West European Politics

ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation

David M. Willumsen

To cite this article: David M. Willumsen (2019) So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation, West European Politics, 42:3, 645-669, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2018.1530887

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1530887

WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
2019, VOL. 42, NO. 3, 645–669
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1530887

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation

David M. Willumsen

Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

ABSTRACT

Legislators face numerous trade-offs with regard to how to spend their time. One factor is, however, beyond their control: the distance between their constituency and the legislature. A more distant constituency implies increased travel, which decreases the time available for activities within the legislature itself, while also raising the possibility of centre–periphery dynamics in representation. Previous work has found that as distance between constituency and legislature increases, so does constituency focus, but it has not established why this is. This article explores the impact of geographical remoteness on representational activity, analysing a dataset of parliamentary activity in the British House of Commons (2005–2015), showing that the more remote an MP's constituency, the less likely that MP is to attend votes, while being more likely to sign Early Day Motions. The article further shows that this is most likely driven by a centre–periphery dynamic rather than simply being a response to longer travel time.

KEYWORDS Representation; UK House of Commons; centre–periphery; vote attendance; Early Day Motions; distance to capital

Representation, that is, an effective link between voters and legislators, is key to the satisfactory functioning of modern democracy (Powell 2004). Representative democracy also has a normative requirement that all voters be represented equally, and systematic differences in representation avoided. Analysing systematic differences in the quality of representation is a central question, which has been explored, inter alia, with regard to interest groups (see, for example, Klüver 2012), voter wealth and income (Bartels 2016; Gilens and Page 2014), gender (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), race (Butler and Broockman 2011), and educational levels (Persson 2013). The role geography plays in representation, however, remains relatively unexplored.

CONTACT David M. Willumsen David.Willumsen@uibk.ac.at

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1530887

Representation of voters takes place in several arenas, most importantly in the constituency (meeting with constituents, surgeries) and in the capital (legislating). Given the impossibility of being in two places at the same time, representatives face a trade-off in terms of where they should invest their limited time. While the question of whether prioritising legislative work and pursuing career advancement in the capital will be punished electorally is subject to a significant debate (André *et al.* 2015), one aspect of this trade-off is outside the control of the legislator: the extent to which their constituency is geographically near to, or far away from, the capital. Previous work has explored the effect of the distance from the capital on the constituency focus of Members of Parliament (MPs) (André *et al.* 2014; Heitshusen *et al.* 2005), finding that as the distance between legislature and constituency increases, legislators become more oriented towards the constituency.

The flip-side of this, namely how geographical distance influences representatives' behaviour in the legislature, remains unexplored. Similarly, the underlying motivation behind differences in representative focus has not been established. In other words, what is the effect of the remoteness of an MP's constituency on their ability to effectively represent their constituency in the legislature? And if remoteness is a significant constraint, do MPs try to compensate for this by engaging in other, less time-sensitive representational activities? Furthermore, legislators representing more distant constituencies may also be subject to centre–periphery dynamics, with their voters having a different relationship with the central government, and so different expectations in terms of representative behaviour. In particular in centralised and non-federal states, centre–periphery dynamics may be amplified by unequal quality of representation based on geography.

This article explores these questions by analysing a novel dataset on legislative behaviour in the UK Parliament. It shows that, firstly, as the distance and travel time between capital and constituency increases, a key activity which requires the presence of legislators in the capital (parliamentary voting) significantly decreases in frequency.

Secondly, the article explores how legislators respond to the limitations in terms of representation caused by a more remote constituency. Do legislators follow a logic of compensation, engaging in other, less time-sensitive representational activities in the capital, or are they driven by a different logic, one based on a centre–periphery dynamic, where voters from more distant constituencies expect different forms of representation than those closer to the capital? Analysing the signing of Early Day Motions (EDMs), which legislators can use to signal their voters, the article shows that the use of these by MPs representing constituencies nearer

the capital is driven by a compensational logic. For MPs representing more distant constituencies, however, higher attendance rates go together with higher EDM signing rates, indicating that a different logic is at play, one that emphasises visibility in the capital.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. First, I review the literature on the topic of distance to the constituency and representation, and develop the theoretical framework and the hypotheses to be tested. The data used to test the hypotheses and the modelling strategy are then discussed in the subsequent section, followed by the analysis and discussion of the findings. A final section summarises the findings and discusses their implications.

Literature review, theory, and hypotheses

Legislators face numerous trade-offs regarding the allocation of their limited time. While the decision on how to schedule their time is, at least to some extent, under their own control, time is also a rare commodity; demand for it will always outstrip supply. While legislators have some flexibility in terms of splitting their time between representative functions in the capital and in their constituency, they cannot influence the travel time between these two. Thus, for representatives from constituencies near the capital, the time cost of a trip 'home' is very different to one for a representative from a remote district.

Fenno (1977) found that US House members from very distant constituencies (the 'Far West') travelled home less often than those from congressional districts nearer Washington, DC. Analysing interview data, both Irish and British junior legislators were found to spend more time in their constituency the farther removed it was from the respective capitals (Wood and Young 1997). On the other hand, Besley and Larcinese (2011) found that British MPs from more distant constituencies do not attend votes at a significantly different rate from MPs representing constituencies nearer London.

Rather than travelling home less often, an alternative reaction of a legislator to representing a distant constituency is to simply leave the capital earlier in the week than those from constituencies nearer the capital. In order to return 'home' at a reasonable time, an MP from a distant constituency must leave the capital well before the end of the business of the week, while their colleagues representing closer constituencies face no such restriction.

Thus, in the US House of Representatives, votes held mid-week have around 11 more Representatives participating than those at the beginning or end of a week, while votes held at the end of a session have around

eight fewer participants than those held at its beginning, indicating that US Representatives, at least in part, choose to engage in electioneering rather than legislating at these times (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000a: 267–8, see also Rothenberg and Sanders 2002). In contrast, Forgette and Sala (1999) find no such effect of mid-week votes (the 'Tuesday–Thursday Club') in their analysis of vote attendance in the US Senate. In the European Parliament, turnout has been found to be significantly lower on votes held on Fridays (Noury 2004; Scully 1997), as MEPs leave early to return to their home countries for the weekend.

