STORMING THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

THE REVOLUTION IN UNSC AUTHORITY

OVER THE PROJECTION OF MILITARY FORCE

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for

projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization—and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so—led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. *should* request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations.

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In memory of Charles E. Cleveland, Ph.D.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The victors of World War II formed the United Nations with the intent that the UN Security Council (UNSC) would regulate the use of military force by states. Experiences leading to the Second World War led them to believe that an organization whose members consisted of the most powerful states in the international system could prevent future wars and ensure international peace and security. This idealized vision of the role of the UNSC failed to materialize. When the UNSC did assume this role it did so through means not contained in the original Charter. After 1989 resolutions for international authorization became the primary mechanism for the UNSC to regulate the use of military force. This change was driven by the choices made by states.

States face several options when projecting military force, some of which have been part of the decision making process and some of which have not been regularly considered. States can operate outside international organizations (IOs) either unilaterally, through ad hoc coalitions or through an IO. If they choose the IO route they can work through a regional international organization (RIO) or they can attempt to work through a global organization such as the UNSC. Options they have in the UNSC include claims to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a resolution authorizing the projection of force or providing the necessary forces under the UN's Military Staff Committee (MSC).

Why did states' use of UNSC resolutions become the preferred method for projecting military force in the aftermath of the Cold War? In this dissertation I construct the argument that states have followed a trail blazed by the United States. In the Persian

Gulf War, the U.S. set a precedent in requesting when they requested international authorization from the UNSC.[1] This authorization delegated UNSC authority to member states to project military force to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In making this choice at this point the U.S. set the standard for how states should use military force. I compare and test this explanation with others drawn from alternative realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives.

PROJECTING MILITARY FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

The research question of this dissertation project is: "Why do states request international authorization to project military force more often after 1989?" I answer this question by looking at the actions of states and the justifications offered by their leaders. These leaders who claim to represent the state's domestic populations are looking to international sources of authorization for their actions. Answering the question about why states turn to IOs when contemplating military force contributes to understanding state behavior.

[1] The reference to the Persian Gulf War or Gulf War can indicate several different conflicts. For consistency in this dissertation the Persian Gulf War or Gulf War refers only to the conflict during 1990-1991. The term Persian Gulf War refers to the entire episode and the politics of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. This episode involves several military operations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is analytically distinct from the operations undertaken by the U.S. and its allies. Operation Desert Shield refers to the placement of military resources to deter further aggression from Iraq while Operation Desert Storm refers to the offensive action taken by the coalition of forces to remove Iraq from Kuwait. There is also a naval interdiction operation to enforce the sanctions placed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. These operations will be specifically referred to when the distinction is important. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War, the UNSC provided international authorization for offensive military action which came to be called Operation Desert Storm but did not need to provide authorization for the deterrent action of Operation Desert Shield. Other conflicts include the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) which has also referred to as the First Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War (2003-2011) which has been referred to the second Persian Gulf War. To avoid confusion these two conflicts will only be referred to as the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraq War respectively in this dissertation.

The argument I construct specifies a distinct mechanism through which an international norm has emerged.[2] Generally, norms are thought to emerge because a specific actor, a "norm entrepreneur," works to create and push others to accept and follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The emergence of the norm that states should request international authorization has emerged through a different mechanism. The precedent of distinctive action legitimized through practice is a different way for expectations to converge and regular behavior to become institutionalized (Kier and Mercer 1996). The norm of requesting international authorization has emerged through this mechanism, explaining why states request international authorization more often after 1989. The research question focuses on the change in state behavior which emanates from two factors. First, a norm of state behavior says that states should request international authorization from the UNSC to project military force. Second, this norm exists and states engage in the specific behavior on the belief that the UNSC is the proper authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of military force. The authority of the UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international authorization. This mechanism is different than the actions of a norm entrepreneur who sets out to change the way others act. With precedent as the mechanism there is no original intent. Instead, the outcome is an unintentional consequence of a specific action. After precedent has been created, all actors can make use of the precedent when justifying their actions. Their justifications lend credibility to their initial action and legitimize emulation and

[2] Conceptually, a norm is the "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996, 5).

repetition. The projection of military force becomes a strong test of this mechanism for the emergence of an international norm.

States make choices about how they project military force. One particular choice has become the more acceptable than others. States use military force to promote national security, economic and even humanitarian goals. Leaders construct plans to deploy military forces outside of their borders to address these interests. They are faced with a variety of methods for pursuing their goals when projecting military force (see Table 1.1).[3] This project focuses on the method of projection when states decide to use military force rather than on the decision to project military force itself.

Leaders will face many decisions no matter what path they pursue when projecting military force.[4] The decision-making model within Table 1.1 is a simplified

[3] When faced with a situation where the projection of military force is a foreign policy option, states are faced with at least five options. The first is the simplest. When faced with a situation where the projection of military force may be a beneficial policy, the base policy is for a state to do nothing. In effect, doing nothing is to accept the changes introduced by other actors and the potentially damaging consequences of their challenges. This may be seen as preferable to the consequences of using military force or some other option. Two other options include diplomatic action and the attempt to exert economic influence through either positive or negative sanctions. These kinds of policy options can, of course, be used together and can include the threat of using military force, implicitly or explicitly. A fourth kind of policy option would be to attempt a form of covert action. This can include both covert military and nonmilitary action. Nonmilitary action would include espionage and other forms of spy or pseudomilitary activities. Covert military action as a form of military force would inherently be unilateral but would not be advertised. The remaining kind of policy option would be overt forms of military operations. These would include unilateral or multilateral options. Unilateral military options include immediate but not covert operations. Obviously, the military benefits of covert military actions and an immediate unilateral response are very similar. Immediate actions would not allow an opposition to consolidate its position and prepare its forces. Delayed and covert military action would still produce a context where soldiers would have to face these problems. An immediate unilateral military operation would not. Multilateral military options, as a different form of military action, would still face the difficulties of allowing an opposition to consolidate its position. A state facing the prospect of projecting military force may want to act in concert with other states for many different reasons. This can be an ad hoc coalition put together when the state is faced with circumstances which warrant the projection of military force or the state can pursue action through the framework provided by an IO. IO-based military operations would be through either an RIO or a global organization, the UNSC. These last two forms could include the participation in peacekeeping operations as well as standard military operations.

[4] Once the decision to use force has been made states must decide how they want to carry out this decision. This is consistent with poliheuristic decision making theory which suggests leaders use a two-stage

Table 1.1. Policy Responses

Nonmilitary	Military Actions
Do Nothing	Covert Action
Political/Diplomatic Actions	Overt Action
Economic Actions	Immediate (Unilateral)
Positive Sanctions	Delayed
Negative Sanctions	Unilateral
Nonmilitary Covert Actions	Ad hoc coalition
Espionage	RIOs
Pseudomilitary	UNSC

ideal type separating out individual decisions for analytic purposes. Reality can be much more complicated, as often many of these steps are condensed into each other and sometimes assumed or skipped altogether. The decision to project military force involves assessing political and diplomatic consequences of multiple actions which are included in a state's foreign policy. Despite this limited reflection of reality, the model can provide the basis for identifying the observable implications of competing explanations.

Projecting military force includes several different possibilities (see Table 1.2). Outside options include unilateral military action or ad hoc coalitions with allies of the primary projector. States can secure international authorization for the projection of military force through RIOs. The United Nations system offers three nominal approaches which states can take. In response to attacks states can respond in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter (UN Charter 1945). States can request specific resolutions to authorize the projection of military force, and nominally states can provide military assets and resource to the UN to be used by the Military Staff

decision-making process (Brulé 2008). The first step is to eliminate untenable alternatives and then to select among the remaining alternatives. For instance, President Clinton's decision to project military force in 1999 exhibits this pattern (Redd 2005).

Table 1.2. Military Force Options

Options	Example
Outside	Unilateral-The United States
	Ad hoc coalition-Vietnam War Coalition
RIO	NATO airstrikes in Kosovo, 1999
Article 51-Self Defense	U.S. action in Afghanistan, 2001
UNSC Resolution	Persian Gulf War, 1991
Military Staff Committee	None

Committee to protect international peace and security (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274).[5] The existence of these options is consistent after 1945, albeit the viability of these options varies depending upon context.

Regardless of the prospects of securing the support of an IO, the state can always fall back on its own capabilities and initiate a unilateral action to project military force. With the exception of unilateral action none of the other possibilities are guaranteed to happen. The possibilities of securing IO approval or gaining support from other states are not certain. Just because the state has the desire to use an RIO or the UNSC does not necessarily mean that it will gain the organization's authorization for projecting military force. The ability of a state to secure IO approval depends upon many factors not the least of which is the nature of the proposed projection of military force and how other states view the intentions of the projector. Leaders consider these factors when deciding to project military force, including whether to use force unilaterally or through an IO. Many possible IOs could be approached to provide international authorization (see Table 1.3).

[5] This option is the mechanism contained in the UN Charter.

Table 1.3. International Political and Security Organizations which Nominally Can Provide International Authorization

International Organization	Dates	Region
United Nations Security Council	1946-Present	Global
United Nations General Assembly	1946-Present	Global
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1949-Present	Europe & N. America
European Union / European Community	1958-Present	Europe
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	1973-Present	Europe
Council of Europe	1949-Present	Europe
Warsaw Pact	1955-1991	Eastern Europe
Organization of American States	1948-Present	Western Hemisphere
Union of South American Nations	2008-Present	South America
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	1981-Present	Caribbean
Baghdad Pact / Central Treaty Organization	1955-1979	Middle East
League of Arab States	1945-Present	Middle East
Gulf Cooperation Council	1981-Present	Middle East
Arab Cooperation Council	1989-1990	Middle East
Organization of the Islamic Conference	1969-Present	Islamic Membership
Organization of African Unity / African Union	1963-Present	Africa
Shanghai Five / Shanghai Cooperation Organisation	1996-Present	Central Asia
Collective Security Treaty Organization	1992-Present	Post-Soviet States
Commonwealth of Independent States	1992-Present	Post-Soviet States
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization	1954-1977	Southeast Asia
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1967-Present	Southeast Asia

EMPIRICAL PUZZLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

States have turned to the UNSC for international authorization with greater frequency after the end of the Cold War. From 1946 through 1989 states requested authorization five times (5%) but from 1990 through 2011, states sought authorization for projecting of military force twenty-one times (47%) (see Table 2.1). Figures 1.1 through 1.3 show the distribution of choices made by the United States when projecting military force among the different options available. Each figure specifies a different time period. The U.S. has made use of these varied options as shown by Figure 1.1. The U.S. tends towards the use of outside options almost as often as the use of international authorization from the UNSC. However, the averages mask the frequency of change over time with

Figure 1.1. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1946-2011



Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1.

which the U.S. has resorted to the different options. Figure 1.2 shows that outside options were the course of action that the U.S. most frequently chose during the Cold War. The United States did not rely upon the use of international organizations, whether they were the UN or an RIO. This pattern changed after 1989. Figure 1.3 shows the U.S. relying more frequently upon resolutions from the UNSC when it decides to project military force. Chapter II examines this phenomenon in greater detail.

I answer the research question through cross-case correlational analysis and within-case process tracing. Cross-case analysis is useful for identifying and explaining general patterns (Hempel 1942) and testing hypotheses by looking at evidence found across a series of cases (van Evera 1997, 50-51). However, the way a particular event influences subsequent outcomes cannot be tested in the same manner. Process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) offers the ability to connect these general patterns with the

Figure 1.2. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1946-1989



Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1.

Figure 1.3. Percent of U.S. Projection Choices, 1990-2011



Source: The data for this table is presented in Table 3.1

specific action through identification of a specific mechanism (Elster 1998; Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Within-case analysis can contribute to a better understanding of causal inference (Mahoney 2003). When competing explanations predict the same outcome it is necessary to trace the process to determine which explanation is more accurate. By tracing the process within specific projections of military force by the U.S. I am able to gain greater leverage over the causal factors which produce the rise of international authorization. This latter method's weakness is in establishing factors which contribute to the general pattern. By using the two in combination, I take advantage of the strengths of both while overcoming their weaknesses. Looking at both general patterns and mechanisms will provide greater leverage and more satisfying answers.

This project employs a set of instances of military force projection after 1945. Each "case" is a particular state's projection of military force. The purpose of this cross-case comparison is to document a pattern in the changes of state behavior over time. These projections of military force will then be linked to the decision of these states to request authorization or not. From the pattern established by state behavior, other features can be identified. Indicators based on the potential explanations will be identified and then correlated with the features of state behavior. This method is limited to identifying a general pattern and may not be able to eliminate all competing explanations based on fine-grained evidence, but it should provide an indication about the existence of a change in the behavior of states and some of the factors which have influenced the decision to request authorization.

The cross-case section provides two clear virtues. First, it provides leverage over whether or not the within-case represents processes similar to those occurring in other

states. If the U.S. is representative then other states will display identifiable processes with marked similarities. If the U.S. is not a representative case, then this study should be able to identify what is unique about the U.S. which leads its decision makers to request authorization. Examination of the multiple projections of military force does not provide a test of characteristics that are unique to this state. The cross-case approach will fill in this knowledge gap by identifying any unique U.S. characteristics.

The second virtue is that factors may operate in states other than the U.S., which may influence their behavior. A cross-case analysis can identify these differences and suggest how they might operate in other states. Through this method the factors should become apparent when examined and compared with the U.S. cases. Thus, to provide greater causal leverage over the processes which affect the decision to request authorization, this study will look at cases beyond the U.S. The cross-case method helps to identify the scope conditions for the U.S.

This study examines the U.S. in order to gain analytic leverage through which the theoretical explanations discussed earlier can be tested. The examination of different projections of military force by the U.S. can provide analytic leverage to evaluate competing explanations in the same way as a crucial case.[6] Because the U.S. is not expected to request authorization for its foreign policy actions from an external actor, the examination of these decisions become a "strong test" of the proposed explanations (van Evera 1997, 30-31). The U.S. possesses a greater capacity to resist external influences and is very unlikely to subject its military force decisions to an external actor. Whatever

[6] A crucial case is a case that, *a priori,* is likely to demonstrate the accuracy of an explanation or one that is unlikely to do so (Gerring and Seawright 2007, 115-122). The examination of a crucial case then can provide substantial support for, or disconfirm, an explanation.

might push the U.S. to request authorization despite its greater ability to resist likely would have an effect on less powerful states as well. Thus, if the processes occurring within the U.S. prompt its policy makers to request authorization, these processes are likely to be seen elsewhere.

Focusing upon the U.S. also controls for several variables enabling greater leverage over causal inference. Since the U.S. is consistently democratic during the two time periods, regime type does not vary. Also, because of the U.S. position within the international system, the need for material resources does not change. In fact, the U.S. is the least likely state to require material resources from an external source to complete a proposed mission thus removing this motivation from consideration. For this component, the individual cases are the circumstances surrounding each instance of the projection of military force by the U.S.

Multiple theories can explain the same pattern of behavior by the U.S. and its action when requesting UNSC authorization after the end of the Cold War.[7] These overlapping predictions mean that a more nuanced approach is needed to determine differences among these potential explanations. Process tracing should illuminate the fine-grained evidence necessary to evaluate these competing theories (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring and Thomas 2007). Within-case analysis can aid in identifying the motivations of various actors despite the consistency of the overarching general action with multiple explanations. This analysis allows the evidence to be linked to hypotheses (which are set forth in Chapter II). The theoretical predictions are compared with the evidence to determine which of the competing explanations holds the most explanatory

[7] This is the issue of "observational equivalence" (see Weingast and Moran 1983, 767).

leverage. This evidence will be used to test the hypotheses derived from the potential explanations of the emergent pattern of state behavior. The second part of this study then focuses upon within-case analysis to identify how the decision-making processes worked within the U.S. For this component, the individual cases are the circumstances surrounding each instance of projection of U.S. military force. The kinds of arguments that are plausible explanations necessitate the examination of several instances of the projection of military force to test their claims. These two components provide a research design capable of assessing competing theoretical explanations of requesting UNSC authorization.

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II lays out the potential explanations and the tests of their observable implications. The explanations which can be tested by cross-case evidence are covered in Chapter III which examines the patterns predicted by the explanations put forward in Chapter II. Chapters IV through VI turn to the United States. Chapter IV surveys the international authorization behavior of the U.S. between 1945 and 1989. This chapter shows that there was no norm of requesting international authorization and that the few instances where states did make requests, such as the Korean War, were political anomalies without lasting effect. Chapter V covers the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War was a juncture or breaking point between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This juncture was a period of uncertainty about the structures of international politics and, in particular, how powerful states viewed international organizations. This chapter shows how the different explanations for why states request international authorization predict different choices for how the U.S. projected military force. Chapter VI compares three post-Cold War cases, revealing

variation in the key outcome of interest. Operation Desert Fox was undertaken in 1998 by the Clinton Administration without a request for international authorization. In 2003, the Iraq War was undertaken without international authorization but the Bush (41) Administration made a very strong effort to secure the authorization of the UNSC. The third case is the 2011 Libyan intervention where the Obama Administration undertook the enforcement of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians under a mandate from the UNSC. These three cases illustrate the dynamics of international authorization and why states make the request.

CHAPTER II

EXPLAINING REQUESTS FOR INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

Why do states request international authorization for the projection of military force from international organizations (IOs) more often after 1989? I argue that international authorization for the use of military force by the UNSC became the tool of choice because the U.S. set a precedent when it requested international authorization in 1990 for the Persian Gulf War. This seminal event created the conditions for establishing an international norm of UN-authorization. This norm created pressure for all states to request international authorization from IOs and enhanced the authority of the UNSC over state projection of military force. This norm helped to produce the observed change in state behavior where international authorization is requested more often after 1989.

This chapter presents an evaluation of the merits of this research question. I then discuss the dependent variable which establishes the change in state behavior. Lastly, I present a discussion of the theoretical debates which produce varied explanations for states to request international authorization. Based on these theories I identify explanations for why states may do so and under what conditions they may do so more often. I compare my argument about the precedent from the Persian Gulf War with the expectations of alternative explanations drawn from this discussion.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question of this dissertation project is: "Why do states request international authorization for the projection of military force more often after 1989?" I answer this question by looking both to the actions of states and to the justifications they provide for their actions. This question contributes to the discussion of the nature of

relations among states and how they relate to international bodies. The move for states to request international authorization is interesting because it is a relatively new phenomenon in international relations. Historically, states considering the projection of military force have not looked to organizations outside their own borders.

The argument I make about why states request international authorization contributes to an understanding of international relations by specifying a mechanism through which an international norm has emerged. Generally, norms are thought to emerge because a specific actor, a norm entrepreneur, works to create and push others to follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As other actors define the new standard of behavior as legitimate, the norm spreads (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). The entrepreneur attempts to persuade or coerce others into accepting and following a standard which is preferred by the actor. Norm entrepreneurs use different frames to achieve their ends (Payne 2001). Norm entrepreneurs can be powerful actors who influence the beliefs of elites in other states (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Reputation and prestige influence how effective these actors are in their efforts (Fordham and Asal 2007). Other less powerful states can also act to promote norms (e.g., Björkdahl 2007). Other kinds of norm entrepreneurs can be from nonstate sources including prominent international actors including IOs (Gheciu 2005), parts of IOs such as the UN Secretary-General (Johnstone 2006; Rushton 2008), nongovernmental organizations (Price 1998), and advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The moral authority of other actors has contributed to their ability to influence international outcomes and the dissemination of international norms (Hall 1997). These actors engage in strategic behaviors as they attempt to persuade others to adopt an international norm (Schimmelfennig 2003).

I posit a different model for the emergence of international norms through the precedent of distinctive action which becomes legitimated through practice. I argue that the norm of requesting international authorization has emerged through such a precedent. This project addresses the emergence of this norm. The research question focuses on the change in state behavior. I argue that this behavioral change emanates from two key factors. First, a norm of state behavior says that states should request international authorization from the UNSC for the projection of military force. Second, this norm exists and states engage in the specific behavior because the UNSC is seen as the proper authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of the projection of military force.[8] The authority of the UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international authorization after the end of the Cold War. This mechanism is different from a norm entrepreneur, who sets out to change the way others act. With precedent there is no intent. After precedent has been created the role of the actors involved is in justifying their actions. Their justifications lend credibility to their initial action and legitimize the action for subsequent emulation and repetition.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

International authorization is a formal international organization's sanction of a state's projection of military force.[9] I am interested in what has caused states to request

[8] Legitimacy is the "belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd 1999, 381). The enhanced legitimacy of the UNSC increased its power because authority is legitimized power (Hall 2005, 66; Hurd 2007, 3).

[9] A decision to project military force is the purposeful deployment of regular military forces of a state outside its internationally recognized boundaries which destroys, or prevents an adversary from using, some resource. Table 3.1 lists the specific instances of projection. See Appendix I for the concept formation of military force projection.

international authorization more often for their military actions. This question engages the reasoning behind specific instances of the projection of military force and reasons for the change in the general pattern of state behavior. Making a request is a form of state behavior that is different than making a claim about the authority of IOs. The request for international authorization may be evidence of the authority of the organization or it could be evidence of some alternative form of calculation as many of the alternative explanations suggest. This section establishes that states have changed their behavior toward IOs, and toward the UNSC in particular. States request international authorization for projections of military force more often after 1989 than from 1946 through 1989.

What does this behavior look like? International authorization is most often a resolution, evaluation, or some other declaratory statement issued by the international body authorizing the projection of military force. A request means a representative of a state seeking to project military force asks the IO to issue such a statement. International authorization from the UNSC comes in two varieties. With the first, the UNSC passes a specific resolution which contains the authorization for state action, often using the now famous language "any necessary means" which is understood to include the use of military force.[10] Alternatively, the UNSC can express its acceptance that the action met the requisites for a claim to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This article recognizes the inherent right of individual states to act to preserve their own security. This expression of consent is exhibited during UNSC official meetings and may include a specific resolution.

[10] With this form of international authorization, the UNSC delegates enforcement authority to member states.

A different mechanism, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), was envisioned under the Charter (Grove 1993). The MSC was organized to administer military units for collective security as proscribed by the UN Charter. This model of enforcement action failed to emerge due in large part because member states did not place military troops, equipment, or other resources under the control of the UNSC's MSC, something which they are still unlikely to do to this day. The MSC was intended as an international military force under the control of the United Nations which could respond to threats to peace and security. The MSC still meets regularly as proscribed under the Charter, but is a committee lacking substantive importance.

States have requested authorization more frequently since 1989 than they did before 1989.[11] Between 1946 and 2011, state leaders made the decision to project military force a total of 153 times (see Table 2.1). These instances include circumstances where the leaders may have reasonably made the decision to request international authorization.[12] From 1946 through 1989 states requested authorization five times (5%) but from 1990 through 2011, states sought authorization for the projection of military force twenty-one times (47%).

Powerful states are not expected by international relations scholars to request the approval of an IO to obtain their foreign policy goals because of their direct and

[11] Three kinds of state behavior are important to identify when attempting to answer the question posed in the introduction. The first form of behavior is the act of projecting military force. The second is the decision to request authorization from an IO for these actions, both anticipated and actual. The last form of behavior is receipt of authorization from an IO. This section focuses on the variance in the attempt to gain authorization for cases of projecting military force.

[12] The set does not include circumstances were a state defended itself from attack nor forms of civil war, albeit foreign intervention into a civil war may be included. For more on specific instances and their coding see Table 3.1 and Appendix A.

Table 2.1. State Requests for Authorization of the Projection of Military Force

	Projection of Military Force	IO Authorization Sought	IO Authorization Granted	IO Authorization Not Granted
Total	153 (100%)	26 (17%)	29 (19%)	124 (81%)
1946-1989	108 (71%)	5 (5%)	5 (5%)	103 (95%)
1990-2011	45 (29%)	21 (47%)	24 (53%)	21 (57%)

Table 2.2. U.S. Requests for Authorization of the Projection of Military Force

	Projection of Military Force	IO Authorizations Requested	IO Authorizations Granted[13]	IO Authorizations Not Granted
Total	35 (100%)	17 (49%)	20 (57%)	15 (43%)
1946-1989	15 (43%)	3 (20%)	3 (20%)	12 (80%)
1990-2011	20 (57%)	14 (79%)	17 (85%)	3 (15%)

potentially more effective tools of statecraft. As a powerful state, the U.S. merits close inspection. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the U.S. From 1946 through 1989, the U.S. sought authorization in only three cases (20%) but since 1989, the U.S. requested authorization in 14 of 20 instances where the state used military force (70%).[14] The U.S. began going to the UNSC with the embargo on Iraq in 1990 (see Table 2.3). The primary IO indicates the organization where the U.S. first put in a request for international authorization. The authorizing IO is the most significant organization to authorize the action. The U.S. held a preference for the UNSC for authorization, something which the UNSC has not always provided.

[13] "Authorizations Granted" can exceed "Authorizations Requested" because states can receive approval *without* a request. For example, the U.S. did not formally request authorization from the UN for Afghanistan in 2001 but, nonetheless, received tacit approval for this force projection.

[14] Of the six instances after 1989 in which the U.S. projected military force without requesting authorization in any form, only two were controversial. Three of them fell under Article 51 of the UN Charter which guarantees individual states the right to defend themselves. These include the 1993 Raid on Baghdad, the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and the 2011 raid to kill Osama bin Laden. The U.S. missile strikes on June 26, 1993, were in response to an Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush. A primary motive in keeping the mission secret was military effectiveness (Jehl 1993). The controversial operation was the 1998 airstrikes on Iraq, Operation Desert Fox. It was seen as beyond simply enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zones without international authorization.

RECEIVING IO AUTHORIZATION

It is also important to look at when states receive international authorization. States make requests because they want the benefits that come from international authorization, whether these benefits are material or ideational. A complete answer to the research question must look at the outcome of their requests. IOs are not consistent in their provision of authorization; sometimes they have provided international authorization and other times they have withheld it.[15] This variation means that states cannot expect that an IO will always provide authorization when requested. Making a request thus involves the risk that the request will be rebuffed. And yet, despite the risk of being denied, states continue to make their requests when projecting military force. Table 2.1 shows the statistics for when IOs authorized states' projections. From 1946 through 1989, a state received authorization from an IO for the projection of military force only five times (5%) but since 1989, IOs have authorized twenty-four projections of military force (53%).

The change for the U.S. is even greater. Of the fifteen instances prior to 1990, the U.S. received IO authorization three times (20%), once from the United Nations and twice from the Organization of American States (see Table 2.2). After 1989, the U.S. decided to project military force twenty times. In all but four of these cases the U.S. received UN authorization (the exceptions being Iraq in 1996, 1998, and 2003, and Kosovo in 1999) and the U.S. did receive authorization from NATO for the 1999 air

[15] There are instances when no specific request was made yet states have explicitly or implicitly received authorization.

Table 2.3. U.S. Requests for International Authorization

Year	Decision to Project Military Force	Administration	Request	Primary IO	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War	Truman	yes	UN	UN
1958	Intervention in Lebanon	Eisenhower			
1961	Deployment in Thailand	Kennedy			
1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	Kennedy	yes	OAS	OAS
1964	Bombing in Pathet Lao War	Johnson			
1964	Vietnam War	Johnson			
1965	Intervention in Dominican Republic	Johnson	yes	OAS	OAS
1970	U.S. in Cambodia	Nixon			
1975	*Mayaguez* Incident	Ford		UN	UN
1980	Iran Hostage Rescue Mission	Carter		UN	UN
1982	Intervention in Lebanon	Reagan			
1983	Intervention in Grenada	Reagan			
1986	Libyan Airstrikes	Reagan			
1987	Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging	Reagan			
1989	Intervention in Panama	Bush (41)			
1990	Embargo on Iraq	Bush (41)	yes	UN	UN
1991	Persian Gulf War	Bush (41)	yes	UN	UN
1991	Iraqi No Fly Zone	Bush (41)	yes	UN	UN
1992	Somalia	Bush (41)	yes	UN	UN
1992	NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia	Bush (41)	yes	UN	UN
1993	Bosnia	Clinton	yes	UN	UN
1993	Baghdad Raid	Clinton		UN	UN
1993	Macedonia	Clinton	yes	UN	UN
1994	Haiti	Clinton	yes	UN	UN
1995	Bosnia	Clinton	yes	UN	UN
1996	Iraqi Airstrikes	Clinton			
1998	Afghanistan/Sudan	Clinton		UN	UN
1998	Iraqi Airstrikes (ODF)	Clinton			
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Clinton	yes	UN	NATO
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping	Clinton	yes	UN	UN
2001	Afghanistan	Bush (43)		UN	UN
2003	Iraq War	Bush (43)	yes	UN	
2004	Haiti	Bush (43)	yes	UN	UN
2011	Libyan Intervention (NFZ)	Obama	yes	UN	UN
2011	Osama Raid	Obama		UN	UN

campaign.[16] Importantly, for this instance and the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. leaders did make a very strong attempt to acquire UN authorization and even framed their justifications for military action on existing UNSC resolutions, in an attempt to make the U.S. actions legal and to gain legitimacy.[17] These two instances are remarkable because the U.S. failed despite its request.

In some instances the U.S. did not put forth a request yet received international authorization, often when acting in self-defense. Such actions are authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Despite the lack of attempt to secure prior authorization for the 1993 Bagdad Raid and Afghanistan in 2001, both were considered forms of self-defense and covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter.[18] Other instances include missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 (UNSC Document 1998) and the 2011 raid in Pakistan which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden (UNSC 2011a).[19]

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[16] Frequently, more than one IO will express their support for a single projection of military force. For instance, NATO, the Arab League and the UNSC all formally expressed support for the airstrikes undertaken by the U.S. and its allies in Libya 2011. The operationalization of the dependent variable relies on the primary IO.

[17] In the aftermath of the decision to initiate the Iraq War, U.S. leaders recognized there was a role for the UN during the post-war occupation. The U.S. pushed to end sanctions and the acceptance of Iraq within the international community. The outcome was UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) which recognized the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Concerns have arisen that UNSCR 1483 would legitimate the war itself. This does not seem to be the case and as will be discussed in later chapters, the legitimacy of the UNSC seems to be enhanced rather than diminished by resisting the demands of the U.S. in 2003.

[18] The U.S. was generally supported for the Baghdad Raid (Allies Back U.S. Strike 1993; UNSC 1993) and the action in Afghanistan was seen as legal and legitimate (Drumbl 2003; Franck 2001). The U.S. action also received support from the UNSC for resolutions passed on September 12, 2001 (UNSCR 1368 2001), and subsequently on December 20, 2001 (UNSCR 1386 2001). This latter resolution was passed after the initiation of actions but did express the support of the organization. It was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and included the pertinent language which authorized the projection of military force.

[19] The recent debate over the legality of the bin Laden raid did not substantially question the U.S. claim of its right to project military force based on self-defense. Instead it focused on the difference between arresting him and killing him outright rather than the right of the U.S. to act. Where the legality of the raid is being questioned is on the authority of the U.S. to kill bin Laden, or whether the U.S. should have taken him into custody to stand trial (Lewis 2011), marking the difference between arresting or assassinating bin Ladin. The administration claims that the raid was entirely legal (Bin Laden Death 2011). Some Pakistani

Secrecy was considered "indispensable" to the success of the Sudan and Afghanistan operation (Albright and Berger 1998). The ability to surprise an adversary can be an important factor in the decision to request international authorization. The decision to make a request means increased scrutiny forgoing the possibility of using surprise to military advantage.

POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS

Compelling potential explanations include those derived from realism, institutionalism, a mixture of realism and institutionalism, and versions of constructivism. The alternative explanations will be tested empirically against the constructivist argument I develop. The realist-based explanations are based on power calculations and the need for additional resources. Two explanations rely on institutions as a key component. The first suggests states with democratic domestic regimes follow international law and thus will request international authorization more than nondemocracies. The second explanation looks at the value of information signaled through formal IOs. An alternative constructivist explanation is also developed. The norm of multilateralism is offered as a reason for the changes in state behavior. After considering these alternative explanations I develop a constructivist argument about setting the precedent of requesting international authorization and the ways in which this precedent shaped decisions to project military force. I establish the general pattern of state behavior, decision-making, and discursive evidence, and international reactions predicted by each in turn.

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leaders have expressed frustration and claimed that the U.S. violated their sovereignty (Perlez 2011a, b). However, this behavior follows an agreement established by George W. Bush with Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 if the U.S. were to pursue bin Laden into Pakistani territory (Walsh 2011). Even claims from bin Laden family members argue he should have been tried and do not address the authority of the U.S. to project military force in this situation (Shane 2011; Statement 2011).

Power: Basic Realism

Realism is pessimistic about the importance of IOs in influencing world politics (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Waltz 1979, 42, 164).[20] Explanations are based on power and interests. All states have interests derived from their position in the international system. Power is typically measured in terms of control over material resources (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979, 97-98).[21] The international system is cast as an arena of self-help, and the most significant constraints on the actions of states are the power and interests of other states. States attempt to achieve their interests through the most effective means available to them within the constraints imposed by the international system. Military interests dominate other nonmilitary concerns (Mearsheimer 2001, 31). When considering whether to project military force states weigh the material costs and benefits of their actions in relation to the power and interests of other states (Miller 1998).

Limitations of Basic Realism

From the basic realist perspective, states should not request approval from other weaker actors. The famous realist maxim asserts, "the strong do what they can, and the weak submit" (Thucydides 1960 [1943], 267). Strong states should not request international authorization and certainly not from an IO such as the UNSC which does

[20] For realism, IOs may operate as an intervening variable but not as an independent cause (Krasner 1982). Many variants of realism could be used to inform an explanation of the activities of states toward the UNSC. However, since structural realism is often considered to be a dominant theory of international politics (Wendt 1999, 2-3), I use this as a starting point to construct a realist account. Waltz's structural realism shares many attributes with these different forms of realism. For typical accounts of defensive realism see Snyder (1991), van Evera (1999), and (Rendall 2006). For offensive realism see Mearsheimer (2001) and Elman (2004). For classical realism see Morgenthau (2006), Carr (1939) and Wolfers (1962). On the differences among these schools of realist thought see Brooks (1997) and Rose (1998).

[21] There are, of course, many forms of materialist-rationalist theories which attempt to explain state behavior which utilize other variables—including sectoral, class, and bureaucratic interests among other. These are not considered here because of their limited ability to systematically explain interactions between actors at the international level.

not control any meaningful material resources. Powerful states do not submit. The UNSC cannot compel any state to follow its resolutions through force. So, theoretically, the most basic form of realism suggests that powerful states should not subject their foreign policies to approval from an IO. This theory does not match the empirical record presented in the previous section which shows that states have increasingly requested and secured international authorization. This expression of the theory does not apply to the cases I examine. Since it does not offer much in the way of a coherent explanation of the observed behavior of states when projecting military force, I turn to a more sophisticated version of realism after considering basic realism's observable implications.

Basic Realist Tests and Observable Implications

Basic realism suggests that power states do not submit to materially weaker actors. Weak actors submit themselves to more powerful ones. This can be stated as a general hypothesis.

> Basic Realism Hypothesis:
> *A state's control over fewer material resources increases its likelihood of requesting international authorization.*

This form of realism does not generate relevant testable expectations about international reactions, decision-making, or discursive evidence. Tests of this hypothesis focus solely on the pattern of state behavior.

Basic Realist Patterns. Some states may need assistance more than others. Developed countries have access to more resources while developing states have greater need which may affect their ability to project military force. Some states may need to spread their risk by gaining allies at different times. Weak states are the actors most likely to request international authorization. States with less developed economies control less resources

than developed economies. The test is to examine whether the influence of the level of development of a state and whether this correlates with requests for international authorization, measured by whether the state in question is developed or developing. This measurement assesses the structural condition of the lack of resources available to states. The pattern suggested by this explanation is that developing states should be the ones requesting international authorization.[22] The developing state should request international authorization to gain access to assistance including, in some cases, the material resources of a developed country which would allow the weaker country to project military force. Chapter III shows the results of the test to see if lesser developed states request international authorization more frequently than developed states.

Power: Sophisticated Realism

A sophisticated version of the realist explanation retains an emphasis on power. This explanation suggests that different structures of the international system are important in explaining international politics. In particular, the condition of unipolarity, in contrast to the bipolar world of the Cold War, offers the preponderant state less constraints on its ability to project military force (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; Jervis 2011; Wohlforth 1999). This perspective suggests that a powerful state can secure international authorization because powerful states have greater ability to secure international authorization compared to other, less powerful states. International

[22] The notion that developing states should be making international authorization requests has two issues that should be noted. First, such a proposition is directly contradictory to the sophisticated realist explanation in the following section. Second, and more importantly, the empirical record presented earlier shows that developed states like the U.S. are the ones requesting international authorization. Powerful states are more likely to want international authorization for the projection of military force because they have the resources to conduct military operations. Such a pattern may not hold in other contexts where powerful and weak states are on more equal footing.

authorization thus reflects power. This kind of explanation could account for why a powerful state, such as the U.S., would turn to an IO for international authorization. International authorization offers a way to influence other states without the exercise of pure unadulterated power. Such authorization is useful to have and easier for powerful states to obtain from an IO. Powerful states have an interest in requesting international authorization and they have the means to do so.

Limitations of Sophisticated Realism

A realist perspective presents no theoretical reason why the sophisticated version should be better than the basic form at describing international politics.[23] The realist perspective can lead to an argument in either direction.[24] Powerful states should either request international authorization more often or less often based on an explanation which relies on state power. This perspective suggests preponderant states should face fewer constraints without subjecting its foreign actions to any kind of scrutiny, especially from a materially weak IO. Even if requesting authorization is simply a formal but insignificant hoop to go through, it still represents a step that a powerful state should not have to accommodate.[25] On the other hand, a more powerful state should have greater control over the actions of others, including IOs, to produce an outcome from an IO that

[23] Basic realism does not compete with the other explanations since it predicts a different outcome than the observed values of the dependent variable.

[24] If anything, the basic realist claim is internally coherent by comparison to the more sophisticated version which cannot account for why a powerful state would want international authorization in the first place. Realism cannot explain the creation of such circumstances. It purports to explain state behavior after these circumstances have been created. Basic realism suggests that these circumstances should never have come about in the first place. If the sophisticated realist is correct that the rise of international authorization is uniquely reflective of state power, it still fails since it denies any account leading to this rise.

[25] If a state does not submit before it became powerful there is no reason to expect that a state should submit when it grows in strength.

is in the favor of the powerful state. Theoretically from a realist perspective there is no reason to prefer one line of argumentation about why states turn to IOs for international authorization. At this point the only reason to prefer a sophisticated realist explanation is because of the empirical record of the dependent variable presented in the previous section. Realism does not suggest why this empirical pattern exists rather than a different one. The lack of motive inherent in this brand of theorizing does not present a satisfying explanation.[26]

Sophisticated Realist Tests and Observable Implications

The sophisticated realist explanation addresses the characteristics of the projector, ranging from powerful to weak. Powerful states are states which hold more material resources compared to others. In particular, a state is powerful when it holds more material resources than the other members of an IO. States that are weak hold less power. Since military power is more important for realism than other forms of resources, I focus on military expenditures which can be used to compel other states to act when they would not otherwise. States that devote more resources to the military are more powerful than others.[27] Powerful states should be able to acquire international authorization from IOs

[26] The sophisticated realist explanation does make more sense out of the empirical pattern of state behavior. The pattern it predicts may be observationally equivalent to other competing explanations. If these other explanations account for more of this pattern of state behavior and asses the motive behind this action they are, by definition, a more complete explanation. Even if realism can predict the pattern of state behavior it cannot provide an account of why the circumstances came into existence in the first place.

[27] This is an imperfect measure and ignores many different forms of power, including situational forms. Often economic power is incorporated into this kind of measure since to have resources to devote to the military requires economic surplus which can be transferred. Of course, different theoretical traditions would use a different interpretation of power and necessitate a different measure when considering the strength of one actor over another (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

while weak ones should not.[28] When confronted by other powerful states, international authorization should not be forthcoming even for a dominant power if other states that carry enough weight oppose a projection of military force. We should see that the dependent variable matches up with the ability of the projector to compel other states. When powerful states hold an interest in projecting military force, we should see their request and the corresponding international authorization from an IO for this action. This explanation can be stated as a general hypothesis.

