Summer 2011

Legitimacy and the politics of opposition in the Middle East and North Africa

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LEGITIMACY AND THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

by

Gail Jeanne Buttorff

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2011

Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Douglas Dion

ABSTRACT

Authoritarian elections present a dilemma for opposition political parties. Should the opposition participate in elections that are largely unfair? Should the opposition boycott the elections or resort to extra-electoral means? What explains the choice of strategy among key opponents of a regime? The goal of this project is to further our understanding of the opposition's strategic choices in authoritarian elections. Focusing on a strategy – boycotting – that occurs more often under authoritarian regimes, this dissertation builds a framework for understanding the set of strategies adopted by opposition parties in authoritarian elections. In particular, I develop an incomplete information model of opposition strategies to explain when opposition forces willingly participate in elections, when they engage in an electoral boycott. The predictions of the model are evaluated with both qualitative and quantitative methods. I first examine the predictions of the model using case studies of Jordan and Algeria, constructing narratives of elections and opposition strategies in each country. Second, I test the propositions derived from the model cross-nationally using a unique dataset of every national-level election (both parliamentary and presidential) held between 1990 and 2008. A central argument of the dissertation is that the opposition's perceptions of regime legitimacy are an important determinant of its strategic decisions. Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates how changes in the opposition's beliefs concerning the legitimacy of the regime drive changes in the strategies adopted.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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PH.D. THESIS

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This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

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To my father

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Like so many projects, the number of people to whom I am grateful has increased with the time I have spent working on this dissertation. I am grateful to my dissertation committee members for their willingness to serve on my committee and to hear repeated presentations, read drafts and provide invaluable feedback. Thank you to Raymond Riezman and Ellen Lust for agreeing to serve on this committee as external members—I appreciate your time and feedback. I greatly appreciate the support and encouragement I have received from both Fred, without whom I would be Stata illiterate, and Jae-Jae for her time talking through incomplete thoughts. My advisor, Doug Dion, has supported me throughout graduate school, and this dissertation would certainly not have been possible with out him--I am very thankful to have the opportunity to work with him on this project. His willingness to spend countless hours working through models, proofs and ideas has undoubtedly made this a better dissertation and me a better scholar.

This research would not have been possible without the generous support from the ACOR-CAORC Research Fellowship. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the University of Iowa in the form of the T. Anne Clearly International Dissertation Fellowship and the Ballard Seashore Fellowship. The National Science Foundation, through the Dissertation Improvement Grant, provided additional support for the Algerian case study. The Algerian Cultural Center in Paris made the my research on Algeria far easier and I thank them for their efforts.

In Jordan, my research would not have been possible without the assistance of many people. I am thankful to the staff (and residents!) of ACOR in Amman, Jordan, and for their wonderful support throughout my graduate studies. I owe special thanks to Dr. Barbara Porter for her assistance in helping an inexperienced researcher get off the ground and running. Only a day after I arrived for my first field research trip, Barbara introduced me to a USAID official that set in motion the elite interview process. I am

grateful to Samya for her time and willingness to call members of the IAF to schedule interviews when my Arabic was not so good, especially over the phone, and to Samar for transcribing seemingly endless interview transcripts. Saleh Al Deek and Murad Khasawneh made my trips to parliament more enjoyable and productive. I thank both for their help and friendship. I had three wonderful research assistants, Mariam, Helen and Bayan, without whom my research would have been far more difficult. I am especially grateful to Bayan Al-Abdullat for his assistance and for his efforts in obtaining meetings that I was unable to get. Lastly, but certainly not least, I am thankful to the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood members in Jordan, whose openness and willingness to meet with me made this dissertation research possible.

Finally, I am remarkably lucky to have many wonderful friends and family that have supported me in so many ways throughout this process. My siblings and Heath are owed particular thanks for their constant support and comic relief. The dissertation writing process was made much easier by the enforcement efforts of my sister Christy and Jessica when I lacked all motivation to actually write a chapter. I am also grateful to Jessica Lee and Heath Spong for their efforts editing most of the manuscript.

I dedicate this dissertation to my father who, through his example, has shown me the importance of having a career you love, and has provided me with the opportunities and resources to pursue such a career. He passed on to me a love of learning all subjects through school, books, and travel, and I am forever grateful.

ABSTRACT

Authoritarian elections present a dilemma for opposition political parties. Should the opposition participate in elections that are largely unfair? Should the opposition boycott the elections or resort to extra-electoral means? What explains the choice of strategy among key opponents of a regime? The goal of this project is to further our understanding of the opposition's strategic choices in authoritarian elections. Focusing on a strategy – boycotting – that occurs more often under authoritarian regimes, this dissertation builds a framework for understanding the set of strategies adopted by opposition parties in authoritarian elections. In particular, I develop an incomplete information model of opposition strategies to explain when opposition forces willingly participate in elections, when they engage in an electoral boycott. The predictions of the model are evaluated with both qualitative and quantitative methods. I first examine the predictions of the model using case studies of Jordan and Algeria, constructing narratives of elections and opposition strategies in each country. Second, I test the propositions derived from the model cross-nationally using a unique dataset of every national-level election (both parliamentary and presidential) held between 1990 and 2008. A central argument of the dissertation is that the opposition's perceptions of regime legitimacy are an important determinant of its strategic decisions. Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates how changes in the opposition's beliefs concerning the legitimacy of the regime drive changes in the strategies adopted.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Table

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Michael Hudson wrote in 1977 that a deficit of legitimacy was the "central problem" facing Arab regimes. More specifically, he argues, "the shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable nature of all present Arab governments" (2). It is remarkable to contrast Hudson's observation of instability among Arab regimes with the more recent research in political science that emphasizes the exceptional stability among Middle East and North African regimes. Indeed, political scientists regard the region as exceptional due to the long-lasting tenure of its numerous authoritarian regimes. These regimes have been surprisingly resilient to the impetus to democratize during a period when the number of democracies increased in all other regions, most notably in Africa and Asia (Bellin 2005:21). Despite the differing assessments between Hudson's claim and recent political science research, legitimacy among Arab regimes remains an issue of interest and opportunity for scholarship. The region's exceptionalism creates a valuable opportunity to examine legitimacy in an effort to understand the period of regime stability and those factors that may ultimately lead to regime collapse.

The legitimacy and stability of authoritarian regimes are issues not unique to the Middle East and North Africa. At the turn of the twenty-first century, we are faced with a new and odd phenomenon: authoritarian elections. In the past, one of the first things authoritarian governments did upon coming to power was to cancel elections and crack down on political activity. Today, the vast majority of authoritarian governments hold national-level elections and, further still, allow multiparty competition; countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, and Libya are the rare exceptions. Authoritarian elections continue to puzzle us, raising questions about legitimacy and the role of elections. Legitimacy, as noted by Huntington (1991), "is essential to understanding the problems confronting

authoritarian regimes" (46). Elections in democracies are regarded as mechanisms of accountability, and even the mechanism through which a regime establishes legitimacy. Banducci and Karp (2003) note that, "Democratic theory assumes a relationship between election participation and the legitimacy of the political system—fairly conducted and regular elections create system legitimacy" (443). The role of elections in authoritarian regimes, however, remains unclear. Some scholars believe these elections help to establish legitimacy and can indeed lead to further democratization (e.g. Hermet et al 1978; Booth and Seglison 1995; Barkan 2000; Lindberg 2006).[1] Others argue that elections under authoritarian regimes work to the detriment of the democratization process, and only sustain authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust-Okar 2006, 2009).[2] If authoritarian elections are not mechanisms of accountability or legitimation, on what basis do regimes establish legitimacy and how can we understand their stability?

Authoritarian elections are a perfect example of what Terry Lynn Karl called the "fallacy of electoralism" which reminds us that elections are not sufficient for democracy; rather, in addition to elections, broader political and civil rights must also be guaranteed (Dahl 1971). Nevertheless, elections are the foundations of democratic systems. Our definitions, both ancient and modern, have always held elections to be an important characteristic of democracy. In the twentieth century, elections took an even more prominent role in defining democracy as democratic theory evolved from its classical emphasis on the common good to modern electoral democratic theory. It was Schumpeter's (1942) definition that provided the basis for modern democratic theory. He wrote, "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political

[1] One criticism of Lindberg's (2006) study is that he only examines elections since 1990, ignoring decades of elections that *did not* lead to democratization. The Gambia, for example, held regular elections and was considered "Free" by Freedom House from 1965 until the military intervention in 1995. I thank Ellen Lust for this point regarding Lindberg's study.

[2] Jordan, for example, held six elections between 1989 and 2010, during which it remained 'Partly Free,' as classified by Freedom House, until 2010 when it was downgraded to 'Not Free.'

decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (269).[3] Dahl (1971) similarly centralized the role of elections, arguing that free, fair, and competitive elections are necessary to guarantee citizens' rights to formulate and communicate their preferences.[4]

During what Samuel Huntington (1991) called the third wave of democratization, approximately 100 countries began the process of democratization. The number of countries democratizing accelerated at the end of the Cold War, placing increasing external pressure on authoritarian regimes to democratize. These countries set up democratic institutions, began holding elections, and many also liberalized restrictions on the media and civil and political rights. However, the vast majority of these countries are neither democracies nor democratizing, and the reversion to authoritarian practices continues (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002).[5] In fact, only about twenty percent of countries democratizing during the third wave successfully transitioned (Carothers 2002). As a result, there is a wide-range of countries that are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian. Some countries' democratization efforts stalled while other countries have moved backwards and undone many of their liberalizing reforms. Although Eastern European countries have successfully transitioned to democracies, many countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that began democratizing during the third wave have failed to meet expectations.

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[3] Schumpeter elaborates on his conception of competitive struggle stating the following: "To simplify matters we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote. The justification for this is that democracy seems to imply a recognized method by which to conduct the competitive struggle, and that the electoral method is practically the only one available for communities of any size" (1942:271).

[4] In addition to elections, Dahl argued that eight institutional guarantees were necessary for democracy: (1) the freedom to form and join organizations; (2) the freedom of expression; (3) right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) right of political leaders to compete for support and the right of political leaders to compete for votes; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference; and (8) free and fair elections (Dahl 1971:3).

[5] Diamond notes that "of the 25 breakdowns or reversals of democracy that have taken place from the beginning of the third wave in 1974 through the end of 2008, 17 of them (about two-thirds) have occurred in the past decade" (xvii).

The existence of regimes that began but never completed the process of political liberalization has generated a number of different regime classifications[6] aimed at deepening our understanding of the dynamics of democratization.[7] Schedler (2006) uses the term "electoral authoritarian" to classify regimes that hold multiparty elections for the legislature and/or the executive, have open political space, universal suffrage, and multiparty elections. Despite these democratic elements, Schedler argues, electoral authoritarian regimes lack the checks and balances, bureaucratic integrity, and the judicial impartiality we usually associate with fully democratic states. Incumbent elites of such regimes often engage in undemocratic practices such as election fraud and regularly restrict access to media and press freedoms.

In addition to the emergence of electoral authoritarian regimes since 1990, we have observed an increased use of the strategy of election boycotts by opposition political parties. Boycotts are "an organized effort to withdraw and induce others to withdraw from social or business relations with another" (Laidler 1913:27). Since 1990, approximately eleven percent of elections have been boycotted (Beaulieu 2006). The majority of boycotts occur in the Middle East and Africa, and under authoritarian regimes. If free, fair, and competitive elections are one of the most important elements of democracy, contestation and participation are also essential for elections to be effective guarantors of democracy. According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), "citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the

[6] See for example Diamond (2002), Schedler (2002; 2006) and Levitsky and Way (2002). Common classifications are pseudo-democratic, semi-democratic, hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes.

[7] This point is made well by Diamond (2002): "Tracking the interplay between changes in political competition and changes in political repression may thus help us understand when and how moments of possible transition open and close in electoral authoritarian regimes….As democracies differ among themselves in significant ways and degrees, so do contemporary authoritarian regimes, and if we are to understand the contemporary dynamics, cause, limits, and possibilities of regime change (including possible future democratization), we must understand the different, and in some respects new, types of authoritarian rule" (23).

ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process" (38).[8] The importance of contestation and participation is certainly evident in political history, which has been dominated by the struggle to achieve political participation rights.[9] We are now entering a period in which political parties and groups are regularly and consciously choosing not to participate in elections, even as many of these boycotting parties lead the struggle for broader participation rights.

The opposition strategy of boycotting an election raises an important issue regarding the study of political behavior under authoritarianism. The answer to why political parties boycott seems obvious: they boycott because the elections do not matter, and/or they believe they will lose. An implication of this conclusion is that we cannot make meaningful inferences about the importance, or significance, of behavior in authoritarian elections. If boycotts are in fact adopted because elections are meaningless, or the opposition will not win, perhaps more puzzling then is why the opposition participates in authoritarian elections at all. A central argument of the dissertation is that the opposition strategies of participation and boycott are both significant, and worthy of systematic investigation.

Political parties rarely boycott every election, and their selective participation suggests that the opposition values participation, at least under particular conditions. This selective participation further suggests that elections do in fact matter, and a growing area of scholarship recognizes the importance of both authoritarian elections and political behavior in these elections. Elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are the primary arena of struggle between the regime and opposition groups (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002). During elections, citizens and opposition parties have an

[8] Political participation, according to Verba et al, is the "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies" (Verba et al 1995:9)

[9] As noted by Huntington, "Broadening political participation is a hallmark of political modernization" (1976:1).

opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Opposition parties organize, build constituencies, publish election platforms, and hold rallies (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002; Schwedler 2006:193). Although authoritarian elections are not contests over policy, they are competitions over access to state resources (Lust-Okar 2006). As such, boycotting a legislative election entails costs for an opposition party, including a loss of seats and, by extension, a platform from which to criticize the government and to publicize their agenda.

Authoritarian elections certainly pose a dilemma for opposition parties. Should the opposition participate in elections that are largely unfair? Should the opposition boycott the elections or resort to extra-electoral means? Opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes face the decision to participate, boycott, or mobilize against the regime (i.e. revolt). Of these three strategies, the strategy of boycotting elections is emerging as a major strategy adopted by opposition parties. Despite the increasing frequency of election boycotts, this strategy has received limited attention from scholars in political science and we have yet to understand why political parties boycott elections and when such a strategy is successful.

The goal of this project is to further our understanding of opposition strategies in authoritarian elections. To this end, I develop an incomplete information model, which provides a framework for understanding the set of strategies adopted by opposition parties in authoritarian elections. Using this theoretical framework, we can identify the conditions under which opposition parties choose particular strategies. The theory developed in this dissertation is a general theory of opposition strategy in that we can explain why, at times, the opposition participates, boycotts and/or mobilizes against a regime. This dissertation, however, is specifically concerned with the opposition's choice between participation and boycott.

The recent increase in the number of boycotted elections makes this study timely. Moreover, election boycotts have significant normative implications for the quality of the

electoral process, representation and democracy. Free and fair elections are a primary mechanism for ensuring fundamental principles of democracy such as representation, participation and accountability. As such, democratic processes and elections without the participation of opposition parties violate these principles. As noted by Mainwaring and Scully (1995):

> Parties give people a channel for political participation, establishing a linkage between citizens and government…Democracy gives citizens and institutionalized, regular, and peaceful opportunity (that is, elections) to replace political leaders and representatives. Democratic accountability revolves in large measure around having this opportunity (24).

This sentiment is echoed by Lindberg (2006) who writes that "without political opposition there is no choice, and when there is no choice, the public cannot exercise its discretion to indirectly rule via representation" (150). Given the undisputed importance of elections and participation to democracy, the conditions under which opposition parties choose to participate, or boycott, warrant systematic examination.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. As election boycotts have received relatively less attention in political science than the strategies of participation and revolt, I will first review the previous explanations for election boycotts and discuss their limitations. Section 1.2 outlines how the dissertation will further our understanding of the strategic choices made by the opposition in authoritarian regimes. Specifically, I emphasize the impact of legitimacy, and the opposition's beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime, on the strategies adopted by the opposition. In Section 1.3, I discuss the methodology employed in the dissertation to investigate these issues. Finally, I outline the plan of the dissertation.

1.1 Existing Explanations of Election Boycotts

Though election boycotts are not a new phenomenon, the increase in boycotted elections is a recent trend corresponding to a wave of democratizations that began in

1990. The election boycott literature has identified several causes of election boycotts. The first explanation of election boycotts is the existence of fraud or unfair electoral processes. In a study of authoritarian elections in sub-Saharan Africa, Lindberg (2006) finds that "opposition parties participated in only 40-45 percent of the flawed elections, whereas the rate hits around 90 percent in elections that were free and fair" (158). He also finds the "extent to which elections are free and fair and whether political violence is used during the campaign and on polling day" to be the largest determinants of whether opposition parties participate in elections (161). Bratton (1998) similarly emphasizes the role of unfair electoral processes in provoking boycotts. He argues that boycotts are employed to "protest an incumbent's efforts to bend electoral rules or monopolize electoral resources" (61). He finds that "every boycott of a second election was accompanied by unfavorable reports on that election from observers and monitors" (61).

The second theory of election boycotts argues that it is not electoral unfairness or transgressions of rules that drives opposition parties to boycott but rather their own electoral prospects. According to this theory, when opposition parties believe they will do poorly in upcoming elections, they will choose to boycott in an effort to "save face" (Pastor 1999). Bratton (1998) similarly emphasizes the possibility that boycotts are mere schemes to save face, insisting that, "we should remain alert to the possibility that a boycott, rather than reflecting a flawed electoral process, can be a ruse by opposition parties that have concluded they have no chance of winning" (Bratton 1998).

Beaulieu (2006) provides the most systematic examination of the causes and consequences of election boycotts to date. In an attempt to reconcile the two previous explanations of boycotts, she differentiates between major and minor boycotts. Major boycotts are boycotts that involve a majority of the opposition and can include boycotts launched by a single party and those undertaken by a coalition of opposition parties. This new typology, according to Beaulieu, helps distinguish between boycotts that are in fact protests against unfair practices and those that are merely employing the rhetoric of

boycotts to gain some particularistic goal. Beaulieu argues that the determinants of elections boycotts will differ across the two party types different parties' types as, according to Beaulieu, minor parties are more likely to be niche parties, ethnic or religious-based parties whereas major parties are more likely to be catch-all parties. Given the differing nature of the major versus minor parties, differentiating between boycotts undertaken by minor parties as opposed to major parties.[10] She states:

> Major boycotts are launched by larger, more general, opposition parties, while minor boycotts are the work of smaller parties that might be considered 'single issue' parties. Major boycotters, because they represent a larger segment of the opposition, can pursue goals that more closely approximate public goods, because they are large enough to internalize the benefit. Minor boycotters, by contrast, are going to pursue more particularistic goals due to their limited size and more homogeneous composition (31-32).

She concludes that major boycotts will be caused by electoral unfairness and opposition strength whereas minor boycotts will stem from heavy international aid dependence and conditional party finance (Beaulieu 2006:66-68).[11]

Although the extant literature has identified several conditions under which boycotts may occur, including weak electoral prospects and unfair electoral processes, these factors alone cannot explain the widespread occurrence of election boycotts since 1990. For example, in many instances elections are neither free nor fair but the opposition party overlooks the boycott option in favor of participation. The explanatory power of fraud in explaining election boycotts weakens considerably when we note that

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[10] Beaulieu failed to account for important institutions (namely electoral rules) that influence the number and type of political parties. Electoral rules, together with ethnic cleavages and geographic concentration of voters, are well-established determinants of party systems (see for example Riker 1982; Kim and Ohn 1992; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003).

[11] Beaulieu also distinguishes between non-violent (Gandhian) boycotts and violent (Fearonian) boycotts. She argues that Gandhian boycotts seeks to delegitimize the regime and will remain nonviolent in the hopes of attracting supporters (32). Fearonian boycotters, on the other hand, will engage in violence in efforts to " threaten the regime with the possibility of future rebellion" (33). This distinction, however, appears to be unimportant since the vast majority of boycotts are nonviolent. No minor boycotts in Beaulieu's dataset are considered Fearonian and only 11% (5 cases) of major boycotts involve opposition-initiated violence.

the decision to boycott an election is made prior to the election in question and frequently prior to the start of campaigning. Moreover, in the absence of blatant manipulation, it is difficult to determine whether elections were in fact unfair given the clandestine nature of fraud and the partisan nature of allegations (Lehoucq 2003; Alvarez et al 2008). Bratton (1998) and Beaulieu (2006), who both use fraud to explain election boycotts, also raise this concern. Beaulieu states, "It is possible that observer reports reflect the conditions that caused a boycott in the first place, but it is also possible that the boycott itself affected the observers' assessment of the fairness of the election" (17).

