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Juror Perceptions of Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: The Role of Generic Prejudice and Emotion in Determinations of Guilt

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JUROR PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILES TRANSFERRED TO CRIMINAL COURT: THE ROLE OF GENERIC PREJUDICE AND EMOTION IN DETERMINATIONS OF GUILT

by

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JUROR PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILES TRANSFERRED TO CRIMINAL COURT: THE ROLE OF GENERIC PREJUDICE AND EMOTION IN DETERMINATIONS OF GUILT

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Research examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults has provided mixed results, with some studies providing evidence of bias against juveniles tried as adults, and others finding no evidence of this bias. The present research aimed to clarify this issue by examining the roles of generic prejudice and emotion in jurors' judgments of juveniles tried as adults. Study 1 assessed which stereotypes people associate with juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adults tried in criminal court. Study 2 examined to what extent angry, fearful, sad, and neutral mock jurors used these stereotypes to make judgments of guilt when presented with a juvenile tried as an adult, or an adult charged with the same crime. Results of Study 1 showed that men endorsed some stereotypes to a greater extent for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants, while women did not. In Study 2, mock jurors judged the adult defendant more harshly than they did the juvenile defendant, but only when they experienced anger and sadness, and in some cases fear. Implications of these results and possible future studies are discussed.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was increasing concern about the rising number of violent juvenile offenders in the United States. There was a 50% increase in total juvenile arrests for violent crimes between 1988 and 1994, and the number of juveniles arrested for murder increased 158% between 1985 and 1994 (Penney & Moretti, 2005). Simultaneously, there were media reports of an increase in juvenile "superpredators," juveniles who were thought to be more dangerous and violent than generations of youth before them, and who began committing violent acts at younger ages (Jordan & Myers, 2008). Researchers also projected that an increase in the juvenile population would create an even larger group of violent juvenile predators in the near future (Zimring, 1998; Shook, 2005). Both the increase in juvenile crime and the public's fears about a growing generation of dangerous superpredators led to a number of legislative reforms facilitating the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court in the early 1990s (Jordan & Myers, 2008).

Although the juvenile population did increase as expected, violent crime rates among juveniles actually decreased significantly from 1994 to 2000, reaching a rate nearly as low as it had been in 1980, before the rise in crime (Butts & Travis, 2002). In recent years, juvenile arrests for violent crimes have been at their lowest level since 1988 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Despite this, many of the punitive reforms from the 1990s remain in place. Currently, approximately 200,000 juveniles are tried, sentenced, or incarcerated as adults every year (Campaign for Youth Justice, 2009). This is a substantial increase compared to the approximately 12,000 juveniles transferred to criminal court in 1978 (Hamparian, 1982, as cited in Krisberg, 2005) (note however, that

the population of juveniles has also grown substantially between 1978 and 2009, so increases in the number of juveniles transferred should be interpreted in this context).

There is some evidence showing that when a juvenile is tried as an adult, the mere fact that the juvenile was transferred to criminal court may lead jurors to judge the juvenile more harshly than they would an adult accused of a similar crime (Levine, Williams, Sixt, & Valenti, 2001; Tang & Nunez, 2003; Tang, Nunez, & Bourgeois, 2009). This bias may occur because of generic prejudice against all juveniles who have been transferred to criminal court (Vidmar, 1997; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar, 2003; Wiener, Arnot, Winter, & Redmond, 2006). Generic prejudice is prejudice that is not specific to the defendant or other parties associated with the trial. It is prejudice that involves the "transfer of pre-existing prejudicial attitudes, beliefs, or stereotypes about categories of persons, entities, or events to the trial setting in a legally inappropriate manner" (Vidmar, 2003).

Although some research has demonstrated juror bias against juveniles tried as adults, other research has found that jurors are no more likely to find a juvenile in criminal court guilty than an adult charged with the same crime (Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003; Woody & Walker, in press). If jurors do experience generic prejudice against juveniles tried as adults, why do only some individuals and only some studies show evidence of bias against juvenile defendants in criminal court? A possible explanation for the inconsistent results in this area of research is the emotions that individuals experience when presented with a juvenile being tried as an adult. It may be that specific emotions facilitate generic prejudice against juveniles tried as adults. According to cognitive appraisal theory and the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner

& Keltner, 2000, 2001), specific emotions have distinct effects on judgment and decision making as a function of the cognitive appraisals associated with each emotion. Participants in studies who did display harsher judgment of a juvenile tried as an adult compared to an adult defendant may have been experiencing different emotions than participants who did not demonstrate this bias (i.e., anger compared to fear or sadness).

The research described in this dissertation attempts to explain the inconsistent results of research examining perceptions of juveniles tried as adults by examining the roles of generic prejudice and emotion in mock jurors' judgments of guilt. This dissertation first provides a legal background for juvenile transfer to criminal court by discussing the history and purpose of the juvenile court, and then current law and processes pertaining to juvenile transfer (also called waiver). Next, it introduces generic prejudice as a factor that can influence jurors' decisions about juvenile defendants in criminal court. This dissertation then provides a summary of the current research examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults, and draws on research examining how specific emotions influence decision making to propose that the experience of certain emotions facilitates generic prejudice toward juveniles tried as adults. Two separate studies tested this proposal. Study 1 examined whether individuals endorse negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults, compared to adult defendants. Study 2 used the results of study 1 to construct a stereotyping measure to examine whether mock jurors would use stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults to make verdict decisions. Study 2 also manipulated emotion and measured pretrial bias to examine whether the experience of certain emotions influenced

participants' use of stereotypes and pre-existing biases to make verdict decisions for a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant.

CHAPTER 2: History of the Juvenile Court

The Juvenile Court Act of 1899 established the United States' first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois. By 1925, all but two states had established specialized courts for children (Snyder & Sickmund, 2005). The focus of the juvenile court was on the welfare of the child, and its main goal was rehabilitation; there was an emphasis on assessment and reform rather than the determination of guilt and punishment as in criminal courts (Snyder & Sickmund, 2005). The juvenile court system was individualistic, with social workers conducting investigations of the child's background, and assisting judges by making recommendations for individual rehabilitative treatment plans (Ullman, 2000). Juvenile offenders were not subject to the formalities of criminal court, including the protections of due process. Instead, juvenile court proceedings were informal and flexible (Slaten, 2003). Despite this orientation toward rehabilitation, the juvenile court was still able to transfer serious juvenile offenders to adult criminal court (Slaten, 2003). At first this rarely occurred, but by the end of the 1920s an increasing number of judges were waiving older and especially violent juveniles to criminal court (Slaten, 2003).

When the juvenile court system began, the presumption was that constitutional rights such as due process were not applicable to juveniles. Critics soon began to argue however, that the juvenile court system was unconstitutional as it became more apparent that the adjudication of juveniles often resulted in outcomes very similar to criminal sentences, and as juveniles began to claim that the informal nature of the proceedings

violated their constitutional rights (Ullman, 2000). *Kent v. United States* (1966) was one of several cases in the 1960s that addressed these constitutional challenges. In *Kent*, the Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile court must conduct a formal hearing with representation on the motion of waiver before transferring a juvenile to criminal court, and that a juvenile's attorney should have access to all records involved in the waiver. The ruling also stated that the juvenile court must provide a written statement of the reasons for waiver (*Kent*, 1966, pp. 561-563).

In an appendix to the opinion, the Court listed eight specific factors for a juvenile court judge to consider when making the waiver decision: 1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires waiver; 2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; 3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; 4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment; 5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in criminal court; 6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contact with law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts, prior commitments to juvenile institutions, etc.; and 8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (*Kent*, 1966, pp. 566-567). Following *Kent*, the

majority of states modified their transfer statutes to comply with the Supreme Court's decision, calling for a hearing and a statement of reasons for a decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court (Frost Clausel & Bonnie, 2000).

Though *Kent* pronounced that juvenile transfer proceedings required due process, the Court did not elaborate on whether those protections also applied to other juvenile proceedings (Slaten, 2003). Several Supreme Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s addressed the issue of how far due process extended in juvenile proceedings, and in turn changed the face of the juvenile justice system. Shortly after the *Kent* decision, the Supreme Court ruled that in juvenile proceedings that may lead to incarceration, juveniles have the right to representation by counsel, notice of charges, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination (*In re Gault*, 1967, pp. 33-57). Adding to the growing similarity between juvenile court and criminal court, in *In re Winship* (1970, p. 368) the Court held that that the "reasonable doubt" standard should be required in all delinquency adjudications (as opposed to the "preponderance of evidence" standard the juvenile court had been using). Five years later, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to prosecute a juvenile as an adult in criminal court for the same conduct that has already resulted in adjudication in juvenile court, citing violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment (*Breed v. Jones*, 1975, p. 541). The determination of whether the juvenile court should transfer a juvenile to criminal court must occur before the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings (*Breed*, 1975, p. 537-538). Although the intention of these decisions was to provide juveniles with the same procedural rights afforded to adults, the result was the deterioration of the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court that differentiated it from

the criminal court. Following these pivotal decisions, juvenile courts began to place a new emphasis on deterrence and punishment. Starting in 1976 more than half of the state legislatures began to make changes to their laws so that it would be easier to transfer youth to criminal court (Krisberg, 2005).

CHAPTER 3: Current Transfer Law and Procedures

Though *Kent* (1966) required juvenile court judges to hold hearings before transferring juveniles to criminal court, many states created automatic transfer statutes to overcome this, and in some states district attorneys were given the power to make transfer decisions without providing juveniles any procedural safeguards (Pagnanelli, 2007). Consequently, there are three basic types of waiver to criminal court: judicial waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and statutory waiver. All states allow for juvenile prosecution in criminal court by one or more types of transfer mechanism.

Judicial Waiver

Statutes that permit judicial waiver give authority to the juvenile court judge to transfer a juvenile to criminal court. There are three types of judicial waiver: discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory (Dawson, 2000). Some states allow more than one type of judicial waiver.

Discretionary judicial waiver. Discretionary judicial waiver involves a case-by-case analysis of each juvenile by a judge. Currently 45 states have enacted discretionary judicial waiver statutes (Griffin, 2008). These statutes specify what factors a juvenile court judge must consider in making the transfer decision. Most states base these factors on the eight factors listed in the appendix to the *Kent* (1966) opinion. *Kent* did not make

the use of these factors mandatory; however, many states have incorporated them into their statutes, either verbatim, or with minor modifications (Slaten, 2003).

Presumptive judicial waiver. Fifteen states currently have provisions for presumptive judicial waiver, which deems certain types of cases or specific combinations of factors as inappropriate for juvenile court, presuming criminal prosecution to be appropriate (Griffin, 2008). This places the burden on the juvenile and defense counsel to show that the case does belong in juvenile court. If they fail to meet this burden of proof then the judge is required to transfer the case to criminal court (Pagnanelli, 2007).

Mandatory judicial waiver. Mandatory judicial waiver requires the automatic transfer of juvenile offenders who meet certain criteria to criminal court (Mears, 2003). The statutory requirements usually include (but are not limited to) age, offense type, and prior convictions. Fifteen states currently have mandatory judicial waiver statutes in place (Griffin, 2008).

Prosecutorial Waiver

Prosecutorial waiver statutes (also called concurrent jurisdiction or direct file) place certain cases in the jurisdiction of both the juvenile court and the criminal court (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Prosecutors then have the power to decide whether to file these cases in either court. The types of cases that are subject to prosecutorial waiver are usually limited to those involving violent or repeat crimes, or offenses involving weapons (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Very few states have set procedures or guidelines for this decision, and a prosecutor's decision is not subject to appellate review (Pagnanelli, 2007). Fifteen states currently have provisions for prosecutorial waiver (Griffin, 2008).

Statutory Waiver

Statutory waiver occurs when legislatures enact statutes that exclude certain cases from juvenile court jurisdiction, automatically placing them in the jurisdiction of the criminal court (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). These statutes define the types of cases over which juvenile and criminal courts have jurisdiction, and they define the age at which the court can try juveniles as adults. Regarding offenses, those most often excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction are murder, capital crimes, and other serious offenses against persons. Regarding age limits, there is variation from state to state regarding minimum ages for transfer. In states where laws set age limits for all transfer provisions, the most commonly used minimum age is 14 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Twenty-three states do not set a minimum age in at least one statutory exclusion provision (Griffin, 2008). For instance, in Pennsylvania there is no minimum age for the murder exclusion (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Therefore, if a juvenile commits murder in the state of Pennsylvania, no matter how old they are, they are eligible for transfer to criminal court. If a juvenile commits other offenses against the person in Pennsylvania, then the minimum age for transfer is set at 15 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). In the remaining states, minimum ages for transfer can range from 10- to 15-years-old (Griffin, 2008). In a statutory waiver situation, the juvenile court judge may still exercise some limited control over the process (Dawson, 2000). The juvenile court judge must find that the circumstances of the case fall within the scope of the mandatory waiver statute, and he or she must find probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed an offense that the statute covers before transferring the juvenile to criminal court (Dawson, 2000). Twenty-nine states currently have statutes excluding certain cases from juvenile court jurisdiction (Griffin, 2008).

Other Transfer-Related Laws

Several other types of laws affect the handling of juveniles in the legal system. "Once an adult always an adult" laws provide that a juvenile who has been transferred to criminal court once must automatically be tried as an adult for all subsequent offenses, regardless of their severity (Griffin, 2008; Slaten, 2003). Thirty-four states currently have "once an adult always an adult" provisions in their transfer laws (Griffin, 2008).

In contrast to "once an adult always an adult" laws, which lead to increased prosecution of juveniles in criminal court, other laws are intended to reduce the number of juveniles tried in criminal court, and to provide judges with more flexible sentencing options for juveniles. Reverse waiver and blended sentencing laws are both "fail safe" mechanisms that act to offset possible abuse of judicial discretion, over-inclusive legislation, and excessive prosecution (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Reverse waiver allows the criminal court to hold a hearing to address whether it should transfer a juvenile back to juvenile court. In some states, a juvenile must petition for a hearing, and he bears the burden of demonstrating why the criminal court judge should transfer him back to juvenile court (Feld, 2000). In other jurisdictions, the criminal court automatically grants this type of hearing (Slaten, 2003). Currently 25 states have some sort of provision for waiving a juvenile in criminal court back to juvenile court (Griffin, 2008).

Blended sentencing allows for greater flexibility in jurisdiction and sentencing decisions of the juvenile court. Blended sentencing laws increase the sentencing options available to juvenile court judges, and to criminal court judges dealing with transferred juveniles (Slaten, 2003). The most common juvenile court blended sentencing provision, currently used in 15 states, permits juvenile court judges to keep a juvenile in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court while imposing a suspended criminal sentence (Griffin,

2008; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). The suspended criminal sentence functions to guarantee that the juvenile successfully completes the terms of juvenile disposition and does not re-offend. If the juvenile does not cooperate, they may have to fulfill the criminal sentence (Griffin, 2008). Another type of blended sentencing statute requires juvenile courts to impose a combination of juvenile and adult penalties (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Finally, in several states there are contiguous blended sentencing statutes, in which juvenile court judges can hand down a sentence that would extend past the state's age of extended jurisdiction. This means that a juvenile is initially committed to a juvenile facility, but then a judge may transfer the offender to an adult facility when he or she ages out of the juvenile system (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Blended sentencing laws for criminal court allow criminal court judges who are sentencing transferred juveniles to impose sanctions that are usually only available in juvenile courts. This provides a means for returning juveniles to the juvenile court for sanctioning after prosecution in criminal court (Griffin, 2008). Seventeen states have criminal blended sentencing laws (Griffin, 2008).

CHAPTER 4: Research Examining the Transfer Process

Researchers have examined a number of different aspects of juvenile transfer to criminal court. For example, there is a fair amount of research examining the decision-making process involved in transferring juveniles to criminal court (Salekin, Rogers, & Ustad, 2001; Salekin, 2002; Salekin, Yff, Neumann, Leistico, & Zalot, 2002; Brannen et al., 2006; D'Angelo, 2007; Nunez, Dahl, Tang, & Jensen, 2007). Although in *Kent v. United States* (1966) the Supreme Court laid out eight factors for judges to consider when making transfer decisions, it is recommended, not required, that judges consider each

factor. Thus, there is variation from state to state as to which factors legislation outlines for judges to consider (Salekin et al., 2002), leading some researchers to inquire which of the eight *Kent* factors judges use most in making the transfer decision. Based on a survey of juvenile transfer statutes throughout the United States (Heilbrun, Leheny, Thomas, & Huneycutt, 1997), Salekin and colleagues identified three constructs that juvenile court judges reported most useful for the transfer decision: 1) dangerousness, 2) sophistication-maturity, and 3) treatment amenability (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin, 2002; Salekin et al., 2002). There are, however, no set guidelines for how to determine whether a juvenile is high or low on these factors (Salekin et al., 2001). Therefore, the researchers went on to examine specifically what core criteria constitute these broad factors.

In two studies, clinical psychologists and juvenile court judges rated the prototypicality of a number of characteristics representative of dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and treatment amenability (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin et al., 2002). Clinical psychologists were included in this research because they often conduct psychological evaluations of juveniles who are under consideration for transfer to criminal court to aid judges in their decisions (Salekin et al., 2001). The results of both studies were highly similar, with both groups of participants indicating that the core criteria composing dangerousness included extreme unprovoked violence; severe, aggressive, antisocial personality; lack of remorse/guilt and empathy; and a leadership role in the crime. The criteria constituting sophistication-maturity were criminal sophistication; ability to plan and premeditate crimes; understanding of behavioral norms; and ability to identify alternative actions. The criteria representative of the third factor, amenability to treatment, were motivation for treatment and expectation to benefit from

treatment; knowledge of right from wrong; demonstration of remorse or guilt and empathy; and a stable and supportive family (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin et al., 2002).

Salekin and colleagues' research revealed what criteria judges consider when determining a juvenile's dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment, however, it did not examine how judges balance these three factors to make an actual transfer decision. To answer this question, Brannen et al. (2006) conducted a study in which judges from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges examined a hypothetical transfer case that varied the levels of the three transfer factors (dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment). Judges read about a 16-year-old male who had committed a serious violent offense. They also read an excerpt from a psychological report that described the juvenile's characteristics as they related to the three transfer factors. The report addressed the characteristics identified in Salekin et al.'s research in three sections. The dangerousness section discussed items such as whether the crime was unprovoked, types of past illegal activities, and whether the juvenile expressed empathy or remorse. The section on sophistication-maturity addressed the juvenile's ability to regulate emotions and understand behavioral norms, and the amount of planning and premeditation in the crimes committed. The treatment amenability section discussed the juvenile's motivation to engage in treatment, his awareness of his difficulties, and the amount of stability and support in his family environment (Brannen et al., 2006). In addition to describing these characteristics, the reports also explicitly stated whether the juvenile was high or low on each of the three constructs. There were eight different vignettes, each with a different combination of either high or low levels of each of the three constructs.

Judges rated how useful it was for psychological reports to address each of the three constructs, and rated on a five-point scale how likely they would be to transfer the juvenile in the scenario to criminal court. In addition to this question, judges also had to make a final "yes or no" decision about whether they would transfer the juvenile. Brannen et al. (2006) found that judges were most likely to transfer a juvenile to criminal court when he was high in dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but low in treatment amenability. Judges were least likely to transfer a juvenile to criminal court when he was low in dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but high in treatment amenability. In addition, although all three factors were significant in informing judges' decisions, judges gave the most weight to dangerousness, followed by sophistication-maturity, and lastly treatment amenability (Brannen et al., 2006).

In addition to studying the transfer decision-making process itself, a few researchers have begun to examine how jurors perceive juveniles once they have been transferred to criminal court (Levine et al., 2001; Tang & Nunez, 2003; Tang et al., 2009; Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003; Woody & Walker, in press). Some theorize that jurors will perceive juveniles tried as adults as being guiltier than adults charged with the same crime. Jurors may believe that because a juvenile was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, he must be guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In cases of judicial waiver, it is likely that the transferred juvenile will have a previous record or will be charged with a very serious crime (Levine et al., 2001), or will have been determined to be a dangerous and criminally sophisticated individual (Salekin et al., 2002; Brannen et al., 2006). However, it is important to note that a juvenile without any previous record could be transferred to criminal court through statutory waiver or prosecutorial waiver

(Tang et al., 2009). Additionally, under "once an adult always an adult" clauses, juveniles who have previously been tried in criminal court will be tried as adults for any subsequent offenses, regardless of the severity of the new charge (Pagnanelli, 2007). The public, however, may not be aware of the different transfer mechanisms available, and may believe that the transfer of any juvenile to criminal court is the result of a juvenile court judge's evaluation. Therefore, the mere fact that a juvenile was transferred may evoke negative stereotypes about the juvenile. Jurors may assume that a transferred juvenile must be a violent, dangerous criminal, or that he must have a previous criminal record. The use of these stereotypes to make decisions about juveniles in criminal court is a type of generic prejudice.

CHAPTER 5: Generic Prejudice

Generic prejudice is not specific to one defendant; rather, it is a prejudice about a category of defendants or crimes (Vidmar, 1997; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar, 2003; Wiener et al., 2006). The nature of the charged offense or the type of parties involved cause the juror to categorize the case as one within a class of cases in which he or she is more likely to evaluate the evidence in a biased manner, or lower the burden of proof (Vidmar, 1997). Generic prejudice is a genre of prejudice that is specific to legal settings. It involves the use of extralegal information that is not relevant to the facts of the case for the purpose of making verdict or sentencing decisions (Wiener et al., 2006). It is the use of stereotypes about a category of defendants or crimes to make verdict or sentencing decisions.

For example, Vidmar (1997) found that 36% of prospective jurors in 25 Canadian criminal trials involving sexual abuse charges reported that they could not be impartial

due to the nature of the charges. Merely hearing that a case involved a charge of sexual abuse evoked stereotypes and attitudes that made it impossible for these jurors to treat the defendant fairly. In two studies, Wiener et al. (2006) tested generic prejudice effects in sexual assault and homicide cases. They found evidence of two types of generic prejudice: charge bias and crime category bias. When participants evaluated multiple sexual assault and homicide cases, the researchers were able to predict defendant guilt ratings from one case to another (crime category bias). This was true regardless of case similarity and case charge, and this effect was much stronger for sexual assault cases compared to homicide cases. Wiener et al. (2006) also found that they could predict guilt ratings from one sexual assault case to another for cases that shared the same specific charge (charge bias).

Generic prejudice can be based on offense type and charge type, as Wiener et al. (2006) demonstrated, but it can also be based on the type of defendant involved in a case. Vidmar (2002) noted that racial prejudice is the most common form of generic prejudice. For example, the knowledge that a defendant is African-American can lead some individuals to assume that the defendant is guilty, more so than if the defendant was White (Vidmar, 2002). Similarly, jurors may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they would an adult charged with the same crime because of generic prejudice toward all juveniles transferred to adult criminal court. The simple incidence of transfer may activate negative stereotypes that in turn lead jurors to assume that the juvenile must be guilty. For example, jurors may assume that to have warranted a transfer the juvenile has a criminal history (Levine et al., 2001), is a danger to society (Tang et al., 2009), or must be a violent, callous predator. Several studies have

experimentally examined mock jurors' perceptions of juveniles tried in criminal court, with mixed results.

CHAPTER 6: Trying Juveniles as Adults: Perceptions of Juveniles in Criminal Court

Levine et al. (2001) conducted some of the first research examining how jurors perceive juveniles who are tried as adults. The researchers attempted to determine whether mock jurors would form negative impressions of a juvenile offender simply because he was being tried as an adult. Participants received minimal information about a defendant; specifically that the defendant was 11-years-old at the time of the crime, that he was accused of committing murder, and that he could have been tried as a juvenile or an adult, but was being tried as an adult. The researchers asked participants to make inferences about the defendant's personality and history, and then asked them how relevant those characteristics were to their verdict. A large percentage of participants indicated that it was very likely that the defendant had a criminal history, and that knowledge of that criminal history would influence their decision to find the defendant guilty. The researchers concluded that jurors who hear cases in which juveniles are tried as adults are likely to infer a previous criminal history and are likely to be prejudiced by that inference toward voting guilty.

There are several problems with this conclusion. Participants may have been endorsing characteristics like "has a criminal history" simply because the juvenile was charged with murder, which is a serious violent crime. It is quite possible that they would have made the same inferences about an adult defendant charged with murder; however, in no condition did participants make judgments about an adult defendant. In

addition, participants formed an impression about the juvenile defendant based on very little information, and in an actual trial jurors would receive far more information, which may lead to different judgments.

Tang and Nunez (2003) extended this research by including an adult comparison group in their study, and by examining differences between prosecution- and defense-biased mock jurors. Participants read a trial summary describing a case in which the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The researchers manipulated defendant age (13-years-old vs.16-years-old vs. 19-years-old) and measured participants' pretrial bias with the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983) to determine whether they were prosecution-biased or defense-biased. For the conditions involving a 13- or 16-year-old defendant, participants read that the juvenile defendant was being tried as an adult. Participants then gave a verdict of guilty or not guilty, and rated their confidence in the correctness of that verdict. They also answered a question assessing what standard of proof they used to find the defendant guilty.

The results indicated that prosecution-biased participants were more likely to find the 16-year-old guilty, were more confident about his guilt, and were more likely to set a lower standard of proof for him compared to defense-biased participants (Tang & Nunez, 2003). In addition, prosecution-biased participants found the 13-year-old defendant guilty less often than they did the 16-year-old defendant, they were less confident that the 13-year-old was guilty compared to the 16-year-old, and prosecution-biased participants set a lower standard of proof for the 16-year-old compared to the 19-year-old adult defendant. Among defense-biased participants, there were no differences between the three defendant conditions for verdict, confidence in verdict, or standard of proof. This

research suggests that some jurors may demonstrate some bias against juveniles who are tried as adults. One limitation of this research however, is that the participants in this study were undergraduate students. Not only are undergraduate students not necessarily representative of the jury pool, the adult defendant in the trial summary used was only 19-years-old, and many of the undergraduate participants were likely very close to this age. Depending on the extent to which the participants viewed themselves as adults, they may have been less likely to view the 19-year-old as an adult.

In an attempt to build on the results of both Levine et al.'s (2001) and Tang and Nunez's (2003) research, Tang et al. (2009) conducted two studies in which they examined participants' reactions to either a juvenile being tried as an adult in criminal court, a juvenile being tried in juvenile court, or an adult being tried in criminal court. The researchers measured pretrial bias with the JBS in an attempt to replicate Tang and Nunez's (2003) finding that prosecution-biased participants (compared to defense-biased participants) judged a 16-year-old defendant tried as an adult more harshly than an adult charged with the same crime. In the first study, undergraduate student participants were assigned to one of three defendant conditions, and were told only that a 16-year-old was being tried as an adult in criminal court, a 16-year-old was being tried in juvenile court, or that a 19-year-old was being tried in criminal court. The researchers did not give participants any other information. Participants then used their best guess to rate the seriousness of the crime, the defendant's dangerousness to society, and the possibility that the defendant was a chronic offender on a 10-point scale.

The results showed that the juvenile tried as an adult was rated as having committed a more serious crime than both other defendants, was rated as being more

dangerous to society than both other defendants, and was rated as more likely to be a chronic offender than both other defendants (Tang et al., 2009). There were no differences between the juvenile tried in juvenile court and the adult defendant in any of these three categories. Although there was a main effect for pretrial bias, showing that prosecution-biased participants judged all defendants more harshly on two of the three crime/defendant rating categories, there was no interaction between trial venue and pretrial bias. This finding was inconsistent with what Tang and Nunez (2003) reported in their research (prosecution-biased participants judged the juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they did the adult defendant, whereas defense-biased participants did not).

To replicate and extend these results, Tang et al. (2009) conducted a second study using community participants rather than undergraduate students, and measuring whether people categorize juvenile defendants as fitting into a superpredator stereotype or into a wayward youth stereotype. The superpredator stereotype represents a more negative view of juvenile offenders, depicting them as "natural born criminals," while the wayward youth stereotype represents a more positive view of juvenile offenders, depicting their delinquent behavior as a result of their environment (Tang et al., 2009). The researchers posited that the differing reactions of prosecution- and defense-biased participants to the 16-year-old defendant in Tang and Nunez's (2003) research might have resulted from these individuals endorsing different stereotypes about juvenile offenders. Thus, they expected prosecution-biased participants (relative to defense-biased participants) to hold more negative stereotypes about the juvenile tried as an adult, in addition to judging him more harshly on the three categories from the first study. Participants followed the same procedure as in the first study, but those judging either of

the two 16-year-old defendants also answered two yes/no questions assessing whether they endorsed either of the above-mentioned stereotypes.

As found in the first study, participants rated the juvenile tried as an adult as having committed a more serious crime than the other two defendants, and as being more dangerous to society than the other two defendants (Tang et al., 2009). There was no difference between the juvenile tried as an adult and the adult defendant for possibility of being a chronic offender. Prosecution-biased participants also rated all defendants as having been charged with a more serious crime, as being more dangerous, and as having a higher possibility of being a chronic offender than did defense-biased participants. However, there was no interaction between trial venue and pretrial bias. Tang et al. (2009) did find that defense-biased participants were more likely to evaluate juvenile defendants as wayward youth rather than superpredators (compared to prosecution-biased participants), regardless of whether the juvenile was being tried in juvenile or criminal court.

Although these results are suggestive of a general bias against juveniles tried as adults, the research lacks ecological validity in that participants were asked to make judgments about defendants based on very little information, even less information than Levine et al. (2001) provided their participants. In an actual trial, a juror would receive far more information, including the charged crime and other various details about the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the crime. It is highly likely that jurors given this additional information would come to different conclusions than participants did in these studies. Additionally, the researchers did not use the stereotyping measure to predict final judgments about the juvenile defendants. It would

have been more informative to know whether endorsement of certain stereotypes led to harsher judgments of the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court. The current research extends Tang et al.'s research by measuring participants' stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, and then using those measures to predict judgments of guilt.

Not all research examining this issue has found bias against juveniles tried as adults. Several studies comparing perceptions of juveniles tried as adults and adult defendants have found that mock jurors judge the two types of defendants equally. Warling and Peterson-Badali (2003) examined whether the age of a defendant and attitudes about youth crime would affect verdict and sentencing decisions. Participants read a written trial summary in which the defendant, aged 13-, 17-, or 25-years-old, was charged with second-degree murder. Participants then indicated whether they thought the defendant was guilty or not guilty, and if they found him guilty, they indicated the sentence he should receive (2, 5, 10, 15, or 25 years in prison). They also completed the JBS, and several scales designed to measure attitudes about juvenile culpability and youth crime.

Surprisingly, the results showed no significant effects on verdict for the defendant's age (Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003). Of the juror bias and attitude measures completed, only the JBS was significantly related to verdict, showing that participants who were prosecution-biased were more likely to vote guilty than those who were defense-biased. Defendant age did have an effect on sentence length, such that as the defendant's age increased, so did the recommended sentence length. However, the Juvenile Culpability Scale and the Attitude toward Youth Crime Scale both accounted for

a significant proportion of the sentencing variance. Participants who believed the law should hold youth more accountable for their crimes and those who believed that youth crime is increasing were more likely to recommend longer sentences.

In Warling and Peterson-Badali's (2003) study, defendant age did not significantly affect verdict decisions. However, this could be at least partially because overall there was a low conviction rate (35% of student participants and 25% of community participants voted guilty). A more ambiguous case regarding the guilt of the defendant would be more effective at detecting juror biases. Nonetheless, these results are inconsistent with the findings of Tang and Nunez (2003) and Tang et al. (2009). One possible contributor to this inconsistency could be the fact that Tang and Nunez and Tang et al. explicitly informed participants that the juvenile defendants in their scenarios were being tried in criminal court as adults. There was no mention of this in Warling and Peterson-Badali's study; participants only learned about the defendant's age. Tang and Nunez (2003) also administered a manipulation check, asking how old the defendant in the case was, immediately before participants rendered a verdict. This could have made age more salient than it was in the Warling and Peterson-Badali study.