> Sophisticated Realism Hypothesis:
> *A state's greater control over material resources increases its likelihood of requesting international authorization.*

The case studies control for the power of the projector by focusing on the United States which has held a position of power within the international system since at least 1945 and a preponderant position since 1989. Chapter III tests the influence of military power on whether states request international authorization.

Sophisticated Realist Patterns. The sophisticated realist explanation suggests that the dependent variable's pattern should show powerful states requesting international authorization more often than weaker states. States should be seen to request international authorization from the IO over which they hold influence as the forum of choice. Powerful states request and are provided international authorization when they have an opportunity to project military force. There should be no instances where IOs deny

[28] Powerful states have the capabilities to project military force. Weak states often do not have the capacity to project military force because of a lack of material resources which would allow them to do so. Weak states are less likely to have the capabilities to project military force without assistance. The next section examines the need for additional resources as a motive to request international authorization.

international authorization to powerful states unless authorization is opposed by other powerful states.

Sophisticated Realist Decision Making and Discourse. Decision making in this model focuses on the power of other states. We should see decision makers focus on geopolitical concerns. The decision to project military force would be considered independently from the decision to request international authorization. Only after the decision to project military force has been made would decision makers turn to the issue of international authorization. Decision makers should consider the leverage they have over the membership of the IO including what kinds of side payments and threats they may need to use to prevent other powerful states from blocking their proposal and to secure international authorization. This process of acquisition of international authorization should occur in parallel to the planning of the projection of military force rather than either being contingent on the other. Military decisions should guide the timing of the projector's diplomatic tactics. Delays should not be allowed for diplomacy when military concerns dominate.

The powerful state should receive sanction from an IO to pursue the goals as initially set by the projector. This model does not allow negotiation over what will be authorized, and the powerful state should not accept more limited goals. Powerful states are not expected to change their goals to suit less powerful states. The powerful state that has to limit its goals it indicates a projector who is unable to exercise power to achieve the desired ends.

Sophisticated Realist International Reactions. Observer states will respond to the projection of military force based on their self-interest rather than on the basis of whether

a state acquires international authorization. If international authorization has been provided to the projector, and if observer states respond as realist theories suggest, then those states that have an interest in the projection of military force will respond favorably. Those who have interests against the projection will respond unfavorably. Under the circumstances where international authorization is not forthcoming, this theory would suggest that the response from foreign leaders would be the same.

Burden-Sharing

Rather than the use or threat of power playing the primary role to explain the changes in international authorization, the impetus to reduce costs could provide the motive to request international authorization. This explanation shares some of the features of a power-based explanation but focuses instead on how international authorization is seen by the leaders of states as a way to share the burden of projecting military force. Any attempt to project military force is a costly endeavor and carries many risks. A burden-sharing perspective suggests that states' leaders should request international authorization when they need help from other states to achieve their goals, or reduce costs and when they think securing authorization will translate into opportunities to gain the needed assistance from other states (Kreps 2011, 6).[29] To achieve some goals states need allies and want others to share their burden (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1997). A state would accept costs imposed by an IO as long as its leaders think they will gain more material support by acquiring international authorization. For instance, more powerful states tend to have the ability to contribute

[29] Many studies have concluded that this motivation is insufficient to explain why, for example, the U.S. turned to the UNSC despite shouldering the bulk of the burden for the Persian Gulf War (Thompson 2006, 15).

more equipment and material resources which can be used directly for the projection of military force while smaller states tend to contribute more to protection missions such as civil crisis management (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling 2009). Smaller states have an incentive to gain assistance from more powerful states that have the capabilities to carry out projections of military force. Reducing or sharing the burden of using military force is a relevant motivation for states to request authorization from an IO that needs to be examined.

Limitations of Burden Sharing

If international authorization functions to reduce the costs of an operation, then all states may request international authorization when they want to project military force since authorization can reduce their costs. Theoretically, then, we need a way to identify variance in the need for burden sharing if this factor is to explain the changes in the value of the dependent variable. A way to do this may be to distinguish intensity the need for additional resources. A projector may have an interest in projecting military force but without specific means to do so. The economic motivation does not account for another kind of burden sharing which includes the need to gain allies who provide specific advantages such as interoperability, basing, or fly-over rights which are necessary to conduct a successful military operation which maybe unrelated to the state of the projector's economy. Acquiring international authorization may be necessary in order to act multilaterally and secure allies for the military operation to take place (Jentleson 2003/2004, 9). Such incentives should be apparent in decision-making discussions which focus upon what the projector needs to successfully conduct the military operation.

An additional problem for this kind of theorizing is that international authorization has value which cannot be reduced to material factors. As purposeful actors, the leaders of states should engage in strategic reasoning that if they acquire international authorization they gain access to more material resources than they would without the authorization. Even powerful states which request international authorization percieve value in acquiring international authorization; otherwise they would not request international authorization. The problem with this reasoning for realism is that the value of international authorization is inherently nonmaterial. The only way in which international authorization leads to greater access to material resources is if other actors view international authorization as a reason to give more material resources to a projector. International authorization can provide legitimacy to a state's foreign policy. Other actors may provide a projector with basing and fly-over rights because a projection of military force has received international authorization. The intent of the projector may be to gain access to material resources, but the rationale for how securing international authorization translates into access is through a nonmaterial mechanism. The strategic calculation may look like a form of cost-benefit analysis but by necessity it includes nonmaterial concerns.

Burden Sharing Tests and Observable Implications

Generally speaking, states either need assistance or they do not. If states need assistance they should turn to an IO in the hope of gaining access to additional resources. The explanation of burden sharing for the changes in state behavior can be put forward as the general hypothesis:

Burden Sharing Hypothesis:
The need for help with material costs of the proposed action increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.

The need for material assistance can be measured in two ways to evaluate its influence on the outcome of interest.[30] The first measure is to assess the condition of the projector's economy. The second is to assess the expected size of the projection of military force compared to the size of military and other resources needed to project military force. These factors suggest that a distinct pattern should emerge in the relationship between the ratio of available resources to expected projection size and decisions to request international authorization. This explanation does not offer unique predictions about decision making or international reactions to a projection of military force.

Burden Sharing Patterns. The first way to test for the need of a state is to assess the economic condition of the projector. This can help identify the intensity of the projector's need for additional resources. If burden sharing makes a difference when states request international authorization, we should see an increase in requests when the projector's rate of growth is shrinking. If this perspective is correct about the politics of international authorization, we should see states which need assistance submitting their request for international authorization with the hope that authorization will yield allies which have the resources to carry out their proposed projection of military force. Periods of economic decline should see more instances of requesting international authorization.

[30] The level of economic development may be a third way to assess the influence of this factor. The tests for basic realism assess the relationship between economic development and international authorization requests. If the level of economic development is negatively related to international authorization request then the pattern is observationally equivalent for both basic realism and burden sharing explanations. If this is the case then we would need to turn to other tests from tracing the decision making process and international reactions to the projection. If there is no relationship, further testing is not warranted.

The second test of the burden sharing explanation looks at the size of the proposed projection of military force and compares it to the size of the projector's military and the other resources needed to project military force. Military operations such as airstrikes require fewer resources than full-scale, boots-on-the-ground invading forces. If resources are a determining factor, we should see larger operations associated with requests.

This hypothesis is evaluated in Chapter III. The case studies in this dissertation control for the level of development and the need for allies to successfully conduct a military operation by focusing on the U.S. As the world's most powerful country, the U.S. has sufficient material resources to conduct its missions. It is able to conduct military operations anywhere on the globe, independently and without assistance. The motivation to gain access to material resources to conduct the necessary military operations to achieve the mission goals may make UNSC authorization desirable for states other than the U.S.

Regime Type: Democracy and the Rule of Law

The democratic peace theory is a perspective which proposes that domestic institutions influence the external behavior of states (Doyle 1986). This perspective suggests that an explanation for the decision to request international authorization is based on domestic democratic regimes. Democratic regimes are less bellicose in their foreign behavior (Russett and Oneal 2001).[31] Following the same logic, states with a

[31] At least democratic states are claimed to be less bellicose towards other democracies. Whether there is a democratic peace and the precise mechanisms by which the democratic peace thesis operates is subject to much debate (see, for instance, Adler and Barnett 1998; Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Chan 1997; Chernoff 2004; Gartzke 2007; Thompson 1996). An evaluation of the

strong commitment to the rule of law are more likely to comply with international agreements (Kelley 2007). Democracies are more likely to consult international organizations about their foreign policies. This formulation suggests that states with democratic regimes are more likely to request international authorization to project military force from international organizations. The UNSC is the primary security organization in the international system. When states signed the UN Charter they agreed that the UNSC is responsible for keeping international peace and security.[32] This variable is controlled for in the case study the regime of the U.S. has had no meaningful change between the Cold War and the post-Cold War time periods that would affect the dependent variable. However, this factor may influence states other than the U.S. which can be examined through the cross-case portion of this project in Chapter III.

Limitations of Regime Type

Theoretically, regime type cannot account for the variance in requests made by a single state when there is no change in its regime type. Additional factors would be necessary to explain why under some conditions the U.S. does not request international authorization for the projection of military force or why it may request international authorization from varied organizations.

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democratic peace is beyond the scope of this project and is thus not covered here. The important aspect is whether domestic regime influences the decision of states to request international authorization.

[32] This leaves aside the issue of whether states have agreed to the specific mechanism of international authorization through the UNSC when projecting military force. As discussed in Chapter I, this mechanism was not contained in the UN Charter so it could be argued that states never committed to this particular form of behavior prior to using military force. When ratifying the UN Charter, states did commit to decisions of the UNSC made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as binding on all members of the UN. When the UNSC acts under Chapter VII its resolutions commit member states to specific actions. That requesting international authorization has become standard practice is part of a different theoretical explanation which does not rely on domestic regime type to explain international behavior. This explanation is discussed under the authority of the UNSC later in this chapter.

Regime Type Tests and Observable Implications

The influence of democratic institutions upon the decision to request international authorization can be stated as a general hypothesis.

> Regime Type Hypothesis:
> *A democratic regime increases the likelihood a state will request international authorization for projecting military force.*

The influence of democracy on the decision to request international authorization can be tested using scores from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This dataset codes democratic and antidemocratic characteristics along a continuum from -10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic. The expectation from this perspective is that higher numbers will be associated with request for international authorization. The decision-making or international reaction tests will not be included in Chapter III on cross-case assessments. These tests will be examined for the U.S. in the case studies. The patterns predicted by this explanation will be evaluated in Chapter III.

Regime Type Patterns. The pattern predicted by this explanation suggests that democracies will request international authorization more often than nondemocracies. Democracies will go to formal IOs of which they are members. Nondemocracies will use other criteria to determine when they should request international authorization, if at all. The pattern nondemocratic states should exhibit should have no relation to their regime type. Democratic projector s should request international authorization from a single IO which is the legal international source of authorization for this state. This kind of state should not request international authorization from different fora since it would not match up to their notions of the rule of law. International law claims that there is one legal source of international authorization for the projection of military force, the UNSC. Other

fora do not hold the same legal status and are questionable. The pattern should show that democracies make requests more often than other states.

Regime Type Decision Making and Discourse. If this explanation about how the decisions are made is correct then leaders will focus on the legality of their action and on meeting their obligations under international law. As long as the actions are legal the leaders of projectors will be reluctant to alter their goals to accommodate the interests of other states. Leaders of democratic states should connect their decision to project military force with the prospect of acquiring international authorization. If authorization is not likely to be forthcoming the leaders will try to avoid projecting military force. Legal advisers are the likely source pushing the projector to make a request for international authorization. In public statements about the decision to project military force the projector's leaders should describe the IO, where requests for international authorization are made, as the legal and democratic forum to make such a decision.

International Reactions to Regime Type. According to the logic of the democracy-based explanation, regime type determines foreign behavior. Democratic states should react differently than nondemocratic states to success or failure of a projector to gain international authorization. The leaders of democratic observer states should not express concerns about the intentions of the projector prior to a projection of military force. Instead they should claim that the projector needs to acquire international authorization before projecting military force because that is what democracies do. Their concern is that authorization be given according to the projector's obligation under international law. Criticism would not be based on the multilateral character of the projection of

military force. This explanation suggests that leaders of democratic observer states are more likely to provide support for democratic projectors who follow international law.

Information Transmission: Signaling and Political Costs

Now consider what might be observed if, rather than a material or restraint motivated world, we inhabited a place better described by theories which emphasize the flow of information as an explanation of why states decide to pursue international authorization. This perspective focuses on the role of IOs in providing information about a proposed use of military force. This perspective holds that audiences who are concerned about the projection of military force want reassurance about the consequences of the action (Voeten 2005).[33] International authorization signals to these audiences that the consequences of the action will be benign (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009). As independent actors, IOs can transmit credible information about the relative merits of a proposed projection of military force. If leaders think the political costs of their proposed action will be high and they are willing to pay the costs of acting through the IO, they will request international authorization to reassure audiences (Thompson 2006, 2009).[34] The theory of strategic information transmission incorporates the political costs and constraints from IOs to explain the motives of leaders who requests international

[33] Target audiences may also include domestic elites such as the U.S. Congress (Schultz 2003) or the domestic public (Chapman 2009, 2011; Fang 2008).

[34] If the situation is one in which the action itself is seen widely as a legitimate action (i.e., situations such the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001) there is no need to request authorization. Very low political costs are thus anticipated, but at the same time since the political costs are so low the constraints to be imposed by the IO would thus be correspondingly small as well. An alternative situation, at the other end of the spectrum, is where the action is extraordinarily controversial. Under these conditions the prospect for authorization by the organization are very low since it is a dubious prospect to project military force. This suggests that only within the particular middle ground of political costs would leaders request international authorization.

authorization.[35] The value of the transmission of information for leaders is a function of the expected political costs of the action, compared to the costs they would incur to secure international authorization from the IO. This section focuses on anticipated political costs, while the next one addresses the issue of IO constraints.

The commitment to the process of acquiring international authorization generates audience costs if a potential projector were to break this commitment (Slantchev 2006). This process, which reassures target audiences, can include targeting either foreign elites (Fearon 1997) or the general public within foreign states (Thompson 2009).[36] Foreign leaders and their populations may be concerned when other states decide to project military force beyond their borders since this action signals to others that a projector is not content with the status quo and the action may have harmful consequences. The endorsement of a neutral organization signals the projector's benign intentions and suggests that the action will have limited consequences. The effect of securing international authorization is to provide a "second opinion" about a proposed projection of military force confirming their support (Grieco et al. 2011). For instance, the UNSC's endorsement provides credible information to foreign audiences because of its institutional features and diverse membership (Thompson 2009, 39). IO support has an effect on the domestic support for the projection of military force.

[35] The argument is best expressed in Thompson (2009), which stresses that the anticipation of high international political costs and a low sensitivity to the requirements of acquiring international authorization will lead states to the UNSC. If one of these conditions is absent then the projector will turn to an RIO, if available, for international authorization. This situation is addressed later in this chapter.

[36] Foreign policy actions require some level of support beyond the set of policy makers in democratic and autocratic states. Democratic states require greater support from the citizenry. The channels of influence that the mass public has on autocratic leaders may be weaker and much more complicated than in democratic states.

This perspective is consistent with the notion that a powerful state would benefit from working through an IO, part of international political order, to project military force (Ikenberry 2001). Doing so restrains the preponderant state in exchange for the promise that other states will cooperate in the future. Working through an IO signals to other states that the powerful state will account for their interests in maintaining international order.

Limitations of Political Costs

An explanation based on transmitting information does have some limits. If this explanation best describes the pattern of requests for international authorization, then anticipated political costs during the Cold War were very low. According to this theory, low political costs lead to few requests for international authorization, as we saw during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, anticipated political costs for projecting military force should have risen and thus there were more requests for international authorization. Missing from this explanation is an account of how political costs were lower during the Cold War creating the pattern of state behavior describes by the dependent variable.

The second issue concerns the expectation that independent or even hostile organizations should be approached. Hostile organizations conceivably would not be expected to provide international authorization. According to this approach, meaningful information is conveyed by the endorsement of an organization which is not expected to endorse a proposed projection of military force. If an IO is expected to endorse the projection of military force, then a target audience has not gained any new information about the consequences of a proposed operation. Conservative, independent organizations

are unlikely to endorse a projection of military force which would have negative consequences (Thompson 2009, 34). Since these organizations are not expected to endorse military force, there is no political downside to asking (Chapman 2011). The UNSC and the Arab League are conservative organizations for the U.S. which are not expected to authorize a U.S. projection of military force. Getting rejected is without political significance to any target audience but getting the authorization from a conservative IO yields great political benefits because its endorsement goes against expectations.[37] On the other hand, NATO is a less conservative organization where the U.S. is expected to get a more favorable hearing. Rejection in this forum can provide new information about the proposed operation which target audiences did not have prior to the IO authorization.

Theoretically, if rejection does not involve any cost then projectors should always request international authorizations from organizations which they expect will *not* provide support. Taken to its logical and absurd conclusion, a state should request international authorization from organizations which are openly hostile to its interests since to do so could only yield benefits. The U.S. should have sought international authorization from the League of Arab States or the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.[38]

[37] The effect of confounding expectations is that credible information is provided to target audiences. This transmission occurs when membership of an organization is composed of either diverse states who hold preferences which can be in opposition to the projector or like-minded states who hold similar preferences but are likely to be opposed to the projector (Thompson 2009, 38-39). This effect emerges because of the difference between like-minded and difference-mined actors and their judgments. Difference-minded actors are those who by virtue of their expected opposition to the projector's policies make a difference by voicing their support for the projector. Like-minded actors make a difference if they voice their opposition. Both of these rely upon the actor voicing an unexpected opinion.

[38] While the U.S. is not a member of the Arab League, it has endorsed U.S. military action in some situations. These endorsements include the Persian Gulf War and the Libyan Intervention in 2011.

A rejection would have no significance to any audience which the U.S. would want to court so it encounters no political risk. While there is a rationale to this kind of strategy for the leaders of states when contemplating the projection of military force, empirical evidence does not suggest that this is what has taken place or that leaders have any similar strategy when contemplating a request. IOs tend serve the interests of their members, so it makes sense that the other members of the organization would share similar preferences. The fact that these absurd predictions logically and reasonably flow from the assumptions made within this explanation suggests that at a certain point it no longer makes sense to approach a hostile organization. But there is no theoretical justification about where this threshold should exist. The choice of which IO to approach must include some possibility that it will provide international authorization but not for every proposed military action. This is increasingly relevant for organizations which, under different conditions, may endorse the policy of an actor which they would not have even contemplated at a previous time.[39]

A third issue arrises when more than one IO endorses a projection of military force. If an organization is not expected to provide its authorization, then it should serve the political purposes of the projector. The expectation should be that the acquisition of international authorization from this organization should be enough, and the projector would stop pursuing international authorization from other organizations.[40] Empirically,

[39] For instance, the League of Arab States is an organization which is generally perceived as hostile towards the U.S., but has also endorsed projections of military force by the U.S.

[40] If an organization meets the criteria set by the authors of this argument, then it should be used as they suggest. Thompson (2009) and Chapman (2011) claim that based on the institutional design the UNSC is an IO which holds the ability to transmit credible information about a proposed projection of military force. The institutional design features concern composition of the membership and decision-making procedures. These features are important only in conveying credible information because they make it unlikely for the

this does not seem to be the case. One example of this would where an organization such as the Arab League provides authorization for an intervention against an Arab state (Thompson 2009, 39). We should expect that the U.S. upon receiving their endorsement would not need to turn to any other organization since this endorsement provides the political cover necessary to conduct military operations without international opposition. If the Arab League provides endorsement we should not expect the U.S. decision makers go to a different forum. However, in several instances, the U.S. has projected military force where the blessing of the Arab League came prior to the authorization from the UNSC. This includes U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf (1991), in Libya (2011) and even in the situation with Syria and the Arab Spring.[41] Theoretically distinguishing between organizations which meet the criteria to convey credible information is a difficulty for theoretical explanations which focus on the transmission of information from international organizations.

Fourth, this kind of explanation does not provide a rationale for why turning to an IO is the way the decision-making process should proceed over other methods to reduce political costs. It does not specify why leaders expect IOs to be better at reducing costs than other means. An attempt to reduce political costs comes from the reason why the action is controversial. For the use of military force the trend comes from the goal or

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organization to support projections of military force. If an alternative organization holds similar features or is expected not to support a projection, then it should logically convey credible information at the same level as the UNSC. Other organizations which are unlikely to support the U.S. include the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council or the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. All of these at one point or another have lent support to U.S. military action.

[41] Calls for intervention by the Arab League also have more recently included calls for the UNSC to step in to authorize intervention (e.g., Stack and MacFarquhar 2012). NATO has done the same thing in its assessment of when military force can be projected (Knowlton 2011).

intentions of the projector. Goals, such as regime change, are very controversial and fit the reason why there were problems with securing international authorization against Iraq under the presidency of George W. Bush. Other means can be used to reduce the international political costs which include forming rhetorical reassurances such as increasing transparency in policy making, notification procedures, forms of credible commitments, and accepting more limited goals including limitations on troop movements. These forms of means have the ability to successfully signal to other states the projector's intentions (Fearon 1997).

Political Costs Tests and Observable Implications

Anticipated political costs as a variable are assessed as high, medium and low anticipated political costs and assessed through qualitative means. Rather than material resources stressed by realism, this explanation focuses on political concerns and can be stated as the proposition:

> International Political Costs Hypothesis:
> *The anticipation of high political costs for the proposed projection of military force increases the likelihood of projectors requesting international authorization.*

Specific observable implications of this explanation can be assessed and are identified in the remaining parts of this section. They are used to test this hypothesis that high anticipated political costs drive the decision to request international authorization.

Political Costs Patterns. The pattern of behavior which this explanation predicts is based on IOs reducing the political costs of a projection of military force. Global organizations, such as the UNSC, and regional ones have the ability to reduce these costs. According to this explanation the pattern of state behavior should show that many different organizations are approached to authorize the projection of military force since a

multitude of IOs can reduce political costs. While the decision to request international authorization may be based on the particulars of each instance, the overarching pattern should display varied use of IOs.

Political Costs Decision Making and Discourse. The decision to request international authorization would be primarily a political decision about how to bolster support for the policy. Political advisers should be the source of the pressure within the administration to request international authorization.[42] The process should compare different IOs and their relative merits. The decision makers will settle on the IO which can best work for the political purposes of the executive administration. IOs would be viewed as a tool which can be used to solve political problems rather than a hurdle to get through. These foreign policy advisors should focus upon the mandate of the IO, and how to reduce political problems. Discussion of how to sell the mission would be privately espoused by comments to other political advisers. Military advisers should focus on the operational aspects of the proposed use of military force rather than political issues. Military advisers should exhibit concern about the constraints of working through an IO and altering the policy to suit the concerns of other states. (The next explanation offers a discussion on IO constraints.)

The place where the diplomatic work takes place should vary depending on the anticipated political costs. If the anticipated political costs are high, then the drafting of statements and resolutions should be by the high ranking executive administration officials. If costs are thought to be low, then it should take place within the diplomatic

[42] If there are alternative methods of lowering the political costs without resorting to international authorization, then political advisers should prefer the alternative since it means avoiding the costs of working through an IO.

mission to the international organizations. After securing international authorization, leaders in the intervening state should stress the informational attributes of the organization in their public remarks. They should discuss the neutrality and varied membership of the IO. The leaders should affirm that this is a clear signal that the projection of military force is justified and will not have harmful consequences.

International Reactions to Political Costs. Leaders of observer states should discuss the information they receive from the IO and what can be inferred from others' use of the same organization. Prior to the projector securing international authorization, observer states should express their concerns about the intentions of the projector. These leaders should express their support for the projection of military force in the aftermath of authorization which correspond to their "before" concern. They should suggest that the IO's authorization demonstrates benign intentions. Their "before" concerns should reflect their criticism after a projection of military force without international authorization.

IO Constraints: Reasons to Avoid Making a Request

While signaling may be a reason to go to an IO, we turn to a perspective that suggests that the decision is dominated by concerns about reasons not to make a request. Assessing the costs of acquiring international authorization influences this decision (Kreps 2011; Thompson 2009). Decision makers may view the acquisition of international authorization as having benefits that need to be considered in light of the downside of international authorization. Any decision to request international authorization compares the benefits to the costs of international authorization. The costs of international authorization represent constraints on the projector's freedom of action and as organizational costs to conduct the operation. This perspective suggests the

benefits of international authorization come, at least in part, from the projector's willingness to pay these costs before engaging in a projection of military force.

Organizational requirements are separate from the costs required to make policy and run the military operation—costs which come from working through the organization that do not directly affect the specific decision making. Two important organizational costs are scrutiny costs (Thompson 2009, 62) and transaction costs (Keohane 1984, 89-92). Scrutiny costs are incurred through the process of gaining authorization from an IO by making public the details of the policy. Because the projector goes through an IO for authorization, other states get the opportunity to review the interests, intentions, and methods of a foreign policy action. Public discussion and deliberation focuses on the details of the proposed military action. The process of requesting international authorization increases the scrutiny costs since it affords the opportunity for other states to closely examine the proposed policy action. This public scrutiny becomes an opportunity for many to criticize the projector and raises the political price if the policy fails (Baum 2004). Transaction costs include efforts to gain authorization which include the diplomatic efforts to persuade others to vote in favor of international authorization.[43] International institutions can lower transaction costs by providing a permanent setting for diplomatic interactions (Keohane 1982), but they can also increase certainty by raising them as well. The diplomatic initiatives such as side payments and threats also fall into this category of cost. All of these efforts to secure international authorization require time

[43] This activity may be lower in comparison to a world without the specific organization but there are still forms of transactions involved in the diplomatic negotiations which require states to put resources into their effort to attempt securing international authorization.

spent which can stall other actions. Delaying the proposed projection of military force is seen by many as the most significant cost paid for international authorization.

Constraints limit a projector's freedom of action when it works through an IO to project military force. This process complicates policy making, reduces autonomy from unilateral action, and can bind the projector to a specific policy or face the domestic costs of breaking its commitment (Fearon 1997). These constraints are a form of policy making cost (Thompson 2009, 59) which forces the projector to change goals, methods, and often the timing of action when conducting military operations. Adjustments are made in conducting the military operation to account for other actors' contributions to the operation. Contributing to an operation provides the coalition member with the right to voice how the operation should be run, thus increasing the influence costs where the projector needs to gain approval of (or explicitly reject pressures from) other coalition members at each decision point (Thompson 2009, 59).[44] Compromises in the projector's policy increase the costs of the operation and may threaten the projector's interests (Kreps 2007). Interoperability of the various military units is also an issue for the coalition. Each additional member makes working as a coherent whole more complicated and thus difficult to manage (Kreps 2007). International authorization commits the projector to a specific policy. If the projector were to deviate from this policy it would face increased costs based on what the projector has already committed to enact.[45] These

[44] At a minimum the projector would need to inform its allies of any changes in plans.

[45] The U.S., France, and the United Kingdom have faced this problem in their interactions with Russia over the Arab Spring movement in Syria. Russia has claimed that the U.S. and its allies exceeded the UNSC mandate to use force in 2011 Libya (MacFarquhar 2012; Russian diplomat: Moscow will block any UN resolution urging Assad to step down 2012). The Russian Federation is reluctant to support criticism of the Syrian regime and is even willing to veto resolutions that do so. This is an international diplomatic cost regarding cooperation on Middle East politics.

contributions to a military operation limit the autonomy of a projector in making and carrying out a projection of military force.

Limitations of IO Constraints

The costs of projecting military force through an international organization demonstrate similar problems to that of anticipated political costs. If the constraints of IOs explain the rise of international authorization, then a dramatic shift in these constraints must have taken place. During the Cold War, constraints imposed by IOs must be substantially greater than after the end of the Cold War.[46] Empirically, the pattern which should emerge should show something that makes IOs more lenient during the post-Cold War period. The constraints imposed may reflect the hostility the IO or its members have towards either the projector or the action which is under evaluation. As political institutions, IOs may not evaluate the actual legitimacy of the projection of military force at all. Members of the IO may take their positions only based on politics.[47]

The influence of this variable is different from the others discussed in this chapter. The presence of this variable pushes states away from requesting international authorization rather than drawing them in. This factor is influential if the decision makers include the costs of working through the IO as their reason for not making a request when they otherwise would do so. Hence there needs to be other factors pushing the state to request international authorization. If these factors are present and the costs are seen to be too high for the decision makers, then we should still see the state project military force

[46] Empirically this may be the case for the UN for either of the major Cold War combatants. However, other IOs which have only the U.S. or the USSR should be approached. The Warsaw Pact or NATO should serve as an adequate venue for a potential projector.

[47] This perspective suggests that a diverse membership reduces the potential bias of an IO.

without international authorization. IO constraints have to be weighed in consideration with the benefits of international authorization. Even if costs are very small but benefits are lacking, a rational calculation would still suggest that a projector will not put forward a request. However, it is not clear when the costs of international authorization exceed the threshold that would deter a projector from making a request.

IO Constraints Tests and Observable Implications

When sensitivity to IO constraints becomes high the projector will be less likely to request international authorization. If sensitivity to these costs is low a projector is more likely to pursue international authorization through the IO. This explanation focuses on costs paid for working through an IO rather than material or political costs which drive a state to request international authorization. This explanation can be stated as a general proposition.

> IO Constraints Hypothesis:
> *The insensitivity to constraints imposed by IOs increases the likelihood leaders will request international authorization.*

This explanation does not offer any predictions about the international reactions of observer states. The remaining parts of this section examine the observable implications of the behavioral patterns and decision-making predictions from this variable.

IO Constraints Patterns. As with anticipated political costs, the IO constraint perspective suggests that projectors should request international authorization from many different IOs. The attempt here is to reduce the constraints on the projector. Different IOs may place different degrees of constraints upon the projector. It would make sense to see the projector asses which IO constrains the least. We should see different IOs approached to provide international authorization.

Based on this explanation a secondary pattern in state behavior should be apparent. Decisions to request international authorization should display a clustered pattern where international authorizations appear in groups rather than in isolated instances. The decision to request international authorization is dependent upon the sensitivity of the leaders in the intervening state to constraints. Some of leaders are more sensitive than others but the executive administration should have a similar disposition when contemplating different instances when the same administration has an opportunity to project military force. President Reagan's Administration should not substantially change its sensitivity to IO constraints while in office. The Reagan Administration held a similar disposition towards IO constraints the entire time Reagan was in office. The Clinton Administration should hold a consistent disposition toward IO constraints when contemplating the projection of military force in 1993 compared to the disposition of the administration in 1998, and so on. The decision to either request international authorization or not is dependent upon the disposition of the administration and should be correlated with each executive leader so that requests are clustered together.

IO Constraints Decision Making and Discourse. Within the decision-making process when IO constraints are the primary issue, sovereignty and autonomy should be identified as major concerns while decision makers plan the projection of military force and determine whether to request international authorization. If sensitivity to IO constraints is high, decision makers will not want to modify their goals for others even when pressed by strong allies. If they are not sensitive they will be more willing to alter their goals to accommodate others. However, the decision to project military force should not be connected to the prospects of acquiring international authorization. The decision should

be seen as separate by decision makers. When sensitivity is high, delays for diplomatic activity would be highly criticized. This explanation does not make predictions about where the support for requesting IA should come from but it does make predictions about where opposition should come from. The opposition should come from operators including military advisers who should be the most sensitive to the constraints of IOs.

If decision makers are concerned about the costs of IO constraints as a high priority, it would make sense that they would discuss the costs of requesting international authorization from different fora. The next section discusses what this would look like.

Permutations on Politics and Constraints: Forum Shopping

Proponents of the theory of strategic information transmission suggest that considering sensitivity to IO constraints and anticipation of high political costs together will produce an outcome different than if either is considered independently. Thompson (2009) asserts that the presence of only one of these factors leads projectors to look for an RIO for international authorization. The anticipation of high international political costs and a low sensitivity to the requirements of acquiring international authorization will lead states to the UNSC. The UNSC is the most effective IO for this purpose of lowering political costs of the projection of military force (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009). The UNSC has design characteristics which boost political support when it provides an operation with international authorization. If a projector's leaders anticipate low political costs there is no need to turn to an IO for international authorization. If only one of these variables points in the direction for a projector to request international authorization then the projector should turn to an RIO, if one is available, rather than to the UNSC. RIOs are thought to impose fewer constraints on a projector. If the sensitivity to IO constraints are

high and the anticipated political costs are as well, then an RIO may offer lower constraints and still be able to reduce the political costs faced by the projector.

Limitations of Forum Shopping

The logic of this explanation does contain a problem. The choice between a global IO (the UNSC) and a RIO is not well explained. That projectors would pursue RIO authorization may make logical sense. If, as this explanations suggests, decision makers are concerned about the political costs of projecting military force and IO constraints, then they should always prefer an RIO to the UNSC. They should do this since projecting military force is always politically risky. So, the notion of anticipating political costs which can be ameliorated by a formal IO should always be present. And, if state leaders are also concerned with sovereignty and autonomy then they would prefer a less constraining IO. To some degree this concern resides in all political leaders who want to remain in power as political leaders. The qualities of RIOs should make them the preferred solution to the issue of the combined tensions of anticipated political costs and IO constraints. Political costs will be reduced so that the projector reaps the benefits of the IO's authorization and the constraints are lower than they would be if the projector sought authorization from the UNSC. RIOs can more easily be controlled by the projector, yet they have political benefits which would make them the preferred choice to reduce political costs anticipated by the leaders of a projector.

Forum Shopping Tests and Observable Implications

The expectations or predictions based on this variant of information transmission do not make any unique predictions about international reactions. The unique predictions

are based on when leaders anticipate high political costs but do not want to pay the costs of IO constraints. The outcome can be presented as a general hypothesis.

> Forum Shopping Hypothesis:
> *Anticipation of high political costs of a projection of military force and high sensitivity to IO constraints will increase the likelihood that leaders will request international authorization from a RIO.*

Forum Shopping Patterns. As with the anticipated political costs and IO constraints, many IOs should be considered by the potential projector. The forum which suits the immediate political purposes of the projector will be the one selected for any given instance. This will show up in the pattern of state behavior. If the limitations of this explanation hold, RIOs should be the preferred source of international authorization. We should see states requesting international authorization from RIOs more frequently than from either the UNSC or failing to request authorization.

Forum Shopping Decision Making and Discourse. Decision makers should discuss the costs and benefits of different IOs. The issue of which IO would constrain the projector the least should emerge when discussing the prospects of projecting military force. The cases from both time periods, during and after the Cold War, include enough variation to ensure that the factors which may influence "IO constraints" unique to each time period should not bias any results.

Norms and an Era of Multilateralism

Moving away from more "materialist" explanations, this next section takes us into a realm where an ideational factor, the norm of multilateralism, describes why leaders decide to request international authorization. According to the logic of this explanation, states should request authorization because of the perceived appropriateness of the approval from a formal international organization and related procedures a projector must

go through when projecting military force (Finnemore 2003). Proponents of this theory argue that a growing norm of multilateralism emerged after the Second World War (Ruggie 1992), prompting increased authorization requesting in state behavior.[48] This norm is durable despite changing circumstances, including differences in the material distribution of power within the international system (Weber 1992). Fundamental changes in the normative framework used to evaluate the projection of military force took place after the end of World War II which required a more substantive form of multilateralism when conducting operations to project military force (Finnemore 1998). The projection of military force became acceptable if it was conducted through multilateral procedures rather than unilateral actions of a single state (Finnemore 2003).[49] Projecting military force with the authorization of a formal IO is seen as the correct way to do so.

The logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) forms the basis of this theoretical explanation.[50] Multilateralism is seen as a good in itself as opposed to any potential material benefits of acting multilaterally. The process of working through a

[48] There is a difference between 'substantive' multilateralism which emerged after the end of World War II and formal forms of multilateralism which existed previously (Ruggie 1992). This understanding of what is multilateral changed in substantive qualitative ways from the 19th century producing the effect that coordination through a formal international organization is a necessary step for multilateralism and thus the legitimacy of the intervention itself. Substantive multilateralism requires working through an international organization while a formal form of multilateralism merely requires the cooperation of more than two states. Such an interpretation suggests that 'formal' multilateralism would include two armies fighting the same enemy but without any form of coordination or adaptation of policy to account for the other army.

[49] An additional change in the normative framework happened along with the move to substantive multilateralism. The normative understanding of who is human changed to include nonwhite foreign citizens (Finnemore 1996). While this altered when states decided to project military force this aspect of the normative framework does not influence the means by which states decide to project military force.

[50] The logic of consequences suggests actors view their action based on consequences in contrast to the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998).

formal IO opens the process for other states to see the actions taken by the primary projector *and* to criticize aspects of the policy prior to its implementation. This process of working through a formal IO thus legitimates the policy to member states.[51] Their ability to voice their opinion enhances the legitimacy of the policy. This explanation suggests that multilateralism is the proper way to pursue goals when projecting military force.

Limitations of Multilateralism

This perspective suggests that the norm of multilateralism has grown stronger since the end of World War II. A particular difficulty for this theory of the rise of international authorization is the dramatic change between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. To explain this difference the theory of the norm of multilateralism would have to become substantially stronger right at the end of the Cold War, and evidence of this should be clear that the multilateralism norm is connected to the behavior of states. However, this explanation suggests that most formal international organizations would meet the needed procedural requirements of the norm. The expectation is that many different IOs would be used by states requesting international authorization for normative reasons.[52]

[51] Criticism does not have to be given for the process to legitimate the action. It is merely enough to provide the opportunity for other states to criticize the potential action. This reaction occurred during the formation of the United Nations as smaller states objected to the right of the veto but acquiesced to its inclusion in the UN Charter in part because they had the opportunity to register their objections (Hurd 2007).

[52] This is in contrast to the authority of the UNSC discussed in the next section.

Multilateralism Tests and Observable Implications

The potential values of a norm of multilateralism for projecting military force can be strong, weak or not present. The strength of the norm can be assessed and the general proposition will be tested. This can be stated as a general hypothesis.

> Multilateral Norm Hypothesis:
> *The high value projectors' leaders place on the process of multilateralism increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*

The remainder of this section examines the observable implications of this explanation and develops tests for the norm of multilateralism.

Multilateral Patterns. Several techniques can be used to test this explanation of the rise of international authorization. The pattern of state behavior should display an increase in the frequency of multilateral operations for the projection of military force. The increase should be gradual as the multilateral norm gathers strength. Projectors should request international authorization from different sources since the procedure required of a norm of multilateralism is that the projection be approved by a formal international organization. The global security organization, the UNSC, or RIOs with a security related focus suit this purpose and can be used by projectors to authorize their projections of military force. Both are available and should be seen in the pattern of requests.

Multilateral Decision Making and Discourse. The decision-making process should display a consideration and emphasis on multilateral procedures. Leaders of projectors should request international authorization because of their sense of procedural correctness. This concern should be evident in planning meetings. Most decision makers will view it necessary to consult with major allies and raise the issue through an institutionalized organization such as NATO, the UNSC, or other multilateral fora. Leaders should be willing to modify their goals to accommodate other states as this may

be necessary for them to secure international authorization. Accommodating other states' interests indicates the value of the institution of multilateralism over the parochial interests of individual states. This decision to project military force is connected to the prospects of acquiring international authorization.

Organizational bodies should be described by leaders both in their public remarks and in planning meetings as legitimate fora for international authorization and their related procedures. The source of the push to request international authorization should come from many sources since this is a norm that guides the leaders of the projector. When the norm is contested the sources should primarily be political but as the norm becomes stronger we should see others joining the support for requesting international authorization. The last holdouts should be those who are ideologically opposed. The diplomatic work should take place within the diplomatic mission when the norm has become consolidated. The process assumes a "taken-for-granted" quality as the act of making a request for international authorization becomes less controversial until it becomes a regular habit of projectors.

International Reactions to Multilateralism. When international authorization has been granted, observer states should justify their support by stressing the multilateral character of the action and the organization to bestow international authorization. Leaders of observer states should suggest that the projector act multilaterally. As the norm gathers in strength pressure from foreign leaders should increase as well. The intentions of the projector are not relevant for a process based account. This is an explanation based on the norm of the projector following proper procedures. Foreign leaders should not be concerned with the consequences of the action itself. Support for the projection of

military force should increase with international authorization. Foreign leaders should justify their support or opposition to a proposed projection of military force on the basis of following the proper procedures contained in the international authorization.

