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Contributing Factors in a Successful Foodborne Outbreak Investigation: an Analysis of Data Collected by the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet), 2003-2010.

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Abstract

Background. Foodborne disease is estimated to cause 48 million illnesses annually in the US resulting in 3000 deaths [1]. Although most infections occur as sporadic cases, outbreak surveillance offers valuable insight about the foods and pathogens responsible for illnesses [2]. A total of 1632 foodborne disease outbreaks were reported during 2011-2012 [3] and recent data indicates an overall decrease in the number of outbreaks reported each year [4]. Understanding which factors contribute to the successful identification of a food vehicle in a foodborne outbreak investigation is crucial for improving outbreak response [5-10]. The purpose of this study was to describe outbreak characteristics and to determine which may be associated with the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation (i.e. one in which a food vehicle has been reported).

Methods. A foodborne disease outbreak was defined as the event in which two or more people acquired similar illnesses from consuming the same food or beverage.Outbreaks occurring in FoodNet sites during 2003 through 2010 were included in the analysis. *Results.* Data were available for 1441(87%) of the 1655 foodborne disease outbreaks documented in FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms from 2003 through 2010. A food vehicle was identified in 692 of the 1441 (48%) outbreaks. Six outbreak characteristics remained statistically significant in both univariate and multivariate analyses: environmental and/or food culture collection, FDA or state agriculture involvement, outbreak size, case-control studies, and number of fecal specimens tested for norovirus. *Conclusions*. Less than half of foodborne outbreaks examined here resulted in a food vehicle being identified. Having more robust resources available for outbreak detection and investigation may improve likelihood of a food vehicle being identified.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN A SUCCESSFUL FOODBORNE OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED BY THE FOODBORNE DISEASES ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK (FOODNET), 2003-2010

By

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B.S., UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN A SUCCESSFUL FOODBORNE OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED BY THE FOODBORNE DISEASES ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK (FOODNET), 2003-2010

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Acknowledgments

"That's the wonderful thing about man; he never gets so discouraged or disgusted that he gives up doing it all over again, because he knows very well it is important and WORTH the doing."

~Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451

I would like to recognize Dr. Christine Stauber and Dr. L. Hannah Gould for their patience and helpful advice in completing this thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Carole Thurman for introducing me to the wonderful world of biostatistics. I would also like to thank my friends and family, especially Zach Gerth, whose support and encouragement means the world to me. I could not have done this without you!

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Chapter I—Introduction

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines foodborne illness as a disease acquired "by consuming contaminated foods or beverages" [11]. Contamination may occur at any stage in food production—pre-harvest, harvest, processing, transport, food preparation, or food handling—and may affect one individual or may lead to a large-scale outbreak [12, 13]. Foodborne illness, according to the United States Economic Research Services, costs the US nearly 7 billion dollars annually. This estimate accounts for lost productivity, medical treatments for sick persons, outbreak mitigation efforts, and lost trade [12].

Various public health regulations have emerged in order to encourage food safety and thereby lessen the burden of foodborne illness. While previous efforts focused primarily on enforcing hygienic conditions in the food service industry, current approaches involve monitoring pathogens at all stages of food production [12, 13]. The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) in particular has been instrumental in reconstructing the US food safety system so that the focus is on prevention of foodborne outbreaks [14]. To improve compliance with food safety measures and response to food safety problems, this law grants the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) several new authorities. These include: mandating preventive controls and safety standards at food establishments, creating regulations which protect against intentional contamination, ordering a mandatory recall if a voluntary one is unsuccessful, and establishing requirements for recordkeeping at facilities that handle high-risk foods [14]. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) requires all food businesses to spot food

1

production stages at which potential hazards may occur and to propose methods for controlling these hazards [12]. The World Health Organization (WHO) and Food Agriculture Organization founded the Codex Alimentarius Commission, an international group responsible for developing food safety standards and guidelines. The WHO also provides health promotion materials to educate both food workers and consumers about the importance of practicing safe food handling and preparation behaviors [13].

Despite the existence of food safety laws and the continual effort to improve food safety, foodborne illness remains a prominent public health issue in the United States. Foodborne disease is estimated to cause 48 million illnesses annually in the US, resulting in 128,000 hospitalizations and 3000 deaths [1]. The 2012 data from FoodNet show that *Salmonella* and *Escherichia coli* infections collectively account for almost 90 percent of all foodborne outbreak-related cases [15]. Although most infections occur as sporadic cases, outbreak surveillance offers valuable insight about the foods and pathogens responsible for illnesses [2]. Preventing these illnesses poses a challenge due to limited resources and difficulty linking individual illnesses to a particular food vehicle. Understanding which factors contribute to the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation is crucial for attributing an illness to a food vehicle and for improving outbreak response [5-10].

This study focused on six different types of outbreak characteristics: agencies substantially involved in the investigation; items included in the investigation (i.e. case interviews, analytical epi investigation, environmental/food cultures, product traceback/recall); number of fecal specimens screened at a lab, public or private, via specified test methods; number of cases in the outbreak; type of etiologic agent identified for a specific outbreak; and Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) category to which the food vehicle belongs. Data from FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms for the years 2003 through 2010 were included in the analysis. Odds ratios were calculated to estimate whether a specific outbreak characteristic—for example, food and/or environmental cultures attained in the investigation—increases the likelihood of a food vehicle being identified. The overall purpose of this study was to describe outbreak characteristics and to determine which may be associated with the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation (i.e. one in which a food vehicle has been identified and reported by the public health agency).

Chapter II—Literature review

Outbreak investigations involve a number of health agencies working to reduce the impact of foodborne illnesses. These agencies share a responsibility to ensure food safety by preventing, responding to, and controlling outbreaks. While some deem these efforts sufficient, others criticize their ability to lead an effective foodborne illness outbreak investigation.

The National Environmental Health Association (NEHA), in an assessment of food safety capacity at local and state health departments, identifies trends which may halt progress of an outbreak investigation [16]. Researchers found that lack of partnering between local and other agencies, decreased funding sources, inability to set long-term controls (i.e. product recall), inexperienced environmental health workers, inadequate training opportunities, and insufficient time for staff to investigate an outbreak may be responsible for reducing capacity of programs which address foodborne illness [16].

The Environmental Health Specialists Network (EHS-Net) oversaw a similar study using focus groups comprised of specialists from public health departments in eight states [10]. Discussion topics consisted of outbreak investigation procedures, methods for identifying factors associated with an outbreak, and challenges. Investigation practices varied widely by jurisdiction; in fact, nearly half of all participants noted minimal involvement except for routine restaurant inspections. Others recounted not only directing restaurant inspections but also interviewing customers and employees to find ill persons and suspected vehicle(s), requesting food or stool samples, and collaborating with epidemiologists and nurses. Instead of describing contributing factors, most participants considered illness characteristics when determining a potential pathogen and managing a restaurant investigation. They cited the following as negatively affecting the investigation: uncooperative employees, difficulty contacting customers to complete a food history, poor epidemiologic assistance and management support, inadequate training in outbreak investigation, lack of cooperation among health agencies, insufficient staffing, physician noncompliance, and delayed outbreak notification. Shifting focus toward obtaining food and stool samples and identifying ill employees and unsafe food handling behaviors would likely increase pathogen detection and foodborne illness knowledge [10].

While both the NEHA and EHS-Net studies address issues faced by public health specialists, others examine consumer attitudes regarding foodborne illnesses. Arendt *et al* [17] convened focus groups to discover reasons for under-reporting. Feeling too ill, not knowing the cause or who to contact, and thinking that reporting would not benefit anyone kept consumers from reporting foodborne illnesses [17]. Healthcare professionals admitted that a lack of food safety knowledge prevented them from realizing the potential severity of foodborne illnesses and treating the patient appropriately. To better care for consumers, the authors recommended that healthcare professionals should receive training on detecting, preventing and managing foodborne illnesses [17].

Health and safety officials also shape consumer behaviors during an outbreak since they recommend which foods to avoid. Issuing warnings and food recalls requires determining which food may be responsible for an outbreak; however, incomplete and changing information makes it difficult for officials to provide advice to consumers. Arnade *et al* [9] learned that news about contamination of foods, rather than food safety, piques consumer interest more often. This suggests that quickly identifying the suspected food vehicle(s) would facilitate better handling of food safety announcements and thus improve foodborne disease outbreak response.

Consumers, producers, supply chain managers, and governments all rely on news they receive during an outbreak to make decisions related to food production. A key component of recognizing when potential food-related hazards emerge is ability to link specific cases of illness to food vehicle(s) [18]. Attributing illnesses to food, however, proves difficult even for large outbreaks. Until recently, there existed no means by which foodborne illnesses could be categorized according to transmission mode [5]. Painter et al [19] devised a hierarchy of 17 commodities to help reporting agencies better describe foods causing outbreaks and to glean information regarding how different food commodities contribute to illness. Coupled with outbreak reports, this categorization scheme has been used to describe sources of illness at the point-of-consumption. In another study, Painter *et al* [7] reviewed data on foodborne disease outbreaks from 1998 to 2008 in order to estimate the number of foodborne illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths for each of the 17 commodities. They attributed 22% of illnesses to leafy vegetables, 16% of hospitalizations to dairy products, and 19% of deaths to poultry. While these results may lend to prioritization of food safety interventions, one main limitation is that this analysis accounted for only those outbreaks with an implicated food vehicle and single etiologic agent. This represents only 37% of all foodborne disease outbreaks present in the database, suggesting that food attribution is an area of outbreak investigation that needs improvement.

