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Multiculturalism revisited:

towards a shared national membership in a
multicultural, democratic nation-state

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**PhD in Sociology
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Declaration

In accordance with University regulations, I hereby declare that:

1. This thesis has been solely composed by myself;
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Signed

Eeke Dix

September 2015

Abstract

This thesis investigates the negotiated interpretations of “self” amongst 2nd generation Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. It thus enhances our understanding of a national identity that is both cohesive as well as susceptible to the multicultural dimensions the modern nation-state inhabits. As part of a theoretical evaluation of multiculturalism, the focus is on the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism, and between acknowledging the civic and ethnic dimensions that embody and unite the national “self”. The thesis unpicks how and in which ways these elements influence the accommodation, the respect and inclusion of the ethno-culturally diverse “other”. Multiculturalism theory tends to overlook this important symbiosis which might explain the current, widespread public and political stance that no longer regards multiculturalism as a viable, sustainable approach to diversity.

The Netherlands is an interesting case study not least because it was portrayed as the multicultural example and yet illuminates a gradual, yet devastating and definite abandonment of multiculturalism. This was symbolized by the assassination of film maker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh whose murderer, a young, educated, Dutch-Moroccan man, claimed to have killed in the name of Islam. The main analysis involves data from thirteen interviewees conducted with seven Dutch-Moroccans and six Dutch-Turks. Such 2nd generation migrants have seen their “Dutchness” contested and/or questioned despite the fact that their upbringing, education and daily life has largely occurred in the Netherlands. Other forms of data collection include a small scale online survey, a pilot participant observation session, and conducted interviews with experts of relevant organisations. This hybrid *mélange* of data illuminates methodological issues of researching a target group that is highly “researched”.

The thesis commences with a contextual chapter that illuminates changing (inter)national public and political discourse on integration and offers a critical overview of Dutch immigration and integration policies (chapter 4). The Dutch approach of “pillarized multiculturalism” illuminates a key flaw in the practical implementation of multiculturalism where the focus on bonding rather than bridging accentuated a rigidified, “pillarized” segmentation of cultural difference according to social categories rather than individual integrity. As a consequence of these policies, an embedded notion of categorical “differentness” is sustained, and is reflected in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals’ identification processes of “self”. In this regard, the role of culture is highlighted in two distinct ways that acts a) as a tool that serves Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to negotiate an individualistic, civic, *inclusive* “Dutchness” as part of their religious and ethno-cultural affiliations and b) as an essentialist force that embodies a “culturalist” Dutch identity that is ethno-ancestrally *exclusive* (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The thesis thus demonstrates the civic-ethnic dialectic inherent in national identity. This dialectic, comprising dilemmas of exclusion and inclusion and boundaries

between majority and minority cultures, can shape a better understanding of a national membership that induces both national cohesion as well as accommodates multicultural diversity.

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Recently, multiculturalism has been widely criticized as having no future and has in fact been pronounced dead (Joppke 2004; McGhee 2008), however, in this study I suggest to reinvent rather than discard it. My main argument is that the theoretical basis to multiculturalism still offers a promising approach to incorporating (multicultural) diversity where it is understood that “difference” is a fundamental process of social identification and interaction that therefore, should be recognized (Modood 2007). In this regard, diversity – of any kind – is worth our acceptance and recognition because it is an essentially “natural” societal condition consequential of identity formation processes where ever-changing frontiers between similarities and differences occur and are thought meaningful (Barth 1969). In other words, identity matters and it can only be understood as a fluid and reflexive dialectic of difference and similarity: what makes the “other” inherently tells us something about “us”.

Nevertheless, there exists a tension between a national(ist) appeal for uniformity-of similarity – under “the” national culture and the accommodation of multicultural diversity within the state. In order to understand a society that is not only conscious of its great diversity but also susceptible to better accommodate cultural differences, the symbiosis between identity, culture and nation is important. In this regard, I am equally concerned with the accommodation of diversity as well as the interpretation of “self”, i.e. the forms of cultural identification in relation to the nation-state. Which dimensions of national identification –or national cultural aspects– best “suit” the incorporation of multiculturalism?

Hence, it is not simply necessary to acknowledge the cultural “other” but also to be aware of the cultural embodiment of the national “self”. The national “self” might be referred to as the collective of the (western) democratic nation-state and the dualistic character it embodies in the form of (a) a liberal-political, egalitarian-based

citizenship and (b) its national identity, encompassing ethnic and civic elements that frame the cultural embodiment of the nation-state. I argue that theorists of multiculturalism often tend to neglect the role of the latter, i.e. the cultural contours of the nation-state and subsequently, how this cultural frame affects distinguishing a shared sense of national belonging in a multicultural society.

Multiculturalism theory does not fully address this vital point. Multiculturalism theorists (Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994) correctly argue that cultural identities should be recognized, because it creates confidence in individuals to participate in society. Yet, in order for individuals to integrate in society the recognition of cultural backgrounds is not sufficient: an overarching identity is needed that relates to individuals from all different backgrounds. This fleshes out the important relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism that crystallizes identification processes of similarity and difference. In this sense, shared national identification constitutes an important marker in people's lives as to who they are and relate to, yet not exclusively as the existence of plurality in cultural identities equally deserves recognition, respect and affirmation. The central question is: how can we negotiate a shared national membership which simultaneously embraces and acknowledges cultural diversity? This issue needs to be addressed in order to tackle "essentialist" judgments of majority versus minority cultures that fuel the marginalization, segregation and alienation of individuals in society. Ultimately, finding a shared national membership enhances rather than undermines the unity of a nation-state democracy which is vital to the sustainability of shared coexistence and identification.

The pitfall of multiculturalism – in its implementation as well as ideological contemplation – has been the creation of divisions between Majority versus minority cultures, thereby enhancing cultural differences as social inequalities and cultures as static group identities.

In order to understand better the contours of a shared national belonging, the role of culture is explored, as a tool and dimension in individual and social identification processes. In this sense, whatever it holds socially, culture is certainly not essentialist or clear-cut.

Therefore, I argue for the exploration of national identification in relation to the promotion of cultural diversity, as a dialogue and active contemplation to ultimately establish a shared multicultural citizenship that emphasizes shared values but nevertheless takes into account the multiplicity and fluidity of cultural affiliations. This is a fine balance to be established between what Jenkins calls, 'the potential tyranny of compulsory inclusion' (2008: 20) without 'foregrounding difference [that] underestimates the reality and significance of human collectivity' (ibid: 23). This study intends to provide an understanding of a shared national membership that allows for individual identity interpretations whilst enhancing shared membership and inclusion.

This thesis concerns the negotiated dimensions of national identification in a multicultural nation-state. It specifically reflects upon interpretations of "self" amongst 2nd generation Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals whose national membership, commitment and loyalty have been questioned from time to time in both societal and political context. This choice underlies the notion that for these individuals, contemplations of national belonging are relatively more "problematic" compared to their Dutch-Dutch peers. It is the assumption that investigating these perceptions of national "self" illuminate dialectics of similarity and difference, i.e. of "us" versus "them". These dialectics unpack "standardized" majority (Dutch national identity) and "individualized" ("Dutchness") minority negotiations of national belonging, and, the accompanying civic and ethnic markers that evoke the alignment and discrepancies between these two (broad) interpretations of national membership. This thesis critically investigates civic-ethnic characterizations of nationalism and national culture. It tackles the

dichotomous notion that emphasizes civic markers as inclusionary “thin” and ethnic labels as exclusionary “thick” notions of national culture, and, the presumption that – by default - these markers are more and less accommodating of diversity, respectively.

Here, I need to remark that although I attempted to avoid, in some places I am guilty of using national culture and identity interchangeably. That is because in this study I delineate the role of culture; both as a flexible, ever-changing tool in social and individual identification processes as well as a component that “formalizes” a sense of national membership, community and identification. Hence, culture is a multilayered and idiosyncratic framework upon which individuals shape a sense of identity, yet to what degree national culture *equals* national identity – and thus bears certain components that “standardize” and unify - is a query unresolved. In this regard, it might best to think of identity as identification and hence as a process of “culturalization”.

1.1 Theoretical underpinnings and objectives

In this research, I embarked upon the idea to investigate *individual* perceptions of national identity as part of social identification processes in which the idea of the nation, *as a whole*, is sustained. The aim was to provide an “individualized” view of national identity constructions alternative to the dominant conception in nationalism research that often treats individuals as ‘*merely* part of [...] collectivities’ (Cohen 1996: 803). To outline this methodological motivation Guibernau’s clear and helpful definition of national identity is considered.

Guibernau notes:

I argue that national identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature, one by means of which a community sharing a particular set

of characteristics is led to the subjective belief that its members are ancestrally related. Belief in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment, and destiny have been invoked, with varying intensity at different times and places, by peoples claiming to share a particular national identity (Guibernau 2004: 134).

In Chapter 2 I will attempt to filter and merge the theoretical dimensions of national identity as consisting of both civic-political and ethno-cultural aspects related to the modern concept of the nation. Yet, exploring national identity also activates socio-psychological perceptions of belonging, similarity and difference which are evoked as part of the symbiosis between individual and social identification processes. As Guibernau's definition highlights, the nation is a 'community' which emphasizes the social identification dimensions in which *individuals*, as part of that national community, enforce a shared national identity. The nation is thus not an entity *in itself*; it is rather an 'imagined community' that is united through the shared perceptions of individuals who consider themselves as part of that community (Anderson 1983: 6). The symbolic power of national identity lies in the daily reinforcing remembrance of the nation-state, practiced by all those individuals that belong to that particular nation-state (Billig 1995).

This might be termed 'personal nationalism' where Cohen states that; 'nationalism becomes at once a compelling means of both locating and depicting their selves [individuals]. Through their ownership of their selves, they "own" the nation...' (Cohen 1996: 808). In this regard, the sustainability of national identity is in the interplay between individual and social identification processes and it is important to research its reproduction, reinforcement and interpretation according to these identification processes. Therefore, this research approaches and investigates national identity as part of individuals' private perceptions that are nevertheless part of a social, national alignment.

This research purpose illuminates the constructivist epistemological rationale behind the research methodology. For the sake of emphasis, I differentiate the

“social” from the “constructivism”, or, as Crotty (1998) has outlined: the difference between “constructionism” and “constructivism”. In this regard, my constructivist outlook refers to the theoretical dimensions of the research design that ‘focus[es] exclusively on the meaning-making activity of the individual mind’ (58). However, as a methodological implementation, my research strategy considers constructionism (or “social” constructivism) as explanatory for ‘all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially, social context’ (1998: 42). Thus, although this research was designed to articulate individuals’ subjective meaning-making processes of national “self” as an alternative for essentializing Dutch national identity *in its entirety*, it is nevertheless understood that these individual national identity contemplations are (partly) constructed in the interactive, social realm of that national collective.

To iterate this point, Weber’s ‘interpretative sociology’ is useful where he notes:

...the individual and his action as the basic unit, as its ‘atom’ [...] In general, for sociology, such concepts as ‘state’, ‘association’, ‘feudalism’ and the like, designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to ‘understandable’ action, that is, without exception, to the actions of participating individual men (1970: 55).

To resonate Weber’s argument, the emphasis in this PhD study is on the interactive and contextual meaning-making through and by individual Dutch nationals who, as part of Dutch society, community and family, i.e. as part of social categories, construct a sense of “self” that in itself reflects back upon these social paradigms and their meanings. I will expand upon this main research objective in Chapter 3 to explain the methodological decisions made regarding the implemented methods and the research groups targeted.

1.2 Why the Netherlands?

The Netherlands makes for an interesting case exactly because it demonstrates a country often considered *the* multiculturalist [meaning a policy approach/philosophical attitude towards incorporating diversity] example and yet is a country that has so definitively abandoned it as an approach to diversity (Entzinger 2003). The Netherlands is now a country where the populist anti-Islamic Party for Freedom (PVV) has entered government after the recent 2010 national elections; where the wearing of headscarves in public places might be banned; where integration and immigration laws have tightened concerning citizenship and language tests; where the focus is now on *the* “Dutch” versus *the* “others” (Ghorashi 2009: 84).

In its practical implementation and execution of multiculturalist policies, the Dutch case illuminates the two particular flaws inherent in multiculturalism. Firstly, where multiculturalism predominantly focuses on the preservation, sponsoring and ‘bonding’¹ of cultural collectives it inattentively spurs to ‘cage’ individuals according to rigidly defined communities that are supposedly culturally uniform (Hall 2003). In this regard, it discounts the complex dynamics inherent in individuals’ identification processes that establish a sense of “self” as part of multi-interpretable and fluctuating social patterns. Dutch 1980s multiculturalist policies especially, are exemplary of this problematic that, in part, built on earlier remnants of 1950s “pillarization”: a hierarchical yet peaceful stratification of Dutch social and political life, categorically dividing a Protestant, Catholic, Social Democrat and Liberal pillar. In this regard, the sponsoring of ethnic minorities – Moluccans, “caravan dwellers”, “foreign workers” etc. – generated an “essentialist” focus on ethnic categories as pillars which is best termed “pillarized multiculturalism” (Soysal 1994).

Subsequently and secondly, Dutch “pillarized multiculturalist” (and later integration) policies neglected the importance to ‘bridge’ the multicultural “other”

¹ See Putnam (1993) for a detailed exploration of the ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ of social capital

into the national collective. These policies thus failed to fully acknowledge that the contours of the national “self” are formed as part of the interaction between the individual “self” and the nation-state the individual identifies with. In other words, the contours of the national “self” are reflected in the eyes of those who behold and want to behold.

The Dutch multiculturalist experience is different to other European countries because, although Dutch integration policies have changed over time, all indicate a persistently, “embedded” categorical and essentialist manner of “dealing with diversity” influenced by the Dutch tradition of pillarisation (Ghorashi 2006). For this reason, the Netherlands makes for an interesting case revisiting multiculturalism.

1.3 Whose identification processes and why?

Considering the fact that the socio-cultural position of 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background specifically, has become a particularly acute topic in recent years - the political developments of which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 – I chose to explore the identification processes of these two particular groups. My reasoning behind this decision needs further explanation. As part of the two largest post-war migrant communities in the Netherlands, there has been much scholarly, public and political attention for the relatively slow socio-economic transition and integration of these individuals into Dutch society (van Praag 2006; Crul et al. 2012; Crul and Doomernik 2003; Pels and de Gruijter 2006; Londen et al. 2007; Vermeulen en Penninx 2000; Driessen 2004; Crul and Heerling 2008). In light of this expansive body of research, I chose to focus on these particular groups of individuals so to draw from the existing research yet with a different incentive in mind.

That is because, the focus on socio-economic status – issues are for example, the relatively higher percentage of criminality activity and educational

underachievement amongst these individuals compared to their Dutch-Dutch peers – also unearths the larger “normative” debates of socio-cultural and national belonging and identification. Although 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background are firmly grounded in Dutch society – they were born in the Netherlands, they speak the Dutch language etc. – many express feelings of discursive exclusion (Ghorashi and van Tilburg 2006; Jaspers and Lubbers 2005). In other words, there is a perceived sense their “Dutchness” is not considered valid by others. In this research the focus is to specifically address these “discursive” contemplations of similarity and difference in relation to social and individual identification patterns.

This reasoning is further explained by the second characterization in Guibernau’s definition of national identity as a belief in ancestral relatedness that propels a sense of unification. In this regard, the cultural embodiment of national identity – which I discuss in chapter 2, signifies civic, civil as well as ethnic aspects– merges with the idea of ethnicity which often encapsulates constructed claims to a shared past and ancestry. Subsequently, the entanglement of culture and ethnicity – as will be discussed in chapter 2 - which manifests itself in a symbolically, shared national identity, then serves as a powerful, social classification mechanism to consider who is “in” and who is “out”. Eriksen (1993) argues that individuals in a state of ‘ethnic anomaly’ might find themselves between ethnic groups: difficult situations and legitimization issues might arise as to individuals’ identification with one group and not the other, depending on context and circumstances (1993: 63). This is a common social process, yet in the Netherlands this seems to be particularly acute amongst 2nd generation Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish background; the generation that sits “in between”. In this regard, these individuals seem to have a national identity that, for the moment, appears to be problematic and “contested”.

With regard to this hypothesis, some deliberation is necessary as to the terminology used to describe the research groups featured in this research. From the start, I struggled considerably finding appropriate yet “pragmatic” terms that could be used throughout the thesis to describe (but not label) individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background that have featured in the research. The term “2nd generation” I have used a few times now and for good order, in the research here, the 2nd generation is defined as individuals who either were born in the Netherlands or who came to the Netherlands before the age of 6 and who, at a later stage in life, have returned to Turkey/Morocco for no longer than one year² (Phalet et al. 2000: 190).

It can be pointed out that speaking in 2nd or 3rd generational terms is potentially problematic as it appears to classify those individuals who have foreign born parents as being implicit in a tale of migrant experience and/or history. As far as the definition goes (as outlined above), 2nd generation individuals often never came from “somewhere else”; they lived for most of their lives in the country where their parents eventually settled, growing up with the cultural customs, values and language of that country. Hence, a certain ambiguity appears in the use of the term “2nd generation” which implicates the individual in a story of migration - of being from somewhere else, bringing a certain “foreignness” – that mostly applies to their parents or sometimes grandparents. The term therefore seems obstructive to the process of inclusion individuals are grappling with. Yet, at the same time the term indicates a possible “inbetweenness” felt amongst 2nd generation individuals – indeed some interviewees noted the generational aspect to describe ‘sitting in between’ processes of identification. Having pointed out my awareness of the connotations surrounding the “2nd generation” terminology, wherever I (sparsely) use the term, I do so not to describe the individual’s identification and positioning

² In contrast, their parents or grandparents are considered the 1st generation and defined as all individuals who were not born in the Netherlands, were older than 6 years when they first came to the Netherlands and who at a later stage in life, for one year or longer, returned to Turkey/Morocco.

of self, but rather to point a demographic indicator, signifying the different demographic backgrounds between the individual and parent/grandparents.

In terms of national belonging, the hypothesis is that individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background portray a negotiated sense of “Dutchness”, rather than Dutch national identity. To convey this balanced positioning and offer more inclusive representations to describe 2nd generation individuals of Turkish and Moroccan background, I wanted to use hyphenated identities of being Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish which I thought more appropriate (Phalet et al. 2000; Eriksen 2007). However, hyphenated descriptions of identification give rise to the assumption of an “Americanized” sense of “self” that is civic and unproblematic and where your ethno-cultural background is chosen, engineered and appropriated to complement national citizenship. As we will see throughout the empirical chapters, identification processes of “Dutchness”, being Moroccan/Turkish and/or Muslim are far more problematic amongst survey respondents and interviewees. Nevertheless, for the sake of conciseness throughout this thesis, the use of hyphenated terminology to describe 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background should be understood as my personal judgment in offering more accommodating, inclusive, possibly “idealist” categories for enhancing incorporative rather than differential terminology in academic research on migration, multiculturalism and integration.

My choice to research those individuals whose national identity is “contested”: it highlights the ways in which “essentialist” (Dutch national identity) and “subjective” (“Dutchness”) perceptions of national identification are constructed and sustained. However, I do not mean to say that in these processes of national meaning-making one part is more “subjective” than the other.

This feeds into the third component of Guibernau’s definition, namely the ‘subjectivity’ of national identity. It is generally considered that an identity of

individual “self” is continuously (re)shaped according to social dynamics of interaction, contexts and situations. National identity is no exception: it is contextual, interpretative, fluid and flexible depending on the person you talk to. Yet, although it is difficult if not impossible to objectively “standardize” a particular national identity, in the minds of its members, the unity and uniqueness of the nation is defined and definable according to particular aspects, whether they are of a predominantly ethno-cultural or civic-political nature. In this regard, national identity acts as a homogenizing factor for those who consider themselves alike. Greenfeld (1993) therefore concludes that, ‘national identity, in distinction, provides an organizing principle applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity’ (1993: 13-14). In this sense, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks might contemplate an individualized “Dutchness” in relation to a collective, “standardized” Dutch national identity they do not necessarily identify with, or, are not considered to identify with by others.

In order to unearth these symbolic boundaries of social differentiation and similarity, it is important to investigate individual national identity perceptions amongst those who perceive not to be considered a part of the national collective. The objective to investigate *individual* rather than *collective* contemplations of national belonging also tackles the multiculturalist problematic of “caging” which I discuss in chapter 2. To investigate the “discursive” individual contours of national “self” is part of this research’ proposed re-evaluation of multiculturalism that is sustainable and avoids the categorization of cultures as essentialist groups representative of individuals per se. In this regard, the intricate, diffused national identity contemplations of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals, possibly divulge the particular aspects— whether they are civic and/or ethnic —that highlight the inclusive and exclusive boundaries between individual and collective notions of national identity. Subsequently, this might enhance our understanding towards a

shared national membership in a multicultural nation-state which is the main objective of this thesis.

1.4 Scoping the field

Theoretical incentives also address a particular gap in national identity studies that Condor and Abell have identified as ‘a relative lack of empirical work on the ways in which ordinary social actors construct themselves as nationalized subjects’ (2006: 52). A similar conclusion was made after reviewing the literature on Dutch national identity specifically; little quantitative and qualitative sociological research has been undertaken that focuses particularly on the subjective and interpretative constructions of Dutch individuals’ national identification patterns. Although of increasing interest to both the academic and political realm, studies on Dutch national identity *per se* are few and mainly comprise semi-governmental and European initiatives that have had clear “top-down” incentives (RMO³ 1999; ISSP⁴ 1995 and 2003; Grever and Ribbens for WRR⁵ 2007). Academic studies mainly comprise historic-ethnological, policy or socio-philosophical explorations of Dutch national identity, themed along aspects of public discourse and media (van Reekum 2012); socio-historical explorations (Lechner 2008; Smeeke 2010; van Ginkel 1999); representations in arts and culture (Boomkens 2010) and the changing interpretation of national identity and citizenship in governmental integration and immigration policies (Schinkel 2008; Duyvendak et al. 2009; Scholten 2007; Klaver and Odé 2011).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dutch national identity has predominantly featured as a “sidelined” component in studies concerned with the integration and emancipation of the four largest minority communities in the Netherlands: the Moroccan, Turkish, Suriname and Antillean community. Overall, the dominant rationale in these studies

³ De Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (RMO), or, Council for Social Development

⁴ International Social Survey Program

⁵ Scientific Council for Government Policy

has been to explain socio-cultural integration mainly in relation to socio-economic aspects of educational level, employment, language and criminality (Odé and Veenman 2003; Dagevos et al. 2003; Jaarrapport integratie Dagevos en Gijssberts 2009: 2010; Pels en Gruijter 2006). In this regard, there appears a dearth of research that has approached national identity *in its own right* and as part of individual identification constructions amongst ordinary nationals. In other words, it has failed to investigate how individuals in fact see themselves in Dutch society and how they construct a sense of being Dutch. Although Duyvendak et al. (2010) have explored the ‘culturalization’ of Dutch citizenship in individual focus-group discussions, the participants cannot be considered “ordinary actors” as they were specifically chosen because of their active involvement in civil engagement and discourse. A valuable exception to the rule concerns Ghorashi who has extensively researched national identity constructions and narratives amongst (Dutch) female migrants in the Netherlands (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012; Alghasi et al. 2009; Ghorashi and van Tilburg 2006). In line with her studies, this research was designed to contribute to the discursive investigation of Dutch national identity constructions amongst individuals of immigrant communities.

1.5 Why go compare?

I chose to focus on these two particular groups as they are representative of the two largest migrant communities in the Netherlands. Apart from that, I sought to address the considerable lack in comparative research that has focused specifically on identification processes of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. Although several studies have undertaken to map identification constructions and patterns of either one of these groups of individuals, few have done so comparatively (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 2009; Buitelaar 2006). Where comparative analysis *has* focused on identity contemplations of “self”, investigations have mainly probed identity constructions concerned with either religious (Muslim) identity (van Tubergen 2007; Maliepaard en Lubbers 2013; Pels

et al. 2008) or ethnic (Moroccan/Turkish) identification (el Bouk et al. 2013; Verkuyten 1992). In this regard, there has been little focus on the interactive exchange and interrelatedness between religious and ethnic with national identification patterns.

Remarkably, only a handful of studies have approached Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turks' individual perceptions of "self" involving a comparative analysis, investigating the correlative dynamics between feelings of being Dutch, Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish. As part of a longitudinal study, the 'Rotterdam Young People's Survey' conducted in 1999 and 2006, Phalet et al. (2000) and Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008) sought to "map" self-identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Dutch youngster residing in Rotterdam. In their 2000 introductory statement, they accredit the importance of their study to the implemented, comparative component:

The uniqueness of this research is in the comparison and confrontation of subjective orientations- values, identities and opinions – amongst allochthonous and autochthonous youths [...] Furthermore, the comparative design also allows to confront with each other the mutual perception of stereotypes of allochthonous and autochthonous youths (Phalet et al. 2000: 7).

Although this PhD study is a comparative analysis of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks alone, The Rotterdam Young People's Survey serves as an important guideline to also address Dutch "majoritarian" perceptions, all of which is extensively touched upon in chapter 5. In recent years, Fleischmann and Phalet have also focused solely on Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals yet have undertaken a "traditional" cross-national, comparative approach investigating identification patterns amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden (2007; 2010). Although Maliepaard et al. (2010) have also drawn upon ethnic, religious and national identity associations amongst Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, their main comparative aspect involved the relationship between the 1st and 2nd generation. Thus there seems to be a considerable dearth in the existing

literature that offers a comparative analysis of the combined, associative dimensions of ethnic, religious and national identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks exclusively. This research was designed to address this gap in comparative analysis.

1.6 Outline of the thesis

Chapter two serves as the theoretical outline of this thesis in which the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism is central. As a result, I critically discuss the civic-ethnic dichotomies of nationalism with regards to the general conceptions – modernist versus primordialist – surrounding the constitution of nation-states. These contemplations work in conjunction with the last part of the chapter which concerns Mead, Barth and Goffman’s theories on identity and “self”, and the role of culture in identification processes. Chapter three outlines the methodological and epistemological considerations of the research. In this chapter, I further discuss the dimensions and definitions of national identity which feeds into the decision to investigate individual, subjective contemplations of national belonging. This also aligns with the rationale for using and operationalizing a mixed-method approach – surveys and interviews – which I discuss subsequently. In chapter four I give an overview of societal and political events, attitudes and policies regarding the gradual yet devastating abandonment of multiculturalism. Central to this overview is the Dutch approach to multiculturalism: “pillarized” multiculturalism and the impact this approach has had on the sustainment of a “normative”, categorical discourse of “difference”. Chapter five represents a discussion of the quantitative data obtained in the online surveys in connection to secondary (ISSP) survey data analysis –representative of a Dutch majority. This chapter offers a preliminary investigation into the self-identification processes amongst Dutch-Turks, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch majority. At the same time, the chapter compares attitudes of Dutch majority with Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans with regards to the importance given to certain civic-ethnic labels of national belonging. Chapter six is

one of two qualitative chapters. It is themed according to concepts of home, belonging and residence in order to investigate the civic-ethnic markers of national membership amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks and to understand where exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of Dutch culture emerge. Chapter seven is a qualitative investigation into Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks' contemplations of Muslim identity. It not only highlights the societal and political dynamics highly critical of Islam, it also illuminates to what degree Dutch national identity is susceptible for the negotiation of being Muslim as well as Dutch. Chapter eight offers concluding remarks and observations to the thesis and research question and offers proposals for further research.

CHAPTER 2 - THEORY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter divides into two main sections. The first part – section 2.2- offers a critical overview of the relevant literature on multiculturalism: it serves to unpick the different meanings and considerations to multiculturalism that currently exist. I discuss two particular dilemmas inherent in multiculturalism. The first dilemma concerns the official recognition of multicultural diversity (meant here as a descriptive, demographic characterization of society) – which is the main objective to multiculturalism – that (unintentionally) implicates the cultural ‘caging’ of individuals according to rigidly defined collectives. The second is the misguided emphasis on national membership as if it were to encompass solely civil-political aspects conducive to diversity.

This critical analysis leads me to the second part of the chapter which is to make clear my own understanding of multiculturalism and the ways in which it is explored in the following chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. I demonstrate that a multiculturalism revisited – rather than discarded - necessitates the need to incorporate and emphasize related concepts of culture; individual and social identification processes of “self” *with that* of nationalism and national belonging.

Central to this discussion is the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism; between (re)creating a shared sense of national belonging that nevertheless acknowledges and incorporates multiculturality. I discuss that in order to move beyond cultural essentialism and the promoting of cultural diversity as if cultures were distinct, different groups in society, the focus should be on finding a shared sense of national belonging that merges *with* multiculturality. I argue that multiculturalism, ideally, is a form of nation-“re”-building which should be understood as a reflexive dialogue of national identification and belonging. In this

regard, I do not investigate concepts of nationalism and multiculturalism in the “strictest sense” according to policies, political ideologies and/or attitudes – although these themes are nevertheless discussed as part of the contextualization throughout this chapter and thesis. Rather, I discuss their relationship by taking into account the fluidity and diversity of identification processes of “self” and the role of culture in order to uncover the aspects conducive to reshaping (hence, nation-“re”-building) a shared sense of national identity that takes into account multiculturalism and diversity.

Hence, the discussion on the role and interpretation of culture is particularly important and leads in two directions which are discussed consecutively. In section 2.3 I explore the cultural frame of the nation-state: culture that is tied to a form of social cohesion, its power and unity determined by geographical, legal and political conformity. This involves a brief overview of modernist and primordialist interpretations regarding the constitution of nation-states. Subsequently, this exposes the civic-ethnic dimensions implicit to the cultural embodiment of the nation-state. These civic and ethnic aspects are explored further in the following chapters in order to understand better a shared national membership conducive to the incorporation of multicultural diversity. In section 2.4 I discuss culture as an individual identification mechanism which establishes social difference and equality between and within (ethnic) groups (Barth 1969). It deals with the sociological “how” of social and individual identification processes and the ways in which culture is used as a tool to sustain a sense of “self” amidst dialectics of similarity and difference.

Definitions of culture are diverse and multi-layered, established through the interaction and communication between individuals, yet how do we judge its power in essentializing difference in society? In other words, when do differences become *cultural* differences which are perceived to be irreconcilable and impossible to surpass? I am concerned with the tension between these two repeatedly

overlapping paths to ultimately determine how best to understand and underline the dimensions of culture in a multicultural nation-state if it is to play a cohesive role in reshaping a shared sense of national belonging.

2.2 MULTICULTURALISM

Defining multiculturalism is complex. The way in which cultural diversity should be represented and/or fostered has been articulated and analysed in many different ways by many different academics. Overall, we can dissect two aspects particular to multicultural theory. In general, multiculturalism emphasizes a) the recognition of *cultural* diversity where it is understood that culture acts as a powerful collective identity marker that matters greatly in social identification processes in which individuals identify and relate to a sense of collective “self” and, therefore, b) multiculturalism goes so far as to stipulate that cultural identities should be *publicly* respected and *officially* recognized as part of the political and legal framework of the nation-state (Kymlicka 1995, 2000; Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). Beyond these two vital but rather general points, interpretations are rather diverse as to the ways in which we might refer to multiculturalism. These interpretations need further elaboration in order to clarify my own understanding(s) and usage of multiculturalism throughout this thesis.

2.2.1 The “-ism” of it all

We might start dissecting the different notions of multiculturalism by implicating the “-ism” in multiculturalism and thereby distinguish “multiculturalism” from “multicultural”. Making this distinction is helpful in pinpointing the “active” as well as “descriptive” notions to multiculturalism. I briefly mentioned the *public* and *official* recognition of cultural diversity implicit in multiculturalism theory which

suggests that multiculturalism is a process of (political) action and (policy) change. It is an important point of departure, yet not the only one.

Wieviorka (1998) distinguishes between three 'registers' of multiculturalism, namely the descriptive, the political and the ideological. The 'descriptive' highlights the "multicultural" in multiculturalism: it emphasises a social reality in which society hosts continuously shaped and reinforced cultural differences or more specifically, *identities* (I will elaborate further on). In this sense, 'descriptive' partly implies a demographic assertion of multiculturalism, or more accurately a society that is *multicultural*. However, it should not be taken at face value and two main points are to be kept in mind. For one, "multicultural" might be descriptive of the existence of cultural differences in society, yet it is important to embed the creation of the *term* "multicultural" in 1960s (and ongoing) politics of identity (Benhabib 1996). Cultural heterogeneity is of all times, yet "multicultural diversity" is a specific description of cultural diversity that has come about with recent (1960s and 1970s) immigration influxes and which suggests democratic societies were pristinely ethnically and culturally homogeneous before (Vertovec in Martiniello 1998). Therefore, and secondly, "multicultural", as a descriptive notion of cultural differences, should not simply be used as a causal "given" but as a product of identity politics and the assertion of community and group rights (Wieviorka 1998: 892). I will elaborate the point as to the misconception of cultures as "givens" later on. Throughout the thesis, I will use the term "multicultural" as a demographic and descriptive notion for 'the diversified structure and working of society' (ibid: 883), yet with the understanding that the "descriptive" partly finds its ground in a politically, policy driven "active" notion of multiculturalism.

This brings me to Wieviorka's second register of multiculturalism, as an approach embedded in political motivation and action to advance the official promotion of multicultural diversity. From this perspective follows an analysis of an "active" and pragmatic multiculturalism through the implementation and reworking of

institutional and policy frameworks. In this instance, we can speak of 'institutionalized multiculturalism' (Vertovec 1996: 49). Its assessment takes the shape of multiculturalisms – plural- "in practice", for, the instrumental responses to strengthening the socio-economic, cultural and civil position of immigrants have been different in each country: Canada, Australia, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. At this stage, my aim is not to dissect every country's approach separately but only to mention that "multiculturalism in practice" is characterized by certain overlapping themes –in a weaker or stronger capacity – namely: the recognition and/or maintaining of cultural values and traditions; issues of discrimination, (socio-economic) welfare and (in)equality (Wieviorka 1998: 884-889). Chapter 4 constitutes a detailed analysis of the politics of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Therefore, in that chapter multiculturalism (and my assessment of it) demonstrates its "-ism": it should be understood along the lines of political action (and rhetoric) and as an "active" process in the instrumental implementation of multiculturalist policies in state structures, institutions and as part of legal frameworks.

Wieviorka's third register concerns the ideological-philosophical dimension of multiculturalism. The ideological contemplation to multiculturalism deserves further discussion as it highlights the fundamental issues and difficulties inherent to incorporating cultural diversity into a democratic nation-state structure. The main query that surrounds the ideological sphere of multiculturalism concerns the extent to which cultural diversity *can* be officially recognized (Wieviorka 1998: 894). This query touches upon the space between private observation and public acknowledgment of cultural diversity. Fundamentally, it identifies the degree of tolerance that is or should be given to the incorporation of cultural diversity in societal and political structures. These three dimensions, that question the interpretation of multiculturalism (meant here as the descriptive "social reality" of cultural diversity in society) and its promotion as part of the ideological and policy contemplations to multiculturalism, centre around one particular point, namely the

problematic position of the individual from the collective, or, the relationship between the 'universalistic from the cultural specific' (Wieviorka 1998: 895).

Three main difficulties arise. For one, where multiculturalism has enforced and ensured the official recognition of cultural diversity as vested in groups (the communitarian approach), it has often meant a process of 'culturalism', or, the acknowledgment of cultures as if they were bound, salient groups and communities (Vertovec 1996; Stolcke 1995). Consequential of this development has been the 'social caging' of individuals according to essentialist notions of cultural belonging (Hall 2003). Furthermore, and secondly, this gives rise to the idea that society is made up of a hegemonic "Majority Culture" and several minority cultures and that boundaries between these are static and rigid. In this regard and thirdly, this questions the idea of a shared national membership and the extent to which the acknowledgment and promotion of cultural diversity inflicts upon or complements national cohesion.

These three thorny issues are at the heart of the ideological contemplation on multiculturalism which I will discuss further. This discussion is adamant in bringing forward my own informed understanding of multiculturalism which simultaneously acknowledges and attempts to move beyond the issues outlined. In this sense, my enquiry is not simply investigating but revisiting multiculturalism. Ultimately, it offers an alternative sociological dimension to understanding multiculturalism, placing at its core the concept of identification as a process of finding a shared sense of national commonality in relation to the multicultural dimensions of the nation-state.

2.2.2. The private-public contours of recognition

The fundamental discussion that underlies the three dilemmas I mentioned is, above all, a discussion surrounding the degree of acknowledgment in the public

sphere of nation-state society and/or democratic state structures. Often, this debate of private versus public promotion of cultural diversity appears synonymous with divisions between the promotion of individual and collective rights. Inherent to these two strands of separation is the philosophical discussion between theorists that uphold a liberal as opposed to a communitarian viewpoint of multiculturalism (Wieviorka 1998: 897).

Interestingly, communitarians and liberals, although often classified as two complete opposites when it comes to their ideas of cultural recognition, appear to actually set out on the same path (Wieviorka 1998: 987). Both start from the premise of the democratic nation-state and its liberal-political frameworks and state structures that enforce a sense of liberal citizenship based on equality, justice and respect. These liberal-democratic state structures provide the public domain in which the universal (human) rights of every individual citizen are recognized and protected. In this sense, the state is effectively (and supposedly) 'indifferent to individual ethnic, religious, linguistic differentiation or cultural practices, which are seen as private options and of no difference to civic rights' (Vertovec 1996: 59). In this sense, ethno-cultural affiliation is condemned to the private sphere whilst only a single civic form of citizenship sustains in the public domain. Whether a democratic nation-state can be completely void of any cultural (civic or ethno-cultural) connotations is another matter that I will discuss later. Yet, what is important to underline here is that where liberals and communitarians differ, is whether this 'difference-blind' status quo is sufficient for the acknowledgment and promotion of cultural diversity.

Barry (2001) has been most noteworthy of broadcasting the "liberal" view -or in fact critique - of multiculturalism. For Barry (2001), the egalitarian constructed concept of citizenship can be the only appropriate *public* vehicle for the preservation of *individual* equality, integrity and self-development. Barry's point of departure is the liberal idea of equality: in order for all difference to be treated equally the

promotion of specific rights to specific groups of people cannot be sustained. Whereas theorists of multiculturalism (such as Young 1990) see “indifference” generated through liberal-political state structures as part of the problem, Barry actually upholds the value of “indifference”: it underlines the public protection of *universal* rights and equal opportunities for every individual citizen. In other words, because the liberal-political framework does not differentiate, it harmonizes on the basis of civil, individual rights. Hence, where liberals – such as Barry - and communitarians diverge is the assignment of ‘special’ (additional) cultural rights to specific groups in contrast to individual rights based on universally shared principles. The bottom line to the divergence between liberals and ‘non-liberals’ concerns the level of *public* recognition for diversity that can be incorporated and promoted as part of a liberal-democratic framework. According to Barry, there is no objective rationale for using culture as a denominator for promoting ‘special’ rights to *groups*: to differentiate in fact compromises values of *individual* equality and universality.

Similarly, Waldron (2000) emphasizes the civic-political, democratic framework of nation-states as a central factor in contemplations of multicultural acceptance, however he proclaims that this democratic, civil structure should necessitate the ‘civic responsibility’ of *individuals* rather than the ethno-cultural demands of communities. Alternatively, Waldron acknowledges that nation-states comprise of diverse cultural groups and each of them has claims for respect: these claims should be regarded as opinions and not interests (2000: 163-165). In this sense, Waldron emphasizes that cultural diversity should be acknowledged (‘opinions’) yet not officially so as part of state policies (‘interests’). The democratic framework allows for the acceptance and toleration of diversity, however the exploration of cultural background is considered a matter that should be private rather than public. In other words, it is every individual’s civic responsibility to leave culture “out of it”, to deal with matters through a political process in order to sustain peace and stability within society. As he argues: ‘the maintenance of such identity claims

seems incompatible with one's duty to participate responsibly in civic affairs' (ibid: 168).

Where for liberals "indifference" is the solution to as well as root of an equal society, communitarians emphasize the insufficiency of 'difference blind liberalism' in bridging inequality and underlining the importance of recognizing cultural diversity. As such, a 'politics of recognition' is needed, according to Taylor (1994). Although Taylor underscores the importance of 'universal equality', his argument extends to the need for further preservation of cultural specificity. That is because, according to Taylor, although the right to having and preserving a specific identity might be a universally acknowledged and shared value, it simultaneously reflects a societal actuality of cultural specificity and diversity which should be equally recognized. To ignore this cultural diversity *publically*, might cause damage to the sustainability of a healthy democratic society (1994: 36). In this sense, universal principles of dignity and authenticity which are inherently important to an *individual's* flourishing of "self", underscore the necessity for the recognition of cultural *groups'* distinctiveness. With a 'politics of difference', Taylor argues, the disparity between a hegemonic or majority culture versus "other cultures" can be overcome (1994: 38). Taylor explains:

The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form. Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory (ibid: 43).

Whereas for Taylor assimilation is the product of skewed cultural relations and inequality, Barry points out that assimilation might be consequential of a "natural" process of harmonization which should not be judged, necessarily, as a process of 'acculturation' (2001: 81). As Barry states, 'for liberals, the right amount of diversity – and the right amount of assimilation – is that which comes about as a result of free choices within a framework of just institutions' (2001: 71). In this sense, the

level of 'indifference' to otherwise *privately* tolerated and accepted spheres of cultural diversity might "organically" but not "interferingly" shift towards more *public* awareness and incorporation.

The discussion surrounding private versus public dimensions of cultural diversity recognition and acceptance, fundamentally, boils down to a discussion of how to position culture in between an inherently individual (and therefore universal) assurance of self-identification and as securely embedded in group assertiveness and community belonging. Although I will offer a sociological discussion of culture in individual and social identification in section 2.4, we first need to delve further into the related effects of communitarianism in multiculturalism ideology and the 'institutionalization' of culture as collective right, which has laid bare the issue of 'social caging'. Subsequently, this touches upon perceptions of the hegemonic dynamics between majority versus minority cultures and finally towards uncovering the underlying (harmonizing and divisive) structures of citizenship and national belonging.

2.2.3 Culture as 'caging' collectives

The communitarian demand for the *official* recognition of cultural difference largely stems from the argument that cultural identities should not be ignored where individuals relate to and sustain a sense of self - of pride, of confidence - in relation to a cultural collective or community. Parekh argues,

since human beings are attached to and shaped by their culture, and their self-respect is closely bound up with respect for it, the basic respect we owe our fellow-humans extends to their culture and cultural community as well. Respect for their culture also earns their loyalty, gives them the confidence and courage to interact with other cultures, and facilitates their integration into wider society (2000: 196).

Evident in Parekh's exposition is the dominant proposition that communities emphasize cultures and therefore the recognition of cultural *collectives* rather than individuals is envisioned. Parekh elaborates that this is because:

...a cultural community performs a role in human life that a voluntary association cannot. It gives its members a sense of rootedness, existential stability, the feeling of belonging to an ongoing community of ancient, and misty origins, and ease of communication (2000:162).

Similar underpinnings adorn Kymlicka's theoretical approach to multiculturalism, or as he terms it 'liberal culturalism' (2001). However, Kymlicka rather emphasizes liberalism to underline the recognition of specific group rights alongside the liberal-political notion of equal (individual) citizenship. In addition to the importance of liberal-democratic contours upholding and protecting individual equality and shared citizenship, Kymlicka argues for the official promotion and institutional embedment of specific minority (group) rights in order to overcome inequality. Kymlicka's focus concerns the position of minority groups vis-à-vis each other, thereby placing the protection of communities central to and as an extension of individual rights. This unearths a tension evident in multiculturalism theory where it concerns the role of culture and the recognition of cultural *collectives* rather than individuals.

Kymlicka addresses this tension when speaking of the external protection of the community and the subordination and integral formalization of the individual's interest as part of this collective: whilst 'internal restrictions' of community interests might cage the individual member, the external protection of group rights should never forego the interest of the individual. Kymlicka concludes:

most such rights are not about the primacy of communities over individuals. Rather, they are based upon the idea that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded different rights (1995: 48).

Nevertheless, his approach unearths a problematic dialect between the integral rights and freedoms of the individual to choose a sense of "self" as part of one or

more cultural groups, and, the official sponsoring of collective rights which might fuel rigid categorizations of certain officially recognized “special” groups and their cultural boundaries, but not others. It is argued this creates and reinforces rigid categories which presume individuals belong and align with one cultural collective alone, even if they choose not to. This appears to enhance an approach the recognition of cultural diversity according to the ‘social reality’ of cultural groups (Modood 2007: 48). In this sense, multiculturalism enforces the state – as a legal framework – complicit in ‘caging’ individuals consequential of the official sponsoring of cultural collectives.

This can be identified as a problem of ‘social caging’ (Hall 2003) by which individuals feel categorized according to “their” ethnic and/or cultural group. The fact that the collective is assigned a “special status”, officially and publically recognized and installed in liberal-political state-structures, means also a judgment is passed as to the *defined* cultural contours of that group, thereby leaving little (official) room for the diversity in identification processes that individuals experience and perform. Hall emphasizes the individual’s cultural background rather than the cultural or ethnic collective which avoids the illiberal dynamics of ‘caging’ individuals according to the collectives corresponding to their cultural, religious or ethnic background (ibid: 29).

In short, this issue illuminates the pressurized position of *individual* cultural integrity and choice versus cultural pluralism as seen as a social reality constituted within and between *groups*. Where this proves especially problematic, is in the *implementation* and *operationalization* of specific group rights protection, embedded in multiculturalist policies and programs. This flags up issues of power, consultation and representation where the official endorsement and acknowledgement of cultural groups has often been achieved through representatives heading these vertical, internal structures of community; in other

words, 'caging' the individual in the midst of these dynamics (Vertovec 1998: 34-35).

Dutch 1960s and 1970s multiculturalist policies are particularly illustrative of this essentialist categorization of cultures and cultural communities alike, and, the caging of individuals according to these cultural categories. As part of the historic-political framework of "pillarization", 1960s and 1970s Dutch multiculturalism focused on the sponsoring of "ethnic minorities" and the preservation of "their" language, traditions and folklore. Although I will elaborate on these policies in chapter 4, it suffices to say that the objective of these "pillarized multiculturalist" policies to emancipate these ethnic communities actually furthered the ethnic differentiation and categorization of these communities as homogeneous, static entities; a process of 'ethnicization' (Entzinger 2006: 181; Rath 1991).

The bottom line to these processes of 'ethnicization' is the "essentialization" of culture, or, 'culturalism' whereby the implication to implementing multiculturalism has had the undesired effect of endorsing culture as static and homogeneous – outlined by supposedly clean-cut differences between groups. Subsequently, an asymmetrical pattern of homogeneous 'uni-cultures' emerges, its significance and access to power and opportunity divided between minority cultures and Majority culture. Here, multi-culturalism is better thought of as 'mono-culturalism', as Vertovec terms it, which (unintentionally) extrapolates a "positivist" understanding of culture as a component that is a given and set in stone. Vertovec (1998 in Martiniello) elaborates:

'Culture', in this sense, is presumed to be something virtually burnt into the genes of people, forever distinguishing and separating them. A 'multicultural' society, in this reasoning, is therefore a pool of bounded uni-cultures, forever divided into we's and they's (1998: 37).

As Vertovec points out, the error – and often mentioned critique – of multiculturalism is in its unintentional positioning and confining of cultures in

hierarchical, static dynamics opposite each other: minority versus majority. Fundamentally, it creates an impasse for bridging and incorporating cultural diverse associations into a shared sense of national “togetherness”, supporting equality and opportunity.

Does this mean we are – from an ideological and policy point of view – better off without multiculturalism and specifically the communitarian approach to promoting cultural diversity? After all, to grant specific group rights and implement a policy-special status to certain collectives does not only jeopardize principles of individuality and universality at the heart of liberal-democratic society– as Barry and others would argue – it also ‘cages’ the individual’s positioning in between categorical assumptions of cultural affiliation and liberal principles of choice and opportunity. Hence, can we leave “culture” out of the equation and instead focus solely on the civic and civil dimensions of an “idealized” citizenship that is culturally ‘indifferent’? No and that is because we cannot take for granted the impartiality, the neutrality – the ‘indifference’ –of liberal-political frameworks to incorporate cultural diversity. Specifically, it is the nation-state itself, with its liberal-political and democratic encasing, that is culturally charged and which dimensions also play their part in its national cohesion and unity. We might call this majority culture or national identity, but to ignore these cultural dynamics is to ignore the inferiority in societal positions from the start.

Hence, these points bring forward the discussion on the embodiment and promotion of ‘culture’; understanding the contours and limits between universalism and cultural particularity and finding a middle ground between ‘indifference’ and ‘mono-culturalism’. From this premise, I consider that a renewed approach to multiculturalism, fundamentally, is to underscore the flexibility and fluidity of culture and to understand cultural associations as part of identification processes where an individual “self” is (collectively) aligned, distanced and positioned. This makes for a diverse and widespread pattern of directions in which the promotion,

acceptance and incorporation of diversity can move. In its turn, it gives us an understanding of the particular obstacles as well as facilitating elements surrounding the space within which these directions move: the cultural contours of the nation-state. This will be further discussed in section 2.2.5.

Before I move on to discuss these cultural contours in section 2.3, I will first explicate why I believe there appears an overall avoidance of acknowledging the cultural bias to the nation-state. For liberals, there is a deliberate, dominant incentive to focus on solely liberal-political citizenship that in its turn offers civic membership and acceptance. Multiculturalists on the other hand take insufficient notice of the cultural bias to the nation-state, thereby focusing more on enhancing minority cultures but in doing so, neglect moving towards a shared national membership. Overall, both sides lack a substantial focus on cultural *dynamics*.

2.2.4 An “idealized” citizenship?

To understand the multiculturalists’ neglect in moving beyond the singular promotion of cultural diversity and towards emphasizing a shared national “togetherness”, we need to briefly return to the previous analogy on caging ‘culturalism’. As I set out, with the promotion and public endorsement of cultural *collectives* rather than focusing on the cultural integrity of individuals, a process of ‘cultural fundamentalism’ emerged:

Instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, cultural fundamentalism segregates them spatially, each culture in its place. The fact that nation-states are by no means culturally uniform is ignored (Stolcke 1995: 7, 8).

Fundamentally, it can be argued that with the spatial segregation of cultural differences, little incentive is available for furthering cultural diversity into a greater narrative of national cohesion and membership.

This is not to say that multiculturalism theorists neglect this concern altogether: there is the acknowledgment that apart from the protection of cultural collectives, multiculturalism should also concern itself with the development of a shared membership and belonging that allows multiculturalism to flourish as well as accommodate itself as part of the grander, national narrative. Kymlicka emphasizes the civic-political and libertarian structure of nation-state democracies that ‘uphold the familiar set of common civil and political rights of citizenship’, that all might adopt, enjoy and share (2001: 42). Although Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of liberal-political citizenship as a vehicle for enhancing a sense of national membership, his focus is predominantly concerned with the additional rights of cultural *groups* and the recognition of these collectives’ positioning in public spheres. Hence, the difficulty in Kymlicka’s approach is his primary concern with the position of cultural groups rather than individuals.

Similarly, Parekh notes the importance of liberal-political structures and societal organization, something that is considered morally sound and works appropriately to further inclusion and national belonging. Parekh (2006) envisions this liberal-political framework a space and platform for ‘dialogue’:

...between cultural majority and ethnocultural minorities to consolidate differences and commonalities ‘which is possible only if the liberal society recognizes itself as a distinct cultural community encountering other such communities represented by immigrants. [...] In its dialogue with immigrants, the liberal society needs to show why it deserves their moral allegiance (197, 198).

The problematic factor in Parekh’s argument is - as with Kymlicka – an emphasis on a communitarian incorporation that focuses on cultural diversity *as* communities rather than individuals. Parekh recognizes the cultural contours of the liberal ‘host’ society and therefore understands that a shared membership might be formed through dialogue within the sphere of liberal-political society which is not simply void of “cultural” stuff. Yet, it is in his positioning of liberal society as a ‘cultural

community' opposite other communities, that he neglects individual positioning and reflection.

Hence, what we are left with brings us back to the start of our discussion. Where multiculturalism, specifically communitarianism, demands and accredits recognition for cultural diversity predominantly on the basis of cultural collectives, it compromises individual cultural integrity, positioning and choice. In doing so, it fuels a societal reality of segregated, rigidly defined cultures as *groups*, thereby leaving little space for individuals to move towards a shared, overarching sense of national "togetherness" that surpasses specific collective cultural associations.

Again, the liberal alternative considers culture and cultural affiliations altogether unimportant in the public, civil-political frameworks of the nation-state; culture should be condoned to the private spheres of identification. That what underlies Waldron's (2000) rhetoric is a sole emphasis on the democratic, civic frameworks of nation-states and civil-political citizenship that are thought sufficiently apt to incorporate these private contemplations of cultural "self". Although this tackles issues of 'caging', this approach ignores the validity of cultural associations altogether, including those cultural dynamics inherent to sustaining democratic nation-states' unification and "togetherness".

For Barry (2001) political citizenship, or 'shared identity', should be understood as a form of 'civic nationality' which acknowledges and at the same time (publically) ignores the cultural importance to national membership. Although Barry underlines that 'civic nationality' evolves as a consequence of flexible exchanges between vying majority versus minority cultural interests – thereby acknowledging the cultural bias to majority culture – its ultimate outcome is civic, consequential of assimilating "private" cultural differences (2001: 81). Similar to Waldron's idea of 'civic responsibility', Barry emphasizes the civic obligation to share "ownership" of the liberal-democratic nation-state:

the core of common national identity is a common commitment to the welfare of the larger society made up of the majority and the minority (or minorities), and mutual trust in others to abide by that commitment even when it entails sacrifices (2001: 88).

At the heart of this thesis is this problematic, between the incorporation of multicultural diversity according to a somewhat idealized sense of national membership based on liberal-civic aspects of equality, respect for democratic laws and institutions and freedom of speech, i.e. political citizenship and the failing to address the cultural dimensions of its counterpart, that is national identity, that encompasses *both* civic and ethnic components that often intermix and are fluid to change over time. Neither multiculturalists nor liberals fully address this vital point, i.e. they fail to recognize its necessary (and possibly problematic) relationship with nationalism.

Habermas (1996; 1998) broaches the topic where he envisions a civic national commitment and national identity constituted on the idea of solidarity, but nevertheless recognizes the cultural basis that underlies every nation-state. Habermas argues:

without this cultural interpretation of political membership rights, the European national state in its initial period hardly would have had the strength [...] to establish a new, more abstract level of social integration in terms of the legal implementation of democratic citizenship (1996: 286).

Nevertheless Habermas states that this 'cultural identity' should be transformed from a culturally to a politically based community. That is, because there exists a tension between the 'egalitarian legal community', to which every individual could hypothetically belong, and the 'cultural particularism' of the nation-state that would exclude everyone with a different cultural background (ibid: 287). In this regard, a transition is envisioned in which the "majority culture" of the nation-state is transformed into a shared national membership based on liberal-political principles. The question remains how this process takes effect.

It highlights the problematic between majority and minority.

Modood's (2000) idea of hybridity emphasizes this process. In the case of Britain, he argues:

hybridity, then, is not a substate nationality [...] it is a form of complex Britishness. [...] They [immigrant groups] are less seeking civic rights against a hegemonic nationality than attempting to negotiate politically a place in an all-inclusive nationality (2000: 186).

More recently, Modood (2008) has again made this point stating multiculturalism is not simply about enhancing minorities' positions in society by solidifying concrete cultural identities, but it is also about creating an overarching national identity which reflects every individual's identity, regardless of his or her cultural background. Modood states that 'the national identity should [...] be woven in debate and discussion, not reduced to a list of imposed values' (2008: 86). Furthermore, Modood (2007) elaborates:

citizenship, then consists of a framework of rights and practices of participation but also discourses and symbols of belonging, ways of imagining and remaking ourselves as a country and expressing our sense of commonalities and differences, and ways in which these identities qualify each other and create – should create – inclusive public spaces (Modood 2007: 128).

