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# Tea Time: A Comparative Analysis of the Tea Party Caucus and House Republican Conference in the One Hundred Twelfth Congress

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TEA TIME: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TEA PARTY CAUCUS AND
HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE IN THE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

by

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# ABSTRACT

Following the historic election of Barack Obama, the largest overhaul of the nation's health care system since the Great Society, and with the country still reeling from the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, a group of disenchanted conservative Republicans and elected leaders wary of government policy gave rise to a new political movement – the Tea Party. Since taking the American political system by storm in 2010, considerable research has focused on the electoral consequences of the Tea Party. Using an original dataset and the American National Election Study, I study the Tea Party Caucus at the elite level by analyzing roll call votes, incumbency, and endorsements, and at the mass level through an examination of congressional districts and constituencies. Findings show that members of the Tea Party Caucus and their Republican House colleagues are largely homogeneous. Exceptions to this include economic final passage votes, legislation receiving presidential support, district lean, census region, and presidential vote in congressional districts. Furthermore, evidence is seen that economic factors in members' districts affected the election of freshmen representatives in 2010, and that district variables strongly influence legislative voting behavior. Finally, discontinuity is discovered between the Tea Party movement at the mass level and the Tea Party Caucus at the elite level.

For my parents and family, for the warmth, love, and inspiration they have given me,

For my professors and teachers, for all their generosity, guidance, and wisdom,

For my friends and colleagues, for all the good times, great memories, and encouragement.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANES            American National Election Study

CPVI            Cook Partisan Voting Index

ER              Establishment Republican

MOC             Member of Congress

TPC             Tea Party Caucus

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Political movements often gain prominence around highly salient public issues such as suffrage, civil rights, war, or a difficult economic period. Since 2009, a new movement – the Tea Party – has taken the American political system by storm, captivating the media as well as the minds of ordinary Americans and political elites (Gallagher and Rock 2012). Popular consensus and academic research (Abramowitz 2011; Campbell and Putnam 2011; Arceneaux and Nicholson 2012) hold that the Tea Party encompasses a group of conservative-leaning Republicans who want a smaller role for government, less regulation, a more robust foreign policy, and lower taxes. These notions are what we think of the Tea Party, but are they accurate?

While some trace the roots of the Tea Party back to the big-government conservatism of President George W. Bush (2001–09), the Tea Party that many people came to know emerged with a thunderous roar during the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as health care reform or Obamacare (Berzon et al. 2010). It was then that a group comprising of Members of Congress (MOC), political talking heads and elites, as well as concerned citizens, voiced their opposition to Obama's signature piece of legislation during his first term (2009–13). This group espoused conservative philosophies, like limited government, personal choice, and tax reduction.

The Great Recession that encompassed the nation from 2007 to 2009 forced the federal government to undertake a wide array of actions to help stabilize and revitalize the country's economy. Among these were a small stimulus package in early 2008 (Economic Stimulus Act), the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008 which included the Toxic Asset Relief Program (TARP), and bailouts of the financial and automotive industries that amounted to trillions of dollars in government spending. Expenditures of this nature continued

into the Obama administration, most notably with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, commonly known as the stimulus. In addition, economic matters were widely cited in the bitter debate over health care reform that took place in late 2009 and early 2010. Even though the dispute over health care may have been a turning point in the movement, garnering it global attention and curiosity, high stakes political fights continued long after over such issues as the loans extended to the American automakers, home foreclosure and refinancing programs, extended unemployment benefits, and the federal deficit and debt among many others. The clash over health care reform continues as well, with the House voting on legislation to repeal or significantly alter Obamacare more than thirty times in the 112th Congress.

Whether one sees the Tea Party traced back to the spending and government actions taken place under Bush or not, the movement clearly gained steam on February 19, 2009 – long before the debate over health care reform gained traction – after an upset CNBC correspondent, Rick Santelli, took to the airwaves live from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, merely two days after the recovery act was signed into law. To the cheering of traders around him, Santelli who was clearly upset with the stimulus package and the Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan – a roadmap to help families avoid foreclosure – suggested a Tea Party be held on the Chicago River in July. Overnight the video became a viral sensation and within days Santelli became a national figure, and the moniker "Tea Party" had taken hold (Rae 2011).

During the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans bolstered by the energy and enthusiasm of the Tea Party movement gained 63 seats in the House, and 6 in the Senate. The election resulted in the largest net seat gain in the House since the GOP gained 81 seats in the 1938 midterm elections – which itself occurred following the Recession of 1937 (Carson 2001).

Whether the Tea Party, as popularly thought, was actually responsible for the Republican surge is investigated as I explore previous literature on the subject, as are claims about endorsements and the motivations of the movement.

At this date, inquiries into the Tea Party movement lack research concerning the officials who were elected and who benefited due to the Tea Party. Research mainly focuses on the 2010 election and not the post-election period. This study focuses specifically on the Tea Party Caucus (henceforth referred to as "TPC") in the United States House of Representatives during the 112th Congress, and focuses on their legislative voting record, as well as their districts and constituencies, and incumbency – topics not yet subjected to rigorous analysis. By creating an original dataset and using the 2012 American National Election Study, I analyze the TPC by examining the legislative voting behavior of House Republicans, their districts, patterns of incumbency and endorsements, and the roll of constituency influence in roll call voting. These results will allow the comparison of TPC members to their House Republican colleagues (herein after referred to as "Establishment Republicans" or "ER") to determine if the two groups differ at statistically significant levels. The data will also examine the electoral forces at play in 2010, allowing the determination of whether the Tea Party was indeed principally responsible for the Republican surge or if it was the result of predetermined factors (Democratic overextension in 2006 and 2008, the economy, etc.).

In the following sections, previous research conducted on the Tea Party movement and the limited scope of these studies is examined. The importance and significance of this paper is detailed, six hypotheses are presented, and the variables and methodology used to construct the dataset and conduct the analysis will be discussed. Following this, an exploration of the findings of the research is performed, and conclusions are drawn from the analysis conducted. The paper

concludes by discussing what the findings mean for the Tea Party movement, and identifies

future avenues of research concerning the TPC.

# CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

"Hell no you can't," "You lie!" and "Job killing," are some of the most notorious and well-known expressions of the Tea Party. These phrases help to steer the public and academic image of the Tea Party as a libertarian leaning anti-government grassroots movement that gained notoriety and influence because its tenets are universally acceptable and popular, i.e., a smaller and more responsible government, lesser taxes, a more accountable Congress, and a strong and robust foreign policy. Author Ron Suskind (2011, 335) writes,

> The Tea Party's platform is populist, both conservative and libertarian, endorsing lower taxes, a reduction of national debt, and a reduction in government spending, along with individual rights and an 'originalist' interpretation of the Constitution. But […] a lot of Tea Party activists, didn't offer much in the way of an actual program or coherent policies. Tea Partiers are often against things that are themselves opposites, and against pretty much anything that Obama does.

As noted by Suskind (2011), some see the movement as an anti-Obama faction, possibly furthered by not only those who vehemently oppose his policies, but those who also dislike him because of his background and history (Parker 2010).

While some (Specter and Robbins 2012) trace the roots of the Tea Party movement back to the big-government conservatism of George W. Bush, the group that most came to recognize emerged in 2009 following the inauguration of President Barack Obama (Boykoff and Laschever 2011). It was at this time that a group comprising of Members of Congress (MOC), political elites, and concerned citizens, voiced their opposition to Obama's legislative agenda. The Tea Party espoused conservative philosophies, such as small government and lower taxation (Barreto et al. 2011). The Tea Party quickly gained national attention, and even faster became a powerful political force across America – as evidenced by the 2010 election.

To begin, I quickly explore the history of the Tea Party movement. This serves two purposes. First, to provide a baseline on its history from which the study begins, and second, to state a number of the preconceived notions – both academically and publically held – about the movement. Though the Tea Party movement drew much attention from the media, it would not be until 2010 that a self-identified Tea Party supporter would be elected to Congress. The group's first election is often seen as that of then-Massachusetts State Senator Scott Brown to fill the seat held for almost 47 years by the late Senator Edward Kennedy (Rae 2011). Research by Abramowitz (2011), Jacobson (2011), and Campbell and Putnam (2011), among others, mainly focuses on what may be identified as the social and electoral implications of the Tea Party movement. At this date, studies involving the Tea Party movement lack post-election analysis concerning legislators since the 2010 election.

Six months after Brown's election to the Senate, Minnesota Congresswoman Michele Bachmann founded the TPC in the House in July 2010. Fifty-two members joined the caucus that month. Following the Republican surge in the 2010 midterm elections in which the GOP gained sixty-three seats and took control of the House, the House Republican Conference gave birth to a freshly minted 60 member TPC headed by Bachmann (Phillips 2012). The "shellacking" experienced by Democrats – a term used by the president in a press conference two-days after the election – is often attributed to disapproval of Obama and Congress' handling of the economy (Campbell 2010). Hibbing and Tirtitilli (2000) found in their study of the 1994 midterm election that Congressional disapproval can result in votes against the majority party – in 2010, the Democrats – and this may have resulted in an increase in Democratic seat losses, coupled with Democratic overextension in 2006 and 2008. Furthermore, a seat swing the size of 2010's greatly affected the level of polarization within Congress, as evidenced by Lewis, Poole,

and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores for the 112th Congress. These scores indicate that the 112th Congress was the most polarized ever (Matthews 2013). As seen in their data since the 1980's, the House continues to see higher levels of polarization than the Senate, though both chambers are at their highest recorded levels. The 2010 election ousted a large number of Blue Dog Democrats in favor of TPC members. This resulted in an increasingly conservative GOP Conference, and a progressively more liberal Democratic caucus. In addition, the 2006 and 2008 election losses by Republicans had the same effect of ousting vulnerable members, resulting in a group that was already leaning far to the right.

The 2006 and 2008 elections resulted in congressional parties that were more homogeneous intraparty, the GOP moving further to the right and the Democrats leaning farther to the left. Though, the loss of more moderate members also caused a deeper divide on issues between the two major parties. Polarization is an important topic to discuss because of its effects at both the elite and mass levels. Also, polarization at the elite level has led to the electorate becoming marginally more polarized as well. This polarization at the mass level is likely to manifest in the most politically engaged part of the electorate, a segment in which Tea Party falls (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz 2011). Prior literature on caucus membership provides explanations for why legislators join congressional caucuses. Hammond (1998) developed a typology of caucuses divided into six categories: party affiliation, personal interest, national constituency, regional, state or district, and industry. The TPC best fits into Hammond's (1998, 31) party affiliation category, whose goal is to "articulate and advance the policy views of an intraparty group."

The two main focusing points of this research is the crossroads between the TPC and legislative voting, and the MOC's election – at the elite level and mass level. First, is the

investigation of legislative voting behavior. Previous studies have shown differences between procedural votes, final passage votes, and other forms of voting (Patty 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 2000; Theriault 2008; Jessee and Theriault 2012). Phillips (2012) found disparities between economic and non-economic votes when examining the TPC, and greater amounts of partisan cohesion on procedural votes. Increased public and media attention on final passage votes, and district level factors, including the electoral consequences of the MOC's vote influence these variations (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989; Gallagher and Rock 2012; Jessee and Theriault 2012). Previous research (Abramowitz 2011; Campbell and Putnam 2011; Jacobson 2011; Arceneaux and Nicholson 2012) clearly identifies the Tea Party as a partisan intraparty movement. This classification is congruous with the party affiliation caucus category of Hammond (1998).

