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Competing pathways of the Internet & new media's influence on women political candidates

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COMPETING PATHWAYS OF THE INTERNET & NEW MEDIA'S INFLUENCE ON WOMEN POLITICAL CANDIDATES

by

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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PH.D. THESIS

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To Gabriel Vernon Hamilton (1985-2007)

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I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science for providing the funding and opportunity to collect the unique data presented in this project. Completion of this dissertation was also funded in part by the Graduate College through their generous Ballard Seashore dissertation fellowship. The impetus for this research question was ironically provided by the Hillary Clinton campaign. How it operated here in Iowa and its reliance on traditional campaign tactics first piqued my interest in how digital media was changing how campaigns operated.

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ABSTRACT

How do digital media and online news, especially blogs, influence support for women congressional and presidential candidates? From work on traditional print and television news we know women are framed differently than men, and are more likely to be framed as women (appearance, clothing, mother or wife, marital status, sex, gendered issues). I argue the transition to digital media (blogs and online news) is exacerbating these trends, increasing gender stereotype opinions of women candidates in the mass public, among both men and women. In turn I find gender stereotype opinions combined with use of online media reduces the probability of voting for women candidates. While much of the literature on digital media focuses on the positives that come with increased political information, participation and mobilization, holding these factors constant, this research highlights a potential cost of digital media.

Much of what we know about the media and women candidates is based on content analysis of newspapers and television stories (Bystrom 20004; 2010a; 2010b; Iyengar et al1997; Lawrence and Rose 2010). The dominant literature on the impact of the mass media on women candidates is based on experimental framing studies with hypothetical candidates. But media scholars are increasingly interested in digital media and citizen journalism, as more Americans now read their news online than read a print newspaper. Davis (2009) and Sunstein (2007) find that journalists too are increasingly turning to the blogs for ideas and content that run on mainstream media. While citizen journalism has many benefits (see Shirky 2010), there is less fact checking with online news, where rumors can often masquerade as truth. Analysis of the coverage of Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential run found that coverage of Clinton online, especially the

blogs, was more sexist than mainstream media (Lawrence and Rose 2010; Richie 2013). For example, one group sold t-shirts and bumper stickers saying "Get Hillary Back in the Kitchen." Boystrum (2010) analyses how women and men presidential, congressional and gubernatorial candidates differ, and how this affects media coverage of the candidates. Using content analysis, she finds no gendered differences in the content of their websites. Thus this research focuses on blogs and online news rather than candidate websites.

No previous research has considered individual level data on use of online news for politics and whether this leads to holding gender stereotype opinions; nor has the existing research considered how digital media use, combined with believing in these stereotypes of women, impacts voting for women candidates in real election contexts. Rather than content analysis used in political communications or laboratory experiments often used in gender studies, this research relies on national survey data to measure the effect of digital media use for voting for women candidates in actual electoral campaigns. Combining large sample nationwide survey data of all congressional candidates running in 2008, 2010 and 2012, with a sample of Iowa caucus participants, and a unique national survey of primary voters, this research seeks to answer two primary questions. First, what is the effect of blogs and online news on holding gender stereotyped opinions of women and men candidates (see Chapters 3 and 5)? Secondly, what is the combined effect of digital media use and gendered opinions in reducing support at the ballot box for women for the U.S. House or the president (see Chapters 4 and 6)? To consider the overall, or net effect, of digital media on support for women candidates, I incorporate the benefits of online news and communication to engage and mobilize the public.

Across many detailed analyses presented in this research, I find that reading blogs and online news generally increases the likelihood of forming opinions about women candidates colored by gender stereotypes, based on experience, knowledge, competency, integrity, strong leader, caring and more. In Chapter 3 I consider the case of Hillary Clinton and find that reading the news online and using online political information increased the belief that Clinton was less experienced, and was less trustworthy. In Chapter 4 I find that gender stereotype opinions and digital media use reduced favorability ratings of Clinton specifically and Clinton compared to her male presidential contenders (Obama and Edwards). These two factors also reduced the probably of voting for her, holding other factors constant. Chapter 5 analyses all U.S. House races from 2008, 2010, and 2012 with one women candidate and one man candidate. Individuals who used online news or political blogs were more likely to believe the woman candidate was less competent, lacked integrity, and was less caring than the man candidate, holding other factors constant. Finally, the results from Chapter 6 show gendered opinions and digital media reduced the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate. The overall, or net effect, models show even the positive effect of online mobilization is outweighed by the negative effect of digital media combined with the believe in gender stereotypes. Such gendered opinions of women candidates are widely held by the mass public.

The dominant explanation for why Obama, as an underdog candidate won the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination was that he was able to mobilize and engage the public, especially the young, through online media. These online venues also significantly increased the money Obama raised through small dollar contributions (Redlawsk, Tolbert & Donovan 2011). However, what these stories ignore is the negative

media coverage of his primary opponent, Hillary Clinton, online. This study attempts to systematically and empirically document how the Internet and online news may have contributed to reduce support for Clinton's candidacy and women congressional candidates more generally.

As new communication mediums are developed there are often short-term increases in misinformation with the proliferation of information, but as standards are established this chaos disappears. Digital media's effect on women candidates for elected office over the long run is unclear and deserves further study.

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CHAPTER 1

HOW DO DIGITAL MEDIA AFFECT SUPPORT FOR WOMEN POLITICAL CANDIDATES?

The 21st Century has witnessed historic changes in mass media ushered in by an era of digital communications, comparable to the advent of the printing press in the 15th Century (Karpf 2012; Rainie & Wellman 2012; Shirky 2008; Silvers 2012; West 2011). America has become a nation of "digital citizens" who turn to the Internet daily for politics and news, as well as economic and societal participation (Mossberger, Tolbert & McNeal 2008). Just twenty years ago the majority of Americans got their political news from a daily newspaper, by watching the national evening news from one of the three major network channels (NBC, CBS, ABC), the local evening news, or from radio.

As of 2012, more Americans read the news online than a print newspaper and the Internet is fundamentally altering the media's role in politics and American democracy (Bimber 2003; Tolbert & McNeal 2003; West 2011). Recent trends from Pew surveys find 80% of American use the Internet. Of adult Internet users, 88% send or read email, 78% read the news online, 67% visit local, state or federal government websites, 67% user social networking sites and 61% look for news or information about politics online (Pew Internet & American Life Project 2012). Thus use of online political news is widespread as America has shifted to a digital nation.

How the Internet and digital media (alternately known as new media), and online campaigning influence the likelihood of voting for women for political office is a question that scholars know little about. While both the gender literature and the digital politics literature are voluminous and growing, the two have not been linked to evaluate how, and through what mechanisms, political information online influence women

candidate evaluations, and voting for, women. Are digital media merely an extension of traditional media, such as television, radio and newspapers? Or are there distinct differences in information and communication technology online that could advantage or disadvantage women candidates?

This project draws on existing research of women candidates, gender stereotyping, traditional media bias, online mobilization, and the Internet and politics, to generate expectations of how use of digital media may influence evaluations of, and voting for, women congressional and presidential candidates. It empirically tests these expectations using various nationwide and state random sample surveys. While there have been a few recent studies of blogs and women congressional candidates, the scope of this research is unique in focusing on both women congressional and presidential candidates and a wider range of uses of digital media. No previous research has considered individual level data on digital media use for politics and whether this shapes the formation of gender stereotypes and in turn voting for women candidates in real election contexts.

Rather than content analysis used in political communications or laboratory experiments often used in gender studies, this research uses survey data to measure the effect of online media in shaping voting for women candidates in actual electoral campaigns. Combining large sample nationwide surveys of all congressional candidates running in 2008, 2010 and 2012, with a sample of Iowa caucus participants, and a national sample of primary voters, this research seeks to answer two primary questions. First, what is the effect of blogs and online news on the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions of women candidates (see Chapters 3 and 5)? Second, what is the

combined effect of digital media use and gendered opinions in reducing support at the ballot box for women for the U.S. House or the president (see Chapter 4 and 6)? To consider the overall, or net effect, of digital media on support for women candidates, I incorporate the benefits of online news and communication to engage and mobilize the public, as well as the costs associated with misinformation from news online.

Why Study Digital Media and Women Candidates?

The impetus for this project came from watching Hillary Clinton's 2007-2008 campaign for president from Iowa, where every potential presidential candidate campaigns and wants to win. The Clinton campaign seemingly focused on traditional media and campaigning tactics, while the Obama campaign was innovative with digital media. From this, what messages reached the public, and what was known about these candidates? Some scholars suggest traditional media coverage of Clinton's campaign was more sexist, and more negative, than any of the other Democratic candidates running for president in 2008 (Bystrom 2010a; Lawrence & Rose 2010). Bystrom (2010a) reports that 22% of the coverage of Clinton was negative, while only 2% were negative for her Democratic rivals, Barack Obama and John Edwards. Bystrom's content analysis of media bias considers the four mainstream television networks, and a conglomeration of newspapers, cable television, radio etc. The author does not consider whether this biased media coverage had any effect on the outcome of the campaign, although it is suggested.

Lawrence and Rose (2010) also consider Clinton's presidential campaign and how the mass media was biased in their coverage; their data are primarily a random sample of newspaper articles from the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Washington*

Post, and stories aired on ABC, CBS, and NBC (pg 156). Content analyses of these stories confirm Bystrom's (2010) research—coverage was more negative for Clinton than the other Democratic candidates. The coverage was also more likely to refer to her as "the wife of" and discuss her family than the other candidates. While both of these studies illustrate that Clinton received equal coverage in the mainstream media, the coverage was more negative.

Lawrence & Rose (2010) go further and consider content analysis of the information online about Clinton; however, their sample was limited to searches of YouTube and Café Press. The authors report anecdotal stories of what was found online. Their study suggests that coverage of Clinton online was more sexist and negative than even in the mainstream media. One group apparently made bumper stickers and shirts with the quote "Get Hillary Back in the Kitchen" (Lawrence & Rose 2010, pg201). Ritchie (2013) analyzes the images available online during the Clinton campaign, and find that the pictures were much more likely to be negative, sexist, and made her bid for the presidency out to be "…improper and unnatural." For Clinton we know that the content in traditional media was more negative, and anecdotes suggest digital media was even more sexist, but there is no study that considers how digital media usage affected actually voting for Clinton.

Much of the work on women candidates running for elected office below the presidency confirm the patterns Clinton faced. But women also are more likely to be tied to certain issues. Bystrom et al (2004) find that women candidates for the U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races were not biased in terms of amount of media coverage they received, nor did they receive more negative attention than their male opponents. They

were more likely to be referenced by their appearance, their sex, and their marital status. Coverage of these women candidates was also often tied to specific issues. When the issue in the article was taxes or crime the man candidate was much more likely to be referenced, but when the issue was healthcare, senior issues, or "women's issues", the woman candidate was more likely to be referenced. These findings are primarily based on content analysis of newspaper articles. Content analysis is valuable in illustrating trends in the type of media coverage, but it is less useful for analyzing whether digital media increases gender stereotypes in the mass public, that in turn weakened the probability of women winning elected office. To answer this question, quantitative analysis using survey data is more appropriate.

In contrast to the content analysis of media studies, most work on the Internet, elections and political participation relies of public opinion data from the mass public, but ignores how online framing and agenda setting tools, such as blogs, may systematically introduce bias against women candidates. The gender and media literature specifically focuses on whether the media coverage is biased and what messages are being sent to the public via commercials and speeches; yet these studies frequently overlook digital media (see for example Callaghan & Schnell 2005; Fridkin & Kenny 2005; Iyengar, Valentino, Ansolabehere & Simon 1997; Kahn & Gordon 1997). Research on voting for women candidates does not take into account how individuals are receiving information through electronic formats. The few published works that do consider digital media and women candidates focus more on the messages candidates are sending to the public through their websites or YouTube videos (Baum 2012; Bystrom 2010; Bystrom, Banwart, Kaid & Robertson 2004; Lawless 2012b), or how online media makes campaign communication

easier. They do not analyze how the Internet may impact individuals' vote choice for women candidates, and evaluations of women candidates.

Competing Pathways:

Women Candidates and Digital Media

In most studies of how blogs and the Internet are changing what is new, what the public knows, and whether they are mobilized and engaged in politics, the authors do not consider how digital media may be impacting women candidates disproportionately. In a key work on how blogs shape American politics, Davis (2009) finds that misinformation and inaccuracies, due to citizen journalism, is on the rise. Mainstream media reporters are now using blogs and online news sites as sources on a daily basis (pg 138). His finding that citizen journalism is replacing mainstream media's fact-checking style of reporting is troubling as the amount of misinformation available is increasing rapidly. While these results are disturbing, he does not tie these findings to any effect on knowledge, public opinion, participation, or engagement by the public in the political process.

What happens to the news when it goes online? Some argue it is subject to more distortion and inaccuracies (McChesney & Pickard 2011; Downie & Schudson 2011; Shirky 2008; Starr 2011). Downie & Schudson (2011) argue that news reporting has been drastically altered by the rise of blogs, and the result is greater misinformation and even corruption. A common theme of McChesney & Pickard's (2011) *Will the Last Reporter Please Turn Off the Lights* is that news online is often characterized by distortion, innuendo and inaccuracies. Shirky (2008), in a chapter entitled "Publish then Filter" offers examples of anti-Semite websites and those dedicated to promoting anorexia

among teenage girls. In Shirky's (2008; 2012) language, in an era of citizen journalism when all information finds it way online, our filters may not be working very well. Nate Silver (2012) also warns of information overload in a digital age and rampant misinformation. As with all information revolutions, the printing press and the digital age, the trick is finding the signal (truth) in the noise (chaos).

The broadcast feature of digital media is unique and more powerful than anything that preceded it. The increase in viral media online has resulted in distortions and inaccuracies being broadcast to a wider and deeper audience. Due to these unique facets of the Internet it is expected that sexist, inflammatory, gendered language and images are more likely to proliferate the Internet (especially blogs) than would be allowed by editors in traditional news outlets. This increase in gendered information reinforces individuals' opinions, including opinions on whether women are qualified, capable, and should be running for political office.

Building on studies of the mainstream media's affect on coverage of women candidates and digital media and misinformation, this project considers how digital media may influence support for women candidates. While much of the existing research assume a direct link between use of online political information and offline mobilization (Bimber 2003; Tolbert and McNeal 2003), the argument presented here assumes an *indirect effect*. Digital media use on its own may not change the likelihood of voting for a woman candidate, but through two competing avenues it may have an impact. The first pathway posits that increased digital media use for politics will result in a higher likelihood of forming candidate evaluations colored by gender stereotypes, which will reduce support for woman running for elected office.

Pathway 1: Digital media use→gender stereotypes→reduced likelihood of voting for women candidates

The rational for this expectation is that if digital media is increasing misinformation and distortion of news in general (McChesney and Pickard 2011; Shirky 2008), this can be extended to media coverage of women candidates. In elections, individuals often rely on stereotypes of candidates as information shortcuts (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). Bystrom (2010b) puts this point succinctly "the online universe of political commentary operates outside of traditional media editorial boundaries and is sometimes incisive but often offensive and unsubstantiated" (Bystrom 2010b. pg 258). In these anonymous online forums, sexism and racism in unedited forms can be freely communicated. Do these online rumors transfer to lower support offline and at the ballot box? Use of online political news is expected to increase the likelihood of individuals believing in gender stereotypes of women candidates; the literature finds gender stereotyping reduces the likelihood of voting for hypothetical women candidates in experiments, thus hypothesizing that digital media will reduce support for women candidates because of stereotyped information is drawn from combining these literatures (see for example Sanbonmatsu 2002; Smith, Paul & Paul 2007).

A unique feature of online media is the ability of individuals to self-select the information they consume. Eli Pariser (2011) argues Americans may become trapped in a "filter bubble" and not be exposed to information that could challenge or broaden their worldview, proving bad democracy (see Cass Sunstein 2007). An example of the filter bubble is micro-targeting of political ads in Google searches. How might this filter bubble effect women candidates? Because individuals selectively seek information and

news outlets and political campaigns increasingly cater to certain groups (Issenberg 2012; Hillygus and Shields 2009), individuals using online news may be less likely to encounter information contradicting their preconceived gender stereotypes (Baum 2012; Pariser 2011; Stroud 2011; Sunstein 2007). With the combination of self-selection and the increased diversity of misinformation online, we might expect individuals that rely primarily on digital media to have higher levels of gender stereotyping. Despite endogeneity concerns about the higher quality of women candidates compared to men (Lawless 2012; Lawless & Fox 2010), even when only looking at a subsample of women candidates in the chapters on the U.S. House, we find increased use of online political information reduces the likelihood of casting a vote for the women candidate.[1]

While online news is expected to have a negative impact on evaluations of women candidates and voting for women candidates through gender stereotyping, use of these same media sources is expected to have a positive impact through the ease of online mobilization. The second pathway for digital media's impact on support for women candidates is through ease of mobilization and engagement among supporters. Some argue digital media can help equalize the playing field between traditionally advantaged candidates (white, incumbent, male) and disadvantaged candidates (Bystrom 2004; Davis 2009). Through the ability to target messages, and thus mobilize and engage their supporters, online information and communications could help women candidates because messages received by potential voters would be more tailored and more likely to result in engagement (Crigler, Just, Hume, Mills & Hevron 2012; Hillygus & Shields 2009; Issenberg 2012). Individuals using online news have been shown to have an

[1] To test this, the dependent variable was whether respondents voted for a major party candidate versus a third party candidate, or not voting at all.

increased likelihood of participating in politics, even after controlling for consumption of traditional television and print media (Bimber 2003; Krueger 2003; Mossberger et al 2008; Tolbert & McNeal 2003). The same finding holds for individuals sending and receiving political emails, or reading political blogs (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 2008). Internet use for political information also is associated with a higher general interest in politics, political knowledge, and discussing politics with friends and family, and the results are evident over the course of a single campaign using panel survey data (Hamilton & Tolbert 2012; Mossberger et al 2008).

Pathway 2: Digital media use→political mobilization→increased likelihood of voting for women candidates

Many forms of digital media for politics--online news, reading blogs, electronic messages, social media, sending and receiving political emails, visiting candidate websites—have been found to increase political participation in general, and civic engagement, including interest and discussion, even after controlling for factors that cause individuals to go online for politics in the first place (Mossberger et al 2008). For example, EMILY's List ("Early Money is Like Yeast, It helps raise the dough") has been very successful in raising money through online campaigning, and targeting the money to female candidates for political office. Thus, women candidates utilizing digital media could increase the number of people that are engaged supporters, and this in turn will increase support (Burrell 1994; 2003; Darcy, Welch & Clark 1994; Lawless & Pearson 2008a).

Mobilization in this project is not simply defined as "did an individual receive a targeted message," but focuses instead on did use of online political information increase

an individual's likelihood of donating money, conversing with others about the candidates etc. As Obama's 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns underscores, the Internet made political mobilization easier with the advent of big data, field experiments, field offices, micro-targeting and more (Issenberg 2012). But technology alone may or may not change political outcomes. A key argument is that online political mobilization and engagement translates to offline changes in political behavior effecting women, including candidate evaluations and vote choice.

Utilizing a competing pathways framework, this work also bridges the gap within the gender literature between experimental studies that shows gender stereotyping influences vote choice and evaluations for women candidates and work on real women candidates using survey data that does not show this stereotyping effect. This gap within the women candidate literature is well expressed by Kathleen Dolan (2008a):

> [Although we have very clear evidence that people evaluate women and men candidates through gendered lenses, we have less information about how those stereotypes shape people's attitudes and behaviors toward women candidates and whether they influence vote choice] (pg 125).

This research bridges a gap between literature on the Internet and politics and gender literatures, but it also helps answer the question of how the "gendered lenses" we have impacts real-world decisions of whether women win election to political office in the United States.

Project Roadmap

The following chapter develops the framework used in this project of the competing effects, or costs and benefits, of digital communication and information on women candidates. The empirical chapters following this help to further our understanding of how digital media shapes gender stereotypes among the mass public,

how it impacts individuals' level of mobilization/engagement, and ultimately how these two competing trends affect evaluations of women candidates and casting a vote for women at the ballot box. The first research question—what is the effect of using digital media on holding gender stereotyped opinions of women candidates—is addressed in Chapters 3 and 5. The second question—what is the combined effect of digital media use, political mobilization and gendered opinions in support for women for elected office—is addressed in Chapters 4 and 6.

In Chapter 2 the competing pathways framework of the costs and benefits of digital media for women political candidates is developed. This chapter includes background information on the different literatures being combined to develop the theoretical framework. A visual representation of causal processes is included here. This chapter seeks to reconcile the expectations from the literature on the Internet with the literature on women in politics. We know that use of online political information increases political interest, engagement, mobilization, and participation, but whether this will disproportionately help women candidates is unknown. At the same time the digital politics literature warns of the misinformation and self-selection biases reducing political knowledge. The expectation is that this misinformation may exacerbate gender stereotypes and disadvantage women candidate. The empirical models in Chapters 3 through 6 test this framework in a variety of ways, by considering different levels of office being sought, the types of candidate traits that measure stereotyping, and different measures of digital media use.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Hillary Clinton's 2007-2008 run for the Democratic Party nomination for president, a very rare case with a women major party contender.

Chapter 3 considers how online news, including exposure to a specific YouTube advertisement targeting Clinton, shaped the belief that Clinton's gender would be a problem for her. The chapter then investigates a variety of gender trait stereotyping measures. Results include that digital media use increased the likelihood that respondents believed Clinton to be a weaker leader than Obama and Edwards; also that she was less experienced.

Chapter 4 presents a complete model of digital media's effect on evaluations of, and vote choice for Hillary Clinton in primaries and caucuses nationwide. It closes with considering three different types of digital media (visiting news websites, visiting political blogs, and exchanging political emails). Key findings are that gender stereotypes and digital media use lowered evaluations of Clinton, and reduced the likelihood of voting for her, supporting the findings of previous experimental research. Counter to the framework's hypothesis, increased mobilization did not increase favorability ratings of, nor the likelihood of voting for, Clinton.

Chapters 5 and 6 mirror Chapters 3 and 4 but consider the effects of digital media on support for women candidates for the U.S. House. In both chapters I consider U.S. House races from 2008, 2010, and 2012 that had one male and one female candidate for the two major parties. Thus only inter-gendered major party races are considered.[2] To see if there is a difference in presidential versus midterm elections, each of the three years is analyzed separately.

Across the three years of this study (2008, 2010 and 2012) I find that reading online news, political blogs, or political emails lead to increased gender stereotyped

[2] The exception to this is the subsample of women versus women races I show in the appendix that were run to test for any endogeneity.

beliefs of women candidates, holding constant other factors. Although there is some variation, these results conform to those found about a women presidential candidate in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 provides an empirical test of the second half of my theoretical framework on congressional candidates, regarding Internet use and mobilization/engagement, as well as the net effect of digital media on voting for women House candidates. While the digital media and gender stereotyping half of the framework is generally supported by the results, the mobilization half is not a significant predictor of voting for woman congressional candidates except in 2008.

Chapter 7 offers a brief conclusion to this project. It recaps the major findings from each chapter and provides suggestions for how to improve study of this topic in the future. Key in this discussion is how to reconcile the expectations for mobilization with the results presented. The project ends with a discussion of what the results mean for women candidates, and suggests expanding research to different types of races.

CHAPTER 2

THE INTERNET AND WOMEN CANDIDATES: WHAT IS THE NET EFFECT?

Introduction

How do the Internet, online campaigning and online news affect support for women for elected office? Expansive literatures on the Internet and politics and women in politics have not been merged together to explore this question. The various literatures presented below are organized in terms of whether digital media use would increase or decrease support for women candidates. The chapter concludes by bringing the expectations developed from the literatures together into an overall expectation of how digital media might affect women running for elected office, termed "the competing pathways framework" or the "net effect" (Shirky 2008).

The argument that one thing, in this case digital media, can have two competing effects on another thing, in this case support for women candidates, is not unique to the political science literature or the literature in journalism and mass communications. Even within the women in politics literature there are examples of competing pathways. The are many studies testing whether women candidates increase mobilization and support among female citizens, thus acting as symbolic mobilizers, and from this test whether female citizens are more likely to vote for women candidates (see for example Atkeson 2003; Dolan 2006; 2008a; 2008b). At the same time scholars study whether women candidates are harmed by "being a woman" because of gender stereotypes held by the mass public. This pathway argues that individuals will be less likely to support women candidates because their gender triggers stereotyping cues (see for example Iyengar et.al.

1997; Lawless 2004; 2009). The expectation that digital media has two competing ways to effect women candidates is not at all unique to the study of women in politics[3].

The framework developed in this project is a two-stage model where digital media use may shape gendered opinions, which in turn reduces support for women candidates in the second stage. Digital media use is also expected to increase levels of mobilization and engagement, which in turn will increase support for women candidates in the second stage, as discussed in Chapter 1. Thus digital media is hypothesized to have an indirect and negative effect on women running for political office in one avenue, but possibly have an indirect and positive effect in another venue.

The literature on digital politics also finds competing results in terms of the media's effect on general political knowledge. As with any new technology, there are growing pains with digital media. Nate Silver (2012) compares the massive increase of information available online to the explosion of information with printing press in the 1440's when "the amount of information was increasing much more rapidly than our understanding of what to do with it, or our ability to differentiate the useful information from the mistruths" (pg 3). The sheer quantity of information available via the Internet is enough to send everyone into "information overload", where we have to simplify information into categories that conform to our biases (Carr 2011; Silver 2012; Toffler 1970). Thus, digital media, and the quantity of information available can reduce factual knowledge because of the misinformation available and the tendency to order information to conform with our biases.

[3] Another example of candidate/representative's gender having two different effects on women representing women can be found in Osborn's (2012) *How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Representation, and Gender in the State Legislatures*.

Others argue the Internet has democratized politics via digital citizenship, increasing civic engagement, political knowledge and the probability of participating in politics (Bimber 2003; Mossberger et al 2008; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Issenberg 2012) and allowing new voices to be covered by the media (Domingo et al 2008). Today, individuals can find almost any information online. No longer is the public bound by what the traditional media, or the publishers feel is worthwhile to print (Singer 2003; 2005; 2006; 2007). Anyone with an opinion can post information online in an explosion of citizen journalism, blogs and online news and convergence journalism (Davis 2009; Mossberger et al 2008; Shirky 2008; West 2011; Singer 2006). Thus digital media has a cost associated to the public's knowledge because of the sheer amount of information and misinformation available, but is beneficial because information is made more publically available.

A Note About Research Design

To consider how digital media affects woman candidates this research focuses on actual inter-gendered elections in the United States. I consider the case of Hillary Clinton's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2007-2008 and women candidates for U.S. House in 2008, 2010, and 2012. This study considers vote choice for women candidates, respondents' reported digital media usage (including blogs, exchanging emails, and online news), self-reported mobilization in the elections, and four different measures of gender stereotype opinions, including survey questions of hypothetical candidates traits to determine how "being a woman" changes the public's perception on several traits[4]. Because of the use of public opinion data, there is no direct

[4] Gender stereotyping opinions are primarily measured in this project by using the public's evaluation of candidates on several traits. These traits include how competent the candidate is,

measure of exactly what information respondents experienced online (with one exception).

While an experiment in a laboratory would allow greater control over what information individuals are exposed to, such a framing experiment would likely overestimate the impact of digital media messages on gendered opinions of female candidates. The uniqueness of the Internet is individuals self-select what information they are exposed to, which is better measured by survey data from actual electoral campaigns or experiments imbedded in surveys. National surveys with measures of actual reported digital media use has the advantage of generalizability (adult sample) and external validity, while the multi-stage statistical modeling used here provides a way to address concerns about self-selection and endogeneity in media use. Replicating the self-selection of information that occurs in a Google search, for example, in a laboratory setting is very difficult, even with technology such as the Dynamic Process Tracing Board (Lau & Redlawsk 2006). While framing experiments with misinformation available online is possible, the experimental setting forces some respondents to see this information, instead of allowing them to searching out information conforming to their opinions. This creates problems for valid causal inference. Additionally, there are several published studies of framing experiments of gender stereotypes altering vote choice (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993a; 1993b); new research shows how encountering a woman candidate during an election alters the information individuals search for (Ditonto Hamilton & Redlawsk 2013). This study based on public opinion data provides a valuable contribution to the existing experimental research on women candidates and the media.

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whether the candidate is a strong leader, is the candidate caring etc. For all but 2012 these traits are evaluations of real candidates, thus I uses evaluations of real candidates on traits that are frequently found in the gender stereotyping literature.

Digital Citizenship and Political Knowledge

To be a digital citizen requires daily Internet use, but it also requires skills to navigate the vast online world of information (Mossberger et. al 2008; 2003). Certain demographic groups are more likely to possess these skills and rely on digital information. As of 2012, eight in 10 Americans use the Internet, but a lower percent (63) have high speed Internet at home. Home broadband access is critical for frequent and effective use of information online for employment, job searches, reading the news, and more. Younger, white, educated, and those with higher incomes, are more likely to have access than are older, minority, lower educated, lower income individuals (Chadwick 2006, Mossberger et. al 2003, 2012; Norris 2001). While women have equal access to the Internet and use it at similar rates, they are less likely to engage in political activities online than are men (Mossberger et al 2008). The skills needed to search for information online does not differ between men and women though (Mossberger et al 2003), thus for this project there should not be a confounding factor of differences in online use and ability between men and women voters.

Digital media allows information to be accessible whenever an individual needs it, and it is possible to find information on virtually any topic online if a person is willing to search. The political opinions available online are also vastly more diverse than those that were available pre-Internet (Davis 2009; 2012). While the diversity of sources and opinions is increasing, there is some argument that the traditional media elites still control what opinions are presented, even among bloggers (Hindman 2009; Singer 2003, 2005). With all this diverse information available, what is its influence on the knowledge of the electorate? The previously mentioned studies have conflicting findings on whether the

Internet is increasing or decreasing political knowledge. In a recent study, Oxley (2012) finds that political knowledge is lower than it was twenty years ago across all demographics; however, the Internet is not directly responsible. He argues that online readers of major news sites are more knowledgeable than the average citizen, but readers of blogs are much worse than average citizens (Oxley 2012). Thus, online news is helping individuals who visit major news sites, but is hurting the knowledge levels of individuals who focus on citizen journalism sites.

Potential Benefits of Digital Media

The potential for digital media to "even the playing field" through cheaper communication, targeting messages, ease of fundraising, and ability to engage and mobilize supporters are endless (see Bimber 2003; Issenberg 2012). Digital media makes it easier for the pubic to receive targeted messages, connect with other supporters of candidate, and to donate money. In 2008 the Obama campaign raised over half a billion dollars online from over three million individuals, and most of these were in increments of $100 or less (Kenski et.al. 2010). The ability of the Internet to raise money and supporters has changed the way modern campaigns are run, and has a direct effect on findings from the women in politics literature.

Expectations from the Campaign Environment

The context of campaigning and what level of office candidates are seeking is known to matter for who votes for women candidates (see for example Burrell 2004; Fox 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Women are more likely to run for local and state legislative

offices than at the national level. They therefore win more often in local or statewide elections than federal level offices (Lawless & Fox 2005; 2010; Ondercin & Welch 2005). When women run for office, they win at similar rates to male candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Results from studies based on experiments in laboratory settings have also shown that there are different expectations for women and male candidates at different office levels. Masculine traits (including strong leader) have a larger influence on the likelihood of being elected in hypothetical elections the higher the office level (president being the highest) (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993b).

While women run for office more at local and state levels, these campaigns are also significantly less likely to receive extensive media attention (Bystrom et.al. 2004; McDermott 1997). Local newspapers and local television may occasionally run a piece on the candidates and campaigns, but these elections do not receive daily attention. The lower information environment also reduces the amount of gender stereotypes presented about the candidates as coverage itself is often short and fact driven (McDermott, 1997). Direct campaign communication via the Internet is often the only way residents know a woman candidate is running and what her policy positions are. Thus a woman candidate does not face the same level of misinformation and potential gender stereotypes at lower level races than a woman candidate running for president would. Thus in terms of level of office being sought, lower level races are expected to benefit more from digital media usage than higher level offices.

From the women in politics literature we also know that region matters, with the Western states being unique in showing gains for women winning office to the U.S. House of Representatives after the mid-1990's (Fox 2010). The percent of state

legislatures that are women is presented in Figure 2.1. As of 2008, the South still had the lowest percent of women in elected office. Figure 2.2 shows the states by whether they currently have women in their House delegation, have had women in the past, or have never had women in their delegation. Four states, as of 2008, have never elected a woman to serve in either the House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate (Iowa, Mississippi, Delaware, and Vermont). As the first state to hold a nomination event and with important agenda setting effects on presidential primaries nationwide (Redlawsk, Tolbert & Donovan 2011), Iowa is especially important when analyzing Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential bid. As of 2013, 17 states do not have a single woman representative in Congress.

There is also an omitted observation problem when studying women candidates at the national level. There is no way to have positive evaluations of, or vote for, a woman candidate if woman candidates decide not to run for office. One rationale proposed by the literature for why there are fewer women candidates is that women are less ambitious office-seekers than men (Lawless & Fox 2010). A key component of any candidate's decision to run for elected office is being asked by someone else to run (see for example Fox 2010; Lawless & Fox 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2006). The Democratic Party does a better job of nominating women to run for open seats for the House than the Republican Party does; however, as of 2008, only 30 percent of the candidates running for the Democratic Party in open contest were women (Fox 2010). If potential women candidates are active online, whether at a lower level office, or in her real life job, it should increase the likelihood that her name has come to the attention of "gatekeepers", which would increase the likelihood of being asked to run for office.