Hence, to further the incorporation of plural diversity into society it is not simply necessary to define the "other", but more importantly to define the "self" and Modood emphasizes this as a processual construction of a shared national membership that allows individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds to belong. Again, the civil-political contours of the democratic nation-states – in the form of citizenship - are evoked as "neutral" dimensions that allow for these contemplations of shared belonging. However, this focus fails to acknowledge the (possibly) obstructive cultural – civic and ethnic – contours of the nation-state. In other words, the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism is taken

into consideration, however too much emphasis is on the civil-political rather than cultural – ethnic and civic - contours of the nation-state.

In section 2.3 I will further elaborate on the cultural contours of the nation-state, yet for the moment we have come to conclude an ideological dilemma at the heart of multiculturalism. That is, to find a balance between disregarding cultural associations altogether – nationally as well as publicly – in placing political citizenship as the predominant focus to incorporating diversity, and, overemphasizing the promotion of cultures as if they were collective hubs thereby enhancing a process of ‘culturalism’ and sustaining cultural categorical divisions rather than moving towards cultural unison. In order to move beyond these tensions surrounding the current communitarian-liberal discussion on multiculturalism, I argue for a shift in understanding and interpreting the embodiment and dynamics of “culture” (as fluid and flexible and processual) that leads us to approaching and investigating multiculturalism – as an active process – differently. In this regard, I propose a ‘grassroots multiculturalism’ which partly resolves the issues outlined above and also offers an alternative approach in investigating multiculturalism.

2.2.5 Grassroots multiculturalism

In his reply to Wieworka’s discussion on the different interpretations of multiculturalism (as broadly outlined in section 2.2.2), Martiniello (1998) points out an important oversight in neglecting to approach multiculturalism from a ‘grassroots’ level. Martiniello explains:

...how do individuals and groups, confronted with cultural and identity diversity in their daily life, manage or not the social interaction with the other? Are there forms of *grassroots multiculturalism* so to speak, and how can they be accounted for? (1998: 915).

Although Martiniello's observation possibly hints mostly to a methodological explanation, i.e. to give guidance as to the investigating of multiculturalism, it gives further food for thought as to the different spaces (and their predicaments) in which multiculturalism is received, accepted or rejected. If multiculturalism can be an ideological debate, a top down policy approach and a demographic observation, what sort of multiculturalism might we encounter on the 'receiving' end of these specifications? In other words, what is multiculturalism if not a 'grassroots' process that takes into account the positions and interpretations – the plural dimensions- of culture used and reworked amongst dynamics of identification, association, alienation and positioning?

This proposition is closely related to Baumann's idea of 'lived multiculturalism' (1996; 1999). In his exposition of multiculturalism, Baumann (1999) distinguishes between ethnic, religious and national identity dimensions which all parallel claims to 'identity' recognition. From an analytical point of view, Baumann argues for the deconstruction of this 'multicultural triangle'. In this sense, Baumann understands culture as encompassing all three components of national, religious and ethnic dimensions and moves on to argue that it is between these three dynamics of culture that we might analyze and understand multicultural society 'at work'. Where the recognition of these cultural dimensions, or multiculturalism, has often paralleled reified notions of identities – as previously mentioned a 'politics of identity' or 'politics of difference' – national identity, ethnic identity and religious identity have flourished as categorically separated notions of "self". Importantly, Baumann observes it is in the analytical use of the label 'identity' itself that makes for these hierarchical and essentialist understandings of culture that undermine processes of traversing and connecting. Instead, Baumann calls for an analytical shift from identities to identification, thereby focusing on the grassroots 'workings' of multiculturalism, i.e. a 'lived' multiculturalism. Hence, what we arrive at is the importance of understanding culture as a tool and fluid notion of positioning,

aligning and differentiating in individual and social identification processes.

Baumann explains:

Instead of viewing society as a patchwork of five or fifty cultural groups, it views social life as an elastic and crisscrossing web of multiple identifications. People make choices whom to identify with when and where, and they even make choices when to engage the reifying discourse of culture and when to engage the processual discourse. We have thus progressed from a reified through a processual to a discursive understanding of culture. [...] What develops in such an [multicultural, ed.] environment is a double discursive competence: People know when to reify one of their identities, and they know when to question their own reifications. What also develops are processes of multicultural convergence: the simultaneous reorientation of otherwise separate traditions upon a new point of cross-cultural agreement (1999: 139).

Through analyzing culture as identification *processes*, the problematic factor of 'social caging' is potentially resolved. Where culture is understood as part of processual and fluid identification dynamics, does the recognition of cultural diversity no longer reinforce reified, essentialist notion of identity. However, this is not to say that identification processes are always judged as fluid and flexible; "identities" might still be reified and *perceived* as "set in stone". I will *investigate* multiculturalism as a "lived multiculturalism" and similar to Baumann, the emphasis is on the role and understanding of culture and the need to de-reify culture as if it was an actual, realistic aspect of societal differentiation.

Notwithstanding the other important components to multiculturalism I discussed, my sociological approach to multiculturalism is thus concerned with the 'lived' experience of multiculturalism and the implications these dynamics have on identification processes of "self". In order to avoid political connotations and policy implications of 'social caging' and cultural essentialism, my understanding of and approach to investigating multiculturalism engages with the active meaning making of accommodating, respecting and promoting diversity through people by people. In this regard, we should talk about identification processes and not so much

identity – as a static notion or notions – but investigate those processes in order to understand a multicultural society that enhances cohesion.

As such, multiculturalism should be investigated, i.e. according to the processual workings of *identification* in contrast to the attempt “to find or to have” *identities*. This distinction, between identification and identity, ties in with Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000) critique of the over-exhausted use and meaning of identity as an analytical tool in scholarly research. In this sense, Brubaker and Cooper note the improper ‘salience of identity’ as a result of conflating identity as a category of practice –as a form of social practice and “doing” in daily life - with a category of analysis – taking and using identity as a thing that “is”, that exists and that one has. So as we might understand the phenomenon of identity as a category of practice, we should be careful using it as a category of analysis, because in this sense identity becomes something “judged and weighed”, rigid and static. This does not mean that we cannot *perceive* identity as being rigid or reified – in fact, reification is very much part of social processes of identity formation – but it is incorrect to take those reifying and categorizing outcomes of social and individual interaction at face value. To take identity as an analytical “given” is to undercut the intricacies, multiplicity and fluidity that constitute it and brought it about in the first place. Yet, at the same time, a wholly constructivist notion of identity, as a solely fluid, flexible and “soft” phenomenon, does not face up to essentialist, reifying associations and categorizations that identification produces. Rather, to have the best of both worlds, we might and in fact should *observe* identification: as the multitude of interactional and contextual processes in which individuals tap into and choose sets of collective “labels” and tools to construct a sense of “self”. In the words of Brubaker and Cooper:

We should seek to explain the processes and mechanisms through which what has been called the "political fiction" of the "nation"- or of the "ethnic group," "race," or other putative "identity" - can crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically

adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 5).

Identity, as a term of analysis, confines our understanding of identification: it brushes over dialectics that are both fluid and hardening, soft and hard, self-identifying and socially categorizing. Identification, in contrast, makes us understand the dynamics of the processes that underpin it. This is further discussed in section 2.4.

We can then take this a step further, i.e. how investigating the mechanisms to identity formation, i.e. identification, inform us about such dialectics of (national) “togetherness” and commonality which are important to our discussion of grassroots multiculturalism. In this regard, I am specifically concerned with what Brubaker and Cooper determine are the different degrees of self-understanding that inspire collective identification and ‘groupness’ vis-à-vis “others” (2000:19).

Identity, in itself, insufficiently describes both affiliating and differentiating processes that are part of individuals’ self-understanding in collective identification. Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper propose analytical terms of ‘commonality’, based on shared common attribute, and ‘connectedness’ that signify the relational ties individuals sustain: together, these two concepts add up to a sense of ‘groupness’ which also ties in with a sense of belonging (2000: 20). It is the dynamics between these three factors of belonging, connectedness and commonality that are important and offer means of distinguishing ‘instances of strongly binding, vehemently felt groupness from loosely, structured, weakly constraining forms of affinity’ (ibid: 21).

To place this in the context of this research, we might thus try, rather than attempting to understand belonging and collective association through distinguishing between sets of identities - Muslim identity, Dutch identity, Moroccan identity –to rather look at the actual mechanisms (the how and why) in which a sense of groupness – e.g. “Dutchness” – is established. Hence,

multiculturalism might be understood and analyzed in this way; through researching the processes of collective (dis)association we might get to the issues and factors that define connectedness, commonality and belonging which in turn will make clearer the (obstructive or facilitating) dimensions of collective relationships in multicultural society and settings. I have argued that central to my revisitation of multiculturalism is to determine a sense of national belonging that is constructive to the multiculturalist idea. In this regard, I am looking for the aspects of “Dutchness” that are accommodating of other forms of cultural identification and affiliation. As I will discuss in the next section, typifying national belonging (or nationalism) has often taken the form of dichotomizing between ethnic and civic labels. Yet, to unravel these dynamics and link these to a sense of national belonging I look rather at the processes, narratives and predicaments in which these labels are used that give us a better sense of how people identify and understand a sense of “self”. Hence, it is not necessarily finding the particular elements or labels – civic or ethnic – that might enhance or obstruct national belonging for Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background; it is about how these individuals apply these labels which is important.

Hence, my approach to multiculturalism ties in with Wievorka’s assessment of a sociological approach to multiculturalism that:

...stricto sensu, will primarily be interested in the working of the society, in which multiculturalism is found, in the way in which the cultural differences within it are produced, received or reproduced; and in the questions and tensions which this generates (Wievorka 1998: 883).

Although not to discard the pragmatic contours of multiculturalism and its implementation through policies (I discuss in chapter 4), my approach to multiculturalism is to move beyond ‘top-down’ dynamics of enhancing the accommodation of cultural diversity. Rather, I propose to investigate multiculturalism from a ‘grassroots’ level to lay bare the importance people give to

these cultural dynamics in identification processes, but most fundamentally to uncover the difficulties and resolves in finding cross-cultural agreement.

In this sense, Baumann and I slightly diverge, for Baumann places at the heart of his analysis an equal emphasis on merging and contesting ethnic, national and religious cultural components, whilst my own proposition is slightly more concerned with a 'national' emphasis focusing on the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism. I do not deny there is a hegemonic tension here in incorporating the nation-state (national) "platform" as a starting point for finding a shared sense of belonging, after all, the nation-state itself sustains a cultural bias. In fact, Brubaker and Cooper underline the importance of the state as a 'powerful "identifier", not because it can create "identities" in the strong sense – in general, it cannot – but because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory schemes...' (2000: 16). This is very true for the 'imagining' of the nation-state which I will discuss in the following section: it is important to keep this in mind.

However, it is important to note that the nation-state can be considered a 'conceptual' space for accommodation and sustainable, accepted membership and therefore nationalism – as a form of nation-rebuilding – might be part of the solution (rather than problem) in understanding a shared sense of togetherness. Understandably, we have to be careful making such judgments as to how we would like to see society. Yet, it does give incentive to move beyond a single political citizenship towards a sense of shared national identification that was established dialogically.

2.3 THE ERA OF NATIONALISM, NATIONS AND NATIONAL CULTURE

To frame processes of national identification it is adamant to acknowledge the perceived hegemonic idea of nations. Most nation-states are simply not void of any ethno-cultural connotations: to neglect these dimensions of national “self” creates obstacles to develop our thinking about a shared national belonging. I argue that national the “self” refers to the collective of the nation-state and the dualistic character it embodies in the form of a liberal-political, egalitarian-based citizenship and its national identity which encompasses ethnic and/or civic elements. To understand better these civic-ethnic- i.e. cultural - dynamics, we need to investigate what constitutes democratic nation-states and the elements adamant to their unified survival.

Hence, to get at the heart of processual thinking about identity formation, diversity and national belonging (“Dutchness”), we also need to underline the reifying (hegemonic) contours and labels that define the nation-state. This is intrinsically linked to the constitution of the nation-state and the ways in which we ‘imagine’ national belonging. In this sense, we might use the implication and interpretation of ‘culture’ as a guideline. How should we interpret national cultures and which aspects are prone to secure better the inclusion and acceptance of multicultural diversity? In order to answer this query, we need to explore the cultural “self” of the nation, i.e. the cultural embodiment that surrounds the nation. Nationalism dictates that a nation has a culture, yet how do we connect this cultural nucleus to the notion of the nation? The “embedded” idea that emphasizes nations as clear-cut communities with particularly defined cultures lies within the constitution and rise of nationalism. Therefore, the foundation of nationalism needs exploring first of all, in order to uncover the cultural boundaries of the nation, its resilience and continuity.

2.3.1 Modernist thinking about nationalism

In general, modernisation is often regarded the cataclysmic cause for the rise of nationalism, although there is some contention where primordialist theorists are concerned (which I will discuss further on). Possibly the most prolific modernist theorist in nationalism studies is Ernest Gellner (1983, 1994). Gellner understands the rise of nationalism as a sequence of profound changes in social hierarchies and state structures mainly generated by the effects of industrialization processes. Gellner demonstrates the impact of societal change by distinguishing three different periods in historical perspectives; the pre-agrarian, the agrarian-literate and industrial stage. In the pre-agrarian and agrarian-literate stages society can be characterized as 'well-stratified [and] traditional' (Gellner 1987:13): horizontal class divisions exist where a large part of the populace serve the task of food production with elite power at the hands of religious and professional clergy (Gellner 1983). In this scenario, Gellner states that structural segregation of society prevails, not the least because high ethnic, regional and linguistic diversity remain as most individuals largely live in small, rural, food-producing communities who look inward, not outward. In short, in a society where everybody knows their place and task national unity seems unnecessary: a uniform culture is impossible to achieve with literacy mainly privileged to the clerical elite.

However, Gellner emphasizes a clear break from previous agrarian societies with the start of the industrial era. In an industrializing society, a uniform, highly communicative work force is needed in order to create perpetual economic growth and prosperity. Society is no longer successful hierarchically: in order to sustain ever-increasing innovation and wealth, a large, uniform, literate mobility has to be *created*. For Gellner, this creation is the birth of nationalism, enforced by the state through mass education and mass literacy whereby, as Gellner puts it, 'the nation and the state ha[ve] to be congruent' (1983: 1). Within this realm, culture comes into play. Previously, a 'high culture' - consisting of 'transition through formal

education, a sacred language and socially transcendent norms' - was the "business" of a small part of society (Gellner 1996: 102). However, in the industrialization era, 'high culture' becomes part of every individual's daily practices, norms and values. In order to retain its economic vitality and prosperity, the political unit is concerned with inventing cultural unity where it did not exist previously. In this regard, culture is a creation, enforced by top-down state processes inducing mass education, literacy and the use of a single vernacular language. Gellner states:

this is the general profile of a modern society: literate, mobile, formally equal with a merely fluid, continuous, so to speak atomised inequality, and with a shared, homogeneous, literacy-carried, and school-inculcated culture. [...] In such an environment, a man's culture, the idiom within which he was trained and within which he is effectively employable, is his most precious possession, his real entrance –card to full citizenship and human dignity, to social participation.[...] So culture, which had once resembled the air men breathed, and of which they were seldom properly aware, suddenly becomes perceptible and significant (Gellner 1987: 15, 16).

Thus, culture becomes identifiable and *identifying* for those who are part of that society: a reciprocal cycle enhancing a diverse population within a state into one nation. In this sense, language offers *the* crucial marker for the enhancement and sustainability of a national culture.

For Anderson, nationalism is a cultural phenomenon enforced by an "imagined" sense of unity. First and foremost, its rise should be understood a consequence of shifting cultural systems that preceded it (1991: 12). Whilst 'divinely-ordained dynastic realms' disintegrated and 18th century rationalism flourished in the Age of Enlightenment, religion, once the dominant spin of societal structure, ceased to sufficiently hold power (1991: 10). Instead, a new belief was required: 'a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning' (1991: 11). With the degrading of powerful religious orders in the 17th and 18th century, the pervasive use of its sacred languages eroded. Instead, vernacular languages flourished, not the least through print capitalism and the mass production of books,

novels, magazines and journals. This gave way to the constitution of 'homogenous empty time' (ibid: 26): individuals could "encounter" and read about the community at large. Not only was the nation strengthened by its secular religiosity of shared 'imaginings' of human fates, hopes and glories, its imagined cohesion could also be transferred in printed text of any kind. It changed perceptions of time where the 'simultaneity' of events, happening in other parts of society, could be imagined (ibid.).

In this instance, a sense of cohesion, of togetherness, developed where any activity or event could be shared, yet imaginatively so - not literally. In this sense and in Renan's (1882) famous terms: 'a nation's existence is (please excuse the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life' (10). Anderson illustrates: 'an American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000-odd-fellow Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity' (2006: 26). Anderson assigns great importance to the rise of vernacular languages as a catalyst process for the constitution and existence of a unified national community. For Anderson modernist historical-cultural roots constitute nationalism. Linguistic singularity, fuelled by the downfall of powerful religious, cultural systems, explains the modern development of 'imagined communities' into nations.

In summary, Gellner and Anderson settle that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, generated by the breakup of powerful pre-modern societal structures. Regardless whether this development was consequential of cultural, economic and/or political hierarchical shifts, it engineered the rise of nations where 'they did not exist previously' (Gellner 1965: 169). In this process, national cultures were "created" and/or invented in order to build and sustain the nation's apparent unity (Weber 1976). Culture is thus creational, yet it also proposes a linguistic, defined uniformity which holds few flexibilities. It is in this processual, imagining of

national belonging that we can link cultural affiliations, associations through the myriad of identification processes in which individuals create a sense of being.

Along similar lines, Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) emphasize the creation of an identifiable nation based on a culture of invention. They speak of ‘the invention of traditions’ by which certain traditional, historical events, rituals, norms and symbols were adopted, modified and reconstructed to be incorporated into a system of remembering, uniting and reinforcing the nation. They argue:

the National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty, and as such they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves they reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation (1983: 11).

In other words, these factors are symbolical reinforcements – or ‘totems’- for individuals to sustain and “imagine” the uniqueness and uniformity of the nation they are part of (Durkheim 2001). Thus, where modernists are concerned, the symbiosis between nation and culture stems from a nationalism that is functional and purposeful: no primordial layout need precede it.

2.3.2 Primordialist thinking about nationalism

Some do consider the existence and necessity of pre-modern ethno-cultural roots *before* nations and estimate ethnicity or ethnic ties as key foundations of modern nations. For primordialists, nations are “natural” occurrences, arisen from supposedly fixed ancestral and biological differences amongst ethnic groups (Hearn 2006; Geertz 1973). Although the latter idea, i.e. ethnicity as a biologically determined differentiation between groups, is considered largely obsolete, ethnicity as ‘fictive’ kinship is an important aspect of primordialist theory (Horowitz 1985). In this regard, pre-existing ethnic ties are considered important “imaginative” dialectics sustaining a “natural” sense of togetherness based on an

ancestral link to a pre-national homeland, language and past (Connor 1978; 1994). This addresses wider debates in nationalism theory with regards to the role of ethnicity as a pre-conditional necessity for the creation of nations, or, as an element that relates to larger (more important) dynamics of modernization and state formation.

There hardly is any contention amongst theorists of nationalism as to the existence of ethnic groups *before* nations (Hearn 2006: 21). In this regard, ethnicity is understood a relational concept in which groups regard themselves as culturally different where they, observably, might not be. Whilst modernists often acknowledge the presence of ethnic diversity in pre-modern societies, most oppose the assumption nations “sprung” from these specific ethnic groups. Rather, it is believed nations were created where nationalization and modernization processes enforced each other. However, Smith (1988; 1996) argues otherwise and assigns importance to ethnicity or ‘ethnie’ as a pre-requisite for the emergence of nations in modern times. Smith defines ‘ethnie’:

a human population possessing a myth of common descent, common historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a particular territory, and a sense of solidarity (1988: 9).

In what he terms ‘ethno-symbolism’ (by which he distances himself from primordialism) Smith argues pre-modern cultural sentiments, symbols and myths sustained symbolically and emotionally bonding communities which lay the foundations for nations to arise (1996). Although Smith agrees modernization set in motion the era of nationalism, he believes nations were “awoken” rather than created where particular ethnic-historical and ethno-cultural characteristics had existed already (Smith 1996: 377). In Smith’s interpretation of ethnicity, the conflation of culture and ethnicity is apparent (which I will also discuss further in section 2.4): he emphasizes the ‘cultural-ontological dimension of dominant ethnicity’ (Kaufman and Zimmer 2004: 66). According to Smith, there is a primordial, *cultural* base that *underscores* every nation or ‘ethnie’ and this is where

he and I depart. Although, I believe there might be an ethno-cultural “core” to the modern nation, I understand this aspect to be reared and implemented according to nationalist designs of unification. In this regard, the strategic implementation and “invention” of cultural artifacts, fueled by side products of (larger) modernization, industrialization and state formation (Breuilly 1996) dynamics, helped create the eventual, “embedded” relationship between nation and culture.

Whether we understand the origins of the nation as a modernist or primordialist development, nationalism dictates that a nation has a culture. If the nation “makes the man”, as Gellner argues, then culture becomes a person’s main identity. This brief overview between modernist and primordialist nationalism theories nevertheless begs the question as to “what” national culture contains. Can we assume that – from a modernist viewpoint – the make-up of national cultures is one that is inclusionary and relatively “thin” to the incorporation of diversity? Or, instead, should we consider the role of “thick”, ethno-cultural dimensions that underscore and reinforce a relatively exclusionary national culture and unity? In other words, what markers of national culture are detectable and in which ways do these elements enforce the exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of similarity and difference? The clue is to research grassroots dialectics of identification processes that simultaneously highlight the labels and tools – ethnic and civic - individuals appropriate to accommodate a sense of national belonging (or not) and how these dialectics relate to the integration of multicultural diversity and affiliations. I will discuss this further with regards to ethnic-civic-civil dichotomies of nationalism that subsequently illuminates the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism.

2.3.3 Civic and ethnic nationalism

Ethnic versus civic dichotomies offer important classifications for examining the conceptualization of nationalism (Shulman 2002). These typologies not only address

the ethno-cultural versus the civil-political dimensions of national culture, they also enforce normative distinctions of illiberal/liberal; bad/good; western/eastern nations (Kohn 1944; Meinecke 1970; Brubaker 1992). Therefore, it is important to understand civic-ethnic dichotomies as useful guidelines rather than absolute differentiations between nations.

Civic nationalism is often linked to the idea of political citizenship which signifies a liberal, tolerant, and peaceful factor and is therefore considered useful in dealing with cultural diversity (Ignatieff 1993: 3). According to Ignatieff, civic nationalism '[...] envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values' (1993: 3). In this context, a civic identity presupposes the unity of the nation regardless of 'race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity', provided one subscribes to the values and principles outlined in democratic law. In this sense, national belonging is offered as a free choice for identity, 'a form of rational attachment' (Ignatieff 1993: 4).

Ethnic nationalism is often posited opposite civic nationalism where it 'claims [...] that an individual's deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen' (Ignatieff 1993: 3). Its national belonging is often determined as rigid and limited when it envisions that national unity lies in shared ethnic ties, conceptualized as a shared native land, past, ancestry, language and culture (Smith 1988; Geertz 1973; Connor 1994;). Especially, where it is primordially formulated that 'every person has a 'natural' feeling of belonging, based on blood, speech, custom, religion or language' (Geertz 1994: 31), ethnic nationalism is thought difficult to accommodate ethno-cultural differences.

Civic nationalism, in contrast, seems to portray a sense of neutrality, equality and most of all, liberty to choose an identity. Consequently, between the two nationalisms, "ethnic" holds connotations of an illiberal, bad force at hand while

“civic” is posed a liberal, good form of national unity. More significantly are the geographical placements of “east” and “west” attached to differentiate ethnic from civic nationalism (Kohn 1944). Ignatieff, for example, understands civic nationalism as a fruitful and liberal consequence of mainly Western historical developments of Enlightenment and English, French and American revolutions, while he uses the Serbian-Croat war to exemplify ethnic nationalism at its most extreme: illiberal, violent and most importantly, an instrumentalist force of nation-building, prone to political hijacking of minor differences with dramatic consequences (1993: 14, 15).

Crucially, dichotomies of nationalism not only sustain “either/or” characterizations of nations, they most importantly pass cultural judgments as to differentiate ethnic from civic nations. In this regard, civic nationalism is often considered culturally blind and therefore thought to propose a “neutral” national identity which enhances a citizenship based on shared democratic grounds of individual choice and free will. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, seems culturally charged where it promotes ethnic uniformity based on a shared sense of culture, descent and kinship ties. Smith, for example, essentializes ‘ethnie’ as cultural uniformities which ‘myths of descent form [cores] for the formation of nations’ (2001: 23). In his analysis on ‘myths of origins’ lies the possible explanation as to the interchangeable use of culture and ethnicity today. Smith argues:

a myth of descent attempts to provide an answer to questions of similarity and belonging: why are we all alike? Why are we one community? Because we came from the same place, at a definite period of time and are descended from the self-same ancestor, we necessarily belong together and share the same feelings and tastes. This ‘explanation’ brings together the twin elements of the Greek term *ethnos*, the ideas of living together and being alike in culture, but adds the secondary meaning of the term, namely, a sense of tribal belonging through common family ties, rather than any sense of genetic and blood ties (1988: 24)

Unlike Smith, I do not accord myths of kinship and descent structure the unifying cores of nations, nor do they prove sufficiently the connection between the existence of ‘ethnie’ and the rise of modern nation-states. Yet, Smith does illustrate

the entanglement of culture and ethnicity on a community that enforces an ethnic nationalism where its members regulate difference and similarity based on assumptions of shared roots, blood ties and culture.

Brubaker (1992) offers a considerably more nuanced deliberation of (geographical) civic and ethnic nationalisms in his typology of French and German types of nationhood. Brubaker expounds the historical divergence between civic, French and ethno-cultural German forms of nationhood and demonstrates how:

particular cultural idioms – ways of thinking and talking about nationhood that have been state-centered and assimilationist in France, and more ethnocultural and differentialist in Germany – were reinforced and activated in specific historical and institutional settings...(1992: 16)

That these cultural idioms are not “static” differentiations but rather redefined and somewhat overlapping dynamics, gives food for thought regarding the flexibility and fluidity of civic and ethnic markers inherent in national culture. In a later work, Brubaker (1999; 2004) has substantially addressed this query by questioning the definitions of “ethnic” or “civic” markers and the ways in which these terms overlap. However, according to Brubaker, some distinction can be made bearing reference to liberalism and Enlightenment and the idea of choice (civic) as opposed to the inherited, ascribed idea of the nation (ethnic).

Yack (1999), in his valuable critique titled ‘the Myth of the Civic Nation’, also addresses this query and indeed identifies the need to reject the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism. Yack argues that there are certain cultural aspects inherent to every nation-state (1999: 105-106). Even though certain nation-states, such as the United States or France, have constituted a form of loyalty and a sense of national community based on civic aspects of equality and freedom of speech, there will always be cultural factors such like national language and a shared national history that underlie the notion that the nation-state is also cultural in its character. Yack is right to say that to become part of a particular civic nation-

state is not simply choosing to accept civic rule; it is also adhering to a specific cultural notion of the nation-state which is not always clear at the surface and which therefore might leave little room for exploring other forms of cultural identification (ibid: 115).

Therefore, in this PhD thesis, I take national culture as encompassing both civic and ethnic markers: these cultural contours of national belonging identify the norms, values, symbols and other aspects that enforce a sense of national unity. This observation is at the heart of further explorations of Dutch national belonging and culture with regards to the incorporation of multicultural diversity, discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Where does this leave the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism? If we consider that the cultural contours of national culture and identification comprise both civic and ethnic aspects, how do these dichotomous dynamics resolve a shared national belonging conducive to multicultural diversity?

Hall (2003) explicates the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism that is 'properly understood [as] 'civil' nationalism' where homogeneity is created within the nation-state as long as 'a shared commitment to minimal liberal political norms' is upheld and individual freedom to choose a cultural background is obtained (ibid: 29, 30). Although he argues for a certain degree of political 'common belonging' parallel to private, cultural group associations, he does not specify what the overarching identity characteristics of this 'common belonging' should entail. Hall makes a good point stating civil nationalism can work best in a culturally 'thin' context (ibid: 28). The USA might be such an example of a nation-state that has 'at its core political loyalty rather than a collective memory of an ethnic group' (ibid), yet much can be said also about its rich cultural and historical aspects and appropriation of these factors in "Americanness".

Miller emphasizes 'nationality' as significant of the relationship between nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism that, as he argues, 'cannot be wholly symbolic; it must embody substantive norms' (1995, 2000: 36). These substantive norms are embodied in the characteristics of the nation which Miller explains as 'a community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and thought to be marked off from other communities by its members' distinct traits' (2000: 31). Miller defines the majority culture of the nation as a 'public culture' which according to him can be seen:

as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together. This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or the rule of law, but it reaches more widely than this. It extends to social norms such [...] as queueing as a way of deciding who gets on to the bus first. It may also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language (1995: 26).

Thus, Miller portrays the nation's characteristics in civic but also ethno-cultural and socio-behavioral terms, emphasizing language and historical legacy. Miller does not see the *public* recognition of cultural diversity as favorable in an established democratic nation-state, because it triggers the solidification of cultural identities which are in essence *personal* and fluid (2000: 77). As Miller states:

there can be a shared public culture which defines the national identity alongside a plurality of private cultures which help define people's identities as members of sectional groups (2000: 77).

Therefore, Miller's definition of 'nationality' actually approaches far greater notions of political citizenship as he argues cultural diversity can be only respected and preserved in the *private* sphere. As Miller goes on 'thus, the food one chooses to eat, how one dresses, the music one listens to, are not normally part of the public culture that defines nationality' (1995: 26). It seems Miller wishes to explain 'nationality' in terms of a civic/civil identity, yet this is not absolutely clear.

2.4 INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION

2.4.1 Culture

In the previous section, I have argued that the focus on culture in whichever shape or form (civic/civil/ethnic) unites a nation and gives cultural “character” to it. This means culture is not simply about ethnic, linguistic and customary elements: it is a tool for individuals to differentiate, which is an assumption widely recognized in social anthropology (Boas 1920; Barth 1969). It is interesting to explore this notion further with regards to multiculturalism: that culture is multiple interpretable and flexible necessitates the exploration of a national “self” that can be considered a “loose” but powerful network of aspects which enhance individuals to accept, adopt and make their own sense of national belonging.

Without embarking on a lengthy elaboration concerning the definition of identity, identity is not something we have, but something we do: we construct, we change, we adapt, or, in other words, we identify (Jenkins 2008: 5-9). Whether it is to identify or not to identify, it is a process which is multilayered, flexible and contextual. More importantly, identity formation is equally concerned with individual and collective identification. Jenkins provides a clear and useful summary:

- with respect to identification, the individually unique and the collectively shared can be understood as similar in important respects;
- the individual and the collective are routinely entangled with each other;
- individual and collective identifications only come into being within interaction;
- the processes by which each is produced and reproduced are analogous;
- the theorisation of identification must therefore accommodate the individual and the collective in equal measure (Jenkins 2008: 38)

Jenkins states that what defines a person is as much an internally (personal) as externally (social) constructed idea of self. The one does not simply work without the other. As a matter of fact, the “other” is a logical consequence of the interactional process of personal and social identification in that it automatically

provokes difference and similarity (2008: 23). In other words, identification processes lead us to understand ourselves through aligning *with* each other and differentiating *from* another. In an attempt to develop a meaningful understanding of oneself personally and place socially in the human world, we simultaneously classify ourselves as such and such whilst setting imaginative boundaries for the “others” who we deem different from us. Opposites of “us” and “them” are automatically provoked here, however it should be understood that what defines the “other” simultaneously defines oneself. Therefore, Jenkins quite rightly argues that ideas of similarity and difference should not be regarded as mutually exclusive, yet as concepts that enforce each other in an individual’s identification processes (2008: 22, 23). The importance of understanding similarity and difference as compatible influences in identity formation processes constitutes a theoretical starting point on which I wish to embark.

Identification mostly takes place on a much grander scale in our lives, namely that of social groups and collectives. The degree to which social identification influences individual identification processes, and vice versa, is another matter which needs discussing further on. Identification is - amongst other things- social, that we as individuals align and differentiate from groups, and that difference and therefore similarity are often set out by groups between groups through the significance attached to imaginary (yet powerful) boundaries, something which Barth has greatly researched (and to whom I will refer later). In this research therefore, the qualitative approach taken with regards to the interviews not only offers a rich, detailed insight into identification formations of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals in Dutch society, but their thoughts and perceptions also make explicit the delicate, complex interaction between individual identification and social group affiliation. A sense of self often was explained through feelings of social attachment to or detachment from diverse groups of people: interviewees’ parents and their somewhat conservative outlook, the *umma*, fellow 2nd generation young Dutch-Moroccans, young Turks in Turkey, Dutch-Dutch peers etc. The list continues, yet

suffice to say that a vast and omnipresent diversity in group affiliation - as there is amongst individual human beings – was a given and whether individuals felt partly obliged, even forced or had chosen to socially represent themselves accordingly, these social influences attribute to identifying a sense of self.

Yet it is not without problems. In certain socio-political paradigms the process of difference and similarity has acquired political connotations, set out along antonyms of inclusion and exclusion; integration and alienation; of “us” and “them”. The socio-political structure I speak of concerns the modern democratic nation-state and its attitude towards inhabiting multicultural diversity specifically. It can be argued that cultural plurality, the symbolically established difference between and by cultural groups, poses a dilemma for the social setting of the nation-state that ultimately sustains a sense of national unity rather than difference. Issues of cultural integration are reflected also in the identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents and demonstrate which directions identity formation takes when cultural differences between groups are played out along the antonyms of which I just spoke, for example of majority versus minority culture.

Ultimately, these contemplations offer an insight into a society where the interpretation of national culture is changing which ultimately affects identification processes of belonging and unity amongst those individuals whose cultural and ancestral background are considered “different”. Keeping in mind the foundation of the nation-state is one based on similarity and national unity, then how do we explain the incorporation of multicultural diversity in this modern social setting? Especially, if we consider processes of similarity and difference to bear political connotations, who becomes the “other” who needs to be incorporated in a particularly shared idea of national unity that might not match the “others” cultural, religious and/or ethnic affiliations?

2.4.2 Barth and culture

If we consider that we identify collectively (as well as individually), aligning and differentiating – similarity and difference - take place on a much grander scale in our lives, namely that of social groups and collectives that we might feel alignment with or not. Difference in groups is and has obviously been vast and omnipresent in every social setting imaginable, yet how are these differences maintained in the interaction between individuals who consider themselves of different social groups?

Processes of difference and similarity amongst and between social groups have been most extensively researched by Barth in his anthropological work on ethno-cultural groups. Barth frames his argument according to one main critique, namely that ethno-cultural difference, or differences between ethnic groups, should not be defined according to supposedly categorically defined trait, language or tradition divisions, but should be established as a social process in which individuals' perceptions of difference are created and sustained (1969: 10-13). Rather than understanding cultural differences to be the result of an evolutionary process of groups' non-interaction with each other Barth understands the process of cultural identification – similarity and difference – to be exactly that of interaction and communication. In this regard, ethnic group A is then differentiated from ethnic group B through the perceptive setting of boundaries; a process which is flexible regarding the particular setting it is performed in. Barth argues:

since belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, having that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged, and to judge oneself, by those standards that are relevant to that identity. Neither of these kinds of cultural 'contents' follows from a descriptive list of cultural features or cultural differences; one cannot predict from first principles which features will be emphasized and made organizationally relevant by the actors. In other words, ethnic categories provide an organization vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems (1969: 14).

What then differentiates A from B are not categorical differences of race, gender, culture etc., but rather the ascribed, verified, congruent 'codes' which allow for identification within the group and exclusion of others outside the group (ibid: 16). In this regard, ethnic groups are social organizations that "carry culture", marked through the acknowledgment and significance attached to the setting of boundaries by groups between groups.

In this regard, the relationship between ethnicity and culture should be marked by distinction between the two concepts. Eriksen's (1993: 2002) definition is helpful here: 'ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction' (ibid: 12). Thus, where ethnicity comprises 'the classification of people and group relationships' (ibid: 4), culture embodies the classifying tools individuals use to differentiate. Eriksen's position points out two observations: firstly, ethnicity is above all relational and secondly, culture and ethnicity should be understood as two different concepts.

Eriksen clearly detaches the two when he argues:

...one may have the same language as some people, the same religion as some of those as well as of some others, and the same economic strategy as an altogether different category of people. In other words, cultural boundaries are not clear-cut, nor do they necessarily correspond with ethnic boundaries (1993: 33).

Nevertheless, ethnicity and culture are sometimes conflated where ethnic groups are classified according to supposedly rigid, separate cultures, and vice versa. In his research on the multicultural London neighbourhood Southall, Baumann observes the tendency of culture being constantly 'reified' across and amongst the different communities (1996: 12). In this context, reification constitutes the rigid equation between culture and ethnicity in which ethnicity - and therefore culture - is constructed according to a biologically-essentialist idea which offers legitimation for the community's constitution, unity and autonomy (ibid: 19). Whilst this tendency

of reification exists, Baumann's ethnographic observation, unsurprisingly, demonstrates there is 'strong evidence that communities are processually constructed, rather than found as the ready-made social correlates of consistent and bounded cultures' (ibid: 191).

A case in point is the emergence of an Asian community consciousness amongst young Southallians which overrides culturally dividing denominators of race, ethnic background or belief (1996: 191). In his analytical framework, Baumann sets out a 'dominant discourse' of reification - often used amongst community elites, media and political leaders - against a 'demotic discourse' on culture expressed by individuals on a local level (ibid: 10). However, the distinction is not black and white. Baumann shows that the 'dominant discourse' rhetoric is often used in order for the community to retain its position in competition with other communities (ibid: 193). Interestingly, in these circumstances heritage is often used to retain or gain appeal for describing the culture of the specific community - an aspect which seems to resonate ethno-racial claims (ibid: 193). Ethnicity does not necessarily equate with an idea of a shared culture, religion, language or customs, yet Eriksen points out it often - but not always- portrays claims of ancestry or claims to a shared past (2002: 34-37). These claims themselves are forms of social constructions, yet they nevertheless amplify the possible entanglement of culture and ethnicity.

The 'dominant discourse' is especially striking in case of the Muslim community in Southall which although highly culturally diverse, is often portrayed as one community with one reified culture. Baumann proposes two possible reasons for this tendency. For one, it is the marginalization and stereotyping of the Muslim community in the public arena which has been a phenomenon for years. Secondly, the claim exists of one unified, global Muslim community, i.e. the "umma", and therefore, it might be difficult to refute the reification of the Muslim community by Muslims themselves (1996: 125, 126). These observations bear many similarities with the Dutch case where the Muslim community is often portrayed as being

ethnically and culturally one whilst religious and ethnic diversities persist. In conclusion, Baumann's case study shows that in the socially constructed process of defining culture, culture becomes reified and static partly due to a perceived idea of heritage and ancestral claims.

For Barth, culture, rather than being a static and inflexible element formulating ethnic differences, is more a *consequence* of social interaction and shaped interactively between persons whose perceptions of difference create boundaries. Within this realm, culture is a diverse, multi-interpretable and individualistic performance. In similar ways to Barth, Cohen (1985) argues the existence and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries between communities according to 'the consciousness of community [which] is, then, encapsulated in perception of its boundaries, boundaries which are themselves largely constituted by people in interaction' (1985: 13). However, rather than Barth's idea of 'codes' Cohen establishes that symbols act as cultural vehicles to enhance cultural unity within a cultural group. In this regard, culture is considered a loose framework of shared symbols which allows room for individual interpretation and meaning. In this process, individuals unite based on 'their common ownership of symbols' (1985: 21). As Cohen puts it:

This symbolic equipment might be compared to vocabulary. Learning words, acquiring the components of language, gives you the capacity to communicate with other people, but does not tell you what to communicate. Similarly with symbols: they do not tell us what to mean, but give us the capacity to make meaning. Culture, constituted by symbols, does not impose itself in such a way as to determine that all its adherents should make the same sense of the world. Rather, it merely gives them the capacity to make sense and, if they level to make a similar kind of sense it is not because of any deterministic influence, but because they are doing so with the same symbols (1985: 16).

Thus, symbols act as sharing "vehicles" which unite a community yet allow room for individual interpretation and subjectivity. They are subjective and therefore "imprecise" (ibid: 21) and therefore open and flexible to different meanings. I agree

with Cohen that, to describe culture as a shared set of symbols is to reinforce a shared culture through individual interpretation of its very symbols. In other words, culture unites individuals through each member's idiosyncratic experience of culture and therefore no dominant juxtaposition of culture prevails. Cohen imposes great emphasis on symbols as key culture shapers. In his view, any element, 'conceptual as well as material' offers a symbolic platform for a community to unite (ibid: 19). In his later anthropological research on Bali, Barth addresses the juxtaposition of symbols as sole factors at the heart of cultural group differentiation. He states:

...no symbol represents a meaning in itself, but only evokes one in its interaction with an actor's particular knowledge, agenda, and positioning. It follows that we cannot usefully inspect an abstracted tradition for its entailments; we must observe the uses to which real people put its concepts, in the practices of a range of actors in a range of circumstances (1993: 349, 350).

By addressing the methodological implications concerning the definition of culture, Barth underlines that symbols whether they are rituals, traditions or customs, only function as a means to an end. Symbols illuminate culture as they are used and employed – routinely and on a daily basis - by persons each in their own individual way. However, Barth extends his view beyond the observable use of symbols alone. In his understanding of Balinese culture, diverse socio-political constructs and/or (religious) dogmas also act as frameworks for individuals to assemble and act out culture. Barth argues that the cultural differences are determined where the conglomeration of the two – frameworks of socio-political and/or religious systems combined with common-sense values and traditions used in daily life - are deployed and acted upon by individuals in order to differentiate the 'us' from 'them', even though observable similarities most probably exist. Barth elaborates:

Thus, [...] we observe a conjunction of two rather different kinds of cultural materials shaping behavior: the major traditions of knowledge, each containing ideas with a distinctive source and history and held together as a body mainly through a distinctive social organization, and, on the other

hand, a range of concepts, values, and worries, that more directly articulate the outcome of people's own lived experience (1993: 350)

According to Barth, culture is where perceptive boundaries are shaped and therefore researching individuals' distinctive experiences and performances of routines and values give us an important understanding of culture as it happens daily. In addition to this, the intricacy of culture is illuminated in the individual's use of broader social, religious and political structures: its traditions and history embedded in that particular society are employed by individuals in order to make sense of culture and thereby delineate cultures. In the qualitative field data, this depiction of culture was clearly visible in the individual interviews held. Interviewees often reflected upon their cultural attachment and the "bigger" contemplations concerning religion, family relations, cultural practices, use of language etc. through explaining the "small", their daily habits, routines and encounters. In one interview, for example, Souhaila explained how she faced an inner dilemma when contemplating whether to go out on Friday night or going to her mosque for Friday prayer. Not only does her story highlight the cultural affiliations and religious preference of a Dutch-Moroccan female; it also bears reference to Islam and how its dogma can be interpreted in a Dutch context. Moreover, does it hint at broader cultural-religious traditions that might exist within Moroccan cultural practices. This and other examples, underline Barth's processual cultural identification. As we shall see in chapter 6 and 7, these are extremely visible interviewees' accounts of cultural heritage, religion and social environment.

To conclude, Barth has been greatly influential in research on the construction and meaning of ethno-cultural group boundaries and some would argue – and I would agree - he has 'fossilized' its definition in social sciences (Jenkins 2012). His research offers a particularly striking insight into group dynamics where differences between groups are a) verified through the construction of perceptive boundaries, which are b) not static but interactive and c) do not mean to verify an objective similarity of individuals as part of that group. The last point is crucial: if variation between

individual group members exists, why do group boundaries endure in the minds of its individual members? According to Barth, it is simply because people 'do employ ethnic labels' (1969: 29). These ethnic labels - and what they might signify or fulfil - are in the eye of the beholder and can therefore be demarcated as tools that are employed in social identification processes. Differences between ethnic groups can be estimated through the maintenance of boundaries which might fluctuate – more to the north or the south, so to speak – yet a boundary it will remain as long as the members of the ethnic group believe in it and together emphasize its borders through a remembrance of shared cultural ties. Nevertheless, boundaries might shift: the significance attached to certain cultural codes might fluctuate and change over time by incorporating "other stuff" which is an altogether promising starting point for finding a suitable approach to incorporating diversity in multicultural nation-states.

Whatever culture holds socially, the thing that is certain is that it is not essentialist, clear-cut or observable according to one or two elements. Nevertheless, in opposition to this view, we should consider the essentialist nature of culture, even if it is not the observable truth- as Barth has shown. If we consider ancestry as an aspect of ethnicity which draws out a static notion of culture, further contemplation is needed concerning:

- the conflation of ethnicity and culture where ethnicity is no longer a social identity regulating group relationships, but where the differentiation between ethnic groups is now measured according to cultural aspects which seemingly justifies difference between individuals, and that
- has ramifications for the politicization of difference, for, whoever is "in" there must be also people who are "out", and,
- consequently, has implications for understanding difference in modern nation-states in terms of majority versus minority cultures and the integration of multicultural diversity.

Definitions of culture are diverse and multi-layered, established through the interaction and communication between individuals, yet how do we judge its power in essentializing difference in society? In other words, when have differences become *cultural* differences which are perceived to be irreconcilable and impossible to surpass? Already on page 18/19

2.4.3 The “self” in social and individual identification processes

Identification is a process of interaction and therefore more than anything else, identity formation is shaped through social experiences, influences and encounters. This principle can be linked to Mead’s (1934) work on the construction of self in which he argues that identification is a process of internalizing, through speech and gestures, the external, social factors and interactions we encounter in daily life. Mead’s point of view starts from social psychology and he clearly outlines his premise as such: ‘for social psychology, the whole (society) is prior the part (individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts’ (1934: 7). According to Mead, identity formation is mainly for the social to preside over the individual which means a ‘self’ is shaped through the individual’s social experiences with and attitudes towards other ‘selves’ of other individuals. In other words, identity cannot develop without having an “other” there to “remind” us: to understand your own “self” is mirrored through the social reflections of others.

However, Mead emphasizes that identification not only constitutes interaction: it is also the familiarization of certain behavioural and attitudinal ‘codes’, embedded and subsequently used in social interaction, through which the individual develops a sense of identity corresponding to a particular social group, or ‘generalized other’, who “act out” those codes in similar ways (1934: 155).

Mead elaborates:

it is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual's thinking (ibid: 155).

Thus, identity formation becomes a behavioural process of internalizing the external social traits that function as a vehicle for the individual to belong to a particular group of others, and, aligns the individual to a certain social identity. Although Mead strongly emphasizes that it is the social group and context that dominate, influence and form individual identity, it is however not a one way process. The social community not only contributes to the development of the individual's self, it also creates a social identity in which symbolically perceived importance is reinforced through and by individuals who feel a sense of belonging to that particular social group. In this regard, individual and social identification are strongly entwined and in this process, '...the self reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes, and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behaviour in which it and the other are all involved...' (ibid: 158).

Mead offers a concrete basis for understanding the socio-psychological process of identification, however too great an importance is attached to social dynamics influencing the development of the individual's self, not the other way around. Although he states the individual self to be a 'physiological organism' different from any other individual human being, Mead argues individual identity to be completely shaped and developed through social influences (1934: 135). In other words, social interaction and activity seem to have "free range" over the development of the individual's self: it is a development according to a one way direction.

Although greatly influenced by Mead, Goffman (1990) offers an alternative perspective on the interaction between individual and social identity by putting greater emphasis on the individual's influence and ability to 'perform' identity in different social contexts. According to Goffman (1990), the individual's self is created upon the act or performance he lays on other individuals who view and mirror that performance (ibid: 26). He calls this performance a 'front' which offers a stage for the individual to identify, in different social settings, the particular social attributes and traits corresponding to the particular social identity exposed. In this regard, the individual most likely will, unintentionally or purposefully, perform an 'idealized' version of those social attributes corresponding to the particular social setting in order to be included and accepted by those individuals who have witnessed the performance (ibid: 30, 31). In the act of "acting out", the individual will present him- or herself in ways corresponding to the accepted, stratified elements of that particular social setting by concealing those irregularities or imperfections the performer him- or herself deems "flawed". Individual and social identity then entwine where the individual will not only perform those idealized, accepted social attributes, but will also adopt and internalize those social elements according to his or her individual identity. Ultimately, then,

it is commonplace to say that different social groupings express in different ways such attributes as age, sex, territory, and class status, and that in each case these bare attributes are elaborated by means of a distinctive complex cultural configuration of proper ways of conducting oneself. To *be* a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one's social grouping attaches thereto (1990: 65).

Through the individual performer, social group belonging is created and differentiated upon, yet Goffman makes clear that social difference is not so much established by the tangible elements we physically observe: it is most importantly through the performative meaning we attach to those elements and how important we perceive these different elements to be. Thus, social difference exists because perceptions of difference exist which sustain difference and therefore similarity.

Goffman elaborates on the social performative identification process by underlining the existence of, and, interaction between 'teams'. Often, not the individual performer but several individuals *together* will perform, as a team, a shared experience in opposition to the audience of other teams of performers (1990: 67-85). According to specific setting, time and place, a certain group of individuals might feel the benefit of 'cooperating together to present their activity in a particular light' (ibid: 89). In this case, individuals might become team members who together will perform, construct and sustain social coherency and alignment concerning that specifically shared social experience.

Goffman's definition of a team offers a useful examination of individual and social interaction and forms the basis for exploring social group identification and dynamics. However, Goffman himself points out that a team, although a 'grouping', should not be seen as an extension of a particular social group (1990: 90). Although a certain group of individuals might establish a specific team whose members will "act out" accordingly, Goffman stresses underlying differences between members remain and therefore moments of team cooperation are reserved only for those particular social settings in which the individual members see it fit to cooperate (ibid: 91).

A social group, therefore, differs from a 'team' in that a) its members offer unconditional belonging not specified to certain circumstances as would members of a 'team', and b) that underlying differences only seem to persist in team constructions, not amongst the members of a social group. Goffman does not elaborate the specific elements – race, gender, culture? – on the basis of which individuals constitute and sustain a "long-term" sense of belonging to a social group as opposed to a "short-term" sense of cooperation within a team. Whether these elements can be sufficiently objectified is another question, however, it is this premise of individual linked to social organisation and affiliation which acts as a starting point to understand social relations between individuals of different

groups, whether 'teams' or socially defined groupings. As this research concerns identification amongst cultural groups in a multicultural society, it is useful to explore social group identification processes amongst ethno-cultural groups, present in the works of Barth.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical backbone to the thesis in which the evaluation of multiculturalism has been my main concern and contemplation. This thesis proposes that multiculturalism still offers a valuable (theoretical) approach to the incorporation of diversity where "difference" is understood as a valuable and essentially "natural" process in a multicultural society where different groups of individuals live side by side. Nevertheless, two dilemmas underscore multiculturalism theory which I have addressed in this chapter and are borne in mind throughout this thesis. For one, is the focus on sponsoring cultural diversity *as* collectives which has led to culturally 'caging' individuals with diverse cultural backgrounds according to essentialist notions of cultural groups. The second involves the multiculturalist focus on 'bonding' cultural collectives rather than 'bridging' this cultural diversity into broader notions of national belonging and shared citizenship.

Theoretically, multiculturalism is not obsolete as an approach to diversity, yet it is problematic in two ways. For one, multiculturalism focuses on the preservation of cultural collectives rather than redefining the contours of the national "self". This has had the unfortunate effect of 'caging' individuals according to essentialist notions of cultural homogeneity. As I will discuss in chapter 4, this is particularly acute in Dutch "pillarized" multiculturalist policies. Secondly -and in addition to the first point – where this issue of 'caging' has been addressed, theorists are primarily concerned with the civil-political, democratic dimensions of the nation-state and

individual orientations towards a *civically* shared national belonging alone. Although these contemplations offer important new ways of thinking about a shared national belonging in a multicultural society, the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism seems neglected.

This illuminates the important relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism where I have argued that an evaluation of multiculturalism is, ideally, a negotiation between nationalism in which plurality is “juggled” between principles of citizenship and national identity in finding the right balance of preservation and recognition of cultural diversity while retaining an overarching, national unity. In this regard, I have proposed a ‘grassroots multiculturalism’ to investigate these dynamics according to identification processes of individuals and the mechanisms people employ to create and diffuse feelings of commonality and togetherness which in its turn should illuminate a sense of national belonging.

I am concerned with finding a shared national belonging that captures both the cultural – civic and ethnic - embodiment *of* the nation-state as well as the multicultural diverse context apparent *in* that nation-state. This research query illuminates dialectics of similarity and difference; exclusion and inclusion which ultimately lead us to comprehend better a shared sense of national belonging that is unifying but that does not ignore the preservation of cultural diversity.

This is where concepts of culture; identification; and similarity and difference merge. As discussed in this chapter, the consolidation of these concepts does not enforce cultural givens but rather underscores (national) culture as part of (powerful) fluid markers that individuals use to contemplate a sense of individual “self” as part of wider social contextual spaces of ethno-cultural backgrounds and national belonging. The research query is to illuminate how civic and ethnic markers – the cultural make-up of national identity – regulate dialectics of national similarity

and multicultural difference in order to apprehend what elements are obstructive and/or conducive to creating a sense of national belonging.

These theoretical contemplations feed into the methodological “how” of this research. In this regard, the investigation into the cultural embodiment of the nation-state underscores the necessity to focus on individual contemplations of “self” which – for one – avoids the issue of “caging”. Secondly, it underlines the choice for a mixed-method approach in which survey analysis serves to unearth the civic-ethnic markers between majority and minority (discussed in chapter 5), and, interview data (discussed in chapter 6 and 7) that illuminates the discursive, multilayered and subjective dialectics of these cultural aspects. I expand upon these methodological contemplations in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The crux of this thesis is to reinvestigate rather than discard multiculturalism as a viable approach to incorporating diversity. In the previous chapter THEORY, I have argued that if we are to create a better understanding of a shared national belonging that allows for the acceptance of multicultural diversity, the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism is to take centre stage. As part of this theoretical discussion, I have outlined that the baseline to multiculturalism theory offers important incentives for the acknowledgement and preservation of cultural identities albeit with the understanding that this multicultural diversity should hold a sustainable place *as part of* a larger national framework of belonging. In this sense, I am concerned with the contours of the national “self”, i.e. national identity in order to uncover the cultural - civic, civil and ethnic - dynamics that are part of its make-up and its susceptibility to diversity.

In this chapter, I critically discuss the “how” of this research query: this chapter reflects upon the methodological contemplations and rationales chosen for investigating national identity in a multicultural society. With reference to this research purpose, two methodological motivations are particularly highlighted. Firstly, this concerns the targeted research groups, i.e. Dutch 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background. Their reflections on and contemplations of national belonging particularly highlight national identification processes of those whose national association is sometimes contested and/or questioned. Those contemplations of national belonging were purposively analysed according to dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, and, similarity and difference in order to understand better the markers conducive to a shared national belonging.

Secondly (and additionally), is the decision to investigate *individuals'* reflections on and identity constructions of national belonging which – amongst other things - addresses the issue of 'caging' that I have discussed in chapter 2. As a consequential flaw of multiculturalist policies, multiculturalism tends to treat cultures as static groups neglecting the individual integrity of "self" which is a particular dilemma this PhD study attempts to avoid. The subsequent chapter 4 will discuss the implications of this "essentialism" with regards to the practical implementation of multiculturalist policies in the Netherlands.

