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REFORMATION AND RENAISSANCE
AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICA'S EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT

by

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B.A. University of Central Florida 2007
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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Education
in the School of Teaching, Learning and Leadership
in the College of Education and Human Performance
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2014

Major Professor: Barbara A. Murray

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ABSTRACT

Education reform has grown into a major policy issue at the state and national level in the United States and for that matter around the world. The purpose of this study was to determine the political and social forces supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and impact of education reform policies in the K-12 public education system of the United States from 2001-2011. Through mixed-methods data analysis a descriptive and analytical picture of education reform was able to be concluded. The results of the analysis showed that with an increase in education reforms from 2001-2011, legislators, predominantly Republican, created state level education reforms which fell in line with both neoliberal economic (market based policies) and neoconservative political (smaller government and increased individualism) ideals. With a focus on accountability, achievement, and choice, reformers, proliferated in profiles of corporations, PACs and other organizations outside the realm of traditional public education, school systems in the United States continued on similar paths of education reform as other post-industrialized countries that have grown out of an economically globalized world.

I would like to dedicate this research to the three greatest teachers I have ever met. With untiring determination and focus on improving not only their students' love for learning but also increasing the profile of our profession, these three teachers, Tammy Johnson, Julie Kraftsow and Robin Grenz, have shown that no matter how education practicum and policy changes, a great teacher is truly all that matters.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the guidance of Dr. Barbara Murray. When I started my doctoral degree I was hoping to meet a professor who could help guide and inspire me on the journey, Dr. Murray was that person without a doubt. Her passion for true education and educational leadership was a breath of fresh air; because of her this dissertation was possible and I would not be the educational leader I am today without her support and dedication.

I would also like to thank Dr. Larry Holt, Dr. Kenneth Murray and Dr. Walter Doherty for their guidance and input throughout the process of my doctoral program and this dissertation. Their experience in educational leadership was of paramount importance as I started this dissertation. With Dr. Holt's attention to detail, Dr. Ken Murray's political and policy advice and Dr. Doherty's connection to "savvy school leadership", this dissertation was able to take form. Thank you all for your generosity in time and efforts.

Finally, I'd like to thank my partner, Kathryn Murrow. Without her patience and support this dissertation process would not have been as enjoyable. She gave up her Sundays for my library time and sat through many hours as my secondary editor. With her by my side, this goal became a reality, thank you!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xiv
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STUDY	1
Introduction.....	1
Statement of Problem.....	3
Purpose of Study.....	3
Background of the Study	4
Theoretical Framework.....	6
Definition of Terms.....	11
Delimitations.....	13
Limitations	14
Research Questions.....	14
Overview of Methodology.....	15
Organization of Dissertation.....	17
Summary.....	18
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	19
Introduction.....	19
Education Reforms.....	20
Alternative Certification	20
Charter Schools.....	23
Collective Bargaining/Unions.....	34
Evaluation	36
Testing.....	40
Tax Credit Scholarships.....	42
Digital Learning	46
Tenure	49
Voucher Programs	51
Education Reform Organizations.....	58

American Legislative Exchange Council.....	58
The Center for Education Reform.....	61
Students First	62
States.....	64
Indiana.....	64
Florida.....	65
Ohio.....	65
Arizona.....	66
Louisiana.....	66
Minnesota.....	67
Wisconsin.....	67
Oklahoma.....	68
Georgia.....	68
Michigan	69
Summary	69
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY	71
Introduction.....	71
Selection of the Sample	71
Research Design and Rationale	74
Collection of Data.....	76
Research Questions.....	78
Analysis of Data.....	79
Methodology Table.....	82
Summary	83
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF DATA	84
Introduction.....	84
Indiana.....	84
Research Question One.....	84
Research Question Two	89
Research Question Three	92
Research Question Four.....	93
Research Question Five	95

Research Question Six	100
Research Question Seven.....	102
Florida.....	104
Research Question One.....	104
Research Question Two	110
Research Question Three	113
Research Question Four.....	114
Research Question Five	115
Research Question Six	126
Research Question Seven.....	129
Louisiana.....	131
Research Question One.....	131
Research Question Two	136
Research Question Three	139
Research Question Four.....	140
Research Question Five	142
Research Question Six	146
Research Question Seven.....	149
Arizona.....	150
Research Question One.....	150
Research Question Two	156
Research Question Three	160
Research Question Four.....	160
Research Question Five	162
Research Question Six	168
Research Question Seven.....	171
Ohio.....	172
Research Question One.....	172
Research Question Two	175
Research Question Three	179
Research Question Four.....	180

Research Question Five	182
Research Question Six	186
Research Question Seven.....	187
Michigan	189
Research Question One.....	189
Research Question Two	193
Research Question Three	196
Research Question Four.....	197
Research Question Five	199
Research Question Six	204
Research Question Seven.....	206
Oklahoma.....	208
Research Question One.....	208
Research Question Two	215
Research Question Three	218
Research Question Four.....	219
Research Question Five	221
Research Question Six	229
Research Question Seven.....	231
Georgia.....	233
Research Question One.....	233
Research Question Two	237
Research Question Three	240
Research Question Four.....	241
Research Question Five	243
Research Question Six	247
Research Question Seven.....	249
Wisconsin.....	250
Research Question One.....	250
Research Question Two	253
Research Question Three	257

Research Question Four	258
Research Question Five	259
Research Question Six	265
Research Question Seven.....	267
Minnesota.....	269
Research Question One.....	269
Research Question Two	273
Research Question Three	276
Research Question Four.....	277
Research Question Five	279
Research Question Six	283
Research Question Seven.....	285
National.....	286
Research Question One.....	286
Research Question Two	289
Research Question Three	292
Research Question Four.....	294
Research Question Five	295
Research Question Six	296
Research Question Seven.....	298
Summary	298
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	299
Introduction.....	299
Summary and Discussion of Findings	300
Research Question One.....	300
Research Question Two	302
Research Question Three	306
Research Question Four.....	308
Research Question Five	310
Research Question Six	313
Research Question Seven.....	314
Conclusions.....	315

Recommendations for Future Research	316
Summary	317
APPENDIX A: INDIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS	318
APPENDIX B: FLORIDA CHI SQUARE TESTS	329
APPENDIX C: LOUISIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS.....	340
APPENDIX D: ARIZONA CHI SQUARE TESTS	351
APPENDIX E: OHIO CHI SQUARE TESTS.....	362
APPENDIX F: MICHIGAN CHI SQUARE TESTS	373
APPENDIX G: OKLAHOMA CHI SQUARE TESTS.....	384
APPENDIX H: GEORGIA CHI SQUARE TESTS	395
APPENDIX I: WISCONSIN CHI SQUARE TESTS	406
APPENDIX J: MINNESOTA CHI SQUARE TESTS.....	417
APPENDIX K: NATIONAL CHI SQUARE TESTS	428
REFERENCES	439

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011	86
Figure 2: Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	91
Figure 3: Indiana ed. reform legislation/per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	94
Figure 4: Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011	105
Figure 5: Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	111
Figure 6: Florida ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	115
Figure 7: Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011	132
Figure 8: Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	138
Figure 9: Louisiana ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	141
Figure 10: Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011	151
Figure 11: Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	158
Figure 12: Arizona ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	162
Figure 13: Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011	173
Figure 14: Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	178
Figure 15: Ohio ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	182
Figure 16: Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011	190
Figure 17: Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	195
Figure 18: Michigan ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	198
Figure 19: Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011	209
Figure 20: Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	217
Figure 21: Oklahoma ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	221
Figure 22: Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011	234
Figure 23: Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	239
Figure 24: Georgia ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	242
Figure 25: Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011	251
Figure 26: Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	255

Figure 27: Wisconsin ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	259
Figure 28: Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011	270
Figure 29: Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	275
Figure 30: Minnesota ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	278
Figure 31: Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011	287
Figure 32: Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID	291
Figure 33: Ten state ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011	295

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: State Rankings by Education Reform Organization	73
Table 2: State Mean Ranking	74
Table 3: Methodology Table	82
Table 4: Indiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics	85
Table 5: Indiana Legislation/Year Correlation	85
Table 6: Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale	87
Table 7: Indiana Group Statistics	90
Table 8: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	90
Table 9: Indiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	93
Table 10: Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	93
Table 11: Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	94
Table 12: Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts	97
Table 13: Indiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID	101
Table 14: Indiana Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	101
Table 15: Indiana Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	103
Table 16: Florida Legislation Descriptive Statistics	104
Table 17: Florida Legislation/Year Correlation	105
Table 18: Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale	106
Table 19: Florida Group Statistics	110
Table 20: Independent Samples Test for Party ID and Legislation	111
Table 21: Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	113

Table 22: Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics	114
Table 23: Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	114
Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts	118
Table 25: Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	127
Table 26: Florida Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	128
Table 27: Florida Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	130
Table 28: Louisiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics	131
Table 29: Louisiana Legislation/Year Correlation	132
Table 30: Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale	133
Table 31: Louisiana Group Statistics	137
Table 32: Independent Samples Test Louisiana Party ID and Legislation	137
Table 33: Louisiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	140
Table 34: Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics	140
Table 35: Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	141
Table 36: Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts	143
Table 37: Louisiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID	147
Table 38: Louisiana Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme	148
Table 39: Arizona Legislation Descriptive Statistics	150
Table 40: Arizona Legislation/Year Correlation	151
Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale	152
Table 42: Arizona Group Statistics	157
Table 43: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	158
Table 44: Arizona Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	160

Table 45: Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	161
Table 46: Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Correlation	161
Table 47: Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	165
Table 48: Arizona Education Reform Themes by Party ID	169
Table 49: Arizona Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	170
Table 50: Ohio Legislation Descriptive Statistics	172
Table 51: Ohio Legislation/Year Correlation	173
Table 52: Ohio Education Reform Legislation Rationale	174
Table 53: Ohio Group Statistics	176
Table 54: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	177
Table 55: Ohio Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	180
Table 56: Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	181
Table 57: Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	181
Table 58: Ohio Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	184
Table 59: Ohio Education Reform Theme by Party ID	187
Table 60: Ohio Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	187
Table 61: Michigan Legislation Descriptive Statistics	189
Table 62: Michigan Legislation/Year Correlation	190
Table 63: Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale	191
Table 64: Michigan Statistics	194
Table 65: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	194
Table 66: Michigan Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	197
Table 67: Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	197

Table 68: Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	198
Table 69: Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	201
Table 70: Michigan Education Reform Themes by Party ID	205
Table 71: Michigan Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme	206
Table 72: Oklahoma Legislation Descriptive Statistics	208
Table 73: Oklahoma Legislation/Year Correlation	209
Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale	210
Table 75: Oklahoma Group Statistics	216
Table 76: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	216
Table 77: Oklahoma Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	219
Table 78: Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	220
Table 79: Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	220
Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	223
Table 81: Oklahoma Education Reform Themes by Party ID	230
Table 82: Oklahoma Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	230
Table 83: Georgia Legislation Descriptive Statistics	233
Table 84: Georgia Legislation/Year Correlation	234
Table 85: Georgia Education Reform Legislation Rationale	235
Table 86: Georgia Group Statistics	238
Table 87: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	238
Table 88: Georgia Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	241
Table 89: Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	241
Table 90: Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	242

Table 91: Georgia Campaign Contributions/State Vendor Contracts	245
Table 92: Georgia Education Reform Themes by Party ID	248
Table 93: Georgia Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme	248
Table 94: Wisconsin Legislation Descriptive Statistics	250
Table 95: Wisconsin Legislation/Year Correlation	251
Table 96: Wisconsin Education Reform Legislation Rationale	252
Table 97: Wisconsin Group Statistics	254
Table 98: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	255
Table 99: Wisconsin Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	257
Table 100: Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	258
Table 101: Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	258
Table 102: Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	262
Table 103: Wisconsin Education Reform Themes by Party ID	266
Table 104: Wisconsin Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme	267
Table 105: Minnesota Legislation Descriptive Statistics	269
Table 106: Minnesota Legislation/Year Correlation	270
Table 107: Minnesota Education Reform Legislation Rationale	272
Table 108: Minnesota Group Statistics	274
Table 109: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	274
Table 110: Minnesota Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	277
Table 111: Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	277
Table 112: Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	278
Table 113: Minnesota Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts	281

Table 114: Minnesota Education Reform Themes by Party ID	284
Table 115: Minnesota Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme	284
Table 116: Ten State Legislation Descriptive Statistics	286
Table 117: Ten State Legislation/Year Correlation	287
Table 118: Ten State Group Statistics	290
Table 119: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation	290
Table 120: Ten State Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme	293
Table 121: Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics	294
Table 122: Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation	294
Table 123: Total Education Reform Themes by Party ID	297

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STUDY

Introduction

With the release of the 1983 report, *A Nation at Risk*, the call for reform in public education grew in congressional corridors and in the minds of the public; a new crisis in the American way of life was unearthed. Parents were told that the public education system in which they grew up was not on par with the other new powers of the world; the bipolarity of the Cold War was over and new forces in economics, science, math and education were emerging (Gardner, 1983). Furthermore, America's youth were not reaching the same academic achievement as the generations before them (Gardner, 1983). To compete with these foreign foes and domestic failings, America's education system needed an overhaul. To the members of the National Committee on Education Excellence, the researchers and authors of *A Nation at Risk*, as well as President Ronald Reagan, education had become the new battleground of global competition and only through massive educational reform and a demand for academic excellence would the United States win the war.

Meant to bring about change that would increase student achievement while also developing a strong publicly educated workforce, the education reform movement, brought forth by the report and later state and federal legislation altered the identity of public education. Free market capitalism, popular in America's modern economic system, was the basis for the new educational reforms meant to increase accountability of schools and students through competition with and deregulation of America's educational

system (Clabaugh, 2009). Federal reforms such as *America 2000*, *Goals 2000* and *No Child Left Behind* were introduced on a federal level to push America's youth to find greater success in their public education system while also reassuring the public that the government was taking care of an education system that supposedly had fallen behind in the post-Cold War world (Ravitch, 2010).

The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people" (U.S. Const. amend. X). With its' focus on authority, this amendment is the guiding principle regulating government control over the nation's public education system. Reforming said public education system is a state issue and as such, reforms must come from the within states. To create a national education policy, almost every state fell subservient to the requirements of the federal government in order to receive the fiscal benefits that came with following the new education policy. Throughout the country, state after state continued on the path of education reform in hopes of reaching the academic excellence that was espoused in *A Nation at Risk*. With each legislative session bringing about an increase in the number of bills and an increase in the diversity of education reform platforms, the United States' educational system remained on a continuous cycle of educational reformation with hope of reaching the renaissance.

Statement of Problem

To date, no study existed which focused on determining the root cause of America's education reform-mindedness while also examining education reform in all facets from theory to policy. With education reform being a major policy issue on the state and national level, an analysis of this reform was needed to determine the forces which drove educational reform, who this reform benefited, the impact that reform had on the k-12 educational system of the United States and to create an illustration of education reform as viewed in modern context. America's public education pendulum had swung from the pivot of policy and practice as the forces laid upon it had changed through events and actions of history. It was the swing of the education pendulum beginning in 2001 and the forces that controlled its momentum which drove the paradigm shift in education policy.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of the study was to determine the political and social forces supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and impact of education reform policies in the K-12 public education system of the United States. This research studied ten states with a propensity for education reform-mindedness: Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan. These states showed the highest propensity for education reform policy as measured by three major education reform organizations: The Center for Education Reform, Students First, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).

Background of the Study

Calls to reform America's public education system grew in volume and intensity with the 1983 publication of *A Nation at Risk*. With President Reagan as a supporter, the National Committee on Educational Excellence reported that America's schools were failing the youth of the country. Students had fallen behind their counterparts across the globe and domestically failed to reach the educational levels of the generation before them (Gardner, 1983). With this publication, the call to action was sounded. Researchers in universities and think tanks across the country began to look for the best methods to increase student achievement for America's supposedly failing students.

Education reforms increased in the late 1980's and early 1990's as states began to take the leadership role in implementing these policies. While the reforms of the 1980's focused on increasing access to more challenging courses for students while also introducing the use of standardized assessment tests to measure student achievement and progress, reforms in the 1990's focused on using these assessments as accountability tools for both school and faculty evaluation. Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in both 1994 and under the title *No Child Left Behind* in 2001 further increased the use of testing and other accountability measures. Beyond accountability, the 1990's education reform movement also included an increase in school choice programs, standards-based teacher certification reforms, and an increase in school funding through accountability measurements (Hurst et al., 2003).

With the publication of *Teaching the New Basic Skills: Principles for Educating Children to Thrive in a Changing Economy* in 1996, American political leaders learned

what knowledge, skills and abilities businesses leaders wanted in their workforce. These characteristics included the ability to read and compute math at a ninth grade level, the ability to work in diverse groups, and the knowledge and skills necessary to use computers and other new technologies (Murnane & Levy, 1996). The political leaders were eager to oblige and brought forth further education reforms focused on creating a workforce capable of meeting the demands of the 21st century workplace.

It was these varying, multiple education reforms that drove the research in this dissertation. Public reforms are meant to improve the lives of citizens for the public good and are rooted in the desire of leaders to do what is best for the populace. Public reforms in food safety and child labor laws that sprang out of the Gilded Age were designed to enhance the lives of not only those citizens directly involved with these segments of society, but the lives of everyone residing in the country. It had been 30 years since the publication of *A Nation at Risk*, the impetus of school reforms, yet public school reforms were still being instituted at a torrential pace. It was this pace, alongside the magnitude by which these reforms impacted public education and the country as a whole, which required research to be conducted to determine the truth behind America's addiction with public education reform.

Theoretical Framework

"The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself."

-Plato

Education reform is a multifaceted issue encompassing a myriad of social, financial, bureaucratic, political and judicial concepts. Despite these various aspects, education reform is rooted in Plato's classic work the *Republic*, written sometime around 380 B.C.E. (Scharffenberger, 2004). It is within the *Republic* that the first flirtation with education reform was seen and acts as the framework for this dissertation. When discussing the youth in an education system of a fictitious city or polis, Plato asked the question, "... we have found the desired natures ... how are they to be reared and educated?" (Scharffenberger, 2004). It is this question that laid the premise of Plato's education reform; once it was decided who received education, the question arose as to what and how they should be taught. Furthermore, Plato raised the issue of justice with the question: "How do justice and injustice grow up in states?" (Scharffenberger, 2004). It was these guiding inquiries where Plato pondered the importance of a just education system. The society he created in the *Republic* was based upon the idea that through specialization in education a just society could be created; it was this idea of justice in education that was the basis for education reform for Plato and his utopian vision. Beyond this definition of justice and despite the nearly 2,400 year gap between the writing the *Republic* and modern American education reform legislation, the theoretical issues regarding education remain the same.

The *Republic* is more a text about justice than society or education; however Plato goes into detail explaining how a civilization should be set up, how the education should appear, and who should govern the utopian civilization. It is in the word "should" that education reform was first seen. Plato wrote, "Educators should devise the simplest and most effective methods of turning minds around. It shouldn't be the art of implanting sight in the organ, but should proceed on the understanding that the organ already has the capacity, but is improperly aligned and isn't facing the right way" (Scharffenberger, 2004). Modern American education reform fell under the shadow of the word "should"; who should fund education, what should education look like, how should students be educated, who should teach students, how should schools be evaluated, what should be taught in school; these questions that drove modern education reform legislation were the same questions that Plato examined in the *Republic*.

Reforming the utopia's education system meant that all children, male or female, received some form of education and that all education was controlled by the polis. This is not to say that the schooling was equal, a just education in the *Republic* meant an education based upon your abilities. Plato wrote, "The result (of the education system), then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others" (Scharffenberger, 2004). To Plato, the utopian polis had to control education because those who taught would be the philosopher-kings, the best of society. To accomplish this, private and home schooling was not allowed in Plato's reformed education system (Scharffenberger, 2004). This reform conflicted with modern American educational reform, which focused on parent

choice and an increase in voucher and charter school programs throughout the country. Also, it is in this area that a stark contrast with the view of teachers was observed; instead of being few and respected, such as the philosopher kings, modern American education reform was purposed to bring a multitude of people into the role of educator through various alternative certification programs and organizations such as Teach for America.

It is book two of the *Republic* where Plato laid out the structure of society; in his view, society was made up of three groups of people: producers, auxiliary and guardians. The producers were those who provided a good or service to the utopian polis and made up the largest population of the city. The auxiliary were the men who made up the military units that defended the utopia from outside forces and kept the producers from causing domestic conflict. The guardians were the rulers of the city, though a special group of guardians, the philosopher-kings, truly led the polis. Mobility up and down the classes was possible as a child, but each group had a purpose for the betterment of society and required different forms of education, with the philosopher-kings receiving the mathematical and dialectical education necessary to lead (Scharffenberger, 2004). One piece of education reform legislation in the United States, Florida's Senate Bill 1076, also known as the Career and Professional Education Act, allowed for specialization in high school education for careers and higher education (Legg, 2013). As Plato envisioned a polis of specialized, class divided citizens, modern education reform legislation brought back this ancient idea.

Further in the *Republic*, Plato introduced the allegory of the cave. In this tale, citizens were in a cave, tied down at the legs, with their eyes forced to look at the back wall of the cave, their backs to the entrance; they had been tied this way since birth and

knew no other state. On the wall they saw shadows of objects; behind them were the objects, a fire behind the objects, and finally the entrance to the cave. To the person staring at the wall, the shadows they saw on the wall was their entire world; there was nothing more, nothing less. When released from the shackles, the citizens turned around, saw the objects in form as well as the fire and the light from the entrance of the cave. Making their way out of the cave, the people were blinded by the sun; confusion and chaos ensued and some returned to the safety of the cave; however they could not see the shadows anymore because they had gone too quickly into the light.

This blindness led to ostracizing those left behind in the cave who never dared to run into the light. For those who left the cave and stayed in the light, these citizens eventually saw the greater world around them and their place in it. They learned the workings of the world and society and became educated leaders. With this education, they had to return to the cave in time as philosopher-kings to help the shackled citizens understand what was outside the cave (Scharffenberger, 2004).

This allegory was Plato's way of explaining that at different stages of life, a student learned different subjects and practices. From fictional stories of heroes who complete noble deeds, to music and math, students needed to learn certain subjects, through different pedagogy, at specific times in their life. If shown too much, too early, the student would not understand what they learned and would retreat to what felt safe. It was through this allegory that Plato described what should be taught in Athens, who should learn which subjects, and when they should learn them. Plato felt that few people could and should leave the cave, but it was equally important that all citizens at least became knowledgeable to the existence of the exit.

The basic education reform that Plato argued for using the allegory of the cave was not seen in modern America's education reform policies. Laws such as *No Child Left Behind* and *Race to the Top* pushed education reform in the direction of excellence for all, with all held to one standard. Specialization of education through one's predisposed skills was gone in modern American education reform as students were held to a standard of achievement and knowledge gain that had not been seen in the past.

Plato discussed that justice in society could be achieved through education, however Plato's definition of justice in education reform was starkly different than that seen in modern education reform. Justice in Plato's *Republic* was when all members of society did what they had an inclination for and were educated enough to fulfill their purpose in society. Some people were meant to be farmers, others auxiliary; but not everyone was held to the same standard because different people had various levels of abilities both intellectually and morally (Scharffenberger, 2004). Beyond this form of justice however, laid a more personal meaning of justice through education. By reforming the city's education system, justice not only occurred in society, but sprouted within one's self. By being a just person through education, a citizen understood the scope of the world and their place in it (Dillon, 2004).

The purpose of Plato's education reform was to make the polis an unprejudiced and just utopia and provide it with an educated citizenry that could sustain the way of life necessary for its further existence. As the head of the Delian League, the polis of Athens saw itself as the leader of the Aegean Sea and Plato felt that through education Athens could grow into the hegemon of the area and become that utopia he described in the *Republic*. (Scharffenberger, 2004). As the impetus for education reform in the United

States, *A Nation at Risk*, claimed that only through broad, extensive reforms would the U.S. be competitive with new enemies foreign and domestic (Gardner, 1983). Plato's *Republic* advocated the same purpose; reform to education would bring security and prosperity to the polis and would result in the betterment of its citizenry. Though the specifics of education reform may differ to some extent between 380 B.C.E. and 2013 C.E., the theory of reforming to create something better remained timeless.

Definition of Terms

The definitions offered are meant to facilitate the understanding of the terms used in analyzing the rationale, growth and impact of education reform in the k-12 public education system of the United States.

Accountability. A measure of student achievement in relation to teacher effectiveness.

Alternative Certification. Programs offered to would-be teachers not coming from traditional university based teacher education programs.

Charter School. A tax funded institution established by a charter between an outside group and an education governing body; the institution operates without most local and state regulations in order to reach its charter goals.

Choice. Process in which parents/guardians choose the educational institution most appropriate for their child; this includes traditional public school, charter school, home school, private school, or virtual school.

Collective Bargaining. The right of teachers to negotiate with school boards regarding issues pertaining to teacher salary, tenure, etc.

Evaluation. The method by which it will be determined the success of a teacher and school.

Economic Neoliberalism. Economic philosophy focusing on free markets, decreased regulation and increased individualism.

Parent Power. A measurement of parental rights in public education choice regarding school selection.

Education Reform. Policy and legal changes which alter the current practices in public education.

Private School. A school maintained and funded through private funding and/or tuition costs; open only to students selected and/or admitted based upon religious affiliation or other qualifications.

Political Neoconservatism. Political philosophy focusing on increased individualism, American international dominance and decreased government interference in economic affairs with increased social regulation.

Political Platform Affiliation. Registered as a member of a political party or non-party independent.

Public School. An educational institution funded through public taxation.

Tax Credit Scholarship. State program used by businesses to fund scholarships for students in return for tax credits.

Testing Mandates. Requirements placed on local school districts to administer annual standardized tests to measure achievement and accountability.

Tenure. Continuing contracts given to teachers after a certain number of years of teaching service.

Sectarian or Religious Private Schools. Private school affiliated with a religious institution.

Statute. A law passed by a legislative body.

Digital Learning Education system primarily based on computer programs with little physical interaction between teacher and student.

Voucher. Scholarship of public funds used by students to attend private k-12 institutions.

Delimitations

This study was delimited to ten states within the United States, Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan, as ranked by three education reform organizations, American Legislative Exchange Council, The Center for Education Reform, and Students First. The study focused solely on K-12 legislation in the ten states aforementioned. State legislation enacted was delimited to legislative sessions from 2001-2011. Types of bills examined were delimited to those relating to alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/ unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or voucher programs. Legislators were delimited to those who were the named as the original, lead author of the bill introduced. The study was further delimited to per-pupil spending on an annual basis, excluding capital outlay, interest on debt and other programs for fiscal years 2001-2011. Vendor contracts were delimited to open contracts at the time of review.

Limitations

The conclusion regarding state funding was limited by the overall economic cycle which impacts legislative budgets. The results of the analysis of political platform affiliation and legislation introduced was limited to bills enacted into law. The sample used is limited to the three organizations used to calculate the state rankings. As two of the three organizations are known to have conservative or Republican political ties, the states ranked by education reform legislation could be construed due to the political leanings. The final limitation focuses on the purpose of education reform; the cited legislation of this research was categorized by education reform theme. These themes did not focus on the actual meaning of the legislation, but simply the theme in name only. For example, one of the major themes of the legislation was *Charter Schools*, however this does not show whether the legislation was supportive or restrictive of charter schools.

Research Questions

Using the theoretical framework as a guide, the researcher developed seven guiding research questions regarding the education reform movement in the k-12 public education system of the United States.

1. What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?
3. What are the themes of the enacted state education reform legislation?

4. Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?
5. Who is financing education reform legislation?
6. Who is supporting education reform legislation?
7. Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

Overview of Methodology

To answer question one, determining the rationale behind the education reform movement, an examination of literature regarding multiple facets of educational reform was conducted. Each reform was analyzed for impact on student achievement and affects that the reform had on the public education system in regards to efficiency, effectiveness, and teacher quality. Research question two was meant to determine if a legislator's political platform impacted the number of education reform bills introduced and supported by that legislator which were enacted into state law. To answer this question, an examination of every education reform bill enacted into each state legislative house from the ten states from 2001-2011 was conducted; every legislator who authored each education reform bill was coded for political platform affiliation. Each bill was then broken down by type of education reform and entered into SPSS. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if a difference existed between political platform affiliation and support for overall education reform legislation. In addition, a

cross-tabulation and Chi-square test was used to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between political platform affiliation and support for certain types of education reform. A comparison table was also created to show the amount of total education reform legislation introduced by each political party.

Descriptive statistics were used to address question three. Each bill examined from 2001-2011 was given a number based upon theme of education reform. The mode of all pieces of legislation was then used to determine which education reforms are more widely introduced, giving a better understanding of the themes of modern education reform. Question four focused on funding for public education and its relationship to the number of education reform bills passed. To answer this question, state funding for public education from 2001-2011 was analyzed for each of the ten states on a per-pupil basis; a correlation was conducted using SPSS to determine if the number of education reform bills enacted had an impact on the amount of education funding spent on a per pupil basis.

To answer questions five, six and seven determining who was supporting, financing and benefiting from education reform legislation, a multifaceted examination was conducted. First, legislation enacted in the ten states from 2001-2011 regarding education reform was found. Each piece of legislation was then researched to determine which legislator authored the bill. Research into the political donations to each of these legislators was then used to connect each legislator with political campaign contributions made by organizations that consider education reform a major policy issue and were connected to the specific reform issue. Additionally, state vendor contracts regarding the

education reform legislation were examined to determine if a connection between financial legislative support and benefits exists.

Organization of Dissertation

Chapter one outlined a brief history of education reform in the United States dating from 1983 to present day. Also included in Chapter one was the introduction, statement of the problem, purpose of study, background of the study, theoretical framework, definition of terms, delimitations, limitations, research questions, and an overview of the methodology.

Chapter two presented a literature review regarding the themes and impact of education reform in the K-12 public education system in the United States. Philosophical, ideological and educational arguments focused on education reform were also included in the review of literature; major education reform organizations were also discussed.

Chapter three included an overview of the methodology used to answer the research questions; use of specific qualitative and quantitative methods was discussed. Chapter four offered an explanation of the results of the research; qualitative and statistical findings were provided as well as a discussion regarding the implications for future education policy and reform. Included in Chapter five were the final conclusions and recommendations for future research.

Summary

Education reform was a policy issue that continued to grow in importance since the publication of the 1983 report *A Nation at Risk*. The impact that this document had on the development of education reform in the United States cannot be understated. By framing education as national security issue, the federal government intensified the pressure on public education to achieve success as defined by parameters created by federal legislation. A national education policy brought forth through the report caused countless national and state level education reform bills to be fast tracked into law. It is was this flood of reform that required analysis and was the provocation for the research within this report.

Using Plato's the *Republic* as the theoretical framework, the researcher discussed the relationship between the theories of education reform in Plato's time to the current reform legislation that will be examined in through the research. An explanation of the methodology, both qualitative and quantitative methods being used, was given, and further clarification regarding the specifics of the methodology was included. Explanation of research questions, definitions and limitation/delimitations was also given; an organization of the research was shown in conclusion.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Education reform is a broad term used to describe policy and legal changes which alter the current practices in public education. For this research, this general definition of education reform was used as the starting for further delineation. An extensive review of literature was conducted; this review focused on the nine types of education reform which were previously used as delimitations. These reforms include alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure and voucher programs in no particular order. Though these reforms could be categorized as impacting either teacher or student, it is difficult to keep effects of such reform to one group without influencing the other; for this reason these reforms were not classified in any manner beyond the term education reform.

Beyond these education reforms, a further review of literature was conducted to give the history and description of the three major education reform organizations used in the research, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), The Center for Education Reform, and Students First. The final aspect of the review of literature focused on basic protocols, policies and designs of the ten states to which this research was delimited, Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan. These states were the top ten education reform minded as measured by the three education reform organization aforementioned.

Education Reforms

Alternative Certification

Alternative certification is a broad term used to describe the process of obtaining teacher certification credentials outside the traditional university undergraduate method. Alternative certification programs (ACP) began to grow in abundance during the 1980's with the publication of *A Nation at Risk*. Fears of teaching shortages and ineffective teachers allowed these programs to multiply; today every state and the District of Columbia (D.C.) has some form of alternative certification (Ludlow, 2013). Each year 35,000 teachers, or one-third of the nation's total, are hired after receiving teacher training through an ACP (Kane et al, 2008a). The goal this education reform is to increase student achievement and diversify the teaching population with individuals from various educational and social backgrounds; to this extent, a literature review was conducted to determine if the results of ACPs are meeting the stated goals.

It is difficult to paint a picture of a standard ACP because one simply does not exist. These programs can be affiliated with public universities, school districts, private institutions, corporations, and/or various levels of government. Though these programs are required to adhere to state guidelines involving what knowledge and skills must be gained, there are over 140 different routes by which one can obtain teaching certificate through an ACP (Ludlow, 2013). Compared to students in traditional certification programs (TCP), students in ACPs are more likely to be minorities, male, entering teaching as a second career, and teach in poor, urban schools. No major differences between TCP and ACP students were reported in regards to grade point average and

ACT/SAT test score (Zeichner and Schulte, 2001); however teacher attrition rates are higher with ACP teachers as compared to TCP (Linek et al, 2012).

Countless research comparing TCPs and ACPs has been conducted regarding how well new teachers are prepared for the profession after taking part in the programs. Studies have shown mixed results regarding self-efficacy and readiness of TCP and ACP graduates. Shen (1997) conducted extensive survey research of 14,000 respondents and concluded that ACP teachers were not as academically successful, not as likely to stay in the teaching profession and more likely to be in a low income school than their TCP counterparts. Survey research by Darling-Hammond et al. (2002) concluded TCP graduates had higher self-efficacy and felt more prepared for their first year of teaching than their ACP counterparts; however Fox and Peters (2013) and Caprano et al. (2010) found no difference in self-efficacy between the two groups.

Research by Peterson and Nadler (2009) concluded that TCP and ACP teacher had similar levels of confidence in instructional skills and Unruh and Holt (2001) reported ACP and TCP teacher reported the same stresses, fears and experiences in their first year of teaching. No statistically significant difference was reported between ACP and TCP teachers and their annual teaching evaluation in their first year of service (Yao and Williams, 2010). These results were supported by Zeichner and Schulte, (2001); however, Linek et al. (2012) showed graduates of TCPs received higher teacher evaluations than their ACP counterparts.

Research regarding the curriculum of ACPs have shown that these programs do not give students enough opportunity to work with students in the classroom setting and

lack the pedagogical basis found in traditional, university-based programs (Boyd et al. 2009). Darling-Hammond et al. (2001) concluded that the more time a future teacher has teaching, the more likely their students will increase in achievement. However, Humphrey and Wechsler (2007) determined that comparing ACP and TCP programs is invalid because of the diversity of the ACP models compared with the TCP systems. Pedagogy and service time with students have shown to have a positive impact on student achievement Boe et al. (2007). (Darling-Hammond, 2010) and Laczko-Kerr and Berliner (2002) concluded that TCP teachers have two months more of pedagogical knowledge than their ACP counterparts.

Comparative analysis of ACP and TCP programs as they relate to student achievement have shown varying results. Multiple studies have shown that certification from a TCP with a major in education had a strong positive correlation with student achievement in Reading and Math (Darling-Hammond, 1999, Darling-Hammond, 2000, Darling-Hammond et al, 2005). Laczko-Kerr and Berliner (2002) concluded that students of non TCP teachers have shown 20% less achievement growth than those students with TCP graduates. Kane et al. (2008b) concluded in an analysis of New York City teachers that the difference in student achievement of ACP and TCP students was negligible and that teaching evaluations in the first two years of service was a better predictor of teacher effectiveness and type of graduation program.

