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Honor and shame in honor and dignity cultures: How can you re-affirm your own honor once it is tarnished?

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Honor and shame in honor and dignity cultures: How can you re-affirm your own honor once it is tarnished?

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ABSTRACT

Available social psychological studies of honor cultures have mostly focused on emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving an honor insult. The aim of this study was to examine possible ways of re-instilling a sense of honor and thus avoiding the negative emotional consequences of losing honor. A combined honor culture sample of Turkish and Latina/o participants (*N*=59) and a dignity culture sample of North Americans (*N*=57) were compared. Participants received an honor insult in the laboratory, and engaged in either self-affirmation or honor-affirmation. Analyses revealed that honor culture participants experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to the honor-affirmation condition, indicating that self-affirmation is not as effective as honor-affirmation in alleviating negative consequences of receiving an honor insult for members of honor cultures. Honor versus self-affirmation did not differentially affect the reactive honor endorsement of dignity culture participants. Our analyses did not reveal similar culture by affirmation interaction for the effectiveness of honor versus self affirmation in reducing negative emotional consequences of receiving an honor insult (e.g., shame and anger). The implications for future honor research are discussed.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Jessie and her brother John are sitting in a crowded cafe located in their small neighborhood in a Midwestern town, drinking coffee and conversing cheerfully. There are three young males sitting at the next table, staring at Jessie for a while. At last, one of them dares to say "Look at the chick at that table; what a sexy thing." All three laugh loudly. John is enraged by this. He gets up, walks towards the man, and asks defiantly "Pardon me. What did you just say about my sister?" The man answers with a crooked smile on his face, "I said what I said. You heard me." John replies "Then you obviously need to take back what you said." What he got back as a response was worse than the initial deed, "I have no intention of taking it back." John stares back at his sister for a brief moment, nods, and then punches the man squarely in the nose. The young man's white shirt is covered with blood immediately. It would be easy to conclude based on his behavior that John is a young man with behavioral difficulties who resorts to aggression as a solution to his problems. Maybe he was raised in a poor community with little education, maybe he is the bully of the neighborhood, or maybe he is on drugs.

Replace the names John and Jessie with Ahmet and Zeynep, and imagine the situation taking place in Turkey, in a small neighborhood in Istanbul. In the case of Ahmet, there is not enough evidence to conclude anything about his character. He is as likely to be a bully as a well-behaved young gentleman. He might be a high school drop-out, or a doctoral student. Maybe he never uses aggression except when the situation definitely calls for it; in other words, he behaves aggressively when his honor is at stake. He behaves in an expected manner, according to the "honor code" of the Turkish culture. His sister's honor is his own, and not responding to the honor threat will cause them to lose their honor. In that case, their

reputation would be tarnished, because the incident is witnessed by some people in their neighborhood, leaving him and his sister in a deep state of shame.

Definition of Honor

For decades, the construct of honor has been studied extensively by anthropologists and sociologists. This rich research notwithstanding, honor is a difficult concept to define. In his influential article, Pitt-Rivers (1966) describes honor as the value a person has in his own eyes, as well as the extent to which society values him. In other words, it's the person's claim to pride as well as his right to it. One earns this right to pride by adhering to a socially constructed system of symbols that includes values as well as rules of conduct (Friedrich, 1977). This socially constructed system, in other words, "the honor code," varies between cultures (Casimir & Jung, 2009). Yet there are shared elements of honor codes in so-called honor cultures (e.g., Spain, Greece, and Turkey). For instance, honesty, loyalty and a concern for reputation are common elements in the honor codes of both Awlad 'Ali Bedouins of Western Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 1986) and of Spanish Andalusians (Pitt-Rivers, 1966).

In many of today's Western cultures, even though they are not considered cultures of honor, the concept of honor exists in reference to a person's integrity, pride, and self-worth. People view themselves as honorable to the extent that they feel pride as a result of their own actions and beliefs. Because the concept of honor exists in both honor and non-honor cultures, the question arises as to the difference between an honor culture and a non-honor culture.

For the remainder of this discussion, following the terminology of Cohen and his colleagues (e.g., Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011),

Western societies in which honor is not a core value in defining the self will be referred to as "dignity cultures." In "dignity" cultures, such as the North American culture, individuals' worth is intrinsic and cannot be devalued by others (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). This personal sense of dignity comes from a perception of a moral core, which does not require external approval. Every individual has an intrinsic and inalienable right to dignity. In a "face" culture such as Japan, respectability of the person is granted by others by virtue of the individual's fulfillment of the societal expectations. Social relationships are organized by hierarchies, and face can be conferred upon the individual by social others that are equal or higher in the social hierarchy. One cannot claim face for oneself, because doing so will bring humiliation. "Honor" cultures (e.g., Turkish and Spanish cultures) are similar to face cultures in the sense that personal worth is conferred by others' respect, and shame is an important emotion regulating one's behavior so as to avoid social disapproval. However, face and honor are not synonymous. Honor cultures are dissimilar to both dignity and face cultures in interesting ways. On the one hand, in honor cultures, dignity is not seen as an inalienable right of a person and self-worth must be approved by others. On the other hand, perception of a moral core of a person exists to a certain extent in honor cultures, and individuals are expected to claim their honor by confirming this moral core. This moral core, however, must be demonstrated by one's behavior and approved by others; it is not a given. The current research concerns a comparison between dignity and honor cultures, and further discussion of face cultures is beyond the scope of this argument.

The conceptualization proposed by Cohen and his colleagues is not the only way in which social psychologists have defined honor cultures. A number of researchers define a society as a culture of honor to the extent that its members' personal worth is defined in

terms of the worth of close others such as family members (e.g., Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999). According to this definition, members of a non-honor culture may define themselves as honorable based on their own evaluation of their self-worth. Their self-worth may or may not have a bearing on the worth of people with whom they are associated. In honor cultures, on the other hand, not only does one's behavior reflect on relational others (such as family members), but also those others' behaviors reflect on one's own honor. Research suggests that the interpersonal aspect of honor is one of the defining characteristics of honor cultures (Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2002a). However, focusing only on this interpersonal aspect almost equates the honor construct to collectivism (see Markus and Kitayama, 1991, for a discussion of collectivist cultures); hence, being an honor culture becomes synonymous with being a collectivist culture. In fact, many social psychologists use the misleading terminology of "honor cultures versus individualistic cultures" (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2000).

Equating honor construct with collectivism is misleading in several ways. First of all, some core elements of the honor code of a given honor culture that is otherwise considered a collectivistic society can also reflect individualistic values. For instance, both loyalty to one's tribe (a collectivistic value), and autonomy (an individualistic value) are essential to the definition of the honor code for Awlad 'Ali Bedouins of Western Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 1986). According to the observations of Abu-Lughod (1986), in this collectivist society of Bedouins, failing to protect the interests of the tribe during a commercial transaction while furthering one's own households' interests could seriously jeopardize one's honor. On the other hand, undermining one's own authority by showing weakness and dependence on

socially equal others would be equally detrimental for a man's honor. Second, some important personal characteristics like integrity and honesty are considered to be defining characteristics of the honor construct in both individualistic Western cultures and in honor cultures (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986; Pitt-Rivers, 1966).

Apparently, the presence of values related to interconnectedness is not enough to explain the difference between the two kinds of cultures. What makes a society an honor culture above and beyond these values pertaining to sharing honor with close others is the centrality of honor to its members' sense of self-worth (Casimir, 2009), and their willingness to defend it in the face of imagined or real offenses (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996). Put in a different way, an important difference between honor and non-honor cultures is the relative strength of honor values in eliciting strong emotions and behaviors in individuals.

In summary, for a society to be considered an honor culture, a distinct honor code should exist, and members of this culture should have a shared understanding of what this honor code entails. Honor of family members and kin should have an influence on an individual's personal honor. Perception of personal worth in honor cultures should entail a moral core of each individual that should be both claimed by the individual himself/herself and at the same time approved by the society. And finally, in honor cultures, honor values should elicit stronger emotions and reactions in individuals compared to dignity culture cultures.

Honor and Self-Esteem

Members of honor cultures attain honor by adhering to the culturally constructed honor codes. Honor codes define the characteristics of an ideal honorable person and this definition is agreed upon by all of the members of the society. Consequently, individuals do not have the freedom to re-interpret their failure to abide by the honor code when their behavior does not fit the expected pattern. For instance, let us assume that chastity is an element of the female honor code in a given honor culture, and that members of this culture agree upon the description of chastity as sexual virginity until marriage. Under these circumstances, losing one's virginity would result in a loss of honor even though the hypothetical female in question regards chastity as a matter of loyalty to one's partner and considers herself to be a dignified person.

Different aspects of the honor code do not carry equal value within each honor culture. Some characteristics of an ideally defined person are necessary elements of having honor, the absence of which brings shame and dishonor. Some other characteristics, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient for honor. Having these characteristics can enhance one's honor, making the person more honorable than some other people, but the absence of these characteristics does not jeopardize one's honor, at least, not to the extent that the absence of core elements would. For the Andalusian culture (the southern region of Spain), for instance, refusal to submit to humiliation is a necessary element of having honor for a man, whereas loyalty is not necessary but a valued characteristic (Pitt-Rivers, 1966).

According to Pitt-Rivers (1966), necessary elements, in other words requirements of honor, come from ethically neutral values that any person should have in order to achieve at least acceptable levels of respectability. These values are ethically neutral in the sense that

everybody is expected to demonstrate these properties, and they are minimum requirements for having acceptable levels of honor. Although Pitt-Rivers (1966) discusses necessary elements only in terms of characteristics pertaining to gender differences (e.g., modesty for females), it is possible to categorize gender-neutral elements of honor (e.g., trustworthiness, helpfulness, honesty) into necessary versus peripheral categories. Consider taking other people's possessions versus sharing one's possessions with others as an example (assuming that it is part of a hypothetical honor code). Not stealing would be considered an ethical neutral that everybody should be able to accomplish. Under these circumstances, if a person steals he would lose honor, but a person who does not steal cannot claim (based solely on this) that he is much more honorable than other people (most of whom do not steal either). Applying Pitt-Rivers' (1966) conceptualization to this example, not stealing would be one of the necessary elements of honor. Sharing one's possessions and resources with less fortunate ones, however, would not be a necessary element. People would not be required to engage in this kind of charitable act in order to claim honor, and not be stigmatized as dishonorable on the basis of this aspect alone. Doing so would certainly enhance one's honor given that one already fulfills the necessary requirements, but it is only one of many possible behaviors that could increase and/or decrease one's honor.

Because of the inflexibility of honor codes, failures to abide by the honor code, especially the core elements of it, result in possible loss of one’s reputation and a deep sense of shame. Shame is considered to be the strongest emotional reaction to loss of honor in the anthropology literature (e.g., Casimir, 2009; Peristiany, 1966; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). The relation between honor and shame also has been demonstrated in psychological research. For instance, in a self-report study comparing Spanish (an honor culture) and Dutch (a dignity

culture) participants, Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2000) showed that different situations are potent in eliciting shame for Spanish and Dutch. Spanish participants considered unfavorable public evaluations of the self (a potential honor threat) as a more important antecedent of shame compared to Dutch participants, whereas Dutch participants considered self-failure as a more important antecedent of shame compared to their Spanish counterparts.

The function of honor as an assessment tool of self-value in honor cultures is served by self-esteem in dignity cultures. Self-esteem can be broadly defined as people's favorable global evaluations of themselves in their own eyes (e.g., Baumeister, Smart & Boden, 1996; Bosson & Swann, 2009). Unlike honor in honor cultures, however, what makes someone an ideal person with high self-esteem is not agreed upon by the whole society in a dignity culture. This is not to say that one's self-esteem is not affected by one's perception of how others evaluate the self. To the contrary, self-esteem is influenced by perception of one's social worth. This indeed, is the basic tenet of the sociometer theory of self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). According to sociometer theory, self-esteem is a sociometer signaling one's acceptance by others or detecting rejection cues. In other words, high-self-esteem is not a basic goal of the self-system, but it is an indication of one's successful satisfaction of the need to belong (Leary, 2004; Leary & Baumeister, 2000).

Unlike the assumptions of sociometer theory, many classical theories concerning self-esteem consider it a basic motivation of the self in and of of itself (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995). Moreover, in order to fulfill this basic motivation in a healthy fashion, one must try to build self-esteem based on one's internal strengths, and not on external contingencies like social approval (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995). A great deal of social psychology research has examined the consequences of basing one's self-esteem on different criteria. For instance, Crocker and

her colleagues (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper & Bouvrette, 2003) created the Contingencies of Self-Worth scale which measures seven distinct sources of self-esteem: physical appearance, approval from others, outdoing others in competition, academic competence, family support, virtue, and God's love. Crocker and Luhtanen (2003) found that the strongest correlation between global self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem inventory and each of the contingency subscales was that of approval from others. However, this strong correlation was consistently negative, implying that basing one's self-worth on others' approval was detrimental to self-esteem, at least in the American samples that were surveyed (Crocker & Luhtenan, 2003).

Although theories vary in their assumptions of what constitutes the source of healthy self-esteem, even the proponents of a socially based self-esteem (e.g., Leary, 2004) do not claim that there are socially prescribed strict definitions of what could or could not bring esteem to a person. In other words, the source of self-esteem may be social acceptance, yet the perception of social acceptance may vary for different individuals. As the discussion on honor in the previous section implies, however, this is not the case for honor. In cultures where an honor code exists, there is an agreed upon definition of honor, and the characteristics of an honorable person are socially prescribed in a strict sense. If, for instance, the existing honor code in a hypothetical culture specifies that it is not honorable to look elders in the eyes, doing so would cost one's honor whether or not one feels valued by friends and family. In this current analysis, the inflexibility of the definition of being honorable is considered one of the basic differences between honor and self-esteem.

Consequences of Losing Honor

In a classic study by Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz (1996), male University of Michigan students were bumped by a confederate and insulted by being called an "asshole." In three experiments, in response to this insult, participants who were raised in the US South were found to have higher cortisol and testosterone levels in their blood, they were more likely to report anger, and they were more likely to have aggression-related cognitions as shown by unobtrusive tasks (such as sentence and scenario completion) compared to their counterparts who were raised in the Northern US. It is interesting to note, however, that those Southern participants who did not receive the insult were not different on these aggression-related measures than their Northern counterparts. According to Cohen et al. (1996), these differences are caused by the fact that Southern US society is a culture of honor (Nisbett, 1993).

In honor cultures, aggression is an acceptable reaction to insults and threats to one's honor. This does not mean, however, that people are in general more violent across all situations in an honor culture compared to a dignity culture. Indeed, surveys conducted in Southern U.S. reveal that members of this culture endorse aggression only when it is perceived as self-protective or a defense of one's honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).

In honor cultures, aggression is not only acceptable but even required in the face of an honor attack if one wants to continue one's claim to honor. Ethnographic and sociological research on diverse honor cultures such as Kurdistan (Akman, 2002), Spain (Gilmore, 1987), rural Greece (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969), and Turkey (Oner-Ozkan & Gencoz, 2008) suggests that members of honor cultures consider retaliation as a duty when one's self or family is insulted. Failure to do so would indicate accepting the insult and admitting that one

is not worthy of honor. The most effective way to restore the tarnished honor would be to repudiate the insult by showing that one is willing to engage in physical aggression when necessary. Under certain circumstances, when the accusation or insult is perceived as justified, such as when a female member of the family engages in an pre-marital/extra-marital sexual affair, aggression is directed towards the "wrongdoer" rather than the insulting party, the most extreme case of which is embodied in intra-familial honor killings (e.g., Abdo, 2004).