Among the women that were interviewed in Lawless & Fox's (2005; 2010) unique survey of potential women candidates, women were much less likely to have been asked to run by "gatekeepers" (party leader, elected official, activist) than men. Those that were asked were significantly more likely to consider running and to take concrete steps toward running, but women were still much less likely to do so than men potential candidates (Lawless & Fox 2010). The authors argue that one possible reason for this is that women believe themselves to be less qualified to run for office, even if they actually are more qualified. Whether this misperception of qualification was a result of the candidates' beliefs about the gender bias present in campaigns was not investigated. Qualifications for elected office may be linked with professional experience. Women are less likely to hold law or business degrees, which are typical proving grounds for running for office (Gertzog 2002; Lawless & Fox 2010; Ondercin & Welch 2005). Potential women office seekers who are active in politics online would be more likely to know the qualifications of other potential candidates. If such women run for office, they are likely to be more adept at campaign communication online than the traditional female candidate.

Thus, whether women are recruited, if they believe they are qualified, where they run, and what level office they seek all matter for the decision to run for office, and ultimately obtain political office. In studying women political candidates, this creates an endogeneity problem, in that the sample of women running for political office may be of higher quality or better funded than typical men candidates. To address this concern, the empirical analysis explores a subsample of elections in which women run against women, presumably holding some of these concerns constant. What women decide to run for

office is changing as digital media becomes more commonplace. While women used to wait for the "right time" to run, more women are taking on the role of being the challenger, and are finding support and resources online.

If women choose to run, the next question is what campaign environment do they meet? Much of this literature paints a positive picture of what women candidates face in terms of campaign finance. While this literature is also vast, the key point is that women candidates are not disadvantaged in terms of raising money (Burrell 1993; 2003; Fox 2010). Fox (2010) finds that in 2008 women candidates for the House outraised their male challengers and Burrell (2003) reports that women in open seat contests actually have a fundraising advantage over their male challengers. This advantage is credited to women's groups like EMILY's list and NOW, both groups which have become active online, and the war chests of long-time women officeholders (for example Pelosi), in helping women candidates raise money early in the election cycle (Burrell 2003). Gaining access to these vast resources does require women candidates to convince the organizations they are legitimate and viable, but once this is done the floodgates of money are opened to women candidates (Burrell 1994).

An interesting point about the playing field in terms of campaign finance is that these studies were conducted on races under the old campaign finance laws, before donations from corporations were allowed under *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010). For the data used in Burrell's (1994; 2003) research soft money was still legal, while in the Fox (2010) study, women candidates were under the rules of BCRA (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002). With the Supreme Court decision in

Citizens United and the resulting creation of Super PAC's, whether women are still equal in ability to raise funds deserves to be reexamined.

With the ease of information, mobilization and capital transfers being increased online, campaigns at different levels of office in the same geographic area are able to share supporter list, call sheets, and donations much easier than in the past (i.e. in a phenomena known as the big data—Issenberg 2012). Of the key pieces of research on campaign finance, only one includes the possibility of donations online, and even these data are out of date given the new rules. Pew Internet and American Life finds that two-thirds of campaign contributions to the Democratic Party in 2012 were made online, and for the first time the FCC allowed campaign donations via text message. As digital media becomes a cornerstone of a campaign's fundraising strategy, candidates who understand the Internet, specifically how to mobilize and engage citizens online, are much more likely to be receiving campaign donations.

While the research suggests women that run for political office win at the same rate as men, and are not, per the established literature, disadvantaged in terms of raising money, women still must contend with the incumbency advantage (Burrell 1994; Dolan 2004; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Since the majority of officeholders are men, female candidates running against a male incumbent will have to overcome the advantage of money, connections, credit-claiming etc. that incumbency provides (Ansolabehere & Snyder 2002). Digital media can help even the odds when the woman is a challenger because it allows easier fundraising, position-taking, and a cheaper way to increase name recognition etc. Open seats have been argued to be women candidates' best chances of winning office. While at the state legislative level more women candidates run for and

win office, at the federal level, there is a relative dearth of cases to study, especially women presidential candidates.

Voting for Women Candidates

Drawing on the literature on descriptive representation by Mansbridge (1999), most studies of voting for women candidates consider whether women voters are more likely to support women candidates (see for example Dolan 2004; Plutzer & Zipp 1996). The results are not a simple yes or no, however. Depending on the level of office, the timeframe, and the party of the candidate and the women voters, sometimes women do vote for women candidates more than men, but sometimes there is no significant difference. Some studies find that women voters are more likely to vote for women candidates when it is a low information election and they use gender of the candidate as a voting cue (tested on U.S. House elections) (McDermott 1997). Since voters can use gender to infer ideology and policy positions of women candidates, voters typically know more about Democratic women candidates than Republican women candidates (Dolan 2005). Both men and women rate Democratic women candidates as more liberal than they actually are, while Republican women candidates are seen as more conservative by men than women. This result is explained by men reading more into the party label and women weighting the gender label more in their evaluations (Dolan 2008a).

While voters infer information from the candidate's gender, low information campaigns are not low information on the Internet. The public can gain information from the Internet that they cannot gain from traditional media sources. Whether this is a good thing depends on the legitimacy of the source—legitimate information will help inform

and mobilize the public, misinformation will simply reinforce stereotypes (Oxley 2012; McChensney and Pickard 2011; Silver 2012), which will reduce support for women candidates. Since women respondents are less likely to believe in gender stereotypes of female candidates, the transition to digital media should not matter as much for female respondents as male voters.

There is evidence that women were more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination (Carroll 2010; Huddy & Carey 2009). The gender gap in the 2008 national exit polls for the nomination showed 61 percent of white women voted for Clinton, while only 49 percent of white men did (minority voters analyzed separately due to the sex/race dynamic) (Huddy & Carey 2009). This gender gap in Democratic nomination voting is unique (Carroll 2010). Hillary Clinton's campaign did attempt to target and recruit specifically women voters (Lawrence & Rose 2010). This research finds that women were more likely to vote for Clinton; however, they were also more likely to be mobilized online, and were less likely to hold gender stereotypes, thus the magnitude of the finding that women vote for women is less than previous research would expect.

Throughout Kathleen Dolan's extensive works she finds that sometimes women voters are more likely to vote for women candidates, but other times there is no difference (see for example Dolan 2004; 2006; 2008a; 2008b). Her results primarily draw from congressional races, and in the Congress section of this project I also find women respondents are sometimes more likely to vote for the woman candidate, but other times are not. In my analyses I find that women respondents are less likely to have their evaluations of women candidates colored by gender stereotypes than men. Thus, it

is possible that successful online campaigning and online information allow women candidates to appear (at least to women respondents) more viable, and more likely to win office. This debate over whether/when women voters vote for women candidates is captured nicely in the conclusion to Zipp and Plutzer's article from 1985:

> [We have two important findings of this research: (1) Sex is related to voting for a female candidate primarily among self-identified Independents in races in which the woman is identified as supporting issues which are important to women; and (2) strong female candidates can attract the crossover votes of both men and women, while weaker ones can lose the votes of men and women.] (pg 194)

Whether women vote for women candidates is important to consider, but a common agreement among the literature is that party matters (see for example Dolan 2004; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; Osborn; 2012; Plutzer & Zipp 1996; Zipp & Plutzer 1985). When party is held constant, there is some evidence that women vote for women candidates more than men do, but this finding does not hold across all elections (Dolan 2008b). Some researchers argue the literature that shows women are more likely to vote for women candidates is actually capturing the fact that more women voters identify as Democrats and more of the women candidates are Democrats as well (see for example Dolan 2004). In terms of women representing women's interests, Osborn (2012) finds that party matters in terms of how women representatives perceive women's issues, and the proposals they support; thus, Republican women legislators perceive women's issues distinctly differently than Democratic women legislators.

The gender gap in voting between men and women in the United States has a long, established literature attempting to explain why women voters consistently vote for the Democratic Party more than men. The Democratic party is considered able to address

policy issues salient to women, including childcare, health, welfare, education, women's issues, etc. (Dolan & Ford 1995; Kathlene 1998; Tolbert & Steuernagel 2001). The Democratic party has aligned itself more with the issues of the feminist movement (like childcare, education, women's rights), and thus women voters who care about these issues are more likely to support this party over the Republican party (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Since 1980 when the term "the gender gap" became mainstream, the smallest gap in voting for presidential candidates was in 1992 when Perot was running for the Reform Party (the gender gap was still 4 points) (CAWP 2008). As of 2008, the gender gap was 7 percentage points. Among Obama voters, 56% were women, while only 49% of men voted for him (CAWP 2008). The gender gap is larger when the dominant issues of campaigns are social welfare policies and "war" (Miller 1988).

While the gender gap favoring the Democratic Party voting continues to exist (Carroll 1988; 2010), the dynamics of this gap may be changing as political information and campaigns moves online. Political parties, and their myriad supporters, flood the Internet each election season with "facts" that instead of being entirely factual are meant to persuade viewers to support their cause. While this has occurred for decades and individuals are cognizant of what an "attack advertisement is", misinformation and negative campaigning online is still a new venue, and being able to distinguish between legitimate information and misinformation is a difficult task. This new environment could help close the gender gap between the parties as Republicans begin to target women specifically online.

Mobilization/Engagement Online

As discussed above, digital media are expected to assist women candidates by facilitating communication with their supporters, which in turn increases the likelihood of being mobilized, engaged, and participating in politics. Americans are increasingly online, and thus candidates are finding new ways to get them involved online. In the 2008 election, over half the adult population used the Internet for a political activity (from watching YouTube videos to visiting candidate websites), and over 70 percent of Internet users reported seeking information about the election online (Smith 2009).

While the effect of digital media on knowledge is divided, there is a growing consensus toward one side of the debate between digital media mobilizing new citizens, or normalizing existing patterns of participation (Anduiza, Jensen, Jorba 2012). Mobilization scholars argue that the unique forums provided online provide an avenue for traditionally disengaged individuals to become interested and eventually become engaged in offline politics as well (see for example Hamilton & Tolbert 2012; Hirzalla, van Zoonen & de Ridder 2010; Kann, Berry, Gant & Zager 2007; Mossberger, Tolbert & McNeal 2008). Others argue that the individuals being mobilized and engaged online are the same individuals that are already most likely to be engaged and participate offline (see for example Chadwick 2006; Van Dijk 2005; Margolis & Resnick 2000). The more recent research in American politics and comparative politics is trending toward the unique ability to mobilize and engage new people online.

While the ease of mobilization is important to consider, the importance of mobilizing supporters is to increase their interest, engagement, and participation, in politics (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins & Delli Carpini 2006). Research has shown

that being online can increase interest in politics, the probability of voting in elections, the likelihood and amount of campaign contributions, etc. (see for example Bimber 2003; Boulianne 2009; Hamilton & Tolbert 2012; Kenski & Stroud 2006; Tolbert & McNeal 2003). Digital media also have the ability to mobilize and bring into the political sphere individuals that were previously disengaged from politics. Younger individuals are the most likely to become engaged online and this interest and engagement does translate into offline activities like voting, attending campaign events, and discussing politics with others (Hamilton & Tolbert 2012; Krueger 2002; 2006). Since the previous work on Clinton has shown that older individuals were more likely to vote for her, engaging the young online could increase overall support, and reduce the age gap.

Thus mobilization for this project is not simply did an individual receive an email from a campaign, or see an advertisement online. Instead, mobilization is defined as whether digital media use translated into offline participation in politics. While seeing an advertisement online can impact an individual's opinion, the ability of new media to make communicating with others about politics, donating money, volunteering time etc. easier is what this project measures as mobilization. Making participation and involvement in the campaigns easier is how I define online mobilization, and thus the measures used throughout the chapters reflect this.

The measurement of mobilization online and offline are drawn from Hamilton & Tolbert (2012) who measure change in use of online political information over the course of the 2008 presidential campaign based on a panel survey (2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, Jackman & Vavreck 2009) and change in offline participation over the same time period. The results show that individuals that increased their online usage

over the course of the election were also significantly more likely to participate in many political activities offline (e.g. volunteering for a candidate, attending a campaign event) and were more likely to vote in the 2008 election (Hamilton & Tolbert 2012). The chapters on inter-gendered House races include these variables for digital media and political mobilization, and add variables measuring gender stereotypes of women candidates.

Potential Costs of Digital Media

While the previous section discussed many commonly agreed upon findings on women in politics and how digital media could impact these findings in a positive way, this section considers the reverse. What do we know about the negatives surrounding women political candidates that could be further exacerbated by the unique environment of digital media? Briefly discussed already was that individuals' hold certain trait expectations of candidates for office, and these are typically male dominated traits (strong leader, competent). While I argue above that women respondents are less likely to hold these stereotypes, digital media is expected to increase the magnitude of stereotyped opinions for women and men, which will reduce support for women candidates.

Gender-Stereotyping Women Candidates

Women candidates have sought to run for President of the United States (or their party's nomination) since 1872 when Victoria C. Woodhull ran for president on the Equal Rights party ticket; her running mate was, interestingly enough, Frederick Douglass (Falk 2008). Almost 150 years later, in 2012, Jill Stein ran for president on the Green Party ticket. Women are, however, rarely major party candidates for president. Geraldine

Ferraro was on the Democratic ticket for Vice President in 1984; she was the first women with a legitimate chance of being on a winning ticket (Frankovic 1988). In 2008, Sarah Palin was the Vice Presidential candidate for the Republican Party. Hillary Clinton's bid to be president in 2008 provides a unique case study of a women running for the highest office in the United States as a major party candidate. Since so few women have had a legitimate chance of winning the nomination, or being on a winning presidential ticket, investigating women candidates for president is difficult (Murray 2010).

Research has documented extensive sexist and gender stereotyped information in media coverage of women candidates (Bystrom 2010a; Huddy & Carey 2009; Woodall, Fridkin & Carle 2010). While some argue the campaign environment is less gendered than it was in the past, as of the 2008 presidential campaign, there are still clear examples of media coverage, messages the candidates were sending, and public opinion poll results that show for the office of the President of the United States women are still heavily disadvantaged (Carroll 2009; Huddy & Carey 2009). In exit polls from the 2008 Democratic nomination contest, for example, there was a clear gap in support of Hillary Clinton, with more women than men supporting her campaign and voting for her, even though the media portrayal of Clinton was much more negative than the male candidates (Bystrom 2010a; Huddy & Carey 2009; Woodall, Fridkin & Carle 2010).

Digital Media Increasing Stereotypes

An central argument of this research is that the Internet may decrease the likelihood of supporting women candidates because they allow preexisting gender stereotypes to persist because of an explosion of often low quality political information

online not vetted by professional organizations, where bias, distorted information and errors can masquerade as fact. As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, individuals self-select political information online rather than being exposed to news that may cause them to reevaluate gender stereotypes. It is well known that sexism and racism are rampant online in forums ranging from social media (Facebook), Twitter, and the blogs and online comments on the news websites (Hindman 2009; McChesney and Pickard 2011; Ritchie 2013; Downie and Schudson 2012).

Congressional and presidential candidates from both the Republican and Democratic Parties (Sarah Palin, Michele Bachman, and Hillary Clinton, for example) complained about biased media coverage both online and through traditional media outlets, such as newspapers and television. But almost no research has empirically tested the effects of online media. Defining, measuring, and understanding gender stereotyping is a critical component of this project. Previous research can roughly be divided into experimental work conducted in laboratory settings, which often focuses on hypothetical candidates and trait evaluation, and survey research about how gender stereotypes affects the real world campaign environment. The analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 6 rely in part on use of hypothetical candidates similar to the experimental work, allowing a bridge between these two methods for analyzing gender stereotypes.

Framing Experiments on Gender Stereotyping

Before considering the varied ways experiments have tested gender stereotyping's effect on women candidates, it is important to distinguish between gender-trait and gender-belief stereotyping. Gender-trait stereotyping is when individuals attach specific

attributes to others based on gender. For example, defining women as compassionate and men as stronger leaders, the common traits considered also include "tough, articulate, trustworthy, family-oriented" (Alexander & Andersen 1993; Huddy & Terkildsen 1993a). Gender-belief stereotyping is where individuals infer information about a candidate simply because of that candidate's gender. An example is that individuals may perceive women candidates as liberal simply because they are women (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993a).

Issue competency is another often researched gender stereotype category, where women are found to be evaluated higher on "women's issues" (for example welfare policies, education), while men are perceived to be able to handle better a military crisis, crime or finances (Kathlene 1998; Lawless 2004). Of these three, much of the literature shows gender-trait and issue competency are the driving forces behind how individuals stereotype candidates for office (see for example Huddy & Terkildsen 1993a; 1993b; Kahn 1994). In an experiment on news coverage of candidates, Kahn (1994) varied the gender of the candidate and held all else equal, but women candidates were still stereotyped as being more compassionate. This study also found that women respondents are more likely to draw distinctions between equivalent experimental candidates in favor of the woman candidate (Kahn 1994). While misinformation and stereotyped information exist on both gender trait and issue competency matters online, women candidates would be rational to use the Internet to combat the beliefs that they are unqualified (Baum 2012; Bystrom 2010b), thus it is expected that the Internet would be worse for gender trait stereotyping than for issue competency stereotypes.

When asked to evaluate support for hypothetical candidates, respondents are often less confident in their evaluations of a woman candidate compared to a hypothetical male candidate (Smith et. al 2007). If the experimental environment is competitive (an election), male candidates are rated higher, while if the environment is communal (group decision-making), female candidates are rated higher by both male and female respondents (Lammers, Gordijn & Otten 2009). This second finding is problematic for the experimental literature that pits two hypothetical candidates against each other and asks respondents their vote choice. It is unclear if they are considering a competitive election environment, or simply considering two candidates outside of a campaign environment.

Another troubling finding from the experimental literature for researchers to consider comes from Smith, Paul, & Paul's (2007) work on presidential candidates. The researchers create a gender neutral name condition (the first name was Terry); however, 89 percent of their respondents assumed this was a male candidate. In their findings for hypothetical presidential candidates, the woman candidate was always evaluated worse on the traits deemed necessary to be president. Another study found individuals hide the truth when asked explicitly whether they would vote for a woman candidate for president if she was on their party's ticket. Using a list experiment run on a national survey to control for social desirability bias it was found that 26 percent of American men, and 25.6 percent of women were upset about the prospect of a female president (Streb, Burrell, Frederick & Genovese 2008)[5]. What is even more troubling is that education, age, region of the country, did not lower this level of opposition to a woman president.

[5] The list experiment in question had one set of respondents receive four things that could have "troubled or bothered them" while a second group of respondents received five things that could

While experimental studies generally find women are evaluated as weaker leaders and less able to handle issues like crime, and one in four Americans are concerned about voting for a woman president when they can share their true feelings (Streb et. al 2008), the silver lining in all of the experimental research on gender stereotyping and women candidates is that women are seen as more compassionate, more communal, and more able to handle issues like education and social welfare.

Another positive for women candidates is that given no other information, 50 percent of respondents in a study reported having no preference for voting for either a male or female candidate (Sanbonmatsu 2002). While this may be considered a "positive" for women candidates, this study also found "…individuals who think men are more emotionally suited for politics, who think that men are more likely to take their position on government spending, and prefer men to handle stereotypically male issues are more likely to prefer the male candidate" (Sanbonmatsu 2002). The positive for women candidates from this study is that while male respondents reported a 19 point preference toward the male candidate, female respondents reported a 15 point preference toward the female candidate. Given the nature of political blogs and anonymous forums online, these "repressed" opinions are likely to be voiced online, even when considered inappropriate in polite society. The freedom of anonymity online can bring out the worst in individuals, and this is also true when it comes to voicing gender stereotyped opinions (Carr 2011; Sustein 2007).

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have bothered them. This fifth item was the "a woman serving as president". Respondents were simply asked how many of the items troubled them, thus the authors simply compare the mean of the two groups, and the difference is the percent of respondents troubled by the fifth item- a woman being president.

Gender Stereotyping in the Campaign Environment

With all the bad news for women candidates from the experimental literature, is there any good news from the survey literature? While women candidates typically win at the same rates, and have similar resources as their male opponents, gender stereotypes still permeate the campaign environment and individual's preferences. Men and women respondents evaluate women respondents' political knowledge as lower; regardless of actual knowledge levels (Mendez & Osborn 2010). The results from the experimental work on issue competency carries over into survey work done on candidate evaluations. Americans continue to report differences in issue competency by gender of the candidate. For example, 30 percent of respondents reported differences between men and women candidates in their competency to handle crime and education using the 2006 American National Election Survey (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 2008). Another study found that 2/3 of respondents do not believe men and women candidates are equally capable of handling a military crisis (Lawless 2004). The gendered differences on issue competency has been found throughout the literature and is a consistent finding (see also Bystrom 2010a; Fox 2010).

From the research on gender stereotyping it is clear that women candidates must overcome preconceived notions about whether they are competent to hold office and what issues they are qualified to handle, even if they are still winning office at the same rate. The media coverage of the campaign is a crucial part of the campaign environment, and there is evidence that coverage by the mainstream media is also colored by gender stereotypes.

Media Bias of Women Candidates

While as a society we have come a long way since Woodhull was the first woman to run for president in 1872, in terms of media coverage of women candidates we have not. Both Elizabeth Dole (2000) and Carol Moseley Braun (2004) received the same percent of gendered emotional descriptions in press coverage of their campaigns as Woodhull did over 120 years earlier (Falk 2008). The coverage of the 2008 presidential election was awash with examples of sexist frames and inappropriate language from reporters' (Boynton 2009). Take for example, Tucker Carlson's (MSNBC commentator at the time) comments that saturated the media "Something about her feels castrating… [when Clinton] comes on television, I involuntarily cross my legs" (as quoted in Traister 2010).

Before Clinton's presidential campaign in 2007- 2008, women candidates traditionally received less press coverage, and were much more likely to be described by their looks and emotions than were male candidates (Falk 2008). The presentation and portrayal of women candidates in the media matter for several reasons. Since the mainstream media choose what stories to cover, they set the agenda of what the public thinks about (this is less of an issue with blogs and citizen journalism via new media than it used to be), and how the public thinks about the issues/candidates (Callaghan & Schnell 2005). Framing effects have been well documented in how the media portray women candidates and its effect on how voters evaluate them (Fridkin & Kenney 2005; Iyengar 1991; Kinder & Sanders 1996). These frames allow individuals to use information shortcuts where gender is an often used heuristic (Norris 1997).

While media coverage is becoming more equal in the quantity of coverage of women campaigns, there remain issues with how the media influence voters' perceptions (Bystrom et. al 2004; Bystrom 2010). Women candidates face the "double-blinds" of being perceived as too young or too old, too masculine or too feminine, too aggressive or too inexperienced etc. The media often portray women candidates as "novelties" instead of legitimate contenders (Falk 2008; Lawrence & Rose 2010). Clinton's media strategy during the Democratic Party's 2008 presidential primaries shows clear trends of trying to downplay being "the wife of" someone and stress her abilities, toughness, and competency for the position of President (Carroll & Dittmar 2010; Duerst-Lahti 2010; Lawrence & Rose 2010). While some argue media coverage of Clinton in 2008 was not overtly sexist, 40 percent of respondents to a survey believed she was not treated fairly by the media during her candidacy (Lawless 2009; Lawrence & Rose 2010). This perception of unfair treatment could be due to the negativity of the coverage the Clinton campaign received. Going into the Iowa caucuses, 66 percent of the coverage for Obama was positive, Edward's coverage was 61 percent positive, while only 33 percent of the coverage of the Clinton campaign was positive (Bystrom 2010; Lawrence & Rose 2010).

While the media coverage of women candidates is often sexist, and is perceived to be so by the public, what messages are the candidates trying to send? Messages from candidates, both men and women, are perceived and responded to by the voters in similar ways (Bystrom et. al 2004). When women candidates focus on social issues (women's issues), they are evaluated more positively than when they focus on issues like crime (Iyengar et al 1997). Perhaps this is why women candidates often focus these issues (Bystrom 2010; Kahn & Gordon 1997). Fridkin & Kenny (2005) found that incumbents

can influence how the media portray the messages they are trying to send to the public; however, challengers do not have this influence. This is especially problematic for women candidates as they are still much more likely to be the challenger than an incumbent in a campaign.

What does this research on traditional media tell us about how digital media might help or hurt women candidates? Women candidates try to distance themselves from being perceived as "soft on crime" or as just a mom/wife/daughter of a male leader (Bystrom 2010; Falk 2008). The Internet may help women candidates tailor messages to their supporters without relying on reporters, commentators, and the traditional gate-keepers of information. The advent of citizen journalism and blogs may also reduce the power of the traditional media elites to frame the issues (Davis 2012), benefiting traditionally disadvantaged candidates.

Women Candidates in Digital Media

The different effects on individuals' level of political knowledge highlights a key point for this study—the Internet is a "motivated medium." An individual has to be willing to seek out information, whereas with television the process was passive, simply watching and listening to the information (Crigler et. al 2012). While there is a plethora of information online about how women are capable, qualified candidates, and information that would challenge stereotypes of women, individuals would have to go seek out that information (Baum 2012; Pariser 2011; Stroud 2011). This selection bias of information is only exacerbated by the way search engines are catering to an individual's preference in what Pariser (2011) has called the "filter bubble". News outlets online are

also now catering to certain groups and are unlikely to cover stories that do not conform to what that group wants to hear (Baum 2012).

Between self-selection of information, search engine's filtering of information, and news outlets catering, it may difficult for candidates online to reach beyond their base (Baum 2012). Through this same process, however, several forms of digital media do allow candidates to target messages at their base and increase the likelihood that supporters will find supportive information (Crigler et. al 2012; Issenberg 2012). It is argued that this matters because it increases the likelihood of a candidate's supporters voting and trying to influence their friends vote choice. Most Members of Congress and virtually all candidates have websites, Facebook pages, and many have even entered the "Twitter-verse". The information they send to followers is not tailored to online messages though. Typically the information sent out via the Internet falls into Mayhew's (1974) classic classifications of credit-claiming and position-taking (Lawless 2012).

Another disadvantage to women candidates is the existence of citizen journalism and the blogosphere. Because bloggers do not have strict editorial boards, they can find a story and post it within minutes (Davis 2009; McChensney and Pickard 2011; Sunstein 2007; Shirky 2008; West 2011). This ability to scoop the mainstream media means that bloggers are now often the first to frame stories about the candidates, and candidates have only minutes to respond to accusations before the story breaks into the mainstream media (Davis 2012). Bloggers also have the ability to post stories and information that could turn out to be false as they do not have to worry about fact-checking. This could be one of the reasons misinformation about political issues is increasing among high frequency Internet users (Oxley 2012; Carr 2011). What effect all of this misinformation and

selective information-seeking has on stereotypes held by potential voters is one question this project seeks to answer, and per the findings in the following chapters the results are not encouraging for women candidates.

The Net Effect of Digital Media on Women Candidates

A comprehensive approach to how the Internet and digital media affect support for women candidates is needed to bridge the many literatures discussed here, and further our understanding of how the constantly changing digital world is affecting women candidate's likelihood of winning office. To this point in this project it has been argued that Internet influences evaluations of, and support for, women candidates in two competing ways. Figure 2.3 provides a visual roadmap of the theoretical argument developed from the previously discussed literatures, which guides the analyses presented in this project.

Figure 2.3 indicates that Internet use is expected to increase the likelihood of political mobilization, and as Bystrom (2010) puts it "evens the playing field". Through this increase in mobilization, digital media will have a positive impact on voting for women candidates. It is unclear from the literature what to anticipate for the effect digital media and mobilization will have on evaluations of women candidates (thus the dashed line and question mark). This expectation is illustrated by the top arc of Figure 2.3, and is tested in Chapters 4 and 6.

The bottom arc of Figure 2.3 is the negative expectation of how digital media will affect support for women candidates. While there is a strong literature to support the belief that Internet use increases mobilization, especially benefiting Democratic Party

candidates who tend to be women (Karpf 2012), there is not an existing literature that investigates digital media's impact on holding gender stereotypes. This research investigates use of online political information and the likelihood of evaluating women running for elected office using gender stereotypes. For congressional candidates this is tested in Chapter 5, for Clinton it is in Chapter 3. It is hypothesized that individuals relying heavily on digital media, especially blogs, will be more likely to hold gender stereotyped opinions of women candidates than will individuals that do not rely on digital media for political information. It is expected that through gender stereotyping, digital media will have a negative impact on support for women candidates.

Thus, this framework argues that the two competing pathways will result in a "net effect" for digital media on support for women candidates. The overall effect of digital media depends on the relative weight of mobilization versus gender stereotyping, and what measure of digital media is being considered. If the positive effects from mobilization outweigh the negatives from gender stereotyping, then digital media are beneficial for women candidates. If, however, the negatives from gender stereotyping outweigh the positives from mobilization, the net effect will be negative. Throughout the analyses in subsequent chapters the common finding is that digital media has a net negative effect on support for women candidates.

Thus, Figure 2.3 drives all the data analyses in the following chapters. To fully test how digital media are affecting support for women candidates I use two very different campaign environments. Chapters 3 and 4 consider a very closely watched election (Clinton's 2007-2008 campaign), and at this point it is a single case study as no other woman candidate has won states in a major party's nomination contest for

president. Chapters 5 and 6 consider U.S. House races for three years since these elections are what much of the empirical work on women candidates uses for analyses. Thus this project tests the competing pathways framework on two different types of campaigns to see if the level of office being sought changes relative importance of gender stereotyping and mobilization.

Figure 2.1: Percentage of Women in the State Legislature 2009



Source: The National Conference of State Legislators

Figure 2.2: Congressional Delegations with Women (2013)



Source: CAWP 2013

Figure 2.3: Competing Pathways Framework Visual Depiction



CHAPTER 3:

DIGITAL MEDIA AND GENDER STEREOTYPING HILLARY CLINTON

Introduction

In 2007-2008 Hillary Clinton waged the most successful presidential primary campaign of any woman candidate in American history. Despite ultimately losing the nomination to Barack Obama, Clinton's campaign is seen as having potentially broken the final pane of the political "glass ceiling". While Clinton's campaign in 2008 is not representative of all women seeking office, it is the first time in the history of the United States where a viable woman candidate was running for the highest political office in the country, thus in this chapter I start to apply my framework of digital media's affect on support for women candidates by considering whether and how digital media reinforced gender stereotyping during her campaign.

Building off the framework presented in Chapter 2 I start my analyses by investigating how digital media usage affected holding stereotyped opinions of Clinton. The examples of how both mainstream media and digital media were sexist against Clinton are numerous and will be discussed in this chapter, but another issue is also directly relevant to Clinton's campaign. Being a nomination election instead of a general election, partisanship played little to no role in voting for her; however, the narrative belief that women were more likely to support Clinton's campaign is necessary to consider in addition to any effect from digital media. This chapter starts with a discussion of women's support for women candidates, then a discussion of how the media (especially digital media) portrayed Clinton, then moves into the data and analysis of the expectations presented in Chapter 2. The key findings in this chapter are first that

digital media usage did make it more likely to hold stereotyped opinions, regardless of how digital media is measured. Secondly, candidate specific traits are useful for measuring stereotyped opinions, but using differences between the candidates provides a more robust measure of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

Who Supports Women Candidates

One of the first questions that must be asked about support for a woman candidate is whether individuals (especially women) feel pressure to claim support because the candidate is a woman (Darcy, Welch & Clark 1994; Fox & Smith 1998; Streb, Burrell, Frederick & Genovese 2008). Using a list experiment, Streb et al. (2008) find responses to whether a respondent would vote for a woman candidate does have a problem with social desirability bias. Across respondent gender, age, and education, there is a consistent trend for individuals to avoid being labeled as "sexist" by not wanting to support a woman candidate for president. While this could be problematic for trying to test support for a woman candidate, fortunately, in the democratic nominating contest for 2008 there were many other qualified unique candidates which could reduce the concern over the socially correct need to support a woman candidate.

Another advantage when considering the Democratic nominating process for support for a woman candidate is the finding that female Democrats are more likely to vote for women candidates, but Republican women are not (Dolan 2004; McDermott 1997). Independents that are women have also been found more likely to vote for a woman Democrat (Zipp & Plutzer 1985). These findings are not universal. Overt support for a woman candidate is generally higher among women voters; however, this

differs by the level of office being sought, which party the woman candidate identifies with, and how the voters evaluate the woman candidate (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993; Jennings 2006; Lawless 2009; Smith, Paul & Paul 2007). Huddy and Carey Jr. (2009) consider exit poll responses to determine whether women were more likely to vote for Clinton. While their findings show clear differences in support between men and women, their data do not include the key states of Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, or Nevada. Thus, in terms of overt support, there is no reason in our analysis to assume women were, all else equal, more likely to support Clinton's candidacy.

Women and Evaluations of Women Candidates

While it is generally believed that more positive evaluations will translate to a higher likelihood of voting for the liked candidate, there is little evidence to support this among the research on women candidates. One exception is Dolan (2008) where women respondents felt more positively for women candidates, but this did not immediately translate into vote choice. Since the research shows that support for women candidates differs depending on the level of office, it would be expected that evaluations would also differ by office being sought (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993; Lawless 2009; Smith, Paul & Paul 2007).

