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Clientelism in Northeast Brazil: brokerage within and outside electoral times

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ABSTRACT

In scholarship on informal politics in Brazil, clientelism is a well-studied phenomenon. While studies of clientelism generally concentrate on elections, campaigning and vote buying, clientelist practices and their impact extend well beyond this temporal and thematic focus. This article develops an approach that builds on theories of brokerage in anthropology and social network studies. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in low-income neighbourhoods in Recife, Brazil, it shows how clientelism is based on informal exchanges both within and outside election periods. Through a study of community leaders, their projects and their search for resources, the article advances a more comprehensive understanding of how clientelism works as a social mechanism in the ordering of life in these neighbourhoods.

Introduction

In scholarship on informal politics in Brazil, clientelism is a well-studied phenomenon (Ansell, 2014; Eiró & Koster, 2019; Gay, 1998). The literature generally accepts that clientelism permeates and regulates social life 'beyond the ballot box'. Yet, it rarely addresses this issue substantially and mostly focuses on electoral periods and its typical events and practices: party politics, campaigning, and voting behaviour (Hunter & Power, 2007; Zucco, 2013). While election periods are very important for understanding clientelism, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate how clientelism also works as a social ordering mechanism beyond this temporal and thematic limitation. In so doing, we widen the scope of studies on clientelism to include actors, practices, networks and sites that are not often included in clientelism research. More specifically, our study contributes to understanding how clientelism plays a continuous role in community projects and, through these projects, on social life in low-income neighbourhoods, such as those we studied in Recife, Brazil.

We approach clientelism through the concept of 'brokerage', the act of bridging gaps and mediating between different layers or groups in society (Stovel & Shaw, 2012). The

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concept was initially developed in social network theory (Burt, 2005; Granovetter, 1985) and cultural anthropology (Geertz, 1960; Wolf, 1956). Examining clientelism with a focus on brokerage as connective practices between individuals or networks, draws attention to a much broader set of practices than is usually included in studies of clientelism.

Based on fieldwork in Recife, the capital of the state of Pernambuco, Brazil, this article focuses on how clientelist relationships and exchanges in local community projects contribute to the social ordering of life in low-income neighbourhoods. First, it demonstrates how, through personal relationships between public office holders and community leaders, state resources are distributed through largely unofficial, yet commonly used channels. Such resources facilitate community projects that play an important role in shaping social life in the neighbourhood. Second, as part of these resources come in the form of salaries or other forms of income, they allow community leaders to invest time in community activities and assist their fellow residents when they need it, instead of having to do other work. Third, community leaders' clientelist networks contribute to their prestige in the neighbourhood, as they are considered 'well-connected' and well positioned to solve problems. This, however, also comes with a risk of possible accusations of being unscrupulous political canvassers, a claim they continuously try to reject as they want to be considered independent actors who work for the benefit of the community (Koster, 2012).

We examine the clientelist relationships in their context of historical power structures in the Northeast region. These power structures, that date back to the colonial era, are characterised by a system of strong rural patronage in which, classically, a patron (a large landowner with regional political power) controls the allocation of resources and the protection of the population (Ansell, 2014; Villela, 2005).

This article is based on ethnographic research, including participant observation, informal unstructured interviews and formal semi-structured interviews. Between 2003 and 2018, Koster carried out 24 months of fieldwork in low-income urban neighbourhoods in the north of Recife, on local community leaders, electoral politics and clientelism. In 2018, Eiró – who conducted extensive research on clientelism elsewhere in Northeast Brazil – joined for a two-month fieldwork period. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, ethnographic fieldwork is a valuable method for studying clientelism. Although clientelism is widely acknowledged, people avoid talking about it in public, or refer to it using emic terms that might pass unnoticed, such as 'to know the right person' or 'ter costas quentes' (to have warm backs, meaning to be well-connected). Moreover, much of what could be understood as clientelism is based upon tacit understandings. Using participant observation, we followed informants as they conducted their daily activities and were thus able to observe clientelist exchanges. This contributed to our understanding 'from within' of delicate practices.