A good way to identify a functioning multilateral norm is by examining responses when the norm has been violated. Foreign leaders' response to a lack of authorization by characterizing it as a violation of the proper procedures of multilateralism will demonstrate support for this explanation. Characterizing the lack of authorization as against their interests or for some other reason will cast doubt on this as a reason for the rise of international authorization.

UNSC Authority

A different form of constructivist explanation holds that decisions to request international authorization after 1989 are due to a dynamic of UNSC authority over a state's projection of military force rather than variables such as the value of the information signaled. This perspective suggests that the greater authority of the UNSC emerged as a consequence of the U.S. decision to request international authorization from the UNSC during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. This explanation posits that requesting international authorization became the model for projecting military force in the post-Cold War international environment. The Persian Gulf War was seen as a success both in terms of international cooperation and for the goals set during this military action. In contrast to the alternative explanations discussed earlier in this chapter, this explanation takes a different perspective on causality. It stresses the path-dependent characteristic (Pierson 2004, 17-55) of this institutionalized model which emerged from

an historical event.[53] Once a choice has been made, subsequent decisions face constraints which provide incentives for remaining on the same 'path' which has already been marked. The U.S. acted during the uncertainty accompanying the end of the Cold War, reinforced its action by using rhetoric which attributed authority to the UNSC, and then continued to act as if the UNSC held this authority. This argument requires two parts. First, there is a period of time where there is uncertainty and, as a consequence of this uncertainty, greater opportunities for action. At this point in time new, different, or experimental actions can be undertaken.[54] Second, within this time period a precedent is created which breaks from previous modes of behavior. A precedent is "an act or statement that serves or is intended to serve as an example, reason, or justification for a later one" (Kier and Mercer 1996, 79).[55] The precedent is reinforced and becomes the foundation of an institutionalized model of state behavior (Kier and Mercer 1996). Precedents shape the way we think about similar events or later acts. It is reinforced through rhetoric, where actors claim the necessary of requesting international authorization before projecting military force and through action. Actors may engage in strategic behavior for instrumental advantage, and many may do so because they see this is how it has been done before.[56] Actions are more likely to become precedents under two

[53] This comes from the notion that any decision to project military force is influenced by the events which surround previous decisions to project military force.

[54] These junctures are often referred to as critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or turning points (Abbott 1997).

[55] Precedents are not new to international politics. Thomas Schelling (1966) identifies precedent as an important part of conflicts including the Cold War. Precedents distinctively "…will be the more expectable, the more recognizable, the more natural and obvious, the more people have got used to recognizing it in the past" (Schelling 1966, 138).

[56] One problem in demonstrating that norms or ideas matter for individuals is that strategic action is often seen as an indication that a norm is not functioning. Change in cultural structures often includes at least

conditions: when they are undertaken under conditions of uncertainty and when they are viewed as successful. Uncertainty about the prevailing structures means that actors are looking for guideposts to the expectations of what others will do. Actors are willing to mimic others' actions in a response to uncertainty, ensuring that the legitimacy of the action spreads (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67). Thus, precedent starts a path-dependent process that produces a behavioral norm.

The first part of this argument is that the end of the Cold War was a time of uncertainty. In an environment of uncertainty decisive action can change the trajectory of subsequent events (Sewell 1996a). The alternative explanations, offered earlier in this chapter, start from a conception of temporality which holds the structure which constrains social interactions as constant and universal.[57] Adopting an "eventful" conception of temporality suggests that historic events contribute to the shape of structures (Sewell 1996b).[58] Events are capable of changing both the composition of causal forces and the logic by which these structures operate (Sewell 1996b, 263). In other words historical events have the capacity to change the constraints faced by individuals by changing the

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three groups: those who oppose the change outright, many who are "true believers," *and* those who follow the new pattern of behavior for instrumental reasons (Eckstein 1988). In a sense, the behavior is followed by both "true believers" and by those who do not believe that it is appropriate but who act strategically and instrumentally because it benefits them. In addition, differing standards of appropriateness can be strategically employed by actors such that they put forth different claims about ideational standards of how action should take place. Decision to claim one over another can be made on the basis of the strategy used by various actors who are attempting to achieve specific goals.

[57] One exception is the norm of multilateralism which views social structure as gradually changing over time. This approach does not require a break from previous modes of human action.

[58] The debates over agency and structure are present in sociological literatures (Granovetter 1985; Sewell 1992) as well as discussions of international politics (Bieler and Morton 2001; Clark 1998; Dessler 1989; Wendt 1987; Wight 1999) and even studies of foreign policy (Carlsnaes 1992).

location of the various structures and, equally important, how these structures constrain different actors.

Crafting an explanation about changes in international structures means adopting a more historic or "eventful" view of causality. The explanation of the frequency of international authorization holds that the greater authority of the UNSC motivated changes in state behavior after the Cold War. These changes occur because of decisive action taken by a notable actor under conditions of uncertainty.[59] The end of the Cold War created a juncture where actors were unsure how they should act towards the UN Security Council. An eventful juncture occurs when structural constraints on the options for political action are relaxed (Capoccia & Keleman 2007).[60] During such a juncture, expectations of how states would behave were unclear. Under such conditions decisive and successful policy actions can provide long lasting changes in the expectations of how actors are supposed to behave. The actions taken are strategic for immediate purposes. In

[59] This decisive action came to be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is especially important for the study of the UNSC as the Council does not control any of the means of coercive force within the international realms. This connection between legitimacy and the UNSC is not something new. Inis Claude (1966, 1967) introduced the concept of "collective legitimation" whereby policy statements from some actors become authoritative. Scholars who have discussed "collective legitimization" and the role of the UNSC in producing a legitimation effect include institutionalists (Keohane 2006; Thompson forthcoming; Voeten 2005), constructivists (Hurd 2007), and legal scholars (Welsh 2004), among others (Luard 1984). This use of collective legitimation focuses upon the effect of the statements by UNSC. However, collective legitimation as an explanation for the behavior of states towards the UNSC does not account for the variance in state behavior between the Cold War and post-Cold War time periods. A theory based on collective legitimation would hold that the authoritativeness of the UNSC is constant and thus would require additional factors to explain the variance. A precedent-based account can be built upon this foundation as legitimacy has been recognized by those involved in UN peacekeeping operations as a significant aspect of peacebuilding (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2008).

[60] Capoccia and Keleman (2007) use this definition to identify "critical" junctures. I use their definition to identify "eventful" junctures where multiple choices which were previously unavailable become viable. Junctures of this nature become critical based on their effects. A choice which creates a different pathway can then be described as "critical" in that the juncture resulted in a different trajectory from the previous path. An uncritical juncture is a point where opportunities for change occur but the actors involved make the decision to continue to act as before the juncture was reached. In effect, these look as if no change from the previous pattern has occurred.

effect they use "strategic action [to] make transformative events possible in the first place" (Sewell 1996b, 271). Such action requires both rhetoric about the appropriateness of the category of action and follow-up action where the same actor sought authorization using the same model of behavior, this time when attempting to intervene in subsequent projections of military force.

This contingent causal story is one where the initial act occurred during a time where the state's relations with the UNSC were uncertain. Requesting UNSC authorization set a precedent which could provide justification for later actions. At the time, it represented a potential institutional model which then became a standard to evaluate how future uses of projections of military force should take place. Actions taken under conditions of uncertainty can set standards for appropriate behavior, but these precedents require reinforcement (Kier and Mercer 1996). Especially an action seen positively by observers can be used as a standard and hold its appeal as a model for subsequent action. Reinforcement takes place when future actions are taken in a similar manner to the initial act and reference is made to the original as a reason to act this way. If an act is not repeated or used as justification, it stands as an anomaly rather than as precedent. Subsequently, anomalies can be disregarded, having failed to transform political structures.

Authority Tests and Observable Implications

I develop two key claims about the UNSC. The first is that the end of the Cold War was a juncture for the UNSC and the United States. The end of the Cold War did represent a large change for the international system (Holsti 1994; Ikenberry 2001; Ruggie 1994). The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the relationship between

states and the UNSC. The second claim is that UNSC authority has changed. This section develops tests of these changes.

I argue that states request authorization from the UNSC because of the enhanced authority of the UN Security Council. Crafting tests of this explanation is more difficult than the identification of an eventful juncture. Ian Hurd (2008) suggests three ways to identify the authority of the UNSC: state compliance with UNSC rules; the way states justify their behavior; and the inclusion of the UNSC in the strategic calculations of states. Hurd concludes that this last option is not a very good indicator. The inclusion of the UNSC in strategic calculations is observationally equivalent to alternative explanations. State compliance and justifications can help identify the authority of the UNSC. While each has limitations, examining the justifications used by states has the best possibility of identifying the changes in authority. This concept is a difficult to measure, and it is difficult to remove confounding influences in any assessment of its leverage over an outcome of interest (Hurd 2008, 37). However, strategies exist based on the comparative method which can increase the leverage of these tests to assess the influence of the UNSC's authority in a way that can be used to answer the research question.

The first way Hurd discusses to identify the UNSC's approach is through state compliance. If states follow the rules put forth by an IO, this compliance could be an indicator that the IO holds authority over the state. This indicator presents problems. Compliance with international rules and treaties is a misleading category when evaluating causal effects (Martin 2011). While compliance may be an indicator of the authority of an IO, compliance failure may not be the result of strategic calculations made by states

(Chayes and Chayes 1993). States may not comply because of alternative structural reasons that prevent their compliance.

Often the notion of compliance is taken to indicate that a state should exhibit a taken for granted quality rather than a strategic or instrumental approach (Hurd 2008, 33). Many assessments of the influence of the UNSC take strategic and socialized rule following as mutually exclusive categories (e.g., Chapman 2009; Thompson 2006, 2009). This unreasonable standard places the notion of following rules in a position where the actor becomes unthinking or reasoning. If rule-followers were simply automatons this standard would make sense; however, real people are not. "Reputation, status, and social standing are all derived from appropriateness, and all enter into strategic thinking" (Hurd 2008, 34). Decisions to comply are in fact strategic. Decision to employ symbolic standards, such as following UNSC rules, can be strategic decisions (Hurd 2002). When a teenager makes the decision to comply with a curfew imposed by her parents, enforcement power and authority can both be present in the teenager's calculations about whether to follow the rules. Enforcement can be present because of the fear of grounding, and even the desire to avoid disapproval is a strategic calculation which is not based on the enforcement powers of the parents. The issue of being grounded would qualify as a form of parental hard power, while the issue of the approval of a parent would certainly be a soft, intangible, ideational form of power. Compliance involves issues of appropriateness. In fact, this example illustrates that compliance is observably equivalent to other relations of power (Hurd 2008, 37). Using compliance as a standard for authority is thus problematic.

The traditional approach to assess such issues is to disentangle compliance as motive from compliance. Motive comes from normative pressures while complaince comes from material interest. Such a form comes in when leaders discuss whether to request international authorization compared to the decision-making discussion where the leaders, accepting that they have to make a request, discuss how they want to announce their policy of making the request. The latter is often thought of as coming from a normative point. The problem with this characterization is that both are actually mixed-motive discussions. Both decisions include considerations based on material and ideational classifications. "Should we request UNSC authorization," involves the idea of good behavior (i.e. "good states go the UNSC"). This is an appropriateness issue but the answer includes assessing both material and ideational interests. The latter intersts include intangible political issues such as domestic public support and different normative standards of behavior. The notion of that leaders consider that "we have to go to the UNSC, but how do we talk about it" shows that leaders want to rationalize their actions in particular ways. In both kinds of discussions leaders express what they deem important when framing their public statements. Strategic behavior includes normative frames and competing ideas. Simply identifying compliance without understanding motives does not provide much leverage in understanding why states act the way they do.

The second way to identify authority is based on "examining evidence that actors feel the need to *justify* their behavior to the institution" (Hurd 2008, 34, emphasis in the original). If the UNSC had no authority, states would have no reason to justify their actions to the organization (Hurd 2008, 35). Justifications used by states may point the way towards understanding the operation of UNSC authority. Thus, do the leaders of

intervening states justify their decision to request authorization for the international use of force in terms of the authority of the UNSC? Evidence of such a proposition includes the terms in which leaders frame their decisions to project military force. If the leaders of both observer states and projectors frame their decisions in terms of legitimacy and the UNSC in their public statements, such framing would corroborate the explanation that the authority of the IO matters. The rhetoric used justify previous actions can be used to justify their latter actions. Leaders' use of normative arguments should indicate different options and discuss the value of acting multilaterally and the inherent value of multilateral action. After the crystallization or institutionalization of the normative behavior leaders should then justify their decisions in terms of the international community and the appropriateness of projecting military force through the UNSC. This can also be stated as a general hypothesis.

> Authority Hypothesis
> *Greater authority of the UNSC increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*

This testable proposition will aid in assessing the causal influence of the authority of the UNSC but particular strategies must account for the problems identified by Hurd. First, it is necessary to assess the justifications provided in comparable cases. Similar cases which control for confounding influences can be used to assess the degree of authority present in justifications. Secondly, evaluating the changes in justifications over time can provide even greater leverage in one case over another. This can aid in identifying variance in the authority and suggest areas where the authority of the UNSC has made a difference on the foreign policies of the U.S. and other states. A third strategy is to identify circumstances when competing explanations suggest an outcome different than the one predicted by the authority of the UNSC. This would provide compelling evidence

that the authority of the UNSC is what made a difference in the decisions to pursue international authorization for the projection of military force.

Authority Patterns. Confirming evidence of the change in authority of the UNSC and the corresponding change in requests for international authorization should be displayed as two different patterns in the two time periods. The first pattern exists until an abrupt precipitates a new pattern. Initially, IOs should be used sporadically until crossing a threshold. Then there should be an increasing trend towards using the UNSC by the U.S. and other states. Justifications for requesting authorization should also change over time. When looking at the initial decision to request authorization the justification should be based on instrumental calculations rather than authority or precedent. Subsequent instances should become increasingly bound by previous decision. This process can explain the observed variance in authorization requests between the Cold War and after. In the pattern of state behavior which follows from the authority of the UNSC, projectors first request international authorization from a single IO which holds authority over the projection of military force. This perspective explains both the preference of acquiring international authorization from the UNSC and why states will continue to request from this source despite receiving authorization from other IOs.

Authority Decision Making and Discourse. If a model of UN authorization is functioning properly, decision makers should discuss prior actions as part of their justifications for current policy. Their diplomatic, military, and political advisers should make reference to the way the state has acted before and should act again. There should be little discussion about deviating from this pattern when the precedent is consolidated. Rhetoric reflecting the authority of the UNSC should be present in policy planning

meetings such as meetings of the U.S. National Security Council and in the diplomatic exchanges within UNSC meetings. The concerns of decision makers should include how the UNSC and the international community will react to their plans. The prospects for securing international authorization should be linked with the decision to project military force.

If decision makers place great importance on the authority of the UNSC, the diplomatic work should take place closer to the center of state foreign policy making power, primarily within the executive administration. The significant policy advisers should aid in coordinating the activities of the IO diplomatic mission but there should be substantial input taken by the executive of the government should provide substantive imput for any IO outputs including resolutions. The public messages delivered through the UNSC meeting provide a forum for states to put forth notions of what is appropriate state behavior. Leaders should characterize the UNSC as authoritative and legitimate in their public remarks. The projector would suggest that the UNSC should authorization this projection of military force and that the decision will show a clear signal of legitimacy of their action.

Decision makers may discuss alternative fora but only if either of two conditions are met. The first is would be during the phase when the norm is still contested. While the norm of UNSC authorization is contested some decision makers may suggest that the UNSC does not hold the authority necessary to make decisions about when states can project military force. This makes sense as the norm itself should be challenged during this phase by those who hold opinions in opposition. Some will have instrumental reasons to oppose the norm, but as it gains strength some will act in support of the norm for their

own instrumental reasons before the norm is consolidated. The second condition under which decision makers would discuss alternative fora is if the projector has no prospects of securing international authorization from the UNSC. In this case decision makers may want to approach a RIO to bolster their case at the UNSC.

International Reactions to UNSC Authority. Observer state responses are an important aspect of the projector's decision to request international authorization from the UNSC. Other states' expectation of a request for international authorization, it increases the prospects of the projector doing so. Leaders of observer states should suggest that the projector needs to request international authorization from the UNSC specifically prior to projecting military force. They should do so in their public statements and communicate this sentiment to the projector's leaders. UNSC meetings include statements which are designed to be public positions of the member states. The representatives to the UNSC should discuss the appropriateness of going to the UNSC for authorization to project military force. If authorization is given by the UNSC, both foreign leaders and their respective publics should increase their support for the proposed projection of military force. These groups should justify their support in terms of the authority of the UNSC. If a prospective projector fails to secure international authorization from the UNSC, then these groups should justify their opposition in the same terms. Other international organizations should suggest that the UNSC is the appropriate place to provide international authorization over RIOs.

CONCLUSION

This project looks at why states request international authorization for the projection of military force more often after 1989. This chapter presented the changes in

states' requests for international authorization and put forth the possible explanation for this change. States have significantly altered their practices by requesting international authorization more frequently after 1989. Several competing explanations for this phenomenon draw from different theoretical traditions including realism, institutionalism, and constructivism. In presenting these competing explanations I develop the criteria to empirically test them. I argue that the constructivist explanation based upon the precedent of the U.S. request for international authorization offers the most compelling answer to the research question. This explanation contributes a nuanced perspective on how actors make strategic use of norms bridging the divide between rationalist and constructivist understandings of international politics.

CHAPTER III

PATTERNS OF STATE BEHAVIOR, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE PROJECTION OF MILITARY FORCE AFTER 1945

States do request international authorization for the projection of military force and they do so more often after 1989. The previous chapter documented circumstances when states requested international authorization from IOs. This chapter provides evidence that the rise in international authorization is not solely a "U.S.-centered" phenomenon and tests competing hypotheses about the patterns of state authorization requesting behavior. The testing compares across different states while later chapters hold the projector of military force constant through an in depth examination of the U.S. The hypotheses developed and presented in Chapter II from basic and sophisticated realism, burden-sharing, and rule of law are tested. These tests show support for the sophisticated realist, burden-sharing and regime type hypotheses. While, the UNSC authority explanation does hold up, distinguishing between these explanations requires more fine grained process tracing.

INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND REQUESTS

This cross-case data includes projections of military force in which decisions could have been made to request international authorization. Table 3.1 shows the decisions to project military force.[61] The projections in the set span 65 years, covering the

[61] The set of cases where states have made the decision to project military force includes all of the cases I am aware of after a survey of the literature. This may be an incomplete set as there may be instances

time period from 1946 until 2011, including 153 instances where leaders of the primary projector made the decision to project military force. The previous chapter indicates for the full time period that 27 requests for international authorization were made, the majority of which took place after 1989. This table includes the year, the title of the decision to project military force, the primary projector, the primary IO, and the mode of projection. The year indicates the calendar year in which the initiation of the projection of military force took place. The primary projector indicates the only the state, and not its allies, which initiated the projection of military force. The primary IO indicates the international organization which provided international authorization for the projection. The mode indicates the choice made for how the projection took place. This is categorized as Outside, RIO, Article 51, UNSC Resolution (UNSCR), or MSC. RIO indicates a projection was made with international authorization from a regional international organization. Article 51 indicates an accepted claim to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter for a projection of military force. UNSCR indicates that the projection of military force was authorized through specific resolution from the UNSC. MSC indicates when the projection of military force was undertaken by the Military Staff Committee which controls military forces provided to the UNSC to enforce its resolution in the event of a breach of the peace. Blank entries under mode indicate that the projection was either unilateral or with allies but took place without formal IO authorization entirely.

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beyond my knowledge that have yet to be identified. This selection of instances is as complete as I can make it at this point in time.

Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011

Year	Decision to Project	Primary Projector	Primary IO	Mode
1946	Corfu Channel Incidents	Albania		
1947	Kashmir Clashes	India		
1948	Berlin Blockade	USSR		
1948	Intervention into Costa Rica Civil War	Nicaragua		
1948	Israel War of Independence	Egypt		
1948	Hyderabad	India		
1950	Tibet	China		
1950	North Korean Invasion	North Korea		
1950	Korean War	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1951	Tel Mutillah Battle	Syria		
1953	Deception Island	United Kingdom		
1953	Gaza Strip Border Clashes	Israel		
1954	Quemoy Bombing	China		
1955	Buraimi Oasis	Oman		
1955	Enosis	United Kingdom		
1956	Yemen Anti-British Campaign	North Yemen		
1956	Hungarian Intervention	USSR		
1956	Suez Crisis	Israel		
1957	Golan Heights Conflict	Syria		
1957	Ifni War	Morocco		
1957	Imam's Rebellion	United Kingdom		
1957	Border Dispute with Honduras	Nicaragua		
1958	British Intervention in Jordan	United Kingdom		
1958	China's 2nd 'offshore islands' crisis	China		
1958	Snipe Island Incidents	Argentina		
1958	French Bombing of Sakiet	France		
1958	U.S. Intervention in Lebanon	United States		
1959	Vietnamese Civil War	North Vietnam		
1960	Congo	Belgium		
1960	West Irian Conflict	Indonesia		
1961	British assistance to Kuwait	United Kingdom		
1961	Malay Confrontation	Indonesia		
1961	Invasion of Goa	India		
1961	Tunisia	Tunesia		
1961	Deployment in Thailand	United States		
1962	Intervention in Guinea-Bissau	Cuba		
1962	French in Senegal	France		
1962	Iraqi Air Raids	Iraq		
1962	Yemen-Aden War	Egypt		
1962	Sino-India War	China		
1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	United States	OAS	RIO
1963	Algeria-Morocco Dispute	Morocco		

Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued)

Year	Decision to Project	Primary Projector	Primary IO	Mode
1963	Syrian Air Attacks on Kurds	Syria		
1964	British Suppression of African Mutinies	United Kingdom		
1964	Rwandan Raids in Burundi	Rwanda		
1964	U.S. Bombing in the Pathet Lao War	United States		
1964	France in Gabon	France		
1964	Vietnam War	United States		
1965	Iraqi-Kurdish War	Iraq		
1965	United States intervention in the Dominican Republic	United States	OAS	RIO
1965	Second Kashmiri War	Pakistan		
1966	UK Embargo on Southern Rhodesia	United Kingdom	UNSC	UNSCR
1967	Six Day War	Egypt		
1968	Egypt-Israel	Egypt		
1968	Israel-Lebanon	Israel		
1968	Seizure of Pueblo	North Korea		
1968	French Intervention in the Chad Civil War	France		
1968	Czechoslovakia	USSR	Warsaw Pact	RIO
1969	China-Soviet Border Clashes	China		
1969	Football/Soccer War	El Salvador		
1970	United States in Cambodia	United States		
1970	Black September	Syria		
1971	Occupation of the Tumbs	Iran		
1971	Indo-Pakistani War	Pakistan		
1972	Oman-South Yemen	Iran		
1972	Iran-Iraq Border Clashes	Iran		
1973	Yom Kippur War	Egypt		
1974	Cypriot Intervention	Turkey		
1974	Indo-Pakistani War	Pakistan		
1975	East Timor	Indonesia		
1975	Laos-Thailand Border Clashes	Thailand		
1975	Lebanon Civil War	Syria		
1975	Western Sahara	Morocco		
1975	Mayaguez Incident	United States		
1975	Angola-South Africa Clashes	South Africa		
1976	Rhodesian War	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)		
1976	Intervention into the Morocco -Mauritania Dispute	Algeria		
1977	Mozambique Civil War	Mozambique		
1977	Ogaden War	Somalia		
1977	Intervention in Ethiopia	USSR		

Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued)

Year	Decision to Project	Primary Projector	Primary IO	Mode
1977	Shaba I incursion	Angola		
1977	Intervention into the Morocco-Mauritania Dispute	France		
1978	Chad	France		
1978	Zaire	France		
1978	Invasion of Lebanon	Israel		
1978	Uganda-Tanzania Border War	Uganda		
1978	Invasion of Cambodia	Vietnam		
1978	Shaba II Incursion	Angola		
1979	China-Vietnamese Skirmishes	China		
1979	Central African Republic	France		
1979	North v. South Yemen	North Yemen		
1979	Intervention in Afghanistan	USSR		
1980	Iran Hostage Rescue	United States		
1980	Iran-Iraq War	Iraq		
1981	Paquisha Incident	Ecuador		
1981	Osirak Reactor Raid	Israel		
1982	Chad-Libya Conflict	Libya		
1982	Falkland Invasion	Argentina		
1982	Second Lebanon Invasion	Israel		
1982	Intervention in Lebanon	United States		
1983	Chad	France		
1983	United States in Grenada	United States		
1985	Anti-ANC Raids	South Africa		
1985	Agacher Strip War	Mali		
1986	France in Chad	France		
1986	Togo	France		
1986	Libyan Airstrikes	United States		
1987	Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging	United States		
1989	Comoros	France		
1989	Panama Intervention	United States		
1990	Gabon	France		
1990	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	Iraq		
1990	Embargo on Iraq	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1990	Rwanda	France		
1991	Persian Gulf War	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1991	Benin	France		
1991	Djibouti	France		
1991	Zaire	France		
1991	Enforcement of Iraqi No Fly	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1992	Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict	Armenia		
1992	Sierra Leone	France		
1992	Somalia (UNITAF & UNOSOM II)	United States	UNSC	UNSCR

Table 3.1. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011 (Continued)

Year	Decision to Project	Primary Projector	Primary IO	Mode
1993	NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1993	Bosnia	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1993	Baghdad Raid	United States	UNSC	Article 51
1993	Macedonia	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1994	Georgia	Russia	UNSC	UNSCR
1994	Rwanda	France	UNSC	UNSCR
1994	Intervention in Haiti	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1995	Alto-Cenepa War	Ecuador		
1995	Comoros	France		
1995	Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1996	Invasion in First Congo War	Rwanda		
1996	Airstrikes on Iraq	United States		
1997	Intervention in Congo	Angola		
1997	Albania	Italy	UNSC	UNSCR
1998	Second Congo War with Foreign Intervention	Angola		
1998	Eritrea-Ethopia	Eritrea		
1998	Afghanistan/Sudan Bombing	United States	UNSC	Article 51
1998	Operation Desert Fox	United States		
1999	NATO Kosovo Air Campaign	United States	NATO	RIO
1999	Kargil War	Pakistan		
1999	Peacekeeping in Kosovo	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
1999	East Timor Intervention	Australia	UNSC	UNSCR
2000	Sierra Leone	United Kingdom	UNSC	UNSCR
2001	Intervention in Afghanistan	United States	UNSC	Article 51
2003	Côte d'Ivoire	France	UNSC	UNSCR
2003	Iraq War	United States		
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	France	UNSC	UNSCR
2004	Haiti	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
2006	Lebanon	Israel		
2007	Airstrikes on Syrian Reactor	Israel		
2010	North Korean Artillery Attack	North Korea		
2011	Bahrain	Saudi Arabia	GCC	RIO
2011	Libyan No-Fly Zone	United States	UNSC	UNSCR
2011	Osama Raid	United States	UNSC	Article 51

Sources: (Allcock et al. 1992; "Appendix A, Clarke & Herbst" 1997; "Appendix II: Multinational Operations Tasked and Authorized by the UN, 1945-2003" 2004; Ayissi 1999; Bailey and Daws 1998; Bakri 2011; Bennett 1999; Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; Blanchard et al. 2011; Bush 1993; Bush 2007; Chapman 2011; Chivers 2010; Ciment 1999a, b; Clarke 1997; Connaughton 2002; Davidson 1987; Doerr 2008; "Editorial Note" 2005; Erlanger 2007; Freedman and Karsh 1993; "Georgia (UNOMIG, CIS, OSCE, EUMM)" 2009; Gertler 2011; Goldich 1992; Gregory 2000; Grimmett 2010,

2011; Hendrickson 2002a, b; Hendrickson and Gagnon 2008; Holt and Berkman 2006; Jessup 1989; Johnston and Dagne 1997; Joyner 1984; Kampfner 2003; Kershner 2007; Lawson 1984; Le Vine 2004; Leurdijk 1986; Lewis 1992; "List of Armed Conflicts and Crises, 1945-2006" 2008; Lowenthal 1992; McDonald 2010; Multinational force begins Albania tasks 1997; O'Rourke 1992; Odom 1992; Paul 1971; Pipes 1983; Prados 1992; Reagan 2007; Reisman 1994; Roberts 1995-1996; Sanger and Mazzetti 2007; Sanger and McDonald 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Schachter 1989; Schultz 2003; Skutsch 1999; Slovenia 1998; Sullivan 1992; Sutter 1992; Thompson 2006, 2009; Tillema 1991; Tripodi 2002; Tucker 2008; UN Endorses Russian Troops 1994; "UN-Authorized Military Operations, 1945-2006" 2008; UNSC 1971; UNSC Document 1958, 1972, 1989, 1990a, b, 1996a, b, c, 1998, 2011b; UNSCR 82 1950; UNSCR 83 1950; UNSCR 84 1950; UNSCR 425 1978; UNSCR 426 1978; UNSCR 488 1981; UNSCR 502 1982; UNSCR 517 1982; UNSCR 713 1991; UNSCR 925 1994; UNSCR 929 1994; UNSCR 937 1994; UNSCR 1529 2004; Weller 1999; Westcott 2011; Western 2002).

Cases involving the United States as the primary projector make up the bulk of both the projections of military force and requests for their international authorization. The data shows that the U.S. has more cases of projections and more instances of international authorization than any other actor in the international system. However, this description of the pattern of state behavior is only part of the story. States with the ability to project military force have made contributions to many authorized military operations. The small number of non-U.S. projections with international authorization belies the fact that these states have undertaken projections of military force as supporting or secondary projectors. In the post-Cold War international environment, undertaking military operations without international authorization has become the exception.

The rest of this section describes operations undertaken by states other than the United States. The states discussed were chosen because they engaged in a projection of military force as the primary projector which they undertook with international authorization or because of domestic legal requirements placed on their decisions to

project military force.[62] The contributions to projections of military force show a distinct pattern that secondary projectors are contributing to projections authorized by the UNSC. Despite exceptions, in general states are not taking action without UNSC authorization, revealing the general pattern of state behavior. After discussing the contributions secondary states make to projections I then test many of the hypotheses developed in Chapter II to see if the patterns they predict are present in the cross-case evidence. International authorization does increase contributions and support for projections of military force.

The United Kingdom

There are two patterns which become apparent by looking at the evidence of projections of military force by the United Kingdom displayed in Table 3.2. The first is that the United Kingdom has contributed as the secondary state more frequently after the end of the Cold War than before. The United Kingdom no longer takes on the role as the primary projector of military force as often as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. The second pattern which is apparent is that while the United Kingdom does not take on the role of primary projector, it is willing to undertake the projection of military force in a secondary capacity when there is international authorization. There are only two cases after 1966 in which the United Kingdom contributed to a projection of military force without the authorization of an international organization. Both of these cases target Iraq where the

[62] The United States is discussed in the chapters following this one. The People's Republic of China then is the only remaining permanent member of the UNSC which is not discussed. This is not an oversight. China has not contributed to delegations of the authority to project military force. The China projected military force six times. All took place prior to the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, China has not done anything more than sabre rattle or swagger. China is a major player and its position must be taken into account by other states contemplating the projection of military force, especially in Asia, but this actor has not made great contributions to others' projections of military force.

Table 3.2. United Kingdom Contributions to Projections of Military Force[63]

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War	Secondary	UNSC
1953	Deception Island	Primary	
1955	Enosis	Primary	
1957	Imam's Rebellion	Primary	
1958	Intervention in Jordan	Primary	
1961	Assistance to Kuwait	Primary	
1964	Suppression of African Mutinies	Primary	
1966	Embargo on Southern Rhodesia	Primary	UNSC
1990	Embargo on Iraq	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Desert Storm	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Iraqi No Fly Zones	Secondary	UNSC
1992	Somalia	Secondary	UNSC
1992	NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia	Secondary	UNSC
1993	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1994	Georgia Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1998	Operation Desert Fox	Secondary	
1999	East Timor	Secondary	UNSC
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Secondary	NATO
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
2000	Sierra Leone	Primary	UNSC
2001	Afghanistan	Secondary	UNSC
2003	Iraq War	Secondary	
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	Secondary	UNSC
2011	Libyan Intervention	Secondary	UNSC

United Kingdom acted in a supporting capacity to the United States. Operation Desert Fox was undertaken in 1998 without express authorization from the UNSC. An irony of this particular incident is that the U.S. and the UK did express their conviction that they were acting in support of resolutions passed by the UNSC which Iraq had violated. The second case is the Iraq War in which the UK contributed to the U.S. invasion in 2003. Later chapters include an exploration of the role of international authorization in the U.S.

[63] Tables 3.2 through 3.8 include information about the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, Australia, and Germany for their respective contributions to the projection of military force. Each table includes the year of the military operation, the label of the projection, the role played by the state in the operation, and the authorizing international organization. The role played by the state indicates if the state was the primary projector of military force or if it played a secondary and supporting role in the projection.

decision to project military force. That incident includes a very strong effort for the U.S. to secure international authorization.

France

French decisions to participate in the projection of military force do display a similar pattern in that they project military force more frequently after 1990 with international authorization from the UNSC. The projections are described in Table 3.3. In several instances the French projected military force as the primary projector in 1991 and 1992 without international authorization. The only other case in which France did so is in 1995 when it projected military force targeted at the Comoros, a former French colony. It also contributed to the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo in 1999. The pattern here is one where France acts with the authorization of the UNSC more frequently after 1989 including a deployment in 1994 in Rwanda (Barnett 1998).

Soviet Union/Russia

The Soviet and Russian pattern of contributions to military force projections is more difficult to assess since there are certainly fewer incidents upon which to base an evaluation of the role of international authorization (see Table 3.4). However, even in the 1990s Russia contributed as both primary and secondary projector to military operations under the authorization of the UNSC. Russia did engage in other military operations in the post-Cold War time period but those operation are not projections of military force since either they occur within the Russian Federation (Chechnya) or were provoked defensive operations (Georgia).[64] The lack of military force projections may be due to

[64] The Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008 is one which the U.S. administration mischaracterized (Chivers 2010). Rather than an operation prompted by the Russian military this operation was provoked by

Table 3.3. French Contributions to Military Force Projections

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War	Secondary	UNSC
1958	Bombing of Sakiet	Primary	
1962	Senegal	Primary	
1964	Gabon	Primary	
1968	Intervention in Chad Civil War	Primary	
1977	Intervention in Morocco-Mauritania Dispute	Primary	
1978	Chad	Primary	
1979	Central African Republic	Primary	
1982	Lebanon Intervention	Secondary	
1983	Chad	Primary	
1986	Chad	Primary	
1989	Comoros	Primary	
1990	Gabon	Primary	
1990	Rwanda	Primary	
1990	Embargo on Iraq	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Desert Storm	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Benin	Primary	
1991	Djibouti	Primary	
1991	Zaire	Primary	
1991	Iraqi No-Fly Zones	Secondary	UNSC
1992	Sierra Leone	Primary	
1992	Somalia	Secondary	UNSC
1992	NATO embargo on Former Yugoslavia	Secondary	UNSC
1993	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1994	Rwanda	Primary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Comoros	Primary	
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Secondary	NATO
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
2001	Afghanistan	Secondary	UNSC
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	Primary	UNSC
2003	Côte d'Ivoire	Primary	UNSC
2004	Haiti	Secondary	UNSC
2011	Libya Intervention	Secondary	UNSC

Table 3.4. Soviet/Russian Contributions to Projections of Military Force

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1948	Berlin Blockade (USSR)	Primary	
1956	Hungarian Intervention (USSR)	Primary	
1968	Czechoslovakia Intervention (USSR)	Primary	Warsaw Pact
1977	Ethiopia (USSR)	Primary	
1979	Afghanistan (USSR)	Primary	
1994	Georgia Peacekeeping Operation (Russia)	Primary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia [IFOR & SFOR] (Russia)	Secondary	UNSC

the Georgian military actions prompting a Russian deployment in response. This does not qualify as a projection of military force as it is not a purposeful deployment on the part of the Russian military.

Russia's preoccupation with several internal military operations such as that in Chechnya, a weakened geopolitical position at the end of the Cold War, or simply the random chance of fewer opportunities for military adventurism. Regardless of the rationale the Russian Federation has made the decision to request and acquire international authorization for projections of military force which occur outside their borders notably for its lead role in the Georgian peacekeeping mission in 1994 (Barnett 1998).

Italy

The Italian contributions are described in Table 3.5. The pattern of military force projection for Italy displays the same emphasis on the UNSC for international authorization. Italy has rarely been the primary projector (only one instance), but it has contributed to many military operations as the secondary projector of military force. The notable exception to this pattern of international authorization when projecting military force is the 2003 Iraq War, where where the attempt to acquire international authorization was a high priority for the primary projector of military force. The pattern here shows projections occurring after the end of the Cold War under the auspices of the UNSC.

Table 3.5. Italian Contributions to Projections of Military Force

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War (Medical Support)	Secondary	UNSC
1982	Lebanon Intervention	Secondary	
1991	Desert Storm	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Iraqi No-Fly Zones	Secondary	UNSC
1992	Somalia	Secondary	UNSC
1992	NATO Embargo on Former Yugoslavia	Secondary	UNSC
1993	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1997	Albania	Primary	UNSC
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Secondary	NATO
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
2001	Afghanistan	Secondary	UNSC
2003	Iraq War	Secondary	
2011	Libya Intervention (No-Fly Zone)	Secondary	UNSC

Australia

Australia's contributions are detailed in Table 3.6. Australia participated in the intervention in East Timor in 1999 as the primary projector of military force. This projection took place after the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo without UNSC authorization. The UNSC did provide international authorization for the majority of the projections made by Australia. The Iraq War is a notable exception for Australia as it is for other contributors to this military force projection after 1989. The decision for Australia to lead the intervention in East Timor required UN authorization before committing to the mission (Coleman 2007, 262).[65] During the 1990s, Australia did contribute in a secondary role to UNSC authorized projections.

Table 3.6. Australia Contributions to Projections of Military Force

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War	Secondary	UNSC
1964	Vietnam War	Secondary	
1991	Desert Storm	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Iraqi No Fly Zones	Secondary	UNSC
1992	Somalia	Secondary	UNSC
1994	Haiti	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia (SFOR)	Secondary	UNSC
1999	East Timor	Primary	UNSC
2003	Iraq War	Secondary	

Canada, Germany, and Japan

The remaining discussion concerns three states which have not made led projections of military force. Two of these states have altered their laws to condition their support and contributions on international authorization. These laws may take various forms but their content is that international authorization is needed for the projection of

[65] Australia did contribute to the U.S.-led Iraq intervention in 2003 with troops for the invasion and insurgent conflict. Australia withdrew these troops in 2008, in part, because of a change in government which held a different disposition on the justifications for the original intervention (Australia Ends Iraq Combat Role 2008).

military force before support is given. Germany and Japan have conditioned their participation in UN peacekeeping missions upon UNSC authorization (Voeten 2005, 532). These two states have legacies which have lasted since their defeat in World War II. The remaining state discussed in this section, Canada, has contributed to missions authorized by IOs but has not initiated any of its own. These actors are influential states in their regions and have contributed to the pattern of international authorization and state behavior towards IOs.

Canada has conditioned future contributions to projections of military force upon the approval of the UNSC. Table 3.7 lists projections for which Canada has made contributions. All of these operations were authorized by IOs. Most of these operations take place after 1989. The lack of UNSC authorization drastically increases the domestic political costs of Canadian contributions to any form of force projection (Hampson 2003, 152). In general this pattern of international authorization for the projection of military force across sovereign borders in the post-Cold War period of time tends to confirm the importance of the IOs, and the UNSC, in particular as a source of authorization.

