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HOW TO “SELL” ENGAGED POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL BENEFITS IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

By

Edmond David Hally

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Political Science in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2007

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Alfonso J. Damico

ABSTRACT

Deliberative democratic theory proposes an active citizenry that becomes empowered by discussing and taking and active part in politics. There is a large gap between theory and practice in the deliberative democratic literature. Namely, while many scholars have theorized why deliberative democracy can be considered normatively desirable, fewer studies have measured whether the benefits gained from deliberation are plausible. Almost all of the major empirical studies in the literature involve either quasi-experimental designs or fieldwork. As such, it becomes difficult to tell whether or not deliberation does produce benefits for individuals, and if so, how durable these gains are.

This doctoral dissertation project explores the individual benefits of deliberation by defining, describing and defending the desirability of the more commonly cited benefits. This is followed by a full experimental set-up that includes one control group and three different treatment groups that participate in different forms of deliberation. The treatment groups include: a group that only watches deliberation, a group that participates in a non-hierarchical and informal discussion, and a group that participates in a rigorously-moderated and highly structured deliberation. The hypotheses indicate that different treatment conditions will have different effects on the existence and magnitude of the two types of individual benefits: civic and educative.

Abstract Approved: ________________________________
Thesis Supervisor

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Title and Department

____
Date

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Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Edmond David Hally

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science at the July 2007 graduation.

Thesis Committee: ________________________________
Alfonso Damico, Thesis Supervisor

____
John Nelson

____
David Redlawsk

____
Cary Covington

____
David Depew

To Beth

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ABSTRACT

Deliberative democratic theory proposes an active citizenry that becomes empowered by discussing and taking and active part in politics. There is a large gap between theory and practice in the deliberative democratic literature. Namely, while many scholars have theorized why deliberative democracy can be considered normatively desirable, fewer studies have measured whether the benefits gained from deliberation are plausible. Almost all of the major empirical studies in the literature involve either quasi-experimental designs or fieldwork. As such, it becomes difficult to tell whether or not deliberation does produce benefits for individuals, and if so, how durable these gains are.

This doctoral dissertation project explores the individual benefits of deliberation by defining, describing and defending the desirability of the more commonly cited benefits. This is followed by a full experimental set-up that includes one control group and three different treatment groups that participate in different forms of deliberation. The treatment groups include: a group that only watches deliberation, a group that participates in a non-hierarchical and informal discussion, and a group that participates in a rigorously-moderated and highly structured deliberation. The hypotheses indicate that different treatment conditions will have different effects on the existence and magnitude of the two types of individual benefits: civic and educative.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES vii

LIST OF FIGURES x

CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND 1

- Introduction 1
- The link between democracy and deliberation 4
  - Democracy 4
  - Deliberation 8
  - Deliberation's relationship to democracy 25
- Modern deliberative democratic theory and competing democratic theory 28
  - Elite democratic theory 28
  - Aggregative democratic theory 32
  - Deliberative democracy as alternative 38
- Conclusion 45

CHAPTER 2 – INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS 47

- Introduction 47
- The benefits of deliberation 49
  - Societal benefits 50
  - Procedural benefits 52
  - Individual benefits 55
- Why individual benefits? 61
- Individual benefits in this study 65
  - Educative benefits 69
  - Civic benefits 80
- Conclusion 91

CHAPTER 3 – DESIRABILITY OF BENEFITS 93

- Introduction 93
- Justification of individual level benefits 96
  - Increased information 96
  - Political sophistication 104
  - Self-interest awareness 110
  - Tolerance 116
  - Moral development 126
  - Participation 132
- Conclusion 142

CHAPTER 4 – PLAUSBILITY OF BENEFITS 144

Introduction 144
Literature review 144
Hypotheses 148
Methods 150
  General procedure 150
  Experimental procedure 152
  Participants 158
  Dependent and independent variables 161
Findings 162
  Increased information 162
  Creativity 167
  Political sophistication 173
  Self-interest awareness 177
  Tolerance 182
  Moral development 186
  Affection 193
  Participation 199
Discussion 203
  Increased information 203
  Creativity 208
  Political sophistication 210
  Self-interest awareness 211
  Tolerance 213
  Moral development 215
  Affection 217
  Participation 218
Conclusion 220

APPENDIX A PRE-SURVEY AND POST-SURVEY 226

APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS 263

BIBLIOGRAPHY 284

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Running Tally of Terrorism Knowledge Questions 164

Table 2. Running Tally of Illegal Immigration Questions 164

Table 3. Running Tally of Subject Knowledge Questions 165

Table 4. Running Tally of All Knowledge Questions 165

Table 5. Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on Illegal Immigration Questions 166

Table 6. Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on Debate Subject Questions 167

Table 7. Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on All Knowledge Questions 167

Table 8. Paired t-test results for political sophistication 176

Table 9. Personal Stake in Terrorism 181

Table 10. Personal Stake in Global Warming 181

Table 11. Personal Stake in Illegal Immigration 181

Table 12. Respondents' Toleration of Disagreeable People 183

Table 13. Respondents Being Tolerated by People Who Disagree with Them 183

Table 14. Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Follow Political News 201

Table 15. Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Vote in Midterm Elections 201

Table 16. Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Vote in Local Elections 201

Table 17. Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Campaign for Politicians 202

Table B1. Gender 263

Table B2. Age 263

Table B3. Race 263

Table B4. Income Level 264

Table B5. UWSP College 264

Table B6. Like to Have Responsibility for Situations Involving a Lot of Thinking 264

Table B7. Prefer to Solve Simple or Complex Problems 265

Table B8. Better to Have Definite Opinions or Remain Neutral 265

Table B9. Do People Follow Your Leadership Abilities? 265

Table B10. How Many Hours a Week do you Spend Getting Information about Politics/ Current Events? 266

Table B11. Political Ideology from Very Liberal to Very Conservative 266

Table B12. Running tally of general knowledge questions 266

Table B13. Running tally of knowledge questions about global warming 267

Table B14. Number of “don’t know” or blank answers for questions about general knowledge 267

Table B15. Number of “don’t know” or blank answers for questions about Terrorism 267

Table B16. Number of “don’t know” or blank answers for questions about global warming 268

Table B17. Respondent Views about Toleration, in General 268

Table B18. Respondent Views about Reasonableness of People He/She Disagrees with 268

Table B19. Respondent Viewed as Reasonable by People Who Disagree with Him/Her 269

Table B20. Respondent Like for People of Their Own Age Group 269

Table B21. Respondent Like for People of Different Political Persuasions 269

Table B22. Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Write Letters to Politicians 270

Table B23. Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Attend Political Rallies 270

Table B24. Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Have Discussions about Politics 270

Table B25. Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Vote in Presidential Elections 271

Table B26. Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Help Turn-out the Vote 271

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Terrorism 169

Figure 2. Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Global Warming 170

Figure 3. Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Illegal Immigration 171

Figure 4. Respondent Creativity – Solutions to a Political Problem in the Follow-up Interview 173

Figure 5. Respondent Views on Reasonableness of Experimental Group 184

Figure 6. Respondent Views on Tolerability of Experimental Group 185

Figure 7. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Terrorist Suspect Legal Rights 190

Figure 8. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Illegal Immigration Being a Felony 191

Figure 9. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 192

Figure 10. How Positively Respondents Rated Their Fellow Subjects 195

Figure 11. Likelihood of Subjects Keeping in Touch with Others from Experiment 196

Figure 12. How Likeable Respondents Rated Their Fellow Subjects 197

Figure 13. Respondents Keeping in Touch with New Friends/Acquaintances From Experiment 198

Figure B1. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 272

Figure B2. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 273

Figure B3. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 274

Figure B4. Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 275

Figure B5. Societal Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Civil Liberties and Security 276

Figure B6. Societal Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction 277

Figure B7. Societal Moral Development Score for Question about whether Illegal Immigrants Help or Hurt Their Communities 278

Figure B8. Participation – Has the Respondent Voted in a Local Election? 279

Figure B9. Participation – Has the Respondent Attended a Political Meeting or Rally? 280

Figure B10. Participation – Has the Respondent Written a Letter to a Politician? 281

Figure B11. Participation – Has the Respondent Discussed Politics with Friends and/or Family? 282

Figure B12. Participation – Has the Respondent Sought Out Information about Politics? 283

CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND

> "Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."
>
> -Winston Churchill

Introduction-

Winston Churchill's famous quip may be true in practice, if not overly bleak in prognosis. While well-designed democracies in the modern world have typically produced stable and prosperous societies, democracy typically has a "least of many evils" quality that the Churchill quote attributes to it. Namely, in states without mandatory voting or automatic registration, the democratic citizen's natural inclination seems to be more often to stay home on election day, to avoid writing letters to legislators, to remain blissfully ignorant of politics, and to groan at even the mention of civic roles like jury duty (Putnam 2002: 405–407).

Some claim this is almost an entirely modern phenomenon, laying the blame on recent generations for failing to live up to the model of the "ideal citizen" (Putnam 2000: 275). However, others remind us that even in times (mistakenly) associated with an overabundance of good citizenship, the average person was less than enthusiastic about democracy. For instance, John Dewey's complaints about his fellow early twentieth century Americans seem straight out of the mouth of a modern day participatory democrat: citizens do not vote, only participate indirectly, are skeptical about the system, and have low voter efficacy (Dewey 1984: 308–309). Likewise, both Plato and the leading minds of "democratic" ancient Greece were skeptical about the theory of democracy and also of the people's ability to carry it out (Cross and Woozley 1964: 198).

Democratic theorists have made many attempts to rescue the theory and practice of democracy from itself. Sometimes, these attempts are in the form of practical reforms, like Progressive referenda, which may backfire and become subject to manipulation and/or majority tyranny (Ethington 1999: 212). Other times, democratic theory excuses, enables, or exonerates the minimalist democracy too often seen today, such as the aggregative or elite models of democracy discussed below.

In contrast, deliberative democratic theory is a recent body of democratic theory that acknowledges the shortcomings of democracy, but proposes that citizens can do better (and in turn *become* better) by incorporating deliberation into the decision-making and public opinion forming processes. In doing so, the deliberative project coheres well with the long-standing tradition of participatory democracy, emphasized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, as well as modern day counterparts like Benjamin Barber and Jane Mansbridge. But the deliberative project is more focused on the transformative power that citizen to citizen *communication* has on democratic societies, processes, and individuals, as opposed to participatory democrats' more expansive focus on participation and political activity. So while both schools emphasize the transformative power of involvement in politics, there are differences in the order of priority. Deliberative democrats claim that before the dreams of participatory democrats can be realized, citizens must be able to know, understand, and speak about politics. In the words of John Dewey, the only possible solution comes through "perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action" (Dewey 1984: 332).

This dissertation contributes to the deliberative project by highlighting and quantifying a relatively unexplored topic in deliberative theory—individual benefits. For a variety of reasons discussed in the chapters below, deliberative scholars are hesitant to promote the project in terms of the individual benefits of deliberation—that discussing politics may make individuals smarter, more connected to each other, more likely and capable of participating in politics, etc. Thus, the central contention of this dissertation is that individual benefits are an understudied, but valuable supplement to deliberative democratic theory. I make this point by first listing, defining and categorizing the individual benefits of deliberative democracy. Then, I defend controversial individual benefits by examining how they could go wrong, but why these negative possibilities are not enough to sink this aspect of the deliberative project. I conclude with an experiment that tests the likelihood that individual benefits actually do arise from deliberation. Overall, I do not hope to change the deliberative paradigm, but rather to add to it in subtly important ways. This addition entails the inclusion of individual benefits as a worthwhile and hopefully effective selling point of deliberative democracy. Ideally, individual benefits could be a very crucial way to move the deliberative democracy from largely theoretical realms into the actual democratic process.

However, before I elaborate my specific arguments in favor of individual benefits, some background on deliberative democracy is necessary. The chapter below serves as a brief introduction to the theory and practice that has lead up to the modern deliberative project. The first section explores the meanings and relationship of democracy to deliberation. In particular, the fundamental aspects of deliberation are explored by highlighting some examples of deliberative practice and thought throughout history. By nature, these examples are only brief glimpses into history in order to elaborate what the deliberative enterprise entails, not full elaborations of any one historical period or theorist. The operating assumption throughout this section is that the modern deliberative project has drawn inspiration from historical forms of deliberation, but is also producing something unique to the contemporary world. The final section discusses deliberative democracy's antagonism to twentieth century versions of democratic theory. This background on the origins and aspects of deliberative theory will set the stage for the specific analysis of the individual benefits of deliberation discussed in Chapter 2.

The link between democracy and deliberation

What is deliberation and what does it have to do with democracy? This section will clear up definitional ambiguities in an attempt to clarify what is meant by the words *democracy* and *deliberation* in the context of this paper. Because deliberation is more central to this paper, a longer part of the chapter will be devoted to explaining various aspects of the word with reference to historical and theoretical examples of deliberation. After that, the intersection between the two words will be explored briefly – is deliberation the product of democracy, a necessary component, an evolutionary stage of it, or something else entirely? At the moment, this examination of deliberative democracy will be exploratory and theoretical. A description of the specifics of the deliberative project will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.

Democracy

Despite being more frequently used than “deliberation”, “democracy” is not easy to define, because, as both concept and a practice, it has evolved greatly throughout history. As a practice, democracy may have come about because of practical means, a way for Greek ruler Kleisthenes to secure a power base amongst the common people (Dunn 2005: 33). Because of this, democracy was held in low regard by many of the classical Greek theorists. For instance, Aristotle included it in his list of bad governments, because he saw it operating in the interest of the poor, not in the interests of the community. What Aristotle called *politeia* (polity – popular government in the common interest) is closer to what modern day people have in mind when they put democracy on a pedestal (Ibid: 47). Despite a somewhat cynical and contested start, the word currently carries great rhetorical appeal. Hence like the words, "globalization" or "terrorism," it is one of those words that begins to lose its standard meaning as more people misapply and stretch the concept.

At its base, democracy consists of *demos-* (common people) and *–kratos* (rule, strength) (Online Etymology Dictionary). Throughout history, most democracies have had some elements of common rule, although very few come close to the ideal. A pure form of democracy, in which citizens make all the decisions at all levels, is not feasible for any real amount of time. The experience of ancient Athenians is typically cited as the closest system to being a pure democracy. However, even in this case, democratic decision-making was not always directly accomplished by the citizens for two reasons. First, ninety percent of the population was shut out from the process. By modern standards, at least, such an overly exclusive system is difficult to classify as a democracy. But second, even in ancient Athens, a lot of the decision making did not come from the *ekklesia* (the Assembly). Thus, much of what came out of this "direct" democracy was decidedly indirect (Sartori 1987: 111). Despite these shortcomings, Athens remains at least a symbolic representation of democracy in a pure form.

Modern proponents of direct democracy typically tap into this ideal image of Athens by championing a widespread referendum process in which citizens vote directly on decisions which will become binding. And while this might make modern systems more democratic, few think that this could completely take over the function of government in a modern era. Allowing "common" people to make all the decisions in a fast-paced, heavily-populated and geographically expansive country would be a logistical nightmare.

Instead, most democracies throughout history have been mixed systems in which democratic elements are combined with other institutions. For instance, Vikings held assemblies called *Tings* in which disputes were settled, laws were debated, and kings were voted upon. A larger, national version was established by Vikings in Iceland around 900 A. D., called the *Althing*; it lasted for three centuries (Dahl 1998: 18–20). The *Althing*, like the Greek Assemblies, drew a large portion of eligible citizens, even though much of the decision making power still rested with the chieftains. It was also semi-federal in that local *Tings* met and reported to the national *Althing* (Magnusson 1977: 13). In addition, Italian republics existed from 1100 to about 1300 A.D. This was not the large, modern democracy that is seen today, but was similar to the city-state based democracy of ancient Athens. As with earlier examples, it started as an Assembly for the wealthy and elite, but generally expanded the franchise to merchants and bankers of the protean middle class (Dahl 1998: 15). In the modern world, most legitimate democracies are representative democracies, in that people select executives and lawmakers who govern on their behalf.

However, these criteria are not as objective as they appear at first glance. Democracy has become a buzzword in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the term has been appropriated by regimes with the barest veneer of democracy—places in which voting is for show and individual liberties are not protected, such as "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea." In practice, this label does not tend to fool the rest of the world into thinking that conditions are better in that country than they appear. Instead, it is more of a rhetorical flourish to legitimate policies as being decided "by the people."

However, even "good" democrats have been responsible for diluting the word's meaning over the last century. An example is how the American government began increasingly equating democracy with anything non-communist in the 1950's, including very repressive regimes. Likewise, in the industrialized West, democracy has become, if not synonymous with, at least inextricably linked to material progress and the freedom to engage in a market economy (Mattson 1997: 2).

So can a word that has seen so many different incarnations, meanings, and connotations really mean anything coherent for the deliberative project? Most deliberative democrats are certainly not direct or pure democrats. An extensive system of national, state-level and local referenda would definitely be more purely democratic, in that it would give decision making power directly to the people. However, if it is not deliberative, it is subject to the same media manipulation and demagoguery that is associated with current democratic practice. Even in recent history, referenda have produced, if not anti-democratic, certainly quite illiberal measures that have been exclusionary and liberty-restricting (Ethington 1999: 212). Many modern day deliberative democrats take a page from Progressive reformers who, while advocating direct democratic reforms, also argued that referenda only really worked if they went hand-in-hand with an educative assembly like civic forums (Mattson 1997: 45).

Deliberative democrats do not typically feel the need to identify some ideal type of democracy to which deliberative practices should be applied. However, there are certain democratic criteria that should be met before deliberation can become part of the democratic practices of a state. Hence, repressive and/or illiberal regimes, despite calling themselves democracies, do not have sufficient protections in place for real deliberation to flourish. The typical hallmarks of a democracy[1] should be met to a reasonable degree before deliberative practices would be meaningful. Once these basic conditions are met, some societies may be more receptive to typically perceived deliberation than others (Gambetta 1998: 38), but all reasonably democratic countries are contenders.

Deliberation

Etymologically speaking, the Latin components of *deliberation* consist of *de-* (entirely) and *–liberere* or *–librare* (to balance or weigh) (Online Etymology Dictionary). The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines *deliberation as,* "a discussion and consideration by a group of persons of the reasons for and against a measure" (Merriam-Webster 2000: 304). Both the composition and the definition of the word highlight the essential aspect of commonly understood deliberation—the act of weighing alternatives with the implication of making some type of a decision based on the result.

However, the etymology of a word is only part of the story. Assessing what the word means in actuality requires noting the forms and practices associated with it both throughout history and in contemporary times. This section will undertake an examination of the features of deliberation by making reference to deliberative forms and theory. These references are not meant to be complete descriptions of any particular historical period or mode of thought. Rather, the references are for elaborative purposes only. They enable us to get a better understanding of how, why, with whom, and about what one deliberates.

---

[1] These include: 1) elected officials; 2) free elections; 3) freedom of expression; 4) alternate sources of information; 5) associational autonomy; and 6) inclusive citizenship (Dahl 1998: 85).

How to deliberate

Both etymology and definition posit that deliberation is at least a thoughtful process, if not sometimes also a drawn-out one. However, common usage of the word can associate deliberation with a quick decision making process. For instance, very few people, when deliberating about where to have dinner with a group of friends, do so by "entirely weighing" all of the options in town (Fearon 1998: 45–46). Nevertheless, even in this case, deliberation is usually the more thought-out process than the alternatives – voting or bargaining. Beyond this, deliberation has no typical procedure – some groups vote after deliberation, other groups use deliberation as an information gathering tool for future inquiries, and yet others deliberate without the intention of producing action. Additionally, communication is an implied, but very necessary component of the "weighing" process. This section examines several historical instances of the process of deliberation, looking at both the face-to-face process of how people deliberate as well as the organizational aspects of getting people together to deliberate.

Some deliberative scholars point to Socratic *elenchus*[2] as an early model for how individuals deliberate. To be sure, *elenchus* does have a few things in common with modern, mainstream versions of deliberative democratic speech – given reasons are expected to be sincere, and an appeal to logic is seen as better than an appeal to image or emotions (Shiffman 2004: 100–101). But the similarities end there, as Plato makes it clear that *elenchus* is a philosophic inquiry for the betterment of individuals – certainly not a decision-making tool or political speech (Ibid: 104–105). Thus, for Plato, the process of deliberation is tied to self-betterment, not some democratic process.

Thus, deliberation involves communication, which is often verbal, but does not necessarily have to be.[3] Deliberation is a different process from conversations and/or discussions, because the deliberation implies persuasion, possibly conflict, and the intention to affect a future course of action. In contrast, conversations and discussions are usually associated with friendly exchanges, typically free from persuasion and conflict, and often simply for the purposes of talking. This is not to say that one can not find examples of non-confrontational, non-action oriented deliberations or hostile, persuasive conversations. Instead, the point is that deliberation is usually assumed to be a more purposeful activity than discussion.[4]

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[2] The Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines *elenchus* as refutation in syllogistic form. In this method of inquiry between either two or a small number of people, refutation starts with an original premise and breaks it down into newer or better premises.

[3] Recent studies by deliberative democrats examine the potential for political deliberation to be an electronic form of communication. See Iyengar et. al. (2005) for a good history and example of electronic deliberation.

[4] The words "discussion" and "conversation" will occasionally be used synonymously with deliberation throughout the paper. This choice is purely a stylistic one, to avoid overusing certain words and phrases. When used in this way, assume that these surrogates share more in common with the description of deliberation listed above than the descriptions of typical discussions and conversations.

The process of bringing individuals together for deliberation has also varied greatly in both historical practice and theory. An imperfect institutional example of citizen deliberation in the ancient world can be found in the institution of the Assembly (*ekklesia*), which was strongest and most democratic from the 5th through the 4th centuries B. C. Typically 6,000 citizens gathered at the Pnyx for the Assembly (Hansen 1991: 130–131).[5] Granted, with thousands of people in attendance, no face-to-face deliberation took place. Instead, debate was conducted by a series of extemporaneous speakers who gave short, persuasive speeches. Theoretically, any citizen present could come forth and give a speech, even if in practice only a small minority had the training and courage to do so. Decisions were then made by estimating a show of hands (Ibid: 142-147).

The American Progressive Era, and the decades that followed, saw a variety of deliberative forms. Sometimes, they were more pseudo-deliberative in nature, such as "tent meeting" forums in Cleveland, the People's Institute in New York, or the Ford Hall forums in Boston. The format typically consisted of either a lecture by an expert or two experts debating either side of a controversial issue. This was then followed by a shorter question-and-answer session (Mattson 1997: 37-38). In this form, the public was given some ownership over contemporary and pressing issues. However, this is deliberation in its most minimal form because the conversation took place between those who governed and those who were governed, with the former in the role of expert and the latter in the role of pupil.

More active and involved deliberative forms followed these tent meetings in subsequent years, such as the Rochester social centers movement and John Studebaker's public forums. Many scholars of the era consider these examples to be very close to the "ideal type" of deliberation. This is because these meetings consisted not just of talking, but of citizens coming together to weigh public alternatives and examine solutions to problems both close to home and national in scope (Mattson 1997: 59). In these examples, citizens not only received a larger portion of the discussion time, but they also helped set the agenda.

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[5] The citizen population for this time varies between 30,000 and 60,000. Thus, while this is not a majority of the population, it is a sizable chunk that was involved directly in decision making (Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 8).

In Rochester, the social centers started, oddly enough, out of a desire to make use of public schools during after-hour periods when the buildings were going unused. Some suggested that the school grounds should be opened during the evenings for a variety of purposes. However, the purpose that eventually came to dominate in Rochester and elsewhere were the social centers which stressed deliberation (Mattson 1997: 48–49). The social centers provided a very detailed method for deliberation in a few regards: The people decided who and what was to be discussed/debated, citizens ran and organized the forums, and citizens determined political action that was to come out of the results (Mattson 1997: 52). This action involved the linked social clubs throughout the nation (after the idea had spread beyond Rochester) sending delegates to a monthly meeting where they looked over local laws and actions and tried to influence their various city and/or state governments (Mattson 1997: 55).

Similarly, in an effort to reconcile competing political ideologies, increase tolerance, and update themselves on current political information, Des Moines superintendent, John Studebaker, created public forums in Iowa's capital. These public discussions were lead by moderators trained in the issue at hand. The typical format was 10 minutes of "spot news," a 45 minute lecture from the group leader, and 30 minutes of very lively audience discussion. The whole experiment was financed by the Carnegie Corporation for $125,000 over a five-year period (Kunzman and Tyack 2005: 323–324, 327). The forums drew about one-sixth of the city's adult population in the first nine months (with many attending more than once) (Ibid: 331). Later, Studebaker was appointed Franklin Roosevelt's Commissioner of Education, at which point, he lobbied for the Des Moines experiment to be tried nationally. In 1936, he got his wish, and the Federal Emergency Relief Association provided $333,000 for a pilot project in ten cities. This initial project blossomed into hundreds of localized forums throughout the nation. The formats and styles differed from forum to forum and local school boards made decisions about staff and administration. (Ibid: 324 – 325). From February 1936 to April 1937, the first year's national forums drew over a million voluntary attendees (Ibid 2005: 331).

Modern deliberative democrats see deliberation taking place on either local levels or organized into a larger national entity, many of which imitate the designs of Progressive Era forum organizers. A good example of localized deliberation is the National Issues Forums, which use materials and resources from the Kettering Foundation. The NIF is a nationwide network that provides information, training, and resources to local forums wanting to organize a discussion on public policy issues. Similar to Studebaker's national forums, the NIF provides instruction through a variety of free or low cost issue-based discussion guides, although most of the issues involving topic, discussion style and staffing are made at the local level (NIFI).[6] National Issues

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[6] I had the privilege of participating as a discussion recorder in a National Issues Forum in July 2006 at the Des Moines public library. Ironically enough, the topic was "revitalizing democracy." Despite the relatively abstract subject matter and a lack of major advertising, forum organizers were generally pleased with the turnout and participation. About sixty participants opted for a discussion about democracy instead

Forums typically take an educative approach to deliberation – they are careful not to stress advocacy of any particular position past what individual respondents wish to advocate, themselves.

The NIF's decentralized approach produces mixed results. On one hand, decentralized deliberative forms are no doubt easier to organize than a singular "national dialogue." All of the predecessors of the NIF: Athenian citizen juries, Jefferson's ward-republics, New England town hall meetings and Progressive Era forums operated on the micro-level. However, too much decentralization produces sporadic and inconsistent results. NIF forums, despite being scheduled frequently, are still at the whim of local organizers to determine location and time. The 2006 NIF forum calendar shows that twenty states had scheduled NIF forums for the first half of 2006. And while this is a fantastic accomplishment, the flipside of this is that over half of the states in the country did not see a National Issues Forum for most of the year, if at all. Certain sites like Austin, Texas and Mesa, Arizona received a disproportionate number of forums because they are located in college towns or locales with a history and culture of civic participation.

Alternately, some deliberative democrats foresee ways to link many local deliberative experiences together into a coherent national discourse. This might not be ideal for an everyday decision making process, but rather a special process – a civic holiday. Fishkin and Ackerman's *Deliberation Day* imagines citizen discussion committees around that size within a modern context, with five hundred citizens or less

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of normal Saturday fare in Des Moines such as the downtown farmer's market or the Jazz Festival. On the downside, the respondents were disproportionally older, white, and educated. Nevertheless, post forum reports indicated that the respondents were typically enthusiastic about their experience and willing to spread the word should another forum be held in the future.

per Assembly. Each segment of the country would get their own Assembly, which would, in theory, give everyone who chooses to participate the opportunity (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004: 24–25, 237 n. 19).

Who deliberates

The Latin roots of the word provide no clues as to whom is doing the weighing. Dictionary definitions often portray deliberation as a group process. But common usage also highlights the notion of “inner deliberations,” in which one person weighs options for or against a course of action in her own mind. However, modern day deliberative democrats generally do not count this as actual deliberation, because (the Freudian model of personality aside) all options for or against a given action come from one source. The modern deliberative project portrays deliberation as a communicative exchange between individuals. By its very nature, this exchange is capable of altering or shifting preferences in the light of new information or persuasive argumentation. It is debatable whether or not inner deliberation is as capable of (truly) altering preferences, at least in the same way that face-to-face deliberation with other human beings can. Regardless, common parlance usually treats deliberation as an activity requiring more than one person.

As an extension of the question about who deliberates is *what type* of person deliberates. The examples in subsequent sections show that deliberation is historically associated with legal or political matters, and as such, is often a tool of the privileged. The Athenian Council in the legislative Assembly was composed of citizens, which excluded women, slaves, barbarians, and men without property (Poulkos 1997: 2). However, there are two reasons why one can consider the Athenian situation remarkable, even though it excluded a large segment of the population. First, these Athenian institutions rank much more highly than other supposedly “democratic” institutions of other ancient proto-democracies. James Fishkin describes the amount of deliberation in ancient Athens favorably in comparison to the Spartan method of Council selection, known as “the Shout.” In this method, potential Council members go before an audience that applauds and shouts for their favorite candidates. Isolated listeners judge the winner based on the loudness of the response. In this vein, both mass media-driven contemporary democracy and the Spartan “applaud-o-meter” seem much less inclusive or democratic than the Athenian Assembly (Fishkin 1997: 25–26).

Second, within the smaller category of citizens who were included in the process, anyone could deliberate. The Council (which directed the agenda of the Assembly), legislative commissions, and juries were selected by lot from the Assembly and rotated regularly to ensure wide participation and voice for the citizenry (Fishkin 1997: 19). The juries, in particular, became a real expression of the voice of the citizenry. About six thousand jury members were chosen each year, with about five hundred per court. These ordinary citizens, without regard for wealth or rank, made legitimate and final decisions on significant cases, including trials involving prominent Athenians (Poulkos 1997: 64; Dunn 2005: 37). Granted, this meant that although any citizen *could* be chosen, not all citizens were chosen. Hence, some might say that this is not a pure example of deliberative *democracy*. This argument is not damning if one considers the sheer logistics of the operation. No modern deliberative theorist thinks that all citizens need to voice an opinion on every decision. Deliberative theorists typically stress the need for an *opportunity* to participate, but realize that many will not. The Assembly presented this opportunity (to citizens), and hence, may be more participatory than representation through elections (Fishkin 1997: 21).

Aristotle's conception of "deliberative rhetoric" also had exclusionary overtones, as it was chiefly characterized as the consideration of public and private ends in a legislature (Nichols 1987: 663). Even Isocrates's version of deliberation, which was perhaps most public-friendly of all the ancient versions because it took the public agora as its venue, was still practiced primarily by those wealthy or well-born enough to attend his high-priced school (Poulkos 1997: 10). To be fair, Isocrates's deliberation was the most populist version of deliberation that would be seen until the Progressive Era for two reasons. First, Isocrates's perfect forum was the reconstituted agora, no longer primarily for intellectual exchanges, but now conceived as a place to disseminate wisdom to the public. Second, deliberation was not about battering your opponent with the better argument as with Socratic *elenchus* or hypnotizing the masses as Plato accused rhetoricians of doing (Poulkos 1997: 10). Rather, in Isocrates's teaching and his "Hymn to Logos," he instructs his students to position themselves to represent the common interest in their deliberations, to "confute the bad and extol the good . . . educate the ignorant and appraise the wise" (Poulkos 1997: 4; Isocrates 1928). This important step forward meant that even if the masses were not deliberating, they were at least being deliberated about.

The idea that deliberation is a tool of the decision-makers (or those able to influence them) persisted in democracies throughout the centuries, from Parisian salons to European and American constitutional conventions (Herbst 1999: 189 – 190; Elster 1998: 97). Only occasionally was deliberation associated with the communication patterns of the average citizen, as was suggested by Jefferson, seen in the Progressive Era, or championed by the Students for a Democratic Society in the 1960's (Mattson 1997: 4; Ethington 1999: 194; Levine 2000: 49).

It is unlikely that the American founders would have been sympathetic to widespread deliberation informing the governing process. Anyone who has taken an American civics class knows that the Founders were petrified of majority tyranny and purposely designed institutions to downplay mass participation (Fishkin 1997: 21). That being said, a few prominent figures of the day, such as Thomas Jefferson, proposed a system in which America was subdivided into small wards of a few hundred individuals that had the power to shape local happenings through discussion and participation. Thus, there is some indication that some early American proponents of political deliberation saw it as a populist enterprise. According to Jefferson, "ward-republics" would be places where citizens could educate themselves and participate in politics. They were essential for enhancing citizens' sense of citizenship (Leib 2004: 48 – 51; Mattson 1997: 3 – 4).

Even though the early Progressive Era tent meetings were less than an ideal deliberative democracy, there were features of these pseudo-deliberative forms that paved the way for better examples of Progressive Era deliberation. First, the meetings often appealed to immigrants, working classes, and farmers (in the case of the Chautauqua movement), as well as the politically active and educated (Levine 2000: 16; Mattson 1997: 37 – 38, 43). Thus, the main hurdle in earlier forms of deliberation, inclusion, was surpassed more than in other eras. Second, although many of these early Progressive Era forums gave the audience a minimal role, others gave the audience more free reign to participate during the question and answer segments (Mattson 1997: 41). The later examples of Progressive Era deliberative forms, such as the Rochester social centers and Studebaker's forums also preserved the populist character of Progressive Era deliberation. The inclusion was not perfect by today's standards, but definitely a step in the right direction. Some forums after the Progressive Era even appealed to all races, even if they were usually segregated (Kunzman and Tyack, p. 332–334). And while "separate but equal" is a hard standard to praise in today's day and age, the fact that minorities were encouraged to deliberate about politics at all in the early twentieth century is remarkable.

As a testament to the mainstream nature of deliberation in the Progressive Era, in 1915, the U.S. Bureau of Education recommended "community civics," which stressed public deliberation (Levine 2000: 16). Similarly, in the 1920's, speech teachers began offering many courses on public speaking and public persuasion. This became known as the public discussion model, and it was promoted by many educators and politicians as the best way to arrive at decisions in a democracy (Bormann 1996: 100 – 101).

Until only very recently, the political science literature treated deliberation as almost entirely the province of lawmakers or the elite. A quick JSTOR text search for "deliberation" brings up thousands of articles, but only in the last fifteen to twenty years can one find articles discussing deliberation among citizens. Even Joseph Bessette, who is frequently cited as coining the phrase "deliberative democracy," was referring primarily to deliberation within institutions (Bessette 1994: xi). Currently, most deliberative democrats examine deliberation in light of citizen communication. As an example, Gutmann and Thompson relegate deliberation mostly to the realms of "middle democracy – settings in which everyday citizens come together to discuss public issues." (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 12 – 13) Many argue that in a representative democracy, citizen conversations about the right and the good either can or should influence the decisions of legislators.

However, some deliberative democrats are still worried about the exclusionary nature of deliberation having gone from *de jure* exclusion to *de facto* exclusion. For example, Iris Marion Young states that the usually passion-free practice of argumentation and reason-giving, as championed by mainstream deliberativists, is only open to all in theory. In reality, typically lower classes or historically underprivileged ethnicities may not have the education, background, or cultural orientation to thrive in a deliberative democracy (Young 2000: 37 – 40). Mainstream deliberative democrats are often aware of this problem, and Young's critique has produced a fruitful conversation about how to conceive of deliberation that is more inclusive in practice. Additionally, deliberation may have a regional/cultural appeal for some and not others. As mentioned above, some locales and states conduct National Issues Forums more often than other locations. College towns and urban centers, which are typically more liberal, more Democratic, and more ethnically diverse, do see a disproportionate share of National Issues Forums.

What one deliberates about

Aristotle's standards for the boundaries of deliberation have held up surprisingly well over the centuries. According to Aristotle, one can deliberate about issues that "generally hold good" but still exist in a realm of uncertainty (Aristotle 1960: 1357a ; Walton 2004: 314). Thus, one can *argue* about supernatural matters, but one can not deliberate, because these things are a matter of belief or disbelief. The empirical is also something that is argued over but not deliberated about, as facts readily lend themselves to proof or refutation. Instead, the Aristotelian idea of deliberation involves *eikotic* arguments about the best course of action in uncertain matters (Walton 2004: 330). In essence, this boils down to the notion that citizens should deliberate about things that they are capable of affecting (Bickford 1996: 400; Aristotle 1955: 1179a – b).

These *eikotic* arguments are not iron-clad proofs of "truth." Instead, they are fragile and capable of being manipulated. However, they are the best kinds of argumentation in a situation regarding deep uncertainty (Aristotle 1960: 1357a; Walton 2004: 304, 314, 330). Elsewhere, in *the Rhetoric*, Aristotle seems to assign a place of primacy to deliberation over rhetoric when he explains that rhetoric is what one uses "to deal with things about which we deliberate" (Aristotle 1960 1357a; Walton 2004: 314). Aristotle's topics for deliberation did seem to be the norm for ancient Athens. The abovementioned Assembly decided these "generally good, but uncertain" matters such as: whether the magistrates were doing a decent job, defense of the land, petitions, etc. (Hansen 1991: 132).

In the Progressive Era, deliberative forms went back and forth on what were the appropriate topics for deliberation. Some placed very few boundaries on what should be discussed. An example is the Rochester social centers, in which normally taboo subjects like politics and religion were both on the table for these forums – controversy was not to be avoided (Mattson 1997: 56). Alternately, the early Progressive Era tent meetings were hierarchically structured, with topics decided in advance, and experts having full control over lectures and partial control over question and answer segments (Ibid: 46). John Studebaker's Des Moines forums were somewhere in-between these two extremes. In theory, he intended the forums to broach any subject, even controversial ones. However, in practice, he avoided positions that were too controversial for local tastes and dispositions. He did not want people to dismiss the deliberative process outright simply because of a few raucous deliberations that might challenge the comfortable status quo. However, Studebaker made it clear in his writings that once the public became used to discussing politics in forums, that very few topics would be off-limits. Over the course of his experiment's history, Studebaker's forums drew socialists, fascists, anarchists, and other less than mainstream speakers, especially when doing so would not create a scandal (Kunzman and Tyack 2005: 327–328).

Modern deliberative democrats have latched onto the Aristotelian conception of the scope of deliberative communication. Gutmann and Thompson portray deliberation as a process of mutual reasoning about moral issues (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 1). The goal is not to prove one argument definitively "right" or "wrong," but rather to resolve political disagreements in a way that promotes mutual respect. This mutual respect is vital to address the further moral disagreements that remain (Ibid: 9). Approaches like Gutmann and Thompson's pervade modern deliberative forums, like the NIF. These forums focus on issues that are typically controversial and topical, although they do so in a way that tries to objectively assess the worth of differing viewpoints. NIF organizers view their forums as educational endeavors that can assist individuals in deciding personal courses of action on a subject. In doing so, they try not to privilege the moral position of any side of the issue.

The modern deliberative project also almost exclusively links deliberation with public talk about political matters. And while deliberative democrats may believe that deliberation may also have positive benefits for businesses, private organizations and/or personal relationships, most focus on deliberation's application to informing, debating, legitimating, and influencing both collective and individual political decisions (Sunstein 1993: 19; Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 41–44; Leib 2004: 34). Thus, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, it is no surprise that deliberative democrats focus on social and procedural benefits first, educative benefits second, and civic benefits only rarely; the thought that deliberation should stay focused on educative topics has a long and distinguished pedigree.

Why deliberate

Neither the etymology nor the common definitions of the word blatantly state why one should "entirely weigh" options and considerations. However, a ready assumption is that deliberation may produce superior decisions. Most theorists do not view deliberation as a procedure intended to solve problems definitively, but rather as a dynamic process for granting legitimacy to temporary outcomes that are open to deliberation in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 6). Deliberation can serve this function by giving the people a sense of ownership over the issue, even in cases in which deliberation was very slight. For instance, various Progressive reformers like Charles Zubin and Frederic Howe promoted this model as a way to bring the public space back into politics (Leib 2004: 53 – 55). Similarly, John Dewey's "The Public and its Problems" was largely a reaction to Walter Lippmann's *The Phantom Public*. Dewey agreed with Lippmann's basic point that the public was woefully uninformed, but unlike Lipmann, he believed that through educative and political reform, they could be turned around (Levine 2000: 88). Dewey believed that the public is at its best if it governed itself in small, localized units which featured truly democratic discussion about concrete problems. Communication was needed to explain and explore the “consequences of interdependent activities [that] may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action.” (Dewey 1984: 323–324)

This focus on a more legitimized and streamlined process does not mean that deliberation is necessary for finding a “true” course of action. Virtually no modern deliberativists think that deliberation will produce definitive truth. Instead, Gutmann and Thompson provide an iconic example of fundamentalist parents in Hawkins County. Despite not getting their way on a textbook controversy, deliberation represented an opportunity for voicing concerns, presenting alternatives, and legitimating decisions when incommensurable world views clashed (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 63–68).

Additionally, some deliberative democrats also mention deliberation’s effect on the individual. Deliberation in ancient Athens, even if not entirely democratic, was definitely linked to self-improvement in the formulations by Aristotle and Isocrates. Likewise, Progressive Era reformers trumpeted deliberation’s potential for improving the mental capacities of those who participate in it. Wisconsin Senator (and later Governor) Robert LaFollete believed that deliberation amongst citizens was key to them forming wise judgments about public matters. Modern accounts of deliberation stress its potential for either critical reflection or, more deeply, preference transformation (Bohman and Rehg 1997: xiii; Dryzek 2000: 2). This means that deliberation is not simply talking for the sake of conversation, but rather a type of discussion that is meant to induce personal and communal reflection. Why people deliberate as opposed to using other methods of reading a decision is a major source of debate amongst deliberative democrats and a key question for this dissertation. As such, it will be explained more thoroughly in chapter 2, and then explored throughout the dissertation.

Deliberation's relationship to democracy

Given that both words have complex and disputed definitions, how do deliberative democrats link deliberation to democracy? From a strict historical perspective, the two are not a complete match. A few pseudo-deliberative institutions aside, ancient Athens, which many see as the epitome of pure democracy, relied largely on rhetoric for public communication in gatherings like the Assembly. Likewise, the classical traditions that emphasized communicative forms closest to what modern day deliberativists think of as deliberation (perhaps Socratic *elenchus*), were not democratic or even intentionally political (Shiffman 2004: 104 – 105). Modern theorists like Iris Marion Young worry that deliberation, when exclusive, is far from being democratic (Young 2000: 37 – 40). As such, deliberation and democracy do not have to automatically go together; instead, the relationship is much less intuitive. The connection between deliberation and democracy can be examined by exploring a few relational questions.

First, is deliberation an essential element of democracy? Few deliberative democrats make this claim, that a democracy must have citizen-to-citizen deliberation before it can either form or function. This statement is hard to make, especially when confronted with numerous examples of democracies that had little to no deliberative practices and continued to exist anyway. As will be highlighted in a section below, our current democracy tends to be very far removed from the deliberative ideal. The deliberative forums that exist in contemporary America tend to be privately-funded ventures that are sparsely attended and unnoticed by large segments of the public. And yet, American democracy has survived for two hundred and thirty years[7] with only sporadic bursts of deliberative practice. Hence, deliberativists tend to pursue other relationships between democracy and deliberation.

Second, might democracy produce deliberation? One theory could be that deliberation is a natural byproduct produced by a nation as it evolves or becomes “more” democratic. Namely, countries that become more democratic allow their citizens a more direct role in decision making. This may take the form of more ballot initiatives, citizen juries, citizen advisory panels, or any combination of the above. However, this theory is faulty for a few reasons. The first is that democracy is not a continuous process of development and improvement. Scholars of democracy have noted the common misconception that American democracy is the apex of a long (perhaps unbroken) line of democratic development. In reality, democracy has developed in spurts in unrelated places and times similar to the anthropological concept of independent invention (Dahl 1998: 7, 9). The second problem with the theory that democracy is steadily advancing is that there is no reason to believe that democracies will or must become more democratic over time. If one were to measure democratic success in terms of how many deliberative institutions (formal or informal) a democracy possesses, contemporary American democracy performs much worse than Progressive Era America.

