(0.079)	(0.007)	(0.027)
Race	0.028	-0.029	0.064 ***	-0.126 +	0.011	0.039 +
	(0.018)	(0.058)	(0.019)	(0.067)	(0.008)	0.020
Ideology	0.173 ***	0.069	0.142 ***	0.045	0.031 ***	0.027 +
	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Not Born Again	-0.114 ***	-0.235 *	-0.052 *	-0.053	-0.015 +	-0.021
	(0.021)	(0.099)	(0.022)	(0.098)	(0.009)	(0.032)
Religion Less Imp	-0.045 ***	0.011	-0.069 ***	-0.071 *	-0.028 ***	-0.019
	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Tea Party Opinion	-0.140 ***	-0.157 ***	-0.096 ***	-0.116 ***	-0.022 ***	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Retired	0.015	0.078	0.036	-0.023	0.002	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.080)	(0.023)	(0.094)	(0.009)	(0.030)
Panhandle	NA	-0.107	NA	-0.248 **	NA	-0.098 *
	NA	(0.076)	NA	(0.083)	NA	(0.044)
Obama Opinion	0.236 ***	0.204 ***	0.219 ***	0.208 ***	0.057 ***	0.051 **
	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Governor Opinion	-0.008	-0.110 ***	-0.007	-0.093 *	-0.017 ***	-0.036 **
	(0.007)	(0.045)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Age						
Older	-0.023	-0.110	0.051 *	0.019	0.033 ***	0.069 *
	(0.020)	(0.087)	(0.022)	(0.099)	(0.009)	(0.034)
Younger	0.022	0.074	0.138 ***	0.152	-0.010	-0.073 +
	(0.023)	(0.117)	(0.023)	(0.105)	(0.010)	(0.042)

Minor Child No	0.016	-0.114	0.054 *	0.033	-0.003	-0.006
	(0.022)	(0.122)	(0.023)	(0.109)	(0.009)	(0.041)
Homeowner						
Rent	-0.024	0.118	-0.026	-0.003	-0.004	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.099)	(0.022)	(0.084)	(0.009)	(0.034)
Other	-0.012	-0.129	-0.106 *	-0.143	-0.047 *	0.051
	(0.039)	(0.122)	(0.045)	(0.168)	(0.022)	(0.082)
Education	-0.036 ***	-0.025	-0.043 ***	-0.049 *	-0.015 ***	-0.016
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.009)
Family Income	0.001	0.007	-0.043	0.005	-0.001	0.006 **
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Adj R2	.3842	.3487	0.2306	.2473	.1227	.1337
N	37963	2627	37934	2627	33657	2286

Source: CCES 2012 - Significance *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1

Table 3 - Effect of Environmental Attitudes on 2012 Presidential Election Choice (Logistic Regression)

