

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT: MANDATE ERA AMMAN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HASHEMITE STATE, 1921-1946.

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This dissertation explores the modern history of Amman during the British Mandate and how the city's development was closely tied to the evolution of the Hashemite state. This study explores the significant cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman because of the state's centralization project. Few historians of the Middle East have examined in depth the formation of capital cities in nascent nation-states and even fewer have studied the city of Amman. The development of Amman must be understood in its regional context because it acts as a mirror for the development of the Jordanian state as a whole. This dissertation posits that Amman developed as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. The Transjordanian state could not have existed if it had not borrowed countless Ottoman institutions and practices. The Anglo-Hashemite state used the Legislative Council of Transjordan to incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the machinery of the Jordanian state, transforming Amman into a Hashemite Versailles. By the end of the Mandate, Amman's gilded cage both constrained and supported the elites within. The cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. Furthermore, Amman's urban fabric was a reflection of its diverse heritage and

cultural practices. The development of Amman as a “dual city,” divided between prosperous Westernized “West Amman” and the impoverished traditional “East Amman,” originated in the Mandate period. Finally, Amman’s central square, Feisal Square, became the figurative embodiment of the heart of Amman and the heart of the state.

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CONSTRUCTION OF THE HASHEMITE STATE, 1921-1946.

By

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**“Capital Development: Mandate Era Amman and the Construction
of the Hashemite State, 1921-1946”**

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

BNA	British National Archives
BR	British Resident
CDAC	Colonial Development Advisory Committee
CDF	Colonial Development Fund
CMS	Christian Missionary Society
CO	Colonial Office
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
EC	Executive Council
ECNC	Executive Committee for the National Congress
ENJC	Executive Committee for the Jordanian Conference
FA	Financial Adviser
FO	Foreign Office
GAM	Greater Amman Municipality
HBM	His British Majesty
HC	High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan
HMG	His Majesty's Government
ICC	Imperial Communications Committee
IPC	Iraq Petroleum Company
IWM	Imperial War Museum
JA	Judicial Adviser
JARA	Jabal Amman Residence Association
JNL	Jordanian National Library
JPL	Jordanian Parliamentary Library
LC	Legislative Council
LOC	Library of Congress
LP	Palestine Pound
MECA	Middle East Center Archives, St Antony's College, Oxford
MESC	Middle East Supply Center
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
OG	Official Gazette of Transjordan/Jordan
SoS	Secretary of State for the Colonies

A Note on Transliteration

Arabic names found in the British records have been left in their original spelling in order to be faithful to the archival material. Places and proper names that are commonly used in the English language have been spelled according to standard journalistic norms (e.g. Amman, not ‘Amman). Similarly, Arabic author’s names have been spelled according to the Romanized way in which the author spells his or her name. All Arabic names, newspaper, and book titles have been transliterated according to standard IJMES practice but I have chosen not to use full diacritics (e.g. Filastin, not Filastīn, or ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif, not ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Munīf). Technical words have all been italicized (*dunum* or *musha*’).

1: Introduction



- Figure 1-1 image of the main entrance of Darat al-Funun on Nadeem Al Mallah St next to a public staircase (author's image)

Hidden behind a high stonewall and through an innocuous metal gate in the Jabal al-Weibdeh neighborhood of Amman is one of Amman's premier art spaces, *Darat al-Funun* (House of Art). This art gallery is a compound of three homes built in the early 1920s. The Khalid Shoman Foundation renovated the main building (also known as the Humud House) and turned it into a gallery space in 1993. However, before these buildings became exhibition halls, they had a former life. The main building of Darat al-Funun (Darat I), was the home of Arab Legion Commander Colonel Frederick G. Peake from 1921 until he retired and left Transjordan in 1939. Peake, one of the two most powerful British administrators (along with British Resident Henry Cox) shaped the development of Transjordan's armed forces from within these halls. When John Bagot

Glubb Pasha replaced Peake in Amman, the house became a residence for British officers and an army officer's club until the Arabization of the army in 1956.¹

The rest of the Darat al-Funun compound (Darat II and Darat III) also has strong connections to Amman's Mandate era past. Ismail Haqqi Abdo built both homes in the 1920s. Abdo served as the Ottoman Governor of Acre before moving to Amman in the 1920s, where he acted as an adviser to Peake through the mid-1930s. Darat II, named "the Blue House" for its Circassian wooden porch, served as Abdo's residence during the Mandate. Darat III's most famous residents were the Great Arab Revolt poet Sheikh Fouad al-Khateeb and Prime Minister Suleiman Nablusi (who held the office in the 1950s).² Below these three buildings, at the bottom of the sloped compound, lie the ruins of a Byzantine Church with an impressive vista of Amman's citadel.

As you descend the steps that flank the Darat al-Funun complex into the central corridor of downtown Amman, *al-balad*, you are simultaneously experiencing Amman's past and present. This collection of buildings span Amman's entire history connecting the ancient city of Philadelphia to the small village of Mandate era Amman, all the way to the modern metropolis of Amman with its population of well over two million people. This physical embodiment of Amman's storied past underscores its complex and at times hidden lineage. Unlike the more traditional cities of the Levant, such as Damascus and Jerusalem, in Amman you have to search for its urban heritage. This hidden and obscured legacy motivated anthropologist Seteney Shami to proclaim famously, "Amman is not a

¹ Mohammad al-Asad and Bill Lyons, eds., *Old Houses of Jordan: Amman 1920-1950* (Amman: Turab, 1997), 84. The house was built by Nimr Abdullah al-Humud by 1920 but the exact construction date is unknown. The Arabization of the army in 1956 was a result of King Hussein's expulsion of Glubb and all other British officers out of the country and transitioning the army to Arab leadership.

² Pat Binder and Gerhard Haupt, "25 Years of Darat al Funun in Amman," *Nafas Art Magazine*, January 2014, accessed February 5, 2015, http://universes-in-universe.org/eng/nafas/articles/2014/25_years_darat_al_funun.

city.”³ For Shami, Amman’s urban confusion is a byproduct of the state’s “efforts to create itself at the expense of the nation and the city at the expense of urbanism.”⁴

Although Shami was analyzing Amman’s modern identity and urban imagination, these same indictments can easily be leveled at Mandate era Amman (1921-1946).



- Figure 1-2 image of Darat al-Funun’s main house and the Byzantine ruins that lie below it. (author’s image)

At the root of Amman’s identity crisis is the manner in which it developed.

Amman became a symbol for the Anglo-Hashemite government first and a city second.

Amman became the personification of the new centralized government. It was shorthand for the might of the Mandatory state. The Mandatory government orchestrated the development of Transjordan from its capital of Amman. The utility of Amman’s

³ Seteney Shami, ““Amman is Not a City” Middle Eastern Cities in Question,” in *Urban Imaginaries: Locating the Modern City*, eds. Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2007), 208.

⁴ Shami, “Amman is not a City,” 230.

institutional power always trumped its urban function during the Mandate period. From 1921-1946, Amman became the economic, cultural, and administrative center of Transjordan. Despite its diminutive size during the Mandate period, the city of Amman housed all of the integral components of a successful and cohesive centralized and bureaucratized state by the end of the British Mandate in 1946. However, the Transjordan government, despite its modernizing and controlling ambitions, did not control all facets of life in Transjordan. Instead, the story of Mandatory Transjordan is a story of tension between the aspirations of the state and its reality. It is a story that privileged government utility and security over anything else. Nearly every government action or goal was checked by fiscal, bureaucratic, and societal limitations. These confines did not prevent the government from functioning successfully, but it did force the government to scale down their aspirations. Regardless of these constraints, the growth of the Anglo-Hashemite state imbued Amman with physical, political, and symbolic significance. Amman's expansion forced the inhabitants of Transjordan to adapt to a new centralized power housed within the city. As a result, the history of Amman during the British Mandate (1921-1946) is to a large extent the mirror for all of Transjordan.

The British Transjordan Mandate intended to create a new centralized state emanating from Amman where one had not existed for millennia. Although the prehistory of modern Amman stretches back to biblical references to the Ammonites, and was an important Roman and Umayyad settlement, Amman was not even recognized as a settlement in the Ottoman cadastral survey of 1586.⁵ Transjordan was a blank spot on the

⁵ Alastair Northedge, "The History of Ammān in the Early Islamic Period," in *Studies on Roman and Islamic 'Ammān: The excavations of Mrs C-M Bennett and Other Investigations, Volume 1: History, Site and Architecture*, ed. Alastair Northedge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 47-55. For more on pre-modern Amman see Alastair Northedge ed., *Studies on Roman and Islamic 'Ammān: The excavations*

map of the Middle East for the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers of Europe in the early nineteenth century. The extent of Ottoman involvement in the region was minimal protection of the hajj route. The only settlements were Salt, Ma'an, and Karak. Large swaths of Bedouin-controlled territory surrounded each of these settlements, which held sway over the towns. The Bani Sakhr were dominant in Salt, the al-Majalis in Karak, and Ma'an was split between tribes who owed allegiance towards Damascus or the Hijaz.⁶ It is important to remember that there was no "Ottoman Transjordan." Ottoman officials only recognized the region by its districts (which were not administrative units): 'Ajlun, al-Balqa', al-Karak and Ma'an. Of these regions, the only one that formally acknowledged Ottoman authority was Jabal Ajlun, whose largely settled non-Bedouin population regularly paid taxes to Damascus.⁷

In 1878, the Ottomans directed a group of Circassians to repopulate the largely abandoned area in order to reestablish it as part of the Ottoman Empire. This Ottoman resettlement policy was a means to alleviate a shortage of manpower throughout the empire as well as an attempt to increase the number of lawful Muslims in the region.⁸ Provincial Ottoman officials often prohibited immigrants from the Caucasus, most of whom were rural people in any case, from settling in cities. Instead, immigrants established new villages on empty land. In the Balqa region of Jordan, the Circassians formed settlements in Amman, Wadi Seer, Sweileh, Jerash, Naour, and Rusaifa.

of Mrs C-M Bennett and Other Investigations, Volume 1: History, Site and Architecture, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Christa Paula, David Saunders and Ammar Khammash, *Jordan: A Timeless Land* (London: TransGlobe Publishing Limited, 2005).

⁶ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27-34.

⁷ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 21-26.

⁸ Seteney Shami, "Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and Self-Representations of Circassians in Jordan," *Iran and the Caucasus* 13 (2009): 144.

Although the Circassians settled in the Balqa in agricultural peasant communities, their primary function for the Ottoman Empire was as a buffer against dissident nomadic Bedouin.⁹ Amman grew from fifty families in 1878 to a town with a population of 1,000 people in 1893 and reached nearly 5,000 people in 1914.¹⁰ However, it is important to remember that despite its early development that Amman still paled in comparison to Salt.¹¹

Even with this resettlement, by 1921 Amman had fewer than 5000 inhabitants. The creation of a capital city in the Levant that owed no fealty to another regional power was a novel development. The centralization project undertaken by the Mandatory state caused the cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman. Amman developed as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics that are evident in the expansion of state programs, urban infrastructure, and local cultural practices. This development always unfolded as a slurry of lofty goals and compromise. Despite British antipathy towards the Ottoman Empire and their lasting imprint on Transjordan, the Mandatory state could not erase their legacy. Contrary to the narrative of the Hashemite state, the Transjordan government heavily relied on Ottoman structures and institutions already in place at the time of its founding. Only towards the end of the Mandate period did the Transjordanian state begin to move beyond this largely Ottoman framework. Amman's hybridized identity is a byproduct of a government that could not afford to start with a blank slate. Instead, the Mandatory government and Amman both built upon a foundation of monarchical order, borrowed elites, and colonial negotiation.

⁹ Shami, "Historical Processes of Identity Formation," 146-49.

¹⁰ Jane Hacker, *Modern 'Amman: A Social Study* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1960), 59. Salt in 1914 had a population of roughly 40,000 people.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 161- 64.

Very few things in Amman were not a personification of the tension, duality, and limitations inherent in the state itself.

Monarchical Regimes and Patrimonial Networks

At all times during the Transjordan Mandate, the power of the state was divided between its monarch and its colonial overseers. These two poles of authority controlled the development of Transjordan's institutions and jockeyed for control over its future.¹² These competing forces shaped the development of Jordanian governance and the enduring legacy of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The construction of the Transjordanian regime happened in Amman. This new state evolved in Amman, gradually incorporating disparate influences while silencing dissonant actors. In this way, the entire city of Amman was a realm of patronage and governance. The capital city acted as an extension of the government. The creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was the culmination of Amir Abdullah's monarchical machinations throughout the Mandate period. Amman functioned as a "Hashemite Versailles;" the government constantly negotiated with its elite populace through a combination of co-option, persuasion, and punishment. Transjordan may have started as a weak tribally oriented monarchy but it evolved into a modern state through the efforts of the Abdullah, the British, and the elites and notables of Transjordan.

¹² The early foundational works on Transjordan include Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); Uriel Dann, *Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). These works largely focused on the development of the Jordanian military and the relationship between Abdullah and the British. Recent works on Transjordan have begun to move away from this elite-centric interpretation of Jordanian history and tend to be more thematically organized.

Although monarchies in the Middle East are popularly conceived as a traditional aspect of governance in the Arab world, the majority of monarchies in the region are modern inventions. With the exception of Morocco, and Egypt and Iran to a lesser degree, the monarchies of the Middle East can all be traced back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.¹³ The first of the post-Ottoman monarchs was Abdullah's father, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, ruler of the Hijaz. Hussein was the first to adopt the title of *malik* (king) when he rebelled against the Ottomans. Prior to Hussein's coronation as King of the Hijaz, Muslim rulers for centuries had avoided the title of *malik* as derogatory and the designation of foreign non-Muslim rulers. However, with the ascendancy of European monarchs in the west, the title of king became less problematic. By adopting the title of king, Hussein hoped to be able to negotiate with the British on a more even footing.¹⁴

Historian Ami Ayalon argues that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire two types of monarchs emerged in the Middle East. The first category were the "traditional" or "tribal" kingdoms, who adopted "Western royal titulature but little else." The second

¹³ Morocco's ruling dynasty, the Alawi, have ruled Morocco since the seventeenth century. Egypt became a protectorate and Sultanate of Great Britain in 1914. Before 1914, Egypt had been semi-autonomous from the Ottoman Empire under the rule of the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. Iran has a long history of ruling monarchies dating back to the Persian Empire. Iran, unlike Morocco, did have a dynastic change as a result of foreign meddling. The British, at least in part, orchestrated the 1921 coup against the Qajar dynasty. Despite British support of the coup, it is unlikely that the British suspected that Reza Shah would become shah and the first member of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1926. For more on the transition from the Qajars to Reza Shah and Great Britain's role in Iran see Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Great Britain & Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921-1941* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001). For more on the impact of colonialism on Morocco and its ruling dynasty see C.R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: a History* (London: Hurst, 2001); Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). For more on colonial Egypt see Juan R.I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1991); Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Ami Ayalon, "Post-Ottoman Arab Monarchies: Old Bottles, New Labels?" in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 24-27.

category of kingdoms was more modern in style. These monarchs both adopted Western titles and European-style institutions, which theoretically checked the king's power. This second category frequently featured some combination of constitutions, elected parliaments, responsible cabinets, political parties, and a free press. These aspects of "modernity" were frequently foisted on Arab monarchs by foreign powers.¹⁵ Although Ayalon depicts these categories as distinct from one another, the interwar period was characterized by monarchies in transition. Places like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan may have started as tribal monarchies but slowly evolved into modern centralized and bureaucratized states.

The heavily patrimonial rule of the monarchs of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Transjordan underwent similar transitions and transformations during the interwar Mandate period. According to the political scientists James Bill and Robert Springborg patrimonial leadership in the Middle East was predicated on the rulers' willingness to compromise, his personal charisma, his ability to utilize his personal connections, and the overall unity of the community. Monarchies in the Middle East evolved as extensions of the leader through paternal, patriarchal, and patrimonial systems. Over time, the royal household was able to develop this patrimonial network into a discrete bureaucratic network.¹⁶ This transition from personal rule to bureaucratized and centralized state occurred throughout the Middle East during the interwar period.

Historian Joseph Kostiner argues in *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: from Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* that the title "chieftaincy" is more applicable to the early years of the Saudi state because it had no clear boundaries, no elaborate

¹⁵ Ayalon, "Post-Ottoman Arab Monarchies," 24 and 28.

¹⁶ James Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East, 3rd edition* (London: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1990), 145-54.

administrative institutions, and a loose political structure based on tribal cooperation.¹⁷ In contrast to other historians, Kostiner maintains that Ibn Saud never had a master plan for the construction of Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ Great Britain's shifting and fractured policy on Saudi Arabia gave Ibn Saud more flexibility and leeway in formulating the policies of the nascent state.¹⁹ Ibn Saud reacted to a changing political situation and was able to harness military conquest as a turning point for the state in the mid-1920s. Expansion turned the Saudi chieftaincy into a "conquest movement," which in turn aided the centralization of the state. By 1936, the Saudi chieftaincy had transitioned to a centralized monarchical state with a growing bureaucracy. The royal family reinforced patrimonial connections through intermarriage with the various tribes of Saudi Arabia. Saudi princes spread throughout Saudi Arabia further reinforced preexisting patron networks.²⁰

There is no evidence of the British encouraging any centralization policies in Saudi Arabia. Any bureaucratic expansion or centralization policies undertaken by the Saudi state were done so independent of foreign intervention or influence.²¹ This pattern of development is analogous to Mandate Iraq and Transjordan. In both Iraq and Transjordan, the early years of the state relied on tribal cooperation and monarchical charisma in place of any centralized power structure. Both Mandates only transitioned away from the title of chieftaincy as their bureaucratic infrastructure was developed. The Hashemites in Iraq and Transjordan tended to marry their cousins instead of

¹⁷ Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: from Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.

¹⁸ David Dean Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 103. Commins argues that it was Ibn Saud's plan to tame the zeal of the Ikhwan after they were no longer needed to conquer new territory.

¹⁹ Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia*, 7-8.

²⁰ Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum, "State-Formation and the Saudi Monarchy," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 132-136.

²¹ Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia*, 186-88.

intermarrying with the local tribes. As a result, the royal family was not as integrated or as expansive in Iraq and Transjordan as it was in Saudi Arabia.²² As well, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, state centralization and control was at the behest of the British in Iraq and Transjordan, not in spite of them.

Similar to Saudi Arabia, no singular British policy applied to Mandatory Iraq. Differences in colonial administration and subsidy created a sense of colonial instability and uncertainty within the Mandate. In *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932* Peter Sluglett argues that a forced rapid state formation, plagued by a chronic lack of revenue, led to the formation of a government that was little more than a façade for an increasingly oppressive rule. In Sluglett's opinion, political freedom in Iraq during the Mandate amounted to little more than "glorified cronyism."²³ Toby Dodge agrees with Sluglett and argues in *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied* that British liberal aspirations in Iraq were never realized. The tenuous financial situation of the Mandate prevented the formation of a sustainable liberal state. The British chose to implement an entirely new system in Iraq, largely ignoring the urban notables that had made the Ottoman system work in favor of tribal sheikhs.²⁴ This decision to reinforce the chieftaincy aspects of Iraq through "institutionalized" tribal land control privileged the "simpler" rural tribal sheikhs over their urban counterparts.²⁵ In addition to courting tribal leaders, the British administration in Iraq was predicated on the king being

²² No work has been completed on the marriage practices of the Hashemites in Jordan. To the best of my knowledge, there was no discrete marriage policy. The only scholarship on the Mandate period that discusses marriage in any facet is Joseph Massad's *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Massad discusses the function of marriage in nationality laws and status, not in relation to patrimonial connections or networks.

²³ Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932, 3rd edition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 216.

²⁴ "Urban notables" and their impact on Transjordan will be discussed in the next section.

²⁵ Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied* (London: Hurst, 2003).

the keystone of their policies. For the British the king “was seen to provide the central point of control for the High Commissioner.”²⁶ This reliance on patrimonial allegiances and comprises, when combined with the reduced financial capacity of the Mandate, created a shallow social foundation for the Iraqi monarchy and state.

Although similar to its Iraqi neighbor, the relationship between the tribes and the monarchy in Transjordan was slightly different. It does not appear that the same lofty goals discussed in Iraq were ever applied to Transjordan. The disruption between the Ottoman and Mandate period was perhaps more jarring in Iraq because of the British decision to shift its elite structure and bureaucratic function. Transjordan, which had little preexisting elite infrastructure, was not burdened by such a power shift. Instead, the supremacy of the tribes was largely maintained. Yoav Alon highlights the tribes’ pivotal role in the creation of a stable state in *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* also. Alon contends that the mutually beneficial relationship between the Anglo-Hashemite government and the tribes of Jordan helped to buoy the Mandatory government. Alon, like Kostiner, refers to Transjordan as a “chieftaincy” that was heavily dependent on patrimonial relations between the Amir and the tribal sheikhs of Transjordan. Alon also describes the evolution of Abdullah’s chieftaincy into a modern state.²⁷ However, while Alon’s study grants the tribes much needed agency and rationality, it only discusses the government in amorphous terms. The central government frequently interacts directly with tribal sheikhs but there is no discussion as to how the political culture and institutional might of the capital of Amman was critical to these

²⁶ Toby Dodge, “International Obligation, Domestic Pressure and Colonial Nationalism; The Birth of the Iraqi State Under the Mandate System,” in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Boston: Brill, 2004), 150-51.

²⁷ Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007).

exchanges. Alon views the government from the perspective of the tribes outside of Amman. By focusing on the development of the regime itself, this study will trace the evolution of governance from the inside out. Overall, it is clear that the Transjordanian monarchy followed a similar pattern of development to neighboring Iraq and Saudi Arabia. All three kingdoms had monarchs who were forced to constantly readjust their relations with the established elites of their lands. The patrimonial relationships of all three monarchies were critical to their stability. The incorporation of new and old elites into these evolving state systems shaped their institutional growth and the gradual expansion of their bureaucracies.

Urban Notables in a Colonial Regime

Financial limitations and shifting British colonial policies limited the ability of the British to ignore and ostracize the preexisting elite of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Transjordan. Both Great Britain and France had no choice but to incorporate the existing notables of their imperial possessions in the Middle East. These elites fell roughly into two groups, the urban notables of the late Ottoman period and tribal sheikhs. Albert Hourani first coined the phrase “urban notables” in his seminal paper “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables.”²⁸ Hourani, who first used the term to describe the urban elites of nineteenth century Cairo, categorized Azhar sheikhs, guild leaders, and wealthy merchants as urban notables. These notables were crucial for the understanding of political functions in the Middle East because they acted as intermediaries between the Ottoman rulers and the remainder of the population. Philip Khoury brought these

²⁸ Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East*, eds. W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968).

Ottoman urban notables into the Mandate period in *Syria and the French Mandate: Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*. It was in the best interest of the urban notables to work with the colonial regime in order to protect their positions of power, privilege, and influence. Khoury notes that the opposition to the colonial administration only came from the young civil servants (*efendiyya*) who fought the Mandatory state through the rhetoric of Arab nationalism. The established urban notables, on the other hand, worked with the French in “honorable cooperation.” These collaborators formed the National Bloc in the 1930s and lost power in post-independence Syria.²⁹

Throughout the colonized Middle East, these former Ottoman elites reinvented themselves to be colonial intermediaries with their new European overlords. Though the exact makeup of this group changed from colony to colony and Mandate to Mandate, both the British and the French utilized these elites in their imperial endeavors in the region. Transjordan was no different. However, because Transjordan did not have many preexisting urban centers many of its urban notables were imported from neighboring Syria and Palestine by Abdullah and the British alike. These foreign elites belonged to two groups. “Naturalized” Transjordanians were the elites who had lived in Transjordan since 1923, while “foreign” elites had moved to Transjordan thereafter. Although viewed as suspect by the native inhabitants of Transjordan, the “naturalized” Transjordanians were eventually accepted in a way in which the foreigners never were. This infusion of foreign urban notables into the administration of Transjordan was necessary given the dearth of educated and politicized elites within the Mandate. These individuals, in

²⁹ Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).

conjunction with the tribal sheikhs and few native urban notables of Transjordan, filled the bureaucratic, administrative, and political roles of the Mandate.

Betty Anderson discusses the development of an early nationalist period during the late 1920s and early 1930s in her book *Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State*.³⁰ Anderson connects early elite objection to the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty to the later formation of a discrete nationalist movement in post-independence Jordan. This early opposition movement, largely organized by the National Congress, generally opposed British action in Transjordan as a curtailment of local autonomy. The National Congress' members were a collection of naturalized and native urban notables and tribal sheikhs from all of Transjordan. Anderson also points out that the civil servants and bureaucrats of Transjordan, akin to neighboring Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, came from the same cadre of Ottoman educated elites (*efendi*). However, Anderson references the movement as a precursor to her true focus, which is the nationalist movement of the 1950s. Anderson does not acknowledge that Amman became the political nexus of Transjordan during the Mandate period. This use of the National Congress and the Legislative Council as a necessary first step towards Jordanian nationalism does not recognize the evolution of the Legislative Council during the Mandate period itself. The Council was not a static entity. Its membership, its autonomy, and its reach changed dramatically throughout the duration of the Mandate. Anderson's analysis does not connect the Legislative Council to the political centralization of the Anglo-Hashemite state in Amman.

³⁰ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).

The opposition movement has been referenced elsewhere by scholars such as Maan Abu Nowar in *The Development of Transjordan, 1929-1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* but again these discussions are only quick summaries that do not discuss how the opposition movement was connected to Amman and the lasting impact of the Legislative Council more generally.³¹ Abu Nowar's analysis depicts the Legislative Council as purely adversarial to the Mandatory government. This perspective ignores the myriad of actors involved in these events in favor of a purely binary loyalty arrangement, either for or against the government. Nowar's analysis, unlike Elizabeth Thompson's description of Mandatory Syria and Lebanon in *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*, fails to give the elites their own agency.³² Thompson argues that Syria and Lebanon's "colonial citizens" created a "civic order" in which the colonizer and the colonized interacted and negotiated with one another. The new Mandatory paradigm created a hierarchy of citizenship based on patriarchal privilege that placed Christian over Muslim, Lebanese over Syrian, and men over women. Similar to Mandatory Syria and Lebanon, the relationship between the elites of Transjordan and the Mandatory regime was not static. The elites of Transjordan, whether they were members of the Legislative Council, regional administrators, or civil servants in Amman acted out of self-interest and self-preservation. These individuals were constantly negotiating with one another in order to privilege themselves and their patron networks.

³¹ Maan Abu Nowar, *The Development of Transjordan, 1929-1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 2006), 117-141.

³² Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

Where British and French colonial policy differed was the scope of authority afforded to these Ottoman elites, and how often these elites rebelled and differentiated themselves in contrast to the Mandatory government. In Transjordan, elite actions were predicated on patrimonial networks and survival, which only rarely amounted to united action against the Anglo-Hashemite state. Mandate Transjordan, unlike Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, was mainly peaceful during the Mandate. It was not burdened by sectarian or ethnic strife. Instead, in the words of historian Asher Susser, Amir Abdullah and the British “were almost entirely undisturbed by domestic opposition, in what was a relatively small and underdeveloped political society.”³³ Although Susser’s comments ignore the political opposition sustained by the Legislative Council of Transjordan throughout the Mandate, he is correct to highlight the lack of widespread opposition and armed conflict in Transjordan that plagued the neighboring mandates.

Imperial Politics and Mandatory Administration

The evolution of the Mandate system in the Middle East was intrinsically tied to the evolution of both the British and French Empires as a whole. Given the scope of both empires, it is impossible to discuss a single unifying imperial policy for either European power. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler’s edited volume *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World* stresses the fact that colonial regimes were not monolithic. There were no uniform “agents of empire.” According to Cooper and Stoler

³³ Asher Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy: the Hashemite Success Story,” in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 89.

the social, cultural, and political practices of both the colonizer and the colonized shifted constantly.³⁴ Instead, it is more fruitful to discuss the imperial aspirations of both powers in the Middle East before and after World War I. The Great War fundamentally shifted the way in which both Great Britain and France interacted with their colonial holdings. In *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922*, David Fromkin notes that the Middle East was the last unclaimed piece of the world, it “was the only native bastion that the Europeans had not yet stormed” on the eve of the twentieth century.³⁵ However, Fromkin argues that the imperial system that led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 was already out of date the subsequent year. By 1922, British society generally rejected both the idealistic (advancing civilization) and practical (that it benefited Britain to extend the empire) arguments for imperialism. The British public only acquiesced to British involvement in the Middle East because Winston Churchill convinced them that it would be an inexpensive imperial venture. By the time the Mandate agreements were concluded in 1922, the British had committed themselves to a settlement that they themselves no longer believed in.³⁶ Similarly, British internal divisions complicated policy in the region. The division between the pro-Hashemite Foreign Office championed by T.E. Lawrence and the pro-Saudi Indian Office championed by Arnold Wilson muddled British affairs from 1917-1920. Timothy J. Paris argues in “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian

³⁴ Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 4-12 and 29. The lack of recognition of a reciprocal colonial relationship plagues the scholarship of the French empire as well. Jennifer M. Dueck calls for the study of the impact of the colonized on the colonizer in “The Middle East and North Africa in the Imperial and Post-Colonial Historiography of France,” *The Historical Journal* 50 (2007): 940-943.

³⁵ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 558.

³⁶ Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 560-63.

and Wilsonian Schools” that this internal division stymied British action in the Middle East during the pivotal post-War years. Although the Foreign Office eventually won, this internal division and divided Middle Eastern policy haunted the region throughout the interwar period. This loss of faith and conflicting goals resulted in the shoestring budgets and reduced colonial staffs of the British interwar period in the Middle East.³⁷

Similarly, the French Empire was also at a turning point after World War I. In *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* Martin Thomas contends that although the French Empire was at its geographical zenith in the interwar period, the French imperial system was actually trending downward. The system “was more diffuse and unmanageable than ever.”³⁸ Similar to Great Britain in the immediate aftermath of World War I, parliamentarians and the press in France were more excited by the prospect of imperial expansion than the arduous task of further developing their existing colonial territories. However, the escalating financial difficulties of France quickly soured the public’s taste for expansion.³⁹ This fervor for expansion was an extension of the French *mission civilisatrice*. However, in the intervening interwar period French colonial policy, with the exclusion of the *anciennes colonies*, shifted from an assimilationist (*mission civilisatrice*) to an association (preservation of local cultures

³⁷ Timothy J. Paris, “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools,” *The Historical Journal* 41 (1998): 773-93. For more on evolving British policy during the interwar period see Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky, eds., *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-1939* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, eds., *Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008).

³⁸ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), 1.

³⁹ Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars*, 38-46.

through cultural sensibility and urban planning) approach.⁴⁰ This shift away from assimilation began before the war in France's North African colonies (which did not include Algeria). This policy change was largely a result of the decreased financial capacity of France. This reality underscored one of the central questions of the French Empire: Did the empire exist to serve France, or was it France's duty to protect the colonies? Thomas argues that it was clear that the empire served the needs of France, not vice versa. By 1928, the colonial empire became France's most important trading partner. In the ensuing years of worldwide depression, France was forced to increasingly rely on its colonial periphery for financial stability.⁴¹

In the end, neither the British nor the French truly encouraged the formation of national administrations in their Middle Eastern colonial holdings. According to D.K. Fieldhouse's *Western Imperialism in the Middle East-1958*, the distinction between British and French rule in the Middle East was nothing more than a façade. Both the British and the French utilized roughly the same number of European administrators in their Mandates. The key difference was that the French ruled more directly in Syria and Lebanon while the British in Iraq and Transjordan acted as "advisers" to Arab ministers.⁴² Despite the veneer of difference, both the British and the French administered their Mandates with a focus on economy. Humanitarianism and the need to

⁴⁰ Gwenedoly Wright, "Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy 1900-1930," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 327.

⁴¹ Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars*, 118.

⁴² D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 257-259. Fieldhouse's assertions about imperialism in the Middle East does not apply to French rule in North Africa. It only applies to France's new colonial holdings of the Syrian and Lebanese Mandates respectively. Fieldhouse also argues that Syria was governed with "minimal indigenous collaboration" which is in stark contrast to the "colonial civic order" outlined by Elizabeth Thompson in *Colonial Citizens: Republic Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in Syria and Lebanon*. Thompson argues that the "colonial civic order" muddled divisions between the colonizer and colonized by focusing instead on how various groups engaged with the colonial order, there was no sharp division between subject and citizen.

civilize the natives no longer justified the price tag of empire. Instead, the colonial holdings of both empires needed to be able to support the metropole. The empire needed to protect the homeland. This security imperative necessitated close colonial administration. However, this imperial oversight was always limited by a lack of resources and strained budgets. Mandate Transjordan, although important in the geopolitical stability of the British Empire, never garnered more than a paltry budget and a handful of British administrators. This fiscal economy constantly limited the aspirations of the Anglo-Hashemite state.

Joseph Massad examines the role of direct and indirect colonial administration in depth in *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*. Massad believes that the infrastructure and institutions created by the military and Jordanian legal codes are the cornerstones of the Jordanian state and Jordanian nationalism.⁴³ British officers (Frederick Peake and later John Bagot Glubb) directly led the Transjordan military. The Jordanian military only shifted to purely Arab leadership in 1956. The Transjordan legal system, on the other hand, had an Arab ministerial head who was advised by the British Judicial Adviser. Although Massad utilizes military and judicial development to frame the inception of a larger sense of Jordanian nationalism, he ignores the city of Amman completely. Massad's Hashemite state and Jordanian nationalism exist in a conceptual realm without any discussion of locality. Massad's work touches on the centralizing aspects of the judiciary and the Arab Legion but does not actually connect these developments to Jordan's capital. Although the military and the judiciary existed

⁴³ Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

throughout Transjordan, their headquarters and physical and symbolic power emanated from the capital.

Similarly, Tariq Tell's *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* focuses on the Mandatory origins to Jordan's regime stability. By focusing on the periphery, Tell argues that the institutions and political economy developed during the Mandate period buttressed the Hashemite regime through the first two decades of King Hussein's rule. The most important of these social pacts was what Tell refers to as the "Hashemite Compact." This social compact emerged during the Mandate as an exchange of resources for political loyalty of the Bedouin and the fellahin (peasants). However, by Tell's own admission, the "Hashemite Compact" only becomes truly important post-independence. Tell's work adds an important dimension to the evolution of Jordan's sociopolitical underpinnings but purposefully does so from the outside.⁴⁴ This approach does not engage with Amman's development or the centralizing aspects of the Mandatory state. For these reasons, it is critical to chronicle the government's development from the vantage point of Amman. The Mandatory state must be analyzed from the inside out in order to identify how the goals of the state became reality. The evolution of Transjordan must be understood on its own terms, not as a prologue to political turmoil and identity questions that unfold after Jordanian independence in 1946. Only by analyzing the Anglo-Hashemite government from its home in Amman can we determine where the state succeeded and where it fell short. Instead of understanding the Mandate as a series of divergent themes and institutions, the state must be understood as a single entity housed in Amman.

⁴⁴ Tariq Moraiwed Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Urban Practice and the Colonial City

The one arena in which a significant difference between British and French colonial practice exists is in urban policy and planning. The British and the French had very different opinions on the function of the colonial city. It is not appropriate to talk about a single “colonial city” any more than a monolithic conception of imperialism or colonialism.⁴⁵ Both British and French interventions into the Middle East during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created either de facto or de jure colonies in former Ottoman lands. Urban change in these imperial settings followed similar goals of economic growth in tandem with improved control and security through infrastructural advancement. However, these goals were accomplished through vastly different means and varying degrees of success in each imperial setting.

The nature and configuration of the French colonial city was heavily dependent upon its region and overall economic importance. The French made urban culture a cornerstone of their political endeavors throughout the empire. The French, renowned for their *mission civilisatrice*, believed in direct intervention in order to shape and improve their colonial cities. This policy existed throughout the French Empire, not just in the Levant and North Africa.⁴⁶ This focus on cultural improvement and advancement was at the core of the French colonial ethos and directly influenced French colonial urban planning. In Algeria for example, the French followed the set pattern of taking over the *Casbah* (headquarters of the Ottoman military forces) and transforming it into their own

⁴⁵ Anthony King, “Writing Colonial Space: A Review Article,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37 No. 3 (Jul 1995): 550-52.

⁴⁶ Alice L Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). Conklin discusses how the same civilizing impulse found in the Levant and North Africa also guided French colonial policy in West Africa.

base, appropriating the grand buildings of the city for their own purposes, and then beginning to expand the urban spaces of the city as needed to necessitate the movement of French troops.⁴⁷

This interventionist approach emphasized altering the urban fabric of the city. Gwendolyn Wright argues in *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* that the colonial city was an experimental space to test solutions for problems that existed in the French metropole such as overcrowding, sanitation problems, class conflicts, and economic stagnation. The colonial city for the French was a space to combine aspects of modernism and tradition.⁴⁸ However, in reality, urban practices in France did not substantively change until after World War II. As already mentioned, the goals of French colonial policy slowly shifted away from assimilation. After World War I, the French approach was “to protect certain aspects of cultural traditions while sponsoring other aspects of modernization.”⁴⁹

The result of these policies was the creation of the “dual city”: a European settlement separate but adjacent to the indigenous town. Wright argues in “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy 1900-1930,” that although the “dual city” model originated in the North Africa it was employed throughout the French Empire in places such as Morocco, Indochina, and Madagascar. The “dual city” originated in Morocco under the rule of Resident-General Hubert Lyautey. Under Lyautey’s leadership, old and new buildings in Morocco, were always separated by a no construction zone (“sanitary corridor”). The French *villes*

⁴⁷ Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 72.

⁴⁸ Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 55.

⁴⁹ Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 323.

nouvelles used the tenets of modern urban design, clean lines, and strict building guidelines, while also incorporating some local architectural accents. The problem with this approach was that the French did not predict the rapid growth of the Arab Moroccan populace. Overtime, the new French urban settlements walled in the medinas in Casablanca and Rabat, stymieing Arab economic development.⁵⁰

This process occurred throughout the *Maghrib* (North Africa) in Algiers, Bône, and Tunis. Each of these cities was designed with grand architecture, monuments, large streets and public squares. All of these characteristics further separated the new European quarters of the city from their traditional counterparts.⁵¹ This pattern of rule continued in the Levant under the French Mandates for Lebanon and Syria. This was particularly evident in the development of Beirut's transportation and communications infrastructure during the French Mandate. New construction transformed Beirut into a spectacular display of French power.⁵² These examples of "dual cities" in the Middle East were deliberate policies of the colonial power. However, this was not true everywhere in the Middle East. The emergence of a dual city became a de facto separation of modern and traditional urban spaces. In Amman, the western half of the city, in particular Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh, developed independently from the traditional urban core of Amman. In these neighborhoods, the "dual city" segregated Amman's growing

⁵⁰ Wright, "Tradition in the Service of Modernity," 328-31.

⁵¹ Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City*, 86-98.

⁵² Samir Kassir, *Beirut*, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 278-86. The new construction in Beirut was mainly utilizing Haussmannian ideas and Beaux-Art ideals. These architectural styles also influenced British colonial city construction and development. The cultural dualism of Beirut marked by different urban influences. The French did not impose the Arabo-French architectural style of North Africa on Beirut. Instead, *Beirut* architecture of the Mandate was marked by "Ottoman revivalism" and European eclecticism. For more on architectural evolution of Beirut during the Mandate see Robert Saliba, "Looking East, Looking West: Provincial Eclecticism and Cultural Dualism in the Architecture of French Mandate Beirut," in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Boston, Brill, 2004), 203-16.

elite, a collection of Ottoman urban notables, tribal sheikhs, merchants, and civil servants, in modern Western-style enclaves from the impoverished lower classes.

Although the government did not impose this division of Amman, it functioned in nearly the exact same way.

The “dual city” approach was also implemented elsewhere in the French Empire in Indochina and Madagascar. Urban development in French Indochina, led by Ernest Hébrard focused on “visual decentralization” by dividing the city into quarters to juxtapose different classes and function rather than phobic racial segregations. In Madagascar, on the other hand, the French constructed public buildings and markets utilizing traditional forms with modern innovations to improve their sanitation and general hygiene. These buildings in the old city were complimented by garden cities around a ring road that separated the new and old urban spaces. Wright convincingly asserts that the dual urban practices of traditional protection and modern development formed an important part of French imperial policy during the interwar period.⁵³ Although the French first used the “dual city,” it became a common colonial practice outside of the French Empire. This rise in the bifurcation of urban spaces was an outgrowth of changing colonial realities. Every imperial power became increasingly limited in their goals and their financial capabilities. Urban planning became an extension of a paternalistic understanding of heritage and cultural authenticity. It was simpler to undertake new construction that did not require the changing of traditional urban practice or have to worry with altering an established urban structure.

⁵³Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 331-36.

The British colonial city, on the other hand, generally did not undergo the same level of seismic shift that occurred in French colonial cities. Urban planning in French colonial cities was undertaken directly by the French colonial administration. Akin to their indirect approach to general colonial administration, the British rarely directly implemented urban plans. R.K. Home argues in “Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1900-1930” that the scale and mechanisms for urban planning that the British utilized was highly dependent on the colonial status of the territory. Areas of direct rule, usually port cities such as Bombay (The Bombay Town Planning Act of 1915) and Madras (the Madras Planning Act of 1920), were amongst the first places in the empire to have complete urban plans developed and executed.⁵⁴ Far more common than these direct urban plans was the British practice of recruiting urban planners from Britain to design new administrative headquarters and commercial centers. The stunning administrative architecture of New Delhi was the grandest example of this approach.⁵⁵ Generally, this approach was used in small towns such as Enugu, Nigeria, which over time grew from towns into cities. This urban planning, according to Home, was clearly designed to benefit the colonial officials and British business interests, not the local inhabitants.

⁵⁴ For more on the implementation of Bombay’s urban plan and the role the local inhabitants had in its formulation and execution see Preeti Chopra, “Refiguring the Colonial City: Recovering the Role of Local Inhabitants in the Construction of Colonial Bombay, 1854-1918,” *Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum* 14 (2007): 109-25.

⁵⁵ Planning in New Delhi was done purely for the benefit and aggrandizement of the British colonial power. For more on the impact of this type of urban planning on the local populace see Stephen Legg, “Governmentality, Congestion and Calculation in Colonial Delhi,” *Social & Cultural Geography* 7 (2006): 709-29.

The British adopted an approach similar to the French association model in “historic” cities such as Alexandria, Cairo, and Jerusalem.⁵⁶ Leila Fawaz and Robert Ilbert argue in “Political Relations Between City and State in the Colonial Period” that in Cairo the British did not so much implement a new urban plan as continue the urban redevelopment begun by Khedive Isma‘il. The construction of this new European-style city to the west of the medieval center was largely completed by the end of the nineteenth century. This “dual city” became a default colonial enclave.⁵⁷ Otherwise, in “historic” cities, the British took a paternalistic conservationist approach that was implemented indirectly through the “consulting” of a local/native authority.⁵⁸

A prime example of British paternalistic efforts to “protect” traditional elements of the cities they controlled was the rule of Ronald Storrs in Jerusalem. Ronald Storrs, the British Governor of Jerusalem from 1917-1927, prohibited any renovations in the old city without his explicit permission. According to historian Nicholas Roberts, the British believed they could “redeem” Jerusalem through urban planning. The urban planning of Jerusalem mirrored French “dual cities” of Rabat and Casablanca, protecting and separating the old city from the new.⁵⁹ However, Annabel Wharton is clear to point out that this preservationist attitude did not apply to structures of the Ottoman period. Ottoman urban heritage was deemed as being inauthentic. Although Storrs led a strong anti-Ottoman heritage campaign, the British government lacked the funds to complete the

⁵⁶ R.K. Home, “Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1900-1930,” *Planning Perspectives* 5 (1990): 25-28.

⁵⁷ Leila Fawaz and Robert Ilbert, “Political Relations Between City and State in the Colonial Period,” in *The Urban Social History of the Middle East 1750-1950*, ed. Peter Sluglett, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 149.

⁵⁸ Home, “Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire,” 25-28.

⁵⁹ Nicholas E. Roberts, Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* XLII (2013): 7-17.

work. Instead, Storrs founded the non-government pro-Jerusalem Society to fund and execute these projects. The pro-Jerusalem society included Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mayor of Jerusalem, the Orthodox and Latin Patriarchs, and the head of the Jewish community amongst its members. The pro-Jerusalem Society removed numerous Ottoman markers from Jerusalem's urban fabric, most notably its nineteenth century clock tower.⁶⁰ This same disregard for ottoman urban heritage existed in Transjordan. The British removed an Ottoman fountain from in front of the Husseini Mosque (*Hamidiyye Sabeel*) but were anxious about the destruction of any Roman ruins (such as the citadel, roman theater, or the Nymphaeum).

The one area in which conservationist policy deviated slightly was in regard to infrastructural improvements. It was infrastructural concerns, according to historian May Seikaly, which necessitated the creation of an urban plan for Haifa. Britain developed Haifa as the strategic center of Palestine. The 1930 master plan created by C. Holliday focused on the core area that contained the newly expanded harbor, the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, and the Palestine railway headquarters. The urban plan called for minimal construction and urban development outside of this core area of Haifa. Seikaly argues that problems arose in Haifa because the Arabs were unfamiliar with the concepts of urban planning and could not lobby accordingly. Zionists, on the other hand, fully understood the advantages to be gained from infrastructural development taking place on, or adjacent to, Jewish land.⁶¹ The urban plan of Haifa was the only urban planning

⁶⁰ Annabel Wharton, "Jerusalem Remade," in *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 44-51. For more on Mandate era Jerusalem see Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem: From the Ottomans to the British* (New York, I.B. Tauris, 2009).

⁶¹ May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society 1918-1939* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 53-72.

beyond Jerusalem directly undertaken by the British. Urban development and planning in Palestine was exceptional in the British colonial world because the Zionists lobbied for and created their own urban plans. In particular, the Zionists favored the creation of “garden cities” throughout Palestine. In general, the British did not utilize garden cities because they broke down class and colonial divisions. It was for exactly this reason that the Zionists enthusiastically endorsed garden cities because they homogenized an area as simply “Jewish” instead of culturally, socially, or religiously diverse.⁶²

In general, the British did not advocate the formation of new colonial spaces in their dealings in the Middle East. The British simply did not have the funds to invest in anything that did not serve an explicit military or security purpose, let alone urban development. Because of the mixture of British paternalism and fiscal conservatism, there was no singular model of a British colonial city. Instead, the British more or less preserved what already existed while they made necessary infrastructural improvements motivated by security concerns. This model of British colonial paternalism was evident in their attitude to Amman’s growth and urban development.⁶³

One of the few works that discusses the development of Amman during the Mandate period is Eugene Rogan’s short article “The Making of a Capital: Amman 1918-1928.”⁶⁴ Rogan argues that the state did not have the funds to inspire legitimacy through large building projects. Instead, it relied on grand ceremonies such as the Amir’s weekly

⁶² Home, “Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire,” 29-34.

⁶³ For more on urban development in Palestine see Noah Hysler-Rubin, *Patrick Geddes and Town Planning: A Critical View* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Mark Levine, *Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Adam LeBor, *City of Oranges: An Intimate History of Arabs and Jews in Jaffa* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).

⁶⁴ Eugene Rogan, “The Making of a Capital: Amman 1918-1928,” in *Amman: The City and Its Society*, ed. Jean Hannoyer and Seteney Shami, (Beirut: CERMOC, 1996), 89-107.

procession to Friday prayers in order to establish authority. Another Amman-centric work is a recent dissertation by Marwan Daoud Hanania, “From Colony to Capital: A Socio-Economic and Political History of Amman, 1878-1958,” which focuses on the social development of Amman’s urban fabric. Hanania argues that ethno-national groups coexisted with minimal conflict and that class categories were far more important in the stratification of Amman.⁶⁵ However, Hanania’s argument also minimizes the Mandate period and instead over-stresses Ottoman continuity and the large impact of Palestinian refugees after the 1948 war. This approach belies the importance of Mandate Era institutions, infrastructural development, and local elite involvement.

The city of Amman is the nexus of multiple competing powers and influences during the Mandate period. Amman is the intersection of imperial might and local autonomy. Amman is the extension of Abdullah’s monarchical patrimonial network. Amman is evidence of a robust Ottoman legacy. Amman is the product of a declining British Empire. By concentrating on the capital of Amman, we can begin to understand how elements outside of the city were forced to adapt to a new centralized authority and the importance of localizing that power in a new space. The Mandate period is critical for understanding not only how the capital was constructed but also how the rest of Transjordan was slowly forced into accepting a centralized power in Amman. This creation of an independent central government in Transjordan was an unprecedented enterprise for this region. Studying this early period of Amman’s institutional history not only highlights the development of Amman and Jordan more generally, but also the shifts in the political climate of the entire region. The early years of Transjordan’s government

⁶⁵ Marwan Daoud Hanania, “From Colony to Capital: A Socio-Economic and Political History of Amman, 1878-1958” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2010).

shared a great deal with the early chieftaincies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Similar to these surrounding countries, Transjordan developed over the Mandate period into a discrete modernizing state. The study of Amman during the Mandate is the story of the evolving governance of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Governmental policy and approach in Transjordan was not static. Although it started as a weak chieftaincy with little, if any, centralizing aspects it became a bureaucratic modernizing state by the end of the Mandate. Amman became the manifestation of the Anglo-Hashemite state and its shadow loomed over the rest of Transjordan.

Furthermore, the creation of Amman as a new capital city allows scholars to study its urban development in context with other Middle Eastern cities during the interwar period. Amman's urban evolution still poses a number of similarities and common characteristics to other regional centers such as Ankara, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus. With the exception of Ankara, a common Ottoman urban heritage can be found in all of these urban spaces. Unfortunately, comparisons to other new capital cities outside the region such as Brasilia and Washington, D.C. are not as fruitful because Amman never had an urban plan.⁶⁶ Unlike most purpose built capital cities, which were planned meticulously, Amman was left to develop without government plans or limitations. This choice not to shape the cityscape in Amman was a discrete decision

⁶⁶ James Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989); Frederick Gutheim, *Worthy of a Nation: The History of Planning for the National Capital* (Washington, D.C.: National Capital Planning Commission and Smithsonian Press, 1977). Washington, D.C. is primarily the product of 2 urban plans, the 1791 Pierre L'Enfant plan and the McMillan Commission and its 1901-1902 recommendations. The construction of Brasilia became the central goal of President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), who wanted to create a new national space and a new national epoch by linking Brazil's interior to its coast. Brasilia Serves as a case study of the modernist city as proposed in the manifestos of the International Congress of Modern Architects (CIAM). Brasilia embodies the premise of social transformation via modern architecture and planning to create new forms of collective association. In both cities, you cannot divorce the development of each city's urban fabric and the urban planning that created it.

undertaken by the Mandatory state. Transjordan's governmental authority did not rely on the geography and architecture of Amman. Instead, it relied on the young government's institutional authority. Amman, unlike Washington, D.C. or Brasilia, could not afford to awe its inhabitants into accepting the supremacy of the central state. Focusing on urban change in Amman facilitated by its institutional and infrastructural centrality provides an excellent opportunity to highlight the importance of locality and transnational political and cultural forces in the development of the Modern Middle East. The city of Amman changes the vantage point from which we can understand the evolution of governance in Transjordan. By looking from the inside out, this study values both British administrators and Transjordanian administrators alike in their ability to create the new Transjordanian state.

Theory, Methodology, and Sources

The framework of this study relies on the inherent tension between the aspirations of the state and its reality. The Mandatory state's goal was to control its populace. Governmental power was the synthesis of all of Government actions, which in turn generated oversight over Transjordan. However, in every aspect of the Mandate, its governmental power had clear limitations.⁶⁷ The Anglo-Hashemite government's chief concern was the maintenance of the status quo of the region. British focus in Transjordan was the protection of their regional assets. This meant the protection of Iraqi oil, the port of Haifa, the Suez Canal, and the ever-important route to India. Because Transjordan was not important unto itself, the thrust of government interest was security and control as a

⁶⁷ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality An Introduction: Volume I*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, Vintage Books, 1978), 94-97.

means to stabilize the entire region. In order to facilitate these goals, the government needed to discipline the population to accept the role and function of the new centralized state apparatus.

However, despite the aspirations of the Mandatory government, its reach never fully enveloped Transjordan. Instead, the history of Transjordan during the Mandate is a story of duality and tension. Amman's desires never fully came to fruition. In this way, Transjordan satisfies what political scientist Nazih Ayubi calls a "hard" state in *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* by the end of the Mandate. Ayubi defines "hard states" as states that were "relatively late-industrializers, with strong executives and higher levels of centralization, that try to enforce a detailed, standardized regulation of the economy and society."⁶⁸ A "hard state" may have strong coercive control but it is not a "strong state" because it "lacks rationality and because it lacks the necessary moral, ideological, and educational supports."⁶⁹ Although Transjordan did not possess coercive attributes at the onset, the government's desire to control its inhabitants was its constant goal. The Mandatory government's controlling and coercive aspirations were undercut by its shaky ideological backing. This dearth of ideological support was the reason for the opposition movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Transjordan. The elites of Transjordan did not accept the nascent Mandatory state simply because Amir Abdullah and the British foisted it on them. The inhabitants of Transjordan fought this increasing institutional control. For this reason, Amman was both the seat of political power during the Mandate while simultaneously being the home of the opposition.

⁶⁸ Nazih N. Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 449.

⁶⁹ Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 23.

The ultimate goal of the state was to control all of Transjordan from Amman. In essence, the functional goal of the state was to transform the city of Amman into a Foucauldian Panopticon. The panopticon was an enclosed, segmented space, in which individuals were constantly observable and supervised. The constant uninterrupted gaze of a hierarchical figure induced “in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”⁷⁰ There was no articulated security program undertaken in Transjordan. Instead, in a piecemeal and somewhat random fashion, the government slowly centralized the machinery of state control in Amman. This haphazard method meant that the government never realized its controlling aspirations. Government control over Transjordan became quite strong, but it was never absolute.

As an extension of the will of the government, the city of Amman conditioned the population of Transjordan to accept its new centralized control and read Amman as a symbol for government authority. Dissident elites were slowly cowed to accept Amman’s power through imprisonment in Amman’s central prison, exile, and most tellingly, domestic exile away from Amman. However, these threats of discipline did not eliminate dissent in Transjordan. The Transjordan government also used Abdullah’s patrimonial network to reward formerly dissident elites with position, prestige, and financial incentives. The remaining oppositional voices were silenced by the extensive censorship activities of the state. Although Amman’s gaze had a curative effect, being removed from the locus of power became its own form of punishment. This simultaneously reinforced the importance of proximity to Amman. The ability of the government as personified in

⁷⁰ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 201.

the city of Amman to condition Transjordanian elites turned Amman into a “Hashemite Versailles.”

Modern scholarship on Louis XIV and Versailles has taken steps away from an all-encompassing absolutist perspective. Instead, scholarship belonging to the “revisionist” school suggests that Louis XIV needed to incorporate elites into a system that was no longer medieval, but not yet modern.⁷¹ To reinforce the control of the monarchy Louis XIV placated formerly rebellious elites by providing them with ideological support, tax breaks, and including them in consultation of certain government projects.⁷² Additionally, the idea of a monolithic “royal faction” is outdated. The French nobility at Versailles organized themselves along social, religious, familial, and ideological lines. There was no binary relationship pitting the crown against the nobility.⁷³ The purpose of Versailles was not to force the nobility to pay fealty to the king. The Palace at Versailles and Louis XIV represents the shift of nobility loyalty from the king to the king and the state’s administration. Louis XIV “re-educated” the nobility to utilize their skills in the new bureaucracy of the state.⁷⁴

⁷¹ There is an ongoing historiographic debate on the nature of Louis XIV’s rule in France. Revisionists have spent the last thirty years moving away from an absolutist understanding of Louis XIV. Scholars such as John Hurt believe this argument has gone too far. Hurt portrays Louis XIV as an absolutist ruler who systematically undermined the ability of the French nobility to resist his will through curtailment of parliamentary function. The revisionist side of the debate will be covered in the ensuing paragraph but see John Hurt, *Louis XIV and the Parelements: The Assertion of Royal Authority* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) for the absolutist perspective.

⁷² William Beik, “The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration,” *Past & Present* 188 (2005): 197-199.

⁷³ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, with Jean-Francois Fitou, *Saint-Simon and the Court of Louis XIV*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Le Roy Ladurie’s work revised the foundational work of Norbert Elias on the court culture of Versailles. Norbert’s most famous work *The Court Society*, trans Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

⁷⁴ Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). Smith uses Foucauldian language to argue that Louis XIV used the “monarchical gaze” to “discipline” the French nobility.

Over the course of the Mandate, the elites of Transjordan were brought into Amman and were cajoled into gradually accepting the legitimacy and authority of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The Mandatory state slowly eliminated the feasibility of Transjordanian tribal sheikhs, landowners, and merchants to operate independently of the government in Amman. The elites of Transjordan had no choice but to accept the Anglo-Hashemite regime and the supremacy of Amman. Similar to Versailles, Transjordanian elites were brought into Amman to be incorporated into the growing machinery of the state. The only way for elites to protect their position and status was to assume posts in the bureaucracy of Transjordan. The forced incorporation of elites into Amman was feasible because of the Amman's centralized and bureaucratized authority. This arrangement in turn allowed the Mandatory government in Amman to discipline economically.⁷⁵ This arrangement differed from Iraq where tribal sheikhs had their authority reified as landowners and did not need to participate in the administration directly. The Transjordanian approach to elite incorporation was in lieu of intermarriage or more traditional patrimonial networking (e.g. Saudi Arabia). The Anglo-Hashemite state needed the elites to directly acknowledge the supremacy of Amman and what the capital stood for if the state was to be successful. This was not an immediate product. Instead, over time Transjordan's governing policies shifted limiting the feasibility of autonomous elites. This narrowing of political opportunity was particularly evident in the government's changing treatment of the tribes of Transjordan.

Overall, this dissertation's study of Mandate Era Amman will not attempt to apply any overarching model or definition for the Middle Eastern city. Although the

⁷⁵ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 203-06.

dissertation does discuss the development of the urban fabric of Amman, a discrete analysis of the use and meaning of space as a social and cultural construct is not productive because of the inherent Marxist undertones of these theories. Amman's development was not a byproduct of economic initiative or action. It was the result of state centralization and machinations. As a result, Marxist space theories such as those of Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, or Paul Rabinow are not applicable.⁷⁶ Instead, I will contrast the development of Mandate Era Amman with other colonial "dual cities" like Jerusalem, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. Nineteenth century Ottoman administrative and infrastructural reforms, in conjunction with the policies of their colonial overlords, affected all of these cities.

The available source material necessitated a focus on the constrictive effects of power and control utilized by the Anglo-Hashemite state. As a result, this dissertation is a study of the creation of the institutional framework of the state from the vantage point of Amman. In the British records, there is a constant focus on control and economy of action within Transjordan. There is a wealth of materials documenting the varying stages of infrastructural and institutional development, both inside and outside Amman. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to determine where these prerogatives originated due to a lack of private papers. Both Jordanian and British records group the actions of the Anglo-Hashemite government into a singular and at times monolithic "government."⁷⁷ In

⁷⁶ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990); Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of Missionary and Didactic Pathos* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

⁷⁷ Chief British Representative Harold St John Philby, Arab Legion Commanders Frederick Peake and John Bagot Glubb all have extensive private papers collections. The wealth of records from these military commanders partially explains why the formation of the Jordanian military has been one of the more widely studied phenomenon in Jordanian historiography (see P.J. Vatikiotis, Joseph Massad, Yoav Alon, etc.)

a similar manner, it is often hard to separate the individual actions of the Amir from those of the Mandatory government. Because the majority of British and Jordanian officials did not leave private records, it is hard to delineate, what actions were the prerogative of the British colonial authority, and which organically developed amongst the Arabs in the Mandatory government.⁷⁸ In response to these limitations, this study chooses to focus on the physical, political, and symbolic meaning of Amman for all of Transjordan. This study chronicles the development of Transjordan's governing institutions, their connection to Amman, and the incorporation of elites into this new government system. However, this dissertation is not a cultural history of Amman. It does not delve into the development of non-elite Ammani society during the Mandate. My inability to find Jordanian newspapers of the period curtailed my ability to discuss non-elite actors. As well, the focal point of Amman grounds the study in how elite actors negotiated and dealt with the central state. It does not leave Amman to discuss how new state policies affected the individual regions of Transjordan or their inhabitants.

Structure of the Dissertation

This study will be divided into three parts. Part I will explore the institutional and infrastructural development of Amman as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. Chapter 2 addresses how safety, stability, and centralized control determined the scope of the expansion of transportation and communications infrastructure as well as the growth of the Departments of Health, Education, and Justice.

⁷⁸ The lack of private papers for other British and Arab officials in the Transjordan Mandate muddles the lines of division between Arab and British initiative. With this in mind, this dissertation will use the titles of Anglo-Hashemite state/government, Transjordan state/government, and Mandatory state/government interchangeably.

The most important of the various political and cultural legacies for the Transjordan state was its Ottoman legacy/heritage. The Mandatory state could not have existed if it had not borrowed countless Ottoman institutions and practices. Utilizing this preexisting Ottoman framework, all infrastructural and institutional expansion undertaken by the Mandatory government was in the service of security and centralization. However, despite the efforts of the state, Transjordan was never completely under the control of the central government in Amman. Throughout the Mandate, dual realms existed separating tribal affairs from the rest of the state. The government was slowly able to incorporate this tribal sphere into the affairs of Amman, but its control was never complete. This chapter establishes the limiting effects of the Transjordanian budget on the scope of governmental control and the aspirations of the state. Subsequently, Transjordan's limited financial resources could not cover numerous aspects of the modern state.

The Mandatory government's budget could not address all of Transjordan's infrastructural and institutional needs. Transjordan, like other Mandates, had to rely on external capital to fulfill the basic needs of the state. The reality of Transjordan's governmental reach was directly connected to its budget. The failings of the Mandatory state to provide for its populace eroded its legitimacy and functionality. Chapter 3 explores the limitations of the Transjordanian budget. In this context, the chapter explores the utility of extraordinary funding in Amman and Transjordan's infrastructural growth through such measures as the Colonial Development Fund, foreign concession agreements, and local entrepreneurial practice. Despite influxes of imperial capital through the Colonial Development Fund, the British failed to leave a lasting impression on Amman's physical infrastructure. The most lasting aspects of British colonial control

in Jordan were found in institutional development and function. In general, each of these investments was only successful if the local population viewed the venture as legitimate and non-exploitative. Regardless of the source or amount of capital devoted to any project, local acceptance and investment were crucial to the success of development in Transjordan.

Part II of this dissertation focuses on the government's utilization of the legislature for elite manipulation. Through the Legislative Council housed in Amman, the Anglo-Hashemite state was able to incorporate formerly autonomous urban notables and tribal sheikhs into the machinery of the Jordanian state, transforming Amman into a Hashemite Versailles. This was not an instantaneous process. The first Legislative Council was created in 1929 to ratify the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement. After the initial outburst of opposition and free political discourse, the government spent the remainder of the Mandate slowly closing this political space. In this way, Amman became both the nexus of governmental control and political opposition. Chapter 4 traces the ratification battle that ensued over the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement and marked the beginning of the tempering of elite sovereignty and autonomy in Transjordan. Chapter 5 continues the story of the Legislative Council after the Agreement's ratification. Slowly, the authority and freedom of the Council diminished and were overtaken by the shadow of the state. By the end of the Mandate, Amman's gilded cage both constrained and supported the elites within. However, the elites of Transjordan were not coopted by the state unilaterally. Patrimonial networks and the need to protect their influence and authority in their home districts slowly mollified the agendas of the Council representatives. It was more important for the elites of Transjordan to be part of

the legislative system than to be ostracized from Transjordan's halls of power. By the end of the Mandate, the cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials.

While Parts I and II dealt with the formation of the machinery of the Anglo-Hashemite state, Part III analyzes the development of Amman's urban fabric. Although Amman was, and remains, the seat of the Hashemite government, it was not just the government's headquarters. The centralization project undertaken by the Mandatory state brought about the cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman. British indifference towards urban planning in Amman is in stark contrast to the strong colonial oversight that the government employed throughout Transjordan to maintain security. Amman never had an urban plan during the Mandate period and was left to develop without direct government oversight. British concerns about Amman had more to do with the symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state it presented than any specific planning or security concerns. This allowed for an open urban space that reflected the various cultural heritages of the Mandate: Ottoman, Arab, and British. The varied architecture of the city highlights a clear Ottoman continuity while allowing for both Western and local influences. This amalgam of architectural styles resulted in numerous hybridized architectural styles in Amman. These diverse architectural styles highlight the inherent contradiction in Amman. The government worked to transform Amman into a Hashemite Versailles but they did so without focusing any of their energy on the actual space of Amman. Instead, Amman became an unruly contested urban space. The government did not own it. The reality of Amman's architecture personifies the limitations and tensions

of the Mandatory state. It wanted to control all of Transjordan but could not even control its own capital.

