EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:

FRAMES AND POWER IN POLITICS

by

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The use of rhetoric to frame policy issues often influences the amount of attention countries pay to international issues and the level of support for those issues. Often, domestic and international actors present different descriptions of policy issues in order to advance their own views and change the international agenda. Despite frequent attempts to change the international agenda and the importance of agendas for policy formation, our understanding of the factors that contribute to why particular issues get international attention is limited. This project develops a theoretical understanding of the development of the international agenda, how issues on that agenda are framed, and why agendas change over time. The project contributes to international relations theory by understanding the factors responsible for increasing attention to issues, and the factors that influence how states define the problems on the international agenda that may eventually become part of international treaties and organizations. The project redefines agendas through a

constructivist approach where individuals interpret real phenomena through frames. Rhetoric's influence on agenda changes described in this project also demonstrates a mechanism through which the soft power of attraction changes international outcomes. The project takes a positivist approach to analyzing constructivist and realist causes of agenda changes. The project tests specific implications of these theories of international agenda development and issue framing by examining the case of international efforts to address whaling. The project demonstrates the importance of polarity in enabling changes in attention from security to non-security issues and the importance of rhetoric in causing changes in issue frames.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What accounts for the emergence of some issues on the international agenda and not others? Why does a given issue emerge when it does, rather than earlier or later? What accounts for changes in perceptions of an issue on the international agenda? At any time, a large number of international issues compete for attention from governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations or advocacy groups. We see news of declining polar bear populations, potential water shortages, conflict in Afghanistan, genocide in Sudan, North Korea nuclear tests, and many other issues. Sometimes these issues attract a great deal of attention from advocacy groups, international organizations, or states, and other times these issues are virtually ignored by one or all of these actors. Before 1970, the international community paid very little attention to issues of environmental protection, yet today, it is one of the more prominent issues on the international agenda with approximately 961 international treaties, of which approximately 76% were created after 1970 (Mitchell, 2003a). Violence in Burundi between Hutu and Tutsi in 1972 received very little attention from the international community, but similar violence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 received worldwide attention eventually leading to a declaration of genocide and the formation of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the violence.

Even when issues appear on the agenda, actors may perceive them very differently. In 2003, the United States and the Coalition of the Willing invaded Iraq with

the intention of changing the regime and ousting sitting head of state, Saddam Hussein. Much of the world looked at the events leading up to the second Iraq conflict in 2003 with very different eyes. The United States saw a rogue regime, frequently defying international sanctions and resolutions placed by the UN prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. Some European states saw a weak Iraqi regime in need of more time to demonstrate its willingness to abide by rules of the international community. The account by the United States changed several times as descriptions moved from a state developing weapons of mass destruction, to a state that had the potential for weapons of mass destruction, and eventually to an oppressive regime. Sometimes, as in the case of Iraq, perceptions of the issue change over time or differ between actors. Other times actors might agree on perceptions of international issues but differ in their attention to such issues.

This project seeks to understand the factors responsible for changes in the international agenda. Two aspects of the international agenda require explanation: issue importance and issue perception. To explain issue importance and issue emergence this project uses variables such as polarity and concern over security and the use of rhetoric to influence perceived issue importance. These variables are rooted in materialist and constructivist theories from international relations combined with theories from the social movement literature.

As part of understanding why issues become part of the international agenda, this project seeks to understand the influence of rhetoric and words on the international

agenda. Can words influence state interest in international issues, creating interest or increasing importance of issues? Can words influence perceptions of issues on the international agenda? Under what conditions might words successfully change issue perception or issue importance for states? The project tests theories of rhetorical influence on the international agenda through changes in frames by examining both material and non-material variables on the case of efforts to address whaling from the 1500s through 2008.

This project shows that both material and non-material variables influence the international agenda in different ways. Material factors better explain changes in issue emergence on the international agenda and the ebb and flow of attention toward international issues over time. Whaling emerged on the international agenda when it involved security concerns for states or when states were under less threat in a bipolar or unipolar international system. Polarity acts as an enabling cause, allowing non-security issues to emerge onto the international agenda when larger states provide some security to smaller states. Non-material, rhetorical, variables influence the perception of issues on the international agenda more than material factors. The perception of whaling transitioned twice in the periods between 1930 and 1946 and between 1970 and 1982. Some factors that contribute to perception change involve international exposure of the rhetoric, connections to a broader culture or discourse, and the particular rhetorical manipulation strategies used by international actors.

The project proceeds in the rest of the introduction chapter to describe why international issue emergence is an important area of study because of its role in generating international policy and international treaties. The chapter also reviews research by other scholars attempting to understand international agenda formation and describes the differences between this project and other research. The introduction describes the project's methodological approach and the use of "frames" as a perspective toward gaining insight into issue perceptions.

After the introduction, Chapter II defines the international agenda in terms of both issue attention and issue perceptions. The chapter utilizes definitions from research on domestic agendas, constructivism, and the social movement research on frames to develop a new definition of the international agenda and measurement of changes in the agenda. To summarize the chapter briefly, the international agenda is defined by issues of some concern to more than one state. This concern is measured by the number of states, the strength of those states, and the depth of their concern for the issue. Issues consist of complex interpretations of reality and constructed perceptions by different actors. This project refers to these perceptions as frames. Frames highlight or hide specific characteristics of the issue, which can influence policies proposed and accepted for addressing the international issue. Therefore, the international agenda consists of issues that states perceive as important and their perceptions of those issues. Changes on the international agenda can occur through changes in either aspect of the international agenda.

Chapter III discuses the theoretical causes of changes in the international agenda. The chapter divides these causes into material and non-material influences just as one might divide international relations theory more generally into realist and constructivist theories (Copeland, 2000; Sterling-Folker, 2002).[1] The realist causes involve state security and polarity in determining the importance of different issues on the international agenda. Realist factors theoretically influence the degree of contestation over frames (issue perception) and issue attention (issue emergence). Non-material factors, based on the influence of rhetoric, theoretically increase issue attention by blaming states or describing them as victims. Non-material factors can also influence the perception of issues through international exposure, connections to a broader discourse and culture, and by containing a complete issue frame. Finally, different strategies of rhetoric manipulation may influence the acceptability of policy prescriptions and influence issue importance.

Chapter IV and Chapter V empirically analyze the theoretical causes developed in Chapter III on the case of whaling between 1500 and 2008. The two chapters divide the empirical analysis based on the two potential changes in the dependent variable. Chapter IV examines theoretical causes of issue attention; issue emergence and change of issue importance on the agenda. In particular, Chapter IV analyzes the influence of polarity on security concerns for states relative to non-security issues and the influence of rhetoric on

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[1] Scholars have divided international relations theories in a variety of ways including the one used in this chapter. (See Carlsnaes, Simmons, & Risse-Kappen, 2002; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).

issue attention. Chapter V examines the influence of polarity on frame contestation and rhetoric, international exposure, connections to discourse, and rhetoric completeness on changes in frames (issue perception). Chapters V and VI do not attempt to explain all the changes that occurred in regards to the whaling issue. Instead, these chapters focus only on aspects relevant to the theoretically derived hypotheses tested in those chapters. Chapter VI concludes the dissertation by summarizing the primary observations in the dissertation and identifying extension of this research to other areas of international relations.

WHY IS THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA IMPORTANT?

As part of the public policy process, getting an issue on the agenda is the first step toward generating public or international law. The process of defining a problem or an international issue is an important part of the policy making process. Although there are a number of ways to define the steps in the policy making process, it can generally be grouped into four stages: (1) agenda-setting and problem defining; (2) policy formation; (3) polity implementation; (4) policy review and assessment (J. E. Anderson, 2006; Kingdon, 2003, pp. 2-3). In the first stage, the issue must gain enough attention to warrant the expense and time of developing policy alternatives in the second stage. Only when an issue has become part of the agenda can policy makers begin generating possible policies to address the issue. In the second stage, states create policies through negotiations among which actors choose a policy through voting or other decision-making process. The perception of the issue directly influences the content of the

policies formulated in the second stage.[2] The third stage involves the provision of material resources in order to move the policy plan into action. Sometimes this involves the provision of money or personnel who act on the policy generated in stage 2. Finally, stage 4 of the policy process involves policy assessment, where actors may audit the effects of a policy in order to determine the success or failure.

A large number of scholars have documented the relative effectiveness of different institutions and treaty designs in stage 4 (Bernauer, 1995; Grundmann, 1998; R. O. Keohane & Levy, 1996; Mitchell, 2002, 2003c; O. R. Young, 1999; O. R. Young & Levy, 1999). There is less much less research on why issues become important for international actors. This first step in the policy making process is under-researched in international environmental politics research (Clark, Jager, & van Eijndhoven, 2001) and international relations theory more generally (Livingston, 1992, p. 313).

Many studies in agenda-setting in environmental politics consist of case studies that explain the emergence of a particular issue on the international agenda without systematic theoretically based examinations of issue development. Examples of these case studies involve efforts of cooperation between East and West Europe (Darst, 2001), protection of the ozone layer (Parson, 1993), international fisheries management (Peterson, 1993), or pesticides management in developing countries (Paarlberg, 1993). These studies set out to understand the dimensions of regulation and management of a

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[2] See also Jervis (1976) and Suh (2005) on the importance of perception for international politics outside of environmental politics.

particular set of international issues. Although issue development is an important part of the story for each issue, these studies do not examine the causes of issue development and agenda formation systematically, because the studies do not focus on understanding agenda formation specifically.

Because agenda formation and problem defining occur in the first stage of policy formation, the first stage naturally affects the subsequent policy stages. In the most basic sense, if an issue does not appear on the agenda, then policy makers cannot formulate policies in the second stage and cannot implement policies in the third. Many issues discussed by international actors never become part of the international agenda, and we often do not hear of such issues unless they become part of the agenda. For example, several years before the adoption of conferences and treaties on landmines, protection of child soldiers, and protection of whales, advocates discussed these issues without much, if any, involvement from states. Some issues, such as banning landmine use were discussed among private actors and non-governmental actors before states began to pay attention to the issue (Cameron, Lawson, & Tomlin, 1998).

Public choice scholars have a long history of documenting the importance of agenda-setting for determining outcomes through game theoretic and other analyses leading one scholar to label agenda control, "the supreme instrument of power" (Schattschneider, 1975). At the heart of this research, Arrow first developed an understanding of how different agendas can produce multiple outcomes given specific voting rules and specific preferences among the voters (1963). Depending on the pairing

of agenda items when votes occur, multiple outcomes are possible. Those who control the items on the agenda can control the outcome of policy formation in certain settings. Agenda-setting in Arrow's study amounts to deciding which policies appear on the agenda, and where they appear in the voting structure. Whoever controls the formation of the voting agenda can control the outcomes of those votes if they have some understanding of the general preferences of the voting population. The importance of setting the agenda for influencing the outcomes expanded in the public choice literature through work by other scholars. The long tradition of this scholarship demonstrated that outcomes could be manipulated through the agenda-setting process (McKelvey, 1976), by introducing amendments onto legislation (Enelow, 1981), and manipulation under different institutional rules (Riker, 1986).

Other scholars highlight the importance of international agendas. There are a large number of international institutions which have some policy making power that can influence states, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and others. All of these organizations have internal rules regarding who may be present at meetings, who may speak, and when issues may be brought up to the institution. Some of these organizations have rules that allow any member to speak on any topic, such as the General Assembly of the United Nations, designed primarily as a forum for communication between nations. Others may severely limit those who may speak at the meetings, such as the United Nations Security Council.

Some scholars have examined agenda-setting in these formal international institutions. Joachim (2007), for example, examines the formation of the UN agenda on gender and reproductive rights, and the role of NGO's in moving gender and reproductive rights to the center of the UN agenda. Joachim shows the importance of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and advocacy groups to strategically frame their issue in order to increase attention to women's rights within the UN. Joachim identifies factors that are important to influencing the UN agenda, such as access to influential actors within the UN that can help alter the institutional agenda. Carpenter also examines agenda-setting within the context of formal institutions, such as within the UN (2003), or within an advocacy group (2005, 2007). Carpenter shows the importance of strategic framing for agendas within advocacy groups or within institutional contexts, highlighting the influence of advocacy groups over the institutional agenda, rather than a focus on NGO's. Scholars have examined agenda-setting and power within the new European institutions (Peter, 2003; Tsebelis, 1997). Given the structure of the European Union (EU) decision-making process, scholars attempt to understand the influences of different offices over agendas within the EU, such as the rotating presidency and the European Parliament. Finally, scholars have examined the international agenda as a foreign policy agenda within the domestic US political system (Wood & Peake, 1998). A number of studies have been done examining policy agenda-setting within the US institutional context and Wood adds to the studies of agenda formation for the US foreign policy agenda. Wood describes the importance of presidential power to influence the agenda,

but also the importance of media and international factors out of the control of United States actors.

These studies all describe the importance of agenda-setting power for international relations theory as they focus on particular actors or international institutions. Although all of these research studies produce valuable theory toward understanding agenda-setting within international institutional contexts, none have attempted to understand the processes of agenda-setting directly without a formal international institutional agenda to proxy the place of the international agenda. These previous studies point out the importance of framing, focusing events, international power distribution, and the media for the development of international agendas, but focus primarily within formal institutions. In addition, several of these studies focus particularly on specific international actors, such as NGO's (Joachim, 2007) or advocacy groups (Carpenter, 2007). Rather than focusing on particular actors in the international system, this project examines the resources that influence the international agenda. Any actor with the available resources can potentially use these resources to influence the agenda, whether they are states, NGO's, or advocacy groups. Some actors may have more available resources than other actors, so focusing on the variables in this project allows scholars to extrapolate to actor influence in other research.

Some of these studies, such as the EU studies primarily focus on formal agenda-setting power, such as the right to set procedural agendas or the structure of issue appearance on the agenda (Pollack, 1997). While the formal agenda-setting powers are

important for understanding how issues become part of the international agenda, so are the informal agenda-setting powers that describe the ability to frame issues differently. Several studies described above, including those by Carpenter and Joachim incorporate these informal powers. The discussions on informal agenda-setting resemble what has also been called the prenegotiation stage of international treaty formation, where actors define the problem and come to a common understanding before policies are discussed (Stein, 1989). The prenegotiation stage, as defined by Stein, begins after the issue has become important for states, and thus has already become part of the international agenda. Young defines the prenegotiation stage similarly to agenda formation, as "the process through which an issue initially finds its way onto the international agenda, gets defined or framed... and reaches a sufficiently prominent place on the agenda to justify... explicit negotiations" (O. Young, 1994, p. 83). Young's definition of prenegotiation resembles the use of agenda formation described in this project, although the definition differs slightly, described later in Chapter II.

Another study examines the specific issue movement from seemingly no frame to one that describes an issue as a "global environmental risk" (Schreurs, Clark, Dickson, & Jager, 2001). The study documents the changes in issue attention and definition of the problem, two dimensions of the agenda (discussed in Chapter II), for three environmental issues: acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate change. The study maintains the centrality of science for all three cases and asks when the cases might become important for policy makers due to the influence of the environmental threat and other variables (Schreurs et

al., 2001). Other studies as well, maintain the central authority of scientific information as truth in formulations of the international agenda or the reason behind the importance of a particular issue (Crane, 1993; Levy, 1993). Although science may be an important aspect of issue defining or agenda formation, reification of scientific information neglects the importance of manipulations of scientific information based on the scope conditions and uncertainty. Ignoring the potential for manipulation of scientific information leaves a gap in the literature regarding the ability of international actors to influence the agenda through rhetorical manipulations.

This project adds to this previous work in several ways. First, this project takes a broader perspective in looking at international issue emergence from a theoretical perspective before examining empirical cases. In general, the studies above take a data-centered inductive approach to understanding issue emergence and problem defining. This project examines the theories that may influence the international agenda and derive hypotheses first before they are examined in the context of an empirical case.

Second, this project does not assume the truth of science like many studies in environmental politics including those above (in particular, Social Learning Group, 2001). Scientific information is manipulable, just as other information, and is defined by scope conditions and differing levels of uncertainty. Since actors may manipulate scientific information in attempts to change the international agenda, this project does not privy one type of information or manipulation over others.

Third, this project contributes to international relations research by examining a case with sufficient variation in agenda and problem definition to determine the influence of different variables over time. In the case studies discussed above, the variation consists of a single change in the dependent variable – the issue moves onto the international agenda with a specific frame (in particular, Carpenter, 2007; Joachim, 2007). In the global environmental risk study, the three issues examined do not exhibit enough variation between them to discern the causes of agenda attention (Schreurs et al., 2001). Instead, the three issues all exhibit similar variation in attention. The issue emerge onto the agenda at similar times, suggesting a single cause or issue linkages to make them essentially a single case (Schreurs et al., 2001).

WHY ARE FRAMES AND NON-STATE ACTORS IMPORTANT?

In addition to the importance of agendas for the creation of policies, non-state actors have greater access to international policy using non-material resources in the agenda-setting stage. Non-state actors have much greater influence over international politics when non-military or monetary resources may influence outcomes. Non-state actors, such as advocacy groups, may strategically present information, use media resources, create grass-roots movements, and use domestic institutions to influence the international agenda (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Politicians, advocates, and those in the news media pay a great deal of attention to the words they use when describing international events and opinions. Politicians offer carefully crafted speeches to the public, prepared by hired speechwriters and authors. Countries sometimes even hire

public relations firms to present positive images of their country abroad (Manheim & Albritton, 1982).

There are a number of cases where advocates, scholars, or politicians attempt to change the way we think about issues in international politics through rhetoric, symbolism, images, and protests. International relations work in this area is relatively new and challenges the realist paradigm that does not rely on constructivist international relations theory. In order to understand how words or ideas may shape outcomes, we must start with the constructivist perspective of international politics.

Under a constructivist view, non-material factors, such as ideas, words, norms, and identities can influence outcomes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Some variants of constructivism assume there are no objective facts in our social world and perhaps extending to the physical world as well (Zehfuss, 2002), while other forms assume the presence of both material and non-material factors (Hacking, 1999; Wendt, 1995). This project takes the perspective that there are real objective events in the world, yet non-material factors, such as ideas and identities, cloud our understanding of those events. Furthermore, the project takes the position that these ideas and identities can change, thus changing the perceptions and understandings of the world. Different actors in the international system often contest and argue about these ideas, which constitute the interpretation of the real world. Therefore, rhetoric, as part of this contestation, becomes a tool for change in international politics.

Research on the manipulation of ideas through rhetoric has been the subject of a large body of research outside international relations scholarship. Research on the development of social movements, media influence over politics, and even psychological studies on decision-making have made the influence of rhetoric a centerpiece of their work. Much of this work refers to the act of using rhetoric to change outcomes as "framing," where individuals describe real events in ways to manipulate how others think about those events (Goffman, 1974). Although this project abandons the use of the word "framing" in order to distinguish the frame (what is believed) from the rhetoric (the tool to change what people believe), research on framing provides a wealth of literature applicable to understanding the influence of rhetoric on international politics. Chapter II defines frames in much more detail.

This project contributes to the literature on agenda-setting theories by showing the value of using frames as a perspective from which we can understand the influence of rhetoric and ideas in international relations. The project develops theory in Chapters II and III based on research from social movements and framing, but adapted to the international environment rather than domestic social movements.

PROJECT METHODOLOGY

One of the difficulties with conducting research into a relatively new or unexplored area of international politics, such as international agenda formation, involves the lack of quantified data for analysis. Without enough data, some methodological approaches become extremely difficult or impossible. Without sufficient data,

quantitative statistical methodologies require the creation of a large data set. Creating a large data-set properly (one that is reliable and valid) requires significant resources in both time and money (Rothman, 2007). Many times creating large-n data sets are beyond the means of a single researcher for a new project.

In order to conduct research on the international agenda in this project using quantitative large-n statistical analyses, a significant amount of data are required. First, the project needs data to describe the issue, attention to the issue (number of states, depth of state interest, and strength of states) over time for a given population of issues. In addition, this project would require data on the dominant interpretation (frame) and the changes in the frames over time for each issue. A dataset for this project would consist of each row or case defined by an issue/year. The dependent variable measurement consists of attention to the issue and the frame, resulting in two dependent variables. Each of which contains three parts identifying the dimensions of the dependent variable. It is not clear how one would combine these three dimensions into a single quantity for analysis, which could create six potential dependent variables. In addition, each independent variable consists of polarity, available from other scholars, and rhetoric, which requires textual analysis. The simplest form of textual analysis simply counts words or texts, which this project uses to develop some quantified data on the rhetoric used before changes in frames and issue attention. The use of newspapers to evaluate issue attention fits well with general policy attention to issues (Schreurs et al., 2001). In addition, the attention discovered in a single news source may be very similar across different major

newspapers in different countries. This project utilizes the New York Times as a proxy for major international newspapers. Although papers may vary in content at a precise level of content analysis, general issue attention may be similar across different international papers (Schreurs et al., 2001). In addition, New York Times articles are available earlier than most other newspapers extending back as early as 1851.

However, frames are not simply the quantity of words, but an interpretation of some real phenomenon. This interpretation requires more than counting. Creating reliable and valid data using good measurement procedures requires substantial resources, and high reliability for texts may require repeated revisions of coding procedures. Some observations are inherently difficult to measure and may never achieve even a moderate level of reliability. Finally, as discovered through this research, issue attention and frames do not change each year. Because changes do not occur often, even with a large number of issue/year rows most years resemble the previous year and result in little variation within each issue. This means data for a large number of issues are needed in order to conduct quantitative statistical analyses.

To avoid the difficulty of conducting quantitative statistical analysis on agenda changes and the quantification of frames, this project relies on qualitative methods with some quantification when possible and appropriate. Without the appropriate amount of data, researchers utilize qualitative methods, with tools to work with a small number of observations. The rejection of quantitative methods does not imply that these methods

are not without merit, but only that they are inappropriate where a large data set is not present.

Qualitative methods provide several benefits for this project. First, these methods allow for studying a small number of cases, so substantial resources are not needed for the creation of large datasets. Qualitative analyses are used from single case studies (Bennett, 2004) to medium case studies (Ragin, 1987). Second, qualitative methods allow for interpretations of discourse and texts that are more difficult under requirements of quantification (Weimer, 1998). Although the system for creating data in this project uses an "expert" coding system (Rothman, 2007), such that data are created by the researcher only, expert coding allows for greater validity and expert interpretation of the data potentially sacrificing some reliability. Third, qualitative methodologies allow greater attention to the details of specific cases. While quantitative measurements may lose some information when moving from non-numerical information to quantified information, qualitative methodologies allow for textual data without losing as much information in the quantification process (Mitchell & Rothman, 2006).

Both quantitative and qualitative methods permit a positivist approach, such that they are concerned with causal theories and hypotheses testing (Lin, 1998). In a desire to generalize theories beyond this project, the project takes a positivist approach to understanding the influence of both material and non-material factors on the international agenda. Taking a positivist approach to understanding the influence of rhetoric on ideas and the international agenda allows us to develop theories and hypotheses and to test

those on a case in international politics. Starting from hypotheses improves the generalizability of the study by allowing testing of the theory and hypotheses on a variety of cases. Although the qualitative case-study approach utilized in this paper makes the generalizability of the empirical results limited, the methods do not limit the potential to test the theories and hypotheses on other cases.

As argued by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) qualitative research and quantitative research do not require substantially different methodologies given a positivist perspective. The differences between qualitative and quantitative research essentially involve the type of data available – data that are quantifiable or data that are not. This research project uses qualitative data primarily because no quantitative indicators are available for this new area of study in international agendas, and the hypotheses are tested using positivist approach.

This project follows the general guidelines proposed by King, et al. in the development of a research project and the application of research methods. A good research project, they suggest, should pose an important question and make a contribution that can be verified and tested in repeated research (King et al., 1994, p. 15).[3] The ability to repeat research by providing explicit identification of source materials and testable hypotheses is a vital part of the research process to developing new knowledge (King, 1995). Repetition is the only way to verify results, and is highly valued in scientific

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[3] Also see Van Evera (1997) for similar criteria from an alternate perspective.

research. Thus, this study explicitly describes information on the location and source of data when possible to accommodate possible replication or extensions of this study.

This project attempts to understand the causes of changes in the international agenda. Causality is both contested philosophically and pragmatically in terms of how we can best infer causal relationships. Since causality can only be inferred from observation rather than observed directly (Beebee, 2006; King et al., 1994, p. 79; Punch, 2005), some research tools must be used to move from observation to causal inference. On one side of the spectrum, experiments provide the best conditions to infer causation. In ideal experiments, only one independent variable changes, and any changes observed in the dependent variable are inferred to result from changes in the independent variable. Because all conditions are controlled and nothing changes except for the independent variable, any changes in the dependent variable must be due to the changes in the independent variable. Experiments for social phenomena or historical phenomena are difficult and sometimes impossible. Since experiments are not always possible, other methods have developed to help infer causation.

The research methods used in this project utilize temporal precedence and correlational connections between the changes in the dependent variables and independent variables. Correlation and temporal precedence provide one method of suggesting causal relationships between variables (Brady & Seawright, 2004). Showing that two variables change together in ways predicted by hypotheses suggests possible causal connections between those variables. In addition, this project uses the

counterfactual approach to determine the influence of independent variable changes on dependent variable changes. The counterfactual approach helps to illustrate causal connections by describing the dependent variable if changes in the independent variable were different. Counterfactual analysis allows us to examine whether changes in the independent variables necessarily lead to changes in the dependent variables (Brady & Seawright, 2004). Chapters IV and V use both correlational and counterfactual approaches in evaluating hypotheses under discussion.

Environmental politics is used for this study primarily because there is more variation possible for issue attention and agenda changes in environmental politics than in other issue areas. Where security issues tend to maintain a higher place on the international agenda (e.g. Morgenthau, 1948), security most likely produces a narrow variance of state attention. Human rights and issues of women and gender are more recent additions to the international agenda (Joachim, 2007), which means there is less variation of state attention. Environmental issues, however, have a longer history of state attention, and this attention varies greatly over the history of environmental politics. Therefore, environmental politics provides issues with a longer history in international politics and the potential for a wider band of variation than human rights or security issues.

Case selection is important in any case-study research because biases are more likely when not selecting cases randomly or when selecting an entire population of cases for analysis. The case selected for this research project does not constitute a "crucial

case," such as a least likely or most likely case for testing of a single theory (Bennett, 2004, p. 29). Instead, the whaling case provides an example case in environmental politics with significant variation on both issue attention and frame changes. Few environmental issues have undergone as much change in the frames for the issue as the case of whaling. Therefore, whaling provides enough variation for testing the non-material and material influences on the agenda. Whaling may be more susceptible to rhetorical manipulation than other security issues, but it is not clear how whaling may be an easier or harder case out of the population of environmental cases. Because whaling contains more variation in state attention to issue and frame changes, and acts as an example for other environmental issues, this project tests theories on the case of whaling. There is no clear indication that whaling is a unique case in environmental politics.

This project breaks new ground in research into international relations theory and agenda formation. To date, few researchers have examined the causes of international issue emergence or changes in frames for issues on the agenda. The project develops a definition of the international agenda and testable hypotheses to engage in positivist research on the causes of changes in the agenda over time. These are tested on the case of whaling, which constitutes a case with the potential for both material and non-material influences on the international agenda. Whaling also provides greater variation on the agenda than other cases in environmental politics.

To reiterate, researching new areas of study in any field is a difficult process because researchers must develop new concepts, sometimes create new data, generate

testable theories and hypotheses, and test these hypotheses on empirical cases. This project does all of these for a single case, which may make the conclusions of the empirical analysis less generalizable than a larger case study. The hypotheses are created with an eye toward generalization and testing in other areas of international politics. Although the empirical conclusions may lack some generalization, the theories developed are widely applicable and testable outside of whaling and environmental politics. Increased testing of these theories can refine the conclusions and determine the extent to which there are differences between security, environmental, and economic issues as well as influences from non-state actors and rhetoric on frames and the international agenda.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND ISSUE FRAMES

At any given time, there are a large number of agendas in the international system. Agendas exist within international organizations, advocacy networks, international scientific and professional organizations, national governments (foreign policy agendas), and the international system itself. To understand international agenda formation for this project, we must understand what the international agenda looks like compared to the many agendas existing in the international system. Is the international agenda a conglomeration of the national foreign policy agendas of all the states? Is the international agenda simply the UN General Assembly agenda? How will this project consider the agendas of large international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, or the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)? Does the international agenda combine the agendas of all these international organizations? Developing common definitions and concepts are an important first step for any research project (Goertz, 2005). Because this project explores a new theoretical area of international relations, this chapter begins by defining the important terms of the project and the dependent variable.

This chapter distinguishes the international agenda from other agendas within the international system and domestic agendas by developing a definition of the international agenda unique to international relations. The chapter provides and initial framework from which we can begin to discuss changes to, and the causes of the international

agenda in later chapters. The definition of an "international agenda" used in this work parallels definitions of agendas for domestic actors, as defined by scholars studying US politics; however, the international agenda distinguishes itself from the domestic agenda by the informal nature of the international agenda and the lack of formal institutional rules within which the agenda forms.

This chapter begins by defining the international agenda as distinct from agendas of international institutions and of domestic politics. Then, this chapter develops definitions for the issues on the international agenda and the frames by which actors relate to those issues.

WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA?

To develop the definition of the international agenda, this project relies heavily on the definition of a domestic agenda, altered to fit the international environment. For this project, **the international agenda consists of those issues to which multiple states are paying serious attention at a given time** (see Livingston, 1992, pp. 314, for a similar definition). The research on domestic agendas describes the existence of at least five agendas: policy, media, public, systemic, and the decision agenda (Birkland, 1997; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Kingdon, 2003; Manheim & Albritton, 1982; Stone, 1989). The media and public agendas are not of interest for this project because they deal with issues of interest to the media and the public, respectively, rather than policy makers. The policy agenda refers to issues of interest to policy makers, which in the case of this project are not politicians, but states. From scholars of US agenda studies, a *policy*

agenda consists of a "list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials... are paying serious attention at any given time" (Kingdon, 2003, 3). The policy agenda consists of any issues that have a minimal level of importance for government officials. The policy agenda is a subset of the *systemic agenda* (Birkland, 1997), which consists of all the issues that might enter the policy agenda. We cannot know the entire content of the systemic agenda, because we cannot know all the potential issues at any given time.[4] Finally, the *decision agenda* consists of all issues for which government officials act on at a given time (Birkland, 1997). For international relations, the decision agenda is difficult to define because there are no institutional voting rules for decision-making as there are in domestic politics. Therefore, this project uses the policy agenda as the agenda of interest as defined above.

At the center of international relations, states are the primary policy makers. Since the creation of sovereignty and the state system with the Treaty of Westphalia, states dominate policy and treaty making.[5] Treaties are the central means by which states create policy at the international level, and international treaties primarily define the content of international law. Therefore, the actors that make international laws – treaties – are the policy actors of interest for this project. In addition, this project assumes the international system is anarchic (see Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979), without a higher

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[4] Note that the possibility principle may be used to create a population of potential issues, although it was not used in this project (See Mahoney & Goertz, 2004).

[5] Note that states are not the only governments that make agreements internationally (Shin, Unpublished), but cases of non-state treaties are relatively rare.

governing body than state governments.[6] This does not mean that the international system is without any rules or norms (see Bull, 1977). The rules of anarchy and sovereignty, for example, create a partial structure to the international system even if the structure may change over time (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Krasner, 1999).

States are the primary actors that make international laws and treaties. The international agenda does not consist of issues of interest to government officials, as the domestic research on agendas suggests, but to states. Although domestic government officials maintain the monopoly over governance in the United States, for example, international politics do not have strong formalized institutional constraints to determine the likely policy-making actors. More informally, the international norms of state-centered treaty-making dominate international politics. Therefore, states are the central policy makers in the international system making them the central actors in the definition of an international agenda.

The international agenda as described above differs from several other examinations of international agenda-setting by other scholars. Research on international agendas is very limited, but several scholars have examined some form of international agenda formation. Carpenter (2007) examines the creation of an international human rights advocacy agenda in regards to an international issue, namely violence against men

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[6] The European Union (EU) is the primary exception. The EU governance structure only applies to countries that bind themselves to the rules through ratification or accession process, however. Therefore, the states are first to have the choice of whether or not to join the EU and make themselves subject to the rules created within the EU governing structure.

and women. In her research, the agenda examined constitutes an institutional agenda of a particular international organization, with internal rules and governance, rather than the international agenda described in this project.[7] Joachim (2007) examines the formation of the UN agenda in regards to gender violence and reproductive rights. Joachim's research presents an interesting possibility that the UN agenda approximates the international agenda. The UN, like other institutions, however, poses a problem for research on international agendas that differs from research at the domestic level. In research involving US domestic politics, for example, examinations of agendas can rely on formalized Congressional agenda documents that detail the issues that can be addressed on the floor of the House or Senate (Kingdon, 2003). The policy agenda examined in domestic research is the product of a number of variables of interest, making the formal documents a reasonable proxy for the US policy agenda. In international institutions, however, agendas develop very differently. At institutional meetings and conferences, the agenda often consists of any topic any of the member nations wish to address. At the UN General Assembly, this policy is explicit, in order to provide a venue for open dialogue and communication. Therefore, any issue can become part of the UN agenda if a single country wishes it to be so. This poses a problem for research in this project because it leaves the international agenda as an almost infinite set of issues that move on and off the agenda continuously. Research on the international agenda using the

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[7] Carpenter and other scholars may not intend to examine international agendas similarly to this project. Therefore, commenting on the research is not a critique of the research but only provides a discussion of her work and others that deal with international agendas in some form.