Woody and Walker (in press) also examined this issue, again finding no evidence of disparate treatment of juveniles tried as adults. The researchers examined the effects of age, crime type, crime outcome, and pretrial bias on verdicts and sentence recommendations. Participants read a short trial summary describing either a 14-year-old being tried as an adult, or a 24-year-old adult defendant. The trial summary also varied crime type, so that some participants read that the defendant was accused of committing a crime against property, and some read he was accused of committing a crime against a

person. Furthermore, within each crime type condition there was either a mild or a severe outcome ($500 of property stolen or $500 in medical bills for the mild outcomes, and $50,000 of property stolen or $50,000 in medical bills for the severe outcomes). Following the trial summary, participants read a set of standard jury instructions, indicated whether they believed the defendant was guilty or not guilty, and completed several other measures. If they found the defendant guilty, they also indicated what sentence he should receive. Similar to Warling and Peterson-Badali's study, results showed no significant differences in verdicts for defendant age, but participants did give longer sentences to the adult defendant compared to the 14-year-old defendant.

Do jurors judge juveniles tried as adults more harshly than adults charged with the same crimes? The answer to this question is still unclear. Inconsistent results from a number of studies make it difficult to conclude whether juveniles receive fair treatment in the criminal justice system. A possible explanation for the generic prejudice shown by only some individuals in this area of research is the experience of negative emotions, specifically anger, fear, and sadness, which jurors would likely experience in response to a juvenile who has been accused of committing a serious crime. It is possible that something about prosecution-biased participants in Tang and Nunez's (2003) study led them to respond to the scenario with anger, while defense-biased participants may have responded with another emotion, such as fear or sadness. It is also possible that details in the different scenarios used in each of the studies examining this issue evoked different emotions in the participants in each study. This possibility is important to consider, because according to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000,

2001), different emotions can affect judgment and decision making in very different ways.

CHAPTER 7: The Effect of Emotion on Judgment and Decision Making: The Appraisal-Tendency Framework

There is a growing body of research demonstrating that specific emotions can affect judgment and decision making in a wide variety of contexts. This line of research builds on cognitive appraisal theory, which posits that different individuals will appraise the same set of circumstances differently, leading to the elicitation of different emotions (Smith, David, & Kirby, 2006; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1987; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984). In other words, it is the manner in which a situation is evaluated, not the situation itself, that determines whether an individual will experience an emotion, and what that emotion will be. The contents of these evaluations, referred to as appraisal dimensions, not only determine which emotion an individual will experience, but also continue to affect decision making after the emotion-inducing event has been resolved (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Research suggests that the appraisals associated with anger lead angry individuals to process more heuristically, while the appraisals associated with sadness and fear lead sad and fearful individuals to process more systematically (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Semmler & Brewer, 2002; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Small & Lerner, 2008; Ask & Granhag, 2007). Therefore, an angry juror processing heuristically, who also brings to a criminal trial a generic prejudice against all juveniles tried as adults, will be more likely to make judgments about a juvenile's guilt based on that prejudice. This is a disturbing possibility, and demonstrates the important need to examine the effects of

emotion on jurors' judgments of juveniles tried as adults. To explore fully how emotions may affect jurors' decisions, I will first provide a brief summary of cognitive appraisal theory, followed by a more in-depth examination of the Appraisal-Tendency Framework.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory

Cognitive appraisal theory has led to the development of a number of specific appraisal models, which can be broken down into three categories: structural, procedural, and relational models (Smith et al., 2006). Structural models testing cognitive appraisal theory endeavor to describe the contents of appraisals, specifically the evaluations individuals make and the outcomes of those evaluations, which lead to the elicitation of different emotions. The types of evaluations made, also known as appraisal dimensions, differ somewhat from one model to another, but most models share the same basic dimensions. Procedural models attempt to describe how appraisals elicit emotions, by examining the cognitive processes that underlie making appraisals. Relational models describe the relational information that individuals draw on when making emotion-eliciting appraisals, specifically information regarding what the circumstances entail for an individual's own well-being based on his or her own needs, goals, and abilities (Smith et al., 2006). The proposed research will focus on a structural model of cognitive appraisal theory, because according to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, it is the contents of appraisals that influence subsequent judgment and decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001).

Researchers have developed a number of different structural models of appraisal theory over the years (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Frijda, 1987, 1993; Scherer, 1984, 2001; Ortony, Clore,

& Collins, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Most of these models are very similar, but do identify some different appraisal dimensions. Generally, structural models include an evaluation of the importance or relevance of the stimulus situation to an individual, which determines how intense the resulting emotional reaction is (Smith et al., 2006). They also usually include an evaluation of how desirable the situation is, which differentiates positive from negative emotions. Additionally, many models include one or more appraisal dimensions regarding the individual's assessment of the degree to which he or she is able to cope with the situation. This differentiates emotions that are associated with low coping ability (sadness and fear) from those associated with high coping ability (calmness, challenge, and determination). Finally, the majority of models include an evaluation of whom or what caused or is responsible for an event or situation (Smith et al., 2006). The Appraisal Tendency Framework examines how these appraisal dimensions influence judgment and decisions.

The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) draws on the work of Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Similar to other structural models of appraisal, Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) model posits that a unique pattern of cognitive appraisals characterizes each emotion. Smith and Ellsworth identified six cognitive dimensions that define the patterns of appraisal underlying different emotions: pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, self-other responsibility, and situational control. Pleasantness is simply whether an emotion is considered pleasant or unpleasant (i.e., positive or negative). Attentional activity refers to whether a stimulus motivates one to examine it more closely or to turn away from it. Tests of this model show that most pleasant emotions are associated with a strong desire to attend to a situation. Certainty is

concerned with how certain or uncertain one is about an event or situation. Fear, hope, and surprise are all associated with uncertainty, while happiness and anger are associated with certainty. Situational control involves an evaluation of whether a human or the situation controls an event. This is important for distinguishing between anger and sadness, because anger is associated with the belief that a person is responsible for an occurrence, and sadness is associated with the belief that the circumstance is responsible for an occurrence. Self-other responsibility goes one step further and involves an evaluation of whether the self is responsible for an event or whether another person is responsible for an event. An evaluation that the self is responsible for an event could result in guilt, while an evaluation that another person is responsible could result in anger. Anticipated effort involves an evaluation of how much effort the situation will require an individual to expend. It is especially important for differentiating pleasant emotions, such as challenge (high anticipated effort) and happiness (very low anticipated effort). The majority of unpleasant emotions are all associated with high anticipated effort.

According to Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) model, central dimensions characterize each emotion. For example, anger is an unpleasant emotion, associated with certainty, and strong attributions of human agency and other-responsibility. While sadness is also unpleasant, it is associated with uncertainty, very high levels of situational control, and moderately high appraisals of other-responsibility. Fear is unpleasant and is associated with high levels of uncertainty, high levels of situational control, and appraisals of other-responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Therefore, although all three emotions are unpleasant, they differ in regards to their positions on the spectrum of appraisals of certainty and situation/individual control.

Cognitive appraisal theory posits that two individuals will experience the same emotion in response to a situation or event only if their appraisals of the situation or event are the same. Two individuals who experience different appraisals of the same situation or event will experience different emotions (Roseman, 1991). For example, if two people witness the same unpleasant event, but one believes another individual caused the event, and the other believes the situation caused the event, they will experience different resulting emotions, with the first individual experiencing anger and the second likely experiencing sadness. Appraisals of the same event can differ from person to person due to differences in personality characteristics, personal goals, needs, abilities, and past experiences (Smith et al., 2006). Thus, one college student may experience anxiety in response to an upcoming exam, while another may view the exam as a challenge (Smith et al., 2006). The two students will appraise the upcoming exam differently based on their different abilities.

The Appraisal-Tendency Framework

The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) builds on and extends initial tests of structural cognitive appraisal models by going beyond identifying the appraisal dimensions associated with specific emotions, and examining how the different appraisal dimensions associated with emotions affect subsequent judgment and decisions. Over the years, a number of researchers have examined the effects of emotion on judgment and decision making, but they have mainly used a valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive and negative affect on judgment and decisions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Bless et al., 1996; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas, 1991; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Keltner, Locke,

& Audrain, 1993). For example, research has demonstrated that when making judgments about future events, people who are in a negative mood tend to make more pessimistic predictions, and those in a positive mood tend to make more optimistic predictions (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower, 1992).

Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) reasoned that if specific emotions are characterized by different patterns of cognitive appraisals, then specific emotions of the same valence will not always have the same effects on judgment and choice. Fear and anger are both obviously negative emotions, but they differ in regards to certainty and control. Situational control and uncertainty define fear, whereas a sense of individual control and certainty define anger. Therefore, these two emotions could have very different effects on decisions. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) proposes that specific emotions activate a cognitive predisposition to appraise events in the future in accordance with the central appraisal dimensions associated with the emotion. This is important to consider in the context of a juvenile being tried as an adult, because an angry juror who must determine the guilt of a juvenile defendant might come to a different conclusion than a sad or fearful juror, due to the different patterns of appraisal associated with each emotion.

Although the initial approach to the study of cognitive appraisal viewed appraisal patterns as the cause of emotions, it is important to note that emotions can also result from unconscious priming or bodily feedback (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Regardless of the source of an emotion, an individual will still experience the appraisals associated with that emotion. The purpose of these appraisals is to help the individual respond to the situation or event that evoked the emotion; however, appraisal tendencies persist even

after the individual is no longer in the emotion-provoking situation, and then affect how the individual interprets subsequent choices and decisions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). For example, consider a juror who comes to court to hear a trial involving a juvenile who has been transferred to criminal court. The juror has had a terrible morning; his wife forgot to wake him up before she left, he didn't have time to get coffee, and he encountered multiple traffic jams and bad drivers on the way to the courthouse. As a result, he is feeling very angry. When he sits down and proceedings begin, he is still fuming. Although the trial is unrelated to the events that angered the juror, the appraisal dimensions associated with this emotion (certainty, human agency, and other-responsibility) continue to influence his decisions and the way he processes the testimony he hears that morning. But how exactly do these appraisal tendencies influence his judgment? The following review of research examining the effects of emotions on judgment and decision making will shed light on how appraisal tendencies affect how people think and process information.

Research Supporting the Appraisal-Tendency Framework

Evidence supporting the Appraisal-Tendency Framework comes from several areas of research. Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) were among the first to examine whether different specific negative emotions have different effects on social judgment consistent with their underlying appraisal dimensions. In one experiment, they examined the effects of sadness and anger on ratings of the likelihood that situational and human caused events would occur. They found that sad participants found negative events caused by the situation to be more likely to occur than angry participants did, while angry participants were more likely to see negative events caused by people to be

likely to occur. In a second experiment, the researchers induced participants to feel sad, angry, or they received a neutral mood induction manipulation. Participants then read a scenario that was ambiguous as to whether the cause was due to an individual or the situation, and made judgments about the cause of the event. Keltner et al. (1993) found that sad participants were more likely than were angry participants to cite situational causes, while angry participants were more likely than were sad participants to cite other individuals as the cause of the event.

While Keltner et al.'s (1993) research demonstrated that people will make attributions about the causes of events based on the emotion they are experiencing, other research has examined how emotions affect the outcomes of certain types of judgments. For example, a number of studies have used the Appraisal-Tendency Framework to examine emotion in the area of risk assessment. Lerner and Keltner (2000) compared the effects of two different negative emotions on judgments of risk, as opposed to comparing positive and negative moods, as valence-based approaches do. Specifically, they examined risk assessments made by dispositionally angry and fearful people. A dispositional emotion is one that a person tends to react with across time and situations. Risk perception is an ideal area to examine the effects of anger and fear on judgment because perceptions of uncertainty and lack of individual control determine judgments of risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The researchers hypothesized that the sense of situational control and uncertainty associated with fear should lead to more pessimistic risk assessments, while the sense of individual control and certainty associated with anger should lead to more optimistic risk assessments.

Participants completed measures of dispositional fear and anger, followed by a risk assessment questionnaire. The risk assessment questionnaire presented participants with 12 events that cause a certain number of deaths in the United States each year (i.e., floods, brain cancer, strokes). Based on the knowledge that 50,000 people in the United States die in car accidents each year, the questionnaire asked participants to estimate the number of annual deaths due to each of the 12 events. As hypothesized, the results showed that fear was positively related to perceived risk (fearful participants gave higher risk assessments) and anger was negatively related to risk (angry participants gave lower risk assessments) (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Despite the fact that anger and fear are both high in negative valence, the two emotions had very different effects on participants' perceptions of risk, contrary to what the valence-based approach predicts.

Lerner and Keltner (2001) extended this research, conducting a series of studies in which they measured dispositional emotions, experimentally induced emotions, and examined how these emotions influenced a wider range of judgments. In one experiment, the researchers measured dispositional fear and anger, and had participants evaluate one of two hypothetical programs to combat an unusual Asian disease said to be expected to kill 600 people. One program was framed as a gain (i.e., if program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved), and the other was framed as a loss (i.e., if program B is adopted, 400 people will die). Previous research has shown that choices involving gains are often risk averse, and choices involving losses are often risk taking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, as cited in Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The researchers found that regardless of how the program was framed (gain vs. loss), the effects of individual differences in dispositional fear and anger determined the choices participants made, with

angry participants making risky choices and fearful participants making risk-averse choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

Lerner and Keltner (2001) went on to induce situational emotions in another experiment, in order to address the possibility that dispositional emotion might be associated with individual differences in risk-related life experiences. The researchers induced participants to feel anger or fear, and then asked them to complete a risk perception measure. The results showed that compared with fear, anger produced greater optimism in risk estimates (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

Extending the research on emotion and risk perception to a more realistic setting, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) examined naturally occurring and manipulated feelings of fear and anger in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Using a national sample, the researchers conducted the study in two waves. The first wave occurred only nine days after the attacks, and consisted of participants answering questions about the attacks and completing measures of anxiety and desire for vengeance in order to measure naturally occurring fear and anger that occurred shortly after the attacks.

During the second wave, which occurred approximately two months later, the researchers experimentally manipulated fear and anger with the same sample of participants by asking them to write about what aspects of the attacks made them angry, or what aspects of the attacks made them afraid (Lerner et al., 2003). Participants also viewed a picture and listened to an audio clip that had been pre-tested and shown to evoke the target emotion (either fear or anger depending on the participant's assigned condition). Following this, participants completed three risk measures. Lerner et al.

(2003) found that experimentally manipulated anger led to more optimistic (lower) estimates of risk, while manipulated fear led to more pessimistic (higher) estimates of risk on all measures. Additionally, naturally occurring anger (desire for vengeance) from the first wave predicted lower risk estimates at wave two, and naturally occurring anxiety predicted higher risk estimates at wave two, providing convergent evidence for the distinct effects of anger and fear on risk perception.

In a third wave of data collection in this line of research, Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, and Small (2005) examined the effects of fear, anger, and neutral emotion on judgments of past risks and future risks associated with terrorism. Researchers contacted participants who completed wave two of Lerner et al.'s (2003) study to participate in another study one year later. Participants completed one of two emotion "recall" manipulations, in which they either relived the emotion manipulation they had completed in wave two, or took a neutral perspective. All participants then made judgments about the probability of eight risky events occurring, in three different ways. First, participants reported what they remembered predicting during wave two the year before (in which they had completed the exact same risk survey). Next, they estimated what they thought the probability of each event occurring was, according to their current knowledge about the United States and its enemies. Finally, they estimated the probability of the eight events occurring in the next 12 months. For all three types of judgments, predictions of future risk, and memories and judgments of past risks associated with terrorism, the researchers found that anger activated lower (more optimistic) risk estimates than both fear and neutral emotion, while fear activated higher (more pessimistic) risk estimates than both anger and neutral emotion (Fischhoff et al., 2005). These results are notable

because they show that emotions not only influence judgments about the unknown future, but also influence judgments about the known past.

Risk perception is not the only type of judgment that emotions can influence. Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that different emotions had different effects on whether participants used stereotypes to make decisions in student misconduct scenarios and in a persuasion scenario. In their first study, the researchers induced participants to feel angry, sad, or neutral and then asked them to read one of four cases of alleged student misconduct. Two cases involved assault, and two involved a student cheating on an exam. Furthermore, within each case type a stereotype either was present, or was not present. In half of the assault cases, the accused student had a Hispanic name (stereotype present condition), and in the other half the student had a non-Hispanic name. In half of the cheating cases the scenario included a description of the accused student as a "well known track-and-field athlete on campus" (stereotype present condition), while the other half of the cases left out this description. After reading about the case, participants rated the likelihood that the accused student was guilty. For those participants who were in the sad and neutral conditions, there were no differences in guilt judgments among stereotype conditions; however, the angry participants were much more likely to find the student guilty in the stereotype present conditions.

Bodenhausen et al. (1994) also found similar effects in a persuasion scenario. Participants all read the same persuasive essay about raising the legal driving age from 16 to 18. Researchers told half of the participants that the essay had been written by "a group of transportation policy experts at Princeton University" (high expertise), and told the other half that the essay had been written by "a group of students at Sinclair

Community College in New Jersey" (low expertise). Participants then indicated their agreement with the position advocated for in the essay. Results showed that angry participants were significantly more likely to be persuaded by the argument when it was attributed to the expert source, compared to sad participants, who were unaffected by the source of the argument.

Why do emotions associated with different appraisal dimensions have such varied effects on decision making? The studies examining risk perception initially suggested that emotions whose central appraisal dimensions are related to certainty/uncertainty and individual/situational control affect risk perception because these very dimensions are central to decisions about risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Bodenhausen et al.'s (1994) results suggest however, that the distinct effects of some emotions on judgment and decision making may be a result of those emotions influencing depth of cognitive processing. The results of both of Bodenhausen et al.'s (1994) experiments suggest that angry people tend to process more heuristically than do sad people, who tend to process more systematically. Heuristic processing involves a reliance on simple inferential rules or heuristics to make decisions, and requires very little cognitive effort (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). This means that when processing heuristically, people will use stereotypes and heuristics such as "experts can be trusted" (as demonstrated in Bodenhausen et al.'s [1994] research) to guide their decisions and behavior. On the other hand, systematic processing involves analyzing all informational input available to determine its importance for the decision at hand, and integrating all relevant information to make judgments or decisions (Chaiken et al., 1989). Systematic processing requires more than minimal cognitive effort.

Further support for the proposition that emotions affect depth of cognitive processing comes from Semmler and Brewer's (2002) research. The researchers manipulated sadness (vs. neutral emotion) through emotional statements of witnesses and details about the harm to the victim in an audio recording of a criminal trial, and varied whether participants were exposed to consistent or inconsistent testimony. Results suggested that sad participants were able to recall inconsistencies in the testimony more accurately than were those in the neutral condition, indicating that those induced to feel sadness engaged in deeper, systematic processing. Unfortunately, the researchers did not compare sadness with another emotion, as Bodenhausen et al. did.

Similar to Semmler and Brewer, Lerner et al. (1998) also only examined one emotion, but they looked at anger rather than sadness. The researchers induced participants to either experience anger or no emotion, and examined how this and whether or not the participant thought an expert would hold them accountable for their decisions affected punitiveness in several civil cases. They found that angry participants were more punitive than were neutral participants. However, when the researchers told participants they were going to hold them accountable for their decisions, angry participants were less punitive than when they were unaccountable. Additionally, with increasing anger and unaccountability, perceptions of the extent to which the defendant acted out of free will or coercion did not affect severity of punishment, while it did influence punitiveness among participants held accountable. The researchers concluded that the attenuation of punitiveness occurred because holding participants accountable may have led them to ask themselves what their justification was for assigning that level of punishment, which in turn led to more systematic processing.

While the studies discussed above identified which specific emotions lead to more heuristic or systematic processing, they did not actually assess why different emotions differentially affect depth of cognitive processing. Tiedens and Linton (2001) attempted to explain why this effect occurs. They hypothesized that experiencing emotions associated with certainty (such as anger) should lead to more certainty in subsequent decisions and judgments (and vice versa for uncertain emotions), and that emotions associated with certainty would then lead to more heuristic processing, while emotions associated with uncertainty (such as fear and sadness) would lead to more systematic processing. Based on Chaiken et al.'s (1989) sufficiency threshold hypothesis, they reasoned that feeling certain tells people that their thoughts or decisions are correct, and that further processing is not necessary. When people feel uncertain, they will make a greater effort to process information until they feel sufficiently certain about whatever they are thinking about or deciding.

Tiedens and Linton (2001) focused on emotions associated with appraisals of certainty and tested their hypotheses in a series of experiments. In Experiment 1, they induced participants to feel disgusted, fearful, happy, or hopeful by having them write about an autobiographical emotional event (disgust and happiness are associated with certainty, and fear and hope are associated with uncertainty). Then in an ostensibly unrelated study, participants made a number of predictions about what would happen in the year 2000 (data was collected in 1998). The researchers found that participants who experienced disgust and happiness were more certain about their predictions than were participants who experienced fear and hope. The researchers noted that this provided support for the notion that appraisal dimensions associated with specific emotions can

affect judgment about subsequent, unrelated events. Furthermore, this study demonstrated that emotions of different valences, such as happiness, clearly a positive emotion, and disgust, clearly a negative emotion, can have similar effects on judgment due to their underlying appraisal dimensions.

In Experiment 2, the researchers tested whether certainty-associated emotions would lead to more heuristic processing and uncertainty-associated emotions would lead to more systematic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The experimenters induced participants to feel angry, content, worried, or surprised. Anger and contentment are associated with certainty, while worry and surprise are associated with uncertainty, and negative valence characterizes anger and worry, while positive valence characterizes contentment and surprise. Participants then all read the same essay advocating for ending grade inflation. The experimenter informed participants that either another student or a distinguished professor of education had written the essay, following which participants indicated their agreement with a number of statements about the essay. The results showed that participants who experienced certainty-associated emotions, and who believed that a professor had written the essay, indicated significantly more agreement with the essay than those who read the essay by the student. However, there was no difference in level of persuasion for participants induced to feel uncertainty-associated emotions. In other words, participants who experienced certainty-associated emotions were more likely to process heuristically and to use the source of the essay to decide whether they agreed with it. On the other hand, the source of the essay did not affect those participants who experienced uncertainty-associated emotions and used more systematic cognitive processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Notably, the valence of the

experienced emotions had no effect on the extent to which participants used heuristic or systematic processing to make decisions. The type of processing participants used to make decisions was determined only by the level of certainty or uncertainty associated with each emotion.

In their third experiment, Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined how emotions affect stereotype use. They focused on negative emotions, specifically fear and disgust, because these negative emotions tend to be involved with prejudice and stereotyping. Using film clips, they induced participants to feel either fear or disgust. Then in a second, "unrelated" study, participants read a scenario about a professor accusing a student of cheating. All participants read the same scenario, except that half of the scenarios described the student as being a well-known athlete, and the other half omitted this description. Participants then indicated how likely they thought it was that the student had cheated. Participants in the disgust condition indicated that the athlete was more likely to have cheated than was the unidentified student; however, those participants induced to feel fear were equally likely to judge the student as having cheated regardless of whether they read about the athlete or the unidentified student. These results suggest that those participants experiencing disgust, an emotion associated with certainty, relied on the stereotype that athletes are more likely to cheat to decide whether the student in the scenario had in fact cheated, indicating greater heuristic processing. Those participants experiencing fear, an emotion associated with uncertainty, processed more systematically, and thus were unaffected by the presence of the athlete stereotype.

Tiedens and Linton (2001) also conducted a mediation analysis to determine whether task certainty mediated the relationship between emotion and belief that the student athlete had cheated. The researchers conducted a mediation analysis using only data from the athlete condition, because in the unidentified student condition there was no opportunity for participants to stereotype. After completing the emotion manipulation, and before completing the stereotyping task, participants completed a measure of how certain they were that they could identify the appropriate outcome in the task. Analyses indicated that participants in the disgust condition were more certain than those who were in the fear condition, as the Appraisal-Tendency Framework predicts. The researchers used this measure of task certainty for the mediation analysis. A series of regression analyses showed that emotion predicted task certainty, and predicted the belief that the athlete had cheated. Task certainty also predicted the belief that the athlete had cheated, and when the researchers entered both emotion and task certainty as predictors for belief that the athlete had cheated, only task certainty was a significant predictor, indicating that certainty mediated the relationship between emotion and belief that the athlete had cheated. As task certainty increased, so did belief that the athlete had cheated. The researchers concluded that participants experiencing a certainty-related emotion were more likely to rely on stereotypes to decide whether a student had cheated, and that this occurred due to the certainty associated with emotions, not the emotions themselves (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).

In their fourth and final experiment, Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined only sadness. Sadness is an emotion that lies more toward the middle of the spectrum for certainty and uncertainty. It is associated more with uncertainty than certainty, but is still

less uncertain than fear, therefore it is more likely that people will sometimes feel sad and uncertain but will also sometimes feel sad and certain. The researchers sought to examine whether the same emotion, associated with either uncertainty or certainty, would have different effects on judgment.

Participants were either induced to feel sad and certain, sad and uncertain, sad and neutral (no certainty instruction), or they received only a neutral emotion induction. Participants then read about a new product: half of the participants read a strong argument for the product, and half read a weak argument, and then rated on a nine-point scale whether they would consider buying the product. Tiedens and Linton (2001) found that those who were sad and uncertain, or who were only sad (no certainty manipulation), were more likely to consider buying the product if they had received the strong argument rather than the weak argument. As predicted, those who were sad and certain, and those who had received the neutral emotion manipulation, were equally as likely to indicate that they would purchase the product no matter which argument they read. (Although the neutral and sad/certain participants did not demonstrate significant differences in their attitudes about buying the product, neutral participants' responses showed marginal differences in their attitudes toward the product depending on which argument they read, suggesting that the sad/certain participants might have processed more heuristically.) The results of this study provided further support for the researchers' conclusion that certainty-associated emotions lead to more heuristic processing and uncertainty-associated emotions lead to more systematic processing. Even when participants felt equally sad, the differences in certainty appraisals led to differences in depth of cognitive processing.

Although the Appraisal-Tendency Framework has been applied extensively to risk assessment scenarios, and a number of other types of decision-making scenarios, researchers have only just begun to apply it to the field of legal decision making (Wiener, Bornstein, & Voss, 2006; see also Feigenson & Park, 2006). For example, Ask and Granhag (2007) recently examined the effects of anger and sadness on criminal investigators' judgments about the reliability of eyewitness statements, hypothesizing that anger would lead criminal investigators to make judgments based on pre-existing expectations and beliefs, and that sadness would lead to deeper processing.

Participants were actual police investigators, and Ask and Granhag (2007) manipulated sadness and anger by asking participants to remember an event that they had experienced while working as a police officer that made them sad or angry. Participants then read a summary of an assault case, followed by two statements from eyewitnesses. The first statement was always consistent with the prevailing theory about the crime (that the victim's father had committed the assault). The second statement, however, was either consistent with the theory, or inconsistent with it. Participants rated how reliable and trustworthy they thought each eyewitness was, and indicated how much weight they would assign to the witness as evidence. They also rated how likely it was that the father was guilty of committing the assault.

Results showed that sad participants were significantly more convinced that the suspect was guilty when they read the consistent eyewitness statement compared to when they read the inconsistent eyewitness statement; however, there was no difference in judgments of guilt between the two witness statement conditions for the angry participants. Additionally, sad participants in the consistent eyewitness statement

condition perceived the evidence as stronger than did those in the inconsistent condition. Yet, as was found for ratings of guilt, there were no differences in ratings of evidence strength for the angry participants in the consistent and inconsistent conditions (Ask & Granhag, 2007). Sad investigators appear to have processed the information more systematically, detecting differences in evidence quality that angry investigators, processing more heuristically, seem to have missed.

Ask and Granhag (2007) concluded that investigators' emotions might influence their open-mindedness when conducting investigations. If an investigator is angry, he or she may rely too heavily on pre-existing notions about the crime, and not rely enough on new information discovered during an investigation. It is important to note that these participants were experienced police investigators, and yet emotions still influenced their judgments. These results could have important implications for juror decision-making research. Similar to a police investigator, a juror who is angry may form an initial impression of the defendant's guilt, and may not attend to or give sufficient weight to contradictory evidence presented later in a trial. It is also possible that angry people (compared to sad or fearful people) will be more likely to interpret ambiguous evidence to support their initial suspicions or impressions.

This is particularly important to consider in the case of a juvenile being tried as an adult, because research has shown that jurors' initial impressions of juveniles tried as adults are quite negative (Levine et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2009). The experience of an emotion such as anger should exacerbate or facilitate this generic prejudice. If jurors experience anger when faced with a juvenile defendant, they will in turn process more heuristically throughout the juvenile's trial. The effect of anger will have a greater

impact on decisions made about a juvenile tried as an adult compared to an adult defendant because jurors are more likely to endorse negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults compared to adult defendants. Angry jurors will use negative stereotypes about juvenile defendants to make judgments throughout a trial because they will be processing more heuristically.

It is also important to note that Ask and Granhag (2007) found that emotion influenced judgments of police investigators, who have extensive experience with emotion-arousing crimes and evidence. Jurors generally have very little experience with this type of information, and thus may be even more susceptible to the effects of emotions in a legal decision-making setting.

The study of the effect of emotions in this type of trial setting is important because a trial involving a juvenile defendant may elicit stronger emotions in jurors than a trial involving an adult defendant. Violent crimes are inherently upsetting and disturbing, but violent crimes committed by youth may be even more shocking to many people. Moreover, the examination of emotions and their effects on judgment and decision making could help explain the inconsistencies found among the studies investigating juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults. The finding that prosecution-biased participants in one study demonstrated bias against a juvenile tried as an adult (Tang & Nunez, 2003), while in another study participants exhibited this bias regardless of their pretrial bias (Tang et al., 2009), could be explained by the emotions those participants experienced. It is possible that some aspect of the detailed trial summary used by Tang and Nunez (2003) elicited anger only in prosecution-biased participants, causing them to rely on a generic prejudice against all juveniles tried as adults, leading to

harsher judgments of the juvenile defendant. Furthermore, it is possible that the lack of details in Tang et al.'s (2009) research led all jurors to use stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults to make their judgments, simply because they had no other information on which to base them.

CHAPTER 8: Current Research

The goal of this research was to clarify and extend the inconsistent results of previous studies examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried in criminal court by examining the effects of emotion on mock jurors' perceptions of juveniles tried as adults. Study 1 directly assessed which stereotypes people associate with juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adults tried in criminal court. The results of this study were the basis of a stereotyping measure for use in study 2. The purpose of study 2 was to determine whether and under what conditions mock jurors use these stereotypes to make judgments of guilt. Several weeks before completing the main portion of the study, study 2 participants completed a questionnaire assessing negative stereotypes associated with juveniles tried as adults and a measure of pretrial bias consisting of items from both the JBS and the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998; Lecci & Myers, 2002; Lecci & Myers, 2008). For the main portion of the study, participants completed an emotion manipulation, following which they completed a short appraisal questionnaire and an emotion manipulation check. They then read either a written trial summary describing a juvenile or an adult tried for the same crime in criminal court. Participants determined whether the defendant was guilty of committing first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter, and indicated how confident they were in their verdict, in

addition to completing a standard of proof questionnaire, a defendant age manipulation check, and an emotion manipulation check. The resulting design was a 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) between subjects design.

Pretrial bias was included as a covariate because it has been included in the majority of the research studies examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults (Tang & Nunez, 2003; Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003; Tang et al., 2009; Woody & Walker, in press). Other researchers in this area have generally used the JBS to measure pretrial bias, but this study measured pretrial bias using items from both the JBS and the PJAQ, because the PJAQ has demonstrated superior predictive validity in some recently published research (Lecci & Myers, 2008). However, because researchers have used the JBS in the majority of studies examining perceptions of juveniles tried as adults, this study included all items pertaining to both instruments.