These and other methodological contemplations are discussed as part of section 3.2 that provides the general discussion to the research design. Section 3.3 describes the final samples and the recruitment strategies undertaken in the data collection phase of the research. In section 3.4 I discuss the piloting and operationalization of the research and the strengths and weaknesses of the methods implemented. Finally, section 3.5 briefly outlines the approach taken to analysis and writing.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

In section 1.3 I briefly expanded upon the reasons for deciding to focus on 2nd generation Dutch individuals with either a Moroccan or Turkish background. Several combined reasons underlie this decision which is best explained in comparison to other migrant communities in the Netherlands, most notably the post-colonial Indonesian community and Antillean community⁶. First of all, there is one important, shared aspect that separates these two migrant communities from the Turkish and Moroccan communities which is that Indonesia and the Netherlands Antilles were once part of the Dutch colonial make up and kingdom of the Netherlands (for the Netherlands Antilles a "special region" administrative relationship is upheld). Obviously this factor has impacted hugely on the ways in

⁶ Individuals originating from the Netherlands Antilles, comprising the islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, Sint Eustatius, Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao.

which individuals from the Indonesian and Antillean regions settled and integrated in the Netherlands post-colonial times. Especially for the older generations who were born and brought up under colonial administration - who received Dutch education classes, were taught the Dutch language and learned of Dutch traditions and customs- an already existing connection provided for a different path of transitional integration in the long term. Obviously this colonial legacy made for an integration trajectory completely different from those who migrated as guest workers from Morocco and Turkey. This divergent premise was one of the decisive factors that incentivized me to focus on individuals of the Moroccan and Turkish communities rather than individuals with an Indonesian or Antillean positioning.

This is not to say that divergence between the two groups of communities is simply distinguished along lines of “easy” versus “difficult” integration processes. If we look at the Indonesian community for example, integration and settlement in the Netherlands has been considerably problematic, most notably with regards to those individuals who identify themselves as Moluccan. Migration from Indonesia to the Netherlands came in several waves, the most notable one around 1949 when Indonesia claimed its independence from the Netherlands. Because of their participation in the Indo-Dutch Army (KNIL) fighting against the insurgent forces, many Moluccans were moved to the Netherlands for fear of reprisals on the hands of the newly independent Indonesian republic. For a long time, their resettlement in the Netherlands was considered of “temporary nature” (Penninx et al. 2006) which largely reflected Dutch government’s attitude and approach to immigration at the time— I elaborate on this with regards to Dutch multiculturalist policies in chapter 4. As a result, heightened tensions and feelings of being marginalized manifested itself in the radicalization of a small group of Moluccan youngsters who were ultimately involved in two train and school hijackings in the late 1970s. Not only does their plight highlight intermediate stages of integration that appear problematic and destabilizing, (Berry 2005), their feelings of marginalization also seemed far from ever reaching peaceful settlement and integration. And yet, the position of the

Indonesian community in Dutch society today is one of a community that is integrated and, to a degree, acculturated. Their integration is a story of combined mutual acceptance, participation and identification: self-identification processes of being Indonesian (as well as Dutch) now have largely symbolic focus on cultural aspects of Indonesian music, language and food. Their story highlights the different stages of integration which, to an extent, is simply to do with time. Most importantly, the settlement of the Indonesian post-colonial community in the Netherlands highlights the intermediate stages of integration in which 2nd generation Moroccan and Turkish individuals currently struggle to identify and be identified, involving stress and conflict. In this research, I decided to focus on individuals with a Turkish or Moroccan background whose 'identificational integration', unlike their Indonesian-Dutch peers, appears more problematic and in an 'intermediate' position (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003).

As to the position of the Antillean community, comparisons are often drawn with the Turkish and Moroccan communities with regards to the disproportionately high level of criminal activity represented amongst these communities (Rezai and Barendrecht 2010). In 2009, of the number of registered individuals suspected of criminal activity, around 6 per cent were of Moroccan denomination, 3 per cent had an Antillean background and 4 per cent had a Turkish background (CBS). Comparing these figures to the communities separately as a whole, it appears individuals with an Antillean background seem more prone to be involved in criminal activity, around 16 per cent whilst the numbers are lower for Moroccan individuals (11 per cent) and Turkish (7 per cent). Yet, the Antillean community appears less "visible" in (public) debates on integration and multiculturalism in the Netherlands. It is a process that van San terms as to do with a 'forgotten' group that appears less in the limelight of integration issues (in Rezai and Barendrecht 2010). Part of this thesis is trying to uncover why individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background seem relatively more exposed to integration critiques, demarcated as representatives of

communities that are “failing” in integration processes. I therefore made the decision to focus on these individuals particularly.

Linked to this rationalize was the decision I made at an early stage in the research, to recruit those individuals who counterbalance a fairly stereotypical image, present in both public perception and popular media, which persistently blames immigrant groups *at large* for problems of segregation, criminality, a high dependency on social welfare and underachievement in higher education and language tests (Scheffer 2000; 2007; Entzinger 2006). The cause of these problems – which I do not wish to trivialize: they are indeed present in Dutch society – is thought to stem from a categorical differentiation that assumes these individuals as ethno-culturally and religiously different from their Dutch-Dutch peers (Jaspers and Lubbers 2005; Jaspers et al. 2009). The presence of this “culturalist” essentialism is expanded upon in chapter 4. In this study, I was determined to show a different picture of integration involving those Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals who can be termed “success stories” of integration: individuals who have attended or are attending higher or university education, who hold highly skilled jobs and who have lived and built their home in the Netherlands. It was chosen to focus on the highly educated and highly skilled individuals within these communities to show there is a “new” generation emerging who are bridging the “immigrant” gap of social immobility and criminality.

A third rationale for focusing on the Turkish and Moroccan communities was to do with Islam, both an inflammable topic which featured prominently in Dutch integration debates – as explained in chapter 4 - as well as a resounding theme used to explain integration problems. Contemplations of being a Muslim – which features in chapter 6 – are important identification processes amongst individuals with Moroccan and Turkish background as to their positioning in Dutch society. Investigating these processes unearths factors of Dutch multicultural society that are problematic and gives us a renewed insight as to the incorporation of diversity.

Superfluous to say, identification processes of being Muslim are not a prominent factor amongst Antillean, Indonesian (Moluccan) or Surinam communities.

As an extension of this last point, my decision to focus on individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish background also stems from a personal reflection on the killing of Theo van Gogh, a film director highly critical of Islam. Mohammed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh, was a highly educated and well mannered, born and bred Dutch man with a Muslim and Moroccan background. His decision to commit the murder - according to his own statement in the name of Islam – not only epitomes the definite blow to Dutch multiculturalism, but also signaled a definite change in the socio-political landscape of the Netherlands.

3.2.1 Why mixed-method approach?

At the beginning of the chapter, I have elucidated upon my methodological outlook as one that - in line with my research objective to investigate *individual* national identity constructions, interpretations and perceptions of “self” - is mainly informed by a (social) constructivist rationale. My informed epistemological interpretation of knowledge thus emphasizes meaning-making by individuals through interaction. I understand, ‘these meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas’ (Creswell 2003: 8). For this reason, constructivism is thought to be more comfortably embedded within a qualitative approach and corresponding research methods. My research intentions – as informed by a constructivist epistemology – were to unearth the interactive and discursive complexities of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks without deliberately labeling individuals according to perceptions of being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish or Muslim. Rather, I wanted to divulge the flexibility and fluidity of and between these identities as part of the subjective constructions of “self”. As part of the abovementioned

considerations, I therefore chose to adopt a qualitative research method in the form of semi-constructed interviews.

However, this methodological rationale might be seen as slightly contrasting with the mixed-method approach that was adopted and which includes the use of (primary) surveys. For one, constructivism often (but not always) implies some sort of “inductive” reasoning where theoretical contemplations and conclusions are the end point of the research. In quantitative approaches (which are largely informed by (post)positivists’ rationales) however, a “deductive” objective is often applied in which theoretical hypotheses are the starting points for testing the theoretical framework as the main objective of the research. To reconcile these and other issues, I need to further elaborate upon the pragmatist paradigm of mixed-method approaches.

Although there is and has been much discussion and contention concerning the pragmatic paradigm, mixed-method approaches have steadily gained ground and increasing popularity in different parts of social science research (Creswell 2003: 208; Green et al. 1989). In pragmatism, which offers a theoretical paradigm for mixed-method approaches, the research problem takes precedence over method which subsequently allows the researcher to come to a solution through pluralistic methodologies (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Guba and Lincoln (1994). With this in mind, mixed methodology offers very useful ways for approaching a research problem, however, specific rationales should be in place addressing the use of mixed-methods in order to avoid confusion. Creswell et al. (2003) outline four basic decisions which I use here to map my motivation for using a mixed-method approach.

The ‘theoretical perspective’ is the first component I wish to consider which also feeds back to the earlier dilemma I outlined concerning the inductive/deductive use of theory in qualitative and quantitative research. In this sense, the researcher

should be clear about the role and positioning of the research's 'theoretical lens' that might *explicitly* guide or *implicitly* inform the theoretical framework and the subsequent choice of mixed methods. As discussed in chapter 2, in this study I am concerned with the re-evaluation of multiculturalism theory; its relation to nationalism and national identity; and the interrelation of culture within this theoretical structure. At the end of chapter 2, the outstanding conundrum related to the role of culture, both as an interactive, subjective tool in social and individual identification processes, as well as part of a "generalized", collective notion of national "self" that is, to some extent, *perceived* as essentialist. These two specific theoretical dynamics were central to the research design and therefore acted as a guideline for the implementation of surveys as well as interviews.

Firstly, surveys were sought to unearth the importance and interrelation of "labels" Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents chose with regards to being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim. Specifically and secondly, the surveys served to explore civic-ethnic dynamics of national culture that as part of the theory review emerged as two main important labels for "mapping" national identity and culture. As a side note, the decision to implement surveys also stems from a practical notion, in that surveys have been used extensively in national identity research, in the UK (McCrone 2001; Rosie and Bond 2002: 2006; Condor et al. 2006; McCrone and Bechhofer 2007: 2010) especially, from which I could also draw upon (the practical operationalization of which I will discuss later in section 3.4).

At the same time, I conducted semi-constructed interviews to filter out the subjective, discursive processes in which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks construct a sense of "self". In this regard, I was more interested to understand how, in which ways and according to which contexts individuals construct a sense of "self" rather than identifying the particular "labels" they use to do so. Rubin and Rubin argue (1995) '...in qualitative interview studies, researchers want to make broader statements about more complex responses than yes or no, approve or

disapprove. Rather than asking simple facts or opinions, researchers ask about complicated cultural behavior and multistep processes' (1995: 72). Thus, whilst the surveys were to map the use and interrelation of being Muslim, Moroccan/Turkish and Dutch as well as to unearth the civic/ethnic aspects these individuals attached to contemplations of "Dutchness", the interviews were conducted to understand *how* respondents came to such interpretations. In line with Condor and Abell, in the interview I thus 'consider[ed] the ways in which ordinary social actors may construct nation-ness [hence, Dutchness] as a matter of subjective identity' (2006: 53). Therefore, the application of interviews was thought to highlight the negotiated sense of "Dutchness" that goes beyond a presupposed, theoretically defined national identity.

In part, this consideration between identification and identity resonates with and is central to Brubaker and Cooper's (2000) argument as to the analytical purpose of identity, which is also discussed in chapter 2. In this sense, Brubaker and Cooper argue that identity is too flat an analytic characteristic. It implies something people have ('strong' interpretations of identity) which in turn makes identity a rigid denominator that fails to cover a multitude of actions, considerations and choices – contextual and time dependent - in which identity "is done" and shaped. Therefore, rather than thinking of the participants in this PhD research as either having a Dutch identity or not (for example), thereby enforcing and implying a "sameness" that one is part of or not, we'd better talk about identification as to understand the mechanisms in which "Dutchness" rather than Dutch identity is construed. However, Brubaker and Cooper also warn against a 'clichéd constructivism' that over-emphasizes the flexibility, construction and fluidity of identity that makes for 'too soft' a conception of identity to be used analytically. Understanding (national) identity simply and alone as a subjective, discursive process, also fails the circumstances in which 'harder' notions of being are perceived to be construed. Hence, there are definitely certain aspects that unite the nation-state in the minds of its members, even if we are aware of the fluidity and flexibility of these symbols,

traditions and notions that can change according to context, time and space. Yet, it is in analyzing the processes and mechanisms that we find clues as to how identification shapes “softer” and “stronger” conceptions of “self”. In this regard, this research is designed to unfold the symbioses of social categories and labels that are employed to sustain a sense of “connectedness” in individual identification processes. As such, identities of being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim are not simply understood as ambiguous and multilayered meanings of “being” – they are socially “labeled” with subsequent meanings attached to them. In this sense, it is mapping identification rather identity and the surveys were effectuated to mapping the specific – ethnic and civic - labels respondents applied in their understanding of their own and others’ Dutch identity as well as to explore how these labels related to conceptions of being Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish. The use of surveys also adds “standardization” to the research: it is a quick and handy research method that will give accurate data on things as complex as people’s attitudes and perceptions on things (Alreck and Settle 1995: 5).

In the research, surveys and interviews were implemented concurrently (Creswell et al.’s second component, also referred to as parallel/simultaneous) as I set out to understand national identity perceptions as one constructed phenomenon, analyzed through two different methodological dynamics. In this sense, the mixed-method approach design can be characterized as a complementary study of national identity (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 43). This refers to Creswell et al. (2003)’s third component: the issue of priority. Although no explicit priority has been given to either one of the research methods, the qualitative aspect of the research design especially serves an important role to address the dearth (which I have already discussed) in studies on Dutch national identity that have been informed by a qualitative or mixed-method methodology. To an extent, the surveys have *served* the qualitative part in that the interviews (in part) were informed by the outstanding queries that arose from preliminary data obtained in the surveys and which were then expanded upon. Yet I would argue this is more evidential of

the research design's complementary rather than priority character. The fourth component to consider a mixed-method approach concerns the integration of the mixed-method data which I will touch upon in section 3.5.

In light of this methodological framework, I have used a mixed-method approach to complement the research objective which was to investigate the symbiosis between both "individualized", subjective ("Dutchness") as well as collective, "standardized" perceptions ("Dutch national identity") of national commonality. In line with my epistemological outlook that is partly constructivist yet curves towards the pragmatist paradigm, I opted to use surveys together with semi-constructed interviews as a combined mixed-method approach which I believe, appropriately addresses the pragmatism stance. By using a pragmatist approach, I felt the use of ethnographic and observational methods slightly inappropriate as these are so profoundly embedded within the constructivist paradigm and inquiry strategies of grounded, narrative, interpretative and reflexivity theory.

Nevertheless, there is a case to be made for undertaking ethnographic research especially with regards to the theoretical underpinning as explored in chapter 2 and adopted throughout this thesis which is to approach multiculturalism through a grassroots process of identification and positioning. To apply ethnographic and/or observational methodology would possibly help to work towards finding more appropriate terminology for describing identification processes rather than Identity, thereby avoiding slipping into arbitrary or categorical assumptions. Hence, it might be true that ethnographic or participant observational techniques would sit more comfortably with the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in which I observe the importance of understanding identification and cultural associations as embedded in fluid and flexible processes of aligning and differentiating oneself.

Yet, the main issue that obstructed me from using these methodological techniques was the crucial factor of access which could not be guaranteed. As I will outline in section 3.3, it proved difficult to commit organizations/institutions/civil society

groups to participate in the research. In order to observe a group of individuals in a particular social setting, access is needed to that setting, situation or context and it is this particular element that proved difficult. Other factors feeding into this argument were time constraints and limited means for realizing this particular route of methodology. Instead, it proved easier to establish contact with individual participants for individual interviews. Another objection has to do with the simple fact that the researcher is not experienced in cultural anthropological research methods and therefore it is not advisable to use these techniques (Creswell 2007: 70).

In the concluding chapter of this thesis I nevertheless make recommendations for future research as to the possible value and appropriateness of using ethnographic and observational methods to investigate multiculturalism as a 'lived multiculturalism'.

3.2.2 Ethical dimension

Before starting the data collection phase of the research, a Level 1 assessment was undertaken first of all to confirm the research was being conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological Association. The ethical review assessed several potential risk factors. First of all, it was established that the research did not involve the interaction with vulnerable communities or children. Secondly, the research did not have the potential of posing any form of health or safety risk either on the researcher or participants. Therefore, the absence of reasonably foreseeable ethical risks could be confirmed.

Several steps were undertaken during fieldwork in order to safeguard ethical aspects of confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent. The online set up of the surveys *per se* offered respondents a certain level of anonymity. An explanatory text was included to introduce the research and researcher, both in the online forum post as well as at the

start of the survey. The survey design did not include any questions about personal data such as name or telephone number (see appendix 1); respondents were invited but not obliged to fill in their email address for a follow up interview. Therefore, the survey data that was collected did not include any form of personal data and thereby secured the anonymity of the respondent; an email address was only obtained by the researcher if the respondent had filled in the designated section of the survey.

In terms of the interviews, all initial communication for setting up an interview - agreeing a date, time and place - was done via email. First of all, the person was sent another explanatory reply so as to make sure that the potential participant understood the purpose of my email, research and request. When the individual agreed to do the interview, a date, time and place was negotiated in writing via email so as to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding for either party. At this stage I would forward my contact telephone number, but never asked the participant to do so too.

At the start of every interview, I informed the interviewee about the scope of the research and myself as researcher. Each interviewee was asked his/her consent to the recording of the interview. At the start of the interview, I explained the data gathered would be confidential and research analysis undertaken would guarantee the participant's anonymity.

A transcript of the interview was sent to each individual participant with the kind request to read it and with the invitation to note any remarks. Via email the respondent would then confirm agreed transcript to be used in the data analysis.

3.3 RECRUITMENT AND SAMPLING

3.3.1 Preliminary observations

Before I started the recruiting phase of the research for both the survey and interviews, I first assessed the proportion of the Moroccan and Turkish communities at large, to determine an adequate sample size for this specific study. At the start of my data collection in 2009, the Moroccan and Turkish community comprised 341528 and 378330 respectively (CBS, Dutch Central Statistics Agency). These figures combine both 1st as well as 2nd generation individuals: the CBS determines the generational distinction if the individual was born abroad (1st generation) or in the Netherlands (2nd generation), with at least one parent born abroad. In this regard, 2nd generation Moroccan individuals were 174754 of whom 23255 had one parent born abroad with the majority of 151499 having both parents born abroad. In the case of 2nd generation Turkish individuals the total number comprised 182955 of whom 31540 had one parent born abroad with an equal majority of 151415 having both parents born abroad. In this research, I considered the total number of 2nd generation individuals, thus with either one or both parents born abroad; 2nd generation Moroccan individuals comprise around 1 percent of the entire Dutch population, whilst for 2nd generation Turkish individuals the percentage proportion is 1.1.

3.3.2 Survey recruitment strategies and sample

Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks have received much scholarly, public and political attention and therefore I was aware of a “saturated” research field. Hence, I anticipated a challenging and time-consuming recruitment period in which different recruitment strategies would have to be implemented in order to have a lucrative result. This data collection incentive also matched well with my mixed-method approach. In line with Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998)’s ‘mixed model

studies' methodology, mixed-method approaches might extend from methodology and methods to data collection and analysis in which the pragmatist inquiry can be used as well (1998: 52). Therefore, different techniques were used complementary in the recruitment of both survey and interview respondents.

The survey recruitment was addressed first of all, presuming gathering primary survey samples would be the most strenuous part of the recruitment process (Creswell 2003). To start with, I sought collaboration with representative organizations of the Turkish, Moroccan and/or Muslim communities. These "gatekeepers" were approached with the potentiality of gaining access to the organizations' members' databases and network in order to distribute the survey. Through establishing a relationship with two or more organizations, I hoped to recruit a sufficiently large research sample beneficiary for the survey analysis as well as create possibilities to approach potential interviewees. Furthermore, I hoped that through these organizations I would gather knowledge about the specific dynamics and issues I needed to address as part of the wider research plan.

Due to the sheer scale of Moroccan and Turkish organizations in the Netherlands⁷, and the fact that representation is widely dispersed across diverse aspects of generation, gender, religion and/or ethnic specifics, it was necessary to make a careful selection. The selection criteria are best described as a three-tiered approach. Firstly, I wanted to address both men and women and therefore female organizations were excluded. Secondly, I identified organizations that were likely to represent younger generations and/or have young individuals amongst their grassroots supporters. Thirdly, I had to have awareness of organizations whose representation is primarily constituted on account of religious doctrine/schools. Although identification processes of being Muslim are a central investigation topic, I had to be careful not to shut out potential respondents who associate themselves with different Islamic schools. Especially amongst the Turkish representative bodies,

⁷ Approximately 1900 in 2004 according to van Heelsum/FORUM

Islam is an important marker that differentiates organizations (and therefore individual members of the Turkish community) from each other (van Heelsum 2004). In this regard, Diyanet is considered the largest Turkish-religious (Sunni) representative body which is an official deputy to the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs. Apart from Diyanet, Millî Görüş forms an important (conservative) Islamic movement whilst there are also a considerable number of Alevi organizations who proffer a Shia/Sufi (mystic) Islam (ibid.). These three religious strands act as umbrella formations that split into numerous smaller organizations and mosques. To a much lesser extent, divisions amongst the Moroccan representative organizations occur due to Islamic schisms (ibid.).

Observing these criteria, several organizations were selected and contacted: they were sent an introductory email explaining my position, research project and request, which I followed up with a telephone call. Ultimately, (one-off) interviews were held with representatives of three organizations:

- Mr. El Kaddouri of the Collaboration of Moroccan Dutch (*Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders* (SMN)).

- Mr. Altuntas, chairman of both the Millî Görüş organisation and the Organisation for Islamic school boards (*Islamitische SchoolBesturen Organisatie* ISBO). He is also involved as a board member of the *Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid* (CMO).

- Mr. Bal of the *Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid* (CMO). The CMO is an umbrella organisation that unites the ten biggest Muslim organizations in the Netherlands. As a representative organization it advises and is in dialogue with the Dutch government concerning the Muslim community in the Netherlands.

No finalized collaboration could be established with any of these potential organizations; there was a sense of reluctance to expose the community to yet another study. One representative explained that due to previous, negative media

attention, the organization meant to keep a 'low-profile' position. Nevertheless, these interviews proved highly informative as a (broad) reference framework for the Moroccan, Turkish and Muslim representative viewpoints, the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish target groups and the research at large. Mr. Altuntas especially was also helpful at the piloting stages of the data collection (which I will discuss further in section 3.4 Operationalization). Talks held with these key informants were complemented by two additional interviews that were conducted with Dr. Landman of Utrecht University who is an expert of Islamic studies and Prof. Dr. Entzinger of Erasmus University Rotterdam who is a leading expert on Dutch integration and immigration who has also acted as a government advisor.

At a second stage of the survey recruitment process, the potential was created to broadcast an online survey. Recent studies have explored the popularity of forum-based websites that are often set up by and for individuals with a Turkish or Moroccan background particularly (Brouwer 2006; Eriksen 2007; D'Haenens et al. 2007). These websites act both as virtual meeting places as well as platforms for discussion where individuals might develop a sense of belonging that subsequently 'may help them to shape their own identity vis-à-vis Dutch [culture]' (D'Haenens et al. 2007: 296). In this regard, a form of 'digital citizenship' is emphasized that demonstrates contemplations of "self" in an attempt to gain acknowledgement and respect for this "Dutchness" (Eriksen 2007). Forum-based websites are most popular amongst the younger generation of Dutch individuals with a Moroccan background. Via an introductory email, I therefore first approached *maroc.nl* and *marokko.nl* which constitute the two most notable Moroccan web-based forums. Initially, the administrators of *maroc.nl* were interested to cooperate, however this could not be finalized. In several email conversations with *marokko.nl* the potentiality of the online survey was discussed. I was keen to further explain the research project in order to gain trust and after several emails in which the survey questions and the introductory text to the survey were preliminary piloted and reviewed by staff from *marokko.nl*, the online survey was broadcasted in one of the

forum topics on the website. The *marokko.nl* website is owned by Marokko Media which is a ‘marketing and communication company that specializes in digital infotainment’⁸. The goal of the company is to ‘entertain, inform and encourage Moroccan youngsters to think about the societal and social relationships within Dutch society’⁹. In a radio interview with the NOS (the Dutch news equivalent to the British BBC) Gijs van Beek, executive consultant of *marokko.nl*, explained the site receives 50 000 daily “views” which accumulates to approximately one million views a month¹⁰.

It was slightly more difficult to find a “Turkish” equivalent. Nevertheless, collaboration was established with the administrator of the forum based website *turksnl.net*, although it has to be noted there was relatively less positive cooperation and feedback from this website than which I received from the administrators of *marokko.nl*. The *turksnl.net* website is a forum-based website that mainly intends to offer an online meeting and discussion place for Dutch-Turks with a clear interest for Turkey, Turkish politics and culture. In a similar manner to the survey broadcasted on *marokko.nl*, I created a post in one of the forum topics which invited members to fill in the online survey. At the end of the data collection period – which I will discuss further in section 3.4 Operationalization– the sample size of the Dutch-Moroccan survey amounted to 107 respondents who completed the survey; for the Dutch-Turkish survey the sample size is 63. These survey sample sizes are relatively small and therefore the survey results that are discussed in chapter 5 cannot be reviewed as being representative for the 2nd generation Moroccan and Turkish individuals at large. Nevertheless, the survey data – as discussed in chapter 5 - offers a valuable, quantitative starting point for understanding self-identification contemplations amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks which are expanded upon qualitatively in chapters 6 and 7.

⁸ <http://over.marokko.nl/>

⁹ <http://over.marokko.nl/page/over-de-mvc>

¹⁰ <http://nos.nl/audio/14671-gijs-van-beek-over-marokkonl.html>

3.3.2.1 Survey samples and demographics

With regards to the two survey samples, certain demographic details need highlighting. First of all, most respondents in both survey samples can be determined 2nd generation individuals. Results from the *marokko.nl* survey demonstrate that approximately 63 percent of all Dutch-Moroccan respondents were born in the Netherlands with both parents born in Morocco. Although around 20 percent of respondents were born in Morocco (with both parents born in Morocco)- and might therefore be considered 1st generation individuals – it is likely these individuals moved to the Netherlands before the age of 6 in which case they can be considered 2nd generational individuals. The *turksnl.net* survey sample shows that around 66 percent of all Dutch-Turkish respondents were born in the Netherlands with both parents born in Turkey; around 25 percent indicated that they themselves as well as both parents were born in Turkey. The average age in both samples gives further indication to assume we are dealing with the younger generation of the Moroccan and Turkish communities. The average age in the *marokko.nl* sample is 21 (the mode is 19); in the *turksnl.net* sample the number is somewhat higher with an average age of 27 (the mode is 24).

In both survey samples gender balance is skewed. The *marokko.nl* sample shows that 87 percent of respondents were female and only 13 were male. In the *turksnl.net* sample, the make-up is slightly less imbalanced and partly reversed: of all respondents, 60 percent were male and 40 percent were female. Residence is a demographic marker showing widespread diversity in both survey samples. However, as far as can be ascertained most respondents in both surveys resided in the southern and central “Randstad”¹¹ areas of the Netherlands, in smaller (e.g. Haarlem and Amersfoort) and larger cities (e.g. Rotterdam and Amsterdam) within these areas.

¹¹ This area consists of the four largest Dutch cities -Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht - and the surrounding areas in the central belt of the Netherlands.

3.3.3 Interview recruitment strategies and sample

For the interviews, two recruitment strategies were employed which involved the online surveys as the main, important recruitment technique. At the end of the completed questionnaire, every online survey respondent was invited to register their email address in order to be contacted for a possible interview. This was the first phase where interviewees were recruited. In this manner, interviews were held with four respondents who had filled in their email address via the *marokko.nl* survey; through the *turksnl.net* survey two respondents were recruited for interviews. Thus, the mixed-method approach proved advantageous in the recruitment phase of the research where the survey served a complementary role in linking respondents to be recruited for a possible interview.

As part of another recruitment strategy, I contacted several non-profit organisations with the request to recruit potential interviewees amongst their grass root supporters. At this stage, the survey recruitment process had informed me about the reluctance of the “traditional” organizations unwilling to participate in the research. Therefore, I chose organizations that did not necessarily affiliate themselves with any of the “umbrella” structures. The organizations I contacted included the non-profit blog www.wijblijvenhier.nl (*‘we are staying here’*); the non-profit foundation ‘De Nieuwe Generatie’ (*‘the new generation’*) and several Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and Muslim student organizations. Although several organizations did not want to cooperate, most of the responses were welcoming and agreeable to the research project. Nevertheless, constrained by the organization’s overall motto, representatives were often unable to distribute my recruitment message further. In a few cases, the contact person promised to forward my message to a familiar circle of friends. Once the organization did agree to my request, an introductory text and explanation was sent which was spread amongst its members. Via the ‘De Nieuwe Generatie’ foundation I recruited four interviewees; one blogger from the *wijblijvenhier.nl* website agreed to an interview

and one interviewee was recruited through a Muslim student organization. One interviewee was recruited during a training day organised by the CMO, which I will expand upon in the operationalization section.

Overall, thirteen interviews were conducted with seven Dutch-Moroccans, three males- Rachid, Samir, Mourad- and four females- Souhaila, Aicha, Salima, Zineb- and six Dutch-Turks, two males- Kuzey, Hektor- and four females- Aygul, Sevde, Nergis, Zeynep. Their names are anonymised. From these 13 interviewees, all can be classified 2nd generation individuals: they were either born in the Netherlands or arrived there before the age of 6. The speakers were between the age of 19 and 40, highly educated- with either a higher vocational education diploma (HBO) or university degree- and all but one interviewee were either employed or studying (or both). The interviewees resided in diverse parts of the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Tilburg and Den Bosch that can all be considered urban city environments of the Netherlands.

3.3.4 Biographical portraits interviewees

Sevde

Sevde was born in Turkey as part of a large family comprising 5 siblings. She is the youngest. The whole family together moved to the Netherlands at the same time and settled in Amsterdam. When she arrived in the Netherlands, Sevde was 5 years old and therefore, is considered a 2nd generation individual with Turkish background. Both her parents quickly found work as production workers.

Sevde grew up in Amsterdam where she went to school. She attended primary and secondary education and successfully obtained her college degree (i.e. higher vocational degree). At the time of the interview, Sevde was 40 years old, working as an entrepreneur, residing in Amsterdam as a single parent household together with her teenage son. The interview was held in April 2010 at Sevde's home in Amsterdam.

Aygul

Aygul was born in Turkey as the youngest in a family with two older brothers. Her father was a metal worker in Turkey and wanted to 'make it in the Netherlands'. He moved to the Netherlands on his own and started working, leaving his wife and children in Turkey. About seven years passed when Aygul's parents decided to move the entire family to the Netherlands, except for the boys, for whom they thought interrupting their studies would be wrong (they eventually moved to the Netherlands, after obtaining their secondary education degrees). Instead, Aygul moved to the Netherlands together with her mother only, she was 4 years old. She can be considered part of the 2nd generation. Aygul grew up in the south of Holland, but did her university degree in Utrecht. She moved to Den Bosch (near her parents) to train as a specialist psychologist. When we conducted the interview, Aygul was 28 years old, living alone in Den Bosch and in a relationship with a man of Turkish background. She had been previously married to a man of Turkish descent, but divorced him at 25. The interview was held in April 2010 at Aygul's home in Den Bosch.

Nergis

Nergis was born in Rotterdam. It was her grandfather who initially moved to the Netherlands. As part of family reunification, Nur's father settled in the Netherlands at the age of 16/17. He later married his Turkish wife (Nur's mother) and brought her over to the Netherlands too. They had three children, Nur being the oldest with one younger sister and brother. Nur can therefore be considered a 2nd generation individual. She grew up and attended primary education in the Netherlands, but as a teenager moved to Turkey to attend secondary education: she lived there on her own for about 4 years and really enjoyed it. She started making plans to go to university there, but then the 1999 earthquake happened, destroying big parts of Izmir and Istanbul and her parents (residing in the Netherlands) urged her to return.

She returned and did a higher vocational degree in communication studies in Rotterdam, but her real passion was in realizing creative projects. When we met, Nur was 28 years old and self-employed, organizing creative workshops for pupils in primary education. She eventually settled in the town of Den Bosch where her husband, a born and bred *Boschenaar* of Turkish descent, was from. At the time of the interview, he had the job of manager in a care home and was trying to set up a multicultural care home for the Moroccan and Turkish elderly. The interview was conducted at the end of May 2010, at the Verkade¹² factory bar in Den Bosch, where Nur was residing together with her husband and daughter.

Zeynep

I met Zeynep in Rotterdam in the central library at the end of September 2010. Both her parents arrived in the Netherlands when they were teenagers: her father was 11, her mother was 14 years old. Her grandparents eventually moved back to Turkey, but their children stayed. Zeynep was born in Rotterdam and has one younger sister. She was brought up neither with a particular religious nor 'Turkey focus'. Nevertheless, Zeynep herself felt a strong connection with Turkey (read Ankara or Istanbul) and mentioned its hospitality and libertarian tolerance towards and acceptance of others. When we met, Zeynep was 28 years old, single and living on her own in Rotterdam. She studied law at Leiden University.

Kuzey

Kuzey grew up in Limburg (southern province of the Netherlands) as part of a family of 4 children. His father's father had moved to the Netherlands in the late 1970s to work and eventually Kuzey's father settled there as well, as part of the family reunification scheme. Kuzey's parents had then already met in Turkey: they married and Kuzey's father brought his wife over to the Netherlands. They settled in the south of the Netherlands where most people from the Bursa region in Turkey lived as a small but tight community. Kuzey attended primary and secondary education

¹² Verkade is a quintessentially Dutch biscuit brand.

and then studied 'his way up', from an MBO (intermediate vocational) degree to HBO (higher vocational) in order to study law at Maastricht University. He switched to Tilburg University as he lived there with his parents and struggled commuting to Maastricht every day. From his teenage years he was interested in politics and became a member of the Labour party (PvdA). In 2009 he entered local elections as a candidate councillor: he won and now represents a particular Tilburg council. When we met in bar in Tilburg at the end of May 2010, Kuzey was single, living on his own in Tilburg and 30 years old.

Hektor

I met Hektor in mid August 2010 in a cafe in Rotterdam: he was 20 years old and had recently finished his first year in international politics at Leiden University. Hektor was born in the Netherlands and from a young age was brought up in Rotterdam. He has one younger brother. His grandparents from his father side were the first to settle in the Netherlands in the 1960s. Hektor's father was born in Turkey, but was brought to the Netherlands as an infant; his two sisters were born in the Netherlands. Hektor's mother is the only one of her extended family who moved to the Netherlands; she had Hektor when she was 19 years old. Hektor can be considered a 2nd generation individual.

Rachid

Rachid was born and brought up in the Netherlands, a son of Moroccan parents. Both his parents settled in the Netherlands at the age of 16/17. Rachid's father came to the Netherlands on his own to study and get a degree, but due to circumstances (e.g. the language) he couldn't. Rachid's mother came as part of family reunification: her father had then already settled in the Netherlands and taught himself to cycle and to speak Dutch. Rachid's father worked for 40 years and his mother stayed at home taking care of the children. Rachid studied computer sciences at the University of Nijmegen and Eindhoven and obtained a specialist Masters degree at the Phillips research institute. When we met, he worked as a

software designer, but in his free time managed a website aimed at engaging the general public about Dutch muslim community, Islam and multiculturalism by coming up with societal-critical slogans similar to the 'Loesje concept' (<http://www.loesje.org/page/3661>). The interview took place in a cafe in Eindhoven in mid August 2010 where he was residing with his partner and child.

Samir

The interview with Samir was conducted in a bar in Amsterdam at the end of April 2010. Samir was born in the Netherlands, in the province of Zeeland as part of large family of 8 brothers and sisters. He describes his father's move from Morocco to the Netherlands as the 'typical guest workers story': he started working in the Netherlands with the intention of moving back but realized that after 15 years he and his family were here to stay. Samir's mother was a home worker. As with most of the 1st generation, Samir described how his parents have remained close to the Moroccan community, not learning to speak the Dutch language very well. When we met, Samir was 25 years old, single and in the midst of his media studies at the University of Amsterdam. As part of his studies, he made mini-documentaries, was a columnist and web editor: in all these three roles engaging in the topic of multiculturalism. He was residing in Rotterdam and once in a while visiting his parents in Zeeland where they still remained.

Mourad

Mourad was born in the Netherlands as the eldest son in a family of 4 children (Mourad has two younger sisters and one younger brother). Both his parents were born in Morocco, but his father moved to the Netherlands at the age of 8 as part of family reunification. He studied mechanical engineering and worked as a project manager. He married Mourad's mother and as part of existing family reunification schemes brought her over from Morocco to live with him in the Netherlands. Mourad can be considered part of the 2nd generation. His parents reside in the south of the Netherlands where Mourad grew up. He studied at the University of

Eindhoven and had recently moved to Amsterdam to start a PhD in maths. At the time of the interview, Mourad was 24, single and living alone in Amsterdam. The interview was conducted in the canteen of the Free University Amsterdam in mid August 2010.

Souhaila

I conducted the interview with Souhaila at the end of April 2010 at her home in Den Bosch where she lived on her own. Although she was born in the Netherlands and spent most of her life there, she and her parents – both born in Morocco - moved from the Netherlands to Morocco when Souhaila was 4 years old. As a result Souhaila spent her primary school years in Morocco and still vividly remembers the different smells and sounds. With part of her siblings remaining in the Netherlands – Samira has 7 brothers and sisters - her parents decided to move back and join them again in the Netherlands. Having finished her primary and secondary education in Morocco, Souhaila started her intermediate vocational training upon arrival in the Netherlands. She then successfully went on to obtain a higher vocational degree in psychology. At the time of the interview, Souhaila was working as an educational mentor in a youth detention centre. She was 28 years old and single and enjoyed travelling.

Zineb

When I met Zineb at the end of September 2010 in the canteen of Utrecht's college university, she was 23 years old and in the midst of finishing her bachelor degree in social legal services. Although this degree would give her plenty of opportunities to work, she was contemplating to do a Masters degree instead. Zineb was born in the Netherlands, in a town near the city of Utrecht. Her father, born in Morocco, arrived in the Netherlands at the age of 21 together with his parents. Whilst living in the Netherlands, he married Zineb's mother in Morocco and as part of family reunification brought her over to live with him in the Netherlands. They had Zineb

shortly afterwards and three more sons followed. At the time of the interview, Zineb was single and lived in the family home in the town where she was born.

Salima

I interviewed Salima together with her friend Aicha (see below) at the end of September 2010 in the main building of the Free University Amsterdam. Although Salima was born and bred in Amsterdam, she felt a stronger connection with Morocco. In their twenties her parents, both born in Morocco, were the only ones of their extended families who settled in the Netherlands: the rest of their entire families remained in Morocco. Apart from Salima, her parents have three sons and another daughter. During the interview, Salima strongly professed a sense of alienation and discrimination that she had felt as a Muslim and she contemplated moving away from the Netherlands. When the interview was conducted, Salima was 23 years old, single and studying psychology at Free University Amsterdam.

Aicha

Aicha was born in Morocco but as part of family reunification, she relocated to the Netherlands when she was only a few months old. At that stage, her father and his father had been living in the Netherlands for some time: they both did factory work. Because Aicha was so young she has no recollection of Morocco other than the photos she was shown and stories told by her family. She grew up in Amsterdam with 4 more siblings. At the time of the interview, Aicha was 24 years old, single and studying psychology at Free University Amsterdam.

3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION

3.4.1 Preliminary pilot enquiry

In more than one aspect, the interviews conducted with my key informants acted as a fruitful first piloting phase of the research. Although the latter “academic”

interviews were held *during* the survey and interview data collection period, the three “representative” interviews conducted with Mr. Bal, Mr. Altuntas and Mr. El Kaddouri all took place at the start of the data collection, between December 2009 and February 2010. During these conversations I was able to verify certain research themes I had had from the start. For example, I was eager to discuss the contextual (political) dimensions of the research in relation to the representatives’ thoughts on integration, multiculturalism and citizenship. I was interested to know the demographics of their grassroots support; my attention was directed specifically towards the younger generation and the perceived identity struggles of belonging these individuals encounter in Dutch society. All these themes were incorporated in the interview guide (appendix 2) that I used for the three interviews. Of a differently structured and prepared character than the “informal”, individual interviews conducted with the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees, these “expert” talks nevertheless helped me to frame clear interview questions and themes as well as the necessity to present a coherent representation of the research project. It also gave me practical guidance for expanding my interviewing techniques: taking notes; formulating questions whilst listening; correctly recording etc.

A second, preliminary piloting phase, involved my attendance to a CMO training weekend for young Muslims which took place on the 19th of December 2009. In this particular weekend, young Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds gathered for training in which individuals were encouraged to create, discuss, share and strengthen their assertiveness and awareness as a Muslim in Dutch society. Following up from our interview, Mr. Altuntas invited me to the training weekend. On the Saturday, I joined the group in training after introducing myself: beforehand, the group had been informed of my role as a researcher and attendee by Mr. Altuntas who attended the training in a supervisory role. During the training, which had a morning, lunch and afternoon section, I did not participate but rather observed the group whilst making field notes regarding the topics the individual

participants discussed and the (broad) themes inherent in the discussions that arose during the training. In casual conversations during coffee and lunch breaks, I queried the training participants about their demographic background, sense of ethno-cultural and religious self, experienced prejudices and discrimination. This ethnographic approach session proved helpful for the piloting stage of the fieldwork. The individual talks and collective discussions informed me of the important, acute topics at the forefront of young Muslims' social and individual identification processes that needed further discussion and investigation in my research. It also gave an indication of the dispersed complexity within the Muslim community with regards to the different theological schools, ethnic and cultural diversity. Keeping in mind the event's organizer (the CMO) and the training's topic (focus on Muslim identity), I was aware these young individuals were probably more inclined to discuss their Muslim identity and their position as part of the larger Muslim community than some of their peers. Although this meant that the topics and issues raised might not be of much concern to those potential Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees less inclined to identify as a Muslim *per se*, I thought it nevertheless important to "test" these issues, themes and concerns in the surveys and interviews to follow. In Chapter 6 I extensively discuss self-identification processes of being Muslim in accordance with the contextual issues of Islam stigmatization and categorization (discussed in chapter 4).

3.4.2 Survey

Before the online surveys were put 'live' on the two forum-based websites, *marokko.nl* and *turksnl.net*, a survey draft was spread amongst acquaintances and colleagues of Moroccan and Turkish background who commented on the format, questioning and length of the survey. In email correspondence with director Gijs van Beek and researcher and freelancer Naima Bouchtaoui of *marokko.nl* I was assisted with regards to the survey format and its language. Two final surveys were devised, one each for the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish research groups

(appendix 1). A website link, which redirected respondents to the survey, together with an introductory text was posted on each of the websites in forum topics designated for “research”. A German free survey tool, www.unipark.de was used to create, broadcast, access and store the survey and data online. Both online surveys were broadcasted from March till August 2010 after which time responses failed to continue to appear and a “saturation” point was reached.

The aim was to keep the survey short and concise, yet with enough room for in-depth analysis to get a ‘hunch’ of the issues, demographics and identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents. Therefore, the survey, which was presented in Dutch, contained a maximum of 24 questions (including 10 demographic ones), depending on the answers chosen in question 1. Question 1 served as a ‘filter’ question asking respondents ‘how do you see yourself?’ with options to choose ‘Dutch’ and/or ‘Moroccan’ and/or ‘Muslim’. Based on the choices made, automatic filters were then triggered which redirected respondents to detailed questions concerning specific parts of identity perceptions, feelings (how proud) and Moreno scale related questions (‘I feel more Dutch than Moroccan’, for example). After this process of “filtering”, *all* respondents were once more redirected to 5 “general” questions concerning Dutch society and socio-political issues. Finally, respondents were asked to fill in 10 demographic related questions which included aspects of gender, age, sex, place of residence, place of birth, parents’ place of birth and religion.

At several stages of the fieldwork, the surveys’ response rates were checked. To spur the response rate, the website moderators were sounded out for the potential to send a “private” message to all its registered members which would act as an endorsement for filling in the survey. Administrators of neither website were able to grant this request. The moderators of *marokko.nl* explained their members were unfavourable towards private messages and therefore this was rarely done. Instead, I wrote a new recruitment message which was added as a post on the survey topic

“thread” by one of the moderators. For the *turksnl.net* website I myself placed the new message in the forum post. Another attempt to get a higher response rate involved contacting my key informants once more with the request to distribute the online survey. The only response came from Mr. Altuntas who promised to spread the online survey amongst members of Millî Görüş and two Turkish student organizations. As far as can be ascertained, this spurred some initial response, however did not have a huge impact on the overall response rating.

3.4.2.1 Discussion

The surveys did not generate a random sample size representative of either of the targeted research groups. This leads me to contemplate the pros and cons for using an online survey approach. First of all, there are obvious reservations to take into account as to the use of online survey data: one cannot verify the respondent’s identity, location and demographic details. Although IP-addresses were recorded – whereby the researcher could verify whether the survey had been multiply filled out/taking out duplicates - ultimately there was no check in place confirming a respondent had true fully filled out the survey. Apart from that, the researcher is not able to assist whilst the respondent is filling in the survey, there is no (direct) opportunity to explain certain questions asked, to assure or take away any doubts on behalf of the respondent. For all these reasons, the data generated through an online survey should be handled with care and utmost sensitivity as to the genuineness of the data. I will expand upon this argument in the introduction of chapter 5.

As to the possible cause probable for the sample outcome, this might concern the location of the survey and the fact that no collaboration with specific partners or “gatekeepers” was established who could have spurred the response rate. The involvement of specific organizations/institutions might have generated a larger sample size. At the same time, the online survey approach is an adequate

alternative that (partly) resolves the dependency upon gatekeepers and their willingness to assist the researcher gaining access to the research field. This also brings up gatekeepers' involvement in the sample selection process which might not be (completely) "synced" with the targeted research group the researcher has in mind. In this regard, the organizations involved might have too great a dominance on the data and "preferred" research results. Having said that, survey partners can play an important, supervisory role in the data collection: they might be able to address issues of trust or difficulties their members might experience when completing the survey. In other words, gatekeeper organizations can act as an important intermediary between researcher and researched group.

Nevertheless, the online survey approach offers respondents the anonymity to complete the survey without the perceived constraints or social control collaborating organizations might exercise. Without their supervision, individuals might be more inclined to project own opinions and interpretations not necessarily directed by the participating organization's goals, motives and viewpoint. The online survey format offers easy accessibility and anonymity which can be attractive to individuals of a precarious and 'over-researched' target group.

As to the format of the online survey, certain conclusions can be made as well. A considerable number of respondents in both surveys only partly filled in the questionnaire: for the *marokko.nl* survey, 47 respondents partly filled in the survey whilst 28 respondents in the *turksnl.net* survey did not complete the survey. If we analyze the answer patterns of these respondents who did finish the survey, it is interesting to see that in both surveys individuals often stopped where they were presented with "statement" questions. The statement questions were included in the questionnaire to detect core issues and sentiments towards societal issues and asked respondents to disagree or agree with certain socio-political statements pertaining to issues of integration, discrimination and political climate (see appendix 1). Interestingly, 5 out of the 28 Dutch-Turkish respondents all stopped at

the beginning of the “statement” questions; in the *marokko.nl* survey, out of 47 respondents, 6 stopped at the beginning and 2 stopped in the middle of these questions. As the “statement” questions were presented towards the end of the survey, possibly a higher response could have been achieved if the statement questions had been shorter and fewer.

Another component that stopped respondents from completing the survey, involved questions asking respondents the level of “proudness” they felt towards certain aspects of Dutch society (e.g. “How proud are you of the Dutch democracy?”) (see appendix 1). In this instance, 13 out of 47 Dutch-Moroccan respondents terminated the survey whilst amongst the 28 Dutch-Turkish respondents only 4 individuals stopped. Apparently, these questions did not sit particularly well with applicants. Interestingly, in the *turksnl.net* survey, 4 respondents abandoned the survey when faced with the demographic questions that were presented at the very end of the survey. No such thing occurred in the *marokko.nl* survey. This gives food for thought regarding the perceived level of privacy and anonymity guaranteed in the online survey approach. Nevertheless, it is at the start of the survey where most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents of the “partly filled” category simply “glanced” the survey but did not continue: 13 out of 47 Dutch-Moroccan respondents and 8 out of 28 Dutch-Turkish respondents. Whether this is evidential of the filter question including not enough options to choose from, or, whether the question was too direct, are methodological queries outstanding.

3.4.3 Interviews

The interviews with informants and the CMO training day served – to an extent - as a piloting phase for interviews with Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. Initial contact with potential interviewees was established via email mostly, either through the survey (where the respondents had registered their email address) or

via one of the organizations' representatives who forwarded my details. The actual interview appointments were all scheduled through email correspondence.

Most interviews took place in "neutral" locations such as a university library or canteen and in cafes. Two interviews were conducted at the interviewee's home. In all cases, I left the interviewee in charge of choosing the location and space allowing for an interview setting the person would feel most comfortable and familiar with. Overall, I was very attentive to creating a "non-conventional" format, space and interaction in the interviews. For example, for every interview I dressed informally so as to not create a particular appearance of being a researcher. With permission, all interviews apart from one¹³ were sound-recorded. Although I kept a notepad during all conversations, I tended to make notes afterwards: I perceived that taking notes during the interview was intrusive to the flow of conversation. On average, interviews lasted for approximately an hour.

The interviews were semi-structured both in preparatory format as well as practice. I prepared a few "themes" rather than concrete questions (see appendix 4). In this sense, the "themes" formed the basic layout to the conversation and (broadly) involved topics of identity and nationality; the political climate; Islam and discrimination; and multiculturalism and integration. I would start the conversation by asking the applicant to tell a bit about their daily life, work, study, family which normally sparked follow-up queries directing towards one of the interview topics. Thus, the themes were not discussed according to a particular order which I felt enhanced the fluidity and flow of the interaction and conversation.

As I was well aware of my interview position as researcher but more importantly as a white, female Dutch-Dutch peer, it felt essential to tell a bit about my personal self, work and leisure. This disposition emanated from my awareness that interviewees might have certain assumptions about my cultural identity which

¹³ This was not an issue of permission. Rather, the interview context and the flow of interaction did not lend itself to a recorded interview structure.

subsequently might affect their narratives and the extent of information they would be willing to divulge to me (Song and Parker 1995). Overall, interviewees were keen to know where I “stood” to ascertain who I was and what I did. Therefore, at the beginning of every interview, I would shortly tell a bit about myself which – to some extent – involved who I was as a Dutch person; where I was born, where I was from and where I had lived and studied. I felt this personal introduction enhanced the interview relationship from the get-go in ways that interviewees were then sufficiently comfortable to talk openly and frankly.

This also touches upon the ontological and epistemological contemplations regarding the position the interviewer takes both in the active interview as well as in the meaning-making process of that interview context. In this regard, the approach I engaged with, underwrites my constructivist understanding of the interview as a form of social interaction: it acts as a platform where knowledge is created rather than gathered in a mutual meaning-making process between interviewer and interviewee. Hence, the interviewer is to undertake an engaging and ‘activating’ role where he or she ‘...sets the general parameters for responses, constraining as well as provoking answers that are germane to the researcher’s interest. He or she does not tell respondents what to say, but offers them pertinent ways of conceptualizing issues and making connections...’ (Holstein and Gulbriem 1995: 39).

Hence, there was a level of ‘self-disclosure’ that as an interviewer I should dispose at various moments for various reasons in the interviews (Abell et al. 2006). In this sense, I engaged in the meaning-making process of ‘doing similarity’ in order to establish common ground and a shared sense of understanding. However, as Abell et al. (2006) have shown, this approach of ‘self-disclosure’ might have mixed results. This excerpt from my conversation with Zeynep illuminates both sides. In this part of the conversation, we talked about minority communities and issues of segregation which Zeynep felt was (partly) due to the fact that Dutch culture and

identity are not propagated more. To be more specific, I probe her by revealing I do like the Dutch monarchy as a particular part of Dutch culture which has the opposite effect: she does not partake in that understanding. However, when I propose a different frame concerning the Dutch government's policies, Zeynep gives a rich account of her understanding on integration.

Zeynep: Dutch monarchy equally so. Are we proud of that? Come on..

ED: I kind of like the Dutch monarchy...

Zeynep: Yes it is nice, but what...

ED: But being proud is another thing, indeed.

Zeynep: Yes

ED: Yeah exactly, I think that few people would say 'I am really proud of our queen' or something.

Zeynep: Yes

ED: That's right yes. But ok, but...but what you do sort of see, what Dutch government tries to do, is actually to sort of promote part of Dutch identity by saying 'people do really have to know the Dutch language', 'civic integration courses' etc.

Zeynep: Oh yes that is a good example, that's those language courses yes.

ED: Yes.

Zeynep: Once I was at my grandpa's and there was a woman and that woman explained that she was obliged to do a language course, instigated by the Rotterdam town hall. Fine. And I am a great supporter of that. Even if she is 50, 60 years old, let them do something useful, sorry. Rather than them sitting on the sofa at home, but, what I find strange, and that is what I mean by that careless attitude of the Dutch gover[...] society to call it like that, is that they send a teacher or a tutor to offer the course at home. No, why do you offer a 1 to 1 class? Let them go to a class room en masse or to a school to...That costs less, for one. Two, why are they so careless? Or, why are they not a bit tougher? They are allowed to act a bit tougher.

This excerpt is exemplary of the interviews I conducted: it pertains to the constructivist interview approach I adopted in which I considered meaning-making to be subjective, mutual and fluid rather than static.

3.4.3.1 Discussion

The aspect of 'disclosure' lends itself for further reflection upon the practical outcomes of the interviews. When taking a constructivist approach to interviewing, it is difficult, as a researcher, to establish a balance between talking and listening, between engaging and taking a "neutral" stance. It is fair to say I have not fully mastered this skill. At times and especially at the start of my interview data collection, I was aware of talking a considerable amount which might have (slightly) affected interview outcomes. By this I mean that I might have "nudged" interviewees too much into one particular direction by conveying my own opinions and interpretations. Nevertheless, for the interviewee this might have been testimony of my engagement and willingness to understand which subsequently might have sparked further divulgement on her or his part. Given that the conversations seemed to appear in a relaxed "chatting" atmosphere might attest to this as well as for the rich interview data I obtained.

Having said that, I was also aware of the interviewees' position: these were individuals who wished to be interviewed and had clear incentives to talk and engage with the research topic. This is a factor to take into account when assessing the interview practicalities, context and data. With regards to this, all interview accounts showed extraordinary clarity and succinctness with which interviewees spoke about aspects of identification and multiculturalism. In the sections of the interviews where identity was discussed, it quickly became apparent that most interviewees seemed to have their own "repertoire" for talking about "self". Most speakers had a well-constructed, articulated story that made sense to them and the outside world, but also made sense of them for the outside world. In one or two cases, the interviewees would "shoot" talking about their identity the second the voice recorder was on. This is interesting when comparing it to Condor's study of English national identity in which the English interviewees often 'lacked glib

answers to straightforward questions concerning their nationality, and often indicated that they were conscious of their national identity only in unusual circumstances' (1996: 55).

Nevertheless, in the case of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks it can be argued that, possibly more than their Dutch-Dutch peers, they expressed their identities of being Dutch, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim in a more salient and neatly identifiable way. This is not to say that these identities are salient and static, but nevertheless presented in a coherent and articulated manner. A similar conclusion was drawn in Buitelaar's narrative life story account of a female, Dutch politician of Moroccan background. Buitelaar noted that: 'Tahara's carefully constructed and oft-repeated public success story appears to consist of little more than a recital of achieved goals and ideological viewpoints' (2006: 263). At the same time, Buitelaar acknowledges the importance of this conclusion: the narrative is evidential of the public, political and individual discourses that are important in her story. Subsequently, this exposes contextual narratives upon which we can expand. It is in this light that I understand the well-constructed repertoire and "rehearsed" contemplations of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees.