Incumbent elites in many developing countries have a large "menu of manipulation" to ensure election victory (Schedler 2002). Such manipulation options include tampering with vote counts and voter registration rolls as well as "legal" manipulations such as redrawing district boundaries (i.e. gerrymandering) and altering the electoral rules. The ambiguous definition of election fraud makes it difficult to distinguish between truly fraudulent elections (e.g. elections involving vote buying, ballot rigging, opening/closing polling stations before or after scheduled times, and intimidation, coercion and/or violence) and elections that are conducted under partisan and inadequately enforced rules. According to Bratton (1998), "Incumbents who are intent on retaining office have found 'wholesale' rule changes (concerning who competes) to be a far more effective means of controlling outcomes than seeking to influence votes individually at the 'retail' level" (63). In other words, incumbent regimes have found legal ways to control election outcomes that do not rely on what we traditionally would characterize as election fraud. In Jordan, for example, the regime has manipulated the electoral rules, including gerrymandering, to engineer a parliament composed of regime loyalists (Lust-Okar 2006).

Contrary to the assertion that weak electoral prospects can explain boycotts, opposition parties often participate in elections despite poor electoral prospects. Opposition political parties still compete in elections in the Middle East and North Africa

even though the election outcomes are "easily predicted" (Brown and Shahin 2010:3). Although electoral victory is certainly part of the entry calculus, there are other reasons motivating parties or candidates to compete in elections. Parties may participate in elections knowing they will lose in an effort to gain concessions or more votes in future elections. According to Cox (1997), for example, political parties may be able to win policy concessions by showing that "entering [a race] will cause a particular candidate to lose the race" (158). Dr. 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, argues that the Islamic Action Front should always participate in the elections despite weak electoral prospects as the party loses a platform from which to speak on behalf of the people when they boycott the elections.[12]

The extant explanations of election boycotts cannot explain when the opposition willingly participates in elections and when the same opposition groups choose to boycott. The next section puts forth an explanation.

1.2 Legitimacy and Opposition Politics

The central focus of the dissertation is the influence of legitimacy on opposition party strategies in authoritarian elections. Specifically, this dissertation will show how changes in the opposition's beliefs concerning the legitimacy of the regime drive changes in the strategies adopted. To explore the relationship between legitimacy and party strategy, I adopt the following definition of legitimacy put forth by Stinchcombe (1968):

> A power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective (162).

[12] He states: "We have to share [participate in elections] even when we don't have [a] big number. We [are] still on ground, we still have [a] place to say something, [and] have power to protect [the] people" (Interview with Author, February 2009, Amman).

The use of this definition, which is explored in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, provides a framework for not only understanding opposition strategies but also regime stability. As has long been noted in political science, the consequence of legitimacy is stability.

Legitimacy has been widely employed to explain various political phenomena including election participation (Powell 1986; Norris 2002, 2004; Karp and Banducci 2008), and protests, rebellions and other antisystem behavior (Worchel, Hester, and Kopala 1974; Muller et al 1982; Lake and Rothschild 1996). Moreover, legitimacy is used to explain revolutions, which become possible when authorities lose legitimacy (Johnson 1964; Gurr 1970). Furthermore, the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the election, and the regime more generally, is often cited by opposition parties as one of the primary reasons for undertaking an election boycott. Thus, in addition to the strategies of participation and revolt, opposition beliefs in the legitimacy of a regime are an important part of the decision to boycott elections.

Although the extant literature alludes to the potential role of governmental legitimacy on the decision to boycott, there does not exist sustained consideration in the literature. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) suggest that boycotts are an action undertaken to reject the legitimacy of the government and to achieve some reform in the rules. Beaulieu (2006) also suggests legitimacy plays a key role in explaining election boycotts. She argues that lower voter turnout during a boycott can signal to the government and the international community that government is illegitimate (88). The underlying logic is that parties believe the government is illegitimate and boycott in an effort to either signal this belief or obtain some policy concession. Mainwaring and Scully, and Beaulieu, offer useful insights about the potential relationship between boycotts and legitimacy. There is, however, no explicit definition of legitimacy or testing of this relationship in the boycott literature. As such, we cannot differentiate between boycotts under legitimate governments and those under illegitimate governments, and ultimately, why some boycotts appear successful whereas others appear ineffective.

Incorporating regime legitimacy, and the beliefs of the opposition, into our analysis of opposition strategies will allow us to explain the strategic decisions of opposition groups. Importantly, this dissertation will provide an explanation for why opposition parties would participate in elections that are largely unfair and rigged. The central argument of the dissertation is that legitimacy is integral to explaining opposition politics in authoritarian regimes. Understanding how political actors perceive the legitimacy of the regime will further assist in determining the conditions under which governments respond (i.e. reform), and thus when elections boycotts are "successful" strategies.

In addition to legitimacy, I also incorporate ideology, institutions, and the costs of triggering a crisis (i.e. the costs of mobilizing against the regime) into the theory of opposition strategy. Not only are these factors well-established determinants of party strategies in democratic elections, but have also been isolated by scholars studying authoritarian elections in the Middle East and North Africa. Masoud (2008), for example, argues that the costs of mobilizing outside the electoral arena (e.g. in cases of high repression) may lead opposition groups to form political parties and participate as opposition candidates rather than engage in other protest activities.

The work of Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) also emphasizes the importance of the costs of mobilization in explaining opposition behavior. Lust-Okar argues that while opposition behavior, specifically the willingness to mobilize against a regime, is affected by economic crisis, the Structures of Contestation (SoCs), regulating the legality of opposition groups, temper this effect. Under unified SoCs in which all opposition groups are either legal or illegal, joint conflict is less costly than a single opposition group mobilizing against a regime. In divided SoCs where only some (radical) opposition groups are illegal, the cost of a joint conflict is actually higher than an isolated conflict for the legal opposition. In this way, SoCs influence not only the costs, but also the

willingness of opposition groups to mobilize against the regime.[13] In addition, Lust-Okar incorporates ideological divergence between opposition groups and the government, and between different opposition groups, into her analysis of opposition behavior. She argues that greater ideological divergence between opposition groups can decrease the expected utility of a conflict to a moderate opposition group. Conversely, when the moderate opposition prefers the ideal point of a radical opposition group to the status quo, the likelihood it mobilizes against the regime increases.

Ideology is also important in explaining opposition behavior beyond mobilizing against the regime. For example, ideology may affect the willingness of opposition groups to cooperate, with greater ideological divergence increasing the difficulty of cooperation between groups (Schwedler and Clark 2006). Ideological positions, according Niethammer (2008), influence the strategies of Bahraini political actors and, in fact, defined the set of available strategies (144). She notes, "Bahraini political actors' strategic options were defined, to a great extent, by their respective positions toward parliament" (144). She argues that the radical opposition, represented by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, "had fewer strategies that they could employ to demand reform" because of its position vis-à-vis the parliament (159).

Posusney (2005) argues successful boycotts require cooperation across opposition forces and "differences in ideology, size, and short-term goals and prospects among parties—all mediated by the electoral system—present barriers to cooperation" (111). Following in the tradition of the institutionalist literature, Posusney and Lust-Okar both emphasize the importance of the institutional setting, which can increase or decrease the costs of certain behavior to the opposition. The fundamental insight of this literature is

[13] As noted by Lust-Okar, "Legal opponents want to mobilize against in order to gain their demands, but they do not want their mobilization to become out of control…They have made implicit agreements with the government to maintain control; in return, they receive access to the formal political sphere, some policy concessions, and selective incentives. In contrast, excluded opposition elites prefer to use more radical methods of challenging the status quo. They have not made agreements with the government and thus have no particular need to curb their attacks" (89).

that "the organization of political life makes a difference" (March and Olsen 1989:1). Institutions, in the words of North (1990) are the "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (3).

Electoral rules are a particularly important set of institutions for understanding party strategy. Since Duverger's (1954) seminal work, the literature on the causes and consequences of election laws has shown that electoral rules affect a party's access to the legislature (see Lijphart 1994) and the strategies adopted by political parties (see for example Downs 1957; Cox 1997; Strøm 1990). Electoral institutions also influence the positioning of political parties in a policy space (Downs 1957), the incentives of candidates to cultivate the personal vote (Myerson 1993; Carey and Shugart 1995; Samuels 1999), and the emergence and success of new parties (Palfrey 1984; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Müller-Rommel 1991; Hug 2001).

Even in authoritarian contexts, electoral rules have important consequences for representation and access to power (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002). Posusney (2005) argues that, "Even under controlled contestation, electoral systems will affect the number of political parties that operate in a country, their internal dynamics, and the strategies they adopt" (95). Incumbent elites can manipulate the electoral rules to maintain power and, in doing so, they alter the representativeness of parliament and the incentives for participation (Lust-Okar 2006; Lust-Okar 2008). Moreover, different institutional rules can make coordination and cooperation (both within and outside the electoral arena) more, or less, difficult (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Posusney 2005; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Lindberg (2006) briefly considers the correlation between boycotts and four types of electoral rules (two-round majority, plurality, mixed and proportional representation systems). However, he does not find an "independent effect" of electoral systems on opposition boycotts after controlling for whether the election is free and fair.[14]

[14] His analysis is problematic as he considers only electoral authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.

1.3 Methodology

This dissertation adopts a multi-methodological approach to develop and test a theory of boycotts using both qualitative and quantitative methods. A multiple methods approach is increasingly advocated by many scholars (see for example, Bennett and Elman 2006; Lieberman 2005; Laitin 2002; Ragin 1987). Laitin (2002) argues that the key to scientific progress is crossing the tripartite method divide (i.e. the divide between large-n analysis, narratives or case studies, and formal theory). Multi-method approaches are also used frequently by scholars studying both party strategy (e.g. Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011) and the Middle East (Lust-Okar 2005; Blaydes 2008). The value of using multiple methodological techniques lies in the ability to combine various methods all of which individually have advantages and disadvantages. In addition, employing multiple methods to evaluate a theory increases the robustness of one's findings. I do not use multiple methods simply as a formality to stay on trend. Rather, each of the three methods employed in this dissertation offers a unique contribution to my study.

There are many reasons to use formal modeling techniques, including the clarity of assumptions, the identification of causal mechanisms, and the generation of new insights. I use a formal game theoretic model in order to investigate the mechanism underlying the relationships between opposition strategies and legitimacy, ideological divergence, and institutions. I test the hypotheses derived from the model using a dataset containing every national-level election held between 1990 and 2008 (Beaulieu 2006).[15] All elections, both presidential and legislative, have been coded as experiencing an election boycott or not. The statistical analysis will help establish generalized relationships between boycotts and the independent variables of interest. However, examining the effects of ideological divergence and legitimacy beliefs on opposition

[15] Emily Beaulieu graciously provided me with her data she collected on boycotted elections. As in many first attempts at large-scale data collection, there were some coding errors. Using Beaulieu's format as a starting point, I collected a new dataset of all boycotted elections between 1990 and 2008.

strategies is particularly well suited to qualitative analysis. Political parties will frequently boycott one election and then participate in the subsequent election under the same regime and the same set of electoral rules. The cases studies emphasize how changes in the opposition's beliefs across elections affect its strategic decisions and, in so doing, we are able to account for the common pattern of participation and boycott observed cross-nationally.

In addition, the case studies of Jordan and Algeria are important for determining the motivations behind boycotts as well as the decision-making processes that precede an election boycott.[16] Within each country, I focus on opposition political parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Socialist Forces Front in Algeria. The model developed in Chapter 3 does not preclude non-party opposition actors and there are important non-party opposition actors (e.g. civil society groups, such as the *archs* in Algeria) in both Jordan and Algeria. The dissertation is, however, primarily concerned with the decision to boycott elections, and I thus select opposition political parties as the unit of analysis for the case studies. I draw upon elite interviews and archival research to assess the actors' beliefs as well as their perceptions of the costs, benefits, and success of the boycott. The case studies move us beyond correlation in exploring the mechanisms linking the independent and dependent variables.

The Middle East and North Africa is a particularly important region in which to study election boycotts and the role of elections. Elections have been boycotted in Israel, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, and Egypt. Moreover, the region has remained exceptional in its resilience to democratization. Almost every country in the region holds national-level elections and yet only two (Israel and Turkey)

[16] This was, of course, the motivation behind *Analytic Narratives* (Bates et al 1998). On using the narrative in conjunction with formal theory, the authors write, "By reading documents, laboring through archives, interviewing and surveying the secondary literature, we seek to understand the actors' preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions" (11).

are considered democracies. Moreover, many Middle East and North African countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia, began democratizing during the third wave; however, none of these countries successfully transitioned. The region, as a result, consists largely of electoral authoritarian regimes.

The 1980s brought economic hardship on much of the populace as the price of oil decreased and international assistance declined. To alleviate growing popular discontent, regimes responded with "promises of economic and political reform" (Ibrahim 1995:43), and both authoritarian monarchies and authoritarian presidencies took steps toward liberalization. As noted by Brown and Shahin (2002), "Elections were used to enhance the eroding legitimacy of Arab regimes and reinforce their claims of adhering to legal procedures and democratic practices" (3). Political liberalization was initiated and controlled by the incumbent regimes across the region and incumbent regimes remain in control of the process of political change. In the Arab world, according to Baaklini et al (1999),

> Neither the supply of political reforms nor the demand for them has culminated in the replacement of incumbent elites by new ones. Instead, political change in the region has been gradual and uneven. Instead of manifesting itself through the downfall of existing regimes, change has taken the form of attempts at relegitimizing the system through elections and the incorporation of new groups into the institutions of the state (31).

Although the number of democracies has increased worldwide since 1972, the Middle East and North Africa has remained "exceptional" in its authoritarianism. The fundamental question, as stated by Eva Bellin (2004), is: "Why have the Middle East and North Africa remained so singularly resistant to democratization?" (139). Much of the work seeking to explain this exceptionalism has focused on the region's lack of certain economic and cultural conditions deemed necessary for a successful democratic transition. The Middle East and North Africa, however, is not unique in lacking the cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy.[17] Many countries in Asia and Africa

[17] See Bellin 2004 for an excellent review of these explanations and their shortcomings.

have democratized despite high poverty and illiteracy levels (e.g. India) and weak civil societies.

Although every country in the region holding elections has experienced an election boycott, there has also been opposition participation in these authoritarian elections. In other words, there is variation in the strategies adopted by the opposition. It is the exceptional stability of the region's authoritarian regimes, however, that makes it such a valuable region to explore legitimacy and its effects; a concept long associated with regime stability. This dissertation in exploring legitimacy and its impact on opposition strategies will provide a framework for understanding this stability

Within this region, I select Algeria and Jordan as cases for several reasons. First, political liberalization in both Algeria and Jordan began amidst widespread unrest and rioting in the late 1980s. Elections in Algeria and Jordan have been criticized domestically and abroad as fraudulent and unfair, and related questions have been raised regarding the electoral rules, the electoral process, and the legitimacy of the regimes. Since 1989, Jordan has held regular national parliamentary elections in which multiple political parties have participated. Since 1995, elections have been held regularly in Algeria, with multiple parties taking part in each election. After the first elections, regimes in both Algeria and Jordan changed the electoral rules to disadvantage major opposition parties (see Baaklini et al. 1999 and Bouandel 2005) and Algeria changed the electoral rules governing the national legislative elections again in 1996. Moreover, Algeria and Jordan use different electoral laws for legislative elections. Algeria currently uses a proportional representation system for legislative elections and a majoritarian electoral system for its executive elections; Jordan uses a majoritarian system for its parliamentary elections. As such, there is important variation both within and across the two cases.

The second reason for selecting these two cases is that they both demonstrate patterns of participation and non-participation. In Jordan, although the same majoritarian-

plurality system was used in all elections since 1993, the opposition has boycotted only twice (in 1997 and 2010). Similarly, in Algeria, Saïd Sadi (the president of Rally for Culture and Democracy—RCD) was a candidate in the 1995 presidential election, boycotted the 1999 presidential and the 2002 legislative elections, and then competed again in the 2004 presidential election. The Socialist Forces Front ("FFS"), on the other hand, boycotted the two legislative elections and three presidential elections held between 1999 and 2009. The current president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected on April 9, 2009 essentially unopposed since the RCD, the FFS, and a number of other parties boycotted. Moreover, every election in Algeria held between 1995 and 2009 was boycotted by at least one opposition party, with the exception of 1997.

Finally, the cases of Algeria and Jordan did not support my preliminary theoretical expectations about the effect of electoral rules on the strategy of boycotting. First, Algeria uses a proportional system to conduct its legislative elections but has still experienced legislative election boycotts under these rules. Secondly, in both countries opposition political parties have boycotted and participated under the same electoral rules, without reform, and under the same regimes. In regard to issues of case selection bias in qualitative cases studies, George and Bennett (2005) note that "the most damaging consequences arise from selecting only cases whose independent *and* dependent variables vary as the favored hypothesis suggest, ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory and over generalizing from these cases to wider populations" (24).[18] It is for these reasons that Algeria and Jordan provide important cases to examine the role of legitimacy on strategic decisions of opposition parties in the two countries.

[18] William Quandt (1998) echoes this sentiment about the case of Algeria specifically: "The Algerian case, because it has challenged so much conventional wisdom, deserves careful attention (7).

1.4 The Plan of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines Stinchcombe's approach to the concept of legitimacy, contrasting it with the previous literature and offering a formalization of his definition. This chapter also explores how we can operationalize Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy. Chapter 2 is particularly important in identifying those features of Stinchcombe's definition (centers of power and doctrines of legitimacy) that will be important in the empirical application of this definition. Using the formalization of Stinchcombe's definition outlined in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 develops a formal theory of election boycotts. I use an incomplete information model to examine the conditions under which an opposition political party chooses to boycott an election and a government responds to the demands of the boycott party. Moreover, the model is used to explain why the opposition participates in authoritarian elections and when it might choose to challenge the regime following a failed boycott.

Chapter 4 tests the propositions of the model cross-nationally using a dataset of every national-level election (both parliamentary and presidential) held between 1990-2008. This chapter establishes generalized relationships between key independent variables and election boycotts. In Chapter 5, I extend the discussion of the operationalization of Stinchcombe's definition to the Middle East and North Africa, and, in particular, to Jordan and Algeria. The identification of the specific centers of power that form the bases of the regimes' support is important to the case studies that follow in the subsequent two chapters. I then examine, in Chapters 6 and 7, the assumptions and propositions of the model using case studies of Jordan and Algeria. These chapters construct narratives of the electoral processes (before, during and after) in each county. The narratives highlight the actors involved (the government, the opposition parties, and the centers of power), their preferences and goals, and the following 4 themes: (1) the reason(s) for deciding to boycott; (2) the perceived costs and benefits; (3) the consequences (positive and negative); and (4) whether (and why) the parties believed the

boycott to be successful. Chapter 8 concludes exploring how this research increases our understanding of the Middle East and North Africa's exceptionalism.

CHAPTER 2
LEGITIMACY

Many elements of the theory are fairly straightforward. We know how to define, and represent formally, both institutions (e.g. electoral systems) and ideological divergence. The electoral system is the set of rules affecting the translation of votes into seats, and includes the electoral formula (proportional representation, majoritarian, etc.), district magnitude, electoral thresholds and ballot structure (Lijphart 1999). Formal theory has long been used to examine the effects of electoral systems (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972; Cox 1984, 1997).[19] Ideological divergence is defined as the distance between two actors' ideal points in a one dimensional, or multi-dimensional, policy space. Formal representations of spatial dynamics also have a long history in political science (Hotelling 1929; Black 1958; Downs 1957).

Legitimacy, however, is a different story. Legitimacy is an important conceptual element in political theory dating back at least to Thucydides, and we find treatments of legitimacy in modern theories of politics as well. Beliefs in the legitimacy of a regime, for example, are important determinants of a wide-variety of political behavior from revolutions to participation. Typically, it is argued that citizens viewing the regime as highly legitimate will participate politically through conventional (established) channels. Such participation, in turn, will "reinforce and stabilize extant institutions" (Booth and Seligson 2009:20). On the other hand, citizens with low beliefs in legitimacy are more likely to engage in antisystem behavior such as protesting and rioting (Norris 1999).

Following in this tradition, I seek to explain the relationship between legitimacy and the choice of strategy by opposition parties. In order to investigate the role of beliefs in the legitimacy of a regime on party strategy, I adopt a non-traditional definition of legitimacy put forth by Stinchcombe (1968). Legitimacy is a notoriously difficult

[19] For the purposes of this dissertation, effect of electoral system is collapsed into π (see Chapter 3).

concept leading some scholars to call for its abandonment (e.g. Przeworski 1986; Levi 2005). As Ansell (2001:8704) argues, "no single and universally acceptable definition of legitimacy exists." Nor is it likely that any single definition, even one as nuanced and innovative as Stinchcombe's, will solve the conceptual difficulties of legitimacy. The goal here is not to advance a single approach over all others, but to suggest a different starting point that can lead us in new directions.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, I first review the previous definitions to the concept of legitimacy before outlining Stinchcombe's approach to the concept. I then offer a formalization of this definition to be incorporated into the formal model developed in Chapter 3. Section 2.3 discusses how we can operationalize Stinchcombe's definition and actually identify centers of powers in particular societies. In Sections 2.4, I elaborate on Stinchcombe's notion of doctrines of legitimacy, which are the various rationales that might prompt a center of power to come to the aid of a regime. Finally, I will consider the willingness of centers of power to act on these doctrines before concluding.