Although the government did not implement an urban plan during the Mandate period, Amman did develop new residential districts. New neighborhoods like Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh became the neighborhoods of the wealthy and the powerful while lesser citizens were pushed towards the outskirts of the city. Jabal Amman became an elite enclave that signaled the growth of a “dual city” in Amman. The central valley of the city, called *al-balad*, became the central economic corridor of the city and its main area of cultural and social exchange. Feisal Square, located in the center of the *balad*, became the symbolic beating heart of Amman.⁷⁹ Whether it was a religious celebration for *Eid al-Fitr*, or a victory parade commemorating the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918, any event of significance took place in Feisal Square. This divided usage and the bifurcated urban identity remain among the most lasting legacies of the colonial period in modern Amman. Amman’s dual aspects are a reflection of the aspirations of the state and its limitations. The Mandatory state pursued a strong modernizing and centralizing agenda but was never fully successful. Abdullah’s patrimonial networks may have garnered him authority but they did not give him the control he desired. Similarly, although the British promoted security in the name of regional stability above everything else, their own financial limitations hamstrung efforts to attain any semblance of control in Transjordan. The overall urban fabric of Amman during the Mandate period depicts a city that is very much a part of the Transjordan government and managed to operate as a

⁷⁹ Feisal Square refers to the strip of King Feisal Street between the Municipality building and Husseini Mosque. It is unclear exactly when King Feisal Street was officially named but it was likely shortly after King Feisal’s visit in 1930. The street was likely renamed after his death in 1933.

space independent from official control. Amman is the physical reality of colonial compromise and shortcomings.

Part I: Building Amman's Infrastructure

2: For the Sake of Security: Infrastructural and Institutional Development of Amman

“No country was less ready for independence than was Trans-Jordan in 1922. The government was weak and the finances in disorder, while relations with Syria, or more correctly with the Mandatory power of that country, were very bad and the subject of much heart-burning in London and Paris.”⁸⁰

- Arab Legion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Peake reflecting in his memoirs on what Transjordan was like shortly after his arrival in the country

From its inception, the Mandate of Transjordan, and its capital Amman, held conflicting levels of importance for the British. Transjordan was the least important of the British imperial holdings in the Middle East. At the same time, despite its lack of natural resources or historical pedigree, Transjordan and Amman were vital for British imperial interests in the region. Britain needed to control Transjordan in order to protect its interests in neighboring Palestine and Iraq. Towards that end, the ultimate goal of the Mandatory regime was security throughout the Mandate. The British approached the maintenance of regional security through the development of the Transjordan state. The ability of the state to control the land and pacify its inhabitants was paramount to the security of the region as a whole. This level of control was only possible through infrastructural development emanating out of Amman. Quite literally, all roads led to Amman, and the centralization of power and influence within the city was integral to the

⁸⁰ Imperial War Museum Archive (IWM), Peake Collection, Lt. Colonel R.F.G. Peake unpublished autobiography, 85.

development of the state and its legitimacy. The Anglo-Hashemite government in Amman became the locus of power, attempting to control all aspects of movement and communication in Transjordan. However, the government never achieved these lofty goals. A tight budget and limited manpower constantly limited the feasibility of government plans. Although the government's control was never all encompassing, the Mandatory government did drastically change the relationship that the inhabitants of Transjordan had to their government.⁸¹

Despite the fact that Transjordan was a new state, it did not emerge from nothing, as Commander Peake insisted. Preexisting Ottoman institutions and traditions shaped Amman and the Mandate as a whole. The earliest phases of the Mandate were functionally the continuation of the Ottoman Empire and its governing apparatuses under a new name and a new monarchy. Through 1924, the government tried to return to the same levels of administration and control that had existed in Ottoman times. Prior to 1924, Amir Abdullah and Chief British Representative Philby operated with minimal imperial oversight. The Mandatory government only needed to protect larger British imperial regional interests. The shape and function of specific aspects of the Mandate's government were irrelevant. This early lack of interest led to the creation of numerous "Potemkin ministries"; ministries and purported government oversight that existed in name only.⁸²

After the arrival of Colonel Henry Cox as the Chief British Resident in 1924, the situation began to change. The British imperial government began to pay far closer

⁸¹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 195-228.

⁸² The concept of Potemkin ministries is an extension of the Potemkin village. Potemkin Villages were fake villages built only to impress. Similarly, the early ministries of the Transjordan Government possessed grand titles but had little, if any, legitimate power, oversight, or policies.

attention to Transjordan's finances and development. After 1924, the Transjordan state slowly began to move away from Ottoman institutions in an effort to increase the degree of control the central government exerted over Transjordan. Slowly, the previously hollow ministries of the government became actual governing entities with legitimate agendas and oversight. The slow growth of the Transjordan state required the balancing of a myriad of local, regional, and imperial interests by both the Mandatory government in Amman and the imperial government in London. The British Resident and a select few British advisers were the avenues through which these conflicting interests were channeled, balanced, and contained.

The political economy that motivated these investment decisions is critical in the understanding of how Transjordan's government developed within Amman. British grant-in-aid combined with Transjordan tax revenue funded the physical infrastructure of Amman (roads, utilities, buildings, and security apparatus) as well as new bureaucratic structures (ministries, councils, and courts). The financial constraints of the Mandate limited the ability of the Mandatory government to invest in large-scale infrastructural growth. The development of Transjordanian statecraft, on the other hand, grew through the Mandate's normal revenue streams. These governmental functions included the creation of new ministries, new government programs, and new levels of oversight into Transjordanian society. All of these programs built upon preexisting Ottoman structures and developed in two discrete arenas: the modern realm of the state and the tribal sphere. Both arenas of government incorporated new British characteristics into the state and its functions. As a result, Amman and Transjordan developed as a discrete amalgam of

Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. This hybridized legacy became evident in all the arenas of the nascent state and its young capital Amman.

Potemkin Mandate: Early Years of the Mandate away from Imperial Oversight 1921-1924

Even before the establishment of the Transjordan Mandate in 1921, the British had a strategic interest in “the land east of the Jordan River.”⁸³ The land that would become Transjordan had its inhabitants fighting on all sides of the war. Tribes fought under the command of the British, Sharif Hussein, and the Ottomans. Although Arab tribal loyalties were divided during the war, Circassians from Amman were amongst the staunchest Ottoman loyalists within the Empire. Circassian volunteers protected the Hijaz Railway and fought against the Arab Revolt in the south. The British Egyptian Expeditionary Force, led by Field Marshall Edmund Allenby, captured the provincial Ottoman capital of Salt on March 25, 1918. After the initial conquest, Allenby and his forces were pushed out of Salt twice (March 31 and May 3). However, Allenby eventually successfully broke the seventh and eighth Ottoman Arab armies in August of 1918 by pushing up coastal Palestine instead of going through Transjordan.⁸⁴ The British established loose military control over the region from 1918-1921.

After World War I, the victorious European powers divided the defeated territories into class A, B or C mandates. Class A designated former Ottoman territories, which were ostensibly most ready for self-rule. From 1918-1920, the Occupied Enemy

⁸³ The name “Transjordan” never existed prior to the creation of the Transjordan Mandate. This territory was considered part of the vilayet of Syria.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 232-40.

Territory Administration (OETA) East controlled Transjordan.⁸⁵ During this period, Transjordan fell under control of Sharif Feisal's Arab Government (Sharif Hussein's son and Abdullah's brother) headquartered in Damascus, which essentially continued Ottoman policies during its two-year rule. The San Remo conference formalized the Mandate system and granted Great Britain control of the Palestinian Mandate in April of 1920. However, there was still no clear plan on how to deal with Transjordan.⁸⁶

The British posted military officers in Transjordanian towns during Feisal's rule. Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner of Palestine, called on these agents to gather Transjordanian notables from Irbid to Tafila for a meeting in Salt. On August 21, 1920, Samuel told over 600 townspeople and tribesmen Great Britain's plan for an autonomous Transjordan separated from Palestine. No notables from 'Ajlun attended due to a dispute between the notables of 'Ajlun and the Bani Hasan tribe. The British planned to encourage the development of a number of local governments with local British advisers. The goal of these local governments was to separate Transjordan from Damascus and to promote trade with Palestine. Samuel also promised that there would be no conscription or disarmament of the population. The British formed governments in Irbid, Amman, Karak, Ma'an, Salt, and Moab. 'Ajlun notables rejected the idea of Samuel's "national government plan." The 'Ajlun notables used this opportunity to reassert their autonomy and argued that their absence from the meeting in Salt absolved them from having to take part in any new government. In reality, the 'Ajlun elites were able to dismiss the "national government plan" because there was no authority or strength

⁸⁵ Vartan Manoug Amadouy, "The British Role in the Development of an infrastructure in Transjordan during the Mandate Period, 1921-1946" (PhD Dissertation: University of Southampton, 1993), 28-33.

⁸⁶ Abla Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan: A Study of State Autonomy" (PhD diss., Georgetown University 1993), 118-27.

in these small local governments.⁸⁷ By December 1920, it was obvious that the local government plan had failed and that a new solution was necessary.

When Abdullah marched to Ma'an on November 21, 1920, the British were unsettled. By early December, Abdullah had amassed a force of 800 trained men, 20 guns and up to 2000 irregulars. Field Marshall Lord Edmund Allenby, who had led the campaign against the Ottomans in the Levant during World War I, was prepared to occupy Amman to block Abdullah's advance. In his communique to the War Office, Allenby acknowledged that Amman was already the most important site in the region. Allenby did not provide a rationale for his assertion.⁸⁸ Amman's strategic location on the Hijaz Railway increased its economic and political standing in comparison to the more geographically isolated Ottoman provincial capital of Salt.⁸⁹ At the Cairo Conference in 1921, the British chose the path of least resistance and granted Abdullah probationary control over Transjordan for a six-month period. This agreement also guaranteed Abdullah a security force and financial aid in the form of grant-in-aid from imperial funds dispersed through the High Commissioner.⁹⁰

Abdullah, the second son of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali and Feisal's older brother, has frequently been described in both the West and the Middle East as a simple Bedouin from the Hijaz. In reality, Abdullah grew up in two of the central cities of the Ottoman Empire, Mecca and Istanbul.⁹¹ Sixteen years in Istanbul made Abdullah as much an Ottoman as

⁸⁷ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 246-51.

⁸⁸ Allenby had tried on a number of occasions during World War I to capture Amman. He never succeeded in a direct assault. Eventually Allenby defeated the second Ottoman army and was able to take control of both Salt and Amman in September 1918.

⁸⁹ British National Archives (BNA), FO 371/5290, Lord Allenby to War Office, 20/12/1920.

⁹⁰ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 33.

⁹¹ Abdullah's connection to both Mecca and Istanbul illustrated his connection to the religious and political centers of the Ottoman Empire. Abdullah's time in Transjordan similarly promoted his dual credentials as both the religious and political leader of the Emirate.

he was a Sharif of Mecca. Abdullah served as the Hijaz's representative in the Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) parliament in Istanbul from 1910-1914.⁹² During World War I, Abdullah was eager to align the Hashemites with the British. The ensuing Hussein-McMahon Correspondence motivated Abdullah after the war to endeavor to create the Arab Kingdom promised to his father.⁹³ To this end, Abdullah was granted probationary control over Transjordan for a six-month period at the Cairo Conference in 1921.⁹⁴ Abdullah's establishment in Transjordan was the crowning of both a Sharifian Amir and a member of the Ottoman elite. Abdullah's familiarity with Ottoman practice and precedent remained a dominant characteristic of his rule throughout his lifetime.⁹⁵

Shortly after naming Abdullah as the Amir of Transjordan, the British ensured that the Balfour Declaration did not apply to the new Emirate.⁹⁶ This was accomplished on September 23, 1922, by exercising article 25 of the Palestine Mandate, which granted the British the right to withhold certain provisions of the Mandate.⁹⁷ Thereafter, Transjordan was legally immune to Zionist immigration. The clear separation of the Palestine and Transjordan Mandates allowed the British to embrace different goals and administrative techniques in these neighboring territories. The British administrative approach in Transjordan evolved into an exercise in minimalism and simplicity, which

⁹² Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 6-16. It was during Abdullah's time in Istanbul that he met his future Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda.

⁹³ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 26-28 and 42-50. The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon stipulated that the Sharif would be granted an Arab Kingdom in the Levant in return for launching a revolt against the Ottomans in the Hijaz. This revolt, known as the "Great Arab Revolt," in reality never included more than 1000 men and did not significantly constrain Ottoman war efforts.

⁹⁴ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 33.

⁹⁵ Abdullah's utilization of Ottoman royal practice and ceremony will be discussed in depth in chapter 6.

⁹⁶ The Balfour Declaration, issued by the British Government in 1917, promised to aid in the formation of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine.

⁹⁷ Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan," 161.

was strikingly different from the shifting Mandatory policies in Palestine. Despite this legal precedent, however, members of the Transjordan government and Legislative Council in particular, would fear Zionist incursion for years to come.

The first years of the Transjordan Mandate were marred with inconsistencies and uncertain policy. After the establishment of the Mandate in 1921, the British sent Harold St. John Philby to be the Chief British Representative. Almost immediately, the political realities of the Emirate of Transjordan became apparent. The British and Abdullah were now responsible for a territory that had never existed before as an independent state. The appearance of state building became paramount, but the British had not dictated the responsibilities or structure of the new Transjordan government. As long as the region was pacified and not antagonistic towards the French in Syria and Lebanon, the British were content.⁹⁸ This laissez-faire attitude is evidence of Britain's disinterest in the administration of Transjordan. Transjordan did not need to function as a true State. From the onset, the Transjordanian government, akin to a Potemkin village, only needed to project the façade of legitimacy and control so that it appeared that the terms of the League of Nations Mandate were being satisfied. As long as the Mandatory government maintained the regional status quo, the British were content. British administrative indifference and economy of action barely acknowledged the existence of the Transjordan Mandate. Control over Transjordan enabled the British to safeguard their more important imperial holdings in the region, notably Palestine and Iraq.

That is not to say that Transjordan, and its Amir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, always wanted to be a part of the British imperial project. The British quickly realized that

⁹⁸ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 20.

granting Abdullah a free hand in Transjordan was problematic for a number of reasons. Abdullah's usage of British grant-in-aid funds was rash and irresponsible in the eyes of the British. Even more worrisome was that Transjordan appeared to be only a temporary interest for Abdullah, who nurtured greater regional ambitions. The Amir had clear designs on creating the Arab Kingdom promised to his father in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.⁹⁹

In 1921, the actual administration of Transjordan was ineffectual. Poor levels of public security, little tax collection and widespread government unpopularity hampered the early efforts of the Mandatory government. Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Frederick Peake, who was responsible for stabilizing the security situation in Transjordan, had difficulty in even recruiting a small military force. Peake eventually succeeded in the recruitment of locals when he paraded enlisted foreigners through Amman. The local inhabitants quickly realized that "their refusal to enlist in the new force would not prevent it from being raised."¹⁰⁰ Peake's reserve force officially became the Arab Legion in 1923.¹⁰¹

The only arena in which Abdullah was successful, according to the British, was his treatment of tribal disputes.¹⁰² Abdullah placated tribal elites with gifts and promises of position. Yoav Alon argues that this patrimonial and paternalistic approach was in keeping with the reforms of the late Ottoman period. Abdullah ruled over Transjordan as the premier sheikh in a large chieftaincy. These tribes had been amenable to a state system in the Ottoman period as long as it granted them a degree of autonomy and the

⁹⁹ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan*, 60-70.

¹⁰⁰ IWM, 43. Peake Collection, Peake unpublished autobiography, 43.

¹⁰¹ The Arab Legion became the Arab Army after Jordan's independence in 1946. The Arab Army remains one of the premier fighting forces in the Middle East until today.

¹⁰² BNA, FO 371/6372, Civil Secretary Deedes to HC Samuel, 2/7/1921.

latitude to exercise leadership over their own tribespeople. The Emirate's weak government likewise necessitated this approach of non-confrontation, which was a continuation of Ottoman precedent. The tribes accepted the token existence of the Anglo-Hashemite state without having to alter drastically their own lives. The early need to placate the tribes necessitated the creation of a dual system with discrete "state" and "tribal" spheres. This limitation on government oversight decreased overtime but the central government never had complete control over the tribes of Transjordan during the Mandate. The division between these two realms blurred in the later years of the Mandate but exists in Jordan today.¹⁰³

Despite his successes with the tribes, pro-Zionist High Commissioner Herbert Samuel was fed up with Abdullah. He wanted the British to give Abdullah enough rope to "hang his reputation."¹⁰⁴ It is unclear if his frustration with Abdullah was a result of Abdullah's administrative mismanagement or an attempt to open Transjordan to Zionist advances. At this point, as far as Samuel was concerned, the only reason that the British allowed Abdullah to remain in power was that there was no ready alternative available. Abdullah's decision to include numerous foreign nationals in his government further antagonized the British. These men, most of whom were Arab nationalists in the *Istiqlal* (independence) party, did not care a great deal about Transjordan's state development. The *Istiqlal* party comprised anti-Ottoman pan-Syrian nationalists who had fled Syria after the collapse of Feisal's government in 1920.¹⁰⁵ The *Istiqlal* ministers harbored great resentment towards the French for crushing their dreams of a pan-Syrian state. Akin to Abdullah, they saw Transjordan as a launching pad into the rest of Greater Syria. The

¹⁰³ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 40-43.

¹⁰⁴ BNA, FO 371/6372, HC Samuel to Colonial Office, 23/7/1921.

¹⁰⁵ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 28-29.

lack of concrete British policy allowed Abdullah and his Syrian Istiqlal ministers to operate with a degree of autonomy.

Chief British Representative (CBR) Harold St. John Philby also operated largely independent of imperial oversight by design from November 1921 to April 1924. The Colonial Office envisioned the Chief British Representative as someone who would not make policy but someone who would be free when necessary to exert force on the Transjordan government to ensure proper policy decisions.¹⁰⁶ Philby was a former member of the Indian Civil Service and had most recently served in Iraq, where he had annoyed Iraqi High Commissioner Percy Cox, who had asked him to leave.¹⁰⁷ High Commissioner Samuel described Philby as “a man of much energy, ability and knowledge of the East ... Unfortunately, he is so fully conscious of the possession of these qualities, that he regards his own judgment as infallible, and everyone else’s as very much the reverse.”¹⁰⁸

Although stubborn and opinionated, Philby was a good administrator who was fluent in Arabic. This attitude of infallibility was evident in Philby’s own assessment of the Transjordan government. In 1922, Philby was astounded that the local government “was beginning to show a tendency to deal with their task with a high hand and were apparently trying to avoid asking or taking my advice.”¹⁰⁹ The idea that the Mandatory government could act independently without his input was anathema. Philby, who was the second Chief British Representative for Transjordan after the short tenure of Albert Abramson, oversaw the slow growth of the Transjordan state with a heavy hand

¹⁰⁶ BNA, CO 732/4, CO Shuckbrugh to War Office, 4/3/1921.

¹⁰⁷ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 68-69.

¹⁰⁸ Middle East Center Archive, St Antony’s College, Oxford (MECA), Philby Collection, HC Samuel to J.H. Thomas, private and confidential, 18/7/1924.

¹⁰⁹ MECA, Philby Collection, Transjordan diary, volume 3, 27/4/1922.

throughout his tenure. Philby's main task as the Chief British Representative was to define the borders of the new territory vis-à-vis Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. He was able to accomplish all of these tasks with the exception of the Saudi border during his tenure. The Hadda agreement, which delineated the Transjordan-Saudi border, was signed in 1925.

Philby's handling of the Hijaz Railway during his term as Representative was indicative of his self-assured and frequently inflammatory approach in Transjordan. Philby strongly believed that the railways were *waqf* (religious endowments), as they were during the Ottoman period, and should not be run for profit. High Commissioner Herbert Samuel scorned Philby's autonomy in Transjordan. "Without consultation or sanction, he transferred the administration of the Hijaz railway between Amman and Ma'an, to King Hussein, a step which has caused great embarrassment, and which his successor has had to revoke as best he could."¹¹⁰ This unilateral decision by Philby threatened British control over the transportation networks of Transjordan and Palestine that was critical to the maintenance of the region's security. Philby's reckless actions left the Transjordan segment of the Hijaz Railway nearly bankrupt by the time of Philby's resignation in 1924.¹¹¹ Adding insult to injury, no real improvements to the line happened under his supervision due to a lack of funds.¹¹² The matter of the Hijaz Railway remained problematic for Mandatory administrators long after Philby's departure from Transjordan in 1924.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ MECA, Philby Collection, HC Samuel to J.H. Thomas, private and confidential, 18/7/1924.

¹¹¹ IWM, Peake autobiography, 97.

¹¹² MECA, Richard Mumford Collection, recollection of time as clerk to Philby.

¹¹³ MECA, Philby collection, Philby to Lord Astor, 22/5/1924.

Despite the resolute and bullheaded approach of Philby and the detached interest of Abdullah, the situation in Transjordan did improve from 1921-1924. However, the scope of these improvements was little more than the reestablishment of Ottoman norms from before the war. The short-lived local governments from 1920-1921 were abolished in favor of district administrations (*liwa*) of Ajlun, Balqa and Karak which mirrored the Ottoman administration. Each of these districts had an administrative council (*majlis al-idara*) responsible for daily matters and a governor (*mutesarraf*) to oversee their general execution.¹¹⁴ Municipalities created under the Ottomans (*baladiyya*) were reconstituted. Each *baladiyya* had its own municipal council (*majlis al-idara*) and was formerly separated from the civil service by the 1925 Municipal Law. Amman was a separate distinct unit called “Ward of the Capital” (*Muhafazat al-Asima*).¹¹⁵ This system closely mirrored the Ottoman reforms enacted with the 1864 Ottoman Vilayet Law with Amman supplanting Salt as the provincial center.

This period also saw the creation of numerous government ministries. By the end of July 1923, the institutional framework of the state included the departments of District Administration, Justice, Finance, Customs, Public Health, Education, Agriculture and Forests, Land Registry, Public Works, Post and Telegraph, Printing Press, and the Arab Legion (later Arab Army).¹¹⁶ The majority of these ministries were largely empty names devoid of clear policies or goals for a number of years. Their establishment was an early step in the formation of a centralized state in Amman, but the ministries announced the importance of the state without having much substance. Similar to the structure of the

¹¹⁴ Maan Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Volume 1: The Creation and Development of Transjordan; 1920-1929* (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989), 57.

¹¹⁵ Micahel J. Reimer, “Becoming Urban: Town Administrations in Transjordan,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 194-95.

¹¹⁶ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 93.

entire Transjordan Mandate from 1921-1924, it was more important for the individual ministries to project power and oversight, rather than actually wield it. The ministries were largely ineffectual throughout the first years of the Mandate. The little infrastructural improvement undertaken by these ministries focused on erecting and repairing telegraph lines and repairing roads to aid in the pacification of Transjordan's tribes and dissident elites.

These hollow ministries propped up the edifice of the central government without adding much substance. Evidence of how empty these ministries were was the frequency with which the various members of the Executive Council (i.e. Cabinet) were shuffled back and forth between them. Ministers purportedly helmed numerous ministries simultaneously and on occasion, no minister whatsoever was appointed.¹¹⁷ The ministries gradually filled out throughout the Mandate, but their institutional existence remained more important than their functional usage for quite some time. In this way, the component ministries of the central government operated in a remarkably similar fashion to the entire city of Amman. They both existed at the onset of the Mandate but only earned legitimate importance and substance over time. Both the ministries of the state and the capital of Amman only gained importance through the centralization of state activities in Amman.

The Fiscal Breaking Point and the Extension of Imperial Oversight

During the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman state had been flexible in the application of laws to the population of Transjordan. Certain statutes applied to

¹¹⁷ For example, 'Audah al-Qusus and Sa'id al-Mufti sat on the Executive Council with no assigned position in 1929 while in 1931 Abdullah Sraj was simultaneously Prime Minister, Chief Judge, Interior and Finance Ministers.

cultivators, but not pastoralists, and vice versa. In general, the longer the Ottomans and their associates were established in a district, the more amenable the local population was to their continued presence. However, this policy of tolerance ended under the Young Turk regime from 1908-1919.¹¹⁸ During this period, the Ottoman government attempted to impose direct control and taxation over Karak, directly clashing with the local leadership (mainly the al-Majali family). The Karak Revolt of 1910 was a result of this policy of Ottoman rigidity.¹¹⁹

For many of the same reasons, there was a series of tribal revolts against the Transjordan government from 1921 to 1923, including the Kura revolts in 1921-1922 and the Adwan rebellion in 1923. These rebellions were largely in response to large increases in the tax burden from the Ottoman period. Similar to the Karak Revolt, the transition from tribal partial autonomy and regional flexibility to a discrete inflexible taxation schema led to opposition.¹²⁰ Of course, the growth and actions of the Transjordan military, the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), played a crucial role in the pacification of Transjordan during this turbulent time. Historians P.J. Vatikiotis and Joseph Massad have discussed the growth and development of the Transjordan armed forces at length.¹²¹ Both historians focus on the important role that the military had in the formation of state identity and security in Transjordan. This study will

¹¹⁸ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 184-85.

¹¹⁹ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 194-200. In the case of the Karak Revolt, Hussein al-Tarawneh tried to warn the Ottoman government while the Majali family opposed the new state control. Later, during the second Legislative Council (1931-1934) both Tarawneh and Majali were major leaders of the opposition.

¹²⁰ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 43-60.

¹²¹ For more on the development of the Arab Legion and TJFF see: Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects, The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 100-62; P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957* (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1967).

not focus on the military itself, but the institutional and infrastructural framework that the military employed to maintain security throughout the Mandate.

Theoretically, British grant-in-aid was meant to aid in tax collection and to provide resources with which Abdullah could curry favor amongst the tribes. The British followed a similar approach with Abdullah's brother Feisal and the tribal sheikhs in Iraq¹²² It would also cover expenditures beyond the means of internally generated revenue.¹²³ This financial model, however, did not function as intended in the early years of the Transjordan Mandate. Bertram Thomas, the Treasurer in Palestine seconded to Amman, was highly critical of the financial practices of the Emirate, blaming both Abdullah and Philby. He estimated tax increases of as much as 100% with few tangible improvements to the government and for its people.¹²⁴ Philby reported in October 1923 that the government had not paid the local police or government officials for a period of three months. These lax financial practices were complicated further when the state refused to submit its financial accounts to the Chief British Representative's office.¹²⁵ Something had to be done in response to these financial difficulties and irregularities. In 1923, the British suspended grant-in-aid, but that had little effect. Peake noted the impact was minimal because much of the grant-in-aid money funded the reserve force, not day-to-day government function.¹²⁶ After this period of fiscal irregularity, it was clear that Philby was unable to exert the necessary financial and administrative control over the Amir and his government.

¹²² Grant-in-aid figures from 1921-1924 were: 1921-22 LP 180,000; 1922-23 LP 90,000; 1923-24 LP 150,000; 1924-25 LP 95,000.

¹²³ BNA, CO 733/78, HC Samuel to Churchill, 21/7/1922.

¹²⁴ Amadouy, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 38.

¹²⁵ Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan," 176.

¹²⁶ IWM, Peake autobiography, 99.

In June 1924, Philby resigned in the midst of the turmoil. Philby notes his resignation was due to “general disagreement with the policy pursued in the Near East in recent years.” Philby had also grown tired of the “personal extravagance” of Amir Abdullah whom he considered a poor administrator and ruler. Philby believed Abdullah “brought his administration into disrepute and the fact that he has not given satisfaction to his own people is evidenced by the attempted rebellion in September last of the Adwan tribe and its associates.”¹²⁷ It is possible that Philby’s displeasure with Abdullah was tied to his Indian Civil Service background. During World War I and its immediate aftermath, the Foreign Office and the India Office disagreed over whether or not to support the Hashemites. The India Office favored the Saudis over the Hashemites in general.¹²⁸ It is telling that immediately after leaving Transjordan Philby went to Saudi Arabia, established a business, and became an unofficial adviser to Ibn Saud. Philby remained in Saudi Arabia for much of the rest of his life. Philby’s resignation may also have been to preempt the inevitable. High Commissioner Samuel had grown weary of Philby’s antics and would have likely removed him either way. In response to the Philby resignation, Samuel noted that the problems of finance were largely due to Philby’s mismanagement. Samuel agreed that tighter control was necessary over Abdullah’s finances, but argued that Philby should have been able to accomplish this.¹²⁹

Shortly after Philby’s resignation, Colonel Henry Cox became the new Chief British Representative (the title changed to British Resident shortly thereafter). Cox had

¹²⁷ MECA, Philby Collection, “The Position in Transjordan: The Cause of Mr. Philby’s Resignation,” 17/6/1924.

¹²⁸ For more on the foreign policy differences between the Foreign Office and the India Office see Timothy J. Paris, “British Middle East Policy-Making After the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools,” *The Historical Journal* 41 (1998): 773-93.

¹²⁹ MECA, Philby Collection, “Notes on Mr. Philby’s Memorandum 26/6/1924 by Herbert Samuel.”

served in Sudan before the war and had most recently been the district governor of Nablus. Unlike Philby, Cox “fitted into the British Colonial Hierarchy” according to historian Mary C. Wilson.¹³⁰ Cox, a “dedicated and unsentimental colonial official,” was ordered to rein in Transjordan’s runaway finances and to make Amir Abdullah understand the need for tighter financial control. Abdullah, not surprisingly, opposed more direct British control. In 1929, Cox reflected upon his initial meeting with the Amir: “Abdullah desires to rid himself of British interference for he believed that if Transjordan were allied with, or amalgamated in, the Hejaz the two countries would need no European assistance. I well remember him telling me that Westerners could not hope to show Orientals a better way even if they made the brims of their hats a yard wide.”¹³¹ Shortly thereafter, Cox delivered an ultimatum from the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, Sir Gilbert Clayton, to Abdullah in July 1924. This stipulation required Abdullah to accept new financial controls, to expel political undesirables (the Syrian *Istiqalists*), conclude an extradition agreement with the French in Syria, and abolish the Department of Tribal Administration.¹³² Abdullah understood the veiled threat that if he did not acquiesce to these British demands that the British would find someone else to lead Transjordan. Abdullah begrudgingly agreed on August 20, 1924. Cox remembered the incident years later noting that the Amir “was obliged to agree to the terms laid down for his acceptance by His Majesty’s Government ... I venture to believe, also the

¹³⁰ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan*, 82-83.

¹³¹ BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Comments on the Political Situation in TJ,” 6/11/1929.

¹³² Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 29-31. Text of the ultimatum found in BNA, FO 371/10102, Clayton to Abdullah, 14/8/1924.

evidence of progress following a closer British control led him to accept that control with increasingly good grace.”¹³³

After Abdullah’s agreement to Clayton’s ultimatum things began to change in Transjordan. The degree of British imperial oversight in Transjordan increased a great deal. All budgetary decisions now ran through the entire imperial hierarchy. Increased British colonial oversight coincided with an increased focus on the development and shape of the Mandatory government. After 1924, the shadow ministries that existed in the early years of the Mandate slowly began to disappear. Early financial and administrative shortcomings had necessitated a more forceful British presence in Transjordan. After 1924, the Transjordan Mandate needed to function like a normal British colonial holding, not merely a supporter of the regional status quo. In short, if the British had to be more involved, the Mandate was going to run more efficiently. This decision led to the appointment of British officers in positions of administrative oversight such as the financial adviser, judicial adviser, director of customs and director of antiquity. The British colonial administrators believed that because of these appointments that “the state of affairs advanced by leaps and bounds towards progress.”¹³⁴ However, it is important to note that the British staff in Transjordan rarely exceeded twenty officers. It remained by far the smallest British colonial staff in the region when compared to Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq.¹³⁵ Similar to Iraq, the administrators in Transjordan were “advisers.” The

¹³³ BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Comments on the Political Situation in Transjordan,” 6/11/1929.

¹³⁴ MECA, Philby Collection, Philip Hunein to Philby, Status of Transjordan 1925-1927, 5/7/1927. Mr. Seton appointed Judicial Adviser, Mr. Alec Kirkbride as Financial Adviser (who later became British Resident in 1939), Mr. Turner as director of customs and excise, and Mr. Horsfield as director of antiquity.

¹³⁵ Rancred Bradshaw, *Britain and Jordan: Imperial Strategy, King Abdullah I and the Zionist Movement* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 40. For example, Palestine had 268 officers in 1921 up to 397 in 1929 and Egypt started at 1600 British officers in 1900, which only declined to 400 by 1945. The small size of the British staff in Transjordan concentrated authority amongst a smaller cadre of officers. This power

British preferred the appearance of local rule whereas the French generally administered their Mandates more directly. After 1924, budgets and other expenditures originated from the Transjordan government or the British Resident. After local approval, these figures went to the High Commissioner, then to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with final approval being at the behest of the British Treasury.

In tandem with this increased financial attention, the British concocted a more concrete policy for the entire Middle East. Previously, there was policy confusion because of the overlapping interests of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, and Colonial Office. The creation of the Middle East Department on March 1, 1921, somewhat remedied this problem.¹³⁶ However, at no time in the British Empire was there a uniform policy for political or economic development in the colonies. In this regard, the conception of a singular “British Empire” is inherently misleading.¹³⁷ Lord L.S. Amery further clarified British imperial interests in the region in 1924 when he became the Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoS). Amery’s tenure, which coincided with British Resident Cox’s arrival, focused on the importance of Palestine in the British geopolitical system. The new policy depended on the ability to protect the southern flank of the British Empire running through Cairo, Baghdad, Calcutta, and Sydney. This defensive position was critical to prevent German infiltration and aggression in the region during World War II. According to historian Ronald Hyam, “[t]he keystone of this geopolitical

concentration was amplified by the long careers of most of the Transjordan administrators. For example, Peake was the head of the Arab Legion from 1921-1939 and Cox was the British Resident from 1924-1939.

¹³⁶ Amawi, “State and Class in Transjordan,” 151.

¹³⁷ John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 25.

arch would be in Palestine, with British influence established on the ruins of a defeated Ottoman Empire and lined with the patronage of Zionism.”¹³⁸

The increased strategic importance of the region necessitated tighter control and a more hands-on approach to Transjordan’s administration. As a result, the British Resident became simultaneously a more important and less autonomous figure than he had been from 1921-1924. After 1924, the office of the British Resident was, “though nominally advisory, in reality the controlling force which makes possible any semblance of government in Transjordan.”¹³⁹ The Resident was now answerable to the imperial hierarchy in a more direct way than he had been before. However, he also took on an increased level of logistical importance. The British Resident became the avenue through which both imperial policies and local pressures would shape actual Mandate policies. The British Resident acted as the “man on the spot.” “They [British colonial administrators] stood at the intermediate point of interlock in a chain of responsibility between decisions handed down and a self-seeking initiatives mediated at the center.”¹⁴⁰ The more direct control and influence exercised by the British Resident led to increased infrastructural growth and the further development of the Transjordan state in Amman. Although the British now dictated more of the policy decisions of the Transjordan state, they did not start from scratch. Ottoman structures provided the institutional bedrock upon which post-1924 infrastructural developments took place. Although financial constraints always curtailed the scope of possible improvements in Transjordan, the

¹³⁸ Ronald Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763-1963,” in *The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in Honor of Wm. Roger Louis*, eds. Robert D. King and Robin W. Kilson (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 43.

¹³⁹ IWM, Peake Collection, unpublished Transjordan history until 1924, 10. In 1924, the small office of the British Resident was only composed of the British Resident, two assistants, and a chief clerk.

¹⁴⁰ Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics,” 36.

security and stability of the Mandatory state did improve a great deal. With these new financial controls, the British were able to focus more explicitly on the development of Transjordan's infrastructure.

Ottoman Infrastructural Precedent

In order to understand the infrastructural and institutional developments of the Transjordan Mandate, it is critical to understand what reforms were undertaken by the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Prior to the nineteenth century, few Ottoman reforms affected the administration and development of Ottoman Levantine cities.¹⁴¹ In general, these provincial cities were more or less left to their own devices and only loosely tied administratively to the Ottoman state. There was little if any form of direct control from Istanbul over the Levant. Some administrative offices did exist, such as *wali* (governor), *mushir* (commander in chief of local army units), *daftardar* (revenue administrator), and *qadi* (senior judge). However, these offices did not form a single centralized institution or administration. There was a little regulation of social, economic, and political affairs. Interaction amongst social groups was largely determined "by religion, family, district, profession or guild and their respective leaders."¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Although there were attempts to reform the tax system in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's bureaucracy remained burdensome and the aristocracy and elites of the empire remained disconnected from the center. This disconnect forced the center to rely increasingly on provincial intermediaries, or *ayans*. Urban elites of the period were "Ottomanized" and worked in an Ottoman context but the central government in Istanbul did not reinforce its central authority until the nineteenth century. For more on eighteenth century Ottoman administration see Bruce McGowan, "Part III: The Age of the *Ayans*, 1699-1812," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume Two 1600-1914*, ed. Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

¹⁴² Stefan Weber, *Damascus: Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation 1808-1918* (Lancaster, U.K: White Cross Mills, 2009, 33.

The character of local administration changed drastically in 1864 with the Regulation of Provinces (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*), which established provincial capitals. The Vilayet Law also created a standard municipality model, based upon the system in Istanbul.¹⁴³ The implementation of the Vilayet Law in 1864 divided the Ottoman Empire into provinces (*vilaya*), regions (*sanjaqs*), cities (*medina*) and quarters (*mahalla*).¹⁴⁴ From 1848-1882 there were six major urban planning regulations: the 1848 Building Regulation (*Ebniye Nizamnamesi*), the 1858 Regulation on Streets (*Sokaklara dair Nizamname*), the 1863 Street and Building Regulation (*Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi*), the 1875 Regulation on Construction Methods in Istanbul (Istanbul ve Belde-i Selasede Yapılacak Ebniyenin Suret-i İnşaiyesine dair Nizamname), the 1877 Istanbul Municipal Law (*Dersaadet Belediye Kanunu*), and the 1882 Building Law (*Ebniye Kanunu*).¹⁴⁵ These combined reforms divided and transformed Istanbul through mandated modernization reforms. By 1900, Istanbul was a dual city with westernized Galata and Pera on one side and traditional Istanbul on the other side of the Golden Horn.¹⁴⁶ Many of these regulations focused on regimenting building construction, height, and a correlation of scale between building height and street width. New parameters, dimensions, and statutes enforced regularity and standardization in urban redevelopment. These new regulations were meant to aid communication efficiency as well as travel speed and trade.¹⁴⁷ This focus on speed, communication, and centralization also led to a

¹⁴³ Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City*, 26.

¹⁴⁴ Weber, *Damascus*, 35-36.

¹⁴⁵ Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*, 51.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 157-58. Even after the municipality reforms Istanbul's development was constrained by irregular streets in a divided and dilapidated city. The reforms aimed at implementing building codes while also cleaning and clearing out the city. However, the only sections of old Istanbul that were modernized were those that had been destroyed by fire.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 51-52.

number of large transportation and communication projects throughout the empire such as the Syrian, Baghdadi, and Hijaz railways, the Damascus-Beirut road, and the Medina telegraph line.¹⁴⁸

This focus on provincial development was reinforced by the 1869 Regulation on Roads and Streets (*Turuk ve Meabir Nizamnamesi*), which created three categories of roads throughout the empire: imperial roads that led to Istanbul, secondary and tertiary roads that linked provincial centers, and roads leading to smaller towns and villages. The Transjordan Mandate used these same laws with Amman replacing Istanbul as the central destination. The goal of the Ottomans' new road program was to increase trade, profitability, and communication speed throughout the empire. However, these reforms were undercut by the Empire's dire financial situation (the Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1876). As a result, foreign concessions (e.g., Beirut-Damascus road opened in 1863 by Edmond de Perthus) funded many roads and railways throughout the empire. Despite these limitations, the Ottoman Empire had over 900 kilometers of roads by the early twentieth century.¹⁴⁹

Perhaps the most important infrastructural project of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was the Hijaz railway. At the onset, the Ottoman government planned the Hijaz railway as a purely domestic project. The hope was that the empire could handle planning, financing, and constructing the railway without any external assistance. This proved to be impossible and a large proportion of the materials and technical expertise came from outside of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁰ There was no real economic motivation for the rail line. The Hijaz railway was justified as a means to

¹⁴⁸ Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City*, 26-28.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

¹⁵⁰ William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980), 41-43.

reinforce the Islamic credentials of the Ottoman Empire by aiding pilgrims on the hajj. It was also hoped that the railway would strengthen Ottoman control over southern Syria and the Hijaz. The line reached Medina in 1908 but never made it to Mecca.¹⁵¹ Although World War I destroyed a number of telegraph lines, damaged roadways, and damaged some railways there was a distinct Ottoman infrastructural network on which the Mandatory government could improve. This Ottoman legacy was critical in the development of Transjordan's physical infrastructure as well as its institutional and legal apparatuses. Municipal reforms modernized cities throughout the Levant and left behind a clear Ottoman urban heritage.¹⁵² The Anglo-Hashemite government did not start from scratch in 1921. The development of Transjordan's transportation and telecommunication network was evidence of this Ottoman legacy.

Infrastructural Improvements: The Department of Public Works and Connecting Amman to the Rest of Transjordan

The Transjordan government's transportation and communication networks in 1924 were far from ideal. The improvement of both networks was vital if the government hoped to increase the centralization and maintain the security of the young state. The

¹⁵¹ Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*, 11-23.

¹⁵² For more on the Ottoman municipal regulations and new historiography on the "Ottoman city" see Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber, "Introduction: Towards a new urban paradigm," in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire* eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg, 2002). Scholarship on the Ottoman city is an outgrowth of earlier work on the "Islamic city." Max Weber in *The City*, translated and introduction by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuirth (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1921) originally coined the term "Islamic city" as a contrast to the superior "Occidental city." This created an archetype for a stereotypical "Islamic city." Scholars such as Janet Abu Lughod and André Raymond, following the example set by Edward Said's *Orientalism*, later broke this archetype. For more on this historiographical evolution see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City-Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (1987); André Raymond, "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views," in *Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period* by André Raymond (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2002).

articulation of a modern transportation and communication system was critical to the government's ability to rule over and stabilize Transjordan. Government control over these networks was necessary to promote the Mandatory state's disciplining gaze throughout Transjordan. In particular, the borders of Transjordan needed tighter control to deter tribal raiding. The improvement of the transportation network fell to the Transjordan Department of Public Works. One of the first jobs of the Department of Public Works was to repair and improve the Ottoman road network. Only a few roads existed in the region during the Ottoman period. The Circassians had only reintroduced wheeled transport into Transjordan in 1878.

At the outbreak of World War I there were approximately 280 km of roads, of which only 30 km were passable by motor traffic. There were only two major north-south roads. The oldest was the *tariq al-rasif* (the paved way), first created by the Romans, which ran southwest from Amman through Madeba and Karak, and terminated in Ma'an. The second north-south route, *tariq al-bint* (the maiden's way) was largely a pilgrimage route running along the desert edge. The Hijaz Railway later used this same path. There were several east-west routes connecting Transjordan with Palestine. None of these roads was paved and they were only passable in dry weather. These roads connected Salt to Jerusalem, Irbid to Nazareth, and Karak to Hebron. The only railroad during the Ottoman period and the Mandate period remained the Hijaz Railway running from north to south in Transjordan, terminating in Ma'an. The track originally went to Medina but was destroyed by Feisal and T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt and was never repaired.

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¹⁵³ A. Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey* (Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1946), 75-76. In the early 1930s, there was a proposal for rail line to run from Haifa to Baghdad that only ever existed on paper. The British never seriously considered the plan that would have

During World War I, the Ottoman military constructed a paved all-weather route that linked Amman to Salt and Jerusalem across the later named Allenby Bridge.¹⁵⁴ This route remained the most important travel artery of Transjordan throughout the Mandate period. When the Department of Public Works was established in 1921 with Khalid al-Hakim as its first director, one of the first tasks of the Department was the repair and repaving of the Amman-Allenby Bridge road. This route's importance highlights the imperative to connect Amman to other British holdings, most notably, Jerusalem. For the British, Amman, and by extension Transjordan, were only important in their relation to the larger imperial system. Imperial connections always took priority in the allocation of construction funds throughout the Mandate. Roads only used by domestic traffic were of secondary importance. Additional dirt path roads were also opened connecting Amman with Madaba and Zarqa and Suwailah to Jarash (completed by volunteer labor).¹⁵⁵

Although never particularly well-funded, the Department of Public Works became one of the most crucial ministries carrying out work vital to the continuation of the Hashemite state. Similar to neighboring Palestine, the Department of Public Works focused on road construction and road maintenance throughout the Mandate. Larger infrastructural improvements, both in Transjordan and Palestine, required special funding and generally fell outside the scope of the Department of Public Works. This fiscal limitation curtailed the degree of control that the central government could exert over Transjordan.¹⁵⁶ The Department of Public Works, through the roadway system of

cost in excess of 2.5 million pounds. (BNA, CO 732/51/8, H.W. Porritt to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 11/11/1931.)

¹⁵⁴ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 130.

¹⁵⁵ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 226.

¹⁵⁶ Seikaly, *Haifa*, 61-69. Examples of extraordinary funding utilized for infrastructural and institutional improvements will be discussed in the next chapter.

Transjordan, defined the reach of the centralizing state. After 1924, the Department of Public Works continued upkeep on existing roads and began to improve preexisting roadways. The roads during the Mandate period can be divided into three groups: all-weather roads (also referred to as metaled roads), covered in asphalt and suitable for any traffic, moto-track roads composed of compressed gravel for dry motor travel, and by far the largest category, was earth-track roads only passable in dry weather.¹⁵⁷

Throughout the Mandate, the military utility of Transjordan's roads always took predominance over any economic motivations. Maintained roads enabled a small military force to travel quickly throughout Transjordan, to suppress uprisings, and curtail tribal raiding. Tribal raiding was particularly problematic along Transjordan's southern border. Tribal raiding was one of the primary reasons for continuing antagonism between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. Since both Transjordan and Saudi Arabia were British clients, the British were highly motivated to remove this source of regional unrest. The new level of discipline and order that the central government aspired to was in stark contrast to the Bedouin conception of travel. Bedouin had never paid attention to borders before the creation of the Mandatory states.¹⁵⁸ This division of *Bilad al-Sham* into several discrete political units with their own borders only began to affect the nomads in earnest in the 1930s. Over time, the Bedouin of Transjordan came to rely on Amman to arbitrate disputes and to protect them from the *Wahabis* in Saudi Arabia and the French in Syria.¹⁵⁹ Transjordan's road network bounded and controlled a previously amorphous and decentralized region. Roads created a regulated and controllable network with

¹⁵⁷ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 131.

¹⁵⁸ During the Ottoman Empire, the region was one contiguous state thus borders were essentially non-existent.

¹⁵⁹ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 75-83.

Amman at the center. The improved transportation infrastructure, in conjunction with the rapid growth of the military, gave the government tighter control over Transjordan. The state, for the first time, could now quickly respond to any action the government deemed illicit.

The increased level of connectivity throughout Transjordan aided merchants and farmers but this occurred only as a positive byproduct. Rough earth-track roads remained by far the most common road type during the Mandate, and required frequent maintenance. New roads, particularly after 1928, continued to open nearly every year further connecting the far reaches of Transjordan with Amman. Every village and town in Transjordan was connected by road to Amman by 1929. The distance maintained by the Department increased gradually from 575 km in 1927, to 962 km in 1929, to 1599 km in 1939.¹⁶⁰ By 1942, all-weather roads ran from Irbid in the north all the way to Wadi Musa in the south.¹⁶¹ In 1926, there were 110 cars, 4 buses and 16 trucks while in 1938 there were 335 cars, 24 buses and 230 trucks. By 1944, there was a total of 599.2 km of all-weather roads in Transjordan.¹⁶²

In the more rural areas of Transjordan, the villagers themselves undertook much of the roadwork. British Resident Cox was keen to encourage this initiative where the Public Works Department provided the supplies to create the roads and the villagers supplied the labor.¹⁶³ Government reliance on villager-constructed roads emphasizes the

¹⁶⁰ BNA, CO 831/1/2, Acting BR situation in TJ, 15/12/1937; CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year of 1929," 6/2/1930; CO 831/ CO 831/51/7, "Report on the Administration of TJ for Quarter Ending 31/3/1939."

¹⁶¹ BNA, CO 831/60/2, BR Kirkbride to HC MacMichael, "Situation Report on TJ for the Month of February 1943," 4/3/1943.

¹⁶² Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey*, 77.

¹⁶³ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929," 6/2/1930.

financial and labor constraints of the state. The Mandatory government had no choice but to rely on this type of voluntary infrastructural advancement. By building their own roads, villagers were voluntarily choosing to be incorporated into the growing infrastructure of the state. The villagers understood that a higher degree of connectivity throughout the country was beneficial to trade and security.¹⁶⁴ The emphasis on paved roads highlighted the government's desire to control the travel of its inhabitants. Roads dictated the flow of individuals and goods through a transportation network with Amman at its center. This was in stark contrast to the roaming "pre-modern" travel of the Bedouin.

However, financial limitations hamstrung further road improvements. According to the 1931 economic commission, no more than LP (Palestinian pounds) 10,000 could be used annually on road maintenance. By 1937, this expenditure restriction left large swaths of Transjordan's road system unmaintained due to lack of funds.¹⁶⁵ These budgetary constraints curtailed the important work of the Department of Public Works. Only the outbreak of WWII in 1939 allowed for the lifting of this restriction. The war necessitated the building of new roads to shore up Transjordan's defenses. These new defense-driven road initiatives always placed imperial regional interests above those of the Mandatory government. Examples of these defensive roads were the Jisr Sheikh Hussein to Ma'an road, a military road from Rematha to Deraa, the 64km road from Amman to Mafrak, which included the critical 4 km link between Amman and the

¹⁶⁴ The majority of the Transjordan's fellah population was located in the Ajlun. This region had accepted Ottoman centralized control in the late nineteenth century and understood the positive economic and security benefits that accompanied centralized government oversight.

¹⁶⁵ BNA, CO 831/41/8, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of April 1937," 1/5/1937.

Amman Hijaz Railway station in 1944.¹⁶⁶ A new influx of cash from the War Department made these new roads possible.

The largest of these projects was the Haifa-Baghdad road built from 1938 to 1941. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) used the same route during the construction of the IPC pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa in the early 1930s. Starting in August 1938, the 340km Transjordan section of the road was upgraded from dirt track to all-weather status. A special agreement signed on July 19, 1941, recognized the road as the British Imperial Highway. This agreement stipulated that the Transjordan government maintained the road but was reimbursed for the maintenance by the British government.¹⁶⁷ The British Imperial Highway was a road maintained for imperial interests, not for the use of the Transjordan government. This is obvious because the road did not run through Amman. The British Imperial Highway also reinforced the limited British interest in the development of Transjordan. The War necessitated the construction of new roads to protect British imperial interests throughout the region. Transjordan only benefitted from this construction boom because it was in the middle of other strategic British holdings. The construction of the British Imperial Highway also underscores the limitations of the reach of the Transjordan government and Amman. Transjordan was little more than the land on the way to Palestine for the British. However, even with additional funding coming from the British military the Department of Public Works was still underfunded. British Resident Alec Kirkbride, who succeeded Cox in 1939, reported in May 1943: “Owing to the increase in wages and cost of materials and the fact that the vote for the

¹⁶⁶ BNA, FO 816/62, acting BR Foot to Brigadier General Staff, 18/8/1941; FO 816/63, BR Kirkbride to TJ Prime Minister, 22/8/1941; FO 816/61, BR Kirkbride to TJ Prime Minister, 29/8/1941.

¹⁶⁷ Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey*, 76-77. See page 76 of Konikoff and pages 302-303 of Abu Nowar's *The Development of Transjordan: 1929-1939* for a list of the major roads of Transjordan.

maintenance of roads in TJ has not been increased since the outbreak of the war, it has been necessary to restrict drastically the road maintenance program for 1945. It seems probable that an increase of expenditure for this service will be necessary in 1944.”¹⁶⁸

The officers of the Department were on the verge of striking in January 1944 because of the government’s refusal to increase rates to keep pace with inflation.¹⁶⁹ The chronic financial constraints of the Transjordan budget limited the scope of any infrastructural or developmental program throughout the Mandate period. Any large-scale infrastructural projects were simply beyond the means of the Mandatory government. These fiscal restrictions checked the government’s control aspirations. The Anglo-Hashemite state simply did not have the resources to completely dominate its subjects.

This same broad desire for control through increased communication capabilities necessitated the revitalization of Transjordan’s telegraph and telephone network. The Ottoman telegraph network in Transjordan was an outgrowth of the Medina telegraph line and the Hijaz Railway. The earliest telegraph line connected Salt and Damascus in 1890. Telegraph service did not travel further south in Transjordan until 1900. Sultan Abdul Hamid II chose to extend the line south from Salt to Medina in order to eliminate the expense of funneling Ottoman communications through the British Eastern Telegraph Line. Construction began in 1900 and linked Salt, Madaba, Karak, Tafila, Ma’an, Aqaba, and eventually Medina by 1901. Istanbul used these lines to stay informed on the progress of the Hijaz Railway construction, which was completed in 1908.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ BNA, CO 831/60/2, BR Kirkbride to HC MacMichael, “Situation Report on TJ for the Month of May 1943,” 4/6/1943.

¹⁶⁹ BNA, CO 831/60/2, BR Kirkbride to HC MacMichael, ”Situation Report on TJ for the Month of January 1933,” 3/2/1944.

¹⁷⁰ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 66-67.

In the wake of World War I, the telegraph system was in an alarming state of disrepair. Somewhat ironically, this was largely a result of the Hashemite-led Arab Revolt. Among the first lines restored by the British military in 1920 were those directly connecting Amman to Jerusalem through Salt, Madaba, and across the Allenby Bridge. Similar to the repair of the bridge itself, the importance of this travel and communication artery was wedded to tighter imperial control from Jerusalem and increasing centralized oversight throughout the state. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs was established in 1922 with Nasib al-Khatib as director. The regional unrest from 1921-1923 reinforced the need for telecommunications throughout Transjordan connecting Amman to the more remote areas of the country. By 1925, there were connections via telephone between fourteen police posts around the country and the Arab Legion headquarters in Amman. The Royal Air Force (RAF) also operated a wireless link between Amman and Ma'an, where telephone service was unavailable. Further upgrades of existing lines continued throughout the 1920s with the laying of both telegraph and telephone lines in all cases. In order to keep up with the increased demand, the government hired a new class of eleven telegraph operators in 1927.¹⁷¹

Telephone service continued to grow in popularity and gradually replace the telegraph. British Resident Cox attributed the large increases in telephone subscribers to trunk calls as a result of a "marked improvement" in service in 1929.¹⁷² Similar to the road network, World War II provided an increase in funds for the laying of telephone lines for defensive measures. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs completed the

¹⁷¹ BNA, CO 831/1/2, Acting BR to HC, 15/12/1927.

¹⁷² BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929," 6/2/1930, 37-38.

work while the military authorities provided the funds.¹⁷³ The improved road and communication networks also aided the frequency and reliability of mail delivery. The postal network gradually improved throughout the Mandate period with regular mail delivery three times a week between Transjordan and Palestine by 1939.¹⁷⁴ The postal system was one of the few departments that actually generated money for the Mandatory government. The Department was self-sufficient by 1938. The Department of Posts and Telegraph continued to grow throughout the Mandate to keep up with demand. The Department had sixteen post offices and employed over a hundred men by 1938. By the end of 1936, motor transport delivered all of the mail to the major towns and villages of Transjordan.¹⁷⁵

A dearth of resources limited the scope of telephone improvements during the Mandate. Attempts to improve international traffic and replace the Amman telephone exchange were beyond the means of normal government revenue.¹⁷⁶ Imperial capital was only available for projects directly tied to both imperial and Transjordanian security.¹⁷⁷ Despite its limited resources, the work of the Department for Public Works and the Department of Posts and Telegraph was vital for the concentration of state authority within the capital of Amman. These departments extended the reach of the government throughout the Mandate, which allowed the centralizing influence of Amman to slowly take hold throughout Transjordan. The reach and oversight of Amman grew with the

¹⁷³ BNA, CO 831/58/2, BR Kirkbride to HC, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of February 1941," 3/3/1941.

¹⁷⁴ BNA, CO 831/51/7, BR Kirkbride to HC, "Report on Administration of TJ for the Quarter Ending 30/6/1939."

¹⁷⁵ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Transjordan 1929-1939*, 301-02.

¹⁷⁶ Attempts to address these shortcomings through external imperial funding (The Colonial Development Fund) will be discussed in chapter 3.

¹⁷⁷ The Amman telephone exchange was a project completed to improve the communication capabilities within the capital as well as its connections to the rest of Transjordan. The exchange was completed during WWII.

communication and transportation networks. The Anglo-Hashemite state utilized these networks to oversee all of Transjordan. Although government oversight was never all encompassing, the transportation and telecommunication networks greatly increased the functional sphere of control of the Mandatory state. Any benefits that the transportation and communication networks provided beyond control and security were merely coincidental.¹⁷⁸

Infrastructure in the Capital: Developments in Amman

A great deal of infrastructural development also took place within the capital itself. Akin to the rest of Transjordan, security necessitated the majority of the infrastructural development in Amman. In 1919 Amman was a village of 650 houses with a total population of 6000 people divided into roughly 750 families with roughly 4000 Muslim Circassians, 2000 Arab, and 167 Christians. There was little industry beyond the five steam mills in the town. The majority of goods were imported and there was no real concentration of skilled labor in Amman.¹⁷⁹ There were few physical improvements made to Amman's infrastructure from 1921-1924, but "it was no longer an obscure village, a convenient center for distributing supplies only, but was promoted to a capital... it began to exert the attractive force common to all capital cities."¹⁸⁰

The municipal administration of Amman was reconstituted (originally created in 1909) in 1925 with a president and seven members who were elected to four-year terms

¹⁷⁸ A few Colonial Development Fund projects did have direct security dimensions. These included the telephone lines erected through Transjordan in 1935 connecting Haifa to Baghdad that aided in regional communication and security capabilities. Similarly, the Wadi Zarqa Bridge, completed in 1940, strengthened the ties of the Ajlun region to Amman. Abdullah regarded the opening of the bridge as "one of many concrete examples [of] extraordinary progress [in] Transjordan resulting from willing [of] loyal cooperation Arabs cum British friends. I hope this cooperation continues..." (BNA, CO 831/55/18, HC to rapid miniform, 12/8/1940.)

¹⁷⁹ MENA, Reginald Monkton collection, Alec Kirkbride "Notes on Tribes East of the Jordan," 4/5/1919.

¹⁸⁰ Hacker, *Modern 'Amman*, 25.

of service. Their stated “general duties” pertained to new construction, maintaining public facilities and amenities, “health measures” covering sanitation, licensing, and inspection, and “public welfare,” which included caring for the poor, traffic regulations, weights and measures, and monopoly prevention. Central and municipal governments worked together on public health, construction of roads, and promoting communication and security.¹⁸¹ Similar to the Mandatory government, the role of the municipality was to ensure stability, security, and control through improved infrastructural capabilities.

The two largest construction projects in Amman were the Husseini Mosque and Raghadan Palace. The construction of Husseini mosque, located in the center of Amman, began in 1923. The construction of Abdullah’s palace, Raghadan Palace, took place from 1924-1927.¹⁸² These two buildings emphasized the dual poles of Hashemite authority: religious and political.¹⁸³ Beyond the constructions of these two buildings, the majority of government-funded construction that took place in Amman during the Mandate dealt with security and health. This dual focus was really two sides of the same coin: each perpetuated the other. The government’s focus on health was not oriented to the needs of the individual, but towards preventing epidemics, which would threaten the stability of the state. The slow imposition of modern health standards in the capital, and throughout Transjordan, was another means by which the centralizing Anglo-Hashemite state could control individuals and their movements.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 26-27.

¹⁸² Arslan Ramadan Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures (tarikh wa suwar)* (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality, 2002), 80.

¹⁸³ Monumental architecture and its impact on the urban fabric of Amman will be discussed in chapter 7.

¹⁸⁴ The “medicalization” of the population will be discussed in depth in the section on the Department of Public Health later in this chapter.

Likewise, the construction of a new central prison in Amman both improved the hygiene of its prisoners and segregated dangerous individuals who could destabilize the control of the new state. The Anglo-Hashemite state project quickly focused on new means to discipline and control its population after its inception. This Foucauldian approach implemented government-mandated modernity into the nascent capital of Amman. Imposed health norms helped the government to control their imprisoned population, and the rest of Amman by extension. The previous prison had to be abandoned “on account of bad ventilation, insufficient light and limited accommodations.”¹⁸⁵ The Amman central prison housed anyone in Transjordan sentenced to a prison term over three months. Thus, Amman became both the center of government and incarceration within Transjordan. This was not mere happenstance. All forms of power - physical, psychological, legislative, executive – emanated from the capital of Amman. The Public Works Department built the new prison on behalf of the Arab Legion to alleviate overcrowding in the old prison. The new central prison’s accommodations increased by 55 prisoners. The improvements undertaken by the Public Works Department also upgraded the prison’s sanitation by constructing a latrine for 500 men and installing a water pump into the prisoners’ bathroom and kitchen.¹⁸⁶ The construction of Amman’s central prison literally disciplined the inhabitants of Transjordan into accepting the new ruling status quo of the land.¹⁸⁷ Criminals and political dissidents alike were sent to the central prison to be reformed by the state. The decision to have the central prison for all of Transjordan in the capital reinforced the

¹⁸⁵ BNA, CO 831/2/2, “Department of Health Report for 1927.”

¹⁸⁶ IWM, Peake Collection, Peake to BR Cox, “Transjordan Government Annual Report of the Arab Legion for the Year 1928,” 15, 35, and 50-52. In addition, a small women’s prison was built in Amman in 1928.

¹⁸⁷ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 207-09,

perception of a centralized state controlling and punishing Transjordan. Although this control was not total, Amman increasingly symbolized the power of the state.

Beyond the construction of a new prison building, there was a new focus on advancing prisoner treatment. Ottoman practice had been that anything beyond bread, water, and “perhaps a dirty blanket” had to be provided by the inmate’s family. It was not the responsibility of the state to provide for the inmates’ overall welfare. This standard changed in Transjordan during the second tenure of Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda (1926-1929). After the completion of the new prison in Amman in 1927, it became common practice for the state to provide proper food, clothing, and bedding for all inmates in their care.¹⁸⁸ This modernizing impulse was in line with the Anglo-Hashemite state’s ultimate goals of developing a modern bureaucratized state.

Hygienic concerns in Mandate Amman were not limited to the prison. The water supply of Amman remained problematic early in the Mandate period because of the spread of malaria and dysentery. Until 1927, the inhabitants of Amman took their drinking water from the main stream (Seil) that ran through Amman and the springs located nearby.¹⁸⁹ A new water supply scheme was completed in Amman in late 1927. “Several public taps have been installed and the waste water from these taps is drained to the ‘Seil’ (the river running through Amman) through piping. The department, so far, has not allowed any private installations for lack of means for the disposal of waste water which would then be too much.”¹⁹⁰ Once again, the scope of the water project highlighted the importance of general public health and hygiene over private or economic benefit.

¹⁸⁸ IWM, Peake Collection, unpublished autobiography, 157.

¹⁸⁹ Hacker, *Modern ‘Amman*, 27.

¹⁹⁰ BNA, CO 831/2/2, “Department of Health Report for 1927.”

The water project did aid the economic development of the young capital, but only as a byproduct of the state's modernizing control scheme.

Unfortunately, the 1927 earthquake drastically affected the quality of life and sanitation efforts of Amman. The 6.2 magnitude earthquake shook the region on July 11, 1927, with an aftershock on July 17, 1927.¹⁹¹ The earthquake caused destruction throughout the region, damaging over twenty towns including Jerusalem, Nablus, and Cairo. However, the "heaviest toll [was] east of the Jordan."¹⁹² The earthquake killed eleven people and wounded thirty-five in Amman. In all of Transjordan, sixty-eight people died and 105 were wounded. 278 houses were demolished and 345 houses were damaged in Amman itself. The earthquake caused the minaret of the newly completed Hussein Mosque to "crash down to the ground as if cut with a pen knife."¹⁹³ This destruction destabilized the situation in Amman for a number of months. The British government provided LP 2000 in loans for the reconstruction of homes. Aid in the aftermath of the earthquake came from both the Anglo-Hashemite government, mainly the Arab Legion and Department of Public Health, and the public. "Within an hour after the earthquake, a central relief committee was formed in Amman, and shortly thereafter sub-committees were formed in each of the districts affected." Despite this aid, many inhabitants of Amman lived out in the open for months. People in Amman used the "dirty" water from the Seil River to wash themselves and cooking utensils, which helped the spread of water-borne diseases. Eventually, the Department of Public Health

¹⁹¹ Benjamin Peim, "Eastern Mediterranean Awaits Inevitable Big Earthquake," *Jerusalem Post*, 1/18/2011, accessed February 9, 2015, <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Eastern-Mediterranean-awaits-inevitable-big-earthquake>. The earthquake has been estimated as being a 6.2 magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale but this is only a rough estimate because the Richter Scale was created in 1934.