Finally, might deliberation enhance democracy? This is the relationship that most deliberative theorists seem to implicitly endorse. Deliberation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democracy, it does not keep democracy functioning, and it is not a natural by-product of democratic development. Instead, deliberation is metaphorically akin to a fuel additive that can make a car engine run more smoothly. This additive is not vital to normal functioning, but it can correct some deficiencies, enhance performance, and maybe even add a few precious years to the lifespan.

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[7] Or eighty-six years, if one considers the sixth democratic criteria listed above (inclusive voting) as essential before a country counts as a democracy.

If democracy is quite capable of surviving without widespread deliberation, more compelling reasons should be advanced for its inclusion into Western democratic practices. One reason is that many diverse traditions in political science are troubled by the current state of American politics: low (and likely decreasing) voter turnout, the proportional relationship between campaign fundraising and winning elections, the increasingly polarized discourse among the elected and the electorate, and the conglomeration of the media, just to name a few (Putnam 2000: 31 – 32; Epstein and Zemsky 1995: 295; Marlantes 2006: 410; Bagdikian 1990: 21). And so, while American democracy will continue to function for some time to come, many agree that it is in need of some type of fix of either a few vital problems or a myriad of interrelated problems.

Deliberative democracy is just one proposed solution competing with a multitude of other solutions from institutional fixes, campaign finance reforms, social capital overhauls, etc (many of these solutions may be very compatible with the deliberative ideal). Thus, if improved citizen deliberation can be shown to be a low-cost, high-payoff improvement to democratic functioning and citizen capabilities, why not try it alongside other compatible ideas for reform? A majority of the deliberative literature concerns itself with the former—deliberation can improve the democratic process and/or have societal benefits. This dissertation concerns itself primarily with the latter—deliberation will have individualized benefits for democratic citizens. Thus, the normative appeal of the deliberative project may be bolstered by empirical findings that can render both claims plausible.

Modern deliberative democratic theory and competing democratic theory

However, the biggest influence on modern deliberative theory may not be from the physical and theoretical examples of deliberation highlighted above. Rather, the deliberative project of the last fifteen years seems to find its strongest expression as a reaction to the prevailing modes of democratic theory that have reigned throughout the twentieth century. As the following subsections show, this is not simply an ivory tower debate among insulated academics. Aspects of elite and aggregative democracy filter down to the cultural level and find expression in movies, television, and popular culture. Thus, to truly understand why deliberative democrats believe what they do, and why democratic theory matters for everyday democratic practice, a full explanation of elite and aggregative democratic theory must be explored.

Elite democratic theory

Although elite democracy is primarily associated with Joseph Schumpeter, it may have found its first modern expression in Max Weber's "Politik als Beruf" (Politics as a Vocation). In this work, Weber illustrates how a small group of specialists really make the decisions in a democracy. The only role of the apathetic people is to select these decision makers every few years (Nino 1996: 79; Weber 1958).

In the 1940's, Joseph Schumpeter proposed an ideal type of elite democracy that is more in line with what is meant by the term today. Although it was not the chief aspect of his book, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, the sections relating to human nature, mob mentality, and the necessity of elites helped define a version of elite democracy that influenced political science in a major way throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Medearis 2001: 1–2). In his version of democracy, citizens are easily-led and malleable. According to Schumpeter, “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the playing field.” (Schumpeter 1950: 262) Schumpeter’s worry was that the irrational masses would base political decisions on affect and extra rational processes. Groups with axes to grind are able take advantage of voter ignorance and apathy in order to create the people’s will for them (Ibid: 263). Thus, it is far more important for a smooth functioning democracy to give the people a minimal role in forming government, because they are not cognitively and emotionally capable of doing much more. The real focus on democracy should be on elites arriving at political decisions by competing for the citizens’ votes (Ibid: 269; Bohman and Rehg 1997: x–xi). Hence, in elite democracy, the aforementioned ignorance and apathy is an inescapable part of human nature, and the primary reason for taking power out of the hands of ordinary citizens.

Versions of Schumpeter’s claims blossomed and evolved since his formulation. In the 1960s, Angus Campbell et. al. conducted a seminal study at the University of Michigan to test Walter Lippmann’s assessment of the public. They found that the public was ignorant, inconsistent, and often irrational. In such a context, elections and surveys were useless as means to inform policy. Politicians were better off making decisions without worrying overmuch about public opinion (Campbell et. al. 1965: 151, 542-544; Levine 2000: 88–89). Although the researchers considered themselves primarily empiricists instead of theorists, these findings fueled elite democracy as one of the mainstays of democratic theory for decades and inspired a host of theoretical and empirical studies that operated under their assumptions.

Another academic example is Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler's widely-used textbook, The Irony of Democracy. The titular irony, according to Dye and Zeigler, is that while democracy is supposed to equal "power to the people," it is really the educated and enlightened elites that keep democracy functioning. The "people," when left to their own devices, are uninformed and apathetic; they are quick to demand anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic policy, such as curbing civil liberties (Dye and Zeigler 1972: 7, 133). In a subversive twist of classical democratic theory, Dye and Zeigler tout the importance of insulating the noble-minded elite from the whims of the anti-democratic masses roused by malicious counter-elites (Ibid: 20). As far as communication is concerned, the elites utilize the electronic media to instruct the masses, even though the latter group rarely pays attention even to this (Ibid: 159). Like most theories of elite democracy, Dye and Zeigler's presumes one-way communication from elites to masses. Perhaps even more pessimistic than Schumpeter, Dye and Zeigler's portrayal of the abilities of the public may even mean that this is less than one-way communication – possibly "no-way communication."

If elite democracy was only a theory known to academics, then its effect on actual democratic practices would be minimal. But one does not have to look far to find some of elite democracy's central premises in more everyday forms. Consider the piece by comedian George Carlin (ever the epitome of the Zeitgeist) in a bit originally titled, "In Defense of Politicians":

> "You might've noticed that I never complain about politicians. I leave that to others. And there's no shortage of volunteers; everyone complains about

> politicians. Everyone says they suck. But where do people think these politicians come from? They don't fall out of the sky . . . ignorant citizens elect ignorant leaders, it's as simple as that . . . So maybe it's not the politicians who suck; maybe it's something else. Like the public . . . For myself, I have solved this political dilemma in a very direct way. On Election Day, I stay home." (Carlin 2001: 234 – 235)

Certainly, Carlin (and those who see things similarly to him) does not parrot Schumpeter, word for word. Carlin's pessimism about democracy extends to everyone: leaders, citizens, even himself. However, the central premise and the proposed solution are strikingly similar to Schumpeter's: the public makes bad decisions and is not to be trusted. Also, less participation (or even no participation) is better than active participation. The only real difference between Schumpeter's and Carlin's type of pessimism is in how separate the elite are from the masses.

Carlin's brand of cynicism is pervasive in modern entertainment and pop culture – the image that all politics (and the publics responsible for them) are equally silly and deserving of scorn. Consider the overly-sensitive citizens of the controversial and popular cartoon, *South Park*. At the slightest offense, they organize into a jumbled mob that screams "rabble rabble rabble" and descend upon City Hall like locusts. In later seasons, the mayor went from being lampooned to seeming sensible in contrast to the easily-offended townsfolk.[8] The same dynamic can be seen on the long-running Fox sit-com, *the Simpsons*. As with *South Park*, the cartoon citizens of Springfield organize into easily-led mobs at the drop of a hat, often under the battle cry from the minister's wife, "Won't someone think of the children?" In all three cases, academic versions of elite democracy have been replaced by a more pervasive cynicism for politics, in general. When visions of democracy like Schumpeter's elite democracy spread beyond academia to inform the public sensibilities and popular culture, there is much less hope for keeping voting and participation at even the dismal levels that are currently seen.

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[8] From the episode titled, "Child Abduction is not funny":
Mayor: People, Calm Down.
Randy: Well what are we gonna do, Mayor?! We have to stop these abductors from being able to get into our town!
Townsfolk: Rabble rabble rabble rabble rabble rabble rabble rabble...
Mayor: Yes, but standing out here yelling "Rabble rabble rabble" isn't going to help anything. (Parker and Stone 2002)

Granted, this can quickly become a "chicken and egg" problem. Did widespread distrust of democratic potential inspire Weber, Schumpeter, Lippmann, and Campbell et. al. to codify elite democracy or have the central tenants of elite democracy filtered down to the pop cultural level? The most likely answer is that they are mutually constitutive – common perception and academic theorizing can and do reinforce each other. As such, even if the direction of causality for these two phenomena can not be established, deliberative democrats should take these signs from the entertainment industry as vital indicators of the public mood. The goal of deliberative democrats would then be to promote a competing discourse that infuses the popular sensibility with the notion that deliberation and participation can be meaningful, effective, and maybe even "cool."

Aggregative democratic theory

Aggregative democracy rose in reaction to Schumpeter's elite democracy, although both have much in common, such as a conception of elite competitors jockeying for the mass public's votes[9]. Both theories remained relatively influential until the

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[9] Schumpeter's version of democracy is sometimes lumped together with aggregative democracy (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 14, 191). Indeed, Downs claims that Schumpeter's version of democracy was the "inspiration and foundation" for his theory and described his debt to Schumpeter as great (Downs 1957: 29, n.11). However, this classification of aggregative democracy does not seem to work for Schumpeter's theory in the same way as it does for Downs's. In Downs's democracy, everyone is rational – both voters and politicians. Hence, rational voter preferences can be aggregated in such a way that Downs and company expect this to be a reasonable approximation of the "will of the people." Schumpeter and his disciples, in contrast, are a lot more negative on the capabilities of the individual citizen. Elites jockey back and forth for the often irrational desires and whims of the public – hardly the same process of aggregating rational preferences proposed by Downs. Hence, I label the theories of citizen irrationality as elite democracy and theories of rational citizen involvement as aggregative democracy.

1970's (Bohman and Rehg 1997: xii). Since then, aggregative democracy, in many ways, has become a major paradigm in democratic theory[10].

In this aggregative version of democracy, citizens are not fools – they are self-interested, rational utility-maximizers. In this school of thought, people are capable of making reasonably sound decisions about politics, even if they do not do much to arrive at these decisions (Downs 1957: 6). They are not Machiavellian intellects, nor should they be. According to Downs, it makes sense for the average American to focus on daily concerns, because the costs associated with acquiring a lot of political information are high for the average citizen (Downs 1957: 215).[11] His only duty is to scrape together enough information to make a modestly decent choice based on any of the following: trusted information gatherers, gut instinct, pocketbook voting, or heuristics (Downs 1957: 207 – 208; 226 – 227; Popkin 1991: 7 – 8; Menand 2006: 349).

The metaphor of the market figures heavily into accounts of aggregative democracy, in that legislators advertise a product (sponsoring popular legislation) in an effort to sway consumers (voters) to their brand name (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 14; Cohen 1991: 221). Others describe the aggregative model as "strategic democracy" and illustrate how it is characterized by instrumental rationality; internal, strategic deliberation used to maximize individual preferences; voting, polling, referenda and other aggregative methods are used to count up preferences and give the majority their way (Estlund 1993: 1440 - 1441). This Downsian *homo economicus* only need be roused every voting season, like a grizzly out of hibernation. In this conception of democracy, communication is more two-way than in elite democracy – citizens lobby for their interests by joining groups that will advance their cause and they vote for whichever party is likely to provide them with the best benefits (Downs 1957: 36). These actions by citizens may not preclude altruism or public-regarding motives, but they do not require or especially motivate them, either (Downs 1957: 37). In reaction, legislators market platforms like advertisers hawking a product. Politicians do not campaign to push across their policy preferences, they shape their policy preferences based on what they believe will get them elected (Downs 1957: 11, 96). In comparison to elite democracy, aggregative democracy believes that (a realistic amount of) ignorance and apathy are likely conditions for most people in political matters. However, in contrast to elite democracy, aggregativists do not see this as a problem because even rationally ignorant individuals are capable of making minimally decent political decisions.

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[10] Some theorists closely link pluralist democracy to aggregative democracy (Young 2000: 19), while others claim that it is an outgrowth of elite democracy (Nino 1996: 82). The central idea of pluralist democracy, that group/faction formation is inevitable and the basic unit of political life is certainly not a recent invention; Madison predicted this problem in The Federalist Papers #10 (Madison). Likewise, in the early twentieth century, Arthur Bentley broke ranks with the Progressives to attack liberal individualism from a different direction. According to Bentley, different groups had different interests that could be recognized, adhered to, ignored, manipulated, or played off against each other (Ethington 1999: 214). Later, pluralist conceptions of democracy received a major theoretical push from Robert Dahl, who is credited as the father of the pluralist model of democracy (Nino 1996: 82). In this paper, pluralist democracy will be largely subsumed under the aggregative model, as both have numerous assumptions in common. Namely, individuals in the both conceptions are rational self-maximizers; the pluralist model differs mostly in its unit of analysis – individuals, as a rational way to spend less energy and get more political gains, organize and join groups.

[11] In the aggregative literature, this is alternately referred to as "rational ignorance", "low-information rationality", or some other variant (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991: 7). In this conception, it makes less sense for citizens to know about politics as opposed to information about the local football team, characters on a popular sit-com, or the marital problems of a Hollywood couple. The former concern is perceived as being distant, an unwise investment of resources (energy, time, emotion), and relatively low pay-off. However, the latter concerns are either more immediate, have lower informational costs, or provide greater benefits (amusement, entertainment, etc.)

Scholars of aggregative democracy portray it as an impartial and streamlined way to make democratic decisions. Aggregative democratic theory boasts an Adam Smith-like "invisible hand" metaphor in which private preferences can often benefit the entire system. Cooperation and altruism are not just possible, they are likely in situations where resources are not scarce (Estlund 1993: 1440). Other advantages of aggregative democracy include producing definitive, final results and having relatively uncontroversial decision-making procedures (at least outside of academia) (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 16). In addition, some claim that the majoritarianism of aggregative democracy can promote the competition of ideas and strengthen political stability (Shapiro 2003: 14).[12] Finally, defenders of aggregative conceptions of democracy claim that the "majority rules" principle it engenders is the most fair of all possible options in a hypothetical case where a decision must be made amongst alternatives proposed by group members. If there is no outer-worldly decision standard that can make the choice for them, and as long as we only consider their preferences, this is the fairest way to accommodate everyone. The process gives each individual member's views as much weight as possible in relation to the other viewpoints (Waldron 1999: 147 - 148). Waldron further argues that majoritarianism is a respectful principle because it acknowledges differences on widely divergent conceptions of the common good without trying to change them. It does not seek out a fake or coerced consensus simply for the sake of consensus (Ibid: 158 - 159).

Versions of aggregative democracy (as well as its pluralist counterpart) are less visible in entertainment and popular culture, most likely because the aggregative program has been codified and coherent for a shorter period of time than elite democracy. However, aggregative democracy is not absent from citizen-level understanding of

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[12] The idea that aggregative democracy promotes the competition of ideas perhaps correctly steals away J. S. Mill's "marketplace of ideas" concept from deliberative democrats. Deliberativists often bandy about the term with a stress on the *"of ideas"* part. However, Shapiro's interpretation of the advantages of majoritarianism shows that deliberative democrats should be hesitant to ignore the *"marketplace"* aspect, which is the guiding metaphor for the rival form of democratic theory.

democracy. Anyone who regularly watches the *Jay Leno Show* is most likely familiar with the segment called "Jay Walking" in which on-the-street interviews reveal that the average person can not name the Vice-President, can not locate Iraq, and does not know anything about presidential platforms, even during election season. However, they do tend to know information like the starting line-up of the 1960 Buffalo Bills or which character was hit by a car on the season finale of *Desperate Housewives*. If these segments were chiding and heavy-handed, we would assume that the intention was to be critical of the lack of citizen knowledge about politics. But instead, these bits are light and funny, because the message is clear—these people are like most of the viewing audience (who are also incapable of naming their Senators). Rational ignorance is okay, because we're all in the same boat.

Or consider the common public perception that pluralism America can be defined as a continuously-shifting series of competing/warring camps and ideologies. The popular 100th episode of *South Park* lampoons both pro- and anti-war protestors before highlighting their mutual dependence on each other. Without mentioning Downs or Dahl, pop culture critic and Libertarian party candidate for Senate Al Barger characterizes the show's message very accurately when he wrote of the episode,

> "In a way, it represents a cynical take on our republic's way of doing business, but yet not really. It shows the system set up in an adversarial manner that legitimately works out the concerns of hawks and doves . . . It doesn't represent cynicism about the result, but presents the construction of our system of governance as based on making properly skeptical expectations about human nature in order to mesh together clashing interest groups in a workable manner that functions optimally." (Barger 2003)

Similarly, there is the widespread cultural perception of a red America characterized by "QVC, the Pro Bowlers Tour and hunting," whereas in blue America, one finds “NPR, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and socially conscious investing” (Brooks 2005: 205). Granted, few citizens make reference to aggregative or pluralist conceptions of democracy when they adhere to these stereotypes about the nation being divided into warring enemy camps. However, without realizing it, they are buying into more than a few key planks in the aggregative platform. Namely, they astutely perceive the vital role of conflict in politics, but then elevate it to the point that conflict and group preference satisfaction seem to be the *only* things that politics is about. Thus, politics is a never ending struggle to gain strategic advantage over (but never vanquish) the other color, and cooperation/communication with the “other” becomes impossible and perhaps even poor strategy.[13]

Deliberative democrats reacting to aggregative democracy do not insist on a re-conceptualization of politics as only cooperation that leads to unanimity, as some critics of deliberation have charged (Waldron 1999: 152–153). Indeed, some theories of deliberative democracy thrive on the idea of conflict in politics. They take moral disagreement as a given of social life because of the lure of self-interest and the human condition (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 18–21). Deliberation may not permanently solve such conflicts, but it can make conflict less protracted and bitter. However, proponents of deliberative democracy worry that aggregative democracy has made democracy into a team sport in which citizens are not players but fans whose job is to “root, root, root” for the home team. One only has to observe campaign coverage that is increasingly referred to using the pejorative, “horse-race journalism,” to see how political discourse has become less about an exchange of ideas and more about which “team” is winning (Squire et. al. 2005: 245). Finally, deliberative democrats propose that the principles of the market, which have long animated aggregative versions of democratic theory, are not as appropriate for politics as the principles of the forum (Elster 1997: 11).

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[13] In a hypothetical democracy in which people vote their preferences in by bare majority rule, deliberating (publicly) about reasons for preferences is counter-intuitive and almost irrational. It would give others the ammunition needed to frustrate your preferences (Freeman 2000: 372).

Deliberative democratic theory as an alternative

What aspects does deliberative democratic theory borrow from the elite and aggregative models? Deliberative democracy, at least on the theoretical level, relies on an informed elite of its own to get the process started. In much the same way that Dewey conceded the reality of the situation to Lippmann's assessment of the public, deliberative democrats often agree with the elite democratic idea that the public is (at the moment) uninformed and not (yet) capable of managing its own affairs. It is possible that the process of deliberation could become citizen-led and localized once people have experience deliberating. But until then, academics and policy entrepreneurs need to conceive of inducements and reasons to convince people that deliberation as participation is worthwhile, much like in *Deliberation Day*. Both elite democracy and deliberative democracy can be seen as elitist, at least in contrast to the seemingly humble aggregative conception of democracy, which takes citizens and their capacities as they are. That being said, the elitism of elite democracy is different in both kind and degree from that of deliberative democracy. The former assumes that citizen capabilities are fixed, for the most part, on permanent modes of "stupid" and "easily-manipulatable." An elite democrat would seek to keep the masses fat and happy through bread and circus while the politicians do the real work. The latter is a kinder type of elitism than that of elite democracy for two reasons. First, the deliberative theorist that recommends deliberation to an apathetic public is engaging in the "teach a man to fish" variety of paternalism – he believes that although citizens are currently performing below their capabilities, that this new idea will lead to more self-capable citizens in the future. But second, and perhaps more importantly, the deliberative democrat does not envision himself in the role of Plato's philosopher king. Deliberative democrats claim that they have a plan for more democratic decision making, not that they should be the decision makers. This is an important contrast with elite democrats who would champion the right of the politically savvy and well-connected to run politics.

As for commonalities with aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy often argues that knowledge of self interest is a good thing. As explained above, J. S. Mill's conception of deliberation (and modern deliberative democrats like Jane Mansbridge echo this sentiment) is that it can firm up uncertain beliefs, opinions and values that end up surviving the deliberative gauntlet. Indeed, Mill's famous metaphor of the marketplace of ideas pays homage to both conceptions (Mill 1990/1859: 108). On one hand, it relies on the marketplace metaphor of rational buying and selling so popular in the aggregative literature. On the other, the central idea is that deliberation hones positions through argumentation that weeds out the weak or prejudicial interests and strengthens the good ones (Christiano 1997: 247).

But aggregativists and deliberativists part company over how central a role self-interest should be given in democratic politics. In the aggregative conception, self-interest (along with the limits placed on self-interest realization) is the primary motivating forces of the apolitical (*homo civicus*) and political (*homo politicus*) citizens alike (Dahl 1961: 223–225). It explains why some people become brilliant policy entrepreneurs and also why fifty percent of the electorate stays home for the Presidential elections—because both have examined their individual cost/benefit structures and are maximizing in the name of personal interest. However, in most conceptions of deliberative democracy, self interest awareness is one virtue that needs to be balanced with community interest, personal development, civic ties, and action.

So what constitutes the deliberative project? The chapter, up to this point, has been an extensive background on historical and theoretical precursors to deliberative democracy along with a contrast to other modern modes of democratic thinking. The described traits of the project differ depending on which deliberative democrat one asked, but certain commonalities do stand out. A truncated list by Samuel Freeman points out the most important commonalities found in the deliberative democratic literature,

> "A deliberative democracy is one in which political agents or their representatives (a) aim to collectively deliberate and vote (b) their sincere and informed judgments regarding (c) measures conducive to the common good of citizens. . . . (h) citizens recognize a duty in their public political deliberations to cite public reasons – considerations that all reasonable citizens can accept in their capacity as democratic citizens – and to avoid public argument on the basis of reasons peculiar to their particular moral, religious, and philosophical views and incompatible with public reason." (Freeman 2000: 382).[14]

Of course, no such list can paint a complete picture of the entire deliberative project. However, Freeman does describe the mainstream of deliberative democracy quite well. An example of mainstream deliberative thought might be Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's 1996 book, *Democracy and Disagreement*. In the book, the authors' main contention is that traditional democratic theory is silent and/or inadequate about the ongoing discussion of incommensurable moral worldviews. They believe that deliberative reforms that center on reciprocity, publicity, and accountability could weigh the merits of these moral disagreements and help to reach more legitimate "provisional moral agreement" (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 12). They contrast their ideal to the status quo championed by constitutional and procedural democrats. And while these theories do address the possibility of disagreement among individual moral actors at the beginning (constitution) and end (just outcomes) of the decision-making process, previous versions of democratic theory ignore the role of moral argument in "middle politics" (Ibid: 40). The authors claim that deliberation would render decisions more legitimate in light of scarce resources, limited generosity, incompatible moral values, and incomplete understanding (Ibid: 41–43).

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[14] The list leaves out points of Freeman's that are a little more controversial amongst deliberative democrats because of the liberal/communitarian divide discussed in chapter 2. For instance, Freeman's part f reads, "Citizens are individually free in that they have their own freely determined conceptions of the good . . ." Deliberativists with a communitarian bent might either downplay this trait or argue that it should make room for community-inspired conceptions of the good, as well.

In recent years, critiques of the deliberative mainstream have attracted considerable attention. In many of his works, Benjamin Barber has critiqued the "thin democracy" that he believes characterizes the liberal project, and increasingly the deliberative project. Thus, liberal democracy is zoo-like in its treatment of citizens. On one hand, it is an escape from a Hobbesian jungle; on the other hand, it becomes necessary to confine political animals within cages of negative liberty, lest the wild instincts inherent in the liberal conception of mankind lead to chaos (Barber 1984: 20–21). This critique can be applied to liberal deliberativists like Bruce Ackerman, who allegedly seek to constrain conversation behind an icy, passion-free exterior (Barber 1988: 150).

Other theorists critique the liberal-leaning deliberative project because it can reinforce existing power structures. Thus, John Dryzek contrasts deliberative democracy with his expanded version of ideal communication, discursive democracy. According to

Dryzek, discursive democracy sharpens the blunted critical edge of deliberative democracy by pushing for democratic reforms against the liberal status quo (Dryzek 2000: 27). Yet others, such as Iris Marion Young, claim that the structure of liberal deliberation favors some groups over others. Typically, liberals favor structured, rational, and emotion-free deliberation over the alternatives, because of the power of structured deliberation to supposedly limit demagoguery. According to Young, however, liberal deliberativists are missing the point – by excluding alternate forms of communication, the inclusiveness of deliberation is destroyed, especially for groups that are less practiced with the forms of communication that deliberative theory often privileges (Young 2000: 37–40).

Two main reasons stand out for why deliberative democracy can be seen as preferable to elite democracy. First, elite democracy has a legitimacy problem once anyone questions why the elites have so much decision-making power. When elites call all the shots, even "obviously correct" positions such as the wrongness of torture, are ineffective when dictated because only broad public support lends legitimacy and reliable enforcement to the policy. The scandal at Abu Ghraib prison is a perfect example – before the national dialogue about torture, most ordinary citizens and soldiers "knew" it was wrong because they had been told so. And yet, without the opportunity for the legitimating force of participatory discussion, it happened anyway.

Second, although elites can be honorable and rule in the public's best interests, they can also be shady and manipulative, as well (Levine 2000: 11). As Hannah Arendt has mentioned, elites-only decision making legitimizes oligarchic rule, privileges certain races and socioeconomic statuses more than others, and lessens the responsibility of government to the masses (Arendt 1963: 276; Nino 1996: 81).

Deliberativists engage with aggregative democracy more directly, as it currently has a place of privilege in political science. Deliberative democrats typically cite a few reasons why democracy runs better with deliberative processes either in place of or as a supplement to aggregative processes. First, aggregative democracy relies on majority rule—a registering of preferences ranked by popularity. But preferences are often ill-informed, wrong, short-sighted, and self-centered, especially when not exposed to other preferences through a process like deliberation (Levine 2000: 8). It is also hard to intuit preferences based off of election results. Did George Bush win the 2004 Presidential election because voters liked his stance on one key issue? Did voters like his entire slate of issue stances? Or did they vote for him for non-political reasons, such as more voters hypothetically preferring to have a beer with him over John Kerry (Economist 2004: 3)? Hence, aggregative democracy aggregates preferences in only the weakest fashion if elected politicians have no earnest way of telling *why* they won their race. This is a shortcoming that widespread citizen discussion of politics could solve. Such a critique of aggregative democracy is not new. Dewey slammed majority rule as a way to "know" public preferences,

> "What has counting heads, decision by majority and the whole apparatus of traditional government to do with such things? Given such considerations, and the public and its organization for political ends is not only a ghost, but a ghost which walks and talks, and obscures, confuses and misleads governmental action in a disastrous way." (Dewey 1984: 313)

Second, aggregative democracy can not handle all primary preferences equally and often makes harsh trade-offs, as a result. Economic preferences tend to translate easily, but how does one factor in life, health, comfort, or happiness into the equation (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 16-17)? What about quality of pleasures, as John Stuart Mill asked when he probed some of the deficiencies of utilitarianism (Mill 1991: 139–140)? Should a minor problem that affects many be given priority over a major problem that affects a few? These problems of incommensurability of preferences and uncomfortable trade-offs of solutions are serious challenges to aggregative democracy. Thus, theories of democracy that are based primarily around satisfaction of preferences often produce either collective action problems (because no one judges the costs of action to be worth it) or "defect/defect" Prisoners' Dilemma outcomes (because many actors' preference-seeking behavior harms all in the pursuit of self-interest) (Nino 1996: 136). A deliberative solution premised on balancing individual and community interests and giving the opportunity to weigh painful trade-offs will not solve these problems, but they may mollify them.

Finally, deliberativists are skeptical about the heuristics that guide rationally ignorant citizens to make basically good decisions in the aggregative conception. As evidence against heuristics, one could cite a study by Bartels which finds that voting cues may not be the best way to make the same decision that people would have made if fully informed. His comparison of actual vote probability to hypothetical "fully informed" vote probability is off by about 10%. Another assumption of defenders of heuristics is that the "goofy votes"—made by voters that have utterly idiosyncratic or mysterious reasons for voting as they do—will cancel out through aggregation. However, Bartels finds that even though the goofy vote is diluted through aggregation, it is not cancelled, giving Democrats and incumbents a slight advantage (Bartels 1996: 194). The deliberative alternative to half-baked heuristics is discussion capable of producing plausible associations and justifiable reasons.

Conclusion

Deliberative practice has existed in greater or lesser degrees since ancient Athens. However, *democratic* deliberation has the paradoxical distinction of both being relatively new, but also seemingly on the decline after the Progressive Era. That being said, theorizing about deliberative democracy is on the rise, especially within the last fifteen years. It remains to be seen whether or not this theorizing heralds an age of neo-Progressive deliberative reforms, or the bemoaning of a communicative form that has been forever lost.

This introduction to deliberative democratic theory and practice serves as a background for my own approach to the subject – the role of individual benefits as a selling point for deliberative reforms, which will be further elaborated in Chapter 2. Deliberative theorists have tried to distance themselves from the market-like cold rationality of aggregative conceptions of democracy. As such, they generally resist, either overtly or subconsciously, the urge to phrase deliberation as something that individuals might desire for instrumental reasons. This causes them to downplay the individual benefits of deliberation—it may make people smarter, more creative, more connected, and more active.

The central premise of this dissertation is that such easy dismissals are a mistake. The gap between deliberative theory and practice becomes a chasm when one tries justifying the project *solely* in terms of high-minded goals like legitimacy or procedural efficiency. On the other side of the chasm exist the actual deliberative reforms that deliberative democrats would like to see enacted, but go untested and generally unheard of outside academic settings. How could one convince politicians that citizen deliberation will not be chaotic, but will instead make representing their constituencies easier? How do you convince the public that talking about politics is the first step towards actually being effective in politics? I suspect neither audience would be persuaded by claims such as, “because deliberation will foster reciprocity” or “because deliberation comes closest to the ideal speech situation.”

Instead, highlighting the individual benefits of deliberation could show politicians that the public is more aware of what they want after they deliberate. Hence, elections and public opinion polls would move away from being a confusing mishmash of half-formed gut reactions. The public may be more likely to vote, campaign, perform community service, and care about the state of politics after receiving knowledge, confidence, and social support from deliberation. In short, promoting individual benefits as the way to motivate deliberative reforms is the most realistic option for getting these changes to see the light of day. Currently, apathy and blind adherence to the political status quo are what keep Churchill’s quip about democracy as true as it ever was. But can’t we do better?

CHAPTER 2 – INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS

> “We are ultimately meant to console ourselves with the thought that we will be better, and better off, for having hashed things out under ideal deliberative conditions. This may or may not be so, but it certainly is a peculiar way to rescue the deliberative project – a bit like a surgeon telling a patient that she’d failed to remove the tumor, but had after all managed to do some liposuction.” (Shiffman 2004: 109).

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how deliberative democracy arose out of a reaction to prevailing modes of modern democratic theory. The conflict set the stage for this dissertation, but is, at best, a sub-theme of the work. These disagreements between deliberative democratic theory and its predecessors have already been elaborated at length elsewhere (Cohen 1991; Knight and Johnson 1994; Gutmann and Thompson 2004). Instead, this dissertation is mostly about how to handle a tendency *within* deliberative theory to downplay an under-examined selling point of the project—individual benefits. I will argue that deliberative democratic theory is best served by adding the plausible and desirable individualized byproducts of deliberation to its list of advantages against other modes of political theory.

The individual benefits of deliberative democracy are not my own invention. Both modern deliberativists and their intellectual forbearers have indicated that political discussion may have beneficial effects on the individuals who engage in it. For instance, deliberation may: raise consciousness, promote an active character, help us to better realize our own self-interest and the community interest, improve citizen understanding, and help us figure out our sense of morality (Pateman 1970: 46; Sunstein 1993: 178; Gastil 2000: 25; Shapiro 2003: 22; Mansbridge 2003: 173).

However, the above examples are exceptions to the rule in deliberative theory. At least amongst modern deliberative democrats, there have been no systematic, in-depth examinations of the individual benefits of deliberative democracy. Typically, deliberative theorists either downplay or ignore individual benefits in order to stress other benefits of deliberative theory – what I label below as societal or procedural benefits. A few openly critique individual benefits as a way to advance the program, probably out of a concern that an individualized focus smacks of the same economic reasoning used in opposing modes of democratic theory.

I propose an alternative, in which the theory of deliberative democracy is rethought in slight, but important ways to include individual benefits more prominently. Deliberative theorists often discuss the benefits of a deliberative society by describing ways that either the society will improve or why decision making processes will move more smoothly. I wish to make clear that both procedural and societal benefits are valuable to the deliberative project. I consider them to be the "grand goals" of deliberative democracy because they present the most normatively compelling reasons to prefer the deliberative project to its alternatives, at least to many political theorists. However, either individually or together, neither type provides a very realistic motivation for the participants of deliberation—for citizens to *want* to discuss politics or for politicians to advocate a method that may upset the status quo. Both societal and procedural benefits are very abstract and removed from individuals who would actually be deliberating about politics. Neither seems like the remedy for turning an apathetic public into a deliberative one.

A slight, but important alteration in deliberative theory is to highlight the individual benefits of deliberation as a vital supplement to the above two benefits. These individual benefits should not replace the societal or procedural benefits typically touted by the literature. To be sure, a focus on individual benefits alone is also an inappropriate justification of the deliberative project. In that case, the fears of deliberative theorists that deliberation has become just another form of naked interest-satisfaction and power politics would be justified. Shiffman's humorous metaphor, while it somewhat mischaracterizes the problem, nevertheless is a valuable lesson about selling deliberation in *purely* instrumental terms. Thus, the deliberative project is best served by acknowledging the importance of all three types of benefits—procedural and societal benefits to provide the moral and theoretical justification, and individual benefits to provide deliberators with a concrete reason to rethink politics. Bringing individual benefits into the wider picture may be exactly what deliberative democrats need to make deliberative reforms desirable, widespread and visible.

This chapter first examines the typical benefits found in the deliberative literature: societal, procedural, and occasionally individual. Next, a fuller defense of individual benefits is laid out. In the following section, I highlight the eight benefits that I intend to focus on for the remainder of the dissertation. Finally, the conclusion applies the framework generated by this chapter to the chapters to come.

The benefits of deliberation

Deliberative theorists rarely justify deliberative democracy by using the term "benefits." One reason may be that for many people, the word usually implies discreet, measurable units that one could use to gauge the success or failure of whatever is providing these benefits. For instance, a benefits package from an offer of employment or a health insurance plan are usually spelled out and quantified to the minutest degree. Over-the-counter medical products advertise their benefits prominently, hyping what kind, how fast, and how long the product can bring relief. It is difficult to phrase the products of deliberation—concepts like legitimacy or more democratic cultural norms—in these terms.

However, even though deliberative theorists rarely use the term, their treatments of deliberation certainly highlight the benefits of deliberation. If we consider "benefits" to be anything derived from a recommended and beneficial course of action (whether easily quantifiable or not)[15], then deliberative theorists are certainly hawking benefits just as certainly as is a foot cream commercial. Thus, even though the term is not used frequently in the deliberative literature, I make use of it to organize and differentiate the different reasons that theorists use to justify deliberation. These justifications fall into categories of my own labeling: societal, procedural, and individual benefits. Below, I highlight and provide examples for all three types of benefits. Since societal and procedural benefits are elaborated more fully elsewhere, their inclusion in this paper is primarily for the purpose of contrasting them to individual benefits, not to critique or defend them.

Societal benefits

Societal benefits are gains from deliberation that apply to everyone in a deliberative democracy, regardless of whether or not an individual citizen has participated in deliberative processes. In such a way, these benefits are very similar to the concept of “public goods” found in economics. According to the literature, a public good is non-excludable and non-rival. These goods are provided to everyone and cannot be consumed by some in a way that lessens the good’s application to others. Common examples include national defense, breathing air, and broadcast television – while not “pure” public goods, are certainly very close approximations. As such, national defense is not parceled out to individuals but to the society as a whole. Similarly, individual breaths do not rob vital oxygen from others under normal conditions (Samuelson 1954: 387). The societal benefits of deliberative democracy work in a similar manner – societies that have deliberative institutions will receive these benefits in a non-exclusive and non-competitive manner. In short, these benefits represent improvements for the society as a whole, in that having opportunities to discuss political problems may lead to wide cultural priorities and values being altered. Thus, societal benefits focus on the possibility of transformed community norms of reciprocity, tolerance, mutual respect, and democratic duty.

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[15] I argue that the standard assumption that benefits are necessarily quantifiable is a false assumption, anyway. Often, products and services either implicitly or explicitly claim to enhance things like quality of life, happiness, well-being – none of which lend themselves to ready quantification or classification.

Most theorists and practitioners of deliberative democracy recommend deliberation because of its societal benefits; these are the “grand goals” of deliberative democracy. To take a historical example, consider the rationale of John Studebaker, organizer of the Des Moines Forums in the 1930’s. He viewed “free and impartial discussion of public issues” to be the democratic practice most crucial to warding off authoritarian (specifically fascist) propaganda (Studebaker 1935: 16). In his mind, Americans would become more critical and less easily manipulated by living in a country that engaged in public dialogue about serious political issues. This benefit is considered societal because it was not only forum-going Americans that would be immune to fascist propaganda, but that the whole society would become healthier and more able to resist.

The modern deliberative project also focuses much of its attention on the societal benefits of deliberation. For instance, Gutmann and Thompson think that deliberation can promote values like mutual respect on a society-wide basis, especially once deliberative processes become more visible (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 80). Conceivably, even those that do not deliberate see or hear about others working their problems out in an environment of mutual respect, thus altering their image of what a good democratic citizen should value. Others believe that deliberation preserves "a cooperative, tolerant, and democratic form of pluralism" (Bohman 1996: x). Finally, some claim that deliberation can produce social and cultural norms that may lead people to express ambitious or altruistic goals more often (Sunstein 1993: 245). These high-minded benefits apply across the board to deliberators and non-deliberators alike; the assumption is that they improve our culture and our values.

Procedural benefits

Procedural benefits revolve around the assumption that deliberation will improve democratic decision-making processes in some fashion, either making decisions more effective, institutions more representative, or enhancing the legitimacy of final outcomes. The proceduralist legacy of deliberative democracy is perhaps most closely traced to Jurgen Habermas, who believed that decisions made in a communicative environment that approximated the ideal speech situation were best. In this ideal speech situation, all participants have rights to speech acts in a permanently open process, with equal chances to make or attack arguments as well as equal chances to make or resist orders for action related to the speech acts. By doing so, they make their feelings, preferences, and orientations transparent to those they communicate with (Habermas 1984: 177–178). However, some mainstream deliberative democrats, such as Gutmann and Thompson, warn against making deliberation *only* about procedure, and advocate a substantive backing to deliberative democracy, as long as that substance is provisional (it could be decided against in the future) (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 7, 110).

Like societal benefits, better procedures are a benefit to both those who do and those who do not participate, because the decisions that are produced from superior outcomes almost always affect more than the decision-influencing parties. Unlike societal benefits, procedural benefits are not focused on changing values and norms of the surrounding culture. Instead, they are primarily concerned with improving democratic processes. To be sure, this change in norms and an updated democratic process could go hand in hand, but they do not necessarily have to. For instance, deliberative forums held between citizens and decision makers might render final decisions more legitimate, because everyday people got a chance to influence the decision-making process. However, neither the “losing” party nor the public at large necessarily has to have more respect for the “winning” party (a value change – societal), even if they’re more inclined to accept the result (an outcome change – procedural).

Procedural benefits can take a variety of forms. One form includes making the decision-making process run more smoothly. An example from the deliberative literature is Gutmann and Thompson’s assertion that deliberation handles clashes between supposedly incommensurable worldviews better (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 41 – 44). Hence, this benefit translates to a less conflict-ridden decision making process, potentially finding ways to compromise between entrenched interests that had previously only led to unceasing conflict.

Others see procedural benefits accruing at the end of the process – namely decisions reached through deliberation are more likely than the alternatives to be accepted as legitimate and justified. This is because deliberation, when inclusive and open, will privilege the force of the better argument (Young 2000: 22–23). These legitimized decisions may be more likely to keep lines of communication open between majorities and minorities in future conflicts. As an example, even though the conservative parents of Hawkins County who protested textbook choices still lost their battle, the decision was more acceptable than if they were just outvoted with no chance to air their arguments (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 64). Some see this latter benefit, producing legitimate democratic decisions, as the preeminent job of deliberative democracy (Benhabib 1996: 69; Cohen 2003: 21).

Other procedural benefits focus on the idea that deliberation will produce "better" outcomes than aggregation of preferences. Better outcomes can include: more democratic outcomes, outcomes more in line with the "enlightened"/informed interest of the citizens, and/or outcomes more in line with the actual (but frustrated) interest of the citizens. This line of thinking can be traced back to Aristotle, who claimed that the masses generally make better decisions than handfuls of elites. Even though individual citizens may be wholly unremarkable on their own, when they come together, they are capable of making decisions that are more in the public interest and more accepted than if they had been shut out of the process. And while on the surface this seems like a justification for aggregation of preferences, it is doubtful that Aristotle intended it that way. Despite the tendency for error and abuse in democracy, to not have the people involved in decision-making is a dangerous injustice – “what is left, then, is for them to share in deliberating and judging” (Aristotle 1984: 1281b).

The modern deliberative project applies Aristotelian rationale to modern deliberative settings. For instance, Gastil believes that citizen juries will produce more sound judgments than other decision making processes and that the nature of elections may be altered for the better (Gastil 2000: 187). He cites Rawls’s original position and experiments in social psychology to show that not only is this benefit desirable, but it is also a likely outcome – generally higher-quality decisions are made after deliberation, especially deliberation involving complex problems and/or value questions (Gastil 2000: 23; Burleson et. al. 1984: 571). Gutmann and Thompson mention that because of the reason giving requirement inherent in most versions of deliberative democracy, deliberation is capable of exploring more options than pure voting alone (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 19–20). Thus, although deliberation is not guaranteed to produce the absolute best choice, it does widen the playing field. Carlos Nino phrases the same point somewhat differently – deliberation picks out mistakes, ambiguities, and falsehoods that a straight voting procedure would gloss over. Deliberation acts as a fixative measure since it is less common that a group of people will all make the same mistake in logic than an individual to make this mistake (Nino 1996: 124).

Individual benefits

Individual level benefits differ from the above two types in a few ways. First of all, individual benefits are divisible in a way that they apply primarily to people who engage in deliberation.[16] Substance-wise, individual and societal benefits can be similar—the chief distinction is in who they apply to after a deliberation takes place—everyone or just the deliberators. Second, individual benefits tend to be a lot less abstract than either societal benefits or procedural. It is easy to gauge whether or not someone has a better grasp on a complicated issue because of deliberation than it is to assess incredibly insubstantial things like "legitimacy" or "altered cultural norms." Hence, individual benefits are easier to quantify and easier to measure.

Although no major published work in deliberative democracy has focused exclusively on individual benefits, a quick reading of the literature will find individual benefits scattered amongst the more prominent societal and procedural benefits. Examples include: deliberation making people more tolerant, reinforcing autonomy, allowing moral development, and refining self-interest (Warren 1996: 256-257; Levine 2000: 94–95; Mansbridge 2003: 173). These are individual benefits because they apply first and nearly exclusively to the person engaging in deliberation. Although the deliberator, after having received these individual benefits may, in turn, go on to improve the society around her or the democratic processes within her locale, there is no necessary expectation that she will extend the same benefit she just received. That is, a person who becomes more creative or politically sophisticated through deliberation will not necessarily make non-deliberators more creative or politically sophisticated.

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[16] I argue that individual benefits apply secondarily to those that witness, but are not necessarily active in deliberation, as well. Indeed, Fishkin finds evidence that "watchers" of deliberation pick up some of educative benefits of deliberation (Fishkin 1999: 282). In my paper, the difference between these types and societal benefits is that a societal benefit would be available to those who have nothing to do with deliberative processes, whereas one must be involved in some minimal fashion (watching) to gain individual benefits.