What is clear is that the remoteness of a district influences not just where the representative spends their time, but also how much of it is available. To the extent that travel time is 'wasted' time, a legislator representing a remote district may simply have significantly fewer hours available in the week. This is clearly illustrated by preferences in terms of the location of the legislature. When voting on whether to move the German capital from Bonn to Berlin, MPs from states (Länder) closer to Berlin were much more likely to support moving the capital there than MPs from Länder closer to Bonn (Wengst 1991: 341), which clearly matches up to a preference for shorter travel time from constituency to capital. Similarly, the longer the travel time from their constituency to Strasbourg relative to the journey time to Brussels, the more likely Members of the European Parliament are to support holding all plenary sessions in the latter city (Whitaker *et al.* 2017).

In addition to the frequency and length of trips to the constituency, the distance to the constituency from the capital may also influence the focus of the representative. The existence of centre–periphery dynamics, originating in more remote parts of a country being opposed to the state-building and centralising processes initiated by the centre (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), is well-established, and this cleavage remains salient in the present (Alonso *et al.* 2013). Under such a dynamic, we would expect that citizens 'in the more peripheral parts of the country feel relatively discriminated against', and so expect a different representational focus than those living near the centre (Thomassen and Esaiasson 2006: 226). To the extent that a centre–periphery dynamic is at play, voters in more distant constituencies may feel more detached from the political decision-making process, whereas more centrally located voters may be more engaged with politics and public policy. Thus, Martin (2013) finds that members of the Irish Parliament (TDs) ask fewer questions on foreign policy the farther their constituency is from Dublin, and similarly, TDs from outside Dublin have been found to ask more locally focussed questions than TDs from Dublin itself (Martin 2011).

This constituency-oriented focus of legislators from more distant constituencies has also been found in comparative work. In a five-country comparison, it was found, based on interview data, that MPs with longer travel times are more likely to have a constituency focus (Heitshusen *et al.* 2005), and a similar effect, also based on interview data, has been found for French MPs, with those MPs whose constituencies are farther from Paris being more locally oriented (Brouard *et al.* 2013). This increased focus on the constituency has also been documented in terms of casework, with MPs reporting spending more time on this the farther away their district is from the capital (André *et al.* 2014).

It should be noted that even if legislators are more constituency-oriented the farther away from the capital their seat is, this is not always reflected in the allocation of resources. Thus, no effect was found of distance between the capital and the constituency on the allocation of Senators' staff between Washington, DC and their state (Atlas *et al.* 1997); however, a weakly significant positive effect on staff costs has been found for distance between constituency and Westminster (Besley and Larcinese 2011).

This focus on the constituency by legislators from more remote constituencies is, however, not necessarily reflected in the amount of time spent there. Comparative work on the amount of time legislators report spending in their district found no effect of distance to the capital (André and Depauw 2014; André *et al.* 2015). Similarly, distance to Westminster was found to have no significant effect on how much time British MPs estimated they spent in their constituency (Searing 1985). However, other work, analysing junior British MPs, has found that MPs from constituencies farther from London report spending more time in their constituencies, but no significant effect for distance is found for the amount of constituency surgeries they hold (Wood and Yoon 1998).

Given the restraint imposed by increased travel time, we would expect that, as remoteness from the capital increases, presence in the capital decreases. Attendance at parliamentary votes serves as a good proxy for this; if an MP is in the capital, they would be expected to participate in floor votes. While attending votes is only one form of representation, failure to attend votes should be very strongly correlated with not representing constituents' interest by, for example, meeting with ministers or interest group representatives, or attending committee meetings. We thus have:

> Hypothesis 1: The more remote their constituency, the fewer legislative votes a representative takes part in.

Assuming that legislators are at least partly motivated by re-election and believe their constituents value industrious MPs, those with low

attendance rates should desire to signal to their voters that they are nonetheless hard at work for their interests, and so compensate by engaging in other representational work which is less time-sensitive than voting. We thus have:

> Hypothesis 2a: The lower a legislator's attendance rate is, the more they will engage in representational activities in the capital which are not time-sensitive.

If non-time-sensitive representational activities are primarily a question of compensation, then these should be independent of constituency remoteness; any effect of restricted time budgets should be built into observed attendance rates. However, if centre–periphery dynamics *are* present, this would not be the case. For MPs representing more remote constituencies, there would be greater incentives to signal their voters that they are hard at work representing them in the centre, bringing up and drawing attention to issues which might otherwise be ignored, whereas MPs from more centrally located constituencies should not have to worry about sending such signals to their voters. We would thus expect MPs with remote seats to engage in non-time-sensitive representational activities, not as compensation, but rather as an additional, complementary, way to signal to their voters that they are hard at work. We thus have:

> Hypothesis 2b: For MPs representing remote constituencies, the higher their attendance rate, the more they will engage in non-time-sensitive representational work.

Having outlined the hypotheses to be tested, the next section will discuss the case used to test them, the data used for this, and the operationalisation of the models.

Case, data, and operationalisation

The UK House of Commons serves as an ideal case to test the hypotheses outlined above. There is wide geographical variation in the location of constituencies relative to the capital, meaning there are few, if any, concerns regarding sufficient variation on the variable of interest to establish effects (if such are present). In terms of the ability of the findings to be applicable to other countries, British MPs do not differ significantly from the European average with regard to constituency orientation. In terms of time spent in the constituency, while British MPs report spending a smaller amount than the average of European MPs, this difference is not significant at the 5% level (André and Depauw 2013; André *et al.* 2015). Further, all MPs are elected using the same electoral system (single-

member simple-plurality districts), avoiding the potentially confounding effects of MPs having differing formal electoral incentives.

While not all votes are recorded in the House of Commons, with voice voting being the default voting procedure (Hug *et al.* 2015), this is less of a worry here than if analysing floor voting behaviour. While MPs may not always enjoy being present for votes, any bias resulting from a non-random sample of votes being recorded should be constant across MPs regardless of the remoteness of their constituency. Attending votes is a key representative function (Clark and Williams 2014; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000b), and serves as a good proxy for other activities which require the presence of an MP in the legislature, given the necessity of physical presence to vote and the high value placed by parties on their MPs voting.

