STARS

2014

Leadership Distrust, Need for Power, and the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Gary Smith
University of Central Florida

University of Central Florida

STARS
Showcase of Text, Archives, Research & Scholarship

LEADERSHIP DISTRUST, NEED FOR POWER, AND THE INITIATION OF
MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES

by

GARY EDWARD SMITH
B.A. Louisiana State University, 2012

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2014

ABSTRACT

Does a leader's psychology affect his/her likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate dispute? The study of leadership psychology has continuously found support for the central assumption that leaders matter in explaining a state's foreign policy behavior. However, many of these research projects have relied on small-sample case studies and experimental methods that have limited generalizability. In this paper, I use two variables drawn from the research program on leadership trait analysis (distrust and need for power) in a multivariate large-n study to explain the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 1,601 cases are drawn from the Correlates of War MID data set. First, using an ANOVA model, I demonstrate that MID initiators have higher average scores for both distrust and need for power and that this difference is statistically significant. Then, using logistic regression, I demonstrate that distrust and need for power have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of MID initiation. I conclude by comparing the predicted probabilities of the psychological variables of interest with territorial contiguity. All of these methods demonstrate that the psychological traits of leaders have an important effect on the likelihood of MID initiation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

The substantive question this paper seeks to ask is: does a leader's need for power and level of distrust affect his/her willingness to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID)? The conflict studies literature is rich with research about MIDs, and that research has identified several structural explanations for the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes. However, this preponderance of structural explanations for MID onset or initiation leaves out a fundamental variable: the heads of state in the international system. The field of political psychology has provided some insights about how leadership personality traits affect foreign policy behavior. Unfortunately, a majority of the psychological models of foreign policy and international relations have involved analyzing a small number of historical cases (Levy 2013, 302). In this paper, I apply variables from leadership trait analysis to a large-N study of militarized interstate dispute initiation.

In this larger-N study, I find that both distrust and need for power have strong, statistically significant, and positive effects on the likelihood a state will Initiate a MID. Further, I demonstrate that one variable in particular, distrust, performs better than territorial contiguity at explaining an increased probability of MID initiation. This research shows that psychological variables, when tested in a large-N setting, can perform as well or better than the more easily tested structural variables at explaining the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute.

To follow will be a review of the existing literature discussing the initiation of militarized interstate disputes, and what political psychology has to say about the initiation of conflict more

broadly. Following the literature review will be a clearly spelled out theoretical justification for the chosen independent variables and hypotheses.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A militarized interstate dispute is defined as: "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force. To be included these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government sanctioned" (Gochman and Moaz 1984, 587). As stated in the introduction, the conflict studies literature has contributed several structural explanations for the occurrence of international conflict. The following review of the literature will discuss research focused on the occurrence of international conflict.

Power Parity and International Conflict

One of the earliest bodies of literature considering causes of international conflict focused on the importance of dyadic balance of power. Garnham (1976) clearly lays out the three fundamental assumptions of the power parity hypothesis and seeks to test them empirically. The three central assumptions are: 1) governments are rational and will only use force if the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs 2) governments will only use force if they cannot achieve their goals through diplomacy 3) governments calculate costs and benefits based on comparisons of their nation's power with that of their potential target (Garnham 1976, 380). As expected, Garnham found that geographically contiguous states with roughly equal power would have a higher probability of engaging in lethal violence (1976, 390).

An essential component of the understanding of power's effect on aggressive foreign policy behavior stems from the research of power transition theory. Power transition theory assumes that hegemons face challenges from growing major powers who have become dissatisfied with the system status quo (Sobek and Wells 2013, 69). Research in this area of

international relations has found support for the theory in various ways over 40 years (DiCicco and Levy 1999, 675-676). Rather than emphasizing the presence of parity between states, power transition theory focuses on power shifts. Spiezio (1999) demonstrates there is a relationship between "critical point intervals" and a great power's propensity for involvement in a militarized dispute. Until recently, the research focused on the interactions of major power states. Sobek and Wells made the logical connection that if power transition theory is true for great powers, the logic would apply to other dyads (2013, 69).

This research vein, though robust, is an incomplete picture of the causes of interstate conflict. Like many structural explanations of international interactions, excluding the individuals inside the organizations leaves it open to criticism. The central assumption of research like this implies that each head of state – who is the principal decision maker in the realm of foreign policy – would perceive changes in the dyadic balance of power in the same way.

Alliances and International Conflict

Jack levy produced one of the most notable empirical studies exploring the relationship between alliance formation and great power conflict over a large span of time (1981). The findings of this research indicate that, after the Congress of Vienna, the nature of alliances changed to alliances that were more likely to create a more peaceful international system (Levy 1981). However, the research itself has a number of shortcomings that called for further investigation. First, like many pieces of research in the study of conflict, the focus rests on the presence of conflict in the system rather than its initiation. Therefore, it is challenging to make a statement about the potential deterrent effect of alliance formation or vice versa (Bennett and

4

Stam 2000b). Further, the research focuses only on the occurrence of great power wars and conflicts across a broad time span, which greatly limits the generalizability of the findings.

Leeds (2003) took some of the fundamental assumptions of alliance and conflict research and applied them to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Leeds notes that simply asking the question, "do alliances lead to peace or war?" is insufficient (2006, 427). Unlike Levy (1981), Leeds distinguishes between the different types of alliances when constructing her model (2003). Leeds finds that the type of alliance (defensive, offensive, or neutrality agreement) affects the probability of initiation differently (2003). If the potential target has a defensive ally, the likelihood of initiating a MID decreases; and if the potential initiator has an offensive ally or a neutrality agreement the likelihood of that state initiating a MID increases (Leeds 2003, 435). However, it is not simply the focus on differing alliance types that gives this research more explanatory value. Leeds also uses the directed-dyad year as the unit of analysis and therefore provides better information about the effect of alliances on conflict initiation rather than merely its presence in the international system.

An additional piece of research considered the potential effect of alliance formation on conflict initiation somewhat differently. First, the central premise of the article is that the processes that result in the formation of interstate alliances cannot be divorced from the processes that result in the initiation of conflict (Kimball 2006, 371). The author finds that the regime type of member dyads is a more significant predictor of alliance formation and conflict behavior respectively (Kimball 2006, 386). This research diverges from a majority of alliance research by arguing that alliances by themselves do not have a direct effect on the willingness to engage in interstate conflict, rather that alliances have an indirect effect.

Like most research into structural causes of MID initiation, the alliance research agenda fails to consider how leaders may vary in their perceptions of the importance of alliances. Some leaders may be more risk acceptant than others and there may well be an interaction between the presence or absence of allies and a leader's level of risk acceptance. This interaction could cause the significance of alliances to disappear in some cases.

Democratic Peace

The democratic peace theory has largely been considered by many scholars to be the closest thing to a law of nature in international relations. The democratic peace has two central empirical claims: 1) democracies are unlikely to fight one another; 2) democracies are just as conflict prone as non-democracies (Rousseau et al. 1996, 512). Though the democratic peace literature has said a great deal about the presence or absence of dyadic international conflict, there is a surprising absence of attempts to explain which states actually initiate conflict. The following section will consider some of the democratic peace literature that addresses the factors affecting initiation of militarized interstate dispute.

Reiter and Stam (2003) begin addressing a recurring problem in the democratic peace literature by changing the dependent variable of focus from onset (the presence or absence of conflict in a dyad) to initiation (one side taking a directed action against another). Their findings support earlier research (see Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002) that democracy-personalistic dictatorship dyads are more conflict prone than other democracy-dictatorship dyads. However, they are also able to identify the direction of the dyadic conflict relationship, and show that dictatorships (regardless of type) are more likely to initiate disputes with democracies (Reiter and Stam 2003, 336).

Before Reiter and Stam's (2003) study of factors affecting the propensity to initiate conflict, Ireland and Gartner (2001) considered causes of conflict initiation within certain democratic regimes. Using hazard analysis to measure the duration between the formation of a governing coalition and the initiation of the first MID, Ireland and Gartner find that majority and coalition governments in a parliamentary system are more likely to initiate MIDs sooner than minority governments in similar systems (2001, 558-561). Their findings also provide support for some alliance hypotheses by showing that having allies decreases the probability of conflict initiation (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 559). More broadly, these findings provide support for the hypothesis that democracies fight less because of perceived political vulnerability. Majority and coalition governments are far less vulnerable than minority governments and are willing to take the risk of initiating MIDs (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 561).

