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A Think Tank on the Left: The Institute for Policy Studies and Cold War America, 1963-1989

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A THINK TANK ON THE LEFT:
THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND COLD WAR AMERICA, 1963-1989

by

Brian S. Mueller

A Dissertation Submitted in
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ABSTRACT
A THINK TANK ON THE LEFT:
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by

Brian S. Mueller

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor J. David Hoeweler

For American intellectuals, the Cold War involved a battle far more important than the ones taking place in faraway lands. While the nearly half-decade conflict never degenerated into a nuclear war, the combat between intellectuals resembled a nuclear explosion at times. Participants in the war of words believed that intellectual debates would determine the direction of American foreign policy, and possibly whether the United States survived the Cold War. Led by groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action, liberal intellectuals held the dominant position during the first decades of the Cold War as they became hardened Cold Warriors intent on containing the Communist menace. By the late 1960s, however, the liberal consensus collapsed under the pressure of the Vietnam War. This dissertation looks at the instrumental role played by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a leftist think tank located in Washington D.C., in causing the breakup of the liberal consensus, as well as the Institute's attempt to restore liberalism to its true form. From the time that IPS opened its doors in 1963 until the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Institute served as the guardian of a genuine liberalism corrupted by the actions undertaken by liberals in pursuit of victory in the Cold War.

Analyzing the intellectual contributions of the activists and writers associated with IPS from 1963 until the end of the Cold War, this dissertation probes a heretofore unexamined set of ideas regarding liberalism, democracy, and American foreign policy. Given life just as a New Left came into being in America, IPS carried forth the ideals of groups like Students for a Democratic Society by calling for a non-interventionist and non-ideological foreign policy, greater participatory democracy, and a more moral and humane world. Thus, despite the demise of liberalism and the concomitant rise of conservatism, a more progressive form of liberalism survived at IPS. At the same time, this study demonstrates the inherent difficulties facing intellectuals trying to influence policymakers, particularly when offering a progressive vision for America at home and abroad in a conservative climate. Drawing upon the think tank's records and the expansive writings of IPS intellectuals, this study reveals the ways in which the think tank kept alive the promise of a reconstructed liberalism in Cold War America.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
The Decline and Fall of Liberalism?	
Chapter One	31
A History of IPS	
Chapter Two	70
A Think Tank on the Left?	
Chapter Three	121
An Unnecessary Alliance: U.S., Europe, and NATO	
Chapter Four	145
Vietnam: The War That Made IPS Famous	
Chapter Five	197
The National Security State and the Men Behind It	
Chapter Six	223
Solidarity: IPS and the Third World	
Chapter Seven	264
Arms Control is Not Disarmament	
Postscript	309
Bibliography	314
Curriculum Vitae	333

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Introduction: The Decline and Fall of Liberalism?

On September 21, 1976, Orlando Letelier, a former Defense and Foreign Minister of Chile under Salvador Allende, Michael Moffitt, and Ronnie Karpen Moffitt were driving to work near Sheridan Circle in Washington D.C. At 9:35 a.m. a bomb exploded underneath the car. Letelier lost both of his legs in the explosion and remained trapped under the car. Ronnie remained conscious but the blast severed her carotid artery. The explosion ejected her husband, Michael, from the backseat of the car. Both Ronnie and Letelier later died as a result of their injuries.¹ Within two years of the bombing, FBI officials named an associate of the Chilean National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), American-born Michael Vernon Townley, along with several members of the Cuban National Movement, as suspects in the killings.

All three passengers worked at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Letelier and Michael as fellows and Ronnie as an assistant. The death of Letelier, who led the movement against Augusto Pinochet after the latter overthrew the democratically-elected socialist leader Allende in a coup on September 11, 1973, brought worldwide attention to the ruthlessness of Pinochet. Letelier's assassination did not come as a surprise to IPS, which had paid close attention to Pinochet and other right-wing dictators in Latin America and elsewhere for the past decade. Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet, the former a staffer of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and the latter a lawyer in the State Department during the Kennedy administration, founded IPS in 1963. In 1965, as the war in Vietnam escalated, Raskin and associate fellow Bernard Fall edited *The*

¹ Saul Landau, *They Educated the Crows: An Institute Report on the Letelier-Moffitt Murders* (Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1978), 1-2.

Vietnam Reader, which became popular with teach-in organizers. Two years later, Raskin and founding fellow Arthur Waskow co-wrote “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” in support of the draft resistance movement. By the end of the decade, Barnet also published *Intervention and Revolution*, detailing the efforts by America to prevent revolutions abroad. IPS’s studies on Vietnam and the Third World, as well as later publications, shared a common theme: liberalism had run amok as a result of the Cold War.

This study argues that IPS sought to resuscitate what the historian Doug Rossinow has called the “left-liberal tradition” in American history. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, a coalition made up of left and liberal elements existed in America between the 1880s and the 1940s. During this time, according to Rossinow, “bridges of cooperation” existed, though not, as some argue, a form of “cooptation” of the leftist radicals by liberals. “This left-liberal tradition,” Rossinow explains, “includes liberals who were deeply critical of American capitalism as well as leftists who saw great value in social reform, as opposed to revolutionary upheaval.”² Though disagreement occurred within IPS over how closely to work with liberals and sometimes disapproval of the slowness of reform rose to the surface, the Institute repeatedly worked with the liberal Establishment.

This study will show the ambivalent and often combative relationship IPS had with liberalism and liberals in power, which made the re-emergence of the left-liberal alliance enormously challenging. The strained relationship between IPS and liberalism had much to do with the think tank’s advocacy of a more robust liberalism based on the ideals put forward by the New Left, particularly as articulated by the Students for a

² Doug Rossinow, *Visions of Progress: The Left-Liberal Tradition in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 2.

Democratic Society (SDS) in the organization's manifesto, the Port Huron Statement. One look at the founding document of SDS illustrates where IPS stood within liberalism. Reading the Port Huron Statement, in fact, is like reading the studies and books put out by IPS intellectuals. SDS complained of "depersonalization" and turning humans into "things." At another point, SDS's manifesto referred to the "militarization of society" made possible by a "moral callous" brought on by the looming threat of nuclear war. The document advocated disarmament rather than deterrence and proclaimed that the latter "should be seen as a political issue, not a technical problem." SDS, moreover, excoriated bureaucrats in schools, labor unions, the Soviet Union, and corporations alike. Most importantly, the Port Huron Statement put forth the ideal of "participatory democracy."³ IPS had, as this study shows, personal relationships with several important SDS leaders, but the association went far beyond friendship. For decades after SDS's implosion, IPS carried on the principles set forth in the Port Huron Statement and, in the process, proved that a Left existed, even in the most conservative of times in American history.

This study refutes the "declension narrative" found in scholarly works that use SDS's turn to revolutionary violence in the late 1960s to argue that the New Left, in its original form, no longer existed. Before historians of the 1960s would look to the decade and see the period as one of decline for the New Left, Irving Howe, like many of his contemporaries, admonished the New Left. Howe claimed that the "politics" of the New Left "asserts so unmodulated and total a dismissal of society, while also departing from Marxist expectations of social revolution, that little is left to them but the glory or burden of maintaining a distinct personal style." This "style," furthermore, took precedence over

³ The Port Huron Statement is reprinted in its entirety in Miller, *Democracy Is In The Streets*, 332, 340, 345, 355-356, 333.

substance and rational thinking. He went on to deride the New Left for its “lack of clear-cut ideas, sometimes even a feeling that it is wrong—or worse, ‘middle-class—to think systematically, and as a corollary, the absence of a social channel or agency through which to act.” In a similar manner, Howe criticized the New Left for its “extreme, sometimes unwarranted, hostility toward liberalism,” which he blamed on an ahistoricism that ignored much of the good accomplished by liberals.⁴ The intellectuals at IPS, though perhaps not as early as 1965, would agree that *specific* elements of the New Left pursued an anti-intellectual and violent path, but the New Left included among its ranks more than just SDS members. Part of the problem with Howe’s and later historians’ caricature of the New Left as street fighting radicals holding Mao’s Little Red Book is that such observations fail to distinguish between SDS and the New Left.

There is no doubt that SDS is synonymous with both the 1960s and the New Left. As a result, the historical studies on the New Left that appeared in the 1980s placed the organization at the center of the narrative. In the process of writing about the New Left, James Miller, Todd Gitlin, and a host of others created a narrative that privileged SDS. In doing so, the authors make it seem as though the downfall of SDS signaled the decline of the New Left as well. “Participatory democracy,” community organizing, and intellectual debates in the early 1960s, proponents of this narrative claim, gave way to anarchism and violence as SDS moved from “protest to resistance” in the middle 1960s.⁵ The

⁴ Irving Howe, “New Styles in Leftism,” in *50 Years of Dissent*, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Michael Walzer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 75-76, 78-79.

⁵ See, for instance, James Miller, *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (1987; reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1993); Maurice Isserman, *If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). IPS is mentioned on one page in Gitlin’s book, Miller mentions the think tank in passing on two occasions, and Isserman does not mention the Institute at all.

“declension” narrative that dominated the early literature of the New Left and the 1960s has led important groups and events to be overlooked in both the sixties and beyond.

As the declension narrative makes clear, historians have dated the demise of the New Left to the late 1960s when activists turned to revolutionary rhetoric and violence. Such an argument, however, deals with the New Left only as a social movement. The declension narrative fails to take into account the continued existence of New Left ideas long after the implosion of SDS. Just as various studies have shown New Left ideals existing prior to the 1960s, this study recasts the fortunes of the New Left by showing how the ideology of the New Left survived into the 1970s and 1980s.⁶ While the New Left as a social movement, if there ever existed such a monolithic movement, surely disappeared by the early to mid-1970s, the ideas put forth in the Port Huron Statement and countless other works of the era found a home in the writings of IPS intellectuals. In this sense, I agree with Doug Rossinow, who has cautioned against “retrospectively lengthening the New Left’s life span” because it “sacrifice[s] the distinctive, and distinctively radical, ideology of the New Left.” Furthermore, Rossinow agrees with the “reasonable argument” that the New Left disappeared in 1973, following the official end of the Vietnam War and the Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade*. As a result, any surviving Left after 1973 did not represent a “continuation” of the New Left of the 1960s. With this end date in mind, Rossinow calls on historians to distinguish the New Left as “a

⁶ James Tracy, *Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), especially 125-126. Other examples of this sort of scholarship include Isserman, “*If I Had a Hammer . . .*”; Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of a New Left* (London: Verso, 1993); Doug Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and John McMillian and Paul Buhle, eds., *The New Left Revisited* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

political outlook” versus “a social movement,” with the latter no longer existing.⁷ I, of course, would add philosophical or theoretical to “political outlook.”

Further, this study recasts the relationship between the New Left and the Third World. For the last decade and more scholars have looked at the ties between social movements in America and the Third World. The majority of these studies, however, chronicle the interactions between non-white activists in America and Marxist and anti-colonial liberation movements around the world.⁸ When historians look into the white New Left’s interest in the Third World, it is primarily to show how groups like the Weathermen sought to imitate the revolutionary violence of Che Guevara. As hopes of changing America diminished, SDS, and later the Weathermen, proponents of this outlook argue, looked to the Third World. Justin Jackson, for instance, has noted how antiwar activists in SDS felt “isolated from an increasingly conservative American working class and middle class blinded by anticommunist ideology and sated by high living standards rooted in the exploitation of Third World people,” and thus became fascinated with Che Guevara and Regis Debray and their revolutionary techniques.⁹

⁷ Doug Rossinow, “Letting Go: Revisiting the New Left’s Demise,” in *The New Left Revisited*, eds. John McMillian and Paul Buhle (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 245-247, 252. For another view on the start and end date of the New Left, see Van Gosse, “A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left,” in *A Companion to Post-1945 America*, eds. Jean-Christophe and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 278-279, 292-293.

⁸ Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Fanon Che Wilkins, “The Making of Black Internationalists: SNCC and Africa Before the Launching of Black Power, 1960-1965,” *Journal of African American History* 92 (2007): 468-491; Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsy Esch, “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution,” *Souls* 1 (Fall 1999): 6-41; Laura Pulido, *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Cynthia A. Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Julia Erin Wood, “Freedom is Indivisible: The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Cold War Politics, and International Liberation Movements” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011).

⁹ Justin Jackson, “Kissinger’s Kidnapper: Eqbal Ahmad, the U.S. New Left, and the Transnational Romance of Revolutionary War,” *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 4 (2010), 82.

It is important to note, however, that several exceptions to the narrative of a revolutionary shift among New Left activists do exist. Van Gosse's research into the New Left's support—through the activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee—of the Cuban revolution in the early 1960s is one example. Disputing the claim made by other historians that the New Left's influence declined once activists took to the streets and joined forces with Third World anti-imperialists, Gosse has called for a long view of the American Left. By showing “a continuous line of solidarity with Latin America” by activists beginning in the late 1950s and continuing into the 1980s with the solidarity movements against American intervention in Central America, Gosse aims to overturn the declension narrative.¹⁰ Caitlin Casey has also shown how the New Left, in this case SDS, always had an interest in the Third World. While the student organization spent a disproportionate amount of time on Vietnam, SDS members also wrote papers, held workshops on the Middle East, carried out protests against South Africa, and traveled to Cuba, Eastern Europe, and Japan. Casey claims that the “internationalism” followed by SDS “was a conscious and much-debated decision.” Only after “it became clear that international meetings, travels, and friendly letters of brotherhood were not ending the war, the language of imperialism blended with a language that went beyond radicalism to revolution.” SDS did, therefore, eventually follow a revolutionary path to obscurity, but not before the organization spent a better part of its existence working across borders,

¹⁰ Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left* (New York: Verso, 1993), 9-10. In arguing for the inclusion of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee as part of the New Left, Gosse makes an argument that appears repeatedly in much of his scholarly work, which is that the New Left should be viewed more as a group following the tenets of “radical liberalism,” which would make it possible to include the Old Left, activists such as Dorothy Day, and groups fighting for everything from disarmament to anti-imperialism. See *Ibid.*, 255-258. Likewise, see Dan Berger, ed., *The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), especially 97-176, which offers information on some of the solidarity movements of the 1970s.

both intellectually and physically. Furthermore, as Casey details in subsequent chapters of her study, transnationalism continued in various forms in the Left.¹¹ IPS had a similar long-term interest in the Third World. From Vietnam in the 1960s, to Chile in the 1970s, and Central America in the 1980s, IPS spoke with and for the people of the Third World against American imperialism, both economic and military.

Therefore, not only the New Left, but also liberalism, I argue, remained a viable school of thought well into the 1970s and 1980s in spite of the destruction of the liberal consensus and the subsequent popularity of conservative ideas. The scholarly literature on liberalism in the twentieth century, however, generally conforms to the “rise and fall” thesis, which posits that almost as soon as liberalism achieved ascendancy during the New Deal it began experiencing a slow decline.¹² Alan Brinkley, for instance, has pointed to a “reconstruction of postwar liberalism” whereby further reform no longer seemed necessary due to the tremendous success of the New Deal. Liberals lauded the New Deal for preserving the capitalist system without bringing totalitarianism to the United States. Postwar liberals, according to Brinkley, “abandoned or greatly de-emphasized the abortive experiments in statist planning, the failed efforts to create cooperative associational arrangements, the vigorous if short-lived anti-monopoly crusades, the overt celebration of government, and the open skepticism toward capitalism and its captains.” Achieving full-employment and expanding social welfare benefits took

¹¹ Caitlin Marie Casey, “Vanguards of Globalization: Transnationalism in American Activism, 1960-1975” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011), 56-173.

¹² Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore have gone so far as to claim that the New Deal represented a minor hiccup, or “historical aberration,” in a conservative century bookended by William Graham Sumner and Richard Nixon. See, “The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History,” *International labor and Working-Class History* 74 (Fall 2008), 4-6.

center stage in postwar America.¹³ The death knell of New Deal liberalism sounded the loudest in 1948 when the Cold Warrior Harry Truman easily defeated Roosevelt's former vice president, Henry Wallace, who ran as a candidate for the Progressive Party. A group that helped determine the contest between progressivism and liberalism in 1948 was the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which had formed in early 1947. Despite its relative newness, the ADA played a key role in the defeat of Wallace and, more generally, progressivism. According to a historian of the organization, Steven Gillon, "the ADA's excessive anticommunism and its yearning to be involved in the political fight—in this case as part of the Democratic Party—prevented it from recognizing the relevance of Wallace's criticisms."¹⁴ Questioning of American policies, both domestic and foreign, became rarer as the second red scare took over the country in the 1940s and 1950s. Part of the reason for this chilled environment stemmed from the loyalty investigations approved by President Truman in 1947 with Executive Order 9835, but as Landon Storrs has shown, earlier and later investigations also silenced America's more progressive voices.¹⁵

Out of reconstructed postwar liberalism came what Godfrey Hodgson has labeled the "liberal consensus." According to Hodgson, the consensus reached its apex in the

¹³ Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (1995; repr., New York: Vintage, 1996), 265-268. See also, Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Era, 1930-1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

¹⁴ Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 90-92; Steven M. Gillon, *Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 39-47, 50-55.

¹⁵ Landon R. Y. Storrs, *The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). On the impact of anti-communism on pacifists and the peace movement more generally, see Milton S. Katz, *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1985* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), especially 50-58; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), especially 325-329; *The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anticommunism, and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), especially chapter 6.

1950s and represented an “ideology of liberal conservatism,” which involved a general agreement that America’s free market economic system brought tremendous economic growth to the nation and lessened, if not completely erased, class divisions. Thus, managerialism and industrial efficiency would solve all of America’s social ills. America, though, would have to play a much larger role in containing Marxism and communism and spread America’s free market ideals around the world. Such a consensus allowed liberals, in the words of Hodgson, “the hope of progress and a feeling of benevolence,” while conservatives could approve of the “business prosperity” and reaffirmation of the status quo.¹⁶ The consensus, of course, broke down in the 1960s for myriad reasons. Even in a decade that witnessed the passage of legislation related to civil rights, health insurance, poverty, and welfare, “liberals were constrained to act within a political culture that imposed severe limits on the extent of permissible change,” according to Allen Matusow. Despite such restraints, the American public turned against liberalism for what many citizens considered the failures of liberal reform, claiming that it either did too much or too little.¹⁷

For historians, the 1970s has come to represent the decade in which America became conservative. The resurgence of conservatism in the 1970s had two interrelated causes. First, white blue-collar and middle-class Americans, fed up with antiwar protestors, welfare recipients, busing, women’s rights issues, and the supposed immorality of America, blamed liberalism for encouraging discussion of the

¹⁶ Godfrey Hodgson, *America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon, What Happened and Why* (1976; repr., New York: Vintage, 1978), 76-81.

¹⁷ Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 270. See also, William L. O’Neill, *Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960s* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1971).

aforementioned issues. As a result, a main component of the New Deal coalition left the Democratic Party, leading to electoral gains by the Republicans.¹⁸ Yet, despite the monumental defeat of George McGovern, often considered the face of interest group politics, in the 1972 presidential election, liberal ideas still found an audience, particularly in local and state elections.¹⁹ IPS, though, generally stayed away from the contentious issues associated with identity politics, choosing instead to speak about democracy more broadly. As a result, it avoided alignment with groups making demands for particular interest groups.

At the same time, historians have begun to question the dominance of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. As Dan Berger has noted, the 1970s represented a “time of limits”—seen domestically with the energy crisis and stagflation and in foreign policy with the rise of détente—but also as “the ultimate exploder of limits.” Individuals and groups from across the ideological spectrum voiced their displeasure with the direction the country was going. Keynesian economics fell out of favor, replaced by neoliberalism and its free-market orthodoxies; unlikely political alliances formed due to

¹⁸ See, for instance, William C. Berman, *America's Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (1991; repr., New York: Norton, 1992); Jonathan Rieder, *Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Robert O. Self, *All in the Family* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012). Most of these studies place blame on the Democratic Party for ignoring economic issues in favor of social issues. As an example, New Politics liberals, according to the historian Jeffrey Bloodworth, “eschewed economic concerns that had been the basis of New Deal liberalism’s success in favor of moral piety.” Maintaining a moral superiority over others, Bloodworth suggests, mattered more to these New Politics liberals than winning elections. See Jeffrey Bloodworth, *Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968-1992* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 5.

¹⁹ Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 402-404. See also, Pierre Clavel, *The Progressive City: Planning and Participation, 1969-1984* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986); Pierre Clavel, *Activists in City Hall: The Progressive Response to the Reagan Era in Boston and Chicago* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). On McGovern’s failed bid for the presidency, see Bruce Miroff, *The Liberals’ Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007).

racial, ethnic, and economic convulsions; and the rise of New Age religions made possible the collapse of boundaries. As the “exploder of limits,” the 1970s, as a result, made it possible for activists of all political persuasions to protest and debate the future of America.²⁰ Thus blanket statements that attempt to put decades neatly into either the liberal or conservative pile ignore the ambiguity of history.²¹ As Bradford Martin, Michael Foley, Christian Smith, and others have shown, liberal and radical activists did not sit idly by as conservative politicians attempted to enact their programs in Washington and, in regard to foreign policy, around the world.²²

Nonetheless, for IPS, liberalism had gone astray and required rehabilitation. At the center of IPS’s critique of liberalism was a belief that liberals had habitually limited democracy both at home and abroad. In 1949, one of the founders of ADA, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., published *The Vital Center*. Proponents of the “vital center” held steadfastly to the view that the “people,” especially when joined together and becoming the “masses,” could not be trusted with power, so bureaucratic “elites” needed to serve in leadership roles. Such an outlook, Richard Pells has suggested, ignored the fact that non-elites could construct alternatives just as “specific and pragmatic.” Yet for most

²⁰ Dan Berger, “Introduction: Exploding Limits in the 1970s,” in *The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism*, ed. Dan Berger (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 6-8.

²¹ Take for instance the recent efforts by historians to show the existence of conservative ideas and organizations in the supposedly liberal 1960s. See, for example, Gregory L. Schneider, *Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); John A. Andrew, *The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997); Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001); Mary C. Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

²² Simon Hall, *American Patriotism, American Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Bradford Martin, *The Other Eighties: A Secret History of America in the Age of Reagan* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2012); Michael Stewart Foley, *Front Porch Politics* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); Christian Smith, *Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

bureaucrats, according to Pells, technique became more valuable than “content.”²³ In the 1950s and early 1960s, support for “democratic elitism” grew. “Participatory ideals were useful primarily for purposes of legitimation and ensuring elite responsibility but were not to be taken seriously as ideals,” Robert Westbrook has written about democratic thought in this era. Such arguments differed greatly from those made by Walter Lippmann and others in the 1920s. These earlier realists sought, according to Westbrook, “to open to view the gap between the reality of American politics and democratic ideals,” whereas later realists “tried to establish the reality of American politics as a new ideal.” Liberal realists defended democratic realism partly in response to the Cold War. Though not perfect, America, unlike communist nations, had an open system of governance that deserved much adulation and to be spread across the globe. These realists, as Westbrook shows, put a much greater emphasis on making government run more smoothly and making sure that it “retained enough participation to be relatively democratic in a world of more or less authoritarian regimes.”²⁴ Looking at the work of prominent intellectuals during this period, such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Daniel Bell, and the activities of groups devoted to the promotion of intellectual and cultural production, particularly the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, clearly marks the period as a desolate time in American history for democratic participation.²⁵

By grounding its criticism of liberalism in democratic terms, IPS could trace its ideological lineage back to John Dewey. In his authoritative biography of Dewey,

²³ Richard H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, 2nd ed. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 145-146.

²⁴ Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 542-546.

²⁵ See Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-1954* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 123-129.

Westbrook has rejected the notion that the philosopher's ideas served as an ideological backdrop for liberalism in America. Rather, Westbrook writes that "a rejection of Dewey's democratic faith has become a standard feature of the dominant strain of liberal-democratic ideology." Dewey's unending yearning for a more inclusive form of democracy made him "a deviant among liberals," according to Westbrook. Dewey, as a result, became a lifelong critic of a liberalism that perceived the "participatory ideal" as "hopelessly utopian and potentially threatening to social stability," as Westbrook has written.²⁶ IPS stood on the same fringe of liberalism that Westbrook has Dewey perched upon through the philosopher's life. Yet due to IPS's precarious position at the edge of liberalism, studies of liberalism and the Left in American history have tended to ignore IPS' contributions to both. Simply put, IPS attempted to construct a form of liberalism more conducive to democratic participation. Thus, sprinkled throughout the writings of IPS intellectuals is the concept of power. IPS intellectuals were concerned with who possessed it, the meaning behind it, and how individuals and nations used it.

Although IPS wrote on issues related to domestic reform and neighborhood government, this study focuses on the writings of IPS intellectuals having to do with the American response to the Cold War and the concomitant effect on democracy at home and abroad. By looking at how IPS responded to the Cold War, it is possible to understand the role the think tank played in undermining the intellectual underpinnings of the Cold War liberal consensus. Robert Latham has described five characteristics of liberal internationalism that served as "the building blocks of liberal social existence" during the early years of the Cold War. Among these he includes free trade, a domestic

²⁶ Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, xiv-xvi.

market economy, government based on liberal designs, the protection of citizens' rights, and "the right of collective self-determination." Latham argues that the liberal order operated on a "uniaxis" with the United States holding a position of dominance with other states situated alongside it on the axis and changing the makeup of the order. However, unlike other illiberal states included on the "uniaxis," such as Latin American nations under the rule of authoritarian leaders, the Soviet Union did not fit on the axis because, in the words of Latham, it was "capable of disrupting the definition process and challenging the broad contours of liberal relations" far more than weaker nations. As "Soviet externalization" began, a concurrent "consolidation" within the liberal order also occurred in order to limit the distance states roamed from the center of the uniaxis. Furthermore, Latham argues, these moves by the United States led to the increasing military nature of the Cold War, as exemplified by the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Marshall Plan in 1948, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.²⁷ IPS, as this study illustrates, opposed the existence of the "uniaxis" and the militarized nature of the Cold War.

Further, IPS's writings in the 1970s and 1980s, after the collapse of Cold War liberalism brought about by the Vietnam War, demonstrates the long reach of New Left ideas even as intellectuals associated with Trilateralism or neoconservatism seemed to dominate discussions about the Cold War. The disappearance of liberal intellectuals on the foreign policy debate is particularly prominent in the literature on neoconservatism. While such scholars as John Ehrman and Justin Vaïsse do not necessarily agree on the

²⁷ Robert Latham, *The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar International Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 17-19, 111-115, 133-138.

exact date that liberal intellectuals became neoconservatives, they generally agree that Cold War liberalism gave birth to neoconservatism.²⁸

The breakdown of the Cold War consensus led to a series of splits in the foreign policy Establishment that would have important ramifications for future foreign policy debates. Both Ehrman and Vaïsse have offered the most precise portraits of the intellectual environment to help scholars understand the fragmentation that occurred during the breakup of the consensus. Relying on the standard liberal to conservative spectrum, Ehrman and Vaïsse situate New Left revisionist historians like William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber, as well as Richard J. Barnet and Marcus Raskin, on what Vaïsse describes as the “extreme left” of the political scale. Leftist intellectuals opposed U.S. interventionism and, more generally, containment itself. On the other end of the spectrum stood the neoconservatives, who, in addition to demanding a more robust form of containment, believed that the New Left’s anti-interventionist outlook threatened America’s survival. Intellectuals from both ends of the spectrum opposed détente for very different reasons. Between the New Left and neoconservatives stood the moderates. At the middle of the spectrum, there existed what Vaïsse has called a “center-left / center-right consensus on détente.” Liberal moderates, including Paul

²⁸ Gary J. Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and Ideology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 48; John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 47-57. Mark Gerson and Jacob Heilbrunn also see the liberalism of the 1950s as the seedbed of neoconservatism. Mark Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996), 26; Jacob Heilbrunn, *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons* (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 21. The transformation of liberal intellectuals to conservatism is the subject of several notable books. See, for instance, Alexander Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and Their World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Alan M. Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left From the 1930s to the 1980s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); John P. Diggins, *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual Development*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Warnke, Stanley Hoffmann, Leslie Gelb, and Tony Lake, wrote for *Foreign Policy*, which had its first issue in 1970, and paid far closer attention to economic matters and other non-military issues. Though certain liberal moderates like Zbigniew Brzezinski still kept a close eye on East-West relations, the majority of intellectuals associated with this group considered issues involving North-South interactions of far greater importance. Thus, rather than looking at the world from a bi-polar perspective, liberal moderates promoted interdependence. Finally, like the national security advisor and secretary of state Henry Kissinger, liberal moderates supported détente as a means to reduce tensions in the Cold War.²⁹

By far, scholars paid the most attention to the neoconservatives, with less attention given to the Trilateralists and almost none to the group furthest to the Left. Beyond the cursory descriptions of Trilateralists and neoconservatives mentioned in reference to each group's position on the political spectrum, it is necessary to explore further their general attitudes toward the Cold War, which will make it easier to see how IPS differed from them. Though much of the material written about the Trilateralists, as well as their chief organization, the Trilateral Commission, has been quite partisan, it is possible to obtain an understanding of their views from these accounts. First, though, a little background on the Trilateral Commission. David Rockefeller, Zbigniew Brzezinski, William Scranton, and several other prominent Americans, along with European and Japanese businessmen and policy makers formed the organization in 1973 to bring greater harmony into the relationship between the United States, Europe, and Japan. Members of the Trilateral Commission, as Stephen Gill has shown, came from companies

²⁹ Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism*, 24-32; Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism*, 98-100.

“at the apex of world economic hierarchies and at the vanguard of the transnationalization process.” Politically, the trilateralists tended to come from the center and held moderate views. Many members often had ties to academic or policy institutions, especially in the fields of political science and economics. By the 1980s, furthermore, almost half of the Commission’s budget came from corporate donations.³⁰

Jerry W. Sanders portrays Paul Warnke and other liberal moderates as following the “global managerial approach” to foreign policy. Global managerialists downplayed the significance of East-West tensions, and thus containment, and argued for a greater focus on the discrepancies between the North and South in regard to development. Thus, according to Sanders, “unilateral military strength” was far less important than a nation being able to create a “new rationalized international order” to allow for equal development in all nations. In other words, threatening Third World nations with military force would not achieve America’s goal of securing scarce resources. In addition to lowering tariffs on Third World goods entering America and paying higher prices for raw materials, the Trilateral Commission also advocated improved trade relations with the Soviet Union so as to temper the militarism of the Cold War. In each of these instances, though, America would remain the primary force, albeit based on economics instead of the military. Accepting Sanders’s description of foreign policy officials and commentators as “managerialists,” Natasha Zaretsky has compared liberal moderates to “benign parents” promoting a “prudent policy that took account of the nation’s limitations.” In general, the “managerialists” demanded more diplomacy and less intervention, expressed a greater concern for the world’s resources—which in turn led to

³⁰ Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 157-160, 165.

a recognition of a shift from East-West to North-South problems—and their preservation, and, in the words of Zaretsky, “greater responsibility for others, not out of a sense of charity, but out of a deeper conception of self-interest.” In her highly critical account of trilateralism, Holly Sklar has described the Trilateral Commission as seeking to bring together the United States, West Germany, and Japan to serve in a “custodial role” to preserve and help flourish “corporate capitalism,” particularly the multinational corporation. Thus, rather than meeting the demands of Third World nations for a New International Economic Order, trilateralists offered plans with “a few flourishes of affirmative action for Third World elites and whatever ‘trickle-down’ effects an expanding world economy could afford.” In regard to human rights, too, trilateralists sought the preservation of the status quo by aiding in the removal of the most barbaric dictators and replacing them with more “moderate” leaders while staying away from revolutionary forces.³¹

Before turning to the neoconservatives, it is worth exploring briefly the transformation of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), *the* premier Establishment foreign policy organization of the Cold War consensus era. Founded in 1921, the CFR had a membership composed of financiers, lawyers, journalists, and academics. The CFR, composed of both Democrats and Republicans, sought to develop an informed analysis of international affairs to guide America’s foreign policy and discourage isolationism.³²

³¹ Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Cambridge: South End Press, 1983), 172-178; Natasha Zaretsky, *No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 172-175; Holly Sklar, “Trilateralism: Managing Dependence and Democracy,” in *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, ed. Holly Sklar (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 8-9, 24-25, 30-32.

³² For a history of the CFR, see Robert D. Schulzinger’s *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Peter Grose,

Although, Vaïsse and Ehrman do not include the CFR on their spectrums, it is clear that the foreign policy body, in the aftermath of the demise of the consensus, favored the trilateral view of the Cold War. Lawrence H. Shoup and William Minter have shown how the CFR and the Trilateral Commission, in the 1970s, shared not only personnel but an affinity for viewing the world from a transnational perspective that required a greater level of interdependence among the nations of the world. Yet, despite a greater interest in the Third World, the trilateralists and CFR, Shoup and Minter have argued, desired nothing beyond a slight increase in raw material prices and the transfer of some industry to the region, as evidenced by their faith in multinational corporations.³³

Trilateralists rose to prominence in the late 1970s as the newly elected Democratic president Jimmy Carter, himself a member of the Trilateral Commission, asked members from both the Trilateral Commission and the CFR to join his administration. While Carter shunned the Committee on the Present Danger, a major neoconservative organization, by not appointing any of its members to administration positions, scholars have concluded that neoconservative ideas reigned supreme by the early 1980s due in part to the president's attempt to straddle both perspectives. As a result, by 1980, Carter offered a more militaristic foreign policy for America. Sanders has argued that the "Carter Doctrine," enunciated by the president during his 1980 State of the Union Address, "represented the return to full-fledged Cold War ideology and the relegitimation of Containment Militarism as the foundation for American foreign policy for the 1980s." Viewing every conflagration in the world as proof of Soviet aggression,

Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (1996; reprint, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2006).

³³ Lawrence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 260-264, 273-274.

proponents of Containment Militarism argued that only American military might, rather than economic leadership, could stop the Soviet menace.³⁴

Taking note of the various strands of thought in the 1970s and into the 1980s, Zaretsky has urged historians to view the decade as a time of transition with various groups offering their visions of America. Zaretsky describes the 1970s as a period of “struggle between those who interpreted recent upheavals through a nationalist lens, and those who were already coming to grips with a nascent post-Cold War transnational order.” In fact, this explains, Zaretsky suggests, the “family-under-siege” mentality that dominated much of the discussion in the 1970s “because it worked to reassert the boundaries of the nation itself at a moment when a transnational order was coming into being.” Political Scientist Joseph Peschek has portrayed these exchanges as an “intra-elite debate” that extended into the 1980s. Among policymakers associated with the Brookings Institution and the Trilateral Commission, “managerialism” served as a solution to the world’s problems. Another group of policymakers, usually tied to the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and other conservative and neoconservative organizations like the Committee on the Present Danger, favored increased defense spending and intervention to stop the spread of communism.³⁵ Yet, while acknowledging the debate over America’s future in the 1970s, the majority of studies pass over the contribution of IPS to this conversation.³⁶ By ignoring the

³⁴ Robert A. Strong, *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 17-20; Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis*, 241-242, 237.

³⁵ Zaretsky, *No Direction Home*, 225-226; Joseph G. Peschek, *Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America’s Rightward Turn* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 112-113.

³⁶ Peschek at least acknowledges IPS in his book, distinguishing the “elite policy actors” associated with the Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and the Trilateral Commission from IPS. The former organizations, according to Peschek, offered “class-based elite strategies of crisis management” as a means to preserve “the social relations of capitalism” so that they can be “reproduced on a domestic and international level.” See, Peschek, *Policy-Planning Organizations*, 5, 55. In stark contrast to IPS, the

contributions of intellectuals at IPS, scholars have made it seem as though general agreement existed among intellectuals and policymakers that American hegemony could not end. In the process of diminishing IPS's importance, furthermore, the popular narrative of liberalism's and the New Left's decline remains uncontested. This study rectifies the situation by offering the first complete study of IPS.³⁷

Though focusing on foreign policy issues during the Cold War, this study also demonstrates the importance of New Left ideas to the populist revival of the 1970s. As J. David Hoeveler has shown, a "shift of faith" occurred in the 1970s as conservatives looked "not [to] challenge the democratic priorities of American liberalism, but sought instead to reclaim them for its own." Conservatives chose an opportune time to embrace populism due to the neglect of the issue by Cold War liberals, who offered instead an elitist democratic theory, and the failure of the New Left, with its participatory democracy, to appeal to a larger share of the American people. Dominic Sandbrook, too, has suggested that "partly as a reaction to Vietnam and Watergate, partly as a result of the

Trilateral Commission, in its 1975 report *The Crisis of Democracy*, warned the nation of the perils of too much democracy. In a chapter of the report written by famed political scientist Samuel Huntington, he concluded that "some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy—an 'excess of democracy' in much the same sense in which . . . the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution . . . helped to precipitate the Civil War." As a result, Huntington called for "a greater degree of moderation in democracy." He argued that the attack on "expertise" had to come to an end and called for "some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups" in society in order to prevent the "overloading [of] the political system" and causing its destruction. Huntington showed affection for the "residual inheritances of traditional and aristocratic values" still found in Europe and Japan. See Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 113-114.

³⁷ There are several books about IPS that look at the writings of the intellectuals associated with the think tank, but there are no historical accounts of IPS that utilize the archival resources used for this study. The majority of the books about IPS, furthermore, serve as little more than fodder for conservatives looking to paint the Institute as un-American and revolutionary. See, for instance, S. Steven Powell, *Covert Cadre: Inside the Institute for Policy Studies* (Ottawa, IL: Green Hill Publishers, 1987); Robert Chandler, *Shadow World: Resurgent Russia, The Global New Left, and Radical Islam* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2008); Harvey Klehr, *Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), especially chapter 12; Guenter Levy, *The Cause That Failed: Communism in American Political Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 246-247.

growth of individualism, the decline of institutions, and the conflict between liberalism and traditionalism,” a “new kind of populism” found a wide audience in America in the 1970s.³⁸ At the same time, particularly at the local level, there arose what historians have called a “New Populism” to describe the tremendous growth in community organizing by leftists in the 1970s.³⁹ Whether coming from a conservative or radical liberal perspective, populism experienced a rebirth in the 1970s. No doubt due to the already mentioned tendency to equate the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of conservatism, IPS, whose fundamental purpose was to advance the ideal of participatory democracy, is nowhere to be found in the literature on populism in the 1970s.

Further, this study demonstrates the role played by IPS in the growing opposition to neoliberalism in America and abroad. Whether leading the effort to expose the ways in which neoliberal economic policies led to human rights abuses in Chile or promoting the “common good” through participatory democracy, IPS stood at the forefront of the struggle against neoliberalism. With the rise tide of conservatism in politics, the nation increasingly turned to neoliberal solutions to deal with America’s declining economic fortunes.⁴⁰ As defined by one of its critics, David Harvey, neoliberalism “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms

³⁸ J. David Hoeveler, “Populism, Politics, and Public Policy: 1970s Conservatism,” *Journal of Policy History*, 10 (1998), 76, 78-79; Dominic Sandbrook, *Mad as Hell: The Crisis of the 1970s and the Rise of the Populist Right* (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), xiii. Perhaps no figure on the Right represented populist conservatism more than Alabama Governor, and presidential candidate, George Wallace. See Michael Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion* (1995; reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 222-242.

³⁹ Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen’s Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), xiv; Robert Fisher, *Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America* (New York: Twayne, 1994), 139-140.

⁴⁰ Neoliberalism, of course, existed as far back as the 1930s. For a history of neoliberal thought, see Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Daniel Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road From Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” Neoliberal theory holds, Harvey explains, that the state is necessary for its ability to issue currency, protect private property, and keep markets functioning freely or even create markets when necessary. States should not interfere with free markets because governments do not possess the requisite economic knowledge and interference by interest groups made government involvement in economic affairs chaotic.⁴¹

What has the turn to neoliberalism done to American civic relations? By the 1970s, according to the historian Howard Brick, the noneconomic society representative of post capitalist thought fell to the wayside as economics once again regained its position of dominance in American thought and society. With this turn came the acceptance of “the principle that only individuals exist and their sum, as ‘society,’ was purely a nominal aggregate and nothing real.” Thus, individualism came to be seen as more real than social groupings. Robert Putnam has offered evidence of what he views as the disappearance of “social capital” in America, which led to a concomitant decline in involvement by ordinary Americans in civic affairs.⁴² With economic principles emphasizing individualism reining supreme and voluntary associations losing their members, participatory democracy faced worsening conditions as the twentieth century came to a close.

Further, this study sheds new light on the role New Left thinkers continued to play in the public sphere. Not all New Left activists left the streets for the lecture halls

⁴¹ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.

⁴² Howard Brick, *Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern American Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 238; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

and seminar rooms of academia. Nonetheless, many commentators and historians repeat the myth that New Left intellectuals, like the protestors on the streets, allowed Marxist dogma to cloud their thinking as they entered History and English departments at universities across the country. One chronicler of the American Left, offering what amounts to a declension narrative for New Left intellectuals, has argued that the New Left did not disappear in the 1980s but rather congregated in the ivory towers of America's universities. Ex-New Leftists, he writes, took on the role of "Marxist and ex-Marxist scholars who assign students books by authors who write of the 'transition' from the 'commodity world' of capitalism to the 'moral economy' of socialism to be read at a time when the world is moving in the opposite direction." "With no constituency in the real world," such intellectuals "had no choice but to ascend to the ivory towers of theory." Influenced by Antonio Gramsci's argument that "hegemony" by the "superstructure" over the masses required a greater focus on the higher-ups in society, the New Left sought to influence their middle and upper class students.⁴³ Many conservatives, of course, made an argument similar to this that added to the culture wars of the 1960s through the 1980s.⁴⁴

One of the most famous, or perhaps infamous, books written on intellectuals is Russell Jacoby's *The Last Intellectuals*. Compared to the intellectuals that came of age in the mid-twentieth century, the most recent incarnation arrived on the scene as "high-tech intellectuals, consultants and professors—anonymous souls, who may be competent, and

⁴³ John Patrick Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the New Left*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 288-289, 294-295.

⁴⁴ One of the earliest, and still pertinent, accounts of the culture wars is James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), especially 197-224.

more than competent, but who do not enrich public life.” Confined to the university, academics “direct themselves to professional colleagues but are inaccessible and unknown to others,” he suggests. According to Jacoby, public individuals began disappearing in the 1960s, when “the universities virtually monopolized intellectual work” so that “intellectual life outside the campuses seemed quixotic.” Even the critics of the universities overcame their disillusionment with higher education and joined its ranks. Several prominent SDSers and student activists modified their views on the university and joined the ranks of academia. Though studying non-traditional topics, their ideas never transcended the university walls. Their writings became “unreadable communiques sweetened by thanks to colleagues and superiors,” but gibberish to the public.⁴⁵

More than any other feature of the academic intellectual, Jacoby derided the insularity of these figures. In comparison to past academics like C. Wright Mills, Marxist professors ignored their social surroundings in order to debate the meaning of texts and each other’s writings. As an example of this latter tendency, Jacoby points to Fredric Jameson’s laudatory remarks about the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, which paid no attention to how the structure seemed to limit access to the building, blocking the everyday person on the street from entering. Jacoby blames Marxists for a mode of thinking “that concentrates on texts, signs, and signifiers as the stuff of interpretation,” at the expense of a more socialized form of knowledge accessible to the layman.⁴⁶ In essence, a community of academic scholars replaced the larger community. More

⁴⁵ Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1987), x, 8, 16.

⁴⁶ Jacoby, 168-173.

recently, Richard Posner has claimed that when university professors did leave the ivory tower, they became nothing more than mouthpieces for a particular cause.⁴⁷

What about those intellectuals who chose to work outside of academia? The number of think tanks in America during the last half of the twentieth century skyrocketed.⁴⁸ While Posner describes “the modern American think tank” as “an important site of public-intellectual work,” he also points to certain characteristics that led him to question whether think tanks offered a base for public intellectuals. To begin with, their “output” usually had as its target audience government officials or other individuals involved in the political process. Posner also points to the fact that each think tank had its own political line. Moreover, think tanks often hired an intellectual to fill a particular niche and thus reified specialized knowledge. Therefore, Posner argues that he had “to regard the think-tank public intellectual as basically interchangeable with the academic public-intellectual.”⁴⁹

Thomas Medvetz, too, has a generally negative opinion of think tanks, blaming them for creating a less scientifically-oriented type of research. For instance, he links the rise of think tanks to “the de-autonomization of the scientific field.” Think tanks make it possible for politicians to ignore “autonomously produced social scientific knowledge”

⁴⁷ Richard A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 148, 52, and 388-389.

⁴⁸ In the early 1990s, James A. Smith put the number “policy research groups” located in the nation’s capital at about 100. By the mid-1990s, Lynn Hellebust claimed that as many as 1,200 think tanks were in operation in America. In 2004, Andrew Rich found 300 think tanks in America. The disparities between the various studies is likely due to the fact that what is and what is not a think tank is not entirely clear. For instance, while IPS is usually classified as a think tank in the literature, fellows at the Institute strongly disagreed with such a characterization. James Allen Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 214; Lynn Hellebust, ed., *Think Tank Directory: A Guide to Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations* (Topeka, KS: Government Research Service, 1996); Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4.

⁴⁹ Posner, 34-35.

by making available an alternative type of research. Thus, Medvetz contends, think tanks have the “power” to bring into question actual autonomous science. Along similar lines, Donald Critchlow has blamed the “change in the ethos of think tanks” on the “breakup of the liberal consensus; to a reassessment, based on heightened ideological tension, of the classical notion of scientific objectivity, a recognition of social pluralism and philosophical relativism; and to the appearance of a new type of think-tank promoter who came out of government disillusioned with a particular policy line and determined to marshal information and theory to suggest a comprehensive shift in direction.”⁵⁰

In fact, a common theme throughout much of the scholarly literature on think tanks is that their output is less scholarly due to the need to appease financial and political benefactors who make it possible for the think tanks’ ideas to see the light of day. Looking for a historical precedent, David Ricci sees the philosophical origins of think tanks in the writings of Aristotle and John Locke, among others. Whereas Plato looked to “philosopher-kings” for guidance, Aristotle feared that limiting advice to so few men and depending strictly on facts made it far more likely that a totalitarian form of government would arise. In place of philosopher-kings, Aristotle called for a “marketplace of ideas,” in the words of Ricci, where the decision-making process took into account various opinions.⁵¹ By rendering think tanks part of a “marketplace of ideas,” Ricci ends up diminishing the ideas that came out of IPS. Because the ideas emanating from IPS too often sought to debunk the Cold War consensus, the Institute failed to grab a larger share

⁵⁰ Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Donald T. Critchlow, “Think Tanks, Antistatistism, and Democracy: The Nonpartisan Ideal and Policy Research in the United States, 1913-1981,” in *The State and Social Investigation in Britain and the United States*, eds. Michael J. Lacey and Mary O. Furner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 319-320.

⁵¹ David M. Ricci, *The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 15-16.

of the market. On the other hand, “responsibly liberal” think tanks, Ricci argues, played a far greater role in determining policy because these think tanks offered ideas appropriate to the existing “American system rather than on behalf of its fundamental transformation.”⁵²

By exploring the writings of IPS intellectuals, who were, in most cases, older than the predominantly college-age students usually associated with the New Left, this study recasts discussions about both the makeup of the New Left and what became of the movement after the halcyon days of the 1960s. Much of the scholarship on the New Left highlights the youth aspect of the New Left. In his discussion of the New Left, Michael Kazin has written, “That the New Left also heralded itself as a *young* left was critical to its growth—and to its ultimate political failure.” The New Left would grow, if for no other reason, due simply to demographics—the baby boom generation started coming of age and entered America’s universities. Yet the New Left’s youthfulness led to a general disregard for liberal visions of the future while never taking the time to formulate its own program. Kazin is correct in saying that the New Left identified itself as a youth movement, but as the 1960s progressed, aging activists made attempts to develop new programs and organizations to carry forward the ideals of the movement. Part of what Holly Scott calls the “deconstruction of the youth frame” involved the move to make the counterculture less age-restrictive. Thus, co-ops, community gardens, neighborhood health care centers, or the numerous other establishments run by local groups, rather than dress and music, signified the counterculture. These efforts represented a sort of pragmatic reasoning on the part of aging radicals. Such “alternative institutions,” Scott

⁵² Ricci, 218-219.

suggests, “became a way to settle in for the long haul” and change society through means other than conflict and revolution.⁵³ IPS itself represented one of the “alternative institutions” that served as a home for aging New Leftists.

⁵³ Michael Kazin, *American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation* (New York: Knopf, 2011), 212-213; Holly Scott, “Youth Will Make the Revolution: Creating and Contesting the Youth Frame in the New Left,” *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2014), 40-41. For studies that make a similar argument, see Jack Whalen and Richard Flacks, *Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 144-147; Rebecca E. Klatch, *A Generation Divided: The New Left, The New Right, and The 1960s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 303-313. There have been, furthermore, a handful of studies of older activists who, while perhaps not of the New Left, shared the perspective of the New Left. See, for instance, Andrew E. Hunt, *David Dellinger: The Life and Times of a Nonviolent Revolutionary* (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Leilah Danielson, *American Gandhi: A.J. Muste and the History of Radicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

Chapter One: A History of IPS

Before considering the intellectual output of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), it is necessary to explore the rationale behind the Institute and the internal debates among fellows over the direction of IPS. With this in mind, this chapter provides background on IPS, focusing on its formation, who it intended to speak for, and how it expected to transmit its ideas to various groups in society. Influenced by their experiences in government and academia, the founders of IPS, perhaps naively, believed that the Institute could educate government officials and the larger American public to think differently about the Cold War. In the end, however, financial difficulties, obstinate government officials, and a poorly designed student education program greatly limited the ability of IPS to spread its ideas.

Origins: The Men and Institutions That Came Before IPS

Prior to coming together to form IPS in 1963, Marcus Raskin, Richard Barnet, and Arthur Waskow had already spent several years writing and thinking about the possible ways to bring an end to the Cold War and achieve disarmament. Raskin and Barnet, as advisors in the Kennedy administration, brought their unpopular views to the White House, and Waskow, a researcher at the Peace Research Institute (PRI), attempted to influence these same officials from outside of government. In the end, though, Waskow's attempt to act as a go-between for starry-eyed pacifists and hard-nosed realists failed, with neither side willing to meet the other halfway. Likewise, both Raskin and Barnet found out that Washington policymakers frowned upon ideas that strayed too far from the Cold War consensus.

Arthur I. Waskow was born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1933. After earning his bachelor's degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1954, he attended graduate school at the University of Wisconsin. Waskow received his doctorate in American history in 1963, for which he wrote a dissertation on the 1919 race riots. While completing his dissertation, Waskow joined Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier's office as a legislative aide in 1959, where he stayed until 1961. Another of Kastenmeier's aides, Marcus Raskin, who had recently earned a law degree at the University of Chicago, worked with Waskow on a study for the congressman that investigated the training of U.S. military forces in biological warfare at Fort Detrick. The two aides also co-wrote a policy paper titled "Deterrence and Reality," which became the basis for Waskow's *The Limits of Defense*. In 1961, Waskow joined the Peace Research Institute as a Research Fellow. He stayed at PRI until it merged with IPS in 1963, where Waskow would become a resident fellow.¹

As Waskow battled Cold War liberalism from outside of the government, Barnet and Raskin joined the New Frontier, pinning their hopes for a fresh foreign policy perspective on the young President Kennedy. Born in Boston, Massachusetts on May 7, 1929, Barnet graduated from Harvard University in 1952 and went on to earn a law degree at the school in 1954. He served as a U.S. Army officer in Europe in the Judge Advocate General's Corps from 1955-1957, dealing with international law. After a three-year stint at a private law firm, Barnet became a fellow at the Harvard Russian Research Center in 1960. From 1961 until 1963 he served as special assistant in the State

¹ For more information on PRI and Waskow's writings while a fellow at the institute, see Brian S. Mueller, "Waging Peace in a Disarmed World: Arthur Waskow's Vision of a Nonlethal Cold War," *Peace & Change* 40 (July 2015): 339-367.

Department for disarmament issues, where he helped set up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).² As a fellow at the Russian Research Center, Barnet studied disarmament issues. His research eventually led to the publication in 1960 of *Who Wants Disarmament?* Looking at the various attempts made by the United States and the Soviet Union to secure a disarmament agreement, Barnet had mixed opinions about such efforts.

The best hope for disarmament following World War II, the 1946 Baruch Plan, failed, according to Barnet, because Stalin realized that the Soviet Union's refusal to follow through would not result in "ultimatums or a rain of bombs, but unending debate." America demobilized its armed forces very soon after V-J Day and the Soviet Union seemed poised for great success in Europe, which offered fertile grounds for communist expansion. Furthermore, the plan itself offered no advantages for the Soviet Union, while, in the words of Barnet, "it was designed to be a riskless adventure" for America. In addition to allowing for the continued expansion of America's nuclear arsenal, the Baruch Plan required, in the words of Barnet, "economic control by a group of capitalist nations" and used "moralistic talk" about punishing countries that refused inspection. Nonetheless, Barnet considered the Baruch plan significant if for no other reason than that it represented "the only time in the post-war period when the American government seriously considered giving up its nuclear stockpiles."³

Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States, according to Barnet, dropped all pretense of wanting to disarm the world. When the Soviet Union uncharacteristically

² Richard J. Barnet Biographical Information, undated, Institute for Policy Studies Records (hereafter IPSR), Wisconsin Historical Society (hereafter WHS), Madison, Wisconsin, box 6, folder 1.

³ Richard J. Barnet, *Who Wants Disarmament?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 17-22.

accepted a plan put forth by the French and British in June 1954 that tied nuclear disarmament to a reduction in conventional forces, the United States suddenly backed down. Instead, beginning in 1956, it sought “ways to reduce the peculiar danger of modern weapons rather than the means to eliminate them entirely.”⁴ For at least the next thirty years, the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, limited discussions to arms control measures, and not disarmament.

A good part of this reluctance by the United States to destroy its arsenal stemmed from ideological considerations and a particular view of Marxism held by U.S. officials, Barnet claimed. While at one time America’s concerns may have been valid, Barnet suggested that Marxist theory no longer had any bearing on the Soviet Union’s nuclear policies. Believing that all capitalist nations were militaristic by nature and only worldwide revolution would bring an end to capitalist wars, Lenin gave little thought to the idea of disarmament. In the view of Barnet, moreover, the atomic bomb made capitalist nations aware of their own vulnerability to attack, and thus somewhat restricted their expansionist tendencies.⁵ Too often, as Barnet and other IPS intellectuals would repeatedly lament in later years, the United States based its foreign policy on ideological calculations, which prevented officials from seeing how existing circumstances offered new opportunities for agreement. Although quite critical of the United States in his studies, Barnet received the attention of John J. McCloy, one of the foreign policy Establishment’s Wise Men and a disarmament advisor for President Kennedy.⁶ As an

⁴ Barnet, *Who Wants Disarmament?*, 30, 38-40,

⁵ Barnet, *Who Wants Disarmament?*, 64-68.

⁶ Barnet admitted that disarmament faced many hurdles due, in large part, to the Soviet Union’s paranoid style and closed system. According to Barnet, the Soviet Union’s “anti-American propaganda” stalled efforts to bring about disarmament and if ended, “would tear down the wall insulating the Soviet Union from the rest of the world.” Barnet also expressed concern over the Soviet Union’s mistrust of foreigners. Fearful of foreign inspectors bringing foreign ideas into the Soviet Union and stealing Soviet

aide to McCloy, Barnet attempted to bring new perspectives to the Kennedy administration during some of the tensest periods in the Cold War.

As Raskin prepared to join the Kennedy administration, some of his past work under Kastenmeier came back to haunt the future IPS founder. During one of the many times that senate and congressional Republicans attacked *The Liberal Papers* and *The Limits of Defense*, Raskin's name came up due to his position in the Kennedy White House. In an attempt to show how deeply entrenched were the ideas of *The Liberal Papers* in both the Democratic Party and the Kennedy administration, Representative Robert Stafford (VT-R) pointed to Raskin's past involvement with the studies in question and his present role in the Kennedy administration. Stafford worried that Raskin, who "ha[d] an amazing record of illogical statements in the past," including questioning America's ability to defeat the Soviet Union and encouraging Americans to avoid military service. According to Stafford, Raskin's position as a special staff member of the National Security Council put him "inside one of the more vital areas of our defense organization today."⁷

Providing further evidence of the infiltration of radical ideas into the White House, Stafford referred to a review of the offending book in the *New York Times*, which "rarely reviewed paperback publications," but did so for *The Liberal Papers*. The congressman claimed that the reviewer's other job as "cultural coordinator" in the White

secrets, Soviet leaders set limits on where inspectors could look. See Barnet, *Who Wants Disarmament?*, 81-94.

⁷ *Congressional Record*, April 16, 1962, 6192-6193; Waskow informed David Riesman in mid-1961 that the Doubleday publishing house agreed to remove Raskin from the *The Limits of Defense* contract and delay publication of the book from anywhere between six and twelve months due to Raskin's position in the National Security Council. See Arthur Waskow to David Riesman, July 18, 1961, Arthur Waskow Papers (hereafter AWP), Wisconsin Historical Society (hereafter WHS), Madison, Wisconsin, box 9, folder 41.

House led him to review the book. His positive assessment of the book, therefore, might have been “an indication that the White House is not wholeheartedly in opposition to the proposals made in this publication,” according to Stafford. While denouncing *The Liberal Papers*, Stafford also sought to expose Raskin’s co-authorship of Waskow’s *Limits of Defense*. Stafford informed his fellow congressmen that Raskin and Waskow had written “Deterrence and Reality” while staffers for Kastenmeier. Upon further investigation, Stafford found that “a cursory check of the first 50 pages reveals not one difference in the wording of punctuation of even one sentence” from the earlier work. As a result, the congressman asked, “Will the real Marcus Raskin please do us a favor and stand up?”⁸

Before going any further, it is necessary to take a step back and look briefly at Raskin’s early years and how he came to arrive at the White House. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on April 30, 1934, by the age of sixteen he received an invitation to train at the Juilliard School in New York. Although considered a piano prodigy, Raskin found politics more interesting, so he left Juilliard after a year to enter the University of Chicago. At Chicago, he took courses with New Dealer Rexford Tugwell and international law expert Quincy Wright. Raskin worked as legislative counsel for Kastenmeier and several other congressmen at the same time as he attended the University of Chicago. When several of the congressmen he served lost in the 1960 election, Raskin began looking for a way to make up lost wages. David Riesman recommended Raskin to McGeorge Bundy. Agreeing to have Raskin join his staff, Bundy explained to Riesman, “Marc Raskin has a remarkably powerful and lively mind. We

⁸ *Congressional Record*, April 16, 1962, 6192-6193.

shall probably have some disagreement, but I shall feel a lot better for knowing that certain problems have passed by his critical eye on their way to resolution.”⁹

On his first day on the job, coming shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Raskin, in front of Walt W. Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and other advisors, questioned Bundy about whether America learned any lessons from overthrowing Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Soon thereafter, Raskin received a phone call from Bundy’s assistant telling him that he should no longer attend staff meetings, and that Bundy would meet with him alone at another time. Raskin, however, remained a thorn in the side of Bundy. In a memorandum written in early 1961, Raskin called for “fundamental changes” at Guantanamo in Cuba. While Raskin opposed ending U.S. occupation of the base, because it “would appear as an indication of weakness both at home and to the Communist world,” he thought the United States had to do something. “We might endeavor to turn it into a series of hospitals and technical institutions for the Cuban people, staffed by U.S. personnel. This will change the nature of the threat toward Cuba and make our presence there more palatable.”¹⁰ It did not bother Raskin that relations between the United States and Cuba were at their worst. Ironically, and unbeknownst to Raskin, administration officials were planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion at the same time as he wrote his memo.

The subject matter of the memos sent by Raskin to his superior covered a range of subjects, including America’s disarmament policy and interventionism. In a memorandum to Bundy and Carl Kaysen, a Deputy National Security Advisor, Raskin,

⁹ Marcus Raskin and Robert Spero, *The Four Freedoms Under Siege: The Clear and Present Danger from Our National Security State* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 273-275.

¹⁰ Raskin and Spero, *The Four Freedoms Under Siege*, 276.

who took part in a series of meetings between delegates from seventeen nations to discuss nuclear disarmament, advised against holding any additional meetings in the future.

Raskin predicted that the recent decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union to resume nuclear testing meant that the disarmament conference would result in “group breast beating on nuclear testing and recrimination by others against the United States.”

In place of the seventeen-nation talks, Raskin recommended that representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union meet privately, or else “the disarmament discussions will continue on a ritualistic and propaganda basis.” Around the same time, Raskin voiced his displeasure with a suggestion made by a British diplomat that the United States should retain indefinitely its trusteeships of certain nations. Reflecting on a conversation he had with Jonathan Bingham, United States Minister for the United Nations Trusteeship Council, Raskin admitted being “a bit taken aback” by the diplomat’s suggestion that the United States should oppose efforts by the U.N. to end America’s trusteeships. “Any maneuvers which would suggest to the world that we are going to keep people in a second class status with the United States acting as a classical ‘imperial power’ would be a tragic error for the United States internationally,” Raskin wrote to Bundy.¹¹

During his time on the National Security Council staff, moreover, Raskin implored Kennedy, through Bundy, to take more seriously the protestors speaking out against nuclear testing. When the Student Peace Union (SPU) picketed in front of the White House in November 1961, Kennedy sent out his disarmament advisors to converse

¹¹ Marcus Raskin Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy and Carl Kaysen, April 25, 1962 and Marcus Raskin Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “Visit to the United Nations,” February 2-5, 1962, both in IPSR, WHS, box 80, folder 5.

with the students. The following February, SPU organized a “Washington Action” protest that brought five thousand concerned Americans to the capitol, during which President Kennedy famously sent out a pot of coffee for the marchers. Writing just prior to the February SPU action, Raskin suggested that the Kennedy administration needed to take seriously the student protestors associated with the February 1962 protests organized by Turn Toward Peace and the Student Peace Union. “To some extent the way this group will be treated by the Administration will decide whether this group and others like it will take a more violent turn,” Raskin wrote to Bundy. He also suggested that public protests might give Kennedy “greater flexibility in foreign policy matters in ways he otherwise feels he might not have.” As a result, Raskin believed the administration had “something to learn from these people” and wholeheartedly recommended that the protestors be “treated courteously, with sensitivity, with understanding” by all government officials.¹² Thus, the faith in the American people that Raskin and so many other intellectuals at IPS exhibited throughout the entire period of this study predated the construction of the Institute.