Although such actions constitute the extreme end of aggression in the name of honor, they reveal a great deal about the nature of the process by which one can re-affirm honor after losing it. First, the willingness of people in honor cultures to take such radical measures, however painful and self-destructive they may seem, gives us clues about the negativity of consequences if one fails to do so; they include shame, ridicule, loss of respect and social resources, and even complete ostracism (Akman, 2002). In traditional societies where social mobility is low, and where the social, psychological, and material prospects of people are closely interwoven with those of the family, tribe, or clan members, ostracism would not only mean loss of social support, but also a loss of material resources that are necessary for survival. Second, the fact that the target of aggression is either the offender or the wrongdoer suggests the necessity of addressing the problems of honor directly rather than peripherally. Stated in Pitt-Rivers' (1966) terms, losing honor by accepting humiliation (a necessary element) cannot be repaired by demonstrating excellence in peripheral elements.

When one does not have the ability or opportunity to take appropriate action, one would experience debilitating emotions such as shame. As mentioned before, in honor cultures shame is considered to be the strongest emotional reaction to loss of honor. In many

such societies, words corresponding to shame are used as synonyms for dishonor (e.g., Casimir, 2009; Peristiany, 1966, Pitt-Rivers, 1966), and proneness to shame is considered to be a positive quality because it implies one's concern for losing honor. This idea is captured by phrases like “having a sense of shame” in many cultures of honor (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1966). In this respect, shame is not only an emotional consequence of honor loss but also an important regulator of behavior. The regulatory role of shame is implicated by the results of a recent study comparing Turkish/Moroccan minority and Dutch majority participants in the Netherlands (Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). In response to honor insults coming from family members and important others (where angry retaliation is not desirable), participants of Turkish or Moroccan descent reacted with verbal disapproval of the insult rather than a verbal attack to the extent that they were concerned with protecting their social image. Their desire to protect their social image was closely associated with the level of shame that they reported. For Dutch participants, shame did not have a strong association with a desire to protect one's social image, and it did not influence one's choice of retaliation or withdrawal behavior.

Rodriguez Mosquera and her colleagues also examined the relation between honor offenses and shame cross-culturally (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2002b). In this study, the researchers asked their Spanish (an honor culture) and Dutch (a dignity culture) participants to indicate the extent to which they would experience shame in response to situations that would constitute honor offenses. Not surprisingly, the results of their experiment revealed that Spanish participants anticipated more shame in response to the hypothetical situation of being depicted as a disgraceful member of their family (an offense to family honor) than did Dutch participants. Dutch participants, on the other hand,

anticipated more anger and shame in response to the hypothetical situations of being portrayed as a person who is not autonomous and assertive (independence related values) than did Spanish participants.

In summary, the evidence provided above strongly suggests that members of an honor culture are more likely to experience shame in the face of real or imagined honor insults compared to members of a dignity culture.

Honor and Self-Affirmation

Research conducted in Western settings suggests that one's global self-esteem is flexible and resourceful in the face of inadequacies. There is ample evidence showing that people distort and reinterpret social reality in ways that bolster their self-worth, such as by dismissing negative or risky information pertaining to the self (e.g., Kunda, 1987), seeking more accurate information about one's positive traits compared to one's negative traits (e.g., Sedikides, 1993), and considering one's positive attributes as more important than one's negative attributes (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989), to name a few. For instance, Dunning and his colleagues (e.g., Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 1989) showed that people consider behaviors and characteristics that they personally demonstrate to be more central to the definition of desirable traits compared to those behaviors and characteristics that they do not demonstrate. In other words, even when there is some agreement on what is a desirable attribute to have, people tweak the definition of these attributes in idiosyncratic ways in order to maintain a positive view of themselves.

One important process that points to this flexibility is self-affirmation (Steele, 1988). According to the theory of self-affirmation, people seek to maintain a positive self image as

having self-integrity and overall adequacy (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993). When a person's positive image is threatened, one can engage in one of many available restorative processes, such as dismissing the threatened aspect of self-image, or biasing perceptions of self-worth in a self-serving manner. Self-affirmation, however, is the process by which the self restores its overall positive image by affirming a self-value that is dissimilar to the threatened aspect. The major goal of the self-affirmation process is not to dissolve the specific threat to a certain self-aspect, but rather to maintain global integrity and self-worth, in other words to re-affirm the threatened self as a whole (Steele, 1988).

In a typical experimental setting, participants' global self-integrity is threatened by such procedures as making them write a counter-attitudinal essay (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983), forcing them into making a less than optimal choice (e.g., Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993), or reminding them the hazards of a risky behavior that they are already engaging in (e.g., Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). This is followed by the affirmation of self-worth. Affirmation procedures also vary, from giving participants some positive personality feedback (Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993) to letting them fill out a value scale concerning a value domain that they deem important (e.g., Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). The results of self-affirmation studies reveal that people do not engage in defensive and restorative processes such as dissonance reduction (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993), or defensive dismissal of risky information (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000) if they have the opportunity to self-affirm.

According to Sherman and Cohen (2006), it is possible for the observed effects of self-affirmation to work to the extent that different aspects of self (which come together to constitute the self-concept) are approximately equally valuable, and the shortcomings in one

area (e.g., not being competent in academics) can be compensated by strength in other equally valued areas (e.g., being true to your ideals). In contrast, one's global self-integrity cannot be restored by affirming a relatively unimportant aspect of the self.

The literature reviewed thus far suggests that for people socialized in honor cultures, honor is a distinct and central aspect of self with unique emotional and cognitive elements as well as behavioral scripts. For people socialized in dignity cultures, however, one's honor is just one aspect of the global self-concept, not as distinct or specialized as the honor construct in honor cultures. Therefore, it can be stipulated that perceived attacks on one's honor would not have different consequences than perceived attacks on any other self-aspect that is not related to honor for members of dignity cultures. Affirmation of such an unrelated aspect of the self could protect people from dignity cultures from experiencing the negative consequences of an honor insult. For members of an honor culture, in contrast, affirmation of an unrelated aspect of the self would not be enough to re-instill a sense of honor and prevent shame after an insult to their honor. For members of honor cultures, honor and self-esteem are distinct indications of perceived self-worth. Competence and academic success for instance, does not have a strong influence on one’s perceived honor; however, it would definitely increase one’s self-esteem. In other words, it would be possible for someone raised in a culture of honor to feel very honorable without having high levels of self-esteem, and to feel dishonored without losing self-esteem. The present research will shed light on this distinction, by examining the differential effects of honor and self-affirmation.

Honor in Turkish, Latina/o and the North American Cultures

The two honor cultures that are the focus of the present research are Latin and Turkish cultures. Spanish culture has been the focus of anthropological and ethnographic studies on honor (Caro-Baroja, 1966, 1992; Gilmore, 1987; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). In fact, the previously discussed concept of necessary elements of honor, which is one of the main focuses of the present research, was initially postulated by Pitt-Rivers (1966) based on his observations of the Spanish society. Social psychology studies examining US Latina/o (e.g., Leung & Cohen, 2011, Vandello & Cohen, 2003) and Latin American samples (e.g., Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franjuk, 2009), including Portuguese speaking Brazilian culture (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 2003) reveal that Latino culture at large can be considered part of the Spanish honor culture.

Like many other Mediterranean societies, Turkish culture is also an honor culture. Therefore, honor is expected to be very central to one's sense of self in Turkish culture. Most of the available sociology and psychology literature on Turkish honor focuses on gender differences in the Turkish honor code, female chastity, and honor-related violence (e.g., Akkoc, 2004; Bagli, & Sev'er, 2003; Ozgur, & Sunar, 1982). Although sexuality is one of the central concepts of Turkish honor code, honor in Turkey is a much more complex construct with many different components, such as having high social status and honesty.

In a recent study of Turkish and North American honor prototypes, Cross and her colleagues (Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Sunbay, & Ataca, 2010) were able to identify four dimensions of the honor construct that were comparable in these two cultures (i.e., Turkey, an honor culture, and Midwestern United States, a dignity culture). These four dimensions were obtained in a factor analyses of honor concepts (which were generated by Turkish and

American college students) rated for their centrality by Turkish and American participants. These dimensions were *status and respect* (e.g., one's position in the society), *behavior and character* (e.g., keeping promises, honesty), *convictions and pride* (e.g., not compromising one's own values), and *helping others* (e.g., willingness to sacrifice for other people). In both of these cultures, *behavior and character* was considered to be the most important aspect of having honor.

The prototype analyses of concepts related to dishonor (also generated by Turkish and American college students) revealed fewer similar honor value dimensions across the cultures. The Turkish *dishonor* construct had more dimensions than the American *dishonor* construct, and the factor structures were dissimilar. The most important dimension for both cultures, however, was somehow similar, and it tapped the same construct as the *behavior and character* aspect of having honor (e.g., dishonesty).

As stated before, necessary (core) aspects of honor refer to those attributes the lack of which would jeopardize one's honor. Peripheral aspects, on the hand, are those attributes that can enhance one's honor, but their lack would not necessarily pose a threat to honor. The studies conducted by Cross et al. (2010) suggest that the *behavior and character* dimension is a core aspect of honor for the Turkish culture as it is the most important dimension of both having and not having honor. The other three aspects, namely *status and respect*, c*onvictions and pride*, and *helping others* are peripheral aspects. As the results of this prototype study reveal, it is possible to capture similarities of lay conceptions of honor in an honor culture and a dignity culture, although emotional and behavioral consequences of demonstrating these attributes (or failure to do so) might be very different for the members of these two cultures.

Despite the plethora of research focusing on Spanish and Latin American honor cultures, no previous study has systematically examined core aspects of honor in this specific cultural geography. Two studies that attempted to come up with prototypes of honor concept in the Spanish culture were conducted by Fischer, Manstead, and Rodriguez Mosquera (1999), and by Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer (2002a). These two studies used cultural values of Schwartz (1992) as a starting point. In the first study by Fischer et al. (1999) Spanish participants evaluated several of these values (including the value "honor") in terms of their importance in the Spanish culture. According to their results, true friendship, social recognition, humility, helpfulness, respect for parents and the elderly, respect for tradition, and wisdom were positively correlated with honor. In the second study by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) participants were presented with a similar list of values and asked to evaluate how much each attribute would contribute to a person's honor. According to the results of this second study, attributes that would contribute most to a person's honor are altruism, honesty, loyalty, self-achievements, a good reputation, and self-respect.

Two points should be kept in mind while considering these studies. First, honor values in Fischer et al. (1999) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) studies were created by the researchers and then presented to the participants to evaluate. Thus, it is possible that there are elements in Spanish/Latin honor construct that were not captured by these studies. In Cross et al.'s (2010) prototype analyses, however, the honor attributes participants evaluated were created by a separate sample of participants from Turkey and US. Second, it is difficult to determine what aspects of honor are peripheral and aspects are core in the Spanish/Latin honor construct based on Fischer et al. (1999) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al.

(2002a). Nevertheless, based on sociological and anthropological literature cited above, as well as the empirical findings by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a), we can claim that honesty is one of the important elements of honor values of the Latino culture. Therefore, members of the Latin honor culture should not be different than members of the Turkish honor culture in terms their perception of criticism of one's honesty as an honor affront.

Overview of the Present Study

The aim of this study is to compare the effects of honor versus self-affirmation on the level of shame experienced after receiving an honor insult between members of honor cultures and a dignity culture. The honor cultures that will be examined are Turkish and Latino cultures and the dignity culture is the U. S. Midwest. In this study, participants will receive an insult targeting the core aspect of honor (i.e., honesty). Following this, participants will have a chance to engage in either self-affirmation or an honor affirmation in the core aspect of honor. Effects of these affirmation tasks will be compared in terms of their potency in reducing the level of shame.

Ethnographic and anthropological accounts explain in detail honor codes of different honor cultures. According to these accounts, failure to demonstrate different aspects of a given honor code are not equally important in jeopardizing one's honor. However, effects of these different aspects were not systematically examined in psychological studies. For instance, honor offenses used in most experimental studies are general insults that do not target any specific honor value (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996). To our knowledge, the importance of core aspects of honor was not examined in any of these studies. In the current study, the honor offense is created on the basis of previous research on prototypes of the honor

construct in Turkey and America (Cross et al., 2010). This study will be the first to examine the effects of a threat to a core aspect of honor experimentally.

The most common approach in the literature to studying the effects of honor offenses has been to examine people's reactions to hypothetical situations (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b). Some studies utilize autobiographical recollections of previously experienced offensive events (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a; 2008). These studies have the ability to analyze only those events that have been already experienced by the participants. Moreover, these studies have many possible confounds such as the severity of the incidents and the source of the insult. The current design overcomes these problems by specifically attacking one of the core elements of honor in a controlled laboratory environment.

Another important contribution of this research to the existing literature is to potentially demonstrate the effectiveness of re-affirming one's honor by the individual. Previous studies focused on emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving an honor threat (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Fischer et al, 1999, Ijzerman, van Dijk & Gallucci, 2007). However, possible ways of re-instilling honor and thus avoiding the negative emotional consequences of losing honor have not been systematically tested. In this study, participants will go through various affirmation procedures, and their effectiveness in reducing negative emotions (i.e., shame and anger) will be examined.

In this study, participants will receive an honor insult representing the core honor aspect (i.e., honest behavior and character) in the laboratory. Half of participants will go through an honor-affirmation procedure that will give them the opportunity to affirm the insulted aspect of honor. The other half will receive a self-affirmation treatment. Following this, their shame levels will be assessed. Shame constitutes the major dependent variable of

this study. Hypotheses concerning the effect of different types of affirmation on shame are as follows:

Main Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Honor culture participants (i.e., Turkish and Latino) who engage in honor-affirmation in the core honor domain about which they were insulted will experience less shame compared to honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation.

Hypothesis 2. Dignity culture participants (i.e., American) who engage in honor-affirmation and self-affirmation will experience similar amounts of shame.

The main concern of the present study is to analyze the relations between honor and shame, and the potential of honor-affirmation in reducing shame. Yet, anger is one of the most commonly studied consequences of receiving insults in the literature. The effects of an insult on the level of anger participants experience will also be examined, in an effort to complement the findings in the literature. The assumptions of this current study concerning anger are parallel to the assumptions concerning shame.

Several exploratory analyses also will be carried out concerning the participants in the self-affirmation condition. It has been observed in previous self-affirmation research that people engage in dismissal of negative or risky information pertaining to self when they do not have an opportunity to affirm their self-value (Sherman et al., 2000). Based on this observation, and considering the assumption that self-affirmation cannot mend the damage caused by an honor insult for members of honor cultures, it is plausible to expect that Turkish and Latino participants in the self-affirmation condition will try to react to the honor insult with an increased dismissal of the insult, as well as a higher endorsement of the honor values. The hypotheses concerning these peripheral assumptions are as follows:

Secondary Hypotheses

Hypothesis 3. Honor culture participants who receive honor-affirmation in the core honor domain about which they were insulted will experience less anger compared to honor culture participants who receive self-affirmation.

Hypothesis 4. Dignity culture participants who receive honor-affirmation and self-affirmation will experience similar amounts of anger.

Hypothesis 5. Honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition will demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult compared to honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition. No such difference is expected in the dignity culture sample.

Hypothesis 6. Honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition will demonstrate higher levels of reactive honor endorsement in the core honor aspect compared to honor culture participants in the honor-affirmation condition. No such difference is expected in the dignity culture sample.

CHAPTER 2: METHOD

Overview

In this study, the effects of honor affirmation and self-affirmation on level of shame following an honor attack were compared across dignity and honor cultures. Participants in each culture were randomly assigned to honor-affirmation or self-affirmation conditions. Baseline levels of shame and other emotions were assessed in an initial session. All participants received a standard honor attack at the beginning of a second session followed by the affirmation. Post-test levels of emotions were assessed after the affirmation task.