UN or other institutional agendas as a proxy requires differentiating between the many smaller issues that are frequently placed on the agenda but have very little interest from more than the one state who placed the item on the agenda.

A second problem emerges when considering the use of the UN as a proxy for the international agenda. The UN is not the only large international institution. There are a number of large international institutions, for which there are more members than the UN. For example, FIFA is one of the largest international institutions with more members than the UN. In addition to large organizations, such as FIFA, other organizations are arguably as powerful or more powerful than the UN. The WTO and the EU are both smaller organizations (in terms of member countries) but have more powerful influences on global trade. The existence of multiple institutions, with different institutional rules, memberships, and power, makes choosing one of them to represent the international agenda problematic. Any one or all of them potentially could proxy the international agenda. Rather than rely on institutions as proxies for convenience when measuring the international agenda, this project develops the measurement of international agendas from the original definition so as not to rely on a proxy, which increases the validity of the measured concept.[8]

Although it is possible to discuss agendas for other actors in the international system, such as international organizations (Joachim, 2007), advocacy networks (Carpenter, 2007), or the media (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), this project is most concerned

[8] See Adcock and Collier (2001) for more information on concept validity.

with the international state agenda. For the reasons discussed above, this project uses the term *international agenda* to refer to issues of concern to states rather than other actors in the international system.

It is also important to discuss the elimination of the term "problem" from the definition of the international agenda. Not all issues on the international agenda must constitute a "problem" for states. Whether an issue is a problem or not entirely depends on the perspective of the actor and whether the issue provides costs or benefits in their view. Some states may receive positive consequences from whaling while other states receive negative consequences from whaling. States who receive positive gains from whaling may not perceive whaling as a "problem." The problem for these states may involve the anti-whaling advocates rather than whaling. Much more discussion on frames takes place later in Chapter III; however, for now it is important to recognize that issues on the agenda do not always constitute problems for all the states who take an interest in that issue. Therefore, this project uses the term "issue" rather than "problem," because some issues on the agenda may not appear as problems at all.

Finally, we must ask ourselves what constitutes "serious attention" for an issue in the international arena. Does a letter written to the General-Secretary of the UN by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regarding racism against Koreans living in Japan signify the introduction of Japanese racism onto the international agenda (DPRK, 2007)? Is something more required before we consider this issue part of the agenda? How should we define the issue of racism to Koreans in Japan? Does the issue include racism

in the public sphere, the private sphere, or both? To answer these types of questions, we must understand how to recognize an international issue and what constitutes serious attention from states.

The section below describes three dimensions that represent the value of an issue's importance when it appears on the international agenda: the number of states attending to the issue, the strength of the states attending to the issue, and the depth of attention to the issue. These three dimensions define the range of attention that can occur for issues on the agenda, which allows an examination of when issues take low (unimportant) places on the international agenda and when issues take high (important) places on the agenda. In other words, they describe the "seriousness" of attention given by states. Following the discussion on issue importance, the rest of the chapter defines other concepts important for understanding international agendas, particularly the concepts of an issue and frames.

DEFINING ISSUE IMPORTANCE

When an issue appears on the international agenda, we can measure its importance on the agenda using three criteria: the number of states attending to an issue, the strength of states concerned, and the depth of their concern. The goal of identifying attention to an issue is to identify the extent to which states value the issue. Rhetoric alone cannot determine the degree of an issue's importance for states because states can (and often do) suggest all issues are important in order to placate domestic and international criticism. Many states, for example, say that climate change, poverty, or

violence against women are important issues for them, but this alone does not help identify the level of concern for the issue. Therefore, the three criteria described above approximate measurements of issue importance to gauge the degree of interest in a particular issue at a particular time.

Number of States

The number of states paying attention to any particular issue varies across issues and time. Previous discussions of international issues typically describe issues that involve two countries (bilateral) or more than two countries (multilateral) (e.g., Barkin, 2004; Mansfield & Milner, 1999; Tomlin, 1989). Although this characterization of international issues distinguishes between the smallest grouping of countries around an issue and all other groupings, the distinction misses the important variation that exists between "two" countries and "many" countries. The number of countries involved in an issue varies between two and the number of countries in the international system at a particular time.

At one extreme, an issue may garner attention from all the states in the international system. Whether a country is in favor of reducing greenhouse gasses or not, almost every state in the international system participates to a degree in discussion on global climate change. For example, when we examine international climate treaties very

few countries, if any, refuse to sign such treaties.[9] The issue of global climate change, therefore, maintains a position on one extreme for internationalized attention. At the opposite extreme, an issue with attention from only two states maintains the lowest level of internationalization. By definition, international issues must concern more than one country.[10] Issues concerned with factors internal to a specific country without interest from other countries cannot maintain a position on the international agenda. The concern over equal rights for African Americans during the 1960's and 1970's in the United States concerns the domestic population within the country; therefore, it belongs on the domestic agenda. If other countries took an interest in African American rights in the United States, the issue could become part of the international agenda. This movement from domestic to international agendas requires attention from more than one state. Other non-state actors, such as cities, NGO's or advocacy networks may maintain some attention toward issues, but this does not mean that the issue holds a place on the international agenda.[11]

To summarize, the number of states is an important measure to understand an issue's place on the international agenda. First, in order for an issue to appear on the international agenda, it must have interest from more than one state. This, by definition,

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[9] Since this discussion involves "attention" to issues and not state policy change treaty signatures suggest attention and ratification is not required. Discussions of depth of attention to an issue are addressed later in this section.

[10] This follows the same logic presented by Mitchell in defining international agreements (Mitchell, 2003b)

[11] These actors may attempt to place their issues on the international agenda, and this is discussed in Chapter III.

makes the issue of international attention and on the international agenda. If an issue concerns only one state, this issue may be part of the domestic agenda for that state; however, unless other states take interest, it does not gain a place on the international agenda. In addition, issues promoted by advocacy groups or other non-state actors may exist on the agendas of those organizations, but they do not necessarily exist on the international agenda. This makes the international agenda distinct from the other agendas that occur within the international and domestic systems. Finally, the number of states helps measure the extent of world concern for a particular issue. When more states become involved with an issue, we can say that the issue is gaining greater attention from the world. Issues with attention from ten states tend to be higher on the agenda than issues with attention from five states. This does not mean that those individual states do not have a greater perceived importance for those issues. Violence in Rwanda may be the most important issue for Rwanda, but this does not make it the most important issue on the international agenda. This leads into other aspects of measuring the seriousness of attention both in terms of strength of state and depth of concern.

Strength of States

Not only do the number of states demonstrate one factor of issue importance, but the strength of the states that take interest in an issue also help identify the seriousness of attention. When states that are larger and more powerful take an interest in an issue, the issue gains a higher place on the international agenda, because the interest of the larger more powerful states gives the issue greater importance. For example, it seems odd to

suggest that an issue of concern to the United States and Russia (2 states) is not as important on the international agenda as an issue concerning Paraguay, Chile, and Argentina (3 states). When two of the largest countries in the world take interest in an issue, the issue gains value on the international agenda, because powerful states constitute a greater interest in the issue than smaller states.

The strength of states is important for understanding the degree of interest for international issues by taking into account the differences that exist among states. Not all states have the same power/strength in the international system, because they do not control the same amount of resources. However, just as it is difficult to justify making an issue that concerns three smaller states more important on the agenda than an issue that concerns two of the largest states in the international system, describing an issue that concerns 30 smaller states as less important than an issue that concerns two larger states also seems somewhat problematic. The strength of more powerful/stronger states does not necessarily outweigh a large number of small states. Both the number of states and the strength of states can make issues relatively higher or lower on the international agenda. Therefore, this project considers both when determining relative position on the agenda of multiple issues.

Depth of Concern

In addition to the number and strength, states attach varying *depth*, or "seriousness," to international issues. Some issues, such as the DPRK concern over possible Japanese racism toward Koreans living in Japan, warrant enough attention to

send a letter to the UN General-Secretary. Other issues, such as international commercial whaling, climate change, or nuclear weapons proliferation generate greater concern for states resulting in conferences, treaties, or formal international organizations. Greater resource expenditure from a group of nations indicates greater importance of the issue for those states. For example, treaty ratification generally requires greater resources than treaty signature, although the costs ultimately depend on the type of government in the state. In general, however, ratification makes a treaty binding in international law and domestic law. Signatures are generally symbolic and only occur during the open signature period when a treaty opens for signature. Since ratification is a stronger bind for the state, it signifies greater costs in domestic political discussions as well as audience costs. Audience costs refer to the cost of reneging on a promise (Fearon, 1994), or in this case a binding international agreement. Ratification of treaties suggests greater concern than treaty signatures, which in turn suggests greater concern than an international conference or no action by the states. One recent example of such costs to potential violations of international treaties occurred in the United States when CIA operatives may have violated international treaties on the use of torture in interrogations.[12] This generates a continuum from no concern over an issue, visible by no action, to very serious concern, visible by actions such as sponsoring conferences or ratifying treaties.

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[12] The legalities of the conduct are complex and involve issues such as whether the terrorists should be considered prisoners of war and thus subject to international treaties. These complexities will not be discussed here.

The costs expended to a particular issue may also increase for other reasons than the degree of interest in a particular issue. Some issues may require greater expenditures to fix than other issues and thus raise the costs to states. Regardless of the costs of the particular issue, however, states are more likely to incur higher costs for issues that are more important. The problem also occurs for issues that may be very important for states, but have insignificant costs associated with the international issue. The measure of costs associated with the issue, therefore, may not always reflect the actual depth of importance for the state. Despite this imperfection, measures of cost associated with a particular issue reasonably approximate the depth of interest by states. In combination with the other indicators, we can get a general sense of the relative importance of various issues or changes in the importance of a particular issue over time.

To conclude, the international agenda consists of those issues to which multiple states are paying serious attention at a given time. The value of *issue importance* on the agenda reflects the amount of attention from states. This project uses three criteria for indicating the amount of attention from states. The number of states tells how wide or narrow states attend to the issue. The strength of states provides an indication of the amount of resources that states could dedicate toward the issue by representing the resources of the states that attend to the issue. The level of resource expenditure in time and money indicate the depth of attention to an issue. Together these three indicators provide an indication of the extent to which a particular issue maintains a high or low

position on the international agenda and allows us to examine relative differences between issues and changes in a single issue's attention over time.

The three dimensions of attention to issues generate a nuanced measure of the international agenda that allows considerable variation between issues. Issues do not appear only "on" or "off" the international agenda, but also appear relative to one another in their degree of importance while on the agenda. It is important to recognize when issues become part of the international agenda, but it is also important to examine when issues move up or down the level of importance on the agenda. The only way to examine such changes is to generate definitions that allow variation among the relative positions of issues on the international agenda.

WHAT IS AN ISSUE?

The previous section, in the course of defining international agendas, spends some time discussing issues on the agenda. To this point, the discussion focused on the agenda rather than the issues on those agendas, which is where this chapter now turns. **An issue on the international agenda consists of a description of a phenomenon, combined with a frame around which different actors relate to that phenomenon**. The international agenda does not only consist of a given issue, but also the way states relate to that issue. In other words, there are two parts to the international agenda: the issue's attention level and the definition of that issue. Discussions of agendas are incomplete without a discussion of how the issues are defined while on the agenda.

One definition of an agenda item suggests "a defined problem, a set of alternative solutions, and an attached level of salience" (Livingston, 1992, p. 315). This definition conflates the phenomenon that exists in the world observed by international actors and the actors' frames that help define the relationship to that phenomenon. The way actors define issues on agendas is an important aspect of describing agendas. Although this project may be the first to use frames to describe the problem definition of agenda items, other scholars have also defined international attention as both the definition and issue attention (Schreurs et al., 2001). This project defines issues in a way to separate the real world events observed and the observation and interpretation of those events.

A phenomenon is central to defining any issue, on or off the international agenda. The phenomenon consists of a real event that an actor observes and describes. The observation is separate from the phenomenon because the observation incorporates some interpretive elements when describing the phenomenon. We cannot have an issue without observing something about the world. For example, we have issues involving the world's food supply, continued violence in the Middle East region, improving human rights for women and other discriminated groups, and many more. All of these issues begin with some phenomenon in the world. We observe that some people in the world do not have food. We observe that there has been violence almost continuously in the Middle East region since WWII. We observe that women do not have equal status with men in a variety of areas. It is hard to imagine any issue that we have today that does not begin with an observation about the world.

What does this description of the phenomenon look like and where might it come from? The observation may come from a variety of individuals in society. Physical scientists, for example, observe a great deal about our world and describe this information in a wide variety of journals, newspapers, and magazines. The discovery of new information often generates new issues by describing phenomena. Scientists' discovery of low levels of ozone, that came to be described as an ozone "hole," in the earth's atmosphere became a central phenomena eventually leading to an international treaty regulating substances that contributed to the formation of the "hole" (Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994). Without the influence of scientific knowledge, we would not have observed the destruction of the ozone layer in the atmosphere. Thus, the ozone layer issue would never have become part of the international agenda. In other words, scientific observations or descriptions of phenomena are a necessary part of defining an issue. Social scientists also observe a great deal about our world. Social scientists often make observations about the world, such as the distribution of wealth and knowledge between various regions (e.g. between the developed and the developing world) or groups of individuals (e.g. between women and men). Without these observations as well, we would not have issues involving human rights or global poverty. Rather than our physical environment, these observations regarding the distribution of wealth and rights involve our social environment.

Identification and description of phenomena do not only come from scientists. Any number of actors, individuals, NGO's, advocacy groups, governments, scientists,

authors, reporters, and news outlets observe and describe phenomena. These actors may often describe a phenomenon based on incomplete or imperfect information. Sometimes the descriptions may not be true and sometimes they may be complete fabrications or manipulations of information. Even attempts at accurately observing social or physical phenomena become difficult, because no observations will be without some form of measurement error or uncertainty (Rothman, 2006). In addition, scope conditions help to define the content of all observations of phenomena, such as the time and space of the observation. Accurate depictions of the same event, if possible, could differ based on the length of time or the space in which one observes the phenomenon. If someone observes one glacier over one year, he or she may see the glacier expand. A different individual observing five glaciers over 30 years may see glaciers retract. Because of the potential for error, uncertainty, and varying scope conditions with any observation, we can never be certain of the truth of any description of phenomena. An international issue is defined by the combination of a description and a frame that relates the phenomena to other actors in the international system. The existence of uncertainty, potential inaccuracy in observation, and varying scope conditions, allows for manipulation or changes in the descriptions and understanding of the phenomena through changes in the frame, which the next section describes in more detail.

WHAT ARE FRAMES?

As discussed, both phenomena and the frame define issues that may become part of the international agenda. **A frame describes the relationship between actors and**

the phenomena described above (Goffman, 1974, p. 1). The frame provides a context for the issue and a way to interpret or understand the phenomenon. Without a frame, the phenomenon has no meaning for individuals because there is no connection between it and those individuals. Just like frames of photographs or paintings may highlight certain colors or textures and obscure imperfections or unsightly areas of a picture, frames around issues highlight some parts of the description of the phenomena and obscure others. Frames play a central role in manipulation of outcomes and agendas by manipulating the perceived causes, consequences, and prescriptions of phenomena. When frames highlight or obscure different real characteristics of the phenomenon, actors' relationships toward the phenomenon change making it more or less salient and change the response toward the issue. Chapter III discusses the details of the causes of frame changes and influences on issue attention. Because of the central importance of frames for the studying of international agenda formation, it is important to define frames in a way that assists in understanding the differences among frames and changes that might occur for frames.

Frames are never right or wrong about issues. As understood through the social constructivist perspective, all real events are understood through ideas (Hacking, 1999). This perspective does not view ideas all the way down, but only part way down. There are real events in the world, but frames always mitigate our interpretation and understanding of real world phenomena (Goffman, 1974). Phenomena observed in the world have real causes and real effects. Sometimes these causes and effects are known

and sometimes they are unknown. For instance, in the case of the environment, there are many causes of climate change, most of which scientists know despite some debate over the relative magnitude of these causes. The effects of climate change, however, are relatively unknown. There are some conjectures and projections about changes in sea level, vegetation, and weather patterns, but effects of climate on human psychology and sociology, for example are still relatively unknown.

Frames are the lenses through which humans interpret and understand the real phenomena and its causes and effects. Sometimes frames focus on a particular set of causes or effects; sometimes they focus on a single cause or effect. Frames can also emphasize the magnitude of effects (either small or large). These frames are ideas about reality, not reality. Therefore, they are constructions, within the realm of social constructivism.

Since frames identify the relationship between a phenomenon and individuals, frames influence the way those individuals react and respond to the phenomenon or what policy individuals may prescribe. The frame identifies, for example, whether the phenomenon has any relevance to an observer. The frame may identify whether the actor is a cause of the phenomenon, or whether the phenomenon affects the actor in some way by it. If someone observes an image of a whale being slaughtered, for example, the observer may frame this as an image of fishing for food or other resources. A different person, seeing the same image, may frame the image as a violation of international law or a violation of their morals to protect other species.

Different frames allow for differentiation among interpretations of observed events and different prescriptions to observed problems. For example, the international community might define the violence in Darfur region of Sudan as an international problem because of the deaths of large numbers of people. However, how the states define and understand the events, for example, defining events as a civil war versus a genocide, partially determines both responsibility for dealing with the problem and what strategies states might use to stop the violence (Cushman, 2000). Frames define how actors think about a particular set of facts, and therefore, are vital for influencing how actors conduct their behavior toward those facts.

To summarize, frames describe the relationship between a phenomenon and an individual, or in the case of this project, a state. A frame is a function of the individual and the phenomenon, describing the relationship between the two. Frames are constructions as discussed earlier, but do not need to be part of a social collective to take form. When a phenomenon couples with a frame, it becomes an issue that might emerge onto the international agenda. Whether or not the issue becomes part of the international agenda depends on a number of factors discussed in Chapter III.

Frames exist for individual actors, but actors also may share the same frame when it becomes socially accepted or dominates other frames. At other times, frames may vary for different actors. These frames can co-exist when they are not in contestation or when the frames do not interfere with one another. Multiple frames may imply that states should not take any action on an issue even if the frames vary slightly as to the

description of a phenomenon. States may see violence within a state as an insurgency or a civil war, where the prescriptive policy of both views involves inaction. When frames are not consistent with each other, some actors may challenge others on the legitimacy of a frame, making that frame contested. The next section discusses frame dominance and contestation in more detail.

FRAME TYPES: UNRECOGNIZED, CONTESTED, AND DOMINANT

There are two types of frames, contested or dominant. Dominant frames are those shared by states in the international system, such that states agree on how to define a particular phenomenon. Each state's frame may be slightly different from others in the case of dominant frames, but the frames do not differ enough to cause conflict among the states.

When a frame is dominant, it does not mean that all states behavior is consistent with that dominant frame. Although we might assume a dominant interpretation of state boundaries such that states do not act within the borders of other states, not all state behavior is consistent with this dominant understanding. Some states act purposefully within the borders of other states covertly or overtly invade the other state's territory. It is most often the case where a dominant frame exists that state behavior can be ruled as "illegal," as contrary to international law or norms.

Dominant frames may be recognized or unrecognized in the international system. Unrecognized frames occur when there is no explicit rhetoric or discussion of a particular issue and states act "naturally" in regards to the issue. What is normal or natural for the

states for a given issue may mean that the states pay no attention to the issue or that there is no contestation of the issue, so there is no need to explicitly define their own frame for the issue.

The implicit nature of the unrecognized frame resembles approaches to discourse analysis (Howarth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000) as well as internalized norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Discourse analysis suggests that sometimes actors within a dominant discourse cannot recognize that discourse because they act within the commonly understood roles and norms. Internalized norms, as well, create implicit recognition of the normalcy of their actions. Internalized norms do not require any explicit discussion, but states obey them because the norms describe the "natural" way to act. The unrecognized frame also presents actors with a frame that actors do not question, but recognize as the "natural" way to act, similar to a common discourse or internalized norms.

Dominant frames may also occur as recognized when states agree on a frame through explicit discussions or treaty making. These periods of recognized, dominant frames often occur after a frame is challenged by another actor in the international system, because the challenge requires that states explicitly defend or identify their own frame. Table 1 illustrates the differences between unrecognized and recognized frames for several issues. Many times, we cannot view an unrecognized frame without reference to a foil – a recognized frame after actors explicitly discuss an issue or the issue becomes part of the international agenda.

Table 1.

Sample Illustration of Dominant Frames in International Politics

Issue	Unrecognized Frames	Recognized Frames
Whaling	Killing whales is good for the economy – whalers should kill whales	Killing whales results in extinction of whales – whalers should not kill whales
Landmines	Use of landmines in combat is good for protecting troops and winning wars – states should use landmines	Use of landmines in combat inflicts harm on individuals long after wars end – states should not use landmines.
CO2 Emissions	Improving the economy through production is valuable, and CO2 is a byproduct of this process – pollution is acceptable	CO2 emissions causes irreparable harm to the environment – pollution is not acceptable
Violence in Sudan	Sudanese violence is a domestic civil war – no intervention is warranted	Sudanese violence consists of genocidal behavior – intervention is required

Issue frames may become dominant for long or short periods and may move between recognized and unrecognized frames. When a frame becomes dominant, states may stop discussing the issue explicitly, because states internalized the norm or it became part of the larger discourse. Thus, these dominant recognized frames sometimes become internalized, making them unrecognized once again.

In addition, appearance of a dominant frame for a particular issue does not mean all states maintain similar frames. Some actors may maintain different frames than the dominant frame, but the differing frame has little or no support from other actors. Actors with different frames may attempt to change the frame to change international attention to the issue. Some states may maintain different frames than the dominant frame as well. Some states, for example may have no interest in an international issue, ignoring the

phenomenon. When frames are not conflicting, the differences may not create conflict or interfere with the dominance of a particular frame.

Dominant frames may also become contested frames when actors attempt to change the dominant understanding of an issue. During times of discussion, when states explicitly express their frames and other actors challenge such frames, the frames become *contested.* When states or other actors in the international system challenge a frame, states must often clarify and elucidate their frame of phenomena. Sometimes these frames conflict and create competition between states and other international actors for dominance of their particular frame so the policies to address the issue coincide with their own view.

The contestation over frames may involve only part of a frame because frames are often complex. For example, many states agree that human activity contributes to climate change, as evidenced by the large numbers of states who participated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Although states generally agree on the causes of climate change in human activity, international actors may significantly disagree on the blame for future climate change, such as disputes between developed and the developing nations (Adger, Paavola, Huq, & Mace, 2006; Schneider & Mitchell, 2001). States appear to agree on the dominant frame for at least part of the frame suggesting that humans cause climate change but differ on the responsibility between developing and developed countries.

Because different actors can relate to issues in different ways, all issues have many potential frames available. For example, before the second Iraq war actors maintained at least two clear frames: containment and regime change. The Bush administration claimed that the only way to solve the continued problems with the Iraqi government involved regime change policy. Others in the world community suggested that the previous containment policies of Iraq and weapons inspections could solve the problem involving possible Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction (Kinsella, 2007). These events did not lead to a clear consensus among the international actors as the United States maintained the Coalition of the Willing with considerable opposition from other states, such as France. In this case, states maintained different frames around Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions and the solution to the defiance.

To reiterate, issues are defined as the phenomenon plus a corresponding frame. Sometimes actors present alternative frames contesting the frame of an issue when it is part of the international agenda. Other times actors may agree on the frame or a part of the frame for issues on the international agenda. Since actors may agree on a part of the frame rather than the whole frame, it is useful to delineate the different parts of a frame. The next section describes frame characteristics that can define the content of a frame, which helps us understand how frames change or become contested.

WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF FRAMES?

Just like the color and material of a picture frame accentuate, highlight, or hide some content around a picture, issue frames do the same. All frames must rely on real

phenomena, although the frame itself is a construction. Just as frames around pictures cannot change the picture itself, issue frames cannot change the phenomenon, only highlight or obscure. As noted in the previous section, issues may have different characteristics that allow more differentiation among frames for a particular issue. This project develops a typology of three characteristics that define the content of frames: the causes of the phenomenon (causal characteristics), the consequences (consequence characteristics), and the policy suggestions (prescriptive characteristics).

These three characteristics map well onto other descriptions of frame characteristics. Some social movement research defines frames as containing a diagnostic element, a solution, and a call to arms (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). Other scholars identify the causes, impacts, and potential solutions as the content of an environmental problem (Schreurs et al., 2001). Schreaurs goes further to describe how these three rather simplistic categories accommodate all aspects of an issue frame. This project's use of these three characteristics, therefore, resembles the use of characteristics in other work.

Not all issue frames contain explicit descriptions of all the characteristics; however, the frame may contain implicit characteristics even when international actors do not state them explicitly. In addition, the characteristics are sometimes related or constricting to other characteristics. These characteristics are not independent or causal, but mutually defining and constraining.

The rest of this section describes the three characteristics in more detail. The section describes each characteristic in relation to one another as well as the content that defines each characteristic. As Figure 1 shows in the issue concept diagram, real causes and real consequences connect to a real phenomenon. As discussed earlier, individuals observe and frame this real phenomenon. The frame is constrained by the real causes and consequences of the phenomenon, but highlights or obscures different aspects of the real causes and consequences.

Figure 1.

Issue Concept Diagram



One characteristic of a frame describes the causes of the phenomenon. The causal characteristic answers questions about where the phenomenon comes from and what factors contribute to its existence. The causes of the phenomenon are important for

determining whether the issue can become part of the international agenda. For example, some scholars argue that issues can only become part of the agenda when they are seen as caused by human action (Stone, 1989). However, this project assumes the causal characteristic has more than two values (caused by humans/not caused by humans). The cause can involve any number of values, one of which could be human action, which may, make the issue more likely to become part of the agenda (discussed more in Chapter III). States, a non-governmental group, nature, a divine origin, or other values can become part of the causal characteristic within an issue frame.

There may be a large number of real causes of the phenomenon of an issue and the causal characteristic highlights some of those causes as well as their relative importance. Causal characteristics may identify only one cause of a phenomenon, but this implicitly suggests that the cause identified is more important than any other real causes of the phenomenon. Sometimes the causal characteristic will identify particular actors or states as part of the causes of the phenomenon, which would make those actors perpetrators. This allows for the formation of blame, which may raise the interest of those states. Other times, the causal characteristic may identify non-actors as the primary causes of a phenomenon. Chapter III discusses the effects of different causal characteristics on the agenda.

Climate change provides an interesting example for examining causal characteristics because of the large number of causes presented in relation to raising world temperatures. Around the phenomenon of rising world temperatures (global

warming or climate change) the causal characteristic may describe one or more of the many potential causes: solar output, the distance between the Earth and the Sun, Interstellar dust, volcanic emissions, surface reflectivity, atmospheric chemistry (including the contributors to CO2 emissions, such as factories, cars, etc), and perhaps others. Actors may emphasize some of these factors over others within the causal characteristics, suggesting differential levels of importance. Different international actors may emphasize different causal consequences in order to change the international agenda or the dominant frame around rising world temperatures.

Consequence characteristics involve the effects of the phenomenon. Questions of consequence may involve which actors (human or non-human) might be affected, how those actors are affected, and in what period those effects might take place. On one dimension, the consequence characteristic identifies whom the phenomenon affects. Given that these characteristics identify the relationship between international actors and the phenomenon, the consequence characteristic identifies the phenomenon's effects on particular actors. Sometimes the consequence characteristic may suggest that a phenomenon affects a particular set of states in a particular region. The ozone layer hole, for example was interpreted to greatly affect states in the southern hemisphere such as Australia, while the consequences for northern hemisphere states were negligible.

Just as the causes of the phenomenon may create blame, the consequences of effects create victims or beneficiaries (depending if the effects are negative or positive). Benford discusses this framing as "diagnostic" where frame content identifies the victims

of an injustice (Benford & Snow, 2000, 615). Of course, it is equally plausible to identify beneficiaries, which the concept of consequence characteristics can incorporate. In addition, just as Stone (1989) identifies causes as human or non-human, non-humans can also receive negative or positive effects from a phenomenon. Frames developed around phenomena of the natural world often begin with the consequences for nature when human consequences occur indirectly. The effects of climate change, for example, often start with rising sea changes and weather changes as the initial consequences. These changes then become phenomena for subsequent consequence characteristics of a frame describing effects for humans (e.g., see Diamond, 2005; Homer-Dixon, 1994).

The consequence frame may also identify *how* the phenomenon affects actors. The consequences of the US invasion of Iraq may affect some states positively, while other states may be negatively affected. For example, one of the recipients of removing Saddam Hussein from power could be the Iranian government because a long-time enemy was no longer in power and the resulting difficulty to secure Iraq required great expenditures by the US (a second potential enemy). On the other hand, countries with strong relations with Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule, such as France and China may receive negative effects from the invasion. Table 2 presents an example of the causes and consequences of the 2003 Iraq war. The case of the Iraq war illustrates multiple potential causes and consequences of the phenomenon that actors could emphasize as part of causal or consequence characteristics.

Finally, the consequence characteristic may suggest the time frame of the effects. Some phenomena affect states in the short term over the course of a few years or less, while other phenomena create effects in the long term, requiring ten or more years to generate. Actors may emphasize the effects of rising sea levels, for example, on different states at different points in the future. Coastal and low-lying states are most likely to be affected in the short term, within the next 50 years or so, while interior or elevated states may be affected in the long term due to changing weather patterns and rain resulting from the higher seas. The consequence characteristic identifies questions about the effects of the phenomenon, how they affect different actors, and when those effects may occur.

Table 2.

Examples of Causes and Consequences of the 2003 Iraq War

Causes	Description of a Phenomenon	Consequences
Failure of containment policy in Iraq	The US and the Coalition of the Willing invade Iraq in 2003.	Removed an Oppressive Regime
Iraq's desire for increased weaponry		Stopped the production of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
US Desire for oil access		Increased US presence in the Middle East
Ideological or personality reasons within the US Administration.		Create a democratic government in the Middle East

Note. Derived from reading and interpretation by Kinsella (2007), various news sources, and reports on the Iraq war.

The third frame characteristic involves prescriptive factors. Prescription characteristics describe the policy choices associated with a phenomenon. These policy

alternatives describe ways to mitigate the consequences of phenomenon by addressing the causes of the issue described within the causal characteristics. The policy alternatives may also describe ways to increase the effects of the phenomenon or prolong the observed facts, if the consequence characteristic defines the effects positively as a benefit rather than a problem needing a solution. This approach differs from some scholars who identify "solutions" as the only responses described within a frame (Benford & Snow, 2000).

In October 2007, spokesperson for the Whitehouse, Dana Perino, described the health benefits of global warming. She stated that the number of people who die of cold-related issues will not be as great as the climate warms ("White House Defends," 2007). If a government administration adopted this consequence characteristic, the government may take prescriptive characteristics that continue to raise global temperatures or at least take no action concerning increasing temperatures. Of course, other climate experts denounced such positive effects as minor in comparison to the much greater negative consequences of climate warming. This consequence characteristic implies greater efforts to stop climate change.

The prescriptive characteristics directly relate to both the consequence characteristics and the causal characteristics. The consequence characteristics suggest whether and which policy options are appropriate based on whether the consequences are positive, negative, or negligible. The prescriptive characteristics also relate to causal characteristics. In order to create policies for a phenomenon, the prescriptive

characteristics usually need to address the causes. If causes directly relate to negative consequences, prescription characteristics would most likely describe reductions in or interference with the cause.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began by describing the international agenda as a list of issues to which states are paying serious attention at any given time. This definition was adapted from the definition used by US politics scholars examining domestic agendas. This definition reflects the role of policy makers in international relations (states) and their policy agenda rather than other agendas, such as those in international organizations. The chapter defined issues that may appear on the international agenda using the social constructivist perspective where real phenomena are interpreted through frames. Frames describe the relationship between the observer and the observed. The frames identify three issue characteristics: causes, consequences, and prescriptive characteristics.

