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ANTI-IMMIGRANT RHETORIC IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF INTEGRATION
POLICIES IN EXTREME RIGHT POPULISM

by

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B.A. University of Central Florida, 2010

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
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ABSTRACT

The recent rise of Western Europe's extreme populist Right (EPR) parties has been attributed to the EPR's mobilization of grievances over the issue of immigration (Ignazi 1991; Taggart 1996; Fennema 1997; Schain, 1998; Mudde 1999; Brubaker 2001; Ivarsflaten 2007). This study contributes to the literature on EPR's anti-immigrant rhetoric by examining whether different integration policies play a role in conditioning anti-immigrant rhetoric, and if so, what their role is in the formulation of such rhetoric.

This thesis is comprised of two case studies: the French *assimilation* approach to immigrant integration and the rhetoric of Front National's leaders Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen; and the Dutch *multicultural* approach to integration and the rhetoric of Dutch Party for Freedom's leader Geert Wilders. The main hypothesis is that each leader's anti-immigrant rhetoric incorporates the shortcomings of the integration approach adopted by their respective governments. Elements of the rejection of both assimilationism and multiculturalism are detected in the FN's and PVV's rhetoric, respectively, through a careful review of secondary and primary sources of language usage in Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's and Wilders' speeches, interviews, and media appearances.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Significance of Research

Western Europe has witnessed the growth of anti-immigration rhetoric by extreme right populist parties. Parties such as Austria's Freedom Party, Switzerland's Peoples Party, Sweden's Sweden Democrats, Norway's Progress Party and Finland's True Finns have gained electoral success through framing immigration as a primary social concern (Eatwell 2000; Kehrberg 2007; Kulish 2011). In Sweden, a country where the integration of political refugees has been deemed the most successful in Europe by the 2010 MIPEX report, the far-right anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats won 20 seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The party's campaign, which frames immigration as "the biggest threat facing Sweden since World War II", included a 30-second television advertisement depicting burqa-clad women in a literal race against a white Swedish senior for social welfare funds (Malik 2011). Far-right nationalist parties have also experienced electoral gains in Norway, where the Progress Party won 23 percent of votes in the 2009 parliamentary elections; Denmark, where the Danish People's Party has 25 out of 139 parliamentary seats; and in Finland, where the True Finns obtained 19 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary election (Kulish 2011). In Switzerland, the Swiss People's Party – responsible for the 2009 ban on minarets – published campaign posters showing three white sheep kicking a black sheep off of the Swiss flag, with the caption "For More Security" (Parvaz 2010).

Table 1: Electoral Results for Extreme-Right Parties in Western Europe¹

Country/ Party	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012
Finland/ True Finns		3 seats 1.6% of votes			5 seats 4.1% of votes			39 seats 19.1% of votes	
France/ Front National	0 seats 11.1% of votes				0 seats 4.3% of votes				2 seats 3.7% of votes
Italy/ Lega Nord				13 seats 4.5% of votes		25 seats 8.1% of votes			
Denmark/ Danish People's Party			24 seats 13.3% of votes		25 seats 13.9% of votes			22 seats 12.3% of votes	
Dutch Party for Freedom/ Netherlands				9 seats 5.9% of votes			31 seats 20.5% of votes		
Sweden/ Sweden Democrats				0 seats 2.9% of votes			20 seats 5.7% of votes		
Switzerland/ Swiss People's Party		55 seats 26.7% of votes			62 seats 28.9% of votes			54 seats 26.6% of votes	

As Table 1 shows, extreme-right populist parties have experienced consistent electoral gains in Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Such parties are also significantly present in France, Denmark, and Switzerland. The noted anti-immigrant stance of these parties has been accompanied by another trend in Western Europe: anti-immigrant violence.

¹ National parliamentary elections. Gray boxes represent non-election year. Source: www.electionsources.org.



Source: Parvaz 2010 (Al Jazeera)

Figure 1: Swiss People's Party Anti-Immigrant Poster: "For More Security"



Source: Spiegel 2010

Figure 2: Swedish Democrats' Anti-Immigrant Advertisement: "A Race for Welfare"

In May of 2008, gangs of Italian men, some affiliated with neo-Nazi organizations, violently attacked and killed several immigrant business owners of Chinese, Indian and

Bangladeshi descent (Nadeau 2008). In 2010, a Swedish man was accused of shooting more than a dozen immigrants (Kulich 2011). Most recently, a self-proclaimed anti-immigrant extremist committed a double terrorist attack in Norway in July of 2011 as repudiation of Muslim immigration and Norway's multicultural approach to integration. Statistical studies conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) indicate that nine of the eleven EU countries that reported comprehensive data on xenophobic and racist crime between the years 2000 and 2005 experienced a growth in percentage of crimes of this nature (EUAFR 2007). Although a truly comprehensive comparison of EU member states cannot be conducted, as member states use different means of collecting data and of defining what constitutes anti-immigrant crimes, the figures provided by the 2007 FRA report on ethnic and racial discrimination clearly illustrate the rise in racist and xenophobic crimes in the first five years of the past decade. According to the study, the most common victims of anti-immigrant crimes in the European Union have traditionally been Africans, 'black' minorities, and the Roma. However, the FRA also reports that, according to European NGOs, the past decade has seen a considerable rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes throughout the European Union (EUAFR 2007).

The electoral rise of the populist right in Western Europe and the growth of anti-immigrant violence in the last two decades have not occurred within a social vacuum, however. These trends have gained prominence along with an increasingly popular anti-immigrant rhetoric, a phenomenon whose understanding serves as the primary aim of this thesis. In particular, this thesis explores how different integration approaches, assimilationist and multicultural, affect the formulation of anti-immigrant ERP rhetoric. Before I describe my

argument I proceed to provide an overview of the use of EPR anti-immigrant rhetoric in Western Europe.

Extreme Populist Right Rhetoric in Western Europe

Although EPR parties in Western Europe are not single-issue parties, their shared focus on anti-immigration politics is viewed as their 'raison d'être' (see Husbands 1992; Fennema 1997; Skenderovic 2007: 157). The extreme populist right utilizes anti-elitist, exclusionary, and nationalistic appeals to frame immigration as a societal threat (Betz and Johnson 2004; Skenderovic 2007). Although economic concerns are a central focus of the EPR parties, studies have found that unemployment only matters when immigration is high, whereas "immigration has a positive effect on populist parties irrespective of the unemployment level" (Golder 2003). These parties also share a common rhetoric which appeals to ethno-nationalistic, xenophobic, authoritarian and populist doctrines (Rydgren 2003). However, in order not to be portrayed as overly racist, EPR parties frame the integration of immigrants as a social, cultural, economic, and security concern.

Successful EPR parties are known for using propaganda to politicize immigration and depict it as both a result of and reason for detrimental political and social phenomena, the latter of which generates racism and xenophobia (Rydgren 2003: 56). According to Rydgren (2003: 57; 2008), EPR parties frame immigrants as either a threat to national identity, a source of

criminality, or as “abusers of the generosity of the state (i.e. “they are only living on state subsidies”, “they do not work, and can nonetheless afford fancy cars”)”.

EPR parties also resort to the use of an anti-establishment rhetoric that portrays them as “disaffected from the political decision-making processes”, allowing these parties to claim to be representatives of ordinary citizens (see Schedler 1996; Rydgren 2003; Betz and Johnson 2004; Skenderovic 2007: 158). As discussed, the rhetoric of opposition parties benefits from a weak establishment and an uncertain political context, as the popularity of such parties may be partially facilitated by an overall loss of confidence in the established government and mainstream parties (Betz 1993; Cole 2005). EPR parties also distance themselves from mainstream parties and political elites by attributing unwanted realities as the consequence of mainstream policies. For instance, former leader of the Italian right-wing Northern League Party Umberto Bossi criticized mainstream Italian parties for facilitating the formation of a "multiracial, multiethnic, and multi-religious society" that "comes closer to hell than to paradise" (Betz 1993).

Although studies show that the EPR draws voters from across the social spectrums, certain segments of the population are more likely to be receptive to their rhetoric. For instance, the core supporter base of the Norwegian Progress Party is composed of males under the age of thirty with low to median incomes (Betz 1993: 421). Betz (1993) argues that EPR voters support such parties out of resentment and frustration or as part of what is called the “ethnic competition theory” (Rydgren 2008). According to Betz (1993), EPR parties have become electorally successful due to their appeal to both segments of the working class and segments of the middle

class. Betz claims their rhetoric is aimed at individuals such as marginalized blue collar workers who feel socially neglected by their respective governments and who have growing fears of what impact growing immigration will have in their lives. For instance, Betz explains that Austrians with a high school diploma are much more likely to support anti-immigration measures than college graduates. Thus, the EPR tactic of attacking mainstream parties attracts the attention of the segments of the population who feel such parties are not acting in favor of their interests.

Although such parties rely on an anti-establishment message to promote anti-immigrant rhetoric, Ivarsflaten (2006) explains that the success of such tactic is dependent upon whether these parties possess “reputational shields”, or the ability to rely on their history and reputation to fight off accusations of xenophobia and racism from the mainstream political establishment. Furthermore, EPR parties depend on the perception that they fully abide by democratic principles in order to be perceived as legitimate political contenders. Parties whose histories are associated with fascist or Nazi roots run the risk of being viewed as anti-democratic, a quality disliked by citizens of Western European democracies (Rydgren 2003).

The EPR also focuses on identity politics as a tool to justify selective exclusion in their agenda (Betz and Johnson 2004). The nationalist elements instilled in EPR rhetoric create internal divisions and lead to exclusionary political views. Such rhetoric employs “neo-racist” elements that point to an inherent difference in cultures, thereby using immigrants as targets of what Betz (1993) calls “politics of resentment” (Skenderovic 2007). EPR parties generate resentment among voters by harboring feelings of competitiveness of economic and social opportunities between the immigrant population and natives who feel “impotent” and “excluded

from society”, and whose reality and expectations do not correspond (Rydgren 2003). For example, the term *Überfremdung*, or “over-foreignization”, a concept promoted by the Swiss extreme-right since the 1960s, implies that the presence of immigrants past a certain threshold can be dangerous, and promotes a view of immigrants based on “stereotypes and prejudices, and appeals to individual's fears and emotions” (Skendreovic 2007: 161). In Switzerland, the Western European democracy that has elected most extreme-right Ministers of Parliament, an anti-establishment, anti-asylum agenda has been combined with a focus on identity politics and the promotion of regional cultural identity to generate a rhetoric of exclusion that frames immigration as a national threat, “inducing xenophobia and hostility towards foreign residents” (Skendreovic 2007: 165-8).

As previously discussed, effective political rhetoric draws from dormant or alienated opinions, which according to Dutch academic Cas Mudde, exist in segments of every society in the form of nativist, authoritarian and populist beliefs. “For example, nativism is a radical interpretation of the “strong nation-state”. As a consequence, there is a rather large breeding ground for radical right parties that mainstream parties can also tap into” (Biswas 2011). Rydgren (2003) also believes the emergence and influence of EPR parties encourages xenophobic popular attitudes by diminishing the stigmatization attached to such behavior. Blunt racism, however, can repel moderate voters who are also concerned about immigration (Eatwell 2000). Therefore, EPR parties in Western Europe have also attacked immigration from an economic standpoint in order to deflect accusations of xenophobia. Their rejection of the asylum policy claims that natives, rather than refugees, should have priority of social services, housing and jobs, as they believe

asylum seekers are oftentimes economically motivated (Betz 1993). Western European EPR parties have also drawn from the fears of a low birth rate among the native population, as well as the rapid growth of non-European immigration to generate further anxiety about the survival of the national culture (Betz 1993). Such arguments are based on the ethno-pluralism approach which states that “in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated,” as “mixing different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction” (Rydgren 2008: 745). Thus, EPR parties rely on the argument that in order for the European culture to be preserved, they must not be mixed with foreign cultures (See also: Taguieff 1988; Minkenberg 1997; Griffin 2000; Betz and Johnson 2004).

The topic of immigrant integration only gained a prominent role in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of Western European EPR parties in the last quarter of the 20th century. After years of contracting non-European guest workers to fulfill the need for unskilled manual labor during the 1960s, numerous Western European countries halted immigration in the early 1970s. However, the implementation of family reunification policies led to the continuous influx of immigrants and refugees primarily from North Africa, Middle East, and Asia. As immigrants became permanently settled in major cities during the 1980s, the question of immigration soon transcended the traditional debates of economic prosperity into a discussion of national policy (Favell 1998, Gibson 2002).

Post-9/11 concerns exacerbated the criticism of immigrant integration approaches across Western Europe. In a widely popular article published in 2001, Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci publicly feared that immigrants aimed to alter Italian “values” and “way of life” (Polakow-

Suransky and Chamedes 2002). In 2004, a multi-partisan report drafted by the Dutch Parliament stated that the Dutch attempt to create a multicultural state was a failure (Roxburgh 2004). Five years later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel also claimed that the multicultural integration approach had 'utterly failed', while British Prime Minister David Cameron stated it 'encouraged segregated communities' in British cities (Kulich 201). Likewise, the French Jacobin assimilation approach has been blamed for fragmented immigrant communities and cultural clashes in major French cities, sparking a government sponsored debate on French national identity and tradition (Mayer 2009).

The significance of this study is thus drawn from the prospect of better understanding the sources of popularity and growth of extreme right wing parties in Western Europe. Do different integration policies play a role in conditioning the rhetoric of the extreme right? If so, how are integration approaches used to formulate the extreme right's anti-immigrant message? While studies have shown that the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric reinforces voting predispositions in support of extreme-right populist parties (see Betz 1993; Brubaker 2001; Ivarsflaten 2006), no significant study has taken into account the effects of integration policies on anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Research Question

The literature on the rise of extreme-right populist parties in Western Europe points to immigration as a primary explanation of this phenomenon (see Mitra 1988; Harris 1990, 1999;

Ignazi 1991; Hainsworth 1992; Husbands 1992; Betz 1993; Taggart 1996; Fennema 1997; Schain, 1998; Mudde 1999; Gibson 2002). While existing literature has demonstrated that economic issues facilitate right-wing populism, recent studies point to the effective mobilization of grievances against immigrants, asylum seekers, and their descendants as the uniting factor of successful extreme-right populist parties (Husbands 1992: 262; Betz and Immerfall 1998: 4-6; Ivarsflaten 2008). As Eatwell (2000: 417) points out, although almost all Western-European states have been subjected to the global economic downturn of the 21st century, some, like Portugal and Ireland, have not witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric. Thus, the ensuing questions are: do extreme-right populist parties incorporate integration policies in the formulation of anti-immigration rhetoric, and if so, how do party leaders address the limitations of their country's integration approach in order to shape their anti-immigrant message? This study aims to contribute to the discussion of Western European anti-immigration politics by exploring the role integration policy plays in the rhetoric of the populist right.

Definitions

This study utilizes Heckmann and Schannaper's (2003: 12) concept of integration, which focuses on the philosophical sense of nationhood, or national identity held by the host society, as well as the concept of citizenship that shapes each immigrant integration approach. Thus, integration policy approach refers to the host society's philosophical expectations of newcomers, as well as the direct and indirect policies in place to facilitate the accomplishment of such

expectations. For instance, the ban of ostentatious religious symbols in the French school system demonstrates the enforcement of cultural homogeneity, whereas the establishment of school lessons conducted in immigrant children's native languages aims to promote cultural inclusion in the Netherlands. This study will draw from multiple socio-cultural policies that best exemplify the country's "ideal types" of integration philosophy.

A brief definition of the term *extreme populist right* (EPR) discussed throughout this study is also necessary in order to ensure specificity. Although extreme right parties may vary in their foundation and economic ideologies, academic definitions point to universal characteristics among the extreme right: the rejection of the notion of equality for all members of a political community, choosing instead to grant rights based on racial, ethnic, or religious affiliations (Betz and Immerfall 1998); the desire for radical restructuring of the socio-cultural and political status quo, including hostility towards the political class (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Eatwell 2000); and the aggressive support for nationalism (Husbands 1992). Furthermore, the extreme right is defined by its common mobilization of resentment against the social implications of immigration, framing it as a threat to national unity (Lambert et al 1990; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Ivarsflaten 2008). Thus, the extreme-right parties in this study have been selected solely based on the usage of hostile anti-immigrant politics to mobilize voters, regardless of any other campaign items on their party platforms.

The term *populist* is included to denote a specific political style that employs charismatic leadership, anti-establishment rhetoric, and a focus on nationalism to promote simple solutions to complicated societal problems (Eatwell 2000). Such parties claim to represent the concerns and

demands of ordinary citizens who often feel unrepresented by mainstream parties or the democratic system. Thus, the defined populist extreme-right utilizes anti-immigrant rhetoric, which includes the alienation and distrust of what Eatwell (2000) calls ‘the other’, as a means of scapegoating minorities in defense of the preservation of the homeland (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Eatwell 2000; Rydgren 2001).

Methodology

Case Studies

This thesis will comprise two case studies: French assimilation approach, and Dutch multiculturalism. France and the Netherlands have been selected as case studies due to both countries' exemplary representation of the two integration approaches addressed in this study. The high percentage of foreign-born population in both countries, 8.4 percent in France and 10.9 percent in the Netherlands, renders immigrant integration a prominent political issue in both societies (OECD 2008). The French Republic and its immigrant integration policies are the uncontested historical model for assimilationism in Western Europe, and was thus an obvious choice to represent this approach. While Germany and the United Kingdom both employ a multicultural approach to integration, the Netherlands was chosen as the best candidate to represent the multicultural approach due to its consistent history of multiculturalism (in contrast with Germany), and the considerable electoral success of its growing extreme populist right party (in contrast with the plateau performance experienced by the U.K.'s British National Party in

recent elections). Therefore, the two case studies will address France's Front National and its long-time former leader Jean-Marie Le Pen (also focusing briefly on its new leader, Marine Le Pen), and the Dutch Party for Freedom and its founder Geert Wilders.

Founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, the National Front (FN) gained momentum in the 1980s, resurfacing in the 2000s. After maintaining the position of the third largest party in the country for the largest part of the past decade, and attaining second place in the 2002 presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen granted the presidency of the FN to his daughter, Marine Len Pen, in the beginning of 2011 (Dejevsky 2012).

In the Netherlands, the anti-immigrant Freedom Party (PVV)'s surprising 2010 electoral ascension, after only five years of existence, was a moment of celebration for its leader, Geert Wilders. The Freedom Party's jump from 9 to 24 parliamentary seats rendered it the third largest party in a country long renounced for its advocacy of tolerance.

Variables, Methodology, and Data Collection

The dependent variable of this study is the rhetoric of extreme populist right parties in France and the Netherlands. The independent variable is the integration approach of each state: assimilation and multiculturalism, respectively. An initial overview of assimilation and multiculturalism theories will introduce the underlying assumptions and concepts that comprise the philosophies behind each integration approach. An overview of the most prominent arguments against each integration theory will then indicate the primary shortcomings of the

current integration policies in place in their respective national contexts. Then, based on the indicated shortcomings of each integration approach, each case study will detect elements related to the criticism of multiculturalism and assimilation in the FN's and PVV's rhetoric. Lastly, both case studies will rely on the literature review of the assimilation and multicultural theories in order to assess which integration policies are promoted in each leader's rhetoric.

The assessment of party rhetoric will be conducted through an extensive review of the literature on the primary ideological themes articulated in language patterns found in speeches, interviews, statements, and media appearances given by Jean-Marie Le Pen (and to a lesser extent, Marine Le Pen) and Geert Wilders. This literature review is based on studies that examine each leader's systematic rhetorical use of symbolism, allusions, and linguistic cues, which this study will relate to the assimilationist and multicultural theories outlined in the integration theory literature review. The Front National case study relies primarily on assimilation keywords and key themes derived from the literature review of assimilation theory. This literature review, found in chapter 2, indicates that prominent terms in assimilation theory include derivatives of the word "nation" (i.e. "nationality", "national pride", "national unity", and "national identity"); references to "acculturation" (i.e. the immigrant's responsibility for adopting the mainstream culture and thereby developing the ability to function according to mainstream social norms); assumptions about generational integration (or criticism of its shortcomings); and criticism of immigrant residential patterns (i.e. the formation of "ethnic neighborhoods"), and the accommodation of immigrant culture by the host society. Likewise, the Dutch Party for Freedom case study focuses on references detected in the literature review of multicultural theory. This

review, also found in chapter 2, points to the concept of “political correctness”; the state's sponsorship of “cultural recognition” (i.e. state subsidized diversity programs); multiculturalism's impact on gender and minority rights (i.e. threat to women and homosexuals); references to threatened social cohesion and the state's excessive accommodation of immigrant culture, traditions and languages as key themes found in multicultural theory.

A significant point of departure of the two political parties chosen for each case study - number of years of party existence - needs also be acknowledged. While the French Front National was established in 1973, the Dutch Party for Freedom was created in 2006. Evidently, the period available for the scholarly analysis of Jean-Marie Le Pen's rhetoric is considerably longer than for studies of Geert Wilders' rhetoric, providing this study with substantially wealthier sources of secondary published works on the Le Pen's anti-immigrant rhetoric. Therefore, while data will be primarily obtained from secondary scholarly publications, such as books and journal articles, that address Le Pen' and Wilders' rhetoric, this study will also draw from newspaper coverage and other web-based sources as a means to support the themes discussed by scholarly publications and to supplement rhetorical analysis that has not been chronicled by academics. The former methodology will be primarily applied to the first case study, where I will utilize secondary sources that cover a time-period between the early 1980s, when Jean-Marie Le Pen's rhetoric became notably less militant, and consistent to his present-day rhetoric, to 2011, when his daughter Marine Le Pen took leadership of the Front National. The latter methodology is more prevalent in the analysis of Geert Wilders' rhetorical style due to the more recent nature of his anti-immigrant campaign. Thus, the Dutch case study will employ a

systematic approach to rhetorical analysis that will gather information from two of the most prominent English-language Dutch newspapers - Radio Netherlands Worldwide and Dutch News Online – and two prominent non-Dutch newspapers that provide extensive coverage of Wilders’ rhetoric – the liberal New York Times and conservative Daily Telegraph – as sources of primary research.

In order to obtain consistent data to support my hypothesis, I will detect a percentage of times Wilders mentions anti-multicultural and pro-assimilation themes in news articles written about his immigration policies (rather than articles referencing Wilders' views on strictly to non-immigration subjects). This search will cover the period between the PVV's formation in 2006 and the completion of this study, in April of 2012. I select all articles that include the word “immigration” and direct quotes by Wilders. Then, the article is analyzed to determine whether Wilders’ quotes refer to anti-multicultural or pro-assimilationist concepts as defined in the literature review of each integration approach. Lastly, it should be noted that I have paid particular attention to eliminating the problem of “double counting” identical quotes by crosschecking quotes between all four newspapers sources. In instances where two or more newspapers report an identical quote, said quote will only be added to the percentage of one of the newspapers.

In an attempt to maintain balance, both case studies study will also draw from both left and right leaning domestic and international publications such as the *Washington Post*, *Foreign Policy*, the *BBC News*, and *Al Jazeera*. In France, newspaper sources will include mainstream publications *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, as well as other English-language, web-based news from

Radio France Internationale and *France 24*. Other sources for Dutch news will be mainstream newspapers *Algemeen Dagblad* and *De Telegraaf*. While English language news articles will be utilized as available, translation will be conducted for all non-English sources. Websites such as YouTube will be used for video recordings of party leader interviews and speeches. Party language and platforms will also be obtained from each party's official website.

Expectations

My main hypothesis is that both sets of EPR leaders will reject the approaches currently employed by their governments as reasons for the unsuccessful immigrant integration efforts in both countries. Furthermore, I expect Jean-Marie Le Pen and Geert Wilders to promote a nationalistic assimilation approach. Lastly, I anticipate that both leaders support adopting a differing approach to integration than is currently present in their countries.

