
Theses and Dissertations

Fall 2009

Ethnic voting and representation: minority Russians in post-Soviet states

Holley E. Hansen
University of Iowa

Copyright 2009 Holley E Hansen

This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: <http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/375>

Recommended Citation

Hansen, Holley E.. "Ethnic voting and representation: minority Russians in post-Soviet states." PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2009.
<http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/375>.

Follow this and additional works at: <http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd>



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

ETHNIC VOTING AND REPRESENTATION:
MINORITY RUSSIANS IN POST-SOVIET STATES

by
Holley E. Hansen

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

December 2009

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Vicki L. Hesli

What factors motivate members of minority groups to vote based on an ethnic attachment? What motivates candidates and political parties to make appeals to specific ethnic groups? I argue that ethnic voting is more likely to emerge when individual socialization experiences and dissatisfaction increase the salience of ethnic identity, contextual factors serve to politicize this salient identity, and the mobilization potential of the ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based appeal will be successful. I test this theory with a combination of regional-level large-N statistical comparisons, case studies, and individual-level survey data.

I primarily examine party voting in the Baltic Republics and Ukraine. In these systems, I contend, ethnic voting may manifest support for traditional ethnic parties but also support for more mainstream but ethnically inclusive parties. These inclusive parties, generally overlooked in the ethnic politics literature, are an important component of ethnic representation and an important addition to research on ethnic voting. While in this work I focus on the Russian minority in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the general theory I develop may be applied to ethnic minorities in other political environments.

Abstract Approved: _____
Thesis Supervisor

Title and Department

Date

ETHNIC VOTING AND REPRESENTATION:
MINORITY RUSSIANS IN POST-SOVIET STATES

by
Holley E. Hansen

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

December 2009

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Vicki L. Hesli

Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Holley E. Hansen

has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Political Science at the December 2009 graduation.

Thesis Committee:

Vicki L. Hesli, Thesis Supervisor

William M. Reisinger

Sara Mitchell

Douglas Dion

Russell Scott Valentino

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without funding from three University of Iowa programs, including the Graduate College and the Seashore Dissertation Year Fellowship, the International Program and the T. Anne Cleary International Dissertation Research Fellowship, and the University of Iowa Student Government Research Grant. This support allowed me to conduct fieldwork and in-depth data gathering, all which has greatly improved the dissertation and enhanced my professional development. I would also like to thank Gerhard Loewenberg and William Mishler, who helped me greatly with the Baltic Barometers Data.

Portions of this project have been presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, the International Studies Association Annual Conference, and the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. Stephen Saideman, Kelly M. McMann, Philip G. Roeder, and Brian Shoup provided useful comments on these working papers.

I am especially indebted to my advisor, Vicki Hesli, who was a supportive mentor throughout this project. She was a friend when I needed it, and knew exactly when to push me when that was required. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee – William Reisinger, Sara Mitchell, Douglas Dion, and Russell Valentino – who aided me in ways both small and big throughout the research and writing process. Finally, I would like to thank Stephen Nemeth, who has been a sounding board through the dissertation process and has provided steadfast support throughout my graduate career and into my first academic positions.

ABSTRACT

What factors motivate members of minority groups to vote based on an ethnic attachment? What motivates candidates and political parties to make appeals to specific ethnic groups? I argue that ethnic voting is more likely to emerge when individual socialization experiences and dissatisfaction increase the salience of ethnic identity, contextual factors serve to politicize this salient identity, and the mobilization potential of the ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based appeal will be successful. I test this theory with a combination of regional-level large-N statistical comparisons, case studies, and individual-level survey data.

I primarily examine party voting in the Baltic Republics and Ukraine. In these systems, I contend, ethnic voting may manifest support for traditional ethnic parties but also support for more mainstream but ethnically inclusive parties. These inclusive parties, generally overlooked in the ethnic politics literature, are an important component of ethnic representation and an important addition to research on ethnic voting. While in this work I focus on the Russian minority in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the general theory I develop may be applied to ethnic minorities in other political environments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	x
INTRODUCTION ETHNIC-BASED PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES	1
Ethnic Voting as a “Voice” Strategy	3
The Logic of Ethnic Voting	5
Why Ethnic Voting: A Basic Theory	7
The Russian Minority as a Test Case	8
Outline of the Dissertation	15
CHAPTER 1 A THEORY OF ETHNIC VOTING	18
Defining Ethnicity	19
Constructivism in Ethnic Politics, a Comparison to Other “Isms”	22
Constructivism and Social Identity Theory	24
A Theory of Ethnic Voting: An Overview	26
When Collective Identities Become Politicized	28
Increasing the Awareness of Shared Grievances: Ethnic Socialization and Ethnic Grievances	30
Ethnic Socialization and the Reinforcement of Ethnic Identities	31
Ethnic Grievances and Political Awareness	36
Reinforcing Adversarial Relations: Ethnic Competition and Evaluations of National Politics	38
From Modernization to Competitive Theories: How Economics Gives Rise to Ethnic Cleavages and Adversarial Relations	39
Dissatisfaction with National Policy: Perceived Legitimacy of Status Quo Politics	41
Mobilization Potential: When Collective Action is Viable	42
Resource Mobilization and Mobilizing Ethnicity	44
Political Opportunities and Ethnic Voting	45
Conclusion	47
CHAPTER 2 IDENTIFYING “RUSSIAN” PARTIES IN THE PR AND MIXED SYSTEMS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION	48
Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Parties in the Post-Soviet World	49
Estonia	58
Latvia	67
Lithuania	75
Ukraine	82
A Quick Note on Non-Inclusive Parties in Ukraine	87

	Ethnic Voting and Representation	90
	Ethnic Voting in Estonia: From Ethnic Parties to Minority Inclusion	93
	Ethnic Threat and the Ethnically Divided Electorate in Latvia	98
	Inclusive Politics and Weak Grievances: The Case of Lithuania	104
	Conclusion	109
CHAPTER 3	ETHNIC VOTING UNDER PR AND MIXED SYSTEMS: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR ETHNIC AND INCLUSIVE PARTIES	112
	Politicizing Ethnicity and Increasing the Ethnic Mobilization Potential	112
	Politicizing Ethnicity: Economic Competition	113
	Mobilization Potential: Resource Mobilization	114
	Mobilization Potential: Electoral Rules as Political Opportunity	115
	Testing Ethnic and Inclusive Party Support in the Former Soviet Union	116
	Key Explanatory Variables	118
	Findings Part I: Support for Ethnic Parties	122
	Findings Part II: Support for Inclusive Parties	134
	Findings Part III: Choosing Ethnic versus Inclusive Parties	141
	Conclusion	156
CHAPTER 4	ETHNIC VOTERS AND ETHNIC VOTING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PARTY SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS	160
	Theories of Vote Choice	161
	Demographic Factors and the Ethnic Socialization Experience	174
	Competitive Ethnic Environments as a Socialization Experience?	177
	Grievances, Dissatisfaction, and the Politicization of Ethnic Identity	178
	Empirical Analysis	180
	Results	183
	Conclusion	191
CONCLUSION	ETHNIC VOTING AND PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES	193
	Overview of Empirical Chapters	197
	Ethnic Voting: The Big Picture	205
	Looking Ahead: Re-envisioning Ethnicity	208
APPENDIX A	DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CHAPTER 3	212
APPENDIX B	POTENTIAL MULTICOLLINEARITY ISSUES IN CHAPTER 3	217

APPENDIX C	CHAPTER 4 CODEBOOK AND ANALYSIS OF RUSSOPHONE CODING	228
	Description of the New Baltic Barometer Survey	228
	Dependent Variables: Ethnic Party and Inclusive Party Vote	228
	Key Independent Variable: Coding the Russian-Speaking Minority	229
	Additional Independent Variables: Coding	248
APPENDIX D	DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR CHAPTER 4 BALTIC BAROMETER SURVEY ANALYSIS	252
REFERENCES		260

LIST OF TABLES

Table		
1.1.	A Comparison of the Former Soviet Union Republics.	9
2.1.	Ethnic, Inclusive, and Non-inclusive Parties in Study.	57
2.2.	Party Categorization in Estonia: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates.	60
2.3.	Party Categorization in Latvia: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates.	69
2.4.	Party Categorization in Lithuania: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates.	76
2.5.	Party Categorization in Ukraine: National Electoral Support and Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program.	84
3.1.	Ethnic, Inclusive, and Non-inclusive Parties in Study.	117
3.2.	Percent Vote for Ethnic Parties by Region (OLS Regression).	124
3.3.	Percent Vote for Inclusive Parties by Region (OLS Regression).	135
3.4.	Vote for One Type of Party over Others by Region (OLS Regression), Latvia Excluded.	143
4.1.	Classification of Political Parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.	165
4.2.	Vote Choice in the Baltic Republics (2001 and 2004 Surveys).	167
4.3.	Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics: 2001 and 2004 (Logistic Regression).	170
4.4.	Vote for Inclusive Parties in the Baltic Republics: 2001 and 2004 (Logistic Regression).	171
4.5.	Probability of Voting for Ethnic and Inclusive Parties.	172
4.6.	Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (Logistic Regression).	185
4.7.	Vote for Inclusive Parties among Russian-speakers (Logistic Regression).	189

4.8	Party Vote in Estonia, 2001 and 2004 (Multinomial Logistic Regression)	190
A.1.	Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics.	213
A.2.	Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics.	215
B.1.	Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables (Interactive Terms Excluded).	219
B.2.	Sample VIF Scores from Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 (Interactive Terms Excluded).	220
B.3.	Sample VIF Scores from Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 (FULL models).	221
B.4.	Percent Vote for Ethnic Parties by Region (Interactive Terms Excluded).	222
B.5.	Percent Vote for Ethnic Parties by Region (Interactive Terms Excluded).	224
B.6.	Percent Vote for Inclusive Parties by Region (Interactive Terms Excluded).	226
C.1.	Party Classification by Year.	229
C.2.	Estonia, Language of Interview.	232
C.3.	Estonia, Home Language	233
C.4.	Latvia, Language of Interview.	234
C.5.	Latvia, Home Language.	234
C.6.	Lithuania, Language of Interview.	235
C. 7.	Lithuania, Home Language.	236
C.8.	Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics (2001).	239
C.9.	Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics (2004).	240
C.10.	Vote for Inclusive Parties in the Baltic Republics: 2001 and 2004.	242
C.11.	Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (2001).	243
C.12.	Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (2004).	245
C.13.	Vote for Inclusive Parties among Russian-speakers.	247
C.14.	District Magnitude in Latvia.	251

D.1.	Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Independent Variables.	253
D.2.	Descriptive Statistics for Additional Independent Variables.	256
D.3.	Pearson's Correlation Matrix for Table 4.3 and 4.4 (Full Sample).	258
D.4.	Pearson's Correlation Matrix for Table 4.6 and 4.7 (Russian-speakers only).	259

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1.1.	A Theory of Ethnic Voting.	27
1.2.	A Simplified Model of Voting, Including Ethnicity.	33
3.1.	Marginal Effect of Urbanization on Vote for Ethnic Parties.	126
3.2.	Marginal Effect of Industrialization on Vote for Ethnic Parties.	128
3.3.	Marginal Effect of Secondary Education on Vote for Ethnic Parties.	130
3.4.	Marginal Effect of District Magnitude on Vote for Ethnic Parties.	132
3.5.	Marginal Effect of Urbanization on Vote for Inclusive Parties.	137
3.6.	Marginal Effect of Industrialization on Vote for Inclusive Parties.	138
3.7.	Marginal Effect of Secondary Education on Vote for Inclusive Parties.	139
3.8.	Marginal Effect of District Magnitude on Vote for Inclusive Parties.	140
3.9.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Estonia).	145
3.10.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Ukraine).	146
3.11.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Lithuania).	147
3.12.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Estonia).	149
3.13.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Ukraine).	151
3.14.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Lithuania).	152
3.15.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over Non-Inclusive Parties (Estonia).	154
3.16.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over Non-Inclusive Parties (Ukraine).	155
3.17.	Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over	

	Non-Inclusive Parties (Lithuania).	157
5.1.	A Theory of Ethnic Voting	198
5.2	A Revised Theory of Ethnic Voting	204

INTRODUCTION

ETHNIC-BASED PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES

An essential component of democracy is the opportunity for participation by the average citizen in the selection of leaders and the determination of basic public policy, most often expressed through voting in competitive elections. Competitive elections are the bare minimum requirement for democracies (Schumpeter 1950, 269)¹ as open, fair elections effectively link citizens to policymakers, structure open dialogue on public policy, and provide the basis of democratic accountability (Powell 2000, 4). Countries seeking to become democracies must hold competitive elections; beyond this, democracies must also be governed by the rule of law, adhere to norms of human rights and liberties, and protect and respect the rights of minority populations.²

For multi-ethnic states undergoing democratization, minority group inclusion in the democratic process is necessary to promote democratic stability and prevent spirals into ethnic violence (Birbir 2007). Research on minority representation has shown that descriptive representation may increase minority group members' sense of system legitimacy, efficacy, and trust in government (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate,

¹ According to Schumpeter, "...the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1950, 269).

² In defining a polyarchy, Dahl lists the following necessary requirements: "...elected officials...free and fair elections...inclusive suffrage...right to run for office...freedom of expression...alternative information...associational autonomy..." (1972, 221). Beyond these requirements, Diamond includes rule of law, constrained executive power, no prohibition on "cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups...from expressing their interests in the political process," equality under law, and an independent judiciary to protect individual and group liberties as necessary elements of a liberal democracy (1999, 11-12).

1991; Mansbridge 1999) while lack of representation may lead to system instability (Cain 1992, 273).³

In competitive elections, minorities are able to express their preferences and be included in the political process by voting for candidates and political parties they feel best represent their interests, including candidates and parties that offer policies targeted to the interests of their specific ethnic group. When ethnic group members choose to vote based on their ethnic identity, they engage in “ethnic voting,” which occurs when 1) ethnic group members “show an affinity for one party or the other which cannot be explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics” or 2) ethnic group members “cross party lines to vote for” a co-ethnic candidate (Wolfinger 1965, 896).

In this dissertation, I examine the conditions that give rise to ethnic voting. To study this phenomenon, I use a combination of regional-level large-N statistical comparisons, case studies, and individual-level survey data to answer the following questions: what factors prompt ethnic group members to vote based on their ethnic identity? and, what circumstances motivate candidates and political parties to make appeals to specific ethnic groups? While in this work I focus on the Russian minority in the countries of the former Soviet Union to help develop and expand on the initial theory, the general theory I develop may be applied to ethnic minorities in other political environments.

I begin by theorizing general factors that encourage ethnic group members to vote based on their ethnic identity, as well as the factors that motivate candidates and political

³ Minority representation has also been argued to increase minority participation in politics (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004), though other research challenges these findings (Gay, 2001; Brace et al, 1995).

parties to make appeals to specific ethnic groups. In line with more recent work by Wilkinson (2004), Posner (2005), Van Cott (2005), Birnir (2007) and others, I reject the assumption that ethnic group political demands are inherently intransigent and predisposed to violence, and instead argue that ethnicity is one of many identities that may serve to unify participation and provide structure for group interests. While previous work on ethnic politics has tended to focus on group-level behavior, such as the rise of ethnic movements (Nagel and Olzak 1982, Horowitz 1985, Bélanger and Pinard 1991) or formation of ethnic political parties (Horowitz 1985, Chandra 2004, Van Cott 2003, 2004), I seek to examine the motivations of voters, and seek to bridge the gap between individual- and group-level behavior.

Ethnic voting is one of many forms of mobilization available to ethnic groups, and so it is influenced by the conditions that give rise to other ethnic political activities, such as ethnic social movements. It is a form of identity politics, and so we can draw from work in psychology and political psychology to understand how ethnic identity affects political behavior. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is a form of electoral participation, and is a way for ethnic groups to express their preferences and have their ethnic interests addressed. Ultimately, ethnic voting is one type of political participation, and one of many strategies available to ethnic groups in expressing their ethnic interests.

Ethnic Voting as a “Voice” Strategy

When ethnic minorities choose to vote for candidates and parties based on ethnicity, this reflects their selection of “voice,” one of the strategies that ethnic groups may pursue to express their interests. The concepts of “exit” and “voice” were originally used by Hirschman (1970) in the economics literature to describe possible responses by

firm customers or members to declining products or services. When choosing “exit” as a strategy, customers stop buying a product or members leave the organization. In comparison, individuals who choose “voice” seek improvement or reform from within the framework of the organization.⁴ Hirschman compares “voice” to interest articulation in political science, and sees it as an alternative to “acquiescence or indifference” (31). “Exit” and “voice” often act as countervailing pressures – if more people chose “exit,” fewer people are available to choose “voice,” which makes any “voice” movement weaker and less effective (Hirschman 1970, 76). However, for Hirschman, loyalty – strong affection for an organization – and voice work together, as loyalty “holds exit at bay and activates voice” (1970, 78).

In the ethnic politics literature, “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” refer to different strategies available to minority ethnic groups in dealing with the dominant culture/state. The concept of “voice” has been used to describe “participation in the new system with the simultaneous demands of ethnic recognition” (Bremmer 1994, 263). As Hirschman describes, “voice” is about improvements from within, and so in the context of ethnic politics, “voice” should be thought of as participation with the goal of pursuing policies of interest to the ethnic group *within the framework of the existing state*. In this way, ethnic voting is one type of strategy, outside of cultural assimilation (“loyalty”), violent

⁴ According to Hirschman, “voice” is where “organization’s members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen” (1970, 4).

action (“arms”),⁵ emigration or demands for territorial autonomy (“exit”) for ethnic groups to gain representation of interests and participate in national politics.

The Logic of Ethnic Voting

If ethnic group members attempt to employ “voice” as a strategy (as defined above), they will seek out candidates they feel most accurately represent their ethnic interests. In this way, ethnic voting is a form of issue voting, in that voters seek candidates and parties that they believe are closer to their issue preferences.⁶ Given the powerful nature of an ethnic identity, this form of issue voting will be especially influential, as issue voting has greater impact for the issues that people feel most intensely (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989).

However, in a world in which voters have limited resources or information in regards to politics and candidates’ preferences, they will rely on informational shortcuts that allow them to estimate candidate positions (Downs 1957, Lupia 1994, Lau and Redlawsk 1997). And so when ethnicity and ethnic policies become a key issue to voters, they will look for cues that give them information on a party’s or candidate’s ethnic issue position.

In party-based systems, voting for an ethnic party is an informational shortcut, as the voter might assume that policies offered by a party associated with the voter’s ethnic group will be closer to a voter’s ethnic interests than the policies offered by other parties in the system (Birnie 2007, 36). This shortcut is especially important in new

⁵ Laitin adds “arms,” or the violent challenge to the existing system, to the exit, voice, and loyalty typology (1998, 177).

⁶ For work on issue voting more generally, see work by Downs (1957), Carmines and Stimson (1980), Bartels (1986), and MacDonald, Rabinowitz and Listhaug (1995)

democracies, as newly developed parties do not have an established behavior to serve as a policy cue to voters (Birbir 2007, 34-35).

In more candidate-centered systems, such as those found in electoral systems that operate using single-member districts, the ethnicity or race of a candidate may serve as an important information cue on a candidate's ethnic issue position (Bullock 1984).

According to McDermott (1998), candidate demographic information, including race and gender, allow voters to "associate a candidate with a political and/or social group and project onto the candidate such things as the issue positions they believe the group holds, or the political performance associated with the group" (898). These demographic characteristics, therefore, may be used by voters to estimate a candidate's ideology, policy preferences, and/or competency, and are based on stereotypes of the group to which the candidate belongs.

Candidates may be burdened or helped by these ethnic stereotypes. Williams (1990) finds that the race of a candidate impacts how voters view the candidate's ability to achieve policy goals (competency) as well how the voter views the candidate's personality.⁷ And so, the ethnicity or race of a candidate may determine whether the voters believe that candidate to be competent, knowledgeable, hard-working, or trustworthy.⁸

⁷ In Williams' experiment, participants were asked, knowing only the candidate's race, to evaluate candidates on the following traits: intelligent, compassionate, a strong leader, knowledgeable, hard-working, exciting, get things done, clear on issues, fair, good judgment in a crisis, religious, trustworthy, liberal and experienced.

⁸ Williams also finds that overall, voters are more likely to give more positive evaluations for the candidates of their own race; however, there are certain dimensions that they would give a higher rating to a candidate of a different race, generally conforming to expectations from racial stereotypes.

Why Ethnic Voting: A Basic Theory

While informational short-cutting may be *how* ethnic voters identify parties and candidates that they believe will represent their ethnic interest, this does not explain *why* ethnic group members decide to vote for these parties or candidates in the first place. Specifically, under what conditions do members of minority ethnic groups mobilize to engage in “ethnic voting?” I argue that ethnic voting is more likely to emerge when individual socialization experiences increase the salience of ethnic identity, contextual factors serve to politicize this salient identity, ethnic group members are dissatisfied with an aspect of national politics and so choose to mobilize to address this dissatisfaction, and the mobilization potential of the ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based appeal will be successful.

Salient identities help align people politically and may potentially motivate and unify collective action. Ethnic socialization experiences strengthen an individual’s ethnic identity and increase its relevance as a social cleavage; however, it is only when this cleavage becomes politicized does it become a motivating factor for ethnic voting. Environments with frequent interethnic contact and ethnic competition serve to politicize ethnicity and motivate ethnic political activity (Kandeh 1992).

Furthermore, as ethnic voting is a “voice” strategy, and both exit and voice are driven by individual dissatisfaction with the current situation (Hirschman 1970), ethnic group members must feel initial dissatisfaction with current policy before their salient ethnic identity motivates political activity. Dissatisfaction with national policies and/or the government and perceived ethnic grievances motivate ethnic mobilization.

Dissatisfaction, in turn, is driven by how an ethnic group views their inclusion or achievement in the society.

Finally, ethnic voting is more likely to occur when the mobilization potential for an ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based political movement will be able to overcome the collective action dilemma and successfully mobilize.⁹ This mobilization potential includes group and individual resources that may be used to mobilize an ethnic group and direct collective action efforts, as well as political opportunities as structured by the state. Groups are more successful at mobilizing when they possess more resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Smith and Wilson 1997, Barany 2002) and act in states with more open political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1994).

The Russian Minority as a Test Case

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, almost 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves as a new minority group in 14 newly independent states (Harris 1993); a sudden diaspora group outside the borders of their newly defined homeland. While the number of Russians in these republics has decreased significantly since then, primarily due to emigration, Russians continue to make up a sizeable proportion of the population in several of these former republics (see Table 1.1).

⁹ According to Hirschman, voice is more likely to occur when exit is not a viable option or members feel that the expression of interest can result in change to the organization (1970, 38).

Table 1.1: A Comparison of the Former Soviet Union Republics

	<i>Percentage of Russians</i>		<i>GNI/capita</i>	<i>Freedom House Score</i>
	1989	Recent Census	(2005)	(2006)
<i>Baltic Republics</i>				
Latvia	34.0	29.6	6760	Free
Estonia	30.3	25.6	9100	Free
Lithuania	9.4	6.3	7050	Free
<i>Western Republics</i>				
Ukraine	22.1	17.3	1520	Free
Belarus	13.2	11.4	2760	Not Free
Moldova	13.0	5.8	880	Partly Free
<i>Transcaucasia</i>				
Georgia	6.3	1.5	1350	Partly Free
Azerbaijan	5.6	1.8	1240	Not Free
Armenia	1.6	0.5	1470	Partly Free
<i>Central Asia</i>				
Kazakhstan	37.8	30.0	2930	Not Free
Kyrgyzstan	21.5	12.5	440	Partly Free
Turkmenistan	9.5	4.0	730 ¹	Not Free
Uzbekistan	8.3	5.5	510	Not Free
Tajikistan	7.6	1.1	330	Not Free

Source: This recent census data comes from Statistics Estonia (<http://www.stat.ee/>), the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (<http://www.csb.lv/avidus.cfm>), Statistics Lithuania (<http://www.stat.gov.lt/en>), the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (<http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng>), the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis in the Republic of Belarus (<http://belstat.gov.by/>), Statistica Moldova (<http://www.statistica.md/?lang=en>), Statistics Georgia (<http://www.statistics.ge/>), the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan (<http://www.azstat.org>), the National Statistical Services of the Republic of Armenia (<http://www.armstat.am/>), the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (<http://www.stat.kz/>), the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (<http://www.stat.kg/>), State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan, the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics (<http://www.stat.uz/STAT/INDEX.PHP>), and the State Committee of Statistics of Tajikistan Republic (<http://www.stat.tj/>). The most recent census was completed in 1995 in Turkmenistan (another is scheduled for 2009); 1999 for Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; 2000 for Estonia, Latvia, and Tajikistan; 2001 for Lithuania, Ukraine, and Armenia; 2002 for Georgia and Moldova, and 2004 in Uzbekistan. Data from the 1989 Soviet census is presented by Harris (1993). GNI/per capita data is available from the World Bank (<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20394802~menuPK:1192714~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>).

¹ The GNI/capita data for Turkmenistan is from 2004.

In Latvia and Kazakhstan, Russians continue to comprise around 30% of the population, but in Transcaucasia and Tajikistan the percent stands at less than 2 percent. And so while “exit” through emigration has been a common strategy for minority Russians in some states, a significant number of Russians chose to remain. These Russians are faced with the choice of apathy, “loyalty,” “arms,” or some form of “voice” as their primary strategy for interacting with these new national governments, and it is these Russians who are the focus of this study.

In countries with large Russian minorities, Russians are generally concentrated by geographic region, prompting some authors to caution against the danger of international conflict arising in these border republics (Kaiser 1994, 372; Chinn and Kaiser 1996, 10).¹⁰ Despite these concerns, however, violent mobilization (“arms”) by the Russian minority has been limited. At the same time, survey results from five post-Soviet republics suggest that assimilation (“loyalty”) is not a trend among the Russian minority (Hagendoorn, Linssen, and Tumanov 2001), and instead, ethnicity remains a salient social divide.¹¹

The Russian minority is an ideal ethnic group to use to develop a theory of ethnic voting, especially as voting appears to be the dominant strategy chosen by this group.¹²

¹⁰ Related to this potential security threat, the plight of the Russian minority has been a major policy focus of nationalist groups within the Russian Federation (Melvin, 1995) and has motivated Russian involvement in the internal affairs of several of these newly independent states (Harris, 1993; King and Melving, 1999/2000). In this way, the status of the Russian minority is considered a security threat in two ways: as an internal threat to the stability of their state as well as a motivation for a potential Russian intervention.

¹¹ Using 1996 survey data from Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, Hagendoorn et al. find that while the titular populations predominantly identify as “indigenous” or “citizens of the republic,” Russians are more likely to identify as Soviet citizens, and they seldom identified as representatives of the titular nation “which would indicate complete assimilation” (40).

¹² In the post-Soviet states, when the Russian have mobilized, it has most often been in the form of voting cohesively or forming ethnically-based political parties (Zevelev 2001).

As shown in Table 1.1, post-Soviet states have dramatically different economic conditions and democratic developments. While still trailing even the poorest members of Western Europe, the Baltic republics have a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita comparable to most Eastern European countries. For instance, in Estonia in 2005, the GNI/capita was 9,100 USD, comparable to Hungary (10,030 USD), Slovakia (7,950 USD), and Poland (7,110 USD). In contrast, the Central Asian Republics such as Tajikistan, which in 2005 had a GNI/capita of 330 USD, can be grouped with the Least Developed Countries such as Tanzania (340 USD), Madagascar (290 USD), and Uganda (280 USD). Comparing democratic development as of 2006, these 14 republics cover the full spectrum of Freedom House Scores, ranging from “Free” (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine) to “Not Free” (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

The identity and history of the Russian minority varies considerably across the republics. References to the Russians in the “near abroad” range from diaspora (Zevelev 2001) to language community (Laitin 1998), reflecting the sometimes fluid nature of this identity group. In some countries and regions, Russians can trace their residence back hundreds of years, while in others they are a “new” immigrant community that settled predominantly during the Soviet period. According to Bremmer (1994), groups with higher *ethnic attachment* – or identification with their territory of residence – are more likely to identify with their ethnicity and demand ethnic rights (264). Cross-national research provides a mechanism for evaluating how these differing settlement patterns impact the degree of attachment of the Russian minority, as well as their tendency to engage in ethnic political behaviors such as ethnic voting.

In Latvia and Estonia, most of the Russian community migrated after World War II, and are viewed as relative new-comers to these states. In Latvia, Russians are more clearly an immigrant community, generally regarded as foreigners or “non-Letts” by the majority population (Laitin 1998, 279).¹³ Similarly, following independence, Russians in Estonia were also viewed by the titular population as outsiders and threats to the state, though this view has moderated considerably since that time (Aalto 2000).¹⁴ Russian attachment to the region is low and this “outsider” status common in the Baltics has decreased assimilation trends among the Russian minority and increased the appeal of ethnic political activity (Evans 1998, 71-72).

In parts of Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, Russians are strongly attached to their place of residence as an ethnic “homeland,” a characteristic more similar to indigenous groups. In these regions, Russians can trace their territorial claim back hundreds of years, strengthening their attachment to their region, while in Western Ukraine Russians migrated at roughly the same time as Russian migration to the Baltic republics. These varying settlement patterns contribute to considerable regional differences in ethnic attachment to land, as Russians in some regions “perceive themselves as being on ‘their own land,’ while in others they clearly consider themselves to be outsiders” (Bremmer 1994, 264).

In many countries of the former Soviet Union, the mobilization of the Russian minority is a distinct possibility, and in some regions a political reality, though the

¹³ Laitin notes that the tendency in the Latvian media and political dialogue is to refer to the Russian and other minorities from the Soviet period in the negative, meaning, that they are often referred to by what they lack (Latvian identity or citizenship) rather than group characteristics that define the minorities.

¹⁴ Evans (1998), using survey data from 1993 and 1995, finds that Estonians and Russians tend to be heavily polarized with very distinct policy preferences.

motivations within each country are very different and influenced by the historical legacy of this minority group. In Estonia, Latvia, and Western Ukraine, the assigned “outsider” status of the Russian minority combined with more negative evaluations by the majority population is more likely to lead to a heightened sense of threat from the majority population and dissatisfaction with the current political situation. In Eastern Ukraine, and Crimea, the “indigenous” nature of the Russian minority is likely to increase the belief that they have a right to inclusion in national politics, thereby increasing the viability of “voice” as a mobilization strategy. However, in Lithuania, ethnic voting by the Russian minority is likely to be weak or non-existent, as they lack the sense of entitlement found in parts of Eastern Ukraine or the heightened sense of threat found in Latvia, Estonia, or Western Ukraine.

Because of this variation in the position and identity of the Russian minority across these different republics, it is possible to address a critique of a trend in much of the ethnic group literature: selection bias towards previously mobilized and more conflictual groups (Brubaker 2004). By focusing on the Russians as an ethnic group, we can contrast the varying mobilization trends in these divergent states, allowing a more thorough understanding of the factors that translate ethnicity into votes. A cross-country examination of the Russian minority is an ideal way to examine the various independent variables, which I hypothesize influence group mobilization potential. For example, because Russians span a variety of institutional settings and political developments both cross-sectionally and over time, we may examine variation in ethnic voting across different electoral systems, allowing for a rough test of the political opportunities arguments summarized later. In addition, because the Russian minority has been the

focus of considerable survey research (Laitin, 1998; Hagendoorn et al, 2001), it is possible to conduct secondary analysis of existing data to assess both group- and individual-level explanations for ethnic voting, and to trace changes in this ethnic group over time.

To an extent, Russians share similar characteristics with other “colonial hangover” groups, and are comparable in some ways to the French in Algeria or Dutch in Indonesia (Landau 1986), allowing us to draw insights from past work in this field. Like the colonial experience in other regions, the legacy of Soviet rule has provided an incentive for politicizing ethnicity in these regions (Suny 1988, Laitin 1998).¹⁵ Similar to colonial rule in Africa (Rothchild 1997, Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003), the institutions of the Russian Empire and later Soviet Union structured political institutions to favor ethnic empowerment.¹⁶ And, like African experience, this “colonial” remnant has made ethnicity a salient social cleavage across this region.

At the same time, the experiences of the Russians as an ethnic group are unique, and must be accounted for when making any comparisons to other groups in the literature. They are distinct from the immigrant communities discussed in the literature on ethnic voting in America or in the literature on immigrant politics in Europe. While in

¹⁵ Similar to other post-colonial states, many post-Soviet states, in the aftermath of independence struggles, have sought to replace the “colonial” language with new “national” languages in order to confirm their new identity, leaving the colonial language communities at a strained position in these new societies. However, as Laitin (1998) discusses, Kazakhstan lacked a strong independence movement; not surprising, then, that Kazakhstan has been largely unsuccessful at instituting Kazakh as an official state language.

¹⁶ Furthermore, Russian and later Soviet migration policies structured the population dynamics in such a way that some of the post-Soviet republics meet two of the three defining characteristics of post-colonial Africa: variation and complexity of ethnic markers that produce salient intragroup differences, and territorial concentration of certain groups that facilitate the group as a unit for collective political action (2003, 382).

many post-Soviet countries, Russians are an immigrant population identifiable on the basis of their language and culture, they are not a disadvantaged group as compared to most immigrant groups in Western Europe or the United States. Instead, at the time of independence, the Russian minority comprised a disproportionate share of employment in industry, transportation, communication, and science in many of these countries (Harris 1993). This privileged status is especially important for understanding the motivations of this group, as they hold a different place in society than many other ethnic minorities.

Outline of the Dissertation

In the next chapter, I lay out a general theory of ethnic voting, using an interdisciplinary approach that combines work from social psychology and ethnic politics to develop my theories. In this chapter, I focus on ethnic salience, dissatisfaction with national policies and adversarial ethnic relations, and the mobilization potential of the Russian minority. I argue that ethnic socialization experiences at the individual level increase the salience of an ethnic identity among ethnic group members. Politicized identities are further reinforced in societies with more adversarial ethnic relations, and ethnic competition (more common in industrialized and urbanized settings) and dissatisfaction with national policy are more likely to lead to politicization of the ethnic cleavage within a society. Where ethnicity is salient and politicized, ethnic voting is likely only when the mobilization potential of the group is high and when the state is more open to the inclusion of a minority group, which is influenced by electoral rules. This general theory is developed and expanded through the use of case study analysis, regional comparisons, and survey data to flesh out a more complete theory of ethnic voting, using the behavior of the Russian minority to more fully understand this context.

In Chapter 2, I examine the types of political parties that have emerged in the post-Soviet Baltic republics and in Ukraine. I classify these parties into three categories – traditional ethnic parties, minority inclusive mainstream parties, and parties that hold no minority ethnic appeal – based on the extent that, in their programs and in their candidate list, they appeal to Russian voters. After classifying these parties, I contrast the different party systems that have emerged in the Baltic Republics, and find that three distinct systems have evolved in each country. In Estonia, support for Russian ethnic parties has declined over time while support for minority inclusive parties has increased, while in Latvia, ethnic party support has remained fairly consistent. Finally, in Lithuania no significant Russian ethnic parties have emerged and instead, Russian interests have been generally represented by a Polish ethnic party and a leftist minority inclusive party coalition. Which parties receive the most support, I argue, depends on the strength of the ethnic policy issues uniting the ethnic electorate (the stronger the issues and grievances, the greater incentive for ethnic voting), the degree to which voters are motivated to engage in strategic voting and support the larger minority inclusive parties over the smaller ethnic parties, and the presence of viable strategic alternatives.

Chapter 3 continues from Chapter 2 and explains electoral support for ethnic, minority inclusive, and parties without a minority appeal. Focusing on regional census and voting data, rather than the national-level focus of Chapter 2, I examine how regional variation in ethnic competition, group resources, and electoral design interacts with the composition of the population influences support for some types of parties over others. I find that for the PR and Mixed electoral systems of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, rates of urbanization, educational resources, and district magnitude interact with

the percent of Russians within each region to influence the amount of support given to parties that make appeals to this ethnic group, though these relations vary by country.

Chapter 4 moves beyond the aggregate-level analysis to examine individual-level determinants of ethnic voting using survey data from a variety of sources, including the New Europe Barometers series and surveys funded by the U.S. State Department and the National Science Foundation. I expand on the ethnic socialization hypothesis (Graves and Lee 2000), and examine how an individual's language, religion, economic class, and education impact ethnic voting. I combine this individual-level analysis with the variables tested in chapters 3 and 4 to explore how individual ethnic experiences and perceptions interact with societal conditions to produce an environment conducive to ethnic voting.

In the Conclusion, I summarize the main empirical findings of this research and discuss the insights offered by this multi-level approach to studying ethnic politics. I then conclude by returning to the idea raised earlier in this introduction, that the participation of the Russian minority has shaped politics and democracy in the former Soviet republics. I discuss avenues for future research, focusing especially on the role that ethnic voting may play in democratic and democratizing societies.

CHAPTER 1

A THEORY OF ETHNIC VOTING

Ethnic group members who are dissatisfied with their current situation may choose to engage in politics to address these concerns. This engagement can take many forms, some violent, like rioting or terrorist activity, and some more peaceful, such as protesting or voting as a bloc. Ethnic voting *is* a type of peaceful mobilization, and so the process that motivates groups to act on their collective identity is in many ways conceptually similar to work on social movements. At the same time, specific benefits and constraints are particular to *voting* as a mobilization strategy, and these specifics must be addressed before ethnic voting may be more fully understood.

To explain the occurrence of ethnic voting, the theory I propose in this chapter draws from the constructivist approach in ethnic politics, which in turn borrows from social identity theory in social psychology. As ethnic politics is a form of identity politics, this social identity approach grants useful insight as to how and why ethnicity emerges as a dominant identity which influences political decisions such as voting. Further, this social psychological theory is expanded by including work from the social movements literature, in particular, the factors that increase the potential for mobilization by ethnic group members. As stated in the introduction, ethnic voting is a form of electoral participation, and it is a mobilization primarily inspired by identity.

In the following sections, I seek to define ethnicity, a concept that has been problematic in the nationalism literature. I then explain how this conception of ethnicity fits my approach within the framework of the constructivist approach in ethnic politics and contrast this approach to other dominant theories in the field. I introduce a basic

theory of ethnic voting, focusing in the discussion on how identities become politicized. In this theory, I specifically highlight the role that ethnic socialization, adversarial environments, dissatisfaction with national politics, and mobilization constraints play in shaping ethnic voting.

Defining Ethnicity

Defining what ethnic identity is and who belongs to an ethnic group has long been a challenge for researchers. A number of authors have discussed the challenges of defining ethnicity and/or nation¹⁷ and some offer their own version of a definition (Geertz 1963; Barth 1969; Van den Berghe 1978; Smith 1981; Gellner 1983; Horowitz 1985; Greenfeld 1992; Eriksen 1993). Many authors seeking to define ethnicity offer almost a checklist of features through which we can know and identify ethnic groups. Illustrative of this approach is work by Hutchinson and Smith (1996) and Fearon (2003).

Hutchinson and Smith define ethnic groups as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members” (1996, 6). Fearon offers one of the most detailed definitions of ethnicity, and defines an ethnic group as possessing: 1) membership identified by descent, 2) individuals conscious of group membership, 3) common distinguishing cultural features, 4) these cultural features valued by group members, 5) a homeland, real or imagined, 6) a shared history with some basis in fact, and 7) the potential to be “stand alone” – not a caste or caste-like group (2003, 201). This sense of a perceived shared ancestry is picked

¹⁷ To further confuse the process of defining ethnicity, nationality is a term that has been at times used interchangeably with ethnicity, especially when referring to ethnic nations or ethnic nationalism.

up by Schermerhorn (1970), who defines ethnic group as "...a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements..." (11). Related to this, Max Weber (quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1996) defined ethnic group as "...human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both...conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists" (35).

Many of these definitions are problematic, and often exclude groups traditionally defined as ethnic groups. A focus on common ancestry or even descent from a common origin, for instance, becomes ineffective as ancestry, when traced back far enough, blurs distinctions between groups (Chandra 2006). Emphasizing feelings of group solidarity, likewise, limits analysis to ethnic groups that are already mobilized, leading to a bias in much ethnic group literature that tends to argue that ethnic group relations are inherently conflictual (Brubaker 2004). In addition, the factors which divide groups in many ways are specific to each society (Posner 2005, 6), rendering most "checklist" approaches meaningless.

This is not to say that defining ethnicity in part by describing ethnic identifiers is completely useless; as Posner (2005) argues, ethnicity is generally organized around characteristics that are impossible to change (such as race) or difficult to change (such as language). Along these lines, Chandra (2006) defines ethnic identity as part of "...a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by descent-based attributes..." (400) and further include properties of constrained change and visibility (414). Constrained change means that ethnic attributes are in some ways

“sticky;” they are difficult to change, especially in the short-term. Likewise, ethnic attributes are visible markers distinguishing identity, such as skin color, ethnic names, speech patterns, or religious practice.

To Chandra’s definition, I would also emphasize the importance of defining ethnicity as a form of *collective* or *social* identity.¹⁸ Collective identities, as the term implies, emphasize self-knowledge in belonging to a group (“we” instead of “I”). Furthermore, each individual understands their collective identity through contrast to other groups in a society, the traditional divide between “us” versus “them.” Taken together, ethnic group belonging requires some degree of “stickiness” and visibility to maintain cohesive categories and is maintained through contrast to other ethnic categories. At the same time, ethnic group belonging requires some fluidity and recognition that ethnicity is in competition with other identities. Ethnic group members may choose to primarily identify with different, non-ethnic societal groups by choosing to emphasize other identity roles.

This idea of ethnicity as a more fluid identity and one that competes for an individual’s attention with other identities, is becoming more prevalent in recent work in ethnic politics, and reflects a shift away from earlier work that tends to view ethnic identity as almost exclusively producing conflict (Connor 1993; Horowitz 1985). For much of this new research, ethnicity is like any social identity – the form of political behavior it manifests depends greatly on the societal context (Van Cott 2005; Wilkinson

¹⁸ One of the earliest uses of this terminology comes from psychologist Erik Erikson (1968), who distinguishes between *ego* identity (now often referred to as “self” or “personal” identity) and *social* (or “collective”) identity. Personal identities are specific to an individual; social identity is determined by the social roles a person plays and the groups to which they choose to belong (Laitin 1998, 14-16).

2006; Birnir 2007). This idea of ethnicity is central to the theory presented in my research, and places this conception within the constructivist approach to ethnic politics.

Constructivism in Ethnic Politics, A Comparison to Other “Isms”

Past work in ethnic politics has often viewed ethnicity as a primordial category (Geertz 1963; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Isaacs 1974; Connor 1993), one stemming from kinship ties and attachment to historical or “tribal” identities. Furthermore, this strong attachment leads members of these primordial groups to perceive irreconcilable differences between themselves and other primordial groups in a society. Because of these irreconcilable differences, many primordialists see ethnic relations as inherently conflictual and disruptive to modern societies. Furthermore, given the “ancient” nature of these identities, primordialists are pessimistic of the ability of states to overcome these identities or reconcile differences between groups.

Much recent work on ethnicity and nationalism draws from the constructivist approach in ethnic politics, marking a clear departure from the assumptions of primordialism. Like primordialists, constructivists do maintain that ethnic identity holds a strong psychological and emotional appeal. However, constructivists emphasize that identity is socially constructed and argue that ethnicity is a flexible identity, dependent on the social environment and created over time (Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1998; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Birnir 2007).

Some constructivists, arguing from the more instrumentalist vein, contend that ethnic communities are “...created and transformed by particular élites...” during times of major social change (Brass 1991, 25). This vein of thought emphasizes how competing political elite manipulate and shape categories and encourage mobilization on

these identities, often for material gain. One example of this approach is described by Snyder (2000) as elite persuasion; for Snyder, elite in democratizing states may choose to promote exclusionary nationalism to “hijack political discourse” (37) and maintain their control of power.

For other constructivists, identity is created by human action, but this human action may represent broad social changes as well as elite control. In regards to European nationalism, Anderson (1991) attributes this to the influence of capitalism and the technological innovation of the printing press. The printing press gave rise to print mediums in non-Latin languages, which allowed communication within national communities beyond the local setting. The rise of a common print language for a culture – print versions of Spanish, English, and French, for instance – solidified a common language of communication for the ethno-linguistic groups and advantaged particular dialects as the recognized “official” language of communication for these groups (1991, 44-45). In essence, print-languages united previously isolated groups into a common ethno-linguistic heritage.

In explaining nationalization experiences outside of Western Europe, Anderson highlights that in former colonies, colonial record keeping – including maps, colonial census, and museums – shape how states view “...the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry” (1991, 164). These records, originally created to help colonizers categorize the territory and people it governed, artificially drew lines between peoples and created new definitions of societal groups. For example, Hintjens (1999) in her discussion of the causes of the Rwandan genocide emphasizes how Belgian colonization led to the hardening of ethnic differences

between the Bahutu and Batutsi and the creation of an origin myth separating the two populations.¹⁹

Beyond this tendency to view identity as socially constructed, constructivist approaches share additional underlying assumptions that reveal the influence of social identity theory in this approach. Constructivist approaches further emphasize that humans have a natural tendency to categorize people into groups to help provide order to societal interactions. As ethnicity focuses on characteristics – often physical attributes or linguistic differences – which are often easily categorized and difficult to change, it is an identity that has meaning across a variety of societies and is difficult to repress (Birnie 2007, 21). At the same time, constructivists see ethnicity is one of many identities that an individual holds, and likewise argues that ethnicity is only one of many identities that can be triggered by the environment and brought into political awareness.

Constructivism and Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory was developed in social psychology to describe intergroup relations and the dynamics of social identities (Tajfel 1974).²⁰ Social identities are labels given to individuals – by themselves or others – and are used to assign membership in social categories or groups (Erikson 1968; Laitin 1998). According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), humans naturally identify themselves and others around

¹⁹ As Hintjens discusses, this origin myth, concocted by European missionaries and explorers, was used by the Belgian colonizers to justify Batutsi dominance over other groups. As supposed descendants from more “northern” populations (Ethiopians or Middle Easterners, depending on which myth), the Batutsi were seen as more similar to Europeans than the supposedly more “indigenous” Bahutus. After independence, as Hintjens contends, this same origin myth was used by the Bahutus to justify oppression of the Batutsi; as the “non-indigenous” population, they were argued to have less of a claim to the Rwandan state.

²⁰ For a more thorough discussion of the distinction between social and personal identities, see work by Weigert et al. (1986) or Turner et al. (1994).

them into identity categories. This theory builds on Tajfel's (1970) "minimal group paradigm,"²¹ which finds that in situations of group decision-making, people naturally and intuitively develop group consciousness and display in-group favoritism and out-group bias, even when groups are artificially constructed (Tajfel 1974; Hogg and Abrams 1988).

Once categorized, individuals compare their group to other groups in a society, seeking self-esteem from this identity comparison. When the comparison is favorable, individuals receive positive esteem from their identity. For individuals in groups with an unfavorable comparison, identification may lead to negative esteem. For these groups, often the subordinate and/or minority groups in a society, they may attempt to improve their esteem by changing the comparison. They may leave their group and adopt behavior from the more favorable group, leading to the "loyalty" option in ethnic politics as described by Laitin (1998).²² They may change the nature of the comparison, either by 1) changing the characteristics under comparison or 2) changing the group to which they are comparing themselves.²³

²¹ While the phrase "minimal group paradigm" was not originally used by Tajfel in his experiments, it is a name given by other researchers (for an example of recent work using this terminology, see Park and Judd 2005;) to these experiments which sought to examine the minimal requirements needed for individuals to assign themselves to groups and engage in in-group bias and out-group discrimination.

²² In the introduction, "loyalty" was part of Hirschman's (1970) original framework, and was defined as attachment for an organization (78). Laitin uses "loyalty" to refer to affection for the "state" identity: in other words, affections for the identity of the *dominant ethnic group* in the state. Minority ethnic groups engage in "loyalty" when they pick up behaviors generally associated with this dominant group (Laitin 1998, 158-159); if they maintain their separate identity to act within the society, they instead engage in "voice."

²³ Tajfel and Turner (1986) provide examples relating to African-Americans in the United States. They use "black is beautiful" as an example of changing the characteristics under comparison. An example of changing the groups to which they are comparing would be if African-Americans, instead of comparing themselves to the dominant white population, instead compared themselves to another subordinate group, such as Latinos.

As a final option when group comparison is unfavorable, group members may seek to change the existing social structure to improve the position of their group in society. In this final option, groups are engaging in “voice” strategies, seeking to improve their position within the society (Hirschman 1970). Subordinate ethnic group members may choose ethnic mobilization, a process in which “...groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends” (Olzak 1983, 355). If they choose this voice strategy, ethnic group members may join ethnic social movements, participate in ethnic riots or violence, or engage in ethnic voting to promote representatives to help improve their group’s position.

