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America's Inconsistent Foreign Policy to Africa; a Case Study of Apartheid South
Africa

A thesis
presented to
the Department of History
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Masters of Arts in History

by
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August 2018

Dr. Daryl Carter, Chair
Dr. Henry Antkiewicz
Prof. Elwood Watson

Keywords: Apartheid, Foreign Policy, Cold war, Africa

ABSTRACT

America's Inconsistent Foreign Policy to Africa; a Case Study of Apartheid South

Africa

by

Olugbenga Samson Ojewale

This study lays bare the inconsistencies in the United States of America's Foreign Policy, and how it contributed to the longevity of apartheid in South Africa.

Michael Mandelbaum opined that America's foreign policy post-Cold War era drifted from containment to transformation.¹ America became involved with transferring their democracy and constitutional order to the countries they entangled with in running those countries' internal governance. Instead of war, America preached and practiced proper, organized governance. Thus, America's foreign policy to Europe and Asia post-Cold War was all about democracy and protection of fundamental human rights.

However, the role of America's Foreign Policy in Africa took a turn in Africa, with Congo in 1960, Ghana in 1966 and Nigeria with their successive military regimes. This study intends to make sense of it all.

¹ Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2016),3.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

United States of America is known to be a trailblazer, front-runner and pioneer of democracy, rule of law, freedom and respect for fundamental human rights for citizens of the world. It is a known fact that the United States of America stands for democratic rule which is indeed the face of their foreign policy. Joyce P. Kaufman, in detailing and proving democracy as the beacon of America's foreign policy, quoted the arguments of some of the founding fathers of America, especially Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, on 'whether the United States be involved with the world or not? Is it the responsibility of the United States to help spread democracy?'² Hence, democracy and the rule of law are not just the foreign policy of America but the very basis of her existence and history. Thus, America's foreign policy to Europe and Asia post-Cold War was all about democracy and protection of fundamental human rights. However, the inconsistency in this famed policy was laid bare in Africa. What America preached against and discouraged elsewhere became conspicuously seen in some parts of Africa.

Why America would support sustained anti-democratic and segregationist rule throws up many questions which we shall try to answer in this study.

The inconsistencies in the American foreign policy contributed to the longevity of apartheid. For almost fifty years, apartheid thrived in South Africa as the minority

² Joyce P. Kaufman, *A Concise History of U.S Foreign Policy*, New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

whites controlled the affairs of the southern African nation while maligning the black majority, and committing great fundamental human rights crimes in the process.

Virtually all the American presidents who were in power during the apartheid regime in South Africa refused to see apartheid as a fundamental problem, but an opportunity for alliance in the Cold War and the war against communism. The country's precious minerals, its strategic location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of American and the West's policy of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the several excuses cited by previous United States presidencies for encouraging the National Party of South Africa and its policies in Pretoria.

This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise in 1994, two years after Reagan left office. It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support Pretoria was in the interest of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for the indignity, pains, and sufferings experienced by the vast numbers of the South African citizenry meted out by the apartheid regime; the U.S. government continuously appealed the U.N. and the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.

Chapter Two discusses how WWII affected South Africa. The effects were not just social, but also economic as the country embraced manufacturing due to needs for various supplies as a result of the war. This manufacturing development did not affect the upsurge of the mining and gold industry already established in the country. Many blacks were employed in the manufacturing industry during the 1939 and 1945 years, and it also discusses the politics behind the after-effects of the war on South Africa and the black segregation policy.

Chapter Three looks at the role of America with the Apartheid government of South Africa, how America never criticized it because of similar policies, like the Jim Crow laws, being played out, especially Southern states in America. With trade relations and investments in South Africa, cultural exchange, particularly education, South Africa and the United States remained strange friends for much of the Apartheid era.

Chapter Four examines the position of South Africa during the Cold War, trying to gain sympathy through the hostility between the Soviets and the United States, with clear military backing from the West (despite several political rhetoric and condemnation of Apartheid, the US still supplied military hardware and personnel). Here we look at if South Africa was really neutral during the Cold War.

Chapter Five presents the Jimmy Carter years in relation with South Africa. The foreign policy of America's president, Jimmy Carter to Africa and South Africa, his message of peace, accountability and human rights and how it affected South Africa and her close neighbors and to ascertain if Carter was true to his message of respect for human rights in Africa.

Chapter Six looks at America's relationship with South Africa during the Ronald Reagan and H W Bush years, how Ronald Reagan publicly declared that he detests Apartheid, yet backed the South African government and even vetoed Congress's sanctions on the South African government. We will also look at Bush's silence on Apartheid and its effects on South Africa.

Chapter Seven reviews the process and events that led to the demise of Apartheid South Africa. America's role leading to the climax and the view of the world and Africa

on the sad effects and the development the regime brought about. This chapter also goes further in analyzing the end of Apartheid through the scholarly contributions of intellectuals from both the perspective of white minority and the opposition. It is thus appropriate to cram this chapter with the historiography of black politics.

CHAPTER 2

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER WORLD WAR II, 1948-1994

One can say that South Africa is known for racial hostility. Known mixed colors with wonderful people and diverse cultures.³ Its very existence has been shrouded in conflict, with the inter-white conflict between the Afrikaners and the British imperialists resulting in the South African War of 1899-1902, splitting allegiance and sympathy between Americans. The Afrikaners and their allies could not contain the British, and with a British victory, the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.⁴ The British Parliament in 1910, approved the Union of South Africa to become an independent, autonomous state within the Commonwealth and made Louis Botha the Prime Minister of South Africa under a parliamentary system of government, with blacks having the privilege of becoming representatives only if nominated and supported by whites.⁵

By 1919, the first prime minister had died and Jan Christiaan Smuts had taken his place. Smuts got South Africa into WWII on the side of the Allied forces against Germany raising about 350,000 soldiers after the initial reluctance of volunteers to join

³ Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, *Cultures of the World: South Africa* (New York, Marshall Cavendish, 2004), 5.

⁴ Gann Lh and Duignan Peter, *Hope for South Africa?* (California, Hoover Institution Press, 1991), 138.

⁵ Rosmarin, Rissik, *Cultures of the World*, 25.

in the war. South African troops bombarded and recorded a victory against the Italian army which had occupied Ethiopia.⁶

South African influence rose with the military exploits of the country in WWII. At the outbreak of the war, the South African troops rallied by Smuts were significant during World War II as the infantry soldiers courageously stood their grounds in 1941 alongside the "British Eight Army in the Sahara Desert" against the renowned German corps. Smuts ensured South Africa played a pivotal role during the second world war, contributing not just its quota, but being an influence not just in southern Africa, demonstrating that it is not a pushover across the whole of Africa. South Africa's influence and Smuts' was reckoned with after the war, Smuts was officially recognized for his efforts in the times of war and thereby made a Field Marshall and became instrumental in forming the United Nations.⁷

The troops from South Africa though minimal were able to make an immense contribution to the success of the Allied forces. Smuts' doggedness paid off as South Africa's participation in the war ensured that the Mediterranean was reopened as

⁶ Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, *Cultures of the World: South Africa* (New York, Marshall Cavendish, 2004), 25.

⁷ Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, *Cultures of the World*, 25.

enemies of the Allies were chased out of Africa in a victory for the Allies.⁸ Citizens of other African countries came in large numbers into South Africa as a result of the war. The population explosion indeed impacted South Africa in a positive way as labor for its manufacturing industry could be had cheaply, which in fact, made its industries to thrive.

South Africa and Mining

Indeed, one of the factors that served as a draw for the influx of people into South Africa was the mining industry. During the war and after, there was a surge in the economy of South Africa as need for weaponry and ammunition to be manufactured arose and because of thriving industries such as mining, especially gold and other minerals. For these reasons, as a result of the war, people moved from other countries to South Africa for economic reasons and to get urbanized. Post-World War II had people moving into South Africa seeking employment into the manufacturing industry as the labor force had also improved by 60%. Between 1950 and 1980 South Africa witnessed an industrial boom as the country had more products being manufactured as commerce picked up in the region. It was then imperative that these thriving industries attract

⁸ Amry Vandebosch, *South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid* (Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 2015),115.

workers from neighboring countries, especially the ones displaced by World War II.⁹ With new industries like the chemical and plastic industry springing up to be added to already strong and thriving industries like the metal and engineering industry, these years witnessed not just the growth of the new industries, but the consolidation of the old ones to become even bigger and stronger.¹⁰

There were diverse reasons which made the industrialization of South Africa a strong and viable one. The fact that cheap labor could be got with relative ease, access to cheap, affordable energy and the South African government's committed policy to the growth of industrialization in the country coupled with the funds got from the successful gold industry all helped to make industrialization successful in the country to the point that the country was to be known widely as a manufacturing one.¹¹ South Africa became a manufacturing country and an exporting one. Gold being the major export of the country, many countries relied on the manufacturing industry of South Africa as the country became a superpower in commerce as trade relations with Great Britain and the United States of America continued.¹² South Africa witnessed an influx of people from other regions in Africa due to the draw of its manufacturing industry,

⁹ Iliffe John, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 280.

¹⁰ Iliffe John, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 280.

¹¹ John, *African*, 274.

¹² *Ibid*, 274.

which picked up from the time of World War II and its sustained need for products to be manufactured and continued after the end of the War to become the mainstay of the South African economy.

Urbanization

Contributing also to the population explosion which impacted South Africa after World War II was the effect of the war on neighboring countries of Africa. People were displaced from their homes, living in terrible conditions, malnourished, impoverished, ravaged with sicknesses and diseases. They had no choice than to move South, because of the better standards of living. With the war having a devastating effect on their country, government and most importantly, resources, these displaced numbers had no choice than to move to South Africa, which boasted a stable economy and a thriving industry that assures employment, they did not mind the fact that at the helm of affairs of the country they had chosen to move to were of European descent they simply wanted to survive, wherever, however.¹³

South Africa thus affords them the opportunity to be urbanized, to move from their towns and villages, to live their lives in urban centers again, with opportunities to feel the hip and funky lifestyle and get to improve the economy of their families.

¹³ Erlmann Veit, *Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers' Isicathamiya Performance in South Africa, 1890-1950* (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 2014), 200.

Africans were motivated to move to South Africa because the War did not affect its economy and cities.

The cities of South Africa served as a draw for other Africans as the influx of people into the country continued after the war.¹⁴ The nationalism that came to fore as the movement of other African people into South Africa began, especially rural, impoverished people moving into the South African urban centers arose because of the mixture of cultures of urban life and the rural settings. The rural immigrants saw the way of life of the urban, dropped theirs and imbibed the culture of urban lifestyle.¹⁵ This saw the population of blacks in South Africa pick up considerably as more blacks poured into South African cities after World War II.¹⁶

With blacks moving in their numbers into South African cities and urban centers, cities like Johannesburg and Cape-town felt the effects the most as they became the biggest cities in Africa due to this urbanization and the thriving manufacturing industry in the country.¹⁷

¹⁴12 South Africa-The Impact of World War II. The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., n.d. Web. 5 May 2014. www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017

¹⁵ Erlmann Veit, *Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers' Isicathamiya Performance in South Africa, 1890-1950* (Illinois, University of Illinois Press), 2014, 200

¹⁶ South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017.

¹⁷ South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017.

Simply put, highlighting the effects of World War II on South Africa would be incomplete without recognizing factors like urbanization and the fact that people had to move south because they did not have a choice as there was nothing left in their own countries to live for or live on as a result of the war than to move south. What was intriguing was that despite that these people knew that South Africa was governed by a white minority, the perceived reason they became homeless and incapacitated in the first place, yet they migrated to South Africa anyway, placing economic gains and survival over whatever hardship and abuse they may encounter in the country.¹⁸

The new manufacturing industry of the post WWII threatened the already established mining and in particular, the South African Gold industry. The government clung to their gold and did not allow manufacturing to affect or kill that industry. On the outside, the world saw South Africa as the new emerging manufacturing powerhouse with a declining gold reserve, while South Africa saw itself as juggling the two, refusing to let slip its export in gold and equally maintain its immense rise in manufacturing.¹⁹ This is obvious and a no-brainer since the country gets two-third of its Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) and three-quarter of its earnings from gold

¹⁶ Erlmann Veit. *Migration and Performance*, 200

¹⁹ South Africa-The Impact of World War II The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., n.d. Web. 5 May 2014. www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017.

export.²⁰ Increased population after World War II also affected the South African economy in that more hands were available to work in the mining industry. Regardless of how dangerous the mining job was, and how tedious the working condition was, there were instances where immigrants had to work two miles underground and temperature reaching 104 degrees with the prospect of getting the miners killed, the immigrants still would work hard and give their best because for them, the conditions were better.²¹

This development brought about the early days of gender equality in South Africa as Xoliswa Vanda emerged as the first black woman to get a blasting certificate in gold mining in South Africa.²² As with the change in every society, this development did not go well with male workers in the industry as they found it strange taking orders from a woman there was little they could do though as Vanda was in charge of financial resources and even their safety at the mines.²³ Post-World War II had so much effect on South Africa that in the post-war years the country recorded increase in GDP to up to 6% a year, which at that time was an immense achievement, considering it being the

²⁰ South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017.

²¹ Reader John, and Michael Lewis, *Africa*: (Washington, National Geographic Society, 2001), 305.

²² John, and Lewis, *Africa*, 305.

²³ *Ibid*, 305

war years.²⁴ On the whole, World War II impacted South Africa positively as the country experienced an economic boom. With about 1,129,000 African people moving from their primitive farming industry into the urban cities of South Africa to move into the mining, engineering and manufacturing industry of the country as labor hands.²⁵ The effects of the War would also result in the migration of millions of other Africans into South Africa with the promise of a better life and oddly, made the lives of South Africans better for it as the South African government came up with innovations socially and economically to better the lives of its citizen.²⁶ Another effect of World War II on South Africa was the spectacular shift from agriculture and country life to industrialization and urban life. After the war, as a result of people moving en-masse to South Africa from neighboring countries who were affected by the war, when other Africans saw this trend, they decided to follow suit and move into the urban centers of the country. The farm hands who served as labor for the white supremacists and their plantations also gave up on the farms and moved to the cities for a perceived better life

²⁴ Iliffe John, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 280.

²⁵ Iliffe, John, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 280.

²⁶ South Africa-The Impact of World War II The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., n.d. Web. 5 May 2014.

for themselves, an action that had a serious effect on the white lords and their economy.²⁷

Population Explosion

The action of the farm laborers to leave the farms and move to the cities for better jobs was as a result of the poor remuneration from their jobs as farmhands in the suburbs. The laborers once on the farms were badly paid and lived on about 20Euros a year, which made them very poor and their lives very miserable.²⁸In these circumstances, eventually something had to give, and when the trend of urbanization began, the farm laborers downed their tools and moved to the urban cities to better the conditions of their families and themselves.

²⁷ Iliffe John, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge University Press, 1995, 273.

²⁸ John, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 274.

Table 1. Population Censuses of 1936 and 1946²⁹

	1936	1946	1936	1946
	Numbers in thousands		Percentages of totals	
Whites	2003	2372	20.8	20.9
Africans	6596	7831	68.6	68.8
Coloreds	769	928	8.0	8.1
Asians	220	285	2.3	2.5

²⁹ B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 108.

A look at the population census when these years are compared sees a change in proportions, highlighting trends exposing a cause and effect, obvious from the war. We see an annual increase in the population of the Afrikaners, with it being higher than the minority of the British descent. Africans that were urbanized during and after World War II rose to 24.3% in 1946 compared to 19% recorded back in 1936 before the war. This shows that the difference in population between 1946 and 1936 of those who moved up to the cities to have a taste of the urban lifestyle.³⁰

Spectacularly between 1939 and 1945, Africans who worked in the South African manufacturing industry rose to about 245,400 from the initial 156,500, which is about a 57% improvement from years gone by before the war.³¹ Change as brought about by the war continued and was visible as the cities got fuller and fuller with 80.8% of the 'urbaners' employed as unskilled labor while about 34.2% of them were semi-skilled, with only 5.8% being regarded as skilled labor.³² This development, a system overloaded with Africans becoming the spine of the labor force in the urban industries brought about a restructuring with the 'majority' blacks as the heartbeat of the making of the thriving economy, but separatist whites as the administrators and rulers of the 'heartbeat.' The racist leadership of the day decided that to protect its interest as minorities, apartheid had to be enforced and made legally binding for it to take full effect. This new policy had a euphemism of 'separate development, but it was not long

³⁰ B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985., 108.

³¹ Ibid,108.

³² Ibid,109.

for it to be recognized as what it really was, an advancement and success for the minority white and a bleak future for the Africans.³³

This process changed South Africa as it became autonomous and less dependent on imperial Great Britain, with its access to more capital as a result of its economic boom through its industries. The urbanized African labor as a result of it being cheap and accessible became a key cog in the wheel of economic prosperity for South Africa and could not be dispensed with.³⁴ In effect, World War II brought the apartheid policy on South Africa. Apartheid became a necessity as a factor of the effects of the war on the country. The white minorities had to do something drastic to maintain their ‘superiority’ and control. Thus, apartheid was the answer to the puzzle. Little wonder when the Purified National Party emerged as the new leadership of the country and introduced full-scale apartheid, giving the nonwhites no voice to air their frustration, the party did not bring in anything new but consolidating on the segregationist policies and practice that was already in effect before they came into power.³⁵ Inevitably, the protests started ringing out from the non-white community against the system and the apartheid policy. That within the framework was not out of the ordinary. What was noteworthy was the fact that the protests became efficient. The non-whites became

³³ B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 109.

³⁴ B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 109

³⁵ Ibid, 109.

radicalized in solidarity, militant even, as they said ‘no’ to all manifestations of apartheid and economic relegation.

The years during and after post-World War II saw a significant increase in the protests of the African majority as about 304 strike actions were carried out over low wages and better working conditions against just 107 in the years before the second world war.³⁶ The non-whites continued to defy the racist, minority whites even as they were humiliated, harassed and banned. About 58,000 non-white majorities still were able to carry out strike actions and stayed committed to their radicalism to make their voices heard.³⁷ This culminated in 75,000 mine-workers downing tools in 1946 because of decrease in wages, though were beaten back to work by the government.³⁸

Everywhere in the cities, there were reasons to protest as the significant number of people who migrated to South Africa and flooded the urban cities were welcomed by the government because they were seen as cheap, affordable labor for the thriving manufacturing industry.³⁹ What was odd and concerning was that the South African government did not make provision for accommodation for them, making most of these lot live in shacks, huts and under terrible conditions.

³⁶B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by UNESCO at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 115.

³⁷ B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 115

³⁸ Ibid, 116.