Operational definitions of the variables are provided later. The analysis of legislative roll call voting is broken into three parts: economic, non-economic, and foreign and security policy – to be explained in more detail in subsequent sections. Some cases to be examined may span multiple policy areas. One of these is the annual defense authorization act, a bill which funds the operations of the Department of Defense for the upcoming fiscal year. This spans all three voting categories, covering economic, domestic, and foreign policy. Manning (1977) studied the relationship between the legislative and executive branches in the foreign policy arena, noting that certain subjects broach the boundaries of foreign policy and enter the domestic realm. Manning (1977) coined the term "intermestic" to describe these cases. For the purposes of this study, defense authorization acts are coded as foreign and security policy votes, as the main purpose of the bill pertains to the military and foreign policy of the United States.

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Foreign policy votes require study because of the political perspective posited by McCormick and Wittkopf (1990), in which they found that in the post-Cold War period interparty partisanship is now central to the executive-congressional relations in the foreign policy arena. This is contrary to the Cold War period where politics "stopped at the water's edge" (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1077). Other research has come to similar conclusions (Weisberg 1978). Non-economic and social votes are also important to investigate because of their focus on domestic politics as well as intermestic areas. Arcelus and Meltzer (1975, 1238) found that principal aggregate effect of economic effects on voting occur because of "changes in the participation rate and not from shifts between parties." Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) discover that voters personally affected by adverse economic conditions (i.e., unemployment, etc.) are not likely to electorally punish candidates of the incumbent party. Economic voting is instead more general in nature and based on collective economic judgments of the economy as a whole. Economic voting is important because economic conditions are thought to be an important factor in congressional voting, especially in support for incumbent candidates.

Second, I examine research pertaining to constituencies, districts, incumbency, and elections. Representation is the most fundamental and basic principle of democracy. In the U.S., representation is a product of the polity at the state and national levels, highlighted by biannual elections in the case of the House. Literature focuses on representation both at the micro and macro level. Micro emphasizes the individual and how they are represented by their MOC, while, in contrast, macro highlights the aggregate relationship between the median voter and their representation in Congress. Most academic literature focuses on representation as outlined by the causal model popularized by Miller and Stokes (1963) in *Constituency Influence in Congress*. The model postulates that there are two sources of a representatives roll call voting,

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their own views and those of their constituents. Perceptions of constituent views can also affect the representative's own views, which in turn affects their voting behavior. This forms the basis of the debate between the trustee and delegate models (Davidson 1969). Representatives are surprisingly accurate in their prediction of district opinions even following redistricting (Erikson et al. 1975; Glazer and Robbins 1985). Glazer and Robbins (1985) examined congressional response to constituency change, i.e. how representatives respond to redistricting. While this is a topic not measured in this project due to time and resource constraints, their research is notable because it shows legislators responsiveness to constituent change.

Furthermore, the conceptualization of representation is also vitally important. Representation must be more broadly defined then simply the level of congruence in attitudes between constituents and their representatives. Eulau and Karps (1977, 235) define representation as responsiveness, writing:

> Anyone who has the least sensitivity to the representative process recognizes that representatives are influences in their conduct by many forces or pressures or linkages other than those arising out of the electoral connection and should realize that restricting the study of representation to the electoral connection produces a very limited vision of the representational process.

Eulau and Karps (1977) argue that responsiveness should not be the dependent variable in the causal structure of representation, instead it should be understood in terms of responsiveness. Eulau and Karps (1977) outline four main kinds of representation: service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, symbolic responsiveness, and policy responsiveness. The last is the most important as it pertains to this study. Policy responsiveness refers to how a legislators attitude is related to their constituent's opinion on a given matter.

Miller and Stokes (1963), and Stokes and Miller (1962), examined congressional representation and found that constituency attitudes and the perceived preferences of the

electorate strongly influence the voting behavior of House members. According to Eulau (1986), Miller and Stokes provided three conditions that must be met for constituency control. First, constituents must have a role in recruiting the representative for office, and will often do so with one who shares common views and values. Second, control can be achieved by threatening the reelection chances of the representative, forcing them to follow district attitudes. Third, they posited that the constituency must account for the views of the candidate (Eulau 1986, 453-4).

Downs (1957) argued that due to electoral competition, electoral districts would be represented by a representative near to district's median voter. Literature on this subject, and the relationship between the representative and their constituency is extensive and growing (Calvert 1985; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Whitman 1990). Research shows that partisan constituencies affect the voting habits and elections of their respective representatives. In their study of elite polarization, Druckman et al. (2013) found that strengthened partisan identities are linked to more polarized environments, and that the polarization of elites affects mass level decision making. Party endorsements are omniportant, and partisans follow their party irregardless of the strength of the argument made, meaning that citizens are "less likely to consider alternative positions and more likely to take action based on their opinion" irregardless of its factuality (Druckman et al. 2013, 74).

Constituencies are also an important topic to study because of the concept of dynamic representation postulated by Stimson et al. (1995). Dynamic representation is a macro concept that focuses on electorates by finding that politicians are rational actors that make informed movement on policy issues based upon an expediency point, a position most likely to benefit the legislator electorally in the future (Stimson et al. 2013). Interestingly, Stimson et al. (2013, 75) find that politicians oblige when the electorate indicates they want a change to a more activist or

conservative government. With previous research (Phillips 2012) finding TPC members come from highly partisan constituencies, as seen by examining the Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), representation and constituencies are an important topic to investigate. They possibly provide a significant step in determining the strength and motivations of the TPC, and could also provide a basis for voting behavior. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011, 794) discover that "[Tea Party] Members of Congress are not responding to changes in the preferences of constituents so much as they are responding to an organized interest, and one that put electoral and legislative politics at the top of its agenda."

District diversity is another element central to the electoral vulnerability and constituency responsiveness of House members and a topic of great debate (Bond 1983; Bond et al. 1985; Davidson 1969; Fiorina 1974; Fenno 1978; Froman 1963; Kingdon 1966; Koetzle 1998). Bond (1983) and Bond et al. (1985) investigates House races in the 1970's and finds no correlation between constituency diversity and increased competition in congressional elections, or differences in challenger quality in such elections. However, Koetzle (1998) argues that such competition not only exists but that is significant in House races between 1962 and 1996. If constituency diversity leads to increased electoral competition, it also has a profound impact on the representatives' relationship and responsiveness to their constituents and their policy positions.

It is also key to understand how constituencies hold their representatives accountable for their roll call voting. While, partisan electorates reward lawmakers who share their ideological underpinnings, can a MOC be held accountable for being too partisan? Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) found that representatives – even those from electorally safe districts – are held accountable, and face electoral detriment by receiving a lower vote share the more they agree

with their party in legislative voting. Canes-Wrone et al. (2002, 138) posit that this occurs because electoral vulnerability derives from roll call voting, and that moderate voting increases the safety of a seat. This is referred to as the marginality hypothesis, which holds that legislators from marginal districts will converge on the median position of their constituents, and this will be displayed as moderation in their roll call voting. Much research has supported the marginality hypothesis, and the notion that responsiveness to constituency opinion is crucial to reelection (Fiorina 1973; MacRae 1952; McClosky et al. 1960; Sinclair-Deckard 1976; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978; Turner 1953). However, other research has shown that representatives may be more supportive to constituents of their own party, and that this results in legislation more likely to be extreme than the median voter (Clinton 2006).

Prior research shows that incumbent legislators benefit from a substantially higher reelection rate than their counterparts (Abramowitz 1975; Friedman and Holden 2009; Hinckley 1980; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Mayhew 1974). The average reelection rate is near 90% for incumbent members of the House. Carson, Engstrom and Roberts (2007) also find a direct effect of incumbency on reelection but also note that candidate quality – operationalized as prior political experience – is also an important variable in electoral success. Mayhew's (1974) research concerning incumbency is regarded as the seminal work in the field, and he finds that time served, and thus experience, are the most important factors in reelection. Studies at the individual level have shown that the economy is a salient issue (as it was in 2008, 2010, and 2012) – especially when economic conditions are poor. Voters often reelect incumbents when the economy expands in election years (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Fiorina 1981). To ensure reelection, legislators must court both the reelection and primary constituencies expanded upon by Fenno (1977). In many cases, MOC's may be more likely to lose their bid for reelection in

primaries rather than the general election (Turner 1953). The Tea Party has ousted many GOP members in primaries since 2010.

Abramowitz (2011, 14-5) analyzes the rise of the Tea Party movement by stating that it emerged from the "natural outgrowth of the growing size and conservatism of the activist base of the Republican Party during the preceding decades," only gaining widespread notoriety during the Obama presidency. Campbell and Putnam (2011) and Arceneaux and Nicholson's (2012) findings are congruous with Abramowitz's (2011) assertion that Tea Party supporters are highly partisan Republicans. Campbell and Putnam (2011) also discover that "past Republican affiliation is the single strongest predictor of Tea Party support." Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011, 25) write, "the emergence of the Tea Party provided conservative activists with a new identity funded by Republican business elites and reinforced by a network of conservative media sources." Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) find no systematic evidence that the Tea Party was responsible for the Republican success in 2010, consistent with findings by Jacobson (2011 and Karpowitz et al. (2011).

Preceding research focuses mainly on the causes of the Tea Party movement, how it affected the 2010 election and the Republican Party, as well as the general make-up of the movement. At this time, scholars are just beginning their research about what the elected Tea Party members have done since assuming office. Research has also yet to fully determine whether popularly held notions were indeed responsible for the election of TPC members in 2010. This paper examines these questions.

# CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In order to determine if Tea Party members differ significantly from Establishment Republicans, this study focuses on the members of the TPC. These members are self-identified, and this demonstrates an overt and manifested sign that they have endorsed the Tea Party movement. By compiling a dataset on the 242 members of the House Republican Conference and looking at the sixty members of the TPC – as seen in Figure 1 – this analysis will measure legislators ideology, internal party cohesion and intraparty differences, as well as their voting behavior, districts, and constituencies.

The study will proceed in five parts. The Tea Party will be examined at the elite level through (1) an examination of roll call voting behavior, (2) by looking at patterns of endorsements and incumbency, including redistricting. Next, the congressional districts and constituencies of GOP legislators will be investigated to examine the Tea Party at the mass level.



**Figure 1: House Republican Caucus in the 112th Congress**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House

This will be achieved by (3) exploring the districts represented by Republican representatives through partisan lean, presidential vote, and region, in addition to an examination (4) of constituency demographic and economic metrics, and mass level opinion.

Previous research provides the basis to form testable hypotheses, and these suppositions are based on mainly on the results of my undergraduate thesis. Similar to this paper, the thesis examined TPC members roll call voting and districts – CPVI (partisan lean), unemployment, per capita income, etc. – during the First Session of the 112th Congress. Concerning roll call voting, analysis showed that "only [in] three of fifteen (20%) cases did the significance tests show noteworthy differences between Tea Party Caucus members and their House colleagues on legislative votes" (Phillips 2012, 30). All three of these votes were economic-minded final passage votes – the April 2011 federal budget compromise, August 2011 debt ceiling compromise, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (patent reform). Based on scholarly research, as well as the findings just described, six hypotheses are tested against the null hypothesis.

Null hypothesis:

$H_0$: There is no difference between members of the Tea Party Caucus and Establishment Republicans at the elite level or mass level.

Forty three key votes are examined from the 112th Congress (2011–13); twenty four final passage votes, and nineteen procedural votes, to understand the MOC's legislative voting. The disparity between the two categories occurs because some bills were not subjected a recorded procedural vote. Key legislative votes were gathered from the Clerk of the House, and (1) concern policy, (2) were controversial in subject or nature, and (3) were a matter of disagreement

between the president and Congress. These votes are ripe for study because they were likely to highlight intra-conference (and partisan) divisions because of the aforementioned criteria.

Procedural votes are examined separately as "They not only involve different public policies, but also different stages in the legislative process" (Jessee and Theriault 2012, 1). Prior research (Patty 2005; Theriault 2008; Jessee and Theriault 2012) finds that procedural votes exhibit more partisan tendencies than the final passage votes on respective pieces of legislation. In simple terms, a procedural vote is a resolution adopted by the House before a bill that lays out the rules of debate for that bill, including how much time is allotted for debate, and whether amendments can be made. Procedural votes showed little variation in previous research.