Building upon that research Reiter and Tillman attempt to uncover how democracies make foreign policy decisions differently than other states in the international system (2002, 811-812). The authors find that differing aspects within democracy have an effect on the propensity to initiate MIDs. They find that greater political participation and an independent legislature have strong negative effects on the willingness to initiate disputes (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821). However, being a major power and having autocratic states on the border increases the likelihood of initiating MIDs (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821).

In 2006, Lai and Slater considered institutional variation between autocracies in an effort to explain conflict behavior. Using the monadic state-year as the unit of analysis, Lai and Slater find that in a model where democracies are excluded, only military dictatorships were more likely to initiate conflict than party-based authoritarian regimes (2006, 121). In addition, there is

7

no statistically significant difference between party-based authoritarian regimes and democracies and their likelihood to initiate MIDs (Lai and Slater 2006, 121). All the previous research focused not simply on the factors affecting conflict initiation between autocracies and democracies, but also on the factors within these different styles of government that made them more or less conflict prone.

The Liberal Peace

Moving away from a focus on regime type, Oneal and colleagues (1996) consider the importance of economic interdependence for the onset of MIDs. The authors find that the power of the democratic peace theory is greatly magnified by the presence or absence of economic interdependence at the dyadic level (Oneal et al. 1993, 23-24). These findings are replicated in a later study with adjustments to the measurement of joint democracy (Oneal and Ray 1997). However, Barbieri (1996) finds that trade interdependence does not significantly decrease the propensity for conflict. Rather, the impact of trade on dyadic conflict onset is curvilinear. If a dyad is too interdependent or the relationship is too asymmetrical, the propensity for conflict increases in a statistically significant way (Barbieri, 1996, pp. 42-44). This finding is challenged by a subsequent study that finds no evidence that asymmetric trade increases the likelihood of MID onset for politically relevant dyads (Oneal & Russett, 1999).

Souva and Prins consider the effect of economic interdependence on the willingness of a state to initiate violent MIDs in particular (2006). Using a monadic model, the authors find that economic interdependence has a statistically significant negative effect on the initiation of violent MIDs. However, the magnitude is not as large as regime type and typical variables for conflict initiation such as national-capabilities (Souva and Prins 2006, 194). The findings in this

research should be taken with a grain of salt. To determine which state initiated, the authors rely on the classification of a state as having revisionist intentions as opposed to being classified as the Side A state, which is coded as the first militarized movers by the MID data set (Souva and Prins 2006, 190). However, only 55.6% of states on Side A are coded as revisionist states (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138). Coding revisionist states as initiators leaves out a large percentage of potential cases. Using a similar research design, Boehmer found support for the argument that democracies are less likely than other states to initiate MIDs (2008). The author differed coding Side A states as the initiator rather than the coding revisionist states as initiators (Boehmer 2008, 88-91).

A more recent study has considered the pacifying effect of trade by considering the effect of exit costs. Peterson (2014) argues that trade is only pacifying when the cost of terminating that trade, often associated with the onset of dyadic conflict, is roughly equal between states in a dyad. Rather than assuming that bilateral trade is almost always pacifying, Peterson demonstrates empirically that conflict is more likely when only one of the two states has more to lose by terminating the trade relationship (2014, 584-585). However, it is worth noting that Peterson does not consider MID initiation as many other authors do, rather considers the raw number of conflict events as the dependent variable (Peterson 2014, 569-570).

The Economic Peace

A more recent area of research argues that democracy matters less than the type of economic system within a state in question. This research area argues that the norms that arise in developed market economies are the cause of pacific relations previously attributed to the degrees of democracy. One of the earliest articles published in this area considered the

9

possibility that the democratic peace was limited only to well developed economies with strong contract norms and enforcement (Mousseau 2000). In this article, Mousseau makes a convincing argument for the connection between contract/economic norms, the emergence of democracy and democratic values, and the underlying reason the democratic peace exists (2000, 475-482). Building on this idea, Mousseau demonstrates that not only are economically developed democracies less likely to engage in conflict with one another, they are more likely to collaborate in militarized conflicts (2002).

As the research area evolved, researchers began discounting the democratic peace as it became clearer that the contract norms within a country may do a better job at explaining the presence or absence of conflict between states. Mousseau demonstrates that contract-intensive economies – states with strong contract enforcement – engaged in no fatal MIDs between 1961-2001, while democracies without these contract norms are not as pacific (2009, 53). Unlike many of the other structural explanations for the presence or absence of conflict, economic norms theorists began including explicit, albeit untested, assumptions about the role psychology may play in conflict. Mousseau argued that contract-poor (clientelist) economies, because of their reliance on interpersonal connections for economic activity (tribe/clan/religion), create individuals with higher levels of distrust and in-group bias that contractualist (contract-intensive) economies (2013, 187-188). Nevertheless, economic norms theory has provided an interesting perspective into understanding the emergence of international conflict. Despite its contributions, like many of the other structural explanations, there needs to be empirical testing of the effects of leadership psychology.

Political Psychology and Dispute Initiation

Political psychology has contributed a variety of interesting theories and findings to the understanding of international conflict. However, as stated above, much of the research has relied on small-sample case studies or difficult-to-generalize experiments to explain the agent aspect of foreign policy behavior (Levy 2013, 302). This section will review the literature contributed by political psychology to the understanding of international conflict by moving the focus from the state as the unit of analysis, to the individual leaders who make foreign policy decisions.

Operational code analysis has been a prominent tool to assess leadership belief systems in the post-World War II era. Operational code analysis has evolved to focus on a political belief system in which elements (philosophical beliefs) guide a leader's understanding of the context for action and other elements (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the strategy and tactics for achieving political goals (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 216). Operational code analysis has been used to explain variation in American foreign policy behavior in response to international strategic adjustment (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999). This method has also been used to explore various aspects of the democratic peace hypothesis. Schafer and Walker explore the monadic-level and dyadic-level hypotheses associated with the democratic peace (2006). In addition, they address the assumption that the behavior of democratic states is informed by the norms of governance within that state (Schafer and Walker 2006). Interestingly, they were able to demonstrate findings similar to other liberal theorists comparing the operational codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. They demonstrated found little support for the monadic assumption – democracies are generally more peaceful – and for the assumption that the different norms of

governing affected their beliefs, while finding that both were more peaceful toward democracies than other states in general (Schafer and Walker 2006, 575-576).

Earlier, Hermann and Kegley (1995) also brought the idea of leadership psychology more directly into the research about the democratic peace. Without trying to dispute the central premises of the democratic peace theory, Hermann and Kegley sought to answer the question of "why democracies behave the way they do," by incorporating theories from political psychology (1995, 511-512). In the same year, Kegley and Hermann moved forward with empirical testing of their theory, considering the case of the Reagan Administration's covert military interventions in the 1980s, and demonstrate that the primary factor used by Reagan involved aspects of his psychology first and his government institutional constraints second (1995, 23) (For a critique of their findings, see Tures 2001).

Building upon the above research, Keller (2005) explores the interaction between regime type and leadership style. In an attempt to address the conflicting views of the monadic aspects of the democratic peace (democracies are generally more pacific), Keller considers whether leaders' willingness to respect or challenge constraints explains differences in democratic responses to foreign policy crises (2005). Keller finds that leaders willing to respect constraints in a democratic system are significantly more likely to use non-violent means when dealing with foreign policy crises than democratic leaders who are not constraint respecters (2005, 225-226). Interestingly, findings also indicate that leaders in democracies who are more willing to challenge constraints are likely to place an emphasis on violence and use more severe violence than their autocratic counterparts that respect constraints (Keller 2005, 225-226).

Keller and Foster explored the relationship between what they call a leader's perception of a the locus of control and the number of uses of diversionary force by U.S. Presidents between 1953 and 2000 (2012). They find that leaders high in self-confidence and high in their belief in ability to control events are more likely to use force against state and non-state actors in periods of declining popularity (Keller and Foster 2012, 594-595). Most recently, Foster and Keller found that leaders with high scores for distrust and low scores for conceptual complexity were more likely to use force when faced with domestic opposition or falling popularity (2013). Though both of these studies provide valuable insight into the link between leadership traits and aggressive foreign policy behavior, both studies focus only on the diversionary use of force by the United States (Keller and Foster 2012; Foster and Keller 2013). This greatly hinders the generalizability of the findings beyond the hegemonic state or beyond simply the use of force as a political tool.

Another area of research considers the effect of integrative complexity on the emergence of international conflict. Integrative complexity refers to the way in which a leader processes information. A leader scoring low in integrative complexity is characterized by simple responses, large distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage; while a leader scoring high is characterized by complexity, flexibility, and effective information search (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977, 169).