Participants

Dignity culture of interest in the current study was North American culture. One criterion for participating was to identify oneself as Euro-American. The initial sample consisted of 68 dignity culture and 63 honor culture members (34 Latina/o and 29 Turkish participants). American participants were recruited from Iowa State University (ISU) psychology participant pool, and they received partial course credit for their participation. Latina/o and Turkish participants were contacted through the ISU multicultural student organizations (i.e., Argentinean-Uruguayan-Chilenean Students Association, Latinoamericanos, Latina/o Graduate Student Association, Latino Heritage Committee, Mexican-American Young Achievers Society, Puerta-Rican Students Association, and Turkish Student Association). A snowballing technique was used to contact honor culture participants who were not members of the aforementioned organizations. Latina/o and Turkish students received monetary compensation of $15 for their participation.

In the dignity culture sample, eight participants (6% of the overall sample) did not complete the second session of the study, and 3 participants (2% of the overall sample) were eliminated due to suspicion. The final dignity culture sample consisted of 57 participants, 33 of whom were female. In the honor culture sample, 3 (2% of the overall sample) participants did not complete the second session of the study and one participant (less than 1% of the overall sample) was eliminated from the sample due to suspicion. The final honor culture sample consisted of 59 participants, 34 of whom were female. Mean age of the dignity culture sample was 19.88 (SD = 1.92) and the mean age of the honor culture sample was 24.03 (SD = 4.81). An independent samples t-test revealed that the difference was statistically significant, t (77) = -6.15, p<.001, d=1.14. Levene's test indicated unequal variances (F=36.25, p <.001), therefore degrees of freedom were adjusted from 114 to 77.

In the dignity culture sample, all participants identified their country of origin as the United States of America, and their first language as English. In the honor culture sample, 12 participants identified their country of origin as the USA, 22 participants as Turkey, 4 participants as both the USA and Turkey, 10 participants as Mexico, 6 participants as Puerto Rico, and 2 participants as Columbia. There were one participant from Chile, Equador, and Portugal, each. In this honor culture sample, the most frequently indicated first language was Spanish with 29 participants, followed by Turkish with 22 participants. 3 participants indicated that their first language was Kurdish, and 2 participants identified themselves as English-Turkish bilinguals. English and Portuguese were indicated as the first language of one participant, each.

Measures and Instruments

Session 1

Measures in the first session are listed below. Turkish participants completed all the measures in Turkish and North American and Latina/o participants completed the measures in English. Except for Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale and Scott's (1965) personal values scale, all scales were used with Turkish samples in previous studies, and available Turkish versions were used. For the purposes of the current study, the state self-esteem scale and personal values scale were translated into Turkish and backtranslated into English by two bilinguals who were fluent in both English and in Turkish. Questionnaires that appeared in the first session are presented in Appendix A.

Demographic information form. Participants responded to a demographic information form which included several questions about gender, age, SES, ethnicity and language. The demographic information form also included questions designed to measure the level of acculturation of the honor culture participants (Appendix A).

Acculturation. Questions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the demographic information form was used to measure acculturation level of honor culture participants. These questions were, "How often do you speak English when you are with your friends?", "What percentage of your friends are Euro-Americans?", " How much do you read, listen to, and watch English (in books, in newspapers, in music, on TV, on the web, in the movies, etc.)?", "How often do you write in English?", "How often do you think in English?" and "Please indicate when you came to USA. Participants responded to questions 10 through 14 on nine point scales ranging from 1 to 9. Question 15 was open ended. Answers to this question were converted into a nine point scale in the following manner: Participants received the score "1" if they

stayed one year or less in the United States. Any participant who stayed in the United States more than one and less than two years received a score of "2". In this way, maximum number of years spent by each participant was converted into a matching likert score up until seven years (e.g., a score of "6" for six years, a score of "7" for seven years). Participants who spent more than seven and less than fifteen years in the US received a score of "8." Finally, participants who spent more than fifteen years in the US (including those participants who spent their entire life in the US) received a score of "9."

Reliability analyses revealed that these six items had Cronbach's alpha of .72 for the honor culture sample. Average of these six items was calculated to obtain a numerical representation of acculturation level of honor culture participants. Higher scores indicate greater levels of acculturation to the North American culture. Comparing Turkish and Latina/o participants revealed that the Latina/o sample scored significantly higher on this acculturation measure (M= 6.69, SD=1.17) compared to the Turkish sample (M= 5.01, SD=1.59), $t(57) = 4.68$, $p<.001$. Although Turkish participants were older (M= 26.22, SD=3.61) than the Latina/o participants (M= 22.32, SD=5.14), $t(56) = 3.30$, $p<.01$, Latina/o participants (M= 14.32, SD=9.99) spend more years in the US than the Turkish participants (M= 3.48, SD=3.98) in USA, $t(40)=5.56$, $p<.001$. Levene's test indicated unequal variances (F=29.09, p <.001), therefore degrees of freedom were adjusted from 56 to 40. The Turkish sample's lower acculturation to the North American culture is probably due to having spent less time in USA.

Self-esteem. Participants' trait self-esteem was measured with Rosenberg's self-esteem scale (1965). Participants' state self-esteem was measured with Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES).

Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale (SES). SES (1965) is a self-report measure of global self-esteem, consisting of ten items such as "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself." (Appendix A) It is one of the most widely used measures of global self-esteem in social psychology research. Although it has been recently proposed that SES reflects multiple components (see Tafarodi, & Milne, 2002; Tafarodi, & Swann, 1995), the scale has generally been treated as a unidimensional measure. In previous studies, SES was found to have comparable reliability levels in American and Turkish samples (Cronbach's alphas of .88 and .88 for American and Turkish samples, respectively; Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Sunbay, Ataca, 2010).

Participants rated each item on how much each statement reflects their feelings on a seven point scale ranging from *1 (strongly disagree)* to *7 (strongly agree)*. Cronbach's alphas for the dignity and the honor culture samples in the first session of this study are .87 and .82, respectively. In the second session, Cronbach's alphas are .89 and .86, for the dignity and honor cultures, respectively.

Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES). SSES (1991) is a twenty item self-report measure of self-esteem with three subscales: Performance, social and appearance (Appendix A). In their initial validation study, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) reported internal consistency of .92 for the overall scale.

Participants rated each of the 20 items of the questionnaire on how much each statement reflects their current feelings on a five point scale ranging from *1 (not at all)* to 5 *(extremely)*. Cronbach's alphas of the overall measure in the first and second sessions were .92 and .91 for the dignity sample, and .89 and .86 for the honor sample. In the first session,

Cronbach's alphas for the three subscales varied between .77 and .89 across the two cultures. In the second session, Cronbach's alphas for the three subscales varied between .75 and .85.

Personal Values Scale. In order to discover important self-aspects of the participants that are unrelated to honor, the intellectualism, physical development, and creativity subscales of Scott's (1965) personal values scale was used. Participants' highest ranking self-value was used as the topic of writing task in the self-affirmation condition. Scotts' (1965) original values inventory is composed of 12 subscales of intellectualism, kindness, social skills, loyalty, academic achievement, physical development, status, honesty, religiousness, self-control, creativity, and independence. Only intellectualism, physical development, and creativity subscales were used in this study, because the other nine subscales of Scott's (1965) inventory tap constructs that are similar to honor prototypes of Turkish and American cultures obtained by Cross et al. (2010). For participants who are in the self-affirmation condition, their most highly rated value among the three (their score in the first session) was used as the topic of the self-affirmation manipulation.

According to the results of Scott's (1965) validation studies, reliabilities of the Personal Values Scale subscales range between .80 (honesty) and .89 (physical development). The intellectualism, physical development, and creativity subscales are composed of 21, 20, and 22 items, respectively. In the original studies Scott (1965) asked his participants to indicate whether or not each item was desirable for other people to have by selecting one of three options: "always dislike", "depends on situation", and "always admire". Only "always admire" responses ("always dislike" responses for the reversed items) were scored. Thus, the total score of each subscale was the number of items that received a response of "always admire".

In order to create consistency between honor and personal value scales, participants in this study were asked to indicate the desirability of having the attributes described in each item on a 7 point Likert scale from *1(not desirable at all)* to 7 *(extremely desirable).* (Appendix A). Cronbach's alphas of the intellectualism, physical development and creativity subscales for the dignity and the honor culture samples in the first session of this study were .90, .89 and .89 for the dignity sample, and .88, .86 and .86 for the honor sample. Similarly, in the second session, Cronbach's alphas for the three subscales varied between .85 and .90 across the two cultures.

Reactive Honor Endorsement. The behavioral and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Questionnaire was used to measure reactive honor endorsement of participants. Reactive honor endorsement was defined as the increase of the score on this measure from first to the second session.

The honor values questionnaire was developed on the basis of the prototype analyses of honor concepts by Cross et al. (2010). In order to elucidate lay conceptions of honor in Turkey and America, Cross and her colleagues asked participants to generate descriptions of what it means to be a person with honor and what it means to be a person without honor. These open ended responses were categorized by bilingual coders into unique concepts (e.g., doing good things), separately for honor and dishonor items. In a second study, a total of 118 unique concepts of honor, and a total of 60 unique concepts of dishonor were rated by a different sample of Turkish and American participants in terms of each concept's importance for the definition of honor on a 7 point scale ranging from *1 (not important at all)* to *7 (extremely important).*

Exploratory factor analyses revealed four aspects of honor that are comparable in the two cultures, with items with similar loadings for the two cultures. The first aspect, *status and respect,* is represented by 16 items (e.g., one's position in the society). The second aspect, *behavior and character*, is represented by 11 items (e.g., keeping promises). The third aspect, *convictions and pride*, is represented by 13 items (e.g., not compromising one's own values), and finally, the fourth aspect, *helping others* is represented by 6 items (e.g., willingness to sacrifice for other people)

Exploratory factor analyses of dishonor items revealed very different factor structures for the two cultures. One factor that was comparable in the two cultures produced 18 items with similar loadings for the two cultures. The items of this factor tap the same underlying aspect of honor as the *behavior and character* factor that was obtained in the honor aspects. Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alpha for these honor factors that were obtained in Cross et. al.'s (2010) initial studies are provided in Table 1.

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alpha of the Perceived Importance for the Factors of Honor in Cross et al. (2010)

	USA			TR		
Factor	Mean	SD	Cronbach's alpha	Mean	SD	Cronbach's alpha
Status and Respect	4.37	.59	.94	3.87	.40	.94
Behavior and Character	5.67	.60	.85	5.91	.48	.87
Convictions and Pride	5.27	.29	.89	4.87	.49	.87
Helping Others	5.68	.26	.81	4.81	.27	.89
Dishonor	5.59	.26	.97	5.94	.47	.95

Participants in the current study rated these 46 honor and 18 dishonor items on how much the attribute or behavior represented in each item is desirable for them to demonstrate

in their daily life on a 7 point scale ranging from *1 (not desirable for me at all)* to *7 (extremely desirable for me)* (Appendix A). Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for the Turkish and the Latina/o samples are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for the first and second sessions, respectively. Cronbach's alphas for the combined honor sample and the dignity sample in the first and second sessions of this study are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

Shame and anger. Participants' implicit shame was measured with the Implicit Association Task and the facial emotion perception task. The facial emotion perception task was also used to assess other honor related emotions: Anger, pride, disgust and anxiety.

Implicit Association Test. Participants' shame was measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a computerized reaction time test intended to measure the strength of learned associations between two concepts. The underlying assumption of the IAT is that sorting well associated concepts together is easier than sorting poorly associated concepts together. Since its introduction, the IAT has been used to research a range of topics such as aggression (e.g., Uhlmann & Swanson, 2004), attitude-behavior consistency (Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001), and self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).

In a typical session, participants categorize stimuli into different groups and computer key mappings are changed so that the two related concepts are sometimes indicated with the same key, and sometimes with a different key. Faster reaction times when two concepts are mapped to the same key indicate a stronger association between those concepts.

Table 2

Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

	Turkish Culture			Latina/o Culture			Mean Difference
	N =27		Cronbach's	N=32		Cronbach's	
	Mean	SD	alpha	Mean	SD	alpha	t-value
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	5.74	.97	.86	5.59	.86	.79	-.66
2. Self-esteem (State)	4.11	.43	.86	3.65	.60	.88	-3.27*
3. Perform (SSES)	4.12	.59	.74	3.78	.68	.79	-2.01
4. Social (SSES)	4.49	.45	.74	3.65	.75	.78	-5.11*
5. Appearance (SSES)	3.65	.54	.70	3.51	.84	.86	-.76
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	6.57	.50	.90	6.12	.70	.90	-2.79
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	5.20	.85	.93	5.47	.86	.91	1.21
8. Helping Others (Honor)	6.08	.58	.89	5.98	.86	.90	-.52
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	6.33	.52	.88	6.16	.49	.83	-1.30
10. Dishonor (Honor)	6.58	.44	.91	6.24	.61	.91	-2.48
11. Physical Development (Personal)	5.57	.64	.90	5.85	.63	.88	1.70
12. Creativity (Personal)	5.27	.68	.87	5.04	.72	.86	-1.27
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	5.83	.66	.89	5.47	.72	.86	-1.96
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	2.56	.78	.75	2.93	.66	.56	1.92
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	2.25	.81	.62	3.19	.90	.55	4.19*
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	2.41	.96	.67	2.41	1.02	.75	.01
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	3.35	.96	.62	3.32	1.10	.68	-.08
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	1.92	.64	.59	2.85	1.06	.63	4.02*
19. IAT	-.46	.41		-.32	.36		1.54
20. Acculturation	5.01	1.59	.79	6.69	1.17	.51	4 .68*

Table 2 Continued

Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

Note:
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Impilicit Association Task; Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale.
*p<.0025

Table 3

Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable in Session 2 for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

	Turkish Culture			Latina/o Culture			Mean Difference
	N =26		Cronbach's	N=32		Cronbach's	
	Mean	SD	alpha	Mean	SD	alpha	t-value
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	5.84	.87	.89	5.43	.94	.86	-1.72
2. Self-esteem (State)	4.18	.37	.83	3.69	.54	.84	-3.95*
3. Perform (SSES)	4.21	.47	.66	3.76	.63	.75	-3.01
4. Social (SSES)	4.51	.44	.75	3.80	.64	.66	-4.75*
5. Appearance (SSES)	3.76	.49	.63	3.48	.85	.83	-1.51
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	6.51	.51	.96	6.32	.56	.89	-1.41
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	5.61	.70	.92	5.47	.66	.87	-.77
8. Helping Others (Honor)	6.17	.57	.94	6.09	.72	.88	-.46
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	6.35	.44	.91	6.25	.61	.93	-.70
10. Dishonor (Honor)	6.69	.39	.93	6.34	.49	.90	-2.95
11. Physical Development (Personal)	5.55	.69	.91	5.84	.63	.88	1.70
12. Creativity (Personal)	5.24	.77	.93	5.03	.74	.87	-1.06
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	5.83	.70	.93	5.61	.79	.91	-1.15
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	2.28	.96	.72	3.01	.76	.62	1.05
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	2.28	.67	.69	3.27	.98	.70	3.86*
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	2.34	.95	.59	2.49	.97	.67	.57
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	3.30	.78	.51	3.43	1.12	.76	.51
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	1.90	.81	.74	2.87	1.17	.76	3.58*
19. IAT	-.51	.39		-.37	.33		1.51
20. Defensive Dismissal	4.62	1.61	.89	3.96	1.16	.74	-1.80

Table 3 Continued

Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable in Session 2 for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

Note:

Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback

*p<.002

Table 4

Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

	Dignity Culture			Honor Culture			Mean Difference
	N =57		Cronbach's	N=59		Cronbach's	
	Mean	SD	alpha	Mean	SD	alpha	t-value
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	5.71	.87	.87	5.66	.91	.82	.33
2. Self-esteem (State)	3.79	.68	.92	3.86	.57	.89	-.64
3. Perform (SSES)	3.96	.69	.85	3.93	.66	.77	.18
4. Social (SSES)	3.85	.86	.89	4.03	.75	.83	-1.21
5. Appearance (SSES)	3.51	.92	.89	3.57	.72	.80	-.40
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	6.29	.74	.92	6.32	.65	.90	-.30
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	5.08	1.06	.94	5.34	.86	.92	-1.45
8. Helping Others (Honor)	6.01	.68	.80	6.03	.74	.89	-.08
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	6.29	.58	.91	6.23	.51	.84	.54
10. Dishonor (Honor)	6.16	.55	.88	6.39	.56	.91	-2.24
11. Physical Development (Personal)	6.10	.59	.90	5.72	.64	.88	3.28*
12. Creativity (Personal)	4.98	.73	.89	5.15	.70	.86	-1.21
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	5.49	.68	.89	5.63	.71	.86	-1.08
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	3.12	.71	.71	2.76	.74	.66	2.67
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	3.22	.93	.71	2.76	.98	.65	2.59
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	1.82	.62	.56	2.41	.98	.69	-3.83*
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	3.53	1.02	.74	3.33	1.03	.65	1.03
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	2.99	.92	.69	2.42	1.00	.66	3.16*
19. IAT	-.46	.54		-.39	.39		-.74

Table 4 Continued

Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

Note:

Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Impilicit Association Task.

