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# A cross-cultural comparison of responses to true accusations and the role of honor values

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# A cross-cultural comparison of responses to true accusations and the role of honor values

by

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## ABSTRACT

In honor cultures (e.g., Turkey, Southern US), self-worth depends on one's own perception and on other people's opinions about oneself, and reputation is very important. In dignity cultures (Northern US, Western Europe), self-worth mainly depends on the individual and cannot be taken away by others. In this work, I investigated how people from an honor culture, Turkey, and from a dignity culture, northern US, emotionally and behaviorally responded to two types of conflict: A true accusation of a transgression and negative performance feedback. Honor has three facets common to these two cultures: Social respect (being respectable in society), moral behavior (being honest), and self-respect (feeling proud of oneself). I proposed that *true accusations* of a transgression would be a complete honor threat because they threatened all three facets, whereas private *negative performance feedback* would only be a self-respect threat. I conducted an online survey (Experiment 1) and a laboratory study (Experiment 2) to compare the two cultures. In Experiment 1, participants read conflict scenarios and imagined themselves as the target of the scenario. They indicated how they would feel and behaviorally respond to the conflict source (e.g., the accuser). In Experiment 2, participants were actually accused by an experimenter for cheating on a task or received negative performance feedback. Their emotional and behavioral responses were measured with multiple methods.

Results revealed that for people from Turkey (an honor culture), being rightfully accused of a transgression was more humiliating and anger-provoking than receiving poor performance feedback. Moreover, Turkish people became more defensive in response to rightful accusations compared to negative performance feedback. I also found that northern Americans (a dignity culture), perceived rightful accusations and negative performance feedback similarly humiliating and anger-provoking, and they became similarly defensive in response to these two threats. These results are in line with the

importance and centrality of reputation and social respect in honor cultures and the emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in individualistic dignity cultures. The findings of this work may have implications for many contexts such as politics, work relations, and romantic relationships.

# CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Your coworker blames you for stealing his/her ideas in front of everyone, even though you worked hard to generate them on your own. How would you deal with this false accusation? Would you try to avoid your coworker as much as possible, would you openly express to him/her your thoughts and feelings about the situation, or would you try to embarrass him/her in turn? What about another situation in which your coworker was right about his/her accusations and you clearly did something wrong? Would you admit your guilt and apologize, would you try to justify your behavior, or would you refuse the accusation even though you clearly deserved it? Depending on the circumstances in which the two types of conflicts occur, different response styles may be adaptive. In particular, the cultural background of the actors and the nature of the relationship between them may call for different responses to these accusations.

In cultures where a person's social image and reputation is highly important, such as Turkey, the falsely accused person may try to restore his/her damaged reputation by retaliating or by damaging the offender's reputation in return. When rightfully accused, admitting guilt and apologizing may be difficult for members of these cultures because the acknowledgment of doing something wrong may exacerbate the reputation damage. In other cultures, where the emphasis is not as much on reputation but on internal self-worth and the independent nature of relationships, such as in the northern US, people may still disapprove of the false accusation and confront the accuser but not necessarily retaliate. When rightfully accused, apologizing may be the common thing to do in these cultures because it would not come at a cost to a person's dignity.

In this work, I aim to investigate how members of an honor culture (Turkey) and of a dignity culture (northern US) differ in their emotional and behavioral responses to

conflict situations that involve *true accusations*. The present work will employ multiple methods to investigate the issue, including an online survey and a lab study. The survey will examine responses to different conflict types through scenarios, whereas the lab study will use a deception set-up to discover emotional and behavioral responses that are closer to a real life experience.

## Honor

The term *honor* has different definitions and implications depending on the culture in which it is applied (Wikan, 2008). Some cultures describe it as virtue, personal honesty and integrity, whereas in other cultures it has an additional dimension, namely, a reputation for strength and toughness (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; p. 4). This additional component of the definition belongs to *honor cultures*, which are mostly located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Mediterranean, Latin America and southern states of America. In these cultures, honor is not only determined by one's own perception of self-worth and virtue, but also by other people's opinions (Bagli & Sev'er, 2003; Peristiany, 1965). Moreover, in honor cultures, honor belongs to families as well, such that individuals' honor is dependent on the honorable or dishonorable behaviors of their family members (Bagli & Sev'er, 2003; Dural, Erdem, & Uskul, 2006). For example, when a family member engages in dishonorable behavior it means that he/she "stained" the family honor and the necessary measures need to be taken to cleanse it (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 2003). In honor cultures, honor can be easily lost and difficult to regain (Stewart, 1994), and losing honor brings a bad social reputation and shame to individuals as well as to their family (Bagli & Sev'er, 2003). This also means that any kind of insult or false accusation, either to oneself or to one's family, needs to be responded to, even aggressively if necessary (e.g., Gregg, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

In *dignity cultures*, such as northern US and Western Europe, in contrast, honor is a private matter and the actions or perceptions of others do not affect one's self-worth as much as in honor cultures. Dignity is based on the idea that individuals possess an inherent worth at birth (Ayers, 1984). In that sense, dignity is similar to "an internal skeleton, to a hard structure at the center of the self" (Ayers, 1984; p. 20). Different from honor cultures, for members of dignity cultures guilt rather than shame is an important determinant of behavior. A person with dignity is expected to act according to his/her own standards more than the requirements of the social situation. In dignity cultures, one's self-worth cannot be taken away by others, through insults or false accusations; in contrast, self-worth is primarily internal. Hence, aggression or retaliation is less common as a response to insults in these cultures compared to honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

Despite the differences in the understanding of honor, a prototype study examining the concept in an honor (Turkey) and a dignity culture (the northern US) revealed similarities in its central elements (Cross et al., 2014). In both cultures, honor has three common facets. The *social status/respect* facet includes features such as "to be respectable in the society" and "to be appreciated by others;" the *moral behavior* facet consists of features such as "to be honest" and to be willing to sacrifice;" finally, the *self-respect* facet includes features such as "to feel proud of myself" and "to feel self-esteem" (Cross et al., 2014, p. 12). Referring to this tripartite structure of honor, in this work, I will focus on two types of threats and examine how people from an honor and a dignity culture respond to them. The first threat will be a *complete honor threat*, in which the person will be rightfully accused of an immoral/dishonest behavior. I consider rightful accusations a complete honor threat because they attack a person's self-respect (a blameworthy person is usually not proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is not honest if he/she has cheated) and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect of others because of his/her

intentional wrongdoing). The second threat will be a *self-respect threat*, in which the person will privately receive negative feedback about his/her performance, such as unintentionally making a big mistake or lacking ability in a task. I expect that this feedback will only threaten the self-respect facet of honor but not the social status/respect or moral behavior facets. The person's behavior will not involve an intentional wrongdoing (i.e., no attack on morality) and the feedback will not be given publically (i.e., no attack on social respect). I predict that the complete honor threat through rightful accusations will make people from an honor culture react more negatively than people from a dignity culture, whereas the difference may disappear or be reversed for the self-respect threat.

**Turkey and the Northern US**

In MENA societies, the code of honor and Islam provide the primary value systems for individuals (Gregg, 2005). As one of the MENA societies, Turkey is located in two continents (Europe and Asia) and can be considered a Mediterranean and a Middle Eastern country. Similar to other MENA societies, Turkish culture is predominantly shaped by the honor code and the vast majority of the population is Muslim. Unlike its Middle Eastern neighbors, however, Turkey has a more secular political system (e.g., Keddie, 2004). Moreover, Turkey is highly collectivistic and high in power distance (i.e., the belief that high power people should have privileges and be respected; Hofstede, 1980, 2001). Research on the concept of honor in Turkey began in the fields of sociology and anthropology in the form of qualitative studies (e.g., Bagli & Sev'er, 2003; Kardam, 2005), and recently expanded to psychology. Turkey, however, is still a society that is understudied in cross-cultural psychology (Uskul et al., 2012).

Psychological research comparing Turkey and the northern US has found similarities and differences in the definition and implications of honor. As mentioned

previously, a prototype study revealed the social status/respect, moral behavior, and self-respect facets in both cultures (Cross et al., 2014). There are, however, important cultural differences in the meaning of honor and the impact of honor-related situations. For example, when asked to define the meaning of honor, Turkish participants generated a greater number of differentiated honor features than northern Americans, suggesting that honor is a more complex concept in Turkey (Cross et al., 2014). Moreover, Turkish features of honor were more likely to focus on actions to be avoided (e.g., not telling lies) compared to northern American features of honor (e.g., doing the right thing; Cross et al., 2014). Another study has found that honor-attacking situations generated in Turkey had greater perceived impact on close others (e.g., insulting someone's family) and were more likely to involve a relational or collective audience (e.g., humiliating someone in front of a classroom), compared to the situations generated by northern Americans. Finally, Turkish participants were more likely to generate honor-attacking situations that involved false accusations and unfair treatment than were Americans, whereas Americans generated more situations that were about negative character and lack of achievement (Uskul et al., 2012).

**Cultural Differences in Responses to Honor Threats**

Studies comparing honor and dignity cultures have revealed that when honor is threatened, members of each culture display different emotional and behavioral reactions (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Compared to members of dignity cultures, members of honor cultures become more stressed and experience more anger and shame when there is a potential honor threat (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002). In terms of behavioral differences, members of honor cultures are more prepared for aggression and engage in more dominance behaviors when there is a potential honor threat compared to members of dignity cultures (Cohen et al., 1996; IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez

Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002). Moreover, Turkish participants are more likely to approve of people who confronted an accuser than people who did not confront (Cross et al., 2012). More direct behavioral evidence for cultural differences in responses to honor threats comes from an experimental lab study, in which Turkish participants who received insulting feedback on an essay retaliated more than American participants who received the same feedback (Uskul, Cross, Günsoy, Gercek-Swing, Alozkan, & Ataca, 2015).

Honor threats are likely to occur in conflict situations; however, there has not been extensive research on the types of conflict that can lead to an honor threat and the possible response strategies actors can use. In this work, I will focus on the issue of honor from a conflict management perspective and discuss a variety of response strategies that have been covered in conflict research. Moreover, different from previous studies on honor and dignity cultures, I will investigate rightful accusations as a type of conflict that could be perceived as an honor threat.

## Conflict Management in Interpersonal Relationships

Conflicts occur when there is an opposition from or disagreement with others regarding various issues such as opinions, norms, or treatment of each other (Ohbuchi & Tedeschi, 1997). Another source of conflict is to have different preferences regarding the ways to accomplish a goal and the resulting difficulties in getting the outcomes individuals seek (Shapiro & Kulik, 2004). Individuals have distinct *conflict management* or *conflict resolution strategies*, which can be defined as a set of behaviors that are intended or actually displayed to overcome conflicts (Boulding, 1963; Gelfand, Leslie, Keller, & de Dreu, 2012; Thomas, 1976; Van de Vliert, 1997). The extensive research on conflict management has revealed three broad types of strategies from which actors can choose: *Competition*, which includes efforts to dominate the partner and win the conflict situation;

*avoidance*, which is the tendency to suppress the expression or importance of the conflict and to avoid addressing it, and *cooperation*, which is about engaging in constructive negotiations and problem solving (Gelfand et al., 2012; Table 1).

Even though many different conflict management strategies fall under these three categories, research has mainly converged on the *dual concern theory* (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) as a guideline for a more detailed classification of conflict management strategies (e.g., De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001). How individuals deal with conflict depends on the level of concern they have for their own and for the other person's interests (Blake & Mouton, 1964). Evolved from these premises, the *dual concern theory* suggests that people can choose from five types of response styles to conflict (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2001). On the most competitive level, they can choose to *force* or *dominate* the other party through threats, retaliation or persuasive arguments with the purpose of winning the conflict (high self-concern and low other-concern). Similar to the broad tripartite distinction, another strategy according to the dual concern theory is *avoiding*, which means not to think about the conflict or to make it seem less important (low self- and other-concern). As a cooperative strategy, conflict partners can choose to *yield* or *suppress*, which involves accepting the other party's will or offering help and compensation (low self-concern and high other-concern). Alternatively, they can engage in *problem solving* or *integration* by examining ideas from both sides and working out a solution that would satisfy both sides (high self- and other-concern). Finally, they can *compromise* or try to find a middle-way in which both sides give in a little (intermediate self- and other-concern; De Dreu et al., 2001; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Van de Vliert, 1997; Table 1).

There are also conflict management strategies that are more indirect than those the dual concern theory suggests (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2004; Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). *Passive aggressive* responses, which would fall under the competitive category, involve

indirect behaviors to threaten the conflict partner. An example could be publically expressing concerns about the conflict in a general way without specifically addressing to the conflict partner (Ting-Toomey et al., 2001; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). *Third-party help* is another indirect method to deal with conflict, which involves an outsider to resolve or mediate the conflict (Ohbuchi & Tedeshi, 1997; Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). Because there is effort to solve the issue, this would fall under the cooperative conflict management category (Table 1).

When a conflict occurs because one side is clearly blameworthy and rightfully accused, there may be additional response options as well as other sub-dimensions of the existing classifications of conflict management strategies. One of the most competitive ways to deal with conflicts, in which the person is clearly blameworthy, is *refusing* the accusation. This involves the denial of personal responsibility of the offense or blaming others (Schönbach, 1980; Schütz, 1998). Alternatively, transgressors can provide *justifications*, in which they try to legitimize their action by trivializing the harm or suggesting that their action may even have positive effects in the long run (Schönbach, 1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). This would be considered as another competitive strategy because the person is trying to win the conflict. Transgressors could also *find excuses* for what they did (Schönbach, 1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). They would admit that they are responsible for the transgression but also provide explanations such as emphasizing factors beyond their control or stating that they did not intend to harm the person. In that sense, finding excuses could be considered an avoidant conflict strategy because transgressors do not address the conflict directly but divert the focus on explanations for their behavior and minimize the negative inferences about themselves (Schütz, 1998). Research on forgiveness, however, has shown that if a person wants to be forgiven, he/she needs to provide a sincere apology (Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). Hence, the most cooperative

strategy, elaborate *apologies*, requires the offender to admit that the event has occurred and he/she was responsible (Schönbach, 1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). The individual also expresses regret and sometimes offers compensations (Table 1). Apologies and excuses are called mitigating accounts that can reduce conflicts and are used in severe interpersonal conflict situations (Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter, 1990; McLaughlin, Cody, & O'Hair, 1983). Apologies, especially, effectively reduce negative sanctions (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).

How do individuals choose from this set of conflict management strategies? "Conflict style is a combination of traits (e.g., cultural background or personality) and states (e.g., situation)" (Ting-Toomey et al., 2001; p. 88). To answer this question, I will focus on *culture* on the "trait" side and examine how it is related to the ways people manage conflicts. Members of individualistic and collectivistic cultures, for example, may perceive and resolve conflicts differently, due to the dominant values and norms of their culture (e.g., Chua & Gudykunst, 1987). The next section will discuss these cultural differences.

**Culture and Conflict Management**

Individualism-collectivism has been one of the most prominent frameworks used to describe cultural differences in various aspects of social life, including conflict management (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1989). In *individualistic* cultures, the emphasis is on the needs and goals of the individual, the relationships are independent and voluntary, and the dominant motivation is to have positive self-esteem. In *collectivistic* societies, however, the emphasis is on one's ingroups and on maintaining harmony because of the strong interdependence in the society (e.g., Adams, 2005; Hofstede, 2001). For these reasons, conflict management in individualistic cultures focuses more on distributing

resources than on relationships, whereas in collectivistic cultures the pattern is the opposite (Adair & Brett, 2004). In individualistic cultures, therefore, competitive, assertive and active methods to deal with conflict are perceived as normal and acceptable, whereas people from collectivistic cultures tend to choose cooperative, non-assertive, and passive responses to conflict (e.g., Chua & Gudykunst, 1987; Gabrielidis, Stephan, Ybarra, Dos Santos Pearson, & Villareal, 1997; Ohbushi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). For example, Japanese people (collectivistic culture) prefer cooperative, mitigating accounts after a transgression such as providing apologies and excuses, whereas Americans (individualistic culture) prefer competitive accounts such as providing justifications for a transgression (Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; Takaku, 2000). Moreover, people from collectivistic cultures are more likely to prefer indirect methods to resolve conflicts, such as involving a third party, compared to individualistic cultures (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Tinsley, 2004). These differences suggest that conflict in collectivistic societies is not perceived as an isolated incident but as a threat to the harmony of the relationship (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Tinsley, 2004).

Collectivism and individualism, however, are broad terms, and there are varieties of collectivistic and individualistic cultures across the world with different dominant values. As mentioned earlier, in this work, I will focus on an honor culture - Turkey - as an example of a collectivistic culture where reputation and social image are strongly emphasized and defended (e.g., Bagli & Sev'er, 2003). I will compare it to a dignity culture – the northern US – as an example of an individualistic culture where the focus is less on social image and more on the individual's inherent self-worth (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

**Honor and conflict management.** Honor can be threatened or lost in conflict situations. An insult coming from the conflict partner, for example, can damage the honor

of the insulted party (Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013). In conflicts that involve an honor threat, therefore, members of honor cultures or people who endorse strong honor values tend to choose competitive, confrontational, or aggressive responses more than members of dignity cultures and people with weaker endorsement of honor values (Beersma et al., 2003; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).

Politeness is also highly valued and emphasized in honor cultures because it is a preemptive tool for not offending others and for preventing the escalation of conflicts and violence (Cohen & Vandello, 2004). When there is no threat to honor, competitive or confrontational conflict management strategies may be riskier in honor cultures than in dignity cultures, because they are likely to be reciprocated by similar strategies (Harinck et al., 2013; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In conflicts that do not involve an honor threat, therefore, members of honor cultures choose less aggressive, more avoidance-oriented and more cooperative responses compared to members of dignity cultures (Beersma et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 1996; Harinck et al., 2013).

As mentioned previously, the concept of honor has three dimensions in Turkey and in the US, namely, the social status/respect dimension (e.g., to be appreciated by others, to be respectable in the society), the moral behavior dimension (e.g., to be honest, to be willing to sacrifice) and the self-respect dimension (e.g., to feel proud of myself, to feel self-esteem; Cross et al., 2014). To have a comprehensive understanding of cultural differences in conflict management, I will include conflicts that arise from a *complete honor threat* (true accusations) that I expect to attack all three dimensions as well as a *self-respect threat* (negative performance feedback) that attacks only one of the dimensions. Previous studies on honor have focused on false accusations or insults as honor threats but no study has examined true accusations. I expect that true accusations, such as being rightfully accused of cheating, can be considered a more complete honor threat than false

accusations because they attack a person's self-respect (a blameworthy person is usually not proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is not honest if he/she has cheated) and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect of others because of his/her intentional wrongdoing). When someone is falsely accused, in contrast, he/she knows that there is a misunderstanding and his/her morality and self-respect may not be threatened as much.

In this study, I expect that Turkish people will be more likely to experience negative emotions such as shame and humiliation after a true accusation - a complete honor threat- compared to northern Americans. Moreover, Turkish people will be less likely to apologize after a true accusation but may be more likely to choose competitive responses compared to northern Americans. The next section will discuss the underlying reasons for these differences.

## True Accusations

Sometimes individuals are accused because there is evidence to prove that they intentionally did something wrong. How do they feel and respond when they face a true accusation? In October 2013, the US Republican congressman Trey Radel was charged for cocaine possession. He delivered an emotional apology on TV for his charge, in which he openly admitted responsibility and asked for forgiveness (Fahrenthold, Alexander & Horwitz, 2011). In December 2013, businessmen close to the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and three ministers' sons were detained because of allegations of bribery and illicit money transfers (Tattersall & Butler, 2014). The prime minister himself was claimed to be involved in the corruption scandal according to telephone tapes leaked in the internet, in which he orders his son to get rid of millions of dollars in incriminating cash (Letsch, 2014). Despite the evidence, protests and pressure to resign, he rejected the allegations,

blamed “outside forces” for the scandal (Young, 2013) and tightened control of the Internet (Tattersall & Butler, 2014). What are the reasons behind different approaches to rightful accusations? Does the cultural background of the two politicians play a role in how they deal with these accusations? Are members of honor cultures reluctant to admit their guilt because it would leave a permanent “stain” on their reputation?

There is extensive research on how members of honor cultures feel and respond when they are falsely accused; however to my knowledge, there is no research that focuses on how they feel and respond when they are the offender or when they are rightfully accused. I expect to find differences between honor and dignity cultures in their reactions to true accusations, mainly because of the emphasis on reputation in situations where the person is blameworthy (Gonzales et al. 1992).

**True Accusation as a Reputation Threat**

In intentional transgressions, the offender’s reputation is threatened more compared to transgressions that are results of accidents or negligence. When people intentionally cheat, lie or harm another person, their destructiveness, immorality, and lack of mindfulness represent a reputation threat for them. In these situations, apologizing may not be preferred because admitting guilt and responsibility would threaten the reputation of the offender even more. Blameworthy offenders, therefore, may become defensive and provide excuses or justifications rather than apologies (Gonzales et al. 1992; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996b).

Reproach behavior is another factor that could influence the willingness of the offender to apologize. Being severely called out for the wrongdoing challenges the offenders’ behavior, but it also suggests their imperfection and brings their self-worth and reputation under threat. When the reproach is severe, therefore, offenders become defensive, more concerned for their own reputation rather than the victim’s, and hence,

less likely to apologize (Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003). Due to the strong emphasis on protecting one's own reputation and the importance of other people's opinions, I expect that members of honor cultures may have a lower threshold for defensiveness when they are the blameworthy offenders compared to the members of dignity cultures.

Blameworthy offenders can choose from a wide range of behavioral options such as finding excuses or justifications for their behavior or refusing to admit the wrong-doing (e.g., Schönbach, 1980). Research on forgiveness, however, has shown that if a person wants to be forgiven, not to be punished severely, or to feel as though they are someone who has integrity, he/she needs to provide a sincere apology (Fehr et al., 2010). Despite these multiple benefits of apologies, some people are less willing and less likely to apologize than others (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). In this work, I will focus on culture and emotions as potential factors underlying the differences in people's willingness to apologize and to choose other conflict resolution strategies.

**Cultural Differences in Apologies**

Most of the cross-cultural studies in the apology literature have focused on East Asian and northern American cultures. They have found cultural differences in the likelihood, meaning, and function of apologies. For example, Japanese people prefer cooperative and nonassertive accounts, such as apologies and excuses, more than competitive and assertive accounts, such as providing justifications for transgressions. Moreover, northern Americans prefer competitive and assertive accounts more than Japanese (Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; Takaku, 2000). The reason for these differences are attributed to the collectivistic culture of Japan, where maintaining social harmony and good relationships matter most, as opposed to the individualistic culture of the northern US, which emphasizes the attainment of personal goals and satisfaction.

Another study comparing Japan and the northern US revealed that for Japanese, apologies were a way of expressing remorse, whereas for Americans, they were means of assigning blame. This finding was explained by the attributional differences in the two cultures. Whereas the collectivistic culture of Japan make people more likely to attribute the causes of events to situational factors, the individualistic culture of the northern US emphasizes attribution of the causes to individual or dispositional factors (Maddux, Kim, Okumura, & Brett, 2011).