The primary purpose of this research was to test whether experienced emotion could clarify the inconsistent results found in several studies regarding prosecution-biased mock jurors, and their perceptions of juveniles tried as adults. Prosecution-biased jurors may be more likely than other jurors are to react with anger when faced with a juvenile tried as an adult. It is possible that in past research prosecution-biased participants treated juveniles tried as adults harshly due to the experience of anger. For purposes of experimental control, this study manipulated emotions instead of measuring naturally occurring emotions. However, an emotion manipulation check assessed what emotions participants in the neutral emotion condition experienced, which served as an indicator of what emotions both defense- and prosecution-biased jurors naturally

experienced in reaction to both juvenile and adult defendants in criminal court. This allowed for an examination of whether prosecution-biased participants did indeed react with anger as opposed to sadness or fear.

Additionally, both the emotions of sadness and fear were included as examples of uncertainty-associated emotions for several reasons. First, sadness and fear are both emotions that an individual could naturally experience in response to a juvenile offender tried as an adult in criminal court. Second, many studies using the Appraisal-Tendency Framework as a basis for studying emotion compare either anger and sadness or anger and fear, but rarely compare sadness and fear. This is likely because sadness and fear are similar in regards to where they stand on the appraisal dimensions of certainty and control, as both emotions are associated with uncertainty and situational control, while anger is associated with certainty and individual/human control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, as demonstrated by Tiedens and Linton (2001), sadness falls more toward the middle of the spectrum for certainty (compared to fear, which lies closer to the uncertain end of the certainty spectrum), such that people will sometimes feel sad and uncertain, and will sometimes feel sad and certain. Therefore, when exposed to a juvenile tried as an adult, people may naturally experience sadness, but depending on their appraisals of the situation, they may experience sadness and uncertainty, or sadness and certainty. If they experiences sadness and uncertainty, they will process information more systematically, similar to fearful individuals. On the other hand, if they experience sadness and certainty, they will process more heuristically, similar to angry individuals. The inclusion of manipulations of both sadness and fear explored the subtle differences between these emotions both of which are potential juror reactions to violent crime.

CHAPTER 9: Study 1

Study 1 assessed whether, and to what extent, individuals associate certain negative stereotypes with juveniles tried as adults, juveniles tried in juvenile court, and adult defendants. A stereotype is "a socially shared set of beliefs about traits that are characteristic of members of a social category" (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Stereotypes guide judgment and behavior in that an individual acts toward a person in a stereotyped group as if that person possesses the traits included in the stereotype. For this reason, it is important to examine whether people hold negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, and what these stereotypes are. Furthermore, because the purpose of study 2 was to assess whether mock jurors use negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults to make guilt determinations, it was necessary to first determine whether people do indeed associate certain negative stereotypes with juveniles tried as adults to a greater extent than they do with juveniles tried in juvenile court and adult offenders.

Several researchers have examined stereotypes about juvenile offenders (not specific to whether they are tried in juvenile or criminal court), finding that some individuals endorse a "superpredator" stereotype while others endorse a "wayward youth" stereotype (Haegerich, 2002, as cited in Tang et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2009). The *superpredator* stereotype describes a juvenile offender as "a serious and violent juvenile offender who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, has the same decision-making competencies as adults, is competent to understand the court process, and has little rehabilitation potential." The *wayward youth* stereotype describes a juvenile offender as "a disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to

adults, does not understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished" (Haegerich, 2002, as cited in Tang et al., 2009). Although these stereotypes are defined as being very specific to juvenile offenders, they were re-worded slightly to be applicable to both juvenile and adult offenders for use in this study.

The questionnaire for use in study 1 included concepts from both research examining stereotypes about juvenile offenders, and research examining stereotypes associated with criminals in general. MacLin and Herrera (2006) examined individuals' stereotypes about criminals, asking participants about the physical characteristics of a "typical" criminal, and about what personality traits are most characteristic of criminals. Some of the traits found to be most characteristic of criminals included, but are not limited to, being angry, vindictive, antisocial, aggressive, hot-tempered, and manipulative (MacLin & Herrera, 2006). Madriz (1997) also examined stereotypes about criminals, but with female participants only. Using in-depth interviews and focus groups, Madriz found that women perceived typical criminals to be lazy, bad, immoral, cruel, and violent, among other things. O'Connor (1984) explored perceptions of violent criminals in Australia, finding that some of the words and concepts associated with violent criminals were dangerous, vicious, unintelligent, commits other crimes, immature, and inconsiderate. The items composing the stereotyping questionnaire in study 1 included some of the stereotypes found to be representative of criminals from the studies described above, in addition to other items (see "Procedure and materials" section for a more detailed description).

In study 1, participants read a brief description of either a juvenile being tried in juvenile court, a juvenile being tried as an adult in criminal court, or an adult being tried

in criminal court for armed robbery. They then rated the extent to which they believed a number of negative stereotypes characterized the accused individual. I expected that participants would rate negative stereotypes to be more characteristic of a juvenile tried as an adult, compared to a juvenile tried in juvenile court and an adult defendant.

Method

Participants. Participants were 67 male and 102 female (N = 169, mean age = 35.6, range 18-70) adults from across the United States. The majority of participants indicated that they were Caucasian (N = 131, 77.5%), while seven indicated they were African American (4.1%), 18 were Asian American (10.7%), two were Hispanic (1.2%), two were Native American (1.2%), and eight indicated that their ethnicity was "other" (4.7%) (ethnicity data for one participant was missing). All participants had at least a high school education, with 36 indicating education at the high school level (N = 36, 21.3%), 24 with an associate's degree (14.2%), 63 with a bachelor's degree (37.3%), 34 with a master's degree (20.1%), and 12 indicating that they had a professional degree (7.1%). The majority of participants were also employed full time (N = 118, 69.8%), 30 were employed part time (17.8%), and 19 were unemployed (11.2%) (employment data for two participants was missing). Study Response, an internet organization operated by Syracuse University, recruited participants for the study. This service sends recruitment and reminder emails to a random sample of individuals who have agreed to participate in web-based research studies. Participants received a five-dollar gift certificate to Amazon.com for their participation.

Procedure and materials. To recruit participants, Study Response sent out invitations to individuals to participate in this study in exchange for a five-dollar gift

certificate to Amazon.com. The email provided a URL address, a username, and a password needed to gain access to the online study materials. Those who did not respond to the initial email invitation received seven- and 14-day reminders. Participants who chose to participate went to a website that randomly assigned them to one of three conditions: juvenile tried in juvenile court vs. juvenile tried in criminal court vs. adult tried in criminal court. All study materials were posted on a website created using SurveyMonkey, an internet survey design and data collection service. Participants completed the study online, in the privacy of their own homes.

When participants entered the study website, they completed a standard consent form (see Appendix A). They then read a very brief newspaper article describing the commission of an armed robbery, and the individual accused of committing the crime (see Appendix B). It briefly described the commission of the crime, and stated that police arrested a suspect and charged him with armed robbery. Depending on the assigned condition, the article went on to state that the suspect was either a 16-year-old who would be tried in juvenile court, a 16-year-old who would be tried as an adult in criminal court, or a 25-year-old who would be tried in criminal court.

Participants then rated the individual in the newspaper article on a number of negative stereotypes that may be associated with juveniles tried as adults, and with criminals in general (see Appendix C). The items on this questionnaire consisted of those that Levine et al. (2001) used in their study of juvenile defendant stereotypes (has committed crimes in the past, has had a lot of previous contact with the police, has gotten into trouble just this one time [reverse scored], has a previous criminal record), and items from Tang et al.'s (2009) research (defendant is a danger to society, defendant is a

chronic offender). It also included items from Madriz's (1997) study of women's stereotypes about criminals (is immoral, is cruel, is lazy, is a bad person, is prone to violence), items from MacLin and Herrera's (2006) study of criminal stereotypes (is aggressive, is vindictive, is antisocial, is hot-tempered, is manipulative), and items from O'Connor's (1984) study on perceptions of criminals (is intelligent [reverse scored], is immature). Furthermore, the questionnaire included items that represent stereotypes people may hold about both juveniles tried as adults and criminals in general (uses illegal drugs, could probably be rehabilitated [reverse scored], knows right from wrong, and does not feel remorse). Participants in all conditions also completed two additional items addressing common stereotypes about juvenile offenders from Haegerich's (2002, as cited in Tang et al., 2009) research (is a superpredator, is a wayward youth). Participants read a definition of each of these two terms, based on Haegerich's definitions (the wording of the wayward youth item was modified so that in the 25-year-old condition participants determined how likely the individual in the article was a wayward youth when he was a teenager). Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each statement on a nine-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *somewhat,* 9 = *completely*). They then completed a brief demographics questionnaire (see Appendix D), which included questions about participant age, gender, ethnicity, education, prior jury experience, juror eligibility items, and religious and political preferences. Participants also completed a manipulation check question that asked what the age of the individual in the newspaper article was, and they answered one question that asked what they thought the race of the individual in the newspaper article was. Although the name of the individual in the newspaper article was found to be race-neutral in other research (Keller,

2010), it was important to examine what race participants perceived the individual to be. Following this, they read a short debriefing statement (see Appendix E).

Results

Preliminary analyses. Participants' responses to the manipulation check question showed some differences between conditions. While 49 (94.2%) of the 52 participants in the 16-year-old in juvenile court condition indicated that the individual in the article was 16-years-old, 50 (86.2%) of the 58 participants in the 16-year-old in adult court condition indicated that the individual was 16-years-old. Furthermore, only 35 (61.4%) of the 57 participants who completed the manipulation check in the 25-year-old in adult court condition indicated that the individual was 25 (two participants in this condition did not answer the manipulation check question). A chi-square test of the condition by accurate responses to the age manipulation showed a significant relationship between accurate responses to the manipulation check and defendant age condition, $\chi^2(2) = 20.48$, $p < .001$. Participants more accurately reported the age of the younger as compared to the older offender.

With regard to responses to the question asking what race participants believed the individual in the newspaper article to be, 59 (34.9%) participants indicated that they thought the individual was White, 43 (25.4%) believed the individual was Black, four (2.4%) believed he was Hispanic, and 63 (37.3%) participants indicated that they did not know what the individual's race was. Thus, there was no indication that participants viewed the defendant as either Black or White.

The average completion time for study 1 was 6 minutes and 24 seconds, with a standard deviation of 12 minutes and 49 seconds.

Factor analysis. A factor analysis examined whether the stereotype data comprised distinct subscales. Submitting all items to a factor analysis using principal component analysis and the varimax rotation method, produced two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00. The first factor (named Chronic Predator factor) explained 40.4% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 9.69. Using a loading cutoff of .49, several items loaded uniquely on this factor, including: whether the defendant has committed other crimes in the past (.79), uses illegal drugs (.78), is vindictive (.66), is a chronic offender (.84), is lazy (.57), has a previous criminal record (.84), is hot-tempered (.49), has had a lot of previous contact with the police (.82), is manipulative (.62), does not feel remorse for what he has done (.63), and is a superpredator (.56). The second factor (named Antisocial factor) explained 11.1% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 2.66. Loading on this factor were: the defendant is aggressive (.72), is a danger to society (.82), is immoral (.80), is cruel (.77), is a bad person (.80), is prone to violence (.72), and is antisocial (.60). Averaging the scores of the items that loaded on each of the factors resulted in two subscales each demonstrating strong internal consistency reliability (Chronic Predator factor, $\alpha = .93$; Antisocial factor, $\alpha = .90$).

Next, to test whether participants rated negative stereotypes as more characteristic of a juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other two defendants, these scales served as the dependent variables in a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with defendant type and gender as the independent variables. There was a significant multivariate effect for defendant type, *Wilk's* $\lambda = .94$, $F(4, 324) = 2.66$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, and for the defendant type by gender interaction, *Wilk's* $\lambda = .91$, $F(4, 324) = 3.89$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. The multivariate effect for gender was not significant, *Wilk's* $\lambda = .98$, $F(2, 162)$

= 1.84, $p = .16$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. There were significant univariate defendant type effects on both stereotype subscales: $F(2, 163) = 4.11$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$ for Chronic Predator, and $F(2, 163) = 3.09$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ for Antisocial. Post-hoc tests showed that participants who read about the 25-year-old defendant had higher scores on the Chronic Predator subscale than did those who read about both of the 16-year-old defendants. Post-hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences among the three defendant type conditions for Antisocial subscale scores. Unfortunately, there were no significant differences between the 16-year-old tried as an adult and either of the other two conditions. There were also significant univariate interactions between defendant type and gender for both stereotype subscales, $F(2, 163) = 6.63$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$ for Chronic Predator, and $F(2, 163) = 6.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$ for Antisocial.

A follow-up MANOVA with defendant type as the independent variable examined the interactions, by including only the data for the male participants. There was a significant multivariate effect, *Wilk's* $\lambda = .77$, $F(4, 126) = 4.34$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, and significant univariate effects for defendant type on both stereotype subscales: Chronic Predator, $F(2, 64) = 6.49$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$; Antisocial, $F(2, 64) = 8.25$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$. Post-hoc tests using the Least Significant Difference (LSD) ($p < .05$) method revealed that men who read about the 16-year-old tried as an adult ($M = 6.05$, $SD = 1.80$) and the 25-year-old adult defendant ($M = 5.36$, $SD = 1.96$) had significantly higher scores on the Chronic Predator subscale than did those who read about the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court ($M = 4.01$, $SD = 1.92$). Furthermore, men's scores on the Antisocial subscale were significantly higher for those who read about the 16-year-old tried as an adult ($M = 7.46$, $SD = .94$) compared to those who read about the 16-year-old tried in

juvenile court (M = 5.61, SD = 1.79) and those who read about the 25-year-old adult defendant (M = 6.50, SD = 1.70).

The same MANOVA as described above using only data from the female participants failed to yield a significant multivariate effect, *Wilk's* λ = .96, $F(4, 196)$ = 1.11, p = .35, η_p^2 = .02. Furthermore, neither univariate effect was significant: Chronic Predator, $F(2, 99)$ = 2.06, p = .13, η_p^2 = .04; Antisocial, $F(2, 99)$ = .44, p = .65, η_p^2 = .01.

MANOVA with individual stereotype items. A MANOVA, which included defendant type (condition) and gender of the participant as between subject factors, treated participants' responses on all individual stereotype items as dependent variables. There was a significant multivariate effect for gender, *Wilk's* λ = .77, $F(24, 135)$ = 1.66, p = .04, η_p^2 = .23. Several of the univariate effects for gender were also significant, including the defendant is immature, $F(1, 158)$ = 4.86, p = .03, η_p^2 = .03; is intelligent (reverse coded), $F(1, 158)$ = 4.19, p = .04, η_p^2 = .03; got into trouble just this one time (reverse coded), $F(1, 158)$ = 6.73, p = .01, η_p^2 = .04; and could probably be rehabilitated (reverse coded), $F(1, 158)$ = 5.81, p = .02, η_p^2 = .04. Examination of the means showed that men endorsed "is immature" (M = 6.90, SD = 1.97) to a greater extent than did women (M = 6.11, SD = 2.20). However, after reverse coding, men endorsed the remaining three significant stereotype items to a lesser extent than did women ("intelligent" M_{men} = 5.73, M_{women} = 6.50; "trouble" M_{men} = 5.40, M_{women} = 6.38; "rehabilitated" M_{men} = 3.79, M_{women} = 4.50).

The remaining multivariate effects were not significant: defendant type, *Wilk's* λ = .66, $F(48, 270)$ = 1.30, p = .10, η_p^2 = .19; defendant type by gender interaction, *Wilk's* λ = .71, $F(48, 270)$ = 1.05, p = .39, η_p^2 = .16. There were, however, significant univariate

defendant type effects for several of the items. These included, the defendant has a previous criminal record, $F(2, 161) = 3.66$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; is antisocial $F(2, 161) = 3.11$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; is hot-tempered, $F(2, 161) = 4.53$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$; is manipulative, $F(2, 161) = 3.03$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; is a superpredator, $F(2, 161) = 3.20$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; and got into trouble just this one time (reverse coded), $F(2, 161) = 4.29$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Post-hoc tests using the LSD method ($p < .05$) revealed that participants rated the 25-year-old defendant as more likely to have a previous criminal record compared to the 16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated the 16-year-old tried as an adult as being more antisocial than the 16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated both the 25-year-old and 16-year-old tried as an adult as being more hot-tempered than the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court; they rated the 25-year-old as being more manipulative than the 16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated the 25-year-old as more likely to be a superpredator than the 16-year-old in juvenile court; and they rated the 16-year-old in juvenile court as more likely to have gotten into trouble more than just this one time compared to the 16-year-old in adult court (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). There were no significant differences between the adult defendant and the 16-year-old tried as an adult. Table 1 shows that the juvenile tried in juvenile court generally showed lower stereotype scores, however the differences between those scores and the scores for the other two conditions (juvenile tried as an adult and the adult in criminal court) were not always consistent.

The results also showed significant univariate interactions between defendant type and gender for several of the items, including the defendant is a danger to society, $F(2, 158) = 5.23$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$; uses illegal drugs, $F(2, 158) = 4.30$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$; is

vindictive, $F(2, 158) = 9.03$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$; is a chronic offender, $F(2, 158) = 6.53$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$; is immoral, $F(2, 158) = 5.12$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$; has a previous criminal record, $F(2, 158) = 3.29$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; is cruel, $F(2, 158) = 7.86$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$; is a bad person, $F(2, 158) = 4.80$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$; has had a lot of previous contact with police, $F(2, 158) = 4.41$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$; does not feel remorse, $F(2, 158) = 3.55$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; and is a superpredator, $F(2, 158) = 3.96$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$.

Follow-up univariate F-tests using only data from the male participants, with defendant type as the between subjects variable, produced a number of significant effects (see Table 2 for F-tests for each significant stereotype item). Post-hoc tests using the LSD method revealed that male participants rated the 16-year-old tried as an adult as being more of a danger to society, more vindictive, and more prone to violence than they did the adult defendant (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). For a number of the significant stereotype items male participants gave higher ratings to the 16-year-old tried as an adult compared to the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court (has committed other crimes in the past, is aggressive, is a danger to society, uses illegal drugs, is vindictive, is a chronic offender, is immoral, is cruel, is a bad person, and is prone to violence). For the remainder of the significant stereotype items male participants gave higher ratings to both the 16-year-old tried as an adult and the adult defendant compared to the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court (has a previous criminal record, is hot-tempered, has had a lot of previous contact with police, is manipulative, does not feel remorse for what he has done, and is a superpredator). Thus, as the factor score analyses reported above, men showed more differences in stereotype scores across defendant type, which tended to support men endorsing an overall stereotype of juveniles tried as adults.

Follow-up univariate F-tests using only data from the female participants, with defendant type as the between subjects variable, produced only three univariate effects for defendant type. These were, whether the defendant is vindictive, $F(2, 98) = 3.61$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$; is a chronic offender, $F(2, 98) = 3.16$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$; and got into trouble more than just this one time, $F(2, 98) = 3.48$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Post-hoc tests revealed that women rated the 25-year-old defendant as being more vindictive ($M = 5.06$, $SD = 2.37$) and more likely to be a chronic offender ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.14$) than the 16-year-old tried as an adult (vindictive, $M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.79$; chronic offender, $M = 3.74$, $SD = 2.15$). They also rated the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court as being more likely to have gotten into trouble more than just this one time ($M = 6.94$, $SD = 1.61$) compared to the 16-year-old tried as an adult ($M = 5.74$, $SD = 1.97$). Women did not endorse more any of the stereotypes for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants. Thus, evidence for a stereotype of youth tried as adults is much weaker for women than for men.

Binary logistic regression analysis. Another way to test for stereotypes against juveniles tried as adults uses binary logistic regression to discriminate between conditions (16-year-old tried in juvenile court vs. 16-year-old tried in adult court vs. 25-year-old tried in adult court) as a function of participant ratings on the stereotype items. The first regression used as the criterion variable a dummy coded factor which compared the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court (0) and the 16-year-old tried as an adult (1) using all 24 stereotype items as predictors. The model was not significant, $\chi^2(24, N = 106) = 31.70$, $p = .14$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .35$. The second regression comparing the 16-year-old tried as a juvenile with the 25-year-old tried as an adult produced a significant effect, $\chi^2(24, N =$

107) = 40.16, p = .02, *Nagelkerke* R^2 = .42. The model predicted 69.4% (n = 34) of the 16-year-old juvenile and 72.4% (n = 42) of the 25-year-old adult conditions correctly, for an overall accuracy of 71.0%. Only one stereotype item, knows the difference between right and wrong, reliably predicted condition membership, B = -.41, *Wald* = 10.60, p = .001, *Exp(B)* = .66. Participants who read about the adult defendant were almost half as likely to indicate that he knew the difference between right and wrong compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court. The third regression compared the 16-year-old tried as an adult (dummy coded 0) with the 25-year-old tried in adult criminal court (dummy coded 1). The model was nearly significant, $\chi^2(24, N = 115) = 35.91$, p = .06, *Nagelkerke* R^2 = .36. The model accurately predicted 73.7% (n = 42) of the 16-year-old adult and 69.0% (n = 40) of the 25-year-old adult conditions, for an overall accuracy of 71.3%. Five of the stereotype items significantly contributed to the model. They were: uses illegal drugs, B = -.39, *Wald* = 3.95, p = .05, *Exp(B)* = .67; is prone to violence, B = -.48, *Wald* = 4.94, p = .03, *Exp(B)* = .62; is immature, B = .35, *Wald* = 4.02, p = .05, *Exp(B)* = 1.41; knows the difference between right and wrong, B = -.37, *Wald* = 9.46, $p < .01$, *Exp(B)* = .69; and does not feel remorse for what he has done, B = .48, *Wald* = 6.86, p = .01, *Exp(B)* = 1.62. Participants who read about the juvenile tried as an adult were more likely to indicate that he used illegal drugs, was prone to violence, and knew the difference between right and wrong compared to the adult defendant. Participants who read about the adult defendant were more likely to indicate that he was immature and that he did not feel remorse for what he had done compared to the juvenile tried as an adult.

Discussion

The results of study 1 suggest that some people do endorse more some negative stereotype items about criminals for juveniles tried as adults as compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adult defendants. Men endorsed more strongly a number of stereotype items (has committed other crimes in the past, is aggressive, is a danger to society, uses illegal drugs, is vindictive, is a chronic offender, is immoral, is cruel, is a bad person, and is prone to violence) for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court. The same result emerged for the Chronic Predator factor. Furthermore, men also more strongly endorsed three of the stereotype items (is a danger to society, is vindictive, and is prone to violence) for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the adult defendant. Men also had higher scores on the Antisocial factor when they read about the juvenile tried as an adult compared to both other defendants. This subscale contained all of the items men endorsed more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court, and it contained two of the three items men endorsed more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the adult defendant. Women did not endorse any stereotype items or subscales more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants.

Results from a logistic regression suggest that the endorsement of three stereotype items reliably differentiated defendant-type condition membership. Those who endorsed uses illegal drugs, is prone to violence, and knows the difference between right and wrong, were more likely to have read about the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the adult defendant (these results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the model was only nearly statistically significant). These results, combined with the results of the MANOVAs, suggest that at least one stereotype item (prone to violence) may be

consistently viewed as more characteristic of juveniles tried as adults compared to adult defendants, and a handful of other items may be more characteristic of juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court.

Overall, the analyses utilizing the factors from the factor analysis provide the most clear and concise results regarding participants' stereotype endorsements. Men endorsed one factor more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court, and endorsed the other factor more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to both other defendants. The use of two distinct factors allowed for a less complicated summary of participants' views of juveniles tried as adults, compared to the analyses that included all of the stereotype items individually.

Men seemed to endorse negative stereotypes more strongly for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants, while women did not show this bias. Although the original hypotheses did not address any potential differences between men and women's judgments of juveniles tried as adults, there is research that suggests that men are more punitive and endorse rehabilitation less as a goal of punishment for crimes as compared to women (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 2002). Studies have also shown that men tend to favor the death penalty more than women do (Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995; Bohm, 1998). It could be that men exhibited some bias toward the juvenile tried as an adult because they tend to have attitudes toward criminals that are more punitive in general. Men's bias toward all criminals may augment their negative views or stereotypes of juveniles tried as adults. On the other hand, women would be less likely to judge a juvenile tried as an adult harshly if they do indeed tend to be less punitive and more in favor of rehabilitation. This

could be particularly true when the criminal is a juvenile defendant, because regardless of the trial venue, the young age of the defendant could reinforce notions of rehabilitation rather than punishment.

The results of the manipulation check could also provide some explanation for the stereotype endorsements observed in the main analyses. A large number of participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition were unable to identify accurately the age of the defendant. A chi-square test demonstrated a significant relationship between defendant age condition and accuracy in answers on the manipulation check question, suggesting that the inaccuracy of participants in the 25-year-old condition did not occur by chance. It could be that something about the 25-year-old condition led participants to focus less on the age of the defendant, and in turn, led them to make judgments about the stereotype items differently than the participants who were aware of the defendant's age. The large number of participants who seem to have missed the 25-year-old defendant age manipulation may have weakened any effects of defendant age on stereotype endorsement.

Another possible explanation for these results is that people do endorse specific negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, but that they were not included on this stereotype questionnaire. Although the questionnaire consisted of items drawn from the literature on criminal stereotypes, it is possible that negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults are very specific and different from general stereotypes about criminals. Future research should examine a broader spectrum of stereotypes, based on not only stereotypes about criminals, but also stereotypes about adolescents in general.

CHAPTER 10: Study 2

Study 2 utilized the results from study 1 to examine whether the experience of specific emotions affects mock jurors' use of negative stereotypes to make judgments of guilt for a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant. Participants completed the stereotype items from study 1 and a pretrial bias measure, several weeks before completing the second phase of the study. During the second phase, participants completed an emotion manipulation, and then read either a short trial summary describing a juvenile or an adult being tried for the same crime in criminal court. The defendant age condition did not include a juvenile being tried in juvenile court because in the juvenile justice system juries do not determine guilt. For this reason, the majority of the jury studies in this area leave out conditions in which a juvenile court adjudicates a youth with criminal charges. One study that did include this type of condition found no differences between mock jurors' judgments of a juvenile in juvenile court and of an adult defendant in criminal court (Tang et al., 2009).

Participants in study 2 indicated whether they believed the defendant was guilty or not guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and indicated their confidence in their verdict. Finally, they indicated what standard of proof they used to determine the defendant's guilt. The resulting design was a 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) between subjects design.

Hypotheses for this design included a main effect for emotion, such that compared to sad, fearful, and neutral participants, angry participants would make harsher judgments about both defendants on all dependent variables, and a main effect for defendant age, with participants judging the juvenile defendant more harshly on all

dependent variables compared to the adult defendant. The last expected main effect hypothesis concerned pretrial bias, such that those individuals who indicated a greater prosecution bias (as opposed to defense bias) would make harsher judgments about both types of defendant on all dependent variables.

Other hypotheses included a two-way interaction between stereotyping and defendant age, such that as participants' stereotyping scores increased (indicating greater negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults) they would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than would those participants with lower stereotyping scores. Those participants in the adult defendant condition would judge both defendants equally regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure. A second two-way interaction hypothesis involving emotion and defendant age anticipated that angry participants would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would the adult defendant on all dependent measures. Sad, fearful, and neutral participants would show no differences in their judgments of the juvenile and adult defendants. Another interaction between emotion and pretrial bias predicted that neutral and angry participants who were more prosecution-biased, would judge both types of defendants more harshly than those neutral and angry participants who were more defense-biased. There should have been no differences in prosecution- and defense-biased participants' judgments within the sad and fearful emotion conditions because the experience of sadness and fear should lead to more systematic processing, allowing these participants to make decisions based on details of the case rather than relying on their pre-existing attitudes.

Finally, and most importantly, the literature reviewed favored a three-way interaction between emotion, defendant age, and stereotyping. Angry participants who

received higher scores on the stereotyping measure (indicating greater negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults) would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would the adult defendant. Angry participants who received lower scores on the stereotyping measure would judge the juvenile and adult defendants equally. Based on this logic, participants in the neutral emotion condition who received higher scores on the stereotyping measure would also judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would judge the adult defendant, but the size of this effect would be smaller than the effect found among angry participants who received high scores on the stereotyping measure. Sad and fearful participants would judge the juvenile and adult defendants equally, regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure. Furthermore, scores on the stereotyping measure would mediate the interaction between emotion and defendant age, such that the interaction would no longer be significant after controlling stereotyping scores. Similarly, appraisals of certainty would mediate the effects of anger on judgments made about the juvenile defendant, such that the relationship between anger and judgments of the juvenile defendant would attenuate after controlling for certainty.

Method

Participants. Participants were 178 male and 188 female (N = 367, one did not indicate his or her gender) jury-eligible adults (mean age = 42.2, SD = 13.8, range = 18-86) from across the United States. To be jury eligible in most states, an individual must be 18 or older and must either have a drivers license or be registered to vote in that state. The majority of participants indicated that they were Caucasian (N = 316, 86.1%), while 13 indicated they were African American (3.5%), 17 were Asian American (4.6%), nine were Hispanic (2.5%), one was Latin American (.3%), two were Native American (.5%),

and eight indicated that their ethnicity was "other" (2.2%) (one participant did not indicate his or her ethnicity). Participants indicated a variety of education levels, with one participant indicating less than a high school education (.3%), 109 with a high school education (29.7%), 68 with an associate's degree (18.5%), 139 with a bachelor's degree (37.9%), 37 with a master's degree (10.1%), and 12 indicating that they had a professional degree (3.3%) (one participant did not indicate his or her education level). A little more than half of the participants indicated that they were employed full time (N = 209, 56.9%), 44 indicated that they were employed part time (12.0%), and 108 indicated that they were unemployed (29.4%) (employment data for six participants was missing).

Procedure. Data collection for study 2 consisted of two phases.

Phase one. The first phase of data collection involved completing two questionnaires, the pretrial bias questionnaire, and the stereotyping measure from study 1. Participants also read a short crime scenario and indicated whether they believed the defendant in the scenario was guilty, which served as a distracter from the true purpose of the research. Study Response sent email invitations to individuals who met jury-eligibility requirements (they were at least 18 years old and were either registered voters or held valid drivers' licenses in their state of residence). Study response invited people to participate in this research in exchange for a total of 15 dollars in Amazon.com gift certificates. The email explained that participants would receive five dollars in gift certificates for completing the first phase of data collection, and then would receive the remaining 10 dollars in gift certificates for completing the second phase. Phase 1 recruitment over-sampled by 50 percent to account for attrition in phase 2. The email provided a URL address, a username, and a password needed to gain access to the online

study materials. Those who did not respond to the initial email invitation received seven- and 14-day reminders. All study materials were posted on a website created using SurveyMonkey, an internet survey design and data collection service. Participants completed the study online, in the privacy of their own homes.

Participants who chose to participate went to a website where they first completed a standard consent form (see Appendix F). Participants then completed the stereotyping measure from study 1 (see Appendix G). Next, they completed the pretrial bias questionnaire (see Appendix H) labeled "Legal Opinions Survey" to conceal the true purpose of the measure (Tang & Nunez, 2003). Following this, participants completed a shortened version of the Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire (Appendix I), read a short crime scenario, and determined whether the defendant in the scenario was guilty (see Appendix J). The Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire and crime scenario task served to distract participants from the true purpose of the study.

Phase two. The second phase of the study occurred approximately two to three weeks later, so that the act of completing the pretrial bias measure and stereotyping measure would not unduly influence participants' responses on the juror decision-making task. Study Response contacted participants who participated in phase one, and asked them to participate in phase two of the study in exchange for a 10-dollar Amazon.com gift certificate. If they chose to participate, an email directed them to a website that randomly assigned them to one of the eight conditions created by crossing the emotion and defendant age factors.

When participants first entered the study website, they learned that they would participate in two short unrelated experiments, one examining how individuals write

about life events (Bodenhausen et al., 1994), and the other examining legal decision making (see Appendix K). Participants then completed the emotion manipulation (see Appendix L). Although participants completed the emotion manipulation before they read the trial summary, research on the Appraisal-Tendency Framework shows that the appraisals associated with an emotional state, will carry over and affect subsequent, unrelated judgments and decisions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). After completing the emotion manipulation, participants completed a shortened version of Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) appraisal questionnaire (see Appendix M).