*p<.0026

Table 5

Session 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

	Dignity Culture			Honor Culture			Mean Difference
	N =57		Cronbach's	N=58		Cronbach's	
	Mean	SD	alpha	Mean	SD	alpha	t-value
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	5.71	.87	.89	5.61	.92	.86	.58
2. Self-esteem (State)	3.97	.60	.91	3.91	.52	.86	.56
3. Perform (SSES)	4.12	.66	.82	3.96	.60	.75	1.33
4. Social (SSES)	4.04	.74	.85	4.12	.66	.76	-.60
5. Appearance (SSES)	3.71	.78	.84	3.61	.72	.78	.75
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	6.42	.49	.84	6.40	.54	.91	.16
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	5.23	.90	.94	5.53	.68	.87	-2.05
8. Helping Others (Honor)	6.02	.75	.84	6.13	.65	.89	-.81
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	6.30	.60	.91	6.30	.54	.91	.11
10. Dishonor (Honor)	6.41	.56	.91	6.50	.48	.89	.97
11. Physical Development (Personal)	6.09	.57	.89	5.71	.67	.88	3.27*
12. Creativity (Personal)	4.99	.66	.85	5.13	.76	.89	-1.05
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	5.61	.65	.87	5.71	.75	.90	-.74
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	3.10	.65	.50	2.92	.72	.68	1.41
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	3.22	.90	.69	2.82	1.08	.74	2.13
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	1.73	.64	.71	2.42	.96	.64	-4.51*
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	3.44	.97	.67	3.37	.98	.67	.39
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	2.97	.96	.72	2.44	1.13	.78	2.76
19. IAT	-.44	.39		-.43	.37		-.19
20. Defensive Dismissal	4.83	1.32	.82	4.25	1.40	.84	2.28

Table 5 Continued

Session 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with Group Comparisons

Note:

Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback.

*p<.0025

During the first block, participants learned target concept discrimination. The target concepts that the participants discriminated was “Self” and “Other.” Self-related words that appeared on the computer screen were: *ME, MINE, WE, OUR, MYSELF* (*BEN, BENÍM, BÍZ, BÍZÍM, KENDÍM,* in the Turkish version). Other related words that appeared on the computer screen were: *OTHERS, THEM, THEIRS, HIS, HE*. (*BAŞKALARI, ONLAR, ONLARIN, ONUN, O,* in the Turkish version). The “L” key was associated with “Other” related words, and “A” key was associated with “Self” related words. The first trial block included 20 trials in which each self and other-related word appeared twice in random order.

During the second block, participants learned attribute discrimination. Attribute categories that were discriminated were “Shame” versus “Pride”. Shame related words that appeared on the computer screen were: *SHAME, EMBARASSMENT, DISGRACE, DISREPUTE, HUMILIATION* (*UTANÇ, MAHÇUBÍYET, REZÍLLÍK, KEPAZELÍK, AŞAĞILANMAK* in the Turkish version). Pride related words that appeared on the computer screen were: *PRIDE, DIGNITY, RESPECT, PRAISE, ESTEEM* (*GURUR, HAYSÍYET, SAYGI, ÖVGÜ, ÍTÍBAR,* in the Turkish version). The “L” key was associated with “Shame” related words, and “A” key was associated with “Pride” related words. The second trial block included 20 trials in which each shame and pride related word appeared twice in random order.

During the third block, the tasks from the first two blocks were combined so that “L” key was associated with other and shame words, and the “A” key was associated with self and pride words. The third block included 20 trials in which each self, other, shame and pride related word appeared once in a random order. The fourth block consisted of 40 critical trials. These use the same stimuli and key mappings as the trials in block three. In the fifth block

participants categorized pride and shame words, but the key mappings was reversed, such that “L” key was associated with pride, and the “A” key was associated with shame. The fifth block consisted of 20 trials. Block six combined the new pride and shame mappings with self and other, such that the “L” key corresponded to other and pride, and the “A” key was associated with self and shame. During this block participants completed 20 trials in which each self, other, shame and pride related word appeared once in random order. Block seven was the second critical block, and used the same words and mappings as block six in 40 trials.

Half of the participants received a version of this task with the self and other mapping reversed such that self always corresponded to “L” key and other always corresponded to “A” key (thus reversing the order of the self-pride and self-shame critical blocks).

Implicit shame was computed based on the strength of the association between self and shame. For the computation, the algorithm proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) was used. In the current sample, there were no participants for which more than 10% of trials had latencies less than 300 milliseconds (extremely fast). Therefore, no participant's IAT data had to be eliminated. As a first step, trials with latencies of greater than 10.000 milliseconds were eliminated. Then, mean of correct latencies were computed for each block, and pooled standard deviations were calculated for blocks 3 and 6, and blocks 4 and 7 respectively. Following this, error latencies were replaced with block means plus 600 milliseconds. New block means were computed after this replacement. Mean differences between blocks 6 and 3, and blocks 7 and 4 were divided by their corresponding pooled standard deviance, and these two quotients were averaged. This resulting number, which can be described as a standardized difference between shame trials in self-pride blocks and

shame trials in self-shame blocks, was used for analysis. Higher scores indicate higher implicit shame.

Facial emotions perception task. Implicit shame and anger experienced as a result of receiving an insult was also measured by a modified version of an anger projection task used by Ijzerman et al. (2007). We also used this task to measure implicit disgust, pride and anxiety. In this projective test, perceived intensity of a facial expression implies accessibility of that specific emotion.

Participants viewed five different black and white photos of faces representing emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and a neutral expression, as well as three morphed pictures representing dominance, submissiveness, and neutrality, taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Set (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998). Participants rated the extent to which each image depicted five emotions (anger, shame, pride, anxiety, and disgust) on a 5-point scale ranging from *1 (not at all strong)*, to *7 (very strong)*. The average anger rating for the eight faces was used as the measure of implicit anger. For the measure of implicit shame, one of the faces (i.e., face depicting disgust) reduced reliability of the overall shame measure. Therefore, as the measure of implicit shame, the average shame rating of seven faces was used. Although there were no specific hypotheses concerning pride, anxiety and disgust, these were included as exploratory measures of possible honor-related emotions. Score of implicit disgust was obtained by averaging disgust rating of all eight faces. In order to increase low reliabilities, average ratings of seven and six faces were used for calculating anxiety and pride scores, respectively. Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for the Turkish and the Latina/o samples are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for the first and second sessions, respectively. Cronbach’s alphas for the combined honor sample and the

dignity sample in the first and second sessions of this study are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

Bogus information processing task. In order to prevent fatigue from responding to lengthy questionnaires and to increase the plausibility of the cover story that influence of personality on socio-cognitive perception is examined, participants received a computerized bogus task during each session. In each task participants received the same set of 20 words, 10 of which appeared on the right side of the computer monitor, and 10 of which appeared at the left side of the computer monitor. These words were APPLE, RED, PRECISION, TIME, EFFICIENCY, ORDER, ANGER, SHAME, BEAUTIFUL, CALM, EMBARASSED, SNOOZE, PRIDE, MINUTE, BLUE, FOUR, FACE, QUICK, PINK, and SPEED. The task was presented as a cognitive-speed test and participants were asked to press "L" key for each word that appears at the right side, and "A" key for each word that appears at the left side.

Session 2

In the second session, participants received the honor insult first, followed by the affirmation task. Following this, they completed all the measures from the first session. Finally, they completed the final evaluation form. Materials that appeared only in the second session are presented in Appendix B.

Honor insult. Participants received bogus feedback on three made-up dimensions of social information processing, personality, and values with fabricated statistical data (Appendix B). They received slightly positive feedback on the dimension of social information processing, *perception and cognitive speed,* and neutral feedback on one of the made-up dimension of personality and values, *globalism and uncertainty avoidance*. Feedback on the third dimension, *insight and psychological control,* included negative

information about the core aspect of honor, and it constituted the honor insult in this study. It implied that they were dishonest and untrustworthy individuals. Their extremely low score on this dimension was flagged in red. In order to make sure they paid attention to the insult, they received a written explanation only on their lowest ranked dimension, *insight and psychological control.* Also, they were told that they would have a chance to talk to a psychometrics expert at the end of the study and to ask her questions about their performance.

Honor-affirmation and self-affirmation. All honor affirmation manipulations consisted of an essay writing task. The essay writing affirmation method used in this study is based on a modified version of the procedure employed by Fein and Spencer (1997). In Fein and Spencer's (1997) study participants indicated their most important value on a value scale, and then wrote several paragraphs explaining the importance of this value.

In the current study, participants in the honor-affirmation condition were instructed to write about the *behavior and character* aspect of honor, which corresponds to the honor insult they received. More specifically, they were asked to write a paragraph describing an incident in which they behaved in an honest, trustworthy and just way and to elaborate on the importance of these characteristics. Participants in the self-affirmation condition were instructed to write a similar paragraph, this time about a domain that was captured by their highest ranked personal value subscale (i.e., intellectualism, physical development, or creativity) based on their first session scores (Appendix B).

Final evaluation form. To assess the defensive dismissal of the insult, and to see whether or not the manipulation (honor insult) was effective, participants were presented with a short feedback form at the end of the second session. This form included several filler

items, manipulation check questions, and items that were designed to assess defensive dismissal of the initial feedback (Appendix B).

Manipulation check. Four open-ended manipulation check questions assessed how much of the negative feedback participants remembered. Two of these questions asked participants to name the dimension of personality that they scored highest and lowest on. The other two questions asked participants to report their percentile ranking on their lowest and highest dimensions as accurately as they could remember. Examination of the responses revealed that forty-seven participants either correctly reported the dimension label, namely, "insight/psychological control", or, provided a description of it such as "being not honest and being manipulative of others." Twenty-seven participants correctly indicated that it was the second personality dimension on the feedback form, but did not indicate the name or the description of the dimension. Of these twenty-seven, fourteen reported their correct percentile, seven reported a lower percentile score than the correct standing (17), and five reported a higher percentile score. Forty-two participants either indicated that they did not remember the dimension name, or a general description that was not interpretable such as "my personality and values," or did not provide a written response. Of these forty-two, twenty-six reported their correct percentile, nine reported a lower percentile score than the correct standing (17), and seven reported a higher percentile score.

To determine whether or not inaccurate responses indicated a lack of understanding the negative feedback, debriefing interview forms were examined. Experimenters took extensive notes during the interviews designed to probe for suspicion before the oral debriefing (Appendix B). Examination of these forms revealed that all participants understood that they received very negative personality feedback, which indicated that they

had a low standing among their peers. Therefore, no participants were eliminated on the basis of the manipulation check.

Defensive dismissal of the insult. The final four questions (questions 7, 8, 9, 10, Appendix B) of the final evaluation form were designed to assess defensive dismissal of the feedback. These questions were "How helpful was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?", "How accurate was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session in terms of reflecting your characteristics?", "How much do you agree with the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?"and "Would you consider taking into account the feedback you received for self-improvement purposes?" Participants rated these items on 7-point scales (e.g., *1*=not helpful at all, *7*=extremely helpful for question 7 and *1*=completely disagree, *7*=completely agree). Reliability analyses revealed that these four items had Cronbach's alpha of .82 and .84 for dignity and honor culture samples, respectively. Higher scores on these items indicated willingness to take the feedback into account. Therefore, each of these items was reverse-scored and the average was calculated to obtain a numerical representation of defensive dismissal of the initial feedback. Higher scores on this scale indicate greater levels of dismissal.

Procedure

Participants attended the study individually in two separate sessions that were approximately one week apart. Participants were told that the aim of the study was to develop a new values and personality inventory that could provide valid comparisons across Latino/a, Turkish and North American cultures. They were informed that personality variables

influence socio-cognitive perception and behavior in important ways, and although the influence of these variables on socio-cognitive perception within each culture is well understood, cross-cultural comparisons are more difficult in the sense that similar personality or cognitive styles might have different consequences in cultural contexts.

During the first session, participants filled out a computerized battery of questionnaires using MediaLab® in two different orders. In both of these orders, the first two questionnaires that they responded to were the demographic information questionnaire and Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale. These two questionnaires were followed by the facial emotion recognition task and the implicit association task. After this, the participants completed the state self-esteem scale of Heatherton and Polivy (1991). Four subscales of the honor values questionnaire, the dishonor questionnaire and three subscales of the personal values questionnaire of Scott (1961) were presented in the last half of the session in two different orders. A filler questionnaire and a bogus cognitive speed task were embedded between these questionnaires. The procedure took less than 40 minutes. At the end of the first session, the participants were told that the battery would be scored by a system developed by expert personality psychologists, and they would receive feedback during their next session which would reflect their personality compared to people from their own culture.

At the beginning of the second session, participants were reminded briefly of the aim and the importance of the study. Participants were also reminded that they were promised feedback on their personality scores. The experimenter left the cubicle to print their scores and brought back the bogus feedback form that had the participants' own participation number on it, along with a blank piece of paper. Participants received bogus negative feedback on their personality about the core aspect of honor, which implied that they were

dishonest and untrustworthy. This constituted the honor insult in this study. The feedback form they received explicitly indicated that detailed explanation is provided only for scores below the 50th percentile, and for statistical data and explanations for all three dimensions, they should consult another document. This bogus statistical report for the population was readily available in the laboratory for participants who would like to see the extra explanations. No participant requested to see it.

In order to prevent participants from arguing with the experimenter, they were told that they had only a couple of minutes to read their scores before the study started, and that they could discuss their results with the experimenter at the end of the session. The blank paper was provided so that they could write down their questions or concerns about their score for later discussion. After 2 minutes, the experimenter returned to the cubicle of the participant to start the procedure.

Just as in the first session, participants completed the second session measures using MediaLab®. The first questionnaire that they responded to was a short version of the demographic information questionnaire. Following this, participants completed the affirmation task. The affirmation task involved writing a paragraph using the instructions that the experimenter brought in a sealed envelope. The affirmation task was followed by the facial emotion recognition task and implicit association task. After these two tasks were completed, participants completed the state self-esteem scale of Heatherton and Polivy (1991), Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale, the four subscales of the honor values questionnaire, the dishonor questionnaire and three subscales of the personal values questionnaire of Scott (1961). As was the case in the first session, a filler questionnaire and a bogus cognitive speed task were embedded among these questionnaires. At the very end,

participants completed the study feedback form, which included questions about how accurate they found the personality feedback they received. This procedure took approximately 60 minutes. After they completed all the measures, participants were probed for suspicion and extensively debriefed.

CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses

Comparisons of Latina/o versus Turkish Samples

We first examined the baseline means and standard deviations of each variable assessed in the first session for Turkish and Latina/o cultures and compared the groups (Table 2). We conducted independent samples *t* tests for each of these variables, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0025 per test (.05/20). As presented in Table 2, five of these comparisons were statistically significant. The Turkish sample scored significantly higher on overall state self-esteem scale and social subscale of state self-esteem scale compared to Latina/o sample. There were also significant cultural differences on two of the five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. On baseline levels of implicit disgust and shame, the Turkish sample scored significantly lower than Latina/o sample. Finally, the Turkish sample scored significantly lower than the Latina/o sample on acculturation. As mentioned in the method section, Latina/o participants spent more years in the US compared to the Turkish participants in USA. Most of the participants in the Turkish sample were international students who came to study in the US. The Latina/o sample, however, was more heterogeneous in the sense that it included not only Latino Americans who were born in the US or migrated early in their life, but also international students who came to US recently. This probably explains the Turkish sample's lower acculturation to the North American culture.

Means and standard deviations of each variable for the Turkish and Latina/o samples assessed in the second session with group comparisons are presented in Table 3. Independent samples *t* tests were conducted for each of these variables, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha

levels of .0025 per test (.05/20). As presented in Table 3, four of these comparisons were statistically significant. The Turkish sample scored significantly higher on overall state self-esteem scale and the social subscale of state self-esteem compared to the Latina/o sample. There were also significant cultural differences on two of the five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. On implicit disgust and shame, the Turkish sample scored significantly lower than the Latina/o sample.

Comparisons of Dignity and Honor Groups

The scores for the Turkish and the Latina/o samples were combined to create the honor culture group. Baseline means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's alphas of each variable assessed in the first session for the dignity and the honor samples are presented in Table 4. Independent samples *t* tests were conducted for each of these variables, comparing the baseline levels across two cultural groups, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0026 per test (.05/19). Three of these comparisons were statistically significant. On the physical Development subscale of the personal values scale, the dignity sample scored significantly higher than the honor sample. There were also significant cultural differences on two of the five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. On baseline levels of implicit anxiety, the honor sample scored significantly higher than the dignity sample. On baseline levels of implicit shame, however, the honor sample scored significantly lower than the dignity sample.

Means and standard deviations of each variable assessed in the second session for the dignity and the honor culture groups are presented in Table 5. Independent samples *t* tests were conducted for each of these variables, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0025 per test (.05/20). Two of these comparisons were statistically significant. On the physical

Development subscale of the personal values scale, the dignity sample scored significantly higher than the honor sample. There was also a significant cultural difference on one of the five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. The honorsample scored significantly higher than the dignity sample on implicit anxiety.

Bivariate correlations of all variables for the honor and dignity samples in session 1 and in session 2 are presented in Table 6 and in Table 7, respectively

Table 6

Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Self-esteem (Trait)		.64***	.52***	.54***	.54***	.22	.14	.19	.46**	.07
2. Self-esteem (State)	.54***		.80***	.90***	.79***	.05	-.08	.20	.29*	.07
3. Perform (SSES)	.55***	.85***		.66***	.40**	.25†	.06	.30*	.33*	.22
4. Social (SSES)	.27*	.83***	.58***		.56***	-.04	-.24†	.09	.18	.13
5. Appearance (SSES)	.52***	.74***	.50***	.37**		-.04	-.02	.13	.24†	-.17
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	.22†	.21	.17	.27*	.05		.27*	.61***	.57***	.47***
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	.15	-.22†	-.24†	-.23†	-.06	.14		.39**	.41**	-.09
8. Helping Others (Honor)	.13	-.00	-.14	.08	.04	.55**	.24†		.53***	.32*
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	.24†	.12	.05	.14	.10	.47**	.27*	.30*		.25†
10. Dishonor (Honor)	.16	.20	.14	.36**	-.05	.74**	.04	.54**	.33*	
11. Physical Development (Personal)	.51***	.15	.19	.01	.19	.16	.28*	.03	.36**	.06
12. Creativity (Personal)	.40**	.54***	.50***	.41**	.40**	.27*	-.24†	.09	.27*	.37**
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	.41**	.38**	.37**	.36**	.18	.26*	-.12	.11	.40**	.41**
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	.03	-.15	-.11	-.28*	.04	-.02	.27*	-.04	.06	-.09
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	-.06	-.28*	-.28*	-.29*	.08	-.17	.29*	-.12	-.01	-.30*
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	.07	-.03	-.05	-.12	.12	-.06	.06	-.04	.04	-.05
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	.10	.08	.10	.02	.07	-.03	.13	-.25†	.06	-.13
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	-.10	-.34**	-.26*	-.45**	-.07	-.23†	.21	-.20	-.04	-.20
19. IAT	-.02	-.24†	-.17	-.26*	-.14	-.10	-.02	-.03	.01	-.03
20. Acculturation	-.05	-.24†	-.17	-.28*	-.12	-.31*	.19	-.09	-.15	-.34**

Table 6 Continued.

Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	.05	.03	-.10	-.22	-.09	.12	.06	.12	-.16	a
2. Self-esteem (State)	.03	.21	-.06	-.19	-.08	.08	.08	-.05	-.11	a
3. Perform (SSE)	.20	.11	.08	-.20	-.11	.14	.04	-.08	-.17	a
4. Social (SSE)	-.09	.26†	-.02	-.30*	-.25†	-.01	-.09	-.13	-.06	a
5. Appearance (SSE)	-.01	.15	-.19	.04	.18	.09	.26†	.10	-.06	a
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	.17	-.21	-.03	.30*	.25†	.19	.28*	.28*	-.02	a
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	.25†	-.27*	-.05	.30*	.44***	.06	.36**	.28*	-.04	a
8. Helping Others (Honor)	.18	-.04	.09	.23†	.23†	.11	.28*	.29*	-.07	a
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	.19	.01	.05	.16	.30*	.10	.31*	.14	-.21	a
10. Dishonor (Honor)	.12	.18	.33*	.01	.04	.18	.05	.14	.18	a
11. Physical Development (Personal)		.06	.33*	.07	.28*	.27*	.45**	.13	-.15	a
12. Creativity (Personal)	.38**		.52***	-.16	.01	.23†	.10	.00	.12	a
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	.51***	.74***		-.10	.02	.27*	.08	-.09	.09	a
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	-.09	-.17	-.30*		.66***	.19	.44***	.75***	.11	a
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	.06	-.31*	-.35**	.56***		.24	.71***	.63***	-.07	a
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	-.19	-.04	-.18	.63***	.35**		.50***	.16	.19	a
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	-.06	-.09	-.17	.59***	.43**	.48***		.52***	-.05	a
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	-.13	-.25†	-.42**	.64***	.62***	.51***	.38**		.14	a
19. IAT	-.19	-.08	-.25†	.24†	.01	.17	.03	.20		
20. Acculturation	.08	-.15	-.10	.16	.33*	-.19	-.06	.09	.03	

Table 6 Continued

Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

Note:

Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Implicit Association Task; Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale.

a. Not computed because "Acculturation" is constant.

$^{\dagger}p<.1$, $*p<.05$; $**p<.01$, $***p<.001$

Table 7

Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Self-esteem (Trait)		.75***	.61***	.61***	.65***	.13	.03	.23†	.32*	.13
2. Self-esteem (State)	.65***		.84***	.89***	.78***	-.04	.01	.11	.30*	.01
3. Perform (SSES)	.69***	.83***		.67***	.43***	.00	-.01	.16	.36**	.04
4. Social (SSES)	.36**	.79***	.49***		.53***	-.02	-.04	-.05	.14	.07
5. Appearance (SSES)	.52***	.78***	.51***	.38**		-.08	.08	.19	.27*	-.11
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	.43***	.20	.26†	.19	.04		.13	.41**	.38**	.63***
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	.37**	.07	.25†	-.03	-.04	.32*		.30*	.44***	.13
8. Helping Others (Honor)	.34**	.21	.25†	.15	.11	.57***	.44***		.52***	.34**
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	.55***	.16	.29*	.10	.01	.61***	.42**	.52***		.19
10. Dishonor (Honor)	.39**	.27*	.28*	.35**	.01	.67***	.09	.52***	.49***	
11. Physical Development (Personal)	.44***	-.03	.12	-.24†	.07	.26*	.21	.26*	.37**	.07
12. Creativity (Personal)	.51***	.49***	.49***	.31*	.39**	.44***	-.04	.29*	.47***	.33*
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	.56***	.37**	.41**	.21	.28*	.58***	.06	.45***	.54***	.47***
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	.09	-.14	.02	-.22†	-.13	.03	.30*	-.20	.16	-.12
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	-.06	-.34**	-.32*	-.29*	-.20	-.14	.25†	-.22	-.02	-.33*
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	.09	.00	.09	-.15	.08	-.20	.10	-.12	-.07	-.10
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	.08	-.06	-.08	.02	-.10	-.07	.22	-.20	.01	-.19
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	-.04	-.32*	-.23†	-.33*	-.22	-.11	.14	-.29*	-.06	-.24†
19. IAT	-.09	-.06	.05	-.05	-.15	-.16	-.06	.15	-.17	-.14
20. Defensive Dismissal	-.09	-.29*	-.23†	-.30*	-.16	-.14	-.04	-.32*	-.15	.20
21. Acculturation	.12	-.35**	-.34**	-.22†	-.26*	-.12	-.12	.03	-.08	-.27*

Table 7 Continued

Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	.13	.18	.14	-.00	-.05	-.10	.10	-.03	.06	-.27*
2. Self-esteem (State)	.11	.29*	.03	.05	.05	.05	.20	.06	.59	-.15
3. Perform (SSE)	.30*	.28*	.22†	-.02	-.01	.10	.19	-.03	-.10	-.21
4. Social (SSE)	.05	.25†	-.02	.00	-.04	-.05	.11	.04	.05	-.10
5. Appearance (SSE)	-.06	.19	-.13	.14	.17	.08	.22†	.14	.20	-.08
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	.19	-.02	.22†	.08	.01	-.14	.08	.09	.19	-.20
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	.46***	-.00	.18	.44***	.33**	.12	.41**	.40**	.01	.16
8. Helping Others (Honor)	.25†	.17	.46***	.33*	.31*	.06	.33*	.30*	.14	-.21
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	.42**	.27*	.28*	.30*	.28*	-.02	.39**	.27*	.05	.04
10. Dishonor (Honor)	.06	-.06	.21	.01	-.12	-.21	-.03	-.02	.27*	-.37**
11. Physical Development (Personal)		.28*	.50***	.38**	.33*	-.00	.41**	.23†	-.36**	.08
12. Creativity (Personal)	.33*		.53***	.15	.02	.09	.09	.05	-.10	.18
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	.50***	.76***		.14	.01	.07	.09	-.02	-.11	-.06
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	-.02	-.12	-.10		.64***	.01	.60***	.75***	.03	.38**
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	.07	-.35**	-.35**	.65***		.17	.74***	.64***	-.15	.40**
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	-.06	-.08	-.12	.52***	.37**		.21	.15	.10	.12
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	-.01	-.28*	-.22	.57***	.68***	.31*		.66***	-.21	.23†
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	.01	-.28*	-.30*	.72***	.75***	.41**	.60***		.04	.34*
19. IAT	-.02	-.22	-.08	-.01	-.02	.17	-.01	.07		.01
20. Defensive Dismissal	-.10	-.26†	-.27*	.31*	.29*	.25†	.15	.40**	-.11	
21. Acculturation	.12	-.16	-.15	-.18	.45***	.00	.13	.26*	-.06	.11

Table 7 Continued

Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

	21.
1. Self-esteem (Trait)	a
2. Self-esteem (State)	a
3. Perform (SSE)	a
4. Social (SSE)	a
5. Appearance (SSE)	a
6. Behavior and Character (Honor)	a
7. Status and Respect (Honor)	a.
8. Helping Others (Honor)	a
9. Convictions and Pride (Honor)	a
10. Dishonor (Honor)	a
11. Physical Development (Personal)	a
12. Creativity (Personal)	a
13. Intellectualism (Personal)	a
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)	a
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task)	a
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)	a
17. Pride (Face Perception Task)	a
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)	a
19. IAT	a
20. Defensive Dismissal	a
21. Acculturation	

Table 7 Continued

Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal are for the Honor Sample

Note:

Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback, Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale.

a. Not computed because "Acculturation" is constant.

$^{\dagger}p<.1$, $*p<.05$; $**p<.01$, $***p<.001$

Results Concerning the Main Hypothesis

We predicted that honor culture participants who engage in honor-affirmation in the core honor domain about which they were insulted will experience less shame compared to honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation. Dignity culture participants who engage in honor-affirmation and self-affirmation will experience similar amounts of shame. Shame was measured in two ways: First, with the implicit association test and second, with the facial emotions recognition task. This hypothesis was tested for both of these measures separately.

In order to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders differed on shame as a function of affirmation, two separate 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVAs with the baseline score for each corresponding measure as covariate were carried out. Three way interactions were not significant for either of the shame measures (IAT and facial emotions perception task).[1] Therefore, scores of the two honor samples were collapsed for the main analyses and gender was not controlled. For each test a hierarchical regression analysis was performed controlling for baseline levels of shame (time 1 score of the corresponding measure) and age of the participant. The reason we included age as a control variable is the significant age difference between the honor and dignity sample.

Shame Measured with IAT

In order to examine the effects of culture and affirmation interaction, a three-step hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. In the first step implicit shame was regressed on the control variables (age and baseline shame measured in session 1 with IAT). This analysis revealed that control variables were not significantly related to implicit shame. In the

second step, culture and affirmation were added. As seen in Table 8, none of the predictors made a unique, significant contribution to the prediction of implicit shame. Finally, the third step which included the interaction term did not improve the results. Means estimated after controlling for age and baseline shame are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Mean Shame Scores Measured with IAT for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=116)



Note.
Mean IAT score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline shame: -.42, age: 21.99

Table 8

Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Shame as Assessed by IAT (N=116)

	Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
				.02				.01				.00
Baseline Shame	.10	.08	.12		.10	.08	.12		.09	.08	.12	
Age	-.00	.01	-.02		-.00	.01	-.03		-.00	.01	-.03	
Culture					.02	.08	.02		.06	.11	.08	
Affirmation					-.05	.07	-.06		-.00	.10	-.01	
Culture X Affirmation									-.09	.14	-.10	
R^2	.02				.02				.02			
F	.89				.55				.51			

Note.

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

Shame Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task

Similar to the previous analyses, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to test the effects of culture and affirmation interaction. In the first step, implicit shame (measured with facial emotions perception task) was regressed on the control variables. As seen in Table 9, session 1 shame made a unique significant contribution to the explanation of shame in the second session. Higher baseline levels of implicit shame predicted higher implicit shame after the manipulation. In the second step, culture and affirmation were added to the model. The linear combination of the predictors was significantly related to implicit shame; however, neither culture nor affirmation made contributions to the explanation of shame. Finally, the interaction term was added to the model. The interaction term was not significant. These analyses did not support our hypotheses which predicted an interaction of culture and affirmation. Means estimated after controlling for age and baseline shame are presented in Figure 2.

Table 9

Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Shame as Assessed by Facial Emotions Perception Task (N=115)

	Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
				.57***				.00				.00
Baseline Shame	.79	.07	.74***		.79	.07	.74***		.79	.07	.74***	
Age	-.02	.02	-.07		-.02	.02	-.06		-.02	.02	-.06	
Culture					-.03	.16	-.02		-.06	.20	-.03	
Affirmation					-.06	.13	-.03		-.10	.19	-.04	
Culture X Affirmation									.07	.27	.03	
R^2	.57				.58				.58			
F	75.47***				37.20***				29.52***			

Note.