Votes are further separated into three categories: economic, non-economic, and foreign policy. Economic votes concern matters that are fiscally oriented (e.g., taxes, annual budget, etc.). Foreign and security policy votes are those that are primarily oriented toward diplomacy, foreign, security, or military policy – including the annual National Defense Authorization Act. Votes that do not fit into either of the previous two categories – including social policy – are classified as non-economic. Thus, differences are tested among final passage and procedural votes, and between economic and non-economic key votes. Research by Clausen and Cheney (1970) finds that party influence is powerful on economic policy in the House. Analysis also shows that economic context plays a significant role in Tea Party support, at the public level and in legislative voting and district characteristics (Gervais and Morris 2012; McNitt 2012; Phillips 2012).

Parker (2010) among others writes that the Tea Party movement is often seen as an anti-Obama faction, furthered not only by opposition to his legislative agenda but also by a personal dislike of the president due to his background and history. To investigate whether animosity

toward the president – and by proxy Democrats – affects roll calls, administration support of legislation is measured. This is accomplished by examining Statements of Administration Policy (SAP) as released by the Office of Management and Budget, which is a part of the Executive Office of the President. SAP's outline the administration's official position on legislation being considered by Congress. Less than half of the bills passed by Congress between 1997 and 2004 triggered the release of an SAP (Rice 2010). To account for bills that may not have prompted an administrative response, presidential support was also measured by analyzing public statements of support made by the president or vice president, or their designees. Designees include the White House Press Secretary or their deputy, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid or the Majority Whip, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi or the Minority Whip. Such support was found in a number of scenarios where compromises between the executive and legislative branches did not allow for the timely release of an SAP (i.e., debt ceiling compromises, fiscal cliff, etc.). In addition, support was only measured for final passage votes, as it is not applicable for procedural votes.

A MOC may vote yea, nay, or present on each roll call. If a representative does not fall within those three categories, they are counted as not voting. Furthermore, under House Rule I, Clause 7, the Speaker is not required to vote except when their vote would break a tie or when voting is done by ballot (Heitshusen 2011). Speakers retain the prerogative to vote on roll calls, and they sometimes do on controversial pieces of legislation to send a – often symbolic – message to their conference.

Elite level hypotheses:

$H_1$: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from Establishment Republicans when examining final passage votes.

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$H_2$: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from Establishment Republicans when examining economic votes (vs. non-economic and foreign policy).

$H_3$: Final passage roll call votes that receive administration support will be statistically significant.

$H_4$: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from Establishment Republicans when examining patterns of incumbency.

Continuing the study of the Tea Party at the elite level, incumbency is also examined dating back to 2003. Redistricting that occurred following the 2010 Census is studied by recording partisan control of the redistricting process at the state level. Endorsements from 2010 are also chronicled. Phillips (2012) found that compared to ER's, TPC members have a higher probability of representing safe-southern Republican districts and served in Congress for longer periods. Endorsements are also logged for the major Tea Party groups.

To examine the Tea Party at the mass level, demographic and geographic information on districts is documented, and the CPVI of the MOC's district – which measures district lean – is noted. The CPVI is calculated by comparing the average vote share for the Democratic and Republican parties over the last two presidential elections at the national level and district level. For example, if the national average for the Democratic nominee was 50, and the district mean was 53, then the district would be D+3. This would be classified as a Weak Democratic leaning district. Data from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) is also examined to provide a more complete picture of the constituencies of Republican representatives. The ANES is a national survey conducted by the University of Michigan and Stanford University before and after presidential elections. ANES Data will allow for a comparison between districts represented

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by TPC members and ER's. By aggregating districts, I will be able to examine the Tea Party movement at the mass level to determine if constituencies account for any differences found between the TPC and ER's.

In the seminal work in the field, Miller and Stokes (1963) found that constituency attitudes and the perceived preferences of the electorate strongly influence the voting behavior of House members. These findings were subsequently examined and reconfirmed by Cnudde and McCrone (1966) in their causal model that studied the civil rights dimension, and Erikson (1978, 532) who found that Miller and Stokes (1963) findings may have underestimated the strength of the relationship between constituency opinions and congressional voting due to measurement error. I will also test a number of district characteristics to test the validity and reliability of previous analysis. Full descriptions of the variables, sources, and descriptive statistics are in the Appendix.

Mass level hypotheses:

$H_5$: The congressional districts of Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from Establishment Republicans when examining their region, partisan lean, and voting patterns.

$H_6$: The districts and constituencies of Tea Party Caucus members are the cause for observed differences in roll call voting ($H_2$).

The hypotheses will form the basis for answering the main research question that this study wishes to answer – do members of the TPC differ at statistically significant levels from their House Republican colleagues? The list of current members of the House of Representatives and members of the TPC were gathered from the Office of Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives (herein after referred to as "The Clerk of the House"), and the TPC's official

House page, respectively in September 2011. To examine variables the elite and mass level variable, TPC membership in the 112th Congress (and in select cases the 113th Congress) is utilized (Phillips 2012). The data examined will provide sufficient evidence to make clear predications about the strength and power of the Tea Party movement and its members.

The methodology utilized to conduct this study has its limitations, though the research and data are sufficient to test to the hypotheses provided. One of these limitations is that this paper mainly focuses on the self-identified members of the Tea Party movement. Certainly, there are House Republicans who identify with the movement – even benefited from it – but have not taken the additional step of joining the TPC. A second limitation is attempting to understand the meaning of a "no" vote by a member. There are a number of reasons that a member may vote nay, including but not limited to, disagreement with the principle of a bill, the legislation may not be conservative enough for their support, or the bill may already have sufficient votes for passage.

# CHAPTER FOUR: THE TEA PARTY CAUCUS

The statistical analysis for this chapter was conducted with SPSS software. For this section – in which the elite level is scrutinized – the variables are analyzed in two distinct phases. First roll call voting is examined in three phases; votes that concern economic policy, non-economic policy, and foreign and security policy. Analysis of the legislative key votes is completed via a means comparison and the creation of an additive index. Presidential support of legislation is also investigated. A summary of the analysis and examination of significance then follows. Second, MOC's elite level district characteristics are examined, including 2010 endorsements, incumbency, and 2012 redistricting. Chapter Five examines in detail the districts that members represent. To conclude, significance testing is completed with binary logistic regression for roll call voting and linear regression for other variables.

## Economic Votes

As seen in previous research (Phillips 2012), votes that concern economic policy are more likely to show statistically significant differences between the TPC and Establishment Republicans. The analysis of roll call voting has been broken into areas, one that deals exclusively with procedural votes, and the second that discusses final passage votes. This has been done in order to assess the two areas separately, to show differences in voting tendencies, and to conclude whether there is evidence that rules votes are more partisan as literature suggests (Theriault 2008).

Table 1 shows significant differences in economic votes. Of the ten final passage votes examined, eight show statistical significance at or below the .10 level between the groups.

**Table 1: Significance Tests of Economic Roll Call Votes**

| Session | Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | April 2011 Federal Budget Compromise – Final Passage ° | -.894*** | .319 |
| | Cut, Cap and Balance – Procedural | .859 | 1.080 |
| | Cut, Cap and Balance – Final Passage | .624 | .784 |
| 1 | August 2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise– Final Passage ° | -1.035*** | .314 |
| | Leahy Smith Patent Reform – Procedural | .379 | .659 |
| | Leahy Smith Patent Reform – Final Passage ° | -.758** | .310 |
| | Paul Ryan Budget FY 2012 – Final Passage | -.011 | .830 |
| | Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 – Final Passage ° | -1.021*** | .305 |
| | Paul Ryan Budget FY 2013 – Final Passage | -.558 | .579 |
| | Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act – Procedural | -1.169* | .651 |
| 2 | Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act – Final Passage ° | -.924*** | .329 |
| | 2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution – Procedural | -.441 | .631 |
| | 2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution – Final Passage ° | -.865*** | .308 |
| | American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – Procedural | 1.233 | 1.060 |
| | American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – Final Passage ° | -1.402*** | .392 |
| | Economic Procedural Votes Additive Index | .054 | .056 |
| | Economic Final Passage Votes Additive Index | -.282*** | .146 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
°Administration support of legislation

The only economic votes that did not exhibit significant variance were the two Paul Ryan

budgets and the Cut, Cap and Balance plan (2.2, 3.4, and 0.6 percentage points respectively).

Four of the most significant final passage roll call votes – the April 2011 Federal Budget

Compromise, the August 2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job

Creation Act of 2012 (Payroll Tax Cut), and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Fiscal

Cliff compromise) – are seen in Table 2. Procedural votes for the April 2011 Federal Budget

compromise, August 2011 Debt Ceiling compromise, Paul Ryan Fiscal Year 2012 budget, and

the Paul Ryan Fiscal Year 2013 budget were not analyzed in the significance table because they

did not display levels of variation great enough for analysis with binary logistic regression.

**Table 2: Means Comparison of Selected Significant Economic Roll Call Votes**

|  | 2011 BUDGET COMPR*** | | | 2011 DEBT CEILING*** | | | 2012 PAYROLL TAX CUT*** | | | 2013 FISCAL CLIFF*** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | TPC | ER | DIF[a] | TPC | ER | DIF[a] | TPC | ER | DIF[a] | TPC | ER | DIF[a] |
| Yea | 60.0% | 78.6% | -18.6% | 55.0% | 77.5% | -22.5% | 41.7% | 66.5% | -24.8% | 15.0% | 41.8% | -26.8% |
|  | (36) | (143) |  | (33) | (141) |  | (25) | (121) |  | (9) | (76) |  |
| Nay | 38.3% | 19.2% | +19.1% | 45.0% | 21.4% | +23.6% | 58.3% | 30.8% | +27.5% | 83.3% | 54.9% | +28.4% |
|  | (23) | (35) |  | (27) | (39) |  | (35) | (14) |  | (50) | (100) |  |
| Not Voting | 1.7% | 1.1% | +0.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.7% | -2.7% | 1.7% | 2.2% | -0.5% |
|  | (1) | (2) |  | (0) | (0) |  | (0) | (5) |  | (1) | (4) |  |
| Non-Member | 0.0% | 1.1% | -1.1% | 0.0% | 1.1% | -1.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% | -1.1% |
|  | (0) | (2) |  | (0) | (2) |  | (0) | (0) |  | (0) | (2) |  |
| Total | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |  | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |  | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |  | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |  |
|  | **(60)** | **(182)** |  | **(60)** | **(182)** |  | **(60)** | **(182)** |  | **(60)** | **(182)** |  |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Included are four significant final passage economic votes that received presidential support. The Speaker of the House may vote on roll calls but is only required to cast a vote in limited circumstances (Heitshusen 2011).
[a]Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Seven votes show differences of greater than 15 percentage points between the two groups on yea voting. The table illustrates the stark differences between the groups on final passage votes.

Procedural votes do not show the same tendency, as all nine were within 2.3 percentage points. The average variance between TPC and ER yea voting was .83 percentage points on procedural votes, and 15.72 percentage points on final passage votes. The greatest discrepancy was 27.9 percentage points on the final passage vote for the fiscal cliff compromise. For procedural votes, the largest divergence was 2.3 percentage points on patent reform. Three of the procedural votes showed no difference between the two groups. In addition, there were three votes where TPC members were more likely than ER's to vote yea, the procedural votes for the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (patent reform), and the FY 2012 and FY 2013 Ryan budget. Seven votes – all significant – received administration support, having an average difference of 21.57 percentage points between the two groups. The smallest was 16.7 and the largest was 27.9 percentage points. These results appear congruous with earlier research that finds animosity toward Obama is a key-driving factor in Tea Party support (Jacobson 2011; Maxwell and Parent 2012). However, it is unknown precisely how administration support affected Tea Party support on key pieces of legislation. Particularly, how did support influence voting on roll calls that MOC's would have supported otherwise. The topic of how administration support specifically affected these votes requires further study.