2.1 Legitimacy

2.1.1 A Difficult Concept

If it is clear that legitimacy is important, it is less clear precisely what legitimacy is. Ansell (2001) divides the literature into two main approaches: the normative and empirical approach. The normative approach ascribes particular standards to be met for governments to be considered legitimate. In general, this approach tends to equate legitimate governments with democratic governments.[20] As a result, it can often ignore the subjective aspects of legitimacy that are arguably more important in understanding

[20] According to Weatherford (1992), "historical and political theorists distinguish legitimate from illegitimate governments by focusing on constitutional provisions that establish the opportunity for wide public participation and ensure procedural regularity, especially provisions dealing with majority rule, minority rights, and accountability in regular and frequent elections (Dahl 1956)" (150).

actual political behavior (Weatherford 1992:150). The empirical approach, on the other hand, seeks to explain the willingness of citizens to comply or obey (Ansell 2001:8704). The foundation for this approach is Max Weber's classic definition of legitimacy as the willingness of citizens to comply and citizens' beliefs in the rightfulness of rule. Rightfulness, in turn, involves legality, justification and consent (Gilley 2009:8).

Most political science work on legitimacy builds from Easton's (1965) definition of legitimacy. Easton defined legitimacy as "the conviction 'that it is right and proper…to obey the authorities and abide by the requirements of the regime'." Easton differentiated between specific support (performance-based support) and diffuse support. Diffuse support, according to Easton, is "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (273).

Easton's work was foundational in associating legitimacy with the idea of popular support. Despite this, there are several reasons the identification is problematic. First, it is difficult to disentangle "the normative bases of compliance or respect from any number of other possible motivations for obedience or deference" (Ansell 2001:8704). The inability to distinguish between different sources of compliance hinders our ability to use legitimacy to explain various political phenomena such as regime stability and change. As noted by Gilley (2009), "suffice it to say that a heavy reliance on coercion or bribery will have drastically different consequences for domestic and international politics than a reliance on moral support" (5). Empirically, the conception of legitimacy as institutional support has faced numerous problems in accounting for decades of declining support levels in democratic regimes without observing any of the hypothesized consequences on regime stability.[21] Easton, and others, would argue that such regimes are drawing on

[21] This "legitimacy puzzle" as stated by Booth and Seligson (2009): "Sharply declining legitimacy levels in established democracies does not seem to consistently cause anything close to regime breakdown. Some new democracies do fail, conforming to theory that they should break down, while others confound the theory by surviving under apparently high levels of stress" (5).

"reservoirs" of support to endure periods of declining support. But Booth and Seligson (2009) argue that the reservoir theory "rings hollow" as legitimacy scores as measured by mass support have been declining since the 1960s in the United States. Moreover, the authors note that many new Latin American democracies have endured crises without having long democratic histories to accrue reservoirs of support (3-4). The solution to this "legitimacy puzzle" adopted by Booth and Seligson is to add new public support indicators to the legitimacy index.

As a result, David Easton's verdict on the literature still stands true, even after over thirty-five years: "Given its long and venerable history as a central concept in political science, legitimacy has yet to receive the attention it merits in empirical research" (Easton 1975:51).[22]

It is not surprising, then, given the problems with the definition of legitimacy and its measurement in political science, many scholars have argued that the term should be dispensed with altogether. Margaret Levi in her 2005 APSA Presidential address stated the following:

> I am self-consciously avoiding the word legitimacy here. Legitimacy is a complex concept that includes many elements, but no one—including Weber himself—has successfully sorted out which of the various elements are necessary or how to measure indicators or their interaction. Until we have a better definition, I prefer to concentrate on factors that indicate approval or acceptance of government and which are measurable.

Przeworski (1986) similarly argued that the concept of legitimacy is useless and in fact tautological: if a regime survives, it is legitimate; if it fails, it is not. Rather, Przeworski argues, "What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives" (51-52).

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[22] Razi (1990) echoes Easton's concern in regards to the study of Third World Politics: "I propose that the significant missing ingredient in most studies of the politics of the Thrid World has been the adequate appreciation of the role of legitimacy" (69-70).

The criticisms of Levi and Przeworski are well taken. The concept is ill defined and has become like Potter Stewart's definition of pornography.[23] Despite these problems, we are correct in wanting to at least approximate and measure the concept of legitimacy as it features so prominently in political science. Legitimacy as a concept is widely employed to explain various political phenomena and as a variable to be explained. It is thought to be important for political stability, regime transformations and democratization. It is argued to affect state strength, state building and development as well as state endurance and survival (Jackman 1993; Gallarotti 1989; Tilly 2005; Ober 1989; Richards and Buren 2000, Migdal 1988, 2001). Legitimacy, together with a supportive political culture and economic development, is thought to sustain democratic political systems (Lipset 1959, 1994). Lipset (1959) argues that legitimacy provides political systems with the ability to endure crises. In addition, legitimacy is believed to be important for the consolidation of democracy and for maintaining power. Often transitioning or liberalizing regimes face problems of legitimacy (O'Donnell and Schmitter1986) and declining legitimacy is cited as one of the catalysts for regime transformation (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Huntington 1991). Revolutions become possible when authorities lose legitimacy (Johnson 1964; Gurr 1970), and thus the loss of legitimacy is seen as a necessary condition for revolutions (Arendt 1965) and regime transitions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Ultimately, the consequence of legitimacy is the stability of a system of power.[24] Legitimacy affects whether citizens work within institutional channels for change or seek change by opposing the state (Cook 2003). It is true, at least in some sense, that every government, and perhaps every institution, requires legitimacy for long-run maintenance.

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[23] Justice Stewart wrote in a concurrence decision, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material [porn[but I know it when I see it."

[24] Legitimacy, however, is not stability. As noted by Gilley: "We should never equate legitimacy with stability. After all, states may remain stable through repression and payoffs. Rather, legitimacy should be viewed as a 'usually necessary' condition for long-run stability of any state" (163).

Without legitimacy, regimes have to resort to coercion and force (Lipset 1994, Gurr 1970; Moore 1978). As succinctly summarized by Arthur Stinchcombe, whose views on legitimacy form the basis for the work to be presented here, "It has been often observed that the stability of power depends on legitimacy, and that power created by naked force is, in the long run, precarious" (1968:150).

Governments in order to sustain a system of power require legitimacy. It does not necessarily follow, however, that citizen support is the only source for legitimacy. In fact, "power based *only* on the shifting sands of public opinion and willing obedience is inherently unstable" (Stinchcombe 1968:161). There are different conceptions of legitimacy that do not rely on the Eastonian conception of public support. There is, of course, the original Weberian trinity of traditional, rational/legal, and charismatic legitimacy, none of which map perfectly into popular support. Scholars in the political culture tradition view legitimacy as stemming from the processes of political socialization (e.g. Parson and Shils 1951; Almond 1956),[25] while Rogowski (1974) sees legitimacy as the product of individual utility calculations. Such approaches still tend to equate legitimacy with public support, seeking to redefine the sources of public support rather than to refine the concept of legitimacy itself.

2.1.2 Stinchcombe's Approach

One way to begin thinking more creatively about legitimacy is to follow the novel lead provided by Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1968) in his classic work, *Constructing Social Theories*. Stinchcombe presents a set of strategies for the construction of theories. He emphasizes the importance of clear concepts if we are to fully understand the empirical implications of our theories. "If the concepts in a theory are so vague that it is difficult to find corresponding observations," Stinchcombe writes, "they are unlikely to be useful in illuminating the pattern in observations" (5).

[25] See Rogowski 1974:4-17 for detailed review of critiques against these theories.

One of those concepts is legitimacy. Like others, Stinchcombe recognizes that understanding legitimacy is necessary if we are to account for the exercise and stability of power. In this dissertation, I adopt the following definition of legitimacy put forth by Stinchcombe (1968):

> A power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective (162).

Reserves, according to Stinchcombe, can include public approval, as has been theorized by much of the political science writing on the topic. The public, however, does not have to be either the sole or even a necessary center of power, as is assumed in the normative as well as the empirical approaches. At the same time, Stinchcombe's definition does not preclude legitimacy from resting on citizens' evaluations. Instead, this definition broadens the way we think of power, often in ways that a focus on popular support would lead us to miss. As Stinchcombe argues, "[by] analyzing in a few cases who has to believe in the legitimacy of a power for it to be stable, we will see that the person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders" (150).

Stinchcombe's definition is consistent with those conceptions of legitimacy that emphasize multiple potential sources from which legitimacy can derive. As a result, legitimacy reacquires the generality offered by Weber's original characterization. This is especially important in thinking about legitimacy outside of the context of developed (Western) democracies. As Booth and Seligson (2009) point out, although the mass public plays an important role, their affection or disaffection with the government "constitute[s] only part of the equation of democratic stability" (23). Elites are critical in undermining or sustaining a democratic system, particularly in developing democracies:

> Far more than in developed democracies, young democracies' critical elites (in the security forces, parties, media, business community, state apparatus) and key external actors all can play major roles in undermining system stability by

> promoting a military or executive coup d'état or undermining popular support for a democratic regime (23).

This would seem to be the case as well for the authoritarian states that are often home to boycotted elections.

Stinchcombe's approach is also consistent with theories of transition emphasizing intra-elite conflict as necessary precursors to regime transition. Theories linking the relationship between legitimacy and democratization, for example, suggest that regime transitions become possible when a regime loses legitimacy. According to Stinchcombe this would occur when some set of the power centers are no longer willing to come to the aid of the regime. Diamond (1999), for example, argues that a key criterion for legitimacy is that all *significant* political actors believe democracy is appropriate and all competitors believe it is the only game in town. Przeworski (1986) similarly argues legitimacy is really about the common belief in a lack of good alternatives.

2.1.3 A Formal Approach to Legitimacy.

The topic of legitimacy has attracted relatively little work in formal theory.[26] Stinchcombe's conceptualization, however, suggests a promising avenue.

I represent Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy formally in the following way. First, define $j \in 1, 2, \ldots, K$ as the set of sufficient centers of powers necessary to come to a government's aid. Second, define the probability that any one center of power does not come to the aid of the government as λ, with $0 < \lambda < 1$.[27] In other words, λ is a failure rate representing the probability that the centers of power fail to come to the aid of the government. Then, the probability that $1, 2, \ldots, K$ centers of power fail to come to the aid of the government is λ^K, and the probability that the government is aided by at least $K=1$ centers of power is $1-\lambda^K$. It is assumed that each K has the same probability of not

[26] For formal treatments of legitimacy see Rogowski (1974), Epstein (2002), and Patty and Penn (2011)

[27] It would be straightforward to generalize this to a set of vector of probabilities $(p_1, ..., p_K)$.

coming to the aid of the government: centers of power are assumed to be identical and independent.

Legitimacy is represented as a probability for the following reason. We may not see a government ever call upon other centers of power because all actors know the government is legitimate and thus the authority of the government is never challenged. As such, we do not want legitimacy defined as whether a third party takes action, as the third party may never need to take action. Legitimacy is thus defined as the probability a third party comes to the aid of a government in given contingencies. According to Stinchcombe, "'Legitimacy' as defined above is exactly such a concept; it tries to locate the causal significance of the contingent probabilities of action of other power centers" (163). Simply put, legitimacy, is the probability that the exercise of authority will be protected by other powers if necessary.

To understand the meaning of *K*, consider an example. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli wrote that a prospective Roman emperor needed either the military or the public to gain or maintain power, implying that the only way to lose power is to lose the support of both. He writes,

> For since princes cannot fail to be hated by someone, they are at first forced not to be hated by the people generally; and when they cannot continue this, they have to contrive with all industry to avoid the hatred of those communities which are most powerful. And so those emperors who because they were new had need of extraordinary support stuck to the soldiers rather than the people (76).[28]

In this example, *K=2* the support of either the military or the public would be necessary to sustain rule. If, by contrast, the military alone determined the ruler, then *K* would equal

[28] Machiavelli writes that it was possible to maintain power with the support of the military alone as the military has great power during this time. Overtime, however, the power distribution between the military and the people shifted in favor of the people. He writes, "And so, if at that time it was necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people. Now it is necessary for all princes except the Turk and the Sultan to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people can do more than the soldiers" (Machiavelli 1998:81).

one. Machiavelli notes that it was difficult to maintain support of both the military and the people because of each center of power's divergent interest, noting that, "the people loved quiet, and therefore loved modest princes, and the soldiers loved a prince with a military spirit who was insolent, cruel and rapacious" (76). Thus, new Roman princes without hereditary right are best served, according to Machiavelli, catering to the interests of the military center of power rather than the societal center of power.[29]

2.2 Operationalizing Stinchcombe's Definition

A key element in Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy is the notion of *centers of power*. Stinchcombe even argues that the exercise of authority is not possible "unless certain other strategic centers of power recognize the right as legitimate" (160). Given the central place of centers of power in defining and understanding legitimacy, it is important to explore this concept in detail.

From Stinchcombe, we know the key role of centers of power as aiding an authority that is being challenged, and the factors that will determine their willingness to aid a challenged regime—Stinchcombe refers to these later factors as "doctrines of legitimacy." It remains to be explained, however, what precisely constitutes a center of power. In order for Stinchcombe's definition to be useful, we must be able to identify centers of powers in order to understand the legitimacy of a regime over time and its prospects for long-term regime stability. This is the subject of the next section.

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[29] Machiavelli's discussion illustrates why a regime may not be able to increase K despite being "safer" as K increases. In Jordan, for example, according to Peters and Moore (2009), the domestic coalition is expensive to maintain because of the disparate and conflicting interests of the two groups: "the merchant elite seeks to maximize profit through preferential trading agreements, which reduce competition in domestic markets and drive up prices for consumers, penalizing tribes that sustain themselves on relatively meager government incomes" (265).

2.2.1 Centers of Power

According to Stinchcombe's theory, the key role of centers of power is to come to the aid of a government when its authority is challenged. The relationship between the regime and its centers or power(s) is, therefore, important to the maintenance of the regime itself. Even in the case of authoritarian one-party regimes with a strong president (e.g. Algeria) the president cannot always act without constraint. Rather, he must cater to a group of supporters through policy (concessions) or the distribution of valuable rents. By doing so, the regime is maintaining its defense against potential threats. In this sense, the concept of centers of power begins to resemble the formation of a coalition, wherein disparate groups form an allegiance to promote their interests. Centers of power, however, cannot be interpreted exactly like coalitions, as the centers of power are independently and individually sufficient. We can think of centers of power as falling into three main categories:

1) Institutions

2) Social groups

3) External (non-domestic) actors

The role of identity in the mobilization of a group, such as with socioeconomic, political, or ethno-religious groups, is commonly understood as one-way of accessing state power. However, power can also be accessed through other "institutions like the party or the army, or through formal economic or professional associations like chambers of commerce" (Owen 2004:32). Therefore, focusing solely on societal groups (e.g., an ethnic group) or solely on institutional centers of powers (e.g. the army) would give us an incomplete picture of the various sources of a regime's legitimacy, or in Stinchcombe's terms: the existing centers of powers that will come to the aid of the regime when its authority is challenged.

Institutional centers of power may include the legislative and judicial branches of government. Stinchcombe illustrates the role of the judicial branch as a center of power

with an example of a policeman arresting a criminal. After making an arrest, the policeman—whose authority to put the criminal in jail can be challenged—can call upon the judicial system to come to his aid to keep the criminal behind bars. In this simple example, the judicial branch is a center of power. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the law itself can be one source of doctrines of legitimacy. In fact, a large literature in political science examines the role of the United States Supreme Court in legitimizing laws (even unpopular laws) passed by Congress (Gibson et al 2005). One such example was the 2000 presidential election, in which the Supreme Court conferred legitimacy on the election of George W. Bush, despite the fact that Al Gore had won the plurality of popular votes.[30]

Stinchcombe argues that an unpopular government (one lacking broad public support) can still retain authority by calling on centers of power, and in particular the armed forces (160). Therefore, the armed forces, including the military, the police, and the secret service, can also be considered an institutional center of power. The military's role as a center of power can be recognized in the number of coups d'état observed over the years and across regions. The role of the armed forces in sustaining regimes is well established in comparative politics and there are numerous examples of armies coming to back a regime in trouble. The military's role in ending the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and backing the regime is one such example. More recently, in the early days of the protests in Egypt in January 2011, the media, protesters, elites, and international, observers watched closely the actions of the military as a signal of what might happen to the Mubarak regime. This example is instructive as it became an instance of a regime falling after the army has refused to lend support, or withdrew its previous support.

[30] The 2000 presidential election in the US is also a good example of why we need to conceive of legitimacy beyond popular support. In 2000, the election was "legitimized" by the decision of the US Supreme Court.

The second source from which centers of power can be derived is society or particular groups within a society. This societal-based set of centers of power also encompasses the traditional Eastonian view of legitimacy dominant in political science, which conceptualizes legitimacy as popular (public) support. However, Stinchcombe's definition extends the centers of power to individual groups and sections of the social structure, rather than considering the support from a majority of the public. The full set of potential centers of power within society (as opposed to institutional centers of power) can be identified from a number of alternative perspectives.

Taking a cue from Lipset and Rokkan (1967), we can think about the potential centers of power as arising from cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan outline four "critical lines of cleavages": (1) Workers versus Owners/Employers; (2) Church versus State; (3) Centre versus Periphery; and (4) Urban versus Rural. Any of these cleavages could indeed be the basis for group mobilization that ultimately becomes a center of power. A second way to consider the society-based centers of power is to consider the important ethnic, religious and linguistic groups along which society may be divided. In other words, the underlying social structure may give rise to societal groups that can form centers of power.

Having outlined the societal and institutional centers of power, we can now consider the third and final set of centers of power: external actors. These potential centers of power include the international community, international organizations, or individual states. The international community, through such recognized doctrines as national sovereignty, plays a key role in legitimizing the right of states to exist, and on occasion, even protects them when their authority over particular territory is challenged. External actors have well-recognized roles establishing, sustaining (and even preventing) states' independence and right to sovereignty. Self-interest also plays a role in these relationships: other countries often have strategic interests in supporting particular

regimes.[31] "Global actors such as the United States, the European Union, and the international financial institutions have often influenced polities in transition" (Mufti 1999:116, citing Huntington 1991; Remmer 1995; Whitehead 1986). The strategic interest(s) of a state will influence its willingness, as an external center of power, to come to the aid of the regime.

2.2.2 Identifying Centers of Power

For Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy to be useful, we must be able to identify the centers of power that underpin legitimacy. Furthermore, we need then to determine when and why a particular institution, social group, or state is (or is not) a center of power. At the outset, we can note that the important centers of power will vary across contexts. For example, when one state invades another state, the relevant centers of power will obviously be different to those involved when a policeman arrests a criminal. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the focus is confined to regime legitimacy, and thus the context remains similar across cases. A second point to note is that centers of power can change over time. We might expect centers of power to change after some (exogenous) shock such as the end of the Cold War or regime transformation. Although both of these "big picture" issues in regards to centers of power present potentially interesting investigations in themselves, the remainder of this section will focus how we can indentify the centers of power in specific cases.

How do we determine whether a particular institution, social group or external actors is a center of power whose support is sufficient to come to the aid of a regime when its authority is challenged? The determination of a center of power will most often need to rely on in-depth knowledge of specific cases. One reason that such specific knowledge is required is that there is a need to know the decision-making units and processes of the relevant group. For example, the traditions, laws, the formal, and

[31] This was, of course, the idea during the Cold War (and after) of supporting disparate regimes (democratic and authoritarian ones) that were allies of either the US or USSR.

informal, distribution of power as well as the control and distribution of resources within the group are all relevant to it potential role as a center of power.[32] This argument is also suggested by Owen (2004), who provides a framework with which to begin identifying the centers of powers for a regime. Although his own focus is the characterization and analysis of authoritarian politics more generally, his approach is instructive. He explains that the forum of political activity, the various actors, and their relative importance, are all relevant in understanding the power structure of various groups.[33] We can begin identifying centers of power using Owen's approach.