Table 3.7. Canadian Contributions to Projections of Military Force

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1950	Korean War	Secondary	UNSC
1991	Desert Storm	Secondary	UNSC
1992	Somalia	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia	Secondary	UNSC
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Secondary	NATO
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
1999	East Timor	Secondary	UNSC
2001	Afghanistan	Secondary	UNSC
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	Secondary	UNSC
2004	Haiti	Secondary	UNSC
2011	Libya Intervention	Secondary	UNSC

Germany may have gone further than any other state in the world for its reliance on international authorization (Nolte 2003). Table 3.8 describes the contributions

Germany has made to projections of military force. After the end of World War II, Germany has been reluctant to deploy its military forces outside its borders, in effect relegating military force to only territorial defense in an effort to prevent fears of its remilitarization (Hellman 1997). This is evident in the German contribution to the Persian Gulf Conflict in 1990-1991. Germany limited its contribution to only financial assistance with the claim that it would not deploy troops outside its own border and that it was focused upon its recent re-unification. Russian fears of German remilitarization emerging from the unification of East and West were alleviated, in part, by the inclusion of the unified country in NATO (Ikenberry 2001, 217). German deployment of troops outside its border was considered a violation of its constitution (Kinzer 1991). However, in 1994 the German constitutional court ruled that it could deploy military force but only when authorized by an international organization under international law. The UNSC is a legitimate source of international authorization for Germany to deploy its military forces (Nolte 2003, 239).[66] Since the constitutional ruling the projection of military force has become a significant part of German foreign policy which contributed to the decision to deploy military forces in the Balkans and Afghanistan in 2001 (Noetzel and Schreer 2008).

Like Germany, Japan's pacifism has been very important for its domestic population and its neighbors. The projection of Japanese military force has been a contentious political issue. To alleviate some of these concerns Japan has conditioned its

[66] The constitutionality of Germany's contribution to the NATO airstrike operation in Kosovo is ambiguous. The source of the international authorization is the collective security organization, NATO, which may not meet the standard set by the constitutional court for international authorization (Noetzel and Schreer 2008, 239-240). The UNSC is clearly a legitimate source of international authorization for the German projection of military force but the issue of alternative IOs has not been considered by the German constitutional court.

Table 3.8. German Contributions to Projections of Military Force

Year	Projection of Military Force Decision	Role	Authorizing IO
1991	Desert Storm (Financial Assistance)	Secondary	UNSC
1995	Bosnia (SFOR)	Secondary	UNSC
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation	Secondary	UNSC
2001	Afghanistan	Secondary	UNSC

participation in peacekeeping missions upon UNSC authorization (Shibata 2003). Article 9 of Japan's constitution renounces militarism and has been seen as a limit on the deployment of its military forces abroad. In 1992, the Japanese legislature adopted legal measures to provide a framework for Japanese contributions to peacekeeping missions (Ishizuka 2005). Under this and subsequent constitutional revisions, Japan has increased its participation in UNSC peacekeeping operations with international authorization. Unlike Germany, Japan has been reluctant to make contributions to projections of military force outside the realm of peacekeeping operations. It limited its participation to a reluctant financial contribution to the Persian Gulf War (Unger 1997) and increasing participation in peacekeeping.

TESTING EXPLANATIONS

The remainder of this chapter tests the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter with the expected patterns of behavior. These include the pattern of behavior of states compared to the expectations of basic and sophisticated realism, burden-sharing, regime type, strategic information transmission, multilateral norms, and UNSC authority. These tests support the explanations of sophisticated realism, burden-sharing, regime type, and UNSC authority. International political costs, IO constraints, basic realism, and the multilateralism norm receive weak or no support from the evidence.

Basic Realism

Basic realism suggests that resources available to a state should influence the decision to request international authorization. States with more resources should not need to request international authorization because they are more powerful. Control over material resources should mean not having to submit to the will of other actors. The predictions of basic realism suggest that weaker states, with less control over material resources, should request international authorization more often than more powerful states. Fewer resources should mean weaker states must submit their actions to the approval of more powerful actors.

Test: National Income

The amount of resources available for the projection of military force should be greater with a larger national income. To test for the available resources for the entire state I look at national income as well, drawing from data available for 114 states during the year they projected military force (see Figure 3.1). Basic realism suggests that states with smaller economies should request international authorization since they have fewer economic resources to draw upon. Again I divide the sample into two groups, of larger and smaller economies, each with 57 instances (see Table 3.9). Basic realism predicts the pattern that smaller economies should request international authorization to project military force more often than the larger economies. The evidence presented here does not support this hypothesis. The 57 larger economies requested international authorization more frequently than smaller economies. The large economic group requested international authorization in twenty-seven instances (47%) while smaller economies did so in only three cases (5%).

Table 3.9. Projection Requests by GDP

	Large	Small
Projections of Military Force	57	57
Requests for International Authorization	27 (47%)	3 (5%)
Projections without Requests	30 (53%)	54 (95%)

Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Figure 3.1. Projection Requests by GDP



Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Looking at the sample without the U.S., to see if the U.S. is driving the data, yields similar findings to the entire sample. Without the U.S., there are 78 instances of military force projection (see Figure 3.2). Dividing this in half between larger and smaller economies shows that no small economy made any request for military force projection. Larger economies requested international authorization in 9 (23%) instances (see Table 3.10). This evidence supports the notion that larger economies support the development of military resources which can be used to project military force. States with fewer resources do not have opportunities to projection military force and do not make requests for international authorization.

Figure 3.2. Projection Requests by GDP (without U.S.)



Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Table 3.10. Projection Requests by Economic Size (without U.S.)

	Large	Small
Projections of Military Force	39	39
Requests for International Authorization	9 (23%)	0 (0%)
Projections without Requests	30 (77%)	39 (100%)

Source: GDP from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Test: Per Capita Income

Per capita income is used as a proxy for resource power to test if the pattern predicted by basic realism for international authorization is present. This test uses the World Bank's "income" classification for states (World Bank n.d.-a). Using this classification I create two categories: high income countries which have large economies and a the low income category.[67] High income countries are those which have high per

[67] The World Bank groups countries into high, middle and low income. For this project I group middle and low income into the low or not 'high income' category.

capita incomes and thus are resource abundant. The sample neatly divides into 78 projections in each of these categories for all states in the sample for which data was available. Figure 3.3 shows the number of projections for each group. The high income group displays 34% more requests (see Table 3.11). The two instances of a low income state requesting international authorization are the Soviet Union in 1968 and the Russian Federation in 1994. The Soviet Union was the lead state in projecting military force for the Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia to reverse reforms during the Cold War. The second low income request was the 1994 deployment of 3,000 Russian Federation troops to Georgia which was authorized by the UNSC. While these two instances come from states which are classified as "low income," they are also considered to be great powers. Russia inherited the Soviet Union's control over nuclear weaponry and holds a great deal of international political power.[68] This test does not support the hypothesis that having access to greater resources leads to fewer requests. Figure 3.3 shows the changes between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods based on income. While the total number of military force projections is the same for both categories, the changes show that low income states are projecting force less often after the end of the Cold War, resulting in fewer opportunities for a low income state to request international authorization for the projection of military force.

Inclusion of the United States in the sample may be driving the data. When the U.S. is removed from the sample the high income grouping has 43 projections of military force (see Figure 3.4). Projections by low income states stays the same, but projections

[68] In the section on Sophisticated Realism, I use a measure of control over material resources which is a more accurate depiction of the power resources available to Russia and the Soviet Union. The measurement of per capita income relates to the general availability of resources to individuals within a state.

Table 3.11. Projection Requests by Per Capita Income, 1946-2011

	High Income	Low Income
Projections of Military Force	78	78
Requests for International Authorization	29 (37%)	2 (3%)
Projections without Requests	49 (63%)	76 (97%)

Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Figure 3.3. Number of Projections by Per Capita Income, 1946-2011



Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

by high income states do change, with requests 15% higher than for the low income grouping. Table 3.12 shows high income states are more likely to request international authorization for the projection of military force than low income states. This test does not provide support for basic realism. Income classification does not display the pattern of international authorization requests predicted by basic realism.

Sophisticated Realism

The sophisticated realist explanation for requests suggests that there should be a pattern of the behavior of states. This pattern is based on the control of material

Table 3.12. Projection Request by Per Capita Income (without U.S.)

	High Income	Low Income
Projections of Military Force	43	78
Requests for International Authorization	8 (19%)	2 (3%)
Projections without Requests	35 (81%)	76 (97%)

Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Figure 3.4. Projection Requests by Per Capita Income (without U.S.)



Source: Income classification from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

resources. States with greater control over material resources are more powerful and should be able to get more of what they want. When powerful states want to get international authorization they should be able to get it. States with greater control over material resources should be seen to request international authorization more often than less powerful states. This test uses data on the share of the world's material resource from the Correlates of War Project on National Material Capabilities (Greig and Enterline 2010) which updates the data from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) and Singer (1988). The National Material Capabilities composite score incorporates six indicators of

control of material resources for states in the international system. The score is a relative measure as it indicates the share of material resources controlled by the state in a given year. Data is available for 150 instances of military force projection. Again, I divided the sample into two groups based on their composite score, greater and lesser. The pattern predicted by sophisticated realism is upheld by the empirical evidence. States with greater control of material resources do request international authorization more often than those who control fewer material resources. Of those states with greater material resources, twenty-four (32%) made requests when they projected military force compared with only four (5%) of those who controlled fewer resources (See Table 3.13). When the U.S. is removed from the sample the pattern is generally the same. States with greater material resources produce eight instances (14%) requests for international authorization compared to only one (2%) in the lesser group (see Table 3.14).

Table 3.13. Projection Requests by Control of Material Resources

	Greater	Lesser
Projections of Military Force	75	75
Requests for International Authorization	24 (32%)	4 (5%)
Projections without Requests	51 (68%)	71 (95%)

Source: Control of Material Resources from Greig & Enterline (2010).

Table 3.14. Projection Requests by Control of Material Resources (without U.S.)

	Greater	Lesser
Projections of Military Force	58	59
Requests for International Authorization	8 (14%)	1 (2%)
Projections without Requests	50 (86%)	58 (98%)

Source: Control of Material Resources from Greig & Enterline (2010).

Burden-Sharing

The explanation posited by burden sharing suggests that needing help with a projection of military force should prompt states to request international authorization. This test looks at the pattern of requests based on the rate of economic growth. Looking

at the rate of growth can allow us to assess the implications of an economy that is either growing or shrinking. The assumption made here is that in a growing economy the intensity of need for additional assistance is not as great as when an economy is slowing or shrinking. The rate of economic growth is taken from the World Bank which compares the contemporary year with the previous to identify the change in the size of the economy of the state. Data on economic growth was available for 111 of the instances of projection of military force in the sample. This data was then divided in two groups based on their rate of growth. Table 3.15 shows the descriptive statistics for this sample. The high rate group included fifty-five instances. Within the high rate group there were eleven (20%) requests for international authorization. The low rate group includes fifty-six instances. Lower or negative economic growth shows more requests with ninteen (34%) of the cases. This provides some support for the notion that states push for international authorization when they need assistance to share the burden of projecting military force.

Table 3.15. Requests by Rate of Economic Growth

	High Rate	Low Rate
Projections of Military Force	55	56
Requests for International Authorization	11 (20%)	19 (34%)
Projections without Requests	44 (80%)	37 (66%)

Source: Economic Growth Rate from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Table 3.16 presents the data without the United States to see if the data is driven by this state. Without the U.S. in the sample there are seventy-five projections of military force for which economic growth data was available. When the U.S. is not in the picture the implications of the rate of growth is more difficult to assess. There is a difference in the frequency with which growth rate is associated with a request for international authorization. The high rate group includes thirty-seven instances. There are three requests (8%) in the high rate group compared to six (16%) in the low rate group. The

low rate is twice the size, but with the small numbers of requests in both groups more testing should be done before drawing strong conclusions about the burden sharing alternative hypothesis.

Table 3.16. Requests by Rate of Economic Growth (without U.S.)

	High Rate	Low Rate
Projections of Military Force	37	38
Requests for International Authorization	3 (8%)	6 (16%)
Projections without Requests	34 (92%)	32 (84%)

Source: Economic Growth Rate from the World Bank (WDI n.d.-b).

Democracy and the Rule of Law

The alternative hypothesis about the influence of domestic institutions suggests that regime type matters for states' decision to request international authorization. The pattern of state behavior should show that democracies request international authorization more often than nondemocracies. This test uses data from the Polity Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) to assess the regime type of a state. If the state held a positive policy cumulative score during a given year I coded the state as democratic. If the state had a zero or negative cumulative polity score during a given year I coded the state as nondemocratic. Table 3.17 shows the requests for international authorization for the two groups. Democratic states are more likely to request international authorization compared to nondemocracies. Democratic states requested international authorization in twenty-nine cases (32%) compared to only two for nondemocracies (3%). This ressult fits the pattern expected by this explanation.

Table 3.17. Requests by Regime Type 1946-2011

	Democracy	Nondemocracy
Projections of Military Force	90	66
Requests for International Authorization	29 (32%)	2 (3%)
Projections without Requests	61 (68%)	64 (97%)

Source: Regime Type is from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).

When removing the U.S. from the sample the test shows similar results (see Table 3.18). Democratic states still request international authorization more often than nondemocratic states. Democratic states requested international authorization in 8 (15%) of the cases. These tests show support for the hypothesis that regime type is associated with requests for international authorization. Further testing is warranted.

Table 3.18. Requests by Regime Type 1946-2011 (without U.S.)

	Democracy	Nondemocracy
Projections of Military Force	55	66
Requests for International Authorization	8 (15%)	2 (3%)
Projections without Requests	47 (85%)	64 (97%)

Source: Regime Type from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010)

Information Transmission and Political Costs

The political costs explanation predicts a pattern where states request international authorization when its leaders antivipate political costs for projecting military force. This pattern is consitent with the presentation of the dependent variable. This is an explanation of why states make the decision to request international authorizaiton rather than an explanation of what kind of IO is approached. The forum shopping explanation focuses on explaining the variance among IO selections. The pattern predicted by a political costs explanation is observationally equivalent with the patterns predicted by the other explanations. The cross-case analysis cannot be used to distingush this explanation from the others. This explanation is evaluated in later chapters.

IO Constraints

The IO constraint-based explanation suggests that constraints imposed by IOs deter leaders from requesting international authorization. Two patterns of state behavior are suggested by this explanation. First, different IOs should be approached since IOs vary in the constraints they impose. Table 3.19 indicates that the empirical record does

not strongly support this alternative hypothesis. Few IOs are approached. Rarely do state select anything other than the UNSC when requesting international authorization.

Table 3.19. Frequency of Primary IO Approached

International Organization	Authorizations
UN Security Council	24 (83%)
Organization of American States	2 (7%)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1 (3%)
Gulf Cooperation Council	1 (3%)
Warsaw Pact	1 (3%)
European Union	0 (0%)
African Union	0 (0%)
Arab League	0 (0%)
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States[69]	0 (0%)

The second pattern should display a clustering of request for international authorization based on specific leaders who have the disposition to request international authorization. Leaders who are more willing to accept constraints imposed by IOs, all else being equal, should request international authorizaiton more often than those who are unwilling to accept IO constraints. The pattern should show requests clustered according to the executive administrations in the respective states. A change in administration may cause a change in the sensitivity to IO constraints and thus we should see changes between different administration requests international authorization. Table 3.20 shows the executive administrations of the U.S. and their statistics for international authorization. This table includes the requests, international authorization secured, the number of projections of military force, and the percentage of projections authorized according to executive administration. There is clustering but it does not seem to be based on individual executive administrations. Post-Cold War presidential administration

[69] The U.S. did claim the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) did provide the U.S. with international authorization for the Grenada Invasion in 1983. However, the OECS did not meet nor hold any vote on this projection of military force. See Chapter IV for a discussion of the U.S. projection of military force in Grenada.

are more likely to request international authorization than those before 1989. Unlike their predecessors, all post-Cold War administrations do request international authorization for most of their projections. The pattern of requests and authorization does not display great variation among the different post-Cold War administrations, reducing support for the notion that IO constraints drive leaders to request international authorization.

Table 3.20. United States Executive Administrations 1945-2011

Executive Administration	Requests	Authorization	Projections	%
Truman	1	1	1	100%
Eisenhower	0	0	1	0%
Kennedy	1	1	2	50%
Johnson	1	1	3	33%
Nixon	0	0	1	0%
Ford	0	1	1	100%
Carter	0	1	1	100%
Reagan	0	0	4	0%
Bush (41)	5	5	6	83%
Clinton	6	8	10	80%
Bush (43)	2	2	3	67%
Obama (through 2011)	1	2	2	100%
Totals	17	20	35	

Forum Shopping

This explanation suggest that the combination of the anticipation of political costs and fear of IO constraints is supposed to produce a drive for leaders to seek out authorization from RIOs rather than the UNSC. To test the expectation that states prefer RIOS when the sensitivity to IO contraints are high and high international political costs are anticipated this test looks at the organizations approached for international authorization. In many instances, multiple IOs provide support for a single projection. The evidence for this test uses the primary IO or most significant source upon which the projector relies for the projection of military force. For instance, the UNSC, NATO, and the Arab League all may support the creation of a no-fly zone and its enforcement

through the projection of military force. This test includes the UNSC as the primary IO when there are other sources of international authorization.

As point out before, Table 3.19 indicates the frequency with which the varied organizations were approached. The results indicate that out of the twenty-nine cases where IO authorization was given, twenty-four cases (83%) international authorizaiton came from the UNSC. This displays that the UNSC is the dominant international security organization to authorize the projection of military force. Other organizations are used infrequently but they have been used.The remaining five cases are divided between the OAS, NATO, the GCC, and the Warsaw Pact. The OAS—the only other organization approached more than once provided authorization two times during the Cold War for the U.S. action during the Cuban Missile Crisis and later during the intervention in the Dominican Republic. This test does not provide support for the explanation based on the anticipated political costs and sensitivity to IO constraints. Proponents of this explanation of state behavior claim that the UNSC is the best international organization for providing credible information to target audiences (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2009); explaining why the UNSC is the IO approached most often. Curiously, RIOs which can reduce political costs were not used more often in situations where the UNSC was unapproachable or unavailable, as was the case throughout the Cold War.

Multilateralism

The Multilateral Norm explanation suggests a pattern where a specific form of behavior is exhibited with increasing frequency over time. This increasing frequency should be evident because the norm of multilateralism should gather strength until it becomes dominant. Ideally a gradual increase would become evident over time in the

number of requests for international authorization for the projection of military force. Figure 3.5. shows projections of military force for each year between 1946 and 2011 in five-year increments. The bars in red indicate when a state has requested international authorization for a projection. This pattern does not look like a norm gathering strength since 1946. The pattern displayed suggests a threshold was crossed in 1990. A threshold pattern does not support multilateralism but it does not disprove it either. Perhaps the norm of multilateralism grew in strength to the point where it reached the threshold and in crossing it became the dominant pattern of state behavior.

The lifecycle model of norm suggests this sort of tipping point should exist between the emergence of a norm and its cascade throughout the system (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This description for the projection of military force present two problems. First, for a behavioral norm to influence actors it has to be practiced. Between 1968 and 1990 no state approached an IO to authorize a projection of military force. This is a very long period of time for states to not practice a behavior if a norm has was gathering strength. Second, this description of the behavior of states better describes the emergence of the norm as starting in 1990 when states began to actively promote the idea that states should go to a multilateral organization. Also, as indicated above, projectors do request international authorization from multilateral sources but not from different multilateral sources for different projections of military force. The UNSC is the specific IO of choice for international authorization. Requests for international authorization do not display a pattern which is consistent with the emergence and strengthening of a norm of multilateralism after 1945. However, to determine the strength of this hypothesis more

fine-grained evidence is needed. These tests are develeoped in subsequent chapters which look at the U.S. projections of military force and international authorization.

Figure 3.5. Projections of Military Force and International Authorization Requests by Year



Source: Data presented in Table 3.1

UNSC Authority

The explanation which uses the authority of the UNSC to explain the change around international authorization predicts a distinct change from one pattern of behavior to a distinct but different pattern of behavior. This pattern should have an easily identifiable point of abrupt change or a break from one mode of behavior to another. When the threshold is crossed a different pattern of behavior emerges to become dominant. As discussed in the previous section, the evidence shows that there is a distinct break from one pattern of behavior to another. While not conclusive evidence of this explanation, it does provide support for the explanation that the enhanced authority of the UNSC drive states to change their behavior to begin requesting international

authorization for the projection of military force more frequently. This explanation does make sense of the anomalies such as the lack of requests to RIOs during the Cold War and why the change in authorization requesting behavior begins in 1990.

CONCLUSION

This chapter puts forth two arguments and evaluates the patterns of state behavior of requesting international authorization for the projection of military force. The first argument is that despite the overt evidence that the U.S. is the state which requests international authorization the most, this is not solely a U.S. phenomenon. Other states are involved in projecting military force with international authorization to the point where projecting without international authorization is the exception. Other states are faced with constraines similar to the U.S. when making decisions to projection military force. The trend indicates that states generally are more likely to project military force with international authorization or contribute to operations which have been authorized by a formal IO.

The second argument advanced is that the authority of the UNSC explains the pattern of states requesting international authorization. This chapter tests the pattern of state behavior expected by the explanations discussed in the second chapter. This chapter has the finding that the need for resources does not predict when states will request international authorization. Control of more material resources is correlated with requsting authorization. This finding is perhaps driven by the notion that having access to material resources is a prequisite to having the ability to project military force. Thus, having more material resources affords more opportunities to project military force and also more opportunities to request international authorization.

This chapter also demonstrates that democracies do request international authorization more often than nondemocracies. Access to material resources also tends to be correlated with democracy as many industrialzed states have democratic regimes. If the explanatory factors are correlated the patterns is observationally equivalent to many explanations. There is some support for the sophisticated realist, burden sharing, the regime type and political cost hypotheses. Further testing of these explanations is warranted. In order to distinguish between explanations more fine-grained process tracing is necessary. The next chapters are devoted to this task where I examine the U.S. and its decisions to request international authorization for the projection of military force.

CHAPTER IV

PRIOR PRACTICE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PROJECTION OF MILITARY FORCE DURING THE COLD WAR

Optimism about the potential role of the UNSC in securing international peace and stability after the end of World War II was soon overshadowed by the concerns of the Cold War and the security concerns between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Even before it could take substantial action the UNSC became a forum paralyzed by the veto wielded by both the U.S. and USSR against each other's interests. Rther than looking to the authority of the UNSC, the pattern of reliance on the resources controlled by the U.S. for its foreign policy was established as the state of affairs. There were no expectations that the U.S. would request international authorization from the UNSC. This chapter documents U.S. practice towards the UNSC during the Cold War.

THE UNSC AND U.S. RELATIONSHIP

What was the relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations during the Cold War? The UNSC/U.S. relationship is a strong test of changes in international politics it is a central location for Cold War politics; some would say the relationship was a victim of the politics of the time. Expectations about the UN and the trust the U.S. holds towards member states, especially the Soviet Union, were low. Before examining what changed after the end of the Cold War we must establish what the relationship was during this period. The U.S. should exhibit a relatively constant policy towards the UNSC when it comes to making decisions about projecting military force. However, Chapter II

identifies a substantial change. This chapter turns to identifying the relationship between the U.S. and the UN over the projection of military force.

Mechanisms operate within structures to reproduce institutional relationships. During the Cold War, a particular set of relations operated between the USSR and the U.S. to produce a pattern. The end of the Cold War held ramifications for international order as these were the two most powerful collective actors in the international system at the time. However, it is not clear why this should necessarily have ramifications on the pattern of relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations.

The United States faced many choices over the method of projecting military force during the Cold War. Table 4.1 shows the different U.S. executive administrations and their decisions to project military force between 1946 and 1989, drawn from the listing put forth in Table 3.1. The U.S. did not request international authorization from the UNSC or any other IO with great frequency during the Cold War. The notable exceptions are the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic intervention, and two acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Korean War is the only example of the U.S. requesting a specific resolution from the UNSC for the projection of military force. During the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Dominican Republic intervention the U.S. acquired international authorization from a regional organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). These two incidents stand as the only times when the U.S. acted under the OAS without sanction from the UNSC. After the end of the Cold War the UNSC and the OAS both authorized projections. The Korean War and the Dominican Republic projections are briefly discussed and compared with the U.S projection in Grenada 1983.

Table 4.1. Decisions to Project Military Force by the United States of America, 1946-1989

Year	Decision to Project Military Force	Administration	Request	Authorization	Mode
1950	Korean War	Truman	Yes	UN	UNSCRs 83 (1950) & 84 (1950)
1958	Intervention in Lebanon	Eisenhower			
1961	Deployment in Thailand	Kennedy			
1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	Kennedy	Yes	OAS	RIO (See Rusk 1962)
1964	Bombing in Pathet Lao War	Johnson			
1964	Vietnam War	Johnson			
1965	Intervention in Dominican Republic	Johnson		OAS	RIO
1970	U.S. in Cambodia	Nixon			
1975	*Mayaguez* Incident	Ford		UN	Article 51
1980	Iran Hostage Rescue Mission	Carter		UN	Article 51
1982	Sinai Multinational Force	Reagan			
1982	Intervention in Lebanon	Reagan			
1983	Intervention in Grenada	Reagan			
1986	Libyan Airstrikes	Reagan			
1987	Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging	Reagan			
1989	Intervention in Panama	Bush (41)			

The Korean War, 1950

The delegation of enforcement authority to a coalition of states through authorization was used for the first time in the Korean War in 1950. [70] UNSC resolutions authorized collective defensive action and a unified command under the U.S. for the Korean War. When looking for a response to North Korean aggression, the U.S. did not have to contend with the threat or use of a Soviet veto. The Korean War was a UN authorized operation under the command of the U.S. military. The outcome within the Security Council was based on a peculiar context where the Soviet Union refused to attend the UNSC meetings in protest over the lack of recognition for the communist government of China. For this empirical event the voting rules of the institution played a role in producing the UNSC approval of the U.S. action on the Korean peninsula. After receiving word that the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel and were making headway into the south, the UNSC passed a resolution which condemned the action as a breach of the peace (UNSCR 82 1950). Following this first resolution on the crisis the UNSC passed UNSCR 83 (1950) which authorized member states to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea for its defense, and UNSCR 84 (1950) which authorized a U.S. command for the forces defending against the North Korean invasion. The Soviet Union's representative did not attend any of the meetings where these resolutions were discussed and thus did not use the Soviet veto in the UNSC. The Soviets argued that the resolution passed in favor of authorizing assistance for the Republic of Korea was illegal

[70] In addition to the resolutions which authorized the U.S.-led UN coalition of forces in Korea, the UNSC did authorize one additional projection of military force during the Cold War. The British received UNSC authorization to enforce an embargo against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (UNSCR 221 1966) which received much less attention than the Korean War.

since the Chinese[71] and Soviet representatives were absent ("Security Council" 1950, 436). This claim was rejected in because it was accepted practice that the absence of a permanent member did not constitute a veto of a resolution. It is noted that this was a practice previously accepted by the Soviet Union and thus an acceptable process outcome based on Security Council precedent. If material capabilities been a key factor in determining this outcome then the voting rules should not have affected the outcome of UN authorization for the Korean War. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described this situation.

> Had the Soviet Ambassador been less terrified of Stalin or been able to obtain instructions more rapidly, he would surely have vetoed the Security Council resolution proposed by the United States asking North Korea to cease hostilities and to return to the 38th Parallel. By failing to attend the session and to cast the veto, the Soviet Ambassador gave Truman the opportunity to organize resistance as a decision of the world community and to justify the American role in Korea in the familiar Wilsonian terms of freedom versus dictatorship, good versus evil. America, said Truman, was going to war to uphold the orders of the Security Council. (Kissinger 1994, 477)[72]

Truman based his authority to project military force upon his powers as commander in chief and on UNSC Resolutions (Hess 2009,34-35).The voting rules of the Security Council did matter and the absence of the USSR representative mattered for the vote which produced the UNSC authorization for the U.S.-led multilateral operation.

This incident is important as the first post-World War II decision by the U.S. to project military force. That it was carried out with international authorization by the UNSC suggests what might have been had cooperation between the great powers

[71] The Soviets' claim about the illegality of this resolution stemmed in part from the fact that the Taiwanese representative was not the legal representative of China.

[72] The position Truman took on the Korean War suggests that the UNSC authorization was an effective way to mobilize support from the domestic population of the U.S.

continued after World War II. The Korean War does not represent a return to the UN Charter proscribed action, nor was this move envisioned under the UN Charter (Blokker 2000). This kind of mechanism had not been attempted before this event. The UN Charter proscribed that the MSC should be used to enforce international peace (Grove 1993; Wilson 2007). If international authorization was to become the way in which states acted after the end of World War II, the Korean War should have created a model of behavior which should have become path-dependent. Instead, international authorization and the Korean War were explained away as anomalies which could not be repeated under the structural conditions of the Cold War.

First, the action was undertaken not under conditions of uncertainty but rather, without hope that the U.S. could repeat this kind of action. The U.S. and Soviet Union held positions which led them to employ a veto against each other's interests. The relations were known to be structured along the lines of the Cold War's bipolarity. The only uncertainty at this time was how long the Soviet Union would continue to boycott the UNSC. As delegates were assembling to attend the UNSC meeting where UNSCR 83 was passed, the Secretary-General Lie suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that he should attend the meeting in the interests of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Malik stated that he would not and the U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Ernest Gross, was relieved (Paige 1968, 203). The prevailing thought was that the Soviet Union was slow to change the instructions given to its representatives in the UN. With the return of the Soviet Union the U.S. moved to make the UN General Assembly (UNGA) take action under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution when the UNSC was deadlocked due to the threat or use of the

veto (Zaum 2008).[73] Moving to the UNGA showed that the U.S. did not think UNSC authorization could be repeated under the threat of Soviet veto.

Second, as a foreign policy action the Korean War was not seen as a huge success and did not change the way people thought about the UN and the projection of military force. The conflict lasted between 1950 and 1953, so it was not over quickly. In fact, the conflict has not yet technically ended. Rather than a peace treaty, the conflict was stopped through a cease fire. This armistice is maintained today. Neither side gained much territory beyond what they had originally held. Thousands of U.S. soldiers died. UN participation did not make a material difference. The U.S. would not request a specific resolution to authorize the projection of military force for another 40 years.

While the Cold War prevented international authorization from the UNSC of subsequent projections of military force, it did not prevent other sources from being approached. If demand for UNSC authorization was thwarted by the onset of the Cold War a different collective body could have been used for this purpose.[74] NATO or some other form of RIO could have been used to provide political cover for many operations. In fact, NATO was not used for the political purpose of supporting the projection of military force until after the end of the Cold War. Like-minded states which make up NATO should have greater resonance with U.S. voters enhancing the support domestically which is a pathway for IOs to influence the foreign policy of states

[73] The 'Uniting for Peace' process has been used relatively infrequently since the Korean War (see, "Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 1950-2006" 2008).

[74] Of course, this is an option when there is an alternative organization for states to turn. RIOs represent one particular kind of organization which can provide international authorization if the intervening state is a member of such an organization in the region or if the state is able to solicit an organization to which it is not a member. For instance, the U.S. is not a member of the Arab League, yet the Arab League has endorsed several actions of the U.S. and its allies.

suggested by the strategic information theory discussed below. The UN authorization did aid President Truman's attempts to bolster support for the Korean War (Chapman and Reiter 2004, 892). Other options were also not considered. Discussions of the Military Staff Committee were absent in the high level discussion of how to response to the North Korean invasion of the South. The U.S. was willing go it along but preferred to get a response from the UNSC (Halberstam 2007). But in these discussion the MSC as an option was absent.

The kinds of policy options evaluated for the Korean War runs counter to the expectation that the end of bipolarity should see less value attributed to IOs rather than more. This is the case since a powerful state, having fewer challengers or constraints, would be less likely to need international authorization. For the Korean War, the U.S. faced almost no opposition since the Soviet Union did not represent a veto threat. As with the Korean War, when the U.S. became the dominant power after the end of the Cold War, it should not need to use an IO to legitimate its foreign policy actions. In other words, the expectation is for the U.S. to turn to an IO less often rather than more. The fact that the empirical evidence shows a different pattern, where the U.S. has sought international authorization more frequently, suggests that something else is happening. The end of the Cold War looks like an easy way to account for the rise of international authorization but it does not satisfactorily answer the question. To form an explanation there must be a connection between the specific events that constitute the end of the Cold War and the change in the behavior of states towards the UNSC. There is no connection between the lack of international authorization outside the UNSC to specific dynamics of Cold War politics.

Dominican Republic, 1965

The Johnson Administration made the decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic to prevent a communist takeover of the country (Crandall 2006). The initial decision did not have the authorization of the OAS but the organization did provide its blessing to the U.S. military operation at a later date. Despite the prior decision of the U.S. to turn to the UNSC in the Korean War, U.S. leaders were much less disposed to rely upon IOs at this time. President Johnson discussed the OAS and the Dominican crisis on April 30, 1965, with his advisers.

> They're going to set up a Castro government [in the Dominican Republic]…We begged the OAS to send somebody in last night. They won't move. They're just phantoms. They're just the damnedest fraud I ever saw, Mike [Mansfield]…They just talk. These international organizations ain't worth a damn, except window dressing…The big question is, Do we let Castro take over and us move out?...the OAS called for a cease-fire last night, but they went home and went to sleep…I'm trying to get them back today. And suppose they don't (meet) today? (quoted in Beschloss 2001, 300)

Following this conversation, National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy warned Johnson against putting pressure on the OAS (Beschloss 2001, 304). Johnson, furious and shouting, replied

> All right, let's see if we can satisfy that bunch of damn sissies [the OAS] over there on that question! Let's cut it out and let's just call them then and say that they're [the rebels in the Dominican Republic] "great statesmen"

President Johnson's disposition towards the OAS suggests that IOs were unimportant to the U.S. while the Johnson Administration was in power. In the end, the OAS approval of the operation was given after the operation had already begun. The decision to project military force in the Dominican Republic was made prior to any decision to approach the OAS and in fact the actual deployment of marines was underway before the OAS voted

its international authorization for the U.S. to project military force (Palmer 1989, 29). The U.S. acted unilaterally, with the IO providing its authorization to support the U.S. efforts despite diplomatic misgivings about the approach taken by the U.S.

Grenada, 1983

An instance where the U.S. did project military force without UN authorization during the Cold War is the 1983 invasions of Grenada. The U.S. was, once again, concerned about a communist takeover of this Caribbean island. President Reagan claimed that he order the military operation to save lives, including around 1,000 Americans, to prevent further chaos, and to restore law, order and democracy from the threat of leftist thugs (Reagan 1985). The American leaders made the decision to project military force and did not include a prominent role for IOs in their decision making process. The U.S. seemed willing at this time to press ahead with its plans to invade the island and make use of whatever support was available at the time rather than attempt work through an IO.[75] IOs were available for international authorization including the UNSC and the OAS. Neither was approached. This incident displays exemplary characteristics of how decision makers in the U.S. were disposed toward the UN during this time period. In this instance, the U.S. did not seek nor did it receive the blessing of the UNSC. In fact, this projection of military force has been considered by many scholars

[75] The U.S. did claim that it received a formal request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (see Reagan 1985). This has been widely disputed (Waters 1989). Reasons are numerous, not the least of which is that Grenada, as party to the Treaty establishing the OECS, is required to approve any act of collective defense on the part of the organization (Joyner 1984, 137). Grenada did not have the opportunity to approve of such an action and even if it had, since it was in the midst of a coup, such approval would have been highly suspect. For the purposes of this project I categorize this action as one undertaken outside of the UNSC and RIOs but one where the U.S. acted with allies. The U.S. action included support of over 300 troops from six other states: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines.

to fail the necessary criteria for multilateral action despite the contributions of some Caribbean states (e.g., Finnemore 2003; Schultz 2003).[76] The Reagan Administration's response to the General Assembly's condemnation of U.S. actions indicates the lack of respect which the President held for the UN. When questioned about the UN's disapproval of the action the President responded by saying,

> …100 nations in the United Nations have not agreed with us on just about everything that's come before them where we're involved. And, you know, it didn't upset my breakfast at all. (Reagan 1983)

POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS

Cold War projections of military force vary greatly in when the U.S. requests international authorization. These cases include incidents where the U.S. did request international authorization from the UNSC, from RIOs, or acted under Article 51, but most frequently, the U.S. acted outside any IO when it projected military force. Three of the explanations put forward rely upon the characteristics of a state to aid in their rationale for the outcome of increased use of resolutions to authorization military force: Basic and Sophisticated variants of realism, and regime type. Realism relies on the power of states to explain their turning to IOs and their success at acquiring international authorization. The examination of the U.S. controls for this factor since the relative control over material resources does not vary greatly from case to case. As a developed country the U.S. tends to have abundant resources available for military actions. Regime

[76] This intervention is considered to be a unilateral intervention by the U.S. despite the fact that other countries contributed to the forces which were deployed in Grenada. Six other countries contributed forces which combined totaled 300 (Joyner 1984, 132). This number is greater than the contributions from countries other than the U.S. during the 1994 intervention in Haiti. The four countries' contributions to the Haitian endeavor totaled 266 (Schultz 2003, 121). This later intervention was considered to be multilateral, indicating that the UN authorization holds power over the interpretation of what is and what is not a multilateral use of force in the post-Cold War era.

type relies on democratic institutions to explain certain states turning to international authorization when projecting military force. This pattern does not vary from projection to projection as the U.S. remains democratic throughout the Cold War. The alternative realist explanation based on the need for assistance when economic resources become in short supply was tested in the previous chapter. The remaining discussion in this chapter focuses upon the factors of information, constraints, multilateral norms and the authority of the UNSC.

Anticipated Political Costs

Strategic information transmission (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2009) focuses upon the notion of signaling intentions to other states through the commitment to IO requirements. This explanation focuses upon the anticipation of international political costs because international audiences are concerned about the intentions of the projector. Working through an IO signals that the projector's intentions are benign. In situations where no attempt is made to request international authorization from an IO, leaders did not anticipate that there would be negative international reactions. However, projecting military force is often controversial. The idea that the U.S. did not approach other IOs besides the UNSC because the U.S. did not anticipate high political costs does not make sense especially because the Soviet Union would likley object to the U.S. projecting military force.

IO Constraints

If constraints imposed by an IO prevent or deter a state from requesting international authorization the expectation is that the U.S. did not make a request. An examiniation of the U.S. requests during the Cold War displays that the U.S. infrequently

requested international authorization from IOs. The Korean War was the one instance where the processs of authorization did not constrain the U.S. ability to project military force. The only member of the UNSC which would have imposed costs upon the U.S. for projecting military force in Korea was the Soviet Union. As it was absent when the police action was authorized, only light constraints were imposed. For the remaining instances of projections during the Cold War, the UNSC was not a viable option, not because the UNSC would not authorize action but the requirements of the USSR would be so severe that it was not worth discussing. The Soviet veto made the UNSC the least likely forum for international authorization for most of the Cold War.[77] Alternative IOs are discussed in the next section on forum shopping. Based on the constraints factor, it makes sense that the UNSC was not approached during the Cold War.

Forum Shopping

The forum shopping perspective suggests when considered separately, anticipated political costs and IO constraints can explain when states request international authorization. Considering these two factors together should aid in explaining what kind of IO will be chosen. When a state anticipates high international political costs but is very sensitive to IO constraints it should request out international authorization from a RIO (Thompson 2009). Both the anticipation of high political costs and IO constraints, together, may indicate why states choose a particular IO. Table 4.2 shows the available

[77] Importantly, as discussed later, there is an issue of whether international authorization was considered necessary. I argue that during the Cold War, for projecting military force, international authorization was not seen as a necessary component of a state's foreign policy. This changed after the Persian Gulf War and, as demonstrated later, after the end of the Cold War international authorization was discussed in the context of the UNSC. During the Cold War, international authorization was not the focus of policy making discussion. Rather IO support was discussed as an issue of who supported the action rather than the IO authorizing the action.

RIOs which could have been approached by the U.S. when considering the projection of military force during the Cold War. The last column indicates which, if any, IO was approached for international authorization. Most of the lines in this column are blank indicating that the U.S. pursued a strategy of projecting military force outside of any IO. The UNSC was a forum with IO constraints that were too high for the U.S. to consider as a source of international authorization. Other IOs, especially more like-minded ones, could have provided authorization and thus reduce the political costs anticipated by the U.S. during the Cold War. Based on this assessment of how anticipated international political costs should be associated with the decision to request international authorization from any IO, the Cold War should show more attempts to request authorization from RIOs.