One potential issue is whether legislators in the UK can influence their probability of re-election, which is necessary for the behavioural mechanisms underlying the hypotheses to work. Any incumbency bonus in elections for the British House of Commons is almost certainly much smaller than what is found in elections for the US Congress (Cain *et al.* 1984; Gaines 1998; Smith 2013). However, the behaviour of British MPs does have at least some influence on their electoral prospects. For example, voters were 1.9 percentage points less likely to vote for MPs who were caught up in the expenses scandal of 2009–2010 (Vivyan *et al.* 2012), which suggests that voters both know who their MP is and, at least for prominent issues, how they act. Similarly, Labour MPs who voted against the party line on the Iraq war were somewhat more successful electorally than those who did not, although this was dependent on whether or not voters had a negative view of Prime Minister Tony Blair (Vivyan and Wagner 2012). Even the simple fact of knowing a candidate for parliament's name has been found to make voters more likely to cast their vote for that person (Pattie and Johnston 2004). Overall, to the extent that MPs desire re-election, their behaviour should, at the very least, take the considerations of their voters into account, and evidence suggests that a link does exist between the policy preferences of constituents and the behaviour of their MP (Hanretty *et al.* 2017).

As in most parliamentary regimes, the opportunities for MPs to act as re-election-seeking individuals in the legislature are quite restrained in the House of Commons. However, one tool available to MPs to appeal directly to their voters is the signing of EDMs. As EDMs are essentially non-binding motions, on which neither debates nor votes are held, it is not necessary to use parliamentary time to deal with them, meaning that there are few procedural limitations on tabling these (House of Commons Information Office 2010).[1] As such, MPs may both introduce and sign as many as they desire.[2] Further, whips do not, as a general rule, attempt to

influence MPs when it comes to introducing and signing EDMs (Kellermann 2012), partly because EDMs serve as a source of information to the whips regarding MPs' policy concerns. The lack of party pressure when it comes to EDMs means that they can, among other things, be used to construct preference measures for individual MPs (Berrington and Hague 1998; Franklin and Tappin 1977; Kellermann 2012).

A key feature of EDMs is that MPs recognise that they can be used to emphasise their role in the political process, and to appeal to voters. MPs are acutely aware that signing EDMs allows them to draw attention to themselves (House of Commons Information Office 2010).[3] While not their only function, with EDMs also being used by MPs to signal party leaders (see above), EDMs serve as a way to gain attention from voters, often by focussing on parochial concerns, which is reflected in the large number of EDMs which simply draw attention to local achievements (such as sporting success); if MPs did not believe this to be an effective way to appeal to their voters, they would not introduce and sign such motions (Kellermann 2012). This is also shown by MPs sponsoring more EDMs the smaller the majority they enjoy in their constituency, using them in the expectation that they can shore up electoral support (Kellermann 2013). Crucially, EDMs also serve a representative function, by allowing (groups of) MPs to highlight to both voters and their party issues which they consider important (Childs and Withey 2004). For the present purposes, EDMs are ideal as they are easily understood by the public and are not time-sensitive,[4] allowing MPs to use them to signal to their voters that they are hard at work representing their interests in the capital. As such, EDMs serve as an ideal compensational activity for MPs.

To test the hypotheses, the voting records of the House of Commons, as made available on the Public Whip website,[5] and the full list of EDMs and their signatories, as made available on the EarlyDayMotions website,[6] were collected for both the 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 UK parliaments. The data were validated by comparing random samples with Hansard.[7] Potential estimation issues related to differences in term length are avoided by the terms having near-identical lengths.[8]

To analyse the effect of remoteness to Westminster on voting attendance (hypothesis 1), the share of votes attended by each MP in both the 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 Parliaments was calculated.[9] As the number of votes held varies widely according to the day of the week,[10] attendance rate is calculated by weekday, giving five observations per MP per term. For hypotheses 2a and 2b (compensatory behaviour), the share of all EDMs introduced in a term signed by each MP was likewise calculated for both the 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 terms. As the distribution of this second dependent variable is strongly right-skewed, as well as due to the

lower marginal benefits of each additional signed EDM, the logged value of the share of EDMs signed was calculated.[11] The models were estimated using OLS, as the dependent variables are approximately continuous.[12] Given the repeated observations of MPs in terms of attendance (one per weekday), and since many MPs served in both terms, the error terms are not independent of each other. To deal with this, MP-clustered standard errors were calculated in all models.

Two measures, capturing slightly different aspects of remoteness, were used: travel time and the geodesic ('as the bird flies') distance between the geographic centroid of the constituency and the Palace of Westminster. Travel time (measured in hours) between the constituency and Westminster was calculated using Google Maps, measured as the shortest travel time between the constituency and Westminster,[13] using whichever is faster of public transport, driving, and flying.[14] The geodesic distance between Westminster and the constituency was calculated using Google Maps, and measured in hundreds of kilometres. As these two variables correlate at a very high level (0.886), they are used in separate models. Figure 6 in the online appendix illustrates geodesic distances from London.

Distance, respectively travel time, was interacted with dummy variables indicating the day of the week (Monday is baseline), allowing for the analysis of attendance rates at the level of the weekday (hypothesis 1).

Several control variables are also included. Firstly, the number of whole years served in parliament at the end of the 2010 and 2015 terms, respectively, given that longer-serving MPs are expected to have higher name-recognition and other resources available to them, which may influence, among other things, their attendance rate. As an illustration of this, research has found that, in the US, the longer Members of Congress have served, the less often they travel back to their constituencies (Hibbing 1991).