The Philosophy Behind IPS

Shortly after the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held its national convention in Michigan, Raskin composed a letter to the president of Haverford College that offered a perspective of America remarkably similar to the outlook found in the recently written Port Huron statement from SDS. Raskin’s letter included a prospectus explaining the impetus behind the National Institute for Policy Studies. The future co-director of IPS bemoaned government officials for exhibiting a “paralysis of will,

¹² Marcus Raskin Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “Student Onslaught, February 15,” February 7, 1962, IPSR, WHS, box 80, folder 5.

imagination and energy, a fatalistic conviction and assumption that nothing much can be done, an acceptance of the belief that to live is to be imprisoned.” The prospectus complained that a “philosophy of nihilism . . . serves as a backdrop for those who would rather shirk their social responsibilities than accept them.” IPS, as described in the prospectus, would seek to overcome this nihilism by carrying out “three principle objectives.” IPS pledged to “investigate the premises and implications of present and proposed policies and institutions in foreign and domestic matters, especially where the latter affects foreign policy; (2) to search for policies and institutional forms that will encourage the ethic of individual responsibility in group or social action, and (3) to create a kind of education which will not only arouse people’s concern for public problems, but show them how their intellectual training bears on the solution of these problems.”

Analysis of government policies and programs, formulation of alternative plans and strategies, and educating citizens to play a greater role in their government would serve as guide posts for all future activities at IPS. Besides criticizing government officials for stale thinking and spelling out IPS’s plans, the prospectus castigated existing think tanks. Of the intellectuals at these think tanks and policy institutions, the prospectus explained, “But for the most part these men live by grace of the individuals or departments they advise, and therefore tend to confine their criticism and suggestions to making existing policy more ‘efficient,’ in terms of already accepted objectives. Their advice is almost always technical and procedural, and rarely ethical and substantial.”¹³

Therefore, Raskin’s unfavorable view toward think tanks such as the RAND Corporation stemmed from his deeply felt belief that intellectual independence and

¹³ “Formation of the National Institute for Policy Studies,” enclosed in letter from Hugh Borton to Marcus Raskin, June 28, 1962, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 25.

government funding were incompatible.¹⁴ As an example, in the twelve years preceding debate over the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in 1968, the Pentagon spent \$4.5 billion for research conducted by think tanks. In addition to researching ABM systems, think tank intellectuals provided the government with various arguments for use in defending the ABM system.¹⁵ To protect against a similar outcome for IPS, the co-directors put a clause in the IPS by-laws prohibiting the think tank and its fellows from taking government funds. As a result, Paul Dickson includes IPS in a group of “truly independent, nonprofit, self-determining think tanks” with “clients” coming from various “publics” rather than from the government.¹⁶

While wanting to distance itself from Washington D.C. so that it could retain its intellectual freedom and speak “truth to power,” IPS nevertheless determined that in order to influence government officials, the Institute would have to operate in the nation’s capital. Not everyone agreed with the decision, however. Recounting a conversation he and Barnet had with William O. Douglas in early 1963 about their idea for a new institute, Raskin remembered the Supreme Court Justice saying, “It’s a good idea, but reason and truth are out of fashion in American life. If I were your age, I would not start an institute in Washington. I would start it in the Himalayas.”¹⁷ Why did Raskin and

¹⁴ The RAND Corporation, which opened its doors in 1946 as a result of a partnership between the U.S. Army and Douglas Aircraft Company, eventually gained its independence two years later. Though independent of the military, the think tank continued contracted research for the various branches. More than any other think tank, the RAND Corporation has received the most attention from scholars. For instance, see Alex Abella, *Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2008); Martin J. Collins, *Cold War Laboratory: RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945-1950* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2002); Bruce L.R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

¹⁵ Paul Dickson, *Think Tanks* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 158-159.

¹⁶ Dickson, *Think Tanks*, 30-31.

¹⁷ Marcus Raskin and Robert Spero, *The Four Freedoms Under Siege*, 278-279.

Barnet feel so adamant about locating their think tank in Washington? A report from 1963 referred to two “opposite deficiencies” in the relationship between government and academia. Academics working closely with the government, the report charged, became mouthpieces for whatever agency or department they worked for, and thus “are not—or do not feel—invited to challenge existing policy (especially the basic premises) much less to suggest or prepare alternatives.” Complete separation from the government, however, posed its own set of problems. Isolation from the workings of government led to “an out-of-date or largely theoretical picture of how policies are formed and how administrative and political forces really come into play.”¹⁸ IPS situated itself between the two “deficiencies,” hoping to avoid both. As discussed below in greater detail, the whole concept behind IPS, of putting ideas into action, could not have taken place, at least during the heyday of liberal governance in the early 1960s, anywhere else besides Washington D.C.

Another proposal spoke of a “special need” for IPS in Washington D.C. First, the report stated that “decisions of defense and foreign policy are being made which have relevance and fundamental importance to the nation for extended periods of time.” For instance, the defense budget earmarked money for weapons development taking place over the next decade and included military aid for countries well into the future. The information used to determine the military budget and international relationships did not reach academics until months or years later. As a result, the report stated, “If the academic community in general is to bring the full power of its resources to bear on problems of first importance to the nation, it must have timely access to information” and

¹⁸ The Institute for Policy Studies Information Sheet, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50.

keep “its representatives in touch with the actual problems under consideration by decision makers.” The report envisioned IPS serving as a “new switchboard for the creative flow of policy debate” that would “provide a meaningful link between the University and policy making that does not now exist.” In explaining the role of the Institute as a center for education, the proposal stated that “it is an especially important responsibility of education to help reverse the trend toward separation of basic decision making from the citizenry.” IPS would strengthen the decision-making power of the American public by “increasing the institutional and geographical representation in Washington of the academic community,” by helping bring public policy issues into universities, and by making the subsequent research “available not only to policy makers but to the community at large.”¹⁹ It is no exaggeration to say, therefore, that IPS held its educative role in high esteem. In a manner similar to other think tanks, IPS sought to educate policymakers by bringing academics into closer contact with policymakers. Yet more important for IPS, and what distinguished it from other think tanks, was the Institute’s desire to educate the masses and prepare them for a larger role in decision-making.

IPS would eventually look outside the beltway for solutions to America’s problems, but in the early 1960s, IPS still considered Washington as the best hope for solving America’s problems.²⁰ In an interview in the mid-1990s, Raskin admitted that IPS’s early efforts “to speak truth to power,” “was predicated on a particular liberal

¹⁹ “Proposal for an Institute for Policy Studies,” no author, undated [likely 1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50.

²⁰ IPS created three additional institutes in the late 1960s: the Cambridge Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Bay Area Institute in San Francisco, California, and the Institute for Southern Studies out of Atlanta, Georgia. With the exception of the Cambridge Institute, IPS’s sister institutes faced dire financial circumstances. IPS found its greatest success with the Transnational Institute (TNI) in Amsterdam.

framework: the powerful being prepared to listen; the framework of the corporate-liberal world where people would engage in discussion on specific things, wanting to hear different kinds of ideas.” As the co-directors admitted, IPS came to realize in a very short time that the policymakers in Washington rarely sought an open dialogue.²¹

In choosing Washington D.C. as its home base, IPS also had to contend with other think tanks with far more experience and years building relationships with government officials. Not ignorant of the possible difficulties ahead for IPS, Raskin met with officials from the Brookings Institution. During the meeting, Robert Calkins, the president of Brookings, questioned Raskin’s desire to create another think tank in Washington D.C. He pointed to the fact that the existing institutions already did not have “adequate financing, adequate manpower and none of which felt it was able to do an adequate job.” With these difficulties in mind, Calkins suggested that Raskin and his colleagues join Brookings or another think tank instead of starting anew. In an addendum to the minutes, Barnet and Robert B. Livingston described Calkins as “positively frightened by the competition” that would likely come from IPS due to the Brookings Institution’s “definitely lesser quality of personnel and product.” Barnet and Livingston offered a critical appraisal of the research coming out of Brookings, describing the reports as “a description of the state of affairs written in conspicuous detail but without much

²¹ Michael Fortun and Kim Fortun, “Making Space, Speaking Truth: The Institute for Policy Studies, 1963-1995,” in *Corporation Futures: The Diffusion of the Culturally Sensitive Corporate Form*, ed. George E. Marcus (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 252. Various organizations, of course, sought to influence America’s foreign policy. For one example, see Robert D. Schulzinger’s *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Schulzinger’s study details the repeated efforts by the Council to influence government policies. For the most part, according to Schulzinger, the Council, even as “the reflector of the attitudes of powerful individuals,” had little clout in the halls of power, with the possible exception being during Truman’s presidency. See 60-62, 136-143, and 253.

evaluation.”²² Calkins’s counsel, therefore, served as additional proof for IPS’s founders of the timid approach of existing think tanks.

Both contemporary and later critics of IPS generally agreed that IPS differed from traditional think tanks by following a clear ideological line. The characterization of IPS as an outcast in the world of policy institutes and think tanks, though, is not necessarily correct. As Thomas Medvetz has shown in his study of think tanks in America, these institutions have always acted ideologically. He rejects what he calls the “transformation thesis,” which posits that think tanks changed dramatically in the 1960s as their numbers swelled and the institutions readily publicized their ideological proclivities. Think tanks like Brookings did not change so much as become a think tank in the 1960s, Medvetz has argued, by taking part in the “genesis of the space of think tanks,” which involved replacing technical academic research with a form of knowledge understandable to the public. As for ideology, Medvetz has shown that think tanks always promoted a particular political cause, though these ideologies have changed.²³

As Raskin gauged the interest of educators and intellectuals regarding the possibility of a new institute, he and a group of his closest associates took the initial steps toward making IPS a reality. According to Waskow, conversations surrounding the formation of IPS originally took place among a group that included himself, Raskin,

²² Minutes from meeting on November 8, 1962 between Richard J. Barnet, Robert B. Livingston, and Robert Calkins, Field Haviland, and George Graham of the Brookings Institute, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 49. As Donald Critchlow’s study of the Brookings Institution has shown, the think tank held quite conservative views. Despite its avowed nonpartisanship, Brookings, under the direction of Harold G. Moulton, became a harsh critic of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Brookings did, however, become more liberal after Calkins took over from Moulton in 1952. See Donald T. Critchlow, *The Brookings Institution, 1946-1952: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society* (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), especially 110, 123-124, and 129-135.

²³ Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 112-113. Medvetz, a sociologist, takes the unique approach of classifying all early “think tanks” as “proto-think tanks” that did not really become think tanks until the 1960s. See 55-83.

Barnet, Christopher Jencks of the *New Republic*, Gar Alperovitz, who had been working on the staff of Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, Robert Livingston of the National Institute of Mental Health, and PRI's Donald Michael. According to Waskow, these early conversations envisioned IPS as being a "home for the kind of learning that I had in Kastenmeier's office, or that Raskin had from Bundy's office." [Waskow crossed out this sentence in his draft of the letter]. In addition to the seven men above, Waskow explained that IPS would invite a "rotating group of about ten eminent men a year in the various social and behavioral sciences," and then another "five to ten non-Established 'elder statesmen' around Washington—men like Rex Tugwell and James R. Newman." While at IPS, these intellectuals would conduct "research in the basic problems of policy formation in the present world crisis, using Washington as a laboratory of sorts. . . ." Waskow also thought that IPS would invite fifty to sixty students to spend an academic year at the think tank. Besides taking part in policy research, students would work in congressional offices, lobby for groups such as SANE, or serve in executive offices.²⁴

It is significant to note that several of the figures with a hand in the creation of IPS previously worked as aides to congressmen or as lower-level bureaucrats. In a letter asking the historian C. Vann Woodward to join IPS as a visiting fellow, Waskow described himself and the six others involved in the early stages of IPS as "a league of frightened men." These early IPS supporters, Waskow wrote, had "all been close enough to the government to realize how unable it is to examine itself or its policies clearly or carefully, and how impossible any change in direction will be without such a basic re-

²⁴ Arthur Waskow to Anatol Rapoport, November 29, 1962, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 49.

examination.”²⁵ The past political experiences of the founders makes it all the more remarkable that these men felt that IPS could have a meaningful effect on government officials.

IPS Fellows

The previous section offered a glimpse into the thinking behind IPS as well as the strategic reasons for situating the Institute in the nation’s capital. Raskin, Barnet, Waskow, and the others, though, still had to deal with the operational issue of funding. Fortunately for IPS, economic hardships at PRI led that institute to seek a partnership or merger. Following the loss of a major foundation grant, Donald Michael, Director of Planning and Programs for PRI, sought a “transformation” of PRI by merging it with another research institute. Michael argued that the collapse of PRI would have an overall negative impact on the entire field of peace research. Trying to gain the support of the PRI board of directors for a merger with IPS, Michael claimed, “I cannot stress this point too much; the extent to which the community that has come to depend on PRI will be encouraged or discouraged in its own methods by PRI’s future affiliations and actions will depend very much on how quickly such a transformation is made.”²⁶ PRI combined with IPS rather than another institute for a variety of reasons, but the relationships between Waskow, Michael, Raskin, and the other originators of IPS no doubt played a role in this outcome.

²⁵ Arthur Waskow to C. Vann Woodward, December 19, 1962, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 49. Explaining that his new job at Yale University prevented him from accepting Waskow’s offer, Woodward called IPS “one of the most promising and bold ventures in American academic life in several years.” See C. Vann Woodward to Arthur Waskow, January 4, 1963, box 6, folder 50. In the mid-1960s, Waskow remembered Raskin as the “spark” that ignited discussion about forming a new institute in Washington D.C. See Arthur Waskow to Joy Matusky, September 1, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 1.

²⁶ Donald Michael to PRI Board of Directors, July 9, 1963, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 11.

Ultimately, the decision to have IPS absorb PRI resulted from another funding offer made to IPS. James P. Warburg, a financial advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt, and Philip Stern, heir to the Sears, Roebuck, and Company fortune, expressed the greatest interest in IPS early on. Stern, according to Waskow, “offered to give a big grant to IPS on two conditions: one was getting a letter from [John F.] Kennedy saying it was a good idea, the other was getting ‘x’ amount of money that he would match, I think it was 50 or 75 or \$100,000, something like that. So where was that match gonna come from? And it was not at all clear until finally what Don Michael and I proposed was that we convince the board of the Peace Research Institute that it wasn’t gonna go anywhere and that it should devote the rest of the money it had to making this match, getting IPS started, on the condition that Michael and I would become fellows of IPS. So the PRI board agreed to that, and that made the match and made possible the opening of IPS in 1963.”²⁷

IPS filed its incorporation papers on November 29, 1962 and on November 3, 1963 the Institute opened its doors.²⁸ Barnet, Raskin, and David Riesman served as the founding trustees of IPS. In addition to these three individuals, the IPS board of trustees included Thurman Arnold, a former judge on the Court of Appeals and a senior partner at Arnold, Fortas, & Porter; David F. Cavers, professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago; Steven Muller, director of the Center for International Studies at Cornell University; Gerard Piel, publisher of the *Scientific American*; Freeman Dyson, physicist at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey; and James Dixon, president of Antioch

²⁷ Arthur Waskow, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2014.

²⁸ Board Minutes Index, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 1.

College. James P. Warburg and Philip M. Stern also served on the board of trustees.²⁹

Barnet and Raskin held the position of co-directors of the Institute.

Originally, intellectuals at IPS held any of three designations. Visiting fellows had a one-year appointment, with the possibility of an extension. Fellows in this category often came from universities, while others were “not chosen for their eminence or formal qualifications in a particular discipline, but for intellectual promise and for interests which can best be pursued at the institute.” When IPS began operations, several universities agreed to pay the salaries and administrative costs to have faculty join IPS as visiting fellows. These universities included Antioch College, Cornell University, Northwestern University, Rutgers University, and Wesleyan University. Associate fellows usually lived in Washington D.C. and held jobs as government officials, academics, or lawyers and worked part-time at IPS. Resident fellows at IPS held permanent positions and would take part in educating the students at the Institute and working on longer research projects.³⁰ Resident fellows in 1963-1964 included Raskin, Barnet, Jencks, Waskow, Donald Michael, and Milton Kotler. David Bazelon, Paul Goodman, and David Riesman held the position of visiting fellows.³¹

Getting By: IPS’s Tenuous Financial Existence

The budget for the year 1963 to 1964 totaled just over \$200,000. Early funding came from the Edgar Stern Foundation, which offered \$40,000 for IPS’s first year with \$30,000 each of the next two years. Another \$32,500 came from the Peace Research

²⁹ Minutes of Organization Meeting of Trustees of Institute for Policy Studies, February 6, 1963, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 2; The Institute for Policy Studies Information Sheet, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50; Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Trustees of the Institute for Policy Studies, August 12, 1963, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 2.

³⁰ The Institute for Policy Studies Information Sheet, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50.

³¹ Institute for Policy Studies: 25th Anniversary Campaign for the Future,” undated [1988], IPSR, WHS, box 17, folder 20.

Institute for the first year, as did \$50,000 from an anonymous source.³² By the end of the decade, the budget grew to almost \$500,000. While IPS did not rake in big money, neither did it face major cash windfalls. Through March 1964, IPS received funds totaling \$167,577.74, which included large grants from the Stern Family Fund, the Ford Foundation, the EDO Foundation and James Warburg. Three years later, Warburg donated \$400,000 to IPS. The next largest donation in 1967, \$25,000, came from the Samuel Rubin Foundation, followed by smaller contributions from Philip Stern and Irving Laucks of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The largest contributions in 1968 came from Philip Stern, who gave IPS just over \$91,000, in addition to another \$11,000 from the Stern Family Fund. \$30,000 came from the Samuel Rubin Foundation. The D.J. Bernstein Foundation contributed \$50,000; donations of \$17,000 came from the Carnegie Corporation; and the Field Foundation provided IPS with funds totaling \$15,000.³³

Thus, throughout the 1960s, it appeared as if IPS's creators made the correct choice when they decided to reject funding from the federal government, but conditions changed in the 1970s. The annual budget ending September 30, 1971 showed that IPS had overestimated its "projected contributions" by \$200,000 and that expenses had gone \$70,000 over budget. Matters improved somewhat the following year after IPS received \$1,066,350 in assets from the estate of Daniel J. Bernstein, a wealthy Wall Street investor

³² Facts About the Institute, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50; The Institute for Policy Studies Information Sheet, undated [1963], Ibid.

³³ Annual Budget: 1964-1965: Budget totaled \$199,200. Annual Budget: 1965-1966: Budget totaled \$220,000. Annual Budget: 1966-1967: \$239,800. Annual Budget: 1967-1968: \$385,000. Annual Budget: 1968-1969: \$423,500. Annual Budget: 1969-1970: \$483,700, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 5; Sources of Funds to the Institute, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 51; Board of Trustees to Finance Committee, September 27, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 3; Contributions—1967, AWP, WHS, Box 7, Folder 23; Contributions—1968, Ibid.

and stockbroker. The Samuel Rubin Foundation gave IPS over \$300,000 in 1974-1975, but \$255,000 of that went to helping IPS create the Transnational Institute.³⁴ By the time of the 1975-1976 budget, IPS had reduced its budget shortfall to \$110,000, which the board considered “manageable.”³⁵ Nonetheless, IPS faced a crisis in 1977 and 1978. IPS’s expenses ballooned to over one million dollars during these years. Recognizing the troubles that lay ahead, the IPS board of trustees decided that the “total authorized expenditure” for fiscal year 1977-1978 could not exceed \$877,522. By February 1978, the IPS budget for fiscal year 1977-1978 had reached \$1.5 million, with a projected income of only \$833,800. Paying down the expected deficit meant that IPS investments, or endowments, would be “entirely depleted.” In addition to the “primary problem” of administrative costs being too high, intellectuals at IPS failed to secure outside funding.³⁶

Budgets, deficits, and foundation grants might seem trivial, but the financial difficulties experienced by IPS in the mid-1970s—a problem that would continue to haunt IPS through the entire period covered in this study—occurred as a result of larger forces both internally and externally. I analyze the outside factors here, while the discussion over how the internal dynamics of IPS led to the budget crisis receive attention later in the next chapter. Alice O’Conner has shown how conservative philanthropy and the foundations that dispensed their funds grew more structured and united in the 1970s. Additionally, within conservative circles there grew a fear of a liberal “new class” made

³⁴ Edgard Lockwood, Report of the Finance Committee, October 15, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 8; Summary of Investment Accounts, March 1, 1972, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 9; Institute for Policy Studies Contributions and Grants for the Nine Months Ended June 30, 1975, AWP, box 7, folder 31.

³⁵ Minutes of Meeting of Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, November 14-15, 1975, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 15.

³⁶ Institute for Policy Studies Projected Income Fiscal year 1977-1978, IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 2; Minutes of Meeting of Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, October 21-22, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 2; and Robert Borosage to Peter Weiss, February 20, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 3.

up of intellectuals and professionals who replaced business capitalists at the top of society. Worried that “new class” ideas threatened capitalism, conservatives issued a clarion call for conservative foundations to fund a “counterintelligentsia.”³⁷

Medvetz’s research on think tanks supports O’Conner’s argument. According to him, think tanks on the Left failed to reach the level of prominence achieved by their opponents on the Right because the former lacked funding from large corporations. Furthermore, Medvetz claims that government surveillance and the decision of many leftist intellectuals to go into academia weakened existing leftist think tanks and made them unattractive to funders. Whereas IPS received the majority of its financial support from the Samuel Rubin Foundation, a conservative think tank like the Heritage Foundation had more options. For instance, the Heritage Foundation’s “Heritage 10: Funding the Conservative Decade” in the 1980s brought in \$37 million by 1986, most of it from corporations. During the campaign, 44 donors gave gifts of over \$100,000.³⁸ Writing in the 1980s, journalist Sidney Blumenthal described this period of growth for conservative intellectuals in and out of think tanks as the birth of the conservative “counter-establishment.” Noting the recent realignment in politics, Blumenthal rejected the idea that the conservative resurgence had anything to do with a change in party structure. Rather, he argued that conservatives became the new “new class.” Conservative think tanks, foundations, journals, and newspapers grew in influence as campaigning

³⁷ Alice O’Conner, “Financing the Counterrevolution,” in *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s*, eds. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 153-154, 157-159. For a conservative critique of the “new class” idea, see B. Bruce-Briggs, ed., *The New Class?* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979). Interestingly, some IPS intellectuals, especially Waskow and David Bazelon, spoke highly of the “new class.” See David T. Bazelon, *Power in America: The Politics of the New Class* (New York: New American Library, 1967), particularly 308-309, 362-367; Arthur Waskow, “The Impact of Abundance—From ‘Working Class’ to ‘New Class,’” *Northern Alumnus* 12 (Summer 1969): 7-9.

³⁸ Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America*, 142-143.

increasingly became non-stop and politicians required new ideas to defend their political positions.³⁹

Educating Washington's Elites: IPS's Seminars

IPS's creators decided to locate the think tank's headquarters in Washington D.C. in order to play an educative role for government officials. Besides providing research to policymakers, IPS used seminars for congressional assistants, a practice carried over from the Peace Research Institute, as an educational forum. In a funding proposal, Barnet pointed to the ability of congressional seminars to introduce congressional assistants to the "subtleties" of legislation. According to Barnet, "the subtleties—which are the important factors in these matters—become clear only by careful study and most Congressmen and their assistants have not had the time for such study. (Indeed, many have not been aware of the existence of the subtleties.)"⁴⁰

No doubt informed by their own experiences as congressional assistants, some of the early fellows at IPS understood the influence aides had over congressmen. IPS held seminars for congressional assistants because, according to a proposal for a seminar on "Defense and Disarmament" in January 1964, "In almost all Congressional offices the legislative assistant is the person whose role it is to be the first to absorb new ideas, cope with new policy problems, and develop new legislative approaches." Much like seminars held in college classrooms, congressional assistants would attend, over a period of ten weeks, seminars led by government officials and academics and discuss a set of common

³⁹ Sidney Blumenthal, *The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: The Conservative Ascent to Political Power*, 2nd ed. (New York: Union Square Press, 2008), 1-8.

⁴⁰ Richard Barnet to Milton Shapp, November 29, 1963, AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 12. PRI held seminars led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control Arthur Barber, Ralph Lapp, Kenneth Boulding, Arthur Lawson, and Emile Benoit.

readings. The twenty-three assistants enrolled in the program in 1965 completed readings related to disarmament. These seminars, Raskin explained, were intended to instill within the congressional assistants “a greater appreciation of why the disarmament context is a plausible and indeed, necessary context in which the U.S. should pursue its foreign policy.”⁴¹

In its first academic year, 1963-1964, IPS also held six seminars for congressmen. Raskin and Barnet led a seminar titled “National Security Institutions and Disarmament;” Paul Goodman and Christopher Jencks conducted a seminar entitled “Innovation in American Education;” and Arthur Waskow and Paul Goodman organized a seminar on “The New Politics.”⁴² A little less than two years into the seminars, Raskin reported that about eight congressmen attended each session. He claimed that the congressmen were “generally enthusiastic” about the sessions and that IPS fellows “developed personal relationships with the Congressmen.” As a result of the “personal relationships,” IPS fellows were able “to initiate a variety of ideas through these members [of Congress].” Raskin specifically mentioned education and foreign policy as two areas in which IPS fellows had a hand in helping congressmen. In addition to meetings with congressmen, IPS held its seminars for congressional assistants. To illustrate the influence of IPS on Capitol Hill, Raskin quoted part of a speech given by congressman John Brademas (IN-D), praising IPS. As a member of the Committee on Education and Labor, the congressman explained that his job required a level of expertise beyond the scope of his staff, so he turned to IPS and its seminars on education. IPS, according to Brademas,

⁴¹ Proposal for IPS Seminar on “Defense and Disarmament,” no author, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 12; Marcus Raskin to Irving Laucks, May 11, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 9.

⁴² The Institute for Policy Studies Information Sheet, no author, undated, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50.

provided him with “a first-class memorandum on the Administration’s education bill” that the congressman found to be so important that he included the information in an amendment that eventually passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives.⁴³

IPS’s congressional seminars, nonetheless, faced a series a problems that limited their reach. In a candid letter to Barnet, Raskin expressed his concern over the unwillingness of government officials to attend the seminars, or if they did attend, do the work required to gain valuable insight from the discussions during these events. Nonetheless, reflecting on the first year’s activities at the Institute, Raskin praised the seminars for bringing the work of the intellectuals at IPS to the attention of other intellectuals and government officials and often laying the groundwork for future studies. Attendance at the seminars, however, posed a problem. Faulting a promotional advertisement for offering too rosy of a picture of IPS, Donald Michael questioned the number of congressional names listed for a seminar conducted by the Institute. “We all well remember how we used to race around getting members of the Institute and good friends to fill up the empty seats so the couple of Congressmen that showed up wouldn’t feel imposed upon.” Even before Michael’s snide comment, the co-directors realized that IPS’s congressional seminars faced hurdles in regard to gaining the acceptance of government officials. “Any idea we had that busy government people or associate fellows would come and do serious thinking requiring study and preparation has proved to be misplaced,” Raskin explained. An open attendance policy, furthermore, led to the diminished stature of seminars. Claiming that “status considerations play an important part” for many when deciding whether to attend or not, Raskin argued, “One or two

⁴³ Marcus Raskin to Irving Laucks, May 11, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 9.

obvious inferiors at the table are enough to send nervous GS 18's and Assistant Secretaries running." Raskin did not offer any solutions to the last point he made about who attended the seminars. It is surprising that given his views on democracy and education Raskin would even voice such a concern.⁴⁴

IPS continued to hold seminars for the rest of the 1960s, receiving positive reactions to the events from congressmen and their assistants.⁴⁵ Republican Senator Charles Goodell's legislative assistant wrote to Barnet in 1970 to tell him how much he "greatly appreciated the opportunity I have had to work with you on the Indochina issue" and mentioned that the senator, too, was "deeply grateful . . . for the invaluable advice and help you have given us." Congressman John Dow (NY-D) praised IPS and proclaimed "we are better off to listen to the rather rare and unusual analyses that your group produces, which are not available elsewhere, because few others can offer that kind of thing."⁴⁶

Despite the praise of congressmen and their aides, IPS abandoned the seminars in the early 1970s. When the Institute attempted to revive the seminars in the mid-1970s, Robert Borosage claimed that a "contradiction" existed between the goals of IPS and the attitudes of congressional staffers in regard to theory that created a lack of interest among for the seminars. Referring to the staffers, Borosage wrote, "They are not interested in

⁴⁴ Marcus Raskin to Richard Barnet, undated [likely 1964], IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 43; Donald N. Michael to IPS Fellows, "Reactions to Draft Statement Describing the Institute for Policy Studies," April 11, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 10, folder 22.

⁴⁵ A sampling of 1968 congressional assistants seminars included "The Impact of the Vietnam War on American Society," with lectures by Raskin and Waskow; Arthur Kinoy on the "Impact of the War on Civil Liberties; Frank Smith of IPS speaking on "The War and the Ghetto"; Richard Barnet on "The War and the Mechanics of Government Policy-Making"; and David Halberstam on "The War and Politics." See "Schedule for Annual Congressional Assistants Seminars," 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 6, folder 53.

⁴⁶ Andrew von Hirsch to Richard Barnet, December 23, 1970, IPSR, WHS, box 3, folder 3; John G. Dow to Marcus Raskin, December 15, 1970, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 8.

theoretical overviews, in change from the bottom or ideas which do not concern their role as ‘professionals.’” Yet, as Borosage saw it, “We specifically sought to provide general overviews of different subjects, combined with the perspectives of activists working at a local level on the problem. The former tended to bore the assistants and the latter tended to appal [sic] them. Their notion of politics was those activities which involved elected officials, and they were antagonistic to those who acted outside of that framework.” However, trying to make the seminars more relevant by offering specific legislative proposals threatened IPS’s tax-exempt status.⁴⁷ It is surprising that IPS attempted to revive the seminars at a moment in its history when, as Borosage’s comments reveal, many of the intellectuals at the Institute focused increasingly on issues of local governance. Thus, Borosage’s cautionary words offer an early glimpse into a question that would continue to plague IPS during these years: should IPS intellectuals work with officials in the national government or concentrate their efforts on grassroots movements?

Educating the Movement: IPS’s Educational Efforts

In addition to using seminars to educate congressmen and their assistants, IPS carried out its educative role by bringing students into the Institute to receive a form of training not available in the traditional university. IPS’s interest in education stemmed from its distrust of America’s educational system, which, in the opinion of IPS intellectuals, catered to America’s military-industrial complex. Taking education out of the classroom, IPS sought an educational program that, among other things, put students in contact with Washington policymakers instead of learning about politics through

⁴⁷ Robert Borosage to Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin, 1973, IPSR, WHS, box 20, folder 30.

books. No doubt influenced by John Dewey's perspective on education, IPS advocated active learning. In the end, IPS's educational experiment suffered as a result of disorganization and a lack of interest in the project among IPS intellectuals.

The federal government and military, seeking scientific expertise during World War I, essentially drafted particular academicians rather than paying universities to conduct scientific research. In the 1920s, universities kept their guard up when it came to taking money from the federal government, relying on private philanthropies for funding. As private funding dried up during the Great Depression universities had to look elsewhere. Describing Vannevar Bush's National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) as "a new generation of leadership in American science," the historian Roger Geiger has shown how universities changed their outlook in the 1930s when it came to the relationship between the federal government and academic researchers. The NDRC took to "reconciling expert direction of defense research by civilian scientists with government funding and ultimate responsibility," and the committee succeeded. As World War II drew to an end, proponents of federal funding of scientific research worried that the relationship between the federal government and universities would cease as well, but higher education continued to benefit from the largesse of the federal government for years to come. Geiger has referred to an "idealism toward science" that solidified the federal government's role in university research funding. From the Korean War until the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik, "programmatic" research, which served a specific military purpose, dominated the type of research conducted in universities.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ For information on the growth of research universities during the twentieth century and the various kinds of research conducted at these universities, see Roger L. Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Before considering IPS's efforts to educate America's youth outside the walls of academia, it is necessary to look at how IPS intellectuals judged the existing educational system. IPS intellectuals blamed many of the prevailing problems in society on universities that no longer produced knowledge for the betterment of society. As evidence of the "profound crisis and transformation" occurring in America, IPS's "Five-Year Development Plan" pointed a finger at the universities for reacting too slowly to America's problems. The university could not meet the task because it was "so completely absorbed with the problems of its own self-preservation that it had ceased for all practical purposes to be a source of energy or ideas to meet the crisis of the society in a creative way."⁴⁹

A part of this self-preservation, obtaining funding for research, required universities to conduct military research, obviously a more destructive than creative use of the knowledge and skills found on university campuses. Indicative of his aversion to defense-related research, Raskin resigned from the Panel on Educational Research and Development in 1965 over the panel's lack of concern about the influence of the military on education. Raskin excoriated educators and researchers for serving as "handmaiden[s] to a program of national security which is based on thermonuclear weapons and napalm." He called on the panel to "study the national security system, define what it has done to our education institutions . . . and redirect our energies to the reconstruction of our own society, which are predicated on scientific and humanistic values."⁵⁰ Waskow went so far as to propose reforming universities by enacting laws "distinguishing the criminal

⁴⁹ "A Five-Year Development Plan for the Institute for Policy Studies," no author, undated [likely 1969], IPSR, WHS, box 6, folder 8.

⁵⁰ Marcus Raskin to Donald Hornig, November 12, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 20.

from the permissible” when it came to an academic’s research. For instance, “research directly and clearly related to the killing of people (military, pollution-creating) is ethically forbidden to a scholar just as killing patients is ethically forbidden to a patient,” Waskow wrote. A “Court of Inquiry” would then make the determination after holding public hearings as to whether a professor’s research was ethical.⁵¹ Thus, lacking ethics and a concern for humanity, universities, in the eyes of IPS intellectuals, failed in their mission to both educate America’s youth and work for the betterment of society.

The response of the universities to the student protests of the 1960s also led IPS intellectuals to hold a very bleak view of these institutions of higher learning. The fact that universities, founded on the principle of free thought and independent inquiry, would limit the speech of student protestors seemed contradictory to certain IPS intellectuals. Explaining what he termed the “paradox” of higher education, Raskin wondered how the university, which depended on the rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution for its own scholarly mission, could deny students these same rights. He complained that the “University, which is dependent on these rights so that it can fulfill its intellectual and social functions to truth and civilization abrogates or cuts corners on them in practice.” Denied their right to free speech, Raskin wondered if it might have been more beneficial to let students leave the universities because “they would have more chance of freedom of intellectual possibility as mere citizens. . . .”⁵² Furthermore, as illustrated by the selective service system’s decision to rank students to determine eligibility for the draft, students lacked the ability to determine their own fate and to be included in a dialogue with the university about their future. In a letter to the University of Chicago Law School

⁵¹ Arthur Waskow to Bob Ross, December 20, 1968, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 10.

⁵² Marcus Raskin to William Matson Roth, December 7, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 10.

Dean, where he discusses the protests organized in 1966 and 1967 against the university's decision to release its class rankings to the selective service, Raskin argued that "the university is not a closed system." Raskin did not even question the use of the rankings as much as the complete refusal by university administrators to bring students into the conversation. "Powerful deans of great law schools should prepare for a changed reality which includes decision making power to students in those areas of their lives not specifically concerned with the classroom," Raskin wrote.⁵³

Central to IPS's disgust with America's higher education system was the close relationship between universities and the state. Raskin derided universities for offering apologies for the government's response to protests off and on campus. Whether revolution or reconstruction would occur depended, Raskin argued, on the position taken by the universities, especially the people working in these institutions, to outside events. In a sort of call to arms to the university community, Raskin wrote, "If the university class cannot distinguish existentially—and feel—between the repression of the police in Watts and the crying wail of misery of the Negro rioters, reconstruction cannot result, and it will become the velvet glove and rationalizing voice for the brutes who would manage the repression."⁵⁴ In other words, university professors could either stand with the American people or join the government in pushing back the people. If academics chose the latter course, revolution would ensue.

How did IPS propose to solve the problems of higher education? Raskin elucidated his thoughts on higher education in a report prepared for the American Council on Education in 1969. In the report, Raskin called for a much more student-

⁵³ Marcus Raskin to Phil C. Neal, August 23, 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 2.

⁵⁴ Marcus Raskin, "Necessity and Change," October 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36.

centered curriculum that took into account ethical judgments and, more generally, he demanded a university less dependent on the state. Despite a plethora of courses available to a student entering the university in 1969, certain requirements set by the university, which demanded the “tradition of scholarship or learning,” greatly limited the students’ options, Raskin argued. Forcing students to enroll in specific courses created “a tradition which says that if you want to go high in the organization, you must attach yourself to this particular course because the values of the corporate organization or academic guild are such as to demand that such courses are to be taken.”⁵⁵ Raskin would later refer to this phenomenon as an example of the “channeling colony,” which tasked educators with circumscribing the occupations open to workers.

Raskin offered several remedies for the problems plaguing American universities. He suggested that colleges allow a certain portion of students’ tuition to go toward hiring new faculty without the approval of the faculty and university administration. “The types of knowledges which would emerge from this group of teachers will be different from the kind which ordinarily come from the academic profession,” Raskin predicted. Beyond the hiring of new faculty, Raskin called for a total separation of the university from the state. Raskin, envisioned universities “operat[ing] according to rules of community which are written by all members who work and study within the community.” Greater coordination with the surrounding community would allow the university “to act outside of the needs of the state—but in the needs of the community.” From such a position outside of the state, Raskin explained, a “university would then acquire its own political purpose, which would be tied to the purpose of human inquiry and the solution of human problems.” The

⁵⁵ Marcus Raskin, “On the University,” Prepared for American Council on Education, 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 37, 3, 6-9, 11-14.

inclusion of humane values into education would significantly alter the kinds of discourse currently found in most college classrooms and perhaps change society as well. “While it is true that teaching about violence does not mean advocating it, the fact of the matter is that virtually no university Social Sciences department or Government department has developed a program on nonviolence or nonviolent methods of relationships,” which slowed the process of creating “a new system of values which would show how groups and nations could relate to each other in associative, non-hierarchic, or non-violent ways.”⁵⁶

In the university conceived by Raskin, a new sort of calculus would determine what kind of research and teaching professors conducted. “Faculties and students will now have to think beyond specialized terms to ascertain the ethical value” of research. If universities failed to abandon specialized research and did not bring ethics into the classroom, Raskin doubted that a new type of knowledge would come out of universities. Nonetheless, he realized the difficulties involved with transforming higher education. As universities received the majority of their funding from the state and federal governments, Raskin conceded that “the likelihood of challenge by the university is small and consequently the development of new knowledge which brings forward a new system of values with the university as the source is not very great.”⁵⁷

Dismayed by the current state of higher education, IPS chose to enter the fray, first cautiously and then to a greater degree. By early 1964 IPS had secured associations with three universities—Cornell University, Antioch College, and the University of Illinois. To be an Associated University, the college had to pay IPS \$2,500 annually.

⁵⁶ Marcus Raskin, “On the University,” 3, 6-9, 11-14.

⁵⁷ Marcus Raskin, “On the University,” 3, 6-9, 11-14.

Association between IPS and the universities involved the university paying the salary for one of its faculty members while in residence at IPS, or having the faculty member obtain outside funding. A specified number of graduate students from the university would join the faculty member at the Institute. IPS fellows would, in return, give lectures at the associated universities and provide these universities with notes from the Institute's seminars.⁵⁸

At the same time, IPS also took on "non-university-affiliated students." In a memorandum written in late 1963, for instance, Waskow claimed that he, Bob Moses of the Mississippi SNCC office, and Bobbi Yancey of the Atlanta SNCC office "were actively moving ahead" with plans to have up to four SNCC field workers enter IPS as "non-university-affiliated students" for six months. Waskow declared that he "would be extremely unhappy for the Institute to back out of" taking on these students. "We need to confront their experience and understanding of what the South is," Waskow wrote, "just as we need a [Paul] Goodman and a [David] Bazelon if we are not to dry up like the Brookings." Waskow cautioned against IPS viewing "formal universities as the only educational institutions in the country."⁵⁹ Charles Sherrod of SNCC became a student at IPS, as did Jeremy Brecher of SDS, Charlotte Bunch-Weeks and several others. By 1967-1968, the number of students at IPS grew to approximately twenty.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Richard Barnet to James G. Miller, February 24, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 30.

⁵⁹ Arthur Waskow to Richard Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Milton Kotler, December 2, 1963, AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 36. By late 1966, Tougaloo College, the University of California-Berkeley, and Reed College had become associated colleges. See Marcus Raskin to George A. Owens, October 17, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 5.

⁶⁰ Arthur Waskow to Rena Leib, January 27, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 2; Student List, undated [1966], AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 6; Institute Students, 1967-1968, AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 26. The majority of IPS alumni went into either academia or returned to Movement work. Out of the 44 IPS alums who responded to IPS's inquiry, 13 continued to work in the Movement, either in the underground press or in organizing; another 14 returned to undergraduate or graduate school; 7 pursued independent ventures

IPS's educational program sought to create an environment for students different from the traditional university. In describing the structure of IPS's student program, a report noted an absence of "organized structure and predictability of most academic institutions," which might "seem baffling and disturbing" to certain students. Rather than learning in the classroom, students received instruction through seminars with congressional staffers and government officials or during conversations over lunch. IPS's distinctive view of students led the Institute to approach education in the manner it did. Waskow imagined students at IPS as "younger, less-experienced, less well-worked-out or worked-through 'versions' of the Fellows." That being the case, Waskow favored "turning them loose." Rather than teaching in the usual manner where the instructor provides the pupil with information, Waskow believed the purpose of the Institute was to provide students with "those opportunities for self-direction they have not had."⁶¹

While the structure of IPS's educational program differed from ordinary institutions of higher learning, it did not, according to IPS intellectuals, affect the ability of students to learn. Waskow wrote to the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in order to get IPS on the list of "approved" institutions of higher education and compared the "caliber of instruction" at IPS "to be at least equal" to what he experienced while an undergraduate at Johns Hopkins University and a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin. Furthermore, the level of academic freedom was, according to Waskow, "probably higher" at IPS than at any institution he had attended previously.⁶²

that included research or writing; 4 remained at IPS; 6 began careers in various fields. "IPS Alumni—Where They Are/What They're Doing," undated, AWP, box 7, folder 7.

⁶¹ Arthur Waskow, "Draft of IPS Annual Report," April 20, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 8; Arthur Waskow to All, "The Role of Students at the Institute," February 28, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 38.

⁶² Arthur Waskow to Robert Van Waes, January 20, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 2.

Early on, at least, the students at IPS seemed to agree with Waskow. The three students enrolled at IPS in 1966, spoke glowingly about the Institute's student program. One student liked being able to "get away from the academic bullshit and see what is really happening, which you do not get in school." Additionally, the students reacted favorably to IPS's ability to bring students into contact with exceptional personalities, the close relationship between tutors and students, and the many seminars, speakers, and conversations outside of the classroom that improved their "general education." IPS came up short, however, according to one student, in getting New Left activists in the program. The student recommended that IPS "draw it [the student program] into immediate contact with a widened horizon of the New Left."⁶³

Several students at IPS, however, found the program lacking. In February 1967, IPS student John Mitrisin, from Antioch College, offered a critique of IPS's student program. Mitrisin explained that while he thought the "core seminar" led by the fellows "valuable," it did not lead to the "interchange of ideas between fellows and students" as intended. Additionally, Mitrisin suggested limiting the number of students admitted to IPS to six to allow for closer relationships. In fact, already, by the fall of 1967, the educational role of IPS was in doubt, with a report describing the program as "in a muddle" by early 1968. "The Fellows," a report noted, "did not have the time nor the desire to perform the teaching function that the students expected; the students, on the other hand, did not take the initiative to develop their own projects and research as the Fellows had expected."⁶⁴

⁶³ Students and the Institute, no author, undated [July 1966], AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 25.

⁶⁴ John Mitrisin to Fellows, February 27, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 5; "The Institute for Policy Studies, 1967-1968," no author, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 105, folder 1.

The promised open-ended dialogue praised by Waskow that supposedly went hand-in-hand with the unstructured setup of IPS's student program did not occur. IPS fellows, perhaps not deliberately, simply did not perform their duties, leaving students at IPS isolated and without guidance. IPS's botched attempt at creating a student program hampered the think tank's ability to relate to young activist intellectuals. Had IPS fellows put greater effort into mentoring the young students at the Institute, the program might have acted as a way station for New Left activists and perhaps kept the movement, including IPS, going strong well into the 1970s.

Despite the failure of the student program, IPS set out to create a "decentralized Ph.D. program" at IPS in the early 1970s in a partnership with the Union Graduate School of Ohio.⁶⁵ Otto Feinstein, the editor of *New University Thought*, encouraged IPS to create a Ph.D. program as far back as 1966. He proposed a program for those individuals in academia who were "left in an institutional and personal limbo in regard to their Ph.D." Feinstein described many of these students as "promising types, often like ourselves but who would wish to function inside the usual academic structures for the principles of relevant inquiry which we represent." An IPS Ph.D. would differ in that it would give students "the time to work on their original contribution without the course and other miky [sp] mouse that the bureaucratic educational institutions require." The Ph.D. program existed as a partnership between IPS and Union Graduate School in Yellow Springs, OH and followed the thinking of Feinstein as it was "designed for the special kind of student who acquires knowledge and understanding in order to meet the

⁶⁵ Waskow described the program as such in a letter to Tema Kaiser, November 20, 1972, AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 30. In the same letter he mentioned that the student program at IPS ended "because some of the Fellows felt guilty and some of the students felt angry that we were not 'teaching' in any sufficiently structured way."

urgent needs of the people of his society.” In addition to traditional students, the program welcomed workers from labor unions and community organizations.⁶⁶

Instead of basing a student’s progress toward degree on the number of courses he or she took, IPS looked at “the quality of the student’s work, the breadth and depth of his knowledge, and his ability to create and carry out projects of social value.”⁶⁷ In short, IPS encouraged students to learn a type of knowledge applicable to society so that they could carry out “projects” rather than produce another manuscript destined to sit on a library shelf gathering dust. According to a report from the late 1970s, IPS created its Ph.D. program in order to increase the amount of research conducted at the Institute and maintain IPS’s links to the social movements that many of the students participated in when not in school. With this connection in mind, the report mentioned the goal of the Ph.D. program as “developing knowledge that is appropriate for the struggles waged by progressive forces, and developing ways of certifying what appropriate knowledge is.”⁶⁸

IPS’s Ph.D. program did relatively well in its first five years. By June 1975, the number of graduates had risen to nine out of a total of thirty-four admitted students. In addition to writing books, such as David Cortright’s *Soldiers in Revolt*, and producing films, graduates, a report claimed, “form a nationwide network conducting research and action projects from Boston to Appalachia to Detroit to Los Angeles.” Graduates of the program included Joseph Collins, Stanley Aronowitz, David Cortright, and Jeremy Brecher. By 1980, 25 students had received their doctorate from the UGS-IPS Ph.D.

⁶⁶ Otto Feinstein to Marcus Raskin, October 7, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 12; “The Ph.D. Program at the Institute for Policy Studies / Under the Auspices of the Union Graduate School,” undated [likely 1970], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 7.

⁶⁷ “The Ph.D. Program at the Institute for Policy Studies / Under the Auspices of the Union Graduate School,” undated [likely 1970], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 7.

⁶⁸ Robert Borosage, “The Institute in the Next Decade,” undated [likely 1979], IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 6.

program. Ph.D. awardees included Michael Klare, David Morris, Rita Mae Brown, and Lee Webb.⁶⁹ IPS's Ph.D. program, however, deteriorated in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Enrollment for 1979 totaled four students, with two more seeking acceptance into the program. A report predicted a total enrollment of only ten students in the coming years.⁷⁰ Although IPS maintained its partnership with UGS, which continued to face accreditation issues, the former's Ph.D. program never rebounded. For all intents and purposes, IPS's Ph.D. program ceased to exist by 1985.

Though IPS found some success with its congressional seminars and educational programs, both efforts ultimately came up short. In failing to keep its seminars and classes from going under, IPS greatly diminished its ability to reach its two most important audiences, congressman and their assistants and the nation's youth. As the next chapter shows, IPS never could reach a decision regarding who its primary audience was, which greatly limited the Institute's ability to transmit its ideas.

⁶⁹ Leonard Rodberg, "Report on the IPS PHD Program," June 23, 1975, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 14; Institute for Policy Studies Doctoral Program, no author, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 27, folder 8.

⁷⁰ Robert Borosage, "The Institute in the Next Decade," undated [likely 1979], IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 6.

Chapter Two: A Think Tank on the Left?

Although this study refers to the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) as a think tank, and other studies on think tanks classify IPS as such, the intellectuals at the Institute vehemently rejected this label. Much of the work undertaken at IPS involved thinking and formulating ideas. At the same time, inspired by the likes of John Dewey, the Institute formulated ideas intended for society as a whole and not just other intellectuals. IPS intellectuals assessed an idea based on its relevance to society and the possibilities it offered for the actual reconstruction of America. Simply put, IPS did not want to replicate the stuffy and staid atmosphere of universities or follow the lead of think tanks that tailored their ideas to their sponsors. Nonetheless, IPS's uncertain relationship with liberalism, and liberal politicians in power, greatly added to the Institute's difficulties as it sought to devise a course of action that straddled the line between offering policy advice to officials in Washington and bringing ideas directly to the people. As the 1960s progressed, IPS found its influence waning among politicians while, simultaneously, the Institute found a new audience in the New Left. Thus, by the late 1960s, some intellectuals at IPS wondered if America needed a new political party that was more receptive to new ideas and the demands of the citizenry. This chapter has two sections. First I look at how IPS fellows understood their role as intellectuals, and then I turn to IPS's relationship with liberalism.

The Intellectual and Activist As One: The Public Scholar at IPS

The hard sciences prospered in the 1930s due to high levels of federal funding. Social scientists, on the other hand, struggled to obtain the same sort of support from

government coffers. As Mark Solovey has shown, the social sciences took a backseat to the natural sciences from the 1930s up to World War II. Vannevar Bush's role in formulating government guidelines for federal funding of research, particularly in a report for President Roosevelt, led to the diminished stature of the social sciences. Guided by the National Academy of Sciences, which tended to avoid social science research, Bush did not include the social sciences in his report to Roosevelt. Through World War II, according to Solovey, social scientists "were overshadowed by the wizardry of the 'hard sciences.'" Moreover, social scientists dominated the National Resources Planning Board, which researched ways to expand America's social welfare programs. The involvement of social scientists on the planning board explained the lack of funding put aside for the social sciences. Conservatives linked social scientists to New Deal programs and derided social science research as unscientific, and therefore refused to allocate funds to such research. Yet Truman ultimately ignored Bush's advice. Solovey has surmised that Truman made the decision in September 1945 to promote social science research because of his predecessor's vocal support for many of the National Resources Planning Board's ideas. Disdain for the social sciences, especially among conservatives, nonetheless, never disappeared and set the stage for later disputes. The National Science Foundation gave ever-larger amounts of funding for social science research by the early 1960s, but, according to Solovey, it was "always within well-defined boundaries that emphasized the strictly scientific character of NSF-funded research."¹

¹ Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 24-26, 156. For information on the social sciences in America prior to the 1930s, see Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Seeking funds for their research, many social scientists turned to the military. In addition to their work at universities, social scientists conducted much of their research at institutes only loosely connected to an academic institution. One historian of these research institutes, Joy Rohde, has described them as existing within a “scholarly and bureaucratic gray area” between academia and the federal bureaucracy. Furthermore, it was “a physical institutional space” where academics could collaborate with military officials to solve military problems. At the same time, Rohde suggests, more abstractly, that places like the Special Operations Research Office at American University carried out their activities in “a cultural and intellectual space where military and scholarly worldviews, conventions, and ideas met, clashed, and merged.” Social scientists, furthermore, Rohde argues, advocated a “strict separation of means from ends,” which made it possible for them to claim neutrality in their work while ignoring how the U.S. military used their research. These scientists, as a result, by focusing on “methods” rather than “goals,” could ignore the fact that they served the interests of the national security state.²

IPS, not surprisingly, held so-called defense intellectuals in low esteem. In fact, Raskin, in a *New York Review of Books* essay, set off a debate by labeling social scientists and other intellectuals working at the behest of the federal government “megadeath intellectuals.” Discussing the growth in government-funded military-related research

² Joy Rohde, *Armed With Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 23, 46. While the protests against defense-related studies at universities in the 1960s led to military research moving away from college campuses, this privatization had far more negative consequences for America. Freed from concerns over value-free research, and more willing to produce studies supportive of government defense policies to obtain limited funding, social scientists dropped any oppositional tendencies they once held. By the 1970s, according to Rohde, defense social scientists “became servants of power; they produced knowledge that by design openly and unquestionably affirmed the Cold War status quo.” See Rohde, 127.

among university professors, Raskin claimed “that their most important function is to justify and extend the existence of their employers.” Although professors had taken part in military research since the beginning of the Cold War, the use of scholarly studies to defend nuclear war and develop nuclear strategy reached a ground-swell during Eisenhower’s presidency. As nuclear weapons and missiles replaced conventional armies, Raskin argued that “military and industrial leaders needed some kind of theory to rationalize their use: they had to prove, in short, that nuclear war was a practical enterprise which could serve the political ends of the state.” Comparing these “specialists in violence” to “Madison Avenue hucksters,” Raskin explained the need for “examining the motives of the men” involved in defense-related research to get to the root cause of the arms race. Once these motivations came to the surface, Raskin argued, it would then, and only then, be possible to begin debate on arms control. “A useful arms debate,” he explained, “can take place only when we are willing to recognize who is capable of thinking independently and who is not, and why,” which, he claimed, did not yet exist.³

Although the influence of foreign policy intellectuals grew to great heights during the Kennedy presidency with its “whiz kids,” critics called Raskin to task for his sweeping judgement of intellectuals. Albert Wohlstetter chided Raskin for his “self-righteous chiliarism” and moralistic categorization of intellectuals. In reference to Raskin’s argument, Wohlstetter wrote, “There are only the good guys: Raskin, Waskow, and several others; and then there is a large conspiracy of the insane, the insincere and the impure, worthy not of refutation but only of exposure.” Wohlstetter pointed to intellectuals like Jerome Weisner and George Kistiakowsky, who either “consulted” or

³ Marcus G. Raskin, “The Megadeath Intellectuals,” *The New York Review of Books*, November 14, 1963, 6-7.

“advised” the military, or “had investments of their own in defense industry” while speaking out against the arms race. For Wohlstetter, it was inconceivable to think that defense intellectuals formulated strategies for nuclear war solely as a cover for America’s expanding nuclear arsenals. “This fantasy,” he claimed, “has all the veracity of the Protocols of Zion and rather less than that of De la Hodde’s conspiratorial *Histoire des Societes Secretes*.”⁴

Intellectuals at IPS saw it as their duty to counteract the type of research conducted by social scientists in universities and research centers. Raskin, for instance, pushed for the inclusion of values into social science research and an opening up of the discipline to allow for more diverse opinions. His thinking on the subject owed much to the student protests of the 1960s. “The social science of search and action, that is, a pragmatic social science which goes beyond numerical calculation and statistics has been strengthened greatly by the risk taking and populist formulations of the student and protest movements,” Raskin explained in 1966. He contended that participants in the new movements carried out their activities “in horizontal rather than vertical relationships.” The latter types of relationships, common in business, military, and government institutions, depended on a hierarchical structure with clear chains of command. The former, on the other hand, allowed for “human associations based on equality of membership and participation,” both of which were central tenets of democracy.⁵ Raskin wanted to bring the values he saw in the student movement into the social sciences.

As a “five-year development plan” from the late 1960s suggested, IPS thought that it could serve as a leader in the movement for a new social science. IPS could “play a

⁴ Albert Wohlstetter, “Letters: Arms Debate,” *The New York Review of Books*, December 26, 1963, 18.

⁵ Marcus Raskin, “Necessity and Change,” October 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 1-2.

unique role” in the social sciences because IPS fellows were “viewed by many in the social sciences as unmatched by any American university political science and government faculty. . . .” Secondly, the plan pointed out, “Both the established forces of the society and insurgent groups have used the Institute as a source of ideas.” Furthermore, referring to recent efforts to form a “praxis” combining existentialism and pragmatism, the plan made the bold assertion “that the next decade in the social sciences could be as exciting and inventive for the social sciences as was the period in the first part of the twentieth century for physics.”⁶

Not surprisingly, given the fact that IPS partly owed its existence to the Peace Research Institute, the think tank considered itself a center for peace research. Yet IPS, for pragmatic reasons, avoided limiting its research to matters of peace. When Irving Laucks of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions asked for Waskow’s opinion on starting a research foundation devoted to peace and funded by wealthy businessmen, the latter offered words of caution. Several prominent businessmen opposed U.S. foreign policy, Waskow conceded, but they were usually “dubious about freewheeling research that comes up with unorthodox approaches or to be nervous about opposing their own government’s policies ‘in the crunch.’” Waskow thought that IPS had an advantage in “being in the *whole* policy business, as against the peace-only business” so that “even during a foreign-policy crisis like Viet-Nam, *somebody* at the Institute is working on *something* that people in the government, businessmen, etc., like—so we are never *all* in bad at the same time.” In comparison, while at PRI during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, “we all worked our heads off on that at

⁶ “A Five-Year Development Plan for the Institute for Policy Studies,” no author, undated [likely 1969], IPSR, WHS, box 6, folder 18, 2-3.

the same time,” Waskow explained, “and a lot of people therefore got mad at all of us at the same time.” Following the crisis, PRI had even more difficulty raising funds, which Waskow ascribed to the think tank’s disregard for issues beyond war and peace.⁷

The way the Institute conducted research also distinguished IPS from traditional research centers. Noting the recent explosion of interest in peace research, one critic lambasted such studies. The Peace Research Movement, a term he borrowed from Kenneth Boulding, “created an informal but nevertheless useful counterweight in government circles to the New Civilian Militarists and their more saber-rattling allies,” but peace researchers also, he claimed, remained too attached to the Establishment. In particular, he lamented that peace researchers focused on political leaders at the expense of the “masses of people.” “Even when the masses are subjected to study . . . it is with a view to seeing how their opinions can be brought to bear on decision-makers, rather than how to intervene themselves, as people.” Concerned with “helping the elite adjust the system,” peace researchers tended to hide “the real roots of international conflict” and thus prevented disarmament, the commentator argued.⁸

Waskow’s response to such criticism offers insight into how he and others at IPS saw their roles as public scholars. Referring to peace researchers, Waskow wrote that “these men do not think that just because they have refused to be whores of the Establishment they must undergo a shotgun wedding with one or another revolutionary party. Most peace researchers are not prepared to mouth anyone’s slogans. They demand to find out.” In order to show how peace research “would be made useful,” Waskow described the research techniques of scholars in the field. After coming up with a theory

⁷ Arthur Waskow to Irving F. Laucks, August 5, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 5, folder 4.

⁸ Martin Oppenheimer, “The Peace Research Game,” *Dissent* 11 (Autumn 1964), 444-445, 447.

or hypothesis, Waskow explained, peace researchers turned to “model-building” and “small-group research” as a means to surmise how officials would respond to particular events. Researchers then placed these models alongside historical events that mirrored the circumstances of the model to determine the likely success of the hypothetical plan. Once researchers obtained “considerably higher confidence” in their hypothesis, they could then begin “action experiments” where “particular small areas of the world would be disarmed according to the principles suggested by the peace research already done.” Following this trial run, it would then be “politically and intellectually possible to create new world policies.” Therefore, peace researchers could not simply offer their support for whatever revolutionary proposal was fashionable at the time.⁹ In other words, while IPS would not grovel before the government, neither would it pander to activists seeking any scholarly defense, regardless of its applicability, for their actions. Additionally, Waskow’s description of “action experiments” highlights how he and IPS planned on presenting their ideas to the public.

The debate over peace research in the pages of *Dissent* is relevant to IPS because the Institute constantly deliberated over the fine line it walked between serving the government and the people. Barnett looked at the type of intellectual who joined IPS and found that the questions pursued by these scholars protected them from getting too close to the government. Speaking before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1971, Barnett distinguished the “public scholar” found at IPS from other kinds of researchers. “He is a trained observer and analyst of the operations of government who communicates his findings to the public,” Barnett explained. Not working directly for the

⁹ Arthur Waskow, “The Peace Research Reality,” *Dissent* 11 (Autumn 1964), 449-450.

government or with funding from the government, the public scholar's "constituency is not the government itself." "Unlike the pure academic, the public scholar does not gather information or make analyses primarily to educate specialists or other scholars but to make available to all citizens information helpful to them in making up their own minds on critical public questions," Barnet told the senators.¹⁰ The public scholar's importance grew as society became more complex.