Other cross-cultural studies, however, have revealed conflicting and complicating results. For example, Japanese respondents were not different from British or Canadian respondents in their frequency of apology use (Tanaka, Spencer-Oatey, & Cray, 2000). In another study, Chinese people were less likely to apologize than Americans, but Koreans had more positive perceptions of apologizing than Americans (Park & Guan, 2006; Park, Lee, & Song, 2005). These studies have examined East Asian cultures, which are more collectivistic than Western cultures; however, the generalizability of these findings to MENA cultures is unknown. The mixed results and the lack of a focus on cultures other than the ones in East Asia render it necessary to have a focus on specific types of collectivistic and individualistic cultures, such as honor and dignity cultures, as well as on the emotions that are prominent in each culture.

**The Role of Emotions**

Emotions of guilt and shame experienced by transgressors are related to people's perception of and responses to true accusations, especially in their likelihood to apologize. Whereas *guilt* is positively associated with apologizing, *shame* is negatively associated with it (Howell, 2012). The potential reason behind the opposite roles of guilt and shame is that guilt focuses on the action, in this case on the wrong-doing, whereas

shame focuses on the entire self of the transgressor (Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Youman, & Stuewig, 2009). Guilt is more about the relation of people's actions with the rules, whereas shame is more about people's relation to an audience or a community (Cohen, 2003). Therefore, feeling guilty turns the focus of the transgressor to his/her action and to its impact on the victim, and tends to make the transgressor more likely to apologize. Feeling shame, in contrast, makes transgressors more concerned about how they are perceived by others and therefore they may prefer justifications or externalizations of the action rather than concessions (Howell et al., 2012).

**Implications for Honor and Dignity Cultures**

Being truly blamed for an intentional wrong-doing is not only a reputation threat but also a potentially shameful experience. Shame is highly valued in honor cultures and indicates that the individual is concerned about his/her honor (e.g., Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). A study examining the antecedents and action tendencies related to shame showed that Spanish participants (an honor culture) mentioned public evaluations more than Dutch participants (a dignity culture) as antecedents of shame, whereas Dutch participants mentioned self-failure more than Spanish participants (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). Moreover, compared to Dutch participants, Spanish participants more often reported that they wanted to escape from shame-related situations (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). In conflict situations in which the individual is blameworthy, this escape tendency may translate into an unwillingness to offer an apology.

There are also dynamics that are specific to the American society that may influence the likelihood of apologies in that culture. American society is becoming more individualistic. It is creating individuals who are free from conventional restraints, but at the same time it is putting more emphasis on morality (Cohen, 2003). These two

dynamics may seem conflicting at first, but they may lead to a similar behavioral tendency when it comes to transgressions. Individualism gives people the freedom to define their own rules and criteria for good and bad, as well as to pick their own reference groups and audiences (Cohen, 2003). This may make people care less about what other people think and feel less ashamed in front of others, especially if those "others" do not belong to their selected audience in their perception. Supporting this idea, the term shame has been diminishing in dictionaries and is giving way to other terms that are related to internal self-evaluations and worth such as self-esteem, pride and dignity (Cohen, 2003). Moreover, guilt-related terms are becoming more prominent than shame, which could be related to the emphasis on morality (Cohen, 2003). Morality, especially in the form of religious morality, is very prominent in American society, and compared to other industrialized countries, Americans are more likely to believe in God, sin, heaven and hell (Inglehart, 1997). The emphasis on morality may underlie the prominence of guilt in the language; it may make people more likely to experience guilt after doing something offensive and more willing to apologize. As mentioned previously, guilt is positively associated with apologizing, whereas shame is negatively associated with it (Howell, 2012).

In honor cultures, the prominence of shame, the concern about not losing reputation by admitting the wrongdoing, and the desire to escape public judgment may overshadow individuals' concern for others' needs or for being honest and transparent. To defend their honor, members of honor cultures may need to be sensitive to a broad range of offenses and potential reputation threats, including seemingly trivial ones (Cohen, 2003). After being rightfully accused for an act, apologizing in the form of admitting guilt may not be common in honor cultures because it could be perceived as a reputation threat. Being constantly on guard against losing reputation may make individuals from honor

cultures less willing to *cooperate* or to apologize, but more willing to *compete* or to justify their behavior and refuse the accusation, compared to members of dignity cultures (Table 1 and 2).

## The Present Experiments

To test my predictions, I employed two experiments with different methodologies. The first experiment was an online survey, in which Turkish and northern American participants indicated their emotional and behavioral reactions to conflict scenarios that involved complete honor threats in the form of true accusations and self-respect threats in the form of negative task-related performance feedback. The second experiment was a laboratory study that was conducted in Turkey and in the northern US. Some participants were encouraged to cheat on a task and were truly accused later on and other participants received poor performance feedback. The main difference between these conditions were the intentionality of the target's behavior, namely, he/she engaged in an intentional transgression in the complete honor threat condition (true accusation) or performed poorly in the self-respect threat condition (negative performance feedback). I examined the differences and similarities in the emotional and behavioral responses to these threats in the two cultural groups. I also included a control condition - no threat (neutral feedback) - that lacked the undesirable behavior of the target (transgression / mistake) and the negative response as a result of his / her behavior (i.e., accusation / negative performance feedback). This condition served as a baseline comparison condition for the two cultural groups. I included a second control condition – social respect threat (false accusation) – that also lacked the undesirable behavior of the target (transgression / mistake) but included the negative response to the target (accusation). Thereby, I wanted to distinguish between the effects of the targets' undesirable behaviors and the effects of the accusation or negative performance feedback they received.

In both experiments, participants explicitly reported their emotions on respective scales and in Experiment 2 (the laboratory study), they also indicated how they perceived faces that depicted different kinds of emotions. The latter task served as a projective measure that collected information on participants' sensitivity to certain types of emotions after being exposed to different types of threats. In Experiment 1 (online scenario study), participants also reported their level of preference for behavioral responses that were competitive, avoidant, and cooperative, as well as their expectations for others' approval of those behaviors. In Experiment 2, participants wrote down their reactions after being actually accused or received negative performance feedback. They also played a bargaining game (ultimatum game) with the experimenter who was the accuser/feedback provider to obtain information about how they would really treat a threat source. This game gave them an opportunity to retaliate by making bargaining decisions that were disadvantageous to the threat source at the expense of their own gain. Moreover, in Experiment 2, participants evaluated the threat source (e.g., the experimenter who accuses them) on various dimensions such as helpfulness and respectfulness. These evaluations were a measure of defensive tendencies, such that the more participants were defensive the more I expected that they would rate the threat source negatively.

**Hypotheses**

Initially, I only made predictions about cross-cultural differences in emotional and behavioral responses to accusations or negative feedback. Examining the mean differences between cultures, however, can be misleading due to the reference group effect (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). When participants complete Likert-type scales, they tend to compare themselves not to a different cultural group but to others in their own society; in other words, their reference group is people in their own society.

This may not only make cultural differences in psychological constructs disappear but also reverse them in some cases. Compared to a sole focus on cross-cultural mean differences, examining the within-culture patterns of constructs provides more accurate and methodologically less biased results (Bond & van de Vijver, 2010). Therefore, I also came up with within-culture predictions, in which I focused on differences in emotional and behavioral responses across accusation/feedback conditions within each culture.

Overall, I expected that Turkish participants (an honor culture) would respond more negatively to true accusations (a complete honor threat) compared to northern Americans (a dignity culture) and compared to negative performance feedback (a self-respect threat). Northern Americans, however, were expected to respond similarly to true accusations and negative performance feedback.

**Hypothesis group 1: Culture and emotional responses.** In both experiments, when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat), Turkish people would be more likely to experience negative emotions compared to Americans (Hypothesis 1a), but I did not expect any cultural differences for positive emotions (Hypothesis 1b, Table 2a).

In addition to the overall negative emotions, I examined the within-culture pattern of specific negative emotions, such as shame, guilt, humiliation-related emotions (e.g., feeling humiliated, belittled), and anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile). I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition (a complete honor threat) would experience the strongest shame and humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in other conditions. In northern US, however, I expected participants in the true accusation (a complete honor threat) and negative performance feedback conditions (a self-respect threat) to experience these emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1c). Moreover, when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat) the experience of

shame would be more intense than the experience of guilt for Turkish people, whereas for Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). Finally, I hypothesized that participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition (a social-respect threat) would be most angry compared to those in other conditions, because they do not deserve the accusation. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition (a complete honor threat) would be more likely to experience anger-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in the true accusation (a complete honor threat) and negative performance feedback conditions (a self-respect threat) would feel anger-related emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1e, Table 2a).

**Hypothesis group 2: Culture and behavioral responses.** I expected that in both experiments, when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat), Turkish people would be more likely to prefer competitive (e.g., retaliation, justification) but less likely to prefer cooperative responses (e.g., apology) compared to Americans. Moreover, Turkish people would be more defensive in this condition, indicated by an unfavorable evaluation of the experimenter/feedback provider (Experiment 2; Hypothesis 2a). When there was negative performance feedback (a self-respect threat), however, I predicted that Turkish people would be more likely to choose avoidant and indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting third party) compared to Americans. They would also be less defensive than northern Americans in this condition indicated by a favorable evaluation of the experimenter/feedback provider (Experiment 2; Hypothesis 2b; Table 2b and 2c).

I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused (a social respect threat) would be most likely to choose competitive responses, least likely to choose cooperative responses, and most likely to be defensive. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition (a complete honor threat) were expected to be

more likely to prefer competitive responses, less likely to prefer cooperative responses, and more likely to be defensive compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in the true accusation (a complete honor threat) and negative performance feedback conditions (a self-respect threat) would be similar in their preference for competitive and cooperative responses and in their defensiveness (Hypothesis 2c; Table 2b and 2c).

In both experiments, the threat came from a higher power person to have a conservative approach. People are more likely to apologize to higher power than lower power accusers, especially in high power distance cultures like Turkey (e.g., Takaku, 2000). Because of the honor threatening aspect of true accusations, I expected that Turkish people would apologize less than Americans; however, in situations where the threat came from a higher power person this cultural difference would be reduced. Consequently, this is a conservative test of my hypotheses.

# CHAPTER 2. PILOT STUDY

## Method

I conducted a pilot study to select the scenarios for Experiment 1. I expected the most appropriate scenarios to be similar in the clarity across threat conditions (e.g., easy to understand) but different in terms of the manipulated aspects (e.g., deservingness of the accusation).

### Participants

Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US ($n$ = 143, 71 women) and at Sabanci University in Turkey ($n$ = 136, 52 women; see Appendix A for the Institutional Review Board approval). They received course credit for participation. The northern American sample consisted of 117 European-American, six African-American, four Latino/a, two multiracial American, and 10 international students. Only European-American participants were included in the analyses. Moreover, in northern US, 11 participants indicated that they had participated in a study that measured similar constructs and therefore were excluded from the analyses. There was no participant in the Turkish sample who had participated in a similar study. The final sample consisted of 109 participants (52 women) in northern US and 136 participants (52 women) in Turkey. Average age was 20.45 ($SD$ = 1.47) in northern US and 23.19 in Turkey ($SD$ = 1.73).

### Design

The pilot study was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback).

**Materials and Procedure**

The study was conducted online (Qualtrics). Participants in each threat condition read three out of seven scenarios that involved different conflict topics (e.g., plagiarism, lying, stealing etc.). There were three university scenarios and four work place scenarios. Each participant read one university scenario and two work place scenarios that were randomly selected and ordered. Names in the scenarios were matched by gender and culture of the participant. Scenarios were adapted from Cross et al.'s (2012), Cross, Uskul & Wasti's (2014), Gonzales's (1992), and Guinote's (2008) work.

Targets in the scenarios were rightfully or falsely accused, given negative performance feedback, or given neutral feedback by a higher power person (e.g., manager or class project leader). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target in the scenario as vividly as possible, even if the situation was not something they would encounter in their life. Below are the four threat conditions for the plagiarism at work scenario (see Appendix B for other scenarios).

**True accusation.** You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You had been struggling with generating good strategies and decided to take a risk. You looked at the company archives and found Amanda's projects from 5 years ago. You took the ideas you liked and presented them as if they were yours. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda comes to your office and

says: “These are good ideas; however, I wish they were yours. How could you think that I wouldn’t remember my own ideas from my own projects?” You realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty.

**Negative performance feedback.** You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once the meeting is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas; however, they are not comprehensive enough. You did not cover any outdoor advertisement strategies, which were clearly mentioned in the briefing document I gave you. Our clients were not happy about it and they even implied that they may not work with us next year.” You realize you made a big mistake.

**False accusation.** You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas;

however, I wish they were yours. I was the one who mentioned these ideas in our last group meeting." You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty.

**Neutral feedback.** You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you feel that you did a satisfactory job. Once the meeting is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: "This was a good meeting. Let's talk about the timeline that the client requested and plan for the next month's project." You feel relieved that you were prepared.

**Questions.** After each scenario, participants summarized the scenario in their own words and indicated how the situation would make them think, feel, or behave. The purpose of this part was to make participants think about the scenarios carefully. Participants also answered close-ended questions about the scenarios and they used a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). To evaluate the overall *valence* of the situation, participants rated how positive, desirable, and pleasant each situation was. To evaluate the *clarity* of the scenarios, participants rated how clear, understandable, and realistic each scenario was. Participants also evaluated the *feedback fairness* by rating the intentionality and responsibility of the target for the behavior that caused him/her to be accused or to receive feedback, as well as to what degree he/she deserved the accusation/feedback. To examine the perception of *honor threat*, participants indicated to what degree they thought the situation would threaten their reputation, others' respect,

value in the society, status in the society, self-worth, and confidence (taken from Cross et al., 2014). Finally, they evaluated to what degree the situation would make them feel humiliated, offended, criticized, ashamed, guilty, angry at the threat source (*negative emotions*) and attentive, alert, and calm (*positive emotions*; in randomized order; taken from Cross, Uskul & Wasti, 2014; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009; Uskul et al., 2014).

## Results

I first computed composite scores for *valence* (average of positivity, desirability, and pleasantness of the situations), *clarity* (realistic, clear, and understandable), *feedback fairness* (responsibility, intentionality, and deservingness), *honor threat* perception (threat to reputation, others' respect, value in the society, status in the society, self-worth, and confidence), *negative emotions* (humiliated, offended, criticized, ashamed, guilty, and angry) and *positive emotions* (attentive, alert, and calm; Appendix C for data). Sample sizes were too small for statistical tests to be reliable. Therefore, I examined the descriptive statistics and chose four scenarios (two from university and two from work place scenarios) which met the following criteria best: 1) True accusation, negative performance feedback, and false accusation conditions were perceived as similar in *valence* but the neutral feedback condition was perceived more positively than the other versions in both cultures. 2) The *clarity* across the threat conditions of the scenarios were more similar and the ratings were higher than of other scenarios. 3) The feedback that the target received in the true accusation condition of the scenarios was perceived similarly *deserved* to the negative performance feedback condition but more deserved than neutral feedback and especially false accusation conditions (least deserved). 4) True and false accusation conditions were perceived more *honor threatening* than negative performance feedback and neutral feedback conditions in Turkey. In northern US, however, true

accusation and negative performance feedback conditions were perceived as more honor threatening than false accusation and neutral feedback conditions. 5) True and false accusation conditions evoked stronger *negative emotions* than the negative performance feedback and neutral feedback conditions in Turkey. In northern US, however, true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions evoked stronger negative emotions than false accusation and neutral feedback conditions. 6) There were no large differences for *positive emotions* across threat conditions of the selected scenarios (Appendix B for the selected scenarios and Appendix C for the data).

# CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1

## Method

### Participants

Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US ($n$ = 318, 155 women) and at Sabanci University in Turkey ($n$ = 206, 100 women), who did not take part in the pilot study (see Appendix A for the Institutional Review Board approval). They received course credit for participation. The northern American sample consisted of 233 European-American, 23 African-American, 15 Latino/a, 17 Asian-American, 12 multiracial American, four Native American, and 14 international students. Only European-American participants were included in the analyses. I also asked participants where they spent most of their lives and excluded those from the US sample who lived in an honor state (e.g., Texas) or who failed to provide that information (8 participants). Moreover, nine participants in northern US and four participants in Turkey indicated that they had participated in a study that measured similar constructs and therefore were excluded from the analyses.[1]

The final sample consisted of 202 participants (98 women) in Turkey and 216 participants (99 women) in northern US. Average age was 22.12 in Turkey ($SD$ = 1.59) and 19.25 ($SD$ = 1.52) in northern US. I imputed mean values for missing data on age, upbringing, and SES based on the culture and gender of the participant. A t-test revealed that Turkish participants were significantly older than northern American participants, $t$

[1] I included four questions in the survey that asked participants to select a certain number on the scale to measure how carefully they read the questions. I compared the responses of participants who did not make any mistakes, who made one mistake, two mistakes, three mistakes, and four mistakes. I focused on shame, humiliation-related emotions, and anger-related emotions and did not find substantial differences in the patterns. Therefore, I included all participants in the analyses regardless of the number of mistakes they made.

(416) = 18.83, $p < .001$, $d = 1.85$. Moreover, Turkish participants had significantly higher SES and more urban upbringing ($M_{SES} = 6.58$, $SD = 1.05$, $M_{Upbringing} = 7.27$, $SD = 1.57$) than northern American participants ($M_{SES} = 5.60$, $SD = 1.25$, $M_{Upbringing} = 4.88$, $SD = 2.06$), $t_{SES}(348) = 8.63$, $p < .001$, $d = .85$, $t_{Upbringing}(416) = 13.40$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.30$. These variables are controlled in the analyses because they differed across the two cultural groups and for the following reasons: Upbringing tends to be controlled in studies examining honor cultures because people who are brought up in rural areas tend to put stronger emphasis on honor values than those in urban areas (Barnes, Brown, & Tamborski, 2012). I controlled SES because research shows that social class plays an important role in shaping behaviors (e.g., Lareau, 2003). Americans who belong to the working class, for example, tend to be more interdependent and to put more emphasis on fitting in compared to middle class Americans (e.g., Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Bivariate correlations of age, upbringing, and SES with the outcome variables are reported in Appendix D.

**Design**

The experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback).

**Materials and Procedure**

The experiment was conducted online (Qualtrics) and presented as a study on situations and values. Participants read two scenarios in each threat condition, one of which took place in a university setting and the second in a work place setting (Appendix B). The order of scenarios was randomized. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target of the scenarios as vividly as possible, even if the situation was

something they would not encounter in their life. They summarized the scenario in their own words and indicated how they would feel and respond to the situation. The purpose of this part was to make sure that participants paid attention to the scenarios, thought hard about the conflict, and experienced them vividly. After that they answered the questions described below.

**Manipulation check questions.** Participants answered several questions to test whether the manipulations worked. They indicated their answers on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). First, they evaluated the *valence* of the scenarios by rating how positive, desirable, and pleasant each situation was. For *reputation threat* manipulation, they indicated to what degree their reputation would be threatened if they were the target in the scenario. Finally, for the *deservingness* manipulation they indicated to what degree they deserved the accusation/feedback as the target in the scenario.

**Emotional responses.** Next, they completed an emotion scale, in which they indicated to what degree they would feel *belittled, humiliated, offended, criticized, threatened, ashamed, embarrassed, guilty, angry, hostile, outraged, furious, enthusiastic, excited, alert, strong, proud, attentive, calm, and peaceful* (in randomized order; taken from Cross, Uskul & Wasti, 2014; Kitayama et al., 2009; Uskul et al.'s, 2014). Even though I was only interested in the negative emotions, I also assessed positive emotions to have a baseline level and to disguise the real purpose of the study.

The reliability analysis for negative and positive emotions showed that Cronbach's alphas were sufficiently high in Turkey (.91 and .87) and in northern US (.93 and .87) for these scales. Moreover, I examined humiliation-related emotions (humiliated, belittled, offended, threatened, and criticized) and anger-related emotions (angry, hostile, outraged, and furious) separately. Cronbach's alphas were sufficiently high for these two

scales as well, namely, .90 for humiliation-related emotions in both cultures and .91 and .95 for anger-related emotions in Turkey and northern US, respectively. I calculated the average ratings for these emotions for my analyses.

**Behavioral preferences.** Next, participants indicated how they would behaviorally respond to the accuser/feedback provider in the scenario by using a scale adopted from previous conflict research (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2001; Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2008; Schönbach, 1980; Shapiro & Kulik, 2004). Participants reported their willingness to choose *competitive* responses in the form of retaliation, disapproval, justification, and passive-aggressive behaviors, their willingness to *avoid* the offender or to find excuses for their behavior, and their willingness to choose *cooperative* responses such as apologizing, finding a middle way, or consulting a third party (Table 1). They used a scale from 1 (not willing at all) to 7 (extremely willing) to indicate their willingness. The items were presented in a randomized order.

Cronbach's alphas for competitive and cooperative responses were sufficiently high, namely .84 and .86 in Turkey and .88 and .84 in northern US, respectively. Cronbach's alpha for the avoidant response scale was .68 in Turkey and .69 in northern US. Neither in Turkey nor in northern US there was an item that would increase the Cronbach's alpha above .70 after deletion. Therefore, results for the avoidant response scale were interpreted with caution. Moreover, I examined indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting third party). The two items in that category were "I would tell another person, who was not involved, what happened and ask for opinion" and "I would ask a senior person to intervene." In both cultures, the two items had a significantly positive correlation, $r_{TR} = .45$ and $r_{US} = .56$, $ps < .001$. I also tested whether the specific, most extreme competitive and cooperative responses, namely, retaliation and apologizing, would show a similar pattern as the aggregate response categories. Reliability analyses

for retaliation and apology behaviors revealed sufficiently high Cronbach's alphas, namely .83 and .95 in Turkey and .79 and .94 in northern US, respectively. I calculated the average ratings for these behaviors for my analyses.

**Approval of behaviors by others.** Sometimes perceptions of social norms influence behaviors more than individuals' own beliefs or attitudes (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010; Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau, & Chiu, 2009). Therefore, in this study, I also examined the socially constructed norms about conflict management by asking participants to rate the extent to which others in their society would approve each response type. Thereby, a potential social desirability problem was overcome as well. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which others in their society would *approve* each response type using a scale from 1 (would definitely not approve) to 7 (would definitely approve). The items were presented in a randomized order. Cronbach's alphas for the perceived approval of competitive and cooperative responses were sufficiently high, namely .90 and .88 in Turkey and .91 and .85 in northern US, respectively. Unlike the personal preference of avoidant responses, Cronbach's alpha for the perceived approval of avoidant responses by others was also sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, .79 in Turkey and .71 in northern US. Similar to the personal behavior preference part, I examined the approval of indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting third party). In both cultures, the two items had a significantly positive correlation, $r_{TR} = .52$ and $r_{US} = .57$, $p$s $< .001$. Finally, I examined the perceived approval of retaliation and apology behaviors. Cronbach's alphas were sufficiently high for these variables as well, namely, .86 and .94 in Turkey and .82 and .91 in northern US for retaliation and apology, respectively. I calculated the average ratings for the approval of these behaviors for my analyses. After completing the approval of behaviors part, participants read the debriefing information.

