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Master's Thesis in Political Science

Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in  
Zambia and Ghana.



*Author:* Prince Maimbo Simunkombwe

*Supervisor:* Prof. Emil Udhammar

*Examiner:*

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## Abstract

Considerable scholarly work and policy discourse on democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa often attribute challenges and instability to lack of economic development. However, the theories of dictatorship, opposition party behavior and democratization challenge this popular assumption. Taking Ghana and Zambia as cases since 1996, the problem of weak opposition parties cannot be overlooked. For this reason, the aim of the thesis was to examine different explanatory factors that account for political opposition weakness in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the thesis attempted to answer what explains democratic consolidation variations in Sub-Saharan Africa. As you can see from the findings and the result analysis, the thesis concludes that, democratic space in Africa except Ghana, is shrinking because of strong personality rule coupled with, fragmented and poorly organized opposition parties in some countries like Zambia make democratic consolidation much harder. Yet, Ghana has greatly consolidated its democracy due to well-functioning opposition parties including combination of several factors ranging general feeling of political socialization to policy alternatives since its return to civilian rule. The case of Ghana and Zambia have also demonstrated that strong institutions are necessary in establishing more stable and sustainable democracy.

## Key words

Democratic consolidation, opposition political parties, strong man rule, dictatorship theory, opposition party behavior theory, democratization theory, role of opposition parties, intra-party democracy, electoral commission, free and fair elections, Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana, Zambia, Robert Dahl, Lise Rakner, Linz and Stepan, Anthony Down, Randall and Svåsand, Chabal and Daloz.



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**List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AfDB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BTI	Transformation Index
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CPDM	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
CPP	Convention People's Party
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
ECG	Electoral Commission of Ghana
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
EU	European Union
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International monetary Fund
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NPP	New Patriotic Party





NRM National Resistance Movement

OAS Organization of American States

PDGE Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial

PF Patriotic Front

PNC People's National Convention

PNDC Provisional National Defence Council

SAP Structure Adjustment Program

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNIP United National Independence Party

UPND United Party for National Development

ZANC Zambia African National Congress

ZSA Zambia Statistic Agency



## **Chapter One**

### **1 Introduction**

#### **1.1 Background and Thesis Context**

The African democratic wave that began in the 1990s especially in Sub-Saharan Africa remains by and large subsiding. While this period witnessed drastic reforms to improve both economic development and guarantee political freedoms within Africa, these changes slowed down after 2000. According to Bratton (2019 p. 386), continental trends in relation to political rights, human rights, and also clean and competitive elections began to shrink. This reverse is attributed to different analogies by different scholars. Others have observed that, democratization in the *third wave* (Huntington, 1991)'s most used metaphor took place rapidly and hurriedly as compared to other regions like Europe (Bratton, p. 387). Similarly, Hyden (2013) claims that, democratization in Africa was subtler accompanied with donor pressure and not inclusive, aimed at not to remove public institutions as left behind by colonial masters at independence but rather to strengthen them (Hyden, 2013 p. 40). For this reason, democracy in most Sub-Saharan Africa countries except Ghana may fail to pass the criterion of ideal democracy as described by Robert Dahl (1998). Top-down democratization approach that took place in this part of the world had negative consequences on effective and inclusive participation, including equality of voting (Dahl, 1998 p. 38). While Dahl's answer lies in installation of inclusive political institutions, this remains a dream to be realized in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political institutions in many Sub-Saharan African countries have remained closed and are marked by neopatrimonialism (Bratton, 1994 p. 458). As a result, Africans are worse off economically and political instability is as a result of lack of democratic governance. However, most African scholars associate the poor economies in the region to structural adjustment programs (SAP) of IMF and the World Bank whose results were generally disappointing (Haynes, 2002 p. 61).

The pressure of donor agencies as observed by Hyden to democratize Africa impacted the region where, those who chose not to accept democracy and its fundamentals were refused aid. Foreign aid donors argued that Africa's failed economy was a consequence of disallowing democracy and lack of political accountability. The emphasis on "governance" and "democratization" across Africa ignoring economic development has to some extent affected the consolidation phase of democratization (Haynes, 2002 p. 62). Therefore, donor's support of democratization is viewed as rhetorical rather than substantial. Likewise, Mkandawire calls



democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 'democracy of tears' brought by superficial reforms of structural adjustment programmes (Mkandawire, 1998 in Ewald 2013 p. 44). For instance, Zambia after returning to constitutional democracy in 1992 has failed to turn around the country's economy and it is also almost impossible to control corruption.

Democratic consolidation according to Haynes (2002) is said to have occurred when all competing political groups accept both formal and informal rules in determining: "who gets what, where, when, and how" (Haynes, 2002 p. 82) or better still democracy becomes in Linz and Stepan sense "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan, 1996 p. 133). In this context, Haynes further argues that, political opposition parties emerge as privileged actors at this stage of democratization. In contrast, the weakness of political opposition too in Sub-Saharan Africa as observed by Randall and Svåsand (2002 p. 9) has prevented democratic consolidation in many African countries and this offers a point of departure. Echoing Randall and Svåsand, Beetham stressed that while political parties has always been the best ally of democratic process, the current trends suggest however that, political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa have come to 'occupy the very bottom place' in the process of democratization (Beetham, 2011 p. 127). Again, we can trace what Dahl (1971) said three decades ago that democratic regimes are determined by the level of political competition. However, discussing Sub-Saharan Africa's opposition parties, Lindberg (2006) similarly argued that the quality and power of the opposition to push up democracy is left to be desired. Thus, political opposition "needs to be revisited both in Sub-Saharan Africa and far beyond its borders" (Lindberg, 2006 p. 149). This point somehow validates Dahl's (1989) plea for polyarchy. Thus, democratizing countries require both institutional incentives and quality of political participation in order to attract the phase of consolidated democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

## **1. 2 Thesis Overview/Disposition**

This research examines explanatory factors as to why there exists weak opposition political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has negatively affected democratic consolidation. The study will be analyzed in the context of three major theories- theory of dictatorship, opposition party behavior theory, and democratization theory as the baseline for the findings. This weakness is explored in terms of disconnection between stabilization policies of the international donor community and the continued status quo using qualitative research strategy. Although the role of the opposition parties for proper working of democracy is now acknowledged, the perceived view in Sub-Saharan Africa is that they only come during



elections. Hence raising concerns as to how full democratic consolidation which largely depends on well-functioning opposition can be achieved. The motivation to carry out this research is that, contemporary literature and policy discourse on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, focus more on social and economic benefits from recent developments in democratization neglecting political institutionalization from the opposition political parties' standpoint. In order to see through the chosen cases, the study employs structured focused comparison design as explained by George and Bennett (2004). We further narrow down the explanatory variable factors using Lise Rakner (2011)'s analytical framework for strong opposition political parties: political environment for opposition parties, intra-party democracy and organizational structure. Other influential variables like the politics of strong men, role of political opposition and electoral commission, free and fair elections are examined.

In outlining its disposition, this thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction chapter which provides the thesis context including the overview, Chapter two outlines a theoretical framework, and see if political parties play a key role in the process of democratic consolidation. This chapter further aims at setting out a detailed review of factors that contributes to opposition political party weaknesses in emerging democracies. These reviews are important to understand how full democratic consolidation which involves political opposition can be achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter three therefore gives area of focus, research questions, critically defines the problem, purpose, and aims of the study. Chapter four explores how cases have been selected including giving historical background of our selected countries. Furthermore, this chapter gives a detailed overview of the politics of strong men in Africa while drawing specific country examples. Chapter five explores, as well as offers full details of the research methodological, design and methods. Chapter six summarizes the key findings on why there exist weak political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa emerging from reviewed literature and theoretical framework. Chapter seven discusses the findings of our cases which brings the research to a logical conclusion, determining the problems and lasting prospects of democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The last chapter concludes.

## **Chapter Two**

### **2 Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.1 Theories of Weak Political Opposition**



Turning directly to the scholarly literature on theories of weak political opposition, factors that account for the weak political opposition are highly contested and debated within the scholarship of political science. To this effect, the thesis tries to distinguish itself by focusing on two countries that share similar historical backgrounds but rather with slight differences in levels of opposition political party weakness. Undoubtedly, a common shared view regarding weak opposition parties is attributed to lack of internal democracy and best practices in providing alternative policies among which citizens can choose (NDI, 2003 p. 3). In order to establish an analytical framework on which to examine the cases, these theories will be closely scrutinized. Understanding factors that make parties weak is a significant imperative to devise preventive mechanisms that support democratic consolidation.

## **2. 2 Theory of Dictatorship**

The study of authoritarian rule in relation to undermining the establishment of democratic society continues to persist in political science. Many believe that dictators are a stumbling block to democracy and democratic consolidation. Perhaps the major problem is that, dictators operate a political system which restricts other actors including the political opposition to form and carry out their activities. As Frantz observed, dictators function largely as a veto player (Frantz, 2018 p. 44). While we can observe some degree of variations among these authoritarian regimes in terms of power, they are driven by the same desire to consolidate control of the state and government. They do this by making sure that their political opponents do not survive through the mechanisms of punishment and reward in seeking loyalty, usually by offering them power-sharing deals where they lose elections. Dictators preside on a political environment of high uncertainty and this prevents formation of political opposition capable of challenging the leader (Frantz, 2018 p. 48). Similarly Linz accounts that, in the event that democracy gives way to authoritarianism, human rights fundamentals within a given society are restricted including prevention of political expression of certain group interests and political mobilization. There is erosion of political institutions and weakening of the governance system (Linz, 2000 p. 170).

Correspondingly to Linz's assertion, all dictators try hard to limit the political space for their opponents according to Frantz by "interfering in military recruitment, including stacking military positions with loyalist and also they create parallel security forces. Thus, establishing a presidential guard to counterbalance the regular army, with sole responsibility of protecting the leader from disloyal military or staging a coup" (Frantz, 2018 p. 48). They strive to hold on



to power and maintain boundary control under which opposition parties operate, simply there is limited pluralism. Authoritarian regimes are dominantly run by the elite through a single party, where a large part of society is excluded from organized participation and governments are not held accountable. They create a complex system characterized by a monopolistic model where political institutions such as the courts, media and civil society groups are heavily controlled by the dictator (Linz, 2000 p. 171). When a dictator successfully controls everything, personalization of power becomes a political instrument and all dictators try to maximize power control. Due to the personalization of power which can occur in both advanced or emerging democracies as well, it makes it more difficult for the opposition parties to challenge such leaders (Frantz, 2018 p. 49). With the sound of personality and mentality Arendt argues, dictators put everything in motion and remain in power through propaganda over ignorance and manipulation of the masses. Dictators organize these masses in such a way that they cannot form a functional organization founded on common shared interest such as into political parties or trade unions. To some extent, all dictators are convinced that the evil way of doing politics by abusing democratic freedoms with the aim of abolishing them acts as a center force of attraction (Arendt, 2004 p. 409).