The final segment of this analysis was completed by creating an additive index of economic votes, and assigned a score of one for each if the MOC voted in the affirmative. This provided maximum scores of ten for final passage votes and nine procedural votes. Members who did not vote or voted present were included with those who voted in the negative (nay).

**Table 3: Additive Index Means Comparison of Economic Roll Call Votes**

| Variable | TPC | ER | DIF[b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Final Passage[a] | 6.30 | 7.78 | -1.48*** |
| Procedural Votes[a] | 8.77 | 8.66 | +.11 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
[a]Additive Index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is ten for final passage and nine for procedural.
[b]Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Research by Cohen and Noll (1991) found that roll call abstentions can be a deliberate voting tactic, the same as yea and nay voting. The procedural vote for the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 was not included in the analysis because it was agreed to by voice vote. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 3, and shows a high-level of variance on final passage votes but not procedural votes between the groups. Table 1 showed that the final passage votes additive index was significant at the .01 level. On final passage, 62.1% of ER's voted for at least eight of the bills. The TPC varied widely, with only 38.4% voting for at least eight of the bills. Contrary to these results, over 80% of both the TPC and ER's voted for all nine of the procedural votes. These findings are in agreement with Patty (2005) and Theriault (2008), who found that procedural votes show greater party cohesion than final passage votes.

An explanation of the significance variance seen in economic votes is complex. In 2010 – when the TPM helped to propel the Republican surge – economic issues were vital as the United States continued to suffer from the effects of 'The Great Recession.' Rae (2011, 6-8) compares the TPM with other "populist movements in US political history […] that […  were] particularly prevalent during times of severe economic distress." Rae (2011) also notes the economic issues were essential to the rise of the TPM. It is also widely thought that TPC members view economic

legislation as their main priority, and that economic conservatism is one of if not the most important facets of the movement.

District level variables play a large role in economic voting. Conservative economic voting can be explained by observing that the majority of TPC members (55%) represented safe-southern Republican districts (Phillips 2012). This pattern, along with the greater conservatism evident in the south, allows TPC members more flexibility in voting. Madestam et al. (2012, 44) find that "representatives responded to large [Tea Party] protests in their district by voting more conservatively in Congress." Concerned with the electoral consequences of their voting, MOC's reflect their districts views in their roll call voting to increase their chances of reelection – by enhancing their policy 'fit' with the district – and it also allows the member to increase their visibility on high-profile legislation (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989). Due to the economic conditions of the country during the 112th Congress, economic issues were likely to gain public attention, and thus were the most visible and important statement a MOC could make.

<u>Non-Economic Votes</u>

The second portion of this analysis focuses on non-economic key votes, including a number of bills that may appear economic in nature, but are not fiscally oriented. Non-economic votes do not show a high-level of variance similar to that of the previously examined economic votes. As observed in Table 4, which provides a breakdown of the non-economic votes analyzed, none of the roll calls were statistically significant – though the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act was on the cusp (0.110).

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The greatest difference on any of the votes was five percentage points on the final

passage vote for the D.C. abortion ban. Among procedural votes, it was 2.8 percentage points on

the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The average difference between TPC

and ER yea voting was .67 percentage points on procedural votes, and 1.91 percentage points on

final passage votes. On six of the fifteen roll calls, TPC members were more likely than ER's to

vote yea. These final passage votes included the legislation to prohibit further funding of NPR,

the Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act, the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women

Act, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business

Creation Act, and the D.C. abortion ban. Seven votes showed no variance between the TPC and

ER's, four procedural and three final passage votes. Once again, procedural votes show a greater

amount of partisan cohesion than final passage votes. No votes received administration support.

**Table 4: Significance Tests of Non-Economic Roll Call Votes**

| Session | Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---------|----------|-------------|-----|
| | No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act – Procedural | .522 | .789 |
| | No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act – Final Passage | .859 | 1.080 |
| 1 | Prohibit NPR funding – Final Passage | 1.513 | 1.049 |
| | Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act – Procedural | -.441 | .631 |
| | Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act – Procedural | -.011 | .830 |
| | Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act – Final Passage | 1.427 | 1.052 |
| | Violence Against Women Act – Procedural | -1.156 | .724 |
| | Violence Against Women Act – Final Passage | .105 | .491 |
| 2 | Repeal of Obamacare Act – Procedural | -.428 | .879 |
| | Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act – Final Passage | -.274 | .707 |
| | DC Abortion Ban – Final Passage | .112 | .413 |
| | Non-Economic Procedural Votes Additive Index | -.014 | .039 |
| | Non-Economic Final Passage Votes Additive Index | .086 | .061 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
[o]Administration support of legislation

**Table 5: Additive Index Means Comparison of Non-Economic Roll Call Votes**

| Variable | TPC | ER | DIF[b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Final Passage[a] | 5.77 | 5.79 | -.02 |
| Procedural Votes[a] | 8.65 | 8.46 | +.19 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
[a]Additive index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is nine for final passage and six for procedural.
[b]Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, ***$p<.01$

The procedural votes for the defunding of NPR, and the final passage votes for Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, Repeal of Obamacare Act, and the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012 were not analyzed in the significance table because they did not display levels of variation great enough for analysis with binary logistic regression.

Similar to the previous section, an additive index was used to further examine the votes. The maximum possible score was nine for the final passage votes and six for the procedural votes, which could be reached if the MOC voted in the affirmative for each vote. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 5. Neither group shows a high-level of variance with 90% of MOC's voting in the affirmative for either eight or nine of the final passage votes. This is a direct contradiction to the results seen when examining economic votes, where only 40.9% of MOC's voted for at least of nine of the ten votes. 83.1% of members voted for all six procedural votes, 2.5 percentage points higher than in the economic votes category. The TPC was slightly more likely to support non-economic legislation on final passage, and slightly less likely to support it on procedural votes. Procedural votes for the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act, and the D.C. abortion ban were not analyzed because they were not subject to roll call votes.

A number of factors contribute to non-economic votes showing less variance. The fifteen votes examined concerned topics that are widely popular amongst Republicans or in general – repeal of the Affordable Care Act, reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, halting new government regulation, and auditing the Federal Reserve. None of these votes likely would have attained the national media exposure that the economic votes would have garnered, nor are they considered important planks of the Tea Party agenda – with the exception of the repeal Affordable Care Act that was both politically important and gained vast media exposure.

<div align="center">Foreign and Security Policy Votes</div>

Roll call votes whose main focusing point is foreign and/or security policy are examined next in this section. Nine foreign policy votes were analyzed, spanning from the authorization of limited use of military force in Libya to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013. As stated previously, these votes are primarily oriented toward diplomacy, foreign, security, or military policy. The smallest of the three groups of legislative votes examined, these votes required further analysis due to the popular notion that "politics stops at the waters edge" (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1077). In our current partisan political atmosphere, it is important to determine if TPC members vote differently on foreign policy than domestic policy.

Due to the country's constitutional structure, the president as commander-in-chief and head of state has jurisdiction over a wide ranging number of issues, and great power and influence over many others. Foreign policy votes take on particular importance because the foreign and security arena belongs largely to the president and these issues are typically well-known by the electorate and covered by the media (Libya, Egypt, Syria, etc.). Due to research

(Parker 2010; Suskind 2011) that finds animosity toward the president is a motivating factor in Tea Party membership at the mass level, it is necessary to see if this distrust – and even contempt – for the president spills over in the elite level on such high-profile presidential issues.

As seen in Table 6, no significant differences are seen in foreign policy votes when conducting significance tests. Examining the means comparison of the five final passage votes and four procedural votes, none show differences of greater than five percentage points. The average discrepancy between TPC and ER yea voting was .975 percentage points on procedural votes, and 2.24 percentage points on final passage votes. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 had the biggest difference amongst final passage votes at 4.1 percentage points, and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2012 had the largest difference among procedural votes at 1.7 percentage points. On five of the nine roll calls, TPC members were more likely than ER's to vote yea. Three votes garnered administration support, and none were significant.

**Table 6: Significance Tests of Foreign and Security Policy Roll Call Votes**

| Session | Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Authorizing Limited Use of Force in Libya – Procedural | .882 | .771 |
| | Authorizing Limited Use of Force in Libya – Final Passage | -.859 | 1.080 |
| | PATRIOT Extension Act of 2011 – Final Passage [o] | .209 | .393 |
| | National Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 – Procedural | .288 | .805 |
| | National Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 – Final Passage [o] | -.143 | .356 |
| 2 | FISA Reauthorization Act of 2012 – Procedural | .294 | .663 |
| | FISA Reauthorization Act of 2012 – Final Passage [o] | -.105 | .604 |
| | National Defense Authorization Act FY 2013 – Procedural | 1.233 | 1.060 |
| | National Defense Authorization Act FY 2013 – Final Passage | -.298 | .395 |
| | Foreign Policy Procedural Votes Additive Index | .082 | .037 |
| | Foreign Policy Final Passage Votes Additive Index | -.026 | .066 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
[o]Administration support of legislation

With the lone exception of the bill limiting the U.S. military role in Libya, all of the votes were supported to some extent by the president. McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) found that in the post-Cold War era partisanship is central to executive-legislative relations in the foreign policy arena. However, McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) focus on differences between the Democratic and Republican parties, whereas this analysis concentrates on intraparty differences. No major differences are seen at the intraparty level between the TPC and ER's, as seen in Table 7. The case may still be that Congress is more likely to defer foreign policy – even in a hyperpartisan environment – to a commander-in-chief seen as strong in the arena, particularly in Obama's case following the raid that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Even though foreign policy votes are visible and often high profile, they may not be as important to constituents as domestic policy votes, particularly those concerning the economy during a recovery. As such, intraparty differences may not be as inherent in the foreign policy arena.

As done previously, to further analyze the votes an additive index was created. The maximum score was five for the final passage votes, and four for the procedural votes, which could be attained if the MOC voted in the affirmative for each vote. The table shows little variance amongst procedural votes. Minimal differences are seen amongst final passage votes.

**Table 7: Additive Index Means Comparison of Foreign and Security Policy Roll Call Votes**

| Variable | TPC | ER | DIF[b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Final Passage[a] | 3.37 | 3.43 | -.06 |
| Procedural Votes[a] | 3.87 | 3.76 | +.11 |

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
[a]Additive index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is five for final passage and four for procedural.
[b]Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

64.1% of ER's voted for at least four of the five pieces of legislation, compared to 58.4% of the

TPC. This is in comparison to over 83% of MOC's who voted for all four of the procedural

votes. TPC members were more likely than their colleagues to support the procedural votes.

However, TPC members were marginally less likely to support the final passage votes. The

procedural vote for the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 was not included in the

analysis because it was "ordered without objection" by voice vote.

Endorsements

Over two-hundred Republican candidates were endorsed during the 2010 midterm

election cycle by at least one of the major Tea Party groups (Bailey, Mummolo and Noel 2011).

Three major political groups were studied in this paper due to their endorsement activities during

the 2010 election cycle, FreedomWorks, the Tea Party Express, and former Alaska Governor,

political pundit, and 2008 GOP Vice Presidential Nominee Sarah Palin. There were 173 total

endorsements made by the three main Tea Party organizations during the 2010 election.