Deliberativists typically give individual level benefits one of three treatments. First of all, some deliberativists ignore individual benefits altogether. They may not view them in a hostile fashion, but they skip over them and focus on other types of benefits. An example is Michael Rabinder James's book, *Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity*, in which he states, "plural deliberation is a model for assessing the legitimacy of democratic processes and institutions that secure collective decisions among members of diverse and constructed collective identities" (James 2004: 53). James considers deliberation first and foremost as a procedural benefit, specifically for assessing outcomes. If deliberation has individual benefits, perhaps they filter down to the individuals when the process becomes more valid, but this avenue is left relatively unexplored by James.

The second way that deliberative democrats treat individual benefits is to acknowledge that they exist, but not single them out for special treatment. In this version, individual benefits are typically treated as beneficial side effects, while societal/procedural benefits get the brunt of the focus. An example of this is found in John Gastil's book*, By Popular Demand*. By the end of his book, Gastil summarizes the primary benefits of a more deliberative system:

> "I have argued that the (deliberative) panels could produce sound judgments, influence voters, change the nature of elections, improve relations between representatives and their constituencies, and ultimately, spur the development of public policy that serves the enlightened interests of the larger public" (Gastil 2000: 187).

Note how individual benefits do appear on Gastil's list of desirable products, but no special emphasis is given to them. Indeed, the "ultimate" result that he leads up to is explicitly a societal benefit. Another example is an article by Cohen and Rogers.

Although they do mention that deliberation can make individuals more civically-oriented, they make clear that deliberation's "fundamental" role is to "neutralize the political role of arbitrary preferences and power by putting collective decisions on a footing of common reason" (Cohen and Rogers 2003: 243–244). In both cases, individual benefits are mentioned, but are relegated to the background.

Finally, other deliberative theorists acknowledge that individual benefits exist, but either downplay their relevance or openly disparage them. This is probably the least frequently used treatment of deliberative benefits, although it is the most important to elaborate, for the purposes of this paper. Far more frequently, deliberative theorists take one of the above mentioned tracks—either overlooking individual benefits or folding them into the laundry list of societal and procedural. However, the theorists that critique individual benefits typically do so for two partially overlapping reasons. First, individual benefits may not be a worthwhile way to justify the deliberative project, because of the existence of better reasons or because the individual benefits of deliberation may not be democratic. Second, many feel that individual benefits may be better conceived as by-products of deliberation, not justifications for it.

The first critique centers on the worthiness of individual benefits as a way to push for deliberative reforms. For instance, although Shiffman is skeptical of the deliberative project as a whole, he thinks that advancing the deliberative project in terms that are individualized and instrumental is a "weak justification" for deliberative theory, because it is just a list of benefits, not anything that is necessary to the survival of democracy. Deliberation, in Aristotlean terms, is more of a self-improvement technique. However, there is nothing necessarily political about it; Aristotle did not recommend it for official or public-regarding speech acts (Shiffman 2004: 88, 109). James Fearon, who is much more sympathetic to the deliberative project, agrees on this point – citing individual and/or moral improvements *by themselves* are a sneaky, perhaps elitist justification for deliberation. In this case, we are being fooled (either by a philosopher-king or ourselves) into deliberating for proposed high-minded and democratic goals, when we are really just doing it for our own improvement (Fearon 1998: 59–60). Fearon's critique is mainly about priority – self-improvement without a mind towards improving quality of outcomes and processes is not democratic.

The above points are good ones if deliberative theorists tried to push individual benefits as the only reason to deliberate and the saving grace of democracy. However, Shiffman does not fully explain why the "strong justification" of deliberative democracy (legitimacy) is not compatible with the weak justification, as he calls it. There is no real reason to believe that the different types of benefits or justifications are mutually exclusive. One can have both more legitimate decisions *as well as* an improved citizenry. Most likely, Shiffman skips this logical step because he is critical of the strong justification of deliberative democracy as well. Thus, Shiffman's central critique is of the deliberative project, as a whole, and will not be dealt with here. Instead, my main point is that if one *can* accept strong justifications for deliberative democracy (such as procedural and societal benefits), then there is no reason to believe that one can not also accept more instrumental justifications like individual benefits.

The second critique states that individual benefits are not really a weaker argument, but instead are better conceived as a by-product of deliberation. According to this critique, to justify the deliberative process by aiming for these benefits is disingenuous at best, harmful at worst. Jon Elster best epitomizes this argument in that he sees individual benefits as by-products of deliberation, but not sufficient justifications, in and of themselves. Politics is about procedure and outcome; we engage with politics to produce more representative and more effective decisions (Elster 1997: 19–20). I've labeled these benefits "procedural" in this paper, but the word "benefit" makes less sense in Elster's context. In contrast, according to Elster, to seek deliberation for the "goodies" it gives us (e.g. individual benefits) is to conflate the means and the ends, as both modern theorists and their forbearers like Mill have done. Elster asks rhetorically if a deliberative result which produced no substantively better decision would be worth it, implying that any self-improvement gained from participation in this situation would not be reason enough to engage in politics. "The non-business part of politics may be the more valuable, but that value is contingent on the importance of the business part" (Ibid: 23-24). Thus, the individual benefits of deliberation may be pleasant side-effects, but we potentially ruin the process if we aim for them.

Elster's points are harder to counter because they speak to fundamental debates about the nature of valued actions. Should we value a course of action (deliberative or otherwise) for its own sake or because of the end results? Is it possible to justify this course of action for ends, means, or both? Grappling effectively with these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in regards to the current example of deliberation, I am willing to give more credence to the idea that individual benefits can be desirable ends than Elster does. His hypothetical situation of a political result that produced nil gains for policy outcome is not entirely convincing to me. I *would* consider it worthwhile if only individual improvements occurred, because an improved citizenry might set the stage for better/more effective decisions in the future. After all, politics is cyclical – there are no true ends, only today's temporary ends becoming the means for tomorrow's battles. Secondly, as I will argue in more detail below, Elster's concern for ends over means makes sense on a theoretical level. However, on the level of application, I still think that individual benefits are just as valuable ends as those that he cites; it may be more persuasive to the people who would actually be deliberating. Thus, advertising "more representative decisions" might be a draw for some altruistic citizens to attend their local forum. However, telling them that they might become smarter, more connected, and more aware of their own interests would no doubt be a bigger draw.

Why individual benefits?

This study's unique focus on individual benefits is only an advantage providing that it does not travel down a dead-end. Are the reasons that deliberative democrats are hesitant to focus on individual benefits cause enough to avoid them? No doubt, the main reason is because they are reacting to the "pathologies of individualism in mass democracy" (Leib 2004: 8). Any discussion of benefits or "goodies" for the individual smacks of the same language that Downsian economic theorists use. It reminds one of the aggregating of preferences, the marketplace of politics metaphor that most deliberativists try to differentiate themselves from. "Benefits" also sounds suspiciously like the "B term" in the economic formula for voting (shaped by Downs and later refined by Riker and Ordeshook): vote (R) = probability x benefits (PB) – costs (C) + duty (D) (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968: 28, 36). In the above equation, individual citizens weigh the probability that their vote will bring about the benefits of their candidate winning with the costs involved with voting. The above process is not just rational, but happens on a level that can be performed by the vast majority of rationally ignorant voters who are not even aware of it. Riker and Ordeshook's addition of the "duty" term is meant to give more explanatory power to the formula. After all, if the probability of influencing the election is magnificently small, then no set of benefits in the world would be grand enough to outweigh the costs of voting.

Deliberativists are uncomfortable with this logic for the reasons highlighted in last chapter's discussion of aggregative democracy. To regard voting as primarily an individual act involved in preference satisfaction downplays the civic, altruistic, and community-oriented reasons that people participate. Riker and Ordeshook's addition of duty to the mix brings little solace – this is still an individualized version of duty, strangely disconnected from the communities, values, and traditions that produced it. All elements of the "D" term are introduced as satisfactions that the individual experiences for informing himself, making a selection, or enhancing political efficacy (Riker and Ordeshook 1968: 28). Democratic choices framed only in individualistic, non-communal terms treat democracy as nothing more than the sum of the preferences of all its citizens and substitute the principles of the market for the principles of the forum (Elster 1997: 11). Thus, deliberativists are likely hesitant to frame good aspects of deliberation as "benefits" because of the similarities to aggregative democracy.

While the instinct of deliberativists to distance themselves from aggregative versions of democracy is healthy, it can lead to negative consequences. Namely, the discussion of word choice above—whether or not to use the word "benefits" or something else to describe the good outcomes of deliberation—is only a minor issue. The same instincts that cause deliberative democrats to distance themselves from terms like “benefits” also influence the *types* of benefits they discuss, and by extension, the types they ignore. As above, deliberativists typically shy away from describing or promoting the individual benefits of deliberative democracy because it reeks of “selling out” to aggregative democracy. It seems to place the burdens and joys of democracy right where Downs and company located it—squarely on the shoulders of the individual. To many deliberative democrats, this notion is heretical because deliberation implies some sort of communal reasoning—even if only two people are doing the deliberating.

Instead, one usually finds the deliberative literature full of societal and procedural benefits. To be sure, these are important; I do not believe that a focus on individual benefits should *replace* the focus on these mainstays of deliberative democratic theory. In contrast, my purpose is to show why it is not selling out to feature individual benefits more prominently—because individual benefits can be transformative and community-oriented in such a way that compliments the societal and procedural benefits nicely.

Individual benefits are worthwhile for three main reasons. First of all, these types of benefits may be the least utopian element of the deliberative project. Studying individual benefits and proving the usefulness of them may be a selling point for real-life deliberative reforms. Too often, there is the aforementioned disconnect between deliberative theory and deliberative practice. How do we make the jump from a society with poor deliberation skills to one with good deliberation? We can not hope that the public will engage in discussion with each other and their representatives simply because of high-minded ideals like “legitimacy” or an “idealized communicative procedure.” Citizens may need instrumental-sounding incentives to get the ball rolling. After all, many studies on deliberative democracy that focus on implementation offer a monetary hook to get people deliberating in the first place. Ackerman and Fishkin's bold idea for "Deliberation Day" promises to pay participating citizens $150 to participate, in the same way that Fishkin's actual Deliberative Polls did. This stipend would conceivably be kept a feature of the public holiday even decades after it becomes a success. But why keep material inducements if they're no longer required? Ackerman and Fishkin recommend not thinking of the $150 in cost/benefit terms, but rather, as a means to shore up deficiencies in democratic theory and practice (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003: 26). How much is that worth?

A second reason to focus on individual benefits involves not automatically equating instrumental benefits with greed and self-centeredness. Most people enjoy learning new information, gaining new skills, and living in a more tolerant and peaceful environment. The individual benefits of deliberation are different from Downs's instrumental rationality, which envisions individuals in strategic competitions – a zero sum game of political winners and losers over scarce resources. In contrast, the individual benefits of deliberation are only partially instrumental. It is true that they do represent individual gains. However, they are at least potentially inclusive for those who do participate. In a rights-respecting democracy, they would be non-excludable in the sense that anyone is *allowed* to deliberate. Additionally, these benefits are not zero-sum—the benefits that Citizen X gains from deliberation does not detract from Citizen Y's supply in the slightest.

The final reason that individual benefits are a worthwhile aspect of the deliberative project is because they also represent positive *transformations* for individuals. Fishkin's deliberative poll in Austin demonstrates this transformation nicely—his participants were excited over their individual gains in sophistication, persuasive skill, information, and interest in politics (Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 21, 28, 32; Smith 1999: 54). Even if many individual level benefits are partially instrumental, at first, one can easily see even this tiny amount of instrumental reasoning diminishing as people become more experienced with deliberation. Once people move past the lure of individual benefits as a reason to deliberate, they will gain more appreciation for the process and the values associated with it. Also, the inclusion of civic benefits (explained fully below) may balance out any remaining instrumental aspects of some of the educative benefits. These may not be tangible selling points ahead of time, but rather benefits that accrue once the process is underway. Ackerman and Fishkin describe a virtuous cycle, based on anecdotal evidence, in which people are more active and interested in politics after a deliberative poll (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003: 18). Seyla Benhabib sees deliberation not just "laundering" unpopular preferences, but eventually leading to a legitimate belief in the public-ness of expressed views, similar to what Hannah Arendt titles, "the enlarged mentality" (Benhabib 1996: 72). Likewise, Gutmann and Thompson hold out for the possibility that legitimate public-spirited perspectives can occur from deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 30).

Individual benefits in this study

This purpose of this study is to explore the individual benefits of deliberative democracy in three steps. The first step occurs here in chapter 2, in which I make sense of the various individual benefits by listing and organizing them into a conceptual framework. The next step occurs in chapter 3, in which I will set out to prove the desirability of these individual benefits, especially in contrast to the "darker sides" that some of these individual benefits may possess. For instance, while some benefits, such as “enhanced creativity,” are generally considered normatively desirable at face value (Would anyone, apart from advertising executives and propagandists, champion citizens being unimaginative?), other benefits may be interpreted differently by separate observers. What may seem like “moral development” to one observer may seem like “increased groupthink” to another. This chapter contains a defense of the normative desirability of the selected individual benefits, or failing that, advice on how to keep the preferable version of certain benefits from degenerating into their flipsides. The final chapter tests the plausibility of these individual benefits arising from deliberation in an experimental setting. The benefits are operationalized, measured, and analyzed to show that individual benefits can arise from deliberation in greater or lesser degrees.

The body of deliberative literature is filled with examples of individual benefits, even if no study before has focused exclusively on them. For the purposes of this study, I divide them into two different (although not entirely mutually exclusive) groups—educative and civic benefits. I label some benefits as *educative* because they involve a change in cognitive capacity or individual abilities. Examples include: expanded information, increased correct information, enhanced presentation skills, rational thinking skills, creativity skills, political sophistication, re-ordered preferences, increased self-interest awareness, and greater interest in politics. The other benefits either relate to the affective domain or the individual’s relationship to her community. I classify them as *civic*, and they include: increased affection, developed moral character, expanded tolerance, civic spirit, mutual respect, transformed preferences, community awareness, and political participation. The lists are not exhaustive, although this does represent a very thorough sampling of the individual benefits found in mainstream deliberative literature.

The educative and civic benefits discussed below are not meant to be an either/or situation, but are instead often a matter of emphasis. Many educative benefits complement civic benefits and vice-versa. For instance, greater self-interest awareness does not automatically make one greedy and selfish. It may instead make a citizen better disposed towards seeing how and where her interest intersects with the good of the community, hence it promotes a citizen’s moral development. Our ideal citizen may be more inclined to forgo her immediate interests in favor of the community once she understands her own position better, as the alternative (lack of self-knowledge) often fortifies positions behind walls of unreason and dogmatic thinking (Mansbridge 2003: 173). This does not preclude the possibility that in occasional instances, some educative benefits may hinder or lessen the possibility of civic benefits arising. It merely states that these educative benefits, in basic and hypothetical form, do not destroy the possibility of civic benefits, or vice-versa.

That being said, the organizational framework is more appropriate than examining each individual benefit in isolation because there does seem to be a high amount of correlation within groups. For instance, when a deliberative theorist discusses educative benefits, he usually neglects or downplays the role of civic benefits. Many times, this is due to an implicit belief that civic benefits are an implausible goal to shoot for. Likewise, other deliberativists discuss primarily civic benefits. This is not a denial that educative benefits exist or are important; it is just that they are can be poor consolation prize if they are the only benefits achieved. I believe that this more closely represents entrenched viewpoints within the deliberative community instead of the inability of educative and civic views to coexist. The experimental section will demonstrate that even though educative benefits tend to arise as a group (as do civic benefits), nothing precludes both from being achieved together.

The sections below detail the eight benefits selected for examination in this study, the first four of which are classified as educative, the second four of which are civic: increased quality of information, enhanced creativity, political sophistication, greater self-interest awareness, enhanced tolerance, moral development, greater affection, and increased political participation. For each benefit, I will explain how it has been discussed and championed in the deliberative literature[17], list experimental or anecdotal evidence of the benefit's appearance after deliberation, and provide a rough outline for how each benefit will be operationalized in the final chapter of this study.[18]

It was important to study multiple benefits from both camps, so as to provide a greater justification to the deliberative project if these benefits are shown to be empirically plausible results of deliberation. However, I narrowed the focus to the eight benefits above for a combination of reasons. First of all, many of the above benefits are the ones most frequently cited by theorists as justifications for deliberative democracy. Thus, I will be testing some of the more popular claims of deliberative democrats. Second, the selection was further refined to take into account ease of operationalization/measurement. Unfortunately, this eliminated a few very intellectually compelling benefits of deliberation, such as enhanced civic spirit, that were extremely difficult to measure in an experimental setting. Future studies may find creative ways to measure the benefits that I exclude in this study. Third, many of the eight benefits were selected because they may have an intuitive appeal to political theorists as reasons to engage in or promote deliberation.[19] And finally, each of the eight benefits were intriguing to me, personally. I am cognizant about the importance of being excited about the fruits of deliberation if my eventual goal is to make others excited and interested in the same thing.

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[17] Many times, this will also include references to figures in the political theory canon who lived in eras before deliberative democracy was a coherent democratic project. These are often the "forefathers" of deliberative theory like J. S. Mill or John Dewey who may be best described as "honorary deliberative democrats."

[18] A more detailed operationalization appears in the final chapter and the Appendix A.

Educative benefits

Educative benefits represent increases in individual deliberators' mental capacities or skill-based abilities. They are often an unintentional paradox in that they are mentioned more frequently in the deliberative literature (sometimes even referred to as the educative aspects or results of deliberation) than civic benefits, but at the same time, often kept at arm's length for the reasons outlined in the section above. The frequency of their mention may have something to do with how plausibly they arise from deliberation—a few empirical and quasi-experimental studies have shown some of these benefits to reliably arise from deliberation, even if these results were almost always incidental to the main findings of these studies.[20] However, these educative benefits also seem very instrumental, especially in contrast to the societal and procedural benefits of deliberation (as well as in contrast to what I label the civic individual benefits of deliberation). For many deliberativists, it may seem that if the only way you can get individuals to deliberate is to promise them individual improvements, then deliberation is only as worthy as a continuing education class at a local community college.

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[19] My justification of individual benefits rests of the assumption that these benefits are also at least partially appealing to the politicians and citizens that would promote and participate in deliberation.

[20] For instance, the primary purpose of Fishkin's Deliberative Polls is to show that deliberation produces collective desires more in line with real collective preference than standard polling processes – to come closer to realizing George Gallup's dream of a national scale town meeting (Fishkin 1999:280). Fishkin finds anecdotal (and occasionally presents statistical) evidence that individual attributes increase, as well, but this is always a secondary aspect of his study.

I disagree with the above statement for two reasons. First, educative benefits, when appearing together with civic benefits, are not equivalent to the self-regarding strategic behavior which animates aggregative conceptions of the citizen. Instead, according to the Mansbridge quote above, educative improvements for the individual may pave the way for more civic-minded and altruistic changes later. Second, even if one only considers the merits of educative benefits in their own terms—while many seem instrumental, they are also all vital aspects of a fully functional democracy as imagined by democratic theorists and participatory democrats before the term deliberative democracy was even invented. That is, these educative benefits can be traced back through a long tradition of thought about the ideal citizen, which owes various ideological debts to Aristotle, Jefferson, Mill, Dewey, and others. These traits are cyclical in the sense that they are not only what are produced in a good democracy, but also the same traits that improve democracy, in the first place. For instance, taking a cue from Mill, William Nelson believes that governments should enhance the "virtue and intelligence" of their citizens (Nelson 1980: 48). Thus, for all of these educative benefits, there is historical and philosophical precedent for trying to enhance these attributes for their own sakes.

Educative benefit #1: increased information

Increased information means that deliberation may be able to "fact check" the correctness of the information that people have about a given subject or in regards to politics in general. For instance, even a few months after the start of the recent Iraq war, one poll found that 60% of the public held at least one major misconception about the war, whether it was an Al Qaeda/Iraq link, finding of weapons of mass destruction, or worldwide support for the war (Kull 2003: 7). Three years after the war, the numbers are more reassuring. However, 22% of Americans still believe Iraq had actual WMDs, 14% still think Iraqis were involved in the attacks of September 11th (Kull 2006: 4 – 5). Likewise, as of 1996, only 22% of American citizens believed that global warming was a serious problem, even though the issue had been prominent for at least ten years (Gelbspan 2004: 53). All of these assumptions are incorrect, yet this erroneous information goes on to color beliefs on other issues and policy preferences.

Mill's "marketplace of ideas" metaphor has served as a rallying point for many deliberativists. The idea, framed by the deliberative project, is that incorrect or misleading information will be much more likely to be sniffed out and exposed when subjected to the judgment and critical eye of a group of diverse individuals (Nino 1996: 124). Thus, deliberation is expected to increase the amount of correct information that citizens possess.

Many times, the deliberative justification for citizens knowing information more accurately is inspired by classical liberalism. Liberals view the job of the state as creating negative liberty—boundaries within which individuals are free to act. Few liberals advocate absolute freedom, because in such a situation, inequalities inevitably arise. Instead, liberal thinkers, like Rawls, ask us to imagine ourselves in an original position, behind a veil of ignorance. Without reference to our own situation, we would design laws and institutions in such a way that the lot of the least advantaged would not be too heinous (Rawls 1999: 109–112; Farrelly 2004: 8).

One inequality that arises among free individuals revolves around the differing level of accurate information that citizens possess. In America alone, it can be seen how unequal levels of information have an effect on an individual's sense of political efficacy and likelihood to either vote or participate. Even though there is a still a debate over causal mechanisms, many accept that there is a linkage between level of information and variables like education and socioeconomic status (McCombs and Mullins 1973: 27-31; Luskin 1990: 352; Squire et. al. 2005: 165, 167). To add to this, a lack of understanding and identification with political issues leads to lowered efficacy and voting *against* things instead of voting *for* something (Warren 1996: 319). Thus, many deliberativists support the role of deliberation in giving *all* citizens a better quality of information. The phrase, "talk is cheap," is often used derisively to imply that words matter less than action. However, in this case, we could use it to mean that *anyone* can deliberate (thus, anyone can improve their understanding of the world around them), regardless of socioeconomic status or educational background.

Quality and quantity of information are variables that are frequently explored in the historical and experimental literature. For instance, many of the early twentieth century forum movements were praised chiefly for their educative function, i.e. giving correct information to the citizens (Mattson 1997: 37–38; Kunzman and Tyack 2005: 326-328). Granted, no deliberation is ever *guaranteed* to give correct information to the participants. It is certainly possible for moderators and organizers with an agenda to consciously or subconsciously reinforce misleading, skewed, or partisan information.

But overall, public forums serve this function the best when impartial information is consciously striven for (Studebacker 1935: 21).

Recent empirical studies bear out the fact that deliberation tends to enhance deliberators' grasp of facts and information both specific and general. After all of James Fishkin's Deliberative Polls, respondents have shown considerable gains in amount of correct knowledge as well as total knowledge on the tested subjects. All of this was assessed using a simple political knowledge test before and after the experiment (Fishkin 1999: 285).

In the final chapter's experimental design, I will measure this variable in a similar fashion—by comparing how frequently respondents answer "facts" questions accurately between pre- and post-experimental surveys. None of the answers to these questions will be presented in pre-experimental materials, nor will the moderators probe the discussion groups on these specific issues. Instead, the questions are geared to test whether or not respondents holding incorrect views of the facts have been corrected in a discussion environment.

Educative benefit #2: enhanced creativity

Enhanced creativity builds off of the first educative benefit because group discussion can do more than clear up factual errors; group discussion can also involve a process of discussants "bouncing ideas off of each other" in order to come to an acceptable course of action. Thus, enhanced creativity refers to the assumption that deliberation may make individuals more likely to arrive at solutions to problems.

There is some evidence of the value of creativity in the versions of deliberative theory most inspired by both classical theory as well as classical liberalism, although it is not as clear cut as liberal justifications of information, eloquence, and rational thinking. For instance, Isocrates outlined the types of traits that make a good deliberator. Luck is a factor, but practicing the art of speaking well reduces the role of luck. These people tend to be better suited towards discovering a good course of action (Poulkos 1997: 80). Both practice and natural talent develop skills like good insight, sound judgment, and *imagination* (Poulkos 1997: 87–88; emphasis mine). Likewise, John Stuart Mill believed that public discussion was capable of advancing certain skills of those who participated in the decision-making process. Deliberation can make us better at argumentation and more consistent and steadfast in our views. Among the skills that Mill lists, he includes "active faculties" (Mill 1990/1859: 111 – 112). Likewise, in Chapters 1 and 6 of "Considerations on Representative Government," Mill mentions that political participation promotes moral, active, and intellectual capacities. The latter two claims have the best tie-ins to creativity as active development contains enterprise and intellectual development includes originality (Mill 1991/1961: Ch. 1, 6; Mansbridge 1999: 308). Finally, in *Art as Experience*, John Dewey likens social interaction (conversations) to works of art, claiming that, "men in general are not aware that they have been exercising an art as long as they have engaged in spoken intercourse with others" (Dewey 1934: 63, 240). The implication in Dewey's words is that conversation, which is an improvisational enterprise, is a creative art form that is maintained through practice, and (one assumes) lessened through disuse (Sawyer 2000: 155).

And so, while mainstream deliberative theorists have not focused exclusively on the role of creativity, it is often mentioned amongst a hodge-podge of other skills that one acquires through active and deliberative involvement. Modern advocates of deliberation piggyback onto Mill's general claim about public discussion producing a variety of skills. If politics becomes centered on compromise, the more people deliberate, the better they may become at brainstorming creative solutions (Gambetta 1998: 23).

Not many deliberative experiments measure creativity. It does present a more difficult measure than the informational gains described above. However, there are a few ways that I intend to measure gains in creativity within the following experiment. The primary method consists of asking an open-ended question about the types of solutions to certain contemporary problems in current events. On the post-survey, a question asks the respondent how many new solutions (i.e. not suggested by the pre-experimental information packets) were arrived at by the group and how many the individual can take credit in helping develop. Thus, if a subject's creativity has been enhanced after deliberation, he will be more likely to list more unique items on the post-survey. A second analysis, which is outside the cost/time constraints of the present study, would consist of a content analysis of the actual deliberation. This may reveal *how* communication has the ability to jog the creative thinking capacities of the participants. The content analysis of the deliberation should reveal individuals bouncing ideas off of one another to arrive at new solutions. And while I expect that not every respondent would become equally creative through deliberation, some gains in creativity should be quite large.

Educative benefit #3: political sophistication

Political sophistication is defined in this study as how consistent a subject's beliefs are. Thus, while the second educative benefit hints to the possibility that deliberation can cause individuals to become better at generating solutions, this benefit means that deliberation may make individuals more ideologically consistent in the proposals that they select as the best. This version of political sophistication borrows heavily from a few recent deliberative studies on the subject. In one, a politically sophisticated person is someone who is: a) ideologically consistent on all questions in the same item, b) is ideologically consistent on similar points in different items, and c) has a negative correlation with the other end of the ideological scale (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 6).

This is the other aspect of Mill's "marketplace of ideas" metaphor. The marketplace weeds out bad information, but it can also promote political sophistication. That is, inconsistent or weakly held opinions were likely to go unsold in the marketplace of ideas. A viewpoint that survived the gauntlet of discussion was likely to do so, on account of its similarity to similarly ideological beliefs that are already accepted. Thus, the deliberator picks up practice and knowledge while defending the view, and becomes more ideologically consistent in the process (Mill 1990/1859: 108; Christiano 1997: 247).

The intense debates about public policy in the sixties, according to some authors, improved ideological consistency, at least temporarily (Levine 2000: 10). This increase in political sophistication was astounding by most measures – going from .15 in the late 1950's to .4 in the mid-sixties, where it remained for over a decade (Huntington 1975: 77). This shed new light on earlier studies of the voting public in the '40's and '50's which delivered grim results about a non-ideological and confused public. Namely, perhaps political sophistication was not fixed, but rather contextual—generally high in times of political conflict and low in times when there are few divisive political issues. This boost in political sophistication had benefits and drawbacks for democratic citizenship. On one hand, consistency meant that citizens had more group identity and were more active in politics. On the other hand, this also meant that people were more polarized and trusted the government less (Ibid: 76–78).

To test for this benefit, all one has to do is run participants through before and after deliberation questionnaires in which respondents identify their positions on a variety of issues and note whether deliberation irons out inconsistencies in their responses. Gastil and Dillard examine the effect of deliberation on the political sophistication of citizens by ranking various options in National Issues Forums books along a liberal/conservative scale (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 3). Thus, after deliberation, we expect liberals to answer positively to values questions and policy proposals identified as liberal more consistently than before deliberation, and likewise with conservatives. My version measures political sophistication in a similar way—I assign subjects an “ideology” score based on their reaction to a few questions towards the beginning of the pre-survey. Towards the end of both pre- and post-surveys, participants will be asked both policy proposal questions and values questions (which are also used in another variable below). I expect that my deliberators become more coherent and aware of inconsistent beliefs after deliberating.

Educative benefit #4: greater self-interest awareness

Self-interest awareness overlaps a little with political sophistication, as described above. The latter is intending to measure one’s consistency and strength of moral beliefs or recommended courses of action. In contrast, to have greater self-interest awareness would be to have a more developed idea of how certain issues impact you directly. The premise is that deliberation can make a citizen more aware of what is in his/her own best personal interest—more capable of seeing the connections between their life and a seemingly distant issue.

In the deliberative literature, this benefit is debated under the heading of preference reordering/transformation. Although some theorists undervalue or ignore the thought that deliberative processes are a boon for interpreting how closely connected to an issue the individual might be (for the same reasons that deliberativists shy away from discussing benefits in general), others are much more in favor of deliberation improving self-interest awareness (Warren 1996: 243). For instance, Jane Mansbridge does not believe that deliberative theory should shy away from stressing deliberation's ability to refine, clarify, and focus self-interest. It is only when people know what they want that they can work out just compromises or even begin to transform their preferences in a more civic direction (Mansbridge 2003: 173). As such, improved self-interest awareness does not automatically induce greed or self-centeredness. In her own words,

> "Yet recognizing and asserting self-interest helps advance distributive justice. Recognizing and asserting self-interest helps one figure out oneself what one wants. Recognizing and asserting self-interest helps in becoming understood (and respected) for what one wants and needs. Finally, recognizing and asserting self-interests helps unveil hegemonic understandings of the common good when those understandings have evolved to mask subtle forms of oppression." (Ibid: 179)

Deliberation may also help us realize when our interests/preferences are in conflict with each other. The mechanism can be similar to the first educative benefit's ability to expose faulty information through group discussion. In this case, one may not realize that the preference for lower taxes and the preference for more social services are in conflict until the paradox is highlighted in discussion with others. The deliberator may then reorder his preferences, accordingly (Manin et. al. 1987: 350). Even though the experiment outlined in chapter 4 does not specifically measure a reordering of preferences, the above feature is relevant to understanding the benefit.

Other deliberative and pre-deliberative democratic theorists have discussed a related benefit—reflection. Reflection is not the same as self-interest awareness—only the beginning of the process. But one can not assess and refine their preferences without at least minimal reflection. Hence, understanding deliberation's ability to produce reflection is related to its ability to produce greater self-interest awareness. For example, Isocrates's vision of public deliberation was vitally linked with reflection and circumspection (Poulkos 1997: p. 71). Modern day theorists of deliberation see things similarly; deliberation-induced reflection may cause heretofore subconscious preferences to be refined and reinforced. Maybe this new information will cause preferences to shift. But it may also strengthen or alter them in vital ways (Freeman 2000: 384). Deliberation may generate the reflexivity necessary to be truly autonomous—to decide what you want, not *entirely* under the influence of unreflective loyalties like race, partisanship, etc. (Warren 1996: 256).

Self-interest awareness is one of the harder benefits to measure in this experimental set-up, but it is not impossible. The reason that it makes for a different variable has mostly to do with the topics chosen for deliberation. All are issues of national importance in which most will have some passing familiarity with, such as terrorism. However, the downside of choosing familiar issues is that many subjects will not (initially) see how these issues affect them. For instance, a sizable number of Americans know personally or are related to people who lost their lives in the attacks of September 11th. Many more Americans feel an emotional connection to the event and the issue, in general. But few Americans, even those directly affected by 9/11, feel that there is something that they can *do, personally*, about terrorism. Personal stakes or individual preferences are not usually perceived as relevant to issues as large as national security.

Thus, this variable will be measured by asking one "personal stake" essay question per issue on the pre- and post-surveys. The questions will essentially ask the subject if they feel they have a personal stake in the issue and then ask them to explain why or why not. One assumption is that they will feel more of a personal stake in each issue after deliberation because they've been exposed to the viewpoints of others who highlight connections to the issue that had not occurred to them before. Of course, this measurement might reveal the opposite trend: deliberating about terrorism might convince someone who believes that terrorists are waiting to hijack every passenger flight, that the threat of terrorism has been exaggerated in their own minds. They may only come to this new realization after deliberation with other individuals who show them that their personal stake in the issue is much smaller than they had originally thought.

Civic benefits

A civic benefit is any individual improvement that enhances links between the deliberator and the political groups of which he is a part. The phrase "civic benefit" is mentioned only very rarely in the deliberative literature, with the most visible examples referring instead to what I have identified as civically-oriented societal benefits like increased aggregate levels of voting, efficacy, and trust (America Speaks).

Leaving the issue of word choice aside, the individual benefits that I've labeled civic benefits *do* appear in the deliberative literature, but usually under a discussion about the transformative effects of deliberation or deliberative democracy, which can be linked to civic republicanism (Bohman 1996: 5). Michelman describes (civic) republicanism as being animated by two main aspects: civic virtue and general good. The former is particularly important for an understanding of civic benefits, as it mentions that the government's primary job is to cultivate "the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private interests to the general good" (Michelman 1986: 18-19). Republican politics involve heavy participation and (more importantly) dialogue, although not in the eternally-bargaining, self-interested mode that has become chiefly associated with liberal democracy. Historical champions of civic republicanism, such as the American anti-Federalists, argued for smaller units of government. Their rationale was partially for the reason that a federal government would rob citizens of the ability to communicate directly with politicians (Michelman 1986: 19). In addition, civic republicanism encompasses the Arendtian notion of "public happiness," in which, "participation in government [is] a positive good, providing a kind of 'happiness' that [can] be found nowhere else." (Michelman 1986: 22) Thus, we have the potential to not just improve our own mental facilities, as with educative benefits, but to *become* more virtuous, more altruistic, and happier.

Many of the theorists that champion my version of civic benefits echo Michael Sandel's claim that an active, morality-cultivating government would create citizens who are used to "deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community" (Sandel 1996: 5). Most of the civic benefits below imply a connectedness and willingness of individuals to see and strive for community goods over individual preferences, at least part of the time.

Civic benefit #1: enhanced tolerance

In this study, enhanced tolerance refers to individuals becoming more accepting of the right of people to express opposing opinions. They do not have to accept or embrace the opposing opinions, themselves. Instead, it just means that they accept the expression of these opinions within democratic discourse. The link between deliberation and increased tolerance is partially intuitive. When deliberation is well-designed and inclusive, deliberators will be exposed to diverse viewpoints and backgrounds. Since most deliberative forums featured in the literature have remained civil and generous, we can assume that most people, regardless of their personal views, will try to explore common ground with those whom they disagree. Few may be "converted" over the course of the average deliberation, but most will concede that their personal views can co-exist in a democratic framework with opposing views. This concession towards greater tolerance may not occur in the absence of the opposing views that deliberation often brings.

Deliberative theorists see a plausible link between deliberation and enhanced tolerance. It is a typical line of radical and deliberative democrats that participation makes better citizens *and* more tolerant people, mostly because of the reasons listed above (Warren 1996: 256). John Studebaker argued that his public forums would promote a "critical open-mindedness" that was essential to democracy (Studebaker 1935: 21).

Evidence for increased tolerance in deliberative experiments is largely anecdotal. Kevin Mattson, a scholar of the Progressive Era, notes that the debates at the social centers heightened participants' sense of inclusion and fairness – both of which are traits closely linked to toleration (Mattson 1997: 58). More recently, observers of Deliberative Polls note a high level of post-deliberation sympathy for those in "opponent" groups (Smith 1999: 52). The few measures that relate to tolerance centered around "values" questions on interviews such as, "I discovered that people with views very different from mine often had very good reasons for those views" (Ibid: 47).

Tolerance will be measured in two different ways. First, subjects should have some tolerance for the opposing views of group members after they have deliberated with them. For these questions, there will not be exact match between the pre- and post-survey versions of the question, as the respondents are specifically commenting on the deliberative forum they just took place in. Instead, the post-survey will ask the respondents about the specific levels of tolerance for opposing opinions expressed within the group, such as, "Do you believe that views expressed in the session that were opposed to yours are worthy of expression?" Thus, while a precise *change* in tolerance can not be ascertained, the measure can indicate whether different treatment groups promote tolerance in instances that contain opposing views.

The second measure will test whether subjects have more respect for the general virtue of tolerance. In similar quasi-experimental designs, questions on tolerance were asked only in the post-interview, as a way of assessing the experiment, itself. However, my experiment will ask questions pertaining to the value and scope of tolerance on both the pre- and post-interviews to measure whether this represents a true change in tolerance or a self-selected group of already tolerant individuals. I expect that, after being confronted with alternate viewpoints, individuals will become more tolerant about not just the specific forum issues, but perhaps also about connected issues in a general sense.

Civic benefit #2: moral development

In this dissertation, moral development will mean deliberation's ability to get deliberators more in line with basic moral views held by the groups to which they belong. For some deliberativists, especially those influenced by classical liberalism, the above possibility is a scary thought—that deliberation may "brainwash" free-thinking individuals to conform to the moral dictates of their community. Thus, you see many visions of deliberative democracy that are content neutral. They often take the Habermasian line that good deliberation is that which most closely approximates an idyllic communicative procedure (Habermas 1998: Ch. 1). In contrast, many deliberative democrats embrace the issue of substance in deliberative democracy, even though it raises the sticky issue of deliberative democrats having to decide, a priori, which moral values good deliberation would promote (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 7, 110).

Is it possible to find certain broad democratic moral values that good deliberation would promote? Prominent communitarian thinkers like Amitai Etzioni say "yes"—there are certain broad moral precepts that are nearly universal: the "golden rule" and prohibitions against unsanctioned murder, rape, child abuse. Others are reasonably accepted by most in our community, such as: dislike of discrimination, violence, and indignity; admiration for respect and law abidingness. Communitarians wish to cultivate moral development by stressing the myriad of broad values that we all share (Etzioni 1993: 91, 97, 99; Frohnen 1996: 11). Deliberation may do this, by reigning in the extreme viewpoints held by otherwise reasonable people who have been exposed to diverse and challenging counter-opinions.

Many advocates of deliberation think that the link between deliberation and moral development is visible and important. According to the Progressive George Mead, individual moral values were linked to deliberative democratic forms but absent from aggregative forms. That is, you can outvote the capitalist, but when you do so, you leave his hegemonic values in place. No discussion about the rightness/wrongness of the system results from a mere vote. And more likely, he will bide his time until he gets back into office. In order for democratic action to be truly effective, it needs to be a deliberation about moral values (Ethington 1999: 206). To be sure, Mead is not saying that deliberation *makes* citizens more moral, only that deliberation about morals and democracy go hand in hand. Deliberation may form an environment in which one is free to consider what one believes is right and wrong. Cass Sunstein phrases the point in a similar fashion when he mentions that collective deliberation is not just about citizens deciding what they want, "but instead who they are – what their values are and what those values require." (Sunstein 1993: 178)

There are few, if any, any deliberative experiments that have attempted to measure gains in moral development, partially because there are numerous ways in which one could be considered to have "developed" morally. However, it is not an impossible variable to operationalize and measure. In this dissertation, moral development will cohere closely to Etzioni's conception above—deliberation reinforcing group/communal values in the mind of an individual. I realize that this is only one way to conceptualize moral development which somewhat neglects other interesting possibilities, such as individuals determining their own morality or moving through "stages" of development.

However, communally-inspired moral development coheres nicely with this dissertation's theme of educative and civic benefits.

Moral development will be assessed by asking two types of questions. The first type is unique to this study and will consist of values questions about the deliberation topics on both the pre- and post-survey. Moral development will be shown to have occurred if there is a convergence towards the median group score on these questions from the pre- to the post-survey. The second type of question is taken word for word from real-life news polls on these topics. That way, I can also measure whether or not individual opinions have become more aligned with national majority values after deliberation.

Civic benefit #3: greater affection

Greater affection simply means that citizens have more positive interactions and impressions of the people with whom they come in contact. In short, deliberation may make you more inclined to like and desire to associate with the people you have deliberated with. In a similar manner to the other civic benefits, the mechanism for this may depend on prolonged exposure to people outside the deliberator's comfort zone. Granted, exposure can also bring contempt and hostility. But given most people's default response of civility, the former seems much more likely than the latter.

Have deliberative or pre-deliberative theorists made a connection between deliberation and affection? Deliberative theorists inspired by the liberal tradition are not entirely positive about deliberation producing affection. This is because for many of them, deliberation is a process of rational argumentation that does not leave room for extra-rational communication, such as that exchanged between friends. Some see this hostility towards non-rational deliberative exchanges as lessening, somewhat. As Jane Mansbridge reports, most deliberative theorists no longer hold to the strict maxim that deliberation can only equal reasoned speech (Mansbridge 2003: 188). Thus, the door is at least open for affection in the eyes of most deliberativists.

Other theorists of deliberation see affection as a much more central component and/or product of deliberation. For instance, Iris Marion Young points out the role of greeting as an understudied but very important part of democratic communication. Otherwise known as public acknowledgment, greeting entails acknowledging the right and ability of others to join in the discourse. The forms this could take are verbal greetings, handshakes, hugs, and the breaking of bread. In a more advanced sense, greeting is the social lubricant which makes productive deliberation even possible. Young mentions a few case studies from diverse cultures throughout the world in which greeting plays an essential role in political communication—from Maori village meetings to even modernized Western communicative exchanges. Even when mainly for the purpose of flattery or deference, greeting can keep deliberation from devolving into simply an exercise in power politics (Young 2002: 57–60). Thus, while greeting does not have to stoke affection—it can be meant ironically or for show—at least in everyday conversation, it tends to signify equal standing and a willingness to respect and take the other party seriously.[21] When spoken honestly, such sentiments are the basis of affection.

Another example is from Benjamin Barber citing of Rousseau's fondness for public voting festivals as an example of how decision making can be linked to promoting affection between citizens. On these days, "the exercise of freedom was a rite as well as a right," and the affiliative aspects of decision making were just as important as the decisions, themselves (Barber 1984: 188). And while Rousseau was against public deliberation, on the grounds that citizens should only deliberate internally (Rousseau 1950/1762: 27; Mansbridge 1999: 298–300), Barber continuously discusses a version of "public voice" throughout his works, in which deliberation is a key element (Barber 1996: 276). According to Barber, public voice has many beneficial effects, including the cultivation of affection between citizens. Proper use of strong talk is capable of reproducing kinship bonds at a wider distance, thus making common political action possible, promoting empathy, and making kinship bonds less demanding than community bonds (Barber 1984: 189 – 190; Barber 1988: 150).

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[21] It is hard to imagine partisan rivals in the United States Senate who address each other as "my distinguished college from the great state of Georgia" before proceeding to (politely) lambaste everything he has just said, as actually feeling affection towards their colleague.