I focus on the factors that lead ethnic group members to engage in ethnic voting, a particular brand of ethnic mobilization and a “voice” strategy. As stated in the introduction, ethnic voting may manifest two behaviors: by 1) supporting co-ethnic candidates and 2) supporting political parties based on ethnic appeal. As the empirical chapters in this research primarily focus on the Baltic Republics and Ukraine, electoral systems that have favored partisan attachments, however imperfect, the theory will primarily emphasize the second of the two varieties of ethnic voting.


A Theory of Ethnic Voting: An Overview

For ethnic voting to be a viable “voice” strategy for an ethnic group, certain conditions must be met. First, ethnic identity must be an activated or politicized identity, meaning that group members choose ethnicity as an identity to classify themselves and believe that mobilizing politically on this identity makes sense. Second, if group members choose to mobilize, their mobilization needs some chance of success. Groups

with a high mobilization potential are more likely to be successful in their collective action attempts, including voting.

In the following sections, I outline a number of factors that politicize ethnicity within a society *or* shape the mobilization potential of an ethnic group. Figure 1.1 diagrams these factors; some influence individual group members, while other factors work at the group-level. For instance, ethnic socialization experiences, meaning the individual grows up and is exposed to ethnic cues in their environment, influences individual group members. In contrast, political opportunities such as electoral rules that allow the formation of ethnic political parties to represent the minority group are constraints imposed on the group from above.

Figure 1.1: A Theory of Ethnic Voting



In the following section, I begin by discussing the meaning of politicized collective identities and the general process required for an identity to become politicized. I then focus on two stages of this process – awareness of shared grievances

and adversarial relations – to explore the underlying factors that trigger these stages. Under the awareness of shared grievances, I focus in depth on how ethnic socialization experiences and a history of ethnic grievances serve to reinforce the solidarity of an ethnic group.

Even the most unified group, however, requires an outside force to serve as the target of their political activity, and so in the next part of the chapter, I consider how competitive environments and national policies reinforce these relationship dynamics. This section links with earlier comparative work on cleavages and party structures (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) along with more recent work on how economics impacts intergroup relations (Olzak 1992). I also discuss how national policy-making and the decisions of the governing party can trigger ethnic dissatisfaction and mobilization against status quo politicians.

Finally, a politicized ethnic group must overcome the collective action dilemma to mobilize successfully. As with other types of mobilizations, resources can play a key role in determining the success or failure of this activity. More specific to voting, electoral rules are particularly influential in deciding the strength and form of ethnic voting as a mobilizing strategy.

When Collective Identities Become Politicized

A central goal of constructivism is understanding how an underlying group identity, such as ethnicity, becomes a focus of political activity. Ethnic voting is in its very nature a decision that is driven by ethnic identity and ethnic group belonging, and is a manifestation of a politicized collective identity. Politicized collective identities “...direct people’s attention to their collective (or social) as opposed to their individual

(or personal) identities, which then regulate their social behavior” (Simon and Klandermans 2001, 320).

Simon and Klandermans (2001) identify a process through which collective identities become politicized. In the first stage, individuals become aware of their shared group membership and recognize that the grievances they experience are shared by in-group members. In the second stage, which they define as *adversarial attribution* (325), group members identify a specific opponent – which may be another identity group, an authority, or the “system” in general – who is to blame for their predicament. Simon and Klandermans note that without an external adversary, groups have a more difficult time mobilizing politically (325).²⁴

Fully politicized groups are actively engaged in political action at the societal level, which may include protesting, lobbying the government, or engaging in ethnic voting. For minority groups, according to Simon and Klandermans, this only occurs if the group is unable to get concessions from their adversarial group. Groups that have their demands met demobilize before they become fully politicized; only groups who continue to feel dissatisfied seek to appeal to the government or other societal groups. This idea harkens back to Schattschneider (1975), who argues that it is the losers of political competition who appeal to the “audience” and try to expand the groups involved in the debate.

²⁴ An example of this predicament can be drawn from the work of Gupta (1998) on African-American politics. Gupta contends that following the Civil Rights movement, the idea of whites as an “enemy” lost meaning for this movement. Blame was more attributed to factors internal to the group, such as lack of education, which served to further depoliticize the movement.

Interestingly, Simon and Klandermans' (2001) theory gives further weight to more recent arguments in ethnic politics that ethnicity is not inherently conflictual or destabilizing (Wilkinson 2004; Van Cott 2005) and may instead promote stability in certain democratic societies (Birnie 2007). Returning to the notion of ethnic voting as a "voice" strategy (discussed in more detail in the Introduction), members that engage in "voice" seek to improve the organization or state from within (Hirschman 1970). Group members that work *within* the system seek to appeal to other societal actors, especially the government, in advancing their ethnic interest. As a strategy for working within the system, ethnic group members must view themselves as part of a broader society and are therefore entitled to make claims to that society, which promotes a sense of inclusion in the society (Wenzel 2000).

Ethnic voting, one example of a "voice" strategy, is therefore a balance between a strong sense of identity and difference on one side, and on the other a sense of loyalty and belonging to the state. Ethnic voting requires a politicized ethnic identity, which an awareness of shared grievances and adversarial relations helps develop. At the same time, ethnic voting also requires that minority group members see the state as a legitimate authority and believe that it will respond to group mobilization and demands, which rests in part on the mobilization potential of the group and the society.

Increasing the Awareness of Shared Grievances: Ethnic Socialization and Ethnic Grievances

Gurr and Harff (2004) argue that ethnic mobilization attempts are most successful among groups that are highly cohesive with a strong shared sense of identity and who perceive strong grievances due to ethnic-based discrimination. A strong, cohesive identity and experiences with discrimination reinforce an individual's belief that his or

her political experience is tied to that of other in-group members. Moreover, the two factors reinforce each other. Individuals with a strong ethnic background are likely to view experiences through an ethnic lens and interpret discrimination as an attack on their group identity; early experiences with discrimination promote solidarity with a group and may serve to socialize an individual, leading them to adopt an ethnic worldview.


Ethnic Socialization and the Reinforcement of Ethnic Identities The first factor which I argue leads to the politicization of ethnic identity is ethnic socialization. Group members who grow up in an “ethnic” environment – for instance, speaking the language of their group or practicing the religion and customs that distinguish their group from others – are more likely to feel a strong attachment to their ethnic identity. This strong attachment is also likely to manifest itself when these individuals engage in politics. Ethnicity, after all, is one of many sociodemographic characteristics that shapes an individual’s worldview (Kinder 1983), and influences how people are brought into and engage with the political system (Kinder and Sears 1985).

To understand how ethnic socialization impacts vote choice, it is useful to place ethnicity within the framework of existing vote-choice theories. In their classic work on American voting, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) found partisan identity a primary determinant of vote choice, a finding that has been supported over time and across a number of different cases (Richardson 1991; Clark 1995; Colton 2003). Partisanship is not just about where a voter stands in reference to a party platform or what they think about that party’s candidates; some researchers have argued that partisanship is a collective identity, and responds to the same biases as other social identities (Kelly 1988; 1989; Greene 1999).

Beyond partisanship, voters prefer candidates they believe share policy preferences similar to themselves (Aldrich 1977; Schulman and Pomper 1975; Miller et al. 1976; Popkin et al. 1976; Hartwig, Jenkins and Temchin 1980; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Kinder and Sears 1985; Kahn and Kenney 1999), as well as those candidates they evaluate positively in terms of qualities they believe will make them good leaders (Marcus 1988; Aldrich, Sullivan and Bordiga 1989; Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994). Furthermore, partisanship has also been linked to issue preferences (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; White, Wyman, and Kryshstanovskaya 1995; White, Rose, and McAllister 1997; Brader and Tucker 2001) and evaluations of candidates (Weisberg and Rusk 1970; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989; Rahn 1993), leading some authors to propose that voting should best be understood as a non-recursive model where partisanship, issue positions, and candidate evaluations are all causally linked and determine vote choice (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979; Whiteley 1988).

In explaining the behavior of Latino voters in the US, Graves and Lee (2000) propose an addendum to this basic theory of voting to explain the role that ethnicity plays in shaping these factors. They conclude that ethnicity directly influences partisanship and issue position, and indirectly affects candidate evaluations through its influence on the previous two factors. Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between these factors as proposed by Graves and Lee.

Figure 1.2: A Simplified Model of Voting, Including Ethnicity
From Graves and Lee (2000)



Note: Graves and Lee's original depiction of the model includes a connection between ethnicity and candidate evaluations. Since they fail to find a significant and direct relationship between the two variables, I have depicted in Figure 1.2 the model their empirical tests support.

Beginning with issues, ethnicity influences an individual's position on policy issues (Cain and Kiewiet 1987; de la Garza and DeSipio 1998; de la Garza and Weaver 1985; de la Garza et al 1992), especially ethnic issues such as immigration or language policy,²⁵ and may determine which issues a voter finds most important in the political debate. Beyond this, ethnicity has also been linked to partisanship and candidate evaluations (de la Garza et al. 1992). In particular, ethnic group members tend to have more favorable impressions of co-ethnic candidates (de la Garza et al. 1992) and are more likely to vote for co-ethnics (Lorinskas, Hawkins, and Edwards 1969; Bullock 1984).

²⁵ Cain and Kiewiet (1984) find no relation between ethnicity and issue positions on more general policies, such as nuclear freezes, bottle deposits, or abortions. However, in a later study, they find significant differences between Anglos and Latinos on more ethnically-based issues, such as immigration or bilingual policy (Cain and Kiewiet 1987).

Birnir (2007) criticizes the machine politics literature (for a sample of such work, see Lowi 1964; Allswang 1971; Johnston 1979; Erie 1988; Mollenkopf 1992) who argue that ethnic socialization creates loyalty to a partisan identity. Instead, Birnir argues that this socialization creates individual loyalty to the *ethnic* identity and the ethnic group, not a political party, and that ethnic group members take cues from their group elite on which parties to support. This reframing of the argument helps explain why groups may suddenly realign in response to elite cues, as black voters in America did during the civil rights movement. In addition, it also explains the “dual nature” of ethnic voting; if individual members are loyal to the group and not a political party, they can favor one party and cross party lines to support co-ethnics and still be consistent in their voting decision-making.

This idea of ethnicity as an *alternative* collective identity to partisan identity seems highly relevant in new democracies such as the post-Soviet republics. Since the end of communism, Eastern Europe is a region characterized by high electoral volatility when compared to many Western European countries, especially early in the democratic transition (Olson 1998; Lewis 2000; Birch 2003; Tavits 2005). Many traditional explanations of partisan identity argue that this is a slow process, emerging from major societal divides (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and requiring socialization into these identities (Jennings and Niemi 1974). Under this theory, the post-Soviet republics lack a sufficient time period as multi-party democracies that would allow these partisan identities to

emerge; a substantial literature finds weak partisan identification in these societies (White, Rose and McAllister 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997).²⁶

In contrast, ethnicity as a collective identity has had a long time to develop in this region. Roeder (1991), for instance, argues that the Soviet system of government actually encouraged ethnic politicization. After independence, Evans and Whitefield (2000) find that ethnicity to be a significant division affecting partisanship and ideology in the region. With this legacy of ethnic division versus a brief period as a multi-party democracy, it seems likely that ethnicity, not party, would be the primary identity determining issue position and candidate evaluations.

In general, growing up in an ethnic environment – in essence, being socialized into an ethnic experience – strengthens an individual's ties to their collective identity and serves to reinforce awareness of a shared destiny with co-ethnics. This awareness of a shared destiny – when combined with shared ethnic grievances – serves to promote the awareness of shared grievances, seen as necessary by Simon and Klandermans (2001) in developing a politicized identity. For many ethnic groups, frequent exposure to a minority language or to the religious community of that ethnic group are central parts of this ethnic socialization experiences. In fact, previous work has linked these two factors with shaping national identity and increasing support for ethnoregional parties, especially in the post-Soviet context (Miller, White, and Heywood 1998; Laitin, 1998; Gordin 2001; Taras, Filippova, and Pobeda, 2004; Hansen and Hesli 2009).

²⁶ While some researchers note a trend towards *greater* partisan identity in the region (for a sample of work, see Miller, Erb, Reisinger, and Hesli 2000; Tavits 2005), this attachment remains much weaker than seen in Western Europe and the United States.

Ethnic Grievances and Political Awareness

According to Kitschelt, “ethnic identities are created and become politicized when a group’s relative resource endowment is shifting to its disadvantage” (1995, 266). Relative deprivation theories (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) focus on this idea that shifting status triggers group unity and mobilization, and argue that group mobilization arises from perceptions of societal injustice and inequality. Previous work has linked group poverty to violent ethnic mobilization (Gurr 1993).

Similar to the economic theories, relative deprivation emphasizes how group activity is motivated by comparisons to other groups in a society, but particularly focuses on the role of individual calculations and perceptions of these relationships (Gurr 1970; Geschwender 1968; Klandermans 1984). Individuals perceive their economic well-being in comparison with others in the society and respond to inequity with mobilization. Feelings of general discrimination and decreasing group status may increase support for certain policies that favor minority groups (Lopez and Pantoja 2004), thereby increasing ethnic voting.

Harff and Gurr (2004) list three common demands that are likely to motivate ethnic political activity: “the right to exercise political control over the internal affairs of their own region and communities, the ability to control and benefit from the development of the region’s resources, and the freedom to protect their own culture and language” (2004; 118-119). When any of these interests are denied, a group will be motivated to try to redress these grievances in whatever political means are available to

them. With the exception of a few cases,²⁷ a demand for regional autonomy has not been a key concern of the Russian minority; however, issues such as language and citizenship policies are key concerns of this group, and so cultural rights are of interest to the group.

Kerbo (1982) offers a corollary theory that combines predictions from both the grievance and resource mobilization literatures. He distinguishes between what he describes as “movements of crisis,” groups economically disadvantaged and motivated primarily by grievances, and “movements of affluence” groups, who are of higher economic status and may have alternative (non-economic) motivations (1982, 653). Affluent group activity is generally non-violent and the result of planning by social movement organizations and elite, rather than spontaneous and/or unorganized protest.

Part of Kerbo’s argument that I find compelling is the claim that affluent groups become more likely to mobilize when their situation begins to approach a “point of crisis” (1982, 655). It can be argued, then, that key events which change the status of an affluent group will motivate a previously demobilized group into political action. This argument fits with the findings that changes in national language policies, in particular, the removal of Russian as an official language, have resulted in political mobilization of the Russian minority (Landau 1986, Dawson 1997, Fournier 2002, Holm-Hansen, 1999).

²⁷ Two counter examples occurred in the Crimea of Ukraine and the Transdnister region of Moldova. During the early 1990s, regional elite in the Crimea of Ukraine pushed to increase regional autonomy (Dawson, 1997). A secessionist conflict broke out in the Transdnister region of Moldova, though the primary causes of the conflict were more about economic relations than ethnic divisions (Melvin 1995). Beyond these two cases, movements for regional autonomy or secession have been exceedingly rare among the Russian minority.

Reinforcing Adversarial Relations: Ethnic Competition and Evaluations of National Politics

In the first part of the theory, I focused on two factors – ethnic socialization and ethnic grievances – that help to politicize ethnicity by increasing awareness of shared grievances with co-ethnics. Primarily, these are factors that influence individuals and vary significantly from group member to group member. Some members of an ethnic group may be raised in an ethnic environment while others were not. While ethnic group members may face political or economic discrimination shared by all due to their ethnic identity, it is most often *individual* experiences of discrimination that raise awareness that this is an issue that affects the group as a whole. In the following section, I discuss the factors that lead to more adversarial relations in societies, the second component that Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue serve to politicize collective identities.

In some ways, the notion of adversarial attribution and politicized collective identities is similar to traditional work on social cleavages. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), social cleavages are societal fault lines that divide groups based on one key characteristic, such as class, religion, or ethnicity. In addition, cleavage groups must be conscious of their collective identities and willing to act on them, demonstrating that they are *salient* identities that motivate political action.

Social cleavages structure political discourse, shape ideological divisions, and determine partisan development as political parties form to represent the most influential cleavages in each society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) list four classic social cleavages: class, state versus church, urban versus rural, and center versus periphery. While center versus periphery predominantly refers to geographic divisions – dividing the “center” or dominant regions from the outlying “periphery” – this category might be broadened to

include ethnicity more generally, especially when reconsidered as the subject versus dominant cultural divide (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 14).²⁸

Simon and Klandermans' (2001) idea of politicized collective identities views politicized identities as more fluid divisions between groups than social cleavage work suggests, a view shared by many social identity theorists. However, it is easy to see how politicized identities (with their adversarial relations) that are reinforced by the political system may over time harden into the stable fault lines that characterize traditional social cleavages. At the very least, the similarity in how the different terms are defined and conceptualized suggests that traditional work on social cleavages may serve as a useful start to understanding the emergence of adversarial relations in different societies.

From Modernization to Competitive Theories: How Economics Gives Rise to Ethnic Cleavages and Adversarial Relations

According to modernization theorists, the forces of modernization worked to erode village or tribal identities and uproot traditional attachments (Gellner 1983; Smith 1986). These approaches linked the rise of ethnic nationalism to the processes of modernization and the tension that emerges between the core and uprooted periphery of groups within a country as a result of this process (Rokkan 1970; Linz 1973; Connor 1972; 1978; Enloe 1981). As an example, migration from rural communities to urban centers, the center of industrial production, eroded attachment to traditional identities such as kinship, the village, and dialectical communities.

²⁸ A classic example of an “ethnoregional” divide would be the Celtic fringe (the Irish, Welsh, and Scottish populations versus the English “center”) in the United Kingdom.

Interaction between groups, and the form of this interaction, is central to other economic theories of ethnic mobilization. In his theory of *internal colonialism*, Hechter (1975) argues that labor market *segregation* and the resulting in-group social network this generates drives ethnic political activity. In his classic study of the Celtic fringe in British politics, Hechter emphasizes how the division between dominant and subordinate groups in a society, and the later exploitation of the subordinate groups, drives conflict between groups. However, unlike relative deprivation theorists, separation and not discrimination is central to this relationship; even if ethnic groups hold jobs in sectors of equal status and pay, if they are distributed into distinct sectors, this will increase ethnic attachment (Hechter and Levi 1979) and trigger ethnic political activity.

In contrast, competitive theorists argue that ethnic mobilization is triggered by frequent contact and competition between groups (Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Rothschild 1981). Ethnic mobilization is most likely when groups compete for the same political, economic, and social resources – including employment, marriage partners, or financial resources. Under this approach, economic integration and competition, not segregation, fuel ethnic political activity.

Research in support of this argument finds that ethnic politics is more prevalent in urbanized and industrialized regions (Beer 1979; Ragin 1979), as these environments brings groups into more intense competition (Kaiser 1994). Taking urbanization as an example, Nagel and Olzak (1982) argue that urban settings: 1) help build networks among transplanted ethnic groups that benefit from settling in communal enclaves, 2) facilitate the formation of organizations, including ethnically-based ones, and 3) serve as “arenas for employment competition” (132) among ethnically-diverse labor markets. The

contact that arises in urban and industrialized settings reinforces perceptions of ethnic differences and, combined with scarce resources, fuel competition and conflict between ethnic groups.

In regards to ethnic voting, previous work on ethnic party support seems to support the ethnic competition approach; work on Spanish ethnoregional parties has found greater support for those parties in the more developed and urban regions of that country (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989). Furthermore, the predictions from the ethnic competition approach seem most applicable to the specific case of focus in this research: the Russian minority. While there are some regions in the former Soviet Union the Russians are more dispersed, such as the Crimea in Ukraine or Northeastern Estonia, the Russian minority is found most often in the capital cities and urban centers, where they are in frequent contact with the titular population.

Dissatisfaction with National Policy: Perceived Legitimacy of Status Quo Politics For minority groups in particular, dissatisfaction with national politics and a sense that national politicians fail to address ethnic group interests makes ethnic-based mobilization more appealing, increasing the tendency of the group to engage in ethnic voting. When national politicians, often representing the majority group in states, fail to adequately address the concerns of an ethnic minority (ethnic or otherwise),²⁹ this may reinforce the belief among these minority group members that a more adversarial role might need to be taken to express this discontent.

²⁹ Birnir (2007, 19-20) provides an interesting example of the Parti Québécois, who, despite their success at promoting the issue of secession in the 1990s, lost a significant number of their ethnic constituency in the 2001 Canadian election due to their failure to address economic concerns.

Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1989) find that in Spain, voters are more likely to support regional parties when they are dissatisfied with the economic policies of national parties. Support for these regional parties is in essence a protest vote against national politics, a finding that is echoed by Madrid (2005) for Latin America. Examining the effect of indigenous populations on party fragmentation, Madrid finds that party systems are more fragmented and volatile in countries where identity is highly salient and when the disadvantaged group believes that the parties do not adequately represent their interests.³⁰

Mobilization Potential: When Collective Action is Viable

Even if ethnic group members have passed the first two stages of politicizing their identity, fully politicized collective identities must engage the public and manifest political behavior. For a group to manifest politically, a significant number of group members must overcome the collective action dilemma (Olson 1968). Like all forms of social activity, voting requires a commitment on behalf of the voters, and, at least in part, voters must think that they receive some sort of benefit in engaging this political activity to be motivated (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).³¹ A number of voting studies

³⁰ Madrid notes that the emergence of indigenous parties has actually decreased party volatility, as they attract the indigenous vote and address the concerns of these previously disenfranchised ethnic groups.

³¹ Downs (1957) relies on the “calculus of voting” to understand the expected utility of voting, which he argues may be understood using the following formula:

$$R = P*B + D - C$$

In this formula, R is the reward for casting a vote; if the reward is high enough, a voter will participate in an election. P is the probability the vote will affect the outcome, B is the benefit an individual voter receives for their candidate winning, and C is the cost of voting, including time and effort. In addition, Downs includes D to describe any positive rewards or feelings a voter receives from fulfilling their duty through the act of voting. While this basic formula is an over-simplified representation of citizen decision-making, it remains useful for framing voting as a collective action problem.

have examined country-specific explanations for differences in voter turnout (Powell 1986; Blais and Carty 1990; 1991; Franklin 2004), while other research has focused on differences between voters within a country (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais 2000). Regardless of the level of analysis, Franklin (2001) argues that the different theoretical explanations can be grouped into three categories. People are primarily driven to participate based on “resources, mobilization, and the desire to affect the course of public policy...” (Franklin 2001, 86).³²

While voter turnout is higher among individuals with more resources, such as education and income (Verba and Nie 1972), political parties and elite can encourage citizen engagement (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and provide resources to motive mass mobilization (Aldrich 1995), serving to increase the benefits and offset the costs of mobilization. Voters are also motivated to participate when they feel their vote matters – when they think their vote can affect the outcome (Downs 1957) and expect that by voting for a specific candidate and party, they will achieve some policy goal (Popkin 1991). Turnout is highest when the election matters more to voters, in other words, when the electoral contest is salient (Franklin 2001).

The above two factors – offsetting costs and increasing the expectation of electoral success – set a useful framework for understanding the circumstances that allow a salient identity to become a politicized one. Research on social movements commonly refers to two other factors which increase the mobilization potential of groups and helps trigger political activity, ethnic or otherwise: group resources and political opportunities.

³² Further, as Franklin discusses, the first two components indirectly link to and build on the last factor.

Resource Mobilization and Mobilizing Ethnicity Resource mobilization theories (Gamson 1968; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Gamson 1968; 1975; Tilly 1978; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980) emphasize movement dynamics as rational, adaptive responses in order to overcome traditional collective action dilemmas, and argue that researchers should focus on the factors that allow groups to compete in the political arena. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), mobilization is most likely when a group has available resources, including potential movement entrepreneurs (1226). In some cases, previous examples of successful mobilization may also serve as a resource (Lipsky 1968), as past success increases individual belief in the probability of future success. Overall, for resource mobilization theorists, the more resources a group possesses, the more likely mobilization attempts will be successful.

Work on *ethnic* mobilization describes several resources that increase the success of this particular collective identity (Smith and Wilson 1997; Barany 2002), which include a potential pool of leaders, organizational capacity, unifying symbols, media access, and financial resources.³³ Many of these factors serve to reinforce one another; ethnic organizations will seek to increase the communal consciousness of their members (Enloe 1973) and their political activity by using common cultural symbols and financial resources to motivate the mass membership (Barany 2002). Ethnic organizations and social movements may serve as a powerful organizational resource; beyond connecting the voters to their political leaders, these organizations may alter their behaviors and

³³ In addition to the resources listed below, Barany (2002) also includes political opportunities and ethnic identity as additional resources a group can draw on. In my theory, these are separate components, distinct from resources, and are discussed elsewhere to keep the terms conceptually distinct.

evolve into ethnic political parties that directly compete for the ethnic vote (Van Cott 2005).

A key factor that can determine the success of collective mobilization is the availability of leaders to motivate this activity. In particular, leaders can connect with members of a group previously unengaged in politics (Breuilly 1993), motivating further collective action. As leaders are primarily drawn from the more educated elite, increasing the overall education level of a community increases their pool of potential leaders. Furthermore, higher group education may increase mobilization more generally, as recent work on civic education finds a link between civic education programs and participation in democracies (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Bratton et al. 1999; Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000; Finkel 2002).

Political Opportunities and Ethnic Voting According to the opportunities approach, mobilization attempts are shaped by the political environment in which groups interact, with more activity possible under more open systems. Political opportunity structures (POS) serve as filters that “either encourage or discourage people from using collective action” (Tarrow, 1994, 18) and determine the type of mobilization strategies groups pursue. Social movements are more effective in open political systems than in closed ones (Kitschelt 1986), and the degree a political system is open is an important factor which explains the rise of particular types of political parties (Kitschelt 1998; McAdam 1996).

While past work on electoral participation has examined the effect of many institutional rules, such as ballot structure, electoral threshold, or different formula for

calculating votes,³⁴ researchers often cite district magnitude as an influential institutional rule. Electoral rules act as constraints in two ways. First, electoral rules set a mathematical constraint on how many parties can win a parliament seat. Second, electoral rules affect political elite and voters psychologically by leading them to anticipate those constraints and act in a way to maximize their chance of winning (Blais and Carty 1991; Benoit 2001). For voters, more electoral constraints means they are less likely to vote for smaller parties as they perceive this as wasting their vote.

Since Duverger's (1951) original assertion that single member districts favor a two-party system, considerable research has demonstrated that district magnitude is perhaps the most influential factor determining the number of political parties in a system (Rae 1967, Riker 1976; 1982; Blais and Carty 1991; Gallagher 1991; Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997). The more representatives elected from an electoral district, the easier it is for small parties to win seats in parliament (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994). Many researchers have further confirmed that a higher legal threshold reduces the number of small parties within a country (Gallagher 1992; Moser 1999; Jackman and Volpert 1996), and many countries have designed their electoral laws with that goal in mind. Ethnic minority parties benefit from rules that favor greater representation (Van Cott 2003; 2005; Birnir 2007) as they by definition represent a minority of voters. Overall, ethnic voters are more likely to support the parties and candidates that they believe are more likely to receive representation.

³⁴ For a more thorough discussion of how these different institutional rules affect voting see Norris (2004).

Conclusion

To understand why ethnic group members choose to engage in ethnic voting, it is best to begin by understanding how ethnicity comes to emerge as a politicized collective identity. Individuals who are part of a politicized identity view their political concerns as shared by all group members, see themselves in competition with other groups in the society, and engage in the political system in a way to express their common political goals. By choosing to engage in ethnic voting, politicized group members practice a form of issue voting where they select candidates and parties that they view will best express their collective interest.

Ethnic voting, however, can manifest itself in many ways. In some countries, ethnic voters may choose to support ethnic political parties, whose clear goal is to address and represent the ethnic interest. In contexts where this option is not viable, ethnic voters may instead support a non-ethnic party that nonetheless addresses key issues of concern to them. And finally, as discussed by Birnir (2007), ethnic voters may suddenly change their support to parties that in the past they have had no ties with but are running co-ethnic candidates.

All of these options are viable expressions of ethnic vote, and so the first challenge in researching this topic is to create a framework that allows us to identify situations where ethnic voting can be said to occur and the situations where it is not. I begin this challenge in the following chapter by classifying the degree to which political parties in the Baltic republics and Ukraine appeal to ethnic voters. Based on this classification, I can then begin the process of identifying *when* ethnic voting is occurring and explaining *why* this trend is stronger in some contexts than in others.

CHAPTER 2

IDENTIFYING “RUSSIAN” PARTIES IN THE PR AND MIXED SYSTEMS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Ethnic voting may develop in many ways. Returning to Wolfinger’s (1965) original definition, as referenced in the introduction, it may include choosing to support co-ethnic candidates or voting for specific political parties. In electoral systems that used proportional representation or mixed rules to choose their representatives, parties are generally favored over candidates in representation, and so political parties will be the primary focus of ethnic voting in those systems. However, voters may choose *different* types of political parties to represent their ethnic interest. Ethnic voters who decide to vote based on their identity may choose to support 1) ethnic political parties, whose clear goal is to address and represent the ethnic interest or, when this option is not viable, they may 2) instead support a non-ethnic but inclusive party that addresses key issues of concern to the ethnic group or presents them with an array of co-ethnic candidates on the party list. Identifying which options are available to ethnic voters is the first step to understanding and analyzing the dynamics of ethnic voting.

In this chapter, I classify the political parties in the Baltic republics and Ukraine into three categories – ethnic parties, inclusive parties, and non-inclusive parties – based on the degree to which these parties appeal to Russian voters. After classifying the political parties in each country, I identify three distinct patterns of party development that have emerged in this region. I argue that which parties receive the most support depends on the strength of ethnic policy issues uniting the ethnic electorate (the stronger the issues and grievances, the greater incentive for ethnic voting), and the presence of

viable alternatives, which can lead to strategic voting and support for the larger inclusive parties over the smaller ethnic parties.

I test this argument using case studies of the major policy concerns and party options in the three Baltic Republics. In both Latvia and Estonia, the Russian minority experienced discrimination in regards to the citizenship and language policies adopted by the newly independent republics, and the resulting grievances contributed to the early formation of Russian ethnic parties. In Estonia, this early support for ethnic parties has declined while support for inclusive parties has increased – a trend that can be explained by the incentive for strategic voting in this country. In Latvia, a lack of viable alternatives has constrained incentives for strategic voting, leading to the continued support of Russian ethnic parties. In Lithuania, the Russian minority has a low incentive to engage in ethnic voting, as the government quickly pursued policies to integrate minority concerns into mainstream policy. Due to this weak incentive, no significant Russian ethnic parties have emerged, and instead the “Russian” interest has been most frequently represented by a leftist inclusive party, and to a lesser degree by a “Polish” party.

Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Parties in the Post-Soviet World

In this chapter, I emphasize and discuss *party* appeals and *party* development primarily because the electoral design these countries chose to adopt after independence emphasize parties as the primary instrument of representation. Both Estonia and Latvia adopted pure proportional representation (PR) systems from the beginning, giving clear

preference to party representation.³⁵ Lithuania adopted a mixed system, with 71 single-member districts³⁶ and one nationwide constituency electing the remaining 70 members of the Lithuanian *Seimas*. Ukraine has experienced the most variance in their electoral system; their transition election in 1994 used a pure majoritarian formula, but by 1998 they adopted a mix formula, similar to Lithuania, with half the 450 Rada seats elected using single-member districts and the other half using one nationwide constituency. Since 2002, however, Ukraine has used a pure PR system with a single nationwide constituency.

In pure PR systems, the only way for representatives to win seats in parliament is if their party receives enough votes. Mixed systems such as Lithuania, however, allow for a method of achieving representation beyond party support, and it has been argued that such a system may operate closer to principals of majoritarianism than to proportionality (Shugart and Wattenburg 2001). While some might argue that Lithuania's electoral systems gives it a stronger stronger candidate orientation than a pure PR system, Lithuania has nonetheless developed a strong party system with strong partisan identification (Miller et al. 2000; Holmberg 2003), and few independents are elected to parliament.³⁷

Previous authors have identified which parties receive support from the Russian minority in the PR and mixed systems of the post-Soviet republics (Clark 1996; Birch

³⁵ Estonia's current electoral system has 11 multi-member districts with a magnitude ranging from 6 to 13. Latvia is comprised of 5 electoral districts with magnitudes ranging from 14 to 29.

³⁶ Lithuania uses a run-off election in a district if no candidate receives a clear majority.

³⁷ Following the 2004 *Seimas* election, only 5 of the 141 mandates, or 3.5%, were independents (Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004b).

and Wilson 1999; Fitzmaurice 2001; Davies and Ozolins 2001; 2004; Birch 2003; Pettai 2003; Purs 2004; Hesli, 2007). Some of these parties, such as the Estonian United People's Party (EURP)³⁸ or the Coalition for Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL), are identified as ethnic parties, as they claim in their programs and in the media to represent the interests of the Russian-speaking minority. Other parties are not identified as ethnic parties but do include a number of pro-Russian policies in their program. For instance, the Party of Regions in Ukraine, supported broadly by both Russians and a good number of Ukrainians, advocates a pro-Russian language policy. Furthermore, their candidates include a number of Russophone Ukrainians and Russian ethnics, representatives who communicate to the Russian population that this is a party sympathetic to a Russian-speaking interest.

As the above examples demonstrate, a study of ethnic vote choice in PR systems must consider both avowedly ethnic parties as well as more inclusive parties that may include an ethnic appeal in their platform. I propose a typology containing the following three categories: ethnic parties, inclusive parties, and non-inclusive parties. This typology is based first on whether the political party includes some form of appeal to a minority ethnic group, and second on the strength of that appeal. Ethnic parties have the strongest ethnic appeal, inclusive parties have at least a moderate appeal, and non-inclusive parties have no appeal to an ethnic minority group.

Beginning with ethnic parties, a number of definitions have been offered. For Horowitz, an ethnically-based party “derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group...and serves the interest of that group” (2000, 291). Under this

³⁸ In 2008, the EURP merged with the Left Party to form the United Left Party of Estonia.

definition, ethnic parties are defined by their support, rather than by their program, with a focus on exclusive representation. A second definition is offered by Chandra (2004), who also defines ethnic parties based on factors of exclusion and ascription but adds mobilization strategy to her definition, placing more emphasis on what the party offers to the voters. As Chandra states, an ethnic party is one that "...overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that makes such representation central to its strategy of mobilizing voters" (2004, 3). For Van Cott, an ethnic party is "an organization authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature" (2005, 3). This definition combines the support-based and programmatic elements of the previous two definitions, but further includes the importance of *membership* as determining the ethnic nature of a party.

Since the major research questions in this study is to explain why some ethnic group members vote for an ethnic party and others do not, and why voting for an ethnic party is more prevalent in some settings than others, it is important to separate what the party offers from who supports it. For this reason, I define an ethnic party based purely on what they offer potential ethnic voters. I include the programmatic component common to most definitions of ethnic parties, but refine Van Cott's *membership* component, and also define ethnic parties based on whether the party list includes co-ethnic candidates. An ethnic political party, therefore, is a party that in its party platform offers policies of interest to the ethnic target group (it represents the group substantively)

and includes in its party lists a high number of co-ethnic candidates (it represents the group descriptively).

The next group of parties I am interested in is parties that have seldom been studied in the comparative ethnic politics literature: mainstream parties that include appeals to minority groups – these I call inclusive parties. Inclusive parties have a more broad-based appeal than ethnic parties (including majority interests in their program), but do include ethnic interests in their program and/or minority candidates on their lists that demonstrate that this party is sympathetic to the ethnic group's interest. For inclusive parties, the broad-based appeal is their primary focus, and so they have a weaker ethnic appeal in their policies and candidates than do ethnic parties.

To understand why some members of a minority group vote for an ethnic or inclusive party while others do not, it is also important to consider a third alternative. The final category in this typology is non-inclusive parties, and includes majority nationalist parties and parties with no ethnic issues in the electoral platform. For example, one party categorized in this group would be the Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party (TB/LNNK), a radical Latvian nationalist party. The TB/LNNK has most consistently opposed liberalizing the citizenship policy, has favored naturalization quotas and pushed for repatriation of the Russophones *to Russia* as the solution to the statelessness problem,³⁹ and advocates for language and education policies that favor the Latvian language (Morris 2004), all policies generally

³⁹ After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian residents of Estonia and Latvia were denied automatic citizenship. The Russian Federation offered citizenship to these populations, but many who wished to remain in the region declined that citizenship, fearing deportation to Russia. This situation has left a sizeable population as “stateless,” lacking any citizen protections under either domestic or international law. Laitin mentions that “stateless” is one generic term for referring to non-Letts, as “Many Latvians wish the Russians living within their border were indeed wards of the international community” (1998, 280).

opposed by the Russian minority. A Russian voter could not support the TB/LNNK and be said, substantively, to be voting in their ethnic interest.

To classify the political parties of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine into these three categories, it is necessary to know 1) whether the party program advocates policies that are in the interest of the Russian minority and 2) whether the party list includes a sufficient number of Russian candidates. To this end, I identify three policies in particular that have been a major concern of the Russian minority since the end of the Soviet Union: liberalizing citizenship policy, increasing the status of the Russian language, and strengthening relations with the Russian Federation (Dawson 1997, Holm-Hansen 1999, Khrychikov and Miall 2002, Fournier 2002). While the emphasis placed on these policies varies by country – citizenship policy has been the major concern in Estonia and Latvia, while the language issue and increased regional autonomy is central for Russians in Ukraine – parties that include these policies in their program are making an appeal to the Russian electorate, and so meet the policy requirement of an ethnic party or an inclusive party. Furthermore, by examining the candidates on the party lists, we can also determine whether a political party fulfills the second criteria, and offers co-ethnic candidates to their voters.

To identify components of party program, I use data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, and McDonald 2006). The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) uses content analysis of party documents to generate data on how often and in what direction (positive or negative) party program include mention of certain policy issues. I contrast the parties on where they fall in

regards to positions on citizenship policy (more or less restrictive),⁴⁰ relations with Russia, the USSR or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),⁴¹ and multiculturalism.⁴² Where the manifestos data are incomplete,⁴³ I supplement this information with more in-depth analysis of the party program, including positions on minority-language issues. On the language issue (not included in the CMP codings), parties receive a positive score if they promote minority language use and learning; they receive a negative score if they exclusively promote the majority language. For Ukraine only, I code for whether political parties favor increased regional autonomy.⁴⁴

Data on candidate ethnicity comes from the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Latvia (www.cvk.lv), the Estonian National Electoral Committee (www.vvk.ee), the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania (<http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/index.eng.html>), and the Project on Political Transformation

⁴⁰ In the Comparative Manifestos project, more restrictive citizenship policy includes “Favourable mention of restrictions in citizenship” or “restrictions in enfranchisement with respect to (ethnic) groups,” while more lax citizenship policy includes “Favourable mention of lax citizenship and election laws” or “no or few restrictions in enfranchisement.”

⁴¹ For the Central and Eastern European countries, the Comparative Manifestos project includes both positive – “Favourable mention of Russia, the USSR, the CMEA bloc or the Community of Independent States” – and negative mention of the same country or groups of countries.

⁴² A positive mention of multiculturalism includes: “Favorable mention of cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarization; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.” The Comparative Manifestos Project also codes for negative mention of multiculturalism, which includes: “Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration” or a negative mention of the same factors included in Multiculturalism: Positive.

⁴³ The Comparative Manifestos Project is limited in two ways that are particularly problematic to this research. First, the parties included in the data set for each year are parties that have passed the electoral threshold and received representation in parliament; this means that for some Russian ethnic parties for some years, no data are available. In addition, while the comparative manifestos project does include some coding of “ethnic” issues, such as citizenship policy, it does not include a specific variable for party position on language policy, which is often key issue of interest to an ethnic minority group and has been a major concern of the Russian minority (Khrychikov and Miall 2002).

⁴⁴ Ukraine, like the Baltic republics and *unlike* the Russian Federation, is a unitary government. Russian-speakers tend to favor increased regional power or a move to a federal system.

and the Electoral Processes in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (<http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/>).⁴⁵ Ukraine does not publish information on candidate ethnicity, and so the data are missing in the Ukraine tables. As a proxy measure, I discuss the ethno-linguistic make-up of the party leadership for the Ukrainian parties.

Table 2.1 presents a classification of political parties in all four countries using the criteria outlined above. The parties included may be thought of as the major party options from which Russian voters may choose. It is important to note that in these tables and classification I exclude the first election following independence. Initial elections exhibit an unstable and highly fragmented party system, in essence, a party “free-for-all.” In addition, in many countries, electoral rules and franchise (many Russians were unable to vote in some of these early elections) changed dramatically after the first elections. For these reasons, I chose instead to focus on the elections from the mid-1990s on. The first of such elections occurs in 1995 in Estonia, 1996 in Lithuania, and 1998 in Latvia and Ukraine.

⁴⁵ In the information of candidates, Latvia and Lithuania regularly report biographical information on candidates, including candidate ethnicity (listed under “nationality”). Estonia, however, does not report this data. To code for Estonia, I follow the work of Khrychikov & Miall (2002) and identify “Russian” candidates as those who have both a first and last name which is Slavic. As Khrychikov and Miall discuss, while not a perfect measure, Slavic and Estonian names are so distinct that this tends to yield fairly accurate results.

Table 2.1: Ethnic, Inclusive, and Non-inclusive Parties in Study

Ethnic Parties	Inclusive Parties	Non-Inclusive Parties
<i>Estonia</i>		
Our Home is Estonia (1995) United People's Party (1999-2003) Russian Party of Estonia (1999-2003) <i>Russian Baltic Party</i> <i>Russian Unity Party</i>	Center Party (1999-2003) Reform Party (2003)	Center Party (1995) Reform Party (1995-99) Republican & Conservative People's Party (1995) Moderates (1995-2003) Coalition Party & Rural Union (1995) Estonian Coalition Party (1999) Estonian People's Union (1999-2003) Pro Patria (1995-2003) Res Publica (2003)
<i>Latvia</i>		
National Harmony Party (1998) For Human Rights in a United Latvia (2002-06) Harmony Center (2006) <i>Russian Citizens' Party</i>	-none-	Social-Democratic Alliance (1998) Fatherland & Freedom/LNNK Alliance (1998-2006) Latvia's Way (1998-2006) Latvia's First Party (1998-2006) People's Party (1998-2006) New Era (2002-06) Green & Farmer's Party (2002-06)
<i>Lithuania</i>		
Lithuania Russian Union (1996) Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (1996-2004)	A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition (1996-2004) Labor Party (2004)	Social Democratic Party (1996) Democratic Party Coalition (1996) Center Union (1996-2000) Liberal Union (2000) Liberal & Center Union (2004) Christian Democratic Party (1996-2000) Homeland Union (1996-2004) New Union (2000) Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (2000-04) Order & Justice (2004)
<i>Ukraine</i>		
Party of Regions (2006-07)	Communist Party (1998-2007) Progressive Socialist Party (1998) "For United Ukraine" bloc (2002) Socialist Party (2006)	Green Party (1998) Christian Democratic Party (1998) People's Democratic Party (1998) Bloc of the Socialist & Peasant's Party (1998) Socialist Party (2002) Social-Democratic Party - United (1998) All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada" (1998) People's Movement - Rukh (1998) National Front (1998) "Our Ukraine" bloc (1998-07) Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc (2002-07) People's bloc Lytvyna (1998, 2007)

The CMP only includes parties in each election that have overcome a country's electoral threshold and received seats in parliament, and as of the time of this coding provides data only up to 2003. Data on smaller parties, such as the ethnic Estonian United People's Party (EURP) or the Lithuanian Russian Union (LRS), is not available from the CMP for certain elections, so I include data based on my own reading of the party programs. For the elections not yet available from the CMP, the same rule was applied to identify and code the most relevant parties in the election – parties that have passed the electoral threshold and parties that are identified as ethnic parties.

In the following section, I describe the classification decisions in greater detail. For each country, I present a table using the data described above to place the major political parties into the three categories: ethnic, inclusive, and non-inclusive parties. For the ethnic and inclusive parties in each country, I expand on the table data and briefly describe the major ethnic policies offered by each political party.

Estonia

Before 1995, membership in the *Riigikogu* was exclusively Estonian. In the 1992 parliamentary election, no Russian candidates received seats (Corbell and Wolff 2004); in fact, not a single Russian party even contested the election (Pettai and Hallik 2002).⁴⁶ Since 1995, five parties have emerged which at times have offered policies or candidates to appeal to the Russian-speaking minority of Estonia: three ethnic parties – Our Home is Estonia, the Estonian United People's Party, and the Russian Party of Estonia – and in more recent elections, two inclusive parties – the Center Party (Kesk) and the Estonian

⁴⁶ Pettai and Hallik attribute this partially to the citizenship policy which disenfranchised the Russian population, but also to the “deep sense of political disorientation that most Russian and Russian leaders felt after independence” (2002, 513).

Reform Party. As seen in Table 2.2, of these five parties, the ethnic parties offer the closest fit to the pre-identified criteria, as they include pro-Russian policies on their platform and include in their party lists a greater proportion of Russophone candidates: over 2/3 of the candidates in these parties are members of the Russian-speaking minority.

Of all the political parties in Estonia, the Russian ethnic parties have been the only parties to advocate for a more lax citizenship policy, a dominating concern of this ethnic group (see Table 2.2).⁴⁷ In regards to other policies of concern to the Russian minority, the Russian parties have been the only parties to promote multiculturalism. They also have more often and more consistently included positive mention of Russia, the USSR, the CMEA bloc or the CIS than other Estonian political parties, though at times this position has been picked up by the other parties, such as Kesk in the 2003 parliamentary election.

Among the inclusive, more mainstream political parties in Estonia, Kesk (1999-2003) offers the most to Russian voters in terms of policy and candidates. While in 1995 Kesk did not include pro-Russian policies in its program and only 4.4% of their list were Russian, since 1999 they have become more substantively and descriptively inclusive of the Russian interest, offering a lesser number of policies and co-ethnic candidates than the ethnic parties but more than other mainstream Estonian parties.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ In 1999, the Estonian Country People's Party (EME) includes a favorable mention of more lax citizenship policies; however, their party programme contains more frequent mention of restricting the citizenship law.

⁴⁸ The percent of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian candidates in the Kesk list has steadily increased, from 9.9% in 1999 to almost 13% by 2003.

Table 2.2: Party Categorization in Estonia: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
Ethnic	Our Home is Estonia (MKOE)	1995	5.9%	+	+	+	none	75.3% (55)
	Estonia United People’s Party (EURP)	1999	6.1%	+	+	+	+	61% (105)
		2003	2.2%	+	+	+	+	72.6% (77)
	Russian Party of Estonia (VEE)***	1999	2.0%	+	+	+	+	77.7% (115)
		2003	0.2%	+	+	+	+	75% (9)
Minority Inclusive	Center Party (Kesk)	1999	23.4%	none	+	None	none	9.9% (24)
		2003	25.4%	none	+	+	none	12.8% (16)
	Reform Party (Reform)	2003	17.7%	—	none	None	none	10.4% (13)
Non - Inclusive	Center Party (Kesk)	1995	14.2%	none	none	None	none	4.4% (5)
	Reform Party (Reform)	1995	16.2%	none	none	None	none	0
		1999	15.9%	—	none	None	none	3.7% (8)
	Moderates (Mõõdukad)	1995	6.0%	none	none	+	none	4% (4)
		1999	15.2%	—	none	None	none	4.6% (14)
		2003	7.0%	none	none	None	none	4% (5)
	Republican & Conservative People’s Party (Parem)	1995	5.0%	none	none	+*	none	3% (2)
	<i>See Moderates</i>	1999						
	<i>See Moderates</i>	2003						

Table 2.2: (continued)

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
Non - Inclusive	Coalition Party & Rural Union (KMÜ)	1995	32.2%	none	none	+	none	3.1% (5)
	Coalition Party (EKK)	1999	7.6%	—	none	+	none	6% (13)
	People's Union (Rahvaliid)	1999	7.3%	—	—	None	none	4.2% (7)
	<i>formerly Country People's Party (EME), Rural Union</i>	2003	13.0%	none	—	None	none	4% (5)
	Pro Patria (Isamaa)	1995	7.9%	none	—	+/-**	none	1.8% (2)
	<i>formerly Pro Patria and ERSP Union (I/ERSP)</i>	1999	16.1%	—	—	None	none	1.1% (2)
		2003	7.3%	—	—	None	none	2.4% (3)
	Res Publica (ResP)	2003	24.6%	none	—	None	none	6.4% (8)

Source: The Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 2006) and candidate data from the Estonian National Electoral Committee (www.vvk.ee).

Note: Number in parentheses is the number of Russian and Russian-speaking (Ukrainian and Belarusian) candidates on the party list.

*Parem's program also includes some negative mention of relations with Russia.

**The Pro Patria and ERSP Union have an equal number of positive and negative quasi-sentences regarding relations with Russia.

*** Political parties that failed to pass the electoral threshold and are not included in the Comparative Manifestos data.

The only other mainstream party that includes a significant number of Russians would be the Reform Party, whose party list in 2003 was roughly 10% Russian. While Reform is not a good policy fit for Russian ethnic voters – for instance, they favor a more *restrictive* citizenship policy – in 2003 they offer almost twice the number of Russian co-ethnic candidates than any other mainstream party besides Keskk, and so are also categorized as inclusive.