Reminding the subcommittee of the founding fathers' insistence that America have a protected free press, Barnet claimed that public scholars served in a similar capacity as journalists. In fact, as matters both domestic and foreign became more complicated, public scholars could offer a more thorough explication of events. "The operations of government have become so vast, the issues so intertwined that the investigative reporter with a daily headline cannot adequately serve the public's right to know," Barnet told the subcommittee. In these situations, therefore, the public scholar would be able to use his or her skills to keep the public informed of government activities.¹¹ IPS clearly wanted to influence the thinking of government officials, but as Barnet's description of public scholars makes clear, intellectuals at IPS had a duty to educate the public and enhance their ability to make informed decisions as citizens of a more democratic republic.

Returning to the point made by Waskow in *Dissent* regarding "action experiments," his description illustrates how Deweyan logic guided the research carried out at IPS and allowed for theory and practice to go hand in hand. Barnet, sounding very

¹⁰ "Remarks of Richard J. Barnet Before Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights," September 29, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 2, folder 44, 2-3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

much like Waskow, explained that the research conducted at IPS did not involve “idle concerns of the Academy divorced from the practical world, nor on the other hand does the Institute act as a servicer to the powerful.” Rather, IPS supported a type of education that valued “participation in the practical world using highly theoretical and very practical ideas.” At the same time, IPS saw itself acting as an intermediary for government officials and activists. In its early years, according to a 1987 discussion memo, IPS was “founded on the theory that ideas have their own legs, that challenging perspectives would draw interest and energy from liberal legislators and executive officers.” When the various social movements gained momentum in the 1960s, IPS “became a bridge between the demands of citizen movements and Washington.” Karl Hess explained the unique space IPS filled when he imagined how the Institute might have conducted itself during America’s revolutionary era. Highlighting the binary quality of IPS activities, he remarked, “If this were 1773, and the city were Boston, the Institute would be holding a seminar on British Imperialism. There would be tables and charts to show the injustice of the tax on tea. Probably somebody from the Governor’s office would be invited. Then, independent of the Institute, six or seven of the fellows would go out and dump a shipload of tea into Boston Harbor.”¹² IPS sought to combine theory and activism, but, as internal debates and a near break-up of the Institute illustrated, the think tank faced an uphill battle.

IPS always struggled to remain relevant in the halls of power while still speaking with and for the average citizen. Writing in the mid-1960s, Burlage expressed concern

¹² Richard Barnet to Mortimer Fleishhacker III, October 20, 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 17; “Report from IPS Program Council: Discussion Memo: Priorities for Growth,” September 14, 1987, IPSR, WHS, box 84, folder 9; “Institute for Policy Studies: 25th Anniversary Campaign for the Future,” 1988, IPSR, WHS, box 17, folder 20.

“about making practical proposals to government without their emerging from and relative to political movement.” Working too closely with the government, Burlage feared would make IPS intellectuals more hesitant to offer innovative ideas and stray too far from the activists on the street. IPS needed the support of movement people because, Burlage asserted, “Without feet, ideas become the rhetoric of co-optation.” Moreover, Burlage offered an early word of caution against IPS becoming too intellectual and losing touch with everyday people. “We must declare our purpose to be the study and demonstration of the policy of publics, not Public Policy in the old, clogged, established channels which are at best only potential arenas if they relate to the people not vice versa,” Burlage explained. Hoping to prevent his own work from becoming too conventional, Burlage began a study on regional development in Appalachia and became actively involved in the region both intellectually and through activism. Don McKelvey agreed with Burlage when the former wrote in 1966 that “organizing people is more important than peddling ideas.” Rather than “developing ideas to bombard one or another (real or potential) elite,” McKelvey wanted to focus on organizing people, particularly the middle-class.¹³

Some IPS fellows also worried that the Institute would cease to retain its radical edge if it did not bring in new blood. Writing in 1970, Waskow described IPS in its early years as “a White Male Uppermiddleclass Leader enclave” that eventually opened up its doors to “some Blacks but not women, the anti-military youth or middle-class, the Yippies, or consumers.” When he wrote the letter in 1970, Waskow noticed a return to

¹³ Robb Burlage, “The State of the World,” memo, undated [1969?], IPSR, WHS, box 30, folder 22; Don McKelvey to Arthur Waskow, Sue Thrasher, and Robb Burlage, June 26, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 3;

“the White Male Uppermiddleclass Leader syndrome.” The social makeup of the Institute had the effect of “getting so much out of touch with the newer movements that we do not understand them and cannot be of much use to them; and getting even more dangerously into High Analysis and out of touch with ourselves—i.e., our own situations, desires, and oppressions.” It was too late for IPS to allow intellectuals linked to these diverse groups into the think tank. So as an alternative Waskow recommended “analytical-political work in communities where we can easily identify with felt needs and oppressions, i.e. work not in the Super-Analysis of the Whole World . . . but work in Part of the World.” Such an approach, Waskow claimed, would allow for “reattachment to real life, real sufferings, and real empirical data.”¹⁴

In other words, IPS, according to Waskow, had turned into an island of high-minded thinkers who had little value to the average student, worker, minority, or any other abject soul in America. Waskow, as a result, even though he had expressed some misgivings about such an approach, began arguing for a greater female presence at the Institute. Additionally, and representative of a larger move within the Institute, Waskow advocated a move toward conducting research for activists at the local level, rather than attempting to provide a “Super-Analysis of the Whole World.” The growing interest in local activism at IPS served as a point of contention between the co-directors and their supporters and the fellows more interested in grassroots organizing. Eventually, the differences between the two groups led to the union struggles at IPS in the late 1970s.

Borosage, while still working at the Center for National Security Studies and under consideration for a job as program director at IPS, offered his view on the debate at

¹⁴ Arthur Waskow to Resident and Visiting Fellows, December 7, 1970, AWP, WHS, box 9, folder 1.

IPS in the late 1970s. Borosage envisioned IPS's role as something more than just an idea factory. "Unlike Marcus [Raskin]," Borosage wrote, "I am not convinced that ideas can create motion and politics in a society; intellectual work too often is for posterity rather than for use." Borosage called on IPS to look beyond the "mainstream institutions" and pay greater attention to "citizen action," "union insurgencies," and alternatives to the Republican and Democratic Parties. Referring to the Left in its various forms, Borosage claimed that "IPS should now relate to [it], seeking to serve the needs of such groups for research and ideas, and helping to define an evolving vision and program for a democratic, locally controlled, civilian society at peace." Describing IPS as "a place of intellectuals, not of researchers or policy analysts who relate to groups in motion," Borosage suggested greater interaction with activist organizations. IPS, Borosage claimed, could "provide factual backup and program ideas to fit the needs of groups organizing in the country."¹⁵

The issue of IPS's institutional identity came to a head in 1977 when a number of IPS fellows formed a union. Four years earlier, these same fellows expressed concerns that only grew larger and ultimately led to their decision to form a union. Though straying from the formula that had guided IPS since it opened in 1963, which saw the Institute as a center for creating new ideas for the government, the report claimed that the Institute had no choice but evolve to meet the changing circumstances in Washington. The difficulty for IPS had to do with the "transformation from an easily definable, highly focused group of people," whether government officials or Movement leaders, to a less clear and more varied group of people. With each fellow dealing with one component of

¹⁵ Robert Borosage, "The Institute for Policy Studies and the Next Stage: A Position Paper," December 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 1.

these varied groups, the coherence that once existed at IPS had disappeared. As a result, the donors, hearing only what Barnet and Raskin were researching, “understood less and less of what was going on at IPS, and became less and less willing to give.” The report advised IPS against going the route of the New Left, which responded to the multifaceted nature of the Movement, the authors of the report claimed, by choosing to “retreat to vulgar Marxism,” which eventually “shattered SDS and other New Left organizational forms, while leaving people still coping with the variousness, but without any effective connections to each other.”¹⁶ With their concerns still unmet in late 1976, several IPS fellows announced the formation of the Union of Fellows and Faculty in affiliation with the American Federation of Teachers. The firings, salary reductions, and staff cuts proposed by the Board of Trustees and supported by the co-directors, the union members claimed, targeted the fellows “most involved with grassroots networks, communities, and movements, and with interconnecting them toward a process of social transformation” rather than traditional intellectual pursuits. Such activism could not be “easily shifted around to fit into the mercurial definition of Management’s program.”¹⁷

The complaints over the dearth of women fellows at IPS, which also became an issue in the 1970s, served as evidence of the new direction that many intellectuals at IPS took in the 1970s. Women were described in the report as being “among the most vital and effective leaders in the new more decentral movements of all kinds that are emerging in the country, and IPS as a ‘bridge’ to these new energies looks and is of questionable

¹⁶ Charlotte Bunch, Robb Burlage, Bettina Connor, Tina Smith, Cynthia Washington, and Arthur Waskow, “Draft-Report from the Fellow Trustees,” undated [likely 1973], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 12.

¹⁷ Barbara Bick, Charlotte Bunch, Robb Burlage, Bettina Conner, Marvin Holloway, Milton Kotler, James Ridgeway, Len Rodberg, Frank Smith, Cynthia Washington, and Arthur Waskow [Union Members] to All IPS Workers,” December 1, 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 1.

effectiveness because of its own strong male bias.” Though the authors of the report commended IPS for setting aside \$7,000 to bring nine women to IPS as associate fellows for one or two-week periods, the report found IPS’s efforts generally “insufficient.”¹⁸ The creation of the Transnational Institute only exacerbated the tension between proponents of a domestic program that emphasized decentralization in America and supporters of a more transnational perspective for IPS. “A Statement on Institute Priorities” circulated in 1976 lamented that “IPS will be an institution with not much more than a foreign-oriented program, with little domestic relevance.” While agreeing that IPS needed to retain its transnational identity, the statement cautioned that “there is an inherent danger in an institution such as ours become [sic] a single-interest transnational institution.” To focus entirely on international affairs would make IPS “ever more irrelevant to the political process in America.” Furthermore, completely ignoring domestic issues weakened IPS’s ability to influence foreign policy. “And the many groups who are struggling in their own communities for a better life will only support our efforts to alter American foreign policy if *we* have been working with them in support of their needs as well,” the statement explained.¹⁹

Christopher Jencks, an original fellow, attempted to explain the larger ramifications behind the present debate over the budget and salaries in a letter to IPS trustee Peter Weiss. Dividing IPS into the “haves,” who easily found financial support outside of the Institute, and the “have-nots,” who found less success in such ventures, Jencks argued that the two groups also differed in more profound ways. Jencks described

¹⁸ Charlotte Bunch, Robb Burlage, Bettina Connor, Tina Smith, Cynthia Washington, and Arthur Waskow, “Draft-Report from the Fellow Trustees,” undated [likely 1973], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 12.

¹⁹ “A Statement on Institute Priorities,” no author, October 8, 1976, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 36.

the “haves” as being “almost entirely engaged in work on ‘public policy’ questions—work of the kind that we originally expected everyone at IPS to do, and which led to the choice of its name.” By the late 1960s, though, many of the fellows at IPS offered a “competing notion” of the purpose of the think tank. The fellows associated with this group, Jencks wrote, “were not [to] be policy analysts who wrote books, ran seminars for Congressmen, held forth on TV, and generally tried to become intellectual celebrities with personal influence.” These fellows took a more activist approach as “political organizers” looking to make possible “bottom-up political change.” Such a division directly paralleled the dispute over fundraising and salaries. “The money raised for the Institute has been raised largely by those who saw themselves and the Institute primarily as a place for generating ideas rather than by those who saw the Institute as a center for political organizing,” Jencks wrote. While arguing “that the Institute is basically the Fellows, not the Trustees or the Co-Directors,” Jencks nonetheless sided with the co-directors by claiming that the funding of political organizing projects had to come from outside sources, mainly the groups they sought to organize.²⁰

Speaking in terms of finances, the co-directors looked at the dispute as a fundraising issue. At the same time, their remarks about the union members offer evidence of a change in the perspectives of Barnett and Raskin regarding theory and action. IPS served as a refuge for both activists and scholars, with the two often collaborating in order to transform both the citizenry’s mind and society. By the late 1970s, however, the co-directors reached the conclusion that activism had replaced the search for knowledge at IPS and caused the current financial difficulties at the Institute.

²⁰ Christopher Jencks to Peter Weiss, undated [likely 1977], IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 1.

Barnet and Raskin blamed the “crisis” at IPS on differing philosophies about what purpose the Institute served in society. According to the co-directors, the “original model” had it that IPS would “concentrate on analysis and public education on the most crucial policy areas—foreign and military policy, development of economic alternatives, democratization of state bureaucracies, factories, neighborhoods, media and schools.” Recently, the co-directors lamented, IPS had failed to offer much of anything to policymakers. “We have access in the press, with the leadership in Congress and with many high officials in the new administration to do this but despite the enormous budget we don’t have the people who will work as a team to make it happen,” the co-directors remarked.²¹

Noting the union’s preference for more action-oriented work, the co-directors explained that the “crisis” led them to a revised understanding of how IPS needed to function. The co-directors admitted that they had erred in thinking “that IPS could be infinitely eclectic, that organizers and scholars would enrich each other’s efforts, and that the same institution could carry on activities at the community as well as at the national level.” Following recent events, the co-directors reached the conclusion, “In theory that was correct. In practice it turned out to be ‘grandiose,’ as some of our critics said. We have limited amounts of money. We have very important things to do as an institution. We have to make choices.” To deal with the limitations, the co-directors suggested having Robert Borosage join IPS as a program director to create “a coherent, financially viable, program.” While claiming that such efforts would “sharpen the focus of IPS,” the co-directors, apparently without understanding why their comment might anger certain

²¹ Dick Barnet and Marcus Raskin to Board of Trustees, Fellows and Staff, January 13, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 23, 2-3.

fellows, explained that Borosage, following discussions with IPS fellows, came up with a compromise in which “non-priority matters,” under which they included “lesbian feminism and religious organizing” would receive a “reduced rate” of funding. The co-directors portrayed the “crisis” as a “confrontation between unaccountable privilege and our common obligation as an Institute to serve the country.”²²

Raskin and Barnet did not absolve themselves when considering the Institute’s current state. They admitted that “we psychologically ran away, masking our feelings, encouraging levels of fantasy among them [the fellows] and ourselves, that did the Institute or themselves no good.” The co-directors also pointed to inadequacies in their leadership, which created a toxic environment at the Institute. “Distinguished scholars, intellectuals, and political leaders have been treated with suspicion, purity tests, or wrongheaded notions that nothing could be learned from ‘them.’ Instead, we embraced notions of constituency so that people began to see the Institute as a palace court where ‘constituencies’ were represented . . . ,” Raskin and Barnet charged. In the process, Raskin and Barnet claimed, IPS “turned away some of the most gifted and creative, the most politically knowledgeable,” which had far reaching consequences both economically and otherwise for the Institute. Raskin and Barnet specifically mentioned Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Erving Goffman, Francis Fox Piven, Karl Hess, and Angela Davis as intellectuals rejected as possible fellows. Blocking prominent intellectuals from joining the Institute, according to Raskin and Barnet, “resulted in our own deadening intellectually and an embracing of an increasingly sloganized or specialized political point of view which does not relate centrally to what we believe are

²² Ibid.

the critical questions of this time.” Additionally, certain fellows “encouraged a process which let people believe that we were involved in a Utopian experiment with few reality principles.” Without an overlapping vision and purpose, Barnet and Raskin believed that IPS “became the stopping-off place to pick up a check and gossip.” Moreover, the co-directors lamented, “we acquiesced in talk about ‘organizing,’ using that term as if it were a term of art.”²³

Whereas the co-directors believed that activism diminished the quality of intellectual production at IPS, union members claimed that they, by fusing thought and action, they remained true to IPS’s roots. Using an argument employed by supporters of the New Politics, or identity politics, predominant within the Left in the late 1960s and 1970s, members of the IPS union argued that, as originally construed, IPS “began as an *amalgam* of domestic and international policy, with a strong emphasis on social transformation and on work with citizen groups and movements. . . .” Raskin, Barnet, and certain other fellows, the union members claimed, wanted to end this “amalgam” in order to prioritize their “specialized work” at IPS. Noting the influence that IPS fellows had had on “Black, labor, feminist, Jewish, peace, religious, and natural resource activist communities,” the union argued that to “fire” fellows associated with such movements “would make its [IPS’s] own Fellows white-only, almost male-only, and elite-oriented.”²⁴

Years later, the co-directors, while cognizant of the need to link with social movements in order to remain relevant, cautioned that the Institute had to maintain a separate identity from protest groups. Barnet and Raskin repeatedly made it clear that

²³ Dick Barnet and Marcus Raskin to Board of Trustees, Fellows and Staff, January 13, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 23, 4-6.

²⁴ Bunch, Burlage, Conner, Holloway, Smith, and Waskow to IPS Board of Trustees, January 23, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 23, 1.

they did not want the tail, or social movements, to wag the dog, meaning IPS. During a “needs assessment” meeting in 1986, the minutes describe Raskin as saying, “IPS has been an island of freedom in the movements of the past two decades,” continually making itself available to activists. He pointed to “Aristotle’s Academy, the Frankfurt Institute in Weimar Germany, which failed because it didn’t really relate effectively to society.” Nonetheless, Raskin referred to a “tension between critical engagement and critical distance from those movements [that] will continue to be before us.” In fact, during an interview conducted in the late 1990s, Raskin reiterated the need for a healthy distance between IPS and the various social movements that sprung up during the Institute’s time in Washington. Raskin explained that “we viewed ourselves as not being of the movement, not being part of any particular movement.” Viewing the Institute with an eye towards the future, he portrayed social movements as temporary “fashions” that changed with the times. Therefore, he favored supporting such movements, but not at the expense of keeping IPS running. He explained “that you have to find a way of protecting them [IPS and other institutes], so that in fact those movements, and ones to come in the future, will have a place to be.” Barnett agreed, claiming that “the independence of the institute was the most critical factor” in deciding how to relate to the movements of the period. “If we were part of the movements, or ‘serving’ the movements, we would be hurting the institute, and ultimately we would be hurting the movement.”²⁵

²⁵ “Easel Pad Notes from Needs Assessment Meeting,” January 31-February 1, 1986, IPSR, WHS, box 33, folder 37; Michael Fortun and Kim Fortun, “Making Space, Speaking Truth: The Institute for Policy Studies, 1963-1995,” in *Corporation Futures: The Diffusion of the Culturally Sensitive Corporate Form*, ed. George E. Marcus (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 259. Unable to reach a settlement to keep the eleven members of the union at IPS, the two sides agreed to sever their relationship. Nine out of the eleven individuals who left IPS formed a new institute, the Public Resource Center, which IPS gave \$440,000 to meet the costs of running. Barnett considered the settlement “generous,” and noted that it “virtually wiped out IPS’s reserves,” but he and the board of trustees did not regret the decision. Of the decision he wrote, “At this time it is crucial that people on the left focus their energy on developing ideas

References to practicality and real world applicability pepper the work and correspondence of almost every intellectual at IPS. This aspect of IPS makes classification of the Institute as a think tank problematical. Writing in 1968, Waskow made a strong case for what differentiated IPS from other think tanks and academic settings. In comparison to other research institutes, IPS was “committed to the idea that to develop social theory one must be involved in social action and in social experiment. And therefore, the Institute stands on the bare edge of custom in the United States as to what an educational research institution is, as against what a political institution is. By standing on that bare edge, it creates tension.” In other words, Waskow did not believe that theory could exist on its own. Theory, once formulated, had to undergo experimentation to see if it stood up to reality. Tasked with carrying out its research in such a way, IPS separated itself from other institutes. As a result, “rather than going to universities and arguing for it, rather than going into foundations and suggesting that they set up study committees to create, we *did* it.” Once academics and politicians witnessed how IPS’s ideas played out in real world situations, they would have no choice but to accept the proposals put forth by the Institute, Waskow claimed.²⁶

Distressed by the current state of the social sciences, intellectuals at IPS also sought to distinguish the Institute as something other than a think tank. Waskow, as an example, held the word itself in disdain, claiming years later that it made IPS “mad” to be labeled as such. “The think tanks were political, very political,” he later remarked, “but

and political support for alternatives to the reactionary consensus, not on law suits and internal bickering.” When Borosage became director of IPS on January 1, 1978, Raskin and Barnet stayed on at IPS as Distinguished Fellows with “a university professor salary,” dependent on fundraising. See Richard J. Barnet to Mr. and Mrs. Philip Lilienthal, October 21, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 5, folder 14; “Richard J. Barnet Positions on Raskin Questions,” undated [likely 1977], IPSR, WHS, box 12, folder 26.

²⁶ Arthur Waskow, “Looking Forward: 1999,” *New University Thought* 6 (Spring 1968), 36.

they were all in service of the government. The Brookings Institution was paid for with government contracts and grants. The Hudson Institute was the Air Force's think tank—they were a think tank—they thought on behalf of the Air Force, they were paid by the Air Force, the politics they did was all pro-Air Force.” Conversely, at IPS, Waskow said, “We were totally un-dependent on the government, we would not take money from the government. We were critical of the government and our constituency was basically the people, the Movement even more than the people.”²⁷ While such blanket statements necessarily circumscribe the activities of think tanks, the fact that Waskow and other intellectuals felt the way they did goes a long way in explaining why IPS distanced itself from other research institutes.

As later chapters show in greater detail, putting ideas into action, through the creation of what Raskin called “projects,” not only served as a way to differentiate IPS from other think tanks, but also accomplish IPS's goal of reconstructing America. IPS intellectuals argued that ideas on their own rarely accomplished anything in the political realm. Changing society required putting ideas into action. Detailing IPS's approach to “institutional reconstruction,” Barnett pointed to the construction of alternative institutions as the first step toward changing America. Once built, public support for the new structures would follow if they offered a viable alternative capable of solving America's economic ills. In Barnett's opinion, without “public support for an alternative vision I see no way of enlisting the political strength to unseat the obstructionists in Congress or to change the rules under which they perpetuate the collapsing status quo.” Taking ideas from the page and making them real, furthermore, prevented intellectuals from

²⁷ Arthur Waskow, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2014.

developing outlandish theories with no practical application. Waskow argued that “if one imports into the present an image of the future so threateningly alien that it is not allowed to persist more than a week and a half, then one is not likely to have done much to change the future.” This does not sound like a revolutionary seeking the total destruction of America. Rather, Waskow’s thinking resonated with Deweyan pragmatism. In fact, Waskow claimed that his strategy was “like the process of science at its best: hypothesis, experiment, new hypothesis—always knowing that no theory is ‘the truth,’ but only a useful and beautiful way of understanding and reshaping the complex reality.” Therefore, pragmatism guided IPS intellectuals and kept the Institute from straying too far from the American grain. A 1968 promotional statement described IPS as “try[ing] to be radical in perceiving the need for change, visionary in conceiving alternatives to present policy, and practical in developing alternatives.”²⁸

Undergirded by a desire to create a more democratic society, the intellectuals at IPS often felt uncomfortable with their role as intellectuals and how they related to the citizenry. In this sense, IPS mirrored the attitude of C. Wright Mills. Referring to the sociologist, Kevin Mattson has argued that Mills avoided “vanguardism and Jamesian elitism” by having the intellectual exist between powerful leaders on the one end and democratic publics on the other. For Mills, intellectuals would provide the people with the knowledge to make their own decisions.²⁹ Evincing a similar attitude, an IPS program report in the mid-1970s remarked that “political and social theory tends to be

²⁸ Richard Barnet to Howard Samuels, March 15, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 33; Arthur Waskow, “Looking Forward: 1999,” 36-38; Richard Barnet to Richard Gunther, December 19, 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 19.

²⁹ Kevin Mattson, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism, 1945-1970* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 88-89.

metaphysical unless it relates to practice,” but IPS could not push particular strategies on receptive subjects. For instance, the report explained, “Institute Fellows continue in the intellectual stimulation of new projects which start from the assumption that the only way to develop meaningful and lasting change is to encourage people to light their own flame and to develop projects and programs that will relate their work to the work of others.” The report offered several ways to accomplish this task. IPS would “bring forward new ideas and programs from the grassroots for managing local, national and transnational affairs,” with a particular emphasis on “a national network outside electoral politics which looks at issues in a critical and fundamental way,” distinct from beltway politicians. The changes advocated by IPS, though, required “a new form of democratic education” involving the citizenry.³⁰

Michael Maccoby specifically addressed the issue of vanguardism in 1975. He thought that IPS needed to initiate discussion on alternative policies for America rather than determining policies on its own. “This is not the time for manifestos asking everyone to sign onto the ideology of ‘vanguard’ intellectuals” Maccoby wrote. Though important, the expertise of intellectuals had to be, Maccoby claimed, combined with the insights of local citizens. Christopher Jencks, too, questioned whether IPS should attempt to guide the transformation of America by offering sage advice to the masses. Discussing the Institute’s future, Jencks argued that IPS should continue to follow the “traditional role of intellectuals,” which involved formulating strategy for “improving the lives of other people” while still allowing them to choose the route taken for transforming their lives. Jencks rejected the idea that IPS intellectuals should act as the “vanguard” for these

³⁰ “Institute for Policy Studies Program for 1974-75,” no author, IPSR, WHS, box 105, folder 1, 5.

other groups. Instead, he believed that the Institute needed to “concentrate on what we can do for ourselves” and “focus on problems which we ourselves have helped create.” Among the problems listed by Jencks were foreign policy, “the organization of work,” particularly in universities and other professional jobs, and the “socialization of the young,” which included personal issues such as gender roles and familial relations.³¹ Thus, Jencks went the furthest in arguing against the notion that IPS could speak for groups that differed greatly from the well-educated intellectuals who made up the majority of IPS fellows.

Even though the very name itself, Institute for Policy Studies, signified a certain level of expertise and interest in setting, or at least influencing, policy, the co-directors, particularly Raskin, did not feel comfortable with the term policy sciences. Raskin scoffed at the pragmatism that gained prominence after World War II, which he labeled the “policy sciences.” According to Raskin, experts in “planning” and “futurology” used “the philosophical pragmatist’s tool[s] to forget about the past . . . [and] control the future.” By creating a “Faustian ‘as if’ world” where “human behavior is further channelized, mediated through assigned social roles which are objectified and rationalized,” planning prevented individuals from taking “political” action, due to their being unable to break free from their circumscribed roles. This “Faustian ‘as if’ world” bothered Raskin because the future depicted by policy scientists ignored the “inner life of the person” and derived persons of their individual humanity. Government institutions that employed “planning” took part in “profilism” to categorize individuals so as to not “allow people to be judged by their unique qualities nor does it develop institutional

³¹ Michael Maccoby to IPS, May 5, 1975, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 32; Christopher Jencks to Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin, “Encyclopedia and 5 Year Plan,” undated, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 36, 1-2.

models which begin from principles of uniqueness,” Raskin complained. For Raskin, Herman Kahn represented the archetypal policy scientist with his ordered vision of the world after a nuclear war.³² IPS, in comparison to intellectuals like Kahn, would allow the average person greater agency to determine their own future.

Although the powerbrokers in Washington and the activists on the streets both took notice of IPS’s ideas, the Institute never felt certain of its role. Doubts regarding IPS’s primary audience became more pronounced in the mid- to late 1960s when the federal government struggled to pass meaningful legislation. Christopher Jencks argued that Washington D.C. had become by 1966 “no longer ‘where the action is’ politically.” As a result, individuals interested in “radical” or even “reformist” change needed to “go back to the constituencies and begin building up another mandate” similar to the one that arose in the late 1950s and forced liberal politicians to support more far-reaching legislation. When IPS formed in 1963, the “possibility of changing America from the top down – from Washington,” did not seem unrealistic, but that was no longer the case. Thus Jencks offered two possibilities. IPS could try to interact more with persons and groups outside of the nation’s capital, “treating our location in Washington a mere accident with peripheral importance to most of our activities.” Or, Jencks suggested, “We can keep talking to the political establishment in Washington, playing the role of a ‘loyal (?) opposition’ and waiting for the political mood to change so that we once have a chance to influence events.” Failure to act, Jencks predicted, would lead to “despair” among the fellows and eventually cause their departure from IPS. By the late 1970s, some intellectuals at IPS began questioning whether IPS even had an audience. IPS

³² Marcus Raskin, “Futurology and Its Radical Critique,” in *The Federal Budget and Social Reconstruction*, ed., Marcus G. Raskin (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 96-100, 104-105

trustee Stanley Weiss described the Institute as “trying to mobilize a counter-elite to out-sell the interventionists who have dominated American foreign policy for so long.” Yet he lamented that “we’ve never set out—or really been effective—in selling a comprehensive economic and political alternative to the conventional trinity of f—k the world isolationism, Henry Kissinger realpolitik and Woodrow Wilson-JFK activism.” Weiss feared that “unless we can harness the lingering discontent, the interventionists will label us ‘isolationists’ and whatever following we have will simply was away.” Therefore, Weiss explained that IPS trustees and intellectuals had to decide what kind of Institute they wanted, which involved thinking about possible collaborators and audiences, as well as how the Institute could best publicize its ideas. Weiss himself wanted to make IPS “a Brookings ‘with ‘balls,’” but he did not clarify what this meant. Nonetheless, he did not hide the fact that he supported creating a new institute to meet the changing conditions in and outside of Washington D.C.³³

IPS’s Uneasy Relationship with Liberalism

Perhaps the lack of research on IPS stems from the fact that it does not easily conform to the rigid categories created by historians to describe the liberal activists and institutions that existed during the Cold War. Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, for instance, begin their magisterial work on the antiwar movement of the Vietnam War by distinguishing “peace liberals” from “radical pacifists.” The former, prominent in the mid-1950 in such groups as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and Americans for Democratic Action, feared that America’s reliance on nuclear weapons

³³ Christopher Jencks to IPS Fellows and Students, “Future of IPS,” June 8, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 22; Stanley Weiss to Raskin, Barnet, Faux, Borosage, and Peter Weiss, August 8, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 16, folder 13.

signified a retreat from democracy since the power to decide whether to use such a weapon rested in so few hands. Economic and technical assistance through international agencies, these liberals believed, offered the best hope for peace, especially in comparison to unilateral interventions by the United States. Peace liberals, moreover, thought contrasting ideologies did not close the door to peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The peace liberals, furthermore, felt that working within the system would achieve better results than massive protests. As a whole, peace liberals represented the complete opposite of Cold War liberals. Radical pacifists, on the other hand, argued that America played as great a role as other nations in causing injustice and unrest around the world. These activists saw liberation and decentralization as more likely to bring about peace than internationalism, which depended on international agencies like the United Nations. Whereas liberals looked to politicians and used electoral pressure to promote peace and justice, radicals sought the complete destruction and renewal of society through non-violent civil disobedience.³⁴ IPS, as the following chapters illustrate, shared many of the same sentiments as both liberals and radicals. Therefore, out of the various labels given to peace and antiwar activists discussed by historians, IPS fits most squarely within Charles Chatfield's conception of "liberal pacifism." Liberal pacifism, according to Chatfield, involved a recognition of "community." As such, liberal pacifists, unlike internationalists, connected war to the injustices brought about by American institutions. Describing the communities

³⁴ Charles Debenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 18, 25-26.

envisioned by liberal pacifists as “transnational and value oriented,” Chatfield has explained their ultimate goal as the large-scale reconstruction of the world.³⁵

Infighting among liberals was, of course, nothing new in the 1960s. In 1955, the political scientist Louis Hartz, in *The Liberal Tradition in America*, contended that America lacked any alternatives to liberalism. Yet, as Peter Berkowitz has written, “To maintain that liberalism constitutes our dominant moral and political traditional [sic] is not to deny the presence in America of competing traditions.” Berkowitz’s statement applies not only to conservatism but also to the many variants of liberalism. As an example, while liberals of progressive and libertarian persuasions both desired “freedom” for American citizens, the former argued that government served this end by ending “inequality” and the latter considered government the “chief menace” to this goal. Unlike the aforementioned groups, “conservative liberals” felt that “freedom” required neither too much nor too little government intervention.³⁶ Thus by the middle of the twentieth century, liberalism took many forms.

Some of the earliest New Left intellectuals, of course, represented the most erstwhile critics of liberalism. Considered by many historians the theoretical backbone of the early New Left, the journal *Studies on the Left*, started by graduate students at the University of Wisconsin in 1959, provided the most forceful criticism of liberalism. According to Mattson, an “unrelenting critique of liberalism” filled the journal’s pages. Most significantly, the periodical presented the earliest arguments against “corporate liberalism.” Martin Sklar and James Weinstein, both editors of the journal, published

³⁵Charles Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), 169.

³⁶Peter Berkowitz, “The Liberal Spirit in America and its Paradoxes,” in *Liberalism for a New Century*, eds. Neil Jumonville and Kevin Mattson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 15.

articles on the concept in *Studies* and later went on to publish scholarly works on the subject. The concept of “corporate liberalism” held that liberals, since at least the Progressive Era, served the corporate interest by quelling domestic unrest with inconsequential reform and spreading markets to every corner of the Earth.³⁷ IPS, as it turned out, touched on many of the same themes, deriding the technocratic solutions of liberals and their interventionist foreign policy.

The intellectuals at IPS most closely resemble the type of liberals associated with what University of Michigan philosopher Arnold Kaufman described as “radical liberalism.”³⁸ Believing that the radicals of the 1960s had gone too far in their denunciation of liberalism, Kaufman declared, “For the need to deepen and enrich the quality of the democratic process, to make it both more deliberative and more participatory flows directly from the central doctrines of liberalism,” which for him meant “liberty and rational choice.”³⁹ At the same time, Kaufman found many of the current tendencies of liberalism distasteful and requiring alteration. As a result, he called for a more radical form of liberalism that he believed would come once politicians began

³⁷ See Martin J. Sklar, “Woodrow Wilson and the Political-Economy of Modern United States Liberalism,” *Studies on the Left* 1 (Fall 1960): 17-47; Martin J. Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Accusing *Studies* of treating liberalism as a “monolith,” Mattson has suggested that fears of “co-optation” ultimately derailed their radical program. See Kevin Mattson, “Between Despair and Hope: Revisiting *Studies on the Left*,” in *The New Left Revisited*, eds. John McMillian and Paul Buhle (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 33-37.

³⁸ Kevin Mattson explores Kaufman’s understanding of “radical liberalism” in greater depth than this rather cursory coverage. Along with Kaufman, Mattson analyzes the writings of Dwight Macdonald, C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, William Appleman Williams, the New Left journals *Studies on the Left* and *New University Thought* in order to show an underlying radical liberal strain found in the writings of each of these leftist writers and publications. This study argues that IPS fits under this umbrella of radical liberalism. See Kevin Mattson, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism, 1945-1970* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

³⁹ Arnold S. Kaufman, *The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), 6-7.

implementing the liberal programs they had promised but never delivered. “Thus, to the extent that the rhetoric of political leaders encourages sincere commitment to liberalism,” he explained, “it also fosters opposition to the illiberal allocation of America’s vast resources, and to the illiberal use of America’s vast power.”⁴⁰ Put simply, Kaufman wanted the latter to conform to the tenets of the former.

In order for liberal deeds to match liberal ideals, activists had to work side by side with the system, albeit in an oppositional manner. Kaufman dismissed “the politics of self-indulgence” favored by many in the New Left because “in rejecting the system he also forfeits access to institutional resources which he must control if liberal ideals are to be effectively pursued. Thus, he sacrifices the prospects of political success for the sake of his soul.” Why did he describe the Movement’s desire for “authenticity” as a form of “self-indulgence?” Kaufman argued that “even if loss of authenticity were the inevitable result of the calculation and compromise that effective action requires, damage to one’s self ought to be balanced against the resulting sacrifices imposed on others.”⁴¹ IPS shared with the New Left a yearning for authenticity, but this did not prevent the former from working within the system.

Yet placing IPS under the theoretical umbrella of radical liberalism is also problematical. As James Miller has shown, Tom Hayden, the primary author of the Port Huron statement and a leader of early SDS, came to his understanding of “participatory democracy” by taking Kaufman’s courses at Michigan. From Kaufman, according to Miller, Hayden came to see participatory democracy as involving a working relationship between the people and their representative bodies. The version of participatory

⁴⁰ Kaufman, *The Radical Liberal*, 15.

⁴¹ Kaufman, *The Radical Liberal*, 47, 51.

democracy espoused by Hayden, therefore, did not mean direct control by the people. Rather, it involved people obtaining a “civic education” that they could use to make informed decisions.⁴² While representative of the thinking at IPS in the 1960s, as intellectuals at the think tank eventually came to question the willingness of officials in Washington to change America’s foreign policy. As more fellows branched out into neighborhood organizing in the 1970s, they no longer shared the view of a receptive government open to persuasion by the public.

Before discussing where IPS stands on the liberal-radical spectrum, it is advantageous to look at one of the original trustees of IPS, David Riesman, a professor of sociology at Harvard University and author of the monumentally successful *The Lonely Crowd*. Given Riesman’s attitude toward the Cold War, it is not surprising that he joined IPS as a trustee.⁴³ One historian has described Riesman as “always more inclined to work within the system for reforms than were the young radicals,” as illustrated by his work with TOCSIN and the Committee of Correspondence. The latter group in particular “embraced a creative tension between liberalism and radicalism,” according to Daniel

⁴² James Miller, *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 94-98.

⁴³ A look at Riesman’s correspondence regarding the foreign policy decisions of Kennedy and his cabinet makes it clear that Riesman opposed the tenets of Cold War liberalism. In 1962 Riesman wrote that his experiences in Washington during the Berlin crisis of the previous year had greatly tarnished his view of liberals in the city. Riesman left Washington “feeling that the ex-New Dealers now in the government were like people at the court of Versailles, loving the parties and the excitement but not really worried about nuclear war.” Another time, trying to understand the influence of Dean Rusk on Kennedy’s foreign policy, Riesman opined that Rusk’s “influence has on the whole been bad.” Rusk’s inaction, Riesman believed, made it more likely that State Department officials would not be able to maintain “a sense of morale against the general American bellicosity. . . .” While Riesman did not consider Rusk a hawk in matters pertaining to foreign policy, the Secretary of State’s pragmatism worried him. Riesman grouped Rusk with other “bomber liberals,” or those “people whose good conscience about their liberalism, their relative sympathy with social democracy, makes it even more possible for them than for conservatives to be guilefully . . . anti-communist.” See David Riesman to Clifford Durr, April 6, 1962 and David Riesman to Cyril Dunn, February 28, 1962, both in IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 6.

Geary. The tension, however, became too much for Riesman when students protested against the UC-Berkeley administration during the Free Speech Movement in 1964.⁴⁴

Whereas 1964 represented a pivotal year in Riesman's transition away from the New Left, and liberalism in general, the same could not be said of IPS, where Riesman remained a trustee until at least 1972.⁴⁵ Much like the Committee of Correspondence, IPS existed between liberalism and radicalism. Far more than the committee, however, the Institute relished its ability to straddle both ends of the spectrum, even at the same time. For instance, the involvement of IPS intellectuals during the uprising at Berkeley in 1964 is instructive when trying to understand IPS's position on the liberal-radical scale. As the Free Speech Movement took over UC-Berkeley, three intellectuals from IPS visited the campus to speak to different segments of the university. "In fact, after the great free speech uprising, there were three of us at IPS who were invited to come to Berkeley by different elements of Berkeley," Waskow has remembered. Christopher Jencks, an expert on educational issues, received an invitation from Clark Kerr, the president of the University of California system, to "brief the trustees, the regents, and upper administration folks. I was invited by the student government to come and speak to them. And Paul Goodman, anarchist and writer of *Growing Up Absurd*, was invited by the free speech movement itself. So there were these three levels of different political brands, you might say. Goodman was the most radical of us."⁴⁶ During the 1960s, at

⁴⁴ Daniel Geary, "Children of *The Lonely Crowd*: David Riesman, the Young Radicals, and the Splitting of Liberalism in the 1960s," *Modern Intellectual History* 10 (November 2013), 617-618.

⁴⁵ In 1970, the IPS board voted to renew Riesman's term until 1972. See Minutes of Meeting of Trustees of Institute for Policy Studies, January 30, 1970, IPSR, WHS, Box 82, Folder 5.

⁴⁶ Arthur Waskow, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2014.

least, the liberal Establishment, students, and radical activists all looked to IPS as the voice of reason.

The area of the most profound discontent between IPS intellectuals and liberalism, at least in the early years of the Institute, existed in the realm of foreign affairs. Shortly after forming IPS, Raskin referred to the intellectuals within the Kennedy administration as “belligerent professors who used their intelligence and education to plan various degrees of genocide.” In particular, Raskin admonished Kennedy for elevated military spending that led to an enlarged nuclear arsenal in Europe and calls for greater levels of civil defense in America. “Liberalism,” as Raskin described it at another point, “became a theology that justified a generation of bureaucrats who wrung their hands at the tragic choices that they could not escape: And in the process they chose the lesser, but nevertheless evil, option. Like compound interest, these ‘lesser evil options’ accumulated until the body politic could no longer pay the cost.”⁴⁷

Arthur Waskow’s relationship with Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) offers a glimpse into the labored relationship between IPS thinkers and liberals. Asked by ADA to serve on its Foreign Policy Commission for its National Convention, Waskow accepted the invitation and wrote “Notes Toward an ADA Foreign Policy Resolution.” The resolution, however, failed to gain approval at the ADA convention. At this time, furthermore, Waskow refused to join ADA’s National Board for several reasons, including, as he explained to ADA president John Roche, his dismay with the ADA leadership for pushing through resolutions that the majority of the convention participants

⁴⁷ Marcus Raskin to John Kenneth Galbraith, June 1, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 6; Marcus Raskin, “Morgenthau: The Idealism of a Realist,” in *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, eds. Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 90.

did not fully grasp. ADA's undemocratic methods "distressed" Waskow because they not only represented a form of chicanery but also, he wrote, "the constant warning that people would not accept this or that position on peace suggested to me that ADA's real and deeply felt 'gut' reactions were quite different from mine." In the end, Waskow did not think that ADA, despite its proclamations to the contrary, supported general and complete disarmament. "It will do as little good for ADA," Waskow wrote, "to have an official position favoring world disarmament, but to reject and flee from its implications, as it already does for the Kennedy Administration to have the same official position and flee from putting it into effect in day-to-day policy." In calling for "world-wide disarmament," the ADA, according to Waskow, "blithely adopt[ed] the position that is furthest out in the future, and one that happens to be adopted at least rhetorically by the United States government, but refuses to adopt a no more difficult position that would be considerably more attainable in the near future." Questioning the ADA's ability to comprehend the complicated ideas inherent in military strategy, Waskow suggested that the ADA return to its "traditional concern with questions of economics," particularly in relation to reconversion following disarmament. Still, Waskow described himself as "one of 'the last liberals'—the last real ones, as against fake Kennedy liberals, New Dealers, bomber liberals, white-supremacy liberals, etc."⁴⁸

Straddling both official Washington and the Movement, IPS often ended up angering both government officials and New Left protestors. In 1966, Waskow, noting how two columnists from the mainstream press described IPS as "the intellectual arsenal

⁴⁸ David C. Williams to Arthur Waskow, March 29, 1963, Waskow to Robert Bender, April 30, 1963, Waskow to Amitai Etzioni, May 7, 1963, Waskow to John Roche, May 6, 1963, Waskow to Edward Hollander, May 20, 1963, all in AWP, WHS, box 4, folder 11; Arthur Waskow to Stanley Plastrik, February 18, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 4, folder 17.

of the New Left” while a student activist called the Institute “the vanguard of the status quo,” explained that he felt “proud of them both.”⁴⁹ In spite of the sentiment expressed by the student activist, IPS considered American youth an important component of the Institute. As the frequent efforts by IPS to create a student program attest to, the Institute saw in the younger generation an ability to look at the world anew, free from Cold War dogma. In 1982, Barnet told the story of IPS’s creation and, in the process, confirmed the importance the Institute’s founders placed on youth. Barnet described the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions as “something as a model for IPS,” though the Institute’s founders had in mind “starting something with younger, less distinguished, more activist, [and more of a] student character.” IPS intellectuals, furthermore, encouraged others to see America’s youth in a similar way. Commenting in 1966 on an early draft of a book written by James Warburg, Barnet tried to persuade him to focus on the younger generation. “You could make the point,” Barnet argued, “that it is the new generation that is in touch with reality around the world and it is the government, now in the hands of the older generation, which is out of step.” Barnet suggested that Warburg take a cue from the younger generation’s interest in equality at home and abroad, their distaste for the Cold Warrior mentality, their diminished sense of uneasiness, and their greater demand for volunteerism.⁵⁰

Making IPS attractive to young Americans sometimes became a factor in deciding what type of intellectuals to bring to the Institute. As one of the original trustees of IPS, David Riesman initially “thought the whole enterprise was chaotic, a series of brilliant

⁴⁹ Arthur Waskow, “Draft of IPS Annual Report,” April 20, 1966, AWP, box 7, folder 8, 6.

⁵⁰ “IPS History: As Retold at the IPS/TNI Meeting of January 27, 1982,” no author, IPSR, WHS, box 34, folder 12; Richard Barnet to James Warburg, March 9, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 32.

but often misguided improvisations, moving off into many directions at once.” Riesman, particularly due to Paul Goodman’s name being “magic” among the younger crowd, saw IPS as acting as “a center for discussion and influence among the young radical students.” IPS appealed to young radical students, Riesman explained, because the younger members of IPS were “close enough in outlook to the radical and dissident young to evoke their responsiveness” but also “help educate the young beyond some of the naïve paranoid [sp] they now hold about American society.” Of all the fellows, Waskow, Riesman surmised, had “a real feeling for the young people and close ties with them while, at the same time, he is more scholarly and detached.” According to Waskow, Raskin and Barnet were “more outside the new left” than others at IPS.⁵¹

As it turned out, the New Left did take notice. Inquiring about the possibility of joining IPS for the fall of 1964, Tom Hayden confessed that he knew little about the Institute except the writings of certain fellows, but nonetheless liked “that it creates a new role opportunity for intellectuals to become involved in the process of social change while maintaining critical independence.” The president of SDS, Todd Gitlin, wrote to Raskin in 1964 asking for a recent article written by the co-director on the Vietnam War. Gitlin promised that Raskin’s piece would have wide coverage since, “we [SDS] have better access to the campus than almost all other student organizations, maybe all.” Gitlin’s successor as SDS president, Paul Potter, wrote to Waskow in 1965 suggesting

⁵¹ David Riesman to James Warburg, September 29, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 25; Arthur Waskow to Liz Schneider, December 11, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 4. Between the two co-directors, Raskin played a more active role in the antiwar movement of the 1960s. For instance, he spoke during the Vietnam Day Committee International Days of Protest at Berkeley in October 1967 and gave a speech, titled “Under What Conditions Can We Get Out of Viet-Nam,” at the October 1969 Moratorium against the Vietnam War. See Vietnam Day Committee International Days of Protest Schedule for Berkeley Campus and Oakland Army Terminal, October 15 and 16, 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 7; Moratorium Schedule—Marcus Raskin, October 15, 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 26.

that IPS and SDS jointly sponsor an institute in the summer for SDS members that, according to Potter, “should be exactly the kind of thing that IPS would like to be involved in.” The idea for a summer institute stemmed from the “really deep concern among the leaders of many of the campus movements . . . that they find some opportunity to discuss and think about the various problems that their activity has forced them to deal with.” As envisioned by Potter, the summer institute would include “between 15 and 30 students living at subsistence and working around a fairly loose curriculum” taught by IPS fellows or other intellectuals.⁵²

Several other SDS members inquired about joining IPS’s student program as well. In March 1966, Lee Webb, past National Secretary of SDS, wrote to Waskow and explained that he “would very much like” to enter the student program at IPS in the fall. Describing the letter as his “formal application,” Webb told Waskow that IPS appealed to him because the fellows and students were “complementary and stimulating” and the Institute allowed free thinking.⁵³ Activists involved with the civil rights movement in the South also frequented IPS. Waskow recounted one particular seminar led by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s Charles Sherrod.

And we got in good touch very soon with the SNCC people. So Bob Moses, Charles Sherrod, other folks, [like] Marion Berry, who became the mayor of Washington D.C.; those folks came to IPS almost as a place to catch their breath from the incredible intensity of what was happening in the South. So they came, we set up seminars for them. I remember an amazing, amazing moment when Charles Sherrod, who was a young minister, or acting like a minister, in Southwest Georgia, came and spent a month or two at IPS, and we arranged a

⁵² Thomas Hayden to IPS, undated [likely 1964], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 51; Todd Gitlin to Marcus Raskin, November 17, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 6; Paul Potter to Arthur Waskow, March 24, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 13.

⁵³ Lee Webb to Arthur Waskow, March 31, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 2. Sue Thrasher, a civil rights activist and founder of the Southern Student Organizing Committee, joined IPS as a student in 1966. Sue Eanet, who worked in the SDS regional office in New York, became a student in September 1967. See Arthur Waskow to Sue Thrasher, July 18, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 3; Minutes of Administrative Meeting, August 18, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 2.

seminar in the evening for members of Congress to meet him and to hear what the civil rights movement really was, because they had not a clue. A bunch of them came, maybe even a dozen members of Congress, and Sherrod began in a fairly conventional seminar way to describe what they were doing in Georgia, Mississippi, and so on. And then, about 10-15 minutes into his talk, he kind of modulated into being a minister giving a freedom sermon at his congregation in Albany, Georgia. So none of them had ever heard anything like it. In fact, the IPS fellows, me, Marcus, etc., had never heard anything like it, it just mullied us over, absolutely, it was incredible. I think it was really important, for us for sure, but, I think for the members of Congress too, to actually have that experience, which was different from just hearing an academic seminar about the civil rights movement. Suddenly they found themselves in one of those churches that was doing the civil rights movement.⁵⁴

New Left support for IPS swelled, for the most part, due to the latter's stance on American foreign policy and Cold War liberalism. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to look at the thinkers who influenced IPS and encouraged the Institute's controversial view of the Cold War. An individual who had a great influence on IPS's co-directors was James Paul Warburg. In addition to serving as one of the original trustees of IPS, Warburg also gave the think tank hundreds of thousands of dollars of his own money to keep the Institute up and running. Yet beyond offering his time and money to the Institute, Warburg served as an intellectual inspiration to IPS. As one of Warburg's biographers has noted, he situated his criticism of American foreign policy in a basic belief that the Soviet Union was not to blame, at least not solely, for the uncertainties of the post-World War II international scene. Instead, Warburg offered a more "complex reality" in which new balance of power relations, anti-colonialism in the Third World, advances in science and technology, and an unwillingness to commit to ideas put forth in the Atlantic Charter made the world ripe for international crises. Warburg perceived the Soviet Union as less of a military threat—he suggested that once it secured a buffer zone

⁵⁴ Arthur Waskow, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2014.

around its borders it would become isolationist—than an ideological threat. Thus, in place of “an increasingly militarized and status-quo-oriented American foreign policy,” Warburg wanted “some form of social democracy complemented by what he felt was the only viable political alternative to the suicidal policies of the nation state: world federalism,” according to his biographer.⁵⁵

Warburg eventually came to question the feasibility of world government, but he continued to argue for an enlarged role for the United Nations. IPS intellectuals would put forth arguments similar to those made by Warburg. In fact, Raskin thought so highly of Warburg that he considered renaming IPS the “James Warburg Institute.” While Raskin saw the new name as a way to honor Warburg’s efforts at securing peace, he also recognized that using Warburg’s name offered certain financial incentives. Raskin confided to Barnet that “my commercial and Talmudic guess is that the Warburg name could be used as an instrument to get money for an endowment from the Warburgs themselves as well as such people as Land, McCloy, Stevenson, etc.”⁵⁶ Putting aside the monetary value IPS placed on Warburg’s name, intellectuals associated with the Institute, especially the co-directors, owed much of their thinking to the ideas put forth by Warburg in the decades preceding IPS.

Another founding trustee, Hans Morgenthau, a professor of political science whose 1948 book *Politics Among Nations* served as the blueprint for political realism, also shaped the foreign policy perspectives of IPS’s co-founders. Claiming that “exposure

⁵⁵ William C. Berman, “James Paul Warburg: An Establishment Maverick Challenges Truman’s Policy Toward Germany,” in *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 55-56.

⁵⁶ William C. Berman, “James Paul Warburg,” 55-56; Marcus Raskin to Richard Barnet, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 32.

to Hans Morgenthau's teaching at a crucial stage in my own development have been influential in shaping my own thinking," Barnet noted several "conclusions" that he reached as a result of his ties to the political scientist. Barnet came to believe, for instance, that America represented the "latest of the modern world empires" and would remain so for only a "brief" moment, while the Soviet Union viewed itself as a "nation-state" rather than "the embodiment of a revolutionary ideology." Additionally, Barnet took from Morgenthau the idea that "national interest," which the former took "to mean the welfare of the majority of citizens of the U.S.," offered a "more reliable guide for policy than any ready to wear ideology," whether economic or political.⁵⁷

IPS co-founder Raskin also looked to Morgenthau's writings for inspiration and guidance. "The principal of logical and moral symmetry is crucial to the realist's position," Raskin wrote in an essay on Hans Morgenthau. Citing Morgenthau's work as exemplary of this kind of thinking—especially *Politics Among Nations*, where Morgenthau calls on the United States to "judge other nations as we judge our own" and thus "respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own"—Raskin lamented that other realists ignored this aspect of Morgenthau's political theory. "Where symmetrical relations are not understood and practiced, the realist's position is often perverted to mean expedient measures, gratuitous and dangerous. The practice of realism is reduced to what Power intends," and therefore "without the moral underpinnings that Morgenthau has made clear are the underpinnings of the realist's position. . . ." ⁵⁸ Critics of IPS often accused the think tank of presenting utopian fantasies that ignored real world conditions, but the co-directors' familiarity with the writings of

⁵⁷ Richard J. Barnet, "In Search of the National Interest," 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 27, 1-2.

⁵⁸ Raskin, "Morgenthau: The Idealism of a Realist," 86-87.

Morgenthau, as well as their yearning for pragmatic solutions, should give pause to such claims.

IPS's hostility towards liberalism was matched only by its contempt for the Democratic Party. In fact, IPS shared with large segments of the American populace a disdain for Democrats. As racial strife led to riots and as thousands marched against the war in Vietnam, support for President Johnson deteriorated. In such an environment, support grew for the "Dump Johnson" movement. Even after Johnson informed the nation in March 1968 that he would not seek re-election, the "Dump Johnson" movement continued to support Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy over Vice President Hubert Humphrey.⁵⁹ Others, including Raskin, questioned whether the Democratic Party could change. Thus, Raskin pushed for the creation of a new party. In explaining the need for a new party, Raskin explained that "the Hubert Humphrey of 1948 has won the liberal battle within the Democratic Party." As a result, activists should temper any hopes about the Democrats undergoing any further transformations. Acknowledging that liberal reforms improved the circumstances of some Americans, Raskin claimed another more detrimental change occurred to American democracy. Writing in September 1968, Raskin compared Humphrey to "the right wing Social Democrats in Germany who espoused piddling social services through authoritarian bureaucracy while accepting the power and legitimacy of the military-corporate elites." Therefore, an insurgent candidate like Eugene McCarthy, even if he had won the nomination in Chicago, would have faced several roadblocks in his efforts to change the Democratic Party as an insider. Raskin

⁵⁹ For more details on the "Dump Johnson" movement, see William H. Chafe, *Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 262-314.

believed that in order “to change the Democratic Party from within by ‘capturing’ it would require a purge of the entire congressional leadership in Congress—an event unknown in the history of American politics.”⁶⁰

Weary of the Democratic Party, Raskin claimed that only a new party could carry out a “structural analysis” of American society and pinpoint the necessary political and policy changes. Continuing to depend on the existing political parties would mean that “the revolutionary repressive situation will grow, and the final result will be the strengthening of the authoritarian aspects of the state—whether through revolution or repression,” Raskin predicted. In comparison, he saw the new party as “offering reconstructive alternatives to those people who are now disfranchised,” by a system where voting rarely led to fundamental changes in society and therefore encouraged non-participation in elections. Raskin pointed to the existence of new party organizations in 39 states and the fact that eighteen states allowed a new party candidate on their presidential ballots as proof of the widespread desire for a new political party.⁶¹

For reasons of its own doing and because of the state of the Left in America since the 1960s, IPS never, with the possible exception of its close ties to the New Left in the 1960s, spoke for a particular group on the Left. Borosage described IPS in 1983 as “an institute for the left that isn’t formed.” What he meant by this was that “no significant left or even social democratic party calls upon our work” and also that “IPS reflects a challenge to the old left—social democratic or state socialist now in significant crisis.” For Borosage, IPS represented “a new left which is unformed both politically and

⁶⁰ Marcus Raskin, “What’s To Be Done? A Fourth Party?” *The New Republic*, September 28, 1968, 17-18.

⁶¹ Raskin, “What’s To Be Done? A Fourth Party?,” 17-18.

ideologically.” As for what IPS had accomplished in such an environment, Borosage commented, “We have not been a consistent resource center for movements. We have not developed a political or intellectual school—hence the absence of a serious journal or journals.” Thus IPS influence came from “ideas which have their own force and through personalities with their own trajectory.”⁶² That IPS lacked a “political or intellectual school” should come as no surprise given the unorganized and sporadic nature of the Institute. Yet, IPS took pride in letting its fellows do their own work without following a particular style of thought.⁶³

Reading what conservatives have written on IPS, however, it would appear as if the Institute sought nothing short of a socialist takeover of America. In describing IPS to the readers of *World Affairs*, for instance, neoconservative Joshua Muravchik created an entirely new category for the think tank. He accused IPS of being “communophiles.” “Communophiles,” according to Muravchik, decried capitalism and called for its replacement with socialism. These “communophiles” did not belong to any communist party, nor did they want the world to follow the Soviet model of socialist development. Communist movements in the Third World, Muravchik claimed, appealed far more to “communophiles.”⁶⁴ IPS intellectuals did, in fact, support certain aspects of socialism and Third World liberation movements, but they understood the repercussions of coming

⁶² Robert Borosage, “Notes on a Five Year Projection,” May 12, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 17, 1-2.

⁶³ In a response to a letter highly critical of an article Eqbal Ahmad wrote for *The Nation*, Borosage explained that IPS respected the individual opinions of its fellows and noted that no fellows spoke for the Institute. Borosage described IPS as “both deeply divided and deeply troubled” over the Middle East. He referred to Peter Weiss who, in contrast to Ahmad’s pro-PLO stance, was a Zionist. See Shelly P. Koenigsberg to Robert Borosage, March 23, 1983, Borosage to Koenigsberg, April 7, 1983, both in IPSR, WHS, box 16, folder 35.

⁶⁴ Joshua Muravchik, “‘Communophilism’ and the Institute for Policy Studies,” *World Affairs* 147, (Winter 1984-1985), 163-164.

out too much in favor of socialist policies. Writing in 1977, Landau explained that he wanted TNI to “bring about a much more intense dialogue between Europeans and Americans and third worlders” and find a way for socialism and democracy to coexist. “Socialism began as an internationalism,” Landau wrote, “and in a sense the Institute can play the role right now and for the near future that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Internationals used to, or were supposed to, have played.” Put simply, Landau wanted “an Institute devoted to the development of democratic socialism.” Only months earlier, one of IPS’s trustees, Stanley Weiss, asked Landau to temper his socialist rhetoric. Weiss cautioned Landau against “putting socialism on the masthead of IPS” for the very pragmatic reason that doing so would make it difficult for the Institute to raise money.⁶⁵ Despite Weiss’s advice, Landau remained a fervent believer in socialism, primarily as it existed in Fidel Castro’s Cuba and in other Third World nations.

While many IPS intellectuals supported Third World revolutions and proposed bringing certain elements of socialism into America, the think tank held largely negative views of the Soviet Union, especially in relation to the superpower’s human rights record. Writing about the Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Raskin stated, “If socialism is to be a progressive social formation, it must consolidate the gains of past revolutions, not bury them.” In the Soviet Union, Raskin wrote, “Practical politics and revolutionary program, the Higher Principle, took the place of natural and decent feelings. And they believed that human relationships were secondary to something else, never understood and never defined.” Claiming that “Solzhenitsyn has thrown down the gauntlet to the world’s Left,” Raskin implored leftists to support the Soviet dissident’s efforts because

⁶⁵ Saul Landau to John Berger, December 17, 1977, Stanley Weiss to Saul Landau, October 18, 1977, both in IPSR, WHS, box 36, folder 16.

“he acts as an artist who is the custodian of the chain of our inner humanitarian spirit.”⁶⁶

Both capitalism and socialism, therefore, lacked the humane elements that Raskin and other IPS intellectuals desired in their economic and political systems.