I did not counterbalance the order of self-preference and approval by others questions for the sake of simplicity. I was more interested in cultural differences in each perspective (self and others) than the difference between these perspectives in each culture.

### Scenario Comparisons

To decide whether there were differences across the four scenarios I conducted reliability analyses for the manipulation check items – deservingness ("As the target in the situation, how much did you deserve the comment?"), reputation threat ("As the target in the situation, to what degree was your reputation threatened?"), and valence ("How negative/undesirable/unpleasant or positive/desirable/pleasant was the situation described in the scenario?"). These three variables or scales consisted of four items/scenarios, namely, cheating on a test, stealing money, plagiarism at work, and missing a meeting. Cronbach's alphas were .75 and .80 for deservingness, .67 and .75 for reputation threat, and .92 and .90 for valence in Turkey and northern US, respectively. I concluded that the scenarios fit well together and calculated their average for all variables in my analyses.

## Results

To overcome Type 1 error, Bonferroni correction was applied to all analyses in this experiment. I conducted the analyses with and without gender and reported the effects of gender in the footnotes only if they were significant. Sample sizes may differ across analyses due to missing data in the outcome variables.

### Manipulation Check

To understand whether my manipulations worked, I conducted univariate ANCOVAs for each manipulation check variable, in which I entered culture (Turkey and

northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. For the sake of brevity, I reported the main and interaction effects of culture and threat condition only in Table 3. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

**Deservingness.** In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}(3, 195) = 109.43$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .63$, and $F_{US}(3, 209) = 108.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .61$. As expected, participants in the true accusation condition perceived the treatment of the target as significantly more deserved than participants in all other conditions, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .81. Negative performance feedback and neutral feedback scenarios were the second highest in deservingness ratings but they did not differ from each other, *p*s > .84, *d*s < .26. As expected, participants in the false accusation condition perceived the treatment of the target as significantly less deserved than participants in all other conditions, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 2.20 (see Table 4 for descriptives).[2]

**Reputation threat.** In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}(3, 195) = 74.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .54$, and $F_{US}(3, 209) = 87.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .56$. Participants who read the true accusation and false accusation scenarios perceived greater reputation threat than those who read the negative performance feedback and neutral feedback scenarios, *p*s < .001, *d*s > .79. Participants in the true and false accusation conditions did not significantly differ from each other, *p*s > .06, *d*s < .47.

[2] There was a significant interaction of gender and culture for the deservingness variable, $F(1, 399) = 4.10$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$. Turkish men ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 1.90$) perceived the treatment of the target significantly more deserved than Turkish women ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 2.01$), $F(1, 191) = 6.37$, $p < .05$, $d = .12$. There was no gender difference in northern US, $F(1, 205) = .19$, $p = .67$.

Participants who read the negative performance feedback scenarios perceived the situation significantly more threatening than those who read the neutral feedback scenarios, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 1.48 (see Table 4 for descriptives).

**Valence.** In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}(3, 195) = 232.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .78$, and $F_{US}(3, 209) = 239.68$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .78$. Turkish participants who read the true accusation and false accusation scenarios did not differ in their valence evaluation of the situations, $p = 1.00$, $d = .30$, but they perceived the situations in these scenarios as more negative than those who read the negative performance feedback and neutral feedback scenarios, *p*s < .05, *d*s > .58. Turkish participants who read the negative performance feedback scenarios perceived the situation as more negative than those who read the neutral feedback scenarios, $p < .001$, $d = 3.39$. As expected, northern Americans who read the true accusation, false accusation, and negative performance feedback scenarios did not differ from each other in their valence evaluations of the situations, *p*s = 1.00, *d*s < .24, but they perceived the situations in these scenarios as more negative than those who read the neutral feedback scenarios, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 4.09 (Table 4). Based on these results, I concluded that manipulations worked well in both cultural groups.

**Main Analyses of Emotional Responses**

I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for aggregate negative and positive emotions as well as for shame, humiliation-related emotions, and anger. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 3. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted

separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

**Cross-cultural comparison of negative and positive emotions.** I hypothesized that Turkish participants who read the true accusation scenarios and imagined themselves as the target would be more likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions compared to northern American participants (Hypothesis 1a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA in the true accusation condition revealed that participants from the two cultural groups were similar in their likelihood to experience negative emotions when they imagined themselves as the target in the true accusation scenarios, $F$ (1, 100) = .38, $p$ = .54, $d$ = .15 (see Table 5 for descriptives).[3]

I did not predict any cultural differences for the likelihood to experience positive emotions (e.g., excited, strong; Hypothesis 1b). As expected, there was not a significant main effect or interaction effect of culture for positive emotions, $p$s > .55 (Table 5).[4]

**Within-culture comparison of specific negative emotions.** I also examined within-culture patterns of negative emotions to overcome the potential issues with cross-cultural comparison of the means, such as reference group effects mentioned earlier. I was interested in specific negative emotions that were particularly relevant to the honor concept, such as shame, guilt, humiliation-related emotions (e.g., feeling humiliated, belittled), and anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile).

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[3] There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for negative emotions, $F$ (3, 399) = 3.55, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .03$. In the negative performance feedback condition, women ($M$ = 4.06, $SD$ = .94) were significantly more likely to report negative emotions than men ($M$ = 3.64, $SD$ = 1.04), $F$ (1, 102) = 7.67, $p < .01$, d = .24.

[4] Men ($M$ = 3.11, $SD$ = 1.19) were more likely to indicate that they would feel positive emotions as the target in the scenario compared to women ($M$ = 2.83, $SD$ = 1.18), $F$ (1, 397) = 7.69, $p < .01$, $d$ = .29.

***Shame and humiliation-related emotions (e.g., humiliated, belittled).*** Due to the importance of honor values in Turkey and the intensity of honor threat caused by a rightful accusation of a transgression, I expected Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be most likely to indicate that they would experience shame and humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in other conditions. Due to the emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in northern US, however, I expected Northern American participants in the true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions to indicate that they would experience these emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1c).

Univariate ANCOVAs for shame showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 195) = 74.11, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .53$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 99.50, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .59$. As expected, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience shame compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > 1.13. Contrary to my expectations, however, northern Americans in the negative performance feedback condition were less likely to indicate that they would experience shame compared to those in the true accusation condition, $p < .01$, $d = .72$, but more likely to indicate that they would experience shame compared to those in the remaining conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > 1.22 (Table 5).[5]

[5] Women ($M$ = 4.30, $SD$ = 2.19) were more likely to indicate that they would feel ashamed if they were the target in the scenario compared to men ($M$ = 3.82, $SD$ = 1.98), $F$ (1, 399) = 11.90, $p < .01$, $d = .23$. There was also a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for shame, $F$ (3, 399) = 4.99, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed that women who read the true accusation ($M$ = 6.31, $SD$ = .90) and negative feedback scenarios ($M$ = 5.37, $SD$ = 1.37) were more likely to indicate that they would feel ashamed compared to men in these conditions ($M_{True}$ = 5.82, $SD$ = 1.29, $M_{Negative}$ = 4.32, $SD$ = 1.58), $F_{True}(1, 98) = 6.28$, $p < .05$, $d = .44$, $F_{Negative}(1, 102) = 13.12$, $p < .001$, $d = .71$.

Univariate ANCOVAs for humiliation-related emotions also showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 194) = 60.97, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .49$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 94.36, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .58$. Partially in line with expectations, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-related emotions compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > .80, but similarly likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-related emotions compared to those in the false accusation condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .21$. This result suggests that in Turkey, people who are rightfully accused of a transgression feel as humiliated as those who were falsely accused of a transgression. In line with expectations, Northern American participants in the negative performance feedback condition were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-related emotions compared to those in the true accusation condition, $p = .40$, $d = .32$, and more likely than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = 1.94$, Northern American participants in the false accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-related emotions compared to northern Americans in the negative performance feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = 1.22$ (Table 5).

***Shame versus guilt.*** I predicted that Turkish participants who read the true accusation scenarios would indicate that they would experience more shame than guilt, whereas for northern Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). Different from the analyses in this section, I conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA for the true accusation condition, in which emotion type (shame vs guilt) was the within-subjects variable, culture was the between-subjects variable, and age, upbringing, and SES were covariates. Results revealed that participants from both cultural groups were

similarly likely to indicate that they would experience shame and guilt, indicated by a non-significant culture and emotion type interaction, $F$ (1, 99) = .00, $p$ = .96 (Table 5).[6]

***Anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile)***. I predicted that participants in both cultures who read the false accusation scenarios would be most likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in other conditions, because they do not deserve the accusation. I also expected Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be more likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in the true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions were expected to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1e). In Turkey, people who are rightfully called out for a transgression may feel strong reputation threat and anger. In northern US, however, a threat to positive self-esteem through negative performance feedback may have the same effect because of the importance of the construct in that cultural group.

Univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 195) = 56.27, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$ = .46, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 92.88, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$ = .57. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition were most likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > .98. In line with my expectations,

[6] There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for guilt, $F$ (3, 397) = 6.57, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$ = .05. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed that women who read the true accusation ($M$ = 6.35, $SD$ = .90) and negative feedback scenarios ($M$ = 5.49, $SD$ = 1.27) were more likely to indicate that they would feel guilty compared to men in these conditions ($M_{True}$ = 5.87, $SD$ = 1.17, $M_{Negative}$ = 4.62, $SD$ = 1.58), $F_{True}$(1, 97) = 6.97, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .46, $F_{Negative}$(1, 102) = 10.15, $p$ < .01, $d$ = .61. Women ($M$ = 1.61, $SD$ = .95) who were in the neutral feedback condition, however, were less likely to report guilt compared to men in this condition ($M$ = 2.21, $SD$ = 1.30), $F$ (1, 94) = 6.49, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .53.

Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in the remaining conditions, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .55. As expected, northern American participants in the negative performance feedback and true accusation conditions were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions, $p = 1.00$, $d = .06$, and more likely than those in the neutral feedback condition, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 1.64 (Table 5).

**Summary**. Participants in the two cultures were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions when they imagined themselves as the rightfully accused target in the scenario. In both cultures, participants in the true accusation condition were most likely to indicate that they would feel ashamed compared to participants in other conditions. For Turkish participants, a rightful accusation - even though deserved - was perceived as equally humiliating as a false accusation. For northern Americans, there was no difference in humiliation-related emotions between those who read the true accusation and negative performance feedback scenarios. This suggests that a threat to self-respect through negative performance feedback in northern US is perceived as similarly humiliating as a complete honor threat through a rightful accusation. Finally, participants from both cultures in the false accusation condition were most likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in other conditions. In Turkey, participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience anger compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, whereas for northern Americans there was no difference between these two conditions. This suggests that for northern Americans a threat to self-respect (negative performance feedback) may be equally anger-provoking to a complete honor threat (true accusation).

**Main Analyses of Behavioral Preferences**

I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for competitive, cooperative, and avoidant responses. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 3. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

**Cross-cultural comparison of competitive, cooperative, and avoidant responses.** I expected that Turkish participants who read the true accusation scenarios and imagined themselves as the target would be more willing to choose competitive responses (e.g., justification) but less willing to choose cooperative responses (e.g., apologies) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my predictions, univariate ANCOVAs in each condition revealed that participants in the two cultural groups were similarly willing to choose competitive responses in the true accusation condition, $F$ (1, 99) = .02, $p$ = .90, $d$ = .05. Similarly, there was no significant difference between the two cultures for cooperative responses in this condition, $F$ (1, 99) = 1.41, $p$ = .24, $d$ = .09 (Table 6).[7]

[7] Men ($M$ = 2.68, $SD$ = 1.02) were more likely to indicate that they would choose competitive responses compared to women ($M$ = 2.45, $SD$ = .96), $F$ (1, 395) = 5.25, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .23. There was also a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for cooperative responses, $F$ (3, 395) = 4.58, $p$ < .01, $\eta^2$ = .03. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed that women who read the negative performance feedback scenarios ($M$ = 5.02, $SD$ = .93) were more likely to indicate that they would choose cooperative responses compared to men in the same condition ($M$ = 4.56, $SD$ = 1.04), $F$ (1, 102) = 6.15, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .47.

For negative performance feedback scenarios, I expected Turkish participants to be more willing to choose avoidant and indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting third party) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b). Contrary to my predictions, univariate ANCOVAs did not reveal a significant difference between the two cultures for avoidance, $F$ (1, 104) = 1.01, $p$ = .32, $d$ = .36, or indirect cooperative responses, $F$ (1, 104) = 1.98, $p$ = .16, $d$ = .01 (Table 6).

**Within-culture comparison of competitive and cooperative responses.** As in the emotion section, I made within-culture comparisons of behavioral preferences across threat conditions. I expected that in both cultures, participants who read the false accusation scenarios would be most willing to choose competitive but least willing to choose cooperative responses as the target in the scenarios, compared to participants who read other scenarios. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more willing to choose competitive but less willing to choose cooperative responses compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be similarly willing to choose competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 2c).

The univariate ANCOVAs revealed a significant main effect of threat condition for competitive responses in Turkey, $F$ (3, 191) = 16.69, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 13.71, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition were most willing to choose competitive responses compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .01, $d$s > .83. Contrary to my predictions Turkish participants in the true accusation were similarly willing to choose competitive responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback and neutral feedback conditions, $p$s > .99, $d$s < .37. Partially in line with my expectations, this was the case for northern American participants as well, $p$s > .99, $d$s < .16 (Table 6).

Similar to competitive responses, there was a significant main effect of threat condition for cooperative responses in Turkey, $F$ (3, 191) = 41.37, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 44.59, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition were least willing to choose cooperative responses compared to those in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > 1.72, but they were not different from those in the neutral feedback condition, $p$s > .09, $d$s < .54. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to choose cooperative responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .05$, and more willing than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = 1.14$. In line with my expectations, northern American participants in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to choose cooperative responses compared to those in the negative feedback condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .08$, but more willing than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = 1.56$ (Table 6).

**Within-culture comparison of specific behaviors.** I also examined specific and most extreme competitive and cooperative behaviors, namely, retaliation and apology behaviors. Results were similar to the patterns of the aggregate competitive and cooperative responses. Univariate ANCOVAs for retaliation showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 191) = 18.92, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .23$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 13.74, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition were most willing to retaliate compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .01, $d$s > .65. Contrary to expectations, Turkish participants who were in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to retaliate compared to those

in the remaining conditions, *p*s > .44, *d*s < .33. In line with my predictions, this was the case for northern American participants as well, *p*s > .62, *d*s < .31 (Table 6).[8]

Similar to retaliation, there was a significant main effect of threat condition for apology behavior in Turkey, $F$ (3, 191) = 70.19, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .52$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 209) = 77.66, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .53$. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition were least willing to apologize compared to those in the true accusation and negative feedback conditions, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 2.11. In Turkey, participants who were in the false accusation condition were significantly less willing to choose to apologize compared to those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = .95$, but the difference between these conditions was marginally significant for northern Americans, $p = .06$, $d = .50$. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants who were in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to apologize compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .16$, and more willing to apologize than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .001$, $d = 1.52$. In line with my predictions, this was the case for northern American participants as well, $p = 1.00$, $d = .13$, and $p < .001$, $d = 1.97$ (Table 6).[9]

[8] Men ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.34$) were more likely to indicate that they would choose retaliation compared to women ($M = 2.02$, $SD = 1.09$), $F$ (1, 395) = 12.33, $p < .001$, $d = .33$. There was also a significant interaction of gender, culture, and threat condition for retaliation behavior, $F$ (3, 395) = 2.82, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .02$. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each culture and condition revealed a significant gender difference only for Turkish participants in the false accusation condition, $F$ (1, 41) = 10.47, $p < .01$, $d = 1.05$. Turkish men ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.29$) were more likely to indicate that they would choose retaliation if they imagined themselves as the falsely accused target in the scenario compared to Turkish women, ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 1.15$).

[9] There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for apology behavior, $F$ (3, 395) = 4.28, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each condition showed that women ($M = 5.42$, $SD = 1.04$) were significantly more likely to indicate that they would apologize if they received negative performance feedback compared to men ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.28$), $F$ (1, 102) = 4.80, $p < .05$, $d = .42$.

**Approval of Behaviors by Others**

Participants not only evaluated their own preference for each behavioral response to threats but also others' approval of these responses. I tested the same behavioral hypotheses by replacing the outcome measures with participants' perceived approval of these behaviors by others in their society. Results were very similar to those for the personal preference of the behaviors and are reported in Table 3 and Table 7.

**Summary.** There were no cross-cultural differences in the likelihood to choose competitive, cooperative, or avoidant behaviors for participants who read the true accusation scenarios. In both cultures, participants who read the false accusation scenarios were most likely to indicate that they would choose competitive responses but least likely to indicate that they would choose cooperative responses. Moreover, in both cultures, participants in the true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions were similarly likely to choose these responses. The examination of specific responses, such as retaliation and apology, as well as the examination of the perceived approval of these responses revealed similar results.

The lack of support for most of my predictions in behavioral responses to conflict could be due to social desirability concerns. Participants may feel comfortable to report their emotions in response to the conflict scenarios, but when it comes to behaviors, they may be concerned about giving the socially appropriate answer. Moreover, these scenarios are about hypothetical situations and may not evoke actual emotions and behaviors. In Experiment 2, I tried to overcome this issue by conducting a laboratory study, in which participants received actual feedback about their own performance and behavior.

# CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2

## Method

This experiment improved on Experiment 1 by providing actual behavioral evidence of retaliation and apologies in response to conflicts. In a laboratory setting, I examined cultural differences in emotional and behavioral responses after real conflicts related to threats such as true accusations and negative performance feedback. Participants were enticed to cheat or not by a confederate and were accused or received negative feedback by the experimenter afterwards (adapted from a paradigm developed by Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005, and Scherr & Madon, 2012). I focused on self-reported emotional responses to these threats and on how participants perceived faces that displayed various emotions. Moreover, participants responded to threats by writing an essay and playing a bargaining game (ultimatum game) that indirectly measured their likelihood to retaliate against the threat source (i.e., the experimenter). They also evaluated the threat source (i.e., the experimenter) on various dimensions, such as competence and helpfulness, as a measure of defensiveness. Employing multiple measures to examine actual emotions and behaviors, this experiment was a strong test of my predictions.

### Participants

Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US ($n$ = 245, 144 women) and at Bogazici University in Turkey ($n$ = 213, 133 women), who did not take part in the pilot study or Experiment 1 (online scenario study; see Appendix A for the Institutional Review Board approval). They received course credit and $8 for their participation. The northern American sample consisted of 199 European-American, 17 African-American, 8 Latino/a, 14 Asian-American, 3 multiracial American, and 2

international students. Only European-American participants were included in the analyses. I also asked participants where they spent most of their lives and excluded those from the US sample who lived in an honor state (e.g., Texas; 23 participants). Another exclusion criterion was participants' suspicion level. At the end of each session, before debriefing, the experimenter asked questions such as "In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this study?" The experimenter assigned a suspicion score based on the participants' answers to these questions. In Turkey, 11 participants (5.2 %), in northern US, 10 participants (5.3 %) were excluded from the analyses because they were aware of the purpose of the experiment (e.g., they said that the experiment measured whether participants would give the experimenter more money because they felt guilty). There were participants who were somewhat suspicious (e.g., who said that the experiment measured how people react to feedback). Analyses comparing these participants with non-suspicious participants did not reveal any meaningful differences between the two groups across cultures and threat conditions. Therefore, I decided to collapse these two groups.[10]

The final sample consisted of 202 participants (128 women) in Turkey and 177 participants (107 women) in northern US. Average age was 20.98 (*SD* = 1.81) in Turkey and 19.82 (*SD* = 1.59) in northern US. A t-test revealed that Turkish participants were significantly older than northern American participants, $t$ (376) = 6.64, $p < .001$, $d = .68$. Moreover, Turkish participants had significantly lower SES but more urban upbringing

[10] I conducted t-tests for manipulation check questions and emotion scales comparing non-suspicious and somewhat suspicious participants in each culture and threat condition. There was only one significant difference in the Turkish sample for the false accusation condition and three marginally significant differences in northern US for true and false accusation conditions.

($M_{SES}$ = 5.35, $SD$ = 1.13, $M_{Upbringing}$ = 6.70, $SD$ = 1.57) than northern American participants ($M_{SES}$ = 5.85, $SD$ = 1.21, $M_{Upbringing}$ = 5.25, $SD$ = 1.95), $t_{SES}$ (376) = 4.11, $p < .001$, $d = .43$, $t_{Upbringing}$ (376) = 7.89, $p < .001$, $d = .82$. As in Experiment 1, these variables are controlled in the analyses. Bivariate correlations of age, upbringing, and SES with the outcome variables are reported in Appendix D.

**Design**

The experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback).

**Materials and Procedure**

Upon arrival to the lab, the participant and the confederate received information about the aim and structure of the study. The experiment was presented as if it was examining the relation of teamwork, cognition, and decision making, and as if it was managed by faculty in the Department of Psychology and the Department of Economics. First, the participant and the confederate were asked to fill out a questionnaire on MediaLab, which included demographic questions (Appendix E). After that the experimenter led the participant and the confederate to a cubicle, where they got to know each other for a little bit and then started working on individual and team logic problems (Appendix E).

**Logic problems.** The participant and the confederate were not allowed to talk during the individual logic problems but they were expected to work together on the team problems. They started with the first individual problem and then moved on to the first team problem. They followed this alternating pattern until they were finished with all of

the problems (four in total). The experimenter left the cubicle after giving the instructions. If the participant was in the true accusation condition, the confederate tried to convince the participant to cheat by asking what he/she found in one of the individual logic problems. If the participant was in the false accusation, negative performance feedback, or neutral feedback conditions, the confederate did not say anything during the individual logic problems. It is important to note that the confederate and the experimenter were blind to each other's conditions. The confederate did not know what type of feedback the participant was going to receive from the experimenter later on. Similarly, the experimenter did not know whether the confederate tried to convince the participant to cheat during the logic problem part and whether the participant has actually cheated or not.

Once the participant and the confederate were finished with the logic problems, the experimenter went back to the cubicle and asked them to fill out a short survey about teamwork and self-evaluation so that he/she had time to score the logic problems (Appendix E). The survey consisted of questions such as "How much did you contribute to the team logic problems?" or "How would you rate your team's ability to work well together?" The confederate let the experimenter know when they were finished with this survey.

**Threat manipulation.** If the participant was in the true accusation, negative performance feedback, or false accusation condition the experimenter went back to the cubicle and told the participant and the confederate that there might be a problem. The experimenter then asked the confederate to follow him/her to the other cubicle so that they could talk and let the participant know that he/she was going to be back to talk with the participant as well. In the no threat condition, the experimenter said that they were ready to move on to the next task, on which they were going to work separately.

Similarly, the experimenter asked the confederate to follow him/her to the other cubicle to set him/her up and told the participant that he/she was going to be back in a bit. In all conditions, threat manipulation was delivered in private.