Affection is a difficult variable to measure, and certainly is not focused on frequently in deliberative experiments. At present, there is certainly anecdotal evidence from Deliberative Polls of participants making new friends because of their experience, including stories of individuals of diverse ideologies and backgrounds becoming close after discussion (Smith 1999: 52). In my experiment, I intend to measure affection with three types of questions. The first is similar to questions asked about tolerance, which will consist of the standard pre- and post-survey questions about affection towards people of opposing viewpoints, in general. Also similar to the tolerance measures, the second type of affection question will be a post-survey question only, asking them about their feelings towards fellow deliberators. Again, since there is no comparable pre-survey question, the analysis for this question is not complex, but rather a simple contrast between treatment groups. The third type of affection question will be conducted on the follow-up interview, which will take place a month or two later. I will ask if they have kept in touch with the people in their group who they did not know, in advance. This question will shed light as to whether or not affiliative links produced from deliberation are stable or temporary. However, I suspect that many who imagine that they have made a friend during the experiment will have kept the friendship by the time of the follow-up.

Civic benefit #4: increased political participation

Finally, deliberativists of the communitarian stripe often recognize the need for selfless service from the citizenry. Many advocate a broadly-defined civil religion that influences political participation, which tends to involve public discussions on the best forms and aims of government and then promote action in these directions (Frohnen 1996: 11-12). In Barber's phraseology, the public voice aims at action towards common goals, because otherwise, talk is just a silly game (Barber 1996: 278-279). This increase may occur because deliberation about issues has instilled a new sense of urgency into an issue that the subject had given little thought to, previously. Thus, a well-designed deliberation may have the same effect as the recent spate of advocacy documentaries that have been in vogue in the last few years – to inspire someone to act because of an issue that has been reframed with particular resonance for the subject.

Of all the civic benefits, participation is the one most openly examined by deliberativists and pre-deliberativists of all backgrounds, regardless of whether they champion an issue-neutral form of participation like the National Issues Forum ("Just get out there and do something!") or if they hope deliberation will produce a specific political reaction. For instance, although J. S. Mill considered a government in which everyone participated to be ideal, he championed a representative government because of necessity of size. Nevertheless, he believed that at least some involvement on the part of the people would “breed an active, vigorous citizenry” and would keep participants away from developing a “servile” or “passive” character (Mill 1977: 412; Pateman 1970: 46; Nelson 1980: 113). In a similar vein, early twentieth century forums were sometimes championed as motivators of political participation (Cleveland tent meetings, Rochester social centers, and Dewey’s appraisal of Hull House), whereas others were purposely distanced from the notion that they were to spark political action (such as Studebaker’s forums) (Mattson 1997: 37–38, 50, 58–59; Kunzman and Tyack 2005: 326-328). In the latter case, Studebaker’s hesitancy might have been to distance himself from the idea that forums were to be at the forefront of a socialist revolution.

Participation will be treated as the desire for and/or follow through of political involvement. This benefit will be measured in a similar way to the affection variable. The first method involves a comparison between pre- and post-interview questions on the participants’ belief that political action and involvement are healthy and/or necessary. The assumption is that deliberation may increase this civic benefit, inspiring people to go out and get involved in working for the good of the community. The second method of assessment involves a list of political activities that they have or have not done in the recent past (pre-survey), how many of these they promise to do in the near future (post-survey), followed by a check on whether or not they’ve kept their promise in a follow-up interview a month or two later. The follow-up is necessary, because the promise to be active is useless if it fades a week later. This tests whether or not people follow through on their increased respect for the role of political involvement.

Conclusion

The chapter's opening quote from Shiffman is an important warning against relying solely on the instrumental aspects of deliberation when trying to advance the deliberative project. Despite the importance of the warning, Shiffman is off-base for two reasons. First, as shown above, my conception of deliberative democracy (as well as most conceptions of it) does not *solely* rely on the instrumental aspects of deliberation. In particular, my framework highlights the civic, transformational aspects of deliberation that make it a worthy activity for its own sake. But secondly, his metaphor may be a tad disingenuous. Democracy does not have a "tumor" which will kill it if left untreated—no deliberative democrat portrays the system in those terms. The sad truth is that we *can* keep going as a lazy, ignorant, and apathetic mass. A better analogy, and one that deliberativists implicitly endorse, is that the patient has been diagnosed with morbid obesity—life threatening in the long term and requiring long-term solutions. Deliberative democracy would not be "liposuction," like it is in Shiffman's analogy, because it does not claim to provide a quick fix. Instead, it would be the diet and exercise regiment—the long term solution—that leads to better results in a variety of areas.

In the two chapters that follow, the above eight benefits will be examined more carefully in terms of desirability and plausibility. I consider desirability because not all of these benefits are automatically good. Therefore, it is important to understand why moral development does not equal brainwashing and participation will not lead to the overthrow of the government, like Studebaker's critics feared. In this chapter, I will prove that not only are the individual benefits preferable to their "darker sides," but that these individual benefits outweigh the individual benefits of aggregative versions of democracy.

Proving the plausibility of these benefits is a two-step process. First, I reference not only the deliberative literature, but related fields, when applicable, like communication and social psychology to judge whether these benefits are likely to arise from deliberation. Second, my own experimental procedure tests for these benefits after a subject has received one of four experimental treatments. The logic follows that if the individual benefits of deliberation are shown to be desirable and plausible, the deliberative project will have a new way to sell itself, which will hopefully lay the groundwork for more deliberative practice that is connected with theory.

CHAPTER 3 – DESIRABILITY OF BENEFITS

Introduction

Deliberative theorists have proposed a plethora of benefits that could potentially derive from deliberative procedures. And some have gone on to empirically test for the plausibility of these benefits arising from actual deliberation, as I do in the next chapter.[22] However, many miss a critical middle step in the process between listing and demonstrating the benefits of deliberative democracy, namely, the justification of these benefits.[23] Deliberative theorists must be careful not to assume that all of the benefits listed in the last chapter are automatically desirable. For instance, what if an abundance of political sophistication makes people overly dogmatic and partisan? What if what some deliberativists see as community morality appears to others as groupthink? Therefore, before it becomes worthwhile to test for the individual benefits of deliberative democracy, it is sensible to explore the desirability of each benefit, individually.[24]

This chapter examines the desirability of the major benefits of deliberation that were outlined last chapter. By necessity, most of these explorations are relatively surface-level examinations, as most of these traits have received extensive coverage and debate in the fields of philosophy, political theory, psychology and ethics. Instead, the main purpose of this chapter is to review common criticisms of each of the benefits and reasonable defenses of their worth.

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[22] Although, as I'll explain next chapter, most of these studies only examine one or two benefits, and they usually have a different purpose in mind than extolling the individual benefits of deliberative democracy.

[23] This gap in the deliberative literature is not surprising, because very few studies focus on the individual benefits of deliberative democracy, with many focusing on procedural or societal benefits, instead. However, despite the shift in focus, many studies still fall into a similar trap of assuming these other types of benefits (e.g. streamlined decision-making process or greater legitimacy) are good, at face value. For this reason, much of my defense of the individual benefits of deliberative democracy will come from outside the deliberative democratic literature.

[24] This discussion will primarily address the normative desirability of these traits, by themselves, not necessarily the desirability of these traits arising from deliberation. Therefore, if increased tolerance is successfully argued to be a desirable thing, at face value, then there is much less of a need to consider whether or not it is desirable if it arises from deliberation.

The justification of each individual benefit will proceed in three parts. First, the benefit will be explained and defined in more detail. Often, some of the conceptual murkiness which prevents a concrete definition of a concept lends clues to why the concept is disputed and/or valued in the first place.

Second, for each applicable benefit, I will explore the following ways in which the benefit could be undesirable. These critiques will take the form of one or more of the following four arguments:

A) Benefit X is usually good, but too much of X is bad. ("moderation *argument*")

B) Some people see Benefit X as good and desirable; other people see Benefit X as bad and undesirable. ("*flipside argument*")

C) Benefit X can be good in principle, but often bad in application. ("*realism argument*")

D) Benefit X is bad and is really not a benefit. ("*desirability argument*")

The titles of the above arguments are of my own devising, but the arguments themselves are timeworn. Some of the more controversial benefits, like tolerance, will receive critiques from many of the four arguments above. These critiques derive mostly from philosophical objections to the concepts contained in the benefits. Other critiques are hypothetical objections of my own devising. Many times, these arguments overlap and reinforce each other.[25] This overlap will be noted, when important; other times, arguments will be presented as ideal types. Certainly, in regards to benefits such as tolerance and moral development, arguments B – D are often found in the philosophical and ethics literature. In addition, one can certainly imagine a few reasons why a "no exceptions" tolerance or an overbearing communally-developed morality is potentially frightening. Other benefits, like creativity, do not seem to have much of a downside. There are very few (serious) academic treatises warning about the danger of too much creativity, or how creativity could really just be a mask for subversive, non-linear thinking.

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[25] In particular, there is some overlap between arguments B and D, although I maintain they are still distinct enough for the purposes of this chapter. Argument B is made by interested observers who may not

As such, it makes sense not to give each of the eight individual benefits equal time in this chapter. The downsides of the deliberative benefits that come under fire the most will be explored fully. In contrast, the less controversial benefits will either be combined into the discussion of more controversial benefits or assumed to be so commonly accepted as desirable, that no further exploration is necessary. For the purposes of this paper, the benefits of increased information, political sophistication, self-interest awareness, tolerance, moral development, and participation will be considered individually. Neither increased creativity nor enhanced affection will be defended; assuming they plausibly can arise from deliberation, very few would attack their worth.

The final part of the justification process involves responding to the critiques of the given benefit. These defenses will come not only from the deliberative literature, but also from ethical/moral philosophy. Sometimes, I will try to convince the reader that the good versions of these benefits are the proper interpretation, whereas the potentially bad

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personally have a problem with the benefit in question, but may see it leading to friction. Theorists who make argument B personally see a good and a bad side to the deliberative benefit under discussion. Argument D differs in two important ways. First, it is made from the viewpoint of a person who is opposed to the benefit in question. Because of this, secondly, proponents of this view do not normally show a positive side to the concept they're attacking.

versions are logically flawed. Other times, I will argue that despite the fact that a particular benefit has good or bad outcomes, the good outweighs the bad, in practice; hence, it is a worthwhile goal. Finally, sometimes the best way to handle objections about a benefit may be to define the benefit in a more nuanced fashion that takes into account the most serious critiques. The style of justifications will differ for each of the benefits listed.

Justification of individual benefits

Increased information

Increased information means that citizens know more about the world around them. Most people reflexively see this as a positive thing or as benefiting individuals. However, simply possessing more pieces of data than someone else does not necessarily make you more informed. In order for this to be worthwhile, two different conditions should be met.

First, increased information is beneficial if these pieces of information are also true, by which I mean empirically verified. For example, imagine that two people are asked to describe the reasons why modern terrorism occurs. Respondent A replies with numerous half-baked “facts” gleaned from conspiracy theories, while respondent B does not have any ideas. If what A perceives to be facts can be proven to be false, we would not say that A is more informed than B just because he *thinks* he knows more. Thus, holding more pieces of information that turn out to be propaganda, bluster, or blatant falsehoods does not equate to being more informed.

Second, not all facts are equal in terms of usefulness. Useful information is context dependent. Thus, as applied to deliberative theory, citizens are more informed if they are receiving information that enables them to be better citizens and to make decisions accordingly. Other information might be useful for different purposes, but irrelevant for being a good citizen. For instance, we would not say that someone who has memorized the statistics of the starting lineup for the Green Bay Packers is, on the whole, a more informed *citizen* than someone that has not, although this knowledge might benefit them in the context of being a sports fan. Therefore, deliberative democrats desire more than people collecting vast storehouses of irrelevant data – they hope that citizens will collect the "right" kind of information.

Critiques of increased information

The casual observer might not see a downside to having more true and useful information about politics. After all, is not having information a benefit for thinking beings? Even minimalist theories of democracy suppose that citizens have enough information to form heuristics that they use to make political choices (Popkin 1991: 7–8; Menand 2006: 349). Thus, would not having more information be better? It is on this point that some disagree. Some make a moderation argument by citing information overload as a serious problem. Others will go a step farther and make a desirability argument about the perils of democratic citizens being exposed to dangerous information, regardless of how true and/or useful it may be.

The more serious critique of increased information focuses on the fact that human cognitive processing capabilities are limited and increasingly inadequate in the information age. The effects of having too much information are especially relevant to the fields of cognitive psychology, computer and information science, and organizational management. Names, descriptions, and proscriptions disagree, but the phenomenon is frequently referred to as “information overload.” The term was, if not created, at least popularized by Alvin Toffler in his best-selling but controversial book, *Future Shock*. In short, information overload refers to the fact that: a) human information processing capacities are limited, and b) that overloading these systems leads to a breakdown in performance (Toffler 1972: 352).

Too much information can be harmful, even if it meets the above conditions of being true and useful. This was summed up by author John Naisbitt twenty-five years ago, but now is much more relevant than ever: “We are drowning in information, but starved for knowledge” (Naisbitt 1982: 24). Information overload is harmful because it causes decision makers to have to sort through volumes of data. If this leads to a decrease in the value of sent messages, because vital points are glossed over, then having more information can be harmful (Van Zandt 2004: 542). Studies have shown that even in conditions of quality information, an increase in the amount of data within messages only raises decision effectiveness to a point, past which increased information lowers decision effectiveness significantly (Keller and Staelin 1987: 211). Similarly, exposure to an overload of information has been shown to make people overconfident in their judgments but not more accurate, which can lead to a dangerous situation in which decision makers are so sure that they have the “right info” that they can not be persuaded to a different course of action (Stewart et. al.: 1992). A recent laboratory study by Glenn Wilson at the University of London showed that workers exposed to more incoming sources of information, such as text messages and emails, were less capable of solving problems. In fact, their IQ dropped by 10 points during the study period, twice as much as workers performing similar tasks after smoking marijuana (Knight 2005).

Additionally, information overload is claimed to cause stress, erode focus, bury significant details, correlate to weakened vision, and increase the lag time between information gathering and processing (Roe 1989: 563; Alesandrini 1992: 15; Caroselli 1997: 3; Shenk 1997: 37)

The concept of information overload is not frequently addressed by political scientists, but is definitely applicable to any context in which a citizen is called upon to make political decisions, such as voting, but in which her performance is hampered by having too much information. For instance, during election season, citizens are bombarded by politics on television, in conversations, and also by frequent appearances by politicians themselves, in the form of local stump speeches, rallies, and public appearances. While it is a trite observation to say that citizens are typically under-informed about politics, one must consider that this ignorance does not exist in a vacuum of information about elections and candidates, but rather a deluge of information, much of which is from reliable and non-partisan sources. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for much political information, especially finer details, to be recorded inaccurately or fly underneath the radar, because people have engaged in “online processing” – a learning of general meanings (Graber 2001: 14).

Thus, there are potentially real-world and political consequences to information overload. For instance, a focus group study by Aldoory and Van Dyke found that participants confronted with information about a hypothetical bioterror attack were averse to seeking out more information because of information overload. In short, they felt overwhelmed by the costs of acquiring more information. As a result, they became uncertain and they easily deferred to statements by authority figures or knowledgeable friends/family. According to one woman, “Ignorance is bliss right now. I don’t need to know about it and I’m not worried that I don’t know about it” (Aldoory and Van Dyke 2006: 354). In a different study, an increase of information from negative political advertising lowered the information levels of less politically sophisticated people, but was a boon for the information levels of politically sophisticated people (Stevens 2005: 423). And while these results seem mixed (because at least one segment benefits from increased information), one could consider that information overload produces a situation in which the (cognitively) rich get richer. Thus, even if some segments of society are capable of handling increased information better than others, the overall effect is to leave more disadvantaged groups even more disenfranchised.

The other argument against increased information is a desirability argument which states that at least for the majority of voters, giving them more information might give them rebellious or dangerous tendencies, even if the increased information fits the above criteria of being true and useful. This argument is not currently in vogue (at least not in an overt form), and as such, will only be considered briefly. The main reason to elaborate this argument is because of its similarity to arguments about why the masses should not participate more than the minimum. Because arguments about the dangers of too much involvement are more acceptable, this earlier critique is worth examination.

The Progressive Era forums of the early twentieth century often ran into this type of critique of increased information. The power elites, churches, and upholders of the status quo were not always covert about their desire to keep the masses uneducated on civic issues. This rationale was especially apparent in the decline of the vibrant Rochester social centers movement, in which the power elites of the town united to keep the citizens from “educating themselves through the processes of deliberation and decision making” (Mattson 1998: 61). Often throughout American history, attempts to keep the public ignorant were veiled behind attempts to protect them from “pernicious” ideas or because intelligence/expertise was associated with trickery or corruption.[26] On a case by case basis, it may be debatable just how genuine this “protection” was intended to be.

Few are currently willing to make the (overt) argument that “the masses” are better off if they are uneducated about politics. However, one could view the anti-intellectualism which has characterized American politics for the last few decades as an outgrowth of the desire to keep democratic citizens under-informed and hence, less dangerous. As with the above example, it is debatable whether or not this is a conscious or subconscious move on the part of those that generate anti-intellectual political memes. Nevertheless, our culture is suffused with themes like: leaders do not need intelligence as long as they surround themselves with smart advisors, pundits should critique based on wit and force of personality (instead of reasoned arguments), and that experts either can not do anything correctly or are power-hungry and conspiratorial (Gitlin 2000; Crowley 2006). Regardless, the effect may be more insidious than Rochester elites openly expressing annoyance at citizen education efforts because these messages have saturated the popular culture. Ironically, as discussed below in the participation section, popular culture has deemed voting “cool” at the same time it stigmatizes expertise and learning.

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[26] Todd Gitlin cites telling examples from American history that seem reminiscent of many ancient cultures’ distrust/awe of shaman. Gitlin quotes Puritan John Cotton, "The more learned and witty you bee, the more fit to act for Satan will you bee" and Baynard R. Hall, who wrote in 1843 of frontier Indiana: "We always preferred an ignorant bad man to a talented one, and hence attempts were usually made to ruin the moral character of a smart candidate; since unhappily smartness and wickedness were supposed to be generally coupled, and incompetence and goodness." (Gitlin 2000)

Those inclined to see a conspiracy in this might claim that those who benefit from minimalist theories of democracy want democratic publics to make infrequent, media-driven gut decisions because this would be the easiest way to maintain the status quo.

Defense of increased information

The desirability argument against increased citizen information is no longer in vogue because it is a difficult argument to back up, both empirically and intellectually. Empirically, the argument does not hold up because the last few decades have been characterized by an overwhelming flood of information for citizens. If the predictions of opponents to the Progressive reformers were true, we would expect this flood of information to have produced a frothing, radicalized citizenry ready to rebel at the drop of a hat. Instead, we have a democratic polity that is perhaps *more* complacent about democracy than seventy years earlier. Alternately, perhaps anti-Progressives were more concerned with how much information people *absorb* leading to problems, instead of how much information was ineffectively thrown at people. But this is also faulty reasoning, because citizens in other modern democracies typically can absorb more information about politics and yet industrialized democracies remain safe and stable. Intellectually, keeping the citizenry in the dark because of the possibility of information giving them “funny ideas,” smacks of elitism and paternalism—two attitudes that are hard to justify overtly.

The challenge of information overload is a more serious concern to address. However, before one can defend increased information as a benefit and downplay the threat of information overload, certain ground must be conceded. First, human information capacities are limited by physiological and idiosyncratic, personal factors.

Second, both traditional and contemporary views on what citizens “should” know are likely unrealistic in terms of these cognitive limitations (Graber 2001: 184). Third, breaking these boundaries can produce negative effects.

Thus, the claim that information overload may hamper political performance is partially correct. There are limits to cognitive processing and the “informed citizen” of deliberative theory might require more than what humans are capable. However, none of these concessions mean that: a) current levels of information are adequate, and b) the process of sending political information can not be reformed so that people can make better use of more information. The first argument is normative and typically occurs between either elite democrats or aggregative democrats versus deliberative democrats. And while this admission may seem to verify the points of aggregative democrats, simply acknowledging the ceiling of information overload does not lead to an endorsement of the informational status quo. If deliberation does produce more information, it is unlikely that this increase will bump up against cognitive processing limits.

The second point is more relevant for this chapter. The information age is here to stay. Short of becoming Luddites, there is little way to stop the flood of information, both political and otherwise, which is directed at citizens on a daily basis. However, the effectiveness of how this information is sent can be increased. Timothy Van Zandt notes that responsibility for controlling information overload belongs with the senders of information, not the receivers. Following this logic, raising the costs of transmission channels has benefits for both senders and receivers. To use an analogy, raising the postage rate of bulk mail may cause advertisers to send mail in a more targeted fashion (Van Zandt 2004: 556). System-wide, the same amount of information may still be sent out; the difference is that the advertisers reach people more likely to give them business, and that regular citizens will not receive irrelevant information.

How does this analogy translate to the transmission of political information? Doris Graber addresses this point in regards to political information disseminated through television (taking the form of news media, campaign coverage, etc.), an often-critiqued medium. Although she has reservations about just how capable television is of making politics interesting to the viewers, she thinks that steps can be made in the right direction, including changing pacing/sequence of information and using evolving media technology to fall in line with human information-processing capabilities (Graber 2001: 175, 184). Thus, more information need not necessarily lead to overload. When presented well, more information can be integrated into human cognitive capacities with hardly any ill effects.

Political sophistication

In a review of the political sophistication literature, Robert Luskin draws out the three elements required for a discussion of political sophistication. To be politically sophisticated, a person's political belief system (PBS) must be significantly large, wide-ranging, and constrained (organized) (Luskin 1987: 860). The third factor – constraint – often receives the lion's share of the attention, in that many of the studies that look for political sophistication are looking for consistency, first and foremost. For instance, Gastil and Dillard describe a politically sophisticated schematic network as one that effectively integrates and differentiates beliefs about an issue in a recognizable ideological pattern. Also, high political sophistication should also correlate with low uncertainty about beliefs (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 4).

Much of the literature on political sophistication mentions that it is highly correlated with certain traits – thus, some people's political beliefs are more consistent because of both inherent and controllable factors. Like any behavioral trait, in order to be politically sophisticated, one needs opportunity, ability, and motivation. Such factors like interest in politics, occupation, education, intelligence, and exposure to political information in the media may provide the opportunity, ability, and motivation needed to become politically sophisticated (Luskin 1990: 335-336).[27] Fewer studies examine the potential to increase political sophistication throughout adulthood, through the use of civic forums or the like (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 3). Implicit in this omission is the depressing idea that both individuals and the aggregate are stuck with "inherent, and thus enduring" levels of political sophistication, which is an argument that aggregative and deliberative theorists alike take issue with, but for different reasons (Nie and Andersen 1974: 543).

Despite a relatively accepted interpretation of political sophistication, it may not be possible to hold perfectly compatible political beliefs for three main reasons. The first has to do with human cognitive capabilities. Many of our beliefs and values come from a variety of unexamined sources and are not continuously evaluated on a conscious level. Secondly, politics is not reducible to easily-meshing dichotomous choices – such as the liberal choice versus the conservative choice.[28] For instance, someone who is pro-life and anti-death penalty might appear politically unsophisticated because they hold one typically conservative belief and one commonly liberal belief about two social issues that are usually found in different combinations. However, it may be that this person is organizing their beliefs in a different fashion than on a liberal/conservative scale; she may have views about the sanctity of life that apply to both fetuses and felons. Thus, any discussion of whether or not someone is politically sophisticated needs to take into account how actively "conflicting" beliefs are justified. At the very least, a pro-life/anti-death penalty advocate who can justify her two beliefs when asked could be viewed as more politically sophisticated than someone who holds the same beliefs unexamined. Finally, some observers of political sophistication have noted that people often do not see a disconnect between holding an abstract political belief (for instance, equality for all), while holding a conflicting belief about the application of that concept (e.g. affirmative action) (Dahl 1961: 318). Hence, what appears to be unexamined inconsistency may really signify nuanced distinctions between different levels of application. With these three limitations in mind, political sophistication is not an either/or concept, but rather a less/more issue.

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[27] Luskin finds interest, intelligence, and occupation to be the most strongly correlated predictors of political sophistication (Luskin 1990: 343). Surprisingly, education had a statistically insignificant effect on political information in this study, which contradicts much of the political sophistication literature which placed education as a key determinant (Converse 1974: 730). As an example of why education might not be the best predictor—while high school seniors may know more about politics than freshmen, this is better explained by maturation and increased guessing ability, not the relatively light impact of high school civics courses (Luskin 1990: 348 - 349).

In much of the literature on political sophistication, the trait is implicitly presented as desirable, if not rare in most people. On the individual level, political sophistication is linked to better participation, being less taken in by media hype, and less able to be persuaded by emotional or symbolic appeals, as opposed to reasoned ones. In the aggregate, a politically sophisticated public should be more open minded, less easy to manipulate, more in tune with its true interests, and more likely to vote on their own interests (Chaiken and Baldwin 1981: 9; Luskin 1990: 332–333; Gomez and Wilson 2001: 899; Stevens 2005: 414).

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[28] Luskin notes that the liberal/conservative dichotomy is not essential to defining political sophistication – it is possible to be sophisticated without reference to those labels (Luskin 1987: 861). However, this ideological scale is typically what political sophistication literature falls back on as an accessible measure. In the next chapter, I measure sophistication in a similar way, while acknowledging the drawbacks of potential oversimplification.

However political sophistication is defined, many studies find a majority of the public possesses low levels of sophistication. In the work that is often cited as a key early study, Campbell et. al. find that only 2 ½% of the electorate (or 3 ½% of voters) fall into the category of true ideologues and 12% (15%) fall into "category A," which consists of ideologues and near-ideologues (Campbell et. al. 1967[1960]: 131). This is contrasted to the low and non-ideologues (Categories B – D), who comprise the other 88% of the electorate (Ibid: 144). Campbell et. al. are not reserved about the effect that this situation does/could have on politics. It causes election results to be ambiguous and inconclusive and leaves policy formation open to special interests (Ibid: 282). As a result, party leaders resort to exploiting these "new and relatively temporary dimensions of popular feeling" in order to get their candidates elected (Ibid: 285).

Some subsequent studies took issue with Campbell et. al.'s measurement, timeframe, and definition of political sophistication. For instance, Nie and Andersen argue that early studies on political sophistication were all drawn from data from the 1950's and hence, they did not take into account the turbulent and polarizing decades to follow (Nie and Andersen 1974: 544). Instead, the authors find that in times of impassioned political debate, ideological consistency rose and maintained itself even into less turbulent times (Ibid: 549–550). More recent studies emphasize that citizens make reasonably sound vote choices, even when they're lacking in political sophistication and the traits related to it (interest, knowledge, participation) (Popkin 1991: 20–21; Lau and Redlawsk 1997: 593). This may be because previous studies overestimated the costs of attaining ideological consistency or they underestimated the citizens' ability to form coherent beliefs, values, and judgments about politics (Goren 2004: 473).

Critiques of political sophistication

The primary critique of political sophistication comes in the form of a moderation argument. Namely, while it is usually a good thing to be consistent in one's views, to be too consistent might mean that one is dogmatic or uncritically partisan. This seems especially relevant in an age of what appears to be extreme partisanship on the part of media figures, politicians, and even the public. Can being too politically sophisticated make one narrow minded and unable to compromise or even communicate with the other side? Are increasing levels of political sophistication responsible for the division of the country into red and blue states?

Knight finds that Converse's ideologues were likely to utilize candidate ideology as their more important vote determinant than party identification or the candidate's platform (Knight 1985: 846). The implications of this are intriguing; one would assume that when "the masses" rely on party ID as their primary source for voting and policy preferences[29], that they are not being critical and merely towing the party line. The ideologues' vote determinant differs only in degree, not in kind, in that they are able to identify and compare the political ideologies of both themselves and the candidates. However, this merely means that they are more perceptive, not less dogmatic (perhaps even more so), or else they would rely more on issues than on ideological similarity to the candidates. Box-Steffensmeier and De Bouf further conclude that only the politically

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[29] As shown in Markus and Converse (1979).

sophisticated segment of the electorate reliably connects partisanship and ideology. Thus, ideological shifts by party elites are meant to satisfy the main segment of the population which is capable of perceiving these shifts and voting accordingly—the politically sophisticated (Box-Steffensmeier and De Bouf 2001: 232, 234). The implication is that if party elites realize that strong ideological appeals are needed to motivate this crucial segment of the voting public, then compromise and moderation are less likely for official party platforms.

Defense of political sophistication

The moderation argument for political sophistication would be damning if politically sophisticated people were so partisan that they became hardened to all types of persuasion. But some studies show that politically sophisticated people may be less open to some types of persuasion, such as by manipulation, symbolism, and personality and more open to persuasion by rational argument (Chaiken and Baldwin 1981: 9; Luskin 1990: 333). In particular, Chaiken and Baldwin found that ideologically consistent subjects were much less likely to identify themselves as either pro- or anti-conservationist based on a manipulatively worded questionnaire, whereas low consistency subjects were likely to contradict previous statements about attitudes and beliefs when the alternate choice was presented in a more attractive way (Chaiken and Baldwin 1981: 1, 9). Also, Stevens finds that negative advertising gives an informational benefit to political sophisticates. However, the (often manipulative) emotional content of negative advertising has virtually no effect on the vote choices of political sophisticates (Stevens 2005: 415). This suggests to the extent that Converse's ideologues are affected by negative advertising, it is primarily the *logos* arguments that work for them, not *pathos* or *ethos*.

Thus, not only is a high level of political sophistication not necessarily a bad thing, we also don't have compelling evidence that an electorate with slightly higher voting rates and an interest in politics in the last few elections is becoming dangerously polarized. And while neither voting turnout nor interest are equivalent to political sophistication, they are typically correlated with it, which means that if political sophistication is on the rise even slightly, it has not had the divisive effects that some have assumed. Instead, it is likely that much of the dire media warnings about the danger of "red" versus "blue" states amounts to nothing more than hype. As scholars and critics of the media have pointed out, certain parties have vested interests in making the country appear a lot more divided than it actually is. Politicians may use this tactic as a rallying point and journalists use it as a way to generate a conflict and sell airtime. In contrast, the views of the majority of citizens in both parties are relatively moderate, even on some "hot button" issues (Fiorina 2006: 416–417). In reality, the level of political sophistication in the country, regardless of whether it is increasing or decreasing, may be entirely unrelated to the country's level of polarization.

Self-interest awareness

Self-interest awareness means that a citizen is capable of understanding his needs and desires and how to act upon them. This section will examine the desirability of both "self-interest" and "self-interest awareness", as there is a rich theoretical literature on the former, but a deliberative democratic focus on the latter. Thus, while the two terms are not treated synonymously, it makes sense to discuss self-interest in place of a discussion *solely* about self-interest awareness under the assumption that if it is shown that being self-interested is desirable or undesirable, then being aware of these interests should be similarly desirable or undesirable.

Classical theorists like Machiavelli and Hobbes assume humans to be self-interested, in politics and elsewhere, regardless of whether or not they are *aware* of their interests (Frolich 1974: 57). Thus, it is not only natural to be self-interested, but it's also the mark of a normal, healthy individual. Likewise, self-interest, in the form of securing pleasure/happiness and avoiding pain became a guiding premise for utilitarian philosophy (Quinton 1973: 2).

Variations on this assumption have influenced modern theories of democracy. For instance, early twentieth century political scientists assumed that when citizens do things in the public interest, it is really just a thinly-veiled rationalization of their own private interests (Lasswell 1960 [1930]). Thus, everything is eventually reducible to self-interest. Likewise, aggregative theorists make similar assumptions about the role of self-interest in democratic politics – individuals and groups are rational, self-interested utility maximizers who are competing for their own interests. This self-interest fulfillment need not be entirely conscious on the part of the utility-maximizer or even accurate in his assessment of what he needs/wants. In the process of competition, some individuals win (realize their interests) and some lose (have their interests frustrated). As a whole, the system benefits from this competition for reasons similar to those that Madison outlined. That is, if an individual or group is constantly checked by other groups (factions) out to advance their interests or agenda, it is unlikely that any utility-maximizer can gain complete dominance over all areas of government.

Self-interest is often conflated with selfishness and greed, which will be addressed below. However, self-interest and social-regarding traits like sympathy and altruism are not incompatible.[30] Perhaps the most cited early proponent of the virtuous side of self-interest was Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*. Despite caricatures of Smith's philosophy, his ideal type citizens were not intended to be greedy egotists. Smith did see self-interest as what kept the division of labor feasible, animating all social and economic transactions (Smith 1937: I.ii: 14-15). However, this was self-interest tinged with social qualities which were all important in his earlier work, *Theory of Moral Sentiments* – specifically, the traits of sympathy and/or the need for approval. Thus, self-interest was motivated *and* restrained by other-regarding traits (Danner 1976: 323; Werhane 1989: 672). Indeed, Smith lambastes other theories that assume men are guided by naked self-interest, such as the theories of Mandeville and Hobbes (Smith 1984: VII.ii.4.12: 313 - 315; Lamb 1974: 676). Additionally, despite the fact that men did not *consciously* seek to improve the common good through their self-interested actions, the public interest is promoted anyway, perhaps even more effectively than when men actively try to promote it (Smith 1937: IV.ii: 421; Mansfield 1995: 53). Thus, Smith's philosophical protagonists are definitely self-interested. While they may only be vaguely aware of their self-interest, they are probably not aware of potential other-regarding effects.

Critiques of self-interest awareness

The main argument against self-interest awareness is a flipside argument, similar to the one made against Adam Smith above. Namely, if someone is acutely aware of what she needs and wants, she will likely act upon it often, thus being more greedy and self-absorbed than others. In the modern context, this is often an argument made not just by deliberative democrats and civic republicans, but from commentators on both the Left and the Right. Self-interest has been portrayed as, "selfish, sordid, divisive, boring, and bourgeoisie" (Mansfield 1995: 48). This is not to assume that people are inherently selfish. Rather, a politics centered on self-interested behavior, as in the aggregative conception, mutes the possibility of compromise and makes for an isolated, atomistic political process in which individuals and/or groups are only watching out for number one. The politics of the market are not necessarily appropriate for the politics of the forum (Elster 1997: 11). This idea, of (civic) virtue standing in opposition to a politics of self-interest has a long and respected pedigree in the form of founders like Jefferson and Adams, who were opposed to each other on almost every other level.[31] Thus, even though self-interest awareness is *also* a benefit sometimes assumed to arise out of deliberative politics, a politics premised on the theory that self-interest animates *all* political interactions may not be the best way to organize democratic politics.

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[30] Although one must be careful not to go too far in the other direction and claim that all other-regarding behaviors are reducible to self-interest, which is an argument for the most jaded of rational choice advocates.

There are modernist and contemporary critics that warn against a false awareness of self-interest which is really just masked desire. Rousseau, in particular, wishes for a civil religion that brings mankind's interests in line with the community's "general will". Thus, if an individual desires something contrary to the general will, his own interests are merely mistaken, and he "must be compelled to bring [his will] into conformity with their reason (Rousseau 1972: 193; Frolich 1974: 57). More contemporary participatory and deliberative democrats similarly warn that a politics centered around self-interest, but not balanced with other-regarding orientations, is one that is doomed to either minimalism or failure.

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[31] Suzanna Sherry quotes the Founders' view of self-interest animated politics. Jefferson: "Self-love is . . . no part of morality. Indeed it is exactly its counterpart. It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities towards self-gratification in violation of our moral duties to others." Adams: "There must be a positive passion for the public good, the public interest . . . established in the minds of the people, or there can be no republican government, nor any real liberty; and this public passion must be superior to all private passions." (Sherry 1986: 553 – 554).

Defense of self-interest awareness

To be sure, the deliberative critique above does not reflect a desire for citizens to be uncritical or unreflective. Instead, deliberativists worry that when self-interest becomes the central goal of the political animal, as it has in mainstream political theory, then citizens become islands unto themselves. However, Americans are used to pluralist politics; it is unlikely that the media or politicians will stop phrasing appeals to citizens in the language of interests any time in the near future. Thus, if self-interest is here to stay in American politics, can being aware of one's self-interest be considered deliberative, or does it necessarily equal narrow-minded selfishness?

Adam Smith, as previously discussed, argued that self-interest mixed with sympathy rebounded to the benefit of the whole. However, deliberativists are rarely satisfied with this, as these societal benefits are largely unintended and almost entirely economic in nature. Even if Smith does not intend for citizens to be petty egotists, it is still the system that produces benefits from mankind's exertions, not the citizens, themselves (at least not intentionally) (Scott 1987: 412). As such, society may reap the rewards of its numerous, self-focused members, but perhaps not the right rewards and not for the right reasons.

Instead, a better way to reconcile self-interest awareness may be through Robert Dahl's *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*. Dahl considers the problem with inculcating civic virtue in a pluralist democracy, which normally tends towards egoistic behavior.

Traditional orientations towards civic virtue, such as the individualist, moral, or organic versions propose either that conflicts of interest will not arise if everyone perceives their individual interests to be common or that citizens should choose the "just" (i.e. societal) outcome over the personal (Dahl 1982: 143, 145). Dahl sees all of these "Type I" orientations as unrealistic, because they rest on assumptions not currently found in representative democracy: small units of governance, no genuine conflicts of interest, people should be either be altruists or philosophers by nature. Dahl's solution's violates the above criteria, and hence, is formulated as a realistic way to accommodate other-regarding behavior in a world governed by self-interest. His Type II solutions rest on the converse assumptions about modern democratic realities: important political units are either national or larger, genuine conflicts of interests do exist in democracies, most citizens are not altruistic, nor are they philosophers (Ibid: 159 – 160). The third point on his list is most relevant to the discussion at hand, as Dahl believes that pluralist democracy benefits from a mixture of individualist and civic orientations, either between different people or in being held by the same person. Dahl refers to this later in his book as "enlightened self-interest," which harkens back to Tocqueville's "self-interest rightly understood." A commitment to enlightened self-interest is an acceptance of conflict as a regular part of democratic politics, but also a striving to strengthen "civic virtue by achieving a greater convergence of interests among American citizens" (Ibid: 187 – 188). This could be done with institutional fixes in the "objective circumstances" of citizens that not only cause their interests to be more complementary, but to give them the capability of recognizing this complementariness, as well (Ibid: 189).

Additionally, self-interest does not have to be narrowly defined to mean id-driven wants and desires. Some deliberativists and civic republicans appropriate the word "preferences" (what they define as pre-reflective inclinations to maximize happiness) and contrast it against "interests" (defined as post-deliberative evaluations of importance). Interests, now defined as reflective desires, become a better basis for both individual and political decision making. In this formulation, preferences and interests may and often do conflict, with the deliberativist hope that interests win out. This formulation seems to have drawn some inspiration from Montesquieu's maxim, "Happy is it for men that they are in a situation in which, though their passions prompt them to be wicked, it is, nevertheless, to their interest to be humane and virtuous" (Montesquieu 1949: XXI.20: 366; Galston 1994: 348). However even here, interests are not guaranteed to avoid selfishness; they just are no longer entirely equated with selfishness.

Tolerance

As with most tricky concepts, disagreement exists over how best to define tolerance. Scholars disagree over how modern conceptions of tolerance arose, how best to define it, and how normatively desirable it may be (Murphy 1997: 594). At base, tolerance typically means the ability to deal with and permit beliefs and/or action that one rejects (Sullivan et. al. 1982: 2). Negative affect is a key element of the definition – one does not tolerate actions of which one approves or enjoys. Nevertheless, tolerance means acknowledging a disagreeable viewpoint's right to exist and/or find expression. As political theorist Andrew Murphy puts it toleration is, "a complex blend of acceptance and rejection" (Murphy 1997: 596).[32] The tolerant person may or may not be in a position to bar the behavior being tolerated[33] - there is some dispute over this point. Some say that one can not truly be tolerant if they're powerless in the face of behavior they disagree with, whereas others might give the example of a prisoner "tolerating" his captivity as a perfectly reasonable use of the word (Fotion and Elfstrom 1992: 4 – 5).

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[32] There is a difference between tolerance and toleration, although it is not easy to pin down. Some have advocated the stance that tolerance refers to attitudes, whereas toleration refers to practice (Murphy 1997:

Tolerance is typically justified in a few ways. Pre-industrial revolution philosophers saw the damage that warring religious sects could do and advocated religious and/or political toleration as a way to keep democratic politics running smoothly, even if individual philosophers never doubted the "correctness" of their own beliefs (Wolff 1965: 15; Locke 1983: 25–26; Mill 1997: 65). Thus, early calls for tolerance may have been more out of prudence than morality or giving other creeds a "fair" shot (Tinder 1976:8). However, tolerance can also be seen as a managing mechanism in a pluralistic society and the marketplace of ideas (Wolff 1965: 20). This position has roots in both Jeffersonian thought and the works of J.S. Mill, both of which advocate the free flow of ideas (including bad ones) as a way to find the best solutions to societal problems (Mill 1990 [1859]: 108; Sullivan et. al. 1982: 8). This is evidenced in a famous quote by Jefferson, "Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error," (Jefferson 1787). Finally, tolerance can be seen as a cornerstone of liberal democracy – a virtue to be promoted in its own right (Wolff 1965: 21).

Critiques of tolerance

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593). The more common view distinguishes toleration from tolerance by claiming that the former developed out of arguments for acceptance of other religions and the latter is more associated with political doctrines (Sullivan et. al. 1982: 3). Regardless of different origins, tolerance is often considered to be the broader argument (Tinder 1976: 3). Even though both tolerance and toleration have similar justifications and are often used interchangeably in popular parlance, I intend to use "tolerance" throughout the course of this chapter, for conceptual clarity. However, many times, classic arguments for "toleration" are applicable for a modern understanding of tolerance.

[33] Of course, to be tolerant, she must only be in this position; she can not actively bar the behavior.

Many scholars make realism arguments against tolerance, although often for vastly different reasons. All four of the arguments outlined above can be leveled against tolerance. Moderation arguments, which attempt to demarcate the substantive boundaries of tolerance, may be the most pervasive. However, the realism and desirability arguments tend to be the strongest and most interesting for the purposes of this paper.

Moderation arguments against tolerance are in plentiful supply, mainly by defenders of the liberal tradition. They typically establish dividing lines in order to separate things properly tolerated from things that should not be tolerated (McClure 1990: 363). These types of arguments usually invoke examples like the American Nazi Party's petition to march in Skokie, Illinois. Ironically enough, two different critics using this same style of argument about tolerance might place the Skokie example on different sides of the line—for some, this is behavior that is beyond tolerance, for others, this type of behavior needs to be protected because it is a true test of societal tolerance. Regardless, when using cases like this, critics rarely assert that the concept of tolerance needs to be scrapped or rethought. Instead, some claim that this particular case (or something similar) might count as an example of too much tolerance. Thus, many seek to impose limits on tolerance which restrict the actions of groups that are harmful, humiliating, or harassing towards other groups or society as a whole. Not surprisingly, there is no ready agreement as to where these lines should be drawn.

Some theorists personally embrace tolerance, but point out the potential for conflicting groups to feel threatened by the concept. Glenn Tinder claims that tolerance is a concept that appeals to the political center, with those on the moderate to far Left and moderate to far Right skeptical of it. In a point that will be echoed by Marcuse below, the Left often feels that tolerance is a diversionary tactic by the status quo to delegitimize dissent. In contrast, the Right rejects tolerance for a different reason – radical views can not be tolerated because they may have the potential to cast the current order into grave peril (Tinder 1976: 4).

Other critics make realism arguments in relation to tolerance – it may be fine in principle, but often lags in application. An example of this is Robert Wolff's argument in his 1965 essay, "Beyond Tolerance." Wolff's main subject is pluralist politics, which he intertwines with tolerance, because any defense of pluralism contains a defense of tolerance (Wolff 1965: 20). Pluralism, and the tolerance that animates it, has provided many great advantages for American democracy. It is "humane, benevolent, accommodating," and also more defensible than the philosophies from which it sprung. It was also vital to address certain social needs during critical periods of American history (Ibid: 52). That being said, pluralism in general, and tolerance more specifically, are no longer appropriate standards for modern American politics. The reality of the situation is that calls for tolerance reinforce injustice by excluding fringe groups, as well as killing the possibility for fundamentally altering the pluralist system (Ibid: 43, 51). According to Wolff, "pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of privilege or injustice – it is a philosophy of equality and justice whose *concrete application* supports inequality by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate social groups" (Ibid: 43, emphasis in original).