Never completely comfortable with liberalism, IPS, particularly Raskin, looked to an alternative mode of thought known as “progressive liberalism.” Raskin argued that a form of “progressive liberalism” could take hold in the 1980s if three major transformations occurred. First, Raskin wanted to replace the “America Incorporated mentality” with a model based on “worker participation.” Next Americans had to immobilize the national security state by advocating for arms limitation treaties and disarmament. Finally, Raskin argued that “the tasks of governments are best performed through participation,” which made possible “equity, dignity, cooperation and fairness in all aspects of our public life.” In its May 17, 1980 issue the *Nation* brought together several commentators to debate “What’s Left?” Calling for a rebirth and reimagining of liberalism for the 1980s, Raskin argued that liberalism needed to eschew “the antipragmatic imperial discipline of geopolitics” in favor of a system of relations based on international law. Moreover, liberalism in the 1980s, he wrote, had to begin “formulating clear policies to deal with an economic system that is out of political and democratic control.” Raskin castigated intellectuals, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for doing no more than simply calling for the revival of “vital center” liberalism for the new decade. The IPS co-director claimed that the center had become too conservative for it to serve the liberal cause.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Marcus Raskin, “Soviet Dissent: In Search of Forgotten Men,” *Ramparts* 12 (March 1974), 26, 56.

⁶⁷ Marcus Raskin to Terry Herndon, August 13, 1981, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 9; Marcus G. Raskin, “Progressive Liberalism for the ‘80s,” *The Nation*, May 17, 1980, front cover.

Searching for a liberalism more appropriate to the 1980s, Raskin turned his attention to two opposing “modes” of liberalism from earlier in the twentieth century. According to Raskin, “establishment liberalism” placed power in the hands of the executive, who acted as an arbitrator between the corporations and the American people. While regulating corporations, the president ensured continued economic growth through economic pump priming. At the same time, the president pushed for passage of social programs in the 1930s and 1960s in order “to stop ‘the unruly classes’ from burning down the cities.” Establishment liberalism succeeded so long as the economy prospered, which it did until the 1970s. A second form of liberalism, “progressive liberalism” also existed in America. Raskin described this alternative as “liberalism’s most vibrant form, suffused with the restless energy of Americans in pursuit of justice and happiness.” Progressive liberalism demanded “a dual-sector economy of cooperatives, public enterprise and small businesses” with a “noninterventionist and independent foreign policy.” The “philosophical roots” of progressive liberalism extended back to the “pragmatism of John Dewey, the politics of Robert La Follette Sr. and the legal thought of William O. Douglas.” Progressive liberalism continued the fight of Eugene Debs, Upton Sinclair, Walter Weyl, Charles Beard, Jane Addams, and John L. Lewis, “all of whom believed that workers should exercise control over their places of work, and evinced a deep suspicion toward unaccountable wealth privately held, unaccountable government and politicians who led their people into war or on imperial ventures.”⁶⁸

The Rebirth of McCarthyism: Conservative Attacks Against IPS

⁶⁸ Raskin, “Progressive Liberalism for the ‘80s,” 587-588.

As Raskin attempted to create a reconstructed liberalism under a progressive label, conservatives initiated a concerted attack against the Institute. In spite of the tremendous success conservative intellectuals experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of them spent an inordinate amount of time worrying about the activities of IPS. Writing in 1988, journalist Sidney Blumenthal argued that by 1976 IPS “was already well on the road to irrelevance.” Nevertheless, he noted that “as the IPS declined in actual influence, its stature grew in conservative demonology; it passed from influence to fable.”⁶⁹ The extensive campaign against IPS orchestrated by conservatives illustrates the continued relevance of IPS and progressive ideas more generally into the 1980s.

Many individuals and publications took part in the campaign against IPS, but the most unrelenting critiques came from the pen of Rael Jean Isaac. In a 1980 issue of *Midstream*, Isaac published an article entitled “The Institute for Policy Studies: Empire on the Left,” from which multiple excerpts appeared in other publications. She began her diatribe against the think tank by offering her readers a bit of surprising news. She wrote that “the Institute represents an unprecedented success story: the achievement of the New Left, after its supposed demise, in shaping United States policy.” In an attempt to illustrate IPS’s anti-American position, and thus strengthen her claim that the think tank wanted to bring America to its knees, Isaac analyzed IPS’s writings on the Soviet Union. According to Isaac, “What IPS Fellows never concede is that the Soviet Union poses any threat to the United States. Soviet behavior is invariably defined as ‘defensive’ in nature.” In addition to IPS’s favoritism towards the Soviets, Isaac derided the think tank for its ardent support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). As evidence, she named

⁶⁹ Sidney Blumenthal, *Our Long National Daydream: A Political Pageant of the Reagan Era* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 276.

Joe Stork and Fred Halliday as editors of *MERIP Reports*, the Middle East Research and Information Project newsletter, which, Isaac claimed, “supports the major Middle East terrorist groups.” Isaac also implicated Eqbal Ahmad for raising funds for MERIP and other IPS fellows for speaking at the Association of Arab-American University Graduates and PLO conferences. Lastly, Isaac referred to an “internal IPS memo” from 1976 in which Saul Landau tried to encourage congressmen to meet with the PLO, IPS intellectuals, Arab-Americans, and “Jewish ‘doves’” to discuss ways to achieve peace.⁷⁰

While the claim that IPS shaped American policy was an overstatement, Isaac’s recognition of IPS as a remnant of the New Left conforms to the argument put forth in this study and explains why conservatives went to such great lengths to renounce IPS.

Conservatives, not surprisingly, quoted generously from Isaac’s article and disseminated its arguments in various outlets without considering the validity of her allegations. These same conservatives viewed Isaac’s IPS article as a clarion call to prevent the overthrow of America. As the *Worcester Telegram* editorialized, “The Isaac article suggests how thoroughly we have been infiltrated on the ideological front and how imperative it is that the nation and its guardians wake up before the erosion becomes irreparable.”⁷¹ Recycling the arguments found in Isaac’s articles, conservatives spun a web of accusations against IPS.

⁷⁰ Rael Jean Isaac, “The Institute for Policy Studies: Empire on the Left,” *Midstream*, June/July 1980, 7, 9, 15, 10-11.

⁷¹ “Hate America, Inc.,” *The Worcester Telegram*, July 5, 1980, IPSR, WHS, box 28, folder 5. In fact, much of the information used by Isaac in her article came from other conservative publications and speeches. As one reporter noted about Rael Jean Isaac’s sources, out of 46 citations, “fully one quarter” depended on John Rees’s *Information Digest*, an extremely conservative publication. Rees also served as Washington correspondent for the John Birch Society’s *Review of the News*. His wife, furthermore, volunteered at IPS in order to find information to use against the think tank or the Left in general. Several other citations came from Congressman Larry McDonald, a vocal critic of IPS. See Doug Ireland, “The New Red Scare’s First Victim,” *The Soho News*, March 11, 1981, in IPSR, WHS, box 28, folder 12.

One of the more infamous examples of the conservative fixation on IPS came with the publication in 1980 of Arnaud de Borchgrave's and Robert Moss's spy novel *The Spike*. The book described the Soviet Union's efforts to divert attention in America away from Soviet activities around the world. Involved in this scheme were two institutes: the Institute for Progressive Reform in America and its international affiliate in Amsterdam, the Multinational Institute. In order to avoid a libel lawsuit from IPS, de Borchgrave and Moss agreed to change the names of the institutes as well as the location of the international center for the paperback edition of the novel.⁷² Both inside and outside of the Institute, commentators viewed *The Spike* as a barely concealed smearing of IPS. Noting the undeniable likeness of the novel's institutes to IPS and TNI, one reviewer described it as "a kind of 'Protocols of the Elders of the Institute for Policy Studies.'" Peter Weiss went so far as to label *The Spike* "the 'Mein Kampf' of the crazy right for destroying everything to the left of itself" that posed a threat to conservative beliefs. Furthermore, Weiss pointed to the "grand design outlined in its pages" that represented "the kind of disinformation which the book is allegedly intended to expose." Raskin described *The Spike* as "disinformation literature bordering on political pornography." A brief conversation took place during the September 1988 board of trustees meeting regarding *The Spike* and *Covert Cadre*. Isabel Letelier, Orland Letelier's widow and a fellow at IPS, looked at the books as an "indication of the significant impact which the IPS has made on US thought and political life." Weiss asserted that IPS needed to have better public relations so that it could respond to its critics. Barnett agreed with Weiss, calling the failure to create a public relations office "a long-term shortcoming" for

⁷² Edwin McDowell, "Changes Made in Novel After Suit is Threatened," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1981, 44.

the think tank. In response to these concerns, Katrina vanden Huevel explained to the board “that *The Nation* is eager to have a roster of IPS staff and the work they are engaged in so that IPS fellows can be more readily consulted for their opinion and contribution to the magazine.”⁷³

IPS always struggled to find the correct balance between intellectual pursuits and activism. This uncertainty undoubtedly led to IPS’s erratic relationship with both official Washington and the social and political movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the nebulousness of its audience, IPS never stopped trying to develop a new liberalism for America predicated upon democratic participation. While IPS continued to promote ideas usually associated with the New Left, intellectuals at the think tank also attempted, during an era known more for conservative dominance, to offer a new style of thinking under the label of “progressive liberalism.

⁷³ Jim Hougan, “The Russians Have Arrived,” *Harper’s*, January 1981, 78, IPSR, WHS, box 28, folder 3; Peter Weiss to Marcus Raskin, May 30, 1981, IPSR, WHS, box 28, folder 25; Marcus Raskin to Bernard Malamud, November 4, 1980, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 5; Minutes of Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, September 26, 1988, IPSR, WHS, box 84, folder 14.

Chapter Three: An Unnecessary Alliance: U.S., Europe, and NATO

Before zeroing on the Vietnam War, IPS confronted what it considered one of the pillars of the Cold War: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). IPS's criticism of NATO stemmed from the Institute's disagreement with the type of internationalism favored by liberal Cold Warriors. Beginning with President Truman, America carried out unilateral interventions outside of international organizations. Furthermore, as several historians have shown, liberal internationalists who had previously led the charge to first create and then strengthen the United Nations (U.N) fell in line behind the Democratic president. E. Timothy Smith has described liberal internationalists as "reluctant supporters" of NATO. The American Association for the U.N. (AAUN) eventually backed NATO after the State Department pressed upon the AAUN that the U.N. and NATO would collaborate on most issues. Even the United World Federalists gave their support to the military alliance, seeing NATO as just one "temporary" step toward world government.¹ IPS intellectuals such as Barnet and Raskin charged U.S. officials with using NATO to prolong and militarize the Cold War. NATO, Barnet and Raskin, argued, would not ease East-West tensions. Therefore, IPS intellectuals called for replacing

¹ E. Timothy Smith, *Opposition Beyond the Water's Edge: Liberal Internationalists, Pacifists, and Containment, 1945-1953* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 88-89. See also Andrew Johnstone, *Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1941-1948* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 171-172, 177-178; Robert D. Accinelli, "Pro-UN Internationalists and the Early Cold War: The American Association for the United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 9 (Fall 1985), 357-359. Lawrence Kaplan, in his study of the relationship between NATO and the United States, has shown how advocates of NATO tried to persuade critics of the alliance "that the pact was actually a codicil of the [U.N.] charter itself" by mentioning the charter in Articles 1, 5, 7, and 12 of the NATO treaty. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, 2nd ed. (New York: Twayne, 1994), 34.

NATO with regional alliance systems. While ambivalent about the U.N., intellectuals at IPS, particularly Waskow, looked to the organization as a means to end lethal warfare.

The decision to create NATO in 1949 came in response to the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the unresolved problem of Germany. As the historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown, the Soviet Union's test of nuclear weapons in 1949 crystallized for American officials the need to work closely with Western European nations. Without a nuclear advantage, the United States could not prevent the Soviets from invading non-communist European nations. As a result, Americans were far more willing to join with Britain and France in the protection of Western Europe. At the same time, the allies needed the support of West Germany due to the strategic importance of that nation. West Germany officially joined NATO in 1955, commencing an uneasy relationship between the military alliance and West Germany. Fearful of a NATO collapse, which could lead to West Germany rebuilding its military and posing a threat to Soviet security, the Soviets accepted the agreement. Though all sides embraced the military alliance, tensions always remained near the surface. Frictions over the number of conventional troops and nuclear weapons under NATO's control made the relationship between America and Western Europe one of constant distress. According to NATO's chronicler, European nations bemoaned their continued "impotence" well into the 1980s. Although ostensibly an alliance of equal partners, the United States dominated NATO. Furthermore, Europeans believed that America had not done enough to bring about détente with the Soviets, nor promote arms control, all while denying Europe a greater role in organizational decisions. Nonetheless, the two sides maintained their relationship

even as a more unified Europe felt, in the words of Lawrence Kaplan, a “sense of dependence” on America.² Thus, the alliance remained in existence.

IPS’s Battle Against a Pillar of the Militarized Cold War

While President Truman succeeded in gaining the backing of liberal internationalists for NATO, by the 1960s various individuals and groups voiced opposition to the military alliance. Senator J. William Fulbright, for instance, gave a speech in 1964 that, according to Kaplan, “implied that the organization certainly, and possibly the alliance as well, had lost its mission.” Two years earlier, Ronald Steel wrote *The End of the Alliance: America and the Future of Europe* that acknowledged the situation in Europe and therefore the diminished need for American assistance.³ Even before IPS opened its doors, Raskin wrote to his former boss expressing his distaste for NATO. Describing the ties between the United States and West European nations as “not pragmatic and almost wholly ideological,” Barnet, in this letter to McGeorge Bundy, called for U.S officials to work with their Soviet counterparts to find a way to remove the superpowers’ troops from the European continent. Barnet suggested that France could shoulder much more of the burden of European defense. A failure to act soon on the issue of NATO would leave America unprepared for the growing anti-NATO sentiment among the American people, Barnet claimed. He predicted that Americans would eventually turn against NATO as “isolationism, UNism, and the fact that a significant portion of the

² Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 100-103, 125-128, 140-144; Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 151-152.

³ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, 82-83.

American people, notably Negroes, will become more vocal and will show that they have little if any commitment to either the ideals or the goals of West Europe.”⁴

The most comprehensive critique of NATO by IPS came in 1965 when Raskin and Barnet published *After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe*. The co-directors argued that by creating NATO the United States thwarted efforts by the Europeans to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union and end the Cold War. Barnet and Raskin accused the United States of extending the Cold War by treating the NATO alliance “as an end in itself” while the Europeans considered it merely “a temporary expedient.” Thus, according to the authors, while Europeans “accepted and occasionally repeated the rhetoric that fired American statesmen, most European statesmen thought it possible to be both against communism and for negotiations with Moscow” in order to reunite Europe. As evidence of America’s foot dragging, Raskin and Barnet pointed to the United States rejection of several proposals made by Stalin, including a plan that would have allowed for the reunification of Germany as a neutral self-governed nation outside of NATO, and later plans, like the 1957 Rapacki Plan, which would have made Germany and Poland a nuclear-free zone. The United States, according to the authors, feared that such plans “undermined the rationale of the Atlantic Community and might weaken the ties between the United States and Western Europe.”⁵

Interference in German affairs by the United States also raised the indignation of Raskin and Barnet. IPS’s co-directors described American policy in Germany as “utterly irrational.” America’s claim that it stationed troops in Germany in order to prevent the

⁴ Marcus Raskin to McGeorge Bundy, March 11, 1963, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 1.

⁵ Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, *After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe* (New York: Random House, 1965), 56-57, 70-72,

nation from becoming an aggressor or an ally of the Soviet Union made no sense whatsoever to the authors. As Barnet and Raskin explained, “We were arming Germany because we were afraid of her.” At the same time, as Barnet and Raskin wrote, “To appease the Germans, we avoided seeking a settlement of the very issues which German statesmen swore to their own people that they would one day find a way to resolve themselves.”⁶ In the end, therefore, according to Barnet and Raskin, the United States only made matters worse in Europe. Barnet made a similar argument in 1966 when he spoke before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. At the hearing, Barnet criticized American officials for failing to “offer a realistic basis for meeting the urgent needs of the United States, the several states of Europe, or the rest of mankind.” By ending American support for a divided Germany and reducing the number of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, Barnet argued at the hearing, relations between Western and Eastern Europe would improve dramatically and make NATO unnecessary.⁷ In order to achieve peace on the European continent, in other words, America had to leave.⁸

Although criticism of NATO had become more common by the 1960s, foreign policy experts found *After 20 Years* too critical of American strategy in Europe. Reviewing the book for the *New York Times*, Henry Kissinger compared the claims made in *After 20 Years* to arguments of earlier critics like Henry Wallace and George Kennan. The more recent work by Barnet and Raskin, however, offered a far more pessimistic view of Europe under NATO. “The authors catalogue the price America paid for its

⁶ Barnet and Raskin, *After 20 Years*, 126.

⁷ “Richard J. Barnet Statement to the Sub-Committee on International Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,” March 23, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 2, folder 44, 1, 3-5.

⁸ The historian John Lewis Gaddis rejects the argument that America forced itself upon the European continent with NATO. See John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 199-202.

commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, but they do not discuss what other options were open; they refuse to admit that the freedom of Europe may be due to America's Atlantic vision," Kissinger exclaimed. Kissinger also berated the authors for not looking into whether the alliance led to the Soviet Union's weakened condition. Instead, the authors used the Soviet Union's diminished strength as evidence to support their claim that Europe did not need NATO to protect the continent against a Soviet invasion. Conversely, the authors, according to Kissinger, had a "tendency to base policy on the most favorable assumptions," such as the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union in matters pertaining to arms control inspections.⁹

IPS intellectuals recommended, at different times, either the complete dismantling of NATO or putting it under the purview of the U.N. In *After 20 Years*, for instance, Barnet and Raskin called for a "collective security arrangement" to replace NATO. Making a distinction between the two, the authors argued that with the former type of alliance, "the problem of European security would once again be treated as a political problem, not as a military one." Transforming NATO into a political alliance, furthermore, would have more firmly put it under the control of the U.N. Envisioning such a relationship, the authors wrote, "Collective *military* action, unless taken under U.N. auspices, was authorized only as an extreme *ad hoc* measure in the case of gravest urgency." Under this theory, NATO would limit its activities to non-military measures unless "deputized by the U.N."¹⁰ As mentioned above, Truman and other advocates of NATO used various means to convince skeptics of NATO that the military alliance

⁹ Henry Kissinger, "Answers Aren't Easy," *New York Times Book Review*, June 27, 1966, B3, B7.

¹⁰ Barnet and Raskin, *After 20 Years*, 168-171.

existed as part of the U.N. Barnet and Raskin, though, wanted to make the relationship real, with the U.N. holding the senior position in the cooperative partnership.

Besides diminishing Cold War tensions, IPS intellectuals believed that breaking up the alliance would make it easier to achieve disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. For IPS intellectuals, a Soviet invasion of Europe seemed far less alarming than the Soviet Union's stationing of troops in East Germany and the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal. Describing the latter two scenarios as NATO's "real military problem," Barnet called for a "mutual reductions of forces." In addition to reducing the number of troops in West and East Germany, Barnet called on the superpowers to formulate plans for the reunification of a non-nuclear Germany. These initial steps would foster an environment more susceptible to nuclear disarmament in Europe, Barnet claimed. As European relations improved, Barnet predicted that "much of the incentive for the United States and the U.S.S.R to continue the nuclear arms race would be gone." Barnet also called on the superpowers to stay out of the discussions over West and East Germany. Increased interactions between the residents of East and West Germany, Barnet suggested, would increase the chances of a non-Communist Germany since the West Germans possessed superior skills and numbers in comparison to East Germany. With the German question no longer an issue, Barnet foresaw a new "regional organization" taking shape in Europe where the United States, the Soviet Union, and all European nations "would be obligated to respond to any threat to European security from any direction," both East and West. Such a security organization would, furthermore, provide the mechanisms for carrying out disarmament.¹¹

¹¹ Richard J. Barnet, "An Inquiry into a New Basis for the Atlantic Alliance," January 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 4, 3-6. As the historian Andreas Wenger has illustrated, however, NATO both

Barnet and other IPS intellectuals claimed that successful economies in Western European countries did more to prevent a Soviet invasion than a nation's nuclear and military capabilities. Writing in the early 1980s, Barnet claimed that NATO served as "an elaborate insurance policy." Yet he questioned the value of the insurance policy and its reliance on nuclear weapons. Barnet argued that "the only workable deterrent," and one that, unlike the threat of nuclear retaliation, actually prevented a Soviet invasion of Europe, involved "the prospect of permanent popular resistance." "A dynamic Europe that is modernizing its institutions, managing its economy and establishing mutually advantageous relations with resource-producing countries" would repel a Soviet invasion, Barnet claimed. A Europe that chose to ignore internal malaise in order to grow its nuclear arsenals, on the other hand, would "risk the same sort of social dissolution" as France in 1940, Barnet explained.¹² As chapter 8 discusses in more detail, Barnet turned, in the 1980s, to the concept of "real security" in order to encourage officials in the United States to strengthen America's economy. He contended that a robust economy would improve America's standing in the world far more than an unwieldy and expensive nuclear arsenal that served no purpose. As the above illustrates, he applied this logic to Europe as well.

Bringing Together East and West: IPS and Collective Security

While sometimes referred to by IPS intellectuals as "regional" blocs, Barnet and others sought, in reality, an organization encompassing nations far and wide and serving an auxiliary function to the U.N. Officials in Washington had, in fact, debated the size of

mollified and intensified the nuclear arms race. See Andreas Wenger, *Living With Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 83, 86-87, 103

¹² Richard J. Barnet, "Why Would the Soviet's Invade Europe?" *The Washington Post*, November 22, 1981, C1.

the U.N. during early discussions about the international body. As Gary Ostrower has shown, participants in the debate over the U.N. supported either regionalism or universalism. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Leo Pasvolsky, a State Department official that played a key role in drafting the U.N. Charter, sought “a truly universal collective-security organization,” while Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Winston Churchill, and even Roosevelt considered “a confederation of regional units” the better option.¹³ In a 1968 report for the U.N. Association Panel on Atlantic Relationships, Barnet discussed a proposal for the creation of a European Security Commission—composed of all European nations, America, and the Soviet Union—to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The new alliance’s forces would be “aimed at no single enemy but at potential disturbers of the peace from either East or West.” European nations would play a much larger role than previously, making possible, Barnet claimed, a reduction in Soviet troops on European soil and an eventual cutback in American troops as well. Troop withdrawals would, however, depend on successfully ending the arms race and solving the problem of German reunification. Barnet accepted the fact that “regional organizations . . . have fallen considerably short of earlier expectations and hopes.” As evidence, he noted the unresolved tension between Greece and Turkey, the rising nationalism among countries like France, and West Germany’s resurgent nationalism despite financial aid and protection from Western Europe. Therefore, Barnet recommended that the European Security Commission “be integrated as closely as possible with the security concerns of the rest of mankind through the United Nations.”¹⁴

¹³ Gary B. Ostrower, *The United Nations and the United States* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 33.

¹⁴ Richard J. Barnet, “The United States, the United Nations, and a European Settlement,” 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 9, 28, 31-32.

Despite the growing discord within NATO and the continued criticism of the military alliance by intellectuals and commentators, the organization remained a fixture in Europe. Regardless, IPS and TNI continued pursuing East-West reconciliation and the dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, though the obstinacy of the superpowers made such efforts difficult. TNI, for instance, started a “New Europe Project,” which sought to bring West and East Europeans together and promote the withdrawal of outside forces. The project, needless to say, faced an uphill battle. Borosage claimed that a paper he presented at a conference, which dealt with the issue of superpower disengagement, caused “the Russians [to] hit the roof. They saw a European settlement as both impossible and undesirable.” America, too, according to IPS intellectuals, showed no inclination to dismantle NATO. Since American officials viewed NATO as “the least risky projection of American military power and the least difficult to justify,” Barnett realized that IPS faced a struggle to end NATO. By the late 1970s, certain IPS intellectuals believed that NATO found new life. During a private “consultation” held in Amsterdam in the late 1970s under the direction of IPS’s Militarism and Disarmament Project, Michael Klare opened the meeting by expressing his concern that the growing spotlight on NATO served the interests of supporters of a militaristic foreign policy. For instance, Klare argued, “Pro-military forces in the U.S. are using NATO as the cutting edge of a campaign to impose a New Cold War on American and European society.” As evidence of this hardening of Cold War wills, Klare pointed to Senator Scoop Jackson’s opposition to SALT II, which would have made it more difficult for the United States to transfer new weapons systems to its European allies. The Department of Defense and

weapons producers also repeatedly used NATO's "alleged vulnerabilities" to garner support for greater military spending, Klare claimed.¹⁵

NATO's resurgence on the American political scene, according to Klare, owed itself to the United States failure in Vietnam. As a means to counter the "Vietnam syndrome" that diminished Americans' support of an aggressive foreign policy, United States officials, Klare contended, "revived NATO as the *raison d'être* of U.S. military planning." Supporters of a strong military and assertive foreign policy used NATO as a way of "neutralizing the anti-military views of liberals" who considered NATO a "centrist, 'democratic' commitment," unlike the "imperial ventures" undertaken by SEATO and CENTO. NATO's stature rose, furthermore, due to a new understanding of geopolitics following the Vietnam War. NATO represented those "core areas," as Klare called the states protected under the NATO umbrella, or "those geopolitical interests whose control by the West is considered essential to the survival of U.S. society in its present form." These geopolitically important nations also faced a common enemy—the Soviet Union.¹⁶

During a congressional seminar in early 1965, IPS trustee James Warburg offered his opinion on the alliance. The historian E. Timothy Smith has described Warburg as among "the most articulate and well-known critics" of NATO. Warburg had no problem with an Atlantic alliance, but he worried that the present structure emphasized military rather than political solutions. Speaking in 1965, Warburg believed that Europe

¹⁵ Robert Borosage to Philip Warburg, October 12, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 16, folder 38; Richard J. Barnet, "Introduction," *Atlantic Europe? The Radical View*, ed. Tom Nairn (Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute, 1976), 6; "NATO Consultation, Opening Remarks by Michael T. Klare," Amsterdam, March 4, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 26, folder 12.

¹⁶ "NATO Consultation, Opening Remarks by Michael T. Klare."

represented the paramount issue of the Cold War. He concluded, therefore, that just as the Cold War started in Europe it would also end there, as soon as the superpowers resolved the issue of Germany. Warburg wanted to replace NATO with “a total European security agreement” including all European countries. Along with a new regional alliance system, Warburg thought that Europeans had to shift “from nationalism to some form of supra-nationalism.” “If they all give up a certain amount of sovereignty,” Warburg predicted, “then it is in everybody’s interest to maintain the peace.”¹⁷ While many liberal internationalists turned away from world government in the late 1940s, Warburg clearly held out hope for such an outcome, at least in Europe.

Warburg’s suggestion that European nations had to accept limits to their sovereignty complimented IPS’s efforts to strengthen international law and the U.N. IPS intellectuals, particularly the co-directors, believed that international law, in combination with the U.N., could greatly reduce conflict in the world and bring about disarmament. Yet achieving the conditions necessary for international law to prevail required nation states to give up some of their sovereign rights, as Warburg acknowledged. Asked if “a corresponding decline of the nation-state” had to follow the strengthening of international law, Barnet responded in the affirmative. He argued that only through “a limitation on the rights of individual nation-states” would it become clear what path offered the best hope for each nation’s “security or for the promotion of their ‘national interests.’” External events, moreover, weakened nation states and made them dispensable, Barnet claimed. By the early 1970s, he argued, various events made the nation-state “obsolete”—it could

¹⁷ Smith, *Opposition Beyond the Water’s Edge*, 95-97; James Warburg and Richard Barnet, “New Era for American Policy and Statecraft,” Transcript from Congressional Seminar, February 17, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 11, folder 28, 10-12.

not, for instance, protect its citizens against nuclear decimation, achieve “world order” through military or other means, promote development in foreign nations, or secure foreign markets. Barnet did not seem disturbed by the decline of the nation-state. While he feared that “managers of nation-states” would “become more frustrated by their inability to solve urgent problems” and thus use “authoritarian and militaristic methods” to try to retain influence, Barnet hoped that an alternative form of organization would eventually replace the nation-state. “Planetary survival will depend upon how quickly the power of the nation-state can be contained and a wider human identity can be established,” he argued¹⁸ Existing conditions, therefore, made it a particularly opportune time for an alternative alliance system to develop.

At the same time, no one at IPS went so far as to call for the creation of a world government, which would have stripped states completely of their sovereignty, even though IPS intellectuals realized that international law would likely fail without some sort of world federalism. Raskin, for instance, accepted that treaties did not always bring about the desired results, but he rejected the suggestion that world government provided a total solution. Pointing to America’s Civil War nearly seventy years after the American Revolution, Raskin wondered if there “would not be a similar international civil war in the context of a world government.” Thus, even as Raskin and Joseph Duffey argued in 1975 that “the U.N. could be the major forum for carrying out the business of foreign policy” and suggested that the United States could “take some responsibility in

¹⁸ “An Interview with Richard J. Barnet,” *SAIS Review*, undated [likely 1974], IPSR, WHS, box 12, folder 36; Richard J. Barnet, “Farewell to the Nation-State,” *The New York Times*, June 19, 1971, 27.

developing a world common law,” world government did not appeal to the pragmatic minds at IPS.¹⁹

Yet, as IPS encouraged the United States and its allies to dismantle NATO and form a new alliance under the control of the U.N., the international body, never popular in America, reached its lowest point. Looking at the U.N. at the start of Nixon’s presidency, one historian has concluded, “The love affair between the United States and the U.N. had surely ended by 1969.” Unable to overcome American intransigence and find a solution to the quagmire in Vietnam, as well as the inability of the United States to control the General Assembly as more nations critical of America joined the body, American officials showed even less interest in the organization.²⁰ Furthermore, historians and political scientists have shown how international bodies like the U.N. served as tools of the most powerful nations to do their bidding. When the United States did go through the U.N., it followed the advice put forth by Dean Rusk, who, according to Mark Mazower, “believed the U.N. itself could be an effective instrument of anti-Soviet pressure.” Furthermore, Rusk’s view of the U.N., as Mazower has argued, was that it had a “blend of idealism and military ambition.” Rusk believed that the U.N. played an important role in promoting international law but he also supported using America’s military to make certain that nations followed U.N. commands. Further bringing into question the ability of the U.N. to act as arbitrator of international law, political scientist G. John Ikenberry has suggested that powerful nations used “constitutional settlement,” i.e. supranational institutions like the U.N., as a cost-saving

¹⁹ Marcus Raskin to Ellsworth P. Carrington, December 19, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 21; Marcus Raskin and Joseph Duffey, “Toward a Modern National Security State: Convention Background Paper,” *Democratic Review* (October/November 1975), IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 45, 49.

²⁰ Ostrower, *The United Nations and the United States*, 125.

measure. Constantly using force and coercion to maintain a position of dominance over other nations cost too much, Ikenberry has argued, while supranational institutions acted as “a form of hegemonic investment in the future” by gaining the approval of other nations for a longer time and without the use of force.²¹

IPS’s Efforts to Bring Populism to the United Nations

The dramatic growth of the U.N.’s General Assembly that began in the late 1960s and eventually led to America’s avoidance of the body found early support among IPS thinkers, especially Waskow. In a 1965 letter to Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland, Waskow argued that the U.N. needed to include in its General Assembly a “special role” for underdeveloped nations. He pointed to an “increasing possibility of hostility to the great powers, including the United States, on the part of the small and large but weak and poverty-stricken powers, as kind of ‘world populism’ that needs some sort of legitimating and peaceful focus if it is not to erupt in violence,” as it did in China in 1949. Waskow predicted that the inclusion of lesser powers in the U.N. matters “might provide a safety valve for this explosive ‘populism.’” At the same time, he cautioned against seeing increased power for the smaller, less developed nations as a threat to American leadership. American industry, Waskow explained using a historical analogy, survived despite the measures enacted by Populists in America in the late 1800s.²²

Waskow continued to pursue the issue in a conversation with Todd Gitlin. He proposed to the SDS leader that “one—just one—current line for those who care about the Third World is to focus support in this country for the General Assembly. . . .”

²¹ Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 241-242; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-56.

²² Arthur Waskow to Harlan Cleveland, May 24, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 4, folder 17.

Waskow recognized that many nations distrusted the U.N. and saw it as an “instrument” of the United States, but he suggested that “the small, the weak, and the poor might respond to this challenge not by collapsing before it . . . but by turning the Assembly into their own instrument and ‘taking it away’ from the United States.” Waskow’s vision for the U.N. required, however, the presence of a “pro-small-and-poor, pro-Assembly, pro-new-kind of U.N., pro-Third-World voice” in the United States.²³

Yet, even with an expanded roster of Third World nations in the General Assembly, the U.N.’s Security Council held much of the decision-making authority, especially in regard to settling international conflicts. Cognizant of this fact, Waskow sought a change in the way the U.N. decided when and where it would send its peacekeeping forces. His proposal to make the decision-making process in the U.N. more democratic involved tying who could vote on peacekeeping measures to the size of the peacekeeping force. Since each group of peacekeepers would be “a spectrum of different sizes,” Waskow suggested setting a particular “threshold” where the amount of money, the number of troops, and the type of weapons used in the mission would determine who could vote on whether to send a peacekeeping mission. Larger operations would require the approval and funding of the Security Council while small-scale operations would need the approval of just the General Assembly. In the latter case, all nations voting yes would pay for the mission. Such a process, Waskow claimed, would allow smaller nations to “pool their power” to stop even the actions of one of the Great Powers. Waskow predicted that his reforms would dramatically improve the functioning of the U.N. because his plan accepted the rise of a “world populism,” which he described as a

²³ Arthur Waskow (with Todd Gitlin), “Toward a Decent Manifest Destiny: An Exchange,” *The Correspondent* (Winter 1965), AWP, WHS, box 3, folder 2, 89-92.

“hostility to *all* the rich, whether capitalist or communists, and a fierce determination to resist them.” This attitude among Third World nations, he predicted, would grow in strength since detente had made interventions in the Third World by the superpowers more attractive because neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would risk nuclear war in order to stop the other side from intervening in the region. Waskow posed the question to the superpowers as a “choice . . . between proliferation of nuclear weapons to a dozen hungry nations, or the creation of a peacekeeping force that the hungry nations in the U.N. could use to protect themselves.”²⁴

Not surprisingly, American officials disagreed with Waskow’s ideas regarding “world populism.” The Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States, Ambassador Francis T.P. Plimpton, felt that Waskow ignored the major role played by the General Assembly, which had the authority to send troops so long as “there is no attempt to force anybody to do anything but to keep the peace. . . .” Plimpton’s comment referred to the ability of the General Assembly to send peacekeeping forces to countries only if a nation desired their presence within their borders. Waskow called this authority “practically useless” because nations that required the assistance of a peacekeeping mission often had several different opposition governments, making it difficult to gain approval. Also, in situations where a superpower invaded a smaller nation, the Security Council had the ability to overrule the General Assembly.²⁵ Thus, truly changing the U.N. required that the General Assembly play a larger role in making policy at the

²⁴ Arthur I. Waskow, “Populism and Peacekeeping at the U.N.,” *War/Peace Report* 5 (May 1965), 8-9.

²⁵ “The Future of the U.N.” Excerpts from *War/Peace Report’s* Conference on the Future of the U.N., *War/Peace Report* 5 (June 1965), 12-14.

international body, where Third World nations made up an increasing proportion of the body every year.

Barnet did not go as far as Waskow in calling for the inclusion of underdeveloped countries into the U.N., but the IPS co-director suggested in 1968 that NATO, if it continued to exist, should look into the non-military related problems of the world. Barnet claimed that the decreased likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Europe and Western Europe's economic revival, made it possible for the United States, the Soviet Union, and European nations "to devise an approach to a settlement that will not only deal with the problems of the last generation but will confront the problems of the next generation." Increasingly, Barnet believed, economic and political problems took precedence over the military issues that dominated world affairs in the decades following World War II. In particular, Barnet argued that NATO needed to deal with "The crises of the industrialized world and the crises of underdevelopment." Even though Western Europe experienced a spectacular economic resurgence, its citizens still lacked basic needs. Barnet linked both the "legitimacy" and "security" of a nation to its ability to keep its citizens well fed, working, and nourished in both mind and body. Massive military spending prevented a nation from caring for its citizens. The underdeveloped countries of the world, Barnet claimed, represented another security concern. Referring to the multitude of problems besetting these nations, Barnet wrote "that the grim reality of mass starvation, political oppression, and violent revolution is the Number One security problem of the next generation." Demanding a separation of aid from Cold War considerations, Barnet called on America, European nations, and the Soviets "to reverse the present dangerous trends which threaten to keep major portions of the globe in a high state of tension and despair"

and threatened the developed world.²⁶ As Barnet made these comments, the Third World joined together and demanded that the U.N. pay greater attention to the plight facing underdeveloped and developing nations on the periphery.

An Isolationist Program?

For the most part, then, IPS supported multilateral solutions to the world's problems through an alliance of nations from both the East and West acting under the direction of the U.N. At other times, though, Barnet, at his most isolationist, called for the end of all alliances and for greater restraint in American foreign policy. During an interview in the mid-1970s, he called for "no formal alliances." In place of the alliance system, Barnet wanted the United States to follow "a consistent policy of being a supporter, not a guarantor, of existing boundaries and then making clear that we have a very strong nonintervention policy on internal disorder," which would prevent America from taking sides during a nation's domestic disputes. America's only concern would be with "the preservation of the existing territorial status quo or to some orderly peaceful change," Barnet explained. The existing alliance system, Barnet claimed, involved "alliances with most countries to stabilize regimes in the face of internal subversion," and rarely looked into aggression by a foreign power. Barnet and others at IPS sometimes spoke in favor of isolationism because they did not fear an upsurge in the number of communist states in Europe or elsewhere.²⁷

Perhaps the most libertarian thinker at IPS, Earl Ravenal embraced a "unilateral disengagement" of U.S. forces from Europe in order to decrease the military budget.

²⁶ Richard J. Barnet, "The United States, the United Nations, and a European Settlement," 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 9, 5-7.

²⁷ "Richard J. Barnet Interview with Public Agenda Foundation," Transcript, April 27, 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 2, folder 41.

Arguing that restrictions on trade or a European trading “bloc” “might actually be more constructive for the international system,” Ravenal cautioned against the United States trying to thwart such outcomes. Furthermore, he acknowledged that communist governments would come to power in certain countries after an American withdrawal—he listed Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal as likely countries for communist party advances in the future—but he suggested that the United States could “establish contacts” with the communists in these countries. For Ravenal, “unilateral disengagement” did not mean complete separation of America from Europe. He made it clear that financial, environmental, developmental, arms agreements, and the maintenance of peace would continue to tie America to Europe. The only difference would be that America would not be able to assert total control over its allies as it had done in the past. The dissolution of NATO involved nothing more than a recognition “of a new kind of international system with a different distribution of power and different patterns of interaction.”²⁸ In calling for a reduced American role in European affairs, IPS intellectuals did not consider such propositions unrealistic, but commentators and officials who saw the world divided between democracy and communism would have difficulty accepting further advances for communism.

Devoid of the concern usually evinced by IPS for democratic participation, Waskow offered a plan that he argued would curb American interventionism. According to notes from a disarmament and national security seminar held at IPS in 1964, Waskow

²⁸ Earl C. Ravenal, “The Dialectic of Military Spending,” in *The Federal Budget and Social Reconstruction*, ed. Marcus G. Raskin (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 151-152. As a further note on the libertarian strain found in the writings of IPS intellectuals on matters pertaining to domestic and foreign policy matters, Earl Ravenal, Michael Klare, and Steven Daggett helped organize a joint IPS-Cato Institute seminar in 1978 that dealt with the “Consequences of Non-Intervention.” See “Discussion Paper for IPS/CATO Seminar on “Consequences of Non-Intervention,” April 6, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 11, folder 38.

suggested creating a body resembling the U.S Supreme Court, which would “serve as a sort of national watchdog or goal-setter for American international policies.” In choosing the Supreme Court as his model, Waskow explained that it “often acts as if its job is to subject present reality to prospects for the future (30-50 years ahead) and to issue prescriptions as to the direction in which American society ought to move.” Not surprisingly, several participants in the seminar strongly disagreed with Waskow’s proposition. Raskin, for instance, questioned what he considered a total lack of democracy in having such a body rule over decisions that impacted all of society. “Raskin doesn’t think that the creation of a body of wise men invested with certain ceremonial as well as real power and who serve as the priests of the society for international matters is possible in a genuinely democratic society,” the notes to the meeting explained.²⁹

In calling for the replacement of NATO with regional collective security arrangements connected to the U.N., IPS intellectuals accepted the fact that America would lose its ability to control world affairs. Barnett, Raskin, and others at IPS would say

²⁹ “Disarmament Seminar,” April 1, 1964,” transcript found in Special Agent Charles M. Sawyer to WFO,” September 8, 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 25, folder 20, 1-2. Waskow, reminiscent of some of the earlier criticisms found in his studies conducted at PRI, came under attack for encouraging members of the body to look at how present decisions would affect America and the world decades later. Arthur Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, expressed “serious reservations” about not only Waskow’s paper but the seminar itself. “Would the seminar merely be an occasion for intellectual gymnastics, or would there be a serious exchange of views in order to come up with ideas bearing at least some remote relation to political plausibility,” Barber declared as he questioned the feasibility of Waskow’s institution. Barber also characterized “Waskow’s insistence on a thirty-year goal for the American government” as “a nonsense statement lacking operational meaning.” While agreeing “future-oriented institutions” seemed far-fetched, Raskin still supported Waskow’s general idea that government and military officials needed to look for policies that, while beyond the pale presently, could offer hope in the future. As the notes for the meeting explained, “Raskin’s experience on the NSC convinced him that in order to come up with politically relevant ideas, and to avoid being forever rooted in dead center, it was necessary to have some free for all with respect to future goals and aspirations.” Nonetheless, Barber still bewailed the “abstract and frivolous discussion of future-futures,” much preferring that talk about the future stay limited to a period not exceeding one decade. See *Ibid.*, 3-4, 6.

that America never held such power in the first place. Furthermore, IPS intellectuals openly acknowledged that their plans for a post-NATO world would do away with the tidy hierarchical structure of the present alliance system. Writing in the early 1970s, Barnet argued that America had to accept “a high degree of disorder and instability” in the world and allow nations to decide what political and economic system worked best for them. Furthermore, the United States, Barnet explained, needed to see itself as one member of a larger group of nations. He appealed to Americans “to identify with the people of other countries as members of the same species with the same basic problems,” and not “as abstractions to be manipulated for our own psychological and political needs and will continue to build our power on their suffering.”³⁰

Part of America coming to grips with its diminished power involved looking at the world in a new way. America would have to approach foreign affairs from a non-ideological perspective. Solving America’s problems, Barnet claimed, required new labels to describe other nations. “Examining old habits of mind and passionate attachments to ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ would,” Barnet wrote, “enable the United States to bring commitments and resources into balance.” Furthermore, Barnet implored American officials to take a less reactionary approach to revolutions abroad. Officials needed to realize, Barnet claimed, that revolutions in the Third World did not threaten America’s security. Such events merely changed the dynamics of foreign relationships. “To live in security in a revolutionary world,” Barnet argued, “the U.S. will have to cope with the unpleasant truth that Americans cannot continue to grow richer while millions starve and still feel safe.” Moreover, if the United States refrained from looking at all world events

³⁰ Richard J. Barnet, “The Illusion of Security,” in *Peace and War*, eds. Charles R. Beitz and Theodore Herman (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1973), 284-285.

through its ideological prism, Barnet claimed that cooperation would be possible. Calling on the United States to “be much less ideological in relating to revolutionary nationalist regimes,” Barnet urged America to form economic partnerships with Third World nations, which he claimed, would “have a moderating influence on revolutionary governments” if based on equity.³¹

In setting its sights on NATO and asserting that the military alliance no longer served a purpose, IPS sought to demolish a primary apparatus of the Cold War. Yet IPS tended to place too much of the blame for NATO’s existence on the United States. In spite of Europe’s constant complaining, European leaders still favored a close relationship with America. The Soviet Union, too, preferred NATO to the alternative, a unified and militarized Germany. In fact, IPS intellectuals, particularly Barnet, attached too little importance to the issue of German reunification, believing that both superpowers would accept whatever political and economic system a reunified Germany chose. Perhaps, as IPS argued, the unwillingness of the participants of the Cold War to move beyond the status quo explains the longevity of NATO. Unwilling to seek an

³¹ Richard J. Barnet, “Reflections: Rethinking National Security,” *The New Yorker*, March 21, 1988, 114; Richard J. Barnet, *The Economy of Death* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 46. Barnet’s appeal to Americans to look more sympathetically toward revolutions mirrored a statement made years earlier by the historian William Appleman Williams, who encouraged American support of revolutions abroad in his famous revisionist history of American foreign relations, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. In order to overcome what he termed the tragedy of American diplomacy, Williams called on the American public and its leaders to adopt a foreign policy of an “open door for revolutions.” Otherwise, as Williams presciently noted, “another Cuba will clearly be dealt with through military intervention” by the United States. See William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* 2nd ed. (New York: Dell, 1962), 307. Though supportive of revolution, Barnet held a very restrictive view of the appropriate means he thought revolutionaries should employ in pursuit of their cause. Barnet criticized the “psychological devices” used by revolutionaries to support their use of violence. Revolutionaries claimed that government oppression necessitated the use of violence and the people had the responsibility to employ violent methods in order to reach the desired end or goal. Such reasoning bothered Barnet. “Just as the National Security Manager justifies the use of napalm, personnel bombs, and crops destroyers as the necessary preparation for a peaceful society so the Revolutionary shares the same guilt-assuaging illusion,” Barnet claimed. See Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 43; Richard J. Barnet, “Reflections: The Four Pillars,” *The New Yorker*, March 9, 1987, 84.

alternative to NATO, both East and West preferred sticking with what they knew.

Regarding the U.N, IPS, with the exception of Waskow's plan that would have allowed the General Assembly to play a larger role in deciding when to send peacekeeping forces into troubled regions, offered few suggestions for how to deal with the Security Council.

Whereas IPS sought to abolish NATO, trilateralists and liberal internationalists actually endorsed plans to strengthen NATO in the late 1970s, which led President Carter to put forth a plan to station Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Neoconservatives, too, supported efforts to bolster European defenses, even after the proposal to rearm NATO countries threatened the very existence of the military alliance.

Chapter Four: Vietnam: The War That Made IPS Famous

For IPS, the Vietnam War represented everything that was wrong with America and its foreign policy. Still haunted by Adolf Hitler, the United States replaced the German leader with a new bogeyman, communism. Nonetheless, the same fear of appeasement drove American officials to view Vietnam as the next Cold War battleground. Even more disconcerting to IPS, America employed the same techniques, especially saturation bombing, in Vietnam as it did during World War II. Unlike American officials tasked with carrying out the Vietnam War, IPS intellectuals looked at the conflict as a political issue. As a result, IPS encouraged the United States to withdraw its troops from the region and pursue negotiations, even if such actions led to the entire country of Vietnam eventually becoming communist. A communist Vietnam bothered IPS far less than the immorality of continued American interference in the region.

As Robert Tomes has shown in his study of American intellectuals and the Vietnam War, prior to 1963, only a small group of “selectivist liberal dissenters” questioned the wisdom of fighting communism across the globe. On Vietnam, intellectuals offered “vacillated” opinions and “contradictory” conclusions. Many liberals, Tomes suggests, could never accept a communist Vietnam as an ally of America. Thus, when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, only the *New Republic*, the *Nation*, and the *Progressive* spoke out against the measure. Other historians, though, have shown the existence of dissent in both America and abroad in the years prior to America’s decision to intervene in Vietnam in 1965.¹ President Johnson,

¹ While noting several instances of antiwar protests as early as 1963, historians of the anti-Vietnam War movement tend to dismiss the activism as “frail and isolated efforts” or “too scattered and undemonstrative

however, chose to ignore them. Fredrik Logevall has criticized previous scholarship for making it seem as though Johnson had no other options in Vietnam besides escalation and for overstating the amount of support the president received from Americans. Logevall shows that Johnson had several alternatives available to him. Noting a “fluidity in Establishment thinking about the war in the crucial months of decision,” Logevall points to the dismay felt by “midlevel bureaucrats” and among several prominent columnists and newspapers.²

As for the general public, wholehearted support for the Vietnam War did not appear until Johnson had already committed American forces to Vietnam. Even in February 1965, as America prepared for Operation Rolling Thunder, there existed a “widespread antipathy” toward sending American troops to Vietnam and “broad support” for negotiations, according to Logevall. Likewise, Logevall has described the United States as “isolated” internationally as American allies offered only “tepid rhetorical support,” rather than soldiers, to the American war effort. Yet, even those individuals and groups calling for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam made sure not to make too much of America’s unwillingness to pursue talks with North Vietnam. Blaming domestic and international critics of the war for allowing “the Americanization of the Vietnam War” to take place “in a permissive context,” Logevall notes how the British and Senate

to rank as a movement.” See Thomas Powers, *The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), 35-36, 41, 51-53; Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 85-94.

² Robert R. Tomes, *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 56-57, 67, 108; Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 376-378.

Democrats spoke up only so much while still allowing the Johnson administration “to escalate by stealth.”³

President Johnson purposely kept American citizens in the dark about matters pertaining to Vietnam. According to Tom Wells, the president preferred not to give a “trumpet call” talk to the nation calling for mobilization of American troops, even though Daniel Ellsberg wrote a speech along those lines for Secretary of Defense McNamara. Johnson’s reluctance to publicize his decisions on Vietnam stemmed from the fact that he did not want to call up the national reserves. Doing so would have led to calls by Senate hawks to increase the bombing of North Vietnam and possibly lead to a McCarthy-like paranoia resurfacing in America. Large-scale mobilization, furthermore, the Johnson administration feared, would bring greater public attention to the government’s Vietnam policy, arousing the still relatively small antiwar movement and possibly encouraging congressional opponents of the war to speak out.⁴

Hitler’s Ghost and America as an Imperial Hegemon

IPS intellectuals held no compunction about condemning America’s actions in Vietnam, both publicly and privately, to government officials and the American people. In the months following the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Raskin called not only for a negotiated settlement, but also for replacing the policymakers in Washington who fashioned American policy in Vietnam. Raskin also derided intellectuals for refusing to take a stand against the administration. In an unpublished “draft” written in November 1964, Raskin proclaimed, “The silence on the part of American intellectuals regarding the

³ Logevall, *Choosing War*, 405-406.

⁴ Tom Wells, *The War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 41-43.

American tragedy is quite deafening.” Listing the many immoral and deadly acts committed against Vietnam by American troops, he lamented, “Like Sisyphus we work with stone so much we become stone ourselves.” As a solution to the mess in Vietnam, Raskin called on the United States, as well as its South Vietnamese allies, to “stop its brutality, its use of napalm, torture, and other crude un-American forms of behavior.” Raskin also insisted that President Johnson “call for the resignation . . . of Rostow, Taylor, Bill Bundy, Richardson, and others who have foisted this miserable situation on ourselves and others.” Lastly, Raskin proposed a meeting between the United States, France, China, and the Soviet Union to create the conditions necessary for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. As part of agreement to end American military intervention in Vietnam, Raskin urged the United States to provide development aid to Southeast Asia.⁵

In calling for the resignations of officials in the Johnson administration, Raskin hoped that bringing in new blood into the government would eliminate from policymaking circles the penchant for equating events in Vietnam with the years preceding World War II. President Johnson’s Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, among others, warned against repeating the mistakes of World War II when American and British officials appeased Hitler. Responding to a paper written by Raskin on the Vietnam War, Bundy criticized him for dwelling on the atrocities committed by South Vietnam and ignoring North Vietnam’s use of the same harsh tactics. Bundy closed his letter by comparing Raskin’s views on Vietnam with similar complaints made against Europeans who tried to prevent Hitler’s expansionist policies in Europe in the 1930s. “Your whole handling of this aspect reminded me all too painfully of attitudes in Europe

⁵ “Raskin—Draft—November 10, 1964,” IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 1, 6; William P. Bundy to Marcus Raskin, January 11, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36

in the 1930s that equated every police measure by Benes against the Sudetens morally to the whole course of Hitler's conduct," Bundy wrote. Raskin, in replying to Bundy's criticisms, chided the assistant secretary of state for his use of "false historical parallels which are totally irrelevant." Bundy's all too familiar analogy of Vietnam as a domino poised to fall and bring communism to all of Southeast Asia, furthermore, seemed to Raskin "far too ideological, emotive, conclusive and reductive." "The apocalyptic view saves us the trouble of forging a sophisticated foreign policy for Asia which requires diplomatic skill and prowess," Raskin explained.⁶

Critical of politicians who continued to use the Munich analogy to defend American actions in Vietnam, Barnet, writing in the late 1960s, again questioned the relevance of such a comparison. Barnet chided U.S. officials for overstating the threat communism posed to U.S. security. To think, Barnet wrote, "that the Castros of the future will muster an army of millions, transport them by sampan and burro, and loose them on our cities is nothing less than a psychotic phantasy, so absurd in fact that it is never explicitly stated, only hinted at in vague anxiety producing historical analogies" unconnected to present conditions. Looking for fictional enemies abroad led American officials to ignore the growing opposition to the war at home among certain segments of society, Barnet claimed. He argued that "the diversion of money and energy to fight which is supposed to keep Asian Communists from landing on our shores helps perpetuate the conditions which have created native insurgents and guerrilla warfare in

⁶ Marcus Raskin to William P. Bundy, January 25, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 56, folder 46. Edward Beneš, as president of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938 and 1940 to 1948, opposed German efforts to take over the Sudetenland and advocated expulsion of ethnic Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. Following World War II, these expulsions continued, often resulting in massacres.

American cities.”⁷ In other words, if the United States truly wanted to stop communism from lurching forward, it needed to redirect some of the money it spent on defense to improve the lives of Third World citizens as well as its own.

Whereas Raskin blamed American actions in Vietnam on an antiquated mindset and an ideological hatred that blinded policymakers to reality, Waskow saw a new attitude taking hold of America, one reminiscent of past hegemonies. Noting America’s refusal to go through the United Nations to end North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam and the use of chemicals to destroy Vietnam’s crops, Waskow, speaking at the University of Michigan teach-in in March 1965, pointed to “the new American arrogance.” According to him, “The new American arrogance says that the ends we seek are so noble, so benign, that any means at all are legitimate to advance them.” At the same time, Waskow described the détente between America and the Soviet Union as “a corrupt deal” because it allowed America to be as “free to do as we like to these and similarly annoying underdeveloped countries whose people have skin colors different from ours and whose governments have a philosophy hostile to ours.” Since the United States would rather “shoot down any troublemaker who arise [sic] from that night of poverty and despair” than to allow him “to shout his hatred into our well-lit, well-upholstered living rooms,” opportunities for dialogue disappeared, Waskow claimed.⁸ America’s rise to hegemony allowed officials to disregard weaker nations. As a result, military action replaced talking.

⁷ Richard J. Barnet, “Patterns of Intervention,” in *The Vietnam War and International Law*, ed. Richard A. Falk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 1168.

⁸ Arthur Waskow, “The New American Arrogance,” revised version, March 24, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 2, folder 30, 3-5, 7-8.

While critical of American actions in Vietnam, Waskow did not support an isolationist foreign policy. In fact, Waskow warned the crowd at the teach-in not to allow a “neo-isolationist arrogance” to guide their thinking on foreign policy. Thus, he encouraged his listeners not to become “the man who simply shuts off his living room with walls and security locks, takes a cab to the office so as not to see the poor, and leave them to rot in their misery.” Rather, the United States, Waskow argued, returning to ideas he pursued earlier in his career, could fight communism with “Unarmed Forces,” like the Peace Corps, and “win unarmed victories for liberty.” However, since the American military decimated Vietnam, Waskow questioned whether America could win an “unarmed victory.” Therefore, he called for an immediate military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. In a 1966 letter to the *War/Peace Report* editors, Waskow demanded that the United States “withdraw militarily without conditions.” While many Americans might disagree with his call for immediate withdrawal, Waskow contended “we should accept a local defeat that resulted from our own stupidity and moral blindness, rather than make the Vietnamese pay for our stupidity by destroying what is left of their country.”⁹ America, in other words, had so tarnished its image and caused such great physical destruction in Vietnam that it could never fix what it had done. Better then to leave with what little dignity America still possessed.

In spite of the ineptitude of American policymakers and the destruction caused in Vietnam by American bombs, the United States continued its bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese. As the historian Robert Schulzinger has shown, the bombing strategy pursued by Johnson owed much to the thinking of Secretary of Defense Robert

⁹ Ibid., 7-8; Arthur Waskow to *War/Peace Report* Editors, October 7, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 3, folder 11.

McNamara. He believed that the bombing of North Vietnam served a single purpose: obtaining a stronger negotiating position for the United States. McNamara devised a bombing strategy meant to stop infiltration of the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam and included built-in pauses to encourage the North Vietnamese to enter into negotiations. When the United States adopted this strategy and initiated the first bombing pause in early 1966, the North Vietnamese refused to conduct negotiations with foreign nations on matters pertaining to the political system in Vietnam. Such defiance by the North Vietnamese actually increased support for the bombing in America and encouraged President Johnson to expand the bombing in the hope that it would end the war more quickly.¹⁰

While the Johnson administration publicly berated the North Vietnamese for their unwillingness to meet at the bargaining table, IPS intellectuals questioned whether the United States really sought an end to the war. American officials, Ralph Stavins wrote in 1971 with the aid of the as yet unreleased Pentagon Papers, began a policy of escalation in early 1965 not as a means to prevent a communist takeover in Southeast Asia, or even to protect America's national security, Stavins argued. President Johnson decided to escalate the war in 1965 in order to preserve America's status as "Number One Nation." According to Stavins, McGeorge Bundy and other officials could accept the fact that aerial bombing failed to secure a military victory in Vietnam because the bombing allowed America to preserve its position as the world's dominant nation. For Bundy, Stavins claimed, "the way he [America] plays the game becomes as important to him as the result of the game." Claiming that Bundy advocated for the continued bombing of

¹⁰ Robert D. Schulzinger, *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 202-203, 206-208.

Vietnam in order to preserve America's domination of South Vietnam, Stavins described the National Security Advisor as "a gamester [seeking] to bring about an imperial goal." Raskin made a nearly identical argument not long after the bombing of Vietnam began in earnest in February 1965. In his "A Citizen's White Paper on American Policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," Raskin suggested that how America appeared to the Chinese mattered more than the military benefits of bombing. Rather than resorting to bombing for military purposes, Raskin argued that America's decision to bomb Vietnam came about as a result of being "goaded by Chinese propaganda and psychological feelings of impotence" and fears that America would appear "like paper tigers" to the Chinese.¹¹

As early as 1966, Waskow called for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, but the majority of intellectuals at IPS advocated negotiations, which included the staged withdrawal of American forces, and a greater role for the United Nations. Raskin, along with the well-known war correspondent Bernard B. Fall, who had previously supported the American war effort in Vietnam, offered the most elaborate plan for ending the American war in Southeast Asia in their 1965 edited collection of essays entitled *The Viet-Nam Reader*. The collection included the writings of such Establishment figures as Dean Acheson and Walt W. Rostow as well as documents from the National Liberation Front.¹² At the end of *The Viet-Nam Reader*,

¹¹ Ralph Stavins, "Washington Determines the Fate of Vietnam: 1954-1965," in *Washington Plans An Aggressive War*, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1971), 153-159.; Marcus G. Raskin, "A Citizen's White Paper on American Policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," 89th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 111, pt. 7, 9587. Stavins's argument accords with what later historians have described as an almost fanatical concern among government officials over American "credibility." See, for instance, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 276-277.

¹² According to Raskin, eleven publishers rejected the *The Viet-Nam Reader* before Random House agreed to publish it in 1965. "They [publishers] said the war was a transitory episode that would soon be

Raskin and Fall offered several proposals for ending the Vietnam War or, at the very least, reducing the carnage caused by the war. “All American servicemen in Viet-Nam,” the editors demanded, “are to be fully and clearly apprised that, *as a minimum*, the Hague and Geneva Conventions on land warfare and on the treatment of prisoners of war and war victims fully apply in combat operations in Viet-Nam.” The admittance of Red Cross officials, Raskin and Fall believed, would help improve conditions in Vietnam. Raskin and Fall also argued that America needed to drop its “ill-founded reasons” for not allowing the U.N. into Vietnam.¹³

As for America’s bombing campaign, it neither succeeded in “break[ing] North Vietnamese morale,” nor did it “boast South Vietnamese morale,” so the editors called for bringing an end to the bombing. America, Raskin and Fall continued, needed to accept the “hard reality” that any coalition government in South Vietnam would have to include the National Liberation Front (NLF). This fact should not have concerned the United States, the editors believed, since “the NLF program does not, at least *formally*, clash with basic United States objectives.” Raskin and Fall also called for removing from South Vietnam all United States and North Vietnamese troops that arrived after February 7, 1965. Troops that entered South Vietnam prior to that date would leave the country at a later date set by an international control commission. After the withdrawal of outside military forces, Raskin and Fall suggested that all sides sign a State Treaty similar to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which “has for the past decade satisfactorily governed the

over, that the book would become irrelevant before it could be published,” Raskin said, explaining the attitudes of these publishers. Quoted in Jessica Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock* (New York: Knopf, 1969), 49.

¹³ Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall, “Diplomatic Alternatives to U.S. Policy: Editors’ Proposals,” in *The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis*, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), 367-374.

relations of Austria with both power blocs and ensured the political stability of Central Europe.” The treaty included plans for the eventual unification of North and South Vietnam.¹⁴ Each “diplomatic alternative” offered by Raskin and Fall would serve as a blueprint for other intellectuals at IPS.