3.5 ANALYSES AND WRITING

In a mixed-method approach, the researcher can use both qualitative and quantitative techniques at different stages of the coding, analysis and writing process (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). This links back to Creswell's point of 'integration' where the researcher will determine how and at what stages of the analysis and writing, the qualitative and quantitative approaches are entwined. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) rightly note that these are mixed-method models in continuous progress and development, the degree to which analysis, coding and

writing were mixed in this PhD research is best understood as a “hands-on” approach that does not necessarily follow a particular model.

The first guideline concerns the different stages in which analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data took place. At a first phase, the survey results were gathered in an excel format. A descriptive statistics analysis was used to gather preliminary themes and characteristics of the data set. In this regard, I focused on the demographic elements of the sample: age, gender, (parents) place of birth and religion to unearth whether these samples were representative of the 2nd generation research target group. A second aspect of the descriptive analysis involved gathering to what degree Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals think of themselves as Dutch, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim (question 1 and “proudness” questions) and in which ways these identification were related to each other (Moreno scaled questions). A third component that was illuminated involved the “contested” dimensions of being Muslim as part of a heightened anti-Islamic, political climate. At the same time, I commenced transcribing the conducted interviews. In this process, I listed preliminary observations and topics emerging from the interview data which corresponded to theoretically and literature informed assumptions concerning the minority communities at large, Islam and the political climate.

At a second stage, I focused on *coding* the interview transcripts by adopting an open coded format where the researcher ‘tak[es] data and segment[s] them into categories of information’ (Creswell 2013: 289). The survey themes partly informed this process. My transcribing method involved no computer programs: I printed out all transcripts and then took to it with different markers to dissect different parts. From the transcripts three broad categories were identified which I termed “climate” (i.e. political discourse and media), “identity” (identification processes of being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim), “ideal society” (proposals made to improve integration and multiculturalism strategies/policies). I then subdivided

these categories into smaller coded themes that were apparent, such as dual nationality, Geert Wilders, anti-Islamic rhetoric, feelings of being 'caged' etc. At a third stage, I went back to the quantitative data and converted the excel datasheets to SPSS recoding. In this regard, the interview themes partly informed the *writing* rather than the analysis procedures of the survey results which are mostly represented in chapter 5.

Thus, the analysis has been mainly *iterative*, in that 'it is characterized by a concurrent analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data such that the data analysis oscillates between both data sets throughout various stages of the data analysis process' (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 369). However, in writing the mixed-method analysis, results have not necessarily been integrated: whilst the 5 chapter is mostly quantitatively informed, the subsequent two chapters 6 and 7 mainly underline a qualitative rationale.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has served as a critical discussion and overview of the methodology employed in this PhD research. In accordance with the research question, which is to enhance our understanding of a shared, national belonging that is embracing and susceptible to multicultural diversity, the focus of the research design has been to find an appropriate methodological structure for researching national identity. In this regard, I have outlined the theoretical and methodological contemplations for analyzing *individual* rather than collective perceptions of national being.

The decision to focus on individual meaning-making processes of national identity addresses the dearth in literature that focuses on the subjective and discursive dimensions of national belonging. Furthermore, I have argued that, investigating individual constructions of national identity, which are established as part of social

and individual identification processes, illuminate the cultural markers – civic and ethnic – that regulate the exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of the national “self”. In the Netherlands, this regulatory discourse of similarity and difference has been particularly acute amongst Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish background who feel their national identification contested at times. Although this contextual setting will be extensively discussed in the following chapter 4, in this chapter I have outlined that, because of their problematized contemplations of national “self”, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks were considered appropriate research groups whose self-identification processes particularly illuminate dialectics between “standardized” collective (exclusionary) notions of Dutch national identity and discursive, individualized (inclusive) interpretations of “Dutchness”.

As to “how” this symbiosis between Dutch national identity and “Dutchness” has been analyzed, I have reviewed the theoretical and practical implementation of a mixed-method approach that involved the use of surveys and interviews. The surveys have served as a preliminary strategy to unearth the civic and/or ethnic “labels” associated with collective as well as individual perceptions of national belonging and identification – the outcomes of which will be discussed in chapter 5. In the interviews, which data is thoroughly reviewed in chapter 6 and 7, I sought to explicate the discursive dimensions of national identity and *how* subjective, “individualized” as well as “standardized” collective notions of Dutch identity were constructed.

The mixed-method rationale was also used in the analysis phase of this PhD study: interview and survey data have complemented each other in order to come to a better understanding of a shared national belonging in a multicultural society, which is the research enquiry at hand. The following chapter provides the contextual and historical synopsis to this research investigation.

CHAPTER 4 –THE END OF DUTCH MULTICULTURALISM: AN OVERVIEW IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

4.1 Introduction

In the morning of the 2nd of November 2004, cycling to his office in Amsterdam-East, Theo van Gogh – fervent critic of Islam and multiculturalism -was shot and stabbed several times by a young Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, later identified as Mohammed Bouyeri. The assassination caused different reactions, previously inconceivable of happening in a country like the Netherlands. Public outcry swept with a ‘countrywide series of assaults against mosques and Muslim schools’ (Entzinger 2006: 14). An example was a Muslim school in Uden, a small town in the Netherlands: on its wall someone had written ‘Theo R.I.P.’ (Buruma 2006: 7). In his speech on the day of the murder, the mayor of Amsterdam Job Cohen, called for a ‘noise manifestation’ in defence of the right to freedom of speech and on that evening around 20 000 people took to Dam square, with pots, pans and whistles (Hajer and Uitermark 2008: 6-7). Very soon, ‘bickering began’ as to whom was to blame for the murder and/or who had let peaceful Dutch society escalate into a turbulent, chaotic state of affairs (Buruma 2006: 14). Cohen was blamed for his years of multiculturalist appeasement approach in trying to ‘keep things together’ (Hajer and Uitermark 2008); the AIVD, the domestic intelligence service, was criticized by ministers for failing to detect the terrorist danger in time; Van Gogh was blamed for fuelling hatred and polemic rhetoric (Buruma 2006: 14). The group ‘Friends of Theo’, several intellectual close friends of Van Gogh, gaining considerable media attention and publicity, resumed Van Gogh’s battle against “political correctness” and defenders of multiculturalism (Hajer and Uitermark 2008: 6). Van Gogh’s death urged several right-wing MPs and media commentators to state ‘the assassination was a final wakeup call’ (ibid: 6): the definite failure of Dutch multiculturalism could no longer be denied. The fact that his murderer

Bouyeri had come to his act as a radicalised Muslim, yet nevertheless being a born and bred well educated Dutchman, seemed to justify this criticism even further. Together with the advance of assimilationist integration policies, Van Gogh's death did set in motion an anti-multiculturalism discourse in which freedom of speech became the epitome of Dutch national identity and a leitmotif to simultaneously define Dutch identity and weed out all things "non-Dutch". In 'New Realism' fashion, now "frank" and "straightforward" criticism was accepted and it polarised positions of being Dutch, or not, according to Dutch liberalism versus Islamic illiberalism and fundamentalism. In this context, Islam has become the "legitimate" scapegoat and this anti-Islamic discourse has fuelled a climate of suspicion against anything Muslim.

The full abandonment of multiculturalism as an approach to diversity is now a fact. The Netherlands, once internationally perceived to be *the* multicultural example now shows harsher immigration policies, the popularity of right wing politicians, the redefining of citizenship laws and the focus on the government's failure to integrate different cultural communities. All this reflects the abandonment of the "ideal" multicultural society the Netherlands was once said to be. This chapter serves to understand better this current societal and political climate. Although Van Gogh's assassination acted as a catalyser for multiculturalism to be proclaimed dead in public and political discourse, it is important to understand this process as a continuation of the decades long right wing 'New Realism' discourse of Bolkestein, Scheffer and Fortuyn, Fortuyn's death and the relative failure of recent integration and immigration policies to substantially improve the position of migrants in the Netherlands (Joppke 2004: 247-249). Therefore, this chapter roughly unfolds into four time frames which each assess the changing policies and discourse towards integration and inclusion, from multiculturalism towards assimilative integration. It is this gradual transition –as part of a turbulent *international* context - that truly tells the story of a society in turmoil, however gradual rather than sudden.

The first time period – discussed in section 4.2.1 - covers 1970s and 1980s “pillarized multiculturalist” approaches where the focus on *bonding* ethnic groups rather than *bridging* individuals into a form of national attachment, illuminates one of the flaws in the practical implementation of multiculturalism. The “caging” of individuals into supposedly inflexible, homogeneous ethnic communities, generates segregation and marginalization. As a reaction to these issues and outlined in section 4.2.2, 1990s governmental policies reflect a gradually changing attitude towards the incorporation of diversity, urging for the civic responsibility of the individual “other” to integrate and conform. Alongside the advance of these civic integration policies, the third period –the 2000s, discussed in section 4.3 – acts as an intermediate period where an increasingly right wing discourse criticizing multiculturalism and the integrating “other” in a fashion previously inconceivable, builds up to the murder of Van Gogh. This gives way to explain the fourth period in section 4.4.; the current societal and political climate where the rising popularity of populist right wing parties and the development of an assimilative integration discourse illuminate the definite abandonment of multiculturalism.

Current integration policies necessitate the civic conformity to a Dutch national identity that is supposedly liberal and secular which in its turn poses “difference” along the lines of religious backwardness and illiberalism, i.e. Islam. In other words, differentiations of “us” versus “them” now equalize categorizations of “non-Muslim” versus “Muslim”. Ultimately, the three time frames in this chapter provide a décor that reflects the perceptions Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks have on their national, ethnic and religious identities and their feelings of inclusion and exclusion; belonging and marginalization, which will be discussed further in the data chapters 5, 6 and 7.

4.2 SYNOPSIS INTEGRATION POLICIES

Although (international) migration is longstanding, for the Netherlands post-war migration specifically has mostly contributed to the development and characterization of a Dutch society that is now multicultural. The self-declared independence in 1945¹⁴ of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), saw the arrival of the first postcolonial migrants – mainly Moluccans who fought in the Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL). The 1960s and 1970s saw a large influx of guest workers - *gastarbeiders*¹⁵ - from Morocco and Turkey, which has our attention here in this study. Mainly men, *gastarbeiders* were recruited to temporarily perform low or unskilled work in the industrial sector. Also during this period migrants from the Dutch colonies Suriname and the Dutch Antilles arrived and there were migration flows in the form of refugees fleeing Portugal, Greece and Spain. In the 1980s, refugees and asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia and Africa have made claims to residence in the Netherlands. This summarized post-war migration history shows a particular variety of patterns, dynamics and different migrant groups that have entered and settled in the Netherlands. Subsequently, past and present governmental attitudes, immigration and integration policies towards accommodating these diverse migrant groups have most definitely changed over time: characterized a “temporary” matter in the 1960s (Penninx 1989; Scholten 2007; Scholten and Holzacker 2009) now, a ‘reluctant’ and ‘hostile’ attitude towards immigration can be detected. Consequently, the Netherlands has ‘struggled to find the right policy’ in incorporating cultural diversity (Penninx et al 2006: 5).

The current social and political climate is particularly explained as embedded in two defining factors that underlie Dutch integration policies from the 1950s onwards. Firstly, the Netherlands was and remains a ‘reluctant’ country to accept itself a

¹⁴ After the Japanese surrender, leaders Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia independent, but after a bloody guerrilla war this was only officially accepted by the Dutch authorities in 1963.

¹⁵ The literal translation is ‘guest workers’. For a history on guest workers in the Netherlands after World War II, see Van Amersfoort (1982).

country of immigration (Penninx et al 2006). Secondly - and this is where the Dutch multiculturalist experience differs from other European countries - Dutch integration policies, whilst changing over time, all indicate a persistently categorical and essentialist manner of “dealing with diversity” influenced by the Dutch tradition of pillarization (Ghorashi 2006). These two points need elaboration for understanding the current social and political climate.

4.2.1 1970s- 1980s “pillarized multiculturalism”

Whilst migration to the Netherlands was well underway, until the late 1970s the presence of migrants in Dutch society was identified first and foremost as temporary, presupposing immigrants to return to their homelands in the near future (Entzinger 1990; Soysal 1994; van Amersfoort and Doornik 2003; Vasta 2007; Scholten 2007). Without an official immigration policy in place, the Dutch government’s main message was that ‘the Netherlands was and should not be a country of immigration’ (Scholten and Holzacker 2009: 87). Instead, Dutch government – keeping in mind the temporary work status of guest workers, for example – advocated the socio-economic maintenance of migrant groups’ internal structures through housing, education and elite representation for that particular group in order to enhance the idea of return and underlining the temporality of their residence in the Netherlands. Scholten (2007) argues this is part of a ‘differentialist frame’,

which manifest[s] in policy and political discourse under the slogan “integration with retention of identity”. [...] Moreover, the categorization of migrant groups also reflected differentialism. Migrant groups were not ‘named and framed’ as one category, but based on their foreign origins – Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, foreign workers – stressing the fact that they were not from the Netherlands. [...] This categorisation of migrant groups maintained the link with the countries of origin, and also stressed the different migration backgrounds of migrant groups (colonial migration, labour migration, family migration, asylum migration). It illustrated that there was not yet a common framework for formulating a general immigrant integration policy (2007: 79).

In other words, migrant bonding with their own group instead of bridging to Dutch society was key (Scholten and Holzacker 2009: 88). This bears resemblance to the pillar system in which religious pillars divided Dutch society on socio-economic and political levels. Many authors have argued that the pillarized legacy of the Netherlands has been an influential factor in 1970s and 1980s Dutch multiculturalist policies (Soysal 1994; Scheffer 2007; Koopmans 2003; Buijs 2009; Scholten and Holzacker 2009; Alghasi et al. 2009), a process which I call “pillarized multiculturalism”. Similar to the pillar system, the multiculturalist policy of the 1970s and 1980s was aimed at retaining the internal socio-cultural structures of ethnic communities and thus creating ethnic pillars.

According to Lijphart (1968), the origins of the Dutch pillar system lies in the actual founding of the Dutch nation-state in the 16th century (1968: 16). It was the first time a Dutch Protestant Republic was formed against the backdrop of Catholic Spain (Parker 1977). Fundamentally, the highly politicized motive underlying this territorially political division was a religious one. The provisional (shaky) formation of a Dutch state – Holland - meant its separation from the Spanish Habsburg Empire that fundamentally upheld Catholicism amidst waves of Reformation sweeping parts of its European dominance. Although, the subsequent annexation of the northern as well as the southern provinces into the Dutch Republic ultimately unified the geographically scattered religious divisions, these events underlie the formalization and pacification of religious divisions in a post-World War I pillar system.

In practice, the pillar system formalized existing religious divisions in Dutch society into four broad pillars: Catholics, Protestants (divided between Calvinistic and Reformed), Social Democrats and Liberals; each pillar profiled and emphasized their own newspaper, political party, radio and television stations, labour unions, schools, youth organizations etc. (Wintle 2000: 143). Headed by elites at the top of every pillar, religious and class differences were carefully contained. Lijphart (1968)

demonstrates how moving outside the pillar was simply “not done”. For example, when looking at a survey on interpillar marriage, Lijphart found 95 percent of all married Catholics stated they had Catholic spouses (ibid: 57). Nevertheless, when asked about friend relationships, 85 percent of Catholic respondents stated they had friends other than Catholics and 61 percent of Protestant respondents claimed the same (ibid: 54). However, social cohesion within the pillars remained strong.

Dutch pillarization was paradoxical. On the one hand, it formalized religious and class differences in society between Catholics, Protestants, Social Democrats and Liberals. On the other hand, these cleavages created the stability necessary for a highly developed democratic system. The tools to reach this consensus and stability in Dutch society lay in the democratic structures that were put in place from the 1900s onwards. To conclude, Lijphart (1968) demonstrates that pillarization as a way of accommodating social and religious cleavages did create a form of stability in Dutch society due to strong leaderships and the democratic structures that were put in place (1968: 211).

Although the pillar system collapsed in the 1960s, it nevertheless laid the foundations for “pillarized multiculturalism”. Faced with the influx of migrants, cultural difference needed to be neatly contained and categorically placed in Dutch society (Koopmans 2003). Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when pillarization somewhat unintentionally had taken a leading role in facilitating the temporary stay of migrants, the 1980s saw a serious strategy of “pillarized multiculturalism” when Dutch government realized most guest workers and other migrants were here to stay, bringing their families and spouses to the Netherlands. According to the Dutch Statistics Institute (CBS) around 130,000 1st and 2nd generation Moroccan, Turkish, Antillean and Surinam people resided in the Netherlands in 1972 with numbers rising to a total of around 305 000 in 1978¹⁶.

¹⁶ <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=70787NED&D1=0&D2=0&D3=0&D4=2-5&D5=0-6&HDR=T,G3&STB=G1,G2,G4&VW=T>

The crystallization of ethnic categories or *pillars* became a fact through the officially adopted 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy (Vasta 2007: 716). Minority policy tactics focused on the combating of discrimination and the cultural emancipation of ethnic minorities (Scholten 2007). It was argued that, as a multi-ethnic welfare state, the Dutch government had a duty to overcome the marginalized position of ethnic minorities vis-à-vis the majority (ibid: 63). Focal points for creating this emancipative process were mainly based in welfare policies of housing, the labour market and unemployment. Special education and training programs, mother-tongue teaching and creating media outlets for each minority group were financially sponsored (Vasta 2007: 716, 717; Entzinger 2003). To conclude, the Ethnic Minorities Policy largely reverberates the pillarization system.

Several problematic factors need highlighting with regards to “pillarized multiculturalism”. Firstly, the clear-cut, rigid idea that ethnic minorities rather than individuals with different backgrounds reside in the Netherlands is questionable. Entzinger (2003) argues: ‘...in the Netherlands so much importance was attached to the racial, national or ethnic origin that the migrants were believed to share, that *etnische minderheden* (ethnic minorities) became the most generally used term to designate them’ (2003: 62). Thus, not only were immigrants classified as ‘belonging’ to a certain pillar, but more importantly this ‘belonging’ was defined in mainly ethnic terms. Soysal (1994), in her comparative analysis of citizenship policies in different European countries, describes the Dutch government’s 1980s multiculturalist approach as one focusing on ‘collective identities’ (1994: 46).

She argues:

Dutch incorporation policy [...] is based on collective categories. Official policy specifies the following minority categories: Moluccans, residents of Surinamese and Antillean origins, migrant workers and members of their families from recruitment countries, Gypsies and refugees. Interestingly, not all of these categories are ethnic; nevertheless they are defined and organized as ethnicized collective identities vis-à-vis the state (ibid: 48).

Moreover, the definition of ethnic minorities is confusing. Scholten states,

government [...] did not provide a definition of 'ethnic minorities', but it selected a number of 'minorities' that would form the target groups of the Minorities Policy; Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Foreign Workers, Gypsies, Caravan Dwellers and Refugees (Scholten 2007: 81).

This seems particularly problematic when it comes to the "Foreign Workers" group which constitutes both Moroccan and Turkish communities who are geographically, culturally and religiously different from each other, but are also internally divided when considering Kurdish and Berber sub-groups.

A second problem, similar to pillarization, concerns the extensive collaboration of elites and elitist organisations as representative bodies for the different ethnic minority groups (Penninx et al. 2006: 8). In 1985 the National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was founded in which the most important minority organizations were incorporated and which served the government in an advisory function (ibid.). Yet, this was not the only representative migrant body. In the conviction that the migrant's democratic voice was best heard through an elaborate representative organizational structure (Scholten 2007: 81), between 2000 and 2500 migrant associations existed in the Netherlands in 1984 (Soysal 1994:95).

Entzinger (2003) has defined this as 'institutionalized pluralism' (2003: 64) by which he means: 'in an effort to institutionalize the promotion of migrants' interests, consultative councils for ethnic minorities were set up both at local and national levels' (ibid: 65). The interesting detail that Entzinger mentions is the fact that the pillarization of ethnic minority organizations and councils was mainly a top-down process which involved little contribution from the ethnic minority groups themselves. More importantly, the organizational structuring of ethnic minorities solidified the idea that pillar and minority group were one: "governed" by an elite which leaves the individual migrant subdued to that hierarchical construction. Consequently, the migrant becomes, not an individual with a minority background,

but a person who is first and foremost part of a collective which in its turn can be defined according to apparent cultural specifics.

To conclude, 1980s Ethnic Minorities Policy seemed to embody a particular form of multiculturalism, i.e. the actual sponsoring of minority cultures (Alghasi et al. 2009: 4; Entzinger 2003: 64). Yet, what was not acknowledged was the actual incorporation of minority groups into and their allegiance to the Dutch nation-state and national identity. This resembles pillarization: although its socio-political purpose was to develop democratic consensus, differences between religious pillars were firmly retained and at such, tolerated. Pillarization was meant to serve the integration of differences *within* one particular cultural group - the Dutch – not *between* other cultural groups (Koopmans 2003: 4, 5).

Therefore, “pillarized multiculturalism” rehashed an attitude of toleration instead of amalgamation, of ‘*gedogen*’¹⁷ but not fully accepting (Koopmans 2003: 5). However, the difference this time was that these divisions were not played out between assertive pillars and their elites, but between dialectics of majority versus minorities. Together with the historical particularity of pillarization and the idea of welfare equality, “pillarized multiculturalism” constituted a dogma of “differentness” in Dutch society in which minorities rather than individuals could be classified as non-conformist (Ghorashi 2006: 8-14).

This is what Rath calls *minorisering*¹⁸:

Inherent to the construction of “minorities” is the construction of a “majority” according to the same criteria. Please note: this distribution of the population into “ethnic minorities” and an “ethnic majority” is not a natural distribution, but an ideological construction of social reality. That distribution has worked out like that simply as a consequence of the selection of particular social and cultural aspects that are deemed significant. As such, that selection mirrors a particular

¹⁷ Koopmans (2003) identifies *gedogen* as follows: ‘a form of tacit toleration of things that are according to the law not allowed’ (5).

¹⁸ The literal translation would be ‘minorization’

norm to which all members of the Dutch imagined community should comply with (1991: 118).

In other words, the artificial creation of a “we versus them” perception became apparent in which ethnic minorities- collectives not individuals – stand opposite a majority and its general norm “Dutchness”. The focus was on the classification of ethno-cultural groups rather than individuals with different cultural backgrounds. Crucially, this “we versus them” dichotomy has gradually laid the foundation for the current dominant discourse in the Netherlands concerning immigration and integration. This essentialist categorization of individual *as* collective, has “embedded” itself in discourse on multicultural diversity which, as we shall see in chapter 5, 6 and 7, has had far-reaching consequences for individual self-identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks who often felt categorized and excluded based on their ethno-cultural background and Islamic religious orientation.

4.2.2 1990s Dutch integration, integration, integration policies

Attitudes towards the Ethnic Minorities policy changed drastically in the 1990s when in 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) reported the marginalisation of immigrants in the Netherlands. The realization dawned that a) special welfare provisions and policies for ethnic minorities had not created the desired effects – for example, unemployment rates amongst ethnic minorities were still three times higher than the active Dutch population in the mid 1980s (Penninx 1989: 88) – and b) the focus on minorities rather than individuals would only further the undesired consolidation of minority categories and their marginalised position in Dutch society (Scholten and Holzacker 2009: 92). Therefore, an attempt was made to de-couple individual from collective stratification in the 1994 New Integration Policy. No longer was it fully and only necessary to enhance the socio-cultural position of ethnic *minorities*, now, the emphasis was on the *individual* migrant’s universal right to ‘active citizenship’

and the duty to participate in society (Scholten 2007: 84; Holzacker and Scholten 2009: 92).

A key focus on integration rather than emancipation became the new course in Dutch immigration policies and a classic form of civic nationalism emerged. Cultural backgrounds were now confined to the private sphere (Scholten and Holzacker 2009: 92) and the 'emphasis [lay] on Dutch language courses, social orientation and vocational training' (Vasta 2007: 717). However, it is important to note that policy targets towards minority groups were upheld, only now at times a distinction was made with 'individual members of minority groups' (Scholten 2007: 84; Vasta 2007: 717). Therefore, what remained was the persistence to define migrants as part of a collective that was considered "different" and "the other": as one who cannot conform to the autochthonous Dutch norm (Ghorashi 2006).

The birth of the term "*allochtoon*" - which in contradiction to the terms "foreigners" or "guest workers", emphasized the migrant individual rather than the ethnic minority he or she might belong to - exemplifies this institutionalization of "difference". Its dictionary meaning is literally 'someone from elsewhere' (www.vandale.nl). The officially adopted policy definition used by the Dutch Statistics Institute (CBS) is the following: 'a person who has at least one parent born abroad'. A distinction is made between 1st generation - who were themselves born abroad- and 2nd generation - who were born in the Netherlands – allochthonous individuals (www.cbs.nl). I wish to shortly illustrate the problematic factor this definition holds with regards to a research note I made concerning the family background of one of my interviewees:

Sevde is a Dutch-Turkish female. She was born in Turkey, but as part of 1960s family reunification options, she moved to the Netherlands at the age of 4. Sevde grew up in the Netherlands: she learned the Dutch language and attended a Dutch school. She went on to college and is now a successful entrepreneur in the Dutch marketing sector. She has a Dutch

passport and resides in a big city in the Netherlands. On holiday to Turkey she tries to visit some family, but the Netherlands is home. Sevde is an 'allochtoon' because her parents were Turkish. Sevde's daughter who was born in the Netherlands is also an 'allochtoon' because her mother was born in Turkey.

The definition of 'allochtoon' is problematic where it is applied to 2nd generation individuals who feel Dutch and are Dutch in a cultural and civic sense. Being categorized an 'allochtoon', embodies a negative categorization of being the "other" and the "outsider" (Prins 2002). Subsequently, an ethnic interpretation of Dutch national identity emerges where the issue of common roots and kinship becomes a bias for difference versus similarity. The fact that 2nd generation individuals are often classified as 'allochtonous', has developed dialectics of ethnic difference between Dutch and non-Dutch groups –an experience explored and fully discussed in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 of this study.

In conclusion, it is questionable to consider the Netherlands *the* prime multicultural example of the previous century (Koopmans 2003). Although Dutch 1980s multiculturalist policies were mainly characterized as liberal, democratic and civil, in practice it rigidly categorized ethnic communities instead of advocating individual choice and a proliferation of culture. The main aim of the multiculturalist approach was to 'achiev[e] a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development' (Entzinger 2003: 63). Yet, in its execution the policy was actually fairly rigid and focused on cultural matters (language, folklore, immigrant culture) when classifying ethnic minority individuals "so and so" from the very start. The Dutch approach to multiculturalism focused on liberal values of individual free will and equality, but in fact it created inequality and marginalization where the focus on ethnic pillars and the subsequent categorization of individuals as part of those pillars failed to recognize the importance of *individual* emancipation, diversity and integration.

Although 1990s integration policies focused on the integration of individuals rather than collectives, it nevertheless reiterated “difference” through polarisation of “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” persons. Therefore, Ghorashi (2006) is correct in arguing that ‘categorical thinking’ in the Netherlands is not just something of recent years: it has been a process which - fuelled by its pillarized legacy, the ideal of welfare state and social security and *minorisering* combined - has given rise to a (even more) toughened social and political climate in which harsh immigration policies, the popularity of right wing politicians and an ethnic redefinition of citizenship laws is apparent in the Netherlands today (ibid: 14). Hence, the explanation for the current fragility and abandonment of multiculturalism in the Netherlands might lie in the assumption that the “ideal” Dutch multicultural society has not been that ideal after all (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). As discussed, multiculturalism as a practically implemented policy was already surpassed in the 1990s when integration and civic participation became the dogmas in Dutch integration policies. However, a second indicator for the demise of multiculturalism can be determined in 1990s political discourse.

In 1991 specifically, multiculturalism as a concept for developing an “ideal” multicultural society started to lose ground when Frits Bolkestein, party leader of the Liberal Party (VVD), openly criticized the “Dutch” integration approach of consensus-seeking pacification and toleration and instead argued that government and its political elites had been too ‘lenient’ and ‘permissive’ towards migrants, creating a passive dependency on housing and other social welfare benefits (Prins 2002: 367, 368). Spurring a national minorities debate, Bolkestein critically assessed that “special” treatment towards ethnic minorities had not fostered the emancipation but segregation of these minority groups from Dutch society (Prins 2002: 367,368). With the ever increasing influxes of marriage partners from countries of origin and large scale family reunifications,

he argued that the withdrawal into the own group conjured up an altogether more worrying development, namely the solidification of minority cultures *opposite* a Dutch culture (ibid.). It is the first time this ‘them versus us’ scenario can be detected in mainstream politics by which differentiation is made between Western civilization and the Islamic “other” (Ghorashi 2006; Prins 2002). Not only did Bolkestein pose Western civilization ‘and its values of secularization, freedom of speech and the principle of non-discrimination against the “world of Islam”’ (Prins 2002: 367; Entzinger 2006; Vink 2007), he also iterated that there should be no leeway in changing these values for the greater good of integration (Bolkestein 1991, *de Volkskrant*).

Disquiet over the incompatibility between western and Islamic values in particular, was also expressed in other European countries. In 1988, the “Rushdie Affair”, sparked widespread outcry amongst Muslims, both in Britain and abroad following the publication of Salman Rushdie’s book *the Satanic Verses*¹⁹. Whilst Rushdie was condemned for blasphemy and issued with a *fatwa* by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini who called on Muslim individuals to kill Rushdie, wider public debates focused on the supposedly violent and extremist predilection of Islam and the bigoted and illiberal views of Muslims in Britain (Abbas 2011: 96). Faced with large Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim communities, it ‘was the first occasion when Britain began to look at its own Muslim population’ (ibid.) and with the focus on understanding these communities first as Muslim and then Asian. In France too, public debate was unleashed over the compatibility of Islam when three girls wore headscarves to their public school. Not only was this “controversy” explained to indicate the non-incorporable “nature” of Islam, it also shook the assimilative and secular core of French national identity and nation-state.

Although fierce debates abroad were unanimously critical of Islam, in the Netherlands, Bolkestein’s comments were criticized at the time (Ghorashi 2006: 5).

¹⁹ The title and content of the book are a reference to supposedly “deleted” Koran verses spoken to the Prophet Mohammed by the devil in order to deceive the Prophet believing it was god -

Nevertheless, his critique opened up a new taboo-breaking discourse: 'New Realism' which reverberates well into current political discourse (Prins 2002). Prins has identified four main characterizations and argues the new realist, a) is not afraid to state the facts, to be bold and frank about the "truths", b) considers him or herself as a spokes(wo)man for the ordinary citizen, i.e. the autochthonous individual, c) juxtaposes realism to "Dutchness" stating that Dutch identity is about being realistic and straightforward and d) fiercely resists the political left and its "high and mighty" elite (Prins 2002: 369). To exemplify these characteristics, we need to explore further the 'hyperrealism' (Prins 2002) that emerged as a heightened 'New Realism' discourse in the 2000s to understand the current climate, populism and xenophobia towards Islam.

4.3 THE 2000S – THE ABANDONMENT OF MULTICULTURALISM: CIVIC INTEGRATION, 'NEW REALISM' AND ASSIMILATIVE INTEGRATION DISCOURSE

4.3.1 'The Multicultural Tragedy', Pim Fortuyn and 'hyperrealism'

At the turn of the millennium, a second national minorities debate erupted (Scholten 2007) when journalist and columnist Paul Scheffer's opinionated article 'The Multicultural Tragedy' (2000, *NRC Handelsblad*) opened the flood gates for a new wave of 'New Realism'. In his exposé, Scheffer argued that decades of immigration and integration policies had failed to resolve the unequal and marginalised position of *alloctonen* in Dutch society. In fact, it had been a 'multicultural tragedy' in which Dutch government had ignored and avoided the segregation of ethnic minorities and the development of an 'ethnic underclass'. Scheffer's conclusions were not surprising or unexpected: unemployment rates amongst non-western immigrants, although decreasing between 1994 and 2000, remained 2 or 3 times higher than amongst native Dutch individuals and in 1998 it

was estimated 28 percent of Dutch native children attended higher education against only 4 percent of Turkish and Moroccan children (Vasta 2007: 719-720).

Similar to the bold, straightforward rhetoric of Bolkestein, Scheffer argued for the adoption of a strong, “no-nonsense” attitude towards integration in which assimilationist tendencies can be detected. Scheffer argues:

An indolent multiculturalism rules because we insufficiently explain in words what holds our society together. We say too little about our boundaries, cherish no relation with our past and treat language in an ignorant way. A society that repudiates itself has nothing to offer to newcomers (January 2000, *NRC Handelsblad*).

Scheffer is correct in identifying that what constitutes national unity in a multicultural society is not simply about defining the “other”, but more importantly about the “self”, i.e. the multicultural nation-state, and its characteristics that are sustainable to incorporating diversity. However, Scheffer takes it a step further by painting a ‘clash of civilizations’ picture in which cultures are seen as homogeneous entities and fails to acknowledge the diversity that underlies each and every culture (Entzinger 2003: 79). More importantly, in his argument he assumes certain cultures are better, more civilized than others. In this way, Scheffer determines that the incompatibility of Islam with western values calls for stronger conformity of immigrants to a sense of Dutch national identity, characterized by its democratic ‘civilization’, history and language (Ghorashi 2003: 167, 168).

Not only was Scheffer’s article a shock to the political system and establishment, it was the way in which he had publicly uttered his critique: out in the open. According to his supporters, finally someone had challenged the political elites who had ‘looked the other way’ (Prins 2002: 370) and who had nourished typically Dutch toleration, *gedogen*. Also, it bolstered others to publicly voice their critique on integration problems and most importantly, Islam.

Superfluous to say, anti-Islamic tendencies are not specific to the Dutch context alone and in light of globalisation, international events served as a reactionary stage for xenophobia towards Islam to develop. Specifically, the 9/11 attacks spiralled a media offensive against Islam and Muslims (Fennema and Maussen 2002). Dekker and van der Noll (2007) note that the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 'observed an increase in violence against Muslims and negative mass media reports about Muslims after 9/11' (2007: 2).

In the Netherlands specifically, tensions rose when on the TV news program *NOVA* the Imam of the An-Nasr mosque in Rotterdam, Khalil el Moumni, declared homosexuality to be a 'contagious disease' (Prins 2002: 373). The 'El Moumni-case', as it came to be known, sparked different reactions that give insight into the turbulent political dialectics of that time. On the one hand, a growing number of 'new realist' critics demanded a tougher approach, whilst on the other, the "Dutch" approach of pacification and consensus-seeking urged Prime Minister Kok to have a dialogue with different Imams. Instead of emphasizing a public debate to critically assess the matter, the case was "resolved" in two ways: a) behind closed doors and b) in front of the court on the basis of official complaints of discrimination that were filed by several organizations (ibid). Thus, Dutch government failed to properly address the incompatibility of values that the 'El Moumni-case' embodied and to discuss the tensions that exist between human rights in a democratic nation-state.

In the (inter)national turmoil of 2001, Pim Fortuyn emerged as a serious contender to the Dutch political establishment when in August of that same year he announced he would run for parliament (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2003: 29-30). In October 2001, Fortuyn, a former university professor of sociology and flamboyant homosexual, was chosen party leader of Liveable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland*). His political presence would announce the rise of 'hyperrealism' (Prins 2002). Fortuyn was no stranger to the political field: he had been a civil servant for

some years and already in 1994, expressed through weekly political columns a strong dissatisfaction with the “leftist” political climate of tolerating Islam and the increasing presence of immigrants and asylum seekers (Prins 2002: 375). Identifying with a tired electorate disillusioned by the eight year reign of the “purple” coalition, – the Labour Party (PvdA), Democrats 66 (D66) and Liberal Party (VVD) – Fortuyn’s star rose (Entzinger 2006: 11). His straightforward rhetoric and self-presentation as spokesman for the “ordinary man”, he firmly believed national identity needed reaffirming in light of the ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society (Prins 2002: 376). Fortuyn’s campaign paid off: in February 2002 polls suggested Liveable Netherlands could win more than 20 seats (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2003: 31).

However, the tide seemed to change for Fortuyn on February 9th when in an interview with the *Volkscrant* newspaper, he stated ‘that Islam is a retarded culture’ and ‘the Netherlands is a “full” country’ (9 February 2002, *De Volkscrant*). Fortuyn’s pseudo-racist comments were rapidly picked up by other media and within one day, Fortuyn was sacked as party leader of Liveable Netherlands. Although most media focused on the provocative and insulting comments Fortuyn made in the *Volkscrant*, it is nevertheless important to distinguish Fortuyn from such politicians as Le Pen in France and Haider in Austria. Entzinger (2006) is correct in arguing that Fortuyn ‘was not really against immigrants as such, but his primary concern was the assault on democratic liberties that might result from the presence of so many people unfamiliar with western values, particularly Muslims’ (2006: 12). However, paradoxically Fortuyn used those same democratic western values to plead for the abolishment of the Constitution article to not discriminate (February 2002, *De Volkscrant*). In his view, national sovereignty and national identity could only be sustained through freedom of speech, civil rights in general and a full stop to immigration.

After being expelled from Liveable Netherlands, Fortuyn continued his electoral race as List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and his tough stance on immigration issues and Islam appealed to many voters. In April, just a month before the national elections, polls

suggested the LPF could win as many as 29 seats in parliament²⁰ (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2003: 43). With the popularity of the LPF rising, a heated campaign got underway. Time and again, Fortuyn would accuse the political establishment of demonizing him in the public domain, creating a climate in which ‘something might happen to me’ (Fortuyn in popular television program *Jensen!*).

Then, on the 6th of May 2002, after giving a radio interview on the popular Radio 3, Fortuyn was shot in the parking lot of the studio building by an animal rights and environmental activist, Volkert van der Graaf. On the ten o’clock bulletin, the NOS²¹ news presenter opened with ‘Pim Fortuyn is dead’ and added ‘what nobody thought possible in the Netherlands, nevertheless has happened: a campaigning politician who meets his death’ (*NOS Journaal*, 6 May 2002). Jan Peter Balkenende, leader of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and prime minister to be, simply called the situation ‘un-Dutch’ (Buruma 2006: 37). Just hours after his death, spontaneous remembrance ceremonies were held in front of Fortuyn’s house and the local town hall in Rotterdam and days after the murder, people continued putting flowers and cards at the parking lot where Fortuyn had died (de Hart 2005). The public outpouring of emotions and “hysteria” that manifested itself in the Netherlands showed a society in disbelief and utter shock (ibid.). However, not only did the murder shock Dutch society itself: also abroad bewilderment was expressed that this tragic event had happened in a country that had always been deemed tolerant and peaceful.

Despite the murder, national elections were held on the 15th of May and the LPF, without its leader, won 26 seats in parliament and became the second biggest party (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2003: 32). The Christian Democrats, the party winning most votes, sought to form a right wing coalition – dubbed Balkenende I after its party leader and subsequent prime-minister- with the LPF and the VVD. However, this coalition government was very unstable and it collapsed after three months

²⁰ Out of the total of 150 seats available in parliament or *Tweede Kamer* (Second Chamber)

²¹ The Dutch public news broadcaster

(Entzinger 2006: 12). By that time, the 'Fortuynists' had lost their strong position due to internal rivalry and controversies, and its gradual decline manifested itself in the 2003 national elections when it did not gain enough seats to be included in a coalition (ibid).

Nevertheless, 'hyperrealism' gained definite ground during Fortuyn's heydays. The demise of "political correctness" and toleration opened up the public arena for liberal critics to proclaim outright freedom of speech which should not be judicially curtailed or restricted (Fennema and Maussen 2002). Furthermore, freedom of speech became a term coined to characterize Dutch national identity in order to determine and criticize all things "non-Dutch". Together with Fortuyn's persistent critique of Islam in general, a "trend" of anti-Islamic sentiment was set in motion. To an extent, the conglomeration of these two developments was the basis for one particular liberal anti-Islam critic to emerge: Theo van Gogh.

4.3.2 The definite abandonment of multiculturalism

After the collapse of the Balkenende I coalition government of LPF, VVD and CDA, the 2003 election results saw the formation of a new centre-right coalition: Cabinet Balkenende II. Fortuyn's political viewpoints, once so fervently opposed by the political establishment, now could no longer go unheard— his murder bizarrely seemed to demonstrate Fortuyn's own warning prophecy. In this politicized context, this meant a new era of "tougher" Dutch immigration and integration policies. Under the new government, appointed minister of Integration and Immigration Verdonk of the Liberal Party (VVD) quickly set out to formulate a new integration policy. Verdonk established herself as a stern, "no-nonsense" minister advocating a tougher stance on immigration and integration policies. In 2003, her memorandum the 'New Style Integration Policy' (NSIP) marked the definite shift from integration to assimilation (Scholten 2007: 86). Within the contours of the NSIP one main principle was prophesied: 'migrants were to blame for their slow

integration' (Entzinger 2006: 13). Therefore, not migrants' rights, but duties were deemed important with a key focus on 'integration obligation' (Vasta 2007: 718).

Previously, the 1990s New Integration Policy had based the successful formula for integration on immigrants' civic rights and duties, promoting the main duty of 'active citizenship' to actively participate and contribute to society. To an extent however, socio-economic welfare provisions and schemes were upheld for ethnic minority groups and the "private" maintenance of cultural backgrounds was accepted (Scholten 2007: 85). Nevertheless, with the introduction of Verdonk's NSIP, instead of understanding the multicultural character of Dutch society as valuable, now cultural differences were 'framed as problematic cultural distances' (ibid: 88). In this new scheme, not the marginalised socio-economic position of migrants, but socio-cultural differences between allochthonous and autochthonous individuals supposedly were to blame for the integration failure of migrants (ibid; Vasta 2007: 718).

This implies a trend of 'cultural fundamentalism' –of which I spoke in chapter 2 - apparent in different European countries faced with large migrant groups which Stolcke indicates, is the embodiment of an exclusionary discourse which holds cultures are homogeneous, static and rigid and therefore incompatible. As Stolcke notes, 'the "problem" is not "us" but "them." "We" are the measure of the good life which "they" are threatening to undermine, and this is so because "they" are foreigners and culturally "different' (1995: 3). In order to protect the supposedly superior, national culture, immigrants are required to adopt and assimilate to this national norm. Therefore, without making a distinction between "new" or "old" immigrants, Dutch integration policies demanded the necessity for conformity to a 'shared' or 'common' citizenship. In a parliamentary briefing this is defined as follows:

common citizenship involves a sort of citizenship based on common values and norms; it involves 'speaking Dutch and complying with basic Dutch

norms, [such as] doing your best to provide for your own welfare and observing laws and regulations'. It brings with it a willingness for 'taking care of the social environment, respecting physical integrity of others, also within marriage, accepting the right of anyone to express one's opinion, accepting the sexual preferences of others and equality of man and woman'. Also, it maintains some of its universalist traits, that citizens are individually responsible for their participation in society (Parliamentary Briefing in Scholten 2007: 87).

This definition of 'common' citizenship is problematic as it presupposes that certain human traits – e.g. 'taking care of the social environment' - norms and virtues are "Dutch". Subsequently, the distinction between Dutch and non-Dutch is made here on the basis of universal and even behavioural traits that are supposedly inherent to and embedded in Dutch culture and Dutch people in general.

The practical implementation of 'common' citizenship conformity translated itself in stricter civic integration programs both for newcomers and long-term residents (Vasta 2007: 718; Entzinger 2006: 13). Based on the principle of "self-responsibility", 'newcomers [were required] to find a course, register and pay for it and eventually, to qualify for a mandatory language-and-culture test' (Entzinger 2006: 13). For long-term migrants, compulsory language and citizenship tests were also put in place, even if these migrants had a Dutch passport already (ibid). Failing to attend and pass these tests could result in fines and the withdrawal of residence permits or social benefits (ibid; Vasta 2007: 718). At the same time, immigration laws were tightened and asylum procedures restricted which meant that in 2004 'the country's migratory balance was negative for the first time since 1967' (Entzinger 2006: 12).

Overall, fuelled by decades of inadequate integration policies, the Dutch approach of toleration and pacification, the political turmoil of Scheffer's societal critique and Fortuyn's murder in 2002 brought about a remarkable shift in governmental integration policies. With the formation of a centre-right government, the Cabinet Balkenende II departed from the multicultural principle that cultural difference is an asset to society. Instead, conformity to Dutch national identity, formulated through

civic, linguistic and socio-behavioural principles, became the norm. Although a 2003 Parliamentary Commission (*Commissie Blok*) concluded the socio-economic integration of immigrants – considering aspects of housing, education, employment and representation – had actually been quite successful, it nevertheless failed to establish a link between this relative success and previous integration policy efforts (Klaver and Odé 2011: 2). Hence, 2003 saw the definite abandonment of multiculturalism as an approach to incorporating diversity in the Netherlands. In its place, civic integration i.e. an individual's own responsibility to integrate and participate in society, together with an assimilationist demand for conformity to a particular "Dutch" norm, was advocated.

This disposition is best described as an "assimilative integration discourse": it highlights the transitional phase where the abandonment of multiculturalism neither leads towards full assimilation nor integration, but a concoction of the two. On the one hand, we can detect a civic integration scheme that presents belonging as a choice, yet the choice is dependent on the individual's responsibility to actively participate and involve oneself as a citizen (Entzinger 2006). On the other hand, we can detect assimilative tendencies that stress conformity that is first and foremost expressed as an obligatory adherence to an extreme civic interpretation of Dutch national identity. In short, "assimilative integration discourse" is best described as a 'policy discourse [that] reflects a 'neo-conservative ideology' that is more restrictive, and a public discourse that [became] more inflammatory' (Vasta 2007: 725).

4.3.3 Theo van Gogh and Submission

In light of this increasing assimilative integration discourse, both in public and political discourse after Fortuyn's tragic death, Theo van Gogh, slowly but surely unfolded himself as the acclaimed public spokesman and commentator for everything anti-Islam and pro-freedom of speech. Van Gogh was well known both

as a television celebrity and newspaper columnist. For this reason, he and Fortuyn had known each other from the early 1990s onwards when, in his television program 'A Friendly Conversation'²², Van Gogh interviewed Fortuyn about his political aspirations. Over the years Van Gogh had acquired a reputation of being a provocative, blunt, outspoken "bad kid on the block", undermining and criticizing anything: from religious fanatics to elitist art critics (Buruma 2006). In the wake of Fortuyn's death, Van Gogh's 'abusive criticism' (Buruma 2006: 97) increasingly started to centre on Islam and in numerous media he appeared a fervent anti-Islam supporter (Prins 2002: 374). Calling Muslims "goatfuckers", Van Gogh claimed he should be allowed to use such frank terms in defence of the 'highest value': freedom of speech (ibid.).

Van Gogh's fervent attacks on Islam were symbolic of a wider, international critique on Islam that steadily progressed, yet acutely heightened with the transport bombings in Madrid of 2004. This again raised the alarm Van Gogh had been prophesying all along, namely that Islam was backward and dangerous, creating Muslim extremists ready to attack western civility. Although Van Gogh's comments were rude and outright offensive towards the Muslim community, mainstream society seemed to tolerate and accept it. In comparison, in the 1990s extreme right politician Hans Janmaat was prosecuted for stating the 'Netherlands is full' (Fennema and Maussen 2002). It demonstrates how provocative, discriminatory rhetoric against "some" people in name of freedom of speech had gradually embedded itself in public discourse since the 2000s.

In 2003, Van Gogh took things a step further and expressed his "loathing" for Islam in a movie titled 'Submission', which he made with Ayaan Hirshi Ali. Hirshi Ali, originally from Somalia, came to the Netherlands in 1992 and asked for political asylum whilst trying to escape a forced marriage arrangement (Buruma 2006: 153). Quickly, she learned to speak perfect Dutch, studied politics at Leiden University

²² *Een prettig gesprek - 1994*

and in 2003 entered the political arena as a parliamentary member for the Liberal Party (VVD). Years prior to her political appointment, Hirshi Ali, a former Muslim, had already started to fervently “preach” Islam was *the* problem (Buruma 2006: 165). Specifically, she condemned Islam and the Koran for supposedly sanctioning the suppression of and violence against women. In her conviction, she fed into the “Fortuyn” assumption that Islam is a backward culture, incompatible with western society (Vasta 726; Buruma 2006: 170). She too saw herself as a provoker and activist wanting to “stir things up” (ibid). The movie Submission did exactly that. In one scene Koran texts are projected on the naked body of a veiled woman, in another the face of a woman is shown all disfigured and tortured. The highly provocative images did cause offence, and more importantly, Hirshi Ali’s message did not speak to or on behalf of either old or new Muslim migrant generations (ibid). However, both Van Gogh and Hirshi Ali could not have imagined that showing their 11 minute movie on Dutch television would have such far-reaching consequences which I noted at the beginning of this chapter: on the 2nd November 2004 Van Gogh was shot and stabbed by Mohammed Bouyeri in the name of Islam.

4.4 THE CURRENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE

4.4.1 Wilders, populism and the “culturalization” of Dutch national identity

After the dramatic national and international events which unfolded between 2001 and 2004, the redundancy of multiculturalism as a sustainable approach to diversity seemed evident. Although this should be understood as a gradual rather than sudden process, the murder of Theo van Gogh, specifically, acted as a shock to the system. We need to ask ourselves; what kind of society emerged after the abolition of multiculturalism as part of (inter)national political turmoil?

For one, where centre-right and left parties previously dominated coalition structures, now, no middle ground is deemed feasible in the eyes of the electorate.

Rather, populist extreme right and left wing views are prioritized in debates where assimilative integration discourse takes centre stage (Lucardie 2007; Entzinger in interview). This should be understood as a wider trend in other European countries where the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the French Front National (FN) and the British National Party (BNP) all have steadily gained political ground (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013).

In the Netherlands specifically, Rita Verdonk's own party Proud of the Netherlands (*ToN, Trots op Nederland*) and Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV, *Partij voor de Vrijheid*) illustrate the rise of radical right wing parties whose populist demands have steadily gained considerable political ground. Although ToN's popularity slowly but surely dissolved under the weight of its disorganized party structure, Verdonk's political career embodies the public and political acceptance of assimilative integration discourse where taboos of political correctness are broken and the political "establishment" is seriously contended on its failure to discuss and solve recurring integration problems. In some ways, Verdonk's demise gave Wilders opportunities to quickly gain a niche in the political arena. The steady decline of traditional parties' popularity gained the PVV 9 seats in the general election in 2006 following the early collapse of the Balkenende II government coalition. At the general election of June 2010, the PVV won 24 parliamentary seats which made it the third biggest party. Subsequently, it formed a right wing minority coalition with the VVD and the Christian Democrats (*CDA, Christen-Democratisch Appel*).

The popularity of Verdonk's ToN party and Wilders' PVV particularly, highlights two particular aspects characteristic of their extreme right wing stance towards integration. For one, there is the glorification of Dutch culture which supposedly represents one Dutch unified majority under the banners of liberalism and democracy, free speech and equality. In its turn, and secondly, this justifies a sense of Dutch superiority over "others" who need but are unwilling to share Dutch values: these "others" are often Muslims or Islam.

The tension that exists between the fear of the Islamic influential “other” and the redefinition and exploration of national culture and identity, is evolving in other parts of Europe too. Controversial debates regarding the headscarf ban in France and Belgium, the prohibition to build Minarets in Switzerland and the international Islamic outrage over the published Mohammed Cartoons in a Danish newspaper, are only but a few recent examples which hint at a steadfast anti-Islamic wave that has been sweeping Europe since the 1980s.

In the Netherlands, a persistently “culturalist” attitude can be detected that demands conformity to a Dutch culture that is both objectified as well as considered superior to “other” cultures. This superiority is supposedly justified according to the reification of Dutch culture as part of liberal civilization and embedded in democratic tradition and values (Ghorashi 2003: 9). Rita Verdonk is a key example of applying this cultural relativist stance when she repeatedly framed and glorified “the Dutch” according to a conception of ‘crude and simplistic majoritarianism’ (Vossen 2010: 31). In order to sustain national unity, conformity into a civic interpretation of “Dutchness” is proclaimed which exaggerates the liberal components supposedly inherent in Dutch history, identity and nation. It remains unclear what these specific Dutch values actually are, yet Verdonk’s stance can be characterized a civic nationalist interpretation of “Dutchness” that exemplifies assimilative, yet inclusive integration (Vossen 2010:31).

Paradoxically, the liberal representation of Dutch culture implicates societal differentiation and assimilative integration. This is an interesting, new dynamic existent between radical right rhetoric and civic integration, a European occurrence which Halikiopoulou et al. (2013) have identified as part of a ‘civic zeitgeist’:

Conformity to liberal democratic principles and mainstream national values increasingly means invoking civic ideals such as multiculturalism and toleration that are by definition contrary to the ideological positions of radical right parties. Parties that continue to emphasise the ethnic elements

of national identity tend to be branded as xenophobic and explicitly racist. In order to avoid this negative label and survive in the political system, radical right parties tend to increasingly adopt a civic rhetoric utilising the liberal elements of their respective national identities in their discourse.[...] Parties [...] will [...] emphasize the superiority of the nation's institutional structure and its right to emancipation from the advances of other 'inferior' nations whose political systems are portrayed as undeveloped, undemocratic and unrepresentative. The balance is therefore achieved through the framing of ethnic values – which can be perceived as violent, irrational and hence anti-systemic – in civic terms, which are perceived as inclusive, tolerant and democratic (2013: 111-112).

This observation is clearly demonstrated in Wilders' manifestos. Wilders' civic wording of 'freedom', 'democratic duties' and 'respect' implies neutrality and tolerance, yet at the same time, these values are linked to an exclusively Dutch culture that should enjoy sole superiority and existence. Wilders explains:

'the norms and values that were constructed in this field of tension between the two traditions [Jewish-Christian and humanistic], form our dominant culture, and that deserves as such, that it is inscribed in a new article 1 of our Constitution. They form not only the basis but also the boundaries of our civilization' (Wilders, Klare wijn, 2006).

Under the banners of "Fortuynist" and "Van Gogh-ism" rhetoric, Wilders trumpets freedom of speech as a key feature of "Dutchness" under threat. Without a doubt, this has encouraged necessary frank discussions and decisions concerning integration problems previously deemed politically and publicly unacceptable to discuss (Fennema and Maussen 2002). It is the assumption that freedom of speech complies with a Dutch identity that is somehow linked to an ethnic, white, non-Muslim majority with which insinuations are made regarding its ethnic and/or religious make-up. Thus, freedom of speech is advocated, but it nevertheless attacks those who are not considered part of the majority who have that veto.

Wilders presents "Dutchness" as the epitome of liberal thought, embedded in the democratic foundations of the Dutch nation-state. For this reason, the superiority of Dutch culture is understood through its inherently liberal values of toleration and

freedom, which Wilders feels are under threat from Islamic, less-civilized cultures (Wilders 2005). In his 'Independence declaration', Wilders clearly distances himself from the political establishment: he critiques the existing political parties' failure to stop the demise of the West and Dutch civilization specifically in an upcoming environment of "Islamization" (*Islamisering*) (Wilders 2005). Thus, the 'claim of authenticity' is made to preserve and protect the majority culture against cultures that 'deviate from the European norm' (Alghasi et al. 2009: 2).

In this regard, Islam is considered obstructive in the desired process of assimilative integration where it is supposed to represent one community under one illiberal, backward culture. Islam is Wilders' main enemy which he characterizes, not as a religion, but as a fascist ideology (*Het Nieuwsblad* 2008). In 2008, Wilders broadcasted the anti-Islamic movie *Fitna* which he used as a platform to spread his message abroad, most notably in the UK and the USA (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013: 120).

Although Wilders was refused entry into the UK for fears of national and international uproar, his intended speech in the House of Lords would have:

'warn[ed] of another great threat. It is called Islam. It poses as a religion, but its goals are very worldly: world domination, holy war, sharia law, the end of the separation of church and state, the end of democracy. It is not a religion, it is a political ideology. It demands your respect, but has no respect for you' (Wilders 13 February 2009).