We know that women candidates are evaluated differently than men candidates depending on the issues stressed during a campaign (Koch 2000; Lammers, Gordijn & Otten 2009; Lawless 2004; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 2008; Seltzer, Newman & Leighton 1997; Smith, Paul & Paul 2007). When the key issue in a campaign involves terrorism or war, women candidates are seen as less competent (Lawless 2004). Sanbonmatsu and

Dolan (2008) find that 30% of respondents reported gender differences in competency on crime and education. Women Democrats are seen as more competent on education, but men are more competent on crime (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 2008). Given the issues present during the 2008 presidential nominating process, could this have driven down overall evaluations of Clinton? Were women still more likely to have positive evaluations of Clinton even though one of the key issues in the election cycle was the Iraq War?

Media Bias against Clinton

While we know from previous literature that evaluations of women candidates and the issues emphasized can impact support for women candidates, another key part of the picture is how the media frames issues. Clinton's campaign for the Democratic nomination for president in 2007-2008 faced numerous issues with how she and her campaign were portrayed in the media. There is vast evidence to show that Clinton's campaign was portrayed more negatively than any other candidate running for the 2008 nomination for either party, and this bias was evident in all forms of media (Bystrom 2010; Lawrence & Rose 2010; Traister 2010). Examples of the biases faced by Clinton have been provided throughout this project, but they can roughly be divided into 3 categories—Personal traits, campaign strategy, and competency issues (Kahn & Gordon 1997). Of these three, only the third is something all candidates face, the first two were directly linked to sexist and stereotyped opinions of Clinton.

What is telling about Clinton's run in 2007-2008 is that this was not the first time the media had covered a campaign of hers with overtly sexist coverage. In her campaign for the U.S. Senate in 2000 the primary medium for political information was still

television and newspapers, but the coverage in these venues were also biased against Clinton. In this campaign, personal appearance was linked to Clinton in 6% of the coverage, while her opponent (Lazio) had his personal appearance discussed in 2% of coverage (Bystrom, Banwart, Kaid & Robertson 2004). Also telling was that marital status and sex were mentioned for Clinton 17% and 15% respectively, while Lazio had marital status mentioned 2% of the time, and sex only mentioned 1% of the time.

From the time of Clinton's election to the Senate in 2000 to her bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008 media had changed dramatically. In that 8 year period more people were gaining information online, blogs and online journalism had come into their own, and candidates for major office had to contend with appeasing bloggers just as they did with journalists before (Davis, 2009). Given the rising importance of the Internet, and ensuring good relations with bloggers (so they do not write unfounded nasty articles about candidates), most major campaigns now make a priority of hiring a renowned blogger to sort and blog supportive articles about the candidate (Davis 2009). Even with Clinton's campaign having a well-known blogger, the overall content of Clinton on the Internet was more negative than other candidates. She was often portrayed in new media as "psychotic; a power-hungry stalker, killer…and questioned her sexuality" (Bystrom 2010, pg 85), and this image spilled over from new media to coverage of Clinton in mainstream media. Given this, it is not unfounded to believe that high use of digital media would reinforce/exacerbate gender stereotypes, which in turn would lower support for Clinton in the nomination process.

Expectations

In this chapter I focus on analyzing half of the overall framework of how digital media affect support for women candidates on the special case of Clinton's campaign. The analyses in this chapter focus on the argument that individuals with high digital media usage will have stronger held gender stereotyped opinions than individuals who do not use digital media. Then this chapter considers how digital media and gender stereotyping affect support for, and evaluations of, Clinton. These models will be used in the next chapter as well, when mobilization is added to create comprehensive models.

When considering how digital media affects holding gender stereotyped opinions, I break down my expectations into two parts. The first expectation from the vast literature of digital media's misinformation is that high Internet use will increase the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

H3.1: Higher digital media use will result in having more strongly held gender stereotyping opinions.

The second key expectation in this chapter is that use of different types of digital media will change the level of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

H3.2: Different types of digital media (political emails, political blogs etc) will have differing effects on holding gender stereotyped opinions.

Finally, what effect do digital media and holding stereotyped opinions have on support for Clinton? I break down the expectations from this question into two parts.

H3.3: Higher digital media usage, and holding gender stereotyped opinions, will result in lower evaluations of Clinton.

H3.4: Higher digital media usage, and holding gender stereotyped opinions, will result in less overt support for Clinton.

Data/ Variables

The data to test what happened to Clinton's candidacy in 2007-2008 and how digital media affected holding gender stereotyped opinions, derive from two distinct datasets. The first comes from a series of telephone surveys conducted over the course of the 2008 Presidential Nomination process at the University of Iowa, commonly referred to as the Hawkeye Polls (Redlawsk & Tolbert). The specific survey considered in these analyses was conducted in March 2007 of Iowa residents. The March 2007 poll was conducted of likely caucus goers of both political parties. Since the analyses focus on support for Clinton's nomination campaign, only individuals that reported at least leaning Democrat were considered[6]. The March 2007 Hawkeye poll was in the field in Iowa from March 19-31, 2007. This wave of the Hawkeye poll had1,267 respondents, of which 626 self-identified as a Democrat or leaning Democrat.

The second dataset used to consider how digital media affected stereotyped opinions and support for Clinton come from the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) of 2008 (Jackman & Vavreck 2009). With large samples, multiple waves, and a focus on early states and battleground states, this dataset allows the models developed with the Hawkeye polls to be tested on a representative national sample. These data were collected in online studies unlike the Hawkeye Polls. Of the six waves of the CCAP, the analyses in this and the next chapter use the first, second, and third waves. The first wave was conducted from December 17, 2007- January 3, 2008, the second wave was

[6] The results presented do not change when true independents are included.

conducted from January 24-February 4, 2008, and the third wave was conducted from March 21-April 14, 2008. Thus, the first wave is before any state had voted, and the third wave is after most states had held their caucuses or primaries. The sample for the CCES is of registered voters stratified by battleground- non-battleground states[7] (Jackman & Vavreck 2009). Each wave had approximately 30,000 respondents (new respondents were added as individuals dropped out of the study); for the January measures of gender stereotyping used in my analyses I have over 4,500 respondents after excluding respondents who did not at least lean democrat.

The measures of digital media used in this and the next chapter are presented in Table 3.1. The gender stereotyping measures used in the various analyses are presented in Table 3.2. The distributions of these stereotyping measures are discussed below.

The candidate specific variables asked questions about Hillary Clinton directly. The trait evaluations of Clinton are coded so that higher values represent less descriptive of Clinton. For example, the trait "weak leader" was recoded so that higher values correspond to "less descriptive of Clinton." To create the difference in trait evaluation, I took the Clinton trait variables and subtracted the average of the Obama and Edwards trait evaluations. Figure 3.1 shows the equation used to create these measures. For example, if Clinton was scored a 1, and Obama and Edwards were each scored 2, thus the trait described Clinton more than Obama and Edwards, the math would result in 1-2 or -1, which represents the woman candidate being evaluated higher. Each of the difference gender stereotyping variables was created by using this same process. The distributions of each "difference" variable are discussed further below.

[7] Battleground states were classified as: Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Iowa, New Hampshire, Minnesota, New Mexico, Nevada and Ohio.

March 2007 Hawkeye Poll Variables

The dependent variable from the Hawkeye poll that measures how strongly held gender stereotypes are comes is "The fact that Hillary Clinton is a woman will be a problem for her", with answers being "strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree". Of the 289 Democrats in the subsample that answered this question, 47% said either strongly agree or agree that this statement was true. The variable was collapsed into a dichotomous agree, disagree statement with the value of 1 equaling agree gender will be a problem[8]. The distribution of this variable is presented in Figure 3.2. The mean of this variable is 0.47, with a standard deviation of 0.5. This is a very unique question because it is a direct question of holding stereotyped opinions, but respondents do not feel pressure to be socially correct in the answer. Individuals can answer that yes they believe gender will be a problem for Clinton without having to tell an interviewer that they personally have a problem with her gender. While it is possible that some respondents answered this question thinking about the general public instead of their personal opinions, it is still an interesting question, with insightful results.

The other variables for the analyses from this dataset include typical demographic variables, and a measure of being online. The demographics included are education, marital status, race, income, gender, and age[9]. The measure of being online chosen for these analyses is whether respondents had seen a specific post on YouTube. Specifically

[8] Running the models presented with the full four point scale does not significantly change the results.

[9] Education is a 7-point scale. Marital status is an indicator variable of 1=married/with partner, 0= all others. Race is measured as 1=non-white (including Hispanic), 0=white. Income is a 9-point scale. Gender is 1=female, 0=male. Age is simply the self-reported age of respondents.

the question was "Have you heard about the YouTube video attacking Hillary Clinton using the Apple 1984 commercial theme?"

Figure 3.3 provides a snapshot of this now iconic political advertisement. The basic premise is a mock of the Apple 1984 Orwellian commercial[10]. Thus, instead of a general measure of being online, the analyses start by using a specific event online that if viewed could have easily colored opinions about Clinton, even though the commercial itself was not gendered. Only 16% of respondents reported they had seen the YouTube post, thus if we find significant biases against Clinton from this one online post it is supportive of my expectations that digital media can reinforce gender stereotypes that harm women candidates. This online variable is also interacted with female respondent when testing its effect on gender stereotyping.

The Hawkeye poll data are interesting to consider as it has a specific question on a specific online "event" that could frame individuals' opinions about Clinton. A concern with this dataset is that all the questions were asked of respondents at the same time, so making causal claims is tenuous at best. Thus, the second dataset considered controls for the time aspect of when individuals were online, when they were measured for holding gender stereotyped opinions, and when their vote was cast. Thus, for models testing my hypotheses on evaluations of, and support for, Clinton, only the 2008 CCAP will be used.

2008 CCAP Survey

Unlike the previous survey, this survey allows us to control for the time aspect of how the expectations expects digital media to influence holding stereotyped opinions, changing mobilization and engagement patterns, and these then to affect evaluations of,

[10] Full commercial available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJklyhWniDQ

and support for, women candidates. The first dependent variables considered are from the January 2008 wave of the CCAP, and are trait evaluations of Clinton that are known to have a gender bias, thus these are my measures of gender stereotyping. The first asked "How well does strong leader describe Clinton?" with responses of "not well at all" "not too well" "quite well" and "extremely well". The scale was inverted so that less descriptive of Clinton had higher values to be representative of the gender stereotyped opinion (0-3 point scale). 46% of respondents stated a negative opinion (high scores)—that strong leader does not describe Clinton—while 54% of respondents stated a positive opinion (low scores). The distribution of this candidate trait is presented in Figure 3.4. The mean is 1.6 with a standard deviation of 1.17.

The second trait, which is much less classically considered a "gendered" trait, asked respondents "How well does trustworthy describe Clinton?" The response categories were the same and were also inverted. With this question 62% said trustworthy did not describe Clinton (3 or 2 on the scale), while only 38% said it did describe Clinton (1 or 0 on the scale). The distribution for Clinton Untrustworthy is presented in Figure 3.5. The mean of this variable is 2, with a standard deviation of 1.1. The category with the largest percentage of respondents is "not well at all" with 46% of respondents. The final question considered is "How well does 'has the right experience' describe Clinton?" This scale was again inverted. The distribution is presented in Figure 3.6. It has a mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of 1.1. The category with the highest percentage of respondents is 1 "quite well" (30%), but is closely followed by "not well at all" at 29%.

To ensure these measures are not simply unique characteristic traits of Clinton I also create a difference measure. I average the scores for Obama and Edwards on these three traits then subtract the men's value from Clinton's score. This results in a -3 to 3 point variable with higher score being more positive to the men candidates than Clinton. The distribution of "weaker leader" is presented in Figure 3.7. From this distribution it is clear that -1 value (Clinton a slightly stronger leader) is the category with the highest percentage of respondents at 13.5%, followed closely by 3 (Clinton a very weak leader, the men candidates both very strong leaders) at 12.7%. The mean of this variable is 0.21, with a standard deviation of 1.8. Figure 3.8 presents the difference variable of Clinton is less trustworthy. The clear modal category is "no difference" between Clinton and the men candidates. The mean of less trustworthy is 0.52 with a standard deviation of 1. The final difference variable is less experienced. The distribution is presented in Figure 3.9. The modal category is again "no difference", the mean is -0.24, and the standard deviation is 0.99.

Two other dependent variables come from the March 2008 wave of the survey. The first was whether respondents voted for Clinton in their state's primary/caucus. This question includes democratic respondents from all states that had already held their nominating event. The final dependent variable asked respondents to rate all candidates on a favorability rating. The candidates' names were randomly rotated through the list so there was not a bias toward the first few candidates. The question asked "How favorable is your impression of…" with this project only considering the favorability rating of Clinton[11]. The responses were on a 5 point scale from very favorable (5) to neutral (3) to

[11] Creating a difference measure of favorability of Clinton versus Obama and Edwards did not significantly change the results.

very unfavorable (1). Thus, the first set of dependent variables was asked in the January wave, while the last dependent variables, which the first help predict, were asked in the March wave. All other independent variables were asked in the baseline (December 2007) wave. With this panel study we have a clear timeline of questions that can fully build the competing pathways framework.

The primary independent variable for all analyses is digital media. The first way this is measured is by an additive variable of four questions asked in the December 2007 baseline wave[12]. The four questions asked were all from the stem of "How many days in the last week did you use the Internet to…" . The four actions considered are visit news websites, visit political blogs, post comments on a news website or political blog, and exchanged political emails with friends and family. Each of these four variables was on a scale from 0-7 days a week, so once added the digital media measure is a scale from 0-28. The distribution of this variable is presented in Figure 3.10. Its mean is 5.7, and has a standard deviation of 6.2. To compare different types of digital media and their effect on gender stereotyping and support for Clinton I consider "visit news websites" "exchange political emails" etc. as individual digital media use variables as well. For these models the scales are 0-7 days a week they did the specific online activity.

All the other independent level variables considered also come from the baseline survey. Unlike the Hawkeye polls, the CCAP has a vast list of television questions, so a control variable for traditional media usage is also included in the models[13]. Other

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[12] This digital media variable has been published in other work. For more information on it see Hamilton & Tolbert 2012.

[13] The variable was created from a series of responses from the prompt of "And what kinds of things have you watched on television in the last seven days?" The responses of prime time, TV

independent variables include gender, age, income, education, marital status, and race[14]. One note about the demographic variables is necessary. The measure of age is simply calculated by taking the year of the survey (2008) and dividing by the year of birth (self-reported). As this survey was conducted over the course of the year it is impossible to know exactly how old individuals were at each survey time. Thus, to be consistent on age, this simple method was used.

The state level variables considered in these analyses come from two sources. The percent women in the state legislature is from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009). Percent of the population with at least a high school degree, total population, median age, and median income are from the 2009 U.S. Census American Community Survey. These measures are all from 2009, but the state level variable changes from one year to the next are minimal, and these are the most comprehensive variables available.

Many of the models also include interactive terms. For the models considering gender stereotyping the interactive term is between digital media and respondent gender. For vote choice and evaluation, there is an interactive term between digital media and gender stereotyping.

Results

Each of the following subsections starts with a quick summary of the findings presented. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide overview results for Section 1, while Table 3.5

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news, late night, day time, political talk shows, and satire shows were considered. Each was coded 0= did not watch, 1= did watch, thus the variable is a 0-6point scale. Respondents were relatively evenly distributed across the scale, with the largest category being 2 with 29%.

[14] Gender is coded 1=female, 0=male. Income is a 14-point scale. Education is a 6-point scale. Marital status is an indicator where 1=married/partner and 0=all others. Race is coded 1=non-white, 0=white.

provides an overview of how holding gender stereotyped opinions and digital media impacted evaluations of, and support for, Hillary Clinton.

Section 1 provides this overview, and then delves into the details of how digital media impacts the holding of stereotyped opinions. Section 2 provides an overview of how digital media and gender stereotyping influence evaluations of, and support for, Clinton, then provides detailed evidence to support these broad findings[15].

Section 1: Digital media and Gender Stereotyping

Tables 3.3 and Table 3.4 provide an overview of the results in this section. To obtain the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 the baseline models were run using the control variables and the specific digital media measure on the stereotyping traits. In Table 3.3, which considers all the Clinton specific gender stereotyping trait evaluations, we see that an increase in each digital media measure (-1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation) resulted in either holding more negative evaluations, or insignificant findings. The insignificant findings for one candidate specific trait evaluations is not surprising since measuring stereotyped opinions is very difficult with just one candidate evaluations.

In Table 3.4, which shows the "difference" trait variables I find supportive results on findings that were above 2%. The gender stereotyping trait of weaker leader (Clinton minus the average of Obama and Edwards) is substantively insignificant. The substantive effect of digital media use on believing Clinton a weaker leader was 0.03%. The other two traits (less trustworthy and less experienced) do show results supportive of the

[15] All of the following models were run including political interest. While it was significant, it is also highly correlated with my digital media measures (0.53, 0.48), so it is excluded as the results of interest do not change by excluding this one variable.

hypothesis. As digital media use increases so too does the likelihood of believing Clinton is less trustworthy and less experienced than her men opponents.

March 2007 Hawkeye Poll

Examining whether Clinton's gender would be a problem for her merits a Logistic regression analysis as it is a dichotomous dependent variable and there are no multilevel factors to consider (as it is an Iowa only sample). In the first model of Table 3.6 respondents who had seen the YouTube video attacking Clinton were more likely to report the stereotyped belief that her gender would be a problem in the nominating race. While this is significant at the 0.1 level, nothing else is significant, and a 0.017 Pseudo R^2 tells us the model fit is not the best.

Because of the prior literatures findings that women and men respond differently to gender stereotyped information, model 2 presents an interaction term between respondent gender and having seen the YouTube video. The fit for model two is better (Pseudo R^2 of 0.027), and while the interactive term is insignificant, there is something interesting going on with the coefficients of the base terms. In this model having seen the video makes an individual much more likely to believe Clinton's gender will be a problem for her. Since this model has an interactive term, the predicted likelihood of believing gender would be a problem is presented in Table 3.7.

From Table 3.7 we can see that respondent gender interacts with having seen the YouTube video to determine whether they have a stereotyped opinion of Clinton. Among respondents that did not use digital media to learn about Clinton via the YouTube video women were slightly (but insignificantly) more likely than men to believe gender

would be a problem (42.8% and 40.8% respectively). However, there is a vast difference in individuals that did see the YouTube video. Male respondents holding a stereotyped opinion of Clinton jumped by 32% (to 72.8%), while women holding a stereotyped opinion only increased by 4.7% (to 47.5%). Thus, when presented negative information online, stereotyped opinions held by males increased dramatically, but females seeing the same information did not have a corresponding increase.

2008 CCAP

The results from the 2008 CCAP are the most sound of the data presented in this chapter as the questions regarding digital media, gender stereotyping, and support for Clinton were measured at three distinct time points, thus providing for a stronger causal argument. The gender stereotyping questions considered are two classic "gender trait" questions and one more neutral trait (trustworthy). In Table 3.8 model 1 is the perception that Clinton is not a strong leader, model 2 is the perception that Clinton is not trustworthy, and model 3 is the perception that Clinton did not have the necessary experience. These are all Clinton specific variables, not the difference variables. The baseline models without the interaction between Internet index and respondent gender are available in appendix Table A1.

In Table 3.8 it is clear that digital media usage generally results in an increase in holding stereotyped opinions of Hillary Clinton. Higher digital media usage results in believing Clinton to be less of a strong leader, and less trustworthy; however, it does not diminish the belief that she is experienced enough for the job. In all models women are less likely to hold stereotyped opinions of Clinton than are men ($p<0.001$). Individuals

who watch television news are less likely to hold stereotyped opinions than individuals who do not watch television ($p<0.03$). State population in some models increase the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions, but the percent of the state legislature that is women is not significant.

Table 3.9 presented the predicted probability of believing Clinton untrustworthy by Internet index and respondent gender. From -1 to +1 standard deviation on the Internet index the likelihood of believing Clinton is untrustworthy increases for women by almost 10%, while for men the increase is only 7%. Women are less likely regardless of Internet use to believe that Clinton was untrustworthy.

In Table 3.10 I report the "difference" variables created by taking the Obama and Edwards evaluations averaged and subtracting this from Clinton's evaluation. The Table presenting the base models is available in Table A2 in the appendix. When considering the difference between Clinton and the men candidates a slightly different picture appears. Higher digital media usage results in holding more stereotyped opinions of Clinton on her being less trustworthy and less experienced, but the results for her being a weaker leader is insignificant. The finding that women are less likely to hold stereotyped opinions holds across these models, but there are no other consistent findings. Education is significant at reducing the stereotyped trait of weaker leader; however, higher educated are more likely to stereotype on the traits of less trustworthy and less experienced. Table 3.11 provides the predicted value on the stereotyping scale (-3 to 3) by the same measures as Table 3.9. Since these results are not as interpretable, it is simply worth noting that the exact same trend is shown as in Table 3.9.

At this point the Hawkeye poll data and the CCAP data have provided supportive, but mixed results for hypothesis 1. Higher digital media use generally results in holding more gender stereotyped opinions, but the trait and how it is measured (difference versus base models) alters the significance of the findings. To test hypothesis two I now turn to considering an online variable, but one that is not explicitly political, that of visiting news websites.

Table 3.12 presents the Clinton trait specific variables by visiting news websites. The base models are available in Table A3 in the appendix. The only clear result in this table is that visiting news websites does not change the likelihood of believing Clinton a weak leader. The other two traits are significant in the base models and have marginally significant interaction terms. Across all these models, as with every other model, women are less likely to stereotype Clinton. Unlike digital media use, watching television news significantly reduces the likelihood of a respondent holding a stereotyped opinion. The predicted probabilities of believing Clinton to be untrustworthy and inexperienced are presented in Table 3.13. Increased visiting news websites results in more gender stereotyped opinions among women for both traits; however, for men the effect is reduced. For the trait of inexperienced simply visiting news websites has no effect for men.

The final set of models considered in this section is on the difference stereotyping traits and visiting news websites. The only major difference between these models presented in Tables 3.14, A4 and Tables 3.13, A3 is the significant term for news websites in the baseline model of A4. In this model visiting news websites results in believing Clinton is less experienced than the men candidates. The only other significant

difference is that increased education significantly reduces the likelihood of perceiving Clinton as a weaker leader than the men candidates, but significantly increases the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions on the traits of trustworthy and experienced.

With the myriad of results in this section a few key results are worth summarizing before moving to whether any of this affects evaluations and voting for Clinton. First, the findings for candidate specific trait gender stereotyping variables are muddled, while the results for the "difference" variables are more consistent. The only exception to this conclusion is from the Hawkeye poll model reporting that seeing a specific YouTube ad targeting Clinton dramatically increased the likelihood of believing her gender would be a problem.

As for the hypothesis that different forms of digital media would have differing effects on the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions I find mixed results. In the aggregate models there is no such difference between the Internet index (which was political information specific) and visiting news websites (more general online activity). However, when the results are broken down by respondent gender there are some significant differences. Counter to what may be expected higher digital media usage disproportionately increases stereotyped opinions among female respondents instead of male respondents. Finally, while the two measures of digital media result in the same findings, the effect of the Internet index is greater than simply visiting news websites.

With these results in mind, the next section only reports findings for the Internet index. Chapter 4 considers several measures of digital media on the comprehensive model, so the results here are reported to see what effect holding gender stereotyped

opinions and digital media have on evaluations of, and support for, Clinton independent of the competing pathway of mobilization.

Section 2: Digital media, Gender Stereotyping and Support for Clinton

With many of the findings in the previous section supporting hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, this chapter now turns to what effect gender stereotyping and digital media use has on support for Hillary Clinton. First I consider evaluations of Clinton, then voting for her in the primaries/caucuses. The gender stereotyping measures I consider are inexperienced and weak leader as these are traditional traits used in the gender stereotyping literature. Because the results between the models are similar, the chapter reports and discusses the models including the difference stereotyping variables. The same models using the base Clinton trait variables are available in the appendix (Tables A5 and A6). Table 3.15 presents models with and without the interaction between the Internet index and the two gender stereotyping variables.

Immediately apparent in Table 3.15 (and Table A5) is that higher use of digital media resulted in lower favorability ratings of Clinton. Holding all else constant, individuals that were more online in December 2007 were less favorable toward Clinton in March 2008 ($p<0.001$). Individuals that held stereotyped opinions (Clinton weaker leader than men candidates, Clinton less experienced than men candidates) were also significantly less favorable of Clinton ($p<0.001$). Women were generally more favorable of Clinton than men, holding all else constant, while minorities were generally less favorable of Clinton than were whites. With hypothesis 3.3 supported by these findings,

let us finally turn to what gender stereotyping and digital media meant for overt support of Clinton.

The results for gender stereotyping, digital media and their effect on voting for Clinton are very similar to favorability results. These results are presented in Tables 3.16 in this chapter and A6 in the appendix. The Internet index is always significant and negatively correlated to support for Clinton. The gender stereotyping measures, regardless of whether it is specifically Clinton (shown in the appendix) or the difference between Clinton and the men candidates (shown in this chapter), are always negative and significantly correlated with evaluations of, and support for, Clinton. In terms of voting for Clinton, lower educated, single, white women, who live in states with low percent of the state legislature being women, were most likely to have voted for Hillary Clinton. Whether or not these results hold after adding mobilization to the complete model in the next chapter, the results from this chapter are a cautionary tale about expecting the Internet to equalize the playing field for women candidates.

Conclusion

In this chapter the goal was to lay out half of the full model of how digital media influence support for women candidates. Through the various data sources, measures of digital media, measures of gender stereotyping, and measures of support for Clinton, there are some mixed results, but also some negative (but consistent with the expectations) results. When considering the gender stereotyping variables the candidate specific traits were not as affected by digital media usage as the difference traits were; however, when they were affected, digital media increased the likelihood of holding

stereotyped opinions of Clinton. Specific forms of digital media also resulted in holding higher gender stereotyped opinions, thus supporting hypothesis 3.2; however the differences between types of digital media are minimal. The models from the large sample dataset also find that holding stereotyped opinions resulted in lower support for Clinton (hypothesis 3.4) and worse evaluations of Clinton (hypothesis 3.3).

This chapter has provided preliminary evidence that individuals who use digital media more are more likely to hold stereotyped opinions of women candidates, even in a non-partisan race like a presidential nomination process. Furthermore, this study of Clinton's candidacy for the Democratic nomination for president has shown that digital media usage influenced these stereotyped opinions, but also had an independent effect on support for Clinton. While the next chapter completes these models to represent the competing pathways framework presented in Chapter 2, this chapter's results suggest digital media may not be the great equalizer as previous researchers have espoused.

Table 3.1: Measures of Internet Use

Hawkeye Poll	CCAP (December 2007 wave)
Saw specific YouTube advertisement	Index of news websites, political blogs, post comments, political emails News websites

Note: In the vote choice models in Chapter 4 additional digital media measures are considered.

Table 3.2: Measures of Gender Stereotyping Trait Evaluations

Gender Trait Evaluations	Hawkeye Poll	CCAP (January 2008 wave)
Candidate Specific	"Gender will be a Problem"	Weak Leader Untrustworthy Inexperienced
Difference Variables (Clinton minus the average of Obama and Edwards)		Weaker Leader Less Trustworthy Less Experienced

Table 3.3: Summary of Results for Clinton Specific Trait Stereotyping

Internet USE	Hawkeye Poll	CCAP		
	Gender a Problem	Weak Leader	Un-trustworthy	Inexperienced
YouTube	+			
Internet Index		+	+	NS
News Websites		NS	+	NS

Note- "-"represents significant findings that reduce stereotyped opinions. "+" represents significant findings that increase stereotyped opinions. NS represents insignificant findings. Finally, blank cells had no appropriate analyses.

Table 3.4: Summary of Results for Difference Trait Stereotyping Variables (Clinton - Average of Obama and Edwards)

Internet USE	CCAP		
	Weaker Leader	Less Trustworthy	Less Experienced
Internet Index	NS	+	+
News Websites	NS	+	+

Note- "-"represents significant findings that reduce stereotyped opinions. "+" represents significant findings that increase stereotyped opinions.

Table 3.5: Summary of Results for Vote/Evaluations of Clinton

	Evaluations of Clinton	Voting for Clinton
Candidate Specific		
Weak Leader	-	-
Inexperienced	-	-
Difference		
Weaker Leader	-	-
Less Experienced	-	-
Internet Index	-	-

Note: "-"represents findings that reduce support/evaluations of Clinton, Asterisks represent findings that changed the probability of voting for Clinton, or having positive evaluations of Clinton by less than 2%.

Table 3.6: Hawkeye Poll- Predicted Belief Gender will be a Problem for Clinton by having seen the Obama YouTube Advertisement

	Base Model		Interaction Model	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Saw the Clinton YouTube	0.687	0.095	1.439	0.034
	(0.412)		(0.678)	
Female	-0.198	0.572	0.083	0.836
	(0.351)		(0.401)	
Female*YouTube	--	--	-1.270	0.142
			(0.864)	
Education	0.066	0.549	0.078	0.484
	(0.109)		(0.111)	
Income	-0.016	0.873	-0.022	0.825
	(0.099)		(0.100)	
Married	-0.025	0.953	0.014	0.973
	(0.421)		(0.422)	
Nonwhite	0.088	0.906	0.070	0.925
	(0.745)		(0.744)	
Age	0.000	0.992	-0.002	0.875
	(0.011)		(0.011)	
Constant	-0.414	0.696	-0.572	0.594
	(1.061)		(1.073)	
N	162		162	
Pseudo R^2	0.017		0.027	
Log-Likelihood	-109.84		-108.71	

Note- Unstandardized Logistic Regression coefficients reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. Probability based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 3.7: Predicted Belief Gender would be a Problem for Clinton

	Saw video	Did not see video	Δ (Saw-Didn't See)
Female	47.5%	42.8%	+4.7
Male	72.8%	40.8%	+32
Δ (F-M)	-25.3	+2	

Note- all other variables set at mean value

Table 3.8: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton by Internet Index (Interactive Models) (Clinton Specific Traits)

	Weak Leader		*Untrustworthy*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	0.015	0.014	0.027	0.001	0.009	0.132
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Female	-0.477	0.001	-0.463	0.001	-0.420	0.001
	(0.087)		(0.087)		(0.088)	
Female*Index	-0.060	0.219	0.015	0.761	-0.048	0.333
	(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.050)	
Age	-0.009	0.001	-0.012	0.001	-0.000	0.865
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.003	0.799	0.009	0.441	-0.009	0.418
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Education	0.006	0.791	0.064	0.007	0.011	0.659
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.024)	
Married	0.108	0.142	0.018	0.803	0.178	0.017
	(0.073)		(0.073)		(0.074)	
Nonwhite	-0.112	0.131	-0.184	0.014	-0.162	0.033
	(0.074)		(0.075)		(0.076)	
Television	-0.056	0.017	-0.065	0.005	-0.075	0.001
News	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.024)	
State Population	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.033	-0.001	0.089
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.003	0.617	0.003	0.529	0.004	0.466
Legislature	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Cut 1	-1.222	0.001	-1.873	0.001	-0.697	0.002
	(0.223)		(0.226)		(0.227)	
Cut 2	0.677	0.002	0.051	0.820	1.342	0.001
	(0.222)		(0.223)		(0.228)	
Cut 3	1.769	0.001	1.331	0.001	2.425	0.001
	(0.226)		(0.225)		(0.234)	
N	3363		3257		3345	
Pseudo R^2	0.016		0.019		0.019	
Log-likelihood	-3912.8		-4175.8		-4175.85	

Note- Unstandardized Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 3.9: Predicted Belief Clinton is Untrustworthy by Internet Index (Model 2 of Table 3.8)

	Female	Male	*Δ(F-M)*
-1 SD Internet Index	26.9%	36.9%	*-10*
+1 SD Internet Index	36.8%	44%	*-7.2*
Δ (high-low)	*+9.9*	*+7.1*	

Note: All other variables set at their mean values

Table 3.10: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Difference Variables) by Internet Index (Interactive Models)

	Weaker Leader		*Less Trustworthy*		*Less Experienced*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	β/SE	P-value	β/SE
Internet Index	-0.003	0.510	0.022	0.001	0.013	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Female	-0.325	0.001	-0.199	0.001	-0.129	0.007
	(0.058)		(0.052)		(0.048)	
Female*Index	-0.034	0.289	0.029	0.322	-0.009	0.723
	(0.032)		(0.029)		(0.027)	
Age	-0.002	0.339	-0.006	0.001	-0.003	0.058
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.005	0.487	0.009	0.183	-0.015	0.014
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Education	-0.050	0.002	0.082	0.001	0.029	0.030
	(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Married	0.031	0.530	0.048	0.277	0.139	0.001
	(0.049)		(0.044)		(0.041)	
Nonwhite	-0.167	0.001	0.037	0.408	0.120	0.004
	(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.042)	
Television	-0.062	0.001	0.005	0.723	-0.016	0.224
News	(0.015)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
State	-0.001	0.020	-0.001	0.108	-0.001	0.333
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.005	0.157	0.011	0.001	0.009	0.004
Legislature	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	-0.224	0.132	-0.001	0.997	-0.650	0.001
	(0.149)		(0.133)		(0.123)	
N	3042		2934		3072	
R^2	0.039		0.072		0.026	

Note- Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 3.11: Predicted Belief Clinton is Less Trustworthy by Internet Index (Model 2 of Table 3.10)

	Female	Male
-1 SD Internet Index	0.14	0.34
+1 SD Internet Index	0.70	0.59

Note: All other variables set at their mean values

Table 3.12: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Clinton Specific Traits) by News Websites (Interactive Models)

	Weak Leader		*Untrustworthy*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
News	0.006	0.717	0.033	0.043	-0.007	0.662
Websites	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)	
Female	-0.608	0.001	-0.607	0.001	-0.581	0.001
	(0.104)		(0.104)		(0.104)	
Female*	0.018	0.430	0.047	0.036	0.038	0.097
News	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)	
Age	-0.009	0.001	-0.012	0.001	-0.001	0.607
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	-0.001	0.935	0.006	0.562	-0.014	0.227
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Education	0.013	0.575	0.068	0.003	0.013	0.594
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.024)	
Married	0.125	0.082	0.032	0.654	0.202	0.006
	(0.072)		(0.072)		(0.073)	
Nonwhite	-0.098	0.176	-0.188	0.010	-0.146	0.050
	(0.073)		(0.073)		(0.074)	
Television	-0.063	0.005	-0.069	0.002	-0.083	0.001
News	(0.023)		(0.022)		(0.023)	
State	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.030	-0.001	0.124
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female state	0.004	0.452	0.005	0.395	0.006	0.307
Legislature	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Cut 1	-1.297	0.001	-1.952	0.001	-0.816	0.001
	(0.222)		(0.224)		(0.226)	
Cut 2	0.607	0.006	-0.015	0.946	1.229	0.001
	(0.221)		(0.222)		(0.226)	
Cut 3	1.705	0.001	1.264	0.001	2.313	0.001
	(0.225)		(0.223)		0.232	
N	3536		3427		3514	
Log-likelihood	-4112.462		-4388.144		-3927.112	
Pseudo R^2	0.015		0.019		0.012	

Note: Unstandardized Ordered Logistic Coefficients reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 3.13: Predicted Belief Clinton is Untrustworthy and Inexperienced by News Websites

	Female	Male
Untrustworthy		
-1 SD News Websites	1.05	1.35
+1SD News Websites	1.28	1.46
Δ (high-low)	*+0.23*	*+0.11*
Inexperienced		
-1 SD News Websites	0.67	0.92
+1SD News Websites	0.76	0.92
Δ (high-low)	*+0.09*	*0*

Note: All other variables set at their mean values.

