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AN ANALYSIS OF THE VULNERABILITY TO
TERRORIST RADICALIZATION IN
GREAT BRITAIN

by

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B.A. Rollins College, 2000

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
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ABSTRACT

To understand the conditions and experiences that might make an individual more vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, this study examines a sample group of Muslim's in Great Britain to determine if responses to survey questions on a range of issues and perceptions can provide indications of an individual's vulnerability to terrorist radicalization. Key to this process was the development of a vulnerability to radicalization score that allowed for an analysis of the relationship between this score and different independent variables.

The dataset for this study was obtained using the Pew Research Center's Spring 2006 Global Attitudes Project 15 Nation Survey. This survey contains a significant oversampling of Muslim respondents allowing for the statistical analysis of potential vulnerability. It is important to understand that this analysis does not provide any indication of radicalization, but a vulnerability based upon accepted theories discussed in terrorism literature. The testing of commonly held theories regarding terrorist radicalization produced a very different picture from what has been viewed in the past. New findings include a previously unrecognized quantity of women who are potentially vulnerable to radicalization. Additionally, income and education do not seem to play the pivotal role that is usually expected, and analysis indicates there is a link between the perceptions of actions by the United States government in the war to combat terrorism and the respondents' vulnerability to radicalization.

Recommendations are for the refinement and expansion of this study to include the remaining Western European democracies that were sampled and the United States in order to perform a comparative analysis providing a broader understanding regarding the vulnerability of Muslims to terrorist radicalization in Western Democracies.

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INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 2007, two cars loaded with explosives were discovered in London. The next day two Islamic radicals drove a Jeep Cherokee into the terminal at Glasgow International Airport and attempted to explode the vehicle. These same individuals were found to have been responsible for the failed car bombs discovered the previous evening. But, unlike the attacks of September 11, 2001, these bombers were not sent from Afghanistan with orders to commit these acts. As it turns out, these men were trained physicians working in the United Kingdom. Dr. Bilal Abdullah was 27 years old, born in the United Kingdom, while his companion Dr. Kafeel Ahmed was born in India. Both men worked as doctors at the Royal Alexandra Hospital. What caused these men, and other British citizens implicated in the attacks, to become radicalized and seek to commit these acts of terror? Furthermore, why do we find young Muslim men: children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants; born, raised, and schooled in a developed nation such as the United Kingdom joining the jihad and committing terrorist acts?

It is unfortunate, but as Barbara Crenshaw (1983) points out when she quotes Irving Louis Horowitz, “terrorism has become a mode of doing politics” (Crenshaw 1983, 143). For groups like the Irish Republican Army, the German Red Army Faction, the Weathermen, the Aum Shinrikyo, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Tamil Tigers (to name only a few of the many groups), political violence escalating to acts of terrorism is the primary vehicle for attempting to affect political change. Konrad Kellen (1998) provides as an example the radicals in West Germany in the 1960s, explaining that “when there was no substantial response to their political drives among either the elite or the masses, their ideology turned them into terrorists” (Kellen 1998, 47). While terrorism

has not changed the nature of power, it has since September 11, 2001 changed the way many states address immigration, security and some social policies. Therefore we must ask how have these policies changed, and have these changes had the effect of reducing or strengthening the available body of recruits for terrorist organizations? An examination of a sample of the Muslim population in the United Kingdom provides us with an opportunity to make just such an evaluation. With a purported rise in the radicalization and the advent of “homegrown” Islamist terrorists willing to commit suicide attacks of terror, such an analysis can be seen as an imperative.

This research assumes that in order to combat homegrown Islamic terrorism it is necessary to understand what we mean by “radicalized.” Radicalization can be defined as “*the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.*”¹ It is commonly held that in certain countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, this radicalization process is a part of the enculturation and education of the population. But is this the case? An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt shows this group did not begin to become radicalized until the government outlawed their organization and began to arrest and persecute its members.

In Europe, the Muslim population has increased significantly as a result of immigration with an estimated 15-20 million Muslims now living in Europe, 1.6-2 million in the United Kingdom alone (Leiken 2005). With the real possibility of radicalization, these growing populations become a major concern, and each new attack brings calls for a crack down on Muslim extremists. But do these types of focused

¹ H.R. 1955 – *To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes*. April 19, 2007. United States House of Representatives.

government policies reduce the potential for violent political action, or is it possible that they actually serve to further radicalize the Muslim population? Is it possible that government policy can serve as a catalyst for radicalization? If so, what actions or policies can be identified that would cause someone who had previously been a law abiding moderate Muslim and lifelong citizen of the United Kingdom to become radicalized?

Within the broader study of terrorism there have been some attempts by academics to understand Islamic radicalization. The majority of the scholarly work on radicalization has been centered on attempts to understand Islamic ideology and the Islamist agenda. Further, considerable work has been done in an attempt to identify the structure of terrorist organizations and cells, recruitment practices, and phenomenon such as suicide attacks. This paper will seek to build on this body of work indirectly by answering the recent call by many scholars to understand the roots of terrorism.

In order to undertake this challenge it is first necessary to establish that becoming a terrorist is a process, with the first step in this process being radicalization. With this starting point it is then possible to consider the factors, experiences, and perceptions that might make one vulnerable to terrorist radicalization. Is it poverty? Do perceptions regarding a lack of upward mobility or prosperity due to limited educational opportunities or being a recently arrived immigrant make one vulnerable? Understanding the influence of these and other factors is essential if one is to consider the vulnerability of the Muslim population in Great Britain to terrorist radicalization.

This analysis provides insights into this vulnerability and the influencing factors. Interestingly, the percentage of women found to be vulnerable to radicalization within

this sample is significantly higher than the almost uniformly male-centered profiles that have been constructed by many terrorism analysts and scholars previously. It is also clear that the policies of the United States and its engagement in fighting terrorism and its involvement in the Middle East is a source of frustration among the Muslim population in Great Britain. Additionally, several commonly held assumptions regarding education and income are shown to not have the influencing effect they were once considered to have. Lastly, the vulnerability of British born Muslims, as seen in the high percentage of naturally born citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization, seems to provide reinforcement to the concerns regarding the threat of homegrown terrorists within Great Britain.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The difficulty in providing a literature review that discusses the concept of radicalization that leads to terrorism is the simple fact that very few studies have been focused on this earliest stage in the process of becoming a terrorist. A considerable portion of the terrorist literature is concerned with the history of terrorism, an accounting of terrorist groups, and the acts they have committed, or the development of timelines to explain the growth of a particular terrorist group like al-Qaeda and the events that transpired leading up to and including the committing of terrorist acts. What is missing from the literature on terrorism is substantive work that seeks to explain why young men and women become terrorists. Just now, we are beginning to see in the literature calls for this type of analysis. Scholars are recognizing that if we are to truly understand terrorism, we must begin to gather some understanding of the sources and the process of radicalization that leads individuals to join terrorist groups or cells (Sageman 2008, Silke 2004). Especially now, given the rise of the 'homegrown' terrorist in western democracies like the United Kingdom and Germany, the need for such knowledge is even more pressing.

Over the years there have been many attempts to identify a terrorist profile in the hope of being able to more easily identify those individuals who are likely to join the ranks of the terrorist organizations. These efforts have ranged from suggestions of psychological deficiencies to economic hardship. While some of these theories have been found to be unrepresentative of the population being studied, it is important to consider that while there is no one phenomenon that can explain why someone commits terrorist acts, it may be possible to examine these various explanations as a collective of events that may lead one to become radicalized and involved in terrorist activities. The

following represents a collection of some of the more popular theories that have been used to explain terrorism.

Terrorist Psychopathy

For years the popular notion among some social scientists was that it might be possible to create a terrorist profile. One theory held that terrorists were psychologically unbalanced individuals who lashed out at the world. Konrad Kellen (1982) discussed whether terrorists were “crazy.” In his study, he cites Franco Ferracuti’s *Psychiatric Aspect of Terrorism in Italy*. In this work, Kellen found that Ferracuti considered right wing terrorists to frequently be pathological while the left wing terrorists who adhered to an unrealistic ideology were more normal yet still fanatical (Kellen 1982; Laqueur 1987)

Jerrold Post (1998) argues that terrorists act out of a sort of psycho-logic whereby their joining, participation, and committing of terrorist acts is a result of psychological abnormalities (see also Sageman 2004). Post (2007) goes further, however, to posit that individuals become terrorists because they have suffered some sort of injustice as a child, are rebelling against authority due to having an authoritative father, or have been raised up in a family that adheres to a terrorist ideology. In his latest work, *The Mind of the Terrorist*, Post is careful to avoid openly stating that terrorists suffer from some sort of psychopathy, but goes on to offer a laundry list of potential psychological explanations of why someone becomes a terrorist. His recounting of individual terrorist story’s provide some childhood experience that he feels drove them to join a terrorist organization. Post (2007) does not, however, cover the time when this individual made the decision to become a terrorist. He jumps from what he perceived to be the psychological ‘root’ of the problem and does not consider the process by which this individual became

radicalized and then incorporated into a terrorist organization. Post continues to see the terrorist as a damaged individual who is acting out in response to some prior psychological trauma or individual psychopathy.

However, Barbara Crenshaw (2000), finds this tendency to see terrorists “as motivated by personality disorders such as narcissism or paranoia,” to be seeking to diagnose from a distance and only serves to, “taint terrorism with a pathology aura” (Crenshaw 2000, 407; see also Horgan 2005). Marc Sageman (2004) adds, in his study of known terrorists (172 subjects) and terrorist groups, he did not detect “a pattern of paranoid personality or lifestyle before joining jihad” (Sageman 2004, 83). Those who reject this psychological explanation suggest becoming a terrorist is a process. It should be considered that while no one theory can explain why someone becomes a terrorist, it may be possible to provide a checklist of possibilities that when combined may serve to promote radicalization.

Frustration Aggression Theory

In examining the frustration aggression paradigm, it is clear that there are possibilities of this theory providing some insight into why and how someone could become radicalized. Ted Gurr (1970) points out that when individuals become frustrated due to conditions they perceive as being unjust or unfair, and they further perceive that all legitimate avenues for redress have been expired or are closed, then the frustration that has built up over time results in these individuals becoming radicalized and eventually, a small portion of the population that is radicalized actually chooses to commit terrorist acts. Gurr (1970) suggests that the concept of “relative deprivation” explains the perception of the way things out to be as compared to the way they are (Gurr 1970, 23).

This perception may not be a true representation of the actual conditions but as a collective value it can drive individuals to commit violence. According to Gurr, “The frustration aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence (Gurr 1970, 23). In a later work he suggests that, “impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation and rationalistic grounds that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics “ (Gurr 1990, 87).

While the frustration aggression concept is central to explaining why people may begin down the path to radicalization leading to terrorism it does not provide the overarching answer to this question. Many Muslims are unhappy with the conditions of their lives but few decide to become terrorists. It is important to determine if there are any specific phenomena that may serve to frustrate the target population, and if so, what the significance of this frustration is to the process of radicalization. Sources of frustration, especially among the Muslim communities in Western Europe could include perceived economic and political deprivation; lack of social identity; and perceived oppression as a result of government policy.