Determining factors which lead to a successful foodborne outbreak investigation

may help with food attribution. Timeliness, according to Hedberg *et al* [20], plays a vital role in identifying those possibly exposed to the source of illness and in limiting case count for an outbreak. Jones *et al* [21] agrees that timely reporting—along with resource availability, health department priorities, specimens procured, health care sought by ill persons, and assistance from health care providers and lab workers—affects whether a food vehicle is established.

Tauxe *et al* [2] defines surveillance as "the systematic collection of reports of specific health events as they occur in a population". It delineates the burden of diseases and mobilizes epidemiologic investigations and prevention initiatives. Foodborne illness surveillance serves these primary purposes: ascertaining a food vehicle, etiology, and location of exposure; and summarizing the results of an outbreak investigation [22]. Implementing HACCP-based plans in the food industry, detecting unfamiliar pathogens, generating awareness of current problems, observing changes in the prevalence of outbreaks by etiology, and evaluating the effectiveness of control and prevention efforts represent additional benefits [2, 6, 22]. Although the United States began surveillance activities in the 1800s, it was not until 2010 that foodborne disease outbreaks emerged as "a nationally notifiable condition" [22].

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains several complementary surveillance systems, including the National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) and the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet), that compile data on foodborne illness and outbreaks in the United States. NORS captures data on enteric and waterborne disease outbreaks reported by public health departments. By integrating the Waterborne Disease and Outbreak Surveillance System and Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, NORS has enhanced outbreak reporting [23]. FoodNet monitors lab-confirmed infections caused by nine pathogens commonly transmitted through food: *Salmonella*, Shiga toxin-producing *Escherichia coli* (STEC) O157 and non-O157, *Campylobacter, Listeria, Vibrio, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Shigella*, and *Yersinia* [24-26]. Though initially comprised of five states—California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, and Oregon—the surveillance area soon covered 10 states and 15 percent of the US population. FoodNet releases an annual *National Report Card on Food Safety*, which compares changes in incidence of diseases during the past year to a baseline period. These aid regulatory agencies, healthcare workers, and consumer and industry groups in tailoring food safety strategies to meet national health objectives. A report showing a rise in *Escherichia coli* O157 infections due to ground beef consumption, for example, prompted USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service and the meat industry to launch a series of interventions which significantly reduced incidence of infection [24].

Foodborne disease outbreak surveillance systems like NORS and FoodNet provide valuable insight regarding the foods and pathogens responsible for illnesses [2]. CDC maintains NORS and FoodNet to collect data on foodborne disease outbreaks occurring in the United States and to ascertain the causes of these outbreaks. These systems serve as primary sources of information about illnesses, hospitalizations, deaths, food vehicle(s) and etiologic agents for foodborne disease outbreaks in the United States [15, 23].

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Chapter III—Manuscript

Contributing factors in a successful foodborne outbreak investigation: an analysis of data collected by the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet), 2003-2010

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Keywords: foodborne illness, foodborne disease, foodborne disease outbreaks, foodborne outbreak investigations

Abstract

Background. Foodborne disease is estimated to cause 48 million illnesses annually in the US resulting in 3000 deaths [1]. Although most infections occur as sporadic cases, outbreak surveillance offers valuable insight about the foods and pathogens responsible for illnesses [2]. A total of 1632 foodborne disease outbreaks were reported during 2011-2012 [3] and recent data indicates an overall decrease in the number of outbreaks reported each year [4]. Understanding which factors contribute to the successful identification of a food vehicle in a foodborne outbreak investigation is crucial for improving outbreak response [5-10]. The purpose of this study was to describe outbreak characteristics and to determine which may be associated with the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation (i.e. one in which a food vehicle has been reported).

Methods. A foodborne disease outbreak was defined as the event in which two or more people acquired similar illnesses from consuming the same food or beverage.Outbreaks occurring in FoodNet sites during 2003 through 2010 were included in the analysis. *Results.* Data were available for 1441(87%) of the 1655 foodborne disease outbreaks documented in FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms from 2003 through 2010. A food vehicle was identified in 692 of the 1441 (48%) outbreaks. Six outbreak characteristics remained statistically significant in both univariate and multivariate analyses: environmental and/or food culture collection, FDA or state agriculture involvement, outbreak size, case-control studies, and number of fecal specimens tested for norovirus. *Conclusions*. Less than half of foodborne outbreaks examined here resulted in a food vehicle being identified. Having more robust resources available for outbreak detection and investigation may improve likelihood of a food vehicle being identified.

Foodborne disease is estimated to cause 48 million illnesses annually in the US resulting in 128,000 hospitalizations and 3000 deaths [1]. Although most infections occur as sporadic cases, outbreak surveillance offers valuable insight about the foods and pathogens responsible for illnesses [2]. An outbreak investigation may yield cause of illness, food vehicle(s), and exposure location; however, less than half of all foodborne disease outbreaks result in a food vehicle being identified [6].

Public health agencies in the United States voluntarily report foodborne disease outbreaks using the National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS). FoodNet enhances national surveillance of these outbreaks by monitoring 10 sites for lab-confirmed infections caused by nine pathogens commonly transmitted through food [11-13]. FoodNet data may provide information regarding how an outbreak investigation was conducted (i.e. agencies involved, studies conducted, specimens collected, outbreak size). Understanding which factors contribute to the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation is crucial for attributing an illness to a food vehicle and for improving outbreak response [3-8]. The purpose of this study was to describe outbreak characteristics and to determine which may be associated with the success of a foodborne outbreak investigation (i.e. one in which a food vehicle has been reported).

METHODS

Data on foodborne disease outbreaks occurring in FoodNet sites from 2003 through 2010 were included in the analysis. FoodNet monitors lab-confirmed infections caused by 9 pathogens commonly transmitted through food—*Salmonella,* Shiga toxin-producing *Escherichia coli* (STEC) O157 and non-O157, *Campylobacter, Listeria,*

Vibrio, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Shigella, and *Yersinia* [11-13]. Though initially comprised of 5 states—California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, and Oregon—the surveillance area now covers 10 states and \approx 15 percent of the US population. FoodNet also collects data on how outbreak investigations are conducted using FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms. These forms contain questions about who initially reported the outbreak; which agencies led the investigation, how they responded to the outbreak, and what challenges they encountered; what items the investigation included (i.e. case-control study, cohort study, environmental and/or food cultures); when and where contamination of foods occurred; and media coverage of the outbreak.

A foodborne disease outbreak was defined as an event in which two or more people acquired similar illnesses from consuming the same food or beverage. For each outbreak, we linked data from the FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms with corresponding reports in the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System (FDOSS). These reporting systems included data regarding the mode of transmission, size of outbreak, etiologic agent, and implicated food. Only outbreaks occurring in a single state that could be linked to reports in NORS were included in the analysis.

We considered only one outcome—whether a food vehicle was identified for the specific outbreak—and defined a successful outbreak investigation as one in which a food vehicle was reported. In selecting variables, we removed those with cell counts of less than 5 for "yes" responses and greater than 50 percent missing. We chose these exclusion criteria since most variables had a large number of missing values and we wanted to be able to analyze as many variables as possible. Missing values were recategorized as "no" when appropriate. For each outbreak, we described the year of the

outbreak, the reporting state, the agencies involved, items included (i.e. case interviews, analytical epi investigation, environmental/food cultures, product traceback/recall), number of fecal specimens tested via specified methods (bacterial culture, norovirus), number of cases, type of etiologic agent, and food category.

We performed univariate analysis for each of the independent variables to determine which exposures were significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation (*FoodVehicleIdentified* = "yes"). Odds ratios were calculated to estimate whether a specific outbreak characteristic—for example, food and/or environmental cultures attained in the investigation—increases the likelihood of a food vehicle being reported. Chi-square values were used for the year of the outbreak, the reporting state, and the type of etiologic agent since these variables contained more than 2 categories, We then used forward stepwise selection to build a logistic model comprised of variables significantly affecting the outcome of an investigation. We conducted statistical analyses using SAS software version 9.3 (SAS Institute), and Excel and Access software, version 2013 (Microsoft). We submitted an Application for Designation of Not Human Subjects Research to Georgia State University's Institutional Review Board and earned permission to use data from FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms.

RESULTS

We included data for 1441 (87%) of the 1655 foodborne disease outbreaks documented in the FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms from 2003 through 2010. Excluded outbreaks represented those for which no record existed in FDOSS, data did not support a foodborne outbreak (i.e. other mode of transmission), or exposure occurred in multiple states. A mean of 180 foodborne disease outbreaks were reported annually (range, 105-251) (Figure 1), and variability in the number and rate of outbreaks reported was observed among sites (Figures 3 and 4). Both year ($\chi^2 = 14.7$) (Table 2) and reporting state ($\chi^2 = 535.4$) (Table 3) were significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation, but neither of these factors significantly affected the outcome of a foodborne investigation when all other factors were considered.