Wolff claims that this inequality arises from a tension between our "liberal" principles and "conservative" sociology, when we want to protect the private sphere through tolerance. This tension takes the form of protecting negative liberties, which is typically the liberal province of individuals, but in application, tolerance is applied to recognized groups, which is a conservative approach (Ibid: 36 – 38). This leaves the door open for intolerance of the ill-fitting individual or the not-yet-mainstream group. As an example of the latter, Wolff asks us to consider why agnostic conscientious objectors receive no sympathy when drafted, but those with bizarre religious beliefs can often avoid serving in the military. Thus, while tolerance is good in principle, it is often discriminatory, in practice (Ibid: 41 - 42). Additionally, because pluralism treats every problem as if it were the sole property of specific groups, and not societal problems, it downplays thinking about problems in terms of the general good (Ibid: 50). In turn, problems are addressed and fixed on a piecemeal basis, but without any serious changes to the pluralist structure which has long stopped being truly tolerant.

Likewise, many theorists of tolerance advocate the concept but doubt that it can deliver on the promises made on its behalf by modernist political theorists. For instance, Locke believed that tolerance was the best way to prevent “seditious commotions” from arising (Locke 1947: 61). Likewise, Mill assumed that tolerance opens up a marketplace of ideas that weeds out the bad ideas and, in the process, quiets disputes (Mill 1990 [1859]: 108). However, this relies on assumptions that mankind has a natural inclination towards order or progressivism, which repeated historical examples have shown to be untrue (Tinder 1976: 44). In reality, the “marketplace” does not automatically privilege liberal, compassionate, or peaceful ideas. Many times, an open marketplace of ideas has allowed base and predatory instincts the ability to carry the day. Thus, a frequent caveat to accepting tolerance is typically that society should be tolerant under normal circumstances, but intolerant of creeds that make normal tolerance impossible (Tinder 1976: 156).

Some theorists go a step farther to make an argument about the desirability of tolerance. According to Marcuse, the status quo uses tolerance as a way to silence voices of discontent that may have fundamental problems with the system (Marcuse 1965: 84). For many holding "radical" viewpoints, the potential danger is that these underlying societal problems are never attacked head-on. Instead, proponents of change are paralyzed by "indecisive open-mindedness" (Tinder 1976: 4). Ironically, when the status quo calls for tolerance, it often masks a subtle condescension for alternative views. Or, as Bernard Crick quotes a maxim of the cynical tyrant, "Let the mob howl—it will make them feel better" (Crick 1973:67).

Thus, "pure" tolerance, which attempts a neutral leveling of all viewpoints, may really just prop up institutionalized inequality. This tendency for unbiased and general acceptance of all viewpoints may be fine for everyday conversation or scientific research, but the realm of politics should be intolerant "where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake" (Marcuse 1965: 88). Therefore, sometimes it makes sense to be intolerant for different reasons than the ones stated above. Jettisoning pure tolerance may have averted many of the mass horrors of the twentieth century. Likewise, in a nuclear era in which "the distance between the propaganda and the action . . . has become too short," we can not afford to be blithely tolerant of every dangerous idea that exists (Marcuse 1965: 109). When adopted in response to radical or harmful ideas, the trait of indifference can be considered dangerous and unjust (Crick 1973: 64).

Defense of tolerance

Any defense of tolerance should begin by addressing the most often-cited criticisms – in this case, the "line-drawing" of the moderation argument. A very frequently used objection is that tolerance can not be all-encompassing and illiberal views, which might deny tolerance should the holders of these views come to power, are rightly suppressed. I agree in principle – no system can be expected to embrace movements that intend to destroy it. Many theorists of tolerance agree on this point—even Rawls, who is hesitant to restrict the liberty of a group or sect simply because their beliefs are abhorrent to the majority. Rawls assumes that the tolerant majority has the right to be intolerant in one major instance: when intolerance is necessary for survival of the group or society. The right to self-preservation is assumed in Rawls's original position – "Justice does not require that men stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence" (Rawls 1971: 218). Hence, lines can and should be drawn for extreme cases.

Despite agreeing that lines can be drawn in theory, I disagree in application – too often, the line-drawing rationale is erroneously cited for groups that, while holding illiberal and/or intolerant views: a) do not intend to take power, b) are incapable of taking power, c) have not expressed a desire to reorder society, and/or d) desire tolerance of their views/actions for reasons solely important to individuals or immediate communities. The example of Muslim girls wearing headscarves in French schools is a good case in point. The claim that, in *this* case, fundamentalist Muslims are trying to manipulate liberal virtues, like tolerance, in order to destroy them, is absurd (Galeotti 1993: 601 – 602; Koker 1996: 316). The group in this situation does not meet any of the four criteria above. Hence, despite the existence of what appears to many Western eyes to be a patriarchical and illiberal practice, France is in no danger of becoming an Islamic theocracy because they allow headscarves. As such, intolerance of intolerant ideas can be justified, but only on a case by case basis, when at least some of the above conditions apply.

Because context needs to be taken into account, it becomes difficult to defend tolerance as a necessary virtue for democracy. Instead, some defend it as one of many competing virtues that, when in conflict, may occasionally need to give way to other values (Sullivan et. al. 1982: 10). This defense should be praised for its realism – if treated as the cornerstone of democracy, we are bound to make uncomfortable sacrifices trying to continuously meet the standard of tolerance. However, defenses of this sort typically fall flat because they do not even begin to work out a calculus of values. What should tolerance give way to and when? How does one measure the amount of harm that tolerating a noxious viewpoint or behavior will inflict versus the benefits of tolerating it? Thus, our major defense of tolerance should rely on a balance of other justifications, even if it is nearly impossible to agree on what this balance should be.

Marcuse's objection to blanket (or "pure") tolerance is interesting because it predicts what will become a central argument for deliberative theorists three decades later. Namely, Marcuse sees this type of tolerance giving equal credibility (and/or equal airtime) to intelligent and stupid arguments alike, because of the notion that no faction knows the "Truth." Hence all viewpoints must be tolerated and then subjected to the masses to choose for themselves, often with disastrous consequences (Marcuse 1965: 94). For a modern example of Marcuse's thought experiment, one need turn only to the American media's coverage of global warming, which typically presents global warming skeptics as equal in number and strength to those that accept global warming. As recent studies tell us, the two sides of the debate are nowhere close to equal, with one paper having examined 928 peer-reviewed papers published between 1993 – 2003 without finding a single work that explicitly argued against the theory of anthropogenic climate change (Oreskes 2004: 1686). And yet, because established interests see a benefit in muddying the waters, general notions of tolerance ask us to view both sides of the global warming debate (and others just like it) as equally likely and equally worthy of consideration.

For Marcuse, this appeal to the *vox populi* is a disaster, because the masses are not capable of choosing intelligently. They do not have authentic information and the ability for real dissent has been silenced (Marcuse 1965: 95). As such, Marcuse does not see true democracy appearing unless there is a massive upheaval (Marcuse 1965: 101). In contrast, deliberative democrats are more optimistic about incremental deliberative reforms within the current situation and less concerned about an obsession with tolerance masking necessary change. They might agree with Marcuse's point that tolerance can lead to a false dichotomy on a given issue, but disagree about the people's (in)ability to choose between illusory equals. However, deliberative democrats are hopeful because deliberation may have a transformative and cumulative effect on other significant benefits mentioned in this chapter, such as increased information and political sophistication. Thus, tolerant citizens in a deliberative democracy will not automatically treat false dichotomies as true choices. Assuming other individual benefits plausibly arise, phony calls for tolerance will not be enough to trick an informed public.

These myriad of approaches to defending tolerance are valid, but one must be careful not to stake a defense of tolerance too heavily on classical or fortress models of tolerance. According to Lee Bollinger, classical models (e.g. Locke or Mills) overestimate the ease with which the "truth" will win out in the marketplace of ideas, especially given the capacity of propaganda and indoctrination in the twentieth century (Bollinger 1986: 74).[34] Likewise, we should also be skeptical of the fortress model's defense of tolerance, which is the equivalent of the slippery slope argument. The argument follows that tolerance should be protected because if we outlaw extreme speech or behavior now, we can not count on popular whim not to erode more reasonable standards in the future. But this premise paints a grim view of human nature and our capacity for reason, which tends towards an elitist view of a much more ambiguous world than fortress advocates admit (Bollinger 1986: 92, 102).

Instead, Bollinger advocates a defense of tolerance that many deliberative democrats heartily endorse – the general tolerance theory. In this theory, speech acts are not to be protected for the intrinsic value of speech itself, but because of the possible social benefits of tolerance – development of the intellect, freedom from bias, democratic attitudes, the ability to compromise, etc. (Bollinger 1986: 140 – 141). Bollinger quotes Justice Brandeis about a similar point, "Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of [free] speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears" (Brandeis 1927).

This is the strongest of the potential arguments for tolerance. One reason is because it promises more than protecting an abstract principle. Conceivably, the positive effects of tolerance are not only available to the person expressing tolerance, but also to the targets of tolerance themselves. To be sure, this is not an overnight transformation; one doubts that the neo-Nazis involved in the *Skokie* case promptly became dues-paying

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[34] Bollinger concerns himself primarily with tolerance in relationship to speech acts and first amendment issues. My paraphrasing of Bollinger's work applies his logic to issues of tolerance, more generally, including non-speech actions (which Bollinger occasionally addresses), but also of static worldviews that are not acted upon or infrequently articulated, that one may be asked to tolerate.

ACLU members afterwards. However, in time and with repeated tolerance, the zeal of the neo-Nazis' supporters and fence-sitters would dissolve. It is possible to be continuously self-righteous in the face of genuine and repeated accommodation, but it is not easy. Rawls surmises something similar; he believes that people and groups that derive benefits from a just constitution (even illiberal groups dedicated to the destruction of the system), usually acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time (Rawls 1971: 219).

But secondly, this defense of tolerance is premised on long-term goods. Often, people attack tolerance because the short term harm of speech/action that could be prohibited is great, but the immediate benefits are slight or negligible. However, if one accepts the transformative potential of tolerance, tolerating even racist, sexist, or inflammatory speech today may have positive ripple effects down the line. Thus, as a theoretical justification for tolerance, this defense is premised upon promoting the greatest good. Whether or not tolerance actually expands people's horizons is a matter for psychological empirical testing.

Moral development

The phrase "moral development" could mean many different things, depending on the context. However, in this dissertation, the benefit of moral development refers to an individual increasingly reflecting the common values of her community or group. Thus, deliberation may bring someone's values more in line with the immediate community (the discussion group) as well as the larger community that forms the context of the discussion. I have more skepticism about the desirability of this benefit than any of the others, for many of the same reasons that liberal philosophers are appalled at the thought of substantive moral values informing the democratic process. After all, who decides what these values will be? What happens when important values conflict? Should either the state or public opinion dictate the right and the good to its citizens? Thus, many of the defenses for this benefit will come from communitarian philosophers or deliberative democrats inspired by communitarian thought.

Despite these reservations, there is much less debate over the mechanisms of the process, the fact that the groups one is closely associated with (family, peers, co-workers)—especially the groups that are influential earlier in life—*do* have a large influence on one's values and morals. Traditional theories on moral development hold that morality is ingrained in human nature or derived from universal principles[35]. These older theories typically have less explanatory power in light of scientific studies on socialization. In particular, families have a large impact on an individual's developed sense of morality, in both primitive and industrialized societies, due to the length of their influence and the typical strength of their bonds (Dawson et. al. 1977: 114-115). Children begin to identify with their parent's political party and values (even though imperfectly understood) as young as eight years old (Hess and Torney 1967: 96). It is true that many people alter their moral views from those held by their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1981: 91). At the very least, families lay down boundaries within which a person's moral sense operates (Wilson 1997: 144). Others argue that the influence of families on socialization and value formation is overstated and that other sources, such as school/peers should get more credit (Dawson et. al. 1977: 119). For the purposes of this paper, it does not matter which source is most influential in shaping morality; all that matters is that morality is primarily shaped by these external factors, most of which occur early in life, before individuals are fully capable of deciding on a coherent system of morals for themselves.

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[35] An example is Thomas Aquinas's view on natural morality. James Q. Wilson summarizes, "the moral law is, in the first instance, an expression of a natural – that is, an innate – tendency." (Wilson 1997: 2).

In addition to psychological research, philosophers and theorists propose reasons to believe that morality develops from the groups of which one is a part. According to Michael Walzer, a society's moral development (and by extension, the individuals within the society) always starts "thick" (localized), whereas "thin" (universal) morality develops later, usually as an outgrowth of a successful thick morality (Walzer 1994: 4, 10). For the purposes of this discussion, the implication is that morality is primarily learned from local influences, not intuited from universal principles. Rawls similarly casts doubt on the notion that morality is ingrained in the human character by elaborating the various stages of morality throughout childhood. At first, children have a "morality of authority" – they do what's right because they've been told what to do by parents and authority figures. This progresses to the "morality of association" in which one develops moral standards applicable to the groups in which one exists. One only progresses to the "morality of principles" after these first two stages have been traversed. To be sure, there are natural attitudes that underlie these moral feelings (Rawls 1971: 466, 467, 471), but that does not mean that these moral feelings are natural, simply that natural feelings (guilt, need for acceptance, love) shape an individual's moral sense in a direction that conforms to member groups.

This transmission of morals from group to individual is obviously not flawless, or else we would all only reflect the values of our first and typically strongest socializing groups – the family unit and early peers. Instead, morals taken from these early sources bump up against and compete with values from other socializing sources. To be sure, cognitive evaluation and other factors like instinct likely do play a role in an individual's moral development. Thus, our morals probably derive from nature, nurture, and cognition.

Critiques of moral development

A main critique of the community-oriented moral development outlined above is a flipside argument. Namely, what some see as becoming more in line with the standards and values of the community of which one is a part, others may see this as conformity and unhealthy groupthink. This especially reflects the liberal uneasiness with morality in politics because they would like to present an image of individuals determining their own morality (Gutmann 1985: 305). If, instead, morality is being determined by the state, the community, or longstanding institutions, then the individuals might be denied the autonomy that liberals believe they should have (Dworkin 1977).

Groupthink is defined as, "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (Janus 1982: 9). Groupthink is not typically discussed in relation to morality, but rather in its power to shape group decision-making effectiveness. However, I believe that it is also appropriate to discuss groupthink's power to shape the moral development of individuals because most of the literature on groupthink makes reference to its ability to shape values and norms, as well. In an atmosphere of groupthink, individuals might hesitate to raise normative issues that run counter the group's standards because they have a strong belief in their group's inherent morality. Thus, alternate moral dimensions and possible ethical consequences are typically under-explored in an environment of groupthink (Ibid: 174).

Critical thinking and honest appraisal are squelched out of a subconscious need for acceptance and/or conformity. The pressure for conformity is greater in more cohesive groups and/or when some outside threat is present (Ibid: 3 - 5).

If groupthink was simply a subconscious method for weeding out dissenters, it could be viewed as a harsh but perhaps necessary process. However, studies show that when very cohesive groups regulate the values, norms, and behavior patterns of their members, it has deleterious effects on other aspects of the group, such as productivity (Janus 1982: 5). Thus, groupthink may not just be bad because of the conformity issue; its disastrous side-effects might be another reason that we should resist seeing this as a benefit from a deliberative democratic process. Finally, moral conformity might privilege certain types of morality over others, preserving the status quo and favoring "old time" moral standards, as opposed to more critical and radical moral views.

Defense of moral development

Those that see moral development as desirable say that it is best when individuals derive their sense of right and wrong more often from the views of the communities in which they currently exist than the other sources like individual consciences or universal principles. Even if a person's sense of right and wrong changes over the course of his life, as long as this moral sense typically reflects the groups to which he belongs at any given moment, this may have certain benefits. One benefit is that individuals are less burdened with having to constantly evaluate the rightness and wrongness of their actions. Informal community pressure (which is typically very tolerant in liberal democracies) sets down a framework of right and wrong within which individuals operate. And while liberal theorists may see this as overbearing, it is no doubt preferable to official coercion or anarchy (Etzioni 1998: 43). Other often-cited benefits of community-derived morality include: minimizing conflict, perpetuating time-tested values, promoting community cohesion and shared decision making (Etzioni 1996: 156).[36] Thus, the communitarian defense of community-inspired moral development is that it is proper for communities to be an essential part of shaping individuals and values (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 7).

The danger of community-inspired moral development becoming repressive and promoting conformity and groupthink is a concern that communitarians take seriously (Etzioni 1998: 41). However, communitarians are well aware of the danger of an all-encompassing communal orientation squelching dissent and critique, as in the Soviet case. Instead, communitarians often hold traditional liberal notions of freedom of thought and belief in high regard. The big difference is that the community has a right to step in and regulate what it deems to be immoral actions (Etzioni 1998: 43). Additionally, many communitarians emphasize that the balance between “I and we” is too heavily weighted in favor of the former in liberal democracies, particularly in America (Etzioni 1996: 157 – 158). Thus, even though groupthink might be a danger from too much community-inspired morality, we’re typically at the other end of the continuum of not giving enough credit to communal morality. A reassessment of where individuals gain their sense of right and wrong in favor of more of a communal influence may be healthier for both individuals and communities, because only this reassessment can account for such non-instrumental obligations towards the community (such as military service) that are very difficult to justify under an individualist perspective (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 6; Selznick 1998: 13).

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[36] This is not to say that all morality is or should be relative to specific communities; it is beyond the scope of this paper to weigh in on the debate between universal and relative morality.

It is also not the case that community-driven moral development signals a return to “old time” morality that is incompatible with modern democracies or liberal institutions. Etzioni claims that “communitarians favor new communities in which all members have the same basic moral, social and political standings” (Etzioni 1996: 158). Likewise, Avineri and de-Shalit see typical communitarian proposals as anything but conservative; they are often laden with egalitarian, feminist, and socialist re-workings of liberal democracy (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 10). In contrast to this typically progressive morality, the liberal obsession with moral neutrality on the part of the state may be (ironically) more likely to contribute to the moral status quo. Namely, by staying silent on a social issue, one inevitably privileges one side of a moral argument over another, which is often the status quo or the side of the power elite (Etzioni 1996: 160). Communal morality is certainly not immune to this possibility; the point is merely that liberal neutrality is not necessarily a safeguard against it.

Participation

By participation, I am referring to the citizens’ capacity for involvement in politics. Participation could be assessed on either an aggregate or individual level, even though the experiment in the following chapter examines individual levels of participation.[37] The ideal “active public” would do more than merely vote, although when they voted, they would turn out in high numbers. Additionally, an active public would consider ways to affect the political process between elections—both directly and indirectly. This includes all the areas of political life that Putnam laments the decrease of in the latter third of the twentieth century, both small-scale and large, such as: discussing politics with friends/family/co-workers, writing letters to legislators, attending speeches/rallies/protests, getting out the vote, campaigning for candidates, and even running for office (Putnam 2000: 31).

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[37] Throughout this section, I will use the terms “participation”, “engagement”, “activity” and “involvement” synonymously.

There are many reasons why being an active citizen could be seen as desirable. Some types of political action, such as voting, are championed by almost everyone. Democratic theorists of all stripes view voting, if not as a duty, then at least as an instrumental good to keep the system running. Politicians and partisans also make broad appeals to participation at election time, even if *actual* vote drives are targeted to areas likely to contain partisan supporters. Even popular culture has tried to make voting appear "cool," recently. For instance, the last two Presidential elections have featured youth-oriented vote drives by World Wrestling Entertainment ("Smack Down the Vote") and MTV ("Vote or Die"). However, partisans, pop culture, and pundits rarely call for more than the democratic minimum of voting. Knowingly or unknowingly, all play into the aggregative conceptions of democracy that only really require the citizen to cast a ballot once every few years and then sink back into more immediate concerns.

Participatory democrats (and deliberative democrats in a similar fashion) champion a notion of citizens who are active at a deeper level than solely voting. The tradition envisions a more intimate role for citizens within the decision making process than merely selecting representatives on an infrequent basis. Participatory democrats do not think that institutions and citizens should be considered apart from each other and that participation in politics enables the citizen to understand the links between public and private spheres better. Because participatory politics can really only thrive in a participatory society, this school of democratic theory advocates bringing participatory processes into as many areas of life as possible, of which, industry (work) is perhaps the most important (Pateman 2003: 41, 46).

Typically, a few reasons are cited for why having an active citizenry is valuable. First of all, involved citizens might make politicians more responsive to their demands (Cupps 1977: 478). This is especially important for segments of the population that are usually on the “losing end” of politics, as low overall levels of participation, including voting, almost always translate to under-representation of disadvantaged groups (Lipset 1960: 216). If participation does make representatives more responsive, it may not be so much as a “keeping them honest” effect (although that is possible, too), as much as clarifying the public will. This is one of Fishkin’s primary objections to standard public opinion polls – since the public is ridiculously under-informed, an obsession with prediction can only lead to disasters when the media, pundits, or politicians actually try to interpret what the public really wants. Fishkin’s alternative, a deliberative poll, would be prescription from a public with some grounding in the issue at hand, not prediction based on a democratic minimalist concept of the public (Fishkin 1991: 81). Thus, a hypothetical politician can often ignore public opinion polls without consequence, even if he is going against the wishes of the majority in his district. His assumption is that the majority is not organized or attentive enough to challenge his decision. A more active public would not necessarily be more informed or less self-selected. However, an engaged citizenry would be less ambiguous about what they want.

Another beneficial effect of greater citizen participation could be greater levels of voter efficacy (Cupps 1977: 478). Often, the opposite causal link was considered—highly politically efficacious people are thought to participate more. But researchers have examined the reverse – can participating in politics, even at basic levels, make citizens feel like they make a difference (Clark and Acock 1989: 551)? Mendelsohn and Cutler note that while participation (they test efficacy in relationship to referenda) is not a cure-all for general political malaise, it can produce a slight bump that makes citizens feel as efficacious as they normally do during important elections and events (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000: 698). However, it could be argued that referenda are only slightly more democratic than regular voting, because they are not immune to the same manipulation that the standard voting process often falls victim to. Going deeper, Finkel demonstrates that people who are actively involved with a candidate's campaign derive not just instrumental benefits from their participation, but they also gain increased feelings of efficacy (Finkel 1987: 461).

Finally, increased citizen participation can enhance the legitimacy of final decisions as well as the system, as a whole (Cupps 1977: 479). This idea has an ancient pedigree stretching back to the classical Greek thinkers that heavily shaped modern understandings of democracy. Although the contention that Aristotle valued participation as intrinsically valuable and a key to the good life is open to interpretation, other prominent figures in the ancient political theory canon supported this notion less ambiguously. For example, Pericles's injunction that "The man who takes no part in politics is useless" and the civic discipline of ancient Sparta went on to influence modernist thinkers like Rousseau and Mill (Mulgan 1990: 212). Contemporary political theorists share this view that decisions made with citizen input enhance the legitimacy of both the immediate and future decisions, because this process (if done correctly) should privilege the force of the better argument (Young 2000: 22–23; Benhabib 1996: 69; Cohen 2003: 21).

Critiques of participation

Moderation arguments abound in regards to citizen participation, no doubt because many who are influenced by the aggregative project can not or will not view *minimal* participation as a bad thing. Instead, they believe that the current American political system works fine with current levels of citizen participation. Some schools of thought see low participation levels as indicating general satisfaction with the status quo (Lipset 1960: 217). This implies that mass participation means that there is at least the perception that something is seriously wrong. This may or may not actually be the case, but the side effect is the same—stress on the democratic system and the decision-makers within it (Hudson 2004: 141). Berelson et. al., paraphrasing Judge Learned Hand, beautifully sum up this “if it ain’t broke” mentality in regards to participation. They state that we may have outgrown the requirements of classical democracy which framed high citizen involvement as a duty and goal. Indeed, perhaps our system even works better because of its current state of affairs (Berelson et. al. 1948: 312).

However, advocates of minimal participation add that just because minimal participation indicates a strong or happy polity, does not necessarily mean that more participation is automatically better. Indeed, calls for increased political participation may have disastrous consequences. For instance, if one accepts the very reasonable premise that a large number of citizens (of all participation levels) are strongly motivated by a small number of issues, then greater participation could be seen as disastrous. Single-issue oriented people are generally not reliable partisans, especially in America, where the two main parties are broad-based coalitions. Thus, a higher level of participation might erode party stability (Riedel 1972: 213). The erosion of our two party system may be a welcome thing for holders of less mainstream views, but likely a disaster for a plurality system that could degenerate into what amounts to narrow, local interests taking over the functions of the major parties. Secondly, even if single issue voters do turn out to be reliable partisans on some issues, it might still put too much pressure on democratic systems. This is especially the case if participation by small, but vocal groups of activists inhibits politicians' abilities to compromise and bargain, for fear of angering an activist base (Hudson 2004: 158).

Some make a realism argument about citizen participation by showing how heightened citizen involvement can lead to hasty, overeager decisions. In principle, it might be more democratic to get the entire citizenry to vote or to have citizen committees looking over the shoulders of unelected bureaucrats. However in practice, full voting would mean that large numbers of citizens were making vote choices for idiosyncratic or trivial reasons (Elms 1976: 25). Likewise, citizen committees might not have the political or technical savvy to demand what turns out to be shortsighted responses (Cupps 1977: 479). Another aspect to the realism arguments above is that increased participation may not be able to exist (in current American democracy) alongside informed participation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between broad versus deep participation. As an example, consider that expansion of the right to vote throughout the twentieth century has always led to a decrease in the worth of the individual vote and thus, the effort that people take to make it a fully informed vote (Ortiz 2004: 211–212). Thus, efforts to increase participation by altering the costs or benefits of it may be counterproductive. More people may turn out to vote, campaign for their preferred candidate, or write letters to their senators. But there is no reason to believe that more people participating in these activities will mean that they do so in a thoughtful fashion (Ibid: 215).

Most theorists who make a desirability argument about the value of citizen action do so in much the same vane as Schumpeter.[38] Schumpeter's main claims, addressed in chapter 1, are that the masses are easily swayed, quickly manipulated, and not entirely trustworthy for making intelligent political decisions. Therefore, anything above a minimal role for the masses could be dangerous (Schumpeter 1950: 262). This offshoot of conservative thought claims that the masses are perpetually uninformed and deadly when manipulated into action. Further elaborations of the same theme have noted that the uninformed masses (often synonymous for "working class") seem to be less tolerant and more authoritarian than the elite. This group of people, while often seeking out progressive economic policies, also typically favors illiberal and even anti-democratic social policies. This orientation may be due to lower education, harsher living environments, authoritarian family structures, etc. (Lipset 1960: 100-102). Finally, historical examples have continuously shown that mass movements have often had high tolls in human lives, suffering, and political/economic realms (Dye and Zeigler 1996: 428). This is not a foregone conclusion, nor does it equate 1960s-era civil rights protestors with *das Volk* from 1930s-era Germany. Mainly, this critique is about expressing a wariness of movements for "the people," which have the very real possibility of lapsing into mob rule and anti-democratic reforms.

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[38] Given that these arguments are typically classified as examples of elite democracy, they tend to not be as in vogue as the above arguments made by proponents of aggregative democracy.

Given these premises, many have argued that it would be best if the decision-making was left to the elites, while the generally uninterested and apathetic segments of the population just stayed home on election night (Schumpeter 1950: 269; Elms 1976: 25; Sullivan et. al. 1982: 15, 17-18). The argument that democracy might be better served if "the masses" stayed home is not currently a popular one for politicians or pop culture icons to make, but it is still held and voiced by certain academics. Their argument is typically as follows—a nation with *full* citizen participation, in which everyone voted and engaged in between-election politicking, would be a scary place to live. Extreme partisans may vote more and have higher levels of voter efficacy, but they are also less open to compromise on the issues that they care about (Berelson et. al. 1948: 314). This state of affairs could potentially be poisonous for tolerance and cooperation and make day to day co-existence difficult if everyone wore their political affiliation on their sleeve (Mutz 2004: 32).

Defense of participation

A good retort to moderation arguments about citizen participation is that many industrial democracies have high levels of participation without the negative outcomes that doomsayers predict. The issue of *why* the citizens of these countries participate more has been over-explored and is not as relevant to the present discussion.[39] Instead, I'm interested in the *effects* of mass participation. How did these countries bring the less motivated and informed segments of their population into the political process without a breakdown of the party system or colossally horrible policy outcomes? Some think that

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[39] Putnam finds that while other countries participation levels in traditional political or social capital-related activities are on the decline (e.g. voting, party membership, union membership, church attendance), they are doing so much more gradually and much later than American rates of participation (Putnam 2002: 404 – 407). Thus, despite a worsening situation for many industrialized nations, a side-by-side comparison of the effects of participation levels is possible.

when governments encourage *gradual* participation (through better education and more relevant links between politics and people's lives) for segments of society that are not used to participating, they become much more willing and capable participants without the doom and gloom scenarios mentioned above (Lipset 1960: 219).

Likewise, the realism arguments above are not good reasons in and of themselves to limit participation past present levels. Namely, we shouldn't limit participation because large masses of voters *might* make goofy choices. Voter heuristics are not always devoid of personal significance, however much they might seem to be to the outside observer. Thus, Hispanic voters rejected Gerald Ford because of his famous gaffe of biting into an unshucked tamale. As ridiculous as this may seem for a vote calculus, a Hispanic voter could reasonably claim that Ford's lack of familiarity with local cuisine said something important about how much priority he gave to the interests of the Hispanic community (Menand 2006: 350). Additionally, the "expertise" issue—that citizen advisory groups will automatically make worse decisions than bureaucrats—may sometimes find verification from anecdotal accounts, but is not inevitably the case for every instance of citizen participation. It also does not take into account the attributes that citizens would bring to the political process that not all bureaucrats would, such as a local perspective, non-economic modes of assessment, and community support. Numerous case studies of citizen advisory boards have shown their capacity for integrity, ingenuity and accountability, such as Callahan's portrait of a citizen budget committee in the township of Monroe. In Callahan's story, the citizen advisory board did the best job possible despite an antagonistic mayor and bureaucrats. They generated more community interest in budget issues than the city managers and elected officials had ever been able to (Callahan 2000: 394 – 397).

The desirability arguments about participation made by Schumpeter and company are the most severe of all the arguments against participation. Many participatory democrats admit that the participatory project has had problems overcoming the association between high citizen involvement and totalitarian movements described by Schumpeter (Pateman 2003: 40). Partially, these examples can be argued against with reference to the more current real world examples mentioned above. In the later half of the twentieth century, industrialized democracies with high participation rates do not typically elect extremists and they do not crumble under the weight of uninformed and illiberal mass opinion. If one takes the “illiberal” position on social issues to mean whichever position is most traditional, than Americans have much more illiberal laws in regards to sexual orientation, the death penalty and related social issues than citizens European democracies – most of which vote and participate at much higher rates (Inglehart and Baker 2003: 170). Thus, when “the masses” participate, they do not automatically turn politics in the authoritative and illiberal direction that Schumpeter and company predict.

But the second objection to the desirability argument about participation is that the link between elevated participation and lowered possibility for compromise might be a fallacious link. What elite democrats seem to fear is massive participation polarizing the electorate into warring camps. Certainly, the fact that the last few national elections have seen an increase in turnout and (supposed) fervor seems to support this notion that more participation equals division. However, many note that this supposed division is mostly superficial – on most issues, the viewpoints of Americans in both red and blue states are very similar. Aside from passionate activists on both sides, a majority of Americans give moderate answers to questions about social issues as seemingly divisive as gay marriage as well as the need for more compromise between parties—neither of which reflects an America on the verge of a cultural civil war, as is commonly postulated (Fiorina 2006: 417). Thus, if Americans today who live in "red and blue America" are not more divided then they were ten years ago, when Americans voted less in Presidential and midterm elections, it seems that the correlation between participation and polarization is either reversed or meaningless.

Conclusion

Justifying the individual benefits of deliberative democracy on theoretical grounds is only part of the process of proving their worth in the deliberative project. The other step is to show whether or not these benefits also plausibly arise from real-life deliberation. Of the two, proving desirability is probably the less important step for a variety of reasons. First of all, the deliberative project has inherited concepts and rationales about the desirability of democratic end-products from thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Jefferson, Rousseau, and the participatory democrats. Certainly, a fine pedigree does not equal freedom from error; however, it does enhance credibility. Secondly, the rationalizations of some benefits are more convincing than others – but the general project of deliberative democracy is not sunk if any one particular individual benefit is judged unworthy. Thus, if Americans reconsider their attitudes towards tolerance in the light of a future terrorist attack—that does not mean that the other benefits of deliberative democracy are any less worthwhile. As long as most of the benefits are typically seen as positive, then it is likely that the deliberative project has a convincing case.

The latter goal, establishing the plausibility of individual benefits, is the more crucial step in my enterprise for a few reasons. First, this avenue is much less frequently explored by advocates of deliberative democracy, who often focus more on the theoretical aspects of deliberative democracy than examinations of actual deliberation. An excessive focus on theorizing will lead to charges of utopianism, similar to how participatory democrats were labeled. This is a critique that deliberative democrats are desperate to avoid (Hauptman 2001: 397). As such, it behooves them to study the effects of actual deliberation. Secondly, establishing plausibility is important for eventually selling the enterprise to politicians and the larger public – the people who will actually be participating in deliberative democracy. I’m doubtful that many politicians have read Rousseau or that the public is impressed by people quoting Aristotle. Thus, theoretical arguments for deliberative democracy may be a necessary first step for getting more academics on board. However, at some point, “results” are needed before any real-life deliberative reforms could see the light of day.

My goal in the final chapter is to accomplish this second goal – demonstrating the likelihood that the above benefits are likely to arise from actual deliberation. The chapter focuses on an experimental design which is a modified version of James Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls. I hope that by showing individual benefits to be both desirable and plausible, they will become more appealing to all involved.

CHAPTER 4 – PLAUSIBILITY OF BENEFITS

Introduction

Previous chapters have categorized or weighed in on the desirability of individual benefits typically associated with deliberative democracy. However, the most important step in the process is to assess plausibility. Otherwise, we are right back to square one—theorizing about all of the potential goodies one can get from deliberation, without being able to *actually* prove that they exist or are likely to result from real-life deliberation. Thus, the gap between deliberative theory and deliberative practice needs to be addressed. Other studies have begun the process of assessing whether or not the above benefits are likely results of deliberative process. The current study aims to add to that effort. In this chapter, evidence for the existence of individual benefits after deliberation will be derived from an experimental procedure. The chapter below outlines the studies that led up to this one, describes the current experiment, and lists and explains the results. The conclusion returns to the original question about the plausibility of individual benefits in deliberative democracy, and relates these findings back to theoretical and methodological issues that continue to plague the deliberative project.

Literature review

There have been surprisingly few experiments designed by deliberative theorists. Instead, many empirical examinations of the effects of deliberation have been either quasi-experimental designs or fieldwork/observational studies. Perhaps the reason for this is best explained by Jane Mansbridge's argument for why the social scientific literature has not produced a plausible link between democratic participation and the development of moral character – our instruments, at present, are very blunt. Although

Mansbridge admits that intuitive and anecdotal evidence exists to lead one to believe that participation enhances individual virtues, she ends her article with a call for more rigorous experimental studies (Mansbridge 1999: 291, 319).

Granted, Mansbridge's article focuses on participation. While much of the deliberative literature is inspired by participatory democratic literature such as Ben Barber's *Strong Democracy*, a focus on deliberation and its effects is a more targeted one than a focus on participation. This means that the independent variable in experiments revolving around deliberation is easier to clarify, even if the types of dependent variables deliberativists are usually interested in (moral development, self-interest awareness, etc) are often maddeningly difficult to pin down.

Many works by deliberative democrats address plausibility issues in an overly theoretical fashion, which often results in charges of utopianism from critics. However, recently there have been a few very influential quasi-experimental studies that have begun the process of testing what deliberative democrats have been theorizing about for the last decade and a half. These studies generally tend to be in a much better position when commenting on matters of the plausibility of deliberative benefits than their less empirical sister studies.

Most of these influential deliberative experiments are actually quasi-experiments, such as James Fishkin's Deliberative Polls and John Gastil's examinations of National Issues Forums (Fishkin 1995; Fishkin and Luskin 1999; Gastil and Dillard 1999; Button and Mattson 1999; Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin 2005). Fishkin classifies his early experiments with Deliberative Polls in Manchester and Austin as quasi-experimental because they did not feature the balanced control groups of a full experiment (Fishkin and

Luskin 1999: 4). In Manchester, the effects from the deliberating sample were compared to the British population as a whole. In Austin, results from the deliberating group were compared to two quasi-control groups, a group of "partial" responders from the first round of interviewing as well as a randomly selected phone interview group that received no pre-forum interview (Fishkin 1995: 165; Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 4 - 5). Likewise, Gastil imagines how a researcher may compare an experimental to a control group in a wide-scale deliberation experiment, such as comparing a state with developed deliberative forums (citizen juries) to those without (Gastil 2000: 193). However, his recent experiments are similarly without formal control groups. In his 1999 co-authored piece, Gastil emphasizes the need for experimental studies on deliberation that compare participant changes to non-treated samples of the population that take the attitudinal survey at two separate points in time (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 21).

Deliberative (quasi-) experiments typically set out to measure the effects of deliberation on what I have identified as educative individual benefits (quality and quantity of information, political sophistication, etc.). For example, Button and Mattson (1999), despite finding other, more negative effects, conclude that deliberation seems to have a positive effect on the understanding of difficult issues, as well as initial preference formation for issues that had not been previously considered by deliberators (Button and Mattson 1999: 621–622). Fishkin typically finds in his Deliberative Polls (in both face-to-face and online versions) that his participants' knowledge both expands and becomes more nuanced (Fishkin 1999: 285; Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin 2005: 18). Fishkin's Austin poll showed considerable statistical and anecdotal evidence of a variety of educational benefits, such as: increased interest in politics, increased political efficacy and the usual informational gains (Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 30–32). Gastil and Dillard illustrate that deliberation often has a positive and significant effect on measures of "political sophistication" (issue coherence, issue certainty, ability to differentiate between positions). They have strong evidence for these boosts in the short term for all educational levels, but are less certain about long-term effects of deliberation on political sophistication (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 20).

Deliberative experiments often neglect an examination of my other category of individual level effects—civic benefits. This is no doubt because the above benefits are more difficult to measure than informational gains. Additionally, deliberative democrats heavily influenced by classical liberalism may look down upon deliberation's ability to produce certain civic benefits. In the sections below, I will outline why civic benefits are not only relevant to study, but how it may be possible to get around typical measurement difficulties.

Finally, other deliberative experiments, while more rigorous than their predecessors, focus more on what I've classified as procedural benefits. For example, David Schwab tested the fairness derived from Habermas's ideal speech situation. He accomplished this through an experimental design in which role-playing groups either adhered to Habermas's communicative procedures (treatment group) or did not (control) (Schwab 2005: 1 – 6). Although the focus of this experiment is not on individual-level benefits, the experiment is instructive because its methodology closely resembles the process that I will lay out below.

Hypotheses

Based on a review of the relevant literature, as well as my own initial forays into deliberation, the following hypotheses were predicted to be reasonable expectations of the experimental results:

> Hypotheses 1a: The groups receiving any of the treatments will receive more educative benefits than the control group.[40]
>
> Hypothesis 1b: The three types of treatment groups (watchers, informal, formal) will receive a corresponding increase in educative benefits when compared to each other.
>
> Hypothesis 1c: The formal deliberation groups will receive significantly more educative benefits than the control groups.

This first group of hypotheses makes predictions about the projected direction and intensity of educative benefit gain. Hypotheses 1a and 1b infer directionality—the non-deliberating group will be less likely to pick up benefits than a group that witnesses deliberation. Additionally, the watcher group will be less likely to gain benefits than groups that engage in some type of deliberation. Groups using unstructured deliberation are less likely to gain educative benefits than groups engaging in structured deliberation. Hypothesis 1c implies intensity; before performing the experiment, it was not possible to tell just how much larger the educative gains may be for deliberators over non-deliberators. Instead, this hypothesis claims that the gains for the structured treatment group are expected to be large.

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[40] This typically means a larger change in response scores from pre-interview to post-interview stages for the four educative benefits.

The reasoning for the above hypotheses rests upon findings from related experiments. Button and Mattson note that deliberative designs that rely heavily on a moderator or central figure tend to foster participant views that deliberation is worthwhile primarily as a learning tool (Button and Mattson 1999: 619 – 620). Thus, the structured deliberation group was expected to achieve the most educative benefits. In addition, watching deliberation and engaging in unstructured deliberation are better ways to get educative benefits than not deliberating at all. James Fishkin surmises that a world in which Deliberative Polls became a standard for public opinion would have beneficial educative effects on those that paid attention to the polls but did not participate in them (Fishkin 1999: 282).

Hypothesis 2a: The groups receiving the two deliberation treatments will receive more civic benefits than the control group and the watcher group.

Hypothesis 2b: The informal deliberation group will receive more civic benefits than the formal deliberation group.

Since civic benefits are unique to this empirical study and slightly harder to measure, the above hypotheses predict directionality, but not necessarily intensity. Hypothesis 2a rests on the common sense assumption that civic benefits, such as generating inter-group community and the possibility of shifting individual preferences to match newly established group norms (in this experiment, labeled “moral development”) cannot really be achieved without some form of interaction. Since both the control group and the watcher group did not deliberate with each other, I expected that neither should have much of a means to gain civic benefits.

As with the educative benefits, hypothesis 2b is grounded in previous empirical findings. The same groups in Button and Mattson's study that believed that structured deliberation was for educative purposes also contained members that longed for less structured, but more activist deliberation (Button and Mattson 1999: 630–631). Nonhierarchical deliberation may lead to the free-flowing discussing of "fantasy chains," that Bormann describes as being particularly good for reinforcing in-group solidarity (Bormann 1996: 104–105). For these reasons, I expected that deliberation which is too structured would not produce the types of community-oriented benefits that I've classified as civic.

Methods

General procedure

The experiment mimicked the basic procedures of Fishkin and Gastil. It departed, however, in both method and intent to a significant degree. The fundamental design of Fishkin's deliberative poll is: pre-forum interview, treatment (deliberation for 5 – 6 hours over a weekend), and post-forum interview. Fishkin's data was then gleaned from the differences between pre-forum and post-forum responses. From these, one could ascertain if the treatment was likely to have produced various educative effects (Fishkin 1999: 284–285).

My set-up was a more typical experimental design, as I randomly assigned participants to one of four treatments. The first treatment was a control in which no deliberation necessarily took place. In other words, each run of treatment 1 was given periods of free time in between video presentations in which they *could have* discussed the videos if they choose. But no deliberation was planned or even suggested by the moderators and experimenter. The other three treatments each got a different experimental manipulation. The first viewed a videotape of deliberation taking place; the second engaged in unstructured, lightly moderated deliberation; the third engaged in structured deliberation similar to James Fishkin's Deliberative Polls, in which moderators followed standard moderator guidelines of keeping respondent comments within strict time guidelines, assuring a fair opportunity for everyone to contribute, and controlling the pacing and order of the topics discussed.[41]

Before detailing my exact procedure, the following are the areas in which I hope to expand upon previous experiments in deliberative democracy, as well as provide an alternative viewpoint to them:

1) My experiment utilizes a classic experimental design as it makes use of comparable control groups. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions or the control treatment, thus (partially) getting around the selection bias issues that haunt many deliberative quasi-experiments.
2) I replicated a "media environment" that all participants were exposed to at the beginning of the experiment. This was a visual presentation on issues that replicated the one-way communication inherent in most real-life issues. It represented an improvement over any experimental designs that solely relied on pre-experimental pamphlets as the only information source. This version accounts for different learning styles, so as not to put visual learners at a disadvantage in the deliberation.

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[41] As each treatment was run multiple times, there is a distinction between "group," which refers to a specific set of people undergoing the experiment at the same time and "treatment," which refers to all the groups undergoing the same experimental manipulation.