To summarize the process of international agenda-setting, before an issue can become part of the international agenda, someone or some group observes and describes a phenomenon in the world. Different actors (or just the observer) can develop one or more frames around this phenomenon, which highlight, expand, exclude, or exaggerate some characteristics of the phenomenon. When the phenomenon combines with a frame, it becomes a potential issue for the international agenda. Because of the potential for multiple frames, actors and advocates may compete with each other in order to make their frame or interpretation dominant over others to guide future behavior or other

characteristics of the frame. The issue can emerge onto the international agenda and move up, down, or off the agenda due to a number of factors including presentation of alternative frames and changes in the dominant frame (discussed in Chapter III).

Understanding frames, how states and other actors relate to phenomena, is vital for both understanding the agenda and understanding how the agenda may change. New frames introduced by states or other international actors, if adopted, can change the meaning of the phenomenon for states. This change in meaning can alter how states perceive the importance or their relationship to the phenomenon (e.g. from perpetrator or victim to bystander). Some actors may intentionally challenge frames and attempt to manipulate them in order to achieve different policy outcomes. These actions are a vital part of setting the international agenda, which Chapter III discusses in detail. Chapter III examines the concepts of setting the agenda and the use of rhetoric to change issue attention and frames. Up to this point, the discussion has focused primarily on describing the international agenda and issues, but the next chapter describes how the international agenda and issues can change and who and what might facilitate such changes.

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

Chapter II described the international policy agenda in this project and frames that describe issues. Chapter II essentially answered the "what" questions in terms of international agendas. The project now turns to the "why" questions of international agendas. Why do international agendas change? Why do issues appear on the international agenda or vanish from it? Why do they move up or down in importance on the agenda? Why do issue frames change? This chapter examines how agendas and frames change, why issues become part of the international agenda, and why changes occur when they do.

Changes in the international agenda occur when an issue moves on or off the agenda or when the issue becomes more or less important for states on the agenda. The movement up and down the agenda reflects the interest of the number of states, the type of states, and the depth of involvement of these states, as described in Chapter II. The agenda also changes when issue content changes. If the content of the dominant frame changes for a particular issue, the international agenda changes because the issue content appearing on the agenda has changed.

This chapter divides the causes of agenda changes into two primary categories based on the theoretical divisions in international relations literature. The first category of causes involves the material causes of change. These material causes of change primarily rely on realist theoretical dependence on military power distributions in the

international systems and the assumption that security is most important for states. The second category of causes involves the non-material variables. These variables rely on a constructivist perspective. The non-material factors rely on the use of rhetoric to change the international agenda and frames, with intervening conditions such as international exposure of the rhetoric and the content of the rhetoric making it easier or more difficult for the rhetoric to create change in the international agenda. These two categories of variables parallel an important division in international relations theory between the constructivist and non-constructivist causes of changes in international politics.

This chapter adds to the agenda descriptions from Chapter II by theorizing the causes for issue emergence onto the international agenda and changes in issue frames. Chapter IV closely examines this theory on the case of international efforts to address whaling and the agenda changes with particular attention to the variables discussed in this project. The discussion below does not attempt to draw out which of the variables are most important or most likely to generate changes in the international agenda. Instead, this chapter describes the potential influences on the international agenda and develops hypotheses, which Chapter IV and Chapter V test through empirical analysis. This analysis resembles a standard positivist approach to hypothesis development and testing, which starts with theory and tests the theories using empirical information (see Chapter I and King et al., 1994).

This chapter begins below with a discussion on the causes of agenda changes due to the influence of material variables. The discussion then moves through the non-

material variable causes of changes in the international agenda. In brief, the material causes of agenda changes involve the distribution of power in the international system and the primary interest of states. According to realist theory, states are primarily concerned with their own security in relation to threats posed by other states in the international system. Issues become important for states when they involve state security or changes in power. The nonmaterial causes begin with a discussion of rhetoric as a primary driving force behind changes in international agendas. The discussion centers on how rhetoric influences international agendas by changing the issue frame. The non-material section continues by describing how exposure and the content of the rhetoric can hinder or promote the ability of the rhetoric to influence the international agenda. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of how actors in the international system can use rhetoric strategically to change the international agenda without falsifying, fabricating, or lying about the issue. This final section discusses how manipulation strategies influence the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics as part of the dominant frame. Chapters IV and V then test the hypotheses generated in this chapter on the case of international efforts to address whaling.

WHY DOES THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA CHANGE?

This section examines why issues move on and off the agenda as well as why the content of the issue frame changes. Influences on the international agenda are grouped into two categories that also correspond to the larger debate in international relations between realist and non-realist theories. The two categories include the material and the

non-material causes. Each category contains several variables and hypotheses described in detail below.

MATERIAL CAUSES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

As discussed earlier, formal institutions create the potential for influence through manipulation of placement of agenda items (see Arrow, 1963; Downs, 1957; McKelvey, 1976; Shepsle, 1979). In the international system, the power to control the agenda lies, according to realist logic, with states. States possess the most military and economic control of the system relative to others and are the primary actors responsible for cooperation and conflict in the international system.

Realism frequently relies on the distribution of power among the states in the international system to determine the extent to which states will conflict or cooperate and the stability of the international system (Waltz, 1979). Based on realist logic, we can infer that different distributions of power will change the international agenda. In addition, realists assume that security is the most important issue for states in the international system (Morgenthau, 1948). Non-security interests, such as environmental, economic, or those regarding human rights become less important on the international agenda. The next section examines these two primary realist assumptions in detail regarding their potential influence on the international agenda.

Issue Importance and State Interest

Material Hypothesis 1: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the international agenda.

Realist theory begins with the assumption that the international system is anarchic, where states are unable to secure themselves from other states through an overarching governing body (Carr, 1956; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). Unlike in domestic political settings where states (police, military, etc.) maintain power over constituents, no institution above national governments maintains a monopoly on the use of force. Domestic governments can maintain security and order within their boundaries by controlling the use of legitimate violence, such as the use of police or military within the domestic borders. Because the existence of anarchy in the international system does not provide for stable state security, security is the first priority for states at all times. When security issues are compared to other issues, such as economic or environmental issues, security issues always take priority (Morgenthau, 1948). This does not mean that environmental issues or economic issues never appear on the agenda. This logic suggests that when there is a security threat on the agenda, it is going to take priority over other issues. Other issues are only likely to appear on the agenda when states are secure.

The best way to provide security according to realists is through military power (Morgenthau, 1948). One of the best ways to achieve greater military strength is through economic resources. Therefore, economic issues are the second most important types of

issues for international actors. Economic power can often become military power in the long term as economic resources can purchase the means to manufacture military resources or can purchase those resources directly. Therefore, economic issues are often less important than security issues, but more important than other issues that are less likely to lead to more military power and security.

Finally, other issues may appear on the international agendas with less importance than economic or security issue. These issues may involve benefits to states beyond security and economic prosperity. Human rights is sometimes seen as a type of luxury good, that can only be addressed by states once they have established security from other states. Therefore, these issues are always less important on the international agenda than security and economic issues.

It is important to note the potential blurring between the material and non-material influences when distinguishing between security and non-security issues when we consider how rhetoric changes the frame for states from a non-security issue to a security one. If we assume that states and actors only understand reality through their own ideas, then the understanding of whether an issue involves state security or not is dependent on those ideas. In general, realist theories do not assume a strong difference between the reality of the world and the ability of actors to understand that reality, as constructivism does. If states have a "real" security interest in an issue, it is more likely to become part of the agenda and take a higher priority than other issues. If the issue becomes part of the agenda because the frame changes due to rhetoric, then the rhetoric becomes the driving

influence on the international agenda. The later part of this chapter takes up the importance of rhetorical influences on the international agenda. Rhetoric may influence the perception of an issue -- whether it is a security issue or not – and thus influence whether the issue appears higher or lower on the agenda. It is important to keep in mind that realists assume an objective observation of state security is possible, while constructivist theorists generally assume that only an interpretation of state security is possible.

Material Hypothesis 1a: Unipolar systems create stability and security allowing other issues to increase in priority or emerge onto the international agenda.

Realists define three types of international power distributions: unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. Unipolar systems are defined by a single dominant state that has larger resources than other states in the international system.[13] Bipolar systems are characterized by two large powers that together maintain a preponderance of power, where other states in the international system have significantly less power. Multipolar systems describe systems with more than two powerful states.

A unipolar system provides a potential exception to the higher importance of security on the international agenda. In a unipolar system, or a region with a hegemonic power, the international agenda may contain issues other than security issues because the

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[13] Some definitions of unipolarity suggest that the hegemon must have more power than the combination of all other states in order to be a true hegemon. Given that this is unlikely to occur, unipolarity is defined by a system where a single state has a preponderance of power (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 27) that makes it very costly and difficult for other states to counter this large state.

dominant state creates stability and reduces security concerns. Under a hegemonic system, non-security issues may increase in importance because the hegemon provides some stability to the international system. With a single large state with enough power to dominate the international system, other states may feel more secure under the protection of this large state (see Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001; Kindleberger, 1986; Lake, 1993). Under these circumstances, states may attend to other issues, making it more likely for non-security issues to increase their importance on the international agenda.

Material Hypothesis 1b: Bipolar systems create an agenda dominated by security issues with some opportunity for non-security issues to increase importance.

In bipolar systems, consistency of interaction is provided by the power rivalry between the two larger states in the international system (Waltz, 1979). Two large states engage in long-term rivalry such that they are most concerned with changes in relative power between them. This stability generates some opportunity for non-security issues to emerge onto the international agenda, but it most likely will not involve the two larger powers. Because the international system is relatively stable, association with larger states can provide smaller states with some security. Among these states, non-security issues may become part of the international agenda.

Although the two powers create a consistent rivalry because security expectations are relatively clear, the two larger states do not always provide security for all smaller states in the international system. Sometimes in this system, the major powers provide some security to their allies. However, given that security cannot always be guaranteed

because of the potential for buck-passing when a powerful state attends to the security of another state (see Elman, 2004), security issues will most likely still dominate the international agenda. In sum, most likely security issues will dominate the international system, but at times, non-security issues may appear on the agenda for smaller states when security is provided by one of the major powers.

Material Hypothesis 1c: Multipolar systems are least likely to allow non-security issues to emerge or to dominate the international agenda.

Multipolar systems provide the least security for states because alliance patterns shift quickly, and there is little consistency or stability in the international system (Waltz, 1979). In a multipolar system, there are no states large enough to provide security for other states in the international system. States achieve security through balancing and allying with other states against more powerful enemies. In this system, where alliances are short-lived and other states cannot provide security, security issues dominate the international agenda, and there is very little room for non-security issues to appear. Unlike in the bipolar system, where the two large states may provide some security for smaller allies, in the multipolar system alliances are more fleeting creating additional security concerns.

Power Distribution and Contestation and Dominance over the International Agenda

Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration of power in one state (unipolarity) results in little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged

contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived contestation.

In a system with a single dominating power, the dominant power should have primary influence over international outcomes. Since the dominant state maintains a preponderance of power and control in the international system, other states should not have the ability to influence the international agenda. If a state challenges the agenda of the dominant state, given the importance and dominance of power the dominant state will be able to resist any challenges. If all states know that the dominant state can resist challenges to change the agenda, it is unlikely that weaker states will be willing to pay any costs of challenging the dominant state. Challenges take place only when the challenging state has a chance of success. This resembles the game theoretical model describing the Chain-Store Paradox (see Ordeshook, 1986, pp. 451-462). In the hegemonic case, the agenda is relatively uncontested.

Bipolar systems are characterized by rivalry between the two dominant powers in the system. Since there are only two dominating powers in these systems, security concerns for both powers involve the threat from the other power. Under these circumstances, each state's desired agenda involves containing the opposing state while potentially expanding the state's own power resources. When there are two states with relatively equal power, either can gain an advantage over the other with a small increase in relative power. Therefore, power concerns are even greater than under the bipolar system, where small increases in power of a smaller states may not be very meaningful of

a larger state. Because small changes in relative power between the two large states may have large implications for domination of one state over the other, security concerns take a heightened importance.

Because any increase in power, no matter how small, creates an advantage, two large powers are likely to compete over all resources including control over the agenda. Under these circumstances, we expect a highly contested agenda because any increase in power (even on the agenda) by one of the two states gives that state an important advantage. If one of the states becomes interested in an issue, it is very likely that the rivalry between the states causes the other state to become interested in the issue also. If both states are not interested in the issue, the issue may appear as a less important issue for smaller states because the two most powerful nations are not interested. In general, however, the bipolar system suggests that the two dominant states will contest the frames for longer periods than in the unipolar system.

Multipolar systems are characterized by instability, intense competition between states and short-lived cooperation and alliances (Waltz, 1979). The intense competition in a multipolar system and great instability leads to an agenda that is also highly contested. However, because of the rapid changes in alliance patterns in order to contain increases in power of many states, contestation over frames is likely to be short lived for any particular issue.

No single state can dominate and force issues onto the international agenda for other states in a multipolar system. States continue to be concerned about security, as

described above, but security issues change rapidly. States are not likely to maintain prolonged interest in a single issue because the security interests will change just as alliances change quickly. Due to the variety of interests of states and their relatively equal power resources, no single state can impose a dominant agenda among other states. Therefore, the agenda is more highly contested and transient than during unipolar or bipolar systems.

RHETORICAL CAUSES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

In addition to the material interests of states, rhetoric can also influence the international agenda. Rhetoric influences the agenda by changing the understanding of the phenomena by changing the frame. By changing the frame, the issue may become more or less important for states. Any number of international actors can manipulate the agenda through rhetoric, including governments and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups. This section discusses the mechanisms by which rhetoric might change the agenda followed by the use of strategic purposeful manipulation.

Factors characteristic of the actors propagating the rhetoric and the content of the rhetoric can promote or interfere with the ability of rhetoric to change a frame. Some actors are better able to communicate their rhetoric through the media, and some rhetoric is more likely to be accepted than other rhetoric. Since much of the information propagated in the world occurs through the media, increased or decreased media exposure can influence the potential for frame changes. Other forums for information

exchange can become important for propagating rhetoric, as well, such as conferences, international organizations like the UN, and other informal venues, such as summits or meetings of heads of state.

Rhetoric is most likely to influence the frame of the issue, which in turn will change the way states attend to the issue. Changing the frame entails changing the way states understand their relationship to the phenomenon. As discussed earlier, the frame identifies how actors relate to the phenomenon observed. Rhetoric can change this understanding by emphasizing different actors or characteristics of a frame in forums, media, or other international outlets. Various factors could enhance the ability of rhetoric to change the frame for international issues. Media exposure, connections to focusing events, the completeness of the frame, and the connection to a broader culture or discourse may increase the influence of rhetoric on the international agenda. In addition, when rhetoric emphasizes a particular state as the perpetrator or the victim of a particular phenomenon, that state may be more likely to attend to the issue. In general, rhetoric propagated through the international system, that is complete, and connected to a broader discourse is more likely to become content of the dominant frame for an issue on the international agenda The next section discusses the importance of rhetoric for influencing frames and the issue placement on the international agenda in more detail. Following this discussion, the text describes the influence of intervening factors in increasing or decreasing the effectiveness of rhetoric.

Blame and Causal Characteristics

Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

Different causal characteristics emphasize different types of actors by assigning blame to those actors. When rhetoric implies the involvement of a particular international actor, the international actor becomes intimately involved with the issue. Instead of acting as a bystander for the issue, blame makes it very difficult or impossible for states to remain neutral in relation to the issue (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994).

Many issues do not necessarily begin as state centered because they involve actors other than states in the characteristics of the frame as the causes and consequences. Violence in many countries in the world often begins as private actor violence. For example, violence in central African countries has been described in many accounts as "ethnic violence" or "tribal violence," which leaves out the state or other international actors in the rhetoric (see, for example, Bowen, 1996). Violence between Tutsis and Hutus was often described in these terms before the Rwandan genocide (Power, 2002). In other cases of violence, the term "civil war" is used rather than other potential terms, such as genocide for extreme violent behavior (Cushman, 2000). When states are named part of the rhetoric, there is an increased chance that the state named must respond in some way.

Naming and shaming, for example, has become part of the mechanism for changing state behavior in response to human rights treaties (e.g. Hafner-Burton, 2008). When rhetoric "names" a state as the perpetrator or cause of a phenomenon, the state becomes part of the issue whether that state government wishes to be part of the issue or not. In these cases, the state may have to pay some attention to the issue, even if the state's goal is to contest the rhetoric and present counter rhetoric.

Naming a state in rhetoric does not automatically mean that the issue linked to the rhetoric automatically becomes part of the international agenda. States may still ignore the issue and the rhetoric. Rhetoric may also fail if states do not accept it as part of the frame, it does not propagate through the media, or it does not relate closely enough to the real phenomenon. These particular aspects of rhetoric success and failure are discussed later. However, in general, rhetoric that emphasizes or names states as the perpetrators or causes are more likely to become part of the international agenda or increase in importance of that issue for those states named.

Victimization and Consequence Characteristics

Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

A similar logic holds true for consequence characteristics of frames. Victimization of states creates the same effect as blame, whether welcomed by the state

or not. States named in rhetoric as victims or beneficiaries of a phenomenon become part of the issue and may have to attend to the issue in some way. When states are emphasized or named in rhetoric as receiving positive or negative consequences from a phenomenon, rather than other domestic or international actors, the issue is more likely to become part of the international agenda and important for those states. The consequence characteristics identify the victims of the phenomenon in the causal story (Stone, 1989). Identification of the victims as a particular state is likely to increase attention to the issue for that state, thus increasing its position on the agenda or placement on the agenda.

Non-material Hypothesis 3: Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences or consequences of a greater magnitude is more likely to increase attention to issues.

Consequence characteristics also may describe time and degree of costs or benefits of the phenomenon. Some rhetoric when describing a phenomenon may describe the magnitude of effects as well as a description of when those effects may occur. Rhetoric used to describe these characteristics of a frame may influence states to treat issues more importantly when states perceive them to have greater magnitude consequences over a shorter time than other issues. The larger the consequences and the nearer the time to effects, the more likely the issue will become part of the agenda. Issues described with dire consequences within the next 10 years are more likely to appear on the agenda and become of greater importance important than issues described as dire consequences likely to occur in 100 years. This is due to the general tendency to favor the short term cognitively (Johnson, 2004; Shermer, 2008; Slovic, 2000), and

political emphasis on the short term due to political pressures. Humans have a tendency to favor short term thinking over long-term thinking due to our evolutionary history and cognitive development (see Johnson, 2004). This creates a heightened importance on issues described with short-term consequences. Politicians, as well, generally focus on the short-term gains in order to satisfy current constituents and to remain in power. Thus, this suggests increased importance for frames that emphasize short-term consequences with greater magnitude of effects.

International Exposure

Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely it is to influence perceptions of the phenomenon.

One way to make rhetoric more effective in changing frames, is through media exposure or exposure at international forums. Popularizing a particular rhetorical description increases the effects of the rhetoric on frames and the influence on states. When rhetoric moves from an outlying understanding of a phenomenon to a common understanding popularized and normalized by international media, the rhetoric's force increases.

Popularizing a particular belief or rhetoric can make it more difficult to act contrary to that belief, similar to the way norms in society make it more difficult to act counter to those norms (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998). When a particular frame or rhetoric is "normal" or dominant, then other rhetoric or understanding that runs counter to the dominant rhetoric becomes more difficult to sustain. Exposure of rhetoric to a wide

audience can be one way for rhetoric to gain traction. By repeating the same understanding in multiple outlets, the rhetoric may change the understanding over long periods. Numerous studies examine media exposure and preference formation over both short-tem and long-term considerations that document effects on preferences from repeated exposure and media content (for example, Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Kellstedt, 2000; Pan & Kosicki, 1996; Worden et al., 1996). Although not everyone may adopt or accept the rhetoric, repetition and exposure in the media make it more likely.

Media and international forums appear in research regarding agenda-setting because of the influence on public perceptions (Joachim, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Manheim & Albritton, 1982). Simply repeating any news story that mentions a particular issue does not influence public opinion as much as the actual content of those stories and the opinions expressed in those news stories (Peter, 2003). Precisely for this reason, this project deals with rhetoric exposure and rhetoric content (discussed later in this chapter). Forums or places of publication where actors present issue frames influence international attention to the issues through influencing the characteristics of the dominant frame and the rhetoric that is part of that frame. The media and other forums for international communication serve as intermediates in the introduction of new rhetoric that may be consistent with frames or contesting those frames (Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001). The more exposure particular rhetoric has in international communication forums, such as the media, the more likely it is that the rhetoric becomes part of frames, thus influencing international attention to issues.

Media, International Organizations, and Academics

There are three primary ways rhetoric propagates at the international level: the media, international forums, and academic journals. The media, often referred to as the mass media, consist of all the new and old forms of media seen today, including the print media, TV, and radio, as well as web-logs (blogs), email lists, and web communication (Merriam-Webster, 2009). The media serve to communicate information to the public and to government officials, although all forms of media do not always present issues. Some scholars and pundits have comment on the biases in media today and the importance of those biases for public opinions (for example, see Groseclose & Milyo, 2003). Traditional media sources have generally attempted to be somewhat more impartial in their presentation of the news (Schramm, 1988), yet choice of stories may still influence the international agenda. With the advent of new media sources, increasingly normative reports and claims are presented (A. Anderson, 1997; Barendt, 1998). Media is an important source of potential influences on frames and changes in the international agenda.

International forums consist primarily of international organizations designed for the express purpose of providing a venue for international actors to express their views on any issue. Such forums exist regarding economic issues, legal issues, and political issues, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the United Nations (UN), respectively. These institutions act as forums because many international actors can present their views on a particular issue within the mandate of the

organization. Some of these forums are open to all actors, such as the ICC, where any actor can make a claim against another. Other organizations, such as the UN are limited primarily to states (although non-state actors are often informally involved in discussions). Actors that present rhetoric at these international forums, whether intentional or not, have the potential to influence international frames and the agenda.

Academic journals are also an important source of rhetoric that may change frames for states. Although propagation is limited to a more elite audience, elite public opinion can be influential in changing the understanding of issues (for example, Karol, 2009). In addition, academics, previously regarded as objective researchers, have recently been increasingly accused of biased in classrooms (Kelly-Woessner & M., 2006; Pipes, 2005) potentially spreading rhetoric to change frames. Most literature on agenda formation does not examine academic journals; however, much of the work of academics introduces new rhetoric or new understandings of issues for policy makers. One clear example comes from the potential connections between climate change and violence. Researchers have engaged in a debate, not only over whether there is a strong empirical basis for connecting climate change and violence (Diamond, 2005; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Myers, 1993), but whether re-defining climate change as a "security" issue helps or hurts the environment (Deudney, 1990; Levy, 1995; Najam, 1995; Saad, 1995). Academic research often presents rhetoric that may change the frames of international issues, and thus must be considered for our understanding of changes in the international agenda.

Regardless of whether the media, the forums, or academics are biased or objective, their information and propagation of the information increases chances of rhetoric influence on frames. Motivations behind the presentation of rhetoric do not influence how the rhetoric may change issue perceptions and frames.

Given the ability of media, international forums, and academic sources to spread rhetoric around the globe quickly, rhetoric found in these sources can change the perceptions of individuals and elites. Changes in perceptions of frame characteristics shared widely, can influence state interest in particular issues by making those states part of the frames, as described earlier. Therefore, the more that similar rhetoric propagates through the media, international forums, and via academic sources, the more likely the rhetoric will become part of a frame. Whether the propagation of rhetoric is done intentionally to manipulate state interest and frames or whether it is done unintentionally, actors who present rhetoric consistently and widely in media and other outlets can change the importance of issues, whether an issue appears on the agenda, and the content of frame for an issue for particular international actors.

Rhetoric and Focusing Event Linkages

Non-material Hypothesis 4a: Rhetoric that links focusing events with a phenomenon and issue frame is more likely to gain attention in the media, increasing exposure.

In addition to propagating rhetoric, linking rhetoric to large events that gain the interest of the media can increase media exposure and increase the likelihood that the

rhetoric influences frame characteristics and the agenda. Scholars often refer to these large events that gain media attention in the literature on agenda development as "focusing events." Focusing events are events that expose a particular issue to a wider audience through media involvement (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 94-95). Large scale and rare events create increased media exposure because they create shock and interest among the media audience. Rhetoric linked to focusing events will get increased exposure to a large population because the focusing event creates increased interest and exposure among the media.

There are several different kinds of focusing events. Some focusing events involve science surrounding a particular problem that confirms or disconfirms previous information or provides new information. Other focusing events involve non-natural large-scale events (mass-murders, missile tests) or natural disasters (the Bali Tsunami). Focusing events have the ability to attract media exposure because they are often rare, large, and unexpected events (Birkland, 1997, 30-31), similar to what has been called a "black swan" (Taleb, 2007). The black swan refers to events unexpected, large, and rare.

Scientific discoveries or those that improve on previous knowledge act as focusing events if the media increase attention to the event. One such case is the discovery of the ozone layer hole (Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994), where scientific knowledge created a focusing event around which the media began broadcasting stories of this new knowledge. Other examples of focusing events that have occurred in recent times include the fall of the Soviet Union, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, Hurricane Katrina, the

World Trade Center attack, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. These events occurred generally without warning, created a large impact, attracted wide media attention, and occurred rarely, if they occurred more than once.[14]

The occurrence of a large-scale event alone does not create changes in the international agenda. The most important aspect of focusing events is the linkage with rhetoric and frame characteristics to cause changes in the agenda. Focusing events alone are large-scale rare events that generate public interest. When actors link these large-scale events with rhetoric and to a particular issue, that issue and rhetoric gain increased attention. An example of a failed attempt to link rhetoric and a focusing event involves Hurricane Katrina. The Taiwan News reported that, "New Orleans may go down in history as the first major city… to be lost to the process of global warming." In Hong Kong's Ta Kung Pao newspaper, reports described Katrina as a "warning by God over President Bush's reactionary behavior on the Kyoto Protocol." Newspapers in Australia and El Salvador also made similar links between climate change and Katrina. The Palestinian press even linked Katrina with the War in Iraq.[15] Linking large focusing events to issue rhetoric helps propagate rhetoric throughout the media. In this case, the rhetoric associating Katrina with climate change may have increased attention to climate change for a short time. The rhetoric linking climate change and hurricane Katrina failed

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[14] Note that focusing events are difficult to measure absent media attention, which makes the influence of focusing events without linkages, somewhat tautological.

[15] All quotations and newspaper information taken from a report from BBC News ("Press awe at Katrina aftermath," 2005).

to maintain interest because the media increased reporting that particular weather events are difficult, perhaps impossible, to attribute to climate changes. Therefore, the linkages between Katrina and the climate acted not only to propagate information about climate change, but doubled the exposure of climate change rhetoric as new scientific information de-linked Katrina from climate change.

Rhetoric Content

The content of the rhetoric propagated through the international system can hinder or accelerate the degree to which the rhetoric becomes accepted by actors in the international system, and states, which can change the international agenda. This section groups the influence of content of rhetoric over agendas into two categories: completeness and resonance. Completeness of rhetoric occurs when the rhetoric satisfies the curiosity of those who are listening to or reading the rhetoric. Complete descriptions of frame characteristics in the rhetoric answer questions about the phenomenon that otherwise might make the rhetoric more difficult to believe. Resonance of rhetoric occurs when the rhetoric fits within a broader discourse and culture of the individual receiving the rhetoric. Individuals, groups, and states may have different cultures and broader discourses to which rhetoric may or may conflict. When the rhetoric conflicts with common practices and beliefs, it becomes more difficult for people with those practices and beliefs to accept the rhetoric and change their frames. The sections below address both of these intervening variables more closely.

Completeness and Audience Reception

Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story including all three frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.

In Chapter II, the definition of frames described three frame characteristics, causes, consequences, and prescriptions. Frames do not need to contain all these characteristics, however, complete rhetorical stories contain all three parts, leaving the audience with few questions.

Social movement research discusses rhetoric a great deal in terms of motivating individuals in overcoming collective action problems (Benford & Snow, 2000; Tarrow, 1998).[16] One of the causes of adoption of rhetoric that can overcome collective action problems comes from the completeness of the rhetoric in describing the phenomenon for the group (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).

The most complete rhetoric describes the phenomenon without leaving the audience curious about the answers to other questions.[17] Since this project identified three primary characteristics of frames, a complete frame would contain content for all three characteristics. Rhetoric that may take the place or change a frame can contain any

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[16] Note in most social movement literature, they refer to propagation of rhetoric as "framing" whereas this project attempts to separate more clearly the act of using rhetoric (an independent variable) and the frame (a dependent variable).

[17] Van Evera (1997) uses a similar definition to describe the completeness of theories.

or all of the characteristics. Complete rhetoric contains descriptions of all three characteristics of an issue's frame.

For sociologists, the completeness of rhetoric has been described as incorporating three primary core aspects of a frame: "(1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic … (2) a proposed solution … (3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). The three parts of rhetoric described map well onto the characteristics of frames described in this project. The diagnostic framing is the identification of an issue as a problem and the formation of causation or blame. The proposed solution maps well onto the prescriptive characteristics defined in this project. This describes the potential policy options to address the phenomenon. The third part of complete rhetoric described in sociology also maps well onto the consequence characteristics of a frame. The call to arms or a reason for engaging in action must describe some reason that the issue needs attention. This call to arms describes a consequence, either moral or otherwise, to suggest that the issue is a problem and requires attention. Therefore, what sociologists have determined as a complete story for their research fits well within the definitions of frames and rhetoric in this project. A complete rhetorical statement describing an issue contains causal, consequence, and prescriptive characteristics.

Complete rhetoric is more likely to be accepted than rhetoric that does not communicate some characteristic of the frame. If rhetoric does not answer all the questions for the audience, they may be less inclined to accept the rhetoric as a

description of the phenomenon. Therefore, the content of the rhetoric can influence the acceptability of that rhetoric into the dominant frame.

Rhetorical Resonance

Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set of cultural beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to influence the international agenda.

When rhetoric is consistent with current cultural practices and beliefs of the audience, the rhetoric may resonate more so the audience becomes more likely to accept the rhetoric and change their frame. The resonance, connections between the audience and the rhetoric, increases the more the audience can identify the themes and ideas within that rhetoric. Scholars describe this type of consistency as an "alignment" process by which strategic individuals attempt to align their rhetoric with the culture and larger discourse of their audience (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986). The alignment process involves strategic behavior, which the chapter discusses later. However, connections between the rhetoric and the larger culture or discourse remain an important source of increasing the ability of rhetoric to influence frames.

Different countries and groups of people subscribe to a larger set of beliefs about the world, set in their cultural or historical identity. Sometimes rhetoric presented to an audience connects with the larger cultural beliefs associated with a broader discourse. For example, during the Cold War issue frames consistent with the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union were more likely to resonate with actors involved in

the Cold War. Discussions of going into space and to the moon in terms of a rivalry between these two spheres for dominance were more likely to resonate than discussing the issue as important research to improve scientific knowledge. Given the general increase in human rights discussions globally in recent years, an example of a larger discourse, issue frames consistent with the discussion of "rights" may be more likely to resonate with a global audience. For example, rhetoric describing water shortages as an individual's "rights to fresh water" may resonate with the broader discourse on human rights rather than describing the number of individuals who suffer without water.

The potential for individuals to reject or question rhetoric or information that is inconsistent with their own cultural and individual beliefs also presents itself in psychological research on cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance makes it more difficult for individuals to accept information when the information does not fit within their current understandings of the world (Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985). When rhetoric presented does not fit with the current cultural practices and larger discourse of the audience, it becomes less likely to be accepted.

To reiterate, frames that are more complete and are consistent with current belief systems and cultural practices of a people are more likely to be adopted by those people. Therefore, frames that incorporate causal, consequence, and prescriptive characteristics and are consistent with a larger discourse or culture are more likely to become the dominant frame for a particular action.

Strategic Use of Rhetoric and Rhetorical Entrepreneurs

Throughout the previous discussions on how rhetoric influences frames, the project has skirted any discussion of strategic use of rhetoric and the manipulation of rhetoric for particular goals. Often described as "framing" in much of the literature,[18] actors can direct rhetoric at specific targets, states, or populations, just as marketing campaigns target specific groups of people with rhetoric by controlling the place, time, and content of advertisements. This project describes actors who engage in using rhetoric strategically as "rhetorical entrepreneurs." They are rhetorical entrepreneurs because they attempt to use rhetoric to change the ideas and behavior of other actors. Many times the rhetorical entrepreneurs must create new language or new ways to describe phenomena to generate the outcomes they desire.[19]

Rhetorical entrepreneurs strategically change frames to serve particular purposes of their institutional or personal agendas. Many actors in international relations act politically for their own benefit or goals. In these cases, the use of rhetoric and manipulation of frames occurs through rational purposeful action on the part of international actors.