**Table 8: 2010 Endorsements Overview by Organization**

| | FreedomWorks | | | Sarah Palin | | | Tea Party Express | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | TPC | ER | TOT | TPC | ER | TOT | TPC | ER | TOT |
| Endorsed | 21.7% | 31.6% | 29.2% | 10.0% | 7.2% | 7.9% | 25.0% | 38.3% | 35.0% |
| | (13) | (57) | (70) | (6) | (13) | (19) | (15) | (69) | (84) |
| Not-Endorsed | 78.3% | 68.3% | 70.8% | 90.0% | 92.7% | 92.1% | 75.0% | 61.6% | 65% |
| | (47) | (123) | (170) | (54) | (167) | (221) | (45) | (111) | (156) |
| **Total** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
| | **(60)** | **(180)** | **(240)** | **(60)** | **(180)** | **(240)** | **(60)** | **(180)** | **(240)** |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective organizations.

There were 84 by the Tea Party Express, 70 by FreedomWorks, and 19 from Sarah Palin. As

seen in Table 8, only 34 of those endorsements were made to candidates who joined the TPC,

only 19.7% of total endorsements. Two House Republicans won  special elections on September

13, 2011 – Mark Amodei and Robert Turner. Amodei represents Nevada's 2nd District, replacing

Dean Heller who was appointed to the United States Senate to replace John Ensign. Turner

represents New York's 9th District, and succeeded Anthony Weiner following his resignation

from Congress. The Tea Party Express had endorsed Heller during his 2010 reelection campaign.

As can be seen in Table 9, the groups' endorsements varied widely. Both incumbents and

challengers were endorsed. The table shows that the almost seventy percent of the total

endorsements were given to freshmen. The Tea Party Express is an anomaly in the groups as it

gave forty-nine endorsements to incumbents and only 35 to freshmen. FreedomWorks awarded

all but one of its 70 endorsements to freshmen – Tom Graves from Georgia's 9th District was the

lone exception. Sarah Palin endorsed 17 freshmen and only two incumbents. TPC freshmen

received 22 total endorsements, 18.2% of total freshmen endorsements. FreedomWorks endorsed

thirteen TPC freshmen, Palin endorsed five, and the Tea Party Express endorsed four.

**Table 9: 2010 Endorsements Overview by Incumbency**

|  | FreedomWorks | Sarah Palin | Tea Party Express | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Freshmen | 98.6% | 89.5% | 41.7% | 69.9% |
|  | (69) | (17) | (35) | (121) |
| Incumbents | 1.4% | 10.5% | 58.3% | 30.1% |
|  | (1) | (2) | (49) | (52) |
| **Total** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
|  | **(70)** | **(19)** | **(84)** | **(173)** |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present
in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective
organizations.

**Table 10: Significance Tests of Endorsements**

| Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|
| FreedomWorks | -.095 | .061 |
| Sarah Palin | .045 | .104 |
| Tea Party Express | -.121* | .058 |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective organizations.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Examined individually, only Tea Party Express endorsements are significant (.061), as seen in Table 10. With these results, the data shows that endorsements as a whole had little effect on members subsequently joining the TPC. This raises the question of whether the candidate's affiliation with the Tea Party was solely for electoral or financial reasons in 2010. These results are consistent with the findings by Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011) who note that not only do the three groups weakly correlate with each other but also that the endorsements meant little for later TPC membership.

<u>Incumbency</u>

In 2010, eighty-seven GOP freshmen were elected to the House. Incumbency is an important factor to be examined because many researchers have characterized the Tea Party as an insurgent force, a notion suggested by the large number of elected freshmen. Rae (2011, 19) characterized the Tea Party movement as "insurgent, spontaneous, and relatively unstructured."

Analyzing incumbency data dating back to 2002 election and the 108th Congress (2003–05) – gathered from The Clerk of the House as well as the Cook Political Report, it can be determined that members of the TPC have a higher likelihood of being an incumbent than ER's.

**Figure 2: 112th Congress, Membership Incumbency in Previous Congressional Terms**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of The House and The Cook Political Report

Figure 2 shows the percent of members from the 112th Congress serving in the respective

congressional terms. TPC members are above both the ER and overall averages. In the 111th and

110th Congresses, the difference between the TPC and ER is 10%. Even dating back to the

redistricting that took place before the 2002 midterm elections, TPC members still exhibit higher

incumbency rates in the 108th Congress, 43.3% to 41.8%. These results show that a majority of

the TPC was on the ballot during the November 2004 general election, in which Bush won

reelection and the GOP gained three seats in the House and four in the Senate.

The 108th Congress is the first congress examined where a majority of those who joined the TPC

in the 112th Congress were not incumbents.

These results shatter the notion that the Tea Party – at least at the elite level – is an

insurgent, grassroots movement, as more than half of TPC members were serving in Congress in

2005. Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011, 8) wrote that the members who eventually joined the

TPC "were responding to the Tea Party; they were not spawned by it." Jacobson (2011) partially

explains this pattern by noting that Tea Party conferred a label on those who already held

conservative Republicans views on economic and social issues. Incumbent Representatives also perform markedly better in reelection campaigns, and incumbents were likely to want to capitalize on the popular momentum of the Tea Party movement – either nationally or within their safe districts (Mayhew 1974; Friedman and Holden 2009). This information coupled with the data concerning district characteristics explains the higher rate of incumbency.

Another incumbency characteristic in need of evaluation is that of the freshmen in the 112th Congress. Were their elections the result of the unique forces at play in 2010? In addition, could these TPC members be reelected again in an election headlined by the reelection of an incumbent Democratic president. Table 11 presents the analysis of these members. Representatives who were reelected are designated as 'members,' whereas those who are no longer serving in Congress are labeled as 'non-members.' Non-members may have chosen to not seek reelection, or they were not reelected in 2012. About 82% of the House GOP – 199 out of 242 members – was reelected to the 113th Congress. Out of the sixty TPC members in the last Congress, forty-nine were reelected. Two reelected members – Mike Coffman (CO-6) and Edward Royce (CA-39) – decided against rejoining the caucus. The analysis shows that both freshmen and incumbents were reelected to the 113th Congress at roughly the same rate (82%).

**Table 11: 112th Congress, 2012 Reelection Overview by Incumbency**

|  | TPC | | ER | | TOTAL | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Freshmen** | **Incumbent** | **Freshmen** | **Incumbent** | **Freshmen** | **Incumbent** |
| 113th Member | 76.5% | 83.7% | 82.9% | 82.1% | 81.6% | 82.6% |
|  | (13) | (36) | (58) | (92) | (71) | (128) |
| 113th Non-Member | 23.5% | 16.3% | 17.1% | 17.9% | 18.4% | 17.4% |
|  | (4) | (7) | (12) | (20) | (16) | (27) |
| **Total** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
|  | **(17)** | **(43)** | **(70)** | **(112)** | **(87)** | **(155)** |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House.

**Table 12: Significance Tests of Incumbency**

| Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|
| 111th Congress Incumbency | .091 | .058 |
| 110th Congress Incumbency | .083 | .056 |
| 109th Congress Incumbency | .005 | .056 |
| 108th Congress Incumbency | .014 | .056 |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and The Cook Political Report.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

However, TPC freshmen were reelected at a slightly lower rate – about 6.5% less – than Establishment Republicans. Table 12 shows the significance test results for the incumbency variables. Based on these findings, hypothesis three is not supported, as none of the variables reach the level of statistical significance. However, Phillips (2012) conclusion that TPC members would be largely successful in gaining reelection in 2012 is proven correct. Of the 87 Republican freshmen elected to the 112th Congress, 71 were reelected

## Redistricting and the 2012 Election

Examining incumbency gains added importance because of the redistricting that occurred following the 2010 Census. As explained earlier, a variable is used to control for redistricting, which is completed by examining which political party controlled the state legislature during the period following the Census, and preceding the 2012 election – when redistricting would have occurred. This variable has two components, which party controlled the state legislature and which party controlled the governorship. For example, if Democrats controlled the legislature but the state had a Republican governor, the state would be coded as under 'split control.'

**Figure 3: 113th Congress, Party Control of Redistricting Process**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and The National Conference of State Legislatures

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2011), eleven states use nonpartisan commissions to conduct the redistricting process. However, these commissions are often nonpartisan in name only – as the majority are staffed by partisan political appointees.

Upon further examination, differences emerge when controlling for redistricting. However, these differences are what would be expected given the circumstances. Figure 3 shows that reelected members are much more likely to emanate from states where the process was controlled by Republicans. On the other hand, 56% of those no longer in Congress emanated from states where the process was controlled by Democrats or split between the parties. In total, about 57.4% of members originated from states with Republican control, 23.6% split control, 17.8% Democratic control, and 1.2% nonpartisan (Nebraska).

Redistricting was found to not be statistically significant with a p-value of .225. Interestingly, 63.4% of freshmen in the 112th Congress who were reelected in 2012 came from states where the GOP controlled the redistricting process. This was marginally better than the 58.6% of incumbents in similar circumstances. 69.2% of TPC freshmen that were reelected were

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from areas with Republican controlled redistricting (ER's 62.1%). 72.2% of TPC incumbents in the 112th Congress that were reelected were from areas with GOP controlled redistricting compared to 53.3% of ER's.

Even though TPC members were statistically just as likely to attain reelection as ER's in 2012, they were more likely to represent districts in states where their own party controlled the process of redistricting, 68.3% of the TPC to 53.8% of ER's. These findings are consistent with Phillips (2012) discovery that a majority of TPC members represent safe-southern Republican districts. These districts are more likely to be in states where the GOP controlled the redistricting process following the 2010 Census, and thus aided to some extent members of the same party. A more in-depth analysis of redistricting, one providing a fuller examination of the nonpartisan commissions for example unfortunately could not be completed within the time provided to complete this study.

Partisan control of the redistricting process plays a key role by not only affecting chances of electoral success at the ballot box in November, but also in the decision by the MOC to seek reelection. Some members, sensing electoral vulnerability – including susceptibility based upon redistricting – may choose to retire rather than risk electoral defeat in a process known as strategic retirement (Moore and Hibbing 1998; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). This process may have played a larger role in 2012 than 2010. In 2010, the GOP was riding a surge of momentum on the back of the Tea Party. In 2012, MOC's not only had to deal with the repercussions of redistricting but also an election headlined by the reelection of a Democratic president. However, only nineteen Republicans retired rather than seeking reelection in 2012, compared to twenty in 2010. Democrats only gained one of these seats in 2012, California's 26th district. The GOP had

a net loss of six seats in 2012, dropping their majority to 234 (the GOP had only 240 sitting

members at the conclusion of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress).


<u>Elite Level Analysis Summary</u>


At the elite level, significant differences are seen in terms of economic final passage

votes. While exhibiting interesting differences using means comparison, non-economic votes,

and foreign and security policy votes, as well as endorsements, incumbency, and redistricting

were not found to be statistically significant. These results show that TPC members vote

markedly more conservative on economic matters than their GOP colleagues. These differences

are found largely on highly publicized and controversial final passage votes, such as Middle

Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.

Whether these voting patterns are the result of elite polarization or constituency influence as

exhibited in Miller and Stokes (1963) causal model of representation is analyzed in the study of

the Tea Party movement at the mass level in the next chapter. Conclusions follow in Chapter Six.

# CHAPTER FIVE: THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

Is the Tea Party really a grassroots movement? Moreover, if so, are its representatives in Congress a product of the movement at the mass level or of elite manipulation. As noted in the analysis, Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011, 37) concluded that the Tea Party movement is more representative of elites than "the will of the people" because TPC members are responding to elite interests and not constituency preferences. Based on like opinions and popular notions, the connection between the Tea Party movement at the elite and mass levels takes on added importance. Was the movement started at the mass or elite level, how do the two levels differ, and did Tea Party movement drag the GOP further to the right, or did a party already becoming increasingly conservative spur the Tea Party movement. These questions are imperative to answer, though the latter while important falls outside the scope of this study.