Bombing might have allowed the United States to retain its credibility, but IPS thinkers strongly disagreed with the notion that Vietnam’s problems required military solutions. IPS intellectuals encouraged the United States to involve the U.N. and include in the negotiations the actual representatives of the Vietnamese people, the NLF. Before discussing IPS’s arguments in favor of negotiations, it is important to understand how intellectuals at IPS viewed the situation in Vietnam. IPS’s repeated calls for finding a legal solution to the Vietnam War stemmed from a specific understanding intellectuals at the Institute had of power. IPS intellectuals opposed the realist view of international relations as a game of power politics between nations. In their introduction to *The Viet-Nam Reader*, Raskin and Fall offered a different definition of power. The editors advocated for a new conception of power that involved more than physical strength. “Power,” the authors wrote, “where it is used without wisdom and only in the name of one nation, will result in the ultimate corruption of the good ends that nation originally might have wished to achieve—and in the corruption of that nation itself.” The legalistic perspective held by IPS intellectuals became apparent as early as 1964 when an attack on

¹⁴ Raskin and Fall, “Diplomatic Alternatives to U.S. Policy: Editors’ Proposals,” 367-374. In the updated version of *The Viet-Nam Reader*, written eighteen months after the initial edition, Raskin and Fall admitted that their previous recommendations did not “constitute the ‘best’ solution to the problem” in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the authors argued that “they have the merit of being feasible since some of them can be implemented unilaterally up to a certain stage.” See Bernard B. Fall and Marcus G. Raskin, “Diplomatic Alternative to U.S. Policy,” in *The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis*, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), 465.

American naval ships supposedly occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin near Vietnam. Referring to the event, Raskin argued that the United Nations Charter prohibited reprisals unless they met a specific number of criteria. With limited or no damage done to American ships, and no American lives lost, Raskin wrote to the *Washington Post*, “I know of no legal doctrine, domestic or international which would conclude the action taken was proportionate to the illegal act committed by North Vietnam.”¹⁵

The Viet-Nam Reader succeeded in capturing the attention of both government officials and student protestors. Raskin claimed that he and Fall received “a great number of letters” from university faculty and their students. “The book hardened up the lines, started people thinking about fundamental American policy,” Raskin noted regarding the success of the book. In fact, the reader served as the authoritative book at teach-ins on campuses across the nation. Raskin took part in several of these teach-ins, debating Abe Fortas, Walt Rostow, and other government officials.¹⁶ *The Viet-Nam Reader* achieved exactly what the co-directors had wanted for IPS publications. Raskin and Fall’s book offered an alternative source of information for policymakers while educating the masses about what went on inside and outside of the United States.

IPS’s Efforts to Bring Law and Order to America Foreign Policy

Feeling so strongly about the illegality of American action in Vietnam, Barnet wrote a 59-page “legal memorandum” in 1966 that provided a legal rationale for bringing officials in the United States to justice. In the memorandum, Barnet pointed to several

¹⁵ Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall, “Introduction: The Issues At Stake,” in *The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis*, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), xix; Marcus Raskin to *Washington Post* Editor,” August 6, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 25.

¹⁶ Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 49.

key articles in the U.N. Charter that the United States purposely ignored in its pursuit of victory in Vietnam. To begin with, Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which dealt with the issue of the Security Council, represented, according to Barnet, “an attempt to substitute for the anarchy of self-judgment, a community standard for judging when force shall be used.” Barnet recognized that the Cold War hamstrung the Security Council, but this did not mean that nations could ignore it. He argued that “if we assume that the purpose of an international legal order is to build a world order in which both aggression and the use of force is contained, then the difficulties in using the machinery of Article 39 do not justify the United States decision to ignore the limitations on the use of force in the Charter.” The United States had a “clear obligation” to go before the Security Council before using force against Vietnam.¹⁷

Barnet also rejected claims made by American officials that it acted in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in Vietnam in response to North Vietnamese aggression. Noting that American troops arrived in Vietnam and began bombing North Vietnam well before the North Vietnamese entered South Vietnam or sent arms, Barnet argued that “the U.S., in invoking Article 51, must be prepared to claim either that the presence of fewer than 400 soldiers and a few weapons constitutes an ‘armed attack’ justifying a counter-response of massive bombardment and a full scale ground war, or that the guerilla operations of the Viet Cong constitute an ‘armed attack’ by North Viet-Nam.” In referring to the first possible argument, Barnet claimed that it “not only stretches the obvious meaning of Article 51 beyond any reasonable limit but it also exposes the United States to retaliatory military operations for having sent large

¹⁷ Richard J. Barnet, “Testing the Legality of the Viet-Nam War,” undated [1966], IPSR, WHS, box 15, folder 70, 8-13.

military missions and vast quantities of arms to most of the nations of the world.”

Neither, according to Barnet, did the argument that North Vietnam provided arms and other forms of assistance to the Viet Cong make America’s claim of self-defense viable. Explaining that over the last twenty years “guerrilla operations have been conducted on every continent” with support from foreign nations, Barnet pointed out that no nation, including the United States, or international body ever argued “that internal strife aided from abroad amounted to an ‘armed attack.’”¹⁸

Even if the United States had ample reason to involve itself in the civil strife occurring in Vietnam, Barnet criticized American leaders for going it alone and, in the process, destroying Vietnam’s physical and political infrastructure. As for what type of law Barnet desired, he argued that “we must conclude that a rule which restricts rather than encourages outside intervention of single states is preferable not only for reducing the dangers of world war but also for promoting the political healing of peoples who have been torn apart by war.” America, he regretted, not only destroyed the landscape of Vietnam, but also its “political fabric,” making it more difficult to achieve peace. Nor could the United States contend that its actions in Vietnam represented a proportionate response to the North Vietnamese. As for the claims made by the State Department that the North Vietnamese violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as much as the United States, Barnet called attention to the fact that only after the South refused to allow national elections did the North Vietnamese breach the treaty. Furthermore, Barnet wrote, “When the North did begin to commit major violations the scale, measured either in

¹⁸ Barnet, “Testing the Legality of the Viet-Nam War,” 8-13.

troops involved, numbers of persons killed, property destroyed, never even approached the scale of violation undertaken by the United States and South Viet-Nam.”¹⁹

Yet while calling for an enlarged role for the U.N., IPS intellectuals also understood that America, so intent, in the words of Rodberg, on remaining “Number One Nation,” would not allow an objective observer like the U.N. to determine its fate. Rather than resorting to force, Barnet argued that the United States should have gone to the U.N. Going through the U.N., he claimed, opened the door for a political solution by dealing individually with particular disagreements rather than all together, which made the problems seem insurmountable. Barnet castigated the United States for issuing “a series of indictments of the Viet-Cong,” and thus preventing American officials from treating them “as separate problems for political resolution.” Regardless, a willingness to allow international organizations to deliberate over disputes meant that America would have to accept decisions unfavorable to its interests, which seemed unlikely. A willingness to settle the dispute in the U.N. would show, Barnet argued, that America “implicitly agrees that the system is more important than the outcome of any particular dispute.” Barnet, though, understood that the United States would likely never accept U.N. arbitration of international conflicts because of America’s “global mission against communism.” Because the United States conflated each battle into a “global struggle” concluding in either “ultimate victory or defeat,” Barnet argued that “it [America] can believe in no system of order other than what it can impose on others.” In the process, according to

¹⁹ Barnet, “Testing the Legality of the Viet-Nam War,” 18-19, 26-27.

Barnet, America both defended its choice to go it alone in Vietnam and, at the same time, claimed that it had the support of the international community.²⁰

The United States justified its unilateralism, Barnet argued, on two grounds. Officials defended American intervention in Vietnam by pointing to outside interference in the country's internal affairs that prevented harmonious relations among nations under U.N. direction. In the words of Barnet, "Once the enemies of freedom are defeated, then the U.S. can perhaps share some of its police responsibilities with others." To prove that it did not, in fact, act unilaterally, the United States also highlighted its "reliance on nominal or subservient multilateral organizations" set up in various regions of the world and composed of relatively weak regional states. One had to look no further, Raskin argued, than America's dependence on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). While the West considered the U.N. "unwieldy and in need of much improvement," in relation to Southeast Asia it had "done more to stabilize that region than either the SEATO arrangement or the American military intervention," Raskin argued. He believed that even SEATO members recognized their organization had "absolutely no moral or political force behind it." The inclusion of African, Asian, and Latin American nations also made the U.N. far more attractive to Southeast Asian peoples.²¹

Unwilling to sit in judgment before other nations, many states, according to Barnet, formulated their own legal defenses for intervening, which, not surprisingly, did not lead to the most solid legal thinking. As a result, Barnet questioned the ability of

²⁰ Richard J. Barnet, "The American Responsibility," in *The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis*, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), 48-49.

²¹ Richard J. Barnet, "Patterns of Intervention," 1164; Marcus Raskin, "A View from Washington," June 3, 1965, 89th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 111, pt. 9, 12570.

international law to solve the world's disputes. Therefore, Barnet rejected the notion popular among some Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s that international law, enforced by international institutions, would make the world more peaceful. For instance, he wrote that "powerful states are in fact claiming for themselves the legal right to make a greater number of decisions—and more far-reaching ones—than at any time in the last 400 years." America's undeclared war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia proved that international law faced a number of hurdles. Faced with the possibility of life or death decisions related to foreign affairs, legal advisors to political leaders often, Barnet claimed, "stretch the law as far as possible to satisfy their clients" and employed a selective approach to international law.²² International law, as a result, became a farce, allowing any nation to do as it pleased using the flimsiest legal precedents to serve their purpose.

Thus, making the world less violent did not require more international laws, but something far more fundamental, a change in the outlook of humankind. According to Barnet, international law would succeed only after an "expectation of violence" in international relations disappeared. Only by changing the "perception of the threat," Barnet claimed, could the world's citizens come to see international law as more constructive than violence. Past events, most notably the passage of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, succeeded in changing the mindset of the superpowers, bringing on a period of relaxed relations between the two sides. Following the treaty, American and Western European officials accepted that the Soviets would not invade Europe.

²² Richard J. Barnet, "Toward the Control of International Violence: The Limits and Possibilities of Law," in *The Future of the International Legal Order*, eds. Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 371-372.

Acceptance of new expectations, however, required something more than an international police force. The new rules had to be, Barnet argued, “perceived not merely as the expression of power but as a source of obligation.” A sense of obligation to international law depended largely on individual governments. Since so many countries relied on “national security bureaucracies,” however, Barnet had doubts about the ability of the world leaders to look at other countries differently. For these countries, he wrote, were “in the hands of those who by tradition and professional experience see the pursuit of power by national states as the ultimate reality of international life.” Nonetheless, Barnet predicted that the influence of “nondefense bureaucracies,” which included transnational corporations and the Peace Corps, would grow as the national security bureaucracies committed one misstep after another. Nondefense bureaucracies, according to Barnet, saw “their own interests served by the development of cooperative transnational relationships rather than by the manipulation of violence.”²³ No doubt, Barnet considered IPS one of these nondefense bureaucracies working to change, through education and other means, the American mindset regarding threats, security, and peace.

Negotiations Now! IPS’s Promotion of Negotiations to End the Vietnam War

When it became clear that America had to find a way to extricate itself from Vietnam, liberal opposition to the war generally split over the issue of what to do with American troops stationed in Vietnam. Whereas radicals called for the immediate withdrawal of American forces, liberals advocated for negotiations. Moreover, while radicals made their displeasure with the war known almost immediately after President Johnson introduced ground troops in Vietnam, liberals only came around to supporting

²³ Barnet, “Toward the Control of International Violence,” 375, 377-380, 386-389.

negotiations years later. As DeBenedetti and Chatfield have shown, most “elite critics,” and even antiwar protestors, sought “some middle ground between escalation and withdrawal.” Ordinary Americans, too, opposed both withdrawal and escalation. The majority of citizens stood between these two extremes, going so far as to support negotiations involving the Vietcong and the formation of a coalition government. Liberal support for negotiations materialized by 1967 with the creation of Negotiations Now! Its membership, “a liberal all-star team,” according to one historian, included Arthur Schlesinger Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, and Joseph Rauh. Negotiations Now! called for a bombing halt as part of a general cease fire and negotiations with all elements of the Vietnamese leadership. American troops, however, would remain in the country.²⁴ IPS stood somewhat in the middle on the matter of troop withdrawals and negotiations. While Waskow supported the immediate removal of American forces from Vietnam, other IPS intellectuals, most notably Barnet and Raskin, called for a staged withdrawal.

For the length of the Vietnam War, IPS intellectuals urged the United States to not only hold negotiations, but, more importantly, open up a place at the bargaining table for the NLF. In the view of many IPS thinkers the NLF, and not the North Vietnamese, represented the only true voice of the revolutionaries. In calling for the United States to negotiate with the NLF, Raskin, in an unpublished paper, argued that carrying on the war would only strengthen the ideological bonds between the diverse groups under the NLF umbrella. On the other hand, beginning negotiations in 1966 would mean that “serious differences in the NLF will [still] show up,” and make it much less likely that the communists would control Vietnam, Raskin predicted. Therefore, he concluded that “in

²⁴ DeBenedetti and Chatfield, *An American Ordeal*, 171; Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 65.

order to end the war on terms which would have served the American national interest” required meeting with “the principal belligerents,” the NLF. To do otherwise “would be similar to Great Britain attempting to get peace during the American Revolution by negotiating with France since the revolution was supported and dominated by the French.” Until American officials acknowledged the actual participants in the war, the conflict would drag on in perpetuity. Barnet criticized the American understanding of “negotiation” because in refusing a role for the NLF, the North Vietnamese and the NLF “gain none of the objectives for which they have fought for more than 20 years—essentially political power in South Vietnam and eventual reunification of the country.” Furthermore, Barnet contended that “the State Department’s whole script for ‘negotiation’ takes on an air of fantasy” by thinking that Ho Chi Minh could say the word and the NLF guerrillas would end their war in the South—an attitude which Barnet blamed on a belief, wrongheaded he claimed, that the Vietnamese civil war might end as did the Greek civil war.²⁵

IPS intellectuals realized that the United States likely would never meet with NLF representatives because American officials did not want to appear weak before the Soviet Union or offer recognition for a revolutionary party. Writing toward the end of 1966, Waskow backed a permanent end to the bombing in both North and South Vietnam, followed by the removal of American combat ships from the region. Regarding American combat troops, Waskow proposed a unilateral cease-fire to remain in effect until the North Vietnamese fired on American troops. After carrying out the above steps, Waskow recommended negotiations between the United States and the NLF for the creation of a

²⁵ Marcus Raskin, “Untitled Draft,” February 16, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 14, 16; Richard J. Barnet, “The Last Act in Vietnam,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 1968, SM26.

coalition government to run Vietnam until elections. South Vietnam, in Waskow's arrangement, would be demilitarized and neutralized until reunification with the North. Recognizing a "sticking point" in his proposal, Waskow conceded that negotiating with the NLF possibly meant "legitimizing 'illegitimate' Communist revolutions everywhere," but America had no other options. "If the USA 'cannot' accept a coalition government in South Vietnam, then there is no way to end the war," Waskow wrote.²⁶

IPS could advocate for the inclusion of the NLF in negotiations because the Institute did not despair over the possibility of a communist government in Vietnam. While the United States refused to entertain the idea of allowing the NLF to join a coalition government in South Vietnam, Barnet believed that America had nothing to fear with the NLF in power. Barnet described the NLF's "program" as "deliberately moderate and non-communist" due to the local conditions the NLF faced in South Vietnam. According to Barnet, the NLF understood that "their only hope of bringing effective rule to South Vietnam is to attract a coalition of the many diverse elements which make up what is, historically, a nation but, organizationally, a collection of duchies." Barnet appreciated the State Department's concern that the non-communist groups within South Vietnam did not possess enough strength to prevent an NLF takeover of the country, but he also blamed the United States for undermining non-communists in Vietnam. Barnet accused the United States of "undercutting the independent power of non-communist nationalists by giving full backing to the military junta." Thus Barnet called on President

²⁶ Arthur Waskow to Ronnie Dugger, December 16, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 33. As a solution to Waskow's dilemma, Barnet called on U.S. officials to support an international legal system "in which nations have the incentive to observe legitimate rules of conduct rather than to try to resolve each revolutionary crisis according to its preferred solution." In Richard J. Barnet, "The American Responsibility," 51.

Johnson to make “[a] telephone call to President Thieu making clear that the U.S. now insists that the cabinet be made representative of opinion in South Vietnam and that negotiations be begun with all political elements,” whether nationalist or communist. In order for negotiations to succeed, however, the United States, Barnet contended, needed to initiate a “political withdrawal” as well as the removal of its troops in Vietnam. Only positive change would come from an American withdrawal, Barnet predicted. Revising the domino effect for his own use, Barnet claimed that American disengagement from the region would have a positive effect on the nations surrounding Vietnam. Using Thailand as an example, Barnet wrote that the Thai government would realize that it had to “follow a strategy of conciliation in dealing with the guerrillas rather than a strategy of pure repression.”²⁷ In order to preserve its ties to America, other nations would change the way they dealt with internal opposition.

The ability of the North Vietnamese to persevere in spite of American bombs raining down on them only increased the respect Barnet and others at IPS had for the people of that country. Following his trip to Hanoi in 1969, Barnet offered a glowing report of North Vietnamese society. Attempting to explain the tenacity of the North Vietnamese, Barnet wrote that “they know that in the severe trials to which they have already been subjected they have shown that they can take punishment and even thrive on it.” Though torn asunder by war, Barnet boasted that university enrollments in North Vietnam had grown, rice yields increased, and deaths from infectious diseases declined. Barnet also spoke highly of how the Vietnamese “decentralized” their industry, school

²⁷ Richard J. Barnet, “Vietnam: The Meaning of Negotiations,” November 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 1, 6, 10-12, 16-17; Barnet sent his article to James P. Warburg, Senators McGovern, Eugene McCarthy, and Robert Kennedy, I.F. Stone, and Arthur Goldberg.

administration, agriculture, and health care. These “changes are popular and have raised morale,” Barnet reported. The North Vietnamese, in fact, expressed an “extraordinary spirit of determination and light heartedness,” in the opinion of Barnet. Explaining how the North Vietnamese “were concerned that the craters were becoming breeding grounds for mosquitos,” Barnet reached the conclusion that “Vietnam appears to be one of the countries in the world least vulnerable to massive air bombardment.”²⁸

IPS’s arguments in support of holding negotiations found few backers in Washington D.C. No matter their disdain for the war, White House officials could not accept the possibility that negotiations could open the door for a communist takeover of Vietnam. Pragmatists at IPS, however, realized that no other alternatives existed for America. Denied a political and military victory in Vietnam, Barnet argued in an unpublished article that “the U.S. must act in a way to make it credible that we are prepared to leave and to permit the play of local forces in Vietnam to determine their political future, even if it means a communist government.” Otherwise, America would hold negotiations for no other reason than “to outwait the patient warriors of Vietnam.” While underscoring the need for America to pressure Thieu to bring more non-communists into his administration, Barnet did not hide the fact that the communists might still take over the South Vietnamese government. No matter how the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam, Barnet, in reference to the possibility of a communist takeover, admitted that “we cannot prevent it if it should turn out that the non-Communist elements are too weak to play a significant independent role.” Still, Barnet claimed, if the United States stopped trying to obtain the “unattainable goal of determining the character

²⁸ Richard J. Barnet, “The View from Hanoi II: How They View Themselves,” 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 11, 3-5.

of the South Vietnamese Government,” Thieu’s government would be able to “better use its power to promote objectives that are both more in its own interest and more realistic.”²⁹ In other words, America’s continued presence in Vietnam actually increased the chances of a communist conquest.

Although Cold War liberalism came under increasing pressure from student protestors and other critics of American foreign policy to cut America’s loses in Vietnam, the idea that America should extricate itself from Vietnam knowing full well that the nation might go communist proved too much for many foreign policy officials. The intransigence of policymakers bewildered IPS intellectuals, who believed that the United States created the conditions that made a coalition government necessary. Invited by the North Vietnamese Jurist Association to visit Hanoi in December 1969, Barnet met with “former soldiers” from the South Vietnamese army and “middle class professionals.” “The destruction and uncontrolled inflation in Saigon are building a nationalist coalition for peace,” Barnet contended. Therefore, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials had to accept such a reality in order for the war to end. Yet part of the problem, according to Barnet, had to do with America’s understanding of the war, which differed dramatically from that of the North Vietnamese. Explaining that he had met with North Vietnam’s Prime Minister, Premier Pham Van Dong, during his trip to North Vietnam and later spoke to President Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and other

²⁹ Richard J. Barnet, “The Conference Table and the Battlefield,” September 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 8, 14-15; Richard J. Barnet, “The Last Act in Vietnam,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 1968, SM26.

American officials upon his return to the United States, Barnet exclaimed that “it became clear to me that Hanoi and Washington are not fighting the same war.”³⁰

By not allowing the NLF at the bargaining table and mischaracterizing North Vietnamese demands, American officials demonstrated their unwillingness to carry out negotiations in good faith. Barnet criticized U.S. officials for offering several “false characterization[s]” of Hanoi’s negotiating position. For instance, Hanoi did not demand the immediate removal of all American troops, but rather 100,000 at the start of negotiations and then a “pledge” to extricate all other forces in the future. Nor did the North Vietnamese want to unify Vietnam prior to the start of negotiations. In fact, Barnet claimed, “They [North Vietnam] are willing to accept a government composed of men they consider authentic Vietnamese patriots even if they are anticommunists.” In order to overcome America’s efforts to hinder negotiations, Barnet suggested to the NLF that it create what the IPS co-director called a “peace cabinet,” which would include both communist and non-communist figures from the NLF and South Vietnam. Writing in February 1969 to Nguyen Thi Binh, who later served as the representative for the NLF during the Paris Peace Conference, Barnet proposed having an American delegation visit Vietnam to promote the “peace cabinet.” Barnet predicted that finding support in Vietnam for such a cabinet would make clear to the world “the real obstacles to negotiation and would help the public to understand that, if the U.S. wants peace in Vietnam, the Nixon administration must not continue to support puppets against the

³⁰ Richard J. Barnet, “Hanoi’s View,” May 26, 1970, 91st Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 116, pt. 13, 17075; Richard J. Barnet, “How Hanoi Sees Nixon,” January 20, 1970, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 116, pt. 1, 381. Asking that Barnet’s article “How Hanoi Sees Nixon,” which originally appeared in the January 29 issue of *The New York Review of Books*, be added to the *Record*, J. William Fulbright called the article “a significant contribution to better informed public discussion of the prospect of the administration’s policy.”

desires of an ever growing majority of the Vietnamese people.” Moreover, Barnet believed that the mission to Vietnam would “make the issue of the war paramount again” and “get Americans to accept the demand that the U.S. withdraw all of her troops and dismantle her bases.”³¹

IPS, especially co-director Barnet, continued to pursue the issue of negotiations in Vietnam throughout Nixon’s presidency. In an apparently unsent memorandum to Henry Kissinger, Barnet told Nixon’s National Security Advisor that he had a plan that would “provide the greatest possible self-determination and protection for all political elements in South Vietnam after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.” After removing Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker from his post in Vietnam and replacing him with someone “who is not identified with old policies and long association with the present Saigon leadership,” Barnet argued that America could immediately call back some of its troops. He recommended the withdrawal of 300,000 American troops by the end of 1970 and all remaining troops by the end of 1971. Barnet also called on Nixon to end all B-52 bombing raids. Furthermore, the troop removals needed to be “final and irreversible assuming the VC and NVA do not harass the American troops as they leave or mount a major offensive against the ARVN forces.”³²

As the United States withdrew its troops and ended the bombing raids, Barnet argued that America could then put increased pressure on South Vietnamese President Thieu to begin negotiations with the NLF, when the presence of American troops still afforded him an advantage. Next, Barnet suggested that President Thieu create a

³¹ Barnet, “How Hanoi Sees Nixon,” 382; Richard J. Barnet to Nguyen Thi Binh, February 20, 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 20.

³² Richard Barnet, “Memorandum for Henry Kissinger,” undated [likely 1969], IPSR, WHS, box 12, folder 51.

Provisional Commission for National Reconciliation. This commission, with the input of the NLF, Buddhists, Saigon government officials and citizens, and exiles would organize and plan for national elections. Barnet's proposal limited America's role in Vietnam to one of "insuring maximum participation and protection for all elements in South Vietnam" and "lend whatever support it can to demands from Vietnamese themselves for international inspection and specific assurances for amnesty." Such a policy, however, would require President Nixon to "candidly tell the public that we cannot guarantee or even predict what the future political development of South Vietnam will be."³³

With the onset of détente and President Nixon's trip to China in 1972, Barnet could not fathom why the United States continued to pour money and troops into Southeast Asia. He rejected claims that America needed to stay in Vietnam in order prevent violent retaliations against America's allies. The North Vietnamese, he claimed, had practiced "pragmatism" in their previous efforts "to survive by adjusting to political reality." Barnet predicted that following the exodus of Americans from Vietnam, "their [North Vietnamese] political goal will be reconciliation and reconstruction of their tortured country." Only an immediate withdrawal of American personnel and troops from the area, however, would allow the Vietnamese people to begin the process of forgiveness. Otherwise, Barnet claimed, "The more 'our Vietnamese' are identified with the brutality of the U.S. war effort and the longer the war goes on, the likelier targets of public anger they become."³⁴

³³ Richard Barnet, "Memorandum for Henry Kissinger," undated [likely 1969], IPSR, WHS, box 12, folder 51.

³⁴ Richard J. Barnet, "When the Americans Really Leave Vietnam," undated [likely 1973], IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 51, 5-10.

Barnet continued to downplay the threat of a communist takeover in Vietnam once America left the region. North Vietnamese and NLF leaders both agreed that present political conditions in Vietnam made it highly unlikely that a reunified Vietnam would come under the control of a communist government. Such claims notwithstanding, Barnet wondered why the prospect of a communist Vietnam worried Americans. Unlikely to ally with either the Soviets or Chinese, Barnet claimed, “The successors to Ho Chi Minh would become the Tito of Asia and would in all likelihood court the friendship of the United States as counterweight to the nearby communist giants.” Furthermore, Barnet asked why, “when the President clinks glasses in the Kremlin and the Great Hall of Peking,” the United States should expend another dollar or cause an additional American to die, all in pursuit of a non-communist Vietnam. Barnet called on the United States to accept the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) proposal to create a “government of national reconciliation,” which would include “any Vietnamese politician or political group who put national independence first.” According to Barnet, the PRG’s proposed government would be “two-thirds non-communist” and follow a “liberal, nationalist, and neutralist” program. The program would, moreover, follow a “deliberately moderate” approach in pursuit of “independence and neutrality” with continued “guarantees [for] private ownership of agricultural land and industrial property.”³⁵

Bringing the Nuremberg Trials to America: IPS’s Case for War Crimes Trials

On November 12, 1969, Seymour Hersh, a roaming journalist, filed a cable for Dispatch News Service regarding the killing of 109 Vietnamese civilians in March 1968

³⁵ Richard J. Barnet, “When the Americans Really Leave Vietnam,” undated [likely 1973], IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 51, 5-10.

by U.S. soldiers. A little more than one year later, the Vietnam Veterans Against War (VVAW) held its Winter Soldier Investigation, in which over one-hundred veterans spoke before the media in Detroit, Michigan about the war crimes they witnessed while on tour in Vietnam. Although both events led to a greater awareness of American atrocities in Vietnam, the media, and therefore a large percentage of the American public, paid little attention to the soldiers' disclosures. In fact, Andrew Hunt, in his study of the VVAW, has concluded, regarding the Detroit event, that "the inquiry instantly became a case study for its failure to attract television and newspaper attention."³⁶ In a March 28, 1971 article for the *New York Times*, "Should We Have War Crimes Trials?," Neil Sheehan brought the issue of war crimes before the American public. After studying a number of recent books on American atrocities in Vietnam, Sheehan concluded, "If you credit as factual only a fraction of the information assembled . . . and if you apply the laws of war to American conduct there," American officials, up to and including President Nixon, "may well be guilty of war crimes." Likewise, Sheehan wondered whether "a moral and legal distinction [could] be drawn between those killings in World War II, for which General Yamashita paid with his life," and the thousands of civilians killed as a result of the American bombings in Vietnam.³⁷

Years before Sheehan brought greater publicity to the issue of war crimes, Barnett offered, in the aforementioned unpublished 1966 "legal memorandum," his thoughts on charging American officials with war crimes. The nature of the war in Vietnam, Barnett

³⁶ Andrew E. Hunt, *The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against War* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 72. On the various efforts to bring attention to the war crimes committed by U.S. forces in Vietnam, see Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 350-355.

³⁷ Neil Sheehan, "Should We Have War Crimes Trials?," *The New York Times*, March 28, 1971, BR 1-2.

argued, made it impossible for the United States to protect the rights of citizens established during previous war crimes trials. The simple act of refusing to leave a particular area did not make a Vietnamese peasant a guerrilla. Yet in reaching such a conclusion, “the U.S. is claiming the right to remove the status of ‘protected persons’ from a civilian population if they resist evacuation,” Barnet contended. He favored bringing American officials before a judge in the United States to rule on the legality of their actions during the course of the war in Vietnam. In order to prevent the law from becoming the “servant of the victor,” Barnet demanded that the war crimes trials begin immediately, while America still waged its war in Vietnam. To do otherwise would support the notion that “might makes right.” Moreover, war crimes trials conducted at the conclusion of a war more often than not allowed the victorious country to escape prosecution for war crimes. According to Barnet, not holding a war crimes trial before the end of a conflict would mean that “only the officials of weak states are likely to pay much attention to their jeopardy under international law, and it is rather the officials of powerful states who most need the guidelines and restraints of law.”³⁸ The stronger nation, after all, expecting to win the war, would see no reason to abide by the rules of international law.

Even if such trials failed to bring American officials accused of committing war crimes to justice, Barnet believed that putting officials before judges “could have an important long-term educational effect on the country.” Trials would force Americans to look more closely at the actions of their chosen leaders and at least consider the possibility that wrongs had been committed. “Conversely, if no serious moral opposition,

³⁸ Richard J. Barnet, “Testing the Legality of the Viet-Nam War,” 44, 49-50, 57.

rooted in law, develops against the Viet-Nam war, and the public is left with the view that the only ones who raise these issues are Viet Cong sympathizers and the most radical critics of United States foreign policy, the next intervention will become that much easier to accept.” Barnet suggested going to court over the “conduct of the war” rather than trying to determine “the legality of the war itself.” As an example, Barnet mentioned that a soldier, refusing induction into the army or deployment to Vietnam, could go to court and claim that a fear of prosecution for war crimes precluded him from going. Even members of Congress could take part in such a case as an attorney or by filing an amicus curiae brief in support of the soldier.³⁹

Motivated by the recent court-martial of Army Captain Howard B. Levy at Fort Jackson, South Carolina after he refused to train Green Berets, Barnet and Richard Falk, a professor of international law at Princeton University, used the occasion to provide a summary of the various war crimes committed by U.S. troops in Vietnam. Barnet and Falk depicted America’s actions in Vietnam as “illegal” and “in flagrant violation” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, especially in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilians. In all, Barnet and Falk found instances of at least “3,000 incidents in which it appears that the laws of war have been violated.” For example, American troops put prisoners of war under the watch of South Vietnamese soldiers who committed acts of torture, often with weapons supplied by the United States. As for Vietnamese civilians, Barnet and Falk contended that America followed a “basic strategy” requiring “removal of civilian villages on the theory that in a guerilla war the ‘people’ are indistinguishable from the ‘enemy’ is inherently illegal.” Claiming that the Vietnamese

³⁹ Richard J. Barnet, “Testing the Legality of the Viet-Nam War,” 44, 49-50, 57.

may not have wanted to move because of historical ties to an area or in order to protect their crops, Barnet and Falk accused the United States of making “a unilateral determination that residents of Vietnamese villages who do not submit to Government demands for relocation cease to have any protection against loss of life and property.” Based on these facts, Barnet and Falk disagreed with the court-martial of Captain Levy.⁴⁰

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IPS considered setting up a “War Crime Task Force” to study the atrocities committed during the Vietnam War. Leonard Rodberg opposed the idea, seeing in it “an attempt to find scapegoats.” He claimed that the blame for the Vietnam War extended far beyond the president, the military, and even Congress. A large percentage of Americans, Rodberg claimed, supported the tactics used in Vietnam. Even more disconcerting to Rodberg was that the Left wanted to use war crimes trials as a means to “discredit the liberal establishment” rather than search for the reasons behind America’s predilection for violence and how to change the mentality that led to such actions. Thus a war crimes trial would involve selecting certain “guilty” officials while leaving countless others untouched. As a result, Rodberg castigated proponents of the war crimes trial for “kidding ourselves if we think that we can use the laws of the State to undermine the State.” Rodberg predicted that the ““war crimes’ atmosphere” would end up harming the efforts of the opposition by making trials an acceptable mechanism to appoint blame for wrong doing. More importantly for Rodberg, the war crimes trials would not look at the American system in order to understand why America intervened in Vietnam. Making a distinction between “individual guilt” and “structural defects,” Rodberg feared that too many proponents of war crimes trials

⁴⁰ Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk, “United States of America vs. Captain Howard B. Levy, Court Martial, Fort Jackson, N.C., May 10, 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 1, 1-3, 5-6.

ignored the difference, which would “lead to a reign of terror, fascism, or a civil war.”⁴¹

It is somewhat surprising that the co-directors, Stavins, and others at IPS supported the idea of holding a war crimes trials given that so much of their work sought to reconstruct society’s institutions rather than the people staffing them. Yet, as the following paragraphs attest, IPS intellectuals did offer various suggestions for making the “State” more adept at prosecuting government official for wrongdoing.

While the historical record leaves little doubt about the atrocities committed by both sides in the Vietnam War, the arguments made in support of holding American officials criminally accountable by Barnet, Raskin, and other intellectuals at IPS looked at the issue too narrowly. While American officials ordered the bombing and other actions against the North Vietnamese and the NLF, there existed a strong contingent of pro-war Americans that insisted on escalation. Though the scholarship on the antiwar movement is vast, far fewer studies detail the pro-war movement waged by conservatives and other groups.⁴² IPS trustee David Riesman recognized the widespread support for the

⁴¹ Leonard Rodberg to Marcus Raskin, Richard Barnet, and Ralph Stavins, “Some Troubled Thoughts on War Crimes,” February 12, 1970, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 25. Though a relatively minor episode, it is worth mentioning how the issue of war criminality led to Barnet’s opposition to the selection of William Bundy as the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, the premier Establishment foreign policy journal published by the Council on Foreign Relations. Referring to Bundy’s appointment as a type of “[o]ld-boy trade unionism,” Robert Schulzinger has described how a meeting between David Rockefeller and Bundy after a Harvard-Yale football game led the latter being offered the position. Many Council members opposed having Bundy serve as editor, including Barnet. Explaining his opposition, Barnet wrote that “it is a disgrace for an organization to select a man for its most important position without even raising or considering the question of whether the man is a war criminal, especially when there is much affirmative evidence spread over the public record.” According to David Rockefeller, Richard Falk, Richard Barnet, Ronald Steel, and Richard Ullman “raised strong objection[s]” to the decision to make Bundy the editor. See Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 210-211; Richard Barnet to David G. Nathan, January 3, 1972, IPSR, WHS, box 3, folder 5; David Rockefeller to Council on Foreign Relations Members, August 9, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 7, folder 11.

⁴² See Joseph G. Morgan, *The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); John Andrew, “Pro-War and Anti-Draft: Young Americans for Freedom and the War in Vietnam,” in *The Vietnam War on Campus: Other Voices, More Distant Drums*, ed. Marc Jason Gilbert (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001): 1-19; Seth Offenbach, “The Other Side of Vietnam: The Conservative Movement and the Vietnam War” (PhD diss., Stony Brook University, 2010);

war as well. Responding to Barnet's article about war criminals that appeared in *The Progressive*, Riesman wondered how Barnet or anyone else could isolate public officials from the people whom they represented. He told Barnet that "the effort to find and, if not punish, then at least to exclude from public life the political leadership tends to hide from view the mammoth support they had or could have had from the public at large." Riesman pointed to the public opinion polls in 1967 and 1968 that showed support not only for the war, but also escalation.⁴³

Like Barnet, Raskin often separated public officials from their constituents, and thus overlooked a possible explanation as to why a bureaucrat or congressman acted in a particular way. Even though Raskin felt that Congress needed to take on a much more prominent role in matters of foreign policy, he wanted congressmen to conform to international law as well. "If . . . you don't think that covert operations are criminal, if it is the case that the bombings and the population removal programs are acceptable—that, in fact, they do reflect the point of view of the Congress of the United States because the majority of the Congress vote funds for these programs—then Congress is complicitous [sp]."⁴⁴ What if, however, Congress acted as it did in response to the wishes of the American people? A tendency that re-emerges in much of the work coming out of IPS is an unwavering belief in the people. In all matters of life, IPS believed that an expanded participatory democracy would solve America's problems, both domestically and

Sandra Scanlon, *The Pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and The Making of Modern American Conservatism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013).

⁴³ David Riesman to Richard Barnet, January 4, 1972, IPSR, WHS, box 3, folder 7.

⁴⁴ Patricia A. Krause, ed., *Anatomy of an Undeclared War: Congressional Conference on the Pentagon Papers* (New York: International Universities Press, 1972), 48.

internationally. Yet sometimes, as Riesman recognized, Americans supported ideas inimical to IPS.

Raskin and other proponents of war crimes trials for American officials often referred back to the trials that took place in Germany and Japan following World War II. For instance, Raskin called for greater “personal responsibility” for American officials involved in the planning process for the Vietnam War. Embedding the ideal of “personal responsibility” into policymaking required following the steps taken in Germany and Japan after World War II. Noting the 1946 “Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism,” which created categories of responsibility and sentences ranging from death to the loss of employment, Raskin suggested applying a similar law in America. Successful application of “personal responsibility” laws would make possible “democratic reconstruction” and mitigate the need for a revolution in America.⁴⁵

Raskin made the aforementioned statement about Congress during a conference held in Washington D.C. in mid-1971 that included both experts and congressmen to discuss the *Pentagon Papers*. Participants included Noam Chomsky, John Conyers (MI-D), Donald Fraser (MN-D), Daniel Ellsberg, Ernest Gruening, and Robert Kastenmeier (WI-D). During the conference, Raskin laid out one of his more detailed plans for setting up a legal structure to punish American officials accused of war crimes. As a first step, Raskin supported creating “a legal office of the president” that would determine whether proposed national security policies passed legal muster, especially in relation to the standards set in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and at the trials held in Nuremberg

⁴⁵ Marcus G. Raskin, “From Imperial War-Making to a Code of Personal Responsibility,” in *Washington Plans An Aggressive War*, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1971), 298-299, 302-303, 306, 316.

and Japan following World War II. Raskin also proposed setting up “a court of international law and security” for citizens to bring cases to when they believed that their country committed illegal acts. In Congress, Raskin suggested creating a position of “national security legal advisor” to make certain that legislation conformed to international law and the United Nations Charter and keep congressmen and senators informed of these laws. Finally, a “jury system” would guarantee implementation of the previous measures and if not, allow citizens to refuse taxation or induction into the armed forces. Raskin described his proposal as “a triple level of involvement.” After the first step of creating a law, a “second level would bring into operation a new legal system to oversee national security and foreign-policy affairs.” Raskin conceived the “third level” as a backup in case the government refused to abide by the decision reached by the court. At this last level, “the people themselves” would be able to review court decisions and then determine whether they as an American citizen should partake in tax refusal or “redirect their taxes away from the federal government.”⁴⁶

Raskin recognized that government officials would try to sidestep the laws suggested in his proposal, but he accepted this fact because of the alternative. Labeling his proposal a “middle course,” Raskin argued that to find government officials completely incapable of following his proposed “code” meant that revolution offered the only viable solution. He believed that his “code” would “set a stage for a value change in society, as, for example, did the civil rights laws.” While opponents of war crimes legislation and trials claimed that such efforts represented a second-round of McCarthyism, Raskin disagreed. Unlike the officials punished for “losing” China, Raskin

⁴⁶ Krause, *Anatomy of an Undeclared War*, 162-163.

argued that officials involved with Vietnam were “being challenged not for their opinions but for the initiation of policies which had clearly been branded by American leaders some fifteen years earlier as criminal.”⁴⁷

The Pentagon Papers

An incident that on the surface seemed unrelated to the issue of war crimes ended up strengthening IPS’s conviction that American officials committed illegal acts in Vietnam. On June 13, 1971, Neil Sheehan of the *New York Times* wrote the first of several articles using information gleaned from the Pentagon Papers. Daniel Ellsberg, a scholar from the RAND Corporation who also worked under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and later Edward Lansdale in South Vietnam, photocopied portions of the study. Prior to the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the *New York Times*, Ellsberg actually leaked the documents to IPS. When Raskin first learned about the secret study he thought that the report would prove that American officials had indeed ordered the massive slaughter of innocent civilians in Vietnam. Raskin later told a reporter, “My hope, you see, was that the Papers would be treated as proof of war crimes.”⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Krause, *Anatomy of an Undeclared War*, 167-168. Richard J. Barnet, “The War Planners: The Trouble With ‘The Best and the Brightest,’” *The Progressive*, (December 1971), 16. The idea of personal accountability for public officials caught the attention of at least one congressman. In 1973, and several times thereafter, Wisconsin congressman, and acquaintance of IPS, Robert W. Kastenmeier put forth a bill in the House of Representatives to punish officials found guilty of war crimes. During the opening hearings on the Official Accountability Act on February 2, 1976, Kastenmeier explained to his colleagues on the Hill that the legislation served as a continuation of previous efforts to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes. Trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II and the United Nations Charter, according to Kastenmeier, “all reflected the basic notion that a nation’s political leaders should be held personally accountable for criminal acts committed at their command.” Kastenmeier believed that stopping events like My Lai and the bombing of neutral nations like Cambodia required “embedding the fundamental principles of Nuremberg in our own national law.” For instance, the proposed legislation would have inserted the language of “international laws and customs of war” into the Federal Criminal Code and create an “institutional mechanism” to investigate and prosecute the laws.” Not surprisingly, Kastenmeier’s legislation faced a slow death in committee. See “Official Accountability Act H.R. 8388” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-2.

⁴⁸ Lacy MacAuley, “How the Institute for Policy Studies Helped Release the Pentagon Papers,” Foreign Policy in Focus Website, June 13, 2011, accessed on June 11, 2014, http://fpif.org/how_the_institute_for_policy_studies_helped_release_the_pentagon_papers/

Raskin first met Ellsberg during a meeting about nuclear policy when Raskin still worked for Bundy. When Ellsberg met with Raskin again in 1970, the former RAND intellectual, who by that time had soured on the Vietnam War, informed the IPS co-director about the Pentagon Papers. After expressing interest, Raskin and IPS received somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 pages from the report. Raskin and Barnet devoured the pages given to them by Ellsberg and, in the process, started thinking about possible outlets for the papers so that the public could learn about the duplicity of American officials. Raskin initially told a *Newsweek* reporter about the Pentagon Papers before bringing the study to Sheehan, whose previously mentioned review of the literature on war crimes caught the co-director's attention. Intrigued by Raskin's offer, Sheehan sent a *New York Times* reporter to pick up the papers from IPS's offices. IPS also copied 4,100 pages of the Pentagon Papers for Senator Mike Gravel (AK-D), who later inserted them into the *Congressional Record*.⁴⁹

Besides seeking an outlet for the Pentagon Papers, IPS also used its copy of the report to write its own analysis. In 1971, Raskin, Barnet, and Ralph Stavins co-authored *Washington Plans an Aggressive War*. While Barnet's chapter dealt with the role of bureaucrats in the formulation of Vietnam policy and Raskin's section offered a code of "personal responsibility," Stavins began the study with a history of American activities in Vietnam prior to 1965 and documented how the United States interfered in a domestic civil war.⁵⁰ As many observers did during the time of the Pentagon Papers release, it is necessary to question IPS's decision to turn the secret study over to journalists and

⁴⁹ Lacy MacAuley, "How the Institute for Policy Studies Helped Release the Pentagon Papers."

⁵⁰ See Ralph Stavins, "Washington Determines the Fate of Vietnam: 1954-1965," in *Washington Plans An Aggressive War*, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1971).

Senator Gravel. Had it chosen not to immediately circulate the report, the Institute could have greatly enhanced its stature by waiting until its own study appeared to serve as the definitive account of American policy in Vietnam. Journalist Sanford J. Ungar, writing in 1972, explained that after receiving a copy of the papers from Ellsberg, IPS made “free use” of them, even allowing others to look at the report. Ellsberg, according to Ungar, did not like the fact that IPS’s study of the Vietnam War, which used the Pentagon Papers, would not appear in print until mid-1971. Of this fact, Ungar wrote, that “this was not the kind of dramatic war-stopping disclosure that Ellsberg had in mind.”⁵¹

The FBI, still investigating IPS, tried to answer this question as well. The FBI believed that IPS had the Pentagon Papers as early as 1969. Dating Ellsberg’s relationship with IPS members back to an initial encounter in 1967, the FBI argued that “IPS would have been a logical turning point and avenue of approach” for Ellsberg to release the Pentagon Papers. FBI officials, nonetheless, still found it difficult to explain why IPS, if the think tank had the papers for so long, did not rush to publish their study, *Washington Plans an Aggressive War*, before the *New York Times* printed the documents. The FBI surmised that IPS, following a meeting with its attorneys, feared legal action if they chose to print their study. If the *New York Times* printed the documents before IPS, then the “legal repercussions would be absorbed by the newspaper” and IPS could quote freely from the now public documents. In fact, previous FBI investigations into the leaking of the papers found that someone offered the documents to both CBS and ABC news after a court injunction prevented the *New York Times* from publishing additional information from the secret study. According to the FBI report, officials from CBS and

⁵¹ Sanford J. Ungar, “Daniel Ellsberg: The Difficulties of Disclosure,” *The Washington Post*, April 30, 1972, D1.

ABC claimed that the papers became available to their news organizations “on an immediate release basis from sources who were in a terrible rush to get these things published” despite the injunction against the *New York Times*. The FBI concluded that IPS officials were behind the leaks to the media, and “upon realizing that publication of their own study was imminent, steps were taken to insure that those portions of the study utilized in their book” became public first.⁵²

The Institute claimed that it allowed other outlets to release information from the Pentagon Papers because IPS intellectuals wanted to write a more analytical study about the secret report. A brief history of *Washington Plans An Aggressive War* explained that publishers initially did not want to publish the book because “the public is bored by the war and is immune to further shocks.” Other publishers showed an interest in the *Pentagon Papers*, but not the material that encouraged holding war crimes trials for American officials involved in the war planning. IPS intellectuals wanted to publish their research despite the appearance of the *Pentagon Papers* in the *New York Times* because additional information discovered through interviews and other means allowed the authors “to put the ‘Pentagon Papers’ in context.” Furthermore, they saw their book as “establishing a code of behavior under which our statesmen at long last will be held to the

⁵² SAC WFO to FBI Director, November 5, 1971, FBI-IPS. In response to the WFO’s suggestion that IPS led the efforts to leak the Pentagon Papers to various news outfits, FBI officials in Boston ascertained that “no valid conclusion” could be reached in the matter of who contacted the various news sources. See SAC Boston to FBI Director, November 23, 1971, FBI-IPS. The Justice Department eventually went after several IPS intellectuals for their role in disseminating the Pentagon Papers. Leonard Rodberg, who edited Senator Mike Gravel’s edition of the Pentagon Papers, received a subpoena in August 1971. Ralph Stavins, who along with Noam Chomsky and Richard Falk received subpoenas to testify, charged the Justice Department with using illegal wiretaps, which led the judge in the case to rescind the subpoenas after the officials from that department failed to provide enough evidence that the government did not use wiretaps against Stavins and other IPS intellectuals. See Jeannette Smyth, “More Pentagon Papers,” *The Washington Post*, October 15, 1971, B4; Sanford J. Ungar, “Boston Probe is Suspended Upon Ellsberg’s Complaint,” *The Washington Post*, January 19, 1972, A2.

standards we demand of real estate salesmen and used car dealers.”⁵³ Thus, while *Washington Plans* included great insight gleaned from the Pentagon Papers, IPS also wanted Americans both in and outside of government to learn from the leaked documents about what right and wrong looked like.

Speaking for the Draft Resistance Movement

In no other war before or since have Americans spoken out in such large numbers as they did during the Vietnam War. Moreover, far more than in earlier wars, a significant proportion of America’s youth refused to fight. Opposition to the draft began in earnest with the burning of draft cards in 1964 and became more common as the war progressed.⁵⁴

While a legislative assistant for Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Raskin authored a report on the draft law in advance of a pending congressional debate over the extension of the draft for an additional four years. Writing the report helped Raskin come to a larger realization about American society. Describing his moment of sudden awareness, Raskin explained, “The argument we had to beat was that if we don’t have permanent conscription our worldwide commitments will become meaningless. This was my first attempt to get at the issue. I began to see the draft as a mechanism to perpetuate a permanent warrior-like mentality in this country.”⁵⁵ The Selective Service System’s decision in 1966 to end college deferments and require college students to take exams in order to determine their class ranking and eligibility for the draft, revived Raskin’s

⁵³ “Washington Plans An Aggressive War: How It Came to be Written,” no author, undated, AWP. WHS, box 8, folder 19.

⁵⁴ On the origins of the Vietnam draft resistance, see Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, *The Resistance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Sherry Gershon Gottlieb, *Hel No, We Won’t Go! Resisting the Draft During the Vietnam War* (New York: Viking, 1991); Laurence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Knopf, 1978).

⁵⁵ Quoted in Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 47.

interest in conscription. He joined the SDS National Secretary at a May 3, 1966 press conference in front of the Selective Service headquarters in Washington D.C., during which SDS introduced its National Vietnam Examination as an alternative exam for students seeking a college deferment.⁵⁶

In a memorandum to the Board of Trustees of Antioch College that Raskin wrote following the protests at various campuses in the spring of 1966 over student rankings, he offered alternatives to the selective service system. One option involved the creation of a volunteer army. “If the American Society wants a standing army it should be prepared to pay for it through the market mechanism,” Raskin argued. A draft lottery, otherwise, seemed “preferable to the present one,” yet such a system still allowed for “selective exceptions” in determining who would fight. Raskin supported having students take part in “national service” instead of military training and action, but with one caveat. He questioned going the route of national service if “the work to be done is chosen only by the ‘top’ and where the values that are transmitted are a quality of toughness and meanness of spirit.”⁵⁷ In the meantime, Raskin and Waskow went to work on a manifesto that came to define the draft resistance movement and encourage thousands of Americans to join with the nation’s young in the movement to end the draft.

As Raskin and Waskow wrote “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” in 1967, they attempted to gather a group of influential intellectuals together in support of young draft resisters. Noting a “groundswell of revulsion against the war” in the aftermath of the

⁵⁶ “War Protestors Pose ‘Real Questions’ In Exam Challenging Deferment Test,” *The Washington Post*, May 4, 1966, A12.

⁵⁷ Marcus Raskin, “Memorandum for the Board of Trustees of Antioch College on Selective Service Policy,” November 10, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 3. After years of protest by the draft resistance movement, the government instituted a draft lottery and, ultimately, created an all-volunteer army. See Beth Bailey, *America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009).

1967 Spring Mobilization against the Vietnam War, Waskow appealed to John R. Seeley of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and famed linguist Noam Chomsky to join with other intellectuals in “a solemn act of civil disobedience by the nearest we have to moral leadership” in America. Explaining why he and Raskin targeted the Selective Service System, Waskow described it as “the tightest link between the war and people’s daily lives,” and he pointed to the already existing opposition to the draft at universities across the country. Without the participation of intellectuals, Waskow claimed, “there will be no one to speak for the legitimacy of draft resistance by the kids,” which weakened the draft resistance movement. Certain that arrests would follow the civil disobedience actions, Waskow intended to offer a defense for himself “on the grounds of the illegitimacy under international law and unconstitutionality under American law of the present uses of the draft, and therefore on the grounds that under Nuremberg there is a positive duty of good citizens to resist its operations.” Waskow and Raskin explained in another letter, this time to Herbert Marcuse, that they hoped to bring together at least fifty “rather well-known intellectuals” to take part in a sit-in at the Selective Service headquarters in Washington D.C. that could involve blocking the building’s entrances.⁵⁸ Raskin’s and Waskow’s appeal to intellectuals to stand together and speak out against official wrongdoing conformed to the image of intellectuals that stood at the center of IPS since its beginnings.

Draft resistance existed prior to 1967, but, despite previous statements in support of such protests, the movement lacked a uniform declaration that offered a philosophical

⁵⁸ Arthur Waskow to John R. Seeley, April 20, 1967 & Arthur Waskow to Noam Chomsky, April 20, 1967, both in AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49; Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin to Herbert Marcuse, May 9, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 16.

rationale for the burning of draft cards and refusing induction into the armed services. This changed in 1967 with the publication in *The New Republic* and *The New York Review of Books* of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” written by Raskin and Waskow.⁵⁹ Interviewed not long after he co-authored the “Call,” Raskin claimed that the idea to write the statement originated with Bernard Fall’s dissatisfaction with Americans’ response to the atrocities being committed in Vietnam. “His greatest anger was directed against the American left, their failure to become aroused over the torture of Vietnamese prisoners of war and the use of napalm. There seemed to be no one to speak out against it, as the French did on Algeria. This turned me on to thinking about something similar to the ‘Statement of the 121,’ the French intellectuals’ manifesto against the Algerian war,” Raskin explained as he described how Fall’s ideas encouraged his own decision to write the “Call.”⁶⁰

The “Call” denounced the Vietnam War from both a moral and legal standpoint. In regard to morality, the “Call” stated that America’s youth “are finding that the American war in Vietnam so outrages their deepest moral and religious sense that they cannot contribute to it in any way.” “We share their moral outrage,” the “Call” proclaimed. Regarding the legality and constitutionality of the Vietnam War, the “Call” castigated the president and Congress for leading the nation into an unconstitutional war that rejected the principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter. The Charter, the “Call” noted, “requires member states to exhaust every peaceful means of settling disputes and to

⁵⁹ In his study of the draft resistance movement, Foley has labeled the “Call” “the most successful and widely known” of the various “complicity statements,” as illustrated by the fact that 2,000 individuals signed their names to the document during the year following its publication. Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 94.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 49-50.

submit disputes which cannot be settled peacefully to the Security Council.” The United States, according to the “Call,” “systematically violated” the U.N. Charter. American military actions in Vietnam, furthermore, mirrored the “crimes against humanity for which individuals were to be held personally responsible . . . and for which Germans were sentenced at Nuremberg to long prison terms and death.” After stating the legal and constitutional arguments against the Vietnam War, the “Call” declared its intentions. “Therefore, we believe on all these grounds that every free man has a legal right and a moral duty to exert every effort to end this war, to avoid collusion with it, and encourage others to do the same,” the “Call” declared. Why use draft resistance as a means to voice their opposition to the Vietnam War? The “Call” claimed that such “open resistance” would “strengthen the moral resolve” of antiwar activists to end the draft and eventually the war.⁶¹ Blending legalism and moralism, the “Call” found support from a wide swath of the American public.

Hundreds of academics, professionals, clergy, and people from all walks of life signed the “Call” as it spread through informal channels and appeared in magazines. By mid-1967, signers of the “Call” included Howard Zinn, Richard Flacks, Gar Alperovitz, Paul Goodman, Benjamin Spock, Al Haber, Staughton Lynd, Sidney Lens, Allen Ginsberg, Dwight Macdonald, Gabriel Kolko, Susan Sontag, William Sloane Coffin, Herbert Marcuse, Noam Chomsky, Linus Pauling, and Carl Oglesby. By October 2, 1967, the “Call” had approximately 375 signers. More and more Americans signed their names to the “Call” as the war dragged on and the number of dead and wounded in Southeast

⁶¹ Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” RESIST pamphlet, no date, AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49. A copy of the “Call” is also in the appendix of Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 255-259

Asia grew. Some prominent intellectuals, though, refused to sign the statement. Speaking for himself and Arnold Kaufman, both professors at the University of Michigan, Donald Michael, one of the original fellows at IPS, criticized the statement because in addition to supporting draft resisters “it gives the impression that signers want to incite youths to stay out [of Vietnam].” This seemed to Kaufman and Michael a questionable legal position for the signers to agree with. Furthermore, seeing the statement as one “of moral commitment rather than a political statement,” Kaufman and Michael advocated for making the latter point clearer. With these objections in mind, Kaufman and Michael refused to sign the statement.⁶² Michael proved prescient in his forewarning about the legal consequences of signing the “Call,” but Raskin and Waskow thought that intellectuals had to stick their heads out and not depend entirely on the bravery of America’s young.

Several other intellectuals that Raskin and Waskow contacted also disagreed with the methods suggested by the authors of the “Call.” The historian Howard Zinn, though, wholeheartedly supported the efforts of Raskin and Waskow. Responding to their appeal, Zinn wrote, “I am with your statement all the way.” As he explained in the letter, he wanted intellectuals to “engage in some act more demonstrative than a teach-in or ad, and I certainly would be willing to engage in any such actions with others.” Merle Curti, Waskow’s teacher at Wisconsin, disagreed, however, with his former student’s contention that American actions in Vietnam constituted an illegal act. President Johnson and military officials, Curti claimed, “could not have done what has been done without huge appropriations from Congress, which is the duly elected representative of the

⁶² “Signers of ‘Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,’” July 9, 1967 & October 2, 1967, Donald Michael to Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin, June 13, 1967, all found in AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49.

majority of voters.” In his own political estimation, Curti thought that most Americans would “react unfavorably to what might be regarded as civil disobedience or even to this kind of education,” and therefore he opposed draft resistance on those grounds. While expressing “emotional sympathy” for draft resistance and the antiwar movement in general, Curti argued that “unless there can be something like mass resistance, I think the effects are apt to be the opposite of those I would like to see; and I cannot believe that the country is going to move toward mass resistance.”⁶³

Perhaps the most prominent peace researcher in America, Kenneth Boulding, described the Selective Service as “a rather passive agency,” and stated his preference for electoral issues since “responsibility for the war in Vietnam lies . . . squarely at the door of the President.” Additionally, he could not offer his support publicly for the draft resistance because, in his opinion, Americans “ha[d] been indoctrinated for so long in the myth of national greatness established by military might that I am very much afraid a frontal attack on the draft would be unsuccessful.” With these prospects in mind, Boulding suggested beginning a “political movement” of Democrats that promised to vote against Democrats in the 1968 elections. Boulding favored this sort of strategy because “only defeat will make it [the Democratic Party] learn anything” and change their foreign policy.⁶⁴ As earlier chapters have shown, IPS intellectuals gave up on reforming the Democratic Party, so Boulding’s suggestion obviously fell on deaf ears.

⁶³ Howard Zinn to Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin, May 17, 1967, Merle Curti to Arthur Waskow, May 30, 1967, both in AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49.

⁶⁴ Kenneth E. Boulding to Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, May 15, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49.

On October 21, 1967, tens of thousands of protestors marched from the Lincoln Memorial to the Pentagon as part of the Stop the Draft Week.⁶⁵ At the Pentagon protest, Raskin, Waskow, Benjamin Spock, William Sloan Coffin, and several other draft resisters took a briefcase filled with draft cards turned in by the protestors and brought them to the Assistant Attorney General John McDonough, who ultimately refused to take the briefcase, at the Justice Department. Both Raskin and Waskow added their cards to the collection. Explaining to David Riesman his reasons for turning in his draft card, Waskow wrote, “My feeling had been that it was a bad scene for ‘safe’ people to be encouraging resistance . . . , and returning the card was thus an attempt to step outside the charmed circle.” Despite being only eight months away from his thirty-fifth birthday, and thus no longer eligible for the draft, Waskow claimed that he could really “empathize” with draft resisters who had to consider “duty to family, to self, to the movement, [and] to country.”⁶⁶

During the conspiracy trial for the charges brought against him and four others, Raskin offered his view of the draft card turn-in that occurred at the Pentagon in October 1967. He described it as “silly” and that he “squirmed” when the group handed the assistant attorney general the briefcase containing the draft cards. Nonetheless, Raskin joined Waskow and the others so that he could speak directly to officials from the Justice Department about conducting an investigation into American atrocities committed in Vietnam. “I didn’t think that the draft-card-turn-in was the issue, in my view the issue

⁶⁵ For a unique, though less than scholarly, treatment of the Pentagon protest, see Norman Mailer, *Armies of the Night* (New York: New American Library, 1968).

⁶⁶ Arthur Waskow to David Riesman, February 19, 1968, AWP, box 1, folder 6. Waskow’s actions at the Pentagon protest led to retribution by the Selective Service System, which changed his draft status from 4-F to 1-A. See Jared Stout, “Protestor: From 4-F to 1-A,” *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1968, 1A; “Draft Board Rejects Protestor’s Appeal,” *The Washington Post*, September 15, 1968, C2.

was the illegality of the war and the problem of war crimes,” Raskin told the court. During the brief exchange with the assistant attorney general, Raskin brought up the issue of war crimes in Vietnam and asked McDonough to speak to the attorney general about creating a “special committee” as a means “to ascertain whether or not war crimes had occurred in Vietnam and whether or not this was in violation of American law.”⁶⁷ As he did in his earlier writings on the conflict in Southeast Asia and in the “Call,” Raskin based his opposition to the Vietnam War on moral and legalistic grounds, particularly the latter, as he called on America to maintain its ideals abroad.