Other scholars consider the effect of motivations on the outbreak and duration of conflict. For instance, David Winter finds that a high need for power and a low need for affiliation often precipitate the outbreak of war. Further, Winter finds that wars already underway only end when there is a decrease in the need for power and an increase in the need for affiliation (1993).

However, like much of the earlier political psychology research, this research focuses on a small number of cases (3) of international conflict.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Within much of the international relations literature, there has been an emphasis on explaining foreign policy behavior using various structural or situational variables. These works have implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, assumed that heads of state make decisions in a vacuum (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 76; Levy 2013, 301). However, Jack Levy notes that the explanations of many important historical events often give great causal weight to the leader in charge (2013, 301). As the literature review above demonstrates, some scholars of international relations have to come to accept that who leads matters.

Granted, there has been rigorous debate about which psychological factors of leaders matter. Some scholars emphasize the importance of political beliefs of individual leaders (Schafer and Walker 2006; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999; Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). Others consider factors such as group decision-making processes and how they are affected by individuals (Schafer and Crichlow 2010). The literature review above demonstrates the diversity of research based on the premise that leaders matter in explaining foreign policy behavior. There is widespread agreement that people matter in the conduct of foreign policy decision-making.

For the purpose of this paper, leadership style will be the theoretical area of focus. There have been a number of empirical research projects demonstrating the importance of leadership style in explaining varying political behavior (see Hermann 2003, 184). Leadership style attempts to explain how leaders relate to those around them, how they structure interactions, and the norms, rules and principles they use to guide them (Hermann 2003, 181). Rather than

focusing on broad categories, such as willingness to respect constraints (i.e. Keller 2005), I focus

on two variables within leadership trait analysis: distrust and need for power.

Distrust and Foreign Policy Behavior

Distrust is often connected with the leader's perception of the world he/she is working in.

Distrustful leaders perceive the world as being more dangerous than leaders who are more

trusting. Rather than thinking of distrust as the opposite of trust, it may be more beneficial to

think of distrust as a personality trait that can shift depending on the situation. A leader may

become more distrustful overtime if he/she is repeatedly taken advantage of by other heads of

state.

Leaders with high levels of distrust tend to have a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness,

misgiving, and wariness about others (Hermann 2003, 202). Therefore, these individuals are

likely to suspect the motivations and actions of other, particularly in regards to those they view

as competitors (Hermann 2003, 202). In the domain of foreign policy, distrust has been shown to

be one of the most important determinants of a hawkish foreign policy (Foster and Keller 2013

5). Distrust causes higher threat perceptions and increases a leader's willingness to use force to

neutralize those threats (Driver 1977; Holsti 1962 as cited in Foster and Keller 2013, 5).

However, much of the literature regarding threat perception relies upon an actor's

response to a specific action taken by another actor. I assume that leaders who score higher for

distrust will not only be suspect of those they perceive as competitors; they will also see a greater

number of competitors in the international arena. Therefore, distrustful leaders will be more

likely to be more aggressive with a larger number of states than less distrustful leaders. The first

hypothesis emerges from this assumption:

16

H1: Leaders with higher scores for distrust will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.

Need for Power and Foreign Policy Behavior

The need for power motive can be defined as a concern about having impact, control, or influence on another person, group, or world at large (Winter 2003, 155). A high need for power may manifest itself as increased visibility and an attraction to careers that give them control over a situation (Winter 2003, 158). However, the shadowy side of the power motive may also bring serious negative consequence. People with a high power motivation are susceptible to flattery and tend to improve only after success rather than failure; in decision-making there is little attention paid to moral considerations; these individuals may be extreme risk takers who engage in aggressive (verbal or physical) and impulsive behavior (Winter 2003, 158).

Leaders with a high need for power have been shown to more independent and confrontational in their foreign policy interaction while expressing a more generally negative affect toward other states in general (Winter 2003, 163). Motive research has often indicated that a high power motivation is a strong explanatory variable for entry into war (Winter 1993, 534). Though these findings have been applied primarily to small-sample research, it is assumed that the finding will remain significant in a larger-sample study of conflict initiation. Therefore, a second hypothesis is constructed:

H2: Leaders with higher scores for need for power will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.

17

RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample

The sample used for this research consists of cases from the Correlates of War Dyadic MID Data Set (COWMID). Using the EUGene software, a directed dyad-year data set has been constructed. The sample consists of 1,601 cases of MID initiations and no MID initiations between the years 1995-2001. The total number of conflict dyads in this sample is 39 and the total number of non-conflict dyads is 1,562.[1] Because speech texts were not readily available for every leader in every possible directed dyad, I was forced to drop some of the initially-selected cases based upon availability – or in this case lack thereof – of data. As a result, I have texts for 68 leaders between 1995-2001, some of whom initiated a MID, and some did not.[2] A list of those leaders who initiated MIDs and their scores for both psychological variables of interest is presented in Appendix A. I discuss my speech text sources more in the section on variables. Finally, some cases had to be dropped because of missing data for defensive alliance and polity scores.

The directed dyad-year is the appropriate unit of analysis for a variety of reasons. First, the directed dyad-year is the only unit of analysis that can be used to understand initiation rather than simply the onset of a militarized interstate dispute. Also, since my primary variables are individual-level variables (psychology), a unit of analysis that allows for the incorporation of

---

[1] MID initiations are rare events. Therefore, it is not uncommon to have this ratio of MID initiations to non-initiations in dyadic data.

[2] Remember, the unit of analysis is the politically relevant directed dyad-year not the individual leader. Therefore, a single leader has more than one potential dyadic interaction. That is how I can have 1,601 cases, while only having speech texts for 68 leaders.

variables at more than one level of analysis is needed and thus the directed dyad-year is more appropriate (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 655-656). Though I am focusing on the importance of individual-level variables, it would be foolish to assume that leaders operate in a vacuum.

In addition, for the sample, only politically-relevant dyads are used. Politically relevant dyads are considered to be the population of dyads at greatest risk for international conflict (Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). Politically-relevant dyads are pairs of states that are either geographically contiguous (on land or separated by some amount of water) or contain at least one major power (Bennett 2006, 245; Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). For this research, a dyad will be considered politically relevant if the states in the dyad share a land border or are separated by up to 400 miles of water or less. A thorough study of the various operationalizations of political relevance show this minimizes the number of conflict cases potentially left out (Bennett 2006). Though conflicts have occurred in non-politically-relevant dyads, research indicates that excluding these cases in a sample does not threaten valid inference (Lemke and Reed 2001, 140-143). The use of politically-relevant dyads permits me to exclude cases that did not have the opportunity to fight, which allows me to focus on factors affecting willingness rather than both opportunity and willingness (Bennett 2006, 246).

Next, only the first year of the MID is coded as the initiation year, and subsequent years are dropped from the data set. EUGene gives a researcher the ability to drop all dyads that begin the year with an ongoing dispute (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 186). Bennett and Stam argue that when ongoing conflicts are included, statistical assumptions of case independence break down. As a result, though there may be a new MID in subsequent years, any changes to the independent

19

variables during an ongoing conflict are endogenous to the process of initiation (2000a, 661).

Finally, I will not include reverse (hypothetical target versus initiator) dyads in my data set.

Variables

The dependent variable for this study is the initiation (or not) of a militarized interstate

dispute. For this paper, the dispute initiator will be determined by the COWMID data set's

coding for "Side A" states. Side A states are coded as initiators if they are the first states to

threaten, display, or use force during an interaction with another state (Gochman and Maoz,

1984). Some have disagreed with this operationalization of the initiator; some scholars believe

that the revisionist state (the state seeking a change to the international status quo) should be

coded as the initiator (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 658; Souva and Prins 2006). However, this

classification is inappropriate for this research since I am trying to understand things that lead

heads of state to initiate militarized conflicts, not pursue a change in the status quo. Only 55.6%

of states coded as revisionist actually militarize disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004,

138). Identifying which of those revisionist states is willing to use violence to pursue change in

the status quo is beyond the scope of this research.

The first independent variable is leader distrust. Distrust is an interval-level variable, and

the score will be determined using Profiler Plus content analysis software

(www.socialscienceautomation.com). The content to be analyzed will be public speeches,

interviews, and press conferences gathered from available open sources. Public statements made

before the initiation of a MID or the start of a non-conflict year will be necessary. The second

independent variable, need for power, will be scored using Profiler Plus as well. The time frame

for the verbal material is the year prior to the conflict or non-conflict year.