Multilateralism Norm

The norm of multilateralism suggests that after 1945 there should be more multilateral attempts to project military force because this option is percieved as the appropriate procedure for states to use (Finnemore 2003). The problem with this pattern of U.S. action during the Cold War is that a brief push occurs right after the end of World War II where states turn to IOs but no significant practice emerges. This suggests that no norm emerged from the ashes of the Second World War and no norm became consolidated during the Cold War. This norm does not provide a compelling explanation of U.S behavior during the Cold War. The most frequent mode of projection of military force is the unilateral option exercised outside of a multilateral framework. If UNSC activity were the result of a broad norm of multilateralism a gradual change should have emerged during the Cold War, especially during the 1980s. At least there should be

Table 4.2. Available Regional International Organizations, 1946-1989

Year	Decision	Admin.	RIOs[78]	Actual IO
1950	Korean War	Truman	SEATO	UNSC
1958	Intervention in Lebanon	Eisenhower	CENTO/LAS	
1961	Deployment in Thailand	Kennedy	SEATO/	
1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	Kennedy	OAS	OAS
1964	Bombing in Pathet Lao War	Johnson	SEATO	
1964	Vietnam War	Johnson	SEATO	
1965	Dominican Republic	Johnson	OAS	OAS
1970	Cambodia	Nixon	SEATO/ASEAN	
1975	*Mayaguez* Incident	Ford	SEATO/ASEAN	UN (Art. 51)
1980	Iran Hostage Rescue Mission	Carter	LAS/CENTO/OIC	UN (Art. 51)
1982	Sinai Multinational Force	Reagan	LAS/OIC/GCC/AU	
1982	Intervention in Lebanon	Reagan	LAS/OIC/GCC	
1983	Grenada Invasion	Reagan	OECS/OAS	
1986	Libyan Airstrikes	Reagan	LAS/OIC/NATO	
1987	Tanker Reflagging	Reagan	LAS/OIC/GCC	
1989	Intervention in Panama	Bush (41)	OAS	

evidence of actors resisting the push to request international authorization. These indicators are lacking while in other areas, multilateralism did become more significant during this time period (Keohane 1990). The post-1945 multilateralism included norms of generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie 1992).[79] However, the norm of multilateralism did not extend to international authorization for military force projection. The UNSC lay almost dormant during the 1970s and early 1980s. Only in the last two years of the Cold War does the UNSC become more active in dispute resolution, notably with the Iran-Iraq war (Malone 2007). But this spurt of activity did not include the practice of requesting

[78] For this table the Regional International Organizations include: Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) [also known as the Baghdad Pact], League of Arab States (LAS) [also known as the Arab League], Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) [now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation], Organization of American States (OAS), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of African Unity (AU) [now known as the African Union) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

[79] An issue arises about the lack of consensus about appropriate standards of conduct for multilateralism (see van Oudenaren 2003).

international authorization. As the next chapter demonstrates, this changed with the Persian Gulf War.

Authority of the UNSC

The explanation based on the authority of the UNSC suggests that the norm of requesting international authorization was not in place during the Cold War. Figure 4.1 displays the relative viability of the various options to project military force providing an assessment of the discursive context in which decision making took place in the U.S. The notion of requesting international authorization from the UNSC as appropriate was not strong. The discursive context of the Cold War made the possibility of using either a specific resolution from the UNSC or the MSC unviable.

Figure 4.1. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1946-1989



Even in the case of the Korean War, when there could have been a push to develop a solution to the crisis from within the UN Charter-based mechanism, there was no move to reignite the MSC. None of the major texts on the Korean War discuss the MSC (e.g., Cumings 2010). After the war was underway, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, did suggest to President Truman that they could develop a committee similar to the MSC within the UN to run the war but Truman shot this idea down, stressing that war cannot be run by committee (Wainstock 1999, 105). This kind of option was not seriously considered during the Cold War. Even the notion of claiming self-defense was not widespread, being first use was in 1958 by Tunisia in defending itself against the French (Bailey and Daws 1998, 103). The U.S. did make use of the RIO option as the OAS was considered in two cases. Outside options were considered to be the perview of the U.S. and alternative IO arrangements were generally not on the table.

CHAPTER V

JUNCTURES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE UNSC: IS THE END OF THE COLD WAR CRITICAL?

The end of World War II produced optimism that cooperation among the great powers would ensure international peace and security through the UNSC. The Cold War emerged before this potential could be realized and the UNSC retreated to marginal issues on the fringe of international politics (Malone 2007). After 1990, the UNSC expanded its range of activities to include conflicts well beyond those it could have undertaken during the Cold War (Malone 2010, 60). For the UNSC, the Cold War is characterized by one pattern described in the preceding chapter while the post-Cold War exhibits another. How the change came about is an important question. Was the end of the Cold War an eventful juncture for the UNSC where new choices were available, choices that would influence the future trajectory of the role of authorization-requesting behavior in international affairs, or was the future trajectory that developed a strongly-determined consequence of the end of the Cold War itself in which choices were different than before but equally constrained by systemic forces?

I argue that the end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture for the relationship between states and the UNSC over the projection of military force which became a critical one. The choices made during this juncture closed off options, creating a path-dependent process encouraging states to request international authorization from the UNSC. In this chapter I establish that the end of the Cold War represents an eventful juncture for the UNSC where the kind of relationship states had with the organization was uncertain. Then I demonstrate the different options which were made available to the

U.S. when confronting Iraq before the Persian Gulf War. The options were not viable during the Cold War but became available with its end. Lastly, I test the explanations developed in Chapter II for why the U.S. turned to the UNSC for international authorization during this crisis.

JUNCTURES AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War marks a point of change for the international system (Holsti 1994; Ikenberry 2001; Ruggie 1994). Even if we accept this claim, is there reason to accept the claim that the end of the Cold War represents a critical juncture in the authority accorded to the UNSC and that this led to the change in the frequency with which states request authorization from it? Despite the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, many international organizations did not experience substantial changes in their operations, mandate, or authority. Even where the U.S. and the Soviet Union were major players in an IO, organizations did not experience anything that could be described as a critical juncture. As examples, the ways that the International Maritime Organization, the UN Economic and Social Council and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty operated did not substantially change despite the role each rival played in these organizations during the Cold War.[80]

[80] These three organizations are examples of the lack of change despite the existence of a critical break at the end of the Cold War. When change has occurred within the operation of these organizations it tends to be incremental rather than revolution. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had a critical juncture when its extension was decided upon at its renewal conference in 1995 (Simpson and Howlett 1994). This was an institutionally imposed juncture for the treaty and the nonproliferation regime, since it was specified in the original treaty that its signatories would consider its renewal 25 years after it went into effect. Hence, there was a conference to extend the regime in 1995. The primary concerns were about regional threats in the aftermath of the Cold War (Cousineau 1994). Treaty membership did increase after the end of the Cold War; due in part to the dissolution of the USSR (Simpson and Howlett 1994). The functioning of the regime did not change. The U.S. and Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, both still held interests in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the uncertainty which accompanied the end of the Cold War may have served only to make these interests more acute. The International Maritime Organization has

While these organizations did not change, behavioral indicators suggest a change in how states view the UNSC which can provide an indication for where to look for an eventful juncture. The UN Charter provides the Security Council with the formal authority to evaluate situations where the use of force is an issue. Chapter VII of the Charter is the source of the claim that the UNSC has authority to enforce international peace and security. The preamble of Chapter VII states,

> The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security (Chapter VII, Article 39).

Under the Charter, states have gone to the UNSC to send out peacekeeping missions and to resolve issues which threaten international peace and security. This is significant because the decision for states to use the Security Council is an indication of its relations with member states. The use of the UNSC indicates that states did not seek a different forum or construct *ad hoc* coalitions of states to resolve matters which threaten peace and often their own security. A first cut examination of the behavior of the UNSC should look at how often the group meets to discuss issues of international importance. Either the Secretary-General or member states must make a request for the UNSC to hold meetings on any given issue. Member states must prompt action in the UNSC. Figure 5.1 shows the frequency of UNSC meetings since the council was first formed. More meetings have been held each year after the Cold War except for the first two years at the beginning of the UN.

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remained a key part of international cooperation in the regulation of maritime shipping since its inception in 1948 (Kraska 2009). The U.S. and the Soviet Union were powerful members of this organization. This organization has continued to function without substantial revision and members have adopted many treaties within the IMO framework. Lastly, despite calls for reform, the UN Economic and Social Council has changed very little since its origin in 1946 (Weiss 2010).

Figure 5.1. Number of Meetings Held by the UNSC



Source: United Nations (Various Dates-a).

The representatives of the member states who make up the United Nations push for resolutions from the Security Council.[81] UNSC resolutions reflect the actions of the member states rather than an action which transcends the constituent parts. The number of resolutions suggests that in the post-Cold War time period the UNSC made decisions on matters of international security with dramatically increased frequency rather than

[81] One line of constructivist theorizing about IOs suggests that by virtue of being organizations with a bureaucracy, IOs hold independent agency (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This argument is often applied to international organizations with specialized technocratic expertise such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. When it is applied to the United Nations it is often used to describe aspects of the bureaucracy of the secretariat rather than the intergovernmental aspects of member state interaction. A "third" UN could include nongovernmental organizations who attempt to influence the UN agenda through member states (Weiss 2008). See also Cronin (2002) on the development of transnational interests from the UN itself. However, the extent to which the UN Security Council can have an independent agency based on its independence from member states is questionable. The actual bureaucracy of the UNSC is small compared to other agencies of the UN and because of its topical focus on security, member states, especially the P-5, pays it a great deal of attention to its activities limiting the delegation to bureaucratic actors. Rotating members covet the position of sitting on the Council as enhancing their international reputation (Malone 2000, 6). These members take part in the various decisions of the council.

procedural issues. The UNSC met to talk more often but also came to a decision about the topic of its meetings (see Figure 5.2). Not only was the UNSC more active in its decision making, but the Council dealt with maters of international security with greater frequency.[82] Procedural matters such as membership in the UN have to be approved by the Council before a state can join the organization. The point is that the Council is not simply more active in passing resolutions in greater frequency in the post-Cold War time period because, for instance, a large number of former Soviet republics have joint the UN as member states. Instead, these resolutions carry purported weight about how states are supposed to behave. Actions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are resolutions in which the UNSC exercises its authority to enforce international peace and security. The number of Chapter VII resolutions passed increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War (see Figure 5.3). In addition to absolute numbers, the UNSC passed a greater percentage of its resolutions under Chapter VII (see Figure 5.4). This indicates the UNSC devoted more of its agenda to security related matters. These resolutions passed by the UNSC include peacekeeping operations (Berdal 2008), sanctions (Cortright, Lopez, and Gerber-Stellingwerf 2008), terrorism (Boulden 2008), piracy (Percy 2008), and, of course, the projection of military force. Between 1946 and 1989 the Security Council passed twenty-two resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Voeten 2005, 530). Between the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and 2004, the UNSC has passed over 145 resolutions under Chapter VII, for an annual rate of nine per year (Voeten 2005, 531). In the post-Cold War period, more of the UNSC's agenda is devoted to issues of international security.

[82] On this difference between procedural and substantive resolutions see Bailey and Daws (1998).

Figure 5.2. Number of UNSC Resolutions Passed



Source: United Nations (Various Dates-b).

Figure 5.3. Number of UNSC Chapter VII Resolutions Per Year.



Source: UN Security Council Resolutions from the United Nations (Various Dates-b), for Chapter VII Resolutions and their classification see Appendix B.

These features suggest that something happened to the UNSC at the end of the Cold War. However, they do not suggest what took place to produce such a change nor do they suggest a causal mechanism which links the end of the Cold War to the changes in behavior of states toward the UNSC. The evidence is not yet compelling that a marked change in the relationship between the U.S. and the UNSC. Before turning to the substantive topic of whether the end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture it may be valuable to eliminate alternative explanations for these indicators based on changes in the organization. Organizational changes could feed into the pattern observed which show that the end of the Cold War is at least a turning point for the UNSC.[83]

Organizational changes within the UNSC would suggest that the size, composition of the members, or decision making procedures changed to produce the change in the indicators discussed above. There should be substantial changes which took place around the end of the Cold War. However, there were no substantial organizational changes for the UNSC close to the end of the Cold War. The general composition of the UNSC membership and the size of the council remained the same during the period of time immediately before and immediately after the end of the Cold War (Bailey and Daws 1998). The procedures of the UNSC do not seem to indicate that there was any substantive change in the role of the UNSC in international affairs. The last major change

[83] A turning point is a description of a point in time that marks the beginning of a different and strongly determined trajectory. This is distinct from an eventful juncture. Turning points do not afford the opportunity for change the pattern but are a response to strongly determined structures. During eventful junctures, actors face choices which can affect context in which subsequent decisions are made.

to the decision making procedures of the UNSC took place in 1983 (United Nations 1983).[84]

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND VIABLE CHOICES

There is reason to think that the end of the Cold War changed the trajectory of the UNSC. However, the question remains whether the U.S. found new choices for the projection of military force which were not available during the Cold War. This section establishes the choices which were available when the U.S. crafted its response to the Iraqi invasion.

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein's military began its invasion of Kuwait. Over the next five months the U.S. built an international coalition to oppose the Iraqi action and based its authority to act upon twelve resolutions passed by the UN Security Council (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). At this time, Europe was the focus of international affairs. The retraction of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe produced a sense of optimism, and the prospect of cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet Union was the highest since World War II. Within this context the U.S. made two separate requests for international authorization from the UNSC. The first was for the UNSC to authorize the enforcement of economic sanctions on Iraq through "measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary" (UNSCR 665 1990). Such measures were understood to include the use of military force. The second request was for the UNSC to authorize offensive military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The

[84] The formal decision making procedures have not change but there has been a shift toward the use of what has come to be known as "informals" which are informal meetings usually between the P-5 where issues are discussed by members. This change in process is a direct result of the end of the Cold War but by itself it cannot account for the changes in UNSC behavior.

United States and its allies received authorization in Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) which set January 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to remove itself from Kuwait. President Bush gave the order to begin combat operations on January 16, 1991.

Figure 5.4. Ch. VII Resolutions as Percent of UNSC Resolutions



Source: UN Security Council Resolutions from the United Nations (Various Dates-b), for Chapter VII Resolutions and their classification see Appendix B.

This section focuses on the Persian Gulf War and establishes that the choice to request international authorization was not the result of a strongly determined response to material or institutional pressures. This decision to request international authorization took place within a period of time marked by uncertainty over what the international order was becoming and as such it took place during time of increased freedom of action. As one diplomat described, the end of the Cold War left the role of the UN uncertain.

> [W]hen the Cold War so unexpectedly came to an end, no one could be at all sure how the removal of the distortions it had imposed would affect the UN's activities and how these would now develop in the absence of the classic East-West confrontation with which all concerned were so familiar. The organisation was sailing into uncharted waters. (Hannay 2008, 12-13)

With this uncertainty as a backdrop that the U.S. faced a crisis from Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait. The role the UN would take was not known beforehand by the U.S. President and other executive officials.

> While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary, I wanted the United Nations involved as part of our first response, starting with a strong condemnation of Iraq's attack on a fellow member. Decisive UN action would be important in rallying international opposition to the invasion and reversing it. I instructed Tom [Pickering, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN] to work with the Kuwaitis and to do all he could to convene an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Although I was optimistic, I was not yet sure what to expect from the UN. I was keenly aware that this would be the first post-Cold War test of the Security Council in crisis. I knew what had happened in the 1930s when a weak and leaderless League of Nations had failed to stand up to Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. The result was to encourage the ambitions of those regimes. The UN had been set up to correct the failings of the League, but the Cold War caused stalemate in the Security Council. (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 303)

The Persian Gulf War took place during a time of uncertainty around the UNSC. U.S. decision makers recognized the end of the Cold War produced more flexibility and greater opportunities for action when discussing policy options. During the August 3, 1990 National Security Council meeting to discuss responses to Iraq's invasion, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made this assessment:

> This is the first test of the post war system. As the bipolar contest is relaxed, it permits this [the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait], giving people more flexibility because they are not worried about the involvement of the superpowers. (Eagleburger in NSC 1990, 3).

Within the uncertainty about how other states would respond, American leaders could have chosen between four different pathways.[85] The alternatives which the U.S. could

[85] Nominally, there were five pathways, with regional organizations representing an alternative if the U.S. selected an option outside the UN. The RIO option was not assessed by decision makers during the crisis despite its nominal availability. I would argue that the RIO option was not seriously considered by U.S. executive officials; the very notion of requiring international authorization was novel. Since getting authorization from an IO was first considered in the context of working through the UNSC there was no

have pursued vary along different degrees of UNSC involvement and would have resulted in distinct outcomes for the authority of the UNSC. The first path would have entailed the least involvement of the UNSC. The U.S. could have abandoned the involvement of the UNSC entirely as the U.S. negotiated the diplomacy of the anti-Iraq international coalition. This pathway involves a secondary choice where the U.S. could have sought out a surrogate IO to provide U.S. actions with political legitimacy, albeit from what was considered a weaker source. The second path would have been to continue to involve the UN as part of the diplomacy of the international coalition but not to request additional support through international authorization. Early in the crisis the U.S. expressed the preference for military action through the UN.[86] Instead, the U.S. could rely upon the authority invested in the right of collective self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Exercising the right of self-defense did not require any additional action on the part of the UNSC. A third path, the one settled upon, was that of requesting an explicit authorization contained within a resolution passed by the UNSC. The fourth possible path which became possible was to revive the Military Staff Committee and run the operation through the UNSC as initially intended by the drafters of the UN Charter. Several of these pathways are more consistent with either expectations

need to turn to a different organization. The UNSC was the first IO to be considered and the appropriate locus of international authorization. Other statements of support came from RIOs but none were considered the end point for international authorization. Had an RIO been considered sufficient in this context, the pattern of state behavior would have been vastly different and the norm of international authorization may not have come into existence. The global scope of the UNSC provided it with greater claim over the projection of military force which cannot be claimed by a RIO.

[86] It was reported on August 10, 1990, that an anonymous administration official said that the Bush Administration would prefer any military action to be "wrapped in the U.N. flag" (quoted in Goshko 1990).

based on the preceding structure of the international system or the alternative explanations presented in Chapter II.

UN or RIO based options were generally not considered viable during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War made these different paths possible but did not determine which path the U.S. would take. The point here is not that the U.S. did not have incentives to remain within the UN process. In fact, the U.S. did gain incentives to work diplomatically within the UN framework and resolutions which the U.S. was party to creating. However, the U.S. did face choices and costs to outside actions which did not stem from the preceding structural constraints encountered during the Cold War. The U.S. faced increasing costs because the Bush Administration pushed for UNSC resolutions. U.S. claimed that the UNSC should act and pass resolutions authorizing action against the Iraqis which legitimized the UNSC. Making these kinds of claims and then breaking away from the process and engaging in outside options would have burdened the U.S. greater costs for the diplomatic cooperation which it intended to preserve. The credibility of both the UN and the U.S. would have suffered and the coalition against Iraq would have collapsed.

Path 1: Outside the UN Process

Of the four pathways working outside the UN process is perhaps the least likely for the U.S. to have taken after the passage of UNSCR 660 (1990). This resolution declared that Iraq was responsible for breaking the international peace by invading Kuwait. The expectation from the preceding structural constraints of the Cold War was that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, would respond to news of the Iraqi invasion by calling for a Security Council meeting as he, in fact, did. Pickering was

going to start a process of negotiation with other UNSC members, which may have lasted months before producing a resolution. This was the situation faced by the members in 1987 when the Security Council was involved in ending the Iran-Iraq War. It took six months to negotiate a finding of a breach of the international peace under the UN Charter (Hume 1994, 188). Ambassador Pickering managed to accomplish this task in a matter of hours (Malone 2006, 58). Prior expectations, even when the relations between the permanent five members of the UNSC (P-5) were friendly, suggested that if the U.S. wanted to accomplish anything quickly about the situation that it would have to act outside the UNSC.[87] Ambassador Pickering and the U.S. Mission to the UN proceeded as normal but instead of encountering resistance, the Ambassador was able to quickly negotiate a text with the other UNSC members. Pickering credits the swift action to the clear aggression of Iraq which was "very much contrary to what people had come to expect the end of the Cold War might mean" (quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 4). Prior expectations suggested that coopeation in the Security Council was surprising.

> 'The Soviets saw any act of aggression by someone in their bloc as an act of liberation,' says Jeane Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's envoy to the U.N. 'If this were two years ago, the Soviets and those associated with them would have defined what Iraq did as an act of liberation.'(quoted in Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A4)

The initial draft for UNSCR 660 was written by the U.S. in consultation with the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the UN, Sir Crispin Tickell (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 80). The two at a dinner party together when Ambassador Pickering received the call that Iraq had invaded Kuwait. He was instructed that should bring the UNSC together to address

[87] The P-5 includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. The remaining member states are elected to the UNSC for two year terms.

this emergent problem. After these two worked on the draft resolution they introduced it to the remaining UNSC members. They arranged for nine sponsors, including Ethiopia and Malaysia.[88] Many U.S. decision makers feared that as the U.S. built the coalition within the UN, working outside increased the risks to undermine the cooperation within the coalition (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). Starting with UNSCR 660, and with each subsequent resolution, it became increasingly unlikely that the U.S. would step outside the UN process all together.

At two additional points in the process the U.S could have chosen a path outside the UN process. The U.S. could have adopted a different path prior to the resolutions which authorized the coalition to use military force. This means the U.S. could have broken away from the UN process. However, the decision to request international authorization to project military force to enforce the embargo on Iraq led directly to the need to gain authorization for Desert Storm (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144). Requesting international authorization made it harder to resist making a subsequent request. Hence, it became harder for the U.S. to change paths the further it went along the pathway. The implications of this pathway on the authority of the UNSC would have been considerable. Had the U.S. attempted to act outside the UN rhetorical devices could have been used, such as claiming that U.S. action was consistent with UNSC resolutions rather than legitimized by them. The UNSC would have been pushed to the margins of international politics, returning to its Cold War obscurity. The U.S. would likely rely upon its

[88] The other sponsors included the U.S., the United Kingdom and France from the P-5. From the elected members, Canada, Colombia, Côte d'Ivorie and Finland agreed to sponsor the resolution. This initial condemnation stands in contrast to UNSCR 678 (1990) that authorized the use of offensive military force by the coalition and was sponsored by the Soviet Union.

developing bilateral relationships with states in the Middle East and Europe emphasizing the support it had garnered from its Arab allies but without UN cover.

Path 2: Article 51 Justifications

U.S. officials claimed they had the authority to enforce economic sanctions mandated under UNSCR 661 prior to the passage of UNSCR 665 on August 25, 1990. This authority came from Article 51 of the UN Charter and the request for help from Kuwait after the invasion (Fitzwater 1991a). UNSCR 661 imposed sanctions while UNSCR 665 authorized the use of force to enforce these sanctions. This basis for action differs substantially from the other possible paths. For this one the U.S. would have relied on the authority of the UNSC in name only. Article 51 asserts:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. (UN Charter 1945)

Procedurally, all Article 51 requires is that member states report measures taken to defend themselves to the UNSC. This article reaffirms that the UN Charter in no way impinges upon the right of states to act in their own defense. To base the legitimacy of U.S. action to enforce the embargo on Article 51 is to base the legitimacy of this decision upon the moral authority of the U.S. to decide to come to the aid of another member of the UN. This right to self-defense includes the right to collective defense where other states come to the aid of the victim of armed attack. U.S. officials claimed that the

Kuwaiti request for assistance provides the U.S. and the other coalition members with the authority to enforce the embargo.[89]

Things did not work out based on the original intent of U.S. officials. "The initial American intention was not to seek further authority from the United Nations to enforce the embargo" (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144). The administrations initial strategy was to work unilaterally and if the UN went along that they would accept the support (Sciolino 1990). President Bush publically articulated the U.S. position based on Article 51 when asked by reporters on August 14, 1990, if the U.S. exceeded its authority to interdict ships in the Gulf.

> I think we're acting legally. So, this little meeting that was called by Cuba yesterday—it doesn't disturb me in the least. I mean, there can be differences, people can discuss them. But I'm convinced we're acting properly, and we are determined to continue to act in that manner. You see, Perez de Cuellar [U.N. Secretary-General] apparently talked about only the U.N. through resolutions can decide about a blockade. But he also said every country has the right to bring up article 51, and the Secretary-General had nothing to say against it. And we have good opinions that we are acting properly. And I have no intention to change at all. (Bush 1991b, 1132-1133)

On the same day, while discussing the issue of legal authority with the Turkish President, President Bush claimed the request for assistance from Kuwait constituted sufficient authority to act.

> President Ozal: One other thing: the Kuwaiti Prime Minister visited us today and brought with him letters from the Emir regarding Article 51.
> President Bush: Yes, That is what gives us the legal authority. (Bush 1990e, 1)

[89] Kuwait requested aid from the U.S. in the midst of the invasion. The first request for aid came from the Crown Prince about three hours after the invasion began (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 67). This request included the condition that the request be neither public nor official. A second request followed but without the conditions. This was later confirmed as the Kuwaiti ambassador to the UN worked with Ambassador Pickering to pass UNSCR 660 (Hume 1994, 187-188). The official request was received on August 12 (Fitzwater 1991a).

Ambassador Pickering pushed the U.S. position in the UNSC on August 9, 1990.

> We are in the course of informing this Council officially by appropriate letter of our action taken under Article 51 of the Charter. As President Bush said yesterday, this is entirely defensive in purpose, to help protect Saudi Arabia, and is taken under Article 51 of the Charter and indeed in consistency with Article 41 and resolution 661 (1990).
> As resolution 661 (1990) affirms, Article 51 applies in this case. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the large military presence on the Saudi frontier create grave risks of further aggression in the area. This being the case, my Government and others are, at the request of Saudi Arabia, sending forces with which to deter further Iraqi aggression. (UNSC 1990b, 8-9)

Support for this position was also forcefully advocated by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). Throughout the Gulf Crisis she thought that Article 51 and UNSCR 660 were sufficient, while requiring an additional resolution suggested that sovereign states did not have the moral authority to act on their own behalf.

> This meeting also saw the beginning of an almost interminable, argument between the Americans—particularly [Secretary of State] Jim Baker—and me about whether and in what form United Nations authority was needed for measures against Saddam Hussein. I felt that the Security Council Resolution which had already been passed, combined with our ability to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, was sufficient … [A]lthough I am a strong believer in international law, I did not like unnecessary resort to the UN, because it suggested that sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became accepted that force could only be used—even in self-defence—when the United Nations approved, neither Britain's interests nor those of international justice and order would be served. The UN was a useful—for some matters vital—forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world order. (Thatcher 1993, 821)

Thatcher used a similar rationale to support action over the Falkland Islands during the 1980s (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 84). The United Kingdom's Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Crispin Tickell also defended this position in the Security Council.

> Members of the Council will also know that at the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia my Government has agreed to contribute forces to a multinational effort for the collective defence of the territory of

> Saudi Arabia and other threatened States in the area. We will do so in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which members will recall was specifically reaffirmed in the preambule to Security Council resolution 661 (1990). (UNSC 1990b, 17-18)

While the U.S. and the United Kingdom stood together on this issue, others did not see it the same way. Iraq, of course, rejected this interpretation of UNSCR 661, calling any attempt to interdict Iraqi oil tankers as an act of aggression (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144). Pickering defended against this ironic accusation by suggesting that looking to Iraq to interpret UNSC resolutions was "…setting the fox to watch the hen house" (UNSC 1990a, 52). Others had perhaps more noble concerns about unilateral enforcement of UNSCR 661 in the Gulf. Tears lingered that, if unchecked by other powers, the U.S. may return to imperialist designs in the Middle East (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 24). France and China looked for an additional resolution as the best way to place limits on U.S. action (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 145). The preferred option of the Soviet Union was to resurrect the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to command enforcement of UNSC resolutions (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 145). The Soviet Union did agree with the French and Chinese that Article 51 was insufficient grounds for enforcement actions. The intended content of the ideal French or Chinese resolution was unclear but France and China seemed to want to limit the freedom of U.S. national decision making. Their ideal point may have been closer to the Soviets in intent but perhaps with a different coordinating mechanism from the MSC. This kind of rhetoric in the decision making process suggests that the initial intent of the U.S. was to conduct itself as it had during the Cold War and claim that its unilateral decisions were consistent with international standards.

The decision to turn from this path towards requesting international authorization emerged from a meeting between President Bush and his top advisers on August 22, 1990.[90] This meeting took place three days before the UNSC passed UNSCR 665 which authorized coalition forces to use force when enforcing the UN mandated embargo. At this meeting the key issue was whether to wait for a UN resolution before interdicting ships in the Gulf. The concern was that Saddam's challeng of the embargo put the credibility of the U.S. at stake requiring immediate action (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 147). The other issue was based on the calculation that if the U.S. waited and sought a resolution but did not secure enforcement authorization, this would be the worst of all possible outcomes for the U.S. The leadership of the U.S. over the coalition *and* its Article 51 justifications would be harmed (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). It is notable that of President Bush's advisers, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft was the strongest advocate against requesting an additional UNSC Resolution. Secretary of State, James Baker argued that an additional resolution was necessary to hold the coalition together. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell expressed that the U.S. could afford to wait to begin enforcement. President Bush was persuaded that it was worth the risk to wait and request an additional UNSC resolution to enforce the embargo.

> Thus, after a false start, the Americans had accepted that they had to keep working within an international consensus in a manner that would have been inconceivable just a few years earlier (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 150).

The Article 51 pathway dominated the understanding of U.S. policy making prior to the decision to request international authorization. The consequences for the UNSC,

[90] Secretary Baker contributed from Wyoming (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 147).

had the U.S. remained on this path seem readily apparent. The U.S. would not have based their action upon decisions in the UNSC but instead would have relied on its Article 51 claims to defend Kuwait. The U.S. requested and recieved international authorization to enforce the embargo on Iraq. Interestly, the statement the White House put out after the passage of UNSCR 665 did not even mention the Article 51 justification for enforcement action (see Fitzwater 1991b). In the aftermath of the passage of UNSCR 665 President Bush invoked the notion that the UN authorized all necessary means to enforce the embargo when briefing Congress on the situation in the Gulf.[91]

> With great speed, the United Nations Security Council passed five resolutions. These resolutions condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and rejected Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The U.N. has also mandated sanctions against Iraq, those chapter VII sanctions, and endorsed all measures that may be necessary to enforce these sanctions. And the United Nations has demanded that Iraq release all foreign nationals being held against their will without delay. (Bush 1991d, 1173).

Bush also cited UNSCR 665 for the contributions from Coalition members to the effort to monitor the seas and enforce the embargo on Iraq.

> This effort has been truly international from the very outset. Many other countries are contributing. At last count, 22 countries have either responded to a request from Saudi Arabia to help deter further aggression or are contributing maritime forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 665. (Bush 1991a, 1177)

[91] It is also interesting to note that the Bush Administration did not treat the authority of the UNSC in the same manner that it did for some U.S. domestic institutions. When it concerns war powers the Bush Administration claimed sole authority to command the military and did not need the support of Congress. It did welcome the support of Congress but did not recognize that it carried authority over the decision of the President to order the beginning of combat operations. This holds certain distinctions which are relevant for the discussion about invoking the legitimacy of action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. If the Bush Administration did not recognize the authority of the UNSC, its response to the passage of UNSCR 665 should have been similar to its reaction to the U.S. Congress passing the authorization to use military force.

President Bush justified U.S. actions from the UN mandate and suggested that this is what the UN is supposed to do in these situations.

> Well, I don't particularly see more hope [for a diplomatic solution] now because it's so clear what the world is demanding of Saddam Hussein [President of Iraq]. Clearly the objectives remain the same: Get out of Kuwait and restore the rightful leaders to their place. But the Secretary-General, I understand, will be meeting with Foreign Minister of Iraq [Tariq ‘Aziz]—I think it's in Amman, Jordan. I haven't talked to him yet. I have a call in to him and will probably get him. But the U.N. mandate is so clear and, on the other hand, Saddam Hussein has been so resistant to complying with international law that I don't yet see fruitful negotiations. But the Secretary-General, knowing the U.N. mandate, is a very good man. And I might add, parenthetically, the Prime Minister [Brian Mulroney of Canada] and I both did talk about this, and we both agree that the U.N. has perhaps demonstrated its finest in recent actions. So, if Perez de Cuellar, an old friend of mine, wants to go forward and try to find some way to get the U.N. action complied with, so much the better. (Bush 1991c, 1167-1168).

In these and similar statements President Bush ceased to use Article 51 as a justification for U.S. enforcement action. Had U.S. officials continued to press Article 51 as the source of legitimacy rather than request international authorization for U.S. action, it is likely that the decisions made in the UNSC would have been seen as mere talk rather than binding on member states.

Path 3: Requesting a Resolution

Whereas paths one and two rely upon the authority of states to act on their own behalf, the third path relies upon a specific delegation of authority by resolution from the UNSC to a coalition of willing members. The process upon which this path relies is for the UNSC to pass a resolution authorizing the use of military force. This discussion of the decision to request international authorization differs from the other three pathways in one key respect. The U.S. officials chose to request international authorization from the UNSC for both embargo enforcement and for their offensive military operation under

Desert Storm. Since the U.S. decision makers decided to pursue international authorization it was clearly a possible avenue of policy.

The UN Charter does not offers a specific provision for international authorization delegating the authority to use military force to member states (Blokker 2000; Wilson 2007). The first time the UNSC delegated its enforcement authority occurred in 1950 for the Korean War. The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council over the permanent membership of Taiwan. Due in no small part to the Soviet return to the Security Council, the only other time during the Cold War in which this instrument was used by the UNSC was UNSCR 221 (1966). This delegation was to the United Kingdom to enforce an embargo upon Southern Rhodesia. It was not used again until the Persian Gulf Crisis after the end of the Cold War. Due to Cold War dynamics its accompanying great power politics the UNSC was not initially used as the primary forum to address issues of peace and security. The diplomacy of the United States leading up to the Persian Gulf War did not focus on the United Nations in any substantial capacity. The initial characterization of the diplomatic strategy pursued by the White House in this situation was that it was a "box to be checked" rather than the centerpiece (Thomas Pickering quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 13). However,

> With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait … the US approach to the Security Council diplomacy changed dramatically. Resolutions, once drafted entirely in New York, were crafted instead within the State Department, passing through a laborious, multi-bureau clearing process before [the Ambassador to the UN, Thomas] Pickering began his negotiations in New York (Rosegrant 1994, 14).

The basis of authority which the U.S. used to justify its action during this crisis changed with the decision to request international authorization to enforce the embargo on Iraq. This decision was made within an uncertain environment. While urging the U.S. to make

a request for international authorization Canadian Ambassador, Yves Fortier "said that these are uncharted waters, that there are no precedents" (quoted in Sciolino 1990). The U.S. decision to request international authorization for its embargo enforcement actions had lasting effects.

> [T]he decision to turn the embargo into an effective blockade … set the precedent for international support for the use of force and, in so doing, shaped future American decision-making" (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144).

This decision paid off for the Bush Administration. In making the decision to continue along the UN path, the U.S. gained support for enforcing the embargo.

> [T]he U.N. has emerged as an invaluable tool. President Bush, himself a former U.N. delegate, understood the potential of the organization for providing cover and legitimacy for his response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Without the prospect of U.N. support, he might not have been able to persuade Saudi Arabia to accept U.S. troops. Without U.N. action, it would have been more difficult for an Islamic state such as Turkey to close its oil pipelines. Without the U.N., the likelihood of Soviet involvement in international action was slim; from the outset, Moscow made it clear that it would not move without the UN. The administration has at some points in the current crisis moved at a slower pace, or shown more caution, than officials would have preferred-specifically in order to keep the five permanent members of the Security Council moving in unison. For instance, Mr. Bush held off on unilaterally enforcing the embargo. That was a deliberate strategy chosen in hopes that the crisis could set a precedent in which the Security Council showed it would take concerted action against international aggressors, something it has seldom done in the past. (Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A4)

The decision to request international authorization for both offensive action and embargo enforcement reflected a new reality for U.S. decision makers. Concerns arose that action outside of the UN would unravel the coalition (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 145), coupled with concerns that the Soviet Union may not support a resolution to authorize force. Both the USSR and China had threatened to veto a resolution which looked to authorize force on the basis of ships already in the Gulf (Freedman and Karsh

1993, 146). However, indications from France, the USSR, and China suggested that they all would support some enforcement activities. (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 147). Ambassador Pickering thought that there were good prospects for the U.S. to get authorization within the UNSC (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). Secretary Baker felt that the USSR could be persuaded to support a UNSC resolution in time (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 148). Part of the issues revolved around the content of a resolution authorizing the enforcement of the embargo. When attempting to figure out the content of such a resolution the U.S. ran into some stumbling blocks. The U.S. preference was for a UN mandate without an effect upon national decision making. Such a resolution should "be confined to a request for assistance from member states to enforce the embargo" (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). This would in effect give member states the authority to enforce UNSC resolutions as they saw fit. Other states were concerned that this gave the U.S. a free hand for any chosen military action. The U.S. needed to accept greater limits on its actions to gain the support of other states. In the end, Bush decided to press for and received international authorization from the UN Security Council.

One crucial aspect in securing international authorization from the UNSC does concern the goals of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. Concerns arose about the intentions of the U.S. In this instance U.S. diplomacy worked to assure other countries prior to securing authorization from the UNSC. The Bush Administration worked hard to reassure members of the coalition and of the United Nations that its goals were the ones enshrined by UNSCRs. The September 1990 decision to remove Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael Duggan, from his post reinforced this notion (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 33). Duggan had told the press that Saddam Hussein would be deliberately targeted. The Bush

Administration had stressed that U.S. goals did not include an attempt to remove Hussein from power but were limited, when asked on August 27, 1990.

> Q. Mr. President, how would you describe your policy for ousting Saddam Hussein right now, as of this moment? Would it be fair to describe it as wait and see?
> The President. No. My policy is to do everything we can, working with other nations, to enforce the sanctions. We have moved forces, considerable forces, and I hope that that has safeguarded Saudi Arabia, which in my view was clearly threatened when Saddam Hussein moved his forces south from Kuwait City. So, I think it is now: Get plenty of force in place—we're still doing that. Enforce the United Nations sanctions rigorously-and for the U.S., we will do that and encourage others to do it. And that's about where we are right now. (Bush 1991c, 1170).[92]

U.S. officials attempted to reassure others that the U.S. did not have imperial intentions. Baker attempted to reassure the Soviet Union that American troops were going to be in the Middle East only for the duration of the crisis (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 80). The American mission to convince King Fahd that U.S. intentions to defend Saudi Arabia were credible also stressed that the U.S. was not looking to permanently station troops there (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 92).

The ability to secure international approval from the UNSC hinged more on the limited U.S. goals rather than the issue of getting other states to support the U.S. because of UN authorization. In other words, the U.S.'s limited goals prompted support from the USSR, China, France, and Arab states rather than the support of those states prompting the U.S. to limit its goals. Had the U.S. pressed for regime change in Iraq this support may have not been forthcoming and there may have been a veto of the authorizing resolution. Ultimately, the U.S. requested a resolution from the UNSC with explicit

[92] On August 30, 1990, President Bush did indicate that the U.S. would welcome a change from inside Iraq but would not work from outside to produce a change in Iraq's regime (Bush 1991a, 1179).

authorization for the enforcement of sanctions and repelling the Iraqi invasion while other states were open to the U.S. pursuing other pathways.

Path 4: The Military Staff Committee

The fourth pathway the U.S. could have taken centers on the MSC of the UN Security Council. When the UN Charter was signed the original intent was for members states to contribute troops and equipment to be used by the UNSC and commanded through the MSC (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274-275). These military units were to be used to enforce peace and ensure security to produce a true collective security system (Grove 1993). This model of enforcement action failed to emerge due in large part because member states did not place military troops, equipment, or other resources under the control of the MSC. Member states are still unlikely to do so to this day. During the Persian Gulf Crisis the MSC experienced a brief revival but it failed to reach the heights envisioned by those who wrote the Charter. The MSC still meets regularly as proscribed by the Charter but the content of these meetings usually only concerns scheduling the next meeting (Bailey and Daws 1998, 274).

