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The defense strategies of middle powers: Competing for security, influence and status in an era of unipolar demise

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ABSTRACT
Do middle powers develop similar defense strategies? Is middle powers a useful category for exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states? This article presents a great variation of strategies among the selected cases. Concurrently, similarities between middle powers belonging to similar regional security complexes (RSC) are revealed. The higher degree of great power penetration into a RSC, the lesser options for middle powers to develop individual strategies and vice versa. Furthermore, by comparing our findings with the strategies of more and less resourceful states, common elements among middle powers in terms of ends, means and ways, appear.

Introduction

This article is based on the claim that analyses of alignment and military strategies of specific states should acknowledge that states come in different shapes and sizes and that their strategies for influence and security are effected by power asymmetries between groups of more and less resourceful states. Mainstream research on alignment and military strategy has mainly focused on the strategies of superpowers and great powers, paying little attention to how power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states will influence perceptions of national interests and choices of strategic means and ways. In a previous study, we explored the strategic adjustments of four small states, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.[1] In this article, we present some initial findings from a corresponding study on middle powers.

This article aims to contribute to previous research in two main ways. First, we want to contribute to contemporary research on middle powers by reintroducing an empirical focus on alignment and military strategies.[2] The need for a renewed attention to questions related to alignment and military strategies is, in our view, motivated by changes in the international system of the twenty-first century that have created a much more uncertain and challenging international environment for all states.[3] In doing this, we will intervene in the present debate between middle power scholars on the definition of middle powers and the fruitfulness of using middle powers as a separate category of states situated between, on the one hand, the system-determining superpowers and great powers and, on the other hand, small states. More specifically, we will address two questions related to contemporary middle power research: Do middle powers develop similar alignment and military strategies? Is "middle powers" a useful category for exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states?

Regarding the first question, our selected cases present a great variation in both alignment and military strategies. However, analysis of differences in regional contexts reveals similarities between

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middle powers belonging to similar regional security complexes (RSC). In this regard, our findings indicate that the higher degree of great power rivalry within and penetration into a specific RSC, the lesser options for middle powers to develop individual defense strategies and vice versa. Regarding alignment strategies and military means, states located in comparably peaceful regions ("security communities") tend to develop hedging strategies and have greater opportunities to focus on expeditionary warfare. Middle powers located in regions characterized by high war expectations ("conflict formations") to a larger extend pursue collective balance of power strategies and develop military capacities related to national defense.[4] We therefore conclude that analyses of alignment and military strategies of middle powers should include and consider differences related to regional contexts. Additionally, by comparing our findings on the military strategies of major middle powers to standard interpretations of strategies of more and less resourceful states, common elements in terms of ends, means and ways appear that distinguish the military strategies of middle powers from corresponding strategies of both great powers and small states. While our answer to the first question is no, our answer to the second question is therefore yes.

Second, by directing attention to middle powers, we also aim to complement mainstream structural realist research and research within Strategic Studies. Both these traditions have generally focused on the alignment and military strategies of great powers, often treating states as "like units." If we are correct in arguing that power asymmetries between states will force less resourceful states to develop strategies that are different from more resourceful states, this means that a continued focus on the strategies of great powers will leave the vast majority of the actual strategies pursued by states belonging to different categories unexplored and untheorized. In addition to this, we will also present a new empirical approach to previously *a priori* theoretical assumptions related to basic aims or interest of states.

Defensive and offensive structural realists do not agree on whether states should give priority to the protection of their own security and survival or if they should maximize their own power and ability to enforce their will on others.[5] Both traditions seem, however, to assume that either of these priorities will fit all states. In our view, this assumption is a mistake since it ignores the practical importance of power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. Moreover, the assumption of states being like units creates an obstacle to the exploration of the diversity of strategies among more and less resourceful states. We therefore argue that the question of whether states give priority to survival or power maximizing should be treated as an open empirical question. Additionally, following previous research on status competition, we will include status recognition a possible third basic interest of states.

In this article, we focus on alignment and military strategies of eight relatively resourceful middle powers: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and South Korea. The empirical material focuses mainly on a time period from 2003 and onward. By focusing on a selection of "major middle powers," we aim to present findings with a general relevance for decision-makers. The empirical findings are based on our ongoing work on a monograph on the defense strategies of middle powers. It has not been possible to include a full analysis of each country in this article. Consequently, the empirical evidence in this article should be viewed as initial findings supporting our general arguments concerning the coherence of middle power strategies among states located in similar regional complexes, the usefulness of the middle power category and the importance of including considerations related to power asymmetries and status regional in the analysis of strategies actually pursued by states.

Our empirical focus concerns two interconnected levels of strategy, which may collectively be referred to as "defense strategy." *Defense strategy* is defined as interconnected ideas on how politically defined strategic ends should be achieved through a combination of alignment strategies and suitable strategic ways of developing and employing military means. *Alignment strategies* refer to different ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organizations to promote the own state's interests relating to security, influence or status. This aspect of strategy is a part of states' external efforts to promote their perceived interest. Examples of alignment strategies are balance of power, bandwagoning, isolation and hedging. *Military strategy* concerns the creation, direction and use of military force. This aspect of strategy focuses on states' internal efforts to promote their interest by developing and using the own state's military resources.[6] More specifically, we will approach the concept of military strategy through the lens of Maxwell Taylor's definition that frames strategy as a matching set of ends, ways and means.[7] Diplomatic and economic strategies, which do not concern questions related to military power, are not included in our definition of defense strategy. The defense strategies analyzed in this article are therefore less inclusive than most definitions of grand strategy (or most actual security strategies of states and organizations) but more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy.

Our focus on military means and strategies is not based on an underestimation of the practical importance of diplomatic and economic means and strategies. Previous research on middle powers (see next section) provides evidence of the importance governments of many middle powers attached to these other means of influence. However, the military strategies of this category of states constitute a more neglected area of research in the post-Cold War era and if we expanded our empirical focus to all aspects of grand strategy, we would have had to drastically reduce the number of cases.

The next section introduces some main themes in the debate on the concept of middle powers, our definition of this concept and our selection of cases. In the third section, defense strategy is defined and operationalized. In the fourth and fifth sections, we elaborate on our initial empirical findings, hence answering the two main questions. In the sixth and final sections, our aggregated conclusions are presented.