In the case of the French assimilation, I expect Le Pen to uphold the classic criticisms against the assimilation approach, such as its overly simplistic view of integration, dangerous threat of ethnic repression, “nation-destroying” tendencies, and contribution to socially detached generations of immigrant children. On the contrary, I expect Geert Wilders to agree with critics of the multicultural approach who argue that multiculturalism promotes a disproportionate accommodation of immigrant culture and emphasis on the protection of minority culture, as well as counters the reality that the state is unable to equally recognize all cultures, and promotes the socially self-defeating trend of political correctness.

Thesis Outline

This thesis is composed of six chapters: the current introduction, a literature review addressing the rhetoric of extreme populist-right movements in Western Europe, an overview of the theoretical formations of assimilation and multiculturalism, two case studies (France's Front National and the Netherlands' Freedom Party), and a conclusion.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical formations of the assimilation and multiculturalism approaches, respectively. The first section of each theory's overview discusses their most prominent authors and arguments. Then, a discussion of the primary critics and shortcomings of each theory aids in the identification of elements that will be later analyzed in each party's rhetoric.

Chapter 3 consists of an extensive literature review that addresses the effects of political communication on voting predispositions. Based on theories of political communication, I detect the primary techniques used by EPR parties to formulate their anti-immigrant rhetoric and gain electoral support. I use these techniques to explore the right wing rhetoric in each distinct integration environment. This discussion of political communication serves as a basis for the case studies' analysis of each party's rhetoric and linguistic strategies.

Chapters 4 and 5 will consist of two case studies: France's National Front and the Netherlands' Freedom Party, respectively. Each case study will be structured in the following manner: a brief overview of the country's immigration history and the historical formation of its integration approach introduce the underlying assumptions and concepts that comprise the

philosophies behind its current integration policies, which will also be briefly outlined. Then, based on the literature review's assessment of the criticisms of each theory, the case studies will address the current shortcomings assimilation and multiculturalism in French and Dutch societies, respectively. Next, a brief introduction to party history and rhetoric will be followed by an in-depth analysis that will detect references to the described shortcomings of integration theories in the rhetoric of Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. The final section of each case study will draw a connection between the exposed shortcomings of integration policies and their usage in each party's rhetoric. Lastly, the case studies will analyze Le Pen's and Wilders' political rhetoric in relation to both integration approaches in order to present a holistic understanding of the integration approaches criticized by and proposed in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of each leader.

The sixth and final chapter will discuss the findings of both case studies, drawing any similarities and conclusions between both integration approaches and both parties' rhetoric. Lastly, I will address any suggestions for future studies.

CHAPTER II: INTEGRATION POLICY THEORIES

Introduction

The process that takes place when, as Milton Gordon (1964: 60) puts it, “peoples meet”, has prompted a multidisciplinary debate from which two dominant approaches have emerged: assimilation and multiculturalism. The concept of individual and group identity, central to both integration approaches, emerged during the post-revolutionary period in the United States and Europe when the ruling aristocratic order was replaced by a system based on nationality and later ethnicity (Sollors 1989, xii). The concept of ethnicity first appeared in print in 1941 and has, since then, been viewed as a “natural” and “stable” social construction that is the center of immigrant integration policy (Gordon 1964).

According to assimilation theory, the meeting of diverse cultural groups leads to Israel Zangwill's (1909: 37, 199) concept of the “melting pot”, where cultures “melt” and blend into the formation of a new culture.² In contrast, multiculturalism theory challenges the idea of the melting pot by claiming that cultural and ethnic differences are not only important but should be celebrated, thus creating the notion of a “salad bowl” where identities mix but ultimately retain their original shapes (Lyman 1992: 181). Therefore, the French assimilation approach proposes the jettisoning of the immigrant's traditional culture for the adoption of the new host society's culture and language, whereas the Dutch multicultural approach supports the preservation of immigrants' heritage, practices and identities by the host society (Lambert et al 1990; Kymlicka

² Quoted in Milton Gordon 1964: 121

1995, 2001). The following discussion of each respective integration approach contains an overview of their theoretical foundations, followed by the most prominent arguments against each perspective.

Assimilation Theory

One of the earliest definitions of assimilation identified it as a process of “making like”, or blending diverse cultures and ethnicities, thereby creating a seemingly homogenous group. A second definition referred to assimilation as the minority’s “incorporation” or “take up” of majority culture (Park 1950: 204). While early anthropological studies (see Gordon 1964: 61) pointed to “acculturation” as the result of contact by individuals of different cultures, the concept of immigrant assimilation is originally associated with the 1920s Chicago school and the work of American sociologists Robert E. Park, W.I. Thomas, and Ernest Burgess (Alba 1997; Waters and Jimenez 2005). Park and Burgess provided an early definition of the concept in 1921:

Assimilation is a process of interpretation and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life (Gordon 1964: 62).

Robert E. Park and the Race Relations Cycle

Robert E. Park (1950) believed assimilation “facilitates the intermingling of the different elements of the population”, thereby promoting national loyalty, solidarity, and empowering the

individual to associate with diverse groups by eliminating social taboos associated with “strange groups” (206). Park elaborated on assimilation's benefits to the immigrant by using the analogy of a dog, who, “without a master is a dangerous animal”, but after domestication becomes a “member of society” (206). Likewise, the assimilation of the immigrant provides him/her with the same “sort of practical working relations with the group to which he [sic] belongs” (207). In a later definition of assimilation, Park added that assimilation's full realization requires the ability of the immigrant to become fully involved in a society's political, economic and social life without facing discrimination (Gordon 1964: 63).

Park's (1950) concept of the race-relations cycle addressed not only the relations between ethnically and culturally diverse groups - a phenomenon primarily caused by migration and colonization- but specifically between groups of individuals who are conscious of such differences. The race relations cycle includes five irreversible steps of minority integration: contact, competition, conflict, accommodation, and eventual assimilation. Park (1950: 114-5, 208-9) stresses the importance of intermarriage and interbreeding as a requirement for the formation of a “single ethnic community”. Furthermore, Park argues the most difficult obstacles to assimilation are skin color, which acts as a visible sign of ethnic difference, and the tendency of a foreigner's “offensive”, rather than positive, traits to make lasting impressions, eventually leading to “natural prejudices” by the native population.

Winefred Raushenbush, also of the Chicago School, attributed the failure of assimilation to immigrant groups' “ignorant tactlessness”, claiming that “the first rule in the book of etiquette on race relations” dictates immigrants “remain a very small element in the population” in order

to avoid alarm (Lyman 1968: 17). According to Park, another means of avoiding friction between native and immigrant populations is through the establishment of interpersonal relationships between members of the two groups, a concept further discussed by Milton Gordon.

Although prominent in sociology's study of immigrant integration, several critics reject Park's race-relations cycle as ambiguous. Revisionists of assimilation theory also question Park's assumption that the process of assimilation is linear, standard among diverse settings, and inevitable in multi-ethnic societies (Barth and Noel 1972; Stone 1985; Lyman 1992; Alba and Nee 1997). Furthermore, academics dispute the notion that a minority's adoption of the host society's culture ensures acceptance by the native population (Lyman 1968).

Milton Gordon and Straight-Line Assimilation

Milton Gordon's influential *Assimilation in American Life* (1964) expanded Park's notion of assimilation by describing it as a "straight-line", multi-stage process in which immigrants either entirely adopt the mainstream culture, norms, and behavior of host society, or join a "melting pot" where, collectively with the mainstream population, a new culture is formed. In both cases the host society remains entirely unaltered, while each generation of descendants becomes more assimilated than the previous (Alba and Nee 1997; Waters and Jimenez 2005; Brown and Bean 2006).

Following are Gordon's (1964: 71) seven steps of assimilation:

1. Cultural: acculturation, or a change in cultural patterns to those of host society.
2. Structural: entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of host society.

3. Marital: amalgamation, or large-scale intermarriage.
4. Identificational: development of sense of peoplehood based on host society.
5. Attitude receptional: absence of prejudice
6. Behavior receptional: absence of discrimination
7. Civic: absence of value and power conflict

Gordon's (1964: 77-81) model indicated that cultural assimilation, or acculturation, is normally the first step in the assimilation process. This stage is slowed by spatial, educational and economic segregation, all central variables to modern assimilation theory. Next is structural assimilation, which Gordon believed naturally triggers intermarriage, in turn leading to the loss of ethnic boundaries, and consequently the eradication of prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. Gordon's 7-step process would be later reflected in the work of contemporary assimilation theorists, as discussed below.

Contemporary Measurements of Assimilation

Recent literature on assimilation includes a large body of work (Gans 1992, Glazer 1993, Portes and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 1997, Rumbaut 1997, and Brubaker 2001). Prominent theorists have drawn from Park's and Gordon's theories in order to measure advanced levels of assimilation. Recent works measure advanced assimilation according to the transcendence of social boundaries between immigrant and native populations, which act as obstacles to the immigrant assimilation's process. These categories are: linguistic, socioeconomic, spatial, and occupational assimilation, as well as intermarriage.

Linguistic assimilation refers to the acquisition of the host society's language. Bean & Stevens (2006) find a strong positive correlation between an immigrant's generation and his or her level of language fluency. Studies on linguistic acquisition have led to the “third generation model of assimilation”, which claims that first generation immigrants speak predominantly their native tongue, whereas the second generation is bilingual, and the third generation speaks predominantly the language of the host society (Alba 1995).

Socioeconomic assimilation includes the immigrant's income and education levels in comparison to mainstream society. This category also includes occupational assimilation, which denotes the decline of ethnic niches in professional specializations. An obstacle to socioeconomic assimilation can be “entry policies that admit large numbers of immigrants with low levels of education,” which can “exacerbate crowding in the labor market, thus slowing economic mobility” (Brown and Bean 2006). Likewise, economic mobility, and by extension, economic integration, can be blocked by what Brown and Bean (2006) refer to as the “racial/ethnic disadvantage”. Nathan Glazer, Patrick Moynihan, and Alejandro Portes describe this “racialization” of immigrants, or ethnic and racial discrimination in the labor market and other spheres, as more apparent to later generations than to first-wave immigrants (Brown and Bean 2006).

Spatial assimilation links the increased trend of suburbanization and growth in residential distance between immigrants to the decline of ethnic neighborhoods (Alba 1995). Massey's (1985) spatial assimilation model indicates that higher socioeconomic attainment, longer residence, and later generations correlate with increased residential sprawl.

Rooted in the notion of amalgamation is intermarriage, a phenomenon viewed as the “litmus test of assimilation”, or the primary indicator of the ultimate transcendence of ethnic and social group boundaries (see Crevecoeur 1782 ; Zangwill 1922 ; Gordon 1964; Lieberman and Waters 1988; Alba 1995; Brubaker 2001; Perlmann and Waters 2004; Waters and Jimenez 2005, Safi and Rogers 2008). Furthermore, intermarriage leads to ethnically mixed children and, consequently, future generations whose ethnicities is a smaller determinant of their identities (see: Gordon 1964; Gilbertson et. al 1991; Alba 1995; Lee and Bean 2004; and Waters and Jimenez 2005; Safi and Rogers 2008).

Criticism and New-Wave Assimilation

Since its conception, critics have rejected the assimilation approach as an ethnocentric, arrogant, patronizing, overly simplistic, and biased view of immigrant integration (Warner and Srole 1945; Taylor 1992; Glazer 1993; Alba 1997; Brubaker 2001). Glazer (1993) discusses the unpopularity of the term assimilation, which Warner and Srole (1945) claim describes the integration process as the “unlearning” of immigrants' “inferior cultural traits” (Alba 1997). Brubaker (2001) claims assimilation's classical definition disproportionately focuses on the end result of complete absorption, a historically unsuccessful approach that has inspired policies that failed to generate “assimilationist outcomes”.

Critics also reject assimilation in extreme forms as dangerous, leading to ethnic repression, violence, and in the worst cases, ethnic cleansing. In 1994, Walker Connor claimed

the imposition of assimilation, or “nation-building”, is in reality “nation-destroying”, as “ethnic groups rather than the states were the real nations” (Levy 2000: 42). Brubaker (1996) would later coin the term the “nationalizing state” to refer to states that impose assimilation in order to cope with religious, cultural and ethnic cleavages. Critics view the imposition of assimilation as a threat to minorities, dissenters, and members of minority groups who wish to become detached from group affiliation. In extreme cases, such imposition is believed to generate anti-immigrant violence and minority uprisings (Levy 2000).

Recent proponents of assimilation have attempted to reformulate its definition by distancing the concept from its negative connotations (see Morowska 1994; Barkan 1995; Kazal 1995; Alba and Nee 1997, Brubaker 2001, Waters and Jimenez 2005, Brown and Bean 2006). Such interpretations point to the mutual cultural transformation and adaptation undergone by both immigrant and native populations, proposing that assimilation “need not imply the obliteration of all traces of ethnic origins” (Alba 1995).

Recent literature also emphasizes the process of growing similarity between group cultures, not the degree to which immigrants shed their cultural heritage to adopt the mainstream culture. Such argument addresses the criticism that the assimilationist argument of “this is how we do things here” is, in and of itself, an insufficient justification for the imposition of the mainstream culture (Taylor 1992; Barry 2001). Brubaker (2001) rejects the classic idea that “identificational assimilation”, a concept defined by Gordon (1964: 71) as “the development of a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the host society”, is a central component of assimilation. Instead, Brubaker explains that the realization of the previously discussed goals of

assimilation do not have to necessarily imply the “complete acculturation” of immigrants.

Furthermore, contemporary assimilation theorists challenge the classic “straight-line” theory of generational assimilation in light of continuous immigration patterns. The noted individual-level variation in the sense of belonging and commitment immigrants feel toward the host society is also presented as a weakness in the claims of straight-line theorists who propose uniform levels of assimilation depend solely upon generational membership (Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998; Brubaker 2001; Walters and Jimenez 2005).

Multiculturalism

Although multiculturalism is a relatively new term in the mainstream sociological vernacular, having been preceded by the concept of cultural pluralism until the late 20th century, its roots date back to the 16th century's separation of church and state, and the Enlightenment's ideals of civil, political, social, and economic rights, tolerance, and equality. The establishment of the democratic society was accompanied by a shift in self-identification, and as the individual's identity became detached from religious and socioeconomic factors, the notions of individualism, self-worth, and dignity became prominent in the building blocks of society (Taylor 1992).

Multiculturalism's previous embodiment, cultural pluralism, has been practiced since the 19th century in immigrant churches, schools, newspapers, and social groups where native languages were spoken with the aim of accommodating diverse ethnic groups (Gordon 1964:

134). The practice was strengthened after World War II, when a human rights debate surfaced, indicating the need for the rights and defense of all individuals, not just minorities, from persecution and discrimination (Kymlicka 1995; Ivison 2010). Furthermore, as a result of assimilation's negative consequences on immigrant children, such as the development of “ethnic self-hatred”, “family disorganization”, alienation from parents, and juvenile delinquency, the adoption of multiculturalism in numerous immigrant countries became increasingly widespread (Gordon 1964: 138).

Early Proponents

American sociologists and philosophers of the early 20th century, such as Horace Kallen, Randolph Bourne, and, Norman Hapgood emphasized the equality of cultures, as well as the importance of immigrant heritage and its contribution to the American cultural landscape (Gordon 1964; Lyman 1992). Kallen, who is credited with coining the term 'cultural pluralism' in 1924, defended the concept as a result of the democratic system where “individuals are implicated in groups, and democracy for the individual must, by extension, also mean democracy for his (sic) group” (Gordon 1964: 142).

During the 1970s and 1980s, the term multiculturalism gradually replaced the concept of cultural pluralism, and became embedded in the integration policy of numerous Western immigration states. According to Ivison (2010), the three primary categories within the multicultural approach have been protective multiculturalism, which attempts to preserve the

cultural heritage of minority groups for their protection; imperial multiculturalism, which relies on a hierarchical system that perceives cultural minorities as homogenous and “not expected to challenge the basic legitimacy of the state”; and liberal multiculturalism, the approach predominantly adopted by Western European states since the 1980s, a phenomenon expressed by Will Kymlicka’s (1999: 113) famous assertion that “multiculturalists have won the day”.

Modern Proponents

Modern cultural relativists of the multicultural approach believe that local, regional, religious and ethno-racial affiliations compose human identity in a more holistic and meaningful way than do national affiliations. However, a primary schism within the multicultural approach is between cosmopolitanism and pluralism. While cosmopolitanism focuses on the individual and his/her ability to simultaneously belong to numerous groups, pluralism focuses on single-group membership. Hollinger's (1995: 106) postethnic theory supports the idea of cosmopolitanism by emphasizing the “several 'we's' of which the individual is a part”.

However, the universal notion behind liberal multiculturalism is the concept of cultural preservation as a means of promoting classic liberal ideas such as tolerance and equality. Prominent defenders of liberal multiculturalism such as Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and Joseph Raz argue that cultural recognition and protection are necessary to ensure the welfare and freedom of the individual, as well as for the stability of the globalized world (Kymlicka 1995;

Iverson 2010). Taylor (1992) supports such argument by stating that a lack of cultural recognition can be oppressive, as human identity is shaped by and dependent upon our society.

Contemporary proponents of multiculturalism have criticized Kymlicka and others for having an “overly homogenous' view of culture”, a notion perceived as a weakness of the classic liberal approach (Iverson 2010). For instance, Hollinger (1995) challenges the validity of multiculturalism's proper recognition of all ethnicities by claiming the approach fails to recognize cultures that transcend the acceptance of mainstream society. In *Postethnic America* (1995: 7, 12-3), he claims the concept of identity should therefore be replaced with the concept of “affiliation by revocable consent”, which he argues is a more flexible system of fostering “communities of consent”, and thereby resists the “pluralist temptation” to categorize society as a multitude of internally homogeneous cultural groups, a prominent concept later discussed by critics of multiculturalism.

Levy (2000: 32) also questions elements of liberal multiculturalism by suggesting that cultural and ethnic diversity should be viewed as an “inevitable fact of life, not as a goal to be furthered by means of state policy”. Inspired by the tenets of protective multiculturalism, Levy's “multiculturalism of fear” proposes that diversity should be addressed through pragmatic state policies intended to avoid ethnic suppression and violence, rather than by the current dominant approach of “multiculturalism of rights and recognition”, whose primary intention is to preserve and celebrate ethnic identities. An alternative approach to diversity policy is Barry's (2001) “strategy of privatization”, in which the state acts as a neutral actor that serves as a mediator of cultural conflicts, instead of a promoter of cultural diversity (Joppke 2004).

Criticism of Multiculturalism

While criticism of the multicultural approach has traditionally originated from ‘cultural conservatives’, it is multiculturalism's leftist proponents who have recently questioned what Brubaker (2001) calls its “absolutization” (see Gitlin 1995, Hollinger 1995, Brubaker and Cooper 2000), and its implications on issues of national security, gender rights, and social cohesion (Iverson 2010). According to critics, a primary consequence of multiculturalism's emphasis on cultural recognition is the overwhelming degree to which the 20th century phenomenon of political correctness has permeated multicultural societies, generating the disproportionate accommodation of minority cultures.

According to Hughes (1993: 149), the 19th and 20th century European “invention of tradition”, or the blending of historical accounts with constructed national “myths”, aimed to generate national self-esteem – a concept also entitled “imagined communities” by Benedict Anderson. However, the confrontation of such tradition with the surfacing of the concept of political correctness created a sense of separatism that rendered the positive practice of cultural recognition into a merely symbolic concept. Hughes (1993: 84) believes that the intended ideal behind multiculturalism – the promotion of a collaboration and mixture of cultures – has “gone sour”, hijacked by proponents of political correctness. Consequently, he claims, multiculturalism has turned into a separatist tool whose resentful rejection of dialogue is “doomed to fail”.

Critics believe that another consequence of the multicultural state's adoption of political correctness is the disappearance of its traditional cultural neutrality. Joppke (2004) questions the

reasoning behind the state's jettisoning of “difference-blind” politics by arguing that states were sufficiently capable of accommodating religious and cultural conflicts before the adoption of multicultural integration policies. Arguments such as his claim that the state-sponsored cultural and linguistic protection is unnecessary since, unlike religion, individuals may adopt more than one culture and language, and therefore such conflicts do not pose a threat to individual identity (Zolberg and Long 1999; Joppke 2004). Therein arises the accusation that multiculturalism's disproportionate emphasis on cultural identity creates the illusion that all disadvantage is caused by the failure of the state to ensure cultural recognition. According to Hollinger (1995: 102), such extreme catering to cultural identities has created “the ironic result of diversifying diversity to the point that the ethno-racial pentagon can no longer contain it”. In this view, multiculturalism is thus seen as the culprit for the neglect of other important types of discrimination, such as those related to socioeconomic inequalities (Scheffer 2000; Barry 2001).

Another problematic shortcoming of multicultural theory is its restrictive influence on the liberal society's ability to impose its values on illiberal minority groups. Kukathas (1995: 251) illustrates such a dilemma by pointing out that “by liberal standards there may be injustice within some cultural communities: Freedom of worship may not be respected, women may have opportunities closed off to them; and the rights of individuals to express themselves may be severely restricted”. According to this argument, the nature of multicultural values of “tolerance” and “acceptance” renders the multicultural state unable to impose such values without violating its own political rhetoric. The multicultural state is thereby bounded by its own philosophical beliefs to tolerate what it deems intolerable practices. Critics explain that such catch-22

demonstrates a primary weakness of multiculturalism: the unilateral nature of cultural recognition in the multicultural state.

Multiculturalism's failure to address the necessity for reciprocal recognition is a primary point of contention between the approach's supporters and critics, the latter of whom accuse multiculturalism of placing a disproportionate focus on the majority's acceptance of the minority culture (Kymlicka 1991; Taylor 1992; Sartori 2000; Joppke 2004). An opposing argument of assimilationist roots proposes instead that in situations of conflict between majority and minority traditions, "the controversial immigrant custom has to retreat" (Parekh 2000: 272). Yet another argument claims that cultural recognition and protection is only appropriate for "historically wronged" domestic groups, and is thus entirely dismissible for "voluntary" immigrants (Joppke 2004: 243; Kymlicka 1999: 113). According to Levy (2000: 33), the classic "'multiculturalism of rights' sometimes leaves too little room for flexibility in institutional design, and sometimes gives too much leeway to symbolic insults". Such system is also viewed as granting too many rights without requiring proportional duties and obligations of its citizens (Hughes 1993).

Critics of multiculturalism also reject the argument that the state is able to equally and simultaneously recognize all cultures. Such an undertaking would require individuals to acknowledge the worth of other cultures from a nonexistent culturally neutral and separate realm in which their worldview is entirely independent of the society to which he/she belongs. Practical examples of this inability lie in a state's official language, predominant philosophies and views, judicial system, and political institutions, all of which naturally reflect the imposed culture of a majority group. Furthermore, a culture's inherent values of 'true' and 'false', 'right' and 'wrong' –

or what Barry (2001: 270) calls “propositional content” – prevents individuals from neutrally addressing cultures as equally valuable (also see Taylor 1992; Gray 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Levy 2000; Barry 2001). Sartori (2000: 69) contributes to this argument by claiming that attributing “equal value” to every culture renders the concept of value meaningless: “if everything is of value, nothing is of value: the value loses its content”. Levy crystallizes the argument by arguing that the state should not be concerned with recognizing the value or worth of each culture.

Assimilation and Multiculturalism Terms and Concepts

The primary aim of this study is to detect the use of concepts associated with and criticisms against the two discussed integration approaches. Derived from the above discussion of each theory and their criticisms, the following two tables will serve as guides for the central criticisms against each theory, and as a list of the key words that will be analyzed in the language assessment conducted in chapters 4 and 5.