Continuing with the comparison of ACP and TCP programs, Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) found that students of TCP teachers achieved higher standardized test scores in Reading but found no difference between the two groups on Science scores and

found TCP teachers had a negative impact on students' Math scores. Peterson and Nadler (2009) concluded that students of ACP teachers scored 4.8 and 7.6 points higher on the NAEP exam in 4th and 8th grade Math. Ludlow (2013) and Boyd et al. (2009) both showed mixed results in regards to student achievement and teacher preparation.

The results of the literature review regarding alternative certification indicate that the ACPs are diverse in design and population. The graduates are more likely to teach in low socioeconomic areas, more likely to be men, minorities and on second careers; however these graduates are also more likely to leave the teaching profession than their TCP counterparts. Literature regarding the impact that ACP teacher have on student achievement data is inconclusive; this does not come as a surprise because the diversity of the design ACPs should result in varying effects on student achievement.

Charter Schools

The growth of charter schools as an alternative to the traditional public school (TPS) setting has been steady since the founding of the first of such schools in the state of Minnesota in 1991. As the calls for educational reform increased with the introduction of *No Child Left Behind* in 2001, enrollment in charter schools has more than tripled (Frankenberg et al., 2011). Charter schools are autonomous, publicly funded institutions which operate on a renewable contract, or charter, with the authoritative decision making body of state. Each state differs in regards to which government entity authorizes charter schools, handles their evaluation and distributes public education funding. Charter schools can be profitable or nonprofit, have various regulations regarding teacher

certifications, uniforms, curriculum models, academic focus and student acceptance rates. One thing that does apply to all charter schools however, is the requirement at state accountability standards apply to the curriculum of the school. Currently, charter schools operate in 42 states and D.C. and reach 3.7% of all k-12 students in the United States (Davis, 2013). From a national review of charter schools, on average a charter school has 300 students, but this varies greatly depending on location and level of education (elementary, middle, high school), is housed in a variety of locations and building types and on a national scale, four percent of charter schools will have their charters revoked each year, with the main cause being financial mismanagement of the institution (Fusarelli, 2002).

Examination of charter school teachers shows that teachers of charter schools have a teacher attrition rate twice that of the TPS. This high turnover rate is likely to cause issues when a discussion of school culture, learning communities, and shared vision occurs. The turnover rate may also show that charter schools principals, free from government regulation, are more likely to get rid of poor teachers than the TPS principal. Furthermore, teachers in charter schools are more likely to be inexperienced, under certified, lack union membership, have lower undergraduate GPAs and report lower FTCE pass rates than their TPS counterparts. Conversely, charter teachers also have higher verbal SAT scores; higher ACT scores and are more selective when it comes to choosing their undergraduate institution (Stuit & Smith 2012).

The first question that must be raised when discussing charter schools is why charter schools were created? Proponents of charter schools argue that because charter schools do not fall under the same regulation as TPSs, charter schools have the ability to be more innovative in regards to teaching practices, administrative design, and school function (Clabaugh, 2009). Further, it is believed that charter schools have the opportunity to encourage more public/parental involvement in schools, provide for internal accountability, increase access for learning to all students, and perhaps the cornerstone of the charter school proponents' argument, charters will bring about competition in education and therefore increase the achievement of both public and charter school through capitalistic market forces (Clabaugh, 2009). It is deregulation of the charter school and the competition of the marketplace that has driven the charter school movement into 42 states and D.C. (Alabama, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia do not have charter legislation currently adopted) (Carruthers, 2012).

Opponents to the charter school movement argue that free market principles applied to public education will take away funds from an already struggling system, competition will only benefits those students whose parents are motivated to send their child to a charter school, the students who are left behind in public schools will suffer from a brain drain, that good schools will keep the best teachers leading to further stratification and segregation of public schools and that these charter schools cannot meet the needs of special needs students and English Language Learners (Fusarelli, 2002). These opponents feel that market driven forces, meant to start competition among

schools, students, and parents, does not have any place in the public education system founded on idea of equal access to a universal education.

The cornerstone to the charter school movement is that charter schools will raise student achievement not only of those students who attend the school, but also those students who are left behind in the public school system. A 2005 study by Carnoy et al. in which researchers examine charter schools in 11 states showed that students did not have higher achievement levels in charter schools compared to their TPS counterparts, but in fact were achieving at a lower level than TPS students (Carnoy et al, 2005). The Center for Research on Education Outcomes concluded from a 2009 longitudinal study of 15 states and the D.C. that 83% of students in charter schools did significantly worse or no better than their TPS counterpart on Math and Reading assessment scores (Miron & Applegate, 2009).

Continuing with the focus on achievement, a study on charter schools in the state of Florida concluded that charter school students underperform their TPS counterparts up until the fifth year that the school has been in existence; after the fifth year students appear to match achievement of TPS students, but never achieve at a higher level than their counterparts. Further, this competition that is hypothesized to bring about higher achievement in all students caused TPS students to achieve higher math scores on state standardized test, but lowered the average reading score (Sass, 2006). A similar study conducted in North Carolina over a twelve year period showed that it took six years for a charter school to be in existence before its' students reached achievement levels of the

TPS counterparts in reading and that students in all grades of the charter schools failed to reach the achievement levels of the TPS students in Math (Carruthers, 2012).

A 2012 study by Ni and Rorrerr compared charter school students to their TPS counterparts over a five year period. Similar to previous research, Ni and Rorrerr concluded that the longer a charter school was open, the higher the students achieved; however students of the charter schools in Utah never met the achievement levels of their public school matches (Ni & Rorrerr, 2012). Another five year longitudinal study, this time of six states bordering the Great Lakes, showed that students in charter schools performed at lower levels on the state standardized tests than their TPS counterparts and also concluded that states with older charter school laws had the higher achievement scores of the charter schools. This follows similar research previously reviewed where the longer the charter school is in existence the higher the achievement level is the student in attendance (Miron et al, 2007).

Moving to Texas, an examination in 2007 concluded that students who entered charter schools had modest, yet statistically significant drops in their math and language arts achievement scores in their first year of charter attendance. These students would make up this drop after three years and eventually match their TPS counterparts (Booker et al, 2007). Further research in a large urban district in the Southwest United States showed that students in charter schools showed a slowdown in achievement growth upon entering the charter school and that these students never recuperated this loss, even if leaving the charter school and re-entering the TPS system.

Furthering the examination of student achievement, a meta-analysis of charter school achievement research by Jeynes (2012), concluded that public and charter schools performed at relatively similar levels on student achievement examinations. Research regarding North Carolina students in grades four through eight concluded that students of charters schools achieved lesser gains in Reading and Math compared to TPS students. Echoing previous research, the newer the charter school, the more likely it was that students performed worse on the student achievement test (Bifulco & Ladd, 2005).

Research regarding the achievement of charter school students is not all negative. A meta-analysis of literature by Betts and Tang concluded that students of charter schools show mixed results regarding achievement with some student underperforming and others matching public school students; however literature did not show charter school students achieving higher success than their TPS twins (Betts & Tang, 2011). New York State's urban districts' middle schools showed that charter schools are positively correlated with 6th and 8th grade Mathematics scores, yet showed no correlation with 6th and 8th grade Language Arts scores. Furthering these conclusions, an examination of seven states by Zimmer et al. (2012) showed mixed results for students of charter schools and their achievement levels.

Beyond the impact charter schools have on students who attend charter schools, the purpose of charter schools is also to increase achievement of students in the public schools. Competition, it is argued, will push teachers in public schools to become better teachers and student achievement should increase. A review of research showed, however, that students in a TPS either do not improve in achievement level once a charter

school is started in proximity to the school (Zimmer & Buddin, 2009) or improve slightly in Math and Language Arts because of the loss of students (Winters, 2012b). Research by Zimmer & Buddin (2009) also concluded that principals did not report an increase in competition pressure when a charter school opened in proximity to their school. Imberman (2011) concluded in his research that charter schools actually had a negative impact on student test score growth in public schools.

There is no clear cut evidence to charter schools improving student achievement; the overwhelming evidence is that charter schools do not improve student achievement of students of charter schools; these students perform worse or equal to their TPS counterparts in most of the literature. Very little literature shows student achieve more at charter schools than TPSs. Secondly, there is no evidence that competition between public and charter schools increases student achievement of students in public schools.

Supporters of charter schools argue that these schools, freed from government regulation, will become more innovative in their practice and management. The results of the literature review on innovation in charter schools show a mixed bag of results when comparing charter schools to a TPS. One major area of innovation by charter schools is increase in cyber charter schools (Ellis, 2008. and Cavanaugh, 2009). Both researchers concluded that cyber charters are growing in use and acceptance and offer another opportunity to increase parental power in public education and are viable options for students not succeeding in the TPS system or those students who are highly self-motivated. Ellis (2008) argued, however, that cyber charter schools were not innovative in regards to increasing student achievement, but were simply a way for the

homeschooled community to maneuver around state laws restricting government funds going to homeschooling as well as dilute local control of education funding. Cavanaugh (2009) concluded that students in cyber charter schools have similar achievement as TPS counterparts, yet cyber charter students rated their experience with the charter poorly and reported a lack of enjoyment of the course. Further research is needed regarding this topic especially regarding the strength of accountability measures (Huerta et al, 2006).

Research regarding innovation (things done at charter schools that are not being done at the TPS) at brick and mortar charter schools is slim, but both Preston (2012) and Lubienski (2003), concluded that innovation in the classroom is not happening in charter schools. Though these schools are innovative when discussing organization set up and management, in general, trusted practices of public schools teachers are being used in the charter school system. This should be expected, however, since teachers of both charter and the TPS receive certification through similar pathways. Though charters do have leniency on teacher certification, there is little evidence to suggest that charter schools are using innovate practices in the classroom. The only area of innovation that Preston (2012) found in favor of charter schools was the lack of the use of tenure; 92% of charter schools do not offer tenure to their teachers.

Charter schools, in general, are not more innovative in teaching practices however have shown more innovation in administrative practices as a result of deregulation. Though there are cases of charter schools bucking the accountability system and truly being innovative (Skilton-Sylvester, 2011 and Neuman, 2008), these are outliers. Most

teachers in charter schools have shown to practice similar teaching practices as their TPS counterparts and innovation is not prevalently seen in the classroom (Lubienski, 2003).

A claim by proponents of charter schools is that freed from the regulations that control public schools, charters schools are more efficient with the public funds they receive. An examination of literature showed mixed results regarding efficiency. Two studies of efficiency in Michigan and one on Texas charter schools showed that charter schools in these states were not as efficient as public schools. Gronberg et al. (2012) concluded that though Texas charter schools can achieve similar education outcomes of the TPS at lower cost, charters in Texas were less efficient than public schools because of systemic inefficiency. After examining charter schools in Michigan, Arsen and Yongmei (2012) showed that charters on average spend \$774 less per pupil and \$1,141 more on administrative costs than their TPS counterparts.

Further, Ni (2009) conducted a 10 year study of Michigan charter schools and concluded that charter schools had a negative impact on both the achievement and efficiency of the public schools in proximity. Only one article, Grosskomph et al. (2009) concluded that elementary charter schools in Texas were more efficient than TPSs. The authors of this article concluded that charters were more efficient because they did not have to stay with class size limitation and did not have to hire counselors, nurses, and other support staff as required by state regulation.

Though research regarding efficiency in charter schools is not as robust as hoped, it is concluded that charter schools are not more efficient than TPSs and actually cause TPSs to achieve less efficiency as a decrease in funding for the TPS occurs with the

introduction of the charter school. Efficiency is a paramount issue in the market-driven economics of charter schools; without efficiency the argument that charter schools spend public money more wisely than public schools cannot be made. Furthermore, even when efficiency is found in charter schools, it is found from reduction of staff and disregard for state regulation that was created to benefit students.

The final aspect of the charter schools that needs to be answered is to whether these schools provide more opportunities for minorities, English Language Learners (ELL), Special Education (ESE), and impoverished students (FRL). This is a major argument proponents use when supporting charter schools; that charters better serve these groups of students often thought to be underserved by the TPS system. An examination of nine studies showed that charter schools do not give these groups of students more opportunities than public schools.

An examination of charter schools in 40 states and the D.C. showed that groups with FRL and ELL status were at a proportionally lower population level in charter schools compared to their TPS counterparts; minorities were overrepresented in the charter schools. These results support the argument that charter schools increase the segregation and stratification of the school system (Frankeberg et al., 2011). Similar research in every article found regarding this subject showed that charter school students are more likely to be a minority, less likely to have ESE status, less likely to have ELL status, and less likely to have FRL status (Wolf, 2011., Wamba & Ascher, 2003., Garcia, 2008., Ni, 2012., Garcy, 2011., Bancroft, 2009., Estes, 2004., and Drame, 2011.)

The overwhelming evidence shows that charter schools do not provide students with opportunities to a better education than TPSs. Studies by Drame (2011) and Estes (2004) examined this question and concluded that charter school administrators and teachers are not adequately prepared to handle students with ELL or ESE status and are lacking knowledge of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and common teaching pedagogy regarding these groups of students. Further, Drame (2011) and Bancroft (2009) concluded that charter schools use methods of weeding out students who fall into the previously mentioned categories. Though charter schools are legally bound to accept all students, research has shown charters are finding legal loopholes such as difficult application process and not offering ESE support services (Drame, 2011, Bancroft, 2009). Also, ethno-centric curriculums of some charter schools has caused resegregation in the surrounding public schools systems (Wamba, 2003).

Charter schools do not offer students more opportunity than TPSs. When examining race, ELL, ESE, and FRL status, charter schools do not support their rhetoric with action. Instead, charters are resegregating schools on a racial level, and leaving students with disabilities, linguistic issues and in poverty for the TPS system to support. In regards to opportunity, research does not support the claim that charter schools provide a better opportunity for minority and at risk students.

Collective Bargaining/Unions

Teachers unions and the right to collective bargaining was first started in New Jersey in the early 1900's. The early teacher unions were created as means for protection from a spoils system concentered in urban life which could result in unfair labor practices and dismissal (McNeal, 2012). Currently, five states do not grant collective bargaining rights to teacher unions; these states are South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Virginia (Winker et al. 2012). The current education reform movement regarding teachers unions is meant to remove these organizations from collective bargaining table and strip them of their rights. To the education reformer, unions stand in the way of changes that need to occur to improve student achievement and burden school districts and states with hefty pensions and strict salary schedules. A literature review was conducted to determine to what extent these claims are true as well as to determine what impact, if any, unionization has on student achievement.

The impact which unions and their collective bargaining rights has on finances of public education has been researched extensively. Kerchner (1986) concluded that districts with unions have higher levels of due process, making termination of teachers more difficult and also increase salaries from 5-10% as compared to non-unionized districts. Lamm-West and Mykerezzi (2011) also concluded that unions and collective bargaining have an impact on salary schedule design and encourage teacher salary increases for qualification but not based on student achievement. Cowen (2009) determined that collective bargaining increases expenditures on school personnel by 20-25% and that collective bargaining increases salaries and fringe benefits for teacher but

drives down teacher quality. Lovenheim (2009) examined three states and concluded that the presence of a union and collective bargaining did not impact teaching salary over time.

Continuing with the impact that teacher unions have on school finance, Eberts (2007) concluded that unions raise teacher pay, improve working conditions and increase employment security of teachers, but also raise the cost of public education by 15%. Countering Eberts, Kasper (1970) came to the conclusion that unions had no statistical impact on increasing teacher salaries. Brunner and Squires (2011) and Frandsen (2011) both determined unionization to have minimal impact on teacher salary over time. Hoxby (1996) determined that unionization causes an increase in the financial inputs of a school district, but reduces the productivity of the teachers and administrators.

The second aspect of collective bargaining and unionization researched is the impact that these variables have on student achievement. Results of the literature review are inconclusive as to the impact that unions have on student achievement. Four of the six articles pertaining to this issue showed that the existence of a teacher union increased the achievement of the students in the area (Eberts, 2007., Grimes and Register, 1991., Steelman et al. 2000., and Milkman, 1997). Research by Kurth (1987) and Prehoda (2007) showed the existence of a teacher union had a small, negative impact on student achievement.

Teacher unions represent 67% of America's three million teachers (Eberts, 2007). Teacher's unions are the nation's largest public sector union block and represent 1/3 of all public union members (Hirsch et al., 2011). Current education reform is focused on

changing the role of teacher unions in the public education field. Results of the literature review showed the difficulty in determining the impact that unionization and collective bargaining has had on teacher salary, especially salary over time. Depending on the level of analysis, research has shown various degrees of impact regarding unionization and teacher salary with little causal evidence. The second aspect of the literature, the impact that unions have had on student achievement, is not overwhelmingly evident, but from the literature review it can be concluded that the presence of teacher unions have an overall positive impact on student achievement. Though some research has shown otherwise, a majority of the evidence shows that unionization increased student achievement.

Evaluation

Another education reform increasing in support is the changing of how teacher evaluations are conducted. Evaluations are important for the education system because research has shown that the teacher has the biggest impact on student achievement (Goldhaber, 2007, Kane et al, 2008b, Milanowki, 2004, and Wright et al, 1997). Education reformers argue that since teachers have such a large impact on student achievement, their evaluations should be connected to how well their students do on achievement tests; this would make teachers want to do better and would give them an impetus to become better teachers. This reform can be seen in the federally funded *Race to the Top* program created by the President Obama administration. It is also seen in public opinion; Darling-Hammond et al. (1983) concluded that the American public believes that by improving teacher quality, student achievement will also improve. The

question remain as how to effectively evaluate teacher while also determining the construct of a valid evaluation instrument.

Before examining current education reforms regarding teacher evaluation, it is important to understand the practice of evaluating teachers prior to the enacting of reform legislation. Exhaustive research by Weisberg et al. (2009) studied the use and impact of teacher evaluations; the researchers used surveyed 15,000 teacher, 1,300 administrators and 80 education officials of the state and local level to come to a description of the teacher evaluation process and the impact of the evaluation on the teaching profession. Weisberg et al. (2009) concluded that though evaluation systems varied across states and school districts, an overall pattern was evident; high performing teachers were unrecognized, poor performing teachers were unrecognized, new teachers were not put under higher scrutiny than their peers, and little professional development was offered to continuously improve teachers.

The survey results by Weisberg et al (2009) help create an illustration of the issues that have driven the reform of teacher evaluations. 86% of administrators did not pursue dismissal of a teacher based upon poor evaluations and 68% of teachers believed that poor performance was overlooked by administrators. Further, 90% of the final evaluations for teachers were concluded based upon three classroom visits over the school year. In other words, teachers and administrators were taking part in an evaluation system that did little to improve the evaluating skills of the administrator and even less to improve the teaching practices of the educator. With 94%-99% of teachers receiving satisfactory or higher evaluations, yet international comparisons showing U.S. students

lagging behind their international counterparts, the impetus for the reform of the teacher evaluation system was evident in the modern American educational setting.

Research regarding the changes in teacher evaluation practices is lacking due to the relative newness of the reform; however, some research focused on teacher quality and the statistics used in modern teacher evaluation reform was available. Goldhaber and Anthony (2004) concluded that though teacher quality is the major factor in determining student achievement, measuring teacher quality is difficult because quality is difficult to define. Also quality varies considerably among teachers; as all teacher applicants must pass licensure tests in all 50 states, it is a bit surprising that such variance is as pervasive as it appears to be. In a survey of principals, Jacob and Legren (2008) concluded that principals can successfully evaluate the best and worst teachers, but have a difficult time ranking the teachers that fall in the middle of the pack. This research supports other research by Hanushek (2009) and Kimball and Milanowski (2009). Harrison and Cohen-Vogel (2012), in a survey of school administrators, concluded that so few poor teacher evaluations were given because of both evaluation design and administrator error.

With such difficulty measuring teacher quality, education reformers have advocated the use of student achievement scores as measurements of teacher effectiveness. Research regarding this issue is not as abundant as other issues, however conclusions can be made based upon the available literature. Value added models (VAM) are mathematical equations used in teacher evaluations that determine the impact that the teacher had on their students' achievement scores (Schochet and Chiang, 2010). The purpose of the value added model is to tie teacher evaluations to student

achievement; a practice that has been advocated in *No Child Left Behind* and *Race to the Top*. Though field use of VAM scores for teacher evaluation has only recently been introduced, research regarding the quality of data that VAM scores create has been published. Schochet and Chiang (2010) concluded that VAM scores are likely to have an error rate of 25% to 35%. This error rate creates major issues when tying teacher evaluations to merit pay, as current education reform advocates. Kimball and Milanowski (2009) determined that when comparing teacher evaluation conducted by principal evaluation with those done using VAM scores, inconsistent evaluations occurred often. However, both Winters (2012a) and Golhaber and Hansen (2010) determined that using a teacher's VAM score in their third year of teaching is predictive of their impact on student achievement in their fifth year of teaching.

Changing the way teachers are evaluated is a major issue in modern education reform. Research is inconclusive as to which is the most appropriate method to evaluate teachers. Though current state level education policy is following the VAM-like model of tying teacher evaluation to student achievement, the implications that this will have to teacher evaluations, teaching as a profession, curriculum and student experience is not known. What is clear from the literature is that teacher action and quality is the most important factor that determines student achievement. It the way to connect those two issues effectively and equitably for evaluation and accountability that has yet to be discovered.

Testing

The high stakes testing movement is one of the oldest aspects of education reform. The first glimpse of testing students on a standardized test can be seen in 1957 when the United States learned that it was losing the space race to the Soviet Union with the launching of *Sputnik*. The movement continued to grow in the 1970s with minimum competency tests and grew more prominent in 1983 and the publication of *A Nation at Risk* which called for more testing to compete with growing educational enemies home and abroad (Amrein and Berliner, 2002). With the passing of *No Child Left Behind* and *Race to the Top*, high stakes testing became firmly planted in the education reform movement with every state currently having some form of testing for achievement (Baker and Johnston, 2010); however questions remain about the effectiveness of testing and impact that such testing has on students and teachers alike.

Research regarding how high stakes testing impacts the teaching profession is quite prevalent. Au (2007) conducted 49 case studies and concluded that high stakes testing narrowed the curriculum being taught by teachers in a majority of the cases. Jacob (2005) examined teaching practices in a high stakes testing environment and concluded that teachers and schools were strategic (i.e. narrowing curriculum, increasing number of special education students, etc.) in their practices when testing was introduced. A review of teaching practices in North Carolina after high stakes testing was introduced showed that the assessment drove instruction, there was increase in time spent practicing for the test and an increased level of stress reported by teachers (Jones et al, 1999).

Continuing with the issue of high stakes testing and impact on teaching, Lomax (1995) determined that in urban, impoverished, minority majority schools, high stakes testing caused an increase in poor teaching practices such as “drill and kill”. In regards to self-efficacy, teachers in a study by Brown (2010) reported that with the introduction of the high stakes test, they began to measure their own abilities to teach on the success their student had on the test. Echoing this, Cimbricz (2002) determined that it was teacher attitude and philosophy which determined how the high stakes test impacted their teaching practices. Finally, Amrein and Berliner (2002) determined that high stakes testing resulted in an increase in teacher and administrator cheating on the test as well as an increase in teacher attrition due to increased stress and decreased job satisfaction.

The impact that high stakes testing has on students abounds and the conclusions drawn from the researchers are quite similar. Amrein and Berliner (2002) studied the effects of high stakes testing in 18 states and concluded that in 17 of the 18 states, high stakes testing resulted in an increased student dropout rate and did not improve student achievement. Albrecht and Joles (2003) concluded that high stakes testing could be in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) because it discriminated against ESE students by not having all students take the tests. Jones et al (1999) concluded that student anxiety increased alongside teacher anxiety with the implementation of the high stakes testing system.

The results of a 30 year study by Madaus and Clarke (2001) determined that high stakes testing did not improve teaching, did not increase student or teacher motivation, was not more effective in measuring student achievement and increased the dropout rate

of minority students. A multitude of other research comes to similar conclusions regarding the lack of relationship between high stakes testing and student achievement. Marchant et al. (2006) determined that from 1992 to 2002, high stakes testing had little relationship with increasing student achievement. Nichols et al. (2006) concluded that pressure from high stakes testing has no relationship with increasing student achievement. Finally, Baker and Johnston (2010) concluded that students of low socioeconomic status were more likely to do poorly on high stakes tests than their high socioeconomic status twins.

High Stakes testing is a cornerstone of modern education reform. By creating standardized tests to evaluate student achievement, teacher effectiveness and school quality can also be evaluated. Though all 50 states and the D.C. currently have high stakes testing in place, the evidence from the literature review is overwhelming that high stakes testing is bad for students, teachers and has no impact on improving student achievement.

Tax Credit Scholarships

Public education is an evolving entity with a multitude of stakeholders having interests in the success of the system. Having a variety of interests involved in the education system brings forth various ideas on how to reform the public education system for all students. One such reform, tax credit scholarship programs, has grown in support and use since first introduced in 1997 in the state of Arizona. Though challenged in the state and federal courts through *Kotterman v Killian* and *Arizona Christian School*

Tuition Organization v. Winn et al, the Arizona law has paved the way for the growth of similar programs throughout the United States (Cavanagh, 2012).

The premise behind tax credit scholarships is the idea of school choice. Tax credit scholarships give students the opportunity to attend private institutions on state funds; however this differs from vouchers in an important manner. Unlike vouchers, which place state funds directly in the hands of students to choose their k-12 school of enrollment, tax credit scholarships allow individuals or corporation the opportunity to donate funds to a scholarship organization in return for a tax break based upon their donation (Cavanagh, 2012).

Supporters of the tax credit scholarships argue that these programs give students, especially those of low socioeconomic status, the opportunity to leave poor performing public schools for private institutions; therefore giving these students an opportunity they might not have had without the scholarship. Supporters also argue that tax credit scholarship help states spend less money on education while still giving students opportunities to improve their education. Critics of this school reform legislation argue that tax credit scholarships are simply vouchers, hidden behind tax breaks. As legal challenges have mounted against voucher programs throughout the United States, detractors of tax credit scholarships see these programs as underhanded actions meant to undermine the public education system, advance religious education through public funds and also claim that they are not as economically advantageous for state funds as previously stated (Cavanagh, 2012).

The thirteen states that currently have tax credit scholarships in place (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia) all follow basic guidelines, but differ in who can donate and how much can be donated (Davis, 2013). Each state allows for individuals and/or corporations to donate to a scholarship organization created to give out these tax credit scholarships. Each state chooses the limitations it places on the amount of money that can be donated, how large the scholarship fund will be and how much of a tax credit the contributor will receive for their donation. The state also decides what types of students are able to receive the scholarship, which schools can receive the funds and how much each pupil will receive. The overall premise for tax credit scholarship program is quite similar among all states; however they differ greatly in the aforementioned regards (Cavanagh, 2012).

The first subject to be examined regarding tax credit scholarships is the affect that these plans have had on student achievement. After an extensive review of literature regarding student achievement, only one article was found tying a tax credit scholarship program and student achievement. Figlio and Hart (2011) examined student achievement in Florida's public k-12 schools after the tax credit scholarship program was started. The researchers concluded that the Florida tax credit scholarship program has improved the achievement of students at public school institutions through increased competition between private and public school (Figlio and Hart, 2011). With this being the only research found regarding this topic, the results of this aspect of the literature review must be taken with caution.

Proponents of tax credit scholarships claim that the creation of the programs will benefit students of minority and low socioeconomic status. The argument can be made in some states where scholarships are limited to specific groups of students, however 10 of the 14 states with tax credit scholarships have loose limits as to who can receive them (Davis, 2013). Jacobs (1980) predicted the forthcoming use of tax credit scholarships and predicted they would benefit white families and children already in private institutions. Research by Belfield (2001) supported Jacob's foresight and concluded that Arizona's tax credit scholarship program benefitted those families who were already enrolled in private schools and the wealthy families enrolled in public schools because it was these families who had the means the motivation to claim tax credits.

Wilson (2000) reviewed Arizona's tax credit program and determined that the law increased educational funding equity and predominantly benefitted wealthier families. Data showed that the average tax credit scholarship was \$411 and that 82% of the scholarships went to families making \$150,000 or more per year (Wilson, 2000). Conversely, Keegan (2001) concluded that 70% to 80% of all scholarship money was going to the poorest students in Arizona.

The difficulty in examining tax credit scholarships is that the 14 states with them all have varying limits to donations, donors, and recipients. For example, Florida limits tax credit scholarship to students of poverty, North Carolina limits their recipients to special needs students, and Minnesota has no limits on who can receive the scholarship (Davis, 2013). This variety of plans and programs as well limits the extent to which research is available. From the literature review, it cannot be concluded how tax credit

scholarships impacts student achievement and it cannot be concluded as to which groups of students benefit from these programs.

Digital Learning

With the proliferation of computer usage and internet capability, digital learning has become an important issue in the education reform movement. Though varying in funding, design, and support, the common theme to nearly all digital learning programs is the use of the computer to connect teacher to student (Barbour and Reeves, 2009). Supporters of digital learning argue that this innovative form of education allows for flexibility, meets the needs of the 21st century student, increases school choice and also motivates students. Dissenters claim that digital learning breaks down the vital interactions between teacher and student, is discriminatory against those without the necessary technology and is harmful to student achievement (Barbour and Reeves, 2009). A review of literature was conducted to determine the current extent of digital learning as a school reform, its impact on the teaching profession and how students in digital learning programs compare to the TPS counterparts.

Currently, 30 states have state government run virtual schools while 24 states have full-time multi district online schools. Overall, these schools serve less than 1% of the k-12 student population in the United States (Davis, 2013). The use of the digital learning schools differ greatly with students using some schools as course recovery, while other utilizing them as full time students. The interaction level between teacher and students varies among institutions ranging from video conferencing and physical

meet-ups to discussion board and emails chats only. The design of these schools also changes from one institution to the other with control over the organization among between state controlled, university run, public or private and school district oversight (Cavanaugh et al, 2004).

Funding for these digital institutions falls into three different categories: central, public funded, or public/private funded. Centrally funded virtual institutions are funded by the state legislature, state boards of education or state education agency with funds going to the state operated virtual school; 13 states currently use this model. Publicly funded institutions are funded by the state legislature, state boards of education or state education agency as well, but funds can be used for both state operated virtual schools as well as other public virtual school organizations; nine states currently use this model. Finally, public/private funded digital learning institutions are similarly funded as the previous two models, but funds in this model can be used for both state, public and private virtual schools; this is the most popular model is use today with it being adopted by 26 states (Stedrak et al, 2012).

Miron and Urschel (2012) examined *K12 Inc.*, America's largest online k-12 education program with 65,000 students and concluded that students of the online institution had a lower graduation rate and performed statistically worse on state achievement tests. Of the 48 *K12* institutions in existence, seven (19.4%) received a satisfactory ranking by state education authorities and 27.7% met the AYP component of *No Child Left Behind*. As a result of less expenditures on building and maintenance, the cost of running each individual *K12* institution was much less that the TPS counterpart.

The influx of digital learning institutions has had an impact on the teaching profession. Surveys by Hawkins et al (2012) and McConnell et al (2013) showed that teachers in the virtual school setting felt disconnected from students, faculty and the profession as a whole though McConnell et al (2013) also concluded that Professional Learning Communities via telecommunications was able help with teacher-teacher disconnection. Furthermore, teachers felt unprepared for the change in teaching style that was needed in the virtual setting. A review of teacher preparation programs by Compton et al. (2009) and Kennedy et al (2013) showed that current practices in teacher preparation programs were not preparing teachers for the changes brought by digital learning in the k-12 setting.

The major push for digital learning as an education reform comes from the belief that by offering more school choice and increasing parental power, student achievement will increase. Results regarding the major issue of student achievement are mixed. Barbour and Mulcahy (2008) examined digital learning programs in Canada and concluded that students of digital learning had similar achievement scores as TPS students. Cavanaugh et al (2004) found a similar conclusion after conducting a meta-analysis of 14 digital learning research articles. An extensive meta-analysis conducted by Bernard et al. (2004), in which 232 studies were examined showed mixed results regarding student achievement and digital learning. Rauh (2011), in research focused on socioeconomic status and student achievement determined that low and mid-poverty level students performed better in the TPS; however high poverty students received achievement scores in the virtual schools setting. Overall, the results regarding student

achievement and use of digital learning are mixed with most studies showing digital learning does not decrease student achievement, but also not increasing the measurement.

As an education reform, digital learning currently reaches less than 1% of all k-12 students in the United States however nearly every states has some form of online schooling available to its public school students. With educational achievement being a major rationale for the increase in online k-12 education, a review of literature was conducted to determine the impact this education reform has had on achievement. Though relatively new to the scene, research has shown that students in digital learning institutions did not outperform their TPS counterparts. Further, it appears that teacher of virtual institutions are ill prepared for the changes needed to teach in digital format.

Tenure

Teacher tenure is a new issue in education reform. Reforming the tenure process for public educators is based on the notion that by removing or making it more difficult to obtain tenure, teacher quality will improve and transparency for public education will increase. This transparency will allow parents more control over the education their child is receiving. It is also argued that tenure has allowed bad teachers to keep their positions while preventing good teacher from becoming great because of a lack of motivation once tenure is achieved (Hassel et al, 2011). Opponents to changing tenure laws argue that tenure is a safeguard from the whims of subjective teacher evaluations and that tenure gives teachers the safety needed to be innovative in the classroom and enjoy academic freedom without fear of persecution. It is also argued that tenure was put in place for the

teaching profession because the low pay of the profession can be offset by the security of employment (Hasel et al, 2011).

Until 2011, every state in the United States had tenure laws in place for teachers. Florida, and 17 other states changed this with the passing of legislation focused on altering the teacher tenure process (Duffrin, 2011). Before this, state laws had allowed for teacher tenure; the length of time before obtaining tenure status varied throughout the United States from one to seven years with 32 of the 50 states determining that teachers obtained tenure status upon three years of successful teaching (Sawchuk, 2010). With other states looking into changing their tenure laws, a review of literature was conducted to determine how tenure impacts the teaching profession and how possible changes in the tenure process could impact student achievement.

In theory, tenure is given to those teachers of high quality and with years of experience. However, the varying tenure laws and difficulty in taking away tenure from poor performing teachers was reported to cause difficulty in a survey of school administrators by Harrison and Cohen-Vogel (2012). Survey results showed that 60% of school administrators did not believe that tenure laws supported fair evaluations and 91% of administrators believed that tenure laws blocked dismissal of teachers.

As discussed in the evaluation section of the literature review, current evaluation research and policy (including Race to the Top) has called for a connection between teacher evaluations and student achievement. With most states beyond Florida looking to adapt their tenure process and not get rid of it altogether, a review of literature was conducted to determine how student achievement could be used to determine tenure

policy changes. Research by Goldhaber and Hanson (2010) and Winters (2012a) concluded that VAM scores could be used to correctly determine a teacher's impact on student achievement score. Though these results show that tenure could be tied to student achievement in a mathematically true manner, both research conclusions warn of connecting VAM scores to teacher tenure due to the connection between education finance, teacher salary, and student achievement data.

With the growing political nature of education policy and reform, teacher tenure is perhaps the newest of reforms. Literature is abundant regarding the impact of teacher quality, years of teaching service and student achievement, but sparse when examining the impact of tenure on teacher motivation. As the most modern education reform, issues of teacher tenure have not been thoroughly researched to conclude the impact that these changes will have on student achievement and the teaching profession.

Voucher Programs

A major issue in facing public education today is the advancement of voucher programs into the state-controlled educational philosophies. Currently, vouchers are used in 11 states and D.C. (Davis, 2013). However, the *Wall Street Journal* called 2011 the "Year of School Choice" as 41 states either passed or discussed legislation regarding vouchers (Wolf et al., 2013). The entire premise of school vouchers is that failing public schools cannot provide an adequate education to students. Vouchers will allow students who could most likely not afford private school, an option to obtain their education at the private institution which, theoretically, would offer the student a better education.