	Full Model plus **No Envir Variables**		Full Model plus **Climate Change**		Full Model plus **Envir v. Jobs**		Full Model plus **Keystone Pipeline**		Full Model plus **All Envir Variables**	
	National	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*	*National*	*Florida*
Intercept	4.258 ***	5.221 **	5.099 ***	6.783 **	5.156 ***	7.355 **	5.222 ***	4.726 *	6.323 ***	7.346 **
	(0.475)	(1.965)	(0.481)	(2.244)	(0.494)	(2.418)	(0.545)	(1.901)	(0.566)	(2.442)
Party Id										
Independent	-0.924 ***	-0.307	-0.865 ***	-0.393	-0.942 ***	-0.269	-0.925 ***	0.003	-0.879 ***	-0.016
	(0.127)	(0.459)	(0.123)	(0.452)	(0.129)	(0.471)	(0.130)	(0.520)	(0.129)	(0.519)
Republican	-3.069 ***	-2.125 ***	-2.956 ***	-2.288 ***	-3.069 ***	-2.123 ***	-3.051 ***	-2.017 ***	-2.942 ***	-2.051 ***
	(0.158)	(0.559)	(0.156)	(0.562)	(0.161)	(0.565)	(0.166)	(0.611)	(0.167)	(0.601)
Gender	-0.109	-0.276	-0.141	-0.298	-0.082	-0.265	-0.137	0.192	-0.135	0.150
	(0.097)	(0.466)	(0.099)	(0.472)	(0.099)	(0.452)	(0.102)	(0.408)	(0.105)	(0.424)
Race	0.538 ***	0.557 +	0.546 ***	0.531 +	0.523 ***	0.380	0.542 ***	0.571 +	0.528 ***	0.409
	(0.108)	(0.305)	(0.107)	(0.308)	(0.108)	(0.293)	(0.110)	(0.334)	(0.110)	(0.318)
Ideology	-0.351 ***	0.054	-0.277 ***	0.054	-0.304 ***	0.092	-0.304 ***	0.249	-0.231 ***	0.247
	(0.063)	(0.280)	(0.063)	(0.264)	(0.063)	(0.277)	(0.066)	(0.282)	(0.065)	(0.285)
Not Born Again	0.305 *	0.596	0.245 +	0.323	0.303 *	0.421	0.270 *	0.349	0.229 +	0.020
	(0.126)	(0.454)	(0.127)	(0.471)	(0.128)	(0.448)	(0.131)	(0.503)	(0.133)	(0.494)
Religion Less Imp	0.365 ***	0.185	0.363 ***	0.235	0.356 ***	0.186	0.386 ***	0.540 *	0.381 ***	0.580 *
	(0.051)	(0.300)	(0.052)	(0.299)	(0.052)	(0.294)	(0.054)	(0.213)	(0.056)	(0.231)
Tea Party Opinion	0.366 ***	0.399 **	0.325 ***	0.400 **	0.353 ***	0.416 **	0.336 ***	0.338 **	0.300 ***	0.407 **
	(0.030)	(0.128)	(0.030)	(0.141)	(0.030)	(0.131)	(0.031)	(0.144)	(0.032)	(0.153)
Retired	0.205 +	1.033 +	0.224 *	1.323 *	0.219 +	1.235 *	0.195	1.359 *	0.239 +	1.634 **
	(0.111)	(0.529)	(0.115)	(0.526)	(0.115)	(0.555)	(0.120)	(0.595)	(0.125)	(0.623)
Panhandle	NA	-0.152	NA	-0.295	NA	-0.262	NA	-0.316	NA	-0.488
	NA	(0.432)	NA	(0.447)	NA	(0.436)	NA	(0.418)	NA	(0.441)

Obama Opinion	-2.229 ***	-3.473 ***	-2.157 ***	-3.449 ***	-2.184 ***	-3.568 ***	-2.189 ***	-3.629 ***	-2.112 ***	-3.708 ***
	(0.076)	(0.267)	(0.077)	(0.257)	(0.077)	(0.270)	(0.079)	(0.307)	(0.079)	(0.319)
Governor Opinion	0.330 ***	0.631 ***	0.327 ***	0.585 **	0.324 ***	0.562 **	0.319 ***	0.653 ***	0.316 ***	0.569 **
	(0.057)	(0.178)	(0.058)	(0.188)	(0.057)	(0.187)	(0.060)	(0.196)	(0.061)	(0.209)
Age										
Older	-0.385 ***	0.032	-0.399 ***	-0.146	-0.366 **	-0.060	-0.317 **	-0.342	-0.317 **	-0.454
	(0.109)	(0.533)	(0.111)	(0.529)	(0.113)	(0.542)	(0.116)	(0.577)	(0.119)	(0.603)
Younger	-0.048	0.079	-0.064	0.177	0.014	0.139	-0.031	0.223	-0.007	0.379
	(0.139)	(0.526)	(0.138)	(0.545)	(0.142)	(0.509)	(0.140)	(0.588)	(0.143)	(0.614)
Minor Child No	0.267 *	-0.261	0.278 *	-0.276	0.294 *	-0.201	0.289 *	-0.139	0.301 *	-0.082
	(0.122)	(0.563)	(0.122)	(0.562)	(0.123)	(0.534)	(0.126)	(0.629)	(0.128)	(0.588)
Homeowner										
Rent	0.403 **	-0.371	0.413 ***	-0.428	0.378 **	-0.417	0.361 **	-0.771	0.364 **	-0.783
	(0.123)	(0.474)	(0.123)	(0.455)	(0.124)	(0.452)	(0.127)	(0.527)	(0.129)	(0.521)
Other	0.358	0.290	0.298	0.023	0.215	0.140	0.221	-0.221	0.092	-0.544
	(0.292)	(0.613)	(0.304)	(0.628)	(0.293)	(0.599)	(0.315)	(0.661)	(0.324)	(0.652)
Education	0.067 +	-0.248 +	0.049	-0.290 *	0.057	-0.342 *	0.063 +	-0.134	0.047	-0.243 +
	(0.036)	(0.147)	(0.036)	(0.147)	(0.036)	(0.143)	(0.037)	(0.132)	(0.038)	(0.135)
Family Income	-0.014	0.003	-0.014	0.002	-0.015	0.009	-0.014	-0.010	-0.014	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.040)	(0.011)	(0.041)
Climate Change			-0.482 ***	-0.561 **					-0.384 ***	-0.256
			(0.054)	(0.185)					(0.063)	(0.216)
Envir v. Jobs					-0.352 ***	-0.479 **			-0.238 ***	-0.344 +
					(0.051)	(0.180)			(0.058)	(0.181)
Keystone Pipeline							-0.616 ***	-0.547	-0.449 ***	-0.571
							(0.125)	(0.395)	(0.126)	(0.403)
McFadden's R2	0.815	0.893	0.820	0.897	0.819	0.898	0.810	0.900	0.817	0.906