Chapter 6 expands upon the consequences of Wilders' anti-Islamic rhetoric in connection with interviewees' self-identification processes of being Muslim. Participants often considered Wilders the epitome of an anti-Islamic stance apparent in wider public and political discourse that propels the incompatibility of Islam with the conformity to a "superior", civic Dutch culture.

4.4.2 Current integration policies: a “culturalist” Dutch citizenship continued

It is important to note however that the current, political concern to specify the contours of Dutch national identity and culture are no longer a showpiece for right wing populism alone. A demand for a firmer definition of the national “self” finds ground across the entire political spectrum and is exhibited in government policies (Boomkens 2010). As part of the gradual yet definite abandonment of multiculturalism, current Dutch societal and political attitudes towards integration and immigration now predominantly reflect an assimilative stance that also demands civic conformity into a “culturalist” Dutch national identity. In this regard, integration is increasingly measured according to ‘moral citizenship’, i.e. loyalty and allegiance to Dutch national identity and culture (Klaver and Odé 2012). The re-introduction of language and civic integration tests in integration policies emphasize the need for greater language proficiency but also demand adherence to a Dutch culture that is explained according to liberal-political (social) norms and values alone (ibid). Klaver and Odé note that governmental policies seem to emphasize a “normative” Dutch culture:

the current practice of testing knowledge of the Dutch society is in the first place oriented to *knowledge* of proper ways of behaviour and of Dutch norms and values. As such, these tests seem to have little to do with creating a common identity or even with the establishment of a sense of belonging (2012: 15).

Hence, the assumption that the proliferation of Dutch culture should dominate *at the expense of* ethno-cultural affiliations actually fuels dynamics of polarization and exclusion rather than belonging and inclusion. As part of a process of ‘emotive culturalization’, which resembles issues of ‘moral citizenship’, Duyvendak et al. note that a “normative” Dutch culture is counterproductive to the loyalty that is demanded of migrant individuals (2010). In this sense, Duyvendak et al. conclude that national identification ‘becomes a “political claim” more than an imagined community [...] [which] cautions [migrants] to claim the nation as their own’ (2010:

248). Hence, discursive segregation rather than the desired assimilation is consequential of this “culturalist” framing.

The governmental attempts that are now made to define the cultural contours of Dutch national identity, feed into a pivotal part that previous multiculturalist policies tended to overlook, namely that sustainable integration should involve an overarching identity to which all individuals from different backgrounds can relate to. However, although this important issue is now addressed, it is also belabored; the necessity to conform, currently excuses the culturalist, superior portrayal of a Dutch national identity which enhances crude differentiations.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the political and social contextual framework crucial to understanding Dutch-Moroccans’ and Dutch-Turks’ contemplations of “self” which are discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 to follow. The chapter has provided an historical overview of multiculturalist and integration policies in the Netherlands and the consequences these legacies have had on the gradual “embeddedness” of categorical differentiation and “culturalist” essentialism in Dutch approaches to multicultural diversity. This has been a gradual rather than sudden process, yet fuelled by (inter)national, political turmoil and the murder of Theo van Gogh particularly, multiculturalism has now made way for assimilative integration.

As part of a current assimilative integration discourse, the emphasis on the national “self” has now taken centre stage in public and political viewpoints that are best described as a combination of “firm” integration and outright assimilation with an emphasis on conformity to and adoption of the “majority rule” (Entzinger 2003: 2006). In the Integration brief 2007-2011 published by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (*Integratienota*), titled ‘Make sure you are part of it!’ (*Zorg dat je erbij hoort!*), the report stresses that a unitary society can only be achieved through

active citizenship and mutual respect of both allochthonous and autochthonous citizens. It is incumbent on the individual to either opt out or accept the terms for belonging and participation in Dutch society, yet it makes this appeal to ‘all citizens to participate in society on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality’ (2007: 5). In this regard, a civic national citizenship is proposed that offers firm yet inclusive adherence based on shared liberal-democratic duties, norms and values.

As will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to this formal, civic citizenship to both describe as well as claim their “Dutchness” in a way that proposes “neutral” inclusiveness and least obstructs “private” identification patterns. We encounter culture as a tool – common in everyday identification processes –which serves individuals to negotiate a sense of “Dutchness” that accords with cultural and religious backgrounds, yet feeds into a shared, inclusive national belonging.

At the same time, an exclusionary, normative rhetoric - particularly part of Wilders’ populist demand – underscores these civic, assimilative demands where Dutch culture is positioned as “rooted” in a “culturalist”, superior limelight of liberal civilization opposite “other” inferior cultures, i.e. Islam. In this regard, an ethno-culturally “thick” Dutch national identity surfaces that fuels the categorical exclusion of those whose ethnic background cannot be considered Dutch. These dialectics of exclusion and inclusion between Dutch national identity and “Dutchness” are discussed further in chapters 6 and 7 where interviewees often noted they felt limitations posed to the validity of their claims to Dutch identity.

As discussed, it is the assumption that the previous focus on bonding individuals according to rigidly defined groups – initially identified as ethnic minorities, then pillars and finally through differentiating terms of “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” - have added to this ethno-cultural, categorical “embeddedness” of difference, both in public and policy discourse. Ghorashi and Vieten (2012) term

this a persistent and essentialist 'sedentary bias' in Dutch integration policies that 'considers the 'rootedness' of migrants in their cultural background and/or the geographic territory of their country of origin as a natural and normal feature of their positioning' (2012: 729).

The following chapter 5 touches upon these dialectics between majority and minority viewpoints of Dutch identity in order to verify whether possible discrepancies are indeed existent in the ways that individuals use ethnic and/or civic markers to emphasize a sense of national "self". This leads us to a better understanding of the markers that further a shared, national belonging where previous integration policies did not succeed.

CHAPTER 5 ‘THE UNDUTCHABLES’: does Dutch national identity exist?

5.1 Introduction

‘But the Dutch identity? No, I did not find it. The Netherlands is: big windows without curtains, so that everybody can have a good look inside. But also: valuing privacy and cosiness. The Netherlands is: just one biscuit with your tea. But also: enormous hospitality and warmth. The Netherlands is: soberness and control. Pragmatism. But also: experiencing intense emotions together. The Netherlands is too diverse to explain or put into one cliché. The Dutchman does not exist’²³ (Speech Princess Maxima, WRR Report presentation).

On the 24th of September 2007, Princess Maxima²⁴ presented the report “Identification with the Netherlands”, a report on national identity in the Netherlands published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). The abovementioned excerpt of her speech aroused a particularly, critical response from and condemnation by politicians like Geert Wilders and left and right wing print media as to what Maxima had meant (Duyvendak 2008). The fact that her statements were deemed “controversial”, “ill-informed” and “sensitive” reflect the transformed political and policy attitudes towards integration in the Netherlands. In the previous chapter 4 I have extensively touched upon this transformative process that, as a result of (inter)national, political turmoil and the relative failure of integration policies, spiraled the definite abandonment of multiculturalism and the rise of assimilative integration approaches to diversity.

Princess Maxima’s speech is interesting because it offers a snapshot of this transformative process with regards to national identity. On the one hand, the speech bears resemblance to a previously accepted multiculturalist stance that waives the specifics of national identity and thereby neglects the importance of

²³ <http://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/nieuws/toespraken/2007/september/toespraak-van-prinses-maxima-24-september-2007/>

²⁴ Princess Maxima (now Queen Maxima of the Netherlands) is the wife of Prince of Orange (now King) Willem-Alexander, heir and first in line to the throne.

'bridging' individuals into an overarching, unifying identity. On the other hand, the public and political reaction the speech evoked, demonstrates the current assimilative integrationist attitude that appeals to the conformity, specification and preservation of *the* Dutch national identity. In light of this assimilative integration discourse, the framing of a "moral" or "culturalist" Dutch national identity has steadfastly taken shape. Currently, adherence to this firmer definition of the national "self" is mainly specified according to civic and civil-political terms yet at the same time these are ethnically framed as protruding particularly "Dutch" norms and values, supposedly embedded in Dutch history and culture. Thus, the undertone is a "culturalist" rationalization that moralizes a superior majority culture, "us", from an adjusting minority culture, "them" (Schinkel 2008).

In this regard, a somewhat "false" proposition for integration is promoted. Whilst adherence is propagated in civic terms, offering "neutral" yet conforming grounds for inclusion, there nevertheless seems an ethnic dimension that obstructs profound acceptance. In other words, a "thin" notion of national identification is presented where a "thick" notion actually stands firm. In this regard, national identity does not seem to embody the interplay between civic and ethnic elements, as I discussed in chapter 2 and 3, but rather the diffusion of these elements into an emotionally charged, banal (yet nevertheless powerful) demand for unconditional allegiance and loyalty (Verkuyten 2014; Klaver en Odé 2009) to Dutch society in general and Dutch culture in particular.

This brief contextual outline mainly concerns the *political* contemplations regarding the national "self": in this chapter, I verify to what extent political dialectics are mirrored in Dutch national identification processes of Dutch-Dutch individuals, and, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically.

This enquiry is explored on the basis of online survey data that was obtained by the researcher herself as well as through analysis of secondary survey data. It is

important to note that, due to the limitations of the survey data, the analysis presented in this chapter should be understood as a “gauging exercise” in exploring processes of national identification. Fundamentally, data analysis and concluding observations made in this chapter should be read as in support of and as a contextual framework for the following qualitative chapters 6 and 7.

What discrepancies might exist between “majority” and “minority” thinking of national identification and the manners in which Dutch national identity is constructed, embodied and performed?

This chapter is concerned with two broad identification patterns I initially outlined in chapter 3, which are:

- “standardized” assumptions of a (majority) Dutch national identity and dissecting the markers popularly viewed to represent Dutch culture, and,
- diffuse, individualized constructions of (minority) “Dutchness” and the aspects Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks articulate in descriptions of their own Dutch identity.

Importantly, these two strands of identification are to be understood - as discussed in chapter 2 – as diffuse, complex and flexible boundaries *between* rather than essentialist affirmations *of* majority and minority group identities. Hence from a sociological point of view, Maxima was right all along in stating that *the* Dutch Dutchman does not exist. In this chapter, the aim is to understand better where these two strands consolidate and depart whilst a) acknowledging the complexity of individual and social identification patterns and thereby avoiding crude categorizations, and yet b) to unearth the regulatory dimensions of the nation-state’s cultural contours which are often neglected in multiculturalism theory. These identification patterns are discussed in section 5.2.

With regards to these contemplations, section 5.3 concerns the evaluation of civic/ethnic dichotomy: it demonstrates its interplay and subsequently questions its division that is often referred to in antonymic terms of inclusion/exclusion, good/bad, neutral/biased. To understand these cultural dynamics of national “self” subsequently estimates its susceptibility towards diversity which might prove fruitful in building towards a shared national belonging. This specific chapter intends to extract from the quantitative data investigated, the complex cultural embodiment of the nation-state that exposes its “obtrusive” elements for further inclusion. I will briefly outline the methodological and quantitative analysis that was undertaken to investigate the above-mentioned queries.

5.1.1 Data collection and methodological remarks

This chapter primarily uses quantitative data which was collected from both secondary and primary survey data sources. It is important to outline and keep in mind the limitations of the survey data. As to the online survey (discussed in this section below) the data does not offer representative sample sizes. Due to the format and “nature” of an online survey, one cannot fully guarantee the sincerity of the response and answers nor the truthfulness of the sample’s demographic details provided. The analysis of the secondary survey data (ISSP, I discuss below) presented here in this chapter is of a descriptive nature; general tendencies can be observed. For these two factors, no firm or conclusive remarks can be made as to the enquiry explored in this chapter. Rather, the chapter functions as an explorative summary of (national) identification processes and the elements that tend to surface and the chapter should be read as such.

As a preliminary investigation of Dutch national identity, secondary data was obtained from the Dutch newspaper *Trouw* who, days after Maxima’s speech, established a survey-forum on its website asking readers to define what Dutch

national identity was and/or meant to them²⁵. The *Trouw* forum could be accessed freely (without registering) where there was space to put a reaction in 650 characters along with providing the respondent's name, residence and email address. As part of an interpretative analysis, respondents' reactions were quantitatively analyzed in SPSS and divided into six broad themes. These themes are religion (Christianity/Calvinism); a common past; liberal-democratic aspects (welfare state; liberal values); symbols (traditions, folklore); the Dutch language; and Dutch 'national character'. In chapter section 5.3, the forum is used to grasp the complexity surrounding the civic and ethnic markers inherent in national identity. The five categories a) liberal-democratic aspects b) citizenship/residence c) place of birth/ancestry d) language and e) religion are used as a themed guideline throughout this chapter. They identify a "starting point" to analyze further the symbiosis between civic and ethnic components that embody both Dutch national identity and "Dutchness".

This beginning resembles Sela-Sheffy's (2004) study of Israeli national identity in which he analyzed common responses (N=295) documented in the Israeli popular newspaper *Maariv* to the question: 'What makes one an Israeli?' Methodological issues similar to Sela-Sheffy's study arise with regards to the *Trouw* survey's format and sample. The survey sample cannot be considered representative of the Dutch population at large for several reasons. For one, the sample (N=210) has a relatively small number of respondents and due to the anonymity of the internet, little can be known about the respondents' demographics; their nationality, their age or their occupation. Secondly, the initiator of the survey, the *Trouw* newspaper, represents an intellectual, Christian viewpoint and therefore, we need to keep in mind that respondents' background, education level and profession do not represent a Dutch majority as a whole. Secondly, the collected reactions cannot be considered spontaneous; those are the opinions of individuals who willfully and intentionally accessed the internet to leave their online, public response. Nevertheless, the

²⁵ <http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/nederland/article1484866.ece>

Trouw data offers us a preliminary view of the multiplicity and complexity surrounding popular beliefs of Dutch national identity which act as a platform for further investigation throughout this chapter.

Other (more substantial) secondary data was obtained from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) who in 1995 and 2003, conducted survey questionnaires on national identity and consciousness in several countries world-wide, including the Netherlands. As part of random population samples²⁶, questions were largely framed in emotive terms of “(not) being proud of...” and “feeling (not) strongly...” to identify the importance respondents attached to diverse national features such as democratic institutions, welfare system, religion, language, history, arts, sports etc. On the other hand, the surveys served to gauge the respondents’ (geographical) attachment and solidarity towards their country, city and neighborhood. The 1995 and 2003 data sets offer us a valuable longitudinal “peek” into the “generalized” national identification patterns of respondents who are, to a degree, representative of a Dutch majority. A Dutch majority is identified here with regards to the respondent’s nationality, parentage and ethnic affiliation. In the 1995 survey, almost 99 percent of respondents claimed to be of Dutch nationality with around 95 percent of respondents stating both parents had Dutch nationality at the time of the respondent’s birth. An overwhelming 97 percent of respondents categorized themselves as ethnically Dutch with an accumulative 92 percent of respondents feeling (very) close to their ethnicity. Similar figures appear in the 2003 survey: a vast majority of respondents claimed Dutch nationality (nearly 98 percent) for themselves as well as for both parents (around 94 percent). Of all interviewed, 95 percent indicated to have Dutch ethnicity. For this specific study, the ISSP data thus serves to provide us with a generally perceived notion of Dutch national identity that both illuminates a civic-ethnic complexity as well as the characteristics thought most central to it.

²⁶ For the Netherlands, the 1995 sample was N= 2089; the 2003 sample was N=1823

Primary data analysis draws from surveys conducted in 2010 on two forum-based websites – *marokko.nl* and *turksnl.net* - where Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (separately) virtually meet to discuss various aspects of identity, daily life and religion. These online surveys aimed to illustrate whether and how Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, specifically, attach importance to Dutch national identity compared to their ethnic (Moroccan/Turkish) and/or religious (Muslim) identity specifically. In this regard, the incentive differs slightly from the ISSP surveys that mostly depict respondents' national affiliations with regards to the geographical particularity of their country, region, city and neighborhood. In the online surveys the first question acted (Do you see yourself as...?) as a filter that was equally concerned to establish whether respondents identify with a Dutch identity and more importantly, how this identification is in symbiosis with ethnic and religious notions of "self". Subsequent "emotive" and statement questions were then presented in order to grasp both the dimensions of "Dutchness" as well as the degree to which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks associate themselves with a Dutch identity. It is important to note that the sample sizes in both surveys are quantitatively low²⁷ - as discussed in chapter 3 - and therefore cannot be considered representative of the two target groups. Nevertheless, the data obtained from these surveys offers us a valuable glimpse of "Dutchness", i.e. the ways in which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically articulate their own Dutch identity.

5.2 THE DUTCH VERSUS "DUTCHNESS"

If *the* Dutch national identity does not exist, does Dutch national identity exist at all? Although politicians and opinion makers were quick to refute Maxima's statement, the query begs further investigation when proposed to the vast majority of Dutch population. In other words, do the Dutch think the Dutch exist? It is

²⁷ For the *marokko.nl* survey N=107, for *turksnl.net* the survey sample N=63

important to address this question as it stipulates the individually “imagined” mechanisms that socially reinforce, reshape and reunite the perception of a united, national community and sense of identity. At the best of times, national identity is – as I have discussed in the introductory chapter and chapter 2- a multiplicity of identification patterns as well as a homogenizing force of cohesion. However, the fragility of this fine balance is exposed where we consider the differentiation between Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background whose Dutch identity associations are contested, as opposed to a Dutch majority that articulates a seemingly, unproblematic sense of national homogeneity. Certainly, social reality is not categorized in such ways and although we should stipulate the complexity, individuality and subjectivity surrounding national identification, can we detect a sense of being Dutch that appears salient for some, but not for others?

In this section, I am concerned with the degree to which respondents in both ISSP and the online surveys choose a Dutch identity to describe themselves in relation to other identity markers. I distinguish between a Dutch hegemonic majority and a multicultural diverse minority and the degree to which Dutch identity is chosen in self-identification processes. As stated, the survey data is insufficient in allowing us to make firm conclusions based on these data sets. Nevertheless, it is interesting to gauge the following hypothesis. We could argue that in light of categorical and “culturalist” exclusion – discussed in chapter 4 - Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents emphasize a form of “Dutchness” that negotiates, evaluates and emphasizes Dutch identity *alongside* and not at the expense of ethnic and religious identities. On the other hand, it is thought that the vast majority of Dutch population perceives Dutch national identity *in itself* to appear a dominant, homogeneous and “unproblematic” factor in self-identification processes.

5.2.1 The Dutch

When the *Trouw* newspaper proposed its readers to articulate whether Dutch national identity in fact existed, unsurprisingly, 84 percent of respondents confirmed this. Whilst readers used various themes – I will discuss these in due course - to support their claim, there appears to be a notion of an assumed “knowhow” that determines a feeling of being Dutch. As said, most respondents indicated they had Dutch nationality. However, whether a strong national identification, in comparison to other forms of affiliation, predominates amongst members of the Dutch majority is to be examined further. In both the 1995 and 2003 ISSP surveys, respondents were asked to indicate how closely they affiliated themselves with geographically and locally determined identities of continent, country, county and city. The aspect of neighborhood, which featured in the 1995 survey but was not included in the 2003 survey, has for this reason been excluded. Figures are tabulated in table 5.1.

Table 5.1 (Inter) national and geographical affiliations in the Netherlands, 1995 and 2003

% How close feel to	Town/City		County		Country		Continent	
	1995	2003	1995	2003	1995	2003	1995	2003
Very close	15.1	24.9	9.5	13.3	28.3	29.4	9.7	14.0
Close	56.3	42.5	39.8	36.4	58.5	50.3	44.6	33.3
Not very close	25.3	26.1	42.1	33.7	11.5	17.1	36.0	35.2
Not close at all	3.2	6.6	8.6	16.5	1.8	3.2	9.7	17.4
<i>N</i>	2089	1823	2089	1823	2089	1823	2089	1823

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis

In general, respondents seemed (very) close to two places of residence particularly; the town or city (a combined 71 and 67 percent in 1995 and 2003 respectively) they live in and their country (a combined 87 and 80 percent in 1995 and 2003 respectively). However, comparing the 2003 with the 1995 results, respondents generally appear to feel less closely towards their town, country and continent in particular. Interestingly, we can detect a slight diffusion of levels of “closeness” especially where it concerns feeling close or very close to town, county and continent. Although small accumulative percentages, more respondents in 2003 than 1995 seem to increasingly feel very close or not close at all to these three localities. We could argue that, to some degree, the process to describe oneself with regards to geographical identification, is increasingly taking place at the opposite ends of the spectrum, i.e. regional and local surroundings as well as part of an international, globalized setting.

We can entertain the thought that this development is possibly explained by the effects of globalization and cosmopolitanism and the central issue of “security” (Scholte 2005). The advance of European integration; international terrorism and the “global” threat of Islam; all are thought evidence of prolonged political, economic and human (in) security (Entzinger 2006). These issues most probably will have struck a chord with members of the Dutch population, yet, the degree to which projections of “self” might have altered, cannot be fully assessed from the ISSP data. Nevertheless, the 1995-2003 timeline makes visible – as I have outlined in chapter 4 - the Netherlands as a country riddled with public and political transformation. Harsh critiques on failed multiculturalist policies and the rise of a ‘new realist’ discourse are exemplary of a societal insecurity specifically revolving around the debate of the cultural “self” vis-à-vis immigrants and Islam. We could argue that the overlap of these (inter) national developments possibly has mobilized changing perceptions of “self” that tend towards both global as well as regional/local outlooks.

Where does this leave *national* identification? As said, in both the 1995 and 2003 survey, the majority of respondents still express being (very) close to their country. Nevertheless, in 2003 an increasing number of respondents did not feel very close or close at all to their country: a combined 20 percent in 2003 compared to 13 percent in 1995. Does this reflect a sense of insecurity on behalf of the majority population and a hesitancy to think of oneself as Dutch? In the face of Pim Fortuyn's murder in 2002 and the raging political debate about the defining contours of Dutch national identity, some have argued that insecurities about the contours of national identification (a Dutch national "self") are thought to symbiotically reflect the constructions of Dutch nationals' individual "self" (Lechner 2012). There is therefore reason to suggest that Dutch individuals might be inclined to identify more closely with "reassuring" local and regional vicinities in light of uncertain national dynamics. To investigate this assumption further, we can review the results of an additional question in the 2003 survey that asked respondents to categorize themselves as part of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd most important group of association. The question offered 10 association options, including demographic markers of age group, occupation and gender as well as nationality and ethnic group. The first most important marker respondents chose was "family/marital status" (44 percent); the second most important marker is "occupation" (22 percent) and the third is "the part of the Netherlands that you live in" (18). If we combine the levels of group association, the picture changes slightly.

Table 5.2 Most important (combined) 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices of group identification patterns in 2003

Group option	Percentage
Family/Marital status	67.5
Occupation	50.4
Age group	39.8
Part of country you live in	33.1
Class	30.3
Nationality	23.9
Gender	20.5
Religion	16.7
Ethnicity	9.1
Pref political party	8.6
<i>N</i>	1823

Source: ISSP 2003 – author’s own analysis

These results hint at the importance of “individualized” and local identity markers in Dutch respondents’ identification processes. Interestingly, nationality is only the 6th most important *combined* identity marker. In contrast, Bechhofer and McCrone (2007) found that amongst survey respondents living in Scotland, national identity markers were considered most important. Out of 23 identity markers the majority of respondents chose to identify themselves as being Scottish (54 percent) as part of either their 1st, 2nd or 3rd choice; even British identity that might be considered a “contested” identity, was rated in 7th place (2007: 255). However, these results are somewhat unusual compared to survey data conducted in other parts of the UK. In this regard, Rosie and Bond (2008) note that for all Welsh, Irish and English respondents, to be a parent was considered the most popular identity marker; national identity ‘[was] of a relatively low salience’ (2008: 53). Nevertheless, a possible explanation for this Scottish result is that contemplations of Scottish

nationalism have received much public and political attention: Scottish national identity is increasingly discussed and problematized. As to the problematization of and focus on Dutch culture (in the wake of political turmoil as discussed in chapter 4) the data here suggests – which should be taken with caution - that this has had possibly opposite effects to Dutch identification processes which is an interesting given.

The question remains whether the ISSP 2003 survey results are an indication of a Dutch national identity in “crisis” yet. Global issues of international terrorism and advancing European integration are likely to have diverted a slightly stronger emphasis from national identification to the local and “personalized”. Yet, it is more agreeable to assume these results are reflective of national identity contemplations *on the brink* of full-blown national turmoil, crisis and insecurity. That is because perceived insecurity normally emphasizes that which is supposedly attacked (Kinvall 2004). Kinvall offers a solid illustration on the social constructivist dialectics of insecurity, self and globalization. She outlines:

Emphasizing (in) security as an inherent component of power relations actualizes the need for one stable and comforting identity. This need is likely to be heightened in uncertain circumstances brought about by forces beyond our control, such as globalization. [...]As their ontological insecurity increases, they [individuals, ed.] attempt to securitize subjectivity, which means an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual existence). This invariably involves a process of establishing and confirming certain identity traits in yourself and the juxtaposition of these to others. Securitizing subjectivity always involves a stranger-other, because the self is not a static object but is part of a larger process of identity construction (Kinvall 2004: 748; 749).

Comparing the 1995 and 2003 survey results, Dutch respondents demonstrate more diffused identification patterns of feeling close to national *as well as* local and personal surroundings. The surfacing of one “stable” identity is not what transcends from the data analyzed. In this regard, the data does not necessarily reflect the (inter) national political turmoil and insecurities that saw – as I have discussed in chapter 4 - the extensive re-evaluation of Dutch national identity after Theo van

Gogh's murder particularly. Indeed, the rise of populism headed by Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders; anti-Islamic tendencies; the 2005 "no vote" against the formation of a European constitution are all evidential of a society increasingly preoccupied with finding a hegemonic national idea of being Dutch.

Especially, the appeal for conformance of "others" into *the* Dutch national identity is a theme that needs further investigation; it might offer us further visibility into national identification shifts consequential of the transformed political context.

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the discrepancies between majority and minority perceptions of multiculturalism and the issue of cultural adaptation versus cultural maintenance. In their study, Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) investigated attitudes towards multiculturalism and acculturation patterns amongst both a majority (Dutch) and minority (Turkish) group of adolescents. Multiculturalism was understood as an ideology favoring the cultural maintenance and promotion of cultural collectives. Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) found strong differences in attitudes between the two groups, especially where it concerned the value of cultural maintenance, i.e. the maintenance of cultural values, traditions and practices. In this regard, the minority group of Turkish adolescents strongly favored maintenance of cultural features whilst the majority group did not so much (2002:99). This discrepancy in dealing with cultural diversity is potentially obstructive to a positive two-dimensional integration process in which 'acculturation [favors] culture maintenance as well as adaptation and contact' (2002: 93). This gives further indication that multiculturalism, as an approach to promoting diversity, might be abandoned and discarded by some (majority) but nevertheless valued by others (minority), which is also the conclusion of a study by Schalk-Soekar et al. 2004.

This needs to be further discussed in later parts of the "themed" section 5.3 of this chapter. For now, it will be interesting to ascertain identification patterns of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents in the online surveys. How are their descriptions of "self" shaped by the political turmoil outlined above? I will discuss this further.

5.2.2 “Dutchness” – online representations of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks

The time span that exists between the online surveys and the ISSP surveys – 2003 and 2010 – can be judged an important, transformative period unfolding the full-blown political and societal deliberations on issues of immigration, integration and national “self” after the dramatic events in 2002 and 2004. The heightened, political emphasis on Dutch national identity - as outlined in the previous chapter 4 - is an aspect to consider when analyzing the online survey data. In light of an expanding assimilative integration discourse, how do we judge self-identification processes amongst those individuals whose “Dutchness” might not align with a “culturalist” conforming Dutch national identity? Although the survey data is limited, we might detect possible effects projecting this political climate concerning the manners in which Dutch individuals of a Moroccan or Turkish background choose to describe themselves.

The first question introduced in the online surveys, asked respondents to indicate how they saw themselves. Respondents were invited to choose any of the three identity options presented; Dutch and/or Moroccan/Turkish and/or Muslim. Obviously, it is understood that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks construct and affiliate themselves with a plethora of identities – gender, age, city and other demographic identities - beyond the scope of these three options. Nevertheless, it was chosen to focus solely on national, religious and ethnic identity components as previous studies have found these to be important markers amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Phalet et al. 2000; Fleischmann and Phalet 2007). The results are presented in tables 5.3 and 5.4²⁸.

²⁸ These percentages include those respondents that at least completed the first question but not the entire survey.

Table 5.3/5.4 National, ethnic and religious identity markers amongst

Dutch-Turks		Dutch-Moroccans	
% 'I see myself as...'	Respondents (N=83)	% 'I see myself as...'	Respondents (N=141)
Dutch, Turkish and Muslim	20	Dutch, Moroccan and Muslim	28
Dutch and Muslim	0	Dutch and Muslim	1
Dutch and Turkish	8	Dutch and Moroccan	2
Dutch only	6	Dutch only	8
Turkish and Muslim	16	Moroccan and Muslim	14
Turkish only	33	Moroccan only	21
Muslim only	17	Muslim only	26

Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net s – author's own analysis

The majority in both surveys appears to not think of themselves as Dutch *at all*; 66 percent of respondents with a Turkish background and 61 percent of respondents with Moroccan background opted either solely for an ethnic or religious identity, or a combination of the two. This is interesting considering most respondents can be classified as “Dutch” along both civic - having a Dutch passport - and ethnic -place of birth- lines. Thus, how do we judge this response? Do Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks *themselves* consider these components to insufficiently determine their own “Dutchness”, or, is there an anticipated reaction that “others” might reject this claim?

The “how” and “why” of this important query is further investigated as part of “themed” section 5.3 of this specific chapter as well as in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. Notably, however, is the degree to which respondents neglect to ascertain a Dutch identity at all. This gives reason to investigate whether respondents *perceive* certain regulatory social barriers enforcing Dutch national identity to be exclusionary, conforming and differentiating rather than inclusionary, flexible and diverse. This possible pattern of national ‘disidentification’ might be

explained as a reaction to the heightened assimilative integration discourse – discussed in chapter 4 - that emphasizes a “culturalist” differentiating of Dutch national identity (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).

In chapter 2, I have outlined that the construction of the individual “self” is (for a big part) established as part of the interactive interplay between individual and social identification processes. Specifically, an individual sense of “self” mirrors a social construction of “self” through group association and differentiation. Why individuals identify with certain social groups but not others is (partly) dependent upon the groups’ *perceived* status which, as part of intergroup communication and interaction, determines how individual self-categorization processes distill a sense of social membership towards ingroup but not outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979). As part of this dialectic between in- and outgroup, it is argued that a stronger, differentiating association with the “ingroup” identity might occur where its individual members perceive its status to be “devalued” by an opposing majority/outgroup (Turner 1985). Thus, we need to consider the effects of an assimilative integration discourse that presupposes the majoritarian, conforming and superior status of Dutch national identity at the cost of other forms of affiliations. In this sense, Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background might be inclined to further identify with their “devalued” ethnic and/or religious identity in the absence of having an accepted national identity.

This dialectic - between perceived in- and outgroup status and self-categorization- featured in a study by Schalk-Soekar et al. (2004) where perceptions on multiculturalism (defined in the study as an ideology that is accepting of cultural differences) were investigated between Dutch majority and Surinam, Antillean, Turkish and Moroccan minority samples. Interestingly, the study looked at the issue of ethnic hierarchies. This idea considers the perceived positionality of social groups in society vis-à-vis each other and the ways in which their perceived affiliation and membership to a social group affect and/or reinforce positional hierarchies

between social groups at large. It departs from the idea that, in a multicultural society, the majority (host) group holds a perceived superior position opposite other social groups which, in the case of individuals from “lower” social groups, might affect attitudes and engagement towards the host society. This means that those individuals who assess their social group being in a lower position, might feel more negatively inclined towards the host society. Ultimately, the perceived level of ethnic hierarchies might affect levels of integration versus separation. Schalk-Soekar et al. found that there appears a positive association between perceived (lower) social position and the degree of inclination felt towards the host society. As a result, they found that Moroccans and Turks – more than Antilleans and Surinams – felt in a lower position in the ethnic hierarchy thereby adding to feelings of discrimination and more inclined towards cultural maintenance (ingroup affiliation). This result parallels the distance and difference Dutch majority perceive towards these two groups particularly as confirmed in previous studies (Schalk-Soekar and van de Vijver 2003; Hagendoorn and Hraba 1989; Verkuyten et al 1999). The study also found that higher levels of education and inter-cultural contact made minority group participants feel more positively inclined towards integration, feeling less discriminated and feeling more at home (2004: 547). Interestingly, in this research such an association was not obvious per se: some interviewees (all highly educated) expressed a negative inclination towards Dutch multicultural society, integration policies; some felt discriminated against. This is an interesting assumption that will be analyzed further in chapter 6 and 7.

Several other studies also appear to confirm an inclination to further identify with the ingroup rather than with a level of “Dutchness”. In a series of three surveys, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) analyzed self-identification patterns amongst Turkish-Dutch Muslims and the degree to which national (Dutch), ethnic (Turkish) and religious (Muslim) identities were considered complementary. In particular, research focused on the relation between perceived social rejection and the subsequent positive or negative correlation with each of the three identity

categories. Concluding results demonstrate that feelings of being Turkish and Muslim do not harmoniously collide with being Dutch (negative association). This does not necessarily mean that these patterns are absolute: national reconciliation might still be preferable for Turkish-Dutch Muslims who solely identify with a Turkish or Muslim identity. However, in terms of perceived social rejection, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) found that:

...this can have a combined effect of strengthening minority identification and weakening national identification. In Studies 1 and 2, perceived rejection was related to less Dutch identification, and this association was (partly) mediated by Turkish-Muslim identity. This shows that perceived rejection is associated with stronger ingroup identification, which in turn is associated with less commitment to the nation-state (2007: 1460).

This means that perceived notions of exclusion, such as (experienced) discrimination or public condemnation, enhances ingroup identification of being Muslim or Turkish and subsequently furthers national disengagement. This resembles outcomes from survey studies conducted amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks residing in Amsterdam (Fleischmann and Phalet 2007). Comparing four European cities, it was found that amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically, correlations were particularly conflicting between ethnic and religious identification on the one hand and national identification on the other. In other words, stronger identification of being Muslim or Turkish/Moroccan coincided with decreased national association (2007: 7).

Comparing these conclusions to the online survey results presented in tables 5.3 and 5.4, we can detect a significant number of respondents who choose to describe themselves as either solely Muslim or Turkish/Moroccan. Whilst 33 percent of respondents describe themselves as solely Turkish, the equivalent for respondents with a Moroccan background is 21 percent. The picture is almost completely reversed when we consider the Muslim identity marker. In this case, 26 percent of Moroccan respondents solely claim a Muslim identity, against 17 percent of Turkish respondents. We can thus entertain the assumption that a considerable number of

both Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents prefer to use ethnic and religious identity markers specific to their perceived minority status. The survey format does not allow us to positively confirm the relationship between these identification patterns and an apprehensive sense of majority exclusion and segregation. However, others studies have. According to Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) who investigated attitudes of multiculturalism amongst Dutch and Turkish counterparts, found that perceived discrimination amongst Turks affected their (higher) support for cultural maintenance and ethnic self-identification than their Dutch peers (2002: 104). This query is discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7 with regards to self-identification patterns of being Muslim and Turkish/Moroccan. There is indication to believe Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background are conscious of obstructive elements that limit the degree to which they identify with a majoritarian interpretation of Dutch national identity. This discursive exclusion appears particularly reflected with regards to a stronger rationalization of being Muslim, as I will discuss in chapter 6.

5.2.2.1. Dutch-Moroccan Muslims and Turkish Dutch-Turks

To investigate this further, it is worth mentioning the slight distinction that appears between the two survey groups when we consider the respondents who think of themselves as solely Turkish/Moroccan *or* Muslim. Comparatively speaking, Dutch individuals of Moroccan descent appear more likely to describe themselves as solely Muslim whilst Turkish respondents seem to identify more strongly with their Turkish, ethnic background. This preliminary observation can be compared with results from the 'Rotterdam Young People's Survey', a longitudinal study conducted in 1999 and 2006 aimed to assess integration, interrelation and identification dynamics of young²⁹ Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and autochthonous individuals residing in Rotterdam (Phalet et al. 2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008).

²⁹ Respondents were between the age of 18 and 30 years

In both the 1999 and 2006 survey, Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents predominantly used ethnic and/or religious rather than national identity markers to describe a sense of “self”. Nevertheless, shifting self-identification patterns can be detected and slightly distinguish the two target groups. In this regard, the 2006 survey data shows that respondents of Moroccan heritage are particularly intent upon the exploration of their Muslim identity, relatively more than their Dutch-Turkish peers.

As part of a process termed ‘religionization’, Entzinger argues that the heightened political awareness towards Islam and *the* Muslim “other” – as discussed in chapter 4 – possibly accounts for stronger identification patterns of being Muslim (Rezai en Barendrecht 2010). Hence, the correlation catches individual identification processes between the perceived threat of majority outgroup *exclusion* and the expansion of a contested Muslim “self” that nevertheless guarantees ingroup *inclusion*. Although this hypothesis is discussed further in chapter 6, Jaspers and Lubbers (2005) have shown that Dutch-Moroccans are very much aware of an “autochthonous” position that holds negative and exclusionary viewpoints towards Islam.

As to the observation that shifting affiliation patterns from ethnic to religious identities are more clearly represented amongst Moroccan-descended Dutch individuals than Dutch individuals with Turkish background, several elements possibly provide an answer. For one, the Turkish community in the Netherlands exercises greater cohesion and social control than the Moroccan community which is more disintegrated (Entzinger in: Rezai en Barendrecht 2010: 28). Secondly, the historical particularity of Turkish “Kemalist” nationalism constitutes the nationalist conglomeration of religious and ethnic differences into one secularized Turkish identity that remains a powerful, representative marker for the Dutch Turkish community. Unlike the Turks, the Dutch Moroccan community exposes the

intertwinement of ethnic and religious aspects that, above all, sustains a Moroccan group identity focused on religious norms and values (ibid; van Praag 2006).

It is useful to further explore whether and how Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background differ in their appreciation and evaluation of both their ethnic and religious identity. Following the identity markers chosen in the first question of the online survey, respondents were asked to indicate how proud they felt towards being Turkish/Moroccan and/or Muslim. The figures are tabulated in table 5.5 and these include only those respondents who completed the survey and chose *at least* one of the identities examined and therefore might have combined identity options of being Turkish and/or Muslim and/or Dutch.

Table 5.5 Being proud of...³⁰

Percentage	Being Moroccan (N=67)	Being Turkish (N=50)	Being DT Muslim (N=35)	Being DM Muslim (N=81)
Very proud	40.3	54.0	77.1	85.2
Proud	34.3	24.0	5.7	12.3
Neutral	23.9	22.0	14.3	2.5
Not very proud	1.5	0	2.9	0
Not proud at all	0	0	0	0

Sources: online survey, marokko.nl; turksnl.net– author’s own analysis

First of all, it is important to note that samples are disproportionate and therefore results are particularly enlarged and unrepresentative. For example, a considerable larger proportion of the respondents with Moroccan background (81 out of 107) chose the Muslim option as opposed to individuals with a Turkish one (35 out 63). This gives some indication to assume that Dutch-Moroccans are keener than Dutch-Turks to describe themselves as Muslim. The picture changes when we consider

³⁰ Respondents were also asked if they were proud of their Dutch identity. Sample sizes for this question were that small that the results have been excluded from table 5.5. NB: in both surveys, most respondents were neutral to being proud about their Dutch identity.

Turkish/Moroccan identity: most Dutch-Turks choose to identify with a Turkish identity (50 out of 63) whilst for Dutch-Moroccans the number is lower (67 out of 107). These results possibly also hint at preliminary, transitional stages of assimilation in which the embodiment and importance of ethnic identity will change and possibly deteriorate over time (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Waters 2011). The fact that in both cases levels of ethnic “pride” are far more diffuse seems to support this theory.

Interestingly, both respondent groups greatly value being Muslim: 77.1 percent of Dutch individuals with a Turkish background and 85.2 percent of Moroccan descent are very proud to be Muslim. The fact that *both* respondent groups put such emphasis on their Muslim identity is possibly explained as a reaction to perceived stigmatization of the (inter) national Muslim community: this is an assumption that is discussed further in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, slight distinctions of Muslim identification patterns are detectable between Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents, especially if we consider the degree of “being proud” about their Muslim identity. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans appear overwhelmingly very proud. In fact, no respondent gave a negative answer (‘not very proud’) about being Muslim. For Dutch-Turks, the percentages are slightly more scattered with 14 percent being neutral about their Muslim identity. As the survey data is too limited to go with this conclusion, the slight apparent divergence is something to be discussed further in Chapter 6.

5.2.2.2 “Dutchness”

Where does this leave respondents who did express an affiliation with Dutch identity? For one, most respondents combined national identification with both a Turkish/Moroccan *and* Muslim identity; individuals of Moroccan heritage are slightly more inclined (28 percent) to combine all three identity markers than respondents with a Turkish background (20 percent). Given that the majority of

respondents did not consider themselves Dutch at all, it is reasonable to infer that they have a strained and problematic relationship with their own Dutch identity. This comes as an unsurprising, tentative conclusion. As discussed previously, the role of perceived social rejection and stigmatization is important in order to understand the considerable degree to which Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background identify with a “devalued” ethnic and/or religious identity primarily. At the same time, the choice to combine Muslim, Moroccan/Turkish and Dutch identity markers also hints at a process of negotiation in which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to a sense of national belonging that *complements* ethno-cultural and religious affiliations.

Nevertheless, there is a general lack of respondents choosing the Dutch identity marker in combination with *either* a Turkish/Moroccan *or* Muslim identity. Once again, this might be indicative of a Dutch national identity that is exclusionary to rather than encompassing ethno-cultural and religious affiliations. The fact that political and social attitudes increasingly pinpoint the incompatibility of Islam with Dutch culture and national identity, possibly explains why respondents are hesitant to combine their Muslim identity with a sense of being Dutch.

The degree to which respondents combine a sense of being Dutch with being Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish was also assessed according to Moreno scaled questions. Designed by Spanish sociologist Luis Moreno, the scale was first applied to measure relations between state and ‘sub-state’ identities. These questions challenge the respondent to make clearer the connection between identities and the degree to which these are scrutinized and compared to one another (if at all). As sample sizes are incredibly small, these results cannot be considered representative of the target groups’ identification patterns. Nevertheless, the data lends itself to gauge the contours of “Dutchness” as respondents construct it.

One general observation can be made with regards to these Moreno questions: most respondents felt more Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish than Dutch. For most Dutch-Turkish respondents, more than their Dutch-Moroccan peers, ethnic and national belonging are on equal foot. When it comes to Muslim identity, both respondent groups demonstrate stronger identification with being Muslim than being Dutch. These are observations that are discussed in greater detail in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7.

5.3 THEMES TO A NATIONAL SONG

This section is concerned with the interplay between Dutch national identity and “Dutchness” that reflects both the multiplicity and fluidity as well as the “essentialization” of nationality. In other words, the symbiosis between similarity and difference - common in all individual and social identification processes - is used as a guideline to better understand the national boundaries, contours and identity of the Dutch nation-state verified with regards to a Dutch majority (ISSP) as well as (minority) Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background (online surveys). Analysis in this chapter section offers contextual guidelines to be explored further in chapter 6 and 7 rather than firm conclusions made as part of the thesis as a whole.

Specifically, the theoretical civic-ethnic paradigm – which I outlined in chapter 2 - forms a guideline to possibly detect the elements of Dutch national identity and culture that determine similarity from difference, inclusion from exclusion, “self” from “other”. Possibly, the question should not be “do the Dutch exist?” but “*how* do they exist?” and can we identify certain aspects of national identity that determine the inclusion of some, but not others? These queries will give us clues as to the ethnic and civic aspects inherent in national identity that are most fruitful to the inclusion and acceptance of multicultural hybridity and the advancement of a shared national belonging. In this chapter section, I compare responses from the

ISSP as well as the online surveys to investigate the components considered central to the respondents' understanding of Dutch identity. As part of this analysis between Dutch majority and multicultural minority, an important dialectic involves the aspects respondents use in relation to the description and construction of their *own* sense of Dutch identity as compared to the markers respondents would accord to the possible acceptance and inclusion of "others".

For the 1995 and 2003 ISSP survey, the analysis concerns the question that presented respondents with several markers (place of birth, citizenship, language etc.) to indicate the importance of each factor for being truly Dutch. To gauge the Dutch majority's view on the markers they consider important for "others" to adopt, several statement questions are used that asked respondents about the status of immigrants in society and the degree to which they should assimilate to Dutch norms and values or retain "their own". For the online surveys, analysis involves questions that presented respondents with a range of options to indicate their own "Dutchness" as well as that of *the* Dutch(wo)man. The results of both ISSP and online survey are compared to find possible discrepancies involving the characterization of Dutch national identity. Subsequently, we might better understand whether differences between Dutch majority and multicultural minority propel ethnic-exclusive versus civic-inclusive divisions, or, whether Dutch identification patterns between these groups are adjoining.

5.3.1 The ethnic-civic divide as cultural conglomeration

This proposed national identification analysis both considers and challenges civic-ethnic dichotomies that are often adopted in nationalism theory to examine classifications of different "nationalisms". As discussed in chapter 2, considerable contention exists as to the validity of understanding nations as either civic or ethnic. For one, it presupposes that these concepts are mutually exclusive and are as such representative of categorically different nations (Yack 1995). Secondly, civic-ethnic

dichotomies resonate contrasting connotations that imply gross geographical (western-eastern); political (liberal/illiberal) and civil (universalistic/particularistic) differentiation (Brubaker 1999). In this regard, civic-ethnic categorizations are suggestive of normative associations between “good” and “bad” nations (ibid).

Despite these critical issues, ethnic-civic dichotomies are not entirely obsolete. Bearing in mind the complexity that underscores these dichotomies, it is nevertheless possible to theoretically outline “civic” and “ethnic” concepts in order to gauge the dimensions of national identification (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010: 582). These typifications provide the theoretical onset for exploring the dimensions of the national “self”, albeit with the understanding that its make-up is more diffuse and containing *both* civic and ethnic components that overlap and entwine (Shulman 2002). I will briefly iterate – as I have done in chapter 2- the “ideal” types of “civicness” and “ethnicness” and what these actually mean for the specific context analysis of this study.

As I have discussed previously, it is understood that the national “self” comprises liberal-political, civic notions of citizenship that formalize a shared sense of nationality, and, ethnic aspects that emphasize a perceived sense of “sameness” based on common roots, heritage and kinship. With regards to the latter categorization, “ethnic” is commonly explained as a *belief* in ‘shared descent’ and the idea that national uniformity constitutes links to a common past, ancestry and territory (Smith 1988)³¹. However, this is too narrow a definition of the ethnic concept, especially considering many nations do not necessarily invoke shared ancestral ties to explain their “unitedness” (Brubaker 1999: 60). Rather, I argue that the term is extended to “ethno-cultural” which implies that shared ethnic ties and belonging are enforced through cultural components of common language, religion, traditions, folklore and symbols. Although language is a distinctive marker referring to both ethnic as well as civic interpretations of nationalism, for the convenience of

³¹ This notion largely defies a primordialist essentialization of ethnicity that focuses on the perceived “givens” of blood ties and lineage as the main source of national uniformity constructions.

analysis I have aligned it with ethno-cultural aspects. Hence, we can roughly differentiate civic, ethnic and ethno-cultural aspects as three components that *all* form the cultural basis of the national “self” and that operate to reinforce a sense of national attachment.

To operationalize identity markers specific to the “ethnic”, “civic” and “ethno-cultural” typologies, answer options presented in the ISSP and online surveys are juxtaposed in order to demarcate and illuminate the diverse characterization of national identity. Faced with the question ‘how important is [...] for being truly Dutch?’ ISSP survey respondents were asked to specify the level of importance for each of the following components separately. In this regard, respondents were invited to specify whether to be truly Dutch is to...:

- * have lived in the Netherlands for most of your life [lengthy residence]³²
- * respect the Netherlands’ political institutions and law [civil adherence]
- * have Dutch citizenship [citizenship; passport]
- * have been born in the Netherlands [place of birth]
- * have Dutch ancestry [ancestral ties]
- * be able to speak the Dutch language [language]
- * be a Christian [religion]

The first three components can be classified as “civic” as they all bear reference to a formal attachment to the state and its institutional and regulatory structure and law. Place of birth and ancestral ties can be termed “ethnic” components while language and religion are considered ethno-cultural examples of national identification markers.

In the online surveys, identical civic-ethnic-ethnocultural stratifications were applied to gauge the elements Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks consider when

³² The abbreviated codes mentioned in brackets are used for the analysis to follow.

they think of themselves as Dutch. Respondents were encouraged to choose one or more of the following elements:

- *I live in the Netherlands [residence]
- *I have a Dutch passport [citizenship]
- *I was born in the Netherlands [place of birth]
- *One or both my parents were born in the Netherlands [ancestral ties]
- *I speak the Dutch language [language]

Similar to the ISSP survey, identity markers include civic elements of residence and citizenship ('I live in the Netherlands'; 'I have a Dutch passport') and ethnic components that exemplify ancestral ties and heritage ('I, one and/or both of my parents were born in the Netherlands'). The ethno-cultural option includes language only. The identity marker of religion – along the lines of 'I consider myself Dutch because I am a Christian believer' - was excluded as an insignificant factor, because religious identification patterns amongst Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background predominantly concern a Muslim identity. We can thus roughly distinguish three main categories of "civic", "ethnic" and "ethno-cultural" which will be discussed separately according to the individual identity markers that were suggested to respondents in both the ISSP and online surveys.

5.3.2 Civic markers of national identification

As an introductory note, I refer first to the *Trouw* survey data in which liberal-democratic aspects were the second most mentioned elements respondents used to describe Dutch national identity. Respondents talked of liberty, tolerance and egalitarianism stipulating the assumed democratic and civil foundations of Dutch national identity. For example, respondent A. remarks the Dutch libertarian character supposedly formed as a consequence of the Netherlands' geographical particularity:

'Because of the struggle against the sea, nobody in the Netherlands is more [important] than someone else. We are all needed to keep this country dry. This is why a Dutchman is egalitarian and [values] freedom.'

Interestingly, this civic characterization of Dutch national identity is embedded in ethnocultural assumptions of a shared past and homeland: the continuous fight to keep the homeland livable becomes a communal struggle for freedom and national unification. This and many other *Trouw* responses are demonstrative of the entwinement rather than differentiation of civic, ethnic and ethno-cultural aspects in national identity constructions. Similar to the *Trouw* survey, we might expect respondents of the ISSP and online surveys to equally accord considerable importance to civic components of national identity, yet knowing these contemplations are part of a larger complexity.

As outlined above, three "civic" components can be demarcated in the ISSP surveys; a lengthy residence in the Netherlands, having Dutch citizenship and respecting Dutch political institutions and laws. The results are tabulated in table 5.6 for both the 1995 and 2003 data set. Corresponding "civic" markers in the online surveys include residency and having a Dutch passport. For the sake of straightforward analysis, all markers are presented in table 5.7.

Table 5.6 ISSP – “Civic” markers for national identification

% How important to...	Lengthy Residence		Citizenship		Respect pol.inst. -law	
	1995	2003	1995	2003	1995	2003
Very important	21.0	23.1	38.8	50.0	40.0	65.6
Fairly important	38.3	33.1	38.3	31.8	43.2	27.7
Not very important	32.9	33.4	18.4	12.4	12.7	4.8
Not important at all	7.8	10.5	4.5	5.8	4.0	1.9
<i>N</i>	2089	1823	2089	1823	2089	1823

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis

Table 5.7³³ Online surveys – “Civic”, “ethnic”, “ethno-cultural” markers for national identification

Based on which elements would you consider yourself Dutch?	Dutch-Moroccans (N=48)	Dutch-Turks (N= 23)
I speak the Dutch language	42.1	28.6
I live in the Netherlands	41.1	30.2
I was born in the Netherlands	37.4	27.0
I feel Dutch	17.8	14.3
One or both my parents were born in the Netherlands	4.7	0.0
I have a Dutch passport	35.5	25.4

Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net– author’s own analysis

³³ Numbers demonstrate the evenly distributed percentages according to N=46/107 and N=23/63

5.3.2.1 Residency

Residence is considered a national identification marker synonymous with a sense of national commitment that is acquired not ascribed (Kiely et al. 2001; 2005). Therefore, we can treat residence as a “fluid” marker that constitutes claims of *becoming* rather than *being* part of the national polity. For those whose national identity claims might be problematised by “ethnic” components of descent and parentage, residency offers a possible, alternative resource to express national attachment (Rosie and Bond 2006). By examining the degree to which (lengthy) residency is considered an exemplary marker of Dutch national identity, we might reveal a possible deviation between Dutch majority and Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks.

In the ISSP surveys, it appears that to have lived in the Netherlands for most of your life is considered somewhat important for being truly Dutch. In 2003, a small majority of respondents (56 percent) believe a lengthy residence to be of great or fair importance to Dutch national identity. Although figures are slightly higher in the 1995 survey (59 percent), this shift is negligible: it gives indication to believe residence is a somewhat significant marker for Dutch national identification constructions. However, the fact that a considerable percentage of respondents do not account much importance to residency for understanding Dutch national identity (combined 41 and 44 percent in 1995 and 2003 respectively) also gives reason to assume that residency might be too ambiguous a national identity marker compared to other, more substantial markers of birth place or citizenship.

For respondents in the online survey, residence seems to be judged differently. Although survey numbers are very small, living in the Netherlands appears to be one of several markers important to express Dutch identity. We might entertain the assumption that residency, as understood as a symbolic construction of home, it signifies a sense of national commitment and belonging through *‘living* the identity

[without] seldom explicitly or definitively claiming it' (Kiely et al. 2005: 153). This might hint at the reason why "residence" is a marker featured in the online survey outcomes and might bear testimony to the assumption that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks construct and *live* a form of "Dutchness". Living in the Netherlands might indeed be an "approachable" resource that signifies a sense of national belonging which, at the same time, does not forego the subtleties of ethnic and religious identification processes. Whether Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks use residency markers as claims to Dutch belonging because these individuals perceive these claims unlikely to be refuted, needs further enquiry in chapter 7. In chapter 7, I discuss themes of home and belonging in relation to the identification processes of "self" amongst the interviewees where - as we shall see - national belonging *as* residence and land of opportunity seems to have taken shape.

At this stage, we might propose that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks emphasize residency because it offers an "unbiased" claim to "Dutchness" that is less problematic than other identity markers. This would explain why a Dutch majority is relatively less inclined to use residence as a national identity marker: where Dutch national identity is supposedly uncontested, other "thicker" markers might be used to emphasize feelings of being Dutch instead.

5.3.2.2 Citizenship

Arguably, citizenship is the component most characteristic for understanding national membership: once bestowed on the individual citizen, citizenship offers social, political and civil rights as well as duties that signify the official contract between individual and polity (Dwyer 2010: 40). Hence, citizenship is generally explained as the formal, political attachment between individual and the state. Ideally, this state-membership endows its individual members with a set of equal political rights and duties that provide the reinforcement of a united (imagined) community within the polity of the nation-state (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 30,

31). As a political concept so profoundly embedded in modern democratic nation-states, we might entertain the presumption that the importance of citizenship is reflected in the responses of both ISSP and online surveys.

Clearly, respondents in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP survey attest great importance to citizenship as a national identity marker. Remarkably, an increase can be detected between 1995 and 2003 which is most visible in the most “favourable” category: in 2003 half of all respondents find citizenship to be very important for being truly Dutch compared to 39 percent in 1995. This increase is possibly explained as part of an assimilative integration discourse which, as discussed in chapter 4, has put greater emphasis on national identity and the necessity to define the cultural contours of this national belonging. The fact that this discourse dominates public and political debates, might be the reason why a Dutch majority is more inclined to consider the importance of citizenship.