Need for power is coded by focusing on verbs. The conditions of need for power are scored when the speaker proposes or engages in a strong or forceful action such as an assault or attack, verbal through, accusation or reprimand; gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited; tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else only if the concern is not reach agreement; and is concerned with his/her reputation (Herrmann 2003, 190). When coding for distrust, Profiler Plus will focus on nouns and noun phrases referring to persons other than the leader and the leader's group. First, a noun or noun phrase is coded as indicating distrust if it expresses distrust, doubt, misgivings about, feelings of unease about, feeling of weariness about what persons or groups other than the leader's are doing. Second, if a leader shows concern about what these persons or groups are doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, etc. to him or herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to them (Hermann 2003, 202-203). I provide excerpts of speeches that scored highest and lowest for distrust and need for power in Appendix B, C, and D respectively.

The speech texts for this research come from a variety of sources. Some were pulled from wire services and broadcast transcripts via the database Lexis Nexis. So long as the leader being examined is quoted directly – not paraphrased – the transcripts were considered a valid source material. For U.S. Presidents, I relied heavily on the American Presidency Project's database of news conferences. For more elusive leaders, I found prepared speeches at some intergovernmental organization gatherings, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). I also pulled text from parliamentary debates using Hansard or other various governmental websites when applicable.

I will include several control variables in the design. The first control variable is the regime type. It is theoretically argued that democratic regimes will be less likely to initiate conflicts than non-democratic states (Reiter and Stam 2003). The ordinal score for side A will be pulled from the Polity IV data set. The measure of joint democracy will be taken from the Polity IV Data set also and will be presented as a dichotomous variable in accordance with standard democratic peace research: a dyad is coded as a jointly democratic if both states have a polity score 6 or higher (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Joint democracy is expected to have a strong negative effect on the likelihood of conflict (Oneal, et al. 1993). Like Souva and Prins (2006), I expect that foreign direct investment (FDI) dependence will have a negative effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. FDI will be determined by dividing the total amount of FDI by a country's gross domestic product (GDP); the data will be gathered from the World Bank. Also, like Souva and Prins (2006), I will use the Penn World Table to get access to data about a state's trade openness as a proxy for trade dependence (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Openness is calculated by taking the sum of imports and exports and dividing the sum by the state's gross national product (GNP). Finally, I will include GDP per capita as a measure of economic development within the potential initiating state (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Each of these measures has been found to decrease the likelihood of violent MID initiation (Souva and Prins 2006).

Since some politically-relevant dyads contain states that are not necessarily contiguous (i.e. major power – any state dyad); territorial contiguity will be included as a separate control variable. The data for geographic contiguity will be gathered using the EUGene software. The measure of contiguity is ordinal. The further away states in a dyad become the higher the

22

number. 1 being the states that share a land border and 6 being states that are separated by up to 450 miles of water (Bennett and Stam 2000b). Geographic contiguity has been shown to increase the likelihood of conflict between two states in the previous research because of an increased opportunity (Leeds 2003, 434).

Another control variable is pulled from Leeds's (2003) research on the important effect of alliances on the likelihood a state will initiate a MID. The control variable of interest in my data set is the presence or absence of an ally for the potential target state (side B) that has promised to come to their aid if attacked. The variable is binary for each directed dyad-year (Leeds 2005). The presence of a defensive ally is expected to have a statistically significant, negative effect on the likelihood a side A state will initiate a MID (Leeds 2003).

A final control I will include is the logarithm of the capability ratio between potential initiators and potential targets (Russett and Oneal 2001, 103). Like Russett and Oneal I expect a negative relationship between the capability ratio and the likelihood of MID initiation (2001, 107-108). This means that as the ratio becomes larger – meaning that the potential challenger state has a greater share of the dyadic capabilities relative to the potential target – the likelihood of initiating a MID decreases. The data will be taken from the Correlates of War project capabilities data set using the EUGene program. The CINC score is based on data on states' total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and the size of armed forces. The score represents each state's share of the world's total for each of these subindicies (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 as cited in Hegre 2008, 577).

Methods

   Though the issue of temporal dependence can be common in research using MID data, my sample is not vulnerable to this problem because I explicitly drop any ongoing conflict years. Leaving those in place would do serious damage to the assumption of independence among cases (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 661). Therefore, I will be using a logistic regression model to calculate the effect of the independent variable and control variables, on the likelihood of dispute initiation. I will use the Relogit specification for carrying out logistic regression with rara events data (Tomz, King, and Zeng 1999). I will also utilize sample averages method to determine the effect of a particular independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their sample means, on the estimated probability of the dependent variable (Pollock 2012, 233-234). Finally, I will include an ANOVA analysis to consider the variance in mean distrust scores between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not.

FINDINGS

The most basic models in this paper rely upon demonstrating that there is a statistically significant difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not. Therefore, I first present the results of ANOVA models for both psychological variables. The first model considers distrust. Leaders who initiate MIDs have an average distrust score of approximately .14, while leaders who do not initiate MIDs have a mean distrust score of .10. The difference between the two groups is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs are on average more distrustful than those who do not. The difference between the two mean scores is statistically significant, as seen in the ANOVA results, $F(1,600, 1) = 19.94$, $p < .0001$. The results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. ANOVA Results Distrust

	Observations	**Mean**
Non-Initiators	1,562	.098
Initiators	39	.135

The same question is posed for the psychological variable need for power. In this case, as with distrust, there is a difference in the average need for power scores between initiators and non-initiators. Initiators have an average need for power score of .249, while non-initiators average .259. The difference is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs have a higher average score for need for power than those who do not. Further, the difference is statistically significant as seen in the ANOVA results, $F(1,600, 1) = 3.06$, $p = .0802$.

Table 2. ANOVA Results Need for Power

	Observations	Mean
Non-Initiators	1,562	.249
Initiators	39	.259

The significant differences between the two groups is very interesting indeed. What has been demonstrated in this section is that individual-level variables, which would be expected to vary in less than predictable ways between heads of state, are to some degree predictable. In these two models, I have successfully demonstrated that initiators are more distrustful and have a greater need for power than leaders who do not initiate MIDs.

Before discussing the results of the logistic regression, a discussion of potential correlations between the independent variables is needed. The correlations for each of the independent variables are presented in Table 3. First, I will discuss the correlations between the psychological variables of interest and the control variables. When considering the relationship between distrust and need for power, it is apparent that the relationship is statistically significant and weakly positive ($r = .1256$). Though the correlation is weakly positive, it would be worthwhile to create models that will explore each psychological variable without the other.

The most powerful correlation is between the polity score for the side A state and the GDP per capita of the potential challenger state. There is a statistically significant and strong positive relationship between the GDP per capita and the ordinal polity score for the potential challenger ($r = .7404$). Granted, this relationship is not surprising given the well documented relationship between market prosperity and the emergence of democracy (for review see

Mousseau 2000). Nevertheless, I will explore the effect of the correlation in the logistic

regression models to follow.

Table 3 Correlations of Independent Variables

	Cap	Contig	PolityA	JointDem	nPower	Distrust	Defense	Trade Open	FDI	GDPpc
Cap	----	.1815 (0.0000)	0.0266 (0.0272)	-0.2247 (0.0000)	-0.049 (0.0000)	-0.0985 (0.0000)	-0.1087 (0.0000)	-0.3358 (0.0000)	-0.1393 (0.0000)	0.0313 (0.0095)
Contig	.1815 (0.0000)	----	.1199 (0.0000)	-0.0241 (0.0000)	0.0024 (0.8424)	-0.0444 (0.0002)	-0.0847 (0.0003)	-0.1448 (0.0000)	0.0146 (0.0000)	0.1764 (0.0000)
PolityA	0.0266 (0.0272)	.1199 (0.0000)	----	0.3587 (0.0000)	0.1518 (0.0000)	-0.1157 (0.0000)	0.1075 (0.0000)	-0.0310 (0.0099)	0.0796 (0.0000)	0.7404 (0.0000)
JointDem	-0.2247 (0.0000)	-0.0241 (0.0000)	0.3587 (0.0000)	----	0.1125 (0.0000)	-0.0532 (0.0000)	0.3670 (0.0000)	0.0162 (0.2047)	0.1250 (0.0000)	0.4265 (0.0000)
nPower	-0.049 (0.0000)	0.0024 (0.8424)	0.1518 (0.0000)	0.1125 (0.0000)	----	0.1256 (0.0000)	0.0922 (0.0001)	-0.1087 (0.0000)	0.1011 (0.0000)	0.1981 (0.0000)
Distrust	-0.0985 (0.0000)	-0.0444 (0.0002)	-0.1157 (0.0000)	-0.0532 (0.0000)	0.1256 (0.0000)	----	-0.0536 (0.0211)	0.2448 (0.0000)	0.0852 (0.0000)	-0.1934 (0.0000)
Defense	-0.1087 (0.0000)	-0.0847 (0.0003)	0.1075 (0.0000)	0.3670 (0.0000)	0.0922 (0.0001)	-0.0536 (0.0211)	----	-0.1209 (0.0000)	0.0528 (0.0241)	0.2650 (0.0000)
Trade Open	-0.3358 (0.0000)	-0.1448 (0.0000)	-0.0310 (0.0099)	0.0162 (0.2047)	-0.1087 (0.0000)	0.2448 (0.0000)	-0.1209 (0.0000)	-----	0.3701 (0.0000)	-0.1854 (0.0000)
FDI	-0.1393 (0.0000)	0.0146 (0.0000)	0.0796 (0.0000)	0.1250 (0.0000)	0.1011 (0.0000)	0.0852 (0.0000)	0.0528 (0.0241)	0.3701 (0.0000)	----	0.1995 (0.0000)
GDPpc	0.0313 (0.0095)	0.1764 (0.0000)	0.7404 (0.0000)	0.4265 (0.000)	0.1981 (0.0000)	-0.1934 (0.0000)	0.2650 (0.0000)	-0.1854 (0.0000)	0.1995 (0.0000)	-----