The concept of middle powers – selecting the cases

Important research on small states was undertaken already in the late 1950s and the 1960s.[8] Comparative research on middle powers as a separate category of states is rarer and begun later than corresponding studies on small states. In 1971, Carsten Holbraad called for more scholarly attention on middle powers.[9] Some years later, Annette Baker Fox published *The Politics of Attraction* which was followed by Holbraad's *Middle powers in international politics*.[10] These two pioneers were empirically concerned with middle powers' defense strategies and the relations between middle powers and great powers. Having access to greater economic, military and political power resources as compared to small states, middle powers have been assumed to have corresponding greater interests in global affairs, greater abilities to project power both within and outside their own region, greater access to international decision-making institutions and higher ranking as partners.[11]

In the theoretical debate during the post-Cold War era, the middle power concept became more contested, creating a situation that can be characterized as a disciplinary identity crisis.[12] Some researchers, such as Eduard Jordan, questioned traditional notions of middle power roles by introducing new subcategories such as the distinction between traditional and emergent middle powers.[13] In 2017, Jordaan instead argued that it is time to "drop adjectives such as 'emergent' or 'southern' middle powers from the lexicon" and stop classifying states with "counter-hegemonic tendencies" as middle powers.[14] Another researcher, Andrew Hurrell, suggested that the middle power concept should be rescued following a constructivist route focusing on identity or ideology.[15] James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves identify three different approaches to middle power research: the ideational, the behavioral and the positional.[16] Other researches have made similar distinctions presenting self-identification, behavioral patterns and relative power capacity as three competing ways of identifying middle powers.[17] In this section, we introduce these three main traditions before presenting our own definition. Using Andrew Carr's terminology, we label these three alternative ways of defining middle powers: (i) the identity approach, (ii) the behavioral approach and (iii) the positional approach.[18]

The *identity approach* to defining middle powers use national self-identification among state leaders as a defining criterion. In this approach, the middle power concept is reserved for states whose leaders claim a special middle power role for their own state. This approach departs from the observation that some states have deliberately cultivated a middle power foreign policy identity and used it as an instrument to support claims for a special status and recognition for the country in question.[19] One problem with the identity approach is that it does not give us a stable ground to identify which states that should be included in this category.[20] Does, for instance, a specific middle power immediately lose this status if a new government stop using this particular label? Can any state claim the status of middle power regardless of both size and policy? Moreover, this way of identifying middle powers ignores the importance of mutual recognition. Even if a state claims a certain status for itself, it will not receive membership in the preferred club unless this status is recognized by the members of the specific club.[21]

Researchers using the *behavioral approach* instead define and identify middle powers by focusing on a specific pattern of statecraft such as coalition and cooperation building using entrepreneurial and/or technical leadership.[22] During the Cold War, middle power diplomacy used mediation and bridge-building activities.[23] In the post-Cold War era, middle powers have widen their repertoire of activity on an issue-specific basis using niche diplomacy.[24] Nevertheless, middle powers are still assumed to share a general preference for multilateralism, confidence building measures and conflict reduction in promoting international security.[25] The behavioral tradition has been criticized for creating an unavoidable tautological element in their explanation since specific behavioral patterns are used both to define this category of states and to explain the behavior of the same group of states.[26] Another criticism is that their definition of middle power statecraft on statecraft is modeled on a few Western states and hereby excluding even comparably resourceful non-Western states.[27] Furthermore, focusing only on diplomatic practices means that any state may qualify as a middle power as long as its policy corresponds to the behavior pattern prescribed for this category of states.[28]

The *positional approach* is characterized by its focus on quantifiable indicators of power asymmetries between states relating to differences in population size, military expenditures, gross domestic product (GDP) etcetera.[29] According to Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil, the positional dimension "refer to the material power capabilities that middle powers possess relative to both great powers and […] small and weak states."[30] The positional approach is, Gilley and O'Neil argue, a natural point of departure for defining middle powers since relative status and access to power capacities are "necessary" conditions for middle powers to make initiatives that are both credible and feasible. However, they emphasized, having middle power capacities does not determine what states will do, but what they "in principle *can* do."[31] The positional approach to identifying middle powers has been criticized by researchers arguing that there "is little or no correlation between a given state's size or position in the international system and the conduct of its diplomacy."[32] It is correct that relative access to power resources does not determine how states behave or respond to external pressures and we do not expect that all middle powers will behave in the international system in a uniform manner. Differences relating to regional contexts and differences related to unit-level characteristics such as historical experiences of armed conflicts, geopolitical position and strategic exposure are likely to produce differences in strategic behavior.[33] However, the same can be said about both great powers and small states.

In analyzing great power conflicts, it is common to make a distinction between status quo and revisionist states.[34] These differences in general orientation have not been used as an argument against using great powers as an analytical category and the fact that small states also pursue different strategies has not generated demands among small-state scholars that the concept of small states should be restricted to states that conform to the researcher own expectations of small-state behavior. The diversity of middle power strategies *is* a problem for the behavioral approach because it uses behavioral patterns to separate middle powers from other categories of states, but it is not necessarily a problem for other approaches. The positional approach to identifying middle powers offers a way to treat the question of similarities and differences between middle powers as an open empirical question.[35] Moreover, the fact that middle powers do not respond strategically to changes in the international system in a uniform manner does not exclude the possibility of identifying similarities among our cases related to power asymmetries distinguishing middle powers from both great powers and small states. In addition to being more resourceful than small states and less resourceful than great powers, middle powers hold a unique relative position based on positive and negative power asymmetries toward other states. In relations to small states, and especially in matters relating to their own regional system, middle powers may pursue "great power strategies" based on a positive power asymmetry. This is generally not the case when a middle power confronts a great power or a superpower.