There is distortion of democratic centralism principle and the role of the party cadre in authoritarian regimes. The principle that allows party leaders to concentrate powers in their hands, from top down organizational structure. In this arrangement, power becomes personal as opposed to it being institutional with relatively little or Zero separation of functions (Linz, 2000 p. 87). Party cadres are signed with responsibility of clamping down any political expression of members of the opposition parties and other interest groups, where limited pluralism becomes institutionalized and party cadres are rewarded for acts of violence. As Chabal and Daloz squarely observed in their stud, African politics is sustained by violence under the guide of the state as the main culprit for violence through direct abuse of power (Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. 77). Such regimes are corrupt and largely steal from the state, erode state institutions and they drive countries towards political decay. The eroded state institutions like the military security, courts and the state broadcast tend to enhance dictator survival in office. In the long run, these pseudo- democratic institutions serve as tools for political mobilization of a strong man (Frantz, 2018 p. 78). Party cadres are appointed to head such institutions like constitutional courts, civil service and the public broadcaster based not on merit but rather loyalty. Dictators prefer loyalty rather than competence and they make sure that whoever opposes them is neutralized by purging and there is promotion of family members



to powerful positions of political influence, even if such cadre lack government experience (Frantz, 2018 p. 44). Ringen (2016) claims, while courts exercises relative independence in some cases, they fail to do so in political cases such that all judgements are politically skewed towards the wishes of the powers that be, including jailing the opposition leaders on trumped up charges (Ringen, 2016 p. 99).

### **2. 3 Opposition Party Behavior Theory**

Although there is no clear theory on opposition party behavior, the study of political opposition or political party behavior in general is influenced by the rational choice tradition within the field of political science, especially in the study of Antony Down. From Down's assertion, political parties are expected to have the behavior of the firms that engage in rational behavior for profits. In the same manner, politicians should pursue votes rationally or they risk to cease to be politicians. Political oppositions often make decisions with limited policy alternatives among which voters can choose. This problem Down continues, does not affect political parties only but rather this includes interest groups and governments (Down, 1957 p. 6). While political opposition can enable representation and also accountability, undoubtedly, some opposition parties are formed to pursue a regional or ethnicity agenda, instead of expressing their political preferences that benefit the entire population. In a democratic society, any prudent government will seek to maximize political support with its primary goal of reelection. This goal becomes more important for those parties out of power, the opposition parties to engage in political activities and policy formulation that will guarantee their growth (Down, 1957 p. 11). Similarly, Rakner argues, political opposition in many instances are formed not to fight for cross cutting cleavages like the economy but rather these parties are polarization of ethic cleavages. What looks like opposition political parties in Africa, she further argues are personalized organizations without grass root structures and they have individual party leaders with ethically inclined voters (Rakner, 2011 p. 111). Opposition parties are characterized by internal power struggles that prevent them from making rational decision making on policies. Often, parties cooperate on strategies which helps them to get elected to office but strongly disagree with each other when it comes to implementation of policies. Decisions are made by top officials neglecting multitudes of grass root people. In this case, the opposite reality is real that political parties formulate policies for the purpose of winning an election not the other way round of winning an election in order to provide the best policy practices (Down, 1957 p. 28). Opposition parties simply lack strategies to adopt policies that outsmart that of the incumbent



or policies that closely match with the ruling party on which citizens can compare and rate government for reelection or not. Opposition parties have also in many aspects failed to utilize coalition of minorities in order to defeat the incumbent.

The level of influence of the opposition parties is affected according to Duverger (1964) by party structure and party organization. The party structure determines basic framework, membership as well as governing hierarchy vertical or horizontal links. For instance, the socialist parties are structured in a way that it recruits a large proportion of the masses, which are financed by the public individual subscription. While on the other hand, Conservatives and Liberal parties narrowly recruit and are privately financed by a few powerful businessmen and backers (Duverger, 1964 p. 1). There are parties which occupy midway positions such Christian Democrat parties and Labour parties are all but rather their different structures limit membership recruitment, degree of participation and nomination of leaders. Some parties are democratic in appearance whereas in reality they are oligarchical.

Scholars within political science continue to probe questions around to what extent that opposition parties still perform the function of representative since true representative democracy demands internally democratic opposition parties (Muller and Strom, 1999 p. 4). Internal democracy is important as it gives opportunity for the citizens to be involved in making choices regarding policy programmes. Opposition parties according to Downsian are seekers of votes and vote maximizers, the only objective that has come to associate the opposition parties with overlooking the other aspects such as the institution on which democratic consolidation can be established, through the provision of policy alternatives and programmes (Strom 1990. p 566). The vote- seeking behavior has compromised opposition parties in their roles and fallen victims to traps of the incumbent. This vote seeking behavior necessitates what Muriaas calls institutional mechanisms of floor crossing, where closer analysis has so far proved that institutional mechanism of floor crossing tends to strengthen and help the ruling party in government to become stronger and dominant as opposed strengthening the opposition parties. In addition, the relationship between opposition parties is further weakened by floor crossing as many small parties cross the floor towards the ruling party (Muriaas, 2011 p. 1076-1077).

## **2. 4 Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory**





Democratic leaders of most emerging democracies in Africa often argue that opposition parties together with civil society should demobilize after the phase of transition to pave way for economic development ignoring the important role political opposition play especially in preventing a reverse to authoritarian rule. In some cases, scholars hold a different view that perhaps democratization took place at a time of political parties weakening, if not all during the period of party vanishing (Morlino, 2019 p. 213). The literature on consolidation phase attributes political opposition weakness by distinguishing between *elite continuity* and *party continuity*. The elite continuity presents a situation where elites from non-democratic era for instance, authoritarian regimes form a new opposition party. These pre-democracy regimes may succeed in forming a democratic government using high or low violence, if they fail to form the government, they remain as opposition parties. While party continuity regards continuation of not only the elite but also the party that was in the previous non democratic era. Thus, it often continues to mobilize as previously in the pre-democratization era in establishing a multiparty democracy and maintaining power. Party continuity breeds a mixture of clientelism, and suppression of political opponent's ideology (Morlino, 2019 p. 217). Party continuity does not present a pure form of consolidated democracy as it may act against the formation of opposition political parties. Where political oppositions are formed, they still fail to mobilize people openly, leaving the elites to play a major role in the transition phase.

In one way or another Burnell et al (2017) thinks that the discussions and debates on policies for economic development have overshadowed the prospect of democratization in the *third wave of democracy* and democratic consolidation including political rights (Burnell et al, 2017 p 23). Comparatively, Rakner (2017) argues, electoralism democratization which places less civil freedoms has instead overshadowed polyarchal democracy, a yardstick upon which we can judge the process of democratization. As opposed to electoralism, polyarchy in Dahl's sense promotes extensive political participation through various actors and civic pluralism (Rakner, 2017 p. 2017 p. 213). While we can avoid the fallacy of electoral democracy within the democratization process, Dahl's modern democracy (Polyarchy) should be promoted for it has conditions that provide formation of a political party as an institution of representation. One of the four conditions of the polyarchy system as argued by Dahl is that citizens should be provided with alternative sources of information and policy, where political opposition is active (Dahl, 1989 p. 221). The argument is that, although electoralism may result in elections being free and fair, it is less prized and also minority rights are insecure which in the long run hinders political opposition institutionalization.



Within the democratization process Rakner asserts, we should be wary of political liberalization and those engaged in promoting democracy in a given context, be it external or internal actors. Political liberalization may take two forms, democratization emerges from above (top-down) and democratization emerges from below (bottom-up) approaches (Rakner, 2017 p. 214). In any case, the top-down approach is targeted at the very top political leadership including state institutions of governance such as executive, legislature and judiciary. The bottom-up method involves civil societies by strengthening them to achieve much required political participation with the notion that civil societies have strong grass-root representation (Silander, 2005 p. 97-9). A particular form of political liberalization can easily trigger a path dependence of a political system including a notion of critical juncture born out of critical moments within a specified period of time with lasting consequences (Randall and Rakner, 2017 p. 47). These critical moments or junctures can come as a result of external dimensions of democratization. External influences may work in different ways to the detriment of political opposition. Different international actors are now actively engaged in democracy promotion such as the European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN) through monitoring and observing elections, and the UNDP is a major funder for projects aimed at improving democratic governance (Rakner, 2017 p. 221). The influence exerted by these powerful organizations and influential countries such as the United States of America, Russia and its allies should not be ignored the role it plays in weakening the opposition parties. These actors may cause “transitions resulting from the conjuncture of various forces” (Bratton, 2017 p. 385), including the decline of opposition political parties.

## **2. 5 Operationalization of the theory/Analytical Framework**

Having understood the prominent theories of weak political opposition, we can therefore establish a baseline and see how these theories are correlated with empirical findings. In addition, the established baseline will help us to build up following chapters of this thesis. The upcoming chapters starting with research questions will situate and examine various variables within the theoretical framework of the aforementioned theories. The intended goal of this thesis is to identify the utmost best explanation as to why Sub-Saharan Africa political opposition is weak.

For purposes of answering the research questions, an analytical framework is chosen that aims at explaining factors contributing to overall political opposition weakness in Sub Saharan Africa. Lise Rakner (2011) for purposes of this study guidelines for strong political opposition



in Sub-Saharan African countries will be applied as the basis of the analytical framework. After analyzing these factors as highlighted by Lise Rakner, we can group these factors into four that contribute to political opposition weakness and distinguish them respectively: political environment for opposition parties, intra-party democracy and organizational structure, and relation between opposition political parties. These factors together with the identified variables will further structure this comparison.

## **Chapter Three**

### **3 Research Focus**

#### **3.1 Major Research Questions/Aim**

Comparatively, when it comes to democratic consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana and Zambia whose reasons for choosing them are explained in the following chapter, offer a relative paradox of variations within each country. Ghana enjoys relatively successful democratic consolidation with economic development standing at USD 2,130 GNI per capita in 2018 (WB, 2019), and it has so far held transparent elections and established civilian government following the “military rule in 1966-69, 1972-79 and 1981-92” (Rakner, 2017 p. 212). On the other hand, Zambia is classified as a partly free country with extremely restricted political freedoms (Freedom House, 2018). For this reason, **the Overall Research Question** for this study is, what explains democratic consolidation variations in Sub-Saharan Africa as evidenced in Ghana and Zambia? However, quick glance at qualitative literature shows that Zambia suffers a higher level of political party weakness including restricted political space than Ghana. Therefore and for purposes of this study, **the Additional Specific Research Questions** to be answered are developed from the ideas of the scholars within the field of political science and are as **follows**:

1. If the views published by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan suggests that political party (ies) is one of the arenas for consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996 p. 9), then what is the role of opposition political parties in democratic consolidation?
2. The second question is developed on the observation made by Randall and Svåsand that, African politics are largely associated with weak political opposition (Randall and Svåsand, 2002 p. 9-10), then why have opposition political parties remained weak in Sub-Saharan Africa?



3. Again, Uddhammar et al on the rule of strong men contended that Africa has presidents with excessively strong powers (Uddhammar et al, 2011 p. 1059), in what ways then has the rule of strong man prevented the establishment of opposition political parties in African Politics?

The study therefore aims to explore and examine different explanatory factors that account for political opposition weakness in Sub-Saharan Africa which has negatively affected democratic consolidation. This is the dilemma I seek to explain using Ghana and Zambia, due to their interesting historical background as presented in chapter four and also being ambitious emerging democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **3. 2 Problem Statement**

My research problem can be traced from the broader way of looking at the research questions themselves. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there exists a weak political opposition even among the emerging democracies like Ghana and Zambia. There is a perceived view that, beyond holding elections these parties cannot function. In fact, for this reason political parties are now perceived as vehicles on which public offices can be contested and attained as opposed to institutions under which democratic consolidation can be achieved. This phenomenon has turned democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa to mean more or less as synonymous to holding elections without looking beyond what political parties can offer as an institution of democracy.