Following from Owen's investigation, in identifying institutional centers of power we should consider the independence, constitutional powers, and resources invested to a particular institution. For example, if the judicial branch is indeed a center of power (as suggested by the work of Gibson and Caldeira), a separation of power must exist or the Supreme Court would have no ability to confer legitimacy upon a regime. For similar reasons, we need to determine the formal powers of any institution that might be a candidate for a center of power. For example, does the parliament have the power to dismiss the executive, or adjust and approve the budget? Stinchcombe notes that this will, in turn, determine whether the executive is "more or less responsible to parliament" (174). Important power structures are not limited to those that are formal (e.g. constitutionally mandated powers). Practical or day-to-day powers of an institution are also highly relevant to the role of an institution as a center of power.

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[32] The need to rely on expert knowledge is echoed by others. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, argue that we must consider decision-making traditions and the "channels for the expression and mobilization of protest" (26). Similarly Posner (2005) argues that in order to determine "particular identities that individuals will find it most advantageous to choose will depend on the nature of the political system's ethnic cleavage structure" (21). And to know this structure, one needs to know the number of cleavage dimensions and the size of the particular groups.

[33] Owen explains his approach as considering both the "different type of actors and different types of arenas involved, as well as their different orders of importance" (2004: 32). Furthermore, he claims that we can use these ideas to identify centers of power: "In the case of the former, this will involve consideration of individuals, of unofficial as well as of organized groups, of classes, and so on. In the latter it necessitates a discussion of the various locations—bureaucratic, institutional, provincial, local—in which political activity used to, and still does, take place" (32).

In determining whether other types of institutions are centers of power, different evaluations may be required. For example, in determining whether the military is a center of power we must make a key distinction. We must distinguish between outright military rule or military government (Chile under Pinochet or present-day Burma) and those praetorian regimes in which the military wields significant influence on a civilian government (e.g. Algeria). According to Bellin, differentiating between the two is not always straightforward: "The distinction between the two is often difficult to draw even in regimes (for example Egypt, Syria and Algeria) where the official head of state is a civilian, because the head of state is often closely allied with the coercive apparatus and highly dependent on coercion to maintain power" (2005:26). While sometimes difficult to make, this distinction is valuable in any effort to determine whether the military is a center of power whose support is sufficient to aid a challenged regime. If the military is in fact also the regime itself, then obviously it does not exist as a center of power as envisioned by Stinchcombe's theoretical framework.

Bellin (2005) perhaps provides us with a good criterion on which to judge the status of the armed forces as a center of power. Bellin distinguishes between institutionalized and patrimonial armed forces. Institutionalized armed forces, according to Bellin, will "have a sense of corporate identity separate from the state. They have a distinct mission and identity and career path." (2005:29). Furthermore, institutionalized militaries can be "distinguished by a commitment to some broader national mission that serves the public good, such as national defense and economic development, rather than to some personal aggrandizement and enrichment alone" (2005:29).[34] Making such observations about the type of military structure, and its apparent goals and objectives, can therefore assist in defining it as potential center of power, or otherwise.

[34] Bellin makes this distinction to explain the coercive apparatus's "will and capacity to hold on to power" arguing that institutionalized militaries are less likely to believe "they will be 'ruined by reform' (29).

In regard to societal centers of power, there are a number of basic questions that need to be first addressed to identify the structure and operations of the various groups in question. Do the groups have suffrage, and do the group members have basic civil liberties and rights? Answers to these questions will offer insights into the mobilization capabilities of the group, and may lead to understand its motivation and constraints more clearly.

To determine the potential of a particular group to be a center of power, we can focus on several areas. First, we can consider the size of the group itself. The percentage of a population identifying with a particular cleavage might be a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. It is easy to imagine a center of power, which represents a minority of the population but who, for example, also controls an important set of resources (e.g. business elite). In many countries it is likely the case that a small but powerful minority controls a significant portion of valuable resources. Second, we can consider whether a particular group or cleavage has the ability to form part of a majority coalition. More specifically, even if the group is not an actual center of power, we might enquire as to the probability the group could form part of a majority coalition in certain circumstances and thus the possibility it could become a center of power.

The possibility that a group can be a member of a relevant coalition requires some knowledge of the particular case in question. As Stinchcombe also explains, a particular group may be a center of power in one country but not in another. He uses the example of the weak nature of the Communist Party in France and Italy: “In quite a different way, much of the proletariat and a fairly large proportion of the peasantry of poorer areas of France and Italy are incapable of influencing how parliament uses its powers, because there is no practically conceivable governing coalition which includes the Communist Party, the party for which many of them vote” (175). While the Communist Party would not be considered a center of power in Italy and France (due to their inability to form part

of a coalition) in other countries it would actually be an important center of power (Stinchcombe notes Chile as an example).[35]

It is also important to consider capabilities and resources when trying to identify societal, and even institutional, centers of power. A small wealthy business elite, although lacking numerical superiority, may have the resources to influence the government and also support the government. If these resources are absent from other centers of power, then despite its small numerical size, a group may become a center of power. Similar logic applies to institutions. The military, although a minority of the population, has (in some cases) the ability to sustain a regime, most notably through the capacity to crush dissent among the larger population. Wealthy elite can affect the government's ability to distribute patronage and can affect employment, which, in turn, can influence the support of another group or institution.

The final task is to determine which, if any, external actors are centers of power. One of the primary ways through which we see states act as centers of power is foreign aid. As such, looking at the sources of foreign aid or assistance a country receives is a good way to determine external centers of power. A central and well-established determinant of foreign aid is the strategic interests of donor governments (see for example, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Moernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). Aid can provide much needed revenue or increase the discretionary spending abilities of a state, e.g., allow them to spend more on military or on patronage than they could otherwise. Although the "strategic value" of aid is noted to have decreased in the post-Cold War era (See Neumayer 2003; Dunning 2004; Bermeo 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2010), aid is still allocated to countries for strategic purposes. When considering the Middle East and North African regions in particular, the U.S. desire for strategic allies seems particularly topical.

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[35] Lipset and Rokkan (1967) also consider the ability to form a majority coalition in their study of party system formation (27).

2.3 Doctrines of Legitimacy

A key element of Stinchcombe's treatment is the notion of "doctrines of legitimacy." Doctrines of legitimacy determine the willingness of other centers of power to come to the aid of a government when its authority is challenged. These doctrines give some cause, or rationale, to the actions of a power center in its decision to come to the aid of the regime. As Stinchcombe outlines, the most important function of these doctrines of legitimacy is to create support for the regime in such a way that its powers can persist without the necessity of imposing force upon its subjects or other groups. On the relationship between power and the doctrines of legitimacy, Stinchcombe writes,

> The crucial function of doctrines of legitimacy and norms derived from them is to create a readiness in other centers of power to back up the actions of a person with a certain right. Doctrines of legitimacy serve the crucial function of setting up that nesting of powers which usually makes appeals to physical force unnecessary (160-1).

Examples of doctrines of legitimacy include law, hereditary monarchies, national sovereignty, and the liberal doctrine of property rights (162). The probability that other centers of power will come to the aid of a government depends on whether such centers of power believe the authority of the government is "validated by some doctrine of legitimacy or some set of norms" (198).

This section considers the various factors that can give cause to a center of power to actually support a regime. These factors are referred to as the "doctrines of legitimacy". Doctrines of legitimacy play the critical role in determining the willingness of other centers of power to come to the aid of a government when its authority is challenged.

The importance of doctrines of legitimacy, and their function in effectively maintaining a regime without the need for physical force, cannot be underestimated. The connective role that doctrines of legitimacy play between the various centers of power and the regimes they support is what provides the form of legitimacy that these regimes

often cling to. Given this crucial function, it is important to consider the forms of doctrines (of legitimacy) we will confront in studying regime legitimacy, and why such doctrines increase the willingness of centers of power to aid a challenged regime.

Doctrines of legitimacy provide an important rationale for supporting a threatened regime and vary in specific character. Stinchcombe provides us with several examples of these doctrines of legitimacy, ranging from the free use of property and its defense, the recognition of hereditary monarchy, or the maintenance of national sovereignty.[36] As Stinchcombe's examples make clear, doctrines of legitimacy are, therefore, the justifications of power and can range from legal-rational to traditional, normative, democratically based, traditional, and/or religiously inspired.[37] That is, there are a number of different rationales or justifications a government can use to justify its authority. The doctrines used to justify authority will also vary across countries, based on the political culture, values and interests of the elites and public.[38]

One of the most important sets of doctrines relate to succession. Without clear or widely accepted succession procedure, instability can arise in the exercise of authority (e.g. the Sunni-Shi'a split in Islam). The precise mechanisms of succession can be based on the doctrine of hereditary monarchy, or the doctrine of electoral democracy. Succession through electoral democracy, familiar across many modern democracies, is based on the "will of the people." If power is justified using the doctrine of electoral democracy, then a center of power will come to a regime's aid that has been elected to

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[36] Stinchcombe's precise explanation includes: "free use of property and the legal arrangements for the defense of property which embody it, the doctrine of hereditary monarchy and the arrangements of vassalage for giving the king certain resources and authority, and doctrines of national sovereignty in the control of defined territory and the procedures for 'recognizing' governments which embody it" (1968:162).

[37] Weber's sources of legitimacy can also be considered doctrines of legitimacy. According to Weber there are three sources of legitimacy: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic Justifications of the right to rule

[38] There are, however, several common doctrines that have been established. For example, following collapse of USSR, there was an internationalization of the norm of elections, such that nearly every country in the world today holds national level elections.

power in accordance with this doctrine.[39] What is most important is that in these cases the doctrine is accepted by the center of power, providing the rationale for its support.

In modern democracies there is a larger portion of regime legitimacy based on popular consent—exercised through free and fair elections—than in authoritarian or electoral authoritarian regimes. Many authoritarian regimes, however, also introduce elements of electoral democracy to legitimate themselves. For example, Schedler explains, "by opening the peaks of state power to multiparty elections, electoral authoritarian regimes establish the primacy of democratic legitimation" (Schedler 2006:13). He continues, "By establishing multiparty elections for highest office, EA regimes institute the principle of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice." In this way, regimes can appeal to multiple doctrines, perhaps using a mix of democratic succession with other modes of succession, namely hereditary monarchy, in order to further legitimize themselves. Again, it is the fact that the doctrine is acceptable to the relevant centers of power that gives rationale to support the regime.

In the context of the Middle East and North Africa, we can certainly observe a variety of doctrines, from rational-legal to traditional justifications for governments' authority and power. Traditional authority today in the Middle East is quite prevalent and established. Monarchies justify their authority based on lineage, and it is often the case that political actors use their tribe or family name to regularly identify themselves (Hudson 1977:84). In addition to patrimonial and personal legitimacy, Arab monarchies have sought to build support using additional doctrines, such as economic development and increasing security apparatuses, in what Hudson calls attempts to bolster structural

[39] It is clear from this discussion that Stinchcombe's definition makes room for both a normative idea of legitimacy and one's not so normatively appealing. However, as noted by Stinchcombe the will of the people is often not sufficient for a regime to retain power (e.g. Allende in Chile) which a powerful illustration of why this definition is so useful for our purposes. We often cannot explain the stability or instability of regimes based on its support with the public. As such, we need to broaden our understanding of legitimacy to include regimes legitimized by other doctrines than electoral democracy.

legitimacy. In so doing, these monarchies are attempting to build legitimacy and support around a combination of personal lineage and regime accomplishments (patronage).

Arab republics, on the other hand, have tried to establish and maintain legitimacy based on revolutionary credentials, such as participation in independence struggles or revolutionary coups (Hudson, 1977: 27). They have sought to establish their credentials through appeal to secular, rational and universal norms, rather than appeal to claims of religious or hereditary legitimacy.[40] In particular, such revolutionary republics are quick to "emphasize Arabism", as a modern identity that links them to their peoples. This strategy, however, faces challenge from persistent traditionalism in some states.[41]

Two dominant ideologies in the Middle East and North Africa are Arabism and Islam. These ideologies can be considered doctrines of legitimacy because they engender shared interests and values. As Hudson explains, these shared interests and values tend to unite Arabs and Muslims across the region, giving them a common perception of what issues are most important to them (54).[42] If a leader deviates from these shared interests, e.g. accepting military or economic help from an external, non-Arab power, according to Hudson, he risks attack both internally, and from across the region. In this way, we can understand the connection with doctrines of legitimacy. If a center of power interprets the legitimacy of authority due to Arabist or Islamic ideology, and the authority acts inconsistently with that ideology, that particular center of power will be less likely to come to the aid of a regime if its authority is challenged.

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[40] Hudson explains this tendency of Arab republics: "The revolutionary republics have also sought to develop new and positive bases for government. In contrast to conservative accommodation of existing identity and authority patterns, they have tried to break them down and integrate people into new ones…They seek legitimacy through secular, rational, and universal norms" (27).

[41] Hudson notes that this strategy is inhibited by "the persistence of traditional primordial and parochial orientations."

[42] Such interests, according to Hudson, are (1) liberation of Palestine; (2) inter-Arab solidarity; (3) nonalignment [book written in 1977]; (4) commitment to economic and social development—equal distribution of wealth; and (5) renaissance of Arab-Islamic culture (54).

The role of Arabism and Islam as doctrines of legitimacy in the regimes across the Middle East and North Africa is similar to that of the forms of succession discussed earlier: there are various forms or combinations of Arabism and Islam that are used as doctrines of legitimacy. Where the doctrines of legitimacy in terms of succession appears to be some hybrid of hereditary and democratic process, the doctrine in terms of shared ideology seems to mix older traditions of Islam and Arabism with modern conceptions of revolutionary credentials and Western democratic values. In Algeria, there has been reliance on anti-colonial or revolutionary credentials to provide a basis for centers of power to come to their aid. Yet, domestically, these same revolutionary credentials began to be challenged by younger generations who do not necessarily accept it as a doctrine of legitimacy.[43] The regime responded in 1988 by establishing multiparty elections to seek a new basis of legitimacy to remain in power (i.e. legitimacy based on the ballot box).[44] Nevertheless, Arabism and Islam were the dominant ways in which regimes have sought to legitimize themselves. Some regimes across the Middle East and North Africa have relied heavily on Islam to bolster legitimacy amongst key groups. In this way, sometimes Islam becomes a doctrine of legitimacy similar to divine right.

In summary, the relevant doctrines of legitimacy in the Middle Eastern and North Africa include succession doctrines of both hereditary and democracy, the doctrines of legitimacy based on to Islam and Arab identity, and, importantly the justification of authority through patronage distribution. Furthermore, there exists an unusual mix of traditional and modern interpretations, wherein a center of power could be willing to come to the aid for the government because of either doctrine. Hudson's explanation of the traditional and modern rationales for accepting Arab authority represents this well:

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[43] This is partly due to the fact that younger generations have no memory of French rule or the War of Independence against France (Evans and Phillips 2007).

[44] Youcef Bouandel, interview with author, April 2011.

> Arabs are still socialized into accepting traditional rationales for obedience based on kinship, religion, dynastic despotism, and feudalism. Yet at the same time, they are influenced by Western ideologies which justify authority on altogether different grounds like 'the will of the people (83).[45]

2.4 Willingness to Come to the Aid of Regimes

Having established the various centers of power that legitimize a regime and the range of doctrines of legitimacy that might rationalize a regime's authority to the centers of power, this section will consider the willingness of centers of power to act on the doctrine of legitimacy. Importantly, it will consider why a center of power may be no longer willing (or unwilling) to come to the aid of a challenged regime. This will be useful as we move into the empirical chapters to explain why perceptions of the regime's legitimacy might change over time. Theorists of democratization provide a starting point to answer this question. Bermeo (1997) explains that Robert Dahl's work, *Polyarchy*, "has encouraged us to think that the likelihood of democratization increases as the cost of suppression rises and the cost of toleration decreases" (1997: 315). She goes on to say, "for the costs of toleration to seem bearable, pivotal elites must believe that they will not be ruined by reform" (1997:315).

The central idea to take from Bermeo's discussion is that in thinking about whether a center of power will change its support, or be willing to come to the aid of a challenged regime, we need to think about how elites (or centers of power) perceive the consequences of the reform being demanded. In other words, how do the elites perceive the potential effects of the reform? If centers of power believe they will be ruined by reform, they will be more likely to come to the aid of the regime.

The notion that institutional elites, to be supportive of a particular reform, must perceive that they will not be ruined (or at least be severely hurt) by reform is seen in

[45] Hudson argues that this duality (existence of both traditional and rational rationales for legitimacy) is a "drain on overall system legitimacy" (83). He further writes that this has created problems since an appeal on traditional grounds can alienate "the modern elements, and the modernists who try to justify their power on the basis of a popular mandate" (83).

Jordan with respect to the business elite. Only slowly have they accepted economic liberalizations, and even begun to push for them, where in the past they viewed such reforms negatively. Bellin (2005) also utilizes this idea in her discussion of the military (the coercive apparatuses). More institutionalized militaries, Bellin argues, are less likely to perceive that they will be ruined by reform. Patrimonial-based militaries, on the other hand, are more likely to believe that they will be ruined by reform and are more likely to support a challenged regime.

While elites, or institutions, have to think of how they will be affected by reforms, in terms of changes in their power, funding, and capacity, societal centers of power also need to consider how maintaining or withdrawing support will affect them. If the patronage system breaks down and I can no longer rely on my tribal or family name to get me a job, contract or into university, am I likely to continue to support the regime? In other words, if a regime's authority is justified (in whole or in part) to a societal center (or centers) of power through the distribution of patronage, and if this regime's ability to distribute patronage is diminished, is a societal center of power more or less likely to come to the aid of the regime in crisis? Economic crises will therefore affect the willingness of centers of power to support the regime, as a constrained budget diminishes the regime's ability to maintain the system of patronage that is the current justification of its power.

The idea that the public's willingness to come to the aid is influenced by economic conditions is consistent with Easton's notion of performance-based support (Easton 1965). Citizens' support for a regime, according to this perspective, "derives mainly from the performance of regimes and institutions" (Booth and Seglison 2009). Beyond the work of Easton, there is strong empirical support for the relationship between the performance of a regime and the citizens' evaluations and support of the regime and its institutions. In terms of doctrines of legitimacy and centers of power, we can think about this process in the following way: when a government fails to perform (well) its

duties as expected by the citizens, those citizens will be less likely to come to its aid when the regime is challenged. More specifically, if a societal center of power believes that government's right to rule is based on its role as a patron, an economic crisis may hinder the government's ability to perform as expected in providing jobs, subsidies, and other services. As such, the justification for its authority has diminished. Similarly, under economic crises or downturns, a public (who sees the government's authority justified on patrimonial grounds) may perceive that it will not be ruined by reform, as the advantages they gain from the status quo are no longer forthcoming.

This relationship between the regime's ability to satisfy its perceived economic obligations, and the continuation of support from various centers of power, is extremely important in understanding the stability of a regime over time. There is significant evidence of economic strain forcing a regime to reform in some measure due to a loss of support. In Algeria, for example,

> The oil-price drop set the stage for the "retreat of the state," a typical moment of crisis for authoritarian regimes. Both in reality and in popular perception, the state was no longer able to fulfill its part of the bargain with a passive citizenry. This caused resentment and also made the state seem weak and vulnerable (Quandt 1998:38).[46]

As the public coffers shrink, the ability of the state to maintain public spending levels and a vast patronage network decreases. This in turn increases the likelihood that particular centers of power withdraw their support. There are numerous examples of widespread discontent followed by a period of reform pressure during the 1980s. Over a sustained period, demonstrations and riots broke out in host of countries, including: Algerian (1988), Egypt (1981 and 1986), Jordan (1989), Kuwait (1989 and 1990), Mauritania (1986 and 1988), Morocco (1984, 1988 and 1990), South Yemen between 1986 and

[46] Similarly in Jordan: "Ever since the Kingdom's inception, the Hashemite rulers of Jordan have constructed a series of distributive institutions – usually at the expense of economic development – in order to maintain a highly disparate regime coalition that consists of a Syrian/pre-1967 Palestinian merchant elite and Transjordanian tribes" (Peters and Moore 2009:257). Thus, the regime's basis of support is certainly a function of its continued ability to maintain its distributive obligations.

1990), Sudan (1985) and Tunisia (1984 and 1988) (Brynen et al 1995:43). These mass demonstrations took many forms, and a range of societal groups instigated them, but the discontent quickly spread. The protests were followed by promises of reform.[47]

The important point of this discussion is to emphasize that economic pressures my result in a reluctance of centers of power to maintain support for authoritarian regimes, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, where regimes maintain vast patronage networks. The commitment of support to a regime by a center of power, particularly societal groups, is highly dependent upon the economic benefit the group obtains from this commitment. Inability to maintain patronage of societal groups is likely to result in some withdrawal of support from the affected centers of power, and thus increase pressure on the regime for reform.[48]

2.5 Conclusion

Legitimacy, as defined by Stinchcombe (1968), is the probability that a government will receive support from a sufficient set of centers of power when its authority is challenged. This definition frees us from relying on public support as the sole indicator of regime legitimacy, allowing us to more fully understand why particular regimes remain stable despite low levels of popular support. As noted by Stinchcombe,

> One can find many other cases in which governments which were quite *unpopular* in an area were quite stable because they were *legitimate* in the sense of being able to call upon centers of power, especially the armed forces. On the other hand,

[47] "Whichever formation started the confrontation, and however its discontent was expressed, other equally alienated socioeconomic formations joined in to advance their own demands…Ruling elites in these countries all responded to mounting discontent with promises of economic and political reform" (Brynen et al 1995:43).