Economic deprivation/Poverty Theory

While many have, in the past, considered poverty and poor education to be the driving force behind radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations, this model has been found to be less representative than first thought and in some cases unrepresentative. Alan Krueger (2007) points out that “a wealth of evidence now shows that any effect of education and poverty on terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak” (Krueger 2007, 13). Further he suggests civil liberties are a more

important determinant of terrorism, and there may be some indirect link between economic conditions and civil liberties. In an earlier work, he suggested radicalization and terrorism should be viewed as a “response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics” (Krueger & Maleckova 2003, 119). This notion is supported by Mark Thomson and Maurice Crul (2007) and by Robbert Woltering (2002) in their finding that children of immigrants are better educated and are able to find more skilled employment than their parents. Further, Erich Weede (1987) suggests that even in developing countries, inequality and economic development do not lead to violence; with regime repression having only a weak relationship. While it is accepted second and third generation Muslim immigrants are better educated and have better economic opportunities than their parents and/or grandparents, it seems there still exists a perception of inequity and discrimination fueling discontent. This condition, coupled with the demonization of immigrants following 9/11, makes this population susceptible to radicalization.

Efforts to integrate these immigrants have been both late and inadequate. According to Hansen, “Migrants and their descendants are poorly represented in national parliaments; they suffer disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they thus draw disproportionately on welfare services” (Hansen 2003, 33). In 1998 employment figures for the United Kingdom showed 75.1% of whites were employed and 57% of the black and Asian populations were employed. This contrasts sharply with employment rates of 35% for Pakistanis and 41% for Bangladeshi immigrants. In Germany, the employment figures are equally appalling. Unemployment rates among immigrants were nearly twice the national average of 8.8% with fully 16.4% unemployment.

Aside from employment inequities, income disparities also plague the Muslim immigrant community.

Income inequality can be considered another source of frustration among the immigrant Muslim population. While educational opportunities are equal for nearly all British citizens, employment practices and the opportunity to make equal wages continues to be a problem. Unemployment and underemployment can be seen as further contributing factors to explain immigrant radicalization.

Table 1 illustrates clearly the income inequalities that exist between Muslim and non-Muslims. As we can see, while few Muslims exist at the higher income brackets, Muslims are represented significantly and disproportionately in the income level that is seen as below the poverty line for each country.

Table 1: Income

Country	Muslims	General Public	Difference
France: Euros			
29,500 or more	20%	32%	-12%
7,500-29,499	35%	41%	-6%
Less than 17,500	45%	27%	+18%
Spain: Euros			
21,500 or more	7%	26%	-19%
14,500-21,499	20%	24%	-4%
Less than 14,500	73%	50%	+23%
Germany: Euros			
30,000 or more	12%	26%	-14%
18,000-29,999	35%	39%	-4%
Less than 18,000	53%	35%	+18%
Great Britain: B.P.			
40,000 or more	13%	23%	-10%
20,000-39,999	26%	38%	-12%
Less than 20,000	61%	39%	+22%

Pew Research Center May 2007

While it can be argued that poverty is not the cause of terrorism, it must be considered that income inequality, or at least the strong perception of inequality, could serve as a catalyst to radicalization.

Terrorism as political violence

Ehud Sprizak (1998) considers terrorism to be a political phenomenon resulting from “a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society or regime...a process whose beginning is, almost always nonviolent and non-terroristic” (Sprizak 1998, 78). Ted Gurr (1998) sees radicalization as the road to terrorism and explains it as “a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists” (Gurr 1998, 87). Participants at an Oslo conference June 2003 listed several ‘root causes’ routinely associated with terrorism. Among them are a lack of democracy, eroded civil liberties, and a breakdown in the rule of law, extreme ideologies, the experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins, and the experience of social injustice, to name but a few (Horgan 2005).

The Process Model

John Horgan (2005) suggests that becoming a terrorist is a process that starts with becoming radicalized, moves to actively engaging in terrorist activities, and in the final stage of disengagement moving away from the terrorist group or activities. He feels that the discussion of terrorism as a process is essential to moving the discussion away from attempts to define terrorism or analyze the phenomenon through a series of events. What is important to the process model is explaining, “behaviours and their antecedents, expected consequences, and outcomes that are associated with terrorism” (Horgan 2005, 80). While focusing on the questions of ‘how’ people move through the process, Horgan does not ignore the burning question of ‘why’ individuals decide to engage in terrorist activities. Offering examples of the IRA ‘terrorist’ who began by marching in

Republican marches, became an activist, and was eventually charged with. “several attempted murders, attempted kidnapping, arms possession, as well as membership in an illegal organization,” this individual did not consider himself a terrorist but rather a participant in the ongoing process of politicization in Northern Ireland (Horgan 2005, 85). Interestingly, this individual was raised in a non-political home. His exposure and witness to police brutality of the nationalist was central to his development of sentiments toward the nationalist cause and his joining of the Republican movement.

Horgan discusses catalysts as primary factors in the individual’s decision to become involved in terrorism. These catalysts can include the witnessing of racially, ethnically, or religiously based abuses by majority groups, police, military, or government: the murder, torture, or victimization of a friend or family member; the persecution of a group or community the individual identifies with, particularly when there are fundamentalist groups involved; or the individual’s response to government policies that are perceived as threatening the individual or the groups they associate themselves with. It is important to note that this association can extend to populations in other countries. It is well known that new recruits into al-Qaeda cells and other groups associated with the global Salafi movement in Europe were developed by creating a psychological link between them and Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. They were compelled to join their ‘Muslim brothers’ in combat and travelled to fight alongside them, thus receiving vital terrorist training.

Another attractant to terrorism can be the individual’s desire to be part of a group as a result of his/her identification with the group’s leader, the stated religious or political ideology of the group, or the desire to gain social status within the community by joining

the group. Lastly, Horgan suggests that timing is critical to the process of joining a terrorist group. It is well known that individuals who are recruited into terrorist organizations are typically vetted in order to ensure internal security. New members are given low level tasks to perform while their trustworthiness is evaluated by the leaders of the cell or group. It is interesting to note that there are cases where European Muslims who went to train with al-Qaeda returned prior to completing their training finding the conditions and the ideology too extreme for their liking. In these cases, the cold reality of terrorist training did not match with the 'romantic' idea of being a terrorist. Consider the harm such individuals could do to a terrorist cell or larger organization if they had been handed the entire 'playbook' upon initial interest or after first arriving at the training camp.

Using Horgan's concept of the process model it is interesting when one considers the possibility of identifying individuals who might be vulnerable to terrorist radicalization based upon their individual experiences and sentiments as a result of those experiences. Other factors include perceptions of political efficacy, social status, cultural security, and perceptions of equality, opportunity, coupled with sentiments of cultural or religious persecution. This begs the question, can the radicalization of some Muslim immigrants in Great Britain be considered a result of the 'root causes' of terrorism or are these radicalizing factors more individualistic in nature and rooted in the individual's perceptions that then serve as catalysts to radicalization?

Government policy as a catalyst

Policy can serve as a potential catalyst to radicalization. Terrorist writings from the nineteenth-century confirm provocation of the government was seen as strategic in order to provoke repressive actions that could be used to rally support for the terrorist cause (Crenshaw 1998). Gregory Miller (2007) agrees that harsh government policies can result in ‘cycles of violence.’ Further, he suggests inaction can be just as detrimental, allowing violent factions to take hold within a country, much as we have seen in the United Kingdom. With radicalism on the rise, and terror attacks on the home front, such permissiveness is viewed as excessive and dangerous (Leiken 2005). New policies regarding immigration and security are being implemented to address these concerns. However, Paul Wilkinson (2007) warns such measures must be rooted in the rule of law and seek to uphold human rights to, “insure these values and the institutional safeguards that ensure their continued observance are not sacrificed on the grounds of ‘protecting national security’” (Wilkinson 2007, 9).

Immigration policy

Immigration policy within the United Kingdom has changed significantly as a result of terrorist concerns. Post World War II immigration policy was primarily concerned with the rebuilding and economic expansion of the United Kingdom. Such a policy, designed to meet short-term economic interests, did little to ensure the long-term economic viability of the immigrant population or the upward mobilization of second and third generation immigrants (Hansen 2003). The result of this policy has been the alienation of the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants, “born and bred under

European liberalism,” now underemployed and made to feel unwelcome (Leiken 2005, 4).

Even before 9/11, economic downturns in the U.K. created an anti-immigrant sentiment among non-immigrants. Opposition to immigration and new support for anti-immigration parties and policies increased as levels of unemployment rose (Sides and Citrin 2007). Applications for those seeking asylum saw a decrease in acceptance from 85.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1997 (Rudolph 2003). New policies regarding immigration have become very restrictive, especially for Muslims. Since September 11, 2001, the migrant-as-a-threat paradigm has shaped new immigration policy (Ibrahim 2005). The prominent philosophy is the enemy outside will be kept out through strict immigration control and the enemy within will be hunted down by security forces. By identifying the foreigner as the threat, Elspeth Guild (2003) suggests such action can serve to justify the expulsion of foreign nationals as well. Such a move is supportive of Christopher Rudolph (2003) and his 9/11 hypothesis where he states, “newly established links between migration and military threat will swing grand strategy sharply toward closure” (Rudolph 2003, 606). As immigrants become viewed as a security threat as a result of ongoing terrorist operations, it can be expected that future opportunities for immigration will be closed and efforts will be undertaken to deport any current immigrants who are suspected of terrorist involvement. One manifestation of past immigration policy is the isolation of the Muslim immigrant community within the United Kingdom (Leiken 2005).

Social Identity/Assimilation

Policies focused on multiculturalism are viewed as having created conditions which separated the Muslim immigrant community, resulting in racism, discrimination, and a general sense of being disadvantaged, generating feelings of hostility (Abbas 2005). Tahir Abbas (2005) points out that a vast majority of Muslims, “are often trapped in low income employment, suffer heavy ethnic penalties through underemployment, live in some of the poorest housing with poor amenities, and tend to suffer high rates of illness.” (Abbas 2005, 163). The model of assimilation in the United States following the Japanese and Chinese immigration cycle in the 1920s-30s found immigrants developing local economies, with second and third generation immigrants becoming fully assimilated and functioning as a part of the larger population. Such assimilation served to diminish cultural differences and facilitated the mobilization of the children and grandchildren of these immigrants during the post war era (Alba&Nee 1997). This is not the picture found within the Muslim immigrant community in the United Kingdom. A shared sense of lack of belonging and exclusion from mainstream politics, creates a condition of “disaffection, disenfranchisement and isolation” that function to lead both “poorer and richer Muslims” to radicalization (Abbas 2007).

While the British government accepts the realities of immigration, there are now calls to “reclaim British-ness” (Melotti 2006, 206). New laws on immigration, asylum seekers, and citizenship have limited the flow of newcomers. Additionally, new laws now require biometric identification of immigrants, with naturalization and long-term stays more difficult, and a requirement that new foreigners settling in the United Kingdom learn English, in addition to other measures targeted at facilitating integration (Melotti 2006). The need to create this sense of British-ness is viewed as necessary given

the realization that fully 81% of the Muslim immigrant population views themselves as Muslim first and British second.