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

****p*<.001

Figure 2
Mean Shame Scores Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT) for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=115)



Note.
Mean shame score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline shame: 2.71, age: 21.97

Results Concerning the Secondary Hypotheses

We had several secondary hypotheses concerning outcomes other than shame. First, we predicted that the honor participants who receive honor-affirmation would experience less anger compared to their counterparts who receive self-affirmation. No such difference was expected for the dignity sample between honor-affirmation and self-affirmation groups (Hypotheses 3 & 4). We also predicted that honor participants in the self-affirmation condition would demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult (Hypothesis 5) and higher levels of reactive honor endorsement (Hypothesis 6) compared to honor participants in the self-affirmation condition. Again, no such difference was expected for the dignity sample.

To test for these hypotheses, we followed a plan of analyses that was very similar to the analysis of the main hypothesis. For each test, we first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVAs to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders differed on each dependent variable as a function of affirmation. Then, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses controlling for baseline levels of each specific measure and age of the participants.

Anger

As stated earlier, we expected honor participants who receive honor-affirmation to experience less anger compared to honor participants who receive self-affirmation. Dignity culture participants who receive honor-affirmation and self-affirmation were expected to experience similar amounts of anger (Hypotheses 3 & 4).

In order to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders differed on anger as a function of affirmation, we first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with anger (measured with facial emotions perception task) as the dependent variable. The three-way interaction was not significant.[2] Therefore, scores of the two honor samples were collapsed for the main analysis and gender was not controlled.

We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis in which the implicit anger was regressed on the control variables (baseline anger assessed in session1 and age) as the first step. As seen in Table 10, baseline anger made a unique significant contribution to the explanation of second session implicit anger, such that greater implicit anger at the first session predicted greater implicit anger in the second session. In the second step culture and

affirmation and in the third step the interaction term was added to the model. Neither the main effects of culture and affirmation, nor the interaction term reached significance. Means estimated after controlling for age and baseline anger are presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3
Mean Anger Scores Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT) for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=113)



Note.
Mean anger score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline anger: 2.93, age: 22.03

Table 10

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Anger Assessed with Facial Emotions Perception Task (N=113)

	Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
				.39***				.00				.01
Baseline Anger	.56	.07	.61***		.58	.07	.62***		.57	.07	.62***	
Age	-.01	.01	-.07		-.02	.01	-.10		-.02	.01	-.10	
Culture					-.09	.12	-.07		.12	.15	.09	
Affirmation					.04	.10	.03		.08	.15	.06	
Culture X Affirmation									-.06	.21	-.04	
R^2	.39				.39				.39			
F	35.56***				17.78***				14.12***			

Note.

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

****p*<.001

Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult

We predicted that honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition would demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult compared to honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition. No such difference was expected in the dignity culture sample (Hypothesis 5). Defensive dismissal of the honor insult was calculated by averaging the scores of the last four questions of the final evaluation form. These questions asked how helpful and accurate the feedback was, to what degree the participants agreed with the personality feedback, and whether or not participants would consider taking the feedback into account for self-improvement purposes. Higher scores indicate higher endorsement of the feedback. Therefore, the scores were reversed before the dismissal score was obtained. Thus, higher scores indicate higher levels of dismissal.

We first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with anger (measured with facial emotions perception task) as the dependent variable. The three-way interaction was not significant.[3] Therefore, scores of the two honor samples were collapsed for the main analysis and gender was not controlled. Because defensive dismissal was measured only in the second session, the only control variable was age.

In the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis, age did not make a unique significant contribution to the explanation of defensive dismissal. As seen in Table 11, culture made a unique significant contribution to the prediction of dismissal, such that being a member of the dignity culture predicted higher levels of defensive dismissal of the honor insult. In the final step, the interaction term was marginally significant.

Table 11

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult (N=112)

	Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
				.00				.08**				.03†
Age	.01	.03	.03		.06	.04	.16		.05	.04	.16	
Culture					-.77	.28	-.28**		-1.22	.37	-.45**	
Affirmation					-.39	.25	-.14		-.85	.35	-.31*	
Culture X Affirmation									.94	.49	.30†	
R^2	.00				.08				.11			
F	.11				3.31*				3.44*			

Note.

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

†*p*<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01

To examine whether or not the marginal interaction was in the hypothesized direction, we conducted simple slope analyses for the within culture comparison conditions. The results revealed that, participants in the dignity sample dismissed the honor insult more after honor-affirmation compared to self-affirmation, $b_{dignity\ culture}$ = .87, $t(54)=2.58$, $p=.013$. Contrary to the hypothesis, for the honor sample the slope of affirmation was not significantly different than 0, $b_{honor\ culture}=-.09$, $t(52)=.-24$, $p=.809$. These simple slope analyses did not support our hypotheses. Means estimated after controlling for age are presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4
Mean Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=112)



Note.
Mean dismissal is evaluated at age: 21.71

Reactive Honor Endorsement

We predicted that the honor sample in the self-affirmation condition would demonstrate higher levels of reactive honor endorsement in the core honor aspect compared to honor sample in the honor-affirmation condition. No such difference was expected in the dignity sample. Reactive honor endorsement is defined as the increase in score of behavior and character subscale (Core subscale) of the honor values scale from session 1 to session 2.

First, we conducted a 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with core honor endorsement as the dependent variable. Baseline levels of core honor endorsement and age of participants were controlled. As displayed in Table 12, controlling for baseline honor endorsement and age, main effect of affirmation was significant such that participants in the self-affirmation condition had higher honor endorsement scores (M=6.52) compared to participants in the honor-affirmation condition (M=6.30). Also, affirmation by culture and affirmation by gender interactions were statistically significant.

Table 12
Summary of ANCOVA Results for Reactive Honor Endorsement (N=115)

	df_1	df_2	F	partial η^2	p
Core1	1	101	47.93	.32	.00
Age	1	101	.24	.00	.63
Culture	2	101	.11	.00	.90
Gender	1	101	.09	.00	.76
Affirmation	1	101	7.34	.07	.01
Affirmation X Gender	1	101	5.17	.05	.03
Affirmation X Culture	2	101	6.13	.11	.00
Culture X Gender	2	101	2.54	.05	.08
Culture X Gender X Affirmation	2	101	.06	.00	.94

Note.
Core1 = Session 1 endorsement of core honor values

In order to examine the nature of culture by affirmation interaction, we conducted three separate simple slopes analyses. For the dignity sample, the slope of affirmation was not significantly different than 0, $b_{dignity\ sample}$ =.07, $t(52)$=.71, p=.479. The Latina/o honor sample experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to honor-affirmation condition, $b_{Latina/o\ sample}$=-.60, $t(27)$=-4.39, p=.000. For the Turkish honor sample, the slope of affirmation was not significantly different than 0, $b_{Turkish\ sample}$ =.-04, $t(21)$=-.214, p=.833. Means are presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5
Mean Reactive Honor Endorsement for the Dignity, Latina/o Honor and Turkish Honor Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=115)



Note.
Mean reactive honor endorsement is evaluated at the following values: Baseline endorsement of core honor values: 6.31 and age: 21.97

This analysis partially supported our interaction hypothesis by showing that Latina/o participants engaged in reactive endorsement of the core honor value more in the self-affirmation condition than in honor-affirmation condition. However, our honor sample is not

composed of only Latino participants, and Turkish participants did not show the same hypothesized effect. However, the direction of the effect (negative betas) was similar in both Latina/o and Turkish samples. Turkish participants had a very slight and non-significant tendency to score higher on reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition than in honor-affirmation condition. In other words, Turkish sample did not show an opposite pattern to the Latina/o sample. Therefore, we combined the two honor cultures and repeated the simple slope analysis for the honor sample. Participants in the combined honor sample experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to honor-affirmation condition, $b_{honor\ sample}$=-.34, t(27)=-2.87, p=.006.

Following this, we examined the gender by affirmation interaction by conducting two separate simple slopes analyses. Male participants experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to honor-affirmation condition, b_{male}=-.37, t(42)=-3.14, p=.003. For female participants, the slope of affirmation was not significantly different than 0, b_{female} =.02, t(61)=.15, p=.884. Means are presented in Figure 6. Because neither culture by gender interaction nor the three-way interaction was significant, we did not further examine gender differences.

Figure 6
Mean Reactive Honor Endorsement for Male and Females across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=115)



Note.
Mean reactive honor endorsement is evaluated at the following values: Baseline endorsement of core honor values: 6.31 age: 21.97

Exploratory Analyses

Emotions Related to Honor

Although we did not have any specific predictions concerning how self versus honor affirmation would affect the emotions of participants other than shame and anger after an honor insult, we measured anxiety, disgust and pride levels in sessions 1 and 2 with the facial emotions perception task. It is plausible that some of these implicit emotion scores would be affected by the culture of the participants, the kind of affirmation they engage in, or the interaction of the two.

In order to explore these possibilities, three separate hierarchical regression analyses was carried out for each of these emotions (i.e., anxiety, disgust and pride) as outcomes. In

all of these analyses, the outcome emotion was first regressed on its baseline level (session 1 score), gender, and age as control variables. The variables of interest, culture and affirmation was entered into the model in the second step. And finally, the interaction term was added.

As displayed in Table 13, baseline levels of each emotion made significant contributions to the explanation of Session 2 levels. Culture made a unique, significant contribution to the explanation of anxiety, such that being a member of the honor culture was associated with higher implicit anxiety. For pride and disgust, the main effect of culture was not significant. In none of these three models, was the culture by affirmation interaction significant.

Table 13

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Implicit Anxiety, Disgust and Pride (N=115)

		Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Outcome	Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
Anxiety					.61***				.03*				.00
	Baseline Anxiety	.78	.06	.77***		.74	.06	.73***		.75	.07	.74***	
	Gender	-.11	.11	-.06		-.14	.11	-.08		-.14	.11	-.08	
	Age	-.00	.01	-.01		-.02	.01	-.10		-.02	.01	-.10	
	Culture					.35	.12	.20**		.30	.16	.17†	
	Affirmation					-.09	.10	-.05		-.13	.15	-.08	
	Culture X Affirmation									.09	.21	.05	
	R^2	.61				.64				.64			
	F	56.67***				37.89***				31.32***			
Disgust					.55***				.00				.00
	Baseline Disgust	.69	.07	.67***		.69	.07	.67***		.68	.07	.66***	
	Gender	-.04	.13	-.02		-.04	.13	-.02		-.04	.13	-.02	
	Age	-.04	.02	-.17*		-.05	.02	-.19*		-.05	.02	-.19*	
	Culture					.10	.15	.05		.22	.20	.11	
	Affirmation					-.03	.13	-.01		.15	.19	.07	
	Culture X Affirmation									-.24	.26	-.10	
	R^2	.55				.57				.57			
	F	33.22***				23.49***				20.46***			
Pride					.39***				.01				.00
	Baseline Pride	.58	.07	.62***		.59	.07	.63***		.59	.07	.63***	
	Gender	-.16	.15	-.08		-.17	.15	-.09		-.17	.15	-.09	
	Age	-.02	.02	-.09		-.03	.02	-.14		-.03	.02	-.14	
	Culture					.18	.17	.09		.17	.22	.09	
	Affirmation					-.03	.14	-.02		-.04	.21	-.02	
	Culture X Affirmation									.01	.29	.00	
	R^2	.39				.40				.40			
	F	24.06***				14.56***				12.02***			

Table 13 Continued

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Implicit Anxiety, Disgust and Pride (N=115)

Note.

Gender coded as 0=male and 1=female

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

$^{\dagger}p<.1$, $*p<.05$, $**p<.01$, $***p<.001$

Self-Esteem

Trait self-esteem. We measured self-esteem of participants with Rosenberg's self-esteem scale (1965) in both sessions. Examination of Tables 6 and 7 reveals interesting relationships between trait self-esteem and aspects of the honor constructs. For the honor sample, baseline level of trait self-esteem has marginally significant positive correlations with the behavior and character (core) and convictions and pride aspects of honor. For the dignity sample, however, the baseline level of trait self-esteem is significantly correlated with the convictions and pride aspects of honor (Table 6). In the second session, trait self-esteem is significantly correlated with all of five of the honor aspects in the honor sample. For the dignity sample, however, trait self-esteem is significantly correlated only with the convictions and pride aspects of honor (Table 7).

This pattern suggests that culture of the participants and the kind of affirmation they engage in might influence their second session trait self-esteem in different ways. To examine these possibilities, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis. In the first step, session 2 self-esteem was regressed on baseline self-esteem, gender and age as control variables. In the second step, culture and affirmation and in the third step the interaction term was added. The results revealed that only baseline self-esteem made a unique, significant contribution to the explanation of self-esteem in the second session. Neither the main effects of culture and affirmation, nor the interaction was significant (Table 14).

State Self-Esteem. We measured state self-esteem of participants using Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) State Self-esteem Scale (SSES). SSES has three subscales: Performance, social and appearance self-esteem. To explore changes in subscale scores of SSES, we regressed session 2 scores of each subscale on its corresponding session 1 scores, and saved

the standardized residuals. These three residual scores were used as the outcome variables in a 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 2 (culture: dignity and honor) factorial MANCOVA with age and gender as covariates.

The overall test was significant for the effect of culture (Table 15). Given this pattern, univariate effects of culture were examined. As presented in Table 16, the main effect of culture was significant for performance and appearance subscales of SSES, such that honor culture participants increased their scores on these subscales from the first to the second session more than the dignity culture participants did, irrespective of the affirmation they received.

Table 14

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Trait Self-Esteem (N=115)

	Step 1				Step 2				Step 3			
Predictor	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	R^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	ΔR^2
				.53				.01				.00
Baseline Self-Esteem	.75	.07	.73***		.75	.07	.73***		.75	.07	.73***	
Gender	-.03	.12	-.02		-.02	.12	-.01		-.02	.12	-.01	
Age	.00	.01	.00		.01	.02	.04		.01	.02	.04	
Culture					-.11	.13	-.06		-.12	.18	-.07	
Affirmation					.16	.12	.09		.16	.17	.09	
Culture X Affirmation									.01	.23	.00	
R^2	.53				.55				.55			
F	42.29***				26.06***				21.52***			

Note.

Gender coded as 0=male and 1=female

Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture

Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation

****p<.001*

Table 15

Summary of Results for the Multivariate Effects (N=114)

Effect	Λ	F	df_1	df_2	p	partial η^2
Gender	.99	.49	3	106	.69	.01
Age	.98	.86	3	106	.46	.02
Affirmation	.98	.79	3	106	.50	.02
Culture	.92	2.99	3	106	.03	.08
Affirmation X Culture	.98	.59	3	106	.63	.02

Table 16

Univariate Effects for Culture (N=114)

Effect	MS	F	df_1	df_2	p	partial η^2
Performance Subscale	5.27	5.89	1	108	.02	.05
Social Subscale	.93	1.07	1	108	.30	.01
Appearance Subscale	5.11	5.90	1	108	.02	.05

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

In this study we compared honor-affirmation and self-affirmation in terms of their potency to reduce the negative effects of receiving an honor insult for members of dignity versus honor cultures. These negative effects included negative emotions such as shame, anger and anxiety, and a drop in self-esteem. We were also interested in defensive coping mechanisms after receiving an honor insult. These included dismissal of the insult and reactive endorsement of the honor values in order to avoid the negative emotional consequences by re-instilling a sense of having honor values. The honor cultures that we examined were Turkish and Latino cultures and the dignity culture was the U. S. Midwest.

Emotional Consequences of Honor Insults

Shame

In this study, our main outcome of interest was shame. It is assumed that offenses to honor would elicit shame in people who are subjected to such insults (e.g., Casimir, 2009; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Following this widely held assumption in the literature, we hypothesized that honor culture participants who engage in honor-affirmation would experience less shame compared to honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation. We did not envision such a difference for the dignity sample. We assumed that for members of dignity cultures, honor is not such a distinct construct, but just one component of self-worth, not so different than feelings of self-esteem or competency. Therefore, the negative effects of an honor-insult can be alleviated equally well by self-affirmation and honor-affirmation.