Whereas in the previous chapter the TPC is examined, in this chapter the districts and constituencies of Republican House members is explored by examining data from the United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey, and the American National Election Study (ANES) from 2012. In this chapter, the variables are again analyzed in multiple phases. First, the districts of TPC members are examined, including presidential voting, district lean, and region. Second, TPC constituencies are investigated through an examination of demographics. Third, an analysis of mass level opinion is completed via data from the ANES. Significance testing is completed using linear regression, or binary logistic regression when appropriate. When coupled, Chapters 4 and 5 provide a fuller analysis of the Tea Party movement by showing the movement at the both the elite and mass levels.

Districts: Geography and Voting


While examining endorsements, incumbency and legislative voting records at the elite level paints a wide picture of any MOC, analyzing the district that they represent helps to illustrate not only their constituency but also the forces that helped send them to Congress and that continue to shape their voting records. In this section, I examine information pertaining specifically to the districts that MOC's represent. Variables analyzed include, the Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), census region, and district presidential vote. These variables differ from those scrutinized in the next section because they deal more with the districts as a whole, not with the constituents of the district. Though, there is room for debate.

First to be examined is CPVI. The Cook Political Report is responsible for the CPVI, which measures how strongly a congressional district leans to the Democratic or Republican Party. This is accomplished by comparing the district's average party share of the presidential vote in the past two presidential elections to the nation's average. Table 13 shows the CPVI for the 112th (all members ) and 113th Congresses (reelected members). The overwhelmingly safe nature of the districts that TPC members represent is an important finding.  In the 112th Congress, no TPC members represented Democratic leaning districts, and only ER represented a Weak Democratic. TPC members are largely represent reliably safe GOP districts. Exploring the 112th Congress, Fifty-five percent of the TPC represents strong Republican districts, compared to 35% of ER's. While 38% of ER's hail from swing or weak Democratic districts, only 8.3% of TPC members represent swing districts (none represent Democratic districts). TPC members are nearly 20 percentage points more likely to represent strong Republican districts, and 30 percentage points less likely to represent swing or Democratic leaning districts.

**Table 13: Cook Partisan Voting Index Overview by Congress**

| | TPC | | ER | | TOTAL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 112th | 113th | 112th | 113th | 112th | 113th |
| Strong Republican | 55.0% | 72.3% | 35.2% | 44.1% | 40.1% | 50.8% |
| | (33) | (34) | (64) | (67) | (97) | (101) |
| Weak Republican | 36.7% | 17.1% | 26.4% | 25.0% | 28.9% | 23.1% |
| | (22) | (8) | (48) | (38) | (70) | (46) |
| Swing | 8.3% | 10.6% | 37.9% | 30.9% | 30.6% | 26.1% |
| | (5) | (5) | (69) | (47) | (74) | (52) |
| Weak Democratic | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% |
| | (0) | (0) | (1) | (0) | (1) | (0) |
| Strong Democratic | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| **Total** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
| | **(60)** | **(47)** | **(182)** | **(152)** | **(242)** | **(199)** |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th and 113th Congresses. The table only analyzes sitting Members of Congress who served in the 112th Congress. Those not reelected were coded as missing.
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and The Cook Political Report.

Freshmen Members of Congress were more likely to represent Democratic and swing districts. Examining the 113th Congress, 72.3% of TPC members are from Safe Republican districts, compared to 44.1% of ER's. The differences seen in the 112th Congress are exacerbated in the 113th Congress – with the percentage point difference increasing by nearly fifty percent. However, more members are likely to represent Swing or Democratic leaning districts, 10.6% of TPC members and 30.9% of ER's.

The main difference seen between the two terms is there are no currently serving members from districts that lean Democratic, and that a higher proportion of the members represent safe Republican districts. These results are partially to be expected, as one of the reasons for the GOP surge in 2010 was that the GOP overextended into a number of swing and Democratic leaning districts (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2011). Research shows that gerrymandering and redistricting are a potent political force. The results are also important

because they show that the GOP is likely to retain the House for the near future – barring another Democratic wave election like 2006 in which they overextended into Republican districts (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2011).

Second to be studied is presidential vote broken down by district. Presidential vote is analyzed in this section because of its connection with the CPVI. Examining how the districts voted in the past three presidential elections, it is seen that TPC members, following the previous finding of the group representing safe Republican districts, did vote for the Democratic candidate at a substantially lower rate than the districts of ER's. Allen West, from Florida's 22nd District, was the only TPC member who represented a district carried by both John Kerry and Barack Obama in 2004 and 2008, respectively. West was not reelected in 2012, though he did seek election in a more Republican district. As seen in Figure 4, in both elections there was marked difference between the two groups, 6 percentage points in 2004, 26 in 2008, and 5 in 2012.



**Figure 4: District Presidential Vote by Election and Group**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and the Cook Political Report

In 2008, only three districts represented by a TPC member voted for Obama. In 2012, that number was only one. When the percentages of the three elections are averaged, 97.1% of districts represented by TPC members did not vote for the Democratic candidate, compared to 83.7% of ER districts.

In 2008, 64.4% of districts represented by freshmen in the 112th Congress did not vote for Obama, compared to 81.3% of incumbents. In 2004, 87.4% of freshmen districts did not vote for Kerry, compared to 97.4% of their incumbent colleagues. In 2012, 91.5% of districts represented by freshmen in the 112th Congress did not vote for Obama, compared to 92.2% of incumbents. Districts represented by members of the TPC had even starker contrasts. 82.4% of districts represented by freshmen TPC members voted the Republican nominee in 2008, while all 43 districts represented by incumbent TPC members voted against the Democratic candidate. In 2004, 94.1% of districts represented by freshmen TPC members voted against the Democratic candidate, compared again to all 43 districts represented by their incumbent colleagues. In 2012, all thirteen TPC districts represented by freshmen in 112th Congress voted for the GOP nominee, along with 97.1 of TPC incumbent districts. In 2004 and 2008, neither Democratic nominee won a district represented by a TPC member who was also a member of the 111th Congress. Obama only won one such district in 2012. Though the numbers provide similar information, analyzing the CPVI and presidential vote of MOC's districts provide further evidence of the safe Republican nature of TPC districts.

Third to be explored is the geographic background of the districts represented by MOC's – census region. As seen in Table 14, TPC members overwhelmingly represent districts in the South. They also represented the other regions of the country at lower rates than their colleagues.

**Table 14: Census Region Overview by Group**

|  | TPC | ER | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northeast | 0.0% | 15.4% | 11.6% |
|  | (0) | (28) | (28) |
| Midwest | 20.0% | 28.6% | 26.4% |
|  | (12) | (52) | (64) |
| South | 63.3% | 36.8% | 43.4% |
|  | (38) | (67) | (105) |
| West | 16.7% | 19.2% | 18.6% |
|  | (10) | (35) | (45) |
| **Total** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
|  | **(60)** | **(182)** | **(242)** |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and the United States Census Bureau.

None represent districts in the Northeast. Almost two-thirds of TPC members represent southern districts, while only 37% of ER's do. Jacobson (2011, 15) found that "The media image of the Tea Partiers is generally on target: people who are… from the South." 16.1% of freshmen MOC's represent districts in the Northeast, 29.9% from the Midwest, 39.1% in the South and 14.9% from the West. Nine percent of GOP incumbent members represent northeastern districts, 24.5% from the Midwest, 45.8% from the South and 20.6% from the West. Wider differences are seen when examining the TPC. 70.6% of TPC freshmen represent southern districts, while 23.5% are from districts in the Midwest, and only 5.9% represent districts in the West. Incumbent TPC members are less likely to represent southern districts with only 60.5% doing so, while 18.6% represent districts in the Midwest, and 20.9% are from the West.

Analogous with the previous chapter on the elite level, significance tests are completed to determine if there is interaction between the variables. As seen in Table 15, all of the district variables were found to be statistically significant, with four falling at or below the .01 level.

**Table 15: Significance Tests of Congressional Districts**

| Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|
| Congressional District 2012 Presidential Vote[+] | -.121* | .110 |
| Congressional District 2008 Presidential Vote | -.263*** | .062 |
| Congressional District 2004 Presidential Vote | -.108* | .115 |
| Cook Partisan Voting Index – 113th Congress[+] | -.245*** | .035 |
| Cook Partisan Voting Index – 112th Congress | -.258*** | .032 |
| Census region | .176*** | .030 |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. [+]TPC membership in the 113th Congress is used as dependent variable.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and The Cook Political Report.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

These variables highlight the unique circumstances at play in both the 2008 and 2010 elections. In the former, an economic downtown not seen since the Great Depression, a deeply unpopular president, and an exceptional campaigner combined for the election of the first African-American President of the United States. In the latter, the same economic forces, an intensely disliked overhaul of the nation's health care system, and a new political movement joined for the biggest seat gain in generations.

Downs (1957) posited that due to electoral competition, electoral districts would be represented by a representative near to district's median voter; therefore conservative roll call voting is begot by conservative districts and voters. These results illustrate that the districts themselves seemingly account for the roll call voting behavior of the MOC, including the more conservative economic voting of TPC members. Representing overwhelmingly safe southern GOP districts that voted for the Republican nominee in each of the past three presidential elections, TPC members have a tremendous amount of leeway in voting more conservatively and being more outspoken on hot-button issues. Research demonstrates that partisan constituencies affect the voting habits and elections of their respective representatives (Druckman et al. 2013).

Because of the safe nature of their districts, these representatives are not afraid of a challenger from the Democratic Party. If anything, they are concerned about a primary fight from the right – something ironically most notably done by the Tea Party. This phenomenon is predicted by the concept of dynamic representation posited by Stimson et al. (2013), where politicians are rational actors that make informed decisions based upon a position most likely to benefit them electorally in the future.

When taken together, these district variables are a powerful force behind the voting behavior of GOP House members. The differences seen between the TPC and ER's further illustrate the importance of constituency influence on roll call voting. In this case, it seems clear that as Miller and Stokes (1963) posited, constituency views – or the legislator's perception of them – have influenced the legislators voting behavior. How accurate the legislators are in their perception is examined in the next two sections of this chapter.

## Constituencies: Demographic and Economic Metrics

As noted previously, diversity in a MOC's district is another element central to the study due to its affect on roll call voting and electoral responsibility for a legislator's decision. There is a great deal of research concerning constituency responsiveness of House members (Bond 1983; Bond et al. 1985; Davidson 1969; Fiorina 1974; Fenno 1978; Froman 1963; Kingdon 1966; Koetzle 1998). Though research differs as to whether constituency diversity leads to increased competition in congressional elections (Bond et al. 1985, Koetzle 1998), it can be deduced that if diversity leads to increased electoral competition, it also has an effect on the representatives' relationship and responsiveness to their constituents and their policy positions.

**Table 16: Means Comparison of Race by Group**

|  | TPC | ER | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Caucasian | 82.3% | 84.7% | 84.1% |
| Black | 10.6% | 8.0% | 8.7% |
| Hispanic | 13.0% | 11.3% | 11.7% |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and ProximityOne.

Because of this literature, constituencies are examined by investigating race, income, unemployment, and education. These variables are based upon information from the 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS is an ongoing continuous survey conducted by the United States Census Bureau that reaches about 2% of American households per year.

First of these variables to be examined is race. Information concerning race was collected into three categories, Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic. For the statistical summary provided later in the chapter, the variable provided is race non-African-American and Hispanic. As seen in Table 16, there is minor variation amongst the TPC and ER's. TPC constituencies are more racially diverse than those of ER's. These results are congruous with the conception of the Tea Party as a mainly non-racially diverse movement, as TPC members on average represent overwhelmingly Caucasian districts. Second, examining education, there is virtually no difference between the TPC and ER's when exploring high school graduation rates, with only a one-percentage point difference between the two caucuses. The constituencies of TPC freshmen had a slightly lower average of high school graduates, 83.47% to 86.48% of ER freshmen. No difference was seen between the incumbents of the two groups.