The end of the Cold War brought about the possibility for this mechanism to be used by the UNSC and the member states to provide a mechanism for coordination and control over military forces. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international military response created an opportuinty to use the MSC. This option to coordinate military activities in the Persian Gulf was favored by the Soviet Union over other options considered by the U.S. when forming its policy response to the developing crisis (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). The Soviet Union's preference for the MSC emerged from the tensions between two aspects of the context in which the USSR found itself at

the end of the Cold War (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 125). The Soviet Union's post-Cold War foreign policy committed President Mikhail Gorbachev to find common interests with the U.S. (Fuller 1991). The Soviet policy of *perestroika* (new thinking) and Gorbachev's domestic support would suffer if Iraq was allowed to retain Kuwait. The emergent international order may have suffered as well. On the other hand, Iraq was a long standing ally of the USSR. It was difficult to alter the effect of these ties and the Soviet stance towards Iraq. These two pressures placed the Soviet Union in a difficult position of siding with a former enemy against a state which the USSR claimed as an ally. The use of Soviet armed forces fighting alongside its former enemy was a difficult image for many in the USSR to contemplate (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 127). The solution to resolve this tension was through the United Nations. This push to focus on the role of the UN led to an emphasis on what the UN was originally set up to do—control military force through the MSC. Working through the UN was consistent with the "new thinking" of Gorbachev and could allow for the USSR to justify its position alongside the U.S. in the Gulf crisis.

For the enforcement of the sanctions upon Iraq, UNSCR 665 recommended the MSC as a mechanism to help coordinate efforts, reflecting the idea that many thought the entire program of the UN could be rejuvenated in response to aggression. This is the first time the MSC had been activated since the Soviet Union boycotted its meetings in 1950, and the first time it could be used to coordinate information among members since it became deadlocked in 1948 (Bailey and Daws 1998, 279). However, the UNSC did not make this mechanism mandatory and it was used only briefly to share embargo enforcement information (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 149-150). When discussing the

crisis with Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu on August 13, 1990, this option was initially considered by President Bush as the most likely route to coordinate action among the different national militaries taking part in preventing trade with Iraq.

> The multinational peacekeeping effort will probably be coordinated through the UN military staff committee and perhaps Japan could participate in those consultations. Although these issues require further consultation, initial ideas being kicked around are mine sweeping and ships to carry equipment to Saudi Arabia—something of that nature. (Bush 1990g)

Since the French and Chinese wanted to limit the United States' freedom of action, it seems likely they would have accepted the MSC as a way to do so. The French in particular may have seen this as a better alternative to direct U.S. control over the French forces. In fact, the French insisted their troops were to be deployed outside of the chain of command of the Coalition forces assembling in Saudi Arabia. Despite this independent political position there was tacit recognition on the ground that in the event of military action the French forces would have to act under U.S. command (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 118).[93] There was even support for reactivating the MSC from the Labour party in the United Kingdom, exhibited during the House of Commons debates on September 6th, 1990 over the authority to use military force in the gulf:

> It is lawful if, at some time, the United Nations judges that the action taken thus far has been "inadequate" for the purpose of fulfilling its resolutions, in which case military action under article 42 of the charter could be taken, either by reference to the Security Council or the military staff committee, or both. Those who say that there cannot be a public declaration of the possibility of a strike do not take into full account the reason for the existence of the military staff committee. Given the military realities, if it were acceptable that a strike took place against an aggressive enemy, the process would be much more likely to go through the MSC

[93] There was a private agreement that the French forces would be integrated into the coalition command as early as October of 1990 (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 44).

> than the Security Council. (Neil Kinnock, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons 1990)

The U.S. had concerns about working through the MSC. The primary concern was that the United States wanted to preserve its national command structure as the most effective and practical means for military action rather than operating directly under UN-command (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 146). The U.S. wanted control over its own operations, especially since it was the state contributing the majority of the military forces in the Gulf. The MSC was not considered an attractive option for offensive military action. The MSC was reactivated but only to exchange evidence of sanctions violations. It did not alter the national command structures put into place by the U.S. over coalition forces (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 29). A second issue for the U.S. concerned the possibility that the USSR would contribute troops which would operate side-by-side with American forces. Had the USSR made the decision to contribute troops or ships, the MSC may have served as the needed mechanism to coordinate military activities.[94] Without contributing military assets to the coalition, the USSR's opinion on the day-to-day operation of the military forces was not very compelling.

The U.S. military focused on two issues about the MSC. The first, they were reluctant to cede command of U.S. troops to an entity that is not within the U.S. command structure. Thus, one pertinent issue concerns placing troops under foreign command. The second was the root of the initial problem of activating the MSC. The Cold War imposed constraints such that placing troops at the disposal of the MSC would provide the Soviet Union with the ability to override U.S. commands. The Soviet Union

[94] Shevardnadze had even suggested the USSR would contribute troops to a multinational force through the MSC (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 85).

held up the formation of stand-by agreements that would have provided military resources for the use of the MSC. Stalin did not want these forces to be used around the world and thus institutionalize the strategic superiority held by western powers (Grove 1993, 178). The easing of tensions between the U.S. and the USSR did relieve this issue. The end of the Cold War meant that policies were no longer discussed in relation to the overwhelming issue of how they would affect the Soviet Union. The role of the MSC could be assessed according to its merits without reference to the Cold War. In the balance of things, the reason why one option was chosen over others was because the policy makers thought it was the best policy option. In this instance they assessed the MSC and found it wanting. They did so because they were concerned about the MSC overriding the national military commands. In fact, when drafting UNSC resolutions U.S. policy makers explicitly did not include reference to Articles 42 and 46 of the UN Charter which dealt with the MSC because it could invite the MSC or the UNSC to interfere with the conduct of the war (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 229). The U.S. accepted the MSC as a mechanism to coordinate the embargo on Iraq but did not think the MSC was necessary unless the USSR contributed military resources to the coalition (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 126). The MSC was considered a policy option but there was an alternative which provided the U.S. with more flexibility in conducting war operations while maintainong cohesion in the coalition against Iraq. Had this alternative not been available, or if France and China did not see a UNSC resolution as acceptable, the MSC may have been the only option to ensure that the U.S. continued to work through the UN and thus maintain the coalition. Failing to work through the UN, the U.S. would not have maintained the coalition that included the Soviet Union.

Had the U.S. acceded to the preferences of the USSR and elected to work through the MSC, the outcome for the authority of the UNSC may have been very different. The process of using authorizing resolutions to delegate enforcement tasks in the Persian Gulf War looked workable. Had the MSC been successful as the UNSC's mechanism to ensure collective security, and, if the coalition forces had removed the Iraqi military from Kuwait, the UN would have dramatically enhanced authority. To acomplish this it would have had to successfully create channels for conducting military operations including coordinating between varied national militaries, selecting proper targets, and executing missions in Iraq to repel the invaders of Kuwait. This organ would report directly to the UNSC rather than operate through a national command. Based on the assessment of recent NATO activities the ability of the MSC to achieve this is highly unlikely.[95] Under such a scenario it would have been the UN acting through the MSC taking command of coalition operations rather than the U.S., even if the U.S. provided the bulk of the military assets and resources.

Alternatively and, much more likely, even if the overarching goal of removing Saddam's troops from Kuwait had been reached, it would have been difficult to call the operation a success. If the operation was an outright failure, the UNSC would have been too intimately connected with the conduct of the operation to avoid blame. As a test, the UNSC would have failed and thus in subsequent crises, such as Somalia in 1992 and

[95] Two recent NATO operations have illustrated difficulties in managing national militaries in cooperation. The U.S. involvement in the operation in Kosovo in 1999 illustrated the difficulties of coalition warfare under the NATO command (Dunn 2009). The second is the Libyan operation which NATO recently undertook in 2011. The assessment of this operation is that NATO could not successfully undertake missions such as this in the future without disproportionate leadership and support from the U.S. (Schmitt 2012). The implications of these operations suggest that the earlier operations Desert Shield and Storm would not have been seen as successful had the U.S. not taken the lead in providing a military role.

Bosnia in 1995, the UNSC most likely would not have been used. Such consequences were not clear to decision makers at the time. The MSC was considered a viable choice which could have been used by the coalition during the Persian Gulf crisis.

POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS

American officials made the decision to request a resolution from the UNSC to authorize the use of force to enforce sanctions on Iraq, thus laying the foundation for international authorization of offensive military operations. The previous constraints which structured the relationship between the U.S. and the UNSC suggest that three of these alternative pathways would not have been available. Authorizing resolutions, using the MSC, or using a RIO would not have been options considered under the Cold War competition. World leaders were surprised about the role of the UNSC in the emerging crisis between Iraq and Kuwait. Many thought that the resolutions which emerged from the UNSC were not possible even a few years before.

> If somebody had told you 2 years ago that this kind of crisis would emerge and the Soviet Union would repudiate Iraq and that the United Nations Security Council would stand in unanimous support of five resolutions and that you would see this kind of support emerge, as I say, from Canada to Australia, you would have bought him a ticket to the funny farm right away. This is an historic achievement by the United Nations, by members of the alliance, and by the President of the United States. This is a remarkable achievement. There are few parallels for it, certainly, in modern history. (Brian Mulroney in Bush 1991c, 1171).

The choices which American officials faced included those which were not previously available. Nominally, these choices were there but they were not considered viable. Of the alternatives which were assessed by the U.S., the use of authorizing resolutions was the most appealing, precisely because it preserved the international coalition by continuing to work through the UN and ensure that the U.S. maintained control over

military decisions. Working through the UN also carried the added benefit that it helped with domestic support from both Congress and the American public opinion. This section now turns to the explanations for why the U.S. turned to the UNSC to gain international authorization.

Sophisticated Realism

The Persian Gulf War shows the limits of a sophisticated realist explanation of the request for international authorization. A sophisticated realist explanation suggests that a state's power over others should translate into that state requesting international authorization because the state's leaders think they can use this power to gain greater international support for authorization for the projection of military force. Under this conception of how international politics works, U.S. leaders are expected to focus on the geopolitical power of other states. U.S. executive officials did focus on the power of Iraq and its potential to gain more upon acquiring more resources. President Bush expressed in a National Security Council meeting on August 4, 1990, that the first thing the U.S. needed to do after Iraq invaded Kuwait was to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (Baker 1995, 277). U.S. decision makers were concerned that if Iraq gained control of Saudi Arabia that with the resources of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia combined with its own, Iraq would control over a quarter of the world oil supplies. In such as case, Iraq could project immense power over the Middle East and beyond and hold the potential to disrupt the world economy. In the National Security Council meeting, the solution to the threat which Iraq represented to Saudi Arabia was to convince Saudi Arabia to accept U.S. troops (Rosegrant 1994, 10). However interesting this preoccupation of U.S. decision makers with the threat which Iraq represented may be by itself, the concern with

Iraq's rising power needs to be connected to the decision to request international authorization. This is a problem for sophisticated realism. The sophisticated realist claim is that the U.S. holds more power than other states and thus is able to get its way in the UNSC, which logically make sense. This claim is supported by the position many states took on the crisis. Since the Cold War ended and the U.S. was the last superpower standing, many states wanted to ally themselves with the U.S. According to one State Department official,

> The truth of the matter is we were in the process of seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Everybody wanted to be close to the United States of America. (quoted in Rosegrant 1994, 20)

This standing made it easier for the U.S. when considering inducements to gain support, but the U.S. still considered side payments and sanctions for support of coalition activities. These included debt forgiveness for Egypt, increasing textile quotas for Turkey, and the promise of future economic assistance to the Soviet Union (Rosegrant 1994, 20). The most expressive inducement came in the form of a negative sanction against Yemen. After the September 29, 1990, vote on UNSCR 678 which authorized the projection of military force, with Yemen voting against international authorization, a U.S. official was quoted telling the Yemeni Ambassador, "That was the most expensive vote you will have cast" (quoted in Atkinson and Gellman 1991). The U.S. proceeded to cut aid to Yemen from $22 million to $3. The U.S. needed China's acquiescence to avoid its veto in the UNSC. China saw the crisis as a means to escape the isolation from great powers which it faced after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 232). Once the decision was made to request international authorization the power of the

U.S. made it easier to secure international authorization from the UNSC.[96] The initial decision to enforce the embargo on Iraq was considered independently of the decision to request international authorization. However, the U.S. decided to accept restraint when its initial intentions were met with concern by observer states. The U.S. thus made the decision to project military force *after* it had acquired international authorization.

The exercise of power within the framework of the UN did have an effect upon international politics during this crisis. However, the expectations of a sophisticated realist explanation are more consistent with a different outcome than the request for specific resolutions providing international authorization to enforce the embargo and repel Iraq from Kuwait. The initial intentions of the U.S. were to act under the collective self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The U.S. convinced the UNSC to act immediately after receiving news of the invasion of Kuwait. With the request for aid from the Emir of Kuwait, U.S. executive officials thought they had all the legal standing to act, including the use of military force. Under the expectations of this explanation the U.S. should have been able to convince others that this constituted legitimate grounds to act and that further resolutions were unnecessary. Something which the U.S. failed to do. This explanation is more consistent with outside options or Article 51. France and China saw a specific resolution as a way to limit the exercise of power by the U.S. Outside options or acting under Article 51 would represent the unfettered exercise of U.S. power. The Article 51 pathway is more consistent with a power-based explanation. Conflicting

[96] The power of the U.S. did make it easier to secure international support for the coalition against Iraq. What also helped were the positions that naked aggression along the lines of the invasion of Kuwait should be opposed and other less direct factors. It is certainly not a single issue which facilitated international cooperation. It there was a single issue which did so, working through an IO would neither have been necessary nor useful.

interests of the varied members of the UNSC should have prevented even the first condemnation of Iraqi action, let alone eleven resolutions which followed. A perspective which focuses upon the issue of raw material power suggests that the U.S. should have opted for policy options outside of the UNSC. The notion that the U.S. would alter its policy to account for other members of the Coalition should make the outside options much more attractive, especially since these interests would work against the national interest of the U.S. While the influence of power upon the outcome within the UN framework is clearly present, the contribution of a sophisticate realist explanation to the decision to request international authorization is limited.

Regime Type

An explanation of the decision to request international authorization which relies upon the regime type of the projector of military force rests upon the notion that democratic institutions are the important causal factor. This explanation suggests that U.S. decision makers should have justified their actions in terms of international law. One limitation that emerges from this explanation is that the U.S. did initially defend its actions and its ability to project military force as consistent with international law but without the requirement of an additional UNSC resolution. The initial resolution coupled with a request for aid was initially considered sufficient to justify the projection of military force under international law. However, to satisfy its partners in the anti-Iraq coalition the U.S. sought an additional resolution which justified the projection of military force. An additional issue is the fact that nondemocracies including the Soviet Union and China pushed for the U.S. to involve the UN despite their interests in the U.S. action. Their support was contingent upon the U.S. working through the UN under a

specific resolution. The Soviet Union held the position that projecting military force through the MSC was its preferred option but could still accept action through a Chapter VII resolution authorizing the projection of military force. Regime type does not seem to guide the reactions of different states to the projection of military force under the authorization of the UNSC.

The emphasis this explanation places upon the role of law in democratic societies makes the option of the MSC the most logical one. The MSC is the original mechanism envisioned by the UN Charter to which the U.S. did agree. Essentially, this is the mechanism through which the UNSC was supposed to function. The UN Charter does not make any provisions for a delegation of enforcement to member states. Under the international law made by the UN Charter the MSC, under the control of the UNSC, was the only actor designated to project military force. The democratic impulse here should have led the U.S. to push for the involvement of the MSC as the outcome which makes the most sense from the perspective of this explanation.

Information Transmission and Anticipated Political Costs

The U.S. executive officials did not anticipate international political costs when they expressed their intent to enforce the UN's embargo on Iraq. When they encountered resistance they justified their actions in terms of international law on the basis of collective self-defense. This justification received objection from other states, notably the Soviet Union, France, and China. The decision to act was in response to these concerns. The information transmission explanation suggests that the decision to turn to an IO for international authorization signals benign intentions when the leaders think they will encounter international political costs with their action. The U.S. did want to keep the

coalition together and so worked to pass a resolution which provided authorization for the coalition to project military force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. Initial drafting of the UNSC resolution took place in the UN Mission but as the crisis moved forward and the U.S. pressed for enforcement authorization, the drafting moved to Washington DC. This fits with the expectations of this explanation.

If the desire to signal credible information about the intentions of the U.S. were the rationale for requesting international authorization, then using Article 51 justifications for U.S. action would have been the pathway selected by the American decision makers. Article 51 claims would signal to both Arab states and the U.S.'s Western allies that the U.S. did not have imperial aims as the U.S. attempted to communicate to other states. During August and early September, USSR officials expressed unease at the presence of U.S. troops in the Gulf region, but Bush managed to quell these fears by stressing that their presence was only for the duration of the crisis with Iraq (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 33). Importantly, the U.S. relieved these fears by communicating its intentions directly to the USSR. Because of this treatment by the Bush Administration Gorbachev formally joined the coalition opposing Iraq on September 9, 1990. This occurred between the two resolutions authorizing the use of force for the different enforcement actions. UNSCR 665 was passed on August 25. The decision by the Soviet Union to join the coalition does not seem to be directly connected to the passage of this resolution. The passage of UNSCR 678 was in November, over two months later, so the decision to join the coalition cannot have been influenced by its passage. The issue of U.S. intentions does not appear to be connected to resolutions passed by the UN. There is no indication why the U.S. would have sought a different mechanism which had not been used to signal its

benign intentions to other states. U.S. officials had other means beside UN resolutions to credibly convince participants in the international coalition of its benign intentions. The U.S. had been using these methods and they were successful at convincing other states to support the U.S. without relying on the UN to signal its intentions.

A comparison with the Panamanian intervention which was conducted by the U.S. the year before the Persian Gulf Crisis erupted is interesting. The primary difference between these two instances is the end of the Cold War which made the UNSC a possible fora. The two cases are dissimilar in that the Persian Gulf War concerned a reaction to state aggression which is generally seen as inappropriate state behavior while the U.S. action to intervene in Panama was seen by many as aggression. Such actions in Latin America are contentions making it more likely that U.S. decision makers would have anticipated international political costs. This anticipation should have made it more likely for the U.S. to request international authorization in the Panamanian instance rather than the Persian Gulf crisis. The fact that the U.S. was responding to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf War made it possible for the U.S. to acquire international authorization.

Selling the U.S. action through the UN to the Soviet Union for their domestic political considerations explains why the U.S. did go to the UN. The intent was to keep the USSR in the coalition. The reason for requesting a specific resolution is a different matter. While the USSR wanted some form of UN action to justify its support, any kind of UNSC approval would have sufficed for Soviet domestic politics including the Soviet preference for the MSC, or the French and Chinese preference for a specific resolution. The U.S. chose the approach which would maximize its flexibility while maintaining the coalition.

IO Constraints

An explanation based on the concerns of a projector of military force about the constraints imposed by an IO would focus on the ability of the projector to maintain flexibility and retain autonomy. After the first condemnation of the Iraqi invasion the Bush Administration began working the diplomatic front to produce an international coalition. U.S. officials thought that Article 51 and a request for aid by Kuwait gave the coalition the needed authority to enforce the embargo. Based on expectations of what was needed the U.S. initially chose this path. U.S. decision makers chose to leave this path because they thought that an additional resolution would bolster support from the international community. The concern was the international coalition rather than domestic political support. The U.S. had lingering fears that the push for time to let diplomacy work out a solution between Iraq and Kuwait was a ploy by the Soviet Union and its allies to support Iraq (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 188). Having lived through the Cold War, many U.S. policy makers did not want to sacrifice national interests to those on the side of the Iraqis. These concerns suggest that the U.S. did not want to endure the constraints of the UNSC especially when the U.S. could get the needed support from allies without requesting additional resolutions from the UNSC. This would balance the aversion to IO constraints with the advantages that come from working within the UNSC.

Forum Shopping

Forum shopping expectations suggest it should be more likely that the U.S. would have proceeded with the endorsement of a RIO. Decisions makers did not discuss the relative merits of IOs and whether they could achieve the same political ends as they could by going through the UN. The issue is that the UNSC was the organization in which great powers such as France, China, and the Soviet Union wanted to be involved.

The initial actions of the UNSC in the passage of UNSCR 660 increased the liklihood that the UNSC would be involved, but necessarily through the actions undertaken. The U.S. could have made the decision to act with only the first UNSC resolution which identified the breach of the international peace and then use regional endorsements as justification for their military actions. These endorsements included the support of Saudi Arabia, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Arab League, among others. The idea of using one of these organizations to provide political cover was not seriously considered by the Bush Administration. As noted above, the Bush Administration held a preference for military action within the UN framework but reserved the option of acting outside.

Multilateralism Norm

The norm of multilateralism stresses the idea that the process of multilateralism is the most appropriate method of projecting military force. This explanation suggests that the U.S. made the decision to request international authorization because of the idea that this was the right thing to do. This belies the process of decision making on the part of the U.S. The initial press for the UNSC to identify the invasion of Kuwait as a breach of international peace makes sense as part of this explanation but the turn to the UNSC for international authorization does not. The U.S. initially set its preference for action under Article 51 which did not require any additional resolutions for the U.S. to act. This suggests that the process of requesting a resolution to provide explicit authorization for the projection of military force was not considered by the U.S. as the "right" thing to do at the time.

Some indicators are consistent with this explanation. The Bush Administration did limit its goals in response to the concerns of its allies and attempted to accommodate interests of others. The Administration did also consult with allies, such as the inclusion of the British Prime Minister Thatcher in planning discussions and numerous conversations between President Bush and foreign leaders to gain their support.[97]

The multilateralism norm explanation is consistent with the MSC pathway which stresses the process of multilateral operations. The MSC pathway was not pursued because to do so would incur greater constraints on the freedom of action than the path selected. In other words, this pathway demonstrates restraint. This option is a mechanism for using U.S. power through an institutionalized organization. It is one which would have been accepted by all of the major actors as an appropriate way for the U.S. to demonstrate restraint and support the goals of the U.S. The MSC pathway would not allow for mission creep. The MSC is the process initially set up by the UN Charter. This option should be the preferred process if a norm of multilateralism holds the key factor in U.S. action during the Persian Gulf crisis. Other forms of action should not have been seen as determining the behavior of states. The process established by the UN Charter was never followed during the Cold War nor during the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. found a way around this problem in response to North Korean aggression. The Korean War has been described as an "ambiguous precedent" for international cooperation

[97] The Bush Presidential Library has records of some of the conversations which President Bush had with foreign leaders. In August 1990, there were 68; in September 1990, 42; in October 1990, 30. A sample of these conversations include on August 2nd, 1990: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Bush 1990h), King Hussein of Jordan (Bush 1990d), President Saleh of Yemen (Bush 1990i), on August 3rd, 1990: Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan (Bush 1990a), Chancellor Kohl of Germany (Bush 1990j), President Mitterrand of France (Bush 1990c), President Özal of Turkey (Bush 1990f), Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (Bush 1990b). President Bush made extensive use of his international contacts during the crisis.

(Dannreuther 1991/1992, 41). However, the action taken by the UNSC during the Korean War gave the U.S. decision makers the argument to keep national control over the military operations when it came to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Authorizing resolutions provide a role for the UN and required that the coalition of willing states report to the UNSC. The UN's role proved acceptable to the P-5 member states whose support the U.S. wanted for the operation in the Persian Gulf.

The MSC represents a better pathway if the pressures for conforming to the norm of multilateralism can explain the behavior of the U.S. during the Persian Gulf crisis. This process should be focused on the MSC as the initial process for using military force under the UNSC. When the U.S. sought international authorization, the Korean War was looked upon at the time as a political anomaly. It was something which could not be repeated because the Soviet Union would not let the same circumstances reemerge. The police action in Korea did not have the support of the USSR or other communist countries. It was claimed as illegal and illegitimate in the debates between members of the UNSC. If this were the controlling factor in explaining why there was a turn to the UNSC during the Persian Gulf War, then it is more likely that arguments about the use of the MSC would have been the option which emerged from U.S. decision making. It would have been much more compelling to reject the precedent of the Korean War as antithetical to the process of multilateralism. The Korean War did not use the procedures envisioned under the UN Charter and did not have the support of various interests whose support was necessary to be represented on the UNSC.

UNSC Authority

Under conditions of uncertainty the United States sought UNSC authorization to use military force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. It is hypothesized that upon this particular action upon which expectations about future behavior converged. This period of time is marked by increased opportunities which the U.S. did not have before. This decision to request international authorization from the UNSC became a precedent around which a pattern of behavior became institutionalized.

The rise of international authorization, then, is the result of action by the U.S. during the 1991 Persian Gulf War which produced a change in the authority of the UNSC over the projection of military force. This action was taken during a time of great uncertainty not just for the international system but also for the relationship between the U.S. and the UN. A crucial aspect of this explanation is that the response to the UNSC role in the Persian Gulf War shaped the expectations of future behavior. Strategic actors, which included both decision makers within the U.S. and those from observer states, made use of the Persian Gulf War to press states to authorize their actions with the UNSC when using military force.

This action could have been defined by the participants as aberrant behavior, an exception to what is expected of states when they project military force.[98] The process of authorization during the Persian Gulf War created a different understanding of what was

[98] Most actions which can change trajectories do not become ruptures breaking with conventional practices (Sewell 1996a, 843). Most potential precedents get reabsorbed, neutralized, ignored or explained away. The issue of the definition of the proper behavior for states to take when using force does have its historical antecedents. The Korean War presents itself as one of the rare Cold War instances where there was international authorization for the projection of military force. However, the Korean War and its associated authorization by the UNSC are defined as a political aberration and hence an exception to normal practice and thus not a precedent to guide future actions.

possible, but it did not automatically result in the requirement of authorization for future state action. It required discussion and interpretation by many pundits and world leaders before this became a mode which held influence over the actions of states.

Subsequent actions using military force by the U.S. and many other states followed the model used for the Persian Gulf War because of the path created by the U.S. action. This reinforced pattern of behavior thus became institutionalized. The U.S. and other countries bestowed legitimacy on the UNSC by engaging it to endorse a particular form of action.[99] In the initial episode, through both rhetoric and action, the U.S. constructed the defining characteristics of an appropriate form of behavior.[100] The action taken was a strategic application of principle to bolster the legitimacy of U.S. policy.

The U.S. declared that UNSC authorization was necessary for the projection of military force and then to back up this rhetoric, the U.S. sought authorization in the Persian Gulf War and in subsequent situations.[101] These subsequent actions enhanced the legitimacy of the institutional model and the body required to authorize the action. The U.S. put forth claims that the UNSC was authoritative when U.S. officials claimed the U.S. would use military force authorized by the UNSC and when the U.S. worked within the standards set by UNSC resolutions. In effect, the U.S. claimed that the UNSC was

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[99] Legitimacy is the "belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd 1999, 381). In that sense, the enhanced legitimacy increased the power of the UNSC since authority is legitimized power (Hall 2005, 66; Hurd 2007, 3).

[100] Linking the notion of rhetoric with practice can produce different effects than either one alone. On practice see Adler and Pouliot (2011), Hopf (2010), Pouliot (2008), Neumann (2002), and Mitzen (2006). On the importance of rhetoric see Risse (2000), Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003), Krebs (2007), and Rothman (2009).

[101] This pattern is similar to the notion of "rhetorical entrapment" (Schimmelfennig 2001). See also Keck and Sikkink (1999).

important and then acted as if it were important. Acting in this way meant that the next time the U.S. was considering the use of military force, a logical question became whether to request international authorization. The U.S. would expose itself to criticism if it did not request international authorization from the UNSC in the future and the U.S. would have to explain why it would not. At each subsequent instance where the institutional model was invoked, the pattern became harder to break with and viable alternative paths became more difficult to find. Each time the U.S. sought UNSC authorization the political costs of doing something different increased because expectations converged around the UNSC as the place to go if any state, including the U.S., wanted to project military force. The formation of an institutional model through precedent then can influence the decision to request international authorization at later points in time.[102] Since making the decision to request authorization during the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. has continued to use rhetoric which reinforced the notion that the UNSC was an authority over the projection of military force and just as importantly has acted as if this were the case. Richard Haass, then special assistant to President Bush for Near East and South Asian affairs was concerned that requesting authorization would create a precedent for future U.S. behavior (Rosegrant 1994, 15). Working through the UNSC changed the way people thought about the UN, how states should project military force and provided a potential model for future UN-based action.

[102] This is not a tautological argument about how we can observe a norm about international authorization from the behavior of requesting international authorization. This is an argument of how prior experience influences subsequent behavior. Each instance contributes what has happened in the past leading to the progression for what follows. The decision to request international authorization at time T1 contributes to the outcome at time T2. What happens at times T1 and T2 contribute to T3, and so on. Rather than a tautological form of argument (i.e. there is a norm, how can we see the norm, we see behavior, the behavior influenced the outcome) this is a product of history. What happens prior contributes to outcomes which occur later in time.

> [T]he Iraq invasion of Kuwait, besides upsetting the balance of power in the Mideast, has promoted a radical change in the views of the U.N. held by American policy makers and others. The U.N. has won praise in recent years for its role in brokering an end to the Iran-Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. For the first time since its founding 45 years ago, however, the organization seemed poised to realize its potential, coming of age as a formidable instrument for resolving international conflicts before they erupt into war. Today with Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar set to meet with Iraq's foreign minister in Jordan in an effort to end the Persian Gulf standoff, even a lot of longtime U.N. skeptics believe that the organization may have been born again … But, it was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait earlier this month that turned all eyes toward the U.N. A series of unanimous Security Council votes on steps to counter Saddam Hussein's expansionism suddenly presented a picture of the world body acting as the world always hoped it could. "If we can pull this off we have a model…with the U.N. … of how to deal with the next half-century," Sen. Moynihan says. (Greenberger and Shribman 1990, A1, A4)

This precedent has guided subsequent U.S. decision making when considering the projection of military force beginning with President Bush.

> In Desert Storm I hope we set positive precedents for future responses to international crises, forging coalitions, properly using the United Nations, and carefully cultivating support at home and abroad for US objectives (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 565).

Other U.S. executive officials recognized the potential for using this model in future operations. As then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney suggested "the overwhelming success of this operation, combined with its lessons, comprises a possible model for international cooperation in a future crisis" (quoted in Prados 1992, 100). The Bush Administration's Post-Cold War intervention thinking was guided by the precedent set by U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf War.

> [T]he ODS [Operation Desert Storm] experience is relevant to an analysis of EN&SC [Ethnic, Nationalist, and Separatist Conflicts] decisionmaking if only because it is regularly invoked as a successful model and precedent when EN&SC interventions are being considered (Kanter 1996, 163).

Internationally, other leaders used the Persian Gulf War as a standard. For instance Margaret Thatcher compared the international community's reaction in Bosnia to the Persian Gulf standard.

> The Gulf War which followed was a superb example of how best to manage conflict. It was marked above all by the closest cooperation between Britain, the United States and of course our host country, Saudi Arabia. The policy *worked* but it has been abandoned in the case of Bosnia. (Emphasis in originalThatcher 1996, 45)[103]

James Baker also made the comparison between the Persian Gulf War and the situation faced by the international community in Bosnia.

> The limits of UN peacekeeping have been revealed in Bosnia. So has the danger of ambiguous authority over operations on the ground. Here, as in so much else, the multilateral effort on Bosnia stands in stark contrast to the one undertaken just a few years before in the Persian Gulf. During the Gulf Crisis, the UN's role as the legitimating voice of the international community complemented, not complicated, the military efforts of the U.S.-led coalition. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the UN's role has, unfortunately, led to confusion and delay in military decision-making. (Baker 1996, 33)

This precedent was also utilized by later administrations. The Clinton White House publically discussed the option of proceeding in Haiti without a mandate from the UNSC.

> The Administration is following much the same path as President Bush took nearly four years ago in seeking to persuade President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and White House officials were quick to draw that parallel (Jehl 1994).

That the action by the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War was perceived of as successful provides reinforcement of the action as a standard for others to emulate. Had it been a failure, no doubt it would have been ignored. However, leaders do want successful

[103] It should be noted that even though Thatcher did compare Bosnia to the Persian Gulf War, she did not accept the idea that states should request international authorization through UNSC resolution. As discussed earlier, she thought that self-defense under Article 51was sufficient authority for military action in the Persian Gulf War.

foreign policies and one route to find them is to build on and emulate the successes of others. I argue that others hoped to repeat the success in subsequent operations. Nominally, there were five different pathways which could have been taken. Figure 5.5 shows the discursive viability of these options relative to the others. These choices included the availability of specific resolutions from the UNSC as well as the re-activation of the MSC which lay dormant during the Cold War.

Figure 5.5. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1990-1991



The authority of the UNSC was not high at the outset of the crisis. The UN was not without appeal as it does carry with it a notion of legitimate social purpose that provides some degree of legitimacy for the organization and its operations. In other words, that the UN is devoted in its mandate to reduce the scourge of war endows it with some degree of legitimacy even if it is seen as doing a poor job of achieving its goals. However, as the organization lay stagnant many were not prepared for the role the UNSC

was called to play in the crisis. There was no precedent of the U.S. request for international authorization. U.S. officials struck a balance between differing instrumental concerns about the varied foreign policy goals within the national interest. The instrumental concerns for policy independence and support were not determined by the Cold War competition or even the lack therein. In other words, the U.S. made the decision to request international authorization for reasons having little to do with the authority of the UNSC.[104] This contingent decision became important beyond the immediate concerns the U.S. faced at this time. The U.S. opted for the UN process because American officials saw the UN as way to keep together the international coalition of support. The UN provided some legitimacy to the U.S. action but this provision was not determinative. Outside options, reserved as a possible choice at each diplomatic interaction, were not pursued. The structure of the Cold War made the option of working through the UNSC a surprise to almost all parties but especially to those who were inside the policy making circles and even Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi leadership's expectations were based on the crumbling structures of the Cold War, assuming that even if the UNSC did condemn the Iraqi action, as occurred with UNSCR 660, that it would not be able to muster support for enforcement actions.

This does not deny logical reasons for the U.S. to prefer one pathway over another. The initial preference for action under Article 51 gave way to a preference of requesting a resolution to authorize military force. The MSC, while viable, was not a preferred pathway for two reasons. First, military commanders would be extraordinarily

[104] It should be noted here that these reason also had little to do with the notion that the Bush (41) Administration could reduce international political costs, a norm of multilateralism, or other alternative explanations.

reluctant to cede command of their troops to an entity that is not within the U.S. command structure.[105] In essence, this would place U.S. military resources outside the control of the U.S. military. Second, the original problems with concluding stand-by agreements for the MSC remained. These agreements would provide the MSC with military resource that could be used to fulfill its mandate under the UN Charter. The Cold War imposed constraints such that placing troops at the disposal of the MSC would provide the Soviet Union with the ability to override the U.S. commands through the UNSC veto. However, the Soviet Union held up the formation of stand-by agreements that would have provided resources for the use of the MSC. The obsticle was that Stalin did not want the agreements to be used to form a set of bases around the world which would institutionalize the strategic superiority held by western powers (Grove 1993, 178). Thus, there is one issue about the East-West conflict which is pertinent which leaves the issue about putting troops under foreign command.

The result of gaining international authorization for the Persian Gulf War was vastly different than the effect of international authorization for the Korean War. The Cold War structure prevented this model from being applied to other crises. The Persian Gulf War became the precedent by which future decisions to project military force have been judged. Leaders often refer to similar situations of the past to inform their contemporary decisions (Khong 1992). Precedents function by creating expectations about future behavior (Kier and Mercer 1996). In terms of domestic audiences, President Bush's decision to secure UNSC authorization for the projection of military force in the

[105] This debate was raised after the problems with the U.S. intervention in Somalia. President Clinton passed Presidential Decision Directive 25 which distinguished between command, held by the President, and operational control, which came from UN commanders (Snyder 1995).

Persian Gulf War produced expectations that future interventions would follow this same pattern, "bind[ing] his successors" to seeking the same form of authorization before intervening (Russett 1994, 193). The expectations of this form of behavior emerge both from external actors (other states' expectations) and from domestic sources (such as the U.S. Congress or domestic groups), resulting in a change in the trajectory of U.S. behavior towards the UNSC. The act of requesting international authorization for enforcing the sanctions on Iraq had far reaching ramifications.

> [T]he enforcement of sanctions also demonstrated that there was no clear dividing line between economic and military measures, for it was through this means that the precedents were set for gaining international authority for the use of military force (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 143).

This process formed the basis of subsequent claims to legitimate actions and shaped perceptions of how states should proceed in the future. The UNSC Authority explanation makes the most sense out of the decision to request international authorization in this instance. The U.S. requested international authorization for reasons which had less to do with the authority of the UNSC than it did with instrumental needs to prosecute an action against Iraq.

CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War was an eventful juncture for the UNSC and produced uncertainty in how members would act within the institutional context of the UN. However, this eventful juncture did not automatically result in greater authority for the UNSC but instead brought about the possibility that states who rivals at one time could change their position and cooperate (Crockatt 2005). This change contrasts with the experience of the Korean War where the U.S. sought authorization for collective military action from the Security Council, but with different results. Instead of enhancing the

authority of the UNSC, the passage of the Korean War resolutions were seen as an exception to what normally would take place. The pattern of behavior reverted back to the original where the actors were once again constrained by the structure of the Cold War.[106]

After the Persian Gulf War a sense of euphoria about the prospects for cooperation on matters of international peace and security took hold (Malone 2004, 5). This period is marked by substantially increased UNSC activities. The perceived performance of international authorization presented by the Persian Gulf War helped to empower the UN (Russett 1994).[107] The success of the coalition of forces seems to have enhanced the legitimacy of the UN as an actor in security affairs. While the U.S. was the primary player in military terms, the UN received credit which outlasted the rally-around-the-flag effect linked to the U.S. This "authorization model" (Berman 2004) became the standard by which latter delegation for enforcement action and projections of military force were evaluated. This period of time is marked by increasing UN peacekeeping missions authorized through the UNSC. The failure of UN peacekeeping and intervention in Somalia illustrated a problem for humanitarian missions. This poor performance contributed to a pullback in the allocation of resources to humanitarian missions. However, this particular episode did not concurrently reduce the demand for such missions and thus there was recognition of the particular need for peacekeeping missions

[106] This illustrates the difference between critical and uncritical junctures. The examination of both can contribute to understanding why critical junctures lead to the changes in institutionalized patterns of behavior.

[107] See also Constable (1990).

(Jakobsen 2002). Consequently, resources were made available for additional future missions (Malone and Thakur 2001).

Why did the end of the Cold War result in a change in U.S. policy? The U.S. did not change its policy simply because the Cold War ended. The end of the Cold War opened space for the U.S. to consider several options which were not previously viable. The U.S. chose one of these options which made the others less viable in the future. The evidence of the change in policy comes from contingent action undertaken during a period of uncertainty. U.S. decision makers expected that the Soviet Union was not prepared to support U.S. action in the Persian Gulf War as part of the post-Cold War diplomacy. They were unprepared for this change and had to adjust their strategy to account for this new context. The decision to focus on the UNSC as the center of diplomacy during the crisis was due to the change in available options in front of U.S. decision makers. The result was a change in the trajectory of what kinds of projections of military force were considered viable. This change stands in contrast to the case of the Korean War. This was an instance where the structural constraints did not produce a change in the trajectory of state behavior toward the UNSC. Instead of creating a separate institutionalized model of action the Korean War international authorization was explained away as an aberration from normal Cold War politics.