Clientelism and brokerage

Clientelism, in most of the literature, is treated as an exclusively electoral practice. Some studies are concerned with the impact of clientelism on electoral results (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014; Montero, 2010), while others analyse the influence of social policies on voting behaviour (Hunter & Power, 2007; Zucco, 2013). Although none of these

studies discards the notion that clientelism extends 'beyond the ballot', their focus is over-whelmingly on electoral periods. Our approach draws on Moacir Palmeira's (1992) argu-ment that clientelism also exists beyond the 'political times' (*tempo da política*) and that it should be understood as a broader structuring mechanism in society:

> What is at stake is therefore a competition that is broader than the electoral competition *stricto sensu*. At stake is both the attempt to access certain positions of command and the relative weight of different parts of society, which is decisive for the ordering of social relations for a certain period of time (Palmeira, 1992, p. 27).[1]

In this regard, an interesting strand of studies on clientelism are those that foreground clients' perspectives. Studies such as Javier Auyero's (1999) on Buenos Aires, Turid Hagene's (2015) on Mexico City and Robert Gay's (1994) on Rio de Janeiro, demonstrate how clients' relationships with public office holders are always assessed and evaluated within terms that extend beyond electoral politics, in the sense that they take place beyond the practices and procedures that are instrumental in gaining votes and assuming or maintaining public offices.[2] Instead, these studies show the importance of notions of friendship, care, commitment and respect. Clientelism, in these studies, is about solving problems, for which contacts among resourceful persons are crucial. However, although these studies point at the wider relevance of clientelism outside the electoral moment, their main focus is, nevertheless, on elections and party politics.

To study clientelism, we use the lens of brokerage. This concept has been used with a focus on electioneering, specifically in political sciences, in studies of political canvassers such as *fixers* in India (Berenschot, 2011) and *punteros* in Argentina (Auyero, 2000; Zara-zaga, 2014). Such individuals act in the interest of political candidates or parties. They are portrayed as the middle element of a pyramidal structure, with the political candidate at the top and the voters at the base. Brokers' actions receive instrumental justification in that they connect voters with political candidates and parties. In contrast to this view, we draw upon a broader definition of brokerage that emerges from social network theory and anthropological studies.

In social network theory, the practice of brokerage bridges the gap between different networks (Burt, 2005; Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Brokers operate as mediators, transmit-ting information between the different networks, to their mutual advantage. This builds upon Granovetter's *Strength of Weak Ties* (1985): whereas strong ties exist within densely knit clumps of actors that share common characteristics, weak ties are the connections that bridge the gaps between different densely knit networks.[3] From this perspective, brokerage is 'one of a small number of mechanisms by which disconnected or isolated individuals (or groups) can interact economically, politically, and socially' (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, p. 139).

In anthropology, early studies of brokerage were written alongside decolonisation and the organisation of new societies in recently emerged nation states. In these studies, central figures, such as village headmen, mediated between local communities and bureaucratic or religious authorities (Geertz, 1960; Gluckman, 1949). More recent studies have concentrated on how brokerage implies the ability to bring together and translate rationalities, interests and meanings (James, 2011; Mosse & Lewis, 2006; Velho, 2013).

Within this analytical framework of brokerage, we understand clientelism as a social mechanism centred upon (an often mediated) personal dyadic relationship, unequal or asymmetrical, relatively durable, and based on reciprocal exchanges or the expectations thereof (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009; Hilgers, 2011; Kettering, 1988; Medard, 1976). In such relationships, as Ansell (2014) and Villela (2005) show, reciprocal obligations beyond material exchanges are negotiated according to a moral calculation, anchored in particular values and mutual respect. Heredia and Palmeira (2006) argue that the long-term commitment (*adesão*) between individuals – and their families – extends well beyond electoral politics and into the domain of social interactions (see also Palmeira, 1996). Clientelism, in such an understanding, is rooted in multifaceted practices, relationships and exchanges that crosscut the different domains of society.