Income and unemployment is examined next, as these two variables require independent study because of these importance of these issues in 2010 as the U.S. continued to suffer from the effects of 'The Great Recession.' Rae (2011, 8) compares the Tea Party movement with other

"populist movements in US political history […] that […] have been particularly prevalent during times of severe economic distress – the early 1890s, the 1930s, and the early 1990s." Rae (2011, 16) also notes that "the issues that drive [the Tea Party's] mobilization have been primarily economic in nature and of relatively recent origin – TARP, the stimulus package, the health care bill, and, most importantly, the escalating federal budget deficit." If the movement was in fact largely driven by economic factors, then it is important to study the economic characteristics of the constituencies represented by TPC members. These economic indicators also have important consequences for the elite level because it leads to economic voting – especially when the economic is weak. Economic voting is important because market conditions play an important factor in congressional voting, especially in support for incumbent candidates. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) discovered that economic voting is general in nature and based on collective economic judgments of the economy, not personal feelings.

Table 17 shows the median household income and mean unemployment rate of congressional districts from 2009. TPC members represent constituencies that had a lower median household income and lower unemployment rates than their GOP colleagues.

**Table 17: Means Comparison of Economic Variables by Incumbency and Group**

|  | TPC Freshmen | ER Freshmen | TPC Incumbent | ER Incumbent | TPC Total | ER Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Median Household Income | $44,444.18 | $49,386.04 | $53,159.09 | $54,428.09 | $50,689.87 | $52,488.84 |
| Unemployment Rate | 10.347% | 9.455% | 8.784% | 9.517% | 9.227% | 9.493% |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress, controlling for incumbency in the 111th Congress. Numbers from 2009.
Significance test: Incumbency and income – Sig: .164
Significance test: Incumbency and unemployment – Sig: .304
Source: Original dataset based upon information from ProximityOne and the American Community Survey.

TPC members fall below the mean in both income and unemployment, by $1,352.94 and .2 percentage points respectively. Freshmen districts had lower income than incumbents. TPC freshmen represented constituencies with a higher unemployment and drastically lower median household income. ER freshman has lower income but also a slightly lower unemployment rate.The difference between TPC freshmen and the Republican Conference as a whole was nearly a $7,600 decrease in income and a .9 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. As such, freshmen districts had weaker economic metrics than incumbents. Economic metrics appear to be a factor in the election of TPC freshmen members in 2010, as their districts had considerably weaker economic numbers than incumbents.

Lastly, significance tests are completed to determine if there is interaction between the variables. Unlike the examination of congressional districts, and as displayed in Table 18, none of the constituency variables examined were significant. The marked differences seen in economic factors between freshmen members and their incumbent colleagues, particularly when comparing the TPC and the ER's are nonetheless interesting and require further analysis.

**Table 18: Significance Tests of Constituencies**

| Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|
| Race (non-Black and Hispanic) – 2009 | -.134 | .001 |
| Median household income – 2009 | -.061 | .000 |
| Percent change in median household income – 2008 to 2009 | .005 | .009 |
| Unemployment rate – 2009 | -.052 | .013 |
| Change in unemployment rate – 2008 to 2009 | -.047 | .025 |
| High school graduates – 2009 | -.080 | .006 |

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source:  Original dataset based upon information from ProximityOne, The Cook Political Report, and other government agencies.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

To conduct this analysis, information from 2012 American National Election Study (NES) was used. Six total variables were analyzed, two for each one of the three roll call voting categories analyzed in the previous chapter. The dependent variable used was based on two qualifications, 1) the respondent voted for the republican candidate, and 2) whether the respondent was from a district represented by a TPC member. Democratic voters were dropped from this analysis because of research by Clinton (2006), among others, who found that representatives are more responsive to the preferences of same-party constituents.

Of the six variables selected from the ANES, a 7-point scale on government spending and services and support for a tax on millionaires was used for economic variables. The two non-economic variables chosen were a four-point abortion self-placement scale and support of gay marriage. The two variables selected to examine foreign and security policy were opinions on increasing or decreasing defense spending and approval of government efforts to reduce terrorism. This mass level analysis results in contradictory results to those of the elite level study.

**Table 19: Significance Tests of Mass Level Variables**

| Category | Variable | Coefficient | SE |
|---|---|---|---|
| ECON | Government Services Spending | -.026 | .012 |
| | Tax on Millionaires | -.026 | .010 |
| NECON | Abortion Self-Placement | -.035** | .007 |
| | Position on Gay Marriage | .070*** | .011 |
| FOR | Defense Spending | -.038 | .011 |
| | Government Efforts to Reduce Terrorism | -.028 | .009 |

Note: Dependent variable based on two factors, 1) did the respondent vote for the Republican candidate, and 2) was the respondent in a TPC district.
Source: American National Election Study 2012
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Where in the study of roll call voting, economic votes are found to be significant and the other two categories are not, in the study of ANES data non-economic variables were found to be the only ones significant below the .05 level as seen in Table 19.

The insignificance of the variable measuring support for a tax on millionaires is interesting. The fiscal compromise package that ended the "Fiscal Cliff" in January 2013 – the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – was the second most significant economic vote at 0.001. The main sticking point of the act was an increase in taxes for high-income earners, specifically those make over $250,000 per year. The discrepancy between support for an increase in taxes for high-income earners at the mass level and the inconsistency with the vote at the elite level shows a discontinuity between the two levels. These discrepancies are either a result of a failure in the causal model (Miller and Stokes 1963) or a more likely failure on the part of the representatives themselves to accurately gauge the perceptions of their constituents. A third option is that legislators are substituting their own views for those of their constituents, or these views are heavily clouding their observation of their constituents. It would not be unthinkable to surmise that TPC voting might be heavily influenced by the conservative economic agenda of the Tea Party at the elite level. At the same time, economic conservatism is widely palatable currently, while main tenants of social conservatism are not (e.g., increasing support for same-sex marriage).

<div align="center">Mass Level Analysis Summary</div>

At the elite level, significant differences are seen in terms of final passage and economic votes. At the mass level, differences are only seen with non-economic variables in the analysis of mass level opinions derived from the ANES. This discrepancy is interesting and shows a

disruption between the two levels. Data on congressional districts shows that TPC are likely to represent safe southern republican districts. Nearly all of these districts voted for the GOP nominee in the past three presidential elections – President Bush, Senator McCain, and Governor Romney, respectively. Constituency data shows that the election of freshmen members in 2010 – especially those of the TPC – was seemingly heavily influenced by district-level factors, particularly the safeness of electoral districts (CPVI, presidential vote) and their respective census regions. These freshmen benefited heavily from Democratic overextension into Republican leaning districts in 2006 and 2008, districts that were particularly hard hit by the recession as seen in the data and evidenced by the low income and high unemployment in freshman districts. Significance testing showed geographic and voting variables to be significant, while income and unemployment were not. These district and constituency variables help to explain the roll call voting behavior of MOC's seen in Chapter Four.

# CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

With the analysis of the variables complete, I must now examine the implications of the findings for the hypotheses as well as further research. The results of this study will also help to either demonstrate or disprove popular notions about the Tea Party movement at both the elite and mass levels. The tests of significance referenced in this chapter that are used for hypothesis testing are found in their respective sections. The null hypothesis that there is no difference between members of the TPC and ER's can be rejected. Rejection occurs at both levels of analysis.

As the data presented shows, and as seen in Figure 5, final passage votes show a higher level of significance than procedural votes, perhaps because the media, activists and the public are more attuned to final passage votes. While variance existed between final passage votes in at least one of the vote categories, procedural votes received nearly unanimous in support in both groups. Procedural votes displayed no significance or variance when examining them collectively, via an additive index, or during the significance tests in any of the vote categories.



**Figure 5: Final Passage Roll Call Vote Averages by Category and Group**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House

**Figure 6: Procedural Roll Call Vote Averages by Category and Group**

Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House

Jessee and Theriault (2012, 14) find that "procedural votes are merely de facto declarations of partisan identification quite unrelated to the underlying substance of the legislation" and that MOC's "vote with two different faces: one face for the less visible party-pressured procedural votes and the other for the highly visible constituency pressured final passage votes." This is evidenced in Figure 6. The findings also show a high-level of cohesion amongst the TPC. Hammond (1998, 179) found that caucus membership is a substantial factor in how MOC vote. In addition, the fact that five of the eight (62.5%) final passage votes that exhibited significant differences happened to be the most controversial and publicized pieces of legislation considered during the112[th] Congress, shows the power of the TPC and its impact on Washington and the American political system. With these results, hypothesis one is supported when examining economic votes.

   As expected, economic votes are significant – accounting for all eight of the roll calls found to be statistically significant. The results are largely congruous with those of McNitt (2012, 10), who found that TPC members cast "more conservative votes on budget and debt

limitation legislation." The results also show vast similarities between the TPC and ER's, particularly on non-economic, and foreign and security policy votes. This is congruent with Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006) who found growing homogeneity amongst policy positions in parties in government. The votes over the federal budget, debt ceiling, and taxes were the most visible and highly contentious roll calls of the Congress. However, the debate over patent reform – The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act – garnered nowhere near the attention of the other significant votes. The same is true of transportation funding, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21$^{st}$ Century Act. Determining why exactly patent reform drew the ire of the TPC is outside the scope of this research; yet some members expressed concern over the transition from a 'first to invent' to a 'first to file' patent system. Economic votes provided an opportunity for TPC members to espouse what the Tea Party movement is popularly thought to stand for, a smaller more limited government, and many did just that. Still other MOC's used each vote as a carefully planned political maneuver, appealing not only to members of the Tea Party movement but also to the activists that helped to elect them as well as their constituents. With economic votes showing significance while the other two roll call categories did not, hypothesis two is supported.

Furthermore, administration support was found for ten roll calls, seven economic votes and three foreign and security policy votes. Of these key votes, seven – all economic – were found to be significant at or below the .05 level, with an average difference using means comparison of 21.57 percentage points. It is noteworthy that a majority of these votes were compromises between the administration and Republican leadership. These results appear congruent with literature that finds animosity toward Obama to be a key factor in Tea Party support (Jacobson 2011; Maxwell and Parent 2012). However, further study is required to

determine how administration support specifically affected these votes. Hypothesis three is supported, as seventy percent of votes receiving presidential support were significant.

Incumbency data shows significant variance between TPC members and ER's, however none of the incumbency variables were significant, and consequently hypothesis four is not supported. However, the elite level results are contrary to the popular conception held by many including Rae (2011, 19) who characterized the Tea Party as an insurgent and spontaneous movement. Over two-thirds of TPC members in the 112th Congress were incumbents, with a majority serving in Congress as far back as 2005. It was also discovered that members reelected in 2012 were much more likely to originate from states where the redistricting process was controlled by Republicans. Over half of members no longer serving in Congress emanated from states where the redistricting process was either controlled by Democrats or where it was split between parties. Though redistricting was found to not be statistically significant, these findings are in line with research conducted by Squire (1995, 235), in which he found the parties that controlled the redistricting process "won more seats than they had before redistricting and they almost always held the seats created for them." While the GOP did lose some seats in 2012, Squire (1995) also found that incumbents, in the rare circumstances in which they lose reelection, usually do so in 'toss-up' districts – similar findings are observed in Table 13. Desposato and Petrocik (2003) similarly determine that the highest rate of incumbent losses occur in the election immediately following redistricting.