### **3. 3 Research Relevance/Purpose**

Basically, the selected countries Ghana and Zambia acts as a tangible reminder of a major dilemma that democratic consolidation is facing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, we should purposely start looking at how oppositions can survive beyond the election circle as an institution of democracy. Consequently, the popular belief is that improving internal democracy, outreach and transparency creates a stable and strong political parties (NDI, 2003 p. 10). In 1996 Linz and Stepan wrote, a full democratic consolidation involves political parties as the core institution of democracy under which society organizes itself to select democratic government (Linz and Stepan, 1996 p. 8). Agencies like International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have repeatedly argued that strong democracy depends on well- functioning political parties. Likewise, these parties should not just exist but rather play a functional role in making the government accountable and also develop alternative policies



among which citizens can choose (IDEA, 2007 p. 5). However, opposition political parties often find themselves in a weak position as a result not limited to regulations but also internal arrangement. In 2003, the National Democratic Institute asserted this line of reasoning. Opposition parties are institutions charged with the responsibility of developing alternative policy ideas on a broad range of issues and effectively communicate to often frustrated electorate (NDI, 2003 p. 5).

Despite the sound argument from influential scholars, and development agencies such as IDEA, Ghana and Zambia simply do not fit this prototype. In fact the entire region of Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with an opposition political party crisis. Regardless of the stabilization policies like that of the European Union, and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) targeted at making political parties strong in Sub-Saharan Africa, the weak trend continues. This then becomes my point of departure and concern to carry out this study.

## **Chapter Four**

### **4. 1 Selection of Cases**

In Sub-Saharan Africa, as explained in the introduction, weakness of political opposition has by and large prevented democratic consolidation in almost the entire continent except one or two countries. The context of this argument is within the continued authoritarian rule even after the attainment of democratic governance and also the dominance of one party rule in a multiparty structure. Notable countries with dominance parties are South Africa, Tanzania and Botswana. In such countries, though there exist small parties, they have no strength to mount a formidable ability to challenge the ruling party (Muriaas, 2011 p. 1068). The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa has been in power since the end of apartheid. Although Freedom House classifies South Africa as free 79/100 (Freedom House, 2019), scholars like Muriaas are concerned with, the dominant of one party coupled with, ANC reluctant to commit itself to the reforms that will increase political participation as well as, real party competition for consolidated democracy. Compared to African National Congress ANC is Chama Cha Mapinduzi of Tanzania. Whereas Tanzania has more than 18 registered political parties, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) which is a ruling party has dominated Tanzanian politics since independence. The party is characterized by personal networks and also a strong central authority. Like in the case of ANC, no party in Tanzania has developed strong enough to challenge Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Eward, 2011 p. 222). Correspondingly, Tanzania according




to Freedom House is a partly free country with a score of 40/100 (Freedom House, 2019). Again, according to BTI the political participation in Tanzania is fragmented and highly dominated by Chama cha Mapinduzi, a revolutionary party that has governed the country since independence (BTI, 2018). Similarly in Botswana, though the country has held free and nonviolent elections, the uneven political environment has continued to give the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) considerable advantage over opposition political parties (BTI, 2018). Identically Zambia too despite having three different political parties governing the country since independence, political space for the opposition parties continues to decline scoring at 54/100 according to Freedom House (2019).

However, while many Sub-Saharan African countries are struggling to consolidate their democracies, a few have so far succeeded. In west Africa, although Nigeria following the continued influence of Army Generals and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigerian politics has not yielded much results in consolidating democracy, compared to Ghana, a fellow West African country with a score of 80/100 political freedom (Freedom House, 2019). Understanding these variations needs a closer comparison, building on the theoretical argument. The choice to compare Zambia and Ghana emanates from figure 1.0 below, coupled with the predictions made by Chabal and Daloz that Africa will reserve back to politics of disorder, big man and neopatrimonial after the 1990s wave of democratization (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In this figure, International Idea has observed that the political party's freedom to both mobilize and function effectively is slowly going down in Zambia compared to Ghana as presented in the graph. In fact, the decline from 2010 to 2018 is very visible and close to call that Zambia is sliding back to autocracy if not authoritarian regime compared to Ghana where in the same period, political party freedom is increasing.



Free Political Parties | 1975-2018



All scoring runs from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the highest achievement.  
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices, 2017, <<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/>>

Figure 1.0: Free Political Parties in Ghana and Zambia. Source: <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/#/indices/compare-countries-regions>

Again, as predicted by Chabal and Daloz figure 1.0 shows that both countries returned to constitutional multiparty democracy in 1990 and made a huge difference. However, the decline recorded from 1995 to the lowest level again in 2018 in Zambia is that the regimes have continued adopting autocratic habits which in turn has eroded democratic space (Lindberg, 2006 p. 83). Furthermore, Zambia has a history of undeveloped and fragmented political parties, and party system. On the other hand, looking at the relationship between increasing numbers of elections and higher stability and quality of democracy (Lindberg, 2009 p.15), Ghana has enjoyed a comparatively stable and peaceful political environment, following seven successive elections conducted between 1992 and 2016 with increased voter's turnout in huge numbers to vote (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2014, p. 125). Again, one would expect from this directly conflicting situation that Ghana with episodes of military governments in between independence and 1992, when it held competitive multiparty elections, to be more unstable (Freedom House, 2018). Along with the aforementioned reasons for selecting these two countries, both are former British colonies. They also present a challenge and at the same time offer a motivational explanation on which we can draw a conclusion as to why Sub-Saharan Africa in general is faced with weak opposition political parties. Therefore, the following



section will provide a slight overview of the selected cases in key areas: history, political institution and political opposition.

#### **4. 2 History of Selected Countries**

Ghana and Zambia are British former colonies. The method by which these two countries were colonized, the British system of indirect rule of using paramount chiefs created an oligarchical political system what Chabal and Daloz call, political clientelism that transitioned in the post-colonial and subsequently came to define a political system of most African nations after independence (Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. 38). At the birth of independence both Ghana and Zambia were multi-party states with two major political parties in each country. However, with no time, there was a reversal to one party system in two countries respectively. In Africa, Ghana was the first country to gain independence in 1957 from British rule (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994 p. 76). In 1960, long before the military took over the government in 1966, Ghana was declared one party state by the ruling party Convention People's Party (CPP) under the leadership of its first President Kwame Nkrumah. Comparatively, Zambia gained independence from British rule in 1964. The United National Independence Party (UNIP) headed by Kenneth Kunda took over power, and faced small opposition from Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). In 1972, the Kunda government announced that Zambia will become a one-party state. Correspondingly, in 1973 the constitution declared UNIP as the only political party allowed to operate in Zambia (NDI and FODEP, 2003 p. 6).

The move from multi-party system to one party state in both Ghana and Zambia resulted in closing down of opposition parties and also restricting civil liberties. Nkrumah in Ghana and Kunda in Zambia tried hard to concentrate power by establishing a patrimonial system and a one party state. For this reason, the oligarchy elites created a greed perspective situation and social marginalization in Ghana. As a result from 1996 to 1990 Ghana recorded several reversals to military rule (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994 p. 78-9). On the other hand, Kunda in Zambia from independence to 1990 successfully managed and maintained the patronage system for 27 years he stayed in power, through extensive patronage price that the government had to pay in exchange for votes through the system of clientelism. Due to the British system left behind, Kunda reached the people at local level through the chiefs, who became part of his governance system. Further, one party in Zambia became institutionalized, where Central Committee party members automatically became cabinet members and these were appointed on tribal lines (Musambachime, 1991 p. 292).





Ghana and Zambia' political path hence returned to constitutional rule in 1991. In both countries, there arose domestic pressure for democracy brought by civil society. For instance in Zambia, the return to constitutional rule and after the 1991 election witnessed the coming of a new liberal party then called Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). This was rather after defeating the former one party rule regime, which had ruled Zambia for 27 years since independence. Partly to this success was the strong tie that the MMD had with civil society groups especially the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (Rakner, 2011 p. 1113). Similarly, Paul and Johannes recorded in their study that Zambia witnessed a political transformation beginning in the 1990s at the supervision of the SIDA and IDEA on the umbrella of Swedish Foreign Policy. After the general elections in 1991, the roundtable discussions were held in Stockholm between the ruling party and members of the opposition to systematically approach both short and long term strategies in order to build sustainable democratic consolidation in Zambia (Paul and Johannes, 2018 p. 64).

Likewise, Ghana also faced both domestic agitation, as well as global pressure through the imposition of political conditions for aid from International financial institutions (IFI), World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donor agencies. There was a demand for political conditions such as transparency, accountability, and good governance to loans. Gyimah-Boadi (1994 p. 84) notes that the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government led by ex-military officer Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings bent down to the path of democratization. In 1991 Ghana was restored to constitutional rule and by November 1992 elections were held which signified Ghana's democratic transition with the support of the World Bank, IMF and Western governments (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994).

### **4. 3 Political Institutions**

After independence, Ghana and Zambia were left by colonial masters to establish their own effective governance. As we have established in the previous discussion, both countries initially maintained their pre-colonial independence regimes even after decolonization. Political Institutions can facilitate or impede citizen participation in the political and development process in a given country. Zambia whose official name is the Republic of Zambia is a unitary state. The Constitution stipulates that Zambia is the Republic Christian Nation and that it remains a unitary, multi-party and democratic sovereign State. Further the constitution states, Zambia being a sovereign Republic shall be governed under a constitutional form of governance (Constitution of Zambia, 2016 p. 9-11). In Zambia, there are two major



political institutions that offer citizens a platform to political participation, and these are voter registration and political party membership. The argument is that voting may increase the likelihood of the people to discuss politics. Voter registration engages citizens in the democratic process and citizens with party membership are more likely to vote in elections (Yezi, 2013 p. 14). However, Zambia has an Electoral body, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) which in most cases fails to administer a fair and transparent election.

Democratic institutions in Zambia relatively perform their functions and are successfully established with notable weakness, as a result a regime fails to develop institutions for meaningful governance. Rakner and Skaålness observed that the current presidential system of governance in Zambia to the larger extent gives more power to the president who in turn dominates other branches like legislature and judiciary. The legislature failed to perform its oversight function because the executive managed to manipulate it through the poaching of opposition MPs. The judiciary too has not been spared by executive manipulation such that it fails to perform horizontal accountability (Rakner and Skaålness, 1996 p. 11-12).

On the other hand, Ghana's political institutions rests between traditional and modern institutions. The Chieftaincy is one good example of a traditional political institution that serves as a guide to political behavior in Ghana. Under chieftaincy political institution, the clientelistic nature of politics is clearly visible (Giles et al, 2018 p. 276). Ghana's return to multi-party democracy since 1992 has been relatively associated with limited competitive clientelism. There are also modern one that include the constitution, parliament, judiciary, elections, political parties, executive and voting. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees a hybrid or semi-presidential system of government. These political institutions are important in African states but rather still suffer a legitimacy deficit due to their colonial legacy and also the post independent neopatrimonial politics (Van Gyampo, 2016 p. 8). The argument is that emerging democracies like Ghana and Zambia can only consolidate when they are supported by functional and effective political institutions. In this regard, it is important that Sub-Saharan African countries work extra hard to make sure that political institutions are institutionalized. Like Zambia, Ghana is a unitary republic and a multiparty political system with 50 percent plus one vote electoral system. Comparatively, Ghana's Electoral Commission has improved and it has also earned public trust with increased voter turnout in each election (Arthur, 2010). Key democratic institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), parliament and judiciary have continued to improve and promote fundamental



human rights. For instance CHRAJ is charged with the responsibility of investigating and exposing corrupt scandals in the country.