Table 3.14: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Difference Variables) by News Websites (Interactive Models)

	Weaker Leader		*Less Trustworthy*		*Less Experienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
News Websites	-0.016	0.154	0.033	0.001	0.004	0.688
	(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.009)	
Female	-0.379	0.001	-0.272	0.001	-0.223	0.001
	(0.070)		(0.062)		(0.057)	
Female* News	0.012	0.434	0.030	0.030	0.021	0.097
	(0.015)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Age	-0.002	0.264	-0.006	0.000	-0.003	0.029
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.005	0.520	0.006	0.334	-0.017	0.005
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Education	-0.049	0.002	0.086	0.001	0.035	0.007
	(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Married	0.045	0.353	0.049	0.256	0.144	0.001
	(0.048)		(0.043)		(0.040)	
Nonwhite	-0.155	0.002	0.033	0.456	0.121	0.003
	(0.049)		(0.044)		(0.041)	
Television	-0.065	0.001	0.003	0.801	-0.016	0.193
news	(0.015)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
State	-0.001	0.028	-0.001	0.155	-0.001	0.279
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female state	-0.006	0.129	0.012	0.001	0.010	0.001
Legislature	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	-0.192	0.194	0.036	0.786	-0.579	0.001
	(0.148)		(0.132)		(0.122)	
N	3204		3091		3230	
R^2	0.035		0.065		0.023	

Note: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 3.15: Favorability of Clinton by Gender Stereotyping Difference Variables and Internet Index

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.030	0.001	-0.031	0.001	-0.016	0.001	-0.016	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.003)		(0.004)	
Weaker Leader	-0.506	0.001	-0.504	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.020)		(0.029)					
Weaker Leader* Index	-	-	-0.000	0.894	-	-	-	-
			(0.003)					
Less Experienced	-	-	-	-	-0.761	0.001	-0.756	0.001
					(0.022)		(0.033)	
Less Exp.* Index	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.001	0.863
							(0.003)	
Female	0.094	0.058	0.094	0.058	0.193	0.001	0.193	0.001
	(0.050)		(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.045)	
Age	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.009	0.266	0.009	0.266	-0.010	0.211	-0.010	0.208
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Education	-0.025	0.157	-0.024	0.159	0.026	0.105	0.026	0.106
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
Married	-0.073	0.176	-0.073	0.176	0.031	0.529	0.032	0.527
	(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.050)		(0.050)	
Nonwhite	-0.242	0.001	-0.242	0.001	-0.095	0.067	-0.095	0.066
	(0.056)		(0.056)		(0.052)		(0.052)	
Television News	0.018	0.291	0.018	0.290	0.029	0.061	0.029	0.061
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
State population	0.001	0.049	0.001	0.050	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.008
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	-0.010	0.015	-0.010	0.015	0.001	0.708	0.001	0.708
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Constant	3.162	0.001	3.165	0.001	2.745	0.001	2.748	0.001
	(0.160)		(0.162)		(0.149)		(0.151)	
N	2835		2835		2870		2870	
R^2	0.221		0.221		0.322		0.322	

Note- Unstandardized OLS Regression coefficients presented. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 3.16: Voting for Clinton by Gender Stereotyping Difference Variables and Internet Index

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.045	0.001	-0.046	0.001	-0.032	0.001	-0.035	0.001
	(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Weaker Leader	-0.287	0.001	-0.281	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.041)		(0.053)					
Weaker Lead* Index	-	-	-0.005	0.860	-	-	-	-
			(0.028)					
Less Experienced	-	-	-	-	-1.846	0.001	-1.815	0.001
					(0.085)		(0.108)	
Less Exper* Index	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.026	0.652
							(0.057)	
Female	0.238	0.012	0.238	0.012	0.372	0.001	0.373	0.001
	(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.114)		(0.114)	
Age	0.019	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.021	0.001	0.021	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Income	0.016	0.309	0.016	0.309	0.001	0.969	0.001	0.976
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.020)	
Education	-0.164	0.001	-0.164	0.000	-0.197	0.001	-0.197	0.001
	(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.041)		(0.041)	
Married	-0.053	0.612	-0.053	0.611	0.190	0.132	0.190	0.134
	(0.104)		(0.104)		(0.127)		(0.127)	
Nonwhite	-0.714	0.001	-0.713	0.001	-0.646	0.001	-0.648	0.001
	(0.109)		(0.109)		(0.131)		(0.131)	
Television News	0.001	0.978	0.001	0.987	-0.023	0.565	-0.024	0.544
	(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.040)		(0.040)	
State population	0.001	0.348	0.001	0.351	0.001	0.312	0.001	0.305
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	-0.028	0.001	-0.028	0.001	-0.022	0.024	-0.022	0.024
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.010)	
Constant	-0.089	0.772	-0.082	0.789	-1.166	0.002	-1.143	0.003
	(0.306)		(0.308)		(0.382)		(0.385)	
N	2216		2216		2244		2244	
Pseudo R^2	0.08		0.08		0.339		0.339	
Log-Likelihood	-1383		-1383.7		-1010.86		-1010.7	

Note- Logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed significance.

Figure 3.1: Equation Used to Create the Clinton Difference Variables

$$gend\_difference = HRC - \frac{(Obama + Edwards)}{2}$$

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Variable "Gender will be a Problem for Clinton"



Figure 3.3: Snapshot of Obama's Apple/Clinton YouTube Advertisement

Figure 3.4: Distribution of Variable "Clinton is a Weak Leader" Trait (Clinton Specific)



Figure 3.5: Distribution of Variable “Clinton is Untrustworthy” Trait (Clinton Specific)



Figure 3.6: Distribution of Variable “Clinton is Inexperienced” Trait (Clinton Specific)



Figure 3.7: Clinton a Weaker Leader (Clinton – average of Obama and Edwards)



Figure 3.8: Clinton Less Trustworthy (Clinton – average of Obama and Edwards)



Figure 3.9: Clinton Less Experienced (Clinton – average of Obama and Edwards)



Figure 3.10: Digital Media Internet Index Measure for CCAP



CHAPTER 4:

THE NET EFFECT OF DIGITAL MEDIA ON HILLARY CLINTON FOR PRESIDENT

Introduction

In the conclusion of *Women for President*, Falk (2008) provides a roadmap for women candidates concerned about the prevalence of gender stereotyping occurring in the mainstream media and on digital media. Step two is "prepare a grassroots organization of supporters to monitor the media" (pg 158). Her argument is that women candidates should use volunteers to monitor the media and digital media and actively counter information that is sexist or in any way inaccurate. This use of the mobilizing ability of the Internet to engage individuals with the campaign, and have them monitor the Internet for sexist information is a key example of how digital media could work as a mechanism for equalizing political campaigns.

As previously discussed digital media has been shown to increase political interest, engagement, mobilization, and ultimately participation in politics (see for example Bimber 2003; Krueger 2002; Smith 2009). While political mobilization from the campaigns is difficult to measure as it is hard to tell who is actually noticing online advertisements, reading the political emails etc. it is possible to measure the increased engagement and participation that results from these campaign efforts. The primary/caucus races in 2007-2008 were the first Presidential election where every candidate had a dedicated staff for digital media, thus it makes sense that each campaign was using digital media to mobilize and engage their supporters (Kenski et al. 2010; Lawrence & Rose 2010). Thus in this chapter I consider how digital media affected

mobilization, but specifically the engagement and participation that results from individuals being mobilized.

Working from the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, this last empirical chapter for Hillary Clinton's campaign completes the competing pathways framework by considering how digital media affected mobilization in the 2007-2008 Democratic primary, and ultimately, how digital media, holding gender stereotyped opinions, and mobilization/engagement affected evaluations of, and support for, Hillary Clinton. The comprehensive models build off the models presented in Chapter 3, by using the same digital media measures, gender stereotyping measures, independent variables and state level variables where appropriate.

Expectations

By now the first half of the framework developed in Chapter 2 has generally been supported by the results presented in Chapter 3. Thus, in this chapter I first verify that my digital media and mobilization measures behave as the previous literature would anticipate, then turn to building the comprehensive model of digital media's effect on evaluations of, and support for, Clinton.

My first hypothesis is drawn from the growing literature on how digital media influences individuals' engagement and participation, and how digital media reduces the costs of communication with supporters. Digital media has been shown to drastically reduce the cost of micro-targeting of messages, which in turn increases support for that candidate (Bystrom 2010). With the cheaper communication, and the resulting

engagement and mobilization, I expect that higher digital media use will result in more engagement, mobilization, and participation by individuals.

H4.1 Higher digital media usage will result in individuals being more engaged and mobilized.

I conclude my analyses of the Clinton case study by considering how the net effect of digital media, mobilization, and gender stereotyping alters evaluations of, and support for, Hillary Clinton. I hypothesize that the net effect of digital media will depend on the relative weights of gender stereotyping (being negative) and mobilization (being positive).

H4.2: Digital media and gender stereotyping will reduce evaluations of Hillary Clinton.

H4.3: Digital media and mobilization will increase evaluations of Clinton.

H4.4: Digital media and gender stereotyping will reduce the likelihood of voting for Clinton.

H4.5: Digital media and mobilization will increase the likelihood of voting for Clinton.

H4.6: The net effect of digital media will depend on the relative weights of gender stereotyping and mobilization on evaluations and support.

To further understand the whole process of digital media's effect on evaluations of, and support for, Clinton, I break down "digital media" into a few specific types (ex. political emails, political blogs) and consider how those individual types compare to the general Internet index of use used for the previous hypotheses.

H4.7: Different types of digital media will alter the relative weights of stereotyping and mobilization.

Data/Variables

The data source for the analyses in this chapter is one of the two considered in Chapter 3. The March 2007 Iowa only sample Hawkeye Poll is not considered here as any candidate evaluations were very early into the campaign season. Thus this chapter only considers the first three waves of the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) (Jackman & Vavreck 2009). Since I am still considering Clinton's campaign, only individuals who reported at least leaning Democrat are considered.

2008 CCAP Survey

Measuring mobilization in the CCAP dataset is an additive index of four activities. The variables considered are listed in Table 4.1. The four considered are "donated money (online, in person, or on the phone), wore a button, discussed the candidate with someone (online or in person), and went to a campaign event (live, or virtual)"[16]. These variables were asked in the January 2008 wave of the survey, the same wave as the gender stereotyping variables. This results in a 0-4 point scale, with the majority of respondents falling in the bottom two categories.

The gender stereotyping measures considered in the comprehensive models also come from the January 2008 wave of the survey. They are listed in Table 4.2. They are Clinton is a weak leader, and Clinton is inexperienced as both of these variables show gender stereotyped opinions and match traditional gender trait measures. I consider both the Clinton variables alone (0-3pt scale of more stereotyped opinions), and the difference

[16] Prompt for this list of questions was "Thinking about the presidential candidates and their campaigns, did any of the following things happen to you yesterday?" With 1=yes, 0=no.

variables[17]. The difference variables are the average of the trait scores for Obama and Edwards subtracted from Clinton's score. Thus higher values corresponds with higher gender stereotyped opinions.

Two other dependent variables come from the March 2008 wave of the survey. The first dependent variable asked respondents to rate all candidates on a favorability rating. The candidates' names were randomly rotated through the list so there was not a bias toward the first few candidates. The question asked "How favorable is your impression of…" with this project only considering the favorability rating of Clinton. The responses were on a 5 point scale from very favorable (5) to neutral (3) to very unfavorable (1). The final dependent variable was whether respondents voted for Clinton in their state's primary/caucus. This question includes respondents from all states that had already held their nominating event. Thus, the first set of dependent variables was asked in the January wave, while the last dependent variable, which the first help predict, was asked in the March wave. All other independent variables were asked in the baseline (December 2007) wave. With this series of surveys we have a clear timeline of questions that can fully build the framework models.

The primary independent variable for all analyses is digital media. The various ways this is measured in this chapter are presented in Table 4.3. First I consider the same additive variable of four questions asked in the December 2007 baseline wave that was used in the previous chapter[18]. The four questions asked were all from the stem of "How

[17] Running the models with an index of both gender trait stereotyping variables (adding weak leader and inexperienced together) instead of the two variables separately does not change the results. These models are available upon request from the author.

[18] This digital media variable has been published in other work. For more information on it see Hamilton & Tolbert 2012.

many days in the last week did you use the Internet to…" . The four actions considered are visit news websites, visit political blogs, post comments on a news website or political blog, and exchanged political emails with friends and family. Each of these four variables was on a scale from 0-7 days a week, so once added the digital media measure is a scale from 0-28. The distribution of this variable is available in Figure 3.10. This variable will also be broken down into individual measures of digital media usage to test hypothesis 4.7 that different forms of digital media will change the relative importance of stereotyping and mobilization on support for Clinton. The three considered in these analyses are visit news websites, visit political blogs, and exchange political emails.

All the other independent variables considered come from the baseline survey. They are the same independent variables used in Chapter 3, including the same two state level variables. For the favorability and vote choice models interactive terms between digital media and gender stereotyping, and between digital media and mobilization are included.

Results

For ease of following the results, this section is broken into four sub-sections. In Section 1 I consider hypothesis 4.1 and present results that show my data conform to what the prior literature would expect. In Section 2 I turn to creating comprehensive models of digital media's effect on evaluations of Hillary Clinton. Section 3 continues building complete models but with the dependent variable being vote choice instead of evaluations. Finally, in Section 4 I consider how different forms of digital media alter the results found in the previous three sections. The summary of all results are presented in Tables 4.4 for evaluations and Table 4.5 for vote choice.

Section 1: Mobilization/Engagement

In Table 4.6 I present two models, one with an interaction between respondent gender and digital media, and one without this interaction. The models presented are negative binomial regressions as the dependent variable of mobilization is a count variable. Higher digital media usage in December 2007 did result in individuals being more mobilized and engaged in January 2008 ($p<0.001$). Higher educated, wealthy, married individuals, and respondents that were high television watchers, were all significantly more likely to be mobilized. The two state level variables were not significant.

These results are consistent with what the established literature on digital media and mobilization would expect, thus hypothesis 4.1 is supported. With the knowledge that my mobilization and digital media measures behave as expected, I now turn to building complete models of support for Clinton.

Section 2: Evaluations of Clinton

The dependent variable of interest in this section is the five-point measure of "how favorable do you find Hillary Clinton". The mobilization measure and the digital media measures are the same variables across this section; however, the measure for gender stereotyping varies across models. I consider the trait difference variables and the Clinton only variables for weak leader and inexperienced. The interactive terms between digital media usage and the gender stereotyped variable also changes based on the gender stereotyped variable in the model.

The first set of models considered is favorability of Clinton using the gender stereotyped variables of weak leader. In Model 1 of Table 4.7 I use the difference in weak

leader variable, and in Model 2 I use specific trait evaluations of Clinton (note that this is the order for all of the following evaluation and support tables). The base models, without the interactions are available in Table A7 in the appendix. With favorability being a five-point scale I ran OLS regression models. Higher digital media usage resulted in lower evaluations of Clinton ($p=0.002$). Higher gender stereotyped opinions also resulted in lower evaluations of Clinton ($p<0.001$); however the interaction between these two variables is insignificant in Model 1, and only marginally significant in Model 2. Counter to my expectations, individuals that were more mobilized and engaged had less favorable ratings of Clinton ($p<0.01$) and the interactive term between mobilization and digital media is not significant. The only other consistently significant finding is that minorities were less favorable of Clinton than were white respondents ($p<0.001$).

Table 4.8 also models favorability ratings of Clinton. Unlike the previous models, the gender stereotyping variable is now Inexperienced. The results are similar to the results in the previous table. Higher digital media usage resulted in lower evaluations of Clinton, holding stereotyped opinions resulted in lower evaluations, and, counter to expectations, being mobilized resulted in lower opinions. Unlike Table 4.7, none of the interactive terms are statistically significant. Also unlike Table 4.7 there are control variables significant across all models. Women were more favorable of Clinton than were men ($p<0.04$), older individuals were more favorable than young people ($p<0.03$), and individuals living in larger states were more favorable toward Clinton than were small state residents ($p<.009$).

The results from the comprehensive model on evaluations of Clinton provide some support for my hypotheses, but there are also findings that run counter to my

expectations. Hypothesis 4.2—digital media and gender stereotyping would result in lower evaluations of Clinton—is supported. Hypothesis 4.3—digital media and mobilization would result in higher evaluations—is not only disconfirmed; the results are significant in the opposite direction. These results hold across two different gender traits, two measures of each trait, and two different models (counting the models in the appendix). Thus, while the results on mobilization lowering evaluations of Clinton are puzzling, I am confident this is not a product of some fluke in one model. In the next section I use this same combination of gender trait variables to analyze what effect my complete model has on voting for Clinton[19].

Section 3: Voting for Clinton

Turning to who actually voted for Hillary Clinton in their state's primary or caucus we find some similarities to the evaluation models, but also some key differences. The tables presented in this chapter are logistic regression models. Table 4.9 reports voting for Clinton using the gender stereotyped variable of weak leader. The base models without the interactive terms are available in Table A8 in the appendix. Higher digital media usage reduced the likelihood of having voted for Clinton ($p<0.001$). A higher score on the gender stereotyped variable of weak leader also reduced the probability of voting for Clinton. Unlike the evaluation models, higher mobilization/engagement is insignificant on voting for Clinton. None of the interactive terms are significant. Older individuals were significantly more likely to vote for Clinton than were young people ($p<0.001$). Lower educated, whites, and those who lived in states

[19] The favorability models including "Obama supporter" (individuals that ultimately voted for Obama) are available in Table A9 of the appendix. The Obama supporter variable is significant, but does not significantly change the stereotyping or mobilization findings.

with a low percent of women in the state legislature, were all statistically more likely to vote for Clinton.

Table 4.10 show results consistent with Table 4.9. Even with the different gender stereotyping variables (this time inexperienced) all the results hold. Thus from these results hypothesis 4.4—digital media and gender stereotyping reduces likelihood of voting for Clinton—is supported by the data presented in this section. The results that show insignificance for mobilization and digital media refute hypothesis 4.5. From these results hypothesis 4.6 is a moot point. Digital media had a negative effect on evaluations of, and support for, Hillary Clinton. Gender stereotyping behaves as expected and further reduced support for Clinton; however, the mitigating factor of increased mobilization did not help Hillary Clinton in her nomination race. With these results, I now turn to the final piece of this puzzle; do different forms of digital media alter these results. Section 4 considers first evaluations, then vote choice (in condensed form), but substitutes different types of digital media for the "Internet index" used above. As the interactive terms were never significant, the models presented below do not include them.

Section 4: Different Types of Digital Media

To consider how different forms of digital media affect evaluations of Clinton, the models from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 were combined by type of digital media. The three types of digital media considered are visiting news websites, visiting political blogs, and exchanging political emails (presented in that order). Each of the three types of digital media is modeled with the four gender stereotyping variables considered in this chapter. As a quick refresher, they are: weaker leader difference variable, Clinton as a weak

leader, less experienced difference variable, and Clinton is inexperienced. Thus each Table in this section shows the evaluation or vote dependent variable by the four gender stereotyping measures. Each of the three digital media measures receives its own Table to make comparisons easier.

Evaluations of Clinton

Table 4.11 presents the likelihood of favorable evaluations of Clinton by the four types of gender stereotyping for the digital media variable of "visit news websites". In Table 4.11 we see similar results to the Internet index models presented above. Visiting news websites resulted in lower favorability of Clinton, as did holding gender stereotyped opinions (all four variations behave in similar ways), and as found earlier higher mobilized individuals were also less favorable of Clinton (all at the $p<0.001$ level). Across all four models the other consistent findings are that women were more favorable toward Clinton than were men, and whites were more favorable than were minorities.

Table 4.12 reports the same models as Table 4.11, but with the digital media measure of "visiting political blogs". The results are very consistent with what was just reported. Individuals who visited political blogs more often had less favorable ratings of Clinton ($p<0.03$). Across all variations of gender stereotyping more strongly held stereotypes resulted in less favorable evaluations of Clinton ($p<0.001$). Consistent with all the previous models on favorability, higher mobilization/engagement also resulted in lower evaluations of Clinton. Unlike visiting news websites, including political blogs reduces the findings on gender and race to insignificance.

The results for exchanging political emails are similar to the previous two tables. Table 4.13 reports the four gender stereotyping measures on favorability with exchanging political emails as the digital media measure. In model 3, which uses the Clinton inexperienced difference stereotyping variable, digital media's significance is diminished (similar to model 3 of table 4.12), but is still within the conventional significance level ($p=0.039$). Higher mobilization and higher gender stereotyping both resulted in reduced favorability of Clinton. Women were more favorable of Clinton than men were across all models ($p<0.05$).

To truly understand what difference the types of digital media had on favorability of Clinton, predicted probabilities were run on Model 1 of Tables 4.11-4.13. This model was chosen as difference in weak leader is the closest available to the classic gender trait variables traditionally used in the gender stereotyping literature. The predicted favorability of Clinton (1-5 point scale) is presented in Table 4.14.

Immediately apparent from Table 4.14 is that the type of digital media is not having much of an impact on favorability ratings of Clinton. At the mean value of each digital media measure the predicted support for Clinton is 3.54[20]. Across the three types there are no significant differences. Thus, from these models we can conclude that the type of digital media is having no substantively significant differences on evaluations of Clinton[21]. With the finding that type of digital media does not change the results on evaluations of Clinton, let us finally turn to whether the type of digital media changes the likelihood of voting for her.

[20] The mean of the favorability rating is 2.6, with a standard deviation of 1.6.

[21] Running the same probabilities on Models 2-4 of Tables 4.12-4.14 result in the same findings.

Voting for Clinton

The final part to this chapter is what effect different forms of digital media had on the likelihood of voting for Clinton in the primary/caucuses. Table 4.15 reports voting for Clinton by visiting news websites, Table 4.16 reports vote choice by visiting political blogs, and Table 4.17 reports vote choice by exchanging political emails. In Table 4.15 visiting news websites reduced the likelihood of voting for Clinton in every model ($p<0.001$). Higher values of the gender stereotyped opinion variable (any of the four) also significantly reduced the likelihood of voting for her ($p<0.001$). Unlike the Internet index models, mobilization is significant in several of the models. However, it is negatively correlated to vote choice, counter to expectations (but consistent to the favorability models). Other consistent findings are that older individuals, less educated, and white respondents, were more likely to vote for Clinton. Women were more likely to vote for Clinton than men in most, but not all of the models.

The results for vote choice by visiting political blogs in Table 4.16 are similar to visiting news websites with the key exception that mobilization is not significant. This is consistent with the models presented in Section 3. Frequent visits to political blogs reduced the likelihood of voting for Clinton, as did holding gender stereotyped opinions. Also consistent with other findings in this chapter is that older respondents, less education, and white respondents, were more likely to vote for Clinton. Women again were more likely to vote for Clinton than men, except in Model 2 (Clinton as a weak leader).

Finally, what effect did exchanging political emails have on the likelihood of voting for Clinton? Table 4.17 shows that in three of the four models this reduced the

likelihood of voting for her, but in one of the models exchanging political emails is insignificant. Holding gender stereotyped opinions reduced the likelihood of voting for her. Mobilization is significant (and negative) in the "Clinton only" gender stereotyped opinions, but is insignificant in the models with difference variables.

To understand what, if any, different effect the types of digital media had on the likelihood of voting for Clinton, predicted probabilities were created from Model 1 of Tables 4.15-4.17 and are presented in Table 4.18. From Table 4.18 there are differences across the type of digital media at each level in likelihood of voting for Clinton. From low usage of the internet for news to high usage the likelihood of voting for Clinton decreased by 9%, while individuals who read political blogs were 10.2% less likely to vote for Clinton when compared to non-blog readers. Political emails had slightly less effect with only a 5.1% decrease in support as usage increased. Finally, from one standard deviation below the mean, to one standard deviation above the mean of the index of all internet activities resulted in decreased support for Clinton by 14%. Thus all types of digital media decreased support for Clinton; however, the substantive effect varies slightly by the type of media used.

Conclusion

In this final empirical chapter on Clinton I created the comprehensive model from the framework laid out in Chapter 2. From the hypotheses laid out, and the analyses presented there is evidence that higher digital media use resulted in individuals being more mobilized and engaged during the 2007-2008 Democratic nominating contest. The

results also supported the hypothesis that digital media and gender stereotyping would reduce evaluations of Clinton. They also resulted in less overt support for Clinton.

While the results above were consistent with my expectations, one key result is discordant. Mobilization was expected to reduce the negative effects of digital media on evaluations of, and support for Clinton; however, this is not what my results show. In terms of favorability, mobilization was significant but in the opposite direction than expected. Higher mobilized/engaged individuals were less favorable towards Clinton. As for vote choice, in the basic Internet index model mobilization was insignificant, thus neither helping nor hurting Clinton.

When breaking digital media into different types, the results were consistent for the most part. All three measures of digital media (news websites, political blogs, and political emails) showed negative results in terms of gender stereotyping and evaluations of Clinton. The same was true (with one exception) for vote choice. Mobilization in these models was either insignificant or significant and negative, counter to my expectations.

One possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding for mobilization is that in this specific race Obama was the one most known for mobilizing and engaging individuals. Table A9 in the appendix models favorability of Clinton (where most of these findings occurred) with a control for Obama supporter. The mobilization measure in two models is reduced to insignificance, and the interactive term with internet index is never significant, thus providing preliminary support that the 2008 nomination contest was unique with a minority candidate having more of a presence online than the woman candidate.

The results from Chapters 3 and 4 testing the competing pathways framework on the unique case of Hillary Clinton present evidence that, as the framework would expect, increased digital media use resulted in holding more stereotyped opinions and an increase in mobilization. However, when considering what affect these variables had on favorability and voting for Clinton, the results are not exactly what the framework would expect. Digital media performs as expected, as does holding gender stereotyped opinions. Increased mobilization, in the case of Clinton, was not a mitigating force as the hypotheses expect.

With these findings in mind, I next turn to considering the same framework on women candidates for the U.S. House in 2008, 2010, and 2012. The next two chapters follow similar patterns to the analyses of Clinton presented in the last chapter and here, but are broken down by the year of the election. The results in the following chapters are, in most cases, similar to those presented in the Clinton chapters.

Table 4.1: Measures of Mobilization

CCAP (January 2008 wave)
Index of:
Went to a campaign event
Discussed the candidates with someone
Wore a Button
Donate money

Table 4.2: Measures of Gender Stereotyping Trait Evaluations

Gender Trait Evaluations	CCAP (January 2008 wave)
Candidate Specific	Weak Leader
	Inexperienced
Difference Variables	Weaker Leader
	Less Experienced

Table 4.3: Measures of Internet Use

CCAP (December 2007 wave)
Index of news websites, political blogs, post comments, political emails
News Websites
Political Blogs
Political Emails

Table 4.4: Summary of Results for Favorability of Clinton

	Increased likelihood	Decreased likelihood
Stereotyping:		
Weak Leader		X
Inexperienced		X
Weaker Leader (difference)		X
Less Experienced (difference)		X
Mobilization		X
Digital Media:		
Internet Index		X
News Websites		X
Political Blogs		X
Political Emails		X

Note- X represents a statistically significant finding in that column's results. Significance based on predicted favorability of Clinton from the base models holding all other variables in the respective model constant.

Table 4.5: Summary of Results for Voting for Clinton

	Increased likelihood	Decreased likelihood
Stereotyping:		
Weak Leader		X
Inexperienced		X
Weaker Leader (difference)		X
Less Experienced (difference)		X
Mobilization		NS
Digital Media:		
Internet Index		X
News Websites		X
Political Blogs		X
Political Emails		X

Note- X represents a statistically significant finding in that column's results. NS represents an insignificant result. Significance based on predicted probability of voting for Clinton from the base models holding all other variables in the respective model constant.

Table 4.6: Predicting Level of Mobilization by Internet Index

	Interactive Model		Base Model	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	0.037	0.001	0.044	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.002)	
Female	-0.098	0.058	0.023	0.491
	(0.052)		(0.034)	
Female*Index	0.013	0.007	-	-
	(0.005)			
Age	0.000	0.836	0.001	0.702
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.013
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Education	0.069	0.001	0.068	0.001
	(0.014)		(0.014)	
Married	0.081	0.091	0.078	0.110
	(0.048)		(0.049)	
Nonwhite	-0.031	0.227	-0.037	0.160
	(0.026)		(0.026)	
Television	0.087	0.001	0.088	0.001
News	(0.012)		(0.013)	
State	-0.001	0.448	-0.001	0.553
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.003	0.243	0.004	0.215
Legislature	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	-1.644	0.001	-1.743	0.001
	(0.123)		(0.127)	
LN Alpha	-20.213	.	-20.213	.
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
N	3528		3528	
Log-Likelihood	-3130.58		-3132.81	
Wald Chi^2	1158.75		1122.26	
Prob>Chi^2	0.001		0.001	

Note: Unstandardized negative binomial regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 4.7: Favorability of Clinton by Internet Index and both Weak Leader Measures (Clinton specific and the Clinton - average of Obama and Edwards measures)

	Difference Variable		*Clinton Only Variable*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	-0.024	0.001	-0.016	0.002
	(0.006)		(0.005)	
Weak Leader	-0.518	0.001	-0.925	0.000
	(0.026)		(0.029)	
Weak Leader*Index	0.004	0.759	-0.026	0.085
	(0.014)		(0.015)	
Mobilization	-0.160	0.009	-0.174	0.001
	(0.061)		(0.051)	
Mobilization*Index	-0.000	0.983	0.004	0.410
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
Female	0.102	0.040	0.049	0.236
	(0.050)		(0.042)	
Age	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.070
	(0.002)		(0.001)	
Income	0.011	0.200	0.005	0.477
	(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	-0.019	0.284	0.003	0.862
	(0.017)		(0.015)	
Married	-0.060	0.265	0.009	0.847
	(0.054)		(0.045)	
Nonwhite	-0.243	0.001	-0.195	0.001
	(0.056)		(0.046)	
Television News	0.024	0.166	0.032	0.027
	(0.017)		(0.014)	
State Population	0.001	0.043	0.001	0.084
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.010	0.019	-0.006	0.062
	(0.004)		(0.003)	
Constant	3.138	0.001	4.461	0.001
	(0.162)		(0.137)	
N	2824		3108	
R^2	0.226		0.397	

Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 4.8: Favorability of Clinton by Internet Index and both Inexperience Measures (Clinton specific and the Clinton - average of Obama and Edwards measures)

	Difference Variable		*Clinton Only Variable*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	-0.011	0.036	-0.015	0.003
	(0.005)		(0.005)	
Inexperienced	-0.765	0.001	-0.946	0.001
	(0.031)		(0.031)	
Inexperienced*Index	0.003	0.837	-0.024	0.143
	(0.016)		(0.016)	
Mobilization	-0.100	0.080	-0.193	0.001
	(0.057)		(0.052)	
Mobilization*Index	-0.001	0.832	0.003	0.486
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
Female	0.202	0.001	0.090	0.033
	(0.046)		(0.042)	
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.001
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	-0.009	0.259	-0.005	0.515
	(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	0.030	0.068	0.009	0.528
	(0.016)		(0.015)	
Married	0.042	0.403	0.037	0.420
	(0.050)		(0.046)	
Nonwhite	-0.095	0.068	-0.222	0.001
	(0.052)		(0.047)	
Television News	0.035	0.029	0.016	0.285
	(0.016)		(0.015)	
State Population	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.003
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	0.002	0.681	-0.005	0.118
	(0.004)		(0.003)	
Constant	2.730	0.001	4.282	0.001
	(0.151)		(0.139)	
N	2860		3098	
R^2	0.324		0.377	

Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 4.9: Voting for Clinton by Internet Index and Both Weak Leader Measures

	Difference Variable		*Clinton Only Variable*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	-0.049	0.001	-0.043	0.001
	(0.012)		(0.013)	
Weak Leader	-0.287	0.001	-1.280	0.001
	(0.053)		(0.091)	
Weak Leader*Index	-0.004	0.876	-0.078	0.143
	(0.028)		(0.053)	
Mobilization	-0.117	0.317	-0.186	0.133
	(0.117)		(0.124)	
Mobilization*Index	0.006	0.558	0.010	0.360
	(0.010)		(0.011)	
Female	0.233	0.014	0.099	0.325
	(0.095)		(0.100)	
Age	0.018	0.001	0.016	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.004)	
Income	0.017	0.281	0.026	0.119
	(0.016)		(0.017)	
Education	-0.160	0.001	-0.184	0.001
	(0.034)		(0.035)	
Married	-0.041	0.696	0.050	0.643
	(0.104)		(0.109)	
Nonwhite	-0.723	0.001	-0.852	0.001
	(0.109)		(0.112)	
Television News	0.002	0.948	0.001	0.996
	(0.033)		(0.035)	
State Population	0.001	0.403	-0.001	0.948
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.028	0.001	-0.032	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Constant	-0.051	0.869	1.653	0.001
	(0.312)		(0.337)	
N	2207		2414	
Pseudo R^2	0.081		0.216	
Log-likelihood	-1377.82		-1290.67	

Note- Unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance.