Table 2: Integration Policy Criticisms and Counterarguments

Assimilation	Multiculturalism
Ethnocentric, arrogant, patronizing, overly simplistic, and biased view of immigrant integration.	State-sponsored cultural and linguistic protection is unnecessary as their conflict do not pose a threat to identity.
Disproportionate focus on the end result of complete absorption.	Political correctness has generated the disproportionate accommodation of minority cultures and silenced inter-cultural dialogue.
Dangerous: its extreme versions lead to ethnic repression, violence, and in the worst cases, ethnic cleansing.	Emphasis on cultural protection leads to neglect of other important types of non-cultural discrimination, such as those related to socioeconomic inequalities.
Seen as “nation-destroying” (“ethnic groups, rather than states, are the real nations”)	Multiculturalism binds the state to its own liberal beliefs, leaving it unable to impose its values on what it deems illiberal groups.
Individual-level variation exists in the sense of belonging and commitment immigrants feel toward the host society	Seen as placing a disproportionate focus on the majority’s acceptance of the minority culture.
Causes children to rebel against his/her ethnic identity, family structure and parents, leading to juvenile delinquency.	The state is unable to equally and simultaneously recognize all cultures.
The argument of “this is how we do things here” is, in and of itself, an insufficient justification for the imposition of the mainstream culture.	

Table 3: Integration Policy Key Words

Assimilation	Multiculturalism
Nation (nation-building, nationalism, national unity, national identity, etc).	Political correctness
Acculturation (i.e. Immigrant's responsibility for acquiring mainstream culture).	State-sponsored cultural recognition (diversity programs, language programs, cultural diversity in public schools)
Generational integration.	Threats to majority culture (threats also to women and homosexuals).
Intermarriage.	Excessive accommodation of immigrant traditions.
Residential patterns (ghettos, slums, ethnic neighborhoods).	Attack of liberal values

While research-based academic criticisms of each integration approach are bound to differ from the political criticisms crafted to persuade voters and gather popular support, the former serve as a road map for the analysis of the arguments EPR parties use in their rhetoric concerning immigrant integration. In fact, the noted academic criticisms of the multicultural and assimilation approaches further illustrate how Front National and Party for Freedom leaders expectedly formulate their integration arguments. This chapter's overview of each theoretical approach supports the expectation that, as anti-multicultural criticisms fall directly in line with the previously discussed anti-immigration arguments of nationalist EPR parties in Western Europe, the FN and the PVV will reject all integration policies derived from or associated with the multicultural approach. Instead, the classic EPR emphasis on national identity, the creation of a homogenous society, and the minority's incorporation of the majority culture are directly inspired by the classic assimilation arguments of Robert E. Park and Milton Gordon. Therefore,

these philosophical foundations lead me to expect both the Front National and the Dutch Party for Freedom to embrace assimilationist policies that promote the mainstream native culture rather than policies inspired by ideals such as cultural relevance and diversity. Although the political figures in one of the case studies, France, are faced with a country that has traditionally practiced the nationalistic assimilation approach, I expected them to nevertheless criticize the current integration policies implemented in their countries as insufficient to generate effective integration and lead to national, economic, and cultural security. I expect a focus on the cultural values of the nation to be a primary component of such rhetoric in both case studies.

As explained in the introduction, EPR parties in Western Europe have historically argued that the state should not become politically correct to the point of becoming unable to properly enforce its basic liberal traditions. This argument is the basis for the discussion regarding whether multiculturalism's emphasis on tolerance undermines the West's ability to reject “questionable” values and traditions practiced by immigrant groups. Therefore, I not only expect the FN and the PVV to promote assimilationist tenets in the rhetoric, but I also expect EPR leaders such as Le Pen and Wilders to argue that multiculturalism's emphasis on acceptance could potentially lead to security concerns and the failure to protect certain minorities (i.e. women, homosexuals, and children). Ultimately, I expect that both leaders will entirely reject all elements associated with the multicultural integration approach in order to promote the tenets of classic assimilationism as proposed by Park, Milton, and their colleagues. In their criticism of multiculturalism, each party leader is expected to promote national homogeneity and the complete incorporation of the mainstream culture, while rejecting the notion that immigrant

cultures and traditions should be portrayed, alongside the native culture, as equally legitimate and respectable.

I will now momentarily set aside these expectations in order to present an overview of some classic theories of political communication that will facilitate the identification of the main rhetorical techniques used by political actors to gain popular support in their respective integration contexts.

CHAPTER III: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND RHETORICAL TECHNIQUES

Introduction

The anti-immigrant rhetoric of the French Front National and Dutch Freedom Party finds its basis on the literature of political communication and the use of rhetoric to generate political support for specific single-issues. Therefore, a review of the literature on the formulation of EPR's rhetoric in Western Europe is in order. This chapter begins with an overview of the literature on political communication and political rhetoric, followed by a look at the components of EPR rhetoric used to mobilize voter grievances against immigration in Western Europe.

The Basics of Political Rhetoric

Studies in political communication explore how communication is used strategically to influence public knowledge, sentiments, and political action (Swanson and Nimmo, 1990, for a survey of the field). Kriesi (2004: 188) describes political communication as a “process of agenda building in which political actors, the media and the public present information, demands, appeals, and arguments”. Within the field of political communication, researchers have focused on areas such as campaign management, political advertisement, and political rhetoric. Each focus area has also been investigated from both a messenger and receiver perspective, with the former addressing the tactics and aims of political communicators, and the latter researching how the information is received and processed by its target audience.

Research in the area of political rhetoric focuses primarily on linguistic techniques used by politicians who aim to generate popular support. Edelman (1993: 130) argues that language gives events and actions a distinct meaning that is context specific and is determined by the “needs and interests of the audiences involved, and of their respective modes of perception”. Therefore, politics and language are viewed as interconnected: language simultaneously shapes and is composed of key political characteristics such as power relations (i.e. authority and influence), social roles, and ambiguous meanings. In this manner, speech reaffirms constructed social concepts such as the idea of “us” versus “them” in an inherently political fashion (See Bell 1975; Corcoran 1990). Such poststructuralist view of political language emphasizes the “struggle over meaning, status, power, and resources”, and affirms that rhetorical language is ultimately used to “privilege some and exploit others” while maintaining the political status quo (Corcoran 1990: 70).

The Intentions of Rhetoric

According to Fisher (1970: 134), political rhetoric is shaped by an actor's motives as much as by the political context. The motive may stem from the actor's desire to create, revitalize, correct, or undermine an “image”, or ideology. However, political rhetoric is used regardless of whether an actor’s intentions are sincere (Krabs and Jackson 2007). Ultimately, the primary objective of political actors in “audience democracies”³ where the public influences the

³ Bernard Manin (1995, 279) describes the modern Western representative government as an “audience

policy-making process is to capture its attention, as public indifference is the biggest threat to any political cause or movement (Edelman 1988). Therefore, diverse actors use political communication to express rhetoric and, consequently, influence public opinion. The following section addresses the numerous techniques used by political actors in rhetoric formulation to gain popular support.

Rhetorical Techniques

Media-Centered Strategies

The influences public support through its airing of political advertisements created by politicians. Such advertisements normally emphasize a candidate's history of accomplishments, partisan identification, and ideology, including a specific ideological vocabulary. Political advertisements also promote a candidate's association with the cultural values and traditions of the population (Joslyn 1990). Such media-centered techniques require an element of surprise and good timing, as well as the delivery of a wealth of information and solutions to the public regarding a specific political issue.

According to Brader (2006), a viewer's reaction to a political advertisement is dependent upon whether the technique of fear or enthusiasm was used to captivate the audience and to appeal to collective emotion. Although the former is generally more common, Brader notes that the latter usually gathers more attention. While some advertisements tend to focus on a

candidate's virtues, others act solely as attack ads that focus on the opponent's shortcomings (Trent and Friedenbergr 1995). Furthermore, political advertisements often display dramatic themes to "attract attention, simplify problems, emphasize particular principles, and structure the responses of participants" (Bennett 1980: 386, quoted in Joslyn 1990: 102). Consequently, studies indicate that such language is primarily used to "arouse voting predispositions rather than to change voting intentions or behavior" (Edelman 1964: 122).

Rhetorical Myths

"Rhetorical myths," a term repeatedly discussed by experts in the field of rhetoric formulation (see Bruner 1960; Fisher 1970; Edelman 1971, 1977, 1988; Elder and Cobb 1983), refers to formulated stories with "facts" used in political rhetoric in order to advise the public on what to think as well as how to feel and act in a context of political uncertainty (Fisher 1970: 131). According to Fisher (1970), rhetorical communication addresses daily concerns of citizens but ultimately displays a fictional foundation that based on cultural contexts rather than empirical evidence. Fisher likens political rhetoric to literature as the political actor selects specific stories and wording to persuade the public of his/her "reality", rendering his/her views relevant within public discourse. Edelman (1977: 28) indicates that such "myths" within political rhetoric utilize linguistic cues that generate social tension and anxiety, and often lead to deceptive beliefs about the causes and nature of social problems. Although symbols hold a "range of diverse, often conflicting meanings" according to the respective audience, their appeal and persuasive effect are

dependent upon how well they are articulated within the creation of a “myth”, how much they resonate within the cultural context (i.e. through the use of key cultural concepts such as “free enterprise”, “bravery”, “tolerance”, “perseverance”, “individualism”), and how well they contribute to the rhetoric of enemy creation (to be further discussed later in the chapter) (Joslyn 1990).

Statistics such as unemployment and crime data are also manipulated to support bleak rhetorical “myths” regarding jobs and security concerns. Political figures employ statistical information in order to persuade the public of the importance and urgency of their arguments as well as to build consensus and gather support for their formulated myths, thereby overriding other social concerns (Edelman 1977). The tactic of “reality-creation” also includes the creation of the belief that social problems are separate from one another. Such technique is used to generate anxiety at the “random” nature of events, leaving people more susceptible to deceitful linguistic cues and political rhetoric (Edelman 1977: 43). According to Edelman (1988), the illusion that the problem has had a widespread impact on society is also a crucial component of convincing individuals that they are not suffering alone. In doing so, blame is placed on the “origin” of the problem, and a solution can then be created and sold to the public. Edelman explains: “unless their audience is receptive to the depiction of a condition as a problem, leaders and interest groups cannot use it to their advantage” (1988: 33). However, Edelman adds, “because a social problem is not a verifiable entity but a construction that furthers ideological interests, its explanation is bound to be part of the process of construction rather than a set of falsifiable propositions” (1988, 18). Such constructed solutions tend to be highly partisan and

polarizing in order to create an easily identifiable threat that may be exploited by parties to gather political support.

The Projection of Public Opinion

An interesting trend in rhetorical techniques is the psychological projection of politicians' ideology onto the public. Studies indicate that political figures refer to their beliefs as public opinion in order to make the public believe they share such concerns, even if such “opinions” are not entirely based factual evidence. Politicians apply this technique by exploiting prevalent public fears and hopes and by leading the public to believe they have developed such opinions through an intellectually autonomous process (Edelman 1977). Krebs and Jackson (2007: 39) assert that “targets of persuasive rhetorical moves [...] sincerely internalize new beliefs and consequently adopt new identities and preferences”. Through this tactic, politicians are able to adopt a “structured set of value terms employed in a political vocabulary to warrant action” (McGee 1985: 158). These “ideographs”, or specific political vocabulary within each respective ideology, use words such as “liberty”, “property”, and “rule of law” to impose a way of thinking on to the population. Such language is derived from specific historical contexts and appearing as specific buzz words repeatedly used by each respective politician to promote their particular ideology (McGee 1985). Although political rhetoric can create the illusion that new ideas have surfaced organically in a bottom-up fashion when in reality they are mostly nonexistent, rhetoric is most effective when it can awaken and reinforce otherwise dormant or suppressed opinions

(Edelman 1964; 2001). Persuasive rhetoric thus pushes the population to adopt the new concept or ideology presented by the actor, who utilizes terms and ideas from everyday life in order to establish an emotional connection with the population and carefully frame the new ideology as non-threatening.

Enemy Creation

One of the more dangerous rhetorical techniques, enemy creation, is derived from a myth created by political leaders to disproportionately focus on a group's existence as the source for diverse social problems, leading to the repression and even extermination of the blamed segment of the population. Berkowitz (1962) suggests that the portrayal of “an adversary group as dominant or all-powerful and another group as rightfully subordinate” generates “fear and presumably acquiescence” (Edelman 1971). The labeling of large groups of “unobservable” and “silent” people as culpable of a “problematic” existence amongst a society is often used to make unverifiable claims and accusations which become easy tools of dramatization (Edelman 1977: 29-30). This technique generates anxiety among followers who then become malleable and “reliant on dubious and conflicting cues”, and therefore support whatever rhetoric that benefits their most basic self-interests. Such rhetorical language reinforces the idea that a group is “inferior” or “dangerous” through the “repetition of false claims that the group somehow harms society” (Edelman 2001: 92). Enemy creation, as Edelman (1977: 35) so poignantly reminds us, is ultimately reliant on the use of words and verbal cues that relate symbols to ideas and cultural ideologies.

Crisis Creation

Similar to enemy creation, political rhetoric is also used for crisis creation, a technique in which political figures label a set of events as a national crisis, promoting the perception of social issues as unique and threatening events (Edelman 1977: 43). In such circumstances, politicians attempt to convince the public that a critical threat will compromise a particular national interest. Furthermore, politicians frame each crisis as an event unrelated to other political issues in order to increase the anxiety level of the general public who are led to believe such unpredictable crises require immediate political leadership. Therefore, a common tactic utilized by politicians is to exaggerate supposed threats from enemies they are often responsible for creating and promoting (Edelman 1977).

Relevancy to Daily Concerns

Edelman (1964) emphasizes the importance of relevancy to the population's concerns as a key to successful rhetoric. According to him, linguistic and iconic rhetorical symbolism must be relevant to "everyday lives, frustrations, and successes" in order to be meaningful (1988: 8). In other words, messages sent out by politicians must resonate with individuals' daily realities. Unsurprisingly, the most widely embraced rhetoric originates from figures that are able to "evoke and synthesize a large number of the experiences of concern to his (sic) audience" (Edelman 1964: 124).

The Use of Memorable Language

The ultimate tool of rhetorical communication is the use of hortatory language. Persuasive language makes use of “chronic repetition of clichés and stale phrases” to suppress critical thinking and facilitate political conformity (Edelman 1964: 124). Furthermore, language can be used to create symbolic relationships in the public's collective mind: labeling things, people and concepts makes people associate said subjects with certain values and connotations. Common terms like ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘public interest’, are used in rhetoric through promising or threatening language in order to ultimately gain popular support (Edelman 1964: 134). As previously stated, meanings do not exist in a cultural vacuum, but rather as part of “social situations, experiences, ideologies, and current psychological needs of those who process and those who originate language” (Edelman 2001: 78). Therefore, the meaning carried by words and phrases tend to be contextually based, and may depart from traditional dictionary definitions, provoking fear and anxiety in some and hope and contentment in others (Edelman 2001: 80). However, a universal trend exploited in hortatory language is the evocation of angry attitudes when people are exposed to angry or insulting language. “Ideologies, then, evoke stereotyped, often false, assumptions and beliefs, and the assumptions and beliefs are proclaimed as fact. When counter-evidence is presented, those who hold these beliefs are likely to express anger” (Edelman 2001: 87). Ultimately, Edelman (2001: 89) concludes, “language is not chiefly an instrument for promoting reasoned conclusions or rational political action, though it can serve those purposes”. Instead, it is primarily used to gather support or create an opposition. Therefore,

an empirical and logical argument may be less memorable than a particularly quotable phrase (Edelman 2001: 97).

The Role of Charismatic Leadership

Although this study focuses on the rhetorical techniques of two political figures, a brief note on leadership style and personality is certainly worth including. According to Edelman (1964) and Elder and Cobb (1983), the success of leadership is measured by the followers' expectations. The successful performance of leaders is based upon his/her ability to divert public attention to constructed problems and simultaneously introduce innovative solutions which citizens can easily follow (Edelman 1988). As various platforms are often composed of non-factual creations and myths, the leader's image, character, and delivery – including the “breadth of vocabulary, grammatical correctness, logical organization of arguments, eloquence, and use of slang” - may be more important than his/her knowledge and presentation of verifiable facts and substantive arguments (McGee 1985; Edelman 2001: 102).

Conclusion

Ultimately, persuasive political rhetoric in contemporary democracies demonstrates the recognition by political actors that public participation in the political realm is not only important but necessary for the democratic implementation of an ideology. Therefore, it is crucial that politicians effectively persuade the population of their respective ideologies. In order to do

accomplish such an aim, political figures use rhetoric to a) influence popular sentiments and b) influence other political actors (Rydgren 2003; Krebs and Jackson 2007). This chapter has indicated that the extreme populist right in Western Europe utilizes multiple techniques in order to gain support for their anti-immigrant views.

After reviewing the most prominent techniques used by political figures in their quest to persuade the population of a specific ideology and gain public support to implement such ideals, the next two case studies will analyze exactly how each respective party leader has employed these rhetorical techniques to discuss the limitations of the immigrant integration policies currently in place in their respective countries. A review of Jean-Marie Le Pen's, Marine Le Pen's, and Geert Wilders' use of these rhetorical techniques will indicate the manner in which they have employed the subject of integration policies and their shortcomings as part of their broader anti-immigrant platforms. The following case study will specifically address the ways in which the anti-immigration rhetoric formulated by the Front National has discussed France's assimilation approach. First, a brief overview of France's history of immigration, the philosophical formation of its current approach, and the consequent social problems it has created will serve as an introduction to the integration context present in France. Then, I will utilize the rhetorical techniques discussed in this chapter as a road map to the analysis of Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's anti-immigrant rhetoric. Lastly, I will draw a concluding connection between how each rhetorical technique employed by the Front National leaders is used to critique France's current approach to integration.

CHAPTER IV: ASSIMILATION THEORY IN FRANCE & THE FRONT NATIONAL

A Brief History of Immigration in France

France has welcomed large-scale immigration dating back to the last few decades of 19th century when the government began to contract unskilled workers from countries such as Belgium, Italy and Poland. Starting in World War II, France contracted over 2 million workers from countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal, and thousands more newcomers fled from Germany and Franco's rule in Spain (Fetzer 2000). In the early – mid 20th century, French employers began to recruit workers from French colonies in North Africa and bi-lateral agreements were made between France and countries of the Maghreb region, bringing in thousands of workers who mostly settled in cities like Lyon, Marseille and Paris. As the French economy was highly dependent upon immigrant labor at this time, French companies were eager to recruit foreign workers – many without legal papers (Freedman 2004). What was initially a temporary settlement of guest workers turned into a permanent move for several thousand immigrants who, after being granted amnesty by the French government, began to bring dependents and family members to join them in France. In 1974, as a consequence of poor economic conditions, growing unemployment, and an increased rejection of immigrants by French nationals, the French government halted the immigration. However, this did not stop further illegal immigration and the influx of immigrant families (Freedman 2004).

Several displays of anti-immigrant sentiment have occurred throughout France's long history of immigration, dating back to the turn of the 19th century. A wave of violence consisting of attacks and murders against the early Belgian and Italian immigrants erupted at the end of the 19th century. French authorities in the 1930s are known to have confined Spanish immigrants to concentration camps (Fetzer 2000: 53). The latest immigrant group to be the victims of anti-immigration violence in France are North African immigrants who settled in the *banlieues* of major French cities in the latter half of the 20th century and were victimized in incidents such as the 1973 riots in Marseille, which left eleven Algerians dead (Freedman 2004: 12).

Assimilation Policy: the French National Context

Historical & Philosophical Formation

The core French social values regarding society and citizenship date back to the 1789 Revolution, when French men and women died for the ideals of secularism, republicanism, and the famous motto of *liberté, égalité, et fraternité*: freedom, equality and fraternity. The revolutionary ideals of republicanism defined the nation "as a voluntary contract between free individuals", where citizens agree on basic ideals and sacrifice personal differences for the sake of national cultural unity, a philosophy derived from the writings of thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Giry 2006; Bowen 2007). The French approach to integration is thus an outcome of its history, philosophy and contemporary concerns which leads to the belief that religious and ethnic affiliations weaken the unison of a society (Giry 2006: 88). This idea has

been reinforced by the 1958 Constitution, which states that "the French Republic is one and indivisible" (Silverman 1992; Haddad & Balz 2006).

France's belief in egalitarianism has generated a law which makes it illegal to conduct polling or census based on ethnic, racial or religious information, the last census recording religious statistics having been conducted in 1872 (Giry 2006: 89). This approach is also derived from the time of the Enlightenment, when religion became a private matter detached from the public political sphere (Kastoryano 2004). At the end of the 19th century, the separation of church and state in France removed the Church's influence over public education, health, and law. In 1905, the concept of *laïcité* – or secularism – became the legislative guide to public education, creating the philosophy that the primary objective of public schools is to raise French citizens as active members of civil society (Marcus 1995). Public school teachers are therefore guided to teach religion solely as a “sociological phenomenon” (Giry 2006: 89). Such approach to education has been associated with “the sometimes brutally homogenizing aspirations and practices of Jacobin Republicanism” (Brubaker 2003) For instance, French teachers of the Third Republic were accused of humiliating student speakers of foreign languages (Brubaker 2003).

Contemporary Applications of Assimilation: Current Government Policies

From the 19th-20th centuries, the French integration system focused on aiding immigrants in areas such as public education, military service and the workplace. In the 1950s, the French government created groups such as the Social Action Fund (*Fonds d'action Sociale*, FAS) to

promote the linguistic and physical integration of Algerian immigrants to French society (Lyons 2009: 65). In the 1980s, under the wing of the *Parti Socialiste*, a pluralist approach to cultural diversity was promoted. At this point, the French still believed that the influx of immigrants was temporary, and workers would return to their countries of origin eventually. Such belief led to the teaching of foreign “mother” languages in public schools in preparation for immigrant children's return to their homelands (Bowen 2007: 66). Zones of Educational Priority (*Zones d'Education Prioritaire*, ZEP) and tax-exempt zones (*Zones Franches*) were established to foster economic and educational stimulation in immigrants populated *banlieues*, the Social Action Fund (FAS) was regionalized, and the National Council of Immigrant Populations was founded (Feldblum 1999; Laurence 2005).

However, the economic crisis and high unemployment of the early 1980s shifted the government's multicultural policies towards a more assimilationist and ethno-national approach (Rydgren 2004). Under the new right-wing parties, programs of pluralistic integration were often used as means of “surveillance” rather than immigrant assistance, especially when directed towards foreigners of colonial origins. Such immigrants were encouraged to not only attend government-run language courses, but also to live in government-affiliated housing (Lyons 2009). In the late 1980s, the Chirac-appointed National Commission on Nationality delivered a consensus-backed report calling for a voluntarist approach to citizenship, a close relationship between national identity and integration, and greater influence of the national legislature in the integration process (Feldblum 1999). The Minister of the Interior under the Chirac administration, Charles Pasqua, implemented policies that facilitated illegal immigrant

deportation and granted police force greater power for the questioning of illegal immigrants (Rydgren 2003).

It was also in the late 1980s when the first national debate concerning assimilation policy took center stage in France and religious integration became, for the first time, a national controversy. What has become known as *l’Affaire du Foulard* (the Headscarf Affair) took place in September of 1989, when three schoolgirls were expelled by their principals for refusing to remove their *hijabs*, the Islamic veil. In 1992, after much controversial debate regarding civil rights of young girls, the *Conseil d’État*, (Council of State, body responsible for granting legal opinion to the national government) ruled that the use of headscarves in public schools directly violated the principle of *laïcité*, the secularist value of the Republic (*Le Conseil d’État* 1992).