Through competition, it is argued, public schools would improve and those that did not would cease to exist because students would have a choice of whether they will attend a different public school or use a voucher to pay for tuition at a private institution. This competition theory is at the heart of the voucher movement; however legal uncertainties as well as achievement outcomes must be addressed to determine the effectiveness and necessity of these vouchers.

Before examining the current research regarding public school vouchers, it is necessary to look at the historical evidence of school choice and voucher-like systems to understand from where this “new” idea has come. Thomas Paine in 1791 and John Stuart Mill in 1840 advocated for a voucher like system (Wolf et al, 2013); early American local communities in Maine and Vermont which did not have public secondary schools offered their residents vouchers to attend the local or neighboring parochial school. The struggle between the parochial school and the newly founded public school system hit a pinnacle when, in 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant tried to get a constitutional amendment passed that would ban the use of public funds being given to religious based organizations. The goal of this amendment was to end the discrimination from the nativist group the Know-Nothings and put an end to the conflict between parochial and public school (Sutton & King, 2011). Perhaps the first notion of vouchers in modern context came from Thomas Friedman, who in 1955 made the argument that government should pay for schooling of citizens, but for the educating to be done in private institutions (Wolf et al., 2013). The issue of vouchers was one set up in a purely theoretical frame for most of the United States’ public education history.

In the 1990's, local school boards in a few states started to pass laws giving students in low performing schools a choice of leaving that school and attending a private school (whether religiously affiliated or not) on publicly funded vouchers. What started off in Milwaukee, Wisconsin soon spread through Ohio, Colorado and Florida as more states saw privatizing public schools through vouchers programs as a viable remedy to public schools which were said to not be achieving the goal of student preparation (Sutton & King, 2011). As voucher initiatives continued to sprout through the grounds of state legislature floors, the legality of vouchers was soon called into question.

The foremost case regarding school vouchers is *Zellmann v Simmons-Harris*. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that despite the fact that most private schools were religiously affiliated; vouchers did not violate the *Establishment Clause* of the U.S. Constitution because the money was first given to parents, who then decided which private institution would receive the public funds (Eberle-Peay, 2011). The parent is able to choose whether the private school their child will attend on the voucher is religious or secular in nature. The *Establishment Clause* states that Congress will not make any laws that support a specific religion. On a Federal constitutional level, precedence has been set; however legal challenges on the state level are finding different conclusions.

The major difference between the results of the Supreme Court case previously discussed and state judicial decisions has to do with what is in state constitution that is not enumerated in the Federal constitution. Within 40 of the 51 state and district constitutions in the United States lies what are known as *No Aid Clauses*. These clauses state that no public funds can be used for sectarian or religious purposes. It is this clause

in the 40 state constitutions that have shown to be the major stumbling block for voucher programs. Affectionately known as Blaine Amendments after former Congressman and presidential hopeful James G. Blaine, these clauses have stopped voucher programs from proceeding in many states, including Ohio, Florida, and Colorado (Sutton & King, 2011).

Beyond the *No Aid Clauses*, further state legal challenges have declared voucher programs unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the *uniformity* clause regarding public and private education. These clauses, found in 16 state constitutions declare that a fair and uniform public school system must be provided by the state (Sutton & King, 2011). The pinnacle case regarding the use of a *uniformity* clause is 2006's *Bush v. Holmes*. This case centered on the creation of a voucher program, Opportunity Scholarship Program, designed to give parents the choice of sending their child to a different school using publicly funded vouchers so as long as their child's home school received a failing grade two consecutive years. Every court that heard the case, including the Florida Supreme Court, declared that the voucher program was illegal because it violated the *uniformity* clause (Gey, 2008). In ruling, the court stated that by taking money from the public school system, the state was not fulfilling its constitutionally required role supporting a uniform public education system (Sutton & King, 2011).

Outside of the historical and legal context of voucher programs, research has focused on the impact that voucher programs have on student achievement. An extensive literature review was conducted regarding this issue with conclusions able to be drawn. In a study of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin voucher program, Carlson et al (2013) concluded that students who went to private schools on vouchers and then came back to public

schools performed at a higher level than when they initially left the public institution. The researchers concluded that the simple act of experience a private institution impacted student achievement in a positive manner. Rouse (1998) also examined the voucher program of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and concluded that vouchers had a positive impact of math gains but no impact on reading gains when examining students in the private school setting. Winters and Green (2011) concluded that the existence of a voucher program decreased the likelihood that a student would be labeled ESE status and that a small, positive correlation existed between existence of a voucher program and public school achievement.

Etscheidt (2005) examined the impact that vouchers had on student achievement of special education students and determined that voucher programs are not equitable toward ESE students as private schools do not have to offer the services for these students as do public schools and found no correlation between student achievement of ESE students and voucher status. Howell et al (2002) examined voucher students in New York City, Dayton, Ohio and D.C. city schools and determined that vouchers had a small positive impact on student achievement, but only in the African American subgroup. All other subgroups showed no student achievement gains. Ladd (2002), in a meta-analysis of voucher literature concluded that vouchers may have a small positive impact on pockets of student achievement, but large scaled positive impacts are not found. Ladd also found that vouchers increase racial and social stratification of schools causing resegregation to occur.

In 1999 the state of Florida created the McKay Scholarship program; this voucher, only available to special education students, is the largest voucher program in the United States and gives each student who receives the voucher an average of \$7,206. To obtain the voucher, a student must be a special needs student, or have in Individual Education Plan (IEP) (Greene & Winters, 2008). Weidner and Herrington (2006) examined the impact that the voucher program had on parental attitudes and concluded that parents of students who used the McKay Scholarship were happier with their student's education and more satisfied with the school as a whole. However, the researchers also concluded that parents of higher socioeconomic status and higher education level were more likely to use the vouchers than their poorer and less educated counterparts.

Further research on the McKay Scholarship program by Greene and Winters (2008) concluded that all special education students, not simply those on the McKay scholarship, received a better education based upon the mere existence of the scholarship. The researchers also concluded that there was a positive relationship between the proximity of the private school accepting vouchers and student achievement at the public school; in other words, the closer the public school was to the private, voucher accepting institution the better the education students at the public schools would receive. The competition that arose between public and private school because of the voucher caused the public schools to improve.

A major premise of vouchers is that private schools can provide better education than public schools. Levin (1998) found no statistical difference between public and

private school achievement; data did show that private institutions had higher graduation rates, college enrollment and college graduation rates but that the introduction of vouchers as a school choice program increased stratification on socioeconomic status and race, continuing the path of resegregation. Rangazas (1997) also concluded that school vouchers will benefit those with motivation and ability to pay the extra costs of using voucher, leaving behind the lowest students. This division of students will cause public school to be less efficient therefore going against the idea of competition bringing about efficiency. McEwan (2004) also determined that equity was hurt with voucher programs increased sorting at all levels of public education. The same author also concluded that there was no link between competition between public and private school and student achievement gains; however it was determined that African Americans showed small achievement gains when using vouchers.

Wolf (2008) examined ten studies regarding voucher programs and determined that vouchers had a small positive impact on student achievement but with little statistical significance. Wolf et al (2013) examined D.C.'s voucher school system and concluded that though vouchers did increase graduation rates and reading scores, the existence of a voucher program did not have an impact on math scores.

Research on the impact of voucher programs on student achievement has shown mixed results. Vouchers do not hurt student achievement, but have not shown to be as

helpful as hoped. The existence of a voucher program increases the inequity in public schools; however using the voucher does increase parental satisfaction with their child's education. From the literature review it can be concluded that research does not support the notion that vouchers are increasing overall student achievement.

Education Reform Organizations

American Legislative Exchange Council

The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), is a non-profit 501(c) (3) status organization with a focus on creating successful state level legislation. The organization, created in 1973 by group of conservative state legislatures and policy stakeholders, falls under the belief of limited government, federalism and individual freedom (History-ALEC). The organization has nine task forces focused on various aspects of life from crime and civil justice to health care and education. Each task force is set up to work with state legislators in order to advance the philosophies of the organization and consists of both a public chair (legislator) and a private chair (business person).

Membership to ALEC costs between \$7,000 and \$25,000 depending on the level of interaction with legislators that corporation or private sector entity wishes to obtain; membership on the task forces requires an additional corporate payment between \$2,000 and \$10,000 depending on the prestige and influence of the task force (Boldt, 2012). This influence can be seen in education with the example of Ron Packard, CEO of K12

Inc., America's largest online charter school corporation, who currently sits on the ALEC Education Task Force (Fischer, 2013). These corporate donations allow the corporation the access to influential state legislators, pay 99% of ALEC's \$7 million dollar budget and also goes toward a state "scholarship" that helps legislators in each state pay for their ALEC memberships and cost of attending the ALEC retreats; further corporate donations are received each year to sponsor these ALEC retreats and the annual meeting (Greeley & Fitzgerald, 2011).

For the purpose of this research, the Education task force within ALEC, and its annual publication *Report Card on American Education* was examined. The mission of the Education task force is to "...promote excellence in the nation's educational system, to advance reforms through parental choice, to support efficiency, accountability, and transparency in all educational institutions, and to ensure America's youth are given the opportunity to succeed." (Education-ALEC). The education task force is responsible for creating "model legislation" to help state legislators produce successful education reforms which adhere to the philosophies of the organization. Rep. Greg Foristall, Republican from Iowa and Johnathan Butcher of the Goldwater Institute are the current public and private chairs of the task force (Education-ALEC).

The *Report Card on American Education* for the year 2013 is the 18th edition of the publication. It is only since the 16th edition of such publication that ALEC has given each state and D.C. a letter grade for education policy as well as an overall ranking. For the 18th edition, ALEC used multiple measures to create the ranking and grading system in the publication. The measures include academic standards, charter school laws,

homeschool regulation, private school choice, teacher quality policies, and digital learning. These variables were quantified in a manner which aligned with the philosophy of the organization and an average score was created. This score was averaged with the state scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) as well as variable including state education spending and graduation rates to create both a ranking of the state and an education policy letter grade (Ladner & Myslinski 2013). For the purpose of this research, the numeric ranking, which averages the education policy grade with other variables, was used to help determine state ranking.

Of the three organizations used by the researcher, ALEC is the most prominent and longstanding; though its' 40 year history brings name recognition it also brings about controversy surrounding the interactions between ALEC, political leaders and the business community. ALEC's membership consists mostly of corporations and their leaders and state legislators. These two groups are the creators of the "model legislation" previously referenced. With the members of corporations and legislatures working collaboratively on creating the state legislation, the ALEC produced bills are ideologically conservative and focused on the ALEC's principals of decreased taxation and private sector supremacy (Boldt, 2012).

ALEC estimates that from this "model legislation" thousands of state level bills are introduced on a yearly basis with a passing rate of 17% (McIntire, 2012), compared to the national average of 4% (Shaw, 2009). For the legislative year 2013, The Center for Media and Democracy determined there were 139 ALEC model education reform bills introduced into state legislatures. These bills were focused on increasing charter schools, parental power, vouchers, tax credit scholarships and alternative certification programs.

Despite the relationship that ALEC creates between corporations and legislators, the organization is not considered a lobbying unit and therefore falls outside the election laws and tax codes created to ensure public oversight of such relationships; because the corporate leaders and state legislators only create “model legislation”, not actual legislation, ALEC retains its’ nonprofit status (Boldt, 2012). Though an argument can be made that as members of the task force, corporations reach out to legislators and help create “model legislation” at ALEC sponsored retreats every year in a similar way lobbyists reach out to legislators to influence legislation, ALEC has continued to gracefully walk to the line between non-profit political think tank and corporate lobbyist.

The Center for Education Reform

The Center for Education Reform (CER) is an organization with a mission to empower parents and reform public education in the United States. The CER was founded in 1993 by its current President, Jeanne Allen and has collaborated with other education reform organizations such as the Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation and the Walton Family Foundation in order to advance the cause of education reform (Background-CER). The organization focuses on both community and media outreach to help create a coalition of education reformers. Though the organization does not directly influence policy decisions as collaboration with legislators is not as prominent as seen in ALEC, the CER acts as an information distributor involving issues such as education transparency, unions, tenure, evaluation and other education reform issues.

The Parent Power Index (PPI) is a ranking of the 50 states and the D.C. in regards to how much power parents have over their child's education. Power defined by the CER as parents having access to quality education and information for their child's education experience. The five variables that were used to rank the states include charter schools, school choice, teacher quality, transparency and online learning (Parent Power Index). These five factors are ranked in regards to the philosophy of the organization and the current educational practices and policies of the states and district.

Students First

Students First is a 501(c) (4) organization created in 2010 by former D.C. Chancellor of schools Michelle Rhee. The mission of the "grassroots" organization is to reform public education so that all students receive the best education possible from the best teachers possible. This can be done through education reform policy issues focused on teacher tenure, accountability, parent choice, online learning and various other education reforms. The organization is currently active in 18 states and basis its focus on three pillars: elevate the teaching profession, empower parents with data and choice, and spend wisely and govern well (Students First, 2013).

Students First published its *2013 State Policy Report Card* as a means to evaluate states based upon the three pillars of the organization. Each state was given both a letter grade and a Grade Point Average (GPA) based on a scale of 0-4. Methodologically, Students First examined all policies and regulations regarding public education in the frame of falling under the three pillars and creating an environment for reform. Once

each piece of policy/regulation was categorized as either elevating the teaching profession, empowering parents, or spending wisely/governing well, the policies were then given a ranking of 0-4, based upon a reform rubric, to determine the strength by which the policy helped create the environment for reform (Students First 2013). This method of calculation allowed the organization to create a ranking of all 50 states and the D.C. in regards to their current and future education reform environment.

The publication of these state rankings was not without conflict. As student achievement was not a major measurement value used to determine the state grade, Massachusetts, a state constantly ranked near the top of public education rankings received a “D” and no state received an “A”. Overall 28 states received a “D” and 11 states received an “F”. Florida and Louisiana were the two highest ranking states, both receiving a “B” and nine states and the District of Columbia received a “C” (Wolfgang, 2013).

Beyond the grading of state education reform legislation and policy, Students First has moved quickly to gain ground in states focused on education reform. For the 2011-2012 election cycle, Students First spent \$533,000 on 60 local and state elections in Tennessee; this sum gave Students First the title of largest campaign donator in the state behind the committees of the major political parties. Further, in 2013 Students First spent

just over \$250,000 on the Los Angeles School Board elections (Guo, 2013). With a focus on analyzing and influencing state and local education policy through published evaluation and campaign contribution, Students First is a young organization focused on growing its influence in the field of education reform.

States

The ten states chosen for the research were put in rank order as measured by the three education reform organizations previously discussed. The mean average of each organization's ranking was used to determine the top ten states focused on education reform. The states are listed in order based upon this aggregate ranking.

Indiana

The state of Indiana's legislature is known as the General Assembly. It consists of 150 total members, 50 from the Senate and 100 from the House of Representatives. The General Assembly meets every year but with differing lengths depending on the year. During odd numbered years the Assembly meets 61 days which must be concluded by April 29; during even numbered years the Assembly meets for 30 days and must conclude by March 14. House members serve two year terms while their Senatorial counterparts serve four year terms. For a bill to become a law, it must pass each house by a majority vote and then be signed by the governor (Indiana General Assembly). The General Assembly is considered a part-time legislature and its members receive a salary

of \$22,616.46 per year and \$152 per diem for each day of the session (Empire Center, 2012).

Florida

The state of Florida's bicameral legislature consists of 120 representatives and 40 senators. Each officeholder is limited to eight years in a specific office. Representatives are elected for two year terms and Senators for four year terms. The legislature meets the first Tuesday after the First Monday in March and for no more than 60 days of regular session. For a bill to become a law, it must pass each house by a majority vote and then be signed by the governor (Online Sunshine). The state legislature is considered a part-time position and members receive a salary of \$29,687 per year and \$131 per day during session (Empire Center, 2012).

Ohio

Ohio's state legislature is known as the General Assembly and consists of a 99 member House of Representatives and a 33 member Senate. Each legislator is limited to consecutive terms of eight years total. Members of the Senate are elected for four year terms and members of the House are elected for two year terms. The full time legislature meets on year round biennium's and receive \$60,583 per year (Empire Center, 2012). Bills introduced during the biennium must be passed by the end of the second year; if they do not pass both houses with a majority vote they do not carry over to the next biennium (Ohio Legislator Guide Book).

Arizona

Arizona's bicameral legislature consists of a 60 member House of Representatives and a 30 member Senate. Each member can serve two-year terms and is limited to four years in that position; members can run for office in the other house of the legislature after their term limit. Each of Arizona's 30 districts is represented by two members of the House and one member of the Senate. The legislature meets on the second Monday in January each year and has a 120 day calendar. As in other states, both houses must pass a bill by popular vote in order for it to go to the governor for signing (Arizona State Legislature FAQ). Arizona's legislature is considered part-time and as such its members receive \$24,000 a year for their position with an additional \$35 per day if a special session is called by the governor (Empire Center, 2012).

Louisiana

The Louisiana state legislature is broken down into the House of Representatives and the Senate. There are 105 members of the House and 39 members of the Senate and each are elected for four year terms with a 3 term (12 year) limit. The legislature meets each year, but with varying lengths. During even numbered years the legislature meets on the last Monday in March for a session no longer than 60 days within an 85 day timeframe. During odd numbered years the legislature meets the last Monday in April for no longer than 45 days in a 60 day timeframe. A bill must pass both houses with majority votes in order for the bill to move onto the governor for signature (Louisiana State Legislature). The legislature of Louisiana is considered part-time and its members

receive an annual salary of \$16,800 with an additional \$6,000 for expenses; legislators also receive \$149 per diem while in session (Empire Center, 2012).

Minnesota

Minnesota has a bicameral legislature with a House of Representatives and a Senate. There are 134 members of the House and 67 members of the Senate; there are no term limits for senators or representatives. Legislative sessions are held biennially and begin on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the odd numbered year. On even numbered years the legislature meets on dates agreed by each governing body. During the biennium term there can be a maximum of 120 legislative days (Minnesota Legislature). Legislators receive \$31,149 per year in salary and expenses of \$96 in the senate and \$66 in the house per legislative day (Empire Center, 2012).

Wisconsin

Wisconsin's state legislature is divided into the House of Representatives and the Senate. The legislature consists of 99 representatives and 33 senators. Each district in the state is represented by three representatives and one senator. Half of the senate and all 99 representatives are elected every two years without term limits. Biennial legislative sessions begin the first week of each odd numbered year, there is a summer recess, and then reconvene in September to continue legislative duties. A bill must pass both houses with majority votes in order for the bill to move onto the governor

(Wisconsin Legislature). Legislators are receive a salary of \$49,943 annually and \$88 a day as stipend during the legislative sessions (Empire Center, 2012).

Oklahoma

Oklahoma's bicameral legislature is made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The legislature consists of 101 representatives and 48 senators who are limited to a 12 term. Representatives are elected every two years and senator every four years on a staggered basis. The legislative session begins on the first Monday in February of each year and must adjourn by the last Friday in May of the same year. All bills majority support from both the house and senate in order for the bill to be passed (Oklahoma Legislature). Oklahoma's part-time legislators receive \$38,400 per year and \$147 per diem while in session (Empire Center, 2012).

Georgia

Georgia's bicameral General Assembly consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate. The house consists of 180 members and the senate has 56; each legislator is elected for a two year term but without term limits. The legislative session begins the second Monday of each year and lasts only 40 days. Any legislation introduced during the first session can be brought up the following year's session but if not acted upon during the second session, the bill dies. Bills must pass both bodies with majority vote to move on in the legislative process (New Georgia Encyclopedia). As a part-time

legislature, representatives and senators receive an annual salary of \$17,342 and a stipend of \$173 per diem in session (Empire Center, 2012).

Michigan

Michigan's bicameral state legislature is made up of a House of Representatives and a Senate. Each of the 110 representatives is elected for a two year term with a maximum of three terms and each of the 38 senators for a four year term with a maximum of two terms. As pursuant to the state constitution, each legislative session begins on the second Wednesday of January of each year and a session last the entire year with short breaks throughout. Bills are introduced in both bodies and must pass with a majority vote in both in order for the bill to reach the governor (Michigan Constitution, 1963). As a full-time legislative body, legislators receive a salary of \$71,685 per year with a \$10,800 stipend for expenses (Empire Center, 2012)

Summary

Education reform is difficult to define because it is contextually an issue of various and sundry facets. From alternative certification to vouchers, the impact that education reform must be placed in frameworks including student achievement, impact on the teacher profession, politics and a multitude of others. An exhaustive review of literature was conducted to determine how the nine themes of education reform, *alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/ unions, evaluation,*

testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure and voucher programs, impacted a variety of variables in K-12 setting of the United States. Further information regarding prominent education reform organizations, The Center for Education Reform (CER), Students First, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), was also specified. The literature review concluded with an explanation of the legislatures of each of the ten states, *Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan* that were researched in this study.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of the study was to determine the political and social forces supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and impact of education reform policies in the K-12 public education system of the United States. The expansiveness of this purpose required a multidimensional approach to conducting research; because of this, a mixed method research design was chosen as the most appropriate manner in which to meet the purpose of the study and be able to draw conclusions regarding the research questions. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of ten states and hundreds of pieces of legislation was conducted with the goal of creating a 360 degree view of the America's k-12 education reform movement.

Selection of the Sample

The population of the study consisted of all fifty states of the United States, the District of Columbia and every legislator who authored education reform legislation in legislative sessions from 2001-2011. To meet the requirement of education reform legislation, the bills introduced had to be focused on alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital/learning, tenure or voucher programs.

For the purpose of this study, ten states were selected as the sample. The states used as the sample were chosen based upon rankings by three major education reform

organizations in the United States. The ten states chosen were Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan. The three education reform organizations used to create this sample were the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), The Center for Education Reform, and Students First. These organizations were chosen because all were renowned for their focus on education reform and have ranked all 50 states and the District of Columbia based upon education reform legislation and policy. Using a triumvirate of ALEC's 2013 publication, *Report Card on American Education: Ranking K-12 Performance, Progress and Reform*, The Center for Education Reform's *Parent Power Index* and Students First's *State Policy Report Card 2013* (TABLE 1), a quantified list of the top ten reform-minded states was created by taking the lowest mean scores of three rankings together (TABLE 2). The District of Columbia was removed from the rankings because the legislative set up of the district as well as its physical proximity and political setting as the Capital of the United States.

Once the sampling of the states was concluded, an examination of the education reform legislation and authoring legislator in each of the ten states from 2001-2011 was conducted. All legislators who authored the enacted education reform bills within the ten sample states and all enacted bills falling under the parameters of alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or voucher programs were used as the sample. This sampling was used for the research to obtain a more thorough and illustrative account of education reform.

Table 1: State Rankings by Education Reform Organization

Rank	ALEC	Center for Education Reform	Students First
1	Indiana	Indiana	Louisiana
2	Arizona	Florida	Florida
3	Oklahoma	Louisiana	Indiana
4	Florida	Ohio	District of Columbia
5	Ohio	District of Columbia	Rhode Island
6	Louisiana	Arizona	Michigan
7	Michigan	Georgia	Hawaii
8	Wisconsin	Wisconsin	Arizona
9	Utah	Minnesota	Colorado
10	Georgia	Utah	Ohio
11	Pennsylvania	Michigan	Tennessee
12	District of Columbia	Pennsylvania	Delaware
13	Idaho	Colorado	Oklahoma
14	Minnesota	Oklahoma	Massachusetts
15	Texas	New York	Georgia
16	Colorado	South Carolina	Washington
17	California	California	Maryland
18	Nevada	Idaho	Connecticut
19	Tennessee	Rhode Island	Pennsylvania
20	New Mexico	Missouri	Wisconsin
21	North Carolina	North Carolina	New York
22	Illinois	Delaware	Maine
23	South Carolina	Texas	New Jersey
24	New Hampshire	Nevada	Nevada
25	Wyoming	Tennessee	Utah
26	Missouri	Maine	New Mexico
27	New Jersey	New Mexico	Minnesota
28	Massachusetts	Massachusetts	Arkansas
29	Arkansas	Oregon	Illinois
30	Iowa	New Jersey	Texas
31	Oregon	Illinois	South Carolina
32	Delaware	Hawaii	Mississippi
33	Maine	Arkansas	North Carolina
34	Connecticut	New Hampshire	Missouri
35	Mississippi	Connecticut	Kentucky
36	Kansas	Wyoming	Kansas
37	Virginia	Maryland	Oregon
38	New York	Washington	Virginia
39	Hawaii	Virginia	Alaska
40	Washington	Mississippi	Idaho
41	Alaska	Alaska	New Hampshire
42	Alabama	Kansas	California
43	Rhode Island	West Virginia	Alabama
44	Vermont	South Dakota	South Dakota
45	Kentucky	Vermont	Iowa
46	Maryland	Alabama	Vermont
47	West Virginia	Kentucky	Wyoming
48	South Dakota	Iowa	West Virginia
49	Montana	North Dakota	Nebraska
50	North Dakota	Nebraska	Montana
51	Nebraska	Montana	North Dakota

Table 2: State Ranking Based Upon Education Reform Policy

State	Mean Ranking
Indiana	1.67
Florida	2.67
Louisiana	3.33
Arizona	5.33
Ohio	6.33
District of Columbia*	7
Michigan	8
Oklahoma	10
Georgia	10.67
Wisconsin	12
Minnesota	12
Range	10.33

*District of Columbia not used in this research.

Research Design and Rationale

Research designs are procedures for obtaining, examining, interpreting and presenting data in a research study. The research design helps guide the researcher in determining the logical steps by which the researching process should take place (Creswell & Clark, 2011). For the purpose of this research, a mixed method research design was used. Though relatively new in the research world, mixed method research has increased in popularity as the barriers between quantitative and qualitative research have slowly been broken down with more than 40 known mixed methods research designs being identified (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). Qualitative methods are usually more rich and deep in institutional understanding and also extensive in illustration of the context and environment in which the research is being done. This methodology allows for an in depth look at a specific issue of study, however lacks the generalizability of quantitative research and can often appear less supported based on a lack of quantified

data to back conclusions (Lieber, 2009). Quantitative methods offer much more generalizability than qualitative methods, usually require less time to complete the research, and are less likely to have bias in the results (Lieber, 2009).

It is the diversity of social research that requires more than a one-or-the other approach to methodology when deciding between qualitative or quantitative methods. Simplistically, quantitative methods is about collecting numbers, while qualitative methods is about collecting words (Greene et al., 1989). The goal of the mixed methods research design is to combine the best of both quantitative and qualitative research while at the same time controlling for the flaws of each research methodology. Mixed methods research allows the research to be more dynamic while also having the methodology be grounded in quantifiable supported detail (Coller & Elman, 2008). It is the mixed methods design that has the ability to limit researcher bias, increase validity of the results, and illustrate a more complete picture of the issue being studied through the accumulation of a wealth of data created by the quantifiable and qualitative (Greene et. al. , 1989; Bryman, 2006).

For the purpose of this research, a triangulation type of mixed method research was used. Triangulation focuses on creating a corroboration and convergence of information to increase validity and decrease bias (Greene et. al., 1989; Bryman, 2006; Cresswell & Clark, 2011). Triangulation is a form of the convergent design of mixed methods research and is the most common, yet most challenging of the research designs (Cresswell & Clark, 2011). Convergent designs allow the researcher to value the quantitative and qualitative data equally, research them simultaneously, and then

converge the two sects of data into a congruent conclusion during the integration phase just after analysis of each sect of research occurs. This convergence increases the validity of the data and decreases the likelihood of bias (Caracelli & Greene, 1997; Cresswell & Clark, 2011).

Triangulation or convergent analysis was chosen for this research due to multifaceted topic of education reform. With the topic having various meanings and with the purpose of the study to create a complete illustration of education reform including causes, themes, and impact, the researcher felt it necessary to use both quantifiable and qualitative data. The qualitative data for this research focused on the examination of education reform legislation. The quantified data focused on funding for education and legislators. By examining these issues separately, and then converging the analysis, a more rich, descriptive and supported picture of America's education reform movement was painted.

Collection of Data

The first part of data collection was focused on obtaining education reform legislation from 2001-2011 that had been enacted in each of the ten identified states: *Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan*. Legislation was found through the *National Conference of State Legislatures* (NCSL) education bill tracking system; this system held bills enacted in legislation sessions 2001-2011 at the time of the research. Each bill was reviewed and categorized by educational reform theme and sponsor/co-sponsor. These bills were then

found on each state's legislative search apparatus and read to have a thorough understanding of all of the education reform legislation.

The next step in the data collection was to obtain the political campaign donations for each year in which the authoring legislator was a candidate for office from 2001-2011. After each legislator who authored the enacted education reform legislation was identified, an examination into the campaign contributions for each candidate, in the election cycle preceding the authored and enacted legislation was conducted. Using data from the *National Institute on Money in State Politics*, campaign contributions were traced to the specific political donor. All donors were examined for the specific election cycle; however only education oriented donors with ties to major education organizations were included in data analysis. These connections were discovered through the use of search engine results. After searching for each contributor, a review of their accomplishments and connections was conducted to determine which organizations they held affiliation. Each donor was examined to determine how much was donated to the candidate in the election cycle immediately preceding the year of legislation enactment. Finally, an examination of current vendor contracts connected to the authored legislation was conducted using state procurement office data and vendor contract data provided by each state. Each of the ten states of the sample had government agency search engines available to determine the state vendor contracts awarded to each organization.

The third step in data collection was to obtain per-pupil spending on K-12 education within each of the ten states from 2001-2011 while also amassing the amount of education reform legislation introduced in those same years. This data was retrieved

from the National Center for Education Statistics and specific state departments of education when needed. Each state had 11 years of per-pupil education funding, converted to 2011 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, and the number of education reform bills placed into an SPSS spreadsheet for analysis.

Research Questions

Using the theoretical framework as a guide, the researcher developed five guiding research questions regarding the education reform movement in the k-12 public education system of the United States.

1. What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?
3. What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?
4. Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced at the state level between 2001-2011?
5. Who is financing education reform legislation?
6. Who is supporting education reform legislation?
7. Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

Analysis of Data

Question one was focused on the rationale for education reform of the K-12 system in the United States. To determine the rationale, an examination and review of literature regarding each reform was conducted. Education reform was identified as literature and research focused on alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or voucher programs. Each topic was thoroughly reviewed to determine the impact that the reform had on public education in terms of student achievement, achievement gap, efficiency, effectiveness and further implications. An analysis of this research was able to conclude how these reforms impacted public education; though it did not conclusively answer question one, it did serve as a qualitative starting point which was later converged in summation.

Question two was meant to address the issue of political party platform and likelihood of supporting education reform on both a meta scale and identified education reform level. After collecting the data from each of the ten states regarding legislator and education reform bills enacted, an SPSS data spreadsheet was created; the spreadsheet classified each legislator by political party affiliation and authorship for each specific type of education reform legislation enacted into law. An independent samples t test was used to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between political party affiliation and support for education reform legislation as a whole. To determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between political platform affiliation and each of the identified education reforms, a cross-tabulation and Chi-square test was conducted

for each of the education reforms as based on legislation and political platform affiliation of the legislation's author. A comparison table was also created to show the amount of total education reform legislation introduced by each political party.

Subsequently, question three focused on the themes of education reform. To come to a conclusion on the themes of education reform, each bill enacted into law was analyzed to determine which education reform theme it identified with. After categorizing each piece of education reform legislation from 2001-2011 and then coding the categories by education theme of alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or voucher programs, descriptive statistics was used to determine the mode of the education reform bills. An examination as to what types of bills occur most in education reform legislation allowed the researcher to determine the themes of education reform from 2001-2011.

Question four examined the relationship between state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced. To come to a conclusion in regards to this question, each piece of education reform legislation was entered into an SPSS spreadsheet by year and state. The mean of this data was used to create a yearly average of education reform legislation enacted into law in the conglomerate of the ten states researched. Further, each state's per-pupil spending was entered into the spreadsheet on a yearly basis. The mean of this funding data was used to determine the average per-pupil funding of all ten states. After entering the data in SPSS, a correlation was conducted to determine if there was a statistically significant

relationship between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted each year, and the overall funding for K-12 education on a per-pupil level. By using a correlation, it was determined if a relationship existed between the total mean amount of education reform legislation introduced and the total mean per-pupil spending of the ten states being researched.

Questions five, six and seven were the most intricate and investigative of the research. To determine who was financing, supporting and benefitting from education reform, data regarding political campaign contributions for each legislator who authored education reform legislation from 2001-2011 in each of the ten states was obtained. Next, the researcher followed the campaign contributions to major supporters of the legislator to determine how large the campaign donations were and from which education organization the donations were received. Lastly, after examining the data regarding current state vendor contracts based upon the education reform legislated enacted into law, the researcher was able determine if there was link between those who financed the legislators, supported education reform, and received education reform oriented contracts following the successful enacting of education reform legislation. This conclusion came full circle to question number one regarding rationale and allowed the researcher to come to a more thoroughly supported answer.

Methodology Table

Table 3: Methodology Table

Question Number	Research Question	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Analysis
1	Rationale Behind Education Reform	N/A	N/A	Qualitative/Quantitative (Pearson Correlation)
2	Difference Between Political Party Affiliation as it relates to Support for Education Reform	Political Party Affiliation	Support for Education Reform	Independent Samples T-test (Overall Education Reform) Crosstabs and Chi-Square (Specific Education Reforms)
3	Themes of Enacted Education Reform Legislation	N/A	N/A	Descriptive Statistics (Mode)
4	Relationship Between Amount of Education Reform Legislation and State Funding for Education	Amount of Education Reform Legislation Enacted	State Funding for Education on a Per Pupil Basis	Correlation
5	Financing Education Reform	N/A	N/A	Qualitative
6	Supporting Education Reform	N/A	N/A	Qualitative
7	Benefitting from Education Reform	Political Donation	Received Vendor Contract	Qualitative

Summary

The methodology used in this research was mixed mode triangulation; through the use of qualitative and quantitative data, a more thorough understanding of the education reform movement in the United States occurred. Quantified data focused on political campaign funding, state mandated education vendor contracts, the amount of education reform legislation introduced, and funding for education reform on a per-pupil basis in each of the ten states dating from 2001-2011. Qualitative data consisted of the legislation enacted, themes of education reform, and political campaign funding. Each set of data was collected and analyzed in parallel factions; convergence occurred after analysis to help illustrate a more expressive picture of K-12 education reform in the United States.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

The analysis section was divided into both state and national levels to create a clear description of the education reform movement in the United States while also allowing for data analysis at the state and national level. All seven research questions were addressed for state and national levels with conclusions following.

Indiana

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 4 and 5 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 1. The results

of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, $r = .775$, $n = 11$, $p = .005$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 1 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 4: Indiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	2.09	2.023	11

Table 5: Indiana Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.775**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.005
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.775**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	
	N	11	11

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




Figure 1: Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Indiana, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to read each piece of legislation to determine the rationale for this reform. Table 6 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. In Indiana, education reform legislation is focused mainly on increasing school accountability and increasing school choice. Of the 23 pieces of education reform legislation, 18 were concluded to have one of these rationales. Beyond these rationales,

another common rationale in some of the legislative pieces is the decreasing power of the educator.