It is important to consider all actors who may use rhetoric to change frames. States, NGO's, advocacy groups, academic organizations, scientific groups, and others

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[18] The term "framing" causes confusion between the noun form of "frame" and the verb or noun form of "framing." This project, therefore, uses "frame" for a description of the perception of an issue and strategic use of rhetoric as the act of "framing."

[19] See Luntz (2007) for an interesting set of examples on strategic framing for US political changes in public opinion by a sophisticated rhetorical entrepreneur.

may attempt to change frames through strategic use of rhetoric. The rise of NGO's and other actors' ability to influence the international agenda is an important change in the international system that was once only dominated by states (Simmons & Oudraat, 2001). Although the importance of state power over all that occurs in the international system has eroded somewhat, states continue to maintain an important influence on international outcomes. In addition to traditional state powers through military force, states may also adopt to use strategies currently used by NGO's and other non-state actors. State politicians may generate particular definitions or frames in order to garner domestic support for a particular international action, like beating the war drum. For example, the United States explicitly avoided using the term, "genocide," to describe Rwanda during the Clinton administration so that the US could avoid actions there (Power, 2002). Rhetorically manipulating the definition of the violence in Rwanda as internal, political, or civil war, changed the relationship between the United States and the violence (the frame). NGO's may generate strategic rhetoric in order to generate attention to particular issues, increase membership in their organization, or increase funding for the organization. For example, some organizations purposefully frame international violence in terms of violence against women and children (ignoring violence against men) to generate increased contributions and support for their organization (Carpenter, 2007).

The description above does not imply that states are only accepting rhetoric manipulation from others without implementing their own manipulative efforts. It is entirely possible and likely that states or other international actors have particular goals in

regards to a phenomenon and attempt to manipulate the perception of others in order to control the international agenda. Any international actor can be a rhetorical entrepreneur if they engage in strategic use of rhetoric to manipulate the international agenda.

Strategically placing rhetoric to manipulate the international agenda is an important aspect of how the agenda works and how non-state actors can influence international outcomes (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Simmons & Oudraat, 2001, p. 667). Although there are various strategies to manipulate rhetoric based on some knowledge of the real causes and consequences of the phenomenon, it is not clear which of these strategies may work best under different circumstances. Instead of addressing which strategies work best, which is not apparent from the strategies themselves, the rest of this chapter describes how manipulation can occur in rhetorical frame manipulation and the influence of these manipulations on the international agenda. In order to have a complete understanding how rhetoric can influence frames we must have some understanding of how actors might manipulate rhetoric to achieve their own goals with the international agenda.

This section proceeds with a discussion of three strategies for rhetorical manipulation of frame characteristics: manipulation of the scope of phenomena, manipulation between frame characteristics, and manipulation within characteristics. Manipulation of the phenomena scope describes changes in the description of the phenomena or the data representing the observation. Presenting data with slightly different images or rhetoric can change part of the issue frame. Between frame

characteristics, manipulation involves changing emphasis in the rhetoric from one of the frame characteristics to another (e.g. shifting focus from causes to consequences). Within frame characteristics, manipulation involves changing emphasis in the rhetoric between the content of a single part of the characteristics. For example, emphasizing one cause of the phenomenon over another cause. It is important to note that the manipulations described below do not include complete fabrications of reality. The manipulations are all based on some description of the real phenomenon, the causes, or the consequences. They are possible because of the uncertainty in our understanding of the real world, described in Chapter II of this project.

Phenomena Scope Manipulation

Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations of the phenomena scope change the audience acceptability of frame characteristics.

Frames with some relevance to the observed phenomenon are more likely to be accepted by actors than frames describing fabrications or lies in regards to the phenomenon. Rhetorical entrepreneurs, however, can manipulate the scope of the phenomenon in order to manipulate the acceptability of frame characteristics. Manipulation of data or the presentation of data can make characteristics seem more or less truthful, making them more or less acceptable to audiences.

Rhetorical entrepreneurs can manipulate the scope of the phenomena through changes in data presentation. Data presentations depend on time, spatial dimensions, and uncertainty of the data. Information and data always involves time as an element of

description of that data. When we look at descriptive data describing some aspect of the social or physical environment, we must define the time as a scope condition of the data presented. Rhetorical entrepreneurs may present data at a single point in time, over a year, over ten years, or over a thousand years. Each presentation of the data may reveal different information about the trends or the phenomenon.

Climate change data, for example, is sometimes manipulated through changing the data time horizon. When climate data are taken for the past 10 to 20 years, scientists point to a cooling trend (Keenlyside, Latif, Jungclaus, Kornblueh, & Roeckner, 2008), for which anti-climate change activists use to emphasize their goals of changing the understanding of climate dynamics. On the other hand, when scientists examine the changes in temperature over a span of a 150-year period, climate data suggests a recent warming trend (Black, 2008). If the data are looked at over hundreds of thousands of years, the temperature of the earth becomes cyclical with cooling and warming periods (Brook, 2008). Different views of the same data create different views of the trends for the phenomenon.

Manipulating the presentation of data changes the acceptability of frame characteristics. In the climate example above, if data are presented over hundreds of thousands of years, carbon dioxide, methane, and the temperature of the earth all become cyclical. Since humans have been contributing to atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide for only a very short part of the presentation, attributing changes in climate to human action becomes less acceptable. It is impossible for changes in the temperature to be

caused by humans if one considers temperature changes that occur 100,000 years ago or more. If data are presented based on the past 150 years, the rise in carbon dioxide coincides with the rise in use of fossil fuels by humans and the description of humans as causes of the current increase in carbon dioxide becomes easier to accept.

Manipulation of the spatial dimension of presenting the phenomenon can also influence the audience's perception of the phenomena. Similar to changing the period for which data are presented, changing the place where the data were acquired can manipulate the acceptability of frame characteristics. Manipulation of presentation on the spatial dimension amounts to limiting presentation to a particular area. Examining climate changes on the North Pole may present different information than climate changes over New York City, or averaging the temperature of over 7000 locations.[20] When describing glacier changes, focusing on a particular glacier can lead to descriptions of glacier expansion (Hewitt, 2005). Examination of the average changes of glaciers around the world glacial changes can lead to descriptions of glacial ice thinning (UNEP). If the presentation of data suggests glaciers are increasing, it becomes difficult to accept climate temperature increases as a cause because increases in temperature suggest a decrease in glaciers. Therefore, changes in the presentation of the phenomenon in terms of the spatial dimension also influences the likelihood of acceptance of associated frame characteristics.

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[20] For a sample of such climate measures see Silver (2008, p. 8).

There are other ways to manipulate the presentation of data as well. Different measurement tools will create different presentations of similar information. When trying to understand the distribution of power in the international system, for example, scholars may use different tools to measure differences in power. Measuring power using coal consumption during before the Second World War may document one type of power distribution among states, while measuring power in terms of population (as militaries depended considerably on population numbers), or nuclear capabilities, may show different descriptions of the power distribution. When one takes the data per capita, yet another distribution of power among countries may appear.

In a more recent example, the Chinese government manipulated the presentation of gold medal winnings at the 2008 Olympics. The Chinese viewed the medal counts by associating the country with the most gold medals as the country in first place, placing the United States second (Economist, 2008). When the data are presented in terms of the total number of medals, the United States takes first place, while China takes second. Yet, another representation emerges when the data are examined per capita.[21] Given this presentation, the country with the highest value on our scale becomes Jamaica (1.48 medals per capita), followed by Bahrain, Estonia, New Zealand, Slovakia, and Australia. The United States has only 0.09 medals per person and China has only 0.03 medals per

[21] A per capita measure of gold medal count is not an arbitrary measure. Given that a country's population influence the number of people from which athletes are selected, per capita data on medal winnings is advocated by some smaller countries to measure success in the Olympic games.

person (Economist, 2008). Clearly, these different measures of Olympic success result in different indications of the most successful countries.

Since frame characteristics are associated with the phenomenon, the presentation of the phenomenon and the data makes the frame characteristics more or less acceptable to audiences. Changing the time or spatial measurement of the phenomenon changes the description and thus how the frame characteristics.

Manipulation Between Frame Characteristics

Manipulation Hypothesis 2: Manipulations between frame characteristics changes the importance of the issue on the agenda.

Rhetorical entrepreneurs may attempt to manipulate policy outcomes by emphasizing different characteristics of an issue (causal, consequence, or prescriptive). Since each characteristic may focus on different actors or suggest varying levels of importance, rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to focus attention on one particular characteristic to influence the importance of the issue for states.

In the case of climate change, if the causal characteristics of a frame focus on large developed nations, and the consequence characteristics focus on negative effects for smaller developing nations, smaller nations have an incentive to reduce climate change and gain protection from the negative effects. If these smaller nations emphasize the negative consequences of climate change in rhetoric propagated in the media, it may be less likely to increase attention to climate change than emphasizing rhetoric blaming larger developed nations for causing climate change. Emphasizing larger nations as

causes for climate change, rather than the negative effects on smaller states, increases the attention from the larger states. Whether or not these larger states become actively involved in reducing greenhouse gasses, they must address in someway their responsibility and discuss the climate change issue – placing it on the international agenda or higher on the international agenda. In the above example, the smaller states may either use rhetoric to emphasize their own negative consequences or emphasize blame on larger nations.

Rhetoric entrepreneurs emphasize different frame characteristics through media, forums, protests, and other forms of communication. As discussed earlier, the more exposure the rhetoric receives, the more likely it will influence outcomes. In order for rhetoric to develop, however, rhetorical entrepreneurs must present their rhetoric to states or individuals who can accept the rhetoric as their frame. Therefore, actor created rhetoric is an important part of the development of dominant frames for a particular population.

Emphasis on one element of the issue frame can change the importance of the issue for different states in the international system. By using rhetoric that one particular group of states are responsible for a problem, those states generally have a greater chance of responding and placing the issue higher on their agenda, whether or not they actually partake in actions to solve the problem. Emphasis between elements of a frame, therefore, has the potential to strategically manipulate frames to increase or decrease

attention for different states in the international system depending on the goals of the rhetoric entrepreneurs.

Because there are multiple characteristics of frames, it is not necessary to fabricate evidence or frame characteristics. In the above example, both the blame on larger countries and the negative consequences to smaller nations may be true representations of real causes and consequences of climate change. Thus, actors can manipulate agendas by emphasizing different characteristics of a frame, which are based on the real causes and consequences of a phenomenon.

Manipulation Within Frame Characteristics

Manipulation Hypothesis 3: Manipulations within frame characteristics changes the acceptability of prescription characteristics.

Frame characteristics also contain within them different potential content, which actors may manipulate to achieve their advocacy goals. Within causal, prescriptive, and consequence characteristics, emphasizing different content in rhetoric can result in changes of frames. Rhetorical entrepreneurs may manipulate the content of each characteristic through emphasis on different variables or different levels of uncertainty. The sections below discuss different types of manipulation that may occur through emphasis within frame characteristics. The first section discusses the use of strategic rhetoric to emphasize different characteristics within frames based on the inherent uncertainty in understanding the real causes and consequences of phenomena to influence the acceptable prescriptions available. The second section discusses emphasis on

different causal pathways followed by a discussion on emphasis of different causes when multiple causes are present. All of these manipulations change the acceptability of prescriptions because causes and consequences directly relate to policies.

Uncertainty

Manipulation Hypothesis 3a: Emphasizing uncertainty increases delay before prescriptive action or increases the likelihood that policies prescribed search for more data and research.

Uncertainty is endemic in scientific research because causality cannot be directly observed or proven, but simply inferred (Brady & Seawright, 2004). This inherent uncertainty allows individuals to create multiple interpretations of the evidence or to use only information that supports their particular view (Jasanoff, 1995). As any econometrics textbook will attest, models designed to predict the future become increasingly uncertain as projections move further away from the available data.

Psychologists also document the difficulty and often inaccuracies of future prediction among political pundits (Tetlock, 2005), highlighting the increased uncertainty as one moves from data to prediction. For example, climate models contain a great deal of uncertainty as to the potential impact of CO2 emissions on global temperatures (Houghton & IPCC Working Group I, 2001). This uncertainty allows advocates on one side of the debate or the other to emphasize extreme possibilities within the range of uncertainty of climate models. Advocates of climate change, for example, may emphasize large increases in global temperatures and see changes, while economic

advocates may emphasize much smaller changes in temperatures. Both emphases do not contradict the findings of climate scientists, but instead focus on different projections because of the large uncertainty of CO2 impacts on the environment. Climate scientists, while trying to be transparent in their estimates, list different scenarios under which their predictions are modeled (Team-6, 2009). These scenarios estimate different level of environmental concern, different levels of technological improvement, and different levels of economic development, for example. Rhetoric entrepreneurs may utilize one of the models over others because the model emphasizes particular elements within an issue characteristic.

Rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to manipulate outcomes by emphasizing the uncertainty in scientific research itself or the different levels of uncertainty for different variables within each frame element. By emphasizing uncertainty within causal characteristics, rhetorical entrepreneurs seek to increase delay in creation and formation of prescriptive policies. Emphasizing information uncertainty suggests that policies should focus on conducting more scientific research to reduce the uncertainty. In climate change discussions, uncertainty often becomes a point of contention because many actors suggest that scientific predictions are too wide without greater certainty. By emphasizing the uncertainty of climate models, rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to prolong delay before generating policy to deal with the effects of carbon in the atmosphere. This delay may also allow advocates against reducing greenhouse gas emissions time to formulate

new presentations of data and research, manipulation of the phenomenon scope, to back up their own claims on other aspects of a frame.

Causal Variables

Manipulation Hypothesis 3b: Emphasizing different causal variables changes the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics.

In addition to emphasis on varying levels of uncertainty, rhetorical entrepreneurs also manipulate outcomes through emphasis on different variables within causal or consequence characteristics. Rhetorical entrepreneurs place emphasis on one causal pathway over another when there are multiple causal pathways that lead to the same outcome, described as equifinality (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). Equifinality occurs when there are multiple sufficient conditions that may lead to the same consequence. Each pathway emphasizes a different set of intervening variables and processes that occur as the cause influences the effect. Different causal pathways contain different sets of intervening variables that can be emphasized within a frame.

By emphasizing different causal pathways, or particular variables within one of the pathways, rhetorical entrepreneurs change the acceptability of prescriptive policies that address the causal variables. For example, as previously stated, some scholars suggest that environmental degradation could lead to increased interstate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Environmental pollution, causing a water shortage, could lead to conflict via more than one potential path. In one path, lack of water displaces individuals, who become refugees that cross borders and create conflict between

neighboring states. On another path, a state with limited water resources may try to extract resources from a neighbor generating increased inter-state conflict. Both pathways begin with water pollution and shortages and end with interstate conflict, but differ on the path from the independent to the dependent variable. Each path suggests different policy solutions, either dealing with mediation between states or dealing with accommodations for a population of refugees. Therefore, the existence of equifinality provides an avenue through which rhetorical entrepreneurs manipulate within frame characteristics to emphasize one or the other causal pathway and change the potential solutions available to the international community.

Manipulation may also occur through emphasis on different variables within issue characteristics. This manipulation is possible because almost all phenomena have multiple causes, consequences, and policy prescriptions. Because the world is incredibly complex, we often simplify the number of causes, consequences, and policy options (see Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; Johnson, 2004). Rhetorical entrepreneurs may emphasize a subset of the causes in order to advocate particular blame or solutions. For example, when examining the causes of climate change many international advocates focus on the influence of human made carbon emissions in the atmosphere as a primary cause. Other scientists, however, have also emphasized the importance of cloud cover, sunspots, and other natural factors in determinations of the earth's climate. It is true that many factors influence the temperature of the Earth and that all the factors simultaneously are at work influencing Earth's temperature. Because of the presence of a

large number of causes, rhetorical entrepreneurs emphasize some of the causes over others to influence the potential solutions. If advocates successfully define international climate change as primarily the result of naturally occurring changes in the sun and other factors, human responsibility becomes limited, in that our actions cannot mitigate changes. On the other hand, if other advocates successfully frame climate change as a problem primarily resulting from human contribution of carbon to the atmosphere, then the solution lies in a reduction of CO2 emissions.[22] The discussion of how rhetoric influences frame preceded this section on manipulation strategies. The important point here is how manipulation takes place through the presence of multiple causes, consequences, and prescriptions within each issue characteristic.

The presence of uncertainty, equifinality, and multiple-causes allows a variety of rhetoric to emerge that maintains consistency with available data and information. The rhetoric may not reflect the scientific consensus of causal factors, pathways, or average values in cases of uncertainty, but the rhetoric may still accurately present descriptions of the phenomenon within the limits of our knowledge. Frames that are not based on some real information, fabrications, may become part of frame characteristics, but would be difficult to sustain under some scrutiny. Therefore, frames will not usually consist of fabrications or lies disassociated from current knowledge.

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[22] This logic closely resembles Stone's (1989) understanding of causal stories and manipulation between natural causes and human-made causes.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began with the "why" questions about changes in the international agenda. Why does the international agenda change? Why do issues emerge onto the agenda at some times and not others? Why do the frames for issues change? The chapter then moved through two logics of explanation: one that depends on material forces and one that depends on non-material forces.

Material causes of changes in the agenda come from realist theories in international relations that describe the importance of security and relative power distributions. Because security is the most important motivator, non-security issues are only likely to appear on the agenda when state security is provided by another state. The provision of security differs depending on the distribution of international power. Unipolar systems are likely to provide the greatest security for states, bipolar systems may provide some security, and multipolar systems are least likely to provide security. Therefore, non-security issues are most likely to emerge in unipolar systems and least likely under multipolar systems.

Non-material influences on issue attention involve rhetorical descriptions of states as causes or consequences. Rhetoric is an important part of changing the international agenda through changing the frame characteristics of an issue. When states are rhetorically placed as part of the blame of the phenomenon or the consequences of the phenomenon, they are more likely to pay attention to the issue. Therefore, the issue increases in importance on the international agenda for those states. Sometimes states do

not wish to attend to an issue, but must pay some lip service because rhetorical entrepreneurs describe the states as part of the cause or consequence characteristics. In addition, describing more imminent effects or larger effects can increase attention to issues by creating a greater sense of crisis and emphasis on the short-term. By describing phenomena in terms of short-term large-scale consequences, the issue is more likely to become of greater importance on the international agenda.

In addition to influencing issue attention, material and non-material variables can also influence the frame. Material variables, in terms of polarity, are most likely to influence the degree of contestation over issue frames. Under unipolar systems, contestation is likely to be non-existent or very short lived because of the dominating power of the hegemon. Similar to a chain-store game theoretic model, actors are not likely to challenge the dominant interpretation of an issue. Bipolar systems prolong contestation because any small change in power distribution between the two large powers can be a great advantage to one of the states. Since competition between these states is intense, the countries are likely to engage in competition for longer periods over control of frames on the international agenda. Under multipolar systems, alliance patterns suggest short-lived attention to issues but some competition between the states over power. Therefore, we expect contestation to be high, but shorter than in the bipolar system.

Non-material factors also influence the content of frames on the agenda. The exposure of rhetoric, the content of rhetoric, and the particular manipulation strategies

implemented can influence the changes in frames or the acceptability of frames. Exposure of rhetoric to a wide audience or those who control a state through the media, international forums, and academic sources can increase the influence of rhetoric to change the frame of an issue. The more exposure and repetition a similar rhetoric achieves, the more likely it can influence the international agenda. Focusing events often increase international exposure when linked with particular rhetoric and issues. These large-scale, rare events alone do not attract interest to an issue and change the agenda. Only when rhetorical entrepreneurs link these events to issues through rhetoric can the events influence the international agenda.

In addition to the importance of international exposure for the rhetoric, the content of the rhetoric may also affect the tendency to adopt the rhetoric as part of a frame characteristic. Rhetoric that is more complete and that is associated with a larger discourse creates greater salience and a greater chance of acceptance by audiences. Rhetoric that leaves few questions unanswered creates a more complete story that becomes more believable by audiences, which generates a higher resonance. In addition, rhetoric connected to an audience's particular culture or broader understanding of the world (a larger discourse) can increase the resonance between the audience and the rhetoric. These factors help to increase the ability of rhetoric to influence the international agenda and frames.

Rhetorical entrepreneurs act as strategic actors who use rhetoric to influence international outcomes through the influence of frames and agendas. Rhetorical

entrepreneurs manipulate frames through scope conditions, different issue characteristics, or different parts within an issue characteristic. Changing scope conditions changes the acceptability or believability of other issue characteristics because they become more or less connected with what appears to be the phenomenon data. Emphasis on different issue characteristics may change emphasis from one characteristic to another, such as from blame to consequences. By emphasizing one or the other, states associated with the emphasized characteristics are more likely to attend to the issue. Finally, emphasis on different parts within issue characteristics changes the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics. Since prescriptions are associated with causes and consequences, manipulating emphasis on the causes and consequences of the frame influences the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics for the issue.

This chapter was organized around the two primary influences over international agendas: material and non-material. Although this is a useful way to organize the theories because it resembles the primary theoretical distinctions made in international relations theory, this conclusion and the following chapters takes a slightly different approach. Chapters IV and V present an empirical analysis of the causes of agenda changes in the case of international attempts to address whaling. These two chapters together analyze the influences of material and non-material variables over the changes in frames and issue attention for the case of international efforts to address whaling. This current chapter did not present a test of the theories or a definitive answer as to whether agendas change due to material or non-material variables. The chapter sets up potential

tests of the different causes of agendas through the development of hypotheses. The following two chapters explicitly test these hypotheses. Chapter IV analyzes the influences on issue attention based on material and non-material factors that resembles the organization in this concluding section. Chapter V analyzes the influences on frames based on material and non-material factors.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: ISSUE EMERGENCE

There are two factors that describe changes in the international agenda, as discussed in Chapter II. The first concerns international attention to the issue. The international agenda consists of issues that move up and down or on and off the international agenda. The second factor of the international agenda is the content of the issue frame. The frame describes the relationship between the phenomenon and international actors. Chapter IV analyzes the first of these two parts to changes in the international agenda regarding attention toward whaling. Chapter V analyzes changes in issue frames for the same case. Each chapter analyzes the relevant hypotheses from Chapter III that relate to changes in issue placement on the agenda or changes in the frame.

This chapter first describes the changes in attention to whaling by states, signifying movement up or down and on or off the international agenda. Subsequently, the chapter analyzes the material and non-material hypotheses relevant to explaining changes in the dependent variable of attention changes. These hypotheses describe polarity and the importance of security issues over others on the agenda, and rhetoric involving blaming, victimization, timing, and the magnitude of consequences of the phenomenon. The chapter demonstrates for the case of whaling that security issues dominate non-security issues most in multipolar systems and to a lesser extent in bipolar and unipolar systems. In addition, the chapter shows that the evidence of non-material

rhetorical influences of blame and victimization on agendas does not support the hypotheses. Evidence of rhetorical crisis making in terms of the timing and magnitude of the effects are also unsupported by this research.

INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO WHALING

Since the earliest days of whaling, the practice has involved a large number of actors including individuals, local municipalities, state governments, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and advocacy groups, as well as international governmental organizations. This chapter describes the changes of attention to whaling and analyzes the causes of changes in terms of the hypotheses developed earlier.

Whaling appeared on and off the agenda in two primary stages. The first stage was characterized by sporadic attention to international whaling where the issue appeared on and off the agenda from the 1500s through 1944. The second stage of whaling from 1945 through the present has been characterized by a long-term sustained interest in whaling and greater depth of concern and greater number of states concerned with the issue. The sustained attention to whaling continues on the international agenda today. Within each broader stage, more subtle changes in international attention occur as the issue moves on and off the agenda during the first stage, and as the specific country attention changes as well as the depth of attention in the second stage.

The chapter seeks to answer a number of questions regarding changes between each stage of the international environmental agenda for whaling. Why did states become involved and interested in whaling sporadically during the first stage? What

made states gain and lose interest in whaling during this period? Why did states increase attention in the second stage and spread to a large number of states with increasing depth?

The rest of this chapter answers these questions through close examination of the whaling industry from approximately 1500 through today. A number of important causal factors influence the changes in the international agenda. Primarily, the analysis shows the influence of material factors on the changes that occurred in attention to whaling, while the hypotheses describing non-material influences receive mixed support. Lack of support does not mean the hypotheses are incorrect, but the analysis does not provide enough evidence to support these hypotheses.

Although this section describes the character of the new frame in two static stages with more nuanced changes within each stage, the primary interest of this dissertation is to explain the changes in the agenda. The international agenda is dynamic and changing, but the categories provide useful reference points to document important changes that occurred in international attention. Although this dissertation groups the stages into boxes, these boxes often merge and flow from one to another often blurring the borders between these stages.

ON AND OFF THE AGENDA (1500 – 1944)

In order to understand the appearance of whaling on the agenda, it is first important to understand the basic history of whaling beginning approximately in the 1500's. The earliest practice of hunting whales most likely occurred with the Norse

populations; however, scholars know very little about the history of the Norse and their relationship with whales. The best indications of whaling during this time come from documents describing family feuds over whale carcasses rather than descriptions of the hunt (Ellis, 1991, 40). Some scholars speculate that the Norse engaged in whaling because the waters frequented by Norse were highly populated with a number of whale species as well as other obscure passages in historical texts referring to creatures and words that may be references to whales (Ellis, 1991, 39). The subsequent Basque whaling, however, is better documented and where most accounts of systematic whaling begin.

The Basque population, generally occupying areas along the Bay of Biscay in what is now France and Spain, most likely were the earliest modern and systematic whalers (Ellis, 1991, 42). Evidence has been found of whale hunts on several Basque communities found along the coast (Ellis, 1991, 46). In addition to hunting along the coasts, the Basques eventually ventured further out from the Bay of Biscay as the Right whale disappeared from the Bay of Biscay.[23] Whaling continued for the Basques as they moved north and out of the Bay of Biscay to areas of Labrador, Newfoundland, Ireland, Iceland, Greenland, and Spitsbergen (Ellis, 1991, 47). Although not a clear end to the Basque whaling, whaling began to blend with British and Dutch whaling in the late 16th

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[23] It is not clear whether the whales were driven from the Bay of Biscay by the Basques or hunted to decreased numbers. Markam (1882) suggests that only a few whales were taken each year by each village and could not force the whales into extinction.

Century after the destruction of the Spanish Armada meant little protection for fishing vessels far from coastal waters.

During the earliest encounters with whales, whalers engaged mostly along the coastal waters of their homes. Most of the villages and communities along the coastal waters were autonomous regions, and there was little intervention in the whaling practices by the Spanish or other larger empires.[24] This illustrates the lack of broader international attention to whaling during the early years of Basque whaling in the first stage. In addition, the Basque whaling practices suggested a desire to exploit the resources as much as possible as they chased the whales out of their own safer community in the Bay of Biscay into the larger open ocean. Although later unprotected by the Spanish, the Basque whalers continued to take whales in cooperation with vessels from Dutch and British communities.[25] Government interests primarily involved religion and warfare before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 at the end of Thirty Years War. These empires, generally fighting for control over the religion in Europe, did not attend to whaling as fighting generally dominated their interests.

After 1648, we can begin to discuss the potential emergence of whaling on the international agenda more easily because there are for the first time, sovereign nation-states in the world system. Between the 17th century and the early 20th century involves

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[24] The governing bodies during this time in Europe were not yet considered sovereign states as generally established by the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, the term empire is used to describe the governments.

[25] Although this project references the Dutch and the British as the location from which whalers came from, it does not imply that the governments were involved in whaling.

an international interest in whaling only in times where governments came in conflict over whaling in the same areas, or where they conflicted in war and wished to control a potentially important resource for combat. These introductions of whaling onto the international agenda appears at sporadic intervals occurring when whaling appears as a cause of security problems for states, while diminishing when conflict demands attention away from whaling.

One of the earliest occasions where whaling emerged onto the international agenda occurred over dominance of the seas around Spitsbergen, an island in the north Atlantic between Greenland and Europe. The conflict occurred between the emerging British and Dutch whalers after the decline of Basque whaling. Leading into the 1600s, Basque whaling declined due to the loss of protection by the defeat of the Spanish Armada. The loss of the Spanish Armada in 1588 meant that Basque vessels could not enjoy protection far from shore, which made whaling in the Northern Atlantic much more treacherous. The end of the Basque dominance in whaling, however, meant the emergence of British and Dutch whalers around the seas in the Northern Atlantic, including around the island of Spitsbergen.

The British commissioned the Muscovy Company to begin whaling the area in the North Atlantic that first met with failure by the ice and difficult conditions there (Ellis, 1991, 57). Despite these initial losses, the British sent more vessels to the area with Basque whalers and harpooners in their employ. These vessels, despite competition from other vessels of Dutch and German origin were able to secure enough whale to fill their

cargo areas (Ellis, 1991, 57). Competition grew between the Dutch and British whalers as both sides' governments claimed monopoly rights over the seas around Spitsbergen Island. Conflicts erupted between the sides, where ships were destroyed, and whale oil, bone, and baleen were stolen initially by the British and subsequently by the Dutch around 1615 (Francis, 1990, pp. 34-35). Increasingly conflictual, the British and the Dutch began arming their whaling vessels or sending warships to protect their vessels while operating around the seas. Given the difficulty of whaling while at perpetual conflict, the British and the Dutch negotiated an agreement to divide the fisheries around Spitsbergen, giving the Dutch the northern areas and the British the southern ones (Ellis, 1991, 57; Francis, 1990, p. 35). After the agreement, the British and the Dutch appeared to have discontinued their discussions on whaling.

Later, the British and the Americans nearly clashed over whaling as well, but the American Revolutionary War interrupted interest in whaling and prevented its emergence on the international agenda. During the 1700's, the British continued to expand their whaling efforts, as did the American colonists. The American and British whalers generally maintained separate areas of operation, but the Americans gradually encroached on the British whaling grounds (Francis, 1990, p. 61). The British, fearful of increased American whaling overtaking the British fleet, issued new rules in 1765 for all whalers, which caused some inconvenience for the Americans and kept them away from the British grounds (Francis, 1990, p. 61). Because the American colonists were under British rule, they were subject to British laws involving whale catch. This does not

clearly constitute whaling entering the international agenda because America was technically part of the British Empire, and the countries were not involved in negotiations or attention toward whaling at this time, although whaling clearly had the attention of the British government. During the American Revolutionary War, the whaling ships from the American colonists were converted for war-fighting against the British, and whaling by the Americans stopped for approximately 3 years (Francis, 1990, pp. 62-63). The British whaling effort fell off dramatically as well, because the ships were needed for logistics in carrying troops and supplies to aid the British armies fighting on the American continent (Ellis, 1991, 71).

By our definition of the international agenda, whaling could not technically appear on the international agenda because the American colonies were subject to the British authorities. Therefore, it became an important domestic issue for the British, but did not appear on the international agenda. If the American colony were a state, whaling would not have appeared on the international agenda regardless because of the relative increase in importance of war between the British and the American colonists. The security concerns of these states outweighed the importance of whaling.

Through subsequent years of the French Revolution, French hostilities against Britain, and the war of 1812, whalers largely operated without interference from governments. They faced many problems whaling under the conditions of conflict between these nations. Whalers often had to move their operations to avoid conflict and

sometimes suffered losses to their fleets at the hands of the warring countries (Francis, 1990, ch. 4).

After World War I, whaling again appeared on the international agenda, beginning with a conference between the United States and Canada as part of a conference on American-Canadian Fisheries in 1918 (Birnie, 1985, p. 105). The conference on fisheries stated only that an international conference should be established after the end of World War I (1918, p. 39). Whaling was not an explicit topic of the conference, but appeared in a statement as part of discussions on cooperation over fisheries on the American-Canadian border.

The next time whaling appeared on the agenda occurred during the earliest conferences specifically about whaling in the 1930s. Although state attention to whaling previously consisted of more muted state action, state attention in the early 1930s consisted of the first whaling conferences and the creation of international treaties. This demonstrates greater depth of attention than earlier. Discussions in 1929 in the League of Nations involved discussions over regulating all international resources, but in particular to whaling, which had no international treaty at the time (Birnie, 1985, p. 111). In 1931, the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling opened for signature signifying a deeper attention to whaling in the international community. Ratified by the required eight states, the treaty entered into force in 1935. The total number of signatories to the treaty amounted to 26 states, showing a significant increase in countries interested in whaling before WWI, where no multilateral treaty was created, and only a limited number of

states paid attention to whaling. The 1931 Convention was followed by the 1937 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, a meeting to institute a protocol in 1938,[26] and an informal meeting in 1939 (Birnie, 1985, pp. 126-127). The succession of several conferences and meetings on whaling confirm the importance of the issue on the international agenda from 1930 until the beginning of World War II.

World War II resulted in no state attention to whaling between the period of 1939 and 1945. Not only did states lose interest in whaling because of the increased fighting in Europe and in Asia, but the number of whalers in operation also declined. In the 1941-1942 season, no whalers were able to partake in high seas whaling because of the war (Birnie, 1985). States conducted no international conferences or attention to whaling during the war. Therefore, whaling moved off the agenda in favor of security concerns involving World War II. Whaling again became part of the international agenda toward the end of the war with a conference beginning in 1944.