Source: CCES 2012 – N: National 54,537; Florida 3850 - Significance *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1

Table 4 - Support for Amendment One, by Group

	Support for Amendment One						
	Definitely Yes	Probably Yes	Probably No	Definitely No	Chi Square	P score	Initial Significance Level
All Respondents	32.8	52.2	9.8	5.1			
Party Id							
Democrat	42.6	50.9	4.8	1.7	50.916	3e-09	Yes
Other	36.6	49.1	10.7	3.6			
Republican	22.4	53.6	14.8	9.2			
Gender							
Male	31.6	48.5	12.7	7.2	14.568	0.002	Yes
Female	34.1	56.0	6.9	3.0			
Race							
White	32.9	51.6	10.5	5.1	1.141	0.8	
Non-White	33.7	53.7	7.9	4.7			
Age							
18-39	34.7	55.8	6.3	3.2	13.793	0.03	Yes
40-59	26.3	54.8	13.5	5.4			
60 & Over	37.5	50.0	7.7	5.0			
Occupation							
Retired	37.7	47.4	9.4	5.5	8.316	0.2	
White Collar	29.0	53.8	11.4	5.7			
Other	29.3	58.1	8.6	4.0			
Region							
Panhandle	29.2	51.8	16.8	2.2	16.361	0.01	Yes
Coastal	36.6	49.7	8.3	5.3			
Other	28.4	56.9	8.1	6.6			
Obama Low	21.2	53.1	15.4	10.3	62.407	2e-13	Yes
Other	41.1	51.8	5.8	1.3			
Scott High	20.4	50.4	19.5	9.7	23.410	3e-05	Yes
Other	35.6	51.8	8.4	4.3			
Conservative	18.0	52.0	19.0	11.0	23.317	3e-05	Yes
Other	35.3	51.6	8.8	4.3			

Source: Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 – N: 813

Table 5 - Amendment One Support by Political and Demographic Variable (OLS Regression)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Intercept	1.656 ***	1.907 ***	1.612 ***	1.867 ***	1.889 ***	1.920 ***	1.777 ***	1.820 ***
	(0.045)	(0.097)	(0.046)	(0.099)	(0.142)	(0.156)	(0159)	(0.164)
Other	0.156 +	0.144 +	0.079	0.069	0.171 *	0.163 +	0.092	0.090
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.907)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.094)
Republican	0.452 ***	0.451 ***	0.249 **	0.254 **	0.460 ***	0.461 ***	0.286 ***	0.272 ***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.798)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.085)
Gender		-0.166 **		-0.161 **	-0.167 **	-0.167 **	-0.157 **	-0.167 **
		(0.057)		(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.060)
Younger					-0.115	-0.125	-0.129	-0.118
					(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.171)	0.100
Older					-0.148 *	-0.157 +	-0.168 +	-0.205 *
					(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.091)
Race					0.072	0.089	0.140 *	0.134 +
					(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.073)
Retired						-0.009	-0.011	0.002
						(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.099)
Prof						-0.040	0.007	-0.014
						(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.081)
Panhandle						0.056	0.045	0.041
						(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Coastal						-0.079	-0.046	-0.049
						(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Obama Low			0.331 ***	0.319 ***			0.311 ***	0.301 ***
			(0.074)	(0.740)			(0.075)	(0.084)
Scott High								-0.005
								(0.242)
Conservative								0.084
								(0.259)
Adj R^2	0.06749	0.07719	0.09757	0.1065	0.08156	0.08143	0.1118	0.1146
N	704	703	673	672	678	673	643	610