This disconnection and ostracization from European society has produced some strong sentiment among the immigrant population across a wide range of issues. The Pew Research Group conducted a survey through the Pew Global Attitudes Project to measure Muslim attitudes in Europe, and the findings are very enlightening and sobering. As a measure of identification, when asked, “What do you consider yourself first?” 81% of the Muslims in Great Britain answered that they considered themselves Muslim first and British second. In Spain the number was 69% Muslim first, Germany was 66% and France followed at 46%.²

Given the history regarding the treatment of and policies toward the Muslim immigrant population in Europe, and terrorist attacks that have taken place in the last few years, it comes as no surprise that Europeans are concerned about Islamic extremism. When polled about how worried they actually were about Islamist extremism, 78% of Germans responded that they were very/somewhat concerned, as did 77% of those from Spain, 75% from the Netherlands, 73% from France, and 70% from the United Kingdom.³ Further immigration is also a concern shared by non-Muslims in Europe. When asked about immigration concerns associated with opposition to Turkey’s inclusion into the European Union 81% of the French saw it as a bad thing. Likewise

² *Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity*, The Pew Global Attitudes Project. July, 2006. P.3.

³ *Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics*, The Pew Global Attitudes Project. July, 2005. P. 18.

76% of the Germans, 67% of those from the Netherlands, and 44% of Great Britain's expressed concern regarding further immigration resulting from EU acceptance.⁴

Marginalization

The marginalization of the Muslim immigrant community via multiculturalism is seen in how the British government dealt with discrimination. By promoting multiculturalism among the immigrant populations, the unintended effect was the isolation of those populations, preventing them from fully assimilating into British society. While discrimination was historically seen as a black-white issue, with most Muslims considering themselves to be white, the laws did not address discrimination on the basis of religion. Muslims were considered to be solely a religious group and direct discrimination was lawful under the 1976 Race Relations Act; a condition that was not changed until 2003 (Modood & Ahmad 2007). The issue of discrimination has been highlighted recently by the controversy surrounding the *niqab* (veil) and the comments of Member of Parliament (MP) Jack Straw regarding the cultural separation created when a Muslim woman wears a veil. Isaac Kfir (2007) points out that the government response to these and other issues fails to assuage the angst of the Muslim street because they do not talk to the young people. As a result, "young British Muslims increasingly take the position that civil protest is insufficient and that only through the use of violence would a change be made" (Kfir 2007, 102). A prime example of this condition is the story of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikhh, a British born Muslim of Pakistani origin who, having gone to the private Forest School and studied at the London School of Economics, chose

⁴ Ibid.P.19.

to join the jihad and has now been sentenced to death for his involvement in the kidnap and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl (Kfir 2007).

Security policy

While studies showing links between immigration and criminal activity are greatly exaggerated, Margaret Thatcher's statement that "we joined Europe to have free movement of goods, not to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, and illegal immigrants" only serves to perpetuate the "criminological axis" as it relates to Muslim immigrants (Karyotis 2007, 9). Internal security has become a key issue in the United Kingdom. Since September 11, 2001, British Muslims report being disproportionately targeted for "stop and searches." From 2002-2003, these stop and searches rose among the Asian community by 285%, and 2003-2004 increases were another 40% raising the number of stop and searches to almost 30,000 (Poynting & Mason 2006).

Anti-Terrorism legislation, rushed through in the wake of 9/11, resulted in the banning of sixteen Islamic organizations and the arrest of over 1000 Muslims with only twenty convictions by 2006 (Poynting & Mason 2006; Abbas 2007). This situation is exacerbated by comments like those of MP Hazel Blears, the minister responsible for counter terrorism, who said in 2005, "Muslims will have to accept the reality that they will be stopped and searched more often than the rest of the public" (Abbas 2007, 294). Therefore, British Muslims argue much of the responsibility for the rise in radicalization "lies squarely with the host society" (Szrbis, Baldassar, & Poynting 2007, 266).

Isolation, disenfranchisement, and the restriction of civil liberties seem to make quite a case for radicalization and violent action. In his analysis of the social dynamics of terrorism, Austin Turk (1982) suggests political violence, "may be the product of a

scarcely articulated resentment of felt obstructions and sensed antagonists, or of a highly developed consciousness and analysis of political relationships” (Turk 1982, 121).

Another victim in the wake of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe will most likely be the multiculturalism that has existed in the United Kingdom. With the Muslim birth rate in Europe being triple that of non-Muslims, it is expected the Muslim population will double by 2015 (Taspinar 2003). This realization, coupled with the reality that the Muslim street in Europe is “on its way to having more political weight than the Arab street of Egypt or Saudi Arabia,” has brought further calls for assimilation and an end to multiculturalism (Taspinar 2003, 77). Calls for assimilation are more easily understood when one considers it is difficult to differentiate between Muslims who harbor anti-western views but are non-violent, and those who are willing and ready to resort to violence. “This distinction can be frustrating for the political establishment, as evidenced by the Muslim community’s reaction to the 7 July bombings in the United Kingdom, where the leaders of the Muslim community condemned the atrocity but seemed to insinuate that they understood the anger of the terrorists” (Azzam 2007, 123).

Maha Azzam (2007) points out that “radicalization does not emerge in a vacuum” (Azzam 2007, 124). With this understanding, and the understanding of the literature relating to policies past and present that affect Muslims, it is possible to see how some within the Muslim community can become radicalized and seek to participate in violent terrorist activity. However, while it is easy to blame the policies of the host government, it must be stated that without the rhetoric of the Islamist Imams, and foreign recruiters sent by the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, seeking to recruit these disaffected youth

into their jihad, this radicalization might follow a more conventional path of political protest and street violence rather than terrorism.

Demographics

In order to fully examine the roots of radicalization, we must also consider what the demographic of the ‘typical’ Islamist terrorist is in the United Kingdom. Age is one variable that must be considered when seeking to find a target population for study. Sageman’s sample of 172 terrorists found the average age for joining the jihad was 25.69 years of age (Sageman 2004). However, in his more recent work, examining the ‘homegrown’ phenomenon, Sageman (2008) finds that younger individuals, many in their early teens, are seeking to join the terrorist movement. However, no work has been done to establish an updated estimate regarding age beyond the 25 average. One reason for the high percentage of young terrorists is the practice of engaging university students in Islamist discussion groups which are seeking to locate viable targets for recruitment. This same process can be seen in the Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist group in West Germany. In his examination of the RAF, Klaus Wasmund (1986) found the terrorist group rose out of the organized student movements of the 1960s and 70s. His view was terrorists were “victims of group thinking,” and his focus on group dynamics serves as a point of enlightenment when considering the radicalization process (Wasmund 1986, 194).

Group Dynamics

Many scholars agree that the radicalization within the Muslim community is strongly influenced by group dynamics and their interaction in Islamic study groups and other prayer groups (Smelser 2007; Sageman 2004; Krueger 2007; Kfir 2007; Crenshaw 1989). Many of these group meetings are not only held on University campuses, but are often funded by the University in response to demands from the student movement leaders (Islamist recruiters) and threats of discrimination. The dispossessed/radicalized college student is one representative group targeted for recruitment. The other target group is made up of troubled youths who are estranged from their families and searching for a sense of belonging (Roy 2005). These youths, also in small groups, find themselves easy targets for radicalization and recruitment into terrorist activity much the same way youths are recruited into street gangs in the United States. The individuals are brought into the mosque and form Islamist study groups which become their surrogate families. From here it is a simple process of radicalization via Islamist ideology and recruitment into the jihad (Smelser 2007). There is, however, a common theme between both groups; dispossession. Dispossession, according to Neil Smelser (2007), “is the perception on the part of the group that it is systematically excluded, discriminated against, or disadvantaged with respect to some meaningful aspect of social, economic, and political life to which it feels entitled” (Smelser 2007, 16).

The evolution of the group can be considered central to the radicalization process, particularly among the immigrant Muslim population. Terrorism scholars point to the importance of the group or the “bunch of guys” to the growth of, or recruitment into terrorist cells (Crenshaw 1981; Sageman 2008; Vidino 2006). The evolution along the path to radicalization that leads to the formation of the small group may be considered the

turning point of the radicalization continuum. Once within the group, the radicalization process seems to speed up as the members of the group begin to isolate themselves from the general population, and serve as the self-motivating force behind the group's collective identity and radicalization efforts.

Considerable work within social science has been done to examine how “closed” groups can gain a sense of identity that leads to an *us-vs-them* mentality. The 1954 Robbers Cave Experiment, conducted by Muzafer Sherif proved an excellent example of how quickly small groups can form identities and become adversarial to those that exist outside the group. Twenty boys were chosen and split into two groups (the Eagles and the Rattlers) and placing them in an isolated location for three weeks. By the end of the experiment the Eagles and the Rattlers had, “entered into conflict” (Fine, 2004). Most interesting are the conclusions Sherif (1954) and his group make regarding the reaction to shared frustrations. In the conclusion he considers the approaches used to explain inter-group behavior and states:

One of these approaches advances frustration suffered in the life history of the individual as the main causal factor and constructs a whole explanatory edifice for inter-group aggression on this basis. Certainly aggression is one of the possible consequences of frustration experienced by the individual. But, in order that individual frustration may appreciably affect the course of inter-group trends and be conducive to standardization of negative attitudes toward an out-group, the frustration has to be shared by other group members and perceived as an issue in-group interaction (Sharif 1961, 202).

This same phenomenon can be seen as immigrant Muslim men, brought together by shared frustrations and a growing interest in radical ideology form study or prayer groups, developing into a cohesive unit that begins to meet daily isolating themselves from family and friends by moving into an apartment or home, quitting school or jobs, and spending all their time reading jihadist literature and watching jihadist video's. Crenshaw (1998) suggests that the group members begin to engage in 'one-upmanship' to see who can be the most devout or the better jihadist leading potentially to involvement in terrorist activities.

Recruitment of Muslim youths

There are three primary groups from which the Islamists seek to recruit troubled youths who are estranged from their families, disaffected college students and young professionals, and inmates within the prison system. Troubled youths are the most vulnerable to radicalization, much like young delinquents recruited into street gangs; they are usually relegated to performing support functions for the group (stealing materials, money, and so on.) These young Muslims have usually been in legal trouble, are often users of alcohol or drugs, have had significant difficulties with their parents, and may be estranged from their homes. In cases where these individuals become radicalized, it usually occurs when a small group of friends brings them to a mosque for shelter. Once inside the mosque, he becomes a part of a prayer group of other disaffected youths, who then become his surrogate family. In this environment, the young Muslim is then ripe for recruitment by a radical Mosque member who might lead a prayer group, or an Islamist imam whose message is anti-western and promotes the Islamist agenda (Smelser 2007, 98). Smelser admits that this relationship is complicated, but states that the mosque and

its leaders, “helped provide the religiously based ideological frame for the groups, thus assuming a supplementary rather than a simply indoctrinating role. By virtue of this pattern, religious ideology and group affiliation serve to supplement and reinforce one another and work toward the kind of commitment that would propel young men into lives of righteous battle, exposure to danger, and sometimes suicide” (Smelser 2007, 98).

One example of this dynamic is Salman Abdulla, a seventeen-year-old high school drop out, who had been involved in street violence:

“Two older boys from the gym he used in Bradford told Abdullah about a preacher from Finsbury Park, and took him along when they went to hear Abu Hamza, who was appearing at a community hall near their home. The cleric spoke about the frustration of Abdullah’s generation, who felt no genuine affiliation to Britain, the country of their birth, nor to their ancestral land, Pakistan, which they had never visited. He spoke quickly, his voice rising as he offered his audience an alternative allegiance-Islam” (O’Neil & McGrory 2006, 77).

Abdullah was recruited to fight in the jihad, sent to Kashmir for training and combat, and returned to Finsbury Park ‘a hero’ in the eyes of his fellow Islamists in London.