Raskin’s statement before the court goes a long way toward explaining why he supported draft resistance. The co-founder of IPS considered it hypocritical of the federal courts to go on prosecuting young draft-resisters while allowing America’s leaders to go unpunished despite causing so much death and destruction in Vietnam. “It seems to me that we have to make clear to the courts and to the lawyers that there is no comparison between a series of misdemeanor violations or laws broken conscientiously by citizens where the basic laws of the nation are being systematically violated by its leaders,” Raskin claimed. Questioning the value of making draft resisters “martyrs,” Raskin encouraged supporters of the draft resistance to “put the entire legal apparatus to work in questioning itself, to the point that it has no choice but to confront the distinction between counseling not to kill, refusing to kill, and war crimes.” Though distinct from draft resisters, Raskin’s comments regarding draft evaders conveys a similar attitude. In recommending amnesty for the latter group, Raskin expressed outrage “that those who are carrying the conscience of this nation before the world should be imprisoned in a

⁶⁷ Quoted in Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 159-160.

society which can ill-afford to lose talent, judgment and concern to the jail keeper.”

These “political prisoners,” as Raskin called the draft resisters, deserved amnesty for their actions, as France, Italy, and Great Britain did with its draft evaders after World War I.⁶⁸

For Raskin, Americans had a duty to voice their indignation over wrongdoing by government officials, and as the true best and brightest, they deserved protection when they spoke out against America’s failure to live up to its ideals.

On January 5, 1968, the United States District Court in Massachusetts issued indictments for William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Benjamin Spock. Inexplicably, Waskow, who personally handed the assistant attorney general the case with the draft cards at the Pentagon protest and whose name clearly appeared as one of the co-authors of the “Call,” avoided prosecution. The fact is even stranger considering that in the section of the indictment dealing with the “overt acts” committed by the defendants, overt act number one stated that Coffin and Spock “distributed and caused to be distributed” the “Call.” The district court based its indictment on a series of conspiracy charges against the defendants accusing them of conspiring to encourage, as well as aid and abet, draft resistance among America’s draft-age youth.⁶⁹ While the “Call” did undoubtedly influence many young Americans to either turn in or burn their draft cards, Michael Stewart Foley has found both then and now a tendency to exaggerate the impact of older activists like Raskin, Waskow, and Spock. According to him, “even a perfunctory review of the draft resistance movement should have indicated to government investigators that the resisters themselves were the

⁶⁸ Marcus Raskin to Monroe Friedman, October 17, 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 12; Marcus Raskin to Sinclair Armstrong, June 21, 1968, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 5.

⁶⁹ The indictment is in the Appendix of Mitford, *The Trial of Dr. Spock*, 251-255.

leaders of the movement.” The younger draft resisters instigated the draft card turn-in at the Pentagon in October 1967. Only later did the older activists come to them asking to join the protest and gather all of the draft cards together so that they could bring them to the Attorney General. Older activists, Foley argues, offered the movement “an added air of credibility” and possessed “fund-raising abilities,” but the idea of a draft card turn-in was born in the minds of the young. Thus, only Michael Ferber, Foley contends, deserved the indictment handed down by the district court.⁷⁰ In the end, Raskin avoided prosecution—the only defendant out of the five to do so—as a result of the minor role that he played in the whole affair.

IPS intellectuals opposed the Vietnam War due to the assumed immorality and illegality of the conflict. IPS intellectuals also accused American officials of irrationality. By refusing to conduct negotiations with the NLF, American officials were letting ideology blur reality. While IPS intellectuals called for diplomatic solutions to the crisis in Vietnam, either through greater cooperation with the U.N. or by opening up negotiations with the NLF, the bulk of the criticism related to America’s actions in Vietnam. Though not for the first time, and definitely not the last, America committed atrocities that so horrified IPS intellectuals that several intellectuals called on U.S. officials to appear before a war crimes tribunal. Criticism of American morality in Vietnam reappeared in much of IPS’s critical commentary on the Cold War, as Chapter 7 illustrates. Therefore, in regard to negotiations, IPS stood somewhere in middle. The Institute did not support an immediate withdrawal of American troops, as radical demanded, but rather a staged removal of U.S. forces, which liberals considered ill-

⁷⁰ Foley, *Confronting the War Machine*, 231.

advised. At the same time, IPS's calls for war crimes tribunals and the Institute's frequent use of moral arguments separated the think tank from the majority of liberal intellectuals. One historian has explained that Schlesinger believed the conflict was a result of "specific errors in judgment, [and] not the inescapable product of a benighted system or the demonic creation of evil men," as some critics claimed.⁷¹

⁷¹ James A. Nuechterlein, "Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar American Liberalism," *The Review of Politics* 39 (Jan., 1977), 28.

Chapter Five: The National Security State and The Men Behind It

While some critics of the Vietnam War viewed the conflict as a one-time blunder caused by poor leadership and even worse decision-making by foreign policy officials in Washington, others, including intellectuals at IPS, blamed Vietnam on the institutional makeup of the American government. Removing the policymakers responsible for America's various follies in Vietnam would not prevent future Vietnams, these critics claimed. Once the bureaucrats left Washington, others would take their place and devise similar policies. Richard Barnet and other IPS intellectuals bestowed upon the men filling foreign policy positions in government the title National Security Managers. Members of this elite non-elected group of bureaucrats preserved America's national security state. Preventing future Vietnam-like wars, therefore, would require American leaders to disavow the national security state, along with the atmosphere of fear and secrecy that developed alongside it. Bringing an end to the national security state, furthermore, required allowing the American people a role in determining the nation's foreign policy through frequent and open debate.¹

Since America's founding, prominent political voices warned against American involvement in foreign wars. Such admonitions, however, fell to the wayside as America went to war against Mexico in the 1840s and by the end of the century, forswearing the cautionary dictates of George Washington and John Quincy Adams, fought in the Spanish-American War. The twentieth century, of course, brought far larger wars with greater American participation. What could account for America's turn away from

¹ On the national security state, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4-5

isolationism and newfound zeal to act as the world's policeman? Many academics and public intellectuals attempted to answer this question in the years during and after World War II when a state of permanent war ascended over America during the Cold War. In 1941, Harold Lasswell, a sociologist and political scientist, famously wrote of America turning into a "garrison state." For Lasswell, the "garrison state" came about due to a constant threat of total warfare. "With the socialization of danger as a permanent characteristic of modern violence the nation becomes one unified technical enterprise" run by a small group, he argued.²

Who controlled the "garrison state?" Writing in 1956, sociologist C. Wright Mills famously introduced Americans to the "power elite," a group that included military leaders, corporation owners, and politicians. Forming an "interlocking directorate," the "power elite" manipulated the American people into accepting the dictates of the military, corporate, and political leaders.³ Led by Mills's "directorate," America underwent fundamental changes as it transformed into what authors have variously called a "warfare state" and a "national security state." The "warfare state" received its closest examination in Fred Cook's 1962 book of the same title. For Cook, "propaganda" and "fear" drove Americans to accept the creation of a warfare state. "We must be taught to fear and to hate or we will not agree to regiment our lives, to bear the enormous burdens of ever heavier taxation to pay for ever more costly military hardware—and to do this at the expense of domestic programs like medical care and education and healthy urban

² Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 46 (Jan. 1941), 459. While pointing to the existence of a "garrison state," Lasswell, unlike the intellectuals at IPS, did not demand its dismantling. In a later book, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, he wrote that "the main problem confronting the American people as a result of the continuing crisis of national defense is not *whether* to have an American garrison but how much to include within it and how to organize it." See Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 127-128.

³ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (1956; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6-9.

development,” he proclaimed. Thus, when “Dr. Win-the-War” replaced “Dr. New Deal” in late 1943, the latter never practiced again. By the time of the 1946 elections, according to Cook, both Democrats and Republicans agreed to rework the Keynesian formula by replacing social spending with higher military budgets to improve economic growth.⁴ Out of this intellectual lineage, IPS attempted to formulate its own theoretical construct of what Marcus Raskin later described as the “national security state.”

Before looking at how IPS intellectuals came to define the “national security state,” it is important to note that historians have long grappled with the question of whether the United States actually took on the characteristics described by commentators and intellectuals in the 1940s and beyond. Much of the historical literature deals with the issue by inspecting the growth, or lack thereof, of the federal government. James Sparrow has contended that the U.S. government used a bit of chicanery to convince the American public that the reach of the government did not expand, when in fact it had swelled greatly. Referencing the millions of volunteers who served in various capacities on the home front—as promoters of American war efforts, builders of “victory gardens,” and sellers of war bonds—Sparrow has argued that “the Roosevelt administration leaned heavily on both the practice and the ideal of voluntarism to run its war effort at the grassroots, but this made mass participation into more of a simulacrum of self-government than the real thing.” Sparrow has suggested that an “imaginary of freedom” took shape that allowed for the existence at the local level of groups that could press the federal government for rights and, in the process, mollify any concerns that threatened

⁴ Fred Cook, *The Warfare State* (New York: Collier, 1962), 100, 189. President Franklin Roosevelt referred to “Dr. Win-the-War” in a December 1943 press conference. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Excerpts from the Press Conference, December 28, 1943, The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16358>.

the growing state. Moreover, according to Sparrow, the “imaginary of freedom” permitted America to take the lead in building postwar international institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank and avoid the fate that befell the League of Nations after World War I. Yet, alongside this “imaginary of freedom” there existed “a cultural logic of nationalism” that Sparrow has described as “a construct designed to obscure the coercions of a modern state capable of mobilizing for total war.” Thus, as citizens volunteered to support war mobilization, Americans faced diminished civil liberties and even imprisonment and internment for their political beliefs.⁵

Other historians, however, have questioned whether the federal government actually augmented its powers and reach during the Cold War. As Aaron Friedberg has noted, “the imminent threat of war produced pressures for the permanent construction of a powerful central state.” At the same time, efforts to enlarge the government “were met and, to a degree, counterbalanced, by strong anti-statist influences that were deeply rooted in the circumstances of the nation’s founding.” Friedberg goes so far as to argue that the latter tendency in America led to the outcome of the Cold War in favor of the United States. Claiming that America’s anti-statist policies helped produce a growth economy and technological innovation, Friedberg suggests that such successes made it easier for Americans to support the Cold War. The dismantling of unpopular New Deal programs in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the decision to not enact universal military training and limit civil defense, made possible what Friedberg has called a “strategic synthesis” in which “domestic components rested with relative ease on the nation’s

⁵ James T. Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 69-70, 76-77.

society and economy, and that could therefore be sustained” for the duration of the Cold War. Had officials and politicians not limited the number of federal programs and carried out more overt defense measures, Friedberg suggests that calls for isolationism would have spiked.⁶

National Security Managers and American Democracy

The “national security state” thrived due to the efforts of a collection of foreign policy officials that Barnet labeled the National Security Managers. Barnet and other IPS intellectuals blamed these bureaucrats for Vietnam and America’s other imperial ventures. As the American state grew and became more centralized, the administration of government, or bureaucracy, garnered much attention from intellectuals. C. Wright Mills and the intellectuals at IPS contributed to a long conversation about the growing centralized state. In fact, IPS’s critique of National Security Managers mirrored the growing anti-bureaucratic feeling of the 1960s. Howard Brick has pointed to a “mutation in the meaning of ‘control’” among radicals in the 1960s, due largely to the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s and Max Weber’s writings on bureaucracy. Whereas reformers from previous eras used “social control” and top-down organization as a means to relieve society of its ills, 1960s activists and intellectuals opposed hierarchical structures that empowered a small group at the expense of society as a whole.⁷

In addition to Weber, James Burnham, a Trotskyist who later turned sharply to the right, offered an important contribution to the idea of bureaucracy, which he called the

⁶ Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-4, 345-346. A similar perspective, though more cognizant of the affect anti-statism had on domestic as compared to national security spending, is found in David Ciepley, *Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

⁷ Howard Brick, *Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 1960s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 132.

“managerial society.” Whereas the move from a feudal to a capitalist society led to the “localization of sovereignty” in parliamentary structures, Burnham pointed to another shift occurring with the rise of the “managerial society.” Sovereignty no longer resided in the parliament in managerial societies like Russia, where Burnham dated the demise of the parliament to before Lenin’s death. Thus, referring to Russia, Germany, and Italy, he argued that “the rules, regulations, laws, decrees, have more and more issued from an interconnected group of administrative boards, commissions, bureaus. . . .” Burnham recognized a similar change taking place in America with New Deal agencies like the NLRB, TVA, and AAA taking on more powers.⁸

Yet even more than centralization, IPS intellectuals despised the rising fortunes of technocrats within the bureaucracy. Years before journalist David Halberstam wrote about the “whiz kids” of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, IPS intellectuals, primarily Barnet, pointed an accusatory finger at the faceless experts brought into government to formulate American foreign policy. Though focusing on corporations, John Kenneth Galbraith, put forth the most well-known portrait of the “technostructure,” as he called it, in his 1967 book *The New Industrial State*. The technocrats of the “technostructure” brought “specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making” and served as the “guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise.”⁹

National Security Managers, according to Barnet, carried out foreign policy with the same understanding of power that Raskin and Fall disparaged in *The Viet-Nam*

⁸ See Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in *From Max Weber*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196-266; James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World* (New York: John Day Co., 1941), 141-150.

⁹ David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (1967; reprint, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 74.

Reader. The great power politics that dominated much of the Cold War created a great interest in the affairs of the Third World, with no comparable concern for the people living in these countries. The National Security Manager, who believed that “the acquisition of power is both a necessity and an end in itself,” furthered the outlook that led America to disregard the citizens of Third World nations, according to Barnet.¹⁰ For the National Security Managers all that mattered was that America gained an edge in the battle against the Soviet Union for Cold War supremacy. Such a mindset led to American interventions in the Third World and the support of totalitarian dictators.

Barnet offered his harshest appraisal of the National Security Managers in his 1972 book *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy*. Barnet bemoaned the “bureaucratization of homicide” as National Security Managers planned for massive bombings, defoliation missions, and assassinations without setting foot on the battleground. Barnet went so far as to compare American officials to Nazi leaders. Like Reinhard Heydrich and Adolph Eichmann, “The bureaucratic killer looks at an assigned homicidal task as a technical operation much like any other. He does not question its moral purpose,” Barnet wrote.¹¹ Here again, the issue of morality served as a central component of IPS’s critique of the men tasked with forming American foreign policy. Schooled as technocrats, National Security Managers did not have the skills or patience necessary to devise sound political agreements capable of settling disputes well into the future, Barnet argued. Noting a growing “militarization of the civilian leadership,” Barnet blamed politicians more than the military for America’s tendency to

¹⁰ Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 25-26.

¹¹ Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Penguin, 1973), 14-15.

rely on military force instead of diplomatic solutions. Claiming that the technocratic outlook of the National Security Managers resulted in America's dependence on military strength, Barnet wrote, "Factors which can be fed into computers such as 'kill ratio' sound more persuasive than political analyses, which is hard to prepare and hard to comprehend." Preferring the certainty of mathematical calculations, American officials avoided entering into unpredictable negotiations in Vietnam and elsewhere. Discussing the run-up to the Vietnam War, Barnet lamented, "No staff work of any consequence was devoted to the kind of peace settlement we ultimately wanted or had reasons to expect, and how we could get it," which foreordained a military strategy in Vietnam. By breaking down the options available to the United States in Vietnam as either victory or surrender, the national security bureaucracy, Barnet claimed, "reduced a complex political reality to a test of the American will" in its fight against communism.¹²

According to Barnet, National Security Managers thrived due to a culture of unaccountability and elite decision-making. Despite the numerous opportunities for peace in Vietnam—America rejected proposals by U Thant at the U.N., as well as offers by Hanoi and the Soviet Union—military solutions always took precedence over negotiated settlements. Bureaucrats ignored such peace feelers because "the rewards and incentives that operate on men when they became national security managers to the electorate provide language and ideology that has been developed to absolve men from personal responsibility for bureaucratic homicide all reinforce each other," Barnet declared. In an earlier unpublished paper, Barnet depicted his National Security Managers as composing

¹² Richard J. Barnet, *The Economy of Death* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 82, 84-85; Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 56-57.

a “separate government” that was “insulated from the people of the United States,” and not particularly responsive to their demands because they had no interest or experience in domestic matters.¹³

Emphasizing the close ties between National Security Managers and private industry before and after their service in government, Barnet claimed that such relationships led to a militarized society. “We have built into our system a set of incentives for continuing the arms race by recruiting the National Security Managers from the weapons industry. The taxpayers have been paying for biased judgment,” Barnet complained. In the process, according to Barnet, America had become weaker. As “the National Security Managers have been piling up useless and obscene hardware . . . the cities rot and Americans turn on each other in frustration,” Barnet lamented. For this reason, Barnet called the National Security Managers “America’s number one problem.” Encouraged, or at least allowed, to carry out a ruthless foreign policy, bureaucrats, hidden from the public’s view, endorsed profligate spending on weapons systems because National Security Managers did not have to answer to the public. The constant revolving door in presidential administrations, furthermore, encouraged short-term thinking by bureaucrats who sought immediate successes that would improve their chances of obtaining a job once they left the administration. “The canny bureaucrat is sustained by the faith that when the policy collapses he will be somewhere else,” Barnet explained.

¹³ Ibid., 90-91; Richard J. Barnet, “The National Security Managers,” October 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 1, 6.

Thus the bureaucrat could promote military measures without taking into account the long-term likelihood of success or failure.¹⁴

The National Security Managers concerned IPS intellectuals because of the great sway the bureaucrats had over presidents. Described by Barnet as “the bureaucratic model of reality,” presidents, he argued, rarely received advice that had not already been circumscribed and considered acceptable by the bureaucracy. Thus, instead of providing impartial advice, the bureaucrat offered policies developed with the interests of the bureaucracy in mind, and not what was best for America. Barnet reiterated this point in another essay when he argued that “the roots of the Vietnam failure lie more in the structure and organization of the national security bureaucracy than in the personality of the President or the idiosyncrasies” of his advisors. As a result, “The President may decide, but the bureaucracy structures the decisions by setting out the choices.” And given their connections to arms producers and corporations, National Security Managers rarely presented the president with policies favoring diplomatic solutions.¹⁵

Though not yet known within IPS as National Security Managers, Raskin had a similarly negative view of foreign policy bureaucrats when he proposed several unlikely candidates to replace President Johnson’s advisors in 1964. “The President has been handed the type of advice which adds up to nothing but military strategies, banal

¹⁴ Barnet, “The National Security Managers,” 26-28, 30; Richard J. Barnet, “The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention,” in *The New Left: A Collection of Essays*, ed., Priscilla Long (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969), 106-107.

¹⁵ Richard J. Barnet, “The Men Who Made War,” in *Washington Plans An Aggressive War*, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1971), 207; Barnet, “The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention,” 88. While National Security Managers isolated presidents from alternative views, Barnet went too far in suggesting that culpability for America’s foreign policy belonged solely to the bureaucrats. Calling Johnson “the biggest hawk of them all,” historian Fredrik Logevall has argued that the president, undoubtedly with the aid of his advisors, but chiefly for his own reasons, pursued a militaristic strategy in Vietnam. See Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 335-336.

ideology, and weak psychology. Through such 'advice' bureaucracies thrive," Raskin argued. Like Barnet, Raskin argued in late 1964 that the foreign policy bureaucracy, and not President Johnson, deserved much of the blame for America's military actions in Vietnam. "Thus, if the President is to be faulted, it is that he allowed himself for a period of time to be sold a bill of goods by people who have no diplomatic or political abilities, no touch with our society or anyone else's, and no sense of the rhythm of history and practical ideals of our nation," Raskin explained. Therefore, he advised the president to fire his foreign policy advisors and replace them with people like Martin Luther King, James Farmer, George Kennan, Arthur Larson, Benjamin V. Cohen, or Telford Taylor.¹⁶

While no president would likely ever include King or Farmer in their cabinet, Barnet offered a more plausible alternative in regard to the makeup of the National Security Council. "The National Security Council includes no one to argue for a distribution of resources other than what the Pentagon demands," Barnet explained as he called for an expansion of the NSC to include a greater diversity of interests. Barnet wanted the NSC to be made over to include Secretaries from Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, Health, Education, and Welfare, and "other spokesmen for domestic interests" as well. Bringing non-military officials into the NSC would force proponents of military spending to explain why its programs should receive support and the money should not go to combat "such domestic threats as poverty, disease, ignorance, and the poisoning of the environment . . .," Barnet claimed. Making a similar argument almost twenty years later, Barnet added that expanding the NSC would also guard against decisions made for short-term benefit. An enlarged NSC could "develop a long-range

¹⁶ Marcus Raskin, "Should Martin Luther King Be Secretary of State?" December 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 3-4.

national planning process which integrates economic, social, environmental, and military considerations” when creating proposals for the president.¹⁷ IPS hoped to gain the support of the American public by illustrating how National Security Managers dominated the foreign policy decision-making process, leading to an excessive emphasis on military strength at the expense of the nation’s social fabric.

While identifying the consequences for America of depending too heavily on National Security Managers, Barnet also hoped to expose a deficiency in Marxist analyses of foreign affairs. Barnet criticized Marxists for “not explain[ing] the peculiar dynamics of American imperialism” at those moments when purely economic interests could not explain American foreign policy. For instance, Marxists could not explain why America continued to fight in Vietnam, which Barnet called “an economic loser” for the United States, if the war offered no financial benefits to the ruling classes. Barnet also begrudged Marxists for failing to take into account the National Security Managers who, he claimed, “do not *think* they are acting solely or primarily to protect private corporate interests.” In the end, National Security Managers did not always act “rationally” and to think that they did so in pursuit of purely economic expansion seemed to Barnet “overly optimistic” and too simple. “They often trade economic gain for such irrational intangibles as the thrill of domination and the mastery of paranoid fears,” Barnet wrote in reference to the National Security Managers.¹⁸

¹⁷ Barnet, *The Economy of Death*, 137; Richard Barnet, “Cobwebs and Catchwords: Rethinking National Security,” in *Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s*, eds. Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 264.

¹⁸ Richard J. Barnet, “Review of *Corporations & the Cold War*, ed. David Horowitz,” *Commonweal*, June 26, 1970, 322-323.

Several prominent intellectuals questioned Barnett's singling out of a small group of advisors and charged IPS's co-director with overstating the importance of National Security Managers. Claiming that Barnett exaggerated the influence of the National Security Managers, these critics also accused IPS's co-director of ignoring obvious examples of bureaucrats speaking out against militarism. One reader criticized Barnett's tendency to absolve all other groups in society of wrongdoing in order to place all of the blame on the National Security Managers. This reader, responding to a 1971 article by Barnett in *Harper's*, pointed to the undue emphasis placed on national security managers in Barnett's work without any mention of the role played by the American public, the Congress, and the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the reader argued that in addition to escalating the war, the national security managers "were responsible for the war's ultimate de-escalation." Referring to evidence in the Pentagon papers, the reader offered Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as an example of a national security manager who spoke out against continued fighting.¹⁹

During a conference on Vietnam in 1968, Albert Wohlstetter, a nuclear strategist associated with the RAND Corporation, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a former advisor to President Kennedy, also took issue with Barnett's narrow view of bureaucrats. They complained of Barnett's unqualified statements regarding the belligerence of the National Security Managers and their ability to influence important foreign policy decisions. Wohlstetter criticized Barnett for making blanket statements about the national security bureaucracy that ignored the actual evidence. For instance, he pointed to examples when military officials "greatly overestimated enemy forces and as a result did not intervene,"

¹⁹ Robert Pervidi to The Editor of Harper's Magazine, November 3, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 14.

while Barnet claimed the opposite always occurred. Wohlstetter also questioned Barnet's claim that the missile gap argument used by Kennedy against Eisenhower owed itself to the national security bureaucracy. Describing the missile gap myth as "a political gambit of the 'outs'—the Democrats," Wohlstetter claimed that Barnet too readily accepted "a very popular misunderstanding."²⁰ Politicians, not bureaucrats, advanced the missile gap myth.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. also felt that Barnet placed too great an emphasis on the National Security Council, leading to a paper containing "a certain amount of insight mingled with a great deal of extravagance and error." Speaking of his own experience in the White House, Schlesinger claimed that Barnet's National Security Managers "made no important decisions on anything" during Kennedy's presidency. While Barnet saw Vietnam "as the model for every decision in foreign policy made since World War II," Schlesinger considered the war a "culmination of error" specific to a unique set of circumstances. In fact, Schlesinger claimed, "the important things" following World War II achieved by the United States had been "political and economic rather than military in nature." Schlesinger also questioned Barnet's depiction of the national security bureaucracy as a "unified monolith," which clashed with the former's own experiences during the Cuban missile crisis and when differences between officials came to the surface. Schlesinger also highlighted the distinction between "those who give the advice," the bureaucrats, and "those who take the advice" and use it to make the actual

²⁰ Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 78-79.

decisions. Barnet, Schlesinger claimed, focused far too much on the former, which explained why he did not ask “why anyone listens to what they have to say.”²¹

Perhaps if Barnet had clearly delineated just who or what bureaucratic positions he included among his National Security Managers he could have avoided making the sweeping indictments criticized by Wohlstetter and Schlesinger. Instead, his National Security Managers remained a faceless unit. Yet, for Barnet, the faces did not matter because whoever entered the bureaucracy lost their individuality and agency. During the conference, expressed concern over the fact that America’s “top civilian leadership” suddenly became more militaristic after entering the bureaucracy. Thus Barnet determined “that the problem may lie in institutional structures which generate pressures that influence men toward militarist analysis and militarist solutions.” Barnet disagreed with commentators who blamed war on biological tendencies instead of looking at American society and its social institutions. In Barnet’s view, an emphasis on biological rationales served to redeem the war makers. “If human beings . . . have biological urges to slaughter their own species at regular intervals there is nothing to be done,” Barnet exclaimed. By locating the “roots of war” in social institutions, however, activists could use domestic reform to limit war.²²

IPS and the National Security State

The very phrase Cold War denotes the relative paucity of hot wars during the drawn out conflict that lasted for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Not to downplay the significance of the countless smaller conflicts that raged on across the globe, with the exception of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, American troops

²¹ Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams?*, 83-86.

²² *Ibid.*, 94; Barnet, *Roots of War*, 5-6.

stayed out of most of these minor conflagrations. Yet just because America avoided sending its military to certain regions of the world did not mean that America was at peace. Mary Dudziak has suggested that since World War II, America has not experienced a period free of actual combat or at least preparation for war. She argues that the tendency to create a “wartime frame” denoting the official start and end of war, or mobilization for combat, resulted in an inaccurate picture of just how much war affected society. In Dudziak’s opinion, “It works to restrict our study of the impact of war and militarization within certain exceptional moments, making it harder to see the ways that war has become part of the normal course of American life.” Thus, ignoring these so-called “small wars,” and, in the case of Vietnam, circumscribing the length of wars, has allowed commentators, politicians, and other authorities to claim that peace existed during certain periods in American history when it really did not.²³

Never ending threats of a worldwide nuclear holocaust also made periods of supposed peace times of angst and anxiety, which allowed the national security state to thrive. The expansionist policies of the Soviet Union following World War II undoubtedly created much uncertainty and gave rise to the Cold War. Yet international affairs represented only one aspect of the Cold War. As historians Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall have shown, the Cold War required a domestic component as well. The popularization of Cold War studies from an international perspective has, according to Craig and Logevall, led historians to ignore or downplay the importance of domestic politics. As a result, the authors have called for an enlarged focus on the “intermestic,” or the ties between international events and domestic politics. Focusing in on the domestic

²³ Mary L. Dudziak, *War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 25-26, 28-31.

sources of the Cold War would, they argue, highlight the fact that America, despite statements made to the contrary by Cold Warriors, had little to fear from outside forces.²⁴ Regardless, Americans living through the Cold War believed that Soviet forces stood at the doorstep of the United States. As a result, the imagined Soviet threat made possible the creation of a national security state.

As the aforementioned book written by journalist Fred Cook in 1962 correctly surmised, American politicians used the fear of a nuclear holocaust to keep the American public compliant. Yet as the numerous scholarly books on American culture in the Cold War era attest, the producers of culture also encouraged a less unruly public. For instance, Stephen J. Whitfield notes how the novels that came out after World War I—including such books as Ernest Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* and John Dos Passos's *Three Soldiers*—praised individuality, but post-World War II novels showed characters bowing to authority. *The Caine Mutiny*, as an example, told the story of how, in the words of Whitfield, “defense of democracy” sometimes required following leaders no matter their deficiencies.²⁵

Whether talking about Vietnam or American intervention in Latin America in the 1980s, the national security state stood at the center of the issues discussed by IPS intellectuals. Upon learning that IPS intended to turn its attention to domestic issues, Howard Romaine of the Institute for Southern Studies argued that one issue stood above all others in importance to IPS. “The central notion of the National Security State as the chief obstacle to a more democratic and decent society at home, and the major threat to a

²⁴ Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 8-11.

²⁵ Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 60-61.

more peaceful and economically equitable world, is what the Institute stands for in my eyes,” Romaine wrote in an attempt to dissuade the Institute from turning away from international issues.²⁶ In fact, the intellectuals at IPS considered one of the primary strengths of the Institute its ability to speak broadly and show the relationship between domestic and international issues.²⁷

The national security state remained an area of central concern for IPS throughout the period under investigation in this study. In 1979, Raskin devoted an entire book, *The Politics of National Security*, to the subject. According to Raskin, the possibility of war, concern over the rising numbers of revolutions, frailties in the capitalist system, and advances in nuclear weapons and technology more generally caused the development of the national security states. At its most basic level, the national security state allowed “ruling elites to implement their imperial schemes and misplaced ideals,” according to Raskin. A growing bureaucracy and an all-powerful president who acted, Raskin claimed, “as a broker and legitimating instrument of national security activity,” aided in the creation of the national security state. Raskin pointed to NSC 68 as the “magna carta of the national security bureaucracy” because the policy paper laid the groundwork for the creation of a plethora of agencies that proved pivotal to the running of the national security state. Among them, Raskin included, corporations, police and military forces,

²⁶ Howard Romaine to Marcus Raskin, January 14, 1971, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 27.

²⁷ For instance, Borosage wrote encouragingly in 1979 of IPS’s wide-ranging studies, which represented another advantage the think tank had over other progressive organizations. According to Borosage, IPS’s reports and books on foreign policy, the federal budget, economic interactions between the First and Third World, and the role of knowledge in politics made possible a fuller understanding of what ailed America. Not only did IPS possess the knowledge to see the interconnectedness of many of America’s problems, but it also recognized the relationship between America’s troubles and the difficulties facing the nations of the world. “Domestic policy organizations simply cannot respond—even in the short-term—to the new global corporate dynamic,” Borosage exclaimed. See Robert Borosage, “The Institute in the Next Decade,” no date [1979], IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 6, 5.

technicians, and labor leaders concerned with creating an American “empire making and preparing for war, and transforming nature into material processes for domination. . . .”²⁸

Before analyzing any further the theory behind the national security state, it is worth looking at when, chronologically speaking, IPS intellectuals detected the earliest signals of the transformation of America. Marking the genesis of the national security state as the moment Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, Borosage claimed that the legislation forever changed American society. In his view, the bill “legitimated wartime institutions and priorities for the peacetime state” and “militarized” the civilians who controlled those institutions. While most historians, and, in fact, other intellectuals at IPS, point to Harry Truman as the president under which the national security state originated, Saul Landau argued that “the first modern national security state” appeared as early as Woodrow Wilson’s presidency. “A crisis mentality ruled, secrecy prevailed, and censorship and repression were widespread” during Wilson’s time in office, Landau claimed.²⁹ While IPS intellectuals did not agree on a hard and fast date for the beginning of the national security state, they concurred on its consequences for America.

Despite looking to the early twentieth century for the creation of the national security state, Landau agreed with his colleagues at IPS that America’s government

²⁸ Marcus G. Raskin, *The Politics of National Security* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979), 31, 33-34. Raskin went so far as to claim that the Peace Corps served as an important component of the national security state. “The State would use the young people by challenging and channeling them into accepting and prosecuting the imperial purpose,” Raskin explained. See Marcus Raskin, “The Kennedy Hawks Assume Power from the Eisenhower Vultures,” in *The Pentagon Watchers: Students reports on the National Security State*, eds. Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1970), 96.

²⁹ Robert Borosage, “The Making of the National Security State,” in *The Pentagon Watchers: Students reports on the National Security State*, eds. Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1970), 12; Saul Landau, *The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 26.

underwent an important transformation in 1947. He claimed that the National Security Act passed that year created a “bifurcated state,” which he described as having one part “open and accessible to the U.S. public” with another section “a secret, suprapublic entity whose agenda and inner workings had to be kept not only from the enemy, but from the state’s own citizens as well.” Such secrecy, Raskin argued earlier, led to the creation of a “para-law.” In the national security state, according to Raskin, “para-law” replaced older forms of law. As understood by Raskin, para-law did “not emerge from either legal decision, public debate, or congressional decision,” though the courts and legislature often approved it after the fact. The national security state’s para-law was “forged in private, outside the public forum, without public debate although it is made by public officials or executive proclamation.” Without “para-law,” Raskin claimed, the national security state could not have existed. In his view, “the daily activities of millions of people who without the color of some form of custom and justification would be forced to see their work as criminal. . . .”³⁰

Not only, as Dudziak notes, does the lack of war not necessarily mean peace, but, according to IPS intellectuals, the national security state depended on the absence of combat. Describing the national security state as a “nondynamic system,” Raskin argued that despite having as its purpose the “continuous preparation for war, the distortion of the economy, [and] the development of capitalists whose livelihood depends on the arms race and continuous covert and military engagement,” actual war could never occur. Kennedy threatened the survival of the national security state when he involved the United States in Vietnam, which led to massive protests. “What was once invisible about

³⁰ Landau, *The Dangerous Doctrine*, 47; Marcus Raskin, *Notes on the Old System: To Transform American Politics* (New York: David McKay, 1974), 135.

imperialism became visible and costly,” Raskin wrote in reference to the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement. The threat of war, on the other hand, served the interests of America’s leaders because a constantly lurking and invisible menace led Americans to self-censorship. Noting “the loss of legitimacy of previous systems of social and political control”—for instance feudalism and aristocracy—Barnet illustrated how states, either through direct force or less visible methods, such as unequal economic systems and governmental surveillance, reclaimed legitimacy. When a state still failed “in maintaining social peace,” it often used “national security” as a way to keep its people in line. As a result, Barnet claimed, “A world of states run by regimes lacking legitimacy is a world at risk.” Creating enemies abroad in order to quell revolt at home, however, did not make much sense to IPS intellectuals, either militarily or economically.³¹

For IPS intellectuals the national security state posed a dilemma because its very existence prevented the public from speaking out against it. In 1970, Barnet and Raskin argued that America’s constant preparation for war made it a “War Machine.” Controlling America’s economic, political, and military institutions, the “War Machine” created a state of “permanent war” even in times of peace. “It *cannot* respond to popular pressure for peace or for a different set of priorities because it cannot stop itself,” Barnet and Raskin declared. Raskin still held out hope that a crack in the foundation of the national security state would open it up to the will of the people. Raskin argued that the national security state was a “synthesis of state power and capitalism,” but within the system there existed a “contradiction.” “It was,” he explained, “that continuous preparation for war, the distortion of the economy, the development of capitalists whose

³¹ Raskin, *Notes on the Old System*, 136-137; Richard J. Barnet, “The Future of Democracy,” *The Yale Review* 72 (Autumn 1982), 26-28.

livelihood depends on the arms race and continuous covert and military engagement would not be contained as a self-enclosed bureaucratic process.” The constant war footing and involvement of the United States in worldwide conflagrations caused harm to the economy and would eventually lead the American public to question intervention.³²

Opening Up the National Security State to the American People

In addition to employing the legal system to protect against abuses of power by government officials, IPS, as it did on so many matters, turned to the American people. Albert Wohlstetter, during the aforementioned 1968 conference on Vietnam, claimed that Barnett’s views on the bureaucracy “lead us so directly to genocide, nothing remains except a prayer that the world can be broken up into very small self-subsistent units in which contacts are face to face.” Even then, fighting still broke out between the Greek city-states, so Wohlstetter claimed that Barnett’s argument “cannot be taken literally.”³³

While IPS intellectuals supported greater local autonomy on certain matters, they also suggested that Congress, with some changes, represented one of the best hopes for the preservation of democracy. Referring to Congress’s inability to stop a president’s march to war once the journey commenced, Raskin called on America’s legislative body to look elsewhere for its “legitimacy.” He argued that congressmen “must find their legitimacy in the people who will act as citizens to determine their interests and purposes in confrontation with the present corporate structures.” With “its roots in the people,” Raskin suggested at another time, Congress represented the best means through which to

³² Richard J. Barnett and Marcus G. Raskin, *An American Manifesto: What’s Wrong With America and What Can We Do About It* (New York: Signet, 1970), 30; Marcus G. Raskin, “The American Political Deadlock,” Paper Presented at “Colloquium on Latin America and the United States: Present and Future of Their Economic and Political Relations,” Oaxtepec, Mexico, November 1975, 15.

³³ Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams?*, 77.

destroy the national security state. Congress, he believed, could open up a dialogue with the citizenry and begin the process of bringing to an end the national security state's "mythicizing [of] people," which distorted American democracy by making it appear as though Americans supported their nation's foreign policy. According to Raskin, the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s already "demythiciz[ed] people and forc[ed] dialogue among those who refused to see one another except as abstract entities," and thus made democracy real.³⁴ In other words, Raskin wanted "We The People" to stand for something and serve as more than patriotic propaganda.

In order to strengthen the relationship between Congress and the American people, Raskin suggested a return to a custom of the eighteenth century. Looking at the implementation of the grand jury in America at that time, Raskin explained that it "was used to find out the problems of government and to institutionalize citizen control and participation." Re-instituting grand juries would "open the way to the emergence of a participatory nation in which citizenship would become the linchpin of a modern American democracy," Raskin claimed. The grand juries would "investigate the major public institutions" and "address the content and direction of governing in the districts" to remove the "barriers" that existed between Congress and the people, Raskin explained. Additionally, the grand juries would do many of the same things as Congress, but with greater participation by the people. In Raskin's grand jury system, each congressman would be responsible to several juries in his or her district. Raskin proposed having one jury for every 50,000 citizens in his or her district. Each jury would have 24 citizens serving two-year terms. Congressmen, as required by law, would have to meet with their

³⁴ Raskin, *Notes on the Old System*, 90-94; Raskin, *The Politics of National Security*, 199-200.

jury for one week at the end of each legislative session.³⁵ At their most basic levels, grand juries made possible greater collaboration between Congress and its constituents on all matters, not just foreign policy.

The favorable view that certain IPS intellectuals had of Congress worried other fellows at the think tank who pointed to Congress's inability to weaken the national security state. Landau, referring to the recent congressional hearings on Iran-Contra in the 1980s, had little confidence in the ability of Congress to halt the growing national security state. Rather than confront the national security ideology during the Iran-Contra hearings, Landau accused the legislature of focusing on the "narrow issue, as if nothing had really changed in the basic partition of powers that the Founding Fathers had meted out to each branch." The Congress could have asked the "question of whether or not the United States could continue to function as a republic *and* as an empire," but instead focused on the president's role in the scandal. Thus, Landau concluded, "So ingrained has anti-Sovietism become that candidates and Congress members chant its tenets like catechism."³⁶

Even proponents of a strengthened Congress periodically expressed disillusionment with the legislative body. Raskin denounced Congress in 1969 for not stopping the national security state from carrying out its policies. The national security state, according to Raskin, turned Congress into "a permanent talk group which arrives at no decisions and effects no changes in terms of the actual direction of the society." Often, Raskin argued at another point, the Executive gave Congress the opportunity to use its

³⁵ Raskin, *Notes on the Old System*, 149-152, 155-156.

³⁶ Landau, *The Dangerous Doctrine*, 176-177; Marcus Raskin, "National Security State," *The Progressive*, June 1969, 19.

constitutional powers only after he had already ensnared America so deep into a war that to deny the president a declaration of war would do irreparable harm to the country and the Executive. Raskin claimed that by asserting its constitutional right to declare war, Congress would make the Executive branch look like “a band of thieves who up that point had engaged in a criminal enterprise” by not seeking congressional approval. The refusal by Congress to rubber stamp the president’s plans for war would lead the American people to demand the president’s ouster, thus threatening the very fabric of American society. “Members of Congress will comply rather than risk internal revolution to stop a war abroad,” Raskin suggested.³⁷

As IPS intellectuals looked more broadly at the national security state, discussion of the National Security Managers gave way to talk of abuses of presidential power by the Commander in Chief. More and more, it appeared as if an “imperial presidency” had overtaken America.³⁸ Presidents used claims of national security to boost their authority during times of actual and imaginary crises, IPS intellectuals argued. Decrying the long list of secrets held under the cover of national security, Landau claimed that many “national security secrets were known to the enemy. The real reason for classifying them was to keep them from the American public.” Furthermore, the term national security

³⁷ Marcus G. Raskin, “From Imperial War-Making to a Code of Personal Responsibility,” in *Washington Plans An Aggressive War*, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1971), 282.

³⁸ Historian and advisor to President John F. Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., brought attention to the idea of an “imperial presidency” with the publication of his book of the same name in 1973. Viewing history as one long, back-and-forth battle between Congress and the Executive for power, Schlesinger, not surprisingly, found Richard Nixon as a paragon of the “imperial presidency.” Schlesinger argued, “Nixon was carrying the imperial presidency toward its ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency” in which— with the President accountable only once every four years, shielded in the years between elections from congressional and public harassment, empowered by his mandate to make war or to make peace, to spend or to impound, to give out information or to hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by executive order, all in the name of a majority” that after the election had to remain supportive of the president. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: popular Library, 1974), 247-248.

served only to protect whoever occupied the Oval Office. “Instead of making us more secure as a nation, the national security doctrine has led to international tensions and consistent abuse of executive privilege,” Landau wrote. If America hoped to prevent another Watergate or Iran-Contra scandal, it had to move beyond dealing with such crises after the fact, Landau argued. In his opinion, Congress had to move “beyond its restorationist role” and determine “what national security really means” so that presidents could not use the term to circumvent democratic decision-making.³⁹

Beginning with the National Security Managers and then turning their attention to the more extensive national security state, IPS intellectuals found in these two concepts an explanation for America’s various missteps both at home and abroad. The National Security Managers not only lacked a moral compass, but their very existence precluded the involvement of the American public in decisions of national import. They existed, furthermore, as part of a much larger and more encompassing national security state, which worked to nullify public worries over the activities of the National Security Managers by embedding within the American psyche a constant fear of attack from the enemy. As they would with so many other issues, IPS intellectuals looked to the American people as the savior, albeit, this time, speaking through a Congress brought closer to the citizenry through the holding of grand juries. In the end, however, IPS intellectuals never advanced their argument beyond the claim that Congress, through closer contact with the people, offered the best possibility for the restoration of American democracy.

³⁹ Saul Landau, “The National Security Trap,” *IPS Features*, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 37, folder 71, 2-4.

Chapter Six: Solidarity: IPS and the Third World

Blaming America's frequent interventions in Latin America on realpolitik and an ideological egotism that rejected any belief system other than democratic capitalism, IPS sought to construct a new path for America in its relations with the Third World. The new role IPS envisioned for America involved a greater consideration of the aspirations of Latin Americans, in regard to both ideological and economic concerns. However, the constant fear of Soviet expansionism led America to sell arms to Third World dictators and, on the home front, treat Latin America as a proving ground after the failure in Vietnam. For IPS, America represented the only threat in Central America as the former sought to overturn popular revolutions in Nicaragua and elsewhere.

Historians have long debated the charge leveled against the United States by its detractors that it represented the new imperial power after the fall of the British Empire following World War II. Some historians have looked for evidence of an American empire going back even earlier to the nation's first years. Writing in the late 1950s, William Appleman Williams located support for expansionism in the writings of James Madison. According to the University of Wisconsin historian, "Americans thought of themselves as an empire at the very outset of their national existence," as exemplified by the thinking of America's early political leaders. Madison, Williams argued, promoted expansion as a way to prevent self-interested groups from obtaining too much power. Thus, Williams contended, Madison's thinking on the subject represented a precursor to Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis of a century later. More recently, Michael Hunt has suggested that the ideology of foreign policy underwent a tremendous change in the

years following Thomas Jefferson's presidency. America's third president and his successors no longer saw the Republican ideal of liberty as contradictory to Alexander Hamilton's calls for American greatness through a strong government. A powerful centralized government would allow the United States to expand further West and preserve liberty by acquiring lands for people to farm and maintain their virtuosity.¹

Histories of the Cold War, especially the more recent studies of the conflict, have attempted to bring attention to the Third World and move the spotlight away from the battle between the United States and the Soviet Union over Europe. A number of studies that look at the Cold War in the Third World refute the charge of imperialism by the superpowers. Arguing for a somewhat softer view of superpower interventions in the region, Odd Arne Westad suggests that "while imperialism got its social consciousness almost as an afterthought, in the Cold War it was inherent from the very beginning." Both Washington and Moscow claimed that they sought "control and improvement" of Third World nations and acted with the interests of each particular nation in mind. Not looking to manipulate the political systems or take the resources of Third World nations, the United States and the Soviet Union genuinely sought the best for their non-European allies, as evidenced by the willingness of the superpowers to sacrifice life and treasure during wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Westad claims. Another historian, Hal Brands, has suggested that Third World countries possessed far more agency than they are usually given credit for. He has argued that anti-communism grew organically in the region and Latin American leaders did not require much persuasion from America to go after communists. Brands argues fervently against the common historical portrayal of Latin

¹ William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* 2nd ed. (New York: Dell, 1962), 19-20; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 30-31.

American military regimes “as mere ciphers that needed to be prompted to be anticommunist.” Even without the prodding of America, Latin American military leaders were extremely worried about guerrillas coming from Cuba to invade their country.²

Other historians have offered less friendly portraits of American interventions in the Third World. Considering the significance of the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 by the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter LaFeber has argued that the overthrow of the democratically-elected leader Arbenz had less to do with external pressures on his rule than internal events. Whereas the Monroe Doctrine protected America’s neighbors against external threats, the situation in Guatemala represented a new, domestic threat. Though John Foster Dulles and others in the United States government cast events in Guatemala as communist-inspired, the Secretary of State recognized the unique nature of the situation. As did Guatemala’s Foreign Minister Guillermo Foriello, who compared American actions in the country to McCarthyism in the United States. Beginning with the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz, America never slowed its interventionist tendencies in the region, LaFeber argues³

IPS’s Critique of Realpolitik

Though historians continue to discuss America’s imperial ambitions, or lack thereof, intellectuals at IPS only had to look at America’s responses to Third World revolutions, particularly those carried out by our neighbors to the South, to reach the conclusion that America aimed to create an empire. Neither the spread of democracy nor

² Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5; Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 81.

³ Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1993), 124-125.

a need for external markets explained American intervention in the Third World, Barnet claimed. He rejected the well-worn arguments used to defend American intervention abroad, which portrayed the United States as altruistic, but also prone to mistakes despite the best of intentions. Neither, though, did Barnet accept the less mainstream, Marxist view that America intervened in the affairs of other nations to protect its capitalist markets. After all, he explained, non-capitalist industrialized states interfered in other nations as well, and American intervention in Vietnam actually hurt American capitalism. Who or what, then, was to blame for the tendency among U.S. officials to intervene around the world? Not surprisingly, Barnet found an answer in the national security bureaucracy. “The urge to achieve stability and control over the world environment by taming and cooling independent political forces in other countries is probably inherent in the hierarchical character of the foreign-policy bureaucracy,” Barnet opined.⁴ Like the foreign policy bureaucrats striving to make America the “Number One Nation” by bombing Vietnam, U.S. officials believed that American supremacy required keeping revolutionary forces in the Third World from achieving success.

IPS intellectuals blamed the calculating and scheming of realists for America’s interventionist policy in the Third World. In a speech given in Mexico in 1975, Raskin accused Reinhold Niebuhr of being “the most powerful American exponent of the national security state and the cold war. . . .” Niebuhr’s ideas “rationalized the development of the Central Intelligence Agency, the dirty tricks and covert operations which allowed for massive intervention abroad,” Raskin declared. He did not expound on the reasons why Niebuhr deserved such scorn, though Raskin claimed that the theologian

⁴ Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 12-18.

promoted the view that America needed to act immorally if necessary because of the fight against “the forces of darkness.”⁵

A major component of realism, the balance of power in international affairs also came under reproach for its total disregard of the less powerful nations of the Third World. Barnet blamed America’s foreign policy debacles in the 1970s on “obsolete analysis, obsolete style, and obsolete goals.” The Kissinger viewpoint, Barnet wrote, “assumes that any world problem can be managed if the right five people get together. It is a 19th Century view of world politics based on the assumption that when princes and potentates meet, they can deliver their subjects.” Such an understanding of world affairs, however, kept “the most obstreperous forces” from the negotiating table. Even when denied a political voice, these forces could still “insure that the status quo will not be pleasant,” by committing terrorist acts and more generally acting as a thorn in the side of the superpowers, Barnet explained. He also criticized Kissinger’s style, which depended on “threat, flattery, puffery, and deception” and denied “the democratic process” a place in foreign affairs.⁶

Kissinger looked to the Austrian diplomat Prince Clemens von Metternich for ideas about how to replicate the peace the diplomat brought to Europe in the nineteenth century. In fact, Kissinger’s first book, published in 1957, *A World Restored: Metternich,*

⁵ Marcus G. Raskin, “The American Political Deadlock,” Paper Presented at “Colloquium on Latin America and the United States: Present and Future of Their Economic and Political Relations,” Oaxtepec, Mexico, November 1975, 7-8. Political scientists and historians disagree over Niebuhr’s support for American imperialism. For two interpretations, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 24-41; Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 174-175. For a historical perspective on how Niebuhr’s political realism compared to Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, see Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

⁶ Richard J. Barnet, “Is Kissinger Obsolete?—His Dove of Peace Has Flown the Coop,” *The Boston Globe*, April 27, 1975, B1 & B4.

Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, looked at the role the diplomat played in securing peace in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars. Bruce Kuklick, in his look at foreign policy intellectuals during the first three decades of the Cold War, has noted Kissinger's tendency to see the historical events of the 1800s as a direct corollary to the Cold War. Prince Metternich ably traversed European politics and brought about peace by making the "revolutionary state" of France into a non-revolutionary "legitimate state." Kissinger would employ a similar strategy with the Soviet Union through détente, which made it possible for the superpowers to reach agreement on Vietnam and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Kissinger, in the words of Kuklick, posited that "the U.S.S.R. could demonstrate its evolution from revolutionary state by helping the United States to extricate itself from the war" in Vietnam. Barnet made almost the same argument almost thirty years earlier. In explaining America's role in the 1973 overthrow of the democratically-elected leader in Chile, Salvador Allende, Barnet argued, "Kissinger is confident that he can isolate the liberation movements from the Soviet Union, and in particular, can inspire Soviet non-interference in American plans for the Western Hemisphere, by offering the Kremlin an ambiguous junior partnership in building a 'generation of peace.'" The relationship with the Soviet Union, and China, he continued, had as its purpose the quelling of liberation movements in the Third World. According to Barnet, Kissinger sought "to accord legitimacy to established revolutionary power in order to isolate it from revolutionary movements which at all costs must be denied legitimacy."⁷ In other words, Kissinger did not seek improved relations with the

⁷ See Bruce Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 189-190, 193-195; Richard J. Barnet, "The Kissinger Doctrine and

Soviet Union and China out of a desire to end the Cold War. Rather, Kissinger hoped that détente would compel the Chinese and Russians to forego their support of revolutionary movements in the Third World, and thus preserve the status quo.

IPS's Promotion of "Ideological Pluralism"

Under the direction of Roberta Salper, IPS's Working Group on Latin America completed a report in 1977 entitled *The Southern Connection: Recommendations for a new Approach to Inter-American Relations*. In the report, IPS intellectuals offered several recommendations that would serve as the foundation for the Institute's opposition to American policy in Latin America. The writers of *The Southern Connection* hoped that their report would inform officials and ordinary Americans of "the broader need to free U.S. policy-making from the outmoded assumption of U.S. hegemony; . . . to accept ideological pluralism in the Caribbean; . . . not only on the pervasiveness of human rights violations in Latin America, but also on the linkages between U.S. interests and institutionalized repression." Allowing for "ideological pluralism" in Latin America made it possible to "override narrow, short lived definitions of national interest and national advantage that have sometimes led to primitive action," the report claimed. Following a policy of "ideological pluralism," furthermore, facilitated economic growth by allowing nations to choose their own economic system based on what worked best for the people of the nation. When outside forces put pressure on nations to implement a particular economic system, like what happened in Chile, the citizens of those nations suffered. Making the connection between economics and human rights, the report stated,

Chile," in *The Lessons of Chile: The Chilean Coup and the Future of Socialism*, ed. John Gittings (Amsterdam: TNI, 1975), 23-24.

“We think the roots of the systematic and gross violations of human rights are to be found in national and international underdevelopment and inequality.”⁸ Both “ideological pluralism” and non-interventionism built on previous arguments put forth by IPS intellectuals. At the same time, economic factors held a much more prominent position in *The Southern Connection* than previous IPS writings.

IPS’s study on Latin America brought the think tank attention, both positive and negative. By early 1978, IPS sold 1,800 copies of *The Southern Connection*.

Additionally, the Overseas Development Council held a dinner in which congressmen, diplomats, and government officials “directly involved in determining U.S. policy in Inter-American affairs” used the report. Due in part to the participation of well-known policymakers and academics, conservatives took notice of the study and lambasted its contents.⁹ Neoconservative Jeane Kirkpatrick, who would later serve as President Reagan’s U.N. Ambassador, spoke out against *The Southern Connection*, believing that the report served as President Carter’s blueprint for Latin American policy. For Kirkpatrick, IPS’s *The Southern Connection* threatened America’s interests even more than the 1974 “Linowitz Report,” which came under the intense scrutiny of neoconservatives due to the study’s conclusion that America did not face any military

⁸ Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America, *The Southern Connection: Recommendations for a New Approach to Inter-American Relations* (Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1977), ii, 4-6.

⁹ In 1985, the Council for Inter-American Security released a report entitled *The Revolution Lobby*. The report, not surprisingly, touched on *The Southern Connection*. Robert A. Pastor, who had served as the Executive Director of the Linowitz Commission and then as a member of President Carter’s National Security Council, also served briefly on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America at IPS. Critics of IPS accused Pastor of serving as “a respectable front man for the group.” Speaking before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, General Gordon Summers, Jr., who served as chairman for various conservative organizations, including the publisher of the study, claimed that IPS’s *Southern Connection* “reads like a blueprint for present Administration policies. Policies that have been or are being implemented often by individuals like Mr. Pastor and Mr. Schneider who first had a hand in formulating them.” See Allan C. Brownfield and J. Michael Waller, *The Revolution Lobby* (Washington D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security and Inter-American Security Educational Institute, 1985), 20, 22-23.

threats in Latin America and therefore should not support military regimes in the region.¹⁰

Most distressing to Kirkpatrick was the report's "sweeping indictment of past U.S. policy," its plea for America to allow self-development in Latin America, and its linkage of human rights to economic rights, which Kirkpatrick labeled a "fight for human rights with socialism." Yet the level of agreement between IPS's report and the Linowitz reports confirmed for Kirkpatrick that the New Left had been welcomed into the foreign policy Establishment, that the "new liberalism" squared nicely with "revolutionary 'socialism,'" and that the "utopian globalism" espoused by these liberals could turn easily into "anti-American perspectives and revolutionary activism." Had the ideas manifested in *The Southern Connection* remained outside of the political system, Kirkpatrick claimed that she would have ignored them since they posed no danger to America. According to Kirkpatrick, however, "No sooner was he [Jimmy Carter] elected than he set out to translate them into a new policy for dealing with nations of the hemisphere"¹¹ As this chapter explores in greater detail, IPS excoriated Carter and rarely approved of his foreign policy, but Kirkpatrick did not explore these differences.

Constantly in fear of Soviet expansionism, the United States, IPS intellectuals argued, refused to explore the reasons behind revolutions in Latin America, and thus ignored how economic problems encouraged revolutionary activities. In the views of Barnet and Landau, the uprisings in several Central American countries "are expressions

¹⁰ Latin American Unit to Saul Landau and Robert Borosage, January 5, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 24, folder 32; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 56-60.

¹¹ Latin American Unit to Saul Landau and Robert Borosage, January 5, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 24, folder 32; Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, 56-60.

of desperate economic and political conditions of the countries themselves,” caused by underdevelopment and not evidence of a link to the Soviet Union. Pointing to the economic origins of revolution, they contended, “Revolutionary leaders do not sacrifice their lives to turn their country over to a superpower 8000 miles away.” What, then, did the authors want America to do in response to Nicaragua and other revolutionary states in the region? “A consistent commitment to human rights and support for political pluralism everywhere is likely to achieve better results than punishing shaky new regimes for their excesses by stepping up the pressure and making a state of siege appear unavoidable, Barnet and Landau concluded”¹² A siege mentality by the United States only made small Latin American nations cling closer to the Soviet Union.

Although IPS intellectuals concentrated most of their energies on Latin America, the Institute, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, paid greater attention to the Middle East and Africa. An expanded focus by IPS on the Middle East had much to do with the rising tensions in that region. Fred Halliday went so far as to claim that Jimmy Carter’s presidency ushered in a “New Cold War,” and noted “a significant geopolitical shift” in emphasis from Europe to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. IPS intellectuals, however, denied that America had reason to fear recent events in the Middle East, particularly in regard to Soviet moves in the region. Not only had the Soviet Union made several blunders in its interactions with the Middle East, but communism as an ideology did not appeal to people of the region, according to Halliday. He explained that “the political character of the countries themselves,” “the relatively opaque development of class consciousness,” and “the vitality . . . of religious, ethnic and other sectarian

¹² Saul Landau and Richard Barnet, “Draft Declaration on Central America,” undated [early 1980s], IPSR, WHS, box 40, folder 8, 1, 3.

differences,” all contributed to communism’s unpopularity in the Middle East. Matters became even worse for the Soviet Union in the 1980s. “At the start of the 1980s, Russian influence in the Middle East appears to be at a lower point than at any time since 1955,” Halliday concluded. Anwar Sadat’s rise to power in Egypt also weakened the Soviet Union’s position in the Middle East. Halliday claimed that Sadat “has repeatedly gone out of his way to insult the Russians.” Iraq, too, a major recipient of Soviet aid, defied their benefactor by supporting Somalia and Eritrea in their battle against the Soviet-backed Ethiopia and criticized the superpower for invading Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union formed new alliances in the region, as they did with the Syrians and Libyans, Halliday suggested that these relationships served more “to check the tendency of both regimes towards reckless ventures” that would have helped the West.¹³ Thus, as leaders from the Soviet Union already understood, Islam and religious fundamentalism did not lend itself to allying with the Soviets. Regardless, America ignored the Soviet failings in the region documented by Halliday. Instead, IPS U.S. officials continued to believe that the Soviet Union threatened American interests in the Middle East, proving, IPS claimed, that ideology rather than pragmatism guided American foreign policy.

IPS’s Response to America as the World’s Arms Market

As it turned out, America’s own activities in the Middle East and Latin America did more to inflame the Third World. Michael Klare and other intellectuals at IPS exposed the massive amounts of armaments America sent to the Middle East and elsewhere, which only exacerbated conditions in and outside of the region. Between 1970 and 1978, according to Klare, arms sales to Iran composed 25 percent of the total arms

¹³ Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1981), 7-9, 60-63.

sales business. Unfamiliar with the new weapons, Iran had to hire 10,000 American weapons experts to train the Iranian military forces. Arms shipments to Iran rose due to an “unprecedented partnership” in which Iran acted as a “surrogate” for America. Yet Americans’ isolationism following Vietnam and the intense hatred many Middle Easterners had for the United States prevented America from taking on a more active role in the region. As a result, instead of sending troops, American officials sold larger quantities of arms to their allies. When America turned Iran into a “surrogate police power, it had no options but to honor the Shah’s requests for the weapons he felt he needed to perform the job,” Klare argued.¹⁴

Moreover, these weapons ensured that American technicians would remain in Iran indefinitely to work on the devices. According to Klare, the technicians “ensur[ed] that the ‘surrogate’ never operated independently of the assigned role as guardian of Western oil interests.” Not surprisingly, the presence of greater numbers of Americans in Iran led to public outcries. In addition to the presence of American technicians, Iranians also complained about the massive amounts of money spent on foreign arms at the expense of domestic needs. According to Klare, “The conspicuous presence of affluent Westerners” in the midst of economic decline, “naturally created much bitterness.” When the Shah used weapons from the United States to crush opposition forces, America lost any chance for redemption.¹⁵ The United States could point its finger at the Soviet Union for the deteriorating relationships in the Middle East, but IPS intellectuals placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. government.

¹⁴ Michael Klare, “Arms and the Shah: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Surrogate Strategy,” *The Progressive*, August 1979, 15-18.

¹⁵ Klare, “Arms and the Shah: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Surrogate Strategy,” 20-21.

Beyond the issue of sending American technicians to foreign lands whose people did not welcome their presence, arms sales generated greater instability in the already volatile regions, according to IPS intellectuals. Speaking before a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations in 1978, Klare and Max Holland rejected every major argument made in support of American arms sales to foreign nations. Instead of strengthening the self-defense capabilities of weak countries, nations used the weapons to instigate wars to further “their own aggressive or imperial ambitions” in their region of the world. As a nation possessed more and more weapons, their enemies strove for greater arsenals as well, leading to a “local arms race” that intensified distrust between nations and increased the likelihood of a surprise attack.¹⁶ Inevitably, Klare and Holland feared that regional conflagrations would ultimately involve either of the superpowers, militarily or otherwise, and raise the threat of a nuclear war.