Online survey respondents seem to confirm this “majoritarian” view of Dutch national identity. When Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents were asked to describe *the* Dutch(wo)man, citizenship (‘...who has a Dutch passport’) was chosen most as a key national identity marker (65 and 49 percent respectively). Also as part of *own* contemplations of “Dutchness”, citizenship is a likely marker to choose for respondents of both Moroccan and Turkish background. Although both respondent groups chose citizenship as the fourth most likely option demarcating their own “Dutchness”, the difference with other markers is negligible. The vast majority of respondents in both research groups indicated to (i.e. total number of respondents) hold a Dutch passport³⁴ and therefore this might have been important in determining own concepts of being Dutch.

It is interesting to reflect upon citizenship in light of the heightened, politicized topic on dual nationality exemplified by Wilders who in 2007 suggested that, then junior

³⁴ 97 out of 107 Dutch-Moroccan respondents retained a Dutch passport compared to 56 out of 63 Dutch-Turks

ministers, Ahmed Aboutaleb and Nebahat Albayrak give up their political positions because of allegedly conflicting loyalties in light of their dual (Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respectively) nationality (Vink 2007). The fact that a considerable number of online survey respondents with Moroccan (35 out of 107) and Turkish background (51 out of 63) hold dual nationality, should be understood in light of this political context in which Dutch citizenship might not be as “firm” a marker for “Dutchness”. Matters are further complicated by the fact that Moroccan and Turkish nationality law make demands for renunciation extremely difficult (Oers et al. 2013: 18). Hence, we could entertain the assumption that Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background possibly assume their national allegiance somewhat problematic *in spite of* having Dutch as well as Moroccan/Turkish nationality.

These are concrete issues considering stricter rules on dual nationality retention that are not voiced by populist politicians alone. In a recent study (N=1633) by the Dutch Central Statistics Agency (CBS), researchers found that: ‘over 60 percent in the Dutch over-18 population oppose the concept of dual nationality [...] Voters hold distinct views on the proposition ‘Members of the cabinet should not be allowed to have dual citizenship’: 70 percent agree with the proposition and 18 percent disagree’ (Schmeets en Vink 2011). Nonetheless, we cannot neglect to observe that current Dutch nationality law regulations are fairly accommodating of retaining dual or triple nationalities. Despite the political call for stricter dual nationality regulations, Oers et al. (2013) note that numerous exemptions make it possible for many naturalized individuals (immigrants, refugees, spouses of, and 2nd generation individuals) to retain their current citizenship (2013: 19).

5.3.2.3 Civil adherence and respect for political institutions and law

Compared to 1995, the 2003 ISSP results demonstrate respondents accrediting greater importance to respecting Dutch political institutions and law which is

particularly observable with regards to the remarkable expansion of the “very important” category. Compared to 40 percent in 1995, a considerably larger proportion of respondents in 2003 (66 percent) pertain greater importance to the respect of civil-political structures as a marker emphasizing the contours of Dutch national identity. Overall, an overwhelming 93 percent of the 2003 ISSP respondents consider civil-political considerations to be fairly to very important compared to 83 percent in 1995. The fact that this civic marker scores high in *both* 1995 and 2003 survey possibly attests to its relative “salience” as an important indicator conditional for understanding Dutch national identity. We might thus argue that Dutch majority appreciates a markedly “civic” notion of Dutch national identity.

However, these responses do not necessarily indicate a greater, “inclusionary” civic appreciation of Dutch national membership. The fact that respondents in the 2003 ISSP survey account considerably greater importance to respecting Dutch political and judiciary institutions is possibly reflective of the politically contextual developments in which the “inclusionary” aspect of civil adherence has in fact increasingly emphasized a “culturalist” exclusionary manifestation of Dutch national identity. As outlined in chapter 4, the upsurge of a “New Realism” discourse, as a reaction to failed integration policies and the “threat” and incompatibility of Islam with “western” liberal Dutch values, developed a public and political rhetoric increasingly concerned with heralding freedom of speech and other aspects of liberal-egalitarian tradition as “civic” epitomes of “Dutch” national characterizations.

This has spurred “culturalist” differentiation discourses of a Dutch liberal-democratic “supreme” culture over other “inferior” cultures. In this regard, a “culturalist” Dutch national identity exemplifies the importance of liberal-democratic, “civic” aspects that are nevertheless asserted according to

differentiating “ethno-cultural” dynamics of a Dutch majority supremacy over “others”.

Unfortunately, we are unable to verify whether online survey respondents are equally keen to emphasize civil adherence as an important component of their Dutch identity, because this option was not included in the online surveys. We can nonetheless estimate respondents’ evaluation of civil-political attributions to Dutch society and its democracy specifically. In the online surveys, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks were enquired to comment on their level of “proudness” with regards to “the manner in which Dutch democracy works”.

Table 5.8 Being proud of Dutch democracy

Percentage	Dutch-Moroccans	Dutch-Turks
Very proud	9.3	4.8
Proud	22.4	34.9
Neutral	40.2	38.1
Not very proud	15.0	14.3
Not proud at all	10.3	6.3
I don’t know	2.8	1.6
<i>N</i>	107	63

Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net s – author’s own analysis

Interestingly, respondents of Moroccan descent were fairly “neutral” to this disposition (40 percent); still 22 percent are somewhat but not very proud of its workings. The data is too limited to make conclusions, but it appears this group of respondents is somewhat undecided about the ways in which Dutch civil-political structures operate and are representative of their position in Dutch society. A fair percentage is neutral and the rest is split between being proud and not proud. Amongst respondents with a Turkish background opinions appear slightly more diffuse; where 38 percent are “neutral” to the manner in which Dutch democracy works, a near identical proportion of respondents (35 percent) are somewhat

proud. Overall, it has proven difficult to substantially interpret these online survey results. It appears both Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks feel fairly respectful of Dutch democratic institutions and the manners in which these civil-political structures operate. Subsequently, we might believe that respondents do partly construct their “Dutchness” in accordance with these “civic” democratic frameworks in the assurance they sufficiently represent and acknowledge Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish as individual citizens. In chapter 6 and 7 this theme shines through a bit more which possibly offers us some further understanding on the matter.

Minor variations are detectable between Dutch-Moroccans, Dutch-Turks and Dutch majority concerning the level of importance that is accredited to civil adherence. These responses are possibly explained according to the same contextual reasons. Although the cultural contours of Dutch national identity might outline predominantly “civic” perceptions of national belonging, these dialectics seem indicative of an exclusionary rhetoric of national conformance and “culturalist” assimilation. In this regard, Dutch “civicness” might not necessarily be conducive to creating a sustained sense of national identification. Nevertheless, civic markers are thought to create some space –discursively - to explore individualized notions of “Dutchness”. These observations will be discussed further in chapter 6 as to the “how” of these dialectics of belonging, home and residence.

5.3.3 “Ethnic” markers of national identification

A working definition of ethnicity concerns the socially constructed cultural “distinctiveness” members of different groups endorse based on aspects of shared descent and kinship (Eriksen 1993). As outlined in chapter 2, ethnicity should be understood a regulatory, interactional process between ethnic groups in which aspects of religion, language and traditions operate as supposedly distinct aspects demarcating ethnic groups from each other. It is important to note that, whilst

culture is *perceived* a useful and powerful tool for ethnic differences, it is in no way a concrete *root* for differentiation. In this sense, culture becomes an essentialist, salient object for explaining differences where it is in fact a contextually, multi-layered aspect of identity formation. Nevertheless, the conflation of ethnicity and culture adds to the ambiguity and complexity of identifying the “ethnic” contours of national identification. As such, “culturalist” dialectics, apparent in debates on Dutch national identity, hint at this conflation between Dutch culture and a seemingly homogeneous ethnic Dutch nation.

For the sake of transparency, in this analysis I distinguish between “ethnic” markers that emphasize the role of common descent and ancestral ties, and, “ethnocultural” aspects of religion and language as cultural tools individuals use to describe Dutch national identity. As I have outlined above, the “ethnic” indicators in the ISSP and online survey answer options include those of Dutch ancestry/ancestral ties (‘I have Dutch ancestry’ and ‘One or both of my parents was born in the Netherlands’) as well as place of birth. The ISSP data is represented in table 5.12; for the online survey, I refer to the table 5.10 which specifies results for all markers.

Table 5.9 ISSP “Ethnic” markers for national identification

% How important to...	Ancestry		Place of birth	
	1995	2003	1995	2003
Very important	-	10.4	23.4	23.9
Fairly important	-	12.2	28.7	25.3
Not very important	-	36.1	35.4	32.9
Not important at all	-	41.3	12.5	17.9
<i>N</i>	2089	1823	2089	1823

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis

5.3.3.1 *Ancestral ties*

To begin with, it is interesting to point out that in the *Trouw* survey, not one respondent specifically articulated “ethnic” notions of ancestral ties or common kinship to describe Dutch national identity. To an extent, respondents’ disclosures can be understood as referrals to a homogeneously perceived national entity, yet this supposed national “salience” was never explained in terms of parentage or common descent. This appears to be a very stark observation, yet there is no real evidence to believe that *Trouw* respondents entertain an “ethnic” interpretation of Dutch national identity. Equally, we might find that the Dutch majority in the ISSP surveys do not accord much importance to “ethnic” aspects of common lineage or ancestry.

Unfortunately, the “ancestry” identity marker was included only in the 2003 ISSP survey and therefore it is not possible to make a comparative assessment between the 1995 and 2003 ISSP data. We are thus unable to analyze whether ancestral markers are increasingly or decreasingly represented as part of Dutch individuals’ national identification repertoires. Nevertheless, it is evident from the 2003 ISSP data that the greater part of Dutch majority attributes little importance to Dutch ancestral ties as a sense of being truly Dutch. In fact, a considerable 41 percent of respondents do not consider ancestry at all an important factor representative of Dutch national identity. Ostensibly, it appears Dutch national identity does not operate as an “embedded” identity reinforced by historical ties of parentage or kinship specifically. Hence, it appears that Dutch majority does not employ ancestral ties as a main prerequisite for defining Dutch national identity which renders the possibility that for most Dutch individuals, ethnicity is an uncontested, unproblematic, “normative” identity marker. In this regard, majoritarian outlooks might indeed be observant of the multi-ethnic dimensions of Dutch society and the essentiality to accommodate diversity as part of “civic” rather than “ethnic”

conceptions of national membership. Yet, is this position really exemplary of relatively “open” attitudes and conditions for *becoming* Dutch?

Even though “ethnic” markers of kinship and parentage seem relatively insignificant in the ISSP data, dynamics of ethnic differentiation, first apparent in “pillarized” integration attitudes and policies, do hint at the proximity of ethnicity in social identification processes of “self”. Especially, “pillarized multiculturalism” policies and the “caging” treatment of ethnic minority groups as supposedly homogeneous social entities, have had prolonged “differentiating” effects in later integration policies in which a superior Dutch “ethnic” core is positioned opposite inferior “others”. As discussed in chapter 4, the policy term of *allochtoon* is particularly illustrative of this differentiation rhetoric that stipulates a person’s parentage as an aspect of not (really) being Dutch; to be different has to do with the fact that either one or both your parents were born outside of the Netherlands. In this regard, Essed and Trienekens note that:

The over-emphasis on to be or not to be an *allochtoon* obscures the underlying presupposition that *autochtoon* represents a higher valued category to which one can only belong when the heritage is rooted in Dutch genealogy. *Autochtoon* means being from Holland, whereby Dutchness is a given through genealogy. *Allochtoon* means being in Holland, but (with fore [fathers]) from somewhere else. But the *allochtoon* can acquire (a degree of) Dutchness (2008: 59).

Being Dutch then distinguishes between genealogical (the “real” Dutch) and acquired belonging (the *allochtoon* “other”) in which kinship indeed plays a concealed, exclusionary role differentiating between being and becoming a Dutch national (ibid). Thus, the fact that the majority of ISSP survey respondents do not actively identify ancestral ties as an intrinsic part of being truly Dutch does not omit the point that ethnic differentiation might indeed be existent, albeit with a “culturalist” emphasis – also discussed above - rather than a literal articulation of kinship. This observation is explored further in chapter 6 and 7 where Dutch

interviewees of Moroccan and Turkish background often spoke of being “caged” and categorically excluded according to essentialist notions of cultures *as groups*.

For what it is worth, in the online surveys, few respondents opted to include ancestral ties as part of their own description of “Dutchness” which is understandable as most respondents indicated both parents were born in Turkey or Morocco³⁵. Based on the abovementioned observations, we can entertain the thought that Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish descent are possibly alert to the idea that their Dutch identity is a “genealogically” contested membership. Unlike their Dutch-Dutch peers, we might hypothesize that these individuals are responsive to exclusionary “ethnic” characterization of Dutch national identity. As an example, I use respondents’ answers to the question that asked to describe the most important markers for identifying *the Dutch(wo)man* where multiple answers were possible.

Table 5.10 ‘A Dutch(wo)man is someone who...’

Percentages	Dutch-Moroccans	Dutch-Turks
Has a Dutch passport	64.5	49.2
Speaks the Dutch language	35.5	38.1
Was born in the Netherlands	43.0	34.9
Has parents who were born in the Netherlands	37.4	27.0
Celebrates certain traditions	13.1	27.0
<i>N</i>	107	63

Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net – author’s own analysis

As the data is limited, percentages in table 5.13 cannot give substantial indication that respondents entertain particularly “ethnic” characterizations of a Dutch

³⁵ 88 out of 107 Dutch-Moroccan respondents indicated both parents born in Morocco compared to 58 out of 63 Dutch-Turks.

majoritarian collective. Aspects of parentage appear relatively important – together with other markers – for both Dutch respondents with a Moroccan as well as Turkish background. For the latter group, the percentage is relatively lower compared to the other markers, yet we cannot consider this a firm indication for Dutch-Turks to neglect ancestral ties as an important aspect of a Dutch majority culture.

We might extend these contemplations to both “essentialist” multicultural policies as well as recent assimilative integration discourse in which the importance of the Dutch national identity has been continuously framed according to supposedly incompatible *cultures* rather than *ethnic groups*, even if this “culturalist” rhetoric prolongs ethnic divisions. In this “clash” of cultures, Islam is particularly “scapegoated” where a supposedly ethnic homogenous Muslim community symbolizes a threat to the civilized aspects and values of Dutch culture. These are contemplations which will be analyzed according to the “ethno-cultural” markers of religion and language as well as in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 to follow.

5.3.3.2 *Place of birth*

Place of birth can be considered a “salient” marker in (national) identification processes, in that one does not choose where one is born. In the online surveys it appears to be considered not an extremely vital marker – in itself - to understanding oneself as Dutch. Especially for respondents both in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP surveys, results in table 5.9 appear to demonstrate that place of birth is a marker far more diffuse than solid for understanding Dutch national identity. Thus, Dutch majority seems divided whether a physical, “ethnic” tie to the Dutch nation-state sufficiently embodies notions of being Dutch. Place of birth concerns a territorial interpretation of belonging, yet it also connects to an “imagined”, historical continuation of place and belonging; national community and homeland. Whether the Dutch nation-state (and its national identity) is particularly reflective of this

“ethnic” idea of nationalism that, in line with Smith (1991) and as outlined in chapter 2, connects ethnic “core” nation and state, is a hypothesis that needs further contemplation in chapter 7 where I discuss concepts of home and belonging.

To conclude, results in both ISSP as well as online surveys seem inconclusive whether ethnic markers of Dutch national identity *per se*, accurately reflect a sense of Dutch belonging. Rather, culture *as* ethnicity – i.e. the conflation of these concepts I discussed in chapter 2 – is a symbiosis that seems at the forefront of Dutch assimilative integration discourse. In this regard, cultures are framed as differentiating “essentialist” groups which – unintentionally – link to ethnic “cores” of Dutch versus non-Dutch communities.

5.3.4 “Ethnocultural” markers of national identification

In the introductory part of the previous section I remarked that due to the complex relationship between ethnicity and culture, it was thought necessary to separately explore the “ethnic” and “ethno-cultural” markers of the national “self”. This section is thus concerned with the specific “ethno-cultural” markers of language and religion and their role in Dutch national identification processes. Results from the ISSP surveys are tabulated below; for the online surveys I refer once more to table 5.7.

Table 5.11 ISSP “Ethno-cultural” markers for national identification

% How important to...	Language		Religion	
	1995	2003	1995	2003
Very important	67.4	81.5	3.3	6.3
Fairly important	28.0	16.0	4.0	6.8
Not very important	3.5	2.0	24.0	22.1
Not important at all	1.1	0.6	68.8	64.8
<i>N</i>	2089	1823	2089	1823

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis

5.3.4.1 Language

Peculiarly, in the *Trouw* survey few respondents mentioned Dutch language as part of their contemplations concerning Dutch national identity which gives the preliminary suggestion that language might not be considered an important national identity marker. However, ISSP outcomes indicate language is very much an important marker. Both in 1995 and 2003, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicate language as a fair to very important national identity marker. Most noticeably, is the significant, steep increase in the “very important” category. Whereas in 1995, 67 percent of respondents stipulate language to be of great importance for being truly Dutch, the 2003 survey results illuminate 82 percent of respondents to do so. Respondents in the online survey appear equally preoccupied with Dutch language as a marker for their “Dutchness”. For respondents of Moroccan and Turkish background, language seems one of the most important markers to explain oneself as Dutch. In other words, to have a good command of the Dutch language appears to be seen as imperative to a sense of being Dutch.

How do we explain the interconnection of this assumption between the ISSP and online surveys? Generally, it is understood that language acts as a crucial “regulator” of familiarization and differentiation processes amongst social groups and therefore we would presume it to be considered an equally important factor in national identification patterns (Brubaker 2013). The most obvious explanation for this is the fact that language is easily noticeable and a “visible” identity marker in social interaction that instantly projects assumptions concerning presumed social position and affiliation (ibid).

Yet, this explanation seems somewhat inappropriate with regards to the ISSP results that demonstrate that respondents are increasingly more inclined to attest greater importance to language as a national identity marker in 2003 than in 1995. Possibly, these responses mirror the steadfast crescendo of political and public condemnation of previously accepted “multiculturalist” and integration policies where the issue of language now constitutes a significant part in public and political debate. This focus on language taps into issues of segregation and the worrying development of ‘white/black schools’ which reflects a recurring phenomenon amongst Dutch-Dutch parents who rather not send their children to “multicultural” schools in the fear that their child will develop language deficiencies as a consequence of being surrounded by children who already lag behind in command of Dutch language (Coenders et al. 2004). Commanding the dominant language is a problematic that taps into far-reaching consequences of career development and education, discrimination, isolation and segregation. In other words, language might be understood as both the symbolic epitome of integration failures and the key to assimilative success. These contextual developments give reason to believe that language is now at the forefront of majoritarian contemplations of Dutch national identity and culture.

The rise of the current assimilative drive now stipulates the importance of learning the dominant, native language where previously the preservation of minority

language and culture was preferred. Widespread (gendered) illiteracy and Dutch language deficiencies amongst 1st generation immigrants especially, are considered exemplary of this failed multiculturalist rationale. It might be for these reasons that 2nd generation respondents are equally concerned about having a good command of the Dutch language. The issue of language addresses the socio-economic issues of integration in terms of attending higher education and finding a job.

Yet, most importantly, these individuals - possibly more than their parents or grandparents - are also aware of the fact that having good Dutch language proficiency is an important “discursive” identifier for others to identify you as Dutch. In this sense, Ghorashi and Tilburg (2006) note that although a good command of the Dutch language will definitely help raise the socio-economic position of migrants, language also serves to discursively exclude those who do not speak it perfectly. Thus, for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks language might be perceived as a factor more adamant in that their “Dutchness” might be instantly rejected or contested when (for example) spoken with an ‘accent’. This perception is possibly exacerbated by the fact that, due to their upbringing, 2nd generation individuals often have a good command of their parents’ native language (Crul et al. 2012), which might be viewed as reflective of continued integration failures and national “disloyalty”.

Surprisingly, language was not a much discussed topic in the interviews and therefore this particular component is not explored further in the chapters to follow. Nevertheless, the survey results offer us an important observation to keep in mind: that Dutch language appears indeed an important marker for “Dutchness”.

5.3.4.2 Religion

In the Trouw survey, religion was hardly considered an important component of Dutch national identity. This is significant, especially because the survey was

conducted by a newspaper who claims to represent mainly mainstream Christian believers. When mentioned in the survey, religion was mostly put in historical contexts to serve contemporary explanations concerning religious diversity. For example, M.E. Kannegieter from Maassluis argues:

'...The Dutch can be proud of their victory in the religious wars of 1648. Naturally, Islam deserves the opportunity to develop itself as a civilized religion...'

The statement is interesting. The respondent refers to the historical victory over religious domination while at the same time underlining the contemporary 'stance' on religion in Dutch society. Basically, Islam "deserves" to express itself freely, yet only under the "civilized" banner of the liberal, democratic values that have been established in the Netherlands. The respondent further states:

'...with this a public distance has to be taken from the Sharia (Islamic law), homo hatred, the stoning of women, adultery and thereafter, the separation between church and state and advance towards 'non-believers' has to be promoted.'

This excerpt builds upon the "culturalist" attitude I discussed: Islam can be accommodated into the civil-political, democratic framework of the Dutch nation-state and culture, but it comes at a price of civic conformance and "subordination". In this instance, the tension is detectable between a Dutch national identity heralded as an inclusive "civic" epitome of democratic freedoms, values and rights, and, the extent to which this inclusiveness can be extended to the incorporation of multicultural and religious diversity. It thus exposes to what extent religion is characteristic of Dutch national identity. If Dutch national identity is predominantly thought of as "neutral" and secular, the question remains to what degree religion can be accommodated as part of this sense of national belonging.

Evidently, the 1995 and 2003 ISSP results demonstrate that (Christian) religion is indeed an insignificant factor in national identification processes. In 1995, 93 percent of Dutch respondents did not account much or no importance at all to religion as an identity marker for being truly Dutch; in 2003 these numbers have slightly dropped to 87 percent of respondents who do not accord much importance to religion. Hence, there is not much indication to believe that the Dutch think of themselves as specifically Christian opposite an Islamic “other”. Religion is an interesting identity marker as it is relatively insignificant in national identification patterns of Dutch majority, yet possibly more problematic for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks whose Muslim identity is a significant component of self-identification processes – as will be discussed in chapter 6. To what degree can religious and national belonging adjoin if we consider that the cultural contours of Dutch national identity are thought as predominantly secular? In this regard, religion might be a problematic factor for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically as their contemplations of “self” expose, on the one hand, a Dutch national identity as a civic, inclusive platform for belonging, yet on the other, as a sense of national belonging that is possibly obstructive to the incorporation of religious affiliations and Islam in particular. This dilemma is discussed extensively in the following chapter 6.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has served as a preliminary discussion of national identification processes of Dutch majority, and, Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background, according to the quantitative survey data obtained in the online and ISSP surveys. I have discussed the different –civic and ethnic - identity markers important to contemplations of national belonging and in which ways these identification patterns differ and align a majority and minority view of Dutch national identity and culture. In this regard, two specific observations can be made.

This chapter has been contextual in detecting certain assumptions and queries which need to be expanded upon in chapters 6 and 7. These outstanding assumptions can be summed up as follows.

For one, civic– residence, citizenship and civil adherence – characterizations of Dutch national identity appear to dominate national identification processes amongst a Dutch majority as well as Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. However, this “civicness” is not necessarily exemplary of profound inclusiveness and acceptance. The fact that respondents in the ISSP surveys progressively emphasize citizenship and civil adherence as two important civic markers of Dutch culture might be best understood in connection to an assimilative integration discourse that stipulates “culturalist” conformity according to a civically framed Dutch culture that underscores “ethnically” exclusionist dialectics. These dialectics possibly affect self-identification processes of Dutch individuals with Moroccan and Turkish background which needs further discussion in chapter 6. In this regard, the marker of residence – as a possibly inclusive marker for “Dutchness” - with reference to a place of belonging and national identification, is to be explored further.

A second observation involves ethnic - place of birth and ancestral ties - characterizations of Dutch national identity. Although the importance of these markers appears to be rather ambiguous for both ISSP and online survey respondents, ethnic categorizations of Dutch versus non-Dutch seem to underscore “culturalist” dialectics I just spoke of.

Thirdly, with regards to the research groups specific to this PhD thesis, the online survey appears to demonstrate one particular substantial finding which is that the majority of Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish descent do not identify with Dutch identity at all. This assumes that national belonging is problematic in identification patterns of these particular groups. This is a troubling conclusion,

because in terms of civic– having a Dutch passport, having residence in the Netherlands – as well as ethnic markers – place of birth – these individuals are Dutch nationals whose home is the Netherlands. At the same time, there is indication to believe that individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background negotiate feelings of being Muslim, Turkish/Moroccan as well as Dutch. These identification patterns of negotiation demonstrate that respondents are claiming a form of “Dutchness” that is inclusive of and susceptible to their Muslim and/or Turkish/Moroccan background, yet which also feeds a sense of national identification.

That this negotiated process of identification is troublesome, is evident in the online survey results where respondents of Moroccan background, relatively more so than their Turkish peers, demonstrate stronger self-identification processes of being Muslim, whilst respondents of Turkish heritage appear more inclined to identify with their Turkish identity. These identity proliferations *at the cost* of national belonging are possibly explained in conjunction with a harrowing political and societal climate that – as discussed in chapter 4 – prophesies “culturalist” conformity and thereby discursively excludes the ethno-cultural “other”. Especially, in light of the stigmatization of Islam, respondents are possibly more inclined to align with the Muslim “ingroup” rather than to be faced with “outgroup” exclusion.

In the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 I discuss the “how” of these identification constructions and the ways in which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees describe a sense of “self”. How do Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks combine a sense of “Dutchness” with feelings of being Muslim and/or Turkish/Moroccan and in which ways are these identity constructions problematic? These contemplations are investigated in chapter 6 –with regards to Muslim identity - and 7 – in terms of belonging, home and heritage – that will inform us further of the *ascribed* labels that categorically exclude as well as the *chosen* markers with which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to a sense of

“Dutchness”. In connection to these contemplations, the slight comparative divergence between Dutch-Moroccans - who seem to proliferate a Muslim identity - and Dutch-Turks – who appeal more closely to a sense of “Turkishness” - is also discussed further in the qualitative chapters to follow.

CHAPTER 6 -TO BE A MUSLIM IN THE NETHERLANDS

6.1 Introduction

In the online survey and elsewhere, there is strong indication that Muslim identity is an important identity marker amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Crul and Heering 2008; Phalet et al. 2000; Phalet and ter Wal 2004). In chapter 5, I proposed that a greater proliferation of Muslim identity – a process slightly more visible amongst Dutch-Moroccans than Dutch-Turks – is possibly explained with regards to a political and societal attitude that is perceived increasingly stigmatizing Islam and Muslim communities specifically. This query is central to this chapter where the assumption is that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are not only aware of heightened anti-Islamic (inter)national dynamics but also affected by them in ways that these individuals are now increasingly preoccupied with the importance of Muslim identity in self-identification processes. In this chapter, the interview data is central to the exploration of these symbiotic connections between heightened awareness and the proliferation of Muslim identity.

Furthermore, this chapter investigates “how” this proliferation of a Muslim “self” is accommodated as part of Dutch society and to what extent feelings of being Muslim and Dutch align or diverge. The presumption is - as discussed in chapter 5 – that these negotiating processes of national and religious self-identification are problematic due to two factors. For one, ISSP results show that religion is an insignificant identity marker in majoritarian views of national belonging. This is further sustained by a “culturalist” dialectic – discussed in chapter 4 and 5 – apparent in societal and political debate that increasingly positions a superior, civic, *secular* Dutch culture opposite an uncivilized, inferior Islamic “other”. In this regard, Islam is posited as a homogeneous culture representative of all Muslim individuals alike and this bears reference to a second problematic factor, i.e. previous “pillarized” multiculturalist policies and the “embedded” perception of categorical

difference. The fact that interviewees often spoke of the categorization of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish *individuals* who are thought to *collectively* align with a “stigmatized” Islam, seems to affirm this assumption.

In other words, are Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks increasingly identifying with a Muslim identity which, in the absence of having an “accepted” national identity, might serve as an identity “tool” to evade discrimination and stigmatization? And if so, what does this suggest about decades long multiculturalist and integration policies? These are contemplations up for analysis.

The chapter is two-fold. Firstly, in section 6.2 (and in conjunction with chapter 4) I outline the awareness Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees have regarding an (inter)national context highly critical and stigmatic of Islam. In this sense, interviewees discussed issues of “essentialist” categorizations and the political rise of Wilders as aspects particularly illustrative of this political and societal context. In part two (section 6.3), I discuss the connection between a political and societal climate highly critical of Islam, and, the proliferation of Muslim identity in self-identification processes of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. Subsequently, how and whether Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks accommodate their Muslim “self” *as part of* national belonging is discussed further which at the same time, furthers our understanding of the obtrusive and/or inclusive cultural dimensions of Dutch national identity.

6.2 ANTI-ISLAM DISCOURSE IN (INTER) NATIONAL CONTEXTS

Following the murders of right wing Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and cineaste Theo van Gogh – both allegedly killed because of their critical stance towards Islam – an increasingly critical attitude towards Islam is now apparent both in Dutch public and political discourse (Scheffer 2007; Buijs 2009). Chapter 4 described how attitudes

towards Islam have changed gradually but considerably. In the 1990s, Bolkestein was met with a storm of protest when he warned that the incompatibility of Islam and democratic values would ultimately limit integration efforts. In 2010 Wilders' PVV became the third biggest party with an election program that propagated the closing of all Islamic schools, a headscarf tax and a proposed ban to build more mosques (PVV Electoral program 2010). As discussed in chapter 4, we should understand anti-Islamic tendencies in the Netherlands against the backdrop of an international décor where Islam has also been increasingly criticized. Atrocities such as 9/11, the Madrid and London public transport bombings, but also earlier conflicts such as the "Rushdie affair", all have contributed to a gradually more critical, pervasive, continuous, negative spotlight shone on Islam and Muslim communities today (Bleich 2009; Sniderman et al. 2003). In short, it is almost superfluous to say that Islam is currently a "hot topic" dominating political agendas, immigration policies, media and civil society both in- and outside the Netherlands. We might therefore assume that these anti-Islamic sentiments - noticeable in public, populist and political discourse - did not go unnoticed in the interviews with my key informants and Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants.

In the first stages of my fieldwork where I conducted interviews with the representatives of the three organizations, it was ascertained that heightened political and public critiques on Islam were a worrying development at the forefront of the organizations' agendas. In the interview with Mr. Altuntas, who amongst other positions fulfils the chairman post of the Turkish Milli Görüş organisation, the urgency was illuminated of an (inter)national situation where religion is increasingly highlighted as a differentiating factor. As part of this dynamic, Mr. Altuntas notes that an enemy in the form of Islam is currently created. In light of the Minaret ban referendum in Switzerland in 2009, Mr. Altuntas argues:

I think, the world order needed a new enemy and then Islam was chosen. And that worries me. [...] Minaret ban. It doesn't have a functional value anymore, hey, we know that as well. It has more of a symbolic value. I find it difficult to stomach that you have a mosque without

a dome, without a minaret. At the same time, I find it difficult to stomach that you have a church without a tower and bells. That is part of a church: that is what makes a church a church. Leave religions in peace, leave Judaism in peace, leave Christianity in peace, leave Islam in peace. We have certain common binding elements, but why is there ever that emphasis on religion, and specifically Islam? Because, we are going out of our minds here. One does need to keep an eye on that.

Clearly, Mr. Altuntas recognizes the ongoing Islam-critical discourse apparent in the Netherlands and abroad. As he emphasizes the ‘binding elements’ that unite rather than differentiate religions from each other, he is particularly concerned about the public and political focus on Islam as an “incompatible” factor in societal life. It demonstrates – as discussed in chapter 4 – an anti-Islamic “culturalist” discourse that hones in on societal differences as if they were religious divisions *per se*, and thereby enhancing exclusionary dialectics that presuppose essentialist divisions between Muslims versus non-Muslims.

It is safe to say that in the interviews with Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants, all narratives conveyed the omnipresent awareness of a societal and political climate highly critical of Islam and Muslim communities. As part of an (inter)national political décor where radical right populism has gained ground, Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) has been particularly keen to propagate and crystallize the “threat” of Islam as part of a debate that explicates religion as the root of all conflict and differentiation. As such, references to Wilders’ PVV and its political success particularly highlight the perceptions Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees have concerning an increasingly anti-Islamic discourse. In this sense, most interviewees reflected extensively upon Wilders’ political appearance and popularity as part of wider anti-Islamic manifestations in political and public debates. Although most interviewees did not underestimate the polarizing effects of Wilders’ political popularity, opinions were divided: some portrayed him as a “clown”; others were seriously concerned as to his political advance.

Especially, where some interviewees made comparative references between Hitler and the extermination of Dutch Jews in World War II on the one hand, and Wilders' populist anti-Islamic rhetoric on the other, can we fathom the "acuteness" of an exclusionary discourse that proffers religion at the heart of differentiation between individuals and groups alike. For example, Nergis jokingly makes the following comment, yet she is nevertheless concerned how Wilders' rhetoric resembles Hitler's rise:

once upon a time Hitler also started, hey, he also became a dangerous guy, so there's lots of things that still can happen and the weather can turn like that. And before you know it, you are really deported out of the country, or whatever. Who knows, hey? Or, you will have to wear a half moon on your clothes. So, yes, who knows? [laughs]

Nergis is ironic as to the extent to which Wilders' political influence and popularity might reach, yet her comment nevertheless signifies the disconcerting appeal his rhetoric might have amongst a considerable part of the Dutch electorate. The fact that the PVV won 24 seats in the 2010 national elections seems to affirm this notion.

Although the popularity for Wilders' PVV can be trivialized based on it being a "one man show" – Wilders is the only member of his party – his populist views have nevertheless struck a chord with a substantial part of Dutch majority. This is the worry expressed amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks: the stigmatizing polemic Wilders enforces on Islam and his continuous insult and taunting of the Muslim community, appears to be accepted and tolerated by a larger part of a non-Muslim, white, Dutch population. Islam seems the legitimate "scapegoat" carried by a majority that in its turn resembles Hitler's stigmatization (and extermination) of Jews in pre-war Germany. In this regard, Sevde is concerned that Wilders' political views are not only carried by a considerable part of the Dutch electorate, but also resonate amongst some of the established political parties. Thus, interviewees feel there seems to be widespread political and societal toleration for Wilders and his

anti-Islamic rhetoric. Sevde points out the danger of this development where if everybody were to vote for Wilders, 'you would get some sort of Hitler'. Resentment permeates her story:

because, the Hitler situation also did happen right? So people blindly followed someone for their emotion and they thought it was all to do with race. Well, because of that, that cost lives and that is possible now if you do not take notice.

ED: and the existing parties in the Netherlands, do you have faith in them? That they would shove him to one side?

Sevde: Well, lately, so we were going, well, that what I said. So you constantly create that the PVV is on telly, that he simply says things and then he says 8 negative things and 2 positive things. And then the other party says, 'yes, we can support that.

ED: That is dangerous.

Sevde: Well yes, so that is that danger. That's why that is....do you have faith in those other parties. It is something mass-like. It can go wrong very badly. It is a mass happening. If everyone follows the mass without thinking about it. So then really anything can happen.

However, it is important to understand that these sentiments signify Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees' *perceptions* regarding a Dutch society that is increasingly unfavourable towards Islam, and are not necessarily reflective of the actual societal and political situation in the Netherlands today. Having said that, surveys results from a longitudinal study indicate that Dutch citizens have a more negative attitude towards Islam in 2006 compared to 1995 (Jaspers et al. 2009).

In this study there seemed a pervasiveness to which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees were aware of the stigmatization of Islam. As set out in chapter 5, we could argue that these perceptions of anti-Islamic sentiment and discrimination might affect these individuals' social attitudes and self-identification patterns. The question thus remains to what an extent this has affected images of "self" and identification? This is a theme threaded throughout the entire chapter which is best understood as part of wider discussions on the role of religion in Dutch

national identification; the effects of previous “pillarizing” multiculturalist policies; and generational differences between individual and community. All these factors emphasize and explain further the dialectics between perceptions of widespread anti-Islamic tendencies and self-identification processes of being Muslim and Dutch in the Netherlands today. Ultimately, these dynamics highlight in what shape or form multiculturalism can, should or is to be a role in furthering the acknowledgment and integration of cultural diversity, unproblematically, alongside national identification patterns. This is further explored in section 6.3.

6.2.1 ‘Islam is no boring uniformity’: categorizations of being Muslim

In light of the continuous, negative portrayal of Islam expressed publicly as well as politically, interviewees frequently noted that the stigmatization of Islam often took the form of stereotyping Islam as a “radicalized”, bad, backward all-in-one culture and community. As such, participants often felt categorized as individuals supposedly representative of an “essentialist” community of Muslims. Aygul exemplifies this tendency by explaining how people portray her as a “bad” Muslim.

...or always have to give decent feedback and explain that if you are a Muslim that does not mean you really slaughter a sheep on the balcony with Ramadan. Or, that you are not happy that they have blown up the Twin Towers. Or, that you are also upset about the fact that Theo van Gogh was murdered. And then I think, yes but I simply am just a human being, of course that upsets me...why wouldn't I be upset, because it was done by a Muslim?

In earlier parts of the conversation Aygul claims she is not a devoted, practising Muslim and therefore feels frustrated to be categorized and held responsible for the actions of radicalized Muslim others. She feels there is a societal perception that explains Islam as a violent and extremist religion which feeds the assumption that *the Muslim* is the “other”, but more importantly the “bad one”. Fundamentally, these social categorizations are confrontations implicating individual identification processes, as I have discussed in chapter 2. Because Aygul feels she has to explain herself *as a Muslim*, it affects her sense of individuality as a human being: she is

more than just a Muslim. These dialectics are discussed further in section 6.3, yet categorizations exemplify the exclusionary boundaries of national belonging where there is little space for individual negotiations of being Muslim as part of Dutch society.

The link between categorization, stigmatization and self-identification processes is evident in Nergis' account where she elaborates on the confrontations that occurred between participants in a public debate she attended. Negative attention towards Islam felt as a personal critique where a certain lady in the audience was particularly critical of the Muslim community and regarded 'all Muslims to be imbeciles and idiots'. Being struck by the harsh comment, Nergis felt that this 'paranoia' directed towards Muslims *collectively* addressed her *personally* as a moderate Muslim. Especially in Rotterdam, where 1 in 3 *Rotterdamers* has an ethnic minority background (Phalet et al. 2000: 99), Nergis' comment gives us an insight of the heated, distraught debates that are held amongst inhabitants of a multicultural, industrial city.

Nergis: I have one time, yes not especially really personally, I think, was more directed against the whole Muslim community probably. In the past I did an internship with a foundation in Rotterdam and they very often organised political debates. Yes, there was this old lady and she was talking with a Moroccan-looking girl and so it appeared, that girl was half-Dutch, half-Moroccan literally, and so they were talking in a completely heated fashion. [...]

But they were not simply having a conversation, they had a really very strong discussion and that old lady really was like 'yes I think that all Muslims are imbeciles and idiots' and there was a girl with a headscarf walking by and 'yes that is simply an imbecile' and that girl tried to explain 'yes but, what should I do then, I have a Dutch mother and a Moroccan father, what should I then..?'

ED: 'what should I do with myself?'

Nergis: Yes. And yes, that lady [was] totally like, 'yes I don't trust any of you and if I turn my back you will stab, just stab me in the back'. She was just completely paranoid. Like really...I didn't expect, but that affected me, I was really bothered for three, four days, I think.

ED: Really?

Nergis: *That I thought, jeez, someone who doesn't know me and hates me so.*

The prejudices and mistrust the old lady utters against “all Muslims”, affects Nergis personally. The symbiosis between social and individual identification processes is illuminated where Nergis’ individual sense of being Muslim is affronted by the insults that are directed at the “imagined” community of Muslims *collectively*. Gross categorizations concerning the Muslim collective she associates herself with, have an impact on Nergis’ personal understanding of Muslim identity. Her story also demonstrates how stereotypical judgements are passed on Islam with the presumption that it signifies a cohesive “static” social group rather than a collective of individuals who emphasize Muslim identity each on their own terms.

That these “labelling” processes are a particular dilemma for Muslim individuals has been picked up by one of my key informants’ organization: the Collaboration of Moroccan Dutch (*Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders* or SMN). In light of the (inter)national scrutiny of Islam and Muslim communities, the organization published and distributed their booklet ‘the Islam Compass’ (2007) in order for Muslims from all walks of life to tackle stereotypes in society. In the introduction of the Islam Compass the message is clearly stated:

the Muslim community is no boring uniformity. It is formed by people who are inspired by Islamic traditions, but who experience and develop that in their own way, each in their own life (in that exists its diversity). This unity in diversity is the salt in the porridge of the *ummah* – it signifies her cultural riches and is the engine to her development. The members of the *ummah* are all Muslims, but they are not Islam itself. Nobody has the right to monopolize Islam (2007: 9).

This example illuminates the tension that exists between a societal perception that perpetually categorizes Muslims as part of *the* Muslim community, and, the individualistic interpretation of Islam as emphasized by organizations like the SMN who represent parts of *a* Muslim community. Hence, there is a call for

understanding Muslim identity as a diverse, complex and negotiated part of individual “self”.

6.2.1.1 “Pillarized” Islam?

These categorization dynamics where Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees experience they are continuously associated with *the* Muslim community possibly hints at the surviving effects of earlier multiculturalist policies, embedded in the *verzuiling* (pillarization) tradition (Koopmans 2003). In chapter 4 I have argued that as part of the Dutch approach to multiculturalism, i.e. “pillarized multiculturalism”, Dutch 1980s integration policies focused on the emancipation of culturally diverse *groups* rather than individuals as part of those groups. In this regard, the representation of multicultural diversity focused on the categorical containment of ethnic communities into pillars: its vertical and elitist structure supposedly represented every individual deemed part of that community. In other words, bonding with the own group instead of bridging into Dutch society was key (Scholten and Holzacker 2009: 88; Putnam 2000). Koopmans (2003) believes “pillarized multiculturalist” intensions are still at the heart of integrationist thinking in the Netherlands where ethnicity remains a key factor for government to promote and financially support ethnic organizations, language classes, media broadcasting and schools. However, in light of the recent and continuous focus on Islam, we can entertain the notion whether prolonged “pillarized” thinking is now increasingly framed in religious rather than ethnic differences, between notions of Muslim versus non-Muslim communities.

Factually, the Dutch juridical system today still appears to offer numerous opportunities to financially aid and sponsor both religious and humanistic organizations (Sunier 2000). As remnants of early pillarization and “pillarized multiculturalism”, the Dutch state actively sponsors the foundation of many Islamic organizations and schools with the intention to emancipate those who feel

represented by these institutions. Interestingly, Sunier points out that this institutionalization of Islam has mainly spread as part of a 'religious infrastructure' rather than a political or socio-economic platform (2000: 54). Although umbrella structures do coordinate gatherings between member organizations, there hardly appears a link with governmental bodies or regional councils, *gemeentes* (2000: 54, 55). Therefore, Sunier concludes that the institutionalization of Islam cannot be linked to earlier pillarization processes as such: its vertical structure does not intend to inhabit and coordinate all spaces of work and social life. Hence, the official stratification of Islam seems not entirely pervasive as a representative of the Muslim community at large.

Nevertheless, Sunier's research does hint at two possible dispositions with regards to the institutionalization of Islam. First of all, the Islamic infrastructure is layered across numerous organizations, schools and foundations which provokes the categorization of Muslim groups *as if they were* ethnically homogeneous communities. Where Islam presents itself as part of a cohesive collaborative structure to "outside" society, it runs the risk of appearing without internal religious, cultural and ethnic differentiation. At the same time and secondly, because the institutionalization of Islam is so dispersed, it only offers a limited amount of representative value for Muslim individuals. In a publication by FORUM³⁶ (2010), it was established that the CMO, the umbrella organisation that is the official governmental negotiating partner currently represents five Turkish, one national, one regional Moroccan and one Surinam umbrella constructions who in their turn represent a diversity of mosques. Apart from this main structure, there are collaborations with women and youth groups who in their turn represent ethnically different Muslim groups. Thus, there appears an embedded, "pillarized" infrastructure that furthers a sense of Islamic homogeneity, yet in actuality this institutionalization of Islam is scattered across the board. The Muslim community is

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anything but one unified community: it is ethnically and dogmatically divided, represented by diverse mosques and organizations.

Alternatively, categorizations of the Muslim community can be understood as a “discursive” ‘habitus of pillarization’ where it concerns the incorporation of new migrants into Dutch society (Ghorashi 2009: 83). Ghorashi notes that a paradoxical situation has developed, where

the increase of anti-religious sentiments in the Netherlands as the result of de-pillarization on the one hand, [...] on the other hand [contradicts] the implicit continuation of religiously based structures in different fields within the country next to the growing presence of Islam (2009: 83).

However, these tendencies are no paradox: their combination has reinforced a normative perception of an essentialist, Islamic “other” that, as a continuation of this habitus of pillarization, is sustained through the discursive establishment of an Islamic pillar. Therefore, it is possible that as a consequence of “pillarized” multiculturalist legacies, individuals continue being “caged”, however this time, according to an Islamic rather than ethnic pillar. Whether an Islamic pillar is desirable as a means to further emancipation and integration is therefore debatable.

A prevalent, societal perception that reinforces the existence of an Islamic pillar supposedly unified, static and representative of the Muslim community at large, possibly explains why interviewees often felt categorized according to a societal judgment of “all Muslims are the same”. For example, Mourad talks about a speech Femke Halsema, the former party leader of Groenlinks [Green Left] gave when visiting his university. Using this anecdote he tries to illuminate the societal categorization of Muslim individuals as if they were part of one “rigid” Muslim community.

And a man was sitting in the audience, he was totally frustrated and he asked the question, eh, 'what do you actually think about the fact that the Muslim community has actually not uttered any sound to condemn the attacks [9/11, ed.] and all of that?' That's what he asked Femke Halsema. And what she said was really very beautiful, like 'what are you talking about? They are all individuals, yes, there is nobody who needs to speak for them, you have to see them as individuals. Would I ask you for apologies about everything the Pope says or does?' Something like that. But yes, I thought that was a very beautiful answer.

Interestingly, in her attempt to condemn the categorization of Muslims as one community, Femke Halsema actually uses the very same religious connotations to not only position Turkish and Moroccan Muslims opposite Dutch Christians, yet also to categorize all Christians as Catholics who confide in the Pope as their spiritual leader. Apparently, discourse on "who is who" in the Dutch nation-state, has indeed transformed along all political divisions. Religion, i.e. Muslim or non-Muslim, is a key denominator that serves the role of understanding difference in Dutch society - even when it concerns a left wing party.

6.2.2 The "incompatibility" of Islam in Dutch society

It is plausible to assume that, as a continuation of "pillarized" categorization processes, "difference" continues to be explained as "embedded" in group identities that are supposedly homogeneous and representative of communities at large. In this respect, discursive dialectics of exclusion and inclusion specifically involve "essentialist", religious differentiations between Muslims and non-Muslims which can also be understood as part of a "culturalist" discourse, outlined in chapter 4. With the recent focus on assimilative integration, the categorical "othering" of Islam is best explained as a process consequential of conformity demands that are fundamentally concerned with the symbolic adherence and loyalty to Dutch culture and value system. In this regard, a "culturalist" discourse posits Dutch culture as a supreme, civil culture "under threat" of an inferior, backward Islam *as culture*. Especially where Islam is increasingly associated as an

illiberal force, do general distrust and prejudices fuel the question whether Islam (and hence, being Muslim) is at all compatible with a sense of being Dutch.

Some interviewees felt this discourse was constantly infused by the media and a general distrust of the media prevailed: the perception was that only one part of the story was generally highlighted, i.e. that of a western, autochthonous majority. Hektor goes so far as to say that there is a certain 'censorship' on voices who might state a non-western point of view. He states that *'what I hear on telly is far from the truth'*. Similarly, Rachid feels that the media mainly reports on problems rather than success stories: *'they are selective'*. In any case, he claims not to read any Dutch newspapers or watch television, because *'the way I see society, they [media] do not'*.

Similar outcomes are found in other studies where media perception and reporting was monitored. In an extensive report on cultural diversity and the mass media in EU member states, Ter Wal examines the extent of literature published in the Netherlands concerning ethnic minorities and the media, between 1995 and 2000 (Ter Wal 2002: EUMC). In her overview, Ter Wal notes that Islam and Muslims, in particular, are constant targets of negative stereotyping. In her review of newspaper articles published between 1992 and 1994, strong anti-Islamic tendencies are apparent that – amongst other things – enforce:

- the stigmatisation and problematisation of Muslims. Islam is systematically associated with images of violence, blood, and undesirable behaviour;
- The tendency to generalise incidents to Islam and Muslims as a category, e.g. by blurring the distinction between religion and nationality;
- The demonisation of the Islamic religion. Religious traditions are ridiculed. Political or social problems are explained in terms of the Islamic religion;
- The collectivisation and depersonalisation of Muslims whose individuality is denied;
- The construction of a distorted image of Islam and Muslims e.g. by making false comparisons, such as the Western ideal versus the Muslim reality or the European present versus the Muslim past (Ter Wal 2002: 292)

Although these are conclusions based on articles written a few years back, it nevertheless demonstrates the gradual stigmatization of Islam that, as the start of this PhD in 2008, seemed still very present according to similar aspects reviewed by Ter Wal.

However, this issue of incompatibility, between Islamic values and Dutch culture, is not merely a concern voiced by politicians or the media. In a survey amongst Dutch-Dutch adolescents, Gonzalez et al. (2008) found that Islam posed a symbolic rather than realistic threat and as such, prejudices against Islam predominantly contained perceived differences in beliefs, morals and values. Another nationwide survey study also gives indication of a prevailing, societal perception that considers Islam and western values as conflicting (Gijsberts 2005: 116). Surprisingly, half of all autochthonous as well as half of all Turkish and Moroccan survey respondents considered western and Muslim life styles, values and principles as incompatible and colliding. In this sense, a segregated outlook dominates both autochthonous and Muslim individuals which implies the difficulty for negotiating a Muslim identity with being Dutch which will be further contemplated in section 6.3.

Particularly illustrative for the portrayal of Islam as “non-incorporable” with western values, is the political debate – ongoing in both the Netherlands and abroad - surrounding the banning of Islamic dress and headscarves in public buildings (Lettinga 2009). The headscarf is now the symbolic epitome for an Islam that proposes inequality between men and women (Kyriakides et al. 2009: 303). Supposedly, it signifies Muslim women are tied to the demands of their male partners and/or family members and in the worst case, suffer domestic violence.

In the Netherlands, Ayaan Hirshi Ali and other politicians have been keen to draw out the issue of headscarves alongside excesses they portray as being fundamental to Islamic tradition, such as honour killings, female genital mutilation and forced/arranged marriages. In a study amongst Dutch female converts, van

Nieuwkerk (2004) demonstrates how these issues of gender and sexuality are used in defining Muslims the Muslim “other” (2004: 233). In September 2009, at the parliamentary general debate Wilders put in a proposal to sell ‘licenses’ to women wearing headscarves in order to ‘clean up our streets’ (*Trouw* 16 September 2009). In what he termed a ‘head rags tax’, female Muslims would be required to pay a 1000 Euros license fee for wearing a head scarf in public. These debates are not simply about exposing these practices as products of previous multiculturalist policies that have been too lenient and evasive. Rather, it is the considered threat these “backward” practices pose to the democratic foundations of liberal societies that uphold principles of human rights, equality and freedom. Headscarves and the existing misconceptions concerning female Muslims wearing the headscarf are evident in the following narration by Nergis.

Nergis: ...generally people do not dare to [ask]. We notice this now with the project of my husband, I mean, the people who we work with, at a certain point you of course have a certain relationship and then you can talk more freely with each other and then you notice that there are a lot of questions that people do not dare to ask. They are simply scared or something. Maybe they find it annoying to be regarded dumb or something.

ED: And what kind of questions are then asked...?

Nergis: [...] there are girls with a headscarf who work there and simply really like [get questions of] ‘yes, do you take it off when you have a shower at home?’ and things like that hey. That kind of questions.

[both laugh]

ED: ‘I never wash my hair, no’.

Nergis: Yes all kinds of, I think. ‘Yes, do you have to wear it because of your husband?’ and god knows what else. All kinds. But yes, they [veiled girls] don’t mind, because they are kind of like ‘rather questions than prejudices’.

Nergis’ account is not only exemplary of debates about the headscarf: fundamentally, it concerns contemplations regarding the cultural dimensions of Dutch national identity and how incorporative it is towards multicultural diversity.

In other words, it symbolizes the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism which, as I discussed in chapter 2, is an important query at the heart of this thesis. What appears from Nergis' narration is that, if the headscarf is symbolic of cultural "clashes" between Dutch (western) and Islamic cultures, it is not a black and white story. Rather, it is the negotiation (and struggle) and not differentiation with which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish girls contemplate a sense of being Muslim *as part of* Dutch society. From their contemplations arises an "individualized" Dutch Muslim identity with which female Muslims not only discuss but also develop and demand awareness, understanding and acceptance regarding the wearing of headscarves in a Dutch context. This is a difficult process, especially in light of societal tensions that question the compatibility of Islam in a context where an inherently and exclusively "civic" Dutch culture enjoys the moral high ground (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013).

These are self-identification processes discussed further in section 6.3. Whether an exacerbated political and societal 'devaluation' of Islam in both national and international contexts, has increasingly affected a sense of Muslim identity amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals, is to be examined further. How is a sense of self affected where both social alignment with a particular group and the particular social group itself are stigmatized? Is there an inclination to align further with a social identity that is negatively categorized by others? I will turn to this now.

6.3 AFFECTED NOTIONS OF BEING MUSLIM: AWARENESS, 'PURE' AND "INDIVIDUALIZED" ISLAM

The hypothesis at hand is to examine whether combined effects of gross categorizations and the demonization of Islam have made Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks more susceptible to a sense of being Muslim in light of associations with a "devalued" Muslim identity that are ascribed rather than chosen.

In chapter 2 I have discussed that the individual “self” is mainly developed through belonging and alignment with particular social groups. In this regard, similarity and difference are common factors consequential of social exchanges between individuals who align with one group but not the other. Yet, when “difference” becomes ‘a stigma, an undesired differentness...’ (Goffman 1963: 15), individuals might feel an outsider where their alliance to a group is devalued (Becker 1973: 1-19). According to Goffman, this stigma, assigned to a particular individual, might become a tool ‘to employ categorizations that do not fit, and we and he [the other, ed.] are likely to experience uneasiness’ (1963: 31). Thus, the categorization of individuals might be based on incorrect and rigid labels, whether they are cultural, racial or religious in content. Where categorizations occur, the individual might feel involuntarily labelled and “caught in the middle” between groups. In this scenario, the hypothesis is that the individual will align further with the “stigmatized” social ‘ingroup’ than assimilate with the ‘outgroup’ one is deemed not part of. Saeed et al. (1999) describe this process in using Turner’s ‘self categorisation theory’ (1985):

Turner (1985) has hypothesized that majority group public devaluation of a personally important social identity results in more ingroup solidarity on the part of the minority/devalued group, and that this is a mechanism which allows the minority group to increase intergroup differentiation and to maintain its self-esteem. Thus, for example, recent growing disparagement by non-Muslims may be expected to have resulted in greater unity among Muslims themselves (1999: 826).

In this section, I investigate whether, as part of societal and political debates that are highly critical of Islam, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are identifying more strongly with a Muslim identity.

In the interviews with my key informants, all affirmed the plausible correlation between an increasingly assimilative, anti-Islamic discourse and its effects on Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ identification processes. For example, Mr. Bal recognizes this dialectic apparent between a society that increasingly conforms and classifies younger generation individuals as part of Muslim communities with which

they are considered to be part of, and, these individuals' increasing investigation of their own interpretation of Muslim identity.