Note: P-values presented in parentheses under *r*, N=1,601

Now that a difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not has been established, I turn to the multivariate logistic regression models in Table 4. Model 1 is the full multivariate model with all the control variables. The purpose of this model is determine which, if any, of the control variables fail to achieve statistical significance and can thus be omitted from subsequent models. The control variables behave as expected. First, the ratio of capabilities between the two states in the dyad performs as expected. As the potential challenger becomes more powerful relative to the potential target, the likelihood of that state initiating a MID decreases in a statistically significant way ($p < .001$). The results perform as expected as well for territorial contiguity. The farther apart the two states get, the less likely a state is to initiate a MID. Joint democracy lessens the likelihood of MID initiation, and the presence of a defensive ally for the target state also decreases the likelihood of MID initiation. However, FDI, trade openness, and GDP per capita fail to achieve significance despite the effects being in the expected direction.

Turning to the psychological variables of interest, model one indicates that distrust behaves as expected by hypothesis 1. Distrust has a statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood that a leader will initiate a militarized interstate dispute; the higher a leader's level of distrust, the more likely he or she is to initiate a MID. In model 1, however, need for power fails to achieve significance at the $p < .10$ level though the relationship is in the expected direction. In the following models I will remove the control variables that fail to achieve significance. This will give me the opportunity to consider the effect of my psychological variables and the significant controls without the statistical noise of the insignificant controls.

Now, I turn to Model 2. In this model, I remove all control variables that fail to achieve

29

statistical significance, except for need for power, which is not removed from model 2 since it is

one of the independent variables of interest. The insignificant variables are removed from model

2, and all subsequent models, because they do not lend anymore insight to the understanding of

MID initiation. Above, there was discussion of the strong significant relationship between the

polity score for the potential challenger state and the GDP per capita of the potential challenger

state. Though the test is not reported in Table 4, removing the polity score and leaving in GDP

per capita did not have any effect on the significance of GDP per capita (p = .358). Therefore,

even when taking this significant correlation into account, GDP per capita does not have any

significant effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. As a result, the models testing this did not

merit reporting in Table 4.

After removing the insignificant variables in model 2, need for power achieves statistical

significance at the p < .10 level and the relationship is positive as hypothesis 2 predicted. This

indicates that as a leader's need for power increases, he/she is more likely to initiate a MID.

Distrust continues to have a significant positive effect on the likelihood a potential challenger

will initiate a MID. The power of the potential challenger state relative to the potential target

state continues to have a significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. Similarly

territorial contiguity, joint democracy, and the presence of a defensive ally for the potential target

state continue to have a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID

initiation.

Since distrust and need for power are both psychological characteristics operating at the

individual level of analysis, it is possible that both are competing for similar sources of the

variance in the dependent variable, thus reducing the significance of the impact of each. Support

for this assertion comes in part from the statistically significant positive correlation between the two variables reported in Table 3. To test these effects, I ran two more models. Model 3, keeps need for power in the model but removes distrust. In this model, all the control variables maintain their respective directions and statistical significance. In model 3, need for power does indeed reach standard levels of significance (b=7.44, p < .05). As the need for power of a leader increases, there is a statistically-significantly higher likelihood that the state will initiate a MID, even when controlling for important and significant structural variables. In model 4, I remove need for power and consider just distrust in relation to the other structural control variables. As model 4 demonstrates, distrust continues to be statistically significant without the presence of need for power when considered alongside the other structural variables. Finally, the effect of distrust is stronger without need for power in the model.

Finally, in Model 5, I test the possibility that distrust's significance relies on territorial contiguity. Therefore, I remove territorial contiguity from model 5 and review the effect. After removing territorial contiguity from model 5, need for power loses its significance once again. However, distrust does not. Model 5 demonstrates that distrust can stand on its own as an explanatory variable without the inclusion of territorial contiguity. However, need for power has some sort of reliance on the presence of territorial contiguity for its significance.

Table 4. Logistic Regression Models

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
nPower	5.13 (3.39)	4.24* (3.19)	7.44** (3.56)	-----	3.71 (3.68)
Distrust	6.56*** (2.87)	6.80*** (2.75)	-----	8.01*** (2.81)	7.34*** (2.71)
Capability Ratio	-.296**** (.083)	-.249**** (.067)	-.238**** (.062)	-.251**** (.068)	-.264**** (.059)
Contiguity	-.358**** (.082)	-.361**** (.073)	-.365**** (.072)	-.358**** (.073)	-----
Joint Democracy	-1.05** (.495)	-1.28**** (.425)	-1.50**** (.432)	-1.25*** (.422)	-1.69**** (.457)
Polity Side A	-.017 (.016)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Defensive Ally Side B	-.922* (.476)	-.829* (.445)	-.672** (.409)	-.815** (1.23)	-.211 (.465)
FDI	-0.0000015 (0.00000696)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Trade Openness	-.015 (.012)	-----	-----	-----	-----
GDP Per Cap	-.0000108 (.0000293)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Constant	3.39	-2.65***	-2.67***	-1.75***	-4.09****
N	1,601	1,601	1,601	1,601	1,601

*$p < .10$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$ ****$p < .001$ **Note: Standard Error in parentheses below logit coefficients.**

Next, I will evaluate the predicted probabilities for two of my psychological variables and compare the performance of those variables to territorial contiguity, one of the most consistently important structural variables in conflict studies (Bremer 1992). Further, this control variable is highly significant in all of my models with a p-value consistently $p < .001$. Logistic regression allows us to think of the effect of independent variables on dichotomous dependent variables in terms of odds ratios and percentage change in the odds of a 1 (MID initiation) instead of a 0 (no MID initiation) (Pollock 2012b, 200). However, the method also assumes a nonlinear relationship between need for power and distrust and the *probability* of initiating a MID (Pollock 2012b, 200). This means that logistic regression assumes that a one unit increase in distrust/need

for power will have less of an effect on those with extremely high or extremely low distrust/need for power, but that a one unit increase will have a much greater effect on those who have moderate scores for need for power and/or distrust. The people who score extremely high on these traits are already likely to initiate a MID and those who are extremely low are likely to not initiate a MID. However, for those with moderate scores for these psychological traits, a one unit increase along one or both of these traits (i.e. going from a distrust score of 0.1 to a distrust of 0.2) could be the difference between deciding to initiate a MID and deciding not to initiate a MID (Pollock 2012, 200). Rather than dealing with odds ratios or percentage change in the odds, it is much easier to think about the effect of need for power and distrust on the probability of initiating a MID. As a result, I turn to predicted probabilities. The predicted probability graphs are a visual representation of the effect of distrust, need for power, and territorial contiguity on the probability of MID initiation.[3]

Figure 1 shows the predicted probability curve for distrust, the psychological variable from hypothesis one. Remember that initiators and non-initiators differ in a statistically significant way regarding this variable, and that distrust is a consistently significant explanatory variable for MID initiation. The distrust score is along the x-axis and the probability of initiating a MID at each value of the independent variable is on the y-axis. The curve indicates visual support for hypothesis one: as the value for distrust increases, the probability of MID initiation also increases. The probability of initiating a MID at the lowest score for distrust is approximately .0025, while the probability of initiating a MID at the highest score for distrust is

---

[3] In response to a comment from a committee member, I explored the possibility that the significance of the variables depends upon the regime type of a state. I tested the model looking only at the effects for autocracies and democracies separately. The results were insignificant, indicating the polity score for side A worked better as a control variable.