³⁹ Ibid,119.

After the second World war II, a renaissance of sorts was experienced in the moribund, old ANC (African National Congress) as Dr. A.B Xuma was elected the party's president in 1940. His election though did not start the era of fiery oration and political militancy and struggle, yet started a chain of events that did culminate in the formation of the youth wing of the ANC called the Youth League.⁴⁰ These set of young, vibrant and intellectually sound activists emerged to change the face of the ANC and the political history of South Africa. Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki among others were a unique group of upstarts who were ready to take the party beyond the inactions of the old guard of the ANC and Xuma, its leader. They believed the era had gone beyond keeping it simple in order to make a difference and bring back sanity in racial relations back to their beloved country they believed a long battle in militancy, in solidarity with the protests in the urban centers that already picked up and gathered pace to make a difference. The protests ongoing in the urban cities and towns had become something daring and innovative. Bus boycotts seeing thousands prefer to trek miles to and from work instead of paying the astronomical fares asked of them by the apartheid government became the order of the day, along with struggles against the laws.⁴¹

In this new daring era of protests and militancy, new townships and peri-urban settlements came into existence. As a result of immigration, rural settlers came to the

⁴⁰B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 119-120.

⁴¹ B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War, 119-120.

city and built settlements and squatter towns in open fields and did not yield to the oppression of the police. Soweto and Mpanza's town-a town 'built' on an open spread of land close to Orlando where some of these kinds of settlements.⁴² The young members of the Youth League consolidated on the protests of the Africans and armed with their realization that a great struggle is what would liberate them from the shackles of the white minority, built on it and launched their own campaign moving away from the sheer prudence of the ANC leadership and embracing militancy as the engine that could drive them towards achieving their aim.

Emancipation

Moving forward, the most significant effect of World War II on not just South Africa, but the whole of colonial Africa, on the whole, is that the war presented Africans the opportunity to see the vulnerability of the colonial masters and thus push for independence from them. Political freedom, a situation almost deemed impossible (at least before the war), almost unthinkable, was able to be achieved across Africa as a result of the war running the European Imperialists ragged and making it quite difficult for them to hold on to their colonized territories. Great Britain and France were hard hit by the war and paralyzed economically. They had used up economic and human resources in the war effort and still not got victory. These powers now looked less super in the eyes of Africa and facing up to these masters suddenly became less of suicide and more of picking up the courage to ask for what rightly belonged to them; a right to be

⁴² B. Davidson. *Africa and the Second World War*. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 120.

governed by themselves. So, the colonized Africans no longer saw the masters as invincible or gods they are human after all and also feel what every human feels.⁴³

That the colonial masters made the Africans look like they were children who could not act nor reason like adults was not unusual, at least to the Africans, what was unusual to them and at the same time became an eye-opener for them was the way the Africans contributed to the war and fought courageously as adults. This, coupled with the war experience of the Africans as they fought side by side with their superior colonial masters during the war and saw the supposed superior white man being scared of death in the line of fire changed the mentality of the Africans toward the white supremacist and gave them belief that freedom was feasible if they asked the right way.⁴⁴

However, the position of South Africa was unique when compared to other colonized Africa. South Africa had never been completely run by ‘whites with a mother country in Europe.’ The whites in charge of running the Union of South Africa were whites who had settled permanently without the prospect of going back ‘home’, they were South African nationals who knew no other home. Hence the need to rule with racial intentions to protect this minority group, using the resources of the millions of the majority blacks to their own economic gain.⁴⁵ Yes, the common advantage of political

⁴³ Ali.A Mazrui. Africa and the legacy of the Second World War: political, economic and cultural aspects. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 13-14.

⁴⁴ Mazrui, Africa and the legacy of the Second World War,14

⁴⁵ A . Kuin'a Ndumbe III. Black Africa and Germany during the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab

emancipation for black Africa got from World War II impacted South Africa, but in a different way.

To conclude, World War II had a lot of effects on South Africa. It did not just bring about freedom from Great Britain for the Union but also revolutionized the nation. The impact of WWII reverberated for decades as South Africa innovated in industry, embraced manufacturing, with the displaced from the war producing cheap labor for the thriving industry while not neglecting the mining industry as gold became their chief exports. Urbanization was also achieved as the groundwork for Apartheid was laid and effected as a result of effects from the war. Apartheid will now be fully treated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

APARTHEID AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Apartheid translates as "apartness" or "separateness." In addition to denoting spheres of physical and social demarcation it carries with it a sense of moral and spiritual imperative. The apartheid concept first emerged in the context of discussions by Dutch Reformed Church missionaries in the 1930s, only gaining wider political currency in the 1940s. In 1943 *'Die Burger'*, the Cape-Town based Afrikaner newspaper described apartheid as "the accepted Afrikaner viewpoint". The following year, Malan, as leader of the opposition, deployed it for the first time in the South African parliament. Later in 1944, Malan explained that apartheid was not the same as the existing policy of segregation which denoted separation in the sense of "fencing off". Instead, he characterized apartheid in more positive, totalizing terms, as a means designed to "give the numerous races the privilege of uplifting themselves on the conditions of what is their own."⁴⁶

Apartheid was the institutionalization of policy and program of racial discrimination in South Africa. It became the implemented strategy and the national ethic of South Africa in 1948, when the National Party displaced the elder statesmen of Afrikanerdom and brought a unique vigor and vengeance to racial politics that would mark the next forty years. But the National Party put into law, and carried to extraordinary extremes in both theory and practice, what was in fact a long history of

⁴⁶ Saul Dubrow, *Apartheid, 1948-1994* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 10.

racial discrimination, brutality, and deprivation that had marked South Africa from the first day of colonialism.⁴⁷

The most common description for South Africa's political system before 1994 was "an apartheid practice." While the National Party governments of South Africa claimed to be representative of a westernized democracy, their claim was said to be generally found to not be true on theoretical grounds. The apartheid system negated many components of democracy since it was ethnically based and divided the South Africans into four races: white, black, coloreds and Indians. It excluded most of the population from political participation so that they lacked representatives who could be held accountable. The system also denied black human rights to the majority, as citizens of the state, since there were different degrees of citizenship (white versus coloreds, Indians, and black), and because the black majority enjoyed the lowest degree of nationality. In the proposed tri-cameral reform system of the 1980s, the Indian and the coloreds were granted a higher degree of citizenship compared with the blacks.⁴⁸

The period between the Boer War and the National Party victory in 1948 saw consistent repression of blacks, Indians, and the coloreds, though with some outwards signs of negotiation or moderations. Mohandas Gandhi began his struggle in South Africa for equal rights against British rule, suffering the same alternating pattern of audience and prison he would later experience in Indian. In 1912, John Dube and Albert

⁴⁷ Princeton N. Lyman, *Partner to History: The U.S Role in South Africa's Transition to democracy*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 9.

⁴⁸ Amneh Daoud Badran, *Zionist Israel and Apartheid South Africa: Civil society and Peace -building in Ethnic-National States*, (London, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010),55, 56.

Luthuli formed the African National Congress (ANC) to press for the black rights. For years the ANC sought to obtain these rights through peaceful protest and petition. All of this, however, yielded little fundamental change. In 1913, a law was enacted formally denying blacks rights to the land they once controlled, and they were instead pressured onto “reserves,” the precursor to the later “homelands.” The law restricted the movement of non-whites and job preservation protected supervisory, managerial, and almost all skilled jobs for whites. Political rights for nonwhites were virtually nonexistent.⁴⁹

Segregation Laws

The South African Apartheid laws came into effect as an implied law at the beginning of the slave trade in the seventh century with about 25 million Africans sold into slavery for the next 12 centuries.⁵⁰ Although, it was in 1948 that the South African regime launched out fully on the Apartheid laws starting with the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, which made it an offence against the state for people of different race to get married and raise children.⁵¹

The act affected families in South Africa after 1949, but the effect was minimal compared to the devastating effects it had on families and mix marriages which had already been standing before 1949. This situation affected the children of mixed race marriages that were standing before the Act was passed into law in 1949. Cases sprung

⁴⁹ Princeton N. Lyman, *Partner to History, The U.S Role in South Africa's Transition to democracy*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 12

⁵⁰ Robert Stock, *Africa South of the Sahara*, (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995), 65.

⁵¹ Stock, *Africa South of the Sahara*, 21.

up where children of the same parents were deemed and classified as different race. Instances sprung up where a child would be deemed Colored while the brother or sister would be classified as white. A typical example of this was the case of Vic Wilkinson, who was initially classified as 'mixed race', later referred to as 'white', then changed his status to 'Colored', became 'white' again, and finally was classified in 1984 as Colored. One cannot imagine the discrimination and hardships as early as the 60s and 70s that this legislation brought upon South African families. So to speak, it brought division in many families and resulted in mental and emotional torture.⁵²

Following this was the Population Registration Act of 1950 which expects everybody to be tagged according to their race, either black, white colored, or mixed. To make this happen, it was imperative that the appearance of the individual be considered. The 'pencil in the air' test was invented to determine who was who. The South African government under Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, who was first Minister of Native Affairs, before becoming the Prime Minister of the regime, oversaw his officials placing a pencil in the hair of people to be determined their race. If the person's curly hair could hold the pencil as he bends over, then he is declared colored, but if the pencil falls out, he is declared black.⁵³ The classification along racial lines also featured along with the texture of hair, color of hair, facial features and the general complexion of the skin. This often became complicated and confusing, and shattering, as there were

⁵² John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 76.

⁵³ Robert Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years*, (New York: Bantam, 1997), 21.

incorrect determination of race, which left many families divided as some colored children were classified white and in some cases blacks branded as colored, with a lot of children becoming outcasts in the process.

The 1950 Immorality Act which forbade any sexual interactions between the different races of South Africa was tepid, and many South Africans was amused at it and deliberately flouted those rules, to go ahead and mate interracially just for the thrill of defiance at the laughable attempt of the authorities in trying to bend the rules of nature, and general human behavior:⁵⁴

If the Immorality Act was awkward to the citizens, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 was not. It gave room for zero different, distinctive opinion of the regime on Communism. The citizens had no right to call for change, or see differently on the issue of communism. Police would brutally descend on anyone whose opinion was different from that of the regime. The Act banned parties like the Communist Party of South Africa which was communist centered and other pro-communist ideologists in a bid to dissuade them completely from communism. Defining communism as any idea that seeks to effect change, industrial, political, economic or social, or disrupting the status quo. The South African government was so in bed with the west that it was desperate to discard with communism, meanwhile also using the Act to clamp down on opposition, as anyone deemed 'communist' was first given a two-week appeal, then prevented from politics or participating in public affairs to being kept in solitary confinement and being jailed.⁵⁵

The apartheid government of South Africa diverted national and international gazes from the genuine reason for frowning at racism and the deprivation of fundamental human rights by pointing fingers at the black movements and labelling them as communists

⁵⁴ John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 74.

⁵⁵ Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, 75.

because they were supported by the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ Taking advantage of the cold war, indeed, both the ANC and Umkhonto Ze Sizwe in the eye of the apartheid South African government are external Soviet agents, and not just taking up arms and canvassing for social, political, and economical involvement like they really were.⁵⁷

The Laws Brought Oppression

This oppression by the apartheid regime forced the pro-equal rights for blacks organizations like the ANC and PAC underground with their activism. They were continually oppressed and brutalized, which ironically led them to get funding from the Communist Party.⁵⁸ The non-whites were discriminated against further with the regime's Bantu Authorities Act 'helping them to be able to vote by creating "Bantusians", "homelands."⁵⁹ Between 1958 through 1966 the homelands came to accommodate blacks and colored. It created an avenue for the blacks and colored with a dwelling place to vote, making it impossible for them to vote in the "White Parliament" while also losing their citizenship.⁶⁰ Not contented with just breaking the citizens into racial lines, the South African regime also divided the non-whites into four homelands, namely, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.⁶¹ This cruelty by the regime to

⁵⁶ Sue Onslow, *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power Black Liberation*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 9.

⁵⁷ Onslow, *Cold War in Southern Africa*, 9.

⁵⁸ Byrnes, Rita M. (1996). "Legislative Implementation of Apartheid". *South Africa: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.za> accessed June 9 2017.

⁵⁹ William J. Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism, and African Freedom*, (New York: International Publishers, 1986), 20.

⁶⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy*, (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2002), 40.

⁶¹ Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy*, 41.

displace the non-whites from their inheritance and frustrate any hope that they may nurture in affiliating with the National Party, and also rid them of citizenship affected the non-whites terribly. In driving home the displacement, then minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. P. Mulder stated that, "If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the Black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship...Every Black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honorable way and there will be no longer a moral obligation on the Parliament to accommodate these people politically."⁶²With the pretext of establishing an hierarchical succession system of chiefs appointed by the regime with the aim of giving governance back to the traditional natives, which the real motive was to cause ethnic differences and divisions.⁶³

There are countless more laws that made it so obvious that the non-whites were different from the whites. Extending even towards segregation in employment, and in public places. It was impossible for non-whites to work where whites work, with the only exception being in rare occasions when the blacks worked for the whites.⁶⁴

Gordimer and Goldblatt in driving this point home shares the experience of a young girl, who said, "we were made to walk, not smile, to not do anything that look like we were having fun. They treated us like animals. To them, we were. It was just the way

⁶²Robert I. Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy*, (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2002), 43.

⁶³John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 75-76.

⁶⁴ John Dugard, Nicholas Haysom, Gilbert Marcus, *The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in South Africa*, (Michigan: Ford Foundation, 1992), 15.

things had to be, we did not understand.”⁶⁵ The Apartheid laws became so barbaric and racial that it soon became a way of life for the non-whites. They were not allowed to smile, nor have fun, nor even acknowledge themselves as humans. The non-whites were made to become second fiddle, second citizens, or ‘non-modern citizens’ at all, as they were deemed not civil enough to live in decent homes. The nightmare of legislation and prejudice of the 60s and 70s consigned the homes of non-whites to suffering, in mental, psychological, and intellectual proportions.⁶⁶

The Separate Representation of Voters Act mixed up non-whites’ more than a hundred years voting rights and placed it on a roll in the Cape. After shifting the ‘judicial goal post’ several times, the Act was eventually revalidated in 1956, successfully getting rid of non-whites from common ‘voters roll’.⁶⁷

Then came the Native Law Amendment Act which ‘criminally’ redefined ‘natives’, declaring the ones who were fit to live in towns, and the ones who were not.⁶⁸ It also compelled all blacks to be with a means of identification all the time, carrying with them, a pass, which bears identification parameters like, record of employment, photograph, tax record, place of origin, and of course, any criminal record. The regime’s definition of criminal record was as discriminatory as it gets, as “any

⁶⁵ Nadine Gordimer and David Goldblatt, *Lifetimes: Under Apartheid*, (Michigan, Knopf, 1986), 13.

⁶⁶ John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 74.

⁶⁷ Charles Villa-Vicencio, *A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-Building and Human Rights*. (Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 64, 65.

⁶⁸ John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 76.

encounter with the police” was a criminal offence.⁶⁹ By late 1950s Apartheid South Africa had mirrored the United States of America’s Jim Crow laws, only surpassing it by establishing several legalized laws that made it an act of breaking the law for any citizen deemed ‘Colored’ to “walk on a Whites Only beach”, “walk through a Whites Only door”, or “ride on a Whites Only bus”.⁷⁰ It became a crime to be outside on the streets after 11pm, you would be a criminal to not have your passbook on you, and also a criminal to have the passbook wrongly signed. It was considered breaking the law to be without a job, and also a crime to seek employment in the wrong, no-go areas. It was considered breaking the law to not have a place to live in, and also to live in a place considered illegal. It was almost considered a crime to be black or non-white.⁷¹ That was the extent of the racial, discriminatory laws of the Apartheid regime.

The outstandingly shocking Bantu Education Act passed in 1953 set up a black curriculum tailored towards educating the blacks with their ‘nature’ and ‘requirements’ in mind.⁷² Hendrik Verwoerd felt it useless and time-wasting to allow non-whites gain education that would get them ambitious enough to want to lay claims to positions in the regime meant for the superior whites, and that would not be available for them to attain anyway. So the blacks were to be educated in skills that would make them

⁶⁹ Allen, *Apartheid South Africa*,76.

⁷⁰Ibid, 76.

⁷¹ John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa:An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 76.

⁷² Allen,76

⁷³ Ibid, 76, 77.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 77.

suitable for homeland use, or better still, to prepare them for excellent service as laborers under the superior whites.⁷³ Similar to this act was the Extension of University Education Act, which made it utterly impossible, and banned black students from being enrolled in white universities. The Prohibition of Interdicts Act made it a crime to contest forced removals in the courts of law, while the Native Labor Act made it an offense for blacks to embark on strike actions.⁷⁴

Generally, as a black person you had to accept whatever comes to you, typically, mostly, bad things of course, without complaints, and bad blood. This was the situation with blacks under the Apartheid regime of South Africa.

As if these were not enough, the Sabotage Act of 1962 trumped the rest of the racist laws yet as it became outright criminal to sabotage the regime. ‘Sabotage’ being defined as “trespassing” or being in possession of ammunitions. The regime also subdued and prevented the younger generation from getting familiar with the activism of people like Nelson Mandela and his colleagues by placing on ban, the reproduction of the voices, or quotes and statements of someone already banned by the regime.⁷⁵

The notorious General Law Amendment Act in a bid to suppress the furtherance of communism, gave the regime the allowance to declare associations like Poqo, Yu Chi Chan Club, the Congress of Democrats and, Umkhonto we Sizwe as criminal and

⁷⁵ John Allen, *Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of Separate Development*, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 77.

illegal.⁷⁶ Further empowering the police to arrest with a warrant or not for crimes as suspicion of a political crime, they could detain the suspect for ninety days without trial or an attorney as the regime deem fit.⁷⁷ With the discrimination against the blacks, South Africa became isolated, abandoned and shunned, like a leprosy by the world due, heavily to its legalized racial policy-apartheid. Apartheid comes to mind as one of the worst crimes against humanity of the 20th century. Televised evidence of the apartheid regime's barbarism was viewed by the West, and Europe of course, every day. P.W. Botha, then prime minister of South Africa, enforced a 'state of emergency in July 1985', giving his administration sweeping powers that effectively placed South Africa under martial law.⁷⁸ The administration of The National Party of South Africa which was in power between 1948-1994 in 1948 imposed Apartheid on the country, which made nations world over, in turn, implement sanctions on the regime.

Intervention and Sanctions

The United States of America in 1986 finally joined the world in imposing 'economic and diplomatic sanctions' on the Apartheid regime. The United States of America had been engulfed with winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union, so believed limiting the presence of the Soviets in Southern Africa would help their cause.⁷⁹ The United States administration saw Apartheid South Africa as an enigma. In

⁷⁶D.A. Kotze, *African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974: Parties and Issues*, (London: C.Hurst & Co. 1975), 37.