Abiding by its assimilationist views, in 2004 France legally banned the use of “any outwardly ostentatious symbols whose precise effect is to separate certain children from the general rules of school-life,” including any blatant signs of religious affiliation such as the *hijab* (Marcus 1995: 90; BBC News 09/2004). In 2010, based on the argument that it is a symbol of female submission and a barrier to integration, the French National Assembly and Senate, with a vote of 246 to 1, overwhelmingly approved a ban on the *burqa* and the *niqab*, the full face Islamic veils (Archick et al 2011). The ban became effective on April 12, 2011, making it illegal for women to wear the Muslim body coverings in public areas, a law enforceable by a fine of 150 euros (CNN Wire Staff 2010; The Guardian 2011). President Nicolas Sarkozy's speech to parliament assuring that the burqa "will not be welcome on French soil" is a clear illustration of the assimilationist reasons behind the ethnically and religious divisive move: "We cannot accept,

in our country, women imprisoned behind a mesh, cut off from society, deprived of all identity. That is not the French republic's idea of women's dignity" (Kirby 2009). In so-called support of the concepts of *laïcité* and gender-equality, an overwhelming 82 percent of French citizens supported the ban, according to polls (CNN Wire Staff 2010). According to the French Ministry of the Interior, more than 280 Muslim French women received the punitive fine between the law's enactment in April and the end of 2011 (Cody 2012).

Another vehicle for the promotion of French culture to children of immigrant origin has been public education, specifically the teaching – or manipulation – of French history. A law established in 2005 required teachers to include in their History lessons of the positive influence of France on its former colonies – especially in North Africa - as well as the “sacrifices” made by French soldiers abroad, an idea belonging to the Front National's agenda which is discussed later in this chapter (Haddad and Balz 2006). Furthermore, public schools have persistently excluded (or heavily suppressed) pupils’ learning of languages of origin such as Arabic or Turkish, as the teaching of such languages is viewed as an encouragement for the development of cultural ties for children of immigrant backgrounds, and therefore incompatible with assimilationist objective of fostering national unity (Horowitz 1992: 152). The assimilation approach has also influenced the French government's approach to granting citizenship. France has traditionally granted citizenship based on the *jus soli* (right of soil) approach, as per Article 23, which grants automatic citizenship to third-generation immigrants born on French soil (Rydgren 2004). However, in the early 1990s, new legislation was introduced that displayed a view of citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), requiring children born on French soil to immigrant

parents to have to apply for French citizenship after coming of age, rather than automatically earning French citizenship upon birth (Gibson 2002). Although the proposed legislation was met with great opposition and consequently dropped, Lionel Jospin's government later implemented a National Code in 1995 which sparked yet another national debate regarding immigration, facilitating the exploitation of the issue by the Front National (Rydgren 2003).

Following its assimilationist ideals, the French government began to offer voluntary integration courses for immigrants called "*plateformes d'accueil*" ("welcome platforms") in 1998. Such courses took place during a half-day period and served as an introduction to French government institutions. In 2007, such integration courses became a mandatory component of French immigration under the 2006 *Loi relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration* ("Law on Immigration and Integration"). Under the new legislation, newcomers are now expected to not only learn about French government institutions, but also about "*les valeurs de la République*" ("the values of the Republic"), such as the concepts of *laïcité* and egalitarianism. The year-long compulsory course entitled *Le Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration* ("The Welcome and Integration Contract") also includes 200 to 500 hours of language training and civic orientation (Mulcahy 2011). In May of 2007, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity was established.

In 2003, in an effort to promote Muslim integration, the French government established the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (the French Council of the Muslim Faith), an organization set up to represent French Muslims before the government and discuss issues pertaining to France's Muslim population within the context of French public life. In 2008, the

government released a plan for integration entitled New Policy for the Suburbs (*Une Nouvelle Politique Pour Les Banlieues*) in order to “increase employment, education, and housing opportunities in the *banlieues*” (Archick et al 2011: 13). Other examples of the assimilationist theory reflected in French law are the lack of quota systems and affirmative action programs.

Societal implications: consequent problems

Although the rate of immigration in France has more or less stabilized since the 1960s, a much higher proportion of immigrants now arriving in France are non-white and non-European. It is estimated that around 5 million Muslims call France home, the largest Muslim population in Europe (Giry 2006). According to polls, this trend has caused the perception among two thirds of French nationals that the rate of immigration has taken a dramatic climb (Rydgren 2004: 161). Furthermore, the French birth rate is declining while the birth rate of Muslim North African immigrants is quickly on the rise, further contributing to the fears of the ethnically white French population (Freedman 2004: 17).

Although most immigrants, primarily French Muslims, are believed to have assimilated French cultural customs such as voting and abiding by French values such as secularism, “their desire to assimilate has sometimes been met with a form of discrimination fueled by nativism and a deep distrust of Islam that has made it harder for them to find homes and jobs” (Girry 2006: 88). According to Freedman (2004), many French nationals associate immigrants with unemployment, high crime, and national insecurity, a perception harbored by politicians. As

early as the 1980s, polls indicated the correlation in collective mind of French society between such societal issues and immigration. According to a poll conducted in 1985, 75 percent of French nationals agreed that "one does not feel secure in areas with many immigrants" and 50 percent felt that "immigrants are an important cause of criminality in France" (Rydgren 2004). By 1989, polls showed that three-fourths of respondents perceived France to be "in danger of losing her national identity if nothing was done to limit the foreign population" (Hargreaves 1995: 151).

The association of immigrants with insecurity has been further reinforced by the housing conditions experienced by the immigrant population. Prior to the influx of immigrants and their families in the 1970s and 1980s, native French citizens were the primary residents of neighborhoods surrounding large cities like Paris. However, as this population moved to nicer neighborhoods, "the projects' managing companies replaced those families with immigrants, leading to a ghettoization of the projects that has been reinforced over time, despite repeated injections of remedial funds by the government" (Girry 2006: 95). As discussed in Chapter 2, the assimilation approach encourages immigrants to reside in dispersed housing as a means to blend within neighborhoods of primarily "native" citizens, thereby undergoing a more effective assimilation into mainstream culture. In France, blue-collar workers of Maghrebi and Turkish descent have not been able to accomplish residential assimilation, and instead reside in poor, government subsidized neighborhoods in suburban areas around major French cities. Such areas usually have "low rent housing, a high concentration of workers, a high proportion of young people without complete education, and high levels of youth unemployment" (Betz 1993: 422).

A review of Milton Gordon's steps to assimilation indicates that this phenomenon is precisely one of the barriers responsible for slowing down the immigrant assimilation process, a subject that will be discussed in further detail later in the analysis of Le Pen's integration rhetoric.

Although French law bans the refusal of service or termination of employees based solely on national, ethnic or religious background, in reality discrimination against immigrants in the workplace is still commonplace (Horowitz and Noiriel 1992). As of 2005, unemployment rates were highest among the immigrant population – 14 percent, compared to 9.2 percent among French nationals (BBC News 2005). Average salary is also demonstrative of the anti-immigrant environment: as of 2010, Muslim immigrants reportedly earned 15 percent less than their white French counterparts, equaling an average of €400 less per month (Le Monde 2010). One possible reason for this disparity is the legal inability of foreigners to practice numerous professions such as doctors, surgeons, dentists, veterinarians, architects and any position in public service (Horowitz & Noiriel 1992). It is also estimated⁴ that immigrants make up 30-50 percent of the prison population (Haddad & Balz, 2006).

⁴ As previously mentioned, it is illegal to conduct polling that regarding ethnic information in France. Consequently, there are no records on the actual numbers of this population (Haddad & Balz, 2006).

Front National & Anti-Immigration Rhetoric in France

Front National: Party Formation

Political anti-immigration movements have been popular in France since mid-20th century, but none have been as successful or influential as the *Front National* (FN). The FN has been a notable contender in the French political scene since the mid-1980s, and has, since then, blamed French social and economic turmoil on immigration. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN's founder, figurehead, and past presidential hopeful, earned the FN a historical landmark when the *FN* received an average of 11-17 percent of votes in local elections of 1983-84 (Rydgren 2004: 17). The Front National became part of the national political scene in at this point, earning 10-15 percent of votes in elections between 1984 and 1997 (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999). In 1999, the party bifurcated into two segments, with Le Pen heading the more extreme right faction. Regardless of the split, Le Pen was able to gather nearly 17 percent of first round votes in the 2002 presidential election. Le Pen's retirement in 2010 brought the FN a new leader, his daughter Marine Le Pen, whose past year of rhetoric will also be analyzed in this case study.

Front National: Party Rhetoric

The primary philosophy of the Front National, the concept of nationalism, relies on the idea of the nation as a living entity derived from an “organic, historic community of culture, held together by family-like bonds”, and possessing a unified and autonomous identity, the basis for

classic assimilation theory (Rydgren 2004: 133). The role of French identity as the primary component of the nation renders it the most important subject for the FN, as indicated in the FN Programme: 300 Mesures pour la Renaissance de la France (Davies 1999).

The Front National is thus loyal to a politics centered around national identity... the defense of our people, of our cultural and natural heritage.

As the FN's primary duty is the development of an ethno-national state, its primary concern is thus the potential threat to the force behind the harmony and unity of the state: national identity. For instance, the FN was one of the first EPR parties of Western Europe to graphically connect falling birth rates (*dénatalité*) and growing non-European immigration in its propaganda pamphlets, phenomena which Jean-Marie Le Pen has described as “mortal threats” to the French nation (Marcus 1995: 102). Such message plays on popular fears that an increasingly strained French government will no longer be able to socially and economically support the French public due to immigrants’ exploitation of its welfare system. Furthermore, the FN portrays a future where the survival of “the French nation, the security of its territory, the integrity of its patrimony, its culture, [and] its language” are highly threatened as a consequence of Western Europe’s well-meaning and generous political and social systems (Betz 1993:417). The party cites the protection of the French identity as the reason behind its disdain for immigrants in order to gain public support and to deflect accusations of racism (FN Activist Fabrice Le Roy, quoted in Davies 1999: 67):

We are fighting for the French identity. We are serving France – we want a French France. Our first motivation is our nation. In the case of immigrants, we are not against them as people but just against the political phenomenon.

The FN has repeatedly used symbolism in its rhetoric to reinforce the “myth” of French culture and identity. According to Davies (1999: 110), the primary symbols used to shape such myth are the land, the people, and a national hero familiar to French society: Joan of Arc. A symbol of the national myth, Joan of Arc represents France, its virtues, and the passion for the nation, all characteristics heartily adopted by the FN. The party celebrates the national hero at its yearly spring festival (Rydgren 2004). The idea that the FN represents the people (causing its affiliation with populism, despite some party officials' desire for distance from such category) is a natural extension of the FN's role as protectors of the nation. However, the FN stipulates that in order for one to be represented by the party, he/she must abide by French customs and be considered a fully integrated citizen, a part of the French nation and of the French people. Such argument is one of the basis for the FN's rejection of multicultural policies, which promote the honoring of immigrants' diverse ethnic backgrounds, and which the Front National views as responsible for segregating the French from immigrants, sabotaging the assimilation process. The FN's argument follows the previously discussed metaphor in assimilation theory of the dog who “without a master is a dangerous animal”, but after domestication becomes a “member of society” (see Chapter 3). Following this logic, the FN believes that immigrants who choose to remain affiliated with their ethnic origins instead of entirely adopting French culture and way of life pose a threat to French society by “remaining dangerous”.

Attacks on multiculturalism and parties whose agenda include such approach have been permanent fixtures in the rhetoric of the Front National. In fact, the party utilized the famous socialist slogan “*le droit à la différence*” (the right to difference - discussed in detail later in the

chapter) in its defense against claims the party is racist by arguing that the slogan – and multicultural policies which favor the immigrant's right to maintain his or her cultural heritage – is inherently racist against native French citizens who were ostracized in the name of immigrant accommodation:

The French is the last in the queue to the HLM [i.e., public housing]. Yes, racism exists: the anti-French racism in our country (Le Pen speech, 23 March 1984; quoted in Rydgren 2003: 58-9).

The Front National and its leaders have repeatedly attempted to gather popular support for its message by claiming multiculturalist policies promote “anti-French racism”, and by generating anger over the conditions to which the native French are subjected (as a result of leftist and centrist policies) in order to accommodate immigrants, a primary criticism of multicultural theory, as noted in chapter 3. A quote from an early FN newspaper illustrates this sentiment through the following question (Davies 1999: 73):

If the foreigner is treated better than the Frenchman, what does it mean to be French?

French “traditional values” such as work, family, and the motherland are also consistently utilized by the FN as part of the creation of myths reflected in its party agenda. For instance, its 1993 Programme for Government lists the following as primary party concerns (quoted in Davies 1999: 66):

immigration ('reverse the tide'), family ('in favor of national preference'), education ('transmit knowledge'), culture ('defend our roots'), and the environment ('safeguard our heritage').

Such values are believed by the FN to have become increasingly suppressed by mass immigration. Le Pen argues that France is being “enslaved”, as the French suffer due to the deterioration of their culture while immigrants refuse to adopt the French way of life, a complaint typical of extreme assimilation theorists. Ultimately, the assimilation claim heavily reflected in FN rhetoric is that “the nation is peace, the national preference is prosperity”, which implies that any threat to national unity is the equivalent to a breach of France's internal harmony (FN party official, quoted in Davies 1999: 70).

Further exemplifying the desire for national homogeneity, FN officials have repeatedly expressed that perhaps not all of the immigrants in the process of becoming French citizens are worthy of being French. Long time party leader Bruno Mégret clarifies this view (quoted in Davies 1999: 76):

To enter into the national community... to integrate into an exceptional community of destiny is not something to be given to every man on earth. French nationality is not a possibility or a right; it is an honor.

Such argument follows the logic that French citizenship will become irrelevant and worthless if anyone is able to earn it, explaining the FN push for the adoption of *jus sanguinis* rather than the current *jus soli* rules of citizenship. The slogan for the FN's campaign for stricter naturalization summarizes such view: “To be French you have to merit it” (Davies 1999: 77).

Cornerstones of the Front National's agenda include several anti-multicultural policies such as the cutting of government funding for immigrant associations, the banning of double-citizenship, the implementation of immigrant quotas in public schools, “the dismantling of ethnic ghettos”, the strict regulation of mosque and Islamic school construction, and the end of all new

and family immigration (Marcus 1995: 107). Other assimilationist policies included in the FN agenda are the exclusion of all non-native French teachers from primary or secondary schools and the promotion of French culture as a primary component of public education (Marcus 1995). These policies follow the classic view of assimilation that promotes the rejection of ethnic roots for the adoption of Milton Gordon's (1964: 71) "identificational assimilation", or "the development of a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the host society" (see Chapter 3).

The Front National's campaign is derived from the belief that "immigration is merely the latest stage in a centuries-old struggle that has pitted European civilization against successive wave of invaders" (Marcus 1995: 105). Therefore, the concepts of the nation, French vulnerability, the survival of French culture and identity, anti-French racism, preservation of French values, and enemy and crisis creation seen in the rhetoric of the FN as a whole are unsurprisingly also reflected in Jean-Marie Le Pen's (and later Marine Le Pen's) rhetoric. In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen shocked France and the rest of the world when he surpassed Socialist Party candidate Lionel Jospin in the first round of the French presidential elections, earning nearly 17 percent, or around 6 million votes in the runoff against UMP candidate Jacques Chirac (Norris 2005; Shields 2007). The election brought Le Pen the closest he had ever been to the role of president, portraying the growing influence and resonance of Le Pen's strict anti-immigration rhetoric and agenda. Although the Front National has lost some voter support since 2002, the party remains a key political player in France: as of 2004, the FN earned 8 percent of votes in all of France's 21 "mainland regions", and its new leader, Marine Le Pen, is a top contender in the 2012 presidential election (Shields 2007). In the next section, I will utilizing the rhetorical

communication tactics outlined in Chapter 3 and assimilation theory concepts of Chapter 2 to address how Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen have addressed the French assimilation approach in framing their anti-immigrant arguments. Although I will primarily draw from the rhetorical studies conducted in secondary academic literature, I will also utilize newspaper sources to portray Marine Le Pen's more recent anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen: Rhetoric

Jean-Marie Le Pen's background – specifically his humble and patriotic origins as the son of a poor fisherman who went on to serve his country's military in Indo-China and Algeria – has been a symbol consistently used in his rhetoric as a model of loyalty and patriotism. According to Le Pen, his father's death at the age of 14 turned the political leader into “a child of the nation” (Marcus 1995). The tragic event in Le Pen's life has been used as part of an overarching theme in his anti-immigrant rhetoric, the family, which will be discussed shortly. Jean-Marie Le Pen retired from FN leadership in January of 2011, granting his daughter, Marine Le Pen, the party's presidency, and the role of continuing to promote the party stance of the “preservation of French values” and to address France's “integration failure” (Erlanger 2011). Ms. Le Pen joined the Front National at the age of eighteen, and previously served as the top leader of the party in the Ile-de-France region, France's most populous region that includes the French capital, as well as in the Northern Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. Ms. Le Pen also acted as one of the Front National's five vice-presidents between 2003 and 2011 (Shields 2004; Pape 2012). Upon assuming control

of the party, Ms. Le Pen began to wage a self-described “de-demonization” of the historically harsh rhetoric of her father and his party, taking steps to mollify the FN's anti-immigrant rhetoric by criticizing immigrant actions rather than beliefs, and by demonstrating a concern for the well-being of immigrants, stating that immigrants themselves desire full assimilation into French society and seek order in their neighborhoods. The FN leader has even attempted to gain immigrant votes by stating that immigrants themselves have been the primary victims of the poor management of integration efforts by the French establishment (Crumley 2007; Coomarasamy 2011; RFI 01/16/2011). Although Ms. Le Pen has adopted a softer rhetorical approach than her father, she has nevertheless continued to uphold Jean-Marie's views on French immigration and immigrant integration (Bennhold 2008; Pape 2012). The following section addresses the ways in which both leaders have utilized the previously discussed rhetorical techniques in order to promote the FN's anti-immigrant and pro-assimilationist views.

Media-Centered Strategies

The long running Front National's campaign slogan “Keep France for the French” is a concise and direct summary of the FN's core message: nationalism above all (Sturcke 2008). This message has been displayed in Jean-Marie's campaigns throughout the FN's history, heavily relying upon the use of fear-generating arguments and tactics in order to emphasize the importance and fragility of a “pure” French identity and homogenous nation (Rydgren 2004). Based on France's historical emphasis on the idea of the jacobinist nation as an entity potentially

weakened by religious and ethnic fragmentations, the Front National endorses the Chicago School's assimilationist idea that minorities should remain a small – and somewhat invisible – percentage of the population. For instance, this ideal is subliminally addressed in a National Front advertisement⁵ with the message “Let’s Defend our Colors” which displays a fist holding up the French flag. The ad utilizes the double meaning of the word “color” in a) an obvious reference to the colors of the French flag which represent important components of French history, and b) as a subtler allusion to colors as symbolic of the ethnic white French purity, versus 'other' racial colors, to propose the idea that the French national identity (and race) must be defended from outside sources. The color motif is also utilized in the Front National's logo, further emphasizing the party's affiliation with the 'purity' of the French jacobinist state and its national history.

The Front National leaders have also utilized campaign ads to reinforce the populist approach of the party. For instance, an FN campaign poster created for Ms. Le Pen's 2009 regional election campaign⁶ displays Marine with a victorious fist in the air, facing a crowd of supporters replicating the warrior-like pose. The poster's message, “*La Voix Du Peuple*”, “The Voice of the People”, is a clear indication that the Front National's candidate – who has told her supporters that “together [they] will make France's political class tremble” - is an anomaly in the French political class as she seeks to legitimately represent the interest of French citizens (Rossignol 2011).

⁵ Advertisement may be viewed here: <http://www.defendonsnoscouleurs.fr/>

⁶ Advertisement may be viewed here: http://galliawatch.blogspot.com/2009_11_01_archive.html

Rhetorical Myths

Although economic matters and issues related to European integration play an important role in Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's rhetoric, an anti-immigration and pro-assimilationist stance have been primary topics addressed by the party and its two presidents. Consequently, themes relating to nationalism and cultural values have been most useful in shaping rhetorical myths that promote traditional values and the importance of French culture. According to a quantitative analysis of Jean-Marie Le Pen's rhetoric between the years of 1983 and 1996, the theme of "morality" appeared in 40 percent of his interviews and speeches, in comparison to the 6.75 percent of the time during which he mentioned economics. According to the study's author, the topic of "morality" included the notion of cultural and social hierarchy (Rydgren 2004: 124). This focus on the nation and the family present in Le Pen's rhetoric is intended to create an emotional connection with the French population by promoting the strong societal values which many believe are the prerequisite of a strong and unified country. Since that time, Le Pen has continued to use the themes of social hierarchy, family, and the nation as his primary rallying points in the FN's anti-immigrant message. The emphasis on cultural decadence and the destructive nature of individualism on the well-being of the nation have also helped Le Pen shape a scenario of crisis in which he questions the survival of the French "civilization".

The theme of the "family" has played a significant role as a rhetorical myth utilized by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's in the framing rhetoric on national identity. The classic assimilation approach to integration has historically upheld the importance of one homogenous

national culture, and the idea of the nation as an extended familial unit that shares customs, beliefs, and historical values. Le Pen promotes such assimilationist notions through his discussion of the family as a building block of a strong and homogenous nation. Jean-Marie's claim that his father's death turned him into "a child of the nation" is a strong metaphor for the familial relationship Le Pen expects French citizens to develop towards France. By comparing his paternal ties to a loyal dedication to his country, Le Pen expresses the view that in order to become worthy of French citizenship, foreigners should first develop a familial relation with the French nation, a view held by many in an older generation that was once a part of France's military efforts abroad, and who believed in the promotion of France's values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Such view is exemplified by Le Pen's quote in French newspaper *Le Monde* (quoted in Rydgren 2004: 141):

If you are loyal to France, (...) if you adopt its laws, morals, language, way of thinking and (...) integrate yourself completely, we will not refuse you being one of us. (...) But if you are loyal to your roots (...) and if you just pretend to live under our laws, with your own morals and culture kept to yourself, it is better that you return home because otherwise it could all end very badly.

As exemplified by this quotation, Le Pen believes that an immigrant can only prove his/her dedication to France by entirely jettisoning his/her attachment to a foreign culture and wholeheartedly adopting the French way of life, a classic assimilationist concept derived from Park's notion that assimilation equals "incorporation" of the minority or the "take up" of majority culture (see Chapter 3). According to Le Pen, the immigrant's complete assimilation of French culture is an absolute requirement for French citizenship and, consequently, the immigrant's

rejection of this process is a reason for a possible cultural crisis for the French nation as it threatens the ideals of cultural and ethnic homogeneity and the unity of the nation.

Enemy Creation

Since the creation of the Front National in 1972, Jean-Marie Le Pen has led the party in the unabashed denouncement of immigration as an barrier to national homogeneity. According to Marcus (1995: 101), “in Le Pen's view, a nation's internal strength is closely linked to its ethnic, religious, social and economic homogeneity”. Therefore, Le Pen views multicultural policies and the infiltration of foreign cultural forces via immigration as the gravest enemies to the nation's unity, two growing trends that must be combated in order to save the perpetually threatened collective identity of the French people (Davies 1999). In Le Pen's view, the foreign traditions practiced by immigrants in France symbolizes their refusal to assimilate into French society, and maintains them, in the words of Park's metaphor, as “undomesticated animal(s) who [are] dangerous to society” (see Chapter 2).