#### **4. 4 Political Opposition**

On what it may appear to be an early call to the analysis but rather suffice to state that, political opposition is by far significantly weaker in Zambia in comparison to Ghana. In actual numbers, Zambia has over 33 registered political parties, but only five can be said to have seriously competed for power since the return to multi-partism in 1991 (Ranker, 2011 p. 1113). Comparatively, leaders of the trade unions were instrumental in resisting one party rule and advocating a return to democratic rule in Zambia, while in Ghana opposition parties played this role. Political parties in Zambia are governed by the Societies Act (Cap 119 of the Laws of Zambia), which governs all societies including political parties. These five major parties are: United National Independence Party (UNIP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), Patriotic Front (PF), United Party for National Development (UPND), and Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), with the current regime being the Patriotic Front (Rankner, 2011 p. 1113). However, according to the Chatham House political opposition in Zambia faces severe restriction using the Public Order Act which opposition parties complain that it has been misused by the ruling party since the UNIP days. Government is using the Public Order Act to clamp down on the opposition (Chatham House, 2017). Similarly, Freedom House in its Freedom in the world 2019 records that PF regime continue to use the Public Order Act they themselves complained about when they were in opposition to restrict opposition rallies. The opposition, including, the press face harassment and obstacles in accessing the media coverage (Freedom House, 2019). As a result, Political opposition in Zambia tends to be weaker.

Ghanaian political opposition has tended to enjoy more reserved, respectful and peaceful working relationships with the incumbent. The contribution of the opposition parties to Ghana's democratic consolidation process cannot be over emphasized. Although the parties were banned during the military rule under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), leaders of the opposition played a pivotal role in advocating a return to democratic rule (Fobih, 2010 p. 26). According to Electoral Commission Ghana (ECG), there are 24 registered political parties in Ghana but only four are active namely: National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Convention People's Party (CPP), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the People's National Convention (PNC), whereas the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is the party in Power currently



(ECG, 2019). Similarly to Zambia, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana allows for the formation of political parties. Article 7 (55 & 56), alongside Political Parties Law (PNDC Law 281) provides a framework for operation and regulation of political parties in Ghana. These two provisions of laws not only govern and guarantee the right to form political parties but rather place the state's responsibility to provide fairness to all political parties including the provision of security to opposition leaders during campaigns (Fobih, 2010 p. 27). Although it's hard to tell at this stage but, this prevailing situation in Ghana may explain why opposition parties there are relatively strong compared to Zambia.

#### **4.5 An Overview of Politics of Strong Men in Africa**

Even though the politics of strong men is one of the independent variables to be considered in this study, we still feel compelled to give its overview in a general manner and interesting way before applying it to our two cases. In line with our third research question, one of the arguments advanced by Uddhammar et al (2011) in the special issue is that, in African societies where political systems are designed to serve the elite interests, presidents assume absolute power. The president nearly controls everything to the extent that internal democracy is absent. All party positions including the government appointments are done on the basis of loyalty and patronage, a neo-patrimonial political system (Uddhammar et al, 2011 p. 1059). Many scholars within the field of political science view neo-patrimonial authority in Weber's typology of authority specifically, the concept of traditional authority in regard to the nation-state. Neo-Patrimonial are regimes in a given state where political authority rests on the individual leader or 'strong man' who rules by allocating offices through patronage in order to maintain loyalty from his subordinate (Joel, 2000 p. 230). As it is mostly argued that loyalty and social control are basic requirements for any state to survive. However, for the past few years neo patrimonial regimes of strong men in Africa have faced a tough rebellion driven by social protest, electoral defeat, and old fashioned coup, marked by struggle over patronage. Recently kicked out of office Gambia's Yahya Jammeh, Sudan's Omar al Bashir, DR Congo's Joseph Kabila, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe after 37 years of being in power (Chatham House, 2020). Nevertheless, Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa still has the longest ruling head of states. Notable among the current longest serving leaders is Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang Nguema 39 years, Cameroon's Paul Biya 36 year, and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni 32 years presiding over state affairs since they took over office (Chatham House, 2020). This long period of hold on to power needs explanation with the recent overthrow of



governments, these three countries appear as if they are an island where political peace and stability prevails. A quick glance at the politics of these three countries; Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Uganda reveals that these are patrimonial states that are run through a political patrimonial system of clientelism relationship. Chabal and Daloz equally argue that African politics has one common thing, that of a shared system of patrimonialism (Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. xix). While we have other African states with longest leaders like Republic of Congo's Denis Sassou Nguesso, Nigeria's rotation of power between two blocks North (Hausa) and South West (Yoruba) with the influence of Olusegun Obasanjo and Army Generals in Nigerian politics, and South Africa's ruling party the African National Congress (ANC) since the end of apartheid, the three cases are an extreme one (Okenve, 2009 p. 144).

The levels at which these three leaders Obiang, Biya and Museveni exploit national resources help them to develop a pure patrimonial system. For instance, expectations from oil revenues were that, it will bring economic and political changes in Equatorial Guinea, but rather it has served the interest of Obiang and his family to enhance clientelist political networks alongside tightened his control over the nation. This system only becomes unbearable when some top members of the political regime are no longer benefiting the rewards of the extortion patrimonial system they helped to put up (Okenve, 2009 p. 149). But to minimize these internal threats, strong men try hard to secure loyalty as well, however, lack of state resources may have clear limitations in securing loyalty. By and large, patrimonialism still remains a main instrument for the securing of loyalty. For Obiang, his patrimonial system relies on his family members to function. Unlike other modern states, the type of loyalty these leaders impose is personal, there is confusion in the patrimonial system between the state and the leader, and people instead show loyalty to the leader as opposed to the state (Okrnve, 2009 p. 150). In her study Campos-Serrano (2013) equally observed that, Obiang managed to expand his loyalty through the Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial (PDGE) as an instrument for rewarding political loyalty and also as a tool for mobilization such that most citizens are formal members of the PDGE, that guarantees loyalty to Obiang. In this regard if one has to be engaged either in private or public work, the person has to be a member of PDGE. This kind of patrimonialism has but rather made Obiang to expand his loyalty from his local home area to a national level, its either party cards or you get fired (Compos-Serrano, 2013 p. 318).

Uganda's Museveni politics of patronage is similar to that of Obiang. In many campaign platforms, the media has quoted Museveni having warned his government not to give



government business deals to members of opposition (The Independent, 2016). The public enterprises under Museveni are run by politics that sacrifices meritocracy including efficiency at the expense of rewarding supporters or better still renting political support. Uganda under the leadership of Museveni has continued to trade off politics of meritocracy including democracy for political patronage. There is appropriation of state resources aimed at buying political support, and public service recruitment is based on party support, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and loyalty to Museveni, with his political doctrine of “ vote opposition and commit political suicide” (The Independent, 2016). As Cantrell articulated in his study Africa today, post-independence regimes in Africa failed to uproot the patrimonial political institution left behind by the colonial masters as a guarantee for democratic legitimacy. This has been a challenge not only in Uganda but the whole Sub-Saharan African continent to get rid of neopatrimonial political system in order to achieve democratic legitimacy. While Museveni attempted to achieve democratic legitimacy in his early days in office, a few years later he transformed Uganda into a neopatrimonial state (Cantrell, 2016 p. 112). Contributing to Uganda’s neopatrimonial political system, Joel (2000) masterically puts it, it has been marked with neo-patrimonial political forms of authority and governance. What Joel observed is that Uganda is trapped into poverty and ethnicity forms of politics which has now produced what is referred to as the politics of belly giving consolidation to neo-patrimonial rule. Museveni’ initial desire for a multiparty system during his first days in office came to mean something else but rather a series of patron- client networks representing ethno- regional constituencies (Joel, 2000 p. 232).

Freedom House in its Cameroon Country Report 2019 noted that, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya, has ruled and maintained power since 1982 through using state resources for political patronage, where policies are designed not to benefit the national as a whole but a group of people connected to his rule. Notable among his appointments is the speaker of the national assembly and the head of state run oil and gas company are all but confidants of Paul Biya. His party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) has successfully rigged the elections and limited the activities of the opposition parties (Freedom House, 2019). In his study which exposed a clear patrimonial exchange, Rogers quoted one of the traditional rulers telling his subject of Oku village in Cameroon that “we cannot achieve our development unless we support the incumbent government” (Rogers, 2014 p. 226). Paul Biya, like many of African leaders, promises developmental projects such as infrastructure to local people in exchange for votes and political related support. Rogers argues that the intimacy of patrimonial relationship



in the context of Cameroon is manifest through the politics of hosting head of state. During such ceremonies, we can observe as well as analyze the over dramatized expression of patrimonial intimacy between Biya and local elites, who practice patronage politics with Biya including the ruling party as they seek development in their region (Rogers, 2014 p. 228). Undoubtedly, Paul Biya serves as undisputed political leader and strong man, on which all and every other actor depends for favor and business opportunities.

As Chabal and Daloz observed, recruitment to any state salaried job even to fill up a junior position in Sub-Saharan Africa depends on the political leader (Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. 6). Similarly in Cameroon, while other social actors such as the church can offer social advancement for the individual, the predominant opportunities for social mobility is only guaranteed by the state through the ruling party (CPDM) as a channel to access such state-centered opportunities. It is such patrimonial relations that has come to define social lives in Cameroon, where Paul Biya directs development through a generalized notion of clientelism and dependency (Rogers, 2013 p. 271). Biya's democratization process hinges on a politics of belonging and this has pushed the political elites to be actively involved in obtaining political support in their communities for the ruling party of President Paul Biya. As Khalil Timamy (2005) put it, Sub-Saharan African leaders since independence have used public institutions and other state agencies to their advantage of holding on to political power, through the practice of patronage and paternalism. Worse still, politics of strong men in Sub-Saharan Africa is now largely associated with totalitarian tendencies driven by rather logic of self-preservation. Cameroon's Biya politics of transparency and accountability is replaced with a culture of patronage and clientelism (Khalil Timamy, 2005 p. 384). This is why we will return to this phenomena variable in the analysis section that compares the role of strong man in Zambia and Ghana's politics respectively.

## **Chapter Five**

### **5 Methodological Consideration**

#### **5.1 Methodology**

The methodology used in this thesis is qualitative research method. Qualitative research approach puts more emphasis on words rather than figures or statistics in both collections as well as analyzing data (Bryman, 2016 p. 374). However, this does not entirely mean there is a



complete absence of numbers or figures in the study. The weaknesses of this approach however is that, it is impressionistic and subjective where it depends much on researcher personal judgement, which are to some extent unsystematic. Critics argue that qualitative research findings are somehow difficult to be generalized and it also lacks transparency on how a researcher arrives at a particular conclusion (Bryman, 2016 p. 399).

## **5. 2 Comparative Case Study**

A structured focused comparison design as described by George and Bennet will be used in this study to analyze our cases. By examining different “classes” or “observations”, the two cases Ghana and Zambia will be analyzed within the specified “focused” comparative case studies (Bennet and George, 2004 p. 69), using a set of theories or analytical framework for the detailed analysis. By “structured” George and Bennett explains that, variables should be identified that structure the comparison (Bennett and George, 2004 p. 70). In this study, democratic consolidation is a dependent variable, while political opposition then becomes the independent variable where in both variables Ghana and Zambia show the most difference. Similarly, King et al explains that pre-selected “observations” or observed effects based on dependent variable which is in this study, democratic consolidation must be clearly stated in order to draw a conclusion (King et al, 1994 p. 122). For this reason, our observations for this study include five independent explanatory variables and one dependent variable. The independent explanatory variables: politics of strong men, role of political opposition, intra-party democracy and organizational structure, electoral commission, and free and fair elections will be examined to see what kind of conclusions can be drawn from this study. In fact without underestimating the effect of selection bias, the selected “observations” or “classes” according to King et al becomes crucial for the outcome of the study (King et al, 1994 p. 135).