⁷⁷ Kotze, *African Politics in South Africa*, 77.

⁷⁸ Sasha Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Random House Books, 2010), 180.

⁷⁹ Alex Thomson, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa: 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.

explaining the position of the South African government, the regime was seen by the United States as a wall that stemmed the advancement of communism; due to its location, being on the Cape Sea Route, blessed with rare minerals, it also housed a lot of United States diaspora companies that found the South African market profitable.⁸⁰

An appraisal of United States Governments' response to the beginning of the regime in 1948 to its end, showed that while they all mildly castigated the anti-human rights policy of apartheid. United States' Presidents did not entirely condemn the prejudiced government of Pretoria by enforcing complete economic and diplomatic penalties on the South African administration. Officials of the Democratic Party and those of the Republican time and time again did not get the hang on stable the white rule is, how the resistance of the black majority had garnered strength and how considerable the presence of the former Soviet Union and Cuban government involvement in the region was, which had equally damaging consequences.⁸¹

Successive American Governments would always reply that the blacks suffering from

⁸⁰ Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa: 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests, 2.

⁸¹ Michael Clough, "Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 5 (Summer, 1988): 1068, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/angola/1988-06-01/southern-africa-challenges-and-choices>(accessed June 14, 2017).

⁸²Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 95.

⁸³John Parsons, "On Constructive Engagement in South Africa," *Tech*, November 5, 1985. <http://tech.mit.edu/V105/N47/parson.47o.html> (accessed September 8, 2017).

apartheid would be the ones to suffer if they did decide to impose sanctions, when probed as to why they failed to impose sanctions. Thomas Borstelmann postulated that, although the United States officials knew the ills and effects of apartheid and its neglect of human rights, Harry S. Truman's government in particular (1945-1953), was reluctant to scold the South African government as uranium ore needed to boost the American nuclear system can be found in abundance in South Africa, as well as other mineral resources. Borstelmann also confirmed that other factors like the economic advantage of trade relations, the South African army's participation in the Korean War and the regime's dedication to containment made it easy for Truman's government to look the other way as regards apartheid.⁸²

Nonetheless, the U.S. kept the diplomatic ties with the apartheid regime intact throughout the period of apartheid. As a matter of fact, the U.S. became Pretoria's second biggest trading partner. Also, the United States became its second largest foreign investor, and the source of one-third of its international credit by 1985.⁸³ Going forward, South Africa powerfully assisted the United States and the west's resistance to communism and decided to stifle the increasing presence and rise of communism in Southern Africa, as these Southern African countries emancipated from foreign rule to autonomy. Under Richard Nixon's government (1969-1974), a thorough study of the United States' policy to Southern Africa branded 'National Security Study Memorandum 39' was produced, which will be analyzed in the following chapter. Under Jimmy Carter's government (1977-1981), the United States got stricter toward

the apartheid South African government, seeing the rise of African nationalism and awareness as a useful tool in Pretoria in aligning with the best interests of the United States.⁸⁴ It is ironical that despite Ronald Reagan's administration (1981-1989) being the toughest yet on the apartheid regime, more than any other president; it was indeed his government that impacted and would change the relationship between the two governments.

To elucidate, in the 1980s, the anti-apartheid movements in the United States and Europe gained momentum and support for sanctions against Pretoria, and for the detachment of United States companies from the apartheid region. However, in spite of the increasing domestic and worldwide movement to depose the regime, during this difficult time, President Ronald Reagan kept a strong relationship with the South African government that was showing no signs of any reformative policies or sanctions. As a matter of fact, through Reagan's administration, he devotedly was for the apartheid regime at the helm of affairs in South Africa. In 1981, President Reagan told the late Walter Cronkite, who was a reporter for CBS, that he was friendly toward the South African government as South Africa was a country that has stood by the United States of America in every war they've ever fought, it was a nation that, strategically, is important to the free world in its production of minerals."⁸⁵ After that chat with CBS, President Botha of South Africa responded the following day that: To learn that the forerunner of the new world order understands and know the strategic grandness of

⁸⁴ Rita Byrnes, *South Africa: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the U.S. Library of Congress), <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.za> (accessed June 9, 2017).

⁸⁵ Y.G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa. A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 247.

South Africa is gratifying.⁸⁶ He continued by saying that South Africa appreciates this understanding of proactiveness and welcomes it. President Ronald Reagan supported the apartheid South African regime publicly, making the South African leader, Prime Minister Botha look like a liberal who was willing to review the policies and support the U.S. in resisting communism interests in Southern Africa.⁸⁷ With this public solidarity by the Raegan's government, it is not but awkward to note that it is the same South Africa that sanctioned its majority from suffrage, refused its major population fundamental human rights and clamped those were brave enough to question its policies and request sanity to the madness, in jail. It is not startling to realize that Reagan only ceded and joined the West and the world in renouncing Apartheid South Africa after six years as president. To be specific, until 1986, when the U.S government slapped the South African government with economic sanctions, the government of Ronald Reagan committed itself to standing by its resolve that the change that South Africa needed would eventually be put in effect by the regime itself.⁸⁸

With the white Apartheid regime going all out to enforce barbaric laws that obviously consigned every other race, particularly the majority blacks, to the background and make them forever inferior to the minority whites, it is to be noted that

⁸⁶ Justin Elliott, "*Reagan's Embrace of Apartheid South Africa*," https://www.salon.com/2011/02/05/ronald_reagan_apartheid_south_africa/ (accessed September 8, 2011).

⁸⁷ Justin Elliott, "*Reagan's Embrace of Apartheid South Africa*," https://www.salon.com/2011/02/05/ronald_reagan_apartheid_south_africa/ (accessed September 8, 2011).

⁸⁸ John de St. Jorre, "*South Africa: Is Change Coming?*," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall, 1981): 112, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1981-09-01/south-africa-change-coming> (accessed September 14, 2011).

the United States of America missed the chance to serve as the umpire who would have regulated the laws and stand up to the regime in favour of the maligned blacks in sanctioning the regime, and fighting the cause of the majority blacks to uphold the fundamental human rights spoken of with glee in Washington. Rather, Washington placed the victory over the Soviets in the Cold War over the moral, human fight for the blacks, and backed the South African racist regime in perpetrating the inhuman crimes against its black majority because of the regime's unwavering opposition to communism.

CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COLD WAR PERSPECTIVE

The 1960s was an explosive period in the annals of apartheid South Africa. Great Britain as the colonial master started transferring power to African nationalists, starting with The Gambia in 1957, then Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ghana. In 1960, France gave up control over their colonies in West and Central Africa. Also, Belgium withdrew from Congo (Zaire).⁸⁹ In South Africa, the decade opened with the Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960.⁹⁰ Lots of folks lost their lives when they had a protest, albeit peaceful, the protests were to question the laws on passbooks. This resulted from the harsh pass laws that passed by Hendrik Verwoerd's National Party. He resumed the 1930s pro-racist reconstruction right with the world watching and intensified racist policy by moving the black majority on to Bantustans and regulate them using passbooks, a major source of insult and contention for black South Africans.⁹¹

Violent Protests and Embargo

As well as passing even more racist laws and Bantustan regulations, the white minority who controlled the racist government of South Africa banned the Pan-African

⁸⁹ Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa, Revised Edition* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), 214.

⁹⁰ Iris Berger, *South Africa in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 122-123-127.

⁹¹ Christopher Coker, *The United States, and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 5-6.

⁹² Annette Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 122, 124

Congress (PAC) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). Capitol Hill was shocked by this decision, deciding that it was best to place Pretoria on the UN Security Council's agenda permanently.⁹² Kennedy also set up a highly selective arms embargo one full year before the UN.⁹³(SACP) The South African Communist Party, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) by 1961 all abandoned the peaceful resistance earlier used to combat pass laws by embracing violence to make their grouse known.⁹⁴ The No. 76 of 1962 of General Law Amendment that gave the allowance to repeat jail term to 90 days with no trial was added to legislation by the white-controlled South African regime because the parties refused to back down on the rate of violence.⁹⁵ By 1967, laws were passed that allowed detention without trial for indefinite amounts of time.

The Soviet Factor

The South African regime laid the chunk of the violent protests employed by the banned ANC, PAC, and SACP at the feet of the communist Soviets, in a bid to court favor and goodwill from the U.S. and the West, as well as to get the United Nations off their backs. The South African government used this ploy to court the favor of the US by taking the side of the US in the cold war by labelling the banned parties as sympathetic to the Soviets. This made the Union look civilized and stabilized, irreplaceable and calculated before the U.S. and the West, and also tried to make them

⁹³ Annette Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 122- 124.

⁹⁴ Annette Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, 126-127.

⁹⁵Ibid, 122, 124.

understand the need to uproot these groups causing chaos and influencing its citizens negatively.⁹⁶ Looking at the influence of the Soviets and communism in the Union, a lot of historians believe that the realness of the danger of the Soviet was not much. As most of the extent of Soviet communism threat was a propaganda whipped up by the leadership of apartheid South Africa to gain the support and consideration of the US and the west, some contested that indeed they had minimal impact in the area, declaring that though the "Cold War paradigm was a myth," it didn't mean that leaders of the National Party, Botha and Malan did not truly believe that they were fighting on behalf of western countries' interests.⁹⁷ The government of South Africa did fear for the Soviets filling the space left by the departing colonial masters, even as they watched Portugal lose its footing in Africa towards 1974, by drastically impacting the geographical advantage the South African regime enjoyed between them and other African countries not linked with a western colonial juggernaut of some dimension.

Although the Soviets did play around in Africa, giving weapons out through East Germany to the opposition uprisings in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, the Communists were not as threatening than the event of a rebellion by a black majority against a fairly small South African white minority.⁹⁸ It is not like there was no link with the ANC, SACP, PAC, and the Soviets. A connection indeed exists between these

⁹⁶ Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa, Revised Edition* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), 215.

⁹⁷ Sue Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 51.

⁹⁸ Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa, Revised Edition* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), 216.

South African political groups and the Soviets, but it was not a big harmful link Pretoria painted before the United States of America. Sub-Sahara Africa and the early Soviet Union indeed had a small link which dates back to 1921, the time the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) had representation in Comintern, later replaced by Cominform after WWII.⁹⁹ When African nations started claiming independence in the 1960's and freshly found political parties showed interest in developing their societies around socialist ideals, Khrushchev responded with enthusiasm.¹⁰⁰ Khrushchev, unlike his predecessors, was more interested in Africa, Khrushchev attended the UN to welcome the sixteen newly admitted African states in the summer of 1960. He liked the idea of the anti-imperialist fire of the first generation of African leaders and wanted to capitalize on it.¹⁰¹

There are a variety of views on the level of importance and aid the ANC, and SACP received from the Soviets. The Soviets massively impacted the ANC and really were responsible for supporting their battle with the South African government and keeping the groups going, especially after the Massacre at Sharpeville. The ANC and SACP got trained in guerilla warfare by Moscow in Minsk and Belarus.¹⁰² They also

⁹⁹ Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova, "African History: A View From Behind the Kremlin Wall," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*, ed. Maxim Mtusevich (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007), 112-116.

¹⁰⁰ Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova, "African History: A View From Behind the Kremlin Wall," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*, ed. Maxim Mtusevich (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007), 112,116, 117.

¹⁰¹ Christopher Andrew and VasiliMitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 426.

¹⁰² Vladimir Shubin, "Beyond the Fairy Tales: The Reality of Soviet Involvement in the Liberation of Southern Africa," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries*

requested weapons and received them through Dar es Salaam and Maputo drop points.¹⁰³ The ANC was "never actually a complete Communist puppet, but it was heavily sustained by the Soviet support and KGB back channels."¹⁰⁴

What did assistance from the Soviets look like? In the 1960s, Communist Soviets began giving aid to the local SACP and ANC. Much of the assistance was given to the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), known as the armed wing of the ANC and SACP. In 1963, the ANC got \$300,000 in aid from Moscow, while the SACP got an addition \$56,000.¹⁰⁵ Moscow was able to train the ANC in their camps in Zambia and Tanzania in 1964. Going further, there is little to corroborate this information. He posited that the instructors from Moscow did not start showing in ANC camps till 1979.¹⁰⁶ However, from 1963 -1991, over 1500 ANC activists did get trained in Soviet military institutions.¹⁰⁷

of Encounters, ed. Maxim Matusevich (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007), 242-243.

¹⁰³ Shubin, 242-243.

¹⁰⁴ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 430.

¹⁰⁵ Vladimir Shubin, "Beyond the Fairy Tales: The Reality of Soviet Involvement in the Liberation of Southern Africa," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*, ed. Maxim Matusevich (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007), 340.

¹⁰⁶ Vladimir Shubin, "Unsung Heroes: The Soviet military and the Liberation of Southern Africa," in *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, ed. Sue Onslow (New York: Routledge, 2009), 155.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 158.

The Cold War

The Cold War had an enormous impact on the modern world, with virtually every part of the world involved in this ideological tussle between two great superpowers and the ensuing battles that followed this competition. This worldwide tussle tremendously impacted Southern Africa. It is established that beyond question it had a complex negative consequence for Southern Africa and its people in the south of the continent. The Cold War enmity helped set in motion the anguish of Southern Africa for thirty years, and it became an important ideological front in the foundation for the white-minority regimes and the various liberation struggles. The both of them exploited this ideological competition for their selfish interests, but in the end had different objectives. The Cold War tensions provided an opportunity for the belligerents to legitimize their acts. In the bid to make these aims a reality, Southern Africa experienced a lot of destructive wars which invited interventions from both the United States and the Soviets and also from different countries supporting either power; prompting guerrilla revolts in several nations, and the policy of Pretoria of destabilization against its autonomous neighbors blocked the political and economic advancement of Southern Africa. Many of these legacies are still evident in Southern Africa today.¹⁰⁸

The Cold War was diffused with many dialogues between the U.S. and the international community, especially the Third World. South Africa would also witness

¹⁰⁸Graham, Matthew (2010), Cold War in Southern Africa, in: Africa Spectrum, 45, 1, 131-139. Accessed May 11 2017,<http://journals.giga-hamburg.de/index.php/afsp/article/view/511/368>

this norm. Instead of responding to the direct menace of the Soviet impact, the U.S. saw in Pretoria an important launch pad for its Navy and an environment for its space program to thrive, thereby ensuring the U.S. turn a blind eye to the antics of the racist apartheid regime and sympathize with the regime. In the 1960s and early 1970s years, the United States' foreign policy towards South Africa regarding the Cold War can be x-rayed through three different means. The three points were the docking of the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1967, the American government using satellite and missile tracking ports in Johannesburg by NASA between 1960-1973 coupled with the ban on arms that Kennedy instituted, which was implemented by Presidents Johnson and Nixon from 1963-1970. These instances, as found in the U.S. National Archives, are close examinations of how Washington carried out policies that affected the government and people of South Africa.¹⁰⁹ Especially as regards worldwide Cold War and as regards apartheid, is important so as to really understand the impulsive component describing how the United States related to the international community in the crucial phase in World History.¹¹⁰

The Influence of Cold War on South Africa

During the Cold War, Pretoria was not the best of an ally. Supporting the government in Pretoria was a tough decision for Washington, being friends with a

¹⁰⁹ The cold war: accessed 26th of April 2017, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Cold-War.aspx>

¹¹⁰Eisenberg, Rebecca Nicole, "Reexamining the Global Cold War in South Africa: Port Usage, Space Tracking and Weapons Sales" (2012). *Dissertations and Theses*. Paper 117. http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/117 10.15760/etd.117, 1.

regime that treated her citizens with contempt and terror was always going to be a big risk, a risk they decided to take considering the huge benefits taking the side of Pretoria would bring. South Africa with its geographical location and its political shape, was blessed with ports that are equipped with innovative technology for Sea and Space, which were cogent to the United States' course. So, Washington had to consistently decide the kind of ties they had to float with Apartheid South Africa and the best way to reach the desired balance internationally and at home.¹¹¹

The Cold War was a difficult period for the U.S. The Cold War was a rivalry of two ideological and political arrangements. It was a war which pits communism against socialism with economic gains behind the motive. It was a race to determine which nation was more developed scientifically, militarily, and regarding nuclear power. A war to see who would have superior geographical dominance, economic power, and political might among non-aligned states. The Cold War in the Southern African region possessed a particular dimension which differentiated it markedly from the battle of systems and ideas in continental Europe. This was a direct product of the particular socio-economic development of South Africa, and its associated class structure which was indelibly linked to racial discrimination and exploitation. Despite the socialist Bloc's enduring faith that the march of history was on its side, the residual strength of the white settler regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia following the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974-1975 which saw the Portuguese army defeated by nationalists in its African colonies, prolonged this contest and gave anti-colonial

¹¹¹ Rebecca Nicole Eisenberg, 1,2.

struggles a particular intensity. These white minority governments used the perceived threat of communism, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, to demonize African Liberation movements and to divert domestic and international attention from the real causes of opposition to the racist rule.

Synthesizing the consolidation of economic and specific meaningful pursuits that the U.S. administration had with Pretoria, with the advancement of the Cold War and the beginning of the Civil Rights movement and an examination of American aid for the racist white minority regime of South Africa and also for the colonial masters of the rest of Southern Africa thrust forward space on the difficult juxtaposition of two big topics of the annals of contemporary America: racism and anticommunism.¹¹² The U.S. used Southern Africa countries of Angola, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and of course, South Africa as an experiment to know if it would be possible to strike an alliance with the third world in fighting against the Soviets.

The US Supports South Africa Against Communism

The Truman government provided invaluable aid to help implement white dominance and authority in South Africa after the second world war in its desire to stem the spread of communism and to preserve the 'free world. 'The United States became, a reluctant uncle- or godparent- at the advent of apartheid.¹¹³ The Truman government doubted the South African blacks and their ability to install a South Africa free of

¹¹² Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.

¹¹³ Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 197.

Soviet dominance, which was mighty important to the United States for different reasons, particularly for some raw materials Pretoria possessed. When Afrikaner nationalists just without question categorized everybody, who opposed apartheid as "communists, " and Truman did not bother to question the legitimacy of the claim seriously.¹¹⁴ Ideally, Truman believed his chances were not much and did not know who to back in South Africa in stemming the propagation of Soviet impact, so decided to support the white minority, a decision he felt in his gut was the best for the United States then.