Table 4.10: Voting for Clinton by Internet Index and Both Inexperienced Measures

	Difference Variable		*Clinton Only Variable*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet Index	-0.042	0.003	-0.040	0.001
	(0.014)		(0.012)	
Inexperienced	-1.823	0.001	-1.245	0.001
	(0.109)		(0.094)	
Inexperienced*Index	-0.022	0.702	-0.104	0.063
	(0.058)		(0.056)	
Mobilization	-0.101	0.475	-0.180	0.139
	(0.142)		(0.122)	
Mobilization*Index	0.010	0.426	0.010	0.350
	(0.013)		(0.011)	
Female	0.360	0.002	0.181	0.068
	(0.115)		(0.099)	
Age	0.021	0.001	0.019	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
Income	0.002	0.903	0.014	0.400
	(0.020)		(0.017)	
Education	-0.198	0.001	-0.180	0.001
	(0.041)		(0.035)	
Married	0.197	0.120	0.103	0.341
	(0.127)		(0.108)	
Nonwhite	-0.656	0.001	-0.849	0.001
	(0.131)		(0.112)	
Television News	-0.025	0.541	-0.018	0.594
	(0.040)		(0.035)	
State Population	0.001	0.330	0.001	0.534
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.021	0.031	-0.030	0.001
	(0.010)		(0.008)	
Constant	-1.102	0.005	1.359	0.001
	(0.389)		(0.334)	
N	2237		2403	
Pseudo R^2	0.339		0.204	
Log-likelihood	-1007.01		-1305.06	

Note- Unstandardized Logistic regression coefficients reported Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance.

Table 4.11: Favorability of Clinton by News Websites (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
News websites	-0.036	0.001	-0.026	0.001	-0.022	0.007	-0.023	0.002
	(0.009)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Gender stereotyping	-0.508	0.001	-0.956	0.001	-0.764	0.001	-0.973	0.001
	(0.019)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.024)	
Mobilization	-0.192	0.001	-0.165	0.001	-0.115	0.001	-0.182	0.001
	(0.039)		(0.033)		(0.036)		(0.034)	
Female	0.150	0.002	0.083	0.041	0.221	0.001	0.129	0.002
	(0.048)		(0.041)		(0.044)		(0.041)	
Age	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.084	0.004	0.012	0.005	0.001
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Income	0.012	0.128	0.005	0.420	-0.008	0.308	-0.004	0.564
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	-0.026	0.137	-0.001	0.965	0.025	0.110	0.004	0.783
	(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.015)	
Married	-0.055	0.300	0.010	0.825	0.037	0.452	0.039	0.387
	(0.053)		(0.044)		(0.049)		(0.045)	
Nonwhite	-0.240	0.001	-0.195	0.001	-0.101	0.047	-0.219	0.001
	(0.055)		(0.045)		(0.051)		(0.046)	
Television news	0.023	0.160	0.030	0.033	0.035	0.022	0.015	0.277
	(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.014)	
State population	0.001	0.032	0.001	0.048	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.011	0.007	-0.007	0.042	0.002	0.603	-0.006	0.106
	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Constant	3.138	0.001	4.465	0.001	2.756	0.001	4.285	0.001
	(0.158)		(0.134)		(0.147)		(0.136)	
N	2975		3268		3007		3255	
R^2	0.216		0.390		0.320		0.370	

Note- Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance.

Table 4.12: Favorability of Clinton by Political Blogs (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Political blogs	-0.067	0.001	-0.043	0.001	-0.020	0.025	-0.036	0.001
	(0.010)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Gender stereotyping	-0.513	0.001	-0.954	0.001	-0.759	0.001	-0.968	0.001
	(0.020)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.024)	
Mobilization	-0.176	0.001	-0.158	0.001	-0.124	0.001	-0.183	0.001
	(0.039)		(0.033)		(0.037)		(0.034)	
Female	0.123	0.012	0.069	0.090	0.225	0.001	0.117	0.005
	(0.049)		(0.041)		(0.045)		(0.042)	
Age	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.111	0.004	0.012	0.005	0.001
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.001)	
Income	0.011	0.197	0.005	0.462	-0.009	0.252	-0.005	0.501
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	-0.024	0.157	-0.001	0.924	0.024	0.127	0.005	0.756
	(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.015)	
Married	-0.041	0.444	0.019	0.664	0.046	0.353	0.046	0.315
	(0.053)		(0.045)		(0.050)		(0.045)	
Nonwhite	-0.251	0.001	-0.202	0.001	-0.097	0.060	-0.222	0.001
	(0.055)		(0.046)		(0.051)		(0.047)	
Television news	0.021	0.218	0.029	0.036	0.035	0.027	0.014	0.338
	(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.014)	
State population	0.001	0.027	0.001	0.061	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.010	0.015	-0.006	0.073	0.002	0.567	-0.005	0.159
	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Constant	3.115	0.001	4.435	0.001	2.709	0.001	4.256	0.001
	(0.158)		(0.134)		(0.148)		(0.137)	
N	2904		3193		2938		3184	
R^2	0.225		0.393		0.321		0.373	

Note- Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance.

Table 4.13: Favorability of Clinton by Political Emails (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Political emails	-0.043 (0.011)	0.001	-0.026 (0.009)	0.005	-0.021 (0.010)	0.039	-0.031 (0.009)	0.001
Gender stereotyping	-0.510 (0.020)	0.001	-0.954 (0.022)	0.001	-0.760 (0.022)	0.001	-0.971 (0.024)	0.001
Mobilization	-0.199 (0.040)	0.001	-0.173 (0.034)	0.001	-0.124 (0.037)	0.001	-0.189 (0.034)	0.001
Female	0.162 (0.048)	0.001	0.095 (0.040)	0.019	0.237 (0.044)	0.001	0.137 (0.041)	0.001
Age	0.006 (0.002)	0.001	0.003 (0.001)	0.042	0.005 (0.002)	0.006	0.006 (0.001)	0.001
Income	0.010 (0.008)	0.226	0.004 (0.007)	0.528	-0.007 (0.008)	0.333	-0.005 (0.007)	0.475
Education	-0.028 (0.017)	0.107	-0.004 (0.014)	0.767	0.022 (0.016)	0.167	0.003 (0.015)	0.853
Married	-0.050 (0.053)	0.344	0.015 (0.044)	0.741	0.040 (0.049)	0.414	0.044 (0.045)	0.333
Nonwhite	-0.213 (0.055)	0.001	-0.177 (0.045)	0.001	-0.083 (0.051)	0.104	-0.201 (0.046)	0.001
Television news	0.014 (0.017)	0.409	0.023 (0.014)	0.102	0.029 (0.016)	0.067	0.010 (0.014)	0.488
State population	0.001 (0.001)	0.053	0.001 (0.001)	0.077	0.001 (0.001)	0.009	0.001 (0.001)	0.003
% Female legislature	-0.011 (0.004)	0.009	-0.007 (0.003)	0.050	0.002 (0.004)	0.597	-0.005 (0.003)	0.117
Constant	3.085 (0.158)	0.001	4.420 (0.134)	0.001	2.706 (0.148)	0.001	4.242 (0.136)	0.001
N	2920		3212		2953		3200	
R^2	0.218		0.390		0.317		0.370	

Note- Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance.

Table 4.14: Predicted Favorability of Clinton by Weaker Leader (Difference Variable) and Different Digital Media Measures

	News Websites	*Political Blogs*	*Political Emails*
-1SD	3.67	3.64	3.61
Mean	3.54	3.54	3.54
+1SD	3.47	3.43	3.46
Δ (high-low)	*-0.2*	*-0.21*	*-0.15*

Note- All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 4.15: Voting for Clinton by News Websites (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
News websites	-0.065	0.001	-0.068	0.001	-0.069	0.001	-0.066	0.001
	(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.018)	
Gender stereotyping	-0.297	0.001	-1.388	0.001	-1.855	0.001	-1.369	0.001
	(0.040)		(0.072)		(0.083)		(0.074)	
Mobilization	-0.146	0.047	-0.191	0.014	-0.065	0.464	-0.174	0.025
	(0.073)		(0.078)		(0.089)		(0.077)	
Female	0.278	0.002	0.136	0.163	0.391	0.001	0.228	0.018
	(0.092)		(0.097)		(0.111)		(0.096)	
Age	0.017	0.001	0.015	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.018	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Income	0.019	0.235	0.026	0.122	0.004	0.840	0.014	0.388
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.016)	
Education	-0.171	0.001	-0.188	0.001	-0.203	0.001	-0.189	0.001
	(0.033)		(0.035)		(0.040)		(0.034)	
Married	-0.010	0.922	0.082	0.436	0.204	0.099	0.126	0.231
	(0.101)		(0.106)		(0.124)		(0.105)	
Nonwhite	-0.721	0.001	-0.837	0.001	-0.656	0.001	-0.835	0.001
	(0.107)		(0.110)		(0.128)		(0.110)	
Television news	-0.001	0.972	-0.004	0.915	-0.028	0.475	-0.023	0.498
	(0.032)		(0.034)		(0.039)		(0.033)	
State population	0.001	0.319	0.001	0.762	0.001	0.266	0.001	0.292
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.030	0.001	-0.035	0.001	-0.022	0.024	-0.031	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.008)	
Constant	-0.033	0.911	1.738	0.001	-1.043	0.005	1.430	0.001
	(0.301)		(0.327)		(0.375)		(0.324)	
N	2326		2540		2352		2526	
Pseudo R^2	0.076		0.214		0.338		0.20	
Log-likelihood	-1458.6		-1360.8		-1061.6		-1377.7	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 4.16: Voting for Clinton by Political Blogs (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Political blogs	-0.135	0.001	-0.133	0.001	-0.078	0.001	-0.121	0.001
	(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.023)		(0.020)	
Gender stereotyping	-0.304	0.001	-1.363	0.001	-1.829	0.001	-1.348	0.001
	(0.040)		(0.072)		(0.084)		(0.074)	
Mobilization	-0.085	0.256	-0.125	0.119	-0.049	0.587	-0.130	0.100
	(0.075)		(0.080)		(0.091)		(0.079)	
Female	0.239	0.010	0.099	0.317	0.392	0.001	0.200	0.040
	(0.093)		(0.099)		(0.112)		(0.097)	
Age	0.017	0.001	0.015	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.018	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Income	0.016	0.329	0.024	0.152	0.000	0.994	0.012	0.450
	(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.016)	
Education	-0.169	0.001	-0.189	0.001	-0.203	0.001	-0.186	0.001
	(0.033)		(0.035)		(0.040)		(0.035)	
Married	-0.009	0.927	0.080	0.455	0.215	0.085	0.126	0.241
	(0.103)		(0.108)		(0.125)		(0.107)	
Nonwhite	-0.737	0.001	-0.847	0.001	-0.628	0.001	-0.840	0.001
	(0.108)		(0.110)		(0.129)		(0.110)	
Television news	0.003	0.915	0.008	0.807	-0.022	0.567	-0.012	0.716
	(0.033)		(0.034)		(0.039)		(0.034)	
State population	0.001	0.250	0.001	0.801	0.001	0.242	0.001	0.371
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female legislature	-0.028	0.001	-0.033	0.001	-0.021	0.032	-0.030	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.008)	
Constant	-0.093	0.760	1.609	0.001	-1.191	0.002	1.320	0.001
	(0.304)		(0.329)		(0.377)		(0.326)	
N	2272		2483		2300		2473	
Pseudo R^2	0.085		0.218		0.336		0.205	
Log-likelihood	-1409.6		-1322.7		-1039.3		-1340	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 4.17: Voting for Clinton by Political Emails (Gender Stereotyping trait used in each model are the column labels)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Political emails	-0.057 (0.021)	0.006	-0.050 (0.022)	0.019	-0.027 (0.025)	0.276	-0.056 (0.021)	0.008
Gender stereotyping	-0.288 (0.040)	0.001	-1.352 (0.071)	0.001	-1.845 (0.083)	0.001	-1.348 (0.074)	0.001
Mobilization	-0.144 (0.075)	0.055	-0.185 (0.080)	0.020	-0.095 (0.091)	0.298	-0.179 (0.079)	0.023
Female	0.322 (0.092)	0.001	0.187 (0.097)	0.053	0.443 (0.111)	0.000	0.268 (0.096)	0.005
Age	0.019 (0.003)	0.001	0.017 (0.004)	0.001	0.020 (0.004)	0.001	0.020 (0.004)	0.001
Income	0.012 (0.016)	0.462	0.017 (0.016)	0.292	-0.003 (0.019)	0.860	0.007 (0.016)	0.671
Education	-0.170 (0.033)	0.001	-0.192 (0.035)	0.001	-0.207 (0.040)	0.001	-0.189 (0.034)	0.000
Married	0.010 (0.102)	0.924	0.107 (0.106)	0.315	0.243 (0.124)	0.050	0.156 (0.106)	0.142
Nonwhite	-0.658 (0.106)	0.001	-0.780 (0.109)	0.001	-0.599 (0.127)	0.001	-0.783 (0.109)	0.001
Television news	-0.006 (0.032)	0.852	-0.003 (0.034)	0.922	-0.025 (0.039)	0.518	-0.018 (0.034)	0.591
State population	0.001 (0.001)	0.450	-0.001 (0.001)	0.932	0.001 (0.001)	0.343	0.001 (0.001)	0.534
% Female legislature	-0.032 (0.008)	0.001	-0.036 (0.008)	0.001	-0.023 (0.010)	0.014	-0.033 (0.008)	0.001
Constant	-0.171 (0.300)	0.569	1.535 (0.324)	0.001	-1.196 (0.374)	0.001	1.255 (0.322)	0.001
N	2280		2493		2308		2482	
Pseudo R^2	0.073		0.207		0.333		0.196	
Log-likelihood	-1436.1		-1348.56		-1050.14		-1361.5	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 4.18**:** Likelihood of Voting for Clinton by Weaker Leader (Difference Variable) and Different Digital Media Measures

	News Websites	*Political Blogs*	*Emails*	*Internet Index*
-1 SD	46.4%	45.9%	43.3%	49.8%
Mean	40.5%	40.2%	40.8%	40.5%
+1 SD	37.4%	35.7%	38.2%	35.8%
Δ (high-low)	*-9*	*-10.2*	*-5.1*	*-14*

Note- All other variables set at their mean value.

CHAPTER 5:

DIGITAL MEDIA AND GENDER STEREOTYPING OF WOMEN CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES

Introduction

As previously discussed in this project, the framework developed is trying to understand how digital media affects evaluations of, and support for, women candidates. In the previous chapters I found the framework was supported by many of the findings, except mobilization did not increase support for Clinton. With these findings in mind I now turn to considering how digital media usage impacts the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions of women candidates running for congress. I conclude my analyses in this and the following chapter on the House as this is the classically studied level of office. Through real candidate evaluations similar to those used in the Clinton chapters, and a set of survey questions on hypothetical candidates for congress, I test in this chapter what influences the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions of women running for congress.

This chapter considers the first part of the overall framework (presented in Figure 2.3)—that higher digital media use will result in individuals holding stronger gender stereotyped opinions. Due to the sheer amount of information, this chapter, unlike Chapter 3, does not consider vote choice models for only half of the framework. Since elections to the U.S. House are every two years, thus occur in both presidential election and midterm election years, I consider 2008, 2010, and 2012 elections to see if there is a midterm effect (Tufte 1975). While there is no reason to expect that the lower turnout and less engagement that occur in midterm years would disproportionately affect women

candidates, each year is run independently to compare across types of years. Considering the years independently also allows the results to show any changes that have occurred between 2008 and 2012.

After considering an abbreviated review of the women and congress literature I turn to the expectations for this chapter and the various data sources utilized. The data presented in this chapter and Chapter 6 are unique as I have several time points, but also a set of survey questions in 2012 that include hypothetical candidates to determine whether given no other information individuals will still rate the man candidate better on male traits. While not an experiment per se, these hypothetical candidate questions allow my analyses to merge the experimental literature that find significant perceived trait differences between hypothetical men and women candidates and the literature that focuses on real candidates and find no significant differences. Thus I use a hypothetical trait evaluation to test the effect of stereotyping on support for real candidates for some of my analyses. Across the years, the various measures of holding stereotyped opinions, and digital media, I find that with a few key exceptions that higher digital media use increases the likelihood of respondents having stereotyped opinions.

Women Candidates for the U.S. House

Much has been learned from studying women candidates for the House over the last 20+ years; however, there are still discrepancies that cannot be answered by the publicly available data often used. The original "Year of the Woman" in 1992 prompted scholars to study how women campaign, who votes for women, when women run etc. Since this time researchers studying women candidates have expanded to consider

Senate, Gubernatorial, and Presidential primary races; however, the percentage of candidates that are women is much smaller at these levels. This prompted another group of researchers to study state level races; however, at this level the amount of publicity and media exposure is greatly reduced. Thus, for a project researching how digital media affects support for women candidates the classic office of U.S. House is a perfect place to end.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on women candidates reports no significant difference in the likelihood of winning office when they run (Sanbonmatsu 2006); however, they are less likely to run for higher level offices than are men (Lawless 2012; Lawless & Fox 2005; 2010). Women running for the U.S. House are not disadvantaged in terms of fundraising (Fox 2010) or endorsements (Burrell 2003), but there are some clear differences in a woman candidate's campaign experience.

The first major difference between a man's and woman's candidate's campaign is even having one. Women run for office at lower rates than men, and even after 2012 this is still the case. There are a variety of explanations for why women do not seek public office including the incumbency advantage, gate-keeping by political elites, lack of political ambition etc. (see Lawless & Fox 2010 for a detailed discussion), but once a woman has decided to run, there are still key differences in how she goes about campaigning.

While women candidates win at the same rate as men candidates, in terms of U.S. House races, women are much more likely to face competitive primaries, which drain resources from the general election fund (Lawless & Pearson 2008b). This ensures women candidates in the general election are stronger candidates than their male

opponents (if not more so). Thus, once a woman candidate reaches the general election, she should be winning at higher rates than men.

Once in general election races, women candidates have a choice to "embrace" their gender and run "as a woman", or try to rebuff focusing on traditional women's issues (Kahn & Gordon 1997; Kathlene 1994). They can focus on mobilizing their party base, or can reach across party lines to try and mobilize women of all parties (Dolan 2008b; Stokes-Brown & Neal 2008). There are a myriad of choices women candidates must make in how they run their campaign, and each choice alters their likelihood of winning a seat in the House. While all these issues are relevant and have vast literatures documenting their importance, for this project simply to acknowledge that women run different campaigns and should be winning at higher rates is enough. Why then are women still so underrepresented in the House?

2012 may have been the "New Year of the Woman" (Vanden Heuvel 2012), but the percent of women in congress is still nowhere near equal. This result could be due to the numerous disadvantages women candidates face. They include not being asked to run, not seeing themselves as qualified, and important to this study, facing media bias. An additional factor reducing the number of women in office is that women candidates are increasingly being challenged for their seat in the House by other women (Lawless & Pearson 2008a). Thus, instead of women running for open seats or challenging vulnerable incumbents, women are challenging each other.

Thus women running for congress face media bias just as Clinton did in her campaigns. The digital world was not friendly to Clinton in her run, and it is expected in the results for congressional candidates to face similar disadvantages. Digital media were

shown to increase the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions surrounding the Clinton campaign, and with the lower information environment of congressional races it would make sense that respondents will hold even more stereotyped opinions of the candidates as less information is known about them and the information available online could be "mistruths".

Expectations

In this chapter I consider the half of my framework focused on how digital media increase the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions. The analyses in this chapter focus on testing the argument that individuals with high digital media use will have stronger held gender stereotyped opinions than individuals who do not use digital media across the different years.

Since I am considering congressional races across three years, the results derived from my expectation will be presented in chronological order within the analyses. The only hypothesis for this chapter is drawn from the vast literature of digital media's self-selection and misinformation (discussed in Chapter 2), and is that high digital media use will increase the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

H5.1: Higher new media use will result in having more strongly held gender stereotyping opinions.

Data/Variables

All analyses in this chapter consider respondents in inter-gender house races for any model using candidate gendered traits[22]. For the hypothetical candidates' traits in 2012 that is used to test digital media's affect on holding gender stereotyped opinions I

[22] The one exception is the models presented in the appendix that consider women versus women races.

use the entire subsample that responded to these questions. Thus in models using survey candidate traits the number of respondents is above 5000, while in models using my unique hypothetical data the number is much smaller. Having both large sample models and much smaller hypothetical models allows me to consider whether my framework holds across different types of data and different years. It also allows direct comparison between candidate traits that show stereotyped opinions and hypothetical candidates' traits. The data used in this chapter (and in Chapter 6) come from three datasets. I use the 2008 CCES, 2010 CCES, and 2012 CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study) (Ansolabehere 2009; 2011; 2013)[23]. The hypothetical candidate biographies and traits I created to test hypothetical candidate traits versus survey candidate traits are located on the 2012 dataset.

Across all models for all datasets I include two state level variables. The first is state population size. This measure comes from the 2009 U.S. Census American Community Survey. The second state level variable considered is percent women in the state legislature in 2009. This is from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009).

Table 5.1 provides a listing of all the digital media measures used across the three years. In 2008 and 2010 the variables are the same. The first measure considered is did respondents read political blogs, while the second is an index of using the Internet for political purposes. In 2012 I consider an index of were respondents digital citizens and did they receive political emails.

[23] Because these were internet surveys the survey weights are used in every model in this and the next chapter.

Table 5.2 provides a listing of all the gender stereotyping measures used across the years. In 2008 and 2010 the traits considered come from survey candidate evaluations asked on the respective survey. In 2012 the traits come from a pseudo-experiment where respondents were asked to evaluate hypothetical candidates who were running for congress. Each of the gender stereotyping variables was created by using the men candidates' trait evaluations - women candidates' trait evaluations. Thus, in Figure 5.1 I show a histogram of the men's and women's coding of "do you consider [insert house candidate1/candidate2 name] experienced enough for office?" This variable had a three point possible response. This three point scale was coded so higher values correspond to believing the trait more closely matches the candidate.

For example, a man given a score of 2 was considered very experienced, and a woman given a score of 1 was considered somewhat experienced. Subtracting the 1 from the 2 (2-1), results in a score of +1, thus the man was rated higher on the trait than the woman. All stereotyping variables that use traits in these chapters use this method of creating an index of stereotyping opinions. Figure 5.2 presents the full range of possible values for stereotyping experienced. Because I am interesting in measuring whether respondents believed the woman was less experienced I collapse the five point variable into a 3 point variable, where -1 is respondents reported the woman as being more experienced, 0 is the respondent reported no difference between the man and the woman candidate, and 1 is the man candidate was rated as more experienced. All the gender stereotyping traits considered in this chapter are created using the same process. From the

full range of values all values where the woman is ranked higher are collapsed to -1, while all values where the man was ranked higher is collapsed to a +1[24].

While this creates some confusion for the "feminine" trait of caring in 2012, to be consistent with the analyses I still code higher values being the man candidate was seen as more caring. Thus, on this one trait variable the values are opposite of what the women in politics literature would expect, but for ease of comparison across the other traits the coding was kept the same. Additionally, while we know experimental women candidates are often reported to be more caring, what effect this gender stereotyping opinion has on the likelihood of actually voting for women candidates is unknown. Do individuals vote for the woman candidate if they believe women candidates are more caring? Since this ultimate effect is unknown, the trait is coded the same as all the other stereotyping variables.

2008 CCES

The first dataset used to test the hypothesis laid out above is the 2008 CCES. This study consisted of three waves, the first, which collected demographic data, in August and September 2008, the second, which was conducted in October 2008, and the post-election wave in November 2008. I only consider Common Content data, which had a total response of 32,800 individuals and was a nationally representative sample (Ansolabehere 2009). This was an Internet survey conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix. While the 2008 CCES has over 32,000 respondents, my analyses consider only respondents in inter-gender House races, thus for my analyses with this dataset I have

[24] For the women versus women models in the appendix this same process was used, however I subtracted the Democratic woman candidate from the Republican woman candidate.

between 5,000-7,500 respondents[25]. The women versus women trait stereotyping models presented in the appendix have approximately 780 respondents.

The key independent measure of digital media usage is measured by considering a 0-2 point index from the questions "did you read a political blog" and "did you comment on a blog". This three point Internet scale had a mean of .61, and 17% of respondents reported doing both.

Measuring holding gender stereotyped opinions is the key dependent variable in every model in this chapter. Since in 2008 there are no experimental measures of holding gender stereotyped opinions, I instead use variables that asked respondents to rate their real candidates for their House seat. Thus, I have a woman candidate's trait evaluation and a man candidate's trait evaluation for each respondent. The original variables were "Do you consider [candidate's name] to be…" with the analyses here considering knowledgeable and experienced. Since the respondents were prompted with the candidates' names, they in effect were primed by the gender of the names. Figure 5.1 presents the two base variables used to create the scale for inexperienced. Figure 5.2 shows the full scale from -2 to 2 for "woman candidate seen as less experienced". From this all negative values were collapsed to -1, while the positive values were collapsed to 1. The no difference category (0) was left alone.

The final three point distribution of inexperienced is presented in Figure 5.3. The "no difference" category has the highest percentage of respondents at 37%. The mean of this variable is -0.013, and the standard deviation is 0.79. Figure 5.4 provides the three point distribution of the other stereotyping measure considered for 2008, lacks

[25] The difference is due to available data for the response of "did you comment on a blog". This question was part of a chain that some respondents were not asked.

knowledge. Again, the category with the highest percentage of respondents is that of no difference, with 40% reporting no difference in knowledge between the candidates. The mean is -0.02, with a standard deviation of 0.77.

Control variables included in all the models presented are: age, income, education, marital status, nonwhite, and female[26]. I also control for tradition media usage, by including a measure for television news[27]. For vote choice in chapter 6 I include two indicator variables for respondent's party[28]. There is also an interactive term used with this dataset. It is between the digital media measures and respondent gender, and is considered in the modeling of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

2010 CCES

The second dataset used in this chapter is the 2010 CCES. Like the previous study it was conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix in the same way, and had a very similar response rate. The common content data had over 50,000 respondents, of which I consider any respondent who was in a congressional district with an inter-gender race. This results in approximately 6500 respondents.

The 2010 CCES has two different measures of gender stereotyping I consider. Both are survey trait evaluations of real candidates, similar to the 2008 analyses. The trait

[26] Age was self-reported in August/September 2008. Income was a 14 point scale. Missing values were imputed. Education was a 6 point scale. Marital status is an indicator variable of 'married/committed partner' as 1, all others coded 0. Nonwhite is an indicator of any self reported minority coded 1, white coded 0. Female is self-reported gender.

[27] This is an indicator variable for whether the respondent watched television news.

[28] One indicator variable is "Democrat", which includes any respondent who at least leans Democrat. The second is "Republican" with any respondent who at least leans Republican included. Thus, true independents are the reference category.

evaluations for survey candidates was asked on the pre-election wave, and should have a gendered aspect to them as the respondents were prompted with the candidates' names. Thus individuals in a race with a woman and man candidate were prompted with those names (were not prompted with party) and asked to evaluate each on the trait of competency and the trait of integrity.

Figure 5.5 presents the distribution for the gender stereotype trait of less competent. The category with the highest percentage of respondents is +1, man candidate is more competent than the woman candidate (46%), while the no difference category is the smallest with only 15% of respondents. The mean of this variable is 0.075 with a standard deviation of 0.92. Figure 5.6 presents the distribution for lacks integrity. Again the largest category is +1 (44% of respondents); however, the -1 category (women have more integrity than men) is not far behind at 40%. The mean of this variable is 0.044, with a standard deviation of 0.918.

The primary independent variable of digital media is measured by an Internet index. The questions considered were whether respondents read the news online[29], and did they read political blogs. These questions were added to create a 3-point scale of 0-neither, 1-one activity, 2- both activities. Reading political blogs is also considered independently. Control variables in the models for this dataset include gender, partisanship, age, income[30], education, marital status, nonwhite, and television news[31]. As

[29] The news online question was "did you read the news online, in print, or both?" Any respondent who reported online, or both were coded 1.

[30] Income was imputed for missing values using education, age, state of residence, gender, marital status, party affiliation, employment status, and race.

[31] The coding of these variables are exactly the same as in the 2008 data.

with the 2008 data I include an interactive term between digital media and respondent gender for modeling holding gender stereotyped opinions.

2012 CCES

The 2012 CCES was conducted in the same way as the previous two datasets discussed (Ansolabehere 2013). The common content dataset has over 54,000 respondents; however, unlike the previous two datasets there are no real candidate trait evaluations to consider. Thus, the analyses using the 2012 CCES will focus exclusively on the Iowa module subsample. This module is a nationally representative subsample. From this I have approximately 500 respondents that answered the hypothetical candidate trait evaluations questions. Of these 500 people, only half were in congressional districts with an inter-gender race. Thus, for analyses using this dataset I have a very small sample, but it is representative (using the weights), and given the pseudo-experimental nature of the gender stereotyping measure I am comfortable running analyses on this dataset.

In the pseudo-experiment, respondents were asked about a hypothetical man candidate and a hypothetical woman candidate. The candidate biographies were created by using the most moderate member of the House of Representatives in 2008 (per their ADA scores) and modifying that person's biography to exclude any time already served in the House (Card 2009)[32]. The only major differences in these biographies were the first name and the use of male versus female pronouns. The names themselves were taken from Smith et al.'s (2007) work. The man candidate was name Thomas Brown, while the woman candidate was Karen Miller. The respondents were then presented with gendered

[32] Question wording available in the appendix.

traits (the ones considered here are caring and competency) and asked to rate each candidate on a 0-100 point thermometer of how well that trait described the candidate. Responses were on a 0-100 point thermometer of how well the traits fit the candidate. Until this dataset all the traits were traditionally "male" traits (competent, knowledgeable, strong leader), but caring is a trait that women are traditionally rated higher on.

Figure 5.7 presents the distribution for the trait of less competent. Unlike the same trait in 2010, the category with the highest percentage of respondents is -1, the hypothetical woman candidate was perceived as more competent than the man candidate (47%). The mean of this variable is -0.79, and the standard deviation is 0.93. Figure 5.8 presents the distribution for the trait of less caring. It should be noted that while caring is a traditionally "feminine trait", the coding was kept at higher values correspond to believing the man candidate is "better". As with less competent in 2012, the largest category is -1, woman seen as more caring than the man candidate. 45 percent of respondents were in this category, followed by the +1 category at 39%. The mean of this variable is -0.065, and the standard deviation is 0.92.

Digital media is an additive index of digital citizenship (high speed Internet users) and receiving political emails. The control variables included from this dataset are exactly the same as the previous two datasets with one exception. I control for age, education, income, gender, marital status, nonwhite, and partisanship, but there was no comparable measure for television news. For modeling gender stereotyping I include an interactive term between the digital media measure and respondent gender.

Results

Every model considered in this chapter is a multinomial logistic regression using the appropriate survey weights, with the standard errors clustered by state. The multinomial logistic regression model makes sense for these variables as there are three categories respondents could be in. Using a multinomial logit also allows me to see any changes from the baseline category of no difference between the candidates (Anonymous ND). For these analyses I use the value of "see no difference between the candidates" as the baseline and model what makes individuals move to or from this category. Running the models in Chapter 3 using multinomial logistic regressions do not change the results of that chapter.

Summary findings of this chapter are provided in Tables 5.3-5.5[33]. In Table 5.3 we see that digital media measures generally conform to expectations, and in only one case was there a deviation from expectations. This occurred on the trait of less competent in 2012. Higher digital media usage significantly reduced the likelihood of believing the hypothetical man candidate was more competent that the woman candidate.