After three minutes, the experimenter went back to the participant's cubicle with a blank sheet of paper. In the true accusation and false accusation conditions, the experimenter said that while scoring their problems, he/she realized that the two of them shared answers on one of the individual logic problems. He/she did not know how to handle this situation and called the professor in charge to find out what to do. The professor said that she will consider this a case of cheating and asked him/her to document what happened. The experimenter then gave the participant a sheet of paper to write down what happened and whatever he/she would like to say.

In the negative performance feedback condition, the experimenter said that the participant performed very poorly on the individual logic problems and he/she called the professor to find out what to say to the participant, without giving the participant's name (to keep it as a private threat). The professor said that the logic problems in this experiment measure very basic reasoning abilities and it seems like the participant lacks them. She recommended that the participant talks to his/her academic advisor about this to ask for a class to take. Similar to true and false accusation conditions, the experimenter asked the participant to write down what happened, what he/she thought about the logic problems, and whatever he/she would like to say.

Finally, in the neutral feedback condition, the experimenter said that he/she scored the logic problems and everything went well. He/she realized, however, that there was something wrong with the materials of the next part and he/she called the professor in charge. The professor helped the experimenter get everything straightened out and he/she

needs to make some copies. In the meantime, the experimenter asked the participant to give feedback about the problems and to write down how he/she solved them and whatever he/she would like to say. The essays in each threat condition were later coded based on the behavioral response list in Experiment 1 (Table 1; adapted from a paradigm developed by Russano et al., 2005, and Scherr & Madon, 2012).

**Emotions, decision making, and evaluations.** The experimenter left the participant's cubicle and came back after three minutes to ask him/her to finish up the essay. In all conditions, the experimenter said that he/she called the professor again and she said she would like to talk to the participant herself. While she was getting ready, however, she wanted the experimenter to move on to the next task.

The experimenter explained that the next part was designed to investigate the relation between emotions and decision making. Participants were also going to be asked to evaluate their teammate and the experimenter. The experimenter explained that the evaluation part was going to consist of a survey and a decision making task (i.e., the ultimatum game). The experimenter's research assistantship contract was supposedly with the Department of Economics and they wanted participants to evaluate him/her in a survey at the end of each study. The average evaluation score at the end of the semester would determine whether the department would renew his/her contract or not. In the decision making task, the experimenter was going to interact with one of the participants and both of them would receive a certain amount of money based on their decisions in the task. The experimenter explained that part of his/her wage was going to come from this task itself.

The experimenter then pulled out an envelope of slips and asked the participant to draw one to determine who was going to be the other party in the decision making task. If

the participant drew a slip that said “responder” he/she would interact with the experimenter in the decision making task. In fact, the envelope only contained “responder” slips. After determining that the participant was going to be interacting with the experimenter in the decision making task, the experimenter went to the confederate’s cubicle to inform him/her about the next part and then came back to open up the emotion surveys for the participant. This part was presented as a set of questionnaires which were designed to obtain information about the relations between emotions and decision making.

***Emotion scale and manipulation check.*** The first task of this part was an emotion scale, which was completed on MediaLab. The instructions indicated that previous research has revealed a relation between emotions (positive and negative) and decision making, and participants would be asked to rate how they felt before the decision making task. As a valence manipulation check, they first described their current mood in terms of how *negative* or *positive* and how *pleasant* or *unpleasant* they felt on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). As an honor threat manipulation check they rated the extent to which they felt *offended* and *threatened*.

Other emotions they rated were *belittled, humiliated, ashamed, embarrassed, guilty, angry, hostile, outraged, furious* (negative emotions), *enthusiastic, excited, alert, strong, proud, attentive, calm, peaceful* (positive emotions; in randomized order; taken from Cross et al., 2014; Kitayama et al., 2009; Uskul et al., 2014). The reliability analyses for negative and positive emotions showed that Cronbach’s alphas were sufficiently high in Turkey (.91 and .70) and in northern US (.93 and .80) for these scales. Moreover, I examined humiliation-related emotions (humiliated, belittled, offended, and threatened) [11]

[11] I forgot to include criticized in Experiment 2 materials, which was one of the humiliation-related emotions in Experiment 1.

and anger-related emotions (angry, hostile, outraged, and furious) separately. Cronbach's alphas were sufficiently high for these two scales as well, namely, .83 and .84 for humiliation-related emotions and .87 and .93 for anger-related emotions in Turkey and northern US, respectively. I calculated the average ratings for these emotions for my analyses.

***Face perception task.*** The emotion scale was followed by a face perception task to indirectly investigate the emotions that were evoked by the accusation / feedback. Participants viewed five black and white photos of faces representing emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and a neutral expression (taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Set; Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998; see Appendix E). Participants rated the extent to which each face depicted emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, shame, guilt, and anxiety on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Previous research using a similar task showed that individuals who were insulted (i.e., honor threat) and who strongly endorsed honor values perceived angry faces as angrier than those who were not insulted and who weakly endorsed honor values (IJzerman et al., 2007).

I conducted reliability analyses for the overall negative emotion perception by including all emotions and all faces participants rated. Cronbach's alphas were sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, .83 in Turkey and .89 in northern US. I also conducted reliability analyses for each emotion participants rated by including the faces as items of that specific emotion scale. For example, to calculate the reliability of the anger scale I included the anger ratings for all five faces. Cronbach's alphas were below .63 in both cultures and the deletion of specific items/faces did not increase Cronbach's alphas to .70 for any scale. Therefore, I only included the average negative emotion perception scores in my analyses.

***Decision making task - Ultimatum game.*** After the emotion surveys, the participant was introduced to the decision making task, originally termed the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). This is a bargaining game in which there is a proposer and a responder. The proposer is given a total amount of money to divide between himself/herself and the responder. The responder decides whether to accept or reject the proposed amount. If the responder accepts the offer, both players receive the amount that was allocated, but if the responder refuses the offer, neither of them receives any money. Even though any amount is better than nothing, previous research showed that offers less than 20 – 30% of the total amount of money tend to be rejected because they are perceived as unfair. Thus, by rejecting an offer, the responder would punish the proposer as well as himself/herself (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman, & Robbins, 2008; Güth et al., 1982; Yang, Wu, Zhou, Vohs, Mead, & Baumeister, 2013). In that sense, rejection of an offer can be considered a competitive but irrational response. Acceptance of an offer (especially if it is highly unfair), in contrast, may be considered as a cooperative response or compensatory bolstering, and may mostly occur after the participant is rightfully accused.

Adapted from previous studies, there were 18 bargaining games in this study, with three high total amounts ($10, $15, $20) and three low total amounts ($2.25, $3, $5). The offers were fair (45% of the total amount), unfair (30% of the total amount) and highly unfair (20% of the total amount). In a randomized order, participants were presented with a total amount along with the offer supposedly made by the experimenter. In fact, all offers were predetermined (see Appendix E for the complete list of offers). Participants indicated whether they would accept or reject an offer by clicking the appropriate button (Crockett et al., 2008) but they were told that the experimenter would not see their response until the end of the experiment (so that participants did not think the

experimenter was reacting to their decision when they made a new offer). The experimenter explained that participants were going to receive payment based on two trials that would be randomly selected at the end of the task (Yang et al., 2013); hence, the maximum amount of money the participant could gain was $8. After giving the instructions and going over two practice trials, the experimenter said that he/she would now go to another computer to set up the connection with the participant's computer and to start the task.

***Experimenter and teammate evaluation.*** As soon as the decision making task ended, the participant saw instructions about teammate and experimenter evaluation surveys on the screen (Appendix E). Evaluations of the feedback provider, the experiment, and the experimenter have been widely used in the literature to measure defensive and aggressive behavior (e.g., Stucke & Sporer, 2002). Similarly, in this study, participants answered questions about their teammate (the confederate) and the experimenter, such as "How helpful was your teammate when you worked together?" and "How respectful was the experimenter?" Participants responded to the questions using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Cronbach's alphas for the experimenter evaluation scale and the teammate evaluation scale were sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, .79 and .82 In Turkey, and .81 and .91 in northern US, respectively. Teammate evaluation scale served as a filler to disguise the true purpose of the experiment and was not included in the results section.

**Debriefing.** At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asked questions that were designed to understand whether the participant was able to see the true purpose of the experiment (Appendix E). Some example questions were "Was the experiment clear in its overall purpose?" and "In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this experiment?" Based on the answers of the participant, the experimenter assigned one of

the following suspicion scores for the participant: 1 - not suspicios, 2 – somewhat suspicious, and 3 – clearly suspicious. Finally, the experimenter fully debriefed the participant and paid him/her $8 for the decision making task.

## Results

As in Experiment 1, Bonferroni correction was applied to all analyses to overcome Type 1 error. I conducted the analyses with and without gender and reported the effects of gender in the footnotes only if they were significant. Sample sizes may differ across analyses due to missing data in the outcome variables.

### Manipulation Check

To understand whether my manipulations worked, I conducted univariate ANCOVAs for each manipulation check variable, in which I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. I reported the main and interaction effects of culture and threat condition only in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

**Mood.** In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}(3, 193) = 9.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$, and $F_{US}(3, 170) = 7.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$. The mood of Turkish participants in the true accusation condition was significantly more negative than those in other conditions, $p$s $< .05$, $d$s $> .56$, except for those in the false accusation condition, $p = .29$, $d = .39$. Mood ratings did not differ between Turkish participants in the false accusation and negative feedback conditions, $p = 1.00$, $d = .15$.

Participants in the neutral feedback condition reported the most positive mood, *p*s < .001, *d*s > .53, but the difference between neutral and negative feedback conditions was not significant, $p = .10$, $d = .67$ (Table 9 for descriptives).

In northern US, there was no difference between the mood ratings of participants in the true accusation, negative performance feedback, and false accusation conditions, *p*s > .18, *d*s < .43. Northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition reported the most positive mood, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .87, but the difference between neutral feedback and false accusation conditions was not significant, $p = .10$, $d = .57$.

**Honor threat.** In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}(3, 193) = 15.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$, and $F_{US}(3, 170) = 15.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .22$. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition experienced greater honor threat compared to those in other conditions, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .63, except for those in the false accusation condition, $p = .13$, $d = .39$. Honor threat perception did not differ between Turkish participants in the false accusation and negative feedback conditions, $p = 1.00$, $d = .22$. Turkish participants in the neutral feedback condition perceived the lowest honor threat, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .89. (Table 9).

In northern US, participants' honor threat perception was not different in the true accusation, negative performance feedback, and false accusation conditions, *p*s = 1.00, *d*s < .18. Northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition perceived the lowest honor threat compared to those in other conditions, *p*s < .001, *d*s > 1.34.

**Main Analyses of Emotional Responses**

As in Experiment 1, I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for aggregate negative and positive emotions as well as for shame, humiliation-related emotions, and

anger-related emotions. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

**Cross-cultural comparison of negative and positive emotions.** Participants completed an emotion scale in which they indicated how they were feeling before the decision making task. They also rated the extent to which five faces reflected negative emotions such as anger and shame to measure their emotion perception.

I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would experience and perceive stronger negative emotions than northern American participants (Hypothesis 1a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for the true accusation condition revealed that participants from the two cultural groups were similar in their likelihood to experience negative emotions when they were rightfully accused of cheating, $F$ (1, 87) = 1.01, $p$ = .32, $d$ = .23 (Table 10 for descriptives). To examine the perception of negative emotions on faces, I conducted another univariate ANCOVA for the average ratings of negative emotions displayed in all faces. Contrary to my expectations, northern American participants were more likely to perceive negative emotions on faces compared to Turkish participants when they were rightfully accused of cheating, $F$ (1, 87) = 4.03, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .53 (Table 10).

I did not expect any cultural differences for the likelihood to experience positive emotions (e.g., excited, strong; Hypothesis 1b). In line with my predictions, culture did not have a main effect or an interaction effect for positive emotions, *p*s > .16 (Table 10).[12]

**Within-culture comparisons of specific negative emotions.** As in Experiment 1, I focused on within-culture patterns to overcome the potential issues with cross-cultural mean comparisons. I was interested in specific negative emotions, such as shame, guilt, humiliation-related emotions (e.g., feeling humiliated, belittled), and anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile).

***Shame and humiliation-related emotions (e.g., humiliated, belittled).*** I also expected Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be most likely to experience shame and humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in other conditions. Northern American participants in the true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would experience these emotions at a similar level but more strongly compared to northern Americans in other conditions (Hypothesis 1c). Univariate ANCOVAs for shame showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 193) = 5.67, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 170) = 19.12, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .25$. Partially in line with my predictions, participants in both cultures who were rightfully accused and who received negative performance feedback experienced similar levels of shame, *p*s = 1.00, *d*s < .17, but they experienced more shame than those in other conditions, *p*s < .05, *d*s > .45 (Table 10).

Univariate ANCOVAs for humiliation-related emotions also revealed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 193) = 12.99, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$, and in

[12] Men ($M$ = 3.27, $SD$ = .60) were more likely to experience positive emotions than women ($M$ = 3.08, $SD$ = .64), $F$ (1, 358) = 4.99, $p < .05$, $d$ = .31.

northern US, $F$ (3, 170) = 16.88, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .23$. Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating experienced the strongest humiliation-related emotions, but the only significant difference was between this condition and the neutral feedback condition, $p < .05$, $d = 1.42$. In line with expectations, northern Americans who were rightfully accused were similarly likely to feel humiliated compared to those who received negative performance feedback and who were falsely accused, $p$s > .22, $d$s < .47, but more likely than those who received neutral feedback, $p < .001$, $d = 1.58$ (Table 10).

***Shame versus guilt.*** I predicted that for Turkish participants who were rightfully accused, the experience of shame would be more intense than of guilt, whereas for northern Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). Different from the analyses in this section, I conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA for the true accusation condition, in which emotion type (shame vs guilt) was the within-subjects variable, culture was the between-subjects variable, and age, upbringing, and SES were covariates. Results revealed that participants from both cultural groups were similarly likely to state that they would experience shame and guilt, indicated by a non-significant culture and emotion type interaction, $F$ (1, 87) = .02, $p = .88$ (Table 10).[13]

***Anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile…).*** I predicted that participants in both cultures who were falsely accused of cheating would be most angry compared to those in other conditions, because they do not deserve the accusation. I also expected Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be more likely to experience anger-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in the true accusation and negative performance

[13] Women ($M = 1.79$, $SD = 1.11$) were more likely to experience guilt than men ($M = 1.45$, $SD = .93$), $F$ (1, 358) = 4.62, $p < .05$, $d = .32$.

feedback condition would feel anger-related emotions at a similar level and more strongly than northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition (Hypothesis 1e).

The univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat condition in Turkey, $F$ (3, 193) = 5.84, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$, and in northern US, $F$ (3, 170) = 7.02, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$. Contrary to my expectations, Turkish participants who were falsely accused of cheating were similarly angry to those in other conditions, $p$s > .11, $d$s < .63. Moreover, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were angrier compared to those who received negative performance feedback, but the difference was not significant, $p = .38$, $d = .33$. Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were significantly angrier than those who received neutral feedback, $p < .001$, $d = .96$. In northern US, participants who were rightfully accused, falsely accused, or who received negative performance feedback did not significantly differ in their experience of anger-related emotions, $p$s = 1.00, $d$s < .28, but they felt significantly stronger anger than those who received neutral feedback, $p$s < .05, $d$s > .78 (Table 10).

**Summary.** As in Experiment 1, participants in the two cultures were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions when they were rightfully accused of cheating. Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were somewhat more likely to experience humiliation-related emotions and anger compared to those who received negative performance feedback. Unlike in Experiment 1, however, the differences were not significant. As expected, there was no difference for northern Americans between these two conditions. These results may suggest that being rightfully accused of a transgression is perceived as a stronger threat and a greater humiliation for Turkish people than is a performance-related self-respect threat, whereas for northern Americans these two are similarly threatening and humiliating.

**Main Analyses of Behavioral Responses**

I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more likely to choose competitive responses (e.g., retaliation in the ultimatum game, providing justifications in the essay), less likely to choose cooperative responses (e.g., providing apologies in the essay), and more likely to experience defensiveness (i.e., more negative evaluation of the threat source) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). In the negative performance feedback condition, Turkish participants would be more likely to display avoidant and indirect cooperative responses (e.g., providing excuses in the essay, being more cooperative in the ultimatum game, evaluating the experimenter more positively) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b).

I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused would be most likely to choose competitive responses, least likely to choose cooperative responses, and most likely to be defensive. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more likely to be defensive, more likely to prefer competitive responses, but less likely to prefer cooperative responses compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be similar in their defensiveness and preference for competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 2c).

**Written statements: Competitive, cooperative, and avoidant responses.** After being accused of cheating or receiving feedback about their performance, participants were asked to write a statement about what happened during the logic problems section. Their statements were coded by two research assistants in each culture. Percent agreement between coders was .97 in Turkey and .95 in northern US. Disagreements were resolved by me.

The codes consisted of three categories, namely, *competitive responses* such as rejection of the accusation / negative performance feedback (e.g., "I did not share my answer with my partner" or "I do not believe that I have logical thinking issues") and justification of behavior (e.g., "We just discussed our answers assuming that we were done"), *cooperative responses* such as apologizing for cheating or admitting poor performance in the problems, and *avoidant responses* such as finding excuses for cheating or poor performance (e.g., "I was tired"). Essays of three Turkish participants and four northern American participants were lost; therefore, the sample sizes are lower for this outcome variable compared to other variables. I calculated the ratio for each code category by dividing the number of codes used in that category by the total number of codes used for that participant. For example, if the participant wrote "I admit that I cheated" and "I apologize," the number of codes in the cooperative behaviors category would be two. If the participant's essay had 10 codes in total then the score for the cooperative response category was recorded as .20 (two divided by 10; Table 11).

As in Experiment 1, I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for competitive, cooperative, and avoidant responses. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

***Cross-cultural comparisons.*** I hypothesized that Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating would be more likely to include competitive responses but less likely to include cooperative responses in their statements compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for

the true accusation condition revealed that participants in the two cultural groups did not differ in their likelihood to include competitive or cooperative responses in their essays, $F$ (1, 86) = .61, $p$ = .44, $d$ = .22, and $F$ (1, 86) = .02, $p$ = .90, $d$ = .04, respectively (Table 11 for descriptives).

I also predicted that in the negative performance feedback condition Turkish participants would be more likely to write avoidant responses compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b). The univariate ANCOVA for the negative performance feedback condition did not reveal a cultural difference in participants' likelihood of writing avoidant responses, $F$ (1, 91) = .04, $p$ = .84, $d$ = .03 (Table 11).

***Within-culture comparisons.*** I hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused would be most likely to include competitive but least likely to include cooperative responses in their essays. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more likely to write competitive but less likely to write cooperative responses compared to those in other conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be similar in their likelihood of including competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 2c).

Univariate ANCOVAs for the competitive response category showed a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}$ (3, 190) = 71.32, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$ = .53, and $F_{US}$ (3, 166) = 44.35, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$ = .45. In line with my predictions, participants in both cultures who were falsely accused of cheating included significantly more competitive responses in their statements compared to those in other conditions, $p$s < .001, $d$s > .88. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were similarly likely to write competitive responses compared to Turkish participants in the negative performance

feedback condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .21$, but they were more likely to include those responses compared to those who received neutral feedback, $p < .001$, $d = 1.68$. In line with my predictions, northern Americans in the true accusation and negative feedback conditions were similarly likely to write cooperative responses in their statements, $p = 1.00$, $d = .23$. Moreover, they were more likely to include these responses compared to northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition, $p$s $< .001$, $d$s $> 1.41$ (Table 11).

Univariate ANCOVAs for the cooperative response category showed a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}$ (3, 190) = 6.06, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$, and $F_{US}$ (3, 166) = 6.83, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$. In line with my predictions, participants in both cultures who were falsely accused of cheating included significantly fewer cooperative responses in their statements compared to those in the true accusation condition, $p$s $< .01$, $d$s $> .67$. Turkish participants in this condition were also less likely to include these responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, $p < .05$, $d = .62$. Participants in both cultures who were falsely accused were similarly likely to include cooperative responses compared to participants in the neutral feedback condition, $p$s $= 1.00$, $d$s $< .36$. Contrary to my expectations, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were similarly likely to write cooperative responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, $p = 1.00$, $d = .15$, but more likely to include these responses than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .05$, $d = .56$. Northern Americans in the true accusation condition, however, were more likely to write cooperative responses compared to those in the negative feedback and neutral feedback conditions, $p < .05$, $d$s $> .67$. Moreover, northern Americans in the negative feedback condition were similarly likely to include these responses compared to those in the neutral feedback condition, $p = .94$, $d = .47$ (Table 11).

**Decision making task/Ultimatum game: Competitive responses in the form of rejecting offers.** As another behavioral response to accusation or feedback, participants accepted or rejected money offers supposedly made by the experimenter. If they accepted the offer both parties would earn the allocated amount of money but if they rejected the offer no one would earn any money. This task was included as a measure of retaliation against the experimenter (i.e., the accuser/feedback provider). One participant in Turkey did not understand this task and was excluded from the analyses.

Because the dependent variable was a count variable, namely, the number of rejections participants made in the Ultimatum Game, I conducted Poisson regressions within each culture (e.g., Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Participants who accepted all 18 offers were excluded from the analyses (54 participants in Turkey and 39 participants in northern US) because their sole motivation may be earning money, and the concerns that were more relevant to the purposes of this study, such as retaliating against the experimenter, may not be captured in their data. Descriptive statistics excluding these participants are presented in Table 12 (for descriptive statistics of all participants see Table 13). I conducted two cross-cultural and four within-culture comparisons in total and applied the Bonferroni adjustment, such that my new critical value was $p < .008$. Analyses including rejection likelihoods across fairness and offer amounts revealed similar results to the overall rejection likelihood; therefore, results are not reported in detail. Descriptive statistics across these variables are presented in Table 12.[14]

[14] I also conducted repeated-measures ANCOVAs in each culture, in which offer amount and fairness were included as within-subjects variables. In Turkey, there was a significant interaction of threat condition, amount, and fairness, $F$ (6, 278) = 3.00, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$, but in northern US, interactions of offer amount and fairness with threat condition were not significant, $p$s > .28. Univariate ANCOVAs in Turkey for each dependent variable (e.g., rejections for high and fair offers, rejections for high and unfair offers etc.) revealed a marginally significant main effect of threat condition only for high and most unfair offers, $F$ (3, 139) = 2.32, $p = .08$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Pairwise comparison showed that Turkish

***Cross-cultural comparisons.*** I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more likely to reject the experimenter's offers (i.e., retaliation) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Results, however, did not reveal a significant cultural difference in this condition, Wald = .33, $p = .57$. I also hypothesized and found that, Turkish participants in the negative performance feedback condition were less likely to reject the offers - an indicator of indirect cooperation - compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b), Wald = 8.01, $p < .008$ (Table 12).

***Within-culture comparisons.*** I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused would be most likely to reject the experimenter's offer compared to those in other conditions. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be more likely to reject the offers compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be similar in their rejection likelihood (Hypothesis 2c).

