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THE DISPARITY OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE
AND ITS EFFECT ON TRANSTALANTIC DEFENSE PROJECT COOPERATION

by

JOHN-MICHAEL JOHNSON
B.A. Saint Anselm College, 2005

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

This study investigated what determines successful transatlantic defense policy cooperation and how that cooperation can reduce the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies. It examines the differing defense policies and defense capabilities between the United States and its European NATO allies. Several theories in International Relations were also used as a foundation for the argument that cooperation is needed. The approach to defense policy is very different between the United States and Europe. The strategic vision of the world of both parties differs as well. Policy, doctrine and defense projects are all taken into consideration and analyzed. Based on the results of the analysis of policy and doctrines, the policy recommendation is that there should be more cooperation on defense policy planning, military doctrine and defense projects conducted in the effective fashion of current successful cases. The European NATO members will also need to cooperate on such policy if the military capability gap is to be lessened.

I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Houghton, Dr. Handberg and Dr. Morales for all their hard work and guidance. I would like to say a special thank you to Dr. Houghton, my committee chair and thesis advisor, for all his hard work and help. Finally I would like to thank my parents.

Without their support I would not be where I am today.

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CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION

Research Theory and Hypothesis

The research question of this project is that the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies can be reduced by cooperation between the governments of the states involved and the defense industries of those states. As it will be explained, the capability gap has been a long time in the making and will not be rectified in the short term. However there have been cases of successful transatlantic defense project cooperation that has not only strengthened the military capability of individual states, but NATO on the whole as well.

The main research question is: What will determine successful transatlantic defense policy cooperation? The primary hypothesis is that a coherent policy framework for defense planning and doctrine determines successful cooperation, which requires there to be clearly defined goals and requirements for the policy, along with the flexibility to meet the needs of all parties involved. The secondary hypothesis of this project is that if there is successful transatlantic defense project cooperation, the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies will close. The independent variable is the successful defense projects and the dependent variable is the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies. The study is important for several reasons. The first is that if NATO is to remain relevant and able to protect its members, strong military capability is needed. The

second is that if European NATO members become more militarily capable they will be able to defend themselves independently, which can not only create better transatlantic relations, but it can also allow for even more defense project cooperation. Thirdly, it means the survival of NATO as an alliance. If NATO is not militarily capable of facing the full spectrum of warfare, then it will not be effective in its missions, present and future.

History and Background

When examining the last fifty or so years of history, there appear to be one prominent event that heralds the course world events in an almost prophetic manner. This key event was the outcome of World War II and how that outcome was achieved. With the victory of the United States and its allies over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the United States was catapulted into the leadership role, which it maintains today. It will be obvious to some how a conventional war is fought and won, but World War II witnessed the emergence of war fought in a manner not experienced before. Many advances may be credited to the German military with such firsts as effectively implementing mechanized infantry, tank warfare and the jet warplane. It is then ironic that all of these advances were eventually seized upon and capitalized by the U.S. military, perfected and utilized against Germany itself and its subsequent enemies. Consequently, with the end of World War II, American power in the world has been mainly defined by its military power. The U.S. military strength is so unrivaled that no other state dare risk a conventional war with the U.S., including Russia. Perhaps this is the primary reason why asymmetric threats have surfaced against the U.S. Asymmetric threats are the one method attempting to counter U.S. military power, if it can be countered at all.

From the initial days of American involvement in World War II, the path the United States would take in respect to military power may be traced and its lineage may be witnessed today in its evolved form. The origin of the strength of the U.S. military is the defense industry where the weapons and systems of the military are researched, designed and refined. The American defense industry is second to none in the world. The products manufactured by the American defense industry are unsurpassed in roughly every facet from navy destroyers to jet fighters. Europe on the other hand has, since the end of World War II, successfully recovered from the massive destruction and its defense industry is highly competitive. However, it pales in comparison to the massive lead that the America defense industry maintains. In light of these issues, the most active military in NATO, with the most resources committed, understandably is the United States. The U.S. military is in fact the one true world-wide military power in NATO. The remaining members of NATO rely on U.S. air and sea lifts in order to conduct NATO missions. In combat situations, with the lack of a comparable European defense industry, the European forces in combat in areas of operations such as Afghanistan are at a disadvantage when compared to their American counterparts. From close air support to armored vehicles, the European militaries are measurable steps behind.

It should not be a revelation that the U.S. holds the lead in military power in the world given the fact that for fifty years the U.S. and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war. With the end of the Cold War, many militaries were down-sized, including the U.S. The United States continued to forge ahead with research and development to prepare its military to engage in the next war and not the last, as was the case for a number of states before World War II. With the attacks of September 11th, 2001 the U.S. defense industry was given a new mission and

propelled into a new era of armed conflict. Since 9/11, the military budget of the U.S. has hovered at approximately \$500 billion. This considerable budget is more than the entire European defense budget combined. In fact, the closest NATO ally of the U.S. in military spending is the United Kingdom which spends just over 1/10th of the U.S.'s budget. It is arguably the second best military in the world with respect to its capabilities, many of which are similar to those of the U.S. but on a somewhat lesser scale. Consequently, with states such as the U.K. which have increased military spending, they have cooperated in trans-Atlantic joint military projects to facilitate bridging the power gap since 9/11. Most of Europe realizes that there are looming new threats; however, it will necessitate some time to analyze if there has been any significant action taken on their part to better secure their own defense. However the recent order of two new and advanced aircraft carried by the U.K. is a sign of a step in the appropriate direction.

Speaking of signs of progress in European defense, there are a few slivers of hope in Europe which demonstrates that there is hope for the European defense industry and the state of European military capability. A quick look at these new bastions of hope has taken form in either trans-Atlantic cooperation in defense, or European internal cooperation in defense. On the trans-Atlantic side, the Joint Strike Fighter program has witnessed the cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom on building a revolutionary warplane that may be produced in three variants to serve the respective air forces, navies and Marine Corps. The capabilities of this aircraft will provide its operators a distinct advancement and advantage in war-fighting capability over the current generation of warplanes. The JSF is the premier example of trans-Atlantic cooperation in defense. On the European side, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the

next generation of advanced air superiority aircraft for Europe was developed by France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the U.K. This is one of many examples of European cooperation on common weapons and defense. Yet with advanced programs similar to that of the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Eurocopter Tiger, the NHI NH90, and the ARTEC Boxer there must be more integration of research, development, and production of European weapons systems.

One of the reasons why the U.S. military is as capable as the wars from Kosovo to Iraq have shown is that the technology and systems used is top notch. If Europe is to increase its military capabilities, which may be seen as an unavoidable requirement for NATO cooperation and European defense, there must be a united front on the European defense industry side of operations. There exists some cooperation already, but their level of product capability continues to lag behind that of U.S. or trans-Atlantic product capability. Because of this lack of capability, Europe and NATO on a whole have become less capable to perform its mission, as seen in Afghanistan. Consequently, NATO has become an alliance of the U.S. and others with everyone else providing either some assistance or just token assistance. Also, with the ever changing doctrines of fighting modern war, the U.S. holds the lead in the area of adapting to new threats. An example of this is the U.S. lead in the development of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The combat seen in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that asymmetric warfare is the likely style of warfare to be seen in the future. With asymmetric war, diverse tactics develop that call for different technologies to support those tactics. NATO, with the exception of the U.S. and to some degree the U.K. and Canada, the European allies are woefully unprepared for combat as it is seen in Iraq. The key rationale for this is that American defense contractors are the major players in the field of weapons systems because they have to be. The

European companies on a whole don't and therefore are unprepared. The Europeans could simply buy American made products, but this would not benefit European defense as a partnership of cooperation would.

With cooperation shaping up to produce tremendous results, the Joint Strike Fighter provides one example, the question remains whether the U.S. wishes for more cooperation and a more militarily capable Europe and whether there is the will in Europe to increase military spending. The foremost worry of the U.S. would be the possible consequences of a militarized Europe. Two world wars were a consequence of this in the past; however, there is no indication of this ever happening again in at least the foreseeable future with the advent of the European Union. With the lead the U.S. possesses in military capability, it is not likely Europe would be a threat in the future. In the terms of European defense, the U.S. also need not be concerned as the past fifty years of experience defending Europe would prove invaluable to European militaries. In short, the U.S. would not lose their position of leadership in European defense. Nonetheless, the United States must formulate a definitive policy when it considers European defense and defense cooperation. As for Europe, with the lack of recent (i.e. post 9/11) combat experience, there is likely no rumbling for change in military doctrine which includes the defense industry in a manner of speaking. Without the need for cutting edge weapons systems, the European defense industry will not perceive a need to truly develop along the lines as the U.S. defense industry has with the introductions of very advanced urban fighting systems designed to conduct operations against asymmetric threats. One example to alleviate this issue is to sell products to the U.S. based on U.S. military requirements as BAE Systems of the United Kingdom has done. To change this environment in Europe would require a policy shift not only

on defense spending, but on foreign policy as well. The non-involvement and pacifist policies that characterize much of Europe are a product of as Robert Kagan would call it, living in a different world, the world of “paradise”.¹

This mentality in Europe has led to the atrophy of the European defense industry, not to mention the languishing capability of its militaries. This lacking in the capabilities of the European militaries has placed major undue strains on the NATO military alliance.² This was first observed in the Balkans and has thus resurfaced currently in Afghanistan.³ It has become a contentious topic when discussing military operations within the alliance. Afghanistan has become a hot topic of debate as to who is contributing and who is not. This only adds to the debate of what should be done about European defense. After 9/11, Europe has ventured into what Kagan has called the world of “power” in which they have discovered that they are for the most part woefully unprepared to utilize their militaries in any offensive capability beyond small unit actions.⁴ That is the reason why in Afghanistan, the U.S., U.K. and Canada are deployed in the most volatile regions. According to the International Security Assistance Force’s website, the command of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the military forces under that command of the most dangerous provinces are commanded by the U.S. the U.K. and Canada in areas such as Helmand, Kandahar, and the areas bordering the tribal areas of Pakistan.⁵ This is but one example of many which provides for a strong argument as to why the European militaries and their supplying industries need reevaluating; and reevaluating immediately. Not only is this a

¹ Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power*. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003), 27.

² *Ibid.* 22.

³ *Ibid.* 20.

⁴ *Ibid.* 24.

⁵ ISAF Regional Command Structure. NATO: International Security Assistance Force. [updated on 2 October 2008. cited on 3 October 2008.] Available from http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html.

point politics, it is a point of philosophy. To alter the politics, the philosophy must first be changed.

The difference in the idea of power approaches a point when examining the various militaries. Some states do not believe in, or are not capable of maintaining, a powerful military. In this area, power has a very measurable value. Although military power and effectiveness is always changing and morphing into something not even dreamed of 10 years prior, by examining what a state has done or not done in terms of military preparedness may provide insight as to where the state stands on the ideological front of this debate. Several first world states are resigned to having a marginal military such as Canada and The Netherlands, and then there are those such as the United Kingdom that undertake on a different approach. The difference between Holland and the U.K. is the presence, or lack thereof, of a military industrial base equipped to meet future wars. By examining this area it may reveal that within NATO there are truly only two interstate military industries of consequence. They are the industries of the U.S. and the U.K. Other European states such as France and Germany cooperate in defense on the level of multinational defense companies that produce products for a wide range of buyers. The U.S. also maintains a wide range of buyers, however, it rarely purchases from foreign companies; the same for the U.K. The root of these differences is ideological as Kagan has stated. Power may surface in many forms on the international stage. Military power is what creates a state's power on that stage or not. Military power is also a means of not only defense, but it may be a means to promote values and ideas that have proven to be effective in human development. With a push by many European states to follow a multilateral path, they are foregoing the ability to retain military power. This power is not exclusive to those that would use

it in defense or for good. Without an effective counter-balance to other forces in the world, Europe relinquishing its military power, relying on the U.S. for defense and not maintaining its strength, Europe will find itself in a precarious predicament.

Why then will it be necessary for Europe to retain its military power instead of following the strict path of multilateralism? Some answers to this may be observed in the many recent failures of multilateralism in dealing with hostile situations. The United Nations Security Council has not proven to be an effective force in dealing with states that oppose the popular will of the leading states. The current issues with Iraq and Iran have revealed that inaction is the common result of most sanctions enacted by the Security Council. United Nations peacekeepers also failed to prevent Hezbollah from conducting raids into Israel, which is the most recent example of the current failures of the doctrine of multilateralism on the world level. NATO is in practice multilateralism; however it is a localized form of it containing states with extremely similar values, beliefs and cultures. Because of those connections, action is much simpler to initiate and sustain. In the realm of theory, Realism is the major ideology that would support the argument presented here. That power, and specifically military power is a paramount concern and security is the highest priority of the state. Security is the prerequisite for the development of the human race to the level that many states enjoy today. These first world states came to power and attained a high level of cultural advancement due to the might of their respective militaries. The United States, United Kingdom, France Germany, Japan and so forth have all had at times or still have powerful militaries. Of course, the U.S. is on an entirely different level when speaking of its military, however, on the second tier, these other states are quite powerful militarily. Also, all the states mentioned enjoyed half a century of military protection from the threat of

communism and revolution by left wing extremists by the military power of the United States. This correlation is a double edged sword, however. There are examples of great military powers where the societies of those states were oppressed; such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the importance of military power and its role in the world today cannot be understated.

The philosophy is that of which Robert Kagan has spoken of. In his book, Of Paradise and Power, Kagan clearly demonstrates that there exists a major difference between the world views of America and Europe. This manifests itself in various areas of politics and policy, but perhaps the most dangerous area it is present in is the area of military policy and affairs. As stated before, the key to the differences between American and European military power is the defense industry and the budget allocated to it. However, the main requirement of understanding what the difference has become is rooted in the differing philosophies. This does not clearly define the difference in the power disparity in the contesting militaries of industries fully, but it does provide for the basis for comprehending the genesis of the current issues. Therefore, to begin the process of delving into the complexities of the change of philosophy that brought about the change in policy after the recovery of World War II, the philosophy of American policy must be examined first, as well. The relationship between policy and philosophy on the American consideration provides for a clear picture as to the advancement of American power in the realm of military power. Here again, Kagan provides a substantial explanation of this occurrence. At first impression, it would seem almost bewildering to comprehend the difference in military power. However, once the differing philosophies are examined and then taken jointly with the actual defense policies, the predicament becomes more navigable.

What is the basic description of what these differences are? The fundamental answer is that the United States maintains such an enormous lead in military power that it would be near impossible for any state, or group of states, to rival its power projection capability. It is likely that the European governments understand this and have chosen to focus efforts elsewhere. This then brings to light the conundrum that faces the issue of European defense; who provides for it? It is very possible that given a catastrophic war, European states would be able to develop more formidable militaries, but it is unlikely that another World War would be in the future for Europe given that tensions are now in the Middle East and East Asia. It is also unlikely that Europe would get involved in a war unless it is in defense; except for a few exceptions such as Afghanistan (Iraq does not have the same European involvement as Afghanistan, however, there are several NATO members that have proven to be formidable fighters). Therefore, as it has been for fifty years, the United States retains the responsibility for European defense due to the fact that America possesses the means to conduct such a mission. As the argument here proposes, the defense industry in the United States is the key to the force multiplying power and technological supremacy of the American military which allows it to operate at the rate and capability it maintains. The theory poses that the philosophy of the two parties, Europe and the United States, were founded and refined during the Cold War which has led to the separate developments of the two respective defense industries. These industries have a direct and inherent effect on the military power of its home state. A stronger defense industry provides for a more capable military as is witnessed with the current state of the U.S. military. The implications of these effects are world-wide spanning and carry such an importance that it could possibly denote the rise and or fall of states, the condition of global order and the very fate of mankind. The states

examined here represent the flag bearers of western civilization and liberal political ideologies. Given that the majority of the world lives in Kagan's world of "power" it becomes imperative that constant examination of military power be performed and assessments made of capability and its foundations. This examination also takes precedence given the very likely event that Europe will, or has already, begun to emerge for the world of "paradise".

CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Basis for Defense Cooperation

The theory that is presented in this project hinges upon two theories of international relations. The two are neo-realism and neo-liberalism. In fact, the basis for the theory is a blending of these two theories because one alone cannot account for argument in this. While I have and will use classical realism to explain many policy choices in this project, certain aspect of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism can add some much needed additional explanation to various aspects discussed in this project.

First, looking at neo-realism, the subset that can shed some light on this topic is that of offensive neo-realism. The main tenet here is that "To offensive neo-realists, international relations is a prisoner's dilemma game. In this era of globalization, the incompatibility of state's goals and interests enhances the competitive nature of an anarchic system and makes conflict as inevitable as cooperation. Thus, talk of reducing military budgets at the end of the Cold War was considered by offensive neo-realists to be pure folly."⁶ However, as stated earlier, this cannot account for all aspects of the argument of this project. Defensive neo-realism can give some insight in that it is true that the costs of wars can outweigh the benefits in some cases, and that interdependence and globalization has helped that assertion⁷, but that is about all it can explain

⁶ John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 211.

⁷ *Ibid.*

in this context. Counter to the point of not reducing military spending is the argument that European states "free ride" U.S. military protection. This contradicts the argument presented here that the international system forces states to maintain reasonable defense spending. While European states might currently free ride U.S. military protection, this cannot last or be sustained.

In the neo-liberalism camp, it is neo-liberal institutionalism that helps a great deal to augment and further justify the research theory of this project. This section on neo-liberalism takes into account non-state actors. As can be seen in current NATO operations in Afghanistan, non-state actors have been the current cause of the need to bolster defense cooperation, procurement and spending because of the particular threat posed by these actors. However, the use of military force as a "tool of statecraft" should not be declined as neo-liberal institutionalism argues. Neo-liberals do support multilateralism, which is the key to NATO and further cooperation among its members. One of the main assertions of this subset of neo-liberalism is that "states are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant actors. States are rational or instrumental actors, always seeking to maximize their interests in all issues-areas...In this competitive environment, states seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation."⁸ Through a stronger NATO and European defense structure, a strong environment of cooperation will achieve the ends to which they seek. A note of caution; the character of a state's domestic policies is not an indicator for its actions on the world stage.⁹

Therefore, the theoretical basis for transatlantic defense project cooperation, to shore-up the transatlantic military capability gap, has a foundation within realism and stretching

⁸ *Ibid.* 213.

⁹ Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. *The Atlantic Monthly*. 266 (2): 36.

out to neo-realism. It also can take attributes from neo-liberalism. Because the states that comprise NATO need to work together on projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter, cooperation is required to maximize their gain in security. NATO will have many challengers in the years to come in regions like Asia; this will need strong defense cooperation to meet that challenge. Using these theories a framework can be constructed with the notion that given the security environment NATO faces, cooperation and multilateralism is required and that a collaboration of several theories shows that there is a theoretical basis for the research theory presented here.

A History of Cooperation?

The cooperation of defense industries is then imperative to continue to have the military power to achieve peace and security in the areas of influence of NATO. Fortunately, there has been a fair amount of cooperation within Europe. The results have been promising. Such projects as the Eurofighter Typhoon have produced a world class platform that is highly capable. Although it has yet to be deployed, on paper it will serve its purpose very well. Outside such examples of cooperation, trans-Atlantic cooperation has been few and far between. Currently the Joint Strike Fighter program is the only substantial trans-Atlantic initiative in common defense development. The history of trans-Atlantic cooperation does have a positive history. Some examples are the P-51 "Mustang", The M1 Abrams/Leopard Main Battle Tank, various small arms and the Stryker Infantry Carrier. The history predates World War II, but these are just a few examples of certain programs that greatly affected the outcomes of battles and even wars. The P-51 was the warplane that offered the allies a long-range bomber escort that drastically reduced the loss of American and British long-range bombers over Germany during

World War II. The strategic bombing campaign proved to be a vital tactic to destroy the Nazi war machine which could not have been completed without the development of the P-51. Not to mention that it was perhaps the finest piston powered fighter of all time; if not the best fighter of all time. The M1 Abrams first saw combat in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. The effectiveness of the Abrams with its advanced main gun and optics single handily destroyed the armored units of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard. In Iraq today, the M1 has proven invaluable to the infantry involved in extremely difficult urban warfare. Also, the Stryker, a Swiss design, has demonstrated to be an extremely effective weapon in urban fighting where its superior protection has saved countless soldiers' lives. Its mobility and quiet operation has served to enhance the lethality of its operators. These several examples illustrate that there is a track-record of very successful trans-Atlantic programs and that tradition needs to continue in the 21st century.

It was no accident that there has been as much cooperation and commonality between the U.S. and its NATO European allies. The Cold War provided ground on which such projects could stand. Commonality in terms of ammunition was the most prominent example of that Cold War doctrine. It was extremely important to have the ability of arm and maintain allied military forces anywhere Soviet aggression could happen. This is not to say that all weapons systems were interchangeable, but the likeness among them served a very practical purpose. The same argument may be used today. From costs stand point to logistical considerations; it makes good business and practical sense. The lead would be taken by the U.S. defense industry as it always has been because of the sheer practical field experience of the units used as of late. The most combat tested weapons systems are of either American design or by joint projects where the unit is deployed by American combat units. It is necessary to state that European designs are

not currently adequately tested in combat scenarios. Therefore, if European defense contractors wish to reap the benefits of trans-Atlantic cooperation they must assume a secondary role initially to American systems. However, this should not pose a serious problem as it has been seen in Afghanistan that most European states are not in strong favor of a long operational stay in the combat zones of Afghanistan. The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces are those that share the most in common on the weapon systems front and are also the states that are witnessing the most combat. It would be then wise to at first focus the trans-Atlantic cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K.

This cooperation is already taking place; however, more is sorely needed. With the common values held by both states in terms of political and social values, there is currently a fertile ground for cooperation to occur at an even greater scale than is presently observed. The political amiability presents itself as a key to this cooperation. The governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom have many similar viewpoints in terms of foreign military relations. The Special Operations forces of both the U.S. and the U.K. are considered the finest in the world. Who is better among the two is up for debate, but the goals, training and working relationship of the two groups is a prime example of how similar the militaries of the U.S. and the U.K. are. Because of this special relationship, the test-bed for enhanced cooperation should be based on U.S. and U.K. past, present and future cooperation. This model may assist and craft the future of defense cooperation throughout NATO and Major Non-NATO Allies. Also in a more performance based examination, it would behoove member states to take up more stock in European-American defense cooperation in that the American designed systems on a whole are unsurpassed and most effective systems in the properly trained hands. It is common knowledge

within the defense field that training is everything. No amount of high-tech weaponry will ever replace proper training. Here again this is where the U.S. and U.K. excel and very often cooperate. The training regimes of the U.S. and U.K. military forces are so interlinked that many U.S. practices are modeled off of and improved versions of U.K. methods. Because NATO is an alliance, there are numerous joint training exercises held every year. However, the original and basic training other member militaries receive may be very high-quality, there needs to be more immediate cooperation and reinforcement of the bonds of cooperation while still retaining the traditions of the many fine and professional militaries of Europe. The cooperation needs to start at the ground level. To attain that goal, the political aspects of the cooperation need to be addressed first. Without exceptional political cooperation, the defense design, training and actual combat cooperation will not represent its true potential and the capability gap that needs to be at least somewhat bridged cannot without cooperation.¹⁰

The Differing Environments of the U.S. and Europe

Even with the present state of U.S.-U.K. relations, which are most likely the most amiable of all U.S.-European relations, the power of the European Union and a new found power in multi-lateralism has presented a new challenge for any transatlantic policy that requires a broadening of defensive capabilities. Hanspeter Neuhold has taken this presence of a rift, much like Kagan has. Although Neuhold would classify Europe more as Mercury than as Venus, he

¹⁰ Grdesic, Ivan. 2004. US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership: Securing the NATO Open Door Policy. *Regional Security* XLI (5): 110.

states that because of Europe's trouble recent past and because much of its history has seen wars on apocalyptic scales that the stance the U.S. takes is not the stance Europe wants to take any longer. Of course the counter to that is Kagan's argument. The Europeans did not have to provide for their own defense during the Cold War so there is no incentive to spend as much or even two-thirds on a whole what the U.S. spends. Also, there is an argument that the classic threat to Europe is gone and there needs to be a change within NATO.¹¹ Neuhold states that "By contrast, European states tend to adopt a multi-lateral approach to external relations. They are guided by a comprehensive concept of security, which also emphasizes the economic and ecological dimensions of international problems. European nations tend to be reluctant to resort to military force and rely more on political and economic means."¹² Kagan's argument also provides a response here, as well. Because the United States is militarily powerful enough to defend Europe as well as itself, Europe may be preoccupied with various concerns other than security. Luckily Europe does not speak with one voice yet, and leaders such as Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy have demonstrated that there remains concern over maintaining strong ties with the United States on military issues. However, more importantly the U.K. is the most independent member of the European Union as can be seen with its steadfast support of many U.S. military policies. It is then imperative that the relationship between the U.S. and U.K. form the basis for the future of trans-Atlantic cooperation because of such critical issues mentioned before. The world of Venus, or Mercury, that most European live in will not last as long as there

¹¹ Browning, Christopher S. and P. Joenniemi. 2004. The Challenges of EU and NATO Enlargement. *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 39 (3): 230.

¹² Neuhold, Hanspeter. 2003. Transatlantic Turbulences: Rifts or Ripples? *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 459.

are states that have no intention of following the lead of the principal states of the world that have substantiated civilizations best interests at heart.

Scholars that hold similar views to that of Neuhold consistently point out the argument that the United States wishes to bring terrorists to justice, for example, but does not participate in many international organizations such as the International Criminal Court. Just as Kagan has pointed out this is a tactic of the militarily weak European Union. Because many European states decide to hide behind such multi-lateral organizations, other organizations such as NATO become weaker. Neuhold contends that the independent actions of the U.S. with regards to the invasion of Iraq did more to discredit NATO than anything else in recent history; this assertion is far off base. According to Neuhold “The decline of the Atlantic Alliance had already set-in in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Although the collective defense guarantee in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 was invoked for the first time in history, the USA ignored the assistance offered by its allies...It did not need it, since it preferred to avoid the complications of another ‘war by committee’.”¹³ This statement is highly suspect for many reasons. The most glaring contradiction is the fact that Article 5 was invoked and the U.S. did accept allied assistance. It is correct that the U.S. does not always require its NATO allies to conduct a military operation, it is important to have as many NATO allies on board with the plan as possible. This allows for even further legitimacy and for assistance in areas where a number of the specialties of some allied militaries may be of support. The United States does wish its allies to assist in such operations similar to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. However, when the

¹³ Ibid. 464.

militaries of Europe are lacking in quality when compared to the U.S. military it is difficult to overlook the power gap and its effects on military operations.

The question of the quality of the European militaries is a complex issue that does not have a simple answer. Yes, European militaries are modern and possess modern training regimes. However, when compared to the overall strength and capability of the United States' military it is truly and unquestionably second-tier. Even with European military capability only on par for playing only a supporting role it is still capable in its own right. Some would even suggest that there be a move to reestablish Europe as a global military power.¹⁴ Hans Morgenthau asked these important questions decades ago during the Cold War. Morgenthau states "The power of a nation in military terms is also dependent upon the quantity of men and arms and their distribution among the different branches of the military establishment. A nation may have a good grasp of technological innovations in warfare. Its military leaders may excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new techniques of war. Yet such a nation may be militarily and in consequence, also politically weak if it does not possess a military establishment that in its overall strength and in the strength of its component parts is neither too large nor too small in view of the tasks it may be called upon to perform."¹⁵ It would then be accurate to state that all members of NATO have a duty to maintain their militaries at the highest attainable levels. According to this measure Europe would then be woefully weak. When there is no threat of force, there is little incentive for other states of opposing wills to comply if their actions constitute a threat. As Neuhold remarked on the history of Europe, there are many states today

¹⁴ Bono, Giovanna. 2004. The EU's Military Doctrine: An Assessment. *International Peacekeeping* 11 (3): 452.

¹⁵ Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 1985.

with leaders that have no interest in the lessons of World War I or II. Even some states that paid a large toll in blood during those wars, their governments realize that the world is a chaotic place where such lessons mean nothing in the face of individual ambition.

Military power according to Morgenthau would be the basis for power on the stage of foreign affairs. If a state's military is weak, it then will become politically weak, as well. The concept of and interpretation of what power in foreign affairs is it is perceived very differently by Europeans as Kagan has argued. If Europeans view power as the ability to pass sanctions and verbally condemn wrong-doings and atrocities, then according to the realist view and Morgenthau's remarks then the Europeans are rendered weak by their insistence on "war by committee" policies. Power is not being able to influence sanctions introduced by the United Nations Security Council. Power is not strict multi-lateralism. Power in foreign affairs is having both military power and political power. Military power may be a last resort in some ways in today's world, but it is an indispensable trait any world leading state should have. Europeans foregoing this posture only weaken themselves and their allies in the eyes of those states that would oppose the values that were fought for during both world wars. If there is any lesson to take away from those wars is that there are always those that will attempt to control and dominate through oppression and fear. The democracies of North America and Europe won World War II and the Cold War to preserve those beliefs. To continue defending and promoting democracy and human rights, Europe must be at the forefront of this charge and it requires a military balance with Europe's political power.

With this doctrine, it would appear that the alliance and relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom would be the example to follow upon which Europe may

base not only its military advancement but its further political advancement, as well. Scholars such as Neuhold would disagree and argue that Europe is on the appropriate track as it currently stands. They would argue in the realist vein that there needs to be a balance of power. Neuhold proposes a multi-polar world where the European Union would be one of those balances to the United States as it is a likely candidate. However, Neuhold does concede that the U.K. has a special relationship that cannot be deterred and that “The platform of common interests is thus too weak for a serious, concerted challenge to U.S. domination, especially if the U.S.A. offers any of the challengers a privileged relationship.”¹⁶ The supremacy of U.S. military and political power is not a force to be contested against as there are challengers that will make advances in the years to come such as China, India or a resurgent Russia. Europe has a long and productive history with the United States. If such challengers become a threat, the E.U. would benefit more with counter-balancing those states rather than the U.S. considering how the cultures and values of the U.S. and Europe are so intertwined and the basic fact that European philosophy gave rise to American political philosophy. Neuhold realizes the danger further separation between the U.S. and Europe could cause. According to Neuhold, the problem is very dire “The present transatlantic crisis is serious. There is a real danger of growing alienation between the two sides of the Atlantic. The reasons for this concern are manifold. In addition to the many causes already mentioned, the geopolitical priorities of the U.S.A. have shifted away from Europe to other parts of the world.”¹⁷ While it is true that the priorities of the U.S. on the geopolitical scale have shifted, the interests of Europe do more or less run parallel with that of the U.S. It would be a catastrophe for the U.S. and Europe counter-balancing each other.

¹⁶ Neuhold, Hanspeter. 2003. Transatlantic Turbulences: Riffs or Ripples? *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 466.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 468.

Neuhold does have a number of sound words of advice that may be very beneficial to heed. Neuhold states “In order to prevent further estrangement and irritations, the root causes of transatlantic differences would have to be tackled. This would require not only an intensive dialogue and a mutual readiness to really listen to and understand the other side, but also considerable efforts both in material and political terms.”¹⁸ This would be an extremely productive start to mend the relationships that have been strained over that last few years. Since each side has similar goals, honest talks and dialogue may achieve real progress. However Neuhold goes on to suggest that “European countries would have to close the military capabilities gap if they want to be taken seriously by the U.S.A. As already stated, the U.S. would have to willing to share not only burdens and responsibilities but also leadership.”¹⁹ This prospect is a much more challenging goal. The resources that are necessary to close the capability gap would not be agreed upon by all E.U. members. However, partially closing the gap is much more reasonable. Also, the sharing of military burdens would occur once the European militaries become more capable. On the leadership issue, the Europeans must prove that they have the capability and the right to assume more leadership than they have currently. Although these issues present many future problems they must be addressed, and addressed expediently.