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 break the results down by respondent gender to see if there was an interaction between respondent gender and digital media. The only difference between male and female respondents is on the trait of inexperienced in 2008. For male respondents using digital media reduced the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more experienced than the woman candidate; however, among female respondents, higher digital media use increased the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions.

[33] Running the models presented here and in Chapter 6 including a control for whether the woman candidate was a democrat (for 2008 and 2010) does not change the results presented. In 2012 it is impractical to include a control like this as neither hypothetical candidate was given a party. The 2008 and 2010 models including this control are available upon request from the author.

2008 Results

Interpreting multinomial regression models requires one to constantly consider what the base value is that the results should be compared to. In Table 5.6 I consider the impact of the Internet index on holding the stereotyped opinions of less experienced and less knowledgeable. Higher values of the internet index significantly increases the likelihood of believing the woman is the "superior" candidate as compared to seeing no difference; however, it also increases the likelihood of believing the man is the more knowledgeable candidate. Age, income, education, percentage of the state legislature that is women, and political interest are all significant. Interestingly, the percentage of women in the state legislature reduces the likelihood of believing men candidates are more knowledgeable and experienced, but does not increase the likelihood of perceiving the women candidates as superior. More women in the state legislature drive respondents to see no difference between the candidates.

Table 5.7 reports the predicted likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions by the digital media variable of Internet index for 2008, presented in Table 5.6. Since Internet index is a scale, I report one standard deviation above (value of 1.4) and below the mean (value of 0, the minimum). From one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions in 2008 increases, but only by a small amount. For knowledge, the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more knowledgeable increases by 0.4%, while for the trait of experienced, the likelihood only increases 0.2%. The reason for this very small increase on experience can be seen in Table 5.8. Among female respondents an increase in digital media use corresponds to an increase in holding stereotyped opinions (1.7%); however,

for male respondents the same increase in digital media use results in a decrease by 1.2%. For knowledge there is no corresponding interactive effect by respondent gender. Both male and female respondents increase the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more knowledgeable as the Internet index increases, but the increase is larger for female respondents.

2010 Results

The results for 2010 show many similar trends to 2008. Reading political blogs increases the likelihood of believing the man candidate is superior on these traits, but also the likelihood of believing the woman candidate is better. The substantive effect is to increase the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions, and is presented in Table 5.10. Higher educated respondents and Democrats are more likely to believe the woman candidate is more competent and has higher integrity than the man candidate. Older respondents and Republicans are more likely to believe the man candidate has more integrity and is more competent than the woman candidate.

The net effect of reading blogs on the traits of competency and integrity show an increase of 4.6% for holding the stereotype of less competent, but only a 1.1% increase for the stereotype of lacks integrity. The reason for these results is evident in Table 5.11. For both traits, the effect of reading blogs is significant and substantively important for male respondents, but is not substantively interesting for female respondents. Among male respondents, reading blogs increases the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions on the trait of less competent by 6.5%, and the trait of lacks integrity by 2.1%. Among female respondents the corresponding increases were only 1.6% and 0.6%. Interestingly, among respondents who did not read political blogs the likelihood of believing the man

candidate was more competent is higher among female respondents than male respondents, while for respondents who did read blogs males are more likely to hold stereotyped opinions than are females.

As with reading blogs in 2010, the Internet index for 2010 has competing effects on the likelihood of holding stereotyped opinions (shown in Table 5.12). The net effect is larger still for increasing stereotyped opinions. The interactive term between respondent gender and digital media are again insignificant. Democrats and minority respondents are more likely to see the woman candidate as stronger on competency and integrity. Older individuals and Republicans are more likely to see the man candidate as stronger on these traits.

The substantive effects of the Internet index on holding gender trait stereotyped opinions of less competent and lacks integrity are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. Results from the baseline models (models 1 and 3) are presented in Table 5.13. A change from the minimum index score of 0 to the maximum score of 2 results in an increased belief that the man candidate was more competent by 5%. The corresponding increase on the trait lacks integrity is 2.6%. What is interesting from these probabilities (and the other probabilities from 2010) is that almost half the respondents are predicted to be in this category, out of the three categories possible.

In Table 5.14, when male respondents are at the high value on the Internet index variable half of them are predicted to believe the woman candidate is less competent than the man candidate. Female respondents are similarly situated. An increase from the minimum to the maximum on the Internet index results in an increase of 5.5% among male respondents, and an increase of 3.9% for female respondents. In terms of lacks

integrity, higher digital media use increases the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions, but the effect is stronger on female respondents. Among females an increase from minimum to maximum digital media use results in a 2.9% increase in believing the woman candidate has less integrity. Among males this increase is only 2.5%.

2012 Results

To this point the results have focused on survey traits collected about real congressional candidates. In 2012 I consider two traits that were asked about hypothetical candidates running in a congressional race. While not an experiment, the hypothetical candidate biographies and traits were similar to traditional experimental candidate research.

The results for the 2012 Internet index on the likelihood of stereotyping hypothetical candidates are presented in Table 5.15. As the index increases, female respondents are more likely to believe the woman candidate is more competent (per the significant interactive term). The second half of the model reports that minorities are less likely to perceive the hypothetical man candidate more competent and caring than the woman candidate. Higher interested individuals, and individuals that live in large states, are less likely to believe the man candidate is more competent, but are insignificant on whether the man candidate is more caring. Finally, respondents who live in states with a high percentage of women in the state legislature are less likely to believe the man candidate is more caring, but is insignificant on whether the man candidate is more competent.

Tables 5.16 and 5.17 report the predicted probability of holding stereotyped opinions based on the models presented in Table 5.15. First, in the baseline models higher values on the Internet index reduce the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more competent than the woman candidate by over 9%. The effect for believing the man candidate is more caring is reversed. As digital media usage increases the likelihood of believing the man is more caring increases by over 20% (from 22.7% to 43.9%).

When broken down by respondent gender we see significant interactive effects. On the trait competency, male respondents decrease the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more competent than the woman candidate by 4%, while for female respondents the decrease is by 13.7%. At low digital media there is no significant difference between the genders (each are at 41%), while at high usage there is a clear divide between the genders. Women are 10% less likely to perceive the hypothetical man candidate as more competent. The typically "female" trait of caring shows an interesting, but different trend than the "masculine" trait of competency has shown.

At Internet index equals zero male respondents are only 9% likely to believe the male candidate is more caring (they believe the woman candidate is more caring, which is expected per the gender stereotyping literature). Female respondents however are over 40% likely to report perceiving the man candidate as more caring than the woman candidate when the index equals zero. Thus there is a difference of over 30% between male and female respondents who do not use the Internet. Among male respondents an increase from the minimum to the maximum of digital media results in a 29.7% increase in the likelihood of believing the man candidate is more caring. Among female respondents the increase is only 8%, but at this value of digital media over half the

women respondents are predicted to hold the belief that the hypothetical man candidate was more caring than the hypothetical woman candidate.

Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter generally conform to what the hypothesis expected. Only one substantively significant effect of digital media on holding stereotyped opinions was in the wrong direction, and as discussed these results are driven by female respondents. Hypothesis 5.1, that digital media usage would increase the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions was supported by the results in 2010, supported, but was substantively not interesting, in 2008, and was supported in 2012 with the one exception. Surprisingly, the feminine trait of caring was the trait most likely to be associated more with the man candidate as digital media increased.

When considering women candidates there is always a concern about whether the candidates we study are anomalies in some way. To address this concern, in the appendix there is one Table (A10) which presents results from women versus women races in 2008. The trait stereotypes were measured Republican woman – Democratic woman, and the results show that digital media do not matter for believing the Republican is more experienced, or more knowledgeable, than the Democrat. The only variables that predict believing the Republican is superior on these traits is Republican party members increase the belief, while Democratic party members and female respondents decrease this belief.

With these results in mind, and with the concern about the endogeneity of the women candidates under evaluation addressed, this project now turns to what, if any,

effect digital media and holding gender stereotyped opinions has on the likelihood of actually voting for woman candidates. Chapter 6 addresses this question after briefly considering the effect of digital media on the likelihood of being mobilized/ engaged in politics. Thus, Chapter 6 builds comprehensive models to test the full framework comparable to the models presented in Chapter 4.

Table 5.1: Measures of Internet Use

2008	2010	2012
	Political blogs	
"Internet Index" of political blogs, comment on blogs, news websites	"Internet Index" of political blogs, news websites	"Internet Index" of political email and digital citizen

Table 5.2: Measures of Gender Stereotyping Trait Evaluations (Man candidate-Woman Candidate)

Gender Trait Evaluations	2008	2010	2012
Survey Candidate evaluations			
U.S. House Candidates	Inexperienced Lacks knowledge	Less Competent Lacks Integrity	
Hypothetical candidate evaluations			
"Running for Congress"			Less Competent Less Caring

Table 5.3 Summary of Results for Holding Gender Stereotyped (Man candidate-Woman candidate) Opinions from Baseline Models

Internet use	2008		2010		2012	
	Inexperienced	Lacks Knowledge	Less Competent	Lacks Integrity	Less Competent	Less Caring
Political Blogs			+	+		
Internet Index	+	+	+	+	-	+

Note- "-"represents findings that reduce stereotyped opinions. "+" represents findings that increase stereotyped opinions. Finally, blank cells had no appropriate analyses.

Table 5.4: Summary of Results on Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (Female Respondents)

Internet use	2008		2010		2012	
	Inexperienced	Lacks Knowledge	Less Competent	Lacks Integrity	Less Competent	Less Caring
Political Blogs			+	+		
Internet Index	+	+	+	+	-	+

Note- "-"represents significant findings that reduce stereotyped opinions. "+" represents significant findings that increase stereotyped opinions. Finally, blank cells had no appropriate analyses.

Table 5.5: Summary of Results on Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (Male Respondents)

Internet USE	2008		2010		2012	
	Inexperienced	Lacks Knowledge	Less Competent	Lacks Integrity	Less Competent	Less Caring
Political Blogs			+	+		
Internet Index	-	+	+	+	-	+

Note- "-"represents significant findings that reduce stereotyped opinions. "+" represents significant findings that increase stereotyped opinions. Finally, blank cells had no appropriate analyses.

Table 5.6: Predicting Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2008 by Internet Index

	Inexperienced		Inexperienced		Less knowledge		Less knowledge	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Women Better Described by Trait (-1)								
Internet	0.127	0.001	0.184	0.001	0.185	0.001	0.271	0.001
Index	(0.039)		(0.053)		(0.035)		(0.047)	
Female	-0.059	0.361	0.058	0.570	0.066	0.241	0.240	0.003
	(0.064)		(0.102)		(0.057)		(0.081)	
Female*	-	-	-0.118	0.056	-	-	-0.174	0.002
Index			(0.062)				(0.055)	
Age	0.019	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.019	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Income	-0.001	0.940	-0.001	0.941	-0.002	0.917	-0.002	0.917
	(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.015)		(0.015)	
Education	0.097	0.001	0.097	0.001	0.050	0.029	0.051	0.028
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.023)		(0.023)	
Married	0.043	0.691	0.044	0.684	0.202	0.027	0.205	0.026
	(0.108)		(0.109)		(0.092)		(0.092)	
Nonwhite	-0.053	0.725	-0.043	0.767	-0.059	0.671	-0.045	0.741
	(0.150)		(0.146)		(0.138)		(0.136)	
Television	0.267	0.011	0.268	0.011	0.167	0.046	0.169	0.043
News	(0.105)		(0.105)		(0.083)		(0.083)	
Democrat	0.199	0.108	0.199	0.105	0.417	0.001	0.417	0.001
	(0.124)		(0.123)		(0.122)		(0.121)	
Republican	0.269	0.035	0.271	0.033	0.169	0.319	0.172	0.309
	(0.128)		(0.127)		(0.169)		(0.169)	
Interest	0.376	0.001	0.379	0.001	0.511	0.001	0.516	0.001
	(0.092)		(0.093)		(0.076)		(0.077)	
State	0.001	0.041	0.001	0.041	0.001	0.351	0.001	0.363
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.006	0.741	-0.006	0.737	-0.004	0.791	-0.004	0.785
Legislature	(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.015)		(0.015)	
Constant	-2.939	0.001	-3.022	0.001	-3.374	0.001	-3.500	0.001
	(0.585)		(0.597)		(0.456)		(0.470)	
Men Better Described by Trait (1)								
Internet	0.063	0.137	0.059	0.189	0.090	0.013	0.119	0.006
Index	(0.043)		(0.045)		(0.036)		(0.044)	
Female	-0.128	0.018	-0.144	0.080	-0.127	0.062	-0.078	0.423
	(0.054)		(0.082)		(0.068)		(0.098)	
Female*	-	-	0.013	0.805	-	-	-0.060	0.242
Index			(0.052)				(0.051)	
Age	0.023	0.001	0.023	0.001	0.021	0.001	0.021	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Income	0.056	0.001	0.057	0.001	0.038	0.024	0.038	0.025
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.017)	

Table 5.6: Continued

Education	0.048	0.124	0.048	0.123	-0.011	0.769	-0.011	0.773
	(0.031)		(0.031)		(0.036)		(0.036)	
Married	-0.083	0.309	-0.082	0.311	0.064	0.455	0.065	0.445
	(0.081)		(0.081)		(0.085)		(0.085)	
Nonwhite	-0.004	0.975	-0.004	0.975	-0.066	0.578	-0.061	0.604
	(0.137)		(0.136)		(0.118)		(0.117)	
Television	0.098	0.318	0.099	0.313	0.129	0.243	0.130	0.234
News	(0.098)		(0.098)		(0.110)		(0.109)	
Democrat	-0.140	0.154	-0.141	0.151	-0.038	0.749	-0.038	0.746
	(0.098)		(0.098)		(0.117)		(0.118)	
Republican	0.601	0.001	0.601	0.001	0.672	0.001	0.673	0.001
	(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.117)		(0.117)	
Interest	0.409	0.001	0.407	0.001	0.508	0.001	0.507	0.001
	(0.087)		(0.087)		(0.093)		(0.093)	
State	-0.001	0.093	-0.001	0.092	-0.001	0.007	-0.001	0.007
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.039	0.004	-0.039	0.004	-0.025	0.013	-0.025	0.013
Legislature	(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.010)		(0.010)	
Constant	-2.034	0.001	-2.022	0.001	-2.569	0.001	-2.601	0.001
	(0.470)		(0.484)		(0.393)		(0.401)	
N	7057		7057		7059		7059	
Log-likelihood	-7184.6		-7181.9		-7065.7		-7061.4	
Pseudo R^2	0.061		0.061		0.065		0.066	

Note: Unstandardized multinomial regression coefficients reported. Value of 0 "no difference between the candidates" is the reference category. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 5.7: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2008 (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) By Internet Index (Baseline Models)

	Predicted Probability of Holding Stereotyped Opinion
Less Knowledgeable	
Index=+1 SD	28.4%
Index=mean	28.3%
Index Value=-1 SD	28%
Δ (high-low)	*+0.4*
Inexperienced	
Index=+1 SD	30.1%
Index=mean	30%
Index Value=-1 SD	29.9%
Δ (high-low)	*+0.2*

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.8: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) by Internet Index in 2008 (Interaction Models)

	Male	Female	*Difference (F-M)*
Less Knowledgeable			
Index=+1 SD	29.9%	27%	*-2.9*
Index=mean	29.8%	26.7%	*-3.1*
Index Value=-1 SD	29.7%	26.3%	*-3.4*
Difference (high-low)	*+0.2*	*+0.7*	
Inexperienced			
Index=+1 SD	30.5%	29.8%	*-0.7*
Index=mean	31.2%	29%	*-2.2*
Index Value=-1 SD	31.7%	28.1%	*-3.6*
Difference (high-low)	*-1.2*	*+1.7*	

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.9: Predicting Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2010 by Political Blog

	Less Competent		Less Competent		Lacks Integrity		Lacks Integrity	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Women Better Described by Trait (-1)								
Political Blog	0.320 (0.097)	0.001	0.430 (0.207)	0.038	0.294 (0.112)	0.009	0.367 (0.171)	0.032
Female	-0.064 (0.118)	0.589	-0.013 (0.149)	0.928	-0.017 (0.112)	0.880	0.021 (0.131)	0.875
Female* Blog	-	-	-0.271 (0.383)	0.480	-	-	-0.187 (0.269)	0.486
Age	0.023 (0.005)	0.001	0.023 (0.005)	0.001	0.016 (0.006)	0.003	0.016 (0.006)	0.004
Income	0.033 (0.029)	0.253	0.033 (0.029)	0.243	-0.004 (0.026)	0.870	-0.004 (0.025)	0.875
Education	0.094 (0.045)	0.036	0.093 (0.044)	0.035	0.105 (0.050)	0.035	0.104 (0.049)	0.034
Married	-0.160 (0.137)	0.241	-0.161 (0.137)	0.241	-0.144 (0.129)	0.264	-0.144 (0.130)	0.267
Nonwhite	-0.363 (0.169)	0.032	-0.365 (0.170)	0.032	-0.408 (0.199)	0.041	-0.409 (0.199)	0.040
Television news	0.009 (0.144)	0.950	0.007 (0.145)	0.959	-0.043 (0.135)	0.749	-0.043 (0.135)	0.750
Democrat	0.946 (0.263)	0.001	0.952 (0.267)	0.001	0.981 (0.229)	0.001	0.986 (0.230)	0.001
Republican	0.713 (0.257)	0.006	0.720 (0.261)	0.006	0.512 (0.239)	0.032	0.517 (0.240)	0.031
Interest	0.429 (0.107)	0.001	0.428 (0.107)	0.001	0.436 (0.105)	0.001	0.435 (0.105)	0.001
State Population	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007
% Female Legislature	0.005 (0.017)	0.788	0.005 (0.017)	0.789	0.006 (0.012)	0.604	0.006 (0.012)	0.601
Constant	-2.923 (0.712)	0.001	-2.936 (0.712)	0.001	-2.382 (0.613)	0.001	-2.395 (0.612)	0.001
Men Better Described by Trait (1)								
Political Blog	0.433 (0.126)	0.001	0.598 (0.195)	0.002	0.266 (0.113)	0.018	0.362 (0.168)	0.031
Female	-0.049 (0.119)	0.682	0.040 (0.123)	0.743	-0.031 (0.106)	0.770	0.023 (0.116)	0.842
Female* Blog	-	-	-0.413 (0.315)	0.189	-	-	-0.251 (0.257)	0.328
Age	0.028 (0.005)	0.001	0.028 (0.005)	0.001	0.022 (0.005)	0.001	0.022 (0.005)	0.001
Income	0.046 (0.023)	0.046	0.046 (0.023)	0.044	0.020 (0.021)	0.349	0.020 (0.022)	0.345

Table 5.9: Continued

Education	0.099	0.009	0.098	0.010	0.070	0.059	0.070	0.061
	(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.037)	
Married	-0.165	0.164	-0.165	0.164	-0.115	0.418	-0.115	0.422
	(0.119)		(0.119)		(0.142)		(0.143)	
Nonwhite	-0.182	0.297	-0.184	0.292	-0.296	0.108	-0.297	0.104
	(0.174)		(0.174)		(0.184)		(0.183)	
Television	-0.054	0.617	-0.056	0.604	-0.067	0.652	-0.066	0.654
News	(0.108)		(0.108)		(0.147)		(0.147)	
Democrat	0.060	0.775	0.069	0.743	0.173	0.367	0.179	0.349
	(0.210)		(0.212)		(0.191)		(0.191)	
Republican	1.278	0.001	1.289	0.001	1.006	0.001	1.013	0.001
	(0.241)		(0.243)		(0.196)		(0.199)	
Interest	0.420	0.001	0.419	0.001	0.433	0.001	0.432	0.001
	(0.078)		(0.078)		(0.094)		(0.094)	
State	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.151	-0.001	0.141
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.002	0.884	0.002	0.888	0.008	0.470	0.008	0.465
Legislature	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Constant	-3.023	0.001	-3.055	0.001	-2.742	0.001	-2.764	0.001
	(0.547)		(0.553)		(0.503)		(0.504)	
N	6573		6573		5438		5438	
Log-likelihood	-6206.3		-6203.7		-5282.2		-5281.35	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.107		0.082		0.082	

Note: Unstandardized multinomial regression coefficients reported. Value of 0 "no difference between the candidates" is the reference category. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 5.10: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2010 (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) By Political Blogs (baseline models)

	Predicted Probability of Holding Stereotyped Opinion
Less Competent	
Reads Political Blogs	49.8%
Doesn't Read Blogs	45.2%
Difference (read-doesn't)	*+4.6*
Lacks Integrity	
Reads Political Blogs	44.3%
Doesn't Read Blogs	43.2%
Difference (read-doesn't)	*+1.1*

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.11: Predicted Probability of Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2010 (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) By Political Blogs

	Male	Female	*Difference (F-M)*
Less Competent			
Reads Political Blogs	51.1%	47.5%	*-3.6*
Doesn't Read Blogs	44.6%	45.9%	*+1.3*
Difference (read-doesn't)	*+6.5*	*+1.6*	
Lacks Integrity			
Reads Political Blogs	45.2%	42.8%	*-2.4*
Doesn't Read Blogs	43.1%	42.2%	*-0.9*
Difference (read-doesn't)	*+2.1*	*+0.6*	

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.12: Predicting Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2010 by Internet Index

	Less Competent		Less Competent		Lacks Integrity		Lacks Integrity	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Women Better Described by Trait (-1)								
Internet	0.266	0.006	0.348	0.041	0.287	0.001	0.293	0.013
Index	(0.097)		(0.171)		(0.090)		(0.118)	
Female	-0.049	0.676	0.056	0.783	0.001	0.999	0.009	0.954
	(0.117)		(0.203)		(0.110)		(0.156)	
Female*	-	-	-0.192	0.432	-	-	-0.014	0.929
Index			(0.245)				(0.162)	
Age	0.024	0.001	0.024	0.001	0.017	0.003	0.017	0.003
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Income	0.030	0.296	0.030	0.296	-0.008	0.747	-0.008	0.747
	(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Education	0.086	0.046	0.085	0.045	0.096	0.048	0.096	0.047
	(0.043)		(0.042)		(0.049)		(0.048)	
Married	-0.146	0.279	-0.148	0.279	-0.129	0.314	-0.129	0.315
	(0.135)		(0.136)		(0.128)		(0.128)	
Nonwhite	-0.354	0.034	-0.355	0.035	-0.394	0.048	-0.394	0.048
	(0.167)		(0.168)		(0.199)		(0.199)	
Television	-0.007	0.961	-0.007	0.960	-0.061	0.650	-0.061	0.650
News	(0.145)		(0.146)		(0.134)		(0.134)	
Democrat	0.936	0.001	0.940	0.001	0.965	0.001	0.965	0.001
	(0.262)		(0.265)		(0.228)		(0.228)	
Republican	0.711	0.006	0.717	0.007	0.500	0.035	0.500	0.035
	(0.259)		(0.264)		(0.237)		(0.238)	
Interest	0.405	0.001	0.404	0.001	0.409	0.001	0.409	0.001
	(0.112)		(0.112)		(0.109)		(0.109)	
State	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.005
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.004	0.830	0.004	0.820	0.005	0.696	0.005	0.694
Legislature	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Constant	-2.875	0.001	-2.925	0.001	-2.323	0.001	-2.327	0.001
	(0.710)		(0.714)		(0.606)		(0.600)	
Men Better Described by Trait (1)								
Internet	0.305	0.001	0.383	0.010	0.270	0.001	0.271	0.025
Index	(0.087)		(0.149)		(0.078)		(0.121)	
Female	-0.036	0.752	0.064	0.672	-0.014	0.888	-0.013	0.924
	(0.113)		(0.152)		(0.102)		(0.142)	
Female*	-	-	-0.186	0.374	-	-	-0.003	0.984
Index			(0.209)				(0.174)	
Age	0.028	0.001	0.028	0.001	0.023	0.001	0.023	0.001
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Income	0.042	0.065	0.042	0.065	0.017	0.441	0.017	0.442
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.021)	

Table 5.12: Continued

Education	0.092	0.014	0.092	0.014	0.062	0.112	0.062	0.113
	(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.039)		(0.039)	
Married	-0.150	0.203	-0.151	0.203	-0.100	0.489	-0.100	0.489
	(0.117)		(0.119)		(0.144)		(0.144)	
Nonwhite	-0.177	0.312	-0.178	0.310	-0.282	0.128	-0.282	0.128
	(0.175)		(0.175)		(0.185)		(0.185)	
Television	-0.072	0.504	-0.073	0.504	-0.081	0.577	-0.081	0.578
News	(0.108)		(0.108)		(0.145)		(0.145)	
Democrat	0.048	0.820	0.053	0.804	0.157	0.417	0.157	0.416
	(0.212)		(0.213)		(0.193)		(0.193)	
Republican	1.272	0.001	1.278	0.001	0.994	0.001	0.995	0.001
	(0.246)		(0.248)		(0.197)		(0.199)	
Interest	0.401	0.001	0.400	0.001	0.408	0.001	0.408	0.001
	(0.081)		(0.081)		(0.094)		(0.094)	
State	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.135	-0.001	0.135
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.001	0.930	0.001	0.919	0.006	0.557	0.006	0.556
Legislature	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Constant	-2.981	0.001	-3.029	0.001	-2.690	0.001	-2.690	0.001
	(0.546)		(0.553)		(0.499)		(0.505)	
N	6573		6573		5438		5438	
Log-likelihood	-6200.4		-6198.4		-5272.9		-5272.9	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.107		0.084		0.084	

Note: Unstandardized multinomial regression coefficients reported. Value of 0 "no difference between the candidates" is the reference category. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 5.13: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) in 2010 by Internet Index (Baseline Models)

	Predicted Probability of Holding Stereotyped Opinion
Less Competent	
Internet Index= 2	49.6%
Internet Index= 1	47.3%
Internet Index= 0	44.6%
Difference (2-0)	*+5*
Lacks Integrity	
Internet Index= 2	45.1%
Internet Index= 1	44%
Internet Index= 0	42.5%
Difference (2-0)	*+2.6*

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.14: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) in 2010 by Internet Index (Interactive Models)

	Male	Female	*Difference (F-M)*
Less Competent			
Index=2	49.9%	48.9%	*-1*
Index=1	47.4%	47%	*-0.4*
Index Value=0	44.4%	45%	*+0.6*
Difference (2-0)	*+5.5*	*+3.9*	
Lacks Integrity			
Index=2	45.2%	45.1%	*-0.1*
Index=1	44.1%	43.8%	*-0.3*
Index Value=0	42.7%	42.2%	*-0.5*
Difference (2-0)	*+2.5*	*+2.9*	

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.15: Predicting Holding Stereotyped Opinions in 2012 by Internet Index

	Less Competent		Less Competent		Less Caring		Less Caring	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Women Better Described by Trait (-1)								
Internet	0.158	0.805	-0.556	0.510	0.948	0.056	1.160	0.195
Index	(0.638)		(0.843)		(0.495)		(0.895)	
Female	-0.083	0.904	-1.315	0.141	-0.693	0.229	-0.503	0.573
	(0.690)		(0.894)		(0.577)		(0.892)	
Female*	-	-	1.806	0.018	-	-	-0.345	0.696
Index			(0.765)				(0.884)	
Age	-0.012	0.453	-0.015	0.373	0.007	0.699	0.008	0.674
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.018)	
Income	0.046	0.727	0.012	0.920	-0.133	0.374	-0.128	0.381
	(0.131)		(0.119)		(0.150)		(0.145)	
Education	0.453	0.101	0.520	0.080	0.386	0.141	0.376	0.152
	(0.276)		(0.297)		(0.262)		(0.262)	
Married	0.547	0.389	0.820	0.218	0.521	0.246	0.449	0.311
	(0.635)		(0.666)		(0.449)		(0.443)	
Nonwhite	-0.485	0.337	-0.592	0.255	-0.588	0.224	-0.558	0.255
	(0.506)		(0.520)		(0.484)		(0.491)	
Democrat	-0.085	0.901	-0.187	0.778	-1.025	0.224	-1.015	0.226
	(0.677)		(0.666)		(0.843)		(0.839)	
Republican	-0.552	0.476	-0.642	0.308	-1.359	0.020	-1.341	0.021
	(0.775)		(0.630)		(0.584)		(0.580)	
Interest	0.337	0.261	0.262	0.388	0.157	0.629	0.176	0.576
	(0.300)		(0.303)		(0.324)		(0.315)	
State	-0.001	0.169	-0.001	0.232	-0.001	0.853	-0.001	0.858
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.021	0.618	-0.013	0.777	-0.055	0.187	-0.054	0.170
Legislature	(0.042)		(0.044)		(0.041)		(0.040)	
Constant	0.460	0.737	0.955	0.566	1.955	0.291	1.786	0.310
	(1.372)		(1.667)		(1.852)		(1.760)	
Men Better Described by Trait (1)								
Internet	0.623	0.303	0.470	0.581	0.605	0.274	0.953	0.274
Index	(0.605)		(0.853)		(0.553)		(0.871)	
Female	1.267	0.095	0.943	0.202	-0.736	0.221	-0.367	0.683
	(0.759)		(0.739)		(0.601)		(0.900)	
Female*	-	-	0.764	0.426	-	-	-0.607	0.521
Index			(0.960)				(0.946)	
Age	-0.028	0.122	-0.027	0.113	0.034	0.093	0.035	0.085
	(0.018)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.020)	
Income	-0.097	0.507	-0.127	0.354	-0.158	0.316	-0.156	0.313
	(0.147)		(0.137)		(0.157)		(0.154)	
Education	0.137	0.619	0.172	0.551	-0.015	0.958	-0.029	0.915
	(0.275)		(0.288)		(0.279)		(0.274)	

Table 5.15: Continued

Married	0.498	0.367	0.595	0.257	0.725	0.145	0.625	0.214
	(0.552)		(0.525)		(0.498)		(0.503)	
Nonwhite	-1.166	0.033	-1.150	0.043	-0.873	0.085	-0.840	0.107
	(0.548)		(0.568)		(0.506)		(0.522)	
Democrat	-0.061	0.942	-0.128	0.876	-0.944	0.175	-0.939	0.168
	(0.835)		(0.820)		(0.696)		(0.682)	
Republican	0.400	0.503	0.304	0.590	-0.371	0.607	-0.376	0.602
	(0.597)		(0.565)		(0.721)		(0.721)	
Interest	0.662	0.024	0.634	0.028	-0.045	0.901	-0.019	0.958
	(0.293)		(0.289)		(0.363)		(0.355)	
State	-0.001	0.109	-0.001	0.093	-0.001	0.278	-0.001	0.296
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.019	0.646	-0.018	0.655	-0.104	0.004	-0.106	0.002
Legislature	(0.042)		(0.040)		(0.036)		(0.035)	
Constant	0.904	0.477	0.994	0.493	3.835	0.032	3.624	0.036
	(1.271)		(1.450)		(1.792)		(1.730)	
N	149		149		196		196	
Log-likelihood	-122.74		-120.18		-168.31		-168.05	
Pseudo R^2	0.176		0.193		0.138		0.139	

Note: Unstandardized multinomial regression coefficients reported. Value of 0 "no difference between the candidates" is the reference category. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 5.16: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) in 2012 By Internet Index (Baseline Models)

	Predicted Probability of Holding Stereotyped Opinion
Less Competent	
Index=2	32.4%
Index=1	38.3%
Index Value=0	41.8%
Difference (2-0)	*-9.4*
Less Caring	
Index=2	43.9%
Index=1	32.4%
Index Value=0	22.7%
Difference (2-0)	*+21.2*

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Table 5.17: Predicted Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions (value of 1 on the stereotyping scale) by Internet Index in 2012 (Interactive Models)

	Male	Female	*Difference (F-M)*
Less Competent			
Index=2	37.5%	27.5%	*-10*
Index=1	40.9%	35.2%	*-5.7*
Index Value=0	41.5%	41.2%	*-0.3*
Difference (2-0)	*-4*	*-13.7*	
Less Caring			
Index=2	38.8%	50.3%	*+11.5*
Index=1	20.5%	48.4%	*+27.9*
Index Value=0	9.1%	42.3%	*+33.2*
Difference (2-0)	*+29.7*	*+8*	

Note: All other variables set at their mean value.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of Base Variables for Gender Stereotype of "Less Experienced"



Figure 5.2: Full Distribution of Stereotype Variable "Inexperienced" (Man candidate-Woman Candidate)



Figure 5.3: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Inexperienced (2008) (Man candidate-Woman candidate)



Figure 5.4: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Lacks Knowledge (2008) (Man candidate-Woman Candidate)



Figure 5.5: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Less Competent (2010) (Man candidate-woman candidate)



Figure 5.6: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Lacks Integrity (2010) (Man candidate-Woman Candidate)



Figure 5.7: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Less Competent (2012 hypothetical)



Figure 5.8: Distribution of Three-Point Variable Less Caring (2012 hypothetical)



CHAPTER 6

DIGITAL MEDIA'S FULL IMPACT ON WOMEN CANDIDATES

Introduction

In the previous chapter I presented the first part of my framework of digital media's impact on support for women candidates for the House. I continue my analyses in this chapter by considering the same datasets as Chapter 5, but incorporate mobilization/engagement and how this may help mitigate the negative effects of digital media on supporting women candidates. In Chapter 5 I found that higher digital media use frequently, but not always, resulted in higher likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions, and with that in mind I add the gender stereotyping variables to mobilization and digital media to create the full model in this chapter.