Le Pen returns to the concept of the family as a response to the imminent cultural crisis posed not only by immigration, but also by “mainstream” integration policies derived from a multicultural approach that provides the immigrant with cultural recognition by the state. In response, Le Pen utilizes the” myth” of the family, a concept familiar to the average population, to generate a strong emotional response (quoted in Rydgren 2003: 58):

I like my daughters better than my nieces, my nieces better than my cousins, my cousins better than my neighbors. It is the same thing in politics; I like the French better.

The concept of the family is repeatedly inserted into Le Pen's arguments for the dual purpose of inspiring patriotism and generating fear of the enemy: immigration and the growing number of immigrant families. Le Pen fears that *dénatalité* – the declining French birthrate – is responsible for facilitating the dangers posed by immigration. While immigrants are increasingly procreating, the ethnic French population is failing to create large families, what he considers “the building block of the nation” (Davies 1999: 120; Marcus 1995: 110). Le Pen utilizes the concept of *dénatalité* as it is an issue familiar to all members of French society who understand the social demographic dangers of an increasingly elderly population. In response to the created common enemy that is *dénatalité*, Le Pen suggests an equally iconic solution: French women. Le Pen portrays French women as the solution to the problem of *dénatalité* as he argues that they are the ones responsible for providing French society with ethnically French children. This populist technique creates a common social enemy while simultaneously empowering average citizens by granting France's female population the power to provide a solution. The two-fold solution of French women having more children addresses both the declining French birth rate and the transmittal of French values to future generations (Rydgren 2004). Such values are viewed as the basis of a traditional and honorable nation that will only survive if its heritage is passed on through generations. Le Pen states (quoted in Marcus 1995: 112):

Nothing is more beautiful and more useful for the nation as a whole [...] than the construction of a healthy family.

In order to portray the foreigner as both an internal and external enemy, Le Pen juxtaposes the connotations of warmth and safety invoked by the symbol of the family with those of danger and distrust he attributes to the immigrant, whom he characterizes as a stranger and foreign threat to society (Fieschi 2004). In his rhetoric, Le Pen divides the population into two distinct groups: those who are part of French society, such as natives and fully assimilated immigrants, and “strangers” who do not belong to French society. The use of tactic is enabled by the assimilationist approach that, unlike multiculturalism's emphasis on groups identity, tends to view populations as homogenous, allowing for a black and white 'us' vs. 'them' argument rather than a focus on particular immigrant groups.

Marine upholds her father's use of the enemy creation technique by suggesting that the growing influx of immigrants will prove fatal to the well-being of French society. The notion of immigration as a grave social threat is based on the previously discussed popular association held by numerous French citizens between immigration and high unemployment, high crime, and national insecurity (see previous section). The new FN leader has also utilized recent dramatic events to illustrate to the population the potential dangers immigration poses to French society. For instance, in the aftermath of 2011 Maghreb revolutions and the consequent influx of refugees into South Europe and later into French territory, Marine equated France to a “fragile” boat lacking the capacity to take on any more immigrants without “sinking” altogether (The Economist 2011). Likewise, the *banlieue* riots of 2005 were portrayed as an example of how failed integration policies can generate social chaos perpetrated by the descendants of immigrants.

According to both FN leaders, multicultural components instilled in the French assimilationist approach, such as government-funded immigrant housing, have failed to effectively integrate immigrants, thereby leading to an environment of violence and insecurity, once again portraying unassimilated immigrants as enemies, a concept discussed by Park and the Chicago school. This appeal to popular safety is combined with the use of other symbols familiar to French natives, such as mosques and headscarves, to represent a more direct and recognizable threat that is directly associated with immigration. The following quote from Jean-Marie Le Pen exemplifies such tactic (quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau, 1991: 201):

The Muslim immigrants want to impose their custom on us: the mosques and the 'headscarves' and veils today, polygamy and the law of the Koran governing marriage and civil life tomorrow.

Le Pen proposes that the extent to which the multicultural approach to immigrant integration promotes the accommodation of immigrant customs renders French nationals uncomfortable and in fear of their cultural freedom. Le Pen rejects the accommodation of immigrant culture as harmful to French society and argues that French nationals should not display complacency in the face of immigrants who resist adaptation to mainstream customs, a tenet of classic assimilation theory. Marine supports her father's argument by proposing that such multicultural policies are inherently anti-French and racist, as they expect the French majority to alter and adapt its cultural traditions to accommodate the beliefs of the incoming minority (BBC interview).

Crisis Creation

Le Pen's promotion of the “myth” of common ancestry, which to him overrides individual concerns, creates an idea of “collective exclusivity” where the “we” is gravely endangered by the presence of the “they”, who are viewed “guests and strangers” (Rydgren 2004: 133). Jean-Marie thus uses the rhetorical tactic of crisis creation by depicting immigration as a civilian invasion of France that will eventually destroy the survival of the French civilization (quoted in Rydgren 2003: 58):

It is the existence of the French people that is at stake. It was not necessary to mobilize France against Germany in 1914 and 1940 if we today are going to tolerate an invasion – this time peaceful – of our national territory.

This quote illustrates a rhetorical technique where Le Pen appeals to voters' emotions by evoking France's recent painful memories of foreign invasion, and by harboring on the fears of the French population that such a crisis not only could but will be realized if the immigration trend is not stopped and reversed. Like her father, Marine tailors her rhetoric to appeal to the fears of the French population by utilizing the imagery of war and occupation in her portrayal of immigration as a potential crisis that is being enabled by a multicultural integration approach she perceives as growing in French society. According to Ms. Le Pen, a cultural occupation occurs once immigrants begin to impose their traditions on French society through means that challenge both the French status quo and legal system. Marine believes the growing importance that is being placed on immigrant's religious and dietary needs (discussed in detail later on in the chapter) serve to foreshadow the potential crisis that could take place in France as a result of

continuous immigration and the growing influence of foreign cultures on French society. As a means of appealing to voters, Marine proposes that multiculturalism-inspired policies that allow for the use of religious symbols and garments in public, the production of halal meat in France, and Muslim street prayers weaken French culture and endanger French society by challenging the traditional French practice of *laïcité*. According to the FN leader, assimilationist legislation must be created to halt the encroachment of foreign practices and avoid a possible cultural crisis that will strip native French the right to maintain their cultural traditions. This argument is crafted to incite the fear and, most importantly, the outrage of the French population who, hopes the Front National, will realize the gravity of the approaching crisis and will in turn support the FN.

The Use of Memorable Language

While Marine Le Pen has admittedly distanced herself from her father's toxic language, she has also used memorable language as part of her anti-immigrant rhetoric. In 2010, Marine referred to Muslim immigrants who began to pray in French streets after Mosques could no longer accommodate them as an “occupation” without tanks and soldiers (RFI 2010; Russia Today 08/2011; Al Jazeera, 09/2011; Rossignol 2011). Once again, the use of war imagery is based on the historical context of French society, and is intended as a memorable warning to French citizens regarding the invasion of their most basic freedoms, such as an undisturbed walk down the street. By appealing to French voters through such memorable language, Marine

expresses her belief the lack of strict immigrant assimilation is a primary reason behind daily discomforts suffered by French citizens, such as the growing street “occupation” carried out by Muslim immigrants. Marine also used memorable language to further the tactics of enemy and crisis creation when she stated that “France is set to become a colony of all its former colonies” (Russia Today 08/2011). In resistance to such trend, Le Pen appealed to French citizens by defending France's secularist tradition, stating “we [the FN and its supporters] will hold this [secular] identity and we won't let this identity be changed (RFI 01/28/2011). Once Muslim street prayers were banned the following year, in September of 2011, angered French Muslims attributed the ban to Le Pen's outspoken bashing of the practice (NYT, 09/16/2011).

The Projection of Public Opinion

According to Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen, the arguments included in the FN agenda are valid concerns held by French society at large, and without their political fight for such issues, mainstream politicians would fail to protect such social interests of French society. The portrayal of Jean-Marie Le Pen as an ordinary Frenchman from simple roots whose biggest ambition is the protection of his compatriots – as seen in the FN slogan “Le Pen, Le Peuple” (Le Pen, The People) – generates the belief that Le Pen is the only political leader legitimately aware of the needs of the French people. Such technique thereby allows Le Pen to claim that his views and agenda reflect popular beliefs and needs, and that he is simply saying “out loud what people are thinking inside – that uncontrolled immigration leads to disorder and insecurity” (Le Pen in

newspaper *Le Monde*; quoted in Marcus, 1995: 54; Davies 1999: 106). Le Pen uses his life story to reassure the population that his agenda ultimately represents their concerns (quoted in Fieschi 2004: 166):

As candidate to the post of President of the Republic, I am nothing more than a French citizen like any of you. War orphan, state-funded pupil, student activist, combat officer, businessman, family man, national and European MP, know your fears, your problems, your worries, your anxieties and your hopes because I have felt them and continue to feel them.

By demonstrating that he is a simple, common Frenchman, Jean-Marie leads voters to believe that his political intentions are genuine and that he indeed understands the concerns of the population. His many roles as “war orphan”, “state-funded pupil”, “student activist”, “combat officer”, and “businessman” are used as bridges between Le Pen and the average French citizen who has most likely served in at least one of these roles. Therefore, the argument goes, if Jean-Marie and Marine, ordinary French citizens who have always served their country and contributed to the well-being of his society, view immigration and the lack of proper immigrant assimilation as a threat to French society, so should the average citizen who has also, through hard work, demonstrated his/her love of the nation and contributed to the prosperity of French society. Ultimately, the FN's populist aim is to persuade the population that by voting for Marine, their fears will be heard and their needs will be represented by the Front National, unlike mainstream leftist parties that are viewed as increasingly representative of the multicultural approach that is more concerned with the needs of immigrants than with the survival of the French culture and the well-being of its society.

Relevancy to Daily Concerns

Jean-Marie Le Pen rejects multicultural policies of immigrant integration such as equal job opportunity which, in his view, equals the prioritization of immigrant labor over the work of French nationals. As illustrated by FN slogan “Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work”, Le Pen promotes the crisis-scenario that immigration, globalization, and multicultural policies are gradually creating social and economic instability for native French citizens. This technique connects the fear projected by enemy and crisis creation to the daily concerns of ordinary French citizens. Le Pen's solution to such socio-economic concerns is the implementation of the “national preference” policy, or the establishment of the French native citizen as a priority in the labor, education, housing, and healthcare markets, as well as in all areas of social life (Rydgren 2004; Norris 2005).

In 2010, Marine Le Pen also addressed daily concerns when she described the production of halal burgers by a French fast food chain as “an Islamic tax” on French restaurants. She applied the crisis creation technique to daily concerns by framing the production of halal burgers in French restaurants as a representation of the growing “Islamification” of French society, a trend she believes must be resisted (Crumley 2010). Marine placed another such daily concern at center of the 2012 presidential election debates when she launched a controversial debate regarding the preparation of meat in France. Citing a television documentary, Ms. Le Pen claimed that all meat produced in France is prepared according to the Muslim halal tradition, and that millions of French citizens – regardless of religious belief – are therefore unknowingly

consuming halal meat (RFI 2012; Cody 2012). According to the FN leader, the halal issue illustrates a grave problem within French integration policy: the growing imposition of minority culture and traditions on the customs of the majority, a classic assimilationist view argued by her father and critics of multicultural integration theory. Marine has used the 2012 campaign spotlight to fully support an integration agenda entirely based on classic assimilation theory (quoted in Al Jazeera, 07/2011):

I believe that when you come to a country you have to adapt to its laws, its values, its rules, its codes, and its customs. That is all I ask, but unfortunately the French government's policies do not reflect this. I do not want halal meals to be imposed in secular schools. I do not want there to be separate hours for separate sexes in French swimming pools. I do not want the French civil code to be adapted to suit religious laws. It's as simple as that.

According to Marine, immigrant cultural norms are being increasingly imposed on French customs to the extent that soon French citizens will have to adapt their norms to cater to the cultural needs of the immigrant population, including halal meals, gender separation, and religious laws.

Ms. Le Pen also echoes her father's concern of how immigration and a shift toward multicultural policies impact the daily lives of ethnic French citizens within the context of social and economic opportunities. For instance Ms. Le Pen argues that the multicultural concepts of affirmative action and equal job opportunity policies are placing native French citizens at a disadvantage in their own society. In an interview to Russia Today, she stated (quoted in Russia Today, 08/2011):

Today, all the enterprises, particularly big ones, have signed a charter that prescribes hiring people from other cultures or a different origin which means that a Frenchman, a poor Frenchman with French roots, will end up behind others. I believe it is a gross violation of the Republican principle of equality. On my part, I believe in merit, whichever the color of the skin is, the origin, that the person that really deserves it will get the job. To agree that someone should take a job just due to his or her color of the skin, origin, or faith is an absolute contradiction with the basic values of France. It means if you're a foreigner you have a better chance of employment than a French citizen [...]. As a result, the French are discriminated in their own country.

The Role of Charismatic Leadership

As discussed in Chapter 2, numerous EPR parties and candidates win popular support by appealing to resentment politics and by distancing their intentions from those of mainstream party leaders. Le Pen is one such example, displaying rhetoric that is heavily reliant upon the rejection of what he calls “the establishment”. His continuous disapproval of “self-serving” and “self-centered” established political parties and institutions emphasizes the gap between the nature of his political leadership and those of mainstream politicians (Fieschi 2004; Norris 2005). In fact, Le Pen has repeatedly accused France's political elite of “all being a part of the same plot to annihilate the French nation” by catering to the needs of immigrants rather than by ensuring the survival of the French nation (Fieschi 2004: 165). Nevertheless, Le Pen is conscious of the need to remain associated with democratic principles in order to establish “reputational shields” to protect him from accusations anti-democratic tendencies and fascism (see Chapter 2). Le Pen has emphasized his loyalty to the democratic system by repeatedly labeling himself as a 'democrat' and as a representative of the people (Fieschi 2004: 162). In a speech on the night of

his first round win of the 2002 presidential election, Le Pen reaffirmed his role as a legitimate representative of the average French citizen and as a fighter against status quo politics by reassuring that his electoral success proved that the “*excluded*” should not “*be afraid to dream*” (Cautres 2004: 74).

Marine has also upheld the populist appeal of her party by distancing herself from the French political elite and emphasizing that she, unlike mainstream politicians, is a leader of the French people who works for the survival of French society (quoted in RT Interview 05/2011):

Je suis la candidate de la France. Je suis la candidate des nationaux, des patriotes.

The statement, “*I am France's candidate. I am the candidate of the nationals, of the patriots*” effectively communicates to French citizens Marine's distancing her image from mainstream political leaders and implies that such leaders' intentions lie in perhaps self-serving goals whose primary benefit is not directed at the well-being of French citizens or French society. Marine strengthens the Front National's populist anti-establishment reputation by claiming that the reason why her campaign has not received the media time equivalent to her share of support in polls is because the FN is “a party of patriots, and because they defend their homeland” and therefore “the political elite sees [the FN] as a threat” (Russia Today 05/2011). According to Marine, the Front National is neither a party of the right nor the left, and is called an extremist-right party as a consequence of the overall shift to the left of French politics, rather than due to a shift to the right of the FN's agenda (Crumley 2007). The FN leader maintains that she holds moderate views that display her loyalty to democratic principles and utmost desire to strengthen

the French political and social systems (Radio Netherlands 06/2011). In continuation of her father's patriotic line, Marine utilizes Jean-Marie's beloved Joan of Arc as a symbol of national unity and loyalty, claiming to closely follow the ideals of the French national hero. Ms. Le Pen's defense of the FN's use of Joan of Arc as a party inspiration was expressed in a recent public dispute with Nicholas Sarkozy who, in light of the 2012 elections, paid a visit to the French national hero's birthplace in a presumed campaign move. According to Marine, in order to hold Joan of Arc as an inspiration and political symbol, one must follow the figure's "values" of national sovereignty, popular freedom, and the protection of the French nation, which Ms. Le Pen does not believe to have been concretized under Sarkozy's governance (Al Jazeera, 01/2012).

The next section will present Jean-Marie Le Pen's and Marine Le Pen's overall views on French assimilation and the integration approach they propose for France: a stricter, more classic version of assimilation. This analysis will rely on the combination of each discussed rhetorical technique in order to present how their attack against multicultural tenets and their infiltration within the French system serve as a key component of their anti-immigrant rhetoric.

FN Views on Assimilation and Multiculturalism

As demonstrated by this overview of rhetorical techniques utilized by the French Front National, one of the party's primary rhetorical tactics has historically been the use of enemy creation between immigrants and natives. Furthermore, the Front National has also applied this

technique to differentiate between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans”, demonstrating the desire for a stronger assimilation approach and the rejection of the multicultural approach to integration (Davies 1999: 67). The FN and the Le Pens view multiculturalism policies and a cosmopolitan society as “a prime modern day evil endangering France’s future”, a “virus of unrootedness affecting the health of the nation”, a view that is exemplified by the discussion surrounding the socialist slogan “the right to be different” (Davies 1999: 73). During the 1970s and 1980s, FN officials reversed the trend toward a national multicultural approach by overshadowing the strong presence of leftist activists and the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) - the Socialist Party – and manipulating the popular idiom *le droit à la différence*. The PS, which proposed amnesty for illegal immigrants, as well as the right for immigrants to be culturally, socially, religiously, or nationally different from the French majority, had its message successfully distorted by the extreme right to signify the immigrant’s right to *remain* different, or not fully French (Favell 1998: 54; Feldblum 1999: 33; Rydgren 2004: 166). The FN used the tactic of counter-framing to change the original meaning of the slogan to symbolize the right of the native population to keep cultural and ethnic groups apart. By attacking socialist programs such as native language teaching in school, Le Pen and the Front National maintained that issues related to cultural diversity must remain out of the popular sphere (Rydgren 2003: 58-9).

The Le Pens' disdain for multicultural policies is evident throughout the study of both Jean-Marie's and Marine's anti-immigrant rhetoric and their use of the rhetorical techniques outlined in chapter 3. For instance, Marine's staunch defense of what she calls the “continuation of [the French] civilization” (quoted in BBC News 2012), demonstrates the belief that the

concept of patriotism is slowly fading from French politics, and that French language and culture is being diluted by immigrants' resistance to assimilation. Like her father, Marine follows the assimilationist view that immigrants should abandon foreign cultures and languages entirely in order to fully adopt the French culture and language, a concept expressed through her use techniques such as crisis creation, relevancy to daily concerns, and memorable language. The FN leader believes proper assimilation is no longer occurring among immigrants in France (quoted in Shorto 2011):

In the old days immigrants entered France and blended in. They adopted the French language and traditions. Whereas now entire communities set themselves up within France, governed by their own codes and traditions.

From this analysis, we reach the expected conclusions that while the Front National criticizes France's current integration policies as an ineffective approach of immigrant integration, Jean-Marie and Marine also demonstrate the desire for the adoption of a more classic – and harsher – approach to assimilation than is currently implemented in France.

A reoccurring pattern expressed through each of the rhetorical techniques utilized by the Le Pens' is the outright rejection of multicultural ideals derived from leftist segments of the political class. For instance, Jean-Marie clarifies his views on the classic multicultural theme of inequality (quoted in Marcus 1995: 104):

The egalitarian movement which involves the leveling of age-groups, the sexes and peoples, is in my opinion to be criticized because it hides reality, which is fundamentally unequal, that is to say there are some inequalities which are just and some equalities which are unjust. We are for justice and not for equality. The theme of equality seems to us to be decadent.

Jean-Marie rejects cultural plurality as an integration approach fit for France, portraying it as an “unrealistic and dangerous” ideology (Marcus 1995: 106). According to him, the previously discussed “anti-French racism” phenomenon is also one of the outcomes of the multicultural approach. For instance, Jean-Marie compares SOS-Racisme, an organization created by a member of the French Socialist Party to fight anti-immigrant discrimination, to the creation of a new hypothetical governmental department called the “Anti-France ministry” (Davies 1999: 139).

In 2011, Marine Le Pen also blatantly rejected multiculturalism by stating she did not believe a multicultural country could ever live in peace, describing it as an integration approach which “ends in war”, citing Lebanon and the Balkans as examples (Totaro 2011; Dejevsky 2012). According to her, multiculturalism has only benefited the political class and their electoral support. Marine has proposed that multicultural states should “demand submission to a single set of values”. Furthermore, Ms. Le Pen believes in the “‘long and noble’ tradition of post-colonial assimilation, which ‘feeble, sick’ French governments allowed to be watered down into an ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ of integration” (Totaro, 2011). Her anti-multicultural views extend to her promise that, if in power, she would amend the constitution to state that the French republic “does not recognize any community [...] because our community is one and indivisible. [...] Everyone must admit the French way of life, its practices, traditions, and rights with no exceptions” (Russia Today 05/2011).

Ultimately, the Le Pens' views are derived from classic assimilation theory, leading to the belief that “the fragmentation of the nation is at the root of all the problems with which France is

faced and that, concurrently, unity and cohesion [...] is the only political remedy”, a solution barred from reality by the growth of multiculturalism and multicultural policies which continue to emphasize (and honor) the differences between France and its immigrants (Fieschi 2004: 156). Jean-Marie Le Pen's statement that “*sans unité nationale il n'y a plus de patrie*” (without national unity, there is no longer a country) exemplifies the ultimate Jacobin Republican ideal: ethnic and national homogeneity as the basis of a strong and unified state (quoted in Fieschi 2004: 156). As discussed in Chapter 3, critics of multiculturalism claim that the state should not be burdened with serving as mediator between cultures, ethnicities or religions. Instead, critics believe the state should play a neutral role in such issues, being responsible only for the maintenance of internal peace within the nation and for the implementation of national norms, rather than for the promotion of group rights. Such argument is reflected in the following quotation of Jean-Marie Le Pen (quoted in Fieschi 2004: 142):

The state must remain the ultimate arbiter of the national interest, the definition of which is not necessarily the sum of individual interests. It must preside over national unity and solidarity and regain its independence vis-a-vis all financial, religious, political, economic, philosophical, trade union and foreign oligarchies who would sacrifice the interest of the French people to their national interest or to the interests of their cast, clan, or class.

Conclusion

My initial hypothesis that extreme populist right parties in Western Europe, and by extension the Front National, formulate anti-immigrant rhetoric by criticizing the national integration theory present in their respective state was supported by this case study's analysis of

Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's rhetoric. However, the nature of such criticism is not as expected, and the rhetoric of the Front National leaders fails to entirely reject the French approach to immigrant integration. Instead, their rhetoric demonstrates that the French integration approach – classic, rather than modern, assimilation - has failed only to the extent that it has not been sufficiently employed to the level desired by the Front National. The Le Pens have carefully crafted a style of anti-immigrant rhetoric aimed at the assimilationist context of French society by referring to all immigrants as dangerous outsiders, rather than addressing the specific integration hurdles faced by different immigrant groups. Their extensive criticism of multicultural policies is present throughout both leaders' anti-immigrant rhetoric to illustrate the dangers such approach has created to French society. The Le Pens' rhetoric displays the belief that the presence – and dominance – of the leftist and centrist mainstream political establishment has introduced numerous multicultural tendencies and policies which have diluted the traditional French assimilationist approach and, as a consequence, placed the survival of French society in a dangerous position. Instead, the Le Pens propose that the French government must adopt a stricter version of the classic assimilation approach in order to strengthen the cultural and ethnic unison of the French nation.

These findings will now be juxtaposed with the following case study: an analysis of Geert Wilders' anti-immigrant rhetoric in a multicultural state, the Netherlands. The Dutch case study will follow an identical structure as this chapter: an overview of the Netherlands' immigration and integration history will be followed by an analysis of how Geert Wilders utilizes the rhetorical techniques outlined in chapter 3 to promote an anti-immigration stance. The last

section of the case study will provide a comprehensive look at how Wilders combines all of the rhetorical techniques to discredit the Dutch multicultural approach. The Dutch case study will be followed by a final concluding chapter that will return to France's assimilation approach in order to compare and contrast the Front National's pro-assimilationist rhetoric with the expected anti-multiculturalism views of Geert Wilders's anti-immigrant campaign.