Based on the direction in which Neuhold was projecting his recommendations for what the European Union should do, it brings about the issue of the prospect of an actual increase in European military power. Obviously, this would be a prominent requirement for any meaningful progress in defense capability and production within the industry. Even being a

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

cornerstone to the proposed argument for a more powerful and more active European contribution to NATO and to European defense, the obstacles to this goal seem to have escaped Neuhold's reasoning. In his own words, the other focuses that he listed of which the European states find just as important as military issues will inherently limit the progress to a more militarily independent Europe. While true and full independence may never be achieved, or deemed necessary by European governments, the inherent opposition of one approach against the other is only the beginning in the roadblocks to achieving progress. While Andrew James speaks of the "Towers of Excellence" and the true ability for progress to take place²⁰, the differing political philosophies threaten all the good that can be done. Denying that the world of "Mars", as Kagan would say, does not exist and expecting other states to believe the same is a foolish course to follow. Since at least the time of ancient Greece the world of power politics and realism has existed. The Melian Dialogue provides a classic example of this principle. The strong will do as they will, in the ancient and modern world. It would be folly to think otherwise. Although the world is now very interdependent, the use of military force is not prohibitive.

Road Blocks to Cooperation

Many roadblocks for cooperation persist, even when the benefits may be seen very clearly. As noted in a report conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies "Although there are significant economic, political and technological benefits in pursuing transatlantic defense cooperation, considerable barriers remain. More-over, the mix of incentives

²⁰ James, Andrew D. 2005. European Military Capabilities, the Defense Industry and the Future Shape of Armaments Co-operation. *Defense and Security Analysis*. 21: 5.

and risks for governments and business to cooperate varies according to whether the project is spearheaded by government or industry. Once a decision has been made in favor of a cooperative program, however, success will depend critically on the ability of both sides to overcome the wide range of political, legal and technical obstacles.”²¹ Finding a viable path to cooperation is of paramount importance to parties on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and Europe both would benefit greatly if they were able to successfully come to terms with the various existing barriers that they encounter and find the will to overcome them. As mentioned, these barriers are many-fold. Even though the challenges are complex, the price to pay for military preeminence is well worth the endeavor. Viable and unquestionable military power is perhaps the most valuable resource on the world stage. With a strong transatlantic defense relationship, that resource would know no rivals. With the economic strength of both the United States and Europe, the ability to develop this concept as reality knows no bounds other than ones that are self instituted.

The decisions to work together may be pursued on several different levels. As stated in the CSIS report these levels are government-led and industry-led. The government-led cooperation has, according to the CSIS report, traditionally been focused in several areas of interest. These areas are: to promote broad national security and foreign policy goals, to strengthen military coalitions in anticipation of future crises, to strengthen transatlantic relations and preserve NATO, to encourage Europe to increase its defense investment spending, to pool scarce resources, to increase stability of a domestic program, to avoid potential leakage of

²¹ Hamre, John J. 2003. The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Community. *CSIS Panel Report*. 17.

technology to hostiles and to retain the ability to act unilaterally.²² These nine points are, and should be, the main focus on the government side. Even if they are what the traditional focus has been, they remain reasonably applicable today. The first point is of obvious importance. National Security issues are of top priority currently, and have always been, even in times of peace. The advantages of having such a powerful partnership such as NATO are that foreign policy goals, as well as national security goals may be simpler to achieve if there is a comprehensive network of states striving together toward the similar goal. Considering how the NATO members all share a somewhat common culture, it enables defining those goals, and how to proceed achieving them effectively much simpler when compared to those states not having the many similarities they all share.

The second point to consider is an existing hot topic among leading NATO members. A current example is the war in Afghanistan. The coalition has found many weak links while operating in Afghanistan which has served to highlight a need to shore-up the capabilities gap. The positive side of the current military coalition is that it does provide greater legitimacy to the operation and also with the highlighted weaknesses, those weaknesses may now be addressed and offer greater rationale for stronger cooperation between the U.S. and Europe in the defense arena. The third point is a familiar selling point that has been challenged many times; the preservation of NATO. However, the preservation of NATO is a paramount aspect of transatlantic relations in general. NATO is seen as the adhesive that holds the U.S. and Europe together. In times of crises, NATO and not economic interdependence will maintain allies at each other's side. Yet with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO

²² Ibid. 18.

continues to serve a forceful and dynamic purpose and perhaps one even more important than its original mission. The current purpose of NATO as a peacekeeper has shown success at a very difficult mission. With such operations as the wars in the Balkans and Afghanistan NATO has demonstrated that it is capable at a new *raison d'être* (with the U.S. at the forefront). Also, transatlantic relations in general may benefit greatly from a continued strengthening of NATO.

The fourth point to consider is the linchpin of narrowing the capabilities gap between the U.S. and Europe. The necessity for greater insistence and encouragement of much more liberal European defense spending is at the core for any cooperation and new defense policy. As the CSIS report states, there have been numerous instances in the past and currently of joint programs that have as one of their objectives to promote greater European involvement and monetary expenditure. However, there also must be the element of inter-European cooperation, as well. If there is to be any independent European defense policy or projects there must be a certain degree of European autonomy within the greater transatlantic cooperation scheme. The fifth point in this consideration is very straight forward. The pooling of scarce resources is an essential consideration. The CSIS report states that “The United States and Europe have a shared interest in ensuring defense resources bring maximum benefit. The need to pool defense resources thus can provide a powerful incentive to seek cooperative solutions and is particularly appealing for smaller European countries.”²³ With emerging powers such as China and India, which seek to modernize and expand their militaries, it is imperative that the current alliance of the United States and Europe continue to cooperate together to ensure continued military dominance. By ensuring a sizeable and stable pool of defense resources, the current military

²³Ibid.

preeminence can remain and develop further to the benefit of all NATO members, large and small.

Here again, the saving grace of the transatlantic alliance is the shifting role of NATO. Because the threats that face the U.S. and Europe overtly are currently of an asymmetric nature, cooperation and imagination are necessary traits that will be called upon to face these evolving and ever-changing threats. Since NATO has been shifting its purpose for some period, there should be fewer roadblocks, not more. It is clearly apparent that the United States and Europe both contribute to this quandary. However, if Europe fell more into line in respect to U.S. military policy, the roadblocks would lessen. The will and determination to act and provide for a more robust military capability would be the starting point. However, as mentioned previously, this is not the current state of affairs. The U.S. has been promoting very broad and clear cut defense and foreign policy goals. This form of government-led cooperation has for the most part been one sided with the U.S. assuming one position and Europe undertaking a different one. There are exceptions, such as the United Kingdom, but it is painfully obvious that the difference in respect to policy is perhaps the largest government-led-side roadblock. With every problem there is a solution. Interestingly enough the solution to this roadblock is easily identifiable, however, difficult to cultivate and maintain. Policy can be easily drawn up. However, persuading all parties to agree is an entirely other challenge. Herein lays the problem between the U.S. and Europe that cannot be resolved without an overhaul of priorities and mindsets. While the U.S. currently continues committed to its foreign and defense policy goals forged in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Europe remains in their somewhat seemingly unaffected and protected world while only temporarily venturing into the world scene that the U.S. has been involved in

since the end of World War II; with Europe acting as a free-rider.²⁴ Finding a means to reconcile these two worlds and building a bridge for Europe should be of immense importance in the policy realm.

Finding New Reasons for Transatlantic Military Cooperation

A dangerous enemy is one that has nothing to lose or one that believes in their “cause” enough to kill and be killed for it. While some states might hold high the economic relations they have with Europe, there are currently, and will be more numerous in the future, alternatives to European money, markets and capital. When that happens, the politics of economy and multi-lateralism will mean much, much less than they do today. Because of this reality it becomes necessary for NATO to taken on new roles. The roles that NATO now must undertake are portrayed currently in Afghanistan. If this is to be the future, along with the emerging threats of China, India and possibly Russia, the help Europe will need in its defense industry will be great. Following a course of policies that give powers away to super-national governments like the United Nations, or super-national organizations like the International Criminal Court where non-western states have power over the western powers has allowed the good idea of multi-lateralism to be used as a weapon against the leading states of Europe and North America. It might seem like an overly dramatic scenario, but the temptation of power will draw competition from all areas. Without a proper defensive and offensive capability, the last Ace will not have its desired effect or no effect at all. If this capability gap continues unattended

²⁴ Cornish, Paul. 2004. NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation. *International Affairs* 80 (1): 70.

due to political incompetence then as James states “The imbalance in European and U.S. military capabilities has been an issue for NATO throughout its history, but the last decade has seen mounting concerns that this gap could grow to such an extent that U.S. and European armed forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate effectively together.”²⁵ At that point, Europe will become the weak and will have to suffer what they must and act as the traders and merchants from the world of “Mercury” that Neuhold had labeled Europe instead of a beacon of power for good alongside the United States.

It would be fair to question why there should be such importance placed on this very point, whether or not Europe should stay as it is politically and more importantly here militarily, or make the changes that will be necessary as the world evolves. James makes the point that the relationship that binds the United States and most of Europe is being strained by the lax and almost indifferent attitude of Europe towards its military commitments. This strain as James states has been ongoing for many decades. However it has not yet snapped. There have been instances where NATO was thought to be dead, such as the end of the Cold War and the tensions during the Balkans Wars. More recently the disagreements over Iraq truly tested the trans-Atlantic relations. To curb such tensions both sides must do more to integrate their ideas, views and of course the military industries. The economies of the U.S. and Europe are already very interdependent. Between banking, technology and even the automotive industry, the links that connect the two powers are already well placed. As there always is, the obstacle here is that of trust. In the world of cars for example, trade secrets are very well protected, but if leaked or sold do not pose a threat to national security. Same goes for all other non-defense related

²⁵ *Ibid.* 7.

business. Even with the requirement for closer cooperation, there is a limit to how close it can be. James argues that it needs to be extremely close. With that, the trade secrets of U.S. defense companies and their advanced technologies would then have to be shared with their European counterparts. James states “For NATO transformation to be effective, the U.S. must be willing to trust its European partners by sharing the advanced technologies that are critical to transformation. Moreover, the U.S. government will likely need to reform technology transfer and export controls if it wishes allies to comparable capabilities. These are big challenges for policy-makers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.”²⁶ Indeed these are big challenges. However, they are challenges that will not be overcome at any time or for any price. Comparable does not mean equal. The gems of U.S. defense technology, such as the B-2 stealth bomber and the F-22 air superiority fighter are not items to be shared. Just as the issue with sharing leadership within NATO always arises, the answer is and should be the same for the very advanced weapons systems. Trust must be earned. Even then, some systems can never be exported and shared. If the Europeans want something on the level of the B-2 then they would need to develop it in house because current U.S. policy will not allow U.S. assistance for the existing knowledge base. This might seem counterintuitive and counterproductive but the supremacy of the U.S. military is the highest priority and overrides the great need for more robust trans-Atlantic defense cooperation.

Here again realism will dictate the course of events. It should be of no surprise and it should be counted as the right thing to expect. If this one huge obstacle is really the main point of contention, along with other trust issues, then a strong NATO has but one more reason

²⁶Ibid. 6.

to exist. Only a strong alliance like NATO could ever hope to have its allies work so closely that an advanced weapon system like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can be shared across the entire spectrum. Granted the F-35 is not as advanced and lethal as the F-22, it is still the second or third best warplane in the world. That alone is truly saying something about the lengths the United States is willing to go to for the sake of better cooperation and better relations. Even with the fact that the U.S. and the U.K. are very strong allies, the most effective and most powerful military technology that the U.S. possesses will never find itself in the hands of the British military. The U.S. would be the first to use its power to help the British military, but the caveat remains; U.S. military technology of the highest echelon will not be shared. However, some comfort can be taken in the fact that most European militaries have the military prowess that matches the tasks that it might perform. Morgenthau states this; and it makes perfect sense. European NATO allies will not have to maintain a worldwide military presence as the United States. In all reality, they wouldn't want to either. Nonetheless, Europe's commitment to NATO does require a military of corresponding power. As Morgenthau would say, "not too large or too small" for the tasks and challenges they might face. As it stands now, Europe is not capable to complete its tasks for NATO. It is then no wonder that Europe is not given more responsibility within NATO. If the source of power stems from a state's military power then the Europeans are extremely weak in comparison to their ally; the United States. It does not matter that the Cold War is over and NATO reason for existence is gone; the good that NATO can do for the rest of the world is more than enough to encourage its members to maintain its might and not languish and fall from power. The United States is moving away from focusing on Europe and has for some time. Europe will increasingly find itself on its own. If they wish to maintain the power they possess,

the quality and quantity of their militaries must transform for the better. The world is full of differing viewpoints, values and beliefs. However, the one constant is what power is and how it is utilized. A powerful military demands respect and along with a positive public image will be sure to guarantee a state's place in the world.

Given the fact that European militaries will play such a role, cooperation of defense project, hopefully successful cooperation, will be a cornerstone of future transatlantic relations. To do this, both the United States and Europe will need to take the necessary steps to ensure successful cooperation on such projects. These steps, such as formulating a clear and concise goal for the project, will determine the direction of the project; success or failure in simple terms. Also, if Europe was more united on defense, along with the U.S. the process would proceed instead of ending in stagnation; and the U.S. will need to make NATO a more important priority.²⁷

²⁷ Bereuter, Doug and John Lis. Winter 2003-2004. Broadening Transatlantic Relations. *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (1): 161.

CHAPTER THREE-PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE PROJECT COOPERATION

There are two levels to the concept of transatlantic cooperation to be considered. One is the ideological and theoretical basis for cooperation, and the other is the actual practical blueprint of how transatlantic cooperation may operate and how it has already functioned in the past. The ideological/theoretical aspect of transatlantic cooperation examines the basis for this cooperation through the lens of theory, in this case realism, in international relations, specifically between the United States and Europe. The “roadmap” level comprises the actual considerations and recommendations on what will need to be accomplished to provide a smoother and encompassing cooperation. It is essential to take in consideration both aspects into account rather than simply the practical recommendations for policy. The theoretical basis for the importance of military power and its growth within NATO can illustrate why scarce resources should be utilized to their utmost in broadening transatlantic defense cooperation. The following is the crux of the secondary hypothesis; which will show what successful cooperation can do to lessen the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies.

Why Military Power

With overwhelmingly many new challenges facing the western world today, soft power cannot always prevail, nor would it be expedient in the cases in which it can effective.

However, the soft power of the U.S. and its NATO allies is an amazingly powerful tool that may be implemented when military might well not suffice. Unfortunately, when dealing with the various challenges NATO is currently encountering, soft power does not provide the advantages it occasionally can bring to a situation involving high or low politics. This is not to discredit the idea of soft power, nonetheless, rather to illustrate that the challenges that are currently on NATO's radar require a measured use of force rather than the cultural and economic power of the western states. It has been clarified what roadblocks are to be encountered in Europe and why there must be a shift in thought and policy. However, since the soft power of the states in question is so overwhelmingly glaring, it must be discussed as to why in the current world climate soft power has serious limitations and why military force is the primary option. Also, because military force is the principal option, it becomes clear as to why the members of NATO necessitate a redirection of policy when it pertains to defense. National security matters require the backing of an impressive defense status. Soft power will not deter states with the willingness to support terrorism or the terrorists themselves. Nor will it deter war and conflict in the classic sense.

Soft Power is an intriguing theory in that it may possibly account for various aspects of inter-state relations that are difficult to accurately grasp and gauge. While new and innovative positions on theory in international relations are welcome and productive, heavy emphasis on any form of power and influence other than military may leave a state vulnerable to other states that are not susceptible to ideological or cultural influence. The population of any state may be more impressionable than the actual government; meaning that it may be totally ineffective in many instances. However, just as soft power may be ineffective in many situations,

so it may as well be with military power. The blunt use of military power is only acceptable in some circumstances. A far-sighted military is what separates effective and ineffective military power. The word far-sighted in this context refers to a military which is not simply a blunt weapon, but a force that possesses the capability to adapt, adjust and overcome situations ranging from conventional war to asymmetric conflicts. The ability of a military organization to adapt to the challenges that confront the modern world should be the goal of the military leadership of any state. What this signifies for NATO, even with its tremendous conventional power, is that NATO requires smart, accurate and adaptable weapons systems. The United States has concurrently moved into the arena of the next generation of weapons systems and the European NATO members are not far behind. Given the current and foreseeable future tactical environment that NATO finds and will find itself in the ability to be “smart” takes on an entire new precedence.