Examining these parties in greater detail and overtime, the first strong showing by any ethnic parties occurred during the 1995 *Riigikogu* election when the Our Home is Estonia (MKOE) coalition received 5.9% of the national vote and won 6 seats (Taagepera 1995). Our Home is Estonia (MKOE) formed for the 1995 parliamentary election and included the two major parties representing the Russian minority in Estonia, the Estonian United People's Party (EURP) and the Russian Party of Estonia (VEE), along with a number of smaller Russian ethnic parties and organizations. This coalition opposed the 1993 Estonian Citizenship Law and pushed for greater liberalization of citizenship policy, for other policies to improve the status of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, and for improving relations with the Russian Federation. Of the Russian population eligible to vote in 1995, an estimated 62% supported the MKOE (Khrychikov and Miall 2002, 203).⁴⁹

Personality conflicts between the leadership of the EURP and the VEE prevented the two parties from forming a coalition in subsequent elections and split the Russian vote. In 1999 the VEE ran independently and attempted to push the ethnic issue, while

⁴⁹ Khrychikov and Miall estimate support for non-Estonian parties using regional population and electoral turnout data. For a full discussion of their calculations, see Khrychikov and Miall (2002, 204).

the EURP led a coalition comprised of the Russian Unitary Party and the Estonian-dominated Social Democratic Labor Party. The EURP coalition received 6.1% of the national vote, passing the 5% electoral threshold and receiving 6 seats, while the VEE received roughly 2% of the vote and no mandates. Due to these personality conflicts, the two parties did not even attempt to form a common list in the 2003, and their electoral support suffered (Pettai 2004): neither passed the 5% electoral threshold and they did not receive any seats in parliament.

In 2006, the EURP changed their name to the Constitution Party, and in 2008, they combined with the Left Party to form the United Left Party of Estonia (United Left Party 2009a). Despite the name change, many of the policies on their programs remain constant. According to their party program (Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei 2000; United Left Party of Estonia 2009b), in addition to policies on economic reform and social policy, the EURP seeks to increase the number of Russian-speakers receiving Estonian citizenship by relaxing the citizenship requirements (particularly the language requirement) and increasing the availability of Estonian-language training to help Russian-speakers overcome the current naturalization restrictions. In foreign policy, they look to strengthen ties with Russia, especially economic relations, and are against NATO membership. The EURP also advocates for greater power for municipal government, a policy in their self-interest as this party has experienced greater success in municipal elections. Non-citizens have the right to vote in local elections in Estonia; as Russian-speakers are the largest group of non-citizens and tend to be concentrated in certain urban municipalities, they make a sizeable voting population in these regions.

The EURP aims to decrease discrimination against minorities, especially language discrimination. They promote the rights of national minorities to use of their native language, particularly in regions where they comprise a sizeable proportion of the population, and call for Russian and other minority-language instruction in secondary and higher education institutions. Finally, the EURP express in their program a preference that the government does not intervene in the establishment of an Orthodox church under the power of the Moscow Patriarchy. They also oppose market reforms and NATO membership (Fitzmaurice 2001).

The VEE (Vene Erakond Eestis, in Estonian) includes a number of similar policies, including liberalization of the citizenship policy, strengthening relations with Russia, continuing Russian instruction in schools, and protection of the Russian Orthodox Church. They further support increased use of Russian language in the medical profession and in the treatment of Russian patients. Many of the VEE's more strongly-worded policies are motivated by their view of the position of the Russian population in Estonia; while they do view Estonia as the historical homeland of the Estonians, the VEE sees the Russian population as a historical population and part of Estonian culture and deserving of certain state protections. Unlike the EURP, which does not include mention of European Union membership in their program, the VEE is in favor of EU membership,⁵⁰ though they give preference to good relations with the Russian Federation

⁵⁰ Prior to accession, Russian-speaking population in Estonia had shown greater support for EU membership than Estonians. This trend reversed, however, with the lead up to the 2003 EU accession referendum in Estonia (though Russian-speakers were still marginally in favor of EU membership). The Russians were optimistic about the economic advantage of EU membership and believed membership would improve minority rights. However, during the 2003 referendum, EU membership was promoted to the public as defense against the Russian Federation and a way of severing ties with the Soviet heritage, which alienated the Russian electorate (Henderson 2004, 163).

as they see Russia as the “cultural homeland” of the Russian minority (Vene Erakond Eestis 2004).

While the EURP and the VEE are the more famous of the political parties claiming to represent the Russian-speaking minority, two other traditional ethnic parties are worth mentioning here. Due to their minor electoral role,⁵¹ they are not included in Table 2.2 nor discussed further in this chapter, but they will be included in the Chapter 4 analysis. The first is the Russian Baltic Party of Estonia, formed in 2000 and merged with the Reform Party in 2002 (Estonian Reform Party 2009). This party promotes liberalizing the Estonian citizenship law and the law on language, favors the use of Russian as an official state language, and supports Estonia’s membership in the European Union (Gynter 2000). The second party, the Russian Unity Party, was established in 1998 and dissolved by court order in 2008 when the party membership fell below 1,000, below the statutes set for political parties in Estonia (Baltic News Service 2008). Like many of the other Russian political parties, this party primarily sought to address the citizenship and language concerns of the Russian-speaking minority (Minorities at Risk 2009).

By 2003, support for the Russian ethnic parties had considerably declined.⁵² The only Russian deputies in the 2003 *Riigikogu* were from Keskk and Reform (Pettai 2004).⁵³

⁵¹ Using the Estonian Electoral Commission website, I am unable to find actual data on the number or percent of votes for these parties during the parliamentary elections. Both parties would be included in the “other” classification reported by the Commission.

⁵² Part of this drop may rest on the slight change to the electoral system going into the 2003 election. Due to redistricting, the heavily Russian Ida-Viru region, which shares an electoral district with Laäne-Viru, lost 2 of their 7 representatives. This change, though, was very minor, and the primary limit on Russian party representation was due to none of the parties passing the 5% electoral threshold, which remained unchanged.

Since the late-1990s, Kesk has expressed an increasing willingness to work with Russian parties and represent the Russian interest (Budryte 2005).⁵⁴ They have included a higher proportion of non-Estonians on their lists than other major parties (Khrychikov and Miall 2002, 205). Fitzmaurize (2001) finds that, in contrast to other mainstream political parties, Kesk places greater priority towards strengthening ties with Russia and is cautious about NATO membership, policies in line with the Russophone population's preferences. In 2004 Kesk signed a cooperation protocol with Putin's United Russia party, a move which drew criticism from more right-wing parties in Estonia (Gunter, 2004) but signaled a pro-Russian stance to its Russian-speaking constituents.⁵⁵ At the same time, while they have made campaign promises to address the statelessness issue (Budryte 2005), Kesk does not specifically include mention of a less restrictive citizenship policy in their party program (Keskerakond 2005).

The Reform Party is a liberal democratic party that, as their program describes, focuses on economic issues and free-market reform (Reformierakond 2006a). While over time Kesk has moved from its centrist position to adopt a more leftist ideology (Grofman et al. 2000), Reform has offered a more rightist socio-economic policy position (Benoit and Laver 2006, 258; Klingemann et al. 2006). In their program, Reform has been fairly non-inclusive towards the Russian minority, favoring a more restrictive citizenship

⁵³ Pettai (2004) mentions that some saw the 2003 election as a normalization of ethnic relations in Estonia, as these mainstream parties integrated ethnic Russians into their ranks.

⁵⁴ Budryte references Raimo Pomm, an Estonian analyst, who argues that the declining support for Russian parties is at least in part due to the efforts by mainstream Estonian parties to appeal to the Russian minority; Kesk and Reform are specifically highlighted as they sought to attract Russian politicians and voters (Budryte 2005, 76-77).

⁵⁵ This agreement called for the creation of a number of interparty commissions on education, culture, and the economy.

policy. In regards to language and culture, the Reform program includes no mention of minority language protections and instead emphasizes the role of the Estonian language as the basis of statehood and belonging (Reformierakond 2006a).⁵⁶ While the party program does not specifically include Russian minority interests in their program, beginning with the 2003 election they do have a special Russian faction, led by former EURP member Sergei Ivanov, which promotes the rights of cultural minorities (Reformierakond 2006b).

Overall, early Estonian parliamentary elections saw the rise of Russian-speaking ethnic parties, the most dominant being the EURP and the VEE. While these parties remain a viable contender in municipal elections, at the national level support for these parties has declined steadily, and since 2003 no Russian-speaking party has participated in the *Riigikogu*. At the same time, two mainstream parties – Kesk and Reform – have increasingly adopted policies on their platforms and candidates on their policy list that appeal to the Russian-speaking community, and have benefited electorally. The trend in Estonia makes an interesting comparison to party development in Latvia. While Estonia and Latvia share similar histories, demography,⁵⁷ and electoral institutional development, the party system in Latvia remains divided on ethnicity.

Latvia

As in Estonia, citizenship policy is a highly charged issue in Latvia (Davies and Ozolins), and remains a dominant concern of the Russian minority in post-independence

⁵⁶ In their program, Reform makes the claim that the “Estonian government exists for the maintenance and development of the Estonian nation and culture.” They promote the use of Estonian in education at all levels, and encourage learning of Estonian in foreign language schools.

⁵⁷ At the time of independence, the Russian-speaking population comprised roughly one-third of the population in the two states (Harris 1993).

Latvia. Again similar to Estonia, the parties that consistently support a more lax citizenship policy are the Russian ethnic parties: the National Harmony Party (TSP), which later split into the For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) and Harmony Center (SC). The Russian ethnic parties also more consistently favor improving relations with Russia, promoting multiculturalism, and improving the status of the Russian language than other parties in Latvia.

In fact, the Latvian party system reflects a clearer division between the Latvian majority and Russian minority population than is seen in Estonia. As seen in Table 2.3, the only parties with a noticeable number of Russian or Russian-speaking candidates are the ethnic parties. Despite a Russian population that comprises roughly one-third of the total population of Latvia, the percent of Russian or Russian-speaking candidates on the other party lists remains less than 6%. The only parties to emerge on the left are the Russian ethnic parties (the PCTVL and the TSP-led Harmony Center alliance); the five major parties representing the Latvian majority are center-right or right (Benoit and Laver 2006, 269).⁵⁸ There are no major parties that can be classified as inclusive; the only party that actively seeks to bridge the gap between the Latvian majority and the Russian minority is the ethnic party Harmony Center alliance (Harmony Center 2007a).

⁵⁸ Benoit and Laver's data, based on expert surveys, estimates the policy position on a 20-point scale for seven of Latvia's parties. From left to right, these are the PCTVL, TSP, ZZS, LPP, TB/LNNK, JL, and TP. Of the five parties representing the Latvian majority, three score a 15 or higher on the Nationalism scale (the ZZS coalition, TB/LNNK, and TP) further demonstrating the divide between the Russian and Latvian parties.

Table 2.3: Party Categorization in Latvia: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
Ethnic	National Harmony Party (TSP)	1998	14.1%	+	+	+	+	60% (33)
	<i>See PCTVL</i>	2002						
	<i>See Harmony Center</i>	2004						
	For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL)	2002	19.0%	+	+	none	+	50.1% (39)
		2006	6.0%	+	+	+	+	62% (44)
	Harmony Center (SC)	2006	14.4%	+	+	+	+	42.9% (36)
Minority Inclusive	- none -							
Non - Inclusive	Social-Democratic Alliance (LSDA)	1998	12.8%	—	none	+	+	2.5% (2)
	People’s Party (TP)	1998	21.2%	none	none	+	+	4.5% (3)
		2002	16.6%	none	None	none	none	1.8% (1)
		2006	19.6%	none	—	none	+	0
	Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK Alliance (TB/LNNK)	1998	14.7%	—	—	+*	+	3% (2)
		2002	5.4%	—	—	—	—	1.5% (1)
		2006	6.9%	—	—	—	—	0

Table 2.3: (continued)

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
Non - Inclusive	Latvia's Way (LC)	1998	18.1%	—	none	+	none	1.6% (1)
		2002	4.9%	none	—	none	none	3.6% (2)
	<i>See LPP/LC</i>	2006						
	Latvia's First Party (LPP)	1998	7.3%	none	none	none	+	0
	<i>formerly New Party (JP)</i>	2002	9.5%	none	none	none	none	5.9% (3)
	<i>See LPP/LC</i>	2006						
	Latvia's First Party/Latvia's Way Alliance (LPP/LC)	2006	8.6%	none	—**	none	+	6.3% (4)
	New Era (JL)	2002	23.9%	none		none	none	0
		2006	16.4%	—	—***	+	+	1.2% (1)
	Green and Farmer's Party (ZZS)	2002	9.4%	none	none	none	+	1.6% (1)
		2006	16.7%	none	—	none	none	5.7% (4)

Source: The Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 2006), with data on election results (% Vote) and candidate data from the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Latvia (www.cvk.lv). Comparative Manifestos data for Latvia 2006 is not yet available. Data presented are estimates based on reading of party program.

Note: Number in parentheses is the number of Russian and Russian-speaking (Ukrainian and Belarusian) candidates on the party list.

* Includes some negative mention of relations with Russia.

** Includes some mention of respecting minority rights, but stronger favoritism to Latvian language and culture.

***Includes some mention of multicultural rights, but greater mention of promoting Latvian culture, for instance, greater teaching of Latvian in minority language schools.

The Harmony Center (SC) alliance is the newest incarnation of the National Harmony Party (TSP). During the mid-1990s, the TSP emerged as a leading party representing the Russian minority in Latvia. Making it unusual among Russian ethnic parties, it also sought to appeal to moderate Latvians. While most members of the party list were Russian, the TSP leadership included a number of Latvians, including party chairman Janis Jurkans, who led the party from 1994 to 2005 (Harmony Center 2007a).⁵⁹ As its main goal the TSP promotes cooperation and peaceful integration between the Russian-speaking and Latvian populations. Originally contesting the 1998 election, the TSP was a merger of the smaller Russian ethnic Equal Rights party and the Latvian Socialist Party (LSP), the successor of the banned Communist Party of Latvia. The TSP joined under the banner of For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) to compete in the 2002 parliamentary election. Due to the more conflictual position taken by the PCTVL leadership, the TSP and the LSP left the coalition in 2003 and in 2005 formed an alliance with the New Center party to create the Harmony Center (SC) alliance. In 2006, the PCTVL and the SC alliance ran separate lists in the parliamentary election.

The SC coalition includes a number of traditional leftist economic policies in its platform, promoting welfare spending, public healthcare, increasing the minimum wage and pensions, and increasing funding for education. It favors membership in the European Union and strengthening ties with Russia, seeing Latvia's role as a bridge between East and West. To help increase the naturalization of Russians, the SC supports inexpensive instruction in Latvian, and they want to give non-citizens the right to vote in

⁵⁹ The current head of Harmony Center is Nil Ushakov, who is a member of the Russian-speaking minority (Harmony Center 2007c).

local elections, as they are able to do in Estonia. The SC promotes multiculturalism and bilingualism, encourages the instruction of Russian for Latvians as the Russian-speaking community is the largest cultural minority, and wants to raise Russian and Latgalian⁶⁰ to the status of an official language. Though not as critical of Latvian nationalist parties as the PCTVL, the SC does accuse these parties of denying participation to the Russian-speaking minority and provoking ethnic tensions (Harmony Center 2007b).

The PCTVL is a more confrontational ethnic party than the SC, especially in relations with Latvian politicians. The PCTVL is highly critical of the Latvian right-wing parties which have dominated the post-independent Latvian government and blame them for a number of Latvia's current problems.⁶¹ Like the SC, it is a more leftist party, offering policies on tax relief, funding of pensioners, and criticizing corruption. The PCTVL emphasizes the multicultural nature of the Latvian state and includes a number of policies to protect and improve the position of the Russian minority (For Human Rights in a United Latvia 2006). They want Latvia to ratify the European Council's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a convention which Latvia has signed but not ratified, as it has been met with opposition from right-wing parties in the Latvian parliament. They promote a policy requiring Russian as an official language in

⁶⁰ Latgalian is a Baltic language belonging to the Indo-European language family that has its origins in the 12th Century. In 1919 it was declared the official language of the Latgales region in Latvia; however, beginning in the 1920s the Latvian government has treated it as a dialect or a historical variant of the Latvian language and there has been a strong tendency towards cultural assimilation towards Latvian. There is a movement among native Latgalian speakers to seek recognition of their language as an official minority language (European Commission 2006). The SC includes members of the Latgalian language minority, and this party promotes the Russian and Latgalian languages as special cultural languages in Latvia.

⁶¹ During the 2002 parliamentary elections, the PCTVL stated in their party program that one of their goals is "solving the problems, which the right parties have collected in their decade of rule" (For Human Rights in a United Latvia 2004b). The PCTVL has blamed these parties for disastrous economic reforms, corruption scandals, and population extinction (For Human Rights in a United Latvia 2004a).

regions where native Russian-speakers make up at least 20% of the population, and advocate increasing funding for education in minority languages. The PCTVL is against membership in NATO and other military alliances, making it stand out from other Latvian parties (Davies and Ozolins 2004), and seeks greater territorial and regional self-rule.

Like most parties in Latvia, the PCTVL is pro-European Union, though the reason behind this position is distinct from parties representing the Latvian majority. While the more nationalist Latvian parties see EU membership as a way to achieve independence and cut their ties with their Soviet history, the PCTVL hopes to use EU membership to push for greater minority and language rights (Pridham 2007). The PCTVL won a seat in the European Parliament during the 2004 election and joined with European Green and regional parties to form the Greens/European Free Alliance parliamentary group, a group which among other policies favors decentralization and a greater role for regional self-determination across Europe (Greens/European Free Alliance 2008).

As in Estonia, there is one further traditional ethnic party worth mentioning in Latvia, especially as it will be included in Chapter 4: the Latvian Russian Citizens' Party (LRCP).⁶² The LRCP was originally formed in 1995 as an alternative to the Socialist Party. They favored Russian as a second official language and originally sought dual citizenship (Latvian and Russian) for Latvia's Russian-speaking minority (Bugajski 2002).

⁶² As in Estonia, the Latvia Electoral Commission does not report the percent or number of votes for this party separate from the "other" category, making it difficult to quantify the amount of their support.

While in Estonia two mainstream parties – Keskk and Reform – have sought to incorporate the interests of the Russian-speaking community; in Latvia, none of the mainstream parties has adopted an inclusive policy position or included a significant number of Russian candidates in their party lists. Due to this lack of viable alternatives, support for the Russian-speaking parties in Latvia has remained fairly constant overtime while support for ethnic parties in Estonia has decreased and appears to have shifted to the inclusive parties. The Russian-speaking parties in Latvia remain a strong voice in the Latvian opposition, reflecting the continued ethnic dynamic that shapes the Latvian party system. While the party systems in Estonia and Latvia ultimately developed in different directions, at least initially both countries saw an emergence of Russian-speaking ethnic parties as the sole promoters of ethnic issues such as citizenship rights. This is very different than the case of Lithuania, where the inclusive nature of Lithuanian policy and parties combined with demographic factors has led to alternative representation through parties besides Russian-focused ethnic parties.

Lithuania

At the time of the last Soviet census, Lithuania's majority was around 80% of the total population, while the Russian-speaking population was only 9% of the population, only slightly higher than the 7% Polish population; by the 2001 census, this number had shrunk to 6.3% Russian, 6.9% Polish (Statistics Lithuania 2009).⁶³ Due to this population breakdown, Lithuanians have been more secure in their claim to the state and have been more open than Estonia or Latvia to instituting inclusive policies towards

⁶³ Most Russians who emigrated from Lithuania following independence were members of the former Soviet military.

ethnic minorities (Gelazis 2003). Relations between Russians and Lithuanians have been fairly good since independence, especially in contrast to the more tense relations between the majority and the Polish population (Hesli 2007). This difference has likewise been reflected in the development of their party programs, as most parties in Lithuania have been fairly inclusive towards minority – especially Russian – interests.

While citizenship has been a major concern of the Russian minority in post-independence Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania quickly incorporated Russians as citizens, and so citizenship has largely been a non-issue for Lithuania's minority groups. In fact, most parties do not even address this issue in their platform (see Table 2.4). On the language issue, government policy in Lithuania has also tended toward inclusive goals and promoting social harmony (Hogan-Brun and Ramoniené 2003). The 1992 Law on National Minorities, while promoting Lithuanian as the official language of the republic, also guaranteed minorities the right to state support for developing their own culture and education (Resler 1997).⁶⁴ Among the Russian community itself, the trend has been towards greater integration in Lithuanian, especially when compared to Lithuania's Polish minority, and they are more likely to have their children educated in Lithuanian language schools rather than in Russian-language schools (Hogan-Brun and Ramoniené 2003).

⁶⁴ As further evidence of the more inclusive nature of Lithuania's language policy, minorities were successful in persuading the government to push back the deadline for Lithuanian proficiency from 1993 to 1995, and they won the right to dual official languages in regions where the minorities comprise more than half the population.

Table 2.4: Party Categorization in Lithuania: National Electoral Support, Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program, and Percent of Russian Candidates

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
Ethnic	Lithuanian Russian Union (LRS)	1996	1.6%	none	+	+	+	95.8% (23)
	<i>See A. Brazauskas Coalition</i>	2000						
	<i>See LLRA</i>	2004						
	Electoral Action of Lithuania’s Poles (LLRA)	1996	3.1%	none	+	none	+	25.9% (7)
		2000	2.0%	none	+	none	+	7.3% (4)
		2004	3.8%	none	+	none	+	15.6% (20)
Minority Inclusive	A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition	1996	10.0%	none	+	+	+	6.7% (7)
	<i>formerly the Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) & the LSDP</i>	2000	31.3%	none	+	+**	+	9.3% (13)
		2004	20.7%	none	+	+	+	5.7% (8)
	Labour Party (DP)	2004	28.4%	none	+***	none	+	4.3% (6)
Non-Inclusive	Social Democratic Party (LSDP)	1996	6.9%	none	none	—*	+	4.2% (4)
	<i>See A. Brazauskas Coalition</i>	2000						
	<i>See A. Brazauskas Coalition</i>	2004						
	New Union (NS)	2000	19.6%	none	none	+	+	3.7% (5)
	<i>See A. Brazauskas Coalition</i>	2004						
	Democratic Party Coalition (LDP)	1996	2.2%	none	none	none	none	0
	Order and Justice – Liberal Democrats (TT)	2004	11.4%	none	—	+	+	2.2% (3)
	Christian Democratic Party (LKDP)	1996	10.4%	none	none	—	+	0
		2000	4.2%	none	none	—	+	2.3% (1)

Table 2.4: (continued)

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Relaxing citizenship policy	Pro-Minority Language Policy	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism	% Russian Candidates
	Center Union (LCS)	1996	8.7%	+	none	+	+	2.5% (2)
		2000	2.9%	none	none	none	+	3.1% (3)
	<i>See Liberal and Center Union</i>	2004						
	Liberal Union (LLS)	2000	17.3%	none	none	***	+	3.1% (4)
	<i>See Liberal and Center Union</i>	2004						
	Liberal and Center Union (LiCS)	2004	9.2%	none	none	none	+	0
	Peasant Popular Union (LVLS)	2000	4.1%	none	none	none	none	0
	<i>formerly the Peasants' Party (LVP)</i>	2004	6.6%	none	none	none	none	5.2% (6)
	Homeland Union (TS)	1996	31.3%	none	none	***	+	0.9% (1)
		2000	8.6%	none	none	—	+	0
		2004	14.8%	none	none	none	+	0

Source: The Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 2006), with candidate data from the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (<http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/>) and the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania (<http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2004/seimas/index.eng.html>). Comparative Manifestos data for Lithuania 2004 is not yet available. Data presented are estimates based on reading of party program.

Note: Number in parentheses is the number of Russian and Russian-speaking (Ukrainian and Belarusian) candidates on the party list.

* The LSDP party program contains some positive mention, but more frequent negative mention of relations with Russia.

**While more often positive, this party program also includes some negative mention of relations with Russia.

*** Includes some mention of respecting minority rights, but stronger favoritism to Latvian language and culture.

Furthermore, most of Lithuania's political elites accept principles of inclusion and diversity; as seen in Table 2.4, most parties give positive mention to multiculturalism in their platforms. Lithuanian parties are also more likely to positively mention relations with Russia than parties in Estonia and Latvia, which may be attributed to Lithuania's more secure claim to the state. Lithuania's election laws further reflect this openness to minority interests: while other parties must receive at least 4% of the vote to participate in parliament, minority ethnic parties need only pass a 2% threshold (Krupavicius 1997).

Despite this openness to minority interests, no Russian parties (running independently) have crossed the threshold to win seats in parliament. One party claiming to explicitly represent the Russian minority has emerged: the Lithuanian Russian Union (LRS). Led by Sergei Dmitriyev, the LRS, according to their program, seeks to improve the representation of Russians in both legislative and executive branches of government (Lietuvos Rusų Sąjunga, 2006). A leftist party economically, the LRS approves of economic reforms with some state protections. The primary focus of this party is on ethnic issues; the LRS promotes minority language rights, including the development of Russian language schools, and favors the broad development of Russian culture. To achieve this goal, the LRS supports a charitable foundation, "Russians of Lithuania," and other programs and organizations that provide aid to the Russian minority (Lietuvos Rusų Sąjunga, 2006). A minor party at best, the LRS ran independently in the 1996 Seimas election but received only 1.6% of the vote, well below the electoral threshold (Clark 1998, 139). It has since run as a minor coalition partner with the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition in 2000, and then with the Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (LLRA) in 2004.

Outside of the LRS, most Russian candidates may be found on the party lists for the Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (LLRA) or the leftist A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition. The LLRA is the largest ethnic party in Lithuania, predominantly representing Lithuania's Polish population, but also promoting an agenda of general multiculturalism and minority rights (Electoral Alliance of Lithuania's Poles 2007). The LLRA favors government decentralization to promote economic development and preserve the historic and ethnic traditions of the regions. They emphasize the multicultural nature of the Lithuanian state, seek to preserve the cultural identity of minority language communities in Lithuania, and support minority language schools. Economically, the LLRA is pro-free market and in favor of privatization.

In 2004, the LLRA entered into an electoral coalition with the LRS, a move that more than doubled the proportion of Russians on the LLRA list when compared to the 2000 election (see Table 2.4). On the LLRA list, LRS candidates were only included in as part of the national list; all single-member district candidates were Polish.⁶⁵ Since the only seats that the LLRA received in the 2004 *Seimas* were the 2 seats won under the SMD list, no Russian candidates were represented from the LLRA/LRS coalition (Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004).

The “inclusive” A. Brazauskas Coalition is led by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), the major party representing the left in post-independence Lithuania (Hesli 2007). The Social Democrats were previously known as Democratic Labor Party, a successor to the Communist Party of Lithuania, and the coalition elected

⁶⁵ The LRS did run a separate list of candidates in 12 of Lithuania's single-member districts, but none were successful at winning seats.

former Lithuanian president Algirdas Brazauskas as their chairman in 2001. The A. Brazauskas Coalition primarily competes with a bloc led the Homeland Union, a more centrist party which has tended to align with more conservative elements in the Lithuanian party system. Since independence, these two major blocs have alternated as the governing party in Lithuania.

A traditional European social democratic party, the LSDP program predominantly focuses on economic issues, but they do support minority issues, including the promotion of minority language rights (Lietuvos Socialdemokratu Partija 2005). During the 2000 *Seimas* election, the LSDP was joined by the New Democracy Party and the Lithuanian Russian Union. The A. Brazauskas Social Democratic coalition received 31% of the national vote and 51 (28 from the PR list) of the 141 seats in the subsequent *Seimas*. Reflecting its role as a minor partner in this coalition, the Lithuanian Russian Union was only allotted one seat. The LRS left the coalition during the 2004 parliamentary elections and instead formed a coalition with the LLRA; this switch explains the decline in the number of Russian candidates from 2000 to 2004 for the A. Brazauskas coalition, and the increase for the LLRA. During the 2004 *Seimas* election, the A. Brazauskas coalition was comprised of the LSDP and the New Union (NS) party, a social liberal party. LSDP representative Gediminas Kirkilas served as Lithuania's Prime Minister from 2006 to 2008, and led a governing coalition of the LSDP, the Liberal and Center Union, and the Peasant Popular Union.

While the LRS, the LLRA, and the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic coalition, serve as the primary parties making appeals to the Russian minority, another party worth noting participated in the 2004 election. The Labor Party (DP) was founded and led by

wealthy Russian Viktor Uspaskich, and the party's appeal in 2004 may have drawn to some extent on nostalgia for the more economically secure Soviet period (Jurkynas 2005). While the party's primary focus is on economic issues, the platform does include mention of minority language and cultural rights.

As compared to Latvia and Estonia, minority interests were quickly incorporated into the Lithuanian political system, and as a result, no major ethnic parties emerged representing the Russian-speaking minority. A minor party, the LRS, does claim to specifically represent the Russian interest but has generally sought representation through electoral coalitions with larger parties. The LRS has formed such coalitions with two other parties who have offered more policies and candidates that appeal to the Russian-speaking voter than other parties in Lithuania, the LLRA – a Polish ethnic party – the A. Brauskas Social Democratic coalition – a mainstream Lithuanian leftist party. These two parties, along with the more broad-based and left-leaning Labor Party, have most consistently represented the Russian-speaking interest in Lithuania.

Ukraine

As in Lithuania, citizenship was a non-issue to Ukraine's Russians, as Ukraine's 1991 citizenship law granted automatic citizenship to most of Ukraine's residents (Barrington 1995).⁶⁶ Instead, the primary divide in electoral politics is between relations with Russia versus the West (Burant 1995; Birch 1995; 2003), particularly in early elections, and regional differences. Previous work has linked political cleavages in Ukraine to these regional differences (Arel and Khmelko 1996; Kubicek 2000; Hesli

⁶⁶ As Barrington discusses, the main exception was residents who had committed crimes against humanity, genocide, or against the Ukrainian nation (1995, 741).

2007), including different views on regional autonomy (Hesli 1995). Also, certain minority ethnic groups, including the Russians, are concentrated in different geographic regions (Hansen and Hesli 2009). These two factors reinforce each other, as Ukraine is politically divided between a more “pro-European” West and a more “pro-Russian” east (Birch 1995; Burant 1995). Following these key electoral divides, Russians in Ukraine tend to favor stronger relations with Russia and increased regional autonomy as key policy interests. Beyond this, the status of Russian as an official language has been a highly debated topic in post-independence Ukraine (Bilaniuk 2005; Herron 2008).

Unlike the Baltic republics, no viable political parties in Ukraine have emerged claiming to exclusively represent the Russian ethnic minority, and so Ukraine is often seen by scholars as lacking a specific “Russian” ethnic party. Nonetheless, the Party of Regions has in many ways sought the interests of the Russophone population – making appeals in their policies and party lists that make them comparable to more traditional ethnic parties. Before the rise of the Party of Regions, many of these issues were taken up by the Communist Party of Ukraine and by the Socialist Party.

From its founding, the Party of Regions has offered policies that make a strong appeal to the Russophone population of Ukraine; the primary focus of their platform is to increase regional autonomy and support the socio-economic development of the regions of Ukraine. They also hold a pro-Russian foreign policy position supporting increased ties with the Russian Federation and favor the status of Russian as a second official state

language (Party of Regions 2008). Their leadership includes a number of Russophone Ukrainians, many with strong ties to the heavily Russophone Donets'k region.⁶⁷

Originally known as the Party of Regional Revival, the Party of Regions was founded in November 1997 by Donetsk mayor Vladimir Ribak. A minor party in earlier elections, receiving less than 1% of the national vote during the 1998 Rada elections, the Party of Regions has become a strong voice in the Ukrainian party system. During the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, Party of Regions received a higher percentage of votes than any other party (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2006a, 2006c, 2007).

The Party of Regions was part of the coalition supporting the re-election of President Leonid Kuchma during the 1999 presidential election. In 2001, the Party of Regions joined with the Agrarian Party, the People's Democratic Party, the Solidarity Party, Labor Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Pensioners Party to form the electoral bloc "For United Ukraine" in preparation of the coming Rada elections. Many of these parties would reform into the new Party of Regions under the leadership of Mykola Azarov; the Agrarian Party resisted this merger but remained part of the electoral bloc (Party of Regions 2007).

⁶⁷ As of the 2001 Ukrainian Population Census, 38.2% of the Donets'k population was Russian ethnic, making this region second only to Crimea in the proportion of Russians (over half the population of Crimea is ethnically Russian). When considering the linguistic breakdown, 58.7% of Ukrainians and 98.6% of Russians in Donets'k consider Russian their native language (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2004).

Table 2.5: Party Categorization in Ukraine: National Electoral Support and Proportion of Statements that Mention Key “Russian” Policy Positions in Program

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Pro-regional autonomy	Pro-Minority Language Policy*	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism
Ethnic	Party of Regions	2006	32.1%	+	+	+	+
	<i>formerly “For United Ukraine” Bloc</i>	2007	34.4%	+	+	+	+
Inclusive	Communist Party (KPU)	1998	24.7%	none	+	none	+
		2002	20.0%	none	+	+	+
		2006	3.7%	+	+	+	+
		2007	5.4%	none	+	+	+
	Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU)	1998	4.0%	+	+	+	+
	Election bloc “For United Ukraine!”	2002	11.8%	+	none	+	none
	<i>see Party of Regions</i>	2006 2007					
	Socialist Party (SPU)	2006	5.7%	+	none	+	+
Non-inclusive	People’s Democratic Party (NDPU)	1998	5.0%	+	none	+	+
	<i>merges with Party of Regions</i>	2002					
	Bloc of the Socialist Party and Peasant Party (BSP-SP)	1998	8.6%	none	none	+	none
	Socialist Party (SPU)	2002	6.9%	none	none	none	none
	Social-Democratic Party – United (SDPU-o)	1998	4.0%	none	none	none	+
		2002	6.3%	+	none	+	+
	All-Ukrainian Association “Hromada”	1998	4.7%	none	none	+	none
	<i>see “Yuliya Tymoshenko” bloc</i>	2002 2006 2007					

Table 2.5: (continued)

Category	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Pro-regional autonomy	Pro-Minority Language Policy*	Relations with Russia / USSR / CIS	Multiculturalism
	Green Party (PZU)	1998	5.4%	+	none	none	none
	Christian Democratic Party (KhDPU)	1998	1.3%	none	none	+/-**	+
	People's Movement (Rukh)	1998	9.4%	none	—	none	+/-**
	<i>see Election bloc "Our Ukraine"</i>	2002 2006 2007					
	National Front (NF)	1998	2.7%	none	none	none	none
	<i>see "Yuliya Tymoshenko" bloc</i>	2002 2006 2007					
	Election bloc "Our Ukraine"	1998	1.7%	none	none	none	+
	<i>formerly Election bloc "Forward Ukraine!"</i>	2002 2006 2007	23.6% 14.0% 14.2%	none none none	none none none	none none none	none none none
	Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc	2002	7.3%	none	none	none	+
		2006	22.3%	none	none	none	+
		2007	30.7%	none	none	none	none
	People's bloc Lytvyna	1998	3.7%	none	none	none	none
	<i>see Party of Regions</i>	2002					
	<i>Formerly the Agrarian Party (APU)</i>	2007	4.0%	none	none	none	+

Source: The Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 2006). Comparative Manifestos data for Ukraine in 2006 and 2007 is not yet available. Data presented are estimates based on reading of party program.

* In consideration that the language interest of the Russophone population in Ukraine is for Russian to be an official language, parties are coded as having a pro-minority language policy only when they support Russian as an official state language. They receive a negative score if they exclusively promote Ukrainian language.

** Includes both positive and negative mentions of issue position.

During the 2002 parliamentary election, this bloc received 23.6% of the national vote, winning 70 mandates from the national list and another 30 elected from the single-member districts (Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine 2006b). In the following Rada, this bloc formed the deputy faction “Regions of Ukraine” and nominated Victor Yanukovych, a head administrator of the Donetsk oblast, as Prime Minister.

Yanukovych ran as the candidate for this bloc during the 2004 Presidential election where he, following public demonstrations from the Orange Revolution, eventually lost to “Our Ukraine” candidate Victor Yushenko. Yanukovych led the Party of Regions during the 2006 parliamentary elections, receiving 32.1% of the popular vote and 186 in the subsequent Rada, briefly leading a coalition government with Yushenko’s “Our Ukraine.” Despite a slight increase in their vote share to 34.4%, after the 2007 parliamentary elections, Party of Regions entered the opposition.

Two other major parties that are best classified as parties inclusive to the Russian interest are the two main left opposition parties in Ukraine: the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). Reflecting their successor position to the former Soviet Communist Party, both parties primarily concentrate on economic issues in their programs. Both parties have also included policies appealing to the Russian ethnic and Russophone Ukrainian populations of Ukraine, particularly in foreign policy, though the Russian appeal is stronger in the CPU while the SPU tends to be more moderate.

The KPU is anti-capitalist and anti-nationalist, supporting strong state control over the economy. It advocates for some form of confederative union with Russia and favors strengthening economic ties with Russia and the CIS. The KPU has been most

popular in Eastern Ukraine, especially in the Donbas region, and is led by Donetsk-born Petro Symonenko. In their program, the KPU favors the status of Russian as a second official state language (Communist Party of Ukraine 2008). The KPU was the largest party in the 1998 parliamentary elections, winning 24.7% of the national vote and 113 of the 450 seats in the following Rada. However, support for this party has declined steadily over time, particularly after the 2004 Orange Revolution. During the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, the KPU received only 3.7% and 5.4% of the national vote, respectfully.

Founded in 1991 – two years before the KPU – the SPU was the first communist successor party in Ukraine. Led by Oleksandr Moroz, the SPU has generally been less nostalgic for the Soviet period than the KPU, and has transformed itself into a more traditional European center-left party. The SPU supports economic reforms with some government intervention. They have a pro-Russian foreign policy orientation and favor strengthening ties with the Russian Federation and the CIS states, but they also favor greater integration with Europe. While primarily an economic party, in more recent elections the SPU has supported increased regional autonomy (Socialist Party of Ukraine 2007).

A Quick Note on Non-Inclusive Parties in Ukraine Early Ukrainian elections were characterized by a broad collection of parties, many who have either faded from importance or merged with other parties. Over time, two parties I categorize as non-inclusive have emerged as major players in Ukrainian politics: the “Our Ukraine” bloc and the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko. In addition, it is also worth mentioning these

parties because they demonstrate the degree that linguistic and cultural policies play in distinguishing the program of Ukrainian political parties.

Originally formed in preparation for the 2002 parliamentary elections, “Our Ukraine” was an alliance of many earlier centrist/center-right parties, including “Forward Ukraine!”, the Party of Reforms and Order, and the Popular Movement (Rukh); Viktor Yushchenko has served as its leader since its founding. Following the 2004 Presidential election and subsequent Orange Revolution, Yushchenko became president. As president, Yushchenko and “Our Ukraine” hold considerable influence over Ukrainian politics, despite the party’s third place finish in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, receiving roughly 14% of the popular vote in both elections.

“Our Ukraine” primarily exists to support the policies of President Yushchenko, and pledges to support European integration and market reform. Many of the economic policies reflect a liberal party leaning, such as their preference for a flat tax rate and the removal of laws that inhibit free enterprise. At the same time, the party program also includes several policies favoring Ukrainian nationalism, and they seek to promote Ukrainian language, religion, and culture and advocate for Ukrainian as the sole official language of the state (Our Ukraine 2008).

A moderate conservative party focusing on market liberalization and battling corruption (Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko 2008), the *Batkivshchyna* (Fatherland) Party, better known as the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc (after its leader), is a pro-Ukrainian party with a strong preference for a foreign policy that favors relations with Europe over Russia. In 1999, it formed from an offshoot of the *Hromada* party following the corruption charges against *Hromada* leader and former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Tymoshenko was

later appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the energy sector under Prime Minister Yuschenko, but was dismissed in 2001 by President Kuchma on charges of corruption. A vocal opponent of then President Kuchma, Tymoshenko and Fatherland led the opposition “National Salvation Forum,” an electoral coalition for the 2002 Parliamentary election.

Following the controversial 2004 presidential election, Tymoshenko was a strong figure for the Orange Revolution, appearing with Victor Yuschenko in a number of public events. Following his victory in the second run-off election, Yuschenko named Tymoshenko as his Prime Minister. After the 2007 parliamentary election, in which the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc received 30.7% of the national vote, Tymoshenko led the governing coalition.

A final party worth mentioning is the People’s bloc Lytvyn (NBL), as of the 2007 election part of the governing coalition with the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc and Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine.” Claiming itself a centrist political party (Narodna Partiya 2009a), the People’s Bloc is currently led by former Kuchma aid Volodymyr Lytvyn. Formerly the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, the People’s Bloc Lytvyn (NBL) was founded in 1996 and supported the de-collectivization of the agriculture sector. Focusing primarily on economic and agricultural issues, the NBL in its party program makes no strong stance on issues such as foreign policy direction (pro-Russian versus pro-European) or on language issues (Narodna Partiya 2009b).

The NBL joined the “For United Ukraine” coalition during the 2002 Rada elections, but resisted the move by Party of Regions to form a single party (Day 2002). Briefly renamed the Folk Agrarian Party before taking its newest name, the NBL

competed independently in both the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, crossing the 3% electoral threshold in 2007 and receiving 20 seats in the subsequent parliament.

Ethnic Voting and Representation

In this section, I exclusively focus on the Baltic republics in analyzing and comparing the type of party systems that have emerged in the former Soviet Union.⁶⁸

The three cases of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania demonstrate three very different patterns of party system development and are good comparative case studies. In Estonia, Russian ethnic parties emerged during the early elections representing the Russian interests; however, these parties saw declining support overtime, while an inclusive party, Kesk, has proven more successful. Latvia, in contrast, sees continued strong support for its Russian ethnic parties, and no emergence of an inclusive party. Finally, in Lithuania, no viable *Russian* ethnic parties have emerged; instead, the electorally successful parties that have included Russian minority interests are the Polish LLRA and an inclusive leftist coalition.

Beginning in this chapter and then continuing in later chapters, I examine why different types of parties are more successful in these different contexts, in essence, why the parties in each country evolved into the types we see. Since voter support determines the success of political parties, it is important to first understand voter decision-making. As discussed in Chapter 1, ethnic voting is motivated by the desire of voters to achieve substantive representation of their ethnic interests, a goal they can achieve by selecting candidates or parties that are closest to their ethnic issue positions. Minority voters are most likely to vote based on ethnic issue positions when there are major policy debates

⁶⁸ While the three Baltic republics are analyzed here as they represent more developed democratic party systems, I do return Ukraine to the analysis in Chapter 3.

that ethnically divide the electorate, particularly if these policies lead to ethnic-based discrimination and strong ethnic grievances (Harff and Gurr 2004, 83).

When the electorate is motivated by ethnic policy issues, they will seek out representatives that most align with their ethnic interests. Voters frequently rely on the ethnic party label to give a fairly accurate cue that this party offers policies of interest to their ethnic constituent group.⁶⁹ Ethnic “party leaders know precisely who their constituency is and can therefore make specific promises that appeal to that population” (Birnie 2007, 36). When ethnic identities matter – when it is a salient political cleavage – the “ethnic” components of a party (platform and candidates) are likely to draw the ethnic vote.

As discussed in previous chapters, ethnic voting is a “voice” strategy that is more likely when individual socialization experiences increase the salience of ethnic identity, ethnic group members are dissatisfied with an aspect of national politics and so choose to mobilize to address this dissatisfaction, and the mobilization potential of the ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based appeal will be successful. These factors help explain why minority voters would support ethnic and inclusive parties over non-inclusive parties, though not why they would support inclusive parties over ethnic parties. Ethnic voters will support inclusive parties over ethnic parties, I argue, when contextual factors and institutional rules make it difficult for ethnic parties to implement policy. Voters support a party expecting that party to achieve representation, participate

⁶⁹ As Birnie discusses, most parties in new democracies “do not have established legislative track records,” tend to make vague campaign promises, and with a few exceptions, such as the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, lack a loyal constituent group who they can tailor their policy towards (35). And so, this lack of past experience with the party and lack of information makes it harder for voters to estimate policy position.

in government, and deliver on their campaign promises; parties that are unable to do so will lose their support. Since overtime, voters will “transfer away from the weaker candidates and lists to the stronger ones...” (Cox 1997, 232), an ethnic party that is unable to enact policy will see declining support. Ethnic voters may engage in strategic voting and instead support a more mainstream inclusive party – a worse policy fit than an ethnic party, but more likely to participate in a governing coalition and enact policy.

Electoral rules are institutional structures that determine whether ethnic parties can successfully implement policy. Birnir has noted the relationship between electoral rules and party choice: “members of ethnic groups likely seek representation through nonethnic parties at a greater rate in plurality systems than in proportional systems and where members of the group are dispersed rather than regionally concentrated” (2007, 48). In addition, previous performance determines whether parties are perceived as a viable choice for ethnic voters; parties that have been unable to participate in government or form a strong opposition are less likely to receive continued support. At the same time, strategic voting depends on the presence of viable alternatives – ethnic voters will continue to support ethnic parties if no mainstream parties seek to integrate ethnic group interests.

To review, voters will most strongly support parties representing their ethnic interest when ethnic interests dominate the policy agenda for that group. Ethnic voters prefer ethnic political parties as they are most likely to offer policies and candidates that most closely align with their interests. However, if the ethnic party is unable to enact policy, voters may instead vote strategically and support a more viable inclusive party.

Strategic voting is more likely when factors make it more difficult for small ethnic parties to achieve representation, but unlikely to occur if no mainstream parties are inclusive.

In the following section, I analyze the three Baltic republics in greater detail, using the discussion above to begin to explain why these party systems have developed in alternative ways. In Estonia and Latvia, citizenship policy and the related language issue divided the population, placing Russians in the role of outsiders in the state. Overcoming this position of exclusion has become a major concern of the Russian minority. In Lithuania, in contrast, Russian minority interests were quickly incorporated into policy, and so mobilization of the Russian minority has been much weaker. In both Estonia and Latvia, Russian ethnic parties, given their minority support base, have had limited success in delivering on their campaign promises. Ethnic voters in both countries have a strong incentive to engage in strategic voting, and in Estonia we do see stronger support in later elections for an inclusive party. However, as the case of Latvia will demonstrate, when political parties representing the majority group are unwilling to include a minority group's interest, minority voters will continue to support an ethnic party, even if this party is denied government participation. With a lack of viable "strong" party alternatives, the pattern of strategic voting which Cox (1997) predicts has no opportunity to emerge.

Ethnic Voting in Estonia: From Ethnic Parties to Minority Inclusion

Following independence, Estonia's restrictive citizenship policy disenfranchised most of the Russian population, and in 1992 no Russian candidates received seats in the *Riigikogu* (Corbell and Wolff 2004). Since the citizenship policy led to early exclusion from national politics, addressing this issue quickly arose as a motivating grievance for

the Russian minority. Ethnic parties representing the Russian-speaking minority competed from 1995 onwards, seeking to address this policy, but support for these parties has declined over time.⁷⁰ While some authors attribute this declining support for Russian parties to the declining importance of the Russian identity in Estonian politics (Grofman et al. 2000; Khrychikov and Miall 2002), I argue that this switch occurred at least in part due to the inability of Russian parties to participate in government, creating an incentive for Russian voters to engage in strategic voting.

In 1992, the Estonian Supreme Council passed a law which gave automatic citizenship to those who were citizens of Estonia prior to 1940 and their descendants; a law which denied around 75% of the Russophone minority automatic citizenship (Barrington 1995, 736). Those excluded from automatic citizenship could apply for citizenship after two years permanent residence (beginning after Estonian independence in 1990) and after passing an Estonian language test. This meant that most Russian speakers would be eligible for citizenship beginning in 1993. This left a majority of the Russian population as stateless individuals for nearly three years following Estonian independence, unable to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections and unable to hold certain government jobs and positions. Despite international pressure (primarily from the European Union), citizenship was further restricted with the 1995 Law on Citizenship, which required that applicants provide proof of permanent residence in Estonia, pass a language and a constitutional law test, have proof of a legal source of income, and denounce prior citizenship.

⁷⁰ Some authors have argued that this support has shifted to Keskkonnakaitse and Reform (Grofman et al. 2000; Khrychikov and Miall 2002).

A 1999 amendment to the Citizenship Law granted automatic citizenship to stateless children born after 1992, and since 2000 the Estonian government has passed a number of laws to increase the pace of naturalization, including a 2002 law which waved the exam on state history for those who passed a high school civics exam (Budryte 2005). However, Estonian citizenship policy, especially the language component, continues to be restrictive for the Russian minority. According to the 2000 Population Census, only about 40% of the Russian population has Estonian citizenship and over 35% remain stateless (Statistical Office of Estonia 2000, 13). Easing these restrictions and improving naturalization rates remains a major concern of this group.