A food vehicle was identified in 692 (48%) of the 1441 outbreaks (Table 1). During 2003 through 2010, the percentage of outbreaks with a food vehicle identified ranged from 37% in 2007 to 55% in 2004 (Figure 5). Approximately 23% of these outbreaks were attributed to multiple food categories and 25% were attributed to a single food category. Of the foodborne disease outbreaks in which the food vehicle could be classified into a single category, meat-poultry and produce were the most common (Figure 6).

An etiologic agent was identified in 1218 (85%) of the 1441 outbreaks (Table 1). Only a small percentage of outbreaks were attributed to multiple etiologies. Of the foodborne disease outbreaks in which the etiologic agent could be classified as a single etiology, viral and bacterial were the most common (Figure 7). Etiology was significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation ($\chi^2 = 101.7$) (Table 5), but this factor did not significantly affect the outcome of a foodborne investigation when all other factors were considered.

The agencies most often involved in an outbreak investigation were local and/or regional health departments (n=1227; 85%) or 1 or more state health departments (n=925; 64%) (Table 4). Outbreak investigations that involved FDA (OR, 13.6; 95% CI,

4.2-44.5), USDA (OR, 8.8; 95% CI, 2.0, 38.6), state agriculture (OR, 4.7; 95% CI, 2.7-8.3), CDC (OR, 3.1; 95% CI, 1.5-6.5), or 1 or more state health departments (OR, 1.4; 95% CI, 1.1-1.7) were found to be significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation (Table 4). When all other factors were considered, FDA (χ^2 =22.6) and state agriculture (χ^2 =18.7) were the only agencies whose involvement significantly affected the outcome of a foodborne investigation (Table 6).

The items most commonly included in an outbreak investigation were case interviews (n=674; 47%) or EHS inspection and/or EHSNET evaluation (n=636; 44%) (Table 4). Outbreak investigations in which environmental and/or food cultures were collected (OR, 3.8; 95% CI, 2.4-5.9), state agriculture was contacted (OR, 4.2; 95% CI, 2.3-7.6), conference calls were held (OR, 5.4; 95% CI, 2.5-11.6), case-control studies were conducted (OR, 1.4; 95% CI, 1.04-1.8), or product traceback was done (OR, 1.8; 95% CI, 1.001-3.1) were found to be significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation (Table 4). Collecting environmental and/or food cultures, conducting case interviews, and conducting case-control studies were the only items whose inclusion significantly affected the outcome of a foodborne outbreak investigation when all other factors were considered (Table 6).

Fecal specimens were tested for bacterial culture in 553 (38%) and for norovirus in 340 (24%) of the 1441 foodborne disease outbreaks (Table 4). Testing more than two fecal specimens via bacterial culture increased the odds of identifying a food vehicle by 30 percent (OR, 1.3; 95% CI, 1.4-1.6). When all other factors were considered, the number of fecal specimens tested for norovirus significantly affected the outcome of a foodborne outbreak investigation (Table 6).

In 688 (48%) of the 1441 foodborne disease outbreaks, more than 10 individuals became ill (Table 4). Outbreaks affecting more than 10 cases contributed to a 30% higher likelihood of identifying a food vehicle as compared with those with 10 or fewer cases (OR, 1.3; 95% CI, 1.0-1.6) (Table 4). When all other factors were considered, outbreak size significantly affected the outcome of a foodborne outbreak investigation (Table 6).

DISCUSSION

Our findings describe the outbreak characteristics associated with a food vehicle being identified and have a few important implications. Foodborne disease outbreak investigations were found to be most successful when environmental and/or food cultures were collected, FDA or state agriculture was involved, and case-control studies were conducted.

During 2003 through 2010, the number of foodborne disease outbreaks reported to FDOSS varied both by year and by reporting state. These variations may be attributed to differences in the resources available—laboratory testing, funding sources, skilled health workers, training opportunities— as well as regional variations in foodborne illnesses. Further research is needed to understand how these factors affect outbreak investigations at the individual state level.

We determined that several of the exposures were significantly associated with a successful outbreak investigation. Having 1 or more regulatory agencies (FDA, USDA, state agriculture) involved in an investigation substantially improved the likelihood of a food vehicle being identified. This is not surprising since state agriculture, FDA or USDA are sometimes not brought into an investigation until there is greater likelihood of

identifying a specific food [14]. The likelihood also increased when either CDC or 1 or more state health departments was involved in the outbreak investigation. These results were consistent with the studies conducted by the National Environmental Health Association (NEHA) [15] and the Environmental Health Specialists Network (EHS-Net) [10], both of which reported that lack of cooperation among health agencies and inavailability of resources may halt progress of an outbreak investigation. To better understand the roles of regional and local health departments, it would be helpful to consider whether the state has a home rule system (i.e. one in which a local or regional health department receives the initial report and relays this information to the state health department) or a centralized system (i.e. one in which a state health department handles the outbreak investigation). We found that investigations which included conference calls, contact with state agriculture, and environmental and/or food cultures were associated with a substantial increase in the odds of a food vehicle being identified. Case-control studies and product traceback were also found to increase these odds. These results are not surprising since doing a product traceback gives the investigators a good idea of which food is responsible for an outbreak [14]. Testing >2 fecal specimens for bacterial culture also proved to be a critical component of a successful outbreak investigation, but testing >3 fecal specimens for norovirus was not associated with an increased likelihood of a food vehicle being identified. These results are somewhat surprising since we would expect that testing more fecal specimens for norovirus would have increased the odds of a food vehicle being identified. There exist no standard methods for identifying a viral agent in foods, which may explain why so few of the outbreaks that tested more than 3 fecal specimens for norovirus resulted in a food vehicle being identified [8]. We were

also surprised to learn that neither case interviews nor product recall was associated with an increased likelihood of a food vehicle being identified. Some research [10, 14] suggested that shifting focus toward obtaining food, environmental and stool samples would likely improve the likelihood that a pathogen and food vehicle are identified.

We found that outbreaks affecting more than 10 individuals contributed to a sizable increase in the odds of a food vehicle being identified as compared with those with 10 or fewer cases. Investigations for larger outbreaks also tend to have the resources necessary to conduct epidemiological studies and to collect laboratory specimens [16]. Although attributing illnesses to food may prove difficult even for large outbreaks [16], outbreak size is important because outbreaks with a high number of ill persons are more likely to be detected, reported and investigated [8].

While these results offer insight regarding the characteristics of a successful foodborne outbreak investigation, a major limitation was that the data obtained from the FoodNet Outbreak Supplement Forms may have been incomplete or inaccurate. During 2003-2010, the format of these forms changed and not all questions were asked each year. Most of the variables chosen had a large number of missing values, which we recategorized as "no" when appropriate, so this might have affected our results. Another limitation was that these reports are done voluntarily, so not all outbreaks may be captured. Since we evaluated outbreak characteristics at the 10 sites which participate in the FoodNet active surveillance, our results may not be generalizable to the US population. The number of reported foodborne disease oubreaks at FoodNet sites was similar in pattern of frequency when compared with national data (Figures 1 and 2), which implies that examining outbreaks in FoodNet may provide insight regarding how

outbreak investigations can be improved. Less than half of foodborne disease outbreaks examined here resulted in a food vehicle being identified. The results of this study suggest that having more robust resources available for outbreak detection and investigation would improve likelihood of a food vehicle being identified.




Figure 1. Number* of foodborne disease outbreaks by year, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.




Figure 2. Number* of foodborne disease outbreaks by year, FDOSS, 2003-2010.




Figure 3. Number* of foodborne disease outbreaks by state**, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.



**New York, California, and Colorado only include selected counties in the states in FoodNet, which is why a large state like California has so few outbreaks included in this study.




Figure 4. Number* of foodborne disease outbreaks by state** and year, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.



**New York, California, and Colorado only include selected counties in the states in FoodNet, which is why a large state like California has so few outbreaks included in this study. The reporting rate for New Mexico is consistently lower than the other states, which helps to explain why this state has so few outbreaks included in this study.




Figure 5. Percentage of foodborne disease outbreaks with food vehicle(s) identified* by year, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010

*n=692 (48.0%) of the total 1,441 foodborne disease outbreaks reported in the supplement forms




Figure 6. Percentage of foodborne disease outbreaks with a single food vehicle identified* by category, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*N=322




Figure 7. Percentage of foodborne disease outbreaks with a single etiology identified* by etiology group, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*N=1215

	No. (%)
Total number of foodborne disease outbreaks	1441
Outbreaks in which a food vehicle was identified	692 (48.0)
Outbreaks in which an etiologic agent was identified	1218 (84.5)
Outbreaks in which case interviews were included	674 (46.8)
Outbreaks in which case-control studies were included	228 (15.8)
Outbreaks in which food/environmental samples were collected	113 (7.8)
Outbreaks in which product traceback and/or recall were included	66 (4.6)

Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics of foodborne disease outbreaks, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

Year of Outbreak		le Identified, (%)	Chi-Square	Significance (p-value)
	Yes	No		(p-value)
2003	95 (6.7)	118 (8.2)		
2004	121 (8.4)	100 (6.9)		
2005	94 (6.5)	86 (6.0)		
2006	119 (8.3)	132 (9.2)	147	0.0206*
2007	44 (3.1)	75 (5.2)	14.7	0.0396*
2008	100 (6.9)	106 (7.4)		
2009	56 (3.9)	49 (3.4)		
2010	63 (4.4)	83 (5.8)		

Table 2. Univariate analysis of the year during which a foodborne disease outbreak occurred, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*This variable was significant at alpha=0.05.