[48] In fact, economic strain can put so much pressure on the legitimacy of a regime that even some of its own members begin to make their own demands, even defecting to opposition. The work of Gandhi and Reuter (2007), for example, consider the collapse of hegemonic ruling parties (their "unraveling"): "Disgruntled party members [members of the hegemonic ruling party] may defect in times of economic crisis in order to capitalize upon popular and elite discontent with the regime in the hope of successfully challenging the incumbent in elections. Our main hypothesis is thus disarmingly simple: poor economic performance should encourage elites to defect from hegemonic parties and challenge the regime in elections" (2).

> popular governments have often fallen because they were not legitimate in strategic centers of power. The communist government of Hungary in the 1950's is an example of the former; the Peronist government in Argentina in the same period is an example of the latter (160).

In addition to outlining and formalizing Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy, this chapter also explored the concept of centers of power. The chapter also considers how we can operationalize this concept to use in applied empirical research and the various rationales (doctrines of legitimacy) an authority can use to engender or retain support from centers of power. In addition, this chapter examines why the willingness of such centers of power to aid a regime might change over time. This operationalization discussion is particularly important for the empirical evaluation of the theory. First, however, we turn to the development of the theory of opposition party strategy.

CHAPTER 3
A FORMAL THEORY OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

In this chapter, I develop an incomplete information model of opposition strategies. Thinking of legitimacy as outlined in the previous chapter enables us to fold in considerations about other political actors into a formal treatment of boycotting. I incorporate Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy into an incomplete information model of opposition strategies so that we can analyze the importance of legitimacy on party strategy in a strategic context. This theoretical framework will allow me to explain how beliefs in the legitimacy of the government influence the strategic decisions of the opposition. The model emphasizes not only the interaction between the government and the opposition parties, but also how beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime influence the decision to participate, boycott and/or trigger a crisis against the government. The model allows us to identify the conditions under which boycotts occur as well as the conditions under which they do not. Moreover, it identifies the conditions under which opposition parties will chose to trigger a crisis and makes predictions regarding when boycotts are successful in eliciting positive government responses.

There are several reasons for the use of this type of formal model. For one, previous studies strongly suggest that the act of boycotting is goal-directed. Such goals include improved fairness in the electoral process, more general political reforms or some particularistic benefit as suggested by Beaulieu (2006). Even if a party boycotts because of weak electoral prospects, the party still hopes to obtain a benefit, which in this case is "saving face" or saving the party's reputation. The attempt to obtain such a specific objective implies that boycotts are rarely random. While previous explanations have focused on the benefits to the opposition party from boycotting, with the exception of Beaulieu's work, they have uniformly failed to consider costs. Boycotting parties, however, often face serious costs, including the loss of seats, re-registration fees, not to

mention the loss of campaign finance (often conditional on the electoral performance) (75). Examining goals without also looking at costs is a problematic approach to explanation.

The model presented in this chapter also formally incorporates the probability of success, something else that previous explanations of boycotts have not done. I argue that this probability is influenced by the legitimacy of the regime, which in turn affects the ability of the regime to withstand challenges to its authority. An incomplete information model allows us to consider how both the costs and the probability of success affect the decision to boycott an election. And since success of a boycott will be determined by whether or not a government responds to the demand of the boycotting, it is necessary to think carefully about the strategic interaction between the opposition and the government. Game theory is one of the best tools to understand this strategic interaction.

The second reason to study boycotts with the use of this type of formal model is that the previous literature on election boycotts implies that there is something to learn from election boycotts. That is, boycotts are signals. If boycotts are to be viewed as signals, what is it that boycotts do in fact signal to observers? There are a number of possible messages that a boycott might imply about a political party. For example, do boycotts signal that the party or parties reject democracy, or that they reject the election process? Do boycotts signal that the boycotting groups reject the government? Or do boycotts signal the strength or weakness of a political party? At this point, the literature does not offer a unified response to these different questions.

Similarly, there are messages that a boycott might send about the government against which a boycott is directed. Much of the literature suggests that boycotts are undertaken to signal to the government, the public, and perhaps even the international community, that an opposition party or parties believe the electoral process, and/or the incumbent government itself, to be illegitimate (Beaulieu 2006), Bratton argues that "opposition boycotts were a surefire way to call the integrity of an election into question"

and that "at a minimum, opposition boycotts signaled a lack of full agreement on the rules of the political game" (61-62). On the other hand, Pastor (1999) claims that boycotts signal that the boycotting party is weak withdrawing from the election fearing defeat. If boycotts are signals, as these alternative accounts claim, then we need to think more carefully about the signaling process. Again, formal theory provides an excellent tool for understanding that process.

Third, a formal model that incorporates a context of incomplete information is useful in capturing the impact of uncertainty. Actors rarely operate with complete information and uncertainty is part of reality. The introduction of incomplete information into our theories allows us to increase our understanding of particular phenomena by more closely resembling the environment in which parties and governments interact. For example, the incorporation of both informational asymmetries, and the use of signaling, into theories of committee allocations allowed political scientists to develop a more refined understanding of the interaction between the floor and the committees in the US Congress (e.g. Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). Moreover, the model developed below provides several paths to observing boycotts. That is, the model helps us parse out observational equivalence and more fully understand why some boycotts achieve reform and others do not.

3.1 An Incomplete Information Model

Boycotting is only one of a broad set of possible strategies open to parties. Policy placement, the issues to adopt, whether to be programmatic or clientelistic, the number of candidates to run in each district, and whether to form pre-electoral coalitions: these and many others are potential avenues for parties seeking influence. In this dissertation, however, I am concerned with the choices of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. The choice, as I see it, is roughly between participation, boycott and revolt. I consequently model each of these "ideal types." Although my interest stems from the

puzzle presented to opposition parties by authoritarian elections, the model captures both democratic and authoritarian contexts allowing us to draw implications about and understand better the choice of party strategies under both contexts.

The model begins with the opposition's choice to participate in elections or boycott. The party makes this decision under uncertainty regarding the type of government (whether legitimate or illegitimate) it is facing. If the opposition party chooses to boycott, the government must decide whether to offer the party a concession (i.e. reform) or simply ignore the demands of the boycotting party. The decision of the government will depend on the probability that it gets help from other centers of power if its authority is challenged and the costs to fighting the opposition should the opposition choose to push on with its demand. The opposition can learn about the government's type (i.e. whether it is legitimate or illegitimate) if and only if legitimate and illegitimate types adopt divergent strategies. If the government ignores the demands of the opposition for reform after an election boycott, the party has the opportunity trigger a crisis (revolt) therein challenging the authority of the regime.

3.1.1 The Setup

In the model outlined, there are two actors in the model: an opposition political party (O) and a government (G). There are two government types: Legitimate and Illegitimate. An assumption of the model is that illegitimate governments are more likely to fail. In order to incorporate this idea into the model, I use a scalar (α) such that the probability of failure if facing a legitimate government is $\alpha^K \lambda^K$ with $0 < \alpha < 1$, and λ^K if the opposition is facing an illegitimate government. Thus, there is a legitimacy "discount" represented by α.[49] When α is low, the probability of failure for legitimate governments is lower, and there is thus a greater difference between legitimate and illegitimate government.

[49] However, there is no assumption regarding λ such that it is always high for illegitimate governments. Illegitimate governments can have either a high probability of failure or a low probability of failure.

We assume both the government and the political party have preferences over the outcome of a particular policy. I assume that the policy outcome falls along a one-dimensional policy space: $x \in \mathbb{R}$. We can think of this policy space as the preferences of the actors for a specific issue. For example, such an issue might include the electoral system, press and publication freedoms, or any other political reform an opposition political party seeks enacted. I assume both actors have a quadratic utility function such that

$$u_i(x) = -(x - x_i)^2, \quad i \in \{G, O\},$$

where $u_i(x)$ is the utility of actor *i* for policy *x*, x_i is the ideal point of actor *i* and *x* is the policy outcome.

I assume that both the government and the opposition party are unitary actors and represent their ideal points as x_G and x_O respectively. Without loss of generality, I set $x_G = 0$ and $x_O > 0$. Although the unitary actor assumption is standard in the literature, there is considerable discussion in the party literature about the justification of this assumption (see for example Laver and Shepsle 1996; Maor 1998). The ideal point of the party will be some function of the underlying distribution of power and interest within the party. For the present purposes, this assumption is justified for several reasons. This assumption does not preclude the consideration of parties as made of self-interested individuals with differing preferences. It only implies that the various factions or individuals must come to an agreement on whether or not to boycott (Dion 1997).[50] What is important is to consider whether parties act "as if" they are unitary actors (Laver and Schofield 1990). If we are interested in how the party makes the decision and the effects of divergent preferences within the party have on the party's decision to boycott

[50] In a discussion of party cohesion, Dion (1997) notes, "while we are assuming that a set of *individuals* are members of the majority party, there is really nothing to prevent us from visualizing these legislators into party *wings*. In that case, party cohesion would involve getting the agreement of the various wings of the party (assuming that the individuals within the wings acted in a unitary fashion)" (32).

or participate, we can, for example, look inside the party to examine these dynamics following the example of Laver and Shepsle (1996).

The party makes the decision to boycott under uncertainty about whether they are facing a legitimate government or not. Uncertainty is incorporated into the model by allowing nature to select the Government's type. A government can be either G_L (for Legitimate) or G_I (for Illegitimate). Let ρ be the probability that nature selects a Legitimate Government (G_L), and $1-\rho$ the probability that nature selection an Illegitimate Government (G_I). The sufficient set of institutions necessary to come to the aid of the government (K) is exogenous (not chosen by Nature) and known by all actors. Nature's selection, however, is only revealed to G.[51] The Opposition, O, knows only the probability with which Nature chooses the Government's type. Thus, the game is one of asymmetric incomplete information.

After Nature selects the Government type, the Opposition party must choose whether to boycott or participate in the elections. The Opposition makes this decision given its prior beliefs (ρ) but without knowing the type of government it is facing (i.e. whether the government is legitimate or illegitimate). If the party chooses to participate in the elections, the game ends with elections in which the Government has a probability π of winning the election and obtaining its ideal point, where $0 < \pi < 1$.[52] The expected utility to G of an election is $-(1-\pi)x_O^2$ and the expected utility to the Opposition is

[51] The reason for this information asymmetry will become apparent in the case studies, especially in regard to external centers of power. The opposition can only observe what is said and done publically, but it is not privy to negotiations between an external center of power and the regime.

[52] We can think of π, more generally, as the "ease" with which a party (government or opposition) can obtain a majority. Thus, π can also be a function of the electoral system.

$-\pi x_O^2$. Since the dissertation is concerned with elections and opposition politics under authoritarian regimes, I assume that π falls above a particular threshold.[53]

If the Opposition decides to boycott the election, the Government must decide whether to offer the Opposition a concession. If the Government reforms, the policy outcome is x_R where $x_G < x_R < x_O$.[54] The payoff to the Government of reform is $-x_R^2$, and the expected utility to the Opposition is $-(x_R - x_O)^2$. Table 3.1 presents the Opposition and Government payoffs to each of the four possible outcomes of the model: Election (participation); Reform; Crisis; and Boycott with no reform (i.e. failed boycott).

If the Government ignores the Opposition party's demand, *O* can challenge *G* by triggering crisis. A crisis is costly for both the Opposition and the Government. If the Opposition chooses not to trigger a crisis, the game ends, and the Government implements its ideal point with certainty. When the Opposition chooses to trigger a crisis, it must pay a costs (C_t) and the Government must also pay a cost of fighting the Opposition in a crisis (C_f). The Opposition's decision to trigger a crisis will depend on the likelihood of success, which, in turn, is determined by the type of government it is facing. The extensive form of the game described above is depicted in Figure 3.1. In the model, a government's authority is challenged when an opposition party chooses to boycott and trigger a crisis if the government does not reform.

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[53] A puzzle regarding electoral authoritarian regimes is why opposition parties that seemed overwhelmingly likely to lose nonetheless participate. To investigate this question, I assume (using notation defined below) that $\pi > \rho\left[\frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{o}}\right]$ (see proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A).

This condition minimizes the incentive of the opposition to engage in participation. As can be seen, despite this, we still obtain participation in equilibrium. In countries where elections outcomes are "foregone conclusions" as is the case in much of the Middle East and North Africa, π will be larger than in more democratic countries where we would expect π to be, on average, one-half.

[54] This is a trivial assumption. We could similarly assume the reverse.

3.2 Equilibrium Outcomes

The equilibrium concept used is sequential equilibrium. This equilibrium concept requires a set of strategies and beliefs at each information set such that,

1. For all government types (Legitimate and Illegitimate), the Government's strategy is optimal given its type and the strategy of the Opposition party;
2. Given the Government's action, the strategy of the Opposition party is optimal in the belief system;
3. Given the equilibrium strategy of the government, the opposition's beliefs about the government's type are updated according to Bayes' Rule; and
4. Where Bayes' Rule does not apply, the posited beliefs can be generated as the limit point of sequences of beliefs generated via Bayes' Rule from a sequence of strictly mixed strategies.

Given a set of parameter values, each of the equilibria derived from the model are unique.[55] The model yields five equilibria: one participation equilibrium and four equilibria in which boycotting occurs. The solution and the proofs are contained in Appendix A. In this section, I focus on the following three quantities:

$$\bar{\alpha} = \rho(\alpha^K) + (1-\rho) \tag{3.1}$$

$$\hat{o} = \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} \tag{3.2}$$

$$\hat{\gamma} = \frac{x_R^2 - C_f}{\lambda^K x_O^2} \tag{3.3}$$

Comparing $\bar{\alpha}$, $\hat{o}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ will allow us to identify the appropriate equilibrium for a given set of parameters. Figure 3.2 illustrates how these equilibria are characterized using these quantities.

The first equation (3.1) determines the line between participation and boycott. This condition is a weighted average of the "illegitimacy scores" of the two types of

[55] There is one exception. In the mixed strategy region (Equilibrium II) there is the possibility of (an equilibrium in which) both types of governments prefer reforming (as opposed to the Legitimate type always ignoring). However, the beliefs that would be support such an equilibrium are improbable. As such, this equilibrium is eliminated.

government (Legitimate and Illegitimate). When $\hat{o} < \rho(\alpha^K) + (1-\rho) = \bar{\alpha}$, the Opposition will boycott the election. As $\bar{\alpha}$ itself increases, the line shifts right (again see Figure 3.2) and cases that were once participation will shift to boycotting. When the Opposition's prior beliefs are such that it believes it is facing a legitimate government with a high probability (high ρ), the line shifts left.

The second condition (3.2) is the cost to the Opposition of triggering a crisis. As can be seen from Figure 3.2, there are three regions into which $\hat{o}$ can fall. When $\hat{o} < \alpha^K$, this implies that the costs of triggering a crisis are so low that the opposition will always trigger a crisis against the regime (or, alternatively, the party is too extreme ideologically). When $\hat{o} > \bar{\alpha}$, the costs are too high for the Opposition to trigger a crisis, and the Opposition will thus participate.[56] Finally, when $\alpha^K < \hat{o} < \bar{\alpha}$, the Opposition is willing to trigger a crisis only against an Illegitimate type.

Finally, the third equation (3.3) captures the costs of reform and fighting a crisis to the government. From Figure 3.2, we can see that there are three regions in which $\hat{\gamma}$ can fall. When $\hat{\gamma} > 1$, neither type of government reforms, and when $\hat{\gamma} < \alpha^K$, both Legitimate and Illegitimate governments reform. In the third region where $1 < \hat{\gamma} < \alpha^K$, Legitimate types will ignore the Opposition's demands but Illegitimate types will reform. It is this region in which we observe a separating equilibrium.

For the Opposition to participate in the elections, we need $\hat{o} > \bar{\alpha}$. Under such conditions, the opposition will always choose participation over boycotting the elections. It is important to note the absence of π on the decision to participate or boycott, suggesting that boycotts are not undertaken to avoid electoral defeat. Remember I assumed a high level of π to concentrate on the opposition-government strategic interaction in authoritarian regimes and authoritarian elections, which is the interest of

[56] This particular result supports Masoud's (2008) conclusion about the costs of mobilizing outside the electoral arena and the opposition's participation.

this dissertation. As such, this is an important result of the model identifying the conditions under which we would observe participation *even* in authoritarian elections.

Conversely, when $\hat{o} < \overline{\alpha}$, all equilibria will be characterized by the opposition boycotting the election. Which of the four boycotting equilibria result will then depend on both $\hat{o}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$. When the costs of triggering a crisis are low ($\hat{o} < \alpha^K$) but too high for the government ($\hat{\gamma} < \alpha^K$), the opposition will boycott and both types of governments will reform resulting in Equilibrium I. As $\hat{\gamma}$ increases above 1 and $\hat{o}$ falls below α^K, the result is Equilibrium IV. Under this equilibrium, the opposition boycotts, both government types ignore, and the opposition triggers a crisis. In addition, this is the only boycotting equilibrium in which a crisis cannot be avoided either through reform or the opposition backing down (as is the cases of Equilibria I, II, and III).

The region where $\alpha^K < \hat{o} < \overline{\alpha}$ and, $\hat{\gamma}$ falls below 1, results in Equilibrium II. This is a mixed strategy equilibrium characterized by an opposition boycott. Under this equilibrium, legitimate governments will always ignore, but illegitimate governments, however, will "mix" between ignoring and reforming. That is, the Illegitimate type will ignore just enough (or reform just enough) to make the Opposition indifferent between triggering a crisis and backing down. The Opposition, on the other hand, will trigger a crisis just enough to make the Illegitimate type indifferent between ignoring and reforming. In this equilibrium there are multiple possible outcomes: the Opposition could back down, the Government could reform, or the Opposition could trigger a crisis, which, in turn, could result in the Government losing power or sustaining its rule. As we will see in the Chapter 4, the 1997 election in Jordan is an example of this equilibrium.

The final equilibrium (Equilibrium III) is a separating equilibrium in which the Opposition boycotts, Legitimate types ignore, and Illegitimate types reform. The Opposition, however, will always trigger a crisis either because the costs are too low or the party is too extreme (i.e. the ideological divergence between the government and the opposition is great).

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I develop an incomplete information model of party strategy to answer the following question: Why do political parties choose to adopt particular strategies? One of the main contentions in this dissertation is that opposition strategy is a function of regime legitimacy. An important insight from the model is that boycotts and participation will occur under both types of government. Boycotts can occur under legitimate governments and opposition parties will participate in elections under illegitimate regimes.

The model also allows us to explain the relationship between several key parameters, namely costs and ideological divergence, and the strategies of participation, boycott and revolt. If the costs of mobilization are high and the ideological distance between the government and the opposition is small, the opposition will not trigger a crisis in equilibrium, choosing instead the strategy of participation. As the ideological divergence between the government and the opposition increases, *ceteris paribus*, an election boycott becomes more likely. Whether an opposition party will trigger a crisis influences both the decision to participate and boycott, and only under a semi-separating equilibrium (Equilibrium II) will we observe the opposition boycott and subsequently not trigger a crisis. Thus, only in the mixed strategy case, is it possible to observe failed boycotts.

Although boycotts are not signals in the model, the results can provide some initial answers about the signaling nature of election boycotts raised in the literature (i.e. what do boycotts signal?). First, the model only assumes that the opposition is a unitary actor with ideal point, x_O and there is no restriction on the ideological position of the opposition vis-à-vis democracy. In other words, the opposition can be "democrats" or reject democracy entirely. The model predicts that as ideological divergence between the Government and the Opposition increases, an election boycott becomes more likely. In this sense, boycotts may in fact signal that the opposition rejects the government and/or

rejects democracy. Second, the costs of triggering a crisis (C_t) and the probability of the boycott's success (captured by α and λ) are important determinants of the decision to boycott. Thus, boycotts may also signal the strength or weakness of the opposition party, and its relative strength vis-à-vis the government.