As discussed previously, the Russian ethnic parties have been the only parties to promote more liberal citizenship policy; however, national vote for these parties has declined over time.⁷¹ This declining support is occurring even as the Russians comprise an increasing proportion of the national electorate.⁷² Assuming that the Russian minority holds a policy preference regarding the citizenship issue, and knowing their proportion of the electorate is increasing –the substantive representation of this group should be increasingly more viable. The question remains, then: why might Russians increasingly vote for Keskkor or Reform, parties that less adamantly reflect their preferred citizenship policy position?

⁷¹ According to the Estonia National Electoral Commission (www.vvk.ee), in 2007 the EURP (renamed as the Constitutional Party of Estonia) received only 1% of the vote, while the VEE dropped to 0.2%.

⁷² As stated earlier, according to the 2000 Population Census, 141,848 of Estonia's Russian population (or roughly 40.4%) had received Estonian citizenship (Statistical Office of Estonia 2000, 13). This is a noticeable increase from earlier elections; in 1992 only 2% of the Russians had Estonian citizenship, while in 1995 the percent increased to 30% (Budryte 2005, 74).

Khrychikov and Miall argue that the increasing Russian vote for Keskk demonstrates that “national identity has become less important in determining party affiliation” in Estonia (2002, 204). This finding is echoed by Taagepera (1995) and Grofman et al. (2000), who claim that Russians base their national vote on factors besides national identity. However, a number of factors suggest that such conclusions may be incorrect. While often denied participation in national government, the Russian parties have had some success in competing in municipal elections. During the 1996 and 2002 Tallinn municipal elections, the EURP received 11.9% and 8.3% of the vote respectively, earning them 5 and 3 mandates in the 63 member municipal council in 1996 and 2002 (Estonian National Electoral Commission 2007). Russian parties have also participated in governing coalitions in Tallinn and in multiple cities in north-east Estonia (Corbell and Wolff 2004). This indicates that national identity continues to be relevant in Estonia, and that ethnic voters continue to be drawn to ethnic parties.

An important explanation for the change in national vote that has yet to be fully acknowledged is that Russian voters are engaging in strategic voting. As discussed earlier in this chapter, ethnic voters may choose to vote for a non-ethnic party which, while not as well-aligned with their policy preferences as an ethnic party, is likely to experience greater electoral success and more able to deliver on policy promises. Pettai and Hallik (2002) note that in Estonia, post-independence national politics has been characterized by majority dominance and the segmentation of the Russian-speaking minority. In regards to parliamentary representation, the Russian elite have been placed into the role of permanent opposition (514). This has likely contributed to a sense in Russian voters that the Russian parties are less able to implement policy, and that their

vote may have greater impact if they support more mainstream parties, such as Kesk or Reform, that may be sympathetic to some of their policy concerns or offers them some co-ethnic representatives.

A more concerning possibility is that this exclusion of the Russians from national policy-making is instead alienating this population. Besides Kesk, no other parties – including Reform – have broadened policy appeals in their program to address the concerns of the Russian minority, especially in regards to citizenship policy, and so Russian interests have been weakly integrated into the existing Estonian party system. At the elite level, disillusion and cynicism appear to be an emerging pattern among the Russian elite, as “...among Russian politicians in Estonia there remained a sense that most Estonian leaders were not interested in accepting them as real partners for dialogue” (Pettai and Hallik 2002, 514). At the mass level, in line with previous work that demonstrates a lack of minority inclusion may threaten democratic stability and decrease perceptions of legitimacy (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1991; Mansbridge 1999; Birnir 2007), Evans (1998) finds that Russians who are ineligible to vote are less satisfied with the state of democracy in Estonia than are Estonian ethnics (64-65).

While this last scenario is a more dire prediction, I would argue the more likely scenario in regards to ethnic voting in Estonia is an electoral realignment among Russian-speakers, at least in parliamentary elections. As the Russian parties have been unsuccessful at influencing national policy, Russian voters have shifted support away from these parties and towards more inclusive parties that are perceived as having a greater chance of participating in government. Fitting with the strategic voting approach

as argued by Cox (1997), Russian voters are altering their vote away from less viable parties.

Ethnic Threat and the Ethnically Divided Electorate in Latvia

As in Estonia, post-independence Latvia passed citizenship policies which denied participation of the Russian-speaking minority, creating a sense of clearly differentiated grievances for this group. Russian-speaking elites organized into ethnic parties to address these issues and experienced early electoral success. Again as in Estonia, the Latvian Russian-speaking parties have been placed into the role of permanent opposition, and so have been denied participation in government and the opportunity to implement policy. However, while the Estonia ethnic parties saw a decline in electoral support, support for the Russian parties of Latvia remains fairly constant. Most notably, inclusive parties seeking to incorporate the Russian interests have failed to emerge in Latvia; without these parties, Russian voters lack a viable option for strategic voting.

In Latvia, no mainstream party has emerged to incorporate the Russian minority; instead, the Latvian party system is divided between the leftist Russian ethnic parties and the right-wing and center-right Latvian parties. Among the five major parties representing the Latvian majority, there exists a strong nationalist tendency (Benoit and Laver 2006).⁷³ This divided party system and strong opposition to Russian interests, as I argue below, result from Latvia's post-independence experience, in particular, their interaction with international organizations and the Russian Federation. As a result, the

⁷³ Based on expert survey data, three of the five major Latvian policies receive a 15 or above on a 20 point scale estimating party positions on nationalism. All five Latvian parties score above 10; in contrast, the PCTVL and the TSP receive a 3.5 and a 4.4, respectfully (Benoit and Laver 2006, 269).

Latvian elite feel a greater sense of ethnic threat from their Russian-speaking minority than do the titular elite in the other Baltic republics and are less sympathetic towards minority issues.

As in Estonia, early Latvian citizenship policy excluded most Russians from participation in the state, as over half of the Russian population in Latvia was denied citizenship (Cordell and Wolff 2004). Latvia did not officially pass a citizenship law until 1994;⁷⁴ prior to this, citizenship was limited to those who were Latvian citizens before 1940.⁷⁵ The law adopted in 1994 gave automatic citizenship to interwar citizens and their descendants, people who were permanent residents of Latvia prior to 1919, Estonian and Lithuanian ethnics who migrated during the Soviet period, non-Latvians who had graduated from Latvian language secondary schools, and spouses of Latvian citizens if they had been married for 10 years (Gelazis 2003). This law created a double-standard for the Russian population, many who, like the Estonian and Lithuanian minorities, migrated during the Soviet period. While minorities from other Baltic republics were granted automatic citizenship, Russians were required to apply for naturalization (Gelazis 2003). Such a citizenship law demonstrates a priority in treatment of the dominant nationality groups (Chinn and Truex 1996).⁷⁶

⁷⁴ When the Saeima first convened, writing a citizenship law was not high on the parliaments list of priorities until the Council of Europe decided that Latvian membership would depend upon the passing of a suitable law (Barrington 1995).

⁷⁵ The Latvian government decided to post-pone discussion of a citizenship law until after the formation of the new Latvian Saeima. To handle the citizenship question, the Latvian Supreme Council made a resolution declaring that the Latvian inter-war citizenship policy would be in effect until the Saeima passed a different law (Barrington 1995).

⁷⁶ To apply for naturalization, an individual had to be a permanent resident of Latvia for at least five years beginning in 1990, pass a language test, pass a test on constitutional law and Latvian history, have proof of a legal source of income, and denounce any previous citizenship. This law also divided applicants into eight groups with different periods they could begin naturalization. While the first group – individuals born

In the early 1990s, Latvia resisted liberalizing their citizenship policy, in part due to a gridlock with the Russian Federation regarding the continued presence of the Russian army on Latvia's soil. As in Estonia, Russia refused to withdraw their forces unless Latvia passed legislation safeguarding the rights of the Russian minority (Simonsen 2001). At the same time, right-wing Latvian politicians refused to consider altering the Citizenship Law while the Russian army remained in Latvia. As Budryte discusses:

“The stalemate surrounding Latvia's Citizenship Law...was finally broken in March 1994, when the German government reiterated its desire to see the European Union expand to include the Baltic states and insisted that Russia should meet its agreement to withdraw troops from Latvia by the end of August. At the same time, during a meeting with Klaus Kinkel, then Germany's Foreign Minister, and his Baltic counterparts, the German government made it clear that there was ‘no alternative to the integration of Russian speakers’ into the Latvian political community.” (2005, 111)

The Russian army withdrew in 1994, and in 1998 the Latvian government introduced a more liberal citizenship law.⁷⁷ This law passed the Saeima and a referendum vote despite opposition from several Latvian parties.

Despite pressure from the Russian Federation and international organizations,⁷⁸ Latvia did not initially amend the citizenship policy (Gelazis 2003); instead passing a

in Latvia and under 20 years of age – could begin their naturalization process in 1996, the final group – foreign-born residents over the age of 30 – could not apply until 2003 (Citizenship Law, 1994). Due to the strict requirements of this law, much of the Russian-speaking population remained ineligible for citizenship (Barrington, 1994; Gelazis, 2003; Cordell and Wolff, 2004).

⁷⁷ During the 1990s, all three of the Baltic republics were in negotiation to join the European Union. The 1997 Commission Opinion on Latvia criticized the discriminatory treatment of the Russian minority in Latvia, and based on this report, Latvia was moved to the “second tier” of accession states while Estonia was allowed to open bilateral negotiations towards membership (Commission of the European Union 1997). A 1998 Commission Report further affirmed that policy change was necessary before Latvia could join the EU, and the Commission recommended the Latvian government adopt the OSCE recommendations regarding citizenship and migration (Commission of the European Union 1998).

⁷⁸ The European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) all criticized Latvia for its slow naturalization process.

special law on the rights of non-citizens in 1995.⁷⁹ This law gave stateless individuals similar rights to Latvian citizens, including the right to travel, develop their national language and culture, and protection from discrimination. Addressing one of the key concerns of the Russian minority, this law protected stateless individuals from expulsion.

Latvia did revise this policy in 1998 in response to international pressure, particularly from the Council of Europe and the European Union. The 1998 law is similar to the Lithuanian citizenship policy,⁸⁰ and as in Lithuania, the new Latvian citizenship law granted automatic citizenship to children born in Latvia (Gelazis 2003). This law still required applicants to pass a language test, but the provisions of the new law were in line with European expectations (Commission of the European Union, 1999; Kellas, 2004). In response to further European Commission Reports, which expressed concern on the linguistic and economic discrimination of the Russophone minority, Latvia passed a number of policies improving the treatment of this group in regards to employment and employment benefits and removed the language requirements for holding public office (Gelazis 2003; Kellas 2004).

While the citizenship law was significantly liberalized in response to pressure from the Council of Europe and the European Union, the naturalization process remains slow and Latvia lags behind the other Baltic republics in providing citizenship to their Russian minority. Despite having almost twice the population of Estonia and twice the number of Russians, from 1995 until 2003 roughly 70,000 Latvian residents became

⁷⁹ This law is entitled “Status of Former USSR Citizens who have Neither Latvian nor Other States’ Citizenship.”

⁸⁰ The Lithuanian citizenship law allows residents to apply for citizenship if they: 1) pass an examination in the Lithuanian language, 2) had been a permanent resident in Lithuania for the past 10 years, and 3) are permanently employed or had a legal source of income.

naturalized citizens, while in Estonia roughly 76,000 received citizenship (Budryte 2005). While non-citizens make up only 17.2% of the total Latvia population, 42.7% of Russians are non-citizens,⁸¹ demonstrating that this issue likely continues to be a concern for a good portion of the Russian-speaking minority.

Latvia continues to resist international recommendations on minority rights, particularly in regards to language rights, and it is the only Baltic republics has refused to ratify the Council of Europe's Framework Convention of National Minorities. As with the citizenship policy, and similar to Estonia, Latvian resistance towards language policy is strongly influenced by its post-independence relations with the Russian Federation. During the 1990s, Russia used the international organizations to which it belonged to pressure Latvia on the status of the Russian-speaking minority,⁸² and when issues concerning the treatment of minorities were picked up by these international organizations and by Western countries, Latvian politicians perceived this pressure as a threat to Latvian sovereignty (Budryte 2005, 111). Overtime, "opposition to the international recommendation to protect minority rights had become a habit for Latvian politicians" (Budryte 2005, 104).

As this above discussion of policy demonstrates, the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia has clearly articulated preferences in regards to liberalizing the citizenship policy,

⁸¹ As of 2007, the Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia estimates that there are 392,816 total non-citizens, 278, 213 (or roughly 71%) are Russians (http://www.np.gov.lv/index.php?en=fakti_en&saite=residents.htm). If we include Belarusians and Ukrainians to estimate the number of Russian-speaking non-citizens, this number increases to 373,100 – meaning that 95% of non-citizens in Latvia are Russian-speakers.

⁸² Estonia faced similar pressures from the Russian Federation during this time; however, the issue seemed to be taken on by these organization and Western governments to a lesser extent than the situation in Latvia. Further, Estonia's politicians have not developed a similar "knee jerk" reaction to pressures to protect minority rights.

and we might expect that these grievances may serve to mobilize their population and impact their voting behavior. In addition to the citizenship question, the Russian minority have further concerns regarding language rights, continued economic discrimination (Minorities at Risk Project 2005) and political underrepresentation.⁸³ As in Estonia, the Russian ethnic parties of Latvia – the TSP and the PCTVL – quickly emerged offering policies to address the concerns of this minority group. They are the only parties to advocate for liberalizing the citizenship law; likewise, they are significantly more in favor of improving the status of the Russian language and promoting multiculturalism than are any of the mainstream parties representing the Latvian majority.

Unlike Estonia, support for the Russian parties remains fairly strong and constant⁸⁴ despite being similarly excluded from participation in the governing coalitions dominated by right-of-center and sometimes nationalist parties. Because Russian ethnic parties function in the role of permanent opposition, as in Estonia, Russian minority voters in Latvia have a similar incentive to engage in strategic voting and switch their support to more mainstream parties. The continued support for the Russian parties in Latvia is due to the fact that no mainstream parties have sought to incorporate Russian interests. No mainstream parties advocate for a more liberal citizenship policy; in fact, the TB/LNNK and Latvia's Way have advocated a more restrictive policy. As the

⁸³ Since independence, Russians have been underrepresented in both national and local politics. For instance, while Russians comprise roughly 43% of the population of Riga (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2002), in 1994 the Riga municipal council had only three Russian deputies; the remaining 54 council members were all ethnic Latvians (Antane and Tsilevich 1999, 100).

⁸⁴ As seen in Table 2.3, during the 1998 parliamentary election the TSP received roughly 14% of the vote; in 2006, the combined vote for the PCTVL and the TSP-led Harmony Center coalition was 20.4%.

Russians have no viable mainstream party alternative to represent their interests, they are do not engage in strategic voting.

But why do no mainstream parties attempt to become inclusive? Ultimately, it is tied to the fact that Latvians view their Russian-speaking minority as outsiders to a greater extent than other Baltic republics (Laitin 1998, Antane and Tsilevich 1999), and the elite appear to be less willing to integrate this minority into the mainstream parties.⁸⁵ In regards to the naturalization process, Latvian politicians – both nationalist party members and even more moderate politicians – openly voiced the opinion that Russian-speakers should be encouraged to leave the country (Budryte 2005, 110). Restoring a strong Latvian state and culture remains a key concern of most Latvian parties. This is not to say that the Latvian party-system is completely dominated by ethnic cleavages. Zake (2002) finds that since 1998 Latvian voters have increasingly engaged in more class-based voting; however, the Russian-speaking minority has largely been excluded from this behavior. And so, while Latvian parties may be moving away from their nationalistic origins, the Russian-speaking minority has largely been left out of their evolution.

Inclusive Politics and Weak Grievances: The Case of Lithuania

Lithuania differs significantly from the other two Baltic republics that more favorable citizenship and language rights have been quickly incorporated into Lithuanian policy. With a lack of sufficient voting strength and less division over ethnic issues, no

⁸⁵ As Steen (2000) argues, the larger proportion of non-Latvians likely caused Latvia to adopt the most exclusionary citizenship law of the Baltic republics, and likewise has made the Latvian elite view ethnic relations as much more conflict-oriented.

major Russian ethnic party has emerged specifically representing this group. Instead, Russian issues and candidates have been most frequently adopted by the Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (LLRA), the Lithuania Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) and its successor, the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition led by Lithuania's former LDDP president Algirdas Brazauskas, and the Labor Party, led by Russian Viktor Upaskich.

Lithuania's citizenship policy quickly incorporated the Russian population: their first citizenship law in 1989 guaranteed citizenship to all permanent residents, regardless of ethnicity, language, religion, or employment status. A second law passed in 1991 granted citizenship to all citizens and residents, their children and grandchildren if they were citizens of Lithuania prior to the 1940 Soviet annexation. Residents who failed to meet the criteria could apply for citizenship if they had: 1) passed an examination in the Lithuanian language, 2) had been a permanent resident in Lithuania for the past 10 years, and 3) was permanently employed or had a legal source of income. Children born in Lithuania, regardless of ethnicity, were given automatic citizenship. Almost 90% of the Russians in Lithuania were eligible for citizenship (Minorities at Risk Project 2005), the main exception Soviet Army soldiers stationed in Lithuania.⁸⁶ Given the open nature of this policy and willingness of the Lithuanian elite to quickly incorporate the country's minorities, citizenship has been a non-issue in Lithuania, and likewise, very few parties address citizenship in their platform (see Table 2.4).

⁸⁶ The Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruled that members of the Soviet army do not count as permanent residents, and therefore they were not eligible for citizenship without government consent (Gelazis, 2003).

Unlike Estonia and Latvia, where the citizenship law and the discrimination this law has imposed on the Russian minority has been the major concern of this group, the major issue for the Lithuanian Russians relates to culture (Minorities at Risk Project 2005). In all three of the Baltic republics, increasing the status of the titular language was a key part of the independence movements. Like in Estonia and Latvia, in 1988 the Lithuanian Supreme Council amended the constitution to declare Lithuanian the official language of the republic. Again, as in Estonia and Latvia, the Lithuanian Supreme Council passed a further language law in 1989⁸⁷ promoting the official language and introducing a phased approach to adopting Lithuanian as the exclusive official language, with the goal of requiring titular language proficiency in all citizens. In response to this law, the Russian and Polish communities mobilized during the Lithuanian independence movement, as they feared this law would decrease their status in the republic (Clyne 1997, 305).

Despite initial similarities, the language policy that was pursued in Lithuania was distinct from the other two Baltic republics in that it more actively sought to address the concerns of their language minorities. While Russian knowledge of the titular language was much higher in Lithuania than in the other republics, only about one-third of Russians knew Lithuania at the time of independence (Zvidrins 1994, 373). Lithuania

⁸⁷ The three Baltic language laws included a number of similar components. They required that the employees of state institutions, enterprises, businesses and organizations that are in contact with the public or conduct work for the state know the state language. The language laws gave priority to the use of the state language in institutions of secondary and higher education. These laws increased the use of the state language in the media, at the same time reducing the amount of Russian-language broadcasting. And finally, these laws required that public information and advertising be in the state language, which exceptions given to notices regarding public health, messages that pertain to cultural or religious organizations, or for international activities. For a further discussion of the early Baltic language laws, see Druviete (1997).

addressed this problem with education reforms, funding a number of programs on instruction of Lithuanian as a second language in schools and adult teaching institutions and emphasized teaching communicative ability (Hogan-Brun and Ramioné 2003). National minorities also successfully lobbied to have the deadline on proficiency required by the language law pushed back from 1993 to 1995 (Resler 1997, 102)

Unlike the other Baltic republics which “...adopted their stringent laws in part to encourage emigration of the Russian diaspora” (Pavlenko 2006, 85), in Lithuania the language policy was tempered by the passage of the 1989 Law on National Minorities. Written in response to demands from the Jewish population and intended to prevent unrest among the Russian and Polish communities during independence, this law “guarantees the rights of national minorities to receive state support for the development of their cultures and education” (Resler 1997, 101). In support of this law, the government works with state-sponsored national minority associations to support minority language schools and programs.⁸⁸ Furthermore, Lithuania, in order to encourage equal economic and political participation in the state, looks to “decrease the economic and educational disparity between nationalities and to train national specialists” (Resler 1997, 102).

As a result of these inclusive policies, the Russian minority in Lithuania has been fairly positive on integration (Hogan-Brun and Ramioné 2003), especially when contrasted to Lithuania’s Polish community, who have instead followed a path of cultural

⁸⁸ As of 2001, there were approximately 200 ethnic minority schools in Lithuania, comprising roughly 9% of the total educational institutions in that country (Hogan-Brun and Ramoniené 2003, 34). Over half of these schools include Russian as part of the language of instruction.

distinction.⁸⁹ As a result, the trend towards Russian ethnic voting should be much weaker in Lithuania than in the rest of the Baltic states; in fact, no Russian ethnic party has ever passed the Lithuanian electoral threshold to win seats in parliament as an independent party. This is despite an electoral system that seems to promote ethnic representation; while the Russian minority is disadvantaged in the single-member districts, their proportion of the overall population is enough to gain a few of the national district seats if they vote as a cohesive bloc.⁹⁰

When Russian ethnic voting does occur, it will likely manifest itself in votes for the parties that include both Russian issues and candidates: the LLRA, the leftist A. Brazauskas electoral coalition, and the Labor Party. As discussed previously and detailed in Table 2.4, while many Lithuanian parties support multiculturalism issues in general, according to the CMP data these parties dedicate a greater portion of their program to issues of multiculturalism and language rights. The LLRA emphasizes minority language rights and supports minority language schools, the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition is in favor of preserving cultural diversity and consistently supports improving relations with both Europe and the Russian Federation, and the Labor Party promotes multiculturalism and appeals to nostalgia for the Soviet period. When comparing their party lists to other parties in Lithuania, these parties include the highest proportion of Russian candidates.

⁸⁹ Since independence, Poles increasingly send their children to Polish language schools (previously, most Polish children had attended Russian language schools), while Russians increasingly send their children to schools with Lithuanian language instruction (Hogan-Brun and Ramioné 2003).

⁹⁰ As mentioned earlier, minority ethnic parties only have to pass a 2% electoral threshold, not the 4% required for other types of parties.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to first classify the political parties of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine into three categories – ethnic, inclusive, and non-inclusive – based on party platforms and party list candidates. Ethnic parties offer policies of interest to an ethnic target group and include a high proportion of co-ethnic candidates on their party lists. Inclusive parties are more broad-based parties (representing both minority and non-minority interests) who do include ethnic policies on their program and a number of (though less than ethnic parties) of minority candidates. Finally, the “non-inclusive” category is comprised of parties that do not offer minority ethnic voters a selection of minority ethnic policies or candidates. These parties range from mainstream parties that are at best neutral towards minority ethnic interests to majority nationalist parties that favor majority interests at the cost of the minority.

After categorizing the parties in these three countries, we begin to see clear differences in party support even at the national level. In fact, three different patterns appear in the three Baltic states. Russian ethnic parties emerged early in Estonia and Latvia; however, support for ethnic parties has remained fairly strong in Latvia while this support has declined over time in Estonia. Political parties remain ethnically polarized in Latvia, and no viable mainstream parties have emerged to compete with the ethnic parties for the Russian-speaking vote. Estonia instead saw increasing support for the inclusive parties, Keskkonn and Reform, and a decline in support for ethnic parties. In Lithuania, no Russian ethnic party has successfully crossed the electoral threshold without forming an electoral coalition; instead, the appeal to Russian voters seems to be picked up by the Polish LLRA, the leftist A. Brazauskas coalition, and the Labor Party. This pattern will

be further tested in Chapter 3 by comparing regional vote for these different party categories.

These differences in party evolutions, I argue, can be explained by first comparing the evolution of ethnic policy grievances in each country and second by examining the incentive and viability for strategic ethnic voting. Policy grievances have been most extreme in Estonia and Latvia and this explains why Russian ethnic parties have emerged in those two countries while no such party has been as significant in Lithuania. Because the vote share of Russian ethnic parties is small, they have been excluded from participation in the governing coalitions in Estonia and Latvia. Russian ethnic voters in both countries may, therefore, have an incentive to engage in strategic voting and support an inclusive party. We can expect that Russian ethnic voters in Estonia will select the strategic option and support the more mainstream parties over time; however, as they lack viable inclusive mainstream parties, Russian ethnic voters in Latvia can be expected to continue to support the Russian ethnic PCTVL and the SC.

Examining these trends in political party development is only the first step in explaining differences in party support. In the next chapter, I test hypotheses about party support by comparing regional vote for ethnic and inclusive parties in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. I test how regional level characteristics explain support for some parties over others, focusing on how competitive ethnic environments, resources, and political opportunities – the effects which are further influenced by the proportion of Russians in the region – give incentives for ethnic voters to support one party over others. This multi-level approach, of evaluating factors that influence ethnic voting at both the national and regional level, will also be continued in Chapter 4, where I present an

analysis of individual differences in party support. By using this multi-level approach, we can better understand the factors that motivate ethnic voting for ethnic and inclusive political parties.

CHAPTER 3

ETHNIC VOTING UNDER PR AND MIXED SYSTEMS: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR ETHNIC AND INCLUSIVE PARTIES

In the previous chapter, I classified parties in four post-Soviet republics based on the extent that they made appeals to the Russian minority. I examined the evolution of three of these party systems, and, by focusing on national trends, I began to explain why ethnic minority voters will sometimes support ethnic parties and sometimes not.

However, within each country, considerable variation in support for parties exists by region. In this chapter, I examine the factors that lead members of an ethnic group to vote cohesively for a co-ethnic candidate or party. I compare the regional percentage of votes for the three types of parties in the Baltic republics and in Ukraine. Due to this aggregate-level focus, I concentrate on contextual factors which make ethnic voting more likely and examine how competitive ethnic environments, resources, political opportunities, and government policy lead to greater support for these types of political parties. In chapter 5, I will examine explanations for party support among Russian voters by using individual-level survey data.

Politicizing Ethnicity and Increasing the Ethnic Mobilization Potential

In Chapter 1, I theorized that ethnic voting increases when ethnic identities become politicized collective identities and when the mobilization potential of the group is high. Some factors work at the individual-level, while others influence group activity. In this chapter, I focus on the group-level characteristics and test how competition between ethnic groups, primarily determined by economic competition, and the

mobilization potential of the Russians in each region impact vote for ethnic, inclusive, and non-inclusive parties.

Politicizing Ethnicity: Economic Competition According to Simon and Klandermans (2001), collective identities like ethnicity become politicized when ethnic group members become aware of their shared experiences and recognize a specific adversary as the focus of their mobilization. This second aspect, which they refer to as adversarial attribution, helps motivate political activity and gives ethnic group members a specific opponent to direct their activity against. Certain environments are more likely to fuel these adversarial relations. As found in the classic works in social identity theory and its predecessor, realistic conflict theory, the more groups compete, the more they are likely to view each other as adversaries (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979).⁹¹

One of the economic approaches to explaining ethnic relations, competitive theories, argue that ethnic political activity is more likely in environments where ethnic groups come into more frequent contact and compete for resources. Ethnic competition is more prevalent in urbanized and industrialized settings (Kaiser 1994); these environments further benefit ethnic mobilization by facilitating the formation of ethnic networks and organizations (Nagel and Olzak 1982), which can be used by movement entrepreneurs to mobilize ethnic group members into political action. The contact that arises in urban and industrialized settings reinforces perceptions of ethnic differences

⁹¹ In their classic Robber's Cave experiment, Sherif et al. studied the origin of group prejudice using two groups of twelve-year old boys at a summer camp. They divided the boys into teams and had them compete over prizes. Very quickly, these teams escalated into hostile relations, including name-calling, refusing to eat together in the mess hall, and conducting raids on opposing camps.

and, combined with scarce resources, fuel competition and conflict between ethnic groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ethnic competition approach fits most closely to the general model of politicized collective identity I propose in my theory.

In predicting the relationship between urbanization and mobilization, this ethnic competition argument runs counter to the mobilization prediction from the classic decline-of-community thesis (see early work by Stein 1960; Verba and Nie 1972). Under this approach, urban environments reduce allegiance to traditional ties and weaken community attachment (Park 1952), a trend made even stronger by changing communication and transportation technologies which have made geographic identities more fluid and less reliant on traditional neighborhood organizations (Lee, Oropessa, Metch and Guest 1984). Furthermore, urban environments are argued to have lower levels of interpersonal trust and social capital, resulting in less civic involvement, lower organizational membership, and lower rates of voter turnout (Putnam 2001). According to this argument, if we approach support for ethnic parties from a decline of community perspective, voters for these parties may be better mobilized and experience stronger ties to the resulting political organizations in rural, not urban, settings.

Mobilization Potential: Resource Mobilization Research on social movements commonly refers to two factors that increase the mobilization potential and help trigger political activity, ethnic or otherwise: group resources and political opportunities. Resource mobilization theories (Oberschall 1973, Tilly 1978, Jenkins and Perrow 1979) view mobilization as a rational, adaptive decision that is constrained by the collective action dilemma. A classic variant of this approach, McCarthy and Zald's (1973, 1977) entrepreneurial theory, argues that availability of organizational resources drive

movement formation and activity. The more resources a group possesses, the more likely mobilization will be successful, as groups with greater resources are more able to incur the costs of collective action and can further use their resources to direct collective behavior. In research on ethnic mobilization, scholars have listed a number of resources, such as financial resources or media access, that increase success of ethnic political activity (Smith and Wilson 1997, Barany 2002) – including an educated population.

Mobilization Potential: Electoral Rules as Political Opportunity

In addition to resources, the degree to which a political system is open is an important factor which influences what parties are likely to arise and how representative the system is. Parties that represent the Russian minority, especially ethnic parties, are likely to be smaller parties, and so electoral openness is especially important in allowing these parties to compete for votes. Researchers often cite district magnitude and legal threshold of a country as two influential institutional rules which influence the degree of openness in a system (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997). Since voters are more likely to support parties they believe are likely to receive representation, Russians will be more likely to support ethnic parties when they think these parties are more likely to win representation in parliament. Ethnic parties are, in general, more likely to win seats in more open systems with larger district magnitude and lower thresholds.

The focus of this chapter is on systems using proportional representation or mixed electoral rules, where parliamentary elections most strongly emphasize parties rather than candidates. I use post-independence electoral data at the regional-level to compare the percent of votes for the three types of parties discussed in the previous chapter: ethnic parties, inclusive parties, and non-inclusive parties. To review, an ethnic party is defined

as a party that offers policies that appeal to their target ethnic group and place a high proportion of co-ethnic candidates on their party lists. An inclusive party is a more broad-based political party that nonetheless includes ethnic interests in their program and/or minority candidates which demonstrate that the party is sympathetic to the ethnic group's interest. Finally, non-inclusive parties do not offer any minority ethnic appeals in their platform or party list – this group includes majority nationalist parties and other political parties.

Testing Ethnic and Inclusive Party Support in the Former Soviet Union

For the dependent variable, my unit of analysis is party vote in national parliamentary elections, and observations are based on data from the smallest geographic unit for which the country reports both electoral and census data –the oblast- (regional) or county-level in Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. For Lithuania, a mixed electoral system with 71 SMD seats, this data is coded at the level of the SMD electoral district. Since my focus is explaining party choice, I exclude the first elections following independence in order to capture more developed party systems. First elections are often a party “free for all,” with a highly fragmented list of options and little to no connections between the voters and the parties. In those initial elections, ethnic political parties are likely to be fairly common, perhaps more so than in later elections, but their share of the votes will be fairly miniscule and difficult to measure, as electoral commissions often report votes on only the parties who receive a notable proportion of votes.

Table 3.1: Ethnic, Inclusive, and Non-inclusive Parties in Study

Ethnic Parties	Inclusive Parties	Non-Inclusive Parties
Estonia		
Our Home is Estonia (1995) United People's Party (1999-2003) ¹ Russian Party of Estonia (1999-2003)	Center Party (1999-2003) Reform Party (2003)	Center Party (1995) Reform Party (1995-99) Republican & Conservative People's Party (1995) Moderates (1995-2003) Coalition Party & Rural Union (1995) Estonian Coalition Party (1999) Estonian People's Union (1999-2003) Pro Patria (1995-2003) Res Publica (2003)
Latvia		
National Harmony Party (1998) For Human Rights in a United Latvia (2002-06) Harmony Center (2006)	-none-	Social-Democratic Alliance (1998) Fatherland & Freedom/LNNK Alliance (1998-2006) Latvia's Way (1998-2006) Latvia's First Party (1998-2006) People's Party (1998-2006) New Era (2002-06) Green & Farmer's Party (2002-06)
Lithuania		
Lithuania Russian Union (1996) Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (1996-2004)	A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition (1996-2004) Labor Party (2004)	Social Democratic Party (1996) Democratic Party Coalition (1996) Center Union (1996-2000) Liberal Union (2000) Liberal & Center Union (2004) Christian Democratic Party (1996-2000) Homeland Union (1996-2004) New Union (2000) Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (2000-04) Order & Justice (2004)
Ukraine		
Party of Regions (2006-07)	Communist Party (1998-2007) Progressive Socialist Party (1998) "For United Ukraine" bloc (2002) Socialist Party (2006)	Green Party (1998) Christian Democratic Party (1998) People's Democratic Party (1998) Bloc of the Socialist & Peasant's Party (1998) Socialist Party (2002) Social-Democratic Party - United (1998) All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada" (1998) People's Movement - Rukh (1998) National Front (1998) "Our Ukraine" bloc (1998-07) Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc (2002-07) People's bloc Lytvyna (1998, 2007)

¹ As mentioned in Chapter 2, the EURP changed their name in 2008 to the Estonian Left Party.

A full list of the parties under analysis is included in Table 3.1, and is based on the coding from the Chapter 2, which analyzes national party development in the four countries. To determine the vote for each party by region, I use election results as reported by the Electoral Commission in each of these republics: the Estonian National Electoral Commission,⁹² the Central Election Commission of Latvia,⁹³ the Central Election Commission of Ukraine,⁹⁴ and the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania.⁹⁵

To overview the findings from Chapter 2, both Estonia and Lithuania saw ethnic political parties emerge in earlier elections, but by the late 1990s these parties appeared to fade from national politics to be replaced by the more broad-based inclusive political parties. Ethnic parties in Latvia have remained fairly steady in their national representation, and no inclusive parties have emerged to appeal to the Russian minority. In Ukraine, several communist successor parties took on aspects of inclusive parties, emphasizing policies that appeal to the Russian minority and Russophone Ukrainians. The strongest ethnic appeal, however, emerges over time from the Party of Regions, classified here as an ethnic party.

Key Explanatory Variables In explaining ethnic voting in these three republics, I focus on three of the concepts introduced in earlier: ethnic competition, mobilization potential, and electoral opportunity. My primary focus is on the “contextual” factor that

⁹² <http://www.vvk.ee/engindex.html>

⁹³ <http://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/>

⁹⁴ <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/W6P001>

⁹⁵ http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/pgl_data_e.htm

is likely to influence these variables within each region: the percent of Russians residing in the region. In particular, it may be expected that many of these variables will only function once the proportion of Russians in a region hits a critical mass; for instance, industrialized regions may only form competitive ethnic environments when there are substantial numbers of both Russians and titulars competing for jobs. Data on the percent of Russians and other demographic, economic, and regional-level characteristics comes from the most recent census data or from data reported by the National Statistics Committee in each of these republics.⁹⁶

Beginning with the ethnic competition hypothesis, various scholars predict that ethnic competition is more common in urban environments and industrialized regions, where ethnic groups come into more frequent contact with each other (Olzak 1982; Kaiser 1994). If the ethnic competition approach is correct, ethnic voting should be more common in regions where competition is higher (where more residents are urban and the industry is industrialized); alternatively, if the decline-of-community approach is correct, we should see more voting in rural regions. To test these competing theories in regards to urbanization, I code for the percent of population in each region residing in urban areas as calculated from the most recent census data. The variable ranges from 4.04% in Panevezys county in Lithuania to 100% in the municipal electoral districts in all four countries.

Turning to the second factor outlined by the ethnic competition approach (Olzak 1982, 1992), industrialization data is more difficult to analyze cross-nationally as Latvia

⁹⁶ These sites include Latvijas Statistika (<http://www.csb.gov.lv/>), Statistics Estonia (<http://www.stat.ee/>), the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (<http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>) and the Statistics Department of the Republic of Lithuania (<http://www.stat.gov.lt>).

does not report regional industrial production on their Central Statistics Committee website comparable to the other countries in this analysis.⁹⁷ Since I cannot measure industrialization in Latvia and Estonia, I instead measure economic development, using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. In Ukraine and Lithuania, I do include data on industrial sales by region.⁹⁸ On average, Estonia's regions have a higher GDP per capita than Latvia's regions (5690.8 USD to 4746.8 USD); Lithuania's regions report on average a greater rate of industrial sales than does Ukraine (111.28 USD to 22.81).

Turning to the mobilization potential argument, ethnic voting should be more common in regions where the population possesses resources that help facilitate mobilization. One key resource for successful group mobilization is education. For this reason, I include the percent of residents in each region who have reached at least a secondary education, as reported in the most recent census. The average percent with this level of education varies across the four countries. In Lithuania and Estonia, this percent was roughly 22.6% and 25.9%, respectfully, while higher in Latvia (36.6%) and in Ukraine (53.8%). Lithuania shows the greatest variation: while some of the Vilnius city districts reports around 3% with a secondary education, in Marijampole county, 64.8% report having a secondary education.

For the opportunities hypothesis, states with more open electoral systems – states with large district magnitude and low electoral thresholds – likely increase the number parties and increase the likelihood that parties will appeal to a smaller subset of the population, such as the Russian minority. For data on electoral systems from 1990 until

⁹⁷ The primary regional economic indicator that Latvia does report is GDP.

⁹⁸ For a more thorough discussion of this variable, see Appendix A.

1998, I use Shvetsova (1999). For the most recent parliamentary elections and where Shvetsova is incomplete, I supplement this data using Birch (2003), Jones (2005), and Ó Beacháin (2005), as well electoral data available from the PARLINE Database⁹⁹ and from the electoral commissions in each relevant country.

The district magnitude in these countries noticeably varies. Estonia has more districts (11-12) with a smaller district magnitude, ranging from 5 (District 5 in 2003) to 14 (District 4 in 2003). Latvia's 5 districts have a greater district magnitude, ranging from 14 (Kurzem district) to 29 (Riga). Lithuania uses a mixed system, with 71 single-member districts and one national district with a magnitude of 70. In 1998 and 2002, Ukraine used a mixed electoral system with 225 single member districts and one national district of 225 seats. After the 2006 parliamentary elections, when Ukraine switched to pure PR with a single national district of 450.

Finally, as support for political parties varies depending on the dynamics of each election, I include election-year variables to control for any additional effects that arise due to the specifics of each election. Since there are three election cycles in the data for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, I include two dummy variables coding for the first (1998, 1996, and 1995, respectfully) and second (2002, 2000, 1999) election cycle, with the most recent election cycle as the excluded category.

Ukraine has data from four election cycles for the Rada elections – 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2007; however, I include only two election year controls for 1998 and 2006, leaving both 2002 and 2007 as the excluded category. This coding is due to issues with the district magnitude data. As mentioned previously, Ukraine changed their electoral

⁹⁹ <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>

laws after 2002, from electing half the Rada members from a 225-seat national district (with the other 225 candidates elected from single-member districts) to 450-seat national district (electing all the members). Adding a variable for 2002 would correlate perfectly with the district magnitude change, and no regression can have both variables included. While dropping this election year control makes it more difficult to separate the effects of this district magnitude change from the election-specific variation, I choose to leave district magnitude as a variable because models with district magnitude have a much stronger goodness-of-fit than models with the year control instead.¹⁰⁰

Findings Part I: Support for Ethnic Parties and Inclusive Parties

I analyze separate statistical models, using an Ordinary Least Squares regression to measure the potential linear relationships between the independent and dependent variables (percent of vote for ethnic parties and for inclusive parties). As mentioned previously, data for Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine are coded at the regional-level, while Lithuania is coded by SMD electoral district, making it difficult to accurately compare Lithuania with the other countries in the dataset. To acknowledge this lack of comparability and to control for additional factors specific to each country, I run separate models for each of the four countries.

In Table 3.2, I present results from regressing the percent vote for ethnic parties by region on urbanization (testing ethnic competition versus decline-of-community

¹⁰⁰ Comparing the two models, a regression on support for ethnic parties in Ukraine has an Adjusted R^2 of roughly 0.86, as compared to 0.66 when the 2002 election control variable is included instead. Across all the models, the Adjusted R^2 is superior in the model with district magnitude instead of the election year control: support for inclusive parties (0.73 compared to 0.61), support for ethnic over inclusive parties (0.76 compared to 0.64), support for ethnic over non-inclusive parties (0.603 compared to 0.40), and inclusive over non-inclusive parties (0.68 compared to 0.53).

approaches), industrialization (ethnic competition approach), the rate of secondary education in the population (mobilization potential), and district magnitude (political opportunity) by region. These contextual effects will vary depending on the population of the region; when there are more people who might be “triggered” by these variables, they should have different impacts. Therefore, a more accurate model must include both the percent of Russians in the region – as regions with more Russians are likely to show greater support for parties that are making appeals to them – and interactive effects between the main explanatory variables and the percent of Russians within a region.

Before continuing, it is important to mention a potential concern of multicollinearity, or correlation between the independent variables. As a result of migration patterns, Russians tend to be concentrated in more urban and industrial areas in the former Soviet Union. This correlation is highest in Estonia, where the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the percent of Russians in a region and the percent of urban residents is .730.¹⁰¹ Russians also tend to be more educated than the titular national group. Multicollinearity issues may increase the standard errors for the coefficients (making it more difficult to achieve significance) and lead to unreliable estimators. Two common fixes for multicollinearity are: 1) drop variables from the analysis, which may lead to misspecification issues, or 2) increase the number of cases. Neither, as I argue in Appendix B, are viable options in this analysis. I do run the models without the interactive, which are the primary cause of this collinearity issue, and report them in Appendix B.

¹⁰¹ When squared, this gives an R^2 of about .53, meaning that roughly half of the urban population is Russian.

Table 3.2: Percent Vote for Ethnic Parties by Region (OLS Regression)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Ukraine
Percent Russians	.186 (.408)	-4.250*** (.859)	5.279*** (.506)	-7.438*** (1.678)
Percent Urban	-.058* (.034)	.240** (.108)	.013 (.026)	.044 (.100)
Industrialization	-.001*** (.0004)	-.002*** (.001)	.00002 (.003)	-1.068* (.638)
Percent Secondary Education	1.318*** (.294)	-3.177*** (.892)	.069 (.051)	-.065 (.163)
District Magnitude (DM)	-.756*** (.224)	.251 (.286)		.064*** (.012)
<i>%Urban * %Russians</i>	-.066 (.204)	-1.321*** (.353)	-4.344*** (.540)	.738 (.692)
<i>Industrialization * %Russians</i>	-.0000003 (.00001)	.00004* (.00002)	-.0004 (.001)	.159*** (.046)
<i>Secondary Educ. * %Russians</i>	-.014 (.010)	.154*** (.027)	-.034*** (.004)	.044*** (.014)
<i>DM * %Russians</i>	.046*** (.009)	.003 (.011)		.005*** (.0004)
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	-2.823* (1.503)	-4.353*** (1.300)	1.690 (1.148)	-.582 (2.390)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002) ¹	.358 (1.112)	-1.026 (1.296)	-1.531 (1.143)	-4.658** (2.286)
Constant	-15.369 (4.997)	103.289 (24.653)	-4.676 (2.319)	9.455 (19.479)
N	57	99	213	107
R ²	.880	.900	.427	.873
Adjusted-R ²	.851	.876	.402	.858
F-test	30.07***	63.67***	59.18***	16.80***

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

¹ Ukraine uses the same district magnitude in the 1998 and 2002 election (a mixed system with one national district of 225 seats) and in 2006 and 2007 (pure PR with one district of 450 seats). Given the lack of variation cross-regionally, I cannot include a country dummy for 2002 if including 1998 as a dummy (nor 2007 if using 2006 as a dummy) since it this variation is already captured by the district magnitude change. For this reason, the country dummies for Ukraine are coded for 1998 and 2006 only.

Beginning with the variable for the percent of Russians in a region (used to measure the critical mass of a population), my findings are mixed. In Lithuania, the coefficient is positive, indicating that as the percent of Russians within a region increases, so too does the vote for ethnic parties. In Latvia and Ukraine, I find a negative relationship, counter to expectations. I find no relationship between the percent of


Russians in a region and ethnic party support in Estonia, which I explain later in the discussion.

Furthermore, several of the non-interactive terms, such as urbanization and district magnitude in Estonia and industrialization in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine, run counter to my predictions. Interpreting interactive terms can be difficult for continuous variables, and so in line with recommendations by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), I use figures to demonstrate the marginal effects of each of these variables in turn.¹⁰² To interpret these figures, the relationship is positive and significant for a given value of the independent variable when the lines representing upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are above 0; it is negative and significant when the lines representing the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are below 0.

Figure 3.1 presents the effects of urbanization on vote for ethnic parties as the percent of Russians in a region increase. While I find no significant relationship between urbanization and ethnic party support in Estonia or Ukraine, I find a significant and negative relationship in Latvia and Lithuania. In those two countries, support for ethnic parties is higher in more rural regions, a finding that supports the decline-of-community hypothesis over the ethnic competition approach. If urban environments do reduce traditional ties and weaken attachment to community identities (Park 1952) such as ethnic identities, then ethnic party supporters may be better mobilized and have stronger ties to the party in the more rural regions of these countries.

¹⁰² To see the models without the interactive terms, see Appendix B.

Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of Urbanization on Vote for Ethnic Parties




In Figure 3.2, I present my findings for the second variable testing predictions from the ethnic competition approach, regional industrialization. To review, ethnic competition theories contend that more industrialized settings place different ethnic groups into more frequent conflict over jobs and other scarce resources (Nagel and Olzak 1982; Kaiser 1994), fueling group competition and adversarial relations. In regards to this theory, the findings are mixed. Ukraine is the only country that fits with the prediction; once the percent of Russians exceed roughly 15%, ethnic party support is higher in more industrial regions. In Estonia, regions with higher GDP see *less* support for ethnic parties. A similar pattern occurs in Latvia, though this effect becomes weaker the more Russians live in the region; by the time the Russian population approaches parity with the majority population, I find no effect for higher GDP.

These inconsistent findings should be addressed. I do use different variables in these countries: in Estonia and Latvia, I use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the economic development of each region; in Ukraine and Lithuania, I use data on regional industrial sales. However, Estonia also reports data on regional industrial sales,¹⁰³ and when I use this variable instead, the findings remain unchanged. These differences in measurement, therefore, cannot be the primary reason for these different findings.

¹⁰³ Latvia's Central Statistical Bureau (www.csb.lv) does not report regional industrial sales data over the time needed for this study.

Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Industrialization on Vote for Ethnic Parties




I would argue instead that this difference may rest on the different economic paths of these republics, especially since the late 1990s. Ukraine's economy reflects a more traditional industrialized economy, while the Baltic republics, especially Estonia, have developed a more high-tech and service-oriented economy. In 2007, 37% of Ukraine's GDP was based on industry; for that same year, Estonia had 30% of their GDP and Latvia had only 22% of their GDP based on industry. In the same year, 12% of Estonia's exports were high-tech exports (down from 27% in 2005), 7% of Latvia's exports were high-tech, and only 4% of Ukraine's exports were high tech (World Bank 2009).

The economic competition approach is a theory developed to explain ethnic politics in industrializing societies, which is in many ways more applicable to Ukraine. In Ukraine, greater rates of industrialization reflect the environments the ethnic competition approach argues are most conducive to ethnic mobilization: environments where different groups compete over factory jobs. In Estonia and Latvia, however, competition over factory jobs is likely to occur most in regions with *lower* GDP per capita; regions with higher GDP have developed more into post-industrial societies with a strong service and high-tech sector.

Turning to the effects of the rate of secondary education in each region (Figure 3.3), I do find support of the resource mobilization argument. In Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine, regions with higher levels of education show greater support for ethnic parties, though there are some important threshold effects occurring. In Estonia, the effect of education becomes weaker as the proportion of Russians approach parity with the majority population.

Figure 3.3: Marginal Effect of Secondary Education on Vote for Ethnic Parties




In Ukraine, regional education levels have no effect until the proportion of the Russian population crosses a critical threshold, a little less than 10%. When Russians comprise at least a minimal proportion of the population, regions with more educated individuals are more able to mobilize and support ethnic political parties. Latvia has an interesting threshold effect: when Russians comprise a small proportion of the population (less than 10%), more educated regions show *less* support for ethnic parties. However, once the proportion of Russians reaches a significant threshold (over 30%), more educated regions have *higher* support for ethnic parties.

In Lithuania, however, support for ethnic voting is higher in *less* educated regions, a finding that seems to contradict the resource mobilization argument. One potential explanation for this finding is that it is being driven by some of the Vilnius districts, which are outliers on the education variable. The Vilnius districts are also more urbanized with a higher Russian population than other regions of the country, which may also be affecting the results.