Another criticism against the positional approach concerns the unavoidable arbitrariness of any quantitative "cut-off line" between different categories of states.[36] We agree with this criticism as well, especially when it comes to the lower dividing line between middle powers and small states. To avoid the problem with the lower threshold, we focus on a selection of comparably resourceful states collectively referred to as "major middle powers," a subcategory of states that does not exclude the possibility of categorizing slightly less resourceful states as middle powers as well.[37] To be included in the subcategory of major middle powers, a state must first fulfill the negative criteria of not qualifying as a superpower or great power. Secondly, it must fulfill the positive triple-criteria of having one of the world's (i) top 20 largest economies (measured as annual GDP), (ii) top 20 accumulated defense expenditures during the last ten years and (iii) having a recognized political status indicated by membership in the Group of Twenty (G20).[38]

Concerning the negative criteria, we have identified five "system-determining states" in the present international system: the sole superpower United States (U.S.), the potentially emergent superpower China and the three great powers France, Russia and the United Kingdom (UK). Our definition of system-determining states is based on aggregate capabilities relating to three different dimensions: (i) economic capabilities indicated by size of GDP and GDP per capita; (ii) military capabilities measured as accumulated military expenses and access to key capacities such as global power projection for super powers and access to nuclear weapons and second strike capabilities for great powers; and (iii) political recognition indicated by permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[39] To meet the criteria for system-determining states, a state must score high on at least two out of three indicators. India's relatively high accumulated defense expenditure, access to nuclear weapons and large GDP could make create a case for classifying India as a great power. However, India's very low GDP per capita and rudimentary second-strike capabilities make us include India in the category of major middle powers instead. Combining the negative criterion and the positive triple-criteria leaves us with a selection of 10 states that fulfills both the negative criterion and the three positive criteria: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.[40] In this article, we will focus on the first eight of these states.

Defining defense strategy

In his seminal work *Theory of international politics*, Kenneth Waltz argued that each state must have its own the survival as its most fundamental end. In a self-help system, the means for self-preservation fall into two categories: i) internal efforts, i.e., actions to increase the state's military strength and resilience; and ii) external efforts, i.e., actions to strengthen the own military alliance and/or weaken the opposing ditto.[41] The emphasis on self-preservation has been challenged by the so-called "offensive" realist scholars, arguing that states rather should pursue strategies that improve their relative position and maximize their power to enforce their will on other states.[42] Stephen Walt has instead argued that the choice to either oppose (balance) or ally (bandwagon) with rising powers is not only based on assessments of changes in the distribution of power among competing states. It is also based on threat perceptions and states will "ally with or against the most threatening power."[43] We see no need to make a definite choice between defensive and offensive realism. Instead, we view state priorities on this issue as an open empirical question. However, we do agree with Walt regarding the centrality of focusing on perceived threats in analyzing the actual strategies pursued by states.

In addition to protecting their own survival or security and maximizing their influence and ability to enforce their will upon others, states may have strong interests in gaining recognition of having a certain relative positional *status* rank. In the present state system, status recognition includes ideas of each state having equal formal rights to sovereignty, procedures of diplomatic representation and collective recognition by peers acknowledged as membership and representation in the United Nations (UN) or organizations such as the Group of Seven (G7) and G20. Interest in states' competition for status is not novel. During the Cold War, some researchers emphasized this aspect of power competition in their analyses and definitions of great powers and less resourceful states.[44] In the second decade of the twenty-first century, interest for status resurged, resulting in a celebrated edited volume with the title *Status in World Politics*. In the introduction to this book, status is defined as "collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued attributes." Status, they argued, manifests itself in two distinct ways: as membership in a defined club of actors and as a relative standing within a particular club. Membership in "international society" – recognized sovereignty – is a status sought by many sub-state groups, and once this status is achieved, the new state may continue to improve their relative position further by advancing to middle power status. Ultimately, states may seek entrance to the highest status group – the great power club – and continue to compete for the "less formal rankings" within this group.[45]

The three basic interests – survival, influence and status – are not mutually exclusive. Power maximizing may, as argued by Mearsheimer, be a way of protecting the survival of the own state, a strategy perhaps most likely to be practiced by great powers. Increased influence over other actors may, in a similar way, lead to recognition of an increased status rank of a particular state. Survival may also be taken for granted by both less and more resourceful states that are situated in a regional context where states do not perceive any existential threats, creating opportunities to instead focus on strategies to improve either influence or status. This, however, does not mean that these "secure states" do not care about their survival. What matters in our empirical analysis is what kind of basic aims the political leadership *prioritizes* in questions related to the use of their armed forces.

In the following, our dependent variable, i.e., defense strategy, is defined as the sum of all internal and external military efforts undertaken by a state. The basic interests, survival, influence and status are common to both these dimensions of strategy being the part of the military strategy of a specific state that connects the internal efforts with the external efforts. The external efforts are labeled *Alignment strategy* and the internal efforts *Military strategy*. The former category may be divided into four basic options: i) balance of power; ii) bandwagoning; iii) isolation and iv) hedging. These alignment strategies may be pursued both within and outside an alliance, and different members of an alliance may pursue different alignment strategies. Balance of power strategies is essentially defensive strategies aiming at avoiding losses.[46] This aim is achieved by creating counter weights to expansive powers in order to increase costs for further expansion. Both first ranked powers and secondary states are, according to Waltz, expected to "flock to the weaker side" thereby avoiding their main threat: that one state establish itself as a hegemon.[47] Within an alliance, states can *chain gang*. This strategy includes stronger commitments to agreements on collective defense and offers of military contributions to allied contingency planning or war efforts. Other members may instead pursue a more isolationist strategy and *pass the buck* to some or several of their allies, hence free riding on the security provided by other members of the alliance. Outside an alliance, states can also pursue a buck-passing strategy or a strategy of *courting*. The latter strategy includes measures to increase the possibility of receiving support from a particular state or a specific alliance as well as measures to enhance the ability to give and receive military assistance.[48] Isolationistic strategies may differ in intensity. Active efforts to promote the own state's interests in relation to the great powers is, by Ole Elgström, termed *distancing*. The opposite of this strategy consists of a passive approach, i.e., avoidance of involvement in great power conflicts, i.e., *hiding*.[49]