33

approximately .07. A change from a score of 0.1 for distrust to 0.2 moves the probability of MID initiation from approximately .01 to approximately .02. However, the overall probability remains low because this study is dealing with the occurrence of a rare event, thus the baseline probability of a MID occurring at all is low regardless of the independent variables of interest.

Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities – Distrust[4]

The predicted probabilities of need for power are presented in Figure 2. Like distrust, need for power behaves as expected. Figure 2 demonstrates that at the lowest score for need for power, the probability of initiating a MID is approximately .007. As the predicted probability curve moves up to its maximum score for need for power, the probability of MID initiation becomes approximately .027. Figure 2 demonstrates that as need for power moves from the

---

[4] Tab Stats appear in Appendix E

lowest score of approximately 0.17 to the highest score of approximately .425, the probability of

a state initiating a MID increases accordingly. This provides additional support for hypothesis 2.

Figure 2 Predicted Probabilities for - Need for Power[5]

In Figure 3, I present the predicted probabilities for one of the strongest structural

variables in the conflict studies literature, territorial contiguity. Remember, that contiguity has

time and again had a strong relationship with the likelihood a state will initiate a MID, and that

the further away states in the dyad are, the less likely it is that a state will initiate a MID (Bremer

1992). Contiguity is an important control variable in all of my models. Its importance is

demonstrated by the consistent statistical significance in each of my models. The curve goes in

the expected direction: as states get further away from each other, the probability that the

---

[5] Tab Stats appear in Appendix F

potential challenger state will initiate a MID decreases. As with the psych variables, despite the accepted importance of contiguity, the probability remains low because MID initiation is a rare event.

Figure 3 Predicted Probabilities – Territorial Contiguity[6]

Now I will move into comparing the three different predicted probability models. It has already been demonstrated that the three variables behave as expected. First, I will explore how distrust compares with territorial contiguity. The highest level (i.e. maximum score in my data set) of distrust increases the probability of MID initiation to approximately .07. Whereas, the probability associated with the lowest score for territorial contiguity – meaning the states in the

---

[6] Tab Stats appear in Appendix G

dyads are closest to each other and therefore more prone to conflict – is only approximately .048. This is a profoundly interesting finding. This comparison indicates that a leader's score for distrust does a better job of explaining the probability of MID initiation than territorial contiguity.

Finally, consider the way need for power compares with territorial contiguity. The maximum score for need for power is associated with a maximum probability of approximately .027. As stated above, the score for territorial contiguity associated with higher levels of conflict is associated with a maximum probability of approximately .048. Need for power's effect on the probability of MID initiation is not as strong as the effect of territorial contiguity. Nevertheless, need for power continues to demonstrate a strong positive effect on the probability of MID initiation. The overarching message of this section is that the psychological variables of interest in this study perform as well or, in the case of distrust, better than territorial contiguity in terms of explaining the increased probability of MID initiation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper started by asking a straight forward question: do a leader's psychological traits affect his/her state's likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate dispute? The answer is emphatically yes. The first demonstration came with the ANOVA models that considered differences between leaders who initiated and those who did not. In agreement with the expectations, MID-initiating leaders had higher average scores for need for power and distrust, and the difference between the two groups were statistically significant. Given that one would expect such traits to vary from person to person in unpredictable ways, the ANOVA tests demonstrate that the differences between the two groups of leaders are, in fact, quite predictable.

Moving on to the logistic regression models, the assertions made earlier in the paper find further statistical support. Knowing the groups of leaders are different along these psychological traits, the logistic regression models demonstrate a statistically significant and positive relationship between the psychological variables and the likelihood a leader will initiate a MID, even when controlling for important structural and situational variables. However, it is worth noting that need for power is less consistent. In model 1, the model with all control variables present, need for power does not achieve significance at the $p < .10$ level. Once the non-significant structural control variables were removed in subsequent models, need for power achieved significance at the $p < .10$ level. Only when distrust was removed in model 3 did need for power reach significance at the standard $p < .05$ level. It is also the case that need for power did not maintain significance without the presence of territorial contiguity. This raises the possibility that need for power is associated with aggressive foreign policy behavior directed at

states nearby, something that later studies can investigate more carefully. Nevertheless, need for power is a noteworthy explanatory variable for understanding the likelihood of MID initiation.

Distrust fares much better throughout the models. Distrust remains significant at the $p < .001$ level regardless of which variables are removed in the various models. The data indicate emphatically that a more distrustful leader is far more likely to be the first militarized mover in an aggressive dyadic interaction. Of the two psychological variables tested here, distrust is the most important explanatory variable for the initiation of militarized interstate disputes.

Beyond the ANOVA models and the logistic regression models, the psychological variables of interest fare very well when I consider the effect they have on probability compared with a powerful structural control variable. The results showed strong support for my independent variables of interest. Further, it is worth restating that the psychological variables performed as well as, and in the case of distrust performed better than, territorial contiguity.

Considering the diversity of my sample, I am not reluctant to say my results are generalizable. My sample includes leaders from a variety of regions rather than simply relying on data from great powers or American presidents (i.e. Foster and Keller 2013). To my knowledge, my sample is the only one to gather psychological data from such a broad range of states.

The confidence in my sample does not mean that my research is without limitations. Some scholars who utilize similar content analysis methods may also take issue with the fact that I use both prepared speeches and off the cuff press conference statements and other spontaneous material. It could be argued that the act of preparing speech creates opportunities for speech

writers to contaminate the text with their psychological characteristics or biases. However, it is hard to believe that a head of state will use a speech written by someone else that is drastically out of line with his/her world view. Additionally, the initial potential sample was limited because of the availability – or more accurately lack thereof – of speech texts. So, though I have a broader range of states than existing studies, some cases simply had to be dropped in an ad hoc fashion.

The admitted limitations notwithstanding, the findings I have presented here have made a strong a case for the importance of leaders' psychological traits in explaining the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Distrustful leaders as well as leaders with a high need for power are more likely to initiate MIDs than heads of state that score lower on these traits. Given the more comprehensive (in terms of states included) and larger sample size than previous research in this area, I believe the case made here for the importance of psychological variables is stronger than the previous small-n research from which this paper was derived.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The interesting findings demonstrated above did leave some questions unanswered. Therefore, the closing section of this paper will be dedicated to possible future research. As discussed in the theoretical foundations section, distrust is often spoken about in considered as response variable. Meaning, that as distrustful leader A observes a troop buildup of leader B, leader A is more likely to perceive that action as a threat and respond in kind (the classic security dilemma). With this in mind, another future research project may involve making conflict escalation the dependent variable of interest. Perhaps a leader high in distrust may be more likely to militarize a dispute with a state that simply expresses verbal dissatisfaction with either the dyadic or international status quo. A large-*n* study of this possibility is lacking in the field and is something that could almost certainly be carried out.

Much of the research mentioned in the literature review lends itself to the inclusion of psychological variables. Consider for a moment the balance of power research vein. Perhaps power shifts increase the likelihood of conflict because the head of the stronger state was more distrustful of the rising other. Perhaps the significance of power shifts depends upon a leader's distrust in the case of the stronger power and/or need for power in the case of the rising power. Power shifts do not occur in a vacuum, and heads of state make the final decision about when to initiate militarized conflicts. As was often stated in the literature review, simply focusing on structure is inadequate for explaining the occurrence of interstate conflict.

Need for power has potential explanatory power beyond the understanding of interstate conflict. Perhaps making the dependent variable the 'revisionist state – or the state that wishes to change the status quo. It is very possible that need for power would have a very strong

relationship with this variable since a change in – for example – the dyadic status quo would likely involve elevating the lesser power. Beyond simply the debate over the operationalization of MID initiator (side A versus Revisionist state), need for power has implication for the broader operation of foreign policy decision-making than has yet been addressed. If need for power is truly to be conceptualized as the need to impose one's will on another person (Hermann 2003, 154) – in the case of foreign policy analysis the state – then perhaps researchers should look past the use of force as the only means of trying to influence other states. Perhaps need for power would have a very strong and significant effect on the use of both positive and negative sanctions be heads of state.

With the emergence and application of automated content-analysis (Profiler Plus), data set construction (EUGene), and the public availability of speeches by heads of state via the internet, it is hard to conceive of many of these psychological questions going unanswered. Applying psychological variables to standard large-*n* conflict studies models is becoming increasingly easier to carry out. This research has helped to create a more complete understanding of the effect of variables from different levels of analysis on the likelihood of militarized interstate dispute initiation.