Technology may be a double-edged sword. It can immensely augment a military enabling it to operate with the same lethality of a larger more traditional force but with much less manpower. However, as seen in current conflicts, there is often no replacement for tangible soldiers on the ground in the towns, cities and countryside of the battle space. However, with the proper mixture of technology and manpower, a military force has the capability to achieve an advantageous balance in which it is capable of operating smarter but also somewhat leaner. The need for such new technologies, the will and commitment to procure them and the expertise to implement them, must be at the forefront of policy. Not only within the United States, but Europe should also consider dedicating resources to “transform” its current military and its military policy, as well. A transformation to a smarter, leaner and more technologically advanced

military may hold many benefits for Europe. The U.S. is seeing those benefits in the conflicts currently taking place. Such benefits are no need of a draft, quicker battles, higher soldier survival rate and less collateral damage. A smarter military would possess the capability to create better relations with native inhabitants during low intensity conflict by reducing collateral damage. This aspect of military transformation is most essential to consider in the current context of conflict in which NATO is involved. It is but one example of what an advanced and well-built military is capable of bringing to the table.

First, the U.S. must encourage Europe to assume more control over its own security. Currently the main protector of Europe remains the United States military. On a basic level, if Europe were solely responsible for its own defense, it would be more inclined to accept seriously more the need for an advanced and capable military. While several European states could better afford to assume such a change from the status quo, it would certainly benefit all of Europe. While the U.S. would never fully abandon European defense solely to Europe, it is very likely that Europe could possibly assume the lead role whereby the U.S. could then be of a more advisory-like role. On many levels this will encourage Europe on both the government and industry-side to invest and focus acutely on defense. Self-interest will take the lead. The security dilemma and the many facets of realism can and most certainly will appear thereby compel Europe to accept the stance much like the U.S. That stance is oppositional to those who would take advantage of the sinister aspect of human nature. The aspect that Hobbes defined so long in the past and to this day his advice still rings true. Europe must realize that the world in which they would prefer to live in does not exist beyond the borders of the western societies. Yet just across from Spain, Africa remains in a world that many in Europe have not experienced since

World War II. While European militaries participate in peace operations through the United Nations, they have not witnessed the world as such since the end of World War II. During the wars in the Balkans, wars that saw great violence and barbarity, Europe was still not in that world.

Europe could learn many lessons from the U.S. in this respect. The U.S. has seen much of war and conflict since the end of World War II, more so than any European state, including Russia, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, South America, Central America, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq; the United States has spent over sixty years combating against the destructive side of human nature. Sixty years of learning lesson after lesson has shaped the U.S. into what it is today. No other state in the modern world has rushed to the protection of others as the U.S. has. If Europe would help take on this role, even through NATO as it has in Afghanistan, it could begin the process of change. In the minds of the people and the policy-makers in Europe is where the transformation must first take place. The only means for that to occur is for Europeans to be fully on the frontlines side by side with their American allies. Fully is an aspect that cannot be achieved without other aspects. Aspects that must take place simultaneously. Industry must provide the means for European militaries to keep pace with the U.S. Once this is accomplished and the governments of Europe stand behind their alliance, then NATO can truly transform. The citizens of Europe may never alter their minds and may always hold the U.S. in contempt, but there is the expectation that the governments of the respective alliance members can discover, a common ground and to not deny the state of the world and the reality of which we live in. The world that has not changed since the time of Thucydides; a world

in which men like Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt accepted the reality and had no illusions about of destruction man is capable of.

If defense and foreign policy can be reconciled in a manner that both the U.S. and Europe, under the flag of NATO or not, so that there is no illusion as to what must to be accomplished then other steps may be undertaken to bridge the gap among militaries of the U.S. and Europe together. Military budgets would be the next objective to undertake; one that Europe would possibly find the most difficult to accept. How would most European citizens react to their taxes budgeted more toward defense research and development instead of health care or unemployment benefits? Not well would be the answer albeit an understatement. Europeans must then realize that providing for their own defense requires sacrifice. A sacrifice that the current population cannot seemingly grasp as the generations that experienced the world wars knew very well. As the populations of Europe become more and more isolated from those experiences the less they are likely to make such sacrifices. The same may be said for the U.S. However, when called upon, the majority of Americans will answer the call regardless of the danger they may encounter. If Europe is incapable of maintaining its own defense, then how can it be expected to fulfill its role in NATO? The U.S. has been and will become more resentful because of this lack of actual willingness to sacrifice for others. What will ensue in the world if those who stand for what is fitting and appropriate do not respond because they rather have a 35-hour work week than work five more hours, allowing for increased government revenue which then can fund their own defense? This may seem overwhelming; however, this is how it can possibly begin. This is may possibly be how complacency and indifference take root. All parties in question carry this blame to some degree. No one is without fault. However, change is a real

possibility. Change for the betterment of freedom and self-determination; if there are those willing to sacrifice for it.

While this may appear somewhat abstract, it in reality forms the foundations for the problems that are before the parties in question. This is also incredibly surprising in that not only are the U.S. and Europe very similar in a multitude of aspects, the basis for much of the political theory that underlines much of the political policy of the United States is of European origin. The similarities should be simply nothing but an incentive for the U.S. and Europe to meet on a common ground much more often than is currently the situation. As William Hopkinson points out “The transatlantic difference in political and military are in some ways surprising. The United States and EU are comparable in economic size; the EU has a somewhat larger population and they have a similar technological base and essentially similar levels of development. Together they produce approximately 58 percent of global GDP and account for more than 40 percent of international trade in goods and services.”²⁸ Hopkinson lays out the obvious similarities. But of course, the similarities run much deeper. What is not similar and the main issue of military capability. Hopkinson makes several important points “With the end of the Cold War, the nature of security in general and of European security in particular changed, and there were growing transatlantic divergences over security issues and appropriate responses. There was little outside threat of the classical to almost any of the countries of the Continent.”²⁹ Herein lays perhaps one of the major contributing factors as to why Europe will not expend more

²⁸ Hopkinson, William. 2003. The United States and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: Reasons Why They Should Work Together, Reasons Why They May Not. *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 25: 482

²⁹ *Ibid.* 484.

on defense and in general making defense issues more of a priority. Europe faces no classical threat.

Challenges within the Transatlantic Relationship: U.S. vs. Europe

Just as theory in international relations changes, the threats that are currently facing the U.S., Europe and NATO have evolved from the oppressing bulwark of the Soviet Union to more asymmetrical threats and peacekeeping issues. While Hopkinson brushes aside the ultimate usefulness of the U.S. military in confronting current threats, he neglects to take into account something that most do: history. Consequently, threats have altered and blunt military force is not always the most effective tool for the job. However, to discount the deployment of military force is a titanic error. For example, Hopkins argues the point that “Military power of the sort the United States now deploys with such superiority will not become redundant. Although increasing in both relative and absolute terms, American military strength is less likely to become less and less usable and useful, or the problems that it can be used to resolve will become a smaller part of the total.”³⁰ It would be accurate to conclude that a military such as that of the United States could face the prospect of diminishing returns if all issues and threats could be dealt with through international bodies such as the United Nations; and that such bodies have binding authority. However, they do not, and often are inert in most truly difficult situations. Hopkinson continues with discounting one of the most useful military resources in the American inventory for either symmetric or asymmetric threats. Hopkinson states that “The marginal utility of carrier task groups or army divisions above a relatively small number will diminish rapidly,

³⁰ Ibid. 488.

for the United States is already so much stronger in such things than any conceivable enemy.”³¹

Carrier groups are extremely valuable in any circumstance. They allow for the projection of American military power to reach any part of the globe not only for military action, but also for humanitarian needs. This may be seen most recently with the crisis in Burma over the summer of 2008. However, in countering asymmetric threats, the ability to have in place a mobile base for air power, special operations, and electronic surveillance and reconnaissance based at strategically significant areas is invaluable to an extent that is worth its cost many times over. For Hopkinson to question that is surprising given his various astute observations elsewhere.

This argument is very similar to another argument that has been raised in the pursuit to identify the best solution for dealing with asymmetric threats, namely terrorism. During the 1990s, terrorism was perceived as a crime and treated as such. Today, it is considered as an act of war. This begs the question: which avenue would net better results? In the world as it is currently, military response is the most effective for various reasons. The most obvious basis is that the reach, power and effectiveness of military action are so much more so than that of the civilian agencies. This is outside the scope of this project; however, it is an interesting aspect of the larger picture that at least warrants some mention. It is reasoned that the U.S. military is considerably overly powerful that it is capable of reaching where others cannot, endure what others cannot endure. This is fundamentally what the U.S. military is designed to do. Its purpose is to efficiently and effectively achieve its objective, to adapt and overcome. That is rationale which is the U.S.’s ace. When dealing in the realm of international relations, military power is the one facet that can tilt the balance. Hopkinson credits what U.S. military power did for

³¹ Ibid.

Europe. “Without U.S. military and economic involvement during World War II and then throughout the Cold War, Western Europe might well have not emerged from Nazi tyranny or survived the challenge of Soviet oppression and dictatorship. After World War II, despite history and internal pressures toward isolationism and unilateralism, the United States played a major role in making the systems of the world. It was, with some limitations, a multilateral actor.”³² This is precisely the point in case. The military capability, and the inherent political philosophy of the U.S., not only allowed for the survival of liberal Western civilization but it also set the course for the rest of the world for the foreseeable future. Without the military capability of the U.S., Europe would have fallen during the dark days of World War II. If history is the greatest teacher, then the usefulness of a military, such as the current one of the United States, should not be discounted, but central to the foreign policy of the states in question. Threats and enemies will vary, but without a superior military, security will only be an illusion.

Tying this back to government-side cooperation, Europe must realize that cooperation on policy is of utmost importance. If not to fulfill their NATO obligations, then to protect the civilization of which they have been an invaluable component. Hopkinson formulates yet another astute observation “The United States needs Europe for the same essential reasons that Europe needs the United States: to help consolidate and safeguard a liberal world order—although, to the extent that the application of military force is necessary part of that safeguarding, Europe also need the United States because it and its component states are not capable of fighting a serious military campaign away from their own borders.”³³ Here again, the capability gap is apparent. If Europe deserves a prominent role, and more authority in this realm,

³² *Ibid.* 493.

³³ *Ibid.* 495.

it must accept the steps necessary for their militaries to advance to a level where they are an asset to U.S. forces, not an encumbrance. If Europe desires to protect its interests, as Hopkinson later asserts, it will need to forgo the mindset it currently has and adopt a more “American” one. Prominent works of political theory and history have held that while economic and cultural power is necessary and useful, it is military power that is the immovable object, the permanent fixture that requires the due diligence to maintain it at optimum condition. Because in the realm of international relations, where power and influence are the most valuable currency it is more prudent to be Athens than Melos. However, for as much as there is agreeability with Hopkinson, he again states that “The United States, however, has to understand that military hegemony will not solve the global problems confronting it and that independent thinking by Europeans is not a hostile act.”³⁴ The military hegemony of the U.S. is what has sustained the world from a descent into total chaos and tyranny for more than 60 years. Undeniably, independent thinking by Europeans is not hostile and ultimately welcomed. U.S. military supremacy is not only necessary, with the state of the world existing as it does, which may best be conceptualized through a realist framework, it is for the subsistence of the world. A reluctant and benevolent leader is superior to any alternative. Would China or India be an alternate state to resort to when assistance is necessary?

The position of the United States being the world’s only super power is that it possesses the capability to exercise its military projection power to promote its values; it also provides a deterrent to the forces in the world that would wish to see nothing more than a change in the status quo. Would Europe really hold the desire to see this evolve? No. Europe holds as

³⁴ Ibid.

much stake in the preeminence of American military power as the U.S. This does not suggest that Europe should play a secondary role rather than as a partner. However, it does suggest that there is a certain hierarchy in particular areas of the transatlantic relationship. The U.S. need not be concerned that the EU seeks to counter balance the U.S. While the EU is an economic powerhouse, and there may be some ill feelings shared by both parties, the U.S. and the EU maintain the similar position of the world order. Bernard Brown suggests that Europe not need become a superpower in the identical mode as the U.S. “Is Europe emerging then as a superpower willing and able to check the United States? Rather than keep readers in suspense, let me answer the question directly. No. I hasten to add that the increasing integration of Europe nonetheless is a revolutionary event and has already changed the structure of power on the world scene. It is not necessary for the EU to become a superpower to play a larger role on the world scene.”³⁵ Since procuring a viable path for the U.S. and Europe to cooperate together has proven elusive, this point is very significant. It is not necessary for Europe to equal the U.S. in terms of overall strength; or even to some extent measure up to it. For Europe to become a more equal partner in NATO and the world at large there are measurable steps that need to be considered, not a full on blitz. With the subject of this project, on defense issues, Europe would only need to accept and assume a more prominent role, not necessarily develop into the new leader as a replacement for the U.S. In Europe, defense should be increasingly Europeanized. However, that may be the only scope where a new, Europe lead should be undertaken.

A common Europe defense is not only hindered by a fractured defense industry but also by divergent policy goals. Just as with the roadblock in regard to transatlantic

³⁵ Brown, Bernard E. 2003. Europe Against America: A New Superpower Rivalry? *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 25: 311

cooperation, it is also present in inter-European relations. How will Europe overcome the transatlantic differences and shortfalls if they cannot formulate a viable solution for them at home? The short answer is that Europe will not be able to successfully complete one without the other. Brown foresees many problems ahead for the European home aspect in that it will require some time for policy and actual readiness to fall into place. “To understand why the EEU is not likely to become a power, much less a superpower, let us look more closely at the plan to create an autonomous defense force. If all goes according to plan and there are no hitches, the defense force is intended to enable the EU to wage a Kosovo-like war by 2030.³⁶ To comment that this is a serious dilemma is an understatement at best. Kosovo was nothing more than a hiccup when taken in comparison to other modern war operations such as Iraq or Afghanistan. For Europe to delay longer than twenty years to reach those forms of operational levels is completely unacceptable and exceedingly disturbing. Brown would agree with this assertion. He lays out neatly the numerous issues that demanded to be faced on the world stage. Issues that necessitate the U.S. and Europe to be in top fighting form if only to dissuade those considered opponents. “This target date is a measure of the problems ahead. Consider some of the current international issues: the dangerous turn taken by the Islamic fundamentalist movement, the truculence of the North Korean regime, continuing instability in some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, simmering discontent in the Balkans, difficulties confronting the developing countries, and the list goes on.³⁷ Considering this particular article was published five years ago and the issues mentioned remain present only highlights the seriousness of what the U.S., Europe, NATO and the EU are encountering. Taking into account that concern, 2030 is in the far distant future, and

³⁶ *Ibid.* 312.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

currently the U.S. is essentially single-handedly facing these issues and threats. Not only is this a testament to the U.S.'s defense policies, but it is also a poignant realization that the U.S. is currently solitary; but for how long? Only the U.S.'s European allies can answer that question.

The prospect that Brown has outlined is not only frightening, but also sobering. This also provides a position for the argument for the supremacy of the U.S. military. If the U.S. has to basically rely only upon itself for possibly thirty years until some noticeable European military assistance. Consequently, there should be no denying the fact that for the foreseeable future the U.S. not only on the self interest level, but to a larger obligation to the world, to not only maintain but to also advance its military power to levels in which the U.S. is capable of engaging on multiple fronts as commonplace. As seen currently with large scale military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is presently holding together a two-front war. The U.S. defense apparatus is initiating measures to ease the strain on its forces by increasing the magnitude of some of the branches of the armed forces and also pursuing new technologies that enables it for greater force multipliers. Brown cites a scenario that highlights not only what the European militaries are unable to do, but also what can possibly be a yardstick to measure when they have reached a level those militaries should have reached a decade ago. "In terms of its own stated goal, the EU unaided by the United States will not be able to meet a challenge similar to that posed by a small state like Serbia for almost three decades. Suppose that Al Qaeda had struck at European instead of American targets? The EU by itself could not have carried through a successful campaign to destroy the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, which required the overthrow of the Taliban regime."³⁸ There is no greater example of the ineffectiveness of

³⁸ Ibid.