## **5. 3 Data Collection- Methods**

A research method according to Bryman (2016 p. 10), is but rather a technique for collecting data. This can be done through specific instruments such as questionnaire, structured interview, participant observation involving listening to others, content analysis using documents as a source of data. Documentary sources produced by individuals, organizations, media outlets and the internet are used in qualitative research (Bryman, 2016 p. 546). In this study where we employ qualitative research strategy, data will not mean numbers but rather empirical





information in words that can help to answer the research questions. These secondary data sources would be collected from Linnæus university library, internet, the homepages of the different institutions that are mentioned in this study such as the NDI, IDEA, Afrobarometer, Freedom House, Chatham House and V-Dem, News Diggers including my personal language and personal collection. Therefore, the content analysis will be fully applied in examining these documents to be able to answer the research questions.

#### **5. 4 Delimitation and limitation**

This research study is delimited to the research questions, personal interpretation and meaning of my own language, theoretical and analytical framework including variables under study. The study is furthermore delimited to Ghana and Zambia due to historical reasons and covers the period following the return to multi-party democracy (1991-2020). If the study is conducted for the second time to ascertain the degree of certainty, the qualitative method used may limit the possibility of replicating the same results. Furthermore, the findings from qualitative analyses cannot be tested to prove statistically significance of the results.

### **Chapter Six**

#### **6 Presentation of Findings**

A summary of findings for this study will be presented through the lens of our three theories. We shall use the theories and see how they correlate with the empirical findings. After we have looked at the empirical evidence as to what causes political opposition weakness in Sub-Saharan Africa, we will see if those weaknesses are caused by what these theories are saying.

##### **6.1 Zambia**

###### **6. 1. 1 Political Environment from the perspective of the dictatorship theory**

Although Zambia from 1991 to 2011 had two major transfers of power, the political situation particularly for the opposition parties continues to deteriorate. The results from Freedom house shows that Zambia is a partly free country with the score of 54/100. In all the three category ratings such as freedom, political rights and civil liberties, Zambia has an overall score of 4/7 on the scale of 1=free and 7=not free (Freedom House, 2019). Both Freedom house and the EU elections observer reports (2019) highlighted that the incumbent use Public Order Act to restrict



opposition rallies and clampdown the media and use state resources to the benefit of the ruling party. The opposition faces major difficulties in accessing public media coverage, whereas private television is attacked when they feature opposition politicians in their studio. This has affected their ability to organize and also to function properly (Freedom House, EU Report, 2019). Coupled with other restrictions, Zambia’s overall political participation is rated at 6/10 by Transformation Atlas Index- BTI (2018). This overall score includes the capacity to hold free and fair elections, democratic governance, rights to assembly and association as well as freedom of expression. In 2016 a few days before the election day, the powerful independent newspaper- The Post was closed down and radio stations covering the opposition like Private TV and Komboni radio came under pressure. Whereas, the state controlled media is heavily politicized. The government through the use of the Public Order Act has managed to frustrate and limit opposition political party mobilization in favor of the ruling party (BTI, 2018). The graph below in figure 2.0 gives us a clear picture of our findings:



Figure 2.0: Political participation in Zambia. Source: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/>

The Public Order Act requires opposition parties to get a police permit in order to hold public meetings and rallies. Instead, the civil society groups and labor unions meetings are dispersed and called off by security forces even in instances where the permit to hold such meetings were granted. For example human rights activist Chama Fumba popularly known as Pilato was arrested from a Church building in the tourist capital of Zambia Livingstone. The arrest was in



connection with the youths discussion meetings on governance issues (Digger, 2019). The arrests and intimidation of human rights activists and The Post Newspaper owner Fred M'membe is a clear attempt to silence critical voices. Additionally in 2017, the leader of the major opposition party UPND Hakainde Hichilema was arrested and charged with treason which carries death penalty (BTI, 2018).

### 6.1.2 Ideology Based Politics from perspective of opposition Party behavior theory

Zambia's political opposition has no clear ideological cohesion. Instead, they operate within two highly polarized political culture known by its citizens as "*Muselala Kwakaba*" meaning politics of the stomach and *Wako-ni Wako* simply, support your own tribes men. Undoubtedly, this culture together with Zambia's unstable party system as evidenced in figure 3.0 contribute to the loss of membership including declining in political and social integration. The overall political and social integration in Zambia stands at 5.3/10 due to regional and tribal lines under which opposition parties function, without clear policies (BTI, 2018). The unstable party system is heavily contested between those who organize urban votes and rural votes. For instance, the main opposition party UPND organizes itself along regional boundaries of its tribe's men in the southern, north-western and western provinces, with the promise of business friendly policies. However, the party in power the PF continues to consolidate itself through its populist policies, control over patronage as well as traditional leaders (BTI, 2018).




Figure 3.0: Political and Social Integration in Zambia. Source: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/>



Opposition parties' structure and organization are very weak outside of the leader's home areas and tribal groupings. These extremely weak structures plus lack of ideology cohesion and discipline makes it easy for the members of the opposition to cross over floors to the ruling party. By constitution, a Zambian president is allowed to appoint an opposition Member of Parliament (MP) to his cabinet and this has so far worked to the disadvantage including creating a disunity within the opposition parties (Constitution of Zambia, 2016). The constitution also allows the incumbent to enjoy considered advantages over the opposition as states resources are used for partisan ends. Again, opposition parties in Zambia avoid holding conventions to elect party leaders. The example of the major opposition the UPND can offer a good illustration. Since 2006 when the current leader Hakainde Hichilema took over office with some officials elected in 1998, the party has not held a party convention to elect leaders in party positions (Diggers, 2019).

### **6.1.3 Autocratizing or Democratizing from perspective of democratization theory**

The current democratization status in Zambia shows that it is moving from defective to highly defective. The results obtained in figure 4.0 from varieties of democracy- V-Dem between 2008 and 2018 puts Zambia on bottom 30-40% a trajectory towards autocratizing (V-Dem, 2018). In fact, this situation is greatly affected by poor performance of democratic institutions including opposition parties, external debt, and poverty including worsening economic crisis.




Figure 4.0: Liberal democracy in Zambia. Source: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

Both the judiciary and the legislature in Zambia are compromised and have also failed to perform horizontal accountability. The bureaucracy too has extremely performed weakly of late. Even though there is consensus not to return to a one party system, multiparty politics faces a serious challenge (BTI, 2018). Similarly, the current debt and debt servicing which stands at US\$ 10.05 billion against the estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$ 25 billion in the year 2019 is affecting democratic consolidation with the overall growth estimated at 2% in 2020. Zambia is today, heavily paying on its loans never before (AfDB, 2019).

In Zambia today, a number of civil society actors are being excluded from the national and transition negotiations dialogue. This exclusion of civil society, trade union movement which played a key role in mobilizing opposition to end the UNIP regime in 1991 (Barlett, 2000 p. 430) and other civil actors like the churches have further weakened these important groups



and made a platform for autocratic resurgence under the PF government. In their pastoral statement in 2017, Catholic Bishops said Zambia is now a dictatorship “Our country is now but all except in designation a dictatorship and if it is not yet, then we are not very far from it” (Diggers, 2017).

## 6.2 Ghana

### 6.2.1 Political Environment from the perspective of the dictatorship theory

Contrary to Zambia, the results obtained from Freedom house indicate that Ghana is a free




Figure 5.0: Political participation in Ghana. Source: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/hom>

country scoring 83/100 on overall rating (Freedom House, 2019). Although there persists discrimination against people like gay, bisexual and transgender, political environment has greatly improved since 1992. In Ghana, the right to organize and form political parties is highly respected as stipulated in the constitution. Generally, there is tolerance of political pluralism in Ghana and “opposition political parties enjoy opportunities to increase their public support” (Freedom House, 2019). Figure 5.0 above on the result retrieved from Transformation Atlas



Index -BTI data shows political participation of 8.5/10, the result which is consistent with Freedom House. The result of 8.5 political participation confirms that both universal suffrage and right to campaign are guaranteed with no serious violation of free and fair elections principles (BTI, 2018). Ghanaians are able to express their opinion freely with no repression of the media.

## 6. 2. 2 Ideology Based Politics from perspective of opposition Party behavior theory

Figure 6.0 confirms that Ghana has ideology based political opposition, a very unique result in Sub-Saharan African context. For this reason, the overall political and social integration stands at 7.8/10. The ruling NPP party is based on liberal conservative tradition, while the main opposition the NDC is a radical left wing party. Both big parties claim ethno-regional strongholds. Again both parties including small ones have gained support outside their home areas (BTI, 2018). Another unique finding from the Afrobarometer survey is that clientelistic appeal is insufficient to make the ruling party win elections in Ghana (Afrobarometer, 2019).






Figure 6.0: Political and Social Integration in Ghana. Source: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/>

The stable party system has significantly contributed to this positive rating on political and social integration. Ghana boasts of a stable two party system with active third parties. The approval of democracy from its citizens appears high as we can see from figure 6.0 (BTI, 2018).

### 6. 2. 3 Autocratizing or Democratizing from perspective of democratization theory

Ghana's commitment to democracy shows that it is democratizing as opposed to autocratizing as seen from Figure 7.0, the data obtained from V-dem below which puts Ghana in the top 30-40% category (V-dem, 2018). Democratic institutions in Ghana are fully functional as well as stable including the Electoral Commission.








Figure 7.0: Liberal democracy in Ghana. Source: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

The regular survey carried out by Afrobarometer in 2017 also shows the independence of the Election Commission. In this survey one of the respondents said, the independence of the commission can be seen from the number of presidential candidates it disqualified in 2016 elections on different accounts. This list included the wife of the Former President of Ghana Jerry Rawlings (Afrobarometer, 2017). Economic growth has also credited the democratic dispensation in Ghana. According to Moody rating, Ghana's economic outlook as of December 2019 changed from stable to positive growth at 6.0 % (MOF, 2020). Similarly, civil society, Churches and other interest groups like NGOs are functional and visible in both urban and rural areas of Ghana. Partly to this positive development according to BTI is the continued donor support or assistance for civil society (BTI, 2018).