Reporting State		le Identified, (%)	Chi-Square	Significance
	Yes	No		(p-value)
California	22 (1.5)	27 (1.9)		
Colorado	63 (4.4)	74 (5.1)		
Connecticut	59 (4.1)	31 (2.2)		<0.0001*
Georgia	72 (5.0)	98 (6.8)		
Maryland	82 (5.7)	83 (5.8)	535.4	
Minnesota	195 (13.5)	170 (11.8)	555.4	
New Mexico	2 (0.1)	11 (0.8)		
New York	58 (4.0)	32 (2.2)		
Oregon	71 (4.9)	145 (10.1)		
Tennessee	68 (4.7)	78 (5.4)		

Table 3. Univariate analysis of the state where a foodborne disease outbreak occurred, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*This variable was significant at alpha=0.05.

			Food V	/ehicle	Odds ratio	Significance
Outbreak Cha	haracteristic		Identified	, No. (%) No	(95% CI)	(p-value)
	Local & /on marianal	Vac	Yes 580 (40.2)	647 (44.9)		
	Local &/or regional health depts.	Yes No	580 (40.3) 112 (7.8)	102 (7.1)	0.82 (0.61, 1.1)	0.1710
	1 or more state	Yes	471 (32.7)	454 (31.5)		
	health depts.	No	221 (15.3)	295 (20.5)	1.4 (1.1, 1.7)	0.0032**
Agencies	FoodNet group	Yes No	58 (4.0) 634 (44.0)	44 (3.1) 705 (48.9)	1.5 (0.98, 2.2)	0.0638
substantially involved in	CDC	Yes No	28 (1.9) 664 (46.1)	10 (0.7) 739 (51.3)	3.1 (1.5, 6.5)	0.0013**
investigation	FDA	Yes No	36 (2.5) 656 (45.5)	3 (0.2) 746 (51.8)	13.6 (4.2, 44.5)	<0.0001**
	USDA	Yes No	16 (1.1) 676 (46.9)	2 (0.1) 747 (51.9)	8.8 (2.0, 38.6)	0.0005**
	State agriculture	Yes No	65 (4.5) 627 (43.5)	16 (1.1) 733 (50.9)	4.7 (2.7, 8.3)	<0.0001**
	Active case finding	Yes No	122 (8.5) 570 (39.5)	114 (7.9) 635 (44.1)	1.2 (0.90, 1.6)	0.2168
	Case interviews	Yes No	307 (21.3) 385 (26.7)	367 (25.5) 382 (26.5)	0.83 (0.67, 1.02)	0.0781
	Chart or record review	Yes No	9 (0.6) 683 (47.4)	12 (0.8) 737 (51.2)	0.81 (0.34, 1.9)	0.6332
	Case-control study	Yes No	125 (8.7) 567 (39.4)	103 (7.2) 646 (44.8)	1.4 (1.04, 1.8)	0.0250**
	Cohort study	Yes No	122 (8.5) 570 (39.6)	123 (8.5) 626 (43.4)	1.1 (0.83, 1.4)	0.5419
Items included in investigation	EHS inspection &/or EHSNET evaluation	Yes No	296 (20.5) 396 (27.5)	340 (23.6) 409 (28.4)	0.90 (0.73, 1.1)	0.3171
	Environmental &/or food cultures	Yes No	86 (6.0) 606 (42.0)	27 (1.9) 722 (50.1)	3.8 (2.4, 5.9)	<0.0001**
	Product traceback	Yes No	32 (2.2) 660 (45.8)	20 (1.4) 729 (50.6)	1.8 (1.001, 3.1)	0.0469**
	Product recall	Yes No	6 (0.4) 686 (47.6)	8 (0.6) 741 (51.4)	0.81 (0.28, 2.3)	0.6975
	Contact with state agriculture	Yes No	51 (3.5) 641 (44.5)	14 (1.0) 735 (51.0)	4.2 (2.3, 7.6)	<0.0001**
	Conference calls	Yes No	38 (2.6) 654 (45.4)	8 (0.6) 741 (51.4)	5.4 (2.5, 11.6)	<0.0001**
No. fecal specimens	Bacterial culture	>2 ≤ 2	287 (19.9) 405 (28.1)	266 (18.5) 483 (33.5)	1.3 (1.04, 1.6)	0.0201**
tested via specified methods*	Norovirus	>3 ≤3	143 (9.9) 549 (38.1)	197 (13.7) 552 (38.3)	0.73 (0.57, 0.93)	0.0118**
No. cases in outbreak*	Greater th Less than or equal		352 (24.4) 340 (23.6)	336 (23.3) 413 (28.7)	1.3 (1.03, 1.6)	0.0226**

Table 4. Univariate analysis of outbreak characteristics, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*Since the distribution of these variables was very positively skewed and each of them had so many different values, the median values were used as cut-off points for these analyses.

**These variables were significant at alpha=0.05.

Type of etiologic agent			Chi-Square	Significance (p-value)	
	Yes	No		(p-value)	
Viral	278 (19.3)	439 (30.5)			
Unknown	88 (6.1)	135 (9.4)			
Parasitic	8 (0.6)	3 (0.2)	101.7	< 0.0001*	
Chemical	44 (3.1)	5 (0.4)			
Bacterial	271 (18.9)	167 (11.6)			

Table 5. Univariate analysis of types of etiologic agents identified for a specific foodborne disease outbreak, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.

*This variable was significant at alpha=0.05.

Outbreak Charac	teristic	Odds ratio		Score	Wald	Pr >
Entered	Removed	(95% CI)	DF	Chi- Square	Chi- Square	ChiSq
Environmental		3.8 (2.4, 5.9)				
&/or Food			1	38.7		< 0.0001**
Cultures						
FDA		13.6 (4.2, 44.5)	1	22.6		< 0.0001**
State Agriculture		4.7 (2.7, 8.3)	1	18.7		< 0.0001**
Case Interviews		0.83 (0.67, 1.02)	1	12.8		0.0004**
Outbreak Size		1.3 (1.03, 1.6)				
Group (>10, ≤ 10			1	6.4		0.0116**
cases)						
Case-Control		1.4 (1.04, 1.8)	1	4.3		0.0386**
Study			1	4.5		0.0380**
No. Fecal		0.73 (0.57,				
Specimens Tested		0.93)	1	4.2		0.0400**
for Norovirus			1	4.2		0.0400
(>3, ≤ 3)						
No. Fecal		1.3 (1.04, 1.6)				
Specimens Tested			1	3.5		0.0630
via Bacterial			1	5.5		0.0050
Culture (>2, ≤ 2)						
	No. Fecal	1.3 (1.04, 1.6)				
	Specimens Tested		1		3.5	0.0632
	via Bacterial		1		5.5	0.0052
	Culture (>2, ≤ 2)					

Table 6. Summary of stepwise selection for multivariate analysis of outbreak characteristics, FoodNet OB Supplement forms, 2003-2010.*

*Chi-square value for model: χ^2_{HF} (df=7) = 1.59; Prob > χ^2_{HF} = 0.9789. **These variables were significant at alpha=0.05.