3) My experiments had a definite lack of star power. I believe that citizen-to-citizen deliberation would benefit citizens more than citizen-to-representative deliberation, because the former would occur much more frequently. In many deliberative experiments, the inclusion of special "guest stars" like Al Gore, Jim Lehrer, and Russ Feingold (Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 12; Button and Mattson 1999: 614) may have been the real reason that participants left the experiment more excited about deliberation and democracy. If deliberation produces efficacy, interest, and participation, then strictly citizen-to-citizen deliberation should produce these effects as well. Otherwise, having marquee names in attendance may be a confounding variable.
4) My purpose is to examine the desirability and plausibility of individual level effects from deliberation. I focused on the potential for both educative and civic benefits of deliberation in order to combine the liberal and communitarian strains inherent in deliberative democratic theory.

Experimental procedure

After signing up, participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: a control group, a watcher group, an unstructured deliberation group, or a structured deliberation group.[42] Each discussion group had up to twelve members in order to replicate juries, the deliberative setting most people are familiar with. They met for almost as much time (about 3 – 4.5 hours) as Fishkin's Deliberative Poll participants met over the course of a weekend (5 – 6 hours), but in my case, they only met for one day

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[42] Throughout this chapter, the phrases "control groups" and "treatment 1" will be used interchangeably. This similarly applies to "watcher groups" and "treatment 2"; "informal deliberation groups" and "treatment 3" and "formal deliberation groups" and "treatment 4".

(Saturday). Each of the groups was scheduled for their own discussion day and time, and none interacted with the other groups.

During the experiment, each group was exposed to the same order of events:

1) Pre-experimental interview (conducted one week before group session)
2) Rules discussion
3) Media presentation for issue #1 (15 minutes)
4) Deliberation for issue #1 (30 – 45 minutes)
5) Short break (15 minutes)
6) Media presentation for issue #2 (15 minutes)
7) Deliberation for issue #2 (30 – 45 minutes)
8) Lunch break (30 minutes)
9) Media presentation for issue #3 (15 minutes)
10) Deliberation for issue #3 (30 – 45 minutes)
11) Short break (15 minutes)
12) Individual post-experimental interviews (one conducted directly after the experiment; one conducted 1 – 2 months later)

For most of the above steps, all treatments experienced very similar procedures. Each treatment witnessed the same media presentations for three real-world issues that are given either scant or complicated coverage in the real media (counterterrorism efforts in the US, build-up of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, and illegal immigration). Each treatment also had exposure to information pamphlets that covered similar material as the presentations. These pamphlets were distributed before the experiment started.

Similarly, all subjects were exposed to the same pre-survey taken before the experiment date as well as identical post-surveys taken after the experiment.

There were two main differences between control and treatment groups. The first difference occurred in step 2, in which groups established ground rules for discussion. This step was largely unnecessary in treatments 1 and 2, because no discussion took place. My student employees did not even mention to their discussion groups the fact that other groups were having discussions, so as not to give these groups an idea of what the true purpose of the experiment was. Instead, these treatments skipped straight to step 3.

Treatment 3 established its own guidelines for deliberation, but did so in very different ways that highlighted their fundamental differences from other treatments. Indeed, even the choice of the word "guidelines" over "rules" emphasized the de-centered nature of this deliberation group. In practice, the facilitator's job was to coach the group into setting their own ideas of what good discussion looked like.[43] Individual group members suggested rules that the facilitator then added to a large sheet of paper on the wall. In theory, the group could argue against suggested standards of communication, although in practice, this never happened. Consensus on the ground rules for discussion was generally not difficult to achieve. It was very important that standards for effective deliberation came from the group, itself, with a minimum of prodding from the student facilitator. All runs of treatment 3 had varying degrees of success with this, with many groups converging on similar guidelines, anyway, such as: no ad hominem attacks, do not interrupt other speakers, one person talks at a time, etc.

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[43] The facilitator was instructed to begin this discussion with a prompt along these lines,

> "In this experiment, we'll be discussing current political events. You'll watch three videos and each will be followed by a 30 – 45 minute discussion section. Although we think that there should be guidelines for these discussions, we also believe that you should be responsible for coming up with these guidelines.
>
> What should people do or avoid doing in order to have a productive discussion?"

In contrast, treatment 4 was given a list of pre-established rules, most of which were culled from National Issues Forums available online (NIFI.org).[44] These rules were written out on a poster before any subjects arrived for the day and posted to the wall in a prominent location. Again, the choice of the word "rules" was significant; it (as well as the content of the rules themselves) added to the formal and educative atmosphere of treatment 4. Many of these rules were reminiscent of the educative setting that most of the subjects in treatment 4 were intimately familiar with, a college classroom.

The second major difference between control and treatment groups occurred in steps 4, 7, and 10. All groups in the control treatment were given 15 – 20 minutes "free time" to use as they wish, as long as they stayed in the experimental room. In essence, this meant that this group skipped the deliberation steps entirely. I wished them to stay because my student employee was monitoring their interactions at these points in time. The participants in the control group were free to deliberate if they chose, but deliberation was not be mandated nor even suggested. Hence, I predicted that not much conversation would take place – especially anything resembling structured deliberation about the topics of the video presentations. The individual benefits for the control group were similarly expected to be slight. Some may have potentially picked up information from the pamphlet and video, but most left the experiment with no educative or civic benefits, as will be shown below.

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[44] The moderator's prompt for group 4 was:

> "In this experiment, we'll be discussing current political events. You'll watch three videos and each will be followed by a 30 – 45 minute discussion section. Since we want this to be a productive discussion, let's lay down some discussion rules in advance:
>
> *1.* Critiques of ideas are okay, but no personal attacks.
> *2.* Please allow people to speak; no interruptions.
> *3.* Please try to limit individual contributions to a reasonable time limit.
> *4.* Occasionally bringing in outside topics is okay; but try not to stray too far from the topic."

In contrast, I used steps 4, 7, and 10 for deliberation in treatments 2 - 4. The second treatment, the "watchers", immediately viewed a tape of other college students in an informal deliberation on the issue about which they were just informed. The taped deliberations ranged in length from 30 – 45 minutes. However, at no point were the members of treatment 2, themselves, instructed to engage in discussion. As outlined above, treatment 2 is important to test whether simply viewing deliberation may have some of the same positive benefits as participating in it. There is anecdotal evidence in the literature about the effects of watching deliberation, but not many major empirical studies that have tested this. For instance, Ackerman and Fishkin mention a Kennedy school study that shows that after the 2000 debates, respondent information levels were still very low, even though there was an increase in "water cooler discussions" the next day (Ackerman & Fishkin 2004: 41 – 42). Thus, it was reasonable to expect somewhat mixed results from group 2, with a likelihood of some educative benefits, because they were being exposed to more information than the control groups. However, it was unlikely this group would show an increase in civic benefits, because they were interacting with each other as infrequently as the control group.

The third treatment, unstructured deliberation, was encouraged to discuss the media presentation they just saw. Their discussions lasted no less than 30 minutes and no more than 45 minutes. Everything about this group was designed to lend an informal atmosphere to the proceedings. For instance, the tables and chairs were arranged in a circular pattern, so as to de-centralize the group and dilute the impression of my student employee as an “expert”. Also, areas of common ground or persistent disagreement were highlighted and added to large posters on the wall. At the end of each segment, these areas of agreement and disagreement became a basis for what the group viewed as proper action to take for the issue that they discussed. Additionally, my student employee made it clear at the beginning of the session that she was a *facilitator*, not a *moderator.* Her job was not to tell them what to talk about, but instead to encourage a discussion of the media presentations in the same way that they’d talk about terrorism, global warming, or illegal immigration with friends and family. She accomplished this by requesting group members to discuss issues with each other, not with her. At times when conservation was becoming to “classroom-like” (a back and forth between “expert” and “students”), the facilitator subtly avoided eye contact with the speaker, which encouraged them to direct their comments outwards. The facilitator’s only major intrusion into the discussion was to pose a general but provocative question at the very beginning of each discussion along the lines of, “*How do we solve the terrorism problem?”* After that, she let discussion proceed as it did, giving minimal guidance. Additionally, the facilitator made sure that no one insulted or verbally attacked anyone else, which did not turn out to be a problem for any of the groups. Otherwise, she sat back and let the deliberations continue on their terms. Some conversations were polite and quiet; other discussions were passionate and energetic, but all seemed to be thoroughly enjoyed by the subjects. In fact, treatment three was typically the most well received treatment condition, obtaining the highest ratings in the post survey – with 64.1% rating the experiment a “very positive” experience and 30.8% rating it a “somewhat positive” experience.

The final treatment, the structured deliberation groups, followed each media presentation with deliberation similar to those moderated by Fishkin's Kettering Foundation-trained moderators. While Fishkin's moderators are certainly not "leaders" (a trait that was downplayed in the informal group), they do take a more active role in regulating speaking times, order, and topic. Discussion typically occurred in a two-way fashion, between the moderator and the group, as a whole. Group members usually directed their comments back to the moderator as opposed to each other. This tendency was not necessarily encouraged, but it also was not downplayed. The moderator let discussion proceed as long as it could on its own steam, but had a much longer list of discussion questions for moving discussion through all major aspects of the video presentation. He also attempted to explore all angles of important debates, when they arose, keeping his own presentation as objective and bias-free as possible. When a deliberator strayed too far off topic, the moderator's job was to try and bring him or her back around to the subject at hand. The discussion produced in treatment 4 is contrasted with the sometimes meandering and often partisan conversations of treatment 3, which occasionally got off on interesting tangents. As with the group rules segment, the conversation in the structured deliberation group purposely mimicked the discussion found in most college classrooms – a conversation between expert and students.

Participants

I attracted participants to my experiment in a few ways. First, I posted flyers around the University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point campus, promising a set amount of money ($40) and free lunch for 3 – 5 hours worth of experimentation over the course of a Saturday. Secondly, I attempted to visit as many diverse college classes, as possible, so that I was attracting students from many different majors and backgrounds. Third, I made use of UWSP's excellent electronic ad board service. Finally, I encouraged positive word of mouth on the part of the subjects who had already gone through the experiment. In total, I ran 127 UWSP students through the experiment in 14 groups: three groups of treatment 1 (total N = 20), three groups of treatment 2 (total N = 31), four groups of treatment 3 (total N = 39), and four groups of treatment 4 (total N = 37). All groups within a given treatment used the exact same procedure. Except when noted otherwise, most of the measurements described below treat the abovementioned groups of the same treatment type as one large group. Thus, even though there were three runs of treatment 1, most of the findings will consider these three groups together, versus a combined treatment 2, a combined treatment 3 and a combined treatment 4.[45]

There was a slight amount of deception used in informing the participants about the nature of the experiment. Originally, I informed all of my groups that I was interested in studying political attitude formation. I did not indicate in advance that I was primarily interested in the byproducts of their discussion on these political issues, because I did not want this influencing the quality and quantity of their discussion. The participants were notified that the deliberations were audio taped. This did not seem to affect participation too much, as most subjects were just as talkative on the occasions that the audiotapes were switched off as they were when they were running.

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[45] The participants were typical college students in most demographic respects: usually white, more female than male, and almost always within the 18 – 21 age range. Although I did get students from all UWSP colleges and a large variety of majors, subjects from the College of Letters and Sciences tended to be over-represented in my sample. Since it is not my goal to draw generalizations about the public, at large, the representativeness issue is not damning. Instead, my main concern was that the groups were properly randomly distributed along demographic and psychological criteria. Having non-random groups could create problems, for example, if respondents who self-identify as more comfortable with being followers than leaders are all placed in the control group. In this case, it would not be too surprising when their participation scores do not change much from pre- to post-survey. Likewise, a group composed entirely of conservatives might report high affection for their group members, whereas if they had been placed in a mixed political affiliation group, they may have scored differently. As it turned out, there were virtually no significant differences between the groups in terms of race, age, income level, UWSP college, preference for thought problems, preference for complex problems, preference for opinion-formation, leadership abilities, or likelihood to seek out news about politics. In only one group was political orientation skewed, because almost everyone self-identified as a moderate liberal. For crosstabulation results, see Appendix B.

General measurement and assessment

The pre-experiment and post-experimental interviews contained primarily the same questions. They consisted of self-administered computer questionnaires with the interviewer and/or student moderator on hand to clarify any questions the subjects might have.[46] Like Fishkin's pre- and post-forum questionnaires, my interviews asked questions that tested issue awareness, issue coherence, media familiarity, and policy preference in order to get a before and after picture of how these attributes have changed. In addition, my pre- and post-interviews contained questions relating to various civic benefits.[47] These questions were similar in format and content to values surveys. The only major difference between the questions on my pre- and post-interview sheets was that the post interview contained questions about the participant's assessment of the experiment itself. Both pre- and post-surveys are provided in Appendix A.

Finally, I also conducted another interview with participants 1 – 2 months after the experiment. This interview was very brief, typically only 1 – 3 minutes and was conducted over the phone. The purpose of this was twofold. First, some of the benefits that I measured are action-based, not attitudinal. That is, I could *ask* respondents if they feel that more interest and participation in political matters is a desirable thing. However, a delayed follow-up determined whether or not participants promising more active roles actually followed up on their commitment. Second, the delayed re-assessment measured the durability of other attitudinal and educative changes. The evidence on this point, so far, is mixed. Gastil and Dillard suspect that increases in their participants' levels of political sophistication may be short-lived (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 21). On the other side, Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin find that carry-overs from previous deliberative experiments start with an informational advantage to their "novice" counterparts (Iyengar et. al. 2005: 18). It may be the case that some types of benefits fade easier than others. I chose a one to two month delay under the rationale that it allowed participants time to actually follow through on commitments to become politically active, but was not so far removed from the experiment that the response rate was too small.

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[46] The experimenter or moderator was only on-hand for the post-survey. Since the pre-survey was taken before the experiment, at the participant's leisure, I remained in email contact with anyone who needed clarification.

[47] An example is: "How likely are you to be active in politics in the future?"

Dependent and independent variables

In this experiment, I measured the effect of the treatments, the independent variable, on the dependent variables described in chapters 2 and 3: 1) increased information, 2) creativity, 3) political sophistication, 4) self-interest awareness, 5) tolerance, 6) moral character, 7) affection, and 8) participation in politics. A basic description of how the benefits were measured can be found in Chapter 2, whereas a more detailed description can be seen in the findings section below. Most of the time, this measurement consisted of a simple comparison of changes in individual and group means from the pre-experiment questionnaire to the post-experiment questionnaire. In most instances, this entailed performing a paired t-test for each treatment type, in order to assess whether or not there was a significant difference between the pre- and post-survey scores. Below, I refer to the "ideal pattern" for paired t-tests. This ideal pattern entails not finding significance for treatment 1, the control group, but to find significance for treatments 3 and 4, with the significance of treatment 2 being somewhere between the control groups and the two discussion groups.[48]

In other cases, when only post-survey scores are relevant, an ANOVA analysis was performed to determine whether or not the means between groups were significantly different.[49] The "ideal pattern" for ANOVA results is a high-enough F-statistic with a significance level of at least .1, as well as the means of treatments 3 and 4 (and treatment 2, to a lesser extent) being higher in a particular measurement than treatment 1. When applicable, these means will be represented graphically.

Findings

Increased information

Whether or not deliberation provided more correct information for individuals was measured in two different ways. Each method made use of the "knowledge" questions on pre- and post-surveys.[50] In the first method, a paired t-test was performed to see if a subject's treatment affected how correctly he answered questions in the post-survey. This method does not examine individual questions as much as it looks at a "running tally" of average subject performance, by treatments. Additionally, a second analysis examined whether or not the number of "don't know" answers on the pre-survey decreased within treatment groups. As will be discussed below alongside the results, finding the treatments to be significant in both measures is the preferable result. Otherwise, the relationship of deliberation to knowledge acquisition is more complex than originally thought. Both of the methods are outlined in detail below, along with statistical results.

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[48] Because of a relatively small sample size, a result is considered significant if it achieves the .1 level of significance.

[49] Overall, thirty-two paired t-tests and twenty-five ANOVA tests were performed. To save space within the body of the paper, all results will be referenced in the text of this chapter, but not all are reported in table or figure form. I will provide tables and/or figures in three instances: a) the results are statistically significant, b) the results are not significant as expected, but telling in an unexpected way, or c) if there is only one measurement for a given benefit, results will be presented graphically regardless of significance. Tables and figures for results that are neither significant nor telling are all presented in Appendix B.

[50] For a listing of all survey questions by variable type in the pre- and post-surveys, please see Appendix A.

First, if deliberation improves the accuracy of information that people possess, then one would expect to find some positive change towards getting correct answers after deliberation. Thus, if respondents consistently answer knowledge corrections wrong in both pre- and post-deliberation surveys (or if, within groups, just as many get closer to a correct answer as move away from it), then deliberation does not have a plausible effect on information levels. Conversely, if respondents consistently answer knowledge questions correctly in both pre- and post-survey, the relationship of deliberation to information is impossible to assess in the current study—perhaps the knowledge questions selected were too easy.

The knowledge questions on pre- and post-surveys were identical – typically ordinal-level responses in which the correct answer was a category or range. Respondents were given a score of 1 for every correct answer they gave (on either survey), and a 0 for selecting an incorrect answer, thus creating a continuous scale of number of correct answers. Six running tallies were taken for both the pre- and the post-surveys, which assessed the respondents' knowledge within subjects (general political knowledge, terrorism, global warming, illegal immigration), a total for all debate subject questions, and a running tally of all knowledge questions. After that, one paired-test per treatment was performed on the before and after scores to indicate whether or not a significant change had taken place.

The paired t-tests did sometimes reveal a significant effect of the treatment between pre- and post-surveys. The "ideal pattern" described above was definitely seen in one running tally (illegal immigration), partially seen in three running tallies (terrorism, debate subjects, all knowledge questions), and not seen at all in two running tallies (general, global warming).[51][52] Full or partial evidence of the ideal patterns are shown below. Results are briefly described below and more fully explored in the discussion section.

Table 1: Running Tally of Terrorism Knowledge Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.89	0.88	1.05	0.85	-1.14	0.27
treat. 2	0.93	0.78	0.81	0.68	1.00	0.33
treat. 3	1.17	0.91	0.94	0.79	1.44	0.16
treat. 4	0.45**	0.62	0.76**	0.61	-2.55	0.02

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

Table 2: Running Tally of Illegal Immigration Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1*	0.82	1.42*	0.77	-1.71	0.10
treat. 2	1.13***	0.63	1.60***	0.67	-3.29	0.00
treat. 3	0.97***	0.71	1.59***	0.68	-5.40	0.00
treat. 4	0.83***	0.85	1.36***	0.87	-3.17	0.00

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

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[51] The paired t-tests for general knowledge questions did not show any significant difference for treatments 1, 2, and 3, meaning that respondents in these groups answered general knowledge questions equally as well in pre- and post-surveys. Treatment 4 was closer to the .1 level of significance (.15). However, it was in the wrong direction – respondents got fewer general knowledge questions correct on the post-survey.

[52] The paired t-tests for global warming questions did not show any significant difference for any treatments.

Table 3: Running Tally of Subject Knowledge Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	3.21***	1.81	4***	1.67	-2.91	0.01
treat. 2	4	1.17	3.92	1.23	0.34	0.74
treat. 3	3.75	1.18	4.08	1.56	-1.50	0.14
treat. 4	2.94***	1.29	3.69***	1.49	-3.41	0.00

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table 4: Running Tally of All Knowledge Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	6.47***	2.48	7.47***	2.62	-3.01	0.01
treat. 2	7.86	2.47	7.82	2.22	0.11	0.91
treat. 3	7.31	2.59	7.66	2.80	-1.20	0.24
treat. 4	6.63*	2.11	7.13*	2.73	-1.78	0.08

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

The most ideal result is seen in Table 2 – questions about illegal immigration. In all cases, respondents answered questions about illegal immigration more correctly on the post-survey than the pre-survey, no doubt due to the effect of watching the video presentation about illegal immigration. However, treatments 2 - 4 were significant at the .01 level, whereas treatment 1 was only significant at the .1 level. Thus, this result most conforms to the ideal pattern for paired t-tests described above. Tables 1, 3, and 4 conform less to this pattern, but all show significant results for treatment 4 and occasionally treatment 1. As will be elaborated in the discussion section below, in the case of treatment 4, this frequent significance may have something to do with the classroom-like atmosphere of the discussion section.

The second method for assessing deliberation's effect on knowledge was a specific look at the number of blank and/or "don't know" answers. Subjects were given a

1 for every blank or don't know answer and a score of 0 if they answered the question (regardless of whether or not they got the answer correct). Like above, everyone was assigned six running tallies on the pre- and post-surveys to measure this tendency. If deliberation assists information gathering, we would expect the subjects in treatments 2-4 to skip fewer questions. Also like above, a paired t-test for each treatment was conducted to determine whether the groups significantly differed on this characteristic or not from pre- to post-test.

The paired t-tests for the "don't know" analysis produced about the same number of significant results as the knowledge running tallies above. However, the results that were significant conformed to the ideal pattern more often. On three measures (illegal immigration, subject knowledge, and all knowledge questions), the ideal pattern was definitely evident. On the three other measures (general, terrorism, global warming), this pattern was absent.[53]

Table 5: Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on Illegal Immigration Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.9	0.91	0.6	0.75	1.67	0.11
treat. 2	0.81**	0.83	0.48**	0.57	2.27	0.03
treat. 3	0.67*	0.84	0.41*	0.59	1.96	0.06
treat. 4	0.84***	0.80	0.46***	0.87	3.19	0.00

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

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[53] In all three of these cases, none of the treatment conditions achieved a significant result. This means that respondents typically left similar numbers of blank or don't know answers on the pre- and post-surveys. There was no apparent pattern to the group means, although in most treatments, respondents did leave fewer blanks on the post-survey.

Table 6: Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on Debate Subject Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.5	2.24	0.75	1.02	1.48	0.16
treat. 2	1.03*	1.08	0.74*	0.82	1.96	0.06
treat. 3	0.95*	1.23	0.67*	1.06	1.72	0.09
treat. 4	1.14***	1.08	0.73***	1.10	3.24	0.00

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 7: Number of "Don't Know" or Blank Answers on All Knowledge Questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.5	2.24	0.85	1.09	1.25	0.23
treat. 2	1.23	1.41	1.19	1.49	0.15	0.88
treat. 3	0.97*	1.25	0.67*	1.06	1.87	0.07
treat. 4	1.19***	1.17	0.73***	1.10	3.22	0.00

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Tables 5 – 7 all exhibit the ideal pattern for paired t-tests. In none of the above instances is treatment 1 significant at even the .1 level, whereas treatments 3 and 4 are significant in all three cases, with treatment 4 often being highly significant. Again, it seems like the "classroom effect" not only provided better knowledge to respondents in treatment 4, but also made them more confident in their answers. As expected, treatment 2 varied between being significant in some instances and not in others. Additionally, the means are also in the right direction, with respondents in treatments 2, 3, and 4 leaving less blank or don't know answers on the post-survey.

Creativity

The measurements for creativity in this study are very basic, but they imply a more sophisticated measurement for subsequent studies. In this study, creativity is first measured by asking a question on the post-survey about how many solutions a student can come up with in regards to the political problems being discussed. Presumably, students in the deliberation treatments will have had time and practice bouncing solutions off of each other and will be able to do more than simply parrot back solutions outlined by the video presentation. Students in the control group and watcher group were given periods of time in which they could discuss whatever they wanted. However, most did not talk about the subject matter, and as such, when asked for potential solutions for terrorism or global warming, they will most likely repeat what they saw in the video or read in the pamphlets. Since this method does not involve comparing pre- and post-survey results, it will be analyzed using an ANOVA test.

All three deliberation topics (terrorism, global warming, illegal immigration) produced the ideal pattern for ANOVA results. Namely, respondents in treatments 3, 4, and sometimes 2, were always able to produce more solutions to political problems after the experiment than respondents in treatment 1. As explained above, only unique solutions that the respondent can claim partial credit in formulating were coded. Respondents who merely parroted back policy solutions featured in the video were not coded as having come up with creative solutions.

The below three measurements all conform to the ideal pattern for ANOVA results. Not only are the means between treatments significantly different, as indicated by the F-statistic, but they are also significant in the right direction, as indicated by the graphs. Namely, in all cases, subjects in treatments 3 and 4 (and occasionally 2) come up with more unique political solutions than subjects who only watch the initial video presentation. As will be discussed below, these results, while positive, should be taken with a grain of salt, because it is difficult to disentangle what might really just be more *exposure* to information about the deliberation topics, as opposed to the effects of deliberation, itself.

Figure 1: Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Terrorism



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*F-statistic: 4.57 Sig.: .005

Figure 2: Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Global Warming



* F-statistic: 8.39 Sig.: .000

Figure 3: Respondent Creativity - Solutions for Illegal Immigration



* F-statistic: 3.20 Sig.: .026

The second method involved measuring how many ideas a subject generated for a political problem in a follow-up interview, one to two months later.[54] Each respondent

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[54] The above measures have some serious limitations, and should be considered primarily as a preliminary inquiry into the question of deliberation's effect on creativity. One of the problems with the aforementioned measurement may center around the post-survey question asking the respondent to *self-report* ideas for ownership. Subjects may incorrectly remember their roles in the group discussion or may wish to avoid appearing foolish. Either case may cause a subject to inflate the number of ideas that he had a hand in actually generating. Conversely, the fact the post-survey question is asked at the end of a lengthy experiment might be depressed due to a fatigue effect. For instance, even if subjects had generated many useful and interesting ideas, they might be anxious to finish the post-survey after five hours of experimentation. Either problem, if persistent, skews the interpretation of this measure.

One fix to this difficulty might be to use content analysis to examine the actual deliberations, themselves. Such a method is outside the time and expense limitations of this project. However, all was only asked to generate solutions for one of the deliberation subjects, which was randomized. As with the above creativity measure, respondents who merely recalled solutions offered by the experimental materials were not coded as having come up with their own solutions. The key advantage of this procedure is that the time-lag between experiment and post-interview should decrease the amount of simply repeating the viewpoints expressed in the video, as will no doubt happen in the method above. The key disadvantage of this procedure (which also applies to other uses of the follow-up interview described below) is that the response rate was low – only 24% (30 responses). Thus, conclusions drawn from the follow-up interview should be taken as provisional, at best. Theoretically, if deliberation affects an individual's lasting ability to generate creative solutions to political dilemmas, then we would expect the individuals in the treatment groups to generate at least a few ideas after their treatment, and the control group to have less unique ideas. These responses were analyzed using an ANOVA test.

The result does not conform to the ideal pattern, because it is not significant at the .1 level. However, the results are in the right direction, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, respondents from treatments 3 and 4 were able to come up with more solutions to political solutions months later, although not significantly so. A basic conclusion that can be drawn from this is that whatever effects deliberation may have on creativity most likely degrade over time.

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discussion and break periods were recorded and/or monitored. Thus, future analyses may use the discussions, themselves, to analyze whether or not the experimental group influenced the overall group creativity. In this analysis, the unit of analysis would shift from individuals to the group, because it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to match speech to specific respondents in an audio recording. In this case, I would compare the number of solutions suggested by the control group to the number of solutions suggested by the treatment groups.

Figure 4: Respondent Creativity – Solutions to a Political Problem in the Follow-up Interview



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* F-statistic: .88 Sig.: .464

Political sophistication

Political sophistication has been measured in a variety of ways in the literature. Some equate it principally with having a constrained or consistent political belief system, whereas others try to take into account the other aspects of someone's personal belief system – such as size and range. Some studies use political ideology as a way to measure political sophistication; other studies claim that ideology can/should be transcended for effective measurement (Luskin 1987: 860 - 862). Despite different methodologies having their own advantages, I have chosen to measure political sophistication in a similar way to Gastil and Dillard in their 1999 field experiment. Gastil and Dillard characterize political sophistication mainly as when a person has high schematic consistency about issues on a liberal/conservative dimension (Gastil and Dillard 1999: 4). My choice to imitate their basic definition of political sophistication is a sensible course of action because the structure of their deliberative forum, their project goals and their philosophic orientation is similar to mine. In other words, my subjects are primarily being measured along the dimension of constraint, or how consistent their responses are with their self-reported ideology.

In both the Gastil and Dillard study and this one, subjects are given a personal ideology score based on how they self-report their ideology. My scoring system relied on four questions about partisanship, ideology, and opinions on recent political candidates that produced a 5-point composite ideology score from extreme liberal (1) to extreme conservative (5). This composite measure attempts to get a fuller picture than simply asking people to rank themselves on a liberal/conservative scale, which many people are either misinformed about or represent themselves as more centrist than they actually are. I operated under the assumption that while it was fully possible for people to have changed their stances on specific issues from pre- to post-survey, that no one is likely to have fundamentally switched from liberal to conservative over the course of the experiment, or vice-versa. Hence, each subject's personal ideology score applied to both surveys.

In a similar fashion to the measurement described above, nine questions on the pre- and post-survey were tagged as "political sophistication questions," in that they essentially present three or more ideologically different solutions to a problem and asked the respondent to select one. Some of these questions solely tested political sophistication; others doubled as questions that tested other variables, such as moral development. The responses for each of these questions were assigned an ordinal value from 1 to 5, based on whether or not each represented an extreme liberal, moderate liberal, centrist, moderate conservative, or extreme conservative viewpoint to a reasonable observer.[55]

Occasionally, some of these assigned rankings may be contestable. For instance, should a question response that advocates increased funding for homeland security as a way to fight terrorism receive a 2, 3, or 4? Although some grey area may exist as to the appropriate rank for a given response, most responses were usually placed alongside other options that could be commonly regarded as more liberal or more conservative by an informed observer. In the above case, the other options are addressing the root causes of terrorism (which is typically a more liberal response) and retaliating against the terrorists (a response often favored by conservatives). Thus, while the exact scores that question responses receive represents a judgment call on my part, they can often be rank-ordered relatively intuitively. In the above answer, root causes received a 1, homeland security a 3, and retaliation a 5.

A politically sophisticated person should frequently pick answers that are consistent with his or her self-reported ideology. Thus, we would expect someone with a personal ideology score of 2 to pick responses that are also ranked 2, when given that option, or else to pick options close to it (1 or 3) for other questions. Because a case or two of inconsistency should not imply that someone is a political simpleton, the difference between what one should answer (due to their political sophistication score) and what they did answer, was be calculated into a running tally which used the following equation:

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[55] For a break-down of how responses are ranked, please see Appendix A.

$| \text{PIS} - \text{Res}_X | + |\text{PIS} - \text{Res}_{X2}| + \ldots + |\text{PIS} - \text{Res}_{X9}| =$ political sophistication score[56]

One political sophistication score was recorded for each subject for both the pre- and the post-survey. Low scores indicated that respondents consistently selected the answer that closely matched their self-identified political ideology, whereas high scores indicated that respondents often selected answers that were opposed to their political ideology. The hypothetical scores range from 0 for a person with perfectly constrained ideology to a 36 for someone self-identifying as an extreme liberal or conservative, but picking the exact opposite answer on all nine political sophistication questions. These two scores were analyzed with a paired t-test to see if any of the treatments had a significant effect on the respondents' political sophistication – or how constrained their political ideology was.

Table 8: Paired t-test results for political sophistication

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	9.28***	3.14	10.78***	2.7	-2.76	0.01
treat. 2	11.13	4.40	11.25	4.32	-0.30	0.77
treat. 3	11.76	3.58	11.70	3.34	0.14	0.89
treat. 4	10.98	4.27	11.55	3.95	-1.02	0.31

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

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[56] PIS = Personal ideology score. This stayed the same for every question on both pre and post-surveys. Res = their ordinally ranked response for any given question.

The results of the analysis were not significant, with the strange exception of treatment 1, in which respondents became less constrained after going through the experiment. Since only one measurement was made for political sophistication, a table with results is presented below, despite lack of significance.

Self-interest awareness

Self-interest awareness was a difficult attribute to measure for a few of reasons. First, the discussion topics were selected because they were accessible and interesting to most people; they were likely to generate good and memorable deliberation. However, because of the national scope of these issues, they were also things that many consider to only remotely affect their lives.[57] As such, even a spirited session of deliberation might have a difficult time convincing UWSP students to see the connections between their lives and the war on terror. No doubt, deliberations held in other locations might show more of an effect for this variable, because the immediate context is capable of making some issues more salient. The second drawback is that this self-interest awareness was self-reported in an open-ended question, which made coding and categorization difficult. People are often misinformed or uncritical of what their self-interest might be. Likewise, self-interest about either long-term or non-material needs similarly plagues studies that attempt to quantify this variable (Sears et. al. 1980: 671). Thus, it was nearly impossible to judge the *content* of these responses – for instance, to say that a lower income respondent *should* be against immigration reform because guest workers might take his future job. Instead, issue saliency eventually became a substitute measure for self-interest awareness.

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[57] This is triply compounded for a group of students living in small-town Wisconsin. Because of its small size and remote location, very few believe that Stevens Point is likely to be attacked by terrorists. Additionally, the Mexican border is thousands of miles away and Stevens Point is relatively homogenous; thus, immigration issues do not seem as pressing. Finally, a particularly cold winter has no doubt lessened the urgency of global warming in the minds of many Wisconsinites.

With these drawbacks in mind, self-interest awareness was measured with three open-ended questions that were the same on both pre- and post-survey. These questions asked the respondent to briefly describe whether or not they had a personal stake in the three deliberation topics and then to explain why or why not. An identical question was asked on the post-survey. Respondents were ranked along an ordinal scale from 0 - 2, depending on the coder's interpretation of how much personal stake they felt they had in the issue. Thus, a rating of 0 meant that the subject reported no connection to the issue. A rating of 1 indicated the respondent felt a partial connection to the issue.[58] A rating of 2 indicated that they felt a deep involvement in the issue. Either it has affected them or someone they love, personally, or they saw a direct connection between how decisions made in this issue affected their daily, current circumstances. While deliberation might change the quality and content of people's beliefs about their personal stakes in these issues, it may be beyond the capacity of this experiment to measure that. As such, the hypotheses would predict that deliberation makes issues more salient to individuals because discussion of an issue can point out unexplored connections between the deliberator's life and an issue. Thus, treatments 3, 4, and 2 (to a lesser extent) were predicted to feel that these issues are more relevant to their lives than treatment 1.

Granted, measuring personal saliency is an imperfect way to assess self-interest awareness, especially as it was outlined in chapters 2 and 3. For instance, deliberative democrats discuss self interest in very ideal terms – such as Mansbridge's contention that deliberation's dual purpose is to help you understand yourself so you can understand your relationship to the greater good (Mansbridge 2003: 173). This is not entirely synonymous with seeing a personal stake in an issue. For instance, you may not actually be affected by the repeal of the estate tax if you are part of the bottom 98% of wage earners in this country. Nevertheless, you may incorrectly perceive a personal stake in the issue if campaign rhetoric has convinced you that the government is about to foreclose on your half-acre family farm because of the dreaded "death tax." Thus, we can think of cases in which there really should be no self-interest, and perception of personal stake would be a poor indicator of self-interest. The discrepancy can also work in reverse – most people should be more aware and feel some self-interest in the fact that increasingly fewer corporations have come to own a larger share of the media over time. And yet, this is an issue that is not on the radar of most people – they do not feel much personal stake in it at all.

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[58] An example would be respondents who replied that terrorism affects their lives because USA PATRIOT Act restrictions may curtail their civil liberties in the future.

So why use personal stake as a substitute measure for self-interest awareness? A weaker (but realistic) defense is that self-interest is a harder concept to concretely define and measure. After all, does the respondent or the researcher define what is in a given subject's self-interest? In the case of the former, they may be misinformed about their own self-interest; they may not know what's best for them. The latter presents a whole host of methodological issues – chief of which is: who can objectively say what *should* be in the self-interest of someone else? Personal stake is a more direct measurement. It may (and often does) correspond to self-interest, but it does not have to. Thus, measuring personal stake is more about someone's personal priorities rather than what's *actually* in their best interest. Thus the tricky issues of respondent misinformation or researcher bias are largely bypassed in favor of the substitute measure.

However, there is a stronger justification for using personal stake instead of self-interest awareness. Namely, recent studies in political psychology show that the level of personal stake that people feel for an issue directly influences both their awareness of the issue and their perception of how much their self-interest is benefited/harmed.[59] David Boninger et. al. claim that when people feel a large personal stake in an issue, they seek out more information on the issue. In and of itself, the above finding is not too surprising. However, they further conclude that sought-out information for high salience issues tends to be more elaborate, remembered easier, and stored in more cognitively complex fashions (Boninger et. al. 1995: 61). Hence, it can be shown that people are more aware, on a variety of levels, of issues in which they feel they have a personal stake. In the same study, Boninger et. al. asked subjects to rank how important a list of current issues were to them. They then performed a content analysis to see what prior orientations may have influenced the sense of personal stake in an issue. The content analysis revealed that 63% of responses were phrased in terms of self-interest rather than group identification or how an issue coheres with a personal set of values (Ibid: 65). In short, people typically view issues as salient or not for reasons of self-interest (e.g. “This issue will/will not affect me.”), instead of how it affects a group they belong to or how it meshes with their personal value system. In another experiment, Darke and Chaiken illustrate that a hypothetical comprehensive test for psychology undergrads that was supposed to take place soon was judged to have higher personal costs than the same test proposed for a later time (Darke and Chaiken 2005: 868). As above, more proximate and salient issues were judged to be more harmful to their self-interest. Thus, in light of these studies, personal stake is not just a more basic measure than self-interest awareness, but it is also related enough that we can assume self-interest (i.e. the direct costs/benefits) for high salience issues can be seen more clearly.

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[59] Most studies referenced used the term “personal relevance” instead of “personal stake.” However, for the purposes of my experiment, the terms are synonymous, hence, the conclusions are relevant.

Table 9: Personal Stake in Terrorism

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.83	0.86	0.67	0.84	0.83	0.42
treat. 2	1	0.89	0.90	0.77	0.55	0.59
treat. 3	1.09*	0.89	0.78*	0.91	1.90	0.07
treat. 4	0.81	0.87	0.87	0.85	-0.40	0.69

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 10: Personal Stake in Global Warming

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.29	0.59	0.17	0.53	1.46	0.16
treat. 2	0.34**	0.67	0.10**	0.31	1.76	0.09
treat. 3	0.58	0.79	0.48	0.71	0.90	0.37
treat. 4	0.44	0.72	0.5	0.72	-0.53	0.60

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 11: Personal Stake in Illegal Immigration

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1	0.96	1.07	0.92	-0.27	0.79
treat. 2	1.11	0.92	1	0.90	0.72	0.48
treat. 3	1.23*	0.88	0.90*	0.91	1.90	0.07
treat. 4	1	0.90	1.21	0.86	-1.27	0.21

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

The results to the paired t-tests only partially conformed to the ideal pattern, but in the opposite direction than expected. Namely, for each of the deliberation subjects, one treatment's post-survey mean was significantly *less* than its pre-survey mean. As discussed in more detail below, this might mean that deliberation has the opposite effect as predicted above—discussion might distance people from issues that they are worried about unnecessarily. However, even this conclusion is tentative because of the lack of significance.

Tolerance

Tolerance was measured in two different ways. One method assessed the subjects' tolerance for different or opposing groups in general. These questions were asked on both the pre- and post-survey to assess whether or not deliberation made the respondents more tolerant in a generalized sense. The questions also assessed whether or not deliberation with individuals of different backgrounds and viewpoints could cause one to reassess views about tolerance as a concept. The second method involved asking a few questions about tolerance in regard to the subject's specific experimental group, in order to see whether or not each individual's deliberative experience made them more tolerant and/or made them feel as if their views were tolerated by people unlike them.

In the first method, I assigned each subject a general tolerance score for each of five questions about non-specific tolerance on the pre- and post-surveys.[60] These scores were then compared through use of a paired t-test for each treatment, in order to determine whether or not individual treatments were likely to produce individuals who were more tolerant, in general. Because all groups were randomly assigned, there was bound to be a few people in each group who had their tolerance tested by people holding radically different views from theirs. If deliberation is beneficial to tolerance, then we would expect scores for the deliberating groups should be higher.

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[60] The five general tolerance questions ask: 1) the respondent's general views on the role of tolerance, 2) whether they are tolerant of views they disagree with, 3) whether others who disagree with them are tolerant of their views, 4) whether they find people they disagree with to be reasonable, 5) whether people who disagree with them find them to be reasonable.

Table 12: Respondents' Toleration of Disagreeable People

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.32	0.67	1.42	0.61	-1.46	0.16
treat. 2	1.35	0.66	1.48	0.51	-1.28	0.21
treat. 3	1.31*	0.73	1.49*	0.56	-1.74	0.09
treat. 4	1.35	0.63	1.38	0.59	-0.24	0.81

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 13: Respondents Being Tolerated by People Who Disagree with Them

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.17*	0.38	1.44*	0.51	-1.76	0.10
treat. 2	1.16	0.37	1.13	0.34	0.37	0.71
treat. 3	1.09***	0.29	1.41***	0.61	-2.76	0.01
treat. 4	1.06**	0.34	1.26**	0.44	-2.23	0.03

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Paired t-tests partially conformed to the ideal pattern in two measures (respondents' tolerance of others, respondents being tolerated by others) and did not conform to this pattern in the other three measures.[61] In both cases of the former, respondents in significant treatments were also significant in the right direction – which means that they had higher means for tolerance questions on the post-survey. In particular, treatment 3 was significantly more tolerant after the experiment in both cases, which gives preliminary evidence against the criticism that deliberation in an informal atmosphere might produce the opposite of tolerance – hardened partisans annoyed after having confronted "the enemy."

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[61] None of the treatments were significantly different from pre- to post-survey for questions pertaining to general views on tolerance, how reasonable the respondent views people she disagrees with, or how reasonable the respondent is viewed by others.

Figure 5: Respondent Views on Reasonableness of Experimental Group



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*F-statistic: .069 Sig.: .976

Figure 6: Respondent Views on Tolerability of Experimental Group



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*F-statistic: .522 Sig.: .668

The second method involved a few specific questions about tolerance as applied to the subject's experimental group. These questions were unique to the post-survey and assessed both the subject's tolerance level towards her group members, as well as how tolerant she perceived them to be of her attitudes. The rationale and expectations for this method were similar to the method above – non-deliberating groups should not think much of tolerating their group members because they were never really put in a position where they had to. Alternately, because treatments 3 and 4 involved lots of discussion, there were many more opportunities to tolerate opposing views. Unlike the method above, there was no before and after comparison score for this method. Instead, an ANOVA test was used to assess the effect of treatment group on tolerance questions about the experimental group experience, under the expectation that treatment groups were likely to show higher levels of tolerance in the post-survey than control groups.

Neither ANOVA test showed significant differences between the treatments. However, the results are interesting for two reasons. First, despite the fact that means for tolerance between groups were not very different, they were often tolerant in the predicted direction, with treatments 2, 3, and 4 believing their fellow subjects more reasonable or tolerable than the respondents in treatment 1. Second, treatment 3 is more tolerant than treatment 4 in one case, as predicted. However, because the F-statistics were so low, these results should be interpreted cautiously. Either deliberation does not really have much of an effect on tolerance towards specific people, or a larger sample is needed to tell, for sure.

Moral Development

Whether or not the subjects' moral stances developed in line with communal stances on the same issue was measured in two different ways. Both methods attempted to test for some type of a convergence of opinion on "morality" questions in the pre- and post-survey. The first method tested convergence of opinion within the discussion group itself. The idea was to see whether or not discussion rendered individual opinions more in line with the group consensus. The second method tested convergence of opinion to a wider communal stance on the issue. Namely, some of the pre- and post-survey questions were from public opinion polls and thus, could be compared (in an imperfect fashion) to what the public values.

Like the self-interest awareness measure, the moral development measure substituted a necessary proxy measure from what was discussed in earlier chapters – which essentially boils down to assessing level of group consensus. In chapter 2, moral development was described as being about one or more of the following: learning about your own values, finding agreement on universal values, finding agreement on more temporary group moral values, and reconciling personal and communal morality in order to satisfy both personal preferences and the common good. All of the measurements below focused on one aspect of the above description—deliberation's ability to find agreement on temporary group moral values—i.e. group consensus.