European military power than the Serbian case. It is cited repeatedly because it is quite frankly embarrassing that states such as France, Germany and the U.K. could not readily be effective without the assistance of the United States. If Europe is to clear the roadblocks to defense cooperation, there is not a defining or more prevalent measuring device than that failure.

As is the objective of this project, the solution to this quandary must be either reshaped or devised. More than likely an entirely new approach for Europe must be fashioned. A 30 year timetable as Brown suggests is unacceptable. Currently, both the U.S. and European militaries are emerging from the Cold War posture of defensive applications and systems developed to engage in large-scale conventional battles. The U.S. is currently in the process, and has been for more than 6 years, augmenting and transforming its military to not only maintain the ability to engage in a traditional conventional war, but also to have the capability to wage in confrontation of low intensity asymmetric battles. It is a testament to the effectiveness and general product quality that many of the old systems were able to shift roles with little to moderate augmenting. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, when proper tactics are applied, the weapons systems developed during the 1980s and 1990s continue to be effective today. The current inventory of the U.S. Army is highly similar to conditions during Kosovo and also the First Gulf War to an extent. Weapons systems such as the M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley, AH-63 Apache and UH-60 Blackhawk were all developed during the Cold War to encounter the Soviet Union and have thus proven very effective in low intensity conflict. Effective sufficiently that there are no planned replacements for any of the mentioned major weapons systems, only upgrades to implement new technologies in optics, communications fire control and situational awareness.

As Brown notes, European militaries are not fairing as well. “Nor is the prospect bright for the creation even of such a limited force by the target date, or ever. European armed forces by and large are still organized for cold-war challenges, helping the Americans contain a massive thrust by the Soviet Union. They still maintain a large amount of outmoded equipment and deploy troops for static defense. To transform their armed forces into mobile units able to use advanced technology in coordination with naval and air power would require a doubling of defense expenditures.”³⁹ A doubling of defense expenditures is an enormously serious and drastic proposal; albeit a necessary one. If current France, the leading spender on defense in Europe, spent over 44 billion Euros on defense in 2007, they would have to spend around 90 billion Euros according to Brown.⁴⁰ To convert that figure into U.S. dollars in 2008, it would roughly be \$140 billion. In contrast, the U.S. on 2007, spent \$578 billion and it is increasing every year.⁴¹ In actuality, it would bring Europe’s defense expenditures in line with the U.S. However, as the CSIS report points out, not only will there need to be an enormous increase in defense spending in Europe, there will also need to be significant cooperation between the U.S. and Europe in order that the money spent is disbursed wisely on projects that will be of benefit to not only European security but also to NATO obligations. The major issue, which is a running theme in this project, is that there will likely be a lack of political will to enact such change.

The Political Will Needed for Change in Defense Policy

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*. [cited 31 July 2008]. Available from <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>.

⁴¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*. [cited 31 July 2008]. Available from <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>.

The will to conduct a major overhaul of European defense concedes down to one item, money. Clearly it is a fundamentally basic and superficial assertion, but accurate nonetheless, and provides for a suitable preliminary point to examine the aspect of the political will. Brown also notes that this is the basic problem. “A start has been made at modernization, but there is little political will to cut back on generous social welfare programs in order to pay for defense. As long as the Germans and most other Europeans believe they are relatively secure under an American military shield, they are tempted to choose a ‘free ride’.”⁴² This is painfully a situation that cannot continue. The U.S. has assumed as the very broad shield of defense for Europe for approximately 60 years. That shield was and is prepared to encounter any blow from any direction and enemy. However, Europe no longer can maintain the “free rider” status. The issue of Europe as a free rider has had several seriously damaging implications. First, it has created resentment on the part of the United States. The U.S. envisions itself as the military that has to continually assume, accept, and act not only as the shield, but the spear as well. For this part, Europe does not appear appreciative for the sacrifices made on their part, considering there is a major element of self interest in the actions of the U.S., as well. Secondly, Europe has atrophied in the defense arena. In view of the fact that there was no direct and urgent need, the European militaries languished in complacency. One only need examine a picture of an American soldier or Marine and compare it to one of a European soldier of any European state. The differences are strikingly obvious. While the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism the United States began to rapidly implement many advanced systems and items throughout its armed forces. The Army and Marines have experienced the brunt of the fighting (not to mention

⁴² Brown, Bernard E. 2003. Europe Against America: A New Superpower Rivalry? *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 25: 312.

the various Special Operations forces from various coalition countries) and have both seen an incredibly noticeable transition from legacy equipment, continually highly capable, to cutting edge items.

In the last several years, the soldiers of the U.S. Army have been assigned redesigned combat uniforms, new body armor, improved weapons and weapons accessories. The Marines have also seen these upgrades for their personal equipment. While this may appear to be semi-trivial, it is very indicative to the mindset of the defense policy in the U.S. compared that of Europe. Those familiar with defense acquisitions acknowledges that it may be a very slow process. However, since the need for redesigned and updated equipment was of paramount necessity for the U.S. given the current combat operations it is engaged in. While most of the attention is given to the extensive budget and “exciting” systems such as jet fighters and naval warships, in conflicts large and small, conventional or asymmetrical, the equipment of the actual war-fighter is an appropriate barometer for how advanced and capable a military is. Given the fact that training and the determination to win has no replacement, every advantage given the war-fighter has increased the chances of achievement of the battle objectives. This is such an overlooked aspect that it is given minimal attention and importance in the mainstream. However, it is because all these seemingly subtle advantages that the U.S. military on the ground is overwhelmingly superior to friend and foe alike.

Taking into account that this aspect minimally mentioned because it does not attract headlines, it should be discussed and addressed when examining how Europe can possibly close the military capability gap. As this facet is less costly than air power advancements, for example, it is an easily accessible area. European militaries can easily take a glance at the

American model of what a modern war-fighter is and needs to formulate a clear roadmap to advancement in this particular phase. Since it has been established that the political will is not committed in this area, low cost yet very effective measures such as this could be an attractive originating point that may see results very quickly. The roadmap would then indicate that European militaries should initiate it, but modestly economically speaking. This would most likely be acceptable to the tax-payers and the governments alike. To place this in perspective, Europe has independently developed the Eurofighter Typhoon; with each unit costing over \$120 million⁴³, it operates at the same price level of the more advanced F-22 of the U.S. Air Force. While there is a need for this system for European air forces, given the current attitude in Europe on defense, it can be conjectured with a large degree of certainty that there will be more friction if more spending is called for. Consequently, this is completely at the mercy of European governments. As one of the roadblocks, defense and foreign policy compatibility requires the political will and dedication to alter the current status quo of European military capability. How can this political will be changed? Or can it ever be changed?

The short answer is that not only can the political will to act on defense be changed; it must be changed for the sake of the transatlantic alliance. As Brown's timetable of 30 years is a daunting span of time, it may require half that time for the will to transform so that the defense capability can improve. Although it is beyond the scope of this project, European governments must consider a shift and adjustment in government funds from social programs to defense spending. It is not necessary to be a prohibitive amount, but adequately enough to spur on further spending. Brown's suggestion of a doubling of spending while necessary cannot be

⁴³ Flug Revue. Eurofighter *Typhoon: Production of Tranche 2 is under way*. [updated June 2008. cited 31 July 2008.] Available from <http://www.flugrevue.de/index.php?id=2835>.

take to action in the initially. A deliberate and gradual increase over a span of many years would be prudent. It is actually fortunate that European militaries are somewhat compact. Because the European militaries are undersized, it will be less expensive and expedient to outfit each unit with the appropriate and modern equipment that will be needed. And as budgets grow, the model provided in the initiation may serve as a template for future acquisitions. However, even with a superior framework to follow, there remains no incentive other than NATO obligations to shore-up the military capability gap. The preservation of the transatlantic alliance should be more than sufficient to bring on any action; however, it is unlikely given the track record since the end of the Cold War with European militaries. Without a clearly defined threat or enemy Europe is less likely to follow the lead of the United States and initiate a buildup of its military capability. Given the fact that as the world has changed, as it always does during times of shifting of power, the end of the Cold War, the nature of threats currently has become elusive not only to identify but to understand their categorization. Because of these difficulties, it will be exceedingly challenging for European governments and their leaders to determine justifications in this area for expanding, updating and strengthening their militaries.

The Changing Nature of Military Threats

In reality, there are numerous threats that are facing the Western world. Europe is also currently combating alongside the U.S. and recognizing these challenges. However, since these numerous threats are not of the classic type, they take on a new meaning to those that face them. That meaning is also dissimilar from alliance member to alliance member. To the United States, it is war. To Europe it may be seen as something entirely different. Europe has dealt with

terrorism for an extended period of time. From the U.K. battling the IRA to the French dealing with Algerian extremists, Europe has witnessed this threat before. That is not to say the U.S. has not. However, for both parties, what is being seen in Afghanistan is not a law enforcement battle, but an actual war. To wage a war today, technologically advanced and well informed militaries are required to combat this threat, not law enforcement agencies that have been deployed in the past. While still valuable, the principal in this new battle needs to be taken by the military. It may be difficult also for Europeans to justify acting in Afghanistan other than that it is a NATO obligation. Europe was not attacked in what precipitated the war in Afghanistan, and through that, a concentrated effort by the U.S. military to not only improve its existing capabilities, but also to be flexible and effective in switching from conventional to unconventional roles. It is no revelation that the U.S. military before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was unquestionably the most commanding military the world has ever seen, but it lacked certain skill sets. Those skill sets were that of asymmetric war. This assertion applies only to the military as a whole. There are various Special Operations units within the U.S. military that are specifically trained in unconventional warfare and have been operating with that as a prime capability since the 1960s. However, those units only comprise a minimal percentage of the U.S. military's combat forces. The bulk of the combat units continue to maintain conventional war as the standard. This has been modified since 2001, and the U.S. has become increasingly effective and successful in facing asymmetric threats. This new focus has prompted a rewriting of the rule book per se as an entirely updated Counter-Insurgency manual and implemented within the U.S. military in the last year. The commencement of changing the mindset in Europe would be to begin with Europe

accepting the reality that there is an ongoing threat to not only themselves, but the world as a whole.

As part of the equation in the government-led side of the roadblocks, recognizing the threat will be necessary if further steps are to be taken. This will be particularly one of the most challenging aspects of changing policy given the fact that it will be problematical for most European states to concur if there is a direct threat let alone how to deal with it. However, once again there are lessons that may be learned from history. In this situation, the lessons may derive from the European-sided debacle during the war in the Balkans. There is no clearer case of where the Europeans went amiss and the ineffectiveness of their militaries caused not only the U.S. to assume the effort to bring an end to the violence but also solidifying the U.S. as the only state that possessed the capability to properly direct a European military effort. "The determining factor was Europe's inability to handle the Balkan Crisis on its own. The Europeans unhesitatingly took on the task of dealing with the Yugoslav problem at the outset. Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg foreign minister who spoke for Europe during the Luxembourg presidency, proudly asserted in a phrase that will enter the annals of world diplomacy 'c'est l'heure des europeens' ...But Europe could not get its political act together."⁴⁴ It was the ideal opportunity for leading European states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom to assume the lead in dealing with a conflict within the boundaries of Europe that would have proven that Europe and the EU would be capable of dealing with military threats. This would not be the case, however. Rather than it being the hour of Europe, it would be a moment of failure.

⁴⁴ Brown, Bernard E. 2001. Europe's Rise-NATO's Demise? *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 23: 286

To add insult to injury, the U.S. stepped in and brokered a peace that the Europeans were unable to do. “It was humiliating that the United Kingdom and France, which had suffered casualties on the ground in Bosnia, stood by helplessly while the diplomacy of a strictly European problem was worked out by an American negotiator in the American heartland with nary a medieval castle or cathedral in sight. Holbrooke exulted that America was the ‘indispensable country’ in view of the European’s inability on their own to agree on goals and take forceful initiatives.”⁴⁵ Considering that the main thrust of the American policy viewpoint of this project is satisfied in this instance in history, it is unfortunate that Europe could not be the participant sharing the success from that occurrence. It would have accomplished a great deal not only politically for Europe on a whole and for their militaries and it would have been an indispensable victory and morale booster. With the failure of European response to the war in the Balkans, one of the pillars of the European Union can find its roots in that failure. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is an attempt for those policies to be created and acted upon in a more efficient and effect way as compared to prior endeavors. Since that time, the EU has moved with urgency to enact measures to create a European military policy that has the ability to respond to such events. Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union, a common defense and foreign policy apparatus has been implemented from the beginning.

European Consensus and its Place in Transatlantic Cooperation

⁴⁵ Ibid. 287.

The Saint-Malo summit would possibly be the beginning of true progress of European defense policy since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. At this summit, the United Kingdom and France came to an agreement on what would be required of independent European defense. The key component to not only European defense, but also the transatlantic relationship has been the United Kingdom. Not only is it a stalwart military power, it also is the bridge between the U.S. and the remainder of Europe based on the close friendship of the U.S. and the U.K. As Brown states “In 1998, the British government, after completing a strategic defense review, decided to reorganize its forces to achieve greater mobility and power projection and to make a contribution to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Blair had decided to play a more active role in Europe. Inasmuch as public opinion was not ready to permit the United Kingdom to enter the common currency zone, defense was a strong card enabling him to lead in Europe.”⁴⁶ The United Kingdom has developed into the cornerstone to European defense and the transatlantic alliance, a cornerstone that if removed could have disastrous effects. Not only has the Saint-Malo summit given hope to European defense policy, it also could signify positive effects for NATO. This was the component of the motives of the British that “a European policy must be carried out in a way that would strengthen, not weaken, NATO.”⁴⁷ The future of European defense and NATO are not mutually exclusive. More autonomous or completely autonomous European defense can still transpire with NATO as an imperative aspect of European and North American defense. There is no basis that the transatlantic alliance should impede EU led or supplemented European defense policy.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

The most prominent and noteworthy element of that summit was the declaration that “To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”⁴⁸ This one statement is perhaps the most significant statement made by Europeans with reference to European defense since the formation of the EU and the progression toward European unity. The lesson of the Balkans also stretched the end of the 1990s at which time the U.S. through NATO led the air war against Serbia. Brown notes that “Prime Minister Blair was shocked to learn that the United Kingdom could only muster a small force for the Kosovo war and that the gap between U.S. military technology and that of Europeans was immense. Even though the American supreme command delivered a victory, the Europeans were determined never again to be in a position of such manifest inferiority.”⁴⁹ This line of progression during the 1990s was promising. A major security issue had shaken the Europeans into action. Through this lens, the failure of European military response may be measured as a necessary failure in order to spur Europe into action to correct the problem. This would culminate in the European Council meeting in Helsinki, Finland in 1999. At this meeting, goals for European defense capabilities were set. The current goal is set for 60,000 combat troops to be deployed for minimally a year, along with much of the supporting units from air to sea power. This goal may appear to be somewhat a modest one, however, an attainable one, nonetheless. However, with a refocused drive to independent defense, the inclusion of the United States has not been forsaken as the U.S. continues to be perceived as an invaluable military partner that can continually participate in European defense.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid 288.

The U.S. has undertaken the mission of European defense for an extensive span of time and it would be shortsighted to dismiss the U.S. A more feasible option would to consider a compromise that would grant U.S. inclusion while position Europeans at the forefront. Brown notes that “Even though the United Kingdom has been leading the charge toward autonomous defense, it has affirmed at every step of the way that the goal is to relieve the United States of an unfair burden, increase the European contribution to the common cause, and thereby strengthen the alliance. Blair has insisted that nothing be done within the EU to cause the United States to withdraw from the alliance.”⁵⁰ A stalwart and more independent, or fully independent EU defense apparatus does not imply that the U.S. need be sidestepped. Not only will there be a need for a strong relationship between the U.S. and Europe for proper defense and defense industry cooperation, it will also be absolutely imperative for the continuation of the transatlantic alliance. With the gathered experience over many years, NATO and its preservation will be a consideration in any European defense policy discussion.