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What was the source, of the initial outbreak report, to the public health system in your state? Initial private distan report medical professional report reportable disease surveillance blip syndromic surveillance blip protectible disease surveillance blip syndromic surveillance blip Date of second outbreak case liness onset?
Image: second cutbreak case lines: onset?
Date of the first case interview purposely related to the outbreak (as opposed to interview done as routine investigation of a sporadic case)? Date of the first case interview purposely related to the outbreak (as opposed to interview done as routine investigation of a sporadic case)? What was the date of the last outbreak case interview? / (m / d / y) I local health dept multiple local HDs I state health dept I local health dept multiple local HDs I state health dept multiple state HDs CDC CDC LHD FDA MLHD USDA SHD Mhat was included in this investigation? ActFind that apply) CaseInt ChrfRev CacCoSt CohortSt West no investigation active case finding case interviews EnvCa chat/record review case-control study Prod insp EHS inspection EHSNET evaluation environmental cultures food cultures foodCx product traceback product recal Prod IsAG contact with state Ag conf call with CDC conf call with FDA conf call with USDA incloth How many cases were interviews dfor exposure history? case exp conf call with recel at apply) ease exp On average, how many days elapsed between report of an outbreak
case)? (m/d/y) caseintdate What was the date of the last outbreak case interview? (m/d/y) lastintdate Which agencies were substantively involved in the investigation? (check all that apply) MSHO FNG 1 local health degi multiple local HDs 1 state health depi multiple state HDs regional HD RHD FodNet group CDC CDC CDC LHD FDA MLHD USDA SHD state Ag SAG InvOth What was included in this investigation? ActFind that apply) Caseint ChrRev CacOSt CohontSt west no investigation active case finding case interviews EnvCA chaf/record review case-control study cohont study product recall Product recall west no investigation EHSNET evaluation environmental cultures food cultures FoodCx product recall Product recall <td< td=""></td<>
I local health dept multiple local HDs I state health dept multiple state HDs regional HD RHD FoodNet group CDC CDC LHD FDA FDA MLHD USDA USDA SHD state Ag SAG InvOth What was included in this investigation? ActFind that apply) CaseInt ChritRev Case-control study cohortst west no investigation active case finding case interviews EnvCx chart/record review case-control study cohort study product recal map EHS inspection EHSNET evaluation environmental cutures food cutures FoodCx product recal Prod SAG contact with state Ag conf call wither states conf call with CDC conf call with FDA conf call with USDA incloth How many cases were interviewed for exposure hiltsory? case exp ConfUDC ConfUDA ConfUDA On average, how many days elapsed between report of an outbreak case to that case's first outbreak interview? elapsed How many control interviews were completed? controlint Who designed the investigation (Le., made decisions about how it was to done)? (check all that apply) San LHD CDN people with
west no investigation active case finding case interviews chart/record review case-control study cohort study prod Insp EHS inspection EHSNET evaluation environmental cultures food cultures FoodCx product traceback product recoil prod SAG contact with state Ag conf call wither states conf call with CDC conf call with FDA conf call with USDA inclOth How many cases were interviewed for exposure history? caseexp ConfFDA ConfUSDA inclOth On average, how many days elapsed between report of an outbreak case to that case's first outbreak interview? elapsed How many control interviews were completed? controlint Who designed the investigation (Le., made decisions about how it was to done)? (check all that apply) San LHD con urses people with advanced epi training ceadOth How many food specimens were tested? (#) none motion food available not epi implicated (#) none no food available not epi implicated Of foodworkers tested, how many were symptomatic? FoodWorkers:
Both Set with Sale Ag Contail with Sale Ag <t< td=""></t<>
How many control interviews were completed? controlint Who designed the investigation (i.e., made decisions about how it was to done)? (check all that apply) San LHD sanitarians LHD CD nurses How many food specimens were tested? EP (#) none no food available Nofcod Nofcodavail Nofcodepi Of foodworkers tested, how many were symptomatic? FoodWorkers Of foodworkers tested, how many were symptomatic?
Who designed the investigation (Le., made decisions about how it was to done)? (check all that apply) San LHD sanitarians LHD CD nurses people with advanced epi training LeadOth How many food specimens were basted? EPI How many food workers were tested? FoodWorkers (#) none no food available not epi implicated If (#) none Nofoodavail Nofood Nofoodavail Nofoodepi Of foodworkers tested, how many were symptomatic? FoodWorkers
How many food specimens were tested? EPI How many food specimens were tested? How many foodworkers were tested? (#) none no food available Food Nofood avail Nofoodepi Of foodworkers tested, how many were symptomatic? FoodWorkers
On what date was a vehicle for this outbreak identified with reasonable certainty? VehicDate (m/d/v)
Was the contamination of the vehicle in this outbreak introduced by: Was the contaminated vehicle implicated in this outbreak served (and caused illness in): □ Contamination at the time of final preparation/serving FinalCont □ Contamination prior to introduction of the product to the place of final preparation/serving FinalCont □ Noidea Noidea □ Other: Other cont □ Other cont □
How many fecal specimens were screened at a lab, public or private, by the following test methods? (Be specific if possible.)
□ bacterial cx LBC (#) □ O & P LOP (#) □ norovirus LNV (#) or, if no specifics □ some (number unknown) □ none □ no ides LOTHER How many other (non-fecal) clinical specimens were tested at a public health lab? CPHL
vomitus CPHLV Diood CPHLB other (specify) CPHLOTH on none on idea
If applicable, what was the median lag time from onset of diarrhea or vomiting to collection of fecal specimens for testing at the public health lab? (enterexact number if possible; otherwise, estimate)_LAG_days (if known) or else within 3 days 4-7 days 8-14 days 14 days 10 not applicable 10 could not be determined ESTLAG
If the etiology was lab-confirmed, where was the pathogen first identified? PATHID
private lab local/state PHL CCC LLABOTH fno etiology was established through basic tests, what other lab tests were done? (provide details below)
none tadin screening otherPCR otherculture referral to CDC OTHTEST NOOTH OTHTS OTHPCR OTHCX REFCDC OTHTEST
What type of intervention was conducted as a response to this outbreak? (check all that apply) close fooddisc
Type at type or intervention was conducted as a response to this outbreak (check all marappy) [code [intervention]] ing ordered cleaning of facility [code facility] code at [intervention]] [code food recall] issued press release press in intervention noint [intervention]] other int
ing ordered cleaning of facility. 🛛 food handler edulfwedul 🖓 restricted/excluded foodworker. 🖓 closed facility. 🖓 embargoed or discarded food

Appendix A: Annotated Foodborne OB Supplement Form

Foodborne OB Supplement State County County eFORS ID # ID State Outbreak ID# State outbreak ID#
What problems significantly affected the success of this investigation? (check all that apply)
FEWC too few cases DELLHD delayed notification of local HD STOOL too few stool specimens FEWCON too few controls available DELSHD delayed notification from local HD to problems with specimens (shipping, not state INADCFIND no/inadequate case finding state SPECPROB enough stool to test) EVERYATE "everybody ate everything" syndrome WKEND weekend/overtime staffing limits SPECS TTEST testing could not be performed by state lab INADQSTUD inadequate study design/ sampling INSTCOOP lack of cooperation from cases LHDCOOP lack of cooperation from restaurant, nursing home, or other institution OTHWRK other work was higher priority BADQUEST methodology/bad questionnaire MSCOOP lack of multi-state coordination OBSCOPE OB scope underestimated HDSTAFF no trained HD staff available OTHAGENCY problems with another agency PROBOTH
Was there any media coverage of this outbreak investigation? yes no urknown MEDIA If yes, was the media coverage initiated by the investigating agency? yes no urknown INITIATED INTENT If the media coverage was initiated by the investigating agency, what was the intent of the coverage? to find additional cases In the public to potential contamination of a commercial product other [INTENTTH]
MEDIAFIND If the media coverage was not initiated by the investigating agency, how did the media find out about the outbreak?
HINDER Did the media coverage hinder the investigation? Uyes (explain how;) HINDERHOW Unknown Unknown
Was an after-action review, involving more than one agency or investigational group, conducted after this outbreak?

COMMENTS

Completed by	COMPBY	

January 1, 2009



date CDATE

Form approved OMB No. 0920-0004

Electronic Foodbarn Outbreak	This form is u used to report involving any	In vestigation of used to report foodborne di Salmonello Enteritidis an mode of transmission. A re cases of a similar illness	-			
Reporting System	in the United information n CDC annual s outbreak, whi	States. This form has 6 ps seeded and must be comple ammnary. Part 2 asks for : le Parts 3 - 6 ask for infor asse complete as much of :	arts. Part ated for the additional mation co	1 asks for the minim is investigation to be information for any encerning specific ve	um or basic counted in the foodborne	State Use Only
		Part 1: Ba				
1. Report Type		3. Dates			4 Location	of Exposure
		Please enter as man	y dates	as possible	1	-
A. □ Please check if this a fin	al report	Date first case became il	. /	/		te
		Date first case became il	Month	Day Year	If multiple state	s involved: urred in nultiple states
B .		Date last case became ill	1	1		ured in single state, but cases
Please check if data doe	s not support a		Month	Day Year	resided in multi	ole states
FOODBORNE outbreak		Date first known exposure / /			Other states:	
		Date first known exposure / / Month Day Year				
2. Number of Cases		Date last known exposure /////Year Reporting count			nty	
Lab-confirmed cases	(A) If multiple countie				ties involved:	
Including s	econdary cases	Exposure occu				urred in multiple counties
Probable cases (B) Including	secondary cases	resided in mult			urred in one county, but cases ple counties	
Estimated total ill						
Of greater than sum	· · · · · ·					
5. Approximate Per		 Sex (Estimated percent of 		estigation Meth		
Cases in Each Age (roup	(Estimated percent of the total cases)		views of only cases preparation review		 Case-control study Cohort study
<1 year% 20-49 y	m %			tigation at factory or	production plant	C Collect Hilly
1–4 vrs % ⇒50 vrs	%	Male%		tigation at original se		
5-19 yrs% Unknor	an%	Female%		ı, marine estuary, etc product traceback	-)	
				ronment / food sampl	le cultures	
8. Implicated Food(
Name of Food N	Afain Ingredient(s	s) Contaminated Ingred	ient(s)	Reason(s) Suspect (See codes just bel	ted Met	od of Preparation ce attached codes)
e.g., Lasagna	e.g., Pasta, sauce,	e.g., Eggs		e.g., 4		e.g., M1
1)	eggs, beef					
2)						
3)						
Food vehicle undeter						
Reason Suspected (List ab 1 - Statistical evidence fro 2 - Laboratory evidence (e	m epidemiological	l investigation 4 - Oth		.g., same phage type lonce lacking but pric		
3 - Compelling supportive		- gran an room, - o - op				

Public reporting burden of this collection of information is estimated to average 20 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to CDC/ATSDR Reports Clearance Officer; 1600 Citton Road NE, MS D-74, Atlanta, Georgia 30333; ATTN: pRA (0920-0004).