We measured shame in two ways: The Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the facial emotions perception task that we created by adapting a projection task used by Ijzerman et al. (2007). Unfortunately, analyses with none of these measures supported our interaction hypothesis. This can mean three things. First, it might indicate that honor and self-affirmation are equally effective in reducing shame after the honor insult. This can be concluded based on the assumption that the honor insult created shame to begin with. This brings us to the second possibility, that our manipulation was not effective in eliciting shame in participants. And finally, the third possibility is that participants experienced shame but our measures were not appropriate or adequate to capture shame.

Unfortunately, we could not include a control condition where participants did not have the opportunity to engage in any kind of affirmation. The number of available Turkish participants was severely restricted and creating comparable lab environments necessary for carrying out the experiment in other locations was not economically feasible. Therefore, our design allowed us to test only the interaction hypothesis, and it cannot differentiate between the first and the second possibilities. In other words, we cannot truly test whether similar shame levels in two sessions were due to a reduction in shame by both honor and self-affirmation, or due to an ineffective manipulation.

The third possibility is that the measures we used were not valid measures of shame. Since its introduction, the IAT has been frequently used in research examining a variety of constructs such as aggression (e.g., Uhlmann & Swanson, 2004), attitude-behavior consistency (Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001), and self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). In the realm of emotions, Egloff and Schmukle (2002) showed its internal

consistency and predictive validity for assessing anxiety. More recently, it was used to assess shame successfully with a German sample (Rusch et al., 2007). Although IAT's effectiveness in assessing emotions is shown, to our knowledge, there is no study that showed its ability to capture experimentally induced changes in emotions over a short period of time.

The other measure we used to assess shame (as well as anger, anxiety, disgust, and pride) was the facial emotions perception task. This measure was adapted from Ijzerman et al. (2007). Ijzerman et al. (2007) was successful in measuring the anger of participants in an honor threatening situation using a version of this test. However, we used different stimuli (faces depicting several emotions) and aimed to measure a greater number of emotions. We used multiple stimuli (8 to 7 images per emotion) to control for variance in the potency of each image to elicit the emotion in question, and obtained acceptable reliability scores. However, because we did not validate our scale, we cannot eliminate the possibility of inadequate construct validity.

Anger and Other Emotions Related to Honor

Similar to shame, we hypothesized that honor culture participants who engage in honor-affirmation would experience less anger compared to honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation. We did not expect any such difference for the dignity sample. We measured anger with the facial emotions perception task. Unfortunately, the expected interaction effect was not observed.

Although we did not set any specific hypotheses for affirmation's role in affecting anxiety, disgust, or pride, we repeated the analyses for these three emotions for exploratory purposes. Just like the case with shame and anger, we did not obtain any significant interaction effects.

The three possible interpretations of these results described in our discussion of results for shame also holds true for anger, anxiety, disgust and pride. Regrettably, our design does not allow for testing whether honor and self-affirmation were equally effective in reducing these emotions (increasing it in the case of pride), or our manipulation was not effective in eliciting them to begin with.

Defensive Coping Mechanisms

Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult

One of the defensive coping mechanisms that we were interested in was dismissal of the honor insult. In line with our previous hypotheses, we predicted that honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition would demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult compared to honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition. No such difference was expected in the dignity culture sample. Our results did not support this hypothesis. We obtained a marginally significant interaction effect which was not in the expected direction. Participants in the honor culture sample did not differ in their dismissal of the honor insult across the self and honor-affirmation conditions.

Reactive Honor Endorsement

The second defensive coping mechanism that we were interested in was reactive endorsement of the specific honor value that was insulted. When the two honor samples (Latina/o and Turkish) were combined for the analyses, our results showed that honor culture participants experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to the honor-affirmation condition. There were no differences for the dignity culture participants between self and honor-affirmation conditions. At first glance, these

results seems to support our hypothesis by indicating that for members of honor cultures, self-affirmation is not as effective as honor-affirmation in alleviating negative consequences of receiving an honor insult, and thus, defensive mechanisms are present after self-affirmation. For members of a dignity culture, engaging in self-affirmation and honor-affirmation does not make a difference.

However, this pattern was observed only for Latina/o sample. Participants in the Turkish sample did not differ in reactive honor endorsement across self and honor affirmation conditions. This observation was surprising for a couple of reasons. It should be recalled that the current Latina/o sample scored significantly higher on the measure of acculturation to North America compared to the Turkish sample. If anything, this would suggest that Turkish participants would endorse honor values more than the Latina/o participants who are acculturated to a dignity culture. On the other hand, some characteristics of the Turkish sample might provide some insight into this situation. The current Turkish sample was much more homogenous than the Latina/o sample in that they were mostly international graduate students who came to study in US recently. This might imply that they are coming from the least traditional segment of the Turkish society, and that they are embrace Western values more than their peers in their homeland. Latina/o sample, on the other hand, was more heterogeneous in this respect. It included not only international students, but also Latina/o Americans who were born in the US or migrated to this country early in their life. In other words, they would not necessarily be the least traditional members of their cultural group.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the sample sizes of each honor sample were very small (N= 32 for Latina/o sample and N=27 for Turkish sample) compared to the

dignity culture (*N*= 57). Therefore, any results comparing the two honor cultures should be interpreted with caution.

Self-Esteem

All of the aforementioned interaction hypotheses were based upon our general assumption that honor is a distinct and prominent element of self-worth for members of honor cultures, and that it is different than self-esteem. Therefore, mending hurt self-esteem would not help repair hurt honor. For members of the dignity cultures, self-affirmation would work just as well as honor-affirmation, because having a sense of honor is not more important than having self-esteem in determining self-worth.

Supposing that our general assumption (that honor and self-esteem are distinct for honor culture participants) is correct, then, it could be assumed that self-esteem of members of honor cultures would not be affected at all by an honor insult. Self-esteem of members of dignity cultures, on the other hand, would be negatively affected by an honor insult because honor is a component of self-esteem, which is not more important than other components. For these reasons, in our design, we can expect no differences in self-esteem after the affirmation manipulation for both cultures. In the honor sample, post-manipulation self-esteem should not be any different for honor versus self-affirmation conditions because supposedly, it was not affected by the honor insult. Self-esteem of dignity culture participants, on the other hand, should not show a difference between self and honor-affirmation conditions for a very different reason: They would work equally well to repair the hurt self-esteem. In other words, a non-significant culture by honor interaction would be expected; however, the reason for this nonsignificant interaction cannot be discerned without

a no-affirmation control group. Thus, in the case of self-esteem it would not be possible for us to interpret the interaction effect whether or not it was significant.

Nevertheless, we carried out our analyses for exploratory purposes, and we obtained a surprising result. Performance and appearance aspects of state self-esteem scale among honor culture participants were elevated more from the baseline to the post-manipulation sessions compared to dignity culture participants. What is more interesting is the fact that this increase (relative to the dignity sample) is not observed in the social aspect of state self-esteem (theoretically most relevant to honor values), but in the performance and appearance aspects, which should theoretically be unrelated to honor values in honor cultures. However, as mentioned before, it is not possible to draw conclusions without a control group.

Implications

Previous social psychological studies of honor focused on emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving an honor threat (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Fischer et al, 1999; Ijzerman et al. 2007). Before the current study, possible ways of re-instilling honor and thus avoiding the negative emotional consequences of losing honor have not been systematically tested. Even though the current study did not provide support for the hypothesis that honor-affirmation could act against honor offenses and reduce negative emotions, it revealed interesting possibilities about the issue of defensive mechanisms following an offense.

It has been observed in previous self-affirmation research that people engage in dismissal of negative or risky information pertaining to self when they do not have an opportunity to affirm their self-value (Sherman et al., 2000). As far as we are aware, this is

the only study to examine such defensive mechanisms in the context of honor. One important contribution of this research to the existing literature is to experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of honor-affirmation by showing that reactive honor endorsement is much lower after honor-affirmation compare to self-affirmation (at least for one of our honor samples). This point is also in favor of our general assumption that self-esteem and sense of honor are distinct constructs for members of honor cultures.

Limitations and Future Directions

As mentioned before, one big limitation of this study is the lack of a control group that went through the same manipulation without having the opportunity to engage in any kind of affirmation after receiving the honor insult. This lack prevented us from examining the reasons for failure to find significant culture by affirmation interactions. Moreover, it does not allow us to draw meaningful conclusions from many significant cultural differences we observed. For instance, honor culture participants scored lower than the dignity culture participants on defensive dismissal of the insult irrespective of the affirmation they engaged in. We cannot determine whether or not such a difference would still hold true if there was a third group of honor culture participants who did not receive affirmation.

Another important technical limitation was related to the methods of participant recruitment. Due to limited availability of the honor sample participants in psychology participant pool, we had to gather international students by offering them monetary compensation. One could argue that monetary compensation is a stronger incentive than course credit, which would cause the honor sample participants to be more engaged and motivated during the procedure. Another result of not gathering the honor sample from

psychology participant pool was the higher average age of the honor sample participants compared to dignity sample participants. One could argue that endorsement of cultural values increases with age, and therefore any observed difference might be due to age differences of the samples.

On a more conceptual note, in order to more fully explore the relationships between the concepts of self-esteem and honor, future studies should employ more complete designs that not only vary the affirmation condition, but also the type of insult. A design such as the current one can potentially answer the question of whether or not self-affirmation can restore a sense of honor for members of honor culture. However, designs that vary the kind of insult would also be able to demonstrate whether honor-affirmation can restore self-esteem for members of honor culture. In our opinion, it should not. However, only a complete design can truly differentiate the effects of honor and self-esteem on the overall sense of self-worth for members of honor cultures.

Another important issue that future studies can address is the relative importance of core versus peripheral aspects of honor. We assumed *a priori* that core aspects of honor would be more potent in creating a negative impact if insulted, and that an insult to this aspect can be rebuffed only by addressing that aspect directly. For this reason, the honor offense we exposed our participants was in the core domain, and the hypothesis concerning reactive honor endorsement was measured using this domain. Yet, our results also showed that participants engaged in reactive endorsement of a peripheral honor aspect after receiving the insult in the core domain. This opens up important possibilities for future research. An experiment in which the honor insult and the honor affirmation are varied across all honor

aspects would demonstrate whether or not the core aspect of honor is truly irreplaceable and most important of the honor aspects as the anthropology literature suggests.

Conclusions

In honor cultures, retaliation is a duty when one's self or family is insulted. Failure to do so would indicate accepting the insult and admitting that one is not worthy of honor. When the insult is perceived as justified, such as when a female member of the family engages in a pre-marital affair, the consequences would be grave: This female might be killed by her own family members in the name honor, be forced to commit suicide, or be disowned by the family. Willingness of people in honor cultures to take such radical measures point to the fact that consequences of losing honor would be very negative. When one does not have the ability or opportunity to take appropriate action, one would lose social reputation, and experience debilitating emotions such as shame, anger, and anxiety. Returning to the hypothetical siblings we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Ahmet punches one of the guys who verbally insulted his sister, Zeynep, in order to prevent a deep sense of shame that he and his sister would feel. Even though the current study did not provide evidence supporting the idea that honor-affirmation could act against honor offenses by reducing negative emotions, it revealed interesting possibilities about the issue of defensive mechanisms following an offense. It is hoped that future theoretical and applied research will demonstrate the ways in which honor-affirmation can be implemented to prevent honor related aggression in honor cultures.

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ENDNOTES

1. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with IAT as the dependent variable did not reveal a significant three-way interaction of gender by culture by affirmation, $F(2, 103)=.69$, $p=.50$. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, $F(2, 103)=.29$, $p=.75$; $F(2, 103)=.19$, $p=.83$; and $F(1, 103)=.10$, $p=.75$, respectively. Similarly, results of the 2 by 3 by 2 ANCOVA with shame assessed with facial emotions perception task as the dependent variable did not reveal a significant three-way interaction, $F(2, 103)=1.03$, $p=.36$. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, $F(2, 102)=.03$, $p=.97$; $F(2, 102)=2.76$, $p=.07$; and $F(1, 102)=1.30$, $p=.26$, respectively.
2. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with anger (measured with facial emotions perception task) as the dependent variable, and age and Session 1 anger as covariates, did not reveal a significant three-way interaction of gender by culture by affirmation, $F(2, 99)=1.00$, $p=.37$. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, $F(2, 99)=.02$, $p=.98$ $F(2, 99)=2.46$, $p=.09$, $F(1, 101)=.01$, $p=.92$, respectively.
3. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with defensive dismissal score as the dependent variable, and age as the covariate did not reveal a significant three-way interaction of gender by culture by affirmation, $F(2, 99)=2.50$, $p=.09$. Also, two way

interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, $F(2, 99)=2.00$, $p=.14$, $F(2, 99)=1.23$, $p=.30$, $F(1, 101)=1.30$, $p=.26$, respectively.

APPENDIX A: MEASURES USED IN SESSION 1

Demographic Information Form

1. What is your gender?: Female Male

2. What is your age?: _____

3. Please indicate the average income level of your immediate family.

1- $25,000 or less	6 - $65,001 - $75,000
2- $25,001 - $35,000	7- $75,001 - $85,000
3- $35,001 - $45,000	8 - $85,001 - $95,001
4- $45,001 - $55,000	9- $95,001 - $105,000
5- $55,001-$65,000	10- $105,001 and above

4. What is your family's socioeconomic status?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
very poor				middle class				very wealthy

5. How would you characterize your upbringing?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
very rural								very urban

6. What is your country of origin? _____

7. Which of the following best represents your ethnic or cultural background?

1- Caucasian American/White	6 - Native American
2- African American/Black	7- Alaskan Native
3- Latino (a) American/Hispanic	8 - International Student
4- Asian American/Pacific Islander	9- Other. Please specify
5- Multi-racial American	_____

8. In the place provided below, please indicate each place you lived in for more than 6 months. Specify the names of the town/city, and country, and indicate the years of your residence in that place.

For instance:
Town/City: Chicago, State: Illinois, Country: USA, Years: 1987-1999
Town/City: London, State: N/A, Country: England, Years: 1999-2007
Town/City: Ames, State: Iowa, Country: USA, Years: 2007-present

9. What is your first language or mother tongue?

1. English
2. English plus another language (bi-lingual). Please specify_____
3. Other. Please specify _____

10. How often do you speak English when you are with your friends?

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
never								always

11. What percentage of your friends are Euro-Americans?

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
%10 or less				about %50				%90 or more

12. How much do you read, listen to, and watch English (in books, in newspapers, in music, on TV, on the web, in the movies, etc.)?

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
not at all								very much

13. How often do you write in English?

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
not at all								very much

14. How often do you think in English?

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
never								always

15. Please indicate when you came to USA (If you are an international student or a migrant. Otherwise write "N/A") _____

Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (1965)

Next, you will be presented with several statements concerning your feelings about yourself. Please rate each item on how much each statement reflects your feelings on the following seven point scale:

1(strongly disagree)
2(disagree)
3(somewhat disagree)
4(neither agree nor disagree)
5(somewhat agree)
6(agree)
7(strongly agree)

1. I feel that I am a person of worth**,** at least on an equal plane with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times, I think I am no good at all.

Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES)

Now, you will be asked to evaluate several statements in terms of how well each represents your feelings right now. While evaluating these statements, please consider what is true for you at this very moment; NOT what is true for you in general.

1 (not at all)
2 (a little bit)
3 (somewhat)
4 (very much)
5 (extremely)

1. I feel confident about my abilities.
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.
3. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.
4. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.
5. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.
6. I feel that others respect and admire me.
7. I am dissatisfied with my weight.
8. I feel self-conscious.