According to Walt, bandwagoning may be pursued with two distinctly different motives. Defensive bandwagoning may be pursued as a form of *appeasement* policy. By aligning with the threatening power, the state may avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere. Bandwagoning may also be pursued for offensive purposes where a state may "align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory."[50] Randall Schweller has further explored the strategy of *bandwagoning for profit*. He argues that this strategy is driven by "the opportunity for gain."[51] For the purposes of this study, *offensive bandwagoning* is defined as strategy primarily motivated by perceived opportunities for gains and includes support to a non-threatening state or alliance. Furthermore, this strategy includes cooperation with the stronger side in a conflict and substantial contributions to common efforts. *Defensive bandwagoning*, on the other hand, is defined as a strategy including unilateral concessions to a threatening state or alliance in order to promote the security of the own state. In more recent publications, Walt has updated his analysis of strategic alternatives by focusing on less resourceful states responses to the U.S. unipolar power.[52] The alignment strategy *regional balancing* presents an additional motive for establishing closer ties with the unipolar power: the desire for protection against a local regional threat. However, since this strategy is primarily directed toward countering a regional threat, it should, in the terminology of balance of threat theory, be considered a specific form of balance of power.[53]

A fourth main alignment strategy is hedging. One way of understanding this strategy is to see it as a way of mitigating risks by pursing different options simultaneously. For instance, the European Union's (EU) policy in relation to Russia has previously sought to both balance a possible aggressive resurgence and integrate the country in Europe.[54] Ji Yun Lee describes hedging as a way to avoid the risk of "betting on the wrong horse."[55] This hedging strategy may include efforts of *multiple courting*, a combination of alignment strategies involving cooperation with several different states or institutional settings. In 2009, Walt identified an additional hedging strategy: *leash-slipping*. In applying this strategy, states form an alliance or establish common institutions in order to "reduce their dependency on the unipole by pooling their own capabilities."[56] In Table 1 below, the alignment strategies are summarized.

According to Richard Betts, strategy can be defined as "the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other".[57] Colin Gray offers a similar definition claiming that strategy concerns "the direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends".[58] In addition, Gray makes a distinction between *grand strategy* and *military strategy*. The former is defined as "the direction and use made of any or all the assets" of a state "including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics." The latter concerns "the direction and use made of force and the threat of force, for the

Table 1. External efforts – Alignment strategies.

Balance of power	Bandwagoning	Isolation	Hedging
• Chain-ganging • Courting • Regional balancing	• Offensive (for profit) • Defensive (appeasement)	• Active (distancing) • Passive (hiding) • Buck-passing	• Leash-slipping • Multiple-courting

purposes of policy as decided by politics."[59] In his influential work, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Barry Posen presents a similar distinction between grand strategy and military doctrine. The latter is defined as "the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means."[60] Our definition of defense strategy is less inclusive than Gray's definition of grand strategy, but more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy. Similar to Betts and Gray, we will approach the concept of military strategy through the lens of Maxwell Taylor's definition. It frames strategy as a matching set of ends, ways and means.[61] Clausewitz, who coined the ends-means paradigm, initially advanced this view.[62]

Concerning ends we will analyze the military strategies of our selected cases by focusing on the three basic interests previously identified. In analyzing means we will introduce a further distinctions related to the more complex international security environment of the post-Cold War era: a distinction between military capabilities primarily developed for national defense and capabilities primarily related to expeditionary warfare and power projection outside the own region. Related to ways we are interested in whether states are adopting unilateral or multilateral approaches in questions related to the use of force. In Table 2 below, our operationalization of military strategies is summarized.

To distinguish between different classes of states we will use a fourfold distinction between first-, second-, third- and fourth-ranked states developed in our previous study on small states.[63] The political leadership of a *first-ranked* state believes that it can obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it can defend itself against states of each category. A first-ranked state further believes that it can lead and organize both unilateral and multilateral international military operations. The number of first-ranked powers determines the polarity of the system is therefore commonly referred to as "system-determining states." The political leadership of a *second-ranked state* recognizes that it cannot obtain security against a first-ranked state primarily by use of its own capabilities. However, they believe that it alone can defend itself against a second-, third- or fourth-ranked state and that it has the ability to lead and organize multilateral military operations together with other states or through an international institution. The political leadership of a *third-ranked state* recognizes that it cannot obtain security against an attack from a first- or second-ranked state primarily by use of its own capabilities or lead and organize multilateral military operations. The political leadership of a third-ranked state does, however, believe that it can defend itself against a third- or fourth-ranked state and that it has the ability make significant contributions to multilateral military operations. The political leadership of a *fourth-ranked* state recognizes that it cannot obtain security against an attack from any higher ranked state or make significant contributions to multilateral military operations. In our previous study, we demonstrated that the perceptions of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden mostly corresponded to third-ranked states.[64] We expect that middle powers are more likely to evaluate their own military capabilities corresponding to our definition of second-ranked states.

The diversity of middle power strategies

Regarding **alignment strategies**, the empirical findings indicate differences among the eight middle powers explored. Three of them preferred hedging, although with slightly different approach.

Table 2. Internal efforts – Military strategies.

Ends	Means	Ways
• Survival	• Capabilities for national defense	• Unilateral approaches
• Influence	• Capabilities for international operations (Expeditionary warfare)	• Multilateral approaches
• Status		

Partly explained by the ambition avoiding being too dependent on the U.S., it is inferred that both the Canadian and the German alignment strategy is *leash-slipping*. Germany's approach is expressed in the ambition finding multilateral solutions primarily through the EU and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rather than via U.S.-led operations.[65] For obvious reasons, the EU is not an option for Canada.[66] In the Canadian case, the alternatives to the U.S. hence consist of NATO and the UN. However, since the U.S. has prominent position in both these organizations, Canada lack the opportunity EU members have, i.e., an independent platform vis-à-vis the U.S. Italy applies a composite of approaches, and it is deemed appropriate to label its alignment strategy as *multiple-courting* toward not only the EU, NATO and the UN, but also the U.S. hence giving a rather balanced attention to these contexts.