Clientelism in Northeast Brazil

Northeast Brazil has been known for fostering clientelism, embedded in a long history of economic scarcity, harsh environmental conditions, dependency and concentrated land-ownership (Leal, 2012; Villela, 2005). The clientelist structure that marked Northeast Brazil until the end of the twentieth century was known as *coronelismo*, a political system where local elites – *coronéis* (colonels) – were connected to the country's political structure through a complex network of reciprocal commitments that reinforced private power in a political regime with a broad representative base (Bursztyn, 2008; Carvalho, 1997; Faoro, 2013). Coronéis were the state representatives at the local level, and thus controlled the public resources that were directed to relieve the region's massive poverty and famine (Cunniff, 1970; Villela, 2010). Peasants and rural workers gave their loyalty to the coronel in exchange for public resources and protection. A similar system of appropriation of public resources and manipulation of federal programmes by local political elites persisted for many years, even when transformed by the modernisation of state institutions and access to resources such as land and water, employment and other sources of income (Hagopian, 1996). Currently, although certain families are still very influential in Pernambucan politics, traditional families no longer hold complete power over public institutions. The scene is more fragmented, with intense competition between political candidates at different levels.

When researching clientelism, it is necessary to carefully assess the terms used. Emic terms help to understand how clientelism and brokerage have local meanings that go beyond the moment of the elections. For instance, in Brazil, *clientelismo* is widely used as a term to denounce political rivals, a direct effect of the criminalisation of 'capture of suffrage' by a 1997 electoral law. Despite being an electoral crime, vote buying is not considered immoral per se. People have a nuanced view of such actions, as identified by Ansell (2014) in Northeast Brazil, where the nature of goods distributed testified to the character of the donor. In short, the *how* is relevant to showing a political candidate's commitment to a community.

Characteristic figures in Brazilian politics are the *intermediários* (intermediaries): informal facilitators in the access to public services and other resources. Although intermediários' actions are often disputed and bordering on the illegal, their existence is commonly accepted. The intermediário should not be confused with political canvassers or vote buyers, even though these different roles can be played by the same person. Someone

who works for a political candidate and is involved in campaign-specific work is referred to as a *cabo eleitoral* (electoral corporal), a term that dates back to the times of coronelismo (Mouzelis, 1985; Villela, 2005). Nowadays, *cabos eleitorais* are positioned between the candidate and the electorate (Koster, 2012). Although widespread, they are often criticised, including by politicians, as it is believed they opportunistically sell their services to the highest bidder. People who operate as intermediários try to avoid the term cabo eleitoral and its negative connotations, arguing that their role is not limited to electoral politics.

Successful intermediários are often offered positions in public offices as a way of rewarding them and maintaining their loyalty to patrons (Hilgers, 2011; Remmer, 2007). These temporary jobs vary from minimum-wage contracts with outsourced contractors to advisory positions known as *cargos comissionados*, which are well paid and can be strategic for electoral reasons if positioned in direct contact with citizens. Both temporary jobs and cargos comissionados are, nevertheless, highly insecure jobs: it is common practice that the entire City Hall staff is replaced when a new local government is formed – this is referred to as the *derrubada* (the upheaval) (Cordeiro, 2007).

Some notes on elections in Brazil

In Brazil, federal and state elections are held every four years, and people cast votes for president, senator, state governor, and members of federal and state legislative chambers. Municipal elections are held midway between the federal/state elections with one vote cast for mayor and another for councillor. The campaign atmosphere builds up slowly over the months until it bursts visually when the electoral period starts 52 days prior to elections. Flags, banners, stickers and T-shirts become abundant as candidates and party supporters go around canvassing for support.

Elections are a window of opportunity for residents to present their needs and aspirations to political candidates, and to gain access to otherwise unavailable resources. Connections between political candidates and residents of low-income neighbourhoods' residents are, typically, mediated by different types of brokers, such as community leaders. In election times, political candidates and their campaign workers (re-)establish relationships with the population, granting favours, distributing goods and money, arranging documents for free, and sometimes even jobs. They claim responsibility for successful projects in their campaigns. In all this, they depend on persons such as community leaders, whom they try to 'recruit' as their cabos eleitorais.

Typically, community leaders start explicitly canvassing the neighbourhoods when the official election period starts. With a team of residents, they wear their candidate's T-shirts and put up posters and stickers. Community leaders recruit these workers and pass on publicity material and a small payment from their candidate (or promise thereof) (Barreira, 1998). In the past, they would also organise *boca de urna* (mouth of the ballot box), the act of handing out flyers and trying to persuade voters to vote for their candidate near voting places on election day, a practice that has been forbidden by the electoral justice since 1997, but that still exists in more subtle ways. Elections provide extra income to those in low-income neighbourhoods who are willing to put up posters, wave flags at crossroads, and drive people to and from rallies.