Whaling generally appeared sporadically during the first stage between the earliest whaling in 1500 through 1944. Although this is a long period of history, much of the time, whalers operated autonomously from governments. In a few instances, whaling took a place on the international agenda. This occurred primarily in 1615 between the Dutch and the British and between the British and the Americans around 1765. These two cases of issue emergence suggest a very limited attention to whaling before 1930.

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[26] The 1937 agreement was extended by the protocol in 1938. Many provisions in the 1937 agreement and the protocol limit their applicability to the next immediate whaling season. These provisions expire without subsequent agreement, not formally established again until 1944.

From 1930 to 1939, states increased attention to whaling by more states and increased depth by international treaty formation.

SUSTAINED INTEREST IN WHALING (1944 – 2008)

From 1944 to 1970, whaling became a more permanent part of the international agenda with the creation of the International Whaling Commission and yearly meetings from 1949 through today. The first significant meeting after the importance of whaling waned in World War II occurred in 1944 between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Eire (Ireland) (Birnie, 1985, p. 131). Subsequent agreements extended after the war and set up the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1946. These early institutions set up an institutional structure that allowed states to attend to the whaling after the end of World War II, if states wished. Since there were provisions to allow states to enter the IWC or leave the IWC with proper notice, the number of states maintaining a membership in the IWC makes a good proxy for attention to whaling after 1946.

MATERIAL HYPOTHESES

The primary material hypotheses associated with issue attention describe the relative importance of security issues over other issues. This initial hypothesis is further developed into three parts based on the polarity in the international system. The following sections describe these hypotheses briefly, review the changes in the international agenda, and then evaluate the hypotheses based on changes relative

importance between security and non-security issues taking into account international polarity.

Figure 2

International Whaling Commission Membership



Note. Data taken from the International Whaling Commission.

In addition to a sustained interest in whaling from 1944, IWC membership (Figure 2) shows two clear periods of membership expansion. From approximately 1974 to 1982 and again from 2000 to 2008, the number of countries interested in whaling increased as membership in the IWC increased during these years. This signifies an increase in attention to whaling as part of the international agenda.

Table 3.

Summary of Agenda Changes for Whaling

Stage	Years	International Agenda
Stage 1 On and Off the Agenda	1500s – 1930	Sporadic and Short-lived Attention 1615, attention by British and Dutch 1765, near-attention by British and Americans 1918, American-Canadian Fisheries Conference 1929, League of Nations interest in marine resources
	1930 – 1939	Increased Attention by Whaling States 1931 and 1937 Conventions on Regulation of Whaling 1938 Protocol Meeting 1939 Informal Conference
	1939-1944 (WWII)	No Attention to Whaling
Stage 2 Sustained Attention	1944 – 1974	Sustained Attention by Whaling and Ex-Whaling States Yearly conferences and the IWC from 1946
	1974 – 2000	Sustained Attention by Whaling, Ex-Whaling, and Non-Whaling States Increase in membership until 1982 Moratorium
	2000 – 2008	Whaling Interest Expansion Increase membership nations from 2000

To reiterate, there are generally two stages of whaling on the international agenda with several transitions during these stages (summarized in Table 3). In the first stage, whaling appeared on and off the agenda several times. The period is characterized by non-sustained interest in the international agenda by a small number of states in the international system. Between 1500 and 1930, there are only four cases of appearance on the international agenda. Between 1930 and 1939, there is increased attention in whaling characterized by greater depth of attention and the creation of international conferences

and treaties. During World War II, states paid no attention to whaling. The second stage begins at the end of World War II and continues to today where there is a sustained interest in whaling, with two changes in attention when the number of states interested in whaling expands. The expansion occurs once beginning in 1974 and again beginning in 2000. Since this project attempts to understand the causes of the changes in the international agenda, the changes described here in the attention to whaling over time are evaluated by examining the hypotheses relevant to changes of international issue attention in the next section.

SECURITY ISSUES DOMINATE THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

Material Hypothesis 1: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the international agenda.

The primary hypothesis regarding material influences on agenda describes the importance of security issues over other issues on the international agenda. Although this study is not a comparative analysis, where we could compare security issues to non-security issues and determine the relative importance, we can still examine whether our case is consistent with the emergence of security issues on the agenda. Security issues should be more likely to emerge on the international agenda and take the place of an environmental issue, such as whaling. When whaling appears as a security threat, we expect whaling to become part of the international agenda. When the issue is no longer a security threat, we expect whaling to become less important or move off the international

agenda. In a unipolar system, we expect security to be less of a concern for states based on hegemonic stability theory. In unipolar systems, therefore, we expect that whaling might appear on the international agenda more frequently or higher because security is less of a concern. In bipolar systems, we expect security to be a greater concern given the rivalry between the two large powers. Therefore, we expect less attention to whaling than to other security issues. Finally, in multipolar systems, security is the greatest concern because of multiple large powers and changing alliances. We expect in the multipolar system that whaling would rarely appears on the international agenda and security issues would overtake whaling frequently.

As described in the first section of this chapter summarized in Table 3, there are two stages of the agenda in regards to whaling. The first stage is characterized by whaling moving on and off the international agenda, while the second stage is characterized by sustained attention. More subtle changes occur within each stage in regards to the depth of attention and the number of states attending to the issue. To determine the application of the hypotheses described above, this section examines the extent to which polarity variables coincide with the international agenda and how well changes in polarity correlate with changes in the international agenda.

Between the 1500s and 1945, multipolarity dominates the international system.[27] Although different states change relative power positions during this time, multipolarity

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[27] Polarity information is all taken from Thompson (1986) unless otherwise noted in the text or citations.

persists for most of this period. From approximately 1945 to 1991, the international system is characterized by bipolarity with the Untied States and the Soviet Union as the two primary global powers. After 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the Berlin Wall, scholars sometimes have classified the international system as a unipolar system with the United States as the only global power (Kapstein & Mastanduno, 1999; Mastanduno, 1997; Wohlforth, 1999). Table 4 provides a summary of polarity during the periods of interest for this project in comparison to the stages of the agenda in regards to whaling.

Table 4.

World Power Polarity and the International Agenda

Stage	Years	International Agenda	Polarity
Stage 1 On and Off the Agenda	1500 – 1930	Sporadic and Short-lived Attention	Multipolar
	1930 – 1939	Increased Attention by Whaling States	Multipolar
	1939-1944 (WWII)	No Attention to Whaling	Multipolar
Stage 2 Sustained Attention	1944 – 1974	Sustained Attention by Whaling and Ex-Whaling States	Bipolar
	1974 – 2000	Sustained Attention by Whaling, Ex-Whaling, and Non-Whaling States	Bipolar and Unipolar
	2000 – 2008	Whaling Interest Expansion	Unipolar

Note. Polarity information taken from Thompson (1986).

During the first stage of the agenda, whaling appeared on the agenda sporadically and for short time periods. Generally, during this time, the attention to whaling was relatively shallow and bilateral. Only during the time from 1930 to 1939 did states begin to take a deeper and multilateral interest in whaling. This time is also characterized as a

multipolar system. The rare and the sporadic short-lived attention suggest that the data are consistent with the material hypotheses. When the attention to whaling on the agenda shifts from stage 1 to stage 2, where sustained international attention and a deeper attention to whaling begins, the system changes from a multipolar system to a bipolar system. This is also consistent with the hypotheses because changes in polarity correspond to changes in the international agenda. Bipolar and unipolar systems make it more likely that a non-security issue gains attention from states. Although unipolarity creates the conditions most likely for non-security issues to emerge on the agenda, bipolarity also provides space for non-security issues because of security provided within the global powers' spheres of influence. Materialist conditions may account for the increased attention in 2000 after the system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar one, where states joining may not have a need for security concerns and could attend to non-security issues such as whaling.

The primary hypothesis for materialist factors also suggests that security will dominate the agenda overall and take precedence over non-security issues. Based on a broader look at the international agenda for whaling, it is clear that at least in one period, the security concerns for states took whaling off the agenda in favor of security issues. In the 1930's, when states developed a deeper and increasing attentiveness to whaling, the Second World War interrupted this trend and took whaling off the agenda until the end of the war. Therefore, this shows a time where security trumped a non-security issue on the international agenda, which the materialist hypothesis suggests.

The materialist accounts fail to explain several aspects of changes in the international agenda, however. Materialist variables fail to explain why, beginning in the 1930s, states took a deeper interest in whaling and began toward a sustained interest that eventually developed after the Second World War. Because this occurred during a multipolar system, we would expect attention to remain short lived and shallow as interest had been before 1930. In addition, materialist conditions fail to explain the expansion of interest in whaling during the 1970s when polarity does not shift correspondingly with the agenda. Overall, materialism can account for some of the variation observed on the dependent variable in terms of state attention to issues, but not all the variation. Thus, materials conditions, or those based on realist logic provide a relatively good explanation for changes in the international agenda, but fail to explain all the changes seen in international attention.

NON-MATERIAL HYPOTHESES

There are three primary hypotheses involving non-material variables that may cause changes in issue attention on the international agenda. These non-material hypotheses involve the use of rhetoric to influence the attention of states for whaling. Blame, victimization, and descriptions of the timing and magnitude of effects of the phenomenon can influence attention to issues in the international agenda. These three hypotheses are described briefly below in addition to reviewing changes in the international agenda before evaluating whether each hypothesis explains the changes in

the agenda. The case study does not explain all aspects of changes in whaling, but focuses exclusively on information relevant to the hypotheses tested.

NAMING AND BLAMING

Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

If rhetoric changes from identification of non-states to states as the perpetrators of whaling, we would expect increased attention from states. Whaling would become part of the agenda or of increased importance when the rhetoric places blame on states. As discussed earlier, there are two primary stages of the international agenda for whaling. The first stage has limited and sporadic attention, while the second stage has sustained attention to whaling and an increasing number of states and depth of attention. We expect whaling to increase in attention after a period of rhetoric describing states as the cause of whaling making them directly part of the issue frame.

During the earliest whaling periods, there is little rhetoric from the early 1500s to 1900 describing the causes of whaling destruction as blamed on states. However, it is instructive to examine briefly some descriptions of the causes of whale changes before the 1920s, which is discussed below when blame on states increased. Generally, during these early years, humans were not considered an important cause of changes for marine life. Although there is little research on whales in particular during these early years, some information on fisheries provides a proxy for how society related to marine life.

United States and Britain created a group of scientists in 1864 to examine the population and effects of human action on fish in the oceans. In particular, questions as to whether certain types of fishing, such as bottom trawling, where fishers drag nets along the ocean floor, reduced fish populations. The results of these studies suggested that humans were not a cause of fishery population declines and influence was negligible. The scientific commission concluded that the effects of human fishing were not significant compared to the effects of predatory species in the oceans (Juda, 1996, p. 21). Continued scientific inquiry by the United States attempted to increase information about the quantity of fish-stocks in the oceans. Often these studies suggested the need for greater data on fisheries, but some also commented on the decline of fish stocks in specific areas (Juda, 1996). Because of the uncertainty in these studies and the number of somewhat contradictory studies presented – fish stocks in one region declined but not in another (Juda, 1996, p. 29) – scientific information presented during these early years on fishing were uncertain or showing negligible influence of humans on fish stocks. Although this does not apply directly to whales because the studies did not include whales, the information provides some sense of how society viewed ocean life generally. Most reports did not attribute lower fish stocks to human consumption. When reports attributed lower fish stocks to human consumption, the reports also described the high uncertainty and the need for more data.

Given the early perception associating non-human activity with the decimation of ocean life, increasing blame on states presents a clear change in the blame for whaling

population declines in rhetoric. The primary states involved in whaling in 1939 at a conference for whaling included Germany, Britain, Japan, Norway, and the United States with Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa as observers (Ellis, 1991, p. 388). These states constitute the states that had an interest in whaling at the beginning of the transition to the second stage. In 1944, the beginning of sustained international attention to whaling began with a Conference by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Birnie, 1985, p. 131). Evidence of increasing rhetorical blame for states before the increase in attention by these nations suggests a possible connection between the blame and attention to whaling.

Evidence of rhetoric blame is developed through an examination of news articles from the New York Times and Google News Search. New York Times archives searches through the earliest printed newspapers headlines from 1851. Google News covers years and newspapers authorized by news media owners. There is no indication from Google on their coverage, although when searching for news, coverage extends back into the 1800's. As an example, searching "New Zealand" and "Whaling," between 1840 and 1850, generates results from the New York Times, The New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, the New Zealand Spectator, Nelson Examiner, The Courier, Sydney Morning Herald, and others. Although coverage depends on the cooperation of newspaper companies, it appears fairly wide for the period under consideration in this study. The searches used for both the New York Times and Google News look for articles that describe whaling with the country associating the country with whaling

actions. This serves as only a proxy measurement for blame. The data are available in the appendix.

Beginning in approximately 1880, the causes of whaling began to shift from companies and individuals to states. Before this year, newspapers often reported catch and oil produced attributed to companies and cities that had large numbers of whalers. After 1880, however, a larger percentage of whaling articles began to describe whale catches along side specific country names rather than the companies who operated the vessels. Figure 3 illustrates that the newspapers reported country names associated with whaling more beginning in the 1880's. The large increase in countries described in the 1860 consists solely of descriptions of "America" and whaling, while later increases contain multiple country names. The increase in rhetoric associating "America" with whaling is an outlier resulting from the American Civil War ending in 1865. The large increase in "America" as part of the rhetoric most likely occurred because of a strong northern emphasis on a central government during the Civil War.

One peak of blame for states occurred in 1910 (3 of 12), 20 years before interest in whaling began to increase. This peak amounts to 25% of the whaling articles published during this time. This evidence is not decisive, but provides some indication that blame increased for states leading into the changes in international attention to whaling. For example, in 1854 a report of the arrival of whaling vessels blends the rhetoric between states and local governments. The article describes the arrival of whalers from New-Bedford along side descriptions of arrivals of ships from Japan

("George Law," 1854). The rhetoric changes during the late 1800s and early 1900s to one that references only countries. In 1903, rhetoric in the newspaper compares sizes of whaling industries between Newfoundland, the United States, and Great Britain ("Whaling fleet of the banks," 1903). This rhetoric becomes greater again as articles increase their use of states as the proxy for whalers. In 1912, an article describes the potential for international regulation because of "the slaughter of whales by the Canadians, the Japanese, and Others" ("Closed season for whales," 1912).

Figure 3.

States and Whaling in the New York Times



Note. N = 371.

More specifically, we can examine the extent to which media described specific states before changes in whaling attention by those states. Google News Search generates a list and count of all news articles given a specific search term, including a timeline of the articles. For the purpose of this project, the search terms consist of

"whaling" and the country name for each two-year period. Figure 4 shows Sparklines for the countries of interest between the years 1920 and 1946 in two-year intervals.[28] The countries are arranged in an order to illustrate commonalities among the peaks in news articles mentioned in particular years. The peaks for the countries near the top of the figure occur in 1928, while peaks for countries at the bottom occur between 1936 and 1938.

Figure 4.

Country Specific Blame Sparklines (1920-1946, 2 year intervals)

Country	Sparkline (1920 – 1946)	Peak (year)	Avg/year (n)
America		166 (1928)	39.9 (1037)
Norway		131 (1928)	23.3 (607)
Australia		115 (1928)	21.8 (567)
New Zealand		88 (1928)	14.0 (365)
Britain		69 (1928)	18.7 (486)
Canada		37 (1926)[a]	9.7 (252)
South Africa		33 (1928)	10.1 (263)
Germany		67 (1938)	14.4 (374)
Japan		58 (1938)	16.0 (416)
Ireland		17 (1938)	4.3 (111)

Note. Data compiled by author from Google News Search as described in the text.
[a]Canada peaked in 1926, but the number of articles remained the same for the following two-year period at 37 in 1928.

Figure 4 indicates that New Zealand, Australia, Norway, the US, Canada, and Britain were associated with whaling to a greater extend peaking around 1928. In 1944, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, and Britain all showed increased

[28] Sparklines are small graphs in order to present data side-by-side without placing the data in one graph where information may be obscured and the Y-axis may vary considerably. See Tufte (2006) for more information on Sparklines.

interest in whaling at the end of the war and as a start to sustained interest thereafter. All of these states show peaks around 1928, suggesting a potential relationship between previous blame of whaling and the increased interest later on. Although the US did not participate in the 1944 conference, the US participated deeply in whaling after 1944 as part of the whaling agreement in 1946. South Africa shows a less pronounced peak blame for whaling as the general number of references for whaling trends downward over time. Ireland does not have a large number of articles mentioning the country on average and does not present any clear peaks.

Overall, there is some indication that attribution of whaling to states rather than other actors could have contributed to the increased attention of states during the early 1900's. In addition, measurement for specific countries indicates the potential for influence of blame and later interest in international whaling. The time distance between blame and interest in international whaling appears to be approximately 40 years. This lag time makes some sense given that rhetoric in the news may take some time before states need to respond during the 1940's as opposed to the rapid communication occurring recently.

We can also examine the increase in attention to whaling in 1974 and whether this occurs due to increase in blame among states. In 1974, non-whaling countries become increasingly part of the International Whaling Commission signifying a change in issue attention as illustrated previously in Figure 2. Therefore, we can examine rhetoric before

1974 to determine if a change occurred in the country blame as an indication that rhetoric blame changes caused the changes in country attention.

The dynamics of country blame in the news, however, are slightly more complex than simply assigning blame to many more states. Blame became more focused on fewer states between 1950 and 1980. The blame rhetoric shifted from a larger number of states, which were previously engaged in whaling, to a smaller number of states in the 1970s. In the data seen in Figure 5, a number of countries appeared next to whaling information or data during the 1950's, but this declined significantly in the 1970s and 1980s to seven or fewer states.

During the changes between 1960 and 1980, anti-whaling activists, originating with Greenpeace, focused blame through their rhetoric, photos, and actions on only two primary countries: The Soviet Union and Australia. Actions by Greenpeace focused almost exclusively on Soviet Whalers (Day, 1987), while other organizations focused on Australian whalers (Day, 1987, p. 17). The more limited focus of blame on fewer countries coincided with actual numbers of whales caught during those years. For example, during the 1969-1970 season, approximately 83.7% of the whales caught were caught by Japan and the Soviet Union (Ishida, 2000b). In the 1959-1960 season, Japan and the Soviet Union caught approximately 47.6% of the total number of whales (Ishida, 2000a). This alone seems to provide some evidence against the hypothesis above because increasing blame and country attention to whaling do not coincide. We would

expect based on the hypothesis that decreased blame would make those states less interested in whaling than when they were part of the blame rhetoric and frame.

Figure 5.

Percentage of Country Blame in the New York Times



Note. N = 165.

If we expect states to gain interest when blamed in rhetoric, we would expect them to lose interest when not blamed in the rhetoric. It appears, however, that there was a large increase in attention to the issue of whaling during the 1970s in particular as a large number of nations joined the IWC and engaged the whaling issue. Therefore, the blame rhetoric cannot explain why states became more interested in the issue during the 1970s.

In 1979, new countries entering the IWC consisted of Sweden, Seychelles, Peru, Chile, and Spain. In examining the relationship between naming these countries in news and their membership, evidence suggests a reversed causal direction. Membership in the IWC most likely influenced the appearance of these countries in the news media rather than their appearance increasing their interest in whaling. For example, examining Sweden, Seychelles, Peru, Chile, and Spain, which joined the IWC in 1979, it is clear that the number of articles describing these countries as part of whaling all rose after 1978.

Figure 6.

Country Specific Blame Sparklines (1970-1980, 2 year intervals)

Country	Sparkline (1970 – 1980)	Peak (year)	Avg/year (n)
Seychelles		9 (1978)	1.5 (18)
Sweden		12 (1980)	3.4 (41)
Peru		22 (1980)	6.8 (81)
Chile		17 (1980)	5.2 (62)
Spain		33 (1980)	8.0 (96)

Note. Data compiled by author from Google News Search as described in the text.

Figure 6 illustrates how these countries all gained increased association with whaling after joining the IWC, and there is much less indication that these states were blamed in rhetoric before joining. In addition, the average number of articles per year for each state is too low to make an adequate suggestion that naming these countries as part of whaling caused them to take an increased interest in whaling.

To summarize briefly, before 1930, the primary causes as discussed in news articles involved non-state actors. Rhetoric implying cause with states increased beginning in the 1920s, peaking for many countries in 1928. These changes, along with

the changes in international interest in whaling in 1944 seem to coincide, given an 18-year lag between the rhetoric and the changes in the agenda. In the second primary change occurring in 1974, there is little indication that rhetoric focusing on blame caused changes in the interest of states because the media focused blame on fewer states. This leaves mixed results for this section and the hypothesis on whether blame in rhetoric causes increased attention for states. It appears that there may be some connection between the two, but a tentative one. It is important to note that nationalization of whaling companies could explain the increase in description of states as the cause of whaling as opposed to individual ships. This does not appear to be the case with whaling, however, as whaling companies seem to persist as private actors. Some subsidies have grown for whaling nations currently, such as Japan, but this does not amount to a significant amount of nationalization in the industry.

NAMING AND VICTIMIZATION

Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

In addition to blame, rhetoric emphasizing different consequences of whaling can change state involvement in the issue. Non-material hypothesis 2 suggests that rhetoric identifying states as part of the effects of the observed phenomenon makes those states more interested in the issue.

During the first stage, where whaling was associated only sporadically with the security of states, there is little evidence available on the communication and rhetoric propagated about the consequences of whaling. The behavior of states suggests that only in the cases where the consequences of whaling interfered with their security, they became interested in whaling; however, there is no rhetoric to associate with the changes in their understanding of the consequences in particular to whales. On the contrary, the only evidence we have from the period consists of descriptions of conflict between the nations' governments before they became involved and attempted to stop such conflict to resume whaling practices (see Ellis, 1991).

In the 1930's, however, the League of Nations and the international conventions in 1930s begin to present rhetoric in regards to the consequence of whaling in terms of marine resources. In these records, effects of whaling are not associated with specific states. During the changes between the first and second stages with an increase in attention for whaling among states, the rhetoric does not point to the consequences of whaling for states in any great degree. Instead, much of the rhetoric describes the consequences of whaling in terms of a more general decline of the whaling industry and economic difficulties. This implies some consequences for whaling states because those states will lose some economic resources or growth. However, the rhetoric does not explicitly identify countries that would suffer from continued whaling.

Consequences of whaling did not focus on states, but on non-state negative effects. One description, from the whalers themselves, describes how their whaling

actions have led to a decline in the profitability of whaling (Epstein, 2008; Stoett, 1997). In this description, whaling itself has led to the decline in profitability because the number of whales has declined and time and resources needed to catch each whale has increased. Companies established rules to control whaling between 1932 and 1936, not part of international treaties, as additional evidence of the association between whaling and economic decline. The agreements between companies established a quota system, where each company could sell their quota amounts to other countries, which was based on the amount of oil produced from whales – the origin of the Blue Whale Unit (Birnie, 1985, p. 120). These inter-company agreements suggest that whaling was a cause of economic problems for these companies and some management could prevent these losses. There is little indication that the economic problems were associated with states, thus the consequences were not generally associated with states.

During the changes of attention to whaling beginning in 1970, with the increase in state attention to the whaling issue, the primary rhetoric described the consequences of whaling, again, not in terms of states. The primary source of rhetoric during the 1970s came from anti-whaling activists. Anti-whaling activists associated whaling with the destruction of an intelligent being part of our common resource rather than as economic decline or explicitly with states (Day, 1987). The rhetoric discussed whaling as a moral bad rather than an economic bad, neither of which discuss states explicitly receiving negative or positive consequences from whaling.

Despite the lack of explicit reference to states receiving consequences from whaling, there may be implied consequences for states in both the cases of rhetoric described above. In the first case, negative economic consequences of whaling can be implicitly associated with states because companies associated with a state suffer consequences, therefore employment may decline as well as taxes paid by the company. In the second case, when whaling causes the destruction of a resource owned by the world, this may imply involvement by not only whaling countries, but also non-whaling countries. However, since the hypotheses outlined previously describe the influence of rhetoric on state action in terms of naming those states, the hypothesis is not supported given the evidence from the whaling case. Stretching the data to implied consequences to states may increase support for the hypotheses, but would require alterations of the hypotheses to include implied meanings. This does not mean that the hypothesis is incorrect, but simply that the reason for increase in attention is not attributable to rhetoric focused on states consequences. There does not appear to be any clear rhetoric describing states as suffering consequences of whaling.

TIMING AND MAGNITUDE

In addition to blaming and victimization, the third influence of non-material factors is through rhetorical emphasis on short-term and greater magnitude effects. Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences and those that emphasize increases in magnitude of effects are more likely to generate attention from states than less extreme rhetoric. This project describes rhetoric increasing the magnitude of effects and the

short-term consequences as *crisis making*. Increasing the magnitude of effects or the proximity of those effects increases the sense of crisis because consequences become more acute.

A primary source for information regarding the magnitude of effects and the timing of those effects comes from the scientific community. During the early years of whaling, very little science concerned the number or the rate at which whale numbers declined. Instead, much of the early research involved identification and description of whaling species. In some cases, scientists identified species of whales only after those whales were already being hunted to extinction (see Ellis, 1991, pp. 371-374; Francis, 1990, p. 215).

Earliest appearances of rhetoric regarding the degree and timing of disappearance of whales comes from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which was started by an informal agreement in 1902 (Birnie, 1985, p. 107), leading to a formalized convention, signed in 1964 (CICES, 1964). ICES primary research involved declining stocks of fish and seals during most of the earlier years until approximately 1927 (Birnie, 1985, p. 108). ICES did not directly conduct research on population numbers, however. ICES primary contribution consisted of generating measurement techniques and describing the urgency for increased research and uniform policies for measurement. ICES also helped draft the 1931 Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (Birnie, 1985, p. 109).

Part of the suggested ICES policies involved collection of data on catch information from the various countries involved in whaling. One publicized study (not conducted by ICES) examined the potential destruction of whaling populations in the future and was published in 1928 (Juda, 1996, p. 69). Despite these reports, the League of Nations was instructed in 1929 that decline in whaling populations would be "self-correcting" because complete extermination would not occur once whaling declined enough to make it not profitable to whalers (Juda, 1996, p. 69). Therefore, although the hypothesis suggests that rhetoric increasing the magnitude of effects or crises results in increased attention, the existence of few reports and contradictions between the reports makes this hypothesis difficult to test. Although ICES was an important part of the development of treaties and the policies within those treaties involving whaling, there was very little research or rhetoric on the rate at which whales were declining or the magnitude of effects of whaling.

Although there are conflicting reports early in whaling, crisis-making rhetoric increased during the 1950s and after. During the 1950s, as research on whale populations began to catch up with whaling practices, some researchers increasingly described the need for lower quotas or a cessation of whaling in order to preserve stocks for the future. These reports by the Scientific Committee of the IWC, suggested for example before the 1959 meeting of the IWC, that the quota set by the IWC of 14,500 Blue Whale Units was too high (Tønnessen & Johnsen, 1982, p. 587). This rhetoric had greater emphasis after the appointment of the Committee of Three in 1960, who were scientists involved in

population research (Aron, 2001, p. 108). The rhetoric increased toward crisis conditions in 1962, when the Scientific Committee stated that, "immediate action by the commission was critical for the protection of whale stocks, particularly the blue, humpback, and fin whales" (Aron, 2001, p. 109).

Although the recommendations by the Committee of Three were not always adopted by the Scientific Committee, the suggestions that some stocks of whale were being destroyed rapidly by whaling practices increased the urgency of whale depletion for those species. Researchers increasingly urged the IWC that whale stocks for some species required immediate attention in order to protect those stocks because of the extensive whaling practices during previous years (Francis, 1990, p. 220). These suggestions amounted to increasing the sense of crisis in regards to the effects of whaling on the whale populations. We expect, based on an increase in the urgency of whaling effects on whale populations that state interest would increase during this time.

Although scientific information may have been a contributor to changing policies and quotas in the IWC (quota levels for species) as well as possibly the emergence of the anti-whaling advocacy movement in the early 1970s, there does not appear to be an increase in state attention to whaling because of the increased urgency presented by the scientists during the 1950's. As previously noted in Figure 2, the increase in attention to whaling began in 1970 as new members joined the IWC. Between 1950 and 1970, there is no noticeable change in membership in the IWC, although membership fluctuates

slightly. The increase in urgency, although not an influence on state attention, may have indirectly influenced state attention through the anti-whaling movement.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began by describing the changes in attention to whaling from 1500 through 2008. Attention to whaling changed over two stages during this time. In the first stage, states paid sporadic and short-lived attention to whaling. The first stage occurred from the earliest whaling to 1944. The transition to the second stage, however, might have begun as early as 1930 when states began to formalize their interest in whaling, suggesting a deeper and more sustained interest. This deeper and sustained interest in whaling, however, begins clearly at the end World War II in 1944. Between 1944, and 2008, states maintained a deeper and sustained interest as the number of states attending to whaling increased twice during this period: once in 1974 and again in 2000.

The material hypothesis examines the degree to which security dominates the international agenda relative to other issues on the agenda. Security issues are more likely to appear on the agenda than other issues and security issues are more likely appear higher on the agenda than non-security issues. The evidence analyzed in this chapter generally supports this hypothesis. Security concerns for states seem to dominate the international agenda and security issues can trump non-security issue attention as occurred when World War II dominated over whaling. Materialist variable changes fail to account for increased attention during the 1970s and the deeper interest beginning in

1944. However, security provided by the two dominant states may partially explain the increasing interest in 1944.

Three primary non-material hypotheses were examined to explain the changes that occurred in attention to whaling. Some rhetoric implying the cause of the destruction of whales with states emerged in 1928, approximately 18 years before a change in whaling interest in 1944. The emergence and repetition of rhetoric in the media blaming states before the change in attention demonstrates a potential relationship between the rhetoric and the changes in attention. Before the changes in 1974, however, there is little indication that rhetoric blaming states led to changes in the agenda. The rhetoric describing the cause of whaling became more focused on fewer states, but the number of states interested in whaling increased. Although this does not support the hypothesis in general, the increased focusing on fewer states may have increased attention indirectly if this focused on a controversial or important state. This is not directly examined in this project, however.

The second hypothesis examined involves rhetoric describing consequences of the phenomenon associated with states. When states are associated with the consequences of the phenomenon, states are more likely to become interested in the issue. In the examination of rhetoric regarding the consequences of whaling for states, the evidence only implies consequences for states without explicit statements. Rhetoric present during the first shift in attention to whaling describes the negative economic consequences of whaling. For the changes in 1974, rhetoric described the consequences of whaling as the

destruction of a resource owned by the world. Both imply consequences for states, but do not suggest state consequences explicitly. In the first case, states with economic interests may suffer negative consequences. In the second case, states with an interest in common marine resources may suffer negative consequences. However, in both cases, explicit rhetoric does not appear involving the consequences for states. This neither supports nor dismisses the hypothesis because no clear change in the independent variable occurs.

The third hypothesis examined involves crisis-making rhetoric that describes changes in the magnitude of effects or changes in the time to effects. There was little rhetoric describing the magnitude of effects of whaling or increased urgency of the issue for changes occurring in whaling attention from the first to the second stage. Some new rhetoric emerged during the 1950s on the increased urgency of attending to whaling; however, no change occurred during the time in terms of state attention to whaling.

Overall, the material causes of agenda changes seem to hold up well given the evidence presented from the case of whaling. The non-material causes show mixed results in their influence over issue attention for whaling. The next chapter continues the empirical examination of whaling by looking directly at frame changes rather than attention changes.

CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: FRAME CHANGES

Chapter IV examined the changes in the international agenda regarding issue attention. This chapter examines the second part of the international agenda that involves changes in the whaling frame. The chapter proceeds to describe the changes on the international agenda regarding the whaling frame over the period from 1500 to 2008. After which, the chapter discusses and analyzes the changes in the frames in regards to the material and non-material hypotheses relevant to frames developed in Chapter III. These hypotheses involve polarity and the degree of contestation over frames, media exposure and focusing events, and connections to a broader discourse or culture. In addition, the chapter examines strategies for rhetorical manipulation, primarily concerning changes in scope, and the effects on frames.

INTERNATIONAL WHALING FRAMES

Before describing the frames, it is important to recognize that the years attached to changes in frames described below are harder to identify than in the previous chapter regarding issue attention. Since the changes that occur in the frame is a bit fuzzier than issue attention, the different periods are a rougher estimate than the years described in changes of whaling on or off the agenda. In the description of the frame changes, the dates associated with the dominant frame represent clear dominance of a frame after a

period of contestation. Although the frame may have become dominant earlier, the dates used suggest clear dominance based on the evidence.