College recruitment

Recruitment of middle and upper class second and third generation immigrant Muslims is done in a very different way. Student groups on University campuses funded by Islamist organizations like *al-Muhajiroun* (Kfir 2007, 105), *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Baran 2005, 7), *Jamat-e-Islami* (Husain 2007, 72), and the *Muslim Brotherhood* reach out to young Muslim students just as many student groups seek membership on many American

college campuses (Taarnby 2005, 43) and these student groups that go by names like the Muslim Unity Organization and the Young Muslim Organization. Radical student group leaders begin by seeking privileges, from the university, on behalf of their Muslim members. These usually begin with requests for a designated hall for daily prayers and escalate to concessions regarding Muslim dress, customs, and even demands for a *hallal* menu for food that meets Islamic standards.

Meetings can include fiery Islamist rhetoric and the showing of films from conflict areas like Bosnia and Afghanistan, depicting ‘atrocities against their Muslim brothers’. The most radical groups will conclude these types of meetings with calls for volunteers to go and fight in the jihad. Students answering this call are sent to training camps where their indoctrination and terrorist training begins in earnest. While some of these new recruits leave these training camps early, and do not participate in any fighting or future terrorist attacks, the ones that stay are fully fledged jihadists, and represent a significant danger upon return to their home country.

METHODOLOGY

The Purpose of this Analysis

The purpose of this analysis is multifaceted. First, it was important to determine whether it was possible to develop an indicator or measure of the individual's potential for radicalization. Then, using this measure, we asked whether other variables could be used to 'explain' the vulnerability to radicalization among the Muslim population that was surveyed. While this is in no way an attempt to develop a 'terrorist profile' it does offer the unique opportunity to gain insight into the individual experiences and perceptions that may lead one to become vulnerable to terrorist radicalization and recruitment. It is important to note that while an individual may be highly vulnerable to radicalization, this does not in any way *guarantee* that he or she will join a terrorist group or commit terrorist acts. They may never engage in these activities, may find legal ways to seek redress, or may offer financial support to causes or groups they are sympathetic to without being directly involved in any terrorist acts (although financial and logistical assistance is now, in many cases, considered a terrorist act).

Data Source

As previously stated, the group to be studied is Muslims within Great Britain. The Pew Research Center's Spring 2006 Global Attitudes Survey of 15 Nations, provides a Great Britain sample size of N=902 with a substantial over-sample of Muslims with N=412. Answers to questions from this survey provide the necessary data to measure the individual's vulnerability to radicalization as the dependent variable, and provide substantive responses to questions that allow for the measurement of individual data and attitudes regarding public policies and personal experiences/perceptions of concern.

Prior to analysis, the subset of British Muslims was isolated from the entire 15 nation dataset as were the questions that received responses from the subject group.

Radicalization as the Dependent Variable

To measure the dependent variable it was necessary to develop a ‘radicalization’ scale. Such scaling was needed in order to measure the independent variables against a range of dependent variables without complex multivariate analysis. Louis Guttman (1944) suggests it is possible to create a scale from a universe of qualitative data. By choosing a group of variables that would represent conditions of the phenomenon to be measured and applying a quantitative measure to the qualitative answers, a scale can be obtained. Such a measure has two advantages. “First, a mnemonic advantage, for a compact representation would be easier to remember than a large table; and second, if it were desired to relate the universe to other variables it would be easier to do so by means of a compact representation than by using the large multivariate distribution of the attributes in the universe (Guttman 1944, 142). The theory is that as an individual ranks higher on the scale, they would also rank higher in the universe of independent variables (Guttman 1944).

However, Guttman (1944) warns that while a group of variables may be scalable for one population, they may not for another population. For this reason, certain variables will be excluded from the scale. For instance, citizenship, which could be seen as a very important issue in the United Kingdom among second and third generation immigrants, would be irrelevant in France where children of immigrants are automatically considered citizens. While this scale was being created to measure the

vulnerability to radicalization in the United Kingdom, care was taken when choosing scalable variables so that future studies in the region may utilize the same process.

Therefore, citizenship will be among the universe of independent variables.

It is necessary to clarify that this scale or score is not an indicator of the individual's involvement in terrorist activity. It is a representation, based on the analysis provided herein, of what can be considered the individuals susceptibility to radicalization as it relates to the cumulative scoring of the responses to ten questions that make up the 'radicalization set' and the segregation of these scored into high, moderate, and low vulnerability to radicalization. These ten variables were chosen because they allow for the measurement of certain 'known' conditions that exist within the terrorist/radicalized community as described in the terrorist literature.

Variables used to develop this scale reflect the individual's national identity, degree of social satisfaction, identification with terrorist ideology or actions, the measurement of alienation or disenfranchisement felt by the respondent, the willingness to develop alternate realities, the displacement of blame for hardships/conditions on external entities, perceptions that the individuals way of life/cultural identity is at risk, views regarding violence as a means of political protest, and views regarding the acceptability of suicide bombing.

Self identification

How an individual perceived his/her identity as it relates to the nation is important. The question from the survey establishing the individual's self-identification as British or Muslim first provides for an understanding of this perception. The importance of this measure is seen in Melotti's (2006) discussion of the need for creating

a sense of “British-ness” given the knowledge that 81% of the Muslims in the U.K. see themselves as Muslims first and British second. It is important to understand if this same attitude pervades the Muslim sample in the Pew survey. While the survey indicates that there is a self identification of Muslim first in 81% of the Muslim respondents, it is crucial to determine whether this identification is of a moderate or of a more fundamentalist nature.

The individual’s identification with terrorist groups, agendas, or actions may provide a valuable indication of their openness to radical ideologies. These sentiments may also reflect the person’s agreement or disagreement with their own country’s foreign policy decisions regarding groups like Hamas or al-Qaeda. The individual’s identification with these groups is viewed by Crenshaw (2000) as being an essential part of the process of becoming a terrorist. This is seen as the beginning of the *us-vs-them* paradigm of radicalization. Within the survey, when questioned whether there was a struggle between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists 58.7% or 242 individuals felt there was indeed a struggle, and 15.8% (65 people) identified with the Islamic fundamentalists in this struggle. Additionally, when asked if the individual felt there was a conflict between Islam and modernity 48.3% felt there was a conflict. Following the same identification line, 71.8% of the respondents felt there was a strong sense of Muslim identity in Great Britain with 28.2% raking it very strong, and 86.3% of these respondents identifying this as a good thing.

Identification of external protagonist

Within the list of potential radicalizing elements is the sense that others are to blame for the struggles of the individual or the group they are associated with. The

perception of social, financial, or political persecution are strong catalysts toward radicalization. Respondents were asked if they felt Muslim nations should be more prosperous than they are today. The response was an overwhelming 83.7% (345) of those surveyed felt that Muslim nations should be more prosperous. These respondents were then asked who they felt was to blame for the lack of Muslim prosperity and while 27.0% felt it was due to the lack of education in the Muslim world and 35.9% felt it was a result of corruption in the government of Muslim countries, still 17.4% felt that the policies of the United States and other Western nations were to blame for the economic problems in the Muslim nations.

The identification of an external protagonist can be the foundations of frustration that can potentially serve to drive an individual toward radicalization. Additionally, it is central to the development of the us-vs-them paradigm that develops in the latter stages of the radicalization process.

Conflict

With Western countries seen as the protagonist in the struggle for Islamic success, it should be considered how the British Muslims view the compatibility of Western Democracy within Muslim countries. The survey offers the statement that *Democracy is a western way that won't work in most Muslim countries*. When given this statement 59% felt that Democracy would work well, but 29.9% answered that Democracy would not work well in Muslim countries.

Additionally when asked whether they considered relations between Muslims around the world and people in western countries to be generally good or bad, only 23.3% indicated they felt relations were generally good while 62.1% responded that they

considered these relations to be generally bad. Further, when asked who they thought was to blame for these bad relations, of those who responded in this manner only 10.5% indicated they Muslims were to blame, while 47.7% blamed people in Western countries and Christians, 0.8% blamed Jews and 29.3% felt both Muslims and Westerners were to blame.

Concern for the future of Muslims

Another potential source of frustration leading to radicalization is a sense of disenfranchisement that would lead one to question the future viability of the individual or the group to exist in the current environment. When questioned regarding the individuals concern for the future of Muslims in the country, fully 80.3 % were either very concerned or somewhat concerned with over 50% being very concerned. While there are several independent variables that allow for the identification of the source of this concern, the importance of this measurement lies in the combined effect with the perception that there are external threats to the future of the Muslim population in Britain.

Perceived connection with terrorist figure

One of the indicators along the path to radicalization is the beginning of a perceived connection to a terrorist group or figure. As discussed previously, John Horgan lists this association with the group or leader as central to the individual's process of becoming a terrorist. Within the survey the respondents were asked how much confidence they had in Osama bin Laden. There were a significant number who had little or no confidence in Bin Laden; 11.2% not too much confidence and 57.3% had no confidence at all. However, 10.4% had some confidence and 4.6% had a lot of

confidence, totaling 15.0% who has at least some degree of confidence in Osama bin Laden.

Refusing to accept reality

Crenshaw suggests that when an individual is on the path to radicalization, they begin a pattern of refusing to accept realities that are not in keeping with their newly found radical ideology. While many of the previous questions are subjective in nature, asking who the individual felt was responsible for certain conditions, there is one question on the survey that allows us to consider the individuals willingness to accept what is known to be true and would certainly be at odds with a radical Islamist ideology. When asked, *Do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11, 2001*, only 18.2% of the respondents indicated that they believe Arabs were responsible. Fully 53.6% did not believe that Arabs were involved and 27.9% indicated they did not know. Given that it is well documented who was involved in the hijacking of the airplanes and the use of those planes as guided missiles into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, added to the fact that Osama bin Laden himself has praised those who were involved, it is of great interest that so many respondents choose not to accept what is known by most to be the truth.

Acceptance of violence as a tactic

How an individual feels about the use of violence as an acceptable means of political protest will carry considerable weight on the radicalization scale. It should be considered that as a respondent becomes more radicalized they would be more willing to consider violence as an acceptable method of expressing political discontent. This

variable can potentially be considered the tipping point for radicalization. It represents the willingness or unwillingness of the subject to potentially move beyond legal means of political expression to illegal violent action. Living “outside normal standards” is a shared experience for radicalized people participating in violent political action (Porta, 1995).

Thus, moving further along the radicalization continuum, gaining insight into the views of the respondent as they relate to suicide bombing will serve as a capstone to the measurement of the individual’s potentiality for radicalization. Being willing to sacrifice one’s own life, or at least agreeing with the concept can be seen as the pinnacle of radicalization that would make one susceptible to terrorist ideology and recruitment into a terrorist organization or cell. An individual who finds suicide bombing to be acceptable will most likely have responses supporting a high degree of radicalization from bottom to top. Hoffman (2006) points out that the suicide bomber is one who is revered in terrorist groups. Special privileges are given to those who are to become martyrs, and martyrdom “has become an ambition for Palestinian children” (Hoffman 2006, 158).

When asked how the respondent felt about suicide bombing 3.2% felt it was often justified, 13.1% felt it was sometimes justified, and 9.7% suicide bombing as rarely justified, for a total of 26.0% who felt that suicide bombing was in some way justified. The remaining 74% were divided among those who felt it was never justified (68%) or either didn’t know or refused (6%).