## **Chapter Seven**

### **7 Comparative Perspective Analysis on Zambia and Ghana**

#### **7.1 Politics of Strong Men**

In order to comparatively understand the politics of strong man and how this has weakened opposition parties in Zambia, perhaps we must understand what Chabal and Daloz (2012 p. xviii-18) describe as the “political instrumentalization of disorder” that leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa employ in an effort to maximize their hold on to power. From the findings, what we see in Zambia is informalization of politics, where disorder through the use of party cadres to disrupt opposition parties and CSOs activities become an institutionalized and valid instrument for maintaining power by the PF regime (Diggers, 2020, Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. Xviii- 18). For instance, President Lungu has successfully used informal channels such as religion by a group calling itself Christians for Lungu and campaign platforms where electorates, not the other way around make promises to the ruling party (PF) and their leader in exchange for a top political positions. Thus, he has undoubtedly managed to combine religion and politics where members of the clergy are now co-opted into a patronage system (Ellis and Haar, 2004 p. 67). Furthermore, traditional or local chiefs too are incorporated in campaigns and influencing voters openly for PF. And those who do not comply with the chief's orders are but rather threatened with witchcraft (Ellis and Haar, 2004 p. 41) Again in trying to consolidate power, Lungu's cabinet and public service including parastatal institutions are stacked with individuals



who are but rather their allies, a country of multi-ethnic groups of 72 tribes and more than Seventeen million people (ZSA, 2020). In addition, one would argue that the Zambian state itself coupled with its underperforming economy is by far very weak yet Lungu has remained strong. In fact, Lungu has not only stacked the military with loyalists but he has also interfered in military and police recruitment (Diggers, 2018). As Frantz once put it, authoritarian regimes' strategy to hold on to power may include "creating parallel security forces aimed at counterbalancing the regular army, by establishing a presidential guard to exclusively protect the leader (Frantz, 2018a, p. 48). Similarly, it is in this notion that Chabal and Daloz criticizes Sub-Saharan African institutions as been weak and creates the conditions necessary for "chaos" in which strong men can "maximize" their hold to power or returns- in what is referred as to "a political instrumentalization of disorder" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999 p. xviii-18).

The kind of chaos and disorder created by the PF regime includes a repressive apparatus whereby any disloyalty is met by repression. Repressive apparatus are carried out by the clientelist networks in a bid to show loyalty to Lungu or for fear of being punished and losing access to government contracts and jobs. For this reason, scholars like Okenve have argued that, while we can associate repression to colonial states, there is more evidence that these strong men in Africa are more repressive than their former colonial masters (Okenve, 2009 p. 153). In Zambia, opposition parties' activities are largely restricted and are prevented from meeting people even during campaign and worse off outside the electoral period through the abuse of Public Order Act with arbitrary arrest of political opponents (Freedom House, 2019, Chatham House, 2017). This therefore confirms that political environment in Zambia is not favorable for the opposition parties, hence undermining the pace at which democratic consolidation can take root. Furthermore, political mobilization in Zambia is the preserve of the ruling party (PF) and its leader Lungu. In this regard, any other type of political mobilization is not allowed and it is met by state censorship. Indeed, the ruling party in Zambia the Patriotic Front (PF) has institutionalized "a political disorder "for political survival. Critics of the PF have argued that repression and other un-democratic means are among the instruments PF uses to hold on to power (Diggers, 2020). This repression raises questions as to whether the PF regime is democratic. In what appears to be a commonly shared strategy among some African dictators is constitution amendments (Okenve, 2009 p. 153). Currently, the PF regime is pushing constitutional amendment bill number 10 of 2019 against public opinion. Zambians feel that if this bill is passed, Zambia becomes a constitutional dictatorship with the President already having excessive powers. The constitutional changes are crafted to make the ruling



party stay in power forever, begin to print money without central bank control, as well as allow for a bloated cabinet (Diggers, 2020). Following this, undoubtedly, an act of violence, abuse of religious faith, repression, and constitution amendment has been the hallmark of the “PF” rule since takeover power in Zambia.

Comparatively, Ghana’s experience from 1992 to 2020 has to a larger extent diverged from what is known as the African norm of big man rule. For example, clientelistic appeal is but rather insufficient for the incumbent to use as a means of holding on to power (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011 p.). Additionally, since the return to civilian rule which saw the end of military dictatorship as Ghana joined the wave of democratization the third wave in 1992, the culture of patronage and clientelism under the military and one party rule was replaced with politics of accountability and transparency (Daddier and Bob-Milliar, 2014 p. 107). Identically, party programs and activities are regulated by “Political Parties Code of Conduct” which has greatly contributed to the stability, legitimacy as well as accountability of the political opposition and enhanced Ghana’s liberal democracy. Furthermore, Ghana has worked around the clock to devise mechanisms aimed at defusing tensions among stakeholders and improve electoral management. Again, there exists a consensus amongst the political elites in Ghana on how to achieve formal consolidated democracy through expansion of political freedoms including the symbolism of public shows that exposes unity among politicians from different political parties (Daddier and Bob-Milliar, 2014 p. 121). Similarly, there is no attempt by the governing to use new oil and gas related resources to cement their hold on to power. Undoubtedly, the proceeds from the newly discovered oil resources and gas would help the party in power to expand their distribution of patronage and consolidate its hold on power. However, as Nana Akufo-Addo Ghana’s President said, “Ghanaians value their power to throw the incumbent” and anyone who misuses national resources risks being voted out (Mohan et al, 2018 p. 280-286). A long side with Political Code of Conduct, Article 7 (55 & 56), and also Political Parties Law provide a framework that guarantees operations of opposition parties including state’s responsibility to ensure that these parties are given security during campaigns, fair and equal opportunity to present their programs and manifestos to the public (Fobih, 2010 p. 27). Again, there is an improvement of parliamentary oversight in Ghana. This is why there is even distribution of public resources or projects across the country. Through parliamentary oversight, the incumbent cannot directly fund developmental projects that directly benefit his supporters or punish his political opponents. Parliamentary oversight has also prevented the incumbent from using state resources and machinery to influence the outcome of election results. Furthermore,



the parliament in Ghana is now regarded as the most respected as well as highly trusted institution in the country (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012 p.341). In this regard of aforementioned reasons, overall failure of the opposition parties in Ghana cannot be as a result of the power of the strong man rule. Correspondingly, ratings from Freedom House on both political and civil liberties have greatly risen from not being free in 1991 to a current situation of 80% free (Freedom House, 2019). Similarly, as demonstrated in our findings, surveys carried out by Afrobarometer suggests that Ghanaians prefer democracy over military, or one party or dictatorship rule.

## **Conclusion**

Politics of strong men highlights why Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with weak opposition which has resulted in democratic consolidation inconsistencies within each country. In Zambia, the cause and effect relationship is substantiated as Zambia proved to be more prone to political instability due to the excessive power of the president as opposed to Ghana

## **7.2 Role of Opposition Parties**

The role of opposition political parties in democratization cannot be overstated. The main roles that political parties play can be summed up as follows: Political mobilization which includes representation, leadership recruitment, and making the party in power accountable. The aforementioned roles, to be deliberated on, are however not the only roles political parties play but rather are reasonably specific for this study. In Zambia for instance, these roles have been heavily affected by lack of institutionalization of parties partly because of some external influence (Rakner, 2011 p. 1107). According to Down (1957 p. 25) defines a party as a coalition of men and women that seeks to influence the affairs of the state. These individuals must cooperate with each other in order to achieve their set goals. Similarly, Sartori (1976) defines a political party as a political grouping that is capable of presenting a candidate for election for public office (Sartori 1976 in Hazan and Rahat, 2010 p. 6). Going by these definitions, Zambian political opposition generally in terms of, party mobilization and political recruitment have performed poorly. For example, selection of candidates for election is largely unregulated and there is no legal system that spells out specific criteria on how a candidate is selected. Therefore, parties in Zambia are allowed to regulate themselves on the process of selecting candidates (Momba, 2005 p. 17). This is why leaders of the major opposition like Hakainde



Hichilema since 2006 when he took over top party office, he has not held party convention to recruit new leaders in party positions to-date. Another example from Zambia is that of Patriotic Front (PF) before coming to power in 2011, it never held a national convention to challenge its leader then Michael Sata (Rakner, 2011 p. 1115).

Again, political recruitment in Zambia suffers from being or lack of transparency. Mobilizations are ethnic for instance, UPND in Zambia is said to be a 'Tonga party' and they affiliate along ethnic lines due to poor selection of party leaders which defines political functions of a party (Hazan and Rahat, 2010 p. 6). This lack of transparency is created by gatekeepers like local branches in screening aspirants which are devoid of transparency. While these local party branches pose a danger to candidate selection, worse off in Zambia is that such recruitment and mobilization centers around a powerful leader not around an ideology, which leads to party splits including undermining policy making (Wang and Muriaas, 2019 p. 403). There is also a less emphasis on increasing women representation and selection procedures are not beneficial to women candidates. In a study done by Morlino he observed, the recruitment process may expose the party whether it is mass based party or clientelistic party, the later which is often characterized by small membership based on patronage relations (Morlino, 2019 p. 214). Correspondingly, the situation in Zambia is more or less the same as clientelistic when it comes to selection of women in party leadership. Gender balance through recruitment has rather remained very low in Zambia. For example if you look at the 2016 election, one of ten candidates were women nominated for primary election (Wang and Muriaas, 2019 p. 405). This therefore indicates that representation of women among political opposition is more or less promoted which in return affects women representation in parliament. For this reason as well as the argued imbalance, the role played by opposition parties has largely affected the enhancement of inclusive participation and also improved accountability. Like in other aspects, opposition parties in Zambia have failed to make the ruling party accountable due to weak coalitions among the opposition political parties. As a result, the ruling party easily forms alliances with individual opposition members of parliament (MP) to pass bills. Thus, weakening the mechanisms indeed for strong opposition to mount solid accountability to the executive (Wang and Muriaas, 2019 p. 405). We can compare this point to the study done by Morlino as he stressed that, through offering policy choice alternatives to the people, opposition parties are able to make governments accountable. These parties in the long run transform societal needs into actual policy proposals, which includes problem solving and in turn they influence the entire policy making process and increase the



base under which voters choose among those policies and preferences (Morlino, 2019 p. 216). Political opposition offers horizontal accountability by way of challenging the party in government.

In comparison, although Ghanaian opposition parties were banned under the regime, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), these parties were instrumental in advocating for the return to democratic rule. Furthermore, they have continued to greatly contribute to democratic consolidation through political recruitment including parliamentary oversight (Fobih, 2010 p. 26). Ghana takes membership to the party with great importance since it is through the party that low ranking officers can rise to the national political office. The role of political participation serving as a medium for political recruitment has been indispensable, played by Ghanaian opposition parties in both promoting and sustaining democracy. While strong personalities were recruited from the background of traditional, education as well professional during Nkrumah that has changed now. In fact, there is now a general feeling of political socialization through civic education that helps Ghanaian citizens form opinions (Morrison, 2004 p. 431). Opposition parties facilitate socialization, participation and help citizens to take part in voting. Cross cutting issues are raised during this process which is mainly carried out in party manifestos and party-led campaigns. Thus, socialization in Ghana has worked on a large scale for mass mobilization presenting a unique form of political recruitment as compared to other African countries. It has provided the most enduring frames for inclusive participation in Ghanaian political processes (Morrison, 2004 p. 432). Correspondingly, candidate recruitment, as well as mobilization of masses are fundamental successes of opposition parties in Ghana.

Again, as agents of democracy, opposition parties in Ghana have been instrumental in fulfilling functions such as interest aggregation and articulation as well as policy formulation. Among the major political parties, we can see alternation of policies between those aligned to social democratic policies and market reforms (Osi, 2013 p. 551). The opposition have identified themselves with group interests such as the civil society group or certain groups to deliver votes from their members especially for urban voters. Similarly, popular candidates for parliamentary seats are selected in order to attract more votes from their community. Most importantly, Ghana' party mobilization has a strategy of rural context, since the media bias in urban areas tends to favour the incumbent and also the internet is directed or restricted to the educated class found in urban cities (Osi, 2013 p. 554). In this regard, opposition parties in Ghana engage in



personal canvassing of rural support through house-to-house campaign which has so far proved to be a key instrument for rural vote mobilization where news media access is limited. For this reason parties in Ghana are able to fulfil their roles. They select candidates, mobilize voters, represent interests for certain groups such that the overall performance of these parties is not that bad.