We have a lot of examples of 3rd generation youngsters³⁷ who haven't had a religious education at home at all, but who still have become religious due to the demand of society. Society says 'hey, we think you are a Muslim, is that correct?' As a result of which that 18, 19 year old boy at once raises the question: yes well, am I? And what does that then mean? And we really have examples of that, for example in the Turkish community, we have the Alevi community and they are very secularised. Well, parents have come to the Netherlands and their children they raise very secularly, they don't talk at all about God, the prophet, Koran and Islam, you name it. And to their utmost astonishment it happens that their son comes and says 'mum this year I am fasting'.

In the interviews with Dutch-Moroccans specifically, several participants made explicit the relationship between Muslim self-identification processes and the heightened political and societal criticism Islam has come in for. Rachid feels that he and others are constantly categorized as Muslims which bears a stigma of "difference": to be a Muslim in the Netherlands is to be considered 'the ugly duckling'.

Rachid: The religious awareness, on the other hand, rises enormously, if you ask me.

ED: Ok.

Rachid: How is that explained?

You become very aware of your religion, because you are the ugly duckling. You differ from all others. And all those others, they ask you 'can you then have some water during Ramadan?'

ED: Yes exactly...

Rachid: You see? The first time you go..., you understand? With every question you think. With every answer you cannot give, you open your books. With every discussion you take on, because you take on a lot of discussions, people who ask 'why a veil? Why this, why that, why so and so?'

ED: Yes yes.

³⁷ Here, Bal's definition of 3rd generation parallels the definition of 2nd used in this PhD study

Rachid: With every discussion your thinking process becomes more aware, more aware and more aware. Well, the Islam has gotten a lot of attention lately and all those factors have brought about that you become more aware about practising your belief. In such a way that, if you look at the average Moroccan in Morocco [he or she] will be far less occupied with religion.

ED: Ok yes.

Rachid: But why? It is normal there, everyone is a Muslim, everyone..

ED: Yes, yes.

Rachid: And there, far less women wear a veil, also very strange, and here much more. So, the awareness is, is being artificially encouraged...

Frequently asked about Ramadan and practices generally associated with Islamic tradition, Rachid senses he is constantly viewed *as one* with the Muslim community. In this sense, *the* Muslim is “essentialized” according to a static notion of community that neglects the complex, fluid internal and external identification processes of “self”. In contrast, Rachid exposes his own interpretation of being Muslim which involves careful exploration, study and awareness of a Muslim “self” that is essentially “tailor made” and individualized. As Dutch individuals of Moroccan background are increasingly “quizzed” about their Muslim identity, the assumption is that these individuals explore what it actually means to be a Muslim which, in part, is reflexive of a society that holds a preconception of what this Muslim identity is thought to entail.

For Samir, being a Muslim bears a stigma in the Netherlands where a critical attitude towards Islam is apparent. In this regard, he tries to ‘perform as a Muslim’ that counteracts the negative image Islam contains in public perception. In similar ways to Rachid, Samir tries to disentangle the Muslim individual from the preconception of a “bad”, static community. Instead, he acts out an individualized Muslim identity that tackles stigmas and stereotypes. He explains:

No, but I have very consciously put up a sort of performance as a Muslim, because I simply think it is a pity...that it has to be heard from both sides, you know. A sort of counter

reaction, between inverted commas, there has to be, because I do see that the Muslim population is actually very passive.

In connection with Turner's self-categorization theory, both Rachid and Samir affirm greater identification and growth of their Muslim being as processes in reaction to perceived categorization and demonization of Islam and Muslim communities specifically.

6.3.1 Comparative aspects of being Muslim

In conjunction with preliminary survey results outlined in chapter 5, the participants with a Moroccan background particularly appeared to use more vocally and centrally a sense of being Muslim within their descriptions of "self". As discussed in chapter 5, a slight distinction appears to exist between the two research groups and the degree to which Muslim identity is considered and called upon as part of identification processes of "self". Other studies have also reported on this comparative difference between Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Phalet et al. 2000; Pels et al. 2008; Crul and Heerling 2008). The interview data is somewhat affirmative of this comparative distinction.

In fact, interviewees of Turkish background were not only less adamant in using Muslim identity as a way of describing themselves: they were actually explicit as to the secondary role Muslim identity played in their identification processes. For example, Hektor finds religion an identity marker secondary to his understanding of "self", yet his "Turkishness" is of utmost importance. In this sense, he is rather more concerned with critical attitudes voiced against Turkey or Turkish foreign policy than Islam. For Hektor, "being Turkish" is first and foremost a secular notion when he notes that 'not every Turk is a Muslim'. In this sense, ethnic affiliation and religious identification are somewhat separate and in that process, being Muslim is not considered that important.

Hektor: Yes, that bothers me as well, but not as such as...

ED: The Turkish part.

Hektor: Yes, my background you know, because my religion, I am not born with my religion. I can change my religion, I can become a Christian, I can become an atheist, if I, everything, that does not define who I am. A Turk is not a Muslim per definition.

ED: No, no.

Hektor: There are Jewish Turks in Lithuania; there are Christian Turks in Lebanon. Shamanistic Turks in Siberia, so...

ED: So that is different.

Hektor: Exactly, so that is not really what I hold onto. But it is more, I am born a Turk and if there is something against, you know, the Turkish population in general then there is something against me, because ultimately that is who I am, you know.

ED: yes...

Hektor: That is my background, I am a Dutchman and I am proud of that as well, but my background will remain Turkish, I mean, that I can never deny.

This appears to confirm previous observations made in chapter 5 in which the cohesive and secular nature of the Dutch Turkish community were considered explanatory aspects for greater *ethnic* identification apparent amongst Dutch-Turks. Similarly, Zeynep, of Turkish descent, explains that a different interpretation to being Muslim differentiates Dutch-Moroccans from Dutch-Turks: Moroccan culture and Islam are far more entwined whilst Turkish culture and Islam are understood as separate norm systems. Zeynep claims that with Dutch-Turks 'culture overpowers belief'. She states:

[...] With us it is always, at least with the people I hang out with, your identity, you are Turkish first and only then you are a Muslim. But if you'd ask a Moroccan, 9 out of 10 times you would, I think, at least as I have experienced it, would first say 'I am Muslim'

ED: Yes ok...

Zeynep: And with us identity stands for, but what you also see under Turks, those people who are really religious, they'd be quicker to say 'I am Muslim'. But I find that, it is a factor of your identity, but I do not find it is your identity...

For Zeynep religion is not considered an important identity marker of “self”: as such, she believes it cannot be considered your identity *per se*. Although she feels that with “us” -i.e. the Turkish community- Islam is less important than a sense of being Turkish, she nevertheless encounters Dutch-Turks increasingly contemplative of Muslim identity in self-identification processes. It is important to note that in the interviews, most Dutch-Turkish participants acknowledged a sense of being Muslim but to a lesser degree than their Dutch-Moroccan peers.

Nevertheless, comparative differences between the two research groups and the importance they attest to their Muslim identity have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Sevde would describe herself principally as a Dutch female with a strong Turkish identity, yet although she does not fully practise Islam, she nevertheless has contemplated investigating her religious background. However, what possibly differentiates Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks with regards to the proliferation of a Muslim “self” is the manner with which individuals proclaim a sense of being Muslim. In this regard, Dutch-Turks are not necessarily prompted to publicly proclaim a Muslim identity: their religious identification processes are more “casual” and “private” considerations (Pels and Gruijter 2008: 18). For Dutch-Moroccans, Muslim identity seems more central to public manifestations of “self” (ibid). Nevertheless, Kuzey, from Turkish background, is quite prolific in showing himself as a Muslim in a multicultural society, proclaiming ‘if I am going to visit the mosque, I am visiting the mosque and if I want to put that on Twitter, I will put it on Twitter’.

Possibly, this is where the distinction is: between private and public assertions. In its turn, this private versus public dynamic hints at the bigger picture involving integration and multiculturalism and the extent to which individuals perceive their cultural affiliations to be accepted, acknowledged, or, marginalized and discriminated against. As I have argued previously, a stronger sense of marginalization of the ingroup is often relational to a stronger alignment and

identification with that social (in)group that is perceived as in an ethnic hierarchically lower position. Hence, where Dutch-Moroccans might affiliate more strongly with a sense of being Muslim that is at the same time stigmatized, they might be more vocal as to their identification with a sense of being Muslim. Yet, most importantly, it is to understand how these factors – perceived discrimination, cultural maintenance/alignment – influence views and attitudes towards multiculturalism and more specifically, as to the embodiment of multiculturalism in the Netherlands.

A study by Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) demonstrates that across their sample groups of young (2nd generation) participants identifying themselves as Dutch, Moroccan or Turkish, awareness of structural, societal discrimination inclined all participants to be more positive about multiculturalism. However, it was also found that perceptions of structural discrimination were more strongly represented amongst the Turks/Moroccans than Dutch which in turn demonstrated a stronger, positive relationship with multiculturalism. As a starting point, Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) identified multiculturalism as an ideology and practice that fosters cultural diversity and promotes the social position of cultural communities and groups. The study confirmed that Dutch, Turkish and Moroccan individuals all appeared to understand multiculturalism as an approach that emphasizes cultural diversity through *groups* (16). In this regard, Verkuyten and Martinovic distinguished ‘communalist’ from ‘individualist’ attitudes and values and found that:

adherence to the ideal of group commitment and the importance of cultural communities was associated with a more positive multicultural attitude. Individualism, on the other hand had a negative association with multiculturalism. People who find individualistic values important do not tend to approve of thinking in group terms and are more concerned with individual responsibility and autonomy (2006: 16).

It will be interesting to outline this communal versus individualist analogy with regards to identification processes of being Muslim. If Dutch multiculturalism is to be understood in terms of the promotion of cultural diversity through group

dimensions, we might find that Dutch-Moroccans (in particular) will identify more strongly – enforced by perceived discrimination- with a Muslim community (i.e. group). Alternatively, we might find an individualistic approach to have taken place, and if so, what does that tell us about the status and in fact very existence of Dutch multiculturalism?

6.3.2 “Pure” Islam

In the wider European context, greater communal identification with a Muslim identity has been partly explained according to a process termed ‘pure Islam’. Apparent amongst European Muslims with a foreign background, these individuals recreate and strongly identify with a Muslim identity that separates the entanglement of cultural practices, traditions and folklore with the scriptural nature and religious practices of Islam as set out in the Koran. In this regard, a small part of younger generation Muslims now strive to practise and interpret Islam in its purest form possible, namely through a literal emphasis on written traditions as outlined in the Koran and adhering to basic Islamic principles in all parts of life (de Koning 2009; Kibria 2008).

According to my key informant Dr. Landman, a process of “pure” Islam can also be detected in the Netherlands which he describes as ‘reformist’ Islam. In his view, 2nd generation individuals now increasingly study the Islamic sources to create a ‘reformist’ Islam that separates culture from religion in order to instigate a more positive image of Islam in light of a Dutch society that is highly critical of Islam. Dr. Landman claims:

[There is] a much bigger group who tries, yes a bit defensively, knows how to create an image of Islam that strongly differs from the negative image of female-unfriendly and aggressive religion. So [who] tries to find and express a more positive image of Islam. [...] I call it then reformist Islam, so an Islam that thinks about what is the ‘true’ Islam, makes differences between what’s really stated and not stated in the Koran. A sort of sifting. And

in that sifting you can leave some critical practises behind you. So then you can say 'forced marriages have nothing to do with Islam'. [...] So 'forced marriages have nothing to do with Islam, but are only [part of] Moroccan culture from the rural countryside', or something like that. Honour killings, 'that is Turkish or Kurdish culture, but it is no Islamic principle'. 'Female circumcision has nothing to do with Islam'. So all kinds of things are then analyzed in that way. So one is really preoccupied with cultural patterns that have blown over from Morocco and Turkey, or are associated with those, in order to sift concerning what do I want to keep as being 'true' Islam and what do I leave behind as simply being culture.

Although “pure” or “reformist” Islam are terms that give reason to think of these processes as “radicalized”, Dr. Landman emphasizes that there is little indication to presume Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks actually renounce from Dutch society altogether. In this sense, De Koning (2009) stresses that although Dutch-Moroccan Muslim youngsters might preach a form of “pure” Islam based on authenticity and essentiality of the Koran, this does not mean these individuals actually practise an orthodox, fundamentalist form of Islam. Rather, these individuals investigate and negotiate Islam and refer back to the idea of ‘pure’ Islam by trying to come to terms *individually* with what it means to be a Muslim in the Netherlands (de Koning 2009: 66, 67). Kibria (2008) draws a similar conclusion with regards to Bangladeshi Muslim migrant youth in Britain. Kibria found that often through questioning ‘backward’ cultural practises associated with Bangladeshi society a distinction was made between ‘true’ Islam and ‘Bengali’ Islam. In this context, ‘true’ Islam actually contests ‘social inequalities’, but most importantly Kibria explains ‘true’ Islam for Bangladeshi Muslims is about being ‘reflexive’ and inherently about ‘individual choice and self-reflection’ (2008: 254).

Amongst both research groups, there was no real indication that participants of either Moroccan or Turkish background had taken to a process of “pure” Islam, separating cultural practices from Islamic rituals, values and traditions. Although several interviewees spoke critically of marriage arrangements for example, these comments were not made in relation to greater identification with a “pure” Islam.

In the Netherlands, the presence of “pure” Islam is best understood with regards to proliferations of Muslim identity that are individualized and chosen. Most visibly, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks attempt a greater negotiation of their Muslim identity *into* rather than differentiated *from* Dutch identity in which a sense of individual “self” is established as part of social and individual identification patterns. It is this process of negotiation that is most visible in the interviews and in the previously cited narrations of Nergis, Rachid, Samir and Aygul.

6.3.3 A negotiation – an individualized Muslim identity

Although Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans illustrate a greater awareness for and contemplations of their Muslim identity, this does not necessarily equal processes of self-expulsion from Dutch society. Rather, Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans appear to negotiate a sense of being Muslim *and* being Dutch. In the interviews, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks often explained their investigative awareness for their Muslim “self” as an “individualized” negotiation connected to the Dutch context. Aicha, for example, advocates and embraces a Dutch liberal-democratic society that allows her to explore an individualized negotiation of Muslim identity *into* the Dutch context. In this regard, she connects the right to freedom of religion to the Dutch setting that is supposedly liberal and tolerant. She narrates:

...I think that, the beautiful thing, for example, I find about being Muslim, is that it is universal: it does not know any culture and it does not know any race; that I find the most beautiful about it.[...] I find that Islam fits perfectly in the Netherlands as well. The Netherlands, exactly because the Netherlands separates church and state, lends itself ideally for that. In other words, what I was saying just now, ‘if you want to do your thing at home, you should just do that’. And if on the street, look, what you also call, hey, that extreme example of the ‘gay pride’ [parade, ed.], that would, we could also have a Muslim pride, you see? And that I find then again the beauty of Dutch culture.

Interestingly, Aicha seeks (and finds) the civic, secular contours of Dutch culture that allow for the unproblematic negotiation of a Muslim “self” as part of being Dutch. Where previously (in chapter 5), I discussed how the secular dimensions of and civic “culturalist” explanations to Dutch national identity were potentially problematic alongside contemplations of being Muslim, Aicha appeals to this civic, “neutral” platform that in fact allows her to sustain a sense of “self” that complements national as well as religious identification processes. However, this is not necessarily an unproblematic process of mutual negotiation and acceptance.

For other interviewees, mere toleration is not acceptable. These individuals not only engage and negotiate an individualized sense of being Muslim as part of Dutch society, they also appeal to this society to acknowledge, incorporate and be informed about the “other”, i.e. Muslim individual. Crucially, it is about the mutual acknowledgement of Muslim identification negotiations as part of a sense of “Dutchness”. For example, Zineb is affronted by the societal disinterest she encounters with Ramadan each year and the fact that she needs to explain what it involves.

Every year you still get the question of ‘can you then not have a sip of water or chewing gum?’ That question I have, I think, since I’m doing the Ramadan, I have had that question every year. Then I think to myself, ‘surely every year you come into contact with someone who has experienced the Ramadan’, if it is your neighbour with whom you don’t have any contact because you have asked him once or someone at school [...] It is so often told on the news that they say ‘the Ramadan has started again for the Muslims’. And that they then very clearly say: ‘it is the month in which [nothing] is drunk, eaten, smoked’. It is simply told very clearly. How difficult is it then to understand that I then can also not have chewing gum? What then is regarded by you as food?

ED: Yes, yes. I would say, indeed everything.

Zineb: Yes.

ED: So also a bit of chewing gum.

Zineb: Yes [...] People are not always open to one another. Because I also don’t think that they...sort of...it’s ‘she is a Muslim, let her be a Muslim’.

Zineb wants to be part of a society that respects and acknowledges all facets of her identity. As a Dutch-Moroccan, Muslim woman, she is concerned with the negotiation of “Dutchness” that includes Islam as an individualized identity marker and appeals to others to respect and have informed opinions about this too.

Other studies also confirm the development and ‘emerging individualisation in the form of a ‘Dutch’ Islam’ (Crul and Heering 2008: 107). In the Rotterdam Young People survey, repeated amongst Rotterdam youngsters from Dutch, Moroccan and Turkish background, Entzinger, Phalet et al. (2000; 2008) found that more Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish youngsters preferred an ‘individualistic’ rather than ‘conformist’ approach to practising and/or interpreting Islam (2000: 22). Whilst ‘conformists’ will ‘often take the conformist or ‘church’ position associated with ritualized traditional Islam or ‘Islam of the fathers’, [...] the ‘stretched’ position stands for a embryonic ‘new Islam’ of Muslim youngsters’ (2000: 22).

With regards to this process of negotiation an anomaly between generations needs to be highlighted. Where the 1st generation, aided by pillarized multiculturalist policies, mostly sustained a solidified, traditionalist form of Islam that corresponded to every ethnic group separately, the 2nd generation negotiates and questions Islam as part of individual identification processes. This is a phenomenon apparent in the Netherlands, but also elsewhere in contemporary society (Roy 2004; Kibria 2008). In this typology, a generational wedge can be detected where 1st generation individuals practically “stick” to the ‘doing’ of traditional Islam, whilst 2nd generation individuals are ‘being’ Islamic by discussing and negotiating their own, individualized version of Islam. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to tackle ‘caging’ and categorically embedded assumptions of “difference” by developing a sense of Muslim “self” that is idiosyncratic rather than representative of a Muslim collective.

Mr. Bal confirms that, more than the 1st generation, the younger generation of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks question and negotiate their Muslim identity:

...that [first] generation did not learn for example to explain prayer, the veil or fasting with substantive reasoning or arguments. Also they acquired to think like 'well, you are a Muslim so you have to pray. If you don't pray, then you are not a good Muslim. And then you will go to hell.' So that is the whole substantive argument, reasoning of these religious rules for the average Muslim. And a Muslim youngster of the 3rd generation who was born and brought up here, has learned in school how to be articulate, to be assertive, he says: 'but why do I have to pray?' And father says: 'well yes it says so in the Koran'. But he says: 'yes but why?' 'Why do I still need to pray?'

Mr. Bal explains that as part of an upbringing that involved a more substantive education and command of the Dutch language, later generation individuals- to greater extent than their parents or grandparents - do not take their Muslim identity for granted. In fact, younger generation individuals' Muslim identity formation and negotiation seems to be a product of the society they were born and brought up in: they take the familiarized liberal-democratic notion to reason and question a sense of "self" that is least problematic.

Yet, this is not without problems. Aygul states that her own interpretation of being Muslim stands in somewhat tense relation where it concerns her parents' interpretation of Muslim identity and Islamic practice. She exemplifies this by the fact that she drinks alcohol: rather than confronting her parents with her own individualized sense of being Muslim, she nevertheless keeps this to herself. Aygul does not feel addressed by "traditional" Islamic rules and views, yet she also understands her parents find it important: it makes for a complicated negotiation of Muslim "self" as part of Dutch as well as family contexts. She explains:

No but I do adapt myself, because I certainly do that, because I go for example, I do not fast since a couple of years. I am...I do believe in God you see, but I am not practising and, because I find that much of those rules, I find, yes I find them practical rules and I do believe they once had some purpose, but now I think like 'well' hey? I can, I cannot logically

rationalize all that and there it kind of ends for me. But, I simply would not tell that to my...yes, maybe that is avoiding the conflict or maybe that is sort of shitting myself, I don't know, but at this point that I, that I would tell that to my parents like 'yes but I do not believe in this and not in this and not in this' – 'I think drinking alcohol is not a problem at all, and frankly I do not understand all of why you have an issue with that, you have never tasted it and you actually don't really know, do you?' Hey? But I am not going to do that, I don't do that and I think that in that moment I then adapt myself to them.

Although Aygul considers the need to adapt to a certain parental notion of what it means to be a Turkish Muslim in the Netherlands, she nevertheless explains that being a Muslim is very much in the eye of the beholder: it is an individual's own choice how it is interpreted and expressed.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has served to expound upon the religious identification processes and contemplations of being Muslim amongst Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan interviewees. The main objective of this chapter has been to verify whether and in which ways greater awareness and proliferation of Muslim identity – a preliminary observation made in chapter 5 – relates to societal and political attitudes that are increasingly negative and stigmatizing of Islam and Muslim communities specifically (discussed in chapter 4).

Regarding this chapter's research enquiry, I first confirmed that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are indeed very aware of an Islam-critical discourse. Subsequently, I discussed the ways in which this political and societal attitude manifested itself in my participants' narrations. Evidently, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks noted that the stigmatization of Islam often involved dialectics of categorization, "caging" and "othering" according to essentialist notions of Islam *as* culture and as supposedly representative of one, homogeneous Muslim community. The (inter)

national portrayal of a bad Muslim “other” seems to exacerbate this discursive exclusion. At the same time, this “embedded” categorical perception of cultures as static communities, seems context-specific to the Netherlands with regards to previous “pillarized” multiculturalist policies.

The legacy to this discursive pillarization and categorical exclusion also feeds an assimilative integration discourse – discussed in chapter 4 – that holds a “culturalist” frame underscoring a superior, civic Dutch culture opposite an uncivilized, Islamic “other”. In this regard, cultures (again) become “essentialist” differentiations with ethnic undercurrents between a non-Muslim, Dutch-Dutch majority and a Muslim, non-Dutch minority. The fact that Dutch culture is posited as the epitome of civil-political and democratic values and norms feeds into the incompatibility and exclusion of the Muslim “other”.

As a reaction to these exclusionary, categorization discourses, I have demonstrated that greater awareness for their Muslim identity is indeed detectable amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. However, this increasing exploration of Muslim identity does not necessarily signify a person’s retreatment and/or differentiation *from* Dutch society. Rather, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to negotiate and incorporate an “individualized” Muslim identity as part of their “Dutchness” that corresponds to adjoining religious and national identification processes of “self”. A negotiated, individualized Muslim identity not only tackles issues of categorization, “caging” and traditional, community conceptions of Islam – illuminating a generational anomaly - it also appeals to a civically “neutral” Dutch identity that is susceptible to these religious identification contemplations of being Muslim. In this sense, the “traditional” idea of multiculturalism – as to the promotion and acceptance of cultural collectives rather than cultural integrity of individuals- does not completely hold anymore. Interviewees demonstrate that their individualized approach to Muslim identification is not only a struggle and possibly a reaction to a “culturalist” assimilationist discourse that frames civic

markers to erect exclusionary boundaries to the preservation of Dutch culture and identity; their individualized approach is also a response to the pillarized multiculturalist policies of the past and the need to go beyond cultural categorizations. We need to explore what this actually entails with regards to a sense of belonging and home which is discussed further in the following chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7 Dutch belonging: contemplations of home in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals' identification processes

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters and chapter 4 specifically, I have dwelled upon the rise and effects of an assimilative integrationist stance currently apparent in Dutch political and public discourse which features tighter “civic-political” demands for conformity that nevertheless provide a form of “official” *inclusion*, whilst a “culturalist” undercurrent (partly) undermines these incentives, provoking a sense of “discursive” *exclusion*. This underlies weightier concepts of belonging and home which, in other words, beg the question of who can belong, in which ways and on what grounds? This chapter investigates the symbolic notions of home and belonging amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals whose perceptions simultaneously enlighten the exclusionary as well as inclusionary aspects inherent in Dutch national identity.

This investigation elaborates on preliminary findings in chapter 5 in which the majority of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish survey respondents pointed towards residence as an important (civic) marker to describe a sense of “Dutchness”. At the same time, results in both ISSP and online surveys demonstrated a certain ambiguity with regards to place of birth as an (ethnic) historically, embedded sense of belonging connected to notions of homeland. This chapter builds on these observations by investigating the subjective and discursive identity contemplations of home, residence and belonging amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. Where interviewees describe belonging in accordance with their own sense of “Dutchness” and in opposition to a presupposed, exclusionary “Dutch national identity”, the dialectic between the

nation-state's civic and ethnic components is unravelled which ultimately allows us to contemplate a new understanding of a developing, shared national belonging.

Section 7.2 touches upon the self-identification processes of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks and the ways in which these individuals contemplate a sense of national belonging, i.e. "Dutchness", alongside ethnic affiliations of family and parental homeland. These dynamics illuminate the "civic" markers – of residence and citizenship - Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks choose to claim a sense of "Dutchness" that does not neglect ethnic background and affiliations; yet, that is individualized rather than communitarian; and that is a "thinner" claim to Dutch identity in the knowledge it is unlikely to be refuted. This brings me to section 7.3 in which I discuss why Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to claim an inclusive, civic sense of "Dutchness" in reaction to a "culturalist" exclusionary Dutch national identity that underscores ethnic differentiations between Dutch versus non-Dutch. These dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are discussed with regards to the -civic and ethnic - ascribed and chosen markers of national belonging.

7.2 HOME, BELONGING AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS

Contemplations of belonging and home are – superfluous to say –important themes in migration stories (Crul et. al 2012; Duyvendak 2011; Castles and Davidson 2000; Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). Fuelled by the culturally and psychologically charged migratory transition into the "unknown" – the new country, environment and/or neighbourhood - feelings of insecurity and powerlessness lead migrants to emphasize "home" as an emotional, spatial and symbolic place of continuity and permanence (Kinnvall 2004: 747). In this regard, home is where a sense of belonging can be retained which often (but not always) involves allegiance towards and sustainability of community. In many ways, community structures have provided migrant individuals with trajectories to build 'a home from home' (Ballard 1994: 28).

For the children of migrants, the 2nd generation, tales of belonging constitute contemplations of home which are of a different sort. In this regard, deliberations of home incorporate feelings of national belonging but also constitute ethnic affiliation regarding the family home, the ethnic community and the parents' "homeland" (Schneider et al. 2012). These symbioses relate to identity constructions of "self" that can be smooth transitions and/or conflicting at times, yet all crave the answer to the question 'what shall I call myself' and where do I belong (Portes and MacLeod 1996)? In other words, these individuals are in the interplay between *becoming* and understanding where they (or their family) *have come from*.

As such, we should investigate "Dutchness" amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks and the conditions under which these individuals claim and sustain a sense of Dutch national belonging that incorporates these dialectics. It is the assumption that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks uphold an inclusionary civically "thin" notion of "Dutchness" that exceeds both communitarian "caging" and exclusionary "thick" majority notions of Dutch national identity. The fact that in the online surveys, Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents remarked residence as an important aspect of their "Dutchness" seems to (partly) affirm this presumption. This will be discussed further in relation to the interviews that were conducted with Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. These conversations shine a light on the subjective constructions of home that bear reference to both national belonging and ethnic affiliations.

7.2.1 "Dutchness": residence as belonging, as a sense of home

Similar to the survey findings, the interview data seems to confirm the role of residence as part of Dutch identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. Yet, the qualitative data allows us to expand upon

residence: it serves as a metaphorical starting point and conglomerate for further explaining ethnic affiliations as well as feelings of exclusion. If we review identity constructions of being Dutch specifically, several Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants remarked that to live in the Netherlands offered a claim and marker to understand oneself as Dutch. In Aicha's account, "Dutchness" signifies a sense of home that relates to both a place of residence and a country where she enjoys formal citizenship that in its turn offers chances and opportunities. Aicha explains:

Yes I can also see myself here in the Netherlands and I mean yes, Morocco is for me something that I know from stories, something I know from holidays, something you know from the weeks you spend there and I have a tremendous big connection with it in that...that I find it very important to remind myself of where I have started. I have always had a vision, I don't know, 'you do not know where you are going if you also don't know where you come from'.

ED: Right, that's true. Yes. Yes.

Aicha: So in that regard that's...Morocco is very important to me and my Berber background in that regard [is] also very important to me. But apart from that I am very much occupied with being Dutch: I want to do a PhD in the Netherlands, I want to develop myself in the Netherlands, I want to build a future in the Netherlands. I... hey? I want to hopefully raise a family in the Netherlands.

For Aicha, her Dutch identity has to do with her own personal development. She is Dutch simply because she envisions her future life in the Netherlands: this is the homeland where she will build her future career and family. At the same time, the idea of home acts as a negotiating element between a Dutch identity that embodies a present place of belonging and future prosperity, yet does not neglect ethno-cultural affiliations which represent a symbolic, ancestral home. In this regard, "Dutchness" bears testimony to a space of opportunity and personal growth that incorporates both national and ethnic belonging.

Where Ghorashi and Vieten (2012) investigated narratives of belonging amongst migrant females residing in the Netherlands, a similar picture emerged as to the actively constructed agency of home as multilayered places of opportunity. They observed:

that many women connect their source of belonging to the space where they can improve themselves and be free of various forms of restrictions they may face because they are female. In their narratives they emphasise that they are not passive victims of their cultures but active agents of change in their own lives and also contributors to the many spaces of which they are part (2012: 732).

Here, the concept of home serves as a powerful metaphor and regulator of belonging that individuals actively pursue. In this regard, the symbolic construction of home is performed across multi-layered meanings of belonging in diverse situations and contexts, operating on national (Dutch), ethnic (Turkish/Moroccan) and local, or, city levels, e.g. 'I am a Rotterdammer' (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012; Fleischmann and Phalet 2010). With regards to the latter category, a case in point concerns Dutch-Turkish Kuzey who in our interview strongly identified with the locality of his home town with which he also addressed a sense of national belonging.

Hence we can entertain the assumption that to construct a sense of "Dutchness", Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turk interviewees use markers of residency and opportunity, because it appeals to a formal "neutral" conception of national belonging that does not neglect other forms of (ethnic) affiliation. Subsequently, we might argue that whilst these individuals might feel reluctant *to be* Dutch – as the online surveys appeared to demonstrate; the majority of both survey groups did not opt to call themselves Dutch at all - residence might nevertheless be a resource for *becoming* Dutch in a way that these individuals perceive this marker unlikely to be refuted by "others". This gives us food for thought regarding the degree to which accessible, "thin" undercurrents emphasize a Dutch national belonging and how "civically" implied markers might be favourable towards a shared national belonging

in a multicultural society. To explore this further, we need to investigate the diverse dimensions of home and belonging that Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees emphasized.

In conversation with Nergis, associations of “home” are multilayered. Nergis lives, works and was born in the Netherlands and as such, she uses predominantly “civic” markers of residency and citizenship to explain her sense of “Dutchness”. However, at the same time, this is not an independent claim: her national belonging is interconnected with her Turkish affiliation that relates mostly to her parents’ heritage and home country. In this sense, Nergis uses her Turkish background to both affirm and play down her claim to “Dutchness”: the Netherlands is her home but being ‘Dutchified’ is not necessarily a desirable process. Rather, an ‘in-between’ identity is sustained. She explains:

Nergis: Yes, I don't think that integration means assimilation. You simply bring the good and beautiful [things] of all, both cultures and those you form into one and that is the basis of your identity. I do not think that you have to be totally 'dutchified' or something to be integrated.

ED: What does that mean then? How do you see that, when I say Dutch, being Dutch?

Nergis: 'Dutchified' or being Dutch? Those are different things, I think.

ED: No right. Let's...being Dutch, 'Dutchified', well ok both then.

Nergis: A allochtone Dutchman or something?

ED: Yes, yes, I don't know if you associate with that?

Nergis: Yes, in any case, course yes, you live in the same country and ultimately you have the same passport so, I was also born here. I think, I was even thinking about that the other day, I feel very much at home here, that yes, it is my home. And Turkey is more of a holiday destination for us [meaning husband and daughter, ed.]

[...] But then in the Netherlands I also again feel Turkish.

ED: That is quite difficult.

Nergis: We are the generation that sits in between.

In the accounts of Nergis (and Aicha previously), the concept of home, as a place of residence and space of opportunity, serves a “neutral”, accessible platform for these female interviewees to actively seek and claim a sense of Dutch belonging without surpassing the plural dimensions of belonging with regards to religious and/or ethnic background. In this regard, “civic” markers of home are part of the active appeal to belong and approach an inclusive sense of being Dutch.

This observation resembles findings from a qualitative study on British identification patterns amongst English migrants living in Scotland (Kiely et al. 2005). In their studies, Kiely et al. (2001; 2005) found that concepts of home and long term residency were sometimes used by the English respondents to explore a Scottish identity as part of an incorporative British identity that, at the same time, sustained an English identity based on heritage and birth. In this regard, British identity acted as an ‘umbrella’ identity inclusive and least intrusive of both English and Scottish identity dynamics. Kiely et al. (2005: 78) explain that:

Claiming to be British might well include being English with regard to birth, ancestry, upbringing and/or accent but also be coupled with Scottish residence (often lengthy), sense of home and belonging, the fact that they often have Scots-born children or partners, and that they see their future as being in Scotland.

Where English respondents appealed to a sense of “Scottishness”, they did so according to a symbolic construction of home that included concepts of residence, opportunity and family relations. In this sense, a tentative claim is made for the negotiation of an inclusive “Scottishness” that does not necessarily broach the “thicker” (and exclusionary) notions of Scottish identity along the lines of ancestral and parental links (Rosie and Bond 2006).

In the present study, it seems Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks make a similar claim to “Dutchness” in their symbolic constructions of belonging and home that regulate both national (Dutch) and ethnic (Turkish/Moroccan) affiliations that ultimately orientate “outwards” rather than “inwards”. In this sense, an appeal is

made for the evaluation of a shared national belonging that is both susceptible to and acknowledges the symbolic importance and use of ethno-cultural identities that add to a sense of national belonging. In this regard, there is an active construction in becoming Dutch on the basis of residence, home and belonging which are markers that broach the inclusionary boundaries of a “thin” notion of Dutch national identity. Yet, this “civic” understanding of “Dutchness” that Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans portray, also contains the fact that belonging (partly) amounts to another important part of “self”. For these individuals, this concerns their ethnic background, family and the homeland which I will discuss further.

7.2.2 “Dutchness” and the accommodation of the ‘in-between’

The assumption is that, amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees the plural expression and understanding of their Dutch identity can be understood as a process to describe and enforce a sense of “Dutchness” and belonging rather than to revive and actively articulate particular aspects of Moroccan or Turkish culture. However, we should not undermine the importance of ethno-cultural affiliations that are used to describe Dutch identity. That is because,

for children of immigrants, ‘home’ is where they were born and raised. Yet, differing from the experience of children of native-born parentage, the second generation has another ‘ethno-national’ reference frame: their parents’ country (and culture) of origin (Schneider et al. 2012: 322).

The importance Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks give to ethno-cultural affiliations should not be underestimated where symbolic dynamics of belonging, place and home augment a sense of “self”. Many studies iterate that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks still demonstrate stronger ethnic (i.e. Moroccan or Turkish) than national (i.e. Dutch) identification patterns with regards to the use of ethnic self-identification labels (Phalet et al. 2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008; Entzinger 2009; Crul et al. 2012). Data from the online surveys – discussed in chapter 5 – also suggests that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are predominantly

inclined to think of themselves as either solely Moroccan/Turkish or Muslim, or, a combination of the two identity labels.

These outcomes entertain the notion that in the Netherlands, ethnic self-identification processes are subject to a slow (but gradual) transition into national or hyphenated identification patterns, representative of the classic “stages” in American assimilation theory (Gordon 1964). Yet, in the interviews with Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, a slightly more nuanced picture emerges: it emphasizes this transition to be in full swing. In this regard, “Dutchness” is best described an “in between” identity in which contemplations of home and belonging iterate the involvement of ethno-cultural labels and the identification with a Dutch identity.

Sevde describes the “inbetween-ness” of feeling at home when she tells the traditional guest worker’s tale of her father who moved the entire family from Turkey to the Netherlands, where he had been working for some years. The idea of home clearly features in Sevde’s account to describe complicated internal and external identification processes of being Turkish and Dutch. In this regard, a sense of “Dutchness” is explained as part of ethno-cultural affiliations: Sevde’s sense of self stands in relation to both the Dutch ‘outside’ society and the Turkish ‘inside’ home.

‘And the children, they actually went to find their own way. And my father still tried to keep everything together, but that was not easy, because very soon we went to learn outside. And then we were, nevertheless, becoming a Dutch Turk. And at home we were, my parents were simply Turkish Turks. And outside we were Dutch Turks. Well, that also gave way to a cultural difference at home. So, there you also had to, you were actually split like ‘different at home’ and ‘different outside’. And outside you were also not really like...not like, you were also a bit locked up in yourself, because outside it was also different, not totally the way you were. And then if you came home, you were also not totally the same anymore, so that was also a bit of a part that you could not express.’

This rather complicated story exemplifies the use of ethno-cultural affiliations as part of the symbolic construction of home and belonging that cuts across generational lines. Sevde neither feels completely part of Dutch society nor identifies fully with the ancestral home where her parents uphold a sense of belonging to their Turkish homeland. Rather, her construction of belonging is layered as part of an “in-between” identity. In this sense, concepts of home and belonging illuminate how younger generation individuals neither sustain nor reinforce ethno-cultural affiliations according to particular, normative assumptions of Moroccan or Turkish culture, yet accommodate these identities to describe a sense of “Dutchness” that least conflicts with either/or scenarios of being either Dutch or Moroccan/Turkish, and vice versa.

As said, these are self-identification processes that seem characteristic of younger generation individuals where ethno-cultural notions of the ancestral home and community, exemplify the active, descriptive use of ethno-cultural labels to describe a sense of national belonging. In a survey analysis conducted amongst immigrant children in Southern California and South Florida, Rumbaut shows that whether born in the USA or abroad, ‘two-thirds of respondents ethnically self-identified with their or their parents’ immigrant origins...’ (1996: 134). In the USA particularly, the description and *use* of “hyphenated identities” portrays the flexibility of ethnicity where 2nd generation immigrants actively choose an ethnic identity as part of an overarching, American identity. In this regard, ethnic self-identification amongst 2nd generation individuals involves the (optional) construction of a ‘symbolic ethnicity’ that is conducive to an individual’s successful assimilation into American society (Alba 1990). Waters (1990) demonstrates ‘freedom of choice’ as an important aspect of ‘symbolic ethnicity’ where white Americans – the case is quite different for Asian or African Americans - *opt* for an ethnic identity that feeds a sense of community, yet complements the civic boundaries of an American national identity that proclaims individuality, openness and choice (1990: 150).

However, it is important to note that the outcome of this particular assimilative trajectory- in which ethnic identification is optional as a consequence of acceptance into a shared national belonging - is not necessarily a straightforward process for all 2nd generation immigrants. The dynamics of ethnic self-identification bear different connotations, dependent on diverse contexts and situations which ultimately reflect 'segmented' upward and downward outcomes of assimilation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 45). In this regard, Portes and Rumbaut point out 'not everyone is chosen';

There are groups among today's second generation that are slated for a smooth transition into the mainstream and for whom ethnicity will soon be a matter of personal choice. They, like descendants of earlier Europeans, will identify with their ancestry on occasion and when convenient. There are others for whom ethnicity will be a source of strength and who will muscle their way up, socially and economically, on the basis of their own communities' networks and resources. There are still others whose ethnicity will be neither a matter of choice nor a source of progress but a mark of subordination (2001: 45).

The case of the USA highlights the extent to which choice is involved in the use and attainment of ethno-cultural labels that 2nd generation individuals mobilize to negotiate a "national" self as part of their ethnic background and heritage. Hence, the query in this present study is how to judge the use of ethno-cultural labels Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks attach to their explanations of "Dutchness" and according to what extent the use of these ethnic affiliations in social identification processes are choices to negotiate this ethnic identity *as part of* and not separated from a shared, national identity. In other words, are Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks developing hyphenated identities that implicate a Dutch national identity that is civil and culturally "thin" and therefore susceptible and open to ethno-cultural diversity (Fleischmann and Phalet 2010: 2)? This query is discussed further in terms of the interplay between the individual "self" and ethno-cultural belonging as constituted in aspects of community, family life and values.

7.2.3 Family, community and ‘individualized’ Dutch identity

As mentioned before, for younger generation individuals belonging (partly) constitutes a form of ethnic affiliation that, to some extent, connects to the parental home and ethnic community. Children of immigrant parents might develop and sustain a “detached” ethnic identity that through their parents’ transmittance of knowledge and values is in keeping with the parents’ country of origin (Verkuyten 2014). In this sense; ‘cultural socialization can give children a sense of roots and belonging and stimulates feelings of ethnic pride’ (ibid: 94). This development is also evident in the studies that have explored the “transnational” constructions of the homeland on popular forum websites that younger generation individuals regularly visit (Brouwer 2006). In these “virtual” spaces, ethnic belonging towards the parents’ homeland is “transnationally” constructed through discussions and information sharing. Therefore, it might be unsurprising that some of the interviewees in this present study posited a sense of “self” and belonging that was formulated according to the ethno-cultural aspects of family values and social norms.

In conversation with Zineb, ethno-culturally-related habits, values and traits of the family home are appropriated to differentiate a sense of Dutch belonging. Being brought up in a Moroccan household, Zineb uses the safety of the family home to confront and contemplate a sense of “Dutchness” that, for the moment and at least in terms of social “rules”, is different to her. Zineb argues:

Zineb: [...] The Dutch culture is more like, ‘me, me, me and the rest be damned’³⁸

ED: Yes, yes.

Zineb: So ‘if you are visiting me, you have to let me know before your visit’ and at our place you can simply storm in.

[ED laughs]

³⁸ A Dutch expression, can be translated as: ‘ikke, ikke, ikke, en de rest kan stikken’

Yes do we suddenly have someone visiting, then we have someone visiting.

ED: Simple, nice, ok.

Zineb: Yes. Visits. But here 'you have to notify'. That is really, rule for rule, you know, we have the law, but we also have our own law. 'Are you visiting? Please call.' 'Are you staying for dinner? Can you let me know that beforehand?' And then you get this birth card, you know, someone was born, then it says really big 'between 1 and 3, mummy and Thijs are sleeping' for example.

ED: Yes yes.

Zineb: There are all these rules and that...you know, that structuring...

For Zineb, being Dutch signifies being exceedingly individualistic and egotistical. The common saying: 'me, me, me and the rest be damned' sums up how "the Dutch" deal or rather not deal, with others around them. This is not implicit of Zineb not identifying with a sense of "Dutchness" at all. Rather, ethnic affiliations and family life offer Zineb important ethno-cultural, communitarian benchmarks to further contemplate who to be in Dutch society. In this aspect, "Dutchness" offers a "civil" component of individuality that allows one to explore a sense of belonging on their own terms, whether this be in the comfort of the family home and community, or not. In a similar vein, Souhaila uses the importance of Moroccan family cohesion to discredit the individualistic nature of the "Dutch" who are 'colder and we are warmer'. Nevertheless, the question remains how these contemplations reflect a combined sense of ethnic as well as national belonging.

The idea of family, family values and the salience of family life are often mentioned in migrant stories to describe "self" as part of the minority culture in opposition to the majority culture (Castles and Miller 2003). Shaw (1994), for example shows how the idea of 'biradari' or kinship group, has played a great role in the preservation of Pakistani family communities in Oxford and the way in which the 'biradari' provided 1st generation migrants with support for finding a job, social welfare and housing (1994: 40). Nevertheless, the 'biradari' – constituting relatively conservative values concerning marriage and sexuality – is now contested amongst the younger

generation of Pakistani's who also align with concepts of "Britishness" that conflict with traditional Pakistani family values. In this regard, British-Pakistani youth incorporate yet struggle formulating a sense of "self" that complements both British as well as Pakistani values.

These are dialectics that resemble contemplations in the present study amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. Although, studies have shown that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks bear considerable adherence to their parents' traditional family values in terms of partner choice for example, an emancipatory trajectory is also noticeable where individuals increasingly, discursively detach themselves from the social control of family and ethnic community and instead emphasize an individualized position of "self" that also takes into account a sense of feeling Dutch (Crul and Doornik 2003; Phalet et al. 2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). This illuminates the generational gap – of which I also spoke in chapter 6 - where Dutch identity (in part) signifies a place called home for the 2nd but not the 1st generation. Whilst the 1st generation might take more comfort in the safety of the own ethnic group, presenting the Turkish or Moroccan homeland in the 'myth of return' (Anwar 1979), the 2nd generation seems to sustain "in between" identities. For example, Samir uses the social situation of visiting his parents to explain this 'switching' between identities that is particularly acute:

Samir: Yes, but it is switching, mind you. It is very often switching.

ED: I hear you yes.

Samir: If I go to my parents then it is really eighty degrees, not that, but it is ninety degrees or something for sure. Maybe a little bit more, hundred and twenty degrees. You know, that you have to then turn the switch but I have made it my own in such a way that I am no longer conscious of constantly switching. You know? So, I am standing very much in between both cultures, but I am almost like a chameleon actually...

Samir's attitudes of "self" and belonging accommodate both a Dutch belonging as well as ethnic affiliations associated with his family and parental home. In this sense, ethno-cultural and national labels of belonging act as tools to make sense of a social self that least conflicts with inner and outer identification processes of being Dutch or Moroccan.

The generational differentiation and development between individualized and communitarian belonging is particularly present in Aygul's account. She explains that to negotiate a sense of "Dutchness" involves a difficult struggle with the traditional Turkish family values that are part of her upbringing and partly serve ethnic identification references that complement a sense of "self". For Aygul, it seems impossible to perfectly combine these identities, yet she nevertheless demonstrates dialectics of inner- and outer self-identification contemplations that process a sense of self that both combines Dutch as well as ethno-cultural affiliations. Therefore, her "Dutchness" is also best described an 'in between' identity in which the use of ethno-cultural labels iterates the involvement and identification with a Dutch identity. She explains:

Aygul: And now I can look at it a bit more nuanced and actually it cannot be combined, because these are two such very different value systems, of values and norms systems, that the combination is actually just a mix up, is actually not...

ED: is actually not possible?

Aygul: is not possible. You will have to decide what you find important of the one culture and what you find important about the other culture and that will be your identity and that grows and that changes and I think that also changes with different life phases. That, assume you will have children, or partner choices, then again you can, you will again be put on a track and then you have to think again about which piece is yours, is it the Turkish piece and what does it say and why do I think that? Is that because I think that my parents want that or that the family will agree? Or is that because I think that myself. So, I find it still, I will not again say so easily like a couple of years ago, I know how to combine it [...] I do not have problems with anything, I notice now however that I find it tricky and that I come across some dilemmas and that I then have to stay very close to myself.

As part of Aygul's construction of "Dutchness", the civil dimensions of a Dutch identity are highlighted that emphasize gender equality, choice and independence; concepts which stand in some tense relation to her ethno-cultural Turkish background where traditional family values, patriarchal structures, the salience of community, social control and honour prevail. Interestingly, Aygul's identity contemplations embody an "individualized" sense of "Dutchness" and she actively constructs this to pursue an emancipated, independent and inclusive position in Dutch society. Unlike Zineb and Souhaila, the individualistic approach to being Dutch suits Aygul to contemplate national and ethnic belonging alike.

This phenomenon, in which an individualized notion of national belonging is partly distinguished from a communitarian, ethno-cultural "self", is aptly articulated by Ballard in his study of the South Asian community in Britain. He explains:

Most of the rising generation are acutely aware of how much they differ from both their parents *and* from the surrounding white majority, and as a result they are strongly committed to ordering their own lives on their own terms (1994: 34).

In conclusion, for most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees, dimensions of belonging and home are formulated across national and ethno-cultural levels. In this regard, belonging bears many different connotations and meaning, dependent on diverse contexts and situations. As part of these negotiations an "in-between" construction of "self" is illuminated in which feelings of being Dutch and/or Moroccan/Turkish sometimes align (i.e. Dutch-Moroccan) or are stood further apart (i.e. I am Turkish and Dutch). It is important to note that these identities are not exemplary of "static" cultural differences setting individuals apart. Rather, it suggests of culture, above all, as a device that negotiates and regulates a sense of self as part of inner and outer social identification dynamics. In this case, culture, rather than being a static and inflexible element formulating ethnic differences, is more a consequence of social interaction and shaped

interactively between persons whose perceptions of difference create boundaries (Barth 1969). In other words, culture is a diverse, multi-interpretable and individualistic performance, yet it is not solely idiosyncratic: in part, it is a “tool” for social identification.

It is in this way we should weight an understanding of “Dutchness”; a term that best describes how Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks accommodate Dutch identity as part of a broader ethno-cultural and religious background. For some, this involves a closer bond with ethnic dimensions of family and community, for others this is more of an “individualized” process. Yet, ultimately these deliberations on “Dutchness” emphasize a Dutch society that is susceptible to these individual contemplations of national belonging and home. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks construct a sense of being Dutch that appeals to a formal, “neutral” conception of a national membership that does not exceed ethnic affiliations. Claims to long term residency and opportunities embody a sense of this “civic” adherence, allegiance and belonging to the geographical, juridical and political spaces of the Dutch nation-state. However, whether we can speak of “hyphenated” identities *à la* the USA is a query outstanding; for one, ethnic affiliations seem to bear greater discursive than symbolic weight. In this sense, these contemplations can be considerably problematic especially if we consider to what extent the boundaries of Dutch national identity are “civically” adaptable and accepting to these identity constructions.

This brings me to the flipside of “Dutchness” as a sense of national belonging Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks portray. That is because, the multilayered and intermediate construction of “Dutchness” also hints at the reluctance of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to make “full” claims to Dutch identity where it is anticipated these claims might be refuted by others. While Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to a form of shared national belonging that is inclusive, they are nevertheless aware of a persistently exclusionary stance apparent in socio-political

discourse - of which I spoke extensively in chapter 4 – which ultimately affects identification processes of being Dutch and belonging. We need to investigate this further in order to reflect upon the interchange between civic and ethnic aspects which illuminate the cultural contours of the nation-state. It is the assumption this will create a greater understanding of a national belonging that is suited to the multicultural dimensions of others who long for belonging as part of that nation-state.

7.3 A HOME EXCLUDED FROM: CATEGORIZATION AND “OTHERING”

7.3.1 Categorization and the individualized exploration of “Dutchness”

In the interviews, most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants expressed a sense of being Dutch. Yet at the same time, these individuals often felt their “Dutchness” contested by a “notional” Dutch majority. In Chapter 4 I have discussed how issues of integration and national identification have become highly debated topics at the forefront of the social and political spectrum in the Netherlands today. As part of this assimilative integration discourse, Dutch-Moroccans’ and Dutch-Turks’ “loyalty” and degree of belonging, have been questioned from time to time. Unsurprisingly, these national identity “confrontations” were apparent in many of the interviews where Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks discussed a sense of “self”. In particular, participants manifested feelings of being labelled which they felt obstructive to a sense of national belonging.

For example, Kuzey is very decisive in his approach towards these categorizations: contemplations about being Dutch are part of his personal choice and individual construction of “self”.

But, what I do find hindering, is that, at a certain point, people start saying, like 'oh you are a new Dutchman or you are just Dutch or you are just Turkish' or something. Yes, well, I will figure that out myself, thank you very much'.

In a similar bid, Aygul was annoyed by blatant categorizations made at a lecture organized by a multicultural organisation. Here, she criticizes the communitarian approach the organisation adopted to enhance a sense of communal commitment and responsibility which, according to Aygul, neglects the particularity of individual development. She explains:

But then again they have to say that 'we', as in, the younger generation, have to do our best to show that we can speak Dutch and that you can do this and that you can do that, and, then, yes, well I find that irritating'

For other interviewees, however, categorizations are not considered particularly harmful or intrusive to a sense of being Dutch. Mourad, for example, is fairly self-assured about being Dutch. Although categorical assumptions might be made about him, he does not think of these labels as obtrusive for him to sustain an "individualized" sense of national belonging. In this regard, he is susceptible and understanding of the fact that it is in people's "nature" to categorize, label and stereotype.

I don't know, actually, I feel a fully fledged citizen of this country and I have the same rights and duties and that's how I also see it. And I do not need to prove or justify myself or whatever [...] I could not [my emphasis] make light of it, but I think [it is not necessary] if you simply act yourself. Then, mostly, the prejudice vanishes like snow melting under the morning sun, but yes. But, that is just something very natural, I think, that if you see somebody, then immediately you start looking to 'oh he is wearing glasses, oh he has that, he has that', then you instantly try to fit [someone] in a box and I kind of understand that people try to do that with me'.

Although each of these interviewees might react differently to being “put in boxes”, all these accounts demonstrate an “individualized” stance to describing a sense of “Dutchness”. Whilst Kuzey will decide “for himself” on manners of national belonging, Mourad thinks of himself an active, individual Dutch citizen unfazed by social categorization. Evidently, “internal” self-identification processes – of which I spoke previously – align with “external” contemplations of “self” in that, from both symbolic processes emerges an actively, individually, constructed form of national belonging. In this regard, these individuals give way to an accessible, civil interpretation of Dutch national identity in order to tackle being “caged” according to supposedly static communities or essentialist cultural frameworks, dynamics that are legacies of pillarized multiculturalist practices (discussed further in section 7.3.3). These processes highlight the interaction between “ascribed” and “chosen” markers that influence Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ construction of “Dutchness”. Hence, the fact that residence might act as a relatively “neutral” marker that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks choose to *become* Dutch, also hints at elements obtrusive to these processes of becoming.

7.3.2 Choice and ascription: fluid “civic” and fixed “ethnic” markers of national belonging

This social interplay resembles an earlier study where Kiely et al. (2001) found that the depiction of Scottish national identity in social identification processes, concerns both the individual claims one makes towards a national identity as well as how these claims are presented to others. In this regard, ‘identity markers and rules’ affect the construction, interpretation and representation of national identity especially where it is anticipated these claims are not sustained by others (Kiely et al. 2001). In the interviews, Kiely et al. (2001) found that respondents’ claims to Scottish identity were fundamentally about their relationship with Scotland as a place, sustained through both ‘fluid’ and ‘fixed’ markers. Whilst ‘fluid’ markers of commitment to place and length of residence were used and accepted to determine

a Scottish identity, residence appeared to be a weak claim on its own where 'fixed' markers of place of birth and ancestry hold a stronger symbolic sense of relationship with a Scottish place of belonging (Kiely et al 2001: 39). Kiely et al. elaborate:

these residence claims are the opposite of the ancestry claims we saw earlier. The residence and commitment claim puts forward the view that national identity can be *achieved* through one's own action and choices. The ancestry claim, on the other hand, advances the idea that national identity is *ascribed* before birth through one's blood-line and not open to change. We have found that most conceptions of national identity in our study fall in the middle ground, though edging more often towards the ascribed than the achieved conception of national identity (2001: 46).

Amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, a similar dialectic between 'fixed' and 'fluid' markers seems to sustain the differentiation between a sense of "Dutchness" rather than Dutch national identity. As discussed, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks seem to claim "Dutchness" on the basis of such 'fluid' markers of place and length of residence and commitment to place. In this sense, these individuals choose to commit to and express a sense of belonging, yet at the same time, the assumption is that "full" claims to Dutch identity are not made where it is anticipated these claims will not be supported by others. This might explain why Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks do not claim a Dutch identity as such but rather formulate a sense of "Dutchness" which resembles the inclination with which English migrants in Scotland express a sense of "Scottishness" as Kiely et al. have demonstrated (2005). Thus, we might investigate whether in the present study, "fixed" ethnic markers of ancestry and kinship act as important, regulatory boundaries that might emphasize a relatively more exclusionary Dutch national identity.