Reviewing the findings from Chapter 2 provides another potential explanation for this finding. Of the three Baltic republics, Lithuania has developed a party system with strong inclusive parties and weak ethnic parties; ethnic voters in Lithuania have a strong incentive to engage in strategic voting and support these inclusive parties. As more educated and informed voters are more effective at strategic voting (for instance, see work by Black 1978), this explains the pattern that also emerges in Figures 3.7 (vote for inclusive parties) and 3.11 (vote for ethnic rather than inclusive parties), and is further supported by the findings in Chapter 4 using survey data. In Lithuania, more educated ethnic voters seem more likely to support inclusive parties rather than ethnic ones.

Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of District Magnitude on Vote for Ethnic Parties



Turning to the political opportunities variable, I do find in Ukraine and Estonia that regions with a more open political system – those with higher district magnitudes – show greater support for ethnic political parties.¹⁰⁴ Latvia does briefly reach significance, with a similar pattern. In addition, the threshold effect seen in Estonia gives credence to the notion that district magnitude indeed psychologically impacts voters, causing them to support those parties they think have the highest probability of winning (Blais and Carty 1991; Benoit 2001). In regions where Russians make up a small portion of the population (less than 10%), voters are less likely to support ethnic parties even in large electoral districts; in regions with many Russians (over 30%), large district magnitudes contribute to even *more* support for ethnic parties.¹⁰⁵

To summarize, I find some support for the decline-of-community over the ethnic competition approach, and find that support for ethnic parties tends to be greater in more rural regions than in more urban ones.¹⁰⁶ In regards to industrialization, I do find support for the ethnic competition approach in Ukraine, and potentially in Estonia and Latvia when taking into account the different economic development of these economies. I do find support for the mobilization potential argument that more educated regions should show greater support for ethnic parties, as well as support of the institutional opportunity argument. Taken together, support for ethnic parties tends to be higher in more rural

¹⁰⁴ A caveat on the finding in Ukraine: due to the perfect correlation between district magnitude and election year, which requires that I drop the 2002 dummy variable from the analysis, it is harder to say with complete confidence that this difference is caused exclusively by district magnitude and not by differences in the elections.

¹⁰⁵ As a reminder, district magnitude does not vary in Lithuania, and so is not included as a variable.

¹⁰⁶ A good example of a rural region with high support for Russian parties is the Rezeknes rajons in the Latgale region of Latvia. Despite an urban population of less than 10%, their support for Russian parties hovers around 40% for all three years in the analysis.

environments, more industrialized regions (with a caveat), more educated environments (with the special case of Lithuania as an exception, and in regions with a higher district magnitude (subject to threshold effects).

Findings Part II: Support for Inclusive Parties

Explaining vote for ethnic parties is only one goal of this chapter. In Table 3.3, I analyze support for inclusive parties by region. Before continuing, it is important to consider that the theory of voting I am testing is based on theories of ethnic voting and may be less suited for explaining support for inclusive parties. Inclusive parties, as they are primarily concerned with policies outside a purely ethnic definition, do appeal to voters for ethnic and non-ethnic reasons. However, since at least some of the supporters for these parties are motivated by ethnic reasons and because it will ultimately allow us to run a model contrasting support for ethnic versus inclusive parties, I conduct a similar analysis to that in Table 3.2. As discussed in Chapter 2, I have coded no parties as inclusive parties in Latvia, so this country is dropped from the following analysis.

Unsurprising, the models in Table 3.3 fit less than those in Table 3.2, and the Adjusted- R^2 is noticeably less than comparable models from the earlier table. Lithuania is the only country where I find a significant relationship between the percent Russians in a region and inclusive party vote. After controlling for all these factors, in Lithuania, inclusive parties receive greater electoral support in regions with fewer Russians.

Table 3.3: Percent Vote for Inclusive Parties by Region (OLS Regression)

	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Percent Russians	.122 (.513)	-.428 (1.573)	-1.399*** (.426)
Percent Urban	-.005 (.078)	.223** (.094)	-.051** (.022)
Industrialization	.00002 (.001)	-1.036* (.598)	.002 (.003)
Percent Secondary Education	-.339 (.677)	.227 (.153)	.052 (.043)
District Magnitude (DM)	.767 (.515)	-.062*** (.011)	
<i>%Urban * %Russians</i>	.768 (.469)	-.511 (.649)	1.103** (.454)
<i>Industrialization * %Russians</i>	.00004* (.00002)	.082* (.043)	-.0001 (.0004)
<i>Secondary Educ. * %Russians</i>	-.028 (.023)	.004 (.013)	.015*** (.004)
<i>DM * %Russians</i>	-.005 (.021)	-.003*** (.0004)	
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	-36.983*** (3.457)	-.999 (2.241)	-39.353*** (.966)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002) ¹	-14.210*** (2.558)	4.001* (2.144)	-18.313*** (.961)
Constant	39.052 (11.494)	31.423 (18.267)	52.413 (1.950)
N	57	107	213
R ²	.939	.754	.896
Adjusted-R ²	.924	.725	.891
F-test	62.71***	26.45***	194.33***

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.15, ***p < 0.01

¹ As before due to correlation with the district magnitude change, the election cycles are 1998 and 2006 in Ukraine, with 2002 and 2007 as the excluded category.

The findings for the non-interactive terms are again mixed. For instance in Ukraine, support for inclusive parties is higher in more urbanized regions, a finding more in line with the ethnic competition approach than the findings for ethnic party support, but lower in more industrialized regions, counter to the approach. Again, however, it is necessary to turn to the following figures to interpret the marginal effects of each of the interactive terms. In Figure 3.5, I only find a significant relationship between urbanization and inclusive party support in Lithuania, which, as stated above, is a finding

more in line with the ethnic competition approach. Inclusive parties receive the most support in regions with both a high percent of Russians and a high rate of urbanization.

In Figure 3.6, I examine the effects of industrialization on inclusive party support. Estonia is the only one of the three countries where I find a significant relationship, a finding which is the opposite of the relation noted in Figure 3.2. Support for inclusive parties is higher in regions with a higher GDP per capita; however, demonstrating a threshold effect, this relationship is only significant when the proportion of Russians exceeds 25% of the total population. Comparing findings from Figures 3.3 and 3.6, this suggests that, at least in Estonia, the economic environment may play a more nuanced role than predicted in the ethnic competition approach. While this warrants further study, these findings do suggest that ethnic voters in more traditional industrialized regions may support different types of pro-ethnic parties than voters from more high-tech or service economic sectors.

Turning to the effects of regional education levels (Figure 3.7), in Lithuania, I find that inclusive parties receive the most support in highly educated regions with a sizeable proportion of Russians. Recalling the earlier discussion on Figure 3.3, this likely reflects the ability of these voters to most accurately engage in strategic voting for the inclusive parties; more educated ethnic voters seem more likely to support inclusive parties rather than ethnic ones. This argument will be more fully developed in the next section of the empirical analysis, when I compare regional vote for party choices, examining what factors cause voters to choose one type of party (ethnic, inclusive, or non-inclusive) rather than another.

Figure 3.5: Marginal Effect of Urbanization on Vote for Inclusive Parties




Figure 3.6: Marginal Effect of Industrialization on Vote for Inclusive Parties






Figure 3.7: Marginal Effect of Secondary Education on Vote for Inclusive Parties



This comparison is useful when explaining the findings here in regards to Estonia. I find in Estonia that once the proportion of Russians pass roughly 15%, more educated regions are *less* likely to support inclusive parties. This finding appears to contradict the support given to the mobilization potential argument in Figure 3.3, which argues that ethnic mobilization should be higher in regions with a more educated population pool which groups can draw on to recruit political elite to direct their mobilization activities. However, we can conclude what effect education has on ethnic mobilization only after contrasting whether voters choose to support ethnic, inclusive, or non-inclusive parties.

Figure 3.8: Marginal Effect of District Magnitude on Vote for Inclusive Parties



Finally, in regards to district magnitude (see Figure 3.8), I fail to find a relationship in Estonia, but find a significant relationship between political openness and inclusive party vote in Ukraine. Comparable to the findings from Figure 3.4, inclusive parties receive the *least* amount of support in regions with higher district magnitudes and a high proportion of Russians; in other words, support for inclusive parties is strongest when there are fewer Russians and a more “closed” political system. Again, this finding, along with the results from the earlier analysis, suggests that if we seek to understand how district magnitude affects party support, it may be useful to consider the strategic incentive for voters to choose inclusive parties versus ethnic ones.

Findings Part III: Choosing Ethnic versus Inclusive Parties

While these initial findings give some insight into why ethnic and inclusive parties receive more support in some regions over others, it cannot fully explain party choice in the context of a party system. When voting, voters in each of these countries decide which type of party they will support *over all other types of parties*. This chapter, rather than focusing exclusively on ethnic parties, seeks to explain why regional support varies between ethnic *and* inclusive parties. In essence, when are voters in a region more likely to support ethnic parties over inclusive and non-inclusive parties, and when do they support inclusive parties over ethnic and non-inclusive parties? To answer these related questions, I run a series of OLS regressions using three ratios for the percent of votes for each region: 1) ethnic party vote over inclusive party vote, 2) ethnic party vote over non-inclusive party vote, and 3) inclusive party vote over non-inclusive party vote. For each

“party choice” category, I run the analysis using a model similar to Tables 3.4 and 3.5, which tested vote for ethnic parties and inclusive parties separately.

The findings for this analysis are presented in Table 3.6 under three categories: support for ethnic over inclusive parties, support for ethnic over non-inclusive parties, and support for inclusive parties over non-inclusive parties. Before continuing, it is important to note that the data from Latvia are excluded. This is because there are no parties coded as inclusive in Latvia, so this variable is coded as missing for the Latvian cases. In essence, the original results from Latvia on support for ethnic parties do reflect this “party choice” option, as Russian voters in Latvia can only choose between support an ethnic party or supporting a non-inclusive party. In Estonia and Ukraine, the goodness-of-fit is strongest for the models measuring ethnic over inclusive party choice, with an Adjusted R^2 of about 0.83 and 0.76, respectfully. The model fit is fairly strong across the three party choice options, with all models receiving an Adjusted R^2 above 0.6.

With the exception of the inclusive over non-inclusive choice (where Ukraine is actually lower), the model fit is weakest in Lithuania for all three party choice options, most likely due to the fact that the Russian community in Lithuania is much smaller than the other countries in this analysis, roughly 6% compared to the 17% in Ukraine and the 27% and 30% in Estonia and Latvia. This size has impacted interethnic relations in Lithuania. Given their population strength, post-independence Lithuanians were more secure in their claim to the state and have been more open towards instituting inclusive minority policies (Gelazis 2003). The changing status for Russians has been less severe in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia, and unlike Ukraine, Russians do not see themselves as indigenous with a strong claim to the state (Bremmer 1994).

Table 3.4: Vote for One Type of Party over Others by Region (OLS Regression), Latvia Excluded

	Ethnic over Inclusive			Ethnic over Non-Inclusive			Inclusive over Non-Inclusive		
	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Percent Russians	-.002 (.013)	-.873*** (.320)	.636*** (.106)	.0005 (.006)	-1.235*** (.351)	.002*** (.0003)	.025 (.020)	-.120 (.099)	.026 (.016)
Percent Urban	-.001 (.002)	-.029 (.019)	.004 (.005)	-.002 (.001)	-.028 (.021)	.00001 (.00001)	-.003 (.003)	-.001 (.006)	-.001 (.001)
Industrialization	-.00001 (.00002)	-.060 (.122)	-.0001 (.001)	-.00003*** (.00001)	-.054 (.134)	.000001 (.000002)	.00003 (.00003)	.046 (.038)	.00004 (.0001)
Percent Secondary Education	.047** (.020)	-.021 (.031)	.008 (.011)	.026*** (.008)	-.056 (.034)	.00003 (.00003)	-.006 (.032)	-.001 (.010)	.002 (.002)
District Magnitude (DM)	-.026* (.013)	.015*** (.002)		-.017** (.006)	-.003 (.003)		.025 (.021)	-.001* (.001)	
<i>%Urban * %Russians</i>	-.019 (.013)	.246* (.132)	-.574*** (.113)	.004 (.006)	.441*** (.145)	-.001*** (.0003)	.067*** (.020)	.103** (.041)	-.034* (.018)
<i>Industrialization * %Russian</i>	-.000002*** (.000001)	.011 (.009)	.00003 (.0001)	.0000005* (.0000002)	.016 (.010)	.0000001 (.0000002)	.000002 (.000001)	.004 (.003)	-.00000002 (.00002)
<i>Secondary Education * %Russians</i>	.001 (.001)	.006** (.003)	-.004*** (.001)	-.001* (.0003)	.008*** (.003)	-.00001*** (.000002)	-.003** (.001)	.001 (.001)	.0002 (.0001)
<i>DM * %Russians</i>	.001** (.0004)	.001*** (.0001)		.001*** (.0003)	.001*** (.0001)		-.0003 (.001)	-.0002*** (.00003)	
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998) ¹		-.020 (.456)	.777*** (.241)	-.113** (.403)	.072 (.500)	.001 (.001)		-.333** (.141)	-1.064*** (.037)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002) ²	.079 (.060)	-1.875*** (.436)	.004 (.240)	-.019 (.032)	.780 (.479)	-.001 (.001)	-.212** (.096)	.177 (.135)	-.672*** (.037)
Constant	-.770 (.296)	.635 (3.715)	-.904 (.487)	-.190 (.142)	6.435 (4.079)	-.002 (.001)	.528 (.473)	1.930 (1.148)	1.242 (.075)
N	38	107	213	57	107	213	38	107	213
R ²	.875	.788	.218	.824	.644	.175	.823	.717	.818
Adjusted-R ²	.829	.763	.183	.781	.603	.138	.758	.684	.810
F-test	18.89***	32.02***	6.28***	19.15***	15.64***	4.78***	12.56***	21.83***	101.10***

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

¹ No parties were coded as inclusive in Estonia in 1995, and so that year was dropped from this analysis in some of the models.

² Due to correlation with the district magnitude change, the election cycles are 1998 and 2006 in Ukraine, with 2002 and 2007 as excluded categories.

As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnic parties have been weak in Lithuania, and Russian ethnic representation is primarily taken up by the inclusive Social Democrat coalition and the Labor Party, explaining why this vote mobilization model has the strongest fit for inclusive party choice. Further, as will be shown using survey data in Chapter 4, few Russians in Lithuania vote for the ethnic or the non-inclusive parties. In Lithuania, Russians almost solely support inclusive parties. Overall, the dynamic of the Russian minority and their resulting mobilization is significantly different in Lithuania.

To ease the interpretation of Table 3.4, I will go through each country in turn and discuss the findings for the key independent variables. Beginning with Estonia (Figure 3.9), I find no relationship between urbanization and district magnitude when explaining support for ethnic over inclusive parties. Reflecting Tables 3.2 and 3.6, I do find that support for ethnic parties over inclusive parties tends to be higher in regions with a lower GDP per capita, but only when the percent of Russians exceeds 15%. Returning to the argument from Table 3.6, it appears that economic environments not only impact *whether* groups become mobilized, but also play a role determining *which* party they support.

I also find that support for ethnic over inclusive parties is consistently higher in regions with a more educated population. Returning to the theory drawn from the resource mobilization literature, a more educated population provides a pool of potential movement entrepreneurs who may be called on to motivate and direct collective action. At least in Estonia, this entrepreneur resource appears especially important in mobilizing votes for ethnic parties. Inclusive parties can draw on entrepreneurs from other populations; Russian ethnic parties are primarily limited to Russian-speakers to provide their pool of leaders.

Figure 3.9: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Estonia)




Figure 3.10: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Ukraine)





Figure 3-11: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Inclusive Parties (Lithuania)




I find a similar relationship between education and support for ethnic over inclusive parties in Ukraine (Figure 3.10), but only in regions that are comprised at least 12% Russian. Again, this suggests the importance of the education resource for motivating ethnic party support. I also find in Ukraine that, in line with the expectations from the political opportunities argument that support for ethnic parties over inclusive parties is higher when the district magnitude is also higher.

In Lithuania (Figure 3.11), I find the opposite relationship between education and support for ethnic over inclusive parties. Support for inclusive rather than ethnic parties is higher in more educated regions in Lithuania. This finding may again rest on the different dynamics of ethnic relation in this country. If the representation of Russians is primarily done through the inclusive parties, as argued previously, then Russian entrepreneurs may direct the collective activity towards supporting the inclusive, not the ethnic, parties. Alternatively, this relationship may be because ethnic Russians in Lithuania have a strong incentive to engage in strategic voting and support inclusive parties since ethnic party vote gives no viable representation. As mentioned before, more educated voters are better able to accurately engage in strategic voting (Black 1978).

Turning to vote for ethnic over non-inclusive parties (Figures 3.12 through 3.14), district magnitude is a variable most consistently significant across the different models, and this finding emphasizes the important role of political institutions in explaining voting behavior. In both Estonia (Figure 3.12) and Ukraine (Figure 3.13), regions with a higher district magnitudes are more likely to support ethnic over non-inclusive parties. This effect becomes even stronger as the proportion of Russians increase, demonstrating the importance of context on the institutional effect of electoral rules.

Figure 3.12: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Estonia)



In Figure 3.12, I find that in Estonia ethnic party choice tends to be higher in regions with a lower GDP per capita. As I argue that these regions represent a more traditionally industrialized economy, this again supports the prediction of the ethnic competition approach. In support of the resource mobilization approach, support for ethnic over non-inclusive parties is higher in more educated regions, though only when the percent of Russians is below 30%. As the proportion of the population approaches parity, I do not find any effect for education.

Regarding the marginal effect of the percent of secondary education by region in Ukraine (Figure 3.13), I do find a significant and positive relationship for ethnic over inclusive parties when the proportion of Russians exceeds 10%. In other words, regions with a more educated population are more likely to support ethnic parties over non-inclusive parties, a finding in line with the resource mobilization argument. Beyond this, more urbanized regions give more support to ethnic over non-inclusive parties, a finding that supports the prediction from the ethnic competition approach.

Lithuania, however, shows a reverse trend for two of the key variables (see Figure 3.14). Support for ethnic over non-inclusive parties is higher in regions that are less urbanized and with a less educated population, counter to both the ethnic competition approach (but in line with the decline-of-community approach) and the resource mobilization prediction. Again, this difference in findings may be a result of the differing ethnic dynamics in Lithuania, which has led the Russian minority to primarily be represented by inclusive, not ethnic, political parties. Since so few voters in each region vote for ethnic parties, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as there is little variance in the values of the dependent variables when coding for ethnic parties.

Figure 3.13: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Ukraine)





Figure 3-14: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Ethnic over Non-Inclusive Parties (Lithuania)



The final vote choice option, support for inclusive over non-inclusive parties, while not the primary focus of this research, discussing this is beneficial to address the full vote options available to the voters in Estonia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. In Figure 3.15, Estonia shows greater support for the inclusive parties in more urbanized regions, a finding that does align with the ethnic competition approach. Support for inclusive over non-inclusive parties is also higher in regions with a higher GDP per capita. Less educated regions tend to favor the non-inclusive parties, and I find no relationship between district magnitude and choice between these types of parties.

In Ukraine (Figure 3.16) I find no significant relation between industrialization or education, but do find, as in Estonia, that support for inclusive over non-inclusive parties is higher in more urban regions. Again, the ethnic competition approach theorizes that urban environments act as competitive environments that also help create ethnic networks that allow more successful mobilization (Nagel and Olzak 1982), creating greater potential support for those parties that appeal to ethnic voters, such as inclusive parties.

On the district magnitude variable, regions with larger district magnitudes were more likely to show greater support for the non-inclusive rather than the inclusive parties. While this finding may seem counter intuitive if we assume that more political opportunities (larger district magnitude) leads to more vote for the inclusive parties (as they do seek to represent a majority population), it is important to remember that as more broad-based parties, inclusive parties are more likely to receive the minority ethnic vote when other options (ethnic party vote) is less viable. Reflecting the results for Ukraine in Figure 3.8, inclusive parties benefit from electoral rules that promote a strategic incentive for voters to choose inclusive parties versus ethnic ones.

Figure 3.15: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over Non-Inclusive Parties (Estonia)





Figure 3.16: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over Non-Inclusive Parties (Ukraine)




In Figure 3.17, the only significant relationship I find for Lithuania is for the education variable. In line with earlier findings from this chapter (see Figures 3.7 and 3.11), support for inclusive over non-inclusive parties is higher in regions with a more educated population, though only when the percent of Russians are below 30 percent. Again, this fits with the strategic voting argument made in Chapters 2 and Chapters 4 about the strong incentive for strategic voting in Lithuania. Furthermore, this result is also in line with research from American politics, which finds that more educated and informed voters are more effective at strategic voting (Black 1978).

Conclusion

This chapter gives insight into some of the dynamics that contribute to ethnic political action. In particular, I find that urban environments, educational resources, and electoral rules shape the political environment in such a way as to influence the salience of ethnicity and the mobilization potential for the Russian minority. These factors interact with the proportion of Russians within a region to determine the amount of electoral support given to parties that make appeals to the Russian minority. These findings give mixed support for the mobilization explanation for party support, but strong support for the effects of institutional rules on party choice.

Figure 3-17: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Vote for Inclusive over Non-Inclusive Parties (Lithuania)



While urbanization has a decreasing effect on vote for ethnic parties in some of the cases, regions with a higher district magnitude and greater industrialization have a higher percent of votes for ethnic parties than do other regions. The effect of education appears more nuanced and seems to relate to more context-specific factors that promote strategic voting in some of these societies. In Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine, more educated regions show greater support for ethnic parties, fitting with the resource mobilization hypothesis. In Lithuania, where the incentive for strategic voting is strongest, these regions instead support inclusive parties, a finding in line with other research on what populations are most effective at strategic voting (Black 1978).

With regards to support for inclusive parties, I find more variation by country. In Estonia, inclusive party support is higher in regions with a higher GDP per capita and lower regional education. In Lithuania, more urban regions and more educated regions support inclusive parties. Finally, in Ukraine, district magnitude is found as the strongest predictor; regions with a lower district magnitude (less political opportunities) are more likely to support inclusive parties. Fitting with the argument from the previous chapter, the data does fit with the claim that the Russian minority engages in strategic voting to support inclusive parties when the chance of ethnic representation by ethnic parties is less viable.

While this chapter and the previous chapter both focused on factors that explain support for different types of political parties, in the next chapter I analyze party choice among ethnic voters. Using survey data, I examine individual differences in vote choice, comparing both Russian and non-Russian voters in their party support, but significantly looking *within* the Russian population to explain why some Russian voters are more

likely to support ethnic parties and why some are more likely to support inclusive parties. By adding this individual-level of analysis to the earlier empirical chapters looking at party support cross-nationally and cross-regionally, we can better understand the factors functioning at different levels that motivate ethnic voting for ethnic and inclusive political parties.

CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC VOTERS AND ETHNIC VOTING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PARTY SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

As defined in the introduction, ethnic voting for a political party occurs when ethnic group members support a party in a way “which cannot be explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics” (Wolfinger 1965). Meaning, that when ethnic voters choose to support a political party – ethnic or inclusive – they are making this decision based on their ethnic identity. In exploring the different explanations for ethnic voting among the Russian minority, previous chapters have examined how national policy and regional differences account for variation in the tendency to support ethnic and inclusive parties.

In this chapter, I begin by demonstrating that ethnic voting by the Russian minority is in fact occurring, using survey data from the Baltic Republics. I find that ethnic identity is significant and one of the most consistent determinants of vote choice for ethnic and inclusive parties, regardless of a voter’s evaluations of the economy or positions on major issues. Russian-speakers, even when controlling for economic voting, issue voting, or other demographic factors, are more likely than non-Russians to support ethnic or inclusive parties.

In the second part of this chapter, I look within the Russian-speaking minority and examine how individual attitudes and socialization experiences affect vote decision-making. Reflecting this individual-level focus, the theory in this section primarily examines the factors which transform ethnicity into a salient cleavage that divides and mobilizes the electorate. In particular, I examine individual ethnic socialization

experiences and views on national politics to see which factors increase the likelihood that Russian-speakers will support ethnic or inclusive parties.

Theories of Vote Choice

When considering factors which may compete with ethnic identity as a determinant of vote choice, the voting literature has focused on issues and ideology (Carmines and Stimson 1986), economic conditions (Tufte 1975), and the sociodemographic characteristics of voters (Popkin 1991, Cutler 2008). To begin with issue voting, the main idea behind this approach is that voters base their party choice on whether they believe a party's policy position and values reflects their own position (Aldrich 1977; Schulman and Pomper 1975; Miller et al. 1976; Popkin et al. 1976; Hartwig, Jenkins and Temchin 1980; and Kinder and Sears 1985; Kahn and Kenney 1999). The exact dynamic of this process is under debate, and there is some distinction between "hard" issue voting, where voters make their decisions based on a sophisticated decision making calculus, and "easy" issue voting, where voters decisions are based on more "gut responses" to parties (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 78).

Issue voting tends to be most prevalent during periods of turmoil, as parties offer distinct policy positions during those periods (Nie, Verba, and Pertocik 1976). If this finding can be applied to the Baltic Republics, issue voting should be a powerful predictor of the vote in this setting. The 1990s, and even to the present, was a period of major economic and political change as these countries became independent and transitioned from a centrally-planned economy. Furthermore, up through 2004, these countries also dealt with pressures as part of their European Union accession, which

required significant economic, social, and political changes on the part of these governments.

According to the economic voting approach, voters decide to reward or punish incumbent parties or candidates for their economic performance (for instance, Fiorina 1981, Kiewiet 1983, Lewis-Beck 1988, Pacek 1994, Remmer 1991, Tillman 2008).

Within this literature, much debate has existed on whether 1) voters make their decisions based on retrospective or prospective evaluations and 2) whether they are sociotropic or egotropic.¹⁰⁷ Retrospective voters base their judgment on past economic performance, while prospective voters base their vote on what they believe is the future direction for the economy. Egotropic or “pocketbook” voters base their decision on their personal financial experiences, while sociotropic voters use national economic conditions to make their decisions. While economic voting primarily explains reactions to incumbent parties, it is at least in part a viable explanation in this analysis, as ethnic parties in the Baltic Republics have generally been cast in the role of permanent opposition, and are likely to benefit from voters choosing to punish incumbent parties for any problems they see in the economy or their personal finances.

The idea that a voter’s demographic characteristics influence vote choice is an underlying assumption of much research on voting behavior and traces back to Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) classic “funnel of causality.” While Campbell et al. argued that vote choice was primarily determined by partisan identification, which was

¹⁰⁷ For a full discussion of this debate, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000). To give a small sample of this debate drawing from survey research in American politics, some work has linked presidential approval ratings to retrospective voting (Norpoth 1996), prospective voting (Erikson et al 2000), and sometimes both (Clarke and Stewart 1994). Research on US presidential elections has found greater support for sociotropic voting (Kiewiet 1983; Alvarez and Nagler 1998), while work on Congressional elections has found support for both sociotropic and egotropic measures (Brown and Woods 1991).

inherited from parents, this work does stress the importance of societal group membership in shaping party choice. Resting on this assumption is the idea that group members share “certain life experiences,” and that “individual responses to the same stimuli turn out to show some similarity” (1960, 332).

More recent work on demographics and vote choice focus on the idea that demographic characteristics provide policy cues to voters and act as information shortcuts (Popkin 1991). These cues are effective only if similar demographic backgrounds tend to lead to similar policy positions. In the case of ethnic voters, they may choose to vote for co-ethnic candidates or parties to maximize the likelihood that pro-ethnic policies will be represented (Birnir 2007). Again, underlying this work is the argument from Campbell et al. (1960) that certain social groupings – such gender, class, religion, ethnicity, and race – lead to similar life experiences among group members which influence their view on key political issues and candidates (Kinder and Sears 1981; Rosenthal 1995; Campbell 2006).¹⁰⁸

Two key variables from the vote choice literature – a voter’s partisan identification and candidate evaluations – are noticeably missing in my analyses. Early work on partisan identification emphasized the importance of parental influence in shaping partisanship (Converse 1969; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Mattei and Niemi 1981): party identification is at least in part inherited from parents.¹⁰⁹ However,

¹⁰⁸ This underlying theory helps overcome Achen’s (1992) critique that demographic factors are problematic in models in that they are purely descriptive and lack theoretic justification.

¹⁰⁹ Other research has sought to revise this position and argues instead that individual partisanship changes overtime in response to evolving issue positions and ongoing experiences in the political environment (Markus 1979; Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989). Authors under this approach, however, do credit the idea that parental partisanship serves as a starting point for an individual’s political views, which are then altered by individual personal experiences (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Achen 2002).

post-Soviet societies are new democracies (therefore new party systems) and lack the generational turnover that helps tie voters to their partisan identity. Lacking this intergenerational phenomena, issue positions, not partisan identification, is a more relevant explanatory variable for a post-Soviet voting model.

Candidate evaluations are also excluded from these models. How a voter views a candidate is strongly related to partisan identification and vote choice (for instance, see Jackson 1975, Page and Jones 1979, Whiteley 1988). Even in the more “party-centered” PR and mixed electoral systems of the Baltic republics, political parties are often associated with key political leaders, such as Edgar Savisaar and the Estonian Center Party.¹¹⁰ How the voter views these leaders are also likely to influence their decision on whether or not to support these parties in the election. However, the Baltic Barometer does not include any questions to measure a voter’s evaluation of key political candidates, and so this variable is regrettably untestable using the current data.

To provide a simple model of vote choice in the Baltic Republics, and to demonstrate the ethnic voting is in fact occurring, I use data from the 2001 and 2004 survey waves of the New Baltic Barometer (Rose 2002, 2005).¹¹¹ In both surveys, respondents were either asked to record which party they had voted for in the previous election (if an election had occurred recently) or which party would they support in an

¹¹⁰ Saavisaar, who is the current mayor of Tallinn and served as Estonia’s Prime Minister from 1990 to 1992, is a controversial figure in Estonian politics. Many Russian-speakers favorably view his criticism of more nationalist Estonian politicians and his push for a Center Party cooperative agreement with Russia’s ruling party, United Russia. Other Estonians have accused Saavisaar of nepotism, corruption, and authoritarian rule.

¹¹¹ The New Baltic Barometer is part of the New Democracies Barometer surveys.

upcoming election. Table 4.1 presents the party options in this survey I classify as ethnic or inclusive parties; all other parties not listed fall into the non-inclusive category.

Table 4.1: Classification of Political Parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

	Ethnic	Inclusive
Estonia (2001)	United People's Party (EURP) ¹ Russian Party in Estonia (VEE) Russian Baltic Party in Estonia Russian Unity Party	Center Party (Kesk) Reform Party (Reform)
Estonia (2004)	United People's Party (EURP)	Center Party (Kesk) Reform Party
Latvia (2001)	For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) Latvian Russian Citizens' Party	- none -
Latvia (2004)	For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) People's Harmony Party ² Socialist Party of Latvia ³	- none -
Lithuania (2001)	Lithuania Russian Union (LRS) Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles (LLRA)	Social Democratic Party ⁴
Lithuania (2004)	Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action (LLRA)	New Union ⁵ Social Democrats ⁶ Labor Party

¹ As mentioned in Chapter 2, the EURP merged with the Estonian Left Party, and has been known since 2008 as the Estonian United Left Party.

² The People's Harmony Party is one of the parties that make up the electoral coalition the "National Harmony Party (TSP)," which is coded in Chapter 2 as an ethnic party.

³ The Socialist Party is one of the parties that make up the "National Harmony Party" (TSP) electoral coalition, which is coded in Chapter 2 as an ethnic party.

⁴ This party was the main party of the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition in 2001.

⁵ New Union was one of the parties in the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition in 2004.

⁶ The Social Democrats was one of the parties in the A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition in 2004.

To recall the definition offered in Chapter 2, an ethnic party is a party that has a platform which includes ethnic policies of interest to the ethnic group *and* includes in its party list a high number of co-ethnic candidates. Inclusive parties have a broader appeal but demonstrate their sympathy to a minority ethnic group by including ethnic policies in

their platform and/or a fair proportion of ethnic candidates on their party list. As seen in Table 4.1, none of the political parties in Latvia are classified as inclusive (see Chapter 2), thus these cells are empty in the following analyses.

I coded respondent vote into two dichotomous dependent variables, support for ethnic political parties and support for inclusive political parties, and so use logistic regression¹¹² in my analysis. In the first variable, respondents received a 1 if they stated that they would vote for an ethnic political party; they received a 0 if they supported a non-inclusive party. Respondents who instead supported an inclusive party were coded as missing in this variable.¹¹³ In the inclusive party variable, respondents received a 1 if they supported an inclusive political party, a 0 if they supported a non-inclusive party, and were coded as missing if they supported an ethnic party. Overall, roughly 12.1% of the full sample in both survey waves supported an ethnic party; about 35% supported an inclusive party.

To test whether ethnic voting is occurring, I divide the sample into Russian-speakers and non-Russians using the language in which the respondent was interviewed. Russophone respondents (“Russian-speakers”) were interviewed in Russian.

To code this last variable, I use the language in which the survey interview was conducted— Russophone respondents were interviewed in Russian, the same variable used

¹¹² As discussed by Long (1997), logistic regression is an appropriate choice when using binary dependent variables.

¹¹³ Coding these cases as missing serves two purposes. First, it allows the variable from Estonia and Lithuania to be comparable to the variable from Latvia, as Latvia has no inclusive parties for respondents to choose to support. Second, since the factors that increase support for ethnic parties are also likely to increase support for inclusive parties, including inclusive parties in the 0 category would increase the risk of Type II error as including these cases would, in essence, put competing pressures on the variables and encourage a null finding.

by Rose (2002, 2005) to identify Russians in the reports on the Baltic Barometers.

Alternative variables are available for coding Russian-speakers, and I include a full discussion of these options in Appendix C.

Table 4.2 compares the support for these types of parties between Russian-speakers and non-Russians in the analysis. I run a two-sample t-test to see whether the mean score of these two populations (Russians and non-Russians) are different.

As can be seen, Russian-speakers are more likely than other respondents to support ethnic and inclusive parties. For instance, in 2001, almost 62.7%% of Russian-speakers supported an ethnic party while only 3.2% of non-Russian-speakers did. In that same year, roughly 72% of Russians but only half as many non-Russians voted for inclusive parties.

Table 4.2: Vote Choice in the Baltic Republics (2001 and 2004 Surveys)

Variable	Non-Russians		Russian-speakers		Pearson Chi ²
	Total number of respondents	% voted for party	Total number of respondents	% voted for party	
Vote for Ethnic Party (2001)	1192	3.2%	375	62.7%	701.46***
Estonia	306	1.6%	78	61.5%	187.48***
Latvia	478	5.2%	260	66.9%	325.45***
Lithuania	408	2.0%	37	35.1%	83.03***
Vote for Ethnic Party (2004)	1025	4.0%	361	44.9%	356.81***
Estonia	209	2.4%	54	35.2%	55.65***
Latvia	333	9.0%	194	65.5%	186.79***
Lithuania	483	1.2%	113	14.2%	42.98***
Vote for Inclusive Party (2001)	1089	35.6%	191	71.7%	87.53***
Estonia	427	29.5%	120	75.0%	81.13***
Latvia	--	--	--	--	--
Lithuania	662	39.6%	71	66.2%	18.63***
Vote for Inclusive Party (2004)	965	29.4%	268	50.7%	42.43***
Estonia	375	45.6%	156	77.6%	45.48***
Latvia	--	--	--	--	--
Lithuania	590	19.2%	112	13.4%	2.09

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

When breaking the data into the specific countries, a similar trend continues where Russians are more likely than non-Russians to support ethnic or inclusive parties. Using Estonia (2001) as an example, 61.5% of Russian-speakers voted for an ethnic party instead of a non-inclusive party, while only 1.6% of ethnic Estonians did the same. Similarly, 75% of Estonia's Russian-speakers choose to support an inclusive party rather than a non-inclusive one; only 29.5% of ethnic Estonians voted for an inclusive rather than a non-inclusive party. The only time I did *not* find significance was in Lithuania in 2004, where I find no significant difference in support for inclusive parties between Russian-speakers and non-Russian-speakers.

However, before concluding that ethnic voting is occurring in these countries, meaning that vote decision-making is based on ethnic identity, it is necessary to control for other factors that contribute to vote decision-making, as mentioned above.¹¹⁴ To control for economic voting, I include an economic evaluation measure, similar to Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) in the American voting literature. It is a measure of egotropic voting,¹¹⁵ as respondents were asked to report on their family's current financial situation.¹¹⁶ I also include whether the respondent belonged to the lowest income quartile to see further economic/social class effects on voting.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ The descriptive for these variables can be found in Appendix C.

¹¹⁵ Kinder and Kiewiet ultimately find that sociotropic measures primarily explain electoral outcomes, but they do find some support for pocketbook voting. The only sociotropic questions in the survey (evaluation of current economy and evaluation of economy before 1989) are used to calculate the pro-market issue position. As the pro-market issue is a standard issue position variable used in the post-Soviet region, I would maintain that this variable is better used as a measure of a key issue that historically divides the electorate and motivates support for one party over others.

¹¹⁶ I also coded a prospective, egotropic economic evaluation variable and also ran the model with that variable; however, the results did not change.

¹¹⁷ Earlier models included a variable for whether the respondent was unemployed at the time of the survey. However, this variable was correlated with low income; for instance, in the full sample in 2001, the

In measuring issue positions, a primary issue of concern in former communist countries during this period was market reform. Furthermore, given that many of the ethnic parties in these countries have historic ties to the former communist parties¹¹⁸ and are generally more critical of market reform than other political parties, this issue is a key variable that may compete with ethnic identity in determining voter support. I use the economic reaction variable from the Baltic Barometer to code a dichotomous variable on whether the respondent holds a pro-market issue position, as previous work in post-Soviet societies links this issue to vote choice (White, Rose, and McAllister 1997). Respondents are coded pro-market if they held a negative evaluation of the socialist system before 1989 *and* a positive evaluation of the current economic system.

I control for a number of demographic variables that may influence vote for these parties: respondent education level, gender, age, and whether they are urban or rural residents. The age of the respondent may be especially relevant: respondents who grew up after independence have a different socialization experience than those who grew up before the fall of the Soviet Union. In regards to partisanship, identification with a party identity is historically weak in the post-Soviet context; however, as Miller et al. (2000) discuss, the socialization hypothesis would suggest a greater attachment to the communist successor parties among older respondents. To measure these potential age differences, I include dichotomous measures controlling for the youngest and oldest age quartiles.

Pearson correlation coefficient was .352. This variable was dropped from the analysis because was correlated with low income and did not add any additional information beyond the other two economic variables, it had little variation (10% or less of the cases in each model were unemployed respondents), and due to its poor performance in the models when it was included.

¹¹⁸ For instance, the Harmony Center Coalition in Estonia includes in its membership the Latvian Socialist Party, which is the successor to the banned Communist Party of Latvia. See Chapter 2 for further discussion of the origins of the different ethnic and inclusive parties in these countries.

Table 4.3: Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics: 2001 and 2004 (Logistic Regression)

	2001			2004		
	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania ¹
Russophone	5.049*** (.614)	3.318*** (.308)	3.317*** (.557)	3.046*** (.671)	2.579*** (.281)	3.703*** (.749)
<i>Economic Measures</i>						
Current Economic Evaluation	-.645 (.410)	-.529** (.222)	-.166 (.402)	-.308 (.504)	-.107 (.192)	-.457 (.451)
Low Income	.679 (.835)	.234 (.362)	.462 (.757)	-1.707 (1.441)	.041 (.331)	1.039 (.724)
<i>Policy Position</i>						
Pro-market	1.004 (.688)	-.702 (.428)	-.593 (1.104)	.239 (.688)	-1.472*** (.784)	
<i>Demographics</i>						
Education	-.436* (.240)	.138 (.140)	-.326 (.283)	.033 (.167)	.057 (.081)	.107 (.144)
Urban	.862 (.567)	.664** (.300)	1.506 (1.132)	.189 (.563)	.892*** (.269)	-1.175 (.729)
Female	-.584 (.539)	-.440* (.259)	-.327 (.530)	.919 (.605)	-.403 (.275)	-.339 (.734)
Youngest Quartile	-.396 (.614)	.736* (.381)	.529 (.775)	-.214 (.650)	.627* (.347)	1.319 (1.724)
Oldest Quartile	-.192 (.554)	.119 (.299)	.505 (.691)	.934 (.788)	.554 (.363)	1.225 (.882)
Constant	-2.925 (1.263)	-2.743 (.556)	-4.384 (1.769)	-4.026 (1.101)	-2.578 (.464)	-3.734 (1.344)
N	337	568	419	208	467	170
Wald Chi ²	85.09***	179.47***	64.95***	29.04***	141.00***	31.73***
Log pseudolikelihood	-60.774	-198.201	-53.541	-43.669	-188.643	-32.658

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ The “pro-market” issue variable was dropped for the 2004 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variation.

**Table 4.4: Vote for Inclusive Parties in the Baltic Republics, 2001 and 2004
(Logistic Regression)**

	2001		2004	
	Estonia	Lithuania	Estonia	Lithuania
Russophone	2.171*** (.301)	1.238*** (.305)	1.250*** (.282)	1.332*** (.316)
<i>Economic Measures</i>				
Current Economic Evaluation	.027 (.167)	-.317** (.130)	-.179 (.192)	-.253 (.160)
Low Income	.057 (.301)	-.164 (.239)	-.295 (.286)	.101 (.242)
<i>Policy Position</i>				
Pro-market	-.249 (.235)	-1.209*** (.279)	-.256 (.255)	-.818*** (.220)
<i>Demographics</i>				
Education	-.130 (.110)	.077 (.088)	-.040 (.063)	-.110* (.059)
Urban	-.039 (.248)	-.501*** (.182)	.545** (.236)	-.756*** (.187)
Female	.007 (.209)	-.251 (.163)	-.011 (.218)	-.186 (.188)
Youngest Quartile	-.407 (.262)	-.021 (.219)	.193 (.296)	.332 (.267)
Oldest Quartile	.326 (.261)	.138 (.211)	.705*** (.268)	-.518** (.216)
Constant	-.586 (.387)	.395 (.362)	-.015 (.418)	1.978 (.391)
N	478	695	427	616
Wald Chi ²	73.81***	56.42***	49.59***	60.004***
Log pseudolikelihood	-271.984	-441.230	-263.301	-358.508

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

The results for this analysis are presented in Table 4.3 and 4.4. The most consistent finding across these analyses is that, even after controlling for these additional variables (economic voting, issue positions, and competing demographic pressures). Russian-speakers are significantly more likely to support ethnic and inclusive parties than are other ethnic groups, even when controlling for other explanations of vote choice. An ethnically polarized electorate, for the most part, appears the norm in these countries, despite previous work that claims that ethnicity is not salient in Estonia (Aalto 2000).

To demonstrate the strength of this effect, I include in Table 4.5 the predicted probability a respondent will vote for an ethnic or inclusive party when all other variables are held constant at the mean or mode. Russian-speakers are *much* more likely to vote for ethnic and inclusive speakers than non-Russians. To use Estonia 2001 as an example, the probability that a non-Russian will vote for an ethnic party is .010. For Russians, this probability is .615, showing that Russian-speakers are .605 more likely to vote for ethnic political parties. On the inclusive party side, the difference is less distinct but still noticeable; Russian-speakers (.782) are more likely than non-Russians (.290) to vote for inclusive parties, showing a .492 increase in the probability of voting for these parties.

Table 4.5: Probability of Voting for Ethnic and Inclusive Parties

	Ethnic			Inclusive		
	2001					
	Non-Russians	Russian-speakers	Prob. Change	Non-Russians	Russian-speakers	Prob. Change
Estonia	.010	.615	+ .605	.290	.782	+ .492
Latvia	.056	.622	+ .566	--	--	--
Lithuania	.015	.290	+ .275	.363	.663	+ .300
	2004					
Estonia	.037	.445	+ .408	.528	.796	+ .268
Latvia	.115	.632	+ .517	--	--	--
Lithuania	.004	.136	+ .132	.570	.834	+ .264

Turning to the alternative theories of vote choice, I find mixed support for economic voting, perhaps unsurprising given that it is a theory developed to explain incumbent rather than opposition support. I fail to find a significant relationship between income level and vote choice in any of the models. In Latvia in 2001, respondents who held a more negative view of the economy were more likely to vote for ethnic political parties, fitting with the notion of these parties as opposition parties. I find no further

relationship between any of the economic variables and ethnic party vote choice for 2004 or for Lithuania.

Turning to issue position, I do find some support that pro-market orientation does shape vote for these parties. In 2004, Latvian respondents who were less positive about market reform were more likely to support ethnic parties. Regarding inclusive parties, I find a similar pattern in Lithuania. Support for inclusive parties is higher in respondents who hold more negative views of market reform.

As mentioned earlier, in many ways, ethnic and inclusive parties have served as opposition parties and have been more critical of post-independence market reforms in the Baltic republics, leading voters who are more dissatisfied with these reforms to choose to support these parties. Many ethnic and inclusive parties, including the Latvian Socialist Party (part of the PCTVL) and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Coalition, are successors to the Communist parties in their respective republic, and have an established reputation criticizing market reforms. The other inclusive party in Lithuania, Labor, appeals to nostalgia for the Soviet period; their supporters are *less* favorable about market reforms. This gives an interesting dynamic to ethnic and inclusive parties in the post-Soviet states; across the board, these parties have a more pro-left orientation, a sharp contrast to the more rightist conservative parties that tend to represent the majority populations.

Turning to the demographic variables, most of the controls fail to reach significance in these models (the one exception being the urban variable), suggesting that outside of ethnic identity, sociodemographic factors are poor predictors of vote choice in these republics. Less educated respondents were more likely to support ethnic parties in

Lithuania in 2001, and less likely to support inclusive parties in 2004, but I find no further significance for this variable in any other country or year. I only find a significant relationship between gender and vote choice in Latvia in 2001, when male respondents were more likely to support ethnic parties. Urban voters were more likely to support ethnic parties in Latvia in 2001 and 2004, and I find that urban voters were significantly more likely to support inclusive parties in Estonia, but only in 2004. In Lithuania, urban voters in both survey waves were *less* likely to support inclusive parties.

For the age variables, I do find that younger respondents were more likely to support inclusive parties in Latvia in 2004, and that older respondents were more likely to support inclusive parties in Estonia and Latvia, but only in 2004. As mentioned previously, many of these inclusive parties are successors of the Soviet communist parties,¹¹⁹ and this generational difference may be due in part to some form of partisan attachment among older generations to these successor parties.¹²⁰

Demographic Factors and the Ethnic Socialization Experience

As this chapter analyzes individual-level explanations for ethnic voting, a primary focus of this level of analysis is how particular ethnic socialization experiences serve to strengthen attachment to the ethnic social identity and increase the tendency of ethnic group members to align themselves on their ethnic identities rather than identities such as social class. Drawn from the literature on Latino voters in the US, ethnicity and the

¹¹⁹ Given that the Communist party was banned in several the post-Soviet countries following independence, these parties are as close to “successor” parties as we have in the Baltic.

¹²⁰ Miller et al. (2004) finds a similar link in Russia; support for the “Anti-Reform Communist bloc” was slightly higher in older generations.

elements of an ethnic environment provide socialization that shapes an individuals' worldviews (Graves and Lee 2000) and attachment to the ethnic category (Birbir 2009). A more "ethnic" worldview, in turn, influences group members' partisan leanings, evaluations of co-ethnic candidates, and preferences on "ethnic" issues, all of which indirectly shape voting decisions.

When considering factors that contribute to an ethnic socialization experience, language use and religious affiliation are two strong socializing mechanisms. Previous research has found a link between frequent minority language use and support for ethnic minority parties (Miller, White, and Heywood 1998). In regards to religious socialization for the Russian minority in the former Soviet Union, Orthodoxy is a central part of a Russian identity (Laitin, 1998) and has been a contributing factor in shaping national identity in this region (Taras, Filippova, and Pobeda 2004). Hansen and Hesli (2009) find that in Ukraine, an individual who is socialized in the religion of their ethnic group tends to be more attached to his or her ethnic group identity.

These socializing factors are more potent when they reinforce ethnic divisions in a society. As Bremmer (1994) discusses, individuals are less likely to integrate and will instead maintain their ethnic identity when they are more distinct from other groups in the society. To give an example, being a Russian-speaker and a member of the Orthodox Church is a more clear distinction in Latvia, where the majority population speaks Latvian and tends to belong to more Western Christian traditions,¹²¹ than in Ukraine,

¹²¹ The largest religious denomination in Latvia is Lutheran (around 20% of the population) compared to Orthodoxy (roughly 15% of the population).

where a sizeable proportion of ethnic Ukrainians continue to speak Russian¹²² and belong to either the Kievan or Moscovite Orthodox Patriarchate.