The opposition in parliament ultimately have held the government accountable by reviewing presidential appointments, including questioning and compelling ministers to issue ministerial statements on certain issues bordering on violation of human rights. They have also facilitated the prosecution of those found wanting. They have been instrumental in uncovering for example fraud and corruption involving government officials. The prevention of corruption has improved governance and also increased the legitimacy of the government (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012 p. 340).

## **Conclusion**

The role of opposition parties in recruiting people to participate in the political process and also for speed transition and consolidation of democracy, play a critical role. In Zambia, this role is faced with discontent and frustration due to lack of institutionalization of political parties with unregulated candidate selection procedure. While Ghana's positive score in this area is a combination of several factors ranging from general feeling of political socialization, interest aggregation and articulation to policy formulation.

### **7. 3 Intra-party Democracy and Organizational Structure**

The analysis of intra-party democracy and organizational structure here accordingly will be restricted to two major parties in each country. For instance although opposition parties in Zambia do not have party offices and party structures nationwide, they have however some form of organization. In her study Rakner however, observed that, few opposition parties in Zambia have had national conventions to elect party leaders. In most cases, party leaders in Zambia avoid national conventions due to financial constraints and also for fear of party split from those who feel aggrieved or see intra-party elections as rigged or stolen (Rakner, 2011 p. 1115). The example of the major opposition UPND is the telling story. From 2006 when its current leader was elected, it has not gone to the convention to elect new leaders. Therefore, in Zambia, parties are run mostly by their party leader or National Executive Committees (NECs) which is a creation of the party leader and does its business according to the wishes of that



particular leader. Meaning, it's difficult to separate the party leader and party popularity in Zambian politics (Rakner, 2011 p. 1115). Undoubtedly, intra-party democracy if managed well at all levels may increase participation as well as enhance decision making. Nevertheless, this criteria of electing leadership for party positions in Zambia is missing. Although party constitutions stipulate that all party positions are elective through general assembly, the opposite is true that leadership positions are by appointments. Regarding policy matters, ordinary party members are not involved. Across the two major parties, the PF and the UPND the general feeling is that NECs are in a great position to initiate as well as influence policies. The argument is that political delegation to conventions are more interested in the elections rather than in policy matters (Momba, 2005 p. 31). In addition, opposition parties are faced with the challenge of attracting enough member experts with the capacity and experience to develop party policies and programs, including those who can debate strongly on party ideology. Although the UPND through its market reform policies are posing alternative to PF, still there is need to develop more comprehensive programs strong enough to match the PF's pro-poor policies. Here again, weakness in policy development can be traced back to the time of MMD in 1994 when it U-turned from labour policy to neoliberal reforms to the surprise of many, after being backed by the trade unions one would have expected the MMD to resist the policy reforms (Rakner, 2011 p. 1116). This therefore led to coalition demise which comprised trade unions and farmers unions, and by 2011 when MMD lost power there was completely absent of trade unions participation in political processes.

In terms of organizational structure, all political parties in Zambia have some form of organization with minimum variation. For example, though the opposition UPND faces organizational challenges which includes patronage dependency on its party president with the electorate viewing it as an ethnic party, the party constitution provides the national management committee (NMC) as the top organ, it has also the NEC comprising of party president and his two deputies, the national chairperson, secretary general, the chairperson for publicity, the treasurer and also three committee members from NMC (Momba, 2005 p. 18). Suffice to mention that members of NEC draw its mandate from NMC whereas NEC members are also NMC members. By party constitution, the NEC members are supposed to be elected by general assembly every five years. The constitution also provides provincial executives elected by provincial assemblies. However, the UPND do not have ward committees or branch committees. Common to all political parties in Zambia not all elected officials are on payroll,





only a few staff running the secretariat including the secretary general are paid (Momba, 2005 p. 18).

Building on our comparisons as highlighted in our findings part of this study, Ghana on the other hand has its political parties management and organization anchored on the country's history, traditions and ideology inspired by western political ideologies. To begin with, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and Political Parties Law prohibits any party to have its name, symbol and motto with regional or ethnic connotation. For this reason, Political Parties Law requires that all party activities be carried out within the confines of party ideology, policy initiatives as well as through organizational strategies (Fobih, 2010 p. 27). For example, NPP prides itself with the Danquah-Busia tradition roots and it also identifies itself with conservative parties found in the advanced democracies like the United States' Republican Party. Again, its constitution is deeply concerned with civil liberties and respect for the rule of law and free-market reforms as well as a promoter of social policies in addressing challenges of social inequalities. Organizational and structure wise, NPP constitution provides party organizational and structure composed of branch units, constituency, regional, national and overseas. All these structures are led by an executive elected through party primaries at every level and the president is elected through nationwide vote in all 230 party constituencies. Similarly, the party's NEC consists of chairperson, three deputy chairperson, general secretary, communications officer, research officers, national organizer, both men and women organizer as well as a youth organizer (Fobih, 2010 p. 28). Again, article 14 of the NPP constitution provides for other structures like, youth wing and national council of elders. Apart from secretary general and party driver, all officials work on a voluntary basis.

The similar trend to NPP is that of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) with its traditions steaming out from Nkrumahist parties, the Convention People's Party (CPP) and People National Convention (PNC) which pride themselves in socialist ideals and are socially inclusive. These parties have structured the political competition and organization of the NDC with its former and still most influential personality Jerry Rawling pursuing populist agenda (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar p. 115). The NDC came to a political scene in Ghana based on Nkrumahist ideology in terms of its support base including electoral strategies and policy orientation. The NDC was by and large built on Rawling legacy and he slowly and successfully co-opted Nkrumahists into his leadership while drifting away from Nkrumahist ideology to his own vision. As we can see from this part of discussion, the strengths of the political parties in



Ghana is derived or deep rooted in the political history of the country whereas NPP is associated with Danquah-Busia tradition promoting political liberalization, free market and human rights (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar p.116). To the contrary, the NDC is viewed as a left-of-centre party inspired by nationalism and pan-Africanism ideologies pursuing social policies. Like the NPP, at national level NDC has a chairperson and two deputy chairpersons, secretary general including a propaganda secretary. In short, the party structure comprises the NEC, regional committees, district committees, constituency as well as ward committees (Fobih, 2010 p. 31). The party constitution also provides party organs like research officer, national treasurer, women and youth organizers.

### **Conclusion**

There is a negative correlation between Zambia and Ghana on how parties are organized respectively. In Zambia, political parties shun party conventions leaving them to be run by NECs and party leaders, this is likely why they are poorly organized and fail to grow. Nevertheless, both countries have a form of organization. However, Ghana's political organization is deeply rooted in the political history and traditions of the country. All party structure positions from national level through to all 275 constituencies are elective as opposed to Zambia where party positions are by appointments.

### **7. 4 Electoral Commission**

To be more precisely, majority of Zambians feel that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) since inception in 1996 has failed to demonstrate competent leadership to manage free and fair elections desirable to all stakeholders and political commentators (Rakner and Svåsand, 2005 p. 99). As we can see from all held elections since 1996 when Chiluba sought re-election under MMD, the election became contentious resulting from boycott by the main opposition then UNIP and subsequently, his victory was contested in courts but MMD prevailed. Again in 2001 presidential election was equally rejected won by Mwanawasa of the MMD. The Main opposition UPND under Mazoka cried foul with protests in major cities. Like in 1996, the UPND challenged the 2001 elections in courts but the MMD won the case once again. Similar situation and protests again took place in 2006 after Sata disputed Mwanawasa's re-election, where the losing candidates questioned the transparency and fairness including credibility of the elections as administered by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (Chatham House, 2017).



The 2016 election remains the most bloody, flawed and ultimately chaotic from start to end that has completely finished any left credibility for the electoral body. The 2016 general elections were poorly coordinated, irregularities in voter registration and also disagreements among stakeholders over the ECZ decision to print ballot papers in Dubai. Furthermore, the political campaigns were marred with violence and intimidation. The incompetencies of ECZ was brought to light in their failure to add and release results including securing votes as intruders were found in the most restricted server room (Deggers, 2016). The 2016 election failed to pass international standards of transparency election. Again, the UPND petitioned the results but the constitutional court (ConCourt) threw away the petition on technicality that 14 days allowance in which to hear the petitioners had but rather expired. The outcome of the ConCourt ruling by and large created a political legitimacy dilemma of the current leadership.

Going by these failures, Zambians continue calling for independent and better still a more competent Electoral Commission of Zambia, separate from any government influence. Thus, reform the ECZ from the current position where the president of the republic appoints all five (5) commissioners and one chairperson subject to parliament approval, to where the chairperson of the commission is elected amongst the commissioners (Rakner and Sväsand, 2005 p. 89). This will somehow make the commission truly independent, neutral and credible to organize elections accepted by all stakeholders. Failure to reform the ECZ, as observed by other scholars like Rakner and Sväsand, Zambia will remain stuck in the transition phase (Rakner and Sväsand, 2005 p. 86). Political interference in ECZ through appointments has weakened state institutions not only the electoral commission but also the courts in regulating electoral processes. As we know that autonomy of the political institutions in a democratic country is a paramount to achieving consolidated democracy but the Zambian electoral body by far does not match up to that expectations. As we have demonstrated in this discussion, election mission observers as well as other political analysts have claimed that almost all elections in Zambia since 1996 were characterized by poor electoral management especially in voter registration, voter education, counting and releasing of results. In addition, polling stations are also poorly managed with lack of security leaving the room for results to be questioned. However, the ECZ attributes its failure to lack of census figures from Central Statistics Office (CSO) for the purposes of voter registration processes including the claim that a number of donors have withheld funds agreed to help ECZ for electoral management (Rakner and Sväsand, 2005 p. 98). Nevertheless, in both cases appointments and budget, the ECZ cannot be said to be an autonomous political institution. The government funds the commission



through the Ministry of Finance and in terms of the budget to run the institution, the president still retains and has the final approval. In this regard, the heavy influence of the president over ECZ makes it ineffective and weak to organize undisputed elections.

On the other hand, the Electoral Commission (EC) in Ghana going by reports both international and local mission observers have successfully managed to institutionalize elections, making it legitimate were the losing candidates concede defeat. Against the backdrop of incompetencies and failures of Zambia's EC, the EC in Ghana has rather organized successful elections with minor errors since 2000 (Debrah, 2011 p. 26). Thus, for successful democratic consolidation to take root, we must have an impartial electoral body capable of delivering free and fair elections acceptable to all political players and stakeholders. For this reason, after the 1992 fraudulent elections, the EC in Ghana set itself on electoral reforms in preparation for the upcoming elections starting the 1996 elections going forward. These reforms included drafting a framework for conducting voter registration, setting its own rules and regulations for conducting general elections, improving transparency in election management while drawing lessons from the failed 1992 elections (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 6).

Notably, since 2000, studies have demonstrated that there is improvement in electioneering management with the general opinion that ECG's officials are competent and also capable of adapting to changing situations. Thus, despite minor challenges Ghana's ECG improved in every coming election with public confidence remaining high. For example, the 2008 election jumped to 70 percent voter turnout from around 54 percent in 2004 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009 p. 138). Before the 2008 elections, the ECG in Ghana revised the voter register in order to avoid the problem of ghost voters as experienced in 2000 and 2004 elections including making constituencies equal in size. While the 2008 elections highlighted that stakes were high concerning the election process, the conducts of competing political parties including the fairness of party primaries, the EC managed to resolve those concerns without involvement of the international community (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 9). The ECG has so far, put several mechanisms in place that supports a peaceful as well as free and fair electoral process. In fact, these processes were aimed at creating a trustworthy relationship that now exists between political parties, electorates and ECG by way of establishing a formalized dialogue platform between the commission and political parties.