Before continuing on to the next part of the study, participants completed emotion manipulation checks to assess whether the emotion induction had an immediate effect on participants' emotional experiences independent of the case facts (see Appendix N). The facts of the case which participants evaluated may have influenced their emotions, thus the emotion manipulation check that participants completed at the end of the study may not have been an accurate indicator of what they were feeling when they first began to read about the case.

Once participants completed the emotion manipulation check, the survey website provided them with materials for the ostensible second study. First, participants read a short set of instructions, explaining that they would read about a case in which the defendant was being charged with first-degree murder, and that they should put themselves in the position of a juror who was hearing the case in court. The instructions stated that the participants would determine whether the defendant was guilty at the end of the trial summary.

Participants then read a relatively short (six pages) written trial summary, describing a case that was ambiguous as to whether the defendant was guilty or innocent (see Appendix O). A pilot study with undergraduate student participants demonstrated that the scenarios produced ambiguous ratings of the defendant's guilt. In the final pilot study version of the trial summary used in the main part of study 2, 54% of the participants found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter and 46% found him not guilty of any charge. Depending on their assigned condition, participants read either that a 16-year-old male was being charged with murder and tried as an adult in criminal court, or that a 25-year-old male was being charged with murder and tried in criminal court. Previous research using a 16-year-old defendant found some bias against that defendant when he was tried as an adult in criminal court (Tang & Nunez, 2003), and other research examining juror perceptions of juvenile defendants used a 25-year-old defendant as the adult defendant in a similar study (Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003).

After reading the trial summary, participants answered a manipulation check question that asked what the defendant's age was in the trial summary (see Appendix P). This question was one of several others (i.e., "What is the defendant's name?") so that the purpose of the study was not obvious. This question served not only as a manipulation check, but also served to reinforce the age manipulation before participants completed the dependent measures. Participants then rendered a verdict (guilty or not guilty) for each of the charges (first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter). Participants also indicated their certainty in the correctness of each verdict, and answered a question assessing the standard of proof they used to determine the defendant's guilt

(see Appendix Q). Following this, participants completed an emotion manipulation check (see Appendix N). Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix R), and read a debriefing statement (see Appendix S).

Materials. In order to prevent participants from discovering the true purpose of the study, the informed consent form described the study as being three separate experiments that different members of a research group were conducting (see Appendix F). The consent form stated that a group of researchers studying social cognition was interested in a number of different types of information processing, and to facilitate data collection they combined several of their experiments. The consent form went on to explain that data collection would occur at two different points in time. The first phase of data collection would occur immediately following reading of the consent form, and would consist of "Experiment 1." The second phase of data collection would occur several weeks later and would consist of "Experiments 2 and 3." The research was described in this manner to avoid suspicion about the pretrial bias and stereotyping measures being related to the second phase of the study, and to avoid suspicion about the emotion manipulation being related to the juror decision-making task.

The stereotyping questionnaire (see Appendix G) included all of the stereotyping items used in study 1. This measure instructed participants to "Imagine a juvenile who has committed a crime and is now being tried as an adult in criminal court." It went on to instruct them to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a number of statements concerning the individual that they imagined. The instruction allowed the use of the same wording for each stereotype item on the questionnaire as in study 1. Participants rated each item on a nine-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *somewhat,* 9 = *completely*).

The pretrial bias questionnaire consisted of items from both the JBS (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983) and the PJAQ (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998; Lecci & Myers, 2002; Lecci & Myers, 2008) (see Appendix H). The JBS consists of 17 items that assess juror pretrial bias along two dimensions, probability of commission and reasonable doubt. The PJAQ consists of 29 items designed to measure pretrial bias, including 12 of the items from the JBS. Lecci and Myers (2002, 2008) developed the PJAQ using items from the JBS and other measures of pretrial bias and using a lay consensual approach to generate new items. An example of some of the items on the JBS and the PJAQ are, "If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime," "Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime," and "A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty." Aggregated answers to these items yielded two subscales that make up the JBS, and three of the six subscales that make up the PJAQ. Analyses included only three of the PJAQ subscales (conviction proneness, system confidence, and cynicism toward the defense), because they are the three that are most similar to the constructs assessed that make up the JBS.

The Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire items only served as a distracter from the true purpose of the study; therefore, I did not analyze responses to this measure. An example of some items on the questionnaire are, "A charge of rape two days after the act has occurred is probably not rape," and "Rapists are motivated more by a desire for power than by a desire for sex" (see Appendix I). The crime scenario that served as a distracter described an attempted sexual assault (see Appendix J). Participants read a one-page scenario describing the attempted sexual assault and then determined whether

the defendant in the scenario was guilty or not guilty of first-degree attempted sexual assault.

At the beginning of the second phase of data collection participants read a cover sheet explaining that they were going to be participating in two separate experiments, one relating to life events and one relating to legal decision making (see Appendix K). Following this, participants completed the emotion manipulation (see Appendix L). The emotion manipulation, labeled the "Life Events Questionnaire," informed participants that the researchers were interested in how individuals write about life events. The instructions asked participants in the anger condition to write about three to five things that make them angry, then to describe in more detail the one situation that makes them, or has made them, most angry. The instructions also asked participants to write the description so that someone reading it might get angry just from learning about the event (Small & Lerner, 2008). In the sad and fearful conditions, the instructions were the same, except that they asked participants to write about three to five things that make them sad or scared. The neutral emotion condition instructed participants to write about three to five activities that they had done that day. The instructions next asked participants to write a detailed description of two of the activities that they had described in the first question, and to write the description so that someone reading it could reconstruct the way in which the individual completed those activities (Small & Lerner, 2008).

Participants then completed a shortened version of Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) appraisal questionnaire, in which they completed three items assessing appraisals of certainty and three items assessing appraisals of control on nine-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *somewhat*, and 9 = *extremely*) (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth,

1985) (see Appendix M). Each question asked to what extent the events the participant described on the emotion manipulation were certain or uncertain, and to what extent the events were under individual versus situational control. The three certainty items demonstrated poor reliability (internal consistency $\alpha = .46$), as did the three control items (internal consistency $\alpha = .22$). Therefore, all analyses used these items individually, rather than averaged together as a single scale.

After completing the appraisal questionnaire, participants completed an emotion manipulation check (see Appendix N). The manipulation check asked participants to report how they felt "right now" by rating six emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise) on nine-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *moderately*, 9 = *extremely strongly*).

The trial summary that participants read reflected the events in a real case involving a juvenile who a jury found guilty of murdering a woman in his neighborhood during an attempted burglary (see Appendix O). In this trial summary, the defendant faced a charge of first-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of a woman. The trial summary included brief overviews of the prosecution's and defense's opening statements, witness testimonies (including testimony of the defendant), and closing arguments of the prosecution and defense. In this scenario, police found the victim's blood on items in a duffle bag belonging to the defendant in an abandoned van near his house. The defendant admitted to entering some of his other neighbors' homes and stealing their credit card information, but denied murdering the victim, and suggested that his friend who was involved in the credit card thefts was the one responsible for the murder. There were two versions of the trial summary, one in which the defendant was

described as a 25-year-old adult, and one in which he was described as a 16-year-old juvenile. All information in the trial summaries was identical except for the age of the defendant, and the age of one of the witnesses (the summary described the defendant's friend as being the same age as the defendant to bolster the age manipulation). In addition, in the 16-year-old defendant trial summary the instructions on the first page stated that the juvenile was being tried as an adult in criminal court. Keller (2010) tested the names of the defendant and his friend and found them to be race-neutral.

After reading the trial summary, participants completed the age manipulation check, which read, "How old is the defendant?" (see Appendix P). It also asked participants what the defendant's name was and how the victim died, to distract from the true purpose of the study. Participants then completed the Final Verdict Questionnaire (see Appendix Q). They read instructions explaining that the state bears the burden of proof to convince the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged, and they read the statutory definitions of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter according to Nebraska law. They then indicated what they believed was the appropriate verdict (guilty or not guilty) for each of the three charges, and they indicated their certainty in the correctness of each verdict on 9-point scales, with 1 equaling "*not at all certain*" and 9 equaling "*very certain*." Participants then indicated what standard of proof they used to determine the defendant's guilt. This question read, "The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a __% chance that he committed the crime" (Tang & Nunez, 2003), and required respondents to fill in the percentage.

Following this, participants completed a second emotion manipulation check (see Appendix N), in which they were asked to report how they felt after completing the juror decision-making task by rating the six emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise) a second time on nine-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *moderately*, 9 = *extremely strongly*).

Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix R), which consisted of items asking about participant age, gender, ethnicity, education, prior jury experience, juror eligibility items, and religious and political preferences. There was also one question that asked what participants believed the defendant's race to be, and two suspicion check questions, included to determine whether participants knew the true purpose of the study. After completing the demographics questionnaire, participants read a debriefing statement (see Appendix S).

Results

Preliminary analyses.

Data cleaning. To be jury-eligible in most states, citizens must be at least 18 years old and without felony convictions. Jury clerks select individuals at random from lists of registered voters and people with valid driver's licenses. To simulate jury clerk selection, the final data set did not include three participants who were not registered to vote and did not have a valid driver's license, one participant who was not a United States citizen, and eight participants who indicated that they were felons without civil rights. I also removed 14 participants who did not complete the emotion manipulation: five originally assigned to the anger condition, three from the sadness condition, three from the fear condition, and three from the neutral condition. Thus, participants removed

because of failure to complete the emotion measures came from each of the study conditions. Finally, although a number of participants realized that the emotion manipulation was related to the juror decision-making task in the second part of the study, none indicated that they knew how or why emotions would affect decision making, therefore no participants were excluded based on their responses to suspicion check questions. The final data set consisted of 178 jury-eligible men and 188 jury-eligible women (and one participant who did not indicate his or her gender) randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions.

Defendant age manipulation check. Of the 184 participants in the 16-year-old defendant condition who completed the manipulation check, 162 (88.0%) correctly answered that the defendant in the trial summary was 16 years old. Of the 171 participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition who completed the manipulation check, 133 (77.8%) correctly answered that the defendant was 25 years old. A chi-square test revealed that there was a significant relationship between defendant age condition and accurate completion of the manipulation check, $\chi^2(1) = 6.65$, $p = .01$. As in study 1, a sizable minority of participants in the 25-year-old condition did not accurately identify the defendant's age, which may have affected their decision making in the remainder of the study. The discussion section addresses this limitation more fully.

Defendant race. With regard to participants' responses to the question on the demographics questionnaire about the defendant's race, of 367 participants, 189 (51.5%) indicated that they thought the defendant was White, 51 (13.9%) indicated that they thought the defendant was Black, and 127 (34.6%) indicated that they did not know, or had not thought about the race of the defendant. Of the 185 participants in the16-year-old

defendant condition, 91 (49.2%) indicated that the defendant was White, 28 (15.1%) indicated that the defendant was Black, and 66 (35.7%) indicated that they did not know what the race of the defendant was. Of the 182 participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, 98 (53.8%) indicated that the defendant was White, 23 (12.6%) indicated that the defendant was Black, and 61 (33.5%) indicated that they did not know the race of the defendant.

Pretrial bias measures. A summed score for the 17 items that make up the JBS scale resulted in scale values ranging from 23 to 77 (scores can range from 17 to 85), with a mean of 53.27 (*SD* = 7.68) and a median of 54. The internal consistency (coefficient alpha) for this scale was .66. Summed scores for the 18 items constituting the three subscales of the PJAQ ranged from 18 to 81 (scores can range from 18 to 90), with a mean of 56.45 (*SD* = 10.41) and a median of 56. The internal consistency for this scale was .83. For both measures, higher scores indicate greater prosecution and conviction bias, while lower scores indicate greater defense bias. The analyses that follow make use of the PJAQ and not the JBS because the reliability of the PJAQ was much higher.

Stereotyping measure. Factor analysis of the stereotype items in study 1 provided two distinct stereotype factors. Male participants rated one of the factors significantly higher for juveniles tried as adults compared to adult defendants. Analyses with these stereotype factors provided the most concise evidence of a stereotype of juveniles transferred to criminal court. For this reason, the stereotype subscales in study 2 averaged the same items that resulted from the study 1 factor analysis. The subscales

both demonstrated more than adequate internal consistency (Chronic Predator, α = .93; Antisocial, α = .91), therefore the main analyses make use of these factors.

Attrition. Of the 471 participants who completed the first phase of study 2, 393 (83.4%) of those completed the second phase as well, with 78 (16.6%) participants dropping out of the study between phases 1 and 2. To identify which participants dropped out of the study before phase 2 I created a new variable in which those participants who completed both phases of the study were coded as zero and those who only completed phase 1 were coded as one. To examine any significant differences in pretrial bias scores and stereotyping scores among participants who did and did not complete the second phase of the study, I submitted the phase one data for all participants to a one-way ANOVA, with the new variable as the between subjects variable and pretrial bias and both stereotype subscales as the dependent variables. There were no significant differences between those participants who did and did not complete phase 2 of the study for pretrial bias, $F(1, 469) = .31$, $p = .58$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, the Chronic Predator subscale, $F(1, 469) = .093$, $p = .76$, $\eta_p^2 = .000$, or the Antisocial subscale, $F(1, 469) = .17$, $p = .68$, $\eta_p^2 = .000$.

Completion time. The average completion time for phase 1 of study 2 was 16 minutes and 53 seconds, with a standard deviation of 30 minutes and 40 seconds. The average completion time for phase 2 of study 2 was 38 minutes and 4 seconds, with a standard deviation of 37 minutes and 46 seconds.

Emotion manipulation checks. ANOVAs with each of the relevant self-reported emotions (anger, fear, sadness) as dependent variables, with manipulated emotion as the independent variable tested the effect of the emotion manipulations for the first measure

of emotion just after the manipulation, and for the second measure at the end of the trial. For the first manipulation check, there were significant main effects of manipulated emotion on each of the relevant self-reported emotions: anger $F(3, 363) = 28.49$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$; sadness $F(3, 363) = 26.48$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$; fear $F(3, 363) = 9.63$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Post-hoc tests using the LSD method ($p < .05$) showed that participants in the anger condition ($M = 4.96$, $SD = 2.52$) demonstrated significantly greater self-reported anger than did participants in the sadness ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 2.44$), fear ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 2.21$), and neutral ($M = 1.83$, $SD = 1.70$) conditions. Furthermore, those in the sadness condition ($M = 5.74$, $SD = 2.59$) demonstrated greater self-reported sadness than did those in the anger ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 2.65$), fear ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 2.78$), and neutral ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.94$) conditions. Finally, participants in the fear condition ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 2.62$) demonstrated greater self-reported fear than those in the anger ($M = 2.97$, $SD = 2.52$), sadness ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 2.65$), and neutral ($M = 2.07$, $SD = 1.87$) conditions.

The same analyses performed on the relevant self-reported emotions provided at the second manipulation check, after participants had determined the appropriate verdict for the defendant, showed significant main effects for manipulated emotion on each of the relevant self-reported emotions: anger $F(3, 363) = 4.52$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; sadness $F(3, 363) = 3.89$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$; fear $F(3, 363) = 3.01$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Post-hoc tests using the LSD method ($p < .05$) showed that participants in the anger condition ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 2.39$) demonstrated significantly greater self-reported anger than did participants in the neutral condition ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 2.11$). There were no significant differences in self-reported anger between those in the anger condition and those in the sadness ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 2.41$) and fear ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 2.46$) conditions. Those

participants in the sadness condition (M = 4.59, SD = 2.47) demonstrated greater self-reported sadness than did those in the neutral condition (M = 3.40, SD = 2.35). Participants in the fear (M = 4.33, SD = 2.64) and anger (M = 4.52, SD = 2.57) conditions did not show any significant differences in self-reported sadness compares to those in the sadness condition. Participants in the fear condition (M = 3.35, SD = 2.62) demonstrated greater self-reported fear than those in the sadness (M = 2.65, SD = 2.05) and neutral (M = 2.37, SD = 2.01) conditions. There was not a significant difference in self-reported fear for those in the anger condition (M = 3.05, SD = 2.41) compared to those in the fear condition. It is not surprising that participants would experience a variety of negative emotions after reading the trial summary. However, it was most important for participants to experience the manipulated emotions before they read the trial summary, as appraisals associated with emotions affect how individuals remember and interpret information. Therefore the fact that participants experienced other emotions after reading the trial summary does not mean that the emotion manipulation was ineffective, rather the results of the first manipulation check show that it was effective at the point in time when it was most important for participants to experience those negative emotions.

Effects of emotion on certainty and control appraisals. Several one-way ANOVAs tested whether manipulated emotions affected participants' certainty and control appraisals as cognitive appraisal theory would predict. For the certainty measures, higher scores indicated greater certainty while lower scores indicated greater uncertainty. For the control measures, higher scores indicated individual control and lower scores indicated situational control (due to the poor internal consistency of the certainty items and control items they could not be averaged and used as a scale). A one-

way ANOVA using manipulated emotion as the independent variable and the first certainty measure (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well did you understand what was happening in those situations?*) as the dependent variable, showed some of the expected differences among the manipulated emotions, $F(3, 363) = 14.85$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$. Post-hoc tests using the LSD method ($p < .05$) revealed that those in the anger condition ($M = 7.45$, $SD = 1.91$) demonstrated significantly higher ratings of event certainty compared to those participants in the fear condition ($M = 6.84$, $SD = 2.08$). Those in the fear condition indicated significantly less certainty than those in all three other emotion conditions (sadness, $M = 7.36$, $SD = 2.05$; neutral, $M = 8.69$, $SD = .59$). Furthermore, those in the neutral condition indicated significantly higher ratings of certainty than did participants in all three other emotion conditions. There was not a significant difference in certainty among those in the anger and sadness conditions.

Reverse coding the second certainty appraisal item (*how uncertain were you about what would happen…*), and using it as a dependent variable in the same ANOVA as above produced a significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 363) = 21.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$. Post-hoc tests using the LSD method demonstrated a pattern of effects identical to those above (anger, $M = 4.62$, $SD = 2.20$; sadness, $M = 4.52$, $SD = 2.50$; fear, $M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.21$; neutral, $M = 6.24$, $SD = 2.45$). A third ANOVA examined the effect of emotion on the third certainty item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well could you typically predict what was going to happen next?*). The effect of emotion was significant, $F(3, 363) = 20.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$, and post-hoc tests revealed a slightly different pattern of effects than those found for the other two certainty items. Those in the anger condition ($M = 5.76$, $SD = 2.32$) indicated significantly greater certainty than

those in the sadness (M = 4.40, SD = 2.59) and fear (M = 4.27, SD = 2.53) conditions, while those in the neutral condition (M = 6.72, SD = 1.82) indicated greater certainty than those in all three other conditions. There was not a significant difference in certainty appraisals among those in the sadness and fear conditions.

Next, several one-way ANOVAs examined the effects of manipulated emotion on each of the three items measuring control appraisals. For the first item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?*), the ANOVA showed a significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 363) = 12.17$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc tests demonstrated the expected pattern of effects, with participants in the anger condition (M = 7.22, SD = 1.99) demonstrating significantly higher ratings of individual control (as opposed to situational control) compared to those in the sadness (M = 5.66, SD = 2.94), fear (M = 5.67, SD = 2.79), and neutral (M = 4.95, SD = 2.70) conditions. There were no other significant differences among the emotion conditions.

The next ANOVA examined the effect of emotion on the second control appraisal item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone else was to blame for what was happening in the situation?*), and again found a significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 363) = 57.52$, $p < .001$. As seen above, those in the anger condition (M = 7.59, SD = 1.82) indicated higher ratings of individual control than did those in the sadness (M = 5.10, SD = 2.95), fear (M = 4.75, SD = 2.93), and neutral (M = 2.53, SD = 2.22) conditions. Furthermore, those in the neutral condition indicated lower ratings of individual control than did those in all three other emotion conditions. There were no significant differences in control appraisals for those

in the sadness and fear conditions. The final ANOVA used the third control appraisal measure as the dependent variable (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent were the events beyond anyone's control?*), and again found a significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 363) = 25.52$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc tests revealed a very different pattern of effects compared to those for the other control measures. Participants in the sadness condition ($M = 5.55$, $SD = 2.88$) demonstrated higher ratings of individual control than did those in the anger ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 2.60$) and neutral ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.23$) conditions. Those in the fear condition ($M = 6.16$, $SD = 2.10$) indicated greater individual control than did those in the anger and neutral conditions.

Verdict analyses.

Guilty versus not guilty verdicts. Overall, 176 (48.0%) participants did not find the defendant guilty of any charge, while 191 (52.0%) participants found the defendant guilty of at least one charge. Within the 16-year-old defendant condition, 91 (49.2%) participants did not find the defendant guilty of any charge, and 94 (50.8%) participants found the defendant guilty of at least one charge. Within the 25-year-old defendant condition, 85 (46.7%) participants did not find the defendant guilty of any charge, while 97 (53.3%) participants found the defendant guilty of at least one charge (see Table 3 for further breakdowns of all verdicts by charge type, defendant age condition, and emotion condition).

First, a forced entry binary logistic regression treated guilty/not guilty verdicts collapsed across all three charges as the dependent variable. The predictor variables were defendant age, three dummy variables representing the different manipulated emotions (in this analysis and the following verdict analyses emotion was dummy coded using the

neutral condition as the reference group), juror pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and a number of two-way and three-way interaction terms stemming from the hypotheses.[1] Standardized pretrial bias and stereotype subscale scores replaced raw scores to increase the interpretability of the resulting Beta weights. The model was significant, $\chi^2(21, N = 367) = 52.15$, $p < .001$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .18$, and correctly predicted 60.8% (n = 107) of the not guilty verdicts and 69.6% (n = 133) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 65.4%. There were a number of significant predictors of guilt. Table 4 shows the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictors. Defendant age, two of the emotion dummy variables, the Chronic Predator subscale, and two of the two-way interactions (sadness by defendant age and fear by defendant age) significantly predicted verdicts collapsed across the three charge types. When holding all other variables constant, participants in the 16-year-old defendant condition were more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared to those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.[2] Participants in the anger and sadness conditions were both more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared to those participants in the neutral condition. Furthermore, as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge.

A binary logistic regression using only the data from the 16-year-old defendant condition served as simple effects analyses for the two-way interactions between the sadness dummy variable and defendant age and the fear dummy variable and defendant age. Serving as predictors were the three emotion dummy variables, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way interaction terms with guilt as the dependent

variable. The model was significant, $\chi^2(15, N = 185) = 26.46$, $p = .03$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .18$, and correctly predicted 63.7% (n = 58) of the not guilty verdicts and 68.1% (n = 64) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 65.9%. However, there were no significant predictors of verdicts (see Table 5).

The same logistic regression using only data from the 25-year-old condition also yielded a significant overall model, $\chi^2(15, N = 182) = 32.48$, $p = .01$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .22$, and correctly predicted 62.4% (n = 53) of the not guilty verdicts and 70.1% (n = 68) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 66.5%. Furthermore, the dummy variables for anger and sadness both significantly predicted verdicts. Those in the anger condition were four times more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared to those in the neutral condition, and those in the sadness condition were nearly three and a half times more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared to those in the neutral condition (see Table 5).

The next logistic regression analysis took apart the interactions in the opposite direction, testing the effects of defendant age within each emotion condition by first including only the data for those participants in the sadness condition. Predictors were the defendant age dummy variable, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way interaction terms, with guilt as the dependent variable. The model was significant, $\chi^2(7, N = 105) = 17.71$, $p = .01$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .21$, and correctly predicted 63.5% (n = 33) of the not guilty verdicts and 69.8% (n = 37) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 66.7%. Chronic Predator was the only significant predictor of verdicts (see Table 6), such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge. Next,

selecting the data for those participants in the fear condition produced a non-significant model, $\chi^2(7, N = 88) = 11.30$, $p = .13$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .16$, and correctly predicted 65.2% (n = 30) of the not guilty verdicts and 57.1% (n = 24) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 61.4% (see Table 6).

First-degree murder verdicts. For the question asking whether the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, guilty verdicts were coded 1 and not guilty verdicts 0. Overall, 271 (73.8%) participants indicated that the defendant was not guilty of first-degree murder, and 96 (26.2%) participants indicated that the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder. Of those participants in the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) found the defendant not guilty, and 49 (26.5%) found him guilty of first-degree-murder. Of those in the 25-year-old condition, 135 (74.2%) found the defendant not guilty, and 47 (25.8%) found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.

Predictor variables in the binary logistic regression analysis of these data were defendant age, the three dummy variables representing each manipulated emotion, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way and three-way interaction terms predicting first-degree murder guilty/not guilty verdicts. For pretrial bias and the stereotype subscales, the standardized scores served as continuous measures as in the verdict analyses above. The model was significant, $\chi^2(21, N = 367) = 53.69$, $p < .001$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .20$, and correctly predicted 95.6% (n = 259) of the not guilty verdicts and 25.0% (n = 24) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 77.1%. Defendant age, all three of the emotion dummy variables, and all three of the two-way interactions between defendant age and emotion significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts (see Table 7). Holding all other variables constant, participants in the 16-year-old

defendant condition were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder compared to those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.[3] Participants in the anger, sadness, and fear conditions were all more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder than those participants in the neutral condition.

Using the same simple effect analysis strategy as above, a binary logistic regression with the three emotion dummy variables, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way interaction terms as the predictors treated first-degree murder guilt as the dependent variable. Using data from only the 16-year-old defendant condition, the model was nearly significant, $\chi^2(15, N = 185) = 24.50$, $p = .06$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .18$, and correctly predicted 97.1% (n = 132) of the not guilty verdicts but only 18.4% (n = 9) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 76.2%. (See Table 8 for regression coefficients, Wald tests, and odds ratios for each predictor). However, none of the variables significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts. For the 25-year-old defendant, the model was significant, $\chi^2(15, N = 182) = 49.19$, $p < .001$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .35$, and correctly predicted 94.8% (n = 128) of the not guilty verdicts and 40.4% (n = 19) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 80.8%. The dummy variables for anger and sadness both significantly predicted verdicts. Those in the anger condition were 13 times more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder compared to those in the neutral emotion condition, and those in the sadness condition were more than eight and a half times more likely to have found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder compared to those in the neutral condition (see Table 8).

The next model, which used only the participants in the anger condition and a similar regression to test the effects of defendant age included as predictors the defendant

age dummy variable, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way interaction terms, and first-degree murder verdict as the dependent variable. The model was significant, $\chi^2(7, N = 99) = 15.74$, $p = .03$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .21$, and correctly predicted 94.3% (n = 66) of the not guilty verdicts and 24.1% (n = 7) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 73.7%. However, none of the variables significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts (see Table 9).

The same model using only the participants in the sadness condition was significant, $\chi^2(7, N = 105) = 16.83$, $p = .02$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .22$, and correctly predicted 94.9% (n = 75) of the not guilty verdicts and 23.1% (n = 6) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 77.1%. Pretrial bias was the only significant predictor of verdicts (see Table 9), such that as scores on the pretrial bias measure increased, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.

Finally, the logistic regression examining participants in the fear condition was significant, $\chi^2(7, N = 88) = 23.91$, $p = .001$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .34$, and correctly predicted 95.2% (n = 59) of the not guilty verdicts and 46.2% (n = 12) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 80.7%. Pretrial bias significantly predicted verdicts, such that as pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias), participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder (see Table 9). Furthermore, the interaction between defendant age and pretrial bias was significant. Examination of the correlations between first-degree murder verdicts and pretrial bias scores within each defendant age condition (among those participants in the fear condition) revealed a non-significant correlation within the 16-year-old condition, $r(38) = -.02$, $p = .89$, but a significant correlation within the 25-year-old condition, $r(46) = .52$, $p < .001$.

Participants made to feel fearful, who read about the 25-year-old defendant, were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as their scores on the pretrial bias measure increased (indicating greater prosecution bias).

Second-degree murder verdicts. Overall, 263 (71.7%) participants indicated that the defendant was not guilty of second-degree-murder, while 104 (28.3%) indicated that he was guilty. Within the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) did not find the defendant guilty, while 49 (26.5%) did find the defendant guilty of second-degree-murder. Within the 25-year-old condition, 127 (69.8%) did not find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder while 55 (30.2%) did.

Predictor variables in the binary logistic regression analysis of these data were defendant age, the three dummy variables representing each manipulated emotion, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way and three-way interaction terms predicting second-degree murder guilty/not guilty verdicts. For pretrial bias and the stereotype subscales, the standardized scores served as continuous measures as in the verdict analyses above. The model was significant, $\chi^2(21, N = 367) = 34.09$, $p = .04$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .13$, and correctly predicted 94.3% (n = 248) of the not guilty verdicts and 17.3% (n = 18) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 72.5%. Only one of the predictors, Chronic Predator, was significant (see Table 10). As participants' scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, they were more likely to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder.

Manslaughter verdicts. For manslaughter verdicts, 266 (72.5%) participants found the defendant not guilty, while 101 (27.5%) found him guilty of manslaughter. Of those in the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) found the defendant not guilty, and 49

(26.5%) found him guilty of manslaughter. Of those in the 25-year-old condition, 130 (71.4%) found the defendant not guilty, and 52 (28.6%) found him guilty of manslaughter.

Analysis using the same logistic regression as above, but with manslaughter guilty/not guilty verdicts as the dependent variable, produced a significant model, $\chi^2(21, N = 367) = 40.22$, $p = .01$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .15$. The model correctly predicted 94.7% (n = 252) of the not guilty verdicts and 14.9% (n = 15) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 72.8%. Both stereotype subscales significantly predicted manslaughter verdicts, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, but as scores on the Antisocial subscale *decreased*, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter (see Table 11).

Verdict certainty ratings.

First-degree murder guilt certainty. The first step in creating a verdict certainty variable was to code guilty verdicts as 1 and not guilty verdicts as -1 for each charge. Multiplying each participant's recoded guilty/not guilty verdict by their certainty in that verdict produced guilt certainty scores that ranged from -9 to 9, with -9 indicating the participant was very certain in a not guilty verdict, and 9 indicating that the participant was very certain in a guilty verdict. A 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) ANCOVA with pretrial bias and both stereotype subscales as covariates, and first-degree murder verdict certainty as the dependent variable, tested the hypothesized main effects and interactions. First, there was a significant main effect for defendant age, $F(1, 335) = 7.21$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, such that

participants were less certain in a not guilty verdict for the 16-year-old defendant (estimated marginal mean = -2.53, *SE* = .46) than they were for the adult defendant (estimated marginal mean = -2.73, *SE* = .47).[4] There was also a significant main effect for pretrial bias, $F(1, 335) = 11.10$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$ (see Table 12 for all F-tests). A positive correlation between pretrial bias and first-degree murder guilt certainty indicated that as scores on the PJAQ increased, indicating greater prosecution bias, the more certain participants were in a guilty first-degree murder verdict, $r(365) = .26$, $p < .001$.

Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between defendant age and pretrial bias, $F(1, 335) = 6.59$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Follow-up correlations examining the relationship between pretrial bias and verdict certainty within each defendant age condition showed that there was a significant correlation between pretrial bias and verdict certainty only within the 25-year-old defendant condition, $r(180) = .40$, $p < .001$. As pretrial bias scores increased, indicating greater prosecution bias, certainty in a first-degree murder verdict increased for those who read about the 25-year-old defendant. The relationship between pretrial bias and verdict certainty within the 16-year-old condition was not significant, $r(183) = .13$, $p = .08$.

Second-degree murder guilt certainty. Making use of the same ANCOVA approach for certainty in a second-degree murder guilty verdict produced a nearly significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 335) = 2.53$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, however, follow-up tests using the LSD method did not demonstrate any significant differences in verdict certainty among the four emotion conditions. There was also a significant main effect for pretrial bias, $F(1, 335) = 8.78$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, such that as pretrial bias increased, certainty in a second-degree murder verdict increased, $r(365) = .21$, $p < .001$. Finally,

there was a significant main effect for Chronic Predator, $F(1, 335) = 3.84$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were more certain in a second-degree murder guilty verdict, $r(365) = .20$, $p < .001$. None of the other effects were significant (see Table 13 for F-tests).