¹⁹² "Holy Land Earthquake Kills 1000," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 13/7/1927.

¹⁹³ "1000 Dead in Quake; Ruin Widespread in Palestine Area," *New York Times*, 13/7/1927.

“arranged through the municipality the provision of clean water, scavenging, etc. The staff of the Department carried out the inspection of those camps daily taking all possible measures for the prevention of disease.” In the opinion of the Director of Public Health G.W. Heron, “The fresh air and sunshine helped a lot in keeping those people in a fairly good health.”¹⁹⁴

After the earthquake, the Public Health Department further protected the water supply by fencing in the reservoir at Ras al-‘Ain in 1928.¹⁹⁵ Three water towers were erected in Amman by 1930, one in the neighborhood of Jabal al-Weibdeh and two in Jabal Amman. These water towers spurred the growth of both neighborhoods. The pattern of residential development following new water resources mirrors the growth of Mandate era Haifa.¹⁹⁶ The steep slopes of Mt. Carmel characterize Haifa’s geography in a similar manner to the many hills of Amman. The pipelines connected to these water towers expanded in 1932 and continued to expand as the city grew throughout the Mandate.¹⁹⁷ The quick expansion of Jabal Amman as its own discrete district led to the creation of a bus line to ferry people from Jabal Amman down to the city center. The Jabal Amman bus line was an expansion of Abdullah Abu Qourah’s privately owned bus company that began by running a line that ran between Feisal Square and the *mahatta*. Shortly thereafter, he started a new line running between Feisal Square and Jabal Amman.¹⁹⁸

Further water sanitation included the treatment of all open water sources against mosquitos. These included the new wells completed in 1927, in addition to the

¹⁹⁴ BNA, CO 831/2/2, “Department of Public Health Report 1927.”

¹⁹⁵ Hacker, *Modern ‘Amman*, 28.

¹⁹⁶ Seikaly, *Haifa*, 66-67.

¹⁹⁷ BNA, CO 831/28/5, “Department of Public Health Report for 1932.”

¹⁹⁸ Munif, *Story of a City*, 225-26. The expansion of Jabal Amman will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

preexisting 342 wells, six cisterns and six springs in Amman. Water treatment against mosquito breeding sites was important to prevent malaria outbreaks. This was particularly crucial for the growth of Amman because the city developed around a number of springs and the Seil River. This same period also saw improvements in waste management in Amman. The municipality constructed two incinerators in 1927 to burn the town's waste. The Amman municipality oversaw the repair of the existing public latrine and the construction of an additional two new public latrines. These combined measures greatly improved general health conditions in the growing capital.¹⁹⁹

Another natural disaster hit Amman in February 1935, when the city faced extensive flooding. Over 200 homes were destroyed in the flood.²⁰⁰ However, the flood's effect on the city's sanitation was shorter in 1935 because of the experience the Department of Public Health gained from the 1927 earthquake and new water sanitation initiatives completed in the interim. In addition to coping with natural disasters, the municipality of Amman also focused on improving the general living conditions within the city. These health initiatives took the form of statutes against hazardous trades in the city center, minimum road dimensions, speed limits, and proper water usage. In general, these statutes forbade potentially hazardous activities, such as the storage of lamp and motor oil, in downtown Amman. These laws focused on the maintenance of security throughout the capital with the positive side effect of being beneficial to the inhabitants of the city.²⁰¹ The British implemented similar municipal regulations in neighboring

¹⁹⁹ BNA, CO 831/2/2, "Department of Health Report for 1927."

²⁰⁰ Library of Congress (LOC), CO 935, Middle East No. 55, "Palestine and Trans-Jordan: Estimates and Finances, 1935-36."

²⁰¹ IWM, Peake Collection, "Trans-Jordan Legislation 1939 (Translated from Arabic)."

Palestine to improve public health.²⁰² Improved sanitation and hygiene helped foster an increased level of stability in Amman. More importantly, these measures gave the increasing powers of the centralized state a charitable and positive connotation.

The remainder of infrastructural and institutional development that took place in Amman during the Mandate period dealt with the establishment of various government programs. These programs transformed the shallow ministries of the early Mandate into legitimate components of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The municipalities' lack of funds was emblematic of the overall budgetary shortcomings of the Mandate.²⁰³ Despite being the capital, Amman received only small influxes of cash from the Mandatory budget to further security initiatives as discussed earlier in this chapter. Municipalities throughout Transjordan, not only Amman, were chronically short of funds.²⁰⁴ Budget limitations prevented the construction of many new government buildings. Instead, the majority of government offices, including the post-office, courts, police, and municipal buildings were rented "box-like buildings, clustered around the Mosque in the centre of town."²⁰⁵ Many of these ministerial "Potemkin villages" were nothing more than hollow shells. However, the mere existence of these new institutions did add credence to the government's authority. New ministries did not immediately affect the lives of Transjordan's populace but they did signal the government's desire to expand their scope. Each new ministry was an attempt to increase the degree of oversight of the Mandatory

²⁰² Seikaly, *Haifa*, 72-79; Levine, *Overthrowing Geography*, 152-181.

²⁰³ Hanania, "From Capital to Colony," 210-13. Marwan Hanania correctly notes that the municipality was chronically underfunded. However, he fails to connect this lack of funds to the overall paucity of funds throughout the Transjordan Mandate. These financial shortcomings necessitated the need for the Colonial Development Fund, Foreign Concessions, and local entrepreneurial activity to aid in the development of the Mandate, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

²⁰⁴ Hanania, "From Colony to Capital," 210.

²⁰⁵ Hacker, *Modern 'Amman*, 31.

state. These new departments and their initiatives changed the public's perception of the Anglo-Hashemite government in Amman. In particular, the expanding health, education, and judicial systems of Transjordan had a substantive impact on Transjordan's population. These departments built upon the preexisting Ottoman structures rebranded as part of the Transjordanian state. These institutions gradually differentiated themselves from their Ottoman predecessors and developed into a new form of Transjordanian statecraft. The varying degrees of British imperial oversight further shaped the unique legacies of each of these departments.

Bringing order to Transjordan: The Judicial System

Akin to the physical infrastructure of the Transjordanian state, the government utilized the judiciary, the health care system, and education system as a means of centralizing state authority in Amman. These departments had a substantive impact on Transjordan's population and built upon the preexisting Ottoman structures. Each of these ministries located in Amman, with their power and oversight emanating out of the capital over the rest of Transjordan. These departments had constant interaction with the general populace of Transjordan and represented the government for the average Transjordanian.

In the earliest days of the Mandate, the Ottoman legal system remained in force unchanged. The Law for the Organization of Justice reconstituted the Ottoman legal system in 1921, which had fallen into disarray during the war.²⁰⁶ The only modifications

²⁰⁶ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 58.

made to the legal code were to adjust the scale of the system from a large empire to a small emirate. Three levels of criminal courts existed in Transjordan during the Mandate. These criminal courts were the Mandate era embodiment of Ottoman era *Nizamiye* (regular) courts with the highest court located in Amman, instead of Istanbul.²⁰⁷ The magistrate courts located in Ajlun, Irbid, Jerash, Amman, Salt, Karak, Tafila, and Ma'an consisted of a single magistrate and dealt with lesser cases.²⁰⁸ The courts of first instance were located in Amman, Irbid, and Karak. These courts consisted of two judges who also sat on their local magistrate courts. The courts of first instance dealt with any civil case with a value over LP 50 or any crime that had a possible sentence over three years in prison. The supreme court of the land, the court of appeals, was located in Amman. This court was comprised of three judges and only dealt with appeals sent from the two lower courts.²⁰⁹ The act of travel into the capital for these court cases by itself strengthened the centralizing aspects of the state and reinforced the supremacy of the word of Amman.

These courts coexisted with the shari'a (Muslim religious) courts, which had only dealt with personal status and *waqf* (religious endowment) since the inception of the *Nizamiye* courts in the mid-1860s.²¹⁰ In 1932, non-Muslim religious community councils were established. These new courts applied to the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Catholic, and Latin Catholic communities and functioned akin to the Ottoman *millet* system. Each religious community had its own community council that dealt with issues of personal status law. Religious community courts adjudicated the same issues as

²⁰⁷ Avi Rubin, "Legal borrowing and its impact on Ottoman Legal Culture in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Continuity and Change* 22 (2007), 283-84.

²⁰⁸ The magistrate courts heard cases that had possible fines below LP 50 or three years in prison.

²⁰⁹ BNA, FO 816/108, JA Gardiner to BR Kirkbride, "Note by the Judicial Adviser on Policy of Long-term Reforms in the Judicial System in Trans-Jordan, 31/3/1945.

²¹⁰ Rubin, "Legal Borrowing and its Impact on Ottoman Legal Culture," 279-80.

the shari'a courts. Such issues included marriage, divorce, dowry, alimony, and wills. In keeping with Ottoman practice, non-Muslims always had the option to use shari'a courts if they so desired.²¹¹ Regardless of which legal community an individual belonged to, his legal options were essentially unchanged from the late Ottoman period. All that had changed was the name of the ruling monarchy.

The main challenge for the Transjordan court system was the huge scope of Ottoman laws that it inherited. "The whole corpus of Turkish law was declared to remain in force subject to any amendments which had been made 'as far as circumstances permit.'" This final clause gave the Mandatory government a large degree of leeway in amending the Ottoman laws. However, since the overwhelming majority of the laws were in Turkish, only officials trained during the Ottoman period were able to understand them fully, as the official language of Transjordan was Arabic.²¹² This linguistic shift was a clear break with Ottoman heritage in favor of newly defined Arab and Hashemite heritage.

The designation of Arabic as the official legal language was further complicated by the fact that many laws originated from the British Judicial Adviser who then in turn translated laws originally written in English into Arabic. The magistrates who adjudicated in this new Transjordan legal system were themselves indicative of three periods. Those trained under the Ottoman system were capable, but of retiring age. The World War I judicial recruits were unsatisfactory, and magistrates recruited after 1921 were trained in Jerusalem or Damascus.²¹³ Complicating things further was the mixed heritage of the

²¹¹ BNA, CO 831/20/10, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, 12/7/1932.

²¹² BNA, FO 816/108, JA Gardiner to BR Kirkbride, "Note by the Judicial Adviser on Policy of Long-term Reforms in the Judicial System in Trans-Jordan," 31/3/1945.

²¹³ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 59.

various legal codes and procedures. The codes of both civil and criminal procedure were drafted along French lines, largely the Napoleonic Code, but had both been altered by Ottoman government supplements. Some Ottoman legal practices were unworkable in Transjordan. For example, the role of public prosecutor and examining magistrate were combined in the Transjordan system to save money.

Although all of the jurists were Arab, the functional head of the Department of Justice was the British Judicial Adviser. The British Government created the Judicial Adviser post in 1927. Akin to the British Resident, the Judicial Adviser was a key member of the Transjordan administration who held significant sway in the Emirate. The input and influence of the Judicial Adviser were particularly important early on in the Mandate, as he advised on the legality of new legislation. Only two Judicial Advisers served during the Mandate period, Mr. A.G. Hooper (1927-1936) and Mr. A.L. Gardiner (1937-1946). The Judicial Adviser was always an English lawyer and the only non-Arab member of the Department of Justice.²¹⁴ The Judicial Adviser was the legal draftsman and adviser to the Transjordan government. He attended Executive Council meetings *ex-officio* in an advisory capacity.²¹⁵

Early on, the Department of Justice was largely in the hands of the Adviser. In particular, the Judicial Adviser (Hooper) heavily advised British Resident Cox and the Transjordan government on how best to deal with a recalcitrant Legislative Council from 1929-1934.²¹⁶ However, a high level of administrative involvement was no longer necessary after the first few years. The reduced direct involvement of the Judicial Adviser

²¹⁴ BNA, FO 816/108, JA Gardiner to BR Kirkbride, "Note by the Judicial Adviser on Policy of Long-term Reforms in the Judicial System in Trans-Jordan," 31/3/1945.

²¹⁵ BNA, CO 831/39/8, HC Wauchope to Clark Kerr, 9/3/1936.

²¹⁶ The creation of the Legislative Council will be discussed in chapter 4. The legality of dismissing a Legislative Council will be discussed in chapter 5.

corresponded to the waning opposition in the Legislative Council. As the Legislative Council became more pliable, fewer laws concocted by the Mandatory government were opposed, and the Judicial Adviser was less essential to help impose the Anglo-Hashemite government's will. By the end of the Mandate, the only responsibility that the Judicial Adviser alone was responsible for was the drafting of new legislation.²¹⁷ The decreased level of importance of the Judicial Adviser coincided with the gradual reduction in the functions of most British officers throughout the Mandate. The Judicial Adviser was never as powerful or as influential as the British Resident but both Hooper and Gardiner shaped Transjordanian legislation, aided the development of a strong central Anglo-Hashemite state, and determined the function of the Department of Justice.

The British wanted to simplify the legal system as much as possible in Transjordan to ease any administrative complications. The penal code was "the most obsolete and undoubtedly the worst of all the codes" in the opinion of the Judicial Adviser A.L. Gardiner.²¹⁸ Any undue complication or complexity was counter to British goals of simplifying Transjordan's administration. The British rejected a system that they deemed a hodgepodge of French law drastically amended by the Ottoman state. This British antipathy was a combination of distrust of French legal procedure and a rejection of a broken and overly complicated Ottoman legal tradition. The only reason the entire legal system was not replaced was a lack of funds. If the British could have afforded the legal training, translation, and publication of a new legal code, they most certainly would have done so. This rejection of late Ottoman *Tanzimat* legal reforms ignored the shifts in the Ottoman legal system in the late nineteenth century. There was a massive effort at

²¹⁷ BNA, FO 816/108, JA Gardiner to BR Kirkbride, "Note by the Judicial Adviser on Policy of Long-term Reforms in the Judicial System in Trans-Jordan," 31/3/1945.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

statutory codification of Ottoman legal precedent between 1850 and the 1880s that divided the *nizamiye* system into criminal, civil, and commercial jurisdictions.²¹⁹ The British did not understand the need for a multi-faceted legal system. The British saw the binary *nizamiye* and *shari'a* system as inefficient and outdated.²²⁰ The *Diwan Khas* (special chamber), was created in 1930, in response to the overlapping and at times contradictory legal statutes. The *Diwan Khas* decided legal interpretations not already determined by precedent. This special committee was composed of the Minister of Justice, two civil administrative officers, and senior officials from the Ministry of Justice, whose main concern was the interpretation of points of statute law.

The Transjordan legal code for laws from 1918-1930 was translated into English and published in 1931.²²¹ This was the only time that the entire corpus of Transjordanian law was translated into English. This translation was of more use to the British officers stationed in Transjordan than it was to the local magistrates, since the official language of Transjordan remained Arabic. After the publication of the Transjordan legal code, the Judicial Adviser strongly advised that the government limit new legislation as much as possible. "The administrative authorities have at their disposal a large number of Ottoman laws adapted to local requirements and it will save an immense amount of labour if the Administrative authorities will concentrate their efforts on a sound application of those Administrative laws already in existence instead of dissipating their energies in an effort to produce a series of brand new laws." However, Judicial Adviser Hooper also contended that the land code, civil code, code of civil procedure, and code of

²¹⁹ Rubin, "Legal Borrowing and its Impact on Ottoman Legal Culture," 283.

²²⁰ Avi Rubin, "Ottoman Judicial Change in the Age of Modernity: A Reappraisal," *History Compass* 6 (2008): 13-14.

²²¹ BNA, CO 831/5/8, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, 6/2/1930, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year of 1929," 22.

criminal procedure “are badly in need of repeal and replacement.”²²² Again, Hooper’s criticism of these codes was in response to their difficulty in the administration of these laws. The complex legal system required judges and magistrates who had a strong mastery of the late Ottoman legal system; unfortunately, such a population did not exist in Mandate era Transjordan.

The scope and responsibilities of the Department of Justice and the Judicial Adviser did not extend to tribal matters. Instead, tribal legal issues existed in their own discrete arena. The realm of tribal affairs represented the limitations of the new state’s authority and reach in Transjordan. The degree of separation that the tribes enjoyed, however, diminished during the Mandate. The first Bedouin courts were established in 1925 as part of the Tribal Court Law of 1924 in Irbid, Karak, Ma’an, and the desert area (Wadi Musa/Wadi Araba area close to Saudi Arabian border). The Bedouin Control Law replaced the first Bedouin courts in 1929 by creating the Bedouin Control Board in its stead. The Bedouin Control Board determined when and where the Bedouin could camp, heard actions within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts law, and investigated any claims of raiding. The board quickly had an effect on curtailing raiding by Transjordan tribes.²²³ The British used the same approach to arbitrate tribal differences as they had earlier in Iraq. In fact, the man responsible for curtailing tribal incursions, Major John Bagot Glubb, had learned his tribal techniques in the 1920s as a British officer in Iraq. The British allowed for the existence of a parallel tribal legal system in Iraq and in large part employed the same strategy in Transjordan. This approach placed tribal affairs outside the purview of the actual state. By excluding the tribes, the government was not forced to

²²² BNA, CO 831/17/7, JA Hooper to BR Cox, 29/1/1932.

²²³ BNA, FO 864/4, BR Cox to HC, “Transjordan: Political Reports for Second Quarter 1/4/1929-30/6/1929.”

confront the reality that they did not have the strength to force the tribesmen to immediately assimilate into the new modern state centered in Amman.²²⁴ Although the government's control over the tribes was minimal, these tribes still had to interact directly with the central government in Amman. Over time, the degree of interaction, exchange, and cooperation between the central government and the tribes increased. The regime's development in Amman forced the tribes to accept a new paradigm of governance in Transjordan. This shift in the political and administrative realities of Transjordan can only be understood by orienting the study of Transjordan from the perspective of its capital in Amman. The various tribal laws and boards established throughout the Mandate period were attempts to mitigate and transform the chieftaincy of Transjordan into a functioning bureaucratic monarchy.

The Tribal Offenses Settlement Law of 1933 supplemented the Bedouin Control Board giving the Board additional punitive measures to curtail raiding. The Bedouin Control Law that created the Bedouin Control Board included the appointment of Abdullah's cousin, the Amir Shakir, within the law itself. After his death in 1934, the government chose to eliminate the Bedouin Control Board because the widespread tribal raiding that had been the reason for its original formation had been eliminated.²²⁵ Thus, 1934 marks the first rollback of a discrete separate tribal system in Transjordan.

In 1936, the Bedu Control Law replaced the Tribal Court Law of 1924, the Bedouin Control Law of 1929 and the Tribal Offenses Settlement Law of 1933. The Mandatory government was able to regn in tribal privilege and exclusion during this period because of the growing strength of Amman and the diminished position of the

²²⁴ Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 42-44 and 51.

²²⁵ MECA, Glubb Collection, Glubb to BR Cox, "a Report on the Administration of the Deserts of TJ for the Month of December 1934."

Bedouin in Transjordan. The drought of the early 1930s only further exacerbated the faltering ability of the Bedouin to exist outside of the state system.²²⁶ The new Tribal Court Law regularized procedure by appointing a tribal court in each of the four settled districts and a fifth in the desert. The tribal court of appeal was in Amman. As a result, even disputes amongst Bedouin as far away as Aqaba had to come to Amman to have their disputes resolved. This further reinforced the legal centrality of the capital city. Adjudicating tribal matters in Amman essentially ended the separation that had previously existed between the state and the tribes. By 1936, everyone in Transjordan was answerable to Amman. The period of the dual realms of tribe and state had ended.

The government deemed the new system “an unqualified success” and adjudicated 251 cases by the end of 1937, the courts’ first year of existence.²²⁷ The new system relied on the importance and influence of premier sheikhs to control the tribal community of Transjordan. Over time, the number of Bedouin declined and tribal reliance on the state increased.²²⁸ However, despite the decreased autonomy of the tribes, tribal dynamics remained integral to state function throughout the Mandate period. Although tribal matters were now adjudicated in Amman, the state relied heavily on the tribes’ patrimonial and patriarchal networks. Essentially, the state had brought the tribe into the realm of the modern state.

²²⁶ BNA, CO 831/27/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, 6/3/1934. The Transjordan government provided aid to the Bedouin in various forms from 1931-1937. For more on aid measures for the Bedouin see Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 110-15.

²²⁷ MECA, Glubb Collection, “A Monthly Report on the Administration of TJ Deserts, January 1938.”

²²⁸ For more on the dynamics of tribe-state relations see, Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, chapters 4 and 5, 84-148; Riccardo Bocco and Tariq MM Tell, “Pax Britanica in Steppe, British Policy and the Transjordan Bedouin,” in *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 108-27.

Amir Abdullah and the royal family occasionally disrupted the proceedings of both the civilian and tribal courts. The Amir had a tendency to pardon members of the elite class of Transjordan, particularly when it related to tribal matters. The pardoning of tribal sheikhs and their dependents reinforced the chieftaincy aspects of the Emirate of Transjordan. The British did not approve of this continuation of tribal practice. In the opinion of British Resident Kirkbride, "It was necessary to check a growing tendency on the part of His Highness, to grant pardons in numerous cases of killings because the two parties involved had made peace and blood money paid to the relatives on the victim. In certain cases, a pardon on those grounds is justifiable, perhaps even desirable, but the too frequent adoption of the course becomes an abuse."²²⁹ Despite the occasionally problematic intervention of the royal family, tribal affairs and judicial matters remained the one arena in which the Amir retained a degree of direct influence and power. The lasting Ottoman legal infrastructure utilized by the Transjordan state allowed for a strong executive removed from the judicial system.

The scope and breadth of law in Transjordan symbolically emanating from Amman vastly altered the perception its inhabitants had of the central government. The slow realization that law from Amman held sway in rural tribal areas such as Wadi Musa and Wadi Araba changed tribal understanding of the Mandatory government.²³⁰ The laws of Amman now trumped tribal custom in most circumstances. Judicial authority did not radiate from any single individual, but it did originate in Amman. The judicial system of Transjordan became one of the main tools of the central government in Amman. The increased judicial reach of Amman further empowered the office of the Judicial Adviser.

²²⁹ BNA, CO 831/60/2, BR Kirkbride to HC MacMichael, "Situation Report on TJ for the Month of June 1944," 5/7/1944.

²³⁰ IWM, Peake Collection, unpublished Peake autobiography, 152-54.

The Adviser determined the scope and strength of new law. Over time, the number of Bedouin declined and tribal reliance on the state increased. Tribal politics did not disappear from Transjordan, but their autonomy did. The judicial legacy of the Mandate period lasted well into the post-independence history of Jordan.

Developing Social Infrastructure: Department of Public Health

Although the majority of the Transjordan budget was allocated towards defense and security, even departments with small budgets made sizeable impacts on state institutional development.²³¹ The Department of Public Health was chronically underfunded. In 1929, the Department of Public Health's budget accounted for roughly 3.5% of the total expenditure of Transjordan and by 1939, this share had reduced to 2%.²³² The Department of Public Health used this paltry budget to improve upon the poor standards of healthcare that existed in the Ottoman period. The only hospital in Transjordan before the Mandate was the small Christian Missionary Society (CMS) Hospital in Salt, which was built in the 1883 with fifteen beds, a clinic and surgery. The Italian National Association opened a small hospital in Karak in 1919 and a Dr. Kumar Sanyal opened a private clinic in Irbid in 1920.²³³ In 1921, Dr. Charlotte Purnell of the CMS opened the only hospital in Amman. The hospital was for women and children. Dr. Purnell financed the hospital largely from her own personal funds.²³⁴

²³¹ The allocation for security increased from 28% of budget in 1924 to 36% in 1936 to a high of 74% in 1946 (due to World War II). The drastic increase in allocation came with World War II when the Arab Legion was transformed from a security and police force to a true army. (Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan," 308).

²³² Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 290 and 314. The total budget in 1929 for the Health Department was LP 10,922 and in 1939, it was LP 16,801.

²³³ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 223.

²³⁴ IWM, Peake Collection, Peake autobiography, 155.

The Department of Public Health was one of the few sections of the Mandatory government that was unable to build upon Ottoman precedent. The only Ottoman policy carried over into the Mandate period was the use of quarantines to contain the spread of infectious diseases.²³⁵ Although midwives and folk doctors continued to work in Transjordan, their existence is far from a continuation of “Ottoman policy” as historian Marwan Hanania asserts.²³⁶ Instead, the Department of Health had to function independently with help from non-government healthcare facilities. Once again, financial constraints limited the feasible extent of government oversight and control during the Mandate period.

The Department of Public Health was established in 1923 but did not submit a health report until 1926. Similar to many other Mandate era empty ministries the Department of Public Health only became a true functioning entity years after its creation. Although all of the ministries of Transjordan were created in one fell swoop, they did not truly come into functional existence until there was an explicit need for improvement. This “need” for improvement was a byproduct of both increased British interest and the growing population of Transjordan. The Health Law of 1926 set the basic parameters of the Department of Public Health’s mission. The ordinance published on March 1, 1926, passed regulations on quarantine, anti-malaria measures, vaccinations, proper burial, medical practitioner licensing, and sanitation standards.²³⁷ This law should be understood as an extension of the government’s security apparatus. The Department of Public Health focused on preventive medicine, measures that would prevent epidemics

²³⁵ Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 165.

²³⁶ Hanania, “From Colony to Capital,” 113 and 213-15.

²³⁷ BNA, CO 831/2/2, “Department of Health Report 1927.”

that could destabilize the state. The Department did not focus on individual care; it focused on population control.

Similar to the Ministry of Justice, the leadership of the Department was split between the Arab ministerial head and the British administrative director. The British Director of Health throughout the Mandate was Dr. G.W. Heron and the first Minister of Health was Dr. Halim Abu Rahmeh (1926-1939). As the administrative head, Dr. Heron was responsible for submitting annual reports on the level of healthcare in Transjordan. When appraising the healthcare situation in Transjordan in 1927, The Director of Health noted, “With limited funds, in a country, although thinly populated, with a large area, and a population consisting largely of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the task is a difficult one.” In 1927, there were only twelve medical staff employed in government service. The Central Medical Board in Amman was responsible for the licensing of all new medical staff.²³⁸ The country was in dire need of more medical practitioners, particularly pharmacists, dentists, and midwives. There were only two certified midwives in all of Transjordan in 1927 for a total population of roughly 300,000 people. The staff of the Department in Amman consisted of only a handful of individuals to aid the Director.²³⁹ Mirroring the focus on preventative medicine, most of the staff were sanitary inspectors (nine in total) who were meant to curtail epidemics and identify possible health problems for the state. In addition to the hospitals, dispensaries operated in Irbid, Jerash, Salt,

²³⁸ BNA, CO 831/60/2, BR Kirkbride to HC MacMichael, “Situation of TJ for the Month of July 1943,” 3/8/1943. Brief mention in record of some dysfunction in the central medical board. The board was defiant towards the Director of Health at the instigation of a Dr. Mustafa Khalifa. Once it was ascertained that he was the ringleader, he was removed from the Board and the remaining members of the board apologized to the government.

²³⁹ The staff in Amman consisted of the director, assistant director, chief clerk, two assistant clerks, one chief inspector, one orderly, a medical officer of health, two sanitary sub-inspectors, and an ambulance driver in addition to the government hospital’s staff and lab staff.

Madeba, Karak, Tafila, Ma'an, and Aqaba. There were also three permanent quarantine stations at Remtha on the Syrian border, at the Amman Hijaz Railway station, and at Ma'an.²⁴⁰ The Department added an additional four inspectors in 1932 but was still under-staffed.²⁴¹

The small staff and budget of the Department made a focus only on curative medicine impractical. There was a particular emphasis on anti-malaria measures and vaccinations against smallpox, typhoid, and cholera. Epidemics had become a problem in Transjordan in the late nineteenth century. The rapid expansion of towns and villages without proper sanitation provisions led to outbreaks of typhoid and cholera. Increased population density in these growing settlements also led to the spread of "vermin-borne diseases such as typhus." Transjordan, which had been remarkable for its cleanliness in the mid- nineteenth century, had deteriorated rapidly by the beginning of the twentieth century. The danger of epidemics continued to grow in severity as the population of Transjordan grew during the Mandate.²⁴²

"Health issues" were dealt with as extensions of the state's desire to control and regulate the population of Transjordan. Healthcare was simply another moniker for the security concerns of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The introduction of the modern medical apparatus and system, which Foucault calls "medicalization" allowed the state another realm of control over its population.²⁴³ Through medicalization, traditional attitudes towards health and illness eroded and professional medical services, which had been

²⁴⁰ BNA, CO 831/2/2, "Department of Health Report 1927."

²⁴¹ BNA, CO 831/31/2, "Department of Health Report 1933."

²⁴² Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 165.

²⁴³ Michel Foucault, "The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine," trans. Edgar C. Knowlton Jr. and Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault Studies*, 1 (2004): 12-15. For more on the introduction of the modern medical institution see Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).

previously unknown, took their place. Additionally, this same process diminished the independence of the patient while increasing the power of the medical profession.²⁴⁴ In the case of Transjordan, the majority of the medical profession was connected to the state, which in turn increased the dominion of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Vaccinations and quarantine protocols limited free movement in Transjordan and allowed the state to control the threat that infected individuals could pose to the rest of the population, and more importantly the stability of the Anglo-Hashemite regime.

Mosquitos posed the largest health threat to the stability of the regime because they were a chronic problem in the Jordan Valley and Amman. Malaria had long been associated with Amman and the Jordan Valley and had been one of the reasons that Amman had remained relatively uninhabited for so long. The Department of Public Health's anti-malaria campaign started in 1926. The campaign consisted of two types of activity: the identification and treatment of water sources and the vaccination and treatment of the populace. By 1929, malaria rates throughout Transjordan dropped substantially. However, malaria remained a persistent problem throughout the Mandate period due to the small number of staff and limited expenditure of the Department.²⁴⁵

The improvement of water sanitation throughout Transjordan also played a large role in the prevention of water-borne illnesses, such as typhoid. New sanitation laws were passed in 1930 that dictated that anyone who occupied a building was responsible for the removal of any "filth, house refuse or sweepings, or other objectionable matter in or on

²⁴⁴ Claudia Huerkamp, "The History of Smallpox Vaccination in Germany: A First Step in the Medicalization of the General Public," *Journal of Contemporary History* 20 (1985): 617.

²⁴⁵ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the year 1929," 6/2/1930, 33-36.

such buildings or in their immediate vicinity.”²⁴⁶ The application of such laws went a long way to helping improve the sanitary conditions of towns and villages alike throughout Transjordan. The other major preventative campaign dealt with smallpox vaccinations. There were over 64,000 vaccinations against smallpox in 1928 alone. The total population of Transjordan at the time was under 250,000 people.²⁴⁷ Improved water sanitation and the vaccination campaigns helped to drastically reduce the number of smallpox, typhoid and cholera cases. These campaigns were most effective in Amman, which saw the sharpest decrease in the number of infectious disease cases. Amman possessed the most advanced sanitation and healthcare facilities in Transjordan, which in turn improved its overall health. These vast vaccination campaigns brought the Transjordan population into direct contact with modern medicine, and by extension the modern state. Again, the primary concern of the Department of Public Health was the prevention of epidemics, not improvements for individual healthcare.

The Department also undertook measures to improve infant and child health. The establishment of infant welfare centers in Salt and Amman helped reduce infant mortality rates. However, the low number of midwives in the country meant that the infant mortality rates remained high ranging from roughly 21% in 1932 to 15% in 1943.²⁴⁸ British Resident Cox acknowledged the need for more midwives and more infant treatment centers in 1934, but took no actions to alleviate the situation.²⁴⁹ His inaction was likely the result of a lack of available funds. By 1943, there were only fourteen

²⁴⁶ BNA, CO 831/7/2, Public Health legislation 1930.

²⁴⁷ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, “Report on the Administration of TJ for the year 1929,” 6/2/1930, 33-36.

²⁴⁸ Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey*, 106.

²⁴⁹ BNA, CO 831/28/5, BR Cox to HC, 18/1/1934.

licensed midwives in the entire country.²⁵⁰ The Department of Public Health gave free treatment of trachoma and other eye diseases at all government dispensaries and schools. These treatments, coupled with sanitation improvements in school buildings throughout Transjordan, improved child welfare.

The combination of the vaccination programs and student health inspections brought the majority of the Transjordan population into contact with modern medicine. In this way, the process of vaccination acted as a way to medicalize the population and have them grow accustomed to the practices of modern preventative medicine and the role of the modern medical professional.²⁵¹ Despite the high efficiency of the Department, Director Heron acknowledged that several services considered essential elsewhere were almost completely neglected in Transjordan.²⁵² It is likely that Dr. Heron wished he could focus more on curative medicine instead of programs that were purely preventative in nature. However, the scope of modern medicine in Transjordan remained connected to preventive measures and public services that aided the population over the individual. The inoculation and treatment of schoolchildren in particular emphasized the importance of the group over that of the individual patient.²⁵³

The British government did impose one initiative on the Department of Public Health, the need to improve the treatment of the Bedouin population. Dr. Norman MacLennan compiled a report on the health of the desert-based tribes in 1934. Dr. MacLennan reported intense malnourishment of the tribes, which he described as “a state of affairs which is nothing less than a disgrace to the government.” Of the 1030 people he

²⁵⁰ BNA, CO 831/36/7, “Department of Health Report 1934,” 22/4/1936.

²⁵¹ Huerkamp, “The History of Smallpox Vaccination in Germany,” 631.

²⁵² BNA, CO 831/28/5, “Department of Health Report 1932,” G.W. Heron to Chief Secretary, 6/2/1934.

²⁵³ Ibid.

examined, only 164, or about 16%, were “well nourished.” He also addressed alarmingly high rates of tuberculosis amongst tribesmen. These distressing findings were a result of the drought and famine that affected Transjordan throughout the early 1930s. Dr. MacLennan concluded his report by stating, “The incidence of disease is likely to increase, for a time, particularly now that they are more in contact with civilization, and that their bodily resistance is at such a low ebb. The outlook appears grave and requires serious attention.”²⁵⁴ Although he never concedes it directly, Dr. MacLennan’s acknowledgment of the impact of civilization on the Bedouin romanticizes their natural state apart from the rest of Transjordan. It implies that civilization and modernity are inherently problematic and unhealthy for the Bedouin. This description implicitly notes the two realms of Transjordan at the time: the sphere of the state and sphere of the Bedouin. These dominions blurred as the government attempted to sway the nomadic populations of Transjordan to settle throughout the 1930s and 1940s.²⁵⁵ Regardless of any romanticized image of the Bedouin, Dr. MacLennan’s findings necessitated the formation of the Desert Mobile Medical Unit. The new unit, created in late 1936, roughly followed tribal migration east of the Hijaz Railway. The unit’s actions coupled with drought relief funds from the British government helped improve the dire situation of the tribes in the mid-1930s.²⁵⁶

Although far from perfect, the Department of Public Health improved living conditions in Transjordan. Akin to the Department of Justice, there was both an Arab

²⁵⁴ MECA, Glubb Collection, “Report on administration of Deserts for August/September-October 1934.”

²⁵⁵ An example of such measures were the Colonial Development Fund water bore projects from 1933-1939. The hope was that these new wells would aid Bedouins in the desert to pursue cultivation. (BNA, CO 831/38/1, BR Cox to Crown Agents, 13/7/1936).

²⁵⁶ BNA, CO 831/37/1, “Report on the Month of March 1936 on the Political Situation by the BR of Amman,” 2/4/1936; CO 831/51/6, G.W. Heron to Chief Secretary Ibrahim Hashim, 6/2/1939.

ministerial post and an English administrator. In both departments, Arabs carried out the majority of the day-to-day functions of the Department. Additionally, both departments reinforced the centrality of the Mandatory government. The medicalization of the Transjordanian populace further engrained in the population the necessity of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The Department of Public Health determined its own policies and programs, with the exception of the Desert Mobile Medical Unit, and was rather successful considering its meager resources. Arab control and influence were predominant in tribal affairs for both departments as well. By 1938, the Department had successfully prevented epidemics in Transjordan for over two years and achieved a degree of stability throughout Transjordan. Preventative procedures enabled the state to prevent epidemic-induced panic and maintain a calm status quo throughout Transjordan. This stability in turn afforded the Department an aura of legitimacy amongst the populace of Transjordan.²⁵⁷

Expanding Social Infrastructure: The Department of Education

Similar to the Department of Public Health, the Department of Education was asked to accomplish a lot for the Transjordan government without a great deal of financial backing. These tight financial constraints were the only limitations, however, that the government imposed on the Department. Beyond its annual budget, the Department of Education was able to operate independently of imperial or local meddling. This approach mirrored the Mandatory education policies in neighboring Iraq. In both Iraq and Transjordan, education was largely left to the local populace with

²⁵⁷ BNA, CO 831/51/6, Chief Minister Ibrahim Hashim to BR Cox, 23/8/1938.

minimal colonial interference.²⁵⁸ This lack of interference was due to the state's belief that education was not a security-sensitive issue. As a result, throughout the majority of the Mandate period, government schools in Transjordan ran under Ottoman education laws. The majority of male children began their education in an elementary level Qur'anic recitation school (*al-kuttab*). In *kuttab*, an imam taught Arabic, Qur'an, Islamic history and basic arithmetic. The secondary school version of the same institutions were known as *madrasas*. The Ottoman state had begun to expand education beyond Qur'an and language study during the Tanzimat period in the late 1830s, though these reforms did not make it to Transjordan until the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 1880s. New subjects introduced by the Ottoman reforms included geography, history, mathematics, and hygiene.²⁵⁹

The introduction of new Ottoman government schools into Transjordan coincided with the Ottoman state's efforts to increase control over the region in the second half of the twentieth century. Primary schools for boys were opened in Salt in 1880, in Karak in 1894, and in Tafila and Ma'an al-Hijazziya in 1897, and Ma'an al-Shamiyya and Shawbak in 1899. Girls' schools were also opened in Salt and Karak. The government opened a secondary school in Karak in 1899, in Ma'an al-Hijazziya in 1899, and in Tafila in 1911. An additional fourteen schools opened in small villages and tribal areas from 1897 to 1915. All of these schools followed the same curriculum as other schools throughout the empire and their graduates were eligible to continue their education in Damascus and Istanbul.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 193-210.

²⁵⁹ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 176.

²⁶⁰ Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 155-57.

The focus on schooling in the late Ottoman Empire was a means to discipline and educate the population. The Ottoman state hoped to stress Ottomanist ideals (reinforce the connections of the Empire's population to the Empire itself) through education. The Ottoman state introduced the vocational orphanages (*islahhanes*) in the 1870s to train children in a trade and reinforce the centrality of the Ottoman regime.²⁶¹ The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) attempted to further modernize Ottoman education through the Ottoman Elementary Education Law of 1914. This law was meant to levy taxes on local immovable property, "the Municipal Education Rates," but the law was never enacted fully during the Ottoman period due to the outbreak of World War II. The Transjordan state resurrected the law in 1937, but only utilized it in Amman and Salt.²⁶²

In addition to government schools, there were also a fair number of missionary schools established throughout Transjordan during the late Ottoman period. The Greek Orthodox Church (1850 for boys), Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem (1870 for boys and 1871 for girls), and the England-based CMS school (1867, co-ed) all had schools in Salt. By the 1870s, there were seven schools in Salt alone.²⁶³ However, the Ottoman state closed a number of these schools in the 1880s in an effort to quell the evangelical zeal of the missionary schools. The Ottomans also forbade Muslim students from attending missionary schools in Salt in 1884. Around the same time, the Greek Orthodox Church also pushed back against Western-backed missionary groups who were converting their

²⁶¹ Nazan Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities and the State: Vocational Orphanages (*Islahhanes*) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011): 493-99.

²⁶² Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East* (Menasha: George Banta Publishing Company, 1949), 302.

²⁶³ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 177.

congregants. By 1886, the Ottoman government had closed all CMS schools east of the Jordan River in an effort to quell foreign influence.²⁶⁴

After World War I, only four government schools remained in all of Transjordan. From 1921-1924, the education system in Transjordan slowly rebounded from the War. Missionary schools, which had closed during the War, began to reopen and government schools began to spread throughout Transjordan. The Department of Education and Antiquities was established in 1923 with Rida Tawfiq as the first Director.²⁶⁵ Adib Wahbah succeeded him in 1924 and served until 1937.²⁶⁶ The final Director of Education was Samir Rifai who served from 1937 through independence in 1946.²⁶⁷ By 1928, there were fifty-seven government schools and a hundred non-government schools (44 Christian schools, 13 Girls' Schools, and 43 Muslim Schools).²⁶⁸ In 1929, there were five Christian Missionary Society (CMS) schools, four American based Christian Missionary Alliance schools, twenty-five Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem schools, nine Greek Catholic Church schools, and twelve Eastern Orthodox Church schools. In these religious schools, the majority of the teachers were Arab.²⁶⁹ A full education in Transjordan included seven years of elementary school (ages 6-13) and four years of secondary education. However, few schools in Transjordan actually offered all of the required years. Numerous "incomplete" primary and secondary schools only offered a fraction of the required course load. As few as ten schools offered full elementary programs in 1935 of

²⁶⁴ Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 144-46.

²⁶⁵ The Department of Education and the Department of Antiquities were separated by 1924.

²⁶⁶ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 224-25.

²⁶⁷ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of October 1937," 2/11/1937.

²⁶⁸ BNA, CO 733/171/2, Palestine and TJ Annual Report for 1928, 105-107.

²⁶⁹ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929," 30-32.

the sixty government elementary schools. A limited budget curtailed both school growth and the number of years offered at elementary and secondary schools throughout the Mandate period.²⁷⁰

There were a number of attempts to reform the education system during the Mandate period. A technical board of seventeen teachers designed a revised syllabus for the state in 1929 in an effort to improve the standard of education in the country.²⁷¹ However, early attempts at educational reform were stymied by a lack of suitably trained teaching staff.²⁷² Training new staff was expensive and similar to other departments; the Department of Education was chronically short on cash. In 1930, the O'Donnell Commission exacerbated these fiscal shortcomings when it recommended reducing the budget for the Department of Education by an additional LP 9,500. The commission argued a budget ceiling of a mere LP 15,000 should be adequate.²⁷³ By 1945, the entire budget of the Department of Education only amounted to 1.1% of the total budget of Transjordan.²⁷⁴ These budget reductions make it clear that education in Transjordan was an Arab project and a private project. It was not the domain of the colonizer because it was not perceived to have direct security implications. The only exception to this imperial indifference related to child hygiene because of its importance for general public health.

Substantive change finally came in 1939, with Education Regulations Number One and Two. These regulations made government elementary schools free and compulsory for both boys and girls, mandated that private schools obtain the permission

²⁷⁰ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 308-09.

²⁷¹ BNA, FO 864/4, "Transjordan: Political Reports for Second Quarter, 1929 (1/4/1929-30/6/1929)."

²⁷² BNA, CO 831/5/9, "Transjordan: Political Reports for Third Quarter, 1929 (1/7/1929-30/9/1929)."

²⁷³ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 182-83.

²⁷⁴ Matthews and Akrawi, *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East*, 301.

of the minister of education before being opened, and that all schools must cover the subjects of Arabic (minimum five lessons per week), history, and geography of the Arab world. These regulations cancelled all preexisting Ottoman education laws. Even with these changes, by 1945, there were only twelve complete elementary schools in Transjordan and the only complete secondary school was located in Salt. By the end of the Mandate, there were 9,874 total students in seventy-three government schools and 6,472 students in non-government schools, of which two-thirds were Christian. All of this was overseen by a small ministry staff, which included the Director, assistant director, and three district inspectors responsible for general administration of schools and assuring quality of instruction.²⁷⁵

The economic constraints put on the Department of Education during the Mandate limited its ability to innovate and improve. As a result, private schools, not government schools, offered the premier education in Transjordan. Two of the most prestigious schools in Transjordan were in Amman. These two sister Christian schools, affiliated with the Patriarch in Jerusalem, were the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) School for Girls (later named the Ahliyyah School for Girls), and the Bishop's School (for boys). Both of these schools were located in the elite enclave of Jabal Amman.

The CMS School for Girls opened in Jabal Amman in 1926. The Bishop's School opened across the street from the CMS School in 1936. The CMS and patriarchate in Jerusalem did not provide much of the funding for their respective schools. In fact, the CMS only paid for the headmistress in the girls' school. The CMS School and the

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 306-320. The three district inspectors each had assessed the quality of one or two subjects. For example, one inspector may have been responsible for English and social sciences while another was responsible for Qur'an and Islamic history. Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell (the poet 'Arar) served as an educational inspector from 1940-1941.

Bishop's School both received funding from the British Council and local investment. By 1942, the school had 117 students and its staff consisted of its headmistress, Ms. Wilkinson, seven full-time teachers and one visiting teacher.²⁷⁶ All instruction, except for Arabic classes, was conducted in English. The school taught kindergarten (which included boys) through eleventh grade (three years of secondary school). Due to the increased demand for English language education by the growing population of Amman, the school continued to grow throughout the Mandate period and its premises expanded a number of times. Despite its expansions, requests for enrollment and for boarding students constantly outstripped the resources of the school in the 1940s.²⁷⁷ The CMS School was the only girls' secondary school program in Transjordan and taught both Christian and Muslim students. The CMS School was the first girls' school in Amman and remains one of the preeminent girls' schools in Amman today. (Appendix 1, figure 2-1 photo of CMS school entrance)

The Bishop's School, located in the same block as the CMS School, offered nine grades from fourth grade through twelfth. The Bishop's School was one of only two boys' schools in Transjordan to offer all four years of secondary education.²⁷⁸ There was a tendency for students to leave after the third year of secondary school to begin instruction at the American University of Beirut (AUB). If students completed their final year of secondary school and passed the Transjordan matriculation exam, they started as sophomores at AUB. The Bishop's School continued to grow at the same pace of the CMS School throughout its first decade of existence and had 212 students in

²⁷⁶ BNA, BW 60/3, K.M. Willey, "Report on the CMS Girls' School Amman," 18/3/1942.

²⁷⁷ Matthews and Akrawi, *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East*, 320.

²⁷⁸ The second complete secondary school was located in neighboring Salt.

1945/1946.²⁷⁹ The Bishop's School, unlike the CMS School, taught the lower grades in Arabic and as a result, English proficiency was often a problem for secondary students. Despite these deficiencies, the school was viewed by the British as a positive force in Amman. In 1942, the British Council appraised the school as "doing liberal and influential work and while it has received a great deal of financial support from the Council, it continues to grow at a steady rate so that expansion is necessary."²⁸⁰ By the end of the Mandate in 1946, the school had expanded beyond its original three-bay style central house.²⁸¹ (Appendix 1, figure 2-2 photo of original building of the Bishop's School)

Given its proximity to numerous government buildings and government officials' homes, the Bishop's School also received direct support from the government on occasion. Major John Bagot Glubb, the Commander of the Arab Legion, provided financial and logistical support to the school's division of the Boy Scouts a number of times.²⁸² Scouting offered British officials a way to influence youth development in Transjordan without being directly involved in the curriculum. Since its inception by Robert Baden-Powell in 1907, scouting had spread quickly, and had been promoted by the British and the French in their Middle Eastern Mandates.²⁸³ High Commissioner of Iraq Henry Dobbs said that "[t]he Boy Scout movement has been a resounding success throughout the land... The movement is full of hope for the future and does much to

²⁷⁹ Matthews and Akrawi, *Education in Arab Countries of the Near East*, 321-22.

²⁸⁰ BNA, BW 60/2, K.M. Wiley, "Report on the Bishop's School, Amman," 16/2/1942.

²⁸¹ The three-bay house will be discussed in detail in chapter 6 in reference to the different residential architectural styles found in Mandate era Amman.

²⁸² MECA, Glubb collection, J.E. Sutton to Glubb, 27/7/1945.

²⁸³ Jennifer M. Dueck, "A Muslim Jamboree: Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon under the French Mandate," *French Historical Studies* 30 (Summer 2007): 489-90. Scouting in the Levant actually predated the Mandate System and had arrived in Lebanon as early as 1912.

encourage the tender plant of 'Iraq[sic] nationality.'²⁸⁴ The British supported the spread of the scouting movement throughout their Mandates with individual colonial administrators taking leadership roles in local troops, providing supplies, and at times, financial assistance. The movement also had religious backing. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, "heartily endorsed the movement in 1931" with little concern for its Protestant Christian roots.²⁸⁵ British High Commissioners in Palestine supported the scouting movement in the 1920s and 1930s, even accepting the honorific title of Chief Scout of Palestine. Since the High Commissioner was in charge of both Palestine and Transjordan, it can be surmised that this support extended to scouting in Transjordan as well.²⁸⁶

The Boy Scout movement was introduced in Transjordan in the early 1920s, but was not acknowledged as a formal part of the global scouting organization until 1953. Girl Guides were introduced in 1938.²⁸⁷ In Transjordan, the scouting movement was not as directly tied to the Mandatory officials. There are no indications from the British records that the Mandatory government ever officially supported scouting. It appears that the leaders of the Arab Legion, Frederick Peake and later John Bagot Glubb, both individually supported the scouting movement in Transjordan.²⁸⁸ There are anecdotal references to a large scouting movement in Transjordan but no precise figures regarding

²⁸⁴ John Harte, "Scouting in Mandate Palestine," *Council for British Research in the Levant Bulletin* 2008 (vol. 3), 48.

²⁸⁵ Dueck, "Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon," 491-92.

²⁸⁶ Harte, "Scouting in Mandate Palestine, 48-50. The British, in time, soured on scouting in Palestine because it inculcated an oppositional spirit in its members that was not conducive with the wishes of the Mandatory Government.

²⁸⁷ "The Jordan Association for Boy Scouts and Girl Guides," World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.wagggs.org/en/world/organisations?mo=72>.

²⁸⁸ MECA, Glubb collection, J.E. Sutton to Glubb, 27/7/1945.

participation or structure.²⁸⁹ Scouting was a regional movement with huge scouting groups in neighboring French Syria and Lebanon. Syrian scouts visited and interacted with the Transjordanian scouting community in 1942.²⁹⁰ Scouting was the largest movement directly associated with education in Transjordan and scout troops were associated with both the Bishop's School and the CMS School in Amman. Although not directly connected to the Department of Education, British support for scouting was the only colonial intervention into Education in Transjordan. The scouting movement also injected a martial and security aspect into Transjordan education, which was otherwise absent.

The departments of Public Health and Education both were responsible for the creation of a sizeable portion of Transjordan's institutional and societal development. Neither institution had a great deal of financial backing. Despite their financial shortcomings, these departments had to cover a large, sparsely populated territory. Both departments operated without a great deal of local or imperial oversight. The Department of Public Health did have a British Director associated with its administration, but local employees carried out the overwhelming majority of its work. This British presence was directly tied to the security implications of the new modern healthcare system. The new Department of Public Health was tasked not only with preventing outbreaks, but also in tracking the inhabitants of Transjordan through infection rates and mortality reports. The Department of Education, on the other hand, operated without any imperial oversight

²⁸⁹ Beatrice Erskine notes a large group/gathering/troop of boy scouts meeting King Hussein on his visit to Amman in 1924. Photographs of the procession show Arab Legion troops but it is unclear if some of these troops were in fact scouts from the photographs. Mrs. Stuart Erskine, *Transjordan* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1924), 45.

²⁹⁰ Jennifer M. Dueck, *The Claims of Culture at Empire's End: Syria and Lebanon under French Rule* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 199.

whatsoever with the exception of the appropriation of its annual budget. This colonial indifference was a result of the belief that the Department's activities were benign and non-security related. Removed from the security apparatus of the rest of the state, the Department of Education was uniquely free to operate independently. Though diminutive in size and economic resources, both departments accomplished a great deal and went a long way towards creating a functional state in Transjordan. This was only possible because both ministries were able to build upon preexisting Ottoman structures. Without these Ottoman vestiges, the function and administration of both departments would have been nearly impossible. There simply was not enough money in the Transjordan budget to create a new education and health system from scratch.

Conclusion

Every infrastructural program and investment undertaken by the government, with the exception of the Department of Education, served the constant imperative for increased security. All of these programs emanated from Amman, constantly increasing the new capital's gravity in Transjordan. Infrastructural advancement improved Amman's functional oversight and concentrated the amorphous authority of the government into a new distinct space. British interest in the Mandate shifted from one of passing importance during the tenure of Chief British Representative Harold Philby to a degree of direct imperial oversight during the terms of British Residents Henry Cox (1924-1939) and Alec Kirkbride (1939-1946). Gradually, the Potemkin ministries of the early years of the Mandate became legitimate government entities with productive successful programs. The transformation of Mandate era ministries was a reflection of increased imperial

oversight and concern with Transjordan. This increased British focus on Transjordan coincided with the expansion of the powers and responsibilities of the office of the British Resident. It became increasingly important for the British Resident and his supporting staff (including the Judicial Adviser, Financial Adviser, and Director of Health), to both enact and push back against British imperial policy. The “man on the spot” was crucial for the development of Transjordan’s government structure and function.

The gradual growth and improvement of the Transjordan government were always in the service of promoting regional tranquility. This keen interest in protecting surrounding British imperial interests led to the development of Transjordan’s transportation and communication networks. However, all infrastructural advancement in Transjordan built upon preexisting Ottoman practices and institutions. Almost nothing in Transjordan was built from scratch. Everything was an outgrowth of centuries of Ottoman imperial practice. This was particularly evident in the development of Transjordan’s judicial and education structures. Although the Department of Health had little Ottoman infrastructure to build on, it did rely on numerous non-government officials and institutions to best serve the populace of Transjordan.

These three departments’ expansion emanated from their departmental homes in Amman. The various British led ministries slowly expanded Transjordan’s infrastructure and institutions. Although led by British administrators, these ministries were almost entirely staffed by Arabs. The Legislative Council and the Executive Council both shaped the Transjordanian budget but final approval always remained in the hands of the British. Regardless of its origin, programs suggested by both British administrators and

Transjordanian Council members, were executed by local civil servants. In general, administrative affairs that fell outside the purview of defense and security concerns garnered more fiscal independence. This financial freedom was most evident in the Department of Education. Each of these departments helped centralize authority in the new capital. However, financial constraints limited the scope of feasible governmental control. Tribal affairs remained distinct from the normal affairs of the Transjordanian state. Despite these limitations, the growth of Transjordan's social and judicial networks coincided with the limited enlargement and advancement of Amman's municipal infrastructure. Although limited in their scope, these developments helped to fashion Amman into a unique amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. This singular heritage would permeate nearly every aspect of Transjordan's government policies, which manifested themselves in the capital city of Amman.

3: Extraordinary Finance: City Infrastructure in the midst of Imperial Funds, Private Capital, and Local Actors

“Revenues of TJ are insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of administration, and in view of the necessity of limiting the annual grant-in-aid of the TJ government by His Majesty’s Government, I cannot recommend that the capital cost of the new equipment should be met from the revenues of the territory.”²⁹¹

Regional stability and defense concerns alone did not build the Mandate of Transjordan. The Mandate of Transjordan’s grant-in-aid, utilized to fund security-related projects, only went so far. For the British, the creation of a centralized state in Transjordan was critical to the Britain’s imperial interests in the region. Transjordan had to be pacified and secure to protect British interests in Transjordan’s neighbors, Iraq and Palestine. However, large-scale infrastructural or developmental projects were beyond the scope or reach of the Transjordan budget. In order to facilitate more expansive projects, and projects without explicit security ramifications, funding had to come from outside of the Colonial Office. The quote above by acting High Commissioner Hathorn

²⁹¹ BNA, CO 831/30/4, acting HC Hathorn Hall to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 3/11/1934.

Hall is found on every document requesting additional funds from the British Treasury. This rather dry language was the magic formula that necessitated the need for external funds. Three types of extraordinary funding financed further infrastructural and institutional development in Transjordan, and Amman specifically: imperially controlled funding of the Colonial Development Fund (CDF), various foreign concessions, and local entrepreneurial investment.

The Colonial Development Fund called for specific formulaic applications and each grant or loan had to satisfy a number of key requirements. These proposals would be adjudicated by the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), which would then in turn send its recommendations to the British Treasury and Secretary of State of the Colonies (SoS). Funding allocations for any given year could not exceed £ 1,000,000. Other provisions stipulated that the Committee should recommend schemes that will eventually fund themselves and that the schemes have the possibility of aiding commerce and industry in the United Kingdom.²⁹² After the approval of the Colonial Development Bill in 1929, which created the CDAC, Transjordan successfully petitioned to be included. As a Mandate territory, Transjordan was able to receive funding from the CDF. Other colonial possessions of the British Empire, such as Egypt and Iraq, could not receive CDAC funds because they were not formal Mandates.²⁹³

Independent foreign capital in the form of concessionary agreements was another option open to the Mandatory government. Concessions were a means to introduce

²⁹² BNA, CO 831/6/4, Colonial Development Bill.

²⁹³ BNA, CO 831/6/4, J.E.S. to G. Grindle, 4/7/1929. Egypt was never a Mandate. It was an unofficial British possession from 1882-1914 and a protectorate and Sultanate from 1914-1922. Egypt's "independence" in 1922 did not end heavy British involvement in Egypt, which continued for an additional thirty years until the Free Officer revolution of 1952. Iraq's independence in 1932 negated its ability to earn CDF grants despite the continuing heavy British involvement in Iraq for years to come.

industry and utility infrastructure to Transjordan but at the cost of natural resources and control over the infrastructure itself. These agreements were extremely unpopular amongst the Legislative Council representatives and general populace of Transjordan because they were devised with minimal, if any, local participation. The local population knew concessions were colonial and foreign agreements, not Transjordanian agreements. The most controversial example of this process was the Palestine Electric Corporation Concession, more commonly known as the “Rutenberg Concession.” Local entrepreneurial investment, in contrast to the concession agreements, was entirely in the hands of the local inhabitants of Transjordan. These Arab businessmen helped to develop Transjordan, and Amman in particular, throughout the Mandate. The only shortcoming from this type of infrastructural and institutional growth, from the perspective of Anglo-Hashemite government, was that it did not have the ability to determine the plans or scope of these developments. Privatization of industry and utilities personified the failings of the Mandatory government. Limited financial resources checked the reach of the government and forced it to rely on actors outside its direct control. This tension between the government’s desire to control the populace and its fiscal realities necessitated the need for local and regional investment in Transjordan.

CDF projects and concessions within Transjordan had an enormous impact on the shaping and development of infrastructure within the Mandate of Transjordan. These infrastructural developments were felt most profoundly within the new capital of Amman. Many of the CDF schemes specifically focused on the capital itself and those that did not were for larger ministerial projects that would be run from Amman. This centralization of finances further streamlined and reinforced British control over the

purse strings of Transjordan. The use of imperial funds, instead of grant-in-aid also further removed the Arab components of the Mandatory government from the larger fiscal decisions of the state. These economic choices were yet another way that the British shaped the character and composition of the burgeoning capital of Amman. The only domain in which Arab participation remained constant was private entrepreneurial investment.

Each of these funding streams had its own pitfalls, but the overall success of new development projects in Transjordan can be determined by the degree of local “buy-in” from the native population. This local familiarity, the ancient Greek concept of *mētis*, was a result of local knowledge resulting from practical experience. The degree of “institutional stickiness” determined the ability or inability of new institutional arrangements to take hold in the Mandate. This “stickiness” was a product of how much *mētis* each project possessed.²⁹⁴ The success of infrastructural and institutional reform and development was directly correlated to how foreign the project felt. The more local and organic a project or plan appeared, the more likely it was to succeed.

Amman Infrastructural Development through CDF

Among the earliest CDF projects were those that helped develop infrastructure throughout Transjordan. These projects were not centered within Amman but they did aid the capital’s development by strengthening the infrastructure of the surrounding area. Three projects in particular, the trans-desert telephone circuit, a bridge spanning Wadi Zarqa, and a desert water-boring scheme, hoped to develop the hinterland of Amman and

²⁹⁴ Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 67 (Apr. 2008): 332-338.

strengthen Amman's importance and centrality. The success of each of these projects varied but they were all designed to strengthen the connectivity and economic position of the new capital. Although these early projects did improve security, each plan had a discrete economic purpose as well. This focus on economic development and self-sufficiency placed these schemes outside the means and purview of standard Transjordan budgetary items.

The early CDF plans also highlighted the problem with utilizing imperial funding within Transjordan. The British handled the entire CDF application procedure. The applications originated with either the British Resident or the British Financial Adviser and made their way through an entirely British hierarchy. There was no Arab involvement in the application for imperial funds whatsoever. As a result, CDF programs had little local support; they had little *mētis*. The problem of "stickiness" became more acute the further a program strayed from local practices.²⁹⁵ The two major CDF infrastructural development schemes in Amman, a new telephone exchange and government hospital, were stymied by the twin demons of bureaucratic red tape and local indifference.

As the centrality and importance of Amman grew, its communication needs grew rapidly. As of the early 1930s, wireless traffic worked only sporadically in Amman and telecommunications were not centralized or controlled from Amman. Major John Bagot Glubb, the commander of the Desert Mobile Force and later the Arab Legion (also known as Glubb Pasha), was particularly annoyed with the system because of "this trouble of not

²⁹⁵ Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson, "Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics," 334-35. Boettke *et al.* divide institutional programs into three categories: Foreign-introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions, indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions, and indigenously introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions. FEX being the least sticky type of institution and IEN being the stickiest. All CDF programs were FEX but had varying degrees of local buy-in.

being allowed to talk to each other when we like.”²⁹⁶ The telephone exchange that existed in Amman at that point was quite antiquated and over-taxed. The system consisted of “a magneto exchange consisting of 2 non-multiple 100 line units coupled together accommodating trunks, junctions, and subscribers. The boards are of an old western electric pattern with non-selfrestoring drops arranged in a separate field unassociated with their respective jacks. Magneto clearing is used.” The calling rate was high with sharp peaks in calling times. With over 170 subscribers (100 official lines, 70 commercial lines) and no record operator, it was impossible for the operators to handle all of the trunk calls and dockets efficiently. This overtaxed telephone exchange needed immediate replacement. The CDF plan for the installation of a new Amman telephone exchange was hugely important. However, akin to other CDF funded installations, the completion rate of the project was far from ideal.²⁹⁷

With these deficiencies in mind, Chief Engineer W.K. Brasher advised the installation of a new CB exchange for 300/600 lines with one trunk and a combined record position. He estimated that the new exchange, which could be sourced from the Egyptians, and an expanded exchange staff, would cost approximately LP 4000.²⁹⁸ In the CDF proposal prepared by Brasher, he noted that the only thing preventing work moving forward on a new exchange was a lack of funds. He estimated that the scheme would take approximately a year to complete once funds were made available.²⁹⁹ Both the acting High Commissioner (HC) Hathorn Hall and Secretary of State (SoS) Cunliffe-Lister strongly endorsed the proposal. Hall noted that the “revenues of Transjordan are

²⁹⁶ MECA, Glubb collection, Glubb to Peake, 12/1/1933.

²⁹⁷ BNA, CO 831/30/4, Chief Engineer W.K. Brasher to Postmaster General, 3/11/1933.

²⁹⁸ BNA, CO 831/30/4, Chief Engineer W.K. Brasher to Postmaster General, 3/11/1933.

²⁹⁹ BNA, CO 831/30/4, “Application for Assistance from Colonial Development Fund for Purchase and Installation of a New Telephone Exchange at Amman,” 3/11/1934.

insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of administration, and in view of the necessity of limiting the annual grant-in-aid of the TJ government by His Majesty's Government, I cannot recommend that the capital cost of the new equipment should be met from the revenues of the territory." Cunliffe-Lister advocated for the approval of the CDF scheme because it was crucial to update the telephone exchange in order to aid centralization of trade and business in Amman.³⁰⁰

Despite these strong endorsements, the CDAC had some reservations. They were willing to dispense funds for the project, but only as a loan with a 3.5% interest rate to be repaid over fifteen years. The Mandatory government eventually accepted these new terms, but then the problem of finding a suitable location for the new telephone and telegraph exchange arose.³⁰¹ As a result, the exchange plan was tabled temporarily when plans for a new general post office in Amman moved forward. The British hoped that the new post office building would also be able to house the exchange. The construction of the new building was scheduled to begin in August of 1939 and the government hoped that by March or April of 1940 the exchange would be able to be installed. After the plans came back from consultation with the Palestine Department of Public Works, it was determined that the plan would be far more expensive than originally envisioned, and a new application to the CDF would be necessary.³⁰²

In a report to the Secretary of State, High Commissioner MacMichael explained that the delay in the exchange was due to a change in the approach for housing it.