CHAPTER V: MULTICULTURAL THEORY IN THE NETHERLANDS & THE FREEDOM PARTY

Brief History of Immigration in the Netherlands

Although the Netherlands has been an immigration country since the 17th century, its government and citizens did not view it as such until the 20th century. The Netherlands had previously perceived itself as a country of emigration, a belief reflected by government policy which, until the mid-20th century, encouraged emigration to countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (Groenendijk and Heijs 2001; Doornik 2003; Penninx 2005). Such belief was also reflected in the Dutch practice of referring to immigrants by several names besides 'immigrant', such as 'repatriates', 'temporary migrants', and 'guest workers' (Penninx 2005; van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006: 324). Until 1983, the Dutch perceived guest-workers as temporary migrants, and the Dutch government "explicitly denied that there were immigrants in the Netherlands" (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006: 324).

As in France, the post-World War II immigration movement in the Netherlands is intricately related to the independence of its former colonies. In its four waves of immigration, the Dutch received Indonesians immigrants (1949), Moluccans who served as soldiers in the Dutch Colonial Army (1950s), Italian, Spanish, Turkish, and Moroccan workers (1956-1973), Surinamese migrants (1975) and other refugees (1985-Present) (Groenendijk and Heijs 2001). Coincidentally, the Netherlands received the highest number of immigrants during the first four years of the 1970s, through the economic recession and unemployment triggered by the 1973 oil

crisis. Both Surinamese immigration peaks took place during the two oil crises, leading to extremely high unemployment rates among the poorly educated Surinamese immigrants. Likewise, uneducated poor youth from the Netherlands Antilles arrived in the Netherlands in the 1970s to find grim educational and job perspectives, leading some immigrants to drugs and criminal activity (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). In the 1960s and 1970s, the Netherlands also received Turkish and Moroccan immigrants who had previously spent time as workers in countries such as Belgium and Germany. The influx of guest workers was a response to the demand of the textile and metal industries for low-skilled labor, and led to an agreement on labor migration between all three countries in 1964 (Crul and Doomernik 2003). As a consequence of the bleak economic conditions and high immigrant influx, the Dutch government officially halted immigration in 1974 (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

Although neither the Dutch nor immigrants of the 1960s considered integration a significant social problem, the issue became a political concern in the mid-1970s when, upon the halting of immigration, guest-workers decided to permanently remain in the country, bringing their families and thereby contributing to the continuation of immigration to the Netherlands. As a response to popular opposition to continued immigration, in the 1980s the Dutch government implemented policies that encouraged guest-workers to return home, and those who stayed to become integrated into mainstream Dutch society (Crul and Doomernik 2003). While the Netherlands faced financial struggles in the post-war period and was initially unable to provide the infrastructure to properly accommodate immigrants, its recovery during the 1980s and 90s proved beneficial to the immigrant population. Mollucans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Indonesians,

and other “Dutch Eurasians” who remained in the Netherlands have since undergone a successful integration into Dutch society by means of an assimilationist approach which focused on facilitating the adoption of the “Dutch way of life” (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1040; van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). Although descendants of mixed Dutch-native heritage (called Indische Nederlanders) and young men of Afro-Surinamese origin were initially stigmatized and associated with drugs and crime, their offspring have successfully integrated into the Dutch education system and job market, as have the children of Antillean immigrants (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1040; van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). By the 1990s, Surinamese employment levels and educational attainment had dramatically improved (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006: 336).

Unfortunately, the integration of immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan roots has not been as successful as their former-colonial counterparts. Although as of 2012 the Muslim community in the Netherlands comprised over 5 percent of the country's population, such statistic does not represent a successful integration into mainstream Dutch society (Hurewitz 2005; CIA World Factbook 2012). The next section will address how the Dutch approach to integration has been historically developed, and how it has been applied to contemporary political policies that, according to Geert Wilders, have not proved sufficient to integrate the Dutch Muslim population.

Multicultural Policy: the Dutch National Context

Historical & Philosophical Formation

The roots of Dutch multiculturalism and its hallmark tolerance for diversity dates back to its time as a colonial power that, unlike its Spanish, Portuguese, and British counterparts, was not eager to fully impose its culture, language, and religion through the oppression of native populations. Instead, the Dutch approach to colonialism resorted to business rather than violence. The Dutch “laissez-faire” ideology is also expressed in the country's extremely liberal views on the use of drugs, prostitution, euthanasia, as well as other social issues (Hurewitz 2005). Its multicultural approach became first solidified by the pillarization of religion that began in the mid-20th century when Dutch society became partitioned into Protestant, Catholic, and secular sections in the areas of education, media, labor (including trade unions and employers' organizations) (Crul and Doornik 2003). Using the pillarized system as its basis, the Dutch pluralistic system shaped its approach to integration by promoting the cooperation between government agencies and social organizations in integrating newcomers (Crul and Doornik 2003; van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006).

An important contributor to the formation of Dutch multiculturalism has been the national trauma still present in the Dutch collective memory. Dutch society remains aware of the consequences of its past political neutrality, which was partly the reason behind the decimation of the Dutch Jewish population during World War II, a total of three times as many deaths in proportional comparison to France and Belgium (Hurewitz 2005: 13). Thus, the Dutch nation is

said to, for the most part, still suffer from the guilt of not having “done enough” to save its Jewish minority in the face of Hitler’s demands, a national shame that has been greatly responsible for the implementation of the multicultural approach to integration (Caldwell 2005; Schulman 2012).

As time passed, the Dutch later partly jettisoned the the pillarization system in the 1970s, turning instead to the integration of “new minorities” and the promotion of a multicultural approach that encouraged “immigrant groups to organize their communities around their religious needs” (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1044). Consequently, numerous mosques, temples, Islamic schools, and Islamic and Hindu broadcasting corporations were constructed, all of which, with the exception of places of worship such as churches and mosques, benefit from full state funding (Crul and Doornik 2003).

In 1976, established by the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work, and later managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Advisory Committee on Research related to Minorities (ACOM) was tasked with advising the Dutch government on integration policy. ACOM’s research initially had minimal influence on policymaking; instead, the Dutch government adopted the recommendations of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid*), which advised policymakers to avoid “minority formation” by granting immigrants the opportunity for political participation and socioeconomic equality. The recommendations became the “Ethnic Minorities Policy” (*Minderhedennota*), which listed its primary objective as “achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a

situation of of equality and have full opportunities for their development” (Entzinger 2003: 63). The stated objective demonstrates the Dutch multicultural approach by directly mentioning the equality to only of 'individuals' but also of 'groups', a primary focus of proponents of multiculturalism who believe groups need also be granted rights and recognition as they grant individuals a sense of identity and belonging within social contexts (see Chapter 3). Implemented by the Parliament in 1983, the *Minderhedennota* was later managed by the Ministry of the Interior and monitored by ACOM, which accompanied its progress from 1984 until it was dissolved in 1990 (Penninx 2005).

The following decade witnessed a slight tilt toward an assimilationist approach of immigrant integration into mainstream society (Kraal 2001: 35). By the 1990s, the national Dutch system of integration had shifted its focus from “Ethnic Minority Policies”, which focused on specific ethnic groups, to an emphasis on an integration approach that addressed general policies affecting all citizens and non-citizens (Kraal 2001: 21, 32). The latter approach also included a focus on the rights and duties of citizenship such as the adoption of the Dutch language, social norms and political participation, to be further discussed in the next section (Kraal 2001; Crul and Doornik 2003). Whereas some cities maintained policies for political participation based on minority affiliation and the ability of immigrant groups to propose initiatives based on ethnic community emancipation, other regions leaned toward the new approach of general citizen policies that bypassed the political involvement of immigrant organizations and did not provide immigrants the ability to propose initiatives concerning ethnic rights (Kraal 2001: 33).

Contemporary Applications of Multiculturalism: Current Government Policies

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch government's multicultural approach included the official recognition of immigrant minorities and the implementation of policies addressing non-discrimination (Kraal 2001; Guiraudon 2009). While perceiving guest-workers as a temporary presence in Dutch society, the national government adopted an extensive multicultural program that included the public-funding of organizations to ensure the preservation of immigrants' 'cultural identities'. The Dutch (often local) government began to fund several immigrant organizations based on national origin, ethnic identity, and political and religious affiliation. Organizations such as the Turkish Cultural Center and the Dutch-Turkish Workers Association were encouraged to contribute to policymaking by representing the social needs and concerns of immigrant minorities and serving as intermediates between migrant groups and the government (Kraal 2001). Dutch integration policy was based on the principle that immigrants should adopt Dutch culture while being allowed to retain their ethnic identities and cultural diversity in order to promote a smooth reversed-transition once immigrants began to return "home". Consequently, the government passed policies aimed at minimizing labor, educational, and housing inequalities between ethnic Dutch and immigrant minorities and maximizing educational and labor integration (Kraal 2001). The majority of the integration budget was allocated towards the funding of educational programs. For instance, the 1985 Educational Priority Policy granted schools with large immigrant populations a budget nearly twice as large as those of schools with primarily native-Dutch students. The government encouraged immigrant schools to teach native

languages to immigrant children with the aim of maintaining their cultural heritage and enabling children to swiftly move back to countries of origin. Accordingly, immigrant schools taught children up to 5 hours per week of native languages, and applied a majority of funds towards teaching Dutch as a second language (Entzinger 2003; Crul and Doornik 2003).

Upon acknowledgment that “temporary guest-workers” were, in fact, permanent immigrants, the Dutch government began to formulate a “coherent” integration policy, while remaining opposed to obligating foreign citizens residing in the Netherlands to become Dutch citizens. Instead, the government attempted to equalize the social and economic rights of citizen and non-citizen residents in the country (Entzinger 2003). For instance, the government lifted a ban on the work of foreigner residents in the public sector (with the exception of positions in the police or the Dutch army), reserving a quota of public-sector jobs reserved for immigrant minorities, an effort it has since attempted to increase (Crul and Doornik 2003). In 1985, foreign residents were granted equal access to Dutch social security and the right to vote and be elected in local District and City Council elections, with the condition that they held a residence permit and have continuously resided in the Netherlands for a period of five years (Kraal 2001; Rogers, Tillie and Vertovec 2001; Entzinger 2003).

However, the multicultural approach soon generated antagonism between native and immigrant populations. In line with the Dutch multicultural approach, the government allowed, and often funded, controversial immigrant practices. For instance, until 2004, the surgical repair of broken hymens was covered by government insurance (Caldwell 2005). Dutch government programs soon became unable to cope with the numbers and pressures of immigration, and its

multicultural policies began to exacerbate tensions between immigrant and native groups. The Dutch Ethnic Minorities' Policy, formulated in the 1980s, viewed immigrants as members of racial, national or ethnic groups, instead of individuals, as is the case with French assimilation. Thus, 'ethnic minorities' became the most widely used term to refer to immigrants. In order to address such social tensions, the government appointed a Minister for Integration Policy in 1998.

In 1990, per request of the government, the private sector joined in the efforts of a diverse labor-market by implementing ethnic quotas for immigrant employment and signing an agreement to increase immigrant employment in private industries by 60,000 jobs in the first five years of the 1990s (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1055). In an effort to stimulate the immigrant economic situation, the government has, since 1995, implemented tax and insurance incentives for private employers willing to hire immigrant minorities (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1055).

Brubaker (2003) and Mulcahy (2011) have noted that, since the late 1990s, the Netherlands has “rolled back multiculturalism” and shifted towards French-like assimilationist ideas, a claim that can be exemplified by the implementation of a compulsory course on the Dutch language and on civic integration for all non-EU immigrants seeking Dutch residency. The 1998 “WIN Act”, the 2007 Integration Act, and the 2007-2011 Integration Memorandum are also demonstrative of the Dutch adoption of assimilationist programs. Under the 1998 WIN act, immigrants are now required to attend civic lessons in order to improve integration efforts and employment perspectives. 2003 marked another visible phase in the shift toward the assimilation approach when the adoption of Dutch culture and traditions became a center component of the government's integration policies, introducing a compulsory integration exam in 2004. The

government also introduced the 'Civic Integration from Abroad Programme' in 2006, “requiring prospective immigrants to pass an exam testing their knowledge of Dutch society and language before they arrived in the Netherlands. Prospective migrants are obliged to purchase and watch a pre-arrival video that contains images of scantily-clad women and homosexual men kissing, as well as a section on 'Dutch values' which makes clear that honor killings, domestic abuse and female genital mutilation are illegal and punishable by law in the Netherlands” (Mulcahy 2011: 193). The videos also contain interviews with other immigrants that have relocated to the Netherlands and who advise the prospective immigrant to emigrate “internally” as well as physically, “so then you won't be shocked when your culture is taken away from you” (Mulcahy 2011: 193).

Finally, in 2011, the Dutch government announced its desire to concretize the Dutch integration approach's gradual shift towards assimilation by releasing a new integration bill. On June 16th, Interior Minister Piet Hein Donner introduced the new bill to his Parliamentary colleagues by reading the bill's covering letter (quoted in Kern 2011):

The government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society.

The policy changes proposed by the right-wing minority government comprised of the Liberal Conservatives (VVD) and Christian Democrats (CDA), and supported by the Party for Freedom (PVV), include a ban of the burqa which will come into effect in beginning of 2013, making the Netherlands the third European country – after Belgium and France – to implement

such policy (NYT 09/16/2011; Al Jazeera 01/27/2012; Nikolas 2012). Furthermore, the assimilationist bill proposes that the government no longer grant special subsidies for immigrants and ban forced marriages. Asylum seekers will be tested on whether they are more attached to the Netherlands than to the country of origin, and will be required to demonstrate a source of income prior to being granted residency (Kern 2011; Tyler 2011).

Societal Implications: Consequent Problems

According to Dutch academic Paul Scheffer, the Netherlands' multicultural integration policy and its focus on immigrant cultural retention had led to the social segregation of immigrants, as well as to their inability to speak Dutch and understand or participate in Dutch society, barring them from adopting Dutch values and norms (Penninx 2005:42). Unlike France, the Dutch government actively conducts research based on ethnicity and monitors the “socioeconomic status of migrants and their children” through studies such as the Social Position and Use of Facilities by Ethnic Minorities Survey (SPVA), which addresses the level of educational integration and success of immigrant children (Crul and Doornik 2003; 1045). Although immigrants of Dutch-colonial roots certainly faced steep integration challenges upon arriving in the Netherlands, government and academic studies demonstrate a visible discrepancy in integration achievements between them and immigrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent.

In the 1980s, Dutch housing policy was implemented to ensure that immigrants had shelter: the 5 percent rule granted Indonesians at least 5 percent of newly constructed housing

during the post-war housing shortage. Moluccans, unlike Indonesians, were initially not considered legal Dutch citizens, and were consequently placed in temporary housing barracks which eventually became segregated Moluccan neighborhoods with majority Moluccan schools. Although some Moluccans were eventually able to move away from such neighborhoods, the majority of the Moluccan population consequently became isolated from mainstream Dutch society (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). The failure of housing and educational integration can also be attributed to what Crul and Doornik (2003: 1060) call the “white flight”, or massive out-flux of ethnic Dutch families who sought larger homes and schools in neighborhoods away from those which became populated with the incoming immigrant population of the latter 20th century. The small vacant homes then became the residence of immigrant families that grew due to family reunification policies of the 1970s and 80s, leading to the present uneven immigrant residential dispersion among the neighborhoods of large Dutch cities such as Amsterdam (Kraal 2001). Although residential areas have recently become more demographically dispersed, ethnic minorities are often remain “concentrated in the poorer segments of housing market and in lower income brackets” (Entzinger 2003: 68)

Like the Moluccan struggle for housing integration, Indonesians also faced various barriers to educational and professional integration, despite their status as official Dutch citizens. According to van Amersfoort and van Niekerk (2006: 329), although the Dutch government provided public funding to immigrant organizations, typical immigrant institutions such as clubs and newspapers did not develop and/or succeed in the colonial immigrant community, as younger generations found the past colonies irrelevant and uninteresting. Furthermore, while the

integration of first generation colonial immigrants was slowed due to the perception of immigrants as temporary guest-workers, integration was accelerated once the Dutch granted its colonial immigrants citizenship and began to include their children in regular Dutch schools, intermixed with the ethnic Dutch population in the mid-1980s (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006: 342). The same trend has not occurred for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.

First-generation Turks and Moroccans have been described as a “lost generation with regard to integration” (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006: 343), leading to a significantly more difficult integration of second and third generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants than their colonial counterparts. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants have not been integrated as successfully as their Dutch colonial counterparts due to the precarious socioeconomic and educational conditions from where they originated, as well as the lack of common cultural, historical, and linguistic similarities they hold with Dutch society, in contrast with immigrants of Dutch colonial origins (Crul and Doornik 2003; van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). Studies show that Turks in the Netherlands, as a whole, resort to Turkish, rather than Dutch, news and consider their identities as primarily Turkish. Studies also show that children of Turkish and Moroccan descent demonstrate substandard fluency in the Dutch language, leading to poor academic achievement in primary school (Crul and Doornik 2003). Moroccan youth have displayed troublesome behavior demonstrative of a lack of integration, such as committing numerous violent acts including train hijackings and building occupations (Penninx 2005). After a Dutch-born Moroccan man committed the murder of Theo van Gogh (discussed in detail ahead), young Moroccan men became shunned by many ethnic Dutch, even being barred from

entering nightclubs (Hardy 2010). Unsurprisingly, “reported crime rates show a dramatic overrepresentation of Moroccan adolescents and young men”, with certain Dutch neighborhoods containing groups of Moroccan youth who “hang around, provoking regular police surveillance” (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1042-3).

Positive developments in the Moroccan community highlight even slower integration of Turks in the Netherlands. While one quarter of women of Moroccan descent marry ethnic Dutch men, there is no significant progression of intermarriage statistics between first and second generation Turks. Second-generation Moroccans reportedly also speak Dutch longer and better than their Turkish counterparts: studies show that while 78 percent of the Moroccan youth speak Dutch to siblings, only 59 percent of their Turkish counterparts do so (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1058). Although studies show that every successive immigrant generation gradually adopt more Dutch cultural customs, they also demonstrate that “second-generation Moroccan and Turkish young people still remain closer to their parents' ideas than to those of their Dutch peer group” (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1059).

The Dutch model of multiculturalism has also proved insufficient in achieving full economic and educational integration. Previously discussed efforts to implement quotas were usually rejected by employers, as they claimed they did not hire immigrants because they lacked the required skills and training for employment. The immigrant unemployment rate varied from 20 to 40 percent during the 1980s, and was particularly high in the Turkish and Moroccan communities (Entzinger 2003). Although some success was reached for colonial-Dutch immigrants such as those of Surinamese and Antillean decent, unemployment remains higher for

Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (Kraal 2001). Economic hardship and unemployment levels among Turks and Moroccans have also remained high as a consequence of poor primary education, which barred several immigrant children from succeeding in entering colleges and universities. Instead, vocational training schools in larger cities have become known as de-facto immigrant schools, as they become the only means of higher education for many children of immigrants (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1061).

Although the Dutch are known for a tolerant approach to immigration, symbols of social and ethnic division can be detected throughout Dutch society. For instance, ethnic Dutch refer to immigrants born in the Netherlands after many generations and even dark-skinned Dutch as “alloctoon”, a term literally translated to “not from here” (Jurewitz 2005: 14). According to Kraal (2001: 35), the present status of immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands seems to demonstrate that Dutch integration policies of the 1980s and 1990s have been unable to “combat the disadvantaged position of ethnic groups”. Thus, the question remains: has the Dutch multicultural approach failed entirely in its objective of successfully integration newcomers and their Dutch-born descendants? According to Dutch EPR politician Geert Wilders, the answer is most certainly a resounding 'yes'. This next section will take a closer look at the rhetorical techniques used by Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom to discredit the Dutch multicultural approach. An overview of Wilders' use of each technique will then lead to a comprehensive analysis of how his views on integration serve as a key component of his anti-immigrant message.

The Party for Freedom & Anti-Immigration Rhetoric

The Party for Freedom: Party Formation

In the early 2000s, two controversial figures – Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh – were assassinated for expressing outspoken anti-Muslim views, including the fear that Islam generates homophobia, violence against women, and anti-Semitism (Enlanger 08/2011). Fortuyn, a popular outspoken homosexual and anti-Muslim far-right politician who was predicted to have electoral success in the parliamentary elections of 2002 was shot to death by an animal rights activist outside a radio station just eleven days prior to the elections (Wigglesworth 2010; Lange and Art 2011). Van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker whose films discussed domestic violence in the Dutch Muslim community, was shot 7 times, had his throat slit, and was stabbed to death by a 26-year-old Dutchman of Moroccan descent (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Hardy 2010; Erlanger 08/2011).

The shocking murders left Dutch society in a state of heightened anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment, generating hostile conditions that greatly benefited Geert Wilders and the electoral momentum of his one-man party, the Dutch Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV). According to Wilders, the PVV is the fastest growing party in the Netherlands (Wilders 2011). The party, formed in February of 2006, won 5.9 percent of votes and a total of nine seats in the 2006 parliamentary election (Wigglesworth 2010; Lange and Art 2011; Vossen 2011). In March of 2010, the PVV won first place in the local elections of Almere and second in The Hague, the only two municipal elections in which the party participated (van Lonkhuijsen 2010).

In June of 2010, the PVV earned a major electoral victory when it obtained 15.5 percent of the vote, expanding from 9 to 24 seats, and making it the third largest party in the Dutch Parliament (BBC News 06/10/2010; The Economist 06/10/2010; Erlanger 2011). The party supports a minority right-wing coalition comprised of the VVD and the CDA (Lange and Art 2011).

Party for Freedom: Party Rhetoric

Wilders' PVV has, since its creation, promoted a strict assimilationist approach to integration that portrays unassimilated immigrants, or even immigrants who in any way identify with cultural aspects of their ancestry, as dangerous to the national well-being, economic success, and security of the Netherlands. The enemy-creation approach is prominent in the PVV's rhetoric, and is exemplified by a recent party campaign that targets Polish and other Eastern European immigrants as contributors to social and economic insecurity. On its website, the PVV encourages Dutch nationals to relate personal stories of “problems” they have experienced with Poles in the Netherlands. According to a statement by PVV member of Parliament Ino van Besselaar, the aim of the campaign is to initiate a discussion regarding the “problems caused by central and eastern Europeans in terms of crime, alcoholism, drugs use, dumping household waste and prostitution” (DutchNews 02/2012). In associating immigrants with social concerns, the PVV is able to promote its agenda of immigration restriction and selective deportation. Although the PVV rejects all non-Western immigration, its anti-immigrant campaigns have primarily focused on Muslim immigrants.

The PVV's anti-immigration rhetoric has been shaped by a clear rejection of Islam as a dangerous ideology that is infiltrating the Netherlands through immigration. Consequently, PVV members have repeatedly expressed the party's intention to close Dutch borders to immigration and to suppress the role of Islam in the Netherlands. PVV MP Barry Madlener explains the party's intention is to “combat the Islamization” of the Netherlands, or the spread of Muslim norms throughout Dutch civil society (DutchNews 04/2012). In its fight against Islam, the party objects to all symbols associated with the religion, including the use of headscarves. The PVV's repudiation of Islamic symbols is so extreme that the party openly criticized Queen Beatrix' use of the headscarf on a trip to the Gulf, claiming the headscarf is a “symbol of [the] Islamization” movement which “legitimizes the oppression of women”, and therefore criticizing the queen's decision to wear it (Carver 2012; Dickey 2012). The PVV's desire to suppress Islam also extends to Muslim religious services normally provided to members of other religious groups. For instance, PVV MP Hero Brinkman stated that he opposed the appointment of Imams as chaplains in the Dutch army, effectively denying Muslim Dutch soldiers the same religious guidance that is provided to soldiers of other faiths. When questioned by the interviewer regarding his thoughts on a Muslim Dutch soldier who had recently died in combat in Afghanistan, Brinkman rejected the soldier's religious association as an irrelevant detail (de Bruijn 2011). Such arguments demonstrate the views of the PVV that multicultural concepts of group identity should be replaced for a focus on national assimilation.