To summarize the changes in the frame briefly, there are three general changes in the dominant frame regarding the relationship between states and whales. During the first frame, governments are largely not involved in whaling, as was shown earlier in discussions of whaling attention, but we can understand the frame as the dominant understanding of whaling in relation to non-state actors. For this first stage, the whaling frame is generally unrecognized by states, as they are not paying much attention to the issue. The first dominant frame describes companies and individuals as primary causes of whaling, which produces economic prosperity and luxury goods. The goals of any policies during this period attempt to increase efficiency of whaling and improve the quality and quantity of whale products.

After this first stage, a period of contestation over the frame begins around 1920, although the actual year is difficult to specify. Beginning in approximately 1945, a second dominant frame emerges describing states as the cause of whaling resulting in economic prosperity, food, and concern about the demise of the whaling industry. Policy proposals involve international management of whaling by states. Following the second frame, a period of contestation occurs beginning in 1970. After the period of contestation, a new dominant frame emerges in 1982. This new frame suggests that whaling results in destruction of whales and policies involve cessation of whaling. Table 5 summarizes these changes, and the next section describes them in additional detail.

Table 5.

Frame Changes in Whaling

	Dominant Frame		
Time	Causes	Consequences	Prescriptions
1500s – early 1920s	Companies and individuals	Economic prosperity and luxury goods	Increase efficiency, quality, and quantity of whale products; reduce piracy; prevent conflict between whaling companies
1920s – 1940s	Period of Greater Contestation		
1939-1945	World War II		
1945 – 1970	States	Economic prosperity, food, demise of whaling industry	Managed whaling
1970 – 1982	Period of Greater Contestation		
1982 – 2009	States	Destruction of whale populations	Whaling moratorium

WHALING EXPLOITATION FRAME

The first dominant frame appeared unrecognized by states during the period from earliest whaling to approximately the 1920s. During this period of over 400 years, the interpretation of the relationship between people and marine resources implies the whaling frame, rather than explicitly described by states. The frame is characterized primarily by the idea that these resources should be exploited like other marine resources, and these resources will renew themselves over time (Stoett, 1997, 28). The discussion below describes this relationship by referencing documents and actions between humans and whales over this 400-year period. Since international actors do not explicitly

describe the frame because state attention is sporadic during this period, we must derive the frame by examining the actions and words of actors that may not explicitly identify the frame.

Individuals believed whales should be exploited since the earliest whaling as evidenced by documents discussing whales and their uses. The practice of consuming whales may have been around for over 150,000 years as archeological studies have found remnants of used whale parts (Rutherford, 2007), most likely from beached whales (Ellis, 1991, 37). The practice of going into the water and whaling has most likely been part of society since approximately the 12th century, when people moved from consuming and using beached whales to the practice of hunting whales along the coastlines (Ellis, 1991,38-9; Stoett, 1997, p. 152).

In early descriptions of whales, they were often referred to as human adversaries, for example, as "monstrous creatures… armed with most terrible, sharpe, and cutting teeth" (Pliny the Elder, 79 AD, Quoted in Ellis 1991, 35). We can also see some indication of the relationship between people and whales from Bible texts. In the Bible, we see references to "Leviathan," which some have suggested as a reference to whales. In Job, for example, the text describes rousing a "Leviathan" (Bible, Job 3.8) and pulling "in the leviathan with a fishhook" (Bible, Job 41.1). These earliest references in the Bible, describing what is likely a whale as a "leviathan" emphasizes the large and powerful nature of the creature. Although this early reference may be considered a whale, scholars also have suggested the creation may be a crocodile or some other large

powerful creature. In the story of Jonah, the term "fish" is used to describe the animal that swallows Jonah, equated with the whale (Ellis, 1991, 34). News articles also reinforced the exploitation frame by continuing to describe whales as "fish" or "monsters" (e.g. "Whale hunting of to-day," 1900).

In all, these texts illustrate the starting point of an adversarial, exploitative, and mysterious relationship between humans and whales. This adversarial and exploitative frame develops further since the 1500, which is described below in terms of the causal, consequences, and prescriptive characteristics of frames.

One way to examine the frame involves examining news presentations as a proxy for common rhetoric regarding an issue. This project uses a sample of New York Times articles between 1851 and 1920 to interpret the dominant frame during the first stage.[29] The examination of the news by the New York Times during this period suggests a frame defined by unrestricted whaling and competition among the whalers for capturing the most whale products possible. By examining a sample of articles from the New York Times before 1930, it is clear that the most common view of whaling is that of the use of whale products for economic goods.

In terms of blame for whaling during this early frame, most articles do not reference states when describing those responsible for whale catches. For example, the

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[29] The articles examined are listed in the Appendix. No formal coding system was used to analyze the frame content of the articles. Instead, the author read and interpreted the articles to understand the frame content. Although there is no clear indication of reliability because of the methods used, repetition of the process is possible by other scholars to determine the extent to which repeated measurements would reveal similar results. See also Hopf (2002) for similar methods.

articles reference the whalers from "New Bedford" or "Nantucket," or reference to specific vessels, such as *Milo*, *Callao,* or *Cassia* ("George Law," 1854; Arrival of whaling vessels," 1855). This early frame involves primarily "whalers" as the cause of the destruction of the whales. It is rare in these New York Times articles to reference a country or a state. In most of the articles, references refer to either whaling companies or cities that are synonymous with whalers because of the large number of whalers who live in the port towns.

The primary exception to referencing non-state actors occurs during the 1860's where a large number of articles reference "America" when discussing whaling involving companies or cities within the United States. It drops off immediately to zero right after this period, however, with no mention of other countries or of America during the rest of this early frame before the 1930's. The reason for this large increase in discussion of America during the 1860's coincides with the start and end of the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865. During this time, the whaling frame does not involve countries. Instead, the use of the word "America" in the articles signifies the importance of the United States as a single country as opposed to the north and south. The use of "America" does not directly relate to whaling. The number of references to country specific names, therefore, remains at zero until approximately the 1890's.

The second part of the first frame around whaling defines whales and whale products as an economic resource. The consequence of whaling provides economic

prosperity and luxury goods. This suggests a positive association with whaling in that the killing of whales provides benefits for society.

The first indication of this frame involves the numerous articles that describe whale catch, products produced, and the value of those goods quantitatively rather than the number of whales killed. This is clear by the numerous mentions of whalebone, oil produced, or whale catch with prices and profits of different actors (for an example, see "George Law," 1854; E.g. "Whaling news -- Marine disasters," 1855). During this early period, whales were implicitly framed as an important economic commodity. When normative statements are used in the articles, the authors describe a low catch as a "poor season," and a high catch as a "good season" ("Whale hunting of to-day," 1900). Sometimes these articles reported the catch and oil produced relatively between the vessels as apparent competition between the different whaling vessels. All these statements confirm that the primary frame during this period was one where people use whales for the production of economic resources.

In addition, when whaling emerged onto the international agenda during this first frame, the interaction between states suggests the strategic importance of whaling resources. Whale products were widely used and important for economic development and industrialization. Ellis suggests that whale oil during the 1800s resembled other strategic goods today, such as gold, diamonds, or petroleum oil (Ellis, 1991, 55). This adds to the evidence suggesting the importance of whaling consequences benefiting states through economic growth and industrialization.

Prescriptive characteristics of the first frame involve policies that attempt to increase the efficiency of whaling and the quality and quantity of goods produced. States did not implement many direct policies involving whaling, however, we can derive the implicit prescriptive characteristics of the frame through examination of technological advancements achieved during this period and the general goals for whalers.

A number of technological improvements occurred during the 1800s to make whaling more efficient and improve the quantity and quality of whale products. The earliest improvements involved processing whale fat into oil for use in products such as lighting and eventually soaps. Inventions and innovations included placing try-works (the process for producing oil from whale blubber) on ships and placing those ships near the whale stocks. The processing of fats into oils required stability, which made it difficult to put the try-works on the whaling vessels on the open ocean (Ellis, 1991). A second important invention concerned the ability to bring whales on board ships through an opening at the stern of the vessels (Ellis, 1991, pp. 310-311). Before this, the whales had to be cut up in the water or brought to port for processing. Later inventions included the creation of grenade harpoons (Ellis, 1991, p. 325), factory ships (Ellis, 1991, p. 342), and using airplane spotters (Ellis, 1991, p. 314; Tønnessen & Johnsen, 1982chs. 1-2). The trajectory of technology and innovation was clear. The primary prescription associated with whaling involved improvement in whaling practices to kill whales faster, in greater quantities, and to create whale products more efficiently.

WHALING MANAGEMENT FRAME

Beginning in approximately 1920, the previously dominant frame becomes contested, and in 1945, a new dominant frame emerges. The second dominant frame describes states as the primary cause of whaling rather than as previously identified with companies, cities, and individual vessels. In addition, the consequences of whaling changed slightly in the new frame to suggest that whaling results in the potential demise of the whaling industry. The new dominant frame qualifies exploitation with the idea that unrestricted whaling results in the long-term destruction of whales and economic loss. This results in a prescriptive frame involving the management of whaling. Whaling management mitigates the destruction of whales because of overexploitation.

The first change in the whaling frame begins to occur in 1890 and continues to World War II. During this period, a transition takes place between identification of whaling with cities and whaling vessels to states. As described in an earlier chapter, Figure 3 shows the number of articles referring to states as a percentage of total articles about whaling over time. The change from whalers to countries importantly signifies the change of frame of responsibility from cities and companies to states. States become increasingly associated for taking whales within the causal characteristic of the frame. Beginning in approximately 1944, articles in the New York Times refer primarily to countries rather than individual whaling vessels or companies. The dominant frame changes from blaming non-state actors to state actors beginning after World War II.

The salient consequences of whaling changed slightly from the previous frame to include a description that whaling could result in economic loss through the demise of the whaling industry. Previously, the consequence of whaling was not directly associated with the destruction of whale populations as people considered it an infinitely renewable resource. In this new frame, unrestricted whaling was associated with a decline in the industry. The effects of whaling involved primarily a decrease in price of oil products and potential collapse of the entire industry.

After the 1930-31 seasons of unprecedented whale catch and oil production, many in the industry began to suggest that whaling might cause a collapse in the whaling industry. For example, in 1932, some involved in the whaling industry commented, "no one unconnected financially with the business of whaling can possibly approve of the present methods of unrestricted slaughter" (Quoted in Francis, 1990, p. 206). In 1929, Norwegian whalers helped pass the Norwegian Whaling Act, or An Act to Regulate the Capture of Baleen Whales, to regulate the capture of whales and essentially eliminate the hunt of the right whale, the population of which had been destroyed by Norwegian whalers. The government in Norway recognized that unrestricted whaling resulted in economic decline and destruction of the population of whales. The legislation attempted to control whaling by licensing whalers and restricting non-licensed whalers (Tønnessen & Johnsen, 1982, p. 362). This initial legislation attempt begins to demonstrate the change in understanding about the consequences of whaling. The dominant

understanding of whaling suggested that the accepted unrestricted whaling produced negative economic consequences (Peterson, 1992) and a reduction in whale stocks.

In the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the preamble says "the history of whaling has seen overfishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after another" (ICRW, 1946). The treaty identifies clearly the dominant understanding of the consequence of whaling in terms of destruction of whale species. This important idea that unrestricted regulation results in an unsustainable whaling industry continues through new amendments and protocols of the 1946 treaty until the next frame change in the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, the evidence demonstrates that the new dominant frame transitioned in the 1930s and dominated after 1946. Whaling, once attributed to non-state actors and considered economically beneficial, transformed to blame states and overfishing, which resulted in economic decline and the destruction of some whale species.

Prescriptive characteristics of the frame for whaling involve a species-specific quota system based on the oil produced for whales and the use of multilateral international treaties for regulation of whaling. The first change that takes place is the emphasis and reliance on multilateral international treaties rather than bilateral regulation or reliance on market mechanisms or non-state actors to control their catch. Before 1930, multinational cooperation and treaties were not generally considered to address international whaling. Most of the prescriptions before 1930 consisted of market mechanisms or domestic politics, regulations, and incentive systems for supporting

whaling. The use of multilateral international treaties appeared in 1931 and continued thereafter as the primary means through which governments attended to whaling. Multilateral treaties and conferences continued through the 1930s and into World War II. After the war, multilateral international cooperation increased in addressing whaling further with the creation of the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling. The use of international treaties to regulate whaling became the dominant understanding of solutions to the consequences of whaling.

Within these treaties, the dominant means through which regulation would occur to solve the perceived whaling problem involved limits on the number and type of whales that could be caught. The 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling states that the goal of the treaty is to "secure the prosperity of the whaling industry and, for that purpose, to maintain the stock of whales" (IARW, 1937). Later treaties, in 1946, describe the goal of regulation to obtain "optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible" (ICRW, 1946). The optimum level of whale stocks was suggested to allow a yield of whales that sustains the fishery for the long-term interest of the industry. These treaties and subsequent meetings from the IWC set up a quota system of management to reduce the number of whales caught. These quotas applied to specific species rather than to all whales together. Although the exact number of whales nations were entitled to catch may have been disputed in meetings at the International Whaling Commission, the use of the quota system continued until the next frame change beginning in the 1970s.

Therefore, the prescriptive characteristics of the second dominant frame involved the use of multilateral international treaties and a quota system, which limited the catch of specific whale species. In the shift from the first to the second dominant frame, states became important causes of whaling rather than individual vessels of companies. In addition, no negative consequences were associated with the first frame. In the second frame, consequence characteristics described the negative consequences of whaling in both the decline of economic prosperity and the declining populations of whales.

WHALING PRESERVATION FRAME

The whaling frame changes a third time during the 1970's and 1980's when the prescriptive characteristics changed from management to a cessation of whaling. The causes of the destruction of the whales remained primarily defined as states. The consequence characteristics changed slightly because the positive economic gains from whaling were largely eliminated from the frame.

In terms of causal characteristics of the frame, states remained as the cause described in the frame. States continued in news and other outlets as the central actors responsible for whaling. The number of states responsible for whaling declined in the media, which coincided with the number of states engaged in whaling during the time. In the 1969-70 season, at the beginning of the third change in frames, the USSR and Japan captured 18,336 and 17,047 whales respectively, while the total catch of whales was approximately 42,254 (Ishida, 2000b). The number of whales caught by 11 other nations amounted to less than 20% of the total whales caught, making their catch relatively

insignificant. Rhetoric and symbolism in this third frame, therefore, focused primarily on Japan, the USSR, and to a lesser extent other nations (see Day, 1987).

Changes in the consequence characteristics of whaling for the third dominant frame began to suggest that whaling removes an important intelligent creature from nature. Instead of primary economic benefits or costs, whaling caused the destruction of a species. Removal of the economic component and increasing the moral component of whaling makes up the primary change of the consequence characteristics for the third frame. Much behavior that was once completely accepted, like military use of whales for target practice, became normatively unacceptable in changes moving toward the third frame (Epstein, 2008; Stoett, 1997, p. 143). Killing whales today has generally become unacceptable for most countries.

The primary change for prescriptive characteristics in the third frame describes whales as one group rather than individual species as well as a reliance on cessation rather than a quota system. Prescriptions continue to rely on international treaties to govern whaling practices, but the policies used to control whaling change from individually specified quotas on specific species to a one-size fits-all model of cessation of whaling for all species.

Early indications of this new frame are seen in the United Nations unanimous (52-0) vote to generate a 10-year ban on whaling in 1972, and the moratorium established by the IWC in 1981, which went into effect in 1986. The moratorium on all whaling illustrated the primary prescription grouping all whales together and instituting a

cessation on all whaling practices. Although the moratorium was suggested first in 1972, it took place slowly over the years as quotas became lower. These quotas eventually led to the moratorium when the International Whaling Commission passed an amendment in 1982, taking effect in the 1986 whaling season creating a moratorium on killing whales of any kind (ICRW Amendments to the Schedule, 1982). This moratorium has lasted through 2009, although there is an increasing chance of lifting the moratorium in the near future, which the concluding chapter discusses explicitly. Figure 7 illustrates the decline in quotas during the management period to the eventual moratorium on whaling during the Conservationist period. Despite the fact that some whales, such as the Minke have good recovery rates and are smaller than other whales (Stoett, 1997), the general moratorium applied to all whales for their protection. The "preservationist" perspective de-emphasizes the importance of economic benefits and whether a whale can recover from killing as the Minke is better able to do, and emphasizes the importance of preserving a natural creature, which may have high intelligence.

The changes in the prescriptive characteristics illustrate the policies implemented did not discriminate between different species of whales. Despite the fact that some whales have faster recovery rates than others, differentiated whaling quotas (even if set at zero) were no longer part of the prescriptive characteristics of the frame. The moratorium differs from previous practices of finding an optimal yield for whales in order to create a sustainable yield in the long term.

Figure 7.

Whaling Quotas and the Moratorium



Note. Data from Stoett (1997).

MATERIAL HYPOTHESES

Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration of power in one state (unipolarity) results in little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived contestation.

The material hypothesis concerning changes in frames suggests that changes in conditions of polarity alter the likelihood and type of contestation over frames. In order for frames to change, alternative frames must be presented in rhetoric, where the old frame becomes contested with an alternative understanding. As stated earlier, in cases of unipolarity, contestation becomes less likely because a single hegemon controls the international system and the frame for issues. In bipolar systems, contestation is likely to

become prolonged due to the rivalry between the two great powers and their relatively similar amounts of power. In multipolar systems, contestation over issue frames is likely to be short-lived because of the shifting alliance patterns and shifting concerns for states in multipolar systems.

The two periods of greater frame contestation occur between 1920-1945 and between 1970-1982. In the first period, before 1945, the international system resembles a multipolar one (Thompson, 1986). During the second period, between 1970-1982, the international system resembles a bipolar one with the United States and the Soviet Union as the primary global powers (Thompson, 1986). Table 6 summarizes the relationship between polarity and contestation.

Table 6.

Whaling Contestation and Polarity

Years	Polarity	Contestation
1500s – early 1920s	Multipolarity	Little Contestation
1920s – 1940s	Multipolarity	Greater Contestation
1939-1945	Transitory	World War II
1945 – 1970	Bipolarity	Little Contestation
1970 – 1982	Bipolarity	Greater contestation
1982 – 2009	Bipolarity and Unipolarity (1991)[a]	Little Contestation

Note. Polarity data taken from Thompson (1986).
[a]1991 is used to place a date on the collapse of the Soviet Union, although decline may have started earlier with the first signal occurring at the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

The first important thing to note about the relationship between polarity and contestation is that polarity does not change consistently with the changes that occurred in the international whaling agenda. In particular, the change in 1991 from a generally

bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union to a system dominated solely by the United States does not coincide with a change in contestation. This change occurred in the middle of one of the periods of contestation where the issue frame did not change and there was little contestation. In other words, the independent variable changed without a change in the dependent variable. This suggests that changes in polarity are not sufficient to change the international agenda or that the effect is too weak to create a change.

In addition to the change in the polarity that is not reflected in the degree of contestation, there are also changes in contestation without a change in polarity. This occurs twice, when the frame becomes contested in the 1920s and again when the frame becomes contested in the 1970s. Both of these changes, from little contestation to greater contestation, occur when there is no clear change in international system polarity.

In most of the period from 1500 through the 1900s, we see very little interest in whaling. When the issue appeared on the international agenda, states or other international actors did not contest the dominant frame. All actors saw the issue similarly during this period. Whales were considered an economic resource for exploitation through efficient and productive means. The frame about whaling during this time did not change much until the 1920s and 1930s, when the frame changed in two ways. First, states became the primary causes of whaling rather than the emphasis on companies or individuals. Second, whaling consequences were seen as causing some negative economic consequences.

There is no clear connection between polarity and the emergence of greater contestation of the issue frame during the 1920s. If polarity were responsible for the degree of contestation, we would expect contestation to occur throughout the period, but it did not. Other factors must explain the change in the frame the increase in contestation that occurred in the 1920s.

The second period of contestation occurred during the 1970s as the whaling frame changed from destruction of an economic resource to a frame describing the destruction of an important animal species. Again, there is no indication that polarity explains contestation emerging in the 1970s since states did not contest the issue since the end of World War II.

The evidence presented, therefore, is inconsistent with the hypotheses developed in regards to the connection between polarity and the degree of contestation. There is also no indication that the period of contestation during bipolarity is any longer than the contestation during multipolarity given the dates above. Therefore, the evidence presented does not support hypotheses on material influences of changes in contestation. This does not definitively rule out the influence of polarity on contestation, but it does not provide evidence in support of the hypotheses in the case of whaling.

NON-MATERIAL HYPOTHESES

In general, rhetoric propagated through the international system with high exposure that is complete and connected to a broader discourse is more likely to become part of the dominant agenda. The non-material factors, such as exposure, completeness,

and connections to a broader discourse change the likelihood of the rhetoric becoming part of the dominant frame. Table 5 previously summarized the changes in the content of the dominant frame, and the section below reviews this information during the analysis.

EXPOSURE

Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely it influences perceptions of the phenomenon.

Increases in media exposure and the use of focusing events to link rhetoric to large scale events in order to increase media attention were an important part of the rhetoric presented before frame changes in the third stage. In the first stage, where states were interested in whaling only sporadically, we have limited knowledge of the media exposure and focusing events connected to rhetoric during that time. Although we have information regarding the rhetoric presented internationally, the degree of media or international exposure is undetermined. For the second change from little focus to a management focus, there is again limited knowledge on media exposure and focusing events linked to rhetoric. Changes from a management frame to a preservation frame, however, coincide with large media exposure and linkages to large focusing events. In addition to media exposure, rhetoric also received much greater exposure in international forums such as in the UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) and within the IWC.

The UNCHE provided a good opportunity to explore policies for whaling that might not have been acceptable to the whaling countries in the IWC. The UNCHE was

the first major conference on environmental issues held at the international level, in 1972 in Stockholm from June 5-16. The conference provided a venue for the attendees, over 113 states, and numerous other organizations to discuss the global environment (UNEP, 1972). The Stockholm Conference provided a venue for the large number of environmental NGO's present to communicate with state policy makers (Epstein, 2008, p. 110), thus providing exposure to their ideas. NGO's, such as Project Jonah and the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, which activists created specifically to stop whaling, attended the Stockholm Conference and established connections with policy makers. It was also at the Stockholm conference where the moratorium policy gained exposure after the conference adopted the policy.

In the IWC, as well, the number of organizations with observer status increased dramatically during the period before the moratorium became part of the dominant frame. In 1969, only 10 observers were present at the IWC meeting, and only five were non-governmental individuals or groups. However, in 1982, 59 observers were present at the IWC meeting when the moratorium passed (Ellis, 1991, p. 442). The increase in the number of observer nations, individuals, and non-governmental organizations again provided access for the spread of the anti-whaling rhetoric.

Non-material Hypothesis 4a: Rhetoric that links focusing events with a phenomenon and issue frame is more likely to gain attention in the media, increasing exposure.

The primary exposure occurred not through international forums, as much as through media outlets coupled with focusing events. As discussed in Chapter III, rhetoric that links focusing events with a phenomenon and issue frame is more likely to gain attention in the media, increasing exposure (Non-material Hypothesis 4a). In the case of whaling, the anti-whaling activists were able to create the dramatic and unexpected events, film and document them, and link them with their own rhetoric on anti-whaling to gain increased media attention.

The most dramatic focusing event linked with the rhetoric of anti-whalers came in 1975 when a small number of Greenpeace activists attempted to interfere with Russian whalers. Often described as a moment between "David and Goliath," the comparatively small inflatable Zodiac boats positioned themselves between the much larger whaling vessel and the target whales (Day, 1987; Ellis, 1991, p. 438). Captured on video, the encounter was presented throughout media on almost every US television network and even in outlets in Canada, Europe, and Japan (Ellis, 1991, p. 445). Walter Cronkite's report on the whalers was hailed as a huge accomplishment, placing the anti-whaler's images with those of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Apollo 11's moon landing, the Kennedy assassination, and other major world events (Day, 1987; Epstein, 2008). With the focus on the conflict between the whalers and the Russians getting considerable media attention, the anti-whaler message was presented around the world. It is important to note as well, that during this same period, other organizations, such as the Sea Shepherd, were engaged in preventing Australian whaling but received much less media attention

(Day, 1987, p. 17). The reason for differing media attention may lie in the ability to present rhetoric in the context of a larger discourse and culture, discussed later.

Greenpeace and other activists purposefully orchestrated these events to gain attention from the media. Greenpeace, for example, planned on confronting whaling ships while the IWC conference was ongoing in order to maximize the amount of media coverage of their encounter (Ellis, 1991, p. 444; Francis, 1990, p. Ch. 12). The activists fully understood the power of dramatic events to help present their message in the media. Other events also gained attention, such as protests at the IWC and putting an inflatable whale in the Japanese delegation's room during the conference (Day, 1987). In Australia, the media were made aware of attempts by activists to interfere with coastal whaling. The media arrived earlier than the activists, and whaling advocates showed the media the benefits of whaling. During the encounters, however, which caught more drama and media attention than demonstrations of the benefits of whaling, the activists failed each time to prevent killing of whales. Despite their failures in stopping the whaling, they successfully received greater media attention and presenting their anti-whaling messages on a larger scale (Ellis, 1991, p. 447).

In 1974, images of whales as an important ecological or environmental resource (not economic) emerged in the media. Greenpeace managed to capture images of a Russian whaling vessel attempting to harpoon and capture a sperm whale over the head of a Greenpeace activist. While Greenpeace filmed these images, one activist managed to climb aboard the floating whale in an attempt to prevent the Russians from taking the

kill (Day, 1987; Epstein, 2008, 97). Flipper, the movie, was released in 1963, where dolphins were first popularized due to both their willingness to perform for the camera and their friendly demeanor (Ellis, 1991, 435). Following the movie release, the television show, along with other works, such as *The Day of the Dolphin*, presented dolphins as intelligent creatures, learning English, or assisting humans with various tasks. These presentations illustrate the changes of the new dominant frame emerging in the 1980s.

The introduction of whales into popular movies and literature coincided with the introduction of scientific discoveries of the potential destruction of whales as well as discoveries of whales' song and abilities to communicate. In 1966, an article in Scientific American described the potential for the destruction of the whales if whaling continued at the same pace. The article described the extent to which whales were being taken by various whaling countries despite the quotas and the involvement of the IWC, created to manage the taking of whales to sustainable levels (McVay, 1966). Scientific estimates of the decimation of the population of whales also appeared through (at least initially) a three-person scientific committee commissioned by the IWC. After three years of research, an impartial committee[30] reported that the blue whale and the humpback whale were in danger of extinction in the Antarctic whaling grounds (McVay, 1966). The

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[30] The scientific committee members were not from member countries and were not whale specialists. They were specialists in population dynamics and other fields related to understanding whale population.

media accounts of whaling illustrate some of the newer descriptions of how whales were framed beginning in the 1960's, which continue for the most part through today.

In the news media, the number of articles describing the value of whales as a species increases after the 1960's and 1970's through today. Given the much greater attention to the anti-whaling rhetoric by the media and the drama created by the activists themselves, we would expect this rhetoric to become a greater part of the dominant frame. Based on our understanding of the dominant frame changes and the coinciding media exposure of the anti-whaler rhetoric, the evidence supports the hypothesis connecting international exposure and frames.

CONNECTIONS TO DISCOURSE AND CULTURE

Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set of cultural beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to influence the international agenda.

As discussed in Chapter III, rhetoric is more likely to become part of the dominant frame when it connects to a larger discourse or culture. Rhetoric presented before the first change in frames coincided with broader discourse and culture on the management of common resources as well as a greater reliance on states for regulation. In addition, rhetoric presented between the management and the conservationist frames resonated with a broader discourse and culture in terms of the Cold War rivalries and in terms of the larger environmental movements.

During the changes from the exploitation frame to the conservation frame, a large amount of rhetoric involved the importance of states in regulating marine resources. For example, the Norwegian effort to regulate whaling in 1927 was largely unsuccessful, which led them to adopt the view that management of whaling requires international policies because whales migrate between areas of control. National control systems for whaling were ineffective since areas under the control of states were not the areas used for whaling purposes generally (Birnie, 1985, pp. 118-124). In addition, the timing of this first change in frame came about after an increase in regulation of other marine species, such as fur seals in 1911.

In 1924, the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law (appointed by the League of Nations) issued a report stressing the importance of multilateral comprehensive agreements to avoid problems with regulating migrating species (Birnie, 1985, p. 111). The report suggested that ad hoc agreements were not able to deal with the problems of migratory species, and states should consider the oceans as a common area of regulation. This report and the work of the League of Nations did not directly address whaling at that time, but it provides a context in which the regulation of whaling by states through multilateral international agreements may have become more acceptable as part of this broader change in international culture.

The culture emerging around the end of the First World War suggested greater involvement from states in the prevention of international conflict and management of international affairs. Although there were treaties between nations before the First World

War, the League of Nations was a very ambitious attempt to implement a form of world governance to prevent further large interstate wars. Mitchell documents less than 10 multilateral environmental agreements between 1878 and 1900, increasing to 20 between 1901 and 1942. This further increases to approximately 30 between 1943 and 1952 (Ishida, 2000b; Mitchell, 2002-2009). This broader dependence on states to govern international affairs, rather than the previous, *might makes right* approach signified the start of a cultural shift in understanding international affairs. Greater reliance on states for international regulation coincided with the rhetoric describing the need for states to address the issue of regulating whaling.

During the 1970s, the broader environmental movement and discourse took a greater role internationally and domestically. A large number of international treaties formed during this period and before the whaling moratorium in the 1980s. For example, the CITES treaty providing guidelines on the protection of endangered species was created in 1973, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance was created in 1971, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Dumping was created in 1972, and a large number of other international environmental agreements were created during the formation of the environmental movement. These agreements and the rise in environmental groups worldwide generated a larger culture for environmental protection during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Within this context, the whaling rhetoric resonates more highly because it also adopts the language of environmental protection of the whales. One of the goals

associated with the anti-whaling movement was the desire to equate whaling with a broader conservationist trend and the increase in attention to endangered species and their protection (Ellis, 1991, p. 437; Epstein, 2008, p. 204 and Ch. 205). The global trend toward greater attention to the environment as population increased and industrialization took hold in more countries created a larger context within which the whaling treaties resonated highly.

In addition to the connection with a wider discourse and culture of environmental protection, rhetoric propagated and resonated with the United States and the west when linked with the broader context of the Cold War (Epstein, 2008). Although it is not clear that Greenpeace specifically targeted Russian vessels because of the connection to Cold War rivalries,[31] the connection with the broader conflict between the US (generally a non-whaler) and the USSR (a whaler) pushed the rhetoric into the media spotlight. The media, for example, gave much less coverage to similar attempts to stop whaling in other parts of the world or against other western countries, such as Australia.[32] It is difficult to know whether the media coverage of the Russian conflict with anti-whalers comes from connection to the larger Cold War rivalries or if the attention was caused by the greater

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[31] There have been several mentions that Greenpeace specifically target the Soviet Union by some scholars such as Epstein (2008), but Day (1987) does not describe such intent in his detailed history of the anti-whaling activism. In addition, Weyler's history of the Greenpeace movement, including the whale campaign, describes the encounter resulting primarily from a desire to confront "the whalers" not the Russian whalers (See Weyler, 2004, 212, 226, 261-265).

[32] Day (1987) describes such efforts, but they do not appear frequently in international news sources. Google News Search results in no results for "Greenpeace, Australia, whale" or "Zodiac Australia, Whale" searched on May 6, 2009.

drama brought out with the Russians. Despite this difficulty, the connection with a broader discourse in the Cold War and the environmental movement most likely had some influence in the greater resonance during the 1960s and 1970s.

Rhetoric connected to a broader culture appears to become part of the frame for whaling as it appeared before the changes in the agenda. This does not suggest that all rhetoric that tied to a broader discourse necessarily becomes part of the international agenda. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that rhetoric connected with a broader discourse is more likely to become part of the dominant frame. In addition, rhetoric not tied to the culture did not appear as part of the dominant frame.

COMPLETENESS

Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story with all three frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.

The presentation of complete stories including causes, consequences, and prescriptions are more likely to become part of the dominant frame. In order to examine this hypothesis, it is necessary to examine rhetoric presented before the frame changes that illustrate differing completeness. Before the change in the first frame, the rhetoric presented describes states as the primary party responsible for whaling. The rhetoric also describes the consequences of whaling in terms of economic decline and a quota system for management. Although both parts of the rhetoric became part of the dominant frame, the parts did not appear together. Since they did not appear together, the rhetoric

presented only focused on one characteristic of the frame at a time. The rhetoric presented before the changes in the first frame, therefore, was not complete as described in the hypothesis. Despite the lack of completeness, the rhetoric became part of the dominant frame. This does not present decisive evidence because there are no alternative more complete stories to compare.