Chapters 4, 6 and 7 of the dissertation will examine the empirical validity of the conclusions derived from the theoretical model. The key question to be answered is whether the model developed in this chapter can explain the actual adoption of party strategies and the empirical patterns of boycott and participation observed cross-nationally. The formal model outlined in this chapter is a general model of opposition strategy in that it identifies the conditions under which the opposition will participate, boycott and revolt. The focus of this dissertation, however, is the strategic choice of the opposition between boycotting and participation. The empirical chapters will thus focus on the following two conditions:

$$\pi > \rho\left[\frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{o}}\right] \text{ where } \hat{o} = \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} \qquad \text{(Condition I)}$$

$$\hat{o} < \bar{\alpha} \text{ where } \bar{\alpha} = \rho\alpha^K + (1-\rho) \qquad \text{(Condition II)}$$

Condition I is always satisfied in authoritarian regimes. The model was devised to explain the dynamics of political opposition in authoritarian elections, and particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, a larger motivation behind the dissertation is the region's exceptional resilience to democratization. Although its intent is to better understand opposition dynamics in authoritarian regimes, the model generalizes beyond the region and beyond the particular class of regimes (electoral authoritarian regimes) that dominate the region's landscape. For the purposes of this dissertation, I therefore assume a high level of π. By relaxing the assumption on the level of π, we can explain the decision to boycott and participate in both democratic and nondemocratic countries. Condition I will be explored in Chapter 4 using a cross-national dataset of democratic and

authoritarian elections. When Condition I is satisfied, Condition II is the "participation" condition: when $\hat{o} > \overline{\alpha}$, the Opposition will participates and when $\hat{o} < \overline{\alpha}$, the Opposition will boycott. Condition II will be focus of the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. Tracking changes in these parameters will allow us to explain the opposition's decisions to participate and boycott across elections in the two countries.

Table 3.1 Payoffs

	Legitimate Type (ρ)		Illegitimate Type (1-ρ)	
	Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
Election	$-(1-\pi)x_O^2$	$-\pi x_O^2$	$-(1-\pi)x_O^2$	$-\pi x_O^2$
Reform	$-x_R^2$	$-(x_R - x_O)^2$	$-x_R^2$	$-(x_R - x_O)^2$
Boycott, No Crisis	0	$-x_O^2$	0	$-x_O^2$
Boycott, Crisis	$-(\alpha^K \lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_f$	$-(1-\alpha^K \lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t$	$-\lambda^K x_O^2 - C_f$	$-(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t$



Figure 3.1 The Extensive Form



Figure 3.2 Sequential Equilibria

NOTE: Equilibrium Path
I. Opposition Boycotts; Government (Both Types) Reform.
II. Opposition Boycotts; Government Always Ignores if Legitimate and Mixes between Reform and Ignore if Illegitimate; Opposition mixes between Backing Down and Triggering the Crisis.
III. Opposition Boycotts; Government Ignores if Legitimate and Reforms if Illegitimate; Opposition Triggers Crisis.
IV. Opposition Boycotts; Both Government Types Ignore Boycott; Opposition Triggers Crisis.
V. Opposition Participates in Election.

CHAPTER 4
PARTICIPATION AND BOYCOTTS CROSS-NATIONALLY

Centers of power play a central role in Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy. The to call upon centers of power when its authority is challenged that makes the regime legitimate. The relationship between the regime and its centers or power(s) is, therefore, important to the maintenance of the regime itself. This relationship is also important for how opposition parties perceive the legitimacy of the regime, i.e., the probability that a government will receive support from a sufficient set of centers of power. This concept, however, as noted in Chapter 2, is difficult to operationalize. This chapter attempts to operationalize this concept to evaluate the model using quantitative methods, namely, logistic regression.

This chapter will explore the determinants of election boycotts. It will focus on one particular questions: Why do opposition parties choose to participate in, or boycott, an election? It does not test the entire theory. Other important predictions of the model, including whether a governments reforms and whether the opposition triggers a crisis, are not evaluated in this chapter. The focus of this chapter will be on Condition I derived in Chapter 3:

$$\pi > \rho\left[\frac{1-\alpha^{K}}{1-\hat{o}}\right] \text{ where } \hat{o} = \frac{C_t}{\lambda^{K} x_O^2}$$

Both Algeria and Jordan satisfy Condition I and thus the case studies undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7 will focus on Condition II. This chapter, however, uses a new dataset of every national legislative and presidential election held between 1990 and 2008. It includes both democratic and authoritarian elections allowing us to test Condition I.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 outlines the variables to be tested and their predicted relationships. In Section 4.2 the results of the

regression models are presented together with a discussion of the implications of the regression models' findings. Section 4.3 concludes with a discussion of the limits of the measures used to approximate the concepts and parameters of the formal model.

4.1 The Variables and Expected Relationships

This chapter uses a cross-national analysis to assess the determinants of election boycotts. The dataset consists of 1,407 national-level elections, with each election linked to its specific country and date (the format is country-election-date). The data covers all countries holding national-level presidential and parliamentary over the period 1990 to 2008.[57] I collected election data for both democratic and authoritarian elections, which will allow us to examine an important result of the formal model. In particular, using this dataset we can test whether in fact π does (or does not) affect the decision to participate or boycott.

Unfortunately, the level of observation does not allow us to account for the effect of x_O^2. Observations are elections, not political parties. As such, we focus on how changes in C_t (the costs of triggering a crisis) and the perceived legitimacy of the regime affect the probability of an election boycott. As the legitimacy of the regime increases (or the perceptions of it), holding all else constant, boycotting is more easily attained in equilibrium. Conversely, as C_t increases, it is less likely that we will observe boycotting in equilibrium.

4.1.1 Elections and Boycott Variables

The dependent variable for the analysis is the incidence of election boycotts. This data was gathered using *Keesing's Record of World Events*. This record is published monthly, with a specific entry for each individual country in a particular month. The dataset includes both parliamentary and presidential elections, and also specifies whether

[57] Territories (e.g. Greenland, Hong Kong, Puerto Rico) and countries not holding national-level elections (Libya, China) are not included.

presidential elections were held simultaneously with legislative elections or separately. In addition, second rounds are included, though when polling takes place across multiple days (e.g. Papua New Guinea), individual days are not counted as separate rounds; only the first polling day is recorded as the election date. Between 1990 and 2008, there were 938 legislative elections and 469 presidential elections.

An election was coded as boycotted if a political party or organization called for a boycott of the election. The emphasis was placed on an organized call for a boycott to differentiate between voter abstention and decisions taken by opposition groups (the interest of this dissertation). Thus, only those elections in which there was clearly a call to boycott the election by an organization or group are considered boycotted in the dataset. Boycotts in separatist regions, such as Chechnya in Russia and Abkhazia in Georgia, are not included as the boycotts are often reported without reference to an organized group or political party. This makes it difficult to determine whether the boycott was simply voter abstention or an organized strategy undertaken by an opposition group or political party. The characteristics of the set of boycotts are presented in Table 4.1. As can be seen from the table, the majority of boycotts during the time period under consideration occurred in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, two-thirds of boycotts occurred in legislative elections, not presidential elections, and overwhelming under majoritarian elections.

In this dissertation one of the questions is whether electoral institutions influence the opposition's strategy by affecting electoral prospects (the probability of gaining access to the elected office, i.e., π). More generally, one theory of election boycotts suggests that boycotts are undertaken by opposition parties because of poor electoral prospects (Bratton 1998; Pastor 1999). Such prospects might result from the conditions under which the election is held (e.g. fraud), the institutions governing the elections (e.g. electoral system), or the type of election (presidential or parliamentary). The type of election is itself related to the electoral system as presidential elections are by their nature

majoritarian. Thus, if the literature is correct in positing that boycotts are motivated by the prospects of winning, we would expect to observe more boycotts in majoritarian and presidential systems.

The vast majority of boycotts occur under authoritarian regimes; only 11% of boycotts occur in democratic countries. I control for regime type using two dummy variables: Partly Free Status and Not Free Status. Given the frequency with which boycotts occur in authoritarian elections as opposed to democratic elections, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the motivations for a boycott are poor electoral prospects. One result derived from the model in Chapter 3, however, is that the decision to boycott (or participate) in authoritarian elections is not be affected by π. This suggests that boycotts are not undertaken because of weak electoral prospects. The case studies in Jordan and Algeria confirm the model's result, and the large-n analysis will allow us to test this result in a cross-national context.

Data on electoral systems were collected from various sources. I expand Golder's (2005) *Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World* dataset to include elections in authoritarian countries.[58] In addition, I extend the timeframe of Golder's dataset until 2008 (the original dataset spans from 1990 to 2000). There are four categories of electoral systems: majoritarian, proportional representation, parallel and mixed systems. The number of electoral constituencies, assembly size, and average district magnitude are also included in the dataset.[59]

4.1.2 Economic Conditions and Societal Centers of Power

In Chapter 2, we discussed the role of economic conditions in shaping the willingness of societal centers of power to come to the aid of the regime, especially in

[58] Golder's codebook is available here: http://homepages.nyu.edu/%7Emrg217/codebook_es1.pdf

[59] Information on electoral systems for elections not included in Golder's 2005 dataset was gathered from four sources: the Parline Database of the Inter-parliamentary Union, Wikipedia, *Keesing's Records of World Events*, and the data handbooks of Nohlen et al (various years).

regimes with large patronage networks, and therefore influence the strategies adopted by the opposition. Poor economic conditions, or, more specifically, deterioration in economic conditions, will suggest to the opposition a potential change in the regime's legitimacy (λ). This, in turn, will influence the strategy adopted by the opposition.

To capture this relationship, the dataset includes standard measures of economic conditions. The first measure is Gross Domestic Product per capita, preferred over GDP to control for population. The second measure is a general food price index (Consumer Prices, Food Indices). This is a particularly good index as it more directly taps into the effects of inflation on the daily lives of citizens. Both the GDP per capita and food price index measurements are sourced from the United Nations Data Repository.[60]

Chapter 2 also emphasized a regime's ability to use economic incentives to maintain its legitimacy, particularly under patronage-based regimes like Jordan. The formal model and the investigation of Stinchcombe's centers of power in Chapter 2 each highlighted the role that an extensive patronage network can play in maintaining loyalty to a regime. The ability to provide lower cost access to various goods and services, as well as employment, appears to be an important factor in the regime maintaining support from its societal centers of power. Many regimes in the Middle East and North Africa maintain large patronage networks to acquire, and retain, the loyalty of supporters. Given the importance of patronage in the region and amongst other authoritarian regimes more generally, it is important to examine whether this relationship exists more generally in a cross-national setting. In order to test this relationship, I incorporate a measure of government final consumption, as a share of GDP per capita (PPP at 2005 constant prices). This data comes from the Penn World Tables.[61] Any perceived changes in the ability of the regime to maintain this patronage network should signal to the opposition

[60] Data available here: http://data.un.org/Default.aspx.

[61] From Penn World Tables: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt70/pwt70_form.php

that the willingness of the societal center (or centers) to aid a challenged regime might change as a result.

In order to capture this idea more precisely, I use an interaction term of government consumption and GDP growth rate. I use an interaction term to test the above relationship for the following reason: if a regime does not maintain support of a domestic center of power via a patronage network, then any change in the regime's ability to spend and consume should not have the same impact on the opposition's beliefs as a change in discretionary spending ability under a regime that does maintain a large patronage network.

Finally, sociological factors that may relate to domestic centers of power are also included in this empirical test. In particular, data on the ethnic, linguistic and religious composition of society (Alesina et al 2003) is incorporated into the model. This dataset provides measurements of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization in some 200 countries as three separate measures. Values of fractionalization close to 0 indicate less fractionalization. Greater fractionalization will increase the difficulty of forming coalitions across disparate groups (i.e. it is more difficult for any one group to be a *sufficient* center of power). Therefore, as fractionalization increases, I expect the probability of an election boycott to increase.

4.1.3 Institutional and External Centers of Power

Two additional centers of power, aside from societal centers outlined above, have been identified as important. One of the main institutional centers of power in the Middle East and North Africa is the military. This is not solely a feature of MENA countries, but is also characteristic of electoral authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, more generally, in which the judicial and legislative branches are constitutionally limited in their power as compared to the executive. Therefore, the empirical test will include a measure for the military as a center of power. To operationalize this institutional center of power, data on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are used. The source of the military

expenditure data is the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset (Singer et al 1972; Singer 1987).

A third center of power that the previous chapters have underlined as important to the legitimacy and survival of a regime is external centers of power. As outlined in Chapter 2, countries that receive higher levels of aid as a percentage of GDP are more likely to have an external center of power. To capture this effect, I use data on Official Development Assistance (grants and disbursements) as recorded by the OECD.[62] We expect changes in foreign aid flows to affect the probability of an election boycott. This relationship, however, is conditional. As discussed in regards to government spending, any changes in aid flows should only affect the probability an election is boycotted *if* a regime relies on an external center of power. In other words, changes in aid flows should only matter for countries that are already receiving large amounts of aid. Only in countries with high aid dependence, should changes in aid flows signal to the opposition a potential change in the willingness of the external center of power to aid the regime. This is represented with an interaction term of aid dependence (aid as percentage of GDP) and change in aid flows.

Similarly, if a military is a center of power (evidenced by high military spending), then any change in military spending should signal to the opposition a potential change in the willingness of this center of power to aid a regime. For example, in Algeria the military is a center of power. If President Bouteflika were to cut the military budget this would likely be greeted with disdain by members of the military, and would likely decrease their willingness to come to the regime's aid. Under such circumstances, we would expect the probability of a boycott to increase. Conversely, if the military is a center of power *and* military spending increases, we expect the probability of an election boycott to decrease.

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[62] Data available from: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx

4.1.4 Costs of Triggering a Crisis

I use two indicators to measure the costs of triggering a crisis to the opposition: (percent urban population and phone access (cell phones per 100 people). Cell phones per 100 people is a common communication indicator to approximate the connectivity of a population. We expect that greater connectivity will decrease the costs of triggering a crisis, and therefore increase the probability of an opposition boycott. Similarly, higher urban densities would decrease the costs of mobilization by decreasing the time it takes to assemble or congregate in a critical mass. Although phone access works in a similar vein, it captures connectivity between disparate geographic locations. Data for both these variables were collected from Gapminder.[63]

4.2 Results

To test the relationships outlined above, I estimate two logistic regression models using robust standard errors, clustered by region. The first model estimates the probability of an election boycott using elections from all regime types (Democratic and Authoritarian); the second, estimates the model using only elections held under authoritarian regimes (high π). Table 4.2 presents the results.

There are several interesting results on which I will focus. First, regarding the prospects of winning. The results of the logistic regression support the predictions derived from the model regarding the effect of π on opposition strategies in several ways. Comparing the two models, we can note that the electoral system significantly influences the probability of an election boycott only when we consider both democratic and authoritarian elections. This is consistent with the formal model's predictions. If we relax the assumption concerning π in Chapter 3 so that Condition I is not satisfied, the strategic decisions of the opposition would in fact depend on π when $\hat{o} < \overline{\alpha}$. As we will

[63] Data available at the following website: http://www.gapminder.org/data/.

see in Chapters 6 and 7, the results underscore the conclusions of the case studies in that electoral prospects (and by extension electoral systems) were not driving the decisions of the opposition in Jordan and Algeria. In addition, the probability of an election boycott actually decreases when the election type is presidential. As the opposition is more likely to gain at least some seats in parliament, this further provides further support this result important result of the formal model.

The effect of food prices in both Model I and Model II on the probability of an election boycott is consistent with the argument that changes in the economic conditions facing the population will affect their willingness to come to the aid of a regime, which will. in turn, influence the opposition's decision to participate or boycott. In Jordan, as we will see in Chapter 6, inflation, and in particular, prices of daily staples were concerns prior to the 1997 and 2010 election boycotts. A unit increase in GDP per capita, on the other hand, is equally likely to result in participation as boycott. One reason for this may be that macroeconomic indicators do not necessarily capture the daily conditions faced by citizens. Commenting on this disconnect between macroeconomic indicators and citizen discontent in Jordan, Ryan (2002) notes, "Although Jordan's economic statistics were far more robust in 1996 than they had been in 1989, they do not reveal, at least at face value, that the reduced budget deficit had resulted in part from reduced government spending in specific areas" (57-58). Ryan provides the example of public-sector salaries, which had not been adjusted to the rising cost of living (58). Food prices, on the other hand, have a tangible impact on citizens' daily life and consumption abilities.

Another interesting result is that of fractionalization. It was hypothesized that greater fractionalization would increase the probability of a boycott. Only linguistic fractionalization, however, is significant in the hypothesized direction; ethnic and religious fractionalization actually reduce the probability of a boycott. It may be that ethnic and religious fractionalization are measuring the costs of triggering a crisis, as opposed to the difficulty of forming a sufficient societal center of power. It may be more

difficult for the opposition to mobilize against the regime when the society it is drawing upon is more fractured (i.e. as fractionalization increases). If fractionalization is in fact measuring the costs of triggering a crisis, then this result would be consistent with the model's predictions.

An alternative reason for the unexpected signs of ethnic and religious fractionalization concerns *K* (the set of sufficient centers of power). From Chapter 2, the probability of failure is equal to λ^K. As *K* increases, the probability of failure decreases. A second explanation for the negative effect of religious and ethnic fractionalization on the probability of an election boycott is that fractionalization is measuring *K*, and thus fractionalization should reduce the probability of a boycott, as regimes that rely on multiple centers of power are "safer."

4.3 Conclusion

The results of the regression models expose some of the limits of this attempt to operationalize Stinchcombe's definition. One problem is how we operationalize concepts such as centers of power. The indicators used to measure the concept of centers of power were insignificantly different from zero, either in coefficients (Military Spending and Government Consumption) and/or in marginal effects (Foreign Aid) (see Figures 4.1-4.6). Another limitation of the analysis is the lack of cross-national data that might better capture important parameters of the model. For example, the costs of triggering are somewhat clumsily approximated, as measured with percent urban population and cell phones per 100 people. These indicators can both be related to economic development. Moreover, boycotts occur overwhelmingly in authoritarian regimes, which are regionally concentrated as are economic development levels. As such, if phone usage (or urban population) is related to development, this variable could influence the probability of a boycott in the opposite direction. Such limitations underscore the importance of the case

studies in evaluating the theory in their ability to retain a level of complexity in the concepts tracked over time.

One of the strongest, and more interesting, results of the logistic regression relate to the motivations behind boycotts. Specifically, they confirm the result of the formal model that electoral prospects do not affect the decision to boycott or participate. As I show in Chapters 6 and 7, beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime largely drove decisions to boycott in Algeria and Jordan. Given the case studies emphasize the role of legitimacy, the best way forward is to concentrate on better measuring legitimacy in a large-n context.

Table 4.1 Boycotts at a Glance

Region	Africa	41.78 %(61)
	Asia	5.48% (23)
	Americas	15.75% (8)
	Oceania	0% (0)
	Europe	13.7% (20)
	MENA	23.29% (34)
Status	Free	10.56% (15)
	Partly Free	35.21% (50)
	Not Free	54.23 %(77)
Election Type	Presidential	33.56% (49)
	Legislative	66.44% (97)
	Concurrent	8.90% (13)
Electoral System	Majoritarian	82.07% (119)
	PR	8.97% (13)
	Parallel	0% (0)
	Mixed	8.97% (13)

Table 4.2 Regression Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting the Probability of an Election Boycott

		MODEL I All Elections		MODEL II Authoritarian Elections	
Election Characteristics (Dummy Variables)	Election Type	-0.825***	(0.200)	-0.763**	(0.334)
	Majoritarian	1.878**	(0.948)	0.861	(1.428)
	PR	0.792	(0.679)	-0.292	(1.217)
	Mixed	0.718	(0.836)	-0.525	(1.336)
	Concurrent	-1.659**	(0.743)	-2.238***	(0.595)
	Partly Free	0.804	(0.504)	--	--
	Not Free	2.294***	(0.535)	--	--
External CoP	Aid (%GDP)	8.568***	(2.834)	5.722***	(1.542)
	Change in Aid	0.002***	(0.001)	0.002***	(0.001)
	Aid Interaction	-0.041***	(0.013)	-0.038***	(0.007)
Institutional CoP	Military Spending (%GDP)	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.002)
	Change in Military Spending	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
	Military Interaction	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Societal CoP	Government Consumption (%GDP)	-0.003	(0.015)	0.028***	(0.009)
	GDP Growth Rate	-0.008	(0.021)	0.013	(0.019)
	Government Consumption Interaction	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.002*	(0.001)
	Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.316	(0.816)	-1.918**	(0.951)
	Linguistic Fractionalization	2.007***	(0.738)	1.682***	(0.466)
	Religious Fractionalization	-1.571**	(0.695)	-1.159**	(0.558)

Table 4.2 Continued

	Price Index	0.011***	(0.001)	0.009***	(0.001)
	GDP per capita	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Cost of Trigger	Urban Population (%)	0.003	(0.007)	0.011	(0.009)
	Cell Phones (per 100)	-0.023**	(0.010)	-0.020	(0.013)
	Constant	-5.334	(0.742)	-2.722**	(1.368)
		n = 713		n = 505	

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure 4.1 Interaction Effect of Foreign Aid

Note: Marginal effect of changes in official development assistance for all elections (Model I).