 Etiology: (Name the bacteria, virus, parasite, or toxin. If available, include the serotype and other characteristics such as phage type, virulence factors, and metabolic profile. Confirmation criteria available at <u>http://www.cdc.cov/foodborneoutbreaks/suide_fd.htm</u> or MMWR2000/Vol. 49/SS- 1/App. B) 								
Etiology		Serotype	Other Characteristics (e.g., phage type)	Detected In (See codes just below)				
1)	Confirmed	Securipe	(w.g., punke type)	(ace codes just below)				
2)	Confirmed			1				
3)	Confirmed							
Etiology undetermined								
Detected In (List above all that appl								
1 - Patient Specimen(s)	3 -Environment	• • • •						
2 - Food Specimen(s) 10. Isolate Subtype	4 - Food Works	r specimen(s)						
To. Isolate Subtype								
State Lab ID PFGE (PulseNet designation) PFGE (PulseNet designation)								
1)								
2)								
3)								
11. Contributing Factors (Check all that apply. See attached codes and explanations) - Contributing factors unknown								
Contamination Factor								
Proliferation/Amplification Factor (bacterial outbreaks only) DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4 DP5 DP6 DP7 DP8 DP9 DP10 DP11 DP12 (describe in Comments) DN/A								
Survival Factor (microbial outbreaks only) □S1 □S2 □S3 □S4 □S5 (describe in Comments) □N/A								
Was food-worker implicated If yes, please check only one of fol Daboratory and epidem epidemiologic evidenc Dab evidence (w/o epid Drior experience make	lowing iologic evidence e (w/o lab confirmation emiologic evidence)							

I2. Symptoms, Signs and Outcomes Feature Cases with outcome/ feature Total cases for who you have informatio available Healthcare provider available	13. Incubation Period (Circle appropriate units)	14. Duration of Illness (Among those who recovered)
Feature Cases with outcome/ you have information of the stature available defined available of the stature of t	(Circle appropriate units)	(Among those who recovered)
føaturo availablo Healthcare provider		(Autoug diose who recovered)
Healthcare provider		(Circle appropriate units)
	 Shortest (Hours, Days) 	
visit	Longest (Hours, Days)	Shortest(Hours, Days)
Hospitalization	 Median (Hours, Days) 	Longest(Hours, Days)
Death	Unknown	Median (Hours, Days)
Vomiting	-	Unknown
Diarrhea	-	
Bloody stools	-	
Fever	 Use the following terms, if approp 	oriste, to describe other common
	characteristics of cases	
Abdominal cramps		leadache Tachycardia
HUS or TTP		ypotension Temperature reversal
Asymptomatic	Bradycardia I Bullous skin lesions J	tching Thrombocytopenia sundice Urticaria
•		ethargy Wheezing
•		fyalgia
•	Descending paralysis P	
		epticemia
	Flushing S	ore throat
15. If Cohort Investigation Conducted		
Attack rate* =////	x 100 =	%
Exposed and ill Total number ex	eed for whom you have illness information	
* The attack rate is applied to persons in a cohort who were exposed to		
the denominator is the total number of persons exposed to the implicate		
		are or Where Food Was Eaten
		Aurine Home
		-
□ Caterer □ Contaminated food imported in □ Grocery Store □ Hospital	□ U.S. □ Grocery Store □ □ Fair, festival, temporary/ mol	Hospital bile convice
		DIR SCHERCE
Fair, festival, other temporary/ mobile services Commercial product, served without further preparation	Unknown or undetermined	
Commercial product, served withour nirmer preparation Unknown or undetermined	Other (Describe)	
Other (Describe) I8. Trace back		
Please check if trace back conducted		
B Piease check II trace oack conducted		
Source to which trace back led:		
	tion of Source	Comments
(e.g., Chicken farm, Tomato processing plant) Sta		
(e.g., Chicken farm, Tomato processing plant) Sta		
(e.g., Chicken farm, Tomato processing plant) Sta		
16. Location Where Food Was Prepared (Check all that apply) Restaurant or deli Nursing home Day care center Prison, jail School Private home Office setting Workplace, not cafetaria Workplace cafetaria Wedding reception Banquet Facility Church, temple, etc Picnic Camp	17. Location of Expos (Check all that apply) Restaurant or deli Day care center School Office Setting Workplace caffetria Banquet Facility Picnic	sure or Where Food Was Eaten suring Home rrison, jail Private home Workplace, not cafeteria Workplace, not cafeteria Workplace, not cafeteria Workplace, not cafeteria Church, temple, etc. Camp

19. Recall Please check if any food product recalled Recall Comments	20. Available Reports (Please attach) Unpublished agency report Epi-Aid report Publication (please reference if not attached)
21. Agency reporting this outbreak	22. Remarks Briefly describe important aspects of the outbreak not covered above (e.g., restaurant closure, immunoglobin administration, economic impact, etc)
Contact person: Name Title Phone Fax E-mail	

Part 3:	Part 3: School Questions					
1. Did the outbreak involve a single or multiple schools?						
□ Single	· ·					
□ Multiple ((f) ves, number of schools)						
2. School characteristics (for all involved students in all inv	volved schools)					
a. Total approximate caroliment						
(number of students)						
Unknown or Undetermined						
b. Grade level(s) (Please check all grades affected)						
Preschool						
 Grade School (grades K-12) 						
Please check all grades affected: □K □1st □2nd □3	nd 04th 05th 06th 07th 08th 09th 010th 011th 012th					
College/University/Technical School						
Unknown or Undetermined						
c. Primary funding of involved school(s)	c. Primary funding of involved school(s)					
Public Private Unknown or Undetermined						
3. Describe the preparation of the implicated	4. How many times has the state, county or local health					
item:	department inspected this school cafeteria or kitchen in the					
Heat and serve (item mostly prepared or cooked	12 months before the outbreak?*					
off-site, reheated on-site)	Once					
Served a-la-carte	Twice					
Serve only (preheated or served cold)	More than two times					
Cooked on site using primary ingredients	Not inspected					
Provided by a food service management company	Unknown or Undetermined					
Provided by a fast food vendor						
Provided by a pre-plate company	5. Does the school have a HACCP plan in place for the					
Part of a club/ fundraising event	school feeding program?*					
Made in the classroom	🗆 Yes					
Brought by a student/teacher/parent	D No					
Other	Unknown or Undetermined					
Unknown or Undetermined	*If there are multiple schools involved, please answer according to the most affected school					

6. Was implicated food item provided to the school through the National School Lunch/Breakfast Program? Yes No Unknown or Undetermined

If Yes, Was the implicated food item donated/purchased

- USDA through the Commodity Distribution Program
 Purchased commercially by the state/school authority
- Other
- Unknown or Undetermined

Part 4: Ground Beef

1. What percentage of ill persons (for whom information is available) ate ground beef raw or undercooked?

Was ground beef case ready? (Ground beef that comes from a manufacturer packaged for sale and not altered or repackaged by the retailer)
 Pres

No
Unknown or Undetermined

3. Was the beef ground or reground by the retailer?

🗆 Yes

🗆 No

Unknown or Undetermined

If yes, was anything added to the beef during grinding (e.g., shop trim or any product to alter the fat content)_____

Part 5: Mode of Transmission

(Enterohemorrhagic E. coli or Sabnonella Enteritidis only)

1. Mode of Transmission (for greater than 50% of cases)

Select one:

D Food

Person to person

□ Swimming or recreational water

Drinking water

Contact with animals or their environment

Unknown or Undetermined

Part 6: Additional Egg Questions

Contamination Factors:¹

- C1 Toxic substance part of tissue (e.g., ciguatera)
- C2 Poisonous substance intentionally added (e.g., cyanide or phenolphthalein added to cause ilness) C3 Poisonous or physical substance accidentally/incidentally added (e.g., sanitizer or cleaning compound)
- C4 Addition of excessive quantities of ingredients that are toxic under these situations (e.g., nacin poisoning in bread)
- C5 Toxic container or pipelines (e.g., galvanized containers with acid food, copper pipe with carbonated beverages) C6 Raw product/ingredient contaminated by pathogens from animal or environment (e.g., Salmonella Enteriditis in egg, Norwalk in shellfish, E. colliin sprouts)
- C7 Ingestion of contaminated raw products (e.g., raw shellfish, produce, eggs)
- C8 Obtaining foods from polluted sources (e.g., shellfish)
- C9 Cross-contamination from raw ingredient of animal origin (e.g., raw poultry on the outling board) C10 Bare-handed contact by handler/worker/preparer (e.g., with ready-to-eat food)

- C11 Glove-handed contact by handler/worker/preparer (e.g., with ready-to-eat food) C12 Handling by an infected person or carrier of pathogen (e.g., Staphylococcus, Salmonella, Norwalk agent) C13 - Inadequate cleaning of processing/preparation equipment/utensils E leads to contamination of vehicle (e.g.,
- cutting boards)

C14 - Storage in contaminated environment E leads to contamination of vehicle (e.g., store room, refrigerator) C15 - Other source of contamination (please describe in Comments)

Proliferation/Amplification Factors:1

P1 - Allowing foods to remain at room or warm outdoor temperature for several hours (e.g., during preparation or holding for service)

- Slow cooling (e.g., deep containers or large roasts)
- P3 Inadequate cold-holding temperatures (e.g., refrigerator inadequate/not working, iced holding inadequate) P4 Preparing foods a half day or more before serving (e.g., banquet preparation a day in advance)
- P5 Prolonged cold storage for several weeks (e.g., permits slow growth of psychrophilic pathogens)
- P6 Insufficient time and/or temperature during hot holding (e.g., malfunctioning equipment, too large a mass of food) P7 Insufficient acidification (e.g., home canned foods)
- P8 Insufficiently low water activity (e.g., smoked/salted fish) P9 - Inadequate thawing of frozen products (e.g., room thawing)
- P10 Anaerobic packaging/Modified atmosphere (e.g., vacuum packed fish, salad in gas flushed bag)
- P11 Inadequate fermentation (e.g., processed meat, cheese) P12 Other situations that promote or allow microbial growth or toxic production (please describe in Comments)