Australia explicitly declared its ambition to work closely especially with the U.S., but with other partners as well. Since the cooperation with the U.S. clearly was prioritized, and since the Australian government expressed relatively limited worries regarding China's ambitions in the Australian neighborhood, we conclude that Australia applied a *bandwagoning for profit strategy*. However, depending on how the perceptions of China develop, we argue that Australia may be in a transformation toward a courting or regional balancing variant of balance of power strategy.[67]

The Brazilian government argued that the regional integration in South America had increased Brazil's ability to act on the international arena. The establishment of the South American Defense Council in December 2008 was considered being "of especial importance" in this regard.[68] We conclude that Brazil preferred an *active isolationist* alignment strategy in which the influence of the U.S. on the South American continent gradually is to be replaced with an increased Brazilian ditto. We argue that India also strive for active isolationism. India's focus was on regional deterrence but the government explicitly announced its ambitions expanding India's international role by increasing the contributions to UN-led operations.[69]

Clearly, Japan and South Korea's dependency on the U.S. regarding their national security made in a necessity rather than an option applying a *regional balancing* strategy.[70] Similar to India, their focus was on regional deterrence with increased ambitions contributing militarily to international operations. Contrary to India, these contributions have mainly focused on military observers and combat support as well as at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Only recently, combat units have been deployed abroad. Notably, the size of the ground units has so far been rather modest compared to the maritime contributions, i.e., destroyers. While all three Asian major middle powers preferred channeling their international engagement through the UN, Japan and South Korea opened up for other contexts as well including NATO. Hedging was, however, not an option in this regard since NATO lack both will and resources to expand its collective defense to Northeast Asia. The NATO option should hence rather be viewed in a force generating and/or international peace support perspective.

Regarding the **ends** of the military strategy, all countries in one way or another referred to the own country's strategic weight, international importance and/or prominence in global affairs in their elaborations. Some of them also saw new opportunities and responsibilities arriving with the perceived upcoming multipolar order. "The advent of a multipolar order, marked by the coexistence of traditional and emerging powers, brings new opportunities" the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, as an example, argued in the defense white paper of 2012.[71] Despite these similarities, we observe four different outcomes among the explored states.

The focus has, in some cases, over time shifted between status and influence. For example, in 2011, the German cabinet acknowledged that the new international settings provided new options and declared its ambition being in a position providing adequate "military contribution in accordance with its size, thus ensuring its influence" in a way that "reflect Germany's position in the world."[72] A couple of years later, the German cabinet, in the white paper on security policy, stressed the importance of maintaining Germany's international "economic, political and military significance."[73] Canada provides another example of shifting focus. By participating in overseas operations, the Canadian-armed forces "will enhance Canada's status as a responsible and contributing member of the international community" the Canadian cabinet concluded in 2005.[74] Ensuring that Canada "can remain secure, continue to prosper, and exert positive influence on the international stage" was explicitly declared a key objective of the Canadian government a decade later.[75] We conclude that while Canada has been focusing on preserving, or even enhancing its influence, Germany seems to have been more preoccupied with not losing its status.

Other states have kept their focus over time. As a "middle-size power, there is much we can and should do to help to keep our region secure, and support global stability" the Australian cabinet declared. To "maximize Australia's influence on events to Australia's advantage" was hence declared a fundamental objective.[76] Contrary to Australia, South Korea mentioned improving its international status. Expanding South Korea's "international role" was hence expressed as core objectives.[77] However, both Japan and South Korea rather stressed survival as the overarching end. The Japanese government declared, for example, the three overarching national interests of Japan to be the following: i) maintaining Japan's peace and security as well as ensuring its survival; ii) enhancing Japan's peace and security and iii) maintaining and upholding international order based on universal values and rules.[78] Similarly, the Korean government declared "protecting the nation's territory and sovereignty and people's lives and properties from multifaceted and complex threats such as armed provocations by North Korea as well as current and future threats and transnational threats" as the core objective.[79] Consequently, we argue that both Japan and South Korea prioritized survival. The two countries also viewed the armed forces as an instrument enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships with their partners, rather than promoting the country's status or influence.

Other middle powers present a balanced priority to status and influence that has been consistent over time. In 2012, the Brazilian President, Miss Dilma Rousseff, declared, for example, that the rise of "Brazil's international status in the 21st century" already was a reality. Brazil's "increasing external presence will require a proper dissuasive military capacity" she concluded.[80] Nevertheless, we argue that the Brazilian government tend to give a balanced priority to influence and status. As Brazil, India also explicitly declared that Indian-armed forces were to be used internationally in order to gain influence and to project power. The Indian government concluded that the international order slowly but steadily was developing toward a multipolar world, with India as one of the poles. "India's emerging economic, political and military capabilities and its position as a reasonable power, including in the areas of nuclear capability, has led to a significant upscale" of India's global position, the government proudly announced. This upscale in India's international relations included "the field of defense," the government clarified.[81] The Italian government also stressed the importance of status and argued: "Italy's role in the world is determined by our vital and strategic interests as a nation and as a prominent member of the international community."[82] Arguably, Italy has also been striving for influence as much as for status.

In addition, when it comes to the **means** of the military strategy, the explored cases present different outcomes. Some states focused on means for expeditionary warfare, and others on means for national defense, while some presented a rather balanced approach. Regarding the former category, the Australian government admitted its intent maintaining regionally superior armed forces and its ambition being capable rapidly conducting peacekeeping operations regionally. Amphibious and sealift ships as well as strategic and operational air lift and other expeditionary combat support assets were, the Australian government argued, "required for strategic mobility for our forces and to provide us with the ability to project military power throughout our primary operational environment and, on occasions, beyond."[83] In 2005, the Canadian government expressed its ambitions that the Canadian-armed forces was "to play a leading and lasting role in peace support operations" and announced its commitment to increase the Canadian-armed forces' capacity to participate with allies in international operations.[84] In 2017, the Canadian cabinet concluded that the reemergence of major power competition put a renewed importance of deterrence and consequently on the ability conducting military operations on Canadian soil. The focus remained, however, on contributing to international operations.[85]

In 2011, the German focus on rapid reaction capability was mainly connected to NATO and the EU. The ambition assuming command responsibility as a framework nation, and hence providing the required capabilities for the entire task spectrum was given much attention.[86] In 2016, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the ambition redefining the military toolbox even further. Rapid availability, high levels of readiness, appropriate sustainability and strategic deployability were the identified key concepts.[87] Already in 2005, the Italian Chief of Defense (ChoD) stressed the necessity increasing the quantitative dimension of the expeditionary capacity of the Italian-armed forces "to the level of ambition of a nation that wishes to maintain a relevant role in the multinational context."[88] A decade later, the Italian government confirmed the continued ambitions for the Italian-armed forces being able to conduct "rapid operations aimed to protect vital national interests, either independently or as part of a broader coalition."[89]

While expeditionary capacity also was part of the Brazilian ambitions, the focus was, however, rather on continental power projection capacity. Brazil must have, the Brazilian government argued, a military capacity "that corresponds to its economic, political and strategic stature" in order to have not only "its voice heard" but also "its position respected."[90] Consequently, we argue that Brazil preferred a balanced approach.