APPENDIX A:
LIST OF MID INITIATORS AND THEIR SCORES

Year	Country	Leader	Need for Power	Distrust
1995	Russia	Boris Yeltsin	.235	.041
1996	Azerbaijan	Heydar Aliyev	0.267	0.061
1996	Russia	Boris Yeltsin	0.215	0.155
1996	China	Jiang Zemin	0.175	0.105
1996	Cuba	Fidel Castro	0.235	0.157
1996	Egypt	Hosni Mubarak	0.254	0.119
1996	South Korea	Kim Young-Sam	0.267	0
1996	Philippines	Fidel V. Ramos	0.302	0.183
1996	Syria	Hafez al-Assad	0.188	0.207
1996	UK	John Major	0.251	0.046
1996	USA	Bill Clinton	0.283	0.064
1997	Russia	Boris Yeltsin	0.169	0.015
1997	Canada	Jean Chretien	0.192	0.085
1997	Greece	Costas Simitis	0.270	0.075
1997	Philippines	Fidel V. Ramos	0.283	0.294
1997	Syria	Hafez al-Assad	0.199	0.157
1997	Ukraine	Leonid Kuchma	0.232	0.078
1997	Uzbekistan	Islam Karimov	0.248	0.060
1997	USA	Bill Clinton	0.228	0.094
1998	Turkey	Mesut Yilmaz	0.267	0.065
1998	USA	Bill Clinton	0.258	0.111
1999	Azerbaijan	Heydar Aliyev	0.236	0.076
1999	Australia	John Howard	0.228	0.225
1999	Russia	Boris Yeltsin	0.279	0.181
1999	China	Jiang Zemin	0.272	0.078
1999	Japan	Keizo Obuchi	0.267	0.123
1999	Sierra Leone	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah	0.268	0.234
1999	UK	Tony Blair	0.228	0.190
2000	Germany	Gerhard Schroder	0.189	0.167
2000	Nigeria	Olusegun Obasanjo	0.415	0.394
2000	Turkey	Bulent Ecevit	0.307	0.107
2000	UK	Tony Blair	0.258	0.059
2001	Azerbaijan	Heydar Aliyev	0.219	0.087

2001	China	Jiang Zemin	0.253	0.172
2001	France	Jacques Chirac	0.222	0.055
2001	Honduras	Carlos Flores	0.240	0.123
2001	India	Atal Bihari Vajpayee	0.25	0.185
2001	Norway	Jens Stoltenberg	0.293	0.059
2001	Russia	Vladimir Putin	0.232	0.155
2001	Sierra Leone	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah	0.277	0.219
2001	Turkey	Bulent Ecevit	0.409	0.049
2001	UK	Tony Blair	0.271	0.167
2001	USA	Bill Clinton	0.273	0.08

APPENDIX B:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH THAT SCORED HIGHEST IN NEED FOR POWER AND DISTRUST

Africans are entitled to celebrate the exit of colonialism from their continent, just in time before the psychological deadline of the end of this millennium. At the same time, a look into our immediate past, not to seek whom to blame for our current woes, but to critically review our realities, will show colonial legacy as an impediment to Africa's progress and development.

Let us face it, the truth is that almost all modern African nation states were conceived and established by colonial design. And until independence, governance of these nation states was the complete anti-thesis of democracy, being government of exploitation, by the exploiters, and for the exploiters. No matter what apologists for colonialism have to say, all manifestations of progress and development experienced by African peoples under colonialism came by default, certainly not by the design of those who came to our continent solely for what they could take. Hence the popular sentiments of the early nationalists who preferred freedom in poverty to affluence in bondage.

African nationalists who led their nations into independence have confessed to the daunting challenges in meeting the expectations of their hard won freedom. Leadership of the nation state felt like the captaincy of a ship which, though legitimately belonged to Africans1 had been preprogrammed to move in the direction of colonial goals and objectives. To achieve real nationhood, these African leaders needed to put the African societies and peoples back into the imposed geopolitical shells. They needed to make the governance of African citizens the responsibility of Africans themselves. National development needed to have Africans as the centerpiece, such that progress could be measured in terms of positive impact on the lives of the citizenry.

Mere change of name, as many African countries did, was not enough to subdue the inevitable debate over the nature and purpose of the acquired nationhood. Leadership of the emergent nations were impelled to find quick solutions to the inherited colonial contradiction of development concept de-linked from equitable and democratic governance. Success at managing this contradiction varied from country to country, depending on such circumstances as economic conditions, geopolitical size, ethnic composition, and the number of educated elites to push their differing political visions. But invariably, there was attendant confusion, often chaos and violent upheavals that came with the formidable leadership task of re-focusing, re-orientating and restructuring the emergent African nation states

Hardly an African nation escaped a phase of instability as political and intellectual leaders quarreled and fought each other over the meaning of independence and the purpose of nationhood. And the notion of benevolent dictatorship gained ground as the stable means of moving African nations forward.

Military incursions into African politics in the sixties and seventies were generally greeted with degrees of euphoria. The ordinary African felt a sense of security with the uniform, so to speak. And political thinkers, in disregard of their liberal philosophical noots in democratic theory, hailed the un-elected military rulers of the post-colonial state by ascribing to them several virtues.

Score – Distrust: 0.394
Score – Need for Power: 0.415

APPENDIX C:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH TEXT THAT SCORED LOWEST FOR NEED
FOR POWER

Esteemed journalists, ladies and gentlemen, the first meeting of the Presidents of Russia and the United States has been held after our reelection. Naturally, it was a difficult one because difficult issues were under discussion. But as always, our meeting was quite frank, and on the whole, it was successful. And I am completely in accord with what the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, just said.

We have opened a new stage of Russian-American relations. We discussed in detail the entire range of Russian-American issues—issues of Russian-American partnership, which is quite broad in scale. After all, our countries occupy such a position in the world that the global issues are a subject of our discussions.

Both sides defended their national interests, and both countries did not abandon them. However, our two great powers have an area—a vast area—of congruent interests. Chief among these is the stability in the international situation. This requires us to develop our relations, and there has been progress in that direction.

Five joint statements have been signed as a result of our meeting—President Bill Clinton and I just concluded signing these—on European security, on parameters of future reductions in nuclear forces, concerning the ABM missile treaty, on chemical weapons, and we also signed a U.S.-Russian economic initiative. But we have not merely stated our positions. We view the signed statements with the U.S. President as a program of our joint action aimed to develop Russian-American partnership.

I would say that emotions sometimes get the upper hand in assessing Russian-American partnership. This is not the approach that Bill and I have. Let's not forget that establishing the

Russian-American partnership relations is a very complex process. We want to overcome that which divided us for decades. We want to do away with the past mistrust and animosity. We cannot accomplish this immediately. We need to be decisive and patient, and we have both with Bill Clinton.

I firmly believe that we will be able to resolve all issues which, for the time being, are still outstanding. Today's meeting with Bill convinced me of this once again. We will be doing this consistently, step by step. We will have enough patience and decisiveness.

And now I ask you to put questions to us.

I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, very principled progress, and they consist of the following— that, yes, indeed, we do maintain our positions. We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, a Russia-NATO agreement. And this is the principal question here. We've agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton.

This is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to those new members of NATO to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remained in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too, will be included in the agreement with NATO.

Score – Need for Power: .169

APPENDIX D:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH THAT SCORED LOWEST ON DISTRUST

Today President Clinton and I exchanged wide-ranging views and opinions on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and agreed to further strengthen cooperation between our two countries to preserve the peace and stability of the region.

President Clinton reaffirmed the United States firm commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea, and I supported the U.S. policy of foreign deployment, of U.S. troops to maintain peace in East Asia. President Clinton and I reconfirmed that maintaining and strengthening a firm, joint Korean-U.S. defense posture is essential to safeguarding the peace and stability not only of the Korean Peninsula but also of the Northeast Asian region.

We share the view that improvement of relations between the United States and North Korea should proceed in harmony and parallel with the improvement of relations between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. We also agreed that our two countries will cooperate closely with each other in encouraging North Korea to open its doors in order to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and promote peace in Northeast Asia.

With regard to this issue, I noted that the issue of establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued through dialog between South and North Korea, under the principle that the issues should be resolved between the parties directly concerned. President Clinton expressed the U.S. total support and resolve to cooperate with the Republic of Korea regarding this issue.

Korean Government supports the results of the Geneva agreement and Kuala Lumpur agreement. And President Clinton and I affirmed that the Governments of our two countries,

while maintaining close coordination with regard to the implementation of the U.S.-North Korean agreement, will continue to provide the support needed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

President Clinton and I express satisfaction over the fact that the economic and trade relations between our two countries have entered a mature phase in terms of the size of our bilateral trade, the trade balance, and bilateral investments and should continue to develop further on a well-balanced basis. At the same time, we reaffirmed that our two nations will further expand mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation under the new international economic conditions being created by the inauguration of the World Trade Organization. We also agreed that any bilateral trade issues arising out of increasing volumes of trade between two countries will be resolved smoothly through working-level consultations.