For community leaders, as brokers, elections are important events. However, their brokering extends well beyond the electoral moment. Resorting to their contacts with

political candidates, public office holders is a continuous element of their search for access to resources, within or outside government programmes. In the election times, latent contacts may become active relationships and personal friendships may turn into public engagements. Before and during election times, some community leaders' services are requested by political candidates, to be their eyes and ears in the communities, relying on an existing paid position or small financial rewards. When elections are done, and a successful result is achieved, they can be granted jobs in recognition for their efforts.

Clientelism within and outside the elections: the role of community leaders

Community leaders, locally referred to as *líderes comunitários* or *lideranças*, are well-known, socially and politically active people from low-income neighbourhoods or rural settlements. They are born and raised in the same circumstances as their fellow residents and face the same problems. The base of their leadership is informal, based on past activities and achievements for the benefit of the community (Herkenhoff, 1995; Queiroz, 1999). Community leaders are known for their extensive social networks, including their contact with politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. They struggle for collective improvements for their community, for example by ensuring that public works are carried out, and grant personal favours to fellow residents, for instance by helping them through the labyrinthine state bureaucracy. In so doing, they form important bridges between a needy population and well-resourced patrons, be they political candidates, high-level bureaucrats or private entrepreneurs.[4] Community leaders often occupy formal positions as representatives of their neighbourhood in participatory programmes or as presidents of residents' associations (Kopper, 2012). These positions contribute to their reputations as leaders.

During election times, political candidates and their campaign workers (re-)establish connections with community leaders, who usually agree to support a specific candidate. In that sense, the community leaders turn into cabos eleitorais, although, according to our research, they reject the 'opportunistic' connotation of the term. The community leaders try to involve their candidates in their projects, looking for material or financial support. Most of these projects – on, for example, culture, health, education, professional training and employment – are initiated within the community and outside of the electoral domain. In electoral periods, however, they gain an electoral dimension when politicians try to connect their name to community leaders and their successful projects. The community leaders organise meetings with candidates and their campaign workers and participate in canvassing activities. When it comes to their political choice, they have considerable room for manoeuvre. Their choice to support a candidate is based on personal relationships with candidates or their affiliates and the assistance they, or their community, have received in the past. Community leaders make their collective and personal needs known to candidates. Generally, their personal reward includes a temporary salary or a lump-sum payment for their services. They may also receive a reward in kind, such as construction materials or employment for themselves or for family members (Borges, 2006; Gay, 1994).

Community leaders operating as brokers

Drawing on our ethnographic fieldwork, this section adds further details into the dynamics of clientelism within and outside electoral periods. It presents in detail how community leaders of the neighbourhood of Chão de Estrelas, a low-income neighbourhood in the north of Recife, operated as brokers in clientelist networks, in- and outside of the elections. Shortly after the 2012 municipal elections, Degenildo, one of the community leaders, had received a job at the City Hall. This work was a so-called *trabalho fantasma* (ghost job). Degenildo collected a monthly paycheck without doing any work at the municipality, a favour he was granted for his help in campaigning for the political party that won the elections. When asked what he did in this job, he said: '*prestando serviço*' (providing services). He explained that 'if they need me, I will go to the City Hall'. The income he had from this job and the fact that he hardly had to show up, enabled him to spend time on several community projects related to sports, culture and infrastructure. Due to these projects, Degenildo was well known in the area. People came to look for him, to organise a sports tournament, to ask him for advice when dealing with the municipal bureaucracy or for information about urban upgrading programmes that were carried out in the area. In a recent upgrading project, Degenildo had represented the area's population and negotiated the terms and details of their relocation to new housing estates. He had been able to spend time on this because of his City Hall 'ghost job'. His fellow residents considered him a good representative (the usual criticism aside) because he was 'well-connected'. Many times they told us that Degenildo knew whom to speak to and how to 'demand' (*cobrar*) things from the authorities. This example illustrates how clientelist contacts and exchanges are a continuous presence in the activities of community leaders. Moreover, it demonstrates how clientelism facilitates projects in the neighbourhood, not just through direct resources, but also because it provides community leaders with time to spend on their activities and with a certain prestige derived from their contacts. This prestige, in addition, helped Degenildo to be elected, time and again, as a district representative in a municipal programme focused on governing low-income neighbourhoods (PREZEIS) which, in its turn, provided him with a monthly meeting allowance and many contacts among the municipality's bureaucrats and policy makers.