Table 6: Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2003	HB 1120	Clarifies the required data to be included in annual school corporation reports	Increase School Accountability
2005	HB 1488	Creates new requirements regarding Reading curriculum and assessments	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0200	Approves the Core 40 required course load and testing for Indiana high school graduates	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0598	Gives charter school equitable access to public school agencies and funding sources	Increase School Choice
2006	HB 1240	Requires the state board of education to review the current testing practices and create long term testing objectives	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0172	Allows public and private schools to hire teachers without teaching licenses if certain criteria are met	Increase Teacher Workforce Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0310	Allows student to receive passing scores on state exams and classroom assessments in an avenue that is not based in school	Increase School Choice
2007	HB 1300	Encourages school administration to apply for federally funded grants to increase minority students advanced placement enrollment	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0088	Exempts administrators from following collective bargaining agreements if positions being filled are considered "high need"	Decrease Educator Power
2008	SB 0022	Requires state board of education to grant individuals	Increase Teacher Workforce

Table 6: Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

		with postgraduate degrees initial teacher licenses	
	HB 1246	Establishes a state committee to examine digital learning	Increase School Choice
2009	SB 0536	Empowers the state retirement board of trustees with oversight over the teacher's retirement fund	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1001a	Requires state board of education to create charter school grants and requires tax credits for individual who donate to scholarship organizations	Increase School Choice
	HB 1479	Requires the development of programs to increase successful teachers areas of underrepresented populations	Increase Teacher Workforce
2010	HB 1135	Promotes the enrollment in advanced placement courses by requiring colleges to accept passing AP scores for credit	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1367	Clarifies issues related to charter school funding, tax credits and reading curriculum	Increase School Accountability
2011	SB 0001	Requires an evaluation system based in party on student growth assessments and requires categories for teacher ratings	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0549	Creates the Indiana Public Retirement System to oversee public employee retirement and collective bargaining	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0575	Disallows teacher evaluations as a topic of collective bargaining	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	HB 1002	Creates the Indiana Charter School Board, requirements for charter school sponsors and path to convert public school to charter school	Increase School Choice

Table 6: Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

HB 1003	Expands the tax credit scholarship program and creates a voucher program	Increase School Choice
HB 1260	Limit the amount school corporations can spend on employee health coverage	Increase School Accountability
HB 1341	Requires school corporations to spend a proportionate amount of funds on special education students not enrolled in public schools	Increase School Choice

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Indiana state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a not a statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .64$, $SD = .809$) and Republicans ($M = 1.36$, $SD = 2.11$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -1.06$, $p = .299$. These results suggest that in the state of Indiana, Democrats and Republicans do not vary that much in regards to support for education reform legislation. However, though there is not a statistically significant

difference between the two parties and support for education reform, the results do show educational relevance. The mean number of the legislation introduced by each party shows that Republicans in Indiana are more likely to support education reform legislation compared to their Democratic counterparts (Table 7). Of the 23 pieces of the education reform legislation enacted in Indiana from 2001-2011, 16 of these bills were authored by Republicans, only seven authored by Democrats.

Table 7: Indiana Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.64	.809	.244
	R	11	1.36	2.111	.636

Table 8: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances				t-test for Equality of Means				
		F	Sig.	T	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper	
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	2.641	.120	-1.06	20	.299	-.727	.682	-2.149	.694
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.06	12.877	.306	-.727	.682	-2.201	.746




Figure 2: Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. The chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix A). Though lacking in statistical importance, a comparison of which political party authored each piece of education reform legislation does show educational relevance. Of all reforms introduced in Indiana, only in bills with the theme *tax credit scholarships* did Democrats (2) introduce more than Republicans (1). Though no statistically significant difference

existed, Republicans in Indiana were more likely to support education reform legislation overall and in each education reform theme except *tax credit scholarships* and *digital learning*. Democrats introduced more bills regarding *tax credit scholarships* and no bills were introduced regarding *digital learning* from 2001-2011.

Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Indiana. Republicans were more likely by a two-to-one ration to support education reform legislation overall and more likely to support each type of education reform legislation except for *tax credit scholarships* and *digital learning*; Democrats are more likely to support *tax credit scholarships*. Though no statistically significant differences were found, the results show educational relevance.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the enacted state education reform legislation?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Indiana from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 9 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Indiana. Overall, Indiana education reform has focused on *testing*, with seven bills or 30% of all enacted education reform legislation focused on this theme in the ten year time period, two more than any other education reform theme. *Collective bargaining and charter schools* rank second and third in terms of enacted legislation with five and four pieces of legislation respectively. *Digital learning and tenure* are the

lowest cited themes of enacted legislation with each theme only have one bill enacted in the eleven year period.

Table 9: Indiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
2	4	5	2	7	3	1	1	2

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Indiana showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = -.571$, $n = 11$, $p = .067$ (Table 11); the scatter (Figure 3) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Indiana, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 10: Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std. Deviation</u>	<u>N</u>
Legislation	2.09	2.023	11
Per Pupil Expenditure	10359.27	370.102	11

Table 11: Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	-.571
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.067
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	-.571	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.067	
	N	11	11




Figure 3: Indiana ed. reform legislation/per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 12 shows the resulting data from this research for Indiana.

Of the 11 sources of campaign contributions in Indiana, only one came from a public education source, the *Indiana State Teacher's Association*. The other ten sources are either private businesses or education reform organizations/affiliates. The *Indiana State Teacher's Association*, donated \$43,500 from 2001-2011 compared to \$43,000 from all other organizations; in other words the teacher's union was a major financier in education reform legislation in Indiana. An examination of the other sources highlights the other financiers of such reform. *All Children Matter* is a political action committee (PAC) is based out of Virginia and was started by Betsy and Richard DeVos; the goal of the organization is to increase school choice in education. *K12 Inc.* is a for-profit company that sells online courses to public and private institutions. McGraw-Hill is a content software company with a focus on providing education supplies. Christel Deehan opened the charter school, *Christel's House* and gained notoriety for her connection with the downfall of Indiana and Florida's former Secretary of Education Tony Bennett.

Connections Academy is a provider of online K-12 schooling. Finally, *Hoosiers for Economic Growth* is the parent organization of *School Choice Indiana* and *The Educational Choice Charitable Trust*, organizations focused on increased school choice in public education.

From the research, it is concluded that both public schools organizations (teachers union) and outside organizations finance education reform. Though the amount of outside influences in education reform legislation outnumbered the public school organizations, the monetary influence remains similar. An examination of the specific contributors shows us that public education reform in Indiana is more widely financed by advocates of school choice than those supporting traditional public schools.

Table 12: Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
Porter	D	HB1120	Testing	2003	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$6,500	No
Behning	R	HB 1488	Testing	2005	All Children Matter	\$2,000	No
Lubbers	R	SB 0200	Testing	2005	Robert Koch II	\$1,000	No
		SB 0598	Charter Schools				
Behning	R	HB 1240	Testing	2006	All Children Matter	\$2,500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					McGraw-Hill	\$500	Yes
Lubbers	R	SB 0172	Alternative Certification	2006	K12 Inc.	\$500	No
Alting	R	SB 0310	Testing	2006	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$16,500	No
Porter	D	HB 1300	Testing	2007	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$7,500	No
					Indiana Association of Private Career Schools	\$600	No
Weatherwax	R	SB 0088	Collective Bargaining	2007	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 12: Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Lubbers	R	SB 0022	Alternative Certification	2008	Christel Dehaan	\$6,000	No
					K12 Inc.	\$2,000	No
					Connections Academy	\$1,000	No
Austin	D	HB 1246	Digital Learning	2008	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$3,000	No
Kruse	R	SB 0536	Collective Bargaining	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Crawford	D	HB 1001a	Charter Schools/ Tax Credits	2009	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$5,000	No
Porter	D	HB 1479	Evaluation	2009	Christel Dehaan	\$6,500	Yes
					McGraw-Hill	\$1,000	Yes
Porter	D	HB 1135	Testing	2010	Indiana State Teacher's Association	\$5,000	No
		HB 1367	Charter Schools/ Tax Credits		Christel Dehaan	\$3,000	No
					McGraw-Hill	\$900	Yes
Kruse	R	SB 0001	Evaluation/Tenure	2011	Hoosiers for Economic Growth	\$3,000	No
					K12 Inc.	\$1,000	No
Boots	R	SB 0549	Collective Bargaining	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 12: Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Collective Bargaining							
Bosma	R	SB 0575 HB 1002	Charter Schools	2011	Connections Academy	\$500	No
Behning	R	HB 1003	Tax Credits/ Vouchers	2011	Hoosiers for Economic Growth	\$6,000	No
		HB 1341	Vouchers				
Dermody	R	HB 1260	Collective Bargaining	2011	Hoosiers for Economic Growth	\$2,000	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Indiana education reform legislation is supported by Republicans by more than a two to one margin. Of the 23 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 16 of those bills. A breakdown of the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 13). In all education reform themes, except for *digital learning* and *charter schools*, Republicans introduce more legislation. In the two aforementioned legislative themes, Democrats and Republicans authored equal number of enacted bills.

Table 14 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Of the seven education reform bills authored by Democrats, four were introduced by the same legislator. Of the 16 Republican authored legislative pieces, there were a total of eight authors.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Indiana were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Also, the difference in

distribution of authored bills between members of their respective parties indicated that education reform in the Indiana was much more likely to be supported by a larger amount of Republican legislatures than their Democratic counterparts.

Table 13: Indiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	2
Charter Schools	2	2
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	4
Evaluation	1	1
Testing	3	4
Tax Credit Scholarships	2	1
Digital Learning	1	0
Tenure	0	1
Voucher Programs	0	2
Total	9	17

Table 14: Indiana Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003	HB 1120	Porter	D	Testing
2004				
2005	HB 1488	Behning	R	Testing
2005	SB 0200	Lubbers	R	Testing
2005	SB 0598	Lubbers	R	Charter Schools
2006	HB 1240	Behning	R	Testing
2006	SB 0172	Lubbers	R	Alternative Certification
2006	SB 0310	Alting	R	Testing
2007	HB 1300	Porter	D	Testing
2007	SB 0088	Weatherwax	R	Collective Bargaining
2008	SB 0022	Lubbers	R	Alternative Certification
2008	HB 1246	Austin	D	Digital Learning
2009	SB 0536	Kruse	R	Collective Bargaining
2009	HB 1001a	Crawford	D	Charter Schools/Tax Credits
2009	HB 1479	Porter	D	Evaluation
2010	HB 1135	Porter	D	Testing
2010	HB 1367	Porter	D	Charter Schools/Tax Credits
2011	SB 0001	Kruse	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2011	SB 0549	Boots	R	Collective Bargaining
2011	SB 0575	Boots	R	Collective Bargaining
2011	HB 1002	Bosma	R	Charter Schools
2011	HB 1003	Behning	R	Tax Credits/Vouchers
2011	HB 1260	Dermody	R	Collective Bargaining
2011	HB 1341	Behning	R	Voucher Programs

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

In the state of Indiana, McGraw-Hill was the contributor to receive the most contracts and the contracts worth the most. McGraw-Hill contributed a total of \$1,300 to various state legislator campaigns from 2001-2011. Table 14 shows the amount of each contribution, the amount of the contract received and the purpose of the contract. For \$1,300 in campaign contributions, McGraw-Hill received \$146,817,459 in state vendor grants. The only other campaign contributor to receive a vendor contract was the Christel House Academy, a school owned by Christel Deehan, a woman who contributed multiple times to legislative campaigns from 2001-2011. For Ms. Deehan's \$6,500 campaign contribution in 2009, her company received \$5,802. Of the nine education based contributors, only these two contributors received any state vendor contracts.

For the state of Indiana it was concluded that those organizations which contribute to campaigns of legislators who author enacted education reform legislation do not benefit from such contributions. Using the vendor contract search for Indiana, only two

of the nine contributors received any state vendor funding from 2001-2011, with one of those contributors receiving four out of the five contracts identified.

Table 15: Indiana Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Contributor	Legislation Theme Contributed	Year of Contribution	Amount Contributed	Contract Received	Contract Purpose
McGraw-Hill	Testing	2006	\$500	\$115,751,781.00	Testing
McGraw-Hill	Testing	2006	\$500	\$10,116,982.00	Testing
McGraw-Hill	Evaluation	2009	\$1,000	\$7,572,106.00	Online Testing
Christel House Academy	Evaluation	2009	\$6,500	\$5,802	Building Expansion
McGraw-Hill	Testing	2010	\$900	\$13,372,088.00	Testing
	Total		\$9,400	\$146,818,759	

Florida

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 16 and 17 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 4. The results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, $r = .687$, $n = 11$, $p = .020$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 4 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 16: Florida Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	3.18	2.328	11

Table 17: Florida Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.687*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.020
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.687*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.020	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 4: Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Florida, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 18 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Of the 35 pieces of education reform legislation, 31 had a rationale of increasing accountability or school choice. Much of the education reform legislation focuses on testing and school choice options which guides the researcher in determining that Florida's legislators have tried to hold schools more accountable in regards to funding and student success while also giving students in Florida an opportunity to attend other educational institutions, private or public, using donation and state funds.

Table 18: Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2003	HB 0023B	Provides alternative assessments to the FCAT for 10 th grade students	Increase School Accountability
	HB 0055A	Creates guiding principles for charter schools as well as rules and regulations for creation and accountability	Increase School Choice
	HB 0915	Creates an accountability system to meet No Child Left Behind requirements and achievement based funding	Increase School Accountability
2004	HB 0769	Establishes career certification specifications for high school students within charter technical career centers	Increase School Choice

Table 18: Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	SB 2986	Clarifies employment status of public and charter school employees	Increase School Accountability
	SB 3000	Loosens rules of construction for charter schools and funding based upon new construction	Increase School Choice
	SB 0364	Creates the Reading Enhancement and Acceleration Development (READ) program	Increase School Accountability
2006	HB 0135	Creates the Florida Schools of Excellence Commission which acts as the state's charter school authorizing entity	Increase School Choice
	HB 7087	Increase the requirement for data use through state testing (School Grades) and increases governor authority over failing schools	Increase School Accountability
	HB 7103	Requires public school district to provide FDOE with unused classroom data and empowers FDOE to recommend chartering underused school property; requires creation of online charter school accountability report	Increase School Choice
	SB 0256	Increases fiscal and academic accountability over the McKay scholarship and the Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship	Increase School Choice Oversight
2007	SB 1226	Creates the voluntary Merit Award Program for teachers and administrators; program gives bonuses to teachers/administrators based upon student achievement	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0108	Creates a commission to increase minority students enrolled in advanced placement courses	Increase School Accountability
	SB 2092	Extends charter school pilot district program and clarifies requirement for charter school renewal	Increase School Accountability

Table 18: Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale

2008	SB 0526	Allows private and charter school students to participate in extracurricular activities at a public school	Increase School Choice
	HB 0653	Expands the Corporate Income Tax Credit Scholarship program	Increase School Choice
	HB 1313	Requires that students with disabilities have equal opportunity to enter charter schools; expands the McKay Scholarship program	Increase School Choice
	SB 1906	Creates a pilot program for industry certification and correlated tests	Increase School Choice
	SB 1908	Creates new state curriculum standards and requires students in alternative schools be counted on school grades	Increase School Accountability
	HB 7067	Declares that virtual schools are public schools and that charter schools can operate as virtual school	Increase School Choice
	HB 7105	Creates and authorizes the State Distance Learning Consortium to examine digital learning in public education	Increase School Choice
2009	SB 0278	Allows charter schools to count as district schools when applying for federally funded grants	Increase School Choice
	HB 0453	Expands the Corporate Income Tax Credit Scholarship program	Increase School Choice
	HB 0991	Requires school grading and accountability measures by school districts, aka Florida's Equal Opportunity in Education Act	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1248	Requires 7 th grade students to pass an end of course exam in the subject of Civics	Increase School Accountability

Table 18: Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	SB 2538	Requires reporting of student achievement and learning gains online	Increase School Accountability
2010	SB 0004	Increases use of end of course exams	Increase School Accountability
	HB 0105	Requires civics education in language arts curriculum and use of assessment data in school grade report	Increase School Accountability
	SB 2126	Increases tax credit scholarship cap	Increase School Choice
	HB 5101	Allows for teacher off-site instruction (virtual) of public school students	Increase School Choice
2011	SB 0736	Requires teacher evaluations to be based party on student achievement and disallows the use of tenure	Decrease Educator Power
	HB 1255	Increases student access to Florida Virtual School and requires student achievement data to be used in calculation Opportunity Scholarship	Increase School Choice
	HB 1329	Expands McKay Scholarship program to 504 status students	Increase School Choice
	HB 1331	Expands the definition of “failing” school to expand use of Opportunity Scholarship	Increase School Choice
	HB 7197	Expands use of virtual education and allows private companies to create virtual schools; requires high school students to take one virtual class before graduation	Increase School Choice

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Indiana state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .36$, $SD = .674$) and Republicans ($M = 2.81$, $SD = 2.386$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -3.406$, $p = .003$. These results suggest that in the state of Florida, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform legislation. Beyond statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduce an average of .36 education reform bills in Florida per legislative session, while Republicans introduce an average of 2.81 education reform bills (Table 19).

Table 19: Florida Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.36	.674	.203
	R	11	2.81	2.386	.719

Table 20: Independent Samples Test for Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	Legislation	F	Sig.	T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
	Equal variances assumed	12.596	.002	-3.406	20	.003	-2.545	.747	-4.105	-.986
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.406	11.587	.005	-2.545	.747	-4.180	-.910




Figure 5: Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests, except for one, showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix B). The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school legislation $X^2 (1, N = 36) = 5.00, p = .025$. This crosstab indicate that if a Democrat authored enacted education reform legislation, there was a 75% chance that that it would be about *charter schools*; however the validity of this statistic must be questioned as two of the counts have less than the assumed five.

The lack of statistical significance for the eight other chi squared tests does not take away from the educational relevancy of the results. Of the remaining eight education reform themes, Republicans in Florida supported every education reform theme introduced at a more prominent level than Democrats. Of all 35 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans authored 31 of them.

Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Florida. Republicans were much more likely overall and more likely to support each type of education reform legislation introduced in the state of Florida. An independent samples T-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation. When breaking each reform down by theme, Republicans were more likely to support each reform introduced, with charter schools showing

statistical significance at $p = .025$, however questions of validity remain on the results of the this statistic.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Florida from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 21 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Florida. It is evident from the data that over the ten year period, *testing* (11) and *charter schools* (10) are the most common themes of education reform legislation in the state. With 35 pieces of education reform legislation enacted into law during the time period, *testing* made up 33% of all education reform legislation, *Collective bargaining* and *alternative certification* are the least enacted legislation reforms with zero bills becoming law.

Table 21: Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain.	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
0	10	0	3	11	3	5	1	5

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Florida showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .524$, $n = 11$, $p = .098$ (Table 23); the scatter plot (Figure 6) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Florida, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 22: Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	3.18	2.328	11
PerPupilExpend	9211.82	663.104	11

Table 23: Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.524
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.098
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.524	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.098	
	N	11	11




Figure 6: Florida ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based

organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 24 shows the resulting data from this research for Florida.

With 43 different sources contributions, Florida's legislators received one of the highest levels of financial support in the sampled states. Of the 43 contributors, four were based in the public education field and donated a total of \$6,000 from 2001-2011. The sources of contributions from outside of education totaled 39 different sources for a contribution level of \$46,697. The financial data shows that organizations outside of public education are financing education reform in the state of Florida. The next step was to determine what kind of organizations/representatives were part of these outsiders.

Working in chronological order, research was conducted to determine the purpose and/or the affiliations of each of the financiers of Florida's education reform legislation. *Education First* is a for profit corporation focused on language acquisition for middle and high school students. *Academica Corp.* is a charter school management corporation that works with such schools to help them reach the goals of the charter school board of directors; this corporation's President, Fernando Zulueta is also listed as a contributor. *Charter Schools USA* is another charter school management corporation and has operations in 58 charter schools in seven states. Another outside organization is *Community Education Partners*, a for profit corporation offering alternative education programs to school districts throughout the United States.

Chancellor Beacon Academy is another charter school management corporation and is America's second largest with 80 public charter schools in the United States. As seen in Indiana and many other states to follow, *K12 Inc.*, a supplier of online based

education components, was an active member of the financial outsiders. *Apollo Group*, a for profit corporation focused on online education and math curriculum, contributed to campaigns in Florida and other states in the sample as well. *White Hat Management* is another charter school management corporation that runs schools in Florida and other states in the sample. The *Paxen Group* is a company which produces career pathways educational curriculum. *Emergent Design and Development* is a consulting firm that focuses on education consulting to state government officials. *William Lager* is the Owner and President of the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), a provider of online education and a subsidiary of Altair Learning Management.

With the abundance of contributions in the state of Florida, each contributor was either based on affiliation with traditional public education or outside of traditional public education sector. In Florida, outside education contributors are responsible for the financing of education reform legislation. Whether these groups are chart schools, school choice advocates, corporations or corporate consulting firms, outside organizations and their affiliates are the main source of financing of education reform legislation in the state.

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
Quinones	R	HB 23B	Testing	2003	Education First	\$500	No
Baxley	R	HB 55A	Charter Schools	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Pickens	R	HB 915	Evaluation	2003	Florida Association of School Administ.	\$500	No
Jennings	D	HB 769	Charter School	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Constantine	R	SB 2986	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Diaz de la Portilla	R	SB 3000	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Constantine	R	SB 364	Testing	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Greenstein	D	HB 135	Charter Schools	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Arza	R	HB 7087	Testing	2006	Academica Corp	\$500	No
					Charter Schools USA	\$500	No
					Community Education Partners	\$1,000	No
					Chancellor Beacon Academy	\$500	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Stargel	R	HB 7103	Charter Schools	2006	K12 Inc.	\$500	No
King	R	SB 256	Vouchers	2006	Apollo Group	\$500	No
					Wayne Blanton	\$500	No
					Charter Holdings Foundation	\$500	No
					Charter School Foundation of Florida	\$500	Yes
					Charter School of Excellence	\$500	No
					Charter Schools USA	\$500	No
					Connections Academy	\$500	No
					Florida Consortium of Charter Schools	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					White Hat Mgmt.	\$500	No
Gaetz	R	SB 1226	Evaluation	2007	Paxen Group	\$500	No
					Keiser College	\$1000	No
					Frank Fuller	\$500	No
Hill	D	SB 108	Testing	2007	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Deutch	D	SB 2092	Charter Schools	2007	Broward Teachers Local	\$1,000	No
					Palm Beach County Classroom Teacher's Assoc.	\$1,000	No
Wise	R	SB 526	Charter Schools	2008	Altair Learning Mgmt.	\$500	No
					Apollo Group	\$1000	No
					Paul Bent	\$1000	No
					Wayne Blanton	\$1000	No
					Charter Schools USA	\$500	No
					Community Education Partners	\$500	No
					Connections Academy	\$500	No
					Education Mgmt. Corp.	\$500	No
					Educational Services of America	\$500	No
					Education Design and Dvlp.	\$500	No
					Donald Kidd	\$500	No
					William Lager	\$500	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

					Joseph and Angela Lokovitch	\$1000	No
					Tom Sawner	\$500	No
					The Cerra Consulting Group	\$1000	No
					Skip Villerot	\$500	No
Traviesa	R	HB 653	Tax Credit Scholarships	2008	Apollo Group	\$500	No
					Educational Partnership LLC	\$500	No
Precourt	R	HB 1313	Charter Schools/ Vouchers	2008	Connections Academy	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					Magdalena Fresen	\$500	No
					Fernando Zulueta	\$500	No
Gaetz	R	SB 1906	Testing	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Gaetz	R	SB 1908	Testing	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Pickens	R	HB 7067	Digital Learning	2008	Apollo Group	\$500	No
Pickens	R	HB 7105	Digital Learning	2008	Wayne Blanton	\$250	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

					Community Education Partners	\$500	No
					Florida School Services	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					Martha Revenaugh	\$500	No
					White Hat Mgmt.	\$500	No
					WIN	\$500	No
					Imagine Schools	\$250	No
Gaetz	R	SB 278	Charter Schools	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Weatherford	R	HB 453	Tax Credit Scholar.	2009	Apollo Group	\$500	No
Grady	R	HB 991	Testing	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Wise	R	SB 1248	Testing	2009	Altair Learning Mgmt.	\$500	No
					Fernando Zulueta	\$1000	No
					Apollo Group	\$1,000	No
					Heather Beaven	\$447	No
					Paul Bent	\$1,000	No
					Wayne Blanton	\$1,000	No
					Charter Schools USA	\$500	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

					Community Education Partners	\$500	No
					Connections Academy	\$500	No
					Education Mgmt. Corp.	\$500	No
					Educational Services of America	\$500	No
					Emergent Design and Develop	\$500	No
					Magdalena Fresen	\$500	No
					Jaeger Corp	\$1,000	No
					Donald Kidd	\$500	No
					William Lager	\$500	No
					Joseph and Angela Lokovitch	\$1,000	No
					Tom Sawner	\$500	No
					The Cerra Consulting Group	\$1000	No
					Skip Villerot	\$500	No
Detert	R	SB 2538	Testing	2009	Altair Learning Mgmt.	\$500	No
					Apollo Group	\$1,000	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

					Wayne Blanton	\$250	No
					Connections Academy	\$500	No
					Florida Association of School Admin.	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
Detert	R	SB 4	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
McBurney	R	HB 105	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Negron	R	SB 2126	Tax Credit Scholar.	2010	Community Education Partners	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
					White Hat Mgmt.	\$500	No
Flores	R	HB 5101	Digital Learning	2010	Fernando Zulueta	\$1000	No
					Red Apple Develop.	\$500	No
					Educational Services of America	\$500	No
					Artswork in Education	\$500	No
					Charter Schools USA	\$500	No
					Community Education Partners	\$500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No

Table 24: Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

					Soars Educational Group	\$500	No
Wise	R	SB 736	Evaluation/Tenure	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Adkins	R	HB 1255	Digital Learning/ Vouchers	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Bileca	R	HB 1329	Vouchers	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Bileca	R	HB 1331	Vouchers	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Stargel	R	HB 7197	Digital Learning	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Florida education reform legislation is supported by Republicans by a near nine to one margin. Of the 35 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 31 of those bills. A breakdown of the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 25). In all education reform themes, except for *alternative certification*, Republicans introduce more legislation. Only in *alternative certification*, of which zero bills were enacted, did Republicans not dominate the Democratic legislatures in support for education reform.

Table 26 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Since 2007, not one Democrat has introduced education reform legislation that was enacted. This clearly shows the near total domination of Republicans regarding education reform in the state.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Florida were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Republicans introduced 31

of the 35 enacted education reforms from 2001-2011, with the major focus of nearly a third of the reforms being on the theme of *testing*. In Florida, Republicans are the dominant force of education reform.

Table 25: Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	0
Charter Schools	3	7
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	0
Evaluation	0	3
Testing	1	10
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	3
Digital Learning	0	5
Tenure	0	1
Voucher Programs	0	5
Total	4	35

Table 26: Florida Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003	HB 23B	Quinones	R	Testing
2003	HB 55A	Baxley	R	Charter Schools
2003	HB 915	Pickens	R	Evaluation
2004	HB 769	Jennings	D	Charter Schools
2004	SB 2986	Constantine	R	Charter Schools
2004	SB 3000	Diaz de la Portilla	R	Charter Schools
2004	SB 364	Constantine	R	Testing
2005				
2006	HB 135	Greenstein	D	Charter Schools
2006	HB 7087	Arza	R	Testing
2006	HB 7103	Stargel	R	Charter Schools
2006	SB 256	King	R	Vouchers
2007	SB 1226	Gaetz	R	Evaluation
2007	SB 108	Hill	D	Testing
2007	SB 2092	Deutch	D	Charter Schools
2008	SB 526	Wise	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 653	Traviesa	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2008	HB 1313	Precourt	R	Charter Schools/Vouchers
2008	SB 1906	Gaetz	R	Testing
2008	SB 1908	Gaetz	R	Testing
2008	HB 7067	Pickens	R	Digital Learning
2008	HB 7105	Pickens	R	Digital Learning
2009	SB 278	Gaetz	R	Charter Schools
2009	HB 453	Weatherford	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2009	HB 991	Grady	R	Testing
2009	HB 1248	Wise	R	Testing
2009	SB 2538	Detert	R	Testing
2010	SB 4	Detert	R	Testing
2010	HB 105	McBurney	R	Testing
2010	SB 2126	Negron	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2010	HB 5101	Flores	R	Digital Learning
2011	SB 736	Wise	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2011	HB 1255	Adkins	R	Digital Learning/Vouchers
2011	HB 1329	Bileca	R	Vouchers
2011	HB 1331	Bileca	R	Vouchers
2011	HB 7197	Stargel	R	Digital Learning

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

In Florida, only one of the over 50 campaign contributors received a state vendor contract. Table 27 highlights that only the Charter School Foundation of Florida received a vendor contract, worth \$20 Million while contributing \$500 to Senator King's campaign the same year as receiving the contract. The purpose of the contract was to create 25-30 charter schools while the legislation King sponsored was focused on voucher programs in Florida.

It was concluded that in the state of Florida, campaign contributions did not benefit (financially) those who contributed. With over fifty different campaign contributors of education reform advocates, the results show that these contributions did not benefit contributors when examining state vendor contracts.

Table 27: Florida Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Contributor	Legislation Theme Contributed	Year of Contribution	Amount Contributed	Contract Received	Contract Purpose
Charter School Foundation of Florida	Vouchers	2006	\$500	\$20,000,000	Create 25-30 Charter Schools

Louisiana

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 28 and 29 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 7. The results of the analysis indicate no relationship, $r = .535$, $n = 11$, $p = .090$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 7 clearly shows this lack of relationship.

Table 28: Louisiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	3.00	4.000	11

Table 29: Louisiana Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.535
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.090
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.535	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.090	
	N	11	11




Figure 7: Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Louisiana, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 30 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Just as with other states, a major rationale for the education reform legislation in Louisiana is to increase school choices and increase school accountability. Of the 33 pieces of education reform legislation, 32 had a rationale of increasing school accountability or choice. This again shows that education reform minded states are focused on giving students more options in terms of the types of schools they can attend and also focused on what is being done in the classroom in regards to student achievement.

Table 30: Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2003	HB 1309	Prohibits a charter school from employing members of its board of directors	Increase School Accountability
	HB 0567	Clarifies employment status of teachers upon promotion to administrative positions	Increase School Accountability
	HB 0568	Requires alternative certification program students to take the same amount of Reading courses as undergraduate certification programs	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0710	Creates a Recovery School District for failing schools and outlines the requirements of the schools	Increase School Accountability
2005	SB 0214	Changes the testing requirements for students and allows students	Increase School Accountability

Table 30: Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

		with disabilities to be excluded from such testing	
	SB 0239	Allows charter schools to apply for state funding for LA4 Curriculum (early childhood)	Increase School Choice
2006	SB 0701	Requires the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education to provide assistance in determining financial impact of charter schools in districts of less than 5000 students	Increase School Accountability
2008	HB 0321	Increases the amount of charter schools allowed	Increase School Choice
	SB 0005	Creates an income tax deduction for enrolling students in nonpublic schools	Increase School Choice
	HB 0349	Changes charter school renewal from a 10 year period to minimum of 3 and no more than 10 year period	Increase School Choice Oversight
	HB 0718	Allows employees of a public school district to take a leave of absence to work in a charter school	Increase School Choice
	HB 1105	Outlines funding requirements for charter schools; allows charter schools to team up with districts to diminish overhead costs	Increase School Choice Increase School Choice Oversight
	HB 1347	Creates the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program (Voucher)	Increase School Choice
	SB 0388	Provides standards to pay teachers who help create standardize tests	Decrease Teacher Power
	SB 0447	Allows a parent to remove their child from a failing school (Recovery School District) and place them in any school from their home district	Increase School Choice

Table 30: Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	SB 0475	Requires charter schools to reimburse school district for transportation costs	Increase School Choice Oversight
2009	SB 0146	Requires third party evaluation of a charter proposal and allows religious institutions to provide services for charter schools	Increase School Choice
	HB 0187	Loosens restrictions for converting public school to charter school	Increase School Choice
	HB 0519	Removes the cap on the amount of charter schools that can be created	Increase School Choice
2010	SB 0083	Allows for the use of norm referenced or criterion referenced testing for Louisiana Education Assessment Program (LEAP)	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0344	Requires public schools supply reasons for denial and public participation when hearing charter school application	Increase School Choice
	SB 0112	Prohibits the use of student achievement data from students in juvenile detention centers when calculation school and district grades	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0490	Creates end of course exams	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0492	Requires governing boards of charter schools to fall under the ethics codes of the state	Increase School Choice Accountably
	HB 0216	Establishes the School Choice Pilot Program for students with disabilities	Increase School Choice
	HB 0388	Extends previous act which allows a public school employee to take a leave of absence to work at a charter school	Increase School Choice
	HB 0420	Restricts certain public school funds from being used for charter schools	Increase School Accountability

Table 30: Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	HB 1487	Allows certain charter schools to create an enrollment preference for certain students	Increase School Choice
	HB 0925	Requires letter grades for schools	Increase School Accountability
	HB 0962	Requires public disbursement of information regarding charters school application and automatic renewal of high performing charter schools	Increase School Choice
	HB 1033	Creates new value-added evaluation system with 50% of evaluation coming from student growth data	Increase School Accountability
2011	SB 0142	Allows charter school creators to remove, revise and reintroduce proposed charter schools before charter school authority rules	Increase School Choice
	HB 0421	Relates to corporate sponsors of charter schools; allows children of employees of corporate sponsors preference for admittance to the charter school	Increase School Choice

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Louisiana state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification

and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a no statistically significant difference between Democrats (M = 1.45, SD = 2.162) and Republicans (M = 1.55, SD = 2.115) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -.100, p = .922$. Beyond a lack of statistical significance, this test also shows that political parties in Louisiana are not too far apart when it comes to supporting education reform overall; Democrats introduced an average of 1.45 education reform bills in Louisiana per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 1.55 education reform bills (Table 31).

Table 31: Louisiana Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	1.45	2.162	.652
	R	11	1.55	2.115	.638

Table 32: Independent Samples Test Louisiana Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	.173	.681	-.100	20	.922	-.091	.912	-1.993	1.811
	Equal variances not assumed			-.100	19.990	.922	-.091	.912	-1.993	1.811




Figure 8: Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix C). Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills shows a fairly equal split between Democrats and Republicans. Of the 33 pieces of education reform legislation, 16 were

introduced by Democrats and 17 by Republicans. Breaking this down into education theme, Democrats introduced more legislation focused on *charter schools* and *tax credit scholarships* than their Republican counterparts. Republicans on the other hand introduced more legislation focused on *alternative certification*, *evaluation* and *testing*.

Results of question two indicate that party identification does not play a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Louisiana. Party identification did not impact support for specific education reform legislation and statistically significant differences were not evident. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed a no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation overall. Chi squared tests also showed no statistical relevance and descriptives indicated that political party identification did not impact support for education reform legislation

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Louisiana from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 33 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Louisiana. Overwhelmingly the legislative theme for Louisiana was *charter schools* with 20 out of the 33 bills (60%) enacted into law focused on this issue; *testing* was the other major theme with seven bills total. Zero of the 33 education reform

bills enacted in Louisiana were focused on the issues of *digital learning*, *tenure* or *collective bargaining*.

Table 33: Louisiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain.	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
1	20	0	2	7	1	0	0	2

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Louisiana showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .533$, $n = 11$, $p = .091$ (Table 35); the scatter plot (Figure 9) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Louisiana, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 34: Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	3.00	4.000	11
PerPupilExpend	10348.18	1112.957	11

Table 35: Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.533
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.091
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.533	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.091	
	N	11	11




Figure 9: Louisiana ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 36 shows the resulting data from this research for the state of Louisiana.