This led to a flaw in the coherence of the United States' multiracial politics with its relations with the Southern African region as the US believed supporting white minority leaders will keep the Southern African states in check. There was the concern that "the leaders in Moscow had started to entertain much more interest in advancing their impact and making it felt south of the Mediterranean Sea. The United States believed that once any racial strife is encouraged, 'it would enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc opportunity in Africa.'"¹¹⁵ President Kennedy's policies towards Pretoria would continue to matter and even transcend to through to the Johnson and Nixon's administrations. His primary strategy was to choose "staunchly anti-Communist white rulers" against picking the majority black ANC or PAC, in spite of fears of how the civil rights movement in the U.S. would react.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Borstelmann, *The Cold War*, 201.

¹¹⁵ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 136.

¹¹⁶ Borstelmann, *The Cold War*, 70.

The years between 1960 -1970s was characterized by policies and relations between Pretoria and Washington being steered by the fear of communism spreading through the impact of the Soviets. Another school of thought believed the marriage of convenience between the U.S and South Africa from the angle of how apartheid influenced United States' establishments that have links to South Africa, like churches, educational institutions, private businesses, civil rights leaders, and diverse leaders from the United States' administration. With the administrations divided and divisive, the United States presidents were too preoccupied with the influence that the South African government wield, and were sensitive enough to want to keep them as an ally in their bid to better the Soviets during the Cold War than to be bothered about the maligned black majority going through hell under apartheid South Africa.

The American government was scared that a revolt in the Southern African country would give room for communism to creep in, thrive and take control of the southern sea routes and the leading light in the supply of gold world over. Washington read while their knees balked, the reports from CIA that communist Soviets had infiltrated the ranks of the ANC. The focus of the cold war thereby changed-, with every intelligence report warped into believing any opposition to apartheid or colonialism an act of support towards communism.¹¹⁷

While not necessarily being entirely focused on why the U.S. parleyed with South Africa in the manner it did, the expansion of communism, by the Soviets, in

¹¹⁷ Robert Kinlock Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 128.

South Africa was the foundation on which the government based its decisions so brought about a positive change for the maligned blacks of South Africa. Considering that "...Kennedy simultaneously affirmed the legitimacy of the apartheid government, not because the Cold War left him no other choice but because that was the only choice his administration was willing to see."¹¹⁸ The U.S. did assume that the ruling racist South African regime was the only one to go with when an ally was to be picked among rival political parties as they were seen as the logical, safest option in the ideological battle against the Soviets.

Ultimately, South Africa's projected image as the 'bastion of the free world' did not compel the West. The unbelief of the west was based on the argument that what the Soviets sought by projecting naval power in distant waters was political influence rather than the means to provoke a military conquest of the West. The West recognized that in the improbable event of a shoot-out in the southern oceans, the Republic's anti-Communist posture would leave it little choice but to place its ports, harbors, and military facilities at the West's disposal.¹¹⁹ In trying to focus on the effort to involve Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, the cash-strapped Soviet Union tried to stay ahead

¹¹⁸ Christian M. De Vos, "Balancing Acts: John Kennedy, The Cold War, and The African National Congress," *Politikon* 32, no. 1 (May 2005), 119. Accessed June 11 2017, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589340500101782>.

¹¹⁹ J.E. Spence, "Southern Africa in the Cold War," *History Today* 49, no. 2 (Feb 1999), 46. Accessed on April 14, 2017, <http://www.historytoday.com/je-spence/southern-africa-cold-war>.

¹²⁰ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books), 438.

¹²¹ Andrew, Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 443.

of the game, even as former African colonies gained independence. A primary tool of the USSR was to distribute forged letters to leaders of the blacks in Africa that were "designed to strengthen their suspicion of the United States and their trust in the Soviet Union."¹²⁰

The Soviet Arms Freedom Movements in South Africa

The Soviet's interaction with the ANC and SACP, more specifically, even though Moscow had "only minor expectations of the possibility of national freedom movements" in South Africa, they felt that it was pertinent to keep ties with the movements that stood against apartheid and may really come to power if there comes a forceful takeover. In spite of the ANC and SACP receiving a small amount of funds to the tune of 300,000 a year to the ANC alone, "the first fifteen years of Umkhonto operations posed no significant threat to the South African apartheid regime." This was mainly due to the mass exile and imprisonment of ANC and SACP leadership.¹²¹

About 328 Umkohonto fighters were trained by the Soviets in Odessa from 1963-1965. The Soviets believed it was necessary for the Umkohonto to be trained in guerilla tactics that may come handy when the need arises to battle apartheid. Training continued for the next two decades, but was spotty and could not be sustained, as the USSR could not get the ANC supplies needed to stand up to militarily to the apartheid regime. It was also difficult to smuggle the fighters back into South Africa.¹²²

¹²² Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 244-245.

The involvement of the USSR in South Africa became further complicated by the incursion and entanglement of Cuba with sub-Saharan Africa, proving the theory further that communism was not always of one accord in the Cold War years. With Cuba seeing the region as "imperialism's weakest link."¹²³ Cuba had interests in the new post-colonialism governments as colonialism collapsed, thus raising the questions of Cuban influence in South Africa and to what extent.

Piero Gleijeses, an historian and a professor of United States foreign policy who worked on Cuban foreign policy offered answers to this. While much of his work focused on Algeria, the Congo, and Angola, he did spend some time examining South Africa. It was Cuba's interest to spread its revolution through Africa that was far more concerning to the U.S. government than Soviet intentions.¹²⁴

There was indeed an intention to ignite a leftist revolution, but this happened through Cuba, instead of the Soviet Union, in Angola, the Congo, and other former Belgian and Portuguese colonies and not in South Africa. South Africa was indeed never a high priority for the Soviets as the major leaders of the ANC in Tambo and Nelson Mandela- were not deemed communists and were never communists, so were never seriously wooed by the Soviets.¹²⁵ A more significant parley was that of the U.S. and Great Britain with the South African regime as a result of their proposed investment in mineral resources and open trade.

¹²³ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books), 433.

¹²⁴ Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 8-9.

¹²⁵ Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa*, 8-9.

The region was an important part of the 'international civil war' of the twentieth century, as the war between 'centre-right and left' interfered with the politics and armed battle in the Southern African region, against the theory of freedom and talks in favor of evolutionary, a socioeconomic change was effectively sidelined.¹²⁶

South African politics of the Cold War era cannot be simply defined by placing it as a traditional definition of the Cold War. Similarly misguided was enveloping apartheid's exploits and making it look like it was all because of its interests in taking sides with the US in the Cold War. Looking closely at it, one realizes that the Cold War paradigm was a myth, a facade. This does not mean that Botha and Malan-the chief advocates and champions did not seriously believe in its fight in the Cold War and that they were fighting the West's good fight. They really did. However, as enmeshed as they were in the misconception, it blinded them from the realities of the South African struggle and the denial of human rights of the Colored citizens of the country. For the apartheid regime, communism was never really the issue.¹²⁷

In conclusion, The United States of America was able to exert its influence in South Africa, and further its economic course and win the battle of both ideological and

¹²⁶ Sue Onslow, "Introduction," *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, ed. Sue Onslow (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-2.

¹²⁶ John Daniel, "Racism, the Cold War and South Africa's Regional Security Strategies 1948-1990," *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, 51.

¹²⁷ John Daniel, "Racism, the Cold War and South Africa's Regional Security Strategies 1948-1990," *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, 51.

moral bragging rights on the Soviets. Even as the white minority leadership of South Africa was able to inflict more inhuman treatment on its non-white citizens in a bid to preserve its supremacy, while courting the favor of the US with its 'commitment' to stemming the advancement of communism in Southern Africa, with Washington looking the other way as its ego was continually stroked by the regime.

CHAPTER 5

HARBINGER OF CHANGE: PRESIDENT CARTER LATE 1970'S

Of all the past administrations, it was President Jimmy Carter's administration that confronted apartheid South Africa the most. With the Kissinger initiative of 1976, the new government of the U.S. zoomed on Southern Africa, making the region a priority in the continent. The Carter administration committed resources to the area to sustain its interest there. With a wind of change, the U.S. verbally condemned the Apartheid policies, warned the Republic severely, and for a change, did not just talk, but acted in line with its voice, and conformed with mandatory U.N. arms ban. However, this new policy yielded little or nothing as the objective of annihilating Apartheid failed woefully as apartheid South Africa refused to budge and effect sweeping changes.¹²⁸

Writing about the presidential election that brought Jimmy Carter to the White House in 1976, reporter Kandy Stroud, claimed that "not many felt like lauding America this year..." and that "there was not that much to celebrate."¹²⁹ It was a time when folks were dissatisfied pervasive with politics, and a predominant sense of disillusionment among the citizens of the United States as a result of both the nation's long engagement in the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal.¹³⁰ Just because of the

¹²⁸ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 89.

¹²⁹ Samia Kouki, *The Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Administrations' Policies Toward Apartheid South Africa: Diverging Rhetoric, Converging Actions*, The Tunis Languages Higher Institute, Tunisia, *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 2011, 210.

¹³⁰ Morris, Roger, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Collins, August 1977), 224.

then-Democratic candidate's campaign on a political premise that promised to further the regard for fundamental human rights, he seemed to be the kind of man that appealed to the United States citizenry and was a candidate that they felt could get elected. As soon as he was elected, the new president promised to "make America proud again,"¹³¹ Many neutral observers believed his vision for respect for human rights would have a significant influence on formulating the American foreign policy. Carter's repute as a defender of human rights was further complemented and consolidated by a lot of appointments made which gave him rave reviews internationally and of course domestically. The strategic appointments made included Andrew Young, a human rights activist who was appointed as the United States ambassador to the United Nations. Another was the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who canvassed for the fair treatment of the poor before he was recognized and got the appointment. Lastly was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who became the National Security Adviser.¹³² These highly influential officials were characterized by their ambition to minimize the grandness of the Cold War in their means to comprehending the dispute in Southern Africa and the rest of the world¹³³ Furthermore, President Jimmy Carter's unique direction toward human rights was established with a Presidential Directive (NSC-30) of February 17, 1978. This unique policy made it known to the world that "it shall be a primary objective of US foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout

¹³¹ Vogelgsang, Sandy, *American Dream Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy*. New York: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1980, 110.

¹³² Cornwell, Rupert. "Cyrus Vance." *The Independent* 14 January 2002. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/cyrus-vance-729665.html> .15 June 2009.

¹³³ Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, January 1994), 215.

the world." President Jimmy Carter highlighted the groundwork of what he called "the U.S. fundamental human rights policy" and explained the instances and conditions involving the violations of human rights and thus required American intervention. These instances comprised how successive governments abused power in illegal arrests, torture, degrading treatments and long detention of individuals without trial¹³⁴. In such instances, the Democratic president promised that the United States would intervene and leverage its influence to preserve individual freedom worldwide¹³⁵.

Going by rhetoric, Jimmy Carter's government's foreign policy looked to adopt a completely new focus, and significant changes in rhetoric seemed to be introduced with the dominant discourse being used. In his first address in 1977, President Carter referred to human rights several times. He expressed the belief that United States foreign policy should drastically alter its priorities towards a nobler "fight against poverty, ignorance, and injustice."¹³⁶ He also affirmed that the United States' foreign policy would significantly prefer to deal with societies which have respect for fundamental human rights.¹³⁷ After being president for four months, Carter declared to the distinguished guests at the University of Notre Dame of his "reaffirmation of America's dedication to

¹³⁴ Samia Kouki, *The Jimmy Carter And Ronald Reagan Administrations' Policies Toward Apartheid South Africa: Diverging Rhetoric, Converging Actions*, The Tunis Languages Higher Institute, Tunisia, *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 2011, 210.

¹³⁵ Carter Library at [www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov /documents/pod directives/ pres_directive](http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pod_directives/pres_directive).

¹³⁶ Samia Kouki, 211.

¹³⁷ Vogelgsang, Sandy, *American Dream Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy* (New York: Norton & Co Inc, 1980), 110.

fundamental human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy"¹³⁸ In his inaugural Senate testimonial on foreign aid, Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State's rhetorics resonated with that of his president, offering the same commitment to upholding human rights. Vance pinpointed two cogent objectives of what should be the United States function abroad. His presentation again consists of conditions and words just as those used by President Carter. He elaborated that the United States' interference in the affairs of the world was supposed "to show America's compassion for the poor and dispossessed around the world," and "to contribute to the cause of peace."¹³⁹ On another instance, Vance proudly declared that "the defense of human rights has been and will always be one of the main aims of this government's foreign policy." What was recurrent in the lexis of different protagonists in the Carter government was that the custom pointing to considerations for geopolitical and national interests were majorly muted, a fact largely illustrated by President Jimmy Carter's argument that "we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism."¹⁴⁰ President Jimmy Carter's direction was to place great concentration on the United States' function and moral duty to fight to uphold fundamental human rights domestically and internationally.

The Carter's administration's dedication to defending fundamental human rights was strong rhetorically. "Freedom", "liberation," and "human rights" are words

¹³⁸ Forsythe, David. *The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 140.

¹³⁹ Trimiew, Darryl, *God Bless the Child that's Got its Own* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 66.

¹⁴⁰ Hayward, Steven. *The Real Jimmy Carter: How Our Worst Ex-President Undermines American Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004), 111.

repeatedly echoed in President Carter's speeches.¹⁴¹ Through President Carter's speeches and public talks, he came out as not just a staunch human rights activist, but more importantly, his rhetoric displayed an obvious consistency in this commitment throughout his presidency. Upon his nomination as the 39th president of America in July 1976, Carter enthused: "our nation was the first to commit itself explicitly to basic moral and philosophical principles, a new, unique development that inspires mankind's imagination."

At the 1977 Notre Dame event almost a year later, his appeal to the same principles looked unchanged when he announced that "as we know that democracy works, we can denounce the contentions of those leaders who deny their people human rights." This dedication to democracy and human rights, especially in Southern Africa, did not seem to become stained at the closure of his presidency because in his farewell speech, he prayed the new Republican presidency to stress human rights heavily like he did because "America every time must defend these basic human rights"¹⁴²In considering American relations with Africa before the Jimmy Carter presidency, "the United States policy toward Africa in the 1950's and 1960's was that of the genial negligence of black Africa and cautious support of South Africa's white apartheid regime."¹⁴³ President Carter's opinions about equality in racial matters, however, were on show as early as his 1971 inaugural speech as the governor of Georgia. In that

¹⁴¹Kouki, *The Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Administrations' Policies Toward Apartheid South Africa*, 210.

¹⁴² Rosenbaum, Herbert, and Alexej Ugrinsky, *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years* (Connecticut: Greenwood, 1994), 77.

¹⁴³ Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky, *Jimmy Carter*, 91.

address, he declared that "After this long campaign, I say to you seriously that the time for racial injustice is done...no poor, weak, rural or black should have to bear the additional yoke of suffering deprivation of the chance of education, simple justice, or even a job."¹⁴⁴ What makes this statement and others by Carter necessary is the kind of expectations and inspiration it gives and raised. As a matter of fact, after Carter's victory at the polls, anti-apartheid activists and elements retained hope that an entirely new approach to United States-Pretoria relations was to be addressed. This hope was helped as a result of the president's expression of regret during his campaign that he did not in any way help the domestic civil rights campaign in the U.S, and promised that if he becomes president, he will correct the anomaly.¹⁴⁵ In fact, not long after being sworn in, Jimmy Carter traveled to Africa, becoming the first U.S. president to visit the continent. When he was there, he declared his oral dedication to democracy again and to uphold moral sanity. In an address in Lagos, Nigeria, he outlined his administration's policy to Africa and proudly declared to the Lagos audience that "with you, we share a dedication to majority rule and fundamental human rights...this dedication determines our position toward your continent."¹⁴⁶

The oration of elements in President Jimmy Carter's government regarding racism, as described above, promised a considerable deviation from the policies of previous United States anti-apartheid policies. The Carter presidency seemed to be

¹⁴⁴ Governor Jimmy Carter inaugural address, Atlanta, Georgia. January 12, 1971, www.carterlibrary.org accessed on the June 28, 2017.

¹⁴⁵ Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, January 1994), 215.

¹⁴⁶Rosenbaum, Herbert, and Alexej Ugrinsky, *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years* (Connecticut: Greenwood, 1994), 256.

greatly averse to any racism of any dimensions which thus extended toward apartheid, South Africa. Cyrus Vance reinforced this, as he delivered a speech highlighting the United States' policy Pretoria, in early July 1977.

In the speech before the yearly conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), he notified the South African administration that its ties to the United States would significantly be affected if no substantial endeavor was soon made to change the racist apartheid policy. The aim of such reversal was to let the complete and efficient participation of all citizens of South Africa in politics, not minding the color of their skin. Cyrus Vance continued by expressing his opinion that it was important for apartheid Pretoria to start negotiating with the majority blacks in the country. He further warned the white minority that failure on their part to effect the desired changes would make their relationship deteriorate; stating that Washington DC will not support a system based on racial discrimination and remain true to ourselves"¹⁴⁷ Andrew Young was also very vocal against the apartheid government. He was able to affirm the predominant assumption that this systemized favoritism toward the racist white was just not acceptable. He once announced that "at some junction, we've to reach the verdict that we ain't going to bankroll the apartheid regime. When we reach that conclusion, it's surprising how fast the people of South Africa will come to see the right thing to do."¹⁴⁸ Carter believed that encouraging democracy and sustaining respect for human rights were not different from each other. He explained further that it would have been really useless to highlight

¹⁴⁷ Massie, Robert, *Loosing the Bonds*, (New York: Talese, 1997), 413, 414.

¹⁴⁸ Massie, Robert, *Loosing the Bonds*, (New York: Talese, 1997), 410.

human rights abuse occurring in a precise context without considering the political system in which they occurred.¹⁴⁹ It is thus only reasonable to conclude that President Carter ought to understand that the solution to the problem of blacks in South Africa was to try and pressure the apartheid regime, to impose a system that internationally abhors apartheid and to effect these changes, and institute a more auspicious means for majority rule and democracy. What is obvious is that, in theory, comparing the Ford and particularly the Nixon presidencies, which provided ephemeral and reckless attention to the challenge of racism in Pretoria, positive development in the means used by the U.S. as regards the nation looked to be on the horizon. The early signs were that the proponents of human rights and racial equality in top positions in the Carter administration were appointed, that the review of the African foreign policy was carried out just after he became the president, and the rhetoric and statements by Carter himself and top members of his administration.¹⁵⁰

Although it strongly disagreed with the tactics employed by the U.S. anti-apartheid movement, the Carter administration concurred that the time had come for the United States to confront Pretoria. The new administration benefited from some individuals within the higher echelons of the State Department with prior knowledge and interest in South Africa. Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning, for example, had written his Ph.D. thesis addressing U.S. foreign policy toward the region, while

¹⁴⁹ Rosenbaum, Herbert, and Alexej Ugrinsky, *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years* (Connecticut: Greenwood, 1994), 81.