Although India, Japan and South Korea all seemed to prefer deploying naval forces when engaging internationally, only India expressed this position explicitly. In addition, the Indian government explicitly announced its ambitions achieving a nuclear triad. All three countries organized units designed for expeditionary warfare including amphibious and airborne brigades as well as enablers such as landing ships and transport aircraft. The bulk of the armed forces was, however, designed for regional deterrence and national defense. Over time, the Indian-armed forces had, as an example, about 1.3 million troops on active duty with additional about 1 million in reserve. The army organized the absolute bulk of these troops, over 2 million. Despite this impressive quantity, when the military contributions to international peace support efforts peaked in 2012, India had only some 7,100 troops deployed abroad.[91] In 2017, the Japanese government, as another example, expressed new ideas on how to develop the Japanese-armed forces. Hence, capabilities considered necessary when responding to attacks on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space attacks, cyber-attacks as well as major disasters were given priority.[92]

We also identified three different outcomes regarding **ways**, i.e., one favoring a multilateral approach, another favoring unilateral approach and a third elaborating rather balanced on both the multi- and the unilateral approaches. We argue that the Australian, Canadian, German, Japanese and South Korean employment of forces have been dominated by multilateral approaches. In the Canadian and German cases, NATO seems to be the favored context, while both Japan and South Korea preferred a multilateral approach, mainly based on their strong relations with the U.S. Independently conducting military operations without relying on forces of other countries was declared being an Australian ambition regarding its neighborhood. Beyond that neighborhood, Australian forces were to be deployed only as part of a multinational coalition. "Australia will work closely" with both the U.S. and other international partners "to play an important role in coalition operations wherever Australia's interests are engaged" the Australian government declared.[93] Consequently, we argue that Australia in total also favors multilateralism.

The Brazilian government also elaborated on multilateralism. "To enlarge the country's projection in the world concert and to reaffirm its commitment with the defense of peace and with the cooperation among the peoples, Brazil should intensify its participation in humanitarian actions and in peace missions with the support of multilateral organisms" the Brazilian government concluded already in 2005.[94] When contributing to multilateral efforts, the UN was the preferred context "since the strengthening of a collective security system is beneficial to world peace."[95] A decade later, unilateral power projection operations were given priority. Although the Brazilian government also stressed the importance of participating in operations established and authorized by the UNSC, we argue that Brazil has come to give more weight on the unilateral approach. Despite the ambition contributing to UN-led operations, India also has showed its capability conducting unilateral operations abroad such as sea surveillance of the economic zones of the Maldives and the evacuation operations of Indian citizens from Libya and Iraq, respectively. We conclude that India's overarching ways should be interpreted as unilateral.

As the other NATO members, Italy also favors a multilateral approach. However, Italy has, as India, conducted a national overseas operation on another state's territory. Moreover, the unilateral Italian operations in Northern Africa may be interpreted as using a window of opportunity, i.e., the civil war in Libya, increasing its influence as well as status rather than countering a perceived strategic exposure to threats emanating from Africa. We therefore argue that Italy's employment of military force indicates a balance between the multi- and unilateral approaches.

In Table 3, the empirical findings are summarized. Obviously, the middle powers present a great variation of defense strategies. Consequently, our first question regarding whether or not middle powers develop similar strategies can be answered with a NO. However, we argue that our findings indicate that the second question on the usefulness of exploring middle powers as a specific category should be answered with a YES. By taking a closer look at the different regional contexts our cases are situated within, similarities between middle powers belonging to similar RSC appear. By relating our findings on the military strategy of major middle powers to standard interpretations of strategies of more and less resourceful states, we also see some common elements in terms of ends, means and ways that separate middle powers from both great powers and small states.

The similarities of middle power strategies

In the second section of this article, we said that we did not expect that all major middle powers will respond to changes in the international system in a uniform manner since differences related to regional contexts and unit-level characteristics are likely to produce differences in strategic behavior. So far, the analysis of our initial results seems to confirm this expectation. However, a closer analysis of the different regional contexts will also reveal similarities between major middle powers belonging to similar regional systems. Moreover, using our operationalization of military strategy as a combination of ends, means and ways, we also see similarities among middle powers across regions when the military strategies of major middle powers are compared to more and less resourceful states.

In identifying differences among regional systems, we use elements of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex Theory.[96] In contrast to most previous research on the regional level in international relations, Buzan and Waever's analytical framework includes an analysis of both the internal dynamics of regional systems and the interplay between the regional level and the global level.[97] According to their conceptualization of RSC, the regional level

Table 3. The defense strategies of middle powers.

	ALIGNMENT STRATEGY	MILITARY STRATEGY		
		ENDS	MEANS	WAYS
AUSTRALIA	Bandwagoning for profit	Influence	Expeditionary warfare	Multilateral
BRAZIL	Active Isolation	Influence/Status	Balanced	Unilateral
CANADA	Leash-Slipping	Influence	Expeditionary Warfare	Multilateral
GERMANY	Leash-Slipping	Status	Expeditionary Warfare	Multilateral
INDIA	Active Isolation	Influence/Status	National defense	Unilateral
ITALY	Multiple-Courting	Influence/Status	Expeditionary Warfare	Multi- and unilateral
JAPAN	Regional Balancing	Survival	National defense	Multilateral
SOUTH KOREA	Regional Balancing	Survival	National defense	Multilateral

constitutes a separate analytical level defined along four dimensions: i) geographical boundaries; ii) two or more autonomous units, i.e., states; iii) polarity in terms of distribution of power among the units belonging to the RSC and iv) a "pattern of amity and enmity" consisting of expectations related to conflicts between states within a region. The latter dimension focuses on durable patterns of interaction ranging from conflict formations through security regimes to security communities.[98] Our analysis will focus on the third and fourth dimensions.