Granted, this leaves out quite a lot of interest in regards to deliberation's effect on the other aspects of moral development. For the most part, I made this choice for methodological reasons. Morality is hard to quantify in the sense that I could not assign an ordinal scale to various moral choices, which labels one choice "more moral" than the others. Likewise, I could attempt to measure moral development as some psychologists and sociologists like Lawrence Kohlberg do, in which I chart "stages" of moral development. This would be problematic for two reasons. First, these moral classification schemes are hardly above debate; there is no guarantee that the stages that Kohlberg or others describe actually correspond to how individuals develop their moral sensibilities. Second, even if there was one conceptualization of moral development that was universally accepted, I would not expect any of my subjects to "evolve" to a higher plane of moral reasoning over the course of a four hour experiment. To actually access the role of deliberation on moral development, as described, would involve multiple sessions and repeated measurements.

Consensus on moral issues, however, is easier to measure. In doing so, I leave aside a host of thorny issues as to how to code a moral response or changes in morality from one point in time to another. However, this sacrifice may leave me open to the criticism of engaging in a drunkard's search – fumbling for my car keys in the lighted area, even though I likely dropped them elsewhere. I am not entirely concerned with this criticism because I am admitting the drawbacks about my choice to use group consensus as a proxy measure for moral development. Given that there have been very few empirical studies of deliberative benefits, and almost no studies on what I have labeled civic benefits (of which moral development is an example), flaws in my conceptual definition may lead to more accurate or all-encompassing ways to measure the larger concept for future studies.

The first method for measuring moral development began by calculating a group average on each of seven morality questions for each experimental treatment. For instance, the group members of a hypothetical group may have had many different views about the morality of holding terrorist suspects as enemy combatants without the same legal protections that Americans enjoy, with some answering that this practice is always justified, which would receive scores of 5, others answering that this practice is sometimes justified, which would receive scores of 3, etc. These morality questions were typically coded along an ordinal scale, which allowed me to produce an "average" group score for any given morality question.[62] In the above case, the average might be 2.9.

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[62] As mentioned above, there is a bit of overlap between questions which are being used for the political sophistication measure and questions that are being used for the moral development measure. All morality

Since the morality questions are the same on the pre- and post-survey, these averages will be computed for both surveys, with the assumption that both individual scores and group means might shift at least slightly after the experiment. Each person is then assigned an "experiment group moral development score" for each morality question that is calculated as follows:

$| GA_{Pre} – Ind_{Pre} | - | GA_{Post} – Ind_{Post} |$ = experiment group moral development score for Question X[63]

If deliberation caused opinions on moral questions to converge, we would expect that being placed in an experimental group over a control group would yield a higher (and positive) experiment group moral development score for each subject. The higher the score, the more powerful of an effect the treatment has had. A score close to zero indicated that the group had a negligible effect. The positive score meant that the treatment has moved group opinion in the "right" direction (i.e. towards the group mean opinion), whereas a negative score implied the reverse – for some reason, the subject had moved away from the moral mainstream of his experimental group. These scores were then analyzed with an ANOVA test, which indicated whether or not different treatments caused subjects to bring their views more in line with the group.

None of the measures conformed to the ideal pattern of significance and direction for the corresponding ANOVA test. Instead, on two questions (giving terrorist suspects legal rights and whether illegal immigration should be a felony), the ANOVA results

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questions are also political sophistication questions (although not all political sophistication questions are morality questions). Thus, the responses assessed for the moral development measure use the same coding for responses assessed for the political sophistication measure.

[63] GA = the group average for a morality question on either the pre-survey or the post-survey; Ind = individual score on either the pre-survey or the post-survey

were insignificant, but in the predicted direction (Figures 7 and 8). Alternately, on one question (trade-offs between economy or greenhouse gas reduction), ANOVA results were significant, but in the opposite direction as predicted (Figure 9). In the other four questions, results were neither significant nor in the predicted direction.[64]

Figure 7: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Terrorist Suspect Legal Rights



*F-statistic: 1.196 Sig.: .315

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[64] The four questions that were neither significant nor in the predicted direction were questions about : the trade-off between civil liberties and security, electronic surveillance of terrorist suspects, whether global warming should be interpreted as a moral dilemma, and if illegal immigrants generally help or hurt the communities that they live in.

Figure 8: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Illegal Immigration Being a Felony



*F-statistic: .726 Sig.: .539

Figure 9: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



*F-statistic: 2.934 Sig.: .037

The second method involved a similar question and a slightly altered technique. Can deliberation bring people more in line with the wider community's standards about a moral issue? This method essentially involved comparing group averages to public opinion poll results on similarly worded questions.[65] Three of these questions appear on the surveys, one for each of the deliberation topics. Unlike the method above, the average that individuals were comparing themselves against (from public opinion polls) was fixed. For instance, if the general public's average for the aforementioned enemy combatant question was 3.2, then this number was compared to both pre- and post-survey scores of the experimental subject. Each subject was assigned a "societal moral development score" for each question. The purpose was to measure how much the treatment moved him towards a wider moral sense. The equation below sums up the comparison:

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[65] When the question is asked often in public opinion polls, I took the version asked closest to the date of the experiment as a reference point. In some cases, this involved comparing an experimental group's response to a question that has not been asked in a few years. Although this is an admittedly imperfect comparison, I operated under the following assumption: if the media has not followed up with a new version of the question in recent years, it probably means that no new events have caused the event to

$$| SA - Ind_{Pre} | - | SA - Ind_{Post} | = \text{societal moral development score}$$ [66]

As with the first method, if deliberation brought the subjects' moral sensibilities in line with wider community standards, we would expect positive high scores in treatment groups and low or even negative scores for the control group. Again, ANOVA was used to compare means between treatments, under the assumption that some types of deliberation might be more adept at cultivating this measure than others. None of these questions conformed to the ideal pattern for ANOVA tests in that results were not significant and also not in the predicted direction.[67]

Affection

Affection was measured in three different ways, two of which were very similar to the tolerance measurements above. The first method involved general questions about

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become salient in the minds of the public. Thus, public opinion has likely only changed glacially, if at all, for the general public.

[66] SA = the average answer for the public opinion poll; Ind = individual score on either the pre-survey or the post-survey

[67] These questions were on the following subjects: 1) the trade-off between civil liberties and security, 2) the trade-off between economic growth and reduction of greenhouse gases, and 3) whether or not illegal immigrants help or hurt communities that they move to.

the respondent "liking" or being liked by groups that are different from her. These two questions asked about abstract affection, similar to some of the abstract questions about tolerance, above. The general affection questions in this method were the same on both the pre- and post-surveys, and as such, were analyzed using a paired t-test. I expected the control treatment to have basically the same feelings towards negatively perceived groups after the experiment. In contrast, if deliberation enhanced or produced affection, the members of both the informal and formal deliberation groups were expected to view formerly negatively-conceived groups in a more positive light.[68] The theory behind this is that exposure to different people in a deliberative setting might cause individuals to reassess groups they have neutral or negative feelings towards, in general. After performing paired t-tests, neither measurement produced the ideal pattern for paired t-tests. Namely, none of the treatment groups were significant, and there was no predictable pattern to the compared means.[69]

Neither the second nor the third methods compare respondent answers from pre- to post-survey. The second method involves questions found only on the post-survey that ask respondents to weigh their affection for the other members of their specific discussion group. There is no before-group comparison to be made because the groups were randomly assigned and most subjects knew very few of their group members in advance. Thus, this measurement was a simple comparison of means between treatments of post-survey questions about specific group affection, using ANOVA. As with the above measure, discussion groups might provide the interaction needed to generate affection for the group. As such, treatments 1 and 2 were expected to give relatively neutral answers for these questions, and treatments 3 and 4 were expected to give their group higher scores.

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[68] The watcher group was in a nebulous grey area for this measurement. This group was hypothesized to be similar to the control group, because they did not encounter anyone from negatively perceived groups over the course of the experiment that would have changed their mind about how affectionate they are, in general. However, the watcher group saw a video featuring informal deliberation that the control group had not seen. Thus, they might have seen a group of very different individuals getting along and having a great discussion. Some people in the group might seem very similar to them and others might not. As such, they could have conceivably become more affectionate towards a group that they have not deliberated with.

[69] These questions asked whether or not the respondents typically like people of their own age group and/or whether or not they typically like people who have different political views as them.

Figure 10: How Positively Respondents Rated Their Fellow Subjects



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*F-statistic: 5.99 Sig.: .001

Figure 11: Likelihood of Subjects Keeping in Touch with Others from Experiment



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*F-statistic: 4.265 Sig.: .004

Figure 12: How Likeable Respondents Rated Their Fellow Subjects



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*F-statistic: .518 Sig.: .671

These ANOVA results were much more in line with the ideal pattern than the results of the first method. Two questions (positive evaluation of other experimental subjects and how likely they are to keep in touch with other deliberators) definitely conformed to the ideal pattern in that there were significant differences between group means and the relationship between these means was in the predicted direction (Figures 10 and 11). The third measurement, how likeable fellow group members were rated, was not significant, but did occur in the predicted direction (Figure 12).

These results can be contrasted to the more generalized questions about affection. Namely, deliberation did not seem to have any effect on vague feelings towards both similar and opposed groups, but it did seem to manifest when asked about specific people that the respondent has deliberated with. The treatment 3 results in Figures 10 and 11 tell an interesting story – informal deliberation seemingly caused a more positive evaluation of others than the formal deliberation group, but not in a long-term sense. Implications behind this will be elaborated in the discussion section.

Figure 13: Respondents Keeping in Touch with New Friends/Acquaintances From Experiment



*F-statistic: 1.529 Sig.: .230

The final method involved a follow-up interview which assesses whether or not respondents continued affiliative links with people after the experiment has concluded. I asked if they kept in touch with anyone from the experiment whom they did not know before. Once again, groups 1 and 2 interacted so little on the day of the experiment that they were expected to part ways without bothering to get to know anyone else there. The chances that subjects made friends or acquaintances were expected to be greater for treatments 3 and 4. This association was measured through ANOVA. The results for this test, depicted in Figure 13, were not significant. However, they were in the predicted direction, with treatments 3 and 4 *actually* having kept in touch with new friends from the experiment more so than treatments 1 and 2. Also in keeping with the results from the second method listed above, the respondents from treatment 3 may have had short term affection for group members, but did not translate into long term friendship.

Participation

Political participation was measured in two ways. The first assessed the participants' general attitudes towards the role and importance of political participation. The second tried to measure whether or not deliberation was likely to make them more politically active, personally. If my hypotheses about deliberation are true, then we would expect the deliberative groups to value participation as an abstract ideal and as a personal goal. Additionally, treatment 3 was predicted to be best at promoting action, regardless of whether or not deliberation had polarizing effects that complicated previous variables. Namely, the unrestrained informal discussion atmosphere might produce a united front – people willing to take action on issues that they care about. Alternately, a polarized group might still be willing to be more active in politics (just not in the same direction), because they've encountered "the enemy" and seek to do something about it.

The first set of questions centered around a group of nine "should" questions that were identical on both the pre- and post-survey. These questions asked the respondents' beliefs on how frequently they *should* engage in the types of activities that civil society scholars lament the loss of: voting, writing letters, attending rallies, working on campaigns, and keeping informed about politics. Not surprisingly, many respondents argued that most of these activities should be done "always" or "frequently" even on the pre-survey. No doubt, this is partially a product of being involved in a political science experiment—they expected that the "right" answer is that participation is good, even if it did not reflect their own personal reality. However, if deliberation can improve people's attitudes on participation, we would expect them to be *even more* highly ranked on the post-survey for the deliberative groups. These before and after scores were analyzed with a paired t-test, under the assumption that deliberative treatments would produce individuals more committed to the idea that political participation is a must.

For some of the measurements above, paired t-tests partially conformed to the ideal pattern in that at least one deliberation treatment (either 3 or 4) showed significant difference between pre- and post-survey scores[70]. However, they violated the ideal pattern in that the results were the opposite of the predicted direction—deliberation seemed to have turned some people off to participation in some treatments. These results are presented in tables below for the four questions about participation that fell into this pattern (following political news, voting in midterm elections, voting in local elections, campaigning for elections – Tables 14 – 17). The other five measures did not conform to the ideal pattern either directionally or in terms of significance.

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[70] These questions asked about participation: 1) writing letters to politicians, 2) attending political rallies, 3) having discussions about politics, 4) voting in presidential elections, and 5) helping to turn out the vote. In all five cases, treatments 3 and 4 were not significant at the .1 level.

Table 14: Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Follow Political News

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.75	0.91	0.7	0.57	0.27	0.79
treat. 2	0.69	0.89	0.76	0.79	-0.47	0.65
treat. 3	0.56*	0.68	0.77*	0.71	-1.75	0.09
treat. 4	0.57	0.69	0.62	0.55	-0.53	0.60

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

Table 15: Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Vote in Midterm Elections

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.2	0.52	0.2	0.41	0.00	1.00
treat. 2	0.10	0.41	0.38	0.94	-1.44	0.16
treat. 3	0.21	0.41	0.31	0.57	-1.16	0.25
treat. 4	0.05*	0.33	0.22*	0.63	-1.78	0.08

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

Table 16: Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Vote in Local Elections

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.15	0.37	0.25	0.44	-1.00	0.33
treat. 2	0.14	0.44	0.34	0.81	-1.24	0.23
treat. 3	0.23**	0.48	0.49**	0.82	-2.24	0.03
treat. 4	0.11	0.46	0.30	0.70	-1.56	0.13

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

Table 17: Participation – Respondents View on Whether People Should Campaign for Politicians

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.1	1.07	1.3	0.98	-1.29	0.21
treat. 2	1.24	1.06	1.41	0.98	-0.96	0.35
treat. 3	1.36	1.01	1.51	1.34	-0.86	0.39
treat. 4	1.05*	1.13	1.32*	0.94	-1.89	0.07

$^{*}p < .1$ $^{**}p < .05$ $^{***}p < .01$

The above results are odd in that they all show significance for one of the deliberation treatments, however not in the predicted direction. In other words, the value of participation degraded in the significant treatments over the course of the experiment.[71] This pattern even holds up for non significant groups – despite their means being relatively similar for pre- and post-surveys, in all cases but one, they valued participation less after the experiment than before. Potential reasons for this are elaborated in the discussion section.

The second method did not contrast a pre-survey question with an identical post-survey question. Rather, it used a follow up interview, conducted one to two months later, to see if deliberation may have contributed to more personal involvement in politics. The topics were the same as the "should" questions listed above. However, some of these topics were irrelevant, because respondents did not have an opportunity to do them since their participation in the experiment. For instance, given that the experiment began on November 18th, 2006, none of them had been able to vote, campaign, or help turn out the vote for a midterm or presidential election. Some of them could have engaged in the other activities, however, such as: voting in the local Stevens Point mayoral primary, attending political rallies or meetings, writing letters to politicians, discussing politics with friends and/or family, and seeking out political information more often than they did before the experiment. The hypotheses predict that the existence and type of deliberation affected whether or not respondents had engaged in these activities since their deliberation session. As with other post-survey only measures, each of these questions was analyzed through use of ANOVA. The results show that none of the measures had a high enough F-statistic to be considered significant and none moved in the predicted direction. No doubt, this is due to the weakness of the follow-up interview as an assessment method, but also to the fact that this was a once-only deliberation session. The potential for repeated deliberation producing greater political participation will be discussed below.

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[71] In these measures, a score of "0" corresponds to the belief that a particular type of participation should "always" be done, whereas a score of "4" corresponds to the belief that a particular type of participation should "never" be done.

Discussion

Increased information

The measurements for increased information conformed to the ideal pattern more often than not. This provides reasonable support for the hypothesis that deliberation influences the information levels of deliberators. In particular, three features of these results bear closer examination: the classroom effect of treatment 4, illegal immigration as the subject with the greatest gain, the interaction between the knowledge measure and the “don’t know” measure. The limitations and caveats of these results will also be considered.

First, not only were deliberative groups often better informed after the experiment, but the formal deliberative groups of treatment 4 often showed the greatest gains. This may be due to the structure of the deliberative session, itself. The discussion atmosphere was formalized, with the moderator in the role of "teacher"—the source of knowledge about issues that the deliberators may or may not already know much about. Indeed, Button and Mattson confirm this possibility—formalized discussion groups produce people who believe that the main point of deliberation is to educate (Button and Mattson 1999: 619 – 620). When subjects arrived at the deliberative session to find seats arranged in rows and the moderator asking pointed questions, they may have quickly shifted into student mode. An interesting follow-up to this study might test formal deliberation with subjects who have either not had much schooling or have been out of school for awhile. Perhaps the educative effects of deliberation are most potent for people who have a lot of practice with assimilating information from oral sources.

A second interesting feature of the knowledge measures was the role of illegal immigration as the subject that showed the most improvements, nearly across the board for all treatments. While the terrorism measure partially conformed to the ideal pattern (and not for the "don't know" measure), illegal immigration was highly significant for many treatments in both measures. This might be due to the fact that UWSP students had much less experience with illegal immigration issues than with the other subjects under discussion. Stevens Point is relatively homogenous, and only deals with assimilation issues in regards to the small Hmong community, very few of whom are here illegally. Additionally, there are no immigration specialists in the UWSP political science department. In contrast, UWSP has a sizable college of natural resources and quite a few social science classes that deal with terrorism – so many students will have learned about global warming or terrorism in a classroom at some point in their college careers. The implication of this finding may be that deliberation is more capable of informing for issues of low exposure than high exposure. A repeat of this experiment in a Texas college, for instance, might show much more modest gains for the illegal immigration measure.

A final feature of the results that bears elaboration is the interaction between the knowledge measure and the “don’t know” measure. The fact that three of the more significant topics were significant across both of these measures is reassuring. After all, if deliberation improved the certainty of responses (lessening “don’t know”), but did not also produce gains in the knowledge measure, then deliberation could be seen as making people more confident about potentially incorrect information. But because both of these measures were significant for the relevant groups at the same time, deliberation seems to have an effect on both the transmission of knowledge and the certainty with which this knowledge is held.

Although the two increased information measures were both very positive for the study, it is important to acknowledge potential shortcomings or drawbacks, should this study be repeated in the future. One possibility is that simply having *exposure* to deliberation topics made respondents more informed, not necessarily *deliberating* about the topics. Hence, we shouldn’t be surprised that treatments 2, 3, and 4 became “smarter” after the experiment because they had more time with the discussion topics. This also raises the thorny possibility of the destructive power of deliberation if used as a forum for false information. That is, if my deliberation sessions had been peppered with false statistics and information, might many subjects have reported incorrect information on the post-survey?

I am not worried about the exposure vs. deliberation effect for two reasons. First, treatments 2 – 4 all got the same length of exposure to the discussion topics. However, treatment 4 showed marked differences in the amount of information being retained, no doubt for the same reasons as discussed above. If exposure to topics was the real reason that the treatment groups did so well, then we would expect treatments 2 and 3 to be as informed as treatment 4. Because the classroom-like setting got the most significant results, we can assume it is not actually length of exposure to information, but the benefits that a certain deliberative atmosphere brings.

Secondly, while the 15-minute video presentations were loaded with accurate information about the deliberation subjects, these videotaped interviews purposely did not contain the correct answers for any of the specific knowledge questions on the post-test. This means that when students correctly answered knowledge questions on the post-survey, they did so because of time spent in deliberation. The deliberation sessions were often widely different from each other and my student employees reported the fact that some people in discussion groups did occasionally advocate false or misinformed ideas, such as claiming a connection between Saddam Hussein and 9/11. And yet, the results show that despite the occasional piece of misinformation, subjects in the deliberation treatments answered knowledge questions more correctly than treatments 1 and 2. If simply having spent more time with a topic made a subject more knowledgeable about it, then I would expect the results to be much more moderate. This is because deliberators were exposed to both true and false information from other deliberators in the sessions, both types of information would make their way onto post-survey responses. Yet, despite the fact that students got good and bad information at these sessions, the results were not meager—subjects seemed to be able to cut through misinformation and effectively answer knowledge questions. This may be due to a mechanism similar to the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. Granted, in the marketplace of ideas, it is not impossible for false or harmful information to take hold. However, participants in an active and deliberating environment may be more likely to spot, question, and counter misinformation when it arises.

Nevertheless, it is proper to test for the possibility that exposure to information is the real determinant of an increase of knowledge, not a deliberative environment. This could be tested in future studies by designing alternate experimental set-ups. For instance, in one experiment, the procedure could be varied by showing one group an hour long movie about a topic versus having a 15-minute movie and 45-minute discussion with a different treatment. If length of exposure is the sole determinant of how informed people are, then the movie-only treatment should have equally significant knowledge scores than the deliberation group. But if deliberation, not length of exposure to a topic, was the real determinant of increased information, we would expect the deliberation group to score better. A second experiment might contain two different videos – one loaded with completely true information and the other loaded with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. Both treatments deliberate after watching the video. Thus, if deliberation irons out the potential falsehoods, we would expect the second treatment to not report all of these falsehoods on the post-test.

Another difficult to explain aspect of the results is why certain other subjects showed little to no gain in knowledge after the experiment. As mentioned above, this issue might have something to do with how exposed people already are to the topics at hand. For issues like terrorism, which many people have a passing knowledge of, more difficult knowledge questions about terrorism may need to be devised to see if deliberation has an effect on even well-known topics. Otherwise, deliberation may have more of an effect on relatively unknown issues.

Creativity

The results for the creativity measures were also somewhat positive for the study. The findings tend to confirm the hypothesis that deliberation about political topics is capable of enabling people to come up with creative solutions to problems. In particular, a feature of the results that bears further examination is the enhanced creativity of treatment 3. As with the knowledge measures above, we should also consider possible words of caution and alternate explanations for the above results.

In all three post-survey creativity measures, treatments 3 and 4 scored higher than treatments 1 and 2. Perhaps more surprising than the overall result is the fact that treatment three did better than treatment four in all versions of the measurement, including the follow-up interview months later. Despite being an educative benefit, which was expected to be the property of treatment 4, it is not too surprising that the informal atmosphere of treatment 3 was more conducive to generating ideas than the structured atmosphere of treatment 4. In many regards, treatment 3 may have resembled a brainstorming session, with respondents taking more risks with their answers, because they were in an environment with equals. While I do not believe I was wrong to categorize creativity as an educative benefit, this may lead to question the assumption that formal deliberation is automatically most conducive to educative benefits. It did not seem to inhibit creativity, but it also was not optimal for it.

Despite the positive results, these creativity measures should be interpreted with caution. As above, having an *opportunity* for creative solutions might have been more responsible for making treatments 3 and 4 creative than deliberation, itself. While subjects in treatments 1 and 2 did have break periods in which they *could* bounce ideas off of each other, very few took this opportunity. An interesting way to test this possibility would be to have given the non-deliberating groups an equivalent amount of time with which they could have organized an informal deliberation on their own terms, which may have been equally or more creative than even the loosely-organized treatment 3. Logistically, this becomes a challenge for control groups—giving them periods of time in which they were *free* to discuss the video, if they choose, but they are not *directed* to was sometimes a painfully awkward experience in the current experiment. Extending this “break-time” to 45 minutes in hopes that they *might* deliberate on their own will produce many unhappy subjects.

Another caveat should be mentioned in regards to the follow-up interview, which will also apply to subsequent uses of the follow-up interview, described below. The creativity measure was in the predicted direction, but was not significant. This means that treatments 1 and 2 might have been equally or more creative than treatments 3 and 4, if more people had been included in the sample. However, the most plausible interpretation is that creativity is likely a short-term benefit of deliberation. If you deliberate about public issues often, you may become a more politically creative individual. But one deliberation session is unlikely to affect this attribute in the long term.

Political sophistication

The measurement for political sophistication was not significant. This does not mean that the results showed a negative effect of deliberation on political sophistication. Rather, the results are inconclusive. Lack of an effect may have been a result of measurement error or something more fundamental to the definition of political sophistication.

On one hand, the inconclusive results may have been due to how the survey was constructed and how the political sophistication questions were worded. As mentioned above, each person's political ideology score was determined by how they self-reported a variety of questions about ideology, party affiliation, and fondness for prominent conservative and liberal political figures. Conceivably, there are two ways to improve this measurement. One method would involve asking fewer, but more detailed questions about ideology. To clear up any potential ambiguities that respondents may have about the labels "liberal" and "conservative," one could instead craft a single survey question that asks respondents to rank themselves along an ideology scale, only after the stereotypical preferences of the above labels have been elaborated. The second method does not rely on respondent self-identification directly. Assuming that many people do not have a clear idea of liberal views versus conservative views, one can instead assess this by asking a bunch of "starter" questions about social issues. These starter questions would be stereotypical "easy issues" of American politics, in which most people have a gut-level reaction to. Based on the respondents' answers to these questions, a more accurate measure might be obtained that does not rely on their ability to distinguish a liberal from a conservative. Future studies which made use of this method would need to make sure that the starter questions do not overlap with the deliberation topics. Perhaps they should also only address social issues and not economic issues, so as to avoid misclassifying people who consider themselves economic liberals but social conservatives (or vice-versa).

However, a more fundamental issue might be that constraint of political beliefs may not be the ideal way to measure political sophistication, in the first place. The liberal-conservative spectrum has become the fallback measure for many studies of political sophistication, but it does not have to be. Deliberative experiments in the future may make use of the criteria that Luskin mentions are usually parts of the definition of political sophistication, but not always a part of measurements of political sophistication—having large and wide-ranging beliefs (Luskin 1987: 860).

Self-interest awareness

The results for the self-interest awareness measure were modest because significance was occasionally established for a given treatment. However, in these cases, the post-survey mean was actually lower than the pre-survey mean, which means that respondents' self-interest in each of these issues declined for significant groups. As discussed above, these results reflect the substitute measure of issue saliency.

A possible explanation for this contrary result may lie in the theorization of the link between deliberation and self-interest awareness. An assumption of deliberative theorists, discussed in chapters 2 and 3, is that deliberation about issues will make people more likely to see where their true interests lie in the issue. This might be the "enlightened self-interest" discussed by Mansfield and Dahl, appropriated from Tocqueville's "self-interest, rightly understood." When designing the variable, my assumption was that exposure to and deliberation about issues would enable people to more ways that these issues impacted their lives. In other words, deliberating about an issue may help people make connections between their own lives and issues previously ignored.

However, the enlightened self-interest described above may not automatically mean that this process of making connections equals issues becoming more salient. It may also signify the reverse (as it seems to have in this experiment)—that an enlightened understanding of your role in relation to an issue actually points out ways in which you are insulated from it. Especially in a media-saturated culture, in which politicians and journalists are often accused of fear-mongering in order to win elections or sell headlines, this seems like a plausible explanation. For example, someone deathly afraid to get on a plane because of 9/11 or afraid to walk to her car in rural Wisconsin because of gory 10 o'clock news stories may *overestimate* her personal stake in these issues. People who don't deliberate about these issues may have a lack of exposure/reflection, which causes them to balloon political problems into monstrous proportions in their own minds. Thus, deliberation may have the ability to put "grand issues" like terrorism or global warming in perspective for ordinary citizens, because you are exposed to the viewpoints of other people with different experiences. These alternate viewpoints can assure you that terrorists are not frequently hijacking planes, nor is the planet going to sizzle into a crisp next year. As a result, the mechanism of self-interest awareness may function similar to what I expected, but in the opposite direction for this sample of subjects. They might more correctly assess their personal stake in these issues as being less salient than previously thought.

One potential way to test this might be to run a similar experiment that examines more local issues, as opposed to national issues. In this case, if deliberation is shown to influence the personal stake that someone feels they have in the issue, then the real distinction might be between the type of issue under discussion, not whether or not deliberation is capable of influencing someone's perception of personal stake.

Tolerance

The results for tolerance were somewhat mixed. On one hand, general indicators of tolerance were often significant, and in the predicted direction, with treatment 3 and 4 being more tolerant than treatments 1 and 2, as well as treatment 3 performing the best for this civic benefit. However, tolerance measurements for specific targets (i.e. fellow group members) were insignificant, which means that deliberation might not necessarily have an effect on a person's tolerance level for the specific individuals that they deliberate with. I will address both of these points below.

Two out of the five general measurements for tolerance were significant in the predicted direction – with either deliberation treatments achieving significance instead of the control treatment or treatment 3, in particular, being highly significant. And while two out of five is not overwhelming, these were the two indicators I was most interested in using to draw a link between tolerance and deliberation. Namely, after deliberation, respondents in the relevant treatments not only felt more tolerant of general viewpoints they disagreed with, but they felt that their views were more likely to be tolerated, as well. The three non-significant general tolerance measurements revolved around respondents' general orientation towards tolerance, as well as how reasonable they perceive and are perceived by people they disagree with. In the case of the former, nearly everyone picked the responses that one should “always be tolerant” or that “tolerance depends on context.” Very few people expressed skepticism about tolerance, which may be too academic of a debate for college undergrads. An improved version of this measurement might include more nuanced choices or topic-specific questions about tolerance which is extended generally. The reasonability measures may not have shown anything because they might have just been a poor proxy measure for tolerance. Believing your opponents to be reasonable is certainly an element of tolerating them, but it is not entirely synonymous, so perhaps this measure is best left alone.

Despite feeling more tolerant in general after the experiment, there was no conclusive evidence that respondents specifically tolerated the views they had come in contact with over the previous four hour deliberation session. To be sure, the ANOVA results are basically in the correct direction, but without very significant scores, it is impossible to tell if subjects tolerated their fellow deliberators more or not. Repeated experiments with a larger sample size would be needed to tell, for sure.

However, assuming there is a discrepancy between deliberation enhancing general tolerance, but not enhancing specific tolerance, a possible explanation abounds. Namely, deliberation might empower a person to become a more democratic individual, which among other things, includes a respect for tolerance. However, there may be a very real disconnect between instilling the virtue of tolerance versus *actually* being asked to tolerate the disagreeable person that you have been conversing with. This does not make deliberators hypocritical – it may be easier to adhere to the general standard than to practice it in specific contexts. One hopes that repeated exposures would lead to cognitive dissonance after awhile –“How can I claim to be a more tolerant individual, but yet I still find myself gritting my teeth whenever that fool talks?" Thus, besides a larger sample size, another potential fix to this dilemma might be to conduct an experiment with multiple deliberations spread out over a longer time period in which people are interacting with the same individuals repeatedly. Measures of tolerance could be taken over the course of this extended experiment to see if specific tolerance for group members steadily increases, steadily decreases, waxes and wanes, or is unaffected by deliberation.

Moral development

The findings for moral development were inconclusive. For the group moral development measures, six out of seven were not significant and the one significant measure was in the opposite direction – deliberation appeared to make individuals less likely to conform to group opinion than treatments which did not deliberate. The three societal moral development measures were also inconclusive.

One possible reason why both types of measures were inconclusive may have to do with the working definition and operationalization of moral development. It may not have been an easy concept to quantify. It may have also been too abstract to be useful in deliberative sessions in which the issue did not come up. For instance, one of the morality questions had to do with the tradeoff between civil liberties and national security against terrorism. If all discussion groups had discussed this specific topic, then we might be in a better position to interpret these results. However, some groups may have addressed this topic and others may not have, which means that the only way deliberation could move someone towards a group consensus would be to give group members an overall impression that the war on terror is too repressive (or not repressive enough), which would then influence their individual and group opinions on the more specific issue of civil liberties. This is too indirect and abstract of a link to make. Thus, future experimenters who want to measure a similar concept might *make sure* that the topics of the moral development questions are discussed for a period of time during deliberation. Of course, this method has its drawbacks. A major shortcoming is that increased researcher control would be disastrous for the relatively spontaneous discussion groups like treatment 3. Is the group truly informal if the facilitator has a list of topics that *must* be discussed? Thus, future experiments might need to only make use of moral development indicators for treatment 4. Alternatively, they could ask about a wide variety of morality questions on the pre and post-surveys, and only assess those questions that actually were discussed in deliberation sessions. This would allow informal treatment 3 groups to also participate.

Not surprisingly, if the experiment group moral development scores were too indirect to produce reliable measures, the societal moral development scores were infinitely more so. Again, the specific topic being measured would have to be brought up in deliberation, and the “accepted” public position (which might not correspond with the “accepted” position amongst college students) would have to be brought into the discussion, before it realistically has a chance to bring people more in line with community norms. Fixes similar to the ones suggested above might improve this measurement. However, an important addition for the societal moral development measure is that treatment groups should also be more representative of the general population. The fact that none of my deliberation groups were representative of the general public was not a major sticking point for most of these measures. However, it is a major shortcoming for this one, because the "mainstream" moral position may not get enough exposure in a non-representative sample.

Affection

A few of the affection measures bore results that were both significant and running in the predicted direction. The correct direction is important in that it provides evidence against a contrary hypothesis – namely that deliberation with other people (some of whom will hold opposite opinions from yours), will promote hostility and bickering. Neither the statistical nor anecdotal evidence from the experiment backs up this opposing view. The affection results contained a few interesting features in that: they were almost the polar opposite of the tolerance results above, and treatment 3 did not always feel more affection for their fellow deliberators than treatment 4.

In direct contrast to the tolerance results, the amount of affection respondents felt for opposed groups in general could not be determined after the experiment. However, respondents did seem to like their fellow deliberators more after the experiment – treatments 2, 3, and 4 all rated their fellow deliberators more positive, more likable, and more likely to be people to keep in touch with than their compliments in treatment 1. Two of these three measures were not only in the predicted direction, but were also significant. Likewise, the follow-up measures, despite exhibiting low levels of significance, also occurred in the predicted direction – treatments 2, 3, and 4 (in that order) *actually did* keep in touch with new friends from the experiment more than the control. So why did deliberation seem to produce general appreciation for tolerance, but a specific application of affection? Part of the reason may be that tolerance and affection are not perfectly overlapping. While one often dislikes things that are not tolerated, liking and tolerance may not have much to do with each other, at all. I do not usually consider having to tolerate the people that I like. After deciding I like them, tolerance does not often enter into the picture, unless they have an odious habit of which I disapprove. But even in this case, tolerating a habit will not usually affect my level of affection for the person. Thus, it should not be too surprising that deliberators liked their fellow group members, but had no real difference in tolerance. On the other side of the issue, deliberation might produce general tolerance but not general affection, because democratic citizenship (especially in pluralistic countries) is often interlaced with tolerance, but rarely promotes affection.

Another interesting discrepancy was the fact that treatment 3 was more affectionate towards their group members in some measures, but less so in others. Granted, treatment 3 typically reported high levels of affection, regardless. But because affection was considered a civic benefit, it was predicted that treatment 3 would typically feel the *most* affection towards fellow group members. In reality, treatment 3 only gave fellow group members more positive evaluations once. They did not rate them as more likeable or more worthy of keeping in touch with, nor did they actually keep in touch with their group members more often. Thus, the informal deliberation group seems to have produced something more akin to respect than affection, while the more formal atmosphere of treatment 4 has produced more affection.

Participation

Like with self-interest awareness, the participation measures were occasionally significant, but in the opposite direction as predicted. Low scores indicated the feeling that a person should “always” do a particular type of activity. Thus, it was surprising to see post-survey treatment means that were typically above the pre-survey means, meaning that various aspects of participation were devalued over the course of the experiment. I have no ready explanation for this other than the fact that subjects may have felt bombarded by calls for political participation, outside the context of the experiment. Then, going through a political experiment in which various courses of action are implied as being good for the ideal situation may have increased frustration. The experiment began directly after the midterm elections and finished before local mayoral primaries. Between these outside influences and a political experiment that pushes across a vision of an ideal citizen, respondents may have felt more turned off about participation after the experiment than before it. However, these discrepant results may also be due to the relatively small sample size. Future studies attempting to examine the link between participation and deliberation may want to hold the experiment at a politically neutral time, as well as utilize a larger sample of subjects.

Additionally, none of the follow-up interview questions indicated much of a difference in terms of how respondents had *actually* participated since their role in the experiment. Again, this was due mostly to the even smaller sample of follow-up respondents—a higher response rate may have produced more interesting or significant results. However, as with the creativity measure, a single session of deliberation may not be good for motivating political participation. It may have short term effects in that people feel empowered to get out there and make a difference, as was reported in Fishkin’s deliberative polls (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003: 18). However, without repeated deliberation, respondents might lose this motivation in the long term. Alternately, a two to three month follow up time may have not been *enough* time for people to begin to participate more. Maybe the respondents didn't have enough time to make good on their ideas about the role of participation. Of course, this raises the tough methodological problems of later follow-ups getting an even lower response rate and the fact that it is harder to trace the effect of the experiment on an action they may take a year later. Despite these methodological issues, the point is valid—my respondents may have not been given enough time to prove they intend to participate in politics.

Conclusion

Not surprisingly, many of the results were mixed. I consider four benefits: increased information, creativity, tolerance, and affection, to have relatively strong links to deliberation (with caveats mentioned above). Self-interest awareness and participation produced interesting, but entirely opposite results. Finally, political sophistication and moral development did not provide conclusive evidence, one way or another. It should not be surprising that the benefits that were hardest to conceptualize and operationalize (except for creativity) tended to be the ones that produced inconclusive results. This emphasizes the need for further methodological rigor in studies involving moral development and political sophistication. Likewise, it is not surprising that the experiment turned up significant but contradictory results for the benefit of self-interest awareness, which is an area that has typically presented theoretical difficulties for deliberative democrats. This may be, in part, because it sounds too much like many of the aggregative conceptions of democracy that deliberativists are trying to distance themselves from. Thus, self-interest awareness may be hard to reconcile with the deliberative project.

The only results that took me by surprise were the participation measurements—the fact that deliberation seemed to turn off many treatment groups to the idea of involving themselves in the political process. Although this may be just a product of small sample size, there may be something else at work here, too. It is fully possible that deliberativists may need to cede a point to the aggregative democrats. Namely, most people may legitimately prefer to take a more passive role in politics than participatory or deliberative democrats would have them take. Certainly, it would be a very tough point for deliberative democrats to cede. After all, deliberation might have all these great effects—it might give people better information, make them more creative, more tolerant and more likable. However, if it does not actually motivate them to get out and *do something* about politics, deliberation becomes a feel good self-improvement mechanism or consumer choice, not necessarily a democratic exercise, which is a harkening back to the likely Aristotlean conception of deliberation (Shiffman 2004: 88, 109). Of course, deliberative democrats might respond that it is only likely to seem that way because people are currently not used to participating and deliberating, so it should not be surprising that modern citizens balk at being asked to do more.

Future studies on the link between deliberation and individual benefits can also make use of altered or improved experimental techniques. For instance, all measurements were derived from pre-surveys, post-surveys, and a follow-up interview. The content of the actual deliberations was not analyzed. A content or discourse analysis on the discussions, themselves, might provide interesting insight into benefits like creativity, tolerance, and moral development. I made a move in this direction by collecting data (audiotapes of treatments 3 and 4), but I did not analyze this data for this project. Tactics like this are often used to great effect, such as Schwab's illustration of how his treatment groups more closely represented Habermas's ideal speech situation in form and content (Schwab 2005: 17 – 18). In future studies, I will search through this deliberation archive to hunt for either pre-established keywords (content analysis) or themes (discourse analysis). For example, if I want to ascertain whether or not civic norms relating to moral development were produced, I could look for examples of "should" language, when one group member calls on another (or himself) to decide an issue in the interest of the "common good."

Additionally, future empirical works on deliberation benefit from both a true control group (as I had, but Fishkin did not), but also a more representative sample (which Fishkin had, but I did not). I have already outlined my arguments for having a full experimental procedure with control group, above. However, the representativeness issue could be important if one wanted to draw larger implications about the effect of deliberation, in general. This became especially relevant for benefits like increased information, in which having a sample entirely composed of college students, who have a lot of recent practice gleaning information from oral sources, might be akin to stacking the deck. Likewise, gathering people from different locales and backgrounds might provide different results for the self-interest awareness measure, in which rural Wisconsinites felt little connection to national issues like terrorism, global warming, and illegal immigration. A truly national forum, like Fishkin's, might bring in unique perspectives—a New Yorker who has to personally deal with civil liberties restrictions or an Alaskan with firsthand evidence of global warming. These unique perspectives, while not likely to be represented equally in the deliberative forums, might provide just enough motivation for people living in other parts of the country to see a personal stake in these issues.

Finally, future studies might want to consider alternate individual benefits. Because about half of the benefits were successfully demonstrated, the general link between deliberation and individual benefits finds decent support. However, future studies may wish to alter the list of individual benefits, somewhat – subtracting some or adding others. In many cases, the basic idea of a benefit might be good, but conceptualized poorly. I am still convinced that deliberation is likely to make people more politically sophisticated—I just need to think of a better way to measure it.

In summation, I believe that my work, as a whole, helps to further the deliberative project in a few small but helpful ways. First of all, my study organizes and lists the individual benefits found throughout the deliberative literature. Much theoretical work has been done on the societal, procedural, and occasionally even the individual benefits of deliberative democracy, but there is a lack of work on categorizing and/or quantifying these benefits, as I have tried to do in this project. Second, my project offers a defense of individual benefits, not as a replacement for the more commonly advocated procedural and societal benefits, but as a helpful addition. Individual benefits may also have the secondary benefit of being a realistic way to sell *actual* deliberative reforms—by hyping up the ability of deliberative forums to make citizens smarter, more connected, or more creative. Third, my project empirically tested for the individual benefits frequently found in the theoretical literature. The fact that solid correlations were found for four out of eight benefits is moderately positive evidence that deliberation can improve individuals. Granted, not all the predictions made by deliberative theorists came true in this experiment, which may be partially due to my experimental design, but also due to a need to reconceptualize certain selling points of deliberative theory. In fact, the negative and opposite results may be most interesting from a theoretical perspective in that common assumptions of the ideal democratic citizen might need to be reassessed in light of what the actual citizen is capable.

On an abstract level, most people would likely agree with the thought that giving citizens more of a voice (or at least more of an opportunity to voice) is a good thing. However, in practice, both elites and citizens have gotten used to the idea that democracy is about summing up self-interested preferences on an infrequent basis through a procedure that amounts to tallying up a show of raised hands. I believe that deliberative democrats are correct to expose the chinks of the armor of aggregative democracy: the uncharitable conception of the egotistical citizen, the passive injustice of low and sporadic participation, and voting as wildly imperfect way to assess "the voice of the people."

That being said, deliberative democrats might be engaging in utopian day-dreaming when they try to present an alternative to the prevailing order by appealing to tendencies and aspects of human nature that they believe aggregative democracy has beaten out of us. These appeals are not wrongheaded, but they are unlikely to gain traction in the lethargic setting of modern industrialized democracy. Perhaps if we think of the traditional societal and procedural benefits as the heart and soul of deliberative democracy, individual benefits are more akin to hands and feet. Heart and soul are necessary to motivate and inspire, but hands and feet are for interaction and movement.

Thus, individual benefits, when taken in combination with procedural and societal benefits, might be what are needed to move the project forward. Individual citizens might be more motivated to deliberate because the process will have a more direct effect on their lives and abilities than the more indirect functions of deliberation, like enhanced legitimacy or streamlined decision-making procedures. Politicians, often wary of reforms that complicate the task of governing, might take heart that deliberative citizens communicate their desires and wishes more effectively and coherently than they were capable of before. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from previous deliberative quasi-experiments shows that politicians from both sides of the aisle are at least willing to give the idea a try (Fishkin and Luskin 1999: 12).

Deliberative democracy is not a cure-all for the problems of modern democracies and individual benefits are not a cure-all for the problems of deliberative democracy. But both are helpful alternative strategies for the paradigms they were meant to critique or enhance. Deliberative democracy proposes a better citizen and a focus on the individual benefits of deliberative democracy suggests a way that we can reach that ideal. Taken together, both could be an important way to improve both democracy and its citizens.

APPENDIX A: PRE-SURVEY AND POST-SURVEY

Notes on interpreting survey questions- This appendix features the pre- and post-surveys used in the experiment. After each question, a designation appears in parenthesis which indicates which benefit(s) the question was used to measure. Other variables were used to measure background characteristics, and will be noted as such. Some question types are followed by an explanation of how the question responses were coded. For instance, on knowledge questions, the correct answer and relevant citation are outlined. Finally, some questions were taken directly from public opinion surveys. For these questions, a citation and the original question follow.