Using these variables to create a vulnerability to radicalization score for each respondent, it was then possible to perform analysis to determine the relationship

between the independent variables and radicalization vulnerability, and the strength of that relationship.

Independent Variables

Independent variables for this study include age, education, employment, income, overall level of satisfaction, immigration status (citizenship), heritage, having a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion, and religiosity.

Age

Knowing the age of respondents is important to understanding whether there is indeed any particular demographic that could be considered more susceptible to radicalization. It is generally considered that Muslims between the ages of 17 and 29 make up the majority of this radicalized group (Crenshaw 2000; Sageman 2004). If it can be found that radicalization occurs more often within a certain age group, this will allow for the targeting of potential sources of radicalizing phenomenon. For example, if it is determined that radicalization occurs more often among individuals over the age of twenty five, then consideration would be given to the potential radicalizing variables associated with college and the post college experience. In order to facilitate analysis the respondents were grouped and represented as follows: 18-29 years of age (42%), ages 30-39 (33.5%), ages 40-49 (12.4%), and over 50 years of age (10%).

Gender

While it is generally considered that most terrorists are male, this is a misconception. Females have been used effectively in terrorist campaigns ranging from the Red Brigade in Germany, the anti-colonial terrorist campaign in Algeria, to the

modern insurgency in Iraq and the use of female suicide bombers. Even within the Muslim population it would be a mistake to think that only men are susceptible to radicalization and recruitment into a terrorist cell or group, or even committing terrorist acts as a 'lone wolf'. The Muslim respondents of this survey were divided proportionally with 52.4% being male and 47.6% being female. This method of identification is used to determine if there is a large percentage of female respondents who are at risk of terrorist radicalization.

Social satisfaction

Social satisfaction is an essential consideration. Understanding the social satisfaction measure provides insight into the degree of marginalization that is felt by the Muslim sample. Issues of discrimination, lack of political efficacy, and persecution can potentially create strong feelings of dissatisfaction that can motivate the individual to participate in civil protest. This measure can be seen as a reflection of the frustration/aggression hypothesis put forth by Post (1998), where dissatisfaction is seen as a catalyst to aggressive action.

Feelings of alienation or disenfranchisement can be a result of many factors. Immigration, social, and security policies may create these conditions. Additionally, failure of the immigrant population to assimilate within their new host country can also add to these feelings. A perception of non-inclusion can also be seen as a compelling reason to participate in civil protest. With no outlet for civil discourse, the concern is that young Muslims will choose to engage in violence to institute change (Kfir 2007).

The survey of British Muslims found that while 50.5% of the respondents were satisfied, fully 37.9% or 156 individuals were dissatisfied with the way things were going in their country, 11.4% didn't know and one individual refused to answer.

Education level

Education is seen as key for several reasons. The limiting effects of lacking a high school education can potentially serve as an avenue for frustration leading to criminality and radicalization. With the radicalizing influences on college campus, understanding how many college students might exhibit signs of radicalization can be very informative. Lastly, in light of recent terrorist attempts by college-educated individuals, it must be considered whether radicalization might occur after the education process is completed and the individual is exposed to other influences like limited employment opportunities or wage discrimination that could contribute strongly to the radicalization.

Within this survey, the education levels were divided and represented as follows:

Table 2 Education levels in Great Britain

Level of Education	Percentage
No qualifications	9.0%
GCSE grades D or below	5.1%
GCSE grades A-C	18.2%
A Level exam	24.8%
College degree, teaching, or nursing cert.	20.9%
Upper level degree	12.6%
Other qualifications	7.0%
Don't know	1.5%
Refused	1.0%

It is necessary to understand that there are examinations administered at different times during the individual's education and the education variable for this analysis is a

combination of test scores at these levels and higher education levels that would correlate more closely to the American model of higher education. GCSE exams are administered when British students are 15-16 years of age. These exams are subject exams and are graded on a A-G scale with A being the highest. Therefore, according to figure 2, 5.1% of the Muslim population that took this exam scored at the D or below level and this was their highest level experience with the educational system. Similarly 18.2% scored C or better but chose not to advance to the A level exams that are considered the equivalent to a college entrance exam of which 24.8% took this exam but did not complete a college degree. From this point the British system is easily understood as compared to the American educational system.

It should be considered that with nearly 14.1% of the Muslim population lacking what can be considered a completed high school education; there is the potential for poverty within the Muslim community that is disproportionate to the population as a whole. This break down provides the opportunity to examine the relationship between education and the risk of radicalization.

Income levels

Income will be measured to determine if there is any validity to the concept of economic limitations and frustration. The Pew Research Center's 2007 report indicates there is a significant income gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Great Britain at every level of income. This report shows that while the 23% of the general population exceeded 40,000 pounds per year of income only 13% of Muslims achieved this income

level. More concerning is the knowledge that 61% of Muslims make under 20,000 pounds per year compared to 39% of the overall population.⁵

Exposure to racial or religious discrimination

Understanding the level to which a Muslim individual has been exposed to domestic security measures/violence allows for an analysis of whether the perception of Muslims being targeted for such action can be considered valid. While it is known that “stop and searches” have steadily risen in Great Britain, it is essential to gain an understanding regarding the influence this and other policies has had on the Muslim population and how such an action is viewed by that group (Poynting & Mason 2006).

Exposure to racial or religious discrimination and violence is the variable to be considered. Respondents indicated whether they have had a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion. While 70.1 percent report no bad experiences, 29.6% or 122 out of 412 reported having a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion. These bad experiences can be considered one of the catalysts that could potential ‘drive’ someone toward radicalization.

Immigration status and citizenship

Immigration, citizenship, and heritage will be obtained in order to categorize the respondents to determine if there is any pattern of radicalization among a particular group (South Asians, Middle Eastern immigrants, or North African Muslims). Further, citizenship will be broken down to determine if the respondents are first generation immigrants or the children/grandchildren of Muslim immigrants. Citizenship is used to establish if the individual is a non-citizen immigrant, an immigrated British citizen, or a

⁵ Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007. *Muslim Americans, Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.*

naturally born British Muslim. The findings are that 46.1% (190) report being born in Great Britain's with 53.6% (221) having been born in another country. Of the 221 not born in GB, 58.4% report having immigrated over 15 years ago; 12.7% arrived between 6-10 years ago; 8.1% within the last 3-5 years; and 6.8% within the last two years. This data is critical and is used to analyze the relationship to the susceptibility to radicalization among immigrants as well as among those born in Great Britain. Of the 412 respondents fully 90.3% are British citizens. Counties of origin range from all over the Middle East, Asia and North Africa. The largest ancestral or ethnic groups are as follows: Pakistan 55.3%; India 12.9%; Bangladesh 10.7%; and other at 12.9% (with no further specificity).

Reaction to the War on Terror

Many have speculated that the 'War on Terror' that is led by the United States with the assistance of its allies, Great Britain being our principle ally, has been the main catalyst to radicalization among the Muslim Diaspora. Respondents were asked if they favored or opposed the U.S. led effort to fight terrorism. While forty individuals (9.7%) either didn't know or refused, 12.9% were in favor of the U.S led effort to fight terrorism while 77.4% (319) were opposed to this effort.

Religiosity

Religiosity is measured to determine if a respondent is simply Muslim by heritage or if they are a practicing Muslim who may potentially be subjected to radical Islamist ideology while attending services in the Mosque. It is well known that certain Imams preach a radicalized form of Islam and call on their members to join the *jihad*.

Several questions address Mosque attendance and reliance on religious leaders for guidance. When questioned regarding the importance of religion, 87.4% of the

respondents indicated that it was very important; 10.9% felt it was somewhat important; with the remaining 1.7% ranging from not too important to not at all with three people who either didn't know or refused to answer. It has already been discussed that when asked how they identify themselves, fully 81.8% considered themselves Muslim first and British second; 7.5% felt they were both equally; and 7% responded British first. Within this category of religiosity, when respondents were asked how often they attended the mosque for salah and Jum'ah prayer 30.6% indicated more than once per week; 23.3% attended once per week; 4.6% once per month and 10.9% only a few times per year. Interestingly 30% of the respondents either seldom or never attended mosque for prayers. This is an interesting statistic when juxtaposed with the responses to who the respondents looked to for guidance on Islam. In response to this question 43.7% looked to their local Imam or sheik; 26.9% to Imams and institutions outside their country like al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina; 15.8% indicated that they did not seek guidance from any of the sources listed in the survey but offered no alternate answers.

Geographic location

When one considers the radicalizing effect of some Muslim religious leaders who are markedly anti-Western, and who call for individuals to join the jihad, it should be considered that geographic location will be important to know. Within the survey group 72.3% of the respondents were located in the Yorkshire region of Great Britain, 20.9% in Granada, 4.1% in Tyne Teen, and the remainder were scattered among five other regions. With this data it may be possible to consider if there is a geographical concentration of individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis #1: ***Vulnerability to radicalization is a result of age, education level, and/or income.***

Important to understanding the vulnerability to radicalization is an examination of the demographics of the population and how these factors relate to the levels of vulnerability within the group. In order to understand these relations the age, sex, education level, and income of the respondents was tested to determine if there was any relationship between these variables and the respondent's vulnerability to radicalization. Literature in the field would indicate that individuals who are the most vulnerable to radicalization would be younger males, less educated, and existing at the lower end of the income scale.

Therefore, there will be a negative relationship between age, education level, and income and increasing levels of vulnerability to radicalization. Further, as the vulnerability to radicalization rises there will be a rise in the percentage of males.

Hypothesis #2: ***Frustration among the members of the Muslim community in Great Britain is responsible for their vulnerability to radicalization***

There are variables that allow for an investigation into impact of social and political frustration on the individuals vulnerability to radicalization. The premise of the frustration aggression theory is that as levels of frustration increase there will be an increase in the individual's willingness to engage in terrorist activity. This being the case, as the percentage of responses indicating a justification for frustration increases, we will find an increased level of vulnerability to radicalization.

As the percentage of respondents who had a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion increases there will be a correlated increase in the vulnerability score. It is well established that individuals who became radicalized and joined the IRA were often

motivated by the mistreatment of themselves or those they knew at the hands of the British Authority.

As the vulnerability score increases there will be an increase in the percentage of respondents who express dissatisfaction with the current conditions within Great Britain and express concern regarding the future of Muslims in the country. Dissatisfaction or perceived injustices are central to the frustration aggression theory previously discussed. It is reasonable to consider that individuals, who are dissatisfied, in keeping with this theory, would be vulnerable to radicalization.

It is well known that the 9-11 hijackers were recent immigrants to Germany who became radicalized shortly upon their arrival from their home countries. It is thought that when immigrants first arrive to their new host country they become isolated and disaffected as their opportunities do not meet with their expectations. This perception of discrimination or injustice, in keeping with the frustration aggression theory, makes the individual susceptible to terrorist radicalization. If this phenomenon is to hold true, those respondents who have immigrated to Great Britain and remain in country longer will be less vulnerable to radicalization and therefore the length of stay will have a negative relationship with vulnerability. Along these same lines, those who are naturally born British citizens should be less prone to radicalization and have lower vulnerability to radicalization scores than those who have recently immigrated.