Secondly, to control for the greater incentives for governing party MPs to be present for votes (to ensure a government majority), as well as such MPs having more effective access to decision-makers in terms of representing their voters' interest, a dummy variable equal to one if an MP's party was in government at the time of a vote (otherwise zero) was included in the models. As different parties were in power in the two terms covered by these data, the effect of government status can be estimated independently of possible party-specific effects. Thirdly, I control for the electoral safety of MPs by including a variable equal to the winning margin of the MP (in percentage of the vote) in their last election. As governing parties usually lose votes in elections, government party MPs may be more sensitive to swings in electoral support (Johnston *et al.* 2002); to capture this, I interact the government status and electoral margin variables.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attendance by weekday	6370	0.596	0.272	0	1
Share of EDMs signed	1274	0.057	0.102	0.000	0.686
Attendance rate (overall)	1274	0.703	0.132	0.077	0.995
Distance to Westminster (km)*	6370	216.808	166.973	0.711	851.999
Travel time (hours)	6370	2.698	1.300	0.083	6.064
Government party	6370	0.553		0	1
Not standing for re-election	6370	0.185		0	1
Years as MP	6370	13.816	8.784	0	54
Electoral margin (in %)	6370	18.850	12.298	0.080	63.800
Share served on frontbench	6370	0.351	0.418	0	1
Regionalist party	6370	0.020		0	1

*The models use this variable scaled to 100s of kilometres.

Fourthly, in addition to the more general pressures discussed above, centre–periphery dynamics may also manifest themselves in the form of parties which have a regionalist or secessionist philosophy. Such parties would be expected to value presence in the capital less than MPs from parties without such a focus, and have a much weaker emphasis on participating in the national policy-making process. To control for this, the models include a variable equal to 1 if an MP represents a party with a regionalist or secessionist philosophy,[15] and otherwise equal to zero. At the same time, as the regionalist parties did not serve in government in the period under study, their MPs had limited input into the law-making process, and so would also be expected to be more inclined to use instruments such as EDMs to draw attention to their constituents' interests and concerns. Note that the non-time-sensitive nature of signing EDMs does not require such MPs to sacrifice spending time in their constituency to sign these.

Fifthly, given that frontbenchers tend to have duties which may prevent them from voting, I control for the share of the parliamentary term each MP served on their party's frontbench in the 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 terms.[16] Finally, I control for any potential effect of an MP not standing for re-election, as such last-period MPs have been found to attend fewer votes and sign fewer EDMs (Willumsen and Goetz 2017). Summary statistics of the variables used in the models are shown in Table 1, with histograms of the distribution of distance and travel time shown in Figure 1. For the models analysing the signing of EDMs, the means and standard deviations of all explanatory variables are identical to those shown in Table 1 (as these are duplicates necessitated by analysing attendance by weekday).

Results

The results of the models analysing attendance are shown in Table 2. To aid interpretation, I have plotted the predicted values of the share of votes



Figure 1. Distribution of distance and travel time to London.

Table 2. OLS models – attendance rates.

	Distance	Travel time
Distance to London (in 100 kms)	−0.016**	
	(0.003)	
Travel time to London		−0.010**
		(0.004)
Tuesday	−0.012**	−0.015**
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Wednesday	−0.008	−0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Thursday	−0.153**	−0.124**
	(0.006)	(0.008)
Friday	−0.572**	−0.537**
	(0.009)	(0.011)
Tuesday * Distance to London/Travel time	0.013**	0.012**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wednesday * Distance to London/Travel time	0.012**	0.010**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Thursday * Distance to London/Travel time	−0.009**	−0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Friday * Distance to London/Travel time	0.000	−0.013**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Electoral margin (in %)	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Governing party	0.120**	0.121**
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Governing party * electoral margin	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Not standing for re-election	−0.043**	−0.043**
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Years as MP	−0.003**	−0.003**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Front bench (share of time)	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Regionalist party	−0.126**	−0.147**
	(0.030)	(0.032)
Constant	0.772**	0.767**
	(0.013)	(0.014)
N	6370	6370
R^2	0.781	0.779

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$ – clustered standard errors in brackets.



Figure 2. Predicted attendance rates.

attended by weekday (Figure 2)[17] at different levels of distance and travel time to London.[18]

Strong support is found for hypothesis 1 (remoteness). As can be seen in Figure 2, regardless of whether remoteness is operationalised as distance or as travel time, the farther away a constituency is from Westminster, the fewer votes are attended by its MP. The extent to which this is the case, however, depends on the day of the week a vote takes place. On Tuesdays and Wednesdays, attendance is highest, and independent of how remote a constituency is; as can be seen in Figure 2, the top two lines are essentially flat and overlapping. On Mondays, there is a small effect of remoteness on attendance, with MPs from more remote

constituencies attending votes at a lower rate than those from constituencies nearer London.

A much stronger effect is seen for attendance on Thursdays and Fridays, where MPs whose constituencies are far from Westminster attended votes at much lower rates than those MPs from more central constituencies. For example, an MP whose constituency is located 100 kilometres from Westminster would be predicted to attend 59.5% of votes on Thursdays, and 18.6% on Fridays, whereas one whose constituency is 400 kilometres away would attend 51.7% and 13.7%, respectively. Similarly, an MP whose constituency is one hour's travel time away would be expected to attend 61.3% of votes on Thursdays, and 20.6% on Fridays, whereas one whose constituency is four hours away would attend, respectively, 52.7% and 13.6% of votes. These differences are all significant at the 0.05 level.

To explore substantive effects in more detail, I calculated the predicted attendance rates while holding all other variables at their means. The average attendance rate was 70.3% over the two terms, with an average of 1263.5 votes recorded per term in the two terms covered, meaning that the average MP attended 884 votes per term. An increase in travel time from 15 minutes to five hours[19] leads to a drop in the attendance rate of 5.8 percentage points, equal to 73 fewer votes attended, while an increase in the distance between Westminster and the constituency from 1 to 600 kilometres[20] leads to a decrease of 7.9 percentage points, equivalent to 100 fewer votes attended. As a comparison, the difference between government and opposition MPs is equivalent to 140 votes (11.1 percentage points) fewer in the models using distance to Westminster, and 144 (11.4 percentage points) fewer in the models using travel time. The substantive effect of remoteness on vote attendance is thus between 51% and 71% of the effect of an MP's party being in government. Variations in constituency remoteness thus lead to both substantial and significant difference in attendance rates.