In the second change of the frame, from management to conservation whaling, rhetoric by the anti-whaling activists described the primary causes of whaling, the negative consequences of whaling and a desire for cessation of whaling as a policy prescription (Day, 1987). Anti-whaling activists created a complete story around whaling suggesting that particular states, such as Japan, Norway, and Russia were responsible for whaling, that whaling caused the destruction of an important mammal without economic consequences, and advocated for a complete stoppage of whaling. Therefore, in the changes for the third frame, the rhetoric appeared more complete than competing rhetoric by whalers. Whaling rhetoric during these changes suggested only that whales provided valuable economic resources (Ellis, 1991, p. 447). The whalers focused their rhetoric on the economic and material benefits of whaling rather than a complete story of whaling. In this case, the rhetoric with a complete story seems to have become part of the dominant frame over the competing rhetoric without a complete story. This supports the general hypothesis that rhetoric that is more complete is more likely to become part of the frame.

RHETORICAL MANIPULATION STRATEGIES

There are three rhetorical strategies discussed in Chapter III that can change the outcomes for international agendas and frames. Altering the scope of the description of the phenomenon can alter the acceptability of rhetoric as part of the frame. Emphasizing different characteristics of a frame can change the attention to the issue on the international agenda. Finally, emphasizing different causes or effects within the frame characteristics can alter the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics. In all three cases, the best test of the hypotheses would involve multiple manipulations that occur for the same issue to determine how these changes affect the dependent variable. Unfortunately for the case under consideration, there are no clear alternative rhetoric strategies presented for the changes in frames.

The best example of within frame emphasis would show different actors emphasizing different causes or effects within the causal or consequence elements and compare their effects on acceptability of prescriptive characteristics. This type of manipulation did not appear explicitly in the case of whaling. For emphasis between frame characteristics, again, the best test of the hypothesis would occur between two sets of rhetoric that emphasize different sets of characteristics and the changes in effects on issue attention. The case of whaling does not provide such data, but Chapter III provides examples outside the case of whaling for both manipulation strategies.

In the changes from the second to the third dominant frames, a bit of rhetorical scope manipulations took place by whaling activists. Although testing the hypothesis for

scope manipulation ideally would have at least two sets of rhetoric, discussing whether the scope manipulations in whaling are consistent with outcomes can help to determine support for the hypothesis.

Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations of the phenomena scope change the audience acceptability of frame characteristics.

Manipulating the scope of the phenomenon can change the acceptability of the rhetoric presented in terms of blame and consequence characteristics for the audience. For whaling, the presentation of information changed dramatically between the earlier presentations of statistics on whale catch and oil produced to stories of individual whale catchers and their methods to hunt specific whales. In most newspaper articles before the 1800's whaling was presented as statistics in terms of the number and amount of whales caught. Most of these statistics involved the resources gained by the whalers, because the emphasis was placed on the economic benefit of whales. In the new rhetoric presented by the anti-whaling advocates, individual stories were documented and presented to the media of a single vessel catching, butchering, and producing whale products. The description of the phenomenon was presented differently with the scope focused on each whaling vessel rather than on the entire global scope of the number of whales and products produced.

In addition, anti-whalers broadened the scope by changing individual species of whales into a single set of "whales." By putting all whales together into a single group, the new rhetoric contrasted claims by the IWC and whaling states, that management

requires different policies for each type of whale because their population dynamics differ. Instead, the new scope created greater acceptability of a stoppage in whaling because "whales" made a single threatened group rather than only some of the species of whale. This scope manipulation is still in contention today where some countries, like Japan, seek to increase the allowable catch for whalers with larger populations in an attempt to separate species and consider their populations individually.

During the IWC meetings, states resisted moratoriums early on, because they sought management conducted on a species by species basis. Moratorium language started with the UNCHE in 1972, where participants called for moratorium. The IWC emphasized that the goal of the IWC was management and suggested that an across the board moratorium is not a management policy, because it does not treat different whale populations individually (Birnie, 1985, p. 422; Francis, 1990, p. 230). By grouping all whales under a single category with rhetoric such as "save the whales" rather than "save the blue whale" or other individual whales, the acceptability of a general moratorium became greater. Under differentiation, the idea of stopping all whaling seemed unnecessary because some species were adequately populated and were not in danger of extinction.

In summary, the manipulations of the scope conditions appear to have changed the acceptability of prescriptive characteristics. As scope conditions changed the focus from a large number of statistically numerical whales to stories of individual whales, the new consequence characteristic may have become more acceptable. This new

consequence characteristic described whaling, not as affecting economies, but as affecting a living mammal, that deserves some rights and protections. In addition, by expanding the scope of whales from individual species to all species of whales, a moratorium becomes more acceptable. When whales are thought about in terms of individual species, a large moratorium banning all whaling seems inappropriate because the moratorium is not focused on each species individually. However, by considering all whale species as one group of "whales" the one policy of a comprehensive moratorium becomes more acceptable.

CONCLUSIONS

There are three dominating frames during the history of whaling. The actions and texts before 1920 imply the first frame, but the frame is not explicitly stated. During this first period, the frame described the consequences of whaling to produce positive economic gains. The primary cause, as described in the media, involves non-state actors, such as individual vessels or companies. Policies involving whaling during this time attempt to increase the efficiency of whaling or the quantity and quality of goods produced. The second frame, beginning around 1944, suggests states as the primary cause of whaling rather than non-state actors. In addition, the frame adds a negative consequence that unrestricted whaling may cause negative economic consequences due to flooding the market with whale products. The primary prescription involves management and some control over the number and type of whales caught primarily involving a system of whale quotas. The third frame describes states as the primary cause again, but

changes the consequence of whaling to the destruction of an important mammal, while removing the positive economic consequences. The primary prescriptive characteristics of the third frame involve cessation of all whaling practices.

The evidence presented for the material hypothesis that polarity influences the degree of contestation for frames does not support the hypothesis. The amount of contestation over frames appears to be relatively unrelated to international power dynamics, and needs to be accounted by other variables. Although not explicitly tested in this research, the degree of contestation is most likely associated with the ability of actors to present new rhetoric, challenging older frames. Contestation, therefore, is most likely actor driven and determined by the extent to which rhetoric by actors successfully enters international forums and media outlets. This is somewhat related to media exposure of frames, but the degree of contestation in regards to media exposure is not directly tested in this project.

Non-material hypotheses developed in Chapter III describe how exposure and connections to a broader discourse affect the whether rhetoric becomes part of the frame. Exposure in the media seems to increase the likelihood that rhetoric becomes part of the frame, and focusing events linked to the rhetoric increases media exposure as demonstrated in Greenpeace activities in 1974. In addition, connections to a broader discourse are also consistent with the rhetoric that becomes the frame. Rhetoric that appears to be connected to a broader culture and discourse becomes part of the dominant frame. In addition, the completeness of the rhetoric also appears to influence the

likelihood of rhetoric becoming part of the international frame. At least for the formation of the third frame, the differences between the completeness of the anti-whaling rhetoric and the rhetoric from whalers suggest the success of a more complete story, supporting the hypothesis.

Finally, the strategy of manipulating the scope of the phenomenon was examined as to its effect on the acceptability of frame characteristics. Although there are no comparative studies in this project, scope manipulations in the 1970's seem consistent with the hypothesis that changes can affect frame characteristic acceptability. By describing whales as a single group rather than differentiated species, the acceptability of a moratorium may have increased.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS

This project set out to understand the formation and changes that can occur in the international agenda and why those changes occur. Studying the international agenda is vital for our understanding of the formation of policies and treaties in the international system, primarily because problem definition and agenda formation are the first steps in policy creation processes. If issues do not become part of the international agenda, states cannot formulate or implement policies or treaties. The content and frame of issues on the international agenda change the content of the policies and treaties created. As political scientists, if we are to understand the formation of international governmental organizations, the formation of international treaties, and the content of those treaties, it is necessary to understand the agenda-setting stage of policy formation.

In addition to the importance of agendas for policy creation, this research also illustrates the importance of constructions and frames as interpretations of international issues that are fluid and susceptible to change. It is not the real costs and benefits in international affairs that define issues but perceptions of those costs and benefits, that is, their social construction. The research does not suggest that material power distributions have no influence over international outcomes, but that both power distributions and the content of frames are important for changes in international policy, thus incorporating both constructivist and realist elements to international relations theory.

As policy practitioners or policy advocates, understanding how the agenda becomes formed, how issues become part of the international agenda, and how content of the frames is created and changed, allows an avenue of influence into international politics. The use of rhetoric to manipulate the international agenda allows non-state actors and others without significant military resources greater influence over international outcomes. This adds to the expanding literature on non-state actor influence over international political outcomes and the importance of advocacy groups. Manipulation of the problem definition or the agenda may have tremendous influences on policy outcomes. Studies in game theory, public choice theory, and social movements reveal that changes in agendas and frames can result in any possible outcome desired by individuals who control the agenda. Agenda control and control over the words used to describe issues can amount to a great amount of power in international politics.

The research contained within this project, therefore, benefits scholars of international politics, policy practitioners, and advocates of international policy. The research provides insights into the workings of the international agenda formation and change in international politics and the manipulation and rhetorical tactics for changing the content of issue frames.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL AGENDA RESEARCH

In particular, Chapter II identified and defined concepts for developing a new understanding of the international agenda outside the context of formal international organizations or domestic institutional contexts. The international system has its own

rules and norms, such as the general rule of anarchy and the norm of sovereignty. The international system has some structure although no governance above states. A series of norms and consistent interaction establishes a constructed set of international standards for behavior (Bull, 1977), within which the international agenda develops and changes. Thus, the agenda described in this paper exists within the implied international rules and norms of the international system rather than any particular set of formal institutional setting, such as the UN or the WTO. The international agenda differs from agendas within these formal institutions because of the different sets of rules operating in the international system than in formal institutions. The rules operating in the international system are also more fluid and subject to change by state action, such as the influence of state behavior on sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). The norms that set the international system apart from other institutions are more easily changed or ignored because there are no governments or organizations above states to enforce violations of the norms of international politics. This makes the study of international agendas different from studying domestic or formal institutional agendas.

Chapter II defined the international agenda as a list of issues to which multiple states are paying serious attention at a given time. Variation in the agenda can occur in the number of states paying attention to an issue, which describes when an issue moves in relation to other issues on the agenda. The greater the number of states and the greater the seriousness of attention of those states may vary between issues making some issues higher or lower on the agenda than others. Seriousness of state attention varies with the

amount of resources expended on a particular issue for that state. Differences of the number of states attending to an issue, the strength of those states, and the depth of their attention define the relative importance of issues, or seriousness of attention, on the international agenda.

This project also describes a new approach to understanding agendas more generally by adding a constructivist perspective developed from research on social movements to our understanding of agendas. The constructivism employed in this research comes from a "soft constructivist" approach (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996), based on Wendt's (1999) vision of international politics or Hacking's (1999) vision of social constructivism. The soft constructivist approach assumes there are ontological truths about the world, but epistemologically, we cannot know these truths. This project uses frames to understand the relationship between observers and real phenomena observed. Issues that appear on agendas emerge not from real facts in the world, but interpretations of those facts – the frame.

Frames consist of the interpretation of causes, the consequences, and the prescriptions for the phenomenon. Just as a picture frame may emphasize or obscure some parts of a painting or photograph, an issue frame emphasizes or obscures different characteristics of the real phenomenon. Real phenomena have a number of causes, consequences and possible policy prescriptions, but the frame identifies a subset of the characteristics in existence. A dominant frame occurs when most of the states that attend to an issue adopt a similar perspective or definition of that issue. Not all states must

agree on the dominant frame or on exactly the same definition for the frame to become dominant. Dominant frames are sometimes unrecognized or internalized such that states do not explicitly discuss them. Other times they are reinforced through discussion or reference to formalized rules. Contested frames are those where no dominant frame exists because actors debate the definition and meaning of a phenomenon. Contestation can exist indefinitely when actors cannot agree on a single interpretation of the event. The use of frames and frame dominance to understand interpretations of issues on the agenda is applicable beyond international agenda research to domestic agenda research as well.

Frames are important for understanding changes in the agenda because frames may change over time although an issue's place in terms of importance may not change. In other words, how actors understand an issue may change, which changes the agenda because it changes how an issue on the agenda is defined. This research makes such implicit interpretations explicitly part of the agenda and an object of study. Chapter II defined two aspects important to the international agenda: attention and frames. Both the international attention to issues and the way those issues are interpreted by actors are important sources of variation on the international agenda.

The project describes the importance of both states and non-state actors for changing the international agenda. Rather than privileging one group or another (such as much of the division between realist and liberalist international relations theory), the

project shows the influence of power on issue attention and non-state actors influence over issue frames.

UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

In addition to the contributions to theoretical work on agendas described above, this project also develops hypotheses to describe the variables responsible for changes in attention to international issues and the interpretation of those issues. The hypotheses apply to two parts of the international agenda: changes in attention and changes in frames. These variables include both material factors and non-material factors that may influence constructed frames and attention. Few studies have examined the causes of changes of social constructions through a positivist framework as advocated by Wendt (1999) and Keohane (2000), unlike this project. This study examines influences over the constructed frames using explicit hypotheses developed in Chapter III and tested in chapters IV and V, which are summarized below.

Changes in Issue Attention on the Agenda

Changes to issue attention for whaling on the international agenda first occurred in the 1930s when nations increased attention to whaling. In 1939, this attention declined in favor of the Second World War. In 1944, this interest increased once again among states to a more long-term, deeper, and a sustained interest in whaling. Attention then increased again in 1974 as more states became interested in whaling. Hypotheses concerning changes of issue attention – movement on and off the agenda or change in

relative issue importance – consist of the domination of security issues on the agenda and rhetoric that names and blames states, victimizes states, or increases the magnitude and temporal proximity to consequences.

Material Hypothesis 1: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the international agenda.

Based on the evidence from whaling, consistent with the hypothesis developed in Chapter III, security issues seem to dominate the international agenda most in a multipolar system. Whaling only becomes part of the international agenda ancillary to security and the safety of ships during multipolar systems, but may emerge onto the agenda independent of security concerns in bipolar and unipolar systems where larger states provide some security and stability. Polarity fails to account directly for why whaling gathered greater attention in the 1970's as opposed to any other time, because polarity does not change near or before the 1970s. However, the bipolar system enabled an increased attention to non-whaling issues. Therefore, polarity acts as an enabler to create the opportunities for non-security issues to emerge onto the agenda rather than a direct cause of increased attention to whaling. In multipolar systems, non-security issues are much less likely to emerge than security issues relative to bipolar and unipolar systems.

Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

Evidence supporting the influence of blame on issue attention comes from the increase in state blame beginning in 1928. Increased rhetoric blaming states can be associated with an increase in state attention during the 1930s and sustained attention in 1946. The evidence does not support the hypothesis, because as attention increased for whaling in the 1970s, blame became more focused, and attention increased.

Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.

Little rhetoric explicitly described the consequences of whaling in terms of states. The primary consequences as described during the early part of the frame was positive economic growth, but not generally associated with states. During the second stage, rhetoric described the consequences associated with economic decline in addition to decreases in whaling populations. In the third stage, explicit rhetoric described the consequences of whaling in terms of declining whaling populations. In none of these stages does the rhetoric explicitly attribute consequences of whaling for states. Therefore, this study cannot directly test this hypothesis.

Non-material Hypothesis 3: Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences or consequences of a greater magnitude is more likely to increase attention to issues.

Rhetoric describing increases in the urgency to attend to whaling or increases in the magnitude of effects emerged in the 1950s from scientific studies. This rhetoric, however, did not seem to influence the attention to issues because there was no discernable change in issue attention as it was already part of the international agenda with sustained state interest. It is possible that such rhetoric influenced the exact quotas used during the 1950s to control whaling, but this does not constitute change in the international agenda.

Changes in Frames

The second part of the dependent variable examined in this study involves changes in the frame of an issue on the international agenda. The dominant frame changes after World War II, preceded by a period of contestation between 1930 and 1945. The frame changes again in 1982 after a period of contestation from 1970 to 1982. The first dominant frame described the responsibility of whaling with fishers and companies that produced economic growth and products. The primary policy for fishers during this time involved increasing the efficiency of whaling and the quality and quantity of whale products.

The second frame changes the responsibility from individuals and companies to states. The frame also describes the consequences of whaling in terms of economic loss without control over the supply of whale goods. During this second frame, the primary

prescriptions involve quotas over the quantity of whales caught. The third frame describes the consequences of whaling in terms of the destruction of all whales and not in terms of economic consequences. The primary prescriptions of this third frame involve a cessation of whaling.

Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration of power in one state (unipolarity) results in little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived contestation.

Polarity does not appear to explain the degree of contestation in the frame for the case of whaling. Contestation occurs irrespective of the changes in polarity. Contestation occurred during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, although there was little contestation in unipolarity. There is no indication that the period of contestation was longer during bipolarity than multipolarity. There is less contestation apparently during the period of unipolarity. Since there has not yet been a period of increased contestation since the emergence of unipolarity, however, this alone does not support the hypothesis.

Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely it influences perceptions of the phenomenon.

Media play an important part in propagating rhetoric through the international system and to various international actors. Media often provide increased exposure to rhetoric accompanying large-scale events, known as focusing events. Focusing events

alone do not change the international agenda, but coupling these events with rhetoric can help propagate the rhetoric, changing frames, and the international agenda. In the case of whaling, increased exposure of state blame during the first change of frames and increased exposure of the anti-whaling rhetoric in the second frame (linked with focusing events) coincides with this rhetoric becoming part of the dominant whaling frames. Evidence from rhetoric and media exposure during the history of whaling frames supports the hypothesis for rhetoric exposure.

Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story with all three frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.

The content of rhetoric affects the degree to which the rhetoric is acceptable to audiences. When the rhetoric tells a complete story and connects to a broader discourse or culture of the audience, the rhetoric is more likely to become part of the dominant frame as it has a greater connection to the audience. The only case where we see competing rhetoric in regards to a particular frame involves the change from the second to the third dominant frame. In the rhetoric prior to this frame change, the anti-whaling activists presented a more complete story including characteristics of causes, consequences, and prescriptions, than the story presented by whalers, which focused on the economic benefits of whaling. The fact that the anti-whaler rhetoric became part of the subsequent dominant frame suggests some support for the hypothesis on the influence of completeness over which rhetoric becomes part of the dominant frame.

Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set of cultural beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to influence the international agenda.

Rhetoric connected to a broader discourse in the 1930s, connecting blame on states with a broader culture of increasing internationalization of issues coincided with the rhetoric's emergence into the dominant frame. In addition, rhetoric connected to the broader environmental movement in the 1970s coincided with that rhetoric becoming part of the dominant frame. The evidence in the whaling case, therefore, supports the hypothesis that rhetoric connected to a broader discourse and culture is more likely to become part of the dominant frame.

Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations of the phenomena scope change the audience acceptability of frame characteristics.

Chapter III also discussed three ways entrepreneurs might manipulate rhetoric in order to achieve particular goals in changing frames and the acceptable policy prescriptions to deal with international issues. Given that most advocacy groups or states seek to influence policies, this section is particularly valuable for such groups. The most valuable aspect of the discussion of strategic manipulation comes from the understanding that all the manipulations are based on real observations. None are based on lies or falsifying data. Each manipulation or description presents a different view of the "truth" just as different individuals can have different views of a car accident and present widely different stories. This makes these manipulations somewhat more legitimate in terms of

policy options since they are not explicit lies or falsifications. Manipulating the description of the phenomenon in terms of spatial or temporal scope affects the acceptability of the frames by making the frames more or less related to the phenomenon. Manipulations that emphasize the causes or the consequences can change the importance of the issue for states because it may emphasize particular states in different parts of the frame. Manipulation within each characteristic can affect the acceptability of policy prescriptions.

In the whaling case, this project only analyzed scope manipulations due to lack of clear evidence showing manipulations between frame characteristics or within frame characteristics. The evidence from whaling suggests that manipulations of the scope conditions appear to have changed the acceptability of frame characteristics. Changing the scope conditions from species differentiation to species conglomeration, made single policy prescriptions more acceptable to address whaling. The moratorium on whaling became more acceptable because activists successfully grouped whales into a single category rather than subdivided into species and subjected to species-specific quotas.

Overall, there are mixed results for the different hypotheses examined in this study. Material factors seem more oriented toward influencing state attention to issues and allowing non-security issues to emerge on the international agenda. Non-material factors seem more appropriately oriented toward changing the dominant understanding or frame for issues in international relations. Therefore, where rhetoric may be able to influence the dominant understanding of issues, it may be less able to change attention to

issues on the international agenda through manipulation of that rhetoric. Instead, rhetoric is better able to change the acceptable prescriptions by modifying the causes and consequences of international issues.

RHETORIC AS A MECHANISM OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE

The influence over issue frames presented in this study describes a form of soft power not commonly examined in much of the literature on soft power resources. The term "soft power" has increasingly made its way into the discourse of international relations research. Types of power have appeared in various writings throughout international relations, including in the earliest realist writings, where attempts were made to discount the importance of norms, morality, and world opinion as forms of power (Carr, 1956; Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 235-280).

At a basic level, power is the ability for one actor to influence the actions of another actor that would not have occurred otherwise (Dahl, 1957). For international relations scholars, this means that when actor A in the international system can influence the actions of actor B in ways that actor B would not have done otherwise, the first actor can be said to possess some amount of power over the second actor given the particular situation. Power has been part of international relations studies since the earliest political writings by Thucydides (1954) and Machiavelli (1935), and it remains perhaps the most important and least understood concepts in international relations (Baldwin, 2002, p. 177).

Soft power has been added to the list of forms of power for international actors more recently (Nye, 1990). Soft power has been described increasingly in international politics as the power of attraction, an alternative to the traditional understanding of power in terms of carrots and sticks (Nye, 2006). Nye divides the differences between hard and soft power in terms of whether the intent is to coerce or to attract. Hard powers, he suggests, are those that attempt to coerce individuals, such that military force and economic sanctions can be used for coercion (Nye, 2006). Economic wealth can be an inducement when others change their behavior because of the desire to be wealthy rather than some use of money by a larger state to coerce actions (Nye, 2006). Attraction as the third form of power, in Nye's definition, lacks a clear explanation of resources used to change the behavior of others. Nye's conception of soft power primarily consists of the policy to attract others. He describes it as "the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced" (Nye, 2004, p. x). The definition of soft power through attraction by use of culture, political values, and foreign policies, is incomplete without the importance of communication of those ideas. Therefore, this project's use of rhetoric as an influence on frames and issue attention is an important part to explaining the potential use of soft power -- attraction to policies – through communication of those policies internationally.

In Nye's concept of soft power, the resources useful for attraction are culture, political ideals, and policies. The problem with these resources is that alone, they have

no connection between the actor yielding power and the target. Policies and culture can exist throughout the world in isolation without affecting other states. One way to implement the use of ideas and cultures as power is to develop particular communication strategies for policy explanations. Therefore, the resource associated with soft power involves rhetoric and symbols that communicate culture and ideas that may or may not be attractive.

Nye makes frequent reference to rival soft power users, such as Osama bin Laden, because he is able to attract individuals to his cause. The rhetoric, however, is vital to the attraction of ideas and culture of Osama bin Laden. Western policies toward the Middle East may be framed entirely as western encroachment and negative consequences by jihadists to attract individuals toward the use of violence against the west. Policies of the United States could also be framed, as the US government attempted to do after the second Iraqi war, as freeing individuals from oppressive governments. In the perspective under this project, both are potential dominant frames of US policies, and the use of rhetoric and media can influence which becomes dominant for specific individuals.

The use of discourse and symbols as the tools of attraction is an important avenue to utilizing soft power. When we move to understanding soft power in the use of discourse and rhetoric, however, we move slightly away from the importance of culture and ideas as the place where rhetoric comes from. Entrepreneurs manipulate rhetoric based on real observations in order to change perception of the world, our frames. By changing the frames for an audience, the audience may act in ways they did not intend.

This mechanism becomes somewhat slippery, because rhetoric and frame changes essentially change the interest of the actor. For example, if the interests of the United States suggest managed whaling, but rhetoric and symbols change the understanding such that the United States becomes interested in protecting whales, rhetoric has changed the interest of the United States. Has the United States done something that it would not have otherwise done because of the rhetoric? If the rhetoric changes the interests of a state or other actor, then this rhetoric fits the definition originally used above – power is the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. Under this perspective, individuals act in a world where arguments and rhetoric can change the way actors understand the world, changing interests and actions (Kratochwil, 1989; Risse, 2000).

Therefore, the use of rhetoric and controlling the discourse or conveyance of ideas becomes the mechanism through which soft power can be utilized. Of course, this is not completely new, as diplomacy and rhetoric have long been part of foreign policy resources. The above describes not a new form of power, but a new way to understand soft power in light of the work in this project on the use of rhetoric to change outcomes in international politics.

It is also important to adopt terminology to recognize the different types of power available to international actors, states, or non-state rather than relying on antiquated realist meanings. In most instances, references to "power" refer to military strength in international politics. By adopting the clarification of "harder power" and "softer powers," communication between realist and non-realist scholars may become easier

because of a common use of terms. These terms also reflect more precisely the type of power discussed in different research projects.

This dissertation begins to develop a theory of the mechanisms by which Nye's notion of attraction operates. The project suggests that attraction operates through the application of rhetoric to communicate the legitimacy of policies, cultures, and ideas. It is easy to understand how force can be used to compel others to do something and how payments can be made for services. Police, for example, use force to compel criminals to obey. We all use money to get others to do actions that they would not do otherwise in services and at work. Our understanding of the uses of soft power in creation and manipulation of international politics has been much more limited.

At least one soft power resource involves the content of rhetoric and the use of media to propagate that rhetoric. Some countries have seen the importance of rhetoric and changing the frame around their country and hired public relations or media firms, such as the country of Georgia (Bogardus, 2009). After successes using imagery and rhetoric in the 1970s with several international advocacy campaigns, Greenpeace established its own public relations section. The use of rhetoric as a mechanism by which international actors can attract others is an important addition to studies in soft power.

SOME CAVEATS OF THIS PROJECT

Although the results in this research project are suggestive of the forces behind international agenda changes in both attention and frames, the results need further testing to determine whether the results generalize to other environmental cases or cases outside

environmental politics. Single case studies face greater challenges in demonstrating causation because many variables are not held constant and coincidence of values on the dependent and independent values may suggest a connection, but need further testing to demonstrate causation.

First, in regards to influence of rhetoric on issue attention and frame changes, the historical whaling case does not allow adequate examination of variation for different rhetoric that did not become part of the international agenda. There is not enough competing rhetoric presented internationally to compare against the successful rhetoric in order to test whether some frame characteristics makes other rhetoric more acceptable. When examining rhetoric manipulation strategies, there is no counter-evidence of strategies that were not successful. In order to determine which rhetoric became part of the frame, we would ideally have multiple sources of different rhetoric, some of which become part of the frames and some that do not. Unfortunately, in this case, there is little alternative rhetoric to those documented within the study. Therefore, the correlations or coincidence of the rhetoric with changes in frames is suggestive of causation, but needs further testing to determine whether the rhetoric is driving the cause.

A second issue related to understanding causation is the lack of variable controls in a single case study. Whaling allows for study into agenda and frame changes easily because the history of whaling allows easy grouping into temporal periods described earlier. However, it also allows a large number of variables to potentially interfere with or overpower the variables of interest in this study. One primary variable that this project

does not hold constant is the domestic institutional context of each nation that became concerned with whaling. It is clear that domestic political contexts can influence international policy (Frieden & Martin, 2001; Hiscox, 2002; Moravcsik, 1998). Domestic institutions may influence the degree to which states pay attention to issues and the frames states maintain for issues on the agenda. This influence may come domestically through interest groups and activists (DeSombre, 2000). It may also be the case that international advocates influence domestic advocates and interest groups (Putnam, 1988). The potential for domestic institutional influences on the international agenda needs to be examined further to determine how rhetoric relates to domestic institutions and advocacy groups.

Another variable not controlled in this study is the level and speed of communication changing over time. As each frame changed for whaling, communication became easier and faster (Schramm, 1988). The changes in communication could be responsible for much of the changes observed in the influence and appearance of rhetoric between the first stage and the third stage. This is similar to having more data available during the later period and much less data in the earlier period. The correlation between the rhetoric and the broader discourse may be a spurious relationship where the primary driving factor is associated with the increase in quantity and speed of communication.

Another issue in this project involves the connection between the broader discourse and the rhetoric seen. Instead of the theory presented in this project that the connection to a broader discourse helps rhetoric become part of the international frame,

the broader discourse may encourage rhetoric similar to that discourse – effectively reversing the causal direction. In particular, rhetoric that describes states as the blame for whaling beginning in the 1920's and the association with a broader discourse could have a reversed causal direction. The increase in focus on states and international treaties may have prompted individuals and the media to present whaling as a state issue identifying the states responsible for whaling rather than individual vessels. This potential causal reversal needs further study in future analysis.

AFTER THE MORATORIUM

Although the third frame presented in this project has dominated since the 1980's, some nations continue to hunt whales, such as Japan, Norway, and aboriginal communities. In a recent push, whaling states may overturn the 1982 moratorium in favor of more regulated whaling as opposed to the frequent "scientific" killings (Brown, 2009). Although the preservation frame is clearly dominant since the 1980's, a minority of states continues to push for alternative frames and contest the moratorium.

Although this research and many accounts of international whaling end with the moratorium on whales in 1987, the issue has continued be part of the international agenda. To many in the international system, the international whaling issue appeared to have been solved with the moratorium; however, whaling states continue to contest the international frame on a conservation of whales, thus maintaining some space on the international agenda for the whaling issue. In particular, Japan and Norway have continued to advocate for their right to whale, and have taken advantage of the provision

for scientific whaling to continue to hunt whales, many of which end up in the Japanese food supply. Their claims to whaling primarily rest on the abundance of Minke whales, sovereignty rights, and food security (Epstein, 2008, p. 231). Organizations, such as the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission,[33] advocate for "optimum utilization of the living resources of the sea" by attempting to alter the dominant frame (NAMMCO, 1992). In addition, aboriginal communities continue to advocate for their rights to whaling as part of a historical cultural practice and population subsistence (Reeves, 2002).

Most whales taken by Japan have come under the provisions of scientific whaling and most taken by Norway have come under its having opted out of the commercial ban under the IWC rules. Many other whales taken have come by the hands of aboriginal populations. Since 1985, 12,300 whales were taken under scientific permit (IWC, 2009c), 7,543 whales for aboriginal subsistence (IWC, 2009a), and 19,674 for commercial purposes under objections to the International Whaling Commission (IWC, 2009b).

Despite the continued claims by Japan to allow controlled, sustainable, whaling of a limited species, their efforts have not been entirely successful to change the frame around whaling until very recently. In 2009, there has been a new push to change the rules of the IWC to allow limited whaling of recoverable species of whale. These changes, if implemented could suggest a return to a management/economic based

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[33] Membership includes Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.

dominant frame as opposed to the preservation frame. As part of these changes, the new agreement will prohibit scientific whaling, which will allow greater control over the number and type of whales hunted.

These changes in the rules of the IWC could be seen through the preservationist frame without indicating that the frame has changed, however. Given the Japanese scientific hunt for whales currently, many anti-whalers may prefer better control of the hunting for scientific purposes by allowing some legal Minke whale hunting. This would close the scientific loophole in the system, which is largely unregulated. Alternatively, we may be seeing a shift back to management of whale stocks before the moratorium. In addition to the Japanese, other countries, such as South Korea, have joined in the desire for whaling rights under the IWC. The signal by South Korea to obtain the right to hunt whales may be part of a regional policy directed towards competition with the Japanese, or it may be part of a broader trend of countries seeking to hunt whales for economic gain in a sustainable managed environment.

These changes are relatively recent developments at the time this project was completed. In the future, we may see an increase in the number of states desiring to take whales for economic reasons in a managed way. Perhaps two frames will develop: one for states with a desire for preservation maintaining the preservation frame; and another for states interested in managed whale harvesting, which see whales as an economic resource.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

In addition to the hypotheses and testing them in the case of whaling, a number of questions remain unresolved and subject to future research. An important possibility discussed earlier about the influence of speed and quantity of communication over the influence of rhetoric needs further examination. Increased ability to take part in international forums, the existence of portable video cameras, and rapid television communication allowed easier propagation of rhetoric around the globe during the 1970s than in the 1930s. Because communication during the 1800s looked nothing like the communication possible during the 1970s, the difference in communication may factor into the ability of rhetoric to influence the agenda during the 1970s to a much greater extent than during previous years.