Hypothesis #3: *Dissatisfaction with the policies of the United States is the source of the vulnerability to radicalization within the Muslim community in Great Britain.*

As the 'war on terror' is seen by many Muslims as a 'war on Islam', it is important to understand how the respondents view the U.S. led war on terror as it related to their individual vulnerability score, particularly since Great Britain is an important ally to the United States in this effort. Given the sentiment of the Muslim community to this action, an increase in the percentage of individuals who oppose the U.S. led efforts to combat terrorism should correlate to an increase in the individual scores relating to the vulnerability of radicalization.

Hypothesis #4: *Individuals who are more religious within the Muslim community are more vulnerable to radicalization.*

The power of the radical Islamist message is seen as a serious threat in combating terrorism. It is well known and established in the previously presented literature that this message often promulgates from within the established religious institutions, the mosques. The individual who is exposed to radical ideology within the mosque is at risk of becoming radicalized as they view the leaders as individuals of authority. As the individual becomes radicalized, their attendance at the mosque becomes more frequent. Therefore, with a higher frequency in mosque attendance there will be an increase in the vulnerability score. Additionally, there will be a strong correlation regarding who the individual looks to for guidance (their local imam or other religious leaders).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Hypothesis #1:

As a result of the analysis that was performed using cross tabulation it is possible to determine the viability of the hypothesis that higher levels of vulnerability to radicalization are a result of youth, sex, education and income level. Within the survey set of Muslims in Great Britain thirty one individuals or 7.5% were found to be highly vulnerable to radicalization, 218 of those surveyed (52.9%) were moderately vulnerable, and the remaining 163 respondents (39.6%) had a low degree of vulnerability to radicalization. Interestingly when each level is examined in detail, patterns do in fact begin to develop.

Of the thirty one highly vulnerable respondents, twenty were between 18 and 28 years of age, eight were 30-39 years of age, one was in the 40-49 age grouping and two of the respondents who were highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization were over 50 years old. Of the two hundred eighteen who were moderately vulnerable, 47.2% or one hundred three respondents were 18-29 years old, seventy-three or 33.5% were 30-39 years old, twenty-three were 40-49 and nineteen were over 50 years old. Of those who were the least vulnerable to radicalization fifty-nine (36.2%) were 18-29, fifty-seven (35.0%) were 30-39, twenty-seven (16.6%) were 40-49, and twenty (12.3%) were over 50 years old.

While it is commonly held that males are more vulnerable to radicalization, the findings of this analysis would suggest otherwise. It is important to state that the sample of 412 respondents contained 216 males (52.4%) and 196 females (47.6%). Within the sample group that was highly vulnerable to radicalization 51.6% or sixteen of the thirty one were in fact female, with the remaining fifteen being male. Similar results were

found within the group that is considered to be moderately vulnerable to radicalization with 111 or 50.9% of the 218 respondents who are moderately vulnerable being female. As can be seen in table 3 only the group that is considered to have the lowest vulnerability to radicalization contains more male respondents (52.4%) than females (42.3%).

Table 3 Male / Female

Radicalization		Sex		
		Male	Female	Total
high vulnerability	Count	15	16	31
	% within vulnerability scores	48.4%	51.6%	100.0%
	% within Sex	6.9%	8.2%	7.5%
moderate vulnerability	Count	107	111	218
	% within vulnerability scores	49.1%	50.9%	100.0%
	% within Sex	49.5%	56.6%	52.9%
low vulnerability	Count	94	69	163
	% within vulnerability scores	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
	% within Sex	43.5%	35.2%	39.6%
Total	Count	216	196	412
	% within vulnerability scores	52.4%	47.6%	100.0%
	% within Sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Another common assumption regarding ‘who becomes a terrorist’ is that they are single. Within this study, of the thirty-one respondents who were highly vulnerable thirteen had never been married, one was separated, one was divorced, and sixteen were married. The numbers are even more surprising in the moderately vulnerable category were seventy-two of the two hundred eighteen had never been married but one hundred twenty-five respondents in this category were married when interviewed.

Continuing to consider the male-female paradox, education was analyzed to examine the relationship with the individual's vulnerability to radicalization and their level of completed education or performance on exam levels as can be seen in table 4 at the end of this discussion. While it is considered that those with the least education would be the most vulnerable to radicalization, only thirty-seven respondents were found to had no qualifications. Of these only two (one male, one female) were considered highly vulnerable to radicalization, while seventeen (eight male and nine female) were moderately vulnerable, leaving thirteen males and five females to comprise the remaining eighteen respondents in the low vulnerability group that had no educational qualification.

Of the respondents that stayed in school long enough to take the GCSE exams but scored D or below, only one female was within the highly vulnerable group. The twelve that were moderately vulnerable were evenly divided among male and female as were the remaining eight that had a low vulnerability to radicalization. Respondents who scored C or better on the GCSE exams were more numerous with 75 having achieved this level of education. Of these, six were highly vulnerable to radicalization (three males, three females), forty-four were moderately vulnerable with twenty-four females and twenty males, and twenty-five (12 males, 13 females) had a low vulnerability to radicalization.

The largest group within the education variable was those who had risen to take the A-Level exams for college entrance. While there is no discussion regarding if or how much the respondent attended college, it is clear, however, that they sat for these exams but did not complete college to the level of achieving a degree. Of the one hundred two individuals who took the A level exam, seven women and five men comprise the twelve who ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization, fifty-six (thirty four women and

twenty-two men) were moderately vulnerable, while the remaining thirty-four respondents, twenty-two women and twelve men, had a low vulnerability score.

Higher education is thought to minimize the individual's vulnerability to radicalization. Of the eighty-six respondents that, at minimum, had completed a college degree, five were highly vulnerable to radicalization, forty-two were moderately vulnerable and thirty-nine had low vulnerability. This is the first level where the number of men exceeded the number of women in every level of vulnerability. Higher level degrees (Masters level or PhD) was the second highest group with eighty-seven respondents, with only one male who scored as being highly vulnerable to radicalization. Sixteen men and eleven women, for a total of twenty-seven, were moderately vulnerable, with the remaining twenty-four respondents (18 men, 6 women) having a low vulnerability to radicalization. The twenty-nine who indicated they had other levels of qualification were made up of two men and two women who were highly vulnerable, fourteen (8 men, 6 women) who were moderately vulnerable and seven men and four women for a total of eleven who had a low vulnerability score. The remaining ten respondents indicated that they either didn't know their level of education or refused to respond.

Table 4 Vulnerability / Education

Education		vulnerability to radicalization (VR) scores (DV)			
		high	moderate	low	Total
No qualifications obtained	Count	2	17	18	37
	% within VR scores	6.5%	7.8%	11.0%	9.0%
GCSE or O level grades D or below / CSE grades 2 or below	Count	1	12	8	21
	% within VR scores	3.2%	5.5%	4.9%	5.1%
GCSE or O level grades A-C / CSE grade 1/ NVQ 2	Count	6	44	25	75
	% within VR scores	19.4%	20.2%	15.3%	18.2%
A level / NVQ 3	Count	12	56	34	102
	% within VR scores	38.7%	25.7%	20.9%	24.8%
Degree / HND / teaching or nursing certificates / NVQ 4	Count	5	42	39	86
	% within VR scores	16.1%	19.3%	23.9%	20.9%
Higher degree (masters, PHD, NVQ 5)	Count	1	27	24	52
	% within VR scores	3.2%	12.4%	14.7%	12.6%
Other qualification	Count	4	14	11	29
	% within VR scores	12.9%	6.4%	6.7%	7.0%
Don't know	Count	0	2	4	6
	% within VR scores	.0%	.9%	2.5%	1.5%
Refused	Count	0	4	0	4
	% within VR scores	.0%	1.8%	.0%	1.0%
Total	Count	31	218	163	412
	% within VR scores	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Lastly, within this hypothesis, it is generally considered that poverty is a source or root cause of radicalization. With the poverty line in Great Britain for a couple with no children at 183 pounds per week, this places the annual poverty figure at just under 10,000 pounds per year for a family of two, less for single individuals and more for those with children. Table 5 allows for the examination of the relationship between income and levels of vulnerability to radicalization. With ninety-one respondents (22.1%) making less than 10,000 pounds per year it is interesting to find only seven with a high vulnerability score. As can be seen in the chart below, high vulnerability to radicalization can be found at all income levels with four making between 10,000-19,000 pounds, seven between 20,000-29,000 pounds, three at the 30,000-39,000 pounds income level, two making 40-49,000 pounds and three making over 50,000 pounds (BP) per year. While we see 46.2% within the moderately vulnerable category making less than 10,000 pounds, it is clear that existing at or below the poverty line does not have a significant impact on the vulnerability of the individual to become radicalized toward terrorism. Interestingly, as income goes up, the percentage of the respondents within each income level that are ranked in the highly vulnerable category goes up. When income is less than 10,000BP only 7.7% within this income group are highly vulnerable, but as income rises to 30-39,000BP the percentage goes up to 10.7% and reaches a high of 12.0% in the 50,000BP and over income level. What is evident however is there are many more individuals who indicate a moderate vulnerability to radicalization existing at or below 20,000 pounds per year. With 50% of this income level being moderately vulnerable it is possible to consider the validity of the argument that relies on the individual's perception of poverty as a factor in the radicalization equation. The preponderance of moderately

vulnerable respondents in each income level below 30,000 pounds would further support this argument.

Table 5 Vulnerability / Income

Income		Vulnerability to radicalization (VR) scores			
		high	moderate	low	Total
Less than 10,000 pounds per year	Count	7	42	42	91
	%	7.7%	46.2%	46.2%	100%
10,000-19,999 pounds	Count	4	68	47	119
	%	3.4%	57.1%	39.5%	100%
20,000-29,999 pounds	Count	7	39	29	75
	%	9.3%	52.0%	38.7%	100%
30,000-39,999 pounds	Count	3	17	8	28
	%	10.7%	60.7%	28.6%	100%
40,000-49,999 pounds	Count	2	11	5	18
	%	11.1%	62.1%	27.8%	100%
50,000 pounds and over	Count	3	10	12	25
	%	12.0%	40.0%	48.0%	100%
Don't know	Count	4	20	12	36
	%	11.1%	55.5%	33.4%	100%
Refused	Count	1	11	8	20
	%	5.0%	55.0%	40.0%	100%
Total	Count	31	218	163	412
	%	7.5%	52.9%	39.6%	100.0%

Hypothesis #2:

When one considers the potential impact of security policy and racial intolerance in Great Britain, it would be easy to consider these abuses as having a strong influence on the radicalization of the Muslim population. However, the analysis shows (Table 6) that of the one hundred and twenty two respondents who indicated they had a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion; only ten, which comprise only 8.2% of those who report having a bad experience, were ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization. Interestingly, the remainder of the highly vulnerable group indicated no bad experience. The largest group that did report a bad experience was those who were moderately vulnerable, with eighty-one respondents (66.4%). It is clear from table 6 that once again we see a large number of respondents within the moderately vulnerable category having had a bad experience. The data would indicate that this event has little significance on its own as the majority report no bad experience.