It would then appear there is the political will, to some extent, to modify and implement the lessons learned from the Balkans. The Helsinki Headline goal was the beginning in which there was a stated objective for European defense policy and capability. Although nothing more than a rapid reaction force, it is a truly positive step in the right direction that Europe has no choice but to take. From Helsinki has developed the Berlin-Plus Agreement in which European militaries may use NATO assets; among other agreements between the EU and NATO. The will and commitment derives from a desire of independence and not relying on or having the U.S. either involved or more likely in command of military operations involving

⁵⁰ Ibid. 289.

European militaries. For example, Brown states that “the French have long sought to retain an American commitment to European defense on European rather than American terms. General de Gaulle’s explanation of French policy, when he ousted NATO headquarters and American bases from France in 1966, has remained a central tenet of French diplomacy. ‘My design,’ said de Gaulle in his memoirs, ‘consists then in disengaging France not from the Atlantic Alliance, which I intend to maintain as an ultimate safeguard, but from the integration realized through NATO under American command.’”⁵¹ There’s been questioning of American leadership in Europe, and while Europe may want and need the safeguard of American military protection, Europe desires to assume the lead in its own defense. This appears nothing but a logical conclusion on the debate on whether or not Europe possesses the will and commitment to defend itself with all the responsibility that entails. However, the defense of Europe must logically be on European terms and not American. While it appears to be a sensible idea, are the Europeans prepared for not only self-defense, but military operations outside of Europe without American assistance? The Helsinki goals and the Berlin-Plus agreement are the genesis of what is the long road to that realization, if by the time it is achieved will the Europeans continue to accept that responsibility and the cost it asks?

⁵¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR-THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN MILITARIES

European Defense Structures: Progress or Stagnation?

Since the 1999 Helsinki Headline goals were established there has been measurable progress in the creation of policies and structures to facilitate the growth of a European military and the advancement of each members militaries. Not only has there been agencies such as the European Defense Agency established, there have been a number of joint European defense projects as well as more transatlantic cooperation. Such examples as previously mentioned are the Joint Strike Fighter, the Stryker IFV and various small arms systems. The European Defense Agency has stated as its goal that “The Long-Term Vision report published by the European Defense Agency in October 2006 is designed to serve as a compass for defense planners as they develop the military capabilities the European Security and Defense Policy will require over the next twenty years in an increasingly challenging environment.”⁵² This statement alone offers much hope that the will and understanding needed for European defense is being addressed by Europeans in the proper and in an expedient manner. The Initial Long-Term Vision Report compiled by the European Defense Agency has laid out the challenges that face Europe and, surprisingly when viewed from the outside, has addressed the issues thoroughly and analytically. Firstly, it is interesting to note that within the Report, NATO

⁵² Long Term Vision. European Defense Agency. [updated 3 May, 2007. Cited 5 August, 2008.] Available from <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146>.

is only mentioned a handful of times. Therefore, before fully delving into the report it must be noted that whenever examining the military capability, consideration for NATO in any European defense structure must be at the forefront. Despite the comprehensive framework within the Report, consideration for NATO must be a major component of the framework without question. The transatlantic alliance is likely to face more internal challenges in the near future, just as it did with Iraq, while the danger of a total breakdown is possible. Goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic is necessary in order for the relationships to remain positive and accommodating to all alliance members. Europe must understand that the U.S. respects the advice and counsel of its European allies. Also, it must be understood that the U.S. must have the assurance that European militaries are continually prepared and improving to aid in the responsibility they both share to the world.

It is more realistic to recognize the position of the United States in that for many decades the U.S. has compensated for and provided for military protection of Europe; not to mention the Marshall Plan. Is it unreasonable for the U.S. to acknowledge that Europe needs to be readily, equipped to not only to defend itself while the U.S. is engaged in conflicts around the world, but to also assist more comprehensively than they have in those conflicts? The counter argument is that those conflicts are of American design and Europe has no obligation to participate. Why should European soldiers be placed in harm's way or money spent on an American conflict? While it appears to be somewhat off topic initially, these questions and issues relate directly as to why there must be cooperation in the defense area between the U.S. and Europe. If there can exist honest cooperation, ties will certainly strengthen and questions such as these will not appear as critical. They shall most likely fade because there will be more common

goals and interests the closer the U.S. and Europe become in the defense community. However, as always, there are thought-provoking challenges. With the EDA extending reassuring statements and goals, the U.S. continues to acknowledge core problems. Brown's article was written before the EDA put out its Long-Term Vision, but his words still ring true in the U.S. "The American position, as put forward by diplomats and officials, addressed wholly different concerns. First, they pointed out that, despite the stated intention of the EU to create an autonomous defense force, there was little evidence that Europeans were increasing their military budgets in order to modernize their forces and assume responsibility for collective defense."⁵³ According to the EDA, from 2005 to 2006, the total defense expenditure of Europe increased from 193 billion Euros to 201 billion Euros. In comparison, the U.S. increased from 406 billion Euros to 491 billion Euros.⁵⁴⁵⁵ From these basic numbers alone, it is crystal clear that Europe is seriously and dangerously lagging in defense spending even when there have been clear and encouraging talks emerging from the European Defense Agency.

An unintended consequence of this troubling trend is the direction that the U.S. has moved in arms research and procurement. The current doctrine of the U.S. military has been a rapid modernization of the all armed forces. This modernization implies moving away from Cold War military to a dynamic and rapidly deployable force able to undertake the full spectrum of modern warfare. From the U.S. Army's 2007 transformation report, it is apparent that the U.S. military has advanced considerably in a few short years and has taken the lessons learned and applied them to future considerations. "Even as the Army continues to fight the current battle, it

⁵³ Brown, Bernard E. 2001. Europe's Rise-NATO's Demise? *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 23: 294.

⁵⁴ European-United States Defense Expenditure. *European Defense Agency*. [updated 19 December, 2006. cited on 11 August, 2008.] Available from <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Facts&id=178>.

⁵⁵ European-United States Defense Expenditure. *European Defense Agency*. [updated 21 December, 2007. cited on 11 August, 2008.] Available from <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Facts&id=310>.

must transform and modernize the force, creating the strategic depth and breadth for readiness, both now and in the future. Iraq has proven to be a non-linear battlefield, where distinctions between combatant and noncombatant have blurred as have those between combat and stability operations, rather than sequential operations, will likely be the rule. Being ready to succeed in this environment requires Soldiers and leaders who are capable of using all resources at their disposal. They must be able to use the best and latest equipment available; employing all capabilities available in a Joint and combined environment.”⁵⁶ With the lessons learned in the current conflicts, the U.S. military has acknowledged that constant modernization and research and development in the next generation military tools and weapons are imperative to meet the challenges that current and future conflicts will present. While European military transformation and modernization goals may be similar, the funding necessary for a successful process is much greater than what the European states are currently budgeting. The EU as a whole has many more soldiers, tanks, and combat aircraft than the U.S. However, their spending is less than half of that of the U.S. There cannot be a clearer implication of misplaced priorities than that example. Consequently, there can be no other conclusion that based on military budgets alone, European militaries are not as advanced or as well equipped as the U.S. military.

As part of the EDA’s Long-Term Vision, one of the leading points, just as is for the U.S., is the rapid acquisition of new technologies and increasing exploration of technology.⁵⁷ If there is anything that Europe can learn from the U.S. is that acquiring new and advanced military technology is expensive and time consuming. A good example of what Europe would have to accomplish would be to follow through on that key point and develop an aircraft similar

⁵⁶ 2007 Army Modernization Plan. U.S. Army. 1.

⁵⁷ Long Term Vision Report. European Defense Agency. 3.

to the American F-22. While many European states are purchasing superior and modern aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the French-built Rafale, they do not compare to the huge technological advantage the F-22 has over all other current combat aircraft. The F-22's main advantage is stealth. That technology is expensive to acquire and maintain. However, the benefits of that technology on the battlefield are invaluable. Not only will the F-22 be able to attack other aircraft before it can be seen by its targets, it can also penetrate enemy air defenses to conduct interdiction missions. Luckily, many European states will be purchasing the F-35 which has fine stealth capabilities. While this is an excellent starting point, the fact that aircraft such as the Eurofighter exist and were developed during the same time as the F-22 demonstrates the priorities of the European militaries which are not in the appropriate position just yet. While Europe may never match the U.S. in military technology, it may come close by utilizing U.S. defense development and doctrine as a guide. Yet while comparing the EDA's Long-Term Vision Report to either the 2004 or 2007 Army Transformation reports, it is perfectly clear that the EDA has a strong grasp on what needs to be done. They are quite similar in that both the "Future Force" key points are almost the equivalent. Not only is this encouraging for Europe, but it is also encouraging for the U.S. in that there is a good possibility of greater force compatibility for future operations.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the EDA's Long-Term Vision Report is a statement in the introduction on the effect of globalization on military action. This would be a thoughtful place to begin the analysis of the report as it allows for the consideration of external non-military actors and influences. "For example, a key hypothesis in what follows is that the phenomenon known as globalization will continue. It is easy to think of scenarios which might

invalidate this hypothesis: an uncontrolled pandemic; massive use of weapons of mass destruction; or perhaps regionalization of the world's economic system, with competition for inadequate resources leading to the emergence of mutually suspicious regional blocks. But, so many stand to gain so much from the continuation of the globalization process that it seems a reasonable assumption to make, at least for now, about the world in which the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will operate."⁵⁸ It is accurate that the world is becoming ever-more interdependent and all out global wars such as World War II are unlikely to occur again; however, regional wars are taking place right now and will be likely to continue. Such wars have taken, and are taking place in areas of the world not easily accessible to the U.S. or even Europe to a certain degree. These wars require a highly mobile force that can be sustained for long periods of time in harsh environments. It would then seem that the initial vision would be correct; to assert that expeditionary forces would be the logical progress while moving from a Cold War, defensive oriented military force. This is exactly what both the EDA and the U.S. military call for and have been working towards. With the U.S. already well on its way into this transformation, Europe (the EDA) can learn much from the trials and tribulations of the American military transformation. The only differing aspect of this item is the differences in world-views between the U.S. and Europe. This could cause some disagreement on what is needed militarily.⁵⁹

What Will European Militaries be Capable of?

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 4.

⁵⁹ Ellner, Andrea. 2005. The European Security Strategy: Multilateral Security with Teeth? *Defense and Security Analysis* 21 (3): 227.

With the stated goals of the European Defense Agency, the militaries of the European Union's members, and in turn most of NATO, should be much more capable of not only autonomous defense but also the ability to operate without U.S. assistance. Although allied assistance is always welcomed, the actual capability even if dormant will be a very positive aspect of this probable transition. The EDA asks this very question of itself; "What do the changes in the economic, social and military world around us-and those at home-mean for the future of ESDP operations in, say, 2025?"⁶⁰ While the date of 2025 is still troubling, the answer to this question is that the EU military capability should at least resemble what the U.S. military is currently at the very least. However, this time-table could be much closer if Europe were to conduct close and intensive cooperation with the U.S. The U.S. military is currently conducting operations in many parts of the world in an expeditionary manner and has for the last seven years. If that is the goal of the EDA, to have European militaries able to conduct such operations, there is no better answer than to permit the U.S. to assist in cultivating European military capability further than it has, until Europe can support its defense structure own its own. As the EDA states, "The typical ESDP crisis management operation will be expeditionary, multi-national and multi-instrument. The EU has recognized the need to be a global security actor. For such purpose it envisages a capability to project forces over strategic distances and to austere areas of operation."⁶¹ This statement is a very clear and profound goal of the EU. While this will assist NATO and the EU alike in reaching this goal, it is an incredibly difficult one to achieve. Becoming a "security actor" that can operate worldwide is something that only one state is able to lay claim to: the United States. Even NATO is primarily dependent on the U.S. for its ability

⁶⁰ Ibid. 13.

⁶¹ Ibid.

to act in such places such as Afghanistan. However, as seen in the Balkans during the 1990s, European militaries were unable to conduct expeditionary style operations within their own sphere of influence. If NATO's missions will look very similar to the Balkans, as it has been argued, then a clear goal can be constructed from this argument.⁶²

The undertaking of providing for power projection to areas such as Central Asia will necessitate defense spending of enormous proportions. Not only will there be the need of the weapon systems and transportation ability, there will also be a need for the sustainability of such forces. Sustainability is one of the key aspects of the reform of the EU's military capability. However, to actually achieve such a goal will require more assistance than the EDA has admitted to. While the bluntness of the goals of the EDA is a hopeful sign for the future, the resources for such goals might not be available for Europe to attain these goals. Putting that concern aside for the time being, the path that the EDA outlines is sound even given the obvious obstacles. Perhaps the saving grace of the EDA's plan is that Europe is prosperous. With a combined economy as strong or stronger than that of the U.S., Europe would be able to afford such change. The changes that will be expensive endeavors are labeled as "the guiding lights" of the development of European military capabilities. Such expenditures would be able to be predicated if one looks to the U.S.'s adventures in military reform.

The "guiding lights" come in four varieties; synergy, agility, selectivity and sustainability. Synergy calls for joint/combined forces that can work efficiently and effective together; which includes land, sea and air power. The implication of technologically advanced systems will require a large amount of investment. This investment will be necessary considering

⁶² Gabor, Francis A. 2004. Reflections on NATO's New Mission: Conflict Prevention in the Struggles for Ethnic Self-Determination. *Review of Central and East European Law* 29 (2): 255.

the changing face of combined arms warfare. The EDA notes these changes, which the U.S. has pioneered. “The traditional combined-arms warfare can be broadly considered as the employment of complementary weapon systems to achieve a synergistic effect. Its most important consequence is to bring about dominance over an opponent at critical time and critical space. The components of combined-arms warfare have already changed from the traditional infantry, armor, and artillery mix to other force elements such as combat UAVs, precision weapons and perhaps more significantly, an ever-increasing array of sophisticated sensors and command and control systems.”⁶³ This modernization is the correct path and the EDA has defined it very well. The synergy is just one aspect of proper planning on the part of the EU. This can only benefit NATO and will allow for more effective contributions to NATO operations by the European members. Not only should the goals of the EDA benefit the EU, but also NATO; just as U.S. military capabilities benefit the U.S. and NATO interests.

Returning to the problem of the will and mindset of the EU, if Europe hopes to have more of a say and role in its defense, it will need to take the steps outlined by the EDA. Julian Lindley-French, although highly biased against the U.S., and not much more complementary on Europe, has one aspect of this problem right: “A change of this nature will require a significant change in mind-set on the part of Europeans. For too long the EU (and most of its member states) has been more interested in the institutional/political structures of defense (that is, a product-led approach) and by and large has ignored the threats (that is, a market-led approach) that have been steadily increasing in the world beyond the regional organization”.⁶⁴ What makes this statement even more riveting is that this article was published in 2002. Now, six

⁶³ Long Term Vision Report. European Defense Agency. 16.

⁶⁴ French-Lindley, Julian. 2002. Can Europe Defend itself? *American Foreign Policy Interests*. 24: 216.

years later, the situation is the same despite forward and clear thinking by the EDA on what needs to be done. The inaction of Europe's leading states in NATO and the ESDP to develop the military capacity and capability to be an effective security actor has caused rifts in the transatlantic alliance and resentment on the part of the U.S. The question then becomes: how can the European Defense Agency spur-on the concepts and proposals they have developed become reality?