Figure 4.2 Interaction Effect of Military Expenditures

Note: Marginal effect of changes in military expenditures for all elections (Model I).



Figure 4.3 Interaction Effect of Government Consumption

Note: Marginal effect of changes in the government's consumption ability for all elections (Model I).



Figure 4.4 Interaction Effect of Foreign Aid

Note: Marginal effect of changes in official development assistance for authoritarian elections (Model II).



Figure 4.5 Interaction Effect of Military Expenditures

Note: Marginal effect of changes in military expenditures for authoritarian elections (Model II).



Figure 4.6 Interaction Effect of Government Consumption

Note: Marginal effect of changes in the government's consumption ability for authoritarian elections (Model II).

CHAPTER 5
CENTERS OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East is a particularly good region to evaluate the operationalization of Stinchcombe's definition of legitimacy, and to evaluate the usefulness of this definition for understanding regime stability. Understanding the stability of a regime, or even the fall of a regime, will require the identification of the various centers of power, and changes in the support they offer a regime. The identification of centers of power is also important for tracking changes in the perceived legitimacy of the regime. Thus, centers of power will have a prominent place as we evaluate the model using cases studies of Jordan and Algeria.

This chapter will first discuss the operationalization of Stinchcombe's conceptualization of legitimacy with reference to the Middle East and North Africa. The region is known for the exceptional stability of its authoritarian regimes, and its regimes share many institutional (i.e. regime type), economic and social characteristics. As such, the probable set of centers of power we are likely to observe in a particular country will be similar across the region. After discussing the centers of power in reference to the region as a whole, we will then turn to the identification of the specific centers of power in Jordan and Algeria.

5.1 The Middle East and North Africa

5.1.1 Institutional Centers of Power

Most regimes in the Middle East and North Africa have a set of institutions that are familiar to democratic societies. There are judicial, legislative and executive branches of government, and also regular, multiparty elections.[64] In practice, however, the powers

[64] The majority of regimes that have national legislatures are considered electoral authoritarian regimes. Israel and Turkey are the exceptions.

of Arab legislatures are constitutionally limited, and exercise less effective power than their counterparts in established electoral democracies.[65] Moreover, many legislatures consist of an elected lower house, and yet retain an appointed (or indirectly elected) upper house. The constitutions adopted in the Middle East and North Africa in the period following World War II created strong executives, and therefore the executive branch often dominates the exercise of power. Accordingly, these systems often lack many key checks and balances on executive power that we normally associate with democratic regimes. Furthermore, this lack of executive accountability in the Arab electoral authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and North Africa contributes to the weak powers of the legislative and judicial branches in practice. These arms of government often lack typical powers, and exercise only limited independence from executive control.

Given the extensive range of powers and limited accountability applied to the executive, it is commonly the case that neither the legislature nor the judiciary will be considered a center of power in most regimes across the region. In fact, only two countries (Lebanon and Morocco) as of 1998 have established legislatures that "have succeeded in negotiating and establishing most of the institutional arrangements required for enshrining the legislature as the principle arena of competition" (Baaklini et al 1999:66). Similarly, it is common that judicial branches lack independence from the executive with the executive retaining control over appointments and dismissals. It is rare that they posses "any independent voice interpreting the constitution." Egypt's judicial branch is perhaps the one exception long-noted for its independence and constitutional rulings against the regime.[66]

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[65] "On rare occasions in which elected institutions showed some vitality – Egypt in the 1930s, Morocco in the 1960s, Kuwait in the 1970s and 1980s – the ruler moved simply to shut them down, suspending parliament and sometimes the entire constitution" (Brown 2003:39).

[66] Since 1979, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Council has had the ability to nominate new members/justices who serve until retirement. Since 1979, the Court has declared a number of laws unconstitutional, including the country's electoral law (Brown 2003:46). "Over half the laws contested by the SCC [since 'Awad al-Murr took over the presidency] were declared unconstitutional" (Brown 1999:46).

While the legislative and judicial branches of government are constrained in their powers, the military, on the other hand, is the one institution that could be considered a strong candidate as an institutional center of power. High levels of military spending are common amongst authoritarian regimes as the military is often a key support base for the regime. The authoritarian regimes of the Middle East are no exception. According to Ayubi (1995), "the military establishment is both larger and more costly than it is anywhere else in the Third World" (256).[67] The ability to sustain such large expenditures stems from access to rents. Such rents are either accumulated domestically via natural resources, and/or supplied by external supporters in the form of foreign aid, often supplied by Western patrons. "This [access to rents] gives them access to substantial discretionary resources so that even if the country is in poor economic health overall, the state is still able to hew to conventional economic wisdom and 'pay itself first,' that is give first priority to paying the military and security forces" (Bellin 2005:32).

It should be noted that the existence of the military as a center of power is less likely in the case of patrimonial militaries. This can limit the military as a center of power as highly patrimonial militaries will be unlikely to act independently from the state. Bellin argues that patrimonial militaries are more likely to believe they will be ruined by reform, and thus less likely to turn against a regime facing a crisis instigated by the opposition. In the Middle East and North Africa, many of the security establishments in the region are characterized by patrimonialism with the exceptions of Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia (Bellin 2005:33).

[67] Bellin notes, "MENA states are the world leaders in terms of the proportion of GNP spent on security" (6.7% region average compared to 3.8 world average). Moreover, the proportion of population employed in security is large: "16.9 men per thousand under arms compared to 6.31 in France" (31).

5.1.2 Societal Centers of Power

The states of the Middle East and North Africa are "overwhelming homogenous" populations: they are almost entirely Arab and Muslim.[68] In the 18th Century, noted Albert Hourani (1961), identity in the Middle East and North Africa was focused around religion and ethnicity. Hourani's assessment remains largely true today. The main cleavages along which societal centers of power are usually divided are: (1) ethno-linguistic, e.g., Jordanians vs. Palestinians, Arabs vs. Berbers; (2) religious, e.g., Sunni vs. Shia'a; and (3) geographic, e.g., North vs. South in Yemen, Urban vs. Rural.

Since WWII, the states of the Middle East and North Africa have exhibited three important trends affecting the type of societal groups that are more likely to be (or become) centers of power. First, population growth rates have been high and the total population has increased by multiples of three and four. The result of this exploding population is a remarkably young population. Although there have been huge development efforts, particularly in regard to education, the economic growth rates and associated levels of job creation have not kept pace with this dramatic population growth rate. This has left a large sector of the population young, educated, unemployed, and often disaffected. This disenfranchised group is also relevant to the second important trend (urbanization), and also the strength of Islamists discussed below.

The second important trend is urbanization. The rate of urbanization since WWII has been "even faster than the growth of population" (Hudson, 1977). The high rate of urbanization has led to high population densities and housing shortages. The demands of dense urban living has been exacerbated by a lack of sufficient infrastructure, such as water and transportation, and a lack of economic development necessary to cope with such demographic changes. Hudson notes, "The Arab world has experienced the growth of a poor *lumpenproletariat*, an economically marginal, semi-employed working class"

[68] Exceptions are: (1) Sudan—South Black Christians; (2) Iraq—Kurds; (3) Morocco and Algeria—Berbers; and (4) Lebanon—Christian (Hudson 1977:38-39).

(142). High population growth rates coupled with high urbanization rates resulted in an additional cleavage facing developing nations: young versus old.[69]

The third and final trend important for understanding the range of centers of power in the Middle East and North Africa is the growth in government capabilities. Since WWII, The presence of the state in many aspects (administrative, security, economic) has expanded—regimes increased both their "administrative presence and function" (Hudson 1977:154). This expanded presence of the state included, according to Hudson, the initiation of "far-reaching programs of socioeconomic development intended to improve the quality of life" (157). Due in part to a weak business class, the state became the primary actor in economic development and the establishment of (state) industries. In short, the state in the Arab world is the major economic player.

Moreover, across much of the Middle East the state has expanded in terms of its share of employment. The manufacturing and agriculture sectors of the economy across much of the region are small, as is employment in both.[70] In addition, the private sector elite also remains small across this region and countries generally lack large middle classes.[71] Despite the historically large role of the state in Arab state economies, in recent times privatization has "increased dramatically in the 1990s" (King 2009:4). It is possible, therefore, that we may yet observe the private sector as a major player in the 21st Century.

Many individual opposition parties across the Middle East and North Africa could not, alone, be considered centers of power whose support would be sufficient to sustain a regime facing a crisis. In some instances, a coalition of opposition parties might present

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[69] One conclusion is that As such, the traditional cleavages around which political parties arose in Western Europe are not dominant and in most Middle Eastern and North African regimes will not be considered a center of power.

[70] There is of course some variation. Waterbury (1989), for example, notes that working classes are stronger in Algeria and Egypt but not in Jordan and Morocco, where organized labor is absent (42).

[71] As noted by Razi: "All available evidence on the Third World so far indicates that class affinity is far weaker as a source of cohesion and commitment that are religion and nationalism" (75).

a possible center of power. One reason for the weakness in individual opposition parties is due to the power of the state, which, as noted above, has expanded its capabilities and employment share. While the state can continue to dominate economic interests of large sections of society, through patronage for example, it is unlikely that an individual opposition party be strong enough to be a center of power. The one exception is the Islamists.

The high population growth rate and increased urbanization have created an opportunity for societal groups (particularly the Islamists) to appeal to disaffected youth. Generally, as noted by Bellin (2005) popular mobilization levels are low and civil society is weak across the Middle East. According to King, Islamism is "the most powerful social movement in the Middle East and North Africa" (King 2009:91). Islamic movements have remarkable resources to reach out to the public of potential supporters through mosques, clinics and charitable/welfare organizations. Wiktorowicz (2004), for example, notes the importance of mosques for local community and their role in promoting collective action: "Within the physical structure of the mosque, Islamists offer sermons, lessons, and study groups to propagate the movement message, organize collective action, and recruit new joiners" (10). In addition to mosques, Islamic movements have a large network of non-governmental organizations through which they offer education, health care and basic social services. Islamists are also involved in student and professional organization, and in many countries across the Middle East and North Africa, have formed political parties. Finally, the Islamists in some countries across the region have demonstrated their strength and support through elections (e.g. Algeria in 1991).

There is no doubt that Islam is important and prominent part of daily life and society.[72] Islam is the official state religion of most Arab states and some regimes have relied heavily on Islam to bolster their legitimacy claims amongst key groups (e.g. Morocco and Jordan). Whether Islam or more specifically Islamists form a center of power whose support is sufficient to support a regime in time of crisis is the question needed to answer, not whether Islam itself is important.[73] We therefore have to make a distinction between ideology (nationalism, Pan-Arabism, Islamism) and a center of power. Although Islamists can certainly be a center of power (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon), this is not universally true across the Middle East and North Africa. The question that must be addressed in each individual case is whether Islamists' support within a particular state is sufficient to sustain a regime when its authority is challenged.

Although, no regime has abandoned Islam "entirely" (Owen 2004),[74] regimes across the Middle East and North Africa have adopted various strategies to negotiate with Islamist movements. Some have sought to eliminate the activities of Islamists, banning them from political activity—often both formally and informally—in addition to "cracking down" on their supporters.[75] Others have sought to co-opt the Islamist movements, and still others have allowed the Islamists to operate on a wider basis. This has led to varying strengths of Islamist groups across countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, support for Islamist movements varies across the region and, more importantly, Islamists themselves disagree about future political development (e.g. whether an end goal should be Islamic Caliphate or Islam-based democracy). In any

[72] According to Hudson (1977), "The profound significance of Islam as a component of Arab identity lies in its pervasiveness in society, its integrating function beyond kinship, its adaptability, and its sociopolitical values" (47).

[73] Analogous to looking at Western countries and whether Christianity via Christian political parties is an important center of power.

[74] "No regime felt able to abandon Islam entirely for this would have been to cut the most important single ideological and cultural link between it and the bulk of the population" (Owen 2004:29).

[75] I say formally and informally because although Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is officially banned, candidates known to be Muslim Brotherhood members run as independents.

event, the Islamist movement in the Middle East is often, but not always, a center of power for regime legitimacy. The demographic trends of young population, high levels of urbanization, and limited economic opportunities, combine to provide an opportunity for Islamist groups to become powerful social movements.

5.1.3 Non-Domestic Centers of Power

The third potential power center for regimes is external, foreign powers. Investigating the importance of this center of power leads us to consider the "degree to which the international context affects the domestic distribution of power and resources among key local actors" (Cavatorta, 2009:34). More specifically, incorporating the support of external actors into our analysis of domestic politics can help us explain opposition and government interactions more completely. External actors have long played an important role in the domestic politics of the Arab world. The role of non-domestic centers of power in the Middle East and North Africa is particularly strong due to the geopolitical importance Western donor governments attach to the region. This largely revolves around demand for oil, however, since the 9/11 attacks against the United States, the strategic importance of the region has increased further as a result of the US War on Terror. Moreover, the United States' war against Iraq in 2003 required the help of strategic allies in the regions, such as Jordan.

One of the most important ways in which external centers of power can show their support for regimes is through foreign aid, in form of financial, technical and military assistance. However, the relationship between external actors and regimes in the Middle East and North Africa is more nuanced than simply the Western governments propping up authoritarian regimes through aid, or even through the provision of financial and technical support. One key way that this legitimacy is extended to the regime from the external actor is through security. Bellin (2004) notes that the maintenance of coercive apparatuses "is also shaped by successful maintenance of international support

networks" (27).[76] The role of external centers of power in their support of regime legitimacy through security has been particularly important in the Middle East and North Africa. The willingness of external actors to provide this support is often related to their own interests. For example, one of the reasons that regimes in this region have received extensive support for their coercive apparatuses has been because their geopolitical position is also of strategic interests to western security. In understanding the legitimacy that external actors can provide, we can also better understand the incentives that regimes face in their decision to reject reform that even when societal centers of power desire.

5.2 Jordan

When the British established the territory of Transjordan as a protectorate in 1921 and installed Abdullah I as emir, the new Hashemite monarchy had to engender domestic support for a monarchy that was not local: the Hashemites are descendents of the Prophet Muhammad and came from Mecca in present day Saudi Arabia. The monarchy lacked local support and has been concerned ever since with the bases of its rule. Perhaps because of this, Jordan has seemed to outside observers to be always unstable:

> For many decades, foreign observers of Hashemite Jordan have predicted instability, decline, and even its imminent destruction….But those few outsiders who really knew Jordan saw the considerable hidden strengths of the Hashemite regime: its loyal core East Bank constituency; the support of the Western powers and, tacitly, Israel; and the very considerable skill of its kings in maneuvering through social tensions within the country and regional threats without (Garfinkle 2993:85).

This statement by Garfinkle is a good example of the power of understanding regime stability through the framework of legitimacy outlined in this dissertation. Understanding

[76] The relationship between external support and domestic security is extremely important. As Bellin further explains, it is often the key in maintaining domestic power:

"The security establishment is most likely to lose its will and capacity to hold on to power when it loses crucial international support…Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on" (Bellin, 2005: 27)

the various centers on which the government relies will allow us to explain the Hashemite Monarchy's remarkable stability, not its imminent destruction.

5.2.1 Institutional Centers of Power

In Jordan, the king's powers as laid out in Articles 31-40 of the Constitution include the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the cabinet and the senate, and dismiss the former as well as the National Assembly. The king calls elections and may choose to postpone or delay the holding of general elections if "a force majeure has occurred which the Council of Ministers considers as rendering the holding of elections impossible" (Article 73.iv). Although the lower house is elected, the king appoints the upper house (the Senate). The power of the legislative branch is limited by the constitution, but also by short sessions, the electoral law and lack of legislative experience (e.g. how to draft laws). When parliament is out of session, the King has the power to pass temporary laws. During the suspension of parliament between 2001 and 2003, more than 200 temporary laws were passed. The judicial branch also lacks independence due to the power the King exercises over the appointment of judges. The judicial branch is subject to executive pressure through appointments, dismissals and promotions (Burgis 2007:145).[77] Although constitutionally independent, the high courts lack clear mandates to interpret the constitution, which negatively affects their ability to check executive power (144).

The military is the one institution that could be a potential institutional center of power. The army, since the establishment of the territory of Transjordan by the British, has been used as a patronage tool and source of Bedouin employment. The Transjordanian basis for the army dates to the early days of the Hashemite monarchy. As noted by Peters and Moore, "In exchange for their allegiance, co-opted tribes demanded payoffs in the form of tax exemptions, cash, weapons, and employment in Jordan's new

[77] The supreme court justice, Faruq Kilani, who had rule the 1997 Press and Publication Law unconstitutional, was dismissed from the court shortly after the ruling (Ryan 120).

military." By the late 1950s, King Hussein had "firmly established" his authority over the army retaining control as well as "personal links" through appointments of all senior personnel (Yapp 1996). Following a coup attempt in 1957, King Hussein purged the ranks of the military. This included, according to Owen,

> This [the purge] included reducing the importance of the better-educated, more politicized Palestinian soldiers by confining them to the technical arms, and then recruiting large numbers of men from the tribes, who were given control over the tank and infantry units that could be expected to play the major role in any future conflict (186).

As a result, the armed forces are overwhelming drawn from Transjordanians and Palestinians have limited opportunities for advancement within the armed forces, and within the pubic sector more generally. In Bellin's terms, Jordan's military is patronage-based and the king "regularly appoints his male relatives to key posts to guarantee against military rebellion" (Kamrava 2000:89l in Bellin 2005).

5.2.2 Societal Centers of Power

The population of Jordan is approximately 6.4 million, of which 1.9 million are registered refugees (mostly Palestinian but also Iraqi).[78] The vast majority of Jordanians are Arabs (Transjordanians and Palestinians) and Sunni Muslim, but there are small Circassian, Chechen, Armenian and Christian populations. Although there are no census data available, approximately 60% of the population is Palestinian, and 78% of the population lives in urban areas. Jordan's economy is service-oriented and 77% of the population is employed in this sector. Only a small percentage of the population is engaged in agriculture (3%) and about 20% of the population is engaged in manufacturing.[79] Thus, neither the manufacturing nor agriculture classes form centers of power.

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[78] Demographic data from CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html. Accessed 7 July 2011.

[79] The contributions to GDP of the three sectors are as follows: 3.4% (agriculture), 30.3% (industry), and 66.2% (service sector).

The central role of the Bedouin in Jordan politics dates to the beginning days of the British Mandate. The British method of indirect colonial rule required local knowledge and collaborators, which the British found in tribal shaykhs (Alon 2007:5-6). To establish and retain the loyalty of the tribes in Jordan, the regime has relied on public sector employment (Alon 2007). Tribal identity in Jordan is, today, still strong. The salience of tribal identity is clearly illustrated in election and voting behavior (Lust-Okar 2006), and is partly a consequence of this long-established patron-client relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Bedouin tribes. Although there are some Palestinians within the ruling coalition, Garfinkle notes that

> All aspects of public administration, from customs personnel to education ministry functionaries, were staffed through the tribes and the oligarchs. The same groups [the army, the *mukhabarat*, the East Bankers, the oligarchs] virtually control the print and electronic media (92).

Despite the size of the Palestinian population in Jordan, the regime has sought to systematically limit the influence of the population. Districts with large Palestinian populations are underrepresented in the national legislature compared to more rural, tribal districts. For example, Lust-Okar (2006) notes that Amman's second district in 1997 had seven fewer seats than it would have if all people were represented equally. Palestinians are also disadvantaged in education and employment opportunity due to the entrenched *wasta* system, which is a necessity for obtaining government jobs, education as well as business contracts and permits. Although the regime has made significant efforts to marginalize the Palestinian population, the Palestinian population in Jordan represents an important center of power due to their size. "Unlike other Arab states, which could and did exclude Palestinians from mainstream social and political life, Jordan could not, for the Palestinians' demographic and economic weight was too large" (Garfinkle 105).[80] It is the Transjordanians and the Palestinians that form the two societal centers of power in

[80] Garfinkle notes that merchants and landlords are predominately Palestinian. In addition, Abdullah I incorporated the merchant elite of Syrian and pre-1967 Palestinian origins into his domestic coalition in the new territory of Transjordan (Owen 2004).

Jordan. Neither an economic elite nor a political party is alone sufficient to aid a challenged regime.

Jordan is considered a partial rentier state with the economy centered on the "Big 5" stated owned industries and foreign aid. During a period of increased Palestinian immigration, the Transjordanians grew nervous about the effect of this new, and growing, group on their state benefits. As a concession to the Transjordanian merchants, the regime brokered a deal in which these merchants together with the state established four of five state-run industries (Piro 1998). These natural-resource-based industries dominate the state Jordanian economy, and the state, through its involvement, thus dominates the economy. The state is also heavily involved in the market through price and import controls (Piro 1998; Knowles 2005).