Some interviewees believed that the ascription of ethnic and/or ancestral claims were evidential, exclusionary markers of a Dutch national identity that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks could not appeal to. In conversation with Hektor, he

describes his “Dutchness” in linguistic, civic and ethnic terms: he speaks the Dutch language, he was born in the Netherlands and enjoys Dutch higher education. As with Nergis’ perception of “Dutchness”, all these components embody a predominantly civic appeal to a sense of national belonging in which the Netherlands functions as a place of residence and opportunity. At the same time, Hektor believes these chosen markers are not sufficient claims to being Dutch because they are not fully sustained by “others”. Hektor explains:

Hektor: [...], if at school I would say ‘I am a Dutchman’ then it would be held against me, like.

ED: That they think like ‘what are you saying...’

Hektor: Yes exactly.

ED: which is strange of course, because you are a Dutchman?

Hektor: Yes, but I simply ain’t. I mean, I was born here, I mean, people from my neighbourhood, I am studying at a higher level than all my other friends I have ever had and...

ED: yes.

Hektor: what is the difference between Jan and Kees and me? We were born on the same date and we both speak Dutch and we both went to the same school...

ED: You are simply Dutch...

Hektor: Exactly.

ED: Yes but where does, why do you think that...why is that difference there? Why do these people then make a difference, you think? Why Jan will be simply seen as a Dutchman but you not? Hektor not?

Hektor: Yes...the difference lies I think, yes where, that is difficult. I cannot just say like ‘ok here is the difference’. It is very tricky.

Whilst Hektor actively chooses and constructs a form of “Dutchness”, it is nevertheless understood these claims are not fully accepted. He asks himself: ‘what is the difference between me and Jan and Kees?’ by which he invokes certain “fixed”, ethnic markers of ancestry that implicate an exclusionary Dutch national identity he cannot appeal to. Hektor presumes Dutch national identity is mostly characterized through ancestral aspects: for Jan and Kees – two archetypical Dutch

boy names – there appears no threshold to be considered Dutch simply because their Dutch parents were born in the Netherlands and their parents in their turn, which is something Hektor cannot “overcome” as his parents came from Turkey.

Whether “fixed”, ethno-ancestral markers play an important, exclusionary role in the cultural embodiment of Dutch national identity, in part, also concerns issues of race. In this sense, physique and facial features can be visual “triggers” in characterizing someone as “alien” which further implicates suggestions of foreign parental ties. In a recent qualitative study, Hondius (2009) discussed perceptions on race relations in the Netherlands in which a strong argument was made for the assumption that race still matters in the Netherlands. In this sense, Hondius argues, race acts as an important marker in social categorization processes to make national differentiation between “non-Dutch” from “Dutch” individuals. As Hondius notes, ‘many interviewees were made to understand by white Dutch people at some point in their lives that they were not really considered Dutch’ (2009: 51). Paradoxically, the political correctness that exists in the Netherlands ignores racism and race relations: race does not seem matter, but it nevertheless does in daily life (ibid: 40-43).

Data from the 2003 ISSP survey – discussed in chapter 5 - does not necessarily suggest that ancestral ties are an important marker in “majoritarian” national identification processes. To recapitulate, where ISSP respondents – who can be considered representative of a Dutch majority - were asked to assess the importance of ancestry as a component for being truly Dutch, a combined 77 percent indicated lineage to be not very or not important at all to understanding Dutch national identity. Although this result is possibly suggestive of respondents’ apprehension of - as Hondius points out- being called racist or discriminatory, on the surface it appears that ancestral markers do not hugely attest to an understanding of Dutch national identity. Although in the interviews, few participants made *explicit* references to “ethnic” markers of race, skin colour or

ancestral ties to articulate the exclusionary boundaries to being Dutch, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks' perceptions of being categorically excluded do hint at the subtle, *implicit* dynamic of ancestry as an exclusionary marker in Dutch national identification processes.

7.3.3 Categorization and “culturalist” exclusion

This tentative observation, which I made in chapter 5, is best understood as a “culturalist” differentiation between a supposedly superior Dutch majority and inferior “static” minorities. Two combined factors underpin this assumption. For one, and as discussed in chapter 4, there is the legacy of “pillarized multiculturalism”, *minorisering* and ‘caging’ integrationist policies which have fuelled an “embedded” and “essentialist” state of “othering” where ethnic differences are representative of supposedly clear-cut cultures and communities. This dialectic is best illustrated according to narratives of “self” that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks expressed in the interviews. For example, Samir utters:

Look, you simply have to realize that you are a minority, you have to...from a religious point of view, from a cultural point of view, you are a minority. So you have to constantly conform to the majority. That simply is the idea. That you are a minority. And that you see yourself as a minority.

In this narration, it is clear that in Dutch society “difference” is, first and foremost, a division between groups rather than individuals. Samir’s individualized understanding of “self” seems dictated by a communitarian group identity that is ascribed to him rather than chosen. In this sense, self-identification processes are intrinsically linked with “static” communities that bear “essentialist” assumptions about cultural differences dividing one Dutch “ethnic” majority from several other minorities. It highlights the remnants of a flawed multiculturalism where,

cultures are [thought] bounded entities, clear cut wholes, clearly distinguishable from other entities that are linked to other groups. [...] the

consequence of this is that the differences and contrast *between* groups are emphasized and that similarities and commonalities are neglected. Moreover, the similarities *within* groups are easily exaggerated, and differences are forgotten (Verkuyten 2004: 76).

Strikingly, an exclusionary dialectic of difference illuminates the conflation of culture with ethnicity which differentiates 'caged' individuals to communities. As I have discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the term *allochtoon* particularly encapsulates these dynamics where powerful connotations of "difference" are connected to and explained as- policy-wise as well as discursively –having foreign ancestral ties and parental links.

To iterate, the definition for *allochtoon* concerns 'a person who has at least one parent born abroad'. The definition thus neglects such markers of place of birth, language, education and residence which might also act as "shared" connections with an *autochtone* Dutch majority. Hence, Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish background might sustain a sense of "Dutchness" on the basis of cultural, civic and/or ethnic (place of birth) aspects, yet exclusionary dynamics of being considered an *allochtoon* will nevertheless pose a "genealogical" obstruction from becoming Dutch where one might not share ancestral links. The term *allochtoon* symbolizes the institutionalization of "difference" that demonstrates 'many feel discursively excluded and not considered as belonging to the imagined construction of the Dutch nation' (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012: 728).

In conversation with Zineb, this symbiosis seems particularly apparent. Zineb identifies with and appeals to a civic "Dutchness" which she expresses as having a Dutch passport, yet apparently this offers no legitimate ground to others who label her an *allochtoon*, a foreigner in the school social setting. She seems apathetic to this situation and resigns in the fact that other people will not accept you as Dutch even if you proclaim to feel Dutch. In this regard, acceptance seems a dead end street where ethnic and ancestral motivations dictate and Zineb claims 'you will always have the foreign name and surname'.

ED: [...] and you were of course born and raised here?

Zineb: Yes, born! I simply came here, I came here.

ED: And how does that feel? How does that feel let's say...because you do have a Moroccan background..?

Zineb: Yes, I am simply allochtoon .

ED: Yes, does it feel to you like that, allochtoon?

Zineb: Yes. I am simply allochtoon.

ED: And you do not feel, not slightly Dutch?

Zineb: Look, you can feel Dutch, but you are simply allochtoon. I mean...

ED: Is that more because you feel that way or because other people see you as allochtoon?

Zineb: Other people simply see you like that. You are and you will remain a Moroccan.

ED: Ok. And how does that feel?

Zineb: How that feels?

ED: Does that feel weird or does it feel like...?

Zineb: It feels, no it is not nasty or something, but you simply have this something feeling of, you don't understand it.

ED: No.

Zineb: You don't understand it. But yes it is also simply, yes, especially now that I am doing this study and all, even in the classroom you will still be regarded as allochtoon.

ED: Really?

Zineb: Yes. So then I have this something feeling of, that is simply something that actually comes with it. Even if you have a Dutch passport or not, you are and you will remain a allochtoon.

ED: And even if you explain to people, do they then have a different...?

Zineb: Allochtoon.

The categorical term of *allochtoon* exemplifies how normative and discursive ideas of ancestry impact a Dutch national identity that is ethnically exclusionary.

This brings me to the second factor evidential of a “culturalist” attitude in Dutch society. As part of an assimilative integration discourse – discussed in chapter 4 – integration appeals are now increasingly voiced with an emphasis on cultural rather

than socio-economic conformance. In this regard, Dutch national identity is not only characterized as a liberally “superior” culture, but more importantly conflated with and historically embedded in “western” traditions, norms and values. As discussed in chapter 6, this phenomenon is particularly acute in societal and political attitudes towards Islam and the Muslim community. The portrayal of a superior Dutch culture provokes a differentiation discourse that assumes the presence of one dominant mono-Dutch national identity and neglects the reality of multilayered, contextual interpretations of “Dutchness”. Conformity to a superior Dutch culture is presented as a one-way street: it feeds into a “culturalist” demand for allegiance and loyalty that cannot be deterred.

Nergis manifests her worries about the ways in which Dutch values are represented in a superior light over others. She notes:

‘the biggest problem is, I think that, I don’t know if it is something with the colonial culture of the Netherlands, they have, in general if I look at the Netherlands, they have something like ‘we will tell you how it is all done and how it actually is supposed to be’. Like, our culture, of norms and values, western so to speak, that is superior to the rest of non-western [cultures]. That feeling, you often get that very strongly. Not with everyone of course. But that is something that people disseminate in general and that is something people do not like, because why should I myself feel inferior,...or see my culture as inferior to the autochthonous Dutchmen, say? I think that in both cultures there are very nice little things.’

In conversation with Nergis, it is clear that she manifests “Dutchness” as a negotiated sense of national and ethno-cultural belonging, which is under considerable pressure from demands for cultural conformance and allegiance. Nergis senses a hierarchical divide is made between a superior ‘they’ and inferior ‘others’. To explain this differentiation process she invokes cultural rather than ethnic terms where culture becomes a solidified emphasis on ‘norms and values’ alone. This terminological use reflects a Dutch society where social differences have become cultural differences that spiral the bifurcation between majority and minority cultures that each represent solidified, supposedly unproblematic ethnic

groups. On the surface, there might be a “culturalist” rationalization of difference, yet what comes to light is a focus on genealogical differences between a superior Dutch majority and inferior minorities in which the emphasis is on a clash of cultures as “civilizations”. In this sense,

culturalism can best be regarded as a ‘discourse of alterity’ that is an equivalent to racism and amounts to the normative observation based on a supposedly cultural distinction, instead of a natural one, as in the case of racism. Culturalism problematizes ‘cultures’ as such for their lack of adjustment to ‘Culture’, dubbed as ‘the dominant Dutch culture (Schinkel 2008: 18, 19)

In conclusion, most interviewees often felt they were not regarded as Dutch based on categorization processes that emphasize an ethnic Dutch national identity which seems to sustain differentiations between a Dutch-Dutch majority and Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish minority. Thus, there exists a perception of a Dutch identity that is solidified and conforming based on ethnic and ancestral markers. However, this does not automatically imply there has not been *any* space for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to negotiate a form of “Dutchness” that incorporates other aspects of identity, as I have discussed above. In part, this has been in fact a reaction to an increasingly conforming and exclusionary discourse and policy categorization. We need to verify further how these assimilative processes have impacted identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, which I will turn to now.

7.3.4 Consequences of categorization: retreating

I will briefly contemplate the impact and possible correlation, as I have done more extensively in chapter 6, of this exclusionary, “culturalist” and assimilative integrationist discourse with regards to “retreating” with which I mean to indicate the psychological as well as literal process (i.e. return migration to Morocco or Turkey) of 2nd generation individuals moving away from Dutch society. The assumption exists that feelings of “discursive” exclusion have led Dutch-Moroccans

and Dutch-Turkish individuals to emphasize more strongly their ethno-cultural identity of being Turkish/Moroccan *at the cost* of national belonging (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). For example, the online survey results indicated that being Moroccan/Turkish was an important identity marker, relatively more so for Dutch-Turkish than Dutch-Moroccan respondents. Whether a correlation exists between an assimilative integration discourse on the one hand, and stronger ethnic self-identification processes on the other, is a relationship more diffuse to uncover.

In the interviews, there were very few indications that “retreating”, as a process of greater ethnic self-identification, was omnipresent. Feelings of alienation and disengagement are however, evident in the interview with Zeynep. Again, we encounter struggles of belonging between an “individualized” notion of Dutch identity and the “traditionalist” dynamics of the Turkish family home and community. Yet, for Zeynep this conundrum does not enhance “in-between” identification processes: it is an absolute where the emphasis is on the *incompatibility* between rather than the *harmonization* of Dutch and Turkish ways of being. Whilst trying to “fit in”, encountered feelings of rejection have left Zeynep disengaged from any form of “Dutchness”.

You try so hard to participate, but you simply see, from your own upbringing, yes my parents are not very highly educated, yes my parents work and still do, but it is not like that they have enjoyed or attended a certain diploma. But if you then, if I then again looked back at people with whom I hung out with and maybe that again was another level of certain community, Dutch community, but I could not find any points of interest. They went to play hockey, they again went to do this, tennis, yes, or you go out, or I could not go out and then the reason was ‘yes my parents don’t allow it’, then it was like ‘yes why not?’, you know. ‘What is that, do you not have an own will or choice?’

Zeynep expresses that ‘being and doing like “they” do – again, an essentialist Dutch ethnic majoritarian “other” formalizes – has been counteractive in sustaining a sense of national attachment. Subsequently, Zeynep regrets “trying too hard” and

instead expresses her Turkish roots as central components to her perceptions of “self”. At the same time, she contemplates going back to her roots and moving to Turkey to build her future there.

I myself think, look, this is only a speculation mind you, but on the basis of what I have experienced myself and have seen with other Turks around me, how ‘Dutchified’ they sometimes are, how well they also participate with the Dutch community, at a certain moment you will actually come to a, you come to your senses that you think ‘hey, and yet I am Turkish’, that you actually finally retreat to your own roots. At least that’s what I have.

Zeynep seems to not only socially disengage from her Dutch-Dutch peers; she has the urge to physically retreat and expresses the wish to live in Turkey one day. This development of return migration whereby Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals are emigrating to the parental country of origin, has received some attention. As part of a public letter drafted by Dutch-Turkish professionals, Fatma Koser Kaya, a former MP for D66³⁹ confirmed that a considerable proportion of young, highly educated Dutch-Turks contemplated moving away in light of their increasingly “isolated” socio-economic and cultural position in the Netherlands (*NRC Handelsblad* 17 January 2011; *De Volkskrant* 10 January 2011).

Thoughts on return migration – or psychically retreating - were also expressed by other interviewees. For example, Kuzey who would not think of emigrating himself, expressed his worries about this development amongst some of his Dutch-Turkish friends. Similarly, Nergis told me she and her husband had contemplated moving to Turkey after events unfolded in light of the murder on Theo van Gogh. Although born and brought up in the Netherlands, Salima also remarked greater attachment to Morocco and the desire to move there. As her parents were the only family members who moved to the Netherlands, leaving the extended family behind in Morocco, she has been brought up with the idea that Morocco signifies the “true” homeland.

³⁹ Democrats ’66, Liberal Centre Party

Studies show that the desire for return migration seems particularly adamant amongst Dutch-Turks and to a lesser extent amongst Dutch-Moroccans (De Bree et al. 2010). In 2005, the CBS found that one in ten 18-27 year old Dutch-Turks had thought about moving to Turkey whilst only one in twenty Dutch-Moroccan youngsters had contemplated this option (website CBS 15 October 2005). Amongst Dutch-Turks this process seems more in flow than with Dutch-Moroccans. Reasons for this comparative divergence might be that – as I have also outlined in chapter 5 and 6 – the Turkish community represents a relatively stronger sense of ethnic harmonisation and affiliation whilst the Moroccan community is more diffuse in alliances. In this regard, a distinction is made between Dutch-Moroccans who appear more individualistic in their orientations of “self” and Dutch-Turks, whose identification processes are relatively more collectivist (Crul and Doornik 2003). Other explanations hint at socio-economic factors: Turkey, and the metropolitan city of Istanbul specifically, are economically thriving areas that offer career opportunities, development and self exploration (Vermeulen 2009).

Overall, however, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks try to make it work in the Netherlands. The truth remains that very few Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks have fully rejected Dutch identity; rather, individualized contemplations of “Dutchness” embody civically inclusive claims to a sense of national belonging. As ethnic affiliations are gradually fading as part of “traditional” assimilative processes, it is unlikely that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are to symbolically or physically retreat from Dutch society altogether.

7.4 Conclusion

The question “who can belong?” has been central to this chapter. To explore this research query, I have taken the concepts of home and belonging – themes important in migrant stories – and discussed these in relation to the discursive

contemplations of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. In this chapter, I focused on belonging – which I understand is multilayered and extendable to other forms of relationship - that directed two ways, namely as a sense of national identification as well as a form of ethno-cultural affiliations. This dualistic sense of belonging is particularly characteristic for 2nd generation individuals and hence relates to how Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks negotiate a sense of national belonging that does not exceed relations to an ethno-cultural background, family home and parental homeland.

In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks demonstrate an “in-between” contemplation of belonging. In conjunction with earlier observations made in chapter 5, interview participants often explained their own sense of national belonging, i.e. “Dutchness”, with reference to the Netherlands as a place of residence and opportunity- illuminating a civically “thin” claim to Dutch identity. In this sense, national belonging signifies an individualized, *chosen* claim to Dutch identity that does not neglect ethno-cultural affiliations of being Turkish/Moroccan. Hence it demonstrates a Dutch identity susceptible to multilayered and discursive contemplations of home and belonging. Yet, at the same time, this “thin” inclusionary notion to “Dutchness” gives reason to believe that these are claims chosen so as to not broach the “thicker” exclusionary concepts of Dutch national identity.

The fact that interviewees spoke extensively of feeling categorically excluded and differentiated from their Dutch-Dutch peers, hints at “thicker” exclusionary notions of Dutch national identity acting as regulatory markers to understand who is “in” and who is “out”. As such, some interviewees believed these dialectics of exclusion infused by ethnically “fixed” conceptions of Dutch national identity focusing on ancestral ties and lineage. As explained, the term ‘*allochtoon*’ – the terminological conception of which constitutes problematic definitions between being foreign and ancestral ties- is particularly characteristic of this “ethnic” dogma of “differentness”.

However, these “thicker” notions are best understood as part of a “culturalist” rhetoric– of which I also spoke in chapter 6 – that underscores an ethnically discursive exclusion of (white) Dutch versus non-Dutch. In this regard, the “embedded” and “essentialist” focus on cultural differences - fuelled by assimilative integration discourse as well as the legacy of “pillarized” multiculturalism – reinforces ethnic differentiations where cultures are presented as homogeneous, social groups corresponding to “ethnic” Dutch versus non-Dutch.

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION

8.1. Introduction

In this thesis, I set out to explore the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism in the knowledge that the theoretical basis to multiculturalism still offers valuable ways of thinking about incorporating diversity. Ultimately, the aim has been to create greater understanding of a shared, national belonging in a multicultural, democratic nation-state that acknowledges as well as bridges diversity into a sense of national togetherness. In order to unravel the specific markers susceptible to a shared understanding of national belonging, the focus has been on the cultural contours of national identification processes of individuals, according to a critical assessment of civic-ethnic dichotomies on nationalism. The main aim of this chapter is to expand upon the findings of this process (in section 8.3) concerning the Netherlands' experience with multiculturalism which has been central to this study. In this regard, The Netherlands has been an interesting case both for its "reputation" as *the* multicultural example as well as for its utter and devastating abandonment of multiculturalism as an approach to diversity. Subsequently, it offers an insight into multiculturalism as a flawed but nevertheless promising approach from which we can gather further knowledge as to its workable dynamics.

In short, this chapter offers a summary of my findings which in their turn might offer a humble contribution to larger discussions on the validity of multiculturalism and the characterization of nationalisms, national identification, culture and belonging (discussed in section 8.4).

To start, I will briefly discuss the methodological and theoretical limitations to the thesis.

8.2 Limitations

Superfluous to say, there are limitations to the research that should be pointed out and that might subsequently offer renewed views on (national) identification research. There are mainly limitations of a methodological nature. The most obvious is the one on the use of online surveys. As I discussed before, although anonymity and accessibility might facilitate research participation, there are obvious issues as to safeguarding the objectivity and truthfulness of the data obtained. For this reason and for the fact that no representative sample numbers could be collected, the online survey data could only be used in a preliminary manner; “gauging” the identification patterns of Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background.

These observations tie in with the overall difficulty of entering a research terrain that is, to an extent, “over researched”. One should be aware of possible ‘saturation’ before embarking on any data collection. A preliminary review of the research terrain should be undertaken to determine whether the research involves a heavily overburdened research group that might be “hostile” to any further research participation. In this regard, the involvement, help and trust of gatekeepers is important as they can play a determinate role in facilitating access and participation – something that could not be obtained in this research.

Another point of issue has been the struggle to find adequate and appropriate terminology to describe the participants’ demographic details – as children of 1st generation immigrants – as well as their identification positions. The use of hyphenated identities gives the impression of identity formation processes that are unproblematic which did not necessarily reflect perceptions and narratives displayed in the research. The use of ethnographic and participant observational techniques might play a part in resolving this difficulty: by observing the interactional spaces and contexts in which commonality and belonging is reached,

might we understand better the self-understanding characterizations used. This issue was not completely resolved here and would benefit from further consideration in future studies.

8.3 Findings and discussion

8.3.1 Belonging and identification in Dutch society: what the data suggests

Although data from the online surveys could not be taken at face value, it nonetheless offered some striking preliminary assumptions. Most importantly, it suggested that – in line with other studies - most Dutch individuals from both Moroccan and Turkish background do not consider themselves Dutch at all. Possibly, the first online survey question that was asked, “do you consider yourself Dutch”, was too categorical and too “hard” an association to be considered for respondents. This would confirm Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000) rejection of the analytical term *identity*, as a term insufficiently covering the multifaceted dimensions of *identity formation*. The online data also suggested that, wherever respondents did indicate to feel Dutch, they did so in consonance with feeling Muslim *and* Moroccan/Turkish. In short, the survey data suggested that to feel Dutch, if not problematic, is at least complicated.

On another note, the (online and ISSP) survey data appeared to confirm that civic aspects of Dutch national belonging – civil adherence, citizenship and residence – are indeed important to and thereby converge both majoritarian and minority viewpoints of national identity. Importance of ethnic aspects seemed negligible. Yet, (unintentional) outcomes of Dutch multiculturalist policies – discussed in chapter 4 –have also hinted at possible “ethnic undercurrents”, maybe most prolific in the Dutch adoption of the policy term *allochtoon*. The development of an assimilative integrationist discourse and the popularity of right wing, anti-Islam, populist politicians have possibly been obstructive elements as to the degree to

which national belonging and a shared sense of commonality has been sustained amongst individuals of both research groups.

As outlined, these preliminary findings gave rise to proceed with a discussion and investigation of Turner's self-categorization theory (1985) that outlines dialectics between stronger 'ingroup' association when encountering stronger 'outgroup' marginalisation. Previous studies on ethnic hierarchies, positioning and multiculturalism in the Netherlands have confirmed perceived notions exist amongst members of Moroccan and Turkish communities of a devalued sense of ethnic group association and status (eg. Schalk et al 2004). Studies also confirmed these individuals perceived to be more discriminated against compared to Dutch peers.

These indications were expanded upon in the qualitative chapters. With regards to identifying as being Muslim (chapter 6), it appeared some interviewees explicitly linked feelings of 'categorical othering' to a further identification and exploration of a Muslim "self". Many indicated this ongoing process apparent in their social surroundings, but did not necessarily apply this to their own identification processes. Comparatively speaking, Dutch individuals of Moroccan descent, relatively more so than their Turkish peers, demonstrated stronger self-identification processes of being Muslim, whilst respondents of Turkish heritage appear more inclined to identify with their Turkish background.

However, this increasing exploration of Muslim identity amongst Dutch-Moroccans does not necessarily signify their retreatment and/or differentiation *from* Dutch society. Rather, most interviewees- both Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks - appeared to negotiate and incorporate an "individualized" Muslim identity as part of their "Dutchness" that corresponds to adjoining religious and national identification processes of "self". That is because a negotiated, individualized Muslim identity not only tackles issues of categorization and "caging": it also defies

certain traditional, community conceptions of Islam –illuminating a generational anomaly. In short, this individualized negotiation indicates a civically “neutral” sphere and sense of Dutch identification that is susceptible to these religious identification contemplations of being Muslim.

Subsequently, these outcomes set straight two difficulties in “traditional” multiculturalism theory. Firstly, it indicates that multiculturalist policies should give up the promotion of cultural *collectives* rather than individuals’ cultural integrity and explorations. Secondly, that national identification plays a part in “bridging” differences and differentiations. Grassroots multiculturalism can play a part in identifying these dynamics in which individuals search and choose similarity and difference, categorization and affiliation: the tools and labels individuals appropriate as part of identification processes gives us greater insight into the ways in which multicultural diversity can be accommodated and acknowledged.

However, this does not mean that national belonging - as a cohesive notion and sense of “sameness” and “commonality” - appeared unproblematic for participants in this research: the obstructive (perceived) tendencies seem to hamper this idea of national “sameness”.

8.3.2 The relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism

The theoretical underpinnings to this study emerged from my notion to revisit rather than discard multiculturalism as a valuable yet flawed approach to dealing with diversity. Following a critical examination of multiculturalism theory, I identified two problematic factors. The first concerned the manner in which multiculturalism intends to assert the official acknowledgment and sponsoring of cultures by taking to the endorsement of cultural groups rather than individuals with a diverse cultural background. In this sense, the recognition of cultural diversity is prone to the enforcement of rigidly defined cultural collectives. I have

argued that this process has enhanced a form of cultural essentialism, not the least exacerbated by the focus on bonding communities rather than bridging these collectives into a sense of national attachment and belonging.

The case of the Netherlands appears to confirm this issue at the heart of multiculturalism. Dutch 1970s and 1980s “pillarized multiculturalism” - influenced by pillarization legacies of the Netherlands’ 1950s approach to societal stratification- envisioned the socio-economic emancipation of ethno-cultural communities rather than individuals. With the creation and sustainment of ethnic *pillars*, treated as socio-culturally cohesive and homogeneous, cultural diversity appeared “manageable”. Yet, it proved problematic nonetheless, especially because these ethnic stratifications often did not correspond to the complex social reality and ethnic make-up of these collectives (think of the ‘Foreign Workers’ category).

With the focus on bonding, the practical implementation to “pillarized multiculturalism” meant the endorsement of ethnic minorities *vis-à-vis* a Dutch majority, thereby adding to the *minorising* of difference (Rath 1991) and the discursive alienation and social segregation of individual migrants. In this sense, the Dutch case also highlights the crucial issue of ‘social caging’ (Hall 2003) which, as a consequence of treating communities as “natural” embodiments of cultures, in fact compromises the individual’s cultural integrity, creating individuals to feel a sense of being ‘caged’ according to an essentialist notion of culture *as* collective.

In the Netherlands, the issue of ‘caging’ has been most visible due to the prolonged effect it has had on the ways in which difference is currently weighed and judged. This process is best described as taken to a discursive ‘habitus’ of understanding diversity in categorical and essentialist terms (Ghorashi 2006), focusing on cultures as groups and hereby neglecting individual particularities of “self”. Even though ISSP survey results do not necessarily demonstrate less inclusive (civic) majoritarian considerations of Dutch national identity, data from the online survey and

interviews does broadly resonate and reflect perceived notions of a 'caging' and essentialist majoritarian viewpoint. Especially in the interviews, many respondents made explicit this "embedded" notion of categorical exclusion as to the validity and legitimacy of their claims to "Dutchness". Preliminary findings in the online surveys also point to national identification processes that are problematic: most respondents did not indicate to feel Dutch at all and if they did, chose multiple identity labels of being Dutch, Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish.

Especially with regards to respondents' contemplations of Muslim identity, this categorically "embedded" notion of difference appears to sustain – in consonance with (inter)national events causing socio-political turmoil and creating a heightened awareness for Islam and Muslim communities – an attitude of "us versus them" that focuses on differences rather than similarity.

Hence, the Dutch case demonstrates – as I have argued - for the necessity to focus on the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism, between the acknowledgment of diversity and the ways in which this diversity is accommodated as part of national belonging and sustained membership. This highlights the second problematic inherent in multiculturalism in which insufficient importance is given to the idea of 'bridging' diversity, focusing on a shared national sense of togetherness. The Dutch case of "pillarized multiculturalism" illuminates the flawed workings of multiculturalism in the form of bonding rather than bridging, 'social caging' and the prolonged sustainment of essentialist ways of thinking about diversity. To avoid the categorical enforcement of differentialist majority-minority dynamics, the focus should be on individual interpretations and experiences of "self" in order to find the aspects to national identification that sustain a shared sense of national belonging. This is perhaps not so much a form of nation-building, but rather renewed ways of looking at what comprises national identification and the labels used.

In this sense, I argue for a conceptual framework that links notions of grassroots multiculturalism with that of personal nationalism in which individual contemplations are central to understanding better the dimensions of “self” and the rules, tools and labels used in processes of (national) association and differentiation. Grassroots multiculturalism takes into account the positions and interpretations – the plural dimensions – of culture used and reworked amongst dynamics of identification and positioning. At the same time, personal nationalism reviews those individual contemplations and interpretations that position national identification processes that at the same time add to an ‘imagined’ sense of national belonging. The two theoretical concepts merge the intricacies of individual identification processes and the perceived and used labels and mechanisms that, when studied, unravel the contours of a national belonging that is cohesive and accepting of multicultural associations.

8.3.3 The civic-ethnic dichotomy: its flaws and workability

To understand and explore the (cultural) contours and labels of national belonging, I have outlined the role of culture as a “tool” in social and individual identification processes that is both idiosyncratic and yet formalizes a sense of national “self” and identity. It is the interplay between these two dynamics that has been central to the discussion on finding the aspects conducive to a shared national belonging. In this regard, primordialist versus modernist theories on the constitution of nation-states— above all else - highlight the role of national culture in creating, shaping and formalizing a sense of imagined “unitedness”. Yet at the same time, I have made explicit that national identity, culture and belonging are also to be understood as constructed, flexible processes subject to change (Barth 1969; Cohen 1996) - which offers us a promising outlook for re-assessing what sort of national belonging unites and is unifying. Therefore, the question remains whether we can utilize classifications of national culture to sufficiently identify the cultural factors inherent

in national identity without essentializing culture as a “natural” process of establishing similarity and difference.

Inherent to this discussion, is the critical exploration of civic-ethnic dichotomies which has been central to this study. In chapter 2 and 5, I discussed the issues involving civic-ethnic classifications of nationalism. In summary, the main criticism towards this dichotomy is that civic-ethnic representations of nationalism often imply we can clearly distinguish between civic assertions of nationhood that are chosen rather than –ethnically – ascribed, and are therefore favourable to inclusively “thin” rather than exclusively “thick” notions of national identity.

With this comment in mind, this study critically assessed the validity of civic-ethnic dichotomies in understanding national culture and identification to, subsequently, take away from it an informed and renewed viewpoint of what sort of national belonging (discussed further in section 8.3.3) complements the theoretical incentives to multiculturalism. With reference to the Dutch case, two main concluding observations can be made concerning the civic-ethnic dichotomy.

8.3.3.1 Exchangeability between civic and ethnic aspects

First and foremost, the case of the Netherlands confirms – in line with Yack (1999) - the presence and *interchangeability* rather than *incompatibility* between civic and ethnic aspects that both add to the cultural embodiment of national identification. Here, the search has been to understand the degree of perceived commonality and connectedness through observing the adoption and use of civic and ethnic labels to engineer a sense of national belonging.

Overall, it appears Dutch national identity is mainly thought of in civic terms. Results from the ISSP survey demonstrated that respondents (who can be considered as representative of a Dutch majority) were indeed prone to classify Dutch national

identity as predominantly civic, giving considerable importance to respecting democratic institutions and having Dutch citizenship as two key civic aspects. Renewed stipulations of Dutch citizenship, integration and immigration laws also make visible the encouragement of a civic interpretation of Dutch national identity which asks of (short and long-term) immigrants an 'active' citizenship: participation, civic responsibility and speaking the language are firm yet civic-inclusive aspects to a sense of national membership.

Nonetheless, these civic connotations to understanding Dutch national identity, and the ways in which these are portrayed and articulated, are inherently and implicitly linked to ethnic markers of nationhood. That is because, with the gradual abandonment of Dutch multiculturalism and the emergence of an (extreme) civic assimilative integration discourse, the focus on bridging (rather than bonding) is now increasingly stipulated with regards to a Dutch culture that is not only framed as the civic epitome of liberal-political values, but more importantly, as the embodiment of civic values that are supposedly, inherently "Dutch" and corresponding to a historic past, tradition and civilization. The dominant civic emphasis on and portrayal of Dutch national identity - most notably advocated by politicians such as Bolkestein, Fortuyn and Wilders – appears to make implicit, the "submerged" ethnic undertones of Dutch national belonging that implicate civic dimensions as embedded in ancestrally tied and historical continuation of national unity. In this sense, demands for allegiance and conformity highlight the emergence of a 'moral' or "culturalist" Dutch national identity that exaggerates its *civic* dimensions to underscore the *ethnic* dimensions of a Dutch culture that is supposedly superior over "others".

This "culturalist" notion seems particularly visible in the ways in which the participants appropriated and identified with a sense of being Muslim in line with a sense of being Dutch. The fact that Dutch culture appears posited as the epitome of civil-political and democratic values and norms feeds into the incompatibility and

exclusion of the Muslim “other”. In this sense, “essentialist” differentiations appear to underwrite ethnic undercurrents between a non-Muslim, Dutch-Dutch majority and a Muslim, non-Dutch minority. As discussed, self-understanding processes reactional to these perceived categorical differentiations, has resulted in an apparent, increased exploration of Muslim identity. Yet, these identification processes do not necessarily signify retreatment and/or differentiation *from* Dutch society. Rather, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to negotiate and incorporate an “individualized” Muslim identity as part of their “Dutchness” that corresponds to adjoining religious and national identification processes of “self”. A negotiated, individualized Muslim identity not only tackles issues of categorization, “caging” and traditional, community conceptions of Islam –illuminating a generational anomaly - it also appeals to a civically “neutral” Dutch identity that is susceptible to these religious identification contemplations of being Muslim. In this sense, the “traditional” idea of multiculturalism – as to the promotion and acceptance of cultural collectives rather than cultural integrity of individuals- does not completely hold anymore.

The “culturalist” attitude and discourse towards Dutch national belonging is reflected – as I have demonstrated in chapter 5, 6 and 7 - in the responses from both survey and interviews where Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants predominantly assessed their own “Dutchness” in relatively neutral, “thinner” rather than “thicker” notions of Dutch identity, most notably in the idea of residence and opportunity. This suggests that – in part – civic dimensions of Dutch national identification do offer Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents space to claim a sense of “Dutchness”. However, it also explicates that these contemplations might not be chosen as such, but conditional and adjusted to “thicker”, ethnic undertones of Dutch national associations that prevented respondents from claiming part or at all a Dutch identity they felt would be accepted. Rather, as the survey and interview data exposes, a sense of “inbetweenness” is sustained.

There is further indication to understanding Dutch national identity according to more explicitly exposed ethnic dimensions. In this regard, ethnic markers of nationhood are not used specifically to refer to what it means to be Dutch – as the ISSP data demonstrates – but most importantly to who is not. The problematic policy-term of “*allochtoon*” symbolizes the explicit manner in which an ethnic characterization of Dutch national identity has sustained an understanding of differences as an embedded belief in ancestral ties and past which thereby underscores the ethnic bias to who is Dutch and who is not.

Hence, the Dutch case demonstrates that civic-ethnic dichotomies are flawed by suggesting that normative and clear-cut distinctions exist between civic and ethnic nations. Rather, acknowledging the diffuseness rather than incompatibility between civic and ethnic markers, illuminated through identification processes of appropriating and differentiating, sets us off in new directions for understanding national belonging.

This observation also adds to the discussion regarding the second problematic inherent in multicultural theory where the incorporation and acknowledgement of diversity tends to be treated as enhanced solely through the civil-political frameworks of nationhood and citizenship. The Dutch case demonstrates that to think of the contours of nation-states as mere “neutral” dispositions in which an “idealized” shared membership must add to the incorporation of diversity, is a misjudgement. Cultural dynamics within national identification implicate both civic and ethnic representations of nationhood that are accommodated, engineered and appropriated in identification processes and failing to acknowledge these aspects might have severe consequences for the fruitful acceptance and incorporation of multicultural diversity.

8.3.3.2 Civic-inclusive versus ethnic-exclusive

In addition to acknowledging the entwinement of civic and ethnic markers for understanding the cultural make-up of national identity, the abovementioned conclusions also highlight the need to reject normative – good/bad; inclusive/exclusive – associations connected to the civic-ethnic dichotomy. As outlined in chapter 2, civic dimensions of national identity – having a passport, adhering to democratic rule etc. – tend to be treated as objective, inclusive and “chosen” norms conducive to furthering the incorporation of diversity. In contrast, ethnic aspects of nationhood – place of birth, a belief in shared kinship ties and past – are “ascribed” and therefore considered more subjective, exclusive and obstructive dynamics for enhancing integration and national belonging.

Although these normative associations are often used to underline differentiations between civic and ethnic forms of nationhood, the case of the Netherlands makes visible the need to reject these assumptions. As outlined above, the Dutch case confirms that civic portrayals of nationhood do not necessarily indicate more inclusive or “neutral” ways of thinking about a shared national identity. In fact, the “culturalist” manner in which “Dutch” liberal-political, civic values are posited opposite illiberal “others”, establishes a “civicness” that is exclusionary rather than inclusionary. For this reason, “thicker” and “thinner” notions of nationhood are possibly more appropriate terms for understanding the inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries of national culture, thereby avoiding these normative associations of good/bad, objective/subjective etc.

On another note, data confirms that belonging, i.e. “Dutchness”, with reference to the Netherlands as a place of residence and opportunity- illuminated a civically “thin” claim to Dutch identity. In this sense, national belonging signifies an individualized, *chosen* claim to Dutch identity that does not neglect ethno-cultural affiliations of being Turkish/Moroccan. Hence it demonstrates a Dutch identity

susceptible to multilayered and discursive contemplations of home and belonging. Yet, at the same time, this “thin” inclusionary notion to “Dutchness” gives reason to believe that these are claims chosen so as to not broach the “thicker” exclusionary concepts of Dutch national identity.

In summary, this thesis has demonstrated the problematic connected to the civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalisms. However, this critical discussion has also provided an insight into its workability and the manner in which “thicker” and “thinner” markers of national identity operate. From this, we can move forward and start thinking about renewed ways of thinking about the incorporation of multicultural diversity, provided we acknowledge that the cultural contours of national identity encompass both civic and ethnic characterizations.

8.3.4 Civil nationalism?

This brings us to finally draw some tentative conclusions with regards to the main research query of this study which was to provide renewed insights into the cultural contours of national identity and the markers most conducive to the accommodation and acknowledgment of diversity into a shared sense of national belonging and membership.

To conclude, the cultural contours of national identity should be understood as an ever-changing interplay between civic *and* ethnic markers of nationhood. Therefore, to (over-)emphasize only particularly civic *or* ethnic characteristics, is to neglect the complexity as well as the particularity inherent to national belonging. By this I mean that national identity is best understood as a meaning-making process that is “individualized”, subject to change and in which culture acts as a vehicle to creating a sense of (national) “self”. In other words, renewed ways of thinking about national belonging might necessitate us to focus on national identification processes in which individuals illuminate civil contemplations, that take as its core individual integrity, tolerance, respect and equality.

A “civil” sense of national belonging not only harmonizes the duality of culture – which I discussed, involves culture as a tool in social and individual identification processes as well as a formalizing force of national belonging – but it also avoids cultural essentialism. In this sense, it accommodates a grassroots multiculturalism approach that focuses on individual contemplations and associations that illuminate the processual meaning making processes of “self”.

In other words, it acknowledges and yet purposively ignores both the cultural – civic and ethnic- particularity of the nation-state and the multiculturalism of society. This ‘civil nationalism’ then, constitutes the idea that individuals retain and embrace cultural belonging and that – on the basis of equal plurality – a shared national belonging can be established. This bears some reference to Hall’s (2003) ‘civil nationalism’ which – as I briefly expanded upon in chapter 2 – explicates the role of individual freedom to sustain a sense of cultural belonging *privately* as part of a liberal-political ‘common belonging’ that is upheld *publicly*.

Yet my idea of ‘civil nationalism’ is probably better connected to Tamir’s idea of ‘liberal nationalism’ (1993). Tamir emphasizes the idea of individual choice – as set in liberal tradition – to be of importance for enhancing a shared sense of national membership that simultaneously underlines and acknowledges the intrinsic value of cultural diversity and backgrounds yet bridges this into a national membership that is shared through morally universal norms and values inherent to individual autonomy and liberal tradition. Tamir outlines:

The idea of the person developed in this work, the “contextual individual”, combines individuality and sociability as two equally genuine and important features. It allows for an interpretation of liberalism that is aware of the binding constitutive character of cultural and social memberships, together with an interpretation of nationalism that conceives of individuals as free and autonomous participants in a communal framework, who conceive of national membership in Renan’s terms, as a daily plebiscite (1993: 33).

This idea of liberal or civil nationalism resolves certain issues at the heart of multiculturalism which have been discussed in this thesis. For one, the focus on the individual, and individual choice and freedom, tackles multiculturalism's proneness to 'caging' individuals according to an essentialist idea of cultural communities and collectives. Rather, the multicultural dynamics of society are acknowledged as constituted in individual identification processes where a sense of "self" is formed according to diverse, cultural and social associations. Secondly, civil nationalism resolves issues of "ascribed" and "chosen" aspects of national culture: inherent to this form of nationalism is the idea of individual choice to reinforce a sense of national belonging that takes into account different aspects of national culture. Civil nationalism advocates the public awareness, respect and acknowledgment for diversity, yet emphasizes the private ways in which this cultural identity is reinforced and sustained.

8.4 Future outlooks

First and foremost, this research has offered a valuable "snapshot" of a country - that reflected upon itself as *the* multicultural example - in multiculturalist disarray. In this sense, the research demonstrates tendencies in socio-political processes that are sweeping many parts of Europe as well: most notably, the rise and popularity of (extreme) right wing populist parties in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. The abandonment of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, as a policy approach to incorporating diversity, brought about public debates and discussion centred around extremism in (Islamic) schools, segregation in big cities, gender subordination, violence and genital mutilation/honour killings etc. These debates resemble many ongoing discussions in other countries too and therewith the research ties in comparatively with more general developments of our time that are apparent.

As to the curious case of Dutch multiculturalism, it has been characteristic of a highly institutionalized, socio-economic policy approach which (unintentionally) “bonded” and “caged” individuals according to rigid categorical perceptions of cultural associations. Even when it was somewhat rejected and replaced by integrationist policies in the 1990s, discursively, the categorization of cultures and “othering” lingered and persisted, offering obstructive and difficult “bridging” incentives into a shared sense of national belonging. This highly institutionalized approach to multiculturalism sets the Netherlands somewhat apart in comparison to other interpretations of multiculturalism, most notably the US or UK. In both these countries, British and American national belonging appear more civic in character, incentivizing more private rather than (top-down) public negotiations of “self”. In parts, it has appeared to spur a process of hyphenation that lacks in national identification processes in the Netherlands. Future studies might look to compare between institutionalized and disintegrated forms of multiculturalism to determine how national belonging and “commonality” has progressed (or not).

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APPENDIX 1

Survey questionnaire

NATIONAL IDENTITY

First of all thank you for your cooperation!

This research is about national identity. This survey is part of that research which is undertaken at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.

Please fill in all questions that apply to your situation.

There are no good or bad answers, it is simply about your personal opinion and situation.

[NEXT PAGE]

Who you are, can be interpreted in many different ways, in many different situations.

- 1. *Still, if you had to choose, do you then see yourself as...? (multiple answers possible)***

[Multiple answers possible]

- 1.1 Dutch*
- 1.2 Moroccan/Turkish*
- 1.3 Muslim*

[FILTER 1: if option 1.1 included → (also) to question 2 and 3]

[FILTER 2: if option 1.2 included → (also) to question 4]

[FILTER 3: if option 1.3 included → (also) to question 6]

- 2. *Based on what aspects would you call yourself Dutch? (multiple answers possible)***

[Multiple answers possible]

- 2.1 I speak the Dutch language*
- 2.2 I live in the Netherlands*
- 2.3 I was born in the Netherlands*
- 2.4 I feel Dutch*
- 2.5 One or both of my parents were born in the Netherlands*
- 2.6 I have a Dutch passport*
- 2.7 Different, namely...*

3. How proud are you of being Dutch?

[Single answer only]

- 3.1 *Very proud*
- 3.2 *Somewhat proud*
- 3.3 *Neutral*
- 3.4 *Not very proud*
- 3.5 *Not proud at all*

[NEXT PAGE]

4. How proud are you of being Moroccan?

[Single answer only]

- 4.1 *Very proud*
- 4.2 *Somewhat proud*
- 4.3 *Neutral*
- 4.4 *Not very proud*
- 4.5 *Not proud at all*

5. If you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you are?

[Single answer only]

- 5.1 *I feel more Moroccan/Turkish than Dutch*
- 5.2 *I feel equally Moroccan/Turkish and Dutch*
- 5.3 *I feel more Dutch than Moroccan/Turkish*
- 5.4 *I don't know*

6. How proud are you of being Muslim?

[Single answer only]

- 6.1 *Very proud*
- 6.2 *Somewhat proud*
- 6.3 *Neutral*
- 6.4 *Not very proud*
- 6.5 *Not proud at all*

7. Again, if you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you are?

[Single answer only]

- 7.1 *I feel more Muslim than Moroccan/Turkish*
- 7.2 *I feel equally Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish*
- 7.3 *I feel more Moroccan/Turkish than Muslim*
- 7.4 *I don't know*

8. Again, if you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you are?

[Single answer only]

- 8.1 *I feel more Muslim than Dutch*
- 8.2 *I feel equally Muslim and Dutch*
- 8.3 *I feel more Dutch than Muslim*
- 8.4 *I don't know*

[NEXT PAGE]

9. A Dutch person is someone who...(multiple answers possible)

[Multiple answers possible]

- 9.1 *has a Dutch passport*
- 9.2 *speaks the Dutch language*
- 9.3 *was born in the Netherlands*
- 9.4 *has parents who were born in the Netherlands*
- 9.5 *celebrates certain traditions (for example, Sinterklaas)*
- 9.6 *Different, namely*

10. Based on which of the following terms would you characterize Dutch society? (multiple answers possible)

[Multiple answers possible]

- 10.1 *Democratic*
- 10.2 *Respect for other cultures*
- 10.3 *Fair*
- 10.4 *Freedom*
- 10.5 *Discriminating*
- 10.6 *Antipathetic*
- 10.7 *Intolerant*
- 10.8 *Unequal*
- 10.9 *Multicultural*
- 10.10 *Different, namely*

[NEXT PAGE]

11. How proud are you of the Netherlands in terms of the following things?

[Single answer only per statement]

- 11.1 *The ways in which Dutch democracy works*
- 11.2 *The social security system for people who need support*
- 11.3 *The Dutch armed forces*
- 11.4 *Dutch history*
- 11.5 *Dutch art and literature*
- 11.6 *Dutch economy*
- 11.7 *Dutch achievements in sport*

[For every statement choose one of the following levels:

1. Very proud
2. Somewhat proud
3. Neutral
4. Not very proud
5. Not proud at all
6. Don't know]

[NEXT PAGE]

12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

[Single answer only per statement]

- 12.1 *Every individual in the Netherlands has an equal position and equal opportunities*
- 12.2 *It is cultural diversity that makes Dutch society original and valuable*
- 12.3 *In the Netherlands the Muslim community is discriminated*
- 12.4 *Geert Wilders is a danger to the stability within Dutch society*

[For every statement choose one of the following levels:

1. Strongly AGREE
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly DISAGREE
6. Don't know]

[NEXT PAGE]

13. Here are some more statements. Please state which ones are applicable to you.

[Single answer only per statement]

13.1 As an individual I feel accepted in Dutch society

13.2 I have the feeling I am respected for who I am

13.3 I feel excluded from Dutch society

13.4 I do not believe the government cares about my opinion concerning Dutch society

[For every statement choose one of the following levels:

1. Strongly AGREE
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly DISAGREE
6. Don't know]

[NEXT PAGE]

14. Are you...?

[Single answer only]

14.1 Man

14.2 Woman

15. What is your age?

.....

16. What is your place of residence?

....

17. What is your marital status?

[Single answer only]

17.1 Married

17.2 Single

17.3 Divorced

17.4 Not living together, in a relationship married

17.5 Living together, not married

18. In what country/countries were you and your parents born?

[Single answer only per item]

	18.1.You	18.2Father	18.3Mother
Morocco	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Netherlands	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Somewhere else	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

19. What is your highest education?

[Single answer only]

- 19.1 Primary education
- 19.2 LBO (lower vocational education)
- 19.3 VMBO (preparatory secondary vocational education)
- 19.4 HAVO (senior general secondary education)
- 19.5 VWO (pre-university secondary education)
- 19.6 MBO (vocational college education)
- 19.6 HBO (higher vocational college education)
- 19.7 University

20. What is your most important daily occupation? (max. 2 answers possible)

[Multiple answers possible: max. 2 answers]

- 20.1 Full-time work
- 20.2 Part-time work
- 20.3 Student
- 20.4 Unemployed
- 20.5 Different, namely ...

21. Can you state which passports you have in your possession?

[Single answer only]

- 21.1 Dutch passport
- 21.2 Moroccan/Turkish passport
- 21.3 Dutch and Moroccan/Turkish passport
- 21.4 Different, namely ...

22. What is your belief?

[Single answer only]

- 22.1 Islam
- 22.2 Christian
- 22.3 Jewish

22.4 None

22.5 Different, namely...

[NEXT PAGE]

It is very much appreciated if you want to participate further in this research in the form of an interview.

[SPACE FOR EMAIL ADDRESS]

Thank you very much for filling in these questions! If you have any questions, comments or more information, you can note these down here:

[SPACE FOR COMMENTS]

[CLOSE WINDOW]

APPENDIX 2

Interview guide experts (1) – representatives

INTRODUCTION	{ (- Tell about my own research)
INTEGRATION/ CITIZENSHIP	{ - What is your understanding of integration and active citizenship? - How would you describe the balance between integrating into one culture and simultaneously maintaining another?
PROJECTS/ ACHIEVEMENTS	{ - What are the most important projects that have been a “success” in terms of enhancing the integration of the Turkish/Moroccan/ Muslim community? And why? - Also what are the most important goals/objectives that have not yet been achieved, things you would like to see changed? And why?
CLIMATE	{ - When taking into account the current social and political climate in the Netherlands with regards to integration, can we say things are bad or simply worse in the Netherlands?
GRASSROOTS IDENTITY	{ - How would you describe those grassroots supporters? - To what extent do people consider themselves Turkish, Muslim and/or Dutch?

APPENDIX 3

Interview guide experts (2) – academics

Prof. Dr. Nico Landman
Utrecht, 27 april 2010

INTRODUCTION {
(- Tell about my own research)
(- Ask Dr. Landman about his current research)

**MULTICULTURALISM/
INTEGRATION** {
- Can we speak of a sort of ‘pillarized multiculturalism’
when it comes to the Netherlands?
- If so, are we seeing the emergence of an Islamic
pillar?

Your extensive research [on Muslim communities in NL] proves to demonstrate that the Muslim community in the Netherlands is greatly splintered across hundreds of different organisations devolved at different levels.

**MUSLIM
COMMUNITY** {
- Do you see this divisiveness as positive/negative? Does it
obscure or actually add to a well presented
community?

- EMANCIPATION** {
- Can we speak of a process of emancipation amongst Muslims? (Imam college degrees? Building of mosques?)
 - Specific to the 2nd/3rd generation: how do they interpret their religious identity? Are they increasingly preoccupied doing so?
 - [In this regard], can we detect certain distinctness between the Moroccan/Turkish community?
- CLIMATE** {
- Is there still consideration/space for this process of emancipation when taking into account the current social and political climate in the Netherlands?

In your research the focus is on the Turkish Muslim community. In the latest (governmental) report on integration it appears Turkish youngsters – more so than Moroccan youngsters - are increasingly “withdrawing”.

- [continued] {
- Is this a development you have noticed as well?

Prof. Dr. Han Entzinger
Rotterdam, 20 april 2010

- INTRODUCTION** {
- (- Tell about my own research)
 - (- Ask Dr. Entzinger about his current research)

- MULTICULTURALISM/** {
- Can we speak of a sort of ‘pillarized multiculturalism’ when it comes to the Netherlands?

INTEGRATION

- If so, are we seeing the emergence of an Islamic pillar?

CLIMATE

- Is a cohesive, multicultural society still achievable in the Netherlands when taking into account the current [social and political] climate?
- Young people have little faith in politicians/government?

From your research projects [longitudinal surveys], one interesting result I found, is that few (survey) respondents chose the 'Don't know' answer in questions concerning identity.

RESEARCH IDENTITY

themselves

- Do you have an explanation for that? Why do you think that people feel the need to choose -or at least have an informed choice ready - when it concerns their identity?
- What are your ideas about which – religious or ethnic – marker of identification is likely to gradually fade (or remain key) where people are to further integrate and feel rooted in Dutch society?

From your research, it is apparent that many young people with a Turkish/Moroccan background do not identify very much with an idea of being Dutch.

[continued]

- Have you been able to detect how these youngsters would generally characterize/typify 'Dutch-being' or the 'Dutchman'? What views do they have about these normative concepts?

In conversations I had with representatives of various organizations, it was emphasized that the 2nd/3rd generations define their Dutch identity in predominantly in civic values: the right to freedom, freedom of religion etc.

[continued]

- Have you also noticed this development concerning the ways in which these youngsters interpret their own sense of being Dutch?

APPENDIX 4

Interview guide - individual interviews

work/study,
INTRODUCTION

- Tell about my own research and myself
- Let the interviewee talk and elaborate on him/herself:
 - family, place of residence [demographics]
 - What work do you do and/or study are you undertaking? (let interviewee describe their work/study environment and social dynamics)
 - (parents' life story/2nd generation) What differences do you encounter between you and your parents in terms of identification processes and (social) position in the Netherlands?

**IDENTITY/
SELF**

Muslim)?

are

regards to

might

- How would you describe yourself? (What nationality?)
- Would you always describe yourself in this way or do you feel that in certain circumstances/moments this might be different? (work; holiday etc.)
- Are you proud of...(being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish, Muslim)?
- How do you see yourself in Dutch society?
- (If applicable, connection with parents' motherland/culture: these important to you and why?)
- Is your religious identity important to you?
- In which ways do you give express this?
- Do you feel it easy to combine your religious identity with Dutch society?
- (if applicable: headscarf? What are the public reactions you encounter?)

**IDENTITY/
BEING DUTCH?**

- What associations do I invoke when I say the terms “being Dutch”/ Dutch nationality”? (Be alert for civic/ethnic aspects: e.g democratic values, where you are from)

Government has a certain idea about what Dutch nationality should encompass: people that are new to the Netherlands need to be able to learn the language, they need to pass a civic integration test. In other words, Dutch government has specified as to what Dutch nationality should entail.

[continued]
What would

- What should Dutch nationality entail according to you?
be your focus

CLIMATE

- Do you believe your opinion is being heard by Dutch government? If yes/no, why?
- Do you think it is the same for other [autochthonous] Dutch people? Do you believe they [both government/people] care about a multicultural society or not? (- Geert Wilders?)
- Do you feel there are strong/ “weak” prejudices with regards to the Muslim, Turkish/Moroccan community?