The data also supports the general intuition that MPs travel home regularly, returning for the start of business on Mondays (with those travelling far arriving a bit later). Variation in overall attendance rate is primarily driven by MPs attending fewer votes on Thursdays and Fridays. In terms of the control variables, electoral margin has either no or a very small effect on attendance rates for both governing party and opposition MPs, with governing party MPs attending votes at a significantly higher rate than opposition party MPs. Retiring MPs attend significantly fewer votes, as do more experienced MPs.

MPs' attendance rate is thus clearly influenced by the remoteness of their constituency: the farther away, and the longer the travel time, the

Table 3. OLS models – logged EDM signing rates.

	Distance	Travel time
Attendance rate (overall)	–2.427**	–3.506**
	(0.937)	(1.326)
Distance to London (in 100 kms)	–0.184	
	(0.183)	
Distance to London * attendance rate	0.586*	
	(0.268)	
Travel time to London		–0.357
		(0.277)
Travel time to London * attendance rate		0.829*
		(0.396)
Electoral margin (in %)	–0.030**	–0.028**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Governing party	–1.789**	–1.789**
	(0.232)	(0.232)
Governing party * electoral margin	0.025**	0.024**
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Not standing for re-election	0.121	0.117
	(0.182)	(0.182)
Years as MP	–0.002	–0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Front bench (share of time)	–1.230**	–1.243**
	(0.177)	(0.179)
Regionalist party	1.373**	1.541**
	(0.388)	(0.333)
Constant	–1.377*	–0.764
	(0.671)	(0.937)
N	1128	1128
R^2	0.173	0.166

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$ – clustered standard errors in brackets.

fewer votes they attend. Irrespective of whether this is caused by increased travel times or by a centre–periphery dynamic, constituencies farther from London are less well-represented in Westminster. This raises the question of whether MPs use non-time-sensitive activities to compensate for lower attendance rates.

To explore this, I model the rate at which MPs sign EDMs, which takes very little time to do, and for which few time constraints exist. This stands in stark contrast to floor voting, which takes significant amounts of time, and which is highly time-sensitive – you cannot make up for a missed vote later in the term. At the same time, EDMs allow MPs to signal to their voters that they are actively looking out for their interests. As such, a strategic MP who cannot attend votes due to the increased travel time caused by a remote constituency would be expected to sign more EDMs. To test hypothesis 2b (effect of attendance is conditional on remoteness), I interact each MP's attendance rate with the remoteness of their constituency.[21]

The models analysing EDM signing are shown in Table 3, with predicted signing rates shown in Figures 3,[22] 4, and 5. The figures show all MPs with an attendance rate above 0.4 and below 0.95, equivalent to 96.78% of all observations.



Figure 3. Predicted EDM signing rates (controlling for attendance rate).

For MPs elected in constituencies relatively near London (<300 kilometres/<3 hours), the lower their attendance rate, the more EDMs they sign, indicating that they are using these to compensate for their lower attendance rate (hypothesis 2a). However, for MPs elected from more distant constituencies, no such compensatory effect is found. For MPs elected in very distant constituencies (400+ kilometres/5+ hours), the higher the attendance rate, the greater the share of EDMs signed, indicating that a different logic is at play, one placing a higher value on showing constituents that a legislator is active on their behalf in the capital (hypothesis 2b). In terms of the control variables, electorally safer MPs from both government and opposition parties sign significantly fewer EDMs, with governing party MPs signing significantly fewer EDMs than



Figure 4. Predicted EDM signing rates (100km vs. 400km).

opposition party MPs. Front-bench MPs also sign significantly fewer EDMs. No significant effect is found for retiring or more experienced MPs.

To more clearly illustrate the conditional effect of distance and attendance rate, predicted EDM signing rates at 100 and 400 kilometres are shown in Figure 4, and for one and four hours' travel time in Figure 5, which represents, respectively, the 29th and 87th percentile (distance), and the 14th and 82nd percentile (travel time).

As can be seen, once the attendance rate rises above around 60% (conditional on distance) or 65% (travel time), there is a statistically significant difference between EDM signing rates of MPs from more central constituencies compared to those from more distant ones (see Figures 8 and 9 in the online appendix for similarly significant effects for 50 kilometres vs 300 kilometres and half-hour vs. three hours travel time). MPs with lower attendance rates are, based on the remoteness of their constituency, indistinguishable in terms of EDM signing rates. However, MPs with higher attendance rates significantly differ; as the attendance rate increases for MPs from more central constituencies, EDM signing rates decline, indicating a compensatory logic. For MPs from more distant constituencies, this is not the case. These MPs also use EDMs to signal their voters, but are not doing so in a compensatory manner. Rather, the driving force is much more likely to be a centre–periphery dynamic, where good representation is perceived differently depending on how far removed a constituency is from the capital.

The MPs with the highest attendance rate, who have little to compensate for, thus differ in their behaviour depending on how remote their constituency is, whereas less active MPs do not differ. Centre–periphery dynamics are thus manifested among those MPs who seek to represent



Figure 5. Predicted EDM signing rates (1 hour vs. 4 hours).

their voters well; the ones from more remote constituencies use EDMs to signal their voters that their interests are being represented at the centre, whereas MPs with similar attendance rates from more centrally located constituencies have no need to send such signals.

It should also be noted that both for attendance at votes and the signing of EDMs, the effect of belonging to a regionalist party is highly significant (at the 1% level). In terms of attendance rate, MPs belonging to such a party attend around 12.6 percentage points fewer votes when using the distance variable to measure remoteness, and around 14.7 percentage points fewer when using the travel time variable. As the average attendance rate over the two terms was 70.3%, the substantive effect of an MP belonging to a regionalist party on the attendance rate is thus very large. In terms of EDM signing, belonging to a regionalist party leads to an increase of 137% in the share of EDMs signed when using the distance measure, and an increase of 154% when using the time measure.[23] Regionalist parties use EDMs to draw attention to the interests and concerns of their voters much more than non-regionalist party MPs do, while placing less emphasis on legislative work, as indicated by their lower attendance rates. This supports the argument that for MPs from more remote constituencies, EDMs are used to signal to voters that their concerns are being raised at the centre, and are not a primarily a compensatory device.