The analyses in this chapter start with a brief analysis to confirm my mobilization models are consistent with what the mobilization literature would expect. In every year the results show this to be the case. Higher digital media usage results in individuals being more mobilized and engaged in politics. However, mobilization and engagement in the full models increases support for women candidates for the U.S. House in 2008, is marginally significant and negative in 2010, and decreases the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate in 2012. In every comprehensive model holding stereotyped opinions reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate, except for the trait of less competent in 2012 when digital media usage is low.

This chapter starts with a brief overview of the relevant literature not already discussed in other parts of this project, outlines the expectations for digital media and the comprehensive framework, details the data sources used, and then turns to the findings.

Women Candidates and Mobilization

While previous chapters have discussed how digital media can increase mobilization and engagement, this chapter is specifically interested in how digital media and mobilization will impact support for women candidates in inter-gender U.S. House races. There are contradictory findings in the women in politics literature on how a woman candidate can change engagement and participation among the public. Atkeson (2003) finds that women candidates can increase political engagement among women citizens. She uses senatorial and gubernatorial races, and her measures of engagement include political efficacy, interest, discussing the campaign, etc. Dolan (2008) on the other hand finds that women candidates do not by their mere presence increase mobilization/ engagement of the public. Her data all come from House and Senate races, and she measures engagement by studying turnout, efficacy, interest, influencing others to vote, and "participation". Neither of these articles considers digital media; however, digital media could change the participation/engagement/mobilization findings as it can influence both how the public learns about women candidates and how the public interacts with women candidates.

Previous research has found that the traditional variables used to predict offline mobilization do not predict who is mobilized online, thus it is entirely plausible that information seen online, and messages received online are different than those received offline (Krueger 2006). The use of microtargeting and targeted messages has increased dramatically since the advent of the Internet, and this allows women candidates to tailor messages to specific supporters (Hillygus & Shields 2008). New work has shown that when individuals are presented with women candidates their search for information

changes, and they focus more on competency related information (Ditonto, Hamilton & Redlawsk 2013). The argument that digital media can change how individuals learn about candidates when mobilized online is valid as the information they encounter online is more likely to be targeted to gain their support.

Expectations

The first half of this chapter investigates how my digital media measures used in the previous chapter impact mobilization/engagement of the public in 2008, 2010 and 2012, to ensure my results are similar to previous work. This is the top arc of Figure 2.3.

H6.1: Higher digital media usage will result in higher mobilization scores.

Once this brief confirmation is done, I turn to building complete models to test my full framework that was laid out in Chapter 2. To do this I incorporate digital media, gender stereotyped opinions, mobilization, and individual and state level control variables to test their differing influence on the likelihood of voting for a woman candidate. Thus expectations from my framework to be tested on the full model are listed below.

H6.2: Digital media and gender stereotyping will reduce the likelihood of voting for women candidates.

H6.3: Digital media and mobilization will increase the likelihood of voting for women candidates.

H6.4: The net effect of digital media will depend on the relative weights of stereotyping and mobilization on support.

Data/Variables

The data sources and the variable coding used in this chapter are the same as what was presented in Chapter 5, with the exception of adding mobilization measures and considering vote choice. Table 6.1 provides the three measures of mobilization considered in this chapter, while Table 6.2 provides summary statistics of the mobilization index variables. Thus, this section explains the new variables added, and briefly discuss the other key independent and dependent variables. For detailed information about the other variables please see Chapter 5.

2008 CCES

The mobilization/engagement measure used from the 2008 CCES is an additive index of five activities. Respondents were asked "Have you…" with the five activities I consider are: attend a meeting, persuade someone to vote, post a political sign, worked or volunteered for a campaign, and donated money. Each of these variables was a 0,-did not do, 1-did the activity. Thus mobilization for the 2008 analyses is a 0-5 point scale. The scale has a mean of 1.6 and a standard deviation of 1.4. The distribution is presented in Figure 6.1. The modal category for both male and female respondents is "one activity". 29% of female respondents reported doing zero of the activities, while only 21% of men reported doing none of them.

Digital media is measured as an additive index political blogs, comment on blogs, and news websites. Gender stereotyping is measured in two ways[34]. First is a "difference"

[34] Creating an index of holding gender stereotyped opinions (adding the two traits for each year together) does not produce different results. For ease of understanding which trait variable is driving support for the woman candidate I chose to report models with the traits separately. The models with this stereotyping index are available upon request from the author.

variable between men and women candidates' perceived experience to hold office. Second is a "difference" variable on whether the candidates' are knowledgeable to hold office. There are interactive terms included in the complete models between the digital media and the gender stereotyping variables, and a second interaction term between the digital media and mobilization variables. For modeling mobilization I include an interactive term between respondent gender and digital media usage.

Finally, vote choice is whether respondents voted for the woman candidate. This dependent variable of vote choice was asked post-election. The respondent was asked who they voted for in their House race, with responses coded as "Democratic candidate" "Republican candidate" "third party" "other" etc. Individuals who did not vote for one of the major party candidates were excluded from the analyses. From this vote variable I matched candidate gender to the party respondents voted for. After excluding same gender races, I have a vote variable that is "did the respondent vote for the woman candidate" regardless of which party the woman was from. For vote choice I also control for whether the woman candidate was the incumbent for the seat[35].

2010 CCES

The mobilization/engagement measure used from the 2010 CCES is an additive index of four activities. Like 2008, respondents were asked "Have you done…" with four of the five from 2008 being asked again on this survey. The only difference is respondents were not asked if they persuaded someone else to vote. Thus I have a 0-4

[35] Incumbency is insignificant in 2008, and thus is not run in 2010 or 2012 as it is highly collinear with two other key variables. Changing the models to allow Stata to run them including incumbency reduces the comparability between the years and when this is done incumbency is still insignificant.

point scale of attended a meeting, put up a political sign, worked or volunteered for a campaign, and donated money. This scale has a mean of 0.91. Figure 6.2 presents the distribution of this variable by respondent gender. Unlike 2008, in 2010 almost 60% female respondents did none of the mobilization activities. Among male respondents zero activities is still the modal category; however, the percentage is much lower (45%).

Digital media usage for 2010 is measured in two ways: did respondents read political blogs, and an additive index of use (read blog, news website). For the 2010 survey trait stereotyping I use two difference variables to measure holding gender stereotyped opinions. The traits considered are competency and integrity[36]. As with 2008 I also include in the complete vote choice models interactive terms between digital media and gender stereotyping, and between digital media and mobilization. In the mobilization models I include an interaction between digital media use and respondent gender.

The final dependent variable considered for this dataset is whether an individual voted for the woman candidate in the races where a woman was running for one of the two major parties. With the variety of inter-gendered campaigns in 2010 we have approximately an equal number of respondents in each category of the vote (51% report voting for the male candidate, 49% report voting for the female candidate).

2012 CCES

The 2012 mobilization measure is exactly the same as in the 2010 dataset. It is an additive index of the same four "activity" questions. However, 57% of respondents reported doing none of the four activities. Table 6.3 presents these results by respondent

[36] As with 2008, creating an index of gender stereotyped opinions from the two trait variables does not change the results, and makes it more difficult to determine which of the traits is more substantively interesting. Results are available upon request.

gender. Again there is a significant difference in having been mobilized between the genders, but it is less drastic than the difference in 2010.

Digital media is measured by an index of political emails and being a digital citizen. Gender stereotyping is measured by the experimental traits of caring and competent. I include appropriate interactive terms as discussed with the other datasets. Vote choice is again did the respondent vote for the woman candidate created in the same way as the 2010 vote choice variable.

Results

The results presented are divided into two sections. First I present models for whether digital media increase the likelihood of being mobilized/ engaged. After this, I create comprehensive models to test the full competing pathways framework. Table 6.3 presents a summary of the results for Section 1, while Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present summary results for Section 2. The key finding in Section 1 is that digital media behaves as expected and increases the likelihood of being mobilized.

Section 2's findings are more complex. An increase in holding gender stereotyped opinions reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate except for if the woman candidate is seen as less caring. Mobilization behaves as expected in 2008, but is significant and negatively correlated with voting for the woman candidate in 2010 and 2012. These results are similar to the findings on Clinton. Finally, digital media's effect is dependent on the model. There is no consistent finding for digital media's independent effect on the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate.

Section1: Digital Media and Mobilization

As presented in Table 6.3 the results in this section match the expectations derived from the digital media and mobilization literature. Digital media use in the baseline wave increases the likelihood of being mobilized in the second wave. It should be noted that the models presented in this section are poisson count models, as the dependent variable of mobilization is a count variable. Running these dependent variables with OLS regression models do not change the result, nor does running them as negative binomial regressions.

Table 6.6 presents the results for mobilization in 2008. An increase on the Internet index measure of digital media corresponds to an increase in the likelihood of being mobilized. There is no significant interaction with respondent gender. Wealthier, higher educated, and single individuals were all more likely to be mobilized in 2008. Partisans and respondents who watched television news were also more likely to be mobilized. Finally, respondents who reported a high interest in politics were more likely to be mobilized and engaged than respondents who were not interested. These results are generally what the mobilization literature would expect.

Table 6.7 presents the results for 2010. As with 2008 higher Internet index values increased the likelihood of having engaged in at least one of the four activities. The digital media measure of reading political blogs behaves the same way. The interaction with respondent gender is now significant. As we saw in Figure 6.2, there was a significant difference in mobilization by gender for 2010. Men were more likely to be mobilized than women, and political blog readers were more likely to be mobilized than non-readers, and the interaction tells us that women who were blog readers were

significantly more likely to be mobilized than women who were not blog readers. The control variables again behaved as expected, with the state level variables also becoming significant in the midterm election.

Mobilization in 2012 conforms less to what the mobilization literature would expect. The results of digital media use's effect on mobilization are available in Table 6.8. Increased digital media use increased the likelihood of being mobilized and engaged in the base model, but not when interacted. Respondent gender is never significant. These results are not surprising given the distribution of the dependent variable presented in Figure 6.3. Higher educated were more likely to be mobilized, as were respondents who are politically interested. Even with many of the control variables being insignificant in 2012, the key predictors of mobilization (education, interest) were significant and in the correct direction. The null results for partisanship, age etc. could be due to the small sample, or due to the low rate of mobilization reported in 2012. Regardless, the three variables for mobilization and the various digital media measures in this section perform as expected and support H6.1, and will thus be used to build the comprehensive models in the next section.

Section 2: Building a Comprehensive Model of Digital Media's Effect on Support for Women Candidates

The results in this section are ordered chronologically. Thus I consider voting for the woman candidate in 2008, 2010, and end with the hypothetical traits in 2012. Table 6.4 reports the findings for the three independent variables of interest from the baseline models for each year. Table 6.5 reports the findings for the models with gender

stereotyping and mobilization interacted with digital media. While there are some results that increase the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate, in general the results are not supportive of women candidates' attempts to gain office. Holding gender stereotyped opinions reduce support, being online could help or hurt women candidates' chances, and mobilization's effect is also dependent on digital media use.

2008 Vote Choice

Table 6.9 reports logistic regression models (using survey weights and with the standard errors clustered by state) on the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate in 2008[37]. In the base models digital media use, measured by the Internet index, is insignificant, while the two gender stereotyping traits are significant and negative. Mobilization is significant and positive. Wealthier respondents, Democrats, politically interested respondents, and individuals who watched TV news were all more likely to vote for the woman candidate. Surprisingly, incumbency is insignificant. Finally, respondents in larger states were slightly less likely to have voted for the woman candidates ($p<0.085$).

To understand the interactive effects, predicted probabilities were run on model 2. Table 6.10 reports the interaction for Internet index. The first finding that is supportive of the hypotheses outlined above is that both gender stereotyping traits reduce the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate as level of stereotyping increased. Higher values of digital media usage increase the likelihood of voting for the woman across all models. The trait stereotype of less knowledgeable is highly predictive of voting for the

[37] Multilevel models of these logistic regression models were also run. Using the state variables as the second level does not produce significant differences from the models presented here. They are available upon request.

woman candidate. Respondents who reported the man candidate being more knowledgeable were over 50% less likely to vote for the woman as compared to respondents who perceived the woman candidate as more knowledgeable.

To test that these results on supporting women candidates are not a product of the woman candidate being more qualified because she chose to run for office and (probably) faced a primary challenger I consider one model that subsamples respondents who were in districts with two women running against each other. In Table A11 in the appendix I report a series of models that consider whether respondents in these women versus women races voted for one of the women candidates (coded 1) versus voted for a third party, did not vote in this race, and did not vote at all (coded 0). Many of the predictors of turnout are significant and in the proper direction. Reading political blogs reduced the likelihood of voting in these races, as did believing the Republican woman was more experienced than the Democratic woman candidate. These results are supportive of the opinion that voting for the woman candidate in these inter-gender races is not simply a product of the woman candidate being more qualified and experienced.

2010 Vote Choice

Several of the results in 2010 are similar to those in 2008; however, the data do not provide support for every hypothesis. Table 6.11 presents the logistic regression models for voting for the woman candidate by the digital media measures of reads political blogs and Internet index. In the base models the digital media measures are insignificant, as is the mobilization index. The gender stereotyping variables of less competent and less integrity behave as expected, with both driving down support for the

woman candidate. Unlike in 2008, income, watching television news, and state population are not significant. In 2010 older respondents, higher educated, Democrats, and those who were interested in politics, were more likely to have voted for the woman candidate.

Predicted probabilities were run on the interactive effects the same way they were for 2008. Table 6.12 reports the predicted probability of voting for the woman candidate by reading political blogs, while 6.13 reports the probability by the Internet index. In Table 6.12 we see that an increase of holding gender stereotyped opinions significantly reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman regardless of reading blogs. Reading blogs increases the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate when interacted with the less competent trait, but reduces support when interacted with less integrity and mobilization. An increase in mobilization among blog readers increases the likelihood of voting for the woman, but reduces the likelihood among non-blog readers.

The results in Table 6.13 are similar, with one key difference—that of digital media's effect. An increase from -1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation for the Internet index variable results in less support for the woman candidate when interacted with mobilization and the trait of less competent, but increases support when interacted with integrity. The interactions with the two traits results in opposite findings between reading blogs and the Internet index. In terms of expectations, gender trait stereotyping behaves as expected, and mobilization among high Internet users behaves as expected, but the results for low online users is counter expectations.

2012 Vote Choice

With 2008 supporting the hypotheses derived from the framework, and 2010 providing support for many of them, let us now turn to the last dataset considered. Unlike the previous two datasets the gender trait stereotyping measures used in these comprehensive models comes from hypothetical candidates. Thus hypothetical candidates' trait evaluations were turned into two stereotyping variables (less caring and less competent) and these scales are used to predict support for real women candidates. The results from these models are much more mixed than the previous years, which is not surprising as respondents could not have used the Internet to find any information about the traits of the hypothetical candidates.

In the baseline model the Internet index is not a significant predictor of vote choice. Neither is either of the stereotyping variables. Mobilization is significant, but is negative. In the baseline model higher educated respondents were more likely to vote for the woman candidate. Democrats were significantly more likely to vote for the woman candidate, and Republicans were significantly less likely to vote for her as compared to Independents. Political interest is surprisingly not significant. With the very small sample in these models adding the interactive terms reduce education to insignificance; however, income becomes significant (wealthier more likely to vote for the woman candidate). With the interactions the trait variables of less caring and its interaction with digital media become significant.

Predicted probabilities were run similar to the previous two years to understand the substantive impact of these findings. Table 6.15 reports the predicted probability of voting for the woman candidate in 2012 by the Internet index. An increased value on the

trait of less caring reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate among high digital media users, but increases the likelihood of voting for the woman among low Internet users.

At low levels of the gender stereotyping variables (women perceived as more caring and more competent) increased digital media use significantly increases the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate (+67.1, +8.1). At high levels of the stereotyping traits an increase in digital media reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate (-42.7, -2.3). Among high Internet users an increase in mobilization reduces the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate, but among low Internet users increased mobilization increases the probability of voting for the woman candidate.

Conclusion

In the first section I reported results that corroborate the argument that increased digital media usage results in individuals being more mobilized and engaged in the election. With these results, every part of the competing pathways framework has generally been supported with the one exception of mobilization in 2012 for women congressional candidates.

Unlike in Chapter 4 where I found mobilization had significant negative effects on support for Clinton, mobilization for candidates for the House is shown to increase the likelihood of supporting women candidates in certain circumstances. In 2008 mobilization increased the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate. In 2010 there is an interaction between digital media and mobilization. When digital media use was high mobilization increased support for the woman candidate, but when it was low, it

decreased support. In 2012 mobilization was negative in the base model, but I find a significant positive effect for mobilization on support for women candidates when interacted with the digital media variable. Surprisingly though, this support is found among low digital media users.

Across all years I find that increased gender stereotyped opinions reduces support for women candidates with only two exceptions. The stereotyping trait of "woman candidate is less caring" measured on hypothetical candidates increases the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate, but only among respondents that are low digital media users. Among high digital media users believing the woman to be less caring results in reduced support. Thus women candidates are helped by being perceived as caring, but this effect is conditional on digital media use. The second anomalous finding is for the hypothetical candidate trait of less competent. Among low digital media users believing the woman candidate to be less competent actually increases the likelihood of voting for the woman candidate by 5.9%. While this amount is not trivial, the predicted probability is increasing from 9.5% to 15.4%, still very unlikely to vote for the woman candidate.

The net effect of digital media on support for women candidates in this chapter is negative; however, there are a few instances when the negative of gender stereotyping is (at least partially) mitigated by positive from mobilization. When both holding stereotyped opinions and mobilization result in reduced support the net effect of digital media is clearly negative. When, in a few instances in this chapter, mobilization increased support and stereotyping decreased support the net effect of digital media was still negative. In the models where mobilization is positive the substantive effect of this

increased support is smaller than the substantive negative effect of holding stereotyped opinions (2008 and 2010).

With the analyses for women candidates for congress complete, in the next chapter I combine all the major findings from Clinton's campaign and the congress chapters together to determine what from the competing pathways framework is useful, what could use further testing, and when the framework simply did not work. After this, I conclude this project by considering what all these results mean for women candidates running for office, and whether there are ways to mitigate the negative effects of digital media on support for women candidates.

Table 6.1: Measures of Mobilization

2008	2010	2012
Index of:	Index of:	Index of:
Attend a meeting	Attend a meeting	Attend a meeting
Persuade someone to vote		
Post political sign	Post political sign	Post political sign
Volunteer for campaign	Volunteer for campaign	Volunteer for campaign
Donate money	Donate money	Donate money

Table 6.2: Details of Mobilization Index Variables by Year

	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
2008	0	1.59	5	1.4
2010	0	0.883	4	1.16
2012	0	0.79	4	1.11

Table 6.3: Summary of Results for Political Mobilization (08, 10, 12)

Internet USE	2008	2010	2012
Read Blogs		+	
Internet Index	+	+	+

Note- "+" represents significant findings that increase level of mobilization. NS is not significant. Finally, blank cells had no appropriate analyses.

Table 6.4: Summary of Results for Voting for the Woman Candidate

	Increased likelihood of voting for Woman Candidate	Decreased likelihood
Gender Stereotyping:		
Inexperienced 2008		X
Lacks Knowledge 2008		X
Less Competent 2010 (survey candidate)		X
Lacks Integrity2010		X
Less Competent 2012 (experimental candidate)		Y
Less Caring 2012	X	
Mobilization:		
2008	X	
2010	Y	
2012		Y
Digital Media:		
Internet Index 2008		NS
Read Blogs 2010		NS
Internet Index 2010		X
Internet Index 2012	X	

Note- X represents a statistically significant finding in that column's results. Y represents results conditional on a digital media variable. NS represents a not significant finding. Significance based on predicted probability of voting for the woman candidate from the base models holding all other variables in the respective model constant. Probability changes of 2% or more are considered statistically significant.

Note- While these are the absolute results, there are many significant interactions occurring in the comprehensive models.

Table 6.5: Summary of Results on Voting for the Woman Candidate by Digital Media Measures

	Blog Low	Blog High	Index Low	Index High
Gender Stereotyping:				
Δ Lack Knowledge			-	-
Δ Inexperienced			-	-
Δ Lack Integrity	-	-	-	-
Δ Incompetent (2010)	-	-	-	-
Δ Incompetent (2012)			+	-
Δ Less Caring			+	-
Mobilization:				
Δ Mobilization 2008			+	+
Δ Mobilization 2010	-	+	-	+
Δ Mobilization 2012			+	-

Note- the change variables go from values of -1 to 1, or from -1 SD to +1 SD

Note- + is increasing likelihood of voting for the woman candidate, - is decreasing likelihood of voting for the woman candidate. DC stands for digital citizen in the 2012 models. These predictions are based on the fully interacted models, unlike the previous table.

Table 6.6: Predicting Mobilization in 2008

	Base model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	0.204	0.001	0.197	0.001
	(0.005)		(0.007)	
Female	0.010	0.326	-0.009	0.648
	(0.011)		(0.019)	
Female*	-	-	0.014	0.255
index			(0.012)	
Age	0.001	0.018	0.001	0.021
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.034	0.001	0.034	0.001
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Education	0.050	0.001	0.050	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
Married	-0.061	0.001	-0.061	0.001
	(0.015)		(0.015)	
Nonwhite	0.030	0.047	0.030	0.051
	(0.015)		(0.015)	
Television	0.062	0.001	0.062	0.001
News	(0.016)		(0.016)	
Democrat	0.264	0.001	0.264	0.001
	(0.017)		(0.017)	
Republican	0.125	0.001	0.125	0.001
	(0.020)		(0.020)	
Interest	0.721	0.001	0.720	0.001
	(0.019)		(0.018)	
State	-0.001	0.089	-0.001	0.088
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.002	0.324	-0.002	0.325
Legislature	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Constant	-2.420	0.001	-2.407	0.001
	(0.065)		(0.064)	
N	23768		23768	
Log-Likelihood	-31277		-31276	
Wald Chi^2	11843		12436.6	
Prob>Chi^2	0.001		0.001	

Note- Unstandardized poisson regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 6.7: Predicting Mobilization in 2010

	Political Blogs				*Internet Index*			
	Base model		Interaction		Base model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Digital media	0.378	0.001	0.332	0.001	0.259	0.001	0.227	0.001
	(0.016)		(0.025)		(0.010)		(0.015)	
Female	-0.055	0.001	-0.096	0.001	-0.044	0.008	-0.111	0.001
	(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.017)		(0.025)	
Female*	-	-	0.109	0.002	-	-	0.074	0.001
digital media			(0.035)				(0.021)	
Age	0.010	0.001	0.010	0.001	0.010	0.001	0.010	0.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.045	0.001	0.044	0.001	0.042	0.001	0.042	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Education	0.098	0.001	0.098	0.001	0.091	0.001	0.091	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Married	0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.996	0.004	0.899	0.004	0.892
	(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)	
Nonwhite	0.087	0.001	0.087	0.001	0.094	0.001	0.093	0.001
	(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.027)	
Television	0.116	0.001	0.116	0.001	0.109	0.001	0.109	0.001
News	(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)	
Democrat	0.318	0.001	0.317	0.001	0.309	0.001	0.308	0.001
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.040)		(0.040)	
Republican	0.358	0.001	0.357	0.001	0.365	0.001	0.365	0.001
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.041)	
Interest	0.851	0.001	0.851	0.001	0.826	0.001	0.824	0.001
	(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)	
State	-0.001	0.048	-0.01	0.050	-0.001	0.056	-0.001	0.058
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.005	0.026	0.005	0.025	0.005	0.031	0.005	0.032
Legislature	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Constant	-5.297	0.001	-5.275	0.001	-5.265	0.001	-5.225	0.001
	(0.140)		(0.142)		(0.140)		(0.142)	
N	45606		45606		45606		45606	
Log-Likelihood	-45751.2		-45741		-45660.8		-45648	
Wald Chi^2	3377.57		3499.9		3565.96		3633.4	
Prob>Chi^2	0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001	

Note- Unstandardized poisson regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 6.8: Predicting Mobilization in 2012

	Base model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	0.212	0.049	0.172	0.251
	(0.108)		(0.150)	
Female	0.058	0.697	-0.030	0.934
	(0.148)		(0.359)	
Female*	-	-	0.075	0.738
digital media			(0.223)	
Age	0.011	0.155	0.010	0.173
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Income	0.030	0.326	0.029	0.346
	(0.030)		(0.030)	
Education	0.186	0.001	0.185	0.002
	(0.058)		(0.059)	
Married	0.039	0.837	0.046	0.810
	(0.188)		(0.191)	
Nonwhite	0.149	0.362	0.142	0.409
	(0.164)		(0.172)	
Democrat	0.242	0.274	0.257	0.243
	(0.221)		(0.220)	
Republican	0.117	0.667	0.133	0.606
	(0.272)		(0.258)	
Interest	1.040	0.001	1.037	0.001
	(0.263)		(0.263)	
State	0.001	0.458	0.001	0.504
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.023	0.066	0.023	0.070
Legislature	(0.012)		(0.013)	
Constant	-5.697	0.001	-5.622	0.001
	(0.924)		(1.025)	
N	296		296	
Log-Likelihood	-245.485		-245.434	
Wald Chi^2	131.900		147.925	
Prob>Chi^2	0.001		0.001	

Note- Unstandardized poisson regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table 6.9: Predicting Voting for the Woman Candidate in 2008

	Base Model		Interactions	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	0.026	0.489	0.198	0.001
	(0.038)		(0.056)	
Inexperienced	-0.173	0.010	-0.172	0.078
	(0.067)		(0.098)	
Inexperienced* Index	-	-	-0.005	0.936
			(0.062)	
Less Knowledgeable	-1.491	0.001	-1.497	0.001
	(0.070)		(0.123)	
Knowledge* Index	-	-	0.002	0.984
			(0.078)	
Mobilization	0.115	0.003	0.247	0.001
	(0.039)		(0.048)	
Mobilization* Index	-	-	-0.096	0.001
			(0.020)	
Female	-0.080	0.198	-0.069	0.283
	(0.062)		(0.064)	
Age	0.004	0.184	0.004	0.179
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Income	0.045	0.001	0.044	0.001
	(0.013)		(0.013)	
Education	0.043	0.154	0.039	0.205
	(0.030)		(0.031)	
Married	-0.071	0.514	-0.076	0.490
	(0.110)		(0.109)	
Nonwhite	0.102	0.483	0.079	0.583
	(0.145)		(0.144)	
Television News	0.193	0.020	0.188	0.025
	(0.083)		(0.084)	
Democrat	0.880	0.001	0.874	0.001
	(0.176)		(0.174)	
Republican	-0.274	0.124	-0.295	0.104
	(0.178)		(0.181)	
Interest	0.775	0.001	0.732	0.001
	(0.074)		(0.076)	
Incumbent	-0.079	0.653	-0.083	0.642
	(0.175)		(0.178)	
State Population	-0.001	0.070	-0.001	0.073
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	0.001	0.956	0.001	0.910
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Constant	-3.722	0.001	-3.764	0.001
	(0.341)		(0.346)	
N	5679		5679	

Table 6.9: Continued

Log-likelihood	-2726.1	-2718.2
Pseudo R^2	0.278	0.28

Note- Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 6.10: Predicted Likelihood of Voting for the Woman Candidate by Internet Index (2008)

	Index high (+1 SD)	Index low (-1 SD)	*Δ (High-Low)*
Inexperienced trait low (-1)	46.8%	37%	*+9.8*
Inexperienced trait high (1)	38%	29.4%	*+8.6*
Δ (High-Low)	*-8.8*	*-7.6*	
Less Knowledgeable low (-1)	76%	68.4%	*+7.6*
Less Knowledgeable high (1)	13.8%	9.6%	*+4.2*
Δ (High-Low)	*-62.2*	*-58.8*	
Mobilization low (-1 SD)	38%	29.2%	*+8.8*
Mobilization high (+1 SD)	40.6%	40.4%	*+0.2*
Δ (High-Low)	*+2.6*	*+11.2*	

Note- all variables except the two crossing in that cell and their interactive term were held at their mean value.

Table 6.11: Predicting Voting for the Woman Candidate in 2010

	Reading Political Blogs				*Internet Index*			
	Base model		Interaction		Base model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Digital Media	0.051	0.672	-0.221	0.276	-0.016	0.851	-0.251	0.083
Measure	(0.121)		(0.203)		(0.085)		(0.145)	
Less competent	-1.058	0.001	-1.052	0.001	-1.057	0.001	-0.849	0.001
	(0.115)		(0.172)		(0.115)		(0.206)	
Competent*	-	-	-0.023	0.937	-	-	-0.315	0.095
Digital media			(0.290)				(0.188)	
Less integrity	-1.399	0.001	-1.284	0.001	-1.400	0.001	-1.285	0.001
	(0.096)		(0.135)		(0.095)		(0.146)	
Integrity*	-	-	-0.445	0.069	-	-	-0.190	0.202
Digital media			(0.245)				(0.149)	
Mobilization	-0.007	0.885	-0.047	0.426	-0.001	0.978	-0.083	0.296
	(0.049)		(0.058)		(0.050)		(0.080)	
Mobilization*	-	-	0.111	0.368	-	-	0.085	0.365
Digital media			(0.124)				(0.094)	
Female	-0.015	0.912	-0.021	0.879	-0.020	0.883	-0.021	0.884
	(0.135)		(0.139)		(0.137)		(0.142)	
Age	0.021	0.001	0.021	0.001	0.020	0.001	0.021	0.001
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Income	0.017	0.523	0.018	0.506	0.017	0.519	0.022	0.405
	(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.026)	
Education	0.156	0.001	0.158	0.001	0.159	0.001	0.164	0.001
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.038)	
Married	-0.046	0.806	-0.029	0.874	-0.050	0.792	-0.040	0.831
	(0.187)		(0.185)		(0.189)		(0.189)	
Nonwhite	0.129	0.504	0.132	0.484	0.124	0.526	0.145	0.435
	(0.194)		(0.189)		(0.195)		(0.185)	
Television	-0.009	0.957	0.007	0.966	-0.014	0.936	-0.011	0.946
News	(0.171)		(0.168)		(0.172)		(0.169)	
Democrat	0.802	0.001	0.813	0.001	0.802	0.001	0.820	0.001
	(0.226)		(0.228)		(0.226)		(0.231)	
Republican	0.380	0.101	0.385	0.103	0.377	0.104	0.395	0.091
	(0.231)		(0.236)		(0.232)		(0.234)	
Interest	0.672	0.001	0.662	0.001	0.680	0.001	0.664	0.001
	(0.141)		(0.142)		(0.141)		(0.137)	
State	0.001	0.707	0.001	0.799	0.001	0.695	0.001	0.895
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.015	0.455	0.015	0.441	0.015	0.442	0.016	0.400
Legislature	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.019)	
Constant	-5.902	0.001	-5.851	0.001	-5.903	0.001	-5.833	0.001
	(1.058)		(1.061)		(1.050)		(1.030)	

Table 6.11: Continued

N	5243	5243	524	5243
Log-likelihood	-1790.1	-1783.5	-1790.2	-1769.8
Pseudo R^2	0.483	0.485	0.483	0.489

Note- Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 6.12: Predicted Likelihood of Voting for the Woman Candidate by Political Blogs (2010)

	Reads Blogs	Doesn't Read Blogs	*Δ (High-Low)*
Less Competent trait low (-1)	71.4%	66.6%	*+4.8*
Less Competent trait high (1)	28.6%	13.3%	*+15.3*
Δ (High-Low)	*-42.8*	*-53.3*	
Less Integrity low (-1)	56.6%	61.4%	*-4.8*
Less Integrity high (1)	13.2%	16.3%	*-3.1*
Δ (High-Low)	*-43.4*	*-45.1*	
Mobilization low (-1 SD)	29.2%	34%	*-4.8*
Mobilization high (+1 SD)	31.9%	31.9%	*0*
Δ (High-Low)	*+2.7*	*-2.1*	

Note- all variables except the two crossing in that cell and their interactive term were held at their mean value.

Table 6.13: Predicted Likelihood of Voting for the Woman Candidate by Internet Index (2010)

	Index +1SD	Index -1 SD	*Δ (High-Low)*
Less Competent trait low (-1)	66.4%	69.1%	*-2.7*
Less Competent trait high (1)	6.7%	14.6%	*-7.9*
Δ (High-Low)	*-59.7*	*-54.5*	
Less Integrity low (-1)	62.3%	59.3%	*+3*
Less Integrity high (1)	37.7%	21%	*+16.7*
Δ (High-Low)	*-24.6*	*-38.3*	
Mobilization low (-1 SD)	25.8%	36.5%	*-10.7*
Mobilization high (+1 SD)	29.2%	32.7%	*-3.5*
Δ (High-Low)	*+3.4*	*-3.8*	

Note- all variables except the two crossing in that cell and their interactive term were held at their mean value.