Arms sales to the puppet government that the United States installed in Iran in 1954, furthermore, represented only a portion of the expanding trade in arms to Third World nations. In the late 1970s, Klare and other intellectuals at IPS began looking at the billions of dollars in aid and trade between the United States and Third World nations in the form of arms and other defense technology. A series of actions taken by the Nixon administration in the summer of 1973—including the overriding of congressional limits on arms sales to Latin America and the sale of \$10 billion worth of new weapons to Iran prior to making them available to NATO—represented a new direction in U.S. foreign policy, according to IPS’s militarism and disarmament project. “The cumulative impact of these decisions was to nullify *in toto* the policies which had governed U.S. arms sales

¹⁶ Michael T. Klare and Max Holland, *Conventional Arms Restraint: An Unfulfilled Promise* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 2.

abroad since World War II,” the proposal declared. No longer would the United States “prevent needless expenditures on non-developmental programs” by Third World nations. Citing Pentagon statistics, the proposal showed that military sales to underdeveloped nations in the 1950s and 1960s averaged \$230 million per year, while the arms sales in the mid-1970s reached \$6.7 billion each year. Though the Carter administration made much of its rejection of 614 weapons requests totaling one billion dollars, arms sales actually increased during his presidency because of loopholes in the provisions that limited arms sales. Thus, besides allowing for “more orderly processes,” Carter’s arms sales policy, Carter’s biographer has written, “was oversold.”¹⁷

The Carter administration came under intense fire from IPS for its arms deals. Despite finding much in the rhetoric of Carter that would suggest a new direction in arms sales, Klare and Holland, writing while Carter was still in office, found much lacking in the president’s arms sale program. First of all, limits on foreign arms sales did not pertain to America’s allies in NATO or Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which from 1976 to 1978 had purchased 25 percent of all American arms on the market. Klare and Holland also noted that the president could override the limits at his discretion, which Carter did when he sold radar planes to Iran. Overall, Klare and Holland concluded that “when all is said and done, Carter’s new guidelines will not make a significant dent in the outflow of U.S. arms, equipment, and services.” What, then, would have to occur in order to close the loopholes and limit the president’s ability to override restrictions on arms sales? One recommendation offered by Klare and Holland involved setting a ceiling of \$8 billion per

¹⁷ “Militarism and Disarmament Project Research Proposal (For Stern Foundation): Arms Sales and Regional Conflict—The Military Implications of U.S. Weapons Transfers to the Less-Developed Nations,” undated [1977], IPSR, WHS, box 13, folder 35; Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 63-64.

year on military exports, with a lowering of the ceiling every year by 10 percent. No sales, furthermore, would be allowed to nations currently experiencing internal turmoil.¹⁸

Aside from threatening peaceful relations, arms sales strengthened the grip that dictators had over their citizens. The abuses committed by dictators could not have occurred on such a scale, IPS intellectuals argued, without American weapons and training.¹⁹ Writing in the early 1980s, Klare and Cynthia Aronson criticized the U.S. government for “stand[ing] at the supply end of a pipeline of repressive technology that extends to many of the world’s most authoritarian regimes.” Though President Carter trumpeted human rights, the authors provided evidence showing that the ten most repressive countries received one-third of all military aid, or \$2.3 billion, and these nations bought an additional \$13.7 billion worth of American arms during Carter’s term. The majority of American aid, furthermore, went directly to the local police forces in these countries in the form of armored cars, tear gas, riot clubs, and instruments for “internal political warfare” against dissidents.²⁰

Yet the practice of supporting dictatorial regimes through arms sales and police training existed well before Carter entered the White House. Unable to defeat the insurgency during the Vietnam War, American officials turned to local forces for assistance. Before turning over most of its responsibilities to the International Narcotics

¹⁸ Klare and Holland, *Conventional Arms Restraint: An Unfulfilled Promise*, 5-7.

¹⁹ The most thorough examination of America’s role in training foreign police forces, going all the way back to what he terms “colonial policing” during the early twentieth century in the Philippines, is Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). See also Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor P. Rodriguez, “State Terror in the U.S.-Latin American Interstate Regime,” in *When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror*, ed. Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor P. Rodriguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 3-27. For an opposing viewpoint, see Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War*, 126-128.

²⁰ Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Aronson, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1981), 4-7, 17-19.

Control program, the Office of Public Safety (OPS), formed in 1962, acted as a form of “preventive medicine,” in the words of Klare and Aronson. Toward the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. officials turned to local police forces to extinguish insurgent rebellions because police on the scene understood events better than foreign troops and native counterinsurgents could target the enemy more precisely, thus posing less of a threat to innocent civilians. In addition to the Phoenix program in Vietnam, the OPS funded the Border Patrol Police in Thailand. OPS money also went toward creating one hundred village police stations, a 75-plane Police Aviation Division, and equipped police units.²¹ As American interventions became more unpopular, U.S. officials turned to different methods to achieve their aims, which only exacerbated many of the problems that concerned IPS intellectuals.

Increasing interference by the Soviet Union in both the Middle East and Africa, as well as a concomitant rise in the sale of arms to nations in these regions, led IPS intellectuals to downplay, even more than they had in the past, the importance of Europe to the Cold War. “If World War III has its Sarajevo, it will be in Beirut, Managua, Namibia or Kampuchea, not in Europe itself,” argued Peter Weiss, Saul Landau, and Adam Hochschild in a 1984 memorandum. The Third World, not Europe, represented the battleground of the superpowers. The authors referred to a “serious state of disrepair in U.S.-Soviet relations generally,” exacerbated by the stalled nuclear talks, which made Third World interventions more appealing. The Soviet Union had also become more assertive, sending troops to areas traditionally considered safely in the America’s orbit. Yet the authors also blamed the tensions in the Third World on American presidents who

²¹ Klare and Aronson, *Supplying Repression*, 26.

could not “regard popular revolutions in the Third World as anything other than conspiratorial Soviet plots.” Thus an “American mindset” prevailed in which revolutions were seen as a sign of American weakness, which “fed a resurgent militarism in the U.S.”²²

Pocketbooks, Morality, and Human Rights: IPS’s Expansive View of Human Rights

IPS intellectuals sought a return to the human rights principles set forth most forcefully in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. IPS intellectuals advocated for a broader definition of human rights to include not only civil and political rights, but also social, economic, and cultural rights. Article 25 of the Declaration professed, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,” along with other protections having to do with employment status, age, and disease.²³ Covert activities conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, threatened the expansive view of human rights held by IPS intellectuals. So too did the rise of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973. In targeting Chile, IPS hoped to expose the complicity of American officials and corporations in propping up a ruthless dictator. Therefore, IPS intellectuals repeatedly pointed to the support given to Pinochet by the American government and private banks, which provided political backing for the dictator and, in the case of the latter, bankrolled his presidency. Thus, curtailing human rights abuses around the world began at home for

²² Peter Weiss, Saul Landau, and Adam Hochschild, “U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations in the Third World,” July 20, 1984, IPSR, WHS, box 42, folder 2, 1, 2.

²³ “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

IPS. Until America's elected and unelected leaders promoted a more ethical approach to international relations, human rights abuses would never abate.

As historians have shown, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the most neglected documents in history. When the U.N. General Assembly—after the Human Rights Commission failed to produce a Covenant—decided in the fall of 1951 to make one Covenant for political and civil rights and another Covenant for economic, social, and cultural rights, the latter seemed to lose its potency. According to Mary Ann Glendon, the decision to separate the two covenants “suggested a retreat from the proposition that a better standard of living cannot be accomplished without larger freedom, and that freedom is threatened by dehumanizing living conditions.” Elizabeth Borgwardt has referred to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “a kind of Atlantic Charter of the human rights movement,” and thus “toothless in the way the Declaration of Independence is toothless” since it had no legal basis. Still, Borgwardt has pointed to the staying power of the declaration, bestowing it with “a moral, cultural, and even political grip that resisted attempts by great powers...to wiggle free.”²⁴ Furthermore, historians have cautioned against seeing the term itself, meaning human rights, as a static term. For instance, Samuel Moyn has described human rights in the 1940s as “not a promise waiting to be realized but a utopia first too vague then too conservative to matter.” Only after “profound redefinition in a new ideological climate” could it come to mean what it does now.²⁵

²⁴ Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001), 201-202; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), 264-265.

²⁵ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010), 47-48.

A human rights “revolution” occurred in the 1970s as transnational activists forced the world’s leaders to take heed of the abuses committed by members of their ruling club against their own people. Some historians have linked the appearance of human rights to a desire among Americans for redemption in the 1970s. Barbara Keys, explaining President Carter’s efforts to bring greater attention to the human rights issue, has argued that “human rights functioned to absolve sin.” Kathryn Sikkink, similarly, has ascribed the rising interest in human rights to a hankering among Americans to reclaim the country’s virtue after Vietnam, but she also credits the civil rights movement, which dismantled states’ rights arguments, with making it easier for activists to make demands on non-governmental organizations and other countries to intervene in the affairs of sovereign nations.²⁶ Another historian has suggested that the rise of human rights occurred collectively as a result of increased interaction between nation states due to globalization. In seeking to explain why human rights emerged as an issue in the 1970s, Daniel Sargent, for instance, argues that “human rights served as an ethical or ideational counterpoint” to the “structural reconstitution of international society” brought about by globalization. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in particular, helped shatter

²⁶ Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 241; Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 162-163. This is not to say, of course, that human rights showed up on the political scene out of nowhere during the Carter presidency. Sarah Snyder has pointed to the late 1960s as an important period in the history of human rights. See Sarah B. Snyder, “The Rise of Human Rights During the Johnson Years,” in *Beyond the Cold War and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s*, eds. Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 238-240.

territorial borders by bringing attention to the internal workings of nations and, in the process, stripping away nations' sovereignty.²⁷

IPS's Response to the Immorality of American Foreign Policy

In one of the earliest studies completed at IPS on the Third World, Richard Barnet, in his 1968 book *Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World*, put to rest any lingering belief that Wilsonian idealism still played a role in foreign relations. Investigating interventions by the United States in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Barnet lamented that "the euphemistic rhetoric of American Responsibility has yielded to the starker idiom of *realpolitik*." As a result, in Barnet's view, American intervention had less to do with "bringing the town meeting, the ballot box, and the supermarket to their backward inhabitants than in making sure that they do not confiscate, collectivize, or chant communist slogans." Moreover, to the dismay of IPS intellectuals, American officials used whatever means necessary to stop the citizens of impoverished countries from creating more equitable societies. Lacking morals and ethics, American foreign policy, under the iron fist of *realpolitik*, ruthlessly pursued the nation's national interest at a tremendous cost to the world's people, IPS intellectuals claimed. Referring to the recent disclosures of intelligence activities, which included "a Pandora's box of murders by the CIA, CIA-supported coups, heroine involvements, massive secret budgets, gangster connections," to name a few, Eqbal Ahmad claimed that such acts represented "the quintessence of a Kissinger policy." In order to block the CIA from committing similar acts in the future, IPS intellectuals called

²⁷ Daniel Sargent, "Oasis in the Desert? America's Human Rights Discovery," in *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*, eds. Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 131-132.

for the restoration of ethics and morality in foreign affairs. During a speech in 1981 before the Chile Solidarity Committee, Isabel Letelier spoke about the need for a “global ethics.” Noting the recent refusal by the Reagan administration to join 157 other nations in opposing baby formula—activists expressed concern over the use of the product in Third World countries where no clean water existed to mix with the powder—Letelier argued that “the philosophy which should guide people’s actions should be based on spiritual values, not their wallets.”²⁸

In the mid-1980s, Barnet accused the United States of “resorting to ever more sophisticated techniques to defuse the moral qualms of citizens about what it does in their name.” Carrying out its activities under cloak and dagger, the United States could more easily “diverge ever more sharply from the best moral traditions of the nation: encouragement of democracy, tolerance of ideological diversity, dedication to international law and promotion of Third World development.” Thus, despite “official rhetoric” promoting “moral traditions,” the “operative policy is that enunciated by the Athenian generals who subdued the island of Melos: the strong exact what they wish and the weak yield what they must.” Barnet referred in 1985 to an “inverted morality” that allowed the U.S. government to commit atrocities abroad that in America would be considered a crime and deserving of punishment. Deterrence, for instance, required the acceptance of substantial American casualties so that America’s nuclear threat remained

²⁸ Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 257; Eqbal Ahmad, “The Kissinger Connection: U.S. Policy Crises in the 1970s,” 1975, 1, IPSR, WHS, box 5, folder 20; Isabel Letelier, “Untitled Speech Given at Hartford, Connecticut, November 12, 1981,” IPSR, WHS, box 52, folder 37, 1-2. Neoconservatives and conservatives also called for bringing a moral perspective to foreign policy and often opposed realist interpretations of international affairs. However, as J. David Hoeverler has noted, conservatives like Jeane Kirkpatrick tried “to incorporate human rights into American foreign policy without succumbing to moral ‘purism’ or rationalism.” J. David Hoeverler, Jr., *Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 171.

viable. Instead of “employ[ing] the language of strategy to obscure this moral madness,” Barnet suggested “using the language of crime, for if it is not a crime to destroy the world, even to attempt to destroy it, even to consider destroying it, then the word has no meaning.”²⁹

Why did Americans so easily put aside moral qualms about their nation’s actions around the world? Barnet claimed that official lies and “deadly abstractions” by U.S. officials helped “in making us comfortable with turning upside down the moral code” that most humans possessed. Other intellectuals at IPS expressed similar concerns in regard to ethics and the lack of accountability for American officials. Demanding punishment for officials who developed immoral policies, Earl Ravenal and his co-authors bemoaned “the two-tier ethic of statecraft, the Niebuhrian double standard, associated with the ‘realists’” Ravenal and the others asked, furthermore, that statesmen meet the same moral ethics as all other humans, using the criterion established during the Nuremberg Trials, which would ensure “morally binding codes of statecraft.”³⁰ Morality, whether in times of war or peace, in other words, did not take on a new definition.

A Poster Child for Dictatorships: IPS Wages War Against Pinochet

In 1970, Salvador Allende, a socialist and Marxist from the Unidad Popular party, won election in Chile to become that nation’s president. His ascension to power garnered the attention of the world as watchful eyes looked to see how the socialist leader would

²⁹ Richard J. Barnet, “Losing Moral Ground: The Foundation of U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Sojourners* (March 1985), 1.

³⁰ Barnet, “Losing Moral Ground,” 3-4; Earl C. Ravenal with Richard J. Barnet, Robert Borosage, Michael Klare, and Marcus Raskin, *Toward World Security: A Program for Disarmament* (Institute for Policy Studies Issue Paper, 1980), 24-25.

handle both domestic and international affairs. During Allende's presidency, however, internal and external forces prevented him from carrying out his political program. The end for Allende came on September 11, 1973 when the Chilean military staged a coup and killed Allende. Allies of Allende blamed counterrevolutionaries within Chile, but also pointed to interference from outside forces, including corporations based in the United States and the Nixon administration.³¹ Following the ouster of Allende, Augusto Pinochet took over as president of Chile and dramatically changed course as he granted himself dictatorial powers and brought in foreign economic advisors to transform the Chilean economy into a citadel for free-market ideals.

Both during and after the coup there existed a worldwide solidarity movement of supporters of Allende's brand of socialism.³² In the aftermath of the coup, one of the leaders of this solidary movement was Orlando Letelier. Under Allende, Letelier served first as ambassador to the United States and then, in 1973, as minister of foreign affairs, interior, and finally defense, the last of which he held up to the day of the coup and led to his being imprisoned for the next year. Settling in Caracas, Venezuela immediately after

³¹ For information on the role that the United States and counterrevolutionaries played in the downfall of Allende, see Lubna Z. Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); Jonathan Haslem, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide* (New York: Verso, 2005); and Peter Winn, "The Furies of the Andes: Violence and Terror in the Chilean Revolution and Counterrevolution," in *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America's Long Cold War*, eds. Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010): 239-275. More recently, Tanya Harmer has argued for a widening in scope of the investigation into Allende's downfall. She points to the increasingly close relationship between Chile and Cuba under Allende, which not only caused consternation among some Chilean leftists, but also caught the attention of the United States. Her study, furthermore, shows how Brazil, Poland, the Soviet Union, and even the Vatican weighed in on Allende's actions. See Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

³² See Margaret Power, "The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s," *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (November 2009): 46-66.

his release in mid-1974, Letelier and his family left for Washington D.C. in late 1974 after IPS offered him a position as associate fellow.³³

More than anyone else at IPS, Letelier sought to explain how particular economic systems tended to create an environment conducive to human rights abuses. The example of Chile is notable, according to Juan Gabriel Valdés, because “the state literally dismantled itself” in order to implement neoliberal economic programs. Whereas many Latin American countries agreed to put in place neoliberal economic policies at the behest of the International Monetary Fund, Chilean politicians voluntarily and enthusiastically worked with economists to implement neoliberal programs. The task of transforming Chile’s economy went to the University of Chicago economists known collectively as the “Chicago Boys.” Trained between 1957 and 1970 at Chile’s Catholic University and at the University of Chicago, the “Chicago Boys” had few followers in Chile until Pinochet came to power in 1973. As Allende’s election in 1970 brought forth more radical leftist policies, businessmen and entrepreneurs who ordinarily held views closer to the center of the ideological spectrum increasingly accepted the right’s pleas for more “radical” measures, particularly as Chile’s economic, social, and political problems intensified, according to Valdés. Unintentionally, therefore, Allende’s policies brought neoliberal economic ideas beyond the ivory tower. The unintended growth of neoliberal thought in Chile occurred because “the issue was no longer the ‘economic policies’ themselves but rather *the economic principles* underlying society’s organization,” Valdés

³³ For Letelier’s experiences following the coup, see Ted Szulc, “A Very Quiet Horror,” *Playboy* (February 1977), IPSR, WHS, box 54, folder 2; Orlando Letelier to Richard Barnet, October 16, 1974, IPSR, WHS, box 13, folder 12; John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 82-87.

has argued. The “shock treatment,” as the “Chicago Boys” labeled their policies, led to devastating cuts to social services. Aid for health services fell by 17.6 percent from 1970 to 1980, and aid for education declined 11.3 percent during the same period. By 1980, the average salary of a Chilean worker decreased by 16.7 percent compared to 1970.

Economic stratification continued to grow as Pinochet’s government sold 197 companies between 1974 and 1978.³⁴

Just prior to being assassinated, Letelier wrote an article in *The Nation* about the worsening conditions in Chile. Letelier pointed to a recent loan made to Chile by the World Bank that illustrated, he claimed, the inadequate attention economists paid to human rights. Letelier complained that “the violation of human rights, the system of institutionalized brutality, the drastic control and suppression of every form of meaningful dissent is discussed (and often condemned) as a phenomenon only indirectly linked, or indeed entirely unrelated, to the classical unrestrained ‘free market’ policies that have been enforced by the military junta.” In addition to expressing skepticism about the actual amount of choice in the free-market economy in Chile, Letelier ridiculed the “Chicago Boys” for not taking into account the unique characteristics of Chile’s economy.³⁵

Letelier did not strive to show the inadequacies of Milton Friedman’s free-market system, but rather why it would be ineffective in Chile. Previously senior economist and director of the loan division of the Inter-American Development Bank, Letelier found

³⁴ Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 236-238, 243-247, 26. See also, Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Picador, 2008), 59-88.

³⁵ Orlando Letelier, “The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile: Economic ‘Freedom’s’ Awful Toll,” *The Nation*, August 28, 1976: 137-142. Quotes come from the version published by TNI. See Orlando Letelier, *Chile: Economic “Freedom” and Political Repression* (Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1976), 5, 7-9, 15-16.

free-market economics “especially objectionable . . . because they propose a total free market policy in a framework of extreme inequality among the economic agents involved. . . .” The extreme forms of monopolism that existed in Chile meant that free-market hallmarks like competitive bidding and competition from foreign corporations did little for the poor and small business owners. Competitive bids, according to Letelier, almost always went to the monopolists and foreign competition rarely came into play since many of the local monopolies were subsidiaries of larger transnational corporations. The Chilean people understood first-hand the unfairness of their economic system, which led, Letelier argued, to human rights abuses. In Letelier’s view, the strong political showing by Allende’s Popular Unity government in the 1973 congressional elections “convinced the national bourgeoisie and its foreign supporters that they would be unable to recoup their privileges through the democratic process.” When, in the aftermath of the coup, the new leaders could not “destroy the consciousness of the Chilean people,” repression ensued.³⁶

Letelier’s *Nation* article represented only the latest effort by the exiled Chilean to spread far and wide news concerning the horrors inflicted on the people of Chile under Pinochet. Landau described Letelier as “a major leader and unifier of the forces seeking the restoration of democracy in Chile.” Letelier, according to Landau, “assumed the responsibilities of political leadership in exile,” which involved speaking at venues around the world, writing for various outlets, and meeting with governments. In 1976, Letelier convinced Holland to renege on a \$6.3 million credit to Chile and, that same year, briefed the U.S. congressional delegation before its scheduled visit to Cuba to

³⁶ Letelier, *Chile: Economic “Freedom” and Political Repression*, 5, 7-9, 15-16.

investigate human rights abuses.³⁷ Then came the explosion near Sheridan Circle on September 21, 1976 that killed Letelier and Ronnie Karpén Moffitt. Though IPS intellectuals had taken notice of the dictatorship in Chile prior to Letelier's death, Pinochet became the prime target of IPS following the assassination.

Nearly two years after the assassination, on August 1, 1978, the U.S. Grand Jury indicted several individuals tied to Chile's secret police force, DINA, and exiled Cubans. DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley, an American citizen who moved to Chile and joined the agency, agreed to a plea that made him eligible for parole in as little as 40 months. His wife, a Chilean national working with DINA, also testified and escaped prosecution. The following month, on September 18, 1978, the FBI named bomb makers Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel and Virgilio Paz Romero as suspects in the case, offering a \$25,000 reward for their capture. Authorities captured Alvin Ross Diaz and Guillermo Novo and charged them with conspiracy to murder. Ignacio Novo paid a \$25,000 bond after being charged with perjury. Also in September, George Landau, United States Ambassador to Chile, asked Chile to extradite General Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the former head of DINA; Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo, Sepulveda's chief of operations; and DINA Captain Armando Fernandez Larios. In their account of the assassination and the subsequent manhunt for the perpetrators of the crime, John Dinges and Landau attributed the drawn out investigation to the stalling tactics of the U.S. government. Landau and Dinges found a glaring problem in the FBI's handling of information related to Townley's unsuccessful attempt to obtain false passports in Paraguay, which the United States found out about and derailed. "No bureaucratic explanation can account for

³⁷ Saul Landau, *They Educated the Crows: An Institute Report on the Letelier-Moffitt Murders* (Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1978), 13-15.

the detours and obstacles the investigators encountered in solving the case. It was not DINA's cover-ups nor the secretiveness of the Cuban Nationalist Movement that kept the investigation off the right track for almost a year. It was the actions consciously taken or willfully omitted by officials and agencies of the United States government," Dinges and Landau wrote. The government's handling of the case made IPS distrust the government even more.³⁸

Though Chileans and Cubans carried out the bombing that led to Letelier's death, the United States did not escape the notice and ire of IPS intellectuals. Immediately after the assassination, IPS alleged CIA involvement in the killing and lambasted the Carter administration for inadequately responding to Chile's blatant terrorist act in the capitol of the United States. IPS assumed from the start that Chile's secret police had played a part in the assassination, labeling DINA the "prime suspect" and demanding that the chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities investigate the group's "relationship" with the CIA. Since Letelier, as well as other ex-Chilean officials murdered in Buenos Aires and Rome, "were the most prominent and visible symbols of hope for a decent alternative to the military dictatorship" that existed in Chile, Barnett, too, had no doubt that DINA and Pinochet were involved in Letelier's death. Taking into account the nature of the attack, Raskin and Barnett argued, "It is unlikely that such a bomb could have been developed without techniques available only to professional demolition experts." Barnett and Raskin called on the chairman of the intelligence committee, Daniel Inouye, to look

³⁸ Landau, *They Educated the Crows*, 1-2; Dinges and Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row*, 389-390. On September 15, 1980, the United States Court of Appeals, while not questioning the outcome of the trial, overturned the 1979 convictions of the three Cubans accused of murdering Letelier and Moffitt. For this and future legal battles, see "Chronology of Events: Letelier-Moffitt Assassination, Investigation, and Trials," April 22, 1983, updated August 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 38, folder 25, 7-10; "Letelier's Kin to Receive Compensation," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 1992, A10.

into the close relationship between the CIA and pro-Pinochet forces before and during Allende's rule in Chile and to "investigate the CIA's 'penetrations' of DINA," which the co-directors claimed existed.³⁹

Though the indictment of Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, head of Chile's secret police, satisfied IPS, many intellectuals at the think tank believed that the investigation into Letelier's and Moffitt's deaths did not go far enough. Referring to a passage in the indictment that started, "With others unknown to the Grand Jury," Robert Borosage argued that complete justice required the arrest of Pinochet, who, Borosage alleged, "took personal command of DINA, and used it virtually as his own personal police force." In Borosage's view, "It is inconceivable that the order to assassinate Orlando Letelier on the streets of Washington, D.C. came from anyone but Pinochet himself." Along with Pinochet, Borosage wanted to open an investigations into the role of the U.S. government, the CIA, multinational corporations, and private banks in Letelier's murder. While Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger helped Pinochet rise to power, the CIA "recruited and supplied Cuban refugees for a campaign of terror, disruption and murder aimed against Fidel Castro" and then set these mercenaries loose when no longer needed, Borosage reported. "In American law," Borosage explained, "one who sets a 'dangerous instrumentality' in motion is culpable for the damage it wreaks, even if no longer in control over it." Despite the pleas of IPS intellectuals, Congress and the government did not investigate the relationship between the CIA and DINA.⁴⁰ On September 21, 1976, Edward Kennedy, James Abourezk, and Hubert Humphrey co-sponsored Senate

³⁹ Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin to Daniel Inouye, September 23, 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 38, folder 42.

⁴⁰ Robert Borosage, "Dear Friend" Letter, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 24, folder 11.

Resolution 561, which stated that the U.S. Senate “condemns the brutal and senseless murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt and the serious injury of Michael Moffitt, and urges a complete and thorough investigation by Federal authorities of the circumstances surrounding the bombing.”⁴¹ Yet no investigations took place regarding CIA involvement in the assassination.

Perhaps it is surprising that IPS intellectuals excoriated Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, of which he devoted so much attention to the issue of human rights, both rhetorically and in policymaking decisions. President Carter referred to human rights in his inaugural address and he touched on the issue when he spoke for the first time before the U.N. At the commencement address he gave in 1977 at Notre Dame, Carter also put human rights at the top of his foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, Carter strengthened the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department by staffing it with well-regarded officials. And, during meetings with foreign ambassadors and world leaders with poor human rights records, President Carter voiced his concern over the conditions in these countries.⁴²

Historians have reached mixed conclusions regarding President Carter’s human rights policy. On one end, David Schmitz has shown that human rights served as a guiding force for Carter, even if the president did not always act in accordance with his human rights principles. Pointing to Carter’s refusal to intervene on behalf of the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, Schmitz has argued that “Carter did compromise at times,

⁴¹ “Senate Resolution 561,” 94th Congress, 2nd Session, September 21, 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 38, folder 28. Toby Moffett and 24 other members of Congress put forth the same resolution in the House. See “House Resolution 1559,” 94th Congress, 2nd Session, September 21, 1976, *Ibid*.

⁴² Robert A. Strong, *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 75.

but the president never abandoned his policy and goals even as he turned to more traditional Cold War policies in terms of relations with the Soviet Union.” Still, even early in 1978, when, according to Schmitz, “the Carter Administration had successfully developed and institutionalized its policy of human rights and made it a central factor in American foreign policy decisions,” administration officials still worried about the “moderation” of Carter’s efforts, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher labeled it. In both loans from international organizations and bilateral aid, the Carter Administration rarely voted against the former or rejected the latter.⁴³ More critical of President Carter’s human rights record, Gaddis Smith points to the Philippines as a prime example of a place where human rights fell to the wayside. Despite being “an ideal target for the application of a policy based on commitment to human rights,” in the words of Smith, the United States never pursued the issue in the Philippines. Carter gave Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos “a polite tap on the wrist,” but nothing more because America needed the country’s military bases to remain open.⁴⁴

For IPS intellectuals, Carter’s indifference to the Letelier assassination only confirmed their observation of the president as lukewarm on human rights. After reviewing his colleagues’ *Assassination on Embassy Row*, Barnet could not help but wonder why Carter did not take a tougher stance against Pinochet. Barnet ascribed Carter’s reluctance to force Pinochet to extradite Contreras to an instance whereby “geopolitics has triumphed over justice.” “Despite the thousands of murders to his

⁴³ David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145, 164-165.

⁴⁴ Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 100-102.

credit,” Barnet continued, “Pinochet has brought a good investment climate to Chile and he is clearly preferred in the Carter White House to the uncertainties that would follow his collapse. Such is standard *realpolitik*.” Thus, despite rhetorical flourishes alluding to a new type of foreign policy that took into account a nation’s human rights record, IPS intellectuals viewed Carter as no different from earlier presidents.⁴⁵

In addition to Carter’s inability to shed his realist garb, IPS intellectuals criticized the president for sharing with his predecessors a fear of revolution. Several years after Carter lost the 1980 presidential election to Republican Ronald Reagan, IPS still targeted the former president for his weak human rights policy. A 1984 report written in part by IPS intellectuals described President Carter as being “locked in ambiguity” as he attempted to balance his desire for a greater respect for human rights with the need to prevent revolutions.⁴⁶ IPS intellectuals claimed that America’s apprehension toward revolutions greatly impeded efforts to solve the world’s real problems. With the Vietnam War over and a continuing *détente* between the superpowers, Carter’s early years in the White House represented a period of relative calm. IPS intellectuals, however, criticized the president for failing to take advantage of the situation. Though calling Carter’s human rights policies a “bold step” and praising the outgoing president for creating conditions allowing for the “the only opening provided to the Cold War since the 1940s,” Isabel

⁴⁵ Richard J. Barnet, Review of *Assassination on Embassy Row*, *The New Republic*, June 21, 1980, 30. Vanessa Walker, who has studied Carter’s response to the Letelier assassination, suggests that “no single human rights issue loomed larger than Letelier’s assassination,” but Carter had to walk a fine line so that his efforts to bring justice to Letelier’s assassins did not result in an intervention in the region. At the same, merely ending America’s relationship with the guilty state would not have brought reform to the nation in question. Vanessa Walker, “At the End of Influence: The Letelier Assassination, Human Rights, and Rethinking Intervention in U.S.-Latin American Relations,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011), 110-111, 116.

⁴⁶ Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America, *Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean* (Washington D.C.; IPS, 1984), 23.

Letelier, an IPS fellow and the wife of the slain former diplomat, argued that Carter did not go far enough. Letelier described Carter's policies as "a yellow light of caution to many Latin American dictators," but nothing more. She blamed Carter's misguided actions in Central America on "very little understanding of Latin American reality, and why it is *that* reality which creates liberation movements and not the Soviet Union." When Letelier spoke about reality, she meant the violence exacted upon the people living in Latin American. "To close one's eyes to this reality is to become a part of a system of denial of basic human rights and to become an ally of those who practice violence against the majority," Letelier explained.⁴⁷

Therefore, even though Carter took action against Pinochet's government, IPS intellectuals considered the response weak, particularly given that Pinochet orchestrated an attack on American soil. Simply put, Carter did not move fast enough for IPS intellectuals. Moffitt and Letelier voiced their displeasure with Carter's inaction and questioned the president's entire human rights policy. In a letter to members of Congress written in mid-1977, Moffitt and Letelier claimed that to give loans to known dictators "would bury in hypocrisy any future for human rights in Latin America." IPS intellectuals continued to press the administration to take action against Pinochet. In a letter to Hodding Carter, who served as Carter's Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, Peter Kornbluh offered his assessment of the Carter administration's sanctions on Chile. "To a citizen like myself it is apparent that 'those responsible' for the decision of how to sanction the Chileans for the Letelier assassination are *not* intent on sanctioning them at all," Kornbluh stated. Asking for a clarification about Carter's response, Kornbluh

⁴⁷ Isabel Letelier, "Politics and Ethics of Liberation: An Agenda for the Eighties," speech given at The Society of Christian Ethics in Iowa, January 18, 1981, IPSR, WHS, box 52, folder 38, 3-5, 7.

concluded, "From where I sit it seems clear that the U.S. government is showing its cowardice in the face of a handful of cutthroat generals and a handful of foreign investors."⁴⁸

In spite of IPS's repeated entreaties for action against Pinochet, the Carter administration would go only so far. Summarizing an "unfortunate confrontation" he had with Robert Pastor, a member of Carter's National Security Council, Kornbluh, expecting as much, found that the Carter administration believed that it had responded to the Letelier murder. While Kornbluh argued that Carter's decision to cut off military aid to Chile represented a "token response," Pastor believed just the opposite. According to Kornbluh, Pastor highlighted the fact that Carter not only stopped sending military aid to Chile, but also paid private corporations so that they too would stop selling military supplies to Pinochet, which showed "that Carter had really done a great deal in response to the assassination." Pastor claimed that "diplomatic limitations" prevented Carter from blaming Pinochet's government for the crime and, furthermore, "no hard evidence" existed to prove Pinochet's role in the assassination. At this point in the conversation, "I was told pretty bluntly that the U.S. had done all it was going to do in this case," Kornbluh reported. Admitting that the "conversation had turned quite sour," Kornbluh "suggested to Mr. Pastor that the Carter administration had let Pinochet, a petty military dictator, pull the wool over its eyes," at which point Pastor accused Kornbluh of using Reagan's argument against Carter. From his brief meeting with Pastor, Kornbluh concluded, "The Carter Administration doesn't feel the assassination was of sufficient importance to warrant [sic] any further steps than the ones they have taken." With respect

⁴⁸ "Dear Member of Congress Letter," June 29, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 48, folder 3; Peter Kornbluh to Hodding Carter III, October 24, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 46, folder 49.

to the Letelier investigation, Kornbluh added, “The case is dead as far as they are concerned.” “They think they did a strong job of demonstrating their dissatisfaction to the junta,” he recounted.⁴⁹

The amount of influence that IPS had on President Carter’s foreign policy is not exactly clear, although the Institute’s constant criticism of his approach makes it likely that the president did not, in spite of what critics like Jeane Kirkpatrick thought, listen closely to the complaints of IPS intellectuals. A 1987 talking paper boasted that IPS “played a significant role in defining the Carter Administration’s human rights initiatives,” but this contradicts a statement made later by one of the co-founders of IPS. Raskin admitted to journalist Sidney Blumenthal that IPS, to its own detriment, “paid very little attention to the Carter administration” for myriad reasons. Raskin explained IPS thought Carter offered no hope, but also confessed, “We [IPS] were moral snobs.” Writing one year after Carter’s election victory, Landau agreed with Raskin’s later recollection. Although the election of Carter offered IPS the opportunity to formulate policy, the Institute failed to take advantage of the new environment. Landau blamed this on the fact that IPS was so “blinded by the glitter of opportunity in the future” that its fellows could not “collectively pull ourselves out of the past muck.”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Peter [Kornbluh] to Robert Borosage, Saul Landau, John Cavanagh, Isabel Letelier, and Michael Moffitt, “Off-the-Record Conversation with Robert Pastor,” undated, IPSR, WHS, box 24, folder 11. Responding to suggestions that the United States should recall Ambassador George W. Landau indefinitely, limit or prohibit private bank loans, or sever ties completely with Chile, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained that such measures “would not serve our interests in Chile or elsewhere.” On November 30, 1979, Carter removed some United States personnel from Chile and ended all weapons sales to Pinochet’s government. The Carter administration also set limits on “financial operations,” investments, and insurance in Chile. See Walker, “At the End of Influence,” 131-132.

⁵⁰ “Talking Paper: Transition Agenda for IPS,” no author, attached to Bob Borosage to Program Council Members, March 1987, IPSR, WHS, box 86, folder 6; Sidney Blumenthal, *Our Long National Daydream: A Political Pageant of the Reagan Era* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 289; Saul Landau to Stanley Weiss, November 3, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 36, folder 16.

Much clearer was IPS's ability to influence Congress. Representative Tom Harkin (IA-D) and 37 other members of Congress "hand-delivered" a letter to President Carter on August 1, 1979 regarding the continued intransigence of the Pinochet government. Like IPS, Harkin and his co-signers linked the Letelier-Moffitt murders to the larger issue of human rights. He implored the president to take "the strongest measures necessary" to force Contreras and other participants in the assassination to stand trial in America. Otherwise he predicted that "our government's passivity can only be perceived as a signal that the United States will compromise on our residents' and citizens' most basic human right—the right to live." Harkin would repeatedly press Carter to take a stronger stand against Pinochet for Chile's role in the assassination of Letelier.⁵¹

Harkin, along with fellow congressmen Toby Moffett and George Miller, wrote to President Carter to inform him of a resolution they put forth in Congress calling for sanctions in response to Chile's unwillingness to extradite the persons [Manuel Contreras, Armando Fernandez, and Pedro Espinoza] charged with planning or carrying out the Letelier-Moffitt murders. The letter to Carter forcefully argued that "the Pinochet regime has literally gotten away with murder. We deplore the Court's decision, and call for firm censure of those who would export their terrorism and violence to this country or any other." The resolution, co-sponsored by sixty members of Congress, noted that "the President on several occasions has committed the United States to the strongest possible measures against governments which have condoned acts of international terrorism or which harbor individuals who have committed acts of international terrorism," and the Letelier-Moffitt murders represented a form of terrorism. Chile, furthermore, had been

⁵¹ News From Congressman Tom Harkin," August 1, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 38, folder 28.

“harboring and protecting individuals wanted in the United States to stand trial for acts of international terrorism” by not extraditing the three accused men. Supporters of the resolution wanted the United States to remove the American ambassador from Chile; end all bilateral and multilateral aid to Chile; stop sending military aid, both equipment and advisors, to Chile; prohibit Export-Import Banks and private banks from offering loans to Chile; and demand that Pinochet restore civil rights in Chile.⁵²

As free-market ideology spread to more countries, a concomitant decline in the personal and economic welfare of citizens living in these countries also occurred. Therefore, IPS intellectuals called for a return to the principles found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Landau, for instance, wanted to replace national security ideology as America’s guiding philosophy with a new approach based on human rights. “Human rights, in the terms laid out in the U.N. covenants, constitute a solid basis for a political alternative to national security doctrine,” Landau wrote. Landau, naturally, encouraged American officials to not only allow human rights to form the basis of American foreign policy, but also use the broadest possible definition of human rights. Far too often, he claimed, Westerners limited human rights to political and civil freedoms and ignored issues related to economic security. For instance, the U.S. government and certain human rights organizations ignored the “endemic poverty” found in places throughout Central America, Landau complained. Such an “oversight,” Landau claimed, essentially “covers up the responsibility of U.S. policy for causing these disastrous conditions through U.S. support for military dictators and local oligarchies.” Landau realized, however, that a more expansive view of human rights required a new mindset in

⁵² Tom Harkin, Toby Moffet, and George Miller to Jimmy Carter, October 16, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 38, folder 28.

America. “To become a moral guideline for policy, human rights, not welfare, must be internalized in the public mind” so that Americans would be more forthcoming, he wrote.⁵³ Thus, according to Landau, a semantic shift away from “welfare” to “human rights” would not only lessen the stigma attached to providing food and shelter to the poor, but also heighten the importance of economic human rights.

In 1977, IPS announced the creation of the Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Award, which honored the lives of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Karpen Moffitt. The award would go to individuals or organizations fighting to advance the cause of human rights. During the news conference about the award, the chairman of IPS’s board of trustees, Peter Weiss, advanced a broader definition of human rights, which took into account the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. He referred to the need “to erase the dividing line between first and second class human rights. The electrode to the nipple is an affront to human dignity; so is the nipple that has no milk for the suckling infant. The use of psychiatric institutions to harbor political dissidents is a perversion of professional responsibility; so is the failure of hospitals to care for the sick. Arbitrary arrest and detention violate the integrity of the person; so does the impersonal system of triage which, under a regime of enforced scarcity, decides who is to live and who is to die.” Weiss went on to explain that Letelier died because “Pinochet could not afford . . . to have the outside world translate human rights policies into financial and economic action.”⁵⁴ As Weiss’s remarks make clear that IPS kept Letelier’s vision of human rights alive.

⁵³ Saul Landau, *The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 165-167.

⁵⁴ IPS News Release, September 19, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 48, folder 22.

Despite the efforts of IPS intellectuals to link the two, Pinochet succeeded in keeping the human rights issue separate from questions related to economics. Protesting the “economic private bank bailout” of Chile after foreign governments cut off aid to Pinochet’s government in protest of Chile’s human rights record, Isabel Letelier and Moffitt admitted that “an enormous influx of *private* bank loans since 1976 has enabled the junta to thumb its nose at the international human rights campaign.” Letelier and Moffitt calculated that loans from private firms totaled approximately one billion dollars by the end of 1978, with about \$927 million coming from American banks. Concerned only with “maximizing global profits and minimizing risks,” private banks “do not consider human rights criteria in their lending policies,” they wrote. That is how Letelier and Moffitt explained the massive loans to Chile made by private banks, which amounted to ninety percent of that nation’s foreign capital. In the mid to late 1970s, six multinational banks with headquarters in the United States supplied Chile with over \$800 million in loans.⁵⁵

IPS intellectuals, therefore, reached the conclusion that stopping human rights abuses required changes to the capitalist system and the rules regulating international loans. While giving a speech on the role of banks in keeping South African and Chilean dictators in power, Moffitt boiled the human rights issue down to capitalism. “It is impossible to understand the importance of international banks, the importance of Chile or South Africa without going to the root of the problem, the international expansion of the capitalist system,” he told the crowd. Moffitt could not understand how Carter, who championed human rights more forcefully than any previous president, did not block

⁵⁵ Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt, *Human Rights, Economic Aid and Private Banks: The Case for Chile* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 1, 10.

private loans to South Africa and Chile. “The large private banks have given the governments a green light to go on violating human rights. Freed from international pressure, they act with impunity attempting to solidify and enhance their rule,” Moffitt explained.⁵⁶ International banks and loans, as a result, took on added importance in the writings of IPS intellectuals as the globalization of both finance and industry took off in the 1970s.

In order to publicize their ideas, IPS organized boycotts against banks that offered loans to Chile. As part of its D.C. Bank Campaign in 1979, IPS closed its account at Riggs National Bank due to the bank’s loan practices. Such banks, Moffitt and Nena Terrell wrote, were “among those whose redlining policies are hastening the deterioration of our major cities while they loan and/or invest in morally bankrupt regimes whose economic policies warrant force to impose them on the majority of the population.” Prior to the large-scale divestment movement of the mid-1980s, IPS sought to “make it unprofitable” for banks to do business with nations committing human rights abuses. IPS director Borosage wrote to the chairman of the board at Riggs and compared the bank’s willingness to make loans to Chile and South Africa to lending money to the Nazis. While recognizing that banks had “a duty to seek profitable investments,” financial institutions, according to IPS, also had to abide by “moral limits” as well. Comparing loans made by Riggs to South Africa and Chile to banks that discriminated against individuals of a particular “race, color, or creed” or “invested in Nazi Germany and profited therefrom,” IPS informed the bank that it refused to do business with such a

⁵⁶ Michael Moffitt, “The Global Banking Empire: From Pretoria to Santiago,” Speech given at Columbia University Law School for the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, February 24, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 56, folder 4, 2, 12.

company. Borosage and Landau castigated the bank for providing loans to South Africa and Chile that “undermine the effect and the principle of our own Government’s policy.”⁵⁷

America, both through its liberal use of covert operations and support of human rights abuses, represented a major impediment to IPS’s efforts to expand the definition of human rights. Political and civil rights represented only a portion of the entire body of human rights developed in the 1940s at the U.N. Until the American government and private corporations understood the connection economics and human rights, such abuses would never abate. Unlike the majority of liberals concerned with human rights, IPS did not limit its understanding of human rights to torture and other civil and political rights. Whereas many liberals, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, looked to human rights as a way to restore America’s global image, IPS claimed that the U.S. government and corporations and banks played a key role in propping up dictators.

⁵⁷ “Dear Friends’ Letter,” June 18, 1979, IPSR, WHS, box 46, folder 49; Robert Borosage and Saul Landau to Vincent Buke, June 15, 1979, box 24, folder 11.

Chapter Seven: Arms Control Is Not Disarmament

When President Truman made the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, he changed war forever. Though no other nation resorted to nuclear warfare after the United States used the weapon to end World War II, the following decades witnessed an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union that led to the stockpiling of tens of thousands of the deadly weapons. The very existence of nuclear weapons, with each generation's more destructive and efficient than the last, had an indelible effect on American society.¹ Driven by a distrust of the Soviet Union and an ideological aversion to communism, American officials built larger and more accurate weapons. IPS intellectuals, though, claimed that fears of the Soviet Union were overblown and that U.S. officials let their suspicions of their rival superpower determine the course of America's nuclear policies. IPS intellectuals encouraged U.S. officials to moderate their anti-communist rhetoric and nuclear threats to make it easier for America to take the lead in disarming the world of nuclear weapons. After all, how the United States and its people viewed the Soviet Union played a large part in whether Americans would wholeheartedly support disarmament. From early on in the nuclear age, U.S. policymakers pursued a contradictory path of building ever larger numbers of nuclear weapons while pursuing disarmament. In the view of IPS intellectuals, however, American efforts to reduce the world's nuclear stockpiles fell far short of the mark. For

¹ See Allan M. Winkler, *Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Margot A. Henriksen, *Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).

much of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union rarely went beyond arms control proposals, putting down attempts at disarmament as utopian.

IPS and Cold War Revisionism

In his highly critical study of New Left Cold War revisionists, Robert James Maddox distinguished the “soft” revisionists from the “hard” revisionists. The former argued that the Cold War began as a result of individual actions by new players on the scene, particularly Harry Truman. Conversely, the latter looked beyond individual actions to institutional factors, such as the felt need of Americans to dominate the world and spread capitalism.² Intellectuals at IPS clearly subscribed to the perspective of the “hard” revisionists. In fact, one of the historians whose work Maddox dissected, Gar Alperovitz, a founding fellow of IPS and a student of William Appleman Williams, offered one of the most well-known revisionist histories with the publication in 1965 of *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*. The main argument presented in *Atomic Diplomacy* is that America’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan in August 1945 had no military basis. Rather, the United States used the device in order to strengthen its economic and politic position in Eastern Europe.³ Other intellectuals at IPS offered similar arguments about the Cold War, often portraying the United States as the aggressor. Before going any further, it is perhaps helpful to discuss how historians have looked at the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent downfall of the Soviet Union, as well as greater access to the archives of former communist nations, historians themselves have begun to offer a more balanced portrait of the period. According to diplomatic

² Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 5-6.

³ Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965).

historian Melvyn Leffler, Joseph Stalin's "overriding goal" was not the spread of communism, but rather assurance of the Soviet Union's survival. Stalin encouraged foreign communist movements to create multi-party fronts, but opposed using force to turn a country into a socialist nation. Stalin feared that using violence would damage relations between his country and Great Britain and America and diminish the Soviet Union's security. In fact, as Leffler points out, Stalin, more concerned with protecting his nation's national security interests, asked communists to moderate their efforts in Greece, France, and Italy despite conditions being ripe in these countries for a socialist revolution. Furthermore, Stalin's anti-capitalist rhetoric aside, he actually allowed free elections or removed Soviet troops from several European and Asian countries. The Soviet Union, furthermore, as Odd Arne Westad has argued, did not coordinate and lead a worldwide revolution composed of Third World nations. Westad describes Moscow's Third World policy as "more ad hoc than strategic," with "alliances [that] were weak and conflict-ridden from the outset." The strained relations between the Soviet Union and Third World countries stemmed from the fact that Soviet leaders did not actively seek out these "alliances," but entered into them only after "existing regimes" chose the United States as an ally over the Soviet Union.⁴

Other historians still contend that the Soviet Union instigated and prolonged the Cold War by continuously seeking new lands to bring into the Soviet sphere. Stalin's decision to exit Iran and the Turkish Straits in 1946 and show restraint during the Berlin blockade of the late 1940s and in Korea in 1950 did not represent "limited ambitions,"

⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and The Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 28-32, 49, 51, 53-54; Odd Arne Westad, "Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World," *Journal of Peace Research* 29 (Nov., 1992), 461-462.

according to John Gaddis. Instead, Stalin recognized that he could improve the Soviet Union's standing in the world without creating a crisis. Similarly, Vladislav Zubok places the blame for the Cold War on the Soviet Union, which sought not only the spread of communist ideology, but also wanted to act as an imperial force in the world. Conditions grew worse following Stalin's death, according to Zubok, as his successors used "revolutionary-imperial discourse" to guide their foreign policy.⁵

Though not apologists for the Soviet Union, IPS intellectuals sought to bring both superpowers to task for exacerbating tensions and making it nearly impossible to end the Cold War. Barnett explained that he came to a "revisionist" view of history in the late 1950s while researching the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the start of the project, Barnett's acquaintances predicted that the study "would be a very good way of documenting how the Russians used the disarmament issue for political maneuvering," but the future IPS co-founder discovered that American attitudes toward disarmament differed little from the Soviet's. Barnett's distaste for American foreign policy grew during his time in the Kennedy administration after he noticed a tendency among officials to use "tremendous abstractions" and show "very little concrete thinking about international interests or what the Russians were really up to."⁶ Instead of erudite thinking on American-Soviet relations, in other words, U.S. officials allowed ideology to guide policy in regard to the Soviet Union.

IPS's Efforts to End the Ideological Cold War

⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 31; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 21, 29, 45, 48, 95.

⁶ "Expert on Russia Questions Policy," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1972, A12.

Looking for an explanation as to why the Cold War continued unabated, IPS intellectuals blamed foreign policymakers for allowing ideology to influence their decision-making and prolong the Cold War. Alan Wolfe documented several instances in which “ideology” spurred a particular “action” during the Cold War. For example, the policy paper NSC-68 laid the foundation for an ideological foreign policy and State Department officials gave currency to the idea of the Soviet Union as an aggressor, which led to the antagonistic policies of the Truman administration. Still a problem in the 1980s, Raskin sought to bring an end to the ideological Cold War by encouraging American officials to follow a strategy that he termed the New Realism. “It sees the U.S. role in the world in flux and in need of redefinition,” Raskin wrote in reference to his strategy. His plan encouraged “changing our relationship with the Soviet Union to one in keeping with our national interest rather than ideological pretension.”⁷ Nuclear weapons, for instance, did not serve America’s national interest, at least in the view of IPS intellectuals. In fact, as later sections of this chapter explain, IPS suggested that America’s massive nuclear arsenal actually threatened the nation’s livelihood.

IPS’s campaign to end the ideological Cold War, which relied so heavily on nuclear weapons and the maintenance of an assertive stance against the Soviet Union faced a major impediment in 1976. Eugene Rostow, who served as President Johnson’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, reorganized the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) after the organization had laid fallow for years—former Under Secretary of the Army Tracey Vorhees created the first CPD in 1950 to promote NSC-68. In 1976, the

⁷ Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the “Soviet Threat”: Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1979), 7-8, 12-13; Marcus Raskin, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: The New Realism,” in *Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s*, eds. Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 292.

CPD immediately garnered publicity after leading the charge to form a “Team B” in order to contest CIA estimates of the nature of the Soviet threat.⁸ Writing in the *Libertarian Review*, Barnet criticized Richard Pipes and the CPD for zeroing in on the “bloodcurdling Soviet military maxims” without taking into account the ways that deterrence encouraged nations to use such ostentatious language in order to make the nuclear threat seem real. Barnet explained that “the deterrence system is sustained by huge bureaucracies which are paid a substantial share of the national treasure to think about winning nuclear war, planning for it, making it credible by pretending that it is a real political option.” In other words, the CPD needed to take the threats of nuclear annihilation in context. Yet Barnet and other IPS intellectuals understood that the CPD focused on the Soviet’s most bombastic statements as a means to convince Americans to support a larger military budget. Not surprisingly, beyond the ability of nuclear weapons to “inspire feelings and convey intentions,” Barnet saw little military value in building America’s nuclear arsenal in order to meet Soviet increases. “The national insecurity that can be so easily fanned by a ‘Committee on the Present Danger’ cannot be cured by 9,000 more bombs,” Barnet wrote. Arguing that the CPD considered themselves “the Paul Reveres of their generation,” Barnet cautioned against inciting “war hysteria” in the present moment. The increase in Soviet nuclear weaponry, technological advances in military weapons, and the growing demands of hundreds of smaller nations in a world with finite resources all made the antagonistic remarks by CPD members far more dangerous, according to Barnet.⁹

⁸ For a detailed account of Team B’s efforts, see Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 122-185.

⁹ Richard J. Barnet, “The Present Danger: American Security and the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance,” *Libertarian Review* (November 1977), 11, 14-15.

Between the CPD and Ronald Reagan in the White House, anti-communist rhetoric and ideological warfare reached its highest levels since the early decades of the Cold War. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 reignited debates over the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies. During a foreign policy meeting held at IPS in early 1980, Barnet disagreed with the widespread view, which he called the "Master Plan model," that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan as part of a master plan to control regions of the world where no opposition existed. Barnet preferred to use a "defensive model" to explain Soviet actions, which had the Soviet Union invading its neighbor in Afghanistan to protect its borders. As the summary of the meeting explained, "While not a justification for Soviet behavior, this model, suggested Barnet, may contribute to understanding what motivated the Soviets." When Earl Ravenal inquired as to why the group spent so much time on the Soviet's "motivations," Barnet claimed that "if the conception of the USSR as a power hungry aggressor, a Hitlerian type, was allowed to go unchallenged the hawks will be able to successfully argue that the Russians are a nation that can't be negotiated with, that they only understand the meaning of armed force."¹⁰ And, of course, such a view would make disarmament nearly impossible to achieve.

IPS intellectuals generally considered the Soviet's actions in Afghanistan defensive and limited in nature. According to Fred Halliday, the Soviets "tried their best to avoid going into Afghanistan," doing so only after communist leader Hafizullah Amin so angered Afghan peasants and assured a future rebellion. In fact, Halliday argued that the Soviets "consistently resisted" pleas by both Amin and President Nur Muhammad

¹⁰ Second Meeting of the Group on Foreign Policy: Summary, January 7, 1980, IPSR, WHS, box 11, folder 23.

Taraki to enter Afghanistan in early 1979. Halliday portrayed the Soviet invasion as an action of last resort to protect a nation on its border from coming under the control of a hostile nation. Citing the aid provided by Pakistan, China, and other Arab nations to Afghan rebels, Halliday claimed that without such outside interference, “it is much less likely that the Russians would have gone into Afghanistan directly.” With the Soviets still bogged down in Afghanistan, Barnet and Eqbal Ahmad wrote in the *New Yorker* that “it seems clear that the Soviet goals in Afghanistan have always been limited.” They based their argument on the fact that the Soviets never “claimed sovereignty over Afghanistan” and sent only a very small number of troops into the country. The Soviets, moreover, “agreed in principle” early on to remove their troops, “a promise they had never made with respect to Eastern Europe.”¹¹ Thus, Barnet and Ahmad did not believe that the Soviet Union planned on turning Afghanistan into a satellite country.

The response of IPS intellectuals to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not surprising, given the general understanding among the intellectuals at IPS regarding the origins of the Cold War. Writing for *Foreign Policy* in 1971 Barnet made the following comment:

Indeed, the naive visitor might well have concluded that the problem of military aggression in the postwar period had its source in the United States. Soviet armies stopped at the point of their farthest advance in World War II and withdrew from adjacent areas such as Czechoslovakia only to return when political domination threatened to fail. The United States retained the major bases it had acquired in World War II and acquired more. Within a few years the Soviet Union was surrounded by air and later missile bases from which devastating nuclear attacks could be launched—all at a time when the Soviet Union lacked a similar capacity to attack the United States. It has been the United States and not the Soviet Union that has stationed its military forces on every continent and spread nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands on the continent of Asia and Europe and on the high seas. It is the United States and not the Soviet Union that has intervened with

¹¹ Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1981), 88, 108-109; Eqbal Ahmad and Richard J. Barnet, “Bloody Games,” *The New Yorker*, April 11, 1988, 62.

its military and paramilitary forces almost every year since 1945 on the territory of other countries either to prevent local insurgent forces from taking power or displacing them from power.

Not until Stalin's death did the Soviet Union begin to interfere in places like Cuba and the Middle East. Barnet blamed this reversal on "the strategy chosen by the U.S. to deal with the limited Soviet challenge to American supremacy," which necessitated a Soviet response.¹² IPS intellectuals, as shown by their reaction to the Soviet attack of Afghanistan, never wavered in their belief that the United States deserved much of the blame for starting the Cold War.

IPS's Early Opposition to the Arms Race

The arms race began with the Soviet Union testing its first nuclear device in 1949, it took another decade for the race to intensify. The theorists behind the strategy of deterrence posited that possession of nuclear arsenals served the purpose of dissuading the other side from instigating a nuclear war. By the late 1950s, nuclear strategists had modified the theory of deterrence in such a way that encouraged the acceleration of the arms race. As Alex Abella has argued in his study of RAND, Albert Wohlstetter's 1959 *Foreign Affairs* article "The Delicate Balance of Terror" succeeded in "laying the groundwork for the constant escalation of the nuclear arms race" that led to each superpower building massive arsenals. Wohlstetter advocated for a different understanding of deterrence that considered the types of nuclear weapons each superpower possessed. The famed nuclear strategist stressed that America's second-strike capability required various types of nuclear weapons in addition to a quantitative

¹² Quote comes from *Foreign Policy* article reprinted in Richard J. Barnet, "The Illusion of Security," in *Peace and War*, eds. Charles R. Beitz and Theodore Herman (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1973), 278-279.

advantage. Furthermore, the increasing importance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in the late 1950s also portended a shift in strategy from one based on a first-strike, counter-force attack, employing bombers and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), to a second-strike retaliatory strategy. Nuclear strategists like Thomas Schelling claimed that as missiles became harder to strike and destroy, the fear of a first-strike would also decline greatly, and so would the tensions of the era.¹³ However, as IPS and other opponents of the arms race would argue, such stability resulted in a cloud of fear hanging over humankind due to the constant threat of a nuclear attack.