Contrary to my expectations, results did not reveal significant differences between Turkish participants' rejection likelihood in the false accusation condition and in other conditions, Walds < 2.16, *p*s > .14. Northern American participants in the negative performance feedback condition were somewhat more likely to reject the experimenter's offers compared to those in the false accusation condition, Wald = 3.63, $p = .06$. Differences between false accusation and the remaining conditions in northern US were not significant, *p*s > .25 (Table 12). Contrary to my predictions, there was no difference for the rejection likelihood between Turkish participants in the true accusation and

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participants in the true accusation condition who received these offers were significantly more likely to reject them compared to those in the false accusation condition, $p < .05$. No other difference was significant, *p*s > .13.

negative performance feedback conditions, Wald = .001, $p$ = .98. In northern US, however, participants in the negative performance feedback condition were more likely to reject the experimenter's offers than those in the true accusation condition, Wald = 10.27, $p$ < .008 (Table 12).

**Defensiveness reflected in experimenter evaluations.** Participants evaluated the experimenter in various attributes such as respectfulness and competence. This scale was included as a measure of defensiveness (i.e., the more negative evaluation the more defensive). I conducted a univariate ANCOVA for this variable, in which culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) were entered as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.

***Cross-cultural comparison.*** I hypothesized that Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating would evaluate the experimenter more negatively compared to northern Americans in this condition (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for the true accusation condition did not reveal a significant cultural difference in the evaluation of the experimenter, $F$ (1, 87) = .16, $p$ = .69, $d$ = .31. I also hypothesized and found that Turkish participants who received negative performance feedback would evaluate the experimenter more positively compared to northern Americans in this condition (Hypothesis 2b), $F$ (1, 94) = 7.00, $p$ < .05, $d$ = .69 (Table 14 for descriptives).

***Within-culture comparisons.*** I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused would evaluate the experimenter most negatively compared to participants in other conditions. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would evaluate the experimenter more negatively compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants' evaluation of the experimenter in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be similar (Hypothesis 2c). Univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat condition, $F_{Turkey}$ (3, 193) = 3.90, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .06$, and $F_{US}$ (3, 169) = 7.61, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants in the false accusation condition did not significantly differ in their experimenter evaluation from those in other conditions, *p*s > .47, *d*s < .39. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition evaluated the experimenter more negatively than those in negative performance feedback condition, but the difference was not significant, $p = .19$, $d = .47$. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition evaluated the experimenter significantly more negatively than those in the neutral feedback condition, $p < .01$, $d = .70$. Partially in line with my predictions, northern American participants in the false accusation, true accusation, and negative performance feedback conditions did not differ in their experimenter evaluation, *p*s = 1.00, *d*s < .16. They evaluated the experimenter significantly more negatively than those who received neutral feedback, *p*s < .01, *d*s > .95 (Table 14).

**Summary.** As in Experiment 1, there were no cross-cultural differences in the likelihood to display competitive, cooperative, or avoidant behaviors for participants who were rightfully accused of cheating. In the negative performance feedback condition, however, Turkish participants were more cooperative (fewer rejections in the ultimatum game) and less defensive (more positive evaluation of the experimenter) compared to northern American participants. This may suggest that receiving negative performance

feedback (a self-respect threat) is perceived as more threatening by northern Americans than by Turkish people.

In both cultures, participants who were falsely accused of cheating were most likely to include competitive responses in their written statements (e.g., refusal of the accusation/feedback) compared to those in other conditions. Moreover, participants from both cultures in the true accusation condition were similarly likely to write competitive statements as those in the negative feedback condition. Similarly, in Turkey, the likelihood of rejecting offers in the ultimatum game (a competitive response) was similar across these two conditions. Interestingly, however, northern Americans who received negative performance feedback were more likely to reject offers compared to northern Americans who were rightfully or falsely accused of cheating. This may indicate that for northern Americans, responding to a self-respect threat requires more competitive behaviors than responding to an accusation of a transgression, even if the person does not deserve it. Finally, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating displayed somewhat greater defensiveness (more negative ratings of the experimenter) compared to those who received negative performance feedback, but the difference was not significant. There was no difference between these conditions for northern Americans.

# CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

Conflicts occur in many contexts such as work. A manager may rightfully accuse an employee for stealing his/her ideas in front of everyone or privately criticize the employee for making an unintentional mistake or performing poorly due to lack of knowledge or capacity. In this work, I investigated cross-cultural and within-culture tendencies to respond to these different conflict situations.

This work is one of the most extensive investigations of conflict types, honor concerns, and the emotional and behavioral responses people from honor and dignity cultures can display. There has been research on how members of honor and dignity cultures feel and respond when they are falsely accused; however, there had been no research until now that focused on how they feel and respond when they are the offender or when they are rightfully accused. In this work, I focused on rightful accusations as an example of a complete honor threat because they attack a person's self-respect (a blameworthy person is usually not proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is not honest if he/she has cheated) and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect of others because of his/her intentional wrongdoing). I compared reactions to true accusations with reactions to negative performance feedback, which can be considered an example of a self-respect threat. The reason is that the person's behavior does not involve an intentional wrongdoing (i.e., no attack on morality) and the feedback is not given publically (i.e., no attack on social respect). I expected Turkish participants to respond more negatively to true accusations (a complete honor threat) compared to northern Americans and compared to negative performance feedback (a self-respect threat). Northern Americans, however, were expected to respond similarly to negative performance feedback and true accusations. My findings were partially in line with these predictions,

reflecting mostly cross-cultural similarities in mean comparisons of emotional and behavioral responses but also interesting differences in within-culture patterns.

In both experiments I found that participants in the two cultures were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions when they were rightfully accused of cheating. This may suggest that members of both cultural groups perceive rightful accusations as similarly unpleasant and threatening. Another possibility, however, is that examining the mean differences between cultures can be misleading due to the reference group effect, which is participants' tendency to compare themselves to others in their own society rather than to those in other cultures (Heine et al., 2002). This might have reduced the existing cultural differences in the constructs I measured. To overcome this effect, I examined within-culture patterns of specific emotions across threat types and found interesting differences. For Turkish participants, true accusations were more humiliating and anger-provoking than negative performance feedback. In northern US, however, these two threat types evoked similar levels of humiliation and anger-related feelings. These results are in line with previous findings on antecedents of shame and humiliation. Studies found that members of honor cultures consider others' evaluations as sources of shame more than members of dignity cultures. Members of dignity cultures, however, are more likely to consider failure as a source of shame compared to members of honor cultures (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). In the present study, true accusations as a complete honor threat involved an evaluation by others and a risk of losing others' respect. Negative performance feedback, however, was an indicator of failure.

Members of the two cultures were mostly similar in their behavioral responses to conflict. Contrary to my expectations, for example, they were similarly willing to apologize or display other cooperative responses when they were rightfully accused of a transgression. This is in line with cross-cultural work on apologies that did not reveal any

cultural differences between East Asian and northern American participants (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2000). People from honor cultures may simply be similar to these two cultural groups in their willingness to apologize. Another explanation, however, could be that the accusation or feedback came from a higher power person in both experiments. People are more likely to apologize to higher power than lower power accusers, especially in high power distance cultures like Turkey (e.g., Takaku, 2000). If the accusation or feedback came from an equal power or lower power person I might have found the expected cross-cultural differences.

In addition to these cultural similarities in behaviors, there were within-culture differences that were noteworthy. In the decision making task in Experiment 2, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused and who received negative performance feedback were similarly likely to reject the experimenter's (i.e., the accuser's/feedback provider's) offers. In northern US, however, participants who received negative performance feedback were more likely to reject the offers compared to those who were rightfully accused of cheating. Moreover, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating were more defensive (i.e., more likely to evaluate the experimenter negatively) than those who received negative performance feedback. For northern Americans, however, there was no difference between these two conditions. These results are in line with the centrality of social respect in honor cultures like Turkey and the importance of achievements and positive self-esteem in individualistic dignity cultures like northern US. When these central cultural values were threatened people became defensive and responded competitively.

## Limitations

One limitation of Experiment 1 could be the low external validity such that participants may not be able to imagine the situations described in the scenarios vividly

because they may not be relevant to their lives. I tried to overcome this by including scenarios from different settings, namely, work and university. Moreover, by comparing participants' reactions across different threat types within and between cultures, I was still able to draw conclusions about how conflict management strategies were related to culture and threat type. Experiment 2 was another improvement on the realism and relevance of the situation because I put participants in a situation in which they were actually accused or given negative feedback.

Another limitation could be that there are several factors other than culture that may influence people's conflict management strategies, such as social class, power relations between actors, and voluntariness of the relationship. For example, the voluntariness or the ease of leaving the relationship may influence people's response preferences to conflict, such that people may be more likely to choose cooperative rather than competitive responses when the relationship is hard to exit.

## Future Directions

Another potential reason for the lack of cross-cultural differences in responses to conflict is that moderators may play a role in people's likelihood to feel or to behave in certain ways. Therefore, I plan to conduct additional analyses with potential moderators such as the endorsement of honor values, measured explicitly (e.g., Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2008) and implicitly (Imura, Berkley, & Brown, 2014). For example, I may find cross-cultural differences in responses to honor-related conflict among participants who strongly endorse honor values but not among those who weakly endorse these values. The reason is that cross-cultural differences in the meaning and content of honor (e.g., the emphasis on reputation versus achievements) may be greater among people who strongly endorse honor values than those who weakly endorse them. Moreover, I will also analyze

the relation between emotions and behaviors across cultures and threat conditions. For example, Turkish participants who feel strong shame after being rightfully accused of cheating may be more likely to retaliate against the accuser, whereas there may not be a strong relation between shame and retaliation for northern Americans.

One extension of this research could be examining the culture of each actor (honor and dignity) in the conflict situation and how belonging to the same or different cultural group may influence people's conflict management strategies. For example, a member of an honor culture may be less likely to retaliate when the threat comes from a dignity culture member as opposed to another honor culture member. Another extension could be switching the focus from self-reports and laboratory studies to cultural products. Popular TV series may be one of these products which reflect the dominant cultural norms and also shape the members of that culture. For example, a content analysis of the scripts of TV sitcoms in both cultures can show the frequency of different types of conflicts (e.g., complete honor threats versus self-respect threats) as well as how the characters in the sitcom deal with them (e.g., how many times the word apology is mentioned in an episode).

## Conclusion

These results suggest that dominant values, concerns, and emotions in cultures may influence people's responses to conflict. For people from honor cultures like Turkey, being rightfully accused for a transgression is more humiliating and anger-provoking than receiving poor performance feedback. Moreover, people in honor cultures become more defensive in response to rightful accusations compared to negative performance feedback. In honor cultures, rightful accusations not only threaten one's self-respect and perception of his/her own morality, but they also threaten one's worth in the eyes of others. As

mentioned earlier, in honor cultures, one's self-worth strongly depends on other people's opinions of oneself. Therefore, a threat to all three honor dimensions may be perceived as more severe than a threat only to the self-respect dimension in these cultures. This work also showed that members of dignity cultures, such as northern US, perceived rightful accusations and negative performance feedback similarly humiliating and anger-provoking, and they became similarly defensive in response to these threats. These results are in line with the importance and centrality of reputation and social respect in honor cultures like Turkey and the emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in individualistic dignity cultures like northern US (e.g., Uskul et al., 2012).

The findings of this work may have implications for many contexts such as politics, work relations, and romantic relationships. For example, this work may help us understand why politicians from some cultures are not willing to admit their wrong-doing as much as are politicians from other cultures. It may help us explain why employees with some cultural background deal with negative performance feedback more easily than others. We may be able to understand why romantic partners respond aggressively to each other for trivial offenses in some cultures but not in others.

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Table 1

*Behavioral Responses to Interpersonal Conflict*

| Broad Classification of Conflict Management Strategies | Dual Concern Theory | Response Types | Response Statements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competitive | Force/Dominate | Retaliation | I would embarrass him/her in the same way as he/she embarrassed me. |
| | | | I would be harsh next time I see him/her, maybe even yell at him/her for what he/she did. |
| | | | I would say that he/she is responsible not me. |
| | | Disapproval/Refusal | I would tell him/her that I did not like what he/she did. |
| | | | I would deny that the event has occurred. |
| | | | I would say I didn't do it. |
| | | | I would say that the event was in the past and does not matter anymore. |
| | | Justification | I would say that what I did was not that bad. |
| | | | I would say that what I did will be beneficial in the long run. |
| | | | I would say that his/her actions contributed to my behavior. |
| | | Passive-Aggressive (indirect) | I would express my concerns in a general way in the group without specifically talking to him/her. |
| | | | I would ignore him/her in a way that he/she understands I am angry. |
| Avoidant | Avoid | Avoiding | I would try not to communicate with him/her or not to run into him/her. |
| | | | I would try to act normal, as if nothing happened. |
| | | | I would try to suppress my true feelings. |
| | | Finding Excuses | I would appeal to unusual circumstances such as fatigue or illness for what I did. |
| | | | I would say that everybody makes mistakes. |
| | | | I would emphasize that I was not intentional. |
| Cooperative | Yield | Apology/Admitting guilt | I would accept full responsibility of what happened. |
| | | | I would acknowledge that I am guilty. |
| | | Apology/Expressing regret | I would say "I'm sorry." |
| | | | I would express my regret. |
| | | | I would ask for forgiveness. |
| | | Apology/Offering compensation | I would try to provide compensation. |
| | Problem Solving/Compromising | Middle-way | I would try to find a middle-of-the-road solution. |
| | | Consulting Third Party (indirect) | I would tell another person, who was not involved, what happened and ask for opinion. |
| | | | I would ask a senior person to intervene. |

Table 2a

*Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Emotions (Experiment 1 and 2)*

| Hypotheses | | Predictions | Experiment 1 Results | Experiment 2 Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-Cultural | | | | |
| Hypothesis 1a | Negative emotions when truly accused | Turkey > US | TR = US | TR = US |
| Hypothesis 1b | Positive emotions | Turkey = US | Supported | Supported |
| Within-Culture | | | | |
| Hypothesis 1c | Shame and humiliation-related emotions | Turkey: TA > Other | Turkey - Shame: Supported<br>Turkey - Humiliation: TA = FA > NEG (Partially supported) | Turkey - Shame: TA = NEG > Other<br>Turkey - Humiliation: Supported |
| | | US: TA = NEG | US - Shame: TA > NEG<br>US - Humiliation: TA > NEG (Partially supported, marginal) | US - Shame: Supported<br>US - Humiliation: Supported |
| Hypothesis 1d | Shame versus guilt when truly accused | Turkey: Shame > Guilt<br>US: Guilt > Shame | TR = US | TR = US |
| Hypothesis 1e | Anger-related emotions | Turkey, US: FA > Other | Turkey, US: Supported | Turkey: FA < TA, FA = NEG<br>US: FA = TA = NEG |
| | | Turkey: TA > NEG | Turkey: Supported | Turkey: TA > NEG (Partially supported, marginal) |
| | | US: TA = NEG | US: Supported | US: Supported |

*Note*. TA: True accusation, NEG: Negative performance feedback, FA: False accusation.

Table 2b

*Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Behavioral Preferences (Experiment 1)*

| Hypotheses | | Predictions | Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-Cultural | | | |
| Hypothesis 2a | Competitive and cooperative responses when truly accused | Competitive: Turkey > US<br>Cooperative: Turkey < US | Competitive: Turkey = US<br>Cooperative: Turkey = US |
| Hypothesis 2b | Avoidant and indirect cooperative responses after negative performance feedback | Turkey > US | Avoidant: Turkey = US<br>Indirect: Turkey = US |
| Within-Culture | | | |
| Hypothesis 2c | Competitive responses | Turkey, US: FA > Other<br>Turkey: TA > NEG<br>US: TA = NEG | Turkey, US: Supported<br>Turkey: TA = NEG<br>US: Supported |
| | Cooperative responses | Turkey, US: FA < Other | Turkey, US: Supported |
| | | Turkey: TA < NEG<br>US: TA = NEG | Turkey: TA = NEG<br>US: Supported |

*Note.* Hypotheses and results about retaliation and apology behaviors are not reported because they were similar to the results about average competitive and cooperative behaviors. TA: True accusation, NEG: Negative performance feedback, FA: False accusation.

Table 2c

*Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Behavioral Preferences (Experiment 2)*

| Hypotheses | | Predictions | Written Statements | Decision Making Task (Number of Rejections) | Experimenter Evaluation (Negative Ratings) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-Cultural | | | | | |
| Hypothesis 2a | Competitive and cooperative responses when truly accused | Competitive: Turkey > US | Competitive: Turkey = US | Competitive: Turkey = US | ___ |
| | | Cooperative: Turkey < US | Cooperative: Turkey = US | ___ | ___ |
| | Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of the experimenter when truly accused | Turkey > US | ___ | ___ | Turkey = US |
| Hypothesis 2b | Avoidant and indirect cooperative responses after negative performance feedback | Turkey > US | Avoidant: Turkey = US<br>Indirect: Turkey = US | Supported (Indirect cooperation: Fewer rejections in Turkey than US) | ___ |
| | Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of the experimenter after negative performance feedback | Turkey < US | ___ | ___ | Supported |
| Within-Culture | | | | | |
| Hypothesis 2c | Competitive responses | Turkey, US: FA > Other | Turkey, US: Supported | Turkey: FA = Others<br>US: FA < NEG, FA = Others | ___ |
| | | Turkey: TA > NEG<br>US: TA = NEG | Turkey: TA = NEG<br>US: Supported | Turkey: TA = NEG<br>US: TA < NEG | |
| | Cooperative responses | Turkey, US: FA < Other | Turkey: Supported<br>US: FA = NEG < TA | ___ | ___ |
| | | Turkey: TA < NEG<br>US: TA = NEG | Turkey: TA = NEG<br>US: TA > NEG | | |
| | Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of the experimenter | Turkey, US: FA > Other | ___ | ___ | Turkey: FA = NEG < TA<br>US: FA = TA = NEG |
| | | Turkey: TA > NEG<br>US: TA = NEG | | | Turkey: Supported<br>US: Supported |

*Note*. TA: True accusation, NEG: Negative performance feedback, FA: False accusation.

Table 3

*Univariate ANCOVA Results for Experiment 1 Outcome Variables*

| | Culture | | | | Threat Condition | | | | Culture x Condition | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome Variables | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ |
| Manipulation Check | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Deservingness | 1 | 407 | .01 | .00 | 3 | 407 | 217.66*** | .62 | 3 | 407 | .18 | .00 |
| Reputation Threat | 1 | 407 | 23.53*** | .06 | 3 | 407 | 158.91*** | .54 | 3 | 407 | 1.96 | .01 |
| Valence | 1 | 407 | .96 | .00 | 3 | 407 | 477.95*** | .78 | 3 | 407 | 2.49$^{+}$ | .02 |
| Emotions | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Emotions | 1 | 407 | 17.84*** | .04 | 3 | 407 | 191.12*** | .59 | 3 | 407 | 4.36** | .03 |
| Positive Emotions | 1 | 405 | .01 | .00 | 3 | 405 | 115.15*** | .46 | 3 | 405 | .70 | .01 |
| Shame | 1 | 407 | 9.18** | .02 | 3 | 407 | 167.70*** | .55 | 3 | 407 | 1.82 | .01 |
| Humiliation-related Emotions | 1 | 406 | 17.41*** | .04 | 3 | 406 | 148.41*** | .52 | 3 | 406 | 2.85* | .02 |
| Anger-related Emotions | 1 | 407 | 5.93* | .01 | 3 | 407 | 143.29*** | .51 | 3 | 407 | 2.35$^{+}$ | .02 |
| Behavioral Preferences | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Competitive Behaviors | 1 | 403 | .11 | .00 | 3 | 403 | 29.62*** | .18 | 3 | 403 | .92 | .01 |
| Cooperative Behaviors | 1 | 403 | .75 | .00 | 3 | 403 | 84.88*** | .39 | 3 | 403 | 1.40 | .01 |
| Avoidant Behaviors | 1 | 403 | .00 | .00 | 3 | 403 | 10.74*** | .07 | 3 | 403 | 3.46* | .03 |
| Retaliation | 1 | 403 | .16 | .00 | 3 | 403 | 33.10*** | .20 | 3 | 403 | 1.37 | .01 |
| Apology | 1 | 403 | 3.11$^{+}$ | .01 | 3 | 403 | 148.35*** | .53 | 3 | 403 | .78 | .01 |
| Approval of Behaviors | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Competitive Behaviors | 1 | 397 | 11.78** | .03 | 3 | 397 | 15.73*** | .11 | 3 | 397 | .05 | .00 |
| Cooperative Behaviors | 1 | 397 | .01 | .00 | 3 | 397 | 18.58*** | .12 | 3 | 397 | 2.14$^{+}$ | .02 |
| Avoidant Behaviors | 1 | 397 | 7.10** | .02 | 3 | 397 | 4.78** | .04 | 3 | 397 | 1.26 | .01 |
| Retaliation | 1 | 397 | 6.84** | .02 | 3 | 397 | 13.57*** | .09 | 3 | 397 | .54 | .00 |
| Apology | 1 | 397 | 1.01 | .00 | 3 | 397 | 39.50*** | .23 | 3 | 397 | 1.88 | .01 |

*Note.* $+p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$. Age, upbringing, and SES are controlled in the analyses.