Overall, there were 9438 EDMs introduced per term in the two terms covered, the average share of EDMs signed (by MPs who signed at least one)[24] was 6.5%, meaning that the average MP signed 613 EDMs per term. Calculating predicted EDM signing rates, and holding all other variables at their means, I find that an increase in travel time from

15 minutes to five hours leads to an increase in the EDM signing rate of 1.7 percentage points, equal to 160 more EDMs signed, while an increase in the distance between Westminster and the constituency from 1 to 600 kilometres led to an increase of 2.7 percentage points, equivalent to 255 more EDMs signed. In comparison, government MPs sign around 207 fewer EDMs than opposition MPs (both distance and travel time models). The effect of remoteness on EDM signing is thus on average roughly equivalent to the effect of the government status of an MP.

In summary, the farther away an MP's constituency is, the fewer votes they attend, and the more EDMs they sign. For MPs from more remote constituencies, and unlike for MPs from more central constituencies, EDM signing rates are not primarily driven by a desire to compensate for lower attendance rates. Rather, the increased signing rates as remoteness increases appears to be an attempt by MPs to signal to their voters that they are hard at work, and to draw attention to policy issues at the political centre, with this most likely driven by centre–periphery dynamics.

Conclusion

This article has explored the effect of the geographical remoteness of constituencies on political representation. By analysing the attendance at votes and the signing of EDMs by British MPs, which are all elected using the same electoral system, but where there exists a wide variation in the travel time and distance from the capital, it was found that, regardless of how it was measured, the more remote a district is, the fewer votes its representative will cast in the legislature. Conversely, it was shown that the more remote a district is, the more its legislator will engage in symbolic, non-time-sensitive representational behaviour, such as signing EDMs. Finally, the motivation for signing EDMs was found to vary according to remoteness of constituencies. For MPs elected from centrally located seats, the prevailing logic was one of compensation – the lower the attendance rate, the more EDMs were signed. For MPs from more remote constituencies, the logic was different, and instead focussed on representing interests which might otherwise be ignored in the capital. Additionally, regionalist MPs, who explicitly have a non-centre-focussed view when it comes to political representation, were found to be much less present in the capital, and much more active in terms of signing EDMs, again suggesting that a centre–periphery dynamic, rather than a compensatory one, is at play when it comes to the signing of EDMs.

Thus, aligning with previous findings that MPs from more remote districts have a more constituency-oriented representational focus (André *et al.* 2014; Heitshusen *et al.* 2005), behaviour is significantly influenced

by remoteness. Less centrally located constituencies have different representational desires, and this is reflected in the behaviour of their representatives. Distance to the constituency is not merely a time constraint on legislators, and should not be understood only as such. Rather, voters are differently represented the more remote their constituency. As such, and similar to the findings of systematic differences in representation based on gender, race, and income, substantial differences in representation exist driven by geographic factors, indicating that voters are unequally represented and may have worse access to the levers of power depending on where they live.

This article focussed on the role of remoteness for representation in a system employing single-member districts; future work should explore the role of distance and travel time in electoral systems employing multi-member districts, where voters' identification of 'their' MP is harder, and where voters' ability to punish and reward individual behaviour may be limited by party lists. Furthermore, the evidence presented in this article suggests that any analysis of the drivers of attendance rates in legislatures should control for the remoteness of constituencies relative to the capital.

Finally, by influencing travel time and geographical remoteness relative to the political centre, the physical location of the capital matters for representation. While it is a rare event, capitals can be moved, as the examples of Brasília (previously Rio de Janeiro) and Berlin (Bonn) illustrate. The findings here suggest that, when considering where to place a country's capital, one consideration should be geography.[25] By choosing a capital in a central location, centre–periphery dynamics may be reduced, thereby leading to a lessening of systematic differences in political representation.

Notes

1. One exception is that the opposition (in particular the leader of the opposition) can use EDMs to seek a debate on a statutory instrument (also known as 'praying' against it). Further, EDMs can also serve the purpose of being motions of censure; the Callaghan government's fall in 1979 was caused by an EDM tabled by Margaret Thatcher (then leader of the opposition) (House of Commons Information Office 2010).
2. The Parliamentary Labour Party requires that, if requested to do so by the Chief Whip, MPs must delay by one day the tabling of an EDM (House of Commons Information Office 2010).
3. The House of Commons itself notes that 'Public interest in [EDMs], which is well known to Members, perhaps in itself, demonstrates their purpose' (House of Commons Information Office 2010: 2).
4. To introduce an EDM, an MP simply hands in its text to the so-called Table Office (open every weekday when the House is sitting); to sign an EDM, an MP can simply tear out the page on which it is printed in the

Notice Paper and hand it in to the Table Office. EDMs stay current (and so available to sign) until the end of the session in which they were introduced (House of Commons Information Office 2010).

5. http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/project/data.php
6. http://www.edms.org.uk/data/
7. Data from both websites has previously been used for academic research (see for example Firth and Spirling 2006; Heppell 2013; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Willumsen and Goetz 2017).
8. The average number of sitting days per year (i.e. days where the House of Commons was in session) was 143.6 in the 2005–2010 Parliament, and 147.2 in the 2010–2015 Parliament (House of Commons Department of Information Services 2015).
9. All MPs serving at the end of each term, with the exception of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers, were included. In the cases where an MP was elected in a by-election, the share of votes participated in and EDMs signed was calculated based only on those held/tabled after the by-election was held. Similarly, in the three cases in the period covered where an MP resigned and then won the subsequent by-election (David Davis in 2005–2010, Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless in 2010–2015), the votes held between the resignation and the by-election were excluded for the purposes of calculating attendance rates. As noted above, EDMs do not expire until the session in which they were introduced ends (House of Commons Information Office 2010), and so these MPs' temporary absence from the House of Commons should not influence their EDM signing rate.
10. Most votes in the House of Commons take place on Mondays (21.8%), Tuesdays (29.5%), and Wednesdays (34.8%), with votes on Thursdays (7.2%) and Fridays (6.6%) being less frequent.
11. Using the non-logged share of EDMs signed also leads to non-normally distributed residuals, whereas the residuals when using the logged values are approximately normal.
12. As a robustness check, the models analysing attendance rates were also estimated using fractional response regression. The results (see Table 4 and Figure 10 in the online appendix) are substantially identical to the models using OLS, and so the OLS results are presented due to their ease of interpretation.
13. Data on constituency boundaries and centroids for were obtained from the Office of National Statistics. In a small number of cases, the centroid was located in an inaccessible location. In these cases, the nearest accessible location was used instead. The ONS only provides data for the Westminster constituencies located in Great Britain; for the Northern Irish constituencies, the location of constituency offices was used instead.
14. Travel time by plane was calculated as the sum of the travel time from the constituency to the nearest airport (the smallest of travel time by either car or public transport) which operates direct flights to London, arriving 60 minutes before the departure of the flight, the flight time as given by Google Maps, 30 minutes to disembark and get to the airport railway station, and 45 minutes by public transport to Westminster. In the cases where no direct flight was available from a nearby airport, and the travel time to an airport which did have such flights by car or public transport was prohibitive, the flying time including a layover was used.