Initially, the plan was to lease land on which to erect the exchange. Instead, the

³⁰⁰ BNA, CO 831/30/4, "Colonial Office Memorandum on Application of Transjordan for Amman Exchange to CDF," 4/1/1935.

³⁰¹ BNA CO, 831/33/3, L.S. Smith of CDAC to under SoS, 5/2/1935 and HC to SoS 20/11/1935.

³⁰² BNA, CO 831/47/3, Andrews ESQ chief secretary office Jerusalem, 19/5/1939.

Mandatory government had decided to purchase land and construct a new government-owned building at a rough cost of LP 10,000. It was not until late 1938 that land could be acquired for the building and by the time the plans had been approved by the Palestine Department of Posts and Telegraphs war had broken out which in turn deferred the project once again. In May 1940, an engineer from Palestine recommended certain “palliative measures” at a cost of LP 300, which would allow the present installation to carry on for at least twelve more months.³⁰³ The engineer’s report noted that the exchange was nearing the end of its useful life and that there was pressing need for more lines due to heavy traffic from military and civil services. As of June 1942, the building’s foundations and main concrete frame had been completed and work began on the ground floor so that the exchange equipment could be installed. The High Commissioner estimated that the cost of a central battery exchange and for the subsequent subscribers’ equipment, cables and switchboards would cost approximately LP 13,600. This new project cost would require the still yet unused LP 4000 from the original CDF loan to be supplemented by an additional LP 9600 to either be provided by an increase to grant-in-aid or a new CDF grant or loan with a term of twenty years.³⁰⁴

The CDAC in conjunction with the wartime welfare and advisory committee decided they were “prepared to support the proposal that the loan sanctioned in 1935 should be cancelled and that they will recommend the grant of a new loan of LP 13,600 under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.”³⁰⁵ As of September 1942, General Electric agents from Palestine oversaw the project as part of the war effort and

³⁰³ Amadouny, “The British Role in the Development Transjordan,” 149.

³⁰⁴ BNA, CO 831/58/12, HC MacMichael to SoS Viscount Cranborne, 15/6/1942.

³⁰⁵ BNA, CO 831/58/12, Sir B. Reilly, Mr. Boyse signed by EB Boyd, 7/8/1942

advanced with all possible haste.³⁰⁶ There is no record of when the new exchange was finally opened. This new loan finally helped to update the Amman exchange to deal with the drastically increased levels of traffic associated with World War II. Unfortunately, the delays associated with the project meant that the new exchange only aided Amman's communication capabilities at the tail end of the Mandate. From its original inception, the new Amman telephone exchange took over a decade to be completed. These bureaucratic shortcomings robbed the project of any momentum that might have spurred local support. Throughout the Mandate period, the Mandatory government remained the largest user of the telephone network.³⁰⁷ The major impetus for replacing the telephone exchange had been government use, followed by commercial concerns. Similar to all imperial investment in Transjordan and Amman, economic improvement was always a secondary issue. Because the telephone exchange in Amman only had domestic ramifications, it was never a project of high importance for the British. Unlike the British Imperial Highway, which ran from Baghdad to Haifa, the Amman telephone exchange was only tangentially useful for the British colonial security apparatus. . The Amman exchange had no impact on regional security. The numerous delays in the exchange's installation had a detrimental impact on the development of trade and business interests within Amman.

Bureaucratic inefficiency and the effects of World War II also mired attempts to construct a new government hospital in Amman. Early in the Mandate period Amman only had a single hospital in Amman run by an elderly British woman, Dr. Charlotte Purnell, who paid for most expenses out of pocket.³⁰⁸ At this early stage, health care was almost entirely undertaken by private non-government hospitals The one government

³⁰⁶ BNA, CO 831/58/12, E.B. Boyd to Crown Agents for the Colonies, 30/9/1942.

³⁰⁷ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 150.

³⁰⁸ Hacker, *Modern Amman: A Social History*, 28-30.

hospital in Amman paled in comparison in to the facilities of Amman's private hospitals. The Department of Public Health existed in name only, a true Potemkin ministry, until the passage of the Health Law of 1926. By 1927, there were four hospitals in Amman "staffed and equipped on modern lines [with] the Italian one being the best as the cost thereof amounted to something in the region of LP 12,000."³⁰⁹ The demand for hospitals soon outstripped supply and by 1935, Dr. MacLennan, in his report on health conditions in Transjordan, advocated for the opening of a new government hospital in Amman. It was impossible to cover the expense of a new hospital from the existing grant-in-aid so an application was prepared for the CDF.³¹⁰ Additionally, the provision of curative individual care was beyond the scope of the Department of Public Health's mandate. At no time did the Department of Public Health have the resources to provide curative individual care to the residents of Transjordan.

By the time of the application to the CDF in 1935, the CDF application stated that ninety-six beds were completely inadequate for a Transjordanian population of 300,000 people. The proposed hospital would take two years to complete and cost LP 35,000 not including recurrent expenditure of LP 6,624 that would be covered by the Transjordanian government. Once completed, the new hospital would also raise hospital revenue to LP 2000 annually from the current income of LP 550. After High Commissioner Wauchope endorsed this proposal, Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald returned the proposal stating the need for more rooms for poorer patients. MacDonald's biggest concern was the low number of third-class beds in the current hospital plan. He advocated the reduction of the number of first-and second-class rooms to accommodate this increase.

³⁰⁹ MECA, Philby Collection, status of Jordan 1925-27, 5/7/1927.

³¹⁰ BNA, CO 831/33/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, 2/1/1935.

MacDonald's focus on third-class beds was likely an attempt to appeal to the non-elite populace of Amman. In addition, MacDonald suggested that the hospital block include a bedroom for the doctor on duty, a library and lecture room, an x-ray room, and an electro-therapy room. MacDonald also believed the hospital's role in the training of nurses and midwives should be highlighted in the CDAC application to demonstrate the developmental aspects of the proposal. Overall, these suggestions decreased the cost per bed and demonstrated how the hospital would be training needed medical professionals in addition to treating patients.³¹¹

All of MacDonald's suggestions were taken into account and the CDF application was revised so that the number of third-class beds increased from thirty-eight to sixty-eight while the number of first and second-class beds remained the same at four and eight respectively. This increased the total beds in the hospital to eighty and included twenty beds for isolation, an outpatient department, and a bacteriologist lab. As well, the new application estimated that the hospital would be able to train six midwives a year, which would greatly aid infant health in Transjordan. As of 1936, there were only five certified midwives in the entire country. The first-year costs were estimated at LP 26,800 and second-year costs at LP 28,158 while recurrent costs of operation of LP 7,455 would be borne by the Transjordan government.³¹²

Despite the changes, the hospital plan was not approved by the CDAC when it finally was reviewed in June of 1937. The CDAC agreed that the hospital was important but could not fund it because the hospital was a curative facility that would not develop new medical techniques. The CDAC believed the hospital fell within the purview of

³¹¹ BNA, CO 831/33/8, SoS Malcolm MacDonald to HC Wauchope, 25/7/1935.

³¹² BNA, CO 831/42/5, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, 10/12/1936.

normal government function. The Transjordan government was responsible for the improvement of individual care in Transjordan, not the CDAC. The irony of the CDAC remark was the idea of a purely curative facility in Transjordan was novel, let alone a hospital that would advance medical practices. The Anglo-Hashemite state was not in the business of providing individual medical care. The medicalization of the Transjordan population was through preventive medicine, not individual curative care. The CDAC, in its concluding remarks, did not reject the idea of approval in the future but found that the current proposal did not fall within their parameters for development.³¹³

After the CDAC rejected the proposal, the only remaining option was to petition the British Treasury for an increase in grant-in-aid, which would in turn finance the hospital's construction. Secretary of State Ormsby Gore petitioned the British Treasury for an increase of LP 27,000 in grant-in-aid to cover the first year of construction. In his petition, he noted that the CDAC refusal was on principle only and they hoped other means would be found to finance "this much needed medical service." Additionally, the only hospital of note in Amman, the Italian hospital, was dispensing Italian anti-British propaganda. In comparison to the Italian hospital, the current government hospital in Amman looked like "little more than a hovel" and was harmful to British prestige in the region.³¹⁴ The Imperial Treasury approved the petition, but the Treasury stipulated in a letter from Treasury secretary J. Phillips, that all other projects, which were not immediately necessary, should be put on hold during the hospital's construction.³¹⁵

Despite the disbursement of additional grant-in-aid, the new hospital was never built

³¹³ BNA, CO 831/42/5, CDAC to under SoS, 30/6/1937.

³¹⁴ BNA, CO 831/42/5, SoS Ormsby Gore to H.F. Downie, 27/11/1937.

³¹⁵ BNA, CO 831/42/5, Treasury J. Phillips to under SoS, 24/12/1937.

during the Mandate period.³¹⁶ Once Italy entered the war against the United Kingdom, all Italians were expelled from Transjordan and the forty-bed Italian hospital in Amman was confiscated, used by the Department of Public Health and run by the doctors at the CMS hospital in Salt.³¹⁷

Overall, infrastructural developments in Amman during the Mandate were far from efficient. The two major infrastructural programs undertaken through the CDF, the Amman telephone exchange and government hospital were marred by problems. In both cases, the applications had to go through numerous iterations before they were considered and even then, only the telephone exchange ever received CDF funding. It is hard to say if the Mandatory government or the imperial government was more responsible for these delays and shortcomings. These restrictions demonstrate the limited physical presence that British Mandate left in Amman. Despite the clear economic advantages to both projects, neither project ever really got off the ground. The lack of private local commercial interest in either scheme also limited their possibilities of success. Neither plan possessed *mētis*; both schemes originated from the British with the expectation of local engagement. However, not all CDF programs were devoid of *mētis*. Government programs run through Amman via the CDF were not as encumbered by imperial bureaucracy and met with a great deal of success. These programs left a longer British legacy within the capital and Transjordan as a whole. These government plans, although they originated in a colonial space, appealed to the local populace.

Government programs funded through CDF

³¹⁶ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan," 164.

³¹⁷ BNA, CO 831/55/7, "Administration Report for the Quarter Ending June 1940."

Government programs and ministerial organization financed through the CDF met with a great deal more success than physical infrastructural programs undertaken under the same imperial program. Programs and institutional reforms were more successful because they were not as artificially imposed as the infrastructural improvements. Each of these plans further developed preexisting practices or built upon already understood concepts. As a result, these plans built upon *mētis* in the Transjordan population.

The first of these programs took place in the outskirts of Amman in Jubaiha.³¹⁸ The Transjordanian government, on a small scale, financed the earliest agricultural experimental stations. In 1926 a proposal was made to set up three of these stations, and by 1929, nine of them were in operation. Despite the incremental growth in the number of stations, these stations were too small in scope and function to truly improve the agricultural situation in Transjordan. They amounted to little more than isolated nursery gardens.³¹⁹ The Mandatory government believed that a larger and more focused agricultural experimental station would help develop a more commercial attitude towards the expansion of Transjordanian agriculture.

The creation of an agricultural experimental station on a far larger scale was first envisioned in early 1935. The British hoped that this station of approximately 600 *dunums* (one dunum is 1000 m²) in size would have both an experimental and demonstrative mission. “The experimental side would include testing the possibility of introducing new crops, fruit trees or fodder for agricultural animals on a remunerative basis, the improvement of existing breeds of livestock and poultry and improvement of

³¹⁸ Today, Jubaiha is one of the wealthiest westernized neighborhoods in Western Amman located near the University of Jordan. New townhouses and villas have long since replaced the farmland of the agricultural station.

³¹⁹ Amadouny, “The British Role in the Development of Transjordan,” 104.

the seed of crops at present raised in this country.” These programs would then aid in the modernization of farming approaches throughout Transjordan. In order to introduce these new techniques to local farmers the demonstrative dimension of the station was necessary. “The demonstrative side would be devoted to showing the local farmer the greater benefit it is possible to obtain from existing crops, vegetables and trees by means of the adoption of more modern methods of cultivation include the use of fertilizers and up-to-date agricultural instruments and a more regular rotation of crops.” In British estimations the average Transjordanian farmer was “a most conservative person” and the only way to get him “to abandon his present archaic methods of agriculture is a practical demonstration.” It was estimated that the station would take eighteen months to complete and would include various plots for crops, a poultry house and runs, brooder/incubation rooms, stables, water troughs, forage store, implement shed, guard room, office and stores, and a manager’s house.³²⁰ High Commissioner Wauchope believed the scheme could be completed for LP 7500 with a recurrent expenditure of LP 1186 to be covered by the Transjordanian government.³²¹

Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister approved the plan and sent it for consideration to the CDAC only slightly changing the grant request to be LP 6740 and increasing the recurrent expenditure to LP 1250. The CDAC agreed to disperse a grant of LP 6740 for the construction of the experimental agricultural station near Amman on October 10, 1935. The CDAC hoped that the agricultural station would help to stimulate the poultry industry in Transjordan, which was sadly neglected up to that point, and generally improve the agricultural conditions in the country. By 1938, the station had been

³²⁰ BNA, CO 831/33/7, “CDF Application for the Agricultural Experimental Station,” 25/2/1935.

³²¹ BNA, CO 831/33/7, HC Wauchope to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 25/2/1935.

completed and had an operating surplus of LP 730. Surpluses in both 1938 and 1939 were spent on further improvements to the station such as additional storage, increased animal capacity, and paving the road to the agricultural station.³²²

Overall, the agricultural experimental stations helped to develop a more commercial and economically profitable agricultural model for Transjordanian farmers. The largest of the stations, the one financed by the CDF, was particularly important for both the propagation of better seed stock as well as its demonstration aspects. The timing of the stations' introduction was critical. Transjordan went through a prolonged drought and agricultural hardship in the 1930s.³²³ The introduction of new agricultural practices was far more likely to succeed under these conditions. Local farmers were eager to implement new techniques that could improve their faltering crops and economic position. This desire on behalf of the local population to participate actively in the program was the reason for its success. This local buy-in explained the program's regional support.³²⁴ Although the agricultural experimental stations did not amount to a new department and did not become a far-reaching developmental program, they were integral to further developing Transjordanian agriculture as well as the illustrating the importance of state-sponsored aid for agricultural expansion.

The final two CDF grants affected both the infrastructure of Transjordan and the expansion of the government in Amman. The schemes for the Department of Development and for the Department of Lands and Surveys were meant to not only develop the agricultural industry in Transjordan but also to centralize decision making related to Transjordan's agriculture in Amman. The plan to create a Department of

³²² BNA, CO 831/47/6, HC to SoS, 8/1/1938 and CO 831/47/6, Colonial Office to HC, 1/2/1940.

³²³ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 295-97.

³²⁴ Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson, "Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics," 340-42.

Development consisted of two distinct components. The first portion of the proposal called for the hiring of a British director for the envisioned Department of Development. This new director would then suggest necessary legislation to govern the best use of the subsidiary streams flowing into the Jordan Valley and the valleys southeast and southwest of the Dead Sea in efforts to improve irrigation in Transjordan. He would also be responsible for utilizing long-term loans from the agricultural bank. The proposal to the CDAC specifically requested an Englishman for this post because of the patronizing British position that “the Arab officials cannot stand alone but under the close supervision and encouragement of an energetic Englishman wonders can be done.” The proposal also called for a loan of LP 20,000 to be issued for use over five years, where the first five years were interest free, to be repaid over a period of fifteen years. This loan would be used to carry out irrigation schemes throughout Transjordan.³²⁵

Mr. Shepherd, the irrigation officer of the Palestine government, examined this proposal. He noted that there were immense possibilities for improvement in the irrigation systems of Transjordan. The existing irrigation channels in Transjordan were of poor quality and wasted a great deal of their water. With regularized water distribution in Jordan Valley terraces, construction of good earth channels, and permanent regulation devices the agricultural position of Transjordan could be greatly improved. As well, Shepherd acknowledged the need for external aid because he deemed it unlikely that the semi-nomadic population of the Jordan Valley could rapidly transition to intensive cultivation, but over time, the population could be educated to the advantages of impermeable channels for agricultural use. Here Shepherd knew the barrier to entry of

³²⁵ BNA, CO 831/33/9, “CDF Application for Director of Development,” 13/6/1935.

such a program; there was only minimal knowledge and interest in irrigation in the Jordan Valley amongst the native population. The drought of the 1930s had made the issue of irrigation and proper water utilization far more critical than it had been in the preceding decade.³²⁶ Thus, with time and proper instruction, Shepherd was confident that the local population would see the benefits of widespread irrigation practices given the endemic water shortages that had become the norm in the region. Beyond proper implementation, nowhere in the application itself do the British discuss how they would prove the utility of widespread irrigation to the Transjordanian populace.

Shepherd estimated the scheme could easily increase the gross revenue of Transjordan by LP 40,000. The most promising ventures, according to Shepherd, would be citrus and banana cultivation, which he believed “will more than justify impermeable canalization throughout [the Jordan Valley].”³²⁷ With these recommendations in mind, the Colonial Office advocated that the CDAC approve a free grant of LP 1,580 for five years (LP 7,900) total for recurrent expenditures in creation of the Department, the salaries of the director and clerk, and a loan of LP 20,000 to pursue irrigation schemes.³²⁸ The CDAC approved the free grant in November 1935 and the British Treasury followed suit in December 1935. Both entities noted that the loan was conditionally approved but there would need to be specific loan allocation petitions for each new irrigation scheme.³²⁹

³²⁶ Amadouny, “The British Role in the Development of Transjordan,” 97.

³²⁷ BNA, CO 831/33/9, Extracts from Reports written by Mr. Shepherd, the irrigation officer of the Palestine government on 7/2/1934 and 19/3/1934.

³²⁸ BNA, CO 831/33/9, Colonial office Memorandum on an Application by TJ Government for Assistance from CDF to Enable them to Establish a Department of Development,” 15/7/1935

³²⁹ BNA, CO 831/33/9, L.S. Smith CDAC secretary to under SoS, 9/11/1935 and R.V. Naid Hopkins to under SoS, 7/12/1935.

By 1937 the Department was up and running and had a Mr. M.G. Ionides as its Director. The Director applied for partial allocations from the LP 20,000 loan twice in 1937. The first loan of LP 1500 was for exploratory fieldwork for a specific irrigation scheme. This was approved in November of 1937 by the CDAC as “sub-scheme number 482.”³³⁰ The second application for a loan was for LP 4000 to be provided by April of 1938 to begin an irrigation project in either Wadi al-Arab or Wadi Ziglab. Director Ionides hoped that this initial irrigation project would be finished by September of 1938 so that the winter rains would not damage half-completed works.³³¹ There is no evidence of the second loan being processed because Chief Engineer K.W. Blaxter had left the Middle East Department and by the time his replacement had been hired the second scheme had been abandoned. In fact, the initial loan of LP 1500 was never properly utilized because the Department of Development had been side tracked by a hydrographic survey of Transjordan, which was approved September 16, 1937. This survey included the information envisioned to be part of scheme 482 and thus would have been a redundant project.³³²

The hydrographic survey completely redefined the focus on the Department of Development. The survey was funded by a grant of LP 30,000 from the Colonial Office, which began in 1937. The results of the hydrographic survey were published in the 1939 report “Water Resources of Transjordan and their Development.” This report found that the Jordan Valley was the only area where there were “opportunities for rapid economic development.” Development in the Jordan Valley, according to the report, should focus on controlling existing streams, a new canal from the Yarmuk River, and pumping water

³³⁰ BNA, CO 831/42/6, T.W. Davies CDAC to under SoS, 5/11/1937.

³³¹ BNA, CO 831/42/6, BR Cox to K.W. Blaxter (CO), 21/12/1937.

³³² BNA, CO 831/47/7, HC MacMichael to SoS MacDonald, 3/8/1938.

from the Jordan River and wells. A rough estimate for this large-scale project was projected to be around LP 120,000. In general, the report argued that government efforts into irrigation schemes would not drastically alter the revenue of Transjordan. Instead, “The government’s efforts and expenditure must be concentrated upon providing the stimulus to individual effort such as is already being done through land settlement and education. Money spent on actual works can only be a pin-prick on the map; Land settlement, education and agricultural services will tint the whole sheet.”³³³ The recommendations of the survey mirrored infrastructural development in Amman and Transjordan in general. Director Ionides knew that the best any government plan could hope for was to spur individual investment. Widespread water development was beyond the means of Transjordan’s shoestring budget. The focus of the Department of Development was to introduce small-scale irrigation schemes with the hope of wider private adoption. Without individual commercial interest, many plans and schemes could not and did not succeed.

As a result of its focus on the hydrographic survey, the Department of Development was largely unable to utilize the CDF developmental funds. The first CDF irrigation scheme for Wadi al-Arab was fully planned and able to move forward, but as of August 1938, work had still not begun in earnest. The second CDF irrigation scheme for Wadi Ziqlab was stymied by the need of a new water law, which had not been passed by the Legislative Council.³³⁴ On December 4, 1938, Director M.G. Ionides gave notice and the Department shifted its focus to water measurements and experiments. Thereafter, it

³³³ BNA, CO 831/54/11, “Water Resources of Transjordan and their Development.”

³³⁴ The adoption of a comprehensive water rights law by the Legislative Council never happened. Numerous forms of this law were introduced throughout the late 1930s to no effect. The water rights law will be discussed in detail in the Hashemite Versailles section of chapter 5.

was determined that the best use of time would be to amplify and deepen the results of the hydrographic survey.³³⁵

As of March 1939, the Director of Lands and Survey, Mr. Thomas, had taken control of the Department of Development as interim director. In the words of Mr. Thomas, the Department of Development “ends its first two years with a regular constitution still far from crystallization, and its positive results are almost exclusively technical and preparatory nature.” Despite the somewhat murky future of the Department of Development the interim director did believe that “the expenditure of a few thousands of pounds has transformed the position of irrigation from one of obscurity in which anything approaching a detailed plan of development could be little more than guess-work, into one in which the future can be foreseen with sufficient accuracy to allow a definite programme of capital development to be put forward, with definable possibilities of revenue.” This optimistic tone was measured by the need to take control of the streams that would be utilized in the prospective irrigation development programs. Without further control of these water systems the two new plans, which could utilize the LP 20,000 loan for irrigation development from the CDF, would be impossible to implement.³³⁶ This loan proposal was approved by the CDAC in February of 1940 but it agreed with Mr. Thomas that legal control of Transjordan’s waterways was of the utmost importance for government irrigation schemes success.³³⁷

Unfortunately, this legal control over the water systems in the Jordan Valley was not forthcoming. Numerous attempts to draft and pass a water law were rejected by the Legislative Council, which felt such a law would give the government too much control

³³⁵ BNA, CO 831/52/4, Mr. Thomas Director of Development and Lands and Survey, 21/12/1939.

³³⁶ BNA, CO 831/52/4, Mr. Thomas Director of Development and Lands and Survey, 21/12/1939.

³³⁷ BNA, CO 831/52/4, CDAC to under SoS, 1/2/1940.

over private water ownership. British Resident Kirkbride, who succeeded British Resident Cox in 1939, acknowledged that it was uneconomical for the Department of Development to remain its own department. The Department of Development became a sub-unit of the Department of Lands and Survey in 1940.³³⁸ No wide-ranging water legislation was ever passed during the Mandate period. Without such a water law, no wide-scale irrigation development took place during the Mandate. Such development did later take place, to varying degrees, in the post-independence period, but was largely a result of private enterprise. However, future private development of the Jordan Valley did owe a great deal to the hydrographic survey completed by the Department of Development during the Mandate period.³³⁹

While the Department of Development project did not produce immediate economic returns for the Transjordanian government, the registration of land and the changing of land tax law did have an immediate impact on the Mandatory state. The program proposed in 1935 to the CDF entailed the partitioning of *musha'* land. In essence, this was a continuation of land reform and registration that had begun nearly a century earlier under Ottoman rule. Up until 1851, village-owned or region-wide collective ownership (*musha'*) land was the norm throughout what would become Transjordan.³⁴⁰ This began to change under the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which required the registration of land (*tatwib*) and the imposition of two types of land taxes, *virgu* and *'ushr*. These two new taxes combined to a taxation rate of roughly twelve

³³⁸ BNA, CO 831/55/17, BR Kirkbride to HC TJ, 4/4/1940.

³³⁹ Amadouny, "The British Role in the Development of Transjordan,"

³⁴⁰ Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 17-18.

percent of the annual land production.³⁴¹ These reforms implemented a more European understanding of land ownership and allowed for individuals to acquire large swaths of land for the first time. According to historian Haim Gerber, these new land laws made large agricultural estates possible for the first time in the Ottoman Empire. The law allowed urban merchants and tribal sheikhs to register large swaths of unoccupied land. This land quickly increased in value as the agrarian rural population of the empire grew throughout the late nineteenth century.³⁴² These shifts in land registration practices were also accompanied by a shift in how land was categorized (shift from Ottoman *feddan*, land that can be plowed by a single ox, to an Ottoman *dunum*, which is an actual area measurement of land of 1000 square meters).³⁴³

The reforms coincided with a more direct form of Ottoman control over Transjordan. Towards the end of the Ottoman period, the *musha'* system became strained as a result of population growth. This trend in turn made people more apt to register their lands with the Ottoman authorities, which made taxation more manageable and documentable. By 1905, *mafruz* (private) land became the norm around al-Karak, al-Tafila, Ma'an and much of the south with the exception of Bani Sakhr held lands.³⁴⁴ However, the northern 'Ajlun province, the richest agricultural lands of Transjordan, remained largely *musha'*. Despite these changes, Ottoman land definitions of *miri* and

³⁴¹ *Ushr*, Arabic for the Ottoman *osr*, or tenth, referred to the standard tithe on the produce of the land. *Virgu* taxation, introduced in the Tanzimat reforms in 1861 consisted of a single tax on the value of the land itself. For more on Ottoman land taxation and land conceptualization see Michael R. Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan* (Boston: Brill, 2000), 7-35.

³⁴² For more on the impact of the 1858 Ottoman Land Law see Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987), 67-90.

³⁴³ Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 29-33 and 83. The Ottoman conception of *dunum* and *feddan* are the inverse of their modern definitions. References to *dunum* and *feddan* here refer to the "new *dunum*" which is 1000 sq meter or one decare.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 44-47.

milk were largely ignored in favor of *musha*‘ and *mafruz* and *feddans* remained the predominant land measurement.³⁴⁵

Mandatory officials quickly understood the need to stabilize land tenure, cultivation, and taxation within Transjordan. The Department of Land, amongst the earliest government ministries formed in 1921, was led by Amir Muhammad al-Shibabi, who was replaced by future Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda in 1926. Both men continued the system implemented in 1858 by the Ottomans. The Department changed to the Department of Lands and Surveys in 1927 under the leadership of a new British director A.P. Mitchell.³⁴⁶ Director Mitchell undertook the initial survey of Transjordan and demarcated boundaries of villages and tribal holdings.³⁴⁷ Eventually, the British felt that the Balqa region was being overtaxed while the ‘Ajlun and Karak regions were under-taxed. The British estimated that revenue should increase by 200% in ‘Ajlun and 400% in Karak.³⁴⁸ The new plan envisioned by the British was meant to continue the Ottoman program of land settlement. The British understood, as did the Ottomans, that private land ownership would increase tax revenue and agricultural productivity throughout Transjordan. These economic incentives were appealing to the state and the local farmers alike.

The Transjordanian Government did not have enough money from grant-in-aid to finance a wide-scale land reform and registration project. Early attempts at land

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 49-53.

³⁴⁶ After 1927, the Department of Lands and Survey always had both a British Director and an Arab ministerial head. This was the standard arrangement for many of the ministries of the Transjordan government.

³⁴⁷ BNA, CO 831/33/5, HC Wauchope to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 25/2/1935.

³⁴⁸ Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 70-75.

settlement were hampered by a lack of properly trained personnel.³⁴⁹ Although the land partition program had begun in earnest in 1933 with the passage of the new land settlement law, the Department of Lands and Surveys was understaffed and ill equipped to undertake such a large project.³⁵⁰ In 1935, the Transjordanian government applied to the CDAC for a CDF grant of LP 5000 a year for six years (LP 30,000 total) to finance the establishment of two new settlement parties. Each settlement party would be responsible for village demarcation and the division of *musha'* land into privately held land plots. The proposal noted that:

The proper development and cultivation of land in TJ has been impossible in the past owing to the fact that the majority of the arable land in this country is held by the cultivators of a village or tribe on a communal basis. This system entails an annual redistribution of plots to the owners of shares with the result that no incentive exists for an individual to improve the land which is temporarily in his possession and which may not fall to his lot again for many years to come.³⁵¹

High Commissioner Wauchope estimated that there 2,475,000 *dunums* of *musha'* land in Transjordan and the Department could currently only survey and partition 200,000 *dunums* per year. Additional funding would double the amount of land partitioned annually to 400,000 *dunums*. The scheme projected that there would be an increase in land revenue because of partition but could not advance an exact figure.³⁵² Wauchope felt that the Department of Lands and Surveys was doing well with its limited resources to introduce the new land tax, but there needed to be a sweeping regularization of land tenure. Only with comprehensive land settlement could inhabitants be educated as to the

³⁴⁹ BNA, CO 831/1/2, "BR Cox Report on the Situation in TJ for Period 1/1/1928-31/3/1938."

³⁵⁰ The 1933 Land Settlement Law will be discussed in detail in chapter five in relation to the workings of the Legislative Council and the transformation of Amman into a "Hashemite Versailles."

³⁵¹ BNA, CO 831/33/5, HC Wauchope to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 25/2/1935.

³⁵² BNA, CO 831/33/5, HC Wauchope to SoS Cunliffe-Lister, 25/2/1935.

advantages of land registers towards development.³⁵³ The Colonial Office believed that land settlement and demarcation would help to spur development and increase revenue. With the approval of the additional settlement teams, the Department was confident that the project could be completed within the six-year window of the grant.³⁵⁴ With this in mind, the CDAC approved the plan that became scheme 377 in November of 1935.³⁵⁵

Although the grant was approved in 1935, the time needed to train the two additional settlement parties meant that the settlement rate did not immediately increase to 400,000 *dunums* per year. Director Mitchell believed that because of land settlement new landowners were taking personal initiative to improve their lands. Such activities included using heavy stones to erect boundary walls and the construction of retaining walls to stop soil erosion. By March of 1938, 1,200,695 *dunums* of land had been settled. As a side effect of the increased quotient of settled lands, land transaction figures also began to rise, and with them revenue generated from transaction fees.³⁵⁶ High Commissioner MacMichael endorsed the continuation of the land settlement project and advised that the grant amount should not be decreased, despite the additional land revenue generated by increased land tax and transaction fees.³⁵⁷ The CDAC agreed to the continuation of “CDF scheme 377” in June of 1938 and noted they were very pleased with “the very satisfactory progress which had been made.”³⁵⁸

At the close of 1938, the land settlement program was proceeding as planned.

The new building for the Department of Lands and Surveys in the Jabal al-Weibdeh

³⁵³ BNA, CO 831/33/5, HC Wauchope to SoS MacDonald, 13/6/1935.

³⁵⁴ BNA, CO 831/33/5, “CO memorandum on Application of TJ Government for Assistance from CDF to Enable the Lands Department to Establish Two Additional Land Settlement Parties.”

³⁵⁵ BNA, CO 831/33/5, LS Smith CDAC to under SoS, 9/11/1935.

³⁵⁶ BNA, CO 831/47/4, A.P. Mitchell Director of Lands and Surveys memorandum to CDAC, 13/4/1938.

³⁵⁷ BNA, CO 831/47/4, HC MacMichael to SoS Ormsby-Gore, 5/5/1938

³⁵⁸ BNA, CO 831/47/4, Smith CDAC to under SoS, 17/6/1938.

section of Amman was completed in August of 1938.³⁵⁹ This new building housed all of the tax lists and registers completed by the land settlement and land settlement court. 140 of the 450 villages had been settled for a combined area of 1,935,000 *dunums* and 7,700,000 *dunums* in all of Transjordan. The land settlement court had visited twenty-three villages in 1938, holding court for a combined sixty-seven days. The court, using “the land settlement law provides for the settlement of all questions or differences in regard to any estate in land, or title thereto, or interest therein or any rights connected therewith. Such rights and interests are recorded in the Schedule of Rights and subsequently transferred to the Land Registers.” A total of 10,016 land transactions accounting for a sum of LP 5,894 had been completed in 1938. Most importantly, according to Director Mitchell, “the peasant landowner who has suffered the insecurity of title for so many years now realizes the importance of a clear title and no case of unregistered disposition has yet come to notice in ‘settled’ villages.”³⁶⁰

After G.F. Walpole became the new Director in 1940, the Transjordanian government applied for an extension of the CDF grant of LP 5000 annually for an additional four years to continue the land settlement work in 1941.³⁶¹ However, by 1941 the calculus of large-scale projects had changed throughout the British Empire because of World War II. Any financial decision had to be measured in how it would affect the war effort. E.B. Boyd expressed exactly this concern in his communications with the British Treasury, noting he would only recommend the extension of scheme 377 if he could be

³⁵⁹ This building still houses the Department of Lands and Surveys and is still used today for the official land registries of Jordan.

³⁶⁰ BNA, CO 831/54/7, “1938 Annual Report on Progress of Department of Lands and Surveys,” 18/1/1939.

³⁶¹ BNA, CO 831/55/16, HC MacMichael to SoS Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 31/8/1940.

assured it would not require men or materials from outside of Transjordan.³⁶² The Treasury understood that if the scheme were stopped it would take an additional seven years to complete the land settlement program, whereas if the grant were continued it would only take four years. In a summary report prepared by the Department of Lands and Surveys, it argued that the “scheme continues to be entirely successful and the annual addition of LP 5000 to the estimates of the department has continued to intensify the interest in Land Settlement throughout the country.” Additionally, the impressive amount of land settled by the Department from 1938 to 1940 was almost entirely funded by the CDF grant. This report requested that the current annual grant of LP 5000 be continued for an additional four years, noting that settlement would be completed by 1946.³⁶³ With these particulars in mind, the Treasury approved the continuation of the land settlement program in January of 1942 as a new CDF scheme D 61.³⁶⁴

Despite the claims of the Department in its 1941 application, land settlement would not be completed before 1946, due to a number of factors. From 1940 to 1942, officials responsible for land settlement had to be temporarily attached to land registries in order to cope with the large number of expropriations and leases of land that became necessary in connection to defense works undertaken as part of the war effort. Additionally, the number of land transactions after 1940 had increased by sixty percent, requiring officials to be taken out of the field and moved to Amman to deal with the increased transaction volume. The independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed the land settlement program in 1952.

³⁶² BNA, CO 831/58/13, E.B. Boyd to Treasury, 21/11/1941.

³⁶³ BNA, CO 831/58/13, “Expansion of Department of Lands and Surveys by grant from the CDF,” report covering period 1st April 1938 to 31st March 1940.

³⁶⁴ BNA, CO 831/58/13, J.A. Barlow to Undersecretary of State, 30/1/1942.

However, it remains unclear if the increases in land settlement could be correlated to any direct increase in agricultural development or revenue. Increasing degrees of plot fragmentation from the growing population of Transjordan diminished the gains of land settlement. Collective land holdings had prevented plot fragmentation before land settlement due to the impermanent nature of *musha* land itself. Once land ownership became privatized, it made the division of land amongst heirs simpler, which in turn led to diminished average plot sizes amongst smaller landholders.³⁶⁵ A lack of funds further limited the ability of individuals to improve their land. The Agricultural Bank rarely had adequate funds to help cultivators in normal years, let alone during the drought years of the late 1930s. When the Agricultural Bank attempted to expand beyond its Amman branch in 1944 it was met with limited success at best.³⁶⁶ Most damningly, the Land Tax Law of 1933 and Land Registration failed to increase tax revenue throughout the Mandate.³⁶⁷

What is certain is that land registration and settlement shifted the average Transjordanian's perception of the state. The Department of Lands and Surveys settlement program had the grandest scope and impact of any infrastructural institution outside of security forces during the Mandate period. It was Department officials who delineated where a village began or ended, what land should be included in that village, and even the names of various plots (*howd*). These names would live on and become the names for districts, a phenomenon particularly evident in many parts of Amman: Jabal al-Weibdeh, Umm Udhayna, 'Abdun, Marj al-Hamam and al-Shmaysani. The

³⁶⁵ Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 135.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 162-63.

³⁶⁷ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 300-301. One tangential benefit of land registration was that it did help stop deforestation by registering forestlands in the name of the government of Transjordan.

infrastructural and institutional model created by the British during the Mandate period was not ephemeral; it shaped both the development of the Department itself and the relationship between the average Jordanian and the capital of Amman.³⁶⁸ The land registration program was another example of an institutional program disciplining the populace of Transjordan to accept the might of the state. The central location of the new Department headquarters in Jabal al-Weibdeh reinforced the centrality of Amman in the eyes of the general populace. Similar to the tribal court of appeals in Amman, the Department of Lands and Surveys forced Transjordan's inhabitants to come to Amman to resolve complicated land disputes. The success of the land settlement program was strongly connected to its Ottoman precedent. The fact that the land registration program continued a preexisting Ottoman policy facilitated the rate of its adoption and the acceptance by the populace. The Ottoman land registration program had created the local practice of private land which then continued by the Transjordan government.

All three of the above-mentioned programs utilized CDF funds to shape the development of Transjordan during the Mandate period. Each of these programs was located in or around Amman and had a distinct impact upon how individuals viewed the fledgling capital and the state as a whole. More to the point, each of these programs was able to succeed only with the influx of imperially sanctioned Colonial Development Funds. Without the CDF and CDAC, these ambitious projects of infrastructural and institutional development would not have been possible during the Mandate period. All of these programs were successful because they were beneficial for the local populace. Transjordanian interest in improved agricultural practice, water usage, and land allocation

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 199-202.

made the programs successful. Without this native interest, the programs could not have succeeded.

Concession Agreements and the Electrification of Amman

The creation of concession agreements in Transjordan during the Mandate period tended to be a rather one-sided affair. Each of the agreements was largely, if not exclusively, coordinated between private individuals and the British Mandatory officials with little Arab influence or interaction. Unlike the CDF, concession agreements did not claim to improve the situation in Transjordan for its population. Both the elite and non-elite population of Transjordan hated concession agreements. These business agreements gave nothing to the Transjordanian populace and robbed them of their land's meager natural resources for decades. These agreements were indicative of the colonial regime failing to work in the best interest of their subjects. Concession agreements were the embodiment of the most exploitative aspects of the Mandate arrangement. Three concessions of note were implemented during the Mandate period: The Dead Sea Minerals concession, the Iraq Petroleum Company concession, and the Palestine Electric Corporation concession (aka the Rutenberg concession). These concessions connected Transjordan to the neighboring Mandates of Iraq and Palestine. Although these business agreements were undertaken for personal gain, the British also had a stake in promoting trade between their colonial holdings. Each of these agreements theoretically provided the Transjordanian state with either infrastructural development or revenue, but actually performed in a lopsided manner.

The Transjordan government granted the Dead Seas Minerals concession to Moshe Novemeysky and a Major Tulloch in April of 1927. The concession was registered in Palestine in 1929 as the Palestine Potash Company Ltd. with an initial capital of LP 400,000. The agreement awarded to the Palestine Potash Company stated that fifty percent of all salt and mineral revenue accrued by the company would go to the Transjordanian and Palestinian governments.³⁶⁹ However, the company did not actually register in Transjordan until 1945. The registration of the Palestine Potash Company caused numerous members of the Legislative Council, including Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and Sa'id al-Mufti, to resign in protest against the perceived Zionist intervention into Transjordan.³⁷⁰

The Legislative Council representatives spoke out against this concession and the Rutenberg concession repeatedly in the First and Second Legislative Councils (1929-1934). The Council members feared the concession would give Zionists an opportunity to settle in Transjordan.³⁷¹ The representatives criticized the Executive Council (the Amir's Cabinet) for blindly approving the concessions and ignoring the Zionist interests in Transjordan. However, it is extreme to surmise, as Maan Abu Nowar does, that these men were acting "as surrogates for the British Resident, Colonel Henry Cox, in the Cabinet and the Legislative Council."³⁷² These concessions may have been in the interest of British policy but they must have also had at least token approval of the Amir. It is highly

³⁶⁹ See MECA, *'Aref al-'Aref Diary Amman 1926-1929*, for more detailed discussion of the proceedings of the Dead Sea Mineral Concession and local objections. When 'Aref confronted Cox about the terms of the concession, he was informed that they were "classified" and could not be discussed.

³⁷⁰ Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan," 299-301.

³⁷¹ The concession agreements in general were hotly debated in the 25th, 27th, and 28th sessions of the First Legislative Council, June 18-June 23, 1929. In the Second Legislative Council, the concessions were passively mentioned as a negative but not debated as they were in the first council.

³⁷² Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 27-28.

unlikely that these men would have remained part of the Executive Council for as long as they did if they did not faithfully represent the wishes of the Amir on most occasions.³⁷³

In 1931, the Mandatory government awarded the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) concession for a period of seventy years. The concession allowed the company to lay oil pipelines through Transjordan in order to connect Iraq and Palestine. Transjordan received no royalties or customs duties from the IPC for this concession. There were no real tangible benefits for Transjordan from this concession whatsoever.³⁷⁴The IPC pipeline opened on New Year's Eve 1935 allowing oil to flow through Transjordan on its way to Haifa.³⁷⁵ The lack of outcry against the IPC concession is ironic because it was the most damnable as a business agreement. The concession gave Transjordan nothing and required the Transjordan government to protect the pipeline for free. The IPC concession avoided the public outcry that the Dead Sea Minerals concession and the Rutenberg concession received because it was not a Zionist project. Although the IPC was mainly a British company clearly benefiting from the colonial arrangement of the Transjordan Mandate, it was not as damnable as the suspicious Zionist activity in the other two concessions. Neither the IPC nor the Dead Sea Minerals concession was ever popular, but they were not met with the disdain and controversy of the Rutenberg concession.

The Palestine Electric Corporation (PEC) concession was part of the grand scheme of its creator and CEO, Pinhas Rutenberg. Rutenberg, a self-identified and published Zionist, felt that the only way to spur growth and expansion in Palestine was

³⁷³ Discussions of the Amir's incorporation into the Anglo-Hashemite state will be addressed in the next chapter.

³⁷⁴ Amawi, "State and Class in Transjordan," 302-03.

³⁷⁵ IWM, Peake collection, unpublished autobiography, 198.

through a massive hydroelectric project. This project would utilize all of the major water sources in the area – Litani, Dan, Hasbani, Baniyas, Yarmuk, and Yabok – to power fourteen power stations on both sides of the Jordan River down to the Dead Sea. The Palestine Electric Corporation developed in and around Haifa accounting for much of that city’s Mandate era infrastructural development.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, Rutenberg wanted all of the work completed by Jewish workers to further Zionist goals in Palestine. In particular, Rutenberg wanted the electrification of Palestine to motivate Jews to live in villages, as opposed to cities, and thus spur rural development.³⁷⁷ Winston Churchill, then the Colonial Secretary, was greatly impressed by the scope of Rutenberg’s scheme and was integral to its advancement. Churchill helped facilitate early negotiations between Rutenberg and the Palestine government and between Rutenberg and the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office.³⁷⁸ Despite early negotiations in 1921 and tacit agreement between Rutenberg and then High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, a full agreement was not ratified until 1926. The inclusion of Transjordan became the sticking point in this agreement.

Rutenberg wanted to include waters on both sides of the Jordan River to make his electrification scheme as wide ranging as possible. His more subtle goals were to establish Jewish settlements near the envisioned power plants in order to expand Jewish settlement into Transjordan. In 1922, the British government announced that the Balfour Declaration, and therefore the Palestine Jewish settlement policy, did not apply to Transjordan. Rutenberg hoped that his concession scheme would be a way around this

³⁷⁶ Seikaly, *Haifa*, 61-72.

³⁷⁷ Sara Reguer, “Rutenberg and the Jordan River: A Revolution in Hydro-electricity,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 31 (Oct. 1995): 692-94.

³⁷⁸ Reguer, “Rutenberg and the Jordan River,” 695. This sentiment of rural improvement was in keeping with the socialist agrarian ideals of the Second Aliyah.

policy change. High Commissioner Samuel and other British officials opposed inclusion of Transjordan in the concession due to fears that it would incite the local Arab population.³⁷⁹ Rutenberg accepted that Amir Abdullah would have to accept the terms of the concession if it were to apply to Transjordan; the British could not include Transjordan without the Amir's approval.³⁸⁰ With this stipulation begrudgingly agreed to by Rutenberg, the concession was finalized on March 5, 1926. Transjordan agreed to the conditions of the concession on January 8, 1928, despite its highly disadvantageous terms.³⁸¹ With its signing, Transjordan lost control of the waters of the Jordan River and its tributaries. This decision would hamper the development of infrastructure and water allocation development through the remainder of the Mandate. The fact that Abdullah had surrendered control of the waters of Transjordan to a Zionist hurt his credentials as a leader in the Arab world for decades.

While the Rutenberg concession negotiations were nearing their close, Amman began to pursue its own electrification program. Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima owned the first generator in Amman.³⁸² He used the generator for his medical work and sold the surplus electricity to his neighbors.³⁸³ Dr. Ghanima bought a second generator in 1933 to supply electricity to the Italian hospital in 1933. Beyond the few homes and businesses powered by Dr. Ghanima's generators, the majority of Amman's inhabitants lived without electricity. Private initiative brought electricity slowly to Amman, but widespread electrification was beyond the means of unaffiliated individual efforts. The streets of

³⁷⁹Ibid., 712-13.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 715-17.

³⁸¹ OG, No. 177, 23/1/1928.

³⁸² Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima was a vocal member of the opposition and a frequent detractor of the government. He will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

³⁸³ Hacker, *Modern Amman*, 34.

Amman were not electrified. Instead, forty kerosene lamps, which required constant refilling and relighting, illuminated the streets of downtown Amman.³⁸⁴ Individual refills of kerosene lamps for private use were quite expensive and not affordable for many Ammanis.³⁸⁵ (Appendix 1, figure 3-1 photo of kerosene lamp from Mandate period)

The first attempts at electrification by the city took place in 1927. The Transjordanian Executive Council entered into negotiations with the PEC for water, electric, and sewage schemes for Amman. Rutenberg promised that the PEC's undertaking of the water and sewage schemes had no Zionist overtones and motivations. This stated position should be questioned because the only reason the PEC was considering these two additional projects was to ensure that they were awarded the electricity scheme. The agreement would include the sale of an area not exceeding 6000 *dunums* for a powerhouse near the junction of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers to the PEC. After members of the Transjordanian delegation visited the site, it was agreed that Rutenberg would need to pay LP 200 for the site and up to LP 1000 to the cultivators whose land would be affected by the project. Rutenberg recommended the formation of an "Amman Electric Company" which would be owned by the PEC with up to forty percent of the company being owned by locals. The Amman Electric Company would provide electricity at reduced rates to mosques, churches, government buildings, and hospitals.³⁸⁶ Problems with this plan soon arose when it became clear that neither the

³⁸⁴ The Jordanian Electric Company, *Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd: Fifty Years of construction 1938-1988*, 29.

³⁸⁵ Muath Freij, "A Merchant's Tale Reveals Amman's Electric Revolution," *The Jordan Times*, January 26, 2013, accessed January 5, 2015, <http://jordantimes.com/a-merchants-tale-reveals-ammans-electric-revolution>.

³⁸⁶ BNA, CO 733/138/2, meeting between Rutenberg and Chief Minister, 24/1/1927 and 25/1/1927. When Amman was finally electrified a decade later, these institutions did receive reduced rates from the Amman Electric Company.

Palestinian government nor the Transjordanian government could guarantee that the Amman municipality would repay the loan issued to them by the PEC for the proposed water works. By May of 1928, it became clear that the concession scheme with the PEC for the electrification of Amman would not be moving forward.³⁸⁷

The municipality attempted to implement the lighting of the city on its own in 1930 but quickly realized that it lacked the necessary revenue. The municipality of Amman, like all of the municipalities and government ministries in Transjordan, was chronically short of funds. The municipality turned the project over to the elites of the city who were members of the Amman Chamber of Commerce. Around this same time, the Chamber of Commerce, created in 1923, began to express a greater interest in the commercial development of Amman.³⁸⁸ The membership assumed that the electrification of Amman would aid their individual commercial interests. Members of the chamber hoped to keep the project a local affair to avoid foreign interference and influence. Despite these hopes, their plans amounted to little progress.³⁸⁹ The Amman municipality rebuffed Arab contractors in the spring of 1931 and 1932 due to Transjordanian fears that they might be part of a Zionist scheme. In 1934, General Electric (GE) applied for the exclusive rights in Amman for “the generation, distribution and sale of electric energy for lighting, heating and other domestic purposes and for power.” This concession, which would last for a period of fifty years, would allow GE to erect overhead line poles, to lay underground cables and to purchase private land that would be needed for the power station and transformers. The proposed agreement allowed for the municipality to own up

³⁸⁷ BNA, CO 733/138/2, Harding to Rutenberg, 24/5/1928.

³⁸⁸ For more on the Amman Chamber of Commerce see Able Amawi, “State and Class in Transjordan: A Study of State and Autonomy” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1993), 401-16.

³⁸⁹ Renate Dietrich, “Electrical Current and Nationalist Trends in Transjordan: Pinhas Rutenberg and the Electrification of Amman,” *Die Welt des Islams* 43 (2003): 96.

to twenty percent of the electric company and set the rates for the electricity produced. The agreement also guaranteed the safety of the plant, buildings, and workers by the Transjordanian government and Amman municipality.³⁹⁰ The Amman municipality did not oppose the GE concession because it would not be associated with foreign or colonial control of Amman. It was solely a business venture. There was nothing inherently problematic with the proposed concession except that the Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister feared that its terms would violate the Rutenberg concession.³⁹¹

When the Judicial Adviser C.A. Hooper considered the matter of the proposed Amman GE concession things became more complicated. Hooper concluded that awarding the concession to any company other than the Palestine Electric Corporation would be in breach of the 1926 PEC concession. The concession must first be offered to the PEC on similar terms and the municipality must give the PEC six months to consider the concession before moving forward with other options. Finally, the adviser did not believe that Amir Abdullah could award such a concession unilaterally without consent and agreement from the High Commissioner first.³⁹²

Rutenberg, when approached for his thoughts on the concession, noted that the electrification of Amman was outside of the terms of the concession, assuming the municipality itself would undertake it. However, the municipality could not create a concession for the electrification of the city unless it first offered it to the PEC. Rutenberg stated that before moving forward with any project the municipality of Amman needed to

³⁹⁰ BNA, CO 831/30/16, Director and Secretary of General Electric Campbell-Brown to Mayor of Amman, 15/11/1934.

³⁹¹ BNA, CO 831/30/16, O.G.R. Williams to HC Wauchope, 4/12/1934.

³⁹² BNA, CO 831/31/5, "Judicial Adviser Opinion on if Article 18 of Palestine Concession affects Electricity Concessions within Amman," 6/5/1935.

have its borders clearly demarcated.³⁹³ The demarcation of the municipality's border was no simple task as Amman continued to expand rapidly during the 1930s. The city expanded from 3 sq. km in the 1920s to over 10 sq. km in 1947.³⁹⁴ Rutenberg also claimed that he had not pursued a venture in Amman more thoroughly because British Resident Cox had insinuated that he preferred to grant the concession to a company other than the PEC due to its Jewish nature. Despite the lack of economic interests in the Amman project, Rutenberg believed that "as many Arab communities as possible should have the benefit of a good supply from the Rutenberg works."³⁹⁵

In response to Rutenberg's claims of bias, the acting Chief Secretary S. Moody requested a more direct response from the PEC as to whether or not it opposed the granting of a concession to a third party in Amman.³⁹⁶ In 1937, Rutenberg again expressed his disappointment and anger at the reception he and his company were given within Transjordan. Rutenberg claimed that he asked the Mandatory government if there was any reason he should not apply for the concession and was told no. Thereafter he was informed there was no way the concession would be granted to the Palestine Electric Corporation due to its "Jewish nature."³⁹⁷ Cox completely rejected and repudiated the allegations made by Rutenberg. He said that at no time had he insinuated that the concession could not be awarded to the PEC simply because of its Jewish

³⁹³ BNA, CO 831/31/5, Pinhas Rutenberg to Chief Secretary Palestine, 26/7/1935.

³⁹⁴ The Greater Amman Municipality (GAM), "The History of Amman's Municipality: The Second Decade, 1919-1929;" and "The History of Amman's Municipality: The Fourth Decade, 1939-1949," published on 28 December 2009 on the Amman Centennial web site <http://ammacity100.gov.jo> (accessed December 10, 2014).

³⁹⁵ BNA, CO 831/31/5, summary note sent to HC Wauchope on supply of electricity of municipality of Amman, no date.

³⁹⁶ BNA, CO 831/31/5, Acting Chief Secretary S. Moody to Managing Director Pinhas Rutenberg, 23/8/1935.

³⁹⁷ BNA, CO 831/40/5, Rutenberg to Chief Secretary Palestine, 18/4/1937.

ownership. Furthermore, Cox attested that there had been no communications with the PEC since October of 1936. The PEC had the plans for the concession since August of 1935 and any further delay on its part would be quite unjustifiable. If Cox and the Transjordan government did not receive an answer by June 1, Cox would “hold them bound by the suggestion and consider that they would be justified in proceeding with the adjudication of other tenders.”³⁹⁸ Rutenberg finally returned the maps demarcating the Amman municipality’s borders in July of 1937 after having them for over eight months.³⁹⁹ By late 1937, there was finally an agreement on the boundaries of the municipality of Amman. Despite this, no agreement was feasible with the PEC for the concession. There also was no explicit or implicit permission given by the PEC to the Amman municipality that would allow it to move forward with other concession proposals for the electrification of the city. In essence, the dealings with the PEC had stymied any efforts to electrify Amman for over a decade without producing any results.

Finally, in 1938, private enterprise, not imperial or foreign funding, electrified Amman. While the Rutenberg concession forbade the Amman municipality from issuing another concession agreement for the electrification of the city, it did not prohibit private entrepreneurial investment. The Amman municipality stipulated in its final proposal for an electrification project that the applicants had to be able to supply the city with electrical current for at least three years and install 400 lights in the streets.⁴⁰⁰ The long awaited Amman Electric Company (AEC) was finally created in 1938. Muhammad Ali Budair, who was originally from Damascus but had lived in Amman since 1927, led the project as part of a group of local investors and merchants (initially eight Syrian

³⁹⁸ BNA, CO 831/40/5, Cox to Chief Secretary Palestine, 26/4/1937.

³⁹⁹ BNA, CO 831/40/5, Rutenberg to Chief Secretary, 19/7/1937.

⁴⁰⁰ Dietrich, “Electrical Current and Nationalist Trends in Transjordan,” 99.

merchants) and had their proposal approved by the municipality in 1938.⁴⁰¹ Initially, the AEC co-opted existing small generators in the city, such as those owned by Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima, in exchange for shares in the company. The company initially brought in a seventy horsepower generator to begin producing electricity in earnest. (Appendix 1, figures 3-3 and 3-4 early light schematic and photo of Ras al-‘Ain plant)

The Amman Electric Company (AEC) began construction on the Ras al-‘Ain power plant in 1939 where the total horsepower of all the generators was in excess of four hundred horsepower. The development of the AEC was different from other regional electric companies because it was Arab owned and Arab financed. Most electric companies in the Middle East were foreign ventures.⁴⁰² The AEC’s local nature meant that it had a great degree of support within Amman. There was not any opposition to this company’s electrification of the city because it was not seen as a foreign or colonial project. It was an outgrowth of established traditional economic practice; it had local buy-in. However, the AEC’s growth was curtailed by the austerity climate of WWII. Electricity in Amman did not extend far beyond the city center until the later 1940s.⁴⁰³ The AEC increased its total capital to LP 50,000 in order to expand the company to meet growing electricity demands within the capital.⁴⁰⁴ However, only after Jordan’s independence would Amman and the AEC totally escape the constraints of the Rutenberg concession, which greatly impeded infrastructural progress throughout the Mandate period. The Rutenberg concession hampered the abilities of both the municipal and national governments to move forward in Transjordan. In the end, the electrification of

⁴⁰¹ The Jordanian Electric Company, *Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd: Fifty Years of construction 1938-1988* (Amman: Jordan Electric Company, 1988), 30.

⁴⁰² The Jordanian Electric Company, *Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd*, 31.

⁴⁰³ Freij, “A Merchant’s Tale Reveals Amman’s Electric Revolution.”

⁴⁰⁴ The Jordanian Electric Company, *Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd*, 41-43.

Amman, similar to many other infrastructural projects in and outside the capital, relied upon the capital of private enterprise. Today, the Ras al-‘Ain power station building has been transformed into a gallery space for art exhibitions and cultural performances. The enduring legacy of the Amman Electric Company remains symbolic of the strength of private Arab action during the period of the Mandate.

Conclusion

The need for extraordinary funding to finance infrastructural and institutional development in Transjordan was a symptom of the Mandate’s inherent tension. The government aspired to improve and control all aspects of Transjordan but did not have the resources to do so. The need for extraordinary finance in Transjordan is indicative of the failings of the Anglo-Hashemite state. However, money accrued from the CDF, concessions, and local entrepreneurial investment financed a number of infrastructural programs in and outside of Amman. The Mandate period saw the development of numerous roads, utilities, and ministerial programs. All of these institutional developments relied upon capital that came from outside the Mandatory grant-in-aid system. These external funds shaped how Amman interacted with the rest of Transjordan. Despite CDF funding, the British failed to leave a lasting impression upon the physical infrastructure of Amman because of bureaucratic red tape and a lack of local interest. Although there were numerous attempts at developing tangible infrastructure during the Mandate period, their success rate can be described as low at best. All of these infrastructural programs failed to engage the local populace. They had little to no *mētis*.

The British were far more successful in the establishment of institutional infrastructure in the form of departmental programs, such as the land settlement conducted by the Department of Lands and Surveys. It is these institutional undertakings that left a lasting impression of British control and heritage in the city of Amman. Ministerial development, although overseen by the British, became a part of Arab Transjordan. This process of local acceptance, the inculcation of *mētis*, was a byproduct of the need for improved agricultural practices during the drought of the 1930s. The ability of CDF programs to build upon preexisting Ottoman precedent made the local population more likely to accept these programs' innovations. Both CDF funds and concession agreements attempted to develop the young capital of Amman. However, concession agreements were foreign business interests with no concern in actually improving Transjordan for its population. Concessions were exploitative colonial agreements and rightfully hated by Transjordanians. These concessions were seen as foreign meddling at best and as Zionist colonial schemes at worst. The Rutenberg concession in particular stymied local economic advancement in numerous aspects of the Transjordan economy. Throughout the Mandate, private capital and investment by locals remained a far stronger force in the infrastructural and institutional development of Amman.

Part II: The Creation of a Hashemite Versailles: Elite Coercion and Amman

4: A Point of Order: A Battle for Autonomy in the First Legislative Council of Transjordan

“The constitutional regime so recently introduced must be regarded as in the nature of an experiment, but I believe that it is an experiment on the right lines. No doubt the new regime will have difficulties to face and obstacles to overcome. That is inevitable and is no more than falls to the lot of every young state wherever situated. It can only be gradually that the new system takes root in the country or acquires anything like the smooth working attained by older constitutions elsewhere. Patience will certainly be required, but given patience and goodwill I do not see why the experiment should not prove a success.”⁴⁰⁵

- High Commissioner J.R. Chancellor on the signing of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty from comments made to the Thirteenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission

This quote, from High Commissioner (HC) J.R. Chancellor alludes to the struggles that every young state must endure. The Transjordanian state experienced a number of growing pains before the central authority of the state solidified and before its character had been determined. These internal contestations unfolded in the first true political arena of the state, the Legislative Council (LC), the first elected body in Transjordan. In the earliest sessions of the First Legislative Council, we see battles for control over language, authority, prominence, and prestige. These political jousts reinforced Amman’s centrality as the home of politics and governmental might in

⁴⁰⁵ BNA, CO 733/171/2, “1928 Palestine and Transjordan Official Report to the Permanent Mandates Commission.”

Transjordan. Most of all, the Council proceedings demonstrate the earliest attempts by the representatives to combat the gravitational pull of Amman. This artificially manufactured Emirate survived because it incorporated local elites into the Anglo-Hashemite state to bolster its authority while simultaneously trumpeting the importance of its Sharifian Amir, Abdullah Ibn Hussein

The history of the Legislative Council, created in 1929, is the story of negotiation between the central government and the elites of Transjordan. The Legislative Council gathered leading elites from throughout Transjordan and made them directly interact with the Anglo-Hashemite state (as represented by the Executive Council and the British Resident). Sectarian differences did not define these men. The levels of power and political intrigue in the Council transcended any one group or region. Instead, unlike neighboring Iraq, these elites only focused on the governance of Transjordan and how the evolving edifice of the Transjordanian state affected their lives and the lives of their clients. These exchanges incorporated formerly autonomous tribal sheikhs and urban notables into the machinery of the state. The Legislative Council forced the traditional elites of Transjordan to respond to a new class of civil servants and a newly centralized state. Although the Legislative Council's legislative powers were diminished throughout the Mandate period, it remained an important collection of Transjordan's leading elites who could not be ignored by the government.

This chapter will explore the battle over the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement's ratification in the Legislative Council. The opening of political space necessitated by the League of Nations Mandates Charter forced the Anglo-Hashemite government to accommodate the dissident elites of Transjordan, at least temporarily. The

1928 Agreement ratification battle transformed Amman into both the home of legislative authority and political opposition in Transjordan. The nascent Transjordanian state needed to incorporate the elites of Transjordan into the government if it hoped to survive. The Legislative Council became the arena in which formerly autonomous elites transformed into Transjordanian elites as they were incorporated into the official machinery of Amman. In Transjordan, the British adopted a similar model of elite manipulation as they had earlier enacted in neighboring Hashemite Iraq. Both states had early defining moments in which the local, previously autonomous, established elites attempted to delineate and protect their spheres of influence and privileges. Although the efforts of the Council representatives to safeguard their autonomy and institutional control were eventually defeated, these proceedings marked a clear battle over power and control in the new Hashemite state.

Iraq and Transjordan: Two Agreements, Two Paths

The 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement was unmistakably a document that originated from the British with minimal, if any, Transjordanian input.⁴⁰⁶ It is clear from the reaction and reception the terms of the agreement received that the inhabitants of Transjordan disliked it.⁴⁰⁷ This situation closely mirrors that of the constitutional process in Iraq. In both Iraq and Transjordan, the initial governments formed quickly without elections, shortly after the establishment of the Mandate. In turn, “the institutional and legal basis of the new Iraqi state was constructed around the twin pillars of cabinet and

⁴⁰⁶ The British acknowledge the Amir seeing earlier versions of the treaty but do not indicate that his suggestions were taken into account for treaty revisions.

⁴⁰⁷ BNA, CO 831/1/2, BR Cox to HC JR Chancellor, “Report on the Situation in TJ for period 1/1/28-31/3/28.” Immediately after the publication of the treaty on March 26, 1928, there were demonstrations throughout Transjordan against the Agreement.

King.”⁴⁰⁸ This dual foundation mirrored the Transjordanian state’s reliance on Amir Abdullah and his Executive Council (i.e., Executive Committee, Cabinet, or Council of Ministers). Both Mandates began before the existence of a clear treaty or agreement between the Mandatory Power (Great Britain) and the new Mandate (i.e., Transjordan/Iraq). Neither Iraq nor Transjordan had a constitution during this early period. Both states incorporated British advisers to oversee the local portions of the government with a chief British officer, either the British Resident in Transjordan or the High Commissioner in Iraq, as the ultimate embodiment of British authority in the Mandate.⁴⁰⁹

In both Iraq and Transjordan, the new Mandates met early resistance. The British, in an effort to quell unrest, decided to standardize their relations with Iraq in the form of a bilateral treaty. In an effort to satisfy the spirit of the League of Nations Mandate, Britain stipulated that the local population must acquiesce to the Mandate’s terms in the form of an Agreement. In Iraq, the treaty was agreed to by the Council of Ministers in June of 1922 with the condition that it would eventually need to be ratified by the Constituent Assembly (the elected legislative body) once it was formed. The ratification of the treaty by an elected Constituent Assembly would publicly declare the acceptance by the local population to the Mandatory arrangement. However, the Agreement’s publication met a great deal of public resistance. In Iraq, King Feisal vocally and adamantly resented the restrictive terms of the agreement, refused to sign it, and directly encouraged anti-treaty opposition. This stance brought him into direct conflict with the British. If he had not

⁴⁰⁸ Toby Dodge, “International Obligation, Domestic Pressure and Colonial Nationalism; The Birth of the Iraqi State Under the Mandate System,” in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Boston: Brill, 2004), 150.