¹⁵⁰ Samia Kouki, The Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Administrations' Policies Toward Apartheid South Africa: Diverging Rhetoric, Converging Actions, The Tunis Languages Higher Institute, Tunisia, *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 2011, 212.

Donald McHenry, deputy representative to the U.N., had published a book on U.S. corporations in the Republic.¹⁵¹ There was a renewed commitment to Africa from the Carter administration. The chief executive himself was to be the first U.S. president to make an official visit to an independent African state when he traveled to Nigeria in the spring of 1978.¹⁵² He followed this trip by declaring, in June of that year, that we want a continent that is bereft of the control of external powers, rid of the acrimony of racist unfairness, without conflict, and without the yoke of hunger, disease, and poverty. We are certain that our best bet in achieving these objectives is through positive policies that recognize African realities and that recognize aspirations."¹⁵³ One of Carter's first acts had been to direct his vice president, Walter Mondale, to concentrate on African issues.¹⁵⁴ Likewise, the president's choice of ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, proved to be significant. With Young as the ambassador, there came about a direct bond between the Pretoria and the U.S.' own struggle against racial discrimination. Young's experience in the civil rights movement, his association with Martin Luther King, and his simple, non-confrontational style of statecraft helped

¹⁵¹ Donald McHenry, *Lake, Caution and Concern; United States firms in South Africa: study project on external investment in South Africa and Namibia*. Bloomington: African Studies Program, Indiana, Indiana University, 1975.

¹⁵² David B. Ottaway, Carter arrives in Nigeria on state visit. *Washington Post*. 1 April 1978. A1. Prior to Carter's state visit, Franklin D. Roosevelt made an informal trip to Liberia on 26–27 January 1943, where he met President Edwin Barclay. FDR was en route from the Allies' Casablanca Conference of 14–24 January 1943.

¹⁵³ Address of President Jimmy Carter before the United States Naval Academy, Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, 7 June 1978. [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30915&st=annapolis&st1=\[Accessed: 26 November 2007\]](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30915&st=annapolis&st1=[Accessed: 26 November 2007])

¹⁵⁴ Presidential news conference, 15 April 1977. *DSB*. 1977, 76(1976), 459.

improve the relations between the United States and African governments.¹⁵⁵ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, too, paid substantial attention to the issues of southern Africa.¹⁵⁶

Indeed, if Carter's initial foreign policies review process can be used as a measure, southern Africa was rated by the new administration as its fourth most pressing global concern, and it was the first region to be subject to a formal presidential directive.¹⁵⁷ Presidential Directives set the tone for the new U.S. policy toward apartheid. Overall, the aim was to "promote the progressive transformation of South African society," and two parallel strategies were to be explored. First, the president directed Vance, in consultation with Young, to draw up a paper recommending "specific steps" that the United States should employ against the Republic. He asked that this paper also comments on the order of implementation of these actions. The second policy path involved Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, developing links with the 12 U.S. corporations that had recently signed the Sullivan Principles on fair employment practices for South Africa. Blumenthal was directed to encourage an expansion of this program.¹⁵⁸

This early presidential directive suggested that the Carter administration was preparing to abandon the "carrots" associated with National Security Study

¹⁵⁵ Andrew J. DeRoche, *Andrew Young: Civil rights ambassador*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2003. 76, 91.

¹⁵⁶ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical years in America's foreign policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 256, 313.

¹⁵⁷ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 92.

¹⁵⁸ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa*, 92.

Memorandum 39, for "sticks": punitive sanctions included.¹⁵⁹ Confrontation, beyond just rhetoric, was now on the agenda. The administration was not, however, contemplating a complete break with Pretoria. Any punitive measures implemented would be designed to be consummate with events in the Republic, and the South African government's responsiveness to the administration. An effective "ratcheting up" of pressure was the aim. The second element of the directive underlined this point of measured confrontation. Carter indicated that he was reluctant to impose any kind of economic embargo on the Republic. For the time being, the administration considered that an engaged U.S. corporate community in South Africa could act as a force for change. Officials would seek to tap into this potential influence by working with the Sullivan signatories. Overall, it was hoped this binary approach would "offer a credible alternative to armed struggle," and limit the opportunities for Soviet intervention in southern Africa.¹⁶⁰ To intimate its new policy to the South African government, the administration agreed to a summit. Prime Minister B.J. Vorster had suggested the need for such a meeting in a personal letter sent to Carter during March 1977. Vorster had asked, "Why must we confront one another, why must we quarrel with each other? Can we not resolve our differences in a way?" He recommended that further talks should take place through a personal envoy, as he considered "normal channels of communication" to be "inappropriate."¹⁶¹ President Carter, despite Vorster's swipe at

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 92.

¹⁶⁰ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 92-93.

¹⁶¹ Letter, Vorster to Carter, 23 March 1977. Document 1. Southern Africa (3/77-4/77). Geographic File: Box 14. Brzezinski Collection. JCL.

the State Department, concurred. He thought that it “could be mutually profitable to have a full and candid exchange of views concerning Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the future political evolution of South Africa.”¹⁶² A bilateral summit was accordingly arranged. The protocol behind this meeting was intricate. The United States did not wish to be seen talking to South Africa under the full gaze of the international press unless there was to be a guaranteed degree of cooperation. Diplomatic feelers were therefore deployed to help Washington DC determine the rank of the envoy selected and the venue for this summit. In the end, Vice President Mondale was dispatched. The president felt confident enough with Pretoria's continued engagement vis-à-vis the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations to permit this. Communication before the meeting, however, indicated that South Africa was unlikely to offer any significant concessions over apartheid itself.

Consequently, the South African territory was considered inappropriate for the talks.¹⁶³ A neutral venue in Vienna was agreed instead, with representatives meeting over two days, commencing on 19 May 1977. The message that Washington DC wished to communicate to Vorster was that U.S.-South African relations had now reached a watershed. In particular, Pretoria was given notice that the United States considered the three issues of Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid to now be “delinked.” Vorster would no longer be offered a “free ride” on apartheid, in return for cooperation elsewhere in

¹⁶² Letter, Carter to Vorster, 8 April 1977. Document 13. Southern Africa (3/77–4/77). Geographic File: Box 14. Brzezinski Collection. JCL.

¹⁶³ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 93.

the region.¹⁶⁴ As Donald McHenry later told the Council on Religion and International Affairs, "We cannot, on one side, try to resolve the problems in Namibia and Rhodesia, and at the same time mute our voices on the outrageous situation in Soweto."¹⁶⁵ The United States was now demanding simultaneous results. As the vice president put it: "We don't think progress on one issue excuses no progress on another."¹⁶⁶ Regarding defining exactly what this "progress" should be, Mondale was careful not to proscribe any specific action.¹⁶⁷ Prior to Vienna, the administration's internal policy review had concluded that U.S. pressure should seek "A peaceful and progressive transformation of South African society, involving the elimination of institutionalized racism and leading to rule by the majority of all the governed, with full and equal political participation by all and guaranteed rights for minorities."¹⁶⁸ Detailed public demands, however, were not specified. Instead, the administration, throughout its term of office, only talked about "full political participation" as being the requirement.¹⁶⁹ A particular blueprint for change was thus avoided, and no one model of post-apartheid governance favored. As Mondale stated at the conclusion of the Vienna talks: "If there is progress within South Africa to remove laws such as the pass laws, discrimination laws, these job set-aside laws, laws to permit active political expression without intimidation, those things should be encouraged and appreciated." Ultimately, however, Mondale thought it was

¹⁶⁴ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 93.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*, 93.

¹⁶⁶ Vice President Walter Mondale's news conference, Vienna, 20 May 1977. DSB. 1977, 76(1982), 665.

¹⁶⁷ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa*, 93.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 93.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 93-94.

up to South Africans themselves to determine their future.¹⁷⁰ The Carter administration acknowledged that what it demanded of Pretoria would “profoundly change the nature” of U.S.-South African relations.¹⁷¹ This was not so much because Washington DC had delinked the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid, but because the United States was now prepared to issue an ultimatum to achieve its ends. Vice President Mondale made it known at Vienna that in the absence of positive moves from the Republic, in all three of these areas, the United States would “change its position of opposing mandatory sanctions.”¹⁷² This was a threat that the Carter administration repeated throughout its watch. Secretary of State Vance, for instance, warned Pretoria just two months after Vienna that, “If progress is not recorded in ten days, our relations will inevitably suffer”; a year later he told the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, “We have to make it clear that a deterioration of our bilateral relations is inevitable if progress is not made”; in 1979, William Dunfey, a member of Carter's U.N. delegation, informed the General Assembly that if reform from Pretoria was not forthcoming his government “will consider other ways to bring about change”; and even in 1980, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose was talking about “our relations with the South Africa Government” being “dependent upon progress toward the elimination of apartheid.”¹⁷³ The message was clear from Vienna onward: Pretoria

¹⁷⁰ Vice President Walter Mondale’s news conference, Vienna, 20 May 1977. DSB. 1977, 76(1982), 665.

¹⁷¹ Memo, Mondale to Carter, 8 April 1977. 2. Document 14. Southern Africa (3/77–4/77). Geographic File: Box 14. Brzezinski Collection. JCL.

¹⁷² Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994* (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), 94.

¹⁷³ Alex Thomson, *U.S Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa*, 94.

only had limited time in which to comply with international standards of racial relations. If there was not suitable progress within this (never specified) time frame, the United States was prepared to apply punitive sanctions. South Africa's response to the Vienna démarche was mixed. Once again, Pretoria reiterated that it was fully prepared to cooperate with Washington DC over the Rhodesia and Namibia negotiations. Within bounds, the Republic was willing to exert pressure on Prime Minister Ian Smith vis-à-vis Rhodesia. Likewise, Vorster confirmed that Pretoria was prepared to end its occupation of Namibia, subject to details being confirmed and guarantees being made.¹⁷⁴

Under Jimmy Carter's Administration (1977-1981), the United States endorsed a tougher stance against the South African government, seeing African nationalism as a driving force in the region that was compatible with United States interests.¹⁷⁵ However, Carter believed that the United States should expand business activities in South Africa because business would be a force for "change."¹⁷⁶ In 1977, President Carter had cut the representation of military American Defense Attaché Officers in South Africa in protest against the South African crack down in the wake of the infamous uprisings in Soweto

¹⁷⁴ Cable, U.S. Embassy-Vienna to State, 20 May 1977. Facsimile published in Mokoena, ed. Declassified history. Document 43.

¹⁷⁵ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan's Problematic Policy of Appeasement with South Africa* (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 23, 2012), 22.

¹⁷⁶ Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa. A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present*, 248.

¹⁷⁷ J.E. Davies, *Constructive Engagement? How Reagan's Administration Tried to support South Africa without appearing to Endorse Apartheid* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007), 23.

in 1976.¹⁷⁷ Also, the Carter Administration banned the export of all items to the South African military and police and prohibited the export of computers that would be used to enforce apartheid.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, during Carter's tenure as president, it witnessed the United Nations adopting the UN Security Council Resolution 418. On November 4, 1977, the resolution was endorsed, imposing a compulsory arms ban against the administration of South Africa. To President Carter's credit, he forcefully and adamantly opposed the institution of apartheid in South Africa and called for its immediate end. However, in spite of Carter's harder stance toward South Africa, the hardest, compared with other presidents, it was Ronald Reagan's presidency (1981-1989) that would change the course of the relationship between the United States with South Africa.¹⁷⁹

Jimmy Carter became president of the United States of America in 1977 with the intent of emphasizing the defense of human rights as an important feature of its foreign policy. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley comment that "Carter felt the issue deeply himself and also, it provided an opportunity for him to distinguish his foreign policy from that of Nixon and Kissinger."¹⁸⁰ One might expect such an emphasis to result in rather intense pressure from the United States on the South African regime to dismantle its apartheid system, and such an impression would have been

¹⁷⁸Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement*, 22.

¹⁷⁹ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan's Problematic Policy of Appeasement With South Africa* (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 23, 2012), 22.

¹⁸⁰ James Lee Ray, *American Foreign Policy, and Political Ambition*, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 261.

reinforced by Carter's appointment of African American activist Andrew Young as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

And, indeed in its early days, the Carter administration did take some steps to increase the pressure for reform on the South African regime, strengthening, for example, an embargo on arms to that nation. In 1978, it also "reprimanded South African for a possible explosion of a nuclear device."¹⁸¹ In the end, Carter administration refused to take any actions that would differentiate its policy toward South Africa substantially from that of its Republican predecessors. According to the Digital National Security Archive (2004), "like its predecessor, the Carter Administration...actively discouraged revolutionary change in South Africa and advocated moderate reforms."¹⁸²

And if the Carter administration was reluctant, because of Cold War pressures, to push the South African regime too hard for a change in its policy of apartheid, the Reagan administration was even more likely to give priority to its struggle against the Soviet Union over any effort to bring about rapid political reform in South Africa.¹⁸³ Furthermore, Carter's campaign rhetoric about the importance of human rights led many, especially liberals, to believe that he was implicitly promising to take a tougher, more principled stand against the white minority governments in Pretoria and Salisbury. American grassroots organizations were optimistic; black African countries

¹⁸¹ Ray, *American Foreign Policy*, 261.

¹⁸² James Lee Ray, *American Foreign Policy, and Political Ambition*, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 261.

¹⁸³ James Lee Ray, *American Foreign Policy*, 261.

were hopeful.¹⁸⁴ Consequently, in the struggle to end Apartheid in South Africa President Jimmy Carter is best remembered for talking tough about human rights and apartheid yet acted soft in effecting change to the status quo. He let slip the opportunity to follow his oration with action by placing economic gains over the emancipation of the maligned Southern Africans. In the next chapter, we will see if the next American presidencies took the chance that President Carter let slip.

¹⁸⁴ Sue Onslow, *Cold War in South Africa White Power, Black Liberation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 179.

CHAPTER 6

DIVESTMENT: US POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN

The Reagan presidency also had to deal with the conundrum that was the Apartheid regime of South Africa. The country's precious minerals, its prime strategic location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of American and the West's policy of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the several excuses cited by previous United States presidencies for encouraging the National Party of South Africa and its policies in Pretoria. This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise two years after Reagan left office.¹⁸⁵ It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support Pretoria was in the interest of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for the indignity, pains, and sufferings experienced by the sheer vast numbers of the South African citizenry meted out by the apartheid regime, the U.S. government continuously appealed the U.N. and the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.¹⁸⁶

A New Dawn

A new dawn in the policy of the United States toward South Africa was ushered in in November 1980 with the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. The "new right," looking to change the liberal policies of the previous administrations in foreign policy, moved into power. Furthermore, Reagan's election to the U.S. presidency would herald the beginning of a fundamentally new political order. Reagan's victory, therefore,

¹⁸⁵ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan's Problematic Policy of Appeasement With South Africa* (Georgetown: Washington, 2012), 15.

¹⁸⁶ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement*, 16.

constituted no less than a "revolution." President Reagan played a major role in shaping the administration's policy towards the Southern African nation.

President Ronald Reagan being a typical politician, deviated completely from the Carter ideology of human rights protection oration, believing that the U.S. had to oppose communism and protect its strategic interest in the region.¹⁸⁷ Under the Ronald Reagan government, Pretoria had eventually found in the U.S, an administration ready to take arguments about its strategic and political importance as an anti-Communist ally seriously.¹⁸⁸

The new government was supportive of the white minority government in Pretoria, and Southern Africa as a whole. The South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister at that time, P.W. Botha and other members of the South African government would visit the U.S. early in Reagan's first term as president to meet with high-ranking cabinet officials. During this time, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, a veteran from the Nixon administration, would craft Reagan's policy towards South Africa, Constructive Engagement.

A New Policy

Describing the terms of the tenets of the policy tagged, Constructive Engagement, which follows a systematic, gradual reform in Pretoria. "The diplomatic relations between Pretoria and the U.S. has now reached a crossroads of arguably historic import.

¹⁸⁷ Pauline H. Baker, *The United States, and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York, Ford Foundation, 1989), 8.

¹⁸⁸ Linda Freeman, "„Constructively“ Supporting Aggression and Repression - Reagan's South Africa Policy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 18, no. 3 (November 1984): 627, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/484775> (accessed September 25, 2017).

After two decades of generally increasing official U.S. government indifference to South Africa and related Pretorian inflexibility, the possibility may now arise for a much more positive and mutual relations between the two nations based upon shared strategic concerns in Southern Africa, our recognition that the government of P.W. Botha constitutes a unique opportunity for domestic change, and willingness of the Reagan Administration to deal realistically with South Africa."¹⁸⁹

Dr. Chester Crocker was appointed Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs soon after Reagan's success at the polls in 1981. By 1988, at the end of his tenure, Crocker had become the longest-serving Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs since the department's creation in 1958.¹⁹⁰

Crocker was then both an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the same university before the U.S. Department of State. During this time, he wrote "South Africa: Strategy for Change" a document which highlights his favorite policy of "Constructive Engagement" to the Southern African administrations – particularly Pretoria.¹⁹¹ The Assistant Secretary of State wondered, after 20 years of different party presidencies, if the United States even had a working policy toward Pretoria. "South Africa: Strategy for Change" would become the blueprint for President Reagan's diplomatic policy of Constructive

¹⁸⁹ Y. G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* (California, Peter Leng, 2008), 247.

¹⁹⁰J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8* (Johannesburg, James Currey, 2007), 23.

¹⁹¹J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement*, 1.

Engagement toward Pretoria and the Southern African region in general. The case for pursuing activist tactics of regional engagement relied less on the opportunities for success than on the real costs of not trying at all.¹⁹² "Clearly, the fundamental objective," was the coming to fore of a Pretorian nation "with which the U.S. can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constant embarrassment or political damage."¹⁹³ However, the ideas of the administration were viewed by some observers as a conceptual throwback to the previous twenty years, when Henry Kissinger, pursued "communication" as a policy toward the Apartheid administration, emphasizing mutual tactical and economic interests, during the Nixon administration.¹⁹⁴

To not focus only on the objective of a full-blown national convention was the way forward as shown in Pretoria's sovereignty showing that only the regime itself can control and monitor the particular exercise since the West has all to gain if it breaks through in pressing minority white-led change toward the direction of real power-brokering.¹⁹⁵ At the base of this faith was that only the white minority of Pretoria could effect peaceful change, and that the majority blacks canvassing for the demise of apartheid must achieve this in a peaceful and nonviolent manner. Constructive Engagement's focus would focus aim at a process of change and would avoid focusing

¹⁹² Chester A. Crocker, Southern Africa: Eight Years Later "Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall, 1989), pp. 144-164" Published by: Council on Foreign Relations DOI: 10.2307/20044114, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044114> Page Count: 21. Accessed August 21, 2017.