Again, the 2012 elections recorded massive improvements in electoral management since the dawn of the Fourth Republic to the credit of the ECG. This time around, the country witnessed



the introduction of the biometric verification of results in case of dispute which in turn enhanced transparency. Though the ECG initially was blamed for some minor flaws and deficiencies in 2012 general election, biometric verification system helped to settle the matter with the opposition candidate then- Nana Akuffo Addo conceding defeat after the court ruling which was in favor of the ECG and the winning candidate John Mahama (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 9). Similarly, the 2016 general election saw huge improvements from lesions of 2012 elections. Correspondingly, the ECG took to implement a series of reforms before the 2016 elections aimed at enhancing credibility, transparency as well as inclusiveness in the electoral process. The 2016 reforms were to do among the things; continuous voter registration, election officials including party agents are to take oaths before judicial officers as opposed to an officer from the electoral commission office. And special attention is to be given to people with special needs or disabilities as well as vulnerable persons at polling stations (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 10). As a result, ECG is now able to process and release the elections results on time. The ECG due to its autonomy both financially and operational has the ability to forge and bring consensus among all political players through IPAC which is the inter-party advisory committee. Therefore, the role that the Electoral Commission of Ghana has played in the administration of the country's elections constitutes a much needed stepping stone towards a consolidated democracy in Ghana.

## **Conclusion**

When we put Electoral Commission of Zambia to Lindberg's test 'democratization by election', undoubtedly it fails to pass the test due to its incompetent leadership coupled with executive interference to manage free and fair elections a condition necessary for democratic consolidation. Whereas, the administrative as well as the financial autonomy of the Electoral Commission of Ghana through its continued reforms, good leadership with experience and professional competence has largely managed to promote democratization by election to the satisfaction of the losing party.

## **7. 5 Free and Fair Elections**

If we take Dahl's definition of polyarchy as a system of political rights where the institution of free and fair election is provided as a necessary condition including the universal franchise right to vote in a competitive free and fair elections (Dahl, 1989 p.219), many Sub-Saharan African countries will fall short of this definition where elections are seen not to be



inclusive, free and fair with the talk of often being rigged. For example in Zambia, the institutional requirement of free and fair election is absent and there exist political unequals of the demos as opposed to Dahl's recommendation of the 'political equals' (Dahl, 1989 p. 233). In this sense, we take 'free' to mean respect for political rights, human rights and rule of law, and 'fair' the even playing-ground to reasonably compete and campaigns with equal access to media among political party leaders. As per our findings, the media plays a crucial role for democratization as well as accountability as a fourth estate in political governance. The media can observe the political process, provide citizens with information, political parties, civil society and also provide civic education where formal institutions like electoral commissions fail to do so (Ewald, 2013 p. 67). Sadly, in Zambia media freedoms have been undermined and put the role of the media in consolidating democracy under constant threat. Take for example the events that surrounded before and after the 2016 general elections. Critical voices such as the biggest and privately owned print media house, The Post was closed before the 2016 elections such that up to now radio and Private TV stations are highly politicized. The journalists together with the company owners The Post were arrested as well as intimidated during the 2016 election campaign period (BTI, 2018). Generally, Zambians feel that the PF regime has become intolerant to dissenting views with the recent cancellation of Prime TV broadcasting license by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) in collusion with the PF government. Similarly, Freedom house also highlights the deteriorating political space in Zambia. There is the abuse of the Public Order Act to clamp down opposition party activities where opposition leaders get attacked in radio stations and studios. Thus, holding of free and fair elections becomes unattainable (Free House, 2019). Again, what we see in Zambia is the complete breakdown in the rule of law and human rights violations where human rights activists and political opposition leaders get arrested on trumped up charges. For example the leader of the largest opposition party in Zambia the UPND was in 2017 arrested and charged with treason. The charge according to Zambian laws carries a death penalty (BTI, 2018). Correspondingly, during the interview with Chatham House the leader of the opposition party Hakainde Hichilema contended that Zambia's state of democracy is uncertain especially after the 2016 elections. His main concern was that fundamental rights like the freedom of speech, assembly and press are but rather being challenged. He further mentioned how state security apparatus are used by the ruling party to brutalize citizens including denying them with basic human rights. Government is using quasi-institution like the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) to close independent media and also clamp down on platforms that opposition parties use to disseminate their programs to the electorates (Chatham House, 2017). He added,



separation of power no longer exists in Zambia with increasing interference particularly in the judiciary. Electoral petitions are thrown out with evidence being ignored. For the very reasons discussed here accordingly, the overall picture in Zambia fails to support the holding of free and fair elections.

In comparison, Ghana has passed “the classical ‘two turnover test’” (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011, p. 1196), by holding successful free and fair elections since 2000. Again, if we consider Lindberg (2009) ‘model’ democratization by elections, Ghana going by a series of electoral reforms undertaken by ECG to improve every coming election, it fits this prototype model. In fact, the argument is that elections provide a complete shift from the old authoritarian government to a new democratic regime to the extent where, as we observe that voter turnouts and turnovers we become certain that democratic consolidation is taking root the measure under which democracy survives breakdown (Lindberg, 2009 p. 5). In this regard, Ghana’s democratization by election is confirmed by the increase in voter turnouts in every election and this as other scholars like Lindberg and Morrison put it, helps to diminish clientelistic links due to experiences voters gain with every elections (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011 p. 1194). During campaigns, Ghana’s opposition parties since 2000 to 2016 elections have largely enjoyed a peaceful political environment with tolerance of political pluralism among different political players. As highlighted in our findings, opposition parties are given equal opportunities to sell their program to the public using public media, creating a political atmosphere of the political equals (Dahl, 1989 p. 233).

Again, as stated in the constitution, the Ghanaian government is mandated to provide security to all political leaders participating in an election during the campaign period (Fobih, 2010 p. 27). Generally, elections are held in a violent free political environment and political conflicts are professionally managed by Inter-Advisory Committee (IPAC). In addition, to foster a violence free political campaigns, the ECG have partnered with the country’s security forces to create the Electoral Security Taskforce (ESTF) charged with responsibility of keeping peace as well as protecting candidates during campaigns since the 2000 general elections (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 8). Thus, the 2000 general elections were generally declared free, fair, credible and transparent by almost all both domestic and foreign observers. Similar results were obtained in 2004 and 2008 elections with no signs of gerrymandering which characterized the 1996 flawed elections. And according to election monitoring groups together with other institutions, elections were deemed to be peaceful, free and fair as both candidates from the ruling party and the opposition campaigned freely necessitated by the 2004 Political Parties Code of Conduct (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 8). While the 2012 general election posed



a threat to Ghana's consolidated democracy, the quick intervention by ECG prevented the situation from degenerating into political battles and the losing candidate then Nana Akuffo Addo accepted the defeat and asked his followers to move on and focus on 2016 elections. Thus, approaching the elections in 2016, the ECG had worked on deficiencies of 2012 general elections and implemented several reforms aimed at improving credibility and transparency of the elections. For this reason again, the outcome of the 2016 elections were deemed credible, transparent, free and fair with the incumbent John Mahama conceding defeat to the opposition leader Nana Akuffo Addo (Botchway and Kwarteng, 2018 p. 9).

## **Conclusion**

As opposed to Zambia which has failed to hold free and fair elections acceptable to all political stakeholders involved due to deteriorating political environment including fundamental human rights restrictions since 1996, Ghana on the other hand presents a platform where political equals exist. Ghana since 2000 has instituted measures to consolidate its democracy based on political participation, respect for both political and civil rights, freedom of the media and expression as well as freedom of religion.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **8. Overall Conclusion**

Generally, except Ghana, which by and large has passed Huntington's (1991) 'two turnover-test' of democratic consolidation, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are stuck in the transition phase of democratization. This thesis attempted to answer what explains democratic consolidation variations in Sub-Saharan Africa using prominent theories of weak political opposition and variables under study.

Key among the reasons is the weakness of the opposition parties. As per our first observed variable, independent opposition in Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, are weak because they are co-opted or rather displaced by personality and mentality leaders disguised as strong men. Comparing Ghana to Zambia, this thesis concluded that the cause and effect relationship is substantiated as Zambia proved to be more prone to political instability due to the excessive power of the president as opposed to Ghana. In the second variable that tried to build up on the specific research question on the role of opposition parties, the opposition party behavior theory takes into account how opposition parties have failed to come up with influential policies strong enough to unseat the ruling party. On this account, we reached the conclusion that opposition parties in countries such as Zambia fail to perform this function because they are faced with discontent and frustration due to lack of institutionalization of political parties with unregulated





candidate selection procedure. However, Ghana's positive score in this area is a combination of several factors ranging from general feeling of political socialization, interest aggregation and articulation to policy formulation. Again, in another research question rooted in the third variable as to why opposition political parties have remained weak in Sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis concludes that the failure and differing attitude among political parties in Zambia and Ghana to facilitate mass political recruitment and mobilization as well as play their roles effectively explains democratic consolidation gap in these two countries and Sub-Saharan African as a whole. Similarly the results from fourth and fifth variables analysis indicate that institutional failure like Electoral Commission, free and fair elections can make democratic consolidation much harder. On this point, the study concluded that there is greater political and institutional openness in Ghana leading to overall political stability and consolidation. Yet, it appears that Zambia's unwillingness to carry out total institutional and electoral reforms leaves the problem but rather only half-solved.

The thesis therefore aligns itself with scholarly work, among others Rakner, Randall, Svåsand, Skaålness, Gyimah-boadi, Chabal and Daloz who have generally advanced the argument that "Africa's democratic consolidation suffers from the shrinking democratic space and it is also eroded with fragmented and poorly organized opposition parties". For instance, Rakner (2011) argued that a small number of opposition parties hold conventions. On this backdrop, this thesis agrees with Rakner as our results from the analysis show that Zambia's major opposition party since 2006 have never held the convention to elect party leaders, leaving parties to be run by NECs. The research findings are also similar to the study done by Chabal and Daloz (1999) on Africa works; disorder as political instrument. Their findings were that political institutions in Africa create a condition necessary for 'chaos' a means by which strong men use to hold on to power. This thesis further discovered that the theory of dictatorship was very strong and useful in answering the question in what ways the rule of strong man has prevented the establishment of opposition political parties in African. On this score, our findings were that strong men do not only succeed in restricting the political environment but they also interfere in public service, parastatal and military recruitments. Again, the research findings are similar to the study done by Frantz (2018) on authoritarianism. His findings too were that authoritarian regimes interfere in military operations by creating parallel security forces aimed at counterbalancing the regular army and also establish a presidential guard to exclusively protect the leader. This research therefore could not agree more that the success in Ghana should be applauded and that these successes should rather be turned over to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.



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
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Figure 7.0 (V-Dem): Liberal democracy in Ghana. Source: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/> [Last Accessed: 2020-04-30]



**Appendix 1**

**FIGURE 1.2: COUNTRIES BY SCORE ON V-DEM'S LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) 2018 COMPARED TO 2008.**





**Appendix 2**

12 SECTION 1: STATE OF THE WORLD 2018 – LIBERAL AND ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