Teachers unions were responsible for a total of \$4,500 of campaign contributions from 2001-2011; nonpublic school organizations contributed \$11,250. This stark contrast shows that Louisiana education reform was predominantly financed by organizations from outside the state with a focus on school choice. The *Apollo Group* is the parent company of many for-profit colleges, but is also supplier of online and consumable mathematics curriculum. As seen in Indiana, *All Children Matter* is a political action committee (PAC) out of Virginia and was started by Betsy and Richard Devos. K12 Inc., also seen in other states, is a for profit company that provides online curriculum for private and public schools. Lastly, the *Louisiana Federation for Children* is a subsidiary of *American Federation for Children* and *Alliance for School Choice* and is focused on increasing the use of vouchers and tax credit scholarships.

Louisiana education reform legislation is predominantly financed by organizations and businesses outside the state of Louisiana and focused on school choice.

Public education unions represent the in-state financiers while businesses and PAC's represent the major contributors from outside the state. The nearly 3 to 1 margin by which these outside organizations contribute to campaigns indicates an increased influence over education reform legislation.

Table 36: Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislat.	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribut.	Vendor Contract
				2001			
				2002			
Carter	D	HB 1309	Charter Schools	2003	Louisiana Association of Educators	\$1,000	No
Crane	R	HB 0567	Evaluation	2003	Apollo Group	\$1,000	No
Crane	R	HB 0568	Alternative Certification	2003			
Theunissen	R	SB 0710	Testing	2003	Louisiana Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
				2004			
Barham	R	SB 0214	Testing	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Ullo	D	SB 0239	Charter Schools	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Jones	D	SB 0701	Charter Schools	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
				2007			
Trahan	R	HB 0321	Charter Schools	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Trahan	R	HB 0349	Charter Schools	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Trahan	R	HB 0718	Charter Schools	2008			
Trahan	R	HB 1105	Charter Schools	2008			

Table 36: Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Marionne aux	D	SB 0005	Tax Credit Scholarships	2008	Louisiana Federation of Teachers	\$1,000	No
Badon	D	HB 1347	Vouchers	2008	All Children Matter	\$1,000	No
Donahue	R	SB 0388	Testing	2008	All Children Matter	\$1,000	No
					Louisiana Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
Cassidy	R	SB 0447	Charter Schools	2008	Louisiana Association of Educators	\$500	No
Gray	D	SB 0475	Charter Schools	2008	All Children Matter	\$2,500	No
Duplessis	D	SB 0146	Charter Schools	2009	All Children Matter	\$4,000	No
Smith	D	HB 0187	Charter Schools	2009	Louisiana Association of Educators	\$1,500	
					East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
					Louisiana Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
Leger	D	HB 0519	Charter Schools	2009	All Children Matter	\$500	No
					Louisiana Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
					United Teachers of New Orleans	\$500	No
Appel	R	SB 0083	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 36: Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts

Duplessis	D	SB 0344	Charter Schools	2010	See Duplessis 2007		
Long	R	SB 0112	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Nevers	D	SB 0490	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Nevers	D	SB 0492	Charter Schools	2010			
Foil	R	HB 0216	Vouchers	2010	All Children Matter	\$250	No
Smith	D	HB 0388	Charter schools	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Leger	D	HB 0420	Charter Schools	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Leger	D	HB 1487	Charter Schools	2010			
Badon	D	HB 0925	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Carter	R	HB 0962	Charter Schools	2010	All Children Matter	\$250	No
Hoffmann	R	HB 1033	Evaluation	2010	All Children Matter	\$250	No
Quinn	R	SB 0142	Charter Schools	2011			
Carter	R	HB 0421	Charter Schools	2011	K12 Inc.	\$250	No
					Louisiana Federation for Children	\$250	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Louisiana education reform legislation is supported by nearly equal number of Democrats and Republicans. Of the 33 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 17 of those bills, Democrats 16. A breakdown of the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 37). A review of the tables indicates that Democrats in Louisiana introduced more legislation focused expanding access via charter schools, vouchers and tax credit scholarships, while Republicans focused on accountability issues such as testing and evaluation. Though the support for education reform is fairly equal between the political parties, the types of education reform supported does differ.

Table 36 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. From the table it is evident that charter schools dominate the reform movement in Louisiana. Of the 33 bills enacted, 20 were focused on charter schools, with Democrats authoring 12 of the bills. 14 of the 33 bills were authored and enacted since 2010 showing a recent push toward education reform.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that neither Democrats nor Republicans supported education reform legislation any more so than the other in the state of Louisiana. Though the parties did differ in the themes of the education reforms supported, the number of the bills enacted were evenly split between the two political parties.

Table 37: Louisiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	1
Charter Schools	12	8
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	0
Evaluation	0	2
Testing	2	5
Tax Credit Scholarships	1	0
Digital Learning	0	0
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	1	1
Total	16	17

Table 38: Louisiana Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003	HB 1309	Carter	D	Charter Schools
2003	HB 0567	Crane	R	Evaluation
2003	HB 0568	Crane	R	Alternative Certification
2003	SB 0710	Theunissen	R	Testing
2004				
2005	SB 0214	Barham	R	Testing
2005	SB 0239	Ullo	D	Charter Schools
2006	SB 0701	Jones	D	Charter Schools
2007				
2008	HB 0321	Trahan	R	Charter Schools
2008	SB 0005	Marionneaux	D	Tax Credit Scholarships
2008	HB 0349	Trahan	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 0718	Trahan	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 1105	Trahan	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 1347	Baldone	D	Vouchers
2008	SB 0388	Donahue	R	Testing
2008	SB 0447	Cassidy	R	Charter Schools
2008	SB 0475	Gray	D	Charter Schools
2009	SB 0146	Duplessis	D	Charter Schools
2009	HB 0187	Smith P	D	Charter Schools
2009	HB 0519	Leger	D	Charter Schools
2010	SB 0083	Appel	R	Testing
2010	SB 0344	Duplessis	D	Charter Schools
2010	SB 0112	Long	R	Testing
2010	SB 0490	Nevers	D	Testing
2010	SB 0492	Nevers	D	Charter Schools
2010	HB 0216	Foil	R	Vouchers
2010	HB 0388	Smith	D	Charter schools
2010	HB 0420	Leger	D	Charter Schools
2010	HB 1487	Leger	D	Charter Schools
2010	HB 0925	Badon	D	Testing
2010	HB 0962	Carter	R	Charter Schools
2010	HB 1033	Hoffmann	R	Evaluation
2011	SB 0142	Quinn	R	Charter Schools
2011	HB 0421	Carter	R	Charter Schools

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Louisiana's state transparency and accountability search program showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Arizona

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 39 and 40 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 10. The results of the analysis indicate no relationship, $r = .490$, $n = 11$, $p = .126$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 10 clearly shows this lack of relationship.

Table 39: Arizona Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	4.81	4.245	11

Table 40: Arizona Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.490
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.126
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.490	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.126	
	N	11	11



Figure 10: Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Arizona, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.

Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 41 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Just as in the previous states, increasing school accountability and school choice appears to be the rationale for education reform in Arizona; changing the profession of teaching in regards to evaluation and licensure show the rationale of decreasing educator power in order to achieve academic goals laid out by legislation.

Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2002	HB 2465	Requires norm-referenced Reading tests in elementary schools	Increase School Accountability
2003	HB 2093	Creates a technology assisted curriculum pilot program in 7 public and 7 charter schools	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2277	Creates a classification other than “failing” for schools which are underperforming for three years in a row	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2461	Clarifies classroom site fund use for the AIM (Arizona Instrument of Measurement)	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2462	Requires 40% of Classroom Site Fund to be used on teacher salary based upon student performance and expense	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1330	Requires school district to define inadequacy as it relates to teacher performance	Increase School Accountability
2004	HB 2105	Requires State Board of Education to create accountable and verifiable procurement practices for school districts	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2255	Outlines the financial relationship between charter schools and public school districts	Increase School Choice Oversight

Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	HB 2353	Requires school accountability reports based upon student achievement growth; ties growth to school funding	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2580	Adds two more members to the State Board for Charter Schools; a charter school classroom teacher and a charter school operator	Increase School Choice Accountability
2005	SB 1074	Creates the Arizona Performance Based Compensation Task Force to oversee the requires performance based educator evaluations	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2438	The sponsor of a charter school may not charge fees to charter school unless work has been done for the charter school	Increase School Choice Oversight
	SB 1422	Requires a performance audit of schools involved in the technology assisted curriculum program by the Auditor General	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1529	Increases the amount of income tax deductions available when donating to school tuition organizations	Increase School Choice
2006	HB 2359	Changes the penalty to charter schools that underperform and fail to report an action plan to the state board (withholding of 10% of state funding on a monthly basis)	Increase School Choice Accountability
	HB 2676	Creates the Arizona Scholarships for Pupil with Disabilities fund	Increase School Choice
	SB 1164	Creates the Displaced Pupils Choice Grant Program	Increase School Choice
	SB 1184	Requires the creation of the Alternative Teacher Development Program	Decrease Educator Power
	SB 1270	Empowers the Superintendent of Public Instruction to publish a list of the top 50 schools as measured by student growth	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1380	Requires all students with disabilities to be included in state mandated tests	Increase School Accountability

Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	SB 1404	Increases the maximum allowed tax credit for donation to school tuition organizations	Increase School Choice
	SB 1499	Allows corporations to claim tax credits on donations to school tuition organizations who provide scholarships to low income students	Increase School Choice
2007	SB 1522	Gives the Department of Education the power to develop school district and charter school district grading system	Increase School Accountability
2008	SB 1081	Requires that schools involved in the e-learning program must report personnel salaries	Increase School Choice Accountability
	SB 1215	Creates specific timeline for charter schools to renew their charter	Increase School Choice Accountability
	HB 2008	Creates alternative graduation requirements if student cannot pass state required examination	Keep the Peace
	HB 2064	Clarifies the required actions of the E-Learning Task Force	Increase School Choice Accountability
	HB 2330	Exempt property owned by charter schools from taxation	Increase School Choice
	HB 2563	Allows state test to take the place of transferred core education credit	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2747	Requires fair busing practices for sensory impaired students in public and charter schools	Increase School Choice
2009	SB 1006	Reduced the funding assistance to charter schools	Increase School Choice Accountability
	SB 1303	Requires charter schools to post public notice of board meeting dates with the Secretary of State	Increase School Choice Accountability
	HB 2011	Prohibits the use of tenure as the basis for teacher rehiring in public and charter schools	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	SB 1386	Requires the review of financial records and academic achievement when charter schools apply for renewal of charter	Increase School Choice Accountability

Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	HB 2099	Allows charter schools to locate in areas where public schools are prohibited from occupying by municipal code	Increase School Choice
	HB 2346	Exempts charter schools building (rented or owned) from taxation	Increase School Choice
2010	SB 1039	Establishes the Charter Arizona Online Instruction (AOI) Processing Fund for charter schools to create online instruction	Increase School Choice
	SB 1040	Creates the requirement for an educator evaluation system with 33% to 50% base upon student achievement data	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	SB 1119	Creates the Task Force on K-3 Accountability and Assessments to examine accountability and assessment best practices	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	SB 1274	Clarifies school tuition tax credit dates for reporting purposes	Increase School Choice
	SB 1282	Clarifies application process for affiliate charter school	Increase School Choice
	SB 1286	Requires baseline performance report for public and charter schools and guidelines for computation of academic achievement	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2008	Decreases charter school funding for 2010-2011	Increase School Choice Accountability
	HB 2128	Establishes Joint Technical education district between public school districts and colleges	Increase School Choice
	HB 2129	Loosens the amount of hours required of digital learning to be considered a full time or half time student	Increase School Choice
	HB 2227	Decreases teacher's time to renew contract, improve teaching practices and appeal dismal	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power

Table 41: Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	HB 2298	Loosens specifications for alternative certification programs for teacher licensure	Decrease Educator Power
	HB 2514	Gives charter schools tax exemption in regards to food, drink or other consumption products	Increase School Choice
	HB 2663	Clarifies school tuition organization rights, responsibilities and requirements	Increase School Choice
	HB 2732	Requires a passing score on the Reading section of the AIM test for promotion to third grade	Increase School Accountability
	HB 2733	Increases the use of the school achievement data to align with requirements of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act	Increase School Accountability
2011	SB 1553	Creates the Arizona Empowerment Scholarship (vouchers for students with special needs)	Increase School Choice
	HB 2706	Requires an annual achievement profile for school districts computed using student achievement data as 50% of the measure	Increase School Accountability

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Arizona state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification

and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

Results of the t-test indicate a statistically significant difference between Democrats (M = .09, SD = .302) and Republicans (M = 4.33, SD = 4.202) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -3.579$, $p = .002$. These results suggest that in the state of Arizona, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform legislation. Beyond this statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .09 education reform bills in Arizona per legislative session, while Republicans introduce an average of 4.33 education reform bills indicating that Republicans dominated education reform in the state (Table 42).

Table 42: Arizona Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.09	.302	.091
	R	11	4.33	4.202	1.267

Table 43: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
Legislation		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	9.381	.006	-3.579	20	.002	-4.545	1.270	-7.195	-1.896
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.579	10.103	.005	-4.545	1.270	-7.372	-1.719




Figure 11: Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix D). Though the lack of statistical significance was surprising considering the overwhelming difference in legislation introduced by each party, educational relevance of the data is telling. Of the 53 pieces of education reform legislation introduced from 2001-2011 in Arizona, 52 were introduced by Republicans, one by Democrats. Looking at the data by specific education reform, Republicans overwhelmingly introduced more legislation in for each theme, minus *collective bargaining/unions* as no such legislation was introduced.

Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Arizona. Republicans were much more likely overall and more likely to support each type of education reform legislation introduced in the state. An independent samples T-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation. Though no statistical significance was shown from the nine chi squared tests focused on party identification and specific education reform theme, the results of descriptive analysis showed that Republicans overwhelmingly introduced more education reform legislation, minus *collective bargaining/unions*, than their Democratic counterparts.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Arizona from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 44 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Arizona. Out of the 53 total enacted education reform bills in Arizona, *charter schools* was the theme for 20 (37%) pieces of legislation. *Testing* was the theme of 13 (25%) legislative bills with *collective bargaining* the only theme not have a bill introduced.

Table 44: Arizona Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain.	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
2	20	0	5	13	5	7	1	3

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Arizona showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .529$, $n = 11$, $p = .323$ (Table 46); the scatter plot (Figure 12) summarizes these results. Overall, the

resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Arizona, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 45: Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	4.81	4.245	11
PerPupilExpend	8181.45	425.610	11

Table 46: Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.329
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.323
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.329	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.323	
	N	11	11




Figure 12: Arizona ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based

organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 47 shows the resulting data from this research for Arizona.

Though 53 pieces of education reform legislation were enacted from 2001-2011, public subsidizing of campaigns is commonly used in Arizona legislative campaigns making private donations and campaign costs limited. Knowing this, the lack of substantial campaign fundraising from private donors is not surprising with 24 of the 42 legislators not having any major education oriented campaign contributions. Of those legislators who did receive donations, all major education oriented donations came from organization outside of traditional public education and totaled \$7,810. Arizona is the only state in which education outsiders contributed all education based campaign contributions.

As with both Florida, Louisiana and other states to follow, the *Apollo Group* is again financing education reform legislation. *William Coats*, a contributor on more than one occasion, is the founder of the *Leona Group*, a charter school management organization with operations in Arizona, Ohio, Michigan and Florida. *Terry Bishop* and *John Sperling* both have ties to the *Apollo Group* with Terry acting as Vice Chair of the Board and John Sperling the Founder of the organization. *Lucia Anderson* also works for the *Apollo Group* as an Academic Advisor. Furthering the influence of the *Apollo Group*, *Charles Edelstein* is CEO and *Joseph Damico* is President of corporation. With multiple donations from the corporation and its employees, it is evident that the *Apollo Group*, headquartered out of Arizona, has played a role in financing education reform

legislation. Finally, *Eileen Sigmund* is President of the Arizona Charter School Association.

The results of question five are not clearly indicated from the data. Though all major campaign contributions to candidates of education reform legislation came from organizations/affiliates outside the traditional public school setting, 57% of all Arizona education reform legislation was financed by public subsidy. This use of the public funds for legislative campaigns pushes the researcher to two conclusions. First, in Arizona, public subsidies play a major role in state politics. Second, the financing of the education reform legislation is unclear due to the use of public subsidy; however if focusing only on legislators with substantial outside funding, it can be concluded that organizations from outside the tradition public school sector are financing education reform legislation in the state.

Table 47: Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
Gullett	R	HB 2465	Testing	2001 2002	Apollo Group	\$150	No
Gray	R	HB 2093	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Gray	R	HB 2277	Testing	2003			
Boone	R	HB 2461	Testing	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Boone	R	HB 2462	Evaluation	2003			
Martin	R	SB 1330	Evaluation	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Boone	R	HB 2105	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Boone	R	HB 2255	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Huppenthal	R	HB 2353	Testing	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Allen	R	HB 2583	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Hellon	R	SB 1074	Evaluation	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Anderson	R	HB 2438	Charter Schools	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Waring	R	SB 1422	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Martin	R	SB 1529	Tax Credit Scholarships	2005	William Coats	\$250	No
Anderson	R	HB 2359	Charter Schools	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 47: Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Knaperek	R	HB 2676	Vouchers	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Verschoor	R	SB 1164	Vouchers	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Huppenthal	R	SB 1184	Alternative Certification	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
		SB 1270	Testing	2006			
Hellon	R	SB 1380	Testing	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Bee	R	SB 1404	Tax Credit Scholarships	2006	Apollo Group	\$200	No
					Terri Bishop	\$200	No
					John Sperling	\$100	No
Martin	R	SB 1499	Tax Credit Scholarships	2006	William Coats	\$250	No
Huppenthal	R	SB 1522	Testing	2007	See Huppenthal 2006		
Gray	R	SB 1081	Digital Learning	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Johnson	R	SB 1215	Charter Schools	2008	Apollo Group	\$200	No
Schapira	D	HB 2008	Testing	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Anderson	R	HB 2064	Digital Learning	2008	Lucia Anderson	\$1,200	No
Anderson	R	HB 2563	Charter Schools	2008	William Coats	\$1,000	No
Anderson	R	HB 2747	Charter Schools	2008			
Mason	R	HB 2330	Charter Schools	2008	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Burns	R	SB 1006	Charter Schools	2009	Apollo Group	\$200	No
Adams	R	HB 2011	Tenure	2009	Apollo Group	\$200	No

Table 47: Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Eileen Sigmund	\$350	No
Tibshraeny	R	SB 1303	Charter Schools	2009	Apollo Group	\$200	No
Huppenthal	R	SB 1386	Charter Schools	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Crandall	R	HB 2099	Charter Schools	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Mason	R	HB 2346	Charter Schools	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Huppenthal	R	SB 1039	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools	2010	Beverly Coats	\$140	No
Huppenthal	R	SB 1030	Evaluation	2010	William Coats	\$140	No
Huppenthal	R	SB 1119	Testing	2010			
Huppenthal	R	SB 1282	Charter Schools	2010			
Huppenthal	R	SB 1286	Testing	2010			
Huppenthal Melvin	R	SB 1275	Tax Credit Scholarships	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Adams	R	HB 2008	Charter Schools	2010	William Coats	\$640	No
					Beverly Coats	\$380	No
					Apollo Group	\$200	No
Crandall	R	HB 2128	Digital Learning	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Crandall	R	HB 2129	Digital Learning	2010			
Crandall	R	HB 2732	Testing	2010			
Crandall	R	HB 2733	Testing	2010			

Table 47: Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Hendrix	R	HB 2227	Evaluation	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
McComish	R	HB 2298	Alternative Certification	2010	William Coats	\$410	No
					Beverly Coats	\$250	No
					Eileen Sigmund	\$75	No
Murphy	R	HB 2514	Charter Schools	2010	Apollo Group	\$600	No
Murphy	R	HB 2663	Tax Credit Scholarships	2010	Charles Edelstein	\$200	No
Murphy	R	SB 1553	Vouchers	2011	Joseph Damico	\$200	No
Lesko	R	HB 2706	Testing	2011	Eileen Sigmund	\$75	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that education reform legislation was supported by Republicans much more so than their Democratic counterparts. Of the 53 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 52 of those bills. A breakdown of the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 48). In all education

reform themes, except for *alternative certification*, Republicans introduced more legislation. This theme was not Republican dominated because no such legislation was enacted.

Table 47 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Of the 52 education reform bills authored by Republicans, a total of 20 authors created each bill. The only legislation enacted which was authored by a Democrat was in 2008 and was focused on *testing*.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Arizona were by far the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Democrats introduced one of the 53 total bills; 2010 was the year with the most bills introduced with 15. Out of the 10 states used for this sample, Arizona was the most Republican dominated of them all.

Table 48: Arizona Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	2
Charter Schools	0	20
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	0
Evaluation	0	5
Testing	1	12
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	5
Digital Learning	0	7
Tenure	0	1
Voucher Programs	0	3
Total	1	55

Table 49: Arizona Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002	HB 2465	Gullett	R	Testing
2003	HB 2093	Gray	R	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools
2003	HB 2277	Gray	R	Testing
2003	HB 2461	Boone	R	Testing
2003	HB 2462	Boone	R	Evaluation
2003	SB 1330	Martin	R	Evaluation
2004	HB 2105	Boone	R	Charter Schools
2004	HB 2255	Boone	R	Charter Schools
2004	HB 2353	Huppenthal	R	Testing
2004	HB 2583	Allen	R	Charter Schools
2005	SB 1074	Hellon	R	Evaluation
2005	HB 2438	Anderson	R	Charter Schools
2005	SB 1422	Waring	R	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools
2005	SB 1529	Martin	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2006	HB 2359	Anderson	R	Charter Schools
2006	HB 2676	Knapernek	R	Vouchers
2006	SB 1164	Verschoor	R	Vouchers
2006	SB 1184	Huppenthal	R	Alternative Certification
2006	SB 1270	Huppenthal	R	Testing
2006	SB 1380	Hellon	R	Testing
2006	SB 1404	Bee	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2006	SB 1499	Martin	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2007	SB 1522	Huppenthal	R	Testing
2008	SB 1081	Gray	R	Digital Learning
2008	SB 1215	Johnson	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 2008	Schapira	D	Testing
2008	HB 2064	Anderson	R	Digital Learning
2008	HB 2330	Mason	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 2563	Anderson	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 2747	Anderson	R	Charter Schools
2009	SB 1006	Burns	R	Charter Schools
2009	SB 1303	Tibshraeny	R	Charter Schools
2009	HB 2011	Adama	R	Tenure
2009	SB 1386	Huppenthal	R	Charter Schools
2009	HB 2099	Crandall	R	Charter Schools
2009	HB 2346	Mason	R	Charter Schools
2010	SB 1039	Huppenthal	R	Digital Learning/ Charter Schools
2010	SB 1030	Huppenthal	R	Evaluation
2010	SB 1119	Huppenthal	R	Testing
2010	SB 1275	Melvin	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2010	SB 1282	Huppenthal	R	Charter Schools
2010	SB 1286	Huppenthal	R	Testing
2010	HB 2008	Adams	R	Charter Schools
2010	HB 2128	Crandall	R	Digital Learning

Table 49: Arizona Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

2010	HB 2129	Crandall	R	Digital Learning
2010	HB 2227	Hendrix	R	Evaluation
2010	HB 2298	McComish	R	Alternative Certification
2010	HB 2514	Murphy	R	Charter Schools
2010	HB 2663	Murphy	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2010	HB 2732	Crandall	R	Testing
2010	HB 2733	Crandall	R	Testing
2011	SB 1553	Murphy	R	Vouchers
2011	HB 2706	Lesko	R	Testing

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Arizona's government accountability office and state procurement office search programs showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Ohio

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 50 and 51 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 13. The results of the analysis indicate no relationship, $r = .148$, $n = 11$, $p = .664$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 13 clearly shows this lack of relationship.

Table 50: Ohio Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.09	1.221	11

Table 51: Ohio Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.148
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.664
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.148	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.664	
	N	11	11




Figure 13: Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Ohio, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 52 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. As in the other states, Ohio’s rationale for education reform is choice and accountability; however unlike some of the states in the sample, Ohio also focuses on decreasing the power of educators. The legislation geared to collective bargaining and alternative certification highlight this rationale; by attempting to remove educator authority over collective bargaining and professionalism in the workplace, reformers in Ohio decided that the current crop of teachers was simply not good enough to help the student of Ohio achieve academic success measured by the legislated tests.

Table 52: Ohio Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2002	HB 364	Allow localities to create “community schools”	Increase School Choice
2004	HB 3	Creates required testing for specific grade levels and achievement data analysis	Increase School Accountability
	SB 2	Creates and empowers the Education Standards Board to create alternative teaching certification standards	Decrease Educator Power
2005	HB 107	Requires State Board of Education to create guidelines including value-added evaluation for traditional and alternative certification programs	Increase School Accountability Decrease Teacher Power
	HB 66	Expands the coverage and increases the amount of Cleveland Scholarship program	Increase School Choice

Table 52: Ohio Education Reform Legislation Rationale

2006	HB 276	Allows more charter schools than the current cap limit if the charter school is operated by an organization outside of the state	Increase School Choice
	HB 530	Allows students in poor performing schools (3 years in a row) the opportunity to access the Educational Choice Scholarship Pilot Program	Increase School Choice
	HB 79	Allows students in poor performing schools (2 out of 3 years) the opportunity to access Educational Choice Scholarship Pilot Program	Increase School Choice
2007	HB 190	Requires the use of elementary school state testing during a two week period	Increase School Accountability
2011	SB 5*	Prohibits striking and restricts the collective bargaining of public unions	Decrease Educator Power
	HB 21	Requires the state board of education to give teacher licenses to Teach for America employees/graduates	Decrease Educator Power
	HB 153	Requires the creation of educator evaluation based at least 50% on student achievement	Increase School Accountability

*Vetoed by public referendum

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Ohio state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political

parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats (M = .09, SD = .302) and Republicans (M = 1.00, SD = 1.095) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -2.654, p = .015$. These results suggest that in the state of Ohio, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform legislation to a statistically significant degree. Beyond statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .09 education reform bills in Ohio per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 1.00 education reform bill (Table 53).

Table 53: Ohio Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.09	.302	.091
	R	11	1.00	1.095	.330

Table 54: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	17.300	.000	-2.654	20	.015	-.909	.343	-1.624	-.194
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.654	11.507	.022	-.909	.343	-1.659	-.159




Figure 14: Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests, except for one, showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix E). The one chi squared test which was statistically significant measured party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school

legislation $X^2(1, N = 12) = 5.455, p = .020$; however the validity of this statistic should be questioned as three of four cells fall under the expected count of five.

This question of validity comes about because of the lack of education reform bills passed from 2001-2011 in Ohio; a total of 12 bills were enacted in this time period. Examining the descriptive data gives us a better illustration of which types of education reforms Ohio is enacting and the difference between the two political parties' support for such legislation. Of all 12 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans in Ohio authored 11; Republicans also authored more bills in each of the education reform theme except for bills focused on *charter schools*, which Democrats and Republicans both introduced one bill and *tenure*, under which no bills were enacted.

Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Ohio. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation $p = .015$. Republicans were more likely to support education reform legislation overall and were also responsible for the introduction of all enacted education reform legislation, minus one bill focused on *charter schools*.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Ohio from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes

the enacted legislation fell under; Table 55 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Ohio. With twelve education reform bills enacted into law during the time period, Ohio has shown the least legislative action toward state reform of the k-12 education system. With this being said, the major themes of this legislation are still present; both *testing* and *alternative certification* were both the themes of three (25%) of all education reform legislation. With 50% of the bills focused on these two themes both *tenure* and *tax credit scholarships* received no education reform bills.

Table 55: Ohio Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain.	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
3	2	1	2	3	0	1	0	3

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Ohio showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .045$, $n = 11$, $p = .894$ (Table 57); the scatter plot (Figure 15) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Ohio, the amount of

education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 56: Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.09	1.221	11
PerPupilExpend	11531.73	385.994	11

Table 57: Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.045
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.894
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.045	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.894	
	N	11	11




Figure 15: Ohio ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based

organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 58 shows the resulting data from this research for Ohio.

Financing of Ohio's education reform legislation can be broken down into two groups; teachers unions and school choice advocates. In total, teachers unions donated \$22,650, school choice advocates contributed \$84,000. With nearly a four to one ratio, school choice advocates from outside the state are the major financiers of education reform legislation. *Susan Dudas*, a contributor of only \$2,500, worked from the Charter Development Foundation at the time of her contribution. William Lager, a contributor of \$46,500, is the Owner and President of the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), Ohio's largest provider of online education. Ann Amer and David Brennan, contributors of \$39,500, are the Founders and Owner of *White Hat Management*, an Ohio based charter school corporation which runs 33 schools in three states (Arizona, Ohio and Colorado).

Ohio education reform legislation is primarily financed by school choice advocates, or those who will benefit from an increased amount of legislation supporting school choice. An examination of the campaign contributions as well as the theme of the legislation indicate that these outside organization are playing a role in the legislative process. The amount of money used in campaign contributions by such organizations indicate that school choice proponents are the dominant financier of education reform legislation in Ohio.

Table 58: Ohio Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract
Husted	R	HB 364	Charter Schools	2002	Susan Dudas	\$2,500	No
					William Lager	\$2,500	No
Schlichter	R	HB 3	Testing	2004	Ann Amer Brennan	\$2,500	No
					David Brennan	\$2,500	No
					William Lager	\$1,000	No
Gardner	R	SB 2	Testing/ Alternative Certification	2004	Ohio Education Association	\$5,500	No
					Ohio Federation of Teachers	\$2,500	No
					William Lager	\$2,500	No
Setzer	R	HB 107	Alternative Certification	2005	Ohio Education Association	\$5,000	No
					Ann Amer Brennan	\$2,500	No
					David Brennan	\$2,500	No
					William Lager	\$3,500	No
					Ohio School Boards Association	\$650	No
Calvert	R	HB 66	Vouchers	2005	William Lager	\$3,500	No
Stewart	D	HB 276	Charter Schools	2006	Ohio Education Association	\$5,500	No
					Ohio Federation of Teachers	\$2,500	No

Table 58: Ohio Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Columbus Education Association	\$1,000	No
Calvert	R	HB 530	Vouchers	2006	William Lager	\$3,500	No
Raga	R	HB 79	Vouchers	2006	William Lager	\$5,000	No
Hite	R	HB 190	Testing	2007	David Brennan	\$2,500	No
					All Children Matter	\$1,000	No
Jones	R	SB 5	Collective Bargaining	2011	David Brennan	\$5,000	No
					William Lager	\$4,000	No
Combs	R	HB 21	Evaluation/ Alternative Certification/ Digital Learning	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Amstutz	R	HB 153	Evaluation/ Digital Learning	2011	David Brennan	\$11,000	No
					Ann Amer Brennan	\$11,000	No
					William Lager	\$10,000	No
					David Brennan	\$5,500	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Ohio education reform legislation is supported by Republicans by a 11 to 1 margin; table 59 highlights this disparity between the two parties with *charter schools* being the only enacted legislation in which Republicans did not author and enact more bills. Table 60 shows the extent to which Republicans have dominated education reform legislation in Ohio with the only Democratic authored legislation to be enacted focusing on the theme of *charter schools* and occurring in 2006.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Ohio were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Though the state did not pass many education reforms from 2001-2011, the fact that Republicans authored 91% of the enacted legislation clearly indicates their dominance in the state in regards to education reform.

Table 59: Ohio Education Reform Theme by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	3
Charter Schools	1	1
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	1
Evaluation	0	2
Testing	0	3
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	0
Digital Learning	0	1
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	0	3
Total	1	14

Table 60: Ohio Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002	HB 364	Husted	R	Charter Schools
2003				
2004	HB 3	Schlichter	R	Testing
2004	SB 2	Gardner	R	Testing/Alternative Certification
2005	HB 107	Setzer	R	Alternative Certification
2005	HB 66	Calvert	R	Vouchers
2006	HB 276	Stewart	D	Charter Schools
2006	HB 530	Calvert	R	Vouchers
2006	HB 79	Raga	R	Vouchers
2007	HB 190	Hite	R	Testing
2008				
2009				
2010				
2011	SB 5	Jones	R	Collective Bargaining
2011	HB 21	Combs	R	Evaluation/Alternative Certification/Digital Learning
2011	HB 153	Amstutz	R	Evaluation

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor

contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Ohio's state procurement search program showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Michigan

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 61 and 62 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 16. The results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, $r = .647$, $n = 11$, $p = .032$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 16 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 61: Michigan Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.90	2.145	11

Table 62: Michigan Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.647*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.032
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.647*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.032	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 16: Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Michigan, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic

research from the literature review. Table 63 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Just as in the previous states, increasing accountability and increase school choice are the rationales for education reform legislation. It appears that in regards to education reform, the rationale is that by increasing choice and accountability, student achievement will rise.

Table 63: Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2002	SB 0562	Clarifies reporting procedures for irregularities on the Michigan educational assessment program (MEAP) test	Increase School Accountability
2003	SB 0393	Allows for the development of Urban High School Academies (Charter School)	Increase School Choice
2004	HB 6230	Specifies time period for which MEAP test can be given	Increase School Accountability
2005	HB 4142	Allows for more MEAP testing to comply with No Child Left Behind and clarifies testing reporting for students	Increase School Accountability
	HB 4991	Creates the Tenure Commission and clarifies tenure in regards to teacher evaluation and retirement	Increase School Accountability
2006	SB 1427	Allows for the creation of “personal curriculum” for students with the collaboration of parents and school counselors	Increase School Choice
	HB 5606	Alters required coursework and testing of high school student	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1124	Requires the passing of subject area exams or Michigan Merit Examination	Increase School Accountability
2007	HB 4591	Creates guidelines for creation and review of teacher preparation programs	Increase School Accountability
2008	SB 1096	Allows ½ of teacher internship to be done as substitute teaching with	Decrease Educator Power

Table 63: Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale

		comparative analysis of traditional and alternative teaching certification programs	
2010	SB 0925	Creates the title of “School of Excellence” for high performing charter schools	Increase School Choice
	SB 0926	Ties funding to Schools of Excellence and virtual Schools of Excellence	Increase School Choice Increase School Accountability
	SB 0981	Requires a new performance evaluation system tied to student performance	Increase School Accountability
	HB 4787	Clarifies the process and requirements for “turnaround schools” specifically with curriculum and assessment	Increase School Accountability
	HB 4788	Changes collective bargaining for “turnaround schools” to allow state chief executive officer to act as school representative in bargaining agreement	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	HB 5596	Creates “interim teacher certificates”	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
2011	SB 0158	Empowers the emergency manager of a school district (fiscal accountability), to reject, modify or terminate collective bargaining agreement	Increase School Accountability
	HB 4625	Extends probationary period for new teachers and termination requirements	Increase School Accountability
	HB 4626	Changes the language used for terminating a tenured teacher from “reasonable and just cause” to “for a reason that is not arbitrary and capricious”.	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	HB 4627	Requires educator evaluations to be based, at least 50%, on student performance	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	HB 4628	Adds curriculum standards, evaluation system, and personnel	Increase School Accountability

Table 63: Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale

decisions to subjects not allowed in collective bargaining	Increase School Oversight
	Decrease Educator Power

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Michigan state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .45$, $SD = 1.214$) and Republicans ($M = 1.45$, $SD = 1.753$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -1.697$, $p = .105$. These results suggest that in the state of Michigan, party identification has little impact on support for education reform legislation. Beyond a lack of statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .45 education reform bills in Michigan per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 1.45 education reform bills (Table 64). Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows

that Republicans authored an average of three times more education reform bills than their Democratic counterparts.