President Clinton and I concurred that our two countries need to further improve bilateral relations, both in terms of quality and quantity, so that in the forthcoming Asia-Pacific era of the 21st century, our two nations can assume leading roles in enhancing cooperation and the development of the Asia-Pacific region.

In this context, President Clinton and I agreed to coordinate closely with each other to ensure that the upcoming APEC summit conference in November of this year in Osaka will be a success. Furthermore, we agreed that our two countries will bolster multipronged collaboration in the United Nations and other international organizations.

Score – Distrust: 0

APPENDIX E:
TAB STATS FOR DISTRUST

distrust	Predicted prob
0	.006
.015	.007
.033	.007
.041	.008
.043	.008
.046	.0081
.049	.0083
.055	.0086
.056	.0086
.058	.0088
.059	.0088
.059	.0088
.060	.0089
.061	.009
.064	.0091
.065	.0092
.067	.0093
.072	.0096
.073	.0096
.075	.0098
.076	.0098
.078	.010
.078	.010
.079	.010
.081	.010
.085	.010
.087	.011
.088	.011
.093	.011
.094	.011
.103	.012
.105	.012
.108	.012
.109	.012
.1098	.012
.111	.012
.114	.013
.118	.013
.119	.013
.123	.013
.123	.013
.131	.014

.142	.015
.155	.016
.155	.017
.157	.017
.157	.017
.167	.018
.167	.018
.172	.018
.180	.019
.181	.019
.183	.0197
.185	.0199
.185	.020
.200	.022
.207	.023
.2197	.025
.225	.026
.234	.027
.394	.074
Total	.012

APPENDIX F:
TAB STATS NEED FOR POWER

npower	Predicted prob
.169	.008
.175	.008
.179	.008
.188	.008
.1896	.008
.192	.009
.199	.009
.200	.009
.215	.0096
.216	.0097
.218	.0097
.218	.0098
.219	.0098
.222	.0099
.228	.010
.228	.010
.231	.010
.232	.010
.232	.010
.235	.011
.236	.011
.239	.011
.239	.011
.240	.011
.241	.011
.244	.011
.248	.011
.25	.011
.253	.012
.254	.013
.255	.012
.258	.012
.258	.012
.259	.012
.263	.012
.267	.012
.267	.012
.267	.013
.268	.013
.268	.013
.269	.013
.270	.013

.271	.013
.271	.013
.275	.013
.277	.013
.278	.013
.279	.013
.279	.013
.283	.014
.289	.014
.293	.014
.296	.014
.302	.015
.307	.015
.307	.015
.325	.017
.325	.017
.409	.026
.415	.026
Total	.012

APPENDIX G:
TAB STATS TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY

contig	Predicted prob
1	.047
2	.033
3	.023
4	.015
5	.012
6	.008
Total	.015

REFERENCES

Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. Economic Interdependence: "A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29-49.

Bennett, D. Scott. 2006. "Exploring Operationalizations of Political Relevance." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23(3): 245-261.

Bennett, D. Scott, Alan Stam III. 2000a. "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 653-685.

Bennett, D. Scott, and Alan Stam III. 2000b. "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions* 26(2): 179-204.

Bennett, D. Scott, and Alan Stam III. 2000c. "A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(3): 451-480.

Boehmer, Charles. 2008. "A Reassessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(1): 81-94.

Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 309-341.

Dicicco, Jonathan, and Jack Levy. 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6): 675-704.

Driver, Michael. 1977. "Individual Differences as Determinants of Aggression in the Inter-nation Simulation." In *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, ed. Margaret Hermann, New York, NY: Free Press.

Foster, Dennis. M., and Jonathan W. Keller. 2013. "Leaders' Cognitive Complexity, Distrust, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1-19.

Garnham, David. 1976. "Power Parity and Lethal International Violence, 1969-1973." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20(3): 379-394.

Ghosn, Faten., Glenn Palmer, and Stuart A. Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Descriptions." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2): 133-154.

Gochman, Charles. S., and Zeev Maoz. 1984. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4): 585-616.

Hermann, Margaret G. 1987. "Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders." Mershon Occasional Papers. Columbus: The Ohio State University.

Hermann, Margaret. G., and Charles W. Kegley Jr. 1995. "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology." *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4): 511-533.

Hermann, Margaret G. 2003. "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*. Ed. Jerrold M. Post: 178-212. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Betinna Aten. 2012. Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Holsti, Ole. 1962. *The Belief Systems and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University.

Ireland, Michael J., and Scott Sigmund Gartner. 2001. "Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(5): 547-568.

Kegley, Charles W., and Margaret Hermann. 1995. "The Political Psychology of 'Peace Through Democratization.'" *Cooperation and Conflict* 30(1): 5-30.

Keller, Jonathan W. 2005. "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 40(1): 205-231.

Keller, Jonathan W., and Dennis M. Foster. 2012. "Presidential Leadership Style and the Political Use of Force." *Political Psychology* 33(5): 581-598.

Kimball, Anessa L. 2006. "Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(3): 371-389.

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations." *International Organization* 55(3): 693-715.

Lai, Brian, and Dan Slater. 2006. "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 113-126.

Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed. 2001. "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(1): 126-144.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 427-439.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2005. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook Version 3.0." Department of Political Science, Rice University. www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds.

Levy, Jack S. 1981. "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25(4): 581-613.

Levy, Jack S. 2013. "Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (*2nd ed.), eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy: 301-333. New York: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010 Data Users' Manual." Center for Systematic Peace. www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

Mousseau, Michael. 2000. "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(4): 472-507.

Mousseau, Michael. 2002. "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation." *International Interactions* 28(1): 137-164.

Mousseau, Michael. 2009. "The Social Market Roots of the Democratic Peace." *International Security* 33(4): 52-86.

Mousseau, Michael. 2013. "The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It's the Economy." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2): 186-197.

Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett. 1993. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85." *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 11-28.

Oneal, John R., and James L Ray. 1997. "New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85." *Political Research Quarterly* 50(4): 751-775.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Explanations: Trade Still Reduces Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 423-442.

Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 2002. "Dictatorial Peace?" *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 15-26.

Peterson, Timothy. 2014. "Dyadic Trade, Exit Costs, and Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(4): 564-591.

Pollock, Phillip H. 2012a. *The Essentials of Political Analysis: Fourth Edition*. Washington D.C.: Sage CQ Press.

Pollock, Philip H. 2012b. *A STATA Companion to Political Analysis*. Washington D.C.: Sage CQ Press.

Reiter, Dan, and Erik R. Tillman. 2002. "Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 64(3): 810-826.

Reiter, Dan, and Alan C. Stam. 2003. "Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation." *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 333-337.

Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Pau K. Huth. 1996. "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88." *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 512-533.

Schafer, Mark, and Scott Crichlow. 2010. *Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Schafer, Mark, and Stephen Walker. 2006. "Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 561-583.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and J. Stuckey. 1972. "Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965." In *Peace, war, and numbers*, ed. Bruce M. Russett, 19–48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 2002. "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics." In *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, eds. Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet, and James M. Goldgeier: 21-152. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sobek, David, and Jeremy Wells. 2013. "Dangerous Liaisons: Dyadic Power Transitions and the Risk of Militarized Disputes and Wars." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 69-92.

Souva, Mark, and Brandon Prins. 2006. "The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950-1999." *International Interactions* 32(2): 183-200.

Suedfeld, Peter, and Susan Bluck. 1988. "Changes in Integrative Complexity Prior to Surprise Attacks." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(4): 626-635.

Suedfeld, Peter, and Philip Tetlock. 1977. "Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21(1): 169-184.

Tomz, Michael, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. 1999. "Relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression, Version 1.1." Cambridge: Harvard University. http://gking.harvard.edu/

Tures, John A. 2001. "Democracies as Intervening States: A Critique of Kegley & Hermann." *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (2): 227-235.

Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young. 1999. "Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(5): 610-625.

Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer, Michael D. Young. 2003. "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, ed. Jerrold M. Post: 215-245. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Walker, Stephen G. 2011. "Foreign Policy Analysis and Behavioral International Relations." In *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, eds. Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer: 3-20. New York: Routledge.

Winter, David G. 1993. "Power, Affiliation, and War: Three Tests of a Motivational Model." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65(3): 532-545.

Winter, David G. 2003. "Measuring the Motives of Political Actors at a Distance." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, Jerrold M. Post: 153-177. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.