⁴⁰⁹ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 36-37.

suffered a timely bout of appendicitis, he might have lost his throne entirely for his opposition according to historian Charles Tripp. In September 1922, British High Commissioner of Iraq, Percy Cox, suppressed “the most radical parties and newspapers, banishing a number of opposition politicians and ordering the bombing of tribal insurgents in the mid-Euphrates. For the King and others, there could be no clearer expression of British determination to see the treaty and their plans for the Iraqi state carried through.”⁴¹⁰ After the British made their intentions clear, the King shifted his support towards the treaty’s ratification, and signed the treaty in October.

While Iraqi King Feisal strongly opposed the treaty, his brother, Amir Abdullah, took the opposite stance and staunchly argued for the treaty’s ratification in Transjordan. This brotherly difference of opinion was likely a result of Abdullah’s more tenuous political position in contrast to Feisal’s. The British always favored Feisal over Abdullah in their own estimations and Baghdad was a far more established city and government center than Amman. The 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement followed a similar course to its Iraqi cousin. The Agreement was a means to reinforce Anglo-Transjordanian relations and to create the legal precedent for a permanent state. In both Iraq and Transjordan, the British did not need to enter into an additional agreement to solidify their position as the Mandatory power. Instead of ruling purely through force of will, the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Transjordanian Agreements respectively gave Britain the cloak of local acceptance and participation. This farce was indicative of Britain’s disdain for the Mandate system and the Permanent Mandates Commission in particular. The British viewed the Mandate system as a “self-imposed limitation of sovereignty” and correlated

⁴¹⁰ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 52-53.

the success of the Mandates to the amount of publicity given to them.⁴¹¹ These bilateral treaties were a public relations gambit on an international stage. However, unlike Iraq, the British took an additional six years to propose the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement for ratification consideration. The cause of the delay is unknown, but likely attributed to Iraq's higher geopolitical and strategic importance for the British due to its oil reserves. Regardless of the exact motivation for the treaty timeline discrepancies, the steps towards ratification remained the same.

Although the British began working on a Transjordanian treaty shortly after concluding the Iraqi version, Amir Abdullah and British Resident Henry Cox did not see a preliminary version of the document until December 1925. However, from the tone of High Commissioner Field Marshall Plumer's dispatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoS) Amery it appears that the Amir's only revisions were that Transjordan should not have the same customs duties policy as neighboring Palestine. Plumer noted that Amir Abdullah was "prepared to accept [the treaty] and indeed anxious to bring it into force" as of March 1926.⁴¹² Interestingly, the original December version of the treaty gave the Legislative Council a higher degree of autonomy. Initially, the Executive would be responsible to the Legislative Council. However, in the end, the Executive Council (EC) became part of the Legislative Council instead as ex-officio members effectively reversed the earlier arrangement. High Commissioner of Palestine and Transjordan Herbert Samuel rationalized this change because he was "persuaded that elections in Transjordan would not yield persons of sufficient education and authority to be entrusted

⁴¹¹ Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, 274.

⁴¹² LOC, Secret Report on the Middle East No. 9, *Transjordan Constitutional Arrangements: Draft Agreement and Draft Organic Law 1926-1927*, HC to SoS, April 22 1926.

with the administration of departments.”⁴¹³ The Amir’s power of the prorogation of the Legislative Council, when coupled with the increased influence of the Executive Council within the Legislative Council, changed the dynamics of the Legislative Council greatly. The Agreement’s terms would clearly strengthen the position of the Amir in Transjordan legally as well as symbolically. These changes to the 1928 Agreement meant that Abdullah was only answerable to the British. The Legislative Council could not check the authority of the Hashemite Amir. Despite the Amir’s desire to enact the treaty, it first needed to be properly vetted. For the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty’s ratification, the Transjordanian Executive Council had to approve it, mirroring the importance of “cabinet and king” already established in Iraq.⁴¹⁴

The Executive Council first saw the agreement in June of 1927. The Cabinet members rebuffed the Agreement from the onset but the Amir preferred to push forward despite the advice of the Chief Secretary ‘Aref al-‘Aref.⁴¹⁵ The Amir contended that it would be easier to amend the treaty once it had passed rather than contest its ratification.

⁴¹⁶ The only objection that the Amir had to the language of the treaty was over the principle of primogeniture. Abdullah did not want his eldest son to succeed him because he knew of Amir Talal’s anti-British and anti-colonial sentiments. Instead, he favored his

⁴¹³ LOC, Secret Report on the Middle East No. 9, HC to SoS, April 22, 1926.

⁴¹⁴ The Executive Council was comprised on the Chief Minister, Minister of Justice, Chief Secretary, Treasurer, Director of Health, and Director of Education.

⁴¹⁵ According to *‘Aref el-‘Aref: A Biographical Sketch 1892-1964* (Jerusalem, Al Ma’aref Press, no publishing date), ‘Aref el-‘Aref was born in Jerusalem in 1892 and “he had been a university student, political economist, soldier, prisoner of war, escapee, writer and publisher, author, editor, district officer in various parts of Palestine, chief secretary to the government in TJ, mayor of Jerusalem and minister of Public Works.” ‘Aref, a vocal opponent to British actions in both Palestine and Transjordan, would remain an active political entity throughout most of his life. After his tenure as Chief Secretary from 1926 to 1929 he worked in the Palestine civil service. He was appointed mayor of Jerusalem by Abdullah in 1950 and elected to this post in 1951, re-elected in 1955. He was later offered the post of minister of public work by Hussein but eventually resigned due to difference of policy with the Prime Minister. He died in 1964. ‘Aref’s biography was published in English sometime after his death in 1964. ‘Aref’s 1926-1928 Amman political diary in Arabic was never published.

⁴¹⁶ MECA, *‘Aref el-‘Aref Diary Amman 1926-1929*, June 1, 1927.

younger son, Amir Nayef, who he believed would more favorably maintain the status quo. Despite his efforts to persuade the Executive Council otherwise, the Council held firm that primogeniture remain part of the Agreement to avoid infighting amongst Abdullah's descendants.⁴¹⁷

It is clear from Chief Secretary 'Aref al-'Aref's political diary that the British delivered the treaty in its final form. The Transjordanian Council of Ministers and the Amir were not involved in drafting the 1928 Agreement whatsoever. However, the open discussion and debate presented by 'Aref in his diary challenges the position of previous historians, such as Naseer H. Aruri and Madi and Musa, that the Executive Council blindly accepted the treaty at face value.⁴¹⁸ Although the Amir and his Cabinet approved the treaty, these discussions demonstrate that the individuals involved were very much aware of both the benefits and the deficiencies that the treaty presented. These were not the actions of people who were politically unaware or naïve.

Plenipotentiaries signed the Agreement in Jerusalem on February 20, 1928, and published it on March 26, 1928. Even after having seen several versions of the treaty in 1927, members of the Cabinet continued their protestations after the treaty's signature. Chief Secretary 'Aref al-'Aref, in his Amman diary, argued with the Amir that the treaty was, "one sided, [with] all obligations on Jordan, all restrictions on her independence." Aref referred to the treaty's terms as a "farce" and "comic." However, the Amir maintained that the treaty would be amended in time and that the Cabinet members needed to trust him. Aref still believed that the treaty was nothing more than "chains and

⁴¹⁷ 'Aref al-'Aref *Diary Amman 1926-1929*, June 8, 1927.

⁴¹⁸ Naseer H. Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965)* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) 37, 74-78, and Munib Madi and Sulayman Musa, *Tarikh al-Urdun Fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin* (History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century 1900-1959) (Amman: al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya, 1959) 279.

restrictions and shackles” but the Amir had already made his intentions clear and was steadfastly in support of the treaty.⁴¹⁹

The public reaction to the treaty was swift, vocal, and overwhelmingly negative. The general rejection of the agreement surprised the British. High Commissioner Herbert Plumer had led the British Colonial Office to believe that “the Transjordan government is anxious to celebrate in some exceptional manner the enactment of the Organic Law of the territory.”⁴²⁰ Plumer had gone as far as having stamps printed to commemorate the event. Despite British efforts to popularize the treaty, British Resident Cox reported that the agreement was “met with a considerable amount of adverse criticism and in the Northern district some demonstrations were held.”⁴²¹ By April, there were widespread protests against the treaty. A telegraph sent from northern tribal elders to the Amir proclaimed that they “strongly protest against the treaty and [we] inform you that the nation does not accept absolute treaties that are used as instruments of slavery.”⁴²² The animosity that the treaty met shocked Amir Abdullah. He resented the opposition to the treaty as a personal attack against himself, and his legitimacy. Early on, the Amir brought “the prominent amongst the agitators and other influential persons” to Amman to discuss the treaty’s terms in person. These meetings generally dispelled fears that article ten, which dealt with Great Britain’s ability to raise and maintain a force in Transjordan, might mean conscription.⁴²³

⁴¹⁹ MECA, ‘*Aref al-‘Aref Diary Amman 1926-1929*, February 20/21, 1928.

⁴²⁰ BNA, CO 831/2/3, HC Plumer to SoS L.S. Amery, 2/3/1928.

⁴²¹ BNA, CO 831/1/2, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Report on the Situation in TJ for Period 1/1/28-31/3/28.”

⁴²² ‘*Aref al-‘Aref Diary Amman 1926-1929*, April 9, 1928.

⁴²³ BNA, CO 831/1/2, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, “Report on Situation in TJ for Period 1/1/1928 – 31/3/1928.”

In the face of this opposition, Aref tried to counsel Abdullah that now was the time to seek amendment of the treaty to appease the populace. The Chief Minister, Hassan Pasha Khalid Abu al-Huda (a naturalized Transjordanian and the son of Sultan Abdulhamid II's religious adviser, he had been Chief Minister since 1926),⁴²⁴ argued that this was not possible because the Amir "is the one who insisted on the treaty to the British." Hassan Pasha bluntly stated that the Amir was arrogant and never consulted with any of his men if he thought that seeking a treaty was in the best interests of the state. The Chief Minister admitted that he had no power to negotiate the terms of the treaty in Jerusalem. His only function was to represent the Amir in his signature.⁴²⁵ The 1928 Agreement would legally install Abdullah and his family as the rulers of the Emirate and reinforce their place in the country. Similar to his brother Feisal, Abdullah knew the limitations of his office and his need to reinforce his monarchical authority if he was to survive in Transjordan. Both Hashemites depended on British power to become sovereign over states in which they had no inherent sovereignty.⁴²⁶

In both the Iraqi and Transjordanian examples, the major proponents of these treaties were the Amirs and their respective Executive Councils. The British understood that the reification of the authority of the Hashemites, and the Amirs' acquiescence, were essential for the stability and feasibility of both Emirates. However, as the diary of 'Aref al-'Aref demonstrates, this Executive support was far from universal or unquestioning. The next step for both governments was the incorporation of local elites into the fold.

⁴²⁴Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 14. Abdullah had met Hassan Khalid during his time in Istanbul. According to Wilson, Abdullah's social circle in Istanbul was limited to other sharifs and members of the Ottoman elite.

⁴²⁵*Aref el-Aref Diary*, April 9, 1928. This fear was a result of Ottoman conscription practices during World War I.

⁴²⁶Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 49-50.

Akin to Iraq, the agreement called for the creation of a new elected representative body. These new representative councils were meant to satisfy the developmental aspects of the Mandate itself.⁴²⁷ The British hoped that this new body would create a class of clients who depended upon the British for their position.⁴²⁸ However, stipulating the need for local approval of the Agreement opened a political space in Transjordan in which an open and vocal opposition could exist.⁴²⁹ Because the Legislative Council's first order of business once convened would be to ratify the 1928 Agreement, these representatives temporarily were in a position of power over the Anglo-Hashemite state. The entirety of the first Legislative Council became a tug of war between the representatives and the government over the size of the political space in which the Council would exist. In essence, the first thing the Legislative Council would have to do would be to define the terms of its involvement in the Hashemite regime.

Elections and Opposition

After their respective executives signed the agreements in Iraq and Transjordan, new electoral laws (1922 Iraq, 1928 Transjordan) followed them. These new laws dictated how the elections for the new assemblies would take place. The 1928 Electoral

⁴²⁷ "The Covenant of the League of Nations," Article 22 and "The Palestine Mandate," London, July 24, 1922. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp#art22.

⁴²⁸ Peter Sluglett, "The Mandates" Some Reflections on the Nature of the British Presence in Iraq (1914-1932) and the French Presence in Syria (1918-1946)," in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Boston: Brill, 2004), 120.

⁴²⁹ My conception of political space is the allocation of room in which discrete political actors may jockey for political control, authority, and sovereignty. This understanding of political competition is similar to Sami Zubaida's 'political field' in which various actors compete over resources and influence instead of overthrowing the dominant political order. Zubaida's 'political field' denotes a maintenance of the political status quo to some degree. It is unclear at the onset of the Legislative Council deliberations what the political order was, and over time, the representatives actively attempted to change the political role attributed to them by the 1928 Agreement. Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), chapter 6.

Law started the process of the Agreement's ratification. The new law dictated how the elections for the new assembly would take place. The law called for indirect elections where primary electors selected a secondary elector, who in turn, would vote for the fourteen actual members of the assembly.⁴³⁰ The elections selected a set number of representatives from each of the three major regions of Transjordan: 'Ajlun (4), Balqa (6), and Karak (4). These elections were for the settled population of Transjordan only.⁴³¹

The two Bedouin representatives were chosen in an entirely different manner. The government arbitrarily divided the tribes of Transjordan into a northern and southern group for the purpose of the Legislative Council elections. The northern tribes included the Bani Sakhr, Sirhan, Bani Khalid, 'Isa and Salit while the southern tribes included the Huwaytat, Manna'in and Hajaya. From these tribes the Amir then selected two ten-member committees of sheikhs who would in turn select a Northern Bedouin and Southern Bedouin representative for the Legislative Council. This selection process acknowledged the prevailing tribal system throughout Transjordan and the technical difficulties in having Bedouin participate in a normal election.⁴³² One of the complications of this system was that the Bedouin population saw the Legislative Council selection as "appointment as a paramount Sheikh of the tribe." Furthermore, according to Major John Bagot Glubb, leader of the Desert Patrol Force and eventual commander of the Arab Legion after 1939, the elected sheikhs were "unaware what the Legislative Assembly is, or what it is for; much less do they realize that the sheikh is supposed to

⁴³⁰ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 58.

⁴³¹ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Transjordan 1920-1929*, 232-33.

⁴³² Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 70-71.

represent their interests in it.”⁴³³ Because of these complications, the Bedouin elections caused a great deal of friction amongst the various sheikhs of a tribe because it sometimes appeared to acknowledge one as “superior” to the other. Despite these issues, the Bedouin council members joined the fourteen other elected members to form a Legislative Council with sixteen total representatives.

Generally, electoral competition in Transjordan focused on the “nationality” of the prospective representatives and the degree to which the nominees opposed the British. The Transjordanian population was mainly Sunni Muslim with small minority enclaves of Arab Christians and Circassians making up less than 11% of the total population. The demographic allocations for the Legislative Council did not match the population distribution of Transjordan. Roughly speaking about half of the population of Transjordan lived in ‘Ajlun, thirty percent in Balqa, and the remaining twenty percent in Karak and Ma’an.⁴³⁴ The Council allocated nine Muslim Arab seats, three Christian Arab seats and two Circassian seats. This representative allocation drastically increased the representation of both the Christian and Circassian communities on the Legislative Council. It is likely that the British set this seat distribution to stack the Council with more pro-Government representatives. Both the Circassians and the Christians had been pro-Ottoman populations, and both groups understood the necessity of a centralized state. The Circassian population in particular remained closely associated with the Hashemite Monarchy, as Abdullah’s personal guard was composed solely of Circassians. Despite the

⁴³³ MECA, Major John Bagot Glubb Collection, “A Monthly Report on the Administration of the Transjordan Deserts November 1937.”

⁴³⁴ Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey*, 16-19. There were no censuses taken during the Mandate period so all of the above demographic figures are estimates taken from voter registration during the Ottoman period and food ration cards during World War II. The total population of Transjordan in 1944 was approximately 340,000 with 300,000 Arab Muslims, 30,000 Arab Christian and 10,000 Circassians.

over-representation of Christians and Circassians on the Council, there were no sectarian issues whatsoever during the Mandate period. Unlike neighboring Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, Transjordan's opposition was solely focused against the scope of British control during the Mandate. Confessional seats existed throughout the Mandate and apparently never raised any ire among its populace.

Regardless of the Council's composition, the elections were set to occur without the prospective representatives knowing the actual powers of the Legislative Council itself. Beyond being an elected representative body, the degree of autonomy and influence the Legislative Council would possess was unclear. As a result, the potential representatives were running for a new position of potential power in the new state. This level of ambiguity would work to the advantage of the Amir and the British later on, because it gave them leverage in dictating the function of the Council. Despite the general opposition, the government promulgated the Legislative Council Electoral Law on August 15, 1928, and formal registration of primary electors for the elections began on September 1, 1928.

The publication of the new election law spurred the resistance to the 1928 Agreement. The clearest illustrations of the popular rejection of the 1928 Agreement were the formation of the National Congress and a series of petitions from Karak and 'Ajlun notables to the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission. The main opposition party, *Hizb al Sha'b* (The People's Party), organized a convention to oppose the 1928 Agreement.⁴³⁵ The National Congress, composed of roughly 150 "notables, sheikhs and intellectuals" convened for the first time on July 25, 1928, at the Hamdan

⁴³⁵ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 30.

coffee house in Amman.⁴³⁶ The coffee house was located in the heart of downtown Amman (*al-balad*) adjacent to the central square, Feisal Square. This downtown corridor, which included Amman's major mosque, Husseini Mosque, was the nexus of exchange in the young capital city. By 1928, Feisal Square had become the political and cultural heart of the state.⁴³⁷ The location of the opposition's congress was critical because it demonstrates the open and free nature of the opposition. It would have been impossible to select a more public and prominent location to hold a political meeting in Transjordan in 1928. These meetings of the National Congress in Amman from 1928-1933 demonstrate that Amman was the home of political opposition in Transjordan. Amman was the seat of the Anglo-Hashemite state but it was not a space that they controlled completely. These meetings were indicative of a strong free opposition, not a cowed assemblage of elite puppets. (Appendix 1, figure 4-1 photo of Hamdan coffee house from 1935)

The National Congress, which elected Hussein al-Tarawnah, a notable from Karak, as its president, questioned the terms of the 1928 Agreement and the Organic Law in reference to how Transjordan should be ruled.⁴³⁸ The National Congress sent a letter composed by Tarawnah to Amir Abdullah and British Resident Cox arguing against the scope of power the Agreement afforded to the Amir and the Executive Council. The Congress believed it was unjust and contrary to the purpose of the Legislative Council to allow any unelected ex-officio members to sit on the Council. They argued that this

⁴³⁶ Munib Madi and Sulayman Musa, *Tarikh al Urdun Fi al-Qarn al- 'Ishrin* (History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century 1900-1959) (Amman: al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya, 1959), 289. For English translation see: Kamel Abu Jaber, "The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Development," *The Muslim World* 59, nos 3-4 (July 1969): 224.

⁴³⁷ Feisal Square's role as the political, cultural, and social core of Amman will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

⁴³⁸ Tarawnah would act as president for the entire duration of the National Congress' existence (1928-1933).

would be in violation to the basic law of 1923. The Legislative Council should have primacy over the appointed Executive Council, not vice versa.⁴³⁹ The National Congress also opposed the scope of the Amir's power within Article 19 of the Organic Law, which granted the Amir near complete control over the Legislative Council. Finally, the opposition party believed that "the Council should be composed only of sons of the country. At present the Legislative Council only contains one member who may be regarded as so."⁴⁴⁰ A "naturalized Transjordanian" or "sons of the country" referred to the Transjordan Nationality Law, which labeled individuals as Transjordanians who were "all Ottoman subjects who were living habitually in Jordan on August 6, 1924." The definition of habitual residence was twelve months of continual residence prior to August 6, 1924.⁴⁴¹ The definition of citizenship in Transjordan was critical because it defined who could take part in the government. Many of Transjordan's "sons of the country" actually came from outside of Transjordan at the beginning of the Mandate. This loose definition of Transjordanian is not surprising given the fact that Transjordan did not exist before 1922. In general, the National Congress opposed the exact form of the agreement but not the need for the agreement themselves. These were demands, which in retrospect, hardly seem extreme.⁴⁴²

British Resident Cox's reply was far from satisfying in the eyes of the National Congress. Cox reasserted that Transjordan was a separate political entity from Palestine and the Balfour Declaration did not apply within its boundaries. Beyond this allowance, Cox reaffirmed that Transjordan was under the domain of His Majesty's Government but

⁴³⁹ 'Aref al-'Aref *Diary Amman 1926-1929*, August 23, 1928.

⁴⁴⁰ CO 831/1/2/ BR Cox to HC Chancellor, Report on the Situation in TJ for Period 1/7/28 – 30/9/28.

⁴⁴¹ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 35.

⁴⁴² Abu Jaber, "The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 224.

went no further in addressing the actual terms of the 1928 Agreement or the Organic Law. In response to the growing unpopularity of the 1928 Agreement, the Executive Council created a banishment law as a means to control the opposition. Amir Abdullah first called for the banishment of opposition figures when he learned of an assassination plot in October of 1928. It is unclear if the allegation was legitimate or not, but it did hasten the passage of the banishment law by the Executive Council on October 8, 1928.⁴⁴³ The banishment law was the first attempt by the Anglo-Hashemite government to begin closing the political space opened by the creation of the Legislative Council.

Undeterred, the National Congress published the National Pact at their next meeting on March 11, 1929 and sent it to the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission. The National Pact's language was much stronger than their initial attempts to appeal to Amir Abdullah and British Resident Cox. The National Pact called on the League of Nations to recognize Transjordan's right to self-determination. In an eleven-point doctrine, it stated the need for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy under the Amir. It also stipulated that the electoral process should be changed, to replace the indirect electoral system of the 1928 Electoral Law with direct elections and representation determined by population demographics.⁴⁴⁴ Finally, it demanded complete independence from Great Britain.⁴⁴⁵

In addition to the National Pact, notables from Karak and 'Ajlun sent their own petitions to the League of Nations. The Karak petition sent in November of 1928 strongly

⁴⁴³ 'Aref al-'Aref *Diary Amman 1926-1929*, October 1 and 8, 1928.

⁴⁴⁴ The first council seats were distributed as four for Ajlun, five for Balqa, three for Karak, and the 2 appointed Bedouin members.

⁴⁴⁵ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 51. Restructuring the LC seats along population demographics would have increased the number of Arab Muslim representatives and decreased the number of both the Arab Christian and Circassian representatives.

opposed the “unlimited authority” held by the British financial and judicial advisers. The power of British officials was more alarming in contrast to the paucity of Transjordanian officials in the Mandatory government. The notables argued that the British forced Transjordan to accept British loans and to accept laws that were not compatible with the customs of Transjordan. The petition also criticized British control over the Hijaz Railway and the army. Akin to the National Pact, the Karak petition called for the formation of a representative constitutional monarchy free of British involvement, and that the terms of the Mandate should be limited to technical advisement.⁴⁴⁶ The petition sent from ‘Ajlun in June of 1929 was identical to the one from Karak.

The League of Nations in its official response to the petitions stated that “the commission was of [the] opinion that the complaints submitted by the petitioners were not of such a nature as to call for any action.” As well, the League of Nations reply asserted that the Hijaz Railway was under an arrangement that approximated pre-war conditions and that Transjordanian Muslims should interact with Mandate Officials to aid in religious matters.⁴⁴⁷ The League of Nations based its opinion on a British report that stated that only five of the signers of the Karak petition were “men of standing” and the other complaints of the petition were erroneous.⁴⁴⁸ As well, British Resident Cox had already dismissed anti-agreement agitation by saying that it had died down considerably

⁴⁴⁶ BNA, FO 371/13748, “Petition by the Inhabitants of Karak to the League of Nations Secretary and British Resident,” 24/11/1928. At no point did any member of the opposition call for the dismissal of the Amir. The opposition divorced the Amir’s approval of the 1928 Agreement and the general will of the Anglo-Hashemite state.

⁴⁴⁷ BNA, FO 371/13748, “League of Nations Mandates Commission to Secretary of State for the Colonies Lewis Vernon Harcourt,” 28/9/1929.

⁴⁴⁸ BNA, FO 371/13748, British notes on Karak Petition, 24/11/1928.

and was “now only maintained by a few place hunters whose object the remainder of the people have now realized.”⁴⁴⁹

British Resident Cox believed that the only reason that the opposition party was successful in getting people to boycott the election was by exploiting the fear that the registration necessary for the election was actually for conscription. Conscription paranoia was an outgrowth of a 1925 government effort to create a population registration and issue identification documents. This initiative entailed having sheikhs provide the Anglo-Hashemite state with lists of their people. The Transjordanian government stopped the registration effort within eighteen months due to widespread opposition. The root of this opposition likely lay in the memory of Ottoman conscription efforts in the nineteenth century. Because of the failure of the 1925 registration efforts, voter registration in 1928 became purely voluntary and left to the discretion of its citizens. A formal census of Jordan was not completed until 1952.⁴⁵⁰

Despite the petitions and protests, the Legislative Council election proceeded on schedule but in the face of “strong opposition.” Both the first and secondary elections were finished by February 18, 1929. The opposition was “a considerable body of opinion [which] was not satisfied with the form of Government proposed and desired that the government should be fully responsible to the electorate.”⁴⁵¹ It is unclear from the British records the exact scope of the election boycott that actually took place, although the boycott was strong enough to prevent elections in the province of Ma’an. In response, Karak and Ma’an, with their combined population of roughly 60,000 people, were

⁴⁴⁹ BNA, CO 831/1/2, BR Cox “Report on the Situation in TJ for Period 1/4/1928 – 30/6/1928.”

⁴⁵⁰ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 72.

⁴⁵¹ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929,” 6/2/1930.

counted as a single region for this election. This southern opposition was a subtle nod to Ottoman continuity. During the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had reasserted its control over the 'Ajlun and most of the Balqa. However, Ottoman authority never traveled further south than the Balqa. Karak and Ma'an had no legacy of centralized state control.⁴⁵² These southern provinces only had a population of roughly 33,000 people in 1917. Transjordan's total population was estimated at 200,000 at the time.⁴⁵³ Much of the opposition to the 1928 Agreement and centralized state authority came from these southern provinces. It is clear that the British anticipated opposition from the southern portion of Transjordan because of the reduced number of southern seats on the Legislative Council, four, opposed to 'Ajlun or Balqa, which had a combined ten seats. Although these southern environs only represented one-sixth of Transjordan's population, the government's inability to control these districts exemplifies the limits of governmental power the further you traveled away from Amman. Despite the omission of Ma'an, in November 1929, the British maintained, when asked by the League of Nations Mandates Commission about the election, that the boycotts had not affected the validity or legality of the election results.⁴⁵⁴

Regardless of the scope of the boycott, five signers of the National Pact were elected to the Legislative Council. The election of Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi (premier Sheikh of Huwaitat tribe, southern Bedouin representative), Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz (premier Sheikh of Bani Sakhr tribe, northern Bedouin representative), 'Atallah al-Suhaimat (notable of Karak), Sa'id al-Mufti (Circassian notable from Amman), and Shams al-Din

⁴⁵² For more on Ottoman Transjordan see Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan 1850-1921* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁵³ Konikoff, *Transjordan*, 17-18.

⁴⁵⁴ BNA, FO 371/13748, British response to petition (Monteagle) to League of Nations, 29/11/1929.

Sami (Circassian notable from Balqa) demonstrated a level of disorganization amongst the opposition.⁴⁵⁵ It is curious that some members of the opposition ran for council seats while its leader, Hussein al-Tarawnah, was not elected. The election of some members of the opposition demonstrates that the National Pact did not have a clear policy on the Legislative Council. These mixed election results are also indicative of a weak sense of political solidarity. The members of the opposition agreed on the need to limit the powers of the British and the Amir in Transjordan but it is doubtful that they agreed on much else. Personal interest and the protection of regional prestige remained the guiding influence for the elected Legislative Council representatives. Beyond the five signers of the National Pact, the remaining representatives did not belong to any political organizations. Fourteen out of the sixteen members were sheikhs or notables supported by large tribes or tribal federations. In general, tribal affiliation held the largest sway in the elections.

What is clear is that the new members of Legislative Council were not political neophytes.⁴⁵⁶ They all were involved in local politics and many had held government positions. The ex-officio members of the Council, who represented the will of the Amir, would not easily sway the new representatives. In no way was it clear at the time of the election that the members of the Legislative Council would be subservient to the Amir. The Legislative Council in early 1929 was an assemblage of powerful “local” elites who had never been under the control of a local centralized state before.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁵ For a full list of all the elected Legislative Councils, refer to appendix 3.

⁴⁵⁶ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 232-34.

⁴⁵⁷ It is important to remember that many of Transjordan’s elites and urban notables originally came from Syria and Palestine.

The Legislative Council members would not find any sympathetic or conflicted members in the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council were committed to having the 1928 Agreement ratified as soon as possible. The one man who might have helped the Legislative Council members push for amendments to the 1928 Agreement, ‘Aref al-‘Aref was gone. In late 1928, British Resident Cox had confronted the major rebellious voice of the Executive Council, ‘Aref al-‘Aref, and accused him of being a member of the opposition. Cox advised him to resign and leave Transjordan.⁴⁵⁸ Aref published a denunciation of the current state of Transjordan on January 7, 1929, and left for Palestine in March 1929. Aref contended that only a truly representative government could save the young state.⁴⁵⁹ It is certain that the formation of the First Legislative Council failed to satisfy this requirement.

Internal Regulations and the First Conflict

The first extraordinary session of the First Legislative Council opened without incident on April 2, 1929. The Council was comprised of nine Muslim Arabs, three Christian Arabs, two Circassians, and two Bedouin sheikhs. Five members of the Executive Council and Chief Minister Hassan Khalid Pasha Abu al-Huda joined the sixteen elected members.⁴⁶⁰ This newly formed body was comprised of the “important notables of Jordan” but was not yet a “powerless body” as Kamel Abu Jaber asserts.⁴⁶¹ The Legislative Council would have its authority and influence neutered over time but

⁴⁵⁸ ‘Aref al-‘Aref *Diary Amman 1926-1929*, November 27 1928.

⁴⁵⁹ ‘Aref al-‘Aref *Diary Amman 1926-1929*, January 7, 1929. ‘Aref served as a civil servant in the British Mandate from 1933-1948 and would eventually be appointed mayor of Jerusalem by Abdullah in 1950 and he served as its mayor through 1955.

⁴⁶⁰ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC JR Chancellor, “Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year of 1929,” 6/2/1930. For a full list of every Legislative Council’s membership, see appendix 3.

⁴⁶¹ Abu Jaber, “The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 223.

that eventuality was far from a foregone conclusion at its inception. Furthermore, the government needed the Council to ratify the 1928 Agreement and as a result could not be overly aggressive with the Council's members at the onset.

An atmosphere of apprehension and competition almost immediately set in between the elected Legislative Council members and the *ex-officio* Executive Council members. "The elected members regarded the *ex-officio* members with strong suspicion in the belief that all possible steps would be taken to deprive them of those new powers which they had acquired."⁴⁶² It is exactly this struggle, which informed the proceedings of the First Legislative Council. From the beginning, members jockeyed for position and influence in the Council. Furthermore, these newly minted Transjordanian elites had to work out exactly what their new positions would afford them and how their new elected office would affect their formerly autonomous positions back in their home districts. In the first Council, the demographic allocations of the Council did not have a significant impact.⁴⁶³ The demographic rigging of the Legislative Council seats did not help the Anglo-Hashemite government's efforts to have the Agreement ratified. Voices of dissent and opposition came from every region and population in Transjordan during the Council proceedings. No sectarian divisions divided the opposition of the Legislative Council. Although the Council's seats were allocated to place more friendly Christian and Circassian voices in the Council, nearly every member spoke against the 1928 Agreement's ratification. The political space opened by the 1928 Agreement ratification debate would have to be closed by some other means. The Legislative Council did not

⁴⁶² BNA, CO 831/8/5, "Report on the administration of TJ for the year 1929," 6/2/1930.

⁴⁶³ Demographics played a larger role in the proceedings of the second LC where the representatives from Karak were the most belligerent to the wishes of the Mandatory Government. In particular, Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali of Karak were the loudest opposition voices in the second council.

have clearly defined powers at the onset of the Council's proceedings, and the ambiguity in the powers and responsibilities of the Council temporarily increased its authority and influence. (Appendix 1, figure 4-2 photo of original prime ministry building in downtown Amman)

The first order of business, once the Amir officially convened the Council, was to draft its Internal Regulations and define the powers of the Council. These regulations were to define the parliamentary procedures of the Council and the exact scope of the powers and the limitations of the Council. The early portions of the regulations, Articles 1-18, were passed without real incident in the fourth meeting on April 10.⁴⁶⁴ Articles 1-3 set that the Council would always convene on November 1 with a speech from the throne. It was then the responsibility of the Council to respond formally to the speech (*mazbutta*). Articles 4-18 called for the election of a new clerk to keep the Council minutes every six weeks and the establishment of the financial, legislative, and administrative committees.⁴⁶⁵

The passage of Articles 19, 24, 25, and 26, which dealt with the authority to draft laws, became the first contest in the Legislative Council for power and influence. According to Article 37 of the Organic Law, and Article 19 of the proposed Internal Legislative Council Regulations, only the Chief Minister or the head of a department could introduce legislation because they were the only individuals deemed "competent" and "experts." In the sixth session Shams al-Din Sami (a Circassian from the Balqa), member of the People's Party and the National Pact, suggested the revision of this provision so that members of the Legislative Council could introduce legislation. Najib

⁴⁶⁴ Abu Nowar, *The History of Jordan*, 234.

⁴⁶⁵ BNA, CO 831/8/5, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929," 6/2/1930.

Abu Sha‘r (a prominent Christian lawyer and notable of a large federation of Christian tribes from Husn) agreed with Shams al-Din and asserted: “We are not minors and we are eager to work for independence.”⁴⁶⁶ At stake for Abu Sha‘r and Shams al-Din was their ability to institute real change and wield real power through the Council. Without the ability to introduce legislation, the Council would be subject to the whims of the British and the Amir. The majority of the Council members agreed that the Council needed to have the ability to shape its own agenda. Pro-Hashemite stalwarts like ‘Audah al-Qusus of Karak agreed with the political dissenters such as Shams al-Din that new legislation was the prerogative of the representatives.⁴⁶⁷ Eventually, due to the absences of a number of pro-Amir members, the Council was able to pass the revised versions of Articles 24, 25 and 26.⁴⁶⁸

This opposition victory was short lived. The Chief Minister read the Amir’s *Iradah* (executive order) the next day, which rejected the revised versions of Articles 24, 25, and 26 because they were in opposition to Article 37 of the Organic Law. At this point, the President acknowledged that “opinions are equally divided” and that the legal committee did not need to consider the articles further. Despite the efforts of the opposition, the Legislative Council passed the original versions of Articles 24, 25 and 26 during the tenth session on April 25. In the end, the Internal Regulations were passed

⁴⁶⁶ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 6th session, April 17, 1929.

⁴⁶⁷ ‘Audah al-Qusus was the only council member who argued for the adoption of the 1928 Agreement without revision.

⁴⁶⁸ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 9th session, April 24, 1929. The president Hassan Khalid abu al-Huda, Refifan al-Majali, Mithqal al-fayiz, Hamd ibn Jazi, and Adib Wahbah were absent from the council session which proceeded with only 14 total members.

stating only heads of departments may introduce laws, because, as the president maintained, the “Heads of Departments are specialists.”⁴⁶⁹

The Internal Regulations had an enormous impact on the powers afforded to the Legislative Council. The members of the Transjordanian representative assembly now held far less sway than their Iraqi counterparts. In Iraq, “any deputy could propose legislation, provided he had the support of ten others and provided that the legislation did not concern financial matters, which were still reserved to British control under the terms of the treaty.”⁴⁷⁰ The Iraqi assembly was far from all-powerful, but its ability to introduce its own legislation gave the members a far higher degree of autonomy than their Transjordanian brethren. The British substantiated this discrepancy by emphasizing that the substance of the agreements was “not comparable” due to the “rapid progress” being made in Iraq.⁴⁷¹ As a result, the representatives could only vote up or down on legislation without the ability to amend existing legislation or introduce new legislation. The Council could not dictate an agenda. The government now controlled the terms of the engagement; all the Council could do was react. The representatives had lost the ability to shape the trajectory of Transjordan independently. These abridged responsibilities were the first true curtailment of the influence of the elites who sat on the Legislative Council. The shift away from the historic power structure of autonomous tribal elites had begun. The political space in which the Legislative Council existed and operated had begun to close. The limitations set forth in the Internal Regulations would handicap the abilities of the representatives throughout the history of the Mandate.

⁴⁶⁹ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 10th session, April 25, 1929

⁴⁷⁰ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 58.

⁴⁷¹ LOC, *Miscellaneous No. 9 (1928) League of Nations Fifty-First and Fifty-Second Sessions of the Council: Reported by the Right Hon. Lord Cushendun*, August 30 to September 8 1928, 5-7.

1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Ratification Battle

After the conclusion of the opening bout, the real fight over the ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement could begin. The halls of the Legislative Council became a battleground. The terms of the 1928 Agreement and the nature of Transjordan's future relationship with the British hung in the balance. Beyond the five signers of the National Pact, the majority of the remaining eleven unaffiliated representatives also vocally opposed the language of the 1928 Agreement.⁴⁷² The major source of opposition to the treaty was the fact that the British created the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement without Transjordanian input. The demands and rhetorical flourishes of the members differed widely, but they were united in their opposition to a treaty that was foreign to them. Only one elected representative advocated the ratification of the 1928 Agreement in tandem with the ex-officio members of the Executive Council: a Christian from Karak named 'Audah al-Qusus.

Analogous to the debate over the Internal Regulations of the Council, the members of the Legislative Council were also united on the issue of immunity during Council sessions. This request, first articulated during the debate over the Council's Internal Regulations, reemerged with discussion of the 1928 Agreement's ratification. Najib Abu Sha'r (Christian from Husn) demanded that each member have his freedom of speech guaranteed and that members would not be silenced like children in *al-kuttab* (elementary school). Shams al-Din agreed and again stressed the need for immunity to guarantee freedom of speech. He contended the issue was of the utmost importance

⁴⁷² The five signers of the National Pact were Shams al-Din Sami, Sa'id al-Mufti, 'Atallah al-Suhaimat, Sheikh Mithqal Ibn Fayiz and Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi. See appendix 3 for a full list of Legislative Council representatives.

because the eyes of Syria, Palestine, and Iraq were all upon them.⁴⁷³ Shams al-Din, Najib Abu Sha‘r, and Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim representative from Madaba) all expressed how reluctant they were to move forward with any Agreement negotiations before their immunity was established. For Abu Sha‘r, the “pillars” of the Council rested on the need for security via immunity. Ex-officio members Secretary General Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and fellow Executive Council member Treasurer Ibrahim Hashim maintained that the issue of immunity was irrelevant because without the 1928 Agreement the Legislative Council was not legal in the first place.⁴⁷⁴

The arguments of the Executive Council did not sway the representatives. The Council members wanted to ensure, above everything else, that they would be able to oppose and protest legislation from a position of legal safety. Immunity rights were directly tied to the ability of the Council representatives to act freely. Debates over immunity were another facet of the same debate over representative authority and autonomy. Amir Abdullah eventually announced amendments to the Organic Law on June 9, 1929, “whereby the members of the Council should have complete freedom of speech within the limits of the Standing Orders during the deliberations of the Council.”⁴⁷⁵ It is important to note that institution of guaranteed immunity only took place after the passage of the 1928 Agreement on June 4, 1929. The Amir’s proclamation unsettled the British. The Permanent Mandates Commission determined during its fifteenth session that the Amir did not have the right to amend the Organic Law without

⁴⁷³ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 9th session, April 24, 1929

⁴⁷⁴ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 11th session, April 30, 1929.

⁴⁷⁵ BNA, CO 831/8/5, “Proclamation amending Organic Law,” 9/6/1929.

the approval of “His Britannic Majesty.”⁴⁷⁶ Despite British anger, the Amir’s order stood, guaranteeing immunity during future Legislative Council sessions.

With the issue of representative immunity settled, the Legislative Council began its debate of the 1928 Agreement in earnest. Representatives used a number of tactics to attack the British and the Agreement but all of the opposition boiled down to a single position: just because the British drafted the Agreement without Transjordanians did not mean they had to accept it. Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from Ajlun) argued “this agreement is not a verse from heaven and difficult to amend. There is no justification for obliging us to ratify it, simply because it was signed.” In these comments Najib Abu Sha‘r never questioned the good intentions of the British. Instead, he reinforced the benevolent nature and intentions of the British by asking the question: “What is the meaning of the Mandate except to train for self-government not colonialism or slavery? We are not asking for anything contrary to the main British interest and its international obligations in our country.” These comments further reinforced that the members of the Legislative Council were well versed in political and diplomatic negotiations. Abu Sha‘r knew what principles and ideals the British lauded, and only asked that they be consistent in their treatment of Transjordan.⁴⁷⁷

Despite their reservations, most members of the Council understood the need for some form of treaty. Mohammed Bey al-Unsi (Muslim from Balqa, former chief of the Royal Diwan) and ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan (Muslim notable of Salt, originally from Nablus) acknowledged that the future of the nation depended on the ratification of a treaty to give the country legality. However, such a treaty would only be acceptable if three conditions

⁴⁷⁶ BNA, CO 831/8/5, Lord Lugard, excerpt from the 15th session of Permanent Mandates Commission, 6/2/1930.

⁴⁷⁷ JPL, LC Minutes, 14th session, May 11, 1929.

were satisfied: the ability to send ambassadors and consuls to other countries, the ability to raise an army and declare war, and the right to negotiate and conclude treaties independently. They cited Articles 10 and 11 and argued “[t]hat the army is the true appearance of independence” and the only way to protect the dignity of the nation. Al-Unsi was adamant that this was a reasonable request. If these three limitations were left unresolved, it amounted to a near complete loss of sovereignty to the British. Furthermore, the representatives saw the 1928 Agreement stipulations as particularly egregious because they were not applied to Palestine, Iraq, or Syria.⁴⁷⁸ However, despite these limitations, neither al-Unsi nor Tuqan advocated the outright rejection of the treaty.⁴⁷⁹

Only Shams al-Din Sami (Christian from Balqa) rejected the idea that Transjordan needed the agreement at all. “The acceptance of this agreement won’t change any current position of us. Of course, it is said to us that acceptance of this agreement would render our temporary constitutional government a permanent one, but where is that constitutional government and, what is the meaning of constitution if we accepted this agreement that would otherwise dispossess us of the right of life.”⁴⁸⁰ Shams al-Din completely dismissed the idea that the Transjordanian government needed the 1928 Agreement to validate, legalize, or perpetuate its existence. He saw the Agreement as nothing more there a litany of abuses against the Transjordanian people.

⁴⁷⁸ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 18th session, May 30, 1929.

⁴⁷⁹ Similar critiques were voiced by Sa’id Pasha al-Sulaibi and Najib al-Shraidah. Both al-Sulaibi and al-Shraidah focused on the economic liabilities that the 1928 Agreement would entail for Transjordan. Neither rejected Great Britain’s role as the Mandatory power. They did however question the financial demands that the British had for the Transjordan budget.

⁴⁸⁰ JPL, LC Minutes, 16th session, May 14, 1929.

‘Audah al-Qusus (Christian from Karak) was the only elected member of the Legislative Council who advocated for the 1928 Agreement’s ratification. Representative al-Qusus understood the goal of independence in broader terms. He, like the ex-officio members of the Executive Council, argued that the Agreement was necessary to establish the Council as a legal administrative body.⁴⁸¹ “Either we take in our hands the right of free action in our resources or otherwise surrender to the mandated government to enforce the mandate act literally and then no one of us will be able to raise his head and ask about what is going on.”⁴⁸² In essence, al-Qusus reminded the Council that Transjordan could not afford the risk of rejecting the 1928 Agreement.

The opposition covered a wide spectrum of opinions from minimal changes to complete rejection. None of the representatives blindly followed a singular ideology. Council members were informed individuals who advocated for themselves pragmatically to ensure that their rights and authority would be preserved. These men needed to protect their own authority in their patrimonial networks in their home regions. These varied approaches reject the binary competition described by historian Maan Abu Nowar as “the opposition” against “the government” which acted out British interests indiscriminately.⁴⁸³ It becomes clearer that the competition for lasting influence and power within Transjordan was not only a competition between foreign and national interests, but of diverging local interests of domestic actors. These sessions represent competition amongst Arabs and Circassians, between northern and southern tribesmen,

⁴⁸¹ The most vocal members of the Executive Council during these deliberations were the Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda, Treasurer Ibrahim Hashim and Secretary General Tawfiq Abu al-Huda.

⁴⁸² JPL, LC Minutes, 16th session, May 14, 1929.

⁴⁸³ Abu Nowar, *The History of Jordan*, 247-51.

between native Transjordanians and Arab Palestinians. This was no simple rhetorical clash.

Finally, during the eighteenth session of the first Legislative Council, the representatives took action. Najib al-Shraidah (Christian from Madaba) presented a motion signed by fourteen members of the Legislative Council ⁴⁸⁴ that demanded the amendment of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 16. Every member of the Council except for the two Bedouin representatives signed the motion. It is odd that the Bedouin members, both of whom signed the National Pact, did not sign the motion for amendment. Perhaps, since the Amir played a more direct role in the selection of the Bedouin representatives, Mithqal al-Fayiz and Hamd ibn Jazi were afraid to vocally and openly oppose the will of Abdullah.⁴⁸⁵ In the following session Tawfiq Abu al-Huda read both a letter he had written to British Resident Cox and Cox's reply. In the letter to Cox, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda had sent a copy of the petition signed by the fourteen members of the Council and had asked for a date to negotiate the 1928 Agreement's terms. Cox replied stating that the Legislative Council has had sufficient time to study the Agreement and that it was now necessary for the representatives to "take their decision without delay." After reading the British Resident's reply Tawfiq Abu al-Huda warned the representatives that this response was dangerous and that inaction would weaken the Council. Sa'id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman, signer of the National Pact) referred to

⁴⁸⁴ The motion was signed by 'Attallah al-Suhaimat; Salih al-'Auran; 'Auqlah Nusair; Sa'id al-Sulaibi; Rifafan al-Majali; Muhammad al-Unsi, 'Audah al-Qusus; Bakhit al-Ibrahim; Najib al-Shraideh; 'Ala' al-Din Tuqan; 'Abdullah al-Kulaib; Najib Abu Sha'r; Sa'id al-Mufti; Shams al-Din Sami. See appendix 3 for each member's home districts and sectarian identities.

⁴⁸⁵ JPL, LC Minutes, 18th session, May 30, 1929.

British Resident Cox's veiled threat as if a "bomb [were] thrown into the council" and demanded the representatives have time to consider their options.⁴⁸⁶

The next day opened with the Speaker reading a motion signed by fifteen members, including the five ex-officio members, where they decided to ratify the 1928 Agreement. Sa'id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman), Shams al-Din Sami (Christian from Balqa), Najib Abu Sha'r (Christian from Husn in 'Ajlun), Bakhit al-Ibrahim (Christian from Salt who lived in Amman), Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim from Madaba in 'Ajlun), and Mithqal al-Fayiz (Sheikh of the Bani Sakhr, northern Bedouin representative) did not sign the petition. Although Cox's letter never concretely threatened to dissolve the Council, the members understood his message. Rather than risk the stability and the integrity of the Council itself, the representatives had decided to pass the Agreement. In essence, they decided to live to fight another day.⁴⁸⁷ The Amir formally ratified the Agreement on June 29, 1929, and then closed the first sessions of the First Legislative Council the next day.⁴⁸⁸

Ratification Aftermath: Questions of Status and the Coalescence of State

In the end, the 1928 Agreement ratification in Transjordan unfolded in a very similar fashion to the passage and ratification of the 1922 Agreement in Iraq. The Iraqi Constituent Assembly began its session in March 1924, and immediately began to criticize the treaty. Similar to British Resident Cox in Transjordan, the High

⁴⁸⁶ JPL, LC Minutes, 19th session, June 1, 1929.

⁴⁸⁷ JPL, LC Minutes, 20th session, June 4, 1929.

⁴⁸⁸ BNA, FO 864/4, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, "Transjordan: Political Reports for Second Quarter, 1929 (1.4.1929-30.6.1929)." The Legislative Council sessions held to ratify the 1928 Agreement were technically a "special session." The first normal session of the Council was opened on November 1, 1929. Regular Legislative Council terms always opened on November 1st with a speech from the throne.

Commissioner of Iraq Sir Henry Dobbs issued an ultimatum stating that if the treaty was not ratified by June that the British would seek alternative means to fulfill its Mandate in Iraq. The Constituent Assembly caved and the treaty narrowly passed.⁴⁸⁹ In both cases, domestic elites on the constituent assemblies unsuccessfully attempted to assert their own authority. The British humbled the elected representatives in both instances. In many ways, Great Britain followed the same model for the creation of Transjordan's state machinery as it did for Iraq, just at a slower pace.⁴⁹⁰ In both Iraq and Transjordan, the British worked to close the political space opened by the Anglo-Hashemite Agreement ratification proceedings. For elites in Iraq and Transjordan, the issue of status and the protection of status was tightly interwoven with political standing and authority.

Evidence of the importance of status lies in the Legislative Council minutes themselves. The representatives' focus on both the language of the Internal Regulation and the issue of immunity were in essence both arguments over status. These debates involved all members of the Council and superseded any political beliefs or doctrine. For members of the Council, protecting their position was of the utmost importance. The consideration of a new sanitation law, oddly enough, is a perfect encapsulation of the values and rights at stake in the 1928 Agreement debate. At its core, the treaty consideration and the sanitation law boiled down to the same things: elite privilege, control, and status; simply put, questions of who exercised true sovereignty in Transjordan.

The source of the contention in the sanitation law was a communiqué issued to speed up the prosecution of health violations in Transjordan. The Department of Public

⁴⁸⁹ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 57-58.

⁴⁹⁰ Sluglett, "The Mandates," 123.

Health issued a general appeal to clarify the issue of public health violations. The sanitation law stated that individuals were responsible for the removal of “dirt, waste, and health risks” from their property within a specified period. If he/she failed to remove the waste, an action would be filed against the offender. The general appeal attached to the law maintained that it was unnecessary for magistrate judges to independently investigate these claims and that they should “rely on the testimony of health inspectors unless they have reason to believe otherwise.” Further investigation by the magistrate judge was superfluous because they could only determine if the dirt was removed, not if it was removed within the specific period required by the sanitation law.⁴⁹¹

On its surface, the law seemed straightforward: if you do not clean up your waste, you will be prosecuted. The aspect of the law that drew the ire of many of the Legislative Council members was who would determine the violations and scope of the punishment. A municipal employee, generally a health inspector, would bring the charges. ‘Audah al-Qusus, the lone Council representative who argued in favor of the 1928 Agreement’s ratification, was horrified by this because “in this case the municipal employee is an individual, and I may say ‘minor’ individual, their discretion will not be sufficient to the Court, he/she (the violator) may be from the elite and this is not commensurate with justice and is not compatible with the soul of law.” In essence, it is unthinkable to have a “minor” individual determine punishments for a member of the elite. For al-Qusus, “to leave the matter for the discretion of a minor employee like this, so that his testimony is considered sufficient to suit people and insult some of them is not commensurate with

⁴⁹¹ JPL, Legislative Council Minutes, 18th session, May 30, 1929.

justice and is not compatible with the soul of law.”⁴⁹² Here it is clear that the problem with the law is not the concept of proper sanitation practices, but who exercised authority. The idea that a mere civil servant’s authority might trump that of a member of the established elite was unconscionable. The Council’s fear about this minor sanitation law was the personification of their fear over being replaceable. Mohammad Bey al-Unsi (Muslim from Balqa) was similarly concerned and believed that a doctor, not a municipal official, should determine the culpability of the accused. Both al-Qusus and al-Unsi were threatened by the idea that a new municipal official could hold sway over a member of the established elite. British Resident Cox shared this low opinion of municipal officials and wrote in the 1929 first quarter report that “[i]n general administrative officers are weak and careless in the management of Municipal affairs and the councils themselves are dishonest.”⁴⁹³

This spat over a seemingly minor sanitation law during the 1928 Agreement ratification debate illustrates how threatened the established elites were by the creation of new government elites. Municipal officials, amongst others, were the personification of a clear threat to the established elites’ monopoly over authority and privilege. Although the 1928 Agreement debate was not framed as a competition between new and old elites, this theme was clearly present in the proceedings. It is telling that the debate over the sanitation law included members of both the opposition and the pro-ratification camps. This fight over authority and respect was by no means limited to the pro-agreement camp. Instead, these perceived rights were critical to everyone on the Legislative Council because they were all established elites. The sanitation law debate was analogous to the

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ BNA, FO 864/4, “Transjordan: Political Reports for First Quarter, 1929 (1/1/1929 – 31/3/1929).”

devil's bargain evident in the 1928 Agreement ratification. The ratification of the Agreement or acquiescence to the sanitation law would simultaneously solidify elite position while diminishing its influence and independence. This sanitation law symbolizes the threat to their autonomy and influence. The conclusion of the 1928 Agreement deliberations represented the efforts of the opposition to safeguard their place in the Mandate's social and political infrastructure.

The formal ratification of the 1928 Agreement by His British Majesty (H.B.M.) took place on October 4, 1929, and it was exchanged with the Amir on October 31, 1929. It should be noted that the opposition did not immediately disappear in the wake of the Agreement's ratification. On the contrary, the president of the National Congress Hussein al-Tarawnah wrote a personal letter to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission asserting that the 1928 Agreement amounted to "the nightmare of arbitrary colonization and military occupation of our weak country."⁴⁹⁴ Nineteen inhabitants of Karak petitioned the Mandatory government about the leadership of Transjordan. The Karak inhabitants criticized the government about lack of Transjordanians by birth in government positions, "The national element is thus entirely excluded from the direction of these departments [in reference to Departments of finance, justice, chief minister, British Resident]." ⁴⁹⁵ This petition attacked both British control and foreign Arab control of the Transjordanian government.

Although there was never a large number of British officials in Transjordan during the Mandate, their strong hold on the true positions of power and influence such as

⁴⁹⁴ BNA, FO 371/13748, Husain al-Tarawnah to League of Nations Mandates Commission Secretary, 21/6/1929.

⁴⁹⁵ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, "Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929," 6/2/1930, pg. 4-7.

British Resident, Financial Adviser, Judicial Adviser, and Commander of the Arab Legion, angered the local population because it deprived them of these esteemed positions of influence as new elites. Patrimonial networks and allegiances do not work in a system filled with outsiders. This criticism also demonstrated a shift in the goals of the opposition. It was critical that Transjordanian elites hold positions in the Anglo-Hashemite government to protect their status in Transjordan. After the ratification of the 1928 Agreement, it became more important to be a part of the Anglo-Hashemite state, rather than simply disparage it from the outside. In time, the number of British and Arab Palestinian government officials would decrease and more Transjordanians became government bureaucrats.⁴⁹⁶

Shortly after the conclusion of the 1928 Agreement ratification battle, the Wailing Wall riots broke out in Palestine. The British expected a great deal of related unrest to occur in Transjordan, but little actual protest occurred. The British explained this “surprising moderation” as being the result of the “proper attitude taken up by His Highness the Amir and the TJ government, all possible influence both personal and official being exerted to prevent any participation by Trans-Jordanians in the disorders... any disloyalty would have resulted in serious embarrassment to the British authorities is a justification of the large degree of Self government given to the country.”⁴⁹⁷ This moderation of Transjordanian officials was indicative of the approach that the Amir and the Executive Council took during the ratification process. It was better, in their eyes, to work within the system than to challenge it and possibly lose their positions of influence and power. However, the opposition seized this opportunity to further frustrate British

⁴⁹⁶ The issue of non-Transjordanians in government will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5.

⁴⁹⁷ BNA, FO 864/4, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Transjordan: Political Reports for Third Quarter, 1929 (1.7.29-30.9.29).”

designs in both Palestine and Transjordan. “It is worthy of note that the leaders of that party which opposed the conclusion of the Agreement ... were loudest in their demands that active support should be given to the Arabs in the recent disorders in Palestine and now declare that it is wrong to discriminate [against] Arabs from whatever country they come.”⁴⁹⁸ Again, the opposition did not simply fade away. However, they did have to change their tactics.

The opposition continued their resistance towards the 1928 Agreement and the new political status quo in Transjordan. The British blamed these “propagandists” for circulating falsehoods and fomenting unrest. “In a place like Transjordan where the mass of people are exceedingly ignorant that propagandists have practically full liberty of action in this respect; and amongst the tales they told were a number calculated to evaporate the people’s confidence in the English.” The propagandists included former members of the government including “a number of notables who had lost their power in proportion as law and order were established.”⁴⁹⁹ Even after the completion of the 1928 Agreement ratification, opposition figures still struggled to protect a degree of their former autonomy and authority. These notables had lost power in proportion to the centralization efforts of the new government in Amman.⁵⁰⁰ This push and pull, the competing efforts of consolidation and decentralization, would define the events of the first Legislative Council.

⁴⁹⁸ BNA, CO 831/8/5, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Report on the Administration of TJ for the Year 1929,” 6/2/1930, pg. 9.

⁴⁹⁹ The British records do not specifically name any members of the opposition. They simply lump them together as “troublemakers” “propagandists” or “the opposition.”

⁵⁰⁰ BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Comments on the Political Situation in TJ,” 6/11/1929.

By 1929, Amman had become both the seat of the Anglo-Hashemite state and the center of all political intrigue in Transjordan. British Resident Cox described Amman as “the centre of all politics, in close touch with Palestine and Syria. The feeling against the Zionists is very bitter. There would scarcely be any serious trouble in Transjordan, which was not organized, and ordered from Amman.” Cox listed Legislative Council member Shams al-Din Sami as one of the individuals most interested in “fomenting political trouble.” Najib Abu Sha’r and Taher al-Joqqa both presented their cases against the 1928 Agreement’s terms to Captain Gordon Canning and argued for the need of Arab unity. Calls for Arab unity and solidarity with Palestine would reappear frequently in future Legislative Council critiques of the government and the Amir.⁵⁰¹ (Appendix 1, figure 4-3 photo of opening of first regular session of First Legislative Council in 1929)

Conclusion

The 1928 Agreement ratification battle illustrates the nuanced power dynamics of Transjordan in the late 1920s. The levels of power and political intrigue transcended any one group or region. At the onset, there was internal commotion in Abdullah’s Cabinet with the Amir pushing for the Agreement’s acceptance while others, most notably ‘Aref al-‘Aref, advised caution and reconsideration. The publication of the Agreement warranted opposition from the National Congress and other regional elites. Eventually, numerous opposition figures were elected to the first Legislative Council. However, the proceedings of the Legislative Council show that the political clash was far more than simply “us” vs. “them.” It was a competition for power, influence, and authority between

⁵⁰¹ BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, “Situation Report,” 17/11/1929.

the new and old elites of Transjordan. Every member of the Legislative Council attempted to protect his own privileged status in Transjordan. The 1928 Agreement's ratification marked a shift away from tribal hegemony in favor of centralized state control. This contest was particularly acute because of Amman's recent reestablishment and its growing political gravity in Transjordan. The characteristics of Transjordanian and Iraqi political development mirrored one another, demonstrating clear similarities in British approaches across their Hashemite Mandates. The usage of elite coercion and military repression shaped the early stages of both Mandates.

Despite the defeat of the Council in the ratification debate, the opposition would continue to hamstring the efforts of the Amir and the British for years to come. The shadow of the opposition was even felt during the formal celebration of the Agreement's ratification on November 5, 1929, when "some 200 riff raff and children paraded the town with flags and shouts against the Balfour Declaration."⁵⁰² These demonstrations were indicative of the continuing efforts of the opposition, and of notables whose authority and influence were being trivialized, to continue fighting. The opposition existed in the political space opened by the British when they stipulated that the Legislative Council must ratify the 1928 Agreement. For the remainder of the Mandate, the Anglo-Hashemite government attempted to close this political space while the opposition struggled to keep it open. The efforts of the opposition would be sustained through the first ordinary session of the Legislative Council until they reached a breaking point in the budgetary battle of 1931. This political tug-of-war continued throughout the Mandate, with the Council members giving up more ground with every passing year and

⁵⁰² BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, "Description of the Opening of the LC," 5/11/1929.

every subsequent Council. Despite their diminished stature, the representatives of the Legislative Council continued to protect their own personal interests. Over time, the Hashemite state's shadow engulfed and overtook the halls of the Legislative Council.

5: Elite Manipulation in the Legislative Council: The Creation of a Hashemite Versailles

“The existence of an assembly forms a useful safety valve for public opinion. The fact that bills must be debated in public before becoming law, causes the government to study public opinion before drawing up new legislation. Finally, membership of the Legislative Assembly has educative value, enabling a number of leading citizens to see something of [the] working of the government.”

—Commander of the Arab Legion Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb in 1943⁵⁰³

By the end of 1929, Transjordan had been under British control for nearly a decade. Although this decade of centralized state control did not completely replace the existing tribalized elite structure of Transjordan, it had begun to minimize its impact. The days of the “chieftaincy” as Yoav Alon refers to it, were numbered.⁵⁰⁴ The passage of the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Council and the subsequent ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement had curtailed the authority of the Legislative Council. However, the newly created Legislative Council was still a largely unknown

⁵⁰³ MECA, Glubb Collection, private files 1941-1945, “A Further Note on Peace Terms in the Middle East” May 25, 1943, Amman.”

⁵⁰⁴ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 82-83.

quantity. The Council fought and lost the right to amend the 1928 Agreement, but the Mandatory government did not know how they would respond to future legislation. The Executive Council and British Resident Cox had dictated the terms of the Agreement and seen to its ratification. The forced ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement was a step towards the closing of the political space that had been opened with the election of the first Council and the treaty deliberations. Over the subsequent years of the Mandate, the Mandatory government continued efforts to close this political space while the members of the Legislative Council struggled to keep it open. Despite their collective defeat in the Legislative Council, the members of the opposition had not given up. Throughout the duration of the First Legislative Council, the representatives continued to strive for more autonomy by criticizing the British and the government. This competition for political influence and authority reached a boiling point during the 1930-1931 budget hearings in the winter of 1931.

In the wake of the dismissal of the First Legislative Council in February 1931, the powers of the Council waned. The Second Legislative Council had a vastly different membership and relationship with the government. The looming threat of dissolution curtailed the extent to which the Council could openly oppose any piece of legislation. Instead, the strategy of non-cooperation became the weapon of the representatives. The Council's reluctant passage of the 1932 Land Tax Law only occurred because of the extreme pressure put on the representatives by the Executive Council and the British. The Legislative Council did not immediately become a rubber stamp for any Government policy. It remained more than a mere "safety valve" despite what John Bagot Glubb thought.

However, with each subsequent Council, the sway and combativeness of the Legislative Council diminished. The Council did manage to block some legislation, such as the Water Rights Acts in the late 1930s, but over time, the focus on the government and the representatives of the Legislative Council changed. As the power of the central government became more tangible the strength and visibility of opposition forces faded. The political space that was created in 1928 for the ratification of the Agreement was rapidly closing. With the amendment of the 1928 Agreement in 1934, additional dissident voices disappeared. The centralizing infrastructure of Amman began to condition and discipline the elites of the Council. Through various punishments and edicts, the number of viable political options for the elites of Transjordan dwindled. The lure of prestige, government positions, and financial incentives slowly muted the strength of oppositional voices. The city of Amman functioned as a complete “Versailles” where elites negotiated with a central government entity to ensure their continued importance. The importance of patrimonial networks and securing positions for themselves and their clients trumped fleeting disagreements over legislative procedure. Consequently, it became more important for Transjordanian elites to be a part of the Council than vocally oppose the government. The prize became the Council seats themselves, as opposed to any actual legislative authority exercised by the elected representatives. By the end of the Mandate, the political machinery of the centralized Transjordanian state absorbed formerly autonomous elites. Largely through the Legislative Council, Amman had been transformed into a Hashemite Versailles. The political space of the capital reinforced the necessity of compromise on both the side of the government and Transjordan’s elites. Neither could exist without the other. This realm of patronage both seduced and

conditioned the elites of Transjordan to accept its existence. Elite status and visibility had completely replaced any functional ability to legislate. By the end of the Mandate, Amman's gilded cage both constrained and supported the elites within. The cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. The physical space of Amman became the stage upon which this performance of prestige and power continually repeated itself while constantly incorporating new actors.