15. Plaid Cymru, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Sinn Féin do not take their seats in Westminster, and so cannot vote or sign EDMs.
16. This variable was coded (in yearly increments) based on the House of Commons database of MPs: http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/. No MP served as a minister in both terms due to the change in government composition in 2010. Frontbench was defined as the frontbench of both the government and of the opposition, as well as opposition spokespersons for the smaller parties. Three MPs (David Blunkett, James Gray and Malcolm Rifkind) held a front-bench position which covered only one calendar year in the 2005–10 Parliament. Blunkett (who was a member of the Cabinet between 5 May and 2 November 2005 (182 days) was coded as having served one year, as was Rifkind, who served as Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions from May to December 2005. James Gray served for one week as Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland in May 2005, and was coded as zero.
17. See Figure 7 in the online appendix for similar findings using a binary (present/not present) dependent variable.
18. The figures are plotted for all observations, except for distances of over 800 kilometres; this affects only the Orkney & Shetland (852km) and Na h-Eileanan an Iar (848km) constituencies.
19. Two per cent of observations had a travel time of more than five hours.
20. Two per cent of observations had a distance between Westminster and constituency of over 600km.
21. As EDM signing is not time-sensitive, these models use MPs' overall attendance rate, rather than attendance by weekday.
22. The predicted values in Figure 3 are shown without confidence intervals, as the large number of these makes the figures illegible.
23. As the 'share of EDMs signed' variable is the log of the share signed, a one-unit increase in an independent variable should be interpreted as leading to a change in the dependent variable of the independent variable's coefficient * 100%.
24. By convention, Ministers, the Speaker, and the Deputy Speakers do not sign EDMs.
25. At the sub-national level, a number of administrative units have their administrative centre outside of the unit itself, making them prime candidates for relocating their 'capital'. For example, Brussels is the capital of the region of Flanders, while being a region in its own right. Between 1921 and 1986, the capital of Lower Austria (Niederösterreich) was Vienna, even though Vienna was a federal state (Bundesland) in its own right. It is worth noting that the new capital (St Pölten) was also the city located closest to the geographic centre of Lower Austria of the five cities considered as the site of the new state capital.

Notes on contributor

David M. Willumsen is a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck. His research on comparative politics and legislative behaviour has appeared in journals such as *European Union Politics*,

European Journal of Political Research, *Parliamentary Affairs*, and *Party Politics*. [david.willumsen@uibk.ac.at]

Acknowledgments

I thank Tamaki Ohmura and Shane Martin, as well as the editor and the anonymous reviewers of *West European Politics*, whose comments greatly improved the manuscript. A previous version of this article was presented at a workshop at the University of Basel and at the 4th General Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments, and I thank the participants, in particular Marcelo Jenny, for helpful comments. The behavioural data were collected as part of a research project on 'Staggered Membership Renewal and Differential Time Horizons in Second Chambers', supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG), grant number GO 1698/4-1.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

David M. Willumsen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2191-1765

References

Alonso, Sonia, Braulio Gómez, and Laura Cabeza (2013). 'Measuring Centre–Periphery Preferences: The Regional Manifestos Project', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 23:2, 189–211.

André, Audrey, Jonathan Bradbury, and Sam Depauw (2014). 'Constituency Service in Multi-level Democracies', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24:2, 129–50.

André, Audrey, and Sam Depauw (2013). 'District Magnitude and Home Styles of Representation in European Democracies', *West European Politics*, 36:5, 986–1006.

André, Audrey, and Sam Depauw (2014). 'District Magnitude and the Personal Vote', *Electoral Studies*, 35, 102–14.

André, Audrey, Sam Depauw, and Shane Martin (2015). 'Electoral Systems and Legislators' Constituency Effort: The Mediating Effect of Electoral Vulnerability', *Comparative Political Studies*, 48:4, 464–96.

Atlas, Cary M., Robert J. Hendershott, and Mark A. Zupan (1997). 'Optimal Effort Allocation by US Senators: The Role of Constituency Size', *Public Choice*, 92:3–4, 221–9.

Bartels, Larry M. (2016). *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix (2007). 'The Rejected, the Dejected and the Ejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001–2005 House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:7, 755–81.