While language use and religious affiliation increase ethnic socialization, other socialization experiences may decrease the salience of an ethnic identity. Research on education has found that more educated individuals are less ethnocentric (Scheepers, Felling, and Peters, 1989), which should make more educated individuals less likely to engage in ethnic voting. However, while higher education may reduce prejudice and negative attitudes towards out-groups (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997, Smith 1981, 1985), higher levels of education may reinforce positive attachment to an ethnic in-group (Hansen and Hesli 2009). This prediction aligns with the resource mobilization argument presented earlier (Smith and Wilson 1997, Barany 2002), which argues that ethnic groups with more educated members may be more effective at mobilizing politically. As found in Chapter 3, support for Russian parties was slightly higher in regions with a more educated population.

An ethnic member's class has been argued to be a powerful influence on ethnically-based voting; however, the exact nature of this relationship is still under debate. Classic works have found a strong sense of attachment and ethnic voting to be more prevalent among the lower class (Katz, 1940; Dahl, 1961). Hechter (1975) argues that ethnic mobilization is triggered when group members are concentrated in low-status occupations and perceive their economic chances as worse off than other groups in a society. Horowitz notes that for low-status groups, ethnic identity can be an alternative

¹²² Furthermore, most citizens in Eastern Ukraine, where the Russian ethnic population is concentrated, speak Russian in their daily lives (Fournier 2002).

way of “measuring worth” (2000, 186). Furthermore, individuals facing economic hardships – such as unemployment or lower income – may be more likely than others to perceive themselves in competition with groups such as minorities or immigrants and thus more likely to exhibit more exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Betz 1994). Others contend that ethnic movements and ethnic voting are stronger in the middle class (Wolfinger, 1965; Smith, 1981; Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, 1989). In his work on party support in the Basque region of Spain, Medrano (1994) finds that white-collar and self-employed residents were more likely than blue-collar workers to vote for Basque rather than national political parties.

To summarize, individuals who are exposed to ethnic socialization experiences, primarily exposure to ethnic language and religion, are more likely to develop ethnic worldviews, which in turn increases their tendency to engage in ethnic voting and support co-ethnic political parties in candidates. In contrast, other socialization experiences, such as education and social class, may provide countervailing pressures that could undermine or reinforce ethnic attachment and indirectly affect ethnic voting.

Competitive Ethnic Environments as a Socialization Experience? While

language use, religion, education, and class are individual demographic characteristics that may increase ethnic socialization and promote ethnic identification, we should also consider how the broader ethnic environment may impact individual ethnic attachment. As discussed in Chapter 3, two competing theories offer insight to possible ethnic dynamics in urban environments. Under the ethnic competition approach (Beer, 1979; Ragin, 1979), urban and industrial environments fuel ethnic tensions as groups come into conflict with each other over scarce resources. In these competitive environments, the

awareness of ethnic differences heighten ethnic awareness and lead to increased mobilization along ethnic lines. In contrast, the decline-of-community approach (Stein 1960, Verba and Nie 1972, Lee, Oropessa, Metch and Guest 1984, Putnam 2001) argues that urban environments reduce traditional community ties and reduce citizens' levels of interpersonal trust and social capital. Overall, these environments decrease civic participation and may make it more difficult for community identities, such as ethnicity, to successfully mobilize an urban population.

In Chapter 3, I found support for the decline-of-community approach over the ethnic competition argument when examining party support at the regional level. In this chapter, we will test whether these findings hold when controlling for other individual-level variations, particularly factors for which the earlier test using aggregated regional data is unable to account.

Grievances, Dissatisfaction, and the Politicization of Ethnic Identity Previous research on ethnoregional parties in Western Europe has linked class, religion (Inglehart 1977), and the presence of regional language differences (Gordin 2001) to vote for these parties, supporting the earlier argument that these factors reinforce ethnic differences and promote socialization in such a way as to increase ethnic mobilization. At the same time, vote for ethnic parties may also represent minority dissatisfaction with more mainstream national parties and policies. This dissatisfaction may come from two different sources: grievances due to perceived deprivation and the perception that national politicians fail to adequately represent ethnic concerns.

According to Kitschelt, "ethnic identities are created and become politicized when a group's relative resource endowment is shifting to its disadvantage" (1995, 266). This

claim is well represented by the relative deprivation approach (Gurr 1970; Geschwender 1968; Klandermans 1984), which emphasizes that individuals' perceived grievances may motivate political activity. Under this approach, individuals perceive their economic well-being in comparison with others in the society and respond to inequity with mobilization; restated, individual perceptions of inequality lead to individual mobilization. If these feelings of general discrimination and decreasing group status align with ethnic divisions, these feelings of grievance may increase support for certain policies that favor minority groups (Lopez and Pantoja 2004). Grievances along ethnic lines may therefore 1) lead to more frequent mobilization by ethnic group members and 2) increase support among an ethnic group for pro-ethnic policies. Taken together, this behavior is likely to increase a tendency towards ethnic voting.

Turning to the issue of representation as a source of dissatisfaction, Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1989) find that in Spain, voters are more likely to support regional parties when they are dissatisfied with the economic policies of national parties. Support for these regional parties is in essence a protest vote against national politics, a finding that is echoed by Madrid (2005) for Latin America. Madrid finds that party systems are more fragmented and volatile in countries where identity is highly salient and when the disadvantaged group believes that other national parties do not adequately represent their interests.¹²³

As discussed in Chapter 2, Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia may potentially possess greater dissatisfaction with national policies, especially in regards to

¹²³ Madrid notes that the emergence of indigenous parties has actually decreased party volatility, as they attract the indigenous vote and address the concerns of these previously disenfranchised ethnic groups.

citizenship, than in Lithuania. In regards to economic policies, all three countries have experienced pressure from the European Union to drastically alter economic behaviors as part of their accession process. For the Russian-minority in the Baltic republics in 2001 and 2004, evaluations of national economic policies may reflect dissatisfaction with national politicians or it may reflect negative views of EU accession and the government's role in the process. Either way, economic dissatisfaction is a relevant issue in the Baltic Republics that may trigger an ethnic "protest" vote against national politicians.

Empirical Analysis

While the first part of the analysis in this chapter examines the voting behavior of Russian-speakers comparing to other groups in these societies, this section focuses exclusively within the Russian-speaking community and analyzes individual difference among group members. The dependent variables under analysis remain the same; this section tests why some Russian-speakers choose to support ethnic and inclusive parties and why some do not.¹²⁴

This sort of analysis goes far to address a key critique from Brubaker (2004) of the ethnic politics literature, which he argues is plagued by issues of "groupism." According to Brubaker, most research seeks to compare groups, and treats ethnic groups as "internally homogenous, externally bounded" (2004, 8). By analyzing *within* an ethnic group, we can more fully understand how the role of ethnicity varies between members of the same group.

¹²⁴ As a reminder, Russian-speakers are respondents who took the survey in Russian, which is a different measure than the language measures used later in the analysis.

Within the Russian respondents in 2001, roughly 32.6% chose to vote for an ethnic political party, 44.9% voted for an inclusive party, and the remaining 22.5% voted for a non-inclusive party. In 2004, 45.9% of Russian-speaking respondents supported an ethnic party, 54.4% voted for an inclusive party, and roughly 23.1% supported a non-inclusive party.

Beginning with the variables testing for ethnic socialization experiences, the 2001 and 2004 survey waves include different questions that make it difficult to develop measures that are easily comparable. In 2004, respondents were asked to report their religion, which I used to create a dichotomous variable, *Orthodox*, in which those respondents who are Orthodox practitioners received a 1. However, this question was not asked in the 2001 survey wave, and is missing from this analysis.

Turning to Russian language use as a socialization experience, both survey waves asked respondents to report the language they speak at home. In 2001, over 96% of Russian-speakers reported speaking Russian at home. Given the rare occurrence of a Russian respondent who did *not* speak Russian at home, this variable was dropped from the logistic regression in the 2001 model due to lack of variability.

In 2004, respondents were also asked what language they spoke at home as children. Both questions were used for the 2004 data to conduct a scale ranging from 0 (did not speak Russian as a child *and* does not speak it at home now) to 2 (spoke Russian at home as a child *and* does speak it now).¹²⁵ In contrast to the extreme lack of variance in the 2001 variable, in 2004, over 80% of Russian-speakers received the highest score,

¹²⁵ Cronbach's alpha for the two items that make up this scale is 0.90, above the 0.8 level commonly used in the social sciences to test whether measures load on a scale.

meaning that they spoke Russian at home as a child and also now as an adult. Roughly 15% spoke Russian at home as a child *or* at home in the present, and 4.4% of Russian-speaking respondents received a 0 on this score.

The measures for educational level, social class (low income), urban residence, and the age variables remain the same as the earlier analysis. Education and social class enter the analysis as socializing factors that may strengthen or weaken ethnic attachment and influence the strength of ethnic socialization as a driving factor in vote choice. Age likewise acts as an alternative socialization pressure to ethnic socialization. Whether the respondent is a resident of an urban environment seeks to measure whether the respondent lives in a more competitive ethnic environment, which would further reinforce ethnicity as a salient social cleavage.

Turning to the issues of grievances and dissatisfaction as a cause of ethnic voting, the Baltic Barometer does not include a straightforward question asking respondents whether they have experienced ethnic-based discrimination, such as used by other work (Hansen and Hesli 2008). They do, however, include two questions that may be used to test the argument that ethnic vote may reflect dissatisfaction with current government policy (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, Madrid 2005). The first variable, the economic evaluation measure, is the same variable used in the earlier analysis to capture potential economic voting for these “opposition” parties. The second variable, *democratic satisfaction*, is a measure of how satisfied they are with how democracy works in their country, ranging from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied).

One institutional context variable has been added to the analysis. Institutional rules are a central focus of the comparative parties literature (Duverger 1972; Rae 1971;

Lijphart 1994), and district magnitude played a large role in explaining regional party support in Chapter 3. To review, electoral rules such as district magnitude determine how open a system is, how many parties can form, and which parties are likely to evolve (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997). For the individual voter, institutional rules may play into their decision calculus (Blais and Carty 1991), especially for voters who are contemplating whether or not to support small political parties such as ethnic minority parties. Of the three countries in the survey, only Latvia includes information that can be used to code the district magnitude of the respondent's electoral district, and I include this variable in the Latvia models given the importance of this variable in the literature.

Results

To test the theory of ethnic voting developed earlier, I use a logistic regression model, the results which are presented in Table 4.6. Beginning with the socialization variables (only available for the 2004 models), I find some support for the ethnic socialization argument suggested by Graves and Lee (2000). I fail to find a relationship between religion and ethnic party support, but do find a significant relation in regards to language.

One potential explanation for this weak finding regarding religion is the historical role of Orthodoxy in this region, especially in the Baltic Republics. Due to the strong link between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian state, for the titular populations, Orthodoxy was a symbol of the colonial government, delegitimized in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. For the Russian-speakers in these new republics, Orthodoxy may be a link to the Russian identity, but it is also a religion that promotes loyalty to a central

government (Hesli, Erdem, Reisinger, & Miller 1999), giving a dual nature to this socialization pressure.

For the language variable, at least part of the explanation may be lack of variation in the independent variable, even in the ordinal scale for 2004. Around 80% of Russian-speakers spoke Russian as a child *and* continue to speak it at home, while only about 4% do not speak Russian as children or at home now. Most of this variation is in Lithuania, where Russians historically have adopted the titular language in higher numbers than in Estonia or Latvia. Roughly 88% of Russian-speakers in Estonia, 86% of Russian-speakers in Latvia, and 60% of Lithuania's Russian-speakers spoke Russian as a child *and* continue to speak it at home. Likewise, less than 1% of Estonia's Russian-speakers, 3% of Latvia's Russian-speakers, and 11% of Lithuania's Russian-speakers did not speak Russian as children or at home as adults.

Unsurprisingly, the only time language reaches significance is for Lithuania in 2004; I find that support for ethnic parties is higher among Russian-speakers who have *less* language socialization, a finding counter to the ethnic socialization argument. This finding, however, does fit with the claim made by Laitin (1998) that ethnic attachment may be stronger in members of a group who are *less* secure in their identity and feel a greater need to prove their belonging. As language is the primary unifier of this ethnic group, Russian-speakers who have less language experiences may feel a greater need to demonstrate their ethnic attachment and vote for ethnic parties.

Table 4.6: Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (Logistic Regression)

	2001			2004		
	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania ¹	Estonia ²	Latvia	Lithuania ³
Orthodox	--	--	--	1.212 (.901)	.142 (.439)	--
Russian language ⁴	--	--	--	.709 (1.171)	.275 (.422)	-2.391*** (.595)
Education	-.578** (.287)	.385** (.172)	.169 (.409)	-.342 (.284)	-.115 (.122)	-.137 (.204)
Low Income	-.423 (1.056)	-.004 (.418)	--	--	-.115 (.439)	.964 (1.403)
Urban	1.389* (.723)	.421 (.400)	--	-.090 (1.066)	-.754 (.545)	-.776 (1.112)
Current economic evaluation	-1.461** (.637)	-.653** (.261)	.445 (.612)	.822 (.869)	-.251 (.297)	.613 (1.164)
Democratic satisfaction	-.051 (.368)	-.183 (.206)	.368 (.567)	-.190 (.537)	-1.337*** (.349)	-1.306 (.929)
District Magnitude	--	-.00002 (.034)	--	--	.141*** (.050)	--
Youngest Quartile	-.047 (.656)	.116 (.402)	-.080 (1.382)	-.538 (.986)	-.046 (.422)	2.272 (1.981)
Oldest Quartile	-.257 (.653)	.086 (.358)	1.299 (.895)	1.516 (1.037)	1.354*** (.678)	2.038 (1.451)
Constant	2.841 (1.333)	.376 (.944)	-2.683 (1.681)	-2.332 (2.326)	-.519 (1.199)	.708 (1.930)
N	76	217	29	38	178	50
Wald Chi ²	9.85	13.55*	3.24	9.95	27.64***	21.84***
Log pseudolikelihood	-43.751	-130.784	-17.399	-21.552	-89.790	-16.106

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ Low income and urban are dropped from the 2001 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variance.

² Low income is dropped from the 2004 Estonian analysis due to lack of variance.

³ Orthodox is dropped from the 2004 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variance.

⁴ The Russian language variable for 2001 was dropped due to a lack of variability, as discussed previously

Turning to the other socialization variables, education appears to have mixed effects. In Estonia in 2001, less educated Russian-speakers were more likely to support ethnic parties, while in Latvia in 2001, more educated Russian-speakers were more likely to support these parties. This finding may be in part due to the nature of the party systems in these different societies. In Estonia, Russian-speakers may also choose to vote for inclusive parties and still vote ethnically. As findings in the next section will suggest, when inclusive parties are an option, more educated group members choose to vote strategically for inclusive parties. In Latvia, voters do not have a choice of voting for inclusive parties, and we see a more straightforward relationship between education and ethnic attachment. This finding fits with both the resource mobilization approach (Smith and Wilson 1997; Barany 2002) and the findings of Hansen and Hesli (2009) that more educated Russian-speakers may hold greater positive attachment to an ethnic in-group. More educated respondents appear to be more successful at mobilizing ethnically.

The measure of social class – low income – fails to reach significance in any of the models. I do find that support for ethnic parties is higher among Russian-speakers who reside in urban environments in Estonia in 2001, a finding that gives some support the ethnic competition argument (Beer 1979; Ragin 1979; Olzak 1992) that urban environments increase contact and competition between groups and triggers ethnic mobilization. This result runs counter to the findings from Chapter 3, which gave greater support to the decline-of-community hypothesis (Verba and Nie 1972; Putnam 2001). Given that this survey analysis is a test of the effect of urbanization on ethnic voting by the Russian minority using a different level of analysis than the test from Chapter 3, this

does suggest that the ethnic competition approach may need further investigation in future tests of this theory.

This analysis does support the argument of Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1989) and Madrid (2005) that ethnic party vote is driven at least in part with dissatisfaction with national policies; however, whether it is economic or political issues that drive voting seem to vary by context. In Estonia and Latvia in 2001, Russian-speakers who are less satisfied with the current economic situation are more likely to support ethnic parties. In 2004 in Latvia, Russian-speakers who are less satisfied with the current state of democracy in their country were more likely to support ethnic parties.

When testing for institutional effects (district magnitude) in Latvia, I do find that ethnic support is higher among Russians in larger electoral districts, but only find significance during the 2004 survey wave. In this wave, the variable is behaving as predicted as Russian-speakers in large electoral districts are more likely to support ethnic political parties, suggesting that institutional constraints may have some psychological affect on the voter (Blais and Carty 1991). Unfortunately, I am unable to verify whether this idea that institutional effects promote strategic voting among the Russian-minority, a key finding from chapter 3. District magnitude is only available for Latvia, and Latvia's Russian-speakers do not have an inclusive party for which they can strategically vote.

On the age variables, the only time I find significance is for Latvia in 2004. In this model, older respondents are more likely to support ethnic parties. Given the polarized nature of the Latvia party system (discussed in Chapter 2) which has created a division between the more leftist Russian parties and the more conservative Latvian parties, many of Latvia's ethnic parties have historic ties to the Communist party. This

result, then, does fit with the generational socialization argument, as older generations do seem to hold a greater tie to these “successors.”

Turning to Table 4.7, I present the results of the logistic regression model for inclusive party support. As I argued in Chapter 3, the theory developed here is better at explaining ethnic party than inclusive party support, as it is more difficult to determine whether a Russian voter supports inclusive parties based solely on their ethnic interests, as these parties have a more broad-based appeal and draw Russian votes for non-ethnic reasons. However, the findings that do achieve significance in the models fit with the theory presented, and are worth discussing.

I find no significance for either of the ethnic socialization variables (religion and language) in 2004, but do find that other socialization variables may play a role in shaping inclusive party support. In Estonia in 2001, in line with the findings from Table 4.6 and the ethnic competition argument, Russian-speakers in urban environments were more likely to support inclusive parties. For Lithuania in 2001, more educated Russian-speakers are more likely to support inclusive parties. Together with the findings from Table 4.6, this suggests that we may be able to apply work by Black (1978) and others, who argue that more educated and informed voters are more able to engage in strategic voting, to the Baltic republics. This finding also echoes the findings from Chapter 3, where more educated regions in Lithuania tend to support inclusive rather than ethnic parties.

**Table 4.7: Vote for Inclusive Parties among Russian-speakers
(Logistic Regression)
Estonia & Lithuania Only**

	2001		2004	
	Estonia	Lithuania ¹	Estonia	Lithuania
Orthodox	--	--	.628 (.538)	.017 (.775)
Russian language ²	--	--	.973 (.694)	.719 (.504)
Education	-.350 (.232)	.662* (.383)	-.099 (.139)	-.131 (.223)
Low Income	.335 (.863)	--	-.797 (.704)	.665 (.791)
Urban	1.048* (.608)	-.107 (1.208)	.691 (.491)	-.180 (.714)
Current economic evaluation	.015 (.379)	-.010 (.466)	-.307 (.460)	-.102 (.551)
Democratic satisfaction	-.202 (.355)	.132 (.423)	-.348 (.318)	.251 (.496)
Youngest Quartile	-.225 (.564)	.557 (.871)	-.838 (.582)	--
Oldest Quartile	-.227 (.563)	.849 (.742)	.566 (.663)	-.182 (.946)
Constant	1.472 (.872)	-1.493 (1.639)	.029 (1.475)	.050 (.705)
N	119	62	132	.968
Wald Chi ²	6.52	4.60	14.03	(1.546)
Log pseudolikelihood	-63.981	-36.205	-62.249	

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ Low income is dropped from the 2001 Lithuanian analysis due to lack of variation.

² The Russian language variable for 2001 was dropped due to a lack of variability, as discussed previously.

To more fully address this idea that these parties represent alternatives to minority voters who seek to vote based on their ethnic identity, I also run a multinomial logistic regression for Estonia, using non-inclusive parties as the excluded category. As there are no inclusive parties in Latvia, this country is dropped; further, so few Russians actually vote for the Lithuanian ethnic parties (only 29 Russians with the two years *combined*),

running a multinomial logit for this country is also unfeasible. The results for Estonia are presented in Table

**Table 4.8: Party Vote in Estonia, 2001 and 2004
(Multinomial Logistic Regression)**

	2001		2004 ¹	
	Ethnic	Inclusive	Ethnic	Inclusive
Orthodox			.350 (.810)	.577 (.516)
Russian language ²			.766 (.869)	1.109** (.560)
Education	-.366 (.259)	-.355 (.236)	-.153 (.181)	-.102 (.149)
Low Income	-.062 (.965)	.396 (.826)		
Urban	1.162* (.684)	1.027* (.601)	.389 (.759)	.487 (.501)
Current economic evaluation	-.915** (.426)	-.009 (.412)	.291 (.599)	-.365 (.484)
Democratic satisfaction	-.060 (.374)	-.237 (.319)	-.682 (.448)	-.379 (.304)
Youngest Quartile	-.059 (.635)	-.189 (.549)	-.605 (.885)	-.638 (.551)
Oldest Quartile	.141 (.600)	-.260 (.553)	.906 (.819)	.350 (.625)
Constant	1.640 (1.005)	1.570 (.912)	-1.636 (1.867)	-.031 (1.257)
N	165		162	
Wald Chi ²	19.01		24.12*	
Log pseudolikelihood	-156.348		-122.478	

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Baseline category is non-inclusive party vote. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ Low income was dropped in Estonia in 2004 due to lack of variation.

² The Russian language variable for 2001 was dropped due to a lack of variability, as discussed previously. The religion question was not asked in 2001.

Overall, when running the multinomial logit, the results are fairly robust, with only two noticeable differences that stand out. First, in predicting ethnic vote in 2001, education loses significance. However, in this analysis, the Russian language variable does gain significance for explaining inclusive party votes; respondents who are socialized into the Russian language are more likely to support inclusive parties in Estonia. This provides at least some support for the socialization hypothesis, and warrants further investigation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate that ethnic voting is in fact occurring in the Baltic republics. Based on Wolfinger's (1965) definition of ethnic voting, even when controlling for other theories of vote choice (economic voting, issue positions, and demographic factors), ethnicity is consistently one of the strongest predictors of whether a voter will support an ethnic or an inclusive party. Ethnicity is a relevant divide in these societies, and is important in understanding vote choice.

In the second part of the chapter, I turned from this focus on *whether* ethnic voting is occurring to *why* some Russians choose to engage in ethnic voting and others do not. For Russian-speakers in the Baltic republics, I do find some limited support for the ethnic socialization argument, despite a lack of variance in the measure and the crude nature of the available survey questions to construct these scales. Though the finding is more reflective of Laitin (1998) than Graves and Lee (2000), which does suggest that the relationship between ethnic socialization and voting may be more complex and dependent on the context of this ethnic experience.

The findings from this chapter also support previous work that has linked ethnic party support with dissatisfaction with national political parties (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989; Medrano 1994; Madrid 2005), arguing that ethnic party vote acts as a protest vote against national politicians. Russian-speakers who were dissatisfied with their economic situation or dissatisfied with the state of democracy in their country were more likely to support ethnic and inclusive parties, who in some form appear to be operating as “outsider” parties.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ The notable exception is Lithuania, where the inclusive party, the Social Democratic Coalition, *was* the governing party. Even in Lithuania, however, voters behaved in a way predicted by the theory.

CONCLUSION

ETHNIC VOTING AND PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES

How does ethnic identity become a politicized identity in societies? What factors motivate minority group members to vote based on an ethnic attachment? What explains the electoral success of political parties who appeal to these ethnic groups? In this dissertation, I have addressed these main questions. I concentrate on the idea of ethnic voting as a “voice” strategy, borrowing from Hirschman’s (1970) work on the strategies consumers can turn to when dissatisfied with current services. Ethnic voting, as defined in this research, refers to the tendency of ethnic group members to either vote for co-ethnic candidates or show an affinity to a political party in a way that cannot be solely explained by factors other than ethnic identity.

The reason ethnic voters choose this strategy is because voters are seeking substantive representation of their issue preferences. In a world of complex information, a candidate’s ethnicity or the name of an ethnic political party can serve as an informational shortcut that allows voters to estimate their position on key ethnic issues that are important to the voter (Birnie 2007). When the vote is for a political party, ethnic voters seek the parties that appeal most directly to their ethnic interests in their lists and platforms.

At any one time, however, citizens of democratic societies have multiple groups they can choose to align with; while ethnicity seems a common cleavage upon which to align, it is not predetermined. Citizens can choose to instead mobilize on their class identity, for instance, and their political behaviors – such as voting – would be decided

based on that group membership instead. If we are to understand why *ethnic* voting emerges as a voice strategy, it is important to first understand why and when ethnicity becomes a politicized identity.

For this explanation, I turned to work in social psychology and discussions of collective identities. For identities to become politicized, individuals who belong to these groups must first identify themselves with the group and hold a certain awareness of shared group experiences (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Ethnic socialization – growing up in an ethnically charged environment – can shape an individual’s worldview and influence policy positions (Graves and Lee 2000; Cain and Kiewiet 1987; de la Garza and DeSipio 1998; de la Garza and Weaver 1985; de la Garza et al 1992). Importantly, though, ethnic socialization increases loyalty to the ethnic identity itself (Birnir 2007), priming this as a key identity that is easily triggered into political awareness. Minority language use and exposure to an ethnic religious community are elements of ethnic socialization and contribute to greater ethnic attachment (Miller, White, and Heywood 1998; Laitin, 1998; Gordin 2001; Taras, Filippova, and Pobeda, 2004; Hansen and Hesli 2009). Furthermore, individual experiences with ethnic-based discrimination further reinforce the sense that ethnicity is an important societal distinction (Gurr 1993; Kitschelt 1995; Harff and Gurr 2004; Lopez and Pantoja 2004).

However, even if ethnic group members possess a strong attachment to their identity, they are not likely to consider this identity an important motivator for political action *unless* they see the need for their group to compete with other groups in a society. This competition can be with other minorities or the majority, and certain environments (urban settings, for instance) increase the competition between these groups (Nagel and

Olzak 1982; Olzak 1992). At other times, group members may perceive themselves in competition with national politicians, and turn to support ethnic parties and candidates when they are particularly dissatisfied with the direction of national policy (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989; Madrid 2005).

Mobilizing around a group identity produces a collective action dilemma, and any ethnic citizen groups, social movements, or voting blocs must be able to overcome the costs inherent in mass politics. Group resources, such as an educated membership to provide potential leaders, can help overcome some of these costs and increase the success of any mobilization activity (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Breuilly 1993; Smith and Wilson 1997; Barany 2002). To campaign and compete electorally, ethnic political parties require significant resources to mobilize effectively.

Ethnic *voting* as a mobilization strategy faces additional challenges to be a successful voice option. As the focus of this research is on ethnic minorities, minority groups face a significant challenge electorally because they tend to pull from a small portion of the population. As parties representing minorities lack sufficient “mass” to overcome more closed political systems, ethnic voting is most probable in electoral systems that allow small group representation. A substantial literature has shown that small groups and small parties have an easier time achieving representation in electoral systems with larger district magnitudes (Rae 1967; Riker 1976; 1982; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; 1993; Blais and Carty 1991; Gallagher 1991; 1992; Lijphart 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997; Moser 1999).

In testing this theory, I have focused on the Russian minority in the former Soviet Union, especially the Baltic Republics and Ukraine. While there are particular dynamics

specific to this minority group in those settings, in many ways the Russians are an ideal case to help develop a generalizable theory of ethnic voting. Russians are found in significant proportions in countries on very different political and economic development tracks, from the Baltic Republics, who have in recent years been able to join the European Union, to the democraticizing and failed democracies of Ukraine and Central Asia. As the historical and political development of this group and this region varies so drastically, this group is a good starting point for a theory that may potentially be applied to other minority groups in other democratic settings.

Moreover, as discussed in the Introduction, the multiple and varied experiences of the Russian minority allow potential comparisons with other ethnic groups around the world. In Estonia and Latvia, they are largely a recent migrant community, and are comparable to other immigrant communities and “colonial hangover” groups.¹²⁷ At the other extreme, in Ukraine, especially in the east, many Russians consider themselves an indigenous population. They are strongly attached to their homeland (Bremmer 1994), and make political demands based on this identity. If the dynamics of ethnic voting behave similarly in such a diverse group, then this theory provides important insights into minority electoral participation in other parts of the world.

Beyond providing a starting point for a more generalizable theory of ethnic voting, the participation of the Russian minority is an important factor determining the success of democracy in this region. Democracies must protect the rights of minorities. In a region where the minority comprises a sizeable proportion of the population – nearly

¹²⁷ As discussed by various authors, Russians in these two countries are seen as clear outsiders and perceived as having a lesser claim to the new state (Laitin 1998; Evans 1998; Aalto 2000).


a third of the population in Latvia, and roughly a fifth in Estonia and Ukraine¹²⁸ – they must also be included in the political process for democratic reforms to rightly be considered a success. Across the post-Soviet region, integrating the Russian minority into the political system is a key challenge for democratic development and nation-building.

Overview of Empirical Chapters

One goal of this study is to develop a theory of *why* ethnic voters choose to engage in ethnic voting that may be applied to minorities in other democracies and democratizing states. This goal is achieved first through an interdisciplinary approach that links different theoretical traditions: social identity theory in psychology, ethnic mobilization and social movements in sociology, and voting behavior and ethnic conflict from political science. These different theoretical traditions provide only a starting point for a theory; without the Russian minority as a test case, many of the claims would remain underdeveloped, as many details and context of the theory is only brought out through the empirical research.

In Chapter 1, I introduce a general theory of ethnic voting, focusing on the factors that lead ethnicity to become a politicized collective identity and those that allow groups to successfully mobilize. In this chapter, I present an illustration of this general theory, recreated in this conclusion to aid the interpretation of these findings. As I go through the findings from each chapter, I will relate this back to Figure 5.1.

¹²⁸ Even Lithuania, which has the smallest proportion of Russians, has a Russian population of roughly 8% initially following independence.

Figure 5.1: A Theory of Ethnic Voting

In Chapter 2, I examined political party development cross-nationally, focusing on the party systems of the three Baltic Republics and in Ukraine. Each country experienced very different party development at the national level. Latvian political parties are ethnically polarized, and this polarization aligns with an ideological divide. Further, the political parties – both ethnic and inclusive – that primarily appeal to the Russian minority are also left-leaning in general, many with historic ties to the Soviet Communist Party. In Latvia, this ideological leaning perfectly aligns upon ethnic lines: the leftist parties are best classified as Russian ethnic parties, and all other parties in the Latvian party system trend towards conservatism and Latvian nationalism.

Estonia and Lithuania developed broad-based national “inclusive” parties that, especially in Estonia, seem to have largely replaced ethnic parties as the main representatives of the Russian minority. In Ukraine, in contrast, the ethnic interest was primarily represented by Communist successor parties, classified here as inclusive parties. With the rising influence of the Party of Regions, the ethnic appeal was more

directly represented, meaning that this party, one of the major blocs in Ukrainian politics since 2000, is best classified as an ethnic political party.

The differences in these party developments flow from two factors. First, as ethnic voting is a “voice” strategy, it emerges when ethnic voters are dissatisfied with national policy, supporting the argument that ethnic grievances serve to politicize ethnicity. Following independence, Latvia and Estonia passed citizenship and language laws that singled out the Russian-speaking population and placed them in the role of outsiders in the state. These discriminatory policies became a clear motivator for ethnic political activity. In contrast, Lithuania passed citizenship policies that were very inclusive towards the Russian-speaking population, and so Russian-speakers in that country lacked the shared grievances to motivate an ethnic voice strategy.

The second factor that explains this differing national party development, I argue, can be attributed to the availability of options to engage in strategic voting. This possible explanation was absent from the original theory; however, as the case study demonstrates, this factor is key to understanding why voters engage in ethnic voting. Ultimately, the goal of ethnic voters is to have their policy preferences addressed in representative institutions – rephrased, they seek to achieve substantive representation. Voting for ethnic political parties is one way of achieving this: by relying on the descriptive characteristics of candidates or using the ethnic party “label,” ethnic voters can use these cues as an information short-cut (Birnie 2007). Ethnic political parties are able to communicate to their potential constituency that, if the constituency votes for them, they will represent the ethnic interest in national politics.

However, ethnic political parties are limited electorally by the proportion of ethnic voters in the society. Even in the most inclusive multi-party systems, if the minority an ethnic party seeks to represent includes, say, a quarter of the voting population, the most this party could become is a *small* party. They may represent the ethnic interest if they take part in a coalition government, but they may also be excluded from policy-making completely if other parties refuse to form a governing coalition with them. Political parties that are unable to deliver on their campaign promises over time will lose voters (Cox 1997). For ethnic voters, they may switch their support to one of the larger, broad-based political parties if that party reaches out to the ethnic voters and promises to substantively represent their ethnic issue preferences. Ethnic voters may vote strategically for the party that has the best chance of joining the government.

This sort of strategic voting seems to have emerged in Estonia over time. In the early 1990s, several ethnic parties emerged to represent the Russian-speaking minority, picking up over 6% of the vote in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary election, enough for at least one of these parties to pass the electoral threshold and hold seats in the Estonian parliament. By 2003, however, support for Russian parties had sharply declined, and no ethnic parties received seats in parliament. Instead, electoral fortunes seemed to favor Kesk and the Reform party, both who saw electoral benefit after reaching out to the Russian-speaking community.

In Latvia, however, no inclusive party has emerged to appeal to the Russian-speaking population. Russian-speakers who want to have their ethnic interests represented *must* vote for the Russian parties, as these are the only ones who address these ethnic issues. Even though these parties have been denied a place in the

government, the support for Russian parties has held fairly steady in Latvia since the late 1990s.

The initial conclusions from Chapter 2 are further supported and expanded by the empirical findings of Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I explore group resources, political opportunities, and the larger intergroup environment more closely by looking at regional differences in ethnic and inclusive party support in the Baltic republics and in Ukraine. In line with the extensive literature on the importance of electoral rules in shaping party opportunities (Rae 1967, Riker 1976; 1982; Blais and Carty 1991; Gallagher 1991; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; 1993; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Lijphart 1994; Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997), I find that district magnitude may be one of the most important factors determining vote choice. Support for ethnic parties is generally higher in regions with a larger district magnitude; support for inclusive parties tends to be higher when the district magnitude is smaller.

I also find important links between the ethnic environment (as measured by urbanization and industrialization) and the availability of an educated population as a group resource and support for ethnic versus inclusive versus non-inclusive parties. The effects of these factors depend on the percent of Russians in a region, and these independent variables interact with the proportion of Russians within a region to determine the amount of electoral support given to parties that make appeals to the Russian minority. Demonstrating the importance of achieving a “critical mass” in an ethnic constituency, some of these factors only achieve significance after the percent of Russians in a region pass a certain threshold. For instance, in explaining vote for ethnic parties, the effect of industrialization (a proxy test of ethnic competition) was only

significant after the percent of Russians passed a certain threshold. The exact point of this threshold did vary from country to country, and demonstrates the importance of understanding the unique context of each country.

The results of Chapter 3 give further support to the argument from Chapter 2 that ethnic voters may be voting strategically for inclusive parties when ethnic party representation appears less viable. Looking at the education variable, the mobilization approach would predict greater ethnic mobilization when the population is more educated (Smith and Wilson 1997, Barany 2002), arguing a more direct link between education and ethnic party or inclusive party vote. I find a more nuanced relation between the variables, largely related, I contend, to country-specific factors which promote strategic voting in some societies rather than others. In Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine, more educated regions show greater support for ethnic parties, fitting with the resource mobilization hypothesis. In Lithuania, where the incentive for strategic voting is strongest, these regions instead support inclusive parties, a finding in line with previous research that finds that more educated voters are the most effective at strategic voting (Black 1978).

Using survey data from the Baltic republics, I demonstrate in Chapter 4 that ethnic voting is occurring in these countries, and that ethnic identity is a significant determinant of the vote *even when controlling for other predictors of the vote*. This held true for ethnic party support as expected, but ethnicity also explained inclusive party vote. Russian-speakers were significantly more likely to vote for inclusive parties than were non-Russians. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that ethnic identity attracts voters to parties that make ethnic appeals.


I then explored the individual-level factors that give rise to ethnic voting. Focusing on the Russian-speaking sample only, I test the role of socialization experiences and evaluations of national politics in leading some voters to support ethnic and inclusive parties. Despite issues with the data, I did find some limited support for the argument that an individual's background experience, ethnic and otherwise, is a significant determinant of whether they choose to engage in ethnic voting, predominantly in Estonia, where I was able to employ a more sophisticated multinomial model to test this relationship. For most elections, I find that dissatisfaction with the direction of national policy – either economic or political – increased the tendency to engage in ethnic voting.

These empirical findings lead me to revise the original theory from chapter 1, presented in Figure 5.2. In this figure, the first noticeable difference is that I distinguish between individual-level factors (socialization, ethnic grievances, and legitimacy of status quo politics) and group-level factors (ethnic competition, resources, and political opportunities). The group-level factors are shown in the gray box, and I argue that the effect of these factors depend on interaction with group-context variables, such as the size and strength of the minority group. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, many group-level variables depend on the proportion of Russians in a region hitting a “critical mass” before they have a significant impact on party support.

The second major change is that I add a variable, “viable vote options,” to the model. This variable captures the role for strategic voting in this theory, which is developed through the case analysis. If ethnic voters choose to vote ethnically, they rely on the presence of viable party options to choose who to support. These party options have two impacts on potential ethnic voters. First, ethnic voting cannot occur unless

there exist political parties who offer policies or candidates to appeal to an ethnic voter; in this way, the presence of available candidates influences the mobilization potential of a group. Likewise, political parties representing these groups are not likely to be a strong part of the party system if the mobilization of this group is weak, as in Lithuania, leading to an important feedback loop. Second, voters, ethnic or otherwise, seek candidates who are most likely to win representation and serve in government, as those are the parties who are able to deliver policy. When ethnic voters are mobilized but ethnic political parties are unsuccessful, voters may choose to vote strategically and switch their vote to the broad-based, inclusive political parties.

Figure 5.2: A Revised Theory of Ethnic Voting



In regards to the variable relationships I test in the empirical chapters, I most consistently find support for the group-level factors. Ethnic competition, the availability of group resources, and open opportunity structures do play a role in determining party vote. The individual-level factors, however, are more problematic. Some, such as ethnic

grievances, I was unable to test directly. For others, such as socialization, I found support only in some of the models. Furthermore, some factors that were measured at both the individual and regional level, primarily urbanization, would sometimes yield different results depending on the level analysis. The first two factors relate to the limits of the dataset, the last illustrates the challenge of using aggregate data to infer individual-level behavior, which may potentially contribute to an ecological fallacy. These methodological issues do suggest that further study is needed to understand the exact empirical relation of these factors.

As a politicized *collective* identity, ethnicity as a mobilizing factor faces constraints on individual voters and those imposed on the group at large. Group resources, political opportunities, and the larger intergroup environment all affect the strength of this mobilization. To fully examine these factors, this requires a shift away from individual voter decision-making to instead focus on the behavior of the group as a whole. In this way, the individual-level analysis compliments and benefits from the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, where I examine the success of ethnic and inclusive parties at the national and regional level. The most successful parties – the ones that receive the highest proportion of the vote – are the ones most able to address both individual- and group-level determinants of voting.

Ethnic Voting: The Big Picture

After analyzing the chapters separately using different levels of analysis, some common findings emerge. Despite methodological issues with the survey analysis, the results show that ethnic socialization has some influence on creating a politicized identity and mobilizing the ethnic vote. I observe a stronger relationship between dissatisfaction

with national policy and ethnic voting, similar to earlier work on ethno-regional party support (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989; Madrid 2005).

The findings on competitive ethnic environments are mixed. When analyzing regional-level support for parties, more urban environments tend to see *less* support for ethnic parties in particular; in contrast, a few of the models in the survey analysis find more support for ethnic and inclusive parties among urban voters. In the regional-level analysis, I also find a positive relationship between industrialization and ethnic party support, results more in line with the prediction from the ethnic competition approach. After considering these findings, I give tentative support for the argument that more competitive ethnic environments lead to more adversarial relations, which in turn triggers ethnic mobilization and ethnic voting, but conclude that the relationship may be more nuanced and deserves further exploration.

When examining how the mobilization potential variables – education and electoral rules – affect ethnic voting, the results indicate that more resources and more open institutions allow groups to overcome the collective action dilemma. Most importantly, though, these factors also shape the strategic incentives and help determine whether ethnic voters will choose to support ethnic parties or inclusive parties as their primary strategy of achieving substantive representation. Electoral rules have the most direct affect; ethnic voters seem more willing to support ethnic parties when the electoral rules are more open.¹²⁹

Education appears to interact with other factors encouraging strategic voting and enhance the underlying pattern: more educated voters and regions support inclusive

¹²⁹ Restated, when the district magnitude is larger.

parties in Lithuania,¹³⁰ a society with a strong incentive for strategic voting, while in Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine (where the strategic incentives are weaker than Lithuania), these voters and regions instead support ethnic parties. I contend that including strategic incentives and the notion that ethnic voting may manifest differently is an important addition to ethnic politics research and our understanding of how ethnic minorities behave and may be included in democratic societies.

One of the major contributions of this research is that it divides the process of ethnic voting into the “supply,” meaning what politicians and parties offer to the minority voter, and the “demand,” meaning who the voter(s) choose to support. This conception leads to a number of different implications. First, this raises the possibility of failed “brands” – parties or candidates that emerge who are unsuccessful at attracting the ethnic voter as a consumer. This helps explain why in countries like Estonia, support for ethnic parties may decline over time, but the electorate can remain ethnically polarized: these parties have lost out to inclusive parties when competing for ethnic voters.

Further, this separation into supply and demand envisions ethnic voting as a more fluid decision. When more broad-based parties make appeals to an ethnic minority, they offer the minority voters a potentially appealing alternative to support for the smaller traditional ethnic parties. Voting for an inclusive party is not a trade-off for an ethnic voter, as these voters can select either ethnic parties or mainstream inclusive parties and still be said to vote ethnically.

¹³⁰ As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the factors encouraging strategic voting in Lithuania is the composition of the population: with few Russians (around 6% according to the 2001 census), ethnic parties have a more difficult time passing the electoral threshold and making it into parliament.

If ethnic voting is more fluid, and vote for a mainstream inclusive party may also count for an ethnic vote, then this raises a number of interesting questions. First, we need to reexamine are assumptions about how minorities, the Russian in particular, are being integrated into these new democracies. Second, we need to explore the different factors that lead to different trends in party development. Why do ethnic parties dominate in some systems and not others? When are inclusive parties most likely to be successful?

These questions lead to a final question that will be an interesting avenue of future research: how are minorities represented in a democracy, and how does that impact their political engagement? As Birnir (2007) discusses, in new democracies, ethnic parties may help bring minorities into the political system and aid in the transition. Over time, however, do differences emerge between minority voters represented by ethnic parties and those represented by mainstream inclusive ones? In particular, which of these voters are most engaged with and supportive of democratic governance?

Looking Ahead: Re-envisioning Ethnicity

One tradition in the ethnic politics and nationalism literature views ethnicity as a polarizing and often destabilizing identity in democratic societies (Kohn 1945; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Smith 1981). Based on this assumption, one of the main theories of ethnic conflict management known as centripetalism argues that democracies should minimize ethnic partisan cleavages to prevent conflict between groups (Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001). However, more recent work has argued that ethnicity should instead be seen as a neutral identity that for a pluralistic society may be positive or negative depending on the political context (Wilkinson 2001; Birnir 2007).

This dissertation fits more broadly into the second research agenda, arguing that if ethnicity may be thought as a neutral identity, than minority voting decisions may also manifest more fluid party decisions. Specifically, when inclusive parties and politicians offer to address ethnic policy interests, ethnic attachment may help tie minority voters into mainstream politics. Especially when representation by an traditional ethnic group is difficult, more broad-based but ethnically inclusive parties may offer a viable alternative that allows ethnic minorities to participate and be represented in a democratic society.

In the American politics literature, research has found that more descriptive representation of a minority group also raises the group members' sense of system legitimacy, efficacy, and trust in government (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson, 1989; Tate, 1991; Mansbridge, 1999). In democratizing societies, Birnir (2007) goes further to contend that ethnic attachment and the rise of ethnic political parties may actually aid a democratic transition. A major challenge facing democratizing states is inclusion of different groups in the society; as Birnir argues, ethnic parties can help pull minorities into political involvement as these parties gives ethnic voters a clear group to support to have their ethnic concerns represented. This idea of ethnic attachment supporting the democratic process is echoed by work by Hansen and Hesli (2009), who find that in Ukraine, respondents with a strong ethnic identity were more likely to vote than those who lack such attachment.¹³¹ Under this view, ethnic attachment should be encouraged in some newly democratic societies.

¹³¹ Further supporting this argument, Hansen and Hesli that respondents with a strong ethnic attachment were more likely to favor a Western-style democracy and oppose a return to the Soviet system than those with a weak ethnic attachment.

This debate raises a final and important question relating to this research agenda: is ethnic voting good for democracies? In many ways, this question returns to the classic work by Lijphart (1977) in *Democracy in Plural Societies*, where he advocates that plural societies should formalize ethnic representation in their political institutions. Only recently has this question of the benefits of ethnic representation reemerged as more authors seek to address how political inclusion – and conversely, exclusion – shapes the democratic process.

The issue of ethnic representation further returns to the classic debate on what is necessary for a state to be recognized as a democracy and, by extension, how we can recognize a successful democratic transition. While more “minimalist” definitions of democracy¹³² define democratic rule as the use of competitive elections, many scholars emphasize additional factors necessary for a functioning democratic society. Dahl (1972) adds participation, the idea that a democracy is “completely or almost completely responsive to *all* [emphasis added] its citizens” (2). Diamond (1999, 11-12), among other factors, also includes protections for minority rights, equality under the law, and the right of all groups to form a party and compete in elections.

The inclusion of minority interests in a government is a necessary component of a democratic society. In a democracy, ethnic groups have the right to form a party, and may create and vote for an ethnic party as one strategy to compete electorally with the goal of inclusion in the political process. Alternatively, they may give their support to other parties, expecting these parties to represent their interest in policy-making. Ethnic voting and the representation of minority interests make a government more responsive to

¹³² For a sample of such work, see work Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1981), and Huntington (1993).

all their citizens, it engages the minority in the political process, and it allows a group to ensure protection of their ethnic and cultural rights.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CHAPTER 3

In this section, I present supplementary data relating to the analyses from Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, I examined regional differences in political party support (i.e. differences in the percent of vote for a specific type of party per region). To review the coding, my primary dependent variables are the percent of voters who supported a specific type of political party; separate variables were coded for the percent of ethnic party votes, the percent of inclusive party votes, and the percent of non-inclusive party votes in each region. These three variables provide the basis for all the dependent variables in Chapter 3. To code for the percent of each type of vote in each region, I use regional election results as reported by the Electoral Commissions in each of the four countries: the Estonian National Electoral Commission,¹³³ the Central Election Commission of Latvia,¹³⁴ the Central Election Commission of Ukraine,¹³⁵ and the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania.¹³⁶

Of the four countries, Ukraine and Latvia show the highest average regional support for ethnic political parties (14.72% and 13.6%, respectively), while the regions of Lithuania average at the low end (3.64%). In line with the conclusion from Chapter 2, that Russian voters have a strategic incentive to support more inclusive parties in Estonia and Lithuania, both those countries see the highest average support for inclusive parties,

¹³³ <http://www.vvk.ee/engindex.html>

¹³⁴ <http://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/>

¹³⁵ <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/W6P001>

¹³⁶ http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/pgl_data_e.htm

on average over 20% of vote per region going to inclusive parties. Most important to performing a cross-regional analysis, regions within each country vary greatly in the percent of vote for each of these types of parties. To use Latvia as an example, some regions give less than 1% of their vote for ethnic parties; at the other end of the scale, some regions give well over half their vote to ethnic parties.

Table A.1: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Ethnic Party Vote (N = 477)	8.26	14.86	0	75.92
Estonia (N = 57)	4.02	5.50	.07	28.78
Latvia (N = 99)	13.60	14.74	.70	57.39
Lithuania (N = 213)	3.64	8.80	.01	69.72
Ukraine (N = 108)	14.72	22.23	0	75.92
Inclusive Party Vote (N = 477)	20.12	18.83	0	70.62
Estonia (N = 57)	21.57	17.70	0	54.58
Latvia (N = 99)	0	0	0	0
Lithuania (N = 213)	30.22	17.38	3.51	70.62
Ukraine (N = 108)	17.91	15.22	.71	66.62
Non-Inclusive Party Vote (N = 477)	57.44	18.96	3.88	92.94
Estonia (N = 57)	67.15	14.37	33.70	92.94
Latvia (N = 99)	74.42	16.35	15.73	91.39
Lithuania (N = 213)	52.04	11.16	9.78	75.27
Ukraine (N = 108)	47.41	22.87	3.88	90.58

For the independent variables, I include data on the percent of Russians in each region (*critical mass*), the percent of urban residents in each region (*urbanization*), and the percent of residents who have achieved at least a secondary education (*education*). I include two measures of *industrialization*: the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the reported value of industrial sales in each region, both measures converted into US dollars. I use these two different measures due to limitations on the availability of the data; Latvia does not report industrial sales, and Lithuania and Ukraine do not report

GDP per capita for the time period needed for my analysis.¹³⁷ For this reason, I use GDP per capita in Estonia and Latvia and industrial sales in Lithuania and Ukraine. This data come from the most recent census data or from data reported by the National Statistics Committee in each of these republics.¹³⁸

Table A.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. On average, most regions are roughly 10-15% Russians. Some score much higher, such as the Ida-Viru region in Estonia (69.5% Russian) and Sevastopol city in Ukraine (71.15%). Other regions have a Russian population of less than 1% of the total, such as Marijampole county in southwestern Lithuania. The rates of urbanization also vary greatly within each country, from the largely rural regions of Panevėžys county in northern Lithuania (about 4% urban) and Zemgale district in Latvia (about 6% urban), to the capital cities and large municipalities in each of these countries, comprised all of urban residents.