Table 6 Vulnerability / Bad experience

Vulnerability to Radicalization		Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, religion			
		Yes	No	Don't know	Total
high vulnerability	Count	10	21	0	31
	% within Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, religion	8.2%	7.3%	.0%	7.5%
moderate vulnerability	Count	81	136	1	218
	% within Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, religion	66.4%	47.1%	100.0%	52.9%
low vulnerability	Count	31	132	0	163
	% within Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, religion	25.4%	45.7%	.0%	39.6%
Total	Count	122	289	1	412
	% within Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When indications of dissatisfaction with the way things are going in Great Britain are analyzed with the vulnerability scores, once again it is difficult to make a connection. It is evident in table 7 that the individual's level of dissatisfaction with the conditions in Great Britain does not provide significant indications of being a source for radicalization. This is clear when fifteen of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents indicate they are satisfied with the way things are going. One could hypothesize that this satisfaction is based upon the tumultuous conditions in Great Britain and the growing influence of the radical Muslim community but this would be speculative at best. The questions asked and the associated data provide no way to make such estimation. It is interesting however to consider that those who were moderately vulnerable, again show a level of dissatisfaction higher than those who were satisfied making up 66% of the entire group that was dissatisfied.

Table 7 Vulnerability / Satisfaction

Vulnerability scores		Now thinking about Great Britain, overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?				
		Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know	Refused	Total
high	Count	15	10	6	0	31
		7.2%	6.4%	12.8%	.0%	7.5%
moderate	Count	95	103	19	1	218
		45.7%	66.0%	40.4%	100.0%	52.9%
low	Count	98	43	22	0	163
		47.1%	27.6%	46.8%	.0%	39.6%
Total	Count	208	156	47	1	412
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Given the recent attack in Western Europe, including Great Britain, by Muslim immigrants, there is considerable desire to understand the impact of the immigrant population as it pertains to terrorist radicalization. By doing a cross tabular analysis of the vulnerability scores with the measure of the individuals having been naturally born in Great Britain or having immigrated, it is possible to make such a determination. As can be seen in table 8, there does not seem to be a clear indication that being an immigrant make one any more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization that does being a naturally born citizen. Of the thirty-one highly radicalized respondents the majority (19) were born in Great Britain, with the remaining twelve having been born outside the country. Among the 218 individuals who were moderately vulnerable, 110 were born in country and 107 outside Great Britain.

Table 8 Vulnerability / Born in Great Britain

Vulnerability to radicalization		Were you born in (country) or in another country?			
		Born in (Country)	Another country	Refused	Total
high	Count	19	12	0	31
		10.0%	5.4%	.0%	7.5%
moderate	Count	110	107	1	218
		57.9%	48.4%	100.0%	52.9%
low	Count	61	102	0	163
		32.1%	46.2%	.0%	39.6%
Total	Count	190	221	1	412
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

What is most interesting regarding the question of radicalization among the immigrant population is that of the twelve highly vulnerable immigrants only two arrived within two years of being interviewed. There was one respondent each in the 3-5 years, 6-10 years,

and 11-15 years, but there were seven individuals who had been in the country for over 15 years who ranked highly vulnerable to radicalization. While those who were moderately vulnerable were more evenly distributed there were only eight who had been in the country less than two years and seven between 3 and 5 years. Fifteen of the moderately vulnerable group had been in Great Britain between 6 and 10 years and seventeen had arrived between 11 and 15 years ago. Most interesting is that of those immigrants who were moderately vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, a total of fifty-nine respondents had come to Great Britain over 15 years previous to being a part of the survey. Conventional wisdom and the literature would indicate that new arrivals would be the most vulnerable to radicalization as a result of their lack of assimilation, limited opportunities, and isolation from their culture; but the data would seem to indicate that exactly the opposite could be the case.

An examination of the ancestry of the respondents who immigrated over 15 years prior to the survey shows that of those highly vulnerable to radicalization two were from Bangladesh, one from India, three from Pakistan, and one other (not specified). Of those who were moderately vulnerable and had been in Great Britain over 15 years, one was from Algeria, five from India, one from Iran, one from Morocco, thirty-eight were from Pakistan, one from Somalia, and there were five others (not specified). In both groups the immigrants from Pakistan make up the majority but this is not unexpected given that seventy-six of the one hundred twenty nine respondents who immigrated over 15 years prior to the survey are from Pakistan and those of Pakistani ancestry represent 55.3% of the 412 individuals that were surveyed. Therefore, it is consistent that nineteen of the thirty-one respondents who were ranked as highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization

are of Pakistani ancestry. Of the remaining twelve, four were from Bangladesh, four from India, and four either scored other (not specified) or didn't know.

Further analysis of immigrant status and vulnerability become particularly interesting when examined within the age groupings previously discussed. Of the nineteen respondents who were born in Great Britain with high vulnerability scores, fourteen are between 18 and 29 years of age, with only six immigrants within this age group being highly vulnerable, accounting for twenty of the thirty-one respondents that had a high vulnerability score. Table 9 provides a breakdown according to having been born in Great Britain or in another country as compared to age groupings within the vulnerability paradigm.

Table 9 Vulnerability / Age

Were you born in (country) or in another country?		age groupings				
		18-29	30-39	40-49	over 50	Total
Born in (Country)	high VR score % within age groupings	14 11.8%	4 6.8%	1 14.3%	0 .0%	19 10.0%
	Moderate VR score % within age groupings	68 57.1%	35 59.3%	3 42.9%	4 80.0%	110 57.9%
	low VR score % within age groupings	37 31.1%	20 33.9%	3 42.9%	1 20.0%	61 32.1%
	Total	119 100.0%	59 100.0%	7 100.0%	5 100.0%	190 100.0%
Another country	high VR score % within age groupings	6 9.7%	4 5.1%	0 .0%	2 5.6%	12 5.4%
	moderate VR score % within age groupings	34 54.8%	38 48.1%	20 45.5%	15 41.7%	107 48.4%
	low VR score % within age groupings	22 35.5%	37 46.8%	24 54.5%	19 52.8%	102 46.2%
	Total	62 100.0%	79 100.0%	44 100.0%	36 100.0%	221 100.0%
Refused radicalization scores	moderate VR score % within age groupings	1 100.0%				1 100.0%
	Total	1 100.0%				1 100.0%

Hypothesis #3:

In order to test the impact of United States policy and actions on the vulnerability to radicalization, three questions were examined to determine whether there was any consistency in response to U.S. policy in the War on Terror among the varied vulnerability groups. First, was the response to the question regarding the United States war on terror and whether the individual was in favor or not in favor of this action. Of the thirty-one who were highly vulnerable to radicalization, twenty-nine were not in favor of the U.S. led war on terror and two were in favor. The moderately vulnerable group of two hundred eighteen respondents also showed an overwhelming disfavor with the U.S. action with one hundred sixty-seven who were not in favor and only thirty-two who were in favor of the U.S. led war on terror, with the remaining nineteen either not knowing or refusing. Surprisingly, even the low vulnerability group expressed similar sentiments with one hundred twenty-three of the one hundred sixty-three within this group not in favor of the U.S. effort. All totaled, of the four hundred twelve respondents, three hundred nineteen were not in favor of the U.S. led war on terror.

Another area where insight can be provided is in responses to how much of a threat the U.S. presence in Iraq poses to Middle East stability. Within the entire sample, two hundred seventy one respondents felt it posed a great danger and eighty six saw it as a moderate danger. Among the vulnerability groups the one with the highest vulnerability was divided among the twenty-five who saw the U.S. presence as a great danger and the remaining six who felt it was a moderate danger. The moderately vulnerable group contained one hundred fifty-six respondents who felt it was a great danger to stability and thirty-six who saw this action as having a moderately dangerous effect. There were, however, nine within this group that felt the U.S. presence in Iraq

posed only a small danger to stability and five felt it was no danger at all. The low vulnerability group contained ninety who saw this as a great danger, forty-four considered in a moderate danger, four felt it posed no danger, and twenty-five indicated they did not know.

Another area where U.S. policy or action has had an impact on Muslims is the media's reporting of incidents in U.S. prisons at Abu Graib in Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay Cuba. Exposure to these media reports is considered to be another factor that could possibly promote radicalization among the Muslim community. When questioned if they had heard the reports of abuses at these prisons, three hundred seventy-seven of the group had heard them, while seventy-four had not and one did not know. Table 10 provides a breakdown that shows twenty-six of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents had heard of the abuses. The moderately vulnerable group also had a high number of individuals (177) who had heard of the U.S. abuses in these prisons, as had one hundred thirty-four in the low vulnerability group. While it is clear the majority of the respondents are aware of the reports of abuses, these events do not seem to indicate a strong influence on the vulnerability to radicalization as knowledge is spread throughout all the vulnerability groups.

Table 10 Vulnerability / Reporting of abuses

VR Scores		Heard about reports about abuses in American run prisons at Abu Graib, Guantanamo and elsewhere			
		Yes – have heard of it	No – have not heard of it	Don't know	Total
high	Count	26	5	0	31
	% within Heard about reports	7.7%	6.8%	.0%	7.5%
moderate	Count	177	41	0	218
	% within Heard about reports	52.5%	55.4%	.0%	52.9%
low	Count	134	28	1	163
	% within Heard about reports	39.8%	37.8%	100.0%	39.6%
Total	Count	337	74	1	412
	% within Heard about reports	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Hypothesis #4:

While the terrorist literature suggests that Islamist terrorists are more politically than religiously motivated, vulnerability as a result of religious involvement within the Muslim community has become a major concern given the revelations of local imams like Abu Hamza preaching anti-western sermons calling for jihad against the United States and the West. Within Great Britain there is considerable concern regarding the effect of these radical imams and how much they are influencing the religious community toward terrorist radicalization. There are three variables that allow for some measure of the relationship between religious involvement and identity and the vulnerability to radicalization. First among these is the measure of the importance of religion to the respondents. Within the highly vulnerable group, thirty of the thirty-one respondents

indicated that religion was very important and the remaining one individual felt it was somewhat important. This pattern holds true throughout the vulnerability groups with three hundred and sixty of the four hundred twelve respondents indicating religion was very important and forty-five responding that it was somewhat important. Only seven respondents offered any other answer indicating not too importance, no importance, or didn't know or refused.

When respondents were asked how strong they felt the Muslim identity was within Great Britain. Within the study group, two hundred ninety-six respondents indicated they felt that the Muslim identity is either very or fairly strong, with only eighty-one indicating not too strong and twenty four felt it was not strong at all. When these responses are analyzed with regard to the vulnerability scores, sixteen of the highly vulnerable respondents felt the Muslim identity was very strong and nine considered it to be fairly strong. Only five felt it was not too strong and one saw it as not strong at all. This was the only vulnerability group where the very strong's outnumbered the fairly strong respondents. Within the moderately vulnerable group, seventy-seven felt it was very strong, ninety-nine responded it was fairly strong, twenty-eight not too strong, and eleven felt it was not strong at all. The low vulnerability group comprised twenty-three that the Muslim identity was very strong, seventy-two saw it as fairly strong, forty-eight indicated it was not too strong, and twelve responded that the Muslim identity in Great Britain was not strong at all. Clearly the majority of the highly vulnerable group was consistent in their opinion that the Muslim identity in Great Britain was either very or fairly strong, however six of the thirty-one respondents did not share this sentiment and

shows that the identification questions does not explain vulnerability across the entire group.

Respondents were asked who they went to for guidance on Islam. This question offered several options ranging from their local Imam or Imam's and institutions outside Great Britain, to national religious leaders, religious leaders on television, none of these or didn't know. Within the group that is considered highly vulnerable to radicalization twenty-eight sought guidance from either their local Imam (17 respondents) or Imams and institutions such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina (11 respondents). The remaining three individuals within this category sought guidance from national religious leaders, leaders on television or answered none (one each). Within the other two vulnerability groups there was a similar reliance on the local and foreign Imams but these groups contained larger numbers of respondents answering that none of the answers were applicable or they didn't know. With no alternatives offered by the respondent when answering no, it is not possible to determine if these individuals seek guidance outside the formally recognized institutions such as leaders of radical prayer groups or on-line religious web sites. It would be imprudent to suggest this is the case, but would be an issue to be addressed in a future study.