Survival Factors:1

S1 - Insufficient time and/or temperature during initial cooking/heat processing (e.g., roasted meats/poultry, canned foods, pasteurization)

- S2 Insufficient time and/or temperature during reheating (e.g., sauces, roasts)
- S3 Inadequate acidification (e.g., mayonnaise, tomatoes canned) S4 - Insufficient thawing, followed by insufficient cooking (e.g., frozen turkey)
- S5 Other process failures that permit the agent to survive (please describe in Comments)

Method of Preparation:²

- M1 Foods eaten raw or lightly cooked (e.g., hard shell clams, sunny side up eggs)
- M2 Solid masses of potentially hazardous foods (e.g., casseroles, lasagna, stuffing) M3 Multiple foods (e.g., smorgasbord, buffet)
- M4 Cook/serve foods (e.g., steak, fish filet)
- M5 Natural toxicant (e.g., poisonous mushrooms, paralytic shellfish poisoning) M6 Roasted meat/poultry (e.g., roast beef, roast turkey)
- M7 Salads prepared with one or more cooked ingredients (e.g., macaroni, potato, tuna) M8 Liquid or semi-solid mixtures of potentially hazardous foods (e.g., gravy, chili, sauce)
- M9 Chemical contamination (e.g., heavy metal, pesticide)
- M10 Baked goods (e.g., pies, éclairs)
- M11 Commercially processed foods (e.g., canned fruits and vegetables, ice cream)
- M12 Sandwiches (e.g., hot dog, hamburger, Monte Cristo)
- M13 Beverages (e.g., carbonated and non-carbonated, mik) M14 Salads with raw ingredients (e.g., green salad, fruit salad)
- M15 Other, does not fit into above categories (please describe in Comments)
- M16 Unknown, vehicle was not identified

¹ Frank L. Bryan, John J. Guzewich, and Ewen C. D. Todd. Surveillance of Foodborne Disease III. Summary and Presentation of Data on Vehicles and Contributory Factors; Their Value and Limitations. Journal of Food Protection, 60; 6:701-714, 1997.

Weingold, S. E., Guzewich JJ, and Fudala JK. Use of foodborne disease data for HACCP risk assessment. Journal of Food Protection, 57; 9:820-830, 1994.

Appendix C: Annotated NORS Reporting Form

Antional Outbreak Reporting System Source Disease Transmission, Person-to-Person Disease Transmission, Animal Contact The form is used to report ordering foodborne, person-to-person, and arimal contact-related disease outbreak investigations. This form has 5 sections, Ganaral, Laboratory: Person-to- associated by the mode of transmission. Place complete the General and Laboratory table for all modes of transmission and complete additional sociates output G1 course output State Report ID State Report ID State Report ID						40- tional				
General Section										
Primary Mode of Transmission (check one)										
□ Food (complete General, Lab, and Food tabs)	G3		Per	son-to-p	erson (comp	lete General, La	b, and Pe	arson-to-Pa	erson tabs	9
Water (complete CDC 52.12)					ital contamii teral and Lab (nation other 1 labs)	than foo	od/water		
Animal contact (complete General, Lab, and Animal	Contact	tabs)				nknown (comp	lete Gen	eral and L	ab tabs)	
Investigation Methods (check all that apply)										
Interviews only of ill persons Case-control study Cohort study Food preparation review Water system assessment: Drinking water Water system assessment: Nonpotable wate	G4 r			estigation estigation d production vironment	n at factory/ n at original ct or bottled	creational wa production/tr source (e.g. water traceb r sample test	eatmen , farm, v back	t plant		L)
Comments										
G5										
Dates (mm/dd/yyyy)										
Date first case became ill (required)		G6			Dat	le last case be	carne ill	1	1	G7
Date of initial exposure / / G8					Dat	e of last expos	sure	1	/	G9
Date of report to CDC (other than this form)			G10							
Date of notification to State/Territory or Local/Tribal	Health A	uthori	ties/	/	G1	1				
Geographic Location										
G12 DExposure occurred in multiple states G13 DExposure occurred in a single state, but cases resided in multiple states G14 Other states: G15 Reporting county: G16 DExposure occurred in multiple counties in reporting state G17 DExposure occurred in a single county, but cases resided in multiple counties in reporting state G18 Other counties: G19										
013										
City/Town/Place of exposure: 1020 (Do not include proprie	tary or	private	e facility n	ames)						
Primary Cases										
Number of primary cases					Sex (number	or percent of th	ne primar	y cases)		
Lab-confirmed primary cases		0	G21	#	Male	G24	#	ŧ	G27	%
Probable primary cases			G22	#	Female	G25	#	ŧ	G28	%
Estimated total primary cases		0	G23	#	Unknown	G26	#	ŧ	G29	%
	# Cases	: Tota	l # of case m info is a		Age (number	or percent of th	he primar	y cases)		
Died	G30	-	G34	#	<1 year	G38 G46	% 20-	-49 years	G42 #	G50%
Hospitalized		#	G35	-	1-4 years	G39 G47	_	-	G43 #	
Visited Emergency Room	G32	_	G36	#	5-9 years	G40 G48		75 years	G44 #	
Visited health care provider (excluding ER visits)	G33	_	G37	#				known	G45 #	
CDC 83.13 MWK 11 2009	000		ta cubma. report		,	0410048				

incubation Period (circle ap	propriate units)	G55		r Primary C Duration of		ong recovered	cases-circle a	G63 ppropriate unit
Shortest	G5	4 Min, Ho	urs, Days					Min, Hours, D
Median	G5		57 Days					MinG65, D
Longest	G5		59 Days					Min G67 D
Total # of cases for whom info is					es for whom	info is available		
Unknown incubation period				Unknown d	uration of illn	ess G69		
Signs or Symptoms ("Refer		endix, if appr	opriate, to	lescribe other				
Feature		# Case	s with signs	or symptoms		Total # of cases	for whom info	is available
Vomiting								
Diarrhea								
Bloody stools	70		G	71			G72	
-ever			2					
Abdominal cramps								
IUS		_						
Asymptomatic								
		_						
Secondary Cases								
Mode of secondary transmission ((check all that apply)			Number of se	-			
L F000				Lab-confirme	ed secondary	Cases		G74
Water Animal contact				Probable secondary cases				
Person-to-person				Estimated total secondary cases				G75 G76
Environmental contamination Indeterminate/Other/Unknow		water		Estimated total cases (Primary + Secondary)				G77
Environmental Health Spe			ble)	Estimated total cases (Primary + Secondary)				
	070	k (ir applicat	oney	070				
	11 - 7 - 8 - 1	_					000	
EHS-Net Evaluation ID: 1.)	G78	2.)		G79		3.)	G80	G8
				G79		3. <u>)</u>	G80	Ge
	ed water only, not p			G79		3.)	G80	G
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type	ublic water)		G79	Traceback	3.) Comments	G80	G
Traceback (for food and bottle	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., pouliry farm, t	ublic water)			Traceback	,	G80	G
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type	ublic water)	Locatio	n of source	Traceback	,	G80	G
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poulitry farm, t processing plant, b water factory)	ublic water)	Locatio	n of source Country	Traceback	,	G80	68
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., pouliry farm, t processing plant, b	omato	Locatio	n of source	Traceback	,	<u>G80</u>	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback of Source name if publicly available)	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poulitry farm, t processing plant, b water factory)	omato	Locatio State	n of source Country	Traceback	Comments	<u>G80</u>	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback co Source name If publicly available) G83	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poulitry farm, t processing plant, b water factory)	omato	Locatio State	n of source Country	Traceback	Comments	<u>G</u> 80	
Traceback (for food and bottle I Please check if traceback or Source name If publicly available) G83 Recall	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle I Please check if traceback or Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle I Please check if traceback or Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall I Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle I Please check if traceback or Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall I Please check if any food or	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle I Please check if traceback co Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency G91	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	Traceback	Comments G87	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback or Source name If publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency Agency name:G91 G92	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	G94	Comments G87	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback co Source name # publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency Agency name: G91 Contact name: G92 Contact name: G92	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	e-mail:Phone no.:	G 94 G 95	Comments 	680	
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback co ource name if publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency Agency name: G91 G92	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poutry farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State	n of source Country 	G94	Comments 		
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback co source name if publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency Agency name: G91 Contact name: G92 Contact title: G93 Songral Bemarks: Briefly des	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poultry larm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State G85 Iled G88	E-mail: Phone no.: Fax no.:	G94 G95 G96	Comments - G87		
Traceback (for food and bottle Please check if traceback co iource name F publicity available) G83 Recall Please check if any food or Type of item recalled: G89 Comments: G90 Reporting Agency Agency name: G91 Contact name: G92 Contact title: G93 Contact title: G93 Contact Bamarks. Britelly des	ed water only, not p onducted G82 Source type (e.g., poulary farm, t processing plant, b water factory) G84 bottled water prod	ublic water)	Locatio State G85 Iled G88	E-mail: Phone no.: Fax no.:	G94 G95 G96	Comments - G87		