Manslaughter guilt certainty. For certainty in a manslaughter guilty verdict, there was again a significant effect for pretrial bias, $F(1, 335) = 7.66$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, such that as pretrial bias increased, certainty in a manslaughter verdict increased, $r(365) = .18$, $p = .001$. The main effect of Chronic Predator was also significant, $F(1, 335) = 4.42$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants indicated greater certainty in a manslaughter guilty verdict, $r(365) = .18$, $p = .001$. Finally, there was a nearly significant interaction between emotion and defendant age, $F(3, 335) = 2.53$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ (see Table 14 for all F-tests). A follow-up ANCOVA using only data from those in the 16-year-old condition revealed a non-significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 169) = 2.05$, $p = .11$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. The same ANCOVA performed on the data from those participants in the 25-year-old condition also failed to reveal a significant effect for emotion, $F(3, 166) = 2.11$, $p = .10$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Reversing the simple effects test to examine further the interaction between emotion and defendant age, resulted in an ANCOVA examining the effects of defendant age, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way interactions on manslaughter guilt certainty within the anger condition. The main effect for defendant age was not significant, $F(1, 91) = 2.95$, $p = .09$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. The same analysis conducted with participants in the sadness condition failed to produce a significant effect for defendant age, $F(1, 97) = 3.05$, $p = .08$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, as did the analysis with participants in the neutral condition, $F(1, 67) =$

.95, $p = .33$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. The ANCOVA using data from those in the fear condition revealed a non-significant main effect for defendant age, $F(1, 80) = .94$, $p = .34$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$.

Standard of proof ratings.

Standard of proof analyses. The same 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) ANCOVA with pretrial bias and both stereotype subscales as covariates used standard of proof as the dependant variable instead of the verdict certainty measure. Responses on the standard of proof item could range from 1 to 100 percent. There was a significant main effect for the Chronic Predator subscale, $F(1, 331) = 4.83$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, however, a follow-up correlation between Chronic Predator and standard of proof was non-significant, $r(361) = -.09$, $p = .11$. There were also significant two-way interactions between defendant age and the Chronic Predator subscale ($F(1, 331) = 7.29$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$), and defendant age and the Antisocial subscale ($F(1, 331) = 6.46$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (see Table 15 for F-tests). Follow-up correlations between standard of proof and both stereotype subscales within each defendant age condition were not significant (16-year-old defendant condition, $r(182) = -.06$, $p = .42_{\text{Chronic Predator}}$, $r(182) = -.08$, $p = .27_{\text{Antisocial;}}$ 25-year-old defendant condition, $r(177) = -.11$, $p = .14_{\text{Chronic Predator}}$, $r(177) = .04$, $p = .61_{\text{Antisocial}}$).

Mediation analyses.

Overview. According to cognitive appraisal theory (Smith et al., 2006; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1987; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984) specific emotions give rise to different patterns of cognitive appraisals. People feeling

angry are likely to experience high levels of certainty and attribute high levels of person-centered control (as opposed to situational control) when judging the causes of social events. At the same time, people feeling fear and to a lesser extent sadness are likely to experience low levels of certainty and high levels of situational control. Therefore, angry (as opposed to fearful, sad, or neutral) mock jurors should feel more certain about the guilt of offenders, especially juveniles tried as adults, and because of that certainty should be more likely to find them guilty of homicide charges. Thus, the hypothesized causal chain involving anger was that manipulated anger (as compared to a neutral emotion) would produce high levels of certainty and personal control, which in turn would result in greater likelihood of guilty verdicts overall and a higher likelihood of guilty verdicts for specific charges. The hypothesized causal chain involving fear (and to a lesser extent sadness) was that manipulated fear or sadness (as compared to a neutral emotion) would produce lower levels of certainty and higher levels of situational control, which in turn would result in a lower likelihood of guilty verdicts overall and a lower likelihood of guilty verdicts for specific charges.

One standard method of examining whether measures purported to be part of a causal chain mediate the relationships between earlier and later constructs in that purported chain follows the Barron and Kenny (1986) approach. In this case, manipulated anger should produce a greater number of guilty verdicts (path C). There should also be a positive association between manipulated anger and certainty (path A) and between manipulated anger and personal control (path A), and a positive association between certainty and guilty verdicts and personal control and guilty verdicts (path B). Finally, when statistical analyses account for certainty and personal control as measured

covariates, the relationship between anger and guilty verdicts should attenuate (path C′). Similarly, manipulated fear, and to a lesser extent sadness, should produce fewer guilty verdicts (path C), should produce lower levels of certainty (path A), and lower levels of personal control (i.e., higher levels of situational control) (path A). Again, when statistical analyses account for certainty and situational control as measured covariates, the relationship between fear or sadness and guilty verdicts should attenuate (path C′).

Mediation analyses for certainty on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts. The test of whether appraisals of certainty mediated the effects of emotions on judgments of guilt collapsed across all three charge types consisted of three separate mediation analyses, each one using one of the three certainty items completed at the beginning of the study as a mediator.

For the first certainty item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well did you understand what was happening in those situations?*), a linear regression with the three emotion dummy codes (each using the neutral condition as the reference group) predicting certainty appraisals yielded significant negative effects for all three emotions, $B_{anger} = -1.24$, $p < .001$, $B_{sadness} = -1.33$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -1.85$, $p < .001$ (path A). Next, a logistic regression with the three emotion dummy codes predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts revealed a significant effect for anger only, $B_{anger} = .70$, $p = .02$, $B_{sadness} = .21$, $p = .50$, $B_{fear} = .10$, $p = .76$. Finally, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes and certainty as the predictors and guilty/not guilty verdicts as the dependent variable produced estimates of paths B and C′. Anger (path C′) significantly predicted verdict ($B = .70$, $p = .03$) while certainty (path B) did not ($B = .000$, $p = .99$),

indicating that the first certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on guilty/not guilty verdicts.

The mediation analysis for the second certainty item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, how uncertain were you about what would happen in various situations?*) was similar. Calculation of path A showed that all three of the emotion dummy codes significantly predicted certainty, $B_{anger} = -1.62$, $p < .001$, $B_{sadness} = -1.72$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -2.92$, $p < .001$. Path C was the same as above, showing that only anger significantly predicted verdicts, $B_{anger} = .70$, $p = .02$, $B_{sadness} = .21$, $p = .50$, $B_{fear} = .10$, $p = .76$. Calculation of paths B and C' showed that certainty did not significantly predict verdict ($B = -.07$, $p = .14$) and anger had only a nearly significant effect on verdict ($B = .60$, $p = .06$), demonstrating that the second certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on verdicts.

Mediation for the third certainty item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well could you typically predict what was going to happen next?*) proceeded in the same way. Calculation of path A showed that all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicted certainty, $B_{anger} = -.96$, $p = .01$, $B_{sadness} = -2.32$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -2.45$, $p < .001$. Path C was the same as above, showing that only anger significantly predicted verdicts, $B_{anger} = .70$, $p = .02$, $B_{sadness} = .21$, $p = .50$, $B_{fear} = .10$, $p = .76$. Finally, calculation of paths B and C′ revealed that certainty did not significantly predict verdicts ($B = .05$, $p = .27$) while anger did ($B = .75$, $p = .02$), showing that the third certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on verdicts.

Mediation analyses for certainty on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts (25-year-old condition). In the main analyses, emotion significantly predicted verdicts for those who read about the 25-year-old defendant. Therefore, the same three mediation analyses as above examined whether certainty mediated the effects of emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts for only those in the 25-year-old defendant condition. A linear regression with the three emotion dummy codes predicting certainty appraisals (for the first certainty item) yielded significant negative effects for all three dummy codes, $B_{anger} = -.92$, $p = .03$, $B_{sadness} = -1.35$, $p = .001$, $B_{fear} = -1.82$, $p < .001$ (path A). Next, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict guilty/not guilty verdicts showed significant effects for anger, $B_{anger} = 1.18$, $p = .01$, and sadness, $B_{sadness} = 1.03$, $p = .02$, but not fear, $B_{fear} = .70$, $p = .11$. Finally, a logistic regression with the three emotion dummy codes and certainty predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts produced estimates of paths B and C′. Anger and sadness (path C′) significantly predicted verdicts ($B_{anger} = 1.26$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.14$, $p = .01$), fear had a nearly significant effect on verdicts ($B = .85$, $p = .07$), and certainty (path B) did not significantly predict verdicts ($B = .08$, $p = .31$). The first certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on guilty/not guilty verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

For the second certainty item, a linear regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict certainty appraisals yielded significant negative effects for all three emotions, $B_{anger} = -1.74$, $p = .001$, $B_{sadness} = -1.88$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -3.03$, $p < .001$ (path A). The logistic regression estimating path C showed that both anger and sadness significantly predicted verdicts ($B_{anger} = 1.18$, $p = .01$, $B_{sadness} = 1.03$, $p = .02$) while fear did not ($B_{fear} = .70$, $p = .11$). Finally, calculation of paths B and C′ showed that certainty

had a nearly significant effect on verdict (B = -.12, p = .06) and anger significantly predicted verdict (B = .98, p = .04), suggesting that the second certainty item may have mediated the influence of manipulated anger on verdicts. A Sobel test examined whether the indirect effect of anger on verdict via certainty appraisals was significantly different from zero, but found that the effect was not significant (Sobel test statistic = 1.63, p = .10). Appraisals of certainty measured with the second certainty item did not mediate the effect of anger (or sadness and fear) on verdicts for those in the 25-year-old condition.

Mediation analysis for the third certainty item showed that for path A, sadness (B = -2.27, $p < .001$) and fear (B = -3.00, $p < .001$) significantly predicted certainty, while anger did not, B = -.91, p = .08. Path C was the same as above, showing that both anger and sadness significantly predicted verdicts (B_{anger} = 1.18, p = .01, $B_{sadness}$ = 1.03, p = .02) while fear did not (B_{fear} = .70, p = .11). The logistic regression calculating paths B and C′ showed that while anger (B = 1.27, p = .01) and sadness (B = 1.24, p = .01) significantly predicted verdicts, fear (B = .98, p = .04) and certainty (B = .09, p = .17) did not, demonstrating that the third certainty item did not mediate the effect of any of the manipulated emotions on verdicts for those in the 25-year-old condition.

Mediation analyses for certainty on first-degree murder verdicts. Mediation analyses for first-degree murder verdicts were identical to those above, using each certainty item in a separate analysis. First, a linear regression with all three emotion dummy codes predicting certainty appraisals (measured with the first certainty item) indicated that all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicted certainty appraisals (B_{anger} = -1.24, $p < .001$; $B_{sadness}$ = -1.33, $p < .001$; B_{fear} = -1.85, $p < .001$) (path A). Next, a logistic regression with all three emotion dummy codes predicting first-degree murder

verdicts yielded no significant effects on verdicts ($B_{anger} = .51$, $p = .17$; $B_{sadness} = .28$, $p = .45$; $B_{fear} = .52$, $p = .16$). The second step of the mediation analysis failed; therefore, the first certainty item did not mediate the effect of emotion on verdicts.

Despite the fact that emotion did have a significant effect on certainty appraisals for both the second ($B_{anger} = -1.62$, $p < .001$, $B_{sadness} = -1.72$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -2.92$, $p < .001$) and third ($B_{anger} = -.96$, $p = .01$, $B_{sadness} = -2.32$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -2.45$, $p < .001$) certainty items, because the emotion dummy codes did not significantly predict first-degree murder verdicts in the logistic regression above, there could be no evidence of certainty mediating the effect of emotion on verdicts. This finding is counterintuitive, because in the main analyses there was a significant effect of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts. It is possible, however, that this occurred because the covariates included in the main analyses were not included here. Furthermore, because the effects for emotion were found only among those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, there could be mediation for only those participants.

Mediation analyses for certainty on first-degree murder verdicts (25-year-old condition). In the main analyses, the effect of emotion was significant only for those in the 25-year-old defendant condition. Therefore, three mediation analyses examined whether certainty mediated the effects of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for only those in the 25-year-old defendant condition. A linear regression testing the effects of the three emotion dummy codes on certainty appraisals (measured with the first certainty item), yielded significant negative effects for all three emotions, $B_{anger} = -.92$, $p = .03$, $B_{sadness} = -1.35$, $p = .001$, $B_{fear} = -1.82$, $p < .001$ (path A). Next, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict first-degree murder verdicts showed

significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.85$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.57$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$). Finally, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes and certainty to predict first-degree murder verdicts produced estimates of paths B and C′. Anger, sadness, and fear (path C′) significantly predicted verdict ($B_{anger} = 2.07$, $p < .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.86$, $p = .01$; $B_{fear} = 2.16$, $p < .01$), as did certainty (path B) ($B = .27$, $p = .02$). Sobel tests for each emotion indicated that the first certainty item did not mediate the effect of anger on first-degree murder verdicts (Sobel test statistic = -1.63, $p = .10$); however, it did mediate the effect of sadness on first-degree murder verdicts for those in the 25-year-old condition (Sobel test statistic = -1.95, $p = .05$). Furthermore, certainty appraisals from the first certainty item also mediated the effect of fear on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition (Sobel test statistic = -2.11, $p = .04$).

Mediation analyses for the second certainty item showed that for path A, all three emotions significantly predicted certainty ($B_{anger} = -1.74$, $p = .001$, $B_{sadness} = -1.88$, $p < .001$, $B_{fear} = -3.03$, $p < .001$). Path C was the same as above, with all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicting first-degree murder verdicts ($B_{anger} = 1.85$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.57$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$). A logistic regression then examined the effects of emotion and certainty simultaneously on first-degree murder verdicts, revealing significant positive effects for anger ($B = 1.65$, $p = .02$) and sadness ($B = 1.34$, $p = .05$), a nearly significant effect for fear ($B = 1.34$, $p = .06$), and a non-significant effect for certainty ($B = -.14$, $p = .09$). The second certainty item did not mediate the effect of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old condition.

The same analyses examined mediation for the third certainty item. A linear regression revealed that sadness (B = -.91, p = .08) and fear (B = -2.27, p < .001) both significantly predicted certainty appraisals while anger (B = -3.00, p < .001) did not (path A). The logistic regression examining the effects of emotions on first-degree murder verdicts showed that all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts (B_{anger} = 1.85, p = .01; $B_{sadness}$ = 1.57, p = .02; B_{fear} = 1.72, p = .01). Finally, the logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes and certainty to predict first-degree murder verdicts revealed that anger, sadness, and fear (path C′) significantly predicted verdicts (B_{anger} = 1.97, p < .01; $B_{sadness}$ = 1.86, p = .01; B_{fear} = 2.12, p < .01), while certainty (path B) did not (B = .13, p = .08). For participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition the third certainty item did not mediate the effect of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts.

Mediation analyses for control on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts. Mediation analyses testing whether appraisals of control mediated the effects of emotion on verdicts were identical to those described above. For the first control item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?*), a linear regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals yielded a significant effect for anger only (B = 2.28, p < .001; $B_{sadness}$ = .71, p = .07; B_{fear} = .72, p = .08) (path A). Next, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict guilty/not guilty verdicts revealed a significant effect for anger (B = .70, p = .02), but not for sadness (B = .21, p = .50) or fear (B = .10, p = .76). Finally, a logistic regression with the three emotion dummy codes and control as the predictors and guilty/not guilty verdict as the

dependent variable produced estimates of paths B and C′. Anger significantly predicted verdict ($B = .75$, $p = .02$); however sadness ($B = .22$, $p = .47$), fear ($B = .11$, $p = .73$), and control did not ($B = -.02$, $p = .63$), indicating that the first control item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on guilty/not guilty verdicts.

Next, a linear regression used the three emotion dummy codes to predict appraisals of control for the second control item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone else was to blame for what was happening in the situation?*), yielding significant positive effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 5.05$, $p < .001$; $B_{sadness} = 2.56$, $p < .001$; $B_{fear} = 2.22$, $p < .001$). As shown above, the logistic regression estimating path C revealed a significant effect for anger ($B = .70$, $p = .02$), but not for sadness ($B = .21$, $p = .50$) or fear ($B = .10$, $p = .76$). Finally, a logistic regression with all three emotion dummy codes and control predicting verdicts found a nearly significant effect for anger ($B = .70$, $p = .06$), but no other significant effects ($B_{sadness} = .21$, $p = .52$; $B_{fear} = .10$, $p = .77$; $B_{control} = .000$, $p = 1.00$). The second control item did not mediate the effect of any of the manipulated emotions on verdicts.

A linear regression examining the effects of the three emotion dummy codes on the third control item (*In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent were the events beyond anyone's control?*) yielded significant effects for sadness ($B = 2.23$, $p < .001$) and fear ($B = 2.84$, $p < .001$) but not for anger ($B = .51$, $p = .19$). Next, as seen above, the logistic regression examining the effects of each emotion on verdicts (path C) demonstrated a significant effect for anger ($B = .70$, $p = .02$), but not for sadness ($B = .21$, $p = .50$) or fear ($B = .10$, $p = .76$). Finally, the logistic regression

estimating paths B and C′ revealed significant effects for anger ($B = .66$, $p = .04$) and for control ($B = .11$, $p = .01$), but not for sadness ($B = -.04$, $p = .89$) or for fear ($B = -.22$, $p = .51$). Unfortunately, because anger did not significantly predict appraisals of control in the first step, the steps of mediation were not all satisfied, showing that the third control item did not mediate the effects of any of the emotions on verdicts.

Mediation analyses for control on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts (25-year-old condition). As noted above in the certainty mediation analyses, the effect of emotion was strongest among those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition; therefore, I conducted mediation analyses with only those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition in addition to those described above. For the first control item, the linear regression using the emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals yielded a significant effect for anger only ($B_{anger} = 2.14$, $p < .001$; $B_{sadness} = .78$, $p = .17$; $B_{fear} = .15$, $p = .80$) (path A). Then a logistic regression used the emotion dummy codes to predict verdicts, showing significant effects for anger ($B = 1.18$, $p = .01$) and sadness ($B = 1.03$, $p = .02$) but not fear ($B = .70$, $p = .11$) (path C). The final logistic regression revealed significant effects for anger and sadness but not for fear ($B_{anger} = 1.20$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.03$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = .70$, $p = .11$) (path C′) or for control ($B = -.01$, $p = .87$) (path B). The first control item did not mediate the effect of emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

The linear regression examining the effects of the emotion dummy codes on the second control item revealed significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 4.70$, $p < .001$; $B_{sadness} = 2.70$, $p < .001$; $B_{fear} = 1.61$, $p = .01$). The logistic regression estimating path C was the same as above, with significant effects for anger

($B = 1.18$, $p = .01$) and sadness ($B = 1.03$, $p = .02$) but not for fear ($B = .70$, $p = .11$). Then, the final logistic regression using emotion and control to predict guilty/not guilty verdicts yielded a significant effect for sadness only ($B_{anger} = .96$, $p = .07$; $B_{sadness} = .90$, $p = .05$; $B_{fear} = .63$, $p = .16$; $B_{control} = .05$, $p = .41$). The second control item did not mediate the effect of emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts for participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

Mediation analysis for the third control item produced significant effects for sadness and fear in a linear regression predicting control appraisals ($B_{anger} = .33$, $p = .56$; $B_{sadness} = 2.17$, $p < .001$; $B_{fear} = 2.69$, $p < .001$) (path A). A logistic regression significant effects for anger ($B = 1.18$, $p = .01$) and sadness ($B = 1.03$, $p = .02$) but not fear ($B = .70$, $p = .11$). Then for last logistic regression significant effect for anger ($B = 1.16$, $p = .01$) and nearly significant effect for sadness ($B = .87$, $p = .06$), but effects for fear ($B = .50$, $p = .28$) and control ($B = .08$, $p = .21$) were not significant. For those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, the third control item did not mediate the effects of manipulated emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts.

Mediation analyses for control on first-degree murder verdicts. For the first control item, a linear regression using all three emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals yielded a significant effect for anger ($B = 2.28$, $p < .001$), but not for sadness ($B = .71$, $p = .07$) or fear ($B = .72$, $p = .08$). The second step in this mediation analysis, examining whether emotion significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts, was identical to the analysis conducted for certainty. As was shown above, none of the emotion dummy codes significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts, therefore it can be concluded that for participants in all conditions, none of the control items

mediated the effects of emotion on verdicts. However, because the effects of emotion were strongest among those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, the following analyses examine whether control mediated the effects of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for that group of participants.

Mediation analyses for control on first-degree murder verdicts (25-year-old condition). Using data from only those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, a linear regression examining the effects of each emotion dummy code on appraisals of control (measured with the first control item) yielded a significant effect for anger ($B = 2.14$, $p < .001$) but not for sadness ($B = .78$, $p = .17$) or for fear ($B = .15$, $p = .80$) (path A). Next, a logistic regression using all three emotion dummy codes to predict first-degree murder verdicts produced significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.85$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.57$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$) (path C). Finally, a logistic regression estimating paths B and C′ revealed that all three emotions significantly predicted verdicts ($B_{anger} = 1.76$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.53$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$) while control did not ($B = .05$, $p = .48$). Therefore, the first control item did not mediate the effects of manipulated emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

For the second control item, a linear regression using all three emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals produced significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 4.70$, $p < .001$; $B_{sadness} = 2.70$, $p < .001$; $B_{fear} = 1.61$, $p = .01$). As shown in the last analysis, a logistic regression examining the effects of emotions on first-degree murder verdicts yielded significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.85$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.57$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$). Then, the final logistic regression using the

three emotion dummy codes and control to predict verdicts produced significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.64$, $p = .03$; $B_{sadness} = 1.45$, $p = .04$; $B_{fear} = 1.65$, $p = .02$) but not for control ($B = .05$, $p = .49$). These results indicate that the second control item did not mediate the effect of emotions on first-degree murder verdicts for participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

A linear regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals (measured with the third control item) revealed significant effects for sadness ($B = 2.17$, $p < .001$) and for fear ($B = 2.69$, $p < .001$), but not for anger ($B = .33$, $p = .56$). Then the logistic regression using each emotion to predict verdicts yielded the same results as described above, with significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.85$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.57$, $p = .02$; $B_{fear} = 1.72$, $p = .01$). Finally, a logistic regression examining the effects of the three emotion dummy codes and control simultaneously produced significant effects for all three emotions ($B_{anger} = 1.83$, $p = .01$; $B_{sadness} = 1.42$, $p = .04$; $B_{fear} = 1.54$, $p = .03$) but not for control ($B = .07$, $p = .29$). The third control item did not mediate the effect of any of the emotions on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.

Effects of the trial on emotions. To examine the effects of the trial on respondents' self-reported emotions, I submitted the data for only those participants in the neutral emotion condition to a 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) x 3 (self-reported emotion: anger, sadness, fear) x 2 (time of emotion measurement: time 1, time 2) repeated measures ANOVA, with self-reported emotion and time of emotion measurement as the repeated measures. There was a significant effect for self-reported emotion, $F(2, 146) = 11.91$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$; however, the interaction between self-

reported emotion and defendant age was not significant, $F(2, 146) = .26$, $p = .77$, $\eta_p^2 = .004$. There was also a significant effect for time of emotion measurement, $F(1, 73) = 13.44$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$, and the interaction between time of emotion measurement and defendant age was significant, $F(1, 73) = 7.09$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Furthermore, the interaction between self-reported emotion and time of emotion measurement was significant, $F(2, 146) = 5.70$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. The three-way interaction between self-reported emotion, time of emotion measurement, and defendant age was not significant, $F(2, 146) = .57$, $p = .57$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$.

Several repeated measures ANOVAs examined the interaction between time of emotion measurement and defendant age using only data from those who received the neutral emotion manipulation and who read about the 16-year-old defendant. The ANOVA examining the change in self-reported anger from time 1 to time 2 was significant, $F(1, 34) = 13.77$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .29$, with participants experiencing greater anger after reading the trial summary ($M = 1.66_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 3.00_{\text{time 2}}$). Self-reported sadness also changed significantly from time 1 to time 2, $F(1, 34) = 14.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$, with participants reporting greater sadness after reading about the trial ($M = 2.40_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 3.94_{\text{time 2}}$). Participants who read about the 16-year-old defendant also reported feeling greater fear after reading the trail summary, $F(1, 34) = 6.40$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$ ($M = 2.03_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 2.77_{\text{time 2}}$).

The same repeated measures ANOVAs using data from neutral participants who read about the 25-year-old defendant failed to reveal any significant effects: anger, $F(1, 39) = .09$, $p = .77$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$; sadness, $F(1, 39) = 2.72$, $p = .11$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$; fear, $F(1, 39) = .08$, $p = .78$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$. Examination of the means for each self-reported emotion at

times 1 and 2 showed that among those in the 25-year-old condition levels of each emotion remained fairly low, similar to those reported by participants in the 16-year-old condition at time 1 (anger, $M = 1.98_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 2.05_{\text{time 2}}$; sadness, $M = 2.35_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 2.93_{\text{time 2}}$; fear, $M = 2.10_{\text{time 1}}$, $M = 2.03_{\text{time 2}}$). Only the participants in the 16-year-old defendant condition experienced increases in each of the three self-reported emotions from the time 1 to the time 2 measurement.

Follow-ups to the interaction between self-reported emotion and time of emotion measurement used a series of paired-samples t-tests to examine the differences between self-reported anger and sadness, anger and fear, and sadness and fear at each time of emotion measurement. For the time 1 measurement of each self-reported emotion, neutral participants reported experiencing significantly more sadness ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.94$) than anger ($M = 1.83$, $SD = 1.70$), $t(74) = -2.42$, $p = .02$. There were no significant differences between self-reported anger and fear ($M = 2.07$, $SD = 1.87$), $t(74) = -1.40$, $p = .17$, or between sadness and fear, $t(74) = 1.68$, $p = .10$.

At the time 2 measurement, neutral participants reported experiencing significantly lower levels of anger ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 2.11$) compared to sadness ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 2.35$), $t(74) = -4.30$, $p < .001$, and significantly lower levels of fear ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 2.01$) compared to sadness, $t(74) = 5.13$, $p < .001$. There was not a significant difference between mean levels of anger and fear, $t(74) = .64$, $p = .53$. These results suggest that participants who did not receive a specific emotion manipulation felt greater sadness than anger both before and after reading the trial summary, and more sadness than fear after reading the trial summary and determining the defendant's guilt. It is unclear why participants experienced elevated levels of sadness at time 1, however it is possible that

because participants knew that they would be reading about the commission of a serious crime in the task following the emotion manipulation, they expected to feel sad, and therefore had already begun to feel some sadness.

Next, three individual ANOVAs with defendant age condition as the independent variable and each self-reported emotion (at time 2) as the dependent variable examined differences between defendant age conditions for each self-reported emotion for those participants in the neutral emotion condition. There was a significant effect of defendant age on self-reported anger, $F(1, 73) = 3.94$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, such that neutral participants in the 16-year-old defendant condition experienced greater levels of anger ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 2.43$) than those in the 25-year-old defendant condition ($M = 2.05$, $SD = 1.69$). The effects of defendant age on self-reported sadness, $F(1, 73) = 3.63$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, and on self-reported fear, $F(1, 73) = 2.63$, $p = .11$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, were not significant.

Finally, to examine whether prosecution-biased participants would experience more anger than would defense-biased participants, I submitted the data from only those participants in the neutral condition to a 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) x 3 (self-reported emotion: anger, sadness, fear) repeated measures ANOVA, with self-reported emotion as the repeated measure, and pretrial bias as a covariate. There was a significant effect for self-reported emotion, $F(2, 144) = 3.40$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$; however, the interaction between self-reported emotion and pretrial bias was not significant, $F(2, 144) = 1.55$, $p = .22$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, indicating that self-reported emotion of those in the neutral condition did not vary as a function of pretrial bias.

Alternative explanations: Affect infusion model. The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995; 2008) provides an alternative explanation for the emotion effects

found in study 2. According to this model, positive affect leads to reduced cognitive processing effort, and negative affect leads to increased cognitive processing effort. In other words, individuals in a good mood process more heuristically, while those in a bad mood process more systematically. Exploratory analyses examined whether this could better explain the effects found in study 2. A new variable named "negative emotion" collapsed the three negative emotion conditions into one level to compare responses of all participants who would likely be in a bad mood to those who were in the neutral condition. A binary logistic regression using guilty/not guilty verdicts collapsed across all charge types as the dependent variable, with negative emotion, defendant age, juror pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and a number of two-way and three-way interaction terms stemming from the hypotheses revealed a significant model, $\chi^2(11, N = 367) = 39.78$, $p < .001$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .14$. The model correctly predicted 57.4% (n = 101) of the not guilty verdicts and 73.3% (n = 140) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 65.7%. Furthermore, negative emotion ($B = 1.11$, *Wald* = 7.81, $p = .01$, *Exp(B)* = 3.05), defendant age ($B = 1.05$, *Wald* = 4.49, $p = .03$, *Exp(B)* = 2.85), and the interaction between negative emotion and defendant age ($B = -1.36$, *Wald* = 6.06, $p = .01$, *Exp(B)* = .26) all significantly predicted verdicts (see Table 16).

To further examine the possibility that those participants experiencing any negative emotion used more systematic processing and thus judged both defendants equally, I submitted the data to a chi-square test, including guilty/not guilty verdicts, defendant age, and the negative emotion variable. Within the negative emotion condition there was no significant difference in guilty verdicts for those who read about the 16-year-old compared to those who read about the 25-year-old, $\chi^2(1) = 2.44$, $p = .07$ (see

Table 17). However, within the neutral condition there was a significant difference between judgments of guilt for those participants in the 16-year-old and 25-year-old defendant conditions, $\chi^2(1) = 3.69$, $p = .05$ (see Table 18). This suggests that those participants experiencing any negative emotion were actually processing more systematically, as they did not demonstrate any bias against the juvenile tried as an adult. This is discussed further in the general discussion section.

Discussion

Study 2 attempted to examine how the experience of different negative emotions would affect mock jurors' use of negative stereotypes to make judgments of guilt for a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant. The results of this study provided support for some of the hypotheses, but did not support others. One initial prediction was that as participants' stereotyping scores increased they would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than would those participants with lower stereotyping scores, and that those participants in the adult defendant condition would judge the defendant equally regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure. Furthermore, angry participants should have judged the juvenile defendant more harshly than the adult defendant on all outcome measures. Examination of the main effects from several of the analyses suggested that participants judged the juvenile defendant more harshly than they did the adult defendant. However, examination of significant interactions revealed a different pattern of effects, such that when controlling for pretrial bias and stereotyping, participants were actually more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of at least one charge (compared to the juvenile defendant) when they were made to feel angry or sad (compared to the neutral emotion group). Emotion did not affect judgments of guilt for

those who read about the juvenile defendant. Participants were also more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of first-degree murder when they were made to feel angry or sad (compared to those who received the neutral emotion manipulation); however, again, emotion did not have an effect on judgments of guilt for the juvenile defendant. Furthermore, as participants' scores on the pretrial bias measure increased (indicating greater prosecution bias), participants were more certain in a first-degree murder verdict, but only for the adult defendant. Participants' certainty in a guilty first-degree murder verdict for the juvenile defendant was unaffected by pretrial bias.

Next, a three-way interaction between emotion, defendant age, and stereotyping, predicted that angry participants who received higher scores on the stereotyping measure would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would the adult defendant. Unfortunately, the three-way interaction was not significant. Overall, the predicted effects for defendant age were unconfirmed.

Regarding the effects of manipulated emotion, cognitive appraisal theory predicts that angry participants should have judged both defendants more harshly than would those participants experiencing fear, sadness, or neutral emotion. Angry participants were more likely than were those in the fear and neutral conditions to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge; however, sad participants were equally as likely to find the defendant guilty. For first-degree murder verdicts, participants in the anger, sadness, and fear conditions were all more likely to find the defendant guilty than were those in the neutral condition. Thus, there appeared to be a general negative emoting effect rather than a specific appraisal impact.