Berrington, Hugh, and Rod Hague (1998). 'Europe, Thatcherism and Traditionalism: Opinion, Rebellion and the Maastricht Treaty in the Backbench Conservative Party, 1992–1994', *West European Politics*, 21:1, 44–71.
Besley, Timothy, and Valentino Larcinese (2011). 'Working or Shirking? Expenses and Attendance in the UK Parliament', *Public Choice*, 146:3–4, 291–317.
Brouard, Sylvain, Olivier Costa, Éric Kerrouche, and Tinette Schnatterer (2013). 'Why Do French MPs Focus More on Constituency Work than on Parliamentary Work?', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19:2, 141–59.
Butler, Daniel M., and David E. Broockman (2011). 'Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55:3, 463–77.
Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina (1984). 'The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament', *American Political Science Review*, 78:1, 110–25.
Childs, Sarah, and Julie Withey (2004). 'Women Representatives Acting for Women: Sex and the Signing of Early Day Motions in the 1997 British Parliament', *Political Studies*, 52:3, 552–64.
Clark, Jennifer Hayes, and R. Lucas Williams (2014). 'Parties, Term Limits, and Representation in the US States', *American Politics Research*, 42:1, 171–93.
Fenno, Richard F. (1977). 'U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration', *American Political Science Review*, 71:3, 883–917.
Firth, David, and Arthur Spirling (2006). 'tapiR and The Public Whip: Resources for Westminster Voting', *Political Methodologist*, 14:2, 2–4.
Forgette, Richard, and Brian R. Sala (1999). 'Conditional Party Government and Member Turnout on Senate Recorded Votes, 1873–1935', *Journal of Politics*, 61:2, 467–84.
Franklin, Mark N., and Michael Tappin (1977). 'Early Day Motions as Unobtrusive Measures of Backbench Opinion in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science*, 7:01, 49–69.
Gaines, Brian J. (1998). 'The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British Elections, 1950–92', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 23:2, 167–95.
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page (2014). 'Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens', *Perspectives on Politics*, 12:3, 564–81.
Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E. Lauderdale, and Nick Vivyan (2017). 'Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System: Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 42:2, 235–67.
Heitshusen, Valerie, Garry Young, and David M. Wood (2005). 'Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom', *American Journal of Political Science*, 49:1, 32–45.
Heppell, Timothy (2013). 'Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers: Cameron and Liberal Conservatism', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 15:3, 340–61.
Hibbing, John R. (1991). 'Contours of the Modern Congressional Career', *American Political Science Review*, 85:2, 405.
House of Commons Department of Information Services (2015). 'SN04653: Number of Commons sitting days by session since 1945', http://

researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04653 (Accessed October 5, 2016).
House of Commons Information Office (2010). 'Factsheet P3: Early Day Motions', http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-office/p03.pdf (Accessed March 10, 2015).
Hug, Simon, Simone Wegmann, and Reto Wüest (2015). 'Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison', *West European Politics*, 38:5, 940–68.
Johnston, Ron, Philip Cowley, Charles Pattie, and Mark Stuart (2002). 'Voting in the House or Wooing the Voters at Home: Labour MPs and the 2001 General Election Campaign', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 8:2, 9–22.
Kellermann, Michael (2012). 'Estimating Ideal Points in the British House of Commons Using Early Day Motions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 3, 757–71.
Kellermann, Michael (2013). 'Sponsoring Early Day Motions in the British House of Commons as a Response to Electoral Vulnerability', *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1:2, 263–80.
Klüver, Heike (2012). 'Biasing Politics? Interest Group Participation in EU Policy-Making', *West European Politics*, 35:5, 1114–33.
Lipset, Seymor Martin, and Stein Rokkan (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
Martin, Shane (2011). 'Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: An Application to the Irish Case', *Political Studies*, 59:2, 472–88.
Martin, Shane (2013). 'Is All Politics Local? The Role-orientation of Irish Parliamentarians towards Foreign Policy', *Irish Political Studies*, 28:1, 114–29.
Noury, Abdul (2004). 'Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament', *Public Choice*, 121:1, 179–211.
Pattie, Charles J., and Ron J. Johnston (2004). 'Party Knowledge and Candidate Knowledge: Constituency Campaigning and Voting and the 1997 British General Election', *Electoral Studies*, 23:4, 795–819.
Persson, Mikael (2013). 'Review Article: Education and Political Participation', *British Journal of Political Science*, 45:3, 689–703.
Powell, G. Bingham (2004). 'Political Representation in Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7, 273–96.
Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders (2000a). 'Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the US Congress', *Public Choice*, 103:3–4, 259–70.
Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders (2000b). 'Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44:2, 316–25.
Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders (2002). 'Modeling Legislator Decision Making: A Historical Perspective', *American Politics Research*, 30:3, 235–64.
Schwindt-Bayer, L. A, and William Mishler (2005). 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', *Journal of Politics*, 67:2, 407–28.
Scully, Roger M. (1997). 'Policy Influence and Participation in the European Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 22:2, 233–52.
Searing, Donald D. (1985). 'The Role of the Good Constituency Member and the Practice of Representation in Great Britain', *Journal of Politics*, 47:2, 348–81.

Smith, Timothy Hallam (2013). 'Are You Sitting Comfortably? Estimating Incumbency Advantage in the UK: 1983–2010 – A Research Note', *Electoral Studies*, 32:1, 167–73.
Thomassen, Jacques, and Peter Esaiasson (2006). 'Role Orientations of Members of Parliament', *Acta Politica*, 41:3, 217–31.
Vivyan, Nick, and Markus Wagner (2012). 'Do Voters Reward Rebellion? The Electoral Accountability of MPs in Britain', *European Journal of Political Research*, 51:2, 235–64.
Vivyan, Nick, Markus Wagner, and Jessica Tarlov (2012). 'Representative Misconduct, Voter Perceptions and Accountability: Evidence from the 2009 House of Commons Expenses Scandal', *Electoral Studies*, 31:4, 750–63.
Wengst, Udo (1991). 'Wer stimmte für Bonn, wer für Berlin? Die Entscheidung über den Parlaments-und Regierungssitz im Bundestag am 20. Juni 1991', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 22:3, 339–43.
Whitaker, Richard, Simon Hix, and Galina Zapryanova (2017). 'Understanding Members of the European Parliament: Four Waves of the European Parliament Research Group MEP survey', *European Union Politics*, 18:3, 491–506.
Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz (2017). 'Set Free? Impending Retirement and Legislative Behaviour in the UK', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70:2, 254–79.
Wood, David M., and Jong-Bin Yoon (1998). 'Role Orientations of Junior British MPs: A Test of Searing's Categories with Emphasis on Constituency Activities', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 4:3, 52–71.
Wood, David M., and Garry Young (1997). 'Comparing Constituency Activity by Junior Legislators in Great Britain and Ireland', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 22:2, 217.