The story of Ovídio, Chão de Estrelas' oldest community leader, also illustrates how clientelism plays a role as a social ordering mechanism in the neighbourhood, in- and outside the election periods. Ovidio was born in 1936, in the Pernambucan countryside. After migrating to Recife in his twenties, in search of work, he became an important figure during the military regime in the 1970s when he was a community leader of one of the riverbank slums that would, in 1981, be relocated to Chão de Estrelas. Ovídio had played an important role in negotiating a resettlement deal for the neighbourhood, instead of the planned removal of the riverbank habitations without any form of compensation. In Chão de Estrelas, over the years, Ovídio carried out many community projects. Recently, most of them were related to waste recycling and urban agriculture, aiming at improving both local livelihoods and the environment. Through these projects, Ovídio said that he wanted to improve the community and 'coordinate the people in acting together'. Considering the scarce resources in his neighbourhood, his projects were

highly dependent on means that he could only obtain through others. Over the years, Ovídio had established connections with many politicians and bureaucrats.

Similar to Degenildo, Ovídio, for many years, earned a salary from a ghost job that he gained in exchange for political support, in his case from a long-term member of Pernambuco's state parliament for the Social Democratic Party.[5] Their relationship dated back to the protests against the military regime in the 1970s. After the return to democracy in 1985, this person became president of the public housing company, a position in which he helped Ovídio and many other community leaders in their struggle for housing. Later, as a member of state parliament, he offered Ovídio a ghost job at a cleaning outsource contractor for the state government, until he was able to retire and receive a pension. The politician, as Ovídio explained, provided material support for his community activities on waste recycling and environmental issues.

Ovídio also had good contacts with the director of Pernambuco's office of the regulatory agency for engineers. Over the years, Ovídio regularly visited the director in his office, who would direct an assistant to help him with his requests, for example to use the Council's printing facilities for promotional material for his projects. Also, at times, the director came to Chão de Estrelas, for example, as a speaker at Ovídio's meetings on environmental issues such as the importance of clean drinking water or the pollution of the nearby river. For the 25th anniversary of Chão de Estrelas, Ovídio organised a series of events. One of them was the issuing of a CD with a community anthem. The song catered to the identity of the community, celebrating 25 years of solidarity, struggles and achievements. For this, Ovídio needed money to pay local musicians to compose and perform the song and a local studio owner to record it, and to buy and burn many copies of the CD. The director provided the means needed and the CD was issued with the agency as its sponsor and distributed widely in the neighbourhood.

During election times, relationships like these would often gain an electoral dimension. Some of Ovídio's contacts became political candidates, while others tried to convince Ovídio to support the candidate of their choice. Also in this case, six months before the municipal elections, the director publicly presented his intention to run for mayor for the Socialist Party, the largest in the state.[6] Two months later, he announced that his party had formed a coalition with the Workers' Party[7] who held the mayor's office, and that he now supported his candidacy for a second term. The director mentioned his choice to support the Workers' Party candidate to Ovídio several times, during their meetings and conversations. He would not, and could not, oblige Ovídio to support his candidate, but he repeatedly told Ovídio 'with whom he was'. Ovídio took this suggestion seriously as he considered the director a respected friend. During these elections, whether or not it was because of the director's choice, Ovídio indeed canvassed and voted for the Workers' Party candidate as mayor.

Ovídio also relied on his contacts for assistance in other projects. For instance, in an urban agriculture project, in which he worked with a group of residents, Ovídio needed seeds, gardening tools and building material for walling a garden. Through a long-term contact – a photographer whom Ovídio knew from their joint struggle against the military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s – he met the chair of the Workers' Party in Recife. Ovídio presented his demands to the chair, who told him to go to the warehouses of a particular federal agency. By that time, both the municipality and the federal government were under Workers' Party rule, so ties were strong between the two. At the warehouse,

after explaining that the chair of the Workers' Party had sent him, Ovídio was immediately brought to the office of the manager, who told him that she would provide the materials. More than a year later, when federal and state elections were held, Workers' Party campaign workers approached Ovídio again with the request to canvass for their candidates. Informal exchanges like these often happened, based on the principle of 'I grant you a favour when you need it and you grant me a favour when I need it', or in colloquial terms, '*uma mão lava a outra*' (one hand washes the other).