Table 64: Michigan Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.45	1.214	.366
	R	11	1.45	1.753	.529

Table 65: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	1.204	.286	-1.697	20	.105	-1.091	.643	-2.432	.250
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.697	17.795	.107	-1.091	.643	-2.443	.261



Figure 17: Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix F).

Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills showed Republicans responsible for 16 of the 21 pieces of education reform legislation in Michigan. Breaking this down into education theme, Democrats introduced more legislation focused on *charter schools* than their Republican counterparts. Republicans on the other hand introduced more legislation

in the categories of *alternative certification, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing* and *tenure*.

Results of question two indicate that party identification played a minor role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Michigan. Party identification did not impact support for specific education reform legislation however not statistically significant differences were evident. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation overall. Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme. Though lacking statistical significance, educational relevance was found as the Democrats were more likely to support *charter school* legislation and Republicans more likely to support *alternative certification, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing* and *tenure* legislation as well as overall education reform legislation at a ratio of 5:1.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Michigan from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 66 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Michigan. Of the 21 pieces of education reform legislation to be enacted in the state, seven (33%) of all reform legislation had a theme of *testing*.

Evaluation was the focus of five (23%) of the legislation with *tax credit scholarships*, *digital learning* and *vouchers* having no education reform legislation.

Table 66: Michigan Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargain.	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
3	3	4	5	7	0	0	4	0

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Michigan showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = -.314$, $n = 11$, $p = .347$ (Table 68); the scatter plot (Figure 18) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Michigan, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 67: Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.90	2.145	11
PerPupilExpend	11399.91	98.835	11

Table 68: Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	-.314
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.347
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	-.314	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.347	
	N	11	11




Figure 18: Michigan ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 69 shows the resulting data from this research for the state of Michigan.

Michigan's education reform legislation, similarly to Minnesota, Wisconsin and Indiana, is financed primarily by organizations affiliated with traditional public schools. These organizations, principally unions, contributed \$26,310 from 2001-2011 compared to \$7,250 from organizations/affiliates outside the traditional public school realm. One aspect of this financing that sets Michigan apart from every other state is the fact that an organization, which is not a union, financially supported a candidate from 2001-2011. *Friends of Kent County Schools* is an organization of parents and community members of Kent County (Grand Rapids), with a focus on equity and success for their public school system. This group is the only such organization discovered in this research.

Beyond public school affiliated contributions, some interesting campaign donors came to light during the research. *JC Huizenga*, founder of the National Heritage Academies, a charter school management organization which focuses on making schools more accountable and results driven. *Daniel Quiesenbeery* is the

President of Michigan Association of Public School Academies, an organization representing and leading charter schools in the state. Finally, the *Great Lakes Education Project* is a nonprofit organization with the intent to increase school choice in the state of Michigan.

Michigan's long history with unions is highlighted by the data regarding contributions to campaigns. Education reform legislation is primarily financed by public education unions and not by school choice proponents as seen in other states. On a nearly four to one ratio, public education affiliates have outspent nonpublic education affiliates in regards to financially supporting education reform legislation. This is the case despite the overwhelming Republican support for such legislation.

Table 69: Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
				2001			
Garcia	R	SB 0562	Testing	2002	JC Huizenga	\$1,000	No
Kuipers*	R	SB 0393	Charter Schools	2003	JC Huizenga	\$1,000	No
Palmer	R	HB 6230	Testing	2004	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$450	No
Palmer	R	HB 4142	Testing	2005	Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals	\$300	No
Emmons	R	HB 4991	Evaluation	2005	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$900	No
Kuipers*	R	SB 1427	Testing	2006	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$2,500	No
Kuipers	R	SB 1124	Testing	2006			
Palmer	R	HB 5606	Testing	2006	Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals	\$300	No
Hopgood	D	HB 4591	Alternative Certification	2007	Michigan Education Association	\$2,010	No
					Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$500	No
					David Hecker	\$500	No

Table 69: Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Representative	Party	Bill Number	Topic	Year	Organization	Amount	Contribution
Jelinek	R	SB 1096	Alternative Certification	2008	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$700	No
				2009			
Thomas	D	SB 0925	Charter Schools	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Thomas	D	SB 0926	Charter Schools	2010			
Kuipers	R	SB 0981	Evaluation	2010	See Kuipers 2006		
Melton	D	HB 4787	Testing	2010	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$5,000	No
					Michigan Education Association	\$4,975	No
					Daniel Quisenberry	\$400	No
Johnson	D	HB 4788	Collective Bargaining	2010	Michigan Education Association	\$1,000	No
					Daniel Quisenberry	\$250	No
Pavlov	R	HB 5596	Alternative Certification	2010	Great Lakes Education Project	\$5,000	No
Pavlov	R	SB 0158	Collective Bargaining	2011	Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$1,000	No
Rogers	R	HB 4625	Evaluation/Tenure	2011	Michigan Education Association	\$625	No
Scott	R	HB 4626	Evaluation/Tenure	2011	Michigan Education Association	\$3,000	No

Table 69: Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Michigan Association of School Administrators	\$2,000	No
O'Brien	R	HB 4627	Evaluation/Tenure	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Yonker	R	HB 4628	Collective Bargaining	2011	Friends of Kent County Schools	\$550	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Michigan education reform legislation is supported by Republicans much more than their Democratic legislative counterparts. Of the 21 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 16 of those bills. In all education reform themes enacted, except for *charter schools*, Republicans introduced more legislation (Table 70). The themes with greatest Republican support were *testing* and *evaluation*; Democrats most authored legislation was *charter schools*, with two bills authored and enacted.

Table 71 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Of the five education reform bills authored by Democrats, two were introduced by the same legislator. Of the 16 Republican authored legislatives pieces, three legislators were responsible for the creation of 8 of the enacted reforms. 11 of the 21 total bills have been passed since 2010 showing the recent jump into education reform by the state.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Michigan were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Republican legislators were responsible for the majority of the legislation with much of the legislation occurring during the 2010, an important election year for Republicans at the national level.

Table 70: Michigan Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	1	2
Charter Schools	2	1
Collective Bargaining/Unions	1	2
Evaluation	0	5
Testing	1	6
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	0
Digital Learning	0	0
Tenure	0	4
Voucher Programs	0	0
Total	5	20

Table 71: Michigan Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002	SB 0562	Garcia	R	Testing
2003	SB 0393	Kuipers	R	Charter Schools
2004	HB 6230	Palmer	R	Testing
2005	HB 4142	Palmer	R	Testing
2005	HB 4991	Emmons	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2006	SB 1427	Kuipers	R	Testing
2006	HB 5606	Palmer	R	Testing
2006	SB 1124	Kuipers	R	Testing
2007	HB 4591	Hopgood	D	Alternative Certification
2008	SB 1096	Jelinek	R	Alternative Certification
2009				
2010	SB 0925	Thomas	D	Charter Schools
2010	SB 0926	Thomas	D	Charter Schools
2010	SB 0981	Kuipers	R	Evaluation
2010	HB 4787	Melton	D	Testing
2010	HB 4788	Johnson	D	Collective Bargaining
2010	HB 5596	Pavlov	R	Alternative Certification
2011	SB 0158	Pavlov	R	Collective Bargaining
2011	HB 4625	Rogers	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2011	HB 4626	Scott	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2011	HB 4627	O'Brien	R	Evaluation/Tenure
2011	HB 4628	Yonker	R	Collective Bargaining

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign

contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.

Michigan's state transparency and accountability search program showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Oklahoma

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 72 and 73 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 19. The results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, $r = .775$, $n = 11$, $p = .005$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 19 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 72: Oklahoma Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	5.09	4.940	11

Table 73: Oklahoma Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.775**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.005
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.775**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	
	N	11	11

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




Figure 19: Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Oklahoma, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 74 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Similar to the other states of the sample, school choice and accountability appear to be the rational for enacting education reform legislation. Oklahoma follows other states in the sample by creating charter schools, increasing testing and the applications of the results, digital learning, alternative certification programs and like Florida, Georgia, Arizona, Wisconsin, Indiana and Louisiana, Oklahoma also added a voucher program to their laws.

Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2002	HB 2341	Alters the requirements in school improvement plans	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1408	Requires districts create policies on online education	Increase School Choice
	SB 1010	Requires the use of outcome based performance measures for teachers and administrators	Increase School Accountability
2003	HB 1414	Requires the use of criterion-based tests to meet the demands of NCLB	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1438	Creates alternative certification for educational leaders	Increase Educator Workforce Decrease Educator Power
	HB 1767	Requires the Virtual Internet School Pilot Program Coordinating Committee to make cooperative partnerships	Increase School Choice
2004	SB 0713	Allocates funds for the State Charter School Facilities	Increase School Choice

Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Incentive Grants Program (Part of NCLB)			
2005	HB 1028	Creates the Oklahoma Commission for Teacher Preparation	Increase Educator Workforce Decrease Educator Power
	HB 1390	Amends alternative certification time limit to three years	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1992	Creates Academic Achievement Award to provide monetary bonuses to teachers of students of high performance	Increase School Accountability
	SB 982	Provides student scholarships based upon student achievement data	Increase School Accountability
2006	HB 2756	Amends the list of offenses leading to termination of tenured educator	Decrease Educator Power
	SB 1493	Increases funding for charter schools	Increase School Choice
	SB 1792	Creates a state committee to direct actions regarding testing via the Achieving Classroom Excellence Act	Increase School Testing
2007	HB 1593	Increases the Academic Achievement Awards available to schools	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1589	Increases the types of organizations which can start charter schools	Increase School Choice
2008	SB 2100	Creates a pilot program to allow up to 10 districts to be charter districts	Increase School Choice
	HB 3124	Requires state board of education to give Teach for America employees teaching certificates	Increase Educator Workforce Decrease Educator Power
2009	SB 1111	Creates the Educational Accountability Reform Act to examine teacher evaluation practices and testing data	Increase School Accountability

Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	SB 0268	Requires that failing schools be put in a turnaround program by the district	Increase School Accountability Increase School Choice
	SB 0394	Pushes back date for renewal of teacher contracts	Increase School Accountability Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0473	Allows the office of accountability to evaluate effectiveness of school spending	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0497	Provides that industry endorsement and the affiliate testing show up on student transcripts	Increase School Choice
	SB 0582	Requires the state board of education to grant alternative teaching certificates to any graduate of such program	Increase Educator Workforce Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0604	Creates the Task Force on Internet-Based Instruction to review the topic for future use	Increase School Choice
	SB 0867	Allows for student remediation via alternative methods in subjects where students fail end of course exam	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1333	Increases GPA requirement for alternatively certified teachers	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1461	Provides state support for failing schools and their teachers	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1837	Creates the Inner City Schools Rescue program to recruit teachers to these blighted areas	Increase School Accountability
2010	SB 0509	Empowers state government to take over failing schools and remove certain teacher contract stipulations	Increase School Accountability
	SB 1799	Gives testing schedule freedom to districts	Increase School Accountability

Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale

SB 1862	Clarifies who can sponsor charter schools and removes the limit of the number of charter schools allowed each year	Increase School Choice
SB 2033	Aligns Oklahoma testing and teacher evaluation practices with Race to the Top requirements (quantitative evaluations)	Increase School Accountability
SB 2109	Modifies the school accounting formula to increase online educations	Increase School Choice
SB 2129	Creates a state taskforce to examine the feasibility of a statewide virtual education program	Increase School Choice
SB 2212	Gives charter schools sponsored by boards of education the same funding status as public schools in regards to federal funding	Increase School Choice
HB 2302	Clarifies funding model for Academic Achievement Award (State Testing)	Increase School Accountability
SB 2318	Requires testing of students in online courses or alternative schools	Increase School Accountability
SB 2319	Prohibits schools from denying students the enrollment in online courses	Increase School Choice
SB 2330	Allows districts to create deregulated empowerment schools or zones	Increase School Choice Increase Local Authority
HB 2747	Removes the requirement of public input regarding alternative certification programs	Decrease Educator Power
HB 2753	Increases the groups which can authorize charter schools	Increase School Choice
HB 2928	Requires evidence based rubric and quantitative student growth required in teacher evaluations	Increase School Accountability

Table 74: Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale

	HB 3259	Decreases the amount of the experience required to receive alternative certification	Increase Educator Workforce Decrease Educator Power
	HB 3393	Creates a school voucher program	Increase School Choice
2011	SB 0141	Increases funding for online schools	Increase School Choice
	SB 0256	Allows charter schools to receive government lease rates	Increase School Choice
	SB 0278	Increases the types of charter school authorities	Increase School Choice
	SB 0280	Decreases regulation of online schools	Increase School Choice
	SB 0346	Requires that students who do not pass the appropriate grade Reading test cannot be promoted to the next grade	Increase School Accountability
	SB 0445	Removes the transfer requirement for students who wish to enroll in a charter school within their current district	Increase School Choice
	SB 0969	Creates a tax credit scholarship program	Increase School Choice
	HB 1267	Creates the Oklahoma Teacher and Leader Effectiveness Evaluation System	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1456	Requires the publication of school testing results and ties performance funding to the results	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1680	Requires the results of state tests and end of course assessments to be published on high school transcripts	Increase School Accountability
	HB 1744	Allows students the opportunity to receive a school vouchers without having to have an IEP the previous year	Increase School Choice

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Oklahoma state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats (M = 1.18, SD = 1.079) and Republicans (M = 3.90, SD = 5.016) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -1.704$, $p = .104$. These results suggest that in the state of Oklahoma, party identification has little impact on support for education reform legislation. Despite a lack of statistical significance, this test shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of 1.18 education reform bills in Oklahoma per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 3.90 education reform bills (Table 75). Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows that Republicans authored an average of three times more education reform bills than their Democratic counterparts. Also, of the 56 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Democrats authored only 13.

Table 75: Oklahoma Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	1.18	1.079	.325
	R	11	3.90	5.016	1.512

Table 76: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper	
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	16.053	.001	-1.704	20	.104	-2.636	1.547	-5.863	.591
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.704	10.923	.117	-2.636	1.547	-6.044	.772




Figure 20: Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix G). Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for 13 of the 56 pieces of education reform legislation in Oklahoma. Breaking this down into

education theme, Republicans authored more enacted legislation for each of the nine education reform themes, except for *tenure* in which no legislation was introduced.

Results of question two indicate that party identification played a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Oklahoma. Party identification did impact support for specific education reform legislation however no statistically significant differences were evident. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation overall despite the data showing Republicans overwhelmingly authored the enacted legislation. Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme despite Republicans authoring more bills enacted into legislation. Though there was not a statistically significance difference between political party identification and support for education reform legislation, results showed Republicans responsible for 77% of all education reform legislation in Oklahoma from 2001-2011.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Oklahoma from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 77 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Oklahoma. With 56 enacted education reform bills, Oklahoma is the

most education reform minded state if using number bills as the measurement tool. Of these bills, *testing* is the most common theme with 18 (33%) of the bills focused on this issue. *Charter schools* 11 (20%) and *digital learning* 9 (16%) round out the top three reform themes for the state. *Tenure* received zero reform bills with *tax credit scholarships*, *collective bargaining* and *vouchers* only receiving one bill apiece in the ten year time period.

Table 77: Oklahoma Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargaining	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
8	11	1	10	18	1	9	0	2

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Louisiana showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .084$, $n = 11$, $p = .807$ (Table 79); the scatter plot (Figure 21) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Oklahoma, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 78: Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	5.09	4.940	11
PerPupilExpend	8289.00	317.543	11

Table 79: Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.084
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.807
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.084	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.807	
	N	11	11




Figure 21: Oklahoma ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based

organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 80 shows the resulting data from this research for Oklahoma.

Education reform legislation in Oklahoma is plentiful to say the least; at 56 pieces of education reform legislation, Oklahoma is the most active state in regards to enacting legislation. Despite the numerous legislation, only six different education related sources contributed to campaigns from 2001-2011. Of these six contributors, four were organizations based outside of the traditional public school system. *Legislative Interaction for Education* is the PAC for Oklahoma's school administrator's union. *Jim Walton* is of the Walton Family Foundation, an organization focused on education reform and school choice. *Jim Dunlap* is a former Oklahoma legislator and 2002 National Chairman of the ALEC, an organization intent on increasing accountability, choice and reform in public education. *Koch Industries* is a national corporation with investments in science, technology minerals. Though the company itself is not affiliated with education reform, Charles and David Koch both serve on the board of directors for the company and are connected to multiple education reform initiatives throughout the United States. *Empower Oklahoma* is a business focused on providing career training to Oklahoma students.

These four organizations/affiliates donated \$13,957 compared to \$20,700 from only two organizations affiliated with traditional public schools. This difference indicates that though outside organizations outnumber traditional education organizations, organizations traditionally affiliated with public schools are more responsible for financing the education reform legislation in the state of Oklahoma.

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
Wilt	R	HB 2341	Testing	2001 2002	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Easley	D	SB 1408	Digital Learning	2002	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Haney	D	SB 1010	Evaluation	2002	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Staggs	D	HB 1414	Testing	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Brannon	D	HB 1438	Alternative Certification	2003	Legislative Interaction for Education/Life	\$500	No
Adair	D	HB 1767	Digital Learning	2003	Legislative Interaction for Education/Life	\$500	No
Williams	D	SB 0713	Charter Schools	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Benge	R	HB 1028	Evaluation	2005	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$250	No
Brannon	D	HB 1390	Alternative Certification	2005	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$600	No
Jones	R	HB 1992	Testing	2005	Jim Walton	\$1,000	No
Morgan	D	SB 0982	Testing	2005	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,000	No
Blackwell	R	HB 2756	Evaluation	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Paddack	D	SB 1493	Charter Schools	2006	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$500	No
Paddack	D	SB 1792	Testing	2006			
Jones	R	HB 1593	Testing	2007	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,500	No
Jones	R	HB 1589	Charter Schools	2007			
Ford	R	SB 2100	Charter Schools	2008	Koch Industries	\$1,000	No
					Jim & Pam Dunlap	\$957	No
Jones	R	HB 3124	Alternative Certification	2008	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$650	No
Jolley	R	SB 1111	Evaluation/Testing	2009	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,250	No
Ford	R	SB 0268	Charter Schools	2009			
Ford	R	SB 0473	Evaluation	2009	See Ford 2008		
Stanislawski	R	SB 0394	Evaluation	2009	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,000	No
Stanislawski	R	SB 0604	Digital Learning	2009			
Jolley	R	SB 0582	Alternative Certification	2009	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,250	No

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Paddack	D	SB 0497	Testing	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Anderson	R	SB 0687	Testing	2009	Koch Industries	\$1,000	No
Denney	R	HB 1333	Alternative Certification	2009	Oklahoma Education	\$1,800	No
					Association Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$650	No
Sears	R	HB 1461	Testing	2009	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$250	No
Hamilton	D	HB 1837	Alternative Certification	2009	Oklahoma Education Association	\$300	No
Ford	R	SB 0509	Evaluation	2010	See Ford 2008		
Ford	R	SB 2212	Charter Schools	2010			
Ford	R	SB 2330	Collective Bargaining/ Testing	2010			
Paddack	D	SB 1799	Testing	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Coffee	R	SB 1862	Charter Schools	2010	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$250	No
Coffee	R	SB 2033	Evaluation/ Testing	2010			

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Stanislawski	R	SB 2109	Digital Learning	2010	See Sanislawski 2009		
Stanislawski	R	SB 2129	Digital Learning	2010			
Stanislawski	R	SB 2319	Digital Learning	2010			
Banz	R	HB 2302	Testing	2010	Oklahoma Education Association	\$1,000	No
					Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$400	No
Jolley	R	SB 2318	Testing/ Digital Learning	2010	See Jolley 2009		
Denney	R	HB 2747	Alternative Certification	2010	Oklahoma Education Association	\$1,000	No
Denney	R	HB 2753	Charter Schools	2010	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$400	No
Coody	R	HB 2928	Evaluation	2010	Oklahoma Education Association	\$2,000	No
					Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$1,000	No
Blackwell	R	HB 3259	Alternative Certification	2010	Oklahoma Education Association	\$1,300	No

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Oklahoma Retired Educators Association	\$1,000	No
					Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$800	No
Nelson	R	HB 3393	Vouchers	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Jolley	R	SB 0141	Digital Learning	2011	See Jolley 2009		
Jolley	R	SB 0346	Testing	2011			
Stanislawski	R	SB 0278	Charter Schools	2011	See Stanislawski 2009		
Stanislawski	R	SB 0280	Digital Learning	2011			
Ford	R	SB 0256	Charter Schools	2011	See Ford 2008		
Ford	R	SB 0445	Charter Schools	2011			
Newberry	R	SB 0969	Tax Credit Scholarships	2011	Koch Industries	\$5,000	No
					Empower Oklahoma	\$5,000	No
Sears	R	HB 1267	Evaluation	2011	Oklahoma Education Association	\$1,000	No
Denney	R	HB 1456	Testing	2011	Oklahoma Education Association	\$1,000	No
					Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$400	No

Table 80: Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Quinn	R	HB 1680	Testing	2011	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$400	No
Nelson	R	HB 1744	Vouchers	2011	Cooperative Council for Oklahoma School Administration	\$800	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Oklahoma education reform legislation is supported by Republicans more so than Democrats. Of the 56 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 43 of those bills. In all education reform themes, except for *tenure*, where no legislation has been enacted, Republicans introduced far more legislation. Table 80 shows this Republican dominance especially in the themes of *charter schools, testing, evaluation and vouchers*. *Testing* was a favorite theme for both parties with Democrats authoring five and Republican thirteen of the enacted legislative pieces.

Table 82 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. This table highlights a theme that is showing itself in a few states; Democrats author some legislation, but not many bills in recent years. In Oklahoma, the majority of Democratic authored education reform legislation was enacted in 2006 or before.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Oklahoma were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Though Democrats did have legislative control of education reform until 2006, Republicans have increased the amount of the education reform dramatically since 2009 with 39 of the 56 pieces of legislation passing from 2009 to 2011. Similar to many states in the sample, Republicans are supporting education reform at a much higher level than their Democratic counterparts.

Table 81: Oklahoma Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	3	5
Charter Schools	2	9
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	1
Evaluation	1	9
Testing	5	13
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	1
Digital Learning	2	7
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	0	2
Total	13	47

Table 82: Oklahoma Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002	HB 2341	Wilt	R	Testing
2002	SB 1408	Easley	D	Digital Learning
2002	SB 1010	Haney	D	Evaluation
2003	HB 1414	Staggs	D	Testing
2003	HB 1438	Brannon	D	Alternative Certification
2003	HB 1767	Adair	D	Digital Learning
2004	SB 0713	Williams	D	Charter Schools
2005	HB 1028	Benge	R	Evaluation
2005	HB 1390	Brannon	D	Alternative Certification
2005	HB 1992	Jones	R	Testing
2005	SB 982	Morgan	D	Testing
2006	HB 2756	Blackwell	R	Evaluation
2006	SB 1493	Paddack	D	Charter Schools
2006	SB 1792	Paddack	D	Testing
2007	HB 1593	Jones	R	Testing
2007	HB 1589	Jones	R	Charter Schools

Table 82: *Oklahoma Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme*

2008	SB 2100	Ford	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 3124	Jones	R	Alternative Certification
2009	SB 1111	Jolley	R	Evaluation/Testing
2009	SB 0268	Ford	R	Charter Schools
2009	SB 0394	Stanislawski	R	Evaluation
2009	SB 0473	Ford	R	Evaluation
2009	SB 0497	Paddack	D	Testing
2009	SB 0582	Jolley	R	Alternative Certification
2009	SB 0604	Stanislawski	R	Digital Learning
2009	SB 0687	Anderson	R	Testing
2009	HB 1333	Denney	R	Alternative Certification
2009	HB 1461	Sears	R	Testing
2009	HB 1837	Hamilton	D	Alternative Certification
2010	SB 0509	Ford	R	Evaluation
2010	SB 1799	Paddack	D	Testing
2010	SB 1862	Coffee	R	Charter Schools
2010	SB 2033	Coffee	R	Evaluation/Testing
2010	SB 2109	Stanislawski	R	Digital Learning
2010	SB 2129	Stanislawski	R	Digital Learning
2010	SB 2212	Ford	R	Charter Schools
2010	HB 2302	Banz	R	Testing
2010	SB 2318	Jolley	R	Testing/Digital Learning
2010	SB 2319	Stanislawski	R	Digital Learning
2010	SB 2330	Ford	R	Collective Bargaining/Testing
2010	HB 2747	Denney	R	Alternative Certification
2010	HB 2753	Denney	R	Charter Schools
2010	HB 2928	Coody	R	Evaluation
2010	HB 3259	Blackwell	R	Alternative Certification
2010	HB 3393	Nelson	R	Vouchers
2011	SB 0141	Jolley	R	Digital Learning
2011	SB 0256	Ford	R	Charter Schools
2011	SB 0278	Stanislawski	R	Charter Schools
2011	SB 0280	Stanislawski	R	Digital Learning
2011	SB 0346	Jolley	R	Testing
2011	SB 0445	Ford	R	Charter Schools
2011	SB 0969	Newberry	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2011	HB 1267	Sears	R	Evaluation
2011	HB 1456	Denney	R	Testing
2011	HB 1680	Quinn	R	Testing
2011	HB 1744	Nelson	R	Vouchers

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Oklahoma's capital assessment and transparency programs showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Georgia

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 83 and 84 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 22. The results of the analysis indicate no relationship, $r = .409$, $n = 11$, $p = .211$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 22 clearly shows this lack of relationship.

Table 83: Georgia Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.45	1.695	11

Table 84: Georgia Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.409
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.211
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.409	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.211	
	N	11	11




Figure 22: Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Georgia, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.

Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 85 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Similar to the other states discussed, the rationale for Georgia’s education reform legislation appears to be increasing school choice and increasing school accountability to have an overall impact of increasing student achievement. Unlike the state mentioned previously, Georgia also used the rationale of increasing local authority, especially when determining spending and school choice. This rationale of local authority differs from all other states and begs the question why? As accountability through federal funding and grants has caused most states to increase state authority, Georgia has done the opposite. Examining the campaign contributions to these legislators does not show any clear indication that local authority would benefit a contributor so this movement toward decentralization is one of the outliers in regards to rationale.

Table 85: Georgia Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2003	HB 0456	Allows the use of Universal Service Fund to support distance learning programs	Increase School Choice
	SB 0193	Creates teacher salary increase based upon criterion referenced testing	Increase Educator Accountability
2004	HB 1190	Requires uniform statewide performance based accountability system	Increase Educator Accountability
2006	SB 0610	Prohibits the preclusion the technology in charter schools	Increase School Choice
2007	SB 0010	Creates the “Georgia Special Needs Scholarship Act” voucher system	Increase School Choice
	SB 0039	Increases school system flexibility to establish charter	Increase School Choice

Table 85: Georgia Education Reform Legislation Rationale

		schools and creates the state appointed Charter Advisory Committee	
2008	HB 0637	Amends the Quality Basic Education Act so as each school system may <i>elect</i> to use norm-referenced tests paid for by the state	Increase Local Authority Increase School Accountability
	HB 0831	State will match donations to charter school capital outlay projects	Increase School Choice
	HB 0881	Establishes the Charter School Commission	Increase School Choice Oversight
	HB 1065	Allows local authority to use sales tax for charter school capital outlay	Increase School Choice Increase Local Authority
	HB 1133	Creates the Georgia GOAL (Tax Credit Scholarship) program	Increase School Choice
	HB 1209	Allows local authority to increase flexibility in exchange for increased state accountability	Increase School Accountability
2009	HB 0555	Charter schools must be allowed use of unused school board facilities at no cost	Increase School Choice
2010	SB 0457	Sets up guidelines and requirements to convert public schools to charter schools	Increase School Choice Increase Local Authority
2011	HB 0192	Creates the State Education Finance Study Commission to reexamine funding needs of k-12 schools, including charter and digital learning environment	Increase School Accountability

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Georgia state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .18$, $SD = .405$) and Republicans ($M = 1.27$, $SD = 1.421$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -2.449$, $p = .024$. These results suggest that in the state of Georgia, party identification has an impact on support for education reform legislation with Republicans more likely to support such legislation. Alongside statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .18 education reform bills in Georgia per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 1.27 education reform bills (Table 86). Also, of the 16 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Democrats authored only two.

Table 86: Georgia Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.18	.405	.122
	R	11	1.27	1.421	.428

Table 87: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	Legislation	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed		4.125	.056	-2.449	20	.024	-1.091	.445	-2.020	-.162
Equal variances not assumed				-2.449	11.611	.031	-1.091	.445	-2.065	-.117




Figure 23: Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix H). Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for two of the 16 pieces of education reform legislation in Georgia. Breaking this down into education theme, Republicans authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on

charter schools, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships and voucher programs.

Democrats and Republicans in Georgia sponsored equal amounts of bills (1 apiece) focused on *digital learning*; all other education reform themes were not addressed via the legislation.

Results of question two indicate that party identification played a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Georgia. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation overall with Republicans more likely to support such legislation. Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme despite Republicans authoring more bills enacted into legislation. Though there was not a statistically significance difference between political party identification and support for specific education reform legislation, results showed Republicans responsible for 87.5% of all education reform legislation in Georgia from 2001-2011.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Georgia from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; *Table 88* displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Georgia. With 16 education reform bills enacted into law, seven

(44%) of the bills were focused on *charter schools*. *Testing* received four bills while *tenure*, *collective bargaining* and *alternative certification* did not have any bills fall under their respective themes.

Table 88: Georgia Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargaining	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
0	7	0	1	4	2	2	0	1

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Georgia showed no statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables $r = .271$, $n = 11$, $p = .421$ (Table 90); the scatter plot (Figure 24) summarizes these results. Overall, the resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Georgia, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has no statistically significant relationship with per pupil expenditures.

Table 89: Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.45	1.695	11
PerPupilExpend	10163.00	391.793	11

Table 90: Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.271
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.421
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.271	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.421	
	N	11	11




Figure 24: Georgia ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 91 shows the resulting data from this research for Georgia.

Of the six campaign contributors, four were school choice organizations. K12 Inc. is an online, for profit, Education Corporation which sells online curriculum to both public and private schools. The company donated a total of \$4,500 to legislators with legislation focused on *charter schools* or *tax credit scholarships*. One major outside organization that entered Georgia politics is *All Children Matter*, with a donation total of \$8,600. This political action committee (PAC) is based out of Virginia, was started by Betsy and Richard Devos and was fined 5.2 million dollars in 2008 for illegal funneling of campaign funds in Ohio. The PAC focuses on school choice and supporting candidates who support such legislation. Another outside organization involved in Georgia politics is *Community Education Partners*. This for-profit company provides academic and behavior programs for school districts; though only one donation of \$500 was given, the organization was the focus of a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union regarding its management and academic success of an Atlanta based alternative

school for which it received a \$7 Million contract. The final outside influence comes from the *American Federation for Children*, which is a PAC focused on school choice; their websites states that they trace their history to leadership of John Walton (Walton Family Foundation) and Betsy Devos.

Research on the campaign contributions in Georgia showed that money from outside the state of Georgia and from organizations/people not affiliated with traditional public education is quite prevalent. Outside contributions totaled \$14,500 from 2001-2011 compared to \$4,100 from public school related organizations. Major education reform organizations and people such as the Walton and Devos Families and their affiliated organizations had a contributable voice in Georgia's education reform. In the state of Georgia, outside influences, especially those focused on school choice, were the major financiers of education reform legislation.

Table 91: Georgia Campaign Contributions/State Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
				2001			
				2002			
Buck	D	HB 0456	Digital Learning	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Moody	R	SB 0193	Evaluation/ Testing	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
O'Neil	R	HB 1190	Testing	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
				2005			
Moody	R	SB 0610	Charter Schools	2006	Community Education Partners	\$500	No
Johnson, E.	R	SB 0010	Vouchers	2007	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Weber	R	SB 0039	Charter Schools	2007	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Coleman	R	HB 0637	Testing	2008	All Children Matter	\$2,300	No
Coleman	R	HB 1209	Testing	2008			
Setzler	R	HB 0831	Charter Schools	2008	K12 Inc.	\$1,000	No
Jones	R	HB 0881	Charter Schools	2008	All Children Matter	\$3,300	No
					K12 Inc.	\$2,000	No
Royal	D	HB 1065	Charter Schools	2008	Georgia Association of Educators	\$1,300	No

Table 91: Georgia Campaign Contributions/State Vendor Contracts

Casas	R	HB 1133	Tax Credit Scholarships	2008	All Children Matter	\$1,500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$500	No
Casas	R	HB 0555	Charter Schools	2009	See Casas 2008		
Weber	R	SB 0457	Charter Schools	2010	All Children Matter	\$2,500	No
					K12 Inc.	\$1,000	No
Coleman	R	HB 0192	Digital Learning	2011	Gwinnett County Association of Educators	\$1,000	No
					Georgia Association of Educators	\$500	No
Ehrhart	R	HB 0325	Tax Credit Scholarships	2011	American Federation for Children	\$2,400	No
Butterworth	R	SB 0161	Charter Schools	2011	Georgia Association of Educators	\$1,300	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Georgia education reform legislation is supported by Republicans more so than Democrats. Of the 16 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 14 of those bills. In all education reform themes in which legislation was enacted, except for *tenure*, Republicans authored more legislation. Table 92 shows this Republican power especially in the themes of *charter schools and testing*. Table 92 also shows Republicans as the party behind the move toward a voucher system and tax credit scholarships for Georgia students. Table 93 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. This table shows that the most recent Democratic supported legislation came in 2008 and before that, 2003.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Georgia were the dominant force behind education reform in the state. Republicans are not only supporting education reform overall in the state of Georgia, but also supporting

each theme, minus *digital learning*, more so than their Democratic counterparts. As in other states of the sample, Republicans are ruling the roost in Georgia.

Table 92: Georgia Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	0
Charter Schools	1	6
Collective Bargaining/Unions	0	0
Evaluation	0	1
Testing	0	4
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	2
Digital Learning	1	1
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	0	1
Total	2	15

Table 93: Georgia Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003	HB 0456	Buck	D	Digital Learning
2003	SB 0193	Moody	R	Evaluation/Testing
2004	HB 1190	O'Neil	R	Testing
2005				
2006	SB 0610	Moody	R	Charter Schools
2007	SB 0010	Johnson, E.	R	Vouchers
2007	SB 0039	Weber	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 0637	Coleman	R	Testing
2008	HB 0831	Setzler	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 0881	Jones	R	Charter Schools
2008	HB 1065	Royal	D	Charter Schools
2008	HB 1133	Casas	R	Tax Credit Scholarships
2008	HB 1209	Coleman	R	Testing
2009	HB 0555	Casas	R	Charter Schools
2010	SB 0457	Weber	R	Charter Schools
2011	HB 0192	Coleman	R	Digital Learning
2011	HB 0325	Ehrhart	R	Tax Credit Scholarships

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Georgia's procurement registry program showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Wisconsin

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 94 and 95 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 25. The results of the analysis indicate no relationship, $r = .409$, $n = 11$, $p = .212$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 25 clearly shows this lack of relationship.

Table 94: Wisconsin Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.18	1.401	11

Table 95: Wisconsin Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.409
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.212
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.409	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.212	
	N	11	11




Figure 25: Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Wisconsin, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 96 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Wisconsin is similar to other states to the extent that accountability and choice appear to be the major rationales for education reform. Unlike other states however, Wisconsin also has school choice oversight as a rationale. As choice has increased in the state for legislation, so too has the state oversight of those choice schools. Similar to other states in the sample, it appears that the rationale for some of the legislation is to decrease educator power by removing the right to collectively bargaining and requiring/limiting certain issues to collective bargaining.