	Laboratory Person-to-Person Animal Contact									
Laboratory Se	ection									
Etiology known?		GL1								
If etiology is unknown, were patient specimens collected? Yes No Unknown GL2										
	s, how many specime									
1,00							in the firm in a		D Dave de la	
	What were they				GL4		GL5	GL6	GL7	
Etiology virulence	(Name the bacterium, chemicalitoxin, virus, or parasite. If available, include the serotype and other characteristics such as phage type,									
Genus	Species	Serotype/6		nfirmed out ology		r acteristic		cted in*	# Of Lab-Confirm cases	ned
GL8	GL9	GL1		GL11	0	GL12		3	GL17	
				🗆 yes						
		GL13		L 14		GL 15		GL16		
*Detected in (choo	ose all that apply): 1 - p						cimen 4 - fo		pecimen	
Isolates/Strains	(For bacterial pathog code, key, and genot				h distinct pat	ttern. For	virai pathoge	ns, provide	CaliciNet outbreak	
State Lab ID	CDC PulseNet or CaliciNet Outbrea		C PulseNet Pat signation for		C PulseNet Pa signation for	attern	Other Molect Designation		Other Molecular Designation 2/	
	Code		zyme 1		ryme 2		CaliciNet Ke	-	CaliciNet Genotype	
GL18	GL19		GL20		GI 21	1	G	22	GI 23	
			0220		0121	1		~~	GL23	
Person-to-Person Section										
Major setting of exposure (choose one)										
Camp Child day care		tel rsing home	9		ivate setting aligious facilit		tial horne)	□ Se □ St		
Community-wide			ention facility specify:		estaurant	-			orkplace	
	Hospital Other, please specify: Attack rates for major settings of exposure									
Group (based on sett	ing)				ed exposed in		timated ill in		Crude attack	
				major se	atting*	m	ajor setting		rate ((estimated III / estimated exposed) x 10	00)
residents, guests,	passengers, patients	, etc.			P2		P4		P6	
staff, crew, etc.					P3			P5 P7		
*e.g., number of pe	*e.g., number of persons on ship, number of residents in nursing home or affected ward									
	of exposure (choose		P8							
Camp Child day care	u camp u Hotei u				Private setting (residential home) Religious facility Ship					
Community-wide	Community-wide Prison or detention facility Restaurant Workplace									
	Animal Contact Section									
Setting of exposure			Type of anim	al	Animal C	Contact R	emarks			
r	-						A3			
4	1		A2				A3			
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					Food			
Food Section								
Food vehicle undetermined F1								
Food		1		2	3			
Name of food (excluding any preparation)		F2						
Ingredient(s) (enter all that apply)								
Contaminated ingredients(s) (enter all that apply)		F4						
Total # of cases exposed to implicated food		F5						
Reason(s) suspected (enter all th apply from list in appendix)	hat	F6						
Method of processing (enter all the apply from list in appendix)	hat	F7						
Method of preparation (select on in appendix)	e from list	F8						
Level of preparation (select one from list in appendix)		F9						
Contaminated food imported to	US? F10	□ Yes, CountryF □ Yes, Unknown □ No	11	Yes, Country Yes, Unknown No	Yes, Country Yes, Unknown No			
	Was product both produced under domestic regulatory oversight and sold?		Yes No Unknown Unknown		□Yes □No □Unknown			
	Location where food was prepared (check all that apply)			Location of exposure (where food was eaten) (check all that apply)				
Restaurant – 'Fast-food' (drive up service or pay at counter)	- Nursin	g home, assisted acility, home care		estaurant – 'Fast-food' (drive o service or pay at counter)	<u></u>			
Restaurant – Sit-down dining	□ Hospit	al		estaurant – Sit-down dining	Hospital			
Restaurant – Other or unknown type	Child d	lay care center		estaurant – Other or hknown type	Child day care center			
Private home	□ School	I	DP	ivate home	□ School			
Banquet Facility (food prepared and served on-site)	□ Prison,	, jail	p	anquet Facility (food epared and served i-site)	□ Prison, jail			
Caterer (food prepared off-site from where served)	Church locatio	n, temple, religious n		aterer (food prepared f-site from where served)	Church, temple, religious location			
Fair, festival, other temporary or mobile services	Camp			air, festival, other temporary mobile services	Camp			
Grocery store	Picnic		G	rocery store	D Picnic			
Workplace, not cafeteria	Other (describe in Where Prepared Remarks)		OW	orkplace, not cafeteria	Other (describe in Where Eaten Remarks)			
U Workplace cafeteria	Unknown			orkplace cafeteria	Unknown			
			14/1-	ere Eaten Remarks:				
Where Prepared Remarks:	15		w.	_	16			

	Food						
Contributing Factors (check all that contributed to this outbreak) F18 F19							
Contributing factors unknown F17							
Contamination Factor							
	9 0 C10 0 C11 0 C12 0 C13 0 C14 0 C15 0 C-N/A						
Proliferation/Amplification Factor (bacterial outbreaks only)							
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4 DP5 DP6 DP7 DP8 DP	9 DP10 DP11 DP12 DP-N/A						
Survival Factor	Survival Factor						
The configuration or suspected F21 to f contamination (check of	one)						
Before preparation Preparation K (Defore Deparation) K (Defore Deparation)							
If 'Before Preparation': Pre-Harvest Processing Reason suspected (check all that ap F22 F23	F 24						
Environmental evidence F25 Laboratory evidence	F26						
Epidemiologic evidence F27 Prior experience mal	kes this a likely source F28						
Was food-worker implicated as the source of contamination? If yes, please check only one of the following: Laboratory and epidemiologic evidence Epidemiologic evidence F30 Prior experience makes this a likely source							
School Questions							
(Complete this section only if "school" is checked in either sections "Location where food was prepared" or "Location of exposure (where food was eaten)").							
1. Did the outbreak involve a single or multiple schools? F31							
Single Multiple (number of schools							
	took)						
2. School characteristics (for all involved students in all involved schools) a. Total approximate enrollment F33 (number of students) Unknown or undetermined F34 b. Grade level(s) F35 Preschool Grade school (grades K-12) Please check all grades affected: K = 1st = 2nd = 3rd = 4th = 5th = 6th = 7th = 8th = 9th = 10th = 11th = 12th College/university/technical school Unknown or Undetermined C. Primary funding of involved schools F36 Public Private							
3. Describe the preparation of the implicated item: (check all that apply) [F37] 4. How many times has the state, county or local health department inspected this school cafeteria or kitchen in the 12 months							
Heat and serve (item mostly prepared or cooked off-site, reheated on-site) Served a-la-carte Served a-la-carte Serve only (preheated or served cold) Cooked on-site using primary ingredients Provided by a food service management company Provided by a fast-food vendor	before the outbreak?* Once Twice More than two times Not inspected Unknown or Undetermined 'If multiple schools are involved, please answer according to the most affected school.						
Provided by a pre-plate company Part of a club or fundraising event	5. Does the school have a HACCP plan in place for the						
Made in the classroom Brought by a student/teacher/parent	School feeding program?* F39						
Other (describe in General Remarks)	No Unknown or Undetermined						
Unknown or Undetermined	'If multiple schools are involved, please answer according to the most affected school.						
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	Food
6. Was implicated food item provided to the school through the National School Lunch/Breakfast Program?	If yes, was the implicated food item donated/purchased by:
Ves F40 No Unknown or Undetermined	USDA through the Commodity Distribution Program The state/school authority Other (describe in General Remarks)
	Unknown or Undetermined
Ground Beef	
1. What percentage of ill persons (for whom information is available) at	e ground beef raw or undercooked? %
 Was ground beef case-ready?	F43 packaged for sale that is not altered or repackaged by the retailer.)
3. Was the beef ground or reground by the retailer?	F44
If yes, was anything added to the beef during grinding (such as she	
Additional Salmonella Questions (Complete this section for Salmonella outbreaks)	
1. Phage type(s) of patient isolates:	
F46 if RDNC* then include # F47	
if RDNC* then include #	
if RDNC* then include #	
if RDNC* then include # * Reacts, Does Not Conform	
Eggs	
1. Were eggs (check all that apply)	
n in shell, unpasteurized?	
□ in shell, pasteurized?	
packaged liquid or dry?	
stored with inadequate refrigeration during or after sale?	
consumed raw?	
consumed undercooked?	
pooled?	
2. Was Salmonella enteritidis found on the farm? Ves No	Unknown F49
Egg Comment (e.g., eggs and patients isolates matched by phage ty	pe):F50
Public reporting landmed the calendare of Internation is estimated to average 20 instals per response, holding the line for instals of the other of Internation Average may not consider of installar average may not consider of installar average magnetic heapond to a consider of installar average magnetic heapond to a consider of installar average magnetic heapond to a consider of installar average may not average the lands of the consideration of the constraint) कोन दोराज, सामटरीजा, कोंगी, तीक स्वाराज, इन्हेंगिलों कु को नामे कोने हो कि तीक स्वार्थक, सर्य उत्तपृत्रित इन्द संकुल क राज्य के सामित्री प्रति हार्य सार्थ सामित्र जिन्द्र प्राज्य साम्राजी के कि संकल्प सामित्र क क्यू तोक स्वाय ते सिंह तोक्सीक त , केंद्रीय, अगस्ट में सा, (1929-1934) «- OO NOT MAE, CARE REPORTS TO THE ADDRESS.
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