CHAPTER VI

THE NORM OF REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION: CHALLENGING AND CONSOLIDATING PRACTICE

The preceding chapter established that out of the choices available at the time of the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. chose to request international authorization through the explicit resolutions from the UNSC. This precedent made the practice more common as the U.S. made requests for international authorization for the projection of military force often after the Persian Gulf War. Why did U.S. officials decide to request international authorization for the projection of military force in some instances and not in others? The decisions examined in this chapter emerge from different contexts and different presidential administrations with very different assessments of the U.S. role in foreign affairs. I evaluate competing hypotheses developed from explanations of the decision to pursue international authorization for the projection of military force. I examine three cases in this chapter. First is the case of the airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 when the Clinton Administration did not request international authorization yet claimed it was acting under UNSC resolutions. Second is the Iraq war in 2003, when the U.S. did make a request but failed to receive international authorization. Third is the Libyan intervention where the administration requested and was given international authorization from the UNSC to project military force. Each of these three cases had a different executive administration. For two of these cases the presidencies were Democrats and the third was from the Republican Party. These cases display variance in their disposition towards IOs. Despite these differences we see both Democratic and Republican administrations requesting international authorization for the projection of military force. The outcome of the

request is different for the Iraq War and the Libyan intervention, but both made strong attempts to secure the support of the UNSC and placed great emphasis on doing so. I find that the decision in both cases was driven, at least in part, by the norm that states are supposed to request international authorization for the projection of military force. This norm emerged from the precedent set during the Persian Gulf War when the U.S. requested international authorization to use military force against Iraq. The expectation that states are supposed to make this request seems to be absent from the situation in 1998 when the U.S. conducted Operation Desert Fox.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

The U.S. projected military force without making a request for international authorization in Iraq in 1996 and in 1998 for Operation Desert Fox. The U.S. did request international authorization from the UNSC in the cases of Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011).[108] Why did the U.S. make the decision to request international authorization for the projection of military force in some situations but not in others after 1989? This central research question can be answered by explanations from different theoretical traditions. These hypotheses were developed in Chapter II and are presented in Table 6.1.

A realist perspective suggests that the U.S. should request international authorization when U.S. officials want material support in order to share the burden of projecting military force. The institutional perspective suggests that IOs should be valuable to the U.S. because of the information they convey to other states (Chapman

[108] In cases of Kosovo (1999) and the Iraq War (2003) the U.S. failed to acquire international authorization from the UNSC. For Kosovo the U.S. did gain authorization from NATO.

2011; Thompson 2009). Decisions to request international authorization are seen by this perspective as a function of the anticipated international political costs of a proposed action assessed along with the constraints which IOs place upon the U.S. Rather than the materialist-institutional explanation an alternative perspective suggests that a multilateral norm drives the behavior of states to use a multilateral process when using military force (Finnemore 2003). All of these are compared to the explanation which suggests the path-dependent development of a precedent from the Persian Gulf War. An explanation from this perspective suggests that precedent influenced the expectations of other states as to the behavior of the U.S. when projecting military force and the authority of the UNSC.

Table 6.1. Hypotheses

Burden Sharing Hypothesis *The need for help with material costs of the proposed projection increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*
Information Transmission Hypothesis *The anticipation of high political costs for the proposed projection of military force increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*
IO Constraints Hypothesis *The insensitivity to constraints imposed by IOs increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*
Forum Shopping Hypothesis *Anticipation of high political costs of a projection of military force and high sensitivity to IO constraints will increase the likelihood that leaders will request international authorization from a RIO.*
Multilateral Norm Hypothesis *The high value projectors' leaders place on the process of multilateralism increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*
UNSC Authority Hypothesis *The expectation from other states that the projector should seek authorization increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.*

CASES

After the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. projected military force 18 times between (see Table 6.2). It is remarkable duing this time period that the decision to project military force is almost always accompanied by a decision to request international authorization. There are few instances where the U.S. did not request international authorization from the UNSC. Even in the circumstances of the Kosovo airstrikes in 1999, the U.S. made an attempt to secure international authorization before turning to a different IO in the face of a threatened UNSC veto. The decision to turn to NATO was not the result of the view that this organization was the choice for the U.S. to get international authorization but that having some form of IO authorization was a necessary step to projecting military force. Each of the three presidential administrations within this time period made the decision to project military force without making a request of the UNSC.[109] The contexts in which these decisions were made are different. The projections for each administration are discussed showing that while there are exceptions, the decision to request international authorization became more common.

The Clinton Administration projected military force without putting forward a request for international authorization from the UNSC more often than the others. Three times the U.S. did not make such a request. The decision to retaliate against Iraq for the assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush in 1993 was not accompanied by a specific request for a resolution authorizing. Instead, the legitimacy of the Baghdad Raid was not substantially questioned. The U.S. put forward the claim that

[109] Albeit, President Obama did act under Article 51 when raiding Pakistan for Osama bin Ladin. This does qualify as a form of international authorization but the U.S. did not make a specific request for a resolution. The Obama Administration does not have any other projections during the time frame.

Table 6.2. Decisions to Project Military Force and International Authorization, 1989-2011

Year	Decision to Project Military Force	Administration	Attempt	IO	Mode
1989	Intervention in Panama	Bush (41)			
1991	Persian Gulf War	Bush (41)	Yes	UN	UNSCR 678 (1990)
1991	Iraqi No Fly Zone	Bush (41)		UN	UNSCR 688 (1991)
1992	NATO Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia	Bush (41)	Yes	UN	UNSCR 787 (1992)
1992	Somalia	Bush (41)	Yes	UN	UNSCR 794 (1992)
1993	Bosnia	Clinton	Yes	UN	UNSCR 816 (1993)
1993	Baghdad Raid	Clinton		UN	UN Charter, Article 51 (1945)
1993	Macedonia	Clinton	Yes	UN	UNSCR 842 (1993)
1994	Haiti	Clinton	Yes	UN	UNSCR 940 (1994)
1995	Bosnia	Clinton	Yes	UN	UNSCRs 1031 (1995) & 1088 (1996)
1996	Iraqi Airstrikes	Clinton			
1998	Afghanistan/Sudan Bombing	Clinton		UN	UN Charter, Article 51 (1945)
1998	Operation Desert Fox	Clinton			
1999	Kosovo Airstrikes	Clinton	Yes	NATO	NATO Press Release 038 (1999)
1999	Kosovo Peacekeeping	Clinton	Yes	UN	UNSCR 1244 (1999)
2001	Afghanistan	Bush (43)		UN	UN Charter, Article 51 (1945)
2003	Iraq War	Bush (43)	Yes		
2004	Haiti	Bush (43)	Yes	UN	UNSCR 1529 (2004)
2011	Libya	Obama	Yes	UN	UNSCR 1973(2011)
2011	Osama Raid	Obama		UN	UN Charter, Article 51 (1945)

this was an instance of self-defense authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The U.S. reported this action to the UNSC and received support from an easy majority of the other UNSC members (Allies Back U.S. Strike 1993; UNSC 1993). These two instances of the projection of military force relied upon the authority of the UNSC in some fashion.

In 1998, there were two operations where the Clinton Administration decided to project military force without an accompanying request for international authorization from the UNSC. These both involve the use of airstrikes against a perceived threat. The first operation was the airstrikes against Osama bin Laden's terrorist network in retaliation for the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. U.S. officials did claim that this was an act of self-defense (UNSC Document 1998). There is some controversy about the legitimacy of the U.S. action (Lobel 1999). However, despite this controversy many in the international community did support the U.S. actions and rejected acts of terrorism (Franck 2002, 94-96).The decision to act without consulting the international community seems to stem from the issue that doing so would have resulted in a failed operation. U.S. officials did suggest that secrecy was considered "indispensable" to the success of the operation (Albright and Berger 1998). Yet this operation was consistent with the Baghdad Raid in 1993 where the U.S. acted under Article 51 and received substantial international support. The second, Operation Desert Fox, is covered in the next section.

Under the Bush Administration the U.S. took a turn towards a policy of unilateralism in the conduct of foreign affairs. In particular, the Bush Doctrine with its emphasis on prevention and self-reliance embodies this unilateral shift in U.S. foreign

policy (Jervis 2003).[110] The U.S. along with several allies began conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a projection of military force in Haiti. The response to terrorism started with the Afghani conflict, a response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and came to include operations in Yemen and Pakistan. This was the only decision by the Bush Administration to project military force which was not accompanied by a decision to request international authorization. Instead, the U.S. relied upon its own authority to defend itself which was accepted under Article 51 of the UN Charter (Drumbl 2003; Franck 2001). This operation received widespread support from the international community and was seen as an act of self-defense. The U.S. action also received support from the UNSC from resolutions passed on September 12, 2001 (UNSCR 1368 2001) and subsequently on December 20, 2001 (UNSCR 1386 2001). This latter resolution was passed after the initiation of combat operations but it did express the support of the organization. It was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and included the pertinent language which authorized the projection of military force. The U.S. returned to the UN Security Council to request international authorization for the Iraq War (a request that failed) and for a deployment in Haiti (where it was secured). For all the talk of the unilateralist preferences, the Bush Administration did attempt to secure international authorization for its projections of military force.

The Obama Administration inherited a global war on terror centered in Afghanistan and a struggle to occupy Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime. Understandably, many in the U.S. were reluctant to project military force beyond these

[110] This emphasis on the rhetoric of unilateralism continued after the Iraq War began but the reality of the U.S. foreign policy was a return to multilateral institutions of the UN in the second term of the Bush (43) Administration (Schlesinger 2008).

particular conflicts. During 2011, the Obama Administration did request international authorization for its projection of military force against the Gaddafi regime in Libya but did not pursue international authorization for a raid in Pakistan which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. The Libyan intervention is discussed later in this paper. The Osama Raid was claimed as an act of self-defense by the United States (Reauthorize 2011). The U.S. received support from the UNSC in the form of a presidential statement which welcomed the end to the activities of bin Laden (UNSC 2011a). The debate over the legality of the bin Laden raid focuses on the difference between arresting him rather than killing him outright. The claim to self-defense by the U.S. has not been substantially questioned. Where the legality of the raid is being questioned is on the authority of the U.S. to kill bin Laden, in contrast to whether the U.S. should have only been able to take him into custody to stand trial (Lewis 2011). The Administration claims that the raid was entirely legal (Bin Laden Death 2011). Despite this issue, the question of whether the U.S. should have engaged in projecting military force is not being seriously debated. Some Pakistani leaders have expressed frustration and claimed that the U.S. violated Pakistan's sovereignty (Perlez 2011a, b). However, this behavior follows the agreement established by George W. Bush with Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 if the U.S. were to pursue bin Laden into Pakistani territory (Walsh 2011). Even the claims from bin Laden family members is over whether he should have been tried, rather than challenging the legitimacy of the U.S. decision to project military force (Shane 2011; Statement 2011).[111]

[111] For additional debate about the legality of this action, including the issue of international authorization, see Thorp (2011).

Because this projection was generally seen as a legitimate exercise of the defense of the U.S. an explicit resolution was not needed for international authorization.

SUMMARIZING THREE KEY CASES

The remainder of this paper tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter II and compares the decision to request international authorization in the cases of the Iraq War and the Libyan intervention and the decision not to make a request for Operation Desert Fox. These three cases concern decisions to project military force from presidential administrations with different perspectives on the U.S. role in international affairs and policy towards IOs. They vary on several of the substantial variables which are potential explanations for why states should turn to the UNSC for international authorization. An examination of these cases should help illuminate the process and factors which contribute to the changes that drive the U.S. and other states to request international authorization from international organizations. This design allows for a comparison of cases with both similar and different outcomes of interest. When the outcome is for a request there is a common factor from which a causal claim is developed.

Operation Desert Fox

Operation Desert Fox was a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq which took place in December 1998. It was conducted by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. This was the second operation where the Clinton Administration did not request a specific resolution providing UNSC authorization to project military force. The U.S. initiated airstrikes to diminish Iraq's capabilities. While lacking specific authorization to act, President Clinton did claim to be acting in support of the UN against the violations of UNSC resolutions placing limits on the ability of Iraq to produce weapons of mass

destruction (WMDs) (Clinton 2000a, c). Neither of these operation garnered widespread support from other UNSC Members nor the international community at large.

The year 1998 proved to be one of high tension between the U.S. and Iraq. Many confrontations preceded this operation. The end of the Persian Gulf War introduced weapons inspections to Iraq to confirm its compliance with the terms of UNSCR 687 (1991). These inspectors were to help ensure that Iraq did not develop weapons of mass destruction which could be used to threaten its neighbors. Despite the cease fire and accepting the terms of UNSCR 687 Iraq continued to engage in provocative acts. In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Saddam began to crack down on Kurds and other dissenters, which generated a massive humanitarian crisis as refugees fled the killings (Dannreuther 1991/1992, 63-67). The Iraqi government was complicit in a plot to kill then former President Bush in 1993 (Bernstein 1993). Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia again in 1994 when it massed troops along its southern border (Byman and Waxman 2000). Escalation was averted under the threat of force as the U.S. mobilized to meet this provocation. In 1996, Saddam attacked a Kurdish group in the north of Iraq (Knights 2005, 153-156). This history set up the tensions which coalesced into airstrikes on Iraq.

The next year Iraq began to evade the weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN Special Committee (UNSCOM). Saddam targeted Americans and eventually expelled American nationals who were part of the inspection teams. Frustrated with Saddam's noncompliance with the inspectors the UNSC passed UNSCR 1137 (1997) which warned of "serious consequences" if Iraq did not comply. For a short time this pattern continued. Iraq would withhold compliance until

threatened and then back off for a little while. This situation came to a head in November of 1998 when the lack of Iraqi compliance prompted the U.S. to mobilize for an attack. Iraq somehow gained word of the impending attack and as the planes flew closer to their targets they announced Iraq would unconditionally comply with the UN, including UNSCOM and the IAEA inspectors. This averted the attack but the U.S. was wary of Iraq's actions. The decision was made to reset the airstrikes to proceed after the release of UNSCOM's report which was to be completed by December 15, 1998. Richard Butler, the head of UNSOCM completed his report indicating that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations to the international community under UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and the United Kingdom proceeded to strike at Iraq. President Clinton justified the military action by stressing that the U.S. was defending previous UNSC resolutions.

> This action, carried out in concert with military forces of the United Kingdom, enjoys the support of many of our friends and allies. It is consistent with and has been taken in support of numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions 678 and 687, which authorize U.N. Member States to use "all necessary means" to implement the Security Council resolutions and to restore peace and security in the region and establish the terms of the cease-fire mandated by the Council, including those related to the destruction of Iraq's WMD programs. (Clinton 2000b)

Despite this attempt to justify the U.S. actions in UNSC terms the international reactions criticized this action as usurping the UNSC's role as the sole authority to authorize the projection of military force. The Russian Federation reaction demonstrates the expectations for states to approach the UNSC.

> In carrying out this unprovoked act of force, the United States and the United Kingdom have grossly violated the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and the generally recognized norms and rules of responsible behaviour on the part of States in the international arena…The Security Council alone has the right to determine what steps should be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. (Ambassador Lavrov in UNSC 1998, 4)

The Iraq War

On March 19, 2003, offensive operations against Iraq began. The Bush (43) Administration focused on the threat that Saddam Hussein's regime posed to the United States and the international community since it invaded Kuwait in 1990. President Bush inherited the policy of regime change in Iraq from a 1998 law passed by Congress during the Clinton Administration.

> Another element was the standing policy inherited from the Clinton administration. Though not widely understood, the baseline policy was clearly 'regime change.' A 1998 law passed by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton authorized up to $97 million in military assistance to Iraqi opposition forces 'to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein' and 'promote the emergence of a democratic government' (Woodward 2004, 10).

The lead up to the projection of military force in 2003 involved heated international diplomacy and substantial planning after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is clear that in the aftermath of removing the Taliban from control of Afghanistan the Bush Administration turned its attention to the issue of Iraq.[112] On September 7, 2002, there was a decision by President George W. Bush to request UNSC authorization for the Iraq War (Danner 2005).The central question here does not concern the motivation for starting the Iraq War but instead why the Bush Administration decided to pursue a resolution from the UNSC authorizing the U.S. to project military force against Iraq. The decision to do so seems puzzling, especially when considering that the U.S. failed to secure a resolution which would have given the blessing of the organization to this endeavor. Often the U.S. action in Iraq is cast as if it is the U.S. who was in opposition to the mandates of the UNSC. The

[112] There is speculation by many that the Bush Administration intended to go to war with Iraq since assuming office. Whether this is the case and the motivations for starting the Iraq are beyond the scope of this inquiry.

interesting aspect is not that the U.S. eventually pursued the projection of military force through an ad hoc coalition of states outside of the UN framework but that an executive administration which was opposed to the notion of relying upon other states or IOs for security would even attempt to secure international authorization. With respect to the questions posed in this study, then, the outcome of interest here is the same for both this and later cases such as the Obama Administration's policy towards Libya in 2011.

The effect of the failure to secure international authorization was costly for the U.S. This episode provides additional evidence of the importance of the Security Council after the end of the Cold War. For many states the decision to support the war was contingent upon Security Council authorization. Canada indicated support for the U.S. policy towards Iraq in January 2003 before the action began (Where the World Stands 2003). Due to the lack of explicit authorization by the UNSC, the Canadian government made the decision not to contribute troops and resources to the U.S.-led war efforts. India also represents a change in stance away from the U.S.'s foreign policy. India initially indicated that it would contribute to the U.S. cause (Where the World Stands 2003). Due to the lack of UN authorization, India declined to contribute troops to the U.S. effort in Iraq (Thakur 2003). India is one of the most significant supporters of UN Peacekeeping (Krishnasamy 2003) demonstrating that UNSC authorization makes it easier for many state leaders to participate in the external use of force (Voeten 2005, 532).[113]

[113] This is also the case for leaders in the U.S. (Chapman and Reiter 2004).

The Libyan Intervention

Eight years to the day after the Bush Administration began its attack against the Iraqi regime, the Obama Administration initiated the use of military force against another Arabic state, in Northern Africa. The situation in Libya began with social protest against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi towards the beginning of 2011. This movement as part of the Arab Spring met with fierce resistance from Gaddafi's forces and swift repression ensued. The U.S. placed sanctions on the Gaddafi regime after American diplomats were able to leave the country (DeYoung and Lynch 2011). Protesters and civilians became the target of loyalist forces and the violence escalated to civil war. Because of the humanitarian suffering the international community began calls to stop this action and eventually for Gaddafi to step down. Neighboring countries and international organizations, concerned about the humanitarian problems, began to look at military action as a way to handle this crisis. The Gulf Cooperation Council called on the UNSC to authorize a no-fly zone on March 7, 2011 (Washington's Options 2011). On March 12, the Arab League did the same (Bronner and Sanger 2011). It is important to note that Libya is a member of the Arab League and this request of the UNSC was passed over its objections. The pressure from Western countries with the support of Arabic states led the U.S. to push for authorization from the UNSC while they feared loyalist gains would mean the end of the rebels (Landler and Bilefsky 2011). In the Security Council, Germany, India, Russia and China opposed military action (Dempsey 2011). The UNSC passed UNSCR 1973 on March 17, 2011 with ten votes in support, none in opposition and Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstaining (UNSC 2011b). The resolution was sponsored by the U.S., the United Kingdom, France and Lebanon (UNSC Document 2011a). Two days later the U.S. led the first airstrikes to enforce the UNSC resolution

and protect the civilian population of Libya. The remaining sections of this chapter test the hypotheses for these cases.

POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS

Burden Sharing

Realist theory suggests that states balance against power (Waltz 1979). If they cannot enhance their own power by developing their resources internally they need to seek allies to balance power. When making the decision to project military force the leaders of states should consider whether they need additional resources to achieve their goals. If they think that international authorization from an IO can aid in their quest for allies to shoulder the burden of military action, then authorization may be seen as beneficial. Reducing or sharing the burden of using military force is thus a relevant motivation for states to request authorization from an IO. If realism is largely correct about how international politics work we should see the U.S. requesting international authorization when it has fewer resources to devote to military action.

The need for material resources does not really distinguish between these cases. For both all three cases, the U.S. held a preponderance of military resources such that aid from others may have been considered desirable to reduce costs but not necessary. However, such assistance does not appear to be a determining factor in the decision to request international authorization. For the action agaisnt Iraq, the U.S. was in a very strong military position compared to Iraq and even to other militaries in the world. The military planning did assess what resources the U.S. military needed to accomplish the task set by the respective presidents. The material costs of the Iraq war would most likely have been shared by other states had the U.S. been able to secure international

authorization from the UNSC (Malone 2007,132). Rather than suggest that the U.S. needed more resources or additional military assets to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the issue was basing or fly-over rights (Woodward 2004, 81-82). The initial planning stressed the need for cooperation from the United Kingdom but even this country was considered useful but not a needed military partner. When asked if the U.S. would go to war without Great Britain at a DoD briefing for the press, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld answer suggested that the U.S .would and that the British may not participate.

> I had a good visit with the Minister of Defense of the U.K. about an hour ago. Their situation is distinctive to their country, and they have a government that deals with a parliament in their way, distinctive way. And what will ultimately be decided is unclear as to their role; that is to say, their role in the event that a decision is made to use force. There's the second issue of their role in a post- Saddam Hussein reconstruction process or stabilization process, which would be a different matter. And I think until we know what the resolution is, we won't know the answer as to what their role will be and to the extent they're able to participate in the event the President decides to use force, that would obviously be welcomed. To the extent they're not, there are workarounds and they would not be involved, at least in that phase of it. (Rumsfeld in Rumsfeld and Meyers 2003)

President Bush reassured Prime Minister Blair about the need for the UK in the coalition despite statements from the Secretary of Defense which indicated that the U.S. could act unilaterally. In terms of basing, crucial support was supposed to come from Turkey. The support of Turkey would have meant a two-front conflict rather than a single one from the south (Malone 2006, 200-201). General Tommy Franks was the Commander of the United States Central Command which included overseeing operations in the Middle East. Franks was not convinced of Turkish cooperation for the Iraq war and did not begin planning a two front conflict until after Turkey had been contacted (Woodward 2004, 83, 123). This suggests that the issue of allies and securing additional material resources

through the UN was not considered by the planners of the Iraq War. The issue of international authorization was one of political significance rather than of material need.

In the Libyan intervention European states wanted the assistance of the U.S. and were reluctant to act without U.S. support. There is evidence to support the motivation that the U.S. wanted others to help shoulder the burden of its military action in Libya.[114] The U.S. took the lead in the initial stages of the operation and after NATO assumed control of the operation on March 31 2011, the U.S. still provided logistical support. A NATO report on the conflict suggested that European countries could not function without the logistical support of the U.S. if a similar situation were to arise in the future (Schmitt 2012). The need for material resources does not appear to be a strong motive in the decision of the U.S. to request international authorization for these conflicts.[115]

Based on the size of the operation between the three cases, the U.S. did not make a request for the smallest one. The other two were projections which included projections carried out by a large coalition of forces. The U.S. shouldered the bulk of all of the operations but the Iraq War and the Libyan intervention did include more allies while U.S. Operation Desert Fox was conducted by only U.S. and United Kingdom forces.

Information Transmission: Signaling and Political Costs

This perspective focuses on the role of IOs in providing information about a proposed use of military force. Strategic information transmission holds that audiences who are concerned about the projection of military force want reassurance about the

[114] Interview with State Department Official, September 19, 2011, Washington, DC.

[115] This is supported by other research on burden sharing (Thompson 2009, 15).

consequences of the proposed action (Voeten 2005).[116] International authorization signals to others that the consequences of the action will be limited (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009). As independent actors, IOs can transmit credible information about the relative merits of a proposed projection of military force. According to this explanation there are two factors which influence the decision to request international authorization: the anticipation of international political costs of the proposed action and the sensitivity of the intervening state's leaders to IO constraints.

When a projection of military force is likely to encounter political opposition from other states a projector is more likely to request international authorization. Through gaining international authorization the projector can reduce political controversy for a proposed military action. Projecting military force can alter the international order and hold greater potential to run counter to the interests of other major states. The perceptions of international political costs for the proposed action were higher for the Iraq War compared to the Libyan intervention. The controversy surrounding the intentions of the U.S. during the run up to the Iraq War was certainly more pronounced when compared to that of the Libyan Intervention. The U.S. started its political strategy from a position of greater sympathy in light of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The attempt to press the position that Saddam's regime in Iraq must go encountered great resistance from the international community. The disposition of other powers towards the notion of regime change was maintained even in later intervention in Libya. Russia and China did not support the notion of regime change but in the case of Iraq neither did France and many other states.

[116] Target audiences may also include domestic elites such as the U.S. Congress (Schultz 2003) or domestic public (Chapman 2009, 2011; Fang 2008).

In the Libyan context the U.S. did accept a more limited form of authorization which prohibited troops on the ground in Libya. In Iraq, the Bush Administration wanted international authorization for an invasion. What the U.S. was willing to accept in these two different circumstances provides some leverage over why one received authorization from the UNSC while the other did not. The Bush Administration encountered greater resistance to the notion of U.S. involvement while the Obama Administration was reluctant to act. In fact, the U.S. in this later case can better be characterized as coaxed into action by its allies.

This theory explains decisions to request international authorization as a function of anticipated political costs and IO constraints. However, it seems unlikely that the political costs anticipated by U.S. decision makers during the Cold War are comparatively lower than after. It is equally implausible that IOs such as the UNSC would ease the constraints required for authorization after the end of the Cold War which encouraged more frequent attempts to acquire international authorization. In fact, institutional features of the UNSC make it unlikely to provide international authorization for the projection of military force. These features did not change with the end of the Cold War.[117] Even if we assume that the constraints the UNSC would place on projectors are vastly different between the two time periods, this theory still does not provide an explanation for the observed pattern. This could only help explain why the pattern shows

[117] It is actually easy to think that the constraints which would be placed on the projector in order to secure authorization from the UNSC during the Cold War could be high. Perhaps it was too high for either the U.S. or the USSR to contemplate seeking international authorization from this source. However, the changes in the requirements from the UNSC would not stem from the institutional features but instead from the preferences of its members. The institutional features highlighted in Thompson (2009, 34-35) and Chapman (2011, 10) refer to decision making procedures and diverse membership. These have not changed with the end of the Cold War.

that the UNSC was used infrequently during the Cold War. Only in rare instances was the UNSC able to be used for this purpose. However, if only the constraints from the UNSC increased, then potential projector should turn to regional organizations (Thompson 2009, 38-39). The empirical pattern documented in Chapter I does not display this trend. In six instances prior to 1990 states sought international authorization. Only half of these were from RIOs and half were states turning to the UNSC. States did not turn to RIOs with greater frequency during the Cold War. The theoretical expectations also stand in contrast with the evidence of cooperation and optimism which accompanied the end of the Cold War. This period suggests that rather than an increase in the need for external authorization the U.S. should have expected fewer political problems from other states. Since the U.S. sought out authorization with greater frequency in the post-Cold War period this expectation does not seem to have borne out. This theory does not appear to explain the observed variance between the Cold War and post-Cold War time periods.

If, on the other hand, decision makers have no discussion about the costs, this lack of discussion does not mean that there were no costs anticipated by them. It may merely indicate that decision makers thought the costs were not worth mentioning because they were willing to pay them and the issue did not need any discussion. Alternatively, such lack of discussion may mean that the decision makers were unaware that working through a particular IO would entail such costs.

IO Constraints

While the some factors may push the U.S. to request international authorization, others factors push against making a request. If American officials are especially sensitive to constraints imposed by a formal IO for authorization they may prefer to

operate outside of the IO framework. This variable is certainly difficult to measure, but in comparison between the cases it is apparent that the Bush Administration is certainly more sensitive to IO constraints than either the Clinton or Obama Administrations. The Bush Administration even placed John Bolton, a neoconservative thinker, as the U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Bolton thought of himself as

> "the last person in their [the G-77] midst to favor reducing national sovereignty to enhance the position of the SG [UN Secretary-General] … Of course what we really wanted was not more authority in the secretary-general, or more authority in the General Assembly, but more responsiveness to the United States throughout the UN system. (Bolton 2007, 213).

In the run up to the beginning of the Iraq War, Bolton served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton expressed his preference for direct unilateral action outside the UN, especially in comparison to the preferences of European states.

> Moreover, we cannot ignore the EU's proclivity to avoid confronting and actually resolving problems, preferring instead the endless process of diplomatic mastication. In certain circumstances, this approach may have its uses, but for the EU, it is essentially now their solution to everything. This decline in European will and capacity is matched by the related phenomenon, beloved by many Europeans, of using multilateral bodies for "norming" both international practice and domestic policy, a development that, over time, most profoundly threatens to diminish American autonomy and self-government, notions that to us spell 'sovereignty.' It is clear that the United Nations remains unreformed. Whether it is in fact unreformable remains to be seen, but the EU's almost invariable proclivity to turn to the institution makes this question of far more than academic interest. (Bolton 2007, 429-430)

The Obama Administration has a greater commitment to multilateral cooperation through the UN than the Bush Administration (Patrick interviewed by Zhenqiu and Xiangjiang 2008).

It is clear that the lack of international authorization from the UNSC did cost the U.S. in its Iraqi adventures, but the attempt to secure authorization also created two kinds of costs which would otherwise not have been encountered. The U.S. faced scrutiny over its intention which would not have been encountered if the U.S. had stayed outside of the UN process. It is through the UN process that other states and interested observers had the opportunity to examine the case the U.S. made against Saddam. This process scrutinized the justifications the U.S. offered. A second cost from the attempt is that the U.S. delayed action against Iraq because of the UNSC (Krauthammer 2003). The military planning suggested that the best time for the U.S. to begin its campaign against the Iraqi regime was December through February (Woodward 2004, 100). March and April were considered too late to begin the campaign because of windstorms and then rains which would hamper military effectiveness. The U.S. efforts were in fact hampered by a five-day sandstorm after the initiation of conflict (Drews 2004). The drive to Baghdad was halted because of the sandstorm and the U.S. military equipment ill-suited for these conditions. Equipment including M-16 rifles were considered by many of the American soldiers to be useless during the storms.

Forum Shopping

Empirically, few cases are available for testing the forum shopping hypothesis. In many cases the projector has few alternative fora. As identified earlier, the U.S. has few cases where there was no attempt to request international authorization from the UNSC. The case examined in this chpater was the 1998 Operation Desert Fox where the U.S. and Great Britain conducted airstrikes against Iraq. In this case no real alternate forum was available to the U.S. The Middle East has no organization which parallels NATO in

which the U.S. is a member. In most other cases the primary IO is the UNSC. It is not clear if this theory can account for why a projector did not turn to the UNSC.

Process of Multilateralism

According to the logic of the process of multilateralism, states should request authorization because of the perceived appropriateness of the approval of a formal IO and its procedures when projecting military force (Finnemore 2003). A norm of multilateralism developed in the aftermath of the Second World War which produced pressures for states to cooperate through multilateral organizations (Ruggie 1992). The process of securing international authorization is the appropriate method for projecting military force. It is the symbol of the process of the UNSC which matters for states (Hurd 2002).

The issue of process for the Libyan intervention is not substantial since the U.S. and its allies worked to get international authorization through the UNSC.[118] The debates over the efficacy of the UNSC suggest that holds a unique position compared to other organizations regarding security affairs. The issues about the lack of UN-authorization for the Iraq War provide evidence that it is not multilateralism which was at stake but the lack of UNSC authorization which mattered. Had NATO or some other organization provided international authorization, the objection likely would have been about the lack of UNSC international authorization. This difference suggests something about the UNSC which matters when states project military force. The U.S. did have allies, for the Iraq War, which provided some degree of multilateralism but this level of support does

[118] The debate here is whether the Western powers exceeded the UNSC mandate, not the legitimacy of the mandate itself (Arab League Criticizes Allied Airstrikes on Libya 2011; Marcus 2011).

not represent the substantive multilateralism, envisioned by those who suggest that a norm of multilateralism for the use of military force has emerged. However, rather than an issue of having a formal organization involved, the issue is having the proper IO providing international authorization.

UNSC Authority

The 2003 conflict over Iraq shows that even powerful states framed their arguments around the Council since both sides in the debate accepted that UNSC approval was a powerful resource for states (Hurd 2006). The scenario of the 2003 Iraqi invasion provides some evidence of the importance of the UNSC. For many states the decision to support the war was contingent upon UNSC authorization. In the case of the U.S. invasion in 2003, Canada indicated support for the U.S. in January, months before the invasion (Where the World Stands 2003). After the invasion and a lack of explicit authorization by the UNSC, the Canadian government made the decision not to contribute troops and resources to the U.S.-led war efforts. The lack of authorization by the UN seems to have heavily contributed to this decision. India also represents a change in stance away from the U.S.'s foreign policy. India initially indicated that it would contribute to the cause of the U.S. (Where the World Stands 2003). Due to the lack of UNSC authorization India declined to contribute troops to the U.S. effort in Iraq (Thakur 2003). India is one of the most significant supporters of UN Peacekeeping (Krishnasamy 2003). These instance demonstrate that the authorization of the Council makes it easier for many state leaders to participate in the external use of force (Voeten 2005, 532).[119]

[119] This is also the case for leaders in the United States (Chapman and Reiter 2004).

This explanation suggests that changes in leaders' calculations emerged as a consequence of the U.S. decision to request authorization from the UNSC during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The precedent of requesting international authorization became the model for projecting military force in the post-Cold War international environment. The U.S. changed the appropriate action for states when considering the projection of military force. It became appropriate for the potential projector to consult the proper body to consider international authorization. This body is the UNSC. Since the U.S. provided evidence that the UNSC was endowed with the authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of projections for military force, other actors and domestic populations came to expect that the U.S. and states more generally should request international authorization from the UNSC. The viability of different options changed after the Persian Gulf War. U.S. decision makers had a different set of viable options where outside options were no longer considered the most legitimate. Figure 6.1 shows the relative discursive viability of the options during this time period.

British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was perhaps the most significant American ally to weigh in on the decision to request UNSC authorizaiton. The initial decision to work through the UN by President Bush came after a meeting to discuss the issue with Blair at Camp David. Blair told President Bush that for the United Kingdom to work with the U.S. the UNSC needed to be involved (Woodward 2004, 178). Blair needed the UN for United Kingdom domestic public opinion (Woodward 2004, 177-178). The leaders of other states, including Australia and Spain, who supported the U.S. echoed the British sentiment, suggesting that even if approval was not forthcomming that the U.S. had to

Figure 6.1. Discursive Viability of Authorization Choices, 1992-2011



make the effort to secure it (Woodward 2004, 183). Russia supported UNSC action (Where the World Stands 2003). The expectations of other states were that the U.S. should request international authorization. They pressed the Bush Administration to request a resolution containing a specific authorization for the U.S. and its allies to wage war. Prior to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, George W. Bush suggested that while the UN authorization may not be necessary for the U.S. to project military force, an effective UN is a normatively good thing.

> Q [Mark Knoller] Mr. President, are you worried that the United States might be viewed as defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with military action without specific and explicit authorization from the U.N.? THE PRESIDENT [George W. Bush]: No, I'm not worried about that. As a matter of fact, it's hard to say the United States is defiant about the United Nations, when I was the person that took the issue to the United Nations, September the 12th, 2002 [when he spoke in front of the UN General Assembly]. We've been working with the United Nations. We've been working through the United Nations. I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don't need United Nations approval to do so. I want

> to work—I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to be a robust, capable body. It's important for its words to mean what they say, and as we head into the 21st century, Mark, when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission." (Bush 2003)

This stands in contrast to the description which President Regan provided of the UN after the invasion of Grenada. Diplomacy through the UN was considered by the President to be more important than military concerns. The planning put the initial start date somewhere between April and June 2002 (Woodward 2004, 60). As the commander responsible for planning the military operation which became the Iraq War, General Franks recommended operations to begin between December 1, 2002 and February 2003 (Woodward 2004, 100). Franks' concern was that sandstorms begin in March and last through April which would hamper the ability of the military to conduct operations. Covert operations at the Central Intelligence Agency briefed President Bush that their Iraqi operatives could only last until the end of February (Woodward 2004, 252). Covert operations thought that the war would begin mid-February at the latest (Woodward 2004, 302). After the end of February, operatives risked discovery which meant they would be killed or they would cease providing intelligence to the U.S. to avoid detection. Despite these operational concerns President Bush ordered military action to begin on March 19, 2003. He ordered the military to change its timetables to adapt to the needs of diplomacy rather than military necessity.

> "Slow down your troop movements," Bush later recalled telling Rumsfeld. Franks and the military then said they could use a little more time and it seemed to Bush that they were shoving the start date back a bit themselves. Then the president shoved it back further, telling Rumsfeld, "Don, we're accelerating too fast relative to where we need to be because of the diplomatic side." (Woodward 2004, 319)

For the Libyan Intervention the issue of requesting international authorization was less of an issue with the Obama Administration. However, major U.S. allies—the United

Kingdom and France—were strong supporters of the U.S. action and pushed for the UNSC to provide international authorization. France and Britain also took a strong role in the military action itself (Erlanger 2011). Had the U.S. deviated from the UNSC process, it seems likely that these states would respond similarly to their previous positions and push the U.S. to work through the UNSC. The experience of U.S diplomacy when considering the projection of military force in Iraq and Libya shows support for the hypothesis that the expectations of other states during the post-Cold War time period pressed the U.S. to request international authorization from the UNSC.

CONCLUSIONS

The authority of the UNSC based on the norm of requesting international authorization display leverage over the decision to request international authorization for the projection of military force in the cases exameind in this chapter. Table 6.3 summarizes the findings of this chapter. The other material, institutional, or ideational explanations do not hold as leverage over these cases. The information transmission theory does not explain the variance. The informational approach suggests that when the leaders of a projector are sensitive to the constraints imposed by an IO but they anticipate very high international political costs, an IO different from the UNSC may be approached (Thompson 2009). This leads to the decision to pursue international authorization from a RIO which may be more pliable than the UNSC. The Bush Administration pushed a more unilateral agenda compared to other post-Cold War presidencies which was a part off the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Administration was the post-Cold War presidency most likely to request international authorization from a RIO rather than the UNSC if an IO was considered at all. This is not observed in the Iraqi case, where it could be argued that

other IOs were not an option. However, when an RIO was an option, such as in the case of Haiti (2004), the Bush Administration did. The U.S. requested international authorization from the UNSC for the projection of military force into Haiti.This took place the year following the Iraqi invasion. The OAS was available and considering the political fallout from Iraq a projection of military force by the U.S. was political controversial. Rather than pursue a strategy with a RIO, in this case and others the Bush Administration made the decision to request international authorization from the UNSC.

The fact that the norm-based explanations both generally point in the same direction does make sense because they rely on similar causal logics. Examining the criticism of the U.S. in the aftermath of the Iraq War can help disentangle these two explanations. The criticism focused upon the lack of legitimacy which came from acting outside the UN framework. It did not come from a lack of multilateral organizational support. Had NATO authorized the U.S. action, the U.S. still would still have faced criticism that the UNSC did not provide its authorization. This is the basis of international criticism encountered by the U.S. for its 1999 action in Kosovo which was authorized by NATO (Henkin 1999). The inclusion of over 30 countries supporting the U.S. in the coalition did not substitute for international authorization from the UNSC. It was not seen as a multilateral action since it did not go through the UNSC. The basis of the criticism against the U.S. action in Iraq provides support for the explanation that the projection of military force requires a request to the UNSC for international authorization.

Table 6.3. Summary of Hypotheses

Case	Burden Sharing	Political Costs	IO Constraints	Multilateralism	UNSC Authority		International Authorization Request
Operation Desert Fox		X		X			
Iraq War		X		X	X		X
Libyan Intervention	X		X	X	X		X

Evidence suggests that in both the Iraq War and the Libyan Intervention the U.S. had an interest in requesting international authorization, despite the fact that in 2003 the prospect of securing authorization for regime change in Iraq was very low. The fact that the Obama Administration used this process when projecting military force in Libya returns the U.S. to this particular model of behavior when contemplating the projection of military force in the future. For the near future the expectation of allies and major powers is that the U.S. will continue to request international authorization when projecting military force. The Iraq War has been perceived as a foreign policy failure for the Bush Administration and for the U.S. in general (Pressman 2009). Rather than increase security it has resulted in a conflict which produces more experienced and better trained insurgents and terrorists. It has helped to generate the perception that the U.S. is in decline relative to other states (Wallerstein 2007). This situation helps to bolster the perception that the UNSC is authoritative since it cannot be pushed around by the preponderant state in the international system and that it is not willing to support abuses of this power. Martin Wolf (2007) has suggested that the real victor in the Iraq war has been the UN. The UNSC has also gained wider prevue against terrorism (Boulden 2008). In the aftermath of the Iraq War the U.S. returned to the UNSC to request international

authorization for the 2004 projection of military force in Haiti. In his second term Bush made greater use of the UNSC (Schlesinger 2008). Obama's strategy in Libya in 2011 returned to the UNSC and generated what has been perceived of as a foreign policy success for the U.S. and NATO (Daalder and Stavridis 2011).