¹⁹³ Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 323-51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>, Accessed August 21, 2017.

¹⁹⁴ Pauline H. Baker, *The United States, and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York, Ford Foundation, 1989), 8.

¹⁹⁵ J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8* (Johannesburg, James Currey, 2007), 26.

on the outcome of destroying Apartheid, as this would keep the West (particularly the U.S.) immobilized by a distant objective.¹⁹⁶ Washington would need a nimble and sustained diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders.¹⁹⁷

Even before Crocker joined the Reagan presidency, he was a vocal critic of the policy of Carter toward Pretoria. Crocker stated that "the Carter government enveloped itself in a straight-jacket of policies which steers and welcomes comparisons of its promises and performance."¹⁹⁸ Helping the decision to appoint Crocker to work on ties with Pretoria was the fact that he took exception to the previous administration's harsh opinions, its extremist and supposedly unrealistic requests to relinquish power, and its many attempts, often half-hearted, to disassociate itself from the regime in Pretoria.¹⁹⁹

Making up for what he regarded as immoderate vocal rivalry toward South Africa by the Carter presidency, Crocker tried to relate with South Africa's tactical interests, particularly its anti-communism position, and to sympathize with the fear of the white minority. Emphasizing plea over pressure, he signaled in advance that there would be no significant penalties for inability to cooperate.²⁰⁰ "In South Africa, it is not our job to have a choice between black and white. In this land of abundance, talented and different people, essential Western strategic, economic, moral and political concerns are

¹⁹⁶J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement?* 26.

¹⁹⁷ Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 345. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>," Accessed August 22, 2017.

¹⁹⁸ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 112.

¹⁹⁹Christopher Cocker, *The United States, and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 154.

²⁰⁰Pauline H. Baker, *The United States, and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York, Ford Foundation, 1989), 72.

at stake.²⁰¹ For South Africa to obey the global demands for eliminating Apartheid, Crocker declared that the U.N, and especially the U.S., must engage with the government of South Africa. There was an opportunity to help shape a regional climate conducive to political accommodation in both Southern Africa and Pretoria if Western administrations were ready to engage in "maintained and active diplomacy" involving leadership in regional problem-solving.²⁰²

The questions 'how could the United States actively support Pretoria to be able to decide their future without the baggage of apartheid that takes into account the interests of the United States were inherent. He proffered a logical reaction to those who trust that wielding an imposing United States influence would be a disadvantage to the whole objective that was being worked at. Then new experience with Iran at that point in time should mute those who believed the United States should wield strong might in socially, economically, and politically weakening apartheid Pretoria. The abolishing of apartheid creating a fresh non-racial administration was not going to be actualized by an unannounced dramatic act such as banning trade or investment with South Africa or even comprehensive sanctions backed by military power.

²⁰¹ Freeman, Linda, and Alfred O. Hero. "'Constructively' Supporting Aggression and Repression - Reagan's South Africa Policy." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 18, no. 3 (1984): 627-33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/484775>. (accessed September 25, 2017).

²⁰² Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 345. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>," Accessed August 22, 2017.

²⁰³ Clarizio, Lynda M., Bradley Clements, and Erika Geetter. "United States Policy toward South Africa." *Human Rights Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1989): 249-94. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/761958>. Accessed June 29, 2017.

Pretoria had proved they could endure all those challenges from former U.S. governments. A major reason used by the Reagan government for the loss of U.S. impact was that past bans led to the loss of credibility with the South African government.²⁰³

Reagan in Bed with Apartheid

Constructive engagement, as highlighted by an executive order by President Reagan, rested on the assumptions underlying the ideal outcomes. First, South Africa's all-encompassing military and commercial dominance in the region of Southern Africa and its great internal security system would, shortly, allow South Africa to "control" external pressures and internal ones to achieve change. Second, the Botha administration could be stimulated to agree to a globally embraced settlement in Namibia if Pretorian withdrawal were linked to a removal of Cuban artillery from Angola and the possibility of an advancement in Pretoria- U.S. relations. A settlement in early Namibia would set a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in South Africa and the region in motion, thus corroborating the unique approach; so, progress could be recorded more swiftly on apartheid issues if the U.S. government used official rather than public channels for its criticism and pressure.²⁰⁴ "We can work with a nation going through a rehabilitative change," Crocker controversially wrote in a Scope Paper for Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State at this point that a new American mentality

²⁰⁴ On U.S.A. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987).

must evolve.²⁰⁵ The United States and the international community could no longer force a change in the diplomatic politics of Pretoria. Rather, the regime would need to realize that her racism was destroying its credibility.

However, there was proof in the regime that change was coming with the National Party under the control of P.W. Botha. With Western engagement absent in South Africa, and the region as a whole, it would be impossible to provide assurances that South Africa would be allowed to have a future with no apartheid. Furthermore, the Americans believed that it should strongly encourage a regional circumstance receptive to compromise and to accommodate before concerted attempts to not validate innovative change and to capitalize on the inevitable unclear and periodic "happenings" that will bring about diplomatic liberalization.²⁰⁶

Change Becomes Imminent

At that time in South Africa, the blacks got some privileges and rights, although not much. They were able to get employed in jobs that had been refused them in the past. The regime removed all the legal sanctions installed to block blacks from being on some international Sports teams of the Southern African country. The most important

²⁰⁵ On U.S.A. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987)

²⁰⁶ Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 345. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>," Accessed August 22, 2017.

change occurred in the labor sector. Blacks had finally been given trade union rights and were steadily moving up into more skilled employment.²⁰⁷

Perhaps more necessary, the finance of Pretoria was not flailing when Reagan assumed office. South Africa was doing fine. South Africa's economy was flush from the exorbitant sums got from gold and other mineral exports.²⁰⁸ The general thought amongst those in the Reagan Administration was that the previous administration's strategy of broken relations with Pretoria was not yielding much difference within the South African National Party. Early in Reagan's presidency, he toned down on some of the bans that had been placed on Pretoria.

With the United States' concerns in South Africa, the supposed incoherence, non-efficient policies from previous governments, and the unclear change emanating from inside the racist regime, what strategy should the Reagan presidency employ on the ruling National Party? The question the government had to answer was this particular one. The U.S. could best enhance change in the apartheid regime by dealing with the minority white might structure and being conscious of white fears.²⁰⁹ He said, "Our objective, is to increase the confidence of the Pretorian administration. As the convener of the Constructive Engagement policy, Assistant Secretary Crocker wanted

²⁰⁷ John De St. Jorre, "South Africa: Is Change Coming?". <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1981-09-01/south-africa-change-coming>. Accessed on 12th of October 2017.

²⁰⁸ John De St. Jorre, "South Africa: Is Change Coming?".

²⁰⁹ Pauline H. Baker, *The United States, and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York, Ford Foundation, 1989), 9.

²¹⁰ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 113.

to make a centrist general agreement, some synthesis of Carter's activism and human rights concerns, with NSSM's realist approach.²¹⁰ He would seek to make his approach to constructive engagement toward South Africa an acknowledgment of the country's importance to the United States and the West.

Even before Crocker was appointed an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he made it abundantly clear that he did not see that the policy of isolating South Africa or exerting unnecessary pressure on it was particularly sensible. He stated that "the United States do not want to 'unruffle' Pretoria or undermine our own tactical and economic concerns. The might force of South Africa is not in our hands."²¹¹ To also establish these proclamations, Crocker would publicly express them, to further appease Pretoria. The policy eventually padded the soothing of South Africa. This, of course, was a welcomed view for Pretoria. In the days of the Carter presidency, they have believed the Carter's 'robust' approach to their administration as a hindrance to extending the relations with the United States. One of the first acts of constructive engagement was to repeal Carter's 1978 complete prohibition of United States trade between herself and the South African military and police. Starting in mid-1981, the companies in the United States could do business in Pretoria as a result of the Constructive Engagement policy.

²¹¹ Y. G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* (California, Peter Leng, 2008), 115.

They could now trade in basic commodities like food, clothing, nonstrategic chemicals, calculators, personal computers, and copying machines.²¹² The government explained that although other parts of the arms ban remain, making sure of "a strong emblematic and diplomatic disassociation of the United States from the enforcement of apartheid," Carter's complete embargo was merely "futile" and had "zero effect."²¹³ Though, compliance with the U.N. arms ban and the United States' failure to utilize Pretorian defense materials were symbolic of importance to the policy and should be furthered when there is no major diplomatic change, barring a dramatic deterioration in the geopolitical situation facing the West in adjacent areas.²¹⁴ Those areas that change frequently lead to should be made possible and given priority. He further elaborated that the United States should prevent, the snare of a sweeping assault on every part of Apartheid – as if each was as odious and neither should be taken into consideration first. If there were a shift in that policy, it would be for a prolonged and orderly change. The U.S. would surely, in this sense, mix itself up with particular processes, change agents, and political forces in concrete cases.²¹⁵ The administration's new policy was a new dawn to the ties between South Africa and the United States. It was "not the clandestine embrace" of the Nixon administration nor "polecat treatment" of the Carter years.²¹⁶

²¹²Y. G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* (California, Peter Leng, 2008), 115.

²¹³ Y. G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa*, 115.

²¹⁴ Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 346. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>," Accessed August 22, 2017.

²¹⁵ Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 346. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728>," Accessed August 22, 2017," 347.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 346.

Reagan Strongly Denies Supporting Apartheid

The victory of President Reagan had bestowed the U.S. with a fresh level of trust with Pretoria because "our desire and mandate is to see changes in diplomatic relations." Though the policy of Constructive Engagement decided to not confront with the regime in Pretoria, the Reagan presidency did not but express its opposition to Apartheid.²¹⁷ Contrary to popular anti-apartheid belief, the policy of Constructive Engagement was a positive approach to promoting change in Pretoria. Terming Apartheid as "morally unacceptable," the government was stubbornly in opposition to Apartheid. One time, in a Congressional hearing in regards to the United States stance toward Pretoria, Assistant Secretary Crocker posited that "our strong political and moral belief about a policy based on legalized racism (any policy which gives or takes political rights on this racial premise) – with the legitimacy of citizenship itself – is going to be repulsive."²¹⁸ Pretoria was using the only system globally "refusing its countrymen natural rights which are openly and legally based on racism," a fact which bestowed upon apartheid "special distinction as the world's most condemned system."²¹⁹

Notwithstanding their dislike for Apartheid, the fact remains the strategy of constructive engagement was aimed at appeasing Pretoria. Washington, D.C. wanted the government of South Africa to know that the U.S. could "cooperate with a society

²¹⁷ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 118.

²¹⁸ J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8* (Johannesburg, James Currey, 2007), 28.

²¹⁹ Y. G-M Lulat, *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* (California, Peter Leng, 2008), 245.

undergoing constructive change."²²⁰ The administration believed that it was in America's interest to encourage and assist reforms and to accept that without the reforms, the threat to American concerns would inevitably gather speed.²²¹ However, as admitted by the Reagan administration, constructive engagement with South Africa had limits regarding achieving results. The U.S. Ambassador to Apartheid South Africa stated that: "we cannot impose any policy on any nation in the region, nor would we want to," in an address at the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, in 1983.

"At the core of U.S. serious experience in Pretoria is that we have realized that there is a critical boundary to what any other superpower – or the United States can do to effect change in the apartheid state.²²² "Decision-making and political exploits would be regionally focused, while the option of whether to compete or not – when the Cubans and the communist Soviets were seriously taking advantage of and militarizing regional conflicts – would have worldwide implications." Constructive engagement tried to buy the government of South Africa space and time to reform its society.²²³ The administration believed that Apartheid transitioning through evolution would suffice and favorable to the U.S. so long as the ruling National Party's strategy represented

²²⁰ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994*, 118.

²²¹ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 118.

²²² J.E Davies, *Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8* (Johannesburg, James Currey, 2007), 24.

²²³ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 114.

genuine reforms. The Assistant Secretary's views were summed up in a 1981 State Department memo: "Though we may still not agree on Apartheid and cannot allow a system of legalized racial discrimination, we can unite with a nation experiencing change."²²⁴ Moreover, while sympathetic towards white South African attitudes, Washington did not react to the plight of the majority blacks and was seen in that perspective by the blacks of Pretoria, a lot of whom had come to see the U.S. as a close friend of the Apartheid regime. As well as blessing a constitution that marginalized blacks, South Africa endorsed a new policy giving limited parliamentary inclusion to the Coloreds, and Indians but excluded the black majority.

Botha, the South African prime minister, had decided to make changes, reforms that were not much. His American counterpart saw a window of opportunity that Botha's reforms brought, and decided to relate with the Southern African nation, after several years of discrepant policies toward them from the United States. With the objective of snuffing out communism in the background, the administration worked on Constructive Engagement that would seduce the white minority of Pretoria, while sustaining the United States' concerns in the nation. It was proposed, that peaceful change preponderantly would be realized through white institutions in South Africa. "There is not a great reason to contest the near-term survivability of white power in South Africa," according to the Reagan administration Constructive Engagement gave Pretoria with material benefits from early in Reagan's first term at the White House.²²⁵

²²⁴ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994*,

²²⁵ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan's Problematic Policy of Appeasement with South Africa* (D.C, Georgetown University, March 23, 2012), 44.

With the material incentives of increase in trade and exchange of technology between both countries, Pretoria became a friend of the U.S. Reagan hoped not to repeat previous administration's parley with South Africa devoid of a coherent policy.²²⁶ The elements of Constructive Engagement toughened South Africa up to make the status quo remain as it is, thus encouraging the apartheid regime to elongate apartheid. Nevertheless, the known objectives of the policy of Constructive Engagement, it eliminated any serious positives for Pretoria to launder its international image by improving the conditions of its majority black African population.²²⁷

Desmond Tutu and Ronald Reagan

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a fierce black South African activist, who clinched the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984, frustrated with the continued inactivity of the west and the backing of the racist government of South Africa to the detriment of the blacks, slammed the leaders of the US, Britain, and West Germany. Bishop Tutu did not mince words as he branded Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl as racists for supporting the racist apartheid government. "I have tried to be as nice as I could be, but we're talking about children being killed by a racist government that is being protected from the consequences of its actions by Mr. Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Kohl," The Nobel Laureate posited in an interview, in obvious swipe at Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl of West Germany. Bishop Desmond Tutu continued by saying that

²²⁶ Shandrá D. Hipp, *Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan's Problematic Policy of Appeasement with South Africa* (D.C, Georgetown University, March 23, 2012), 44.

²²⁷ Freeman, Linda, and Alfred O. Hero. "'Constructively' Supporting Aggression and Repression - Reagan's South Africa Policy." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 18, no. 3 (1984): 627-33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/484775>. (accessed September 25, 2017).

"certainly, the support of this racist policy is racist."²²⁸ "I'm supposed now as a Nobel laureate to speak responsibly and all that sort of thing, and I try to, but I just think we are seeing closet racism coming out into the open. How else can you explain the fact that people say that sanctions will hurt the blacks, so we won't apply sanctions?"²²⁹

In his address at the New York General Assembly's Special Committee Against Apartheid, he aired his frustrations at the total lack of sympathy at the suffering of blacks in his country by the Reagan government. He continued by saying, "It is highly unlikely he would have the same indifference if the casualties had been white," obviously referring to the 700 mostly black people, who have been killed in racial hostilities in South Africa since August of the previous year.²³⁰ He continued by saying that if the South African government failed to end apartheid in the following six months he would call for sanctions in line with the Commonwealth agreement in the Bahamas to impose mild sanctions and follow up with tougher ones in six months.

In his criticism of the policy of Constructive Engagement, he said, "I said when constructive engagement was put into place that it was unmitigated disaster for

²²⁸ Tutu Denounces Raegan "New York Times" July 23, 1986.<https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/tutu-denounces-reagan.html> (accessed March 31, 2017).

²²⁹ Tutu Denounces Raegan "New York Times" July 23, 1986.<https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/tutu-denounces-reagan.html> (accessed March 31, 2018).

²³⁰ Tutu Denounces Raegan "New York Times" July 23, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/29/world/tutu-denounces-reagan-as-racist.html> . (accessed March 31, 2018).

blacks."²³¹ On the blacks' readiness for sanctions and President Ronald Reagan's speech on South Africa and Apartheid early 1985, he said, "Trade unions, black trade unions have said they call for sanctions." "Over 70 percent of our people in two surveys have shown that they want sanctions. He continues that Reagan thinks otherwise, by saying, "No, President Reagan knows better - we will suffer."He sits there like the great, big white chief of old can tell us black people that we don't know what is good for us," he continued. "The white man knows."²³²

In a speech at Hunter College in New York in 1986, Bishop Desmond Tutu further denounced Ronald Reagan and his policy of constructive engagement by saying, "there is no room for neutrality. When you say you are neutral in a situation of injustice and oppression, you have decided to support the unjust status quo. Are you on the side of injustice? Are you on the side of oppression or liberation? Are you on the side of death or of life? Are you on the side of goodness or of evil?"²³³

The Nobel Prize winner vehemently protests that the quiet diplomacy by the government of Reagan towards Apartheid South Africa has made life turn for the worse for blacks in the country. The policy of constructive engagement has indeed increased racial violence meted out on the hapless blacks in the country, and the continued

²³¹ Tutu Denounces Raegan "New York Times" July 23, <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/tutu-denounces-reagan.html>. (accessed March 31, 2018).

²³² Tutu Denounces Raegan "New York Times" July 23, 1986. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/tutu-denounces-reagan.html> .(accessed September 25, 2017).