Before the publication of the EDA's Long-Term Vision Report, the various militaries of Europe possessed commendable strength; but that strength was mainly confined in either special operations forces or defensive warfare. A very important point to remember when comparing European military capability is to remember that the comparison is with the United States. Stale Ulriksen has made this point to highlight the fact that European militaries would appear to be less capable. However, that does not mean they are not capable. Ulriksen states that "The explanation for this perceived weakness is of course that European military capabilities are constantly compared to those of the United States. Moreover, most of these comparisons have focused exclusively on the capabilities for waging battles and waging war the American way."⁶⁵ While it might seem an unfair comparison, in reality it is not. European militaries need at least a measurable amount of parity with the U.S. if they wish to have a larger role in NATO; not to mention more independent self-defense. Action will need to be expedited; unlike the slow progress of recent years.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ulriksen, Stale. 2004. Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures. *International Peacekeeping*. 11: 457.

⁶⁶ Cornish, Paul and G. Edwards. 2005. The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report *International Affairs* 4: 806.

In hindsight, the article by Ulriksen has many errors in comparison. However, his main idea and concept are on the right path. While European militaries are nothing to take lightly, to say that they equal the U.S. military in any other way than size is not correct. This mindset, if prevalent, is not only incorrect but can be very undermining to transatlantic cooperation. In full disclosure, the particular article was published in 2004. This fact must remain in constant consideration because much has changed in the U.S. military since then. In contrast, movement on the EDA's vision has not in perceivable terms; mainly noticeable by the defense budget of Europe on a whole in the last few years. Ulriksen gives more credit than is due to the capability of European militaries; which is evident in the very first paragraph on his article. Ulriksen asserts that "In fact, except for the United States, no state or alliance can match EU member states' capabilities for military power projection. For instance, outside the US Navy, there are just 12 aircraft carriers in the world in service or being built. Eight of those ships belong to EU member states."⁶⁷ While that number is impressive relative to the rest of the world, it is a misleading fact. While EU member might have eight aircraft carries total, with possibly more on the way, there is no denying the facts that those carriers are not in the same category of the U.S. carriers. There is a reason they are called super-carriers. The U.S. carriers on average are two to four times the size of their European counterparts, while carrying two to three times the number of aircraft. European carriers should be compared to the Amphibious Assault Ships of the U.S. as they are more comparable. The U.S. Navy operates eleven of these ships with a new class being built. While the EU members operate carriers with the ability of power projection, that power is of somewhat modest strength. This assertion is a prime example of the

⁶⁷ Ulriksen, Stale. 2004. Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures. *International Peacekeeping*. 11: 457.

mind-set that needs to be changed for Europe to truly achieve the goal it has set for itself in defense capability.

If one of the primary tenants of the EDA's Long-Term Vision is to achieve an effective expeditionary capability, which is a capability of the U.S. military, then such over-estimation of abilities must be realized. Numbers can only count for only so much. The focus should be not only expanding numbers to acceptable levels, but enabling those forces to conduct missions for which the goal has been stated. That process will require a change in budgetary policy to allow for more funds to advance the technological envelope. Ulriksen criticizes the U.S. with what he calls "an idealized American way of war."⁶⁸ He states that this "way of war" has been a failure and because of that perceived failure Europe should not follow the lead of the U.S. in defense. However, Ulriksen should have not only taken more factors into account, such as the history of war in Afghanistan, but that doctrine and tactics, not reliance on technology and lack of numbers that gave U.S. forces less than what they needed to achieve their objectives. His article was perhaps premature. The U.S. military has been in the midst of change since the beginning of this decade. It would be unfair and unwise to critique an ongoing process which is building exactly the force he slams the U.S. for not having.

The EDA's Long-Term Vision Report, the Army Transformation Report of 2004 and the Army Modernization Report of 2007 have all stated similar goals and the methods to achieve them. Ulriksen criticizes the old Cold War military; and rightly so. Unfortunately, he does not include the plans that the U.S. military has enacted. What he does mention is the Rumsfeld Doctrine and why it was a failure. However, Ulriksen asserts what the EU should do,

⁶⁸ Ibid. 467.

which not only did the EDA echo two years later, but the U.S. Army stated at the same time as Ulriksen; not to mention the desire by Rumsfeld to change forces before that as seen in the cancelling of the Crusader and Comanche programs. Ulriksen also makes the point that European forces are highly capable in the field of peacekeeping and stability operations. While that may be, so is the U.S. military. Even with major problems with adjusting the military of the United States to a post Cold War military, the U.S. has proven that it can conduct such operations that Ulriksen praises the European for just as well or better than their European cousins. The ability to not only dominate on the area of warfare, conventional war, but the ability to adjust to new challenges has been made possible by the resources available to the U.S. military. If European militaries were given more funds and resources, then according to Ulriksen their already excellent peacekeeping abilities will only be enhanced. This will not only benefit Europe, but NATO as well.

The betterment of NATO will mean shared benefits for all member states. Even Ulriksen concludes that European centric improvements will be best used if integrated within NATO. He states that “The European Union may have 30 member states by the year 2010. The integration and standardization of forces from such a large number of states will represent a substantial challenge. The best solution for Europe to integrate these forces may be to use the experience and mechanisms of NATO.”⁶⁹ i.e. the U.S. military. It would make the transitions much easier on European militaries if they have a proven framework to follow. Of course, there are no perfect or complete solutions to shore up the transatlantic military capability gap. There will be, however, tried and tested doctrines and weapons systems that can provide European

⁶⁹ Ibid. 471.

governments and European defense contractors a very advantageous starting point. European defense can be independent; however, it cannot be totally divorced from the U.S. military and NATO. Likewise, while the U.S. military can, will and sometimes rightfully be able to act unilaterally, it would benefit the U.S. to have its NATO allies standing by its side. There is no reason, when there is cause for it, which Europe and the U.S. through NATO need to stand alone.

Interestingly, the argument of this project that the key to igniting effective transatlantic defense cooperation is the United Kingdom; according to Ulriksen, the U.K. is the key to EU defense consolidation and effectiveness. He remarks that “The bilateral cooperation between France and Britain is the main engine driving the ESDP. If these two countries succeed in establishing a European response force ‘able and willing’ to respond to request from the UN in acute crises, that will mean that the EU has taken an important first step towards operationalizing the ESS and giving purpose to European military power.”⁷⁰ The U.S. and the U.K. will need to continue their already close defense cooperation despite disagreements on policy. There is too much to gain to allow issues that can be worked on by both parties to spoil the potential for great cooperation that can also extend, hopefully, to the rest of Europe through NATO. There will also be hope for greater cooperation overall if current defense projects that have been developed jointly prove to be worthwhile and effective in its stated goals (The Joint Strike Fighter being the most obvious current major transatlantic defense project).

The importance of capability Interoperability

⁷⁰ Ibid.

With the increase of capability when speaking of European militaries, it will be essential that the ability for diverse and complex systems, doctrines and policies to succeed together in challenging environments and missions. NATO-EU and internal EU considerations are interrelated and will play an important role as the EU gains more influence in the defense arena.⁷¹ Antonio Missiroli speaks directly to this concern. While he would not agree that Europe should follow a U.S. defense model, he does agree with the fact that Europe cannot match the U.S. in military power due to various conditions. However, just as explained earlier, there is a defense capability status that Europe can achieve. Missiroli states that “However, the proper standard for European defense is not that of the USA: after all, there is not going to be a war between allies across the Atlantic and, while the surge in US military technology creates problems of interoperability, the two sides still need to work together and to develop complementary, rather than parallel, force structures.”⁷² This particular excerpt reveals a certain roadblock in terms of desired goals for both the U.S. and Europe in terms of what is required and what is realistically attainable. While the U.S. and European defensive capabilities should be complementary, they also need to be independent at the same time. That is why utilizing the existing force structure of NATO will be a key point in European defense. NATO will be more significant in this respect as it can provide the coordination for not only Europe, until an EU structure for force management and control is in place, but also coordination between the U.S. and European militaries. NATO has been in existence for approximately 60 years with the explicit duty to provide command and control for transatlantic defense cooperation.

⁷¹ Diedrichs, Udo. 2005. The Development of the European Security and Defense Policy and its implications for NATO: Cooperation and Competition. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3 (1): 56.

⁷² Missiroli, Antonio. 2003. Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for European Defense. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 5.

However, since there will be, at some point, a NATO/U.S. independent, European military, there will be a need for Europe to develop its defense forces with that in mind; although there is the possibility that could be overly redundant.⁷³ That independence will require separate structures and systems. However that does not imply that they will not be able to complement NATO or the U.S. In short, those future structures will not be redundant. If the EDA's goals are to be met, there must be those structures. Europe will be fortunate in the sense there is at present a very efficient and effective force transformation framework. This framework will compliment their goals of providing a technologically advanced expeditionary military capable of operating independently and capable of sustaining such operations. However, there will be overlapping capabilities. This will possibly be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. The EU consists of independent states and because this is not a complete union, similar to the U.S., each state will possess their own fully functional militaries. Missiroli called these overlaps 'inevitable duplications'; he states that "the EU Member States' forces cannot be considered (nor counted or treated as) a single unit, like the American ones. There certainly are unnecessary duplications of capabilities vis-à-vis the USA (especially as far as strategic assets are concerned)."⁷⁴ While this may be perceived as a roadblock, it is an immovable one. There will need to be a workaround for this issue that can allow for the consequences of redundancy to be mitigated. One possible solution would be to follow the U.S. model of transformation, which can streamline a military force. Therefore, pursuing a European military as a single unit should then be considered a moot point. Each European state will have a fully functioning military; this will not change and should

⁷³ Chivvis, Christopher S. 2005. ESDP and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Political and Geopolitical Considerations. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3 (1): 24.

⁷⁴ Missiroli, Antonio. 2003. Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for European Defense. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 10.

not impede European military operations or modernization/transformation to increase its capability.

Perhaps the most daunting task in terms of policy will not be interstate or transatlantic tensions; but the budgetary policies of European states. These “sociological/societal constraints”, as stated by Missiroli, present the largest challenge for actual change in defense policy. Funds for defense spending will have to battle welfare and social programs for the funds needed to enact an effective defense systems and policy. There are several factors to this struggle according to Missiroli. He states that “the sociological/societal constraints that derive in part from demography (aging societies) and in part from established welfare entitlements. Overhauling public expenditure and diverting resources, say, from pensions to defense is a daunting task for political leaders: it takes time and does not bring electoral dividends.”⁷⁵ While there is nothing inherently incorrect, policy wise, with having such programs, it does create a political environment where changing such policy will possibly bring horrible political blowback. While this roadblock is fixable, it would be one roadblock that would take an entire shift in government policy and funding across the entire spectrum of government programs. This will be even more difficult given the accepted fact, as stated earlier, that there is no current classical threat to Europe. However, because classical threats are rarer, and are changing in nature, the threats of today should not be dismissed because they do not resemble the threats of yesterday. Nonetheless, NATO will remain essential to European defense, even if Europe can

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

defend itself independently because of the very examples noted by Missiroli and the argument that Europeans might want it "both ways".⁷⁶

The Funding of European Defense

The process of funding an advanced military may be highly complex and inefficient. Throwing monies and funding at the defense departments/ministries will not be a smart plan of action for any state, European or not. There will need to be a clear and concise plan of action, with clearly stated goals as what must be accomplished. Luckily Europe has such goals, at least when looking at the goals stated by the European Defense Agency. Without clear and attainable goals such new spending may be wasted on obsolete projects; such was the case with the Crusader artillery system. Another possible avenue for improved defense policy in terms of spending would not only be increasing spending in areas that are essential, based on a working and effective framework of the U.S. military, but also in closer integration of European militaries. There is currently an incredibly close relationship among European NATO allies; however, with closer political integration through the EU it may be possible for pooling, as Missiroli suggests, at more than one level. The most significant aspect of pooling in relation to another issue is that of overlapping capabilities.

There are a number of "smaller" members of not only the EU but NATO, as well. These states, such as The Netherlands and Belgium, cannot be expected to develop militaries that could be considered rivals to that of the United Kingdom and France. However, they can be

⁷⁶ Eichenberg, Richard C. 2003. The Polls-Trends: Having it Both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67: 634.

expected to keep their militaries up to date and more importantly, fill a niche role. Missiroli argues that “such pooling would be helped by some role specialization for both capabilities/forces and assets/materiel. This could imply the allocation of specific functional roles to certain member states, especially (but not exclusively) smaller ones”⁷⁷⁷⁸ The important note here, according to Missiroli, is that although there will be duplications of capability, it nonetheless may improve effectiveness and consolidation of military assets and functions. Perhaps more importantly to this project is the assertion that Missiroli makes that NATO is practicing this concept. Since NATO is the linchpin of cooperation, as per this project, here again, U.S. military policy has shown to be effective. NATO on the whole does resemble the U.S. military itself. There are various overlaps in capability within the U.S. military; such as the redundant capabilities of the Army and Marine Corps. However, each branch does contain niche functions that other branches lack. Such examples are within the Special Operations community of the U.S. military. The Navy’s SEAL teams specialize in naval based operations, while the Army’s Special Forces (“Green Berets”) specialize in, among other things, foreign internal defense. While such units as these cross-train and overlap in their capabilities, there is at least one area in which they fill a niche role. Just as the Marines specialize in amphibious warfare, the Army specializes in heavy armor. When examining NATO, niche role players can be seen. This strategy may be effective in allowing for not only a sharing of responsibility within NATO but also to allow for greater effectiveness in utilizing role players that are highly trained and specialized in their particular role.

⁷⁷ Missiroli, Antonio. 2003. Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for European Defense. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 13.

⁷⁸ Clemmesen, Michael H. 2003. The New NATO and the Security of the Alliance Periphery States. *Baltic Defense Review* 10 (2): 14.

NATO, and in turn the U.S. military, has proven that multi-national defense initiatives can be effective in providing defense obligations. One such example is the NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). Missiroli noted that this approach is a “method of sharing costs and risks, benefits and facilities—a single budget covered at 11/12 (Britain has a partially distinct position), managed by an ad-hoc agency, with dedicated bases in Germany and the UK and multinational-manned and commonly trained crews—could well apply to some already existing but still sputtering common European projects”⁷⁹ This example is a clear mark of what can be expected out of an effective European military structure that will be necessary if the transatlantic military capability gap is to be narrowed to acceptable levels. This will also allow for a possible framework for the European defense structure. As there will unquestionably be a need for participation for as many EU members as possible in a European-wide effort at a European defense structure, this simple example of how to integrate a multinational military system into a multinational alliance may provide clues or even better, a roadway, to achieving the EDA’s goals.

Building an improved multinational effort for defense in Europe does not only imply cooperation on the actual defense structure level, but also on the industry level. This roadblock, suggested by the CSIS report on transatlantic cooperation, is of utmost importance. With the plethora of defense contractors in Europe, it is not difficult to understand why there may be trouble brewing in European defense procurement. While it is obvious that there will need to be funds to procure defense systems, there also needs to be a more consolidated base of contractors; and the products they produce. This jumbled mix of different defense systems has

⁷⁹Missiroli, Antonio. 2003. Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for European Defense. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8: 13.

further fractured European defense. As compared to the U.S., where a much more consolidated defense industry exists, "such a system is in place (especially since the industrial consolidation of the 1990s), the only buyer is the Pentagon and the supply of military equipment is concentrated in a very limited number of companies, while in the EU the demand is extremely diverse and supply equally fragmented."⁸⁰ This consolidation has allowed for the development and procurement of some of the finest defense systems in the world. A quick glance at the European defense market reveals that the major European power, the U.K., Germany, France and Italy, all have their own robust defense industries supplying their respective militaries with the full spectrum of defense systems; thus leading to competing defense systems. However, there are several pan-European defense projects that shine some much needed light on the idea of European defense supply consolidation.

The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company is a multinational defense, among other things, company that is the parent company of several multinational European defense ventures. One such venture is the Eurofighter project; with its first system, the Eurofighter Typhoon. This aircraft was developed with a pan-European mindset as it was developed by a group of several European firms; which came together to build an aircraft to serve European defense in the 21st Century. Eurocopter, whose parent company is EADS, has also developed a number of defense systems that were born of multinational European involvement. The majority of helicopters that are not of American build or produced by Agusta-Westland in service with European militaries (especially Western European states) are from Eurocopter programs. Worth noting is the fact that many European militaries also procure many

⁸⁰ Ibid. 14.