This cross-regional variation is also noticeable for the industrialization and education variables. Within Latvia, for example, GDP per capita ranges from 861 (Latgale district) to 7,114 (in the capital region, Riga). On industrial sales, Ukraine shows the least amount of variation, but still shows a jump from only 19 USD in Khmelnyt'ska Oblast to nearly 30 USD in Poltava Oblast. On the secondary education variable, the regions of Latvia show the least amount of in-country variation, but even so

¹³⁷ Statistics Estonia does report both measures, and I ran the analyses with both variables and found little to no difference in each of the models.

¹³⁸ These sites include Latvijas Statistika (<http://www.csb.gov.lv/>), Statistics Estonia (<http://www.stat.ee/>), the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (<http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>) and the Statistics Department of the Republic of Lithuania (<http://www.stat.gov.lt>).

the levels of education jump over 10% from Kurzem district (31.3%) to Latgale district (roughly 44%).

Table A.2: Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Percent Russians (N = 477)	12.14	14.41	.34	71.15
Estonia (N = 57)	15.79	17.81	1.01	69.54
Latvia (N = 99)	21.04	14.43	3.36	55.22
Lithuania (N = 213)	5.55	6.52	.34	38.17
Ukraine (N = 108)	15.05	17.54	1.24	71.15
Percent Urban (N = 477)	58.74	28.60	4.04	100
Estonia (N = 57)	53.68	28.58	14.93	100
Latvia (N = 99)	48.62	29.68	5.79	100
Lithuania (N = 213)	62.89	31.49	4.04	100
Ukraine (N = 108)	62.50	16.81	37.03	100
GDP per capita (N = 156)	5091.70	3072.211	331.10	15679.97
Estonia (N = 57)	5690.79	3296.41	331.10	15,312.25
Latvia (N = 99)	4746.76	2896.54	1897.73	15,679.97
Industrial Sales (N = 377)	104.27	196.70	1.103	1914.80
Estonia (N = 57)	231.04	247.90	1.10	1914.80
Lithuania (N = 213)	111.28	211.34	1.35	1914.80
Ukraine (N = 107)	22.81	1.82	19.03	29.84
Percent Secondary Educ. (N = 477)	32.95	16.23	3.02	66.04
Estonia (N = 57)	25.88	5.51	21.47	38.16
Latvia (N = 99)	36.63	2.94	31.30	44.04
Lithuania (N = 213)	22.57	14.25	3.02	64.75
Ukraine (N = 108)	53.79	7.34	40.08	66.04
District Magnitude	112.68	135.18	5	450
Estonia (N = 57)	9.07	2.04	5	14
Latvia (N = 99)	18.91	5.13	14	29
Lithuania (N = 213)	70	--	--	70
Ukraine (N = 108)	337.5	113.02	225	450

I also include as an independent variable the regional district magnitude. This is coded primarily based on research by Shvetsova (1999), but more recent data are drawn

from the PARLINE Database¹³⁹ and from the electoral commissions in each relevant country. As discussed in Chapter 2, Estonia has more districts (11-12) with a smaller district magnitude, ranging from 5 (District 5, which includes Saäre maakond and Laäne maakond, in 2003) to 14 (District 4, or Rapla maakond, in 2003). Latvia's 5 districts have a greater district magnitude, ranging from 14 (Kurzem district) to 29 (Riga). Lithuania uses a mixed system, with 71 single-member districts and one national district with a magnitude of 70. Ukraine used a mixed electoral system with a national district of 225 seats in 1998 and 2002, but after 2006 they switched to pure PR with a single national district of 450 seats.

¹³⁹ <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>

APPENDIX B

POTENTIAL MULTICOLLINEARITY ISSUES IN CHAPTER 3

As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a potential multicollinearity issue with the independent variables in the analysis. Historically, Russians tend to be concentrated in more urban and industrial areas in the former Soviet Union, and, as a key national group of the USSR, they benefitted with more education than many titular groups. Several key independent variables in this analysis – the percent of Russians in a region, the degree of urbanization and industrialization, and the education level of the region’s population – may be related.

Linear regression analysis rests on the assumption that the independent variables are largely independent of one another. Some relationship between the explanatory variables should be expected – after all, they are all predicted to influence the behavior of the dependent variable – but high correlations may be problematic for an analysis. When the independent variables are highly correlated, the standard errors for the coefficients increase and it becomes more difficult to find statistical significance. Multicollinearity issues increase the likelihood of committing a Type II error, meaning that a researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis (no relationship) when the null is actually false. Some signs that may indicate potential multicollinearity include:

- a) large changes in the coefficients when another explanatory variable is added or deleted,
- b) large changes in the coefficients when cases are added or deleted, and/or

- c) failure to find significant correlations among the independent variables, but the model as a whole has a strong goodness-of-fit (Adjusted R^2) and passes an F-test that the proposed model fits the data well.

One way of diagnosing potential multicollinearity is to examine a correlation matrix of the independent variables. A high value (0.8 or 0.9) indicates high correlation (Kennedy 2001, 187). Table B.1 presents the correlation matrix for the key explanatory variables from Chapter 3. The election year “dummy” variables are not included in this table.¹⁴⁰ Only two relations pass this high threshold: in Estonia and Latvia, regional urbanization and education levels are highly correlated (0.838 and 0.829, respectfully).

Correlation matrixes may detect collinearity between two specific variables, but it fails to examine multicollinearity problems that arise from the model as a whole. An alternative measure would be to use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score, which measures the degree that the variance of a coefficient is increased due to collinearity. A common rule of thumb is that model VIF scores above 10 may indicate harmful collinearity.

¹⁴⁰ For the most part, I find no correlation between the country variables and the other independent variables. The only exceptions are in Estonia, where regional GDP per capita was lower in 1995 (-0.50, $p < 0.01$), and in Ukraine, where regional industrial sales were lower in 1998 (-0.27, $p < 0.01$). As Ukraine changed their district magnitude in 2006, election year 1998 (-0.58, $p < 0.01$) and year 2006 (0.58, $p < 0.01$) are also correlated.

**Table B.1: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
(Interactive Terms Excluded)**

<i>Estonia (N = 57)</i>				
	% Russian	% Urban	Industrialization	% Second. Educ.
% Urban	.730***	--		
Industrialization	.353***	.413***	--	
% Second. Educ.	.723***	.838***	.602***	--
District Magnitude	.105	-.166	-.003	.032
<i>Latvia (N = 99)</i>				
% Urban	.579***	--		
Industrialization	.269***	.534***	--	
% Second. Educ.	.648***	.829***	.483***	--
District Magnitude	-.005	.136	.184*	.367***
<i>Ukraine (N = 107)</i>				
% Urban	.680***	--		
Industrialization	-.233**	.166*	--	
% Second. Educ.	-.307***	-.345***	-.038	--
District Magnitude	.000	.000	.155	.000
<i>Lithuania (N = 213)</i>				
% Urban	.479***	--		
Industrialization	.099	.262***	--	
% Second. Educ.	-.194***	-.541***	.098	--
District Magnitude	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

In Tables B.2 and B.3, I list the VIF scores for the independent variables in Chapter 3. Table B.2 presents the results *before* the interactive terms are included. Individually, none of the independent variables exceeds a VIF score of 10. None of the models exceeds this value; Estonia has the highest mean VIF score at 4.02, well below the “rule of thumb.” While the key dependent variables that tend to be associated with Russians in the former Soviet Union – urban residence, industrial settlement, and education – are related, this relationship does not appear strong enough to lead to multicollinearity issues in the model.

**Table B.2: Sample VIF Scores from Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5
(Interactive Terms Excluded)**

Variable	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Ukraine
%Russian	2.63	1.96	1.31	1.88
%Urban	4.81	3.92	1.89	1.88
Industrial Development	5.04	1.45	1.08	1.17
%Second. Educ.	7.67	5.23	1.43	1.14
District Magnitude	1.33	1.46		1.98
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	4.18	1.35	1.34	1.58
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002)	2.49	1.35	1.33	1.50
Mean VIF	4.02	2.39	1.40	1.59

The primary concern with multicollinearity in Chapter 3, however, is in the interactive terms. Interaction variables, as the name implies, are constructed from other, original variables. Specifically to Chapter 3, I include multiplicative interactive terms created by the key independent variables (urbanization, industrialization, education, and district magnitude) multiplied with the percent of Russians in the region, which I argue provides “context” on the conditions when these other variables impact party support. According to Brambor et al. (2006), models with interactive terms should almost always include the *constitutive terms* – the original variables used to construct the interaction. As these interaction terms are comprised of these constitutive variables, the correlation among these variables tends to be very high, and the risk of multicollinearity greatly increases.

In Table B.3, I include the VIF scores of the full models from Chapter 3. As can be seen, the variable-specific and model mean VIF scores greatly multiply, with several of the terms scoring over 100, over 10 times the “rule of thumb” cut-off. Ukraine has the highest variable and mean VIF scores of the four countries. The variable that contributes most to this issue is the percent of Russians in the region (VIF score 1186.14), understandable considering that this constitutive term is used to construct *all* the

interactive terms. With the interaction terms included, the models exhibit substantial multicollinearity.

**Table B.3: Sample VIF Scores from Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5
(FULL models)**

Variable	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Ukraine
%Russian	195.53	556.84	49.71	1186.14
%Urban	11.55	37.45	3.04	4.16
Industrial Development	19.93	17.68	1.81	2.03
%Second. Educ.	32.63	24.95	2.41	2.10
District Magnitude	2.59	7.87		2.83
<i>%Russian * %Urban</i>	162.16	109.99	49.66	147.92
<i>%Russian * Industrialization</i>	24.47	33.87	3.30	428.66
<i>%Russian * %Second. Educ.</i>	452.90	945.78	5.77	201.94
<i>%Russian * District Magnitude</i>	31.34	33.51		12.06
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	6.34	1.37	1.35	1.59
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002)	3.47	1.37	1.33	1.50
Mean VIF	85.72	160.97	13.15	180.99

As stated before, the primary concern rising from multicollinearity is that it makes it more difficult to find significance. As a final – and very crude – check on whether this issue is changing the findings, in the following pages I present the models *before* the interactive terms are include. Across all the models the goodness of fit measure, the Adjusted R^2 , is higher when the interactive terms are added, meaning that the explanatory power of the models is stronger when controlling for each variables interaction with the percent of Russians in the region. Restated, the better models are those that include how the proportion of Russians in each region shapes the contextual behavior of the other independent variables. Beyond this, there are some noticeable differences in the findings of the models when the interactive terms are not included. I have bolded the coefficients and standard errors that either show a significant relationship change (positive to negative

or vice versa) or if the coefficient *gained* significance when compared to Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.

**Table B.4 (from Table 3.2): Percent Vote for Ethnic Parties by Region
(Interactive Terms Excluded)**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Ukraine
Percent Russians	.193*** (.035)	.979*** (.061)	.513*** (.099)	.512*** (.105)
Percent Urban	-.021 (.030)	-.062 (.042)	-.088*** (.025)	.179* (.106)
Industrialization	-.001*** (.0002)	-.001*** (.0003)	-.002 (.003)	-.414 (.761)
Percent Secondary Education	.550*** (.196)	.310 (.491)	-.050 (.047)	.221 (.188)
District Magnitude (DM)	.174 (.220)	-.087 (.149)		.141*** (.016)
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	-1.819 (1.674)	-4.056** (1.550)	1.753 (1.386)	.731 (3.741)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002)	1.384 (1.292)	-.721 (1.550)	-1.531 (1.382)	-4.658 (3.589)
Constant	-8.916 (3.230)	-8.088 (14.647)	7.605 (2.345)	-52.959 (23.786)
N	57	99	213	107
R ²	.755	.833	.149	.673
Adjusted-R ²	.719	.820	.124	.650
F-test	21.51***	64.71***	29.09***	6.00***
Adjusted-R ² with Interactive Terms	.851	.876	.402	.858

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

One of the most obvious differences between this model and those presented in Table 3.2 is that for all the models here, the percent of Russians has a positive and significant affect on the percent of votes for ethnic parties in a region, meaning that regions with more Russians are more likely to support ethnic political parties. This difference rests in part because this variable is a component of *all* the interactive terms, meaning that it has the highest correlation with the other independent variables in this model.

Turning to the other variables, I find remarkably little change. Urbanization does gain significance in Lithuania, but in a direction opposite as predicted by the economic competition approach (Nagel and Olzak 1982; Kaiser 1994) and more in line with the decline-of-community approach (Stein 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Lee, Oropessa, Metch and Guest 1984; Putnam 2001). This finding, however, does not greatly deviate from the results presented in Figure 3.1; in this graph (with the interaction terms included), I find that more rural areas in Lithuania are more likely to support ethnic parties, and that this effect increases as the percent of Russians in the region also increase. I do find an opposite relationship in Ukraine, where support for ethnic parties is higher in more urban regions. This finding is different from Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, as I found no relation between urbanization and ethnic party support once the interactive terms were included.

Rerunning Table 3.3 (regional support for inclusive parties) with no interactive terms, I again find that the goodness-of-fit (Adjusted R^2) is better with the interactive terms included, though admittedly only a slight improvement for Estonia. I find again that with the interactive terms dropped, the relation between the percent of Russians in a region and inclusive party vote becomes positive and significant, but only in Ukraine. Inclusive party vote is higher in regions with more Russians. As above, part of this difference in findings likely rests on collinearity issues.

On industrialization, I do find a significant and negative relationship in Estonia, which fits with the findings from Chapter 3 after analyzing the marginal effects of industrialization. Support for inclusive parties is weaker in more “industrialized” regions (those with higher GDP per capita) in Estonia. While seeming in contradiction to the ethnic competition approach, remember from Chapter 3 that Estonia is a post-industrial

society, and higher GDP per capita means the region is likely *less* industrialized and more geared towards high tech industry and the service sector, which is less likely to drive ethnic competition over jobs.

Table B.5 (from from Table 3.3): Percent Vote for Inclusive Parties by Region (Interactive Terms Excluded)

	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Percent Russians	.104 (.063)	.178** (.076)	.022 (.072)
Percent Urban	.080 (.053)	.221*** (.076)	-.030* (.018)
Industrialization	-.001* (.0005)	-.224 (.550)	.002 (.002)
Percent Secondary Education	-.710** (.349)	.296** (.136)	.144*** (.034)
District Magnitude (DM)	.621 (.393)	-.103*** (.012)	
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)	-36.686*** (2.986)	-1.294 (2.704)	-39.347*** (1.004)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002)	-14.177*** (2.305)	4.001 (2.595)	-18.313*** (1.002)
Constant	40.264 (5.763)	24.495 (17.193)	47.779 (1.700)
N	57	107	213
R ²	.925	.624	.885
Adjusted-R ²	.914	.598	.882
F-test	85.67***	23.51***	265.04***
Adjusted-R ² with Interactive Terms	.924	.725	.891

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Regarding the education variable, I do find a significant relationship between education and inclusive party support, though the relationship varies by country. In Estonia, vote for inclusive parties is higher in regions with a less educated population. In Ukraine and Lithuania, in support of the resource mobilization hypothesis, support is higher in more educated regions.

Finally, I rerun the analyses from Table 3.3 without the interactive terms (see Table B.5). Again, the most noticeable difference is in regards to the percent of Russians in each region; without adding the interactive terms, regions with a higher proportion Russians are more likely to: a) show greater electoral support for ethnic parties rather than inclusive or non-inclusive ones, and b) show greater support for inclusive parties rather than non-inclusive parties. Overall, regions with more Russians are more likely to support more “ethnic” voting options.

In regards to support for ethnic over inclusive parties, I also find that this support tends to be higher in regions with a lower GDP per capita, in line with the Chapter 3 results when interactive terms are included. Likewise in Lithuania, support for ethnic over inclusive parties tends to be higher in *less* urban areas, again similar to the findings with the interactive terms included. For the analysis of support for ethnic over non-inclusive parties, the only difference seen in Table B.6 is that in Ukraine, there is more support for ethnic parties when the district magnitude is higher, again a finding in line with the results from Chapter 3.

In examining support for inclusive versus non-inclusive parties, the main differences I find are that greater support for the inclusive parties tend to be in more urban regions of Ukraine, less educated regions in Estonia, and more Russian, less urban, and more educated regions in Lithuania. As before, these findings are echoed in Figures 3.17 through 3.17 in Chapter 3, which graphs the marginal effects of the interactive terms. Overall, the findings for Table 3.3 *without* the interactive terms included are consistent with the models *with* the interactions included.

**Table B.6 (from from Table 3.3): Percent Vote for Inclusive Parties by Region
(Interactive Terms Excluded)**

	Ethnic over Inclusive			Ethnic over Non-Inclusive			Inclusive over Non-Inclusive		
	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania	Estonia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Percent Russians	.005** (.002)	.076*** (.016)	.047** (.018)	.005*** (.001)	.065*** (.018)	.0001** (.00005)	.011*** (.003)	.023*** (.005)	.004* (.003)
Percent Urban	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.016)	-.0111** (.005)	.0001 (.001)	.023 (.018)	-.00003** (.00001)	.003 (.003)	.012** (.005)	-.002*** (.001)
Industrialization	-.00004** (.00002)	-.053 (.115)	-.0001 (.001)	-.00001** (.00001)	-.001 (.129)	-.0000002 (.000001)	.00003 (.00002)	-.003 (.036)	.00002 (.0001)
Percent Secondary Education	.040*** (.014)	.015 (.028)	-.001 (.009)	.003 (.005)	-.022 (.032)	.00001 (.00002)	-.033* (.018)	.001 (.009)	.005*** (.001)
District Magnitude (DM)	-.001 (.012)	.024*** (.002)		.009 (.006)	.007** (.003)		.020 (.016)	-.004*** (.001)	
Election 1 (1995, 1996, 1998)		.094 (.564)	.770*** (.257)	-.069 (.046)	.179 (.634)	.001 (.001)		-.377 (.176)	-1.064*** (.038)
Election 2 (1999, 2000, 2002)	.104 (.070)	-1.875*** (.541)	.004 (.259)	.020 (.035)	.780 (.609)	-.001 (.001)	-.316*** (.089)	.177 (.169)	-.672*** (.038)
Constant	-.612 (.202)	-6.117 (3.587)	.530 (.435)	-.082 (.088)	-2.773 (4.034)	.002 (.001)	.886 (.259)	1.041 (1.117)	1.238 (.064)
N	38	107	213	57	107	213	38	107	213
R ²	.685	.659	.095	.665	.401	.061	.715	.538	.806
Adjusted-R ²	.624	.635	.068	.617	.358	.034	.660	.505	.801
F-test	11.23***	27.31***	3.59***	13.87***	9.45***	2.23**	12.98***	16.45***	142.83***
Adjusted-R ² with Interactive Terms	.829	.763	.183	.781	.603	.138	.758	.684	.810

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.01

Across all the analyses, the most significant change noted is that, after dropping the interactive terms, I now find that regions with more Russians are more likely to support ethnic and inclusive political parties. Beyond this, however, there are little changes in the results, especially comparing these “linear” relations to the findings regarding the marginal effect of these variables as the proportion of Russians increase. Along with the improved goodness-of-fit measures with the interactive terms included in the models, this leads me to conclude that any model explaining regional support for these parties is correctly specified only when the interactive terms are included.

Even with high multicollinearity, coefficients remain BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator), and we can trust in the general direction of the relationships when the analyses do find significance. Unless there is *perfect* multicollinearity, the OLS regression assumptions are not violated.¹⁴¹ While some researchers suggest altering the analysis to deal with this issue (for instance by adding more data, dropping variables, or creating a composite index of the different independent variables), “doing nothing” is also a viable option, especially if a researcher prefers the specific theoretical model (Kennedy 2001, 187-189). Furthermore, excluding certain explanatory variables because they are highly correlated with one another risks engaging in *specification error* as it may leave key theoretical explanations out of the analysis.

¹⁴¹ As Berry (1993, 27) does point out, the primary problem with multicollinearity is that the coefficient values for the independent variables will fluctuate from sample to sample. The sign of the relationship, however, will remain unchanged, and so researchers can interpret the *direction* (positive or negative) of the relationship even though they may not be able to accurately discuss the *strength* of the relationship.

APPENDIX C

CHAPTER 4 CODEBOOK AND ANALYSIS OF RUSSOPHONE CODING

Description of the New Baltic Barometer Survey

The New Baltic Barometer, housed at the University of Aberdeen, was launched in 1993 and surveyed respondents in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. The surveys proceeded in six waves (1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2004), and I use data from the last two waves of the survey, which is available to the public. Respondents were able to complete the survey in the national language of the country or in Russian, and it is one of few surveys with some way of distinguishing the Russian minority from the Baltic peoples (through the language of the interview).

Dependent Variables: Ethnic Party and Inclusive Party Vote

The coding for the dependent variables was based on the response to the questions of which party did/would the respondent vote for in the most recent/upcoming elections. Based on my own coding of political parties in the Baltic Republics from Chapter 2, for ethnic party vote, respondents received a 1 if they stated that they would vote/had voted for a party that has been identified as a Russian ethnic party, 0 otherwise. For the inclusive party vote, they received a 1 if they stated they support a party has been identified as a party inclusive towards the Russian minority and a 0 otherwise. Respondents who did not vote or responded “don’t know” were coded as missing. The exact coding is detailed in Table C.1:

Table C.1: Party Classification by Year

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Ethnic Parties (2001)	United People's Party (EURP) Russian Baltic Party in Estonia Russian Party in Estonia (VEE) Russian Unity Party	Latvian Russian Citizens' Party For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL)	Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action Union of Lithuanian Russians (LRS)
Ethnic Parties (2004)	United People's Party (EURP)	For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) People's Harmony Party (part of the TSP) Socialist Party of Latvia (part of the TSP)	Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action
Inclusive Parties (2001)	Center Party	None	Social Democratic Party
Inclusive Parties (2004)	Center Party Reform Party	None	New Union (part of the A. Brazauskas Coalition) Social Democrats (part of the A. Brazauskas Coalition) Labor Party

**Key Independent Variable:
Coding the Russian-Speaking Minority**

The 2001 and 2004 survey waves of the Baltic Barometer include three potential options for coding the nationality of the respondents. In the first option, respondents were asked to self-identify their ethnicity, with options varying by country. This variable has two issues that make it difficult to use for this analysis. First, this data is missing for Latvia in 2004, which means that were this variable used, we would lose one of the countries in this analysis. Second, the actual responses available to the respondents in each country make it difficult to use this variable consistently across the different models. In Lithuania, the available responses are the most detailed, especially in 2004 when respondents could choose between “Lithuanian,” “Russian,” “Polish,” “Byelorussian,”

“Ukrainian” and “Other.”¹⁴² In contrast, Estonia was the least detailed; respondents could only select “Estonian” or “Other.” This coding is especially problematic, as this “Other” may include any of the ethnic minorities commonly found in Estonia, such as Russians, Belorusians, or Ukrainians – who should be grouped as part of the “Russian-speaking minority” – *or* Latvians and Lithuanians – who should *not* be included in this group.

The other two variables that may be potentially used to identify the nationality of respondents use a similar approach to Laitin (1998), among others (Vihalemm 1999; Van Elsuwege 2004), and define this minority group based on their language, not ethnic identity. In essence, this coding seeks to divide the “Russian-speaking minority” from other language groups. Two questions are potentially useful for this coding. First, respondents were asked what language they spoke at home. With this coding, “Russian-speakers” would be respondents who spoke Russian at home. This method of categorizing the respondents is also problematic; this question is missing from the 2001 Estonia survey wave; as the above coding, this would also mean dropping one of the countries due to the lack of the key independent variable. Furthermore, for the 2004 survey wave this variable is part of a scale for a different independent variable measuring the concept of linguistic socialization. Using this variable to code ethnicity would prevent its use in this socialization scale.

The final option for coding nationality is to use the language in which the respondent was interviewed. In this coding, respondents who took the interview in

¹⁴² In 2001, less options were available, and respondents could only choose “Lithuanian,” “Russian,” “Polish,” and “Other.”

Russian would be coded as “Russian-speakers.” While it is an imperfect measure of ethnicity, this is also how Rose (the primary investigator of the New Democracies Barometers) codes nationality when reporting data for the Baltic Barometer. Using this approach grants two advantages. First, it is the only of the three variables discussed here which appears in all survey waves and countries. Second, the coding of this variable is consistent across survey waves and countries, improving the comparability of this variable across all five models and minimizing potential bias as a result of question wording.

Below I present a series of tables comparing the three potential ways of coding respondent nationality by country. In the first two tables, I compare the three different coding options for Estonia. In Table C.2 and C.3, we see that the two variables present in the 2001 Estonian survey wave are very similar;¹⁴³ the coding of Estonians is identical regardless of which variable is used. Among respondents coded in the “Other” ethnic category, 90.5% would be coded as “Russian-speakers” while the rest would be coded as non-Russians. Since we do not know how many of the “Other” respondents are Russians and not Latvians or Lithuanians, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of these variables.

Looking at the variables in the 2004 survey wave, we again see a great degree of similarity in coding regardless of which variable is used. Roughly 99.5% of Estonian ethnics are correctly coded as “non-Russian” using the language of the interview; similarly, 98.9% of respondents who *do not* speak Russian at home were interviewed in the non-Russian language. The coding does differ in a higher amount when coding for

¹⁴³ Again, Estonia is missing the question for language spoken at home during the 2001 survey wave.

“Russians;” examining the two language variables, 94.9% of “Russian-speaking” respondents would be coded as such regardless of the variable used.

Since we might consider the nationality variable slightly more accurate,¹⁴⁴ we can better compare the two language variables and their accuracy by comparing to the nationality variable and identifying the number of cases that have been “incorrectly” identified. In other words, how many Estonians are coded as a “Russian-speaker,” and how many Russians are coded as “non-Russians?”

Table C.2: Estonia, Language of Interview

Interviewed in...	Self-identified Nationality		Language spoken at home:	
	Estonian	Other	Russian	Other
2001				
Russian	0	90.5%	No information	
Titular Language	100%	9.5%		
	[616]	[31]		
Total	616	327		
2004				
Russian	.5%	92.7%	94.9%	1.1%
	[3]	[303]	[299]	[7]
Titular Language	99.5%	7.3%	5.1%	98.9%
	[610]	[24]	[16]	[618]
Total	613	327	315	625

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

For Estonia in 2004, both language variables are equally correct in identifying Estonians: they are both 3 cases off. The “Other” category is too vague to determine which respondents are correctly identified as “Russian-speakers,” but both variables are remarkably similar. Of the respondents, 24 who are classified as “Other” would be coded

¹⁴⁴ Given the vagueness of the “Other” ethnic category in many of these countries, this accuracy is far from perfect.

as “non-Russian” using the language of the interview; for the home language variable, only 22 “Other” respondents would be labeled as “non-Russian.”

Table C.3: Estonia, Home Language

Table C1: Estonian, Home Language		
	Self-identified Nationality	
Language spoken at home:	Estonian	Other
2001		
Russian	No Information	
Titular Language		
Total		
2004		
Russian	.5%	93.2%
	[3]	[305]
Other	99.5%	6.7%
	[610]	[22]
Total	613	327

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

Turning to Latvia, we again see a high similarity in categorizing the respondents, especially when coding the titular population, the Latvians. Like Estonia, the “Other” ethnic category is too vague to allow us to judge which members should be classified as Russian-speakers and which ones as non-Russians, but we can compare accuracy in categorizing Latvian and Russian respondents into correct linguistic categories.¹⁴⁵ Comparing the two linguistic variables, the language of interview question has the advantage. This variable correctly identified 100% of the Latvians and 90% of the Russians; when averaged, this coding was correct for Latvians and Russians 96.9% of the time. In contrast, the variable for language spoken at home had almost twice as many

¹⁴⁵ As mentioned earlier, this is only possible for the 2001 data, as the nationality question was not included in the 2004 Latvian survey wave.

incorrect guesses – 56 incorrect to the 27 of the previous variable – meaning the coding is correct 93.7% of the time.

Table C.4: Latvia, Language of Interview

	Self-identified Nationality			Language spoken at home:	
Interviewed in...	Latvian	Russian	Other	Russian	Other
2001					
Russian	0	90%	77%	81.8%	1.8%
		[243]	[92]	[324]	[11]
Titular Language	100%	10%	22.6%	18.2%	98.2%
	[612]	[27]	[27]	[72]	[594]
Total	612	270	119	396	605
2004					
Russian	No information			83.7%	2.4%
				[354]	[11]
Titular Language				16.3%	97.6%
				[69]	[520]
Total				423	533

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

Table C.5: Latvia, Home Language

	Self-identified Nationality		
Language spoken at home:	Latvian	Russian	Other
2001			
Russian	7.5%	96.3%	75.6%
	[46]	[260]	[90]
Titular Language	92.5%	3.7%	24.4%
	[566]	[10]	[29]
Total	612	270	119
2004			
Russian	No information		
Other			
Total			

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

In the nationality variable, Lithuania has the most detailed coding, allowing respondents to select “Lithuanian,” “Russian,” “Polish,” and, in 2004, “Byelorussian”

and “Ukrainian” as well.¹⁴⁶ These multiple options allows for the most detailed test of the accuracy of the linguistic variables. To clarify, if we define this ethnic group as “Russian-speakers,” based on the notion that this is a linguistic community of the Baltic Republics (Laitin 1998), then the Belorussian and Ukrainian ethnics should also be coded as “Russian-speakers” given their shared linguistic heritage.

Table C.6: Lithuania, Language of Interview

Interviewed in...	Self-identified Nationality						Language spoken at home:	
	Lithuanian	Russian	Polish	Byelorussian	Ukrainian	Other	Russian	Other
2001								
Russian	0	89.7% [113]	0	N/A	N/A	76.6% [36]	23.2% [43]	.8% [7]
Titular Language	100% [894]	10.3% [13]	100% [55]			23.4% [11]	76.8% [142]	99.3% [932]
Total	894	126	55			47	185	939
2004								
Russian	1.2% [10]	78.5% [84]	70.1% [68]	89.5% [34]	91.3% [21]	50% [5]	79.3% [195]	96.9% [840]
Titular Language	98.8% [828]	21.5% [23]	29.9% [29]	10.5% [4]	8.7% [2]	50% [5]	20.7% [51]	3.1% [27]
Total	838	107	97	38	23	10	246	867

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

In the 2001 wave, the language of interview variable has the advantage. It correctly identifies 100% of Lithuanians and Poles, though it is less accurate than the home language variable at classifying the Russians. However, on average, all but 13 cases are “correctly” identified, meaning that the language of interview divides 98.8% of ethnic nationalities into the correct “Russian-speaking” and “non-Russian” communities.

¹⁴⁶ As in the comparisons for Latvia, I do not compare linguistic variables at identifying the “other” category due to its vagueness.

In comparison, 96.1% of the 1075 cases are correctly divided into “Russian-speaking” and “non-Russian” when using the home language variable.

In 2004, however, the home language variable has a slight advantage. Both variables do a fairly good job classifying Lithuanians as “non-Russians,” and are fairly similar in classifying “Byelorussians” and “Ukrainians” as “Russian-speakers.” The language of interview variable has a more difficult time classifying Russians in the 2004 survey wave than in 2001, perhaps due to the increased use of Lithuanian by the Russian population. Russians have been more likely to assimilate linguistically in Lithuania over time, especially compared to the Poles (Hogan-Brun and Ramoniené 2003). Both questions are less successful at classifying the Polish population when compared to 2001.

Table C.7: Lithuania, Home Language

Language spoken at home	Self-identified Nationality					
	Lithuanian	Russian	Polish	Byelorussian	Ukrainian	Other
2001						
Russian	1.5%	93.7%	38.2%	N/A	N/A	70.2%
	[13]	[118]	[21]			[33]
Other	98.6%	6.4%	61.8%			29.8%
	[881]	[8]	[34]			[14]
Total	894	126	55			47
2004						
Russian	2.6%	95.3%	62.9%	92.1%	91.3%	50%
	[22]	[102]	[61]	[35]	[21]	[5]
Other	97.4%	4.7%	37.1%	7.9%	8.7%	50%
	[816]	[5]	[36]	[3]	[2]	[5]
Total	838	107	97	38	23	10

Note: Number in brackets is number of cases.

Beginning with the language of interview variable, 21.5% of Russian ethnics are incorrectly classified as non-Russians and 70.1% of Poles are classified as “Russian-speakers.” For the home language variable, 93.7% of Russians are identified as

“Russian-speakers” but 62.9% of Poles are classified as “Russian-speakers.” Across the five ethnic groups for the 2004 survey wave, the language of interview question had 107 (9.7%) cases that did not classify as expected while the home language variable had 93 (8.4%) of such cases.

Given the above comparison and discussion, my initial conclusion is that using the language of interview variable to code for Russophones will not bias the results any differently than using a different coding for ethnolinguistic identity. To verify this, I recreate in the following pages the analysis from Chapter 4, using the two other identity variables: self-identified ethnicity and whether the language spoken by the respondent at home is Russian. For the most part, the conclusions from the models remain very similar regardless of which variable was used to code for Russian ethnic group. For this reason, I will limit my discussion to what difference *do occur* when using the different variables to identify Russian ethnics. In these tables, I have highlighted any differences between the version of the models presented here and the original analysis presented in Chapter 4. Coefficients and their standard errors were bolded black if either a) a significant relationship changed signs (positive to negative or vice versa) or b) if the variable gained significance.

I begin by rerunning the analyses from Chapter 4 using the self-identified ethnicity variable. Before continuing, I would like to add a word of caution on the analysis for Estonia: the coding of “Estonia” versus “Other” does not provide enough detail to be sure that I am truly identifying Russian ethnics from other non-Russian-speaking populations in this country. Therefore, I am less sure whether the respondents in the Estonia models that are grouped as “Russian” using this variable (the “Other”

category) are actually Russian ethnics. With that same concern, for Latvia (2001) and Lithuania (2001 and 2004), I code the “Other” category as missing, given the lack of detail.

Tables C.8 and C.9 presents the revised models from Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. This analysis tests whether ethnic voting is in fact occurring in the Baltic republics; in other words, whether Russian ethnicity determines vote for these parties. In Table C.8, I present the changes to the 2001 model if self-identified ethnicity and home language are used instead to identify Russians in the survey. Since the home language variable was missing in Estonia in 2001, this country year was dropped from the analysis. In Table C.9, I present the changes to the 2004 model. As the self-identified nationality variable was not included in the Latvia 2004 survey wave, I do not run an analysis for that wave. I was also unable to reanalyze the Lithuania data, as only 2 of the 168 respondents who self-identified as Russian, Ukrainian, or Byelorussian actually reported voting for the ethnic party.

Beginning with the 2001 models with self-identified ethnicity as the primary “Russian” variable, in Estonia, both the economic voting variable and the urban variable gains significance. In line with the economic voting literature and the argument that ethnic parties are inherently opposition parties, voters who were more dissatisfied with their economic situation were more likely to vote for ethnic parties. Further, urban voters in Estonia in 2001 were more likely to support ethnic political parties than other types of voters. In Latvia in 2001, I do find a new significant relationship between pro-market and voting in the direction expected: support for ethnic parties is higher among

respondents who are more critical of market reforms.¹⁴⁷ Younger respondents were more likely to support ethnic parties for Lithuania in 2001. Finally, when using home language as the “Russian” variable, the only difference I find is in Latvia, where I find that more educated respondents were more likely to vote for ethnic parties.

Table C.8 (4.3 Revised): Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics (2001)

	Self-identified ethnicity			Home language	
	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania ¹	Latvia	Lithuania ²
Russophone	6.406*** (1.227)	3.392*** (.349)	3.061*** (.595)	3.989*** (.384)	3.061*** (.539)
<i>Economic Measures</i>					
Current Economic Evaluation	-.693* (.394)	-.335 (.248)	-.510 (.410)	-.582*** (.207)	-.147 (.396)
Low Income	.587 (1.133)	.206 (.435)	.194 (.746)	.092 (.371)	.001 (.686)
<i>Policy Position</i>					
Pro-market	1.183 (.791)	-1.274** (.503)	-.281 (1.135)	-.468 (.471)	-.788 (1.123)
<i>Demographics</i>					
Education	-.557** (.256)	.237 (.167)	-.213 (.297)	.236* (.141)	-.420 (.293)
Urban	1.474** (.674)	1.048*** (.328)	1.468 (1.115)	.374 (.304)	1.537 (1.107)
Female	-.621 (.570)	-.043 (.292)	-.628 (.530)	-.469* (.267)	-.202 (.530)
Youngest Quartile	.374 (.654)	1.174*** (.440)	1.307* (.790)	.750* (.390)	.518 (.725)
Oldest Quartile	.456 (.560)	.302 (.336)	1.124 (.791)	.256 (.299)	.676 (.697)
Constant	-4.914 (1.668)	-4.080 (.692)	-4.521 (1.693)	-3.609 (.605)	-4.256 (1.649)
N	337	504	409	568	419
Wald Chi ²	48.36***	155.68***	54.75***	143.10***	51.34***
Log pseudolikelihood	-52.742	-155.794	-48.933	-189.351	-55.264

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ In Lithuania in 2001, urban and pro-market issue position were dropped due to lack of variance.

² The “pro-market” issue variable was dropped for the 2004 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variation.

¹⁴⁷ During the same year, the gender variable fails to reach significance as it does in the Chapter 4 models.

Turning to Table C.9, I find no difference in the models for Estonia when using either of the ethnicity alternatives. In Latvia in 2004, the economic evaluation variable does reach significance when using home language instead of the language of interview to denote Russian speakers. As in Estonia in 2001, this result does support the economic voting literature, as more dissatisfied voters who were more likely to vote for ethnic parties.

Table C.9 (4.3 Revised): Vote for Ethnic Parties in the Baltic Republics (2004)

	Self-identified ethnicity		Home language		
	Estonia	Lithuania ¹	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania ²
Russophone	3.353*** (.758)	3.174*** (.803)	2.945*** (.663)	3.195*** (.344)	2.066*** (.629)
<i>Economic Measures</i>					
Current Economic Evaluation	-.344 (.496)	-.738 (.594)	-.348 (.489)	-.410* (.211)	-.453 (.421)
Low Income	-1.896 (1.281)	2.697** (1.296)	-1.659 (1.402)	-.054 (.355)	.872 (.537)
<i>Policy Position</i>					
Pro-market	.134 (.653)		.113 (.679)	-1.125** (.544)	
<i>Demographics</i>					
Education	.037 (.166)	.554*** (.202)	.041 (.154)	.048 (.085)	.143 (.165)
Urban	.045 (.614)	-.999 (1.045)	.112 (.570)	.704** (.292)	-1.198* (.721)
Female	1.017 (.620)		.859 (.601)	-.402 (.293)	-.425 (.570)
Youngest Quartile	.117 (.685)		-.118 (.663)	.794** (.373)	.852 (1.034)
Oldest Quartile	1.198 (.795)	-.143 (1.950)	.987 (.773)	.493 (.353)	.983* (.590)
Constant	-4.380 (1.196)	-6.429 (1.978)	-3.898 (1.062)	-2.709 (.511)	-2.596 (1.015)
N	208	79	208	467	170
Wald Chi ²	29.26***	41.12***	27.49***	139.84***	29.99***
Log pseudolikelihood	-41.864	-6.768	-44.433	-173.405	-45.660

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ In this model, pro-market issue position, female, and youngest quartile were dropped due to lack of variance.

² The “pro-market” issue variable was dropped for this analysis due to lack of variation.

In Lithuania in 2004, the only change from Chapter 4 is that I now find that older voters are significantly more likely to support ethnic parties. However, when using the self-identified ethnicity variable, I do see some differences, though it should also be noted that a true comparison is problematic as this model is different from the Chapter 4 model since two additional variables were dropped due to lack of variance. Voters who were more dissatisfied with their economic situation and low income voters were more likely to vote for ethnic parties. Both predictions are in line with the proposed relationship in Chapter 4, but I failed to find a significant relationship when using the language of interview variable. Finally, the Russophone variable does not reach significance when using the same variable, perhaps due to the loss of several key control variables and possible collinearity issues, as using the self-identified ethnicity variable almost halves the sample size.

Turning to inclusive party support (Table 4.4 in Chapter 4), I recreate the analyses using these new variables. As in the original models, Latvia is excluded as there are no inclusive parties for voters in Latvia to support. I also drop Estonia 2001 from the analysis for the language question, as this question was not asked for this survey. As seen in Table C.10, I find no difference between the original analysis and this one, regardless of which variable is used to measure Russian identity. One variable that was significant in Chapter 4 and which I fail to find significance occurs for Lithuania in 2004: the education variable is not significant in either of the models below. I do find that the economic evaluation measure is significant in Lithuania when using the self-identified ethnicity variable, and in the direction predicted.

Table C.10 (4.4 Revised): Vote for Inclusive Parties in the Baltic Republics: 2001 and 2004

	2001			2004			
	<i>Self-identified ethnicity</i>		<i>Home language</i>	<i>Self-identified ethnicity</i>		<i>Home language</i>	
	Estonia	Lithuania	Lithuania	Estonia	Lithuania	Estonia	Lithuania
Russophone	2.034*** (.268)	.953*** (.323)	1.214*** (.275)	1.108*** (.269)	1.676*** (.343)	1.215*** (.273)	1.510*** (.291)
<i>Economic Measures</i>							
Current Economic	.051	-.316**	-.320**	-.191	-.318*	-.192	-.238
Evaluation	(.172)	(.131)	(.130)	(.191)	(.165)	(.190)	(.163)
Low Income	.037	-.185	-.180	-.319	.034	-.296	.153
	(.306)	(.242)	(.241)	(.283)	(.249)	(.285)	(.245)
<i>Policy Position</i>							
Pro-market	-.211 (.240)	-1.159*** (.280)	-1.241*** (.277)	-.312 (.254)	-.897*** (.230)	-.258 (.255)	-.805*** (.223)
<i>Demographics</i>							
Education	-.135 (.109)	.082 (.089)	.068 (.088)	-.036 (.064)	-.111* (.060)	-.034 (.064)	-.108* (.058)
Urban	.072 (.241)	-.504*** (.183)	-.514*** (.183)	.560** (.236)	-.774*** (.190)	.546** (.236)	-.813*** (.189)
Female	-.035 (.209)	-.190 (.165)	-.260 (.163)	.002 (.218)	-.223 (.193)	-.001 (.218)	-.220 (.188)
Youngest Quartile	-.330 (.262)	.020 (.220)	-.045 (.218)	.244 (.293)	.405 (.274)	.214 (.297)	.324 (.265)
Oldest Quartile	.361 (.260)	.151 (.214)	.182 (.212)	.724*** (.268)	-.526** (.224)	.704 (.268)	-.529** (.219)
Constant	-.737 (.397)	.329 (.366)	.413 (.363)	-.004 (.413)	2.077 (.396)	-.030 (.415)	1.925 (.396)
N	478	669	695	427	583	427	616
Wald Chi ²	81.20***	46.21***	59.52***	48.09***	71.96***	49.91***	66.67***
Log pseudolikelihood	-271.022	-427.698	-439.558	-265.147	-338.261	-263.475	-353.254

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

Table C.11 (4.6 Revised): Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (2001)

	Self-identified ethnicity			Home language	
	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania ¹	Latvia	Lithuania ²
Orthodox	--	--	--	--	--
Russian Language	--	--	--	--	--
Education	-.582** (.258)	.510** (.201)	.196 (.435)	.285* (.147)	-.125 (.369)
Low Income	-.558 (.952)	.032 (.490)	--	.268 (.368)	--
Urban	1.434** (.621)	1.052** (.446)	--	.485 (.348)	--
Current Economic Evaluation	-.884* (.464)	-.450 (.286)	-.674 (.678)	-.410* (.217)	-.349 (.521)
Democratic Satisfaction	-.152 (.327)	-.556** (.246)	.821 (.605)	-.078 (.179)	-.169 (.556)
District Magnitude	--	-.018 (.039)	--	.006 (.029)	--
Youngest Quartile	.133 (.604)	.678 (.468)	2.355 (1.749)	.046 (.353)	1.061 (1.042)
Oldest Quartile	.026 (.579)	.267 (.393)	2.064 (1.362)	.203 (.316)	1.117 (.874)
Constant	1.989 (1.026)	-.141 (1.024)	-3.280 (1.449)	-.332 (.784)	-.638 (1.164)
N	87	176	30	259	40
Wald Chi ²	11.28	20.37***	4.62	10.43	2.23
Log pseudolikelihood	-52.692	-104.609	-14.813	-167.635	-23.046

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ Urban was dropped from the 2001 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variance. I also ran the analysis with low income excluded, to fully copy the analysis from Chapter 4, with no change to the model.

² Urban was dropped from the 2001 Lithuania analysis due to lack of variance. I also ran the analysis with low income excluded, to fully copy the analysis from Chapter 4, with no change to the model.

In the second part of the analysis from Chapter 4, I focus within the Russian minority and seek to explain why some Russian ethnics are more likely to support ethnic and inclusive parties than their co-ethnics, particularly analyzing the effects of ethnic socialization and satisfaction with national policy direction to explain this within-group difference. Again, I find that overall, the findings are very similar regardless of which identifying variable is used.

In Table C.11, I revise the analysis from Table 4.6 in Chapter 4 using the self-identified ethnicity variable and the home language variable for the 2001 data. Again, I am unable to reanalyze the data from Estonia in 2001 as the home language variable was not included in that country's survey wave. The only difference I find occurs in Latvia when using the self-identified ethnicity variable; I now find that Russian respondents who live in urban areas are significantly more likely to support ethnic parties than their co-ethnics. This does support the ethnic competition approach (Beer 1979; Ragin 1979; Olzak 1992), which argues that ethnic mobilization should be higher in urban settings as there is more frequent contact and competition between ethnic groups.

In 2004 (Table C.12), I was only able to recreate the analysis for Estonia using the self-identified ethnicity variable: the Latvian survey, as stated previously, did not include this variable in the questionnaire, and only 2 of the "Russian" respondents in Lithuania voted for an ethnic party (making analysis impossible). With this new coding, the orthodox variable does gain significance in the direction predicted by the ethnic socialization hypothesis: Orthodox Russians were more likely to support ethnic parties.

I also dropped the analysis for 2004 for Lithuania, as too few Lithuanian Russian's who spoke Russian at home actually voted for an ethnic party. For the models using the home language variable, this same variable was used to construct the original "Russian language" scale for the 2004 data, and so this analysis required a recoding of the language variable to run this model. I find no significant difference between these models and the original models from Chapter 4.

Table C.12 (4.6 Revised): Vote for Ethnic Parties among Russian-speakers (2004)

	Self-identified	Home language	
	Estonia	Estonia ¹	Latvia
Orthodox	1.548* (.884)	1.341 (.904)	.329 (.398)
Russian Language	-.200 (.897)	.636 (1.124)	.545 (.480)
Education	-.215 (.205)	-.254 (.255)	-.082 (.114)
Low Income	-2.045 (1.607)	--	.082 (.406)
Urban	.105 (.962)	-.027 (.960)	-.152 (.472)
Current Economic Evaluation	.400 (.589)	.720 (.833)	-.022 (.282)
Democratic Satisfaction	-.078 (.438)	-.298 (.534)	-1.352*** (.313)
District Magnitude	--	--	.105** (.043)
Youngest Quartile	-.030 (.983)	-.532 (.971)	.142 (.402)
Oldest Quartile	1.141 (.973)	1.513 (1.049)	1.232** (.531)
Constant	-1.220 (1.598)	-1.850 (1.766)	-.653 (1.066)
N	48	40	204
Wald Chi ²	7.67	9.40	34.59***
Log pseudolikelihood	-25.698	-22.174	-106.858

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ Low income was dropped for Estonia in 2004 due to lack of variance.

Finally, in Table C.13 I reanalyze the same models for inclusive party support (Table 4.7 in Chapter 4).¹⁴⁸ Beginning with the 2001 data, I find no difference between the original analysis in Chapter 4 and the new Lithuania analysis using the home language variable. Using the self-identified nationality variable, I do find a significant and negative relationship between education and inclusive party vote in Estonia in 2001; less educated respondents were more likely to support inclusive political parties. In

¹⁴⁸ As before, Latvia is excluded as there are no inclusive political parties.

Lithuania in 2001, the education variable is no longer significant when using self-identified ethnicity as the “Russian” variable.