Fracturing Opposition and non-Transjordanians in Government

In the wake of the 1928 Agreement's ratification, the representatives of the Legislative Council became more fixated on government administration. In particular, there was an increased aversion to non-Transjordanians taking government positions. Transjordanian identity during the Mandate was a legal definition. The Transjordan Nationality Law classified anyone who had "lived habitually" for a period of twelve months in Transjordan prior to August 6, 1924 as "sons of the country." This definition applied to all sectarian and demographic groups of the Mandate. A Muslim Arab Transjordanian did not possess more authority or legitimacy than his Circassian or Arab Christian compatriots did.⁵⁰⁵ The ratification of the 1928 Agreement cemented the rules of the game by which the Council members had to abide. After the game's codification, the Legislative Council members did not want the deck stacked against them. British officials and Arab Palestinians, over whom the representatives held no sway, occupied numerous positions in the Mandate during this period. At the time, British officials held

⁵⁰⁵ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 35.

the posts of: Financial Adviser, Judicial Adviser, Director of Customs, Director of Lands and Surveys, Inspector of Surveys, Commandant of Arab Legion, second-in-command of Arab legion, Inspector of Motor Vehicles, Inspector of Antiquities, government bacteriologist, and Chief Accountant of Arab legion. The majority of the British officials were officials from the Palestinian Mandate who had been “seconded” to the Transjordanian government. Arab Palestinians held the posts of Director of health, Director of Public Works, Chief Accountant, stores officer, Postmaster of Amman, and sanitary sub-inspector. The government claimed that non-Transjordanians held these posts due to a lack of trained Transjordanian personnel. Members of the Council rejected this response and agitated to increase the Transjordanian presence in government positions.

The first target of the Legislative Council was the Executive Council because it included two non-Transjordanians, Palestinian officials Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu Rahmah. Technically, it was illegal, according to the Organic Law, for non-Transjordanians to hold Executive Council or Legislative Council positions. According to Maan Abu Nowar, “it was the ambition of every educated sheikh or notable to take part in the government of his country” and their membership robbed Transjordanians of this possibility.⁵⁰⁶ This statement overplays the amount of patriotic sentiment that any of the members of the government held while minimizing the importance of the salary and prestige that accompanied these government posts. Bowing to Legislative Council agitation, Abdullah restructured the Cabinet in October of 1929, replacing half of its membership with three elected representatives. ‘Audah al-Qusus (an Arab Christian from

⁵⁰⁶ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 19.

Karak) and Sa'id al-Mufti (a Circassian from Amman) replaced the Palestinian officials (Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu Rahmah). Representative 'Ala' al-Din Tuqan (an Arab Muslim from the Balqa) resigned from the Council so that he could become the new Minister of Antiquities. A special election to replace 'Ala' al-Din Tuqan on October 17, 1929, elected Nazmi 'Abd al-Hadi, a naturalized Transjordanian of Palestinian origin and a member of the opposition (Free Moderate Party).⁵⁰⁷ Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda retained their posts, while Ibrahim Hashim (formerly Treasurer) became the Minister of Justice.

The creation of the new government was the first step towards the mollification of the opposition through the manipulation of elite loyalty. This change in the Cabinet simultaneously accomplished a number of desirable outcomes for the British and the Amir. One, because the two new officials did not yet have ministerial posts, they were cheaper than their predecessors had been.⁵⁰⁸ Second, the opposition could no longer criticize the Executive Council for excluding "sons of the country" from its membership. Third, the British were able to tighten their financial control over Transjordan by not appointing a treasurer to the Executive Council. This temporarily gave the British more direct financial oversight but it did not give British Resident Cox unilateral control of salaries of the ministers as Abu Nowar asserts.⁵⁰⁹ The financial adviser and chief revenue officer absorbed the duties of the Treasurer because of a lack of suitable candidates

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid, 39-40.

⁵⁰⁸ BNA, CO 831/6/10, BR Cox to HC J.R. Chancellor, 12/11/1929. Each of the new EC members were paid LP300 annually. Total savings from not appointing a treasurer and the discounted new EC posts was LP923.

⁵⁰⁹ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 39.

according to High Commissioner J.R. Chancellor.⁵¹⁰ Finally, this shift in membership transformed three of the most outspoken members of the Legislative Council into loyal government officials. All three men suddenly found themselves part of the Anglo-Hashemite state machinery they had previously opposed. Sa'id al-Mufti had been part of the opposition (*Hizb al-Sha'b*) while 'Ala' al-Din Tuqan and 'Audah al-Qusus had always spoken their minds in the Council, especially in regards to the Internal Regulations and the importance of Council immunity. The salary, prestige, and security associated with these government posts overcame any lingering misgivings about the Mandatory government's dealings with the Amir and the British. The Executive Council met in Abdullah's Raghadan Palace further reinforcing his direct authority over these men. The physical space of the palace was used to awe members of the Transjordanian elite throughout the Mandate period. Although the Amir's explicit powers were somewhat subdued by the British colonial presence, Abdullah continued to use to royal pomp and circumstance to reinforce his authority. All of these techniques helped the government recycle formerly troublesome elites. This rebranding of Transjordanian elites remained a popular technique utilized by the Mandatory government to silence critics for years to come.

However, this shuffling of the Cabinet did not address the systemic problem of Transjordanians being under-represented in their own government. The Mandatory government finally responded to the law for the dismissal of non-Transjordanian employees in December 1930. The law had been passed nearly a year earlier in

⁵¹⁰ A new Minister of the Treasury, Shukri Shash'ah, would be appointed to the next Executive Council on February 21, 1931. The Minister of Finance would remain the Prime Minister until 1932.

December 1929.⁵¹¹ Tawfiq Abu al-Huda announced that the committee organized to deal with this matter had invited the employees to Amman to meet with them individually. After meeting with the employees it was determined, that out of the forty considered, nine of them had proven their Transjordanian nationality. The directors of the departments deemed an additional ten employees vital to the function of the government due to a lack of suitable Transjordanian applicants. Council member Refifan al-Majali (Muslim from Karak, the al-Majalis was the leading family of Karak) questioned the purported dearth of qualified Transjordanians and asserted instead that the directors of the departments did not want to hire Transjordanians. Both he and Shams al-Din Sami (Circassian from the Balqa) concluded that the law did not actually benefit Transjordanians because the directors would not hire them either way. Although both Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from ‘Ajlun) and Shams al-Din believed Arab unity was important, they could not vouch for a system that favored nepotism and favoritism over competency. Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim from Madaba in ‘Ajlun) continued the attack, stating that the intransigence of department heads to employ only non-Transjordanians advocated a variety of “Arabness [which] is damnable.”⁵¹² By the end of the session representatives Najib al-Shraideh, Refifan al-Majali, Shams al-Din, Najib Abu Sha‘r, Attallah al-Suhaimat (Muslim from Karak), and Bakhit al-Ibrahim (Christian from Salt who lived in Amman) had all strongly condemned the government for its negligible hiring of Transjordanians.

This debate surrounding non-Transjordanian preference for government posts was an example of the First Legislative Council acting independently and in opposition to the

⁵¹¹ JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 16th session, December 10, 1930.

⁵¹² JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 16th session December 10, 1930.

general will of the Mandatory government. However, the continued focus on promoting “sons of the country” for employment had more to do with self-interest than any fledgling sense of nationalism or patriotism.⁵¹³ Instead, it is another sign of the Council’s fixation on status and prestige. Advocating for Transjordanians to hold government posts was a symptom of Council members wanting to obtain employment and position for their family members and tribesmen more than it was a nationalist antagonism against outsiders. Securing more government posts for Transjordanians increased the likelihood that the Council representatives would be able to protect their positions of power and autonomy in Transjordan through regional and tribal networks. Patronage networks do not work with strangers. Future Legislative Council sessions returned to the issue of non-Transjordanian employment repeatedly, and, over time, the government did employ more native Transjordanians.

The reshuffling of the Cabinet hardly appeased the wide-ranging demands of the opposition. By late 1929, the National Congress Party had become the dominant party of the opposition. The People’s Party (*Hizb al-Sha’b*), which had been the dominant opposition party, ceased to exist independently by 1930, since most of its members had joined the National Congress Party. The National Congress met a third time in Irbid on May 25, 1930. The third meeting of the National Congress Party signaled a shift in the Congress’ support of the Anglo-Hashemite state. It began to criticize the legality of the Legislative Council itself. The party was convinced that the Council was no longer an independent body and called for the formation of a true constitutional representative

⁵¹³ For more on Jordanian nationalism see Betty S. Anderson’s *Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2005).

government.⁵¹⁴ The forced ratification of the 1928 Agreement had diminished the appeal of the Legislative Council for the opposition as a viable vehicle from which to change the Transjordan government. The conference also advocated the abolishment of extradition and expulsion laws, which the Amir and the government had begun to use to penalize the opposition and other individuals whom they deemed troublemakers.

However, by 1930, the National Congress was not the only opposition party. The opposition had begun to splinter into competing parties largely due to personal competition. The fracturing of the opposition along lines of personal allegiance diminished its collective voice. After the ratification of the 1928 Agreement in 1929, individual rivalries curtailed the opposition's ability to affect Government policy. Sheikh Refifan al-Majali of Karak, a rival of Karak native Husain al-Tarawnah, formed a new party, the Free Moderate Party (*Hizb al-Hur al-Muatadil*) on June 24, 1930. In addition to al-Majali, the new Free Moderate Party also included three other Legislative Council members: Sa'id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman), Mohammad al-Unsi (Muslim from the Balqa), and Nazmi 'Abd al-Hadi (Muslim from the Balqa who replaced 'Ala' al-Din Tuqan when he became Minister of Antiquities). The party's goals were vague and mundane. It failed to develop a clear party organization or propose a definitive list of programs or platforms.⁵¹⁵ The Free Moderate Party, as well as other subsequent political parties, opposed the current government's trajectory without truly offering a viable alternative. The party's principles included remaining loyal to the Amir, loyal to the nation, and "[t]he spreading of the principles of nationalism, social and health, and educating the people on civil democratic politics." The party quickly lost political

⁵¹⁴ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 58-60.

⁵¹⁵ Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, 78-79.

viability and popularity when Said al-Mufti left the party on June 25, 1930. Although diminished in stature, Refifan al-Majali, Mohammad al-Unsi, and Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi would remain vocal opponents of the government throughout the duration of the First Legislative Council.⁵¹⁶ The National Congress Party remained the only opposition party that articulated a clear plan for the future of Transjordan and as a result was the most problematic for the Mandatory government.

The 1930/31 Budget and the End of the First Legislative Council

The problem of revising the 1930-31 budget dominated the remaining tenure of the First Legislative Council. The issue of the budget had become particularly acute as the economy of Transjordan floundered in the wake of the worldwide economic depression. A string of drought years, natural disasters, and regional political instability further compounded economic hardships. These factors hampered population and economic development from 1929-1936 in Transjordan.⁵¹⁷ The depressed economy particularly hurt the nomadic population, which was experiencing severe famine in the early 1930s.⁵¹⁸ A gradual reduction in grant-in-aid during this period further compounded the budgetary hardships of Transjordan.⁵¹⁹ This budget economy was a result of the diminished financial capabilities of the British government, which was also coping with the worldwide economic depression. The Colonial Office, not the British Resident, determined the reduction in aid. Although British Resident Cox did exert some control

⁵¹⁶ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 60-61.

⁵¹⁷ The natural disasters included the 1927 earthquake, swarms of locusts in 1930-31, and continuing drought. The limitations that these natural disasters imposed on Transjordan are discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.

⁵¹⁸ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 92.

⁵¹⁹ The 1930/31 grant-in-aid was LP 84,000. This figure had been reduced to LP 60,000 for the 1934-35 budget.

over the budget, he did so at the behest of the High Commissioner and His Majesty's Government. He was not a rogue officer unilaterally impoverishing the Transjordanian people as Maan Abu Nowar repeatedly asserts in his "Gratuitous Interference" chapter of *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*. This economic backdrop informed the heated debate over the 1930-31 budget throughout the winter of 1930-31.

The government introduced the original 1930-31 budget into the Legislative Council on March 9, 1930. Although there was a fair amount of debate over the budget, it passed with some Council revisions on April 27, 1930. The introduction of a special temporary budget law for 1930-31 during the eleventh meeting of the Council on November 29, 1930 sent the Council into a fury. The new budget proposal changed a number of budget lines and added LP 4,700 for the creation of Glubb's Desert Patrol Force.⁵²⁰ The substantial budget allocations towards the armed forces were exceedingly unpopular in the Legislative Council.⁵²¹ Glubb Pasha maintained that the only way to improve the financial standing of the nomadic population was to curtail raiding by the Saudi *Ikhwan* in the south.⁵²² The revised budget acted as symbol for the Council representatives. Its actual revised provisions were immaterial. The Legislative Council was never as vocal or as unified in its opposition to the government as it was in the discussion of the 1930-31 budget revisions.⁵²³

Council members drew a line in the sand over the budget issue. This was the moment to stand united against the will of the Mandatory government. The forced

⁵²⁰ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan*, 125.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

⁵²² Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 93. The *Ikhwan* were a group of Wahhabi zealots who were initially supported by Ibn Saud. They revolted against the Saudis in 1928. Their unpredictable violent actions became problematic for Ibn Saud who suppressed the group by 1932.

⁵²³ JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 11th session November 29, 1930.

ratification of the 1928 Agreement may have weakened the powers of the Legislative Council but it had not silenced it. Vocal opposition leader Shams al-Din saw the approval of the revised budget as unacceptable. Its passage would “degrade the dignity of the nation.” He did not oppose the right of His Majesty’s Government to express an opinion on the budget “but this does not mean that it is necessary to act as he (HBM) pleases.” Furthermore, he questioned the value of local government, or the Legislative Council, if the British were going to intervene so constantly into Transjordanian affairs. Despite the British subsidy, the Council could not have its job confined “to the signing and ratification of everything it (HMG) displays.” Overall, Shams al-Din saw the 1930-31 budget as a historic moment in the Council’s history. They could either violate the nation by accepting the treaty or “prove themselves’ heroes and refuse to consider the budget... [We] must stick to the decision of the previous council.”⁵²⁴ The gauntlet had been thrown down to his fellow representatives. They must stand up for themselves and their right to legal and administrative autonomy or become subservient to the whims of the British.

New Legislative Council member Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi agreed with Shams al-Din that the Council could not tolerate the interference of the British in the regular administration of Transjordan. Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi invoked the gravity of the situation, reminding his fellow representatives that their “children and grandchildren” will remember this moment and that their actions “will go down in history.” He criticized the Colonial Office for its interference in Transjordanian budget affairs,⁵²⁵ which violated the natural rights granted in the 1928 Agreement. Thereafter Council order eroded as the session became a shouting match between two Muslim representatives from the ‘Ajlun,

⁵²⁴ JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 29th session, January 26, 1931.

⁵²⁵ This included allocation for an agricultural school, refusing to expand the expenditures of Arab-run departments, and blocking the allocation of LP 1,000 to crown prince Talal.

Najib Abu Sha‘r and Najib al-Shraidah, who refused to acknowledge the rights of the others to speak or have an opinion. This bedlam forced the Council president, Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda, to suspend the Council until the next session.⁵²⁶

Given the lack of order that characterized the last session, the Prime Minister opened the thirty-first session of the First Legislative Council, imploring the representatives to think with not only their emotions and assuring everyone that all opinions would be heard. However, the Council was not placated. Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi spoke for the Council as a whole when he said that they would rather sacrifice their seats than relinquish their right to make up the budget to the Colonial Office even “if it leads to the dissolution of the Assembly.” After such a declaration, Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda could do nothing. He begrudgingly acknowledged that the Council agreed with the proposal to oppose any change to the 1930-31 budget and thereafter dismissed the Council.⁵²⁷ This final act of defiance by the Legislative Council members was a challenge to the Mandatory state. It was not clear if the government could afford to dismiss the representatives without destabilizing Transjordan. In response, the Amir issued an official *Iradah* (executive order) dissolving the First Legislative Council on February 9, 1931, citing a lack of cooperation between the two branches of the government.⁵²⁸

The formal disbanding of the First Legislative Council ended the most vocal and outspoken period for the opposition, and the Legislative Council in general. The Amir had called the Council’s bluff. The dismissal of the First Legislative Council coincided with the mitigation of the opposition outside the Council. Leading members of the

⁵²⁶ JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 30th session, January 28, 1931.

⁵²⁷ JNL, Legislative Council Minutes, 31st session, January 31, 1931.

⁵²⁸ Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, 84.

National Congress Party left the opposition and were incorporated into the government. For example, Hashem Khayr, the one-time vice president of the party, resigned and helped form the pro-government Moderate Liberal Party in June 1930. Taher al-Joqqa, who was the General Secretary of the National Congress Party, was appointed Mayor of Amman in June 1931.⁵²⁹ Both men had appeared on a list of troublemakers drafted by British Resident Cox in November 1929.⁵³⁰ Once again, the government had transformed former opponents into allies. This game of privileged musical chairs proved that members of the opposition began to understand their true political position. Council members were expendable. Many men chose to protect their own personal position at the expense of a unified oppositional stance towards the Anglo-Hashemite government.

However, the First Legislative Council's dissolution did not completely silence criticism of the government or the British. Similar to the opposition's defeat with the ratification of the 1928 Agreement, the opposition had to regroup, and again change its explicit focus. Despite these changes, at its core, the opposition always fought for more autonomy and a greater degree of administrative and legal control. A degree of political influence was the only means by which the Council members had to protect their own personal interests and patrimonial standings. Status, and the protection of personal rights, remained of the utmost importance. Without a sense of independence from the government, the representatives became less significant and more disposable. Although the budget would remain a thorny issue for years to come, it was never opposed as it was in 1931. The looming threat of dismissal checked the aggressiveness of future Legislative Councils. The Anglo-Hashemite government had called the representatives' bluff. The

⁵²⁹ Ibid., 80.

⁵³⁰ BNA, CO 831/5/9, BR Cox to HC Chancellor, 6/11/1929. Other "troublemakers" included LC representatives Shams al-Din Sami and Adil al-Azmah.

rules of political participation in Transjordan changed once again and the members of the Legislative Council continued to cede power, autonomy, and authority to the centralizing Mandatory government. Future Councils now had one fewer card to play if they hoped to stay in the game.

A New Legislative Council and the Land Tax Law

In the wake of the Council's dismissal, Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda resigned and was replaced on February 21, 1931, with Sheikh Abdullah Saraj.⁵³¹ New elections took place for the Legislative Council on June 1, 1931. Despite the dissolution of the first Legislative Council, Council seats were strongly contested in the 1931 elections. For example, in Karak, there were numerous petitions from Abdullah al-Akashah arguing that he should have been elected instead of Mitri al-Zereikat for Karak's Christian seat. In each district, representative seats were allocated along sectarian and ethnic lines for Arab Muslims, Arab Christians, and Circassians. Abdullah al-Akashah contended that there were ripped up ballots that had his name on them that would have secured him the Council seat in the round of secondary elections. Akashah's chief complaint was that secondary electors had written down too many Muslim candidates on their Council ballots. There was secondary elector confusion when some electors wrote four Muslims as their top four choices for Legislative Council membership instead of the

⁵³¹ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan*, 127-128. The new EC was comprised of Prime Minister/minister of interior/minister of finance Abdullah Saraj; Minister of Justice 'Umar Hikmat; Director of Treasury Shukri Shash'ah; Director of Antiquities Adib al-Kayid al-Awamlah; General Secretary Tawfiq Abu al-Huda; Attorney General 'Audah al-Qusus. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and 'Audah al-Qusus were the only holdovers from the previous EC.

prescribed three Muslims and one Christian seats allocated to Karak.⁵³² Although the High Commissioner saw no reason to intervene, he did acknowledge that voting regulations should be clarified so that no ballot could have more than the maximum number of Muslim or Christian representatives listed for their respective districts.⁵³³ This anecdote illustrates the two simultaneous paradoxical trends in the Legislative Council. With each subsequent election, the Council seats became more coveted and desirable. The meaning and status imbued from being an elected member of the Legislative Council continued to increase as the actual legislative might of the Council progressively waned throughout the Mandate. This does not mean that the Second Council was completely powerless. However, the importance of status began to trump political efficacy. The personal prestige and power afforded from a Council seat became more important than any actual ability to dictate widespread change. Securing a Council seat reinforced the authority, privilege, and status of both the individual elected and his patrimonial network. These political and social benefits were more important than the actual salary paid to the Council members, which did not increase during the Mandate period. The gradual reduction in political authority and autonomy made the Second Legislative Council less outwardly hostile to the Mandatory government than its predecessors.

The membership of the Legislative Council changed dramatically from the previous Council. Only four members of the Legislative Council were reelected (Circassian Sa'id al-Mufti from Amman, two Muslims Sheikhs from Karak, Refifan al-Majali and Salih al-Auran, and the southern Bedouin representative Hamd ibn Jazi,). No

⁵³² BNA, CO 831/15/11, acting BR Kirkbride to HC J.R. Chancellor, 13/8/1931. 'Abdullah al-Akashah also argued that some confused voters had listed five Muslim representatives instead of the proscribed 4 Muslims and one Christian delegate for the Karak district. Abdullah al-Akashah is never elected but his relative Yousef al-Akashah is elected a decade later to the 5th Legislative Council in 1942.

⁵³³ BNA, CO 831/15/11, HC J.R. Chancellor to SoS Lord Passfield, 13/8/1931.

members of the opposition who had directly opposed the 1928 Agreement's ratification were reelected.⁵³⁴ Although some of these individuals, most notably Shams al-Din Sami, would remain outspoken government opponents, inciting opposition against the British and the Amir both inside and outside of Transjordan, they never regained a position of prominence in the Mandate period.⁵³⁵ This is not to say that there were no dissident voices in the second Legislative Council. The National Congress Party did not boycott the elections as it had the first time in 1929. Three National Congress members were elected: Hussein al-Tarawnah (the leader of the National Congress and an Arab Muslim from Karak), Qasim al-Hindawi (Arab Muslim from 'Ajlun), and Adil al-Azmah (Arab Muslim from Balqa). The Second Legislative Council would remain a semi-autonomous body throughout its tenure (1931-1934). Although it lacked the flash and outward bravado of the First Council, the members of the Second Legislative Council still actively contested Government policies. The Council was not "docile." They were not mere pushovers as Betty Anderson and Naseer Aruri both have argued.⁵³⁶

Although the Second Legislative Council was not as directly adversarial as their predecessors were, that does not mean that its members simply acquiesced to every whim of the government. On the contrary, the newest tactic adopted by the opposition forces within the Legislative Council was one of delay and non-cooperation. The Second Legislative Council would remain a substantive group throughout its duration. Despite the fact that recognized members of the opposition only held three seats, the Council as a

⁵³⁴ Nazmi 'Abd al-Hadi was the only member of the opposition from the First Legislative Council who ever returned to the LC. He is elected to the third Legislative Council from 1934-1937.

⁵³⁵ Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, 84.

⁵³⁶ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 52 and Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, 84-85.

whole continued to question the directives and initiatives of the government and the British.⁵³⁷

For example, the 1932-33 budget deliberations were more productive for the Legislative Council than the 1930-31 rendition. The government wanted to avoid previous levels of Council intransigence in relation to budget appropriations. These discussions took place against the backdrop of the worsening economic situation in Transjordan. Sa'id al-Mufti, who had been a member of the previous Executive Council and Legislative Council, submitted a proposal for agrarian aid, signed by eleven other representatives, to alleviate the economic situation in Transjordan.⁵³⁸ The government responded with emergency loans from the Agricultural Bank and tax exemptions. Thereafter, there was some debate of the 1932-33 budget but it passed with little cajoling on September 17, 1932. The government's administration of emergency agricultural loans was a win for the Council members. They managed to change government financial and agricultural policy. However, these loans were not solely the result of Council agitation. The British were acutely aware of the worsening economic situation, which was well documented in their records.⁵³⁹

Unlike previous Legislative Council sessions, the Second Legislative Council's biggest issue was not the budget or treaty negotiations. Instead, the issue of land taxation and land reform became the central disputes of the day. The implementation of land

⁵³⁷ This view is contrary to the assessment of Naseer Aruri who maintained that only the First Legislative Council challenged the government in anyway. (85).

⁵³⁸ The other signers were Hadithah al-Khraishah, Hamd ibn Jazi, Hussein al-Tarawnah, Naji al-'Azzam, Qasim al-Hindawi, Adil al-Azmah, Mohammad al-Saad al-Batainah, Hussein al-Yousef, Hashim Khair, Salti al-Ibrahim, and Mitri al-Zuraiqat.

⁵³⁹ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 139. For examples of British reactions to economic situation see BNA: CO 831/14/12 "Administration Reports 1930" 1931, CO 831/13/5 "Locusts" 1931, and CO 831/23/11 "Political Reports 1933."

registration and land reform were central to making Transjordan self-sufficient in the eyes of the British. The British believed that a bundle of laws with efficient revenue-generating potential (a land tax law, income tax law, trade licenses law, and death duties law) would balance the Transjordan budget.⁵⁴⁰ Regularized and increased taxation figures would decrease the need for the British subsidy and allow the country to develop utilizing only domestic funds. Land registration took place from 1929 to 1952. The majority of Land Settlement funding came through Colonial Development Fund (CDF) grants as discussed in chapter three.

However, land registration would be irrelevant without a revised taxation system. The new system would replace the Ottoman system (which combined *virgu* and *'ushr* taxes at roughly twelve percent of annual land production) to a flat rate of six percent of annual gross yield of the land for each *hawd* (subunit of land within a village).⁵⁴¹ British Resident Cox estimated that the new land tax would increase tax revenue in 1932 by an estimated LP 12,000 to LP 15,000.⁵⁴² Representatives were not nearly as understanding about the new proposed legislation as British Resident Cox had hoped. The new tax code would change their personal tax liabilities. The new taxation system would affect Transjordan unevenly due to shifts in agricultural production since the Ottoman period.

The redistribution of tax liabilities made interest and opposition to the new Land Tax law a regionally organized issue. Although there was a universal rate, preexisting tax law meant the effect of the new law was highly uneven. Irbid, for example, would receive

⁵⁴⁰ BNA, FO 816/36, JA C.A. Hooper to BR Cox, 27/11/1932.

⁵⁴¹ *'Ushr*, Arabic for the Ottoman *osr*, or tenth, referred to the standard tith on the produce of the land. *Virgu* taxation, introduced in the Tanzimat reforms in 1861, consisted of a single tax on the value of the land itself. For more on Ottoman land taxation and land conceptualization see Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 7-35.

⁵⁴² BNA, FO 816/36, BR Cox to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, June 13, 1931.

a tax reduction with the new law. The 'Ajlun, which included Irbid, was the largest agricultural producer and most densely populated region of Transjordan. This region had incurred a heavy tax burden because of its agricultural prosperity under the Ottomans. On the other hand, other regions of Transjordan including Karak, Jarash, and the Bani Hasan tribe's sections of 'Ajlun province would all see substantial tax increases because of the new land tax laws (as much as 400% in the case of Bani Hasan). These areas were less cultivated in Ottoman times and had a larger proportion of Bedouin, making it more difficult to collect taxes. Not surprisingly, Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali, the leading representatives from Karak, were adamantly against the new tax law because of its dire personal economic impact. Although Karak was a traditional opponent of central authority, Tarawnah and Majali's opposition was rooted in personal interests, not a general regional antipathy towards the Anglo-Hashemite state. Both representatives needed to protect their own financial interests as well as the interests of their clients in Karak if they hoped to retain their elite standing in the region. Because of personal economic interests, the Land Tax Law did not pass in 1931. In fact, the law never even made it out of committee.

Inaction was not an acceptable answer for the British. As noted, this new taxation system was vital for the success of their Transjordan Mandate. The British determined that the revision of the tax code was a crucial component of Transjordan's treaty obligations according to the 1928 Agreement. Judicial Adviser C.A. Hooper determined that "not only may it be passed but it must be passed, we have a clear mandatory obligation to pass the Land Tax Law." The British decided to determine their legal options. Hooper wrote a twenty-one page opinion on what alternatives were available to

the government. The main problem, as Hooper saw it, was that the British had never imagined an eventuality when the Legislative Council could hamper the Amir's ability to fulfill treaty obligations. This issue harked back to the initial formation of the Council.

The British had never foreseen the emergence of an adversarial Legislative Council when they called for its formation to ratify the 1928 Agreement. The British lawyers who concocted the Organic Law never thought that the representatives "might prove recalcitrant or obstructive, and consequently no express stipulation was inserted to deal with such a contingency as that which has now arisen, mainly, the refusal of the Legislative Council to pass laws which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, are essential to fulfillment of their mandatory obligations." Judicial Adviser Hooper determined that, because the Land Tax Law was critical to the fulfillment of Transjordan's treaty obligations, the Amir could dissolve the Council through an *Iradah*. Thereafter the Amir could pass the law as an ordinance according to Article 41 of the Organic Law. However, Hooper cautioned against the immediate dissolution of the Council. He believed that "with men of the type of which the Legislative Council is composed, the possibility of loss of pay and of playing an ostentatious role and possibly also the definite knowledge that His Britannic Majesty's Government insisted on the passage of a particular measure as being part of the Amir's treaty obligations, might have considerable weight."⁵⁴³ In other words, the threat of a loss of station and salary would be powerful enough to force the hand of the representatives. The fact that no opposition figures had been reelected to the Legislative Council after the first Council's dissolution heightened the impact of this threat. Dismissal likely meant the loss of political or social

⁵⁴³ BNA, FO 816/36, JA C.A. Hooper to BR Cox, 27/11/1932.

capital for the current representatives. Once again, the matter of status and financial security would become the ultimate arbiter of Council action.

The British decided not to push the Amir to dissolve the Legislative Council. Instead, they chose to play the representatives against one another. To this end, the Mandatory government pressured the Council into passing a partial law only applying the new land tax regulations to Karak and the Bani Hasan sections of the 'Ajlun province on June 21, 1932. The partial law passed because it did not affect the majority of the Council.⁵⁴⁴ Its passage greatly angered the two leading representatives from Karak, Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali. Thereafter it was decided, upon the recommendation of the Treasurer Shukri Shash'ah, that the Land Tax Law should not be introduced into the Legislative Council until February 1933.⁵⁴⁵ Shukri Pasha made this suggestion because he was unable to convince the other members of the finance committee to accept the law in December 1932. The Executive Council hoped to use the Ramadan holiday to convince other representatives to support the legislation.⁵⁴⁶

By February 1933, the British were growing impatient. Both British Resident Cox and Judicial Adviser Hooper noted that there must be a decision about the Land Tax Law's viability immediately. It was common knowledge, according to Cox, that the Amir wanted to dissolve the Legislative Council.⁵⁴⁷ However, the British feared the precedent that might be set from frequent Council dismissals. Instead, Hooper advocated that the

⁵⁴⁴ BNA, FO 816/37, BR Cox to Arab Legion Commander Peake, 25/3/1933. The partial law passage does not appear in the Legislative Council Minutes of 1932. The extraordinary session convened in 1932 dealt with the passage of the 1932 customs excise law and its final session was on June 14, 1932. It can be surmised that the partial law was passed in the financial committee whose records are not part of the Council minutes.

⁵⁴⁵ BNA, FO 371/16926, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of December 1932," 5/1/1933.

⁵⁴⁶ BNA, FO 816/37, JA Hooper to BR Cox, 21/12/1932.

⁵⁴⁷ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of March 1933," 5/4/1933.

Cabinet increase the pressure on the representatives by “buttonholing” the members that they had particular influence over. Hooper spoke privately with Refifan al-Majali and six other prominent landowners in Amman in hopes of convincing them to support the law.⁵⁴⁸ The British tactic of pursuing landowners in Amman to support the bill is evidence that the majority of the representatives had residences in Amman as well as their home districts. In essence, the Council’s membership required forced inhabitation in Amman, adjacent to the Mandatory government. This proximity alone was a weapon of the state. The government’s supervision of the Legislative Council robbed them of some of their autonomy simply as a byproduct of where they now lived. Amman’s growing authority began to convince the representatives of the utility of cooperating with the government. The calculus of Transjordanian statecraft was changing. Similar to the French nobility during the reign of Louis XIV, the autonomous tribal sheikhs and urban notables of Transjordan began to understand the importance of becoming part of the state. It was better to be a part of Versailles than to be expelled from the halls of power.⁵⁴⁹

Members of the Executive Council were particularly motivated to pursue the law’s passage to protect their own positions. If the law failed to pass, the current government would be dissolved. The constant fear for any member of the Legislative or Executive Council was that once they lost their seat, there was no way back. The elites of Transjordan were expendable. Losing your seat was not only a blow to that individual, but a loss of position and influence for their entire patronage network. With the threat of

⁵⁴⁸ BNA, FO 816/37, JA Hooper to BR Cox, 19/2/1933 and 22/2/1933. The British tactic to compel landowners in Amman to support the bill is proof that the majority of the LC had residences in Amman as well as their home districts. In essence, LC membership required forced inhabitation in Amman, adjacent to the Mandatory Government. This proximity alone was a weapon of the state. The supervision of the LC’s membership robbed them of some of their autonomy simply as a byproduct of where they now lived.

⁵⁴⁹ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, 125-51.

dissolution and significant pressure from the Cabinet, the Legislative Council finally passed the Land Tax Law on March 9, 1933. The British claimed that the final law passed because the representatives from Karak, most notably Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali, supported the general application of the law to spite the other members of the Council. As an added incentive, a provision placed into the ninth and final version of the law guaranteed the gradual increase of tax rates for any landowners who would see a fifty percent or higher increase to their tax burden.⁵⁵⁰

The 1933 Land Tax Law was the first new tax law of any kind enacted throughout Transjordan during the Mandate. Hypothetically, the Land Tax Law coupled with the Income Tax Law and Trade Licenses Laws, also passed in early 1933, would help balance the Transjordan budget. However, as historian Michael Fischbach points out, the law was not nearly as successful as the British had hoped. Its rollout was slow because large segments of Transjordan had not yet gone through land registration. In the end, the law failed to increase tax revenue throughout the Emirate.⁵⁵¹ Although the Land Tax Law itself was not as successful as initially envisioned, it did speak to the Council members' approach towards dealing with the government. Intra-Council rivalry and animosity overcame any sense of collective unity for the Legislative Council's policy of non-cooperation. Personal animus motivated the leader of the opposition, Hussein al-Tarawnah, to push for the acceptance of the 1933 Land Tax Law in spite of its financial ramifications for the rest of the country. These personal squabbles in the Council hastened the closing of political space in Amman. Council representatives living in

⁵⁵⁰ BNA, FO 816/37, BR Cox to Arab Legion Commander Peake, 25/3/1933. For landowners falling into the 50% tax increase bracket, they would be allowed to pay in installments over the span of five years with their tax liability increasing by 1/5th each year.

⁵⁵¹ Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan*, 78-125.

Amman gradually acknowledged the necessity of acquiescing to the will of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Personal privilege and status trumped higher aspirations of Council solidarity in respect to the 1933 Land Tax law. The cumulative effect of the dwindling political options for Transjordanian elites led to the fragmentation and eventual death of political opposition during the Mandate period.

Political Parties and the Slow Death of the Opposition

The passage of the Land Tax Law did not occur in a vacuum. Political agitation continued to take place outside of the rather subdued halls of the Legislative Council in 1932 and 1933. The fourth meeting of the National Congress took place in Amman on March 15, 1932. The meeting produced the standard list of resolutions including demands for revision of the 1928 Agreement, formation of a constitutional government, a reduction in taxation, and abrogation of emergency laws.⁵⁵² By 1933, Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali were once again at odds and split their support into two parties. Refifan al-Majali and Mithqal al-Fayiz (of the Bani Sakhr) announced the formation of their new party, The Jordanian Solidarity Party (*Hizb al-Tadmon al-Urdoni*), on March 24, 1933.⁵⁵³ Many of these individuals had been members of the National Congress Party but had moved away from Tarawnah as he moved closer to the *Istiqlal* party.⁵⁵⁴ The new party adopted the unprovocative platform of advocating for a

⁵⁵² Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 143.

⁵⁵³ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 160. Other party members included Hadithah al-Khraishah, Mohammad al-Sa'd al-Batainah, Sa'id Abu Jabir, Salti al-Ibrahim, Qasim al-Hindawi, Najib Abu Sha'r, Shams al-Din Sami, Salih al-'Auran, Mitri al-Zuraiqat, Hashim Khair and Ahmad al-Saub.

⁵⁵⁴ *Hizb al-Istiqlal* (Independence party) main goal was the creation of a unified Arab state. In general, the party supported the Amir's brother, King Faisal of Iraq, much to the annoyance of Abdullah. Abdullah briefly courted the *Istiqlal* party after his brother's death in September 1933 hoping to become the new

remission of taxes for cultivators as part of drought relief. The new party also wanted the government to encourage foreign investment to improve the dire economic situation in Transjordan. In general, the Solidarity Party was intended to weaken Tarawnah's political position while supporting the Amir's political goals in Transjordan.

Hussein al-Tarawnah convened the fifth and final meeting of the National Congress on June 7, 1933.⁵⁵⁵ The motivation of the National Congress was largely preventative in nature in that its focus was condemning the formation of the Jordanian Solidarity Party. The Jordanian Solidarity Party eventually had its own congress on July 1, 1933. However, only fifty to sixty people attended and the party quickly fell apart. In response to the poor attendance of the Jordanian Solidarity Party's Conference, the Amir planned to hold another Congress of notables "to produce sensible proposals for political and economic reform and to affirm the complete trust of all the leaders of the native born Transjordanians in the person of the Amir."⁵⁵⁶ The Amir hoped to create his own political party, which would allow him to control the Legislative Council and the Executive Council simultaneously. Previously, the Amir had a contingent of representatives who were loyal but never a majority. Opposition figures and independents held sway in previous Legislative Councils and had only selectively sided with the Amir. An organized political party would allow the Amir to criticize British policy indirectly.

leader of the Arab world. When this effort failed, the Amir turned on *Hizb al Istiqlal* (he had been forced to abandon the party earlier in 1924 at the behest of the British).

⁵⁵⁵ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of June 1933," 1/7/1933. The Arab National Party also met in Amman in early June (June 6) but its resolutions mainly dealt with keeping Jews out of Transjordan. Initially Mithqal al Fayiz promised to hold a meeting to oppose this but it never occurred.

⁵⁵⁶ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of July 1933," 2/8/1933.

The Amir's new conference convened on August 6, 1933. The Congress of the People of Transjordan was well attended and thirty people were elected to its Executive Committee with Naji al-Azzam as president and Sa'id al-Mufti (both on the Legislative Council) and Najib al-Shraidah (former Legislative Council member) as the Congress's secretaries. The People's Congress led to the creation of the People's Party (*Hizb al-Sha'b*). This new party did not produce any resolutions that were distinguishable from other Congresses held in Amman. The formation of the new party was indicative of the Hashemite state's policy of courting former opponents and turning them into allies. Each time a member of the Legislative Council or tribal sheikh participated in the Amir's political machinations they allowed their political identities to change. Men who had been autonomous regional and tribal elites were slowly becoming Transjordanian elites. The main purpose of the new People's Party (the original People's Party dissolved in 1930) was to combat the influence of the National Congress and the members of the Istiqlal party. Members of the Istiqlal party, Adil al-Azmeh and Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanimeh, attacked the People's Party in a new newspaper in which they accused the new party's founders of a number of scurrilous abuses.

In order to check the strength of *Istiqlal* and other opposition forces the government chose to revise the Ottoman Press Law so that any new paper or journal must first receive the government's approval to be published.⁵⁵⁷ The National Congress planned to hold another meeting on September 15, 1933 in Karak to oppose the People's Party. Before this could happen, the government passed an ordinance banning all

⁵⁵⁷ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of August 1933," 31/8/1933.

unapproved public meetings.⁵⁵⁸ The revival of the Ottoman Press Law and the ban on unapproved public meetings signaled the Mandatory government's growing proclivity for censorship. These two pieces of legislation drastically curtailed the visibility of any opposition forces in Transjordan. In tandem with the waning strength of the opposition, the government began to increase their powers of control over Transjordanian populace. The political space originally opened by the formation of the Legislative Council had been synched one notch tighter. The Mandatory government increased its disciplinary actions in an effort to make the general population more pliable. The National Congress never met again after 1933.⁵⁵⁹ There was no other unified opposition force in Transjordan during the Mandate period. Only the National Congress had ever articulated a clear platform and party agenda.

The opposition had lost much of its steam in its attempts to fight off the Land Tax Law of 1933. By November 1933, fourteen of the sixteen members of the Legislative Council were now members of the Amir's *Hizb al-Sha'b*. The only holdouts were Hussein al-Tarawnah (president of the National Congress) and Adil al-Azmeh (member of *Istiqlal*). Even former member of the National Congress Party Qasim al-Hindawi had joined *Hizb al-Sha'b*. The Council became the personal political tool of Amir Abdullah. What had once been a proud defiant representative chamber was now an instrument to be used at Abdullah's whim against the wishes of the British. Through the Legislative Council, the Amir was able to differentiate his views from those of the Mandatory state. After British Resident Cox's 1924 ultimatum, Abdullah had lost much of his ability to vocally and publicly oppose the will of the British. Through his new political party, the

⁵⁵⁸ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of September 1933," 2/10/1933.

⁵⁵⁹ National Congress Party dissolved after the annual National Congress meetings stopped.

Amir was able to indirectly challenge the British agenda. The power of Raghadan Palace increased now that Abdullah could directly orchestrate the affairs of the Legislative Council. The Amir decided to use the strength of his new political party to bring about a change in the Executive Council. Prime Minister Saraj had fallen out of favor with the Amir over the course of 1933 but the British Resident had cautioned the Amir not to change the Cabinet until the end of the current Legislative Council. In order to bring about a change in the Cabinet, the representatives, instructed by Abdullah, increased their policy of non-cooperation with the reconvening of the regular council in November 1933. The elected Legislative Council members excluded the ex-officio Cabinet members from every committees of the Council. In addition, the representatives prevented the passage of legislation through deliberate absences, which denied the Council quorum.

In response to the legislative standstill, Amir Abdullah was able to dismiss his ineffective Chief Minister Saraj and appoint Ibrahim Hashim as the new Prime Minister. Hashim formed a new Government on November 18, 1933. Sa'id al Mufti returned to the Executive Council replacing Tawfiq Abu al-Huda as Administrative Inspector. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda became the Director of the Agricultural Bank after his removal from the Cabinet. Hashim Kheit became Director of Antiquities and Qassim al-Hindawi, former member of the National Congress, became the sixth member of the Executive Council without a specific post. The appointment of Qassim al-Hindawi to the Cabinet continued the government practice of placating former opposition figures with Government

posts.⁵⁶⁰ Once the Cabinet had been reconstituted, the Legislative Council ceased to be an impediment to the government.

The end of the Prime Minister Saraj's government and the end of the Second Legislative Council's tenure reinforced new truths in Transjordan. Prominent government officials realized how tenuous their positions in the government had become.⁵⁶¹ Any shift in government could easily correspond to a shift in personnel. In response, the Legislative Council had ceased to be a source of any organized opposition. Future Councils sporadically opposed legislation, but they did so to protect their own personal interests. Any group solidarity that had once existed in the halls of the Legislative Council died by the end of the Second Council's tenure. Similarly, Amman ceased to be the home of organized opposition to the Mandatory government. After 1933 there were periodic protests against government action and policy but after the National Congress, there was never again unified oppositional activity in Transjordan during the Mandate. Amman remained the home of politics in Transjordan, but it was a home increasingly furnished by the Anglo-Hashemite state. Instead of opposing the will and trajectory of the government, it became far more important to protect one's post on the Council. After 1933, few challenges would be directed at the Transjordan government directly. Political parties continued to function, but their attention was increasingly focused on regional issues, such as Palestine and Arab nationalism, instead of domestic ones. It was no longer viable to question the will of Amman.

⁵⁶⁰ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of July 1933," 4/12/1933.

⁵⁶¹ BNA, CO 831/23/11, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of December 1933," 4/1/1934.

Amendment of the 1928 Agreement and 1934 Elections

Since its publication in 1928, numerous parties inside and outside of Transjordan had called for revision of the 1928 Agreement. The signing of the 1934 supplementary agreement to the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement in Jerusalem on June 22, 1934, finally answered these calls for revision. The need for amendments was a frequent topic of discussion in both the First and Second Legislative Councils and had been a common demand of every political party in Transjordan. Despite the fact that revision of the 1928 Agreement was a near universal demand, the actual supplemental agreement signed in 1934 hardly addressed the deficiencies of the 1928 Agreement. The most common requests of the Transjordan government dealt with financial and diplomatic considerations. First, the government wanted the ability to have consular representation in London and the surrounding Arab countries. Consular representation would signify that Transjordan was a true political entity and not merely the puppet of the British crown. In addition, the Transjordan government wanted to have its financial obligations diminished by having the British Resident and his staff's salaries removed from the Transjordan budget. The Transjordanians also asked that custom variation between Transjordan and Palestine not need approval from HMG and that Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) and Arab Legion always be paid by grant (not loan).⁵⁶² These Agreement revision requests did not address the ultimate goal of the National Congress Party and others for the implementation of a constitutional government but ostensibly could be seen as a step in the right direction.

⁵⁶² BNA, CO 831/30/14, SoS Cunliffe-Lister to acting HC, 2/6/1933 and O.G.R. Williams (for SoS) to Treasury, 10/10/1933. The Transjordan government had made some wider ranging requests regarding budget allocation, treaties with other countries, and the function of the Arab Legion that were not entertained by the British.

The official 1934 Agreement addressed most of the requests listed above but curtailed the scope of their immediate impact. Transjordan was granted the right to have consular representation in Arab states (not London) but with the caveat that it must be paid for in full by the Transjordan government. The depressed economic situation in 1934 made the appointment and financing of consular representation impossible until the general economic situation improved. The 1934 Agreement also formally acknowledged that there should be no customs barrier between Palestine and Transjordan. However, the British maintained strict control of the Transjordanian budget, refusing the Amir's request to end the practice of itemized budget review or to be more generous in the grant-in-aid allocations to Transjordan.⁵⁶³

The 1934 Agreement amendment paid lip service to the idea of greater financial freedom for Transjordan without actually increasing Transjordan's financial autonomy. Overall, the 1934 Agreement had little substantive impact in the short term but it did increase the Amir's legitimacy. Although there were many issues not addressed by the 1934 Agreement, it was still viewed as progress towards eventual independence. The 1934 Agreement did not placate the opposition entirely, but it did remove one of their strongest criticisms of the Amir and his government. It reinforced the claims of Amir Abdullah that Transjordan was progressing and that the relationship with Great Britain was not static. More importantly, the 1934 Agreement was now a weapon to be used by the Anglo-Hashemite state against its detractors. Although the terms of the Agreement gave Transjordan very little, its mere existence was enough to silence many government critics. By 1934, the strength and vitality of the opposition were at their lowest point. No

⁵⁶³BNA, FO 816/29, Abdullah to BR Cox, 31/5/1934 and HC Wauchope to BR Cox, 22/6/1934.

political party had enough clout to criticize the 1934 Agreement's passage in Transjordan.

The subdued nature of the opposition in 1934 was evident in the election results for the Third Legislative Council. In the 1934 elections, completed in October 1934, opposition leaders Hussein al-Tarawnah and Adil al-Azmah were not reelected. It is likely that Tarawnah's arrest on September 4, 1934, in Karak blocked his reelection. Refifan al-Majali, Tarawnah's Karak rival and fellow member of the Legislative Council, likely instigated the arrest for holding a political meeting in the city without the proper permit. Tarawnah was released within 48 hours after posting bail. When news of Tarawnah's arrest reached Amman, the government decided to extend the elections in Karak by two weeks to try to alleviate the situation.⁵⁶⁴ Regardless of whether or not the arrest was orchestrated by the Hashemite state to block Tarawnah's candidacy, he was not reelected to the Legislative Council in 1934. With the removal of Tarawnah and Azmah from office, the opposition was formally shut out of the Third Legislative Council. The only former member of the National Congress still on the Council was Nazmi 'Abd al-Hadi (Arab Muslim from the Balqa), who had left the Moderate Liberal Party to help form the People's Party in 1933.

Shortly after the completion of the elections in 1934, rumors began to spread about "electoral irregularities." The Syrian paper *L'Orient*, originally reported this charge on October 14, 1934. However, the paper's accusations did not draw the attention of the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) until June 1935.⁵⁶⁵ The

⁵⁶⁴ Werner Ernst Goldner, "The Role of Abdullah Ibn Hussain, King of Jordan, in Arab Politics, 1914-1951: a Critical Analysis of his Political Activities" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1954), 190.

⁵⁶⁵ BNA, CO 831/32/10, League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 27th session June 3-18, 1935.

commission instructed the British to look into these allegations and to report to the Commission. The British quickly discovered a number of problems with the election. Although British Resident Cox reported in September 1934 that the election of secondary electors proceeded without “undue excitement,” he also noted: “The government is confident that only those whom it wishes to be elected shall become members of the Legislative Council.”⁵⁶⁶ The possibility of government tampering was there in the September report but Cox’s October report removed any level of plausible deniability:

The Legislative Council elections were completed about the 20th and all the successful candidates are those who enjoyed government support. Many of those who hoped but failed to gain a seat have joined forces against the government whom they accuse of rigging the elections in an entirely unscrupulous manner. To what degree this is true I am not in a position to say, but there is no doubt that the government exercised its influence having persons acceptable to it elected. The whole business is corrupt and votes are bought and sold quite openly. A number of disappointed persons referred to above have come to Amman to discuss their line of action and will probably be sent off to their homes in a few days.⁵⁶⁷

It was clear without any doubt that there had been government tampering in the 1934 Legislative Council elections (which may have included Tarawnah’s September arrest). The exact scope or nature of this meddling was unclear, but the British could not ignore its existence. Most damning was Cox’s direct acknowledgment of the corruption. Somehow, in response to these allegations the High Commissioner J.A. Wauchope still chose not to launch an enquiry because he believed it “would serve no useful purpose.”⁵⁶⁸ There is a clear level of panic in the British records themselves about the elections.

Some reply must be given to the Permanent Mandates Commission’s enquiry and the question is what! We cannot pass on any of the account in the political summary, even in a bowdlerized form, without admitting that the whole election

⁵⁶⁶ BNA, CO 831/37/8, Mr. Blaxter and Sir C. Parkinson to S.I. James, in reference to September report No. 36. 12/3/1936

⁵⁶⁷ BNA, CO 831/37/8, Mr. Blaxter and Sir C. Parkinson to S.I. James, in reference to October report No. 41. 12/3/1936.

⁵⁶⁸ BNA, CO 831/37/8, HC to SoS, 27/3/1936.

was corrupt, and we shall be open to the perfectly just criticism that we knew all about it and took no steps until we were found out. It is not easy to see how we can get out of this.⁵⁶⁹

In the end, it is unclear if the British ever actually did anything about the 1934 elections. Regardless of any internal hand wringing, the representatives elected in the original election in October 1934 served out their term until 1937. It does not appear that the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission ever penalized or rebuked the British in response to the 1934 elections. The fact that the Anglo-Hashemite state was able to rig the 1934 elections without widespread condemnation in Transjordan is further proof of the diminished strength of the opposition. By 1934, no one was left to effectively oppose the government. Furthermore, even if local non-government elites had wanted to protest the 1934 election results the government had denied them the means to do so.

In retrospect, it is clear that late 1934 and 1935 were a period where the Transjordan government tightened its control over political discourse in Transjordan. In June 1934, shortly before leaving Transjordan on a trip to Iraq and the United Kingdom, Amir Abdullah was said to have given “strict instructions that energetic steps should be taken to suppress any opposition,” according to *L’Orient*. A new bill published on December 25, 1934, granted the Amir the power “to censor postal packets, to have suspected persons arrested and deported, and to exercise control over the Gulf of Aqaba and over the aerodromes.” This bill, which became the Transjordan Defense Law of 1935, was to come into effect when the Amir declared a state of emergency or in cases where the armed forces of His Majesty’s Government (HMG) or Transjordan were threatened. When discussion of the Defense Law was raised in the Permanent Mandates

⁵⁶⁹ BNA, CO 831/37/8, Mr. Blaxter and Sir C. Parkinson to S.I. James, in reference to October report No. 41. 12/3/1936.

Commission Mr. Moody determined that the Transjordan Mandate was of increasing importance every year and that such a law needed to exist, and had already been in effect in Palestine for fourteen years.⁵⁷⁰ Mr. Moody claimed that the law was not published in 1935 due to any change in the Transjordan's domestic political climate. Despite the assertions of Mr. Moody, it is clear that the increased censorship activities in Transjordan were a blatant attempt by the government to silence oppositional voices. The law's passage in 1935 was not mere serendipity..

After the close of the Second Legislative Council's term, no further organized political opposition would come from its halls. The Council became a tool of the Amir to use against the British on measures that "he and his government could not resist openly."⁵⁷¹ The government continued to remove avenues for agitation and opposition to the government's programs. The 1935 Defense Law, when combined with the 1928 banishment law, 1932 law against unlawful public meetings, and the revival of the Ottoman Press Law, functionally destroyed the feasibility of an organized opposition existing within Transjordan. With increased levels of censure and media control, the opposition lost its ability to foment trouble for the government domestically. These censorship laws, when combined with the infrastructural and institutional centrality of the Anglo-Hashemite state in Amman, removed the last available avenues for public political dissension. In the face of growing government censure, the elites of Transjordan had the choice to work from within the government with minimal real power or to oppose the government and have their local and regional support stripped away from them. The rise

⁵⁷⁰ BNA, CO 831/32/10, League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 27th session June 3-18, 1935.

⁵⁷¹ Tariq Moraiwed Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 74.

of civil servants in the Transjordanian government further limited the feasibility of remaining an autonomous tribal sheikh or urban notable outside of the government system. These elites knew that if they chose to opt out of the government that someone else would take their place. By 1934, there was no such thing as an independent elite or notable in Transjordan. Elites either worked with the government and had a voice or existed outside the government where they were ostracized and powerless. In the face of increased Hashemite control and censure, the majority of challenges to Transjordan's government now dealt with its regional opposed to domestic policies and most of the criticism came from outside of Transjordan. Finally, in the mid-1930s, the government began to use Amman itself as a weapon against political dissidents. As the gravity of the capital increased, domestic exile away from the capital became a constant threat and weapon for neutering any remaining disgruntled elites. Amman functioned as both a place of discipline and of reward.

The Creation of a Hashemite Versailles

The rise of a new class of young civil servants illustrates the shift in the Transjordan political atmosphere. The Transjordanian elites raised in the Mandate system and educated during the Mandate period operated within the framework they knew. Historian Betty Anderson described their development as being crucial to the later emergence of nationalism in Jordan. "In a situation like Jordan's where the state was so very new and the focus of loyalty so fluid, schools provide a powerful means for regrouping and redefining the identities of students. Many of the messages imparted

highlight the need for obedience to the new state structure.”⁵⁷² Throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, these new civil servants did not rebel against the government. Instead, they worked within the confines of the state’s structure as teachers, bureaucrats, and young professionals to lobby for gradual change.⁵⁷³ These young civil servants (*efendis*) had no choice but to work within the government’s tightly controlled framework. Open avenues for opposition had been systematically closed one by one in the years following the formation of the Legislative Council in 1928. The open political space that briefly existed in 1929 had been slammed shut by the late 1930s. The rules of engagement had changed in Transjordan. The political machinery housed in Amman was now only employed in the service of the Mandatory state. Amman became synonymous with the will of the government. Battles for change in the government no longer pitted an independent opposition movement against the will of the Anglo-Hashemite state. In its place, members of the Mandatory government now instigated change from the inside.⁵⁷⁴ They had no other choice.

As the 1930s progressed, opportunities for political opposition continued to narrow. Public meetings and political conferences in particular, held without prior approval, had been outlawed. The 1935 Transjordan Defense Law limited the circulation and feasibility of opposition periodicals within Transjordan. The ban on public meetings even applied to former government officials. Taher al-Joqqa, the former mayor of Amman, attempted to convene a Congress in Amman on January 28, 1936, but was

⁵⁷² Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 64.

⁵⁷³ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 184-87.

⁵⁷⁴ This would change in the early 1950s but this young civil servant class worked within the government in the interim.

turned down by the Chief Minister.⁵⁷⁵ When members of the opposition threatened to stage disturbances in Amman on April 23, 1936, the Amir moved a large force of the Arab Legion and a half squadron of the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) to the Amman railway station to ensure that no problems arose.⁵⁷⁶ In 1937, the government continued to curtail public meetings when it outlawed the meeting of societies and clubs that did not have explicit government permission.⁵⁷⁷

In response to the government's new tactics, criticism of the Transjordan government increasingly came from outside of Transjordan. Syrian papers (*Alef Ba, Ayyam, Lewa*) and Palestinian papers (*Filastin* and *al-Di'fa*) were used to criticize government regional policies. Domestic papers could not criticize the state because of the threat of immediate censure and punishment. Most frequently, the government and the Amir were attacked for their policies on Palestine and rumors of the Amir and other Transjordanian elites selling or leasing land to Zionists in Transjordan.⁵⁷⁸ Both issues increased in importance during the Palestine Revolt from 1936 to 1939. These attacks frequently came from Transjordanians in self-imposed exile such as Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima.⁵⁷⁹ The government undertook further measures to minimize the impact of external opposition pamphlets, including confiscating them at Post Offices to prevent

⁵⁷⁵ BNA, CO 831/37/1, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of January 1936," 1/2/1936.

⁵⁷⁶ BNA, CO 831/37/1, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of April 1936," 2/5/1936.

⁵⁷⁷ BNA, CO 831/37/1, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of February 1937," 2/3/1937.

⁵⁷⁸ These accusations were not groundless. The Amir and Mithqal al Fayiz both considered leasing land to Zionists. However, the Amir never actually went forward with any of these possible agreements.

⁵⁷⁹ This is the same Dr. Ghanima who owned the first electric generators in Amman. He was largely living abroad by the late 1930s.

their circulation.⁵⁸⁰ Additionally, the government paid off paper editors to stop publishing damaging stories about the Amir.⁵⁸¹ Political parties attempted to form outside of Transjordan in an effort to influence the state while outside of its reach. The First General Conference of Transjordanian Students met in Damascus on May 15, 1937, to discuss the danger to Transjordan from Zionists and the need for closer Arab unity.⁵⁸² This particular conference never amounted to anything, but it was indicative of the depleted options available to a drastically weakened opposition.

The few who attempted to fight against the increased levels of censorship and government control in Transjordan were punished. However, in a small country such as Transjordan, the government could not afford to simply exile problematic elites. These individuals frequently filled needed government posts. The low levels of educated officials meant they were hard to replace, especially in the early periods of the Mandate. For example, as early as 1928, the *Mutasarrif* (Ottoman term for regional administrator) of ‘Ajlun Ahmad Ramzi, invoked the powers of the Crime Prevention Law of September 7, 1927, to place Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell (also known as the poet ‘Arar) under house arrest in Amman for six months for disturbing the peace. As part of his punishment, he was unable to leave Amman without written permission and had to remain indoors at night.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸⁰ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of April 1937,” 1/5/1937.

⁵⁸¹ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of December 1937,” 3/1/1938.

⁵⁸² BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of May 1937,” 1/6/1937.

⁵⁸³ Abu Nowar, *The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939*, 54-55. The poet ‘Arar and his relationship with the Hashemite state will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter (chapter 6) on Amman’s developing urban landscape.

Over time, the approach to house arrest changed in Transjordan. It was no longer a punishment to be in Amman. Where once being Amman was a penalty because it forced inhabitants to interact with the new centralized state infrastructure, by the mid-1930s the converse was true. Being in Amman had become an advantageous position. This shift was analogous to the change in the general perception of Amman, and the Anglo-Hashemite state more generally. The court culture of the Anglo-Hashemite state now demanded proximity to ensure political position. A myriad of elites, regardless of their individual motivations, needed to be in Amman to curry favor with the Amir.⁵⁸⁴ The symbolic weight and importance of Amman grew proportionally with the authority of the Mandatory government. Amman was simultaneously a place of privilege and discipline. As a result, the sentence du jour became exile away from the capital. This form of domestic exile was a common technique employed by the Ottomans when they would send viziers and other elites who had fallen out of favor away from Istanbul.⁵⁸⁵ The simple rationale was that being removed from the locus of power; a person becomes less significant and less powerful.⁵⁸⁶

A Transjordanian example of this practice was Mohammad al-Hussein (the former head of His Highness' Diwan, out of office and in opposition by the mid-1930s) who attempted to "foment anti-government agitation in the 'Ajlun district." Al-Hussein's punishment ordered by the Chief Minister was to return to his native town, Tafileh, and

⁵⁸⁴ Le Roy Ladurie, *Saint-Simon and the Court of Louis XIV*, 343-48.

⁵⁸⁵ Fatma Sel Turhan, *The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising: Janissaries, Modernisation, and Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 186-92. Turhan discusses the domestic exile of rebellious elites away from Istanbul. She notes that these exiles were rarely permanent.

⁵⁸⁶ Yonca Koksal, "Coercion and Mediation: Centralization and Sedentarization of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42 (May 2006), 475. Exile was also used as a group punishment in the Ottoman Empire. Frequently, after new lands were conquered dissident tribes or populations from the Empire were forcibly resettled in a practice known as "*sürgün*."

“to remain there in enforced residence until further notice.”⁵⁸⁷ Initially, al-Hussein fled to Syria, but upon his return, he was placed in enforced residence in Tafileh.⁵⁸⁸ In another example, Mohammad Hejazi, a “troublesome politician of Amman,” insulted the Chief Minister and “nearly caused a fight between the Nablusi and Damascene elements of Amman who support[ed] the government and a number of Mohammad Hejazi’s rowdy associates.” In response to this disturbance, the government arrested Hejazi and placed him in enforced residence at Aqaba “for being a menace to the peace of Amman.”⁵⁸⁹

For “sons of the country,” domestic exile away from Amman fulfilled two simultaneous government goals. It removed troublemakers from the halls of power and reinforced the symbolic and functional importance of the new capital of Amman. These examples illustrate how proximity to the capital, and the power and influence it represented, had become desirable and practically necessary for the elites of Transjordan. The political necessity of the capital forced sheikhs and urban notables throughout Transjordan to come frequently to Amman. The physical act of coming into Amman by itself reified Amman’s growing central importance in the young Emirate. The process of political pilgrimage into Amman simultaneously stripped elites of their autonomy and strengthened the power of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Being sent away from Amman was the ultimate punishment for political dissidents. Similar to its Ottoman antecedents, this domestic exile was rarely permanent. Instead, these terms of house arrest in the country

⁵⁸⁷ In addition to Mohammad al-Hussein, his fellow conspirators were also domestically exiled. Bahjat Seleibi, Ahmed Najdawi, and Mikhail Salih Fakhoury were all sent to Aqaba.

⁵⁸⁸ BNA, CO 831/37/1, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of January 1936,” 1/2/1936.

⁵⁸⁹ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of March 1937,” 1/4/1937.

were a means to rehabilitate problematic elites and to convert them to the government's position.

Inside the government, the centralization of power and authority also continued. The Third Legislative Council caused the government few issues. It rarely spoke out against the Amir and generally followed Government instruction. Unlike previous Councils, budgets generally passed without amendment.⁵⁹⁰ The Council did periodically pursue arguments for independence or admission into the League of Nations, as they did in April 1937, but these were hardly revolutionary sentiments. The Council criticized British actions in Palestine and advocated for Arab unity to little effect. In general, Council members parroted the wishes of the Amir and were regarded as harmless by the British.

Despite their limited and dwindling legislative role, elections for the Legislative Council were still quite contentious. In fact, each subsequent Council election was more hotly contested than its predecessor. Estimates stipulated that contending parties spent at least LP 1000 in the Ma'an province race alone, despite the fact that the annual salary for a member of the Legislative Council was only LP 108. The competition in the 'Ajlun "elections are being contested with considerable intensity and the tendency to exaggerate the number of secondary electors had to be checked particularly in the Jerash sub-district. The *Mutasarrif* of the district went through the lists of the primary electors of this sub-district and on inspection reduced the number by nearly fifty percent." In Karak, there were attempts to block the Tafileh and Ma'an elites from being elected at all. The Karak representatives wanted to garner enough votes to ensure that all four seats for the

⁵⁹⁰ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of March 1937," 1/4/1937.