Table 4

*Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Items (Deservingness, Reputation Threat, and Valence) in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 50) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 52) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 46) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 54) | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 55) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 57) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 57) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 47) |
| Manipulation Check | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Deservingness | $5.92_{b, c, d}$ (1.04) | $4.63_{a, c}$ (1.44) | $1.64_{a, b, d}$ (1.17) | $4.95_{a, c}$ (1.08) | $5.95_{b, c, d}$ (1.23) | $4.81_{a, c}$ (1.38) | $1.89_{a, b, d}$ (1.27) | $4.99_{a, c}$ (1.13) |
| Reputation Threat | $5.67_{b,d}$ (1.24) | $3.99_{a, c, d}$ (1.26) | $5.04_{b, d}$ (1.47) | $2.21_{a, b, c}$ (1.13) | $6.01_{b, d}$ (1.01) | $5.07_{a, c, d}$ (1.13) | $5.93_{b, d}$ (1.02) | $2.84_{a, b, c}$ (1.26) |
| Valence | $1.64_{b, d}$ (0.84) | $2.11_{a, c, d}$ (0.77) | $1.43_{b, d}$ (0.50) | $5.10_{a, b, c}$ (0.98) | $1.59_{d}$ (0.77) | $1.75_{d}$ (0.58) | $1.66_{d}$ (0.67) | $5.02_{a, b, c}$ (0.97) |

*Note*. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 5

*Descriptive Statistics for Negative and Positive Emotions in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 50) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 52) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 46) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 54) | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 55) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 57) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 57) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 47) |
| Emotions | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Negative Emotions | $4.47_{b,d}$ (1.16) | $3.42_{a,c,d}$ (0.94) | $4.20_{b,d}$ (0.94) | $1.81_{a,b,c}$ (0.86) | $4.62_{d}$ (0.89) | $4.22_{c,d}$ (0.93) | $4.98_{b,d}$ (0.75) | $1.92_{a,b,c}$ (0.95) |
| Positive Emotions | $2.15_{c,d}$ (0.74) | $2.58_{d}$ (1.00) | $2.97_{a,d}$ (1.13) | $4.36_{a,b,c}$ (0.86) | $2.31_{c,d}$ (0.81) | $2.38_{c,d}$ (0.70) | $2.91_{a,b,d}$ (0.78) | $4.31_{a,b,c}$ (1.00) |
| Shame | $5.99_{b,c,d}$ (1.17) | $4.38_{a,c,d}$ (1.63) | $3.01_{a,b,d}$ (1.83) | $2.01_{a,b,c}$ (1.30) | $6.13_{b,c,d}$ (1.10) | $5.21_{a,c,d}$ (1.42) | $3.37_{a,b,d}$ (1.58) | $1.97_{a,b,c}$ (1.08) |
| Humiliation-Related | $4.34_{b,d}$ (1.44) | $3.27_{a,c,d}$ (1.21) | $4.62_{b,d}$ (1.26) | $1.73_{a,b,c}$ (0.88) | $4.57_{c,d}$ (1.09) | $4.20_{c,d}$ (1.20) | $5.49_{a,b,d}$ (0.90) | $2.01_{a,b,c}$ (1.05) |
| Guilt | $5.96_{b,c,d}$ (1.06) | $4.50_{a,c,d}$ (1.46) | $1.93_{a,b}$ (1.41) | $1.91_{a,b}$ (1.19) | $6.24_{b,c,d}$ (1.07) | $5.51_{a,c,d}$ (1.39) | $2.54_{a,b}$ (1.51) | $1.96_{a,b}$ (1.19) |
| Anger-Related | $3.45_{b,c,d}$ (1.59) | $2.67_{a,c,d}$ (1.20) | $4.87_{a,b,d}$ (1.28) | $1.70_{a,b,c}$ (0.84) | $3.51_{c,d}$ (1.37) | $3.43_{c,d}$ (1.10) | $5.42_{a,b,d}$ (1.01) | $1.77_{a,b,c}$ (0.91) |

*Note.* Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 6

*Descriptive Statistics for Behavioral Preferences in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) |
| | (*n* = 49) | (*n* = 52) | (*n* = 46) | (*n* = 51) | (*n* = 55) | (*n* = 57) | (*n* = 57) | (*n* = 47) |
| Behavioral Preferences | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Competitive Responses | $2.43_{c}$ (1.09) | $2.08_{c,d}$ (0.77) | $3.35_{a,b,d}$ (0.72) | $2.65_{b,c}$ (0.91) | $2.37_{c}$ (1.16) | $2.21_{c}$ (0.83) | $3.22_{a,b,d}$ (0.85) | $2.37_{c}$ (0.79) |
| Cooperative Responses | $4.67_{c,d}$ (1.13) | $4.72_{c,d}$ (0.99) | $2.77_{a,b}$ (0.77) | $3.32_{a,b}$ (1.24) | $4.76_{c,d}$ (0.78) | $4.83_{c,d}$ (1.04) | $3.27_{a,b}$ (0.94) | $3.26_{a,b}$ (1.11) |
| Avoidant Responses | $3.46_{c,d}$ (1.31) | $3.20_{c}$ (0.89) | $2.61_{a,b}$ (0.73) | $2.92_{a}$ (0.99) | $3.27_{d}$ (1.08) | $3.52_{d}$ (0.89) | 3.10 (0.93) | $2.73_{a,b}$ (0.78) |
| Indirect Cooperative Responses | $3.04_{c}$ (1.56) | $3.51_{c}$ (1.49) | $4.46_{a,b,d}$ (1.65) | $3.33_{c}$ (1.39) | $3.14_{c}$ (1.34) | $3.52_{c}$ (1.27) | $4.89_{a,b,d}$ (1.42) | $2.97_{c}$ (1.33) |
| Retaliation | $2.11_{c}$ (1.32) | $1.72_{c}$ (1.04) | $3.43_{a,b,d}$ (1.38) | $2.02_{c}$ (0.94) | $2.12_{c}$ (1.27) | $1.79_{c}$ (0.89) | $2.92_{a,b,d}$ (1.16) | $1.79_{c}$ (0.85) |
| Apology | $5.21_{c,d}$ (1.38) | $5.00_{c,d}$ (1.20) | $2.05_{a,b,d}$ (1.00) | $3.16_{a,b,c}$ (1.31) | $5.45_{c,d}$ (1.05) | $5.31_{c,d}$ (1.18) | $2.69_{a,b}$ (1.30) | $3.30_{a,b}$ (1.13) |

*Note*. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 7

*Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Approval of Behaviors by Others in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) |
| | (*n* = 48) | (*n* = 50) | (*n* = 46) | (*n* = 48) | (*n* = 55) | (*n* = 57) | (*n* = 57) | (*n* = 47) |
| Approval of Behaviors | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Competitive Responses | $2.73_{c}$ (1.24) | $2.96_{c}$ (1.38) | $3.75_{a,b}$ (0.79) | 3.11 (1.02) | $2.32_{c}$ (1.08) | $2.58_{c}$ (1.04) | $3.26_{a,b,d}$ (0.86) | $2.66_{c}$ (0.82) |
| Cooperative Responses | $4.93_{c}$ (1.18) | $4.76_{c}$ (1.23) | $3.72_{a,b}$ (1.23) | 4.24 (1.34) | $4.93_{c,d}$ (0.82) | $5.04_{c,d}$ (0.92) | $4.25_{a,b}$ (1.06) | $4.02_{a,b}$ (1.24) |
| Avoidant Responses | 3.68 (1.32) | 3.88 (1.24) | 3.54 (1.02) | 3.55 (1.17) | $3.14_{b}$ (0.96) | $3.80_{a,d}$ (0.85) | 3.44 (0.87) | $3.12_{b}$ (0.89) |
| Indirect Cooperative Responses | $3.93_{c}$ (1.60) | 4.43 (1.57) | $5.18_{a,d}$ (1.35) | $4.23_{c}$ (1.42) | $3.57_{c}$ (1.34) | $4.03_{c}$ (1.89) | $5.03_{a,b,d}$ (1.14) | $3.74_{c}$ (1.45) |
| Retaliation | $2.31_{c}$ (1.41) | $2.60_{c}$ (1.55) | $3.58_{a,b,d}$ (1.32) | $2.52_{c}$ (1.28) | $2.01_{c}$ (1.25) | $2.22_{c}$ (1.23) | $2.85_{a,b,d}$ (1.09) | $2.09_{c}$ (0.95) |
| Apology | $5.22_{c,d}$ (1.51) | $4.81_{c}$ (1.39) | $3.16_{a,b,d}$ (1.55) | $4.15_{a,c}$ (1.46) | $5.54_{c,d}$ (1.05) | $5.40_{c,d}$ (1.08) | $3.95_{a,b}$ (1.37) | $4.10_{a,b}$ (1.30) |

*Note*. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 8

*Univariate ANCOVA Results for Experiment 2 Outcome Variables*

| | Culture | | | | Threat Condition | | | | Culture x Condition | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome Variables | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ | *Df* | *Error* | *F* | $\eta^2$ |
| Manipulation Check | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mood | 1 | 366 | .41 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 15.87*** | .12 | 3 | 366 | .58 | .01 |
| Honor Threat | 1 | 366 | .71 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 30.68*** | .20 | 3 | 366 | 1.66 | .01 |
| Emotions | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Emotions (Scale) | 1 | 366 | 1.22 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 30.05*** | .20 | 3 | 366 | 1.58 | .01 |
| Negative Emotions (Faces) | 1 | 365 | 1.98 | .01 | 3 | 365 | 4.04** | .03 | 3 | 365 | .67 | .01 |
| Positive Emotions | 1 | 366 | 2.00 | .01 | 3 | 366 | 10.65*** | .08 | 3 | 366 | .77 | .01 |
| Shame | 1 | 366 | .50 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 24.07*** | .17 | 3 | 366 | 2.10 | .02 |
| Humiliation-related Emotions | 1 | 366 | .32 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 29.51*** | .20 | 3 | 366 | 1.60 | .01 |
| Anger-related Emotions | 1 | 366 | 1.12 | .00 | 3 | 366 | 12.88*** | .10 | 3 | 366 | .69 | .01 |
| Behavioral Preferences | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Competitive Responses in Essays | 1 | 359 | .04 | .00 | 3 | 359 | 113.53*** | .49 | 3 | 359 | .81 | .01 |
| Cooperative Responses in Essays | 1 | 359 | .50 | .00 | 3 | 359 | 113.53*** | .49 | 3 | 359 | .96 | .01 |
| Avoidant Responses in Essays | 1 | 359 | 2.22 | .01 | 3 | 359 | 25.15*** | .17 | 3 | 359 | 1.15 | .01 |
| Experimenter Evaluation | 1 | 365 | 4.51* | .01 | 3 | 365 | 10.78*** | .08 | 3 | 365 | 1.70 | .01 |

*Note.* $+p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$. Age, upbringing, and SES are controlled in the analyses.

Table 9

*Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Items (Mood and Honor Threat Perception) in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) |
| | (*n* = 49) | (*n* = 52) | (*n* = 55) | (*n* = 44) | (*n* = 43) | (*n* = 47) | (*n* = 47) | (*n* = 40) |
| Manipulation Check | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Mood | $2.77_{b,d}$ (.85) | $3.26_{a}$ (.87) | $3.12_{d}$ (.94) | $3.72_{a,c}$ (.86) | $2.87_{d}$ (1.04) | $3.12_{d}$ (.72) | 3.28 (.90) | $3.73_{a,b}$ (.67) |
| Honor Threat | $2.69_{b,d}$ (1.03) | $2.10_{a,d}$ (.82) | $2.30_{d}$ (.99) | $1.44_{a,b,c}$ (.65) | $2.53_{d}$ (1.09) | $2.40_{d}$ (.97) | $2.34_{d}$ (1.06) | $1.25_{a,b,c}$ (.44) |

*Note.* Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 10

*Descriptive Statistics for Negative and Positive Emotions in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 49) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 52) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 55) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 44) | True Accusation (a) ($n$ = 43) | Negative Feedback (b) ($n$ = 47) | False Accusation (c) ($n$ = 47) | Neutral Feedback (d) ($n$ = 40) |
| Emotions | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Negative Emotions (Scale) | $2.13_{c,d}$ (.85) | $1.77_{d}$ (.74) | $1.60_{a}$ (.72) | $1.28_{a,b}$ (.43) | $2.34_{c,d}$ (1.00) | $2.14_{c,d}$ (.89) | $1.64_{a,b,d}$ (.60) | $1.21_{a,b,c}$ (.33) |
| Negative Emotions (Faces) | 3.23 (.63) | 3.11 (.66) | 3.03 (.50) | 3.03 (.55) | $3.60_{d}$ (.75) | 3.27 (.77) | 3.27 (.73) | $3.15_{a}$ (.69) |
| Positive Emotions | $2.94_{c,d}$ (.63) | 3.09 (.58) | $3.25_{a}$ (.59) | $3.30_{a}$ (.54) | $2.90_{d}$ (.74) | $3.00_{d}$ (.66) | 3.27 (.62) | $3.48_{a,b}$ (.46) |
| Shame | $2.27_{c,d}$ (1.29) | $2.13_{d}$ (1.09) | $1.65_{a}$ (1.04) | $1.45_{a,b}$ (.85) | $2.51_{c,d}$ (1.32) | $2.30_{c,d}$ (1.21) | $1.32_{a,b}$ (.73) | $1.15_{a,b}$ (.43) |
| Humiliation-Related | $2.37_{d}$ (.91) | $1.99_{d}$ (.82) | $2.01_{d}$ (.93) | $1.32_{a,b,c}$ (.51) | $2.48_{d}$ (1.01) | $2.44_{d}$ (1.01) | $2.05_{d}$ (.82) | $1.28_{a,b,c}$ (.36) |
| Guilt | $2.33_{b,c,d}$ (1.26) | $1.42_{a}$ (.78) | $1.29_{a}$ (.71) | $1.36_{a}$ (.81) | $2.77_{b,c,d}$ (1.27) | $1.74_{a,d}$ (1.01) | $1.30_{a}$ (.83) | $1.10_{a,b}$ (.30) |
| Anger-Related | $1.93_{d}$ (.99) | 1.63 (.85) | 1.62 (.83) | $1.22_{a}$ (.35) | $2.03_{d}$ (1.10) | $1.95_{d}$ (.93) | $1.75_{d}$ (.94) | $1.19_{a,b,c}$ (.36) |

*Note.* Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

Table 11

*Descriptive Statistics for the Ratio of Essay Responses in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) |
| | ($n$ = 49) | ($n$ = 50) | ($n$ = 54) | ($n$ = 44) | ($n$ = 42) | ($n$ = 46) | ($n$ = 46) | ($n$ = 39) |
| Essay Responses | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Competitive Responses (Rejection, Justification, Other) | $.44_{c,d}$ (.37) | $.36_{c,d}$ (.40) | $.90_{a,b,d}$ (.27) | $0_{a,b,c}$ (0) | $.52_{c,d}$ (.35) | $.43_{c,d}$ (.43) | $.83_{a,b,d}$ (.35) | $0_{a,b,c}$ (0) |
| Rejection | $.13_{b,c}$ (.26) | $.36_{a,c,d}$ (.40) | $.88_{a,b,d}$ (.30) | $0_{b,c}$ (0) | $.11_{b,c}$ (.27) | $.43_{a,c,d}$ (.43) | $.81_{a,b,d}$ (.36) | $0_{b,c}$ (0) |
| Justification | $.31_{b,c,d}$ (.32) | $0_{a}$ (0) | $.02_{a}$ (.14) | $0_{a}$ (0) | $.42_{b,c,d}$ (.35) | $0_{a}$ (0) | $.03_{a}$ (.10) | $0_{a}$ (0) |
| Cooperative Responses (Apology/Admission) | $.15_{c,d}$ (.28) | $.11_{c}$ (.25) | $0_{a,b}$ (0) | $.03_{a}$ (.12) | $.16_{b,c,d}$ (.25) | $.05_{a}$ (.15) | $.02_{a}$ (.15) | $0_{a}$ (0) |
| Avoidant Responses (Excuses) | $.40_{b,c,d}$ (.36) | $.19_{a,c}$ (.33) | $.02_{a,b}$ (.08) | $.13_{a}$ (.29) | $.28_{c,d}$ (.32) | $.18_{c}$ (.33) | $.03_{a,b}$ (.10) | $.04_{a}$ (.18) |

*Note.* The ratio for each code category was calculated by dividing the number of codes used in that category by the total number of codes used for that participant. The columns do not sum to 1.00 because the competitive responses category is aggregated across rejection, justification, and other competitive responses, and the "overall other" category is not included in the table.

Table 12

*Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Rejections in the Ultimatum Game in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions, Excluding Participants Who Accepted All 18 Offers (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation ($n$ = 37) | Negative Feedback ($n$ = 37) | False Accusation ($n$ = 40) | Neutral Feedback ($n$ = 33) | True Accusation ($n$ = 38) | Negative Feedback ($n$ = 35) | False Accusation ($n$ = 36) | Neutral Feedback ($n$ = 28) |
| Number of Rejections | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Total | 6.97 (4.79) | 6.46 (3.73) | 6.25 (3.58) | 6.64 (3.01) | 7.45 (3.78) | 9.54 (4.45) | 7.92 (4.59) | 8.29 (3.79) |
| High Offers | 2.46 (2.30) | 1.78 (1.99) | 1.66 (1.97) | 1.70 (1.59) | 3.26 (2.19) | 3.97 (2.56) | 3.36 (2.39) | 3.29 (1.84) |
| Most Unfair Offers | 1.51 (1.19) | 1.11 (1.02) | .93 (1.02) | 1.21 (1.67) | 2.00 (1.14) | 1.91 (1.17) | 1.83 (1.21) | 1.64 (1.06) |
| Unfair Offers | .70 (.91) | .54 (.93) | .65 (.92) | .39 (.61) | 1.11 (1.06) | 1.57 (1.17) | 1.14 (1.10) | 1.11 (.96) |
| Fair Offers | .24 (.68) | .13 (.42) | .10 (.30) | .09 (.29) | .16 (.44) | .49 (.89) | .39 (.87) | .54 (.92) |
| Low Offers | 4.51 (3.01) | 4.68 (2.30) | 4.58 (2.25) | 4.94 (1.97) | 4.18 (2.13) | 5.57 (2.49) | 4.56 (2.55) | 5.00 (2.58) |
| Most Unfair Offers | 2.08 (1.01) | 2.41 (.76) | 2.33 (.89) | 2.39 (.86) | 2.08 (.97) | 2.46 (.82) | 2.11 (.85) | 2.21 (1.13) |
| Unfair Offers | 1.54 (1.24) | 1.65 (1.16) | 1.80 (1.16) | 1.82 (1.07) | 1.63 (1.08) | 2.14 (1.09) | 1.78 (1.12) | 1.82 (1.16) |
| Fair Offers | .89 (1.22) | .62 (.89) | .45 (.75) | .73 (.91) | .47 (.76) | .97 (1.15) | .67 (1.07) | .96 (1.23) |

Table 13

*Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Rejections in the Ultimatum Game in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions, All Participants (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation ($n$ = 49) | Negative Feedback ($n$ = 52) | False Accusation ($n$ = 57) | Neutral Feedback ($n$ = 43) | True Accusation ($n$ = 43) | Negative Feedback ($n$ = 47) | False Accusation ($n$ = 46) | Neutral Feedback ($n$ = 40) |
| Number of Rejections | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Total | 5.27 (5.14) | 4.60 (4.31) | 4.39 (4.15) | 5.09 (3.87) | 6.58 (4.29) | 7.11 (5.68) | 6.20 (5.23) | 5.80 (4.97) |
| High Offers | 1.86 (2.26) | 1.27 (1.86) | 1.18 (1.81) | 1.30 (1.57) | 2.88 (2.31) | 2.96 (2.81) | 2.63 (2.53) | 2.30 (2.16) |
| Most Unfair Offers | 1.14 (1.22) | .79 (1.00) | .65 (.95) | .93 (1.14) | 1.77 (1.25) | 1.43 (1.31) | 1.43 (1.31) | 1.15 (1.17) |
| Unfair Offers | .53 (.84) | .38 (.82) | .46 (.83) | .30 (.56) | .98 (1.06) | 1.17 (1.22) | .89 (1.08) | .78 (.95) |
| Fair Offers | .18 (.60) | .10 (.36) | .07 (.26) | .07 (.26) | .14 (.41) | .36 (.79) | .30 (.79) | .38 (.81) |
| Low Offers | 3.41 (3.27) | 3.33 (2.88) | 3.21 (2.83) | 3.79 (2.72) | 3.70 (2.42) | 4.15 (3.26) | 3.57 (2.94) | 3.50 (3.16) |
| Most Unfair Offers | 1.57 (1.26) | 1.71 (1.27) | 1.63 (1.30) | 1.84 (1.27) | 1.84 (1.13) | 1.83 (1.29) | 1.65 (1.16) | 1.55 (1.40) |
| Unfair Offers | 1.16 (1.26) | 1.17 (1.23) | 1.26 (1.28) | 1.40 (1.22) | 1.44 (1.14) | 1.60 (1.34) | 1.39 (1.24) | 1.28 (1.28) |
| Fair Offers | .67 (1.13) | .44 (.80) | .32 (.66) | .56 (.85) | .42 (.73) | .72 (1.08) | .52 (.98) | .68 (1.12) |

Table 14

*Descriptive Statistics for the Experimenter Evaluations in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)*

| | TURKEY | | | | US | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) | True Accusation (a) | Negative Feedback (b) | False Accusation (c) | Neutral Feedback (d) |
| | (*n* = 49) | (*n* = 52) | (*n* = 55) | (*n* = 44) | (*n* = 43) | (*n* = 47) | (*n* = 46) | (*n* = 40) |
| Evaluation | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* | *Mean (SD)* |
| Experimenter Evaluation | $5.96_{d}$ (.97) | 6.34 (.59) | 6.21 (1.01) | $6.53_{a}$ (.62) | $5.64_{d}$ (1.11) | $5.80_{d}$ (.93) | $5.70_{d}$ (1.03) | $6.51_{a,b,c}$ (.50) |

*Note.* Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true accusation condition (a) is significantly different from all three conditions, letters b, c, d are added next to the true accusation mean.

# APPENDIX A. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Institutional Review Board
Office for Responsible Research
Vice President for Research
1138 Pearson Hall
Ames, Iowa 50011-2207
515 294-4566
FAX 515 294-4267

**Date:** 2/4/2015

**To:** Ceren Gunsoy
W112 Lagomarcino Hall

**CC:** Dr. Susan E Cross
W112 Lagomarcino Hall

**From:** Office for Responsible Research

**Title:** Conflict Management and Values

**IRB ID:** 14-629

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Approval Date:** | 2/3/2015 | **Date for Continuing Review:** | 2/2/2017 |
| **Submission Type:** | New | **Review Type:** | Full Committee |

The project referenced above has received approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Iowa State University according to the dates shown above. Please refer to the IRB ID number shown above in all correspondence regarding this study.

To ensure compliance with federal regulations (45 CFR 46 & 21 CFR 56), please be sure to:

- **Use only the approved study materials** in your research, **including the recruitment materials and informed consent documents that have the IRB approval stamp**.
- **Retain signed informed consent documents for 3 years after the close of the study**, when documented consent is required.
- **Obtain IRB approval prior to implementing any changes** to the study by submitting a Modification Form for Non-Exempt Research or Amendment for Personnel Changes form, as necessary.
- **Immediately inform the IRB of** (1) **all serious and/or unexpected adverse experiences** involving risks to subjects or others; and (2) **any other unanticipated problems involving risks** to subjects or others.
- **Stop all research activity if IRB approval lapses**, unless continuation is necessary to prevent harm to research participants. Research activity can resume once IRB approval is reestablished.
- **Complete a new continuing review form** at least three to four weeks prior to the **date for continuing review** as noted above to provide sufficient time for the IRB to review and approve continuation of the study. We will send a courtesy reminder as this date approaches.

Please be aware that IRB approval means that you have met the requirements of federal regulations and ISU policies governing human subjects research. **Approval from other entities may also be needed.** For example, access to data from private records (e.g. student, medical, or employment records, etc.) that are protected by FERPA, HIPAA, or other confidentiality policies requires permission from the holders of those records. Similarly, for research conducted in institutions other than ISU (e.g., schools, other colleges or universities, medical facilities, companies, etc.), investigators must obtain permission from the institution(s) as required by their policies. **IRB approval in no way implies or guarantees that permission from these other entities will be granted.**

Upon completion of the project, please submit a Project Closure Form to the Office for Responsible Research, 1138 Pearson Hall, to officially close the project.

Please don't hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns at 515-294-4566 or IRB@iastate.edu.

## APPENDIX B. PILOT STUDY AND EXPERIMENT 1 SCENARIOS

### Work Context, Plagiarism (used in the main online study)

*True accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You had been struggling with generating good strategies and decided to take a risk. You looked at the company archives and found Amanda's projects from 5 years ago. You took the ideas you liked and presented them as if they were yours. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda comes to your office and says: "These are good ideas; however, I wish they were yours. How could you think that I wouldn't remember my own ideas from my own projects?" You realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty.