Pre-survey

In the following survey, you are allowed to skip questions that you are uncertain about, uncomfortable with, or unwilling to answer.

The first part of the survey measures political knowledge.

1. The next few questions all ask you to rank politicians along the political ideology scale below, where 1 means extremely liberal and 9 means extremely conservative. If you don't know who some of the politicians in the questions are, guess where you think they may be on the scale. [*knowledge*]

On the above scale, what number would you give:

-Edward Kennedy

-Hilary Clinton

-Dick Cheney

-George Bush

-John Kerry

-John McCain

Coding note for question #1: Given that placement of politicians is somewhat subjective, each of the above politicians were coded within ranges. For instance, Hilary Clinton is often known as a moderate left-of-center politician. Thus, someone ranking her from 3 – 6 is making a reasonable guess, and would receive a "1". Someone ranking her from 1 – 2 correctly understands that she is left of center, but is making her out to be more extreme than reasonable, and is assigned a score of "0". Someone who ranks her from 7 – 9 is incorrect about both the direction and intensity of her beliefs, and would receive a "-1".

2. For the following questions (2 and 3), highlight one of the following options: almost Always (Al), Frequently (Fr), Sometimes (So), Rarely (Ra), or almost Never (Ne).

How often do you:

-Write a letter to a politician?

-Attend a political rally?

-Discuss politics with friends/coworkers?

-Seek out political news/current events?

-Vote during Presidential elections?

-Vote during midterm elections?

-Vote during local/other elections?

-Campaign for elections?

-Try to help turn out the vote?

3. How often do you think you *should*: [*participation*]

-Write a letter to a politician?

-Attend a political rally?

-Discuss politics with friends/coworkers?

-Seek out political news/current events?

-Vote during Presidential elections?

-Vote during midterm elections?

-Vote during local/other elections?

-Campaign for elections?

-Try to help turn out the vote?

4. Some people like to have responsibility for situations that require a lot of thinking, and other people don't like to have responsibility like that. What about you? Do you like

having responsibility for situations that require a lot of thinking, do you dislike it, or do you neither like nor dislike it? [*background characteristics*]

-Dislike a lot

-Dislike somewhat

-Neutral/Undecided

-Like somewhat

-Like a lot

5. Some people prefer to solve simple problems instead of complex ones, whereas other people prefer to solve more complex ones. What about you? Which type of problem do you prefer to solve: simple or complex? [*background characteristics*]

-Simple

-Complex

6. Some people have opinions about almost everything; other people have opinions about just some things; and still other people have very few opinions. What about you? Would you say that you have opinions about almost everything, about most things, about some things, or about very few things? [*background characteristics*]

-Almost everything

-Most things

-Some things

-Very few things

7. Compared to the average person, do you have fewer opinions about moral issues, about the same number of opinions, or more opinions? [*background characteristics*]

-A lot fewer

-Somewhat fewer

-Same

-Somewhat more

-A lot more

8. Some people say that it is important to have definite opinions about lots of things, while other people think that it is better to remain neutral on most issues. What about you? Do you think it's better to have definite opinions about lots of things or to remain neutral on most things? [*background characteristics*]

-Definite opinions

-Remain neutral

9. When faced with problems or uncertain situations, some people like to take charge and give directions to other people in order to solve the problem. Other people prefer to have someone else take charge and prefer boundaries and guidelines from others when solving problems. What about you? Do you prefer to take charge or have someone else take charge? [*background characteristics*]

-Prefer someone else to take charge a lot

-Somewhat prefer someone else to take charge

-Prefer neither option more

-Somewhat prefer to take charge, myself

-Prefer to take charge, myself alot

10. Do other people follow your leadership abilities often, sometimes, or never? [*background characteristics*]

-Often

-Sometimes

-Never

11. About how many hours a week do you spend getting news about politics and current events? [*background characteristics*]

-0 hours

-0 - 1 hours

-1 - 3 hours

-3+ hours

12. What type of source would you say that you get most of your news on general current events, when you do get it? [*background characteristics*]

-television news (ABC nightly news; Fox News; CNN Nightly news, etc.)

-other television sources (Jay Leno, Daily Show, etc.)

-news radio (NPR, etc.)

-talk radio sources (Rush Limbaugh, Air America, etc.)

-online versions of mainstream sources (New York Times.com; CNN.com)

-other online sources (blogs; alternative media websites)

-newspapers

-Other (please specify)

13. Which of the following sources do you get most of your information about politics, when you do get it? [*background characteristics*]

-television news (ABC nightly news; Fox News; CNN Nightly news, etc.)

-other television sources (Jay Leno, Daily Show, etc.)

-news radio (NPR, etc.)

-talk radio sources (Rush Limbaugh, Air America, etc.)

-online versions of mainstream sources (New York Times.com; CNN.com)

-other online sources (blogs; alternative media websites)

-newspapers

-Other (please specify)

14. Would you consider yourself to know more than the average person about current events, about the same as the average person, or less than the average person? [*background characteristics*]

-A lot less

-Somewhat less

-Average

-Somewhat more

-A lot more

15. Would you consider yourself to know more than the average person about politics, about the same as the average person, or less than the average person? [*background characteristics*]

-A lot less

-Somewhat less

-Average

-Somewhat more

-A lot more

16. Do you consider yourself a liberal, a conservative, or a centrist? [*political sophistication*]

-Very liberal

-Somewhat liberal

-Centrist or not-political

-Somewhat conservative

-Very conservative

17. Do you typically support/vote for one party always, sometimes, or do you give the major parties about the same amount of support/votes? [*political sophistication*]

-Always support Democratic

-Usually support Democratic

-Support both parties about equally

-Usually support Republican

-Always support Republican

18. In the 2004 election, did you have a favorable, unfavorable or neutral impression of John Kerry? [*political sophistication*]

-Very favorable

-Somewhat favorable

-Neutral/no impression

-Somewhat unfavorable

-Very unfavorable

19. In the 2004 election, did you have a favorable, unfavorable or neutral impression of George Bush? [*political sophistication*]

-Very favorable

-Somewhat favorable

-Neutral/No opinion

-Somewhat unfavorable

-Very unfavorable

20. Which of the following most closely matches your views on the outcomes of political discussions? [*background characteristics*]

-Discussions should usually lead to a course of action.

-Discussions should usually lead to understanding other viewpoints better.

-Discussions should usually lead to improving the education and skills of the people discussing.

-Discussions should usually lead to better decisions than when no discussion takes place.

-Discussions should usually lead to ideals like better democracy.

-Other (please specify)

21. Some people think that you should almost always tolerate all viewpoints in our society. Other people are skeptical about toleration, because they think that too much

toleration may let harmful or wrong views gain more acceptance. Yet others think it largely depends on the situation. What about you? Do you think it's best to almost always be tolerant of other views, or do you think toleration depends on the situation, or are you skeptical about toleration? [*tolerance*]

-Almost always tolerant of other views

-Toleration depends on the situation

-Skeptical about toleration

22. Do you consider yourself to be more tolerant than average about views that you don't agree with, as tolerant as average, or less tolerant? [*tolerance*]

-More tolerant

-As tolerant as average

-Less tolerant

23. Do you think others are very tolerant of your views, even when they don't agree with them, somewhat tolerant, or not very tolerant? [*tolerance*]

-Others are very tolerant of my views

-Others are somewhat tolerant of my views

-Others are not very tolerant of my views

24. For the next few questions, answer each prompt with: almost Always (Al),Frequently (Fr), Sometimes (So),Rarely (Ra), or almost Never (Ne). [*tolerance, affection*]

How often do you:

-Think that people with different political views are reasonable people?

-Think that people with different political beliefs consider your beliefs to be unreasonable?

-Like people of your own age group?

-Like people with different political views than yours?

25. In a few brief sentences, explain what you think are the best ways to solve the terrorism problem. Or explain why you don't think terrorism is actually a problem

26. Do you believe that it’s okay or not okay for Americans to give up some civil liberties to gain more protection from terrorism? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding notes for question #26: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, “First, thinking about how the government is dealing with the issue of terrorism: Do you think the Bush Administration has gone too far, has been about right, or has not gone far enough in restricting people's civil liberties in order to fight terrorism?” The results were: “Too far: 41%, About right: 34%, Not far enough: 19%, Unsure: 6%) (PollingReport (b) 5/12 – 13/2006)

27. Is it proper for the government to collect data or electronically monitor the phone conversations of average Americans as a measure against terrorism? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding note for question #27: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

28. Is it right to give non-American terrorist suspects the same rights as Americans who are on trial? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding note for question #28: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

29. Does it seem like the number of terrorist incidents have been increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same over the last few years? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

Coding note for question #29: The correct answer is that the volume of terrorist incidents has been decreasing over the last few decades. (Combs 2006: 310).

30. Does it seem like the lethality of terrorist attacks have been increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same over the last few years? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

Coding note for question #30: The correct answer is that the lethality of terrorist incidents has been increasing over the last few decades. (Combs 2006: 311).

31. Which types of Americans are international terrorists most likely to strike? [*knowledge*]

-Military personnel

-Business/private interests

-Politicians

Coding note for question #31: The correct answer is that terrorists are increasingly likely to strike business targets and private interests. (Combs 2006: 317).

32. Which party seems to handle the terrorism issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Democrats

-Republicans

-Both handle it equally well/poorly

-Not sure

33. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the terrorism issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

34. Different people have different opinions on how best to respond to terrorism. If we had to choose from the following list, which would you say is the best response? [*political sophistication*]

-retaliating against terrorists and their supporters with force or sanctions [*4*]

-addressing the root causes of terrorism and alleviating them [*2*]

-fortifying the homeland to make it harder for terrorists to attack [*3*]

-don't know

Coding note for question #34: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

35. In a few brief sentences, explain what you think are the best ways to solve the global warming problem. Or explain why you don't think global warming is actually a problem.

36. Do you believe that global warming can be seen as a moral issue? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Definitely [*1*]

-Probably [*2*]

-Maybe [*3*]

-Probably not [*4*]

-Definitely not [*5*]

-Don't know

Coding note for question #36: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

37. If you think that global warming might be a problem, who do you think is most responsible for the problem? [*political sophistication*]

-Politicians [*2*]

-Corporations [*1*]

-The Public [*3*]

-Scientists [*4*]

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

Coding note for question #37: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

38. In addressing the global warming issue, economic growth may come in conflict with reducing global warming. If this happens, which should be given priority? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Economic growth [*1*]

-Reducing global warming [*3*]

-Equal priority [*5*]

-don't know

Coding notes for question #38: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, “With which one of these statements about the environment and the economy do you most agree? Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth. OR, Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” The results were: “Environment: 52, Economics: 37, Equal: 6, DK: 4” (PollingReport (a): 3/13 – 16/2006).

39. For each of the following prompts, how much disagreement do you think exists in the scientific community: a lot of disagreement, a fair amount of disagreement, some disagreement, very little disagreement, or almost no disagreement? [*knowledge*]

-whether or not global warming is happening

-how much human activity contributes to global warming

-how bad the effects of global warming may be

Coding note for question #39: The correct answer for the first two prompts is, “almost no disagreement” (Oreskes 2004). The correct answer for the third prompt is, “some disagreement.” (Hougton 2004: 10)

40. What percentage of the world’s greenhouse gasses do you think that Americans are responsible for? [*knowledge*]

-0% - 5%

-5% - 10%

-10% - 15%

-15% - 20%

-20%+

-don't know

Coding note for question #40: The correct answer for this question is 20%+ (specifically, 23%) of total world carbon emissions in 2003 (United Nations 2003).

41. Which party seems to handle the global warming issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Republicans

-Democrats

-Both equally good/bad

-don't know

42. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the global warming issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

43. Different people have different opinions on how best to respond to global warming. If we had to choose from the following list, which would you say is the best response? [*political sophistication*]

-seek out alternate energy sources [*2*]

-government regulation and fines for polluters [*3*]

-promoting "green" innovations from corporations and the private sector [*4*]

-don't know

Coding note for question #43: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

44. What do you think are the best ways to address the illegal/undocumented immigration problem? Or explain why you don't think it is actually a problem.

45. Overall, do immigrants who come to America help the country and make it a better place to live or do they hurt the country and make it a worse place to live? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-help [*2*]

-it depends [*3*]

-hurt [*4*]

-don't know

Coding notes for question #45: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, "Would you say that immigration helps the United States more than it hurts it, or immigration hurts the United States more than it helps it?" The results were: Helps: 44%, Hurts: 45%, Not Sure: 11% (PollingReport (c): 2006).

46. Which of these statements do you agree with the most about America's responsibility in the immigration issue? [*political sophistication*]

-America has a responsibility to legal and natural-born Americans primarily; therefore illegal immigration should be stopped or slowed dramatically. [*3*]

-America has a responsibility to improve living conditions in nearby poor countries; therefore less illegal immigrants would come in the first place. [*2*]

-America has a historical responsibility to take in immigrants; therefore we should find some fair way to incorporate undocumented immigrants into the country. [*4*]

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

Coding note for question #46: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

47. Should illegal/undocumented immigration be considered a felony? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Usually [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-don't know

Coding note for question #47: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

48. Approximately how many illegal/undocumented Americans do you think are currently in the country? [*knowledge*]

-Less than 5 million

-About 5 million – 10 million

-About 10 million – 15 million

-More than 15 million

-don't know

Coding notes for question #48: The correct answer is, "About 10 million – 15 million," with most estimates agreeing on a figure of 11 - 12 million (Schorr 2006).

49. Does the Bush administration support building a 700 mile wall along the Mexican border? [*knowledge*]

-Yes

-Only with restrictions

-No don't know

Coding notes for question #49: The correct answer is, "only with restrictions," as President Bush has advocated building walls along busier sections of the border. His version of the wall plan was much less extensive than most anti-immigration members of Congress (Johnson 2006).

50. Has the number of illegal/undocumented immigrants coming to this country been increasing in the last few years, staying about the same, or decreasing? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

-don't know

Coding notes for question #50: The correct answer is, "increasing," (Ottowa Citizen 2005).

51. Which party seems to handle the immigration issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Democrats

-Republicans

-both equally well/poorly

-don't know

52. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the immigration issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

53. Of the following solutions to illegal/undocumented immigration, which do you think stands the best chance of working? [*political sophistication*]

-deport all illegals; secure the borders [*1*]

-construct a guest worker plan for immigrants already here [*3*]

-provide amnesty to undocumented immigrants already in the country [*5*]

-don't know

Coding note for question #53: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

54. If our country decides to respond to terrorists with force, from the following list, which kind of force do you think is the best?

-using the military to attack terrorists and the countries that harbor them

-using the military to attack only terrorist training camps and important sites

-covert operations engaging in assassination and sabotage

-using non-military force, like economic sanctions or freezing terrorist assets

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

55. If our country decided to address and alleviate the root causes of terrorism, what aspect of societies that generate terrorism from the following list should be addressed/answered/fixed first?

-hatred of freedom

-fundamentalist Islam

-weak states/ lack of democracy

-poverty

-problems with American foreign policy

-resistance to globalization

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

56. If our country decides to focus on fortifying the homeland, which target do you believe deserves the most protection?

-airports

-political locations (White House, Capitol, etc.)

-economic centers (World Trade Center, Fort Knox, etc.)

-symbolic targets (Statue of Liberty, Mount Rushmore, etc.)

-nuclear, chemical, biological laboratories

-tourist or recreational locations

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

57. If we had to give preference to one alternate energy source over the others, which one do you think would address the global warming issue best?

-clean coal

-nuclear power

-biofuels (ethanol, etc.)

-renewable energy (wind, solar power, etc.)

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

58. If we had to preference one type of government regulation over the other choices, which is the best way for the government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions?

-write tough laws that reduce carbon emmissions

-give out strict fines and penalties to carbon emmitters

-regulate citizen products that give out greenhouse emissions (cars, air conditioners, etc.)

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

59. If we had to preference a way to enhance corporate responsibility or "green" innovations from the private sector, which one do you think would address the global warming issue the best?

-give tax breaks to corporations that invent green technology

-give tax breaks to corporations that use pre-existing green technology

-give prizes/grants to private individuals who invent/market green technology

-relax environmental laws to allow corporations to run day to day business; "dirty" corporations will be punished by the consumers

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

60. If we decide that we must crack down on illegal immigration, which aspect of this tactic should deserve the most consideration?

-guarding the borders with troops

-putting up a wall along the Mexican border

-guarding entry points like airports and ports more effectively

-going after visa-overstayers in the country

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

61. If we decide to construct a guest worker plan so that illegal immigrants can eventually become citizens, which method should be used?

-Deport all illegals; allow them to apply for re-entrance as guest workers

-Allow illegal immigrants who have been here the longest into the guest worker program; deport newest arrivals

-Allow all undocumented immigrants currently into the program; deport future arrivals.

-Open guest worker program to current and future undocumented immigrants

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

62. If we decided to grant amnesty to undocumented immigrants, how should we decide who gets amnesty?

-All undocumented immigrants both present and future will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants currently in the country will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants who have been in the country for 5 years or more will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants, currently in the country, who have not committed a crime will get amnesty.

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

63. Gender- [*background characteristics*]

-Male

-Female

64. Age [*background characteristics*]

-18 or 19

-20 or 21

-22+

65. Race/Ethnicity: [*background characteristics*]

-African/American

-Asian American

-Caucasian

-Hispanic/Latino

-Native American

-Pacific Islander

-Biracial

-Other (please specify)

66. Level of education: [*background characteristics*]

-First year (Freshman)

-Second year (Sophomore)

-Third year (Junior)

-Fourth year (Senior)

-Graduate student

67. Approximate family income: [*background characteristics*]

-$30,000 or less

-$30,000 - $50,000

-$50,000 - $70,000

-$70,000 - $110,000

-$110,000 - $150,000

-$150,000+

68. I am a student in the following UWSP college: [*background characteristics*]

-Continuing Education

-Natural Resources

-Letters and Sciences

-Professional Studies

-Fine Arts and Communication

-I am a student in two or more colleges

69. My intended occupation after graduating UWSP is: [*background characteristics*]

Post Survey

In the following survey, you are allowed to skip questions that you are uncertain about, uncomfortable with, or unwilling to answer.

The first part of the survey measures political knowledge.

1. The next few questions all ask you to rank politicians along the political ideology scale below, where 1 means extremely liberal and 9 means extremely conservative. If you don't know who some of the politicians in the questions are, guess where you think they may be on the scale. [*knowledge*]

On the above scale, what number would you give:

-Edward Kennedy

-Hilary Clinton

-Dick Cheney

-George Bush

-John Kerry

-John McCain

Coding note for question #1: Given that placement of politicians is somewhat subjective, each of the above politicians were coded within ranges. For instance, Hilary Clinton is often known as a moderate left-of-center politician. Thus, someone ranking her from 3 – 6 is making a reasonable guess, and would receive a "1". Someone ranking her from 1 – 2 correctly understands that she is left of center, but is making her out to be more extreme than reasonable, and is assigned a score of “0”. Someone who ranks her from 7 – 9 is incorrect about both the direction and intensity of her beliefs, and would receive a “-1”.

2. How often do you think you *should*: [*participation*]

-Write a letter to a politician?

-Attend a political rally?

-Discuss politics with friends/coworkers?

-Seek out political news/current events?

-Vote during Presidential elections?

-Vote during midterm elections?

-Vote during local/other elections?

-Campaign for elections?

-Try to help turn out the vote?

3. Some people think that you should almost always tolerate all viewpoints in our society. Other people are skeptical about toleration, because they think that too much toleration may let harmful or wrong views gain more acceptance. Yet others think it largely depends on the situation. What about you? Do you think it’s best to almost always be tolerant of other views, or do you think toleration depends on the situation, or are you skeptical about toleration? [*tolerance*]

-Almost always tolerant of other views

-Toleration depends on the situation

-Skeptical about toleration

4. Do you consider yourself to be more tolerant than average about views that you don’t agree with, as tolerant as average, or less tolerant? [*tolerance*]

-More tolerant

-As tolerant as average

-Less tolerant

5. Do you think others are very tolerant of your views, even when they don’t agree with them, somewhat tolerant, or not very tolerant? [*tolerance*]

-Others are very tolerant of my views

-Others are somewhat tolerant of my views

-Others are not very tolerant of my views

6. For the next few questions, answer each prompt with: almost Always (Al),Frequently (Fr), Sometimes (So),Rarely (Ra), or almost Never (Ne). [*tolerance, affection*]

How often do you:

-Think that people with different political views are reasonable people?

-Think that people with different political beliefs consider your beliefs to be unreasonable?

-Like people of your own age group?

-Like people with different political views than yours?

7. Which new solutions to the terrorism problem did you and your group come up with that you hadn’t thought of before? Which of these new ideas, if any, did you help develop? [*creativity*]

8. Do you believe that it’s okay or not okay for Americans to give up some civil liberties to gain more protection from terrorism? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding notes for question #8: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, "First, thinking about how the government is dealing with the issue of terrorism: Do you think the Bush Administration has gone too far, has been about right, or has not gone far enough in restricting people's civil liberties in order to fight terrorism?" The results were: "Too far: 41%, About right: 34%, Not far enough: 19%, Unsure: 6%) (PollingReport (b) 5/12 – 13/2006)

9. Is it proper for the government to collect data or electronically monitor the phone conversations of average Americans as a measure against terrorism? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding note for question #9: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

10. Is it right to give non-American terrorist suspects the same rights as Americans who are on trial? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Frequently [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-Don't know/No opinion

Coding note for question #10: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with "1" representing a very liberal belief and "5" representing a very conservative belief.

11. Does it seem like the number of terrorist incidents have been increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same over the last few years? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

Coding note for question #11: The correct answer is that the volume of terrorist incidents has been decreasing over the last few decades. (Combs 2006: 310).

12. Does it seem like the lethality of terrorist attacks have been increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same over the last few years? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

Coding note for question #12: The correct answer is that the lethality of terrorist incidents has been increasing over the last few decades. (Combs 2006: 311).

13. Which types of Americans are international terrorists most likely to strike? [*knowledge*]

-Military personnel

-Business/private interests

-Politicians

Coding note for question #13: The correct answer is that terrorists are increasingly likely to strike business targets and private interests. (Combs 2006: 317).

14. Which party seems to handle the terrorism issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Democrats

-Republicans

-Both handle it equally well/poorly

-Not sure

15. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the terrorism issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

16. Different people have different opinions on how best to respond to terrorism. If we had to choose from the following list, which would you say is the best response? [*political sophistication*]

-retaliating against terrorists and their supporters with force or sanctions [*4*]

-addressing the root causes of terrorism and alleviating them [*2*]

-fortifying the homeland to make it harder for terrorists to attack [*3*]

-don’t know

Coding note for question #16: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

17. Which new solutions to the global warming problem did you and your group come up with that you hadn’t thought of before? Which of these new ideas, if any, did you help develop? [*creativity*]

18. Do you believe that global warming can be seen as a moral issue? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Definitely [*1*]

-Probably [*2*]

-Maybe [*3*]

-Probably not [*4*]

-Definitely not [*5*]

-Don't know

Coding note for question #18: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

19. If you think that global warming might be a problem, who do you think is most responsible for the problem? [*political sophistication*]

-Politicians [*2*]

-Corporations [*1*]

-The Public [*3*]

-Scientists [*4*]

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

Coding note for question #19: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

20. In addressing the global warming issue, economic growth may come in conflict with reducing global warming. If this happens, which should be given priority? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Economic growth [*1*]

-Reducing global warming [*3*]

-Equal priority [*5*]

-don't know

Coding notes for question #20: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, “With which one of these statements about the environment and the economy do you most agree? Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth. OR, Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” The results were: “Environment: 52, Economics: 37, Equal: 6, DK: 4” (PollingReport (a): 3/13 – 16/2006).

21. For each of the following prompts, how much disagreement do you think exists in the scientific community: a lot of disagreement, a fair amount of disagreement, some disagreement, very little disagreement, or almost no disagreement? [*knowledge*]

-whether or not global warming is happening

-how much human activity contributes to global warming

-how bad the effects of global warming may be

Coding note for question #21: The correct answer for the first two prompts is, "almost no disagreement" (Oreskes 2004). The correct answer for the third prompt is, "some disagreement." (Hougton 2004: 10)

22. What percentage of the world's greenhouse gasses do you think that Americans are responsible for? [*knowledge*]

-0% - 5%

-5% - 10%

-10% - 15%

-15% - 20%

-20%+

-don't know

Coding note for question #22: The correct answer for this question is 20%+ (specifically, 23%) of total world carbon emissions in 2003 (United Nations 2003).

23. Which party seems to handle the global warming issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Republicans

-Democrats

-Both equally good/bad

-don't know

24. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the global warming issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

25. Different people have different opinions on how best to respond to global warming. If we had to choose from the following list, which would you say is the best response? [*political sophistication*]

-seek out alternate energy sources [*2*]

-government regulation and fines for polluters [*3*]

-promoting “green” innovations from corporations and the private sector [*4*]

-don’t know

Coding note for question #25: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

26. Which new solutions to the immigration problem did you and your group come up with that you hadn’t thought of before? Which of these new ideas, if any, did you help develop? [*creativity*]

27. Overall, do immigrants who come to America help the country and make it a better place to live or do they hurt the country and make it a worse place to live? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-help [*2*]

-it depends [*3*]

-hurt [*4*]

-don't know

Coding notes for question #27: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

The above question was used to calculate a societal group moral development score. The original poll question read, “Would you say that immigration helps the United States more than it hurts it, or immigration hurts the United States more than it helps it?” The results were: Helps: 44%, Hurts: 45%, Not Sure: 11% (PollingReport (c): 2006).

28. Which of these statements do you agree with the most about America’s responsibility in the immigration issue? [*political sophistication*]

-America has a responsibility to legal and natural-born Americans primarily; therefore illegal immigration should be stopped or slowed dramatically. [*3*]

-America has a responsibility to improve living conditions in nearby poor countries; therefore less illegal immigrants would come in the first place. [*2*]

-America has a historical responsibility to take in immigrants; therefore we should find some fair way to incorporate undocumented immigrants into the country. [*4*]

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

Coding note for question #28: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

29. Should illegal/undocumented immigration be considered a felony? [*political sophistication, moral development*]

-Always [*5*]

-Usually [*4*]

-Sometimes [*3*]

-Rarely [*2*]

-Never [*1*]

-don't know

Coding note for question #29: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

30. Approximately how many illegal/undocumented Americans do you think are currently in the country? [*knowledge*]

-Less than 5 million

-About 5 million – 10 million

-About 10 million – 15 million

-More than 15 million

-don't know

Coding notes for question #30: The correct answer is, “About 10 million – 15 million,” with most estimates agreeing on a figure of 11 - 12 million (Schorr 2006).

31. Does the Bush administration support building a 700 mile wall along the Mexican border? [*knowledge*]

-Yes

-Only with restrictions

-No don't know

Coding notes for question #31: The correct answer is, "only with restrictions," as President Bush has advocated building walls along busier sections of the border. His version of the wall plan was much less extensive than most anti-immigration members of Congress (Johnson 2006).

32. Has the number of illegal/undocumented immigrants coming to this country been increasing in the last few years, staying about the same, or decreasing? [*knowledge*]

-Increasing

-Staying about the same

-Decreasing

-don't know

Coding notes for question #32: The correct answer is, "increasing," (Ottowa Citizen 2005).

33. Which party seems to handle the immigration issue in a way that you most agree with?

-Democrats

-Republicans

-both equally well/poorly

-don't know

34. Do you feel like you have a personal stake in the immigration issue? In a few brief sentences, explain why or why not. [*self-interest awareness*]

35. Of the following solutions to illegal/undocumented immigration, which do you think stands the best chance of working? [*political sophistication*]

-deport all illegals; secure the borders [*1*]

-construct a guest worker plan for immigrants already here [*3*]

-provide amnesty to undocumented immigrants already in the country [*5*]

-don’t know

Coding note for question #35: The above question choices were coded along a liberal/conservative continuum with “1” representing a very liberal belief and “5” representing a very conservative belief.

36. If our country decides to respond to terrorists with force, from the following list, which kind of force do you think is the best?

-using the military to attack terrorists and the countries that harbor them

-using the military to attack only terrorist training camps and important sites

-covert operations engaging in assassination and sabotage

-using non-military force, like economic sanctions or freezing terrorist assets

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

37. If our country decided to address and alleviate the root causes of terrorism, what aspect of societies that generate terrorism from the following list should be addressed/answered/fixed first?

-hatred of freedom

-fundamentalist Islam

-weak states/ lack of democracy

-poverty

-problems with American foreign policy

-resistance to globalization

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

38. If our country decides to focus on fortifying the homeland, which target do you believe deserves the most protection?

-airports

-political locations (White House, Capitol, etc.)

-economic centers (World Trade Center, Fort Knox, etc.)

-symbolic targets (Statue of Liberty, Mount Rushmore, etc.)

-nuclear, chemical, biological laboratories

-tourist or recreational locations

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

39. If we had to give preference to one alternate energy source over the others, which one do you think would address the global warming issue best?

-clean coal

-nuclear power

-biofuels (ethanol, etc.)

-renewable energy (wind, solar power, etc.)

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

40. If we had to preference one type of government regulation over the other choices, which is the best way for the government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions?

-write tough laws that reduce carbon emmissions

-give out strict fines and penalties to carbon emmitters

-regulate citizen products that give out greenhouse emissions (cars, air conditioners, etc.)

-don’t know

-Other (please specify)

41. If we had to preference a way to enhance corporate responsibility or “green” innovations from the private sector, which one do you think would address the global warming issue the best?

-give tax breaks to corporations that invent green technology

-give tax breaks to corporations that use pre-existing green technology

-give prizes/grants to private individuals who invent/market green technology

-relax environmental laws to allow corporations to run day to day business; "dirty" corporations will be punished by the consumers

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

42. If we decide that we must crack down on illegal immigration, which aspect of this tactic should deserve the most consideration?

-guarding the borders with troops

-putting up a wall along the Mexican border

-guarding entry points like airports and ports more effectively

-going after visa-overstayers in the country

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

43. If we decide to construct a guest worker plan so that illegal immigrants can eventually become citizens, which method should be used?

-Deport all illegals; allow them to apply for re-entrance as guest workers

-Allow illegal immigrants who have been here the longest into the guest worker program; deport newest arrivals

-Allow all undocumented immigrants currently into the program; deport future arrivals.

-Open guest worker program to current and future undocumented immigrants

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

44. If we decided to grant amnesty to undocumented immigrants, how should we decide who gets amnesty?

-All undocumented immigrants both present and future will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants currently in the country will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants who have been in the country for 5 years or more will get amnesty

-All undocumented immigrants, currently in the country, who have not committed a crime will get amnesty.

-don't know

-Other (please specify)

45. In the next few prompts, you will be asked to rate the following things as: very positive (VP), somewhat positive (SP), neutral (N), somewhat negative (SN), or very negative (VN). [*affection*]

I had the following feelings about:

-the experiment as a whole

-the head experimenter

-the student assistant conducting the experiment

-the other subjects in my group

-the videos used in the experiment

-the discussion sections (if any)

46. In the next few prompts, rate the following things either very likely (VL), somewhat likely (SL), equally likely or unlikely (EQ), somewhat unlikely (SU), or very unlikely (VU).

How likely is it that you will: [*participation*]

-Keep in touch with other subjects from the experiment

-Be interested in politics

-Be active in politics

-Engage in discussion as a way to educate yourself on issues

-Engage in disucssion as a way to solve problems

47. The next few prompts all deal with how your initial impressions of the other experimental subjects matched up to your actual experience.

Think back to your initial impressions of the other subjects towards the beginning of the experiment. Now that you've spent some time with them, do you find them to have more, less, or about the same amount of the following traits than you originally thought? [*tolerance, affection]*

-Similarity to you

-Likability

-Well informed

-Reasonableness

-Moral

-Having toleration

APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS

Crosstabulation results-

Table B1: Gender:

	male	male %	female	female %
tr 1	7	36.80%	12	63.20%
tr 2	14	45.20%	17	54.80%
tr 3	17	43.60%	22	56.40%
tr 4	18	48.60%	19	51.40%
Total	56	44.40%	70	55.60%

*Chi-Square value = .728
Sig. = .867

Table B2: Age:

	18 - 19		20 - 21 %		22+%	
tr 1	7	36.80%	9	47.40%	3	15.80%
tr 2	19	61.30%	4	12.90%	8	25.80%
tr 3	20	51.30%	12	30.80%	7	17.90%
tr 4	11	29.70%	16	43.20%	10	27.00%
Total	57	45.20%	41	32.50%	28	22.20%

*Chi-Square value = 11.879
Sig. = .065

Table B3: Race:

	Asian		White		Af-Am		Hispanic		Biracial	
tr 1	0	0%	17	89.50%	1	5.30%	0	0%	1	5.30%
tr 2	1	3.20%	29	93.50%	0	0%	1	3.20%	0	0%
tr 3	0	0%	38	97.40%	0	0%	0	0%	1	2.60%
tr 4	1	2.70%	34	91.90%	0	0%	2	5.40%	0	0%
total	2	1.60%	118	93.70%	1	1%	3	2.40%	2	1.60%

*Chi-Square value = 13.3
Sig. = .348

Table B4: Income Level:

	0		1		2		3		4		5	
tr 1	2	10.50%	6	31.60%	4	21.10%	5	26.30%	2	10.50%	0	0%
tr 2	7	24.10%	5	17.20%	7	24.10%	6	20.70%	4	13.80%	0	0.00%
tr 3	11	28.20%	9	23.10%	9	23.10%	8	20.50%	2	5.10%	0	0.00%
tr 4	8	21.60%	13	35.10%	5	13.50%	9	24.30%	1	2.70%	1	2.70%
tot	28	22.60%	33	26.60%	25	20.20%	28	22.60%	9	7.30%	1	0.80%

*Chi-Square value = 11.278
Sig. = .733

Table B5: UWSP College:

	0		1		2		3		4		5	
tr 1	0	0.00%	3	15.80%	8	42.10%	3	15.80%	5	26.30%	0	0%
tr 2	1	3.30%	6	20.00%	13	43.30%	5	16.70%	1	3.30%	4	13.30%
tr 3	2	5.10%	5	12.80%	13	33.30%	12	30.80%	4	10.30%	3	7.70%
tr 4	2	5.40%	6	16.20%	15	40.50%	6	16.20%	7	18.90%	1	2.70%
tot	5	4.00%	20	16.00%	49	39.20%	26	20.80%	17	13.60%	8	6.40%

*Chi-Square value = 14.928
Sig. = .457

Table B6: Like to Have Responsibility for Situations Involving a Lot of Thinking:

	0		1		2		3		4	
tr 1	0	0%	1	5.60%	2	11.10%	12	67%	3	16.70%
tr 2	1	3.20%	4	12.90%	10	32%	11	35.50%	5	16%
tr 3	0	0%	3	7.90%	10	26%	19	49%	7	17.90%
tr 4	0	0.00%	4	11.10%	7	19%	20	55.60%	5	13.9%
total	1	0.80%	12	9.70%	29	23%	62	50.00%	20	16.10%

*Chi-Square value = 9.418
Sig. = .69

Table B7: Prefer to Solve Simple or Complex Problems

	simple		complex	
tr 1	10	52.60%	9	47.40%
tr 2	11	35.50%	20	64.50%
tr 3	12	30.80%	27	69.20%
tr 4	20	54.10%	17	45.90%
tot	53	42.10%	73	57.90%

*Chi-Square value = 5.646
Sig. = .130

Table B8: Better to Have Definite Opinions or Remain Neutral

	opin		neu	
tr 1	13	72.20%	5	27.80%
tr 2	19	63.30%	11	36.70%
tr 3	27	71.10%	11	28.90%
tr 4	19	51.40%	18	48.60%
tot	78	63.40%	45	36.60%

*Chi-Square value = 3.878
Sig. = .275

Table B9: Do People Follow Your Leadership Abilities?

	often		somet	
tr 1	9	47.40%	10	52.60%
tr 2	13	41.90%	18	58.10%
tr 3	17	43.60%	22	56.40%
tr 4	20	54.10%	17	45.90%
tot	59	46.80%	67	53.20%

*Chi-Square value = 1.24
Sig. = .743

Table B10: How Many Hours a Week do you Spend Getting Information about Politics/ Current Events?

	0 - 1 h		1 - 3 h		3+ h	
tr 1	9	47.40%	8	42.10%	2	10.50%
tr 2	17	54.80%	11	35.50%	3	9.70%
tr 3	16	38.50%	15	38.50%	9	23.10%
tr 4	15	43.20%	15	40.50%	6	16.20%
tot	57	45.20%	49	38.90%	20	15.90%

*Chi-Square value = 3.62
Sig. = .728

Table B11: Political Ideology from Very Liberal to Very Conservative

	0		1		2		3		4	
tr 1	1	5.30%	7	36.80%	5	26.30%	6	31.60%	0	0%
tr 2	3	9.70%	9	29%	8	25.80%	10	32.30%	1	3.20%
tr 3	10	25.60%	11	28.20%	5	12.80%	9	23.10%	4	10.30%
tr 4	8	21.60%	17	45.90%	3	8.10%	6	16.20%	3	8.10%
tot	22	17.50%	44	34.90%	21	16.70%	31	24.60%	8	6.30%

*Chi-Square value = 16.273
Sig. = .179

Supplementary paired t-tests-

Table B12: Running tally of general knowledge questions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	3.22	2.05	3.28	1.81	-0.19	0.85
treat. 2	3.65	1.94	3.69	1.93	-0.15	0.89
treat. 3	3.61	1.91	3.55	2.08	0.23	0.82
treat. 4	3.86	1.59	3.58	2.01	1.47	0.15

*$\underline{p} < .1$ **$\underline{p} < .05$ ***$\underline{p} < .01$

Table B13: Running tally of knowledge questions about global warming

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.32	1	1.53	1.17	-0.89	0.39
treat. 2	1.90	0.98	1.65	0.98	1.49	0.15
treat. 3	1.56	0.97	1.49	1.14	0.52	0.61
treat. 4	1.54	1.07	1.46	1.07	0.52	0.61

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B14: Number of "don't know" or blank answers for questions about general knowledge

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0	0	0.1	0.31	-1.45	0.16
treat. 2	0.19	0.91	0.45	1.50	-1.28	0.21
treat. 3	0.03	0.16	0	0	1.00	0.32
treat. 4	0.05	0.33	0	0	1.00	0.32

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B15: Number of "don't know" or blank answers for questions about terrorism

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.15	0.67	0	0	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	0.03	0.18	0.10	0.30	-1.00	0.33
treat. 3	0.05	0.32	0.10	0.38	-1.43	0.16
treat. 4	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.23	0.00	1.00

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B16: Number of “don’t know” or blank answers for questions about global warming

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.45	0.94	0.15	0.37	1.45	0.16
treat. 2	0.19	0.40	0.16	0.37	0.44	0.66
treat. 3	0.23	0.43	0.15	0.37	1.36	0.18
treat. 4	0.24	0.43	0.22	0.42	0.44	0.66

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B17: Respondent Views about Toleration, in General

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.37	0.5	1.26	0.42	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	1.16	0.37	1.23	0.43	-1.00	0.33
treat. 3	1.23	0.43	1.26	0.44	-0.33	0.74
treat. 4	1.35	0.54	1.38	0.59	-0.30	0.77

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B18: Respondent Views about Reasonableness of People He/She Disagrees with

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	3	0.67	2.89	0.57	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	2.52	0.72	2.68	0.54	-1.41	0.17
treat. 3	2.79	0.77	2.82	0.72	-0.26	0.80
treat. 4	2.54	0.80	2.62	0.64	-0.72	0.47

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B19: Respondent Viewed as Reasonable by People Who Disagree with Him/Her

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2.05	0.52	1.95	0.62	0.81	0.43
treat. 2	1.9	0.7	2.1	0.7	-1.06	0.30
treat. 3	1.92	0.90	2	0.76	-0.52	0.61
treat. 4	1.95	0.70	1.97	0.64	-0.26	0.80

$*p < .1$ $**p < .05$ $***p < .01$

Table B20: Respondent Like for People of Their Own Age Group

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2.95	0.62	2.89	0.66	0.57	0.58
treat. 2	2.87	0.76	2.84	0.58	0.44	0.66
treat. 3	2.62	0.94	2.79	0.83	-1.64	0.11
treat. 4	2.95	0.70	2.84	0.69	1.28	0.21

$*p < .1$ $**p < .05$ $***p < .01$

Table B21: Respondent Like for People of Different Political Persuasions

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2.79	0.63	2.74	0.65	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	2.29	0.74	2.48	0.57	-1.65	0.11
treat. 3	2.69	0.80	2.79	0.66	-1.16	0.25
treat. 4	2.59	0.69	2.51	0.51	0.68	0.50

$*p < .1$ $**p < .05$ $***p < .01$

Table B22: Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Write Letters to Politicians

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2	0.73	1.95	0.69	0.44	0.67
treat. 2	2.14	0.74	1.93	0.88	1.65	0.11
treat. 3	1.79	0.89	1.87	0.89	-0.49	0.63
treat. 4	1.89	0.84	1.73	0.80	1.29	0.21

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B23: Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Attend Political Rallies

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2.45	0.83	2.3	0.8	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	2.41***	0.73	1.83***	0.85	3.64	0.00
treat. 3	1.92	1.01	1.95	1.07	-0.22	0.83
treat. 4	1.86	1.00	1.76	0.68	0.81	0.42

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B24: Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Have Discussions about Politics

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	1.45	0.69	1.45	0.76	0.00	1.00
treat. 2	1.52	0.87	1.38	0.90	0.94	0.36
treat. 3	1.26	0.97	1.18	0.85	0.60	0.56
treat. 4	1.32	0.88	1.27	0.77	0.57	0.57

*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table B25: Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Vote in Presidential Elections

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	0.1	0.45	0.05	0.22	1.00	0.33
treat. 2	0	0	0.21	0.77	-1.44	0.16
treat. 3	0.05	0.22	0.21	0.73	-1.23	0.23
treat. 4	0.05	0.33	0.16	0.60	-1.28	0.21

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table B26: Participation – Respondent Views about Whether People Should Help Turn-out the Vote

	pre-survey mean	stan. dev.	post-survey mean	stan. dev.	T-statistic	sig.
treat. 1	2.05	1.05	2.3	0.86	-1.16	0.26
treat. 2	2.04	1.29	2.07	1.05	-0.16	0.87
treat. 3	2.18	0.85	2.28	1.02	-0.73	0.47
treat. 4	1.92	1.01	2.03	0.90	-0.78	0.44

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Supplementary ANOVA analyses-

Figure B1: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



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*F-statistic: .323 Sig.: .809

Figure B2: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



*F-statistic: .04 Sig.: .989

Figure B3: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



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* F-statistic: .652 Sig.: .583

Figure B4: Experimental Group Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



*F-statistic: 1.478 Sig.: .224

Figure B5: Societal Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Civil Liberties and Security



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*F-statistic: .507 Sig.: .678

Figure B6: Societal Moral Development Score for Question about Trade-offs between Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Reduction



*F-statistic: .927 Sig.: .430

Figure B7: Societal Moral Development Score for Question about whether Illegal Immigrants Help or Hurt Their Communities



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*F-statistic: .767 Sig.: .515

Figure B8: Participation – Has the Respondent Voted in a Local Election?



*F-statistic: .793 Sig.: .509

Figure B9: Participation – Has the Respondent Attended a Political Meeting or Rally?



*F-statistic: 1.733 Sig.: .185

Figure B10: Participation – Has the Respondent Written a Letter to a Politician?



*F-statistic: 1.387 Sig.: .269

Figure B11: Participation – Has the Respondent Discussed Politics with Friends and/or Family?



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*F-statistic: . Sig.: .

Figure B12: Participation – Has the Respondent Sought Out Information about Politics?



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*F-statistic: 1.529　　　　Sig.: .230

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