Furthermore, participants in the fear condition demonstrated an interesting effect that did not follow from the hypotheses. Fearful participants who read about the 25-year-old defendant were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias).

The predicted two-way interaction between emotion and pretrial bias, suggested that participants who experienced the neutral and anger emotions and who were more prosecution-biased would judge both types of defendant more harshly than those neutral and angry participants who were more defense-biased. The results suggested the opposite pattern of effects, with those in the sadness and fear conditions being more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as pretrial bias scores increased, indicating greater prosecution bias. This result is again inconsistent with cognitive appraisal theory.

Finally, appraisals of certainty should have mediated the effects of anger on judgments made about the juvenile defendant, such that after controlling for certainty, the relationship between anger and judgments of the juvenile defendant should have attenuated. Mediation analyses demonstrated that certainty mediated the effects of sadness and fear on first-degree murder verdicts, only within the 25-year-old defendant condition. However, certainty did not mediate the effects of anger on any judgments of the defendants, contrary to expectation. Mediation analyses examining control as an alternative appraisal dimension to explain the emotion effects showed that control did not mediate the effects of any of the emotions on any of the verdict measures.

CHAPTER 11: General Discussion

The current study measured stereotypes of juveniles tried as adults and examined the effects of negative emotions on verdict determinations to clarify the inconsistent results of past research examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults. The results suggest that mock jurors do not demonstrate a generic prejudice against juveniles tried as adults as some other research has shown. Study 1 attempted to assess whether people endorse negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adult defendants. The results suggested some negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults, but only for male participants. Women did not endorse negative stereotypes to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults. This could be because the stereotype questionnaire actually measured general stereotypes about criminals, and did not address stereotypes that may be more specific to juveniles tried as adults. It could also be because people actually do not endorse negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults compared to adult defendants. The results of study 2 suggest that this may be the case. In study 2, participants did not judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they did the adult defendant. In fact, participants who felt angry or sad actually judged the adult defendant more harshly than they did the juvenile defendant.

Previous studies examining this issue have found some evidence of bias against juveniles tried as adults, but others have not. It may be that there is no general bias against juveniles tried as adults, or at least not in situations where jurors receive enough detailed information to make informed decisions. Study 2 used a lengthy trial summary including many details, which may have given participants sufficient information to make verdict decisions, similar to an actual trial. Other research in this area that did find bias

against a juvenile tried as an adult provided participants with very little information regarding the defendant and little to no information regarding the charged crime (Levine et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2009). This may have led participants to rely on their stereotypes to make decisions simply because they had no other information to use. Providing participants with a detailed trial summary may have reduced any need to rely on stereotypes to make decisions. Furthermore, male participants in study 1 displayed evidence of holding some negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, which suggests that men in study 2 should have shown evidence of this bias as well. However, preliminary analyses including gender in study 2 did not find significant main effects for gender or significant interactions between gender and either of the stereotype measures.

Alternatively, people may be more biased against adult defendants compared to juvenile defendants. Perhaps participants viewed the adult defendant as more culpable due to his older age, and thus when they experienced anger (a certainty-associated emotion) and sadness (an emotion that can be associated with either certainty or uncertainty) they were more likely to judge him harshly compared to the juvenile. Jurors may not experience bias against a juvenile because he or she is transferred to criminal court; rather they may take the juvenile's age into consideration when making judgments, and judge him or her more leniently than an adult defendant.

Overall, it is difficult for any experiment to accurately determine whether jurors in a real trial would exhibit generic prejudice against a juvenile tried as an adult. One factor that was absent from this research was simply the youthful appearance of the defendant. In a real trial, jurors would see the juvenile defendant in court every day, and this visual reminder of his age could have a significant impact on how they make verdict

decisions. A juvenile who has more adult-like features may be judged more harshly, while a juvenile who appears to be very young may receive treatment that is more lenient. Research examining the role of race in capital punishment sentencing decisions has shown that Black defendants who have more stereotypical Black features are more likely to be sentenced to death (when the victim is White) (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). It is possible that people view certain physical features as more characteristic of juveniles who are transferred to criminal court compared to juveniles who are not. Future research should include photographs of the defendants, both juvenile and adult, to determine if this affects juror decision making.

Emotion

The effects of emotion on judgments of the adult defendant were mostly in line with previous findings regarding the influence emotions have on judgment and decision making. Angry participants were more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of first-degree murder, compared to those in the fear and neutral emotion conditions. However, those participants in the sadness condition showed a similar pattern of judgments. Sadness was included in this study because it lies more toward the middle of the certainty spectrum than fear, making it possible for individuals to feel sad and uncertain or sad and certain. Sad people could have been experiencing greater certainty than those in the fear condition, so that they made decisions more similar to angry people. Analyses examining the effects of manipulated emotion on certainty appraisals confirmed that both those in the anger and sadness conditions demonstrated greater certainty than did those in the fear condition on two of the three certainty items. Therefore, it appears that sad participants made similar judgments to those of angry participants because they were experiencing

similar levels of certainty. However, mediation analyses showed very little evidence of certainty mediating the effects of emotion on any verdict decisions. One analysis found that certainty mediated the effects of sadness and fear on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition. However, the main analyses yielded significant effects on verdict for angry and sad participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, which leads one to question why certainty did not also mediate the effect of anger on verdicts.

Furthermore, participants in the fear condition demonstrated some judgment similar to that which would be expected for an angry individual. Fearful participants were more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of first-degree murder as pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias). A possible explanation for this effect is that after reading the trial summary, participants were still experiencing relatively high levels of their manipulated emotions, but were also experiencing high levels of other negative emotions. As the emotion manipulation check data showed, after reading the trial summary participants in the anger, fear, and sadness conditions demonstrated similar levels of anger and sadness. Those in the fear and anger conditions demonstrated similar levels of fear. The emotion experienced before reading the trial summary is what should have affected how participants processed the information in the trial summary; however, by the time participants made their verdict decisions they were clearly experiencing elevated levels of more than one negative emotion, and this likely affected their judgments. It could be that in the context of juror decision making it is simply the valence of the emotion that impacts decision making, such that the experience of any negative emotion affects judgment similarly. Or, it may be the change in emotion

that influences judgment, rather than the absolute emotion itself. If the experience of any emotion increases in intensity, that change alone could affect whether a juror is more or less punitive.

It is also possible that when an individual experiences several emotions at once, and one is high in certainty, the certainty associated with that emotion will override the uncertainty associated with the other emotions. Research on the Appraisal-Tendency Framework has not addressed this possibility, perhaps for obvious reasons. Researchers generally aim to isolate the effects of one specific emotion on decision making; if an individual experienced more than one emotion it would be impossible to know which emotion or emotions exerted the most influence on subsequent judgment. Although it would be difficult to accomplish, it would be informative to attempt to induce participants to experience two emotions at once, one from each end of the certainty spectrum, to determine how this would affect subsequent decision making.

One way that participants would likely experience more than one emotion would be to manipulate integral emotions. Integral emotions are emotions provoked by attributes of the judgment target (Lerner, Han, & Keltner, 2007). The emotions that participants experienced after reading the trial summary were integral emotions. The emotions resulting from the emotion manipulation in this study were incidental emotions, meaning the emotions were unrelated to the juror decision-making task. The manner in which participants are made to experience emotions could have different effects on how they process information and make verdict decisions (Feigenson & Park, 2006). Research examining the effects of appraisal tendencies on decision making has mainly used incidental emotions, rather than integral emotions. This is likely because incidental

emotions tend to persist past the emotion-arousing event, affecting subsequent, unrelated decisions. Furthermore, the use of incidental emotions allows for greater experimental control. However, integral emotions could actually be more intense, because they result from the judgment target itself, leading to even larger effects of appraisal tendencies. For example, in study 2, the trial summary appeared to arouse a number of negative emotions in participants, other than the emotion from the manipulation at the beginning of the study. It is reasonable to expect that emotions resulting from a criminal trial would be stronger than the lingering emotions left over from an unrelated event that occurred before the trial started. A valuable addition to the research examining the effects of emotion on legal decision making would be to manipulate emotions using the content of a trial summary. However, this would be extremely difficult to accomplish, given that the emotions people experience are dependent on their appraisals of events, and different people often have different appraisals of the same events. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to do this without confounding the emotion with the evidence in the case that leads to the emotional reaction. Regardless, if researchers could successfully manipulate integral emotions it would be informative to examine whether they influence decisions the same way incidental emotions do.

Finally, there is an alternative explanation for the emotion effects found in study 2. The AIM (Forgas, 1995; 2008) posits that positive affect leads to more heuristic processing, while negative affect leads to more systematic processing. While this was not the theory tested in this research, it does provide a feasible explanation for the results. Additional analyses that treated the three negative emotions as one negative emotion variable found that overall, those participants who experienced any negative emotion did

not demonstrate differences in judgments of the juvenile and adult defendants. However, those participants in the neutral condition judged the juvenile defendant more harshly than they did the adult defendant. This may help to explain the results of past studies in which participants judged a juvenile defendant more harshly than they did an adult defendant. No other studies examining this issue have manipulated emotions; therefore one would expect that participants in those studies likely entered each study experiencing neutral, or very little, emotion. The experience of negative affect may account for the lack of bias toward the juvenile tried as an adult in the current research.

Pretrial Bias

A suggested explanation for the results found in prior studies in which prosecution-biased participants judged juveniles tried as adults more harshly than they did adult defendants was that those participants reacted to trial stimuli with more anger than did defense-biased participants. It could be that the specific details of the trial summaries in those studies evoked more anger in prosecution-biased participants, which led to the harsher judgments of the juvenile tried as an adult. However, the details of the trial summary used in this study appear to have not affected prosecution-biased participants differently than defense-biased participants. Both types of defendant reacted to the trial summary with similar emotions. Again, it would be valuable to identify what details in a trial summary evoke certain emotions, in order to manipulate integral emotions.

It is still unclear why prosecution-biased participants in only some studies examining this issue showed bias against a juvenile tried as an adult while defense-biased participants did not. In this study, participants were actually more certain in a first-

degree murder verdict for the adult defendant as pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias). It is possible that these differences among studies are a result of different details in the trial stimuli used. For example, the crime with which the defendant is charged could differentially affect participants' decisions (e.g., first-degree murder, second-degree murder, burglary, etc.). Prosecution-biased individuals may view certain types of crimes as more characteristic of certain types of criminals, thus resulting in harsher judgments when there is an uncharacteristic pairing of crime and criminal type. Alternatively, a participant's general impression of the defendant's personality, family history, and other personal characteristics could affect whether they demonstrate bias against a juvenile tried as an adult. A juvenile tried as an adult who is perceived as being a victim of his upbringing could be judged less harshly than his adult counterpart by defense-biased participants, but more harshly by prosecution-biased participants who may view this as an unacceptable excuse for the defendant's behavior.

Stereotyping Measure

The results of study 1 showed some support for a negative stereotype against juveniles tried as adults. However, this was only true for men. Research suggests that men are more punitive and endorse rehabilitation less as a goal of punishment for crimes as compared to women (Applegate et al., 2002), and that men tend to favor the death penalty more than women do (Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995; Bohm, 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising that evidence of negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults would be stronger among men. On the other hand, the data in study 2 did not reveal the same effect. It is possible that because men are generally more punitive they do hold negative stereotypes about

juveniles tried as adults, but they only use these stereotypes when they have little information to inform their decisions. The detailed trial summary in study 2 may have provided enough information for male participants to base their decisions on so that they did not have to rely on their stereotypes.

Another possible reason a stronger stereotype effect did not surface could simply be that the items included on the stereotyping measure were not representative of juveniles tried as adults, but were representative of criminals in general. There was some indication that the stereotype measure constructed for study 2 was more of a measure of general bias against criminals, as some analyses showed that participants judged both defendants more harshly as their scores on one of the stereotype subscales increased. Future research should examine stereotypes that are more specific to youth of various ages to determine if there are negative stereotypes about youth that people may endorse to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults.

Strengths and Limitations

This research had several strengths. First, participants were adults from various communities from across the country. Several of the studies that have examined this issue used undergraduate college students as participants, which could be problematic for several reasons. Undergraduates are generally between the ages of 18 and 22, therefore the juvenile and adult defendants in the research in this area would only be several years younger or older than would be the participants judging them. Eighteen-year-olds asked to determine the guilt of a 16-year-old may view themselves as being more similar to a 16-year-old defendant than a 25-year-old defendant, thus potentially making it less likely that they would find the 16-year-old guilty. Furthermore, undergraduate students are not

representative of the average juror. By using a sample of adults from across the country, I was able to obtain a sample that is more similar to average jurors than those studies using undergraduate participants. This could be one reason why the results of this study are not the same as earlier ones in this line of research, which used undergraduate mock jurors.

Additionally, participants read a detailed trial summary based on a real case. Although this is not the same as participating in a real criminal trial, it is still more similar to an actual trial than those studies that only provided participants with one or two sentences about the defendant.

Furthermore, this study not only measured the stereotypes individuals endorse about juveniles tried as adults, but to also used those stereotypes to predict judgments of a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant. This extends previous research in which researchers measured stereotypes about a juvenile, but did not use them to predict judgments of guilt (Tang et al., 2009).

There were, of course, several limitations to this research. Participants completed both studies over the internet in their own homes. Although the computer program took precautions to ensure that participants took their time and paid attention to the details of the studies, it is still possible that some participants did not carefully read the trial summary, and did not give thoughtful consideration to the questions regarding guilt and standard of proof. Those participants who deviated significantly from the study protocol (e.g., those who did not complete the emotion manipulation) were not included in the data analyses. However, there were likely responses remaining from others who did not pay attention but whose answers did not identify them as such. Evidence for this

conclusion comes from the fact that a number of participants in both studies were unable to identify correctly the age of the defendant in the trial summary. Results of chi-square tests in both studies showed a significant relationship between accurate responses on the manipulation checks and defendant age condition. This is concerning, as inaccurate responses should be evenly distributed among conditions due to random assignment of participants to conditions. It is possible that when participants read about the 25-year-old defendant, they automatically categorized him as an adult, and in the following minutes gave little thought to his actual age. Participants in the 16-year-old conditions may have been more able to remember the defendant's specific age because it is somewhat more shocking to read about a youth committing a violent crime. Future research should develop methods to present the defendant in a way that does not lead to differential results in participants' conscious awareness of the defendant's age.

Furthermore, there were very small numbers of participants who found the defendant guilty of each of the individual charges. When I collapsed verdicts across all three charge types to examine who found the defendant guilty of at least one charge, there was a relatively even split of guilty/not guilty verdicts. However, for each individual charge, larger numbers of participants found the defendant not guilty rather than guilty. These smaller numbers of guilt verdicts may have limited the effects of emotion on verdict. Although pilot tests of the trial summary showed that participants were equally likely to find the defendant guilty or not guilty, participants in the pilot study were undergraduate students. It is possible that the adult community sample in study 2 responded differently to the trial summary than the undergraduates in the pilot test did. A

trial summary that resulted in a more even split of guilty/not guilty verdicts may have provided different results.

Additionally, 78 (16.6%) participants dropped out of study 2 after completing phase 1 and before phase 2. It is possible that the participants who dropped out of the study were different had different traits than those who completed both phases. Analysis examining pretrial bias and stereotyping scores for both groups of participants did not reveal any significant differences, however it is possible that these participants differed on other unmeasured factors.

Finally, even though the detailed trial summary was more similar to an actual trial than the stimulus used in some other studies, it is still not equivalent to participating in an actual trial. Participants did not see what the defendant looked like, and study 2 lasted only about 30 minutes, whereas a real trial would likely last for days or weeks. In addition, participants did not read jury instructions, and they did not deliberate as a group. It is likely that jurors in a real trial would demonstrate different patterns of judgments when presented with a juvenile tried as an adult.

Future Directions

The issue of whether jurors exhibit generic prejudice against juveniles tried as adults is still unclear. Many factors may contribute to this issue that future research should address. For example, some recent research has examined the voir dire process in cases in which juveniles are transferred to adult criminal court. Results of archival research show that in cases where a juvenile is being tried as an adult, voir dire includes questions about whether potential jurors could find the defendant guilty knowing that he could spend time in an adult prison (Danielsen, Levett, & Kovera, 2004). Similar to

death qualification, this "juvenile" qualification has the potential to substantially alter the make-up of juries charged with determining the guilt of a juvenile tried in criminal court. Indeed, researchers have found that in trial simulations, juries comprised of only jurors who would be considered juvenile qualified were more likely to convict a juvenile defendant being tried as an adult than were juries comprised of both juvenile qualified and non-juvenile qualified jurors (those who would likely be excluded from jury service) (Levett, Greathouse, Sothmann, Copple, & Kovera, 2006). Future research should examine whether juvenile qualified jurors endorse stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults more or less than non-juvenile qualified jurors, and whether this accounts for differences in verdicts.

In addition, some research shows that jurors are more likely to find a defendant guilty when the features of the charged crime match their stereotypes of that type of crime (Smith, 1991; Smith, 1993; Smith & Studebaker, 1996). Similarly, jurors may have prior knowledge of the types of crimes they believe juveniles tried as adults are likely to have committed, and this could affect guilt determinations. If the details of the crime are not the same as what a juror thinks is typical of a crime committed by a juvenile tried as an adult, then he or she will be less likely to find that defendant guilty. Researchers should examine whether jurors do believe that certain types of crimes or features of crimes are more stereotypical of juveniles who are tried as adults.

Another factor that future research should examine is jurors' knowledge regarding the waiver process. As discussed in this paper, jurors may assume that if a juvenile is transferred to criminal court it is the result of an evaluation by a juvenile court judge. This may lead them to conclude that the juvenile must be guilty, or must have done

something very serious for a judge to decide to send the youth to criminal court. However, many juveniles are waived to criminal court through other mechanisms, such prosecutorial waiver and statutory waiver, which do not involve a direct evaluation by a judge. Jurors may view a juvenile tried as an adult differently depending on the mechanism through which he or she was transferred to criminal court. Researchers should vary type of waiver to examine whether this affects verdicts.

Regarding the effects of emotions on decision making, future research should continue to examine the effects of emotion on judgments of juveniles tried as adults, but it should manipulate a wider variety of emotions. An important emotion absent from this study is disgust. Disgust is a certainty-associated emotion that could have a similar effect on judgment as anger. It is also an emotion that participants would likely experience in response to a trial involving a violent crime. The inclusion of additional negative emotions could help clarify how emotions affect judgments of juveniles tried as adults.

Finally, future research should examine the interaction between defendant age and race. Although many researchers have examined the effects of an adult defendant's race on verdicts, and some recent research has examined the effects of race on verdicts for a juvenile tried as an adult (Stevenson & Bottoms, 2009), no research has examined how defendant race and age interact. While there may not be differences in jurors' judgments of a White juvenile tried as an adult and a White adult defendant, it is possible that jurors would judge a Black juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they would a White adult defendant.

This research contributes to the growing body of literature addressing the important issue of whether the criminal justice system treats juveniles fairly. There is

still too little evidence to allow for a conclusion regarding whether jurors demonstrate bias against juveniles who are transferred to adult court. However, the results of this research suggest that jurors may not exhibit bias against juveniles in adult court, or that there are more factors involved in jurors' decision making when it comes to juveniles tried as adults. Additional research will allow us to better understand this complex issue.

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End Notes

[1] I did not include participant gender in the reported main analyses for study 2, because in preliminary analyses it did not significantly affect any of the outcome variables, and it did not significantly interact with any of the other predictor variables. Although there were significant differences between men and women in study 1, because gender differences were not part of my original hypotheses and because gender did not affect outcomes in study 2, I did not include it as an independent variable.

[2] The main effect of defendant age is very small and is a result of the inclusion of the covariates and emotion dummy codes in the model. A logistic regression with only the emotion dummy codes and defendant age predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts resulted in a significant model, $\chi^2(7, N = 367) = 14.66$, $p = .04$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .05$, with a nearly significant effect for defendant age, $B = .91$, $p = .06$; however, a logistic regression with only defendant age predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts produced a non-significant model, $\chi^2(1, N = 367) = .23$, $p = .63$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .001$. Defendant age alone did not significantly affect verdicts.

[3] The main effect of defendant age is very small and is a result of the inclusion of the covariates and emotion dummy codes in the model. A logistic regression with only the emotion dummy codes and defendant age predicting first-degree murder verdicts resulted in a non-significant model, $\chi^2(7, N = 367) = 12.98$, $p = .07$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .05$, and a logistic regression with only defendant age predicting first-degree murder verdicts also produced a non-significant model, $\chi^2(1, N = 367) = .02$, $p = .89$, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .000$. Defendant age alone did not significantly affect first-degree murder verdicts.

[4] The main effect demonstrating that those in the 16-year-old defendant condition were more certain in a guilty verdict than were those in the 25-year-old condition is misleading due to the estimated marginal means within the neutral emotion condition. While participants in the anger, sadness, and fearful conditions were more certain in a guilty verdict for the 25-year-old defendant compared to the 16-year-old, those participants in the neutral condition showed the opposite pattern, indicating much greater certainty in a guilty verdict for the 16-year-old ($M = -1.62$) than for the 25-year-old ($M = -4.74$).

Tables

Table 1

Mean Stereotype Ratings by Defendant Age Condition

Stereotype Item	**16-year-old juvenile** *Mean* (*SD*)	**16-year-old adult** *Mean* (*SD*)	**25-year-old adult** *Mean* (*SD*)
Has a previous criminal record	4.20_{a} (2.25)	$5.09_{a,b}$ (2.40)	5.40_{b} (2.33)
Is antisocial	4.65_{a} (2.24)	5.68_{b} (2.35)	$5.40_{a,b}$ (1.92)
Is hot-tempered	4.92_{a} (2.13)	6.09_{b} (2.04)	5.84_{b} (2.09)
Is manipulative	4.20_{a} (2.29)	$4.79_{a,b}$ (2.17)	5.31_{b} (2.47)
Is a superpredator	3.39_{a} (2.23)	$4.18_{a,b}$ (2.69)	4.59_{b} (2.42)
Got into trouble just this one time (reverse coded)	6.73_{a} (1.80)	5.46_{b} (2.51)	$5.91_{a,b}$ (2.34)

* Means within each row that do not share subscripts are significantly different at the .05 level.

Table 2

Significant Univariate Effects of Defendant Type on Men's Endorsements of Stereotype Items

Stereotype Item	***F*(2, 60)**	***p***	η_p^2	***Mean* (*SD*)**
Has committed other crimes in the past	3.33	.04	.10	
16-year-old juvenile				4.56_{a} (2.71)
16-year-old adult				6.61_{b} (2.48)
25-year-old adult				$5.55_{a,b}$ (2.46)
Is aggressive	3.34	.04	.10	
16-year-old juvenile				6.28_{a} (2.35)
16-year-old adult				7.70_{b} (1.52)
25-year-old adult				$7.14_{a,b}$ (1.36)
Is a danger to society	4.74	.01	.14	
16-year-old juvenile				6.06_{b} (2.65)
16-year-old adult				7.96_{a} (1.40)
25-year-old adult				6.45_{b} (2.28)
Uses illegal drugs	4.22	.02	.12	
16-year-old juvenile				3.17_{a} (2.01)
16-year-old adult				5.43_{b} (2.50)
25-year-old adult				$4.41_{a,b}$ (2.79)
Is vindictive	5.86	.01	.16	
16-year-old juvenile				3.78_{a} (2.02)

16-year-old adult				6.22_{b} (2.41)
25-year-old adult				4.59_{a} (2.52)
Is a chronic offender	5.16	.01	.15	
16-year-old juvenile				3.78_{a} (2.16)
16-year-old adult				6.22_{b} (2.43)
25-year-old adult				$5.05_{a,b}$ (2.59)
Is immoral	4.07	.02	.12	
16-year-old juvenile				5.72_{a} (2.42)
16-year-old adult				7.57_{b} (1.47)
25-year-old adult				$6.77_{a,b}$ (2.25)
Has a previous criminal	5.63	.01	.16	
record				3.44_{a} (2.18)
16-year-old juvenile				5.78_{b} (2.30)
16-year-old adult				5.55_{b} (2.63)
25-year-old adult				
Is cruel	6.68	.002	.18	
16-year-old juvenile				4.67_{a} (2.72)
16-year-old adult				7.30_{b} (1.19)
25-year-old adult				$6.00_{a,b}$ (2.76)
Is a bad person	6.47	.003	.18	
16-year-old juvenile				5.17_{a} (2.23)
16-year-old adult				7.35_{b} (1.58)
25-year-old adult				$6.36_{a,b}$ (1.99)

Is prone to violence	5.31	.01	.15	
16-year-old juvenile				6.00_{a} (2.06)
16-year-old adult				7.70_{b} (1.26)
25-year-old adult				6.36_{a} (2.01)
Is hot-tempered	6.52	.003	.18	
16-year-old juvenile				4.61_{a} (1.82)
16-year-old adult				6.87_{b} (1.77)
25-year-old adult				6.14_{b} (2.36)
Has had a lot of previous contact with police	5.13	.01	.15	
16-year-old juvenile				3.67_{a} (2.14)
16-year-old adult				6.00_{b} (2.43)
25-year-old adult				5.41_{b} (2.48)
Is manipulative	3.70	.03	.11	
16-year-old juvenile				3.56_{a} (2.31)
16-year-old adult				5.39_{b} (2.45)
25-year-old adult				5.45_{b} (2.60)
Does not feel remorse for what he has done	4.00	.02	.12	
16-year-old juvenile				4.11_{a} (2.61)
16-year-old adult				5.83_{b} (2.23)
25-year-old adult				6.00_{b} (2.07)
Is a superpredator	4.36	.02	.13	

16-year-old juvenile	2.94_a (2.34)
16-year-old adult	5.35_b (2.95)
25-year-old adult	4.77_b (2.58)

* Means for each dependent variable across conditions that do not share subscripts are significantly different at the .05 level.

Table 3

Number of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age and Emotion Condition

Charge type	Anger		Sadness		Fear		Neutral		Total	
	Guilty	**Not**	**Guilty**	**Not**	**Guilty**	**Not**	**Guilty**	**Not**	**Guilty**	**Not**
All Charges	62	37	53	52	42	46	34	41	191	176
	(62.6%)	(37.4%)	(50.5%)	(49.5%)	(47.7%)	(52.3%)	(45.3%)	(54.7%)	(52.0%)	(48.0%)
16-year-old	34	21	23	32	17	23	20	15	94	91
	(61.8%)	(38.2%)	(41.8%)	(58.2%)	(42.5%)	(57.5%)	(57.1%)	(42.9%)	(50.8%)	(49.2%)
25-year-old	28	16	30	20	25	23	14	26	97	85
	(63.6%)	(36.4%)	(60.0%)	(40.0%)	(52.1%)	(47.9%)	(35.0%)	(65.0%)	(53.3%)	(46.7%)
First-Degree	29	70	26	79	26	62	15	60	96	271
Murder	(29.3%)	(70.7%)	(24.8%)	(75.2%)	(29.5%)	(70.5%)	(20.0%)	(80.0%)	(26.2%)	(73.8%)
16-year-old	14	41	12	43	11	29	12	23	49	136
	(25.5%)	(74.5%)	(21.8%)	(78.2%)	(27.5%)	(72.5%)	(34.3%)	(65.7%)	(26.5%)	(73.5%)
25-year-old	15	29	14	36	15	33	3	37	47	135

	(34.1%)	(65.9%)	(28.0%)	(72.0%)	(31.2%)	(68.8%)	(7.5%)	(92.5%)	(25.8%)	(74.2%)
Second-Degree	33	66	31	74	22	66	18	57	104	263
Murder	(33.3%)	(66.7%)	(29.5%)	(70.5%)	(25.0%)	(75.0%)	(24.0%)	(76.0%)	(28.3%)	(71.7%)
16-year-old	16	39	14	41	9	31	10	25	49	136
	(29.1%)	(70.9%)	(25.5%)	(74.5%)	(22.5%)	(77.5%)	(28.6%)	(71.4%)	(26.5%)	(73.5%)
25-year-old	17	27	17	33	13	35	8	32	55	127
	(38.6%)	(61.4%)	(34.0%)	(66.0%)	(27.1%)	(72.9%)	(20.0%)	(80.0%)	(30.2%)	(69.8%)
Manslaughter	33	66	30	75	21	67	17	58	101	266
	(33.3%)	(66.7%)	(28.6%)	(71.4%)	(23.9%)	(76.1%)	(22.7%)	(77.3%)	(27.5%)	(72.5%)
16-year-old	21	34	12	43	8	32	8	27	49	136
	(38.2%)	(61.8%)	(21.8%)	(78.2%)	(20.0%)	(80.0%)	(22.9%)	(77.1%)	(26.5%)	(73.5%)
25-year-old	12	32	18	32	13	35	9	31	52	130
	(27.3%)	(72.7%)	(36.0%)	(64.0%)	(27.1%)	(72.9%)	(22.5%)	(77.5%)	(28.6%)	(71.4%)

Table 4

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Emotion						
Anger	1.27	.49	6.68	1	.01	3.56
Sadness	1.30	.48	7.49	1	.01	3.69
Fear	.80	.47	2.97	1	.09	2.24
Defendant Age	1.05	.49	4.47	1	.03	2.84
Pretrial Bias	.30	.34	.82	1	.37	1.36
Chronic Predator	.91	.33	7.66	1	.01	2.48
Antisocial	-.47	.30	2.35	1	.13	.63
Defendant Age x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Anger	-.89	.68	1.72	1	.19	.41
Defendant Age x Sadness	-1.83	.66	7.75	1	.01	.16
Defendant Age x Fear	-1.41	.67	4.46	1	.04	.25
Defendant Age x Chronic	-.68	.74	.85	1	.36	.51
Predator						
Defendant Age x Antisocial	.16	.79	.04	1	.84	1.19
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	.22	.42	.29	1	.59	1.25
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.06	.40	.02	1	.88	.94
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.14	.42	.11	1	.74	.87
Defendant Age x Stereotyping x						

Emotion						
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Anger	.63	.85	.55	1	.46	1.87
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Sadness	.17	.85	.04	1	.84	1.19
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Fear	-.57	.88	.42	1	.52	.57
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Anger	-.35	.90	.15	1	.70	.70
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Sadness	.54	.91	.36	1	.55	1.72
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Fear	.94	.93	1.02	1	.31	2.56

Table 5

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age Condition

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
16-Year-Old Condition						
Emotion						
Anger	.33	.47	.50	1	.48	1.40
Sadness	-.52	.47	1.22	1	.27	.60
Fear	-.55	.49	1.27	1	.26	.58
Pretrial Bias	.78	.52	2.25	1	.13	2.17
Chronic Predator	.20	.69	.08	1	.77	1.22
Antisocial	-.52	.77	.45	1	.51	.60
Emotion x Stereotyping						
Anger x Chronic Predator	.72	.87	.69	1	.41	2.05
Sadness x Chronic Predator	.12	.88	.02	1	.89	1.13
Fear x Chronic Predator	-.40	.91	.19	1	.66	.67
Anger x Antisocial	-.05	.94	.003	1	.96	.95
Sadness x Antisocial	.69	.96	.52	1	.47	1.99
Fear x Antisocial	1.14	.97	1.38	1	.24	3.13
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						

Anger x Pretrial Bias	-.47	.61	.60	1	.44	.63
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.21	.63	.11	1	.74	.81
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.86	.64	1.82	1	.177	.42
25-Year-Old Condition						
Emotion						
Anger	1.40	.54	6.78	1	.01	4.06
Sadness	1.24	.48	6.69	1	.01	3.44
Fear	.72	.48	2.22	1	.14	2.06
Pretrial Bias	.003	.50	.000	1	1.00	1.00
Chronic Predator	.62	.79	.62	1	.43	1.87
Antisocial	-.25	.86	.09	1	.77	.78
Emotion x Stereotyping						
Anger x Chronic Predator	-.36	1.20	.09	1	.76	.70
Sadness x Chronic Predator	.44	.96	.21	1	.65	1.55
Fear x Chronic Predator	.82	1.06	.60	1	.44	2.27
Anger x Antisocial	.53	1.17	.21	1	.65	1.70
Sadness x Antisocial	-.40	.99	.16	1	.69	.67
Fear x Antisocial	-.58	1.07	.29	1	.59	.56

Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	.81	.68	1.43	1	.23	2.24
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.003	.62	.000	1	1.00	1.00
Fear x Pretrial Bias	.33	.64	.27	1	.60	1.39

Table 6

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Emotion Condition

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Sadness Condition						
Defendant Age	-.77	.43	3.14	1	.08	.47
Pretrial Bias	.000	.37	.000	1	1.00	1.00
Chronic Predator	1.06	.54	3.83	1	.05	2.90
Antisocial	-.65	.48	1.84	1	.18	.52
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	-.75	.77	.93	1	.33	.47
Defendant Age x Antisocial	.82	.74	1.24	1	.27	2.28
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	.57	.51	1.25	1	.26	1.76
Fear Condition						
Defendant Age	-.29	.46	.38	1	.54	.75
Pretrial Bias	.33	.39	.73	1	.39	1.40
Chronic Predator	1.44	.70	4.22	1	.04	4.24
Antisocial	-.83	.63	1.75	1	.19	.44
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	-1.64	.92	3.17	1	.08	.19
Defendant Age x	1.45	.85	2.89	1	.09	4.27

Antisocial						
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	-.42	.54	.60	1	.44	.66

Table 7

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Emotion						
Anger	2.30	.76	9.19	1	.002	9.94
Sadness	1.86	.77	5.91	1	.02	6.42
Fear	1.92	.76	6.40	1	.01	6.85
Defendant Age	2.18	.76	8.30	1	.004	8.86
Pretrial Bias	.87	.50	2.98	1	.09	2.38
Chronic Predator	.31	.37	.73	1	.40	1.37
Antisocial	.18	.35	.29	1	.59	1.20
Defendant Age x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Anger	-2.82	.91	9.56	1	.002	.06
Defendant Age x Sadness	-2.44	.90	7.34	1	.01	.09
Defendant Age x Fear	-2.25	.90	6.29	1	.01	.11
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.21	.81	.07	1	.80	1.24
Defendant Age x Antisocial	-.98	.90	1.19	1	.28	.38
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	-.72	.56	1.64	1	.20	.49
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.24	.58	.17	1	.68	.79
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.34	.58	.33	1	.57	.72

Defendant Age x Stereotyping x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Anger	1.29	1.12	1.33	1	.25	3.64
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Sadness	-.18	1.00	.03	1	.86	.84
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Fear	-.81	.97	.69	1	.41	.45
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Anger	-.45	1.19	.14	1	.71	.64
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Sadness	.98	1.09	.81	1	.37	2.66
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Fear	1.23	1.05	1.38	1	.24	3.44

Table 8

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts by Defendant Age Condition

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
16-Year-Old Condition						
Emotion						
Anger	-.61	.55	1.22	1	.27	.54
Sadness	-.70	.56	1.55	1	.21	.50
Fear	-.20	.54	.14	1	.71	.82
Pretrial Bias	.68	.56	1.47	1	.23	1.98
Chronic Predator	.52	.72	.53	1	.47	1.69
Antisocial	-.70	.83	.71	1	.40	.50
Emotion x Stereotyping						
Anger x Chronic Predator	1.35	1.12	1.45	1	.23	3.84
Sadness x Chronic Predator	-.29	1.02	.08	1	.78	.75
Fear x Chronic Predator	-.33	.98	.12	1	.73	.72
Anger x Antisocial	-.39	1.19	.11	1	.74	.67
Sadness x Antisocial	.86	1.11	.61	1	.44	2.37
Fear x Antisocial	1.12	1.05	1.14	1	.29	3.07

Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	-.89	.67	1.80	1	.18	.41
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	.23	.74	.10	1	.75	1.26
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-1.04	.70	2.21	1	.14	.35
25-Year-Old Condition						
Emotion						
Anger	2.57	1.14	5.10	1	.02	13.10
Sadness	2.16	1.13	3.64	1	.06	8.68
Fear	1.45	1.22	1.42	1	.23	4.26
Pretrial Bias	1.61	1.18	1.85	1	.17	4.98
Chronic Predator	-.22	1.45	.02	1	.88	.80
Antisocial	.52	1.71	.10	1	.76	1.69
Emotion x Stereotyping						
Anger x Chronic Predator	.03	1.70	.000	1	.99	1.03
Sadness x Chronic Predator	.04	1.56	.001	1	.98	1.04
Fear x Chronic Predator	1.07	1.68	.41	1	.52	2.92
Anger x Antisocial	.14	1.85	.01	1	.94	1.15
Sadness x Antisocial	-.83	1,80	.21	1	.64	.44

Fear x Antisocial	-.15	1.89	.01	1	.94	.86
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	-1.03	1.27	.65	1	.42	.36
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.44	1.31	.11	1	.74	.64
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.03	1.33	.001	1	.98	.97

Table 9

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts by Emotion Condition

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Anger Condition						
Defendant Age	-.69	.55	1.56	1	.21	.50
Pretrial Bias	.58	.46	1.60	1	.21	1.79
Chronic Predator	-.19	.89	.05	1	.83	.83
Antisocial	.66	.73	.83	1	.36	1.94
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	2.06	1.23	2.80	1	.09	7.85
Defendant Age x Antisocial	-1.76	1.12	2.47	1	.12	.17
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	-.79	.58	1.86	1	.17	.45
Sadness Condition						
Defendant Age	-.36	.54	.44	1	.51	.70
Pretrial Bias	1.17	.57	4.25	1	.04	3.21
Chronic Predator	-.18	.58	.09	1	.76	.84
Antisocial	-.31	.57	.30	1	.59	.74
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.41	.93	.20	1	.65	1.51
Defendant Age x	.47	.93	.26	1	.61	1.60

Antisocial						
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	-.25	.74	.12	1	.73	.78
Fear Condition						
Defendant Age	.85	.68	1.54	1	.22	2.33
Pretrial Bias	1.58	.61	6.59	1	.01	4.83
Chronic Predator	.85	.85	1.02	1	.31	2.35
Antisocial	.37	.80	.22	1	.64	1.45
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	-.67	1.07	.39	1	.54	.51
Defendant Age x Antisocial	.05	1.03	.002	1	.96	1.05
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	-1.94	.74	6.78	1	.01	.14

Table 10

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Second-Degree Murder Verdicts

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Emotion						
Anger	.98	.55	3.16	1	.08	2.67
Sadness	.98	.54	3.31	1	.07	2.66
Fear	.49	.56	.77	1	.38	1.64
Defendant Age	.60	.59	1.02	1	.31	1.82
Pretrial Bias	.58	.42	1.87	1	.17	1.78
Chronic Predator	.89	.36	6.11	1	.01	2.43
Antisocial	-.46	.33	1.99	1	.16	.63
Defendant Age x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Anger	-.84	.75	1.26	1	.26	.43
Defendant Age x Sadness	-.95	.74	1.67	1	.20	.39
Defendant Age x Fear	-.73	.78	.89	1	.35	.48
Defendant Age x Chronic	-.11	.87	.02	1	.90	.90
Predator						
Defendant Age x Antisocial	-.27	.93	.08	1	.78	.77
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	.02	.49	.001	1	.97	1.02
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.44	.48	.87	1	.35	.64
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.28	.51	.29	1	.59	.76

Defendant Age x Stereotyping x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Anger	-.66	.96	.47	1	.50	.52
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Sadness	-.10	1.02	.01	1	.92	.91
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Fear	-.77	1.06	.53	1	.47	.46
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Anger	.84	1.04	.65	1	.42	2.32
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Sadness	.24	1.08	.05	1	.83	1.27
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Fear	.51	1.11	.21	1	.65	1.66

Table 11

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Manslaughter Verdicts

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Emotion						
Anger	.17	.55	.09	1	.76	1.18
Sadness	.85	.52	2.75	1	.10	2.35
Fear	.28	.54	.27	1	.60	1.33
Defendant Age	-.07	.63	.01	1	.91	.93
Pretrial Bias	.57	.42	1.82	1	.18	1.77
Chronic Predator	1.03	.37	7.92	1	.01	2.80
Antisocial	-.84	.34	6.01	1	.01	.43
Defendant Age x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Anger	.90	.78	1.31	1	.25	2.45
Defendant Age x Sadness	-.66	.78	.72	1	.40	.52
Defendant Age x Fear	-.56	.88	.41	1	.52	.57
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.18	1.02	.03	1	.86	1.20
Defendant Age x Antisocial	-.11	1.08	.01	1	.92	.90
Emotion x Pretrial Bias						
Anger x Pretrial Bias	-.14	.49	.08	1	.78	.87
Sadness x Pretrial Bias	-.48	.48	1.01	1	.32	.62
Fear x Pretrial Bias	-.26	.52	.25	1	.62	.77

Defendant Age x Stereotyping x Emotion						
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Anger	-.48	1.12	.18	1	.67	.62
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Sadness	-1.23	1.13	1.19	1	.28	.293
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator x Fear	-1.79	1.19	2.25	1	.13	.17
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Anger	.03	1.20	.001	1	.98	1.03
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Sadness	1.48	1.20	1.52	1	.22	4.41
Defendant Age x Antisocial x Fear	2.35	1.30	3.29	1	.07	10.46

Table 12

Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a First-Degree Murder Verdict

Effects	***F***	***df***	***p***	η_p^2
Defendant Age	7.21	1, 335	.01	.02
Emotion	.19	3, 335	.91	.002
Pretrial Bias	11.10	1, 335	.001	.03
Chronic Predator	.95	1, 335	.33	.003
Antisocial	.32	1, 335	.57	.001
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	6.59	1, 335	.01	.02
Emotion x Pretrial Bias	.76	3, 335	.52	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age	1.81	3, 335	.15	.02
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	1.31	1, 335	.25	.004
Defendant Age x Stereotyping 2	.53	1, 335	.47	.002
Emotion x Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	1.39	3, 335	.25	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.56	6, 335	.76	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x	.67	6, 335	.67	.01

Antisocial

Table 13

Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a Second-Degree Murder Verdict

Effects	***F***	***df***	***p***	η_p^2
Defendant Age	.004	1, 335	.95	.000
Emotion	2.53	3, 335	.06	.02
Pretrial Bias	8.78	1, 335	.003	.03
Chronic Predator	3.84	1, 335	.05	.01
Antisocial	.81	1, 335	.37	.002
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	.53	1, 335	.47	.002
Emotion x Pretrial Bias	1.45	3, 335	.23	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age	2.00	3, 335	.11	.02
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	1.75	1, 335	.19	.01
Defendant Age x Stereotyping 2	.04	1, 335	.85	.000
Emotion x Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	1.92	3, 335	.13	.02
Emotion x Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.41	6, 335	.88	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x	.78	6, 335	.59	.01

Antisocial

Table 14

Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a Manslaughter Verdict

Effects	***F***	***df***	***p***	η_p^2
Defendant Age	.79	1, 335	.37	.002
Emotion	1.73	3, 335	.16	.02
Pretrial Bias	7.66	1, 335	.01	.02
Chronic Predator	4.42	1, 335	.04	.01
Antisocial	1.89	1, 335	.17	.01
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	.67	1, 335	.41	.002
Emotion x Pretrial Bias	1.84	3, 335	.14	.02
Emotion x Defendant Age	2.53	3, 335	.06	.02
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	2.63	1, 335	.11	.01
Defendant Age x Antisocial	2.00	1, 335	.16	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	2.01	3, 335	.11	.02
Emotion x Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	1.12	6, 335	.35	.02
Emotion x Defendant Age x Antisocial	1.30	6, 335	.26	.02

Table 15

Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Standards of Proof

Effects	***F***	***df***	***p***	η_p^2
Defendant Age	.004	1, 331	.95	.000
Emotion	.33	3, 331	.80	.003
Pretrial Bias	.000	1, 331	.99	.000
Chronic Predator	4.83	1, 331	.03	.01
Antisocial	2.42	1, 331	.12	.01
Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	.000	1, 331	1.00	.000
Emotion x Pretrial Bias	.84	3, 331	.47	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age	1.87	3, 331	.14	.02
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	7.29	1, 331	.01	.02
Defendant Age x Antisocial	6.46	1, 331	.01	.02
Emotion x Defendant Age x Pretrial Bias	.65	3, 331	.58	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	.67	6, 331	.68	.01
Emotion x Defendant Age x Antisocial	.47	6, 331	.83	.01

Table 16

Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts with Negative Emotion as a Predictor

Variable	***B***	***SE***	***Wald***	***df***	***p***	***Exp(B)***
Negative Emotion	1.11	.40	7.81	1	.01	3.05
Defendant Age	1.05	.49	4.49	1	.03	2.85
Pretrial Bias	.30	.34	.81	1	.37	1.35
Chronic Predator	.92	.32	8.17	1	.004	2.51
Antisocial	-.47	.29	2.57	1	.11	.62
Defendant Age x Negative Emotion	-1.36	.55	6.06	1	.01	.26
Pretrial Bias x Negative Emotion	-.06	.36	.03	1	.88	.95
Defendant Age x Chronic Predator	-.69	.73	.88	1	.35	.50
Defendant Age x Antisocial	.17	.78	.05	1	.83	1.18
Defendant Age x Negative Emotion x Chronic Predator	.17	.73	.06	1	.82	1.19
Defendant Age x Negative Emotion x Antisocial	.34	.79	.18	1	.67	1.40

Table 17

Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age and Negative Emotion Condition

	Negative Emotion	
	16-year-old	**25-year-old**
Guilty	74 (49.3%)	83 (58.5%)
Not Guilty	76 (50.7%)	59 (41.5%)

Table 18

Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age and Neutral Emotion Condition

	Neutral Emotion	
	16-year-old	**25-year-old**
Guilty	20 (57.1%)	14 (35.0%)
Not Guilty	15 (42.9%)	26 (65.0%)

Appendix A

Informed Consent

Identification of Project: Perceptions of Crime and Criminals

You are invited to participate in a research study that examines perceptions of crime and criminals. This study will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. You were selected as a participant because you have signed up to participate in web-based research through Study Response. To complete this study, you must be at least 18 years of age. This study is being conducted by researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln under the direction of Megan Jones, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology.

Participation in this study will require approximately 15 minutes of your time. This study will take place on the internet. You will read a brief newspaper article about the commission of a crime, and answer some questions about your opinions regarding crime and criminals. You will also be asked to provide some demographic information.

You will receive a $5 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for your participation.

The potential benefits of the current study outweigh any cost that may accompany participation. Knowledge generated through this study will help researchers better understand how individuals think about crime and criminals. Such knowledge about perceptions of crime and criminals can lead to improvements in the legal system.

There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. If a participant does not feel comfortable answering a question during the session, the participant can choose not to respond. You will not be penalized for skipping any questions that you do not want to answer. You may skip any questions or stop completing any survey without penalty. The alternative to this study is non-participation. Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty to you or loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

The results of this study may be published, but your name and identity will not be revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous. All data will be identified with numbers that have no links to you as a research participant and will be kept in a locked, secure lab in Burnett Hall at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for a period of five years after which it will be destroyed. Nonetheless, some of the questions on the demographic sheet ask about, among other things, your gender, your ethnicity, and your age. Feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that the answers may reveal your identity.

Megan Jones (graduate student) and Dr. Richard L. Wiener are conducting this study. They will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the study. You may contact Ms. Jones at (402) 472-9639 or mberingerjones@gmail.com, or Dr. Wiener at (402) 472-1137 or rwiener2@unl.edu. To obtain more information about your rights as a research participant or to report any concerns about the study, please contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Research at (402) 472-6965.

If you wish to participate in this study, please read the following statement and provide your electronic signature by clicking at the bottom of the webpage. It is suggested that you print a copy of this informed consent form for your personal records.

I have read and understood the information presented above. If I have any questions before I begin, I may contact the researchers. Otherwise, my concerns have been answered to my satisfaction via this consent form. I consent to take part in this experiment.

____ I agree, and I consent to take part in this experiment

____ I disagree, and I do not wish to take part in this experiment

Name and Phone Number of Investigators:

Megan Jones	(402) 472-9639
Dr. Richard Wiener	(402) 472-1137

Appendix B

Newspaper Article (16-year-old, Juvenile court)

Teen charged with armed robbery

OMAHA – A 16-year-old Omaha teen was charged Friday with robbing a man at gunpoint last month.

Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff's Department with robbery with a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail.

Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a gun. Davis will be tried in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court next month. Davis's trial will be held in the juvenile court in front of a juvenile court judge because of his young age.

Newspaper Article (16-year-old, Criminal court)

Teen charged with armed robbery

OMAHA – A 16-year-old Omaha teen was charged Friday with robbing a man at gunpoint last month.

Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff's Department with robbery with a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail.

Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a gun. Davis will be tried as an adult in the Douglas County adult Criminal Court next month. Davis's trial will not be held in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court in front of a juvenile court judge even though his young age could allow his trial to proceed in that venue.

Newspaper Article (25-year-old, Criminal court)

Man charged with armed robbery

OMAHA – A 25-year-old Omaha man was charged Friday with robbing a man at gunpoint last month.

Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff's Department with robbery with a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail.

Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a gun. Davis will be tried in the Douglas County adult Criminal Court next month.

Appendix C

Stereotype Questionnaire

Below are a series of statements concerning the individual charged with armed robbery in the newspaper article you just read. Please use your best guess and ***indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement*** by selecting the number on the numerical scales that best expresses your opinion.

1. This individual has committed other crimes in the past.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

2. This individual is aggressive.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

3. This individual is a danger to society.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

4. This individual uses illegal drugs.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

5. This individual is vindictive.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

6. This individual is a chronic offender.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

7. This individual is lazy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

8. This individual is immoral.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

9. This individual has a previous criminal record.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

10. This individual is cruel.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

11. This individual is intelligent. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

12. This individual is a bad person.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

13. This individual has gotten into trouble just this one time. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

14. This individual is prone to violence.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

15. This individual is antisocial.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

16. This individual is hot-tempered.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

17. This individual has had a lot of previous contact with the police.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

18. This individual is manipulative.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

19. This individual could probably be rehabilitated. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

20. This individual is immature.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

21. This individual knows the difference between right and wrong.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Not at all — Somewhat — Completely

22. This individual does not feel remorse for what he has done.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Not at all — Somewhat — Completely

23. This individual is a superpredator. (A superpredator is a serious and violent offender who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, is competent to understand the court process, and has little rehabilitation potential.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Not at all — Somewhat — Completely

(For 16-year-old conditions)

24. This individual is a wayward youth. (A wayward youth is a disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Not at all — Somewhat — Completely

(For 25-year-old condition)

24. This individual was a wayward youth when he was a teenager. (A wayward youth is a disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Not at all — Somewhat — Completely

Appendix D

Demographics Questionnaire

1. What is your age? ____ years old

2. What is your gender? ____ Male ____ Female

3. What is your ethnic origin and/or race?

_____ African American
_____ Asian American
_____ Caucasian
_____ Hispanic
_____ Latin American
_____ Native American
_____ Other

4. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?

_____ Less than high school
_____ High school
_____ Associate's degree
_____ Bachelor's degree
_____ Master's degree
_____ Professional degree (i.e., M.D., J.D., Ph.D.)

5. Is English your primary language?
_____ yes _____ no

6. Have you served as a juror on: (check one answer for each):

a state civil case? _____ yes _____ no
a state criminal case? _____ yes _____ no
a federal civil case? _____ yes _____ no
a federal criminal case? _____ yes _____ no

7. Are you registered to vote?
_____ yes _____ no

8. Do you have a valid driver's license?
_____ yes _____ no

9. Are you a citizen of the United States?
_____ yes _____ no

10. Are you a convicted felon without civil rights?
_____ yes _____ no

11. What is your religious preference (if any)?
_____

12. What is your current work status? (check one):
_____ employed full time _____ employed part time _____ unemployed

13. What is your political affiliation? (check one):
_____ Democrat _____ Republican _____ other _____ none

14. What was the age of the individual described in the newspaper article? _____

15. When you read the newspaper article, what did you think the race of the individual was?
_____

Appendix E

Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study was to examine stereotypes about juveniles who are tried as adults in criminal court. Some research suggests that juveniles who are transferred to criminal court are judged more harshly than adults who are charged with the same crimes. The goal of the current study is to assess which stereotypes people associate with juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adults tried in criminal court. The results of this study will be used to construct a stereotyping measure for use in future research examining juror decision making regarding juveniles tried as adults.

Once again, we thank you for your participation; we ask that you not discuss this research with any future participants as it may negatively influence the results of our study. If you have any questions or concerns about this project, or if you would like to know the general results of the research upon its completion, feel free to contact Megan Jones or Richard Wiener at 402-472-9639.

Appendix F

Informed Consent

Identification of Project: Social Cognition in Recall of Life Events and Legal Decision Making

You are invited to participate in research that examines both social cognition in recall of life events, and legal decision making. A group of researchers studying social cognition is interested in a number of different types of information processing, and to facilitate data collection has combined several of their experiments. You were selected as a participant because you have signed up to participate in web-based research through Study Response. To complete this research, you must be at least 18 years of age. This research is being conducted by researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln under the direction of Megan Jones, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, and Dr. Richard Wiener, professor in the Department of Psychology.

This research will consist of three separate experiments. Experiment 1 will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Experiments 2 and 3 will occur several weeks after the completion of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 will take approximately 15 minutes to complete, and Experiment 3 will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. All three experiments will take place on the internet.

In Experiment 1 you will answer some questions regarding your opinions about the legal system, crime, and criminals. You will also read a short crime scenario and decide whether the defendant in it is guilty. Experiment 2 will examine how individuals write about life events. You will be asked to write about past or present life events, and then will complete a few other short questionnaires about what you wrote. Experiment 3 will examine legal decision making. You will be asked to read about a case in which the defendant is being charged with a serious crime, following which you will determine whether the defendant is guilty and answer several other questions about the case.

You will receive a $5 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for your participation in Experiment 1. You will receive a $10 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for your participation in Experiments 2 and 3.

The potential benefits of the current research outweigh any cost that may accompany participation. Knowledge generated through these studies will help researchers better understand individual differences in information processing about life events, which will contribute to the study of social cognition. This research will also help researchers better understand legal decision making, which can lead to improvements in the legal system.

The risks of this research are minimal. Some participants may experience some minimal discomfort when writing about life events in Experiment 2. Some participants may also

experience some minimal discomfort when reading about the crimes described in Experiments 1 and 3. In addition, this research, like much other research in Psychology, may contain some questions that you may find sensitive or personal.

If a participant does not feel comfortable answering a question during the study, the participant can choose not to respond. You will not be penalized for skipping any questions that you do not want to answer. You may skip any questions or stop completing any survey without penalty. The alternative to this research is non-participation. Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in this research or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty to you or loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

The results of this research may be published, but your name and identity will not be revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous. All data will be identified with numbers that have no links to you as a research participant and will be kept in a locked, secure lab in Burnett Hall at the University of Nebraska for a period of five years after which it will be destroyed. Nonetheless, some of the questions on the demographic sheet ask about, among other things, your gender, your ethnicity, and your age. Feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that the answers may reveal your identity.

Megan Jones (graduate student) and Dr. Richard L. Wiener are conducting this research. They will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the research. You may contact Ms. Jones at (402) 472-9639 or mberingerjones@gmail.com, or Dr. Wiener at (402) 472-1137 or rwiener2@unl.edu. To obtain more information about your rights as a research participant or to report any concerns about this research, please contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Research at (402) 472-6965.

If you wish to participate in this research, please read the following statement and provide your electronic signature by clicking at the bottom of the webpage. It is suggested that you print a copy of this informed consent form for your personal records.

I have read and understood the information presented above. If I have any questions before I begin, I may contact the researchers. Otherwise, my concerns have been answered to my satisfaction via this consent form. I consent to take part in this research.

____ I agree, and I consent to take part in this research

____ I disagree, and I do not wish to take part in this research

Name and Phone Number of Investigators:

Megan Jones	(402) 472-9639
Dr. Richard Wiener	(402) 472-1137

Appendix G

Stereotyping Measure

Imagine a juvenile who has committed a crime and is now being tried as an adult in criminal court. Below are a series of statements concerning this individual. Please use your best guess and **indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement** below by selecting the number on the numerical scales that best expresses your opinion.

1. This individual has committed other crimes in the past.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

2. This individual is aggressive.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

3. This individual is a danger to society.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

4. This individual uses illegal drugs.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

5. This individual is vindictive.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

6. This individual is a chronic offender.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

7. This individual is lazy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

8. This individual is immoral.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

9. This individual has a previous criminal record.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

10. This individual is cruel.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

11. This individual is intelligent. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

12. This individual is a bad person.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

13. This individual has gotten into trouble just this one time. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

14. This individual is prone to violence.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

15. This individual is antisocial.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

16. This individual is hot-tempered.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

17. This individual has had a lot of previous contact with the police.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

18. This individual is manipulative.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

19. This individual could probably be rehabilitated. (reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

20. This individual is immature.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

21. This individual knows the difference between right and wrong.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

22. This individual does not feel remorse for what he has done.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

23. This individual is a superpredator. (A superpredator is a serious and violent offender who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, is competent to understand the court process, and has little rehabilitation potential.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

24. This individual is a wayward youth. (A wayward youth is a disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all				Somewhat				Completely

Appendix H

Pretrial Juror Bias Questionnaire

Below are a series of statements concerning the legal system. **Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the number on the numerical scales that best expresses your opinion.**

1. If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

2. A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

3. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

4. In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good lawyer.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

5. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which they are charged.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

6. For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long as there is a 90% chance that he committed the crime.

1	2	3	4	5

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

7. Defense lawyers don't really care about guilt or innocence; they are just in business to make money.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

8. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

9. Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

10. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

11. Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime, then that person should be punished.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

12. If the defendant committed a victimless crime, like gambling or possession of marijuana, he should never be convicted.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

13. Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

14. Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

15. Once a criminal, always a criminal.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

16. Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

17. Criminals should be caught and convicted by "any means necessary."

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

18. A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person's guilt in the present case.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

19. Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

20. If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly				Strongly

Disagree Agree

21. Minorities use the "race issue" only when they are guilty.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

22. When it is the suspect's word against the police officer's, I believe the police.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

23. Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than women.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

24. The large number of African Americans currently in prison is an example of the innate criminality of that subgroup.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

25. A Black man on trial with a predominantly White jury will always be found guilty.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

26. Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often than not.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

27. If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding something.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

28. Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

29. Famous people are often considered to be "above the law."

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

30. The death penalty is cruel and inhuman.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

31. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

32. If the grand jury recommends that a person be brought to trial, then he probably committed the crime.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

33. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

34. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the crime, the jury should vote *not guilty.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree

Appendix I

Attitudes toward Rape

In this section, you will be asked a series of questions regarding your beliefs about sexual assault. For these questions, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the number on the scale that you feel is closest to your opinion about each statement.

1. A charge of rape two days after the act has occurred is probably not rape.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

2. It would do some women good to get raped.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

3. Most charges of rape are unfounded.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

4. A convicted rapist should be castrated or serve a life sentence in prison.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

5. In most cases when a woman was raped, she was asking for it.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

6. Rapists are motivated more by a desire for power than by a desire for sex.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

7. In order to protect the male, it should be difficult to prove that a rape has occurred.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

8. In forcible rape, the victim never causes the crime.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

9. During a rape, a woman should do everything she can to resist.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

10. Most men would commit rape if they knew they could get away with it.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

Appendix J

Crime Scenario

People v. Martin

Henry Martin, the defendant, is charged with **attempted sexual assault in the first degree** for acts allegedly committed against Christina Wilson.

According to Christina Wilson, a man standing over her bed awakened her in the middle of the night. Wearing a paper mask and gloves, the intruder attacked Mrs. Wilson as she tried to scramble out of bed. Wilson testified that she managed to slide away from Martin but he grabbed her and the two of them struggled on and off the bed for a period of time. Wilson claimed that when she screamed for Martin to stop, he placed his hands over her mouth to silence her. As Martin tried unsuccessfully to remove Christina's pajama bottoms, Wilson heard the sound of a car pulling into the driveway. Hearing the car, the defendant ran fearfully out of the house and out the backdoor. Wilson testified that Martin knew that her husband was out of town, and that he knew the layout of the home because he had done handy work for the Wilsons and had watched the house when the Wilsons were out of town. Further, the Wilson's German shepherd knew the intruder and did not bark at his presence. Nonetheless, Mrs. Wilson admitted that she never observed the intruder's face directly during the ordeal nor did she ever hear him speak.

The defendant, Henry Martin told a very different story. He admitted that he was at the victim's home on the morning of question. He denied breaking into the house or attempting to rape the victim. According to Martin, the two were having a consensual affair and Christina invited him there because her husband was away on business. He testified that prior to the day in question; he had made frequent visits to Mrs. Wilson's home during the course of her husband's absences. Martin claimed he ran away when he and Christina heard the sound of a car pulling up because they believed it to be Christina's husband. Martin testified that Christina told him to leave before her husband saw Henry.

The Law of the Case: Henry Martin is guilty of **attempted sexual assault in the first degree** if he intentionally acted with conduct, which under the circumstances as he believed them to be, constituted a substantial step toward the commission of sexual assault in the first degree. Conduct is considered a substantial step only if it is strongly corroborative of Mr. Martin's criminal intent. Sexual assault in the first degree is sexually penetrating another person without her consent. It is the state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Martin is guilty of all elements of attempted sexual assault in the first degree.

1. Is Henry Martin guilty of attempted sexual assault in the first degree?

a. Not guilty

b. Guilty

Appendix K

Introduction to Phase 2 of Study 2

You will now be participating in the second and third experiments in the series of three experiments that you agreed to participate in. The Social Cognition Research Group is interested in a number of different types of information processing. Therefore, you will participate in two unrelated experiments to address several of the group members' research questions.

Experiment 2 will examine how individuals write about life events. You will be asked to write about past or present life events, and then will complete a few other short questionnaires about what you wrote.

Experiment 3 will examine legal decision making. You will be asked to read about a case in which the defendant is being charged with a serious crime, following which you will determine whether the defendant is guilty and answer a number of other questions about the case.

Appendix L

Emotion Manipulation (Anger)

Life Events Questionnaire

Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed responses.

Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most angry? Please write two to three sentences about each thing that makes you angry.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Question 2: Now we'd like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes you (or has made you) most angry. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the anger-inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event(s) as is possible.

If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get angry just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why does it make you so angry?

_____

_____

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_____

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Emotion Manipulation (Sadness)

Life Events Questionnaire

Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed responses.

Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most sad? Please write two-three sentences about each thing that makes you sad.

_____

_____

_____

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Question 2: Now we'd like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes you (or has made you) most sad. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the sadness-inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event(s) as is possible.

If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get sad just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why does it make you so sad?

_____

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_____

Emotion Manipulation (Fear)

Life Events Questionnaire

Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed responses.

Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most scared? Please write two to three sentences about each thing that makes you scared.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Question 2: Now we'd like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes you (or has made you) most scared. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the fear-inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event(s) as is possible.

If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get scared just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why does it make you so scared?

_____

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_____

Emotion Manipulation (Neutral)

Life Events Questionnaire

Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed responses.

Question 1: What are three to five activities that you did today? Please write two to three sentences about each activity that you select. (Examples of activities you might write about include: driving to work, eating lunch, going to the gym, etc.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Question 2: Now we'd like you to describe in more detail two of the activities that you just discussed. Begin by writing down a description of each activity and then figure out how much time you devoted to each activity. Describe in detail what you did to complete each activity.

If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might be able to reconstruct the way in which you, specifically, completed each of your activities.

_____

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_____

Appendix M

Appraisal Questionnaire

Instructions: Please consider the situations and experiences you wrote about on the previous pages when answering the following questions.

1. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well did you understand what was happening in those situations?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

2. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

3. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how uncertain were you about what would happen in various situations?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

4. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone else was to blame for what was happening in the situation?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well could you typically predict what was going to happen next?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

6. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent were the events beyond anyone's control?

Not at all				Somewhat				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Appendix N

Emotion Manipulation Check

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you feel each of the following emotions right now.

1. Happy

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

2. Angry

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

3. Disgusted

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

4. Sad

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5. Fearful

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

6. Surprised

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely strongly

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Appendix O

Trial Summary – 25-year-old version

INSTRUCTIONS

The following trial summary is based on an actual case. It describes a 25-year-old adult defendant who has been charged with first-degree murder and is being tried in criminal court. While you read the summary, please put yourself in the position of a juror who is receiving this information in court. Please pay close attention to the information in the trial summary. At the conclusion of the trial summary, you will be asked to make a decision regarding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. (All personally identifying information has been changed to protect the privacy of the parties involved.)

IN THE DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

v.

AIDEN DAVIS (Defendant)

The Charge:
First-degree murder

People in the Case:
Susan Parker, victim
Aiden Davis, defendant

Witnesses:
Andrew Parker, victim's husband
Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner
Julia Manning, criminalist
Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist
Sean Phillips, defendant's friend
Lucas Allen, defendant's neighbor
Ramona McConnell, defendant's neighbor

Summary of Opening Statements

Prosecution:
The Prosecution explained that the evidence would show that on July 11th, 2009, 25-year-old Aiden Davis bludgeoned Susan Parker to death during an attempted residential burglary. Davis had stolen credit card information from other individuals in his neighborhood, and on the day of the murder he was attempting to steal Susan Parker's credit card information. Susan Parker's blood was found on items in a bag belonging to Aiden Davis, and he had injuries on his body consistent with those that Mrs. Parker's assailant could have sustained from her efforts to defend herself. The Prosecution stated that the trial would show that Aiden Davis is guilty of committing first-degree murder.

Defense:
The Defense explained that Aiden Davis was innocent and had been wrongly accused of the murder of Susan Parker. The defense stated that the evidence would show that the defendant's friend, Sean Phillips, killed Susan Parker. Phillips was the mastermind behind the plan to steal credit card information to buy equipment for growing marijuana. Phillips had been to the van where the blood-stained items were found, and does not have an alibi for the morning of the murder. None of the forensic evidence can establish that

Davis was at the scene of the crime. The Defense stated that the trial would prove that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker.

Summary of Testimony

Witness 1: Andrew Parker, victim's husband

Andrew Parker testified that on the morning of Saturday, July 11th, 2009, he left the house shortly before 8:00 a.m. to attend a meeting. Parker's wife, Susan, was still asleep when he left. Mr. Parker attempted to call Susan periodically during the day but she did not answer the phone. He left his office late in the afternoon that day, and stated that when he arrived home, he was surprised to see Susan's car was still in the garage, as she had plans to attend the ballet that evening. When he approached the front door he noticed smears on it. He opened the front door and saw Susan lying there in a pool of blood. He fell to the floor screaming. He called 911 from inside the house and then returned to Susan's body and continued to cry and scream.

Mr. Parker testified that he lives one block away from the defendant, Aiden Davis, and that he had seen him in passing but had never spoken with him.

Witness 2: Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner

Dr. Fielding conducted the autopsy of Susan Parker. He stated that she died as a result of blunt force trauma to her head. The vast majority of Mrs. Parker's external injuries were abrasions (scrape-type injuries) and lacerations (crushing or tearing-type injuries) caused by blunt force, many on the victim's head. While it was difficult to estimate how many blows Mrs. Parker suffered because of possible overlap, Fielding was able to identify eight distinct injuries on the right side of Mrs. Parker's head, 11 on the back of her head, and seven on the left side of her head. Mrs. Parker's internal injuries as a result of the blows to her head consisted of bleeding inside her scalp and over virtually every surface of the brain.

There were also contusions, abrasions, and scratches to Mrs. Parker's shoulders, breasts, and upper torso, fractures to her left hand, and bruising on her right foot, which Fielding concluded were probably defensive injuries. The injuries to the right foot were most likely sustained while the victim was on the floor "trying to get anything between her and the force being inflicted."

Dr. Fielding surmised that Mrs. Parker would have died within minutes as opposed to hours after the first blows were struck to her head. Based on his examination, Fielding concluded that Mrs. Parker probably died sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on July 11th.

Witness 3: Julia Manning, criminalist

Julia Manning, a criminalist with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department, arrived at the crime scene at about 9:15 p.m. on July 11th to process the crime scene and collect evidence. Manning observed blood on the floor and the walls near Mrs. Parker's body. Manning also observed blood smears on the interior portion of the door that she opined were consistent with someone who was wearing a long-sleeved garment. Mrs. Parker was found in a short-sleeved t-shirt. Based on the location of the great majority of the blood evidence, Manning opined that most of the victim's injuries were sustained while Mrs. Parker was low to the ground in the entryway.

On the walls and on objects in the room there were numerous finger marks in blood; some of these contained fine linear striations, indicating they were fabric patterns rather than fingerprints, consistent with the attacker wearing gloves throughout the incident.

Witness 4: Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer

A forensic examination of Susan Parker's computer showed that it was used beginning at 8:07 a.m. on July 11th to visit several Web sites that were consistent with her interests. The computer was used very extensively in the first part of the morning. The last use was at 10:12 a.m. and there was no further activity on the computer that day up until Mrs. Parker's body was discovered.

Officer Bourne testified that in the defendant's bedroom, police officers found pieces of paper with credit card account numbers and names of two of the defendant's neighbors. These papers included a birth date and credit card security code number for one of the neighbors, and user names and passwords for the other neighbor's online accounts, written in the defendant's handwriting.

Police officers searched an abandoned van located just down the road from the defendant's residence. The van had been there for several years and was surrounded by vegetation. Behind the driver's seat, officers found a relatively new looking duffle bag containing a black, long-sleeved shirt that appeared to have blood stains on it. The duffle bag also contained two black, costume-style evening gloves that extended up the forearms, and also appeared to contain blood stains.

The duffle bag had an airline tag from December 2008 with defendant's name on it. The duffle bag was identified as luggage that the defendant used on a trip to Florida in 2008.

Officer Bourne acknowledged that although the bag was the defendant's, it was possible that someone else could have taken the bag from the defendant's home, placed the shirt and gloves inside the bag, and placed it in the van.

Witness 5: Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist

Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist at the Douglas County Sherriff's Department, conducted a DNA analysis of the evidence recovered from the abandoned van. She tested

the duffle bag and the items found inside the duffle bag, and determined that Susan Parker's blood was on the interior of the bag and on the shirt and gloves found in the bag.

Murphy also testified that when the defendant was arrested several days after Mrs. Parker was killed, he had a scratch on his nose and bruises on both arms, a red discoloration on his back, a yellow discoloration on his thumb, abrasions on his leg, and various red marks on his body. She stated that these injuries were consistent with injuries Mrs. Parker's killer could have received based on the extent of the defensive wounds found on her body.

Murphy did admit, however, that the defendant's injuries also could have been sustained in a number of other ways, and that she could not state definitively that he received the injuries while attacking Mrs. Parker.

DNA testing of Mrs. Parker's fingernails found no DNA present other than her own.

Witness 6: Sean Phillips, defendant's friend

Twenty-five-year-old Sean Phillips testified that he had been close friends with the defendant since the eighth grade. At the beginning of the summer in 2009, the defendant and Phillips began discussing a plan to grow marijuana. Phillips testified that the defendant came up with the idea of using stolen credit card information to pay for the growing equipment they needed.

A week before Parker's murder, the defendant and Phillips exchanged e-mails in which Phillips identified the lighting and hydroponic equipment they would need to grow marijuana in the defendant's closet, and the online sites from which to order them. Phillips stated that the defendant had all of the stolen credit card information and was planning on purchasing the equipment identified by Phillips sometime that week. He testified that although he knew the defendant was going to use stolen credit card information to make the purchases, he was not involved in obtaining the credit card information. Phillips stated that the defendant told him that he would take care of obtaining everything they needed to grow marijuana, and that he just needed Phillips to tell him which equipment to buy.

Phillips testified that he knew of the abandoned van where the defendant's duffle bag was found, and that he had been to the van with the defendant on several occasions to "hang out." He also stated that he often visited Davis's house, and had seen the duffle bag in Davis's closet, but said that he was unsure about whether he had seen the shirt and gloves before.

Phillips testified that he was alone at home on the morning of the murder, and admitted that since he was alone no one can confirm where he was when Susan Parker was killed.

Witness 7: Aiden Davis, defendant

The defendant, 25-year-old Aiden Davis, testified that on the day of the murder he went for a walk with his dog in the woods near his house from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 10:40 a.m. He testified that on the weekends he always walks his dog at the same approximate time, around 9:30 a.m. On the day of the murder there was no one at the defendant's house to verify when he walked his dog, but Davis did see one of his neighbors, Lucas Allen, when he left his house with his dog, at approximately 9:30 a.m., and when he returned to his house at approximately 10:40 a.m.

Davis admitted that he and his friend, Sean Phillips, had decided to start growing marijuana. However, he testified that Phillips was the one who had suggested stealing credit card information to pay for the growing equipment. He stated that Phillips had suggested that they try to get credit card information from Davis's neighbors because the neighborhood Davis lived in was "nicer" than Phillips' neighborhood and he thought the people living there would have more money and be more likely to have credit cards.

Davis testified that he and Phillips had entered two of Davis's neighbors' homes together and obtained credit card information either from the neighbors' computers or by writing down their credit card numbers directly from their credit cards in their wallets. He testified that Phillips often talked about what they would have to do if someone caught them while they were in the neighbors' homes. Davis stated that Phillips said that he would do "whatever it takes" to make sure they didn't get caught. When he asked Phillips what he meant, Phillips said he would "use whatever force is necessary" to take care of someone who got in their way.

Davis testified that he didn't know how his duffle bag got in the van. He stated that the last time he saw it, it was in his closet. He stated that the shirt and gloves were not his and that he had never seen them before.

Davis testified that he sustained his injuries while walking his dog in the woods. He stated that in the woods near his house there is a steep incline leading down to a creek, and that while attempting to walk down to the creek he lost his balance and rolled down the incline about 20 feet. Davis stated that he hit several rocks and trees when he fell, which caused his injuries.

Witness 8: Lucas Allen, defendant's neighbor

Lucas Allen lived across the street from the defendant. He testified that he would often stop and talk to the defendant when they ran into each other outside while the defendant was walking his dog. He testified that on the day of the murder he was outside mowing his lawn and doing yard work from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. he saw the defendant leave his house with his dog. Allen stated that the defendant waved and said good morning, and that he waved back, and that the

defendant then began walking in the direction of the woods. Allen testified that he was still outside when the defendant returned to his home at about 10:40 a.m. He testified that the defendant was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and appeared calm and relaxed. Allen testified that he had never seen the defendant frustrated or angry, that he always had a smile, and was kind. He had never seen him act in a violent manner. He testified that he never saw the defendant lose his temper or lose control.

Witness 9: Ramona McConnell, defendant's neighbor

Ramona McConnell testified that she lived next door to the defendant and had known him for four years. McConnell has two young children, and she testified that the defendant would often stop and let the children play with his dog when he saw them outside. She stated that the defendant was always very kind, patient, and gentle with the children. On one occasion, her son, who was four-years-old at the time, had fallen on the driveway and scraped his knees and was crying. McConnell testified that the defendant had been passing by and rushed over to make sure the little boy was ok. She stated that she believed the defendant was a very caring and compassionate individual.

Summary of Closing Arguments

Prosecution:
The Prosecution argued that Aiden Davis entered Susan Parker's house on July 11th to steal her credit card information, and when he discovered that she was at home, he bludgeoned her to death. The Prosecution reminded the jury that police found stolen credit card information from several of Davis's neighbors in Davis's house, written in his handwriting. Forensic evidence showed that the person who killed Susan Parker wore gloves and a long-sleeved shirt. Both gloves and a long-sleeved shirt were found in Davis's duffle bag in a van near his house, and all of the items were stained with Susan Parker's blood. The injuries seen on Davis's body shortly after Susan Parker was killed are consistent with injuries one would expect to see on Mrs. Parker's assailant, because her wounds suggested she fought back when attacked. And finally, although Davis was seen leaving to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and was seen returning at 10:40 a.m., the evidence suggests that Susan Parker was killed sometime between 10:12 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., therefore Davis could have walked the one block to arrive at Parker's house after he returned to his home at 10:40 a.m. The Prosecution concluded by stating that Aiden Davis killed Susan Parker during the commission of a burglary, and therefore the jury should find Davis guilty of first-degree murder.

Defense:
The Defense stated that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker. The Defense argued that the defendant's friend Sean Phillips is the real culprit. Phillips was the one who suggested stealing credit card information from Davis's neighbors to buy the equipment for growing marijuana. Phillips told the defendant that he would be willing to do "whatever it takes" to avoid getting caught stealing credit card information, including using "whatever force is necessary." Phillips could have easily taken Davis's duffle bag

from his house during one of his visits there, and used it to dispose of the gloves and shirt in the abandoned van, which he had been to several times. And, Phillips does not have an alibi for the morning of the murder. Furthermore, Davis's DNA was not found on Susan Parker's fingernails. If Davis had attacked her and she had fought back, there would likely be DNA on her fingernails. Also, Davis's neighbor saw him leave his house to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and return from walking his dog at 10:40 a.m., confirming Davis's testimony that during the time of the murder he was in the woods walking his dog. It is highly unlikely that Davis would have had time to go to Parker's house and commit this crime in the very short amount of time between when he returned from walking his dog and 11:00 a.m. The Defense reminded the jury that Davis does not have violent tendencies, and is well-liked by people who know him. The Defense concluded that Aiden Davis is innocent, and that Sean Phillips should be investigated for the murder of Susan Parker.

Trial Summary – 16-year-old version

INSTRUCTIONS

The following trial summary is based on an actual case. It describes a 16-year-old juvenile defendant who has been charged with first-degree murder and is being tried as an adult in criminal court. This juvenile could have been tried in juvenile court, but has been transferred to adult criminal court due to the seriousness of the crime. While you read the summary, please put yourself in the position of a juror who is receiving this information in court. Please pay close attention to the information in the trial summary. At the conclusion of the trial summary, you will be asked to make a decision regarding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. (All personally identifying information has been changed to protect the privacy of the parties involved.)

IN THE DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

v.

AIDEN DAVIS (Defendant)

The Charge:
First-degree murder

People in the Case:
Susan Parker, victim
Aiden Davis, defendant

Witnesses:
Andrew Parker, victim's husband
Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner
Julia Manning, criminalist
Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist
Sean Phillips, defendant's friend
Lucas Allen, defendant's neighbor
Ramona McConnell, defendant's neighbor

Summary of Opening Statements

Prosecution:
The Prosecution explained that the evidence would show that on July 11th, 2009, 16-year-old Aiden Davis bludgeoned Susan Parker to death during an attempted residential burglary. Davis had stolen credit card information from other individuals in his neighborhood, and on the day of the murder he was attempting to steal Susan Parker's credit card information. Susan Parker's blood was found on items in a bag belonging to Aiden Davis, and he had injuries on his body consistent with those that Mrs. Parker's assailant could have sustained from her efforts to defend herself. The Prosecution stated that the trial would show that Aiden Davis is guilty of committing first-degree murder.

Defense:
The Defense explained that Aiden Davis was innocent and had been wrongly accused of the murder of Susan Parker. The defense stated that the evidence would show that the defendant's friend, Sean Phillips, killed Susan Parker. Phillips was the mastermind behind the plan to steal credit card information to buy equipment for growing marijuana. Phillips had been to the van where the blood-stained items were found, and does not have an alibi for the morning of the murder. None of the forensic evidence can establish that

Davis was at the scene of the crime. The Defense stated that the trial would prove that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker.

Summary of Testimony

Witness 1: Andrew Parker, victim's husband

Andrew Parker testified that on the morning of Saturday, July 11th, 2009, he left the house shortly before 8:00 a.m. to attend a meeting. Parker's wife, Susan, was still asleep when he left. Mr. Parker attempted to call Susan periodically during the day but she did not answer the phone. He left his office late in the afternoon that day, and stated that when he arrived home, he was surprised to see Susan's car was still in the garage, as she had plans to attend the ballet that evening. When he approached the front door he noticed smears on it. He opened the front door and saw Susan lying there in a pool of blood. He fell to the floor screaming. He called 911 from inside the house and then returned to Susan's body and continued to cry and scream.

Mr. Parker testified that he lives one block away from the defendant, Aiden Davis, and that he had seen him in passing but had never spoken with him.

Witness 2: Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner

Dr. Fielding conducted the autopsy of Susan Parker. He stated that she died as a result of blunt force trauma to her head. The vast majority of Mrs. Parker's external injuries were abrasions (scrape-type injuries) and lacerations (crushing or tearing-type injuries) caused by blunt force, many on the victim's head. While it was difficult to estimate how many blows Mrs. Parker suffered because of possible overlap, Fielding was able to identify eight distinct injuries on the right side of Mrs. Parker's head, 11 on the back of her head, and seven on the left side of her head. Mrs. Parker's internal injuries as a result of the blows to her head consisted of bleeding inside her scalp and over virtually every surface of the brain.

There were also contusions, abrasions, and scratches to Mrs. Parker's shoulders, breasts, and upper torso, fractures to her left hand, and bruising on her right foot, which Fielding concluded were probably defensive injuries. The injuries to the right foot were most likely sustained while the victim was on the floor "trying to get anything between her and the force being inflicted."

Dr. Fielding surmised that Mrs. Parker would have died within minutes as opposed to hours after the first blows were struck to her head. Based on his examination, Fielding concluded that Mrs. Parker probably died sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on July 11th.

Witness 3: Julia Manning, criminalist

Julia Manning, a criminalist with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department, arrived at the crime scene at about 9:15 p.m. on July 11th to process the crime scene and collect evidence. Manning observed blood on the floor and the walls near Mrs. Parker's body. Manning also observed blood smears on the interior portion of the door that she opined were consistent with someone who was wearing a long-sleeved garment. Mrs. Parker was found in a short-sleeved t-shirt. Based on the location of the great majority of the blood evidence, Manning opined that most of the victim's injuries were sustained while Mrs. Parker was low to the ground in the entryway.

On the walls and on objects in the room there were numerous finger marks in blood; some of these contained fine linear striations, indicating they were fabric patterns rather than fingerprints, consistent with the attacker wearing gloves throughout the incident.

Witness 4: Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer

A forensic examination of Susan Parker's computer showed that it was used beginning at 8:07 a.m. on July 11th to visit several Web sites that were consistent with her interests. The computer was used very extensively in the first part of the morning. The last use was at 10:12 a.m. and there was no further activity on the computer that day up until Mrs. Parker's body was discovered.

Officer Bourne testified that in the defendant's bedroom, police officers found pieces of paper with credit card account numbers and names of two of the defendant's neighbors. These papers included a birth date and credit card security code number for one of the neighbors, and user names and passwords for the other neighbor's online accounts, written in the defendant's handwriting.

Police officers searched an abandoned van located just down the road from the defendant's residence. The van had been there for several years and was surrounded by vegetation. Behind the driver's seat, officers found a relatively new looking duffle bag containing a black, long-sleeved shirt that appeared to have blood stains on it. The duffle bag also contained two black, costume-style evening gloves that extended up the forearms, and also appeared to contain blood stains.

The duffle bag had an airline tag from December 2008 with defendant's name on it. The duffle bag was identified as luggage that the defendant used on a trip to Florida in 2008.

Officer Bourne acknowledged that although the bag was the defendant's, it was possible that someone else could have taken the bag from the defendant's home, placed the shirt and gloves inside the bag, and placed it in the van.

Witness 5: Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist

Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist at the Douglas County Sherriff's Department, conducted a DNA analysis of the evidence recovered from the abandoned van. She tested

the duffle bag and the items found inside the duffle bag, and determined that Susan Parker's blood was on the interior of the bag and on the shirt and gloves found in the bag.

Murphy also testified that when the defendant was arrested several days after Mrs. Parker was killed, he had a scratch on his nose and bruises on both arms, a red discoloration on his back, a yellow discoloration on his thumb, abrasions on his leg, and various red marks on his body. She stated that these injuries were consistent with injuries Mrs. Parker's killer could have received based on the extent of the defensive wounds found on her body.

Murphy did admit, however, that the defendant's injuries also could have been sustained in a number of other ways, and that she could not state definitively that he received the injuries while attacking Mrs. Parker.

DNA testing of Mrs. Parker's fingernails found no DNA present other than her own.

Witness 6: Sean Phillips, defendant's friend

Sixteen-year-old Sean Phillips testified that he had been close friends with the defendant since the eighth grade. At the beginning of the summer in 2009, the defendant and Phillips began discussing a plan to grow marijuana. Phillips testified that the defendant came up with the idea of using stolen credit card information to pay for the growing equipment they needed.

A week before Parker's murder, the defendant and Phillips exchanged e-mails in which Phillips identified the lighting and hydroponic equipment they would need to grow marijuana in the defendant's closet, and the online sites from which to order them. Phillips stated that the defendant had all of the stolen credit card information and was planning on purchasing the equipment identified by Phillips sometime that week. He testified that although he knew the defendant was going to use stolen credit card information to make the purchases, he was not involved in obtaining the credit card information. Phillips stated that the defendant told him that he would take care of obtaining everything they needed to grow marijuana, and that he just needed Phillips to tell him which equipment to buy.

Phillips testified that he knew of the abandoned van where the defendant's duffle bag was found, and that he had been to the van with the defendant on several occasions to "hang out." He also stated that he often visited Davis's house, and had seen the duffle bag in Davis's closet, but said that he was unsure about whether he had seen the shirt and gloves before.

Phillips testified that he was alone at home on the morning of the murder, and admitted that since he was alone no one can confirm where he was when Susan Parker was killed.

Witness 7: Aiden Davis, defendant

The defendant, 16-year-old Aiden Davis, testified that on the day of the murder he went for a walk with his dog in the woods near his house from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 10:40 a.m. He testified that on the weekends he always walks his dog at the same approximate time, around 9:30 a.m. On the day of the murder there was no one at the defendant's house to verify when he walked his dog, but Davis did see one of his neighbors, Lucas Allen, when he left his house with his dog, at approximately 9:30 a.m., and when he returned to his house at approximately 10:40 a.m.

Davis admitted that he and his friend, Sean Phillips, had decided to start growing marijuana. However, he testified that Phillips was the one who had suggested stealing credit card information to pay for the growing equipment. He stated that Phillips had suggested that they try to get credit card information from Davis's neighbors because the neighborhood Davis lived in was "nicer" than Phillips' neighborhood and he thought the people living there would have more money and be more likely to have credit cards.

Davis testified that he and Phillips had entered two of Davis's neighbors' homes together and obtained credit card information either from the neighbors' computers or by writing down their credit card numbers directly from their credit cards in their wallets. He testified that Phillip often talked about what they would have to do if someone caught them while they were in the neighbors' homes. Davis stated that Phillips said that he would do "whatever it takes" to make sure they didn't get caught. When he asked Phillips what he meant, Phillips said he would "use whatever force is necessary" to take care of someone who got in their way.

Davis testified that he didn't know how his duffle bag got in the van. He stated that the last time he saw it, it was in his closet. He stated that the shirt and gloves were not his and that he had never seen them before.

Davis testified that he sustained his injuries while walking his dog in the woods. He stated that in the woods near his house there is a steep incline leading down to a creek, and that while attempting to walk down to the creek he lost his balance and rolled down the incline about 20 feet. Davis stated that he hit several rocks and trees when he fell, which caused his injuries.

Witness 8: Lucas Allen, defendant's neighbor

Lucas Allen lived across the street from the defendant. He testified that he would often stop and talk to the defendant when they ran into each other outside while the defendant was walking his dog. He testified that on the day of the murder he was outside mowing his lawn and doing yard work from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. he saw the defendant leave his house with his dog. Allen stated that the defendant waved and said good morning, and that he waved back, and that the

defendant then began walking in the direction of the woods. Allen testified that he was still outside when the defendant returned to his home at about 10:40 a.m. He testified that the defendant was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and appeared calm and relaxed. Allen testified that he had never seen the defendant frustrated or angry, that he always had a smile, and was kind. He had never seen him act in a violent manner. He testified that he never saw the defendant lose his temper or lose control.

Witness 9: Ramona McConnell, defendant's neighbor

Ramona McConnell testified that she lived next door to the defendant and had known him for four years. McConnell has two young children, and she testified that the defendant would often stop and let the children play with his dog when he saw them outside. She stated that the defendant was always very kind, patient, and gentle with the children. On one occasion, her son, who was four-years-old at the time, had fallen on the driveway and scraped his knees and was crying. McConnell testified that the defendant had been passing by and rushed over to make sure the little boy was ok. She stated that she believed the defendant was a very caring and compassionate individual.

Summary of Closing Arguments

Prosecution:
The Prosecution argued that Aiden Davis entered Susan Parker's house on July 11th to steal her credit card information, and when he discovered that she was at home, he bludgeoned her to death. The Prosecution reminded the jury that police found stolen credit card information from several of Davis's neighbors in Davis's house, written in his handwriting. Forensic evidence showed that the person who killed Susan Parker wore gloves and a long-sleeved shirt. Both gloves and a long-sleeved shirt were found in Davis's duffle bag in a van near his house, and all of the items were stained with Susan Parker's blood. The injuries seen on Davis's body shortly after Susan Parker was killed are consistent with injuries one would expect to see on Mrs. Parker's assailant, because her wounds suggested she fought back when attacked. And finally, although Davis was seen leaving to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and was seen returning at 10:40 a.m., the evidence suggests that Susan Parker was killed sometime between 10:12 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., therefore Davis could have walked the one block to arrive at Parker's house after he returned to his home at 10:40 a.m. The Prosecution concluded by stating that Aiden Davis killed Susan Parker during the commission of a burglary, and therefore the jury should find Davis guilty of first-degree murder.

Defense:
The Defense stated that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker. The Defense argued that the defendant's friend Sean Phillips is the real culprit. Phillips was the one who suggested stealing credit card information from Davis's neighbors to buy the equipment for growing marijuana. Phillips told the defendant that he would be willing to do "whatever it takes" to avoid getting caught stealing credit card information, including using "whatever force is necessary." Phillips could have easily taken Davis's duffle bag

from his house during one of his visits there, and used it to dispose of the gloves and shirt in the abandoned van, which he had been to several times. And, Phillips does not have an alibi for the morning of the murder. Furthermore, Davis's DNA was not found on Susan Parker's fingernails. If Davis had attacked her and she had fought back, there would likely be DNA on her fingernails. Also, Davis's neighbor saw him leave his house to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and return from walking his dog at 10:40 a.m., confirming Davis's testimony that during the time of the murder he was in the woods walking his dog. It is highly unlikely that Davis would have had time to go to Parker's house and commit this crime in the very short amount of time between when he returned from walking his dog and 11:00 a.m. The Defense reminded the jury that Davis does not have violent tendencies, and is well-liked by people who know him. The Defense concluded that Aiden Davis is innocent, and that Sean Phillips should be investigated for the murder of Susan Parker.

Appendix P

Defendant Age Manipulation Check

1. What is the defendant's name? _____
2. How old is the defendant? ____
3. How was the victim killed?
    a. Stabbed with a knife
    b. Beaten
    c. Shot with a gun

Appendix Q

Final Verdict Questionnaire

Instructions: The prosecution is charging the defendant with first-degree murder. However, if you do not believe that the defendant is guilty of this charge, but believe that he is guilty of a lesser charge, you may find him guilty of second-degree murder or manslaughter. If you believe that the defendant is not guilty of any of the charges, please mark "not guilty" for each of the separate charges. It is the burden of the state to prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant was charged with an offense does not mean he is guilty. The defendant is presumed to be innocent, unless you find him guilty.

The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Reasonable doubt is based upon common sense and impartial consideration. You do not have to be free from all doubt about the defendant's guilt, but you must be firmly convinced of his guilt.

Please read the following statutory definitions of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and use these definitions to answer the questions below.

Nebraska § 28-303, First-Degree Murder: A person commits murder in the first degree if he or she kills another person (1) purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking of any public or private means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by administering poison or causing the same to be done; or if by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the same he or she purposely procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person.

Nebraska § 28-304, Second-Degree Murder: A person commits murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.

Nebraska § 28-305, Manslaughter: A person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act.

Considering the information presented in the trial summary and the information above, please answer each question by selecting the option that best expresses your own view.

1. Is the defendant guilty of First-Degree Murder?

a. Not Guilty

b. Guilty

2. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 1?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All Certain				Somewhat Certain				Very Certain

3. Is the defendant guilty of Second-Degree Murder?

a. Not Guilty

b. Guilty

4. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 3?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All Certain				Somewhat Certain				Very Certain

5. Is the defendant guilty of Manslaughter?

a. Not Guilty

b. Guilty

6. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 5?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All Certain				Somewhat Certain				Very Certain

7. For this case, the defendant should be found guilty of one of the three charges if there is at least a ____% chance that he committed that crime as charged. (Fill in the blank)

Appendix R

Demographics Questionnaire

1. What is your age? ____ years old

2. What is your gender? ____ Male ____ Female

3. What is your ethnic origin and/or race?

_____ African American
_____ Asian American
_____ Caucasian
_____ Hispanic
_____ Latin American
_____ Native American
_____ Other

4. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?

_____ Less than high school
_____ High school
_____ Associate's degree
_____ Bachelor's degree
_____ Master's degree
_____ Professional degree (i.e., M.D., J.D., Ph.D.)

5. Is English your primary language?
_____ yes _____ no

6. Have you served as a juror on: (check one answer for each):

a state civil case? _____ yes _____ no
a state criminal case? _____ yes _____ no
a federal civil case? _____ yes _____ no
a federal criminal case? _____ yes _____ no

7. Are you registered to vote?
_____ yes _____ no

8. Do you have a valid driver's license?
_____ yes _____ no

9. Are you a citizen of the United States?
_____ yes _____ no

10. Are you a convicted felon without civil rights?
_____ yes _____ no

11. What is your religious preference (if any)?
_____

12. What is your current work status? (check one):
_____ employed full time _____ employed part time _____ unemployed

13. What is your political affiliation? (check one):
_____ Democrat _____ Republican _____ other _____ none

14. When you read the trial summary, what did you think the race of the defendant was?
_____

15. What did you think the purpose of Experiment 2 was? Please explain why you thought this.
_____
_____
_____
_____

16. What did you think the purpose of Experiment 3 was? Please explain why you thought this.
_____
_____
_____
_____

Appendix S

Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study was to examine whether and under what conditions mock jurors use negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults to make judgments of guilt. Results of several studies suggest that jurors may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than an adult charged with the same crime; however, other research suggests that jurors show no bias against juveniles tried as adults. The goal of this study is to clarify this issue by examining the roles of generic prejudice and emotion in mock jurors' judgments of juveniles tried as adults.

Generic prejudice is prejudice that is not specific to the defendant or other parties associated with a trial, but rather prejudice about a category of defendants or crimes. Jurors may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they judge an adult charged with the same crime because of generic prejudice toward *all* juveniles who have been transferred to criminal court. Furthermore, the experience of certain emotions may facilitate this generic prejudice. Specific emotions have been found to have distinct effects on judgment and decision making as a function of the cognitive appraisals associated with each emotion. Angry individuals tend to rely on stereotypes when making decisions, while sad and fearful people tend to process information more systematically. We expect to find that angry individuals will use negative stereotypes about a juvenile tried as an adult to make judgments of guilt, judging him more harshly than an adult charged with the same crime. However, we expect sad and fearful individuals to judge a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult charged with the same crime similarly.

Once again, we thank you for your participation; we ask that you not discuss this research with any future participants as it may negatively influence the results of our study. If you have any questions or concerns about this project, or if you would like to know the general results of the research upon its completion, feel free to contact Megan Jones or Richard Wiener at 402-472-9639.