*Negative performance feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once the meeting is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: "These are good ideas; however, they are not comprehensive enough. You did not cover any outdoor advertisement strategies, which were clearly mentioned in the briefing document I gave you. Our clients were not happy about it and they even implied that they may not work with us next year." You realize you made a big mistake.

*False accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda calls you to her office and says: "These are good ideas; however, I wish they were yours. I was the one who mentioned these ideas in our last group meeting." You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty.

*Neutral feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new product for one of the agency's clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on your own in the last month and you feel that you did a satisfactory job. Once the meeting

is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “This was a good meeting. Let’s talk about the timeline that the client requested and plan for the next month’s project.” You feel relieved that you were prepared.

**Work Context, Missing a Meeting / Lying (used in the main online study)**

*True accusation.* You went to the bars last night, drank a lot and overslept this morning, even though you knew there was an important meeting at the marketing research company where you work as an entry-level employee. You missed a connection bus, hence you miss the meeting as well. The meeting was an end of the year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will work with your company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as you arrive and explain why you were late. You say that there was an accident that caused an unusual amount of traffic. The manager, who will determine next year’s promotions, does not believe you and says, "Yeah, right. We have heard a lot of such excuses. I use the same highway and there was no accident whatsoever at that time this morning. This meeting was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. I wouldn’t be surprised if they decided not to work with us next year.” You realize that you have been caught lying.

*Negative feedback.* You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused an unusual amount of traffic. This caused you to miss a meeting at the marketing research company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting was an end of the year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will work with your company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as you arrive and explain why you were late. The manager, who will determine next year’s promotions, believes you but says, "I understand but this is very unfortunate. The meeting was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. I wouldn’t be surprised if they decided not to work with us next year." You realize that you may have caused a big problem.

*False accusation.* You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused an unusual amount of traffic. This caused you to miss a meeting at the marketing research company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting was an end of the year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will work with your company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as you arrive and explain why you were late. The manager, who will determine next year’s promotions, does not believe you and says, "Yeah, right. We have heard a lot of such excuses. This meeting was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. I wouldn’t be surprised if they decided not to work with us next year.” You realize that you are being falsely accused of lying.

*Neutral feedback.* You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused an unusual amount of traffic. You thought this would cause you to miss a meeting at the marketing research company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting was an end of the year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will work with your agency next year or not. When you arrive at work, however, you find that the meeting has been delayed because the client is running late. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as the meeting ends. The manager, who will determine next year’s promotions, says, “This was a good meeting. Let’s talk about the timeline that the client requested.” You are relieved that you did not miss the meeting.

**Work Context, Car Accident**

*True accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the public relations department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but today you are a little annoyed by the fact that Sarah is sending you to this meeting instead of going herself. While thinking about your irritation with Sarah, your mind wanders, you end up not seeing the car coming from the side street, and you collide with it. Both cars are totaled but you and the other driver only have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and with the other details you call Sarah to let her know. The police had already contacted her. She says: "I can't believe you were daydreaming as usual and ruined my car. What was your problem?" You realize that you are being rightfully accused of causing the accident.

*Negative feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the public relations department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but that day you are nervous about the meeting and a little distracted. You end up not seeing the car coming from the side street and collide with it. Both cars are totaled but you and the other driver only have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and with the other details you call Sarah to let her know. The police had already contacted her. She says: "I realized this morning that you were really nervous about the meeting. I wish you were more careful. My insurance has a $1000 deductible I will have to pay." You realize you made a big mistake and caused a lot of damage.

*False accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the public relations department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to you so that you can go to a meeting. You drive carefully but another car does not stop at the red light and collides with you. Both cars are totaled but you and the other driver only have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and with the other details you call Sarah to let her know. The police had already contacted her. You tell her that you were careful and it was the other driver's fault. She does not believe you and says: "It is always the other person's fault, isn't it? I can't believe this. I'm sure you were daydreaming as usual and did not pay enough attention." You realize you are being falsely accused of lying.

*Neutral feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the public relations department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but that day you are nervous about the meeting and a little distracted. You nearly miss a car coming from the side street and almost collided with it but you were able to break at the last minute. After the meeting you call Sarah to tell her how it went. She says: "Good, we better get started on their project then. Let's meet when you get back and talk about the time line." You realize that you feel relieved the meeting is over.

**Work Context, Gossip**

*True accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a coworker in a restaurant near the office, where employees usually have their lunch. You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which could potentially damage her career. You decide to tell your coworker Jenna's secret in detail and you two discuss it extensively for a while. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated within earshot and it seems like she has heard what you were talking about. You run into her in the office and she says: "I can't believe you are telling other employees about my secret. I overheard you two talking about it. I trusted you." You realize you are rightfully accused of disloyalty.

*Negative feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a coworker in a restaurant near the office, where the employees usually have their lunch. You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which would potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker but you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as well and she sees you. In the office, you run into her in the hallway and she says: "I overheard you two talking about me but I know you didn't tell her anything about my secret. Regardless, I don't like the fact that you talk with another employee about me, it is not professional." You realize you made a mistake by talking about her with another employee and you may have violated her trust.

*False accusation.* You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a coworker in a restaurant near the office, where employees usually have their lunch. You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which could potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker but you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as well and she sees you. You run into her in the office and she says: "I can't believe you are telling other employees about my secret. I overheard you two talking about me. I trusted you." You realize you are falsely accused of disloyalty.

*Neutral feedback.* You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a coworker in a restaurant near the office, where the employees usually have their lunch. You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which would potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker but you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as well and she sees you. In the office, you run into her in the hallway and she says: "I just sent you an e-mail about our new project. Can you look at it when you have a chance?"

You realize you feel relieved that she did not hear you talking about her with your coworker.

**University Context, Cheating on a Test (used in the main online study)**

*True accusation.* You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your study group and you are the secretary. Teresa's role is to distribute topics as well as to compile and share each person's slides with the group. Hence she has great control over the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam, so during the exam you look over Teresa's exam paper and copy a few of the formulas. Next week in class you find out that Teresa, the study group leader, told the professor that you copied her answers during the exam. You realize that you are being rightfully accused of cheating.

*Negative feedback.* You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your study group and you are the secretary. Teresa's role is to distribute topics as well as to compile and share each person's slides with the group. Hence she has great control over the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam nor did you pay much attention during the presentations. Next week in class, Teresa approaches you and says: "I realized that your notes are really bad. We'll all fail the exam with these notes. Didn't you know how important the notes are because not everything is written on the slides?" You realize that you made a big mistake.

*False accusation.* You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your study group and you are the secretary. Teresa's role is to distribute topics as well as to compile and share each person's slides with the group. Hence she has great control over the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam. During the exam, it crosses your mind that you can look over Teresa's exam paper to copy her answers but you decide not to. Next week in class you find out that Teresa, the study group leader, told the professor that you copied her answers during the exam. You realize that you are being falsely accused of cheating.

*Neutral feedback.* You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your study group and you are the secretary. Teresa's role is to distribute topics as well as to compile and share each person's slides with the group. Hence she has great control over the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations and send them to Teresa. At the end of the exam, Teresa approaches you and says: "I thought the professor would surprise us with some unexpected questions but I didn't see any. What did you think?" You realize that you are relieved the exam is over.

**University Context, Stealing (used in the main online study)**

*True accusation.* You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. Towards the end of the month you realize you need money and you decide to take some money from the cashbox of the club. You also decide not to put it back when you have cash again because there are no club activities left. After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you privately and says that you stole funds from the club. You realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty.

*Negative feedback.* You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. You have usually been careful about your job but that month you were busy with exams, so you did a lousy job. You reported the budget needed for next year as much lower than it was supposed to be. After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you privately and says that the university has decided to give a really small amount of money to the club because of your wrong budget report. You realize you made a big mistake and caused the club to lose money for next year.

*False accusation.* You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. You have been very careful about your job and you are doing everything by the book. After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you privately and says that you have been stealing funds from the club, which cannot be true. You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty.

*Neutral feedback.* You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. Recently, you reported the club budget to the university to request money for next year's activities. After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you privately and says that the university officials told him that they received the request. You realize that the hardest part of the job is over.

**University Context, Plagiarism**

*True accusation.* You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. Hence, the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for the project. Katie is the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part of the project. You need to read articles about the topic and summarize their findings in your own words. In the end, however, you decide to copy and paste parts from existing scientific papers without rephrasing anything and without any other group member knowing. After you send the final version of the paper to the group, Katie responds and says: "I looked at your section and it seems to me that you just copied and pasted the information from a few articles without even rephrasing them. This is plagiarism." You realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty.

*Negative feedback.* You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is

responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. Hence the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for that project. Katie is the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to summarize their findings in your own words. A week later, Katie sends you an e-mail and says: “I don’t know if you saw it but we got a really low score for this project and I think you are responsible. I went back to the project and realized that you have missed classic articles about the topic that I told you to include.” You realize you made a big mistake.

*False accusation.* You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. Hence, the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for the project. Katie is the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to summarize their findings in your own words. After you send the final version of the paper to the group, Katie responds and says: “I looked at your section and it seems to me that you just copied and pasted the information from a few articles without even rephrasing them. This is plagiarism.” You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty.

*Neutral feedback.* You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. Hence the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for that project. Katie is the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to summarize their findings in your own words**.** You complete your part and send it to Katie. She writes back and says: “Thanks. I will add this to the final version.” You are relieved that your part of the task is done.

# APPENDIX C. PILOT STUDY TABLES

## Descriptive Statistics for University Scenarios (Pilot Study)

| | TURKEY | | | | | | | | | | | | US | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cheating on a Test* | | | | | | | | | | | | Cheating on a Test* | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.45 | 0.45 | 11 | 1.26 | 0.43 | 9 | 2.46 | 1.34 | 8 | 5.58 | 0.87 | 12 | 1.59 | 0.55 | 9 | 1.35 | 0.60 | 9 | 2.00 | 0.62 | 9 | 3.25 | 1.09 | 8 |
| Structure | 5.52 | 1.11 | 11 | 5.37 | 1.06 | 9 | 5.50 | 1.66 | 8 | 5.14 | 0.89 | 12 | 6.11 | 0.94 | 9 | 5.56 | 1.49 | 9 | 5.52 | 1.03 | 9 | 5.29 | 1.35 | 8 |
| Feedback Fairness | 4.32 | 1.69 | 11 | 1.38 | 0.46 | 8 | 4.44 | 0.96 | 8 | 4.58 | 0.83 | 12 | 5.75 | 0.89 | 9 | 1.82 | 0.84 | 9 | 4.75 | 0.83 | 9 | 3.78 | 0.85 | 8 |
| Honor Threat | 4.27 | 1.99 | 11 | 3.25 | 1.50 | 8 | 3.58 | 2.02 | 8 | 2.99 | 1.83 | 12 | 5.48 | 1.24 | 9 | 4.52 | 1.12 | 9 | 4.19 | 1.70 | 9 | 2.99 | 1.24 | 8 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.45 | 1.10 | 11 | 4.33 | 1.80 | 8 | 4.24 | 1.56 | 8 | 1.63 | 1.20 | 12 | 5.57 | 0.94 | 9 | 4.74 | 1.01 | 9 | 4.76 | 1.17 | 9 | 2.77 | 1.20 | 8 |
| Positive Emotions | 2.48 | 1.06 | 11 | 2.88 | 1.45 | 8 | 3.17 | 1.02 | 8 | 3.72 | 1.67 | 12 | 4.30 | 0.87 | 9 | 3.78 | 1.21 | 9 | 3.96 | 1.21 | 9 | 3.21 | 1.18 | 8 |
| | Stealing Money* | | | | | | | | | | | | Stealing Money* | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.13 | 0.23 | 10 | 1.55 | 0.87 | 11 | 1.61 | 0.57 | 12 | 4.83 | 1.55 | 14 | 1.10 | 0.25 | 7 | 1.40 | 0.47 | 10 | 1.78 | 0.98 | 10 | 5.95 | 1.11 | 7 |
| Structure | 5.83 | 0.91 | 10 | 5.39 | 1.39 | 11 | 5.36 | 1.23 | 12 | 5.52 | 1.51 | 14 | 6.33 | 0.75 | 7 | 5.67 | 1.74 | 10 | 6.17 | 0.63 | 10 | 6.24 | 0.92 | 7 |
| Feedback Fairness | 6.18 | 0.76 | 10 | 2.36 | 1.74 | 11 | 4.35 | 1.09 | 12 | 4.87 | 1.61 | 13 | 6.93 | 0.12 | 7 | 1.85 | 1.20 | 10 | 5.65 | 0.65 | 10 | 6.14 | 0.96 | 7 |
| Honor Threat | 6.24 | 0.60 | 9 | 4.40 | 2.29 | 11 | 3.07 | 1.37 | 12 | 3.18 | 1.90 | 13 | 5.86 | 1.40 | 7 | 4.62 | 2.05 | 10 | 5.15 | 1.95 | 10 | 2.57 | 1.55 | 7 |
| Negative Emotions | 5.57 | 1.13 | 9 | 4.70 | 1.42 | 11 | 4.24 | 0.89 | 12 | 2.13 | 1.91 | 13 | 5.02 | 1.02 | 7 | 4.35 | 1.62 | 10 | 4.72 | 1.11 | 10 | 1.19 | 0.50 | 7 |
| Positive Emotions | 1.96 | 0.65 | 9 | 3.64 | 1.84 | 11 | 2.00 | 0.84 | 12 | 4.28 | 1.70 | 13 | 4.19 | 1.57 | 7 | 4.30 | 1.25 | 10 | 4.05 | 1.47 | 10 | 4.14 | 0.86 | 7 |
| | Plagiarism in Class Project | | | | | | | | | | | | Plagiarism in Class Project | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 2.41 | 1.36 | 9 | 2.92 | 1.49 | 13 | 1.67 | 0.40 | 8 | 4.53 | 1.23 | 12 | 2.25 | 0.99 | 8 | 2.13 | 0.64 | 8 | 1.67 | 0.42 | 11 | 4.78 | 1.48 | 12 |
| Structure | 5.85 | 0.94 | 9 | 5.69 | 1.21 | 13 | 5.63 | 0.86 | 8 | 5.36 | 1.34 | 12 | 6.00 | 0.69 | 8 | 6.04 | 0.72 | 8 | 6.24 | 0.91 | 11 | 5.69 | 0.96 | 12 |
| Feedback Fairness | 5.94 | 1.07 | 9 | 2.65 | 1.40 | 13 | 4.09 | 1.68 | 8 | 4.35 | 1.39 | 12 | 5.72 | 0.95 | 8 | 1.75 | 0.86 | 8 | 3.48 | 1.20 | 11 | 5.88 | 0.88 | 12 |
| Honor Threat | 3.65 | 1.18 | 9 | 3.53 | 1.66 | 13 | 3.13 | 1.81 | 8 | 2.96 | 1.56 | 12 | 4.65 | 1.08 | 8 | 3.58 | 2.23 | 8 | 3.59 | 0.79 | 11 | 3.11 | 1.52 | 12 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.43 | 0.81 | 9 | 3.55 | 1.69 | 13 | 3.72 | 1.05 | 8 | 2.24 | 1.47 | 12 | 5.31 | 0.91 | 8 | 4.63 | 1.38 | 8 | 5.11 | 0.48 | 11 | 2.53 | 1.68 | 12 |
| Positive Emotions | 3.37 | 1.65 | 9 | 4.10 | 1.52 | 13 | 3.08 | 1.11 | 8 | 3.25 | 1.66 | 12 | 3.83 | 1.17 | 8 | 4.29 | 1.44 | 8 | 3.58 | 1.25 | 11 | 4.50 | 1.03 | 12 |

*Used in the main online scenario study.

## Descriptive Statistics for Work Scenarios in Turkey (Pilot Study)

| | Plagiarism in Work Project* | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 2.10 | 1.02 | 14 | 1.75 | 1.21 | 16 | 1.59 | 0.68 | 13 | 5.83 | 1.50 | 18 |
| Structure | 5.65 | 0.76 | 14 | 5.54 | 1.42 | 16 | 4.94 | 1.25 | 13 | 5.81 | 1.07 | 18 |
| Feedback Fairness | 6.32 | 0.70 | 14 | 2.83 | 1.85 | 16 | 4.21 | 0.88 | 13 | 5.83 | 1.10 | 18 |
| Honor Threat | 5.35 | 1.28 | 14 | 3.55 | 2.13 | 16 | 2.36 | 1.21 | 13 | 3.68 | 2.08 | 18 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.69 | 0.86 | 14 | 4.65 | 1.46 | 16 | 4.20 | 1.13 | 13 | 1.51 | 1.32 | 18 |
| Positive Emotions | 2.60 | 1.71 | 14 | 3.75 | 1.76 | 16 | 2.99 | 1.14 | 13 | 4.45 | 1.64 | 18 |
| | Missing Meeting / Lying* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.77 | 1.06 | 16 | 1.53 | 0.61 | 15 | 2.08 | 0.60 | 13 | 3.37 | 1.69 | 19 |
| Structure | 5.96 | 1.07 | 16 | 6.04 | 1.08 | 15 | 4.74 | 1.60 | 13 | 5.96 | 1.27 | 19 |
| Feedback Fairness | 5.78 | 1.09 | 16 | 2.83 | 1.16 | 15 | 3.58 | 1.27 | 13 | 3.50 | 1.48 | 19 |
| Honor Threat | 5.18 | 1.43 | 15 | 3.66 | 1.51 | 15 | 2.35 | 1.23 | 12 | 3.22 | 1.50 | 19 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.82 | 0.91 | 15 | 4.81 | 1.09 | 15 | 3.08 | 1.32 | 12 | 2.86 | 1.40 | 19 |
| Positive Emotions | 2.02 | 1.07 | 15 | 2.98 | 1.33 | 15 | 3.28 | 0.92 | 12 | 2.82 | 1.41 | 19 |
| | Car Accident | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.79 | 0.76 | 14 | 1.73 | 0.94 | 17 | 1.81 | 0.81 | 14 | 3.59 | 1.23 | 15 |
| Structure | 5.35 | 1.36 | 14 | 5.75 | 1.26 | 17 | 5.62 | 1.39 | 14 | 5.20 | 1.30 | 15 |
| Feedback Fairness | 2.96 | 1.03 | 14 | 2.26 | 1.30 | 17 | 4.11 | 1.22 | 14 | 4.46 | 1.08 | 14 |
| Honor Threat | 3.19 | 1.41 | 14 | 2.77 | 1.77 | 17 | 2.89 | 1.76 | 14 | 3.30 | 1.90 | 14 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.93 | 1.33 | 14 | 4.66 | 1.00 | 17 | 4.10 | 1.34 | 14 | 2.88 | 1.43 | 14 |
| Positive Emotions | 2.43 | 1.16 | 14 | 2.27 | 1.13 | 17 | 2.00 | 1.08 | 14 | 2.83 | 1.37 | 14 |
| | Gossip | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.33 | 0.51 | 13 | 1.49 | 0.63 | 15 | 2.31 | 1.00 | 14 | 3.61 | 1.67 | 19 |
| Structure | 4.97 | 1.29 | 13 | 5.27 | 1.30 | 15 | 4.81 | 1.51 | 14 | 5.61 | 1.16 | 19 |
| Feedback Fairness | 6.60 | 0.46 | 13 | 1.97 | 1.38 | 15 | 4.02 | 1.31 | 14 | 4.39 | 1.50 | 18 |
| Honor Threat | 5.71 | 1.12 | 12 | 4.06 | 1.41 | 15 | 3.55 | 1.93 | 14 | 3.69 | 1.83 | 18 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.29 | 1.03 | 13 | 4.33 | 1.28 | 15 | 3.79 | 1.03 | 14 | 3.32 | 1.70 | 18 |
| Positive Emotions | 2.74 | 1.32 | 13 | 2.89 | 1.61 | 15 | 2.98 | 1.51 | 14 | 3.80 | 1.55 | 18 |

*Used in the main online scenario study.

## Descriptive Statistics for Work Scenarios in Northern US (Pilot Study)

| | Plagiarism in Work Project* | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.87 | 0.91 | 10 | 1.69 | 0.61 | 12 | 1.77 | 0.63 | 16 | 5.53 | 1.14 | 15 |
| Structure | 5.87 | 1.07 | 10 | 5.94 | 1.69 | 12 | 5.96 | 0.89 | 16 | 6.24 | 0.74 | 15 |
| Feedback Fairness | 6.20 | 1.10 | 10 | 2.06 | 1.13 | 12 | 4.59 | 1.19 | 16 | 5.80 | 0.93 | 15 |
| Honor Threat | 5.13 | 1.69 | 10 | 3.78 | 1.50 | 12 | 4.59 | 1.69 | 16 | 4.01 | 1.54 | 15 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.90 | 1.00 | 10 | 4.18 | 1.35 | 12 | 4.80 | 1.37 | 16 | 1.53 | 0.58 | 15 |
| Positive Emotions | 3.73 | 1.27 | 10 | 4.03 | 1.40 | 12 | 3.92 | 1.46 | 16 | 4.47 | 0.70 | 15 |
| | Missing Meeting / Lying* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.27 | 0.42 | 11 | 1.46 | 0.66 | 13 | 1.79 | 0.89 | 16 | 3.97 | 1.37 | 13 |
| Structure | 6.27 | 0.93 | 11 | 5.85 | 0.85 | 13 | 6.04 | 0.88 | 16 | 6.31 | 0.71 | 13 |
| Feedback Fairness | 5.82 | 1.02 | 11 | 2.26 | 0.78 | 13 | 2.81 | 1.45 | 16 | 4.63 | 1.54 | 13 |
| Honor Threat | 5.33 | 1.13 | 11 | 4.58 | 1.03 | 13 | 3.91 | 1.45 | 16 | 3.78 | 1.31 | 13 |
| Negative Emotions | 5.12 | 0.85 | 11 | 5.19 | 0.85 | 13 | 4.10 | 0.82 | 16 | 3.00 | 1.32 | 13 |
| Positive Emotions | 3.73 | 1.23 | 11 | 4.41 | 0.90 | 13 | 3.69 | 1.38 | 16 | 4.18 | 1.03 | 13 |
| | Car Accident | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.69 | 0.62 | 13 | 1.33 | 0.49 | 12 | 1.20 | 0.37 | 15 | 3.40 | 1.40 | 14 |
| Structure | 5.69 | 0.92 | 13 | 6.03 | 0.73 | 12 | 6.31 | 0.78 | 15 | 5.62 | 1.37 | 14 |
| Feedback Fairness | 4.08 | 1.19 | 13 | 1.75 | 0.93 | 12 | 5.53 | 0.40 | 15 | 4.95 | 1.37 | 14 |
| Honor Threat | 4.43 | 1.71 | 13 | 3.22 | 1.48 | 12 | 4.06 | 1.67 | 15 | 4.04 | 1.69 | 14 |
| Negative Emotions | 5.09 | 1.34 | 13 | 5.06 | 0.97 | 12 | 4.42 | 0.99 | 15 | 3.35 | 1.04 | 14 |
| Positive Emotions | 4.08 | 1.45 | 13 | 4.28 | 1.19 | 12 | 4.16 | 1.42 | 15 | 4.17 | 1.10 | 14 |
| | Gossip | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | True accusation | | | False accusation | | | Negative Feedback | | | Neutral Feedback | | |
| | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* | *Mean* | *SD* | *n* |
| Valence | 1.88 | 1.20 | 11 | 1.67 | 0.47 | 15 | 2.33 | 0.55 | 12 | 3.03 | 0.92 | 12 |
| Structure | 6.23 | 0.58 | 11 | 5.40 | 1.55 | 15 | 5.53 | 1.16 | 12 | 5.64 | 1.02 | 12 |
| Feedback Fairness | 6.11 | 0.96 | 11 | 2.32 | 1.21 | 15 | 4.40 | 1.21 | 12 | 4.10 | 0.81 | 12 |
| Honor Threat | 5.02 | 1.65 | 11 | 4.69 | 1.29 | 15 | 3.76 | 1.26 | 12 | 4.28 | 1.40 | 12 |
| Negative Emotions | 4.86 | 0.66 | 11 | 4.07 | 1.18 | 15 | 4.32 | 1.23 | 12 | 3.53 | 0.83 | 12 |
| Positive Emotions | 4.33 | 1.14 | 11 | 3.98 | 1.49 | 15 | 3.75 | 0.61 | 12 | 3.50 | 0.93 | 12 |

*Used in the main online scenario study.