Regarding the polarity, Buzan and Waever included the level of great power presence or penetration in the RSC in their elaborations. Consequently, a RSC with a great power being contained within it was labeled *great power centered*, while a RSC with no regional great power and a low degree of penetration was labeled *standard*. A third category, *great power influenced*, was placed in the middle of the spectrum due to a high degree of great power penetration. In addition, we find Emanuel Adler and Michel Barnett's distinction between loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled security communities useful. The latter category is defined as a RSC that possess "common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of collective security system."[99] Consequently, we include this category as a fourth outcome. When it comes to the patterns of amity and enmity, Buzan and Waever identified three distinct alternatives. *Conflict formations* are RSCs characterized by "a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations."[100] In *security regimes* patterns of security interdependence are "shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence," but these "fears and expectations are restrained by agreed set of rules of conduct, and expectations that those rules will be observed."[101] Finally, *security communities* are regions characterized by patterns of security interdependence in which the units do not expect or even prepare for the use of force in their internal political relations. In Table 4 below, our eight cases are categorized according to these two dimensions.

So what can be said about the correlation between, on the one hand, the distribution of power among the RSC units and the patterns of amity and enmity, and, on the other hand, defense strategies? The alignment strategies multiple courting and leash-slipping are pursued in security communities characterized by regional cooperation, common institutions and no expectations of using force to manage intra-regional disputes. The friendly settings in North America and EU-Europe both offer institutional platforms to channel security cooperation through. Our initial findings indicate that the regional presence of even the sole superpower is less important in this regard than perhaps expected. Leash-slipping strategies in relation to the U.S. are applied by both Canada and Germany. However, tightly coupled complexes seem to offer better institutional frameworks for effective leash-slipping strategies. Italy's choice of pursuing a different hedging strategy, multiple courting, indicates a need to complement the analysis of alignment strategies of specific states with unit-level characteristics.

Contrary to hedging, all other three main alignment strategies are dependent on at least one friendly or hostile great power. In regions with more hostile settings, the perceived negative power asymmetry of the own state in relations to the dominating great power in the region seems to have explanatory power. Arguably, Japan and South Korea's perceived weakness in their relation to China explains their appliance of the balance of power strategy regional balancing leaning on support by the U.S. Notably, only Australia preferred a bandwagoning strategy. However, if

Table 4. Cases and RSCs.

	Conflict formation	Security regime	Security community
Great power centered	Japan and South Korea		Canada
Great power influenced		Australia	
Standard	India	Brazil	
Tightly coupled			Germany and Italy

China's penetration into Southeast Asian and Australia's neighborhood continues to increase, Australia may shift to regional balancing as well. Brazil's and India's active isolationism in relation to the U.S. and China respectively may be explained by a more positive evaluation of their own relative strength and a decreased level of great power influence in South America and South Asia, respectively. In addition, Australia, Brazil and India all have a leading position within their own regional systems being regional poles within their respective system. In the case of Brazil, the regional settings (a standard security regime) may even serve as a perceived force multiplier in this regard.

In summing up this part of our argument, we conclude that the analysis of the alignment strategies of major middle powers should include an analysis of differences related to the regional context that may reveal similarities between middle powers situated in similar RSCs. However, the polarity of regional systems and their patterns of amity and enmity will probably affect other categories of states in a similar ways. Therefore, our initial results related to the external efforts of the defense strategies of middle powers are not enough to support the claim for using middle powers as a separate category in exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states. A second analysis of our initial results on the internal efforts provides us with better support for this claim.

The greater the self-confidence, the greater the ambitions for influence. There is, however, one thing being confident in a rather friendly environment, such as in security communities/regimes, compared to being confident in relation to a hostile neighboring great power, i.e., in conflict formations. Regarding ends, superpowers and great powers are generally thought of as having global ambitions and interest, and their perceived position as top-dogs in the community of states has to be defended against challengers. Small states, on the other hand, often pay more attention to their own regional contexts and to the security of their own state. Their limited national capabilities make them more dependent on external efforts relying on quick adjustments to changes in an external environment that they cannot influence by use of their own capabilities.[102] Major middle powers seem to place themselves between these two positions. In contrast to small states, middle powers tend to prioritize enhancing or at least maintaining their international influence and status. Moreover, they strive for achieving leading roles regionally and internationally, something that is uncommon and in most cases materially impossible for small states to play. Still the level of ambition varies. Arguably, India's self-image even goes beyond being just a middle power despite its location in a conflict formation. Japan and South Korea, on the other hand, have a more pronounced focus on survival that can be explained by the hostile environment in Northeast Asia involving not only the unpredictable North Korean regime but also three competing great powers.

Regarding means, states in security communities have more options focusing on expeditionary warfare instead of national defense compared to countries in conflict formations. However, since all cases indicate an increased focus on capacity for expeditionary warfare, we argue that this can be explained by the quest for international recognition, status and/or influence regardless of the regional context. Regarding military capabilities, we notice a qualitative difference between major middle powers and small states corresponding to the greater ambitions of the former category of states. Most of our cases demonstrate that middle powers often invest in offensive military capabilities for regional or global power projection. This is highly uncommon for small states. Arguably, there is still a quantitative gap between the major middle powers' resources in this regard compared to the resources held by superpowers and great powers. Access to a wider range of military capabilities creates military options for middle powers that are not open to small states, and it also makes them more valuable and useful as partners to other states.

Regarding ways, we see similarities between middle powers and small states when it comes to international operations. Both categories of states have a general preference for multilateral operations. However, in similarity to even more resourceful states, many major middle powers also

Table 5. Perceived rank of military capabilities.

	National defense	International operations
First ranked	India	
Second ranked	Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea	Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Italy
Third ranked		Japan, South Korea
Fourth ranked		

emphasize the need to be able to act unilaterally in their own region and in some cases also internationally. Admittedly, there are differences between our cases in this respect too. Arguably, the focus on multi- rather than on unilateralism can be explained by both the degree of amity/enmity and unit-level characteristics related to by the self-image. In the former case, friendly surroundings provide options for international cooperation while hostile environments may make cooperation a necessity, not an option. If the self-confidence is high enough, unilateralism can be reflecting the perceived status and demand for influence. In Table 5, the perceived rank of military capabilities is presented.