Karak/Tafileh/Ma'an district would be awarded to Karak. The Amir noted that such an outcome was undesirable and "[g]overnment supporters are endeavoring to ensure that the wishes of the authorities are met."⁵⁹¹

After the commotion and problems that surrounded the 1934 elections, the British were keen to ensure that the Mandatory government refrained from interference. Upon the conclusion of the elections on October 16, 1937, the British Resident was happy to report: "[t]hough they were much more keenly contested than on any previous occasion, [the elections] were carried through without any breach of the peace. The government, except in the case of one official who was acting under the influence of the Amir, remained neutral in the elections but a good deal of money changed hands in the purchase of votes of the secondary electors."⁵⁹² The Fourth Legislative Council's elections were the most contested on record. Although the victorious elites fought hard for their Council seats, the Council was the most pliable yet. The political and social currency of the Council's representatives had become the seats themselves, not any actual legislative authority that they exercised. Possession of a Council seat not only reinforced the authority of the Council member, but also advanced the standing of his entire patronage network. For this reason, as the Council diminished in functional importance the status of the Council representatives continued to increase. By the fourth Council, the opposition had been quashed and elites who wanted to remain relevant needed a Council seat to reaffirm their regional influence and importance. The tenure of the Fourth Council was extended in 1940 in response to the outbreak of WWII. The extended term was a means

⁵⁹¹ BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of August 1937," 3/9/1937.

⁵⁹² BNA, CO 831/41/8, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of October 1937," 2/11/1937.

to limit political disruption during wartime as the Council term increased from three to five years.⁵⁹³ The Fourth Legislative Council only stubbornly refused one piece of legislation, the Water Settlement Laws.

The Water Settlement Laws were an attempt by the government to regulate water resources in Transjordan. The government hoped that the law would already be in place as new water development programs, notably irrigation schemes, arose. It would give the government near total control of all water resources in Transjordan including well water, surface water, and irrigation projects. British Resident Cox feared early on that there would be difficulty in getting the law passed by the Legislative Council without more details about how the law would be implemented.⁵⁹⁴ As of October 1939, the Council had still not passed the Water Law. “The draft water law was withdrawn from the last session of the Legislative Council when it became apparent that the elected members were not willing to vote its passage in its present form because they considered the rights which it would give the government over water supplies which were now in private ownership to be too wide.”⁵⁹⁵ The delays caused by the representatives made it impossible to begin any of the irrigation schemes created by the Department of Development.⁵⁹⁶

A revised Water Law reduced the powers granted to the government for the distribution of water but to no avail. The Water Law languished in the Legislative Council in various forms for years. In 1945, Council representative Majid al-Adwan (an Arab Muslim from the Balqa who had served on every Legislative Council since 1931) opposed the law because it would force him to give land shares to his brother and

⁵⁹³ BNA, FO 816/40, BR to HC, “Amendment to Organic Law passed,” 14/3/1940.

⁵⁹⁴ BNA, FO 816/98, BR Cox to M. Ionides (Head of Department of Development), 26/10/1937.

⁵⁹⁵ BNA, FO 816/100, BR Kirkbride to HC, 4/4/1940.

⁵⁹⁶ The Department of Development and other CDF funded programs were discussed in chapter 3.

sisters.⁵⁹⁷ The stubborn refusal of a few Legislative Council members blocked the passage of a Water Rights law during the Mandate. This act of political independence by the representatives had everything to do with personal interests. This was not a cooperative act of defiance by a united opposition. This was not a stance against the encroachment of government authority on the lives of normal Transjordanians. Instead, opposition to this law was firmly rooted in individual interest and fear that the law would adversely economically affect the representatives and their familial and patrimonial network. The opposition to the Water Law, regardless of the delegates' motivations, demonstrated that the representatives still had a shred of autonomy as late as the Fourth Legislative Council.

The subtle remnants of independence and opposition washed away with the election of the Fifth Legislative Council in October 1942. The Fifth Council was the Legislative Council's most docile incarnation. "They approved 32 laws in two weeks without recording even one dissenting vote and without a single debate."⁵⁹⁸ Even the election of the old opposition leader, Hussein al-Tarawnah, could not alter the ethos of the Fifth Council. By the 1940s, Council seats had become an understood component of elite life in Transjordan. Council seats remained in families. In some cases, seats were even inherited with the death of the father. For example, Refifan al-Majali's son Ma'arik took over his seat in 1945 and Majid al-Adwan's son Abdullah took over for him in 1946.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁷ BNA, FO 816/100, BR Kirkbride to Chief Minister Samir Pasha Rifai, 3/3/1945.

⁵⁹⁸ Maan Abu Nowar, *The Struggle for Independence: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 2001), 94-95.

⁵⁹⁹ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 144.

The transformation of the Legislative Council was complete. What had started as an autonomous bastion of the opposition had become the rubber stamp of the Mandatory government. The Anglo-Hashemite state had transformed the Legislative Council into an assemblage of cooperative Transjordanian elites. Through elite manipulation in the legislature, Amman was able to incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the machinery of the Jordanian state. Membership to the Legislative Council operated as a commodity of status. No legislative authority remained in the seats whatsoever. Amman had become a Hashemite Versailles. Similar to the Palace of Versailles in early modern France, Amman became a place where possibly rebellious elites were concentrated and observed in a single discrete space. Once in Amman, the Mandatory government reconditioned the elites of Transjordan into accepting its existence. The mere act of residing in Amman forced Council representatives to acknowledge the political centrality of Amman. The Anglo-Hashemite state conditioned formerly autonomous elites into accepting, and even embracing, the control of the central government. One by one, the Mandatory government eliminated the available avenues for dissent. There was no legal way to oppose the will of the government by the late 1930s. For the few members of the opposition who insisted on continuing their opposition into the late 1930s, domestic exile away from Amman robbed these individuals of any political clout or influence.

By the end of the Mandate, Amman's gilded cage both constrained and supported the elites within. The cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. The Legislative Council had gathered elites unconditioned to understanding centralized authority and domesticated them. The allure of protected, all be it diminished, status and

prestige trumped frustrated desires to legislate. Amman had gathered formerly independent elites of a tribalized society and made them respect and acknowledge a dominant centralized state. The shadow of Amman, and the dominant state infrastructure it represented, now fell over all of Transjordan.

Conclusion

The 1930s saw a drastic change in the function of the Transjordanian state and the importance of Amman. In 1930, the Legislative Council was still smarting from the forced ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement and Organic Law. The First Legislative Council did not become a cowed group. Instead, it chose to fight the will of the government and the British by refusing to pass an amended version of the 1930-31 budget. This choice led to the ultimate dissolution of the First Council. Thereafter, each subsequent Council gradually changed their tactics and relationship with the government. The autonomy and legislative might of each successive Council diminished bit by bit. The Council's opposition to the Land Tax Law and the Water Rights Law demonstrate the final shreds of independence that the Council held. The shift in the Council's outlook and makeup was completed in the Fifth Legislative Council. The prestige and consolidated position that the representatives of the Council enjoyed trumped any desire for dissenting action. The need to protect the authority and status derived from a Legislative Council seat superseded ideological differences. The elite of Transjordan could no longer risk antagonizing the government. Continuing prominence and position in Transjordan was now connected to directly serving the government.

The dominance of the central government in Amman solidified in this period. The government was able to centralize its supremacy over political, military, and economic spheres of life. In concert with the evolution of the Legislative Council, the government began a gradual process of limiting the avenues of possible opposition. The passage of the 1935 Transjordan Defense Law along with other censoring activities drastically curtailed the number of viable outlets that dissenting individuals had to voice their opposition. The increase in censorship coincided with the government's initiative to rehabilitate opposition figures. Numerous members of the opposition were placated with government posts that turned former opponents into government allies. The practice of domestic exile away from Amman highlighted the importance of the capital and mitigated the influence of those individuals who refused to curtail their criticism of the government. Taken together, Amman had transformed formerly autonomous elites into Transjordanian elites. Amman had become a Hashemite Versailles.

Part III: Building the Heart of Amman

6: Public Celebration and Government Control: The Development of Amman's Urban Fabric

“In the center of town, where the two roads meet, is a fountain near which the mosque is being built, here, morning and evening, a crowd assembled. There would be men on horseback or riding mules or camels, shepherds with their flocks, boys in charge of goats, all talking at the top of their voices. A car comes along and the crowd, that has spread all over the roadway, divides to let it pass, swarming all over the road again directly after it has passed. The crowd is always interesting; perhaps it is more gaudy than usual owing to the presence of the King and the Emir.”⁶⁰⁰

– Beatrice Erskine on the state of Amman during Sharif Hussein’s visit in 1924

As early as 1924, it was clear that Amman was the center of life in Transjordan.

Beatrice Erskine remarked during her visit that Amman was already a vibrant place. She remembered the constant commotion and buzz of activity that characterized life in the center of Amman. Despite Erskine’s early assessment of Amman, academics for years have rejected the city of Amman as being an inauthentic and insignificant city. This blanket dismissal resulted from Amman’s atypical urban characteristics. Amman did not fit into the “stereotypical models of what an ‘Islamic’ or ‘Arab’ city should look like.”⁶⁰¹ Amman is not surrounded by a set of ancient walls, and its recent resettlement makes the city feel inherently modern. Amman’s late nineteenth century heritage did not make it easily adaptable to models devised for “Traditional cities” such as Damascus, Cairo, or Jerusalem.

However, the dismissal of Amman as being a bastardized modern city is misplaced. The urban makeup of Amman is very much in keeping with the norms of other Levantine cities of the period, and British colonial cities more generally. Amman’s urban development straddled Western conceptions of modernity while still operating in a clearly pre-modern context. Amman never had a comprehensive urban plan developed or

⁶⁰⁰ Mrs. Stuart Erskine, *Transjordan* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1924), 39-40.

⁶⁰¹ Rami Daher and Irene Maffi, eds., “Introduction” in *Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage in the Middle East: Positioning the Material Past in Contemporary Societies*, eds. Rami Daher and Irene Maffi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 5.

employed during the Mandate period.⁶⁰² Amman did not have its first urban plan until 1955. This lack of urban planning allowed the city to develop without government interference. This approach is quite different from the intense urban planning that took place in neighboring Palestine. Tel Aviv, Haifa, and to a lesser extent Jerusalem, grew dramatically under the British Mandate.⁶⁰³ In Palestine, the increased level of planning was mainly at the behest of the Zionists.⁶⁰⁴ The British only took a nominal interest in urban planning in Palestine in an effort not to anger the local populace.⁶⁰⁵ British indifference towards urban planning in Amman was in stark contrast to the strong colonial oversight that the government employed throughout Transjordan to maintain security. What British concerns existed about Amman had more to do with the symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state it presented than any specific planning or security concerns.

It was this symbolic Amman that the poet Mustafa Wahabi al-Tell (i.e., ‘Arar) rejected. ‘Arar was both a part of the city, living there for a number of years while working for the Hashemite government, and inherently removed from its inner workings and evolving social character.⁶⁰⁶ It is this isolated individual perspective that makes ‘Arar a *flâneur* par excellence. This dual identity allowed ‘Arar to comment on and frequently

⁶⁰² BNA, CO 831/37/1, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of November 1936,” 1/12/1936. Amman did have a municipal engineer, Sharif Fawaz al-Muhanna, from 1933-1936. However, Sharif Fawaz had a very minimal impact on the architecture of Amman in his official capacity as municipal engineer. Most of his buildings that exist in Amman until today are from his private career. BNA, CO 831/37/1, “report on the political situation for the month of November 1936, 1/12/1936.

⁶⁰³ Mark Levine, *Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 153-181.

⁶⁰⁴ Hysler-Rubin, *Patrick Geddes and Town Planning*, 75-94 and 107-118.

⁶⁰⁵ Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem: From the Ottomans to the British* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 161. Although the British administration was not officially involved in urban planning in Jerusalem, numerous members of the pro-Jerusalem society were also British officials including the Governor of Jerusalem Ronald Storrs.

⁶⁰⁶ Richard Loring Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey: Verse of ‘Arar, Poet of Jordan* (Irbid Jordan: Yarmouk University, 1998), 1-11.

critique the burgeoning young capital from the unique vantage point of a *flâneur*.⁶⁰⁷ ‘Arar personified the schizophrenia of the elites of Transjordan. He was part of the government, yet bristled at the implications of his governmental involvement. ‘Arar claimed to speak on behalf of an unblemished land of Transjordan but did so as a member of Transjordan’s growing class of civil servants. It was this disconnect that disgusted ‘Arar most of all. The beacon of this hypocrisy and schizophrenic world-view was Amman. Amman was a vapid cancerous contagion, in ‘Arar’s eyes. The city threatened to infect all of Transjordan. For ‘Arar, Transjordan was a natural entity with its own discrete ethos that must be protected from the tainted new elite of Amman.

The cultural and architectural realities of the city were quite different from ‘Arar’s manufactured grand caricature. The city of Amman was not a grand or resplendent urban space. It was a city left to develop on its own, with minimal government intervention and few monumental buildings. This ironic juxtaposition to the government’s controlling aspirations demonstrates the limitations of the Mandatory state. The Anglo-Hashemite government may have wished to develop a discrete urban plan for Amman but they simply could not afford to do so. The British viewed the actual city of Amman, beyond its security-oriented infrastructure as largely inconsequential. This benign neglect allowed for an open urban fabric that reflected the various cultural heritages of the Mandate: Ottoman, Arab, and British. The varied architecture of the city highlights a clear Ottoman continuity while allowing for both Western and local influences. This amalgam of architectural styles resulted in numerous hybridized residential architectural styles in Amman. These new residential architectural forms helped to designate the first

⁶⁰⁷ Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Thetford Press Limited, 1973), 37.

elite enclave of Amman, Jabal Amman al-Jadid (New Jabal Amman, hereafter simply Jabal Amman). This elite community established on one of the hills to the west of Amman's downtown corridor became one of the first neighborhoods outside of the city center with its own discrete character and function within Amman. Unlike other neighborhoods outside of downtown, Jabal Amman only began its development during the British Mandate, particularly after the earthquake in 1927. Jabal Amman's development along modern and Western lines led Amman to become a "dual city." This bifurcated identity remains one of the most lasting legacies of the colonial period in modern Amman.

Regardless of socio-political class or standing, all of Amman congregated in the same central space. Amman's urban development naturally coalesced itself around the central corridor of the city, *al-balad* (literally "the country," "the city," or "the town"). Within this central valley along the Seil River developed the natural center of the capital. This corridor, in particular Feisal Square, functioned as the beating heart of Amman. The government and normal Ammanis alike used Feisal Square as a natural meeting place and as a space for celebration and commemoration. The cultural gravity of Feisal Square predated the Anglo-Hashemite government. Although the streets that made up Feisal Square existed before the Mandate, it was not until Hussein Mosque was constructed in 1924 that the square became the preeminent cultural, religious, and political space in Amman. Hussein Mosque gave the space cultural gravity. The government usurped this space through a wide variety of public functions held in Feisal Square. These celebrations were an inexpensive expression of political and cultural control, which underscored the might of the Hashemite government in lieu of monumental architecture. Amman's identity as a

Hashemite Versailles was solidified in the performances and celebrations held in Feisal Square. Abdullah's claiming of Feisal Square as a political space differentiated his authority from that of the British colonial authority.

Despite the government's use of Feisal Square, it remained the venue of choice for religious celebrations and political opposition for normal Ammanis throughout the Mandate period as well. This dual function was analogous to how the entire city of Amman functioned within the workings of the Transjordan Mandate. Although Amman was the seat of the Mandatory government, it still functioned as a real city with inhabitants operating outside the sphere of strict government control. The government did not own Amman, therefore, the reality of Amman's architecture and urban layout personify the limitations and tensions of the Mandatory state. It wanted to control all of Transjordan but could not even control its own capital.

'Arar and the City

Thus far, this study has explored how infrastructural centralization and elite manipulation heightened Amman's structural, political, and symbolic importance. The actions of the Anglo-Hashemite state transformed Amman into the personification of government authority and Hashemite legitimacy in the young Emirate. Amman's physical development was far less important than the evolution of its symbolic meaning throughout Transjordan. The government records of the period give a clear depiction of how the Mandate looked from the vantage point of Amman. To invert this perspective and look from the outside in, we must turn to someone who operated in both worlds,

someone who was a part of the capital and distinctly removed from it. In order to understand this dimension of Amman's history, we must turn to the poetry of 'Arar.

Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell, better known as 'Arar, was the preeminent cultural and political critic of the British Mandate of Transjordan. Today, 'Arar is frequently referred to as the "uncrowned poet laureate of Jordan – spokesman for Jordanian ideals and aspirations."⁶⁰⁸ 'Arar has been interwoven into the story of the Jordanian nation, his poetry playing a critical role in its formation. However, this memory is not indicative of 'Arar's complicated history with the Transjordan State. In the words of historian Betty Anderson, 'Arar "was in tune with the national narratives already resonating in Jordan, irrespective of the actions of the Hashemites themselves."⁶⁰⁹ The Greater Municipality of Amman (GAM) perpetuated this distorted memory of 'Arar in 1999 with the publication of *Arar: The Poet and Lover of Jordan* in honor of his 100th birthday. Nowhere does the volume mention his harsh critique of Amman or the Transjordan Government. In fact, the introduction explicitly states that the volume will not refer to specifics from Arar's daily life. Instead, the volume alludes to a number of general categories that drew 'Arar's focus, such as foreign control of Jordanian resources, Zionist incursions, and a general stand for social justice.⁶¹⁰ This revision rebrands 'Arar as an honored son of Amman, a patriot, and a keen supporter of the Jordanian state. This vision ignores the criticism and satire at the heart of much of 'Arar's poetry.

⁶⁰⁸ Taylor, *Mustafa's Journey*, 1.

⁶⁰⁹ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 48.

⁶¹⁰ Abdullallah Radwan, "Foreword: 'Arar, the Unwavering Principled Poet," in *Arar: The Poet and Lover of Jordan*, selected by Abdullallah Radwan, trans. Sadik I. Odeh (Amman: National Library, 1999), 9.

Although other scholars have commented on ‘Arar’s role as part of the political opposition,⁶¹¹ they have ignored his role as a cultural and urban critic. ‘Arar operated in a discrete liminal space. He was an outcast and a heavy drinker. ‘Arar’s personal familiarity with the city and the government gave his criticism a distinctive voice and unique venomous quality. It is this isolated individual perspective that makes ‘Arar a *flâneur* par excellence. Walter Benjamin’s *flâneur* is the bourgeois male observer of the patterns and rhythms of the city. The *flâneur* exists in a period of urban transition. He acknowledges the city as the nexus of modern life, but feels a sense of loss in this new modernity. In the example of Baudelaire’s Paris, the *flâneur* inhabits the arcades of the city as his home. “The street becomes the dwelling for the *flâneur*; he is as much at home among the facades of houses as a citizen is in his four walls.”⁶¹² This public urban space allows him to stroll freely, to be aloof and involved simultaneously in the flows of the city.

In Mandate era Amman, ‘Arar strolls through *al-balad*.⁶¹³ This central corridor operates in much the same manner as Paris’ arcades. In particular, the suqs and cafes of *al-balad* allow for the juxtaposition of the different social classes present in Amman. The alleyways and corridors of the suq protected ‘Arar’s ability to stroll without fear of oncoming cars.⁶¹⁴ Akin to the Parisian arcades, the pedestrian nature of *al-balad* would be short lived. Amman developed with the car and as a result, the centralization of life in *al-balad* would dissipate over time as the city modernized. From his perch in a café

⁶¹¹ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 44-56.

⁶¹² Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, 37.

⁶¹³ The central valley of Amman, surrounded by numerous hills, developed into the central corridor and functional heart of Amman. The development and symbolic importance of *al-balad* will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

⁶¹⁴ Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, 54-55. Benjamin acknowledges the bazaar as the last bastion of the *flâneur*.

(frequently Hamdan coffee house), bar, or pub, ‘Arar was able to be both part of the movement of the city and be protected from the unpredictable undulations of the crowd.⁶¹⁵ The flâneur never becomes part of the masses; he “demanded elbow room and was unwilling to forego the life of a gentleman of leisure.”⁶¹⁶ As historian Gregory Shaya points out, the flâneur “was a figure of the modern artist-poet, a figure keenly aware of the bustle of modern life, an amateur detective of the city, but also a sign of the alienation of the city and of capitalism.”⁶¹⁷ For ‘Arar, this leisure was generally found in the bottom of a glass of cognac.⁶¹⁸ In ‘Arar’s own words “[i]t is as if Amman knew no brother of joy who habitually frequents pubs and makes pilgrimages to taverns.”⁶¹⁹ ‘Arar both acknowledges his participation in normal Ammani life while simultaneously feeling alienated from the ethos of the city.

‘Arar was not an inconspicuous part of Ammani society. The famous novelist Abd al-Rahman Munif⁶²⁰ recalls in his memoir that “[t]he name ‘Arar was mentioned by many, because that poet’s life was linked to politics, gypsies and poetry that had to be secretly read, either because it was too explicit or because it had been banned. One of the main places where he was to be seen was the Kawar Tavern.” Students would come by and recite his poetry to try to engage and entice a response from the poet. Munif recalled

⁶¹⁵ Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 64. ‘Arar mentions his friend Hamdan in the poem “Repenting Penitence.” According to Taylor, Hamdan and ‘Arar were friends and ‘Arar used the coffee house frequently for political opposition meetings.

⁶¹⁶ Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, 54.

⁶¹⁷ Gregory Shaya, “The Flâneur, the Badaud, and the Making of a Mass Public in France, circa 1860-1910,” *The American Historical Review* 109 (Feb 2004), 47.

⁶¹⁸ Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 187. Arar in his poem “Ask Michael” acknowledges that he spent time in Amman drinking cognac in a pub while others drank beer and Araq. He laments: “How many times did he receive our salaries before we obtained a penny from them ourselves?”

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁶²⁰ Abd al-Rahman Munif grew up in Amman during the 1930s and 1940s. He is famous for his five-part series of novels titled *Cities of Salt (Mudun al-Malh)* about the development of an unnamed gulf state changed by the oil boom.

that on occasion ‘Arar would stand up, clap, and say, “‘you see you ignoramuses, how important poetry is? Even the schoolboys have memorized it!’”⁶²¹ ‘Arar’s poetry was meant to engage the masses both inside of Amman and throughout Transjordan. Poetry was the major medium of intellectual exchange of the period. According to Taylor, “poetry fulfilled the function of history text, newspaper and political speech. It was, in short, the major vehicle for formulating cultural identity in response to historical events.”⁶²² Despite the primacy of poetry, and his personal renown, ‘Arar remained a controversial figure removed from mainstream Ammani society of the Mandate. In this way, ‘Arar remains the disconnected flâneur whose gaze was inherently directed at the city which he will never truly be a part of.⁶²³

‘Arar’s personal history with the young Transjordan government was intimately connected to his divergent views on Transjordan’s development, and its capital of Amman. Born in Irbid in 1899 and educated in Damascus and Aleppo, ‘Arar’s poetry bridged the gap from the last gasps of the Ottoman period through the Mandate into the early years of Jordanian independence until his death in 1949.⁶²⁴ The lyrical style of ‘Arar’s poetry itself acknowledges the transitional period in which he lived. ‘Arar’s poetry frequently invoked classical phrases and allusions while imbuing his language with a new modernity by using colloquial phrases. ‘Arar is credited as one of the innovators of the modern renovation of the Arabic *qasidah*, transforming it “from being

⁶²¹ Munif, *Story of a City*, 219.

⁶²² Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 2.

⁶²³ Shaya argues that to understand the crowd you must employ the figure of another nineteenth century type, the *badaud*. The *badaud*, the curious observer, rubberneck, and gawker, wedged themselves into the crowd and became a part of it. The *badaud* did not have an aristocratic or removed perspective and as a result was not singular. Shaya identifies groups of *badauds* as the symbol of the urban masses, not the flâneur.

⁶²⁴ Ziad al-Zubi, “Mustafa Wahbi al-Tal: His Life and His Works,” in *Arar: The Poet and Lover of Jordan*, selected by Abdullah Radwan, translated by Sadik I. Odeh (Amman: National Library, 1999), 17-19.

an imitation and emulation of its predecessors into a *qasidah* with its own distinctive qualities, experience and discourse.”⁶²⁵ His poetry helped transform Arabic poetry into a modern medium.

Throughout his life, ‘Arar held numerous teaching posts and government positions. His career as a civil servant from the late 1920s through 1942 oscillated between official government posts and periods of imprisonment and exile.⁶²⁶ At various times, he was the Governor of Wadi Seer, Zerka, Shobak, and Salt. He also spent significant time in Amman first as a teacher and later as the Executive Officer of the Amman Court, Chief Clerk of the Amman Court, Inspector for the Ministry of Education, and finally as the Chief of Ceremony for the Royal Palace in 1941-1942. These appointments also reflect the unique relationship that ‘Arar had with Amir Abdullah. They were the two preeminent poets of their time and exchanged barbs with one another in verse on more than one occasion. This special relationship helps explain why despite his frequent open criticism ‘Arar always found his way back into the good graces of the government.⁶²⁷ This varied work history makes ‘Arar’s criticism and mocking of Amman and the government all the more personal and jarring. ‘Arar frequently found himself part of the very system and institutions that he lambasted in his poetry.

This schizophrenic relationship with the Anglo-Hashemite state was indicative of the realities of the educated classes during the Mandate period. The government needed to employ the small class of educated men as civil servants and teachers. The Mandatory government could not simply afford to expel these men due to the limited numbers of qualified individuals. This explains why the state frequently chose to imprison and exile

⁶²⁵ Radwan, *Arar: The Poet and Lover of Jordan*, 12.

⁶²⁶ ‘Arar was imprisoned or sent away from Amman in exile a minimum of four times from 1924-1942.

⁶²⁷ Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 2 and 13.

members of the political opposition only to quickly reintegrate them back into the government after their terms had expired.⁶²⁸ “The small cadre of educated men like ‘Arar thus became intertwined with the state, even as many like ‘Arar, spent periods of time in opposition to it. The Hashemite state could import clerks and politicians from the surrounding areas, but to gain a foothold in the country, it needed to rely upon indigenous skills.”⁶²⁹ The Mandatory state needed the population to accept its rule. It had to inculcate *mētis*. Without local acceptance, the Anglo-Hashemite state would never develop lasting authority, and perhaps more importantly, authenticity. This uneasy detente informed the dual nature of ‘Arar’s professional life. This duality is evident in the prime target for ‘Arar’s angst and displeasure with changing social and cultural norms of Transjordan: the city of Amman.

For ‘Arar, Amman symbolized all that had gone awry in his beloved land. Amman was a proxy for the Mandate government, which had twisted and tainted Transjordan. The imposition of centralized control emanating from Amman over the land of Transjordan was unnatural; it marked the destruction and pollution of the natural beauty of Jordan by a bevy of foreigners (both the British and the Hashemites). ‘Arar considered Transjordan to be a natural entity. He clearly differentiated Transjordan from neighboring Palestine. ‘Arar has been frequently praised as a Jordanian patriot because he was among the first to champion the natural existence of a discrete Jordanian state, separated from Palestine. ‘Arar’s separation of the Transjordan government and the land of Transjordan was inherently paradoxical. No one had ever considered the land “east of the Jordan” a single discrete unit until the formation of the Transjordan Mandate in 1922.

⁶²⁸ This phenomenon of temporary domestic exile or imprisonment was discussed in depth in chapter 5.

⁶²⁹ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, 56.

‘Arar’s weapon against the government was his sardonic wit and mockery of all semblances of official life in Amman. This included using public inebriation at any formal or state occasion as his form of non-vocal opposition. He contrasted his literal drunkenness with the figurative inebriation of the entire city of Amman. “Let Amman be drunk with shameless hypocrisy and lies.”⁶³⁰ ‘Arar frequently contrasted Amman to unspoiled landscapes/places outside of the city such as Madaba, Wadi Seer, and Salt. The highest ideal of virtue, justice and equality ‘Arar reserved for the gypsies. The gypsies were the personification of the outsider in Mandate era Transjordan. ‘Arar imbued the gypsy with many of the noble characteristics that others have attributed to the noble and savage Bedouin.⁶³¹ His idolization of the gypsies was meant as a “mirror to mock his contemporaries.”⁶³²

Despite its shortcomings, ‘Arar frequently yearned for his homeland while away. However, he always knew that the inhabitants of Amman and “the deity of Raghadan [would] be pleased” if he had fallen into ruin.⁶³³ ‘Arar beseeched his countrymen in “No One Criticizes Your Poetry” to not fall prey to the allure of Amman:

Don’t be deceived by Amman’s palaces. Their honor and their exquisite carvings
are no greater than a boudoir woven by a caterpillar /
Nothing emerges from them but harm; all their hullabaloo is mere sandman’s
sand. /
Don’t be impressed by glorious titles; Not every word means what it says. /
If inhabitants of Amman were really my fellow countrymen they would not put up
with whatever they confront.⁶³⁴

For ‘Arar, the pomp and circumstance of Amman were empty. The titles given out by its illegitimate government meant nothing. If the inhabitants of Amman were true

⁶³⁰ Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 165-66.

⁶³¹ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 23-27.

⁶³² Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 2.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, 135-136.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

Transjordanians, they would fight the growth of the new government. The injustices meted out by the Mandatory government could not and should not be accepted according to ‘Arar. “Establish your house away from Amman: Darkness never leaves Amman, but elsewhere the sun always shines... I knew in Raghadan noble free men, who, upon going forth to defend the Right, took up arms without wasting words. What became of them? May God preserve them. If you tried to force them to speak they would remain silent. Is it not true that the splendor of Raghadan outshines the night of Amman?”⁶³⁵ The influence of the palace in Amman, Raghadan, corrupted all who encountered it. Noble men have entered Abdullah’s palace but none has returned. ‘Arar sarcastically mocked the splendor of the palace saying that it outshone the city of Amman. For ‘Arar, the city of Amman was nothing more than the hollow seat of the Hashemite state. This grand depiction of Raghadan Palace and Amman was quite removed from the realities of the Mandate era capital. The level of splendor that existed in Amman, even the pomp attributed directly to the Amir, was quite minimal. There simply were not the finances to afford anything more grand or lavish. What ‘Arar described was the grotesque symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state. This caricature of Amman was more dangerous for ‘Arar than the real conditions of the capital. Although its reality may not have been extravagant, it was still highly corrupt and vapid compared to the pure countryside that ‘Arar champions.

‘Arar laments and mourns what Amman and the land of Transjordan once were. Here, once again, there was an inherent paradox in ‘Arar’s memory of Amman and its reality. ‘Arar bemoans the spoiled nature of modern Amman, but in the late Ottoman

⁶³⁵ Ibid., 80.

period Amman was little more than a small village. His nostalgia for an earlier time is for one in which no territory known as “Transjordan” existed. Instead of longing for the actual reality of the Ottoman past, ‘Arar essentially yearned for a period without a strong centralized state. His perception of “natural” is a land untouched by modern government. His wistful remembrance of a purer past is keeping with Benjamin’s nostalgic flâneur. He remembers Amman as a village but notes that it was “too easily influenced – a corruptible soul.” ‘Arar sees no redeeming characters in Mandate Era Amman: “You were not yesterday’s future, nor are you tomorrow’s hope. The qualifications of a decent town are unity of opinion and dearth of backbiting. But you, O Amman, have no opinions except those of the British Resident.”⁶³⁶

British Mandatory officials housed in Amman were ‘Arar’s favorite target for his venomous rhetoric. Although ‘Arar frequently indicts Amir Abdullah, in ‘Arar’s eyes the chief offenders were British Resident Cox, Arab Legion Commander Peake, and Judicial Adviser Hooper. These three men had infected his beloved land and warped its government. ‘Arar’s opinion of Abdullah seems to vacillate over time. His demonization of Ragahdan Palace is an indictment against the entire Mandatory government, not only Amir Abdullah. ‘Arar yearns to “renew the day of Sheehan,” by which he means the days in which the inhabitants of Karak rebelled against the Ottomans in 1909.⁶³⁷ He longs for the days in Transjordan before the coming of Abdullah and the British, before the onset of modernity.

Beyond government officials, ‘Arar frequently criticized the shallow and seemingly vacuous people of Amman. ‘Arar lambasted Amman as being “full of

⁶³⁶ Ibid., 184.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., 250.

demagogues who imagine themselves high in the stars, while they are trussed up in chains.”⁶³⁸ The demagogues and elite, which ‘Arar disdainfully referred to, had turned their back on the true beauty of Jordan. The “ladies of Amman” acted as “the social arbiters of their glittering new world, always ready to outdo their competitors in adopting foreign ways and fashions.”⁶³⁹ ‘Arar viewed these women, and the larger elite social class to which they belonged, to be alien from the true essence of Transjordan.⁶⁴⁰

The sense of dislocation that ‘Arar alludes to was symptomatic of the growing divide developing in Amman. The city’s population began to self-segregate during the Mandate period. The establishment of the neighborhood of Jabal Amman, and later Jabal al-Weibdeh, was indicative of the growing schism in Amman between a westernized elite enclave and a traditional impoverished quarter. Jabal Amman, which was the only new neighborhood developed during the Mandate period, became the home of Amman’s new notables. It embodied the creation of a new elite class in Amman and centralized public and cultural life away from *al-balad* for the first time. Again, ‘Arar’s scorn is not so much directed at the actual individuals who comprised this new elite class but what they symbolized. The new elite in Amman dragged Transjordan further away from ‘Arar’s unspoiled natural ideal. ‘Arar’s misanthropy was derived from a sense of self-loathing as he was occasionally part of this toxic class that he so despised. ‘Arar hated what the Mandatory government, and Amman by extension, symbolized, but that did not stop him from collecting his pay as part of the same government infrastructure.

⁶³⁸ Ibid., 184.

⁶³⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁴⁰ The “ladies of Amman” were contrasted with the idealized “gazelles of Wadi Seer,” which referred to the morally superior Circassian women of the region.

Always contrarian, ‘Arar seemed to revel in the consternation and irritation he caused the government. He frequently admits in his poetry that he may be going too far. “I have gone too far. Here (Amman) ignorance resembles learning. My salary prevents speech as if I had water in my mouth.”⁶⁴¹ ‘Arar notes the inherent hypocrisy of working for the same government he detests. On a number of occasions, ‘Arar speaks of quitting but does not appear to have ever actually done so. In “Remains of Merry Tunes and Sad Memories”, he acknowledges that:

The authorities in Amman disapprove of my frankness, and they have judged me to be unpardonable. /
They say the authorities in Amman are tired of my way of life, in which I accept invitations to join revelers, /
and that people bitterly disapprove of my running freely to the tents with my drinking companions. /
Their attitude would have been valid if Amman had ever known a single respectable person.⁶⁴²

‘Arar in three lines dismissed every person who has ever lived in Amman. ‘Arar saw no problem in this blanket rejection of Amman’s inhabitants, including himself, because he never claimed to be respectable. Despite his apparent lack of respectability, ‘Arar remained a prominent figure in the cultural sphere of Transjordan after he was finally ousted from government posts with his final arrest in 1942. Although he died in 1949, he remains a literary and cultural pillar in the construction of Jordanian identity today. His perverse and twisted relationship with Amman and the Hashemite state remains as odd and convoluted today as it was in the interwar period.

‘Arar’s systematic attack on the symbol of Amman was quite different from the city’s reality. Although ‘Arar depicted Amman as an extravagant capital, corrupted by the

⁶⁴¹ Taylor, *Mustafa’s Journey*, 162.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, 242.

Hashemite government, Amman's actual architectural façade and urban fabric were something quite different. The slow growth of Amman throughout the Mandate period had more in common with the growth of a young town than the creation of a modern capital. Amman's urban landscape was almost entirely devoid of monumental architecture. Instead, the inhabitants of Amman built on the few Ottoman urban structures left in place and focused on residential development to create a new Ammani urban fabric.

Limited Monumentality in Ammani Architecture

Despite 'Arar's claims to the contrary, Amman's development was largely a byproduct of its geography, not the evil machinations of Raghadan Palace. Today, Amman is a city of countless hills and steps, but Amman's earliest incarnation was little more than a village that hugged the banks of the Seil River. Although Amman's identity as the "City of Water" is now hidden below concrete and asphalt, Amman's formation and growth had everything to do with the river and springs that run through its core. The waters began at the Ras al-'Ain spring. Water from the spring, pumped to the various water towers in the city, supplied all of Amman with water during the Mandate period. The waters of the spring flowed into a stream that eventually became the Seil River. The Seil ran from West to East through Amman and eventually terminated in the Zarqa River.

The city's central river defined the boundaries of Amman during the early parts of the British Mandate. In the words of Abd al-Rahman Munif, "[t]he city of Amman began at al-Muhajereen Bridge in the west and almost ended at al-'Asbali Bridge in the

east, except for a few scattered houses further east.”⁶⁴³ The population of the city kept close to this central corridor during the early years of Amman. The river’s role was crucial for Amman, but its tendency to flood in the winter also threatened Amman’s inhabitants. “The journey through Amman from the river’s origin to its mouth was short, but the importance of a river [is] not always determined by its length. Rivers are like human beings – not all of the same nature or disposition. The river looked and behaved in a more or less similar way during three seasons: spring, summer and autumn. But in winter, it was a different matter.”⁶⁴⁴ There were particularly devastating floods in 1935, 1938, and 1943 when “the square stretching from al-Husseini Mosque, beyond the vegetable market, had turned into a lake.”⁶⁴⁵

Amman, despite its atypical topography, was not a “unique” or “abnormal” city for the Levant. The city shares many common characteristics with the neighboring capitals in the region. Like Cairo and Baghdad, Amman developed around its central river. What at first glance appears unique about Amman is that it developed in the Ras al-‘Ain Wadi (a valley surrounded by hills with a river cutting through it) and consequently has a very hilly topography. However, even this abnormal topography has urban Ottoman counterparts. The Ottoman provincial capital of Salt developed in the same manner with the *haras* (residential neighborhoods) on the hillside and the *suq* in the central valley.⁶⁴⁶ Similarly, in Beirut urban expansion had begun to climb the “steepest terrain, neglected in the first phase of urbanization” in the late Ottoman period.⁶⁴⁷ Amman’s hills are perhaps more pronounced and dominant in its urban fabric than in other cities, Mandate

⁶⁴³ Munif, *Story of a City*, 145-46.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., 147.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 160.

⁶⁴⁶ Erskine, *Transjordan*, 20.

⁶⁴⁷ Kassir, *Beirut*, 150.

Amman spanned seven hills, but this does not disqualify it from being a traditional “Middle Eastern city.” Amman’s development, akin to many other cities in region, coalesced around the availability of water, division of spaces between residential and commercial life, and the necessity of a central mosque.⁶⁴⁸

Although Amman can satisfy the arbitrary classifications of the “Middle Eastern city,” a simple division between residential and commercial areas does not summarize its characteristics. Furthermore, the trope of the “Islamic/Arab/Middle East city” has been thoroughly refuted as reductionist by a number of scholars including Janet Abu Lughod, Jens Hanssen, Marc Levine, and Stefan Weber amongst others. Instead of discussing Amman in sweeping stereotypes, it is more productive to focus on the urban fabric of the young capital. Amman is largely a modern city, but this does not negate its Ottoman heritage. Ottoman Amman did contain most of the architectural components of other late Ottoman settlements. Amman had three major focal points that delineated the space and were important to the residents of Amman. All three landmarks, the ‘Umari Mosque (replaced by the Hussein Mosque in 1924), the Roman theater, and the Amman municipality building, predated the start of the Transjordan Mandate. The ‘Umari Mosque and the Roman theater played crucial cultural, social, and religious roles in Amman long before the arrival of Abdullah and the British. These buildings remained central to day-to-day Ammani life during the Mandate period.

The Amman municipality building was one of the few buildings erected by the Ottoman authorities. Though there is no specific date available for its construction, it

⁶⁴⁸ It is unclear if the seven hills of Amman were an explicit attempt to reinforce Amman’s ancient heritage, akin to other seven hilled ancient cities such as Rome and Istanbul. The original seven hills of Amman were Jabal Amman, Jabal al-Weibdeh, Jabal al-Husseini, Jabal al-Jofa, Jabal al-Taj, al-Jabal al-Hashimi, and Jabal al-Nasir. Today Amman encompasses at least nineteen hills.

appears on an aerial map from 1918. The municipality added a second story to the building and a balcony during the 1920s.⁶⁴⁹ While there was no official governmental residence during the Ottoman Period, it was found in neighboring Salt, the municipality building essentially fulfilled the same role. The village of Amman also contained an Ottoman army barracks and communications complex. The British renovated both buildings for the use of the Mandatory government. The army barracks, which were attached to the train station, became the headquarters for the Arab Legion at the beginning of the Mandate.⁶⁵⁰ As well, Amman's first school government school, Dar al-Najah, was established behind the mosque in 1916. This school, also referred to as the "war school," taught classes in Turkish with the exception of religion, which was taught in Arabic.⁶⁵¹ All of these buildings and institutions mirrored the common characteristics indicative of a late Ottoman city but in a much smaller scale.

Amman's three monumental buildings each spoke to a different part of the Mandate regime. The Husseini Mosque represented the Islamic character of the state and the local populace. Raghadan Palace personified Hashemite legitimacy and the British Residence stood for the clear colonial oversight that existed in nearly all parts of the Mandate. The limited number of monumental buildings in Amman during the Mandate was not abnormal for Middle Eastern cities of the nineteenth century. Amman's urban development followed many of the same trajectories that other "traditional cities" had a century earlier. It included a central mosque, governmental residences, an army barracks, and even a small clock tower. The small clock tower, which barely reached one story,

⁶⁴⁹ Janset Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate of Transjordan, 1921-1946" (MA thesis, University of Jordan, 2003), 25.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁶⁵¹ Arsalan Ramadan Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures* (Amman: Municipality of Amman, 2002), 98.

was constructed in Feisal Square at some point during the Mandate period, but it hardly evoked a sense of grandeur.⁶⁵² From this perspective, Amman's urban layout was "traditional." The three monumental buildings constructed during the Mandate period (Husseini Mosque, the British Residence, and Raghadan Palace) superseded the three monumental buildings of late Ottoman Amman (the 'Umari Mosque, the Amman municipality building, and the Roman theater). The focal points of Mandate Amman were its royal palaces and the grand mosque. However, in colonial Amman there were two "palaces" representing the two poles of political power.⁶⁵³ (Appendix 1, 6-1 for procession showing clock tower in 1939)

Similar to other "traditional" cities, Amman's mosque was the center of the city (*medina*). Construction on the Husseini Mosque began in 1923.⁶⁵⁴ The mosque was built on the ruins of a Byzantine basilica and an old Umayyad era mosque (the original 'Umari mosque). Chief British Representative Philby was greatly angered by Abdullah's decision to tear down these old buildings. Philby, it seems, focused more on the protection of Western ideas of cultural heritage, than promoting the religious or political credentials of the Amir.⁶⁵⁵ Abdullah responded to Philby's rage by writing to High Commissioner Herbert Samuel. Abdullah argued that Philby's actions were an intrusion into the religious affairs of the Emirate. Historian Irene Maffi believes that "Abdullah voluntarily abandoned the idiom of cultural heritage and adopted the religious one, pretending not to

⁶⁵² It is unclear when the clock tower in Feisal Square was constructed. The short clock tower was no more than a single story tall and stood in the middle of Feisal Square.

⁶⁵³ Bernard Hourcade, "The Demography of Cities and the Expansion of Urban Space," in *The Urban Social History of the Middle East 1750-1950*, ed. Peter Sluglett (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 170-71.

⁶⁵⁴ Husseini Mosque is also referred to as the 'Umari Mosque.

⁶⁵⁵ Irene Maffi, "The Intricate Life of Cultural Heritage: Colonial and Postcolonial Processes of Patrimonialisation in Jordan," in *Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage in the Middle East: Positioning the Material past in Contemporary Societies*, eds. Rami Daher and Irene Maffi (London: IB Tauris, 2011), 71.

understand Philby's arguments. Abdullah's refusal to consider the Basilica Affair to be a matter of cultural heritage was also the expression of his resistance to a practice typical of the colonial power."⁶⁵⁶

Abdullah's choice to replace the Umayyad Mosque with a new Hashemite Mosque represented the new religious focus of the Emirate. The Amir derived a lot of his authority and legitimacy from his religious status as a Sharif. His decision to destroy the preexisting mosque can simultaneously be understood as providing the city with a new, renovated, and enlarged religious space, while also erasing the damaged Islamic past of Amman. A run down mosque was not going to be the religious beacon that Abdullah used to appeal to his subjects. In spite of the cultural and political angst caused by its construction, the Hussein Mosque quickly became the focal point of Amman. The utilization of the preexisting basilica/mosque location for the new Hussein Mosque, in addition to being a political and cultural decision, was also a geographic choice. The old mosque sat at the epicenter of downtown Amman in Feisal Square. The centrality and inherent significance of this location was undeniable. Hussein Mosque became the nexus for all of Mandate era Amman because of this centrality. The entire city radiated out from its new mosque.

The mosque itself was of simple construction, in keeping with the modest means of the Mandate government. It was composed of a prayer hall forming a simple rectangular block, with a courtyard in front of it, which was surrounded by arcades on three sides.⁶⁵⁷ Originally, the mosque had a single minaret, consistent with Ottoman tradition. However, a second minaret was added after the first one was damaged in the

⁶⁵⁶ Maffi, "The Intricate Life of Cultural Heritage," 73.

⁶⁵⁷ Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period," 73.

1927 earthquake. The Hussein Mosque originally had a drinking fountain placed in front of it as well. The Ottomans likely built this fountain, the *Hamidiyye Sabeel*, since it already existed in 1924 when Beatrice Erskine mentioned it in her travel memoir *Transjordan*.⁶⁵⁸ By the 1930s, the government removed the fountain. The fountain's removal was in line with the British practice to remove architectural markers of the Ottoman period.⁶⁵⁹ (Appendix 1, figure 6-2 and 6-3, image of the construction of Hussein Mosque in 1925 and image of the Ottoman fountains in front of Hussein Mosque)

Overall, the Hussein Mosque fulfilled two roles central to the function of the Anglo-Hashemite government. First, the new mosque reinforced the religious appeal of the Sharifian Amir. Abdullah constantly presented himself as a devout Muslim and made a show of his weekly processions to the mosque for Friday prayer.⁶⁶⁰ These weekly processions from Raghadan Palace to Hussein Mosque for Friday prayers highlighted the dual poles of Hashemite authority: their Sharifian lineage and their political might.⁶⁶¹ Secondly, the mosque generated a new sense of cultural, religious, and social gravity for downtown Amman. The mosque became the clear meeting place and focal point of the city. Orientating the city around its new Hashemite mosque subtly reinforced the necessity of the Hashemite monarchy to orient and ground the state.

⁶⁵⁸ The fountain's name is derived from Sultan Abdul Hamid II. It is unclear if the fountain was given this name because the fountain was built during his rule, or, if the name Hamidiyye was honoring the refounding of Amman in 1878, which happened during his rule.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., 25. A famous example of the British practice of erasing the Ottoman architectural past was the removal of the clock tower in old Jerusalem.

⁶⁶⁰ Hussein Mosque personified the official version of Islam in Transjordan. Populist Islamic movements were not relevant during the Mandate. Although the Muslim Brotherhood entered Transjordan in 1942, it did not become a significant organization until after independence in the 1950s.

⁶⁶¹ Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 74.

The second symbol of Hashemite authority in Amman was the royal palace. Amir Abdullah's palace, Raghadan Palace, was built between 1924 and 1927 in the outskirts of Amman. The palace was built on a hilltop, near the train station, so that it could overlook the entire city. Its lofty position was indicative of the Amir's power and oversight over all of Amman, and by extension, all of Transjordan. The dual poles of Hashemite might further reinforced the role of the Amir. Abdullah's religious clout gave his authority bearing, emanating from the core of Amman, while his political mantle allowed him to oversee all of Amman, from his elevated perch. The palace was built by Sa'ad al-Din Shatila (al-Dimashqi), who had also overseen part of the Hijaz railways construction between Kiswe and Ma'an. It is unclear who designed the palace.

Raghadan Palace, which consisted of a single building, was modest and constructed of sandstone. Over time, other buildings were added to turn it into a royal complex. The original building had a tripartite construction, but was too grand and ornate to truly fall within the three-bay home classification.⁶⁶² The main entrance had a large "imperial" staircase leading entrants directly to the throne room on the second floor. On the first floor, there was a library, small reception parlor, and an official dining room. On the second floor, there was the large throne room, where Abdullah held his weekly *salami* (men's reception) on Friday mornings. The Amir used this space to meet with his Cabinet.⁶⁶³ The palace as a whole kept to the triple-bay style while including Western elements, such as the imperial staircase. Its hybrid style was an apt reflection of the Amir's position within the Mandate. He was a Sharifian Amir, who had been tempered

⁶⁶² Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period," 58-61.

⁶⁶³ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 94-95.

by Western experience, and beholden to a colonial state apparatus. (Appendix 1, figure 6-4, photo of Raghadan Palace in 1940)

The palace was flanked by the seat of colonial power during the Mandate, the Chief British Representative's Residence. The British Residence in Amman stands out from other Mandatory architecture because it was the only building planned by the colonial apparatus of the state. The placement of the British Residence was key. This new building was built next to Raghadan Palace, on the road to the *mahatta* (train station). This placement, in the words of historian Eugene Rogan gave the "notion of power behind the power" which was the "spatial parallel to the prince's relation to the British."⁶⁶⁴ It is clear that the site of the new Residence was not accidental. This was architectural colonial dominance. This paternalistic approach both guarded the Mandate and Amman by extension, while reserving the authority to intervene into local affairs when necessary. This dichotomy between paternalism, interventionism, and a respect of the regions natural environment was evident in the construction of the British Residence. The British Residence was the colonial building par excellence in Amman.

The chief architect of the Palestine Department of Public Works, Austen St Barbe Harrison, designed the British Residence. Prior to the construction of the purpose built British Residence in 1926, the Chief British Representative had been using a leased building in *al-balad*. Both Philby and Cox complained of the unsanitary conditions of the building, saying it was "infested with vermin." Consideration of building a new residence had begun as early as 1922, but no progress occurred until the arrival of High Commissioner Lord Plumer in 1925. The actual construction of the new residence began

⁶⁶⁴ Rogan, "The Making of a Capital: Amman, 1918-1928," 103.

in 1926.⁶⁶⁵ Perhaps it is telling that both the Amir's palace, and the British Residence, were constructed simultaneously. Their construction was the architectural personification of the constant jockeying between the opposing poles of the Transjordanian government. The new building was composed of three parts: a forecourt accessed through a wide portal and surrounded by service rooms, the living quarters of the British Resident, which included a drawing room, study, dining room, and a salon on the ground floor with bedrooms on the upper floor, and finally a walled in garden.⁶⁶⁶ (Appendix 1, figure 6-5 architectural plans of the British Residence)

A respect for local urban environment and architectural styles was common throughout the British Empire in the interwar period. The colonial administration of New Delhi and Haifa generally only focused on infrastructural improvement and the construction of necessary administrative buildings. The only difference between the British approach in New Delhi and Amman was the grand scale the British adopted in India.⁶⁶⁷ Harrison believed both in the idealist theories of the Beaux Arts Movement as well as a respect for the local environment. He thought that a building must fit its local surroundings and make use of local materials.⁶⁶⁸ Harrison's plan developed along two main axes, with every element of the design having a balanced symmetrical counterpart.⁶⁶⁹ This approach was in keeping with British colonial architecture in New Delhi that rejected modernism in favor of "consider[ing] the interests of 'civilization' at large,

⁶⁶⁵ BNA, CO 733/138/9, HC Plumer to SoS L.S. Amery, 4/3/1927.

⁶⁶⁶ Ron Fuchs and Gilbert Herbert, "Representing Mandatory Palestine: Austen St. Barbe Harrison and the Representational Buildings of the British Mandate in Palestine, 1922-1937," *Architectural History* 43 (2000): 289.

⁶⁶⁷ Legg, "Governmentality, Congestion, and Calculation in Colonial Delhi," 709-17.

⁶⁶⁸ Fuchs and Herbert, "Representing Mandatory Palestine," 288.

⁶⁶⁹ Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate period," 65.

which were not necessarily identical to those of the country's inhabitants."⁶⁷⁰ According to Fuchs and Gilbert, the Residence paid homage to the Islamic model and was a "central residential block [which] bears striking resemblance to the Çinili Kiosk, the 15th Century Ottoman imperial pavilion at the Topkapisaray, Istanbul." In addition to being in line with Ottoman precedent, the Residence also had a plain white washed exterior, which was in keeping with both Palestinian village homes and Circassian homes common in Mandate era Amman.⁶⁷¹ This combination of symmetry and local architectural conventions was a convenient shorthand for the British approach to their rule in Transjordan.

The British controlled much of Transjordan's financial minutiae, but left the actual fulfillment of their meticulous plans to the local inhabitants of Transjordan. It is important to note that although the British Residence was outside of the city center, the Resident's offices remained in *al-balad*, despite the frequent protests that the building was in a flood plain and unsuitable.⁶⁷² Similar to the two manifestations of Hashemite authority, the mosque and the palace, the office of the British Resident also had two architectural symbols in Amman. The British Residence, which overlooked all of Amman, denoted a clear paternalistic approach of total oversight. This all-encompassing oversight was balanced by the actual humble offices of the British Resident in *al-balad*. The British Residence may have been perched on a hill outside of the city proper, but the actual day-to-day function of the British Resident took place in the heart of the city.

(Appendix 1, figure 6-6 completed British Residence 1928)

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid., 285.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid, 291.

⁶⁷² BNA, CO 831/34/5, acting HC J. Halhorn Hall to SoS Malcolm MacDonald, 22/6/1935.

Although there were only three monumental buildings built during the British Mandate period, they each played a critical role to the function of the city and the state. Both Raghadan Palace and the British Residence were critical in the day-to-day function of the government housed in Amman. However, only a small elite cadre of Transjordan's population ever set foot in either building. Both buildings were far outside the city center, and were thus disconnected from the daily life of the city. Although Amman's monumental architecture played an important role in the development of the capital, it only had a minimal impact on Amman's urban fabric. The expansion of Amman and the creation of a discrete Ammani urban landscape were extensions of Amman's residential architecture. It is in Amman's residential architecture where the diverse heritage of Amman was most evident.

The Residential Architecture of Amman

Amman's urban fabric developed without government oversight throughout the Mandate period. The lack of an urban plan scheme allowed the city's expansion to be gradual. This growth did not have to conform to a new colonial architectural style. Ironically, the government had worked to transform Amman into a Hashemite Versailles but they did so without focusing any of their energy on the actual space of Amman. Instead, Amman became an unruly contested urban space. Amman's architecture evolved as a natural outgrowth of its own hybridized Ottoman past. Although the Ottomans built many of Amman's earliest buildings, it is hard to pin down a discrete list of Ottoman urban characteristics or attributes to analyze Amman's architecture. This difficulty is a result of the fluid approach that the Ottomans took towards architectural

development. The Ottoman Empire ruled over the Middle East for over four hundred years. Over this long period, architectural styles changed to suit the needs of the times. According to the architect Rami Daher, “The Ottoman architectural and urban heritage in the Middle East is characterized by a harmonious unity, while managing to accommodate regional diversity. Ottoman architectural works vary greatly, in both quality and quantity, between the various provinces, and can be seen as a testimony to the Ottomans’ attention to and incorporation of contextual spatial and historic specificities.”⁶⁷³ Despite their common Ottoman origin, these buildings do not correspond to a universal Ottoman architectural style or category. Ottoman buildings were similar in their functionality, not necessarily their appearance.

Taking into account the limitations of an Ottoman category, it is more productive to discuss the four distinct residential building styles found in Mandate era Amman, and highlights the various Ottoman influences found within each style. There was very little non-residential construction in Amman during the Mandate. Two notable exceptions were the Church Missionary Society School for girls and the Bishop’s School, both located in the neighborhood of Jabal Amman.⁶⁷⁴ The vast majority of the city’s growth during the Mandate period was private residential construction. The four dominant residential architectural styles of the period were the Circassian house, the Arab rural or village house, the Bilad al-Sham townhouse, and the three-bay or central hall house. The first two building styles, the Circassian house and the Arab rural house, both appeared in Amman during the Ottoman period and the earliest days of the Mandate. The latter two

⁶⁷³ Daher and Maffi, *Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage*, 12-13.

⁶⁷⁴ For more on these schools refer to the education section at the end of chapter 2.

styles, the Bilad al-Sham townhouse and the three-bay house, only started to appear in Amman in the late 1920s.

The earliest dwellings used in Amman were the caves and ruins found amongst the Roman theatre. This recycling of ancient materials by the early Circassian population greatly upset British Resident Philby. “All the ancient buildings now standing are occupied by modern houses, and every day it seems some parts of the old walls are ... broken up and carried away.”⁶⁷⁵ The Circassian population of Amman quickly moved on to a housing style that was distinct in its architectural features and its building materials. In Amman, many of these early homes used the stones taken from the surrounding archaeological remains. The Circassians used these stones to build homes with a simple façade and a flat roof. When old stones became scarce, the Circassians moved on to a second building model made of mud brick. These homes incorporated wooden porches and used wooden posts to hold up the roofs. The porch was central to these homes because the rooms did not connect to one another; instead, they all opened onto the porch.⁶⁷⁶

The second iteration of the Circassian home was remarkable for its woodwork. These homes employed a post and lintel construction made of huge timbers. This contrasted strongly with the stonework that comprised all other houses found in Amman. Most Circassian homes were oriented to the North, limiting the amount of sunlight entering the homes.⁶⁷⁷ They were constructed with mud bricks tempered with straw and a roof of cane arranged on oak beams. These houses were constantly white washed to

⁶⁷⁵ MECA, Philby Diary, “Amman,” July 24, 1922.

⁶⁷⁶ Seteney Shami, “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and Self-Representations of the Circassians in Jordan,” *Iran and the Caucasus* 13 (2009): 150-152.

⁶⁷⁷ Shawash, “Architecture in Amman during the Emirate of Transjordan,” 38-39.

keep them clean.⁶⁷⁸ Although the Circassian homes utilized local materials, little evidence of Ottoman influence was visible in these homes. The Circassian house style existed largely unchanged, regardless of where the Circassians settled throughout Bilad al-Sham. This housing style developed in the Caucasus and then was simply deployed in a new locale. A few of these homes exist in Amman today, but their construction fell off markedly as Amman ceased to be a Circassian village, and became an Arab Muslim city in the early years of the Mandate. (Appendix 1, Figure 6-7 is an image of second type of Circassian style home in Jabal al-Qal'a (citadel hill) in Amman, figure 6-8 photo of Jabal al-Qal'a in 1920s showing numerous Circassian homes)

The majority of the Circassian homes were clustered in neighborhoods that corresponded to the different waves of Circassian immigration. The four Circassian quarters in Amman were the Shapsug, the Abzakh, the Kabartey, and the Muhacirin.⁶⁷⁹ Each distinct derived its name from a different dialect group except the Muhacirin, which were a later immigrant group from 1906-1907, belonging to the Kabartey dialect group. It is from this Circassian group that the Muhajirin Bridge derived its name. The Circassians during this period largely formed a middle-class urban community, many holding government positions.⁶⁸⁰ The most prominent member of the Circassian community was Sa'id al-Mufti, who was a member of the First Legislative Council, a Mayor of Amman, and became Prime Minister four times during the 1950s. The al-Mufti family home was frequently used for government functions and to house foreign dignitaries visiting Amman. (Appendix 1, figure 6-9 photo of al-Mufti home)

⁶⁷⁸ Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 91.

⁶⁷⁹ Muhacirin is the Turkish spelling of the Arab word Muhajirin, meaning migrants.

⁶⁸⁰ Shami, "Historical Processes of Identity Formation," 152-53.

Similar to the Circassian house, the Arab rural house or Arab village house predated the Mandate period. These homes consisted of an all-purpose single rectangular room. This single room housed all daily activities, sleeping quarters for the extended family, and for the livestock. The space was divided into a lower spoiled space (*qa' al-bayt* or simply *qa'*) near the entrance and an elevated sleeping and living space (*mastaba*).⁶⁸¹ These homes belonged to the Arab peasants (*fellah*) and were usually located close to grazing pastures for their livestock. The Arab rural home appeared as early as the seventeenth century in Palestine. There was a wide variety of Arab rural homes in Palestine. Each sub-type incorporated varying degrees of elaboration. In Transjordan, these homes tended to be much simpler, with the most common version consisting of a repeated parallel arch structure inside the home. The exterior of these homes were wooden beams faced with mud, and hay, and eventually cement. These outer layers were patched and updated annually.⁶⁸²

These homes existed on the outskirts of the Amman, primarily near the Amman train station (*mahatta*). This old style of home was widespread in the Ottoman Levant, but relatively short lived in Amman. Newer hybridized architectural styles replaced the Arab rural house in Amman by the mid-1930s. Both the Arab rural home, and the Circassian home, were symptomatic of a long-lived architectural styles found in the Levant catering to extended family units.⁶⁸³ The newer architectural styles found in the Mandate era mark a discrete break with these earlier styles in that they were meant for

⁶⁸¹ Ron Fuchs, "The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic 'Primitive Hut'" *Muqarnas* 15 (1998): 158.

⁶⁸² Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate of Transjordan," 43-45.

⁶⁸³ Mohamed Rafieh, ed., *House's of Old Amman: Work's of Architect Sharif Fawaz al-Muhanna* (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality, 2007), 273.

nuclear family units. This subtle shift denoted a more modern building ethos.⁶⁸⁴ This style of home was indicative of the transition of Amman from a small village to a city. The Arab rural home was part of a pre-modern Amman that slowly faded away as Amman developed into the modern capital of Transjordan. (Appendix 1, figure 6-10 Arab rural home on outskirts of Amman)

The Bilad al-Sham townhouse and the three-bay house did not begin to appear in Amman until after the start of the Mandate. All the religious and ethnic segments of Amman's population used these homes. Both house styles relied on stone and concrete construction. The municipality endorsed this style of construction after the 1927 earthquake because it was safer than the mud-brick construction of Circassian and Arab rural homes.⁶⁸⁵ Although both types of homes were made of the same materials, the function of the two building styles was quite different. The Bilad al-Sham traditional townhouse was mainly a commercial building, and as a result, it was geographically constrained to market areas throughout the region. This style of building had existed throughout Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, in cities like Haifa and Nablus for centuries.⁶⁸⁶

Early versions of these homes contained a central courtyard, with poorly lit and ventilated apartments surrounding it. These apartments on the ground floor were used as stores and shops instead of living quarters because of these uncomfortable conditions. The earlier iterations with large courtyards had largely disappeared by the late nineteenth century, in favor of a more condensed design. Over time, these homes adapted to a linear

⁶⁸⁴ The division between the qa and mastaba can be seen today in simple homes in Amman with a separation of dirty work being done away from the sleeping quarters. For more examples of remnants of the Arab rural house in modern Amman, see Shawash, "Architecture during the Emirate of Transjordan," 148.

⁶⁸⁵ Rami Daher, "Prelude: Understanding Cultural Change and Urban Transformations: Qualifying Amman: The City of Many Hats," in *Cities, Urban Practices, and Nation Building in Jordan* (Beirut: IFPO Press, 2011), 75.

⁶⁸⁶ Dr. Rami Daher (architect), interview by Harrison Guthorn, Amman, Jordan, 12/5/2013.

pattern following the market street. This compressed pattern increased the economic utility of the building at the cost of its residential inhabitants.⁶⁸⁷ Bilad al-Sham townhouses, which began to appear in Amman during the 1920s, were concentrated in and around the suqs of *al-balad*. These homes generally had shops and other businesses on the ground floor, with residences on the second and sometimes third floors. The various floors of these buildings frequently rented out to different individuals or families.⁶⁸⁸

Two extant examples of this style of home were built in 1937, and designed by Municipal Engineer Sharif Fawaz al-Muhanna. These homes, located on King Feisal Street, were owned originally by Hamid Kilmat and Majid Muhammad respectively. The bottom floor of the Hamid Kilmat home, located near the Arab Bank building, operated as the “Brazil Café” in 1946. The Majid Muhammad building had a commercial Indian shop on its ground floor.⁶⁸⁹ Many other iterations of the Bilad al-Sham townhouse survive today along King Feisal Street, Salt Street, King Hussein Street, Talal Street, and Wadi Seer Street. The Bilad al-Sham townhouse is an excellent example of the malleable nature of Ottoman architecture. Although the style emerged during the Ottoman period throughout the Levant, it was not a static design. It changed over time becoming more compact, with the courtyard and garden losing relevance and size in its Ammani manifestations.⁶⁹⁰ The Ammani version of the Bilad al-Sham townhouse prioritized economic utility for the building’s owner over residential comforts for the individuals

⁶⁸⁷ Shawash, “Architecture in Amman during the Emirate of Transjordan,” 29.

⁶⁸⁸ Rafieh, *House’s of Old Amman*, 47.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 56-57 and 60-61. Like most commercial shops, the shops themselves were rented spaces from the individual who owned the entire building.