The PVV claims to be the only party aware of the dangers of Islamization, and therefore promotes naturalization only for those that relinquish any loyalty to their original homeland or

country of ancestry (Bruijn 2011). The party is also against the idea of dual citizenship, wanting to ban this practice for future naturalization cases, and to implement the denaturalization of immigrant criminals who are repeat offenders (YouTube 2006 (2); Tyler 2010). The PVV believes the immigrant's renunciation of his/her original citizenship demonstrates the true desire to become a Dutch citizen, and his/her loyalty to Dutch society (Tyler 2010).

Geert Wilders Rhetoric

Although Wilders has refused to discuss his personal history and is secretive about his family background, it is known that he was born in the Dutch town of Venlo in 1963 and raised as a Roman Catholic (Vossen 2011). After years of traveling during his youth, reportedly visiting Israel between thirty to forty times and spending extensive periods of time in other Middle Eastern countries, Wilders returned to the Netherlands, temporarily worked for the state-run insurance system, and eventually turned to politics (Vossen 2011). He joined the conservative VVD party as a junior staffer in 1998, and later became one of the party's speech writers (Lange and Art 2011; Dickey 2012). In 2001, as a member of the VVD, Wilders claimed that there was “nothing wrong” with Islam as a religion, and that it must be respected as any other religion. At the time, Wilders stated that the problem lies in Islamic extremism, and that neither him nor his party had “anything against Islam” (Hoebink 2010). In the time-span of three years following those remarks, Wilders radically changed his tone regarding the Muslim religion, which he has since infamously called “the reprehensible ideology of a retarded culture” (Hoebink 2010).

Throughout his time as a VVD member, Wilders gradually became one of the primary critics of party's policies on immigration and integration. Unsurprisingly, Wilders promoted a strong stance against Turkey's accession to the European Union, another point of contention between him and the VVD. Wilders' ideological shift ultimately led him to leave the party in September of 2004. After the assassination of Theo van Ghogh, Wilders was placed under state protection, and two years later, in February of 2006, Wilders formed the PVV (Wigglesworth 2010; Lange and Art 2011). Since then, Wilders has continued to receive repeated death threats for his anti-Muslim views, forcing him to live in and out of numerous safe-houses under constant police surveillance (Hurewitz 2005; van der Tol 2012).

Since the formation of the PVV, Wilders has stated that his first action as a leader of government would be to halt all immigration from Muslim countries (Traynor 2008). Although enemy-creation and crisis-creation have been the most prominent tactics used in his anti-immigrant rhetoric, Wilders has employed nearly all of the political communication and rhetorical formulation techniques previously discussed, infusing them with emotions such as anger and outrage, to gather anti-immigrant support (Bruijn 2011). Utilizing the rhetorical communication tactics outlined in Chapter 3 and the multicultural concepts and criticisms of Chapter 2, this section will discuss how Wilders has exploited Dutch multiculturalism in framing his anti-immigrant arguments. I would like to also remind the reader that, unlike the case study of France's Front National, the PVV's recent existence has led this case study to rely primarily on newspaper articles as sources of Wilders' direct rhetoric. Thus, newspaper statistics will also be

presented to support secondary literature addressing Wilders' rhetorical style and views on immigrant integration.

Media-Centered Strategies

As a small party with only twenty-four parliamentary representatives and only one official member (Wilders), the PVV's public relations have been, since its creation, under its leader's tight control (Lange and Art 2011: 2040). This approach is extended to not only the overall rhetoric of the PVV's Members of Parliament in their speeches and interviews, but also to any advertisement associated with the party, which does not have local branches. The most recognizable poster of the PVV, shown below, demonstrates the austere and direct approach molded by Geert Wilders to present Dutch voters some of the most utilized terms in his ideological vocabulary: the theme of immigration as a grave threat to Dutch national, cultural, and economic security. The poster is also a representation of Wilders' use of fear as a technique to gather the voter's attention. The climate of fear that developed in the Netherlands after the murders of Theo Van Gogh and Pim Fortyyn have become a powerful tool in Wilders' arsenal, incidents which Wilders depicted as shocking symbols of the dangers of immigration and the multicultural approach to integration. Wilders exploits the murders' repercussion among the Dutch public to create a rallying point of fear and an illustration of the intolerance generated by multicultural policies.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on political advertisement has pointed to a common pattern of the oversimplification of dramatic themes to “attract attention, simplify problems, and emphasize particular principles”. This tactic is exemplified by a PVV campaign poster⁷ which exploits this environment of fear among the Dutch population to propose an overly simplified ideal that portrays immigration as the cause behind crime and terrorism (Bennett 1980: 386). The poster displays the image of a smiling Wilders as the background to the slogan *Meer Veiligheid, Minder Immigratie* (More Security, Less Immigration). The subject of security, discussed throughout this section, is one of Wilders' primary weapons of enemy and crisis creation, as well as his favorite means of relating to the common Dutch public. Therefore, in its few advertisements, the PVV's rhetoric is short but powerful, aiming to generate an atmosphere of antagonism and fear through short catchphrases and statements shaped by an ideological vocabulary of security as its primary theme.

Another advertisement⁸, published in the popular Dutch daily *de Volkskrant*, continues the theme of security by promoting the recent feature on the PVV's website where Dutch nationals can voice their complaints against anti-Eastern European immigrant. This advertisement contains a short paragraph that reads (translated from Google Translate):

The numerator of the Central and Eastern European Hotline of the Freedom Party is now more than 46,000, but there is still more! Do you have to deal with annoying nuisance, or have you lost your job due to the massive influx of

⁷ Advertisement may be viewed here: <http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/2010/05/wilders-pvv-has-best-election-poster.html>

⁸ Advertisement may be viewed here: <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2694/Internet-Media/article/detail/3188405/2012/02/18/Waarom-de-Volkskrant-de-advertentie-voor-het-PVV-meldpunt-plaatste.dhtml>

Central and Eastern Europeans? Do not wait any longer and let us know immediately at www.meldpuntmiddenenoosteuropeanen.nl (Remarque 2012).

Once again, Wilders exploits the socioeconomic context of the Netherlands to generate anger among the native population. By asking Dutch voters if they have become unemployed as a result of recent Central and Eastern immigration, this PVV advertisement utilizes recent the economic strain in the country to frame immigrants as competitors for jobs.

The PVV uses not only media-centered strategies, but all rhetorical techniques discussed in Chapter 3, to frame the problem of security as the result of non-Western immigration and multicultural government policies. In order to resonate with Dutch voters, a primary rhetorical technique used is the projection of public opinion, in which Wilders claims to speak for the average Dutch citizen.

The Projection of Public Opinion

As discussed in chapter 3, one of the key components of populist far-right parties in Western Europe has been their self-identification as the only legitimate representatives of the masses and as the only political movements capable of challenging the mainstream political elite. For instance, Wilders exploits the national guilt still present from the Dutch government's failure to sufficiently protect Jews from Nazi persecution by claiming that this aspect of Dutch history has rendered mainstream parties overly politically-correct and afraid to detract rights from groups who do not deserve them. Therefore, Wilders argues, it the PVV's responsibility to act rationally, rather than emotionally, and denounce Muslim immigrants for what they really are: a

threat to the well-being of Dutch society. Wilders's rhetoric is replete such arguments that characterize him as the only true defender of the interests of Dutch citizens, a tactic he exploited during his 2011 trial, discussed later in the chapter (Wilders 2011):

I am being tried for challenging the views that the ruling establishment wants to impose on us as the truth.

Wilders' usage of the word “us” is not merely accidental; by stating that the political establishment has imposed a view on “us”, Wilders categorizes himself as member of the common class of Dutch citizens whom he feels is being ideologically marginalized by an elite that promotes multiculturalism as the only humane approach to integration. This technique implies that Wilders' views are the same the views held by the overall population and, therefore, a trial against Wilders' freedom of speech is a trial against the freedom of speech of Dutch citizens.

Wilders' populist claims extend to the 'endearing' name by which he refers to his constituency of native Dutch men and women – “Henk and Ingrid”, two common Dutch names – as a means of establishing familial ties with the native Dutch population. Wilders also used this argument to vilify the leftist immigration-friendly Labour Party (PvdA), whom he accused of “championing only the interests of Ahmed and Fatima”, in a direct reference to Muslim immigrants (RNW News Desk 2010). Like Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen, Wilders claims to speak what Dutch men and women are thinking but are unable to vocalize (quoted in Rijckaert 2010):

My supporters say: 'At last there is someone who dares to say what millions of people think'. That is what I do. People are fed up with the government; the leftist elite that has failed them.

The PVV leader argues that Dutch citizens disapprove of the Dutch multicultural approach to integration and, as a representative of popular concerns, Wilders defends this position among the political class. For instance, Wilders accuses mainstream parties of the left of being “guilty of practicing cultural relativism,” a key underlying component of the arguments against the multicultural approach (Wilders 2011). Wilders also claims his views on open immigration represent popular views on such issue: according to a 2008 poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund, only 41 percent of Dutch citizens believe Muslim immigrants can positively contribute to Dutch culture and society, in comparison to 72 percent who believe immigration in generation can positively contribute to Dutch culture and society (Gustin and Ziebarth 2010). Such statistical findings seem to support Wilders' assertion that Muslim immigration is a legitimate concern of Dutch citizens. Therefore, Wilders formulates his anti-immigrant rhetoric based on the notion that without his leadership, the fears held by Dutch citizens regarding immigration would be entirely ignored by the mainstream multicultural elite who, rather than upholding Dutch values as a legislative priority, instead abides by political-correctness that dilutes the purity of Dutch culture.

Rhetorical Myths

Another primary technique utilized by Geert Wilders to reject Dutch multiculturalism is the use of rhetorical myths, or stories based on Dutch cultural traditions that dictate how society should feel and act in face of uncertain circumstances. These stories are also utilized to generate social anxiety and deceptive beliefs about the causes and nature of social problems. Some of the main themes presented in Wilders' rhetoric are based on the Dutch tradition of the Enlightenment-age concepts of a vibrant civil society, successful democracy, freedom of expression – which Wilders cites as the most important component of the Dutch constitution – and an effective rule of law. Wilders cites Western religions and traditions, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Humanism, as key influences that have historically helped shape Dutch culture (YouTube 2006 (1)). According to Wilders, these concepts constitute the core of not only Dutch society but Western civilization, and therefore must be honored and respected by all non-Western immigrants who choose to reside in Europe and North America, a reality Wilders claims is failing to take place as a consequence of multiculturalism's emphasis on honoring traditional immigrant traditions. In order to reject immigrants as unwilling to abide by such traditions, Wilders draws from the multicultural focus on specific groups to directly attack Muslims as the immigrant group known for failing to assimilate such Dutch values.

Another central concept discussed in Wilders' rhetoric, the idea of Dutch tolerance, is portrayed both as a cornerstone of Dutch society, and as an ideal that has been hijacked by left-wing multiculturalists and that, consequently, now plays a dangerous role in Muslim ideology's

imminent takeover of the Dutch society. While he praises the Dutch as a classically tolerant people, the PVV leader argues they have been “too tolerant of the intolerant”, an argument based on the Dutch multicultural tradition of accepting diversity, and a criticism directly in line with academic critique of the multicultural approach (YouTube 2006 (1)). A primary concern of critics of multiculturalism has been the fact that the integration approach obliges natives to welcome, accept, and adapt to immigrant cultures while such actions are not reciprocated by immigrant populations. Wilders echoes this concern by attributing the murder of Theo Van Gogh to the Dutch accommodation of immigrant traditions (quoted in Hurewitz 2005: 13):

For too long we've been tolerant of the intolerant. We've had a policy for years that everything should be tolerated, that anything is possible. [...] We should have seen it coming.

However, the traditional liberal nature of Dutch society compels Wilders to readily defend Dutch tolerance by arguing that the Dutch need only learn how to remain “tolerant to the tolerant” while learning to be “intolerant to the intolerant” (YouTube 2006 (1)). While Wilders defends his belief in the concepts of human rights, rule of law, and freedom of religion of the Netherlands, he does not believe these privileges should be granted to those with “Islamofascist” intentions (YouTube 2006 (1)). By focusing his rhetoric on “Islamofascist” individuals, Wilders once again singles out a specific group as the source of danger to Dutch society. Furthermore, Wilders criticizes the Dutch government funding of multicultural organizations as a means of using taxpayer money to encourage the lack of integration promoted by the multicultural approach.

Wilders' proposed solution to strengthen tolerance and rule of law in the Netherlands is to minimize leftist political correctness in Dutch society. Wilders argues that Western society is undergoing Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations", and that the classic ideological ideals of human rights, democratic rule of law, and egalitarianism are being challenged by a foreign "backwards" Muslim ideology that abhors Western values. In order to illustrate this assertion, Wilders consistently utilizes examples of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks in Western Europe. The PVV leader also mentions the word "Islam" in 60 percent of the analyzed articles detailing his anti-immigrant stance, often claiming that the Islamic civilization aims to "destroy everything we stand for", namely what he views as Enlightenment ideals classically associated with Western ideology. In order to avoid the destruction of Western ideals, the PVV leader argues that political correctness should be jettisoned entirely before it permanently fails to stop this trend.

Another of Wilders' proposed solutions to protect the tenets of Dutch civilization is to clearly define and outline the "dominant" Dutch culture into law (YouTube 2006 (1)). Proposals such as these are meant to uphold Wilders' depiction of himself as "the protector of Dutch modernity against Islam and progressive naivety" (Vossen 2011: 187). His fight against Muslim immigration is viewed as an attempt to protect these Enlightenment principles which he believes are the basis of classic Dutch culture (Vossen 2011). To support the notion that Dutch and Western principles are under attack, Wilders creates an extensive anti-immigrant message based on the enemy creation rhetorical technique, which will be discussed next.

Enemy Creation

One of the cornerstones of Wilders' rhetoric is the appeal to fear and enemy creation, specifically the characterization of Muslim immigrants as the bearers of an intrinsic danger to Dutch values and society (de Vries 2011). Wilders views Islam as the gravest threat to the survival of Dutch society, and Muslim immigrants as the conduits for Islam's the destruction of Dutch values. In order to instill such fears into Dutch society, Wilders utilizes the enemy creation technique by consistently using fear-generating language in his interviews, speeches, films, and books. In Wilders' upcoming book, *Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me*, set to be released in the United States in May of 2012, the PVV leader outlines what he calls a "solid, historical analysis of the dangers of Islamization" (RNW 12/2011). His 2008 short film, *Fitna*, also employed the enemy-creation technique by juxtaposing Koranic passages with images of extremist Islamic terror, thereby associating Muslims with violence. The film, written and produced by Wilders, admittedly aims to demonstrate that "Islam and the Koran are part of a fascist ideology that wants to kill everything we stand for in a modern Western democracy" (Grouch 2008; Fekete 2012). Both pieces of work are blunt tools of enemy-creation aimed at spreading Wilders' anti-Muslim message that the Netherlands' two biggest enemies, Islam and multiculturalism, will be ultimately responsible for the destruction of previously discussed rhetorical myths associated with Dutch society (Child 2009). Once again, Wilders focuses on a specific immigrant group as a source of grave concern.

In order to thoroughly develop the depiction of Muslims as enemies of Dutch culture and Western civilization, and to further induce fear in the Dutch population, Wilders's rhetoric repeatedly associates Islam, which he views as a totalitarian ideology, with criminal activity and security concerns. The enemy-creation technique is consistently used to connect the fear of insecurity to immigration by the use of words such as “safety”, “danger/dangerous”, “crime/criminal”, “violence”, “criminals”, “terrorist”, “fascist”, and “security” in various of the fifty-eight news article chosen for analysis in this study. By using such loaded ideological vocabulary, Wilders questions the true intention of Islamic immigrants, and attempts to anticipate the possible hostile acts that could be committed by their more radical faction. The following rhetorical question exemplifies Wilders' scaremongering tactics (quoted in Hurewitz 2005: 13):

Do we have to wait until a lot of people are killed in Holland? Must we wait until they use some kind of sarin gas in the metro in Rotterdam?

Fearful ideas are further promoted by the rhetoric which sheds doubt on the immigrant's willingness to abide by Dutch norms. Enemy creation is thus expanded with accusations that Muslim immigrants do not, in fact, wish to integrate and adopt Dutch values. Instead, Muslims are characterized as “settlers” who intend to appropriate themselves of Dutch society (de Bruijn 2010: 26). Wilders refers to Muslim immigrants as (de Bruijn 2011: 12):

colonizers – Islamic colonizers – because they have not come [to the Netherlands] to assimilate but to take over the country and subjugate us.

By categorizing Muslim immigrants as “colonizers”, Wilders portrays them as enemies who, through immigration, intend to invade the Netherlands and gradually destroy the freedoms and

privileges granted to Dutch citizens by the political system their ancestors created (Fekete 2012). Like the academic criticisms of multiculturalism, Wilders rejects the Dutch integration approach as submissive to immigrants who he claims are resistant to assimilate Dutch culture by granting state recognition to foreign customs and traditions. Wilders' argument goes on to predict that once the 'enemies' take over Dutch society, they will impose their values and beliefs on Dutch citizens, by which point the latter will have lost their Western liberties and will be unable to fight back (Bruijn 2011: 15):

The time will come when our daughters and granddaughters will have to wear headscarves.

Like Jean-Marie Le Pen before him, Wilders' rhetoric addresses the notion that the extended Dutch national 'family' will become culturally irrelevant and powerless as a consequence the political correctness and excessive tolerance practiced as a result of the multicultural approach. His exaggerated language serves the dual purpose of creating an enemy whose danger is currently being underestimated by the Dutch mainstream political class, and of predicting the obliteration of the Dutch rhetorical myths – the common history of an open, tolerant, and free people. This prediction is the underlying tool behind another of Wilders' preferred rhetorical techniques: crisis creation.

Crisis Creation

Wilders and the PVV characterize Muslim immigrants, and Islam as a religion, as the gravest threat to Dutch society they because are viewed as responsible for an imminent crisis: the

end of Dutch civilization. According to Wilders, Islam “seeks to destroy our Western civilization”, and consequently “has to be defeated” (Spiegel 2008). Like Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen, Wilders generates fear of an imminent crisis by appealing to his country's recent history of war and occupation. Wilders' primary objective, to “stop the Islamic invasion of Holland,” can only be achieved by portraying Islam as more than just a religion, but rather as a (Buruma 2009; quoted in RNW 10/2011):

an ideology of hatred, of destruction, of conquest. It is my strong conviction that Islam is a threat to Western values, to freedom of speech, to the equality of men and women, of heterosexuals and homosexuals, of believers and unbelievers.

The article analysis conducted for this study detected the use of the terms “Islamization”, “Islamic invasion”, and “tsunami of aliens” in several of Wilders' quotes related to the consequence of immigration. Wilders was directly quoted using these exact terms in eight out of fifty-eight articles on immigration, while the overall notion of an “Islamic invasion” was implied in numerous more. According to Fekete (2012), the theme of war and combat is utilized in Wilders' rhetoric to portray Dutch citizens as fighters protecting their civilization. For instance, the depiction of Dutch natives as “‘warriors for good', and statements such as 'let us no longer be afraid' to heed the 'battle cry' and 'wake up'...Islam is at your gate”, are used to depict a state of future chaos that need be taken seriously, and to generate defensive feelings of patriotism that fuel conflict and war (Fekete 2012: 43). Although Wilders and Marine Le Pen's campaigns are shaped by different historical contexts, both countries' shared experiences of invasions serve as strong metaphors that effectively generate public fear due to the recent nature of such events.

In Wilders' view, Islam is more closely comparable to ideologies such as communism and fascism than to religions such as Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism, and as such, would lead to a future of bleak human rights and individual liberties. Bruijn (2011: 15) explains that this tactic of crisis creation describes an unwanted reality so horrible that mobilization is generated through fear, what he calls the “small risk of a major disaster” technique. Therefore, Wilders emphasizes that the crisis is already noticeably underway (quoted in Bruijn 2011: 16):

Crime is rising exponentially, and the atmosphere is becoming increasingly violent. Moroccans appear in police statistics five times more often than indigenous Dutch people. One Moroccan told a journalist, and I quote: 'In the years' time, we'll be in charge here. And then the first thing we'll do is kick out the fucking Queen'.End quote.

In order to strengthen his crisis creation tactic and substantiate his anti-immigrant rhetoric, in 2009 Wilders asked all the Dutch Ministries for a cost-benefit analysis of immigration, and in 2010 sponsored a study that supports the notion that immigrants are hurting Dutch society. The study, conducted by the Nyfer economic research unit, indicated that non-Western immigration is estimated to cost the Netherlands 7.2 billion euros per year (Sittig 2010). However, Wilders argues, the cost of immigration and the political class' multicultural policies is not solely economic; instead, the cost includes the notion that Dutch citizens are (Bruijn 2011: 17):

slowly losing the Netherlands: to mass immigration; to the influx that we can no longer control; to a culture characterized by backwardness and violence; to Moroccan thugs who go through life cursing, spitting and beating up innocent people; thugs who terrorize the streets [...], beat up homosexuals and call women 'whores'.

Ultimately, Wilders' point is clear: if Dutch society fails to understand the urgency of this imminent crisis and the intentions behind “pure” Islam, they will “lose” Dutch society permanently (YouTube 2006 (1)). While the multicultural context leads Wilders' rhetoric to focus on Muslims as the perpetrators of such crisis, thereby differing from the French approach which focuses on immigration as a whole as the real reason for concern, both the PVV and FN leaders depict a vivid portrayal of an upcoming annihilation of Western society if a stricter assimilation approach is not implemented in the near future. In order to accelerate the sense of urgency for integration reform, Wilders also employs a tactic used by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen: the use of arguments that address daily concerns of average citizens.

Relevancy to Daily Concerns

As previously discussed, Wilders' most prominent rhetorical tactic is the use of enemy-creation that portrays Muslim immigrants as the primary causes of criminality in the Netherlands and in Europe, a technique strongly used since the creation of the PVV, notes Vossen (2011). Bruijn (2011) explains that, by pointing to Islam as the ideological source of crime, Wilders also addresses a daily concern of Dutch citizens: domestic security. In order to appeal to the mundane fears of Dutch citizens, the PVV leader often refers to immigrant delinquents as “street terrorists” (Bruijn 2011: 11-12):

[...Dutch] pensioners have been terrorized by Moroccan street thugs for several years. Every year , the building's windows are smashed dozens of times [...]. The muggings are so violent that victims end up spending weeks in hospital with broken bones.

His characterization of Moroccan immigrants as “street thugs” who “terrorize” common citizens instills fear into the population by leading them to believe that they will be unsafe in their neighborhoods due to the presence of immigrants. According to Wilders, the criminality of Muslim immigrants is a result of their violent faith, a threat he calls an “Islamic intifada” in Dutch cities (Bruijn 2011: 12). As a solution, Wilders proposes “declaring a state of emergency, preventive arrests, administrative detentions and the deportation of suspects” (Vossen 2011: 183).

Furthermore, Wilders' rhetoric relies on generating anger at the notion that immigrants refuse to assimilate but nonetheless are allowed to utilize the Dutch welfare system that is funded by the tax-payer money (Bruijn 2011: 17):

[Immigrants] are happy to accept our social benefits, our houses and our doctors, but not our norms and values.