Table 96: Wisconsin Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2004	AB 0747	Installs residency requirement for charter school attendance.	Increase School Choice Oversight
	AB 0847	Creates strict reporting requirement of private schools that enter the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program	Increase School Choice Oversight
2005	AB 0425	Every school must publicly report (via internet or newsletter) a school performance report	Increase School Accountability
2006	AB 0698	Establishes the Wisconsin-Parkside Charter School	Increase School Choice
	AB 0829	Provides charter school and voucher program school students access to volunteer healthcare providers	Increase School Choice
	SB 0618	Testing requirement for private schools participating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program	Increase School Choice Oversight

Table 96: Wisconsin Education Reform Legislation Rationale

2008	SB 0396	Virtual charter school clarifications and state created virtual school accessibility	Increase School Choice
2009	AB 0095	Creates mandatory subjects to be collectively bargained	Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0311	Adds “teaching assistant” to the collective bargaining unit for the Teaching Assistants Association, American Federation of Teachers and the AFL-CIO	Keep the Peace
	SB 372	Allows the use of standardized test results in evaluating teachers and adds “teacher evaluation plan” to the required list of collective bargaining terms	Increase School Accountability
	SB 373	Requires the application for a charter school to be judged based upon the standards of the National Association of Charter School Authorizers	Increase School Choice Oversight
2011	AB 0011	Diminishes the power of collective bargaining	Decrease Educator Power
	SB 0020	Gives the right to sell school properties to the Milwaukee City Council if the Council can show the properties are underused.	Increase School Choice

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Wisconsin state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political

parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a not a statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .82$, $SD = 1.250$) and Republicans ($M = .36$, $SD = .674$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = 1.061$, $p = .301$. These results suggest that in the state of Wisconsin, party identification does not have an impact on support for education reform legislation. Despite this lack of statistical significance, this test and descriptive data shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .82 education reform bills in Wisconsin per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of .36 education reform bills (Table 97). Of the 13 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans authored five of the bills; this makes Wisconsin one of the two states in the sample to have more Democrats than Republicans author education reform legislation.

Table 97: Wisconsin Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.82	1.250	.377
	R	11	.36	.674	.203

Table 98: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
Legislation		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	Equal variances assumed	1.744	.202	1.061	20	.301	.455	.428	-.439	1.348
	Equal variances not assumed			1.061	15.361	.305	.455	.428	-.457	1.366




Figure 26: Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix I). Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for eight of the 13 pieces of education reform legislation in Wisconsin. Breaking this down into education theme, Democrats authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on *charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, digital learning and evaluation*. Republicans authored more legislation focused on *testing*; all other legislative themes were either not addressed or equally supported.

Results of question two indicate that party identification did not play a major role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Wisconsin. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation and descriptives showed Democrats were responsible for 61% of all education reform legislation. Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme despite Democrats authoring more bills enacted into legislation. Though there was not a statistically significance difference between political party identification and support for specific education reform legislation. Unlike most of the states in the research though, Wisconsin's education reform movement was more likely

supported by Democrats than Republicans, but not with a statistically significant difference.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Wisconsin from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 99 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Wisconsin. With only 13 education reforms enacted in the ten year period, Wisconsin is one of the least education reform minded states when it comes to state legislation. Of the 13 bills, 7 (54%) were focused on the theme of *charter schools*. *Collective bargaining* had four (31%) and vouchers had two (15%) to round out the top three education reforms in the state. *Alternative certification*, *tax credit scholarships*, and *tenure* did not have any reform bills fall into their categories.

Table 99: Wisconsin Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargaining	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
0	7	4	1	1	0	1	0	2

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Wisconsin showed a statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables $r = .620$, $n = 11$, $p = .042$ (Table 101); the scatter plot (Figure 27) summarizes these results. Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the state of Wisconsin, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has a strong positive relationship with per-pupil expenditures.

Table 100: Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.18	1.401	11
PerPupilExpend	11998.18	299.035	11

Table 101: Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.620*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.042
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.620*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.042	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 27: Wisconsin ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to

determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 102 shows the resulting data from this research regarding the state of Wisconsin.

With a minimum donation of \$100 and a maximum of \$1,000, no campaign donation with origin from an education based donator contributed more than 5% of the total campaign funds for that year. Though the amount of contributions were not sizeable, the source of contributions shed light on who is financing education reform legislation. Of the 23 contributions examined for this research, 13 were from education unions. The other 10 contributions came from a variety of sources focusing on the themes of education reform. Starting in 2006, an increase in the financial support of legislator by educational reformers occurred. Jim Blew, \$250 contributor in 2006, is a consultant with the Walton Family Foundation in the area of K-12 education reform. Deborah McGriff, a contributor of both \$375 and \$750 is on the Board of Directors for the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. She is married to Howard Fuller, a contributor of \$375 and the Founder of Black Alliance for Educational Opportunities and Institute for the Transformation of Learning out of Marquette University. Susan Mitchell is founder of Alliance for Choices in Education (American Education Reform Council), affiliated with School Choice Wisconsin and donated \$1,200 to two legislators. Greg Jobin-Leeds, contributor of \$1,000 is founder of the Schott Foundation for Public Education, an organization focused on educational equity and access.

From the research it can be concluded that Wisconsin legislation is financed by both teachers unions and outside sources of contributions. In total, public education

related organizations contributed \$6,550 while nonpublic school affiliated contributors donated a total of \$5,700. From the other pieces of legislation and the contributors to the legislators, no pattern shows itself regarding the financing of education reform in Wisconsin. What sets Wisconsin apart from all of the other sample states is the amount of legislation which was introduced by committee and not an individual legislator. Four of the most important and recent education reforms in Wisconsin were introduced by committee, making it difficult to determine which legislator was responsible for the bill and therefore who financed such legislation. Some *charter school* legislation brings about great support from charter school/choice advocates, while other times similar pieces of legislation were introduced without any financial support from charter school advocates. What is clear is that in Wisconsin, both school choice advocates and teachers unions finance education reform legislation.

Table 102: Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
				2001			
				2002			
				2003			
Sinicki	D	AB 0747	Charter Schools	2004	Wisconsin Education Association Council	\$500	No
Sinicki	D	AB 0847	Charter Schools	2004	School Administrator Alliance	\$100	No
					School Administrators Association	\$100	No
Petrowski	R	AB 0425	Testing	2005	School Administrators Alliance	\$100	No
Vos	R	AB 0698	Charter Schools	2006	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Richards	D	AB 0829	Charter Schools/ Vouchers	2006	Wisconsin Education Association Council	\$500	No
					North Shore United Educators Council	\$500	No
					Association of Wisconsin School Administrators	\$250	No
Darling	R	SB 0618	Vouchers	2006	Jim Blew	\$250	No
					Deborah McGriff	\$375	No

Table 102: Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Howard Fuller	\$375	No
					Susan Mitchell	\$200	No
				2007			
Lehman	D	SB 0396	Charter Schools/ Digital Learning	2008	Wisconsin Federation of Teachers	\$1,000	No
					Madison Teachers	\$1,000	No
					Greg Jobin-Leeds	\$1,000	No
					Association of Wisconsin School Administrators	\$500	No
Sinicki	D	AB 0095	Collective Bargaining	2009	Federation of Teachers Local 212	\$500	No
					Wisconsin Education Association Council	\$500	No
					Madison Teachers	\$500	No
					Milwaukee Teachers Education Association	\$500	No
Joint Committee on Employee Relations	D*	SB 0311	Collective Bargaining	2009			
Education Committee	D*	SB 0372	Evaluation/ Collective	2009			

Table 102: Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Bargaining							
Education Committee	D*	SB 0373	Charter Schools	2009			
				2010			
Assembly Organization Committee	R*	AB 0011	Collective Bargaining	2011			
Darling	R	SB 0020	Charter Schools	2011	Ann Amer Brennan	\$1,000	No
					Susan Mitchell	\$1,000	No
					Henry Herzing	\$750	No
					Deborah McGriff	\$750	No

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Wisconsin education reform legislation is supported by Democrats more so than Republicans. This differs from the previous eight states examined but fall in line with the rest of the research regarding Wisconsin. Of the 13 education reform bills enacted, Democrats, or democratically controlled committees, authored eight of those bills. In the reform themes of *charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, digital learning* Democrats introduced a majority of the legislation. The only theme in which Republicans introduced more legislation than their Democratic counterparts was in *testing*, but even that is only one piece of legislation. Table 103 shows this Democratic control despite the little reform that occurred from 2001-2011.

Table 104 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Wisconsin is different from any other state because some of their education reform legislation, four out of 13 total, was created by joint committees at the proposition of the governor. These pieces of legislation were focused on collective bargaining; overall the major reform in Wisconsin was charter schools.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Democrats in Wisconsin were the force behind education reform in the state. Democrats authored more legislation overall and more legislation on almost all education reform themes. Unlike the previous eight states from the sample, Wisconsin’s education reform is primarily Democratically created with a third of the reform bills originating in committees.

Table 103: Wisconsin Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	0	0
Charter Schools	5	2
Collective Bargaining/Unions	3	1
Evaluation	1	0
Testing	0	1
Tax Credit Scholarships	0	0
Digital Learning	1	0
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	1	1
Total	11	5

Table 104: Wisconsin Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003				
2004	AB 0747	Sinicki	D	Charter Schools
2004	AB 0847	Sinicki	D	Charter Schools
2005	AB 0425	Petrowski	R	Testing
2006	AB 0698	Vos	R	Charter Schools
2006	AB 0829	Richards	D	Charter Schools/Vouchers
2006	SB 0618	Darling	R	Vouchers
2007				
2008	SB 0396	Lehman	D	Charter Schools/Digital Learning
2009	AB 0095	Sinicki	D	Collective Bargaining
2009	SB 0311	Joint Committee on Employee Relations	D*	Collective Bargaining
2009	SB 372	Education Committee	D*	Evaluation/Collective Bargaining
	SB 373	Education Committee	D*	Charter Schools
2010				
2011	AB 0011	Assembly Organization Committee	R*	Collective Bargaining
2011	SB 0020	Darling	R	Charter Schools

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Wisconsin's vendor and contract systems showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

Minnesota

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform in each state. Each state's education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 105 and 106 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 28. The results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, $r = .690$, $n = 11$, $p = .019$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 28 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 105: Minnesota Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.18	.874	11

Table 106: Minnesota Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.690*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.019
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.690*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.019	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 28: Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011

From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Minnesota, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform. Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review. Table 107 explains the rationale for each piece of identified education reform legislation. Increasing accountability is the major rationale for the legislation in Minnesota; also decreasing the power of the teaching profession appears to be a major rationale for legislators. By increasing accountability through testing and increase the number of teachers through alternative certification programs, Minnesota's legislator hope to create a high achieving public education system when using standardized tests as the measures of achievement.

Table 107: Minnesota Education Reform Legislation Rationale

Year	Legislation	Summary	Rationale
2003	HF 0302	Creates state wide academic standards and tests	Increase School Accountability
2004	SF 1793	Creates the high objective uniform state standard of evaluation (HOUSSE) program for alternative certification	Decrease Educator Power
2005	HF 0141	Allocate funds using student performance via standardized tests	Increase School Accountability
	SF 0106	Removes the \$2,000 per family cap on the education tax credit	Increase School Choice
2007	HF 2245	Creates the Graduation Required Assessment for Diploma (GRAD) exam	Increase School Accountability
	SF 1073	Ratifies collective bargaining agreement between state and Teacher's Retirement Association	Keep the Peace
2008	HF 1812	Initial teacher licensure via portfolio (temporary certificate)	Decrease Educator Power
	SF 2796	Removes the term "qualified" and specific licensure required for early childhood education programs	Decrease Educator Power
2009	HF 0002	Creates a committee to advise the governor on methods to improve school choice, testing results/methods and teacher accountability and quality.	Increase School Choice and Accountability
2010	SF 2505	Creates a task force to improve early childhood education through increased federally funded charter schools and state wide school evaluation system	Increase School Choice and Accountability
	HF 3329	Fast tracks funding for Charter Schools serving high level of ESE population	Increase School Choice
2011	HF 0026	Creates a teacher and administrator evaluation system with the goal of increasing student success	Increase School Accountability
	SF 0040	Creates new alternative teacher certification programs which must have curriculum focused on outcome based assessment	Decrease Educator Power

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Minnesota state legislature from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = .64$, $SD = .809$) and Republicans ($M = .36$, $SD = .674$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = .859$, $p = .401$. These results suggest that in the state of Minnesota, party identification has little impact on support for education reform legislation. Despite a lack of statistical significance, this test and descriptive data shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of .64 education reform bills in Oklahoma per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of .36 education reform bills (Table 108). Also, of the 13 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Democrats authored nine, making Minnesota one of the two states in which Democrats authored more enacted education reform legislation than their Republican counterparts. Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows

that Democrats authored roughly three times more education reform bills than their Republican counterparts.

Table 108: Minnesota Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	.64	.809	.244
	R	11	.36	.674	.203

Table 109: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	Legislation	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
	Equal variances assumed	1.108	.305	.859	20	.401	.273	.318	-.390	.935
	Equal variances not assumed			.859	19.370	.401	.273	.318	-.391	.936




Figure 29: Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix J). Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for nine of the 13 pieces of education reform legislation in Minnesota. Breaking this down into education theme, Democrats authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on

alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, testing and tax credit scholarships. Republicans only authored four total enacted bills in the ten year time period.

Results of question two indicate that party identification played a role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Minnesota though not to a statistically significant level. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation, however descriptives showed Democrats were responsible for 70% of all education reform legislation. Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme despite Democrats authoring more bills enacted into legislation. Similar only to Wisconsin, Minnesota's education reform movement was more likely supported by Democrats than Republicans, but not with a statistically significant difference.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in Minnesota from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 110 displays this tally and the mode of the state legislation for Minnesota. With 13 education reform bills enacted, Minnesota falls into the same category as Wisconsin as one of the states which has taken the least action to legislation education reform. Of the 13 bills, five (38%) are focused on testing,

four (30%) are geared toward *alternative certification* and three (23%) fall under the theme of *charter schools*. Zero education reform bills were focused on *digital learning*, *tenure* or *vouchers*.

Table 110: Minnesota Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargaining	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
4	3	1	2	5	1	0	0	0

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the state of Minnesota showed a statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables $r = .639$, $n = 11$, $p = .034$ (Table 112); the scatter plot (Figure 30) summarizes these results. Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the state of Minnesota, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has a strong positive relationship with per-pupil expenditure.

Table 111: Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	1.18	.874	11
PerPupilExpend	11059.82	502.379	11

Table 112: Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExpend
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.639*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.034
	N	11	11
PerPupilExpend	Pearson Correlation	.639*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.034	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 30: Minnesota ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted. Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based organization or person affiliated with such organizations. Table 113 shows the resulting data from this research for the state of Minnesota.

Overall there were six different sources of campaign contributions to education reform candidates in Minnesota from 2001-2011. Of these six contributors, all but one were affiliated with public schools. The Leisa Irwin, the outlier of the group, was the Executive Director of Paladin Academy, a charter schools for high school level students. *Minneapolis Teacher's Retirement Fund Committee of Thirteen* is a political action committee focused on protecting retirement benefits. *Education Minnesota* is an affiliate union of the National Education Association (NEA).

With only 13 articles of enacted legislation and six total contributors to all education reform campaigns, Minnesota is not the most active state in regards to enacting education reform, hence its rank of tenth. However, what is evident in Minnesota is the importance unions play in the state compared to others. Minnesota is one of the two Democratically controlled states as it pertains to education reform and the contributions to legislators' campaign follow the traditional political philosophy of union support for

Democratic candidates. One thing that separates Minnesota from the other states in the sample except for Arizona is the common and dominant use of public subsidies for campaigns. Every candidate who introduced enacted legislation received a majority of their funds for public subsidies, a fact that may hinder the growth of outside organizations entering the education reform ring in Minnesota.

Table 113: Minnesota Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

Legislator	Party ID	Legislation	Ed. Reform Category	Year of Introduced Legislation	Source of Contribution	Amount of Contribution	Vendor Contract Procurement
Sykora	R	HF 0302	Testing	2003	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Kelley	D	SF 1793	Alternative Certification	2004	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Sykora	R	HF 0141	Testing	2005	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Pogemiller	D	SF 0106	Tax Credit Scholarship	2005	Minneapolis Federation of Teachers Local 59	\$500	No
				2005	Minneapolis Teachers Retirement Fund Committee of Thirteen	\$500	No
					Education Minnesota	\$400	No
Greiling	D	HF 2245	Testing	2007	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Scheid	D	SF 1073	Collective Bargaining	2007	Education Minnesota	\$650	No
					St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund Association	\$500	No
Carlson	D	HF 1812	Alternative Certification	2008	St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund Association	\$500	No

Table 113: Minnesota Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts

					Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers	\$500	No
					Education Minnesota	\$400	No
Saxhaug	D	SF 2796	Alternative Certification	2008	Education Minnesota	\$400	No
Greiling	D	HF 0002	Testing/ Evaluation/ Charter Schools	2009	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Bonoff	D	SF 2505	Testing/Charter Schools	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Greiling	D	HF 3329	Charter Schools	2010	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		
Garofalo	R	HF 0026	Evaluation	2011	Leisa Irwin	\$250	
Olson	R	SF 0040	Alternative Certification	2011	No Meaningful Campaign Contributions		

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that Minnesota education reform legislation is supported by Democrats more so than Republicans. This is similar only to Wisconsin in the top ten reform minded states, but is falling in line with other data regarding the state. Of the 13 education reform bills enacted, Democrats authored nine of the bills. In the reform themes of *alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, testing and tax credit scholarships*, Democrats introduced a majority of the legislation. Republican and Democrats tied one a piece on *evaluation* legislation. Table 114 shows this Democratic control despite the little reform that occurred from 2001-2011.

Table 115 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation. Though Democrats have dominated education reform in Minnesota, the 2011 legislative session only had two education reforms enacted, both from Republican legislators. Despite this, Democrats dominate the authorship of legislation from 2001-2011.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Democrats in Minnesota were the force behind education reform in the state. Democrats authored more legislation overall and more legislation on almost all education reform themes. Unlike most of the states from the sample, Minnesota's education reform is primarily democratically created.

Table 114: Minnesota Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	3	1
Charter Schools	3	0
Collective Bargaining/Unions	1	0
Evaluation	1	1
Testing	3	2
Tax Credit Scholarships	1	0
Digital Learning	0	0
Tenure	0	0
Voucher Programs	0	0
Total	12	4

Table 115: Minnesota Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme

Year	Legislation	Author(s)	Party ID	Ed. Reform Theme
2001				
2002				
2003	HF 0302	Sykora	R	Testing
2004	SF 1793	Kelley	D	Alternative Certification
2005	HF 0141	Sykora	R	Testing
2005	SF 0106	Pogemiller	D	Tax Credit Scholarship
2006				
2007	HF 2245	Greiling	D	Testing
2007	SF 1073	Scheid	D	Collective Bargaining
2008	HF 1812	Carlson	D	Alternative Certification
2008	SF 2796	Saxhaug	D	Alternative Certification
2009	HF 0002	Greiling	D	Testing/Evaluation/Charter Schools
2010	SF 2505	Bonoff	D	Testing/Charter Schools
2010	HF 3329	Greiling	D	Charter Schools
2011	HF 0026	Garofalo	R	Evaluation
2011	SF 0040	Olson	R	Alternative Certification

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state's vendor contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted. The rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor contracts for education purposes.

The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution. Minnesota's office of management and budget search system showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011. For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed.

National

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of education reform at an aggregate level. All ten states' education reform legislation was qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed methodology of the research. Using the results of question one and other six research questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was created.

To determine if education reform was even a policy issue of importance, it was necessary to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and the time period 2001-2011. A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are seen in Tables 116 and 117 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 31. The results of the analysis indicate a very strong positive relationship, $r = .881$, $n = 11$, $p = .000$ between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 31 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.

Table 116: Ten State Legislation Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	25.00	16.631	11

Table 117: Ten State Legislation/Year Correlation

		Legislation	Year
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.881**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	11	11
Year	Pearson Correlation	.881**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	11	11

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




Figure 31: Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011

From Figure 31 it is evident that the amount of education reform legislation has dramatically increased from 2001-2011. The next step was to determine the rationale for these reforms at a ten state total to draw a conclusion regarding education reform in the

United States. From the rationale tables in each state, it is concluded that increasing school choice and increasing school accountability are the major rationales for education reform legislation in the United States. These two goals indicate that the country is focused on increasing student test scores by holding teachers and public education facilities accountable for student learning gains while also introducing competition into the public school sector to act as an impetus to increase scores. A secondary rationale from the research was decreasing educator power. Seen in every state in the sample, testing legislation was soon followed with requirements of teacher evaluations based somewhat on the testing results and increasing alternative certification opportunities for people to become teachers without going through the traditional channels of education certification. These factors draw the conclusion that the rationale for education reform legislation is to fundamentally alter the power structure of public education; to remove the authority of educating students from the teacher just as industrialization has removed the power of labor from the skilled worker at the turn of the 20th century. Replacing professional teacher authority with testing authority; replacing local authority (for all but one state) with state and national authority; turning public education from a supposed equitable existence to one of capitalistic competition in hopes that through testing and reduced autonomy, the next generation of workers will be created.

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted. First, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in all ten of the states' legislatures from 2001-2011. After determining if a difference existed between political parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes.

There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 5.921$) and Republicans ($M = 19.00$, $SD = 13.109$) and support for overall education reform bills; $t(20) = -2.830$, $p = .010$. These results suggest that in the most educated reform minded states, party identification has an impact on support for education reform legislation with Republicans more likely to support such legislation. Alongside statistical significance, this test and descriptive data also shows the educational relevance of the results. Democrats introduced an average of 6.00 enacted education reform bills per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 19.00 enacted education reform bills (Table 118); Republicans are introducing and enacting education reform legislation on a nearly three to one ratio. Of the 275 pieces of enacted legislation, Republicans authored 209.

Table 118: Ten State Group Statistics

	PartyID	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Legislation	D	11	6.00	5.921	1.785
	R	11	19.00	13.109	3.953

Table 119: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Legislation	Equal variances assumed	6.906	.016	-2.830	20	.010	-12.273	4.337	-21.320	-3.226
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.830	13.917	.013	-12.273	4.337	-21.580	-2.965




Figure 32: Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school legislation $X^2(1, N = 275) = 9.440, p = .002$. This result showed that a relationship existed between party identification and support for charter school legislation. An examination of crosstabs clarified that if a Democrat introduced any type of education reform legislation, there was a 47% chance that the legislation would be about *charter schools*. Despite only

one relationship existing at a statistical level, further educational relevance was discovered when examining the descriptive data.

Results of question two indicate that party identification played a role in the support of education reform legislation on a national level when using the ten most education reform minded states as the sample. An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education reform legislation at $p = .020$. Crosstabs showed that Republicans sponsored more education reform legislation at a 3 to 1 ratio. Chi square tests conducted showed statistical significance between party identification and support for charter school legislation only with Democrats authoring only 31 of 87 charter school bills but these 31 bills making up 47% of all Democratically authored legislation. Despite a lack of other significant relationships between specific reforms and party affiliation, crosstabs show that Republicans authored a majority of the legislation for each one of the nine education reform themes; with this and the significance of the t-test, it is clear that on a national level, education reform legislation is predominantly authored and supported by the Republican Party.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in each of the ten states from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 120 displays this tally and the

mode of the state legislation for ten most education reform minded states. Of the 275 pieces of education reform legislation that was enacted from 2001-2011, 87 (32%) fell under the theme of *charter schools*. Close behind with 76 (28%), *testing* showed to be a major theme of the education reform bills. In third place, yet with much less legislation was theme of *evaluation* which received 33 (12%) of the education reform bills enacted. The least used education reform theme was *tenure* will only seven (3%) of the bills focused on this reform.

To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine reform themes. The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically significant relationship between Party ID and support for charter school legislation $X^2 (1, N = 280) = 9.440, p = .002$. This result showed that a relationship existed between party identification and support for charter school legislation. An examination of descriptives clarified that Republicans authored 56 of the 89 pieces of legislation focused on this theme (Appendix K). Despite only one relationship existing at a statistical level, educational relevance was discovered when examining the descriptives of the data.

Table 120: Ten State Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme

Alt. Cert.	Charter Schools	Collective Bargaining	Eval.	Testing	Tax Credits Scholarships	Digital Learning	Tenure	Vouchers
23	87	16	33	76	16	26	7	20

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced at the state level between 2001-2011?

To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson's r correlation was conducted. The results of this analysis for the sampled ten states showed a statistically significant relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables $r = .621$, $n = 11$, $p = .041$ (Table 122); the scatter plot (Figure 33) summarizes these results. Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the ten most education reform minded states, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has a strong positive relationship with per-pupil expenditures.

Table 121: Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Legislation	25.00	16.682	11
PerPupilExp	10254.1545	345.20217	11

Table 122: Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation

		Legislation	PerPupilExp
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	1	.621*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.041
	N	11	11
PerPupilExp	Pearson Correlation	.621*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.041	
	N	11	11

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Figure 33: Ten state ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

An analysis of all ten states in the sample indicate that to a large extent, organizations and affiliates outside the traditional public school system are the main financiers of education reform legislation. These outside sources differ from state to state, with private companies being a major contributor as well as policy advocates, non-profits, PACs and individuals working for each entity. In total, these organizations

donated \$234,414 to education reform legislators compared to \$138,410 given by contributors affiliated with traditional public schools. This clearly indicates that private organizations, specifically those offering new education alternatives and philosophical agendas, are financing education reform legislation.

Public schools unions were responsible for most of the financing that came from public school affiliated organizations. These organizations proved financially influential in Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. Education reform legislators from the other six states in the sample, Florida, Arizona, Oklahoma, Georgia, Ohio and Louisiana were financed by the aforementioned outside organizations more so than public school affiliated organizations. For questions five, the research indicates that organizations from outside the traditional public schools, specifically organizations focused on increasing school choice, are the main sources of financing for education reform legislation.

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted legislation. From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding who was supporting education reform in each state.

The results of the data collection show that at the national level, using the ten state totals, education reform legislation is supported by Republicans far more so than

Democrats. Of the 275 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 209 of those bills. Furthermore, in all education reform themes, Republicans authored and enacted more legislation than their Democratic counterparts. Table 123 clearly shows the amount of the control that Republicans have had on the education reform movement.

Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in United States were the dominant force behind education reform. The total amount of legislation as well as support for each legislative theme clearly favors the Republicans in the state legislative sample. The only education reform theme in which Democrats rise close to the level of Republican support is *charter schools*, but even then a 25 pieces of legislation separate the two parties. Overall, in the United States from 2001-2011, Republicans were the party to support not only support education reform as a movement, but also every single theme of education reform.

Table 123: Total Education Reform Themes by Party ID

Ed. Reform Theme	Democrat	Republican
Alternative Certification	7	16
Charter Schools	31	56
Collective Bargaining/Unions	5	11
Evaluation	4	29
Testing	16	60
Tax Credit Scholarships	4	12
Digital Learning	5	21
Tenure	0	7
Voucher Programs	2	18
Total	74	229

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

The purpose of this question was to determine if donating to a legislator's campaign would lead to financial benefits for the contributor. The results of the data analysis showed that to a large extent contributions were not connected to benefits. Only three out of over 300 campaign contributors received state vendor contracts from 2001-2011. This great divide between contributing and benefiting indicates that donating to campaigns at the state level does not lead to financial benefits for the contributor as measured by state vendor contracts.

Summary

Education reform legislation in the ten most education reform minded states grew dramatically from 2001-2011. The legislation enacted was meant to increase student achievement through increasing accountability and school choice. With Republican domination of education reform legislation, introducing 209 of the 275 enacted legislative pieces, themes of testing and charter schools highlight the relationship with the rationale. This increased legislation correlated with an increase in per-pupil funding in most states and at the aggregate level. The financing for this legislation predominantly came from sources outside of public education, specifically corporations and PAC's. However, the financing of such legislation did not lead to financial benefits for contributing organizations when examining state vendor contracts.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to determine a few key issues regarding education reform in the United States. First, the researcher wanted to show exactly what education reform looked like in the country. Another purpose was to show who, politically, supported education reform legislation. A third issue that the researcher examined was the rationale for education reform. Finally, a focus on the stakeholders in education reform would be able to bring clarity to issues regarding financial support and benefits of enacted education reform legislation.

To create a sample for the research, purposive sampling was used to determine which states were the most education reform oriented; enacted education reform legislation from 2001-2011 was then used to explain what were the rationale, themes and purposes of education reform. Political campaign contributions were used to determine who was financing education reform and state vendor contracts researched to conclude if financing reform led to financing benefits. Results of the research indicated a clear characterization as to what education reform is in the United States as well as the relationship between this reform and legislative funding and the politics/policies of the top ten education reform minded states.

Summary and Discussion of Findings

Research Question One

What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 2001-2011?

After conducting an extensive literature review and then examining 275 pieces of education reform legislation, a supported conclusion is evident. The literature review conducted showed that education reform, no matter the theme, is focused on improving student achievement and making American students more competitive in the world marketplace. Though the methods for increasing student achievement varies, the end goal is all the same whether its testing, accountability, collective bargaining, or any other education reform theme identified. The rationale is that through reformation, a renaissance for public education can be created.

However, the literature review is only half the process in answering question one. Examining each of the 275 education reform legislative pieces while also researching the supporters and financiers of education reform legislation highlight other rationales alongside the general increasing of student achievement. A vast majority of the legislation had the rationales of increasing accountability and school choice. Accountability as a rationale was focused on increasing testing of students and tying teacher evaluations to a student's achievement or growth on said assessment. This form of accountability is supposed to assure that good teachers in the classroom and that poor teachers are removed. By decreasing the power of collective bargaining and

changing tenure laws, as many of the states in the sample legislate, accountability moves from the school district level to the state and national level.

The rationale of increasing school choice (vouchers, charters, virtual and tax credit scholarships) is meant to increase competition between traditional public schools and the new alternatives. In theory in competition will spur on student achievement and teacher effectiveness as fear of losing students to school choices options will drive instruction. School choice works hand-in-hand with accountability as fear of choice options holds public schools accountable for what students are learning.

A final rationale, decreasing educator power, is seen in many of the sampled states. When tying evaluations to student achievement through state testing, the teacher loses the authority over a student's success. No longer is the teacher's evaluative techniques the measurement of student success, but instead the standardized tests determine how students, parents and society measures student success and teacher effectiveness. The results of decreasing educator power could very well have a negative impact on the teaching profession and the students they teach. Instead of making teaching a more attractive profession through incentivization, education reforms as currently used will turn teachers into replaceable widgets. This widgetization of professional educators will have a broad impact on the future of public education.

The two major rationales determined from this research, increasing school choice and accountability, follows a growing practice on the international level. Research by Wobmann et al, (2008) showed students performed better in countries with higher levels of school choice and school accountability when examining the results of the 2003 PISA

test. Furthermore, a focus on the human input of education (teachers) has grown in use on an international level (Verger et al., 2013). The rationales discovered from this research highlight a clear connection between globalization and neoliberal ideals of education. This neoliberalism, as Hursh (2005) describes, has taken root on a global scale as education reforms focus on competition, accountability and privatization of education. The rationales of America's education reform movement show that the United States is following incredibly similar paths as other countries in regards to the types of reforms being enacted and the rationales for such reforms.

Research Question Two

Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support for education reform legislation?

Question two was created to show the difference between Democrats and Republicans in regards to support for the overall education reform movement and each identified education reform theme. Support was defined as authoring the enacted education reform legislation. The results showed that in six of the ten states sampled, there was no statistically significant difference between the two parties. The other four states, Florida, Arizona, Ohio and Georgia, showed a statistically significant difference with Florida and Arizona showing a statistically significant difference at $p = .01$. As a national data set, the ten states combined clearly indicated a statistically significant difference also at the $p = .01$ level. In all statistically significant differences, Republicans were more likely to support education reform legislation as a topic of legislation.

Further chi-square and cross tabs were conducted to determine if party identification was related to support for each type of education reform legislation. Though the crosstabs and chi square tests were conducted at state and national levels, only those tests at the national level proved valid because the states did not have enough data (5) in each value of the 2 X 2 crosstab. At the national level the only relationship which existed was between party identification and charter schools at strength of $p = .01$. Though the crosstab showed 56 of the 87 charter schools bills were authored by Republicans, any bill authored by Democrats had a 47% chance of being focused on charter schools. Beyond this relationship, no such statistical relationship occurred.

A lack of statistical significance turned the researcher to look at crosstab descriptives to get a better view of education reform as it related to party identification. The results of this analysis showed that on a national level, with 275 pieces of education reform legislation, Republicans sponsored more bills in each theme than their Democratic counterparts. This added together to show Republicans authored 209 or the 275 total legislative bills enacted into law. At the national (10 state) level, Republicans by far support education reform legislation overall and in each theme of legislation.

Breaking that down into each state, Florida, Arizona and Oklahoma were dominated by Republicans in both overall legislation and in each theme. Democrats did not produce any piece of the legislation more than their Republican counterparts. Beyond these three states however, Democrats did introduce some themes in some states more than their Republican brethren. In Indiana, Democrats authored more tax credit scholarship and digital learning legislation, while both parties created equal amounts of

charter school and evaluation theme legislation. Democrats in Louisiana authored more legislation regarding charter schools and digital learning while produced equal amounts legislation focused on vouchers.

Ohio Democrats did not author any legislative theme more than Republicans however did author equal amounts of legislation focusing on charter schools. Michigan Democrats only produced more legislation focused on charter schools. Georgia followed similar suit with digital learning being the only education reform theme in which Democrats created more legislation than Republicans. Wisconsin Democrats showed more control over charter schools, collective bargaining, evaluation and digital learning and produced equal amount of legislation focused on vouchers. Finally, Democrats in Minnesota created more legislation non alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining, testing, and tax credit scholarships while authoring equal amounts of legislation on evaluation.

The differences among each state's results clearly indicate that party identification is not enough to clearly indicate one's support for specific education reform legislation. Though statistically a difference exists between the parties and support for legislation overall; relationships between the parties and support for specific education reform legislation are not so clear. The data indicates that if a Democrats authors education reform legislation it is more likely to be focused on charter schools than any other theme; this does not tell us a lot about major differences between the parties. It appears from the data that other issues beyond party identification drive education reform authorship when it comes to specific themes. Though Republicans dominate education reform as a policy

and in each education theme when using all state data combined, how each party relates to each identified education reform theme at the state level remains unclear.

Though the data at the aggregate level indicate that Republicans are clearly authoring and enacting the education reform legislation at the state level, this does not draw the most vivid picture of which political party supports specific types of education reform. An examination of the official Democratic and Republican party platforms show both parties support increasing opportunities for student to receive a top public education. Both platforms also clearly state that the United States must improve its education systems in order to meet global demands for an educated workforce (this follows the conclusions discussed in Question One regarding globalization). What differentiates the party platforms from each other however is that Republicans bluntly state their support for market driven education reforms (charter schools, scholarships, vouchers) whereas the Democratic platform calls for improving education without giving clear indications as to the means to such improvement.

Though an examination of state level education reforms showed that Republicans clearly are responsible for a vast majority of the enacted legislation, this does not tell the entire story. It must be remembered that much of this state level legislation which has been passed since 2001 was done so in order to meet the guidelines of a Republican presidential education plan (NCLB) and a Democratic presidential education plan (RTTP). The fact that both parties are responsible for this legislation due to the power of the purse shows that education reform is being used as a national security issue today, just as it was in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik. By focusing on economic globalization,

political leaders have been able to generate market driven, neoliberal education reforms which create an education system focused on pushing out widgets capable working for corporations in the new global economy. With a vast, educated workforce, America's place as the global hegemon in the political, economic and militaristic theatre can be concreted. Though the data shows state level Republicans responsible for such neoliberal reforms, the well is truly deeper.