American made defense systems that are not only proven, unlike some European systems, but also have been in European use for decades. While it is highly beneficial for European militaries to procure European systems, more revenue means more research and development; competition will always drive innovation and improvements.

European defense companies, although producing capable systems, have not been as successful as their American counterparts. Because of the differing market environments in Europe "the share of European armament companies on the international market has decreased from 56 per cent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 1999, and keeps shrinking. Among the 100 biggest private defense producers in the world, the 40 top US companies make up 57 per cent of the market, while the top ten European ones cover just 12 per cent."⁸¹ While there has been progress on that particular front with numerous orders of the Eurofighter Typhoon, for example, because of the fragmented nature of the European defense market, true progress is not likely to take place without consolidation. EADS is a prime example of the consolidation of defense projects in Europe. However, it must be noted that this is strictly in the arena of Aerospace defense projects. Nonetheless, for Europe, EADS provides not only hope but a framework for European defense consolidation. In fact, Missiroli is correct to assert that the NATO AWACS could be used as a model for defense consolidation because in reality, that is what the NATO AWACS is; consolidation. With a common structure of command, commonly trained crews and standardized equipment, it will be feasible to apply this model not only as an example of military consolidation, but also budgetary and policy-related consolidation.

⁸¹ Ibid.

It would be feasible to recommend that perhaps the most effective action to take in regards to European defense planning is to have an over-arching policy that regulates defense procurement; along with the planning of projects for needed defense systems. Keeping with the EADS example, it is important to note that the proliferation of the Eurofighter Typhoon is a prominent example of consolidation on multiple levels. Because of the stated goal of the Typhoon project, the participating defense contractors (which are a part of EADS) were able to create a system that would meet the needs of its clients. The consolidated role of that systems provides a model, along with the Joint Strike Fighter, of how to procure a defense system that is flexible, able to meet operational requirements set forth by the respective defense agencies and cost effective because of the system's flexible nature. The importance of flexibility for any military cannot be understated. For European militaries, and the U.S. military also, it will be vital on the point of budgetary considerations that the procurement and planning process for military transformation and modernization take flexibility as absolutely essential. The future of European defense planning must rest on the mantra of "multi-role". The development of capable multi-role systems will permit the smaller and less capable European militaries to become more capable, while limiting the increase needed in defense spending to ensure their own security independently, and more up to date.

The concept of multi-role defense systems is scarcely a new facet of defense planning. Interestingly enough the first multi-role aircraft developed by Europeans was the Tornado, built by Panavia, a joint venture by the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. During the same period of time, the U.S.'s F-16 was also developed as a light-weight fighter with the multi-

role capability. This aircraft was also produced in Europe for several NATO members.⁸² For nearly three decades, the need for and the reasoning behind developing flexible cost effective systems has had a plan in NATO defense planning. While U.S. defense policy and planning allows for specialization in almost all defense planning areas, European defense policy and planning has yet to allow for any one state to truly specialize in the same fashion as the U.S. military has. Therefore, a past example of flexibility will be of benefit to current and future plans. Here again, the U.S. military has developed many multi-role and multipurpose defense systems in large quantities to every branch since the ideas for what a 21st century military would look like became part of the defense planning mindset; first seen after the lessons learned from the Vietnam War which were given consideration in the development of defense systems. Such examples of multi-role systems are the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter (in fact most helicopters can be used in multiple roles), the HMMWV, the Stryker armored vehicle, the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

With the U.S. military well versed in the merits of multi-role systems, as mentioned before, there is an allowance for the implementation of specialized systems. With the cost of operating a military on par with that of the U.S. clearly prohibitive for any single state, and even for an organization such as the EU, it will be clearly beneficial for the EU to focus on cultivating multi-role defense systems which are developed and produced by a consolidated base of European defense companies. If budgetary concerns are the most difficult to reconcile with the tax payers, as Missiroli argues, then joint-venture, multi-role systems that have placed importance not only capability but cost (be it initial procurement costs or life-cycle costs) will be

⁸² F-16 Fighting Falcon. *Global Security*. [cited on 1 September, 2008.] Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16.htm> .

the most beneficial path to follow. A suitable combination of following such modernization doctrine as demonstrated by the U.S. military, combined with the policy and planning based on the previously stated argument will allow for an amicable compromise of price and capability; with the added bonus of compatibility with U.S. military capability.

When examining the current state of multi-role capability, Europe does possess the need history and experience in this area to continue to the future and improve along the way. The multi-role concept, when taken as an over-arching policy, will need to expand from the aircraft defense systems to all defense area systems (ground, sea, communications and so on). European Defense Agency policy will need to reflect this doctrine with the proper policy to accommodate it. Their long-term vision report does lay the groundwork for this direction in defense policy. For budgetary purposes, there are several examples of where a streamlining and cost effective solution can thrive. As noted before, this will be necessary given the likely occurrence of expensive European social policy not changing. First the fore-mentioned Typhoon multi-role aircraft was designed as a "swing-role" (multi-role) for the inception of the program. In monetary/budgetary terms, multi-role is the most cost effective solution. Based on the U.S. military's current doctrine of "high/low mix" aircraft procurement, the European Typhoon clients have opted not to buy systems based on that doctrine. Current U.S. high/low mixture is the F-22 (high) and F-35 (low). The total cost of having both systems is considerably high than that of a multi-role system. Where the combination of the F-22 and F-35 will cost roughly \$210 million⁸³⁸⁴, the Typhoon will cost roughly \$120 million.⁸⁵ While it cannot be expected that one

⁸³ FY 2009 Budget Estimates. U.S. Air Force. February 2008. 43.

⁸⁴ FY 2009 Budget Estimates. U.S. Air Force. February 2008. 55.

⁸⁵ Flug Revue. Eurofighter *Typhoon: Production of Tranche 2 is under way*. [updated June 2008. cited 31 July 2008.] Available from <http://www.flugrevue.de/index.php?id=2835>.

Typhoon will be able to replicate all the capabilities of the two other aircraft, it can do enough to justify a focus on multi-role for many reasons, let alone the cost efficiency of that purchase.

CHAPTER FIVE-CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Military Challenges Europe Will Face

Just as the introduction of the section on the progress of European militaries notes the challenge of facing a world continuing down the path of globalization, this section addresses what Europe and the world will look like in the coming decades. Although this is just a forecast, it speaks to very pressing issues that Europe will face. A quick look over the main topics illustrate that there are many issues that the EDA has highlighted as factors that will influence what a European military will look like. The report states that “unless globalization stops or goes into reverse, the world of 2025 is likely to be more diverse, more interdependent, and even more unequal...Europe will in particular be held back by low fertility rates...These demographic trends will have major implications for public finances with increasing health care and pension costs...Globalization will produce winners and losers...So the prognosis is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe.”⁸⁶ Europe lacks the luxury of being geographically isolated similar to the U.S. It is therefore likely that Europe can and will be very close to conflicts in the various hot spots in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.

With that forecast alone, it would appear that not only must Europe have forces able to defend itself and its borders, but if it wishes to proceed as a peacekeeper in any function it must take a hard look at what would be needed and what can be afforded in terms of defense and defense acquisition. This also goes along with the changing trends of what security is and how to

⁸⁶ Long Term Vision Report. European Defense Agency. 6.

maintain it.⁸⁷ The funding question is one of the largest obstacles to military transformation in Europe, and the EDA recognizes this. A brief statement on it reveals that the EDA feels that once there are some clear threats to Europe, the mindset will change. Increasing concern with homeland security will erode distinctions between what is regarded as the province of ‘defense’ and what of ‘security’, and indeed may call in question the taxpayer’s willingness to fund ‘defense’ if this is seen as wholly concerned with interventions abroad or deterring increasingly improbable conventional attacks on European territory.”⁸⁸ It will not take much for European sentiment to change if threats begin appearing and are a clear danger to European security. The U.S. is a perfect example for a change in policy following security threats. In 1997, the U.S. military expenditure was more than \$336 billion; in 2007 the U.S. military expenditure was more than \$546 billion.⁸⁹ Both numbers are in 2005 U.S. dollars. While some of that increase is attributed to two ongoing wars, those wars have prompted the U.S. military to put transformation in the forefront when the Cold War styled forces showed inadequacies in modern asymmetric conflicts. Therefore an enormous increase in spending is evident when examining the numbers. The same may be expected in the future for the European militaries.

The need for such a transformation, and its associated costs, is not lost on the EDA. As mentioned previously, the EDA has studied the U.S. military and its ongoing operations and has learned what the future of defense, security and conflict hold in store for Europe. If Europe wishes to successfully emerge from Kagan’s world of “Paradise” they must learn the lessons of the combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EDA points to those two

⁸⁷ Granville, Johanna. 2002. 9-11: A Wakeup Call for NATO and the European Union? *Global Security* 16 (4): 441.

⁸⁸ Long Term Vision Report. European Defense Agency. 7.

⁸⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*. [cited 14 August 2008]. Available from <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>.

conflict as proof of the changing nature of warfare. “Allied to this is the widespread perception that technology is putting into military hands the means to conduct operations with ever greater precision and restraint. Warfare has been described as a mixture of intelligence and kinetic energy. The opening campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have confirmed beyond doubt that we are transitioning from the industrial age to the information age of war—that intelligence (or knowledge, or information) will become an ever more important resource for successful operations, whilst kinetic energy has to be applied in ever more precise and limited quantities.”⁹⁰ This “Network Centric” style of warfare is exactly how the U.S. has modeled its military. Information/intelligence is one of, if not the most, valuable asset a military force can have. With accurate intelligence and ever-more accurate weapons, a military will be more effective in prosecuting its objectives than ever before in history. However, the cost of such capabilities becomes prohibitive for many; hence the reasoning for a concentrated focus of defense cultivation.

A useful example of what the cost of force transformation will entail is the use of munitions in Kosovo conflict and the operations in Iraq. According to the EDA “in the Kosovo air war only 15% percent of munitions dropped were ‘smart’, by the 2003 Iraq war, the proportions between dumb and smart were reversed.”⁹¹ This simple example of the use of more advanced weaponry can illustrate that given what the EDA calls “24/7 media scrutiny” the need for such weapons exists. Not only are they needed because of their effectiveness in battle, but because they reduce greatly the likelihood of collateral damage and civilian casualties. The price of these weapons is much more than that of “dumb” weapons. However, their need is

⁹⁰ Long Term Vision Report. 2006. European Defense Agency. 10.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

unquestionable. Along with that one simple illustration of the change that is needed, the EDA perceives the focus of its military forces will be preventative in nature because of the sheer force it commands; which in turn is a deterrent. “Thus the focus of military efforts will shift to complementing diplomacy in preventing wars from occurring, containing those conflicts that do occur, and discouraging the emergence of parties whose objective is to contribute to the generation of a crisis.”⁹² The doctrine of overwhelming force remains in play in this strategy. If the force one has at its disposal is so powerful, it acts as just one reason for many not to challenge a modern, well equipped and well trained military force.

A productive first step to European military transformation, which will also require assistance from U.S. defense establishments and the American defense industry, is the recognition of the state of modern warfare. While conventional state vs. state war may continue to take place, the sheer deterrent factor that such militaries as the U.S. military possess will make conventional war a rare occurrence that if initiated could result in the end of the world; just as it was during the Cold War. Since no one will obviously benefit from that, militaries should not only focus on their main conventional roles, but also perfect the art of asymmetric warfare. The EDA’s conclusion is that “In sum, the operations for which European forces should primarily prepare for the foreseeable future will require force to be applied in opaque circumstances, against an opponent at pains to conceal himself amongst the civil populations, under tightly constraining rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.”⁹³ To conduct such operations, a complete overhaul of European military systems and establishments is necessary. If the Cold War is not likely to ever return, then that posture is no longer necessary as the main doctrine of

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

conducting military operations. European militaries will need to embrace the technology that will allow for such a force; and prepare for sticker shock.

The driving force behind this shift and the key to a successful transition will be the embracing of new technologies. The U.S. military is currently on this path and has been for over a decade. Under the Rumsfeld tenure the U.S. military experienced its principal change when the Brigade Combat Team organizational doctrine was established as well as a innovative focus on the idea that a 21st century military needs to be fast, agile and easily deployable. A very noticeable and somewhat controversial shift away from the Cold War posture of the last fifty-plus years in which the U.S. military was a large and powerful force but not very mobile. Today, the U.S. military has continued its movement into a more expeditionary force and provides a perfect example of what a modern military can be. The EDA has thus seen the advantages that come with being on the cutting-edge of military technology and has stated that “Science and technology are playing a key part in driving the changing role of military force; and exploitation of what they have to offer will be a key to successful adaptation to that changing role.”⁹⁴ Here is where cooperation with the U.S. and its defense industry will provide for invaluable benefits. It would be most difficult for Europe to undertake this process alone. It would not be very prudent either. The U.S. and Europe are allies within and without NATO. That relationship provides for a perfect avenue for the sharing and transferring of military research and technology. In the areas that are most valuable in fighting any type of war, the U.S. maintains the technological lead. If Europe can come to an agreement to either jointly develop or acquire production licenses for

⁹⁴ Ibid. 11.

such technologies as stealth, i.e. the F-35, then perhaps a portion of the cost could be mitigated and the 30 year time-table Bernard Brown predicted could be reduced.

Concluding Remarks

The research project has strived to present the case for better and more complete transatlantic defense cooperation in defense projects. The benefits for more cooperation and the current benefits of cooperation that is already taking place have been examined; and how those benefits will contribute to easing the tensions within NATO in the area of capability differences between the United States and Europe. With three actors, the United States, the European Union and NATO, acting in each of their own interests, cooperation in defense projects is an elusive goal with only a handful of successful cases of defense policy cooperation. Based on the needs and requirements for future military operations, this research project has highlighted the great disparity of military power between the United States and Europe. To lessen this unfortunate circumstance, the lessons learned from the case studies examined in this project should be exported to any project that can, or should, be a cooperative project.

As the European Defense Agency has stated in its Long Term Vision, there will have to be a strategy to deal with the world how it is, and how it will be. There will need to be a close relationship with the United States, and the incorporation of NATO wherever possible, to take on these current and new challenges. A common strategy would be the most beneficial to all parties involved. A joint strategy that can be acted upon and enforced would be much more of an effect and legitimacy than several separate strategies. However as it stands, that might be one of the most challenging aspects of transatlantic cooperation. If there can be a common view then the

goals and requirements of defense projects and their purpose can be more clearly defined; which has been shown to be one of the keys to a successful defense project. With a clearly defined and common world-view, and military planning/strategy based on that view, defense projects can have more incentives built in to them if they have been optimized to meet the requirements for the world they will operate in. Also, there will be the need for an increase in defense spending on the part of the European states. Without more of a stake in research and development, and procurement, there will not be an as equal as possible partnership in defense project cooperation.

The genesis of this research project came from the intriguing fact that while Europe is an economic powerhouse, a world leader in many aspects of business and technology, and relatively militarily powerful, it is not on the same footing as the United States in terms of military power. This can be related to the free-rider effect, or that Europe does not see the same threats as the United States does. Nonetheless, within Europe there have been strides made to bridge the gap between the U.S. and Europe in terms of military capability. While it has not been decided as to which path Europe will take, more independent or more interdependent from the United States, what is known is that there are many challenges that each party will face. How those challenges are met is up to speculation. What is not speculation is that there has been a history of successful defense project cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. Whether for NATO purposes or national purposes, those successful projects are extremely important to the future of not only NATO, but the defensive viability of the states involved. There can be more gained from cooperation, as seen with the F-16 and F-35 program, than will be sacrificed with accommodating many states in the project. With the project framework that was developed under the F-16 program, and continued and refined under the F-35 project, hope for future and even

more successful defense projects is well founded. If policy can be developed to reflect that success and replicate it in more areas than not only will Europe benefit from greater military capability, but so will NATO and the United States. With open dialogue, well defined objectives and honest commitment the framework that has been presented here will serve to not only lessen the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies, but it will bring the U.S. and Europe closer together; not only on the government side, but the industry side as well. This will help insure the future existence of NATO, provide for a united front to face current and future threats and to allow greater defensive integration and capability.

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