The expansion of communication appears to continue to build toward greater speed and quantity of information. As new forms of communication become more prevalent through Web 2.0, will advocacy groups become more influential? Some might suggest so, but there is an alternate logic as well. Today, anyone with a computer can create a web log (blog) or other forms of interactive communication to spread information and rhetoric very broadly almost instantaneously. The spread of rhetoric and ideas may make it more difficult than in the 1970's to garner international attention for a particular rhetorical claim. This increase in communication quantity and speed may cause a decline in the ability to change frames because the increase in communication allows for too much rhetorical competition. Given the large number of individuals and

activists engaged in the propagation and strategic manipulation of rhetoric, the larger supply has made it more difficult for any particular actor to gain an advantage, increasing exposure of their ideas and rhetoric. Therefore, the growth of communication, while accelerating the influence during the 1970s, may have led to too much communication today making rhetoric manipulation more difficult.

Another area of rhetoric not examined in detail in this study involves the "securitization" of issues to increase attention to those issues. Securitization involves the description of previously understood non-security issues as part of national security (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998; Waever, 1995). Changing issues from an environmental issue, for example, to an issue involving state security, where the consequences of the phenomenon decrease state security may increase the importance of that issue. This allows the incorporation of securitization as a basis for frame changes.

The whaling case was not presented as a security issue in rhetoric as an attempt to change the frame; however, the influence of rhetoric to securitize frames deserves future research. Scholars have already begun discussions on particular issues, such as climate change and whether those issues have security elements (Deudney, 1990; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Levy, 1995; McNeill, 2005).

A third area of interest for future studies would entail experimental research for the influence of rhetoric on belief systems and frames. Although this project does not examine the influence of rhetoric at the individual level, policies are ultimately created and changed by individuals. Therefore, it is important to know, in addition to current

work on frames and decisions (e.g. Druckman, 2004; Fox, 1992; Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988), how changes in rhetoric might influence which frames become dominant. Much of the research in psychological studies examines how frames change individual behavior, but to a less extent on which frames are adopted by individuals and why.[34]

In addition, it is unclear from the research how different manipulation strategies compete and are reconciled when positioned in media against each other. When two sets of rhetoric, equally exposed in the media use different strategies, by emphasizing actor blame versus victimization, it is not clear which will become dominant and why. Experiments or other techniques to examine these questions make an interesting extension of this research.

Fourth, this study also did not discuss aboriginal whaling in its analysis. Aboriginal whaling is an important aspect of the whaling story and important for whaling activists and anti-whaling activists today. This research was primarily concerned with understanding state interest in whaling and changes in the international agenda rather than telling the story of the history of whaling. Scholars can use the theories developed here to understand the framing and international attention to the case of aboriginal whaling. There is some indication that native populations attempted to use rhetoric to influence their ability to continue whaling despite international efforts (See Francis, 1990, pp. 240-242). Although aboriginal whaling is an important part of the whaling

[34] An exception appears in Whyte (1989).

story, it is not an important part of the story of changes in the international agenda regarding whaling. Certainly, it is plausible that banning whaling could be easier without the rhetoric presented by aboriginal and other whalers today about their legitimate whaling. The influence of rhetoric from aboriginal whaling and the ability of aboriginal communities to maintain differing frames about whaling deserve future study.

Finally, this research has primarily focused on the changing importance of the whaling issue on the agenda, but it does not examine the relative importance of whaling to other issues. If the importance of whaling increased during the 1970s, as documented in this research, this increase may not be as meaningful if all issues gained increasing importance during this time. The relative increase between the whaling issue and others could be zero although we observe an absolute increase in importance. Hypotheses that examine the relative importance of security versus other issues were also not possible to test without including other issues in the study. The project also cannot examine the "crowding out" hypothesis more closely, except in regards to security versus the environmental issues. The crowding hypothesis suggest that attention to some issues causes other issues to lose attention with the implication that there is a finite amount of attention actors provide issues at any given time (Downs, 1972; Schreurs et al., 2001). Although this project suggests that crowding must take place since the whaling issue moves on and off the agenda, the project also attributes these changes to a variety of variables not including all the other issues that may take the attention of states.

Examining relative issue importance on the international agenda will add substantially to our understanding of changes in the international agenda.

APPENDIX A

NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DATA

New York Times data were compiled from ProQuest Historical New York Times Database through the University of Oregon Library database access. Some articles were eliminated by the author if the article's reference to whaling did not involve the mammal. Sometimes articles used words, such as "whale of a good time," and other colloquial phrases. Articles with such text in the titles were eliminated from the population before any coding or analysis.

All articles were coded by the author, which resembles an "expert" coding system. A random sample of articles was taken from the population of articles for each decade for examination. Table 7 indicates the frequency of the total number of articles by decade. Table 8 provides the list of articles examined and referencing notes for each article. Table 8 also contains the codes for country mentions within each New York Time Article. ISO 2-letter codes are used to denote each country listed. In addition, several codes are used to denote non-state actors of interest mentioned in the texts. These are presented in Table 9. Codes of countries in the articles do not include country names when they are used only for geographical reference. Since the intention is to capture blame, association between the country and the act of whaling, statements describing a whaling vessel off the coast of Australia, for example, are not coded for Australia since Australia is not associated as a cause of the whaling.

Table 7.

Frequency of Whaling Articles in the New York Times by Decade

Decade Start	Frequency
1850	53
1860	54
1870	115
1880	149
1890	147
1900	111
1910	85
1920	263
1930	260
1940	142
1950	204
1960	165
1970	281
1980	285
1990	192
2000	75

Table 8.

New York Times Article Data

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Latest Intelligence	1852	08	11	2	0
Russian Machine for Killing Whales	1853	11	21	2	0
Arrival of Whaling Vessels	1855	05	29	1	0
Transfer of the Whaling Business	1855	08	28	4	0
Very like a Whale	1856	09	08	4	0
New-York City	1858	05	01	8	0
Arrival of the Overland Mail	1859	01	19	1	0
Brooklyn News	1861	11	22	5	0
The Whale Fishery for 1861	1862	01	08	6	US
Whaling Intelligence	1865	09	30	1	0
The Whaling Fleet	1866	01	08	5	US
Monetary Affairs	1866	01	31	2	US
San Francisco	1866	04	19	5	0
The Whale Fishery	1868	01	13	3	0
American Whales in the North Pacific	1870	12	16	2	US
The Pacific Coast	1870	12	26	5	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Jonah's Whale	1873	12	08	4	0
A Bark Attacked by a Whale	1874	02	16	2	0
Counterfeiters Arrested	1875	08	05	2	0
The Escaped Fenians	1876	08	21	5	0
Twelve Ships Lost at Sea	1876	10	22	1	0
Whaling News	1877	07	27	5	0
Riding on a Whale's Back	1877	10	07	2	0
Arctic Whaling	1877	11	19	2	0
A Whaleship's Escape	1877	11	26	2	0
The Trade of Dundee	1878	01	06	7	0
The Eothen's Whaling Voyage	1878	06	18	5	0
The Arctic Whaling Fleet	1878	09	10	1	0
Whaling Intelligence	1878	09	14	5	0
A Whale Killed near Riverhead	1878	10	24	2	0
Whale-Fishing at Charleston	1880	01	08	5	0
The Big Whale	1880	04	06	5	0
A Whale Attacks Abark in Mid-Ocean	1881	04	29	3	0
From the Arctic Sea	1881	10	03	1	0
How a Whale Breathes	1882	10	15	12	0
Whaling in the Arctic	1882	11	01	2	0
The Tail and Muscles of the Whale	1885	03	01	9	0
The California Whale Fishery	1885	04	04	2	0
Chasing Whales	1885	07	18	5	0
A Whaling Brig Wrecked	1885	08	25	2	0
Amagansett's Big Prize	1886	01	11	8	0
Catch of the Whaling Fleet	1886	10	30	3	0
Collision with a Whale	1887	05	13	8	0
First Whale Taken This Year	1888	01	13	3	0
The Catch of Whales	1888	07	30	1	0
The Flag Again Insulted	1889	02	07	1	0
Sunk Off Whale Rock	1889	05	18	5	0
Cut a Whale in Two	1889	10	11	2	0
A Whaling Steamer Lost	1889	11	02	8	0
On the Way to Halifax	1889	11	24	14	0
Esquimaux and Whales	1889	12	30	3	0
Whales Rob Fishermen	1891	11	17	3	0
Off the Highlands Was a Whale	1894	07	03	8	0
The Exhibited Whale Washed Ashore	1895	05	28	10	0
Even Marines Would Not Believe It	1895	07	14	3	0
After Humpback Whales	1895	11	03	30	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Disappointed Finders of a Fossil	1895	12	06	10	0
Quogue Watching for a Whale	1896	01	15	1	0
A Whale Hunt Off Provincetown	1896	05	08	3	0
No Whales Like the Old Whales	1896	06	07	5	0
Jonah and the Whale	1897	02	01	3	0
Two Whales Off South Hampton	1897	02	20	1	0
Cutting Up Amagansett's Whale	1897	03	17	4	0
Whales Off Long Island	1897	07	07	1	0
European Edible Oddities	1897	12	12	11	0
Whaling Fleet in Danger	1898	01	03	3	0
The Whale Escaped	1898	01	11	5	0
A Whale Off Long Island	1898	03	10	10	0
Whaling Schooner Had Good Luck	1898	08	21	11	0
Whaling in the Faroes	1898	09	04	15	FR
Sharks and the Dead Whale	1898	11	20	21	0
Big Whale Washed Ashore	1899	09	18	2	0
Baldwin-Ziegler Expedition	1900	12	27	7	0
Whale Sends a Bark to Davy Jones's Locker	1902	04	25	2	0
Whale Disabled a Ship	1902	05	20	3	0
Whale Bumped into Mine	1904	03	31	2	0
Took Whales for Japanese Ships	1904	04	14	2	0
Roosevelt to M'kinley "a Minnow to a Whale"	1904	04	23	5	0
Here's a Tale of a Whale	1905	06	18	7	0
Dead Whale Ashore on Long Beach Bar	1905	07	03	12	0
Life on the Great Ocean	1906	09	08	9	0
Sperm Whale Got Away	1907	03	22	1	0
Polar Expedition Sails	1908	04	13	4	0
In the Wright Aeroplane, Whose Secret Is Carefully Guarded…	1908	05	17	SM3	NO
Record Catch of Whales	1908	08	17	5	CA JP
Whale Races Liner	1908	08	26	1	0
Big Whale Drifts Ashore	1909	03	06	1	0
Whales Off Nantucket	1909	07	13	1	0
Four Tie at Morris County Golf Club	1910	06	19	S3	0
A Stranded Whale Roped at Arverne	1912	05	20	6	NO GL
Closed Season for Whales	1912	06	30	X7	JP CA US
Dead Whales in Ship's Path	1912	10	20	C5	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Escaped after a Privateer Burned a Whaling Fleet	1912	11	24	X20	0
What Happened to Aaron's Whale	1913	04	13	X4	0
Amateur's Picture Hung on the Line	1914	05	10	C5	0
Two Trawlers Sunk	1914	10	31	4	SE
The Fallacy of a Jitney Submarine	1915	09	25	10	0
White Sox Whale Browns	1917	04	21	10	0
Sunday Hits Darwin for 'Nature Faking'	1917	05	25	7	0
Seek U-Boat Bases, Marconi Suggests	1918	06	13	8	0
Seaplanes for Whaling	1920	06	02	12	0
Whale Hits Staten Island	1921	06	25	6	0
45-Ft. Whale at Cape May	1921	09	04	3	0
Sidelights from the London Press	1921	10	16	75	0
Whale and Calf Inshore	1921	12	26	15	0
Notes on Trade and Industry abroad	1922	07	09	38	0
Natal Whaling Industry	1922	08	20	E2	0
Whale Is Sighted Off Southampton	1922	10	14	10	0
There's No Harm in a Whale Shark	1924	03	02	E2	0
Whale and Earthquake	1924	08	03	X14	0
The Wanderer Quits Movies To Hunt Whales Once More	1924	08	18	1	0
Did Whale or Shark Get Jonah? He Asks	1924	10	27	10	0
A Shrine for the Last Whaling Ship	1925	03	22	91	US
Seeks to Save Whales From Extermination; Britain Will Send Experts…	1926	03	31	1	UK
Arctic Whale Hunt for Museum Here	1926	05	11	7	0
British Museum Asks Putnam's Aid	1926	09	01	4	0
British Scientists Seek to Find Whether Whale Is Polygamous	1926	10	03	XX7	0
Navy's Iron Whale	1927	01	09	XX2	0
Bronxville Boy Seeks New Bedford Whaling	1927	03	17	3	0
Two Whales at Cape May Keep Mackerel Fishermen in Port	1927	04	12	1	0
Whales Thrill Lindbergh	1927	06	09	4	0
Big Whale Bumps Destroyer Which Races Near It at Sea	1927	07	10	E8	0
World Mark Falls in Detroit Regatta	1927	09	07	24	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Big German Company Will Enter Whaling; "Factory Ships" Will Make Oil…	1927	12	04	E1	NO GB CL DE
Whales Still Stage Battles for Wondering Seafarers	1928	03	04	158	0
Motor Boat Breaks Mark from Albany	1928	04	15	157	0
New Circus Samson on Diet of Whales	1928	04	16	27	0
Norway Wins in Fight for Antarctic Whales	1928	11	25	E3	GB NO
Overjoyed to Reach Goal	1928	12	27	1	0
Dead Whale's Long Trip	1929	02	20	5	NO
Byrd Rebroadcast from Antarctica	1929	02	24	3	0
Organizes to Check Slaughter of Whales	1929	05	20	33	0
Berlin Fliers Wait at Hudson Bay Post	1929	07	07	2	0
A New Point About Whales Disclosed by Captain Irving	1929	08	06	20	0
Boy Finds Fossil Whale	1929	09	10	22	0
Humpback Whales Numerous in Bay of Fundy Waters	1929	10	13	X22	0
Scott Survivors Sail for the Antarctic	1929	12	15	9	0
Whaling Fliers Lost in Antarctic Sea	1929	12	31	1	NO
Huge Whaler Here; Crew Lauds Byrd	1930	04	20	22	NO
Byrd Set a Record through Ice Pack	1930	04	21	8	NO
Sea Monster Seen at Newport Is Identified as White Whale	1930	05	24	3	0
Battle Whale Nine Hours	1930	05	25	21	US
8 Outboard Marks Set at Worcester	1930	05	30	22	0
Lone Arctic Posts Radio Day's Cheer	1930	12	26	16	0
California Scientists Trace Dawn-Age Man	1931	01	20	17	0
Whaling Ship Here with $1,500,000 Oil	1931	04	19	27	NO
Nets 5-Foot Whale in Chesapeake	1931	04	29	51	0
Biologists Capture Nest of Baby Eels	1931	07	28	4	0
Ship Sails for Antarctic	1931	10	11	E3	FK
Would Kill Visiting Whale	1931	10	23	48	0
George M. Cohan in a Studio -- Bothersome Stories -- Mr. Whale's New…	1932	10	02	X5	0
Explains Whale Deaths	1933	07	04	29	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Remains of Early Eskimo Race Found Near an Alaskan Glacier	1933	09	11	19	0
Byrd Is Now Due at Little America	1934	01	18	3	0
Ice Pack Vanishes Off Bay of Whales	1934	01	23	8	0
Byrd Ship Returns to Unloading Task	1934	01	26	15	0
Byrd Ship in Peril; Buffeted by Winds	1934	01	28	3	0
Whale Jostled by Bremen at Sea	1934	03	03	15	0
Whale Attacks Vessel, Snaps Propeller Blades	1934	06	23	4	0
'Miles of Whales' Off Asbury But Only Fishermen saw Them	1934	06	25	1	0
Miss Carstairs, Here, Silent on Buying Isle	1934	10	06	17	0
18th Century Whale Oil To Light Yule Service	1934	12	23	12	0
Two to Go Whaling Off Long Island	1935	01	18	25	0
Joseph P. Fawell	1935	03	23	16	0
Fight Whales 6 Hours in Florida Waters	1935	03	25	17	0
Arctic Explorer to Seek Whales at Amazon Mouth	1935	06	15	15	0
Whaling Curb Is Denied	1936	03	05	17	JP, GB, AU
Humpback Whale Cause Of Waikiki Traffic Jam	1936	03	15	N3	0
Whale Draws Crowds in Brazil	1936	06	14	30	0
Persistent Pleas Held Path to God	1936	08	24	9	0
Science Is Blamed for Moral Chaos	1936	09	07	18	0
Whale Goes 1,000 Miles Up River	1936	09	13	35	0
Bermuda to Revive Whaling	1937	02	24	25	BM
Sea Wolves Kill Seals	1937	04	25	5	0
Ready to Seize Whale Oil Cargo	1937	11	18	18	US NO
Cutter Hunts for Whale In San Francisco Bay	1938	02	08	15	0
Ecuador Scents Mystery In Carcasses of 23 Whales	1941	09	21	4	0
$12,547 Verdict to Artist	1942	02	21	17	0
James H. Wood	1943	05	27	25	0
Last Whale Harpoon Maker DiesI	1944	02	24	15	0
Capt. Henry Mandley	1944	05	08	19	0
Gay Whale Spouts in Flushing Creek	1944	06	08	23	0
New Whale Ship Uses Radar	1945	10	29	5	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Wild Life Had Severe War Casulties; Oil Killed Gulls, and Submarines...	1946	01	28	21	0
Whale Sighted in Sound at 5 A.M., And Blow Me Down, Mates, It's So…	1946	10	22	26	0
13 in Whaling Accord	1946	12	03	11	0
Tanker Sets out on Antarctic Trip	1946	12	27	35	NO
Polar Whale Haul Put at $100,000,000	1947	05	05	45	US NO GB JP SU ND
Raft in High Seas Rides Easy and Dry	1947	05	20	27	0
Japan to Ship Whale Oil	1947	12	04	13	0
Youngsters' Garb Shown by Brogan	1948	04	29	26	0
Log of a Whaleship	1948	06	06	BR5	0
Old Customs House at Sag Harbor To Be Restored, Moved to New Site	1948	09	10	25	0
Whale Meat Cargo Near Britain	1949	03	20	18	GB
Whale Fishing	1949	11	27	BR14	NO
Scientific Circus Features Animals	1949	12	30	4	0
Books of the Times	1950	05	04	40	0
In The Nation	1950	08	17	26	0
One-Pound Whale Shown at Museum	1952	02	27	28	0
Whale Meat Is Tested As a 'Milk' for Babies	1952	10	20	25	0
Ladd Plans Movie of a Whaling Trip	1952	11	03	36	0
The Screen in Review	1952	11	24	19	0
Events of Interest in Shipping World	1953	04	12	S10	0
Two Whales Get Lost in Britain	1953	09	16	13	GB
Copters Popular for Whale Hunts	1953	12	26	21	GB NO JP
Whale That Can't Swim Channel Gives Briton a Weighty Problem	1954	03	26	23	0
Prehistoric Head of Whale Is Found	1954	04	25	119	0
Exhibitor to Dispose of Whale	1954	07	21	30	0
Peru Fines Whale Ships	1954	12	01	9	PE
Sperm Whale's Oil Guards Reservoirs	1955	02	27	30	0
Talks on Whaling Mapped in Moscow	1955	06	19	S11	1I AU BR CA DK FR NL NZ NO SU GB US ZA PA MX JP SE IS AR CL PE

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Upstate Leviathan	1955	10	30	BR40	0
Mink Living on Whale Meat	1956	01	05	C76	0
Soviet Skipper Visits U.S. Ship	1956	04	08	23	0
Screen: John Huston and Melville's White Whale	1956	07	05	18	0
Whales Auditioned	1956	07	22	E9	0
Long Island Museums and Landmarks	1956	09	09	X25	0
Meeting Debates Whale Quota Cut	1957	06	26	45	0
Antarctic Whaling Argeement	1958	08	23	30	1I GB NO JP NL SU
Whale No. 2 Due Here	1958	08	29	24	0
Brown Gets Whaling Relics	1958	10	05	62	0
Shipping Events: Whaling Quotas	1959	06	23	66	0
Two Quit Whaling Pact	1959	07	02	52	NL JP NO
Boy's Gift Solves Whale's Identity	1959	07	31	21	0
Indians' Capture of Whales	1959	09	05	14	0
Science Notes	1959	12	13	E11	0
Whale-Hunting, California-Style	1960	02	07	XX23	0
Members of Lamoureux Divide Their Profits in Fashion of Whaling Men	1960	03	06	X11	0
Tiny Pale Whale Arrives at Coney	1960	07	08	23	0
Soviet Whaling Expanded	1960	10	14	64	SU
Informality Rules Shops In an Old Whaling Port	1961	08	29	34	0
Whale Towed to Sea	1961	09	30	16	0
Outsmarting Crocodile and Whale	1961	12	31	BR4	0
Whaling Village Tour	1962	08	19	64	0
Sidelights	1963	07	27	23	JP GB
150 Whales Wash Ashore	1963	12	16	63	0
Sidelights	1964	03	06	42	NO JP ND SU
Early Japanese Get Whales	1964	03	16	62	JP
Last of Wooden Whale Ships May Be Designated Shrine	1964	07	13	52	0
At Home by the Mizzen	1964	08	09	BR1	0
Letters	1964	12	27	138	0
Whale Found in Hudson Towed to Sea and Blown Up	1964	12	30	33	0
It Isn't a Carrier, It's a 'Birdfarm'	1965	06	01	5	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
F.A.O. Calls for Global Rules To Protect Whale Industry	1965	06	30	45	1F
A Salty New Museum for an Old Whaling Town	1966	05	08	XX4	0
George F. Salman of Service Corps	1966	06	02	43	PE
Whales Try Mass Suicide in Florida	1966	08	15	28	0
2 Whales Flown Here With Romance in Mind	1967	09	08	46	0
Antiques: The Charms of Scrimshaw	1969	01	18	28	0
500-Mile Quest for White Whale	1969	04	23	56	0
3 Main Whaling Countries Will Keep Antarctic Quota	1970	07	01	10	JP SU NO US
Last Call for Whales	1970	07	14	36	JP NO SU US
Whale and Dolphin Pool Planned	1970	09	15	51	0
Whale Watchers Active on Coast	1971	01	17	80	0
Ban on Whaling Stuns Coast Company	1971	03	07	58	SU JP
Exterminating the Whale	1971	03	28	E14	US JP SU
Resolved: To Save the Whale	1971	07	29	32	US SU JP 1I
Fisherwoman Hooks Whale	1971	08	29	54	0
Soviet Fleet Sails Before Pact To Protect Whales Is Ratified	1971	10	08	12	SU JP 1I
End of American Whaling	1971	12	26	E8	US 1I
Whaling Halt Urged in Stockholm	1972	06	10	4	SU NZ DE FR ZA VA PT
Quotas Reduced on Whale Catch	1972	07	01	5	0
Hurt Mother Whale Rescued on Beach With Newborn Calf	1972	09	26	1	0
Baby Whale Dies After Month In Captivity at Aquarium Here	1972	10	27	82	0
Reginald B. Hegarty, 66, Whaling Historian, Is Dead	1973	01	20	34	0
Scientists Find Value In Dead Whale Here	1973	02	25	97	0
Article 6 -- No Title	1973	10	28	507	0
Letters: A Torch Might Have Saved The Arctic Whales	1973	11	11	566	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Boycott of 2 Nations' Goods Asked Because of Whaling	1973	11	25	84	JP SU
Metropolitan Briefs	1973	12	12	100	0
Pregnant Whale's Fetal Heartbeats Elude Detection	1973	12	28	33	0
Alaska Whale Killed As Buckley Watches	1974	05	26	44	0
Ideas & Trends	1974	09	01	138	0
Rare Whale Dies on Beach	1974	09	03	8	0
Metropolitan Briefs	1975	05	08	43	0
Out of The Whale	1975	05	11	BR8	0
Books of The Times	1975	07	17	27	0
Metropolitan Briefs	1975	08	06	34	0
New Hope for Whales	1975	08	11	20	JP
Aquarium Displays Its 2 Baby Whales	1975	08	22	33	0
Smaller Whales Are Expected To Be Next Targets of Industry	1975	09	01	18	JP US
More Dead Fish Found Off Shore	1976	07	22	67	0
Folk Programs Sunday At L.I. Whaling Museum	1977	04	01	73	0
Alaskan Eskimos Angered Over Ban on Hunting of Bowhead Whales	1977	10	05	8	0
Around the Nation	1977	10	13	18	0
Whaling Group Is Urged to Reverse Cut in Quota	1977	11	29	8	JP SU IS
Science Watch: Microbe Weaponry	1978	11	14	C1	0
Mass Panic Is Linked To 56 Whales' Deaths Along Mexican Shore	1979	01	14	15	0
Big Spectator Sport: Watching the Whales	1979	04	18	A14	0
Remains of 41 Beached Whales Buried in Sand Dunes in Oregon	1979	06	26	A10	0
Beached Baby Whale Is Rescued in Oregon	1979	09	20	16	0
Around the Nation	1980	01	10	A20	0
The Region	1980	02	11	B7	0
Notes Whale-Watching in New England Waters	1980	04	20	XX9	0
Letters to the Editor	1980	07	13	XX23	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Grand Jury Questioning Eskimos On Killing Endangered Whales	1980	10	25	7	0
Around the Nation	1980	11	24	A18	0
Gray Whales in Revival Off California	1981	01	31	8	0
Narrative Recalls Deadly Attack by Whale in 1820	1981	02	15	26	0
Whale-Watcher's Delight: Spume in Atlantic Off L.I	1981	05	04	B1	0
Ban on Whaling Strains U.S. Relations With Japan	1982	07	28	A2	JP US
2 Whales Beach on Cape And One Dies There	1982	12	27	A12	0
Whaling Protesters Say Chase Followed Incursion in Siberia	1983	07	20	A6	SU 1G 1I
A Siberian Sojourn Ends Well for Foes of Whaling	1983	07	25	A2	SU 1R 1G
Herter to Whaling Panel	1983	09	01	A3	0
Misinformed Arguments for a Total Whaling Moratorium	1984	02	09	A30	JP US 1I
Teen-Agers Find Rare Whale Fossil	1984	06	19	C3	0
In the Whale's Wake	1984	07	22	BR7	0
Japan Suggests a Whaling Limit In Attempt to Head Off Full Ban	1984	08	02	A8	JP
U.S. Reports Accord With Japan on Whales	1984	11	11	6	JP US
Riding Waves, Seeing Drama	1984	12	02	LI34	0
Soviet Icebreaker Is Trying To Rescue Trapped Whales	1985	02	24	5	SU
Russians Tell Saga of Whales Rescued by an Icebreaker	1985	03	12	C3	SU
Using Inflatable Whales to Elucidate Economics	1985	04	29	C15	0
Roaming Whale Enlivens the Sound	1985	09	08	CN20	0
Whale Clears a Hurdle For Return to Ocean	1985	10	26	8	0
Reagan Is Told of Norwegian Whaling Infractions	1986	06	10	A16	NO 1G
Iceland, Voicing Anger, Halts All Whaling	1986	07	29	A5	IS US

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Iceland Expresses Anger At U.S. in Whale Dispute	1986	07	30	A5	IS
Whaling Ships Refloated in Iceland	1986	11	20	A7	0
Soviet Says It Is Giving Up Commercial Whaling	1987	05	24	1	SU 1G
U.S. Effort to Stop Whaling For Research Brings Protest	1987	06	23	B8	IS JP US NO
Japan, Defying Protests, Pushes Whaling Plan	1987	08	02	6	JP IS KR
Increase in Whales Puzzles Scientists	1987	08	16	LI1	0
Whale Expedition Defended	1988	02	19	A6	JP 1I
'Whale Rescue,' Escape And a Happy Ending	1988	03	08	C18	0
2 Say Method Averts Need To Kill Whales for Research	1988	05	31	C4	JP US 1I
It's Showtime for Baby Whale	1988	09	24	6	0
Whale Trapped in Net Freed	1988	10	24	A13	0
What 3 Whales Did to the Human Heart	1988	11	06	E11	0
Aquarium Trying to Save a Stranded Whale	1988	12	22	B2	0
Publishing	1989	06	26	D6	0
Scrimshaw, With No Threat to Whales	1989	08	03	C3	0
Carcasses of 23 Gray Whales Wash Up on Islands in Alaska	1990	07	16	A10	0
Fiction	1991	05	12	BR18	0
Up to Her Elbow in Alligators	1991	12	29	BR7	0
Nothing Wasted but the Whale	1992	02	23	BR26	0
A Whale: Food for Deep Thought, or Just Food?	1992	04	06	A4	JP
Whale Killed in New Hunt	1992	07	07	A8	NO
Be It a Whale or a Dinosaur, Can I.B.M. Really Evolve?	1992	09	06	F10	0
The Messy Science of Cetology	1993	02	21	SM4 4	0
For Children	1993	04	02	C31	0
Commission to Save Whales Endangered, Too	1993	05	18	C4	NO JP IS
Whale Watching	1993	06	06	XX1 2	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
Stray Whale Is Herded Toward Uncertain Fate	1993	08	04	B6	0
Norwegians Claim Their Whaling Rights	1993	08	07	1	1G NO DE
The Minke Whale	1993	08	07	2	0
Imagining a heroine for Hanukkah A tale of five Hannahs Seeing things…	1993	12	10	C34	0
Fossils Point to a Walking Ancestor of Whales	1994	01	14	A25	0
A Tribe Sees Hope In Whale Hunting, But U.S. Is Worried	1995	06	04	1	0
Whales and Boys in Risky Environments	1995	07	19	C10	0
At Twin Lights, Keeping Memories of Whale Oil Burning	1996	05	12	NJ3	0
Central Park Whale Faces Tattered Retirement	1997	05	26	27	0
Over the Airwaves: All-Whale Radio	1997	10	04	A4	0
Winter Whale-Watching Off Baja	1997	10	19	154	0
Scientists Report Rare Attack by Killer Whales on Sperm Whales	1997	11	09	26	0
Castoff Whale Washes Up on a New Shore	1997	11	30	CY8	0
Whale Hunt Protesters Are Arrested by Police	1998	11	02	A19	1S
Conservationists Who Oppose Tribal Whale Hunt Remove Boat	1998	11	26	A40	1S
A Boston Firebrand Alienates His Allies Even as He Saves Whales	1999	01	23	A9	0
Microsoft Hunts Its Whale, the Digital Set-Top Box	1999	05	10	C1	0
Family Fare	2000	07	28	E35	0
U.S. to Move Against Japan Over Whales	2000	09	13	A6	JP
Liberties	2000	11	29	A35	0
Like a Bird, Like a Whale, Like the Wind	2001	05	06	AR22	0
The View From Mystic	2001	07	01	CT2	0
Gray Whales Rebound For West Coast Ritual	2002	03	18	A16	0
Japan Cuts Whaling Rights For Native Peoples of Arctic	2002	05	25	A4	JP
Swimming in the Sea of Memory	2003	06	15	CY3	0

Article Title (Abridged in Some Cases)	Year	Month	Day	Start Page	Country Appearance
A Whale Stops By, But Doesn't Stay Long	2003	11	10	B3	0
Thar She Blows! Researchers Say A New Species of Whale Is Found	2003	11	20	A10	JP

Table 9.

Codes for Non-State Actors of Interest in New York Times Text

1F	FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1G	GREENPEACE
1R	RAINBOW WARRIERS
1I	INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
1S	SEA SHEPHARD CONSERVATION GROUP

APPENDIX B

GOOGLE NEWS SEARCH DATA

Google News was searched and data were compiled on May 6, 2009. The search terms involved country names in combination with "whale" to determine the number of articles describing both the country with the whaling issue in the title. Only news sources were searched during the process, eliminating other internet sources. Tables 10 and 11 present the data developed for countries used in the project.

Table 10.

Google News Search Article Count (1920-1946, 2-Year Intervals)

Year	DE	GB	JP	NO	US	CA	ZA	IE	NZ	AU
1920	17	15	17	7	38	12	26	5	7	18
1922	26	25	19	17	57	15	24	9	19	29
1924	22	27	24	34	81	18	23	9	26	43
1926	38	48	39	93	120	37	19	5	57	67
1928	40	69	34	131	166	37	33	7	88	115
1930	27	53	32	79	115	31	28	14	42	68
1932	21	18	26	33	68	18	19	9	28	46
1934	23	26	32	40	66	9	17	6	23	44
1936	42	35	57	32	80	17	27	7	21	38
1938	67	59	58	53	96	18	20	17	18	28
1940	34	46	24	45	80	11	3	12	8	16
1942	5	19	14	12	34	6	7	7	2	9
1944	12	46	40	31	36	23	17	4	26	46

Table 11.

Google News Search Article Count (1970-1980, 2-Year Intervals)

Country	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	total
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	9	9	18
Sweden	4	6	6	2	11	12	41
Peru	11	8	15	7	18	22	81
Chile	9	5	9	7	15	17	62
Spain	7	6	17	14	19	33	96

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