Turning to the 2004 data, I do see some differences when using the self-identified nationality variable, especially in regards to the ethnic socialization variables. In Estonia, Russian language use is positive and significant in this model. While I failed to find a significant relationship in Chapter 4, this revised finding does support my theory that ethnic socialization plays an important role in shaping a respondent’s ethnic worldview and increases the tendency for Russian ethnics to support an inclusive party, and is in line with the findings from the multinomial logistic regression model in Chapter 4. Overall, I find no significant differences in Lithuania.

In conclusion, the findings when using the different ethnic identification variables are more complementary than dissimilar, with some notable differences. In Chapter 4, I choose to use the language of interview variable to identify Russian-speakers, primarily due to its ease of comparability across all three models and both years in the survey waves. Compared to the self-identified nationality variable, there are 4 instances where I find significance in Chapter 4 and do not find it here, and 8 instances where I fail to find significance in Chapter 4 when the self-identified nationality variable would find significance. For the home language variable, there are 2 instances in Chapter 4 when I find significance but do not find it here, and 4 instances where I fail to find significance but would if I used the home language variable. Overall, the decision to use the language of interview variable does not appear overly bias the results in a way that would cause me to strongly doubt the conclusions from Chapter 4.

Table C.13 (4.7 Revised): Vote for Inclusive Parties among Russian-speakers

	2001			2004			
	<i>Self-identified ethnicity</i>		<i>Home language</i>	<i>Self-identified ethnicity</i>		<i>Home language</i>	
	Estonia	Lithuania	Lithuania ¹	Estonia	Lithuania ²	Estonia	Lithuania
Orthodox	--	--	--	.642 (.507)	.017 (.775)	.624 (.516)	.225 (.681)
Russian Language	--	--	--	.838* (.445)	.719 (.504)	.843 (.731)	.184 (.668)
Education	-.401* (.221)	.525 (.351)	.347 (.297)	-.114 (.134)	-.131 (.223)	-.069 (.136)	-.107 (.190)
Low Income	.460 (.733)	-.303 (1.105)	.372 (1.054)	-.908 (.699)	.665 (.791)	-.789 (.754)	.432 (.804)
Urban	.967* (.500)	-.324 (.945)	-.617 (.912)	.697 (.486)	-.180 (.714)	.517 (.502)	-.509 (.727)
Current Economic Evaluation	.112 (.328)	.109 (.514)	.109 (.409)	-.335 (.421)	-.102 (.551)	-.338 (.457)	.023 (.562)
Democratic Satisfaction	-.208 (.303)	.385 (.405)	-.001 (.347)	-.266 (.289)	.251 (.496)	-.440 (.316)	.348 (.464)
Youngest Quartile	-.066 (.490)	1.075 (.807)	.443 (.624)	-.686 (.583)	-.182 (.946)	-.832 (.557)	-.091 (.871)
Oldest Quartile	.258 (.515)	1.002 (.746)	.884 (.627)	.800 (.678)	.050 (.705)	.799 (.684)	-.142 (.615)
Constant	1.318 (.759)	-1.755 (1.451)	-.253 (1.236)	.233 (1.094)	.970 (1.546)	1.227 (1.012)	1.889 (1.385)
N	138	83	80	140	96	137	115
Wald Chi ²	7.28	6.32	3.26	16.62*	5.42	15.01*	3.25
Log pseudolikelihood	-76.829	-31.469	-49.382	-67.199	-37.808	-65.118	-44.926

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

¹ When I drop the low income variable to fully replicate the original analysis for Lithuania in 2001, I find no change in the model. None of the other variables reach significance even with low income dropped from the model.

² Young was dropped in the self-identified ethnicity variable for Lithuania in 2004 due to lack of variance.

Additional Independent Variables: Coding

Economic Voting To test the effects of economic voting on party choice, I used responses to the question: “As for your own household, how do you rate its economic situation today?” Respondents selected from the following options:

- 0 Very unsatisfactory
- 1 Not very satisfactory
- 2 Fairly satisfactory
- 3 Very satisfactory

Issue Voting: Pro-market Orientation The Baltic Barometer dataset includes its own coding for how respondents view the economic changes that have taken place since the end of communism. To construct this scale, they use two questions “Where on this scale would you put the Socialist economic system before the revolution of 1989?” and “Where on this scale would you put our current economic system?” Respondents were asked to place their answer on a scale ranging from -100 (complete disapproval) to 100 (complete approval). “Pro-market” respondents were ones who held a negative evaluation of the pre-1989 economic system and a positive view of the current system.

Social Class In each of the three republics, respondents were asked to report their total family income from the previous month in the local currency. This data was used to construct a four-point scale on income quartile, with respondents who were in the lowest income quartile receiving a 0 and those in the highest quartile a 3. This variable (“incqua”) was recoded into a dichotomous variable, “low income.” Respondents who were in the lowest income quartile received a 1 while other respondents received a 0.

Education Respondents were asked to report on their highest level of education, and chose from the following 7 point scale:

- 0 Elementary or lower
- 1 Incomplete secondary
- 2 Vocational school, incomplete secondary
- 3 Secondary school
- 4 Vocational school with secondary
- 5 Higher incomplete
- 6 Higher education

Urban Respondents were coded as urban residents if they reside in cities of greater than 50,000. Residents of rural regions and of towns less than 50,000 were coded as rural. For Lithuania in 2001, however, interviewers marked the type of settlement the respondent lived in: Vilnius (the capital), the major urban centers of Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, or Panevezys, a district center, another town, or a village. Only those respondents who lived in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, or Panevezys were coded as “urban” residents in the 2001 dataset; all other respondents were coded as rural.

Gender At the end of the survey, the surveyor recorded the gender of the respondent. From this question, I created a dichotomous variable, “female,” where female respondents were coded as 1 and male respondents were coded as 0.

Age Respondents were asked to report their age. The reported ages range from 18 to 95 in the 2001 wave and 90 in the 2004 wave. From this variable, I coded two dichotomous variables, one for the youngest quartile of respondents and the other for the oldest quartile of respondents. In both survey waves, the data were divided the same:

respondents 32 and below falls into the bottom quartile and respondents 60 and above belong to the oldest quartile.

Language use In the 2001 survey, respondents were asked “What language(s) do you usually speak at home today?” This question was used to create the variable “langruss,” where respondents received a 1 if they spoke Russian at home, and a 0 if they did not. In the 2004 survey wave, two questions are potentially useful for coding for language socialization: “What language did you speak at home when you were a child?” and “What language(s) do you usually speak at home today?” For both questions, respondents would then report whether they spoke the national language (Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian), Russian, Polish, Finnish, Belorussian, Ukrainian, or other. For the second question, respondents were allowed to choose more than one language.

The first question captures a past experience with ethnic socialization, while the second captures ongoing socialization and a feeling of ethnic distinction. I combine these two questions into a 3 point scale “homelang,” 0 for respondents who did not in childhood and do not speak Russian at home today, 1 for respondents who either did speak *or* do speak Russian at home, and 2 for respondents who did speak *and* do speak Russian at home.

Religion (Orthodox) Respondents were asked their religion and allowed to choose from the following options: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Judaism, Islam, Other religion, and not a believer. This was collapsed into a dummy variable for *Orthodoxy*; respondents who reported that they were Orthodox received a 1, while all other respondents were 0.

Democratic Satisfaction Respondents were asked to rank their satisfaction with the

current system of democracy in their country. They selected one of these options from the following 4 point scale:

- 0 Not at all satisfied
- 1 Not very satisfied
- 2 Fairly satisfied
- 3 Very satisfied

District Magnitude Of the three countries in the survey, only Latvia has information on a respondent's region of residence that makes it able to extrapolate the district magnitude of the region. Below are the five electoral districts in Latvia, along with their district magnitude during the 1998 and 2002 elections (used to code the data for the 2001 and 2004 survey waves, respectfully).

Table C.14: District Magnitude in Latvia

District	1998 Election	2002 Election
Riga	28	28
Kurzeme	14	14
Latgale	18	17
Vidzeme	25	26
Zemgale	15	15

APPENDIX D

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR CHAPTER 4 BALTIC BAROMETER SURVEY ANALYSIS

In the following pages, I present a number of descriptive statistics for the independent variables in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the analysis was performed in two parts. First, I examined the entire sample from the Baltic republics to see whether being a member of the Russian-speaking community was an important determinant of the vote, even when controlling for other potential explanatory variables. In the second part of the chapter, I limited the analysis to Russian-speakers only, and examined which factors increased the likelihood that members of this minority would vote for ethnic or inclusive political parties. Likewise, in the following tables, I present the descriptive statistics for these two samples to reflect the two groups of analysis in chapter 4. Each table presents: 1) descriptive statistics for the full survey sample and 2) descriptive statistics for the Russian-speaking minority only.

Table D.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous independent variables included in the models. Unsurprising, the variables associated with “Russianness” – language and Orthodox belief – are found more often in the Russian population. For instance, in 2001, 27.3% of respondents in the Baltic Barometer spoke Russian at home. Many of these respondents were Russian-speakers; within that population, over 96% spoke Russian at home. This lack of variation in the Russian-speaking population is the key reason why in 2001, language is dropped from the analysis in Chapter 4.

Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Independent Variables

Variable	Full Sample		Russians only	
	%	Total N of respondents	%	Total N of respondents
<i>Russian home language</i>				
2001	27.3%	2125	96.3%	484
Estonia	--	--	--	--
Latvia	39.6%	1001	96.7%	335
Lithuania	16.5%	1124	95.3%	149
<i>Orthodox Believer</i>				
2004	19.7%	3009	57.4%	895
Estonia	25.6%	940	70.3%	306
Latvia	25%	956	54.2%	367
Lithuania	10.2%	1113	45.0%	222
<i>Urban resident</i>				
2001	56.0%	3068	81.5%	780
Estonia	50.5%	943	84.7%	296
Latvia	46.1%	1001	73.4%	335
Lithuania	69.4%	1124	93.3%	149
2004	43.4%	3009	65.4%	895
Estonia	41.0%	940	68.6%	306
Latvia	46.1%	956	69.8%	367
Lithuania	43.1%	1113	53.6%	222
<i>Low Income</i>				
2001	20.3%	2886	16.7%	720
Estonia	15.1%	943	12.8%	296
Latvia	25.0%	875	23.8%	585
Lithuania	21.2%	1068	9.7%	134
2004	25.6%	2724	25.1%	812
Estonia	24.9%	790	19.9%	272
Latvia	25.3%	881	27.3%	333
Lithuania	26.2%	1053	28.5%	207
<i>Pro-market Issue Position</i>				
2001	18.8%	2783	7.1%	695
Estonia	28.6%	826	9.6%	260
Latvia	17.3%	833	5.9%	286
Lithuania	12.6%	1124	4.7%	149
2004	19.7%	2742	7.6%	812
Estonia	24.7%	858	8.2%	279
Latvia	17.1%	835	7.6%	327
Lithuania	17.5%	1049	6.8%	206
<i>Gender (Female)</i>				
2001	54.2%	3068	56.7%	780
Estonia	54.1%	943	55.7%	296
Latvia	55.7%	1001	55.8%	335
Lithuania	53.0%	1124	60.4%	149
2004	54%	3009	53.7%	895
Estonia	53.8%	940	55.6%	306
Latvia	52.5%	956	52.0%	367
Lithuania	55.4%	1113	54.1%	222

A similar pattern appears for the religious variable, which was only coded for 2004. Less than 20% of respondents in the full sample are Orthodox believers; among Russian-speakers, 57.4% are Orthodox. Even within the Russian-speaking population, there is considerable variation by country. In Estonia, 70.3% of Russian-speakers are Orthodox. In contrast, only 54.2% of Russian-speakers in Latvia and roughly 45% in Lithuania are Orthodox.

Also noteworthy, Russians tend to be less in favor of market reforms than the full sample. In 2001, almost 20% of the full sample was positive about market reforms; in that same year, only about 7% of the Russian-speaking sample was in favor of market reforms. Russians in Estonia tended to be slightly more positive about market reforms (9.6% in 2001 and 8.2% in 2004) while the Russian-speakers of Lithuania were the least positive (4.7% and 6.7%, respectfully).

Fitting with results gleaned from census data (Kaiser 1994), Russians are more likely to live in urban areas and are *slightly* better off economically than other respondents, at least in 2001. In that year, roughly 20% of the full sample belonged in the low income category, while less than 17% of Russian-speakers did. In 2004, this trend continued in Estonia, but in Latvia and Lithuania, more Russian-speakers (27.3% and 28.5%, respectfully) we classified as low income, slightly higher than the comparable proportions in the full sample (25.3% and 26.2%).

Turning to the urban variable, in 2001, 81.5% of Russian-speakers lived in urban areas; in the full sample, this proportion was 56%. In 2004, the comparable proportions were 65.4% and 43.4%, respectfully. Part of this drop from 2001 to 2004 is likely explained by the different coding for urban resident available from the Baltic Barometer

in the two years. For a full discussion of that coding, see Appendix C. There are only slight differences between the full sample and the Russian-speaking sample in regards to gender.

Table D.2 presents the results for the descriptive statistics for the remaining independent variables. As with the dichotomous variables, the variable measuring Russian socialization – frequent Russian language use – is more concentrated in the Russian-speaking sample. As discussed in the Appendix C Codebook, values in this scale range from 0 (respondent does not speak Russian at home now *and* did not speak Russian at home as a child) to 2 (respondent speaks Russian at home now *and* spoke Russian at home as a child). In the full sample, the average was .601, meaning many respondents do not have language socialization experiences in Russian. Among the Russian-speakers, however, the average was roughly 1.8, meaning that many did have some form of language socialization. As with the urban variable, the sample does reflect what we know from survey data (Kaiser 1994); Russians were on average more educated than the general population.

In regards to the measures of satisfaction with national policies – the economic evaluation variable and the democratic satisfaction variable – among the full sample in 2001, the average scores were roughly 1.3 and 1.2, respectfully. In 2004, the averages were roughly 1.4 (economic evaluation) and 1.2 (democratic satisfaction). Among the Russian-speaking sample, these averages were roughly 1.2 (economic) and 1.1 (democratic) in 2001, and 1.3 (economic) and 1.1 (democratic) in 2004. In the context of these scales, this means that, while the average tended to be fairly close to the middle of

these scales for all groups, respondents did tend to fall a bit more on the negative side of these evaluations.

Table D.2: Descriptive Statistics for Additional Independent Variables

	Full Sample				Russians Only		
Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	N	Scale	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Russian language use							
2004	.601	.872	3009	0-2	1.759	.520	895
Estonia	.648	.908	940		1.873	.362	306
Latvia	.821	.936	956		1.828	.450	367
Lithuania	.371	.717	1113		1.486	.691	222
Education Level							
2001	2.443	1.038	3006	0-5	2.532	1.015	778
Estonia	2.422	1.039	943		2.618	1.015	296
Latvia	2.447	1.030	999		2.429	1.005	333
Lithuania	2.456	1.046	1124		2.591	1.020	149
2004	3.441	1.840	3007	0-6	3.690	1.788	893
Estonia	3.454	1.865	940		4.026	1.698	306
Latvia	3.402	1.831	955		3.5	1.796	366
Lithuania	3.464	1.829	1112		3.539	1.835	221
Current Economic Evaluation							
2001	1.270	.682	3009	0-3	1.203	.700	770
Estonia	1.361	.672	908		1.284	.697	292
Latvia	1.210	.671	994		1.166	.665	331
Lithuania	1.248	.694	1107		1.122	.767	147
2004	1.446	.669	2901	0-3	1.306	.674	876
Estonia	1.509	.647	902		1.372	.669	301
Latvia	1.355	.695	944		1.255	.675	364
Lithuania	1.473	.656	1055		1.299	.677	211
Satisfaction with Democracy							
2001	1.230	.727	2968	0-3	1.144	.767	749
Estonia	1.186	.732	913		1.118	.780	287
Latvia	1.202	.720	952		1.120	.766	317
Lithuania	1.291	.726	1103		1.248	.741	145
2004	1.302	.700	2823	0-3	1.115	.741	833
Estonia	1.272	.719	863		1.106	.769	283
Latvia	1.230	.711	921		1.077	.724	350
Lithuania	1.390	.665	1039		1.195	.728	200

As additional information, I also include correlation tables for the different independent variables from the models in chapter 4. In any regression model we would expect some correlation between the independent variables since they should, ideally, all be related to the dependent variable. However, if the correlation between the independent variables becomes too high, we may have problems with multicollinearity. Multicollinearity may increase the standard errors of the coefficients, making it more difficult for the variables to achieve significance, and may lead to unreliable estimators.

These correlations tables are a *very* rough test of potential collinearity issues; multicollinearity is an issue among all the variables in the model, and a simple bivariate correlation matrix will fail to measure a model's collinearity.¹⁴⁹ However, given that the variables are behaving as theoretically predicted in the models from Chapter 4, and given that the strength of the correlation between these variables is fairly low, I would consider the following tables a sufficient test of potential multicollinearity. Other than the two age variables, which are constructed from the same scale, the highest Pearson correlation coefficient in any of these models occurs in the 2001 (full sample) analysis between the variables Russian-speaker and urban resident, which achieves a coefficient of .301. Squaring this score gives an R-squared of .091, meaning that less than 10% of urban residence is “determined” by ethnic identity.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ If I was using an OLS regression model, I would analyze the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score, as I did in chapter 3 (see Appendix B).

¹⁵⁰ R-squared is a coefficient of determination, meaning that the value of R-squared represents the fraction of the variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the independent variable.

Table D.3: Pearson's Correlation Matrix for Table 4.3 and 4.4 (Full Sample)

<i>2001</i>								
	Russian-speaker	Economic Evaluation	Low Income	Pro-market	Education	Urban	Female	Youngest
Economic Evaluation	-.058*** [3009]	--						
Low Income	-.053*** [2886]	.272*** [2831]	--					
Pro-market	-.173*** [2783]	.217*** [2734]	-.138*** [2631]	--				
Education	.050*** [3066]	.179*** [3007]	-.139*** [2884]	.150*** [2781]	--			
Urban	.301*** [3068]	.033* [3009]	-.190*** [2886]	-.015 [2783]	.196*** [3066]	--		
Female	.029 [3068]	-.068*** [3009]	.050*** [2886]	-.031 [2783]	.024 [3066]	.008 [3068]	--	
Youngest	-.022 [3068]	.164*** [3009]	.054*** [2886]	.125*** [2783]	.022 [3066]	.001 [3068]	-.04** [3068]	--
Oldest	.043** [3068]	-.101* [3009]	-.206*** [2886]	-.084*** [2783]	-.256*** [3066]	.002 [3068]	.049*** [3068]	-.355*** [3068]
<i>2004</i>								
Economic Evaluation	-.137*** [2901]	--						
Low Income	-.006 [2724]	-.293*** [2641]	--					
Pro-market	-.196*** [2742]	.180*** [2644]	-.093*** [2499]	--				
Education	.088*** [3007]	.179*** [2899]	-.258*** [2722]	.120*** [2740]	--			
Urban	.288*** [3009]	-.018 [2901]	-.145*** [2724]	-.004 [2742]	.186*** [3007]	--		
Female	-.003 [3009]	-.058*** [2901]	.101*** [2724]	-.028 [2742]	.056*** [3007]	.027 [3009]	--	
Youngest	-.030* [3009]	.180*** [2901]	-.146*** [2724]	.103*** [2742]	.017 [3007]	.057*** [3009]	-.024 [3009]	--
Oldest	-.015 [3009]	-.112*** [2901]	.218*** [2724]	-.079*** [2742]	-.312*** [3007]	-.0004 [3009]	.054*** [3009]	-.338*** [3009]

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in brackets are number of cases.

Table D.4: Pearson's Correlation Matrix for Table 4.6 and 4.7 (Russian-speakers only)

<i>2001</i>								
	Orthodox	Russian Language	Education	Low Income	Urban	Economic Evaluation	Dem. Satisfaction	Youngest
Russian Language	N/A	--						
Education	N/A	.018 [482]	--					
Low Income	N/A	-.068 [424]	-.072* [718]	--				
Urban	N/A	.090** [484]	.113*** [778]	-.174*** [720]	--			
Economic Evaluation	N/A	.012 [478]	.227*** [768]	-.178*** [712]	.056 [770]	--		
Democratic Satisfaction	N/A	-.050 [462]	.097*** [747]	-.097** [693]	.016 [749]	.287*** [740]	--	
Youngest	N/A	.038 [484]	.024 [778]	.081** [720]	-.053 [780]	.178*** [770]	.088** [749]	--
Oldest	N/A	.056 [464]	-.260*** [778]	-.185*** [720]	.055 [780]	-.162*** [770]	-.023 [749]	-.367*** [780]
<i>2004</i>								
Russian Language	.287*** [895]	--						
Education	.159*** [893]	.140*** [893]	--					
Low Income	-.005 [812]	.062* [812]	-.214*** [810]	--				
Urban	.181*** [895]	.154*** [895]	.074** [893]	-.096*** [812]	--			
Economic Evaluation	-.041 [876]	-.023 [876]	.198*** [874]	-.256*** [798]	-.046 [876]	--		
Democratic Satisfaction	-.056 [833]	-.038 [833]	-.002 [831]	-.002 [755]	-.013 [833]	.279*** [817]	--	
Youngest	-.051 [895]	.059* [895]	-.003 [893]	-.121*** [812]	-.002 [895]	.129*** [876]	.055 [833]	--
Oldest	.091*** [895]	-.069** [895]	-.274*** [893]	.261*** [812]	.063* [895]	-.174*** [876]	-.018 [833]	-.311*** [895]

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Numbers in brackets are number of cases.

REFERENCES

- Aalto, P. (2000). Beyond Restoration: The Construction of Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia. *Cooperation and Conflict* , 31 (1), 65-88.
- Achen, C. H. (2002). Parental Socialization and Rational Partisan Identification. *Political Behavior* , 24 (2), 151-170.
- Achen, C. H. (1992). Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression: Breaking the iron triangle in voting research. *Political Behavior* , 14, 195-211.
- Aldrich, J. H. (1977). Electoral choice in 1972: A test of some theorems of the spatial model of electoral competition. *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* , 5, 215-237.
- Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aldrich, J. H., Sullivan, J. L., & Borgida, E. (1989). Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz before a Blind Audience?'. *American Political Science Review* , 83, 123-141.
- Allswang, J. M. (1971). *A House for All Peoples: Ethnic politics in Chicago*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1998). Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election. *American Journal of Political Science* , 42, 1349-1363.
- Amorim-Neto, O., & Cox, G. W. (1997). Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Science* , 41, 149-174.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Antane, A., & Tsilevich, B. (1999). Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Latvia. In P. Kolsto (Ed.), *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies* (pp. 63-152). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Arel, D., & Khmelko, V. (1996). The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine. *The Harriman Review* , 9.1-2, 81-91.
- Baltic News Service. (2008, February 29). Estonia's Russian Unity Party Dissolved By Court. *Baltic News Service* .
- Barany, Z. (2002). Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies. *World Politics* , 54 (3), 277-307.

- Barrington, L. (1995). The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 47, 731-763.
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Berry, J. M. (1977). *Lobbying for the People*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berry, W. D. (1993). *Understanding Regression Assumptions*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Betz, H.-G. (1994). *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bilaniuk, L. (2005). *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine* . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Birch, S. (2003). *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Birch, S. (2003). The parliamentary elections in Ukraine, March 2002. *Electoral Studies* , 22, 524-531.
- Birch, S. (1995). The Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994. *Electoral Studies* , 14, 93-99.
- Birner, J. K. (2007). *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Black, J. A. (1978). Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* , 22, 609-638.
- Blais, A. (2000). *To Vote Or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Blais, A., & Carty, R. (1990). Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout? *European Journal of Political Research* , 18, 167-181.
- Blais, A., & Carty, R. (1991). The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor. *British Journal of Political Science* , 21 (1), 79-93.
- Blais, A., & Carty, R. (1991). The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor. *British Journal of Political Science* , 21, 79-93.

- Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko. (2008). *Програмні засади напмії*. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko web site:
<http://www.byut.com.ua/ua/aboutus/program.php>
- Bobo, L., & Kluegel, J. R. (1993). Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes? *American Sociological Review* , 58 (4), 443-464.
- Brader, T., & Tucker, J. A. (2001). The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996. *American Journal of Political Science* , 45 (1), 69-84.
- Brambor, T., Clark, W., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. *Political Analysis* , 63-82.
- Brass, P. R. (1991). *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bratton, M., Alderfer, P., Bowser, G., & Temba, J. (1999). The Effects of Civic Education on Political Culture: Evidence from Zambia. *World Development* , 27, 807-824.
- Breuilly, J. (1993). *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. (2007). Where (Who) Are Collectives in Collectivism? Toward Conceptual Clarification of Individualism and Collectivism. *Psychological Review* , 114, 133-151.
- Brown, R. D., & Woods, J. A. (1991). Toward a Model of Congressional Elections. *Journal of Politics* , 53, 454-473.
- Brubaker, R. (2004). *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Budryte, D. (2005). *Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bugajski, J. (2002). *Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era* . Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Bullock, C. S. (1984). Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials. *Journal of Politics* , 46 (1), 238-251.
- Burant, S. R. (1995). Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 47, 1125-1144.
- Cain, B. E., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1984). Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District. *Social Science Quarterly* , 65, 315-327.

- Cain, B. E., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1987). Latinos and the 1984 Election: A Comparative Perspective. In R. O. de la Garza, *Ignored Voices: Public Opinion Polls and the Latino Community* (pp. 47-62). Austin, TX: Center for Mexican American Studies.
- Campbell, R. (2006). *Gender and Vote in Britain: beyond the gender gap?* Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press .
- Carmines, E. G., & Stimson, J. A. (1980). The Two Faces of Issue Voting. *American Political Science Review* , 74 (1), 78-91.
- Carmines, E. G., McIver, J. P., & Stimson, J. A. (1987). Unrealized Partisanship: A Theory of Dealignment. *Journal of Politics* , 49, 376-400.
- Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania. (2004a, August 11). *Candidate Lists of Parties*. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Elections to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania '2004:
http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2004/seimas/kandidatai/part_sar_e_20.htm
- Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania. (2004b, October 31). *Members of the Seimas 2004-2008*. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from Elections to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania 2004:
http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2004/seimas/rezultatai/rez_isrinkti_e_20_2.htm
- Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. (2002). *Results of the 2000 Population and Housing Census in Latvia*. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia.
- Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. (2002). *Results of the 2000 Population and Housing Census in Latvia*. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
- Chandra, K. (2006). What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter. *Annual Review of Political Science* , 397-424.
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, T. D. (1998). The 1996 elections to the Lithuanian seimas and their aftermath. *Journal of Baltic Studies* , 29 (2), 135-148.
- Clark, T. D. (1995). The Lithuanian Political Party System: A Case Study of Democratic Consolidation. *East European Politics and Societies* , 9 (1), 41-62.
- Clarke, H. D., & Stewart, M. C. (1994). Prospections, Retrospections, and Rationality: the "Bankers" model of Presidential Approval. *American Journal of Political Science* , 38, 104-123.

- Clyne, M. (1997). Multilingualism. In C. Florian (Ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 301-314). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Collier, D., & Mahon, J. E. (1993). Conceptual "stretching" revisited: adapting categories in comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 87 (4), 845-855.
- Colton, T. J. (2003). Parties, Leaders, and Voters in the Parliamentary Elections. In V. L. Hesli, & W. M. Reisinger, *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Commission of the European Union. (1998). *Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession*. Retrieved 11 May, 2006, from Europa: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/latvia/la-op_en.pdf
- Commission of the European Union. (1999). *Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession*. Retrieved May 11, 2006, from Europa: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/latvia_en.pdf
- Communist Party of Ukraine. (2008). *Programa*. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from Communist Party of Ukraine web site: <http://www.kpu.net.ua/program/>
- Connor, W. (1978). A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a... *Ethnic and Race Studies*, 1, 377-400.
- Connor, W. (1993). Beyond Reason: the nature of the ethnonational bond. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 373-389.
- Connor, W. (1972). Nation-building or nation-destroying? *World Politics*, 24, 319-355.
- Converse, P. E. (1969). Of time and partisan stability. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2, 139-171.
- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cutler, F. (2002). The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and Electoral Choice. *Journal of Politics*, 64 (2), 466-490.
- Dahl, R. A. (1972). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Davies, P. J., & Ozolins, A. V. (2001). The 1998 parliamentary election in Latvia. *Electoral Studies*, 20, 135-141.
- Davies, P. J., & Ozolins, A. V. (2004). The parliamentary election in Latvia, October 2002. *Electoral Studies*, 23, 834-840.

- Dawson, J. I. (1997). Ethnicity, Ideology, and Geopolitics in Crimea. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* , 30, 427-444.
- Day, A. J. (Ed.). (2002). *Political Parties of the World*. London: John Harper Publishing.
- de la Garza, R. O., & De Sipio, L. (1998). Interests Not Passions: Mexican American Attitudes toward Mexico and Issues Shaping US-Mexican Relations. *International Migration Review* , 32 (2), 401-422.
- de la Garza, R. O., & Weaver, J. (1985). Does Ethnicity Make a Difference: Chicano-Anglo Public Policy Perspectives in San Antonio. *Social Science Quarterly* , 66, 576-586.
- de la Garza, R. O., De Sipio, L., Garcia, F. C., Garcia, J., & Falcon, A. (1992). *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Druviete, I. (1997). Linguistic human rights in the Baltic States. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* , 127, 161-185.
- Duverger, M. (1951). *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley.
- Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei. (2000). *Programma*. Retrieved September 14, 2007, from Estonian United People's Party website:
http://www.eurp.ee/rus/programm_full.asp
- Electoral Alliance of Lithuania's Poles. (2007). *Program*. Retrieved January 18, 2008, from Electoral Alliance of Lithuania's Poles website:
<http://www.awpl.lt/index.php?lng=pl&action=page&id=16>
- Enloe, C. (1973). *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Enloe, C. H. (1981). The growth of the state and ethnic mobilization: The American experience. *Ethnic and Race Studies* , 4, 123-136.
- Erie, S. P. (1988). *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Eriksen, T. H. (1993). *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. New York: Norton.

- Erikson, R. S., MacKuen, M. B., & Stimson, J. A. (2000). Bankers or Peasants Revisited: Economic Expectations and Presidential Approval. *Electoral Studies*, 19, 295-312.
- Estonian National Electoral Commission. (2007). *Electoral results*. Retrieved February 27, 2008, from Estonian National Electoral Commission website: <http://www.vvk.ee/engindex2.html>
- Estonian Reform Party. (2009). *History*. Retrieved October 26, 2009, from Estonian Reform Party Website: <http://www.reform.ee/et/reformierakond/erakond/Ajalugu>
- European Commission. (2006, October 10). *The Euromosaic study: Other languages in Latvia*. Retrieved January 18, 2008, from Europa - Website of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/euromosaic/lat5_en.html#2
- Evans, G. A., & Whitefield, S. (2000). Explaining the formation of electoral cleavages in post-communist democracies. In H.-D. Klingeman, E. Mochmann, & K. Newton, *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: The First Wave* (pp. 36-70). Berlin: Ed. Sigma.
- Finkel, S. E. (2002). Civic Education and the Mobilization of Political Participation in Developing Democracies. *Journal of Politics*, 64, 994-1020.
- Finkel, S. E., Sabatini, C., & Bevis, G. G. (2000). Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic. *World Development*, 28, 1851-1874.
- Fiorina, M. P. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fitzmaurice, J. (2003). Parliamentary elections in Lithuania, October 2000. *Electoral Studies*, 22, 161-165.
- Fitzmaurice, J. (2001). The parliamentary elections in Estonia, March 1999. *Electoral Studies*, 20, 141-146.
- For Human Rights in a United Latvia. (2004). *Программа объединения «За права человека в единой Латвии» для выборов 7-го Сейма в 1998 г.* Retrieved January 16, 2008, from For Human Rights in a United Latvia: http://www.pctvl.lv/index.php?lang=ru&mode=party&submode=program&page_id=663

- For Human Rights in a United Latvia. (2004). *ПРОГРАММА объединения политических организаций «За права человека в единой Латвии» для выборов 8-го Сейма*. Retrieved January 2008, 16, from For Human Rights in a United Latvia web site:
http://www.pctvl.lv/index.php?lang=ru&mode=party&submode=program&page_id=89
- For Human Rights in a United Latvia. (2006). *Программы*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from For Human Rights in a United Latvia website:
<http://www.pctvl.lv/index.php?lang=ru&mode=party&submode=program>
- Franklin, M. N. (2001). Electoral Participation. In R. G. Niemi, & H. F. Weisberg, *Controversies in Voting Behavior* (4th Edition ed., pp. 83-99). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Franklin, M. N. (2004). *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Gallagher, M. (1992). Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities. *British Journal of Political Science*, 22, 469-496.
- Gallagher, M. (1991). Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies*, 10, 33-51.
- Gamm, G. H. (1989). *The making of New Deal Democrats: Voting behavior and realignment in Boston, 1920-1940*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gamson, W. A. (1968). *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- Gamson, W. A. (1975). *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- Geertz, C. (1963). The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States. In C. Geertz (Ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa* (pp. 105-157). New York: The Free Press.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Graves, S., & Lee, J. (2000). Ethnic underpinnings of voting preference: Latinos and the 1996 U. S. senate election in Texas. *Social Science Quarterly*, 81 (1), 226-236.
- Greene, S. (1999). Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach. *Political Psychology*, 20 (2), 393-403.
- Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Greens/European Free Alliance, The. (2008). *Who We Are: Presentation*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from The Greens/European Free Alliance Website: <http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/default/rubrik/6/6646.presentation@en.htm>
- Grofman, B., Mikkel, E., & Taagepera, R. (2000). Fission and fusion of parties in Estonia, 1987-1999. *Journal of Baltic Studies* , 31 (4), 329 - 357.
- Gunter, A. (2004, December 15). Center Party signs cooperation protocol with Kremlin-controlled United Russia. *The Baltic Times* .
- Gupta, D. K. (1998). Ethnicity and Politics in the US: The Predicament of the African-American Minority. *Ethnic Studies Report* , 16, 215-254.
- Gynter, A. (2000, June 29). Russian Baltic Party of Estonia becomes a new political force. *The Baltic Times* .
- Harmony Centre. (2007c). *НАШИ ЛЮДИ*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from Harmony Centre Web site: <http://www.saskanascents.lv/index.php?text&id=53&level=0>
- Harmony Centre. (2007a). *О НАС*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from Harmony Centre website: <http://www.saskanascents.lv/index.php?text&id=79&level=0>
- Harmony Centre. (2007b). *ПРОГРАММА*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from Harmony Centre Website: <http://www.saskanascents.lv/index.php?text&id=99&level=1>
- Hartwig, F., Jenkins, W. R., & Temchin, E. M. (1980). Variability in Electoral Behavior: The 1960, 1968, and 1976 Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* , 24 (3), 553-558.
- Henderson, K. (2004). Developments in the Applicant States. *Journal of Common Market Studies* , 42, 153-167.
- Herron, E. S. (2008). The parliamentary election in Ukraine, September 2007. *Electoral Studies* , 27, 551-555.
- Hesli, V. L. (2007). *Governments and Politics in Russia and the Post-Soviet Region*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Hesli, V. L. (1995). Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 25, 91-121.
- Hesli, V. L., Erdem, E., Reisinger, W., & Miller, A. (1999). The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* , 7, 42-72.
- Hintjens, H. M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* , 37, 241-286.

- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hogan-Brun, G., & Ramoniené, M. (2003). Emerging Language and Education Policies in Lithuania. *Language Policy* , 2, 27-45.
- Holmberg, S. (2003). Are political parties necessary? *Electoral Studies* , 22, 287-299.
- Holm-Hansen, J. (1999). Political Integration in Kazakhstan. In P. Kolsto, *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan* (pp. 153-226). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). *The Third Wave*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Isaacs, H. R. (1974). Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe. *Ethnicity* , 1, 15-41.
- Jackman, R. W., & Volpert, K. (1996). Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Political Science* , 26, 501-521.
- Jackson, J. E. (1975). Issues, Party Choices, and Presidential Votes. *American Journal of Political Science* , 19, 161-185.
- Jennings, M. K., & Niemi, R. G. (1974). *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools*. Princeton: Princeton University Press'.
- Johnston, M. (1979). Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage. *American Political Science Review* , 73, 385-398.
- Jurkynas, M. (2005). The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Lithuania. *Electoral Studies* , 24, 770-777.
- Kahn, K. F., & Kenney, P. J. (1999). *The Spectacle of U.S. Senate Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kelly, C. (1988). Intergroup differentiation in a political context. *British Journal of Social Psychology* , 27, 319-332.
- Kelly, C. (1989). Political identity and perceived intragroup homogeneity. *British Journal of Social Psychology* , 28, 239-250.
- Kennedy, P. (2001). *A Guide to Econometrics*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Keskerakond. (2005). *Programm*. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from Estonian Centre Party website: <http://www.keskerakond.ee/>

- Key, V. (1964). *Politics, parties, and pressure groups*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell .
- Khrychikov, S., & Miall, H. (2002). Conflict Prevention in Estonia: the Role of the Electoral System. *Security Dialogue* , 193-208.
- Kiewiet, D. R. (1983). *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, D. R. (1983). Diversity and complexity in American public opinion. In A. Finifter, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (pp. 389-425). Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
- Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: the American case. *British Journal of Political Science* , 11, 495-527.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* , 40, 414-431.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1985). Public Opinion and Political Action. In G. Lindzey, & E. (. Aronson, *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (Vol. II, pp. 659-741). New York: Random House.
- Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political Opportunity Structure and Political Protes: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* , 16, 63-37.
- Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., & McDonald, M. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kohn, H. (1944). *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*. New York: Macmillan.
- Krupavicius, A. (1997). The Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 1996. *Electoral Studies* , 16, 541-549.
- Kubicek, P. (2000). Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 52, 273-294.
- Laitin, D. L. (1998). *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lewis, P. (2000). *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*. New York: Routledge.

- Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1988). *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science* , 3, 183-219.
- Lietuvos Rusų Sąjunga. (2006). *O Partiji: Programma Sojuza Russkich Litvi*. Retrieved March 2, 2008, from Lithuanian Russian Union website:
<http://www.sojuzru.lt/index.php?name=Pages&op=page&pid=3>
- Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija. (2005). *Lietuvos socialdemokratų partijos programa*. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija web site:
<http://www.lsdp.lt/index.php?867117891>
- Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Linz, J. (1973). Early state building and late peripheral nationalisms against the state: The case of Spain. In S. Eisenstadt, & S. Rokkan, *Building States and Nations* (pp. 32-116). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Lipset, S. M. (1981). *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press.
- Lipsky, M. (1968). Protest as Political Resource. *American Political Science Review* , 62, 1144-1158.
- Lodge, M., McGraw, K. M., & Stroh, P. (1989). An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation. *American Political Science Review* , 83, 399-419.
- Long, J. S. (1997). *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Lorinskas, R. A., Hawkins, B. W., & Edwards, S. D. (1969). The Persistence of Ethnic Voting in Urban and Rural Areas: Results from the Controlled Election Method. *Social Science Quarterly* , 49, 891-899.
- Lowi, T. J. (1964). *The Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and power in New York City*. London: Collier-MacMillan.
- MacKuen, M. B., Erikson, R. S., & Stimson, J. A. (1989). Macropartisanship. *American Political Science Review* , 83, 1125-1142.

- Mansbridge, J. (2000). What does a Representative Do? Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and Historically Denigrated Status. In W. Kymlicka, & W. Norman (Eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (pp. 99-123). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marcus, G. (1988). The Structure of Emotional Response: 1984 Presidential Candidates. *American Political Science Review* , 82 (3), 737-761.
- Markus, G. B. (1979). The Political Environment and the Dynamics of Public Attitudes: A Panel Study. *American Journal of Political Science* , 23, 338-359.
- Markus, G. B., & Converse, P. E. (1979). A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice. *American Political Science Review* , 73 (4), 1055-1070.
- Mattei, F., & Niemi, R. G. (1991). Unrealized Partisans, Realized Independents, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Partisan Identification. *Journal of Politics* , 53, 161-174.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements. *American Journal of Sociology* , 82, 1212-1241.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1973). *The Trend of Social Movements*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning.
- Melvin, N. (1995). *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Miller, A. H., Erb, G., Reisinger, W. M., & Hesli, V. L. (2000). Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction? *Journal of Politics* , 62 (2), 455-490.
- Miller, A. H., Miller, W. E., Raine, A. S., & Brown, T. A. (1976). A majority party in disarray: Policy polarization in the 1972 election. *American Political Science Review* , 70, 753-778.
- Minorities at Risk. (2009). *Assessment for Russians in Estonia*. Retrieved October 20, 2009, from Minorities at Risk Dataset:
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36601>
- Minorities at Risk Project. (2005). *College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management*. Retrieved January 18, 2008, from
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>
- Mollenkopf, J. H. (1992). *A Phoenix in the Ashes: The rise and fall of the Koch coalition in New York City politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Morris, H. M. (2004). President, party and nationality policy in Latvia, 1991-1999. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 56 (4), 543-569.

- Moser, R. G. (1999). Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States. *World Politics* , 51, 359-384.
- Nagel, J., & Olzak, S. (1982). Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the Competition Model. *Social Problems* , 30, 127-143.
- Narodna Partiya. (2009). *Історія Народної Партії*. Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Narodna Partiya web site: <http://narodna.org.ua/about/>
- Narodna Partiya. (2009). *Програма Народної Партії* . Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Narodna Partiya website: <http://narodna.org.ua/ua/about/programa/>
- Nash, M. (1989). *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nie, N., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. (1976). *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Niemi, R. G., & Jennings, M. K. (1991). Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification. *American Journal of Political Science* , 35 (4), 970-988.
- Norpoth, H. (1996). Presidents and the Prospective Voter. *Journal of Politics* , 58, 776-792.
- Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oberschall, A. (1973). *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Olson, D. M. (1998). Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe. *Political Studies* , 46, 432-464.
- Olzak, S. (1983). Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization. *Annual Review of Sociology* , 355-374.
- Olzak, S. (1992). *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. V. (1994). Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Science* , 38, 100-123.
- Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. V. (1997). Toward Stability or Crisis? *Journal of Democracy* , 8, 27-42.
- Our Ukraine. (2008). *Ustanovchi Documenti: Programa*. Retrieved February 13, 2008, from Our Ukraine web site: <http://www.razom.org.ua/documents/443/>

- Pacek, A. C. (1994). Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* , 38, 723-744.
- Page, B. I., & Jones, C. C. (1979). Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote. *American Political Science Review* , 73, 1071-1089.
- Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (2005). Rethinking the Link Between Categorization and Prejudice Within the Social Cognition Perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* , 9, 108-130.
- Pettai, V. (2004). The parliamentary elections in Estonia, March 2003. *Electoral Studies* , 23, 828-834.
- Pettai, V., & Hallik, K. (2002). Understanding processes of ethnic control: segmentation, dependency and co-optation in post-communist Estonia. *Nations and Nationalism* , 8 (4), 505-529.
- Popkin, S. L. (1991). *The Reasoning Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Popkin, S. L., Gorman, J., Smith, J., & Phillips, C. (1976). Comment: Toward an Investment Theory of Voting Behavior: What Have You Done for Me Lately? *American Political Science Review* , 70 (3), 779-804.
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, G. B. (1986). American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective. *American Political Science Review* , 80, 17-43.
- Pridham, G. (2007). Legitimizing European Union Accession? Political Elites and Public Opinion in Latvia, 2003-2004. *Party Politics* , 13 (5), 563-586 .
- Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill.
- Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. (1972). *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
- Rae, D. W. (1967). *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Rahn, W. M. (1993). The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates. *American Journal of Political Science* , 37, 472-496.
- Rahn, W. M., Krosnick, J. A., & Breuning, M. (1994). Rationalization and Derivation Processes in Survey Studies of Political Candidate Evaluation. *American Journal of Political Science* , 38 (3), 582-600.

- Sartori, G. (1970). Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 64 (4), 1033-1053.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1975). *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
- Schulman, M. A., & Pomper, G. M. (1975). Variability in Electoral Behavior: Longitudinal Perspectives from Causal Modeling. *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1), 1-18.
- Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L. D., & Krysan, M. (1997). *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schumpeter, J. (1947). *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd Edition ed.). New York: Harper.
- Sherif, M., Harvey, O., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman: University of Oklahoma, Institute of Intergroup Relations.
- Shugart, M. S., & Wattenberg, M. P. (2001). Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology. In M. S. Shugart, & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), *Mixed-member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* (pp. 9-24). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shvetsova, O. (1999). A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998. *Electoral Studies*, 18, 397-409.
- Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: a social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist*, 56, 319-331.
- Simonsen, S. G. (2001). Compatriot Games: Explaining the 'Diaspora Linkage' in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53 (5), 771-791.
- Smith, A. D. (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1981). *The Ethnic Revival*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. W. (1985). Cohorts, Education, and the Evolution of Tolerance. *Social Science Research*, 14, 205-225.
- Smith, A. W. (1981). Racial Tolerance as a Function of Group Position. *American Sociological Review*, 46, 558-573.

- Smith, G., & Wilson, A. (1997). Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-east Estonia. *Europe-Asia Studies* , 49, 845-864.
- Smith-Sivertsen, H. (2004). Latvia. In S. Berglund, J. Ekman, & F. H. Aarebrot (Eds.), *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (2nd Edition ed., pp. 95-132). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Snow, D. A., Zurcher, L. A., & Eklund-Olson, S. (1980). Social networks and social movements. *American Sociological Review* , 45, 787-801.
- Snyder, J. (2000). *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: WW Norton and Company.
- Statistical Office of Estonia. (2000). *2000 Population and Housing Census: Citizenship, Nationality, Mother Tongue and Command of Foreign Languages*. Retrieved March 4, 2008, from Statistics Estonia:
<http://www.stat.ee/files/eva2003/RV200102.pdf>
- Statistics Lithuania. (2009). *M3010215: Population by ethnicity* . Retrieved October 28, 2009, from Statistics Department Database of Indicators:
<http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp>
- Steen, A. (2000). Ethnic relations, elites and democracy in the Baltic states. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* , 16 (4), 68-87.
- Taagepera, R. (1995). Estonian parliamentary elections, March 1995. *Electoral Studies* , 14, 328-331.
- Taagepera, R. (1995). Estonian parliamentary elections, March 1995. *Electoral Studies* , 14 (3), 328-331.
- Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. S. (1993). Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect. *American Political Science Review* , 87 (2), 455-464.
- Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. S. (1989). *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1970). Aspects of national and ethnic loyalty. *Social Science Information* , 9, 119-144.
- Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and inter-group behavior. *Social Science Information* , 13, 65-93.

- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel, & W. G. Austin, *Psychology of Inter-group Relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Tavits, M. (2005). The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* , 49, 283-298.
- Tillman, E. R. (2008). Economic Judgments, Party Choice, and Voter Abstention in Cross-National Perspective. *Comparative Political Studies* , 41, 1290-1309.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Tonkin, E., McDonald, M., & Chapman, M. (1989). *History and Ethnicity*. London: Routledge.
- Tufte, E. R. (1975). Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review* , 69, 812-26.
- United Left Party of Estonia. (2009). *About the Party*. Retrieved October 27, 2009, from United Left Party of Estonia website: http://www.vasak.ee/o_partii.html
- United Left Party of Estonia. (2009). *Party Program*. Retrieved October 27, 2009, from United Left Party of Estonia website: <http://www.vasak.ee/programma.html>
- Van Cott, D. L. (2005). *From Movements of Parties in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Cott, D. L. (2003). Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America. *Latin American Politics and Society* , 45, 1-39.
- Van den Berghe, P. (1978). Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* , 1 (4), 402-411.
- Vene Erakond Eestis (Russian Party of Estonia). (2004). *Osnovnie Poloshenija Programmi RPE*. Retrieved January 15, 2008, from Russian Party of Estonia Website: <http://www.rusparty.ee/?smg=15>
- Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Weisberg, H. F., & Rusk, J. G. (1970). Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation. *American Political Science Review* , 64, 1167-1185.
- Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and Identity: The Significance of Inclusion for Perceptions of Entitlement and the Justice Motive. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* , 26, 157-176.

- White, S., Rose, R., & McAllister, I. (1997). *How Russia Votes*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
- White, S., Wyman, M., & Kryshchanovskaya, O. (1995). Parties and Politics in Post-communist Russia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* , 28 (2), 183-202.
- Whiteley, P. F. (1988). The Causal Relationship between Issues, Candidate Evaluations, Party Identification, and Vote Choice - the View from "Rolling Thunder". *Journal of Politics* , 50 (4), 961-984.
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). *Who votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- World Bank, The. (2009, April). *Key Development Data and Statistics*. Retrieved September 25, 2009, from The World Bank Web site:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>
- Zake, I. (2002). The People's Party in Latvia: Neo-Liberalism and the New Politics of Independence. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* , 18 (3), 109-131.
- Zvidrins, P. (1993). Changes of ethnic structure in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. *Humanities and Social Sciences (Latvia)* , 1 (1), 10-26.