Finally, we observe that all five cases located in security communities/regimes represent a common approach to military capabilities that correspond to our initial discussion on second-ranked states. Notably, the three cases located in conflict formations differ in this regard in two ways. First, while India clearly has the ambitions of a first-ranked state regarding the national defense dimension, its ambitions for international operations are similar to those of the cases located in security communities/regimes. Second, while both Japan and South Korea have similar perceptions of military capabilities for national defense as the cases located in security communities/regimes, their ambitions for international operations are rather modest. They correspond to these of third-ranked states and are similar to those of the small states we previously explored.[103] Arguably, the quest for survival in a hostile environment involving three great powers constrains them from fully acting as a middle power.

Conclusions

This article presents initial findings related to two questions: Do middle powers develop similar alignment and military strategies? Is middle powers a useful category for exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states?

Regarding the first question, our selected cases of major middle powers present a great variation in alignment strategies. However, an analysis of differences in regional contexts reveals similarities between middle powers belonging to similar regional complexes. In this regard, our findings indicate that the higher degree of great power rivalry within and penetration into a specific RSC, the lesser options for middle powers in that RSC to develop individual defense strategies and vice versa. Additionally, by comparing our findings on the military strategies of major middle powers to standard interpretations of strategies of more and less resourceful states, common elements in terms of ends, means and ways, appears that separate middle powers from both great powers and small states.

Regarding ends, major middle powers seem to place themselves between the categories of great powers and small states. Compared to small states, they are more concerned with enhancing or at least maintaining their international influence and status. However, with the possible exception of India, they do not present claims of being first-ranked powers. Regarding military capabilities, we notice a qualitative difference between major middle powers and small states corresponding to the greater ambitions of the former category of states. Most of the middle power case studies examined in this analysis have invested in offensive military capabilities for regional or global power projection that are unheard of among small states. Arguably, there is a quantitative gap between the major middle powers' resources compared to the resources held by superpowers and great powers. Regarding ways, we see similarities between middle powers and small states when it comes to international operations. Both categories of states have a general preference for multilateral operations. However, in similarity to even more resourceful states, many major middle powers also emphasize the need to be able to act unilaterally in their own region and in some cases also globally. These similarities make us conclude that even though middle powers do not develop similar defense strategies, they can still be seen as a useful category when exploring the diversity of real world strategies among states copying with change in the international system and challenges related to power asymmetries among more and less resourceful states.

Notes

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3. See, for example, John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neo-conservative Moment," *Survival*, 46, no. 1 (2004); Christopher Layne, "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the "Pax Americana"," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2012); Graham Allison, "Countdown to War: The Coming U.S.-Russia Conflict," *The National Interest* May/June 2015 Book 137 (2015); Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century. China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position," *International Security* 40, no. 3 (2016); Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides's Trap?* (London: Scribe Publications, 2017); Jennifer Welsh, *The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-first Century* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2017).
4. In identifying differences among regional systems, we use elements of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex Theory. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of International of Great Power Politics* (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).
6. Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, *Military Strategy of Small States,* 4–5. Regarding the distinction between external and internal efforts, see Waltz *Theory of International Politics,* 168 and his argument on internal and external balancing.
7. Arthur Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, edited by Arthur Lykke. (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: US Army War College, 1989).
8. See Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); David Vital, *The Inequality of States – A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford: Calderon Press, 1967); Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1968); David Vital, *The Survival of Small States – Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflicts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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12. See, for example, Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, no. 2 (1999); Jonathan Ping, *Middle power statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil, "China's Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers" in *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, edited by Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Allan Patience, "Imagining Middle Powers," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 2 (2014); Jeffrey Robertson, "Middle-power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 4 (2017).
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14. Eduard Jordaan, "The Emerging Middle Power Concept: Time to say Goodbye?," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (2017): 405.
15. Andrew Hurrell, "Some Reflections of the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions" in *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*, edited by Andrew Hurrell, Andrew Cooper, Guadalupe González González, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes and Srini Sitaraman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre, 2000, 1).
16. James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves, "Locating Middle Powers in International Relation Theory," in *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, edited by Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014, 29).
17. See, for example, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing* World Order (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 1993); Chapnick, "The Middle Power"; Andrew Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systematic Impact Approach," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 1 (2014); Robertson, "Middle-Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme."
18. Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systematic Impact Approach."
19. Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000); Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project. Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2005).
20. Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systematic Impact Approach," 76–7.
21. Hurrell, "Some Reflections of the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions."
22. Andrew Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy. A Conceptual Overview," in *Niche Diplomacy. Middle Powers after the Cold War*, edited by Andrew Cooper (London: Macmillan Press, 1997, 6, 9–13).
23. Alan Henrikson, "Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation within, across and outside Institutions," in *Niche Diplomacy. Middle Powers after the Cold War*, edited by Andrew Cooper (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).
24. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy. A Conceptual Overview."
25. Nossal and Stubbs, "Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?," 149–51.
26. Chapnick, "The Middle Power", 76.
27. Ping, *Middle power statecraft,* 39–40.
28. Cooper, "Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence", 322.
29. Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systematic Impact Approach," 71–2.
30. Gilley and O'Neil, "China's Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers," 4.
31. Ibid., 4. See also Ungerer, "The "Middle Power' Concept in Australian Foreign Policy," 539; Emmers and Teo, "Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific," 186.
32. Ungerer, "The "Middle Power' Concept in Australian Foreign Policy," 539; Cooper, "Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence," 321.
33. Concerning these variables, see Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, *Military Strategy of Small States.*
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35. See also Manicom & Reeves, “Locating Middle Powers in International Relation Theory”, 28.
36. See, for example, Øyvind Østerud, “Regional Great Powers,” in *Regional Great Powers in International Politics*, edited by Iver Neumann (London: Macmillan, 1992, 4); Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?,” in *Small States in International Relations*, edited by Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Jessica Beyer (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 2006); Anders Wivel, Alyson Bailes, and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security,” in *Small States and International Security: Europe and beyond*, edited by Clive Archer, Alyson Bailes, and Anders Wivel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
37. According to Manicom and Reeves states ranking roughly within the range of 10 to 30 on various power indexes can be characterized as middle powers. Manicom and Reeves, “Locating Middle Powers in International Relation Theory”, 30. For other recent examples of the positional approach, see Ping *Middle power statecraft;* Gilley and O’Neil, “China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers”; Emmers and Teo, “Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific.”
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