## APPENDIX D. CORRELATION TABLES

### Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the true accusation condition (Experiment 1)

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .53*** | .93*** | .38** | .86*** | .48*** | .12 | .43** | .38** | .43** | -.02 | .09 | .05 | -.17 |
| 2. Shame | | .45** | .65*** | .21 | .05 | .35* | .15 | .14 | .00 | .34* | .09 | .14 | .04 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .24+ | .67*** | .50*** | .05 | .45** | .41** | .45** | -.11 | .15 | .18 | -.17 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .09 | -.16 | .37** | .14 | .01 | -.23 | .41** | .07 | .10 | .01 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .54*** | -.03 | .38** | .35* | .53*** | -.15 | .08 | -.07 | -.22 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .00 | .54*** | .56*** | .91*** | -.25+ | .18 | -.10 | -.02 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .44** | .49*** | -.19 | .92*** | -.11 | -.07 | .05 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .70*** | .29* | .19 | .04 | -.29* | -.24+ |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .37** | .14 | .03 | -.14 | -.08 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.38** | .15 | -.03 | -.05 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | -.14 | -.02 | .06 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | .04 | -.26+ |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .30* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .22 | .94*** | .26+ | .85*** | .27* | .38** | .50*** | .43** | .26+ | .13 | -.07 | -.10 | .16 |
| 2. Shame | | .13 | .74*** | -.19 | -.63*** | .53*** | -.22 | -.17 | -.55*** | .70*** | .02 | -.06 | .12 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .14 | .73*** | .31* | .36** | .52*** | .47*** | .27* | .09 | -.04 | -.11 | .16 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | -.10 | -.58*** | .41*** | -.18 | -.23+ | -.51*** | .59*** | -.02 | -.08 | .11 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .55*** | .12 | .56*** | .46*** | .52*** | -.19 | -.11 | -.05 | .11 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | -.18 | .63*** | .56*** | .92*** | -.59*** | -.01 | -.11 | -.09 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .18 | .37** | -.18 | .83*** | -.35** | .04 | -.08 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .54*** | .52*** | -.15 | -.06 | .01 | -.14 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .55*** | -.18 | -.06 | -.01 | -.07 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.55*** | -.02 | -.08 | -.03 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | -.29* | .09 | -.05 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | .00 | -.08 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .12 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the negative performance feedback condition (Experiment 1)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Turkey | .52*** | .91*** | .46** | .73*** | .47*** | .35* | .47*** | .61*** | .24+ | .18 | .08 | .08 | .29* |
| 1. Negative Emotions | | .37** | .50*** | .05 | -.06 | .42** | .14 | .34* | -.20 | .35* | .15 | .03 | -.04 |
| 2. Shame | | | .34* | .54*** | .52*** | .32* | .50*** | .61*** | .23 | .12 | .02 | .04 | .29* |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | | -.01 | .00 | .64*** | -.04 | .30* | -.25+ | .60*** | .09 | .07 | .17 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | | .51*** | -.09 | .43** | .38** | .53*** | -.22 | .05 | .04 | .21 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | | .00 | .62*** | .57*** | .67*** | -.22 | .17 | -.07 | .11 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | | .31* | .43** | -.30* | .93*** | .18 | .18 | .31* |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | | .48*** | .34* | .14 | .13 | -.07 | .13 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | | .34* | .09 | .22 | .18 | .02 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | | -.43** | .17 | -.10 | -.04 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | | .12 | .11 | .29* |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | | -.43** | -.16 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | | .44** |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | .51*** | .90*** | .50*** | .75*** | .27* | .45** | .40** | .46*** | .23+ | .34** | -.01 | .06 | .05 |
| 1. Negative Emotions | | .33* | .69*** | .05 | -.34* | .53*** | .20 | .11 | -.34* | .59*** | -.12 | .10 | -.14 |
| 2. Shame | | | .25 | .55*** | .34** | .37** | .38** | .44** | .28* | .24+ | .08 | .07 | .07 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | | .19 | -.26+ | .52*** | .19 | .17 | -.28* | .58*** | -.17 | .13 | -.10 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | | .43** | .07 | .27* | .40** | .39** | -.05 | .00 | -.02 | .19 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | | -.05 | .55*** | .38** | .91*** | -.25+ | -.10 | -.04 | .11 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | | .56*** | .57*** | -.03 | .94*** | -.13 | -.04 | -.19 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | | .55*** | .49*** | .39** | -.11 | -.07 | -.05 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | | .27* | .29* | .07 | -.03 | .00 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | | -.18 | -.16 | -.09 | .00 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | | -.18 | -.03 | -.18 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | | .06 | -.06 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | | .34* |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the false accusation condition (Experiment 1)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .54*** | .87*** | .24 | .74*** | .33* | .20 | .14 | .47** | .31* | .00 | .16 | .21 | .07 |
| 2. Shame | | .33* | .20 | .20 | -.03 | .33* | .17 | .24 | -.05 | .22 | .25+ | .08 | -.08 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .12 | .47** | .26+ | .07 | .13 | .41** | .15 | -.11 | .06 | .22 | .11 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | -.10 | -.03 | .52*** | .04 | -.06 | .03 | .61*** | -.04 | -.07 | -.17 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .41** | -.10 | .01 | .42** | .53*** | -.28 | .20 | .15 | .11 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .00 | .38* | .46** | .75*** | -.18 | .29+ | -.10 | -.26+ |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .31* | .26+ | -.17 | .86*** | .10 | -.04 | .05 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .18 | .14 | .17 | .20 | -.12 | -.22 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .27+ | -.22 | .14 | .09 | -.01 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.25+ | .10 | -.13 | -.13 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .06 | -.11 | .02 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.15 | -.29+ |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .42** |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .51*** | .88*** | .20 | .82*** | .22 | .04 | .09 | .26+ | .17 | -.03 | .03 | .02 | .07 |
| 2. Shame | | .16 | .61*** | .19 | .08 | .30* | .13 | .16 | .07 | .29* | .03 | .13 | .09 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | -.10 | .70*** | .10 | -.04 | .01 | .17 | .04 | -.10 | -.01 | -.06 | .00 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | -.14 | .09 | .34* | .26* | -.12 | .17 | .42** | .01 | .11 | .06 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .33* | -.18 | -.01 | .39** | .31* | -.31* | .01 | -.06 | .04 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | -.19 | .40** | .29* | .80*** | -.26* | .04 | -.11 | -.07 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .44** | .14 | -.33* | .93*** | -.07 | -.07 | .10 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.06 | .08 | .47*** | .06 | -.15 | -.14 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .24+ | -.21 | -.31* | -.19 | .13 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.37** | .09 | -.07 | .03 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .04 | -.01 | .07 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | .00 | .10 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .06 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the neutral feedback condition (Experiment 1)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .77*** | .95*** | .88*** | .90*** | .32* | .32* | .39** | .16 | .30* | .34* | .24+ | -.21 | -.23+ |
| 2. Shame | | .66*** | .80*** | .50*** | .24+ | .30* | .29* | .07 | .18 | .34* | .43** | -.14 | -.20 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .74*** | .81*** | .36** | .25+ | .40** | .16 | .32* | .26+ | .14 | -.20 | -.16 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .71*** | .26+ | .35* | .39** | .16 | .22 | .38** | .27* | -.17 | -.23+ |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .23 | .24+ | .29* | .15 | .27+ | .26+ | .16 | -.28* | -.27* |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .73*** | .77*** | .69*** | .82*** | .64*** | .08 | .15 | -.06 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .72*** | .72*** | .43** | .96*** | .07 | .17 | -.14 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .65*** | .61*** | .65*** | .08 | .11 | -.18 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .54*** | .53*** | .01 | .16 | -.05 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | .37** | .23+ | .16 | -.05 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .12 | .15 | -.16 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.13 | -.12 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .28* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .83*** | .96*** | .82*** | .94*** | .49** | .32* | .52*** | .22 | .53*** | .32* | .02 | -.03 | -.14 |
| 2. Shame | | .70*** | .83*** | .73*** | .33* | .30* | .42** | .11 | .43** | .37* | -.05 | .02 | -.07 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .71*** | .86*** | .50*** | .30* | .56*** | .25+ | .50*** | .27+ | .02 | -.04 | -.19 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .72*** | .46** | .40** | .48** | .26+ | .54*** | .43** | .01 | .03 | .03 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .43** | .24 | .41** | .14 | .49*** | .24 | .04 | -.04 | -.14 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .65*** | .79*** | .64*** | .88*** | .59*** | .02 | .01 | -.10 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | .74*** | .84*** | .53*** | .96*** | .08 | -.09 | .06 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .61*** | .65*** | .69*** | -.13 | .02 | -.10 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .46** | .70*** | .10 | -.27+ | .14 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | .52*** | .01 | .14 | .03 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .03 | .01 | .05 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.17 | -.02 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .35* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the true accusation condition (Experiment 2)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .32* | .69*** | .81*** | .61*** | .82*** | -.32* | -.04 | .36* | .10 | -.09 | -.09 | .05 | -.15 |
| 2. Shame | | .16 | .45** | -.04 | .28+ | -.10 | -.13 | .21 | .49*** | .05 | -.14 | -.19 | -.11 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .58*** | .64*** | .22 | -.20 | .21 | .05 | .08 | .16 | -.10 | .06 | -.28+ |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .38** | .59*** | -.19 | -.14 | .31* | .19 | -.22 | -.27+ | -.02 | -.05 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .24+ | -.15 | .19 | .02 | -.23 | .10 | -.11 | .05 | -.22 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | -.31* | -.19 | .46** | .10 | -.24+ | .03 | .04 | .00 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | -.38** | -.70*** | .12 | .04 | .13 | -.03 | .12 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.38** | -.28* | -.04 | .01 | -.06 | -.06 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .08 | -.01 | -.14 | .08 | -.08 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.07 | .19 | -.34* | -.01 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .07 | .20 | -.16 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.01 | -.27+ |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .17 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .29+ | .81*** | .85*** | .68*** | .90*** | -.24 | .14 | .26+ | .24 | -.34* | .04 | .13 | .21 |
| 2. Shame | | .11 | .37* | .01 | .35* | -.07 | .22 | -.04 | .14 | .15 | -.22 | .33* | .08 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .54*** | .73*** | .59*** | -.31* | .07 | .39* | .21 | -.12 | .00 | -.01 | -.02 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .46** | .81*** | -.11 | .07 | .15 | .08 | -.30* | .07 | .02 | .22 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .37* | -.34* | .09 | .37* | .26+ | -.37* | -.04 | -.21 | .06 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | -.12 | .17 | .09 | .19 | -.28+ | .02 | .32* | .35* |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | -.37* | -.64*** | -.32* | -.10 | .21 | .03 | .19 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.31* | .24 | -.08 | -.36* | .21 | .20 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .23 | .05 | .17 | -.15 | -.20 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.06 | -.05 | .05 | -.11 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | -.49** | .11 | -.24 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.16 | -.05 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .32* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the negative performance feedback condition (Experiment 2)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .11 | .79*** | .90*** | .53*** | .87*** | .07 | .08 | .03 | .14 | -.21 | -.24+ | .20 | .09 |
| 2. Shame | | .25+ | .22 | .04 | -.03 | -.03 | .05 | .08 | .16 | .03 | -.10 | .24+ | .14 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .69*** | .37** | .54*** | .11 | .09 | -.20 | .06 | -.14 | -.22 | .10 | .06 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .53*** | .73*** | .00 | .20 | .00 | .10 | -.22 | -.23 | .26+ | .14 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .31* | -.18 | .17 | .36* | .12 | .06 | -.19 | -.05 | -.34* |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .14 | -.07 | .03 | .10 | -.26+ | -.25+ | .26+ | .13 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | -.30* | -.40** | -.17 | -.17 | .11 | -.27+ | .24+ |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.06 | -.06 | .19 | -.13 | .35* | .27+ |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .17 | .09 | -.06 | .11 | -.30* |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.17 | -.02 | .11 | .09 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .04 | -.03 | -.26+ |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.07 | .05 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .34* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .34* | .89*** | .89*** | .61*** | .84*** | -.30* | -.03 | .40** | -.04 | -.49** | .13 | .02 | .08 |
| 2. Shame | | .25+ | .19 | .21 | .43** | -.18 | .12 | .32* | .12 | -.30* | .10 | -.06 | .15 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .84*** | .54*** | .62*** | -.25+ | -.07 | .34* | -.03 | -.44** | .20 | -.03 | .10 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .56*** | .60*** | -.29+ | .00 | .35* | -.01 | -.43** | .18 | -.01 | .09 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .29+ | -.34* | .11 | .38** | -.15 | -.14 | .25+ | .03 | .11 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | -.19 | -.07 | .27+ | -.03 | -.48** | -.10 | .09 | .01 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | -.19 | -.45** | .07 | .03 | -.10 | .02 | .08 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | .14 | .02 | .05 | .22 | .05 | .26+ |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | -.04 | -.26+ | .04 | -.09 | .24 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.02 | -.11 | -.21 | .11 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .03 | -.01 | .08 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.07 | .03 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .23 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the false accusation condition (Experiment 2)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .00 | .72*** | .85*** | .47*** | .88*** | .12 | NA | -.10 | .28* | -.30* | -.11 | -.07 | .12 |
| 2. Shame | | .23+ | .04 | .02 | -.05 | -.08 | NA | .10 | .24+ | -.03 | -.02 | -.05 | .18 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .59*** | .51*** | .41** | .06 | NA | .01 | .24+ | -.06 | -.03 | -.13 | .03 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .22+ | .72*** | .14 | NA | -.16 | .31* | -.18 | -.07 | -.12 | .12 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .21 | -.10 | NA | .08 | .14 | -.11 | -.14 | .05 | .08 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .12 | NA | -.10 | .22+ | -.43** | -.10 | -.05 | .19 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | NA | -.28* | .13 | -.03 | .05 | .07 | .13 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | -.07 | -.04 | -.03 | .07 | -.13 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | .17 | -.11 | .09 | .38** |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .06 | .06 | -.08 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.03 | -.21 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .31* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .25+ | .52*** | .81*** | .49*** | .80*** | -.06 | .28+ | .18 | .27+ | -.18 | .03 | -.12 | .22 |
| 2. Shame | | -.06 | .23 | .08 | .21 | .17 | -.18 | -.15 | .23 | -.13 | -.16 | .00 | .09 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .34* | .85*** | .00 | -.26+ | .77*** | -.01 | -.13 | .02 | -.04 | .03 | .08 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .24 | .63*** | .07 | .09 | -.02 | .22 | -.26+ | .04 | .00 | .17 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | -.02 | -.37* | .67*** | -.09 | -.13 | .11 | -.12 | -.07 | .12 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | .09 | -.12 | .33* | .40** | -.26+ | .13 | -.14 | .16 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | -.36* | -.18 | .17 | -.28+ | -.09 | .22 | .04 |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.04 | -.04 | .15 | -.08 | .06 | -.09 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | -.01 | .12 | .05 | -.08 | -.05 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | -.22 | .04 | -.25+ | .02 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | -.18 | .31* | -.28+ |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.23 | .17 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | -.14 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. NA: Not applicable because Turkish participants did not write cooperative responses in this condition.

**Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the neutral feedback condition (Experiment 2)**

| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .17 | .90*** | .78*** | .84*** | .78*** | NA | -.07 | -.07 | -.09 | -.21 | -.26+ | -.03 | -.28+ |
| 2. Shame | | .17 | .09 | .28+ | .00 | NA | -.11 | .39* | .16 | -.14 | -.20 | -.34* | -.15 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .70*** | .87*** | .49** | NA | -.12 | -.16 | -.07 | -.32* | -.25 | -.03 | -.27+ |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .62*** | .59*** | NA | .20 | .00 | .15 | -.13 | -.31* | .07 | -.25+ |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .44** | NA | -.10 | -.06 | .05 | -.32* | -.31* | -.21 | -.34* |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | NA | .06 | .04 | -.19 | -.06 | -.12 | .10 | -.04 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | -.10 | .17 | .11 | -.15 | .17 | .09 |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | -.06 | -.04 | .26+ | -.21 | -.10 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | .15 | -.19 | -.07 | .12 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .02 | -.07 | -.04 |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | .08 | .16 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .35* |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Negative Emotions | .27+ | .75*** | .77*** | .85*** | .92*** | NA | NA | -.14 | .30+ | -.07 | .08 | -.07 | .03 |
| 2. Shame | | .20 | .32* | .37* | .17 | NA | NA | .04 | .14 | -.01 | -.49** | -.26 | .00 |
| 3. Humiliation-Related | | | .56*** | .67*** | .59*** | NA | NA | -.08 | .18 | -.06 | -.09 | -.04 | .25 |
| 4. Guilt | | | | .69*** | .59*** | NA | NA | -.18 | .17 | -.23 | -.22 | .09 | .02 |
| 5. Anger-Related | | | | | .69*** | NA | NA | -.07 | .35* | -.13 | -.16 | -.13 | .07 |
| 6. Competitive | | | | | | NA | NA | -.12 | .27+ | -.04 | .25 | -.05 | .05 |
| 7. Cooperative | | | | | | | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 8. Avoidant | | | | | | | | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 9. Indirect Cooperative | | | | | | | | | .19 | .22 | -.01 | -.10 | .12 |
| 10. Retaliation | | | | | | | | | | .03 | -.22 | .11 | .10 |
| 11. Apology | | | | | | | | | | | .06 | -.07 | -.29+ |
| 12. Age | | | | | | | | | | | | -.12 | .06 |
| 13. Upbringing | | | | | | | | | | | | | .04 |
| 14. SES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. NA: Not applicable because participants did not write competitive and cooperative responses in this condition.

# APPENDIX E. INSTRUMENTS

## Demographic Information

What is your current age in years?

What is your gender?

Female___ Male____

Please indicate the average income level of your immediate family (circle one number):

1-$25.000 or below

2-$25.001 - $35.000

3-$35.001 - $45.000

4-$45.001 - $55.000

5-$55.001 - $65.000

6-$65.001 - $75.000

7-$75.001 - $85.000

8-$85.001 - $95.000

9-$95.001 - $105.000

10-$105.001 and above

What is your socioeconomic status?

1-very poor 2 3 4 5-middle class 6 7 8 9-very wealthy

How would you characterize your upbringing? 1-very rural 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-very urban

What is the ethnic identification that best describes you?

Caucasian American

African American

Asian American

Hispanic American

Native American

Multi-racial American

International student (please specify your country)

Other (please specify)

What is your first language?

English

Other (please specify)

Where were you born? (City & Country)

How long have you lived in the United States in years?

___ years

< 1 year

How devout a religious follower are you?

1-Not at all devout 2 3 4 5-Somewhat devout 6 7 8 9-Extremely devout

What is your major?

**Logic Problems**

**Individual Problem #1**

Janet, Barbara, and Elaine are a housewife, lawyer, and physicist, although not necessarily in that order. Janet lives next door to the housewife. Barbara is the physicist's best friend. Elaine once wanted to be a lawyer but decided against it. Janet has seen Barbara within the last two days, but has not seen the physicist.

Janet, Barbara and Elaine are, in that order, the

a. Housewife, physicist, lawyer
b. Physicist, lawyer, housewife
c. Physicist, housewife, lawyer
d. Lawyer, housewife, physicist

**Individual Problem # 2**



How many triangles can you find in the figure above? Look carefully – there are more than 16!

**Team Problem # 1**
Right now Bethany is 12. You can find her older brother's age by switching the digits in Bethany's age. They'll be able to switch the digits in their ages again sometime in the future. How old will Bethany and her brother be when this happens?

How old will Bethany be? _____

How old will Bethany's brother be? _____

**Team Problem # 2**
A man is looking at a portrait and says "Brothers and sisters I have none, but that man's father is my father's son."
Who is the man looking at a portrait of?

**Teamwork and Self-Evaluation Survey (1 – not at all to 7 – extremely)**

1) How much did you contribute to the team logic problems?

2) How would you rate your logical thinking ability?

3) How would you rate your communication skills?

4) How would you rate your decision making skills?

5) How would you rate your team's ability to work well together?

6) How would you rate your team's efficiency?

7) How would you rate your team's success?

8) How willing are you to work with your teammate again?

**Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998)**

**Ultimatum Game**

Participants will see the offer and the total amount one by one in a randomized order. (e.g., "Total amount: $10, Offer: $3;" "Total amount: $3, Offer: $1.4" etc.).

| | | Fair Offer | Unfair Offer | Highly Unfair Offer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total $ | 45% | 30% | 20% |
| High Stake | 10 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 2.0 |
| High Stake | 15 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 3.0 |
| High Stake | 20 | 9.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 |
| Low Stake | 2.25 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Low Stake | 3 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.6 |
| Low Stake | 5 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.0 |

**Experimenter and Teammate Evaluation Survey**

**Experimenter:**

1. Overall, how competent was the experimenter?
2. How clear was the experimenter in giving the instructions of the study?
3. How respectful was the experimenter?
4. How helpful was the experimenter?

**Teammate:**

1. How helpful was your teammate when you worked together?
2. How knowledgeable do you think s/he is?
3. How respectful was your teammate when you worked together?
4. How much did your teammate contribute to the team logic problems?
5. How would you rate your teammate's logical thinking ability?
6. How would you rate your teammate's communication skills?
7. How would you rate your teammate's decision making skills?

**Debriefing Questionnaire**

1. Do you have any questions about the study?
2. Was the experiment clear in its overall purpose?
3. Did all aspects of the procedure make sense?
4. Was anything odd or confusing?
5. Had you heard anything about this study before coming?
6. In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this study?
7. Do you have any feedback or suggestions for our study?