²³³ <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/16/opinion/sanctions-vs-apartheid.html>

alliance between Reagan and Pretoria does not bode well for the blacks and for the end of apartheid.²³⁴

George Bush's Different Approach

In contrast to Ronald Reagan, George Bush comes to the South African issue vulnerable in a political sense. Note that Reagan entered his second term in 1984 on the heels of a landslide victory over Democratic challenger Walter Mondale. Bush won the presidency in the 1988 polls by a large popular and electoral majority vote, but it is serious to note— as the political experts in the administration bear in mind — that strains caused by the electoral college voting system masked what was actually a very close win by Bush over Democrat Michael Dukakis in 1988.²³⁵

The thing is that in the states which could have ensured Governor Dukakis win the election, Bush came on top by a small percentage. Bush won over the conservatives, which is usually comfortable for a Republican gunning for the White House against a liberal. However, Bush's strategy for winning hinged upon his call to some liberals and even moderates, who got hooked to his message of a 'kinder, gentler nation. Bush must, however, formulate a policy dependent on his political desires for his re-election of 1992. And with the elections fast approaching, the Bush administration was going to be very preoccupied with making policy in ways calculated to retain his support among moderates and some liberals. He may regard the issue of South Africa as a means of

²³⁴ <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/12/07/Nobel-Peace-Prize-winning-Bishop-Desmond-Tutu-met-President-Reagan/7281471243600/>

²³⁵ Stephen M. Davis, *The Bush Presidency, and South Africa: Congress and The Sanctions Outlook* (Braamfontein 2017, The South African Institute of International Affairs Jan Smuts House, May 1989), 4.

assisting in achieving that aim, as a lot of general voters in America still favors stricter anti-apartheid measures.²³⁶

Unlike Reagan, Bush comes to the South African issue indifferent to any policy. Bush did not request for, and neither received any mandate from voters on how to thread on the subject. In the course of his campaign, the candidate almost did not touch on the subject. However, Bush entered the fray with an address to suggest that the U.S. sanctions against the regime in South Africa was a positive one, as Pretoria now knew how serious the U.S. government was on displacing Apartheid. He said it would seem that the sanctions caused great hardship and economic stress for the blacks of South Africa. Bush refused to elucidate his statement on the discourse, only to show that he was not going to change or drum support for the repeal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act(CAAA). The resulting effect of that is that President Bush regarding policy towards South Africa became neutral, without venturing towards any particular direction, but he was vulnerable to pressure from any side looking to take charge of the policy.²³⁷

The Bush administration, however, with its continued opposition to sanctions, had a different strategy in mind. Herman Cohen's interpretation of the CAAA surfaced during a July 1991 hearing of the House of Representatives. The assistant secretary of state argued that, when it was passed, the CAAA was not meant to reward Pretoria only when a non-racial democracy was established. Instead, this legislation was about

²³⁶ Stephen M. Davis, *The Bush Presidency, and South Africa*, 5.

²³⁷ Stephen M. Davis, *The Bush Presidency, and South Africa: Congress and The Sanctions Outlook* (Braamfontein 2017, The South African Institute of International Affairs Jan Smuts House, May 1989), 5.

encouraging the National Party government to make initial steps toward negotiation. It was about persuading Pretoria to undertake the fundamental reforms that would permit constitutional talks. And this is exactly how the administration used the CAAA. Now that Pretoria had met the criteria, and continued to negotiate, the National Party was rewarded by a progressive removal of sanctions.²³⁸ In particular, this approach was designed to help President De Klerk ward off opposition from the “white right” within South Africa, enabling Pretoria to demonstrate tangible benefits of reform. Bush continued this strategy of reward as the negotiations evolved. In October 1991, for instance, the White House removed the U.S. embargo on the sale of computers, aircraft, and petroleum products to the South African military.²³⁹ Similarly, in February 1992, the president authorized the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank to once again offer loans and guarantees on South African contracts. At the same time, South Africa had reclassified a "friendly state" on the Foreign Assistance Act.²⁴⁰ Again, these measures were portrayed as helping to ease the negotiations process. Effectively, the sanctions debate was now closed in the United States. The Bush administration had removed those punitive measures that were under its control, whereas the incoming Clinton administration chose not to seek the removal of any of the remaining rules.

The United States still banned nuclear transfers to the Republic; prohibited intelligence sharing; required fair employment practices from businesses seeking

²³⁸ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 162.

²³⁹ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994*, 162

²⁴⁰ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan) ,162.

Export-Import Bank assistance; embargoed remaining gray area items being sold to the Republic's security forces; refused South African related tax credits; instructed its officials to advocate withholding International Monetary Fund Finance from countries practicing apartheid; maintained the U.N. mandatory arms embargo; and had in place a myriad of other state and local government imposed restrictions targeting purchasing contracts and investments involving businesses associated with the apartheid economy.²⁴¹ Clinton's position effectively ended any hopes that the anti-sanctions lobby had by way of continuing to chip away at this list of provisions. Clinton was not going to cede more grounds to Pretoria unless the republic was ready to be positive and forthcoming on the reforms. The new president took the view that he would only recommend the removal of these remaining sanctions when signaled to do so by the ANC. The U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Princeton N. Lyman, recalled how President de Klerk "visibly winced" when he was informed of this stance.²⁴²

It must be noted, however, that it's not all gloom for President George Bush. Matter of fact, he had an advantage that Reagan of 1986 never had. For one, he can refer to a successful foreign policy in Southern Africa - that is, the Angola/Namibia agreement of 1988. During his campaign, candidate Bush defended against the calls for sanctions by citing this diplomatic accomplishment. The Economic sanctions at this volatile time, he argued, would jeopardize the accord and doom the opportunity for an autonomous Namibia. When Bush becomes president, he can expectedly utilize the

²⁴¹ Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994*, 162,163.

²⁴² Thomson Alex, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994*, 163.

same argument - for the time - to block pressure from the embargo, from Capitol Hill.²⁴³

Another factor in Bush's favor is that public awareness of and concern about the South African topic had since 1986, drastically reduced. This affords the president ample political space to evolve and market a unique policy that is not as drastic as the one supported by Congress recently.

Lastly, Bush's tenure sees good relations with the Soviet Union being inherited and helped his course with the cogent relationship with the Soviets.²⁴⁴ This helped open fresh, new opportunities of combined superpower process against Pretoria. The republic could no longer use the excuse of communism to court the favor of the United States while in the process continuing with Apartheid, which was unimaginable in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan and Congress had a run in at each other.

On the whole, this chapter highlights the obvious shifts from the toothless oratory of Jimmy Carter and his support for the fundamental human rights of the citizens of the world, to the pragmatism of President Ronald Reagan, who saw the need to vehemently combat communism and thus protect the United States' interest in Southern Africa. Reagan drafted the policy of Constructive Engagement, championed by Crocker, which became friendly towards the regime in South Africa, and made enemies with black South Africans. George Bush, on the other hand, came with a conspicuous neutrality, removing embargoes in the apartheid nation, especially as communism was no longer an issue to deal with.

²⁴³ Stephen M. Davis, *The Bush Presidency, and South Africa: Congress and The Sanctions Outlook* (Braamfontein 2017, The South African Institute of International Affairs Jan Smuts House, May 1989), 6.

²⁴⁴ Davis, 6.

CHAPTER 7

THE FALL OF APARTHEID

The rise and fall of the South Africa's system of racial oppression which is known as the apartheid system really marked one of the most infamous chapters in the contemporary world history. The consequences of apartheid on over 40 million South Africans who were present at the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president of South Africa in the year 1994 are indelible.²⁴⁵ The racist apartheid regime of South Africa came to fore in the year 1948, with the ascending to power of the Afrikaner-dominated National Party and its promotion of an ideology of racial and ethnic separatism. Apartheid officially came to an end in the year 1994, the period when the African National Congress-dominated a majority of parliamentary seats in the first South African democratic election. However, it would be a misconception to view the existing legal structure of apartheid, or also its psychological and social effects, as starting abruptly and fully in 1948 or as ending suddenly with the change of regime in 1994. It was an earlier policy of the state, and it took the period of thirty years to establish.²⁴⁶ These policies includes the relocation of African families from their respective farms and placed them in a "native reserves"; the segregation of living, working, and recreational spaces available within the cities; the classification of Africans as a "temporary sojourners" within the cities; and also a range

²⁴⁵ Richard A. Schroeder, *Africa After Apartheid: South Africa, Race, and Nation in Tanzania* (Indiana, University Press 2012) 1.

²⁴⁶ John Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid* (Minneapolis London, University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 2.

of laws restricting the interaction between races, including the separation of the public services and amenities (“petty apartheid”).²⁴⁷

However, it was considered that the tendencies which ought to lead to the relinquishment of apartheid from the year 1990 onwards were already made evident in the late 1970s. During this period, of course, things were not too clear, and this development was said to be seen as signs of hope by the apartheid’s opponents, or, by its supporters, as major problems which must be confronted and overcome, if they were identified at all.²⁴⁸ South Africa’s transformation took even the National Party by surprise, as did many South Africans. “It was a cautious change as not all were enthusiastic or optimistic about changes, in South Africa. The relatively passive stance taken by the National government was a result of the priority that domestic affairs took in the years 1990-1994, and an international situation that did not allow for acts that could be interpreted as support for the increasingly shaky Nationalist government in Pretoria.”²⁴⁹

The period 1990-1994 was probably the most complex and challenging period from a South African standpoint. Following the forced resignation of P.W. Botha in

²⁴⁷ John Pepper, *Art and the End of Apartheid*, 2.

²⁴⁸ Robert Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge, University Press 1997, 2008), 174.

²⁴⁹ Lauren Peacock, *National Ideas or National Interest: New Zealand and South Africa, 1981-1994*, University of Wellington 2013, 95.

<http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3368/thesis.pdf?sequence=2>

1989 and the assumption of the presidency by F.W de Klerk, the liberation parties were re-legalized, and negotiations to determine the future constitutional settlement of South Africa were pursued with varying degrees of success. This culminated in the 1994 election and appointment of the first ANC government in South Africa.²⁵⁰

The older segregation laws had been scrapped by the Nationalists in an attempt to show their bona fides to the outside world, and to their internal opposition. The three main apartheid laws, the Natives Land Act (1913), the Group Areas Act (1950), the Population Registration Act (1949), and the restricted franchise stubbornly remained in place, as did much of the draconian security legislation and censorship laws.²⁵¹ The Homelands were still officially in existence.

Without the legitimizing context of the Cold War, White South Africa's need to find a settlement looked more pressing than ever. Political prisoners were released, including Nelson Mandela. Commenting on these events prominent anti-apartheid journalist Allister Sparks observed in 1991 "Verwoerd was right. Concessions don't ease pressure or buy time, and the introduction of piecemeal reforms do introduce illogicalities that make it harder to hold one's ground."²⁵² President P.W Botha's

²⁵⁰ Lauren Peacock, *National Ideas or National Interest: New Zealand and South Africa, 1981-1994*. 96.

²⁵¹ David R Penna "Apartheid, The Law and Reform in South Africa" in *Africa Today* Vol. 37, No. 2 (1990): 5-21. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186650>

²⁵² Allister Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, (London: Mandarin, 1991), 329.

“concessions,” the 1983 Constitution and Tricameral Parliament, had backfired in spectacular fashion.

Resistance against the apartheid system was mainly conducted and organized by the African National Congress (ANC). Acknowledging the existence of The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Black Consciousness Movement, and these organizations’ roles in the resistance movement, choose to focus on the ANC in this brief description of the struggle against apartheid.²⁵³

Formed in 1912, the ANC became the first non-tribal organization of blacks promoting black interests under white rule. Up until the 1940s, the ANC’s trust in the possibility of compromise remained a platform for the organization, resulting in an attitude of aloofness, removed from the harsh realities of black people everyday life²⁵⁴. The ANC did, however, catch up with the realities, and few years after the Nationalist Party came to power the Defiance Campaign was launched, promoting peaceful, but forceful resistance against the repressive system. In this campaign, black people were urged to dress formally, act politely and behave as if they had the same legal access to public facilities as white people. They would sit in white parks, on white benches reading their newspapers in peace; they entered the first-class white carriages on public transport and used white public toilets. Another widespread form of resistance was the refusal to carry identity documents, which led to great problems for the police force, as

²⁵³ Kaja Kathrine Kristiansen, *The Professional Identity of Black South African Teachers Personal and professional struggles in a disjunction between policy and practice*, Master Thesis, Faculty of Education, Institute for Educational Research, University of Oslo December 2008.12.

²⁵⁴ Davis M. Stephen, *Apartheid’s Rebels: Inside South Africa’s Hidden War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 174.

they did not have facilities to arrest the thousands of people who refused to carry their documents²⁵⁵. In 1955, the ANC drafted The Freedom Charter, which claims that:

*“South Africa belongs to everyone who resides within it, either black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority on the people unless it is based on the will and consent of all the people”*²⁵⁶

This cooperative and non-violent agenda was continued until 1961 when Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation” in Zulu, hereafter referred to as MK), a semi-independent body of the ANC with a military mission, was formed. It was the police force’s relentless violence and continued attacks on the people that was the incentive to this change in tactics, and the ANC started a campaign of sabotage led by Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela.²⁵⁷

In 1960, seventeen African countries were said to have won their independence from colonial rule. This was the year in which more African countries became independent than any other year in its history, and the year 1960 went down in memory lane as the ‘Year of Africa’ or ‘Africa Year.’ At the end of his tour to the African continent in the month of February, the then Conservative British Prime Minister in the person of Harold Macmillan famously cautioned the South African parliament of a “wind of change” raging all over Africa. As the process of decolonization gathered momentum on the remaining part of Africa, the ANC, and PAC, the two most viable

²⁵⁵Kristiansen, Tomm W. (1996). *Mandela's Land. En fortelling om frihet*. Oslo: J.W. Capellens Forlag.

²⁵⁶ African National Congress (1955): Freedom Charter. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html>. Accessed 12 september 2017.

²⁵⁷ Davis, M. Stephen. *Apartheid ‘s Rebels. Inside South Africa ‘s Hidden War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 175.

African nationalist organizations in South Africa, increasingly associated their problems with the struggles of fellow Africans against colonialism. Even in South Africa, the most industrialized nation in Africa, the opportunity for freedom from the shackles of the racist white minority did not look far off. In his address to the December 1959 Annual Conference of the ANC, its President Chief Albert Lutuli exhorted: "Africa is very much astir. She is swift in freeing herself from the bonds of colonialism. The year 1960 could actually be described as a year of destiny and a new beginning for many areas in Africa."²⁵⁸

In another vein, the Pan-Africanist Congress similarly associated itself with "the progressive forces of African nationalism" some other places in Africa, whereby, as outlined in its Manifesto (adopted in April 1959), "the breaking down of the protagonists of oppression is a process that not even nuclear power can stop."²⁵⁹

The Historiography of Black Politics During the Struggle

The studies of the annals of black political organizations in existence until the late 1960s were the ones written by some of the intellectuals of the different opposition movements according to the political parties they were sympathetic to. One of their aim was to redress the general indifference of the major settler and liberal traditions in the

²⁵⁸Presidential Address to the 47th Annual Conference of the African National Congress, Durban, 12 December 1959, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/lutuli/lutuli59.html>. Original emphasis.

²⁵⁹Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, in Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964*, Vol. 3 (Stanford, Indiana University Press, 1977), 518-519.

²⁶⁰Edward Roux, *Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa* (London, V. Gollancz, 1948), 7.

South African historiography to contemporary black politics as a subject matter.²⁶⁰

Leading work in this regard was the Eddie Roux's *Time Longer than Rope*, which was originally published in the year 1948.²⁶¹ It was later followed by the Jack and Ray Simons' *Class and Color in South Africa* which appeared in the year 1969 also in the year as the first part of Wilson and Thompson's *Oxford History of South Africa*.²⁶² Although it's not strictly academic because of their underlying political aim although the Simons' rather called their book "an exercise in political sociology on a time scale," rather than a history.²⁶³ All these set of early Marxist works have too often been ignored by the next generation of radical historians.²⁶⁴ Some of the questions which was introduced by these authors for instance with credence to the subject of race and class exploitation and the relationship between national and class struggle in South Africa are still much relevant in half a century later. However, the historical period

²⁶¹ Another relevant work which was authored by John Burger (pseudonym of Leo Marquand), *The Black Man's Burden* (London, 1943). For a non-Marxist interpretation see Jordan Ngubane, *An African Explains Apartheid* (London, 1963)

²⁶² Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol.1, *South Africa to 1870*, and Vol. 2, *1870-1966* (Oxford, 1969-1971). Leo Kuper's chapter in volume two (426-476) this was really the only contribution to the collection sacrificed to the history of African nationalism in South Africa. In the South African edition, even this was excluded from its publication.

²⁶³ H.J. and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (London, Penguin, 1969), 9.

²⁶⁴ Arianna Lissoni, "The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970," Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008, 15. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>.

²⁶⁵ Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 3, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 15.

under scrutiny in this study was too recent to be written about by this group of scholar-activists.

From the early 1960s, the reappearance of protests of note in South Africa itself was equal with a matching concern in social and popular history by a new generation of radical-revisionist and by the Marxist-favored historians. In 'From Protest to Challenge', the foreword to the 1977 edition of Volume 3 of the impressive documentary which chronicled the annals of black revolt in Pretoria between 1882-1964, American scholars Karis and Carter while combining both archival material and analytical essays, also declared the belief that their work would be "a launch-pad for new generations of historians."²⁶⁵ Moreover, in the preface to the fifth volume in the series, which seem to appeared in the year 1997 and also covers the history of the liberation struggle from its nadir in the year 1964 to its resurgence in the year 1979, however readers are told that "all these expectations are as telling today as if it were twenty years back."²⁶⁶ With a small number of exceptions, such as Tom Lodge's influential survey of black resistance *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*.²⁶⁷ It has really in fact been one of the shortcomings of the revisionist school that only a few broadly syntheses of South

²⁶⁶ Arianna Lissoni, "The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970," Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008, 16. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>.

²⁶⁷ Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London, Longman, 1983),

²⁶⁸ *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation, and Apartheid*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 2000); Robert Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge, 1999); William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, rev. ed. (Oxford, 2001).

Africa's history have been examined,²⁶⁸ And despite the amplification of many, in-depth case studies. Although black political organizations have been regarded in principle as key agents of political change and as important mobilizers of social identity by revisionist historians, their concern with social history and history 'from below' – Rather than the existing 'institutional,' history has actually resulted on the whole in a localized focus of inquiry. Bernhard Magubane has vehemently debated this point in one of the recent critiques of the liberal and revisionist traditions in South Africa's historiography:

When one tends to read all the inputs of the Marxist-influenced historians, the rare discourse of the national freedom group and its battles strikes one very Forcefully. The banning of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress seems to have recommended that the national ambition of Africans was no longer feasible.²⁶⁹

On the other hand, the transition of South Africa's to democracy has helped historians, with many of those that participated in the anti-apartheid movement, to vehemently write and speak about the past more openly than ever before. As soon as the bans on individuals and organizations were gradually lifted after 1990, so there were many of the inhibitions which the demands of the struggle and the commitment to against the apartheid exacted. The main problem today lies, as historian Shula has argued, "in the transformation of South African history from being a morality play

²⁶⁹Arianna Lissoni, "The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970," Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008, 17. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>

²⁷⁰ Shula Marks, "Rewriting South African history: or The hunt for Hintsa's head," in Simon McGrath, Charles Jedrej, Kenneth King, and Jack Thompson (eds.), *Rethinking African History* (Edinburgh, 1997), 105.

whether in its settler version as a narrative of the confrontation between civilization and or in its humanitarian version of villains and victims.”²⁷⁰

The first publication of the foremost volume of the book titled the *Road to Democracy* in South Africa in 2004 has really signified a very important step in this direction. All chapters in the volume above provide new and fresh insights into the years between 1960-1970 by focusing more on particular organizations, their activities, the evolution of their strategies and tactics, as well as those specific events and other necessary aspects which shaped and made the decade memorable. Their main aim is to challenge "the belief that the 1960s period was a decade of political quiescence.”²⁷¹ However, it is actually a shortcoming of the book that the complementary chapters, which individually stand mainly on their own, seems not to form a continuous narrative, as it is common with collections of this nature. In fact, it could well argue that it was on the premises of the accomplishments, as well as of the problems, shortcomings, disagreements and the doubts that surfaced at this time, that the freedom groups ultimately emerged victorious in the year 1990.