The private sector is weak and largely dependent on the state. Rent seeking among public officials is rampant and crony-capitalism extensive. As noted by Knowles (2005), the private sector and the state, from the mid-1940s onward, became increasingly interdependent evolving "into a parasite feeding on the body of the state" (42-43).[81] Knowles further notes that, "The overlap of state-private sector relations, as at 1989, was manifested in four areas: state involvement in productive companies; state involvement in the market; the use of access to the economy by the state for political purposes; and the institutional structure of the private sector" (73). Although the private sector during the period under study cannot be considered a center of power today, in the future it might be. Private sector is slowing beginning to push for reform (liberalization and privatization) that the donor community (via the IMF) has long desired (Knowles 2005:162).

[81] Although beyond scope of dissertation, see Knowles (2005) for excellent overview of the changing relationship between the state and the private sector from the mandate period to the present, and the factors affecting this relationship.

Opposition political parties are also weak in Jordan, with the exception of the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The IAF, the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, is the largest and best-organized political party. It is the only political opposition to consistently win seats in the national legislature. Throughout much of King Hussein's reign, the Muslim Brotherhood had a close relationship with the regime and it was the only group that remained legal throughout the period of martial law. During the 1950s and 1960s, the regime sought closer relations with the Brotherhood to counter the Ba'athists and communists. Although the Islamists are not alone a center of power, the Monarchy cannot afford to ignore them: "The IAF, while posing no direct threat to either monarch or administration, still had sufficient power and influence to not have their demands ignored."

5.2.3 Non-Domestic Centers of Power

Jordan is considered a partial rentier state for its dependence on foreign assistance. As noted by Ryan (2002), "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has throughout its history been dependent on foreign assistance to keep its economy afloat" (48). After the creation of the protectorate of Transjordan, Britain provided Jordan with enough external revenue to "develop both the army and the central administration" (Owen 2004:39). The foreign aid Jordan received from first the British, and later other Arab states and the United States, has impacted domestic politics and development in important ways (Brand 1995:41-42). The Hashemite monarchy has used the external rents it receives to build a domestic coalition of support through patronage distribution (*wasta*) resulting in an ingrained patronage system. Foreign aid has allowed the regime to maintain its network of patronage distribution despite the IMF structural adjustment programs to which Jordan has committed. As noted by Peters and Moore (2009),

> The majority of tribal side payments, such as public employment and the selective provision of welfare benefits [prohibited by IMF agreements], have persisted

> because the regime has been able to foot the bill through foreign aid as budget support and unregulated privatization proceeds (285).[82]

The United States is today the largest external patron of Jordan and is an external center of power for the Jordanian regime. Jordan is rewarded for its policies toward Israel, and for its support of US efforts in Iraq and the War on Terror (Peters and Moore 2009:263). The 1957 domestic challenge King Hussein faced is one example illustrating the important role of the United States as a center of power is illustrated at several points at which the Hashemite Monarchy has been challenged. During the turbulent period of 1957 in which the regime probably faced its biggest challenge yet in its short history, the Jordanian regime was able to secure US support after being previously "rebuffed" by the United States. After King Hussein dismissed the leftist prime minister, Suleiman Al-Nabulsi, according to Peters and Moore (2009),

> Within days, an agreement was signed to grant Jordan $10 million in economic assistance under the guise of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was immediately followed by another $10 million for the army and $10 million in budget support. In May, the White House instructed the Embassy to issue the grant substantially without conditions, claiming, 'political conditions were overriding' (the White House 1957)"(268-269).

5.3 Algeria

5.3.1 Institutional Centers of Power

Algeria, like Jordan, is an electoral authoritarian regime, and until 2011 was under a constant state of emergency since the military coup in 1992. The president of Algeria is elected by direct, universal suffrage and retains complete executive power. Until 2008, the president was limited to only two-terms. Today, however, there are no term-limits imposed on the president. The Algerian constitution vests the president of Algeria with the powers to appoint and dismiss the head of government, one-third of the upper house, the president of the upper house, and a number of other civil and military posts.

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[82] After the 1980s economic crisis, and subsequent domestic unrest, the US "devoted substantial resources toward economic reform in Jordan, but it has done so while providing budget support that allows the Hashemites to maintain their tribal base, as well as by constructing new institutions that secure trade-based rents for the displaced Transjordanian economic elite" (Peters and Moore 2009:274-5).

The 1996 constitutional referendum established an upper house of indirectly and appointed members. The reforms passed with the 1996 constitutional referendum also included strengthening the presidency, which retained important emergency powers (Quandt 1998). Moreover, all draft legislation requires "the approval of a three-quarters majority of the upper house," which is, according to Roberts (2003), "massively dominated by regime place-men" (264). Thus, like Jordan, the lower house of Algeria's parliament has limited power constitutionally and in practice. Roberts (2003) argues that the parliament is in fact much closer to that of a consultative body and, "As such, the Parliament has so far failed to comprehensively amount to a significant centre of political power outside the executive of the state" (265).

In neither country would the legislative or judicial branches be considered centers of power. Executive power is vested in the king in Jordan and in the president in Algeria. The legislative and judicial branches, as in many countries in the region, have limited powers, formally (constitutionally) and in practice. Moreover, since the recent political liberalization, there have been attempts to weaken the already constitutionally weak legislatures in both Jordan and Algeria. Unlike Jordan, however, the military in Algeria is considered a center of power.

The military since the War for Independence has played a dominant role in Algerian politics. In fact, the legitimacy of the new regime, as noted by Evans and Philips (2007), "was derived from the era of liberation and the figure of Ben Bella as one of the historic leaders of the FLN" (74). But it was the military that took power in 1962 using Ben Bella as a figurehead and the military that came to the rescue of the regime during "Black October" in 1988 (Evans and Philips 2007). The military would again take control in 1992 following the Islamist victory in the first round of the legislative elections. As noted by Quandt (1998),

> The army remains an essential part of Algeria's political life. From the beginning, it has been the mainstay of each regime. Other political groupings have

> fragmented, but the military has never split in the same way. Its coherence and hierarchy has given it staying power, even if it lacks popularity (78).[83]

Despite Bouteflika's attempts to marginalize the military, it remains an important center of power to the Algerian regime.

5.3.2 Societal Centers of Power

Algeria is a country of approximately 35 million people.[84] It is overwhelming Sunni Muslim (99%), and although the majority of the population is Arab (and the vast majority Arab-Berber), approximately 20% of the population identifies as Berber. There are several distinct Berber groups in Algeria, but Berberism (the social movement for the recognition of Berbers, and their language Tamazight, as an integral component of national identity) has developed almost solely as a Kabylie issue. Sixty-five percent of the population is urbanized, and urban migration continued at approximately 2.5% between 2005 and 2010. Only a small portion of the population (14%) is engaged in agriculture, industry (13.4%), and construction and public works (10%). Employment in government comprises the largest share at 32%.

The state, as in Jordan, dominates the economy. Algeria is a rentier state deriving some 60% of its budget revenues from the hydrocarbon industries. The agriculture and service sectors contribute 8% and 30% respectively. The neglect of the agriculture sector following independence led to a "rural exodus" which further exacerbated Algeria's "absorption crisis" (Bonner et al 2005:2).[85] As in Jordan, the Algerian middle class is weak (Colonna 2005) and despite Algeria's much greater privatization efforts than Jordan, it still lacks a strong private sector elite independent of the regime.

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[83] Quandt also notes that, "True, the Algerian military had long been the real power behind the scenes, but there is still a difference between being a puppet master and being on stage" (63).

[84] Demographic statistics obtained from the CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html. Accessed 7 July 2011.

[85] The absorption crisis refers to the inability of the socialist Algerian state to provide education, housing and employment to the population. According to Bonner et al, "Aggravating the crisis was a high population rate, which swelled the number of young Algerians seeking schooling, apartments and jobs" (2).

Labor in Algeria is an important social group within Algeria, unlike in Jordan, and in many other Middle East and North African countries. For example, the national trade union (the UGTA) organized strikes in 1991 to protest price increases and "participation rates were above 90 percent in urban areas and above 60 percent in rural areas" (King 2009 quoting Alexander). Again in 1998, the UGTA demonstrated its power in gaining concessions on wages, factory closures, and several other issues (King 2009:152). The UGTA, and other organizations like it, "remained powerful tools for (electoral) mobilization for core elites and their clients in government and parliament" (Werenfels 2007:65). The UGTA belongs to the *famille révolutionnaire* and, as stated by Werenfels, "its strong veto power became obvious in 2002, when it forced Bouteflika to shelve the draft for a new hydrocarbon bill" (66).

Following independence, the Algerian state expanded, as in other Arab socialist countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, nationalizing industries including minerals, banking insurance and manufacturing (Ruedy 1992:216). In addition to its nationalization of key industries, the Algerian government also expropriated some 1.3 million hectares of land (Bennoune in Owen 2004). Revenues from the hydrocarbon industry facilitated and maintained the state's expansion.

There are several potential cleavages along which society could be divided to form centers of power in Algeria: language (French vs. Arabic), ethnicity (Berber vs. Arab), ideology (Islamists vs. democrats and/or nationalists)[86] and generation (young vs. old). In Algeria, the generational divide forms a center of power because, unlike in other Middle East and North African countries, they cannot identify with the basic right to rule narrative propagated by the state. As noted by Evans and Phillips (2007), "This new generation had no memory of French rule; no sense of the contrast between pre-1962 and post-1962" (107). Generations are separated by ideology and, in this way; generations

[86] The civil war largely eliminated the power of the Islamists (for a number of reasons), and they are no longer considered a center of power.

are divided along doctrines of legitimacy. The older generation accepts the basis of rule (the revolution) proffered by the nationalists (the FLN, the UGTA, and even perhaps the RND) (Quandt 1998).[87] The younger generation, however, does not.

This generational cleavage also overlaps with other cleavages present in Algeria. For example, Roberts (2003) notes that this younger generation schooled in Arabic as opposed to French had limited employment opportunities.[88] State corporations preferred French speakers as they dealt with "predominately Western suppliers and customers" (Roberts 2003:12). Roberts further argues that this divide between *arabisants* and the older, French speaking population constitutes a "major cleavage." He notes,

> A high proportion of *arabisants* came from poorer families in the remoter areas of the country, from those sections of society which had been lease affected by French culture during the colonial period and whose traditional way of life in agriculture and stock raising had been undermined by developments and upheavals in the countryside…And, with the massive exodus from the countryside which began during the war and continued unabated after 1962, this category of frustrated *arabisants* increasingly constituted an important and potentially turbulent element of the urban population (12).

It was not only history that spurred the generational divide but also economics: over 75% of those looking for were under the age 35 in 1985 (three years before Black October) (Evans and Philips 2007). The young, poor and unemployed (mostly men) in Algeria were referred to as *hittistes*, derived from the Arabic *heta* – wall – and referring to the practice of standing around the walls of neighborhoods. The dire situation and the lack of hope for improvement in the near future, made the *hittistes* amenable to the Islamist message. "The bedrock of the FIS support was unemployed youth, who saw the party as the natural expression of their anti-establishment feeling" (Evans and Philips 2007:151). It was the youths who challenged the regime in 1988, and formed the corps of

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[87] Quandt (1998) notes that two major currents in Algerian society are the nationalists and the democrats (represented by the FFS and other smaller groups).

[88] According to Roberts, the "public administration and the state sector of the economy did not keep pace with that of secondary and higher education, with the result that by mid- to late 1970s there were large numbers of young Algerians educated in Arabic for whom employment opportunities were scarce." (12).

the rioters during the Berber unrest in 2001. According to Werenfels, "the term 'generation' has been part of the Algerian political vocabulary for decades" (79).

5.3.3 External Centers of Power

A further center of power for the Algerian regime can be found externally. Both the United States and France (the European Union more generally) recognize the strategic importance of Algeria (Cavatorta 2002). President Boumediene sought foreign allies in Egypt, the USSR, and China to support his regime, while his successor, President Chadli "sought to realign Algeria with Europe and America" (Evans and Philips 2007). It was thus during the Cold War, and before the thawing of relations between France and Algeria, that the Soviet Union provided Algeria with the "principle external premises…of the substantive sovereignty of the Algerian state" (Roberts 2003:349).

After the military coup in 1992, Western countries, especially France and the US, provided both economic and political support to the Algerian regime following the cancellation of the elections. The regime benefitted from debt-rescheduling (on two different occasions) thanks to the US and France. According to Cavatorta (2002), "the financial difficulties of the regime could have been exploited to pressurise those in power into accepting a negotiated resolution, but the regime was instead bailed out" (39). Werenfels (2007) also notes the importance of debt rescheduling for the survival of the regime:

> Debt rescheduling, linked to an IMF-induced structural adjustment programme, saved the Algerian state from bankruptcy and thus indirectly allowed the continuation of the costly military repression of the insurgents…It helped the core elite hold on to power by enabling it to renew and uphold clientelistic networks in which allegiances were brought through the distribution of rents and the conferring of economic 'rights', such as import and distribution licenses (49).

Cavatorta succinctly summarizes the attitudes of key Western countries to the Islamist victory in the first round of the 1992 legislative elections: "Washington preferred the generals to the Islamists" (38).[89]

Algeria also benefitted from military support supplied by France in the form of weaponry, intelligence, and surveillance technology. The strategic importance of Algeria to Western countries, like the US, only increased following the 11 September terrorist attacks (Martinez 2005). Discussing the Pan Sahel initiative, Entelis (2005) notes that, "Washington's new interest in regions like southern Algeria fit into a global strategic vision that dovetails with Algeria's own political agenda, including maintaining a robust authoritarian state" (544).

5.4 Conclusion

Identifying centers of power is particularly important as we delve into the case studies of Jordan and Algeria. More specifically, having identified a center of power—and the factors that might determine its continued support—we can now attempt to track its willingness to aid a regime facing a crisis. This in turn, will enable us to understand how opposition's beliefs as to whether a particular center of power will aid a threatened regime can change over time. In the next we will turn to the case of Jordan to examine these relationships.

[89] This attitude was not unique to the US and France as "many African and Arab leaders breathed sighs of relief. They had been fearful of the domino effect of an Islamist victory in Algeria, which might have been a beacon for Islamist movements throughout North Africa and the Middle East" (Evans and Philips 2007:173).

CHAPTER 6
Jordan

The model developed in Chapter 3 provides us with a framework for understanding government and opposition behavior in electoral authoritarian regimes. This chapter will track those parameters of Condition II that the model suggests to be important, namely the legitimacy parameters (ρ, α, λ), C_t, and x_O, in order to explore how changes in these variables affected the behavior of the opposition and government in Jordan from 1989 to 2010. In so doing, I will provide one explanation for the pattern of government and opposition strategies observed in Jordan during this period.

The question is, of course, why Jordan? Although Jordan began a process of political liberalization in 1989 with King Hussein's decision to hold elections, the country never successfully transitioned to a democracy.[90] As a result, Jordan, like many of its regional neighbors, is today considered an electoral authoritarian regime (Condition I is satisfied). There is also significant variation in opposition behavior: of the five elections held since 1989, the opposition has boycotted only twice (1997 and 2010) and has participated three times (1993, 2003, and 2007) (see Table 6.1). Variation in opposition behavior also occurred during times of boycott; following the 1997 boycott, the opposition in Jordan chose not to trigger a crisis, an approach later rejected following the second boycott in 2010. The basic facts of the Jordanian experience leave us contemplating the relative infrequency of boycott strategy given the relative consistency of the electoral rule, the opposition's grievances, namely the electoral rule.

This chapter uses a more detailed examination of the Jordanian experience to evaluate the model and its predictions outlined in Chapter 3. To align the case study with the structure of the model, the chapter will follow three sets of actors: (1) the regime; (2)

[90] The 1989 elections were not the first national-level elections to be held in Jordan. The first national-level elections took place in 1947

the opposition (the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated political party, the Islamic Action Front or IAF),[91] and (3) three centers of power: Transjordanians, the Palestinians, and the United States. I will show how the model can explain the pattern of participation and boycott observed in Jordan from 1989 to 2010. More specifically, the chapter will show how the opposition's shifting interpretation of regime legitimacy drove the changes we observe in opposition strategies across time. To do so, I rely on elite interviews triangulated with news archives and previous academic work on Jordan (Webb et al 1966). I conducted over 40 interviews with IAF party leaders and members, elected officials, nongovernmental organizations, academics, journalists as well as government officials. The interviews were held in Amman, Jordan between February and June 2009, and October and November 2010.

6.1 Political Liberalization in Jordan

Parliamentary life was restricted following Jordan's loss of the West Bank in 1967 and the subsequent implementation of martial law. After an over 20-year hiatus, some semblance of democratic institutions and processes returned to Jordan with the resumption of parliamentary elections in 1989. In response to domestic unrest over economic conditions in areas of traditional monarchy loyalty, King Hussein decided to hold Jordan's first parliamentary elections in over two decades. This process of political liberalization in Jordan was concurrent with similar processes occurring elsewhere in the region and in the world more generally. Jordan's most recent foray into democratic politics began at the tail end of the third wave of democratization that had its start in the mid-1970s with the overthrow of the fascist regimes in Portugal and Spain. From 1989 to the early 1990s, democratic reform swept across Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle

[91] There are numerous political parties, and opposition parties, in Jordan. However, most lack popular support and have not won many, if any, seats.

East resulting in the (re)establishment of multiparty elections and politics in Jordan and elsewhere.

Prior to King Hussein's decision to hold elections in 1989, Jordan had already begun plans to re-establish parliamentary life. In January 1984, the government reconvened parliament, which subsequently ratified a new electoral law. Elections were expected in 1987. However, at this time Jordan had not yet relinquished its claim to the West Bank, and following a breakdown in talks with the PLO, on 10 October 1986 King Hussein announced the postponement of elections indefinitely (Mufti 1999:104). When the First Intifada broke out in 1987, King Hussein postponed the "revival of parliament" indefinitely (Mufti 1999). But just two years later, following domestic unrest sparked by economic crisis, Jordan finally restored parliamentary elections.

The economic crisis in Jordan in the 1980s, which eventually brought about political reforms and the revival of parliamentary life, was precipitated by the oil shock of the 1980s. As a partial rentier state, Jordan was indirectly dependent on oil. The economy relied on remittances from Jordanians and Palestinians employed in the Gulf oil sector as well as significant foreign assistance from those same Gulf States and from other countries such as the United States. When the oil economies contracted following the global drop in oil prices in the 1980s, Jordan lost both of its primary sources of revenue.[92] Due to the international oil shock and subsequent reduction in capital inflow, Jordan borrowed heavily throughout much of the 1980s. By 1988, Jordan's debt was twice its GDP (Ryan 2002:51). International currency markets reacted strongly to Jordan's growing debt, with the Jordanian Dinar losing half its value over a period of four months in 1988 (Piro 1998:73).

After seeking assistance from the International Monetary Fund, particularly with regard to debt relief, Jordan agreed to implement austerity measures, including the

[92] The World Bank estimated that aid to Jordan decreased by about one-third between 1988 and 1989 (see Garfinkle 1993:90).

reduction and/or elimination of price subsidies. The result of this change in government policy was disastrous for both the general public and the regime itself. As Piro (1998) has noted, when subsidies were removed on 16 April 1989, prices increased by 10 to 65 percent. The increases affected many household staples, such as gasoline, sugar, and soft drinks, but also extended to industrial inputs such as steel bars (73). The effects were felt immediately. Riots erupted in Ma'an days later and soon spread to Karak and Tafileh. Adhering to the requirements imposed by the IMF generated significant discontent across the population. However, as Ryan (2002) has pointed out, "public discontent focused not only on the price hikes for fuel and other products, but also on broader and more endemic issues such as long-term political and economic mismanagement" (53). King Hussein recognized the connection between flares of domestic unrest and popular concern over political and economic realities. In response to the outbreak of rioting in southern Jordan, he expedited the process of political liberalization that had slowed following the start of the First Intifada. The result: Jordan's first parliamentary elections in over 20 years.

The 1989 Jordanian elections were regarded as the most free and fair of the elections that that have since taken place. They resulted in one of the strongest parliaments in Jordan's history; the only Jordanian parliament of comparable strength was installed by the 1956 elections.[93] This sentiment, common among various Jordanian (political commentators, opposition, observers) is affirmed by Tahir al-Masri, a former prime minister, who argued, "Every elected parliament [since 1989] is weaker."[94] The perceived open and fair nature of the election was remarkable not only because it followed the turmoil created by the April 1989 price increases, but also because it was

[93] This was a sentiment widely expressed in interviews and informal conversations during my fieldwork in Jordan. Dr. 'Abd al-Latif 'Arrabiyyat, for example, called the 11th Parliament the "peak" of parliamentary life in Jordan. Moreover, in its official