If the Iraq War had been seen as a foreign policy success it may have changed the position of the UNSC. Had the Bush Administration not encountered the decline in the popularity for the war it may have severely affected the status of the UNSC. Since the UNSC refused to sanction the Iraq War it was vindicated when the action proved to be a foreign policy disaster for the U.S. If this had not been the case then it would lend credibility to the claim that the UNSC is an irrelevant institution in the international system. Rather the UNSC has gained considerable ground in its perceived legitimacy, even from the U.S. which continues to request international authorization for the projection of military force.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This project looked at what options are available for states when requesting international authorization for the projection of military force. States have requested international authorization more often since 1989. This increase came about because, of the choices available, projecting military force with international authorization was seen as the most important and effective way to do so. States have significantly altered their practices by requesting international authorization more frequently after 1989. Several competing explanations for this phenomenon are drawn from realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theoretical perspectives. In presenting these competing explanations I empirically test them in comparison with the argument I develop. The constructivist explanation based upon the precedent of the U.S. request for international authorization and the authority of the UNSC offers the most compelling answer to the research question. This explanation contributes a nuanced perspective on how actors make strategic use of norms bridging the divide between rationalist and constructivist understandings of international politics and how international norms emerge from the practices of states.

The Argument

The norm of requesting international authorization from the UNSC for the projection of military force emerged because of the precedent of U.S. action during the Persian Gulf War. The norm remains in place because the UNSC is viewed as the proper actor for deciding the legitimacy of the projection of military force in the international system. This international behavioral norm accords the UNSC with authority over

decision by states to project military force. During the Cold War, the U.S. did not view international authorization as important. Discursively, options outside of IOs were the most viable choice. These options structured the foreign policy decision-making in the U.S. such that international authorization was considered as an afterthought at best. The Korean War was the only incident where the U.S. turned to the UNSC. The Cold War structures of international politics limited the implications of the turn to the UNSC. It did not change the thinking either about the projection of military force or the UNSC. The Cold War put security and quick, forceful actions at the forefront of foreign policy making. Working through IOs for projecting military force was not considered a priority. During this time period the UNSC did not hold authority over the projection of military force by states. The end of the Cold War changed the politics towards the UNSC. The end of the Cold War ushered in uncertainty over the international order and how states should relate to the UNSC. During those unsettled times, the U.S. requested international authorization to project of military force during the Persian Gulf War. This conflict was seen as a dramatic success for both the U.S. and for the UNSC. The act of securing international authorization prior to engaging military force came to be seen by many as the proper course of action in the post-Cold War era. This shift set the tone for subsequent decisions about the projection of military force and made other options less viable and more costly.

Alternative explanations for the change in the viability of requesting international authorization for the projection of military force include those derived from realism, institutionalism, and versions of constructivism. These alternative explanations were empirically tested in comparison with the constructivist argument I develop. The realist-

based explanations are based on power calculations and the need for additional resources. Two explanations rely on institutions as a key component. The first suggests that states with democratic domestic regimes follow international law and thus will request international authorization more than nondemocracies. The second explanation looks at the value of information signaled through formal IOs. There is also an alternative constructivist explanation. The norm of multilateralism is offered as an alternative constructivist explanation of the changes in state behavior.

These alternatives do not make sense of the change in the viability of different choices available to states after 1989. Empirically, the realist power-based arguments do not account for the motivations for states to request international authorization. The institutional arguments do not account for the drive to go to the UNSC rather than to alternative IOs. The alternative constructivist approach does not account for the timing of the strength of the norm coalescing in 1990 rather than after 1945. These alternatives do not hold up the empirical argument about how the viability of alternatives changed with the precedent of requesting international authorization for the Persian Gulf War.

The argument I make about why states request international authorization makes a contribution by specifying the mechanism through which this international norm emerged. The general understanding of how norms emerge is through norm entrepreneurs who work to create and push others to follow the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In defining the new standard of behavior as appropriate and legitimate the norm spreads and others adopt the behavioral norm (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). The entrepreneur attempts to persuade or coerce others into accepting and following a standard which is

preferred by the actor. Norm entrepreneurs use different frames to achieve their ends (Payne 2001).

The precedent of distinctive action represents a different model for the emergence of international norms. Precedent becomes legitimated through practice rather than through the specific intent of a norm entrepreneur. I argue that the norm of requesting international authorization has emerged through such a precedent. The research question focuses on the change in state behavior. I argue that this behavioral change emanates from the emergence of a norm of state behavior which proscribes that states should request international authorization for the projection of military force from the UNSC. States engage in this specific behavior because the UNSC is seen as the proper authority to make decisions about the legitimacy of the projection of military force. The authority of the UNSC was enhanced by the practice of requesting international authorization after the end of the Cold War. This mechanism for the spread of norms works differently than a norm entrepreneur. Norm entrepreneurs set out to change the way others act. With precedent there is no intent. After precedent has been created the role of the actors involved is in justifying their actions. Their justifications lend credibility to their initial action and legitimize the action for subsequent emulation and repetition.

Theoretically, identifying the reasons why states have looked to IOs provides a contribution to the understanding of state behavior. This research contributes to the debates over when structures and agency matter for interesting outcomes in international politics. The argument I develop in contributes to the discussion between rationalist and constructivist approaches to scholarship (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). Rationalism and constructivism should be used to contribute something different to the

understanding of international politics (Fearon and Wendt 2002). They should not be mutually exclusive. The rationalist logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1998) is often thought to be the logic used in the instrumental or strategic calculations of actors in international politics. This logic stands in contrast to the rule based normative logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2006). The argument I develop reaches beyond this understanding of strategic action as only proving the rationalist perspective, to demonstrate that actors engage in strategic calculations using norms and common understandings as they purposefully attempt to achieve their goals. Actors strategically use claims of appropriateness. This argument helps to bridge a divide in the understanding of these two theoretical positions.

APPENDIX A

CONCEPTUALIZING THE DECISION TO PROJECT MILITARY FORCE

States use force. They do so domestically and internationally. The difference between these domains is the character of how force is used (Waltz 1979, 103). Within the domestic sphere states hold the ability to decide when force is legitimate (Weber 1921 [1918]). A state holds sovereignty over its territory. Force used outside of this territory inherently occurs in a place where the state does not claim authority to decide its legitimacy. This makes decisions to use force outside a state's territory all the more interesting. This study uses the concept of force within the international realm rather than the conventional notion of military intervention or armed conflict.

This study defiens the projection of military force in the following way: *The decision to project military force is the purposeful deployment of regular military forces of a state outside their internationally recognized boundaries which destroys, or prevents an adversary from using, some resource.* The projection of military force holds similarities to the conventional understanding of war and international intervention. This latter term is especially problematic (Rosenau 1969). The concept of intervention can have military and humanitarian connotations (Finnemore 2003). Intervention is often applied to covert or atypical military actions (e.g., van Evera 1991). It has also been applied to any action which attempts to change the characteristics of the target society (e.g., Falk 1992). This term becomes confused in its application. Humanitarian intervention is often used with the implied comparison to military intervention. However, discussion of military intervention includes those missions or operations which are

motivated by humanitarian concerns (e.g., Haass 1999), illustrating the conceptual confusion which emerges when two terms are compared that are at different places along the ladder of abstraction.[120] The projection of military force aims to clear some of the confusion which exists as part of the conceptual landscape of intervention.

The conventional notion of military intervention is often either left undefined or the scholar focuses on a single instance known to be an intervention. Often military intervention is understood as a form of conflict. Conflict is a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics. Conflict continues to occur in many areas despite attempts to prevent its occurrence. The multicausal, equifinal nature of conflict creates very large problems for scholars trying to understand the reasons for its persistence. These problems are embodied in the debates over the concept of intervention and using force in international politics. Intervention as a concept is difficult to define and reflects characteristics of an essentially contested concept.[121] To make matters more complicated there is often a difference between meaning when the conception used colloquially and when it is used in scholarly research.

The issues surrounding this concept are continued in the distinction between military and nonmilitary conceptions of intervention. James Rosenau's (1968, 1969) classic statement on intervention is an attempt to address these problems by constructing an analytic, narrow conception of intervention which can be used in systematic inquiry. Rather than focus on force, Rosenau looked towards the effect a state has on the authority

[120] The ladder of abstraction refers to the idea introduced by Sartori (1970). A concept's position on the ladder changes through increasing the number of attributes which are covered under a particular concept. Greater attributes holds greater intention for a concept. According to Sartori, the intention is inversely related to the extension or the empirical cases to which a concept can be applied.

[121] For more on essentially contested concepts (see Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu 2006; Gallie 1956).

structures of another. However, while his conception holds merit, it deliberately would not include some clear instances of the use of military force. Some scholars focus on the legalistic aspects of intervention which imply interference with the domestic society of another state (Bull 1984). Other scholars have attempted to solve the problems surrounding the conception of intervention by focusing on clear instances of military deployment (e.g., Grimmett 2010; Haass 1995; Tillema 1989).

Some eschew dealing with the concept of intervention altogether. For instance, Martha Finnemore (2003) takes a more historical approach to solving the dilemma. She focuses on a methodological solution where the instances of intervention require the participants to describe the incident among themselves as a form of intervention. Other scholars use notions of coercion (Thompson 2006, 2009) or military disputes (Chapman 2009) to focus their inquiry. Often setting the boundaries of the concept under scrutiny is deemed to be unnecessary since the object of inquiry is generally understood to be intervention.

None of these attempts have solved the issues about the term. Rather than add to the conceptual confusion about the meanings and understandings of the term I choose to employ a different term to guide this study. The concept of intervention is a poor one to use when studying the reasons for why foreign policy decisions are made. Decisions to intervene militarily are not qualitatively different than the decisions to project military force. Using the concept of military force projection has the benefit of carrying an easily understood meaning while encapsulating the most significant aspects of the decision making process. In other words, the projection of military force is easily understood by

academics and by those outside of academia while holding clear boundaries that distinguish an incident from that which is not.

The concept would include phenomena where the object of the military deployment is not changing the domestic authority or political structures of another state. This concept is distinct from a conception of military intervention which requires at some level the interference in the domestic politics of another state. The projection of military force can be distinguished from the broader concept of armed conflict or war on the basis of its international character. Armed conflict, as a concept, includes things such as civil war or conflicts which occur within the domestic sphere.[122]

The first significant characteristic of the concept of military force projection is the deployment of regular military forces of a state. These troops are not from irregular or civilian forms of military organization. Covert actions taken by irregular troops do not fall within the identified conceptual boundaries.

The second signficant characteristic is their deployment outside the state's internationally recognized boundaries, including regular military troops being deployed outside of a state's territory. This represents a clear demarcation of the area where a state controls the territory. Inside the state's internationally recognized boundaries would be a police action such as the use of domestic force. Decisions regarding the legitimacy of the use of force by a state are limited to the territorial boundaries of that state. Internationally recognized boundaries represent the limit of a state's authority to make these kinds of decisions. The focus of the concept of military force projection deals with actions taken

[122] Civil wars and similar kinds of conflicts involve determining which actor or groups of actors have the authority to define what is considered to be a legitimate use of force. These are uses of force that are inherently domestic whether they are considered domestic or not.

outside of the limit where state sovereignty dictates that the state can decide the legitimacy of the action. In this realm, the state is not supreme by right but instead may have to rely on other resources or tools aside from sovereignty to justify its actions, whereas in the international realm no particular institution holds the ability to decide the legitimacy of force. A use of force is international when the state acts outside of the boundaries where it can decide the legitimacy of the use of force. This includes areas where control of a territory is in dispute. That is, areas where the control over territory is in dispute are areas where the holder of the ability to decide the legitimacy of force is in dispute. It makes sense that this would be outside the area where a state had the ability to make decisions about the use of force. Disputed territories are not internationally recognized but there is a territory which is internationally recognized as the undisputed territory of a state. When states act outside this territory the action becomes international.

The third characteristic of the concept of military foce projection is that the deployment destroys or prevents an adversary from using a particular resource. Deployment to a military base for sustained presence or to act as a supply facility thus does not fall within this concpet. The deployment has to be a physical rather than a peaceful use of force (Art 1980). This distinction matters, for the interpretation of military force projection. Peaceful uses of military force, such as swaggering or deterrence, are not relevant attributes for the concept.

The fourth characteristic of military force projection is the purposeful nature of the action. The focus of the concept is upon the decision to project military force. This includes purposeful decisions to use military troops rather than accidents and other forms of military activity which do not involve the decision. For instance, a projection of

military force would include the North Korean decision to invade South Korea in 1950, but it would not include the South Korean decision to resist the North Korean's use of force. It includes the U.S. deployment of troops to attack Iraq and repel the invaders from Kuwait in 1991, but not the attempt by the Kuwaitis to resist Iraq in 1990. The U.S. engaged in a purposeful deployment to destroy Iraqi resources but the Kuwaiti resistance was the attempt to repel the Iraqi attacks.

Conceptually the phenomenon classified as projections of military force should include instances of military intervention but not all instances of intervention. Intervention and military force projection are neither equivalent nor comparable concepts but they are overlapping concepts. The projection of military force includes instances which would not be included in the more conventional notions of military intervention. These additional phenomena have more in common with other forms of military force projection than they do with the broader conception of intervention.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER

1946-1949		
UNSCR 54 (1948)		
UNSCR 62 (1948)*		
1950-1959		
UNSCR 82 (1950)#		
UNSCR 83 (1950)#		
UNSCR 84 (1950)#		
UNSCR 146 (1950)*		
1960-1969		
UNSCR 161 (1961)		
UNSCR 169 (1961)		
UNSCR 217 (1965)#		
UNSCR 221 (1966)#		
UNSCR 232 (1966)		
UNSCR 253 (1968)		
1970-1979		
UNSCR 277 (1970)		
UNSCR 288 (1970)		
UNSCR 314 (1972)		
UNSCR 386 (1976)*		
UNSCR 388 (1976)		
UNSCR 409 (1977)		
UNSCR 418 (1977)		
UNSCR 421 (1977)#		
1980-1989		
UNSCR 502 (1982)		
UNSCR 598 (1987)		
1990-1999		
UNSCR 660 (1990)	UNSCR 677 (1990)	UNSCR 706 (1991)
UNSCR 661 (1990)	UNSCR 678 (1990)	UNSCR 707 (1991)
UNSCR 664 (1990)	UNSCR 686 (1991)	UNSCR 712 (1991)
UNSCR 665 (1990)0	UNSCR 687 (1991)	UNSCR 713 (1991)
UNSCR 666 (1990)	UNSCR 689 (1991)	UNSCR 715 (1991)
UNSCR 667 (1990)	UNSCR 692 (1991)	UNSCR 724 (1991)
UNSCR 669 (1990)*	UNSCR 699 (1991)	UNSCR 733 (1992)
UNSCR 670 (1990)	UNSCR 700 (1991)	UNSCR 743 (1992)
UNSCR 674 (1990)	UNSCR 705 (1991)	UNSCR 748 (1992)

1990-1999 (Continued)		
UNSCR 757 (1992)	UNSCR 919 (1994)	UNSCR 1080 (1996)
UNSCR 760 (1992)	UNSCR 923 (1994)	UNSCR 1088 (1996)
UNSCR 770 (1992)	UNSCR 929 (1994)	UNSCR 1093 (1997)
UNSCR 771 (1992)	UNSCR 940 (1994)	UNSCR 1101 (1997)
UNSCR 778 (1992)	UNSCR 941 (1994)	UNSCR 1111 (1997)
UNSCR 787 (1992)	UNSCR 942 (1994)	UNSCR 1114 (1997)
UNSCR 788 (1992)	UNSCR 943 (1994)	UNSCR 1115 (1997)
UNSCR 794 (1992)	UNSCR 944 (1994)	UNSCR 1119 (1997)
UNSCR 806 (1993)	UNSCR 947 (1994)	UNSCR 1120 (1997)
UNSCR 807 (1993)	UNSCR 949 (1994)	UNSCR 1125 (1997)
UNSCR 813 (1993)	UNSCR 954 (1994)	UNSCR 1127 (1997)
UNSCR 814 (1993)	UNSCR 955 (1994)	UNSCR 1129 (1997)
UNSCR 815 (1993)	UNSCR 958 (1994)	UNSCR 1130 (1997)
UNSCR 816 (1993)	UNSCR 967 (1994)	UNSCR 1132 (1997)
UNSCR 819 (1993)	UNSCR 970 (1995)	UNSCR 1134 (1997)
UNSCR 820 (1993)	UNSCR 981 (1995)	UNSCR 1135 (1997)
UNSCR 824 (1993)	UNSCR 981 (1995)	UNSCR 1136 (1997)
UNSCR 827 (1993)	UNSCR 982 (1995)	UNSCR 1137 (1997)
UNSCR 833 (1993)	UNSCR 986 (1995)	UNSCR 1143 (1997)
UNSCR 836 (1993)	UNSCR 987 (1995)	UNSCR 1152 (1998)
UNSCR 837 (1993)	UNSCR 988 (1995)	UNSCR 1153 (1998)
UNSCR 841 (1993)	UNSCR 990 (1995)	UNSCR 1154 (1998)
UNSCR 844 (1993)	UNSCR 992 (1995)	UNSCR 1155 (1998)
UNSCR 847 (1993)	UNSCR 994 (1995)	UNSCR 1156 (1998)
UNSCR 859 (1993)	UNSCR 998 (1995)	UNSCR 1158 (1998)
UNSCR 861 (1993)	UNSCR 1003 (1995)	UNSCR 1159 (1998)
UNSCR 864 (1993)	UNSCR 1004 (1995)	UNSCR 1160 (1998)
UNSCR 869 (1993)	UNSCR 1005 (1995)	UNSCR 1165 (1998)
UNSCR 870 (1993)	UNSCR 1009 (1995)	UNSCR 1166 (1998)
UNSCR 871 (1993)	UNSCR 1011 (1995)	UNSCR 1171 (1998)
UNSCR 873 (1993)	UNSCR 1021 (1995)	UNSCR 1173 (1998)
UNSCR 875 (1993)	UNSCR 1022 (1995)	UNSCR 1174 (1998)
UNSCR 878 (1993)	UNSCR 1025 (1995)	UNSCR 1175 (1998)
UNSCR 883 (1993)	UNSCR 1026 (1995)	UNSCR 1176 (1998)
UNSCR 886 (1993)	UNSCR 1031 (1995)	UNSCR 1192 (1998)
UNSCR 897 (1994)	UNSCR 1037 (1996)	UNSCR 1198 (1998)
UNSCR 899 (1994)	UNSCR 1038 (1996)	UNSCR 1199 (1998)
UNSCR 900 (1994)	UNSCR 1051 (1996)	UNSCR 1203 (1998)
UNSCR 908 (1994)	UNSCR 1054 (1996)	UNSCR 1205 (1998)
UNSCR 910 (1994)	UNSCR 1060 (1996)	UNSCR 1207 (1998)
UNSCR 913 (1994)	UNSCR 1066 (1996)	UNSCR 1210 (1998)
UNSCR 914 (1994)	UNSCR 1070 (1996)	UNSCR 1212 (1998)
UNSCR 915 (1994)	UNSCR 1074 (1996)	UNSCR 1221 (1999)
UNSCR 917 (1994)	UNSCR 1078 (1996)	UNSCR 1234 (1999)
UNSCR 918 (1994)	UNSCR 1079 (1996)	UNSCR 1237 (1999)

1990-1999 (Continued)		
UNSCR 1242 (1999)	UNSCR 1266 (1999)	UNSCR 1275 (1999)
UNSCR 1244 (1999)	UNSCR 1267 (1999)	UNSCR 1280 (1999)
UNSCR 1247 (1999)	UNSCR 1270 (1999)	UNSCR 1281 (1999)
UNSCR 1264 (1999)	UNSCR 1272 (1999)	UNSCR 1284 (1999)
2000-2009		
UNSCR 1289 (2000)	UNSCR 1408 (2002)	UNSCR 1503 (2003)
UNSCR 1291 (2000)	UNSCR 1409 (2002)	UNSCR 1506 (2003)
UNSCR 1293 (2000)	UNSCR 1410 (2002)	UNSCR 1509 (2003)
UNSCR 1295 (2000)	UNSCR 1411 (2002)	UNSCR 1510 (2003)
UNSCR 1297 (2000)	UNSCR 1412 (2002)	UNSCR 1511 (2003)
UNSCR 1298 (2000)	UNSCR 1413 (2002)	UNSCR 1512 (2003)
UNSCR 1302 (2000)	UNSCR 1417 (2002)	UNSCR 1518 (2003)
UNSCR 1304 (2000)	UNSCR 1418 (2002)	UNSCR 1519 (2003)
UNSCR 1305 (2000)	UNSCR 1420 (2002)	UNSCR 1521 (2003)
UNSCR 1306 (2000)	UNSCR 1421 (2002)	UNSCR 1526 (2004)
UNSCR 1315 (2000)	UNSCR 1422 (2002)	UNSCR 1527 (2004)
UNSCR 1320 (2000)	UNSCR 1423 (2002)	UNSCR 1528 (2004)
UNSCR 1329 (2000)	UNSCR 1425 (2002)	UNSCR 1529 (2004)
UNSCR 1330 (2000)	UNSCR 1431 (2002)	UNSCR 1532 (2004)
UNSCR 1333 (2000)	UNSCR 1432 (2002)	UNSCR 1533 (2004)
UNSCR 1336 (2001)	UNSCR 1439 (2002)	UNSCR 1534 (2004)
UNSCR 1341 (2001)	UNSCR 1441 (2002)	UNSCR 1535 (2004)[θ]
UNSCR 1343 (2001)	UNSCR 1443 (2002)	UNSCR 1540 (2004)
UNSCR 1348 (2001)	UNSCR 1444 (2002)	UNSCR 1542 (2004)
UNSCR 1352 (2001)	UNSCR 1445 (2002)	UNSCR 1545 (2004)
UNSCR 1355 (2001)	UNSCR 1446 (2002)	UNSCR 1546 (2004)
UNSCR 1356 (2001)	UNSCR 1447 (2002)	UNSCR 1551 (2004)
UNSCR 1357 (2001)	UNSCR 1448 (2002)	UNSCR 1552 (2004)
UNSCR 1360 (2001)	UNSCR 1452 (2002)	UNSCR 1555 (2004)
UNSCR 1363 (2001)	UNSCR 1454 (2002)	UNSCR 1556 (2004)
UNSCR 1367 (2001)	UNSCR 1455 (2003)	UNSCR 1558 (2004)
UNSCR 1372 (2001)	UNSCR 1464 (2003)	UNSCR 1562 (2004)
UNSCR 1373 (2001)	UNSCR 1472 (2003)	UNSCR 1563 (2004)
UNSCR 1374 (2001)	UNSCR 1474 (2003)	UNSCR 1564 (2004)
UNSCR 1376 (2001)	UNSCR 1476 (2003)	UNSCR 1565 (2004)
UNSCR 1382 (2001)	UNSCR 1478 (2003)	UNSCR 1566 (2004)
UNSCR 1385 (2001)	UNSCR 1481 (2003)	UNSCR 1572 (2004)
UNSCR 1386 (2001)	UNSCR 1483 (2003)	UNSCR 1575 (2004)
UNSCR 1388 (2002)	UNSCR 1484 (2003)	UNSCR 1576 (2004)
UNSCR 1389 (2002)	UNSCR 1487 (2003)	UNSCR 1577 (2004)
UNSCR 1390 (2002)	UNSCR 1490 (2003)	UNSCR 1579 (2004)
UNSCR 1399 (2002)	UNSCR 1491 (2003)	UNSCR 1584 (2005)
UNSCR 1400 (2002)	UNSCR 1493 (2003)	UNSCR 1587 (2005)
UNSCR 1404 (2002)	UNSCR 1497 (2003)	UNSCR 1590 (2005)
UNSCR 1407 (2002)	UNSCR 1501 (2003)	UNSCR 1591 (2005)

2000-2009 (Continued)		
UNSCR 1592 (2005)	UNSCR 1676 (2006)	UNSCR 1754 (2007)
UNSCR 1593 (2005)	UNSCR 1679 (2006)	UNSCR 1755 (2007)
UNSCR 1594 (2005)	UNSCR 1682 (2006)	UNSCR 1756 (2007)
UNSCR 1596 (2005)	UNSCR 1683 (2006)	UNSCR 1757 (2007)
UNSCR 1597 (2005)	UNSCR 1688 (2006)	UNSCR 1758 (2007)
UNSCR 1600 (2005)	UNSCR 1689 (2006)	UNSCR 1759 (2007)
UNSCR 1601 (2005)	UNSCR 1692 (2006)	UNSCR 1760 (2007)
UNSCR 1602 (2005)	UNSCR 1693 (2006)	UNSCR 1761 (2007)
UNSCR 1603 (2005)	UNSCR 1694 (2006)	UNSCR 1762 (2007)
UNSCR 1607 (2005)	UNSCR 1696 (2006)	UNSCR 1763 (2007)
UNSCR 1608 (2005)	UNSCR 1698 (2006)	UNSCR 1764 (2007)
UNSCR 1609 (2005)	UNSCR 1702 (2006)	UNSCR 1765 (2007)
UNSCR 1610 (2005)	UNSCR 1706 (2006)	UNSCR 1766 (2007)
UNSCR 1616 (2005)	UNSCR 1707 (2006)	UNSCR 1767 (2007)
UNSCR 1617 (2005)	UNSCR 1708 (2006)	UNSCR 1768 (2007)
UNSCR 1621 (2005)	UNSCR 1711 (2006)	UNSCR 1769 (2007)
UNSCR 1623 (2005)	UNSCR 1712 (2006)	UNSCR 1770 (2007)
UNSCR 1626 (2005)	UNSCR 1713 (2006)	UNSCR 1771 (2007)
UNSCR 1628 (2005)	UNSCR 1718 (2006)	UNSCR 1772 (2007)
UNSCR 1630 (2005)	UNSCR 1721 (2006)	UNSCR 1795 (2008)
UNSCR 1632 (2005)	UNSCR 1722 (2006)	UNSCR 1799 (2008)
UNSCR 1633 (2005)	UNSCR 1723 (2006)	UNSCR 1800 (2008)
UNSCR 1635 (2005)	UNSCR 1724 (2006)	UNSCR 1801 (2008)
UNSCR 1636 (2005)	UNSCR 1725 (2006)	UNSCR 1803 (2008)
UNSCR 1637 (2005)	UNSCR 1726 (2006)	UNSCR 1807 (2008)
UNSCR 1638 (2005)	UNSCR 1727 (2006)	UNSCR 1810 (2008)
UNSCR 1639 (2005)	UNSCR 1731 (2006)	UNSCR 1811 (2008)
UNSCR 1641 (2005)	UNSCR 1735 (2006)	UNSCR 1814 (2008)
UNSCR 1643 (2005)	UNSCR 1736 (2006)	UNSCR 1816 (2008)
UNSCR 1644 (2005)	UNSCR 1737 (2006)	UNSCR 1819 (2008)
UNSCR 1647 (2005)	UNSCR 1739 (2007)	UNSCR 1822 (2008)
UNSCR 1649 (2005)	UNSCR 1740 (2007)	UNSCR 1823 (2008)
UNSCR 1650 (2005)	UNSCR 1741 (2007)	UNSCR 1824 (2008)
UNSCR 1651 (2005)	UNSCR 1742 (2007)	UNSCR 1826 (2008)
UNSCR 1652 (2006)	UNSCR 1743 (2007)	UNSCR 1831 (2008)
UNSCR 1654 (2006)	UNSCR 1744 (2007)	UNSCR 1833 (2008)
UNSCR 1657 (2006)	UNSCR 1745 (2007)	UNSCR 1836 (2008)
UNSCR 1658 (2006)	UNSCR 1746 (2007)	UNSCR 1837 (2008)
UNSCR 1660 (2006)	UNSCR 1747(2007)	UNSCR 1838 (2008)
UNSCR 1665 (2006)	UNSCR 1748 (2007)	UNSCR 1840 (2008)
UNSCR 1667 (2006)	UNSCR 1749 (2007)	UNSCR 1841 (2008)
UNSCR 1669 (2006)	UNSCR 1750 (2007)	UNSCR 1842 (2008)
UNSCR 1671 (2006)	UNSCR 1751 (2007)	UNSCR 1843 (2008)
UNSCR 1672 (2006)	UNSCR 1752 (2007)	UNSCR 1844 (2008)
UNSCR 1673 (2006)	UNSCR 1753 (2007)	UNSCR 1845 (2008)

2000-2009 (Continued)		
UNSCR 1846 (2008)	UNSCR 1874 (2009)	UNSCR 1893 (2009)
UNSCR 1849 (2008)	UNSCR 1877 (2009)	UNSCR 1895 (2009)
UNSCR 1851 (2008)	UNSCR 1878 (2009)	UNSCR 1896 (2009)
UNSCR 1853 (2008)	UNSCR 1880 (2009)	UNSCR 1897 (2009)
UNSCR 1854 (2008)	UNSCR 1881 (2009)	UNSCR 1900 (2009)
UNSCR 1855 (2008)	UNSCR 1882 (2009)	UNSCR 1901 (2009)
UNSCR 1856 (2008)	UNSCR 1883 (2009)	UNSCR 1903 (2009)
UNSCR 1859 (2008)	UNSCR 1884 (2009)	UNSCR 1904 (2009)
UNSCR 1861 (2009)	UNSCR 1885 (2009)	UNSCR 1905 (2009)
UNSCR 1863 (2009)	UNSCR 1890 (2009)	UNSCR 1906 (2009)
UNSCR 1865 (2009)	UNSCR 1891 (2009)	UNSCR 1907 (2009)
UNSCR 1872 (2009)	UNSCR 1892 (2009)	
2010-2011		
UNSCR 1910 (2010)	UNSCR 1955 (2010)	UNSCR 1990 (2011)
UNSCR 1911 (2010)	UNSCR 1956 (2010)	UNSCR 1991 (2011)
UNSCR 1915 (2010)	UNSCR 1957 (2010)	UNSCR 1992 (2011)
UNSCR 1916 (2010)	UNSCR 1958 (2010)	UNSCR 1993 (2011)
UNSCR 1924 (2010)	UNSCR 1961 (2010)	UNSCR 1995 (2011)
UNSCR 1925 (2010)	UNSCR 1962 (2010)	UNSCR 1996 (2011)
UNSCR 1927 (2010)	UNSCR 1964 (2010)	UNSCR 2000 (2011)
UNSCR 1928 (2010)	UNSCR 1966 (2010)	UNSCR 2001 (2011)[θ]
UNSCR 1929 (2010)	UNSCR 1967 (2011)	UNSCR 2002 (2011)
UNSCR 1931 (2010)	UNSCR 1968 (2011)	UNSCR 2003 (2011)[θ]
UNSCR 1932 (2010)	UNSCR 1970 (2011)	UNSCR 2008 (2011)
UNSCR 1938 (2010)	UNSCR 1971 (2011)	UNSCR 2009 (2011)
UNSCR 1940 (2010)	UNSCR 1972 (2011)	UNSCR 2010 (2011)
UNSCR 1942 (2010)	UNSCR 1973 (2011)	UNSCR 2011 (2011)
UNSCR 1943 (2010)	UNSCR 1975 (2011)	UNSCR 2012 (2011)
UNSCR 1944 (2010)	UNSCR 1977 (2011)	UNSCR 2016 (2011)
UNSCR 1945 (2010)	UNSCR 1980 (2011)	UNSCR 2019 (2011)
UNSCR 1946 (2010)	UNSCR 1981 (2011)	UNSCR 2020 (2011)
UNSCR 1948 (2010)	UNSCR 1982 (2011)	UNSCR 2021(2011)
UNSCR 1950 (2010)	UNSCR 1984 (2011)	UNSCR 2023 (2011)
UNSCR 1951 (2010)	UNSCR 1985 (2011)	UNSCR 2025 (2011)
UNSCR 1952 (2010)	UNSCR 1988 (2011)	UNSCR 2029 (2011)
UNSCR 1954 (2010)	UNSCR 1989 (2011)	UNSCR 2032 (2011)

[*] This resolution makes reference in its text to a specific article within Chapter VII but not explicitly to Chapter VII itself.
[♯] This resolution contains an implicit reference to Chapter VII.
[θ] Resolution makes reference to Chapter VII resolution in its preamble. For instance the resolution contains a 'recall' of a Chapter VII resolution.

Source: 1946-1995 from Bailey and Daws (1998, 272), 1996-2002 from Johansson (2003`), 2003-2011 are coded by the author from UN Security Council Resolutions (United Nations Various Dates-b).

APPENDIX C

LIST OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS FOR SPECIFIC CASES[123]

Table C.1. The Korean War, 1950

Resolution	Date	Meeting	Vote	Notes on Vote
UNSCR 82 (1950)	June 25	473rd	9-0-1	Yugoslavia in abstention, the USSR was absent.
Identified the North Korean invasion as a breach of the peace.				
UNSCR 83 (1950)	June 27	474th	7-1-0	Yugoslavia in opposition; Egypt and India did not participate in the vote; the USSR was absent.
Authorized military assistance to be provided to the Republic of Korea by members of the United Nations.				
UNSCR 84 (1950)	July 7	476th	7-0-3	Egypt, India and Yugoslavia in abstention, the USSR was absent.
Authorized a unified command led by the United States of America.				
UNSCR 85 (1950)	July 31	479th	9-0-1	Yugoslavia in abstention; the USSR was absent.
Requested that the Unified Command coordinate and administer aid to civilian population of Korea.				
UNSCR88 (1950)	November 8	520th	8-2-1	China and Cuba in opposition; Egypt in Abstention.
Procedural resolution inviting a representative from the People's Republic of China to be present when discussing the matter of aggression in Korea.				
UNSCR 90 (1951)	January 31st	531st	11-0-0	
Removed the "Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea" from matters upon which the UNSC was seized.				

[123] The voting for this appendix is cataloged as Support-Opposition-Abstention.

Table C.2. The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991[124]

Resolution	Date	Meeting	Vote	Notes on Vote
UNSCR 660 (1990)	August 2, 1990	2932nd	14-0-0	Yemen did not participate in the vote.
Condemned the invasion of Kuwait and identified it as a breach to international peace and security.				
UNSCR 661 (1990)	August 6, 1990	2933rd	13-0-2	Cuba and Yemen in abstention.
Imposed sanctions on Iraq.				
UNSCR 662 (1990)	August 9, 1990	2934th	15-0-0	
Condemned Iraq's formal annexation of Kuwait and declared it null and void.				
UNSCR 664 (1990)	August 18, 1990	2937th	15-0-0	
Demanded that Iraq allows the immediate departure of foreign nationals from Kuwait and Iraqi territories.				
UNSCR 665 (1990)	August 25, 1990	2938th	13-0-2	Cuba and Yemen in abstention.
Authorized the enforcement of the economic embargo against Iraq through the use of force.				
UNSCR 666 (1990)	September 14, 1990	2939th	13-2-0	Cuba and Yemen in opposition.
Established process to determine when humanitarian need justified the provision of food supplies to Iraq.				
UNSCR 667 (1990)	September 16, 1990	2940th	15-0-0	
Condemned Iraq's treatment of diplomatic personnel and property. It also demanded the release of foreign nationals.				
UNSCR 669 (1990)	September 24, 1990	2942nd	15-0-0	
Established procedures to address requests for assistance arising from the invasion.				
UNSCR 670 (1990)	September 25, 1990	2943rd	14-1-0	Cuba in opposition.
Extended the Embargo to include air traffic in addition to naval traffic. Did not include the use of force but included nonviolent means.				
UNSCR 674 (1990)	October 29, 1990	2951st	13-0-2	Cuba and Yemen in abstention.
Concerned the Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals.				
UNSCR 677 (1990)	November 28, 1990	2962nd	15-0-0	
Response to Iraqi attempts to change the demographic characteristics of Kuwait.				
UNSCR 678 (1990)	November 29, 1990	2963rd	12-2-1	Cuban and Yemen in opposition. China in abstention.
This resolution authorized Member States to use all necessary means to implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all relevant resolutions.				
UNSCR 686 (1991)	March 3, 1991	2978th	11-1-3	Cuba in opposition. China, India and Yemen in abstention.
Defined Iraq's international obligations and set initial conditions for peace and a provisional end to hostilities.				
UNSCR 687 (1991)	April 3, 1991	2981st	12-1-2	Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention.
The Gulf Crisis ceasefire resolution which sets up the international position against Iraq domination and military aspirations.				

[124] Resolutions in bold include authorization for the projection of military force.

Table C.3. Operation Desert Fox, 1998

Resolution	Date	Meeting	Vote	Notes on Vote
UNSCR 686 (1991)	March 2, 1991	2978th	11-1-3	Cuba in opposition; China, India, and Yemen in abstention.
Provided a provisional cease fire for the Persian Gulf War.				
UNSCR 687 (1991)	April 3, 1991	2981st	12-1-2	Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention.
Provided a ceasefire for the Persian Gulf War and defined the international obligations of Iraq and established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).				
UNSCR 699 (1991)	June 17, 1991	2994th	15-0-0	
Confirmed UNSCOM's and the IAEA's mandate from UNSCR 687 and deplored Iraq's lack of cooperation.				
UNSCR 707 (1991)	August 15, 1991	3004th	15-0-0	
Demanded that Iraq fully disclose its weapons program and authorized fixed-wing and helicopter flights for inspections purposes in Iraq.				
UNSCR 715 (1991)	October 11, 1991	3012th	15-0-0	
Established an ongoing monitoring and verification regime for Iraq.				
UNSCR 949 (1994)	October 15, 1994	3438th	15-0-0	
Demanded Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM and for Iraq to return the recently deployed troop from southern Iraq and refrain from provocations which threaten its neighbors.				
UNSCR 1060 (1996)	June 12, 1996	3672nd	15-0-0	
Rebuttal to Iraqi claims that "Presidential" sites were off-limits to UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors.				
UNSCR 1137 (1997)	November 12, 1997	3831st	15-0-0	
Cited Iraq for expelling American-national weapons inspectors and warned of "serious consequences" if Iraq failed to comply with its international obligations.				
UNSCR 1284 (1999)	December 17, 1999	4084th	11-0-4	China, France, Malaysia, and Russia in abstention.
Established the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM.				

Table C.4. Iraq War, 2003

Resolution	Date	Meeting	Vote	Notes on Vote
UNSCR 678 (1990)	November 29, 1990	2963rd	12-2-1	Cuban and Yemen in opposition. China in abstention.
This resolution authorizes Member States to use all necessary means to implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all relevant resolutions for the Persian Gulf War.				
UNSCR 687 (1991)	April 3, 1991	2981st	12-1-2	Cuba in opposition. Ecuador and Yemen in abstention.
Provided a ceasefire for the Persian Gulf War and defined the international obligations of Iraq and established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).				
UNSCR 1441 (2002)	November 8, 2002	4644th	15-0-0	
Established an enhanced inspections regime for Iraq and provided Iraq a "last" chance to meet its international obligations set by UNSCR 678 and other relevant resolutions.				
Draft Resolution UNSC Document (2003)	March 7, 2003	S/2003/215	Withdrawn without a vote.	
The draft of the "second resolution" withdrawn on March 17, 2003 by its sponsors Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom. Upon passage this resolution would have reactivated UNSCR 678.				
UNSCR 1483	May 22, 2003	4762nd	14-0-0	Syria did not participate in the vote.
Lifted sanctions on Iraq and recognized the U.S. and the UK as occupying powers.				

Table C.5. The Libyan Intervention, 2011

Resolution	Date	Meeting	Vote	Notes on Vote
UNSCR 1970 (2011)	February 26, 2011	6491st	15-0-0	
Condemned the situation in Libya, referred the situation to the ICC and implemented sanctions.				
UNSCR 1973 (2011)	March 17, 2011	6498th	10-0-5	Brazil, China, Germany, India & Russia in abstention
Established a No-Fly Zone around Libya, authorized the use of military force to protect civilians and enforce the No-Fly Zone.				
UNSCR 2009 (2011)	September 16, 2011	6620th	15-0-0	
Established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.				
UNSCR 2016 (2011)	October 27, 2011	6640th	15-0-0	
Terminated the mandate to use military force contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 through 12 of UNSCR 1973.				
UNSCR 2017 (2011)	October 31, 2011	6644th	15-0-0	
Established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.				
UNSCR 2022 (2011)	December 2, 2011	6673rd	15-0-0	
Extended the mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.				
UNSCR 2040 (2012)	March 12, 2012	6733rd	15-0-0	
Extended the mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.				

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