Source: Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 - Significance codes *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1

Table 6 - Amendment One Support - Republicans and Women (OLS Regression)

	Republicans Gender/Obama	**Republicans** Demographic	**Republicans** All Variables	**Women** Party Id	**Women** Party/Obama	**Women** Demographic	**Women** All Variables
Intercept	2.491 ***	2.747 ***	2.543 ***	1.664 ***	1.642 ***	1.629 ***	1.538 ***
	(0.185)	(0.233)	(0.306)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.147)	(0.175)
Other				0.070	0.022	0.138	0.125
				(0.114)	(0.123)	(0.112)	(0.122)
Republican				0.270 ***	0.147	0.311 ***	0.210 *
				(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.082)	(0.106)
Gender	-0.346 ***	-0.346 ***	-0.338 ***				
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.105)				
Obama Low	0.202 +		0.145		0.214 *		0.193 +
	(0.119)		(0.139)		(0.096)		(0.107)
Younger		-0.159	-0.193			-0.259 *	-0.264 *
		(0.177)	(0.201)			(0.114)	(0.125)
Older		-0.247 *	-0.226			-0.282 ***	-0.257 *
		(0.105)	(0.164)			(0.079)	(0.118)
Race		0.011	0.096			0.139	0.218 *
		(0.140)	(0.164)			(0.088)	(0.094)
Retired			-0.074				-0.085
			(0.181)				(0.124)
Prof			0.065				-0.007
			(0.148)				(0.103)
Panhandle			-0.041				0.025
			(0.149)				(0.112)
Coastal			-0.015				-0.061
Scott High			0.284				0.547
			(0.393)				(0.337)
Conservative			-0.224				-0.496
			(0.412)				(0.357)
Adj R^2	0.04625	0.049	0.04728	0.02723	0.04186	0.06588	0.08901
N	288	286	254	348	331	335	293

Source: Cherry Communications Sept 2014 - Significance codes *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1

Table 7 - Florida Environmental Attitudes

	CCES Data			
	Climate Change	**Envir v Jobs**	**Keystone Pipeline**	**Amendment One**
Intercept	2.518 ***	2.949 ***	1.773 ***	1.867 ***
	(0.267)	(0.259)	(0.095)	(0.0235)
Party Id				
Independent	-0.117	-0.178 +	0.024	0.052
	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.039)	(0.090)
Republican	0.263 *	0.131	0.079 +	0.0259 **
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.045)	(0.083)
Gender	-0.149 *	0.054	-0.052 *	-0.151 **
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.057)
Age				
Younger	0.042	0.081	0.066 +	-0.106
	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.037)	(0.090)
Older	-0.112	0.054	-0.061 +	-0.158 +
	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.037)	(0.086)
Race	-0.062	-0.071	0.027	0.109
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.019)	(0.069)
Retired	0.052	-0.014	-0.003	0.014
	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.035)	(0.085)
Panhandle	-0.069	-0.166 +	-0.074 +	0.075
	(0.074)	(0.085)	(0.039)	(0.073)
Obama Opinion	0.279 ***	0.309 ***	0.053 ***	0.062 *
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.015)	(0.030)
Governor Opinion	-0.234 ***	-0.132 ***	-0.044 ***	-0.084 **
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.028)
Adj R2	0.2794	0.2030	0.1061	0.1017
N	3336	3359	2971	673

Source: CCES 2012 – Climate Change. Envir v Jobs, Keystone Pipeline
Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 – Amendment One
Significance codes *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1

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