Table 6.14: Predicting Voting for the Woman Candidate in 2012

	Base Model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	0.161	0.692	0.129	0.841
	(0.407)		(0.644)	
Less Caring	-0.080	0.762	1.675	0.040
	(0.263)		(0.816)	
Caring*Index	-	-	-2.079	0.007
			(0.766)	
Less Competent	0.277	0.385	0.277	0.575
	(0.318)		(0.493)	
Competent* Index	-	-	-0.226	0.639
			(0.481)	
Mobilization	-0.745	0.067	-0.368	0.478
	(0.406)		(0.519)	
Mobilization*Index	-	-	-0.822	0.204
			(0.647)	
Female	0.695	0.303	0.603	0.406
	(0.674)		(0.726)	
Age	0.008	0.676	0.019	0.356
	(0.020)		(0.021)	
Income	0.210	0.103	0.348	0.026
	(0.128)		(0.157)	
Education	0.426	0.016	0.287	0.095
	(0.177)		(0.172)	
Married	-0.159	0.827	-0.555	0.475
	(0.725)		(0.777)	
Nonwhite	0.088	0.870	0.170	0.735
	(0.535)		(0.502)	
Democrat	2.202	0.003	2.002	0.013
	(0.731)		(0.804)	
Republican	-2.143	0.023	-2.654	0.058
	(0.942)		(1.401)	
Interest	0.115	0.787	0.282	0.553
	(0.425)		(0.476)	
State Population	-0.001	0.139	-0.001	0.024
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	-0.011	0.783	-0.011	0.801
	(0.039)		(0.044)	
Constant	-4.185	0.016	-4.712	0.006
	(1.740)		(1.725)	
N	113		113	
Log-likelihood	-47.547		-41.685	
Pseudo R^2	0.279		0.368	

Note- Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table 6.15: Predicted Likelihood of Voting for the Woman Candidate by Internet Index (2012)

	Index +1SD	Index -1 SD	*Δ (High-Low)*
Less Caring trait low (-1)	69.8%	2.7%	*+67.1*
Less Caring trait high (1)	1.6%	44.3%	*-42.7*
Δ (High-Low)	*-68.2*	*+41.6*	
Less Competent trait low (-1)	17.6%	9.5%	*+8.1*
Less Competent trait high (1)	13.1%	15.4%	*-2.3*
Δ (High-Low)	*-4.5*	*+5.9*	
Mobilization low (-1 SD)	31.1%	25.9%	*+5.2*
Mobilization high (+1 SD)	0.8%	85.7%	*-84.9*
Δ (High-Low)	*-30.3*	*+59.8*	

Note- all variables except the two crossing in that cell and their interactive term were held at their mean value.

Figure 6.1: Distribution of Mobilization in 2008 by Respondent Gender



Figure 6.2: Distribution of Mobilization in 2010 by Respondent Gender



Figure 6.3: Distribution of Mobilization in 2012 by Respondent Gender



CHAPTER 7:

IS THERE ANY GOOD NEWS FOR WOMEN CANDIDATES?

Introduction

Throughout this project the argument has been made that new media is impacting evaluations of, and support for, women candidates, and that we need a comprehensive framework to begin to understand how this influence is occurring. By studying two different levels of office over three years, capturing presidential and midterm years, and measuring the three key variables (digital media, holding gender stereotyped opinions, and mobilization) in various ways, this project considered a plethora of data on how new media affects support for women candidates. While there are some results that contradict the framework laid out in Chapter 2, the majority of the data presented throughout this project support the hypotheses that digital media are influencing evaluations of, and support for, women candidates and are worth continuing to investigate.

The first finding from this project is that higher digital media usage frequently increases the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions. Also presented are results that show higher digital media usage increases the likelihood that an individual is mobilized and engaged in politics. This second finding is not surprising as it is consistent with what a growing literature mostly agrees upon as "truth"[38]. Combining these two findings into a complete model of digital media, and their impact on evaluations of, and voting for, women candidates was not an easy task, but one which this project has hoped to begin to create.

[38] Chadwick (2006) and the other normalizing scholars represent an ever shrinking minority voice in the literature.

Digital Media's Effect on Holding Gender Stereotyped Opinions

As should not be surprising given the growing literature that warns of the filter bubbles of information online (Pariser 2011), the selection-bias of information (Baum 2012), citizen journalism not having editorial controls (Davis 2009), and an explosion outlets catering to their readers (Davis 2012), individuals who are more active on digital media are significantly more likely to hold gender stereotyped opinions. In Chapters 5 and 6, the gender stereotyping measures considered were: inexperienced, lacks knowledge, not competent, not a strong leader, and not caring. Of all the traits measured, "not caring" is the only one that is a typical "feminine" trait. The rest are typically assigned as masculine traits. Across these traits the results showed that, with few exceptions, higher digital media use increased the likelihood of holding a stereotyped opinion.

The results from studying the case of Hillary Clinton in 2007-2008 are similar. In these chapters the stereotyping measures were: weak leader, untrustworthy, and inexperienced. The digital media measures were an additive index like in the congressional chapters, but I also considered reading political blogs, reading the news online, and exchange political emails.

Across all the analysis a theme has developed. The hypothetical candidates' traits for gender stereotyping, the congressional candidates "difference" traits (man candidate-woman candidate trait evaluations), Clinton's specific traits (higher values were less positive), and the Clinton versus Edwards and Obama difference traits—all show digital media increasing negative trait association with women candidates. Digital media

increases the likelihood of holding gender stereotyped opinions, and whether the traits used to investigate holding gender stereotyped opinions are candidate specific, congressional/nomination race specific, or about hypothetical candidates, this result is consistent across all datasets, years, and offices considered.

Results for the Competing Pathways Framework

Of the dozens of models presented in this project that create comprehensive models of this framework, some show what is expected, while others show there is still work to be done on both the framework and finding more appropriate measures.

In terms of voting for Hillary Clinton, the results are generally supportive of the framework presented, but there are a few key exceptions. Table 7.1 presents an overview of the findings from the various models across the chapters. The Clinton data from 2008 show consistency with expectations except mobilization did not increase the likelihood of voting for Clinton. Whether this is a product of the campaign environment, Obama was mobilizing everyone online, a product of the different level of office being sought, or the fact that this was a primary campaign—whatever the reason, Clinton's campaign comes close to supporting the complete framework, but misses on this one point. Thus, the net effect for the Clinton chapters is that digital media reduced evaluations of, and support for, her; there was no mitigating positive effect.

In the 2008 and 2010 studies, the results comply generally with the expectations derived from the competing pathways framework. Digital media in 2008 and 2010 increased holding gender stereotyped opinions, increased levels of mobilization, and in the comprehensive models showed results generally consistent with expectations. The

net effect of digital media in all these findings is negative. While digital media and mobilization increased support, the substantive effect was much smaller than the effect for digital media and gender stereotyping reducing support.

Turning to the 2012 House race data, there are results that are supportive of the expectations, but everything in these models is conditional. Even the finding that mobilization reduces support for women candidates is made insignificant when an interaction with digital media is included in the models. The results show that as individuals believe a hypothetical woman to be less caring, voting for a real woman candidate *increases* when digital media use is low. At high levels of digital media use the reverse is true—less caring results in less support for real women candidates. The trait of less competent behaves more in line with what the framework expects; however, there is still an interaction with digital media usage that is significant in the opposite from expected direction (less competent increases probability of voting for the woman candidate from 9% to 15%).

Across the three years considered for congress, mobilization has 3 different outcomes on the likelihood of having voted for the woman candidate. In 2008 it follows what the framework expects and increases support. In 2010 it increases support among high digital media users, but not among low digital media users. In 2012 it has a positive effect on low digital media users, but not among high digital media users.

How to Improve the Competing Pathways Framework

While the results of the analyses in these chapters are not entirely supportive of the competing pathways framework, many of them are, thus considering how to improve

both the framework and the measurements is worthwhile. Scholars that study women in politics, whether it be voting for women, women's campaigns, media coverage—scholars in this literature should consider more closely how digital media are changing the campaign dynamic, and whether digital media are helping bring supporters to women's campaigns, or whether new media are further alienating potential supporters due to information only reinforcing gender stereotypes. The data in this project are not perfect, but the consistent results, especially in terms of gender stereotyping and digital media, should make us hesitant to believe new media will be "the great equalizer" that will flood political institutions with women. With this in mind, there are still many things to be done to improve on this framework and improve our understanding of the dualistic relationship between new media and support for women candidates.

My first step in improving this project is to investigate the inter-gender Senatorial and Gubernatorial races that occurred in 2008, 2010, and 2012. To investigate these races I can use all of the same data presented in Chapters 5 and 6, but use them to predict support for the women running in these other races. While ideally I would like to have true experimental stereotyping trait variables for every dataset, this is incredibly expensive, and this project has shown that using difference traits (woman candidate's trait evaluation subtracted from comparable men candidate's trait evaluations) is a potential substitute for measuring whether respondents hold gender stereotyped opinions.

The ways to measure digital media and mobilization are endless, and in this project there were few issues with digital media not consistently increasing the rate of mobilization/engagement. In future work I would like to test different mobilization measures to see if the model still holds. Everything from "read a campaigns email" to

"was asked for money from a campaign online" would more directly test the campaigns' ability to target and mobilize individuals online.

While this project is by no means conclusive, the results do provide evidence that new media is having an effect on evaluations of, and support for, women candidates. Hopefully by refining measures and expanding the types of races considered I will be able to find more compelling evidence supportive of the competing pathways framework.

Implications for Women Candidates

The results presented in this project are a cautionary tale about digital media's effect on support for women candidates. Women running for political office at every level should dedicate resources to ensuring any sexist, inflammatory, mistruth, or half-truth, posted online are dealt with immediately. Nikki Haley, candidate for governor of South Carolina in 2010 (governor as of 2013) was a master at having campaign staff search the Internet and be ready with responses to any salacious, sexist, or mistruths reported online before the mainstream media even picked up the story (Davis 2012; Hudson 2010). When the alleged extramarital affairs stories surfaced online she had press statements on the allegations before any of the television stations had picked up the story, thus she was able to help shape and spin the story for mainstream media.

While the results of this project show digital media usage reducing support for women candidates, this could entirely be a product of the growing pains of a new technology. Silver (2012) argues that with each new advance in information sharing (from the printing press straight through to the Internet) there are periods of misinformation that over time are addressed and a return to "truths" occurs. His most

famous example is that when the printing press was invented in the 15th Century a text called “The Wicked Bible” was printed, “…which committed the most unfortunate typo in history to the page. Thou *shalt* commit adultery” (Silver 2012 pg 3). While this may be comforting to individuals’ years from now, in the current world of political campaigns, women candidates cannot be too careful with how they utilize the Internet, and the public needs to learn how to tell “truths” from “mis-information” online.

Table 7.1 Overview of the Competing Pathways Results

	2008	2010	2012	Clinton
Gender Stereotyping	↓	↓	Cond.	↓
G. Stereotyping*Digital Media	↓	↓	Cond.	↓
Mobilization	↑	↑	Cond.	↓
Mobilization*Digital Media	↑	↑	Cond.	↓
Net Effect of Digital Media	↓	↓	↓	↓

↓- represents significant reduction in likelihood of voting for woman candidate.
↑- represents significant increase in likelihood of voting for woman candidate.
Cond. – results were conditional based on other factors.

APPENDIX
Chapter 3

Table A1: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Clinton Specific Traits) by Internet Index (Interactive Models)

	Weak Leader		*Untrustworthy*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	β/SE	P-value	β/SE
Internet	0.011	0.033	0.028	0.001	0.006	0.242
Index	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Female	-0.544	0.001	-0.447	0.001	-0.473	0.001
	(0.068)		(0.067)		(0.068)	
Age	-0.009	0.001	-0.012	0.001	-0.000	0.842
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.002	0.829	0.009	0.436	-0.010	0.402
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Education	0.005	0.818	0.064	0.007	0.010	0.681
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.024)	
Married	0.108	0.139	0.018	0.809	0.179	0.016
	(0.073)		(0.073)		(0.074)	
Nonwhite	-0.107	0.147	-0.185	0.013	-0.157	0.037
	(0.074)		(0.075)		(0.076)	
Television news	-0.057	0.014	-0.065	0.005	-0.076	0.001
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)	
State Population	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.034	-0.001	0.083
	(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	0.003	0.633	0.003	0.524	0.004	0.482
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Cut 1	-1.275	0.001	-1.860	0.001	-0.739	0.001
	(0.218)		(0.221)		(0.223)	
Cut 2	0.623	0.004	0.064	0.771	1.299	0.001
	(0.218)		(0.219)		(0.224)	
Cut 3	1.714	0.001	1.344	0.001	2.382	0.001
	(0.222)		(0.221)		(0.230)	
N	3363		3257		3345	
Log-likelihood	-3913.561		-4175.896		-3741.528	
Pseudo R^2	0.016		0.019		0.012	

Note- Unstandardized Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table A2: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions Using the Difference Variables by Internet Index (Base Models)

	Weaker Leader		Less Trustworthy		Less Experienced	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
Internet	-0.005	0.148	0.024	0.001	0.013	0.001
Index	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Female	-0.364	0.001	-0.165	0.001	-0.140	0.001
	(0.045)		(0.040)		(0.037)	
Age	-0.002	0.321	-0.006	0.000	-0.003	0.057
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.005	0.506	0.009	0.178	-0.015	0.014
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Education	-0.051	0.001	0.083	0.001	0.029	0.030
	(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Married	0.032	0.518	0.047	0.282	0.140	0.001
	(0.049)		(0.044)		(0.041)	
Nonwhite	-0.164	0.001	0.035	0.440	0.121	0.004
	(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.042)	
Television	-0.062	0.001	0.005	0.694	-0.016	0.217
news	(0.015)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
State	-0.001	0.019	-0.001	0.113	-0.001	0.327
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.005	0.151	0.011	0.001	0.009	0.004
Legislature	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	-0.194	0.183	-0.025	0.851	-0.642	0.001
	(0.146)		(0.131)		(0.121)	
N	3042		2934		3072	
R^2	0.038		0.072		0.026	

Note- Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table A3: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Clinton Specific Traits) by News Websites (Baseline Models)

	Weak Leader		*Untrustworthy*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	β/SE	P-value	β/SE
News Websites	0.006	0.314	0.029	0.000	0.008	0.148
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)	
Female	-0.251	0.001	-0.229	0.001	-0.200	0.001
	(0.031)		(0.033)		(0.029)	
Age	-0.003	0.001	-0.006	0.001	-0.000	0.827
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	-0.002	0.699	0.001	0.883	-0.008	0.114
	(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.005)	
Education	0.002	0.860	0.029	0.013	-0.002	0.833
	(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.010)	
Married	0.066	0.050	0.030	0.414	0.101	0.002
	(0.034)		(0.036)		(0.032)	
Nonwhite	-0.066	0.052	-0.097	0.009	-0.076	0.021
	(0.034)		(0.037)		(0.033)	
Television	-0.027	0.011	-0.036	0.002	-0.038	0.001
news	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
State Population	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.052	-0.001	0.204
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female state	0.001	0.706	0.002	0.488	0.002	0.402
Legislature	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)	
Constant	1.265	0.001	1.595	0.001	1.002	0.001
	(0.100)		(0.109)		(0.096)	
N	3536		3427		3514	
R^2	0.031		0.044		0.026	

Note: Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table A4: Likelihood of Holding Stereotyped Opinions of Clinton (Difference Variables) by News Websites (Baseline Models)

	Weaker Leader		*Less Trustworthy*		*Less Experienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P-value	β/SE	P-value
News Websites	-0.010	0.220	0.047	0.001	0.014	0.033
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Female	-0.337	0.001	-0.166	0.001	-0.148	0.001
	(0.044)		(0.039)		(0.036)	
Age	-0.002	0.281	-0.006	0.001	-0.003	0.035
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income	0.005	0.494	0.007	0.284	-0.017	0.007
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Education	-0.049	0.002	0.086	0.001	0.034	0.008
	(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.013)	
Married	0.043	0.369	0.046	0.282	0.141	0.001
	(0.048)		(0.043)		(0.040)	
Nonwhite	-0.157	0.001	0.029	0.507	0.118	0.004
	(0.049)		(0.044)		(0.041)	
Television news	-0.065	0.001	0.003	0.799	-0.016	0.191
	(0.015)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
State Population	-0.001	0.029	-0.001	0.170	-0.001	0.299
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female state legislature	-0.006	0.128	0.012	0.001	0.010	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	-0.222	0.122	-0.034	0.789	-0.629	0.001
	(0.143)		(0.128)		(0.118)	
N	3204		3091		3230	
R^2	0.035		0.064		0.022	

Note: Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Table A5: Favorability of Clinton by Digital Media and Gender Stereotypes (Clinton Specific Traits)

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.021	0.001	-0.018	0.001	-0.021	0.001	-0.021	0.001
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)	
Weak Leader	-0.952	0.001	-0.930	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.022)		(0.033)					
Internet*weak leader	-	-	-0.003	0.341	-	-	-	-
			(0.003)					
Inexperienced	-	-	-	-	-0.971	0.001	-0.969	0.001
					(0.024)		(0.035)	
Internet* inexperienced	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.000	0.945
							(0.003)	
Female	0.048	0.251	0.048	0.250	0.083	0.049	0.083	0.049
	(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.042)	
Age	0.003	0.067	0.003	0.076	0.006	0.001	0.006	0.001
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.004	0.572	0.004	0.594	-0.006	0.394	-0.006	0.393
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
Education	-0.004	0.773	-0.004	0.781	0.003	0.851	0.003	0.851
	(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)	
Married	-0.002	0.961	-0.001	0.974	0.022	0.627	0.022	0.626
	(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.046)		(0.046)	
Nonwhite	-0.195	0.001	-0.194	0.001	-0.220	0.001	-0.220	0.000
	(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.047)		(0.047)	
Television news	0.024	0.086	0.025	0.083	0.006	0.678	0.006	0.678
	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
State population	0.001	0.080	0.001	0.077	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	-0.007	0.050	-0.007	0.050	-0.006	0.093	-0.006	0.093
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Constant	4.480	0.001	4.463	0.001	4.300	0.001	4.298	0.001
	(0.136)		(0.137)		(0.138)		(0.139)	
N	3120		3120		3109		3109	
R^2	0.392		0.392		0.371		0.371	

Note- Unstandardized OLS Regression coefficients presented. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table A6: Voting for Clinton- Clinton only stereotyping variables

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.044	0.001	-0.037	0.001	-0.043	0.001	-0.035	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.009)	
Weak Leader	-1.357	0.001	-1.266	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.073)		(0.090)					
Internet*weak leader	-	-	-0.085	0.111	-	-	-	-
			(0.053)					
Inexperienced	-	-	-	-	-1.351	0.001	-1.236	0.001
					(0.075)		(0.093)	
Internet* inexperienced	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.108	0.052
							(0.056)	
Female	0.114	0.252	0.110	0.272	0.194	0.049	0.191	0.053
	(0.100)		(0.100)		(0.099)		(0.099)	
Age	0.017	0.001	0.016	0.001	0.020	0.001	0.019	0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Income	0.025	0.138	0.024	0.150	0.014	0.417	0.012	0.462
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)	
Education	-0.192	0.001	-0.190	0.001	-0.187	0.001	-0.185	0.001
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)	
Married	0.035	0.746	0.036	0.739	0.085	0.432	0.089	0.410
	(0.108)		(0.109)		(0.108)		(0.108)	
Nonwhite	-0.839	0.001	-0.837	0.001	-0.833	0.001	-0.834	0.001
	(0.111)		(0.111)		(0.112)		(0.111)	
Television news	-0.003	0.921	-0.003	0.931	-0.023	0.497	-0.022	0.516
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.034)		(0.034)	
State population	0.001	0.913	0.001	0.924	0.001	0.442	0.001	0.453
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female Legislature	-0.034	0.001	-0.033	0.001	-0.031	0.001	-0.031	0.001
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Constant	1.647	0.001	1.594	0.001	1.362	0.001	1.310	0.001
	(0.331)		(0.333)		(0.329)		(0.330)	
N	2424		2424		2411		2411	
Pseudo R^2	0.214		0.215		0.202		0.203	
Log-Likelihood	-1299.03		-1297.7		-1312		-1310.9	

Note- Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed significance.

Chapter 4

Table A7: Favorability of Clinton by Gender Trait Stereotypes (Baseline Models of 4.7 and 4.8)

	Weaker Leader		*Weak Leader*		*Less Experienced*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet	-0.025	0.001	-0.016	0.001	-0.012	0.001	-0.015	0.001
Index	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Difference	-0.513	0.001	-	-	-0.761	0.001	-	-
Trait	(0.020)				(0.022)			
Clinton	-	-	-0.956	0.001	-	-	-0.974	0.001
Trait			(0.022)				(0.024)	
Mobilization	-0.162	0.001	-0.149	0.001	-0.109	0.004	-0.171	0.001
	(0.041)		(0.035)		(0.038)		(0.035)	
Female	0.102	0.040	0.053	0.201	0.202	0.001	0.093	0.028
	(0.050)		(0.042)		(0.046)		(0.042)	
Age	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.056	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.001
	(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.011	0.200	0.005	0.444	-0.009	0.260	-0.004	0.526
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	-0.019	0.287	0.002	0.915	0.030	0.067	0.009	0.544
	(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)	
Married	-0.060	0.265	0.008	0.863	0.042	0.406	0.037	0.425
	(0.054)		(0.045)		(0.050)		(0.046)	
Nonwhite	-0.242	0.001	-0.197	0.001	-0.095	0.067	-0.223	0.001
	(0.056)		(0.046)		(0.052)		(0.047)	
Television	0.024	0.167	0.030	0.033	0.035	0.028	0.015	0.316
news	(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.015)	
State	0.001	0.043	0.001	0.078	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.003
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	-0.010	0.018	-0.007	0.055	0.002	0.681	-0.006	0.108
legislature	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)	
Constant	3.144	0.001	4.470	0.001	2.737	0.001	4.291	0.001
	(0.160)		(0.136)		(0.150)		(0.138)	
N	2824		3108		2860		3098	
R^2	0.226		0.396		0.324		0.377	

Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table A8: Vote Choice by Gender Trait Stereotypes (Base Models of Tables 4.9 and 4.10)

	Weaker Leader		*Weak Leader*		*Less Experienced*		*Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.044 (0.008)	0.001	-0.042 (0.008)	0.001	-0.032 (0.009)	0.001	-0.041 (0.008)	0.001
Difference Trait	-0.292 (0.041)	0.001	-	-	-1.848 (0.085)	0.001	-	-
Clinton Trait	-	-	-1.363 (0.073)	0.001	-	-	-1.354 (0.075)	0.001
Mobilization	-0.065 (0.077)	0.403	-0.107 (0.082)	0.193	-0.013 (0.094)	0.888	-0.104 (0.082)	0.201
Female	0.236 (0.095)	0.013	0.108 (0.100)	0.283	0.364 (0.115)	0.002	0.189 (0.099)	0.056
Age	0.018 (0.003)	0.001	0.016 (0.004)	0.001	0.020 (0.004)	0.001	0.019 (0.004)	0.001
Income	0.017 (0.016)	0.290	0.026 (0.017)	0.118	0.002 (0.020)	0.921	0.015 (0.017)	0.381
Education	-0.161 (0.033)	0.001	-0.187 (0.035)	0.001	-0.198 (0.041)	0.001	-0.183 (0.035)	0.001
Married	-0.041 (0.104)	0.697	0.050 (0.109)	0.646	0.198 (0.127)	0.118	0.101 (0.108)	0.351
Nonwhite	-0.722 (0.109)	0.001	-0.849 (0.112)	0.001	-0.652 (0.131)	0.001	-0.843 (0.112)	0.001
Television News	0.002 (0.033)	0.950	-0.001 (0.035)	0.980	-0.024 (0.040)	0.551	-0.019 (0.035)	0.576
State Population	0.001 (0.001)	0.392	-0.001 (0.001)	0.976	0.001 (0.001)	0.337	0.001 (0.001)	0.509
% Female legislature	-0.028 (0.008)	0.001	-0.033 (0.008)	0.001	-0.021 (0.010)	0.030	-0.030 (0.008)	0.001
Constant	-0.081 (0.307)	0.792	1.663 (0.333)	0.001	-1.160 (0.383)	0.002	1.369 (0.3300	0.001
N	2207		2414		2237		2403	
Log-likelihood	-1378		-1292		-1007.4		-1307.3	
Pseudo R^2	0.08		.0215		0.339		0.203	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance tests.

Table A9: Favorability of Clinton controlling for Obama Supporter (from 4.7 and 4.8)

	Weak Leader Difference		*Clinton Weak Leader*		*Inexperienced Difference*		*Clinton Inexperienced*	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet	-0.014	0.018	-0.009	0.089	-0.005	0.351	-0.008	0.152
Index	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.005)	
Gender	-0.475	0.001	-0.794	0.001	-0.612	0.001	-0.794	0.001
stereotyping	(0.027)		(0.033)		(0.035)		(0.034)	
Internet*	0.003	0.848	-0.021	0.184	-0.003	0.879	-0.023	0.157
stereotyping	(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.017)	
Mobilization	-0.097	0.108	-0.125	0.019	-0.046	0.447	-0.142	0.009
	(0.060)		(0.053)		(0.060)		(0.054)	
Internet*	-0.006	0.199	-0.001	0.758	-0.007	0.178	-0.002	0.705
mobilization	(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Obama	-1.258	0.001	-0.836	0.001	-0.731	0.001	-0.878	0.001
supporter	(0.050)		(0.046)		(0.055)		(0.047)	
Female	-0.001	0.989	-0.002	0.958	0.149	0.002	0.043	0.335
	(0.050)		(0.044)		(0.049)		(0.044)	
Age	0.001	0.733	0.000	0.802	0.002	0.256	0.002	0.190
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Income	0.009	0.274	0.002	0.738	-0.006	0.491	-0.003	0.720
	(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Education	0.030	0.088	0.027	0.083	0.051	0.003	0.033	0.037
	(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)	
Married	-0.010	0.850	0.036	0.450	0.073	0.172	0.063	0.191
	(0.054)		(0.048)		(0.054)		(0.048)	
Nonwhite	-0.030	0.587	-0.042	0.390	0.011	0.839	-0.074	0.135
	(0.055)		(0.049)		(0.055)		(0.050)	
Television	0.034	0.046	0.036	0.017	0.047	0.006	0.027	0.072
News	(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.015)	
State	0.001	0.029	0.001	0.042	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.003
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% female	-0.009	0.038	-0.007	0.049	-0.001	0.719	-0.006	0.110
Legislature	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Constant	3.687	0.001	4.698	0.001	3.161	0.001	4.537	0.001
	(0.162)		(0.144)		(0.163)		(0.146)	
N	2255		2460		2285		2450	
R^2	0.394		0.473		0.392		0.463	

Note- Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Chapter 5

Question Wording 2012 Experiment:

Karen Miller: Born in 1954, Miller was a Rhodes Scholar from Oxford University in 1977. She is married and has three children. She was an attorney from 1980-82, and has been a State Senator since 1983.

Considering the information provided on Karen Miller, how well would you say the following terms describe her? 0 meaning not at all well, 50 meaning somewhat describe her, and 100 being very well describe her. (*MEASURED ON 0-100 pt scale*)

a- Competent

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

b- Caring

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

c- Integrity

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

Thomas Brown: Born in 1950, Brown attended Harvard and graduated in 1966, then served four years in the National Guard. After this, he worked for his family's company until being elected to the State Senate in 1985, and has served his district since then. He and his spouse have two children.

Considering the information provided on Thomas Brown, how well would you say the following terms describe him? 0 meaning not at all well, 50 meaning somewhat describes him, and 100 being very well describes him. (*MEASURED ON 0-100 pt scale*)

a- Competent

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

b- Caring

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

c- Integrity

0-Not at all well, 50- somewhat, 100- Very well (on a 0-100 scale)?

Table A10: Republican versus Democratic Women Trait Stereotyping by Internet Index (2008)

	Inexperienced		Less experience		Lack knowledge		Less knowledgeable	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Internet Index	-0.019 (0.103)	0.856	0.102 (0.171)	0.552	0.099 (0.068)	0.144	0.183 (0.097)	0.059
Female	-0.028 (0.150)	0.850	0.228 (0.259)	0.378	-0.247 (0.087)	0.004	-0.071 (0.142)	0.618
Female* Index	-	-	-0.273 (0.188)	0.145	-	-	-0.190 (0.110)	0.085
Age	0.009 (0.005)	0.108	0.010 (0.006)	0.093	0.007 (0.006)	0.260	0.008 (0.007)	0.242
Income	-0.009 (0.044)	0.842	-0.006 (0.043)	0.887	0.015 (0.029)	0.597	0.017 (0.028)	0.552
Education	-0.091 (0.077)	0.240	-0.101 (0.078)	0.196	-0.114 (0.056)	0.042	-0.121 (0.054)	0.027
Married	-0.292 (0.198)	0.141	-0.308 (0.199)	0.123	-0.394 (0.188)	0.036	-0.404 (0.190)	0.033
Nonwhite	0.236 (0.327)	0.472	0.249 (0.320)	0.435	0.187 (0.211)	0.376	0.198 (0.206)	0.337
Democrat	-0.146 (0.381)	0.702	-0.140 (0.377)	0.709	-0.127 (0.297)	0.669	-0.121 (0.299)	0.687
Republican	-0.643 (0.199)	0.001	-0.656 (0.195)	0.001	-1.184 (0.221)	0.001	-1.195 (0.219)	0.001
Interest	0.561 (0.162)	0.001	0.558 (0.174)	0.001	0.749 (0.172)	0.001	0.746 (0.180)	0.001
Television News	0.112 (0.227)	0.620	0.129 (0.230)	0.574	-0.084 (0.187)	0.652	-0.075 (0.184)	0.683
State Population	-0.001 (0.001)	0.650	-0.001 (0.001)	0.631	-0.001 (0.001)	0.336	-0.001 (0.001)	0.317
% Female Legislature	-0.038 (0.059)	0.519	-0.038 (0.058)	0.516	-0.049 (0.032)	0.132	-0.049 (0.032)	0.129
Cut 1	-1.928 (1.783)	0.280	-1.763 (1.785)	0.323	-2.831 (1.157)	0.014	-2.714 (1.115)	0.015
Cut 2	-0.222 (1.803)	0.902	-0.049 (1.801)	0.978	-0.887 (1.165)	0.446	-0.766 (1.119)	0.494
N	780		780		786		786	
Log-likelihood	-812.92		-810.87		-772.72		-771.76	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.05		0.094		0.095	

Note- Unstandardized ordered logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test.

Chapter 6

Table A11: Did Respondent Vote for Major Party Candidate in Election when Both were Women Candidates?

	Political Blogs				*Internet Index*			
	Base model		Interaction		Base model		Interaction	
	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P	β/SE	P
Digital Media	-0.672	0.051	-1.077	0.020	-0.095	0.718	-0.341	0.270
Measure	(0.344)		(0.464)		(0.262)		(0.309)	
Inexperienced	0.698	0.016	0.888	0.079	0.720	0.021	1.080	0.075
	(0.291)		(0.505)		(0.312)		(0.607)	
Inexperienced*	-	-	-0.481	0.381	-	-	-0.570	0.272
Digital media			(0.549)				(0.518)	
Less	-0.210	0.334	-0.631	0.208	-0.216	0.369	-0.802	0.149
Knowledgeable	(0.217)		(0.501)		(0.240)		(0.556)	
Knowledge*	-	-	1.086	0.126	-	-	0.997	0.118
Digital media			(0.711)				(0.638)	
Mobilization	0.000	0.998	-0.109	0.399	-0.028	0.824	-0.192	0.310
	(0.113)		(0.129)		(0.125)		(0.189)	
Mobilization*	-	-	0.238	0.159	-	-	0.142	0.257
Digital media			(0.169)				(0.125)	
Female	0.201	0.676	0.142	0.741	0.274	0.575	0.237	0.578
	(0.481)		(0.430)		(0.489)		(0.427)	
Age	0.007	0.499	0.007	0.516	0.008	0.502	0.009	0.489
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.014)	
Income	0.114	0.059	0.112	0.067	0.107	0.084	0.109	0.092
	(0.060)		(0.061)		(0.062)		(0.064)	
Education	-0.010	0.941	0.011	0.930	0.000	0.999	0.033	0.782
	(0.139)		(0.129)		(0.140)		(0.119)	
Married	-0.133	0.626	-0.211	0.489	-0.140	0.622	-0.292	0.462
	(0.272)		(0.304)		(0.284)		(0.397)	
Nonwhite	-0.025	0.959	-0.131	0.756	-0.019	0.968	-0.141	0.722
	(0.487)		(0.422)		(0.473)		(0.397)	
Television	1.091	0.019	1.189	0.013	1.010	0.029	1.149	0.016
News	(0.465)		(0.479)		(0.461)		(0.479)	
Democrat	0.566	0.033	0.638	0.033	0.586	0.023	0.733	0.016
	(0.265)		(0.300)		(0.258)		(0.304)	
Republican	0.063	0.921	-0.049	0.935	0.070	0.910	-0.100	0.867
	(0.638)		(0.609)		(0.626)		(0.595)	
Interest	0.586	0.061	0.686	0.024	0.544	0.135	0.644	0.075
	(0.313)		(0.304)		(0.364)		(0.362)	
State	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Population	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Female	0.040	0.318	0.040	0.360	0.040	0.323	0.044	0.324
Legislature	(0.040)		(0.044)		(0.040)		(0.045)	

Table A11: Continued

Constant	-1.062	0.629	-1.111	0.631	-0.988	0.653	-1.126	0.638
	(2.198)		(2.315)		(2.200)		(2.392)	
N	576		576		576		576	
Log-likelihood	-120.37		-118.56		-121.61		-118.42	
Pseudo R^2	0.161		0.174		0.153		0.175	

Note- Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. P-value based on two-tailed significance test. Stereotyping variables are -1 Democrat better than Republican, 0 no difference, 1 Republican better than Democrat on the traits.

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