9. I feel as smart as others.
10. I feel displeased with myself.
11. I feel good about myself.
12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.
13. I am worried about what other people think of me.
14. I feel confident that I understand things.
15. I feel inferior to others at this moment.
16. I feel unattractive.
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.
18. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.
19. I feel like I'm not doing well.
20. I am worried about looking foolish.

Three sub-scale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale

Please evaluate the following statements in terms of how desirable it is for you to have the attribute described in each statement.

1 (not desirable at all)
2 (undesirable)
3 (somewhat undesirable)
4 (neither desirable nor undesirable)
5 (somewhat desirable)
6 (desirable)
7 (extremely desirable)

Intellectualism sub-scale

1. Having a keen interest in international, national, and local affairs.
2. Having a strong intellectual curiosity.
3. Developing an appreciation of the fine arts –music, drama, literature, ballet.
4. Having an active interest in all things scholarly
5. Having cultural interests
6. Striving to gain new knowledge about the world
7. Enjoying books, music, art, philosophy and sciences
8. Keeping abreast of current events
9. Knowing what is good in the world of politics.
10. Keeping up with world news through regular reading or by watching informative programs.
11. Being an intellectual.
12. Having restricted and narrow interests.
13. Having no knowledge of current events.
14. Being interested only in one's work.
15. Having no opinions about the world situation.
16. Knowing only one's specialty.
17. Having little interest in arts, theater, music, and other cultural activities.
18. Being uninterested in national and world affairs.
19. Showing little interest in the final things of life.

20. Ignoring what goes on in the world around one.
21. Reading only things that don't pose any intellectual challenges.

Physical Development sub-scale

1. Being graceful and well coordinated in physical movements.
2. Taking good care of one's physical self, so that one is always healthy.
3. Being good in some form of sport
4. Developing physical strength and agility
5. Developing an attractive body that others will admire
6. Having a good figure or physique.
7. Having good muscular coordination.
8. Being a well-developed, outdoors type who enjoys physical activity.
9. Keeping a good physical shape
10. Exercising regularly.
11. Being physically weak and puny.
12. Being an indoor type, and avoiding outdoor activities.
13. Being poorly proportioned physically
14. Being uninterested in sports
15. Being listless and uninterested in strenuous activity.
16. Being awkward in bearing and walk
17. Being unable to do anything that requires physical effort.
18. Being unskilled in any form of athletics.
19. Ignoring one's own physical condition.
20. Avoiding any form of exercise.

Creativity sub-scale

1. Being able to create beautiful and artistic objects.
2. Developing new and different ways of doing things.
3. Constantly developing new ways of approaching things.
4. Inventing gadgets for the fun of it.
5. Trying out new ideas.
6. Being original in one's thoughts and ways of looking at things.
7. Always looking at new roads to travel.
8. Doing unusual things.
9. Creating unusual works of art.
10. Being an innovator.
11. Creating beautiful things for the enjoyment of other people.
12. Devoting one's entire energy to the development of new theories.
13. Doing routine things all the time.
14. Not having any new ideas.
15. Always doing things in the same way.
16. Enjoying a routine patterned life.
17. Doing things the same way other people do them.
18. Abiding by traditional ways of doing things.
19. Repeating the ideas of others, without any innovation.
20. Working according to a schedule that doesn't vary from day to day..
21. Painting or composing or writing in a traditional style

22. Keeping one's life from changing very much.

Honor Values Scale (Cross et al., 2010)

Please indicate the desirability of having the attributes described in each item using the scale below

1 (not desirable at all)
2 (undesirable)
3 (somewhat undesirable)
4 (neither desirable nor undesirable)
5 (somewhat desirable)
6 (desirable)
7 (extremely desirable)

Behavior and character sub-scale

1. Being just
2. Not cheating
3. Not to cheat on people
4. Keeping promises
5. Not to steal anything
6. Honesty
7. Not to use others for my own benefit
8. Having a clean life
9. To have a good moral character
10. Not telling lies
11. Not being a hypocrite

Convictions and pride sub-scale

1. To have my own principles
2. To apply my own virtues in life
3. Having my own attitude towards life
4. Having my own beliefs
5. Holding myself with dignity
6. Having my own virtues
7. Not to let myself be oppressed by others
8. To feel proud of myself
9. Feeling that I am a person with dignity
10. Being confident
11. Not compromising my own characteristics
12. Being determined
13. The value I give to myself

Helping others sub-scale

1. To be helpful to other people
2. Doing good things for others
3. Being willing to sacrifice
4. To be involved in community work
5. Saving someone

6. Doing something for society

Status and respect sub-scale

1. My position in the society
2. To reach a certain status in the society
3. How much the society values me
4. To be respectable in the society
5. Being admirable
6. Being appreciated
7. Being respected
8. Not to have my own truths to contradict with society's truths
9. To be highly regarded
10. To fit into customs and traditions
11. Social esteem
12. To make others proud
13. To be respected for what I do
14. Being successful
15. Being respected for my achievements
16. Winning an award

Dishonor sub-scale

1. To cheat
2. Dishonesty
3. Violate other people's rights
4. To commit injustice
5. To stab someone in the back
6. Treating others poorly
7. To be untrustworthy
8. To lie
9. To trick other people
10. To slander someone's name
11. Committing fraud
12. To steal
13. To use people
14. Not keeping promises
15. Hypocrisy
16. To be unfair
17. Thinking only of myself
18. Being a freeloader

Filler items

1. Respecting the nature and environment.
2. Keeping my books and study materials organized.
3. Being able to take benefit of new technological developments.
4. Having enough sleep.
5. Being efficient in multitasking.
6. Being able to manage my time effectively.
7. Not procrastinating.

8. Following traffic rules.
9. Completing tasks fast.
10. Completing tasks precisely

Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The IAT is a computerized reaction time test. First, five words related to the category of self, and five words related to the category of other appeared on the computer monitor. One of two different keys (A and L) of the keyboard was associated with only one of the categories. Participants were asked to press the correct key for each word that randomly appears on the monitor.

Second, a separate set of five words related to the category of shame, and five words related to the category of pride appeared on the computer monitor. Again, one of two different keys (A and L) of the keyboard were associated with only one of the categories. Participants were asked to press the correct key for each word that randomly appears on the monitor. After this, these two tasks were combined in four different versions: 1. Self and shame category words associated with the same key. 2. Other and pride category words associated with the same key. 3. Self and pride category words associated with the same key 4. Other and shame category words associated with the same key.

List of words in the “self” category: ME, MINE, WE, OUR, MYSELF
List of words in the “other” category: OTHERS, THEM, THEIRS, HIS, HE
List of words in the “shame” category: SHAME, EMBARASSMENT, DISGRACE, DISREPUTE, HUMILIATION
List of words in the “pride” category: PRIDE, DIGNITY, RESPECT, PRAISE, ESTEEM.

Example Screen-Shot of the Computer Monitor (Instructions for Block 6):



Facial Emotions Perception Task

Pictures Used As Stimuli

Instructions and Example Item

Next, you will be presented with several pictures of people. Indicate the extent to which each of the following five emotions (anger, shame, pride, anxiety, disgust) are depicted in each picture.

Example 1:

SHAME

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Not at all Strong **Very Strong**

Example 2:

ANGER

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Not at all Strong **Very Strong**

Bogus Information Processing Task

A set of 20 words appeared on the computer monitor a random 10 of which appeared on the right side of monitor, and 10 of which appeared at the left side of the monitor. Participants were asked to press a different key for each left and right side words.

The list of stimulus words:
APPLE, RED, PRECISION, TIME, EFFICIENCY, ORDER, ANGER, SHAME, BEAUTIFUL, CALM, EMBARRASSED, SNOOZE, PRIDE, MINUTE, BLUE, FOUR, FACE, QUICK, PINK, SPEED.

Example Screen-Shot of the Computer Monitor (Instructions):



APPENDIX B: MATERIALS USED IN SESSION 2

Honor Insult

PCSC-Rev.3 (Personality and Context Specific Social-Cognition Inventory --Edition 3 – REVISED)

Feedback form for individual participant

Participant #: 0110

Flags	Dimension	Aspect	Participant Raw Score	Maximum Score Possible	Percentile Rank (Standing in the comparable population)
	Socio-cognitive Information Processing	Perception/Cognitive Speed	44	65	56
!	Personality and Values	Insight/Psychological Control	12	65	17
	Personality and Values	Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance	41	65	51

Percentile ranking refers to the percent of people in the initial validation study who scored lower than the participant.

For feedback purposes, detailed explanation is provided only for scores below average. For statistical data and explanations for all three dimensions, see abridged report version 3.52

Descriptions (only for flagged aspects)

	Aspect 1: Perception/Cognitive Speed
	NA
!	**Aspect 2: Insight/Psychological Control**

A raw score of 36 is average for this subscale. Young adults scoring above the average (especially at or above 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional insight into their feelings and emotions. As a result, they are more likely to be honest towards themselves and towards other people. These positive characteristics are combined with self-control and general social adaptiveness. Below average scores: Young adults who score below 25th percentile are more likely to reflect low levels of psychological control. Low scores point to a tendency to engage in socially harmful or dishonest behavior especially under stress. These behaviors might vary from cheating, abusing other people's resources and even fraud or stealing in extreme cases. Scores below the 20th percentile usually points to a lack of self-insight, where the individual would be prone to engage in defensive mechanisms to rationalize his/her behaviors. Low scorers are advised initially to take small steps towards improving their behavior (e.g., not to ask favors from friends when it would put the friends under stress). Gradually try more complex tasks (e.g., not to lie in order to hide from responsibilities).
Aspect 3: Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance
NA

PCSC-Rev.3 (Personality and Context Specific Social-Cognition Inventory --Edition 3 – REVISED)
Abridged Report –3.52

Scale Characteristics

Dimension	Aspect	Possible Score Range	Mean	α	Kurtosis
Socio-Cognitive Information Processing	Perception/Cognitive Speed	8-65	40	.874	4.379
Personality and Values	Insight/Psychological Control	8-65	36	.821	4.467
Personality and Values	Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance	8-65	38	.896	2.946

Aspect 1: Perception/Cognitive Speed

A raw score of 40 is average for this subscale. The distribution is slightly skewed towards low scores. Young adults scoring above the average (especially at or above the 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional perceptual agility and cognitive speed. As a result, they are more likely to be efficient multitaskers. This positive characteristic contributes to social abilities such as monitoring multiple incoming social stimuli (such as being able to carry out meaningful conversations with more than one person simultaneously). Young adults scoring below the 25th percentile are more likely to experience difficulties under perceptual stress. In other words, information coming from multiple modalities (i.e., visual, auditory, tactile) reduces performance for these people.
Scores below the 10th percentile also point to concentration difficulties accompanied by attention deficits. Low scorers are advised to take several steps towards improving their cognitive and social performance. In the cognitive realm, for instance, they should avoid noise and other unrelated stimuli as much as possible while learning new material. Precision in performance should be preferred to speed. In the social realm, complex social situations might increase the perceptual/social stress, and depressive mood. Structured social interactions should be preferred by these individuals.

Aspect 2: Insight/Psychological Control

A raw score of 36 is average for this subscale. Young adults scoring above the average (especially at or above 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional insight into their feelings and emotions. As a result, they are more likely to be honest towards themselves and towards other people. These positive characteristics are

combined with self-control and general social adaptiveness. Below average groups: Young adults scoring at the bottom 25 percent are more likely to reflect low levels of psychological control. Low scores point to a tendency to engage in socially harmful or dishonest behavior especially under stress. These behaviors might vary from cheating, abusing other people's resources and even fraud or stealing in extreme cases. Scores below the 20th percentile usually points to a lack of self-insight, where the individual would be prone to engage in defensive mechanisms to rationalize his/her behaviors. Low scorers are advised initially to take small steps towards improving their behavior (e.g., not to ask favors from friends when it would put the friends under stress). Gradually try more complex tasks (e.g., not to lie in order to hide from responsibilities).
Aspect 3: Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance
A raw score of 38 is average for this subscale. The distribution is normal within the population of young adults. Young adults scoring above the average demonstrate high levels of uncertainty avoidance. They perform best when the social environment is structured. They prefer consistency in the actions of themselves and social others. They evaluate most social situations (e.g., behavior of others) in a context specific way. Young adults scoring below the average demonstrate low levels of uncertainty avoidance. They perform most efficiently in unstructured social environments; and they evaluate most social situations with global attributions. Adults scoring within one standard deviation of the average do not demonstrate any consistent pattern of preference.

Honor and Self-Affirmation Manipulations

Instructions for Honor-Affirmation Task

Please think about an incident in which you behaved in an honest, trustworthy, and just way even when doing so could hurt you. For example, you didn't deceive a person, behave unfairly, violate someone's trust, or engage in a dishonest act that could benefit you greatly, even though the opportunity presented itself with minimal costs, if any. Why and how did you choose to do the right thing? What did you gain psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen. If you never experienced such a distinct event, think for a moment about the importance of honesty and trust in your life. Try to write down your ideas about the psychological benefits you experienced or hope to gain as a result of following these principles. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task.

Instructions for Self-Affirmation Task

Intellectualism. Think for a moment about the importance of intellectual and political curiosity in your life, or your cultural interests. Think about the activities you enjoy doing, such as reading books, following the news, going to concerts or art festivals. Consider the time you spend on doing these activities, and escape the routines of daily life. How much time do you spend doing such activities? What do you gain intellectually and psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen, describing the satisfaction you experience as a result of your devotion to your intellectual or cultural interests. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task.

Physical Development. Please think for a moment about the importance of physical activity and sports in your life. Think about the activities you enjoy doing, such as being part of a sports team, doing exercise, or enjoying walks out in the nature. How much time do you spend doing such activities? What do you gain physically and psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen, describing the satisfaction you experience as a result of your devotion to your physical development. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task.

Creativity. Think for a moment about the importance of creativity in your life. Think about the activities you enjoy doing, such as creating beautiful and artistic objects, writing in an original style, integrating new and innovative ideas into your scholarly work, or traveling in order to explore different cultures and ways of life. Consider the ways in which these activities help you escape the routines of daily life. What do you gain intellectually and psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen, describing the satisfaction you experience as a result of your devotion to trying out new ideas. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task.

Final Evaluation Form

Thanks a lot for participating in this study. The following questions are prepared with the intention of collecting feedback from our participants in order to improve future study designs. Your feedback is very valuable for us. Please take a minute to complete the questionnaire.

1. Have you ever participated in research before? Yes_____ No_____

2. How polite/respectful was the experimenter?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Extremely rude/ Disrespectful						Extremely polite/ Respectful

3. Were the instructions clear and easy to follow?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very complicated/ Difficult to follow						Very clear/ Easy to follow

4. a. Please think about the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session. What was the dimension of personality on which you received your highest score? _____.

b. Please report your percentile ranking as accurately as you can remember: _____.

5. a. What was the dimension of personality on which you received your lowest score? _____.

b. Please report your percentile ranking as accurately as you can remember: _____.

6. How helpful was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not helpful at all						Extremely helpful

7. How accurate was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session in terms of reflecting your characteristics?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not accurate at all						Extremely accurate

8. How much do you agree with the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Completely disagree						Completely agree

9. Would you consider taking into account the feedback you received for self-improvement purposes?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Definitely

Debriefing Interview Form

Participant # _____ Experimenter _____

1. Do you have any questions about this experiment?

2. Was the experiment clear in its overall purpose?

3. Did all aspects of the procedure make sense? Was anything odd or confusing?

4. Had you heard anything about this study before coming?

5. In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this study?

6. What did you think about the feedback (personal scores) you received at the beginning of this session?

Overall impression of the participant

1 = no suspicion;
2 = were suspicious, but did not explain why; could not specify
3 = clearly saw through the cover story and knew the true purpose of the study.