⁶⁹⁰ Daher interview, December 2013.

who rented out the other apartments. (Appendix 1, figure 6-11 photo of Bilad al-Sham townhouse owned by Hamid Kilmat on King Feisal Street in *al-balad*.)

Perhaps the most widely studied type of home found in Mandate era Amman is the three-bay house, also referred to as the central hall house.⁶⁹¹ These homes were a regional subgroup that developed in the late Ottoman period. Three-bay homes featured “a closed, cubic body, with rows of windows oriented towards the street [and a] rectangular covered central hall flanked by several rooms.”⁶⁹² These homes developed throughout the Levant, in cities such as Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. According to historian Anne Mollenhauer, these homes were a synthesis of the local *liwan*-plan of Bilad al-Sham homes, houses with a central open *iwān* hall flanked by rooms, and the Anatolian *sofa*-plan, urban houses with a covered inner hall, known as a *sofa*. If the three-bay house is viewed as a synthesis of these styles, it can be understood as an attempt by the local population to acknowledge their part in the Ottoman Empire, while still preserving a local identity.

What was most remarkable about the appearance of the three-bay house throughout Greater Syria was how the homes interacted with the areas around them. Traditional courtyard homes used high plain facades to hide the homes from the public. The home was meant to be a private space. Three-bay homes, on the other hand, adopted a more modern and open orientation with numerous outward facing windows. These

⁶⁹¹ The literature uses these two terms interchangeably to describe the same style of home. For the sake of clarity, I will only refer to them as three-bay homes because the central hall home can be confused with older building types.

⁶⁹² Anne Mollenhauer, “The Central Hall House; Regional Commonalities and Local Specificities: A Comparison between Beirut and al-Salt,” in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (Wurzberg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 276-77.

homes also frequently had balconies in front of the triple arched windows.⁶⁹³ This shift from an introverted, to an extroverted character, was indicative of a societal change towards the built environment and the community at large. “In fact, the emergence of these houses is a manifestation of the process of modernization that began to affect the Arab World during this period. The traditional inward-looking house was turned inside out such that it opened out to its surroundings, rather than presenting them with blank facades. Its primary facades and openings no longer faced an interior courtyard, but instead faced the outside world.”⁶⁹⁴ The new elite of the late Ottoman Empire, the *efendi* class, used these homes as a means to more publicly display their wealth and status.⁶⁹⁵

In Amman, government officials, Legislative Council representatives, and merchants became the local notables, similar to the late Ottoman *efendi*. The new merchant class in particular expanded rapidly towards the end of the Mandate period and was responsible for many of the three-bay homes in Amman. Although there had been merchants in Amman since its resettlement in 1878, the merchant class only began to grow in Amman during the Mandate period. The majority of these merchants originally came from neighboring Palestine and Syria. As Amman grew so did its merchant population. The influx of cash into Amman through grant-in-aid and other imperial projects created new markets for Amman’s merchants.⁶⁹⁶ However, it was the commercial activity associated with World War II that changed the position of Amman’s merchant class. The creation of the Middle East Supply Center (MESCC) in 1941, and its

⁶⁹³ Mollenhauer, “The Central Hall House,” 294-96.

⁶⁹⁴ al-Asad, *Old Houses of Jordan*, 20.

⁶⁹⁵ Shawash, “Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period,” 113.

⁶⁹⁶ Amawi, “State and Class in Transjordan, 399-400. The Amman chamber of commerce was founded in 1923.

quota system, was highly beneficial for Transjordan merchants.⁶⁹⁷ This massive accumulation of capital solidified a new merchant-elite class centered in Amman.⁶⁹⁸

Much of this surplus capital funneled into new three-bay home construction.

The earliest appearances of three-bay houses in Amman were closer to the iwan-style homes of Bilad al-Sham. Two early examples of these homes are the Qa'war house built in the 1920s in Jabal al-Weibdeh, and the Amir Shakir house built in Jabal Amman in 1928.⁶⁹⁹ Both of these homes contain a central iwan that had not yet been fully made into an interior space. These homes are a deviation from the older iwan-style because they incorporate a large number of windows, verandas, and balconies that allow the home to both provide privacy, and incorporate views from the surrounding areas into the home.⁷⁰⁰ (Appendix 1, figure 6-12 diagram and photograph of the Qawar home in Jabal al-Weibdeh)

Lebanese influenced triple-arched versions of the three-bay home also appeared in Amman. The most famous version of this home in Amman belonged to the Chief Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda. He constructed his home in Jabal Amman in 1927 overlooking the ancient citadel of Amman (Jabal al-Qala'). The house also became the home of another Chief Minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (no relation), and later the

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., 418-20 and 440. In 1936 there were only nine non-industrial commercial companies registered with the Amman Chamber of Commerce. This figure spiked significantly with over 317 commercial and service companies registered with the Chamber of Commerce by the late 1940s. The quota system introduced as part of the MESC favored Transjordan merchants because Transjordan had spare supplies where there were shortages elsewhere in the region. This surplus made Transjordan the home of highly profitable commodity smuggling during the war. In addition, Transjordan's merchants benefited from a 434% increase in exports during the war.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., 510-12.

⁶⁹⁹ Amir Shakir, also referred to as Sharif Shakir, was Abdullah's cousin and the head of the Tribal Control Board from its inception in 1924, until his death in 1934.

⁷⁰⁰ Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period," 117-20.

headquarters of a local sports club, al-Jazirah Club.⁷⁰¹ Other government officials also rented three-bay style homes throughout Jabal Amman. For example, Sir Alec Kirkbride rented the “Bani Hamidah house” when he was the assistant British Resident.⁷⁰² In fact, all of the British Resident’s staff rented in Jabal Amman after the completion of the new British Residence.⁷⁰³ (Appendix 1, figure 6-13 diagrams of the Abu al-Huda house in Jabal Amman)

More common than the Lebanese triple-arch model was the Palestinian triple-bay style. This style incorporated traditional techniques such as vaults, thick walls, and biforic windows. It is possible that the Palestinian triple-bay home was a response to the British Mandate itself because these homes only appeared in Amman after the start of the Mandate. The Palestinian triple-bay home were the latest iteration of the triple-bay home in Amman and only began to appear in Amman in the 1930s. These homes incorporated simpler British interpretations Greco-Roman classical motifs evident “in the abstracted ornament and the protruding portico.” This style of triple-bay was far more common than the Lebanese variant. It was easier to construct, while still exuding the prestige of a triple-bay home. An example of this style is the Sabbagh home built in 1935 in Jabal Amman. The Sabbagh home was part of the old British Embassy complex, along with the embassy building itself.⁷⁰⁴ Another example of this style is the old building of the Bishop’s School also found in Jabal Amman.⁷⁰⁵ (Appendix 1, figure 6-14 diagram of Sabbagh home)

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., 123.

⁷⁰² Al-Asad, *Old houses of Jordan*, 36.

⁷⁰³ BNA, CO 831/11/7, Revenue and Expenditure 1929-1930 and CO 831/30/15 and CO 831/39/5, British Resident and Staff Estimates, 1934. British officials never owned land in Jabal Amman, they only rented.

⁷⁰⁴ Shawash, “Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period,” 127-30.

⁷⁰⁵ The Bishop’s School opened across from its sister school, the CMS School for Girls, in 1936.

Many of the three-bay style homes in Amman were concentrated in one neighborhood, Jabal Amman. The new neighborhood of Jabal Amman became Amman's first elite neighborhood, rising out of the destruction of the 1927 earthquake. After the 1927 earthquake, the government and the municipality incentivized government employees to move to Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh. Employees were tempted with a three-month salary advance if they would build their homes outside of the crowded city center.⁷⁰⁶ The earthquake had hardly damaged the homes on the hills, and thinning the urban center was thought to be in the best interest of the health of the city. New development in Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh had a number of advantages. However, Jabal al-Weibdeh's development did not pick up speed until after independence in 1946.⁷⁰⁷ These two hills were not as steep as the other hills surrounding the city center. The ease of climb of Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh made construction easier and not as expensive. The distance from *al-balad* provided better security. Until the end of the 1920s, there was still fear of Wahabi raids as far north as Amman. Jabal Amman delineated the outskirts of the city. The countryside began at the First circle and the reservoir of Jabal Amman, and the neighborhood essentially operated as its own enclave.⁷⁰⁸ Perhaps most importantly, the completion of new water reservoir towers in both areas made true development possible. This model of development mirrored similarly hilly Haifa.⁷⁰⁹ Previously, water had to be carried up to Jabal Amman on pack

⁷⁰⁶ Nabil Abu Dayyeh, "Prospects for Historic Neighborhoods in atypical Islamic Cities: The View from Amman, Jordan," *Habitat International* 30 (2006): 52.

⁷⁰⁷ Abu Dayyeh, "Prospects for Historic Neighborhoods in atypical Islamic Cities," 52-57. One important exception was the house in Jabal al-Weibdeh rented by Colonel Frederick Peake while he served as the head of the Arab Army. This building later turned into the Darat al-Fanun cultural center and was discussed in detail in the introduction.

⁷⁰⁸ Munif, *Story of a City*, 225-26.

⁷⁰⁹ Seikaly, *Haifa*, 52-67.

animals.⁷¹⁰ Understanding the possible advantages, and possessing the resources to fund new construction, wealthy merchants, landowners, and government employees flocked to Jabal Amman. Soon Jabal Amman became a bastion for the elite inhabitants of the city instead of the traditional downtown corridor.

Beyond the development of favorable infrastructure, Jabal Amman provided the rising elites in Amman the opportunity to separate themselves from the rest of the city. Prior to the development of Jabal Amman as a new area, the city had been a collection of ethnic and religious enclaves side by side in the city's central corridor. Jabal Amman developed in a markedly different manner. This new neighborhood from the start was a mixed community of local Muslims and Christians, as well as Circassians, Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. The only barrier to entry into Jabal Amman was resources. This division of the city's population happened naturally; the new elites of Amman moved out of the city center and created a discrete more modern "city" alongside the old center (*medina*). Late Ottoman Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv/Jaffa all became dual cities. These bastions of modernity and Western architectural styles stood out from their more traditional urban counterparts. The evolution of a "dual city" links Amman to all other colonial urban centers during the interwar period.⁷¹¹ Jabal Amman became the home of the new elite of Amman and its small European population (mainly British officials of the Mandate). However, this colonial city was not a byproduct of colonial planning like the Heliopolis or Zamalek in Cairo or Place de l'Etoile in Beirut. Akin to the rest of Amman's urban development, the dual city in Amman emerged without government intervention. No explicit urban plan dictated the formation of a new modern

⁷¹⁰ Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 57.

⁷¹¹ Hourcade, "The Demography of Cities and the Expansion of Urban Space," 155-56; Levine, *Overthrowing Geography*, 212-14.

neighborhood apart from the traditional city center, but it emerged along these lines nonetheless.⁷¹² However, the competing urban spaces that existed in Amman were not the result of a binary division of the city. Although Amman became divided between a more and less affluent population, these groups were hardly homogeneous. Amman's elite class by the end of the Mandate was a combination of tribal sheikhs, urban notables, landowners, merchants, and civil servants. These varied actors may have resided in a single space but their goals and aspirations were quite different. (Appendix 1, figure 6-15 1930s photograph of Jabal Amman)

The demographic and economic division of Amman that began with Jabal Amman continues until today. Today, *al-balad* signifies the demarcation of east and west Amman. Jabal Amman has become part of "Westernized" and more affluent western Amman while the older Circassian neighborhoods, Citadel Hill (Jabal al-Qal'a), and other new neighborhoods have remained the poorer more "traditional" segments of modern Amman. Despite these economic divisions, the architecture of Amman from the Mandate period still complied with a basic Ammani style. Ammani style homes, regardless of their specific category, use "roughly-textured stone blocks (locally known as *tubzeh* blocks) [that] provided the major exterior surface material for the houses."⁷¹³ These homes have minimal detailing and ornamentation. In general, these homes were meant to serve the needs of a nuclear family. They are humble buildings with minimal monumentality, but possess elegant lines according to architect Rami Daher.⁷¹⁴ Such

⁷¹² Hourcade, "The Demography of Cities and the Expansion of Urban Space," 175-80.

⁷¹³ al-Asad, *Old Houses of Jordan*, 18.

⁷¹⁴ Daher Interview, December 2013.

minimalist buildings are in keeping with the feel of Mandate era Amman and represent the diverse heritage of the city.⁷¹⁵

Amman's hybridized heritage coalesced in the city's downtown corridor. Regardless of socio-economic status, everyone in Amman congregated in *al-balad*. The focal point of *al-balad*, the single space in the city utilized by every Ammani, was Feisal Square. Although Anglo-Hashemite authority was magnificently personified on the outskirts of the city, it was how both the British and the Amir represented themselves in the city's core that had a far larger socio-cultural impact on the city's populace.

al-Balad, Feisal Square, and the Heart of Amman

The emergence of *al-balad* as the center of Amman was not a development of the Mandate period. Amman was not the only place to describe its downtown corridor as *al-balad*. This popular term was used in both interwar Beirut and Cairo as a response to the redistricting of these cities. *Al-Balad* denoted where the true city was located, opposed to new neighborhoods and districts.⁷¹⁶ In the case of Amman, this region in the valley of Wadi Ras al-'Ain was the first area inhabited after the re-establishment of Amman in 1878. The topography of the area naturally funnels to this point of convergence in between the surrounding hills. Amman is famous for its countless stairs leading down from the hills (*jabal*) into downtown. These steps ran for hundreds of meters scaling the hillsides of the city. The stairs became some of the earliest communal urban spaces in

⁷¹⁵ For a matrix illustrating the transformation of residential models in Amman please see appendix 2 (Shawash, "Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period," 198).

⁷¹⁶ Kassir, *Beirut*, 288.

Amman as they funneled its population to its urban core, *al-balad*.⁷¹⁷ As the city grew, the centrality of *al-balad* increased. Although Amman began to divide between a prosperous western half and a more impoverished eastern half, *al-balad* remained the common denominator for all the inhabitants of the city.

This shared importance was because most of the key economic and social services of Amman were located in *al-balad*. Various banks, schools, hospitals, government buildings, and hotels all bordered this central downtown corridor of Amman during the Mandate period. Newer trappings of the modern world also found their way to *al-balad*. The only gas pump in Amman was located in the middle of King Feisal Street, opposite the Ottoman Bank.⁷¹⁸ The preeminent hotel of Amman, the Philadelphia Hotel, was located opposite of the Roman theater. Numerous suqs, shops, and stalls lined the streets of downtown Amman including suq al-Bukharieh, suq al-Bsharat, the halal livestock market, and later in the period, suq Mango and suq al-sukkar (sugar market)⁷¹⁹ The only bakery in Amman where one could buy ready-made bread was located in the middle of suq al-Bukharieh.⁷²⁰ In the center of town, morning and night, a crowd was always assembled. According to Beatrice Erskine, “Amman seemed like the hub of the universe after a plunge into the country. The streets were particularly animated in the Afternoon. Men were buying and selling or sitting and gossiping at their doors; cars were worming their way through the crowd... And everyone talked at once.”⁷²¹ This nexus of activity and daily life coalesced around the heart of downtown Amman, Feisal Square.

⁷¹⁷ Taleb Rifa'i, “Amman City Centre: Typologies of Architecture and Urban Space,” in *Amman: The City and its Society*, ed. Jean Hannoyer and Seteney Shami (Beirut: CERMOC, 1996), 134.

⁷¹⁸ Munif, *Story of a City*, 131.

⁷¹⁹ Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 49, 64, and 152.

⁷²⁰ Munif, *Story of a City*, 84.

⁷²¹ Erskine, *Transjordan*, 124.

While the anchor points of *al-balad* - the Roman theater, the Umari Mosque and the Amman municipality building - existed before the start of the Mandate, they took on additional meaning and cultural resonance during the Mandate period. The Anglo-Hashemite government utilized each of them to reinforce its validity and authority. This area made a natural backdrop, and ideal stage, for demonstrations, celebrations, and ceremonial displays.⁷²² The true center of the city, known as “Feisal Square” or “Feisal Plaza,” was the strip of King Feisal Street between the Hussein Mosque and the “island” formed by Radah and Sa’adah Streets, where the municipality building was located.⁷²³ Unlike neighboring Beirut and Damascus, the centrality of Feisal Square was not a result of urban planning. Beirut’s Place Hamidiyyeh and later Place de l’Etoile, or Damascus’ Martyr Square, were constructed as government centers, and only over time became social and commercial hubs.

Feisal Square followed the opposite trajectory. Feisal Square developed on its own without government intervention or planning.⁷²⁴ The natural gravity of Hussein Mosque, and Feisal Square by extension, was indicative of the natural growth of the entire city. No other Mandate era capital’s development was as separated from its governmental function as Amman’s was. While neighboring capital cities had, their urban environments imbued with meaning by the government through urban planning, in Amman this was a spontaneous byproduct. Although the streets that comprised Feisal Square predated the Mandate, the square underwent a transformation after the construction of Hussein Mosque. Prior to the construction of the new mosque, Feisal

⁷²² Rogan, “The Making of a Capital,” 103.

⁷²³ Rafieh, *House’s of Old Amman*, 47. There is no actual “square” in this area. The term square and plaza were used in reference to the width of King Feisal Street as the central avenue of Amman.

⁷²⁴ Kassir, *Beirut*, 142 and 282.

Square was a logical central meeting point of the city. The city's inhabitants utilized it out of convenience, not necessity. Husseini Mosque, on the other hand, transcended mere geographical centrality. Husseini Mosque and Feisal Square became the social, cultural, and religious epicenter of Amman. Only after the square generated this cultural gravity and heightened significance did the government begin to use it as a stage for government rituals. This opportunistic use of space was a reflection of the Transjordan government's limited finances. The government did not have the money to create its own performative urban spaces. Instead, the government co-opted Feisal Square. In particular, Feisal Square became the stage for the exhibition and performance of Hashemite celebrations, ceremonies, and parades. This small space became the proving ground for Hashemite authority during the Mandate.

The utilization of public processions for government purposes had been a common trope of the late Ottoman Empire. Public processions and demonstrations were a way for the modernizing Ottoman state to spatially reinforce a group identity. The Ottomans utilized these celebrations as a way to promote Ottoman identity over divisive, and potentially damaging, national and religious identities. For example, Ottoman usage of Frank Street in Izmir closely mirrors the pomp and ceremony that the Mandatory state imbued into Feisal Square.⁷²⁵ Nearly all government celebrations and parades took place on and around Feisal Square. These events further emphasized the dual nature of Hashemite authority. Government celebrations in Feisal Square exalted the authority, authenticity, and legitimacy of the Transjordanian state to all of Amman, and all of Transjordan. The political space of Feisal Square allowed Abdullah to export his

⁷²⁵ Sibel Zandi-Sayek, "Orchestrating Difference, Performing Identity: Urban Space and Public Rituals in Nineteenth-Century Izmir," in *Hybrid Urbanism: On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment*, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (London: Praeger, 2001), 45-63.

monarchical authority and prestige outside the halls of Raghadan Palace. In this way, Abdullah imbued into Feisal Square the weight of monarchical authority. The celebrations of Feisal Square further reinforced Amman's identity as a Hashemite Versailles. These performances were yet another technique for the government to condition the populace into accepting its existence and necessity.

The victory parade that accompanied Amir Abdullah's first trip to London in 1923 was one of the earliest occasions in which the new government utilized rituals and ceremonies in Feisal Square.. The government decided that Abdullah should leave his capital with all possible "pomp and glory" and ordered Commander Peake to have the Reserve Force (the predecessor of the Arab Army/Arab Legion) line the streets of central Amman. The newly formed army band, later known as the Massed Band, would march in front of the Amir's car, literally trumpeting his arrival. However, the band had only received the instruments fourteen days earlier, and according to Peake, the band produced "an incredible amount of tuneless noise," and he was thankful that "Amman was very small so we did not have to suffer long." The ultimate indignity of the proceedings was when asked to play the royal salute the band instead played a tune called "come to the cookhouse doors."⁷²⁶

Despite the Massed Band's early misadventure, the band became quite popular in Transjordan by the mid-1930s. The Mandatory government used the Roman theater as a high visibility stage for performances by the Massed Band. These performances were meant to entertain the masses, but they also subtly denoted the martial strength of the government. The band became so popular that they were invited to play at a number of

⁷²⁶ IWM, Peake Collection, Peake's autobiography, 387-88.

private parties and celebrations, like the opening of the Circassian Charity Association in Amman in 1940.⁷²⁷ The most important instrument for the band was bagpipes. This instrument was introduced in 1929 by the order of the Amir. The Bagpiper Band, originally comprising only six members, marched in front of Amir Abdullah on his weekly processions to the Husseini Mosque for Friday prayers. The bagpipes remain an integral part of the Massed Bands of the Jordanian Armed Forces (*al-Jawqat al-Musiqiyyah*) today.⁷²⁸ (Appendix 1, figure 6-16 photograph of massed band with bagpipes celebrating the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt in 1940)

The band played a key role in the military drills and spectacle that were “exploited to impress the citizenry with the strength and discipline of the armed forces.”⁷²⁹ Historian Eugene Rogan correctly argues that military precision and displays of martial strength were critical in the personification of Hashemite authority in Amman, and by extension, all of Transjordan. Numerous events were ritualized by the inclusion of military processions and displays in Feisal Square throughout the Mandate period. One of the most striking examples of such a display was the grandeur that accompanied the arrival of Abdullah’s father, King Hussein ibn Ali of the Hijaz, in January of 1924. This grand affair angered the British who deemed it a waste of resources that exceeded the entertainment allowances of the Chief British Representative and the Amir.⁷³⁰ For the British, this superfluous display was merely entertainment, not part of foreign policy. The British did not view the grand spectacle as critical for the reinforcement of the Amir’s

⁷²⁷ Munif, *Story of a City*, 95.

⁷²⁸ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 155-56.

⁷²⁹ Rogan, “The Making of a Capital,” 103.

⁷³⁰ MECA, Peake Collection, HC Samuel to SoS J.H. Thomas, 12/2/1924.

political authority or legitimacy. (Appendix 1, figure 6-17 King Hussein arriving in Amman greeted by Commander Peake, British Resident Cox, and Amir Abdullah)

Regardless of British angst, the event included military parades, band performances, and speeches. Ceremonial honorary arches were erected throughout Amman in King Hussein's honor. The event's choreography even included the minutiae of what type of headwear was suitable; *kafiyeh* was appropriate, *tarbush* forbidden.⁷³¹ Although somewhat trivial, the headwear choice was an indictment against the Ottoman past, which had standardized the *tarbush*, or *fez*, in the nineteenth century. Favoring the *kafiyeh* was simultaneously a clear statement against the Ottoman past, while also emphasizing the Hashemites' origins in the Hijaz and their Sharifian heritage. Beatrice Erskine described King Hussein's equally grand departure saying:

The following day all Amman turned out to see the King and the Emir make a State departure, accompanied by the heir-apparent, the Emir Ali (heir to the Hijaz). The whole space between the theatre and the villa was thronged, with a holiday crowd, the Arab Legion was on duty, boy scouts of all ages from infants to young men turned up with banners. The old King was greeted with enthusiasm, and after he left the house the guns up above the theatre on the Citadel Hill boomed a salute.⁷³²

The visit of King Hussein was indicative of the formulaic reception honored guests received in Amman. Similar treatment was afforded to Amir Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, various British High Commissioners (including Herbert Samuel, J.R. Chancellor, and A.G. Wauchope), King Feisal I and King Feisal II of Iraq, amongst others.⁷³³

⁷³¹ Rogan, "The Making of a Capital," 105-06.

⁷³² Erskine, *Transjordan*, 45.

⁷³³ "Visit of King of Iraq (*ziyarat malik al-'Iraq*)," *Filastin*, 6/4/1944. Boy Scout and Girl Guide troops frequently participated in these events as well. For more on scouting in Transjordan see Chapter 3.

Triumphant state celebrations were pivotal to the commemoration and reinforcement of Hashemite mystique. Two magnificent examples of such endeavors were the gala celebrations for Abdullah's son, Amir Talal's wedding in 1934, and the annual commemoration of the Arab Revolt, usually held around September 1. Both events celebrated different aspects of Hashemite legitimacy through the elaborate staging of spectacle. Talal's wedding on November 26, 1934, was a national holiday that turned Feisal Square into a "mardi gras... with all the color and picturesqueness of an Arab 'fantasia... Arches of green trees and shrubs spanned the streets and flags flew from all buildings. The scene was climaxed at sundown by a brilliant fireworks in the public square."⁷³⁴ These comments from an American diplomat highlight the revelry and carnival atmosphere of the royal wedding. Akin to King Hussein's visit in 1924, the British deemed this wedding unnecessarily showy. The meaning of the pageantry that accompanied Talal's wedding was lost on the British administrators of the Mandate. The celebration of Talal's wedding was a celebration of the monarchy and the future of the Hashemite dynasty in Transjordan. The annual commemoration of the Great Arab Revolt (also referred to as the "Arab Renaissance") on the other hand, utilized past Hashemite exploits to reinforce Hashemite authority in Transjordan. (Appendix 1, figure 6-18 Amir Talal's wedding procession in 1934)

This annual event held every September followed a set pattern orchestrated by the Amir. There was a ceremonial procession, led by Abdullah, dressed in full Western military garb and a *kaffiyeh*, from Raghadan Palace to Feisal Square. Abdullah's dress paid homage to his cultural Hijazi roots, while simultaneously emphasizing the modernity

⁷³⁴ NARA, RG 84, 890i.0011/4, 11/28/1934.

of the Transjordanian state. This hybridized image was present in all government ceremonies in Feisal Square. The Hashemite rulers of Jordan, including Abdullah's namesake and great-grandson Abdullah II ibn Hussein, use this curious hybridized image today. Next, Abdullah would inspect the military and police forces present. Finally, Abdullah gave a speech from the balcony of the municipality building, or from a custom-built platform in the center of Feisal Square, in front of all of the officers of the Mandate.⁷³⁵ It was important that these ceremonies reinforced Abdullah's cultural and religious credentials, while simultaneously transforming this credibility into political might. These commemorations needed to reinforce Amman's political, cultural, and social centrality. This centrality, in turn, reinforced the importance of Amman. These celebrations were regular and standard enough that the British dismissively refer to them as "the usual ceremonies" each year in their records.⁷³⁶ Similar standardized ceremonies accompanied the annual opening of the Legislative Council (every November 1) and the annual celebration of Transjordan's "Independence" on May 15, 1923.⁷³⁷ (Appendix 1, figure 6-19 photo of Abdullah II wearing a military uniform and kaffiyeh. figure 6-20 and 6-21 are two depictions of the Arab Revolt ceremony in Feisal Square in 1940)

Activities held in Feisal Square and the Roman theater were not limited to military maneuvers and victory parades. Feisal Square remained the cultural and religious epicenter of Amman. The events that took place in Feisal Square were indicative of a town becoming a city, of a city entering modernity. Numerous cafes, including Hamdan

⁷³⁵ "Celebration of the Arab Renaissance in Amman, (Ihtifal al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya fi 'Aman) *Filastin* 11/1/1941.

⁷³⁶ BNA, CO 831/58/2, "Report on the Political Situation for the Month of September 1941," 3/10/1941 and MECA, Glubb collection, "a Monthly Report for the Month of May 1939."

⁷³⁷ Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 77 and "Opening of the Legislative Council (iftitah al-majlis al-tashri'i)" *Filastin*, 11/6/1933. Transjordan's "independence" refers to its formal separation from the Palestine Mandate by the British on May 15, 1923.

coffee house, the Arab League Café, and al-Shalati coffee house, ringed Feisal Square. These coffee houses were open venues of political, cultural, and social debate. Numerous book and magazine shops also clustered around the square.⁷³⁸ These spaces housed much of the political discourse of the period.⁷³⁹ These cultural spaces did not belong to the government. Instead, the regular inhabitants of Amman controlled these places. It was from these cafes that the opposition movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s sprouted. The first meeting of the National Congress on July 25, 1928 was held in Hamdan coffee house.

Cinemas in Amman were also critical modern spaces of exchange during the Mandate period. The earliest cinema in Amman, founded in 1925 by Rushdi al-Safadi called *al-Sharq al-Arabi* (Arab East), showed open-air performances. A Damascene known as Abu Sayyah al-Qabbani established the first movie theater building, *al-Nasr* (victory) cinema, in 1929.⁷⁴⁰ The most famous cinema in Amman during this period was Cinema Petra, built in 1934 by Wadi As'ad and Tawfiq Qattan. Cinema Petra served as a place of open cultural, social, and political communication. The cinema hall was a dynamic space. It was used for religious celebrations, musical and theater performances, literary competitions, and receptions for foreign political dignitaries. Unlike neighboring Damascus and Beirut, the cinema in Amman was not utilized by the British for propaganda.⁷⁴¹ The same degree of contestation and negotiation over the cinema as a public space does not seem to have occurred in Amman. Cinema Petra was open to both

⁷³⁸ Daher, "The City of Many Hats," 77-79.

⁷³⁹ This was particularly true in relation to the activities of the National Congress from 1928-1933.

⁷⁴⁰ Saleem Ayoub Quna, *Downtown Amman; A Social Tapestry* (Amman, 2008), 22-23 and Renate Dieterich, "More Than Movies: Cinema Petra in Amman During the Mandatory Period," *Middle East – Topics & Arguments* 3 (2014): 142.

⁷⁴¹ Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 199-201.

men and women, with each sex having their own discrete section of the theater. Urban historian Renate Dieterich hypothesizes that there likely was no women's cinema in Amman because the potential audience in Amman was much smaller than Damascus, and a women's cinema would not be profitable. This multi-faceted space quickly became one of the beacons of Amman's developing diverse urban society and culture.⁷⁴²

Although open and frank discourse took place in Amman's cinemas and cafes, the public demonstrations and commemorations that took place in Feisal Square and the Roman theater remained the more vocal embodiments of Amman's life apart from the Mandatory government. These frequent political demonstrations and protests made Amman the home of political opposition throughout the Mandate. In the early years of the Mandate between 1921 and 1924, there were protests that pitted the municipality of Amman against the nascent Anglo-Hashemite government. On Monday July 24, 1922, there was a day of ritualized mourning for the fall of Feisal's Sharifian state in Syria. The performance, according to British Resident Philby, included "Sherifian flags draped in black, three minutes [of] silence as a sign of grief and patriotic speeches." What was surprising to Philby was that the municipality of Amman had sponsored this public display. Shortly thereafter, Madhhar Beg (a member of *majlis al-idarat*, the city administrative council) and Mayor of Amman Said Khair, were informed that similar events would not be tolerated in the future by the Mandatory government.⁷⁴³ By the time of British Resident Henry Cox's arrival in Transjordan in 1924, such divisions between the will of the Anglo-Hashemite government and the municipality, had ceased. By 1924, the municipality administration functioned as an extension of the Mandatory government.

⁷⁴² Dieterich, "More Than Movies," 143-146; Thompson, *Colonial Citizens*, 202-10.

⁷⁴³ MECA, Philby collection, Philby diary, Monday July 24, 1922.

The Mandatory government would not tolerate any division within its embryonic capital. Although Feisal Square remained a place of popular protest and opposition, this opposition never again originated from the members of the Amman municipality during the Mandate period.

The majority of the political protests held in Feisal Square during the Mandate were on behalf of the Palestinian cause. In October and November 1933, there were protests against the violations of natural rights, and against the “atrocities,” that had befallen Palestine. These protests asked the Amir to intervene in the Palestine question. The demonstrations were strong enough in November that Commander Peake and the chief of police were forced to take refuge within the Ottoman Bank.⁷⁴⁴ Later, many of the shopkeepers of Amman, particularly those from Damascus and Nablus, protested the Zionist presence in Palestine by closing their shops as part of the “general strike.” These strikes were meant to be part of the larger Palestine Revolt that took place from 1936-1939. This happened a number of times in 1936 and 1937. Although the strikes had a limited impact on Amman, the government warned the strike organizers that “it was not prepared to allow political agitation of this kind to proceed unchecked.”⁷⁴⁵ (Appendix 1, Figure 6-22 photograph of protests in Amman in 1933 in opposition to British actions in Palestine)

Numerous student protests also took place in Feisal Square on behalf of the Palestinian cause. The source of the unrest generally came from the Salt Secondary School. British Resident Cox described these boys as being “badly infected by what they

⁷⁴⁴ BNA, CO 831/23/11, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of October 1933,” 1/11/1933; “Incidents and Demonstrations in Jordan (al-muzaharat wa hawadith fi’l-Urdun)” *Filastin*, 11/5/1933.

⁷⁴⁵ BNA, CO 831/37/1, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of January 1936,” 1/2/1936 and BNA, CO 831/41/8, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of July 1937,” 2/8/1937.

have seen going on in other countries.” The student protests of the Salt Secondary School in Amman signify two disparate things. First, they demonstrate that the students in Transjordan were aware of the political and social issues of the region. Secondly, the fact that the Salt students come to protest in Amman is a de facto acknowledgment of the capital, and its role in Transjordan. In response to numerous student protests in Amman in 1936, the government closed the Secondary School in Salt, the Arts and Crafts School in Amman, and expelled the leaders of the protests. The schools reopened the following month but the students were under close government supervision.⁷⁴⁶ By late 1937, the Mandatory government banned the meeting of societies and clubs that did not have explicit government permission. This ban essentially outlawed public political protests and demonstrations in Amman and throughout Transjordan.⁷⁴⁷ However, there was one more isolated incident in May 1941; six boys instigated a public demonstration in Feisal Square against the government for their lack of action on Palestine. The boys were dealt with swiftly. The government expelled six students permanently and expelled an additional forty students temporarily. Thereafter all demonstrations and meetings in Transjordan were prohibited.⁷⁴⁸

The other important urban space for public congregation was the Roman theater. Although the government occasionally used the Roman theater for its celebrations and rituals, it was mainly a space for the people of Amman.⁷⁴⁹ This was particularly true for

⁷⁴⁶ BNA, CO 831/37/1, “Report on the Political Situation of May 1936,” 1/6/1936.

⁷⁴⁷ BNA, CO 831/37/1, BR Cox to HC Wauchope, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of February 1937,” 2/3/1937. Government censorship was discussed in depth in chapter 5.

⁷⁴⁸ BNA, CO 831/58/2, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of May 1941,” 4/6/1941. The school protest was against Chief Minister Rashid ‘Ali in particular. The prohibition of all meetings was also in response to unrest in Ma’an and neighboring Iraq. Schools in Amman are discussed in detail in the education section of chapter 2.

⁷⁴⁹ The government did begin clearing away old houses that stood in front of the Roman Theater as early as 1941 (BNA, CO 831/58/2, “Report on the Political Situation for the Month of December 1941,” 3/1/1942).

Amman's celebrations of 'Id. The spectacle of the 'Id celebrations brought together all of Amman into a single enclosed space. Author Abd al-Rahman Munif recalled the annual 'Id celebrations of his youth harkening back to the festivals held in the same space by the Romans 2000 years before.

There were the sounds of drums, pipes, singing and dancing, the vendors' calls, children's' shouting, the sound of swings, the shouting of photographers and cart owners, and clowns calling out 'a head without a corpse.' All of those different sounds intermingled to create a din which those who were part of it did not feel... as though people were bidding farewell to days that they would not see the like of for a very long time to come, or as though they were saying in those few hours what they had not said on many previous days.⁷⁵⁰

Husseini Mosque and the Roman Theater acted as the homes of Muslim life in Mandate era Amman. The Muslim monopoly over this space was a byproduct of Amman's overwhelmingly Muslim population. This popular version of Islam in Amman utilized the central spaces of Amman, Husseini Mosque and the Roman theater, to create a distinctly Ammani embodiment of Islamic celebration. The Hashemite throne's Sharifian credentials imbued Husseini Mosque with a more "official" interpretation of Islam that respected the Amir's lineage. The Roman Theater, on the other hand, was generally outside the purview of the Anglo-Hashemite state. These celebrations were tolerated by the government, which in turn allowed these celebrations to take on a carnevalesque air. These spaces existed apart from the Anglo-Hashemite state. Overall, Feisal Square represented the inherent duality of the city of Amman. It was used both by the Mandatory

The current government demolished all of the homes in front of the Roman Theater in the 1980s to construct the empty Hashimiyya Square. This urban whitewashing has favored ancient heritage over recent architectural heritage. For more on the perils of neo-liberal construction approaches see Rama al-Rabady and Shatha Abu-Khafajah, "'Send in the clown': Re-inventing Jordan's downtowns in space and time, case of Amman," *Urban Design International* (2013), 1-11 and Rami Daher and Irene Maffi, eds., *Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage in the Middle East: Positioning the Material Past in Contemporary Societies*, eds. Rami Daher and Irene Maffi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

⁷⁵⁰ Munif, *Story of a City*, 291.

government and against the government. Feisal Square was the personification of the Mandatory government's might and its shortcomings. The state aspired to control the inhabitants of Transjordan but could not even control the development of its own capital. Amman was a real city, not only a symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Amman, as embodied by its spiritual core in Feisal Square, was more than just a company town.

Conclusion

The urban development of Amman was the physical manifestation of the conflicted colonial approach of the British. This dual city and its growing elite were personified in Amman's first gentleman's club, the King Hussein Club. The notables of Amman founded the King Hussein Club in 1943. The club officially opened on June 11, 1943, with Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, all of the Executive Council Ministers and Arab Legion Commander Glubb in attendance. Amir Abdullah did not attend the opening, but he had gone to the club that morning to donate a picture of his late father, King Hussein.⁷⁵¹ He stated "object of the club is to promote cultural and social activity and to foster relations of friendship and cooperation between its Arab and British Members." It was hoped that the club would also help British officials transition "from administration to the position of adviser."⁷⁵² This paternalistic approach was evident in the general attitude of the British in Amman. The divided city oscillated between the poles of Hashemite and British authority.

⁷⁵¹ BNA, BW 60/1, "Extract from Quarterly Report of British Council Work in Palestine, 1 April – 30 June 1943." BR Kirkbride was invited but had to leave for business in Jerusalem at the last minute. The EC members in attendance were Ahmad 'Alawi al-Saqqaf, Shukri Shash'ah, Samir al-Rifa'i, Abd al-Rahman Rushaidat, and Dr. Hanna al-Qusus.

⁷⁵² BNA, BW 60/1, "Extract from Report on Representative's Work in Palestine, 1 September to 31 December."

Although the British closely watched and oversaw all aspects of the Transjordan Mandatory government, they generally left the symbol of that government's might, the city of Amman, to develop on its own. This neglect allowed Amman's architecture and general urban fabric to reflect its diverse cultural heritage – Ottoman, Arab, and British. However, the majority of the inhabitants of Transjordan continued to understand Amman as the personification of Hashemite and British authority in Transjordan despite their hands off approach. The poet 'Arar ridiculed this image forcefully. 'Arar mocked the government both from the inside and the outside. 'Arar was one of the few people in Transjordan who could be considered both a part of the establishment and vocally anti-establishment. No one was safe from 'Arar's cutting gaze. The most frequent victims of 'Arar's attacks were the British officials of Transjordan and the new elites of Amman. These elites had embedded themselves in the new district of Jabal Amman and in the process created a new city apart from the rest of Amman. This "dual city" connected Amman to other colonial cities throughout the world during the interwar period. Unlike neighboring dual cities, Amman was created by its inhabitants, not by a colonial administrator. The attributes of the dual city, of creating a bifurcated urban space, would exist long after Jordan's independence in 1946.

Although the physical development of urban space in Amman was ignored by the Anglo-Hashemite state, the government closely controlled the use of that space. Feisal Square, which developed before the existence of the Mandate, acted as the proving ground of Hashemite authority. Feisal Square was as important, if not more important than Raghadan Palace, for the reinforcement of Abdullah's monarchical and sherifian authority. Feisal Square's political space acted as the center of Hashemite authority.

Constant celebrations, commemorations, and parades filled Feisal Square during the Mandate. These displays supplemented the sparse monumental architecture of Amman as the representation of the government's strength. Public demonstrations of the state's power further disciplined the populace of Transjordan into accepting the supremacy of the Anglo-Hashemite government. Although the government did its utmost to control Feisal Square's symbolic meaning for Amman, and the rest of Transjordan, the regular population of Amman did not relinquish control over this space. Feisal Square remained the home of political protest and religious life in Transjordan throughout the Mandate. Regular Ammanis did not allow Amman to exist only as a "company town." Amman had a life separated from the government. This dichotomy between the official image, and popular image of Amman, speaks to the role of the capital city during the Transjordan Mandate. The city functioned as the clear embodiment of the new strength and resolve of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Despite this clear identity, the city continued to have a life of its own separated from the colonial apparatus. Amman was simultaneously a product of the colonial interwar period and a city that had been left to its own devices. This ambivalent existence made Amman both the home of the Hashemite state and the center of opposition in Mandate.

8: Conclusion

The Mandate of Transjordan officially ended on May 25, 1946. The newly independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan celebrated this momentous event in the only space worthy of such a spectacle: Feisal Square. The coronation of King Abdullah “ended” the colonial period in Jordan. However, Jordan remained on the British subsidy and kept close relations with the British crown through 1957. The events of the 1948 war, more than its independence, forever changed the urban fabric of Amman and the demographic makeup of Jordan. Millions of Palestinians were suddenly incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom and hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into Amman. The days of the quiet, slowly developing capital were over. Seemingly overnight, Amman was transformed from a city of roughly 46,000 people in 1946, to a city of over 250,000 people by the early 1950s.⁷⁵³ Today, Amman is home to over 2.2 million people. This demographic explosion drastically changed the urban fabric and spatial layout of the city. The one constant following Jordan’s independence was the steady centrality of *al-balad* and Feisal Square.

That Feisal Square has remained a crucial place of cultural, religious, and social exchange speaks to its inherent natural gravity. The symbolic meaning of this space was constructed during the Mandate period and this significance perpetuated itself into the independence era. Similarly, the material, political, and symbolic importance of Amman was not fleeting. Despite its diminutive size during the Mandate period, the city of Amman housed all of the integral components of a successful and cohesive centralized state by the end of the British Mandate in 1946. The city of Amman symbolized the

⁷⁵³ Potter, “Ever Growing Amman,” 82-83. Jordan and Amman in particular, absorbed two distinct waves of Palestinian refugees. The first wave was associated with the 1948 War while the second wave was a product of the 1967 War.

authority and might of the Anglo-Hashemite government. The British government needed Amman to control the region of Transjordan with minimal direct British intervention. Transjordan unto itself was not an important imperial possession for the British; rather the territory derived its significance from its central location between Palestine and Iraq. For this reason, the British largely ignored the Mandate of Transjordan initially. The entire Mandate was analogous to a “Potemkin Village” from 1921-1924; the scaffolding of a new government existed only to project the appearance of order and control without any actual substance. Only after the British financial intervention of 1924 with British Resident Cox did the British begin to monitor the development of Transjordan more acutely.

The Mandate’s growth, predicated on the need to protect larger imperial interests, valued the security of Transjordan above everything else. The maintenance of the status quo in the region was critical to the success of the Mandatory regime. A strong centralized government was crucial for Britain’s regional security goals. The appearance of control and structure in Amman and Transjordan initially satisfied these security initiatives. Over time, Transjordanian infrastructural development necessitated moving beyond mere “Potemkin ministries.” If the Anglo-Hashemite government needed to pacify the region, it had to do so through legitimate statecraft and infrastructural development. The Mandatory government was successful in keeping Transjordan peaceful throughout the Mandate period. Unlike the neighboring states of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, no sectarian or nationalist uprisings occurred in Transjordan. In order to legitimize its existence and continued importance for the balance of forces in the country, the state needed to highlight the material, political, and symbolic centrality of

Amman to the Mandate. The infrastructural and institutional development of the capital centralized political, social, and economic exchange in Amman. Although the government was successful in establishing Amman as the nexus of Transjordanian life it did not possess complete control over its populace. Its limited budget and resources constantly checked the ambitions of the state. All-encompassing oversight was simply beyond the scant means of the state.

However, these administrative and institutional advancements were only feasible because of the preexisting Ottoman framework. The Transjordanian government heavily relied on Ottoman structures and institutions already in place at the time of its founding. Transjordan's limited budget made investment in non-security projects untenable. As a result, the reinvigoration of Ottoman institutions was critical for the Mandate to succeed. The government simply did not have the resources to dismiss and ignore the Ottoman infrastructure that already existed. Only towards the end of the Mandate period did the Transjordan state begin to move beyond this largely Ottoman framework. The gradual expansion of government responsibilities and functions slowly created a more productive and legitimate centralized government. The growth of the transportation and communication networks allowed the government to respond to dissident and rebellious activity throughout Transjordan more effectively. Coupled with the transformations of the Departments of Justice, Public Health, and Education, the new Transjordanian state permeated the lives of its populace. However, any improvements made to the infrastructural and institutional systems of Transjordan were done in the service of larger security concerns. Despite these advancements, Transjordan was never under complete government control. Tribal affairs remained largely outside the purview of the state

throughout much of the Mandate. Furthermore, anything not directly associated with defense, control, and security had to be financed from extraordinary funding streams such as the Colonial Development Fund, foreign concessions, or local entrepreneurial investment. This reliance on foreign capital and local entrepreneurial investment to achieve basic infrastructural advancements reflected a failure of the Anglo-Hashemite state.

Similar interests motivated the formation of Transjordan's representative body. The Legislative Council formed in 1929 to ratify the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement. The political space opened with the creation of the Legislative Council in 1929 was short lived. The Mandatory state utilized the Legislative Council as a way to incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the machinery of the Transjordanian state. Amman became the undisputed home of political exchange and power during the Mandate. It was also the undisputed home of political opposition throughout the Mandate period. After the forced ratification of the 1928 Agreement, the elites of Transjordan slowly capitulated to the might of the state. However, the Council did not immediately become a rubber stamp for the government. The members of the Council protested government initiatives and will after the First Legislative Council, but the united opposition of the Council began to wane. One by one, viable outlets for opposition disappeared. The open political space that once existed slowly began to close. The gradual process of censorship and manipulation robbed Transjordan's elites of their autonomy and their agency. However, this was not a unilateral exchange. Although these elites and urban notables lost a great deal of their autonomy, their position on the Council afforded them continued influence, prestige, and pride of place both in the capital and

their home districts. Council representatives needed to protect their own personal interests and those of their patronage networks. As well, during the years of drought and economic depression the salary paid to Legislative Council members became increasingly alluring. By the end of the Mandate, the elites that had resisted the state now relied on the Mandate government for their authority. The seats of the Legislative Council became commodities of status. It was no longer a viable option to exist outside of the government edifice. It was more important for the elites of Transjordan to be part of the legislative system than to be ostracized from Transjordan's halls of power. Elites were both constrained and supported by the narrow halls of the Legislative Council. If they resisted the hold of Amman, they ceased to be relevant in the Mandate's political landscape. Amman became a Hashemite Versailles, which manipulated the elites of Transjordan into acquiescence.

However, Amman was not only a symbol or a tool of the Mandatory government. It was a real urban space. Amman's urban fabric developed with virtually no oversight from the central government. This deliberate choice by the government not to invest in the urban development of Transjordan undermined their efforts to transform Amman into a Hashemite Versailles. The government strived to imbue Amman with symbolic power but left the city to grow haphazardly without order or direction. The centralization project undertaken by the Mandatory state caused the cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman. The resulting unruly urban space was a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics that are evident in Amman's residential architecture. The monumental architecture of Amman, although minimal, represented the various poles of authority and legitimacy for the Anglo-Hashemite state. Raghadan

Palace, Husseini Mosque, and the British Residence each radiated a distinct type of governmental authority, whether it is religious, colonial, or political. Regardless of the various nodes of governmental authority in Amman, the nexus of Amman remained in its central corridor, *al-balad*.

In the heart of *al-balad*, Feisal Square developed as the natural epicenter of Amman and cultural heart of the entire Mandate. This freedom of development contrasts with the tight control that the Mandatory government had over the rest of Transjordan. The Anglo-Hashemite state heavily utilized Feisal Square as a site of government performances of strength and authority. The stage of Feisal Square reinforced Amman's political centrality and dominance. The transformation of Amman into a Hashemite Versailles had destroyed functional authority outside of the capital. Elites chose to be part of the system, rather than be relegated to political irrelevance. However, the state did not control all of Amman. Oppositional forces and free cultural exchange continued to occur in Amman throughout the Mandate. Amman was the seat of the Anglo-Hashemite government, but it was not only a proxy for government authority. The natural gravity of Feisal Square did not exist because of the state. Feisal Square was the coalescence of life in Amman. By the end of the Mandate, Amman existed as the personification of infrastructural, political, and cultural life in Transjordan. Although its population remained small during the Mandate, the impact of Amman's diverse heritage and legacy were vital to the formation of the Jordanian State. Amman, with its population of over 2.2 million people, is no longer the small town that it once was during the Mandate period. However, Amman remains the heart of Jordan.

Appendix 1 – images of the Mandate

Figure 2-1, image of current CMS school building in Jabal Amman. (author's image)



Figure 2-2, original entrance to the Bishop's School, built in 1936, in Jabal Amman. (author's image)



Figure 3-1, photograph of a kerosene lamp used in the streets of Amman before electrification. (Freij, “A Merchant’s Tale Reveals Amman’s Electric Revolution,” *The Jordan Times*, January 26, 2013.)

Figure 3-2, schematic for early lights in Amman. (Rashid, *Malamih al-Haya al-Sha‘biyya fi Madinat Amman 1878-1948*, 94.)

Figure 3-3, photograph of construction of Ras al-Ayn power plant (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 69.)

Figure 3-4, renovated Amman Electricity Hanger (Image © Rami Daher)



Figure 4-1, photo of Hamdan coffee house in 1935 (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 92)

Figure 4-2, photo of prime ministry building which included the prime minister, chief justice, and minister of justice offices. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 83)

Figure 4-3, official opening of the first normal session of the Legislative Council on November 1, 1929. This official opening of the Council took place after the ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement on June 4, 1929. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 69)

Figure 6-1, Military parade through Feisal Square in Amman in celebration of the 24th Anniversary of the Arab Revolt on September 11, 1940. In the foreground a small white clock tower is visible. (LOC, Matson Registers Volume 2 1940-1946, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010006366/PP/>)



Figure 6-2, photo of the Ottoman fountain Hamidiyye Sabeel in front of Hussein Mosque before it was removed by the municipality in the 1930s. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 79)

Figure 6-3, photo of Hussein Mosque being constructed in 1925. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 81)

Figure 6-4, photo of Raghadan Palace showing Arab Legion Mess Band preparing for a performance in honor of the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt. (LOC, Matson Registers Volume 2 1940-1946, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/matpc.20867/>)



Figure 6-5, architectural plans for the British Residence in Amman. These plans were published in the *Architect's Journal* December 28, 1932.




Figure 6-6, photograph of completed British Residence in 1932. Published in *Architect's Journal* December 28, 1932




Figure 6-7, photo of a Circassian style home in Jabal al-Qal'a in Amman. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 91)

Figure 6-8, photograph of citadel hill from 1920s with arrows indicating all of the Circassian homes with their pronounced wooden porches. (Bakij, *Amman: Yesterday and Today*, 1983)

Figure 6-9, photo of al-Mufti home in downtown Amman. The al-Mufti home was one of the oldest multi-storied homes in Amman and frequently hosted foreign dignitaries. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 62)

Figure 6-10, photograph of Arab rural home (Rafieh, *House's of Old Amman*, 274)

Figure 6-11, Bilad al-Sham townhouse owned by Hamid Kilmat on King Feisal Street in *al-balad*. (Rafieh *House's of Old Amman*, 56)

Figure 6-12, diagram and photograph of the Qawar house (Shawash, "Architecture in Amman During the Emirate Period," 120)





Figure 6-13, diagrams of the Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda home in Jabal Amman (Rifa'i, *The First Houses of Amman*, 30).

Figure 6-14, diagram of Sabbagh home (Rifa'i, *The First Houses of Amman*, 103-104)

Figure 6-15, 1930s photograph of Jabal Amman. (Bakij, *Amman: A History with Pictures*, 57)

Figure 6-16, Massed Band of the Arab Legion assembled to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt on September 11, 1940. (LOC, Matson Registers Volume 2 1940-1946, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010006370/pp/>)



Figure 6-17, King Hussein arriving in Amman greeted by Commander Peake, British Resident Cox, and Amir Abdullah on January 18, 1924. (LOC, American Colony Jerusalem photo department, <http://memory.loc.gov/phpdata/pageturner.php?type=contactminor&cmIMG1=/pnp/ppmsca/13200/13291/00240t.gif&agg=ppmsca&item=13291&caption=240>)



Figure 6-18, photograph of clans marching to the palace in honor of Amir Talal's wedding on November 27, 1934 (LOC, John D. Whiting collection, <http://memory.loc.gov/phpdata/pageturner.php?type=contactminor&cmIMG1=/pnp/ppmsca/18400/18429/00054t.gif&agg=ppmsca&item=18429&caption=54>)



Figure 6-19, photograph of Abdullah II depicting him in the same hybridized outfit as his namesake Abdullah I. (business insider, June 5, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/king-abduallh-of-jordan-is-a-total-badass-2015-2>)

Figure 6-20, photo of Feisal Square and dais during the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt. (LOC, Matson Registers Volume 2 1940-1946, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/matpc.20893/>)



Figure 6-21, photo of the masses assembled for the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt. (LOC, Matson Registers Volume 2 1940-1946, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010006383/PP/>)



Figure 6-22, photograph of protests in Amman in 1933 in opposition to British actions in Palestine. (Library of Congress, G. Eric and Edith Matson Photograph Collection, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002712932/>)



















152 Arab Protest Demonstration in Amman, Transjor

Appendix 2: Amman Residential Architecture Matrix

(Shawash, "Architecture in Amman During the Emirate Period," 199, used with author's permission.)

Type	Case study	Plan	Elevation	Comments
Amman as a rural entity	Rural house Sunna' house 1900 s Madaba			<p>context: cluster conglomeration around courtyards</p> <p>spatial arrangement: conglomeration of multi-functional single space units</p> <p>structure and exterior finish: stone load bearing arches are used in the unit on left, while stone bearing walls are used solely in the unit on right; roofs are wood, mud and cane layering for the left unit and I-beam covered with concrete layer reinforced with steel mesh for the unit on right; lintels are arched stone for the left unit and reinforced concrete for the right; both structures are built of uncoursed rubble and plastered on interior and exterior</p> <p>builder: members of the community upon traditional know-how</p> <p>storeys: limited to one</p> <p>notes: the left unit represents an early type of rural house at Amman, while the right represents a later variation</p>
	Circassian house Anonymous prototypes 1880s to 1920s Amman			<p>context: individual units accompanied with a courtyard, seldomly conglomerated</p> <p>spatial arrangement: linear arrangement of functionally distinctive spaces which open to a gallery</p> <p>structure and exterior finish: dried mud-brick load bearing double walls, plastered on the interior and the exterior, roofs are supported on wooden beams and consist of layers of mud and hay, better off houses have tile roofs; lintels are wooden</p> <p>builder: community members upon traditional know-how</p> <p>storeys: one or two, where the first floor has a facade long balcony</p> <p>notes: this mode was abandoned when Amman transformed into an urban entity</p>
Amman as an urban entity	Bilad al Sham town house	Shweihat building 1916 Madaba		<p>context: linear conglomerations at the edges of commercial streets of Bilad al Sham towns</p> <p>spatial arrangement: this mode usually starts as a linear arrangement of shops facing the street, the first floor is added on for residential purposes and consists of units depicting the ones below yet interconnected via doorways. This mode was contaminated at a later stage with features of the three-bay house, such as the three-bay plan configuration and the triple-arch motif. The first floor would take various configurations, in Shweihat building the first floor consists of adjacent interconnecting units, where the triple-arch part is a clear addition which by itself signifies to the rising popularity of the motif. In Jumeian building; in spite of the extensive use of the triple-arch motif, the plan doesn't reflect three-bay sub-divisioning</p> <p>structure and exterior finish: both buildings employ stone cross-vaulting for supporting a flat roof, except two rooms in the Jumeian building, added at a later period, where the roof is supported on two load-bearing stone arches. Lintels are of stone arches, except in some instances where flat steel I-beams were used. The roofs are of a concrete mixture supported on steel I-beams, which protrude on the front elevation to carry the balconies. Stone walls are plastered on interior, and coursed on exterior; in both cases smooth 'motajjar' texture is used for the main masses and 'msamsam' for detailing. In Shweihat building, the lower storey displays rough coursing dating it to an earlier stage</p> <p>builder: Shweihat building: builders from the West Bank, including Qahhat from Beit Jalla; Jumeian building: builders from the West Bank</p>
		Jumeian building 1905 Madaba		
		Abu-Jaber building 1887/ 1896/ 1905 Salt		<p>context: a residential complex for a wealthy family in Salt, located in a commercial area on the main road in the city</p> <p>spatial arrangement: as explained above, the base of this complex consists of shop units arranged in a linear manner facing the street, yet due to the large size of the complex a variety of interconnected spaces resulted on the back of the ground floor, on far right there is a notion of the three-bay arrangement. The first floor displays overlapping three-bay compositions in the plan which fade away in the second floor giving space to rooms gathered around open courts.</p> <p>structure and exterior finish: this building mainly utilizes stone as a structural material; ground and first floors employ cross-vaulting and vaulting, while the second floor mainly utilizes load bearing walls and steel I-beam support for the roof. The tile-roof of the building and lavish facade decoration eludes to the sumptuous financial state of the owner. Stone employed on the facade of the ground floor is rougher in texture and of bigger coursing than the upper stories, for which smooth 'msamsam' yellow stone is used.</p> <p>builder: Abdulrahman al-Aqrouq from Nablus built the first and second floors</p> <p>storeys: three</p> <p>notes: this building can be considered as the peak of architecture in the Balqa' region during the Ottoman rule, and displays a continuity of Bilad al Sham commercial-residential town complex taking on three-bay features</p>
Madi building 1924 Amman		<p>context: this building is a unit of three located on the main commercial street of Amman</p> <p>spatial arrangement: the ground floor consists of three shop units facing the street, while the first floor displays an adaptation of the three-bay plan to this linear kind of building conglomeration. The service area takes up the blind rear zone of the floor. The staircase leading from the street has access from the right side and serves only this unit</p> <p>structure and construction: in spite of utilizing triple-arch motifs on the elevations, thick stone bearing walls carry the concrete roof which is reinforced with steel mesh and supported by steel I-beams.</p> <p>exterior finish: 'tobzeh' stone for main mass and 'msamsam' texture for detailing</p> <p>storeys: two</p>		

Three-bay house		variations on the plan of the three-bay type	
		iwān-like model	gallery model
Sharif Shaker house 1928 Amman			<p>context: a free-standing house in a residential area</p> <p>spatial arrangement: a three-bay type, with a central courtyard that brings to mind the open yards of the houses of Bilad al Sham tradition. Side entrance for the main floor</p> <p>structure: load bearing thick stone walls, the roof is a flat layer of concrete reinforced with a steel mesh supported by steel I-beams, lintels consist of stone bearing arches.</p> <p>exterior finish: stone even coursing with wide joints, upon a bit rough 'mfajjar' texture, while the decorative details are dressed in 'msamsam' stone</p> <p>storeys: half-storey basement, and a main floor</p> <p>notes: this building can be considered a link between the three-bay module and the courtyard module</p>
	Qa'war house 1930s Amman		
Qussous house 1929 Amman			<p>context: a free-standing house in a residential area</p> <p>spatial arrangement: three-bay type, services tucked in upper left corner, front entrance, entrance recess adorned with a gallery</p> <p>structure: stone bearing walls, concrete flat roof reinforced with steel mesh, structural stone arched lintels</p> <p>exterior finish: stone coursing in 'tobzeh' texture for the main mass and 'msamsam' for decorative detailing</p> <p>storeys: one</p>
	Shihabi house 1925 Amman		
Abulhuda house 1927 Amman			<p>context: a free-standing house in a residential area</p> <p>spatial arrangement: original three-bay type, services tucked the upper left corner with separate entrance, main side entrance for the first floor, internal staircase</p> <p>structure: stone bearing walls, concrete flat roof reinforced with steel mesh, structural stone arched lintels</p> <p>exterior finish: stone coursing in 'tobzeh' texture for the main mass and 'msamsam' for decorative detailing</p> <p>builder: Shakeeb Abu-Hamdan (Lebanese)</p> <p>storeys: half-storey basement, and a main floor</p>
	Farraj house 1928 Amman		
Sabbagh house 1935 Amman			<p>context: a free-standing house in a residential area</p> <p>spatial arrangement: three-bay type, front main entrance, bedrooms combined with bathrooms to form suits, kitchen forms the rear portion of the central bay and has independent entrance</p> <p>structure: stone bearing walls, concrete flat roof reinforced with steel mesh, flat stone lintels supported with reinforced concrete concealed ones</p> <p>exterior finish: stone coursing in 'msamsam' texture for the main mass and smoothed 'tobzeh' for some detailing</p> <p>storeys: one</p>
	Shawash house 1963 Amman		

Appendix 3
Legislative Councils of Transjordan (1929-1946)
(FO 371-52945 for TJ personalities according to GB in 1946)

1st Legislative Council 1929-1931

- **'Ajlun** – (Muslims) ‘Abdullah Kulaib al-Shraidah, ‘Auqlah Muhammad al-Nusair, and Najib al-Shraidah, (Christian) Najib Abu al-Sha‘r
- **Balqa** – (Muslims) ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan (replaced by Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi in special election), Sa‘id al-Sulaibi, and Muhammad al-Unsi (Christian) Bakhit al-Ibrahim (Circassians) Sa‘id al-Mufti and Shams al-Din Sami
- **Karak** – (Muslims) Sheikh Rifafan al-Majali, ‘Attallah al-Suhaimat, and Salih al-‘Auran (Christian) ‘Audah al-Qusus
- **Bedouin** – (North) Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz and (South) Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi

2nd Legislative Council 1931-1934

- **'Ajlun** – (Muslims) Qasim al-Hindawi, Mohammad al-Sa‘d al-Batainah, Naji al-Azzam and (Christian) Salti al-Ibrahim
- **Balqa** - (Muslims) Sheikh Majid al-‘Adwan, Sa‘id al-Mufti, Hashim Khair, Adil al-Azmah (Christian) Sa‘id Abu Jabir and (Circassian) Hussein Yousef Khawaja
- **Karak** – (Muslims) Refaifan al-Majali, Hussein al-Tarawnah, Salih al-‘Auran and (Christian) Mitri al-Zuraiqat
- **Bedouin** – Sheikh Hadithah al-Khraishah (North) and Sheikh Hamd ibn Jazi (South)

3rd Legislative Council 1934-1937

- **'Ajlun** – Mohammad al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Falah al-Zahir, and Sulaiman al-Khalil
- **Balqa** – Fawzi al-Nablusi, Majid al-‘Adwan, Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi, Asaad al-Khalil, Fawzi al-Mufti, and Wasif al-Bisharat
- **Karak and Ma’an** – Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-‘Auran, Mahmoud Kuraishan, (Christian) Mitri al-Zuraiqat

- **Bedouin** – (North) Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz and (South) Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi

4th Legislative Council 1937- 1942 (extended term to five year by the Amir due to WWII in 1939)

- **‘Ajlun** (excluding Jarash) – (Muslims) Mahmoud al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Mohammad al-Awad, (Christian) Salti al-Ibrahim
- **Balqa** (including Jarash) – (Muslims) Majid al-‘Adwan, Sabri al-Tabba, Sa‘ud al-Nablusi, (Circassians) Shawkat Hamid (appointed Mutasarrif), ‘Umar Hikmat (replaced Hamid), Hussein Khawaja, (Christian) Khalil al-Sukkar
- **Karak and Ma’an** – (Muslims) Sheikh Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-‘Auran, and Mahmoud Kuraiشان. (Christian) Ibrahim al-Sharaihah.
- **Bedouin** – (North) Sheikh Hadithah al-Khraishah, (South) Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi

5th Legislative Council 1942-1946

- **‘Ajlun** (excluding Jarash) – (Muslims) Salim al-Hindawi, Abd al Qadir al-Tal, and Musa al-Awad Hijazi, (Christian) Isa al-Awadh
- **Balqa** (including Jarash) – (Muslims) Majid al-Adwan, Sa‘ud al-Nablusi, Sabri al-Tabba, (Circassians) Fawzi al-Mufti and Hussein Khawaja, (Christian) Salamah al-Twal
- **Karak** – (Muslims) Refaifan al-Majali and Hussein al-Tarawnah (labeled in British records as Hussein Pasha al Tirro occasionally) and (Christian) Yousef al-Akashah
- **Ma’an** (including Bedouin) – (Muslims) Mahmoud Kraishan, (Northern Bedouin) Sheikh Adhub al-Zabin and (Southern Bedouin) Sheikh Hamd ibn Jazi

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