Furthermore, the sampling used for this research may have contributed to a Republican dominated sample. The publications from *Center for Education Reform*, *Students First* and *ALEC*, the latter two being known as more conservative entities, were used as the basis for the ranking of the states; this may have contributed to Republic controlled legislatures dominating the research and therefore the showing up as the party behind education reform.

Research Question Three

What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced?

After reading each of the 275 pieces of education reform legislation in each of the ten states enacted from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were run to determine which education reform theme state legislation was focused on reforming. In all states the most often used themes of the education reform legislation was either *testing* or *charter schools*. In six of the states (Indiana, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma and Minnesota), *testing* was the most common theme. In four of the states (Louisiana,

Arizona, Georgia and Wisconsin), *charter schools* was the most common theme. The least common theme of education reform was *tenure* where only four of the states (Louisiana, Florida, Arizona and Michigan) enacted education reform legislation focused on this issue.

These results indicate that from 2001-2011, education reform legislation in the United States had a competition driven and results oriented focus. The top three education reform themes were *charter schools*, *testing* and *evaluation*. With these three themes making up 72% of all education reform in the ten states, clear conclusions regarding the themes of education reform were made. First, competition was a major focus of education reformers from 2001-2011. This is evident in the fact that 32% of all education reform legislation during this time period fell under the theme of *charter schools*. With a goal of creating competition to increase student achievement, the charter school movement dominated the first decade of new millennium.

Secondly, education became results oriented during the decade. In order to show who wins this competition between schools, both traditional public as well as charter schools, some form of data must be used as evidence. This was accomplished by state legislatures as 28% of all education reform legislation was focused on the theme of *testing*. Testing forced schools to show their successes and failures and become more accountable for the actions of their teachers and administration.

Finally, the use of the test results as evaluative measures and decision making apparatuses is evident as 12% of all education reform legislation had the theme of *evaluation*. Once competition was initiated via charter schools and comparison of

schools was done through testing, evaluation of school success based upon the testing policies forced public schools to change how both school and personnel would be evaluated. This basic process, competition-testing-evaluation, is evident when examining each states legislative themes as all ten states have some combination of two out the three major themes in their top three education reform themes.

Not surprisingly, the results of the types of reforms being enacted follows suit with the rationales for education reform. These reform themes continue with the everclearer picture of education reform as a response to globalization and international competition. As Windle (2014) concluded, market driven reforms, including choice choice and competition, are the driving forces behind education reform in the United States and on a global scale. Using capitalistic philosophy, education reformers have pushed to create a simple process of transferal from teacher to student, therefore creating scapegoats, easy to blame and weak in voice, when the fear of falling behind our competitive counterparts on the global level is bellowed. With little regard for the altruistic nature of education, political and business leaders of the United States have reformed education into a production line system of gilded results based upon competition and capitalism.

Research Question Four

Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level between 2001-2011?

After analyzing the data from the sample, it was concluded that there was a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil funding and the amount of the education reform legislation enacted from 2001-2011 when amassing the ten state totals. This was surprising due to the fact that in eight of the ten states used as the sample, there was no statistically significant relationship; in Minnesota and Wisconsin there were statistically significant relationships.

The first question that arises from the data is why there is a difference between the ten state average and eight of the ten states individually. This disparity could lie with amount of legislation introduced in each state; though a state like Oklahoma had 56 pieces of education reform legislation, Ohio only produced 12. This difference in the amount of legislation may have played a part in the lack of coherence of results.

A major factor that jumps out from this data is that Minnesota and Wisconsin were the only two states in which Democrats authored more enacted legislation than their Republican counterparts. This finding leads to a major conclusion, the data shows that Democrats are more fiscally responsible when it comes to funding educational reform initiatives than their Republican counterparts. In the two Democratic states, as education reforms increased or decreased each year, so followed per pupil expenditures on education.

Another conclusion to be drawn from the research is the use of the incorrect term “unfunded mandate” in regards to education reform. On an aggregate level, as the amount of education reform legislation increased, the per-pupil funding also increased. Though the researcher has shown a positive correlation between education reforms and

funding, Duncombe et al (2008) concluded that when examining Federal funding only, education reforms were underfunded by Federal dollars when purposing for high achievement students. The idea that the Federal government places mandates on states and school districts and then does not supply the funds necessary for such changes needs to be examined further. However, as the movement toward market driven education reforms has grown, the focus on funding models for public education will come under spotlight. With neoliberal notion of competition for finite resources moving into public education, the issue of funding, and perhaps “underfunded mandates” will become a major issue in education policy.

The results of the data analysis of question four show that at a national level, there is a statistically significant relationship between state funding for education at a per pupil level and a the amount of education reform legislation enacted from 2001-2011. Of the ten state, only Minnesota and Wisconsin showed similar results; eight of the ten states showed no statistical significance.

Research Question Five

Who is financing education reform legislation?

Financing education reform candidates and their enacted legislation was meant to determine the sources of money that were influencing state legislators who enacted education reform legislation. It was concluded that sources from outside the traditional public school system, specifically those organizations focused on school choice, were the

main financiers of these candidates; money from nontraditional education organizations are playing major role in the development and growth of educational reform organization.

A few issues from the data stuck out as interesting when examining the sources of financing. First, education reform organizations and school choice advocates are not restricted by state boundaries. Many organizations focused on education reform were identified as contributors in multiple states indicating a large scale lobbying effort for education reform. Secondly, traditional public schools have very little advocacy/lobbying beyond the public school union. In every state, except Michigan, the educators unions were not only the major financier within the traditional public school contributors, they were the only financiers! This indicates that public schools are ill prepared to represent themselves and their stakeholders when it comes to issues of policy change. Compared to the numerous and diverse nontraditional public schools financiers, public school unions are monolithic.

Finally, in the narrative of public school reform in the United States, public school unions have often been vilified for protecting poor teachers at the expense of student success. Education reformers have focused great efforts on demonizing the public school unions and the results of this research shows exactly why they have taken this course of attack. Because educators unions are basically the only form of lobbying and financing of education reform legislation, the attacks against them by education reform advocates will always hit their target. Without multiple agencies and organizations representing the interests of traditional public schools, educators unions

will continue to be lambasted by education reformers in the public realm and out spent in regards to education reform financing on an aggregate level.

The findings from question five is supported by previous research regarding the source of education reform on an international level. Research by Ball (1998), concluded that the globalization of industrialized economies acted as the impetus for education reform in modern society as increased competition for limited commodities has required business and government to work together to create a labor force able to compete in this globalized economy. Brown and Lauder (1996), originated this idea of globalization as a major cause of education reform and further research has come to similar conclusions regarding the connection between globalized economies and reformed education systems based upon free market principles. Again, the issue of globalization and neoliberal philosophies drive the education reform movement in the United States, as they are on a global scale.

As the United States has increased its' amount education reform legislation, the interests of organization outside of the traditional public education has grown similarly in voice. This view of globalization and the economization of public schools through education reform is also seen in the increasing use of testing to measure (compare) one country's students to another's and therefore a country's future economic strength (Lingard et al., 2013). The increased use of standardized and high-stakes testing on a state, national (Common Core) and international level (PISA) which currently takes a paramount role in education reform, fully supports the theory of globalization of business as a major impetus for the education reform legislation. Results of research questions

five, funding for education reform legislation, clearly indicates that outside organizations are playing a major role such reform.

Research Question Six

Who is supporting education reform legislation?

Supporting education reform in the United States appears to a clear cut issue; Republicans, by an overwhelming majority, support education reform legislation compared to their Democratic counterparts overall and for each education reform theme. When taken at the aggregate level, Republicans appear to dominate the education reform movement; breaking down the legislation to state level status highlights an interesting finding.

Though overall legislation and legislative themes of education reform are supported more so by Republicans than Democrats at the collective level, the state of Minnesota and Wisconsin buck this trend. In these two North Midwestern states, Democrats have controlled the education reform in their states. The amount of the education reform legislation in these states is much lower than other states in the sample and outside financing is also less bountiful. Though these two states rank 9th and 10th in education reform mindedness, they still outrank 40 other states, some of which will be Republican controlled states. This leads to the question: Why are these two states different from the rest?

Research Question Seven

Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their support?

One of major intents of this research was to determine if those who financially supported candidates who in turn authored enacted education reform legislation received any financial benefits in return for their support. Using state vendor contracts as the descriptor for “benefits”, an examination of each state’s vendor contract system was conducted. The results of the research indicated that the affiliates of educational organizations and the organizations themselves who financially supported these campaigns did not receive financial benefits for their political and financial support.

Though the question is sufficiently answered for the purpose of this research, variables remain that pose further questions. The researcher chose to use state vendor contracts as the avenue by which financiers of education reform legislation could receive benefits. By focusing only on state vendor contracts, other paths by which financial benefits might possible be received are not unlikely. Though the organizations and people who donated to campaigns did not receive financial benefits for their contributions via state contracts, does not mean they did not receive financial benefits in other avenues.

Also, one must take into the account that financial remunerations are not the only benefits that an organization or person may receive for their campaign contribution; influence, for example, can be difficult to quantitatively measure. Though the conclusion of this research is was no financial benefits were received for campaign contributions, a

broader term of benefits and examining different methods by which public funds are distributed may result in different findings.

Conclusions

Education reform legislation in the ten most education reform minded states grew dramatically from 2001-2011. The legislation enacted was meant to increase student achievement through increasing accountability and school choice. With Republican domination of education reform legislation, introducing 209 of the 275 enacted legislative pieces, themes of testing and charter schools highlight the relationship with the rationale. This increased legislation correlated with an increase in per-pupil funding in most states and at the aggregate level. The financing for this legislation predominantly came from sources outside of public education, specifically corporations and PAC's. However, the financing of such legislation did not lead to financial benefits for contributing organizations when examining state vendor contracts.

Though the purpose of this research was to determine how education reform in the United States could be characterized, the results of the research highlight a global issue in education. A focus on privatization, competition and other neoliberal ideals have taken a foothold in education reform worldwide. Though there are various degrees of reform being instituted on a global scale, the general premise of neoliberalism has been decided upon as the method to create the best education systems. The paramount finding from this research, perhaps the most vital question not asked, is now that we know the reforms...what is the renaissance?

Recommendations for Future Research

Education reform is a broad topic, one in which a researcher can get lost in and never finish discovering new information; because of this, further research regarding the top can be quite extensive. From this dissertation, a few specific research recommendation can be made. First, research needs to be conducted specifically on education reform in all fifty states. This could show answers as to what major differences and similarities are between the most and least education reform minded states. Second, research regarding education reform funding needs to focus not only on legislator who introduce enacted legislation, but also on the governors of the states as these individuals carry great power and influence over legislative policy. Another area of further research is focused on benefits of funding education reform legislation. This research used state vendor contracts as the method to determine in those who funded campaigns received financial benefits; further research should focus on district level finances to determine if benefits exist. This would require extensive research in each individual state. Though the focus of this dissertation reached acceptable conclusions regarding education reform, rationales and support for such legislation, further research is necessary to clarify the relationship between outside organizations and financial benefits of supporting education reform legislation.

Perhaps the greatest need for future research lies in an examination of the root of neoliberal ideals which have taken a foothold in education reform. Where these ideals get their support on an international level would help greatly in determining how these reforms have grown and what the ultimate goal is for such reforms. Education reform is

a global issue, one in which most educational systems on an international level are following the same steps. Who created these steps and why they have become the road more travelled needs to be answered.

Summary

America's infatuation with education reform may have started in 1983 with the publication of *A Nation at Risk*, but not until the new century did the United States begin to fundamentally change public education in the country. With an increase in education reforms, legislators, predominantly Republican, across the country tried to enact a reformation to create an educational renaissance. With a focus on accountability, achievement, and choice, reformers, proliferated in profiles of corporations, PACs and other organizations outside the realm of traditional public education. Though these various stakeholders did not benefit financially from their political and financial support, education reform in the United States, and the world, was an issue of growing legislation and increasing importance as globalization and neoliberal philosophies propagated education reform.

APPENDIX A: INDIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Indiana Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23
Party ID * Charter School	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	23	100.0%	0	0.0%	23	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Indiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	0	7
	R	14	2	16
Total		21	2	23

Indiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.958 ^a	1	.328		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.204	.328
	Cramer's V	.204	.328
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Charter School

Indiana Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	5	2	7
	R	14	2	16
Total		19	4	23

Indiana Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.875 ^a	1	.349		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.195	.349
	Cramer's V	.195	.349
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Indiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	0	7
	R	11	5	16
Total		18	5	23

Indiana party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.795 ^a	1	.095		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.52.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.349	.095
	Cramer's V	.349	.095
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Evaluation

Indiana Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	6	1	7
	R	15	1	16
Total		21	2	23

Indiana Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.396 ^a	1	.529		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.131	.529
	Cramer's V	.131	.529
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Testing

Indiana Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	3	7
	R	12	4	16
Total		16	7	23

Indiana Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.733 ^a	1	.392		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.13.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.179	.392
	Cramer's V	.179	.392
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Tax Credit Scholarships

Indiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	5	2	7
	R	15	1	16
Total		20	3	23

Indiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.139 ^a	1	.144		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.305	.144
	Cramer's V	.305	.144
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Indiana Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	6	1	7
	R	16	0	16
Total		22	1	23

Indian Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.390 ^a	1	.122		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.322	.122
	Cramer's V	.322	.122
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Tenure

Indiana Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	0	7
	R	15	1	16
Total		22	1	23

Indiana Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.457 ^a	1	.499		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.141	.499
	Cramer's V	.141	.499
N of Valid Cases		23	

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Indiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	0	7
	R	15	1	16
Total		22	1	23

Indiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.457 ^a	1	.499		
N of Valid Cases	23				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.141	.499
	Cramer's V	.141	.499
N of Valid Cases		23	

APPENDIX B: FLORIDA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table : Florida Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Party ID * Alt. Certification	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Charter School	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	35	100.0%	0	0.0%	35	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Florida Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	4	4
	R	31	31
Total		35	35

Florida Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Test

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	35

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 35

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Party ID * Charter School

Florida Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	3	4
	R	24	7	31
Total		25	10	35

Florida Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. 2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.002 ^a	1	.025		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.11.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.373	.025
	Cramer's V	.373	.025
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Florida Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	4	4
	R	31	31
Total		35	35

Florida Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	35

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		35

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Party ID * Evaluation

Florida Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	0	4
	R	28	3	31
Total		32	3	35

Florida Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.409 ^a	1	.522		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.107	.522
	Cramer's V	.107	.522
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Testing

Florida Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	3	1	4
	R	21	10	31
Total		24	11	35

Florida Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.141 ^a	1	.708		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.33.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.063	.708
	Cramer's V	.063	.708
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Florida Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	0	4
	R	28	3	31
Total		32	3	35

Florida Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.409 ^a	1	.522		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.107	.522
	Cramer's V	.107	.522
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Florida Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	0	4
	R	26	5	31
Total		30	5	35

Florida Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.726 ^a	1	.394		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.142	.394
	Cramer's V	.142	.394
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Tenure

Florida Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	4	0	4
	R	30	1	31
Total		34	1	35

Florida Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.129 ^a	1	.720		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .11.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.060	.720
	Cramer's V	.060	.720
N of Valid Cases		35	

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Florida Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	0	4
	R	26	5	31
Total		30	5	35

Florida Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.726 ^a	1	.394		
N of Valid Cases	35				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.142	.394
	Cramer's V	.142	.394
N of Valid Cases		35	

APPENDIX C: LOUISIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Louisiana Case Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Party ID * Alt. Certification	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Charter School	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	33	100.0%	0	0.0%	33	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Louisiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	16	0	16
	R	16	1	17
Total		32	1	33

Louisiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.971 ^a	1	.325		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.356	1	.244		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.515
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.171	.325
	Cramer's V	.171	.325
N of Valid Cases		33	

Party ID * Charter School

Louisiana Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	12	16
	R	9	8	17
Total		13	20	33

Louisiana Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.695 ^a	1	.101		
Continuity Correction ^b	1.652	1	.199		
Likelihood Ratio	2.749	1	.097		
Fisher's Exact Test				.157	.099
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.286	.101
	Cramer's V	.286	.101
N of Valid Cases		33	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Louisiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	16	16
	R	17	17
Total		33	33

Louisiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	33

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 33

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Party ID * Evaluation

Louisiana Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	16	0	16
	R	15	2	17
Total		31	2	33

Louisiana Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.004 ^a	1	.157		
Continuity Correction ^b	.470	1	.493		
Likelihood Ratio	2.775	1	.096		
Fisher's Exact Test				.485	.258
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .97.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.246	.157
	Cramer's V	.246	.157
N of Valid Cases		33	

Party ID * Testing

Louisiana Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	14	2	16
	R	12	5	17
Total		26	7	33

Louisiana Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.411 ^a	1	.235		
Continuity Correction ^b	.580	1	.446		
Likelihood Ratio	1.452	1	.228		
Fisher's Exact Test				.398	.225
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.39.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.207	.235
	Cramer's V	.207	.235
N of Valid Cases		33	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Louisiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	15	1	16
	R	17	0	17
Total		32	1	33

Louisiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.096 ^a	1	.295		
Continuity Correction ^b	.001	1	.975		
Likelihood Ratio	1.481	1	.224		
Fisher's Exact Test				.485	.485
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.182	.295
	Cramer's V	.182	.295
N of Valid Cases		33	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Louisiana Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	16	16
	R	17	17
Total		33	33

Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	33

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a
	33

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Party ID * Tenure

Louisiana Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	16	16
	R	17	17
Total		33	33

Louisiana Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	33

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		33

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Louisiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	15	1	16
	R	16	1	17
Total		31	2	33

Louisiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.002 ^a	1	.965		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.002	1	.965		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.742
N of Valid Cases	33				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .97.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.008	.965
	Cramer's V	.008	.965
N of Valid Cases		33	

APPENDIX D: ARIZONA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table : Arizona Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Party ID * Alt. Certification	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Charter School	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Arizona Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	50	2	52
Total		51	2	53

Arizona Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.040 ^a	1	.842		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.027	.842
	Cramer's V	.027	.842
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Charter School

Arizona Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	32	20	52
Total		33	20	53

Table : Arizona Party ID and Chart School Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.618 ^a	1	.432		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.108	.432
	Cramer's V	.108	.432
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Arizona Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	1	1
	R	52	52
Total		53	53

Arizona Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	53

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a
	53

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Party ID * Evaluation

Arizona Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	47	5	52
Total		48	5	53

Arizona Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.106 ^a	1	.745		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.045	.745
	Cramer's V	.045	.745
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Testing

Arizona Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	0	1	1
	R	40	12	52
Total		40	13	53

Arizona Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.136 ^a	1	.077		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.243	.077
	Cramer's V	.243	.077
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Arizona Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarship Crosstab

		Tax Credits Scholarships		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	47	5	52
Total		48	5	53

Arizona Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.106 ^a	1	.745		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.045	.745
	Cramer's V	.045	.745
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Arizona Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	45	7	52
Total		46	7	53

Arizona Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.155 ^a	1	.694		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.054	.694
	Cramer's V	.054	.694
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Tenure

Arizona Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	51	1	52
Total		52	1	53

Table : Arizona Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.020 ^a	1	.889		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.019	.889
	Cramer's V	.019	.889
N of Valid Cases		53	

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Arizona Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	49	3	52
Total		50	3	53

Arizona Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.061 ^a	1	.805		
N of Valid Cases	53				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.034	.805
	Cramer's V	.034	.805
N of Valid Cases		53	

APPENDIX E: OHIO CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Ohio Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12
Party ID * Charter School	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	12	100.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Ohio Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	8	3	11
Total		9	3	12

Ohio Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.364 ^a	1	.546		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.605	1	.437		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.750
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.174	.546
	Cramer's V	.174	.546
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Charter School

Ohio Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	0	1	1
	R	10	1	11
Total		10	2	12

Ohio Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.455 ^a	1	.020		
Continuity Correction ^b	.873	1	.350		
Likelihood Ratio	4.111	1	.043		
Fisher's Exact Test				.167	.167
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.674	.020
	Cramer's V	.674	.020
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Ohio Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	10	1	11
Total		11	1	12

Ohio Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.099 ^a	1	.753		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.182	1	.670		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.917
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.091	.753
	Cramer's V	.091	.753
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Evaluation

Ohio Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	9	2	11
Total		10	2	12

Ohio Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.218 ^a	1	.640		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.382	1	.536		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.833
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.135	.640
	Cramer's V	.135	.640
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Testing

Ohio Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	8	3	11
Total		9	3	12

Ohio Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.364 ^a	1	.546		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.605	1	.437		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.750
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.174	.546
	Cramer's V	.174	.546
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Ohio Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	1	1
	R	11	11
Total		12	12

Ohio Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	12

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		12

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Party ID * Digital Learning

Ohio Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	10	1	11
Total		11	1	12

Ohio Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.099 ^a	1	.753		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.182	1	.670		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.917
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.091	.753
	Cramer's V	.091	.753
N of Valid Cases		12	

Party ID * Tenure

Ohio Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	1	1
	R	11	11
Total		12	12

Ohio Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	12

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		12

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Ohio Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	0	1
	R	8	3	11
Total		9	3	12

Ohio Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.364 ^a	1	.546		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.605	1	.437		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.750
N of Valid Cases	12				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.174	.546
	Cramer's V	.174	.546
N of Valid Cases		12	

APPENDIX F: MICHIGAN CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table : Michigan Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21
Party ID * Charter School	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Michigan Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	1	5
	R	14	2	16
Total		18	3	21

Michigan Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.222 ^a	1	.637		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.206	1	.650		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.558
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .68.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.101	.637
	Cramer's V	.101	.637
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Charter School

Michigan Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	3	2	5
	R	15	1	16
Total		18	3	21

Michigan Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.819 ^a	1	.051		
Continuity Correction ^b	1.471	1	.225		
Likelihood Ratio	3.189	1	.074		
Fisher's Exact Test				.117	.117
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .68.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.417	.051
	Cramer's V	.417	.051
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Michigan Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	4	1	5
	R	14	2	16
Total		18	3	21

Michigan Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.014 ^a	1	.905		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.014	1	.905		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.675
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.026	.905
	Cramer's V	.026	.905
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Evaluation

Michigan Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	5	0	5
	R	11	5	16
Total		16	5	21

Michigan Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.903 ^a	1	.168		
Continuity Correction ^b	.597	1	.440		
Likelihood Ratio	2.985	1	.084		
Fisher's Exact Test				.290	.235
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.14.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.294	.168
	Cramer's V	.294	.168
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Testing

Michigan Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	4	1	5
	R	10	6	16
Total		14	7	21

Michigan Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.417 ^a	1	.519		
Continuity Correction ^b	.010	1	.921		
Likelihood Ratio	.443	1	.506		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.477
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.59.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.138	.519
	Cramer's V	.138	.519
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Michigan Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	5	5
	R	16	16
Total		21	21

Michigan Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	21

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		21

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Party ID * Digital Learning

Michigan Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	5	5
	R	16	16
Total		21	21

Michigan Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	21

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		21

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Party ID * Tenure

Michigan Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	5	0	5
	R	12	4	16
Total		17	4	21

Michigan Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.438 ^a	1	.230		
Continuity Correction ^b	.291	1	.589		
Likelihood Ratio	2.312	1	.128		
Fisher's Exact Test				.535	.325
N of Valid Cases	21				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.256	.230
	Cramer's V	.256	.230
N of Valid Cases		21	

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Michigan Party ID and Voucher Program Crosstab

		Voucher Programs	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	5	5
	R	16	16
Total		21	21

Michigan Party ID and Voucher Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	21

a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 21

a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant.

APPENDIX G: OKLAHOMA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table: Oklahoma Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Party ID * Alt. Certification	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Charter School	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Oklahoma Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	10	3	13
	R	38	5	43
Total		48	8	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.997 ^a	1	.318		
Continuity Correction ^b	.301	1	.583		
Likelihood Ratio	.914	1	.339		
Fisher's Exact Test				.376	.279
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.89.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.135	.318
	Cramer's V	.135	.318
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Charter School

Oklahoma Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	11	2	13
	R	34	9	43
Total		45	11	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.227 ^a	1	.634		
Continuity Correction ^b	.006	1	.937		
Likelihood Ratio	.237	1	.626		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.486
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.064	.634
	Cramer's V	.064	.634
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Oklahoma Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	13	0	13
	R	42	1	43
Total		55	1	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.315 ^a	1	.574		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.545	1	.460		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.764
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.076	.574
	Cramer's V	.076	.574
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Evaluation

Oklahoma Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	12	1	13
	R	34	9	43
Total		46	10	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.259 ^a	1	.262		
Continuity Correction ^b	.505	1	.477		
Likelihood Ratio	1.460	1	.227		
Fisher's Exact Test				.421	.248
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.151	.262
	Cramer's V	.151	.262
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Testing

Oklahoma Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	8	5	13
	R	30	13	43
Total		38	18	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.254 ^a	1	.614		
Continuity Correction ^b	.028	1	.868		
Likelihood Ratio	.250	1	.617		
Fisher's Exact Test				.738	.426
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.068	.614
	Cramer's V	.068	.614
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Oklahoma Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	13	0	13
	R	42	1	43
Total		55	1	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.315 ^a	1	.574		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.545	1	.460		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.764
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.076	.574
	Cramer's V	.076	.574
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Oklahoma Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	11	2	13
	R	36	7	43
Total		47	9	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.012 ^a	1	.913		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.012	1	.913		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.642
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.13.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.015	.913
	Cramer's V	.015	.913
N of Valid Cases		56	

Party ID * Tenure

Oklahoma Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	13	13
	R	43	43
Total		56	56

Oklahoma and Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	56

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 56

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Oklahoma Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	13	0	13
	R	41	2	43
Total		54	2	56

Oklahoma Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.315 ^a	1	.574		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.545	1	.460		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.764
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.076	.574
	Cramer's V	.076	.574
N of Valid Cases		56	

APPENDIX H: GEORGIA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table : Georgia Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16
Party ID * Charter School	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Table : Georgia Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	2	2
	R	14	14
Total		16	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	16

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a
	16

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Party ID * Charter School

Table : Georgia Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	1	1	2
	R	8	6	14
Total		9	7	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.036 ^a	1	.849		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.036	1	.849		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.700
N of Valid Cases	16				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .88.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.048	.849
	Cramer's V	.048	.849
N of Valid Cases		16	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Table : Georgia Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	2	2
	R	14	14
Total		16	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	16

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		16

a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant.

Party ID * Evaluation

Table : Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	2	0	2
	R	13	1	14
Total		15	1	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.152 ^a	1	.696		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.276	1	.599		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.875
N of Valid Cases	16				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.098	.696
	Cramer's V	.098	.696
N of Valid Cases		16	

Party ID * Testing

Table : Georgia Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	2	0	2
	R	10	4	14
Total		12	4	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.762 ^a	1	.383		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.243	1	.265		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.550
N of Valid Cases	16				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.218	.383
	Cramer's V	.218	.383
N of Valid Cases		16	

Party ID * Tax Credit Scholarships

Table : Georgia Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	2	0	2
	R	12	2	14
Total		14	2	16

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.143	.568
	Cramer's V	.143	.568
N of Valid Cases		16	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Table : Georgia Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	1	1	2
	R	13	1	14
Total		14	2	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.939 ^a	1	.086		
Continuity Correction ^b	.327	1	.568		
Likelihood Ratio	2.079	1	.149		
Fisher's Exact Test				.242	.242
N of Valid Cases	16				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.429	.086
	Cramer's V	.429	.086
N of Valid Cases		16	

Party ID * Tenure

Table Georgia Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	2	2
	R	14	14
Total		16	16

Table: Georgia Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	16

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		16

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Table : Georgia Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	2	0	2
	R	13	1	14
Total		15	1	16

Table : Georgia Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.152 ^a	1	.696		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.276	1	.599		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.875
N of Valid Cases	16				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.098	.696
	Cramer's V	.098	.696
N of Valid Cases		16	

APPENDIX I: WISCONSIN CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Wisconsin Case Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Party ID * Alt. Certification	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Charter School	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Wisconsin Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	8	8
	R	5	5
Total		13	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 13

a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant.

Party ID * Charter School

Wisconsin Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	3	5	8
	R	3	2	5
Total		6	7	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.627 ^a	1	.429		
Continuity Correction ^b	.048	1	.826		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				.592	.413
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 4 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.31.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.220	.429
	Cramer's V	.220	.429
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Wisconsin Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	5	3	8
	R	4	1	5
Total		9	4	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.442 ^a	1	.506		
Continuity Correction ^b	.002	1	.962		
Likelihood Ratio	.459	1	.498		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.490
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.54.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.184	.506
	Cramer's V	.184	.506
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Evaluation

Wisconsin Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	1	8
	R	5	0	5
Total		12	1	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.677 ^a	1	.411		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.023	1	.312		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.615
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.228	.411
	Cramer's V	.228	.411
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Testing

Wisconsin Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	8	0	8
	R	4	1	5
Total		12	1	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.733 ^a	1	.188		
Continuity Correction ^b	.061	1	.805		
Likelihood Ratio	2.047	1	.153		
Fisher's Exact Test				.385	.385
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.365	.188
	Cramer's V	.365	.188
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Wisconsin Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	8	8
	R	5	5
Total		13	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		13

a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant.

Party ID * Digital Learning

Wisconsin Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	1	8
	R	5	0	5
Total		12	1	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.677 ^a	1	.411		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.023	1	.312		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.615
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.228	.411
	Cramer's V	.228	.411
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Tenure

Wisconsin Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	8	8
	R	5	5
Total		13	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	. ^a
N of Valid Cases		13

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Wisconsin Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	7	1	8
	R	4	1	5
Total		11	2	13

Wisconsin Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.133 ^a	1	.715		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.130	1	.718		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.641
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.101	.715
	Cramer's V	.101	.715
N of Valid Cases		13	

APPENDIX J: MINNESOTA CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Minnesota Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13
Party ID * Charter School	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	13	100.0%	0	0.0%	13	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Minnesota Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	6	3	9
	R	3	1	4
Total		9	4	13

Minnesota Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.090 ^a	1	.764		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.092	1	.761		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.646
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.083	.764
	Cramer's V	.083	.764
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Charter School

Minnesota Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	6	3	9
	R	4	0	4
Total		10	3	13

Minnesota Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.733 ^a	1	.188		
Continuity Correction ^b	.364	1	.546		
Likelihood Ratio	2.588	1	.108		
Fisher's Exact Test				.497	.294
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .92.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.365	.188
	Cramer's V	.365	.188
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Minnesota Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	8	1	9
	R	4	0	4
Total		12	1	13

Minnesota Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.481 ^a	1	.488		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.772	1	.380		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.692
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.192	.488
	Cramer's V	.192	.488
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Evaluation

Minnesota Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	8	1	9
	R	3	1	4
Total		11	2	13

Minnesota Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.410 ^a	1	.522		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.385	1	.535		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.538
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .62.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.178	.522
	Cramer's V	.178	.522
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Testing

Minnesota Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		
		No	Yes	Total
Party ID	D	6	3	9
	R	2	2	4
Total		8	5	13

Minnesota Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.325 ^a	1	.569		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.321	1	.571		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.510
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.54.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.158	.569
	Cramer's V	.158	.569
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Minnesota Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	8	1	9
	R	4	0	4
Total		12	1	13

Minnesota Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.481 ^a	1	.488		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.772	1	.380		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.692
N of Valid Cases	13				

a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.192	.488
	Cramer's V	.192	.488
N of Valid Cases		13	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Minnesota Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	9	9
	R	4	4
Total		13	13

Minnesota Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 13

a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant.

Party ID * Tenure

Minnesota Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	9	9
	R	4	4
Total		13	13

Minnesota Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 13

a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant.

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Minnesota Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs	
		No	Total
Party ID	D	9	9
	R	4	4
Total		13	13

Minnesota Party ID and Voucher Chi-Square Tests

	Value
Pearson Chi-Square	. ^a
N of Valid Cases	13

a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant.

Symmetric Measures

	Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi
N of Valid Cases	. ^a 13

a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant.

APPENDIX K: NATIONAL CHI SQUARE TESTS

Crosstabs

Table : National Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Party ID * Alt. Certification	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275
Party ID * Charter School	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Collective Bargaining	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Evaluation	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Testing	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Digital Learning	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Tenure	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%
Party ID * Voucher Programs	275	100.0%	0	0.0%	275	100.0%

Party ID * Alt. Certification

Table : National Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab

		Alt. Certification		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	59	7	66
	R	193	16	209
Total		252	23	275

Table : National Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.570 ^a	1	.450		
Continuity Correction ^b	.250	1	.617		
Likelihood Ratio	.542	1	.461		
Fisher's Exact Test				.450	.299
Linear-by-Linear Association	.568	1	.451		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.52.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.046	.450
	Cramer's V	.046	.450
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Charter School

Table : National Party ID and Charter School Crosstab

		Charter School		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	35	31	66
	R	153	56	209
Total		188	87	275

Table : National Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.440 ^a	1	.002		
Continuity Correction ^b	8.531	1	.003		
Likelihood Ratio	9.059	1	.003		
Fisher's Exact Test				.004	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.406	1	.002		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.88.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.185	.002
	Cramer's V	.185	.002
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Collective Bargaining

Table : National Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab

		Collective Bargaining		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	61	5	66
	R	199	10	209
Total		260	15	275

Table : National Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.490 ^a	1	.484		
Continuity Correction ^b	.158	1	.691		
Likelihood Ratio	.463	1	.496		
Fisher's Exact Test				.546	.331
Linear-by-Linear Association	.488	1	.485		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.84.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.042	.484
	Cramer's V	.042	.484
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Evaluation

Table : National Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab

		Evaluation		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	62	4	66
	R	180	29	209
Total		242	33	275

Table : National Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.901 ^a	1	.089		
Continuity Correction ^b	2.208	1	.137		
Likelihood Ratio	3.301	1	.069		
Fisher's Exact Test				.126	.063
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.890	1	.089		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.92.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.103	.089
	Cramer's V	.103	.089
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Testing

Table : National Party ID and Testing Crosstab

		Testing		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	50	16	66
	R	149	60	209
Total		199	76	275

Table : National Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.608 ^a	1	.435		
Continuity Correction ^b	.388	1	.534		
Likelihood Ratio	.621	1	.431		
Fisher's Exact Test				.530	.269
Linear-by-Linear Association	.606	1	.436		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.48.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.047	.435
	Cramer's V	.047	.435
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships

Table : National Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab

		Tax Credit Scholarships		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	62	4	66
	R	197	12	209
Total		259	16	275

Table : National Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.009 ^a	1	.923		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.009	1	.923		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.563
Linear-by-Linear Association	.009	1	.923		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.84.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.006	.923
	Cramer's V	.006	.923
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Digital Learning

Table : National Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab

		Digital Learning		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	61	5	66
	R	188	21	209
Total		249	26	275

Table : National Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.358 ^a	1	.550		
Continuity Correction ^b	.128	1	.721		
Likelihood Ratio	.375	1	.541		
Fisher's Exact Test				.637	.373
Linear-by-Linear Association	.357	1	.550		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.24.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.036	.550
	Cramer's V	.036	.550
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Tenure

Table : National Party ID and Tenure Crosstab

		Tenure		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	66	0	66
	R	202	7	209
Total		268	7	275

Table : National Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.636 ^a	1	.425		
Continuity Correction ^b	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.102	1	.294		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.577
Linear-by-Linear Association	.634	1	.426		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.048	.425
	Cramer's V	.048	.425
N of Valid Cases		275	

Party ID * Voucher Programs

Table : National Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab

		Voucher Programs		Total
		No	Yes	
Party ID	D	64	2	66
	R	192	17	209
Total		256	19	275

Table : National Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.754 ^a	1	.185		
Continuity Correction ^b	1.080	1	.299		
Likelihood Ratio	2.046	1	.153		
Fisher's Exact Test				.258	.148
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.748	1	.186		
N of Valid Cases	275				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.32.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.080	.185
	Cramer's V	.080	.185
N of Valid Cases		275	

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