In particular, it is recommendable that the African National Congress and all its allies managed not only to exist one another but were actually able to create a degree of unity, purpose, and thrust which in turn allowed the African National Congress to pull through one of the fragile periods in its history. The Pan-Africanist Congress in exile, was affected by some internal problems which in part overshadowed the message of the

²⁷¹ SADET (eds.), *The Road to Democracy*, Vol. 1: 1960-1970, (Cape Town, Struik Publishers, 2005) xv.

political tendency that the organization represented when it was founded in the year 1959. Despite all these odds, which became evident from the initial stage, the Pan-Africanist Congress never disappeared from the political scene. The Pan-Africanist Congress continued their struggle for survival, however troubled, can in part be laid at the feet of its pro-Africanist ideology and the fact it was able to generate interest within and without South Africa and at a Pan-African level.²⁷²

The Anc

This movement was originally called the “South African Native National Congress,” the African National Congress was formed in the year 1912 as a platform to bring together Africans across what was then regarded as the Union of South Africa into a single organization which passed both ‘tribal’ and regional differences by promoting a spirit of African nationalism. Later In the mid1940s, the socio-economic developments unveiled by the Second World War – most essentially African urbanization, employment in the secondary sector and as well as the trade union organization – which helped bring about a double process of reawakening and radicalization of the African National Congress, under the influential impact of its Youth League.

By turning to non-violent tactics of direct action, the African National Congress grew in the following years into a truly mass organization which was now extremely steeled up, and hell-bent on achieving full emancipation and citizenship rights for

²⁷² Arianna Lissoni, “The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970,” Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008.20, 21. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>

marginalized black South Africans throughout the country as clearly outlined in its 1949 Program of Action.²⁷³

An Alliance for a Common Cause

In the early 1950s, the Colored People's Congress (CPC) and the (white) Congress of Democrats (COD) were formed to mobilize their respective communities in opposition against the government and in support of the African National Congress. However, together with the African National Congress, the SAIC and as well as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), they all came together to constitute a large union of forces that came to be recognized as the Congress Alliance. The Congress alliance grew out of the principle that the African National Congress, as President Lutuli explained, was “prepared to cooperate fully by equality with any National or political party or organization, provided they share common aims and common methods of achieving our objectives.”²⁷⁴

The Congress Alliance endorsed its manifesto, Freedom Charter, on the 26th of June, 1955, in Kliptown at the People's Congress.²⁷⁵ The Charter outlined the vision of all society that is equal which would be governed in line with the principles of economic and social justice. Despite being often cited as evidence of the ANC's non-

²⁷³Arianna Lissoni, “The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970,” Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008, 11. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>.

²⁷⁴Arianna Lissoni, “The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970,” Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008, 11. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni> 12.

²⁷⁵Lissoni, ,12.

²⁷⁶Ibid,12.

racism, in which the Freedom Charter actually reflected as multi-racial, rather than viewing South Africa as a non-racist and racial, pluralized country of four different countries or, to use the term of the Charter, "national groups."²⁷⁶

The divisions of the African, Indian, Coloured and as well as the white, reflected the official categories that were used by the South African government. It was evident that the latter did not view all Africans as constituting a single nation, but they further subdivided the African population into a variety of smaller, ethnically defined nations. This classification system underpinned much of apartheid legislation, as well as the Bantustan project. Although this study does not really support the divisions imposed by the apartheid state, it does nevertheless make use of the words "African," "Indian," "Colored," and "white" as these were how they were named by the freedom group. When "black" was mentioned, it is often used in the same way as the post-Soweto generation wanted it to refer to African, Colored, and as well as the Indian sections of the entire populations collectively.

The same multi-racial understanding also informed the tactical union of the four, racially separate Congresses in the Congress Alliance. The Pan-Africanist Congress was established on 6 April 1959 after the internal dissension that occurred within the African National Congress led to the collapse of a group popularly known as the Africanists, who had been earlier growing more and more disgruntled with the policies of the African National Congress. The Three major reasons for the Africanists' disagreement can be identified as follows. Firstly, they had been antagonized to the

calling off of the 1952 Defiance Campaign by the senior African National Congress leadership in January 1953. Second, there was also the issue of cooperation with the Indians in the SAIC, and also with the white liberals and as well as the communists in the COD. According to them, the African National Congress had earlier come to be unduly influenced by the non-Africans within the Congress Alliance, whom they all alleged of dictating policy to the African National Congress. And lastly, they claimed that the African National Congress had forsaken the 1949 Program of Action and renamed it with the Freedom Charter.²⁷⁷

The Ideological Shift to Armed Struggle

In spite of the widespread hope, which seemed to fill the beginning of the decade, the year 1960 turned out to be disappointing for the South African liberation struggle. The date, however, remained a watershed in the history of South Africa's. Also On 21 March 1960, the peaceful anti-pass demonstrations convened by the Pan-Africanist Congress indeed ceased in the cruel police butcheries of Sharpeville and Langa. Both the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, which were consequently both declared illegal organizations, agreed to move underground and also to embrace armed struggle to confront the South African government's increasing ferocity and oppression. Within the next few years, the new draconian legislation was introduced which in effect later turned South Africa into a police state. The decade

²⁷⁷ Arianna Lissoni, "The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970, Phd." the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008.20, 21. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>, 13.

which preceded, on the surface a period of apparent peace, saw the efficient bashing of almost every internal political opposition by the apartheid machinery.²⁷⁸

The Frontrunner of the Struggle

One cannot discuss the ANC's fight against apartheid without including Mandela, who together with Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki formed the backbone of the resistance movement. Mandela, Tambo, and Sisulu formed the Congress Youth League (CYL) in 1944 and paved the way for the mass actions of passive resistance mentioned above. Preceding the formation of MK and their sabotage actions, Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki were charged with recruitment for guerrilla warfare for the purpose of violent revolution furthering the objects of communism, and aiding foreign military units when they hit the Republic. They were found guilty on all charges and sentenced to life imprisonment. At this time other central figures in the ANC leadership were either under banning orders or in exile. Davis (1987) states that it was the incarceration of these key executives "virtually beheaded the ANC and the organization was shattering."²⁷⁹ Extremely tense and violent years followed with South Africa in a state of civil war. During this time, the ANC had to conduct most of its work underground; there were great conflicts with other liberation movements, and the government did all it could to spark possible tensions to split the resistance. The ANC did, however, manage to survive. It gained allies and created a nationwide infrastructure

²⁷⁸ Arianna Lissoni, "The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970," Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, January 2008.20, 21. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni>, 13-14.

²⁷⁹ Davis M. Stephen, *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 20.

of resistance against the apartheid state, which eventually led to negotiations with the apartheid government and democratic elections in 1994.²⁸⁰

As the 1980's was coming to an end local and international pressure on the apartheid government, as well as the realization that apartheid could neither be maintained by force forever, nor overthrown by the opposition without considerable suffering, both sides came to the negotiating table. The first meeting between Mandela and the National Party government came while P.W Botha was President; however, they made little progress.²⁸¹ Botha had declared that apartheid was dead, but he never rejected the policy of white supremacy; it thus follows that the common grounds for negotiations were limited.²⁸² In 1989, W.F. de Klerk was elected the new State President, and in his first address to parliament, he transformed South Africa by lifting the ban on the ANC and other banned organizations and political parties, and releasing Mandela from prison.²⁸³

In the following years, negotiations continued, but were steadily threatened by grave eruptions of violence, resulting in the ANC leaving the negotiation table accusing De Klerk's government of complicity in the Boipatong massacre where people were

²⁸⁰ Kaja Kathrine Kristiansen, *The Professional Identity of Black South African Teachers Personal and professional struggles in a disjunction between policy and practice*, Master Thesis, Faculty of Education, Institute for Educational Research, University of Oslo December 2008.13.

²⁸¹ Kristiansen, Tomm W. (1996). *Mandela's Land. En fortelling om frihet*. Oslo: J.W. Capellens Forlag

²⁸² Heather Deegan, *The Politics of the new South Africa: Apartheid and after*. (Harlow, Longman, 2001), 198.

²⁸³ Barber, James (1999). *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

killed²⁸⁴. They re-entered negotiations, but experienced another breakdown with the assassination of "Chris" Hani, leader of the SACP. This country was brought to the brink of disaster, but was able to ultimately prove a turning point, after which the major parties pushed for a settlement with increased determination. The assassination of Hani is more often considered as an event, which really led to a shift of power in favor of the African National Congress because of Nelson Mandela's who is said to be handling the situation. He addressed the nation appealing for calm, in a speech regarded as 'presidential' even though he was then not president of the country²⁸⁵:

This day an unforgivable sin has been committed, A man full of passion, of unsurpassed courage, has been killed in his prime. Chris Hani is known to all of us, loved by millions, hated only by those who are scared of the truth, Chris Hani had well supported the quest for peace, combing the nook and cranny of South Africa calling for a spirit of tolerance among our citizens. Our country is mourning. Our hurt and indignation are real. We mustn't allow ourselves be provoked by those who seek to deny us the very freedom Chris Hani gave his life for. African National Congress dips its banner in salute to this outstanding son of Africa.²⁸⁶

On April 27, 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections. The entire police force and the military were ready to handle any disruption that might occur and damage this new beginning in the history of South Africa. They were left with nothing to do; despite the long lines of people waiting for hours to cast their vote, the elections

²⁸⁴ ANC (1992): Statement of the emergency meeting of the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1992/links/pr920623.html>. Accessed 16.08.2007

²⁸⁵ Heather Deegan, *The Politics of the new South Africa: Apartheid and after*. (Harlow, Longman, 2001), 198.

²⁸⁶ African National Congress (1993): Address to the nation by African National Congress President, N.R. Mandela, on the assassination of Chris Hani.

<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1993/sp930410.html>. Accessed 15.08.2007.

were conducted peacefully and resulted in the African National Congress polling 62% of the vote, and which made Nelson Mandela become the president, with De Klerk and Thabo Mbeki as his deputies. However, the National Party, also with 20% of the vote, joined the African National Congress in a Government of National Unity²⁸⁷.

The Transitional politics commenced again after the election, with which a new constitution was finally agreed upon in the year 1995.

²⁸⁷ Kristiansen, Tomm W. Mandela's Land. En fortelling om frihet. Oslo: J.W. Capellens Forlag. (1996)

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The inconsistencies in the American foreign policy contributed to the longevity of apartheid. For almost fifty years, apartheid thrived in South Africa as the minority whites controlled the affairs of the southern African nation while maligning the black majority, and committing great fundamental human rights crimes in the process. Virtually all the American presidents who were in power during the apartheid regime in South Africa refused to see apartheid as a fundamental problem, but an opportunity for an alliance in the cold war and the war against communism. The country's precious minerals, its prime strategic location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of American and the West's policy of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the several excuses cited by previous United States presidencies for encouraging the National Party of South Africa and its policies in Pretoria.

This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise two years after Reagan left office. It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support Pretoria was in the interest of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for the indignity, pains, and sufferings experienced by the sheer vast numbers of the South African citizenry meted out by the apartheid regime; the U.S. government continuously appealed the U.N. and the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.

In conclusion, it is essential to briefly describe the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as it contributed to making South Africa's transition to democracy something out of the ordinary. The TRC was established in 1995 and intended to serve

as the instrument through which South Africa would come to grips with its discriminatory past and allow for a peaceful transition to democracy. The underlying assumption that the TRC's work was based on is that understanding history by letting perpetrators narrate their politically motivated crimes will aid in the creation of a more peaceful and democratic future. In hindsight, there is disagreement on how successful the TRC was. It was no doubt a very bold venture, consuming vast amounts of resources by holding hundreds of hearings, interviewing thousands of victims of apartheid, granting amnesty to nearly a thousand human rights violators, and producing a massive final report²⁸⁸.

For further reading on the TRC process, I strongly recommend *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa* by Antjie Krog, which is a gripping document on the national healing process that took place in South Africa in the first years after 1994. André Brink, professor of English language and literature at the University of Cape Town and acclaimed author, is quoted on the back cover of this book: "It's quite essential to note that trying to carefully comprehend the new South Africa without the Truth and the Reconciliation Commission would be fruitless; trying to comprehend the Commission and not relating to this book would really be irresponsible."

²⁸⁸ Antjie Krog. *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa*, (New York, Broadway, 1998)

According to many, the truth and reconciliation process was exceptionally successful, believing that it prevented South Africa from erupting in a racially based civil war. According to Gibson, South Africans themselves are not so full of hope about the process, because many tend to complain more that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission erupted racial tensions in the country by exposing the evil deeds of both the then apartheid government and its agents and as well as the liberation forces. Some were firmly against the conjecture that truth can somehow lead to reconciliation, claiming instead that uncovering the details about the scary events of the past only hurt people, making them far less likely to be willing to adapt with the new democratic regime. Indeed, despite to my vivid observations of the South African media, complaints and condemnations of the truth and reconciliation process seem too far outcasted laudatory assessments²⁸⁹.

Gibson adds that social scientists should be more agnostic about the TRC process and that it is remarkable how little systematic investigation has been conducted into whether or not the TRC succeeded in its objectives²⁹⁰. The TRC achieved insofar as the emotionally injured people of South Africa experienced that they were healed and could move on with their lives. It is, however, hard to tell how many this applies to. Did all those involved in the hearings and interviews experience this healing? How

²⁸⁹ James L. Gibson *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* (New York, Russell Sage, 2006), 84

²⁹⁰ James Gibson, *Overcoming Apartheid*, 84-85

²⁹¹ Stultz, Newell M. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, no. 2/3 (2002): 518-20. doi:10.2307/3097652

²⁹² R. W Johnson, *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since The End of Apartheid*, (New York, Overlook, 2010), 4.

extensive was the symbolic effect of the TRC? These are questions one can hopefully gain answers to after thorough sociological research. For the formerly oppressed South Africans, to most, the TRC has had a limited effect, and many will point to statistics of violent crime²⁹¹ in South Africa, which is a particular sign that many hearts and minds still need to be healed.

South Africa became an epitome of conflict negotiation in the eyes of the world after apartheid was finally laid to rest. Reveling in this achievement, the ANC journeyed around the world, getting the recognition they deserved along the way.²⁹² According to the historian R.W. Johnson, the absolute wonder was not that the embattled former apartheid nation attained constitutional status, it was the way they achieved it. Mounting pressure on F.W. de Klerk, the National Party leader led the minority white to give up power peacefully, and without bloodshed.²⁹³

President Nelson Mandela who successfully reconciled the blacks and the white minority, announced a 100 Days Plan to be put into practice immediately after his inauguration.²⁹⁴ The 100 Days Plan did not work out well as a result of improper planning, and lack of funds. It was a complete disaster, as there were no staffed clinics

²⁹³ R. W Johnson, *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since The End of Apartheid*, 4

²⁹⁴ Johnson, *South Africa's Brave New World*, 4.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid* 5

²⁹⁶ *Ibid* 5

and hospital.²⁹⁵ Fast forward to 2001, and HIV/AIDS had become a real menace. Up to 5,000 infected patients were dying of the hazard per week, and it soon increased to 1,000 patients losing the battle against HIV/AIDS in a day.²⁹⁶ The better life that South Africans saw for themselves post-apartheid soon became a mirage. Johnson writes, “life was not only not better for all, for too many, but it was also shorter, and poorer. Signs of social distress proliferated. Crime rates soared.”²⁹⁷ Apartheid had eaten so much into the fabric of the country that no immediate policy could set things right. It became too overwhelming for even the excellent duo of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki to fix. Blacks especially still could not live the life they expected. President Nelson Mandela set himself three goals to pursue, namely; the harmony of the state, the security of the land, and the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Program.²⁹⁸ The president delegated almost everything else to his able deputy, Thabo Mbeki, who loathed to work with the Reconstruction Development Program coordinator, as he was a stubborn man not given to anyone’s opinion but his alone.²⁹⁹

The Mandela government met the best run, most efficient water system in Africa, yet was faced with the harsh reality of dealing with the supply of water to squatter camps and the black communities, an area the apartheid government failed to allocate

²⁹⁷ Ibid 5.

²⁹⁸ Ibid 5.

²⁹⁹ R. W Johnson, *South Africa’s Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since the End of Apartheid*, 56.

water to during the segregation years.³⁰⁰ The new government in a bid to arrest the development decided to adopt the idea of Kader Asmal, a minister in Mandela's cabinet, who came up with a new "water schemes" to be bankrolled by the Independent Development Trust, an idea completely rivaled and contested by several water resources experts in the country.³⁰¹ These specialists and other experienced officials were sure that the plan would not work, and warned the government against it. The project did not work out as well as other development projects by the Mandela administration. It proved too complicated, too late for the frail Mandela who could not do much with the power he had.³⁰²

South Africa today has naturally developed since the Mandela administration but still face inherent problems that can be traced back to apartheid. Jacob Zuma, the incumbent president of the former apartheid state, believes that the country's woes can be laid at the feet of apartheid and colonialism.³⁰³ The segregation education laws, Bantu education, are some of the roots of the socio-economic challenges present-day South Africa faces, and according to Jacob Zuma, colonialism and apartheid are the reason the country still battles with a low standard in education, poverty, and

³⁰⁰ Ibid, 104.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 104

³⁰² R. W Johnson, *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since The End of Apartheid*, 136

³⁰³ SA News (2014) Zuma upbeat about SA's future, despite challenges (online), available:<http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/zuma-upbeat-about-sas-future-despite-challenges> [14 February 2014] (Accessed February 17, 2018)

unemployment.³⁰⁴ The transition to running a democratic nation is still a problem because of the legacies of apartheid.

³⁰⁴ SA News (2014) Zuma upbeat about SA's future, despite challenges (online), available:<http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/zuma-upbeat-about-sas-future-despite-challenges> [14 February 2014]) (Accessed February 17, 2018)

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