Considered a major step in the path to détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned all nuclear testing in the atmosphere, space, and underground, nonetheless failed to slow the nuclear arms race. As historians have shown, both the 1963 test ban and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sought to limit nuclear weapons to nations already possessing the device, served only to stop other nations from obtaining nuclear weapons and did not limit the number of nuclear weapons held by the Soviet Union and America. One historian has gone so far as to say that Kennedy had a “near obsession” with China, which served as the “primary impetus” for securing a test ban treaty. Kennedy considered China’s attempt to secure nuclear capabilities as “the whole reason for having a test ban,” according to the historian Francis Gavin. China’s combative actions and proclamations led U.S. officials to label the nation a “rogue” state, which shattered the peace brought about by containment and deterrence. Additionally, U.S. officials feared that China’s entrance into

¹³ Alex Abella, *Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2008), 117-119; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear War Strategy*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1989), 169-170, 193-195; Robert Ayson, *Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 59-61.

the nuclear club would threaten American interests in Asia and encourage other nations to build their own nuclear weapons. When Lyndon Johnson became president, he issued a national security memorandum in 1965 that allowed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to pursue a nonproliferation treaty. Johnson took such an approach because he agreed with analysts who saw a Soviet attack on Central Europe as far less worrisome than the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller nations.¹⁴

Calling the years between 1963 and 1980 the “Big Sleep” due to the “apathy” and “neglect” of disarmament issues by the American public, Paul Boyer has offered several reasons for Americans’ disinterestedness in matters pertaining to nuclear weapons. With testing prohibited above-ground, Americans no longer had to witness the sheer destruction of nuclear weapons, which led to a “loss of immediacy” as nuclear explosions no longer seemed so visceral. Also, the growing number of nuclear power plants diminished Americans’ fear of nuclear energy more generally. Finally, abstruse nuclear strategy kept ordinary Americans in the dark and unable to discuss disarmament and nuclear weapons. Activists as well, even individuals previously involved in the disarmament movement, turned their attention to Vietnam. For instance, by 1966, SANE placed nuclear proliferation on the backburner as the organization’s co-chairman Benjamin Spock became involved in the antiwar movement. One of the leading groups of the 1960s, moreover, the Students for a Democratic Society, rarely evinced much concern over the threat of a nuclear war. Boyer has ascribed SDS’s aloofness toward nuclear matters to the organization’s views on the bureaucracy. Whereas opponents of nuclear

¹⁴ Shane J. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 208-209, 259-260; Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 78-80, 99-100.

weapons writing prior to 1963 did not believe that politicians could remain levelheaded during a nuclear exchange, SDS argued that the rational bureaucrats would not initiate a nuclear war. The New Left reluctantly joined the protest against the Vietnam War, much preferring local community organizing to international relations. Thus, even though disarmament activists considered the 1963 treaty banning atmospheric testing only a preliminary step, ordinary people, even those individuals prone to activism, felt otherwise as the mushroom cloud disappeared from the public's view.¹⁵

Given the background of IPS's co-founders, it is not surprising that IPS intellectuals advocated for disarmament. Intellectuals at IPS also noticed the lack of concern over nuclear weapons among policymakers and public figures. For Barnett, though, the indifference grew out of a desire by the U.S. government to preserve the status quo. While "a sudden surge of interest in disarmament" followed the Cuban missile crisis, some commentators suggested that American nuclear superiority led to the positive outcome for the United States in Cuba and therefore argued in support of retaining the nation's nuclear stockpiles. Additionally, Kennedy and his administration "turned their eyes anxiously to Europe and found that the Soviets did not dare to move, that a real truce has been achieved in Europe without arms control or disarmament." Moreover, problems within NATO, particularly the attempt by Charles De Gaulle to create a European-led alliance, detente with the Soviet Union, a diminished Soviet threat in Europe, and efforts by Europeans to improve East-West relations made the United States reticent to carry out disarmament. There existed within the United States a "deep-seated fear that the whole

¹⁵ Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 356-359; Paul Boyer, "From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980," *Journal of American History* 70 (March 1984), 828-836, 839-842; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 453-454.

structure of U.S.-continental relations is shaky and that nothing must be done to disturb it further. The decision was made to try to use the detente in Europe to maintain the status quo rather than move towards arms control,” Barnet claimed. Furthermore, the advantage America held over the Soviet Union in regards to nuclear weapons and the escalating nature of the Vietnam War caused support for disarmament to ebb, Barnet argued. IPS intellectuals rejected the cautious approach taken by American officials. Writing near the end of the Cold War, IPS director Borosage proposed ending the NATO alliance and turning Europe into a nuclear-free region. Referring to the relative calm in Europe following the construction of the Berlin Wall, Borosage argued that decreasing American military aid to Europe could be the first step toward a new world by turning what previously served as “the centerpiece of the Cold War, the heart of the militarized containment” into a nuclear-free zone with “common security arrangements and common sense relationships.”¹⁶

IPS Versus the “Mega-Death” Intellectuals

Despite the death and destruction that would follow an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers, nuclear strategists did not agonize over such outcomes when constructing war plans. IPS intellectuals explained the lack of concern on the part of nuclear strategists by pointing to the latter’s ability to rationalize a seemingly irrational possibility—nuclear warfare. Nuclear strategists often justified nuclear war by arguing that such warfare could be controlled. The idea of a nuclear war being manageable seemed to Waskow unbelievable. Waskow described such scenarios as “non-scientific

¹⁶ Richard J. Barnet, “The Current Disarmament Impasse,” in *Arms Control for the Late Sixties*, eds. James E. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman Jr. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand C., 1967), 9-11; Robert Borosage, “NATO: From Containment to Common Security,” in *Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s*, eds. Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 364-365.

strategies” and questioned whether believers of controlled nuclear wars were “real scientists,” or just “science-fiction writers.” Analysts at think tanks like RAND, he explained, “have responded [to the absence of a thermonuclear war] by spinning out of their own brains, with the help of their computers, the quasi-logical fantasies of controlled thermonuclear war: fantasies that have nothing to do with science” since no historical precedent existed.¹⁷

Writing for *The American Journal of Psychiatry* in 1964, Raskin described a tendency predominant among nuclear strategists in which words took on new and different meanings from their traditional definitions. Raskin claimed that bureaucrats and scientists used a “special language” to “ease their moral qualms, make the extraordinary ordinary, the emotional and abstract seemingly rational and quasi-comfortable.” Devoid of human feeling, this “machine language” led “people [to] accept, accede to and support situations which they might otherwise reject or oppose.” Citizens, as a result, no longer participated in politics as equally informed parties.¹⁸ Just like the National Security Managers who led America into war in Vietnam, defense strategists used rational and technical language to hide the fact that their planning would lead to the deaths of millions of innocents.

In spite of the very real consequences associated with nuclear war, neoconservatives and conservatives continued to push for larger defense budgets and new weapons systems, even as the Soviet leader Mikail Gorbachev called for reductions. In a 1986 editorial, Raskin questioned Jeane Kirkpatrick’s criticism of Gorbachev’s call for a

¹⁷ Arthur Waskow to the New York Review Editors, December 11, 1963, AWP, WHS, box 3, folder 11.

¹⁸ Marcus Raskin, “Political Anxiety and Nuclear Reality,” *The American Journal of Psychiatry* 120 (1964), 833-844.

reduction in conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament. Raskin admonished Kirkpatrick and her supporters for their abiding faith in technological solutions like SDI. “Technological fixes” not only had no military value, but Raskin feared that they “will either cause or intensify existing political tensions with our adversaries,” and thus actually diminish America’s security.¹⁹ For IPS intellectuals, political solutions, not military or technological, represented the best approach to solving the nuclear weapons dilemma.

While the critique of defense strategists offered by IPS intellectuals is hardly surprising, more unexpected, perhaps, was the lack of enthusiasm among intellectuals at the Institute for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). As a former official within the agency, Barnet had a close-up view of the work carried out at the ACDA. In a lengthy discussion of the limitations of the ACDA, Barnet derided the agency for its hard-boiled solutions and constant concern with how disarmament would affect America’s military standing in the world. Looking at the origins of the ACDA, Barnet distinguished between “two quite different constituencies” that spoke out in favor of a new agency devoted to arms control and disarmament. The first group modestly “stressed the need for ‘new ideas, but what they had in mind were techniques for implementing established policy, primarily in the area of inspection, rather than radical new concepts which could be the basis of alternative policies,” Barnet explained. He included among this group government officials, arms control officials, and individuals with ties to the military. A different assemblage of supporters, which included Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, who along with 26 other members of the House of

¹⁹ Marcus G. Raskin, “Kirkpatrick’s Acorn, Humphrey’s Tree,” *The Washington Post*, February 15, 1986, A25.

Representatives offered a bill in 1961 for the creation of a National Peace Agency, sought peace, not just disarmament. Rather than focusing on arms control, this group sought the creation of an agency that undertook “investigation of the causes of war and the consideration of various alternatives for establishing and maintaining peace.”²⁰

The studies conducted by the ACDA illustrated that it existed to carry out the goals of the first group. For the most part, the ACDA concentrated on issues having to do with inspection and how disarmament proposals would impact America’s military strength, Barnet reported. For instance, he noted how the ACDA’s budget for fiscal year 1965 earmarked almost \$10.5 million out of a total budget of \$11 million for “inspection studies” and “inspection field reports.” The unwillingness of the ACDA to develop imaginative and innovative approaches to disarmament prevented the agency from looking beyond the Cold War calculus. “Far too much has been made of the ‘lack of specifics’ in disarmament proposals,” Barnet claimed while criticizing the ACDA for its fixation with coming up with concrete proposals. Barnet acknowledged the need for offering specific numbers in regard to how many officials would take part in inspections, the number of inspections that would take place, and precisely how many missiles each superpower could possess in such a scheme, but he believed that numerical limitations did little to bring about disarmament. In Barnet’s view, previous disarmament proposals did not fail, Barnet argued, due to inadequate data. “A more likely explanation is that both [America and the Soviet Union] had only a partial view of where they wanted to go and where they thought their own proposals would lead them,” he wrote.²¹

²⁰ Richard J. Barnet, “Some Problems of Government-Sponsored Disarmament Research: The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” undated [likely 1965], IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 45, 1-2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2-5, 8-9.

Reviewing the usual explanations given for why disarmament would not lead to a peaceful world, Barnet suggested that the ACDA needed to formulate a “theory of peace.” While not disputing the need for a “utopian blueprint of a disarmed world,” Barnet thought “of greater value would be the analysis of the political process involved in moving towards various alternative political structures for the world.” In addition to investigating possible paths to disarmament in the future, Barnet wanted more research on how present conditions slowed disarmament. For instance, he wondered if the general attitude that equated strength with superiority in nuclear weapons really mattered when international disputes broke out. As an example, Barnet suggested conducting investigations into whether American nuclear superiority actually compelled the Soviets to back down during the Cuban Missile crisis. Without such research, opponents would use the same well-worn arguments to stall or discredit disarmament, Barnet claimed.²² Unless analysts and researchers questioned the maxim that nuclear superiority led to an increase in American power, disarmament would never occur.²³

²² Ibid., 8-13, 18-21. Interestingly, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, which allowed for inspection. Besides approving “an intrusive and otherwise formidable verification system,” John Newhouse has shown that the treaty only reduced each superpowers’ nuclear arsenals by four percent, or 50,000 weapons. Both short-range and long-range weapons still threatened the world. See John Newhouse, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Knopf, 1989), 402. Thus, the criticisms by IPS intellectuals that inspection often received more attention than actual disarmament proved true in the case of the 1987 treaty.

²³ As a congressional aide to Representative Kastenmeier, both Barnet and Waskow played a key role in advocating for the creation of a National Peace Agency. In its place, Congress accepted a bill drafted by John F. Kennedy’s disarmament advisor, John J. McCloy, one of the famed Establishment figures who made up “The Wise Men,” that called for the creation of the ACDA. Barnet obviously felt strongly enough about the ACDA to accept a position in the agency while he served as an aide to McCloy, but he quickly came to the conclusion that the agency failed in its goal of disarmament, as the report above makes clear. Other intellectuals at IPS shared Barnet’s sentiment regarding the failure of the agency. Writing in the early 1970s, Raskin voiced horror over the path taken by the ACDA. He considered “the ACDA’s original vision” to have “been very badly corrupted within the government to the point where it is alarming.” This led the IPS co-founder to “feel rather betrayed.” See Marcus Raskin to Bradford Morse, November 23, 1971, ISPR, WHS, box 57, folder 37.

In response to U.S. officials' and defense strategists' penchant for rationalizing nuclear war, IPS intellectuals advocated for the broadening of the types of activities normally identified as war crimes and human rights violations. Barnet once called it "the fundamental intellectual and moral problem" of nuclear war and the arms race that a man who kills passengers on a plane demanding a ransom was a "terrorist," but presidents who targeted enemy populations were carrying out a "strategy." Looking to extend the purview of what constituted a human rights violation, Raskin explained his opposition to the bifurcated structure that absolved certain individuals from being charged under human rights laws. Calling it "a conceptual and moral error," to restrict activities that occurred only after an outbreak of war, Raskin demanded a new set of legal guidelines that would apply also to preparations for war, and thus make it possible to take legal and criminal actions against arms producers and war planners. "The final 'frame' or act in a process which leads to a culminating event, in this case the 'go signal' for nuclear war or aggressive war, does not have to be completed for us to realize that the event is already underway. One needs only to look at arms budgets and strategic doctrine to comprehend the criminal nature of the arms enterprise," Raskin argued²⁴

Changing Americans' Minds to Disarm the World

Addressing the War Resisters International in 1966, Waskow predicted that within twenty years nations would free themselves of nuclear weapons. According to Waskow, the stalemate in Korea proved that America could not use conventional forces to bend the will of others; the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated the drawbacks of

²⁴ Richard J. Barnet, "History of the Arms Race, 1945-1978," in *Peace in Search of Makers: Riverside Church Reverse the Arms Race Convocation*, ed. Jane Rockman (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1979), 13; Marcus G. Raskin, "Have Human Rights Come of Age?," paper prepared for International Human Rights conference, Deham, Massachusetts, October 22-24, 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 45, 17, 20-21.

depending too much on nuclear forces; and events in Vietnam demonstrated the shortcomings of America's counter-insurgency strategy. Therefore, Waskow predicted that foreign policy failures in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam would force policymakers to rethink America's nuclear strategy. Unable to achieve a clear-cut victory in the aforementioned conflicts, and under increasing pressure from American citizens, Waskow claimed that nuclear weapons would cease to exist by 1985.²⁵

While nuclear weapons held no military value, they did serve as a marker of a nation's standing on the world stage. For Barnet, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the inexplicable attachment nations had to their nuclear weapons. Referring to President Kennedy's initial reluctance during the Cuban Missile Crisis to remove America's Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for the Soviet's dismantling of its missiles in Cuba, Barnet argued that the goal had become "victory itself, the vindication of the American will." The nuclear weapons in Turkey served no strategic purposes, but Kennedy still wavered over whether to remove them in order to end the crisis in Cuba. Barnet blamed Kennedy's recalcitrance on a changed perspective among American officials regarding nuclear weapons. Instead of serving as the means to an end, nuclear weapons became the end goal. "When a nation defines its interests as winning irrespective of the concrete economic and political objectives for which it fights, then the 'weapons culture' has overwhelmed the art of statecraft," Barnet concluded. Therefore, the United States continued to build up its nuclear arsenal and construct new weapons systems, which offered "transcendent symbolic and abstract goals," but little else for America. According to Barnet, even the U.S. military realized that nuclear weapons were of little use in the

²⁵ Arthur Waskow, "A Vision of the Possible Society: Creative Disorder, 1999," address to Convention of the War Resisters International, Rome, Italy, April 7, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 3, folder 5.

current environment, where revolutions occurred more frequently than wars. Thus, the American military had “to justify a bad bargain” using “mystical or heroic terms” since the inflated “defense budget would not stand the test of practical social or political accounting.”²⁶

To counter the unexplainable spell that nuclear weapons had over the world’s leaders, IPS intellectuals made repeated appeals to American and Soviet officials to employ other means of persuasion than nuclear threats. Barnet admitted that “exhortations by the great powers on the advantages of nuclear abstinence will not be enough,” and some sort of “guarantees” of nuclear protection would be necessary. Even then, Barnet expected that other nations would not necessarily follow the superpowers’ lead. Not only would protected nations be unsure if another nation would risk a nuclear attack against its own country to defend a faraway country, but nuclear weapons offered a nation something more than just physical protection. For many non-nuclear nations, such weapons served “as symbols of independence and national sovereignty,” Barnet claimed. More than their military utility, nuclear weapons came to represent “status symbols” and acted as a sort of “currency of international bargaining.” Therefore, such intangible reasons for owning nuclear weapons meant that promises of protection against nuclear attack would never be a good enough reason for a nation to forego construction of its own nuclear forces. Barnet claimed that “for a nation to accept a nuclear protectorate is to admit that it is less than fully sovereign.”²⁷ It was only necessary to look at the strained relations among NATO nations to understand the great value placed on nuclear weapons.

²⁶ Richard J. Barnet, “On Living in an Arsenal,” *Science*, April 19, 1968, 293-294.

²⁷ Barnet, “The Current Disarmament Impasse,” 15.

Whereas disarmament advocates and policymakers sparred over issues pertaining to inspection, IPS intellectuals spent little time on the question. While accepting the possibility of achieving nuclear disarmament through an agreement that included inspections of nuclear reactors and control of the materials needed to build nuclear weapons, Barnet wanted to diminish the “incentive” to build the weapons in the first place. American officials had talked about reducing nuclear weapons, but by “affirming through our military policy and diplomacy the importance of nuclear weapons for great power status we have whetted the appetite of other countries for them,” Barnet claimed. Accordingly, if the United States made “it clear that nuclear weapons are to play a diminished role in their day to day diplomacy, other nations would probably lose some of their interest in them.”²⁸

IPS intellectuals constantly underscored the need for the United States to reconsider its understanding of power. Calls for a reassessment only intensified as America lost its military and economic advantage in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite a growing military force, a concomitant rise in America’s standing in the world did not occur. As America continued dividing the world into Communist and non-Communist camps, tribal, ethnic, and religious tensions took precedence for many nations, in the view of Barnet. Also, the spread of conventional and nuclear weapons made states more willing to go to war without the support of the great powers. With the world becoming more unpredictable, the United States had to face the reality that it could not control

²⁸ Richard Barnet to James R. Newman, January 25, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 11.

international relations, Barnet argued. Thus minimizing the importance of nuclear weapons became even more important.²⁹

Nonetheless, nuclear weapons still mattered to nations, in large part due to the great weight the superpowers afforded the weapons. Until America abandoned its dependence on atomic weaponry, nuclear proliferation would continue indefinitely, Barnet claimed. He also argued that supporters of disarmament did not do enough to prepare humankind for a world without nuclear weapons. “Since the purposes of disarmament are unclear and the implications uncertain, most people prefer to stay with the world we know or think we know than to enter a world in which we put our trust in the sanity and decency of people rather than the power of machines,” Barnet lamented. He encouraged American leaders to begin the process of “devaluing” nuclear weapons. At the same time, America had to “delegitimize them [nuclear weapons], to keep stressing that whether or not they are exploded in anger, they cannot be used as instruments of power or as the foundation of security without destroying our society in the process.”³⁰

Neither pleas by the United States to end nuclear proliferation, nor a non-proliferation treaty would succeed in freeing the world of nuclear weapons. As Barnet explained during a congressional seminar held at IPS in 1965, America needed to follow a plan “which looks at the whole nuclear proliferation question as an essentially political one” requiring “an international political climate” that removed the “incentive” for proliferation. Pointing to the fact that some nations possessing the technological

²⁹ Richard J. Barnet, *Real Security: Restoring America's Power in a Dangerous Decade* (New York: Touchstone, 1981), 91-98.

³⁰ Richard J. Barnet, “The Power of Myth, The Myth of Power,” *Christianity and Crisis*, November 27, 1978, 280-284.

capabilities to build nuclear weapons still did not do so, Barnet suggested that the United States try to popularize these “natural incentives” against nuclear proliferation. Still, Barnet explained, “what we are talking about is trying to generate a political atmosphere not in which for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons are going to be abolished, but where at least the importance of nuclear weapons as measures of prestige, as badges of international position, will be downgraded.”³¹ Therefore, IPS intellectuals repeatedly called on the United States to initiate a policy of unilateral disarmament to encourage other nations to follow suit.

IPS’s Critique of Arms Limitations Agreements

As criticism of massive retaliation grew in the 1950s and America began following a policy of deterrence, arms control replaced disarmament as the preferred approach to lessening the nuclear threat. Pointing to such works as 1961’s *Strategy and Arms Control*, written by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield suggest that by the early 1960s, “arms control as an instrument of effective deterrence had become conventional wisdom in mainstream liberalism.”³² As arms control agreements took form during the 1970s, lobbyists and nuclear scientists continued to press for such measures, but an alternative view also took shape. David Meyer has pointed to the existence of another group, composed of faith-based

³¹ James Warburg and Richard Barnet, “New Era for American Policy and Statecraft,” transcript of a seminar for members of Congress, February 17, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 11, folder 28, 5-7.

³² Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 37-38. The story of liberal support for arms control is also told in Duncan C. Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency* (New York: Free Press, 1979); Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear War Strategy*, 95-103, 191-207; and Robin Ranger, *Arms And Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control In A Changing Political Context* (Toronto: Gage, 1979), 3-49.

organization and New Leftists who had participated in the Vietnam antiwar movement, which viewed the arms as symptomatic of a larger problem in American society.³³ IPS intellectuals derided arms control advocates for sacrificing disarmament and allowing the arms race to continue indefinitely.

Into the 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued making nuclear threats that discouraged a reduction in arms. Instead of striving for disarmament, the superpowers participated in half-measures, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Barnet compared such agreements to the Missouri Compromise, which failed to stop the spread of slavery. Carrying the comparison further, Barnet wrote, “As with slavery, our economic dependence upon the war system is profound as well as anachronistic.” While nuclear weapons, like slavery, “made short-term economic sense,” the “war system” has “outlasted its time because it blocks possibilities for much more efficient and rational use of resources and more effective means of developing power to solve political and social problems,” Barnet explained.³⁴ As historians have made clear, SALT I, indicative of the more general inadequacies of arms limitations treaties, did not change the behaviors and attitudes of any of the presidents who served in the last decades of the Cold War.

Although President Nixon signed the SALT Treaty in Moscow in 1972, his nuclear policy, as several historians have noted, did not indicate that the nuclear arms race would subside. Francis Gavin has argued that Nixon’s and Kissinger’s worldview, which favored the “supremacy of geopolitics” led them to disavow arms control treaties.

³³ David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 143.

³⁴ Barnet, “The Power of Myth, The Myth of Power,” 281.

The president and his national security advisor believed that wars occurred as a result of political disagreement, not because of issues related to the arms race. Moreover, the fear of a nuclear war actually led to peaceful conditions because each superpower hesitated to start a conflict, fearing nuclear retaliation. Furthermore, Nixon repeatedly referred to America's nuclear superiority during the Cuban missile crisis as the reason for America's victory in that contest of wills. Nixon and Kissinger also worried that nuclear parity with the Soviets threatened America's allies. As a means to overcome the arms control agreement, Nixon put into place a strategy of flexible response that increased nuclear options. Also, influenced by advisors such as Paul Nitze and T.K. Jones, who claimed that as America sought nuclear parity and abided by the tenets of mutually assured destruction (MAD) the Soviets aimed for superiority and first-strike capabilities, Nixon returned to an emphasis on counterforce strategy, which directed attacks on military targets. Following the policy put forth by his Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and thus known as the Schlesinger Doctrine, Nixon advocated a counterforce strategy that increased the number of individual targets during a nuclear strike to as many as twenty-five thousand. Though "rhetorically qualified" by every president except Reagan, each administration since Johnson's followed the tenets of counterforce strategy. Even Jimmy Carter, who spoke of a world free of nuclear weapons, accepted Nixon's NSDM-242, which called for a strategy of flexible response including striking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion by ground troops.³⁵

The SALT I agreement set the stage for Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 and earned the president many accolades for his statesmanship, but America's nuclear policy

³⁵ Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, 108-116; Gregg Herken, *Counsels of War* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 256-264; Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 369-370, 382-387.

changed little. The nuclear stockpiles of both superpowers continued to rise to unimaginable levels. SALT's inability to slow the nuclear arms race did not surprise IPS intellectuals. Speaking at Columbia University in 1985, Raskin informed the audience that arms control and disarmament represented two completely distinct processes. Arms control talks offered much promise, but the negotiations usually proved more useful politically than for actual disarmament. "The Reagan administration sees negotiating on arms as a sacrament to buy off one's own population," Raskin argued. These discussions, Raskin continued, provided "a way of cooling out opposition in both countries and getting people off the streets."³⁶

More specifically, IPS intellectuals found the numerical limits on nuclear weapons that served as the focal point of SALT both ineffectual and misleading. Fred Kaplan questioned the value of SALT negotiations because the talks "distorted" the important elements of defense strategy and "fundamental problems" received scant attention. The distortion involved the excessive emphasis placed on "static indicators" like the number of missile launchers, which made little difference because of the ability of each superpower to MIRV missiles, but still received attention because numerical limits allowed for verification, which each superpower demanded. Kaplan called instead for "indirect ways of controlling the spiraling escalation of arms," which included the limiting of nuclear missile tests to levels that made production of new missiles a more drawn out process.³⁷ The limitations of arms control catalogued by IPS intellectuals

³⁶ Untitled speech given by Marcus Raskin at Columbia University, January 26, 1985, box 59, folder 27, 6. Jeremi Suri has made a similar argument in regard to détente in general. See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 2, 213-214.

³⁷ Fred M. Kaplan, *Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear Threat* (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1980), 61-63.

explained why Nixon could sign the SALT I agreement while simultaneously increasing the number of targets in a nuclear war.

Moreover, the SALT I agreement, while limiting one class of weapons, actually encouraged production of other weapons. For this reason, Barnet dismissed arms control agreements reached in the past as useless and unlikely to bring about disarmament. While SALT prevented each superpower from building ABM systems, the agreement allowed for an increase in arms, not a decrease. The Vladivostok agreement, which Barnet used as an example, limited the United States to MIRV 1,320 missiles. Officials in the United States had planned on MIRVing 1,046 missiles, but felt that they had, in the words of Barnet, an “obligation” to build more MIRVed missiles. Even more disconcerting for Barnet was the fact that the Soviets had no existing MIRVed missiles prior to the agreement. Therefore, Barnet claimed that the “agreement was a cap for an empty tube that is only now being filled.”³⁸ Most Americans, however, not up to date on the various weapons systems and acronyms, took the word of commentators and politicians that the agreement limited nuclear weapons.

The fact that Americans acceded to arms control experts’ opinion of SALT I bothered IPS intellectuals. For instance, Raskin blamed arms control for creating a situation in which “people are wont to believe that there is an inherently rational process to the arms race system and that those involved in it as experts and managers know what they are doing.” In reality, Raskin claimed, “we have a system of arming which is predicated on the most soggy of assumptions” based on whether a particular weapons system is “vulnerable or invulnerable.” Allowing experts to take the lead in arms control

³⁸ Richard J. Barnet, *The Giants: Russia and America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 104-105.

talks also made it more difficult to attract people to the anti-nuclear weapons position. “The discussions of strategy and arms control, which accept the given—and the present imposed future given—as true can only fail to excite large numbers of people,” Raskin wrote. Questioning the value of campaigns to either stall or stop production of new weapons systems, such as the MX missile, Raskin moved beyond such limited goals, preferring instead “a practical vision of future policies and actions” to excite the American public and bring them closer to the disarmament cause. Focusing on the minutia of the nuclear arms race, in other words, blinded opponents of nuclear war to the larger goal, general and complete disarmament. Pushing stop-gap measures, furthermore, would likely encourage politicians, even Democrats, to go only so far. Raskin predicted that if the Democrats took control of the White House, this new group of politicians “would keep in place the war system as well as the programs which Reagan initiated and add to conventional forces.”³⁹ Though arms control agreements offered hope to ordinary Americans, IPS intellectuals sought to illustrate the difference between such accords and actual disarmament.

IPS intellectuals also blamed liberal groups supportive of arms control for confusing the public. Writing in 1986, William Arkin argued, “It is with the liberal establishment and their allies in the arms control community that we have our biggest fight,” not necessarily conservatives and Reagan. Arkin referred to “non-disarmament groups,” such as the Committee for National Security, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Center for Defense Information, “which fool their public supporters into believing that they are working on an *end* to the arms race, when in fact they are only

³⁹ Marcus Raskin to Betsy [?], undated, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 5.

trying to make it safer.” He further scoffed at peace activists for being into “fads” and depending on “capricious funders” and holding generally “partisan” views. Arkin thought that activists needed to look beyond SDI because, he claimed, “the only way to defeat SDI . . . is to obviate the justification for it (particularly as an augmentation of offensive deterrence) by eliminating nuclear weapons.”⁴⁰ Whether in regard to arms control or opposition to a single weapon, IPS intellectuals derided liberals for fighting for piecemeal reforms rather than disarmament.

During his time at the Peace Research Institute, Waskow sought to transform foreign policy planning by encouraging policymakers to take into account the long view of foreign relations. IPS intellectuals voiced a similar concern in relation to arms control. Looking for a historical antecedent for their disarmament proposals, IPS intellectuals looked to the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a paper for a Militarism and Disarmament Project study group held in 1977, Raskin criticized arms control officials for limiting their objective and thus abandoning disarmament. Whereas the McCloy-Zorin disarmament plan and the General and Complete Disarmament proposals prescribed a date at which nuclear weapons production would end, later agreements did not include a specific timetable. “As a result, armaments and disarmament discussions were chopped up into pieces all of which did not appear to relate to each other and none of which had an interlinked time boundary to them,” Raskin argued. Nuclear weapon stockpiles, therefore, actually expanded despite limitations on particular weapons. The history of arms control led Raskin to argue, “Any serious comprehensive agreement must be *time*

⁴⁰ William M. Arkin, “National Security Program: Thoughts on the Next Decade of Work at IPS,” November 3, 1986, IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 48, 12.

bound. The document must state what has to be accomplished within a limited period of time, what can wait, or be deferred, and what needs to be strengthened.”⁴¹

IPS and Unilateral Disarmament

Diminishing the importance of nuclear weapons, and moving beyond the inadequate arms control measures associated with SALT, required, IPS intellectuals claimed, a greater willingness on the part of U.S. officials to take unilateral actions in matters related to disarmament. Prior to the 1960s, and before arms control dominated nuclear policy discussions, *Liberation* magazine and the historian H. Stuart Hughes, among others, supported unilateral disarmament.⁴² Despite falling out of favor in America, IPS intellectuals continued to urge American officials to carry out unilateral measures to achieve disarmament. Barnet, for instance, recommended in 1977 that the president announce to the world that the United States would not produce cruise missiles, the Trident, the MX, the neutron bomb, and other new weapons systems. “There is such a superfluity of nuclear destructive power in American hands that we have ample room for experiments that could lead the world back from the edge of madness,” Barnet wrote. Thus, even if such unilateral actions by the United States went unreciprocated, it would not harm America’s standing in the world.⁴³

While IPS intellectuals might argue that America could afford to disarm unilaterally without similar moves by the Soviet Union, government officials and politicians would likely never accept such a plan. During the aforementioned congressional seminar held at IPS in 1965, one congressman wondered whether America

⁴¹ Marcus Raskin, “MDP Study Group,” October 13, 1977, ISPR, WHS, box 13, folder 35, 1-3.

⁴² Howard Brick, *Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 1960s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 150.

⁴³ Richard Barnet, “Russian Roulette,” *Working Papers for a New Society* 6 (May/June 1978), 77.

would agree to take the unilateral steps suggested by IPS intellectuals. Referring to a discussion that took place earlier in the seminar about the United States needing to downplay the significance of nuclear weapons in international affairs, Congressman John Conyers (MI-D), one of IPS's strongest congressional backers, thought this solution unrealistic. "We couldn't go out tomorrow morning to our respective jobs and even roll out to quorum talking like this. So it seems to me that there is a big education task confronting the intellectual pocket in America. We have to talk about disarmament as an official position, not just several authors and a few people in Washington taking that kind of posture," Conyers explained.⁴⁴ From the beginning, IPS's founders saw the Institute as playing an educative role in society, but changing the American mindset to allow for even a limited unilateral disarmament seemed far-fetched for a group of intellectuals that sought pragmatic solutions to the world's problems.

Despite the word of caution offered by Conyers, many of the disarmament proposals that came out of IPS involved some sort of unilateral actions on the part of the United States. Writing in the mid-1970s, Raskin offered a three step plan for disarmament. The earliest stage had the United States unilaterally halting production of missiles, uranium, and plutonium. Then America could begin the "process of 'agonizing reappraisal' and reconsideration" within the bureaucracy to prevent disarmament measures from being "sabotaged." Once the bureaucracy was on board, America could advocate for the creation of "regional disarmament agreements" that prohibited the stationing of conventional armies, nuclear weapons, and missiles in particular regions of the world. Raskin explained that each of these steps, furthermore, would occur under the

⁴⁴ James Warburg and Richard Barnet, "New Era for American Policy and Statecraft," transcript of a seminar for members of Congress, February 17, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 11, folder 28, 22-23.

purview of the United Nations. Raskin also included in his disarmament proposal “‘confidence building’ measures,” which he claimed “would cause national leaders to move to the abolition of weapons and armed forces except for purposes of internal order.”⁴⁵

Towards the end of the Cold War, Raskin envisioned an even larger role for the U.N. in disarmament. He suggested policing disarmament agreements through an “International Disarmament Organization” under the auspices of the U.N. This organization would “be assured unrestricted access without veto to all [disarmament] plans” and create laws and penalties for the disarmament process. Raskin also recommended setting up “an international peace force” made up of “peacekeeping contingents” from various nations and under the direction of the U.N. Later in the decade, Barnet also called for an immediate stoppage of all nuclear weapons development, production, and deployment. If the superpowers failed to reach an agreement, Barnet suggested that the United States should carry out its “own three-year moratorium on production and deployment of new weapons” as a means to create a more favorable “negotiating atmosphere.” Next, the United States would need to end its policy of “first use” of nuclear weapons.⁴⁶

IPS intellectuals did not expect disarmament to take place overnight, or even within a few years, as another proposal put forth by Raskin in the mid-1980s made clear. Regarding the reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons the proposal included as a first step the requirement that the United States and the Soviet Union take the initiative to rid

⁴⁵ Marcus Raskin, “Towards a Modern National Security Policy,” in *The Federal Budget and Social Reconstruction*, ed., Marcus G. Raskin (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 66-67.

⁴⁶ Raskin, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: The New Realism,” 289; Richard Barnet, “Ultimate Terrorism,” *The Progressive*, February 1979, 19.

each of their countries of outdated weapons. Proof of disarmament would come from “citizens’ inspections” conducted by a nation’s people and satellite surveillance.

Secondly, Raskin offered a plan whereby each superpower would select one weapon from their opponent’s arsenal for dismantling. If either side refused to eliminate the weapon chosen by the other superpower, then an alternative weapon would take its place on the cutting block. Raskin also proposed creating an “international registry” of persons involved in the construction and research of atomic weapons as well as a listing of individuals who agreed to sign an “international public oath” refusing to take part in any actions that went against the agreed upon reduction. By the third year of the process to eliminate nuclear weapons, Raskin predicted that both sides would reach an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons within fifteen years. As part of the disarmament accord, Raskin wanted greater international input, including having a representative from the International Court of Justice serve as “judge and mediator” for perpetuity to make sure that all sides abided by the nonproliferation agreement.⁴⁷ While most of Raskin’s proposal seems feasible, the component that essentially had the two superpowers bartering away one another’s weapons systems ignored the difficulties involved with the SALT negotiations and agreements. The great number of variables associated with nuclear weapons—quantity, throw weight, range, and number of warheads on each missile, to name just a few—made it nearly impossible for such a scheme to work.

Disarmament By and For the American People

One aspect of Raskin’s proposal from the previous paragraph that deserves highlighting is the portion dealing with “citizens’ inspections,” which would make sure

⁴⁷ Marcus Raskin, *The Common Good: Its Politics, Policies and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 211-213.

that each nation followed through with its promise to disarm. Given the importance that IPS intellectuals placed on citizen involvement in governmental decision-making, it is not surprising that Raskin would include in his proposal a role for the people actually threatened by nuclear weapons. Yet it might also say something about the attitudes IPS intellectuals had towards inspection. In the 1950s and 1960s, especially, the issue of inspection prevented the superpowers from reaching a disarmament agreement. Possibly considering these earlier failures, Barnet, writing in the mid-1960s, questioned the relevance of inspection. He argued that the emphasis placed on inspection by U.S. officials ended up “creating obstacles where none need exist.” Using historical precedents as evidence, Barnet explained that even though the Versailles Treaty required inspection of Germany to prevent rearmament, no such inspections took place. Even without conducting inspections, Barnet argued that officials could find “sufficient information” regarding rearmament. Furthermore, when the Japanese and Germans did not follow the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922, they did so openly, which led Barnet to declare that “secret violations are not particularly likely.”⁴⁸ Regardless of historical precedent, Raskin may have placed too much faith in the people by believing that they could overcome their national pride and expose their country’s misdeeds.

Yet, in the minds of IPS intellectuals, the people would likely do no worse than the individuals currently authorized to make nuclear policy. Leaving disarmament to “the Joint Chiefs of Staff, national security bureaucracies, and defense corporations is a little like expecting corporations to self-regulate, and see their destructive side without any advice, persuasion or insistence from other forces in the society,” Raskin argued.

⁴⁸ Richard J. Barnet, “Inspection: Shadow and Substance,” in *Security in Disarmament*, eds. Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 20-22.

Therefore, Raskin called on Congress to hold “hearings on the cost of the arms race, whether it is related to anyone’s security, and whether there are means to secure the United States” besides using nuclear threats. During a convocation held at Riverside Church in the late 1970s, Barnet expressed a similar concern over the fact that as the arms race continued and the American people did not have a say in nuclear policy. Depriving Americans of the ability to determine whether their government used weapons that could result in their own death, put the citizenry “in the same position as the people of Jonestown,” Barnet argued.⁴⁹

Left out of the conversation regarding military spending and nuclear policy, the real needs of the American people escaped the attention of officials in power, IPS intellectuals argued. Furthermore, groups like the CPD encouraged the view that American decline in the recent past stemmed from military blunders and insufficient military forces. Barnet responded to CPD claims by arguing that American officials, no doubt influenced by neoconservatives, misunderstood the meaning of power at the twilight of the American century. According to Barnet, instead of worrying about the “Finlandization” of America and calling for massive arms increases, as neoconservatives in the CPD did, America needed to learn from France’s fall to Hitler in 1940. “The greatest army in Europe surrendered because the society it was defending had rotted,” Barnet claimed. To guard against internal decay, America needed to divert its limited resources to social programs and allow for the preservation of the “values for which the nation was founded—justice, opportunity, and the liberation of the human spirit.” That is to say, Barnet did not believe that America’s inability to influence the world had anything

⁴⁹ Raskin, “Towards a Modern National Security Policy,” 65; Richard J. Barnet, “History of the Arms Race, 1945-1978,” 13.

to do with the military capabilities of the United States.⁵⁰ “Something was happening in the late twentieth century to change the traditional relationship between the capacity to make war and the ability to exercise political power,” Barnet claimed. Military domination no longer assured political success. The thriving economies of West Germany and Japan illustrated an “uncoupling of economic power and military power” so that massive military spending no longer necessarily resulted in a strong overall economy. In fact, Barnet explained that a bloated military budget often weakened a nation. He argued that “excessive military spending now produces some of the same consequences as military defeat; that is, it gives foreign governments greater control over the life of the country.”⁵¹ As America spent its riches on strengthening its military, Germany and Japan modernized their industrial sectors.

IPS intellectuals believed that greater participation by the American citizenry would force government officials to redirect spending from military to social programs. Therefore, IPS intellectuals offered several blueprints for creating an economy no longer dependent on what critics of military spending still label “military Keynesianism,” after the economist John Maynard Keynes, who advocated for greater government spending as a means to heighten consumer demand. The issue of converting America’s economy from a war-time to a peace-time economy held the attention of Barnet for most of his time at IPS. In his 1969 book *The Economy of Death*, Barnet excoriated American leaders and educators for funneling the nation’s students into jobs that benefitted the national security state at the expense of the welfare of its citizens. When “our best and brightest, most

⁵⁰ Barnet, *Real Security*, 113-118.

⁵¹ Richard Barnet, “A Reporter at Large: The Search for National Security,” *The New Yorker*, April 27, 1981, 120, 140.

creative people are given the incentive to apply their talents to the essentially insoluble problem of finding security in the technology of death,” education and healthcare suffer, Barnet wrote. In his view, the real problems of society remained unresolved due to neglect. Yet, while U.S. officials displayed little concern over America’s crumbling public and social infrastructure, citizens did, and they often voiced their displeasure through protests. In regard to protests, Barnet feared that “a society that has decided that it cannot afford to deal with the causes of unrest must suppress unrest” and essentially become a totalitarian state.⁵²

Later on in *The Economy of Death*, while detailing the steps required to convert from a military to peacetime economy, Barnet called on the government to aid in transition. The government had to promise corporations that federal funds would cover some of the costs associated with risky ventures. “Only when making high-speed transport systems is as profitable as making missiles will the weapons-makers voluntarily move out of the death business,” Barnet claimed. He further argued that the federal government needed to “subsidize the technology of peace as it has subsidized the technology of war” by helping keep wages high and conducting research on groundbreaking ideas. Barnet recommended creating a National Conversion Commission tasked with aiding the transition from a war to peace economy easier. The commission would provide funding for scientists and engineers as they transitioned from making technology for wars to technology that benefitted civilians. Towns devastated by the loss of their local military production facilities would be given “special assistance” because, Barnet argued, “they are ‘disaster areas’ and should be eligible for the sort of

⁵² Richard J. Barnet, *The Economy of Death* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 8-10.

extraordinary relief that is given to communities stricken by flood or tornado.”⁵³ No longer fearing a depression caused by a reduction in military spending as a result of disarmament, Americans, IPS intellectuals hoped, would push more forcefully for the destruction of nuclear weapons.

As this study has shown, while hoping to influence policymakers, IPS also insisted on empowering ordinary citizens to act outside of government. Thus, in May 1983, IPS and the Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized a meeting in Minneapolis between forty representatives from the United States and another forty Soviet representatives. The Minneapolis conference represented the first of several meetings over the next three years, with the delegates meeting in the Soviet Union in 1984 and in San Francisco the year after. Participants at the inaugural conference included former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Patricia Derian and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under President Carter, Donald McHenry, who also co-chaired the conference with Minneapolis Mayor Donald Fraser. Paul Warnke, who had served as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a negotiator at the SALT II talks, provided a paper for the conference, though he did not attend. Other well-known activists that appeared included Randall Forsberg, Cora and Peter Weiss, Reverend William Sloan Coffin, the editor of the *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists* Ruth Adams, Jerome Grossman of the Council for a Livable World, and co-chairman of SANE Seymour Melman.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., 153-158.

⁵⁴ John Rees, “Freezers Meet With Soviets to Make Plans,” *The Review of the News*, June 15, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 1, 32.

Explaining the importance of continuing the conversation between IPS and the Soviet group, a funding proposal for one of the later meetings stated, “They [the meetings] expose leading scholars and activists from the disarmament movement to serious discussion with Soviet scholars on arms control and disarmament.” The proposal claimed that the exchanges “develop[ed] an educated community able to challenge conservative scholars in discussion on what is possible with the Soviet Union.” Not surprisingly, Raskin highlighted the significance of average citizens taking part in disarmament talks. The IPS co-founder celebrated the fact that the meetings opened the way for citizens of the two superpowers to get together and create an agreement for general and complete disarmament. In other words, a type of citizen diplomacy materialized in Minneapolis. After receiving input from “senior research institutes around the world,” Raskin felt “that by 1988 our work could be presented to all nations in many different forums.” To publicize the agreement, Raskin suggested that “joint U.S.-Soviet teams should travel together to discuss these matters with nations of military significance.” A report describing the planned meeting as a means to go beyond the freeze proposal. Participants would explore radical proposals to *reverse* the arms race.” Meetings at the “unofficial level,” would, the report suggested, “begin to influence the official negotiating agenda.”⁵⁵ The meetings, in other words, served as a way to end the isolation of government officials and bring into the discussion alternative viewpoints.

Although Raskin and other intellectuals and commentators involved with the Minneapolis conference reveled in the possibility of bringing ordinary citizens into the

⁵⁵ “Program on National Security General Support Proposal,” no author, 1986, IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 47, 7; Marcus Raskin to Dr. A.A. Vasiliev, October 16, 1985, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 30; Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, March 15, 1983, “Institute for Policy Studies in 1983: A summary of Projected Work,” IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 12.

foreign policy debate, the latter's inclusion led to a few tense moments when the audience posed questions to the delegates. Rather than issues related to disarmament, many of the queries from the floor related to the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews and restrictions on their emigration, which led Soviet delegate Genrikh Trofimenko to reply brusquely, "Whoever wants to emigrate from the Soviet Union can." Derian, Carter's assistant secretary of state for human rights, later said of her experiences at the meeting, "For me, the discussions were as weightless as the spoon [referring to a gift she received from a Soviet delegate]. And as ceremonial. There is never a concession of imperfection by Soviets around a table; total denial is the norm." Yet Derian felt that the meetings needed to occur. "We must meet because our diversity seems mad to them and their singular intolerance of diversity seems mad to us," she explained. Finding some sort of common cause between the superpowers, Derian continued, "comes with meeting the same people over and over again, getting past opening statements and host/guest rituals to whatever else is there."⁵⁶

Conservative politicians and commentators, however, did not have such an open mind when it came to reaching an agreement with the Soviets. Writing to Secretary of State George P. Schultz regarding the IPS-sponsored meeting, Congressman Larry McDonald (GA-R), along with several of his colleagues, claimed, "All available evidence indicates that the 'exchanges' and 'dialogue' advertised for the Minneapolis conference are a fraud." They further argued that the Soviet delegation would be "salted with professional KGB officers to have full access to American decision-makers and those

⁵⁶ For Trofimenko quote, see Arch Puddington, "The New Soviet Apologists," *Commentary Magazine*, November 1, 1983. Patricia Derian, "Talking to Russians: Why Bother?," *The Washington Post*, June 9, 1983, A19.

who influence U.S. public opinion.” Reporting on the U.S.-U.S.S.R Bilateral Exchange Conference, John Rees, a longtime opponent of IPS, alleged, “Among the Soviets were known ‘active measures’ specialists, and they played the conference as a classical political influence operation.” As for the U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Friendship Society and the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, Rees claimed, “These institutions operate under the direction of a shadowy and supreme Soviet espionage service that can give orders to both the K.G.B. and the G.R.U.” He was referring to the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, which replaced the Comintern.⁵⁷ As it turned out, the IPS conferences received more attention from the conservative press and anti-communist politicians than from more respectable media venues and political leaders.⁵⁸ Thus, in the highly charged atmosphere of Cold War politics, even citizen diplomats with the best of intentions faced a difficult time reaching the decision-makers in Washington.

As noted above, IPS intended for the bilateral talks between citizens from the United States and the Soviet Union to offer a way to move “beyond the freeze proposal” that dominated disarmament discussions. Randall Forsberg, a founding director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts, grabbed the attention of the American public and politicians when she issued a “Call to Halt the Arms Race” in 1980. Popular due to its simplicity, the “Call” demanded an immediate stoppage of all weapons testing, production, and deployment. Various individuals had put forward

⁵⁷ Larry McDonald to George P. Schultz, May 12, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 28, folder 18; John Rees, “Freezers Meet With Soviets to Make Plans,” *The Review of the News*, June 15, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 1, 32.

⁵⁸ For instance, according to the *Washington Post*, the most significant information to come out of the first meeting was the acknowledgement by one of the Soviet participants that his nation might institute a launch-on-warning strategy to counter Reagan’s arms buildup. See Dusko Doder, “Soviets Said to Consider Faster Nuclear Missile Launch in Crisis,” *The Washington Post*, April 11, 1982, A5.

a similar demand for a freeze—including the lead U.S. negotiator for the SALT I talks, Gerard Smith—but Forsberg’s appeal found the largest audience and led to the formation of the nuclear weapons freeze campaign.⁵⁹

Not all intellectuals at IPS, however, supported the idea of a freeze. IPS, in fact, shared with the American Friends Service Committee and the War Resisters League, among other groups, an ambivalence toward the freeze, believing that Forsberg’s proposal did not advance any unilateral measures for America to undertake.⁶⁰ Raskin, for instance, found many shortcomings with such an approach. In a 1982 letter to Cora Weiss—daughter of Samuel Rubin, a major funder of IPS from its earliest years, and wife of Peter Weiss, who served as IPS’s first chairman of the board of directors—Raskin expressed his reservations regarding the nuclear freeze movement. He feared that politicians would use the freeze option to forestall talks about disarmament or, at the very least, turn the freeze proposal into a watered-down version of its former self. For instance, he argued that the Democrats had co-opted the issue and, in the process, took the initiative away from the American people. Allowing Democrats to stand at the forefront of the freeze movement politicized the issue. As a result, moving forward with the freeze depended on electoral victory for Democrats, Raskin concluded.⁶¹

Due to the popularity of the proposal among both politicians and the general public, the ideals behind the freeze became a “shared rhetoric,” with everyone proclaiming their support for ending the nuclear arms race. For Raskin, the fact that so

⁵⁹ David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 141. For more on Forsberg and the nuclear freeze movement, see Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent*, 157-170; Robert Surbrug, Jr., *Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974-1990* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 136-170.

⁶⁰ Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent*, 165, 210.

⁶¹ Marcus Raskin to Cora Weiss, July 14, 1982, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 13.

many officials who had previously supported massive spending on arms suddenly changed course and advocated a nuclear freeze made it “hard to distinguish the victims from the executioners” of a nuclear war. In order to make it perfectly clear who really supported a nuclear freeze, Raskin suggested devising a “practical action which cannot be symbolically or rhetorically coopted because what is involved is the direct challenge to power.” In other words, Raskin wanted to develop a proposal and campaign that could not “be easily adopted by the executioners.” The action must “draw a line . . . on our side of the line, show[ing] cultural alternatives, possibilities that define a different type of relationship and possibility for humanity.” Raskin listed several possible actions for Weiss and the Riverside Church to carry out. One possibility involved having church members pay the portion of their taxes that normally would have gone to weapons production into a “Church Fund,” which would “be proclaimed as the peace and justice fund.” Raskin also suggested that localities and states pass laws that punished “nuclear age crimes,” which included “crimes against humanity,” “preparation for aggressive war,” and “destruction of innocent populations,” among others.⁶²

The current IPS director, Borosage, also disagreed with the freeze proposal, believing that while it sounded good in theory, it would take too long to put into action. Describing the anti-nuclear movement’s approach as “prudent,” Borosage wrote, “The notion of a nuclear arsenal is not challenged: focus is placed not on disarmament, but on ending the arms build-up.” Nonetheless, Borosage supported several measures put forth by the anti-nuclear activists. For instance, he supported the main premise of the freeze, which involved stopping further production of all nuclear weapons. Borosage questioned

⁶² Marcus Raskin to Cora Weiss, July 14, 1982, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 13.

the emphasis in the freeze proposal on bilateral actions, which, he claimed, would mean that negotiations to carry out the freeze would not begin until 1986, with ratification likely taking at least another year. During this time, Borosage claimed, production of more and deadlier nuclear weapons would continue. He feared as well that the continued dependence on negotiations between the two superpowers “insur[ed] that the arms establishment in both countries retain control of the action,” and thus cause further delay in the freeze’s implementation. Therefore, Borosage supported a “unilateral freeze” carried out by the United States. While he expected immediate outrage by critics on the Left and Right for advocating such a policy, Borosage did not understand the contempt for a unilateral freeze since the Defense Department periodically destroyed warheads unilaterally. “The condemnation of unilateral initiatives should be seen for what it is: a refuge for executive officials who do not want the public or the legislature to infringe upon their prerogatives.”⁶³ The freeze, as Raskin and Borosage understood, offered politicians a visible and relatively simple proposal to cling to. In the end, IPS intellectuals believed that co-optation and bureaucratic inertia would prevent the freeze from becoming a reality.

In calling on the U.S. to end its ideological Cold War against the Soviet Union, IPS intellectuals hoped to create an environment more amenable to disarmament. IPS intellectuals pursued a strategy whereby a changed understanding of the value of nuclear weapons would allow for their ultimate destruction. By merely downplaying their significance, the U.S. government, IPS intellectuals contended, could encourage

⁶³ Robert Borosage, “The Bilateral Box,” *Working Papers for a New Society*, May/June 1983, IPS Reprint, IPSR, WHS, box 30, folder 19, 1-2, 4. For an argument similar to Borosage’s, see Pam Solo, *From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988).

disarmament. Arms control, on the other hand, offered more of the same. In tandem with developing a greater trust of the Soviets and devaluing nuclear weapons, IPS intellectuals encouraged the United States to disarm unilaterally. Even a freeze, as advocated by activists in the anti-nuclear movement, required independent actions by the United States if such a strategy hoped to succeed. Unlike the majority of liberal intellectuals, IPS did not turn away from disarmament in favor of arms control. Therefore, when the freeze proposal found widespread support in the 1980s, IPS offered only a tepid defense of it. Liberals and radicals had called for the United States to take unilateral measures in regard to testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, but few, since the 1960s, had encouraged the destruction of existing nuclear weapons by America. IPS intellectuals also saw greater input from citizens as preferable to a continued reliance on nuclear strategists and other experts.

Postscript

Born into an era of liberal ascendancy and persevering during the conservative revival of the 1970s and 1980s, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) challenged Cold War liberalism, conservatism, and neoconservatism. IPS intellectuals stood at the forefront of the fight against the Vietnam War and played a key role in the struggles of the late 1970s to make human rights a fundamental component of U.S. foreign policy. Then, as Cold War liberals became neoconservatives, IPS represented the only substantive opposition to the militaristic and ideological Cold War of the late 1970s and 1980s. Usually identified as the singular intellectual force of the 1980s, neoconservatives did not speak for all of America. IPS offered its own set of policies for the Cold War and, in the process, framed a liberal response to the neoconservatives. Therefore, in many ways, and as much as IPS disliked ideology, the Institute took part in an ideological battle against neoconservatives.

The diametrically opposed views of IPS intellectuals and neoconservatives became apparent when Irving Kristol helped found *The National Interest* in 1985. In the journal's inaugural issue, Kristol published an essay, "Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology," which, in the words of Gary Dorrien, "proclaimed that a nonideological politics in foreign affairs was a disarmed politics." In its very form liberal internationalism, which Kristol saw as the ideology guiding American foreign policy, was a type of "nonideological politics" since the strategy, with its emphasis on international law, prevented America from asserting itself in international affairs. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, succeeded in making Marxism-Leninism attractive, in

the words of Dorrien, to “alienated elites in the West and the Third World.” Instead of viewing the United States as one nation among many acting in accordance with international law, Kristol, in his other writings on foreign policy, urged U.S. policymakers to allow a strong nationalistic ideology to guide their actions. Showing an utter lack of concern for the difficulties facing Third World nations, Kristol wanted to bring an end to the United Nations. Additionally, Kristol, as well as other neoconservatives, found the liberal emphasis on human rights abhorrent. Using ideology as a weapon, neoconservatives would “unmask America’s reigning, self-weakening ideology of human rights,” according to Dorrien. A concern for human rights too often led to what Kristol called “antinationalist isolationism.” Kristol and other neoconservatives advocated that America follow a policy of “nationalist unilateralism” that harnessed the power of ideology in support of American intervention abroad to rollback communism. So strong was Kristol’s defense of unilateralism that he even opposed U.S. involvement in NATO.¹

Although sharing with Kristol the label neoconservative, commentator Charles Krauthammer supported a much more aggressive foreign policy for America. Dorrien has described Krauthammer as “neoconservatism’s chief exponent of the democratic globalist faith.” As long as it coincided with American national interest, Krauthammer believed that the United States needed to hasten the spread of democracy across the globe. Krauthammer saw no contradiction between maintaining a democracy at home and becoming an imperial power. Even if America lost some its freedoms, Krauthammer still considered an American empire worthwhile. He compared such a forfeiture of democracy

¹ Gary Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 115-123.

to “a kind of foreign aid program in which the transfer is made in the coin of democratic practice rather than cash.”² While neoconservatives like Krauthammer promoted American exceptionalism and called on the nation to undertake a crusade to spread democracy, IPS, as this study has shown, argued that a militaristic and interventionist foreign policy actually decreased democracy at home and abroad.

Thus, even a cursory glance at the foreign policy writings of these two leading neoconservatives highlights the stark differences between the IPS vision of the world and the alternative put forward by neoconservatives. On almost every issue of importance to IPS—ideology, international law, the United Nations, the Third World, human rights, co-existence between the superpowers, and democracy—neoconservatives took an opposing position. At the same time, the counter-arguments put forth by IPS intellectuals offer proof that a neoconservative approach to foreign affairs did not lack a comprehensive opposition on the Left.

With the Cold War coming to an end, IPS held no illusions about the likely course of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Although the influence of neoconservatives declined during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, calls for a more assertive foreign policy did not disappear.³ While this study is interested in IPS during the Cold War, it is worth noting that the Institute considered the national security state just as much of a threat in the post-Cold War world.

² Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind*, 324-333.

³ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and Global Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74-111; James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 216-247; Gary Dorrien, *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Maria Ryan, *Neoconservatism and the New American Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

While the Soviet Union no longer represented as great of a danger to the nation's security, the Cold War mindset still prevailed among America's foreign policy experts. IPS broke down its research pursuits into three overarching categories, or "working groups," in 1989. These working groups formed around the issues of foreign policy, globalization, and the role of citizens in domestic policy. In explaining why IPS underwent this restructuring, a report noted, "There is hunger for new ideas for new ways to relate to the rest of the world but neither the Administration nor mainstream think tanks are presenting anything but dressed-up versions of Kissinger's détente or plans for a new American Century based on the collapse of communism."⁴

America's attitude at the end of the Cold War differed greatly from the Soviet Union's outlook, IPS intellectuals claimed. Writing in late 1989 as the Berlin Wall fell and former Soviet republics began leaving the Communist orbit, Barnet celebrated "the intellectual ferment of the new thinking in Moscow," which differed greatly from "the sober, cautious reshuffling of old thought" he found in Washington. Barnet blamed the contrasting mindsets on economic conditions in the two countries. With problems "too profound to ignore" and glasnost's allowing for "an astonishing process of self-examination and self-criticism," the Soviets had to search for an alternative to the Cold War. In America, on the other hand, with its economic recovery, "the national-security establishment of the United States feels vindicated by events and shows no enthusiasm for making major reductions in force levels and expenditures," Barnet wrote. Viewing the Cold War as inimical to their interests, the Soviet Union happily looked to a future free of conflict, according to Barnet. The United States had a completely different interpretation

⁴ Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, "IPS Program for Fiscal Year 1990," June 26, 1989, IPSR, WHS, box 84, folder 17, 2.

of events. “The Cold War prism has served to simplify and explain world events, to set limits on undesired domestic social spending—especially in the nineteen eighties—and to shift the domestic political consensus to the right,” Barnet concluded.⁵ Only begrudgingly would foreign policy specialists in America change their perspective of the world.

Therefore, despite the general agreement among scholars that neoconservatism replaced liberalism by the 1980s, this study has shown that the Institute for Policy Studies deserves just as prominent a place in postwar intellectual histories. Whereas Cold War liberals converted into neoconservatives, IPS intellectuals continued to advocate for a reconstructed liberalism based on the participatory ideals of John Dewey. The fellows at IPS refused to succumb to the bellicose language of the cold warriors associated with the Committee on the Present Danger and the voices of *The National Interest*. In the end, whether battling Cold War liberals or neoconservatives, IPS intellectuals stood as the guardians of a genuine liberalism.

⁵ Richard J. Barnet, “Reflection: After the Cold War,” *The New Yorker*, January 1, 1989, 68-69.

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Education

Ph.D. in History, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2009-2015

Dissertation: "A Think Tank on the Left: The Institute For Policy Studies and Cold War America, 1963-1989."

M.A. in History, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2006-2008

Thesis: "The Confluence of the Pen and the Sword in Protest at the University of Wisconsin in the 1960's."

Teaching Experience***Instructor in History, UW-Milwaukee, 2013-2014***

American History 404: Radicals & Social Change, 1930s-1970s: Fall 2013

American History 151: 1607-1877: Spring 2014

Teaching Assistant in History, UW-Milwaukee, 2006-2008 & 2009-2013

American History: 1607-1877: Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Fall 2012

American History 1877 to the Present: Fall 2006, Fall 2008, Fall 2011

World History Since 1500: Spring 2013

North American Indian History Since 1877: Spring 2007, Spring 2012

The 1960s in the United States: A Cultural History: Spring 2008

The Vietnam War: Fall 2009

Big City Life viewed through HBO's "The Wire": Spring 2011

Professional Experience

Research Assistant, Encyclopedia of Milwaukee Project, 2014-2015

Articles, Encyclopedia Entries, & Book Review Essays

"Waging Peace in a Disarmed World: Arthur Waskow's Vision of a Nonlethal Cold War," *Peace & Change: A Journal of Peace Research* 40 (July 2015): 339-367.

"World War I Peace Movement," "Peace Movement, 1930s," "Antiwar Movement," and "Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign," in *Imperialism and Expansionism in American History: A Social, Political, and Cultural Encyclopedia*, eds. David Bernstein and Chris J. Magoc (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. (Forthcoming, 2015).

"Family, War, and Democracy: The Fortunes of Liberalism and Conservatism in Post-1960s America." Review essay of *All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s*, by Robert O. Self, and *A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra Campaign*, by Roger Peace. *Left History* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2013), 88-98.

Book Reviews

Review of *The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism*, edited by Dan Berger. *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2013), 147-149.

Review of *The Admirable Radical: Staughton Lynd and Cold War Dissent, 1945-1970*, by Carl Mirra. U.S. Intellectual History Blog, <http://us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com/2011/02/book-review-mueller-on-mirras-admirable.html>.

Conferences

“Let the People Decide: The Institute for Policy Studies & Participatory Democracy in Liberal America,” 2015 Society for U.S. Intellectual History Seventh Annual Conference, Washington D.C., October 15-18, 2015.

“Confronting America’s National Security State: The Institute for Policy Studies and the Vietnam War,” 2015 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., June 25-27, 2015 (I organized).

“A Think Tank Against Empire: The Institute for Policy Studies’ Opposition to America’s National Security Managers,” 2014 Society for U.S. Intellectual History Sixth Annual Conference, Indianapolis, IN, October 9-12, 2014 (I organized).

“A Think Tank Against Empire: The Institute for Policy Studies and the Vietnam Antiwar Movement,” 2014 Popular Culture Association/American Culture Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, April 16-19, 2014.

“Power to the People: The Institute for Policy Studies and Participatory Democracy in the Neighborhood,” 38th Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association, Chicago, IL, November 21-24, 2013.

“Decentralization and the Neighborhood: The Thinking of Paul Goodman, Milton Kotler, Karl Hess, and the Institute for Policy Studies,” UWM Urban Studies Programs 18th Annual Student Forum, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, April 27, 2013.

“Disarmament Without Borders: Arthur Waskow’s Exploration of Strategies for a World Police Force,” The Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Borders, Boundaries, and Peace Conference, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, February 28-March 1, 2013.

“The Institute for Policy Studies and the Radical Confrontation with Realpolitik,” Society For U.S. Intellectual History 2012 Conference and Annual Meeting, CUNY Graduate Center, November 1-2, 2012 (Paper accepted, but conference cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy).

“Fighting Imperialism from Within the Empire: The Institute for Policy Studies Against American Intervention,” 2012 Windy City Graduate Student History Conference, University of Illinois, Chicago, October 13, 2012.

“Dictators, Global Capitalism, and Human Rights in the Third World: The Institute for Policy Studies and the Left’s Response to Globalization,” Midwest Labor and Working-Class History Graduate Student Colloquium, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, February 18, 2012.

Manuscript Reviewer

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Awards

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Department of History Travel Grant, 2013

Community Service

Judge, National History Day, Southeastern Wisconsin Regional, UW-Milwaukee, 2007-2015