In his performance, Ovídio, like the other community leaders, rejected allegations of being involved in electoral politics only for the sake of acquiring votes. He said that he was not a cabo eleitoral and claimed that he only engaged in politics for the sake of improving the community: 'I do a community service (*trabalho social*). I do not do it for political reasons.' He explained to us that his work for the community was also political, but on a higher level, transcending what he referred to as party politics: 'I want to do Politics with a capital P. Little party politics I do not do.'

In this way, activities outside election time were connected to politics within election time. Another community leader explained it clearly. She was active in many different projects and told us how she wanted to organise things 'independently'. However, she said, this was hard because she needed funding. She concluded: 'If you like it or not, at a certain moment politics will enter.' Indeed, as our research illustrates, electoral politics pervaded community projects.

By concentrating on their brokerage practices, we see how community leaders such as Degenildo and Ovídio are involved in clientelist relationships with different (potential) patrons. They maintain these relationships over long periods and also cooperate with these patrons outside election times. They organise projects for the benefit of the community. For these projects, resources become available largely through durable relationships with public office holders. Most of the time, these relationships are not determined by electoral politics. Instead, they centre upon friendship, care, respect and exchanges of favours. Then, in election times, they gain an electoral dimension.

The provision of resources through clientelist contacts facilitates community projects and events which, in their turn, shape the neighbourhood's social life and its leadership. For example, the 25th anniversary anthem emphasised solidarity and community identity. Also, the income that community leaders earn through clientelist contacts, such as from their ghost jobs, enables them to invest their time and energy in community projects, while otherwise they would have to do other work for an income. Finally, community leaders' clientelist networks contribute to their prestige in the neighbourhood, as their connections help them to solve problems. In so doing, clientelist relationships and exchanges contribute to the social ordering of the neighbourhood.

Conclusions

By using brokerage as an analytical lens, this article demonstrates how clientelist relationships and exchanges play a continuous role in community leaders' projects in low-income neighbourhoods in Recife, Northeast Brazil. Brokerage, as the act of connecting and translating between different individuals or networks, draws our attention to the relationships between public office holders and (underprivileged) city residents. The community

leaders in our ethnographic vignettes are not the typical political canvassers who try to establish plain vote-for-favour exchanges during elections. Instead, they are, in complex ways, continuously involved in acts of brokerage. These acts contain, at least potentially, an electoral dimension in which public office holders grant or promise personal favours to residents in exchange for political support.

Even though the literature generally builds on the premise that clientelism relies on relations built and maintained outside elections, it rarely shows how these affect social life. We showed how these ties are slowly constructed, how they are transformed (or reinforced) during elections and how they shape life in the neighbourhood. Stretching clientelism to times and practices outside election periods, our article ethnographically supports Palmeira's argument that people's commitment to political candidates may depend on the 'acceptance of material goods in the time of politics, as much as a service thought as a favour or help outside the time of politics' (Palmeira, 1992, p. 28). Following this line of thought, we argue that, in order to gain a better understanding of how clientelist mechanisms influence society, it is necessary to analyse how clientelism operates at moments when votes are not directly at stake. In so doing, we gain more insight into clientelist practices in local community projects, in government programmes, in the bureaucracy, in people's relationships, in their search for employment, and in the distribution of resources through formal and informal channels. Indeed, clientelism does not only play a role in how people cast their votes: it is, to paraphrase Palmeira, a central element in the ordering of social life.

Notes

1. All translations from Portuguese into English are ours.
2. Electoral politics corresponds to a certain extent with party politics, but it is not limited to boundaries between, or competition within, parties.
3. Sociology's interest in brokerage also draws from Simmel's theory on the third element, the 'tertius gaudens' (Simmel & Wolff, 1950).
4. The community leaders in this study differ from the image of criminally involved leaders prevalent in studies on Rio de Janeiro (e.g. Arias, 2009; Penglase, 2009).
5. *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), centre-right party.
6. *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* (Brazilian Socialist Party), centre-left party which coalition is in charge in Recife since 2013.
7. *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party), left-wing party which coalition was in charge in Recife between 01/01/2001 and 31/12/2012.

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