Mass level analysis utilizing information on congressional districts and constituencies yielded mixed results. The CPVI of congressional districts from both the 112th and 113th Congresses were found to be significant, as well as census regions, and the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential vote at the same level. Taken together, these results paint a fuller picture of the

districts represented by Republican House members, and especially those of the TPC. Members of the TPC represent safe southern Republican districts that voted for GOP nominee in each of the past three presidential elections. Because all six of these district-level variables were found to be significant, hypothesis five is supported. These findings support Campbell and Putnam (2011), Arceneaux and Nicholson (2012), and Abramowitz's (2011) assertions that Tea Party supporters are partisan Republicans. The constituency demographic and economic variables – race, education, income, and unemployment education – were not to be significant. However, these variables aid in completing the portrait of TPC constituencies and their influence on the election and roll call behavior of their legislators. In addition, considerable differences were seen in the economic metrics when comparing TPC members and ER's and controlling for incumbency. These differences likely played an influential role in the election of freshmen members in 2010 and require further study.

The geographic and voting district variables – CPVI, presidential vote, region – provide at least a partial explanation for members voting behavior. Clinton's (2006) research on Congressional roll call voting is significant to note because it was conducted during a period when the GOP controlled the House (1995-2007), providing a similar period for analysis to the present. Clinton (2006) found that majority-party Republicans were more responsive to the preferences of same-party constituents. Due to these results, as well as a depth of literature on constituency influence and economic voting (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Calvert 1985; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Miller and Stokes 1963; Stokes and Miller 1962; Whitman 1990), hypothesis six is supported.

Contrary to the results in the analysis of elite level roll call voting, economic variables at the mass level were not significant. Foreign and security policy variables were also not

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significant, the same as found previously. However, non-economic variables were highly

significant, both below the .05 level as seen in Table 19. The reversal of significance between

economic and non-economic varibales is significant to note, especially since only GOP voters

were analyzed. Illustrating a split between the elite and mass level, a number of the mean

comparison results are interesting. For instance, over sixty percent of Republican voters

supported raising taxes on millionaires. However, when examining the American Taxpayer

Relief Act of 2012 – which ended the Fiscal Cliff by raising taxes on higher income Americans –

the vote was significant at the .001 level. The No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act from the

first session was insignificant at .640, yet the four-point self-placement scale on abortion in the

ANES was statistically significant below the .05 level. The ANES variables are a complete

reversal from the elite level in terms of economic and non-economic variables.

These results illustrate ideological and partisan polarization amongst elites. As elites have

become more polarized, voters have to a certain extent become more polarized as well. This

polarization at the mass level comes in multiple forms, including placement on the left-right

ideological spectrum, evaluations of party positions, as well as views on key issues. These results

are most likely to manifest in the most politically engaged part of the electorate (Abramowitz

2010; Abramowitz 2011).  Most research focusing on mass polarization emphasizes the

importance of political elites (Hetherington 2001). Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011)

found that the Tea Party was largely funded by Republican business elites, and reinforced by a

conservative media – making the Tea Party an elite movement in the eyes of many researchers.

However, polarization at the mass level is not as pronounced as at the elite level, and as party

polarization has increased, mass level polarization has not grown by the same amount. This

disconnect may be because the majority of the electorate does not focus on politics (Layman,

Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Further research needs to be completed to find the causal link between elite polarization and that of the mass level. In addition, more research should be conducted to assess how subgroups at the mass level affect the behavior of political and media elites – a topic particularly important concerning the Tea Party movement.

This research was conducted cognizant of its limitations and opportunities for future research. This paper's main constraint is that only the self-identified members of the TPC were subjected to heightened scrutiny as the congressional arm of the Tea Party movement. Further research could broaden the scope of the dependent variable by using a different measure of Tea Party support. Two models would be a measure of public statements of support for the movement, or endorsements received by Tea Party organizations (Tea Party Express, FreedomWorks, etc.). In addition, future research could focus on a historical comparison between the Tea Party movement and the 2010 election, and a historically similar period. The results from this analysis show the Tea Party's effect on Congress and the American political system, and preconceived notions of the movement and its members.

## The Future of the Tea Party

At the beginning of the 111th Congress, Democrats held 256 seats in the House and 57 in the Senate, including the two Independent senators that caucus with the Democrats. As explained previously, this left the Democrats at a disadvantage of defending a large number of seats they had gained in 2006 and 2008, many of them in districts that would normally lean towards the GOP. The GOP was caught in a similar storm in 2012. For instance, in 2008 Democrats gained 21 House seats, a third of the number Republicans did in 2010. A reasonable question to be asked then is

did the Republicans overextend? More specifically, are members of the Tea Party Caucus that overextension? Furthermore, what do these results say about 2014?

The main byproduct of the Tea Party movement in 2010 was its energy. However, the Tea Party also likely cost the GOP control of the Senate in 2010 and 2012. Conservative Senate candidates such as Sharon Angle (Nevada), Christine O'Donnell (Delaware), Todd Akin (Missouri), and Richard Murdock (Indiana), all enjoyed Tea Party support and lost winnable contests against Democrats. If in an election year where the incumbent Democratic president won reelection with 51.1% of the popular vote, Democrats could only pick up eight House seats, it is highly unlikely that the GOP would lose the seats necessary to lose their majority in 2014. This scenario is also increasingly unlikely after examining the effects of the redistricting that occurred after the 2010 Census, and because of the increasing safeness of GOP seats – fifty-two of the members examined currently represent swing districts and none come from a Democratic leaning district. A breakdown of House membership – as of March 2014 – is seen in Figure 7.



**Figure 7: 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, Breakdown by Party and Group**

Note: Membership current as of March 2014
Source: Based upon information from The Clerk of the House

Five of these seats are TPC members, credibly leaving forty-seven of the seats studied in play. Due to the electorally safe nature of TPC districts, it is safe to assume that many of these members could have been elected, and could be reelected without the Tea Party banner.

Statistician Nate Silver (2012) believes that due to the rise of hyperpartisan districts, there are only about thirty-five true swing districts. Democrats would need to win more than half of these seats to regain the gavel. The data shows that most members of the TPC should remain in office for the 114th Congress, because forty-two of the members examined represent Republican-leaning districts. However, economic conditions while still likely to be the number one issue facing voters, is not likely to be as important as it was in 2010. Concerns over foreign policy, entitlement and defense cuts, and health care are likely to be salient issues. Chances are that at least some of the five TPC members and forty-seven ER's studied in swing districts will face a competitive race. Barring a political scandal, economic downturn, or foreign intervention, the preceding study allows me to hypothesize that Republicans are likely to retain their House majority in the 114th Congress. This hypothesis is congruous with research (Erikson 1988) that shows the president's party often suffers an electoral decline in midterms – with the notable exceptions of 1934 (Franklin Roosevelt), 1998 (Clinton), and 2002 (George W. Bush).

Following the historic 2008 election of our nation's first African-American commander-in-chief, a group of conservatives wary of government policy gave rise to the Tea Party movement. As noted by Jacobson (2011), the Tea Party "brought an intense, angry energy to the Republican cause" in 2010 contributing to the GOP surge. Whether the group will provide this same surge in 2014 is unknown. However, the Tea Party is without a doubt a powerful group that has influenced local, state, and federal political races, affected economic and foreign policy, and brought our nation to the brink of default and caused a government shutdown. The TPC has

endured many public struggles with Boehner, most notable the debate over the raising of the

nation's debt ceiling in August 2011 and the "fiscal cliff" in December 2012. The movement has

not only captivated our media but also the minds of ordinary Americans and political elites, and

has taken the American political system by storm.

# APPENDIX: VARIABLES

| Elite Level Variables: Membership, Endorsements, Incumbency, and Redistricting | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Sources** |
| Member of Congress | | http://www.house.gov/representatives/ |
| Tea Party Caucus Membership 112th Congress | 1 = Member 0 = Non-member | http://bachmann.house.gov/ News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=226594 |
| Tea Party Caucus Membership 113th Congress | | http://bachmann.house.gov/ News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=226594 |
| FreedomWorks Endorsement 2010 | 1 = Endorsed 0 = Not-endorsed | http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/tea-party-endorsement-results/ |
| Sarah Palin Endorsement 2010 | | http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/palin_tracker/ |
| Tea Party Express Endorsement 2010 | | http://www.teapartyexpress.org/endorse-2010/ |
| 108th Congress Incumbency | 1 = Member 0 = Non-Member | http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/108/house/members/ |
| 109th Congress Incumbency | | http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/109/house/members/ |
| 110th Congress Incumbency | | http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/110/house/members/ |
| 111th Congress Incumbency | | http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/111/house/members/ |
| 113th Congress Incumbency | | http://www.house.gov/representatives/ |
| Redistricting State Legislative Control | 5 = Nonpartisan 4 = Nonpartisan Co. 3 = Democratic 2 = Split 1 = Republican | Process: http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx Partisanship: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2010_Legis_and_State_post.pdf |

| 112th Congress First Session Roll Call Vote Variables | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Sources** |
| No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll286.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll292.xml |
| Federal funding of National Public Radio and the use of Federal funds to acquire radio content Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll190.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll192.xml |
| Department of Defense and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll266.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll268.xml |
| "Cut, Cap and Balance" | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll604.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll606.xml |
| Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya Act | 4 = Non-Member<br>3 = Not voting<br>2 = Present<br>1 = Yea<br>0 = Nay | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll492.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll493.xml |
| August 2011 Debt Compromise | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll687.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll690.xml |
| Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll010.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll014.xml |
| Leahy Smith America Invents Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll465.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll491.xml |
| PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll376.xml |
| Paul Ryan FY 2012 Budget | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll266.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll277.xml |
| Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll859.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll869.xml |
| National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll926.xml<br>F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll932.xml |

Note: The procedural vote for the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 was not analyzed because it did not receive a roll call vote.
Legend: P – Procedural Votes, F – Final Passage Votes

| 112th Congress Second Session Roll Call Vote Variables | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Sources** |
| Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll072.xml |
| Paul Ryan 2013 FY Budget | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll140.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll151.xml |
| Violence Against Women Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll255.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll258.xml |
| Repeal of Obamacare Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll457.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll460.xml |
| Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll166.xml |
| | 4 = Non-Member | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll451.xml |
| Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012 | 3 = Not voting | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll513.xml |
| | 2 = Present | |
| Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act | 1 = Yea | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll536.xml |
| | 0 = Nay | |
| District of Columbia Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll539.xml |
| FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012 | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll561.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll569.xml |
| 2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll573.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll579.xml |
| National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll642.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll645.xml |
| American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 | | P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll658.xml |
| | | F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll659.xml |

Note: The procedural votes for the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act, and the District of Columbia Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act were not analyzed because they did not receive a roll call vote.
Legend: P – Procedural Votes, F – Final Passage Votes

| Mass Level Variables: Congressional Districts, Constituencies, and ANES | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Sources** |
| Cook Partisan Voting Index 112th Congress | 6 = Non-member 5 = Strong Dem | http://cookpolitical.com |
| Cook Partisan Voting Index 113th Congress | 4 = Weak Dem 3 = Swing 2 = Weak GOP 1 = Strong GOP | http://cookpolitical.com |
| District Presidential Vote 2004 | | http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/ files/pvistate.pdf |
| District Presidential Vote 2008 | 1 = Democratic 0 = Non-Democratic | http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/ files/pvistate.pdf |
| District Presidential Vote 2012 | | http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/ files/pvistate.pdf |
| Census Region | 4 = West 3 = South 2 = Midwest 1 = Northeast | http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf |
| Percent Race (Non-African-American and non-Hispanic) 2009 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Percent High School Graduates 2009 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Unemployment Rate 2009 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Unemployment Rate Change 2008-09 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Median Household Income 2009 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Median Household Income Change 2008-09 | | http://proximityone.com/cd.htm |
| Government Services Spending | | ANES 2012 |
| Tax on Millionaires | | ANES 2012 |
| Abortion Self-Placement | Respective point-scales | ANES 2012 |
| Position on Gay Marriage | | ANES 2012 |
| Defense Spending | | ANES 2012 |
| Government Efforts to Reduce Terrorism | | ANES 2012 |

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