An initial examination of mosque attendance as seen in table 11 would seem to indicate there is no relationship between mosque attendance and the individual's vulnerability to radicalization. While it is clear that across all three levels of vulnerability those who attend more than once per week outnumber those who attend only once a week and the numbers continue to decline as attendance becomes more seldom. However such an assumption may be hasty. In order to understand the impact of mosque attendance on

the vulnerability to terrorist radicalization it was necessary to view these findings through the filter of the male/female relationship.

When mosque attendance is viewed with the added consideration of the male/female paradigm, the importance regarding the frequency of mosque attendance changes significantly. As we can see in table 12, when males who were highly vulnerable to radicalization are examined it is found that all fifteen respondents within this group attended mosque at least once per week with nine reporting they attended more than once per week. Interesting, the females within the highly vulnerable group were found to either attend seldom or not at all (7 respondents), only a few times per year (three respondents), but the remaining five highly vulnerable females indicated that they attended mosque more than once per week. Given the limitations of the role of females within the mosque it could be considered that those who attend infrequently or not at all may receive their religious training outside the mosque but no questions provide this insight. However, it is significant to understand that one hundred seventy of the two hundred sixteen males and fifty-two of the one hundred ninety-six females attend mosque at least once per week. Surprising is the difference in the number of males, twelve, who never attend as compared to the eighty three female who indicated they never attend.

Table 11 Vulnerability / Mosque Attendance

On average, how often do you attend the mosque for salah and Jum'ah Prayer?		Vulnerability scores			
		high	moderate	low	Total
More than once a week	Count	14	69	43	126
	% within	11.1%	54.8%	34.1%	100.0%
Once a week for Jum'ah	Count	6	50	40	96
	% within	6.2%	52.1%	41.7%	100.0%
Once or twice a month	Count	0	14	5	19
	% within	.0%	73.7%	26.3%	100.0%
A few times a year especially for (example vary by country)	Count	3	20	22	45
	% within	6.7%	44.4%	48.9%	100.0%
Seldom	Count	1	13	11	25
	% within	4.0%	52.0%	44.0%	100.0%
Never	Count	6	50	39	95
	% within	6.3%	52.6%	41.1%	100.0%
Total	Count	30	216	160	406
	% within	7.4%	53.2%	39.4%	100.0%

Table 12 Vulnerability / Mosque attendance: male/female

On average, how often do you attend the mosque for salah and Jum'ah Prayer?			vulnerability scores			
			high	moderate	low	Total
Male	More than once a week	Count	9	52	35	96
		%	9.4%	54.2%	36.5%	100.0%
	Once a week for Jum'ah	Count	6	36	32	74
		%	8.1%	48.6%	43.2%	100.0%
	Once or twice a month	Count	0	7	4	11
		%	.0%	63.6%	36.4%	100.0%
	A few times a year especially for (example vary by country)	Count	0	4	11	15
		%	.0%	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
Seldom	Count	0	1	3	4	
	%	.0%	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%	
Never	Count	0	5	7	12	
	%	.0%	41.7%	58.3%	100.0%	
Total	Count	15	105	92	212	
	%	7.1%	49.5%	43.4%	100.0%	
Female	More than once a week	Count	5	17	8	30
		%	16.7%	56.7%	26.7%	100.0%
	Once a week for Jum'ah	Count	0	14	8	22
		%	.0%	63.6%	36.4%	100.0%
	Once or twice a month	Count	0	7	1	8
		%	.0%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
	A few times a year especially for (example vary by country)	Count	3	16	11	30
		%	10.0%	53.3%	36.7%	100.0%
Seldom	Count	1	12	8	21	
	%	4.8%	57.1%	38.1%	100.0%	
Never	Count	6	45	32	83	
	%	7.2%	54.2%	38.6%	100.0%	
Total	Count	15	111	68	194	
	%	7.7%	57.2%	35.1%	100.0%	

CONCLUSIONS

As scholars seek to identify a terrorist profile or gain understanding as to the root causes of terrorism, it has become increasingly clear that there is no 'silver bullet' in this endeavor. Dispositionist theories that include the existence of some sort of psychopathy or a level of frustration that leads to aggression could not be confirmed within this study. Similarly, situational arguments centered on negative conditions such as poverty, lack of education, displeasure with current conditions, or bad experiences as a result of race, religion or ethnicity cannot fully explain why people become radicalized toward terrorism. There are however certain variables that were examined as a part of this study that provide some insight as to conditions that make individuals more vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.

Within the analysis, a bivariate correlation was done between the vulnerability to radicalization score (DV) and all the independent variables that were examined. Of these, four were significant at the .05 level using the Kendalls Tau b measure. They were the importance of religion to the individual, sex, and being born in Great Britain. There was a positive relationship with the importance of religion, indicating that individuals who were more vulnerable to radicalization considered religion to be very important. With regard to sex, there was a positive relationship between the level of vulnerability and the probability of being female. This is of particular interest given that the 'standard' terrorist profile is being male. Another variable that measured significant at the .05 level was being born in Great Britain. This is important given the commonly held assumption that terrorists in western democracies are usually immigrants who are newly arrived and bring their radical ideology with them to their new host country. As was seen in the

analysis, those born in Great Britain were more vulnerable to radicalization followed closely by immigrant who had come to the country over fifteen years previous to being interviewed and had considerable time to assimilate and become encultured into British society. Lastly, the profile of being single must be questioned as a result of the significance of being married as it relates to being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.

More interesting are those variables that were measured having significance at the .01 level which would be considered very significant. One commonly held perception was confirmed, that being the relationship between age and vulnerability. It was determined that as the vulnerability scores rose, the age of the respondents went down. Two policy issues, the U.S. presence in Iraq and opposition to the U.S. led effort in combating terrorism, were both found to have positive relationships with the vulnerability scores and were significant at the .01 level. Additionally, two variables within the religiosity hypothesis, seeking guidance from local and foreign Imams and Mosque attendance were also found to be positively related to increased levels of vulnerability to terrorist radicalization and were significant at the .01 level.

What does this all mean to the study of terrorist radicalization? It should be considered that the fundamental assumptions that have driven research in this field need to be reexamined and a more multi-disciplinary approach should be considered in order to obtain a more substantive understanding of this phenomenon. The dispositional and situational arguments should be considered as integral to each other and future research should be focused on identifying the combination of personalities, conditions, perceptions, and experiences that will provide a more complete understanding of the factors that influence radicalization. With this more complex understanding it may then

be possible to address some of the issues that are central to creating vulnerability thereby affecting the availability of recruits for terrorist radicalization.

Recommendations for future research

Building on this analysis of the vulnerability of Muslims in Great Britain to terrorist radicalization, future research will be focused on performing a comparative analysis of the remaining western democracies within the fifteen nation survey conducted by the Pew Research Center to determine the consistency of these findings across the broader European Muslim community. As such an analysis will vastly increase the number of respondents (France-N=400 Muslims, Germany-N=413 Muslims, Spain-N=402 Muslims); it should then be possible to engage in regression analysis that could provide some predictive findings regarding the relationship of certain conditions and/or situations and their influence on vulnerability to radicalization. Given the potential for regression analysis it may then be possible to develop a panoramic picture of the variables that could serve as catalysts making an individual more vulnerable to terrorist radicalization. Finally, the analysis of Muslims within western European democracies could then be compared to the findings of the analysis of Muslims within the United States to gain insight into the similarities and differences of the populations and what makes each more or less vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.

Attempts to engage in the identification of direct influences on radicalization will require additional survey questions that may or may not be answered truthfully by the respondents. The ongoing problem within the field of terrorism research of obtaining reliable data will continue to be a valid concern given the criminal nature of the terrorist

act and the transforming effect of radicalization on the individual's perception. However, the addition of a few more specific questions to the existing survey could provide valuable data. For example, it would be beneficial to determine whether the respondent attended college but did not complete a degree, and if they had participated in Muslim student groups on campus. Measures of unemployment would also add significantly to the demographic data including current employment status and past periods of unemployment. Additionally, questions that identified if the respondent had traveled abroad, where they traveled and how often, would allow for the examination of potential foreign influence on Muslims who were born in Great Britain but seem to have a high instance of being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.

While it is recognized that only a very small percentage of Muslims within Great Britain and other western European democracies will become radicalized toward terrorism, it is important to understand that with nearly two million Muslims in Great Britain, if one percent becomes radicalized toward terrorism there will be potentially 20,000 Islamist terrorists in Great Britain alone. The challenge is to provide substantive analysis that will allow for the identification of factors that make individuals more vulnerable to radicalization and implement actions and policies that, rather than serve to further the level of frustration and conflict within the Muslim community, will seek to ameliorate their impact and promote conditions that will not only limit future radicalization but also serve to de-radicalize those who were most vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.

APPENDIX A
CREATION OF THE VULNERABILITY TO RADICALIZATION
SCORE

Vulnerability to Radicalization Score

To develop the vulnerability to radicalization score it was necessary to attribute a score to the responses of the ten variable questions. The following questions were used to develop the additive vulnerability score and the scoring for the varied responses is provided for each. The total possible additive score was 16.

Q.40. Now I'm going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs— a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. The leader was Osama bin Laden.

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
A lot or some confidence	1
Other answers	0

IF RELATION GENERALLY BAD (Q7=2) response to Q.7. Do you think that relations these days between Muslims around the world and people in Western countries such as the United States and Europe are generally good or generally bad? Those who answered bad.

Q.8 Who do you think is mostly to blame for this, Muslims or people in Western countries?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
People in Western Countries	1
Other answers	0

ASK IF THINKS MUSLIM NATIONS SHOULD BE MORE PROSPEROUS (Q.10=1):

Q.11 What is most responsible for Muslim nations' lack of prosperity? Is it the policies of the U.S. and other western nations, the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, the lack of education in the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism, or corruption in the government of Muslim nations?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Policies of U.S. and other Western nations	2
Lack of Democracy in Muslim world	1
Other answers	0

Q.30 In your opinion, how many (Muslims/people) in our country support Islamic extremists like al Qaeda –would you say most, many, just some or very few?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Most or many	2
Some	1
Other answers	0

Q.16 In your opinion, how strong a sense of Islamic identity do Muslims in our country have - very strong, fairly strong, not too strong, or not strong at all?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Very strong	2
Fairly strong	1
Other answers	0

Q.5 Now on a different subject, some people feel that democracy is a Western way of doing things that would not work in most Muslim countries – others think that democracy is not just for the West and can work well in most Muslim countries. Which comes closer to your opinion?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Democracy would not work	1
Other answers	0

Q.27 Do you think there is a struggle in (survey country) between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists or don't you think so? Q.28 Which side do you identify with more in this struggle, moderate Muslims or Islamic fundamentalists?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Fundamentalists	1
Other answers	0

Q.24 How concerned, if at all, are you about the future of Muslims in this country – very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Very concerned	2
Somewhat concerned	1
Other answers	0

Q.38 On a different subject, do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11 (2001) or don't you believe this?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Do not believe Arabs involved	1
Other answers	0

Q.29 Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Often justified	3
Sometimes justified	2
Rarely but still justified	1
Never and others	0

APPENDIX B
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