This argument illustrates how Wilders connects multicultural policies to the detriment of hardworking Dutch citizens who are told that their hard-earned money supports lazy, unruly, and violent immigrants. Wilders' rhetoric generates anger among native Dutch citizens by telling them that while "the government insists that you respect Islam", the favor is not returned: “Islam has no respect for you” (Spiegel 2008).

Like Marine Le Pen, Wilders has also denounced the production of halal meat in the Netherlands, partnering up with the Dutch Party for Animals (PvdD) to propose a bill banning halal slaughter in the country (Schulman 2012). By denouncing specific immigrant practices, Wilders is able to directly exemplify how multiculturalism leads to the violation of respect for mainstream cultural norms, a classic complaint of proponents of the assimilation approach. In

order to clearly illustrate how immigration is threatening the Dutch way of life, Wilders also relies on the use of memorable language to gain voter support.

The Use of Memorable Language

Wilders' consistent use of not only memorable, but often controversial and sometimes shocking language has been one of his primary tools for gaining popular notoriety and electoral support (Lange and Art 2011). According to Vossen (2011), linguists have described Wilders' speech as particularly more blunt and vulgar since 2007: “while his speech used to be firm but also loaded with political jargon, he now began to accuse the government of straightforward lies and deceit and ministers of being 'bonkers' or having a 'spine of whipped cream’” (185). Wilders' use of such language runs counter to the expectation that, as a politician who is a member of a multicultural society that promotes diversity and acceptance, he should use politically correct language that is non-offensive and non-threatening to specific ethnic and religious groups.

Instead, Wilders directly attacks Muslim immigrants and their religion through memorable language that contributes to his tactic of portraying them as the ultimate enemy to Dutch society. In his fight against Islam, Wilders has likened the Koran to *Mein Kampf*, and in 2007, the PVV leader asked for the former to be banned in the Netherlands. Wilders has portrayed the prophet Mohammed as a barbaric rapist and murderer, called Imams “idiots”, called Moroccan delinquents “street terrorists” and “Muslim colonists”, and referred to minarets as “the towers of an advancing desert ideology” (Traynor 2008; Buruma 2009; DutchNews

09/14/2009; RNW News Desk 2011; RNW 09/2011; Vosser 2011: 186). In his fight against multiculturalism, Wilders uses shocking language even in his assimilationist policy proposals: in 2009, Wilders proposed that women pay a fine of 1,000 euros for wearing headscarves, or “rag-heads” (RNW 2009; Tyler 2009; Vossen 2011: 185). His blunt language has even caused Wilders to be indicted for trial under the charges of inciting hatred and discrimination toward Muslims. Wilders was eventually acquitted on all charges in January of 2011 (Wigglesworth 2012).

Exaggerated facts and statements have also been a consistent part of Wilders' rhetorical arsenal. For instance, when asked how many Muslims he perceives as posing a threat to the socioeconomic well-being of Europe, he responded: “millions, tens of millions” (Bruijn 2011: 11). The threat, Wilders explains, is derived from the “totalitarian Islamic ideology” that is “the single greatest threat to [Western] liberty” (Buijn 2011: 12).

While his language is pronouncedly more blunt than Marine Le Pen's, Wilders's rhetoric is reminiscent of the early language utilized by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who has also been repeatedly tried for his anti-immigrant statements. Like the Le Pens, Wilders also attempts to display reputational shields to establish him as a legitimate political leader. In order to emphasize his loyalty to democratic principles, Wilders repeatedly distances himself from fascist movements, and even the Front National, which according to him belongs to such classification (Danmarks Radio 2008; YouTube 03/05/2010). Most importantly, Wilders' language aims to portray him as an effective leader who is capable of promoting the concerns of Dutch citizens.

The Role of Charismatic Leadership

Throughout his six years as leader of the PVV, Wilders' tight control of the party's rhetoric and membership and his authoritarian style of leadership has effectively managed to steer the public debate on national security and the ideological protection of Dutch civilization (de Bruijn 2011; Lange and Art 2011). As described by Edelman (1988) a successful leader is able to divert public attention to constructed problems and simultaneously introduce innovative solutions which citizens can easily follow (see Chapter 3). Wilders' rhetoric throughout his 2011 trial effectively shifted the public debate to the discussion regarding free speech, and the notion that this important aspect of Dutch society is under attack. Wilders' trial served as an opportunity for him to stress to the court and to Dutch society that his aim was not simply to defend his right to free speech, but that of all 1.5 million PVV supporters, and all Dutch citizens (Al Jazeera 10/2010):

Formally I'm on trial here today, but with me, the freedom of expression of many, many Dutch people is also being judged.

Also like the Front National leaders, Wilders asserts that his political views – of stricter assimilation policies – would also benefit immigrants themselves, such as modern Muslims who desire to adapt to Dutch society (Hurewitz 2005). Therefore, his role as leader is not solely important for his constituency, but for all members of Dutch society who reject the dangers of Muslim extremism, including assimilated Muslims. Once again, multiculturalism's focus on group identity grants Wilders the opportunity to differentiate between “law-abiding” Muslim Dutch and “Islamofascist” Muslim immigrants.

Wilders' forceful tone, strong language, and unflinching demeanor characterizes him as a serious leader who is able to prevent the spread of an evil ideology. As pointed out in Chapter 3, a leader's arguments, eloquence, and speech techniques are sometimes able to override the factual validity of his (or her) arguments. Wilders relies on this detail to generate a contrast between the intentions behind the PVV's leadership and that of mainstream Dutch parties. Instead of presenting verifiable claims to support his rejection of mainstream Dutch parties, Wilders exploits emotionally-based 'us vs. them' arguments to distance him from the rest of the political establishment in the Netherlands and in Europe (Bruijn 2011). According to him, such mainstream parties have “sold out” European culture and identity to Muslim immigrants as a consequence of left-wing political correctness (YouTube 2006 (1); Traynor 2008). Wilders' disdain for the Dutch leftist elite is exemplified by his use of the example of a journalist who was raped by Taliban members and later described them as respectful by giving her “tea and biscuits” (Bruijn 2011: 10). Wilders' argument that leftist elite is “blinded by its own ideology” serves as a basis for his claim that without his leadership, the Dutch political elite would compromise security, national unity, and economic well-being for political correctness and multicultural policies (Bruijn 2011: 10).

The next section will present Wilders' overall views on Dutch multiculturalism and the integration approach he proposes for the Netherlands: assimilation. This analysis will rely on the combination of each discussed rhetorical technique in order to present how his attack against multiculturalism serves as a key component of his anti-immigrant rhetoric.

PVV Views on Assimilation & Multiculturalism

Dutch academic Paul Scheffer and his influential and widely popular essay published in 2000 by leading Dutch newspaper NRC/Handelsblad entitled “The Multicultural Disaster”, the lenient Dutch multicultural approach to integration has failed. “Policies have been too liberal and focused too much on “retention of culture” of immigrants” (Penninx 2005:42). Scheffer foresees the ultimate concern of anti-multiculturalism critics by stating that "the culture of tolerance is coming up against its limit" (Hurewitz 2005: 13). The PVV and Geert Wilders have created a party platform that is entirely based on Mr. Scheffer's analysis.

Wilders and the PVV view multiculturalism as a dangerous policy that has been promoted by the leftist political elites without worry as to the consequences of such integration approach. Fekete (2012: 36) explains that, according to Wilders, this leftist elite's “misguided liberalism” is responsible for implementing multicultural policies, such as the hate laws under which Wilders was tried, that facilitate the process of Islamization. According to the PVV, multiculturalism's protection of Islam has threatened the Dutch way of life, including freedom of speech and sexual preference, as well as gender equality (Poort 2011). Wilders stressed this anti-multicultural belief in the following quote (BBC Hard Talk 2008):

The Dutch democracy and rule of law would be strengthened if minorities were not allowed to commit crimes and kill everything that we stand for.

Thus, Wilders makes it clear that, if he were to become Prime Minister of the Netherlands, a strict assimilationist approach would be implemented that would not tolerate immigrants who fail to fully integrate and adopt Dutch culture (RNW 07/2009):

I'd like to make it very clear that as a prime minister of the Netherlands, a dividing line goes through the country; on one side the people who obey our rules, respect our norms and our values. Everyone who obeys them, whether yellow, red, Muslim or not, they're all welcome to stay and will be treated equally. But let me add that those who cross the dividing line and commit criminal acts, whether its terrorism or street terrorism, or if they want to introduce Shari'a law. For those people there is no place in the Netherlands.

Once again, Wilders returns to the tactic of enemy creation by framing his anti-multicultural views in an “us” vs. “them” argument that addresses immigrants as the “others” or as strangers to Dutch society. According to Wilders, an immigrant has the obligation to adopt the customs of the receiving country, an obligation that multicultural integration policies fail to enforce. The PVV leader believes that multicultural integration policies encourages immigrants to disregard and disrespect local cultural norms by validating immigrant cultures instead of regarding the local culture as superior. In 2011, Wilders dedicated a speech in Rome to discuss the flaws within the multicultural approach to integration (Bostom 2011):

That is the paradox of the multicultural society. It claims to be pluralistic, but allows only one point of view of world affairs, namely that all cultures are equal and that they are all good.

Wilders points to cultural relativism as an intrinsic paradox of multicultural theory because, he argues, cultures are inherently unequal, as they are each derived from different “roots”. The argument that cultural relativism cannot, and should not be implemented by the state is a classic complaint presented by critics of multiculturalism who argue that the state is unable to equally recognize multiple cultures. Wilders also believes multiculturalism weakens Europe by leading to self-censorship and political correctness and diminishing freedom of speech and the sovereignty of the nation-state. His provocative rejection of the Dutch elite's self-censorship and

political correctness is a proven attack on Dutch multiculturalism. In 2007, Wilders bashed Queen Beatrix's Christmas message to the Dutch population as replete with “multicultural mumbo-jumbo” (de Bruijn 2011).

Wilders also follows a classic point of contention presented by critics of multiculturalism: the approach's defense of group rights rather than individual rights. According to Wilders, human rights have been created to defend the individual, not a religion or group, and therefore should be granted to individuals deserving of such rights, namely immigrants who have entirely adopted Dutch customs. By prioritizing the defense of group and religious rights, Wilders argues, the Netherlands is failing to protect the rights of the individual, a hallmark value of Dutch society for centuries past. Ironically, the multicultural focus on group rights enables Wilders to call for the removal of rights of an entire group that includes diverse individuals, from street criminals, to followers of extremist Islamic doctrine, to murderers and terrorists.

Out of the 92 selected articles in which Wilders directly discusses immigration, over 60 percent directly discuss Wilders' rejection multiculturalism and its policies, including his views on how multiculturalism deteriorates Dutch security, identity, and culture, causing the oppression of Dutch culture and the “pollution” of Dutch streets with burqas and headscarves (DutchNews 09/17/2009).

Ultimately, Wilders proposes assimilation as an integration policy which will defeat multiculturalism (Bostom 2011):

National identity is an inclusive identity: It welcomes everyone, whatever his religion or race, who is willing to assimilate into a nation by sharing the fate and

future of a people. It ties the individual to an inheritance, a tradition, a loyalty, and a culture.

Words such as “tradition” and “loyalty”, when tied to the idea of a “culture” and a “nation”, are concepts that evidently belong to the assimilation theory vocabulary. Through the notion of assimilation, Wilders attempts to demonstrate a concern for the well-being of the immigrant who is willing to assimilate. In fact, Wilders follows the argument made by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen that strict assimilationist integration policies benefit immigrants themselves, such as moderate Muslims who desire to adapt to Dutch society (Hurewitz 2005).

Lastly, an interesting aspect of Wilders' ideology need be noted. In 2011, Wilders famously stated that the Dutch government should apologize to Dutch Jews for not having done enough to save them during the Holocaust (Schulman 2012). Although, as previously discussed, this is a common position held by many in Dutch society, this statement is particularly poignant originating from Wilders who opposes the basic foundations of multicultural theory, among which is the notion that groups should be granted special recognition independently of society as a whole. Furthermore, Wilders' rhetoric displays an obvious absence of criticism against immigrants descending from former Dutch colonies, such as Surinamese, Moluccans, and Indo-Dutch (Vossen 2011). A potential rationalization of these seemingly contradicting actions could be that Wilders aims his criticisms at immigrants whom he does not view as truly integrated into Dutch society. This argument would ultimately support the notion that Wilders' attack on multiculturalism originates from his belief that this integration approach is indeed unable to effectively integrate immigrants into mainstream society.

Conclusion

Unlike the French case study, the analysis of the Dutch integration approach and Geert Wilders' formulation of anti-immigrant rhetoric resulted entirely as expected: Wilders not only criticizes his country's current approach to integration, but also suggests the implementation of the opposing approach to immigrant integration: classic assimilation. The next and last chapter will compare and contrast these results to those found in the French case study of the Front National's rhetoric in order to assess how Wilders' integration rhetoric differs from that of Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Initial Expectations

Based on the initial literature review on each integration theory and their respective criticisms, I expected both party leaders to utilize the shortcomings of their country's integration policies in the formulation of their anti-immigrant rhetoric. Furthermore, based on the literature review of political communication, rhetorical formulation, and past rhetoric of the extreme populist right in Western Europe, I expected both leaders to criticize current integration approaches used in their respective countries as issues of grave cultural, economic, and national security concerns. I also expected that, based on the Netherlands' long tradition of multiculturalism and accommodation of immigrant cultures, the Dutch EPR leader utilizes less incendiary anti-immigrant rhetoric in the name of honoring its immigrant population and, most importantly, honoring the multicultural values of diversity and political correctness practiced by the Dutch population. In contrast, I expected France's historical tradition of focusing on national, rather than group well-being, to lead French EPR leaders to overlook the integration difficulties experienced by particular minority groups. Based on the overview of each integration approach and past rhetoric by EPR parties in Western Europe, I expected that EPR leaders would propose the implementation of a different integration approach than what is currently in place. Specifically, I expected Le Pen to criticize France's current assimilationism as containing too many multicultural tenets, and therefore not promoting a pure, classic version of the assimilation

approach; in the case of the Netherlands, I expected Wilders to entirely reject multiculturalism and propose the implementation of an assimilation system instead.

Research Findings

Finding #1: As expected, both parties draw from their respective integration theories to shape their anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Finding #2: As expected, both leaders reject their country's current integration policies as contributing to the deterioration of cultural, economic, and national security.

Finding #3: As expected, the nature of the arguments made by Le Pen and Wilders are identical: each leader proposes the jettisoning all aspects of the multicultural approach in their country's respective integration policies.

Finding #4: Contrary to expectations, Wilders' anti-immigrant rhetoric is unaffected by the multicultural practices of political correctness and belief in immigrant diversity. The formulation of his rhetoric is thus unaltered by the the social values associated with his audience. However, Wilders relies on the multicultural approach's emphasis on group distinction to single out Muslim immigrants as a source of concern.

Finding #5: Contrary to expectations, Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen's anti-immigrant rhetoric does indeed address the well-being and integration success of particular minority groups, a concept normally associated with political actors of multicultural societies.

The notion that both leaders reject their respective integration approaches and argue for changes to their current integration system is supported by the case studies, as is the expectation that both EPR leaders propose the adoption of assimilationist integration policies. While, as expected, Geert Wilders' rhetoric rejects multiculturalism and proposes the adoption of assimilation, Le Pen's arguments also reject multicultural policies in order to promote a more extreme version of the assimilation approach than is currently in place in France. The following section will delve into the specific similarities and differences in the rhetorical approaches utilized by Le Pen and Wilders.

Rhetorical Similarities

Although both leaders have tried to distance themselves from one another (Wilders stating that Marine Le Pen is not an ally and that the Front National is a “fascist group”; Le Pen claiming that unlike Wilders, she is not “waging war against Muslims”), both share numerous similarities in rhetorical style and political aims (Traynor 2008; RNW 06/2011). For instance, both figures have stated their aim is to “fight the Islamization” of their respective countries, and both resist Islamic fundamentalists who, in their view, desire the imposition of Shari’a law in Europe. According to Marine, “Shari'a law is not compatible with [French] principles, values or democracy”, an assertion identical to repeated claims Wilders has made regarding the superiority of Dutch values over the “Islamic ideology” (RNW 06/2011).

Jean-Marie Le Pen criticizes the ghettoization of immigrants in his anti-immigrant rhetoric as a major barrier toward immigrant integration. Le Pen's argument in favor of the blending disappearance of immigrants into mainstream society, rather than in support of government-funded immigrant neighborhoods, exemplifies his support for the assimilation approach which, his views demonstrate, is not taking place at a fast enough pace. His rejection of multicultural elements was also clarified through his statement that races are fundamentally unequal and that therefore the government is unable to implement policies that will foster racial inequality (BBC News 2007). In the following quote, Le Pen discusses his views on the government protection of minorities (quoted in Rydgren 2004: 124):

By granting privileges to the weak, by favoring them excessively in all respects, one weakens the social body as a whole.

Le Pen agrees with the frustration held by multicultural critics such as Taylor (1992), Parekh (2000), and Joppke (2004) who claim that government protection of minorities comes at the cost to mainstream society, and that it is the minority's responsibility to adopt the ways of the majority. For instance, Le Pen supports the assimilationist view that complete linguist and spatial integration should take place once immigrants move to a new society; in the case of France, immigrants should adopt French as their primary language, and should be responsible for living conditions which do not pose a “burden” to the rest of society, as is the case with the government-funded housing – the banlieues - that has turned into de facto immigrant ghettos surrounding French suburbs. Furthermore, classic assimilation theorists such as Milton Gordon

believe that each generation should be more assimilated than the previous, a trend Le Pen does not view as a reality in France.

Wilders' rhetoric contains elements that address each of these 'multicultural concerns' articulated by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen. For instance, Wilders is a staunch supporter of the immigrant's responsibility of learning to speak Dutch and of dressing as the Dutch (rather than in 'non-Western' attire such as the burqa). Like Le Pen, Wilders firmly opposes the multicultural ideal of cultural relevancy, as he believes cultures are not equal (and that Dutch culture, and the cultures of Western civilization, are superior to the "Muslim culture"). Like Le Pen and critics of multiculturalism, Wilders believes that mainstream Western societies have over-accommodated the cultural norms and needs of a minority that has not reciprocated the favor, rejecting integration into their host societies. Lastly, Wilders' supports the view held by the Front National leaders that the political elite present in Europe are a "self-serving progressive caste," that has "hijacked democracy through a policy of subsidizing progressive indoctrination" of multiculturalism as the only worry approach to immigrant integration, and who "demonizes all dissenters" (Vossen 2011: 183).

The outcome of the analysis of each leaders' rhetoric suggests that both leaders reject their country's current approach. However, their nature of their rejections (and proposed solutions) are noticeably different in that while Wilders promotes the jettisoning of the Dutch multicultural approach altogether for the adoption of assimilation policies, Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen promote the intensification of France' current approach, namely a stricter version

of assimilation policy. Ultimately, all three politicians promote the adoption of the assimilation approach by using the argument of “this is how we do things here: adapt or leave”.

In his discussion of ERP parties' relationship with ethnic diversity and multicultural policies, Hughes (1993: 98) explains that “the conservative fear of [ethnic] mixture is tinged with paranoid exaggeration”. His argument supports the finding that both leaders of extreme right parties appear to reject ethnic “mixture” by supporting exaggerated fears that immigration is a grave threat to the survival of Western societies. Hughes (1993: 151) believes that if such “cultural separatism” surpasses a temporary political phase and becomes part of a more permanent approach to integration, “it would be an educational disaster for those it claims to help”. While moderate critics of multiculturalism argue for certain scenarios where the state may justify the use of cultural issues in policy formulation (see Levy), others, such as the two political leaders addressed in this study, oppose multiculturalism in all its forms. The most recent formulation of assimilation theory will, according to Brubaker (2001) aid the noticeable trend of reversion from multiculturalism to assimilation.

Rhetorical Differences

Although Wilders' rhetoric follows several of the concepts discussed by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen, his message differs from the latter by focusing specifically on Islam as a “fascist” religion. Unsurprisingly, Wilders employs fear-mongering tactics in a different fashion than the Le Pens by discussing the dangers of the Muslim religion specifically, rather than

focusing primarily on the danger of overall immigration and the failure of assimilation. This difference could be viewed as partly the result of the multiculturalism's heightened visibility of specific cultures and cultural groups; whereas the assimilation approach leads to a fear mongering that focuses on the 'other' as a whole, the multicultural focus on specific groups renders the rejection of specific groups more relevant in anti-immigration arguments. Furthermore, while the PVV leader's rhetoric is almost entirely aimed at immigrants of Muslim descent, sparring the criticism of immigrants originating from cultural backgrounds similar to Dutch culture, such as those descending from former Dutch colonies, the rhetoric of the Front National leaders attack all non-western immigration as a whole, even though most immigrants in France today descend from ancestors from former French colonies (such as Algeria) and whose cultures have been closer to that of the French.

The Future of Western Europe's Integration Policies

Analysts have proposed that instances such as the banlieue riots in French cities, the assassination of Theo Van Gogh, and the recent Toulouse murders demonstrate that both approaches to integration – multiculturalism and assimilationism – have failed (Giry 2006: 87). Politicians in countries practicing either approach have indicated their belief that integration policies have failed to accomplish their intentions, and that the failure to properly assimilate immigrants have led to the deterioration of Western European society, values, welfare system, and security. According to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the French “have been too

concerned with the identity of those who have been arriving and not enough with those who are receiving him”. Sarkozy added: “We don't want a society in which communities co-exist alongside each other. If you come to France, you agree to base yourself in a single community, the national community. If you don't accept that, you don't come to France” (RFI 02/2011). British Prime Minister David Cameron has stated that the British system's encouragement of segregated cultures apart from the mainstream, with values that differ from those of the British, is responsible for failing to “provide a vision of society to which [immigrants] feel they want to belong”. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has also echoes the view that the multicultural policy diverse cultures “living happily side by side” has simply not worked (Al Jazeera 03/2012). Ultimately, political leaders across Europe have collectively rejected the multicultural approach for its failure to produce a cohesive national identity to which citizens feel they belong. In the following quote, European Parliament Member for the UK Independence Party Paul Nuttall summarizes the growing European sentiment toward multiculturalism (quoted in YouTube 2011):

Multiculturalism has failed for many years now. It was something born out of the 1970s and the idea that you can have different communities, living side by side, who never integrate, who don't share the same culture, don't share the same language, is never going to work. What it will do is it will increase the power base of the far right across Europe. What we need is integration [...]. I don't think [multiculturalism] has a future at all because what it does is it divides people. What it does is it doesn't allow people to integration. What we need is people sharing the same culture, sharing the same values, [...] and unfortunately multiculturalism divides people, it doesn't bring people together.

Closing Remarks

In his 1977 work, *Political Language*, Edelman likened politicians to paranoid schizophrenics who believe that “they could save the world, if only they were heeded” (24). This somewhat shocking and yet poignant comparison claims that individuals with high political aspirations normally believe they too have the answers, regardless of whether the answer, in reality, creates national divisiveness and contributes to political in-cohesion. Jean-Marie Le Pen and Geert Wilders are no different than any other politician in that respect: both believe they present the solution to their country's integration problems. While Le Pen proposes a more extreme version of what is already in place in France, Wilders advocates the abandonment of Dutch multiculturalism for the adoption of the class assimilation approach. Whether their proposed remedies for immigrant integration policies in France and the Netherlands would actually generate a more successful program of integration, and avoid problems of security and social tension, is yet to be determined. However, what this study can suggest is that, as Edelman (1988: 5) states, “...the long catalog of political acts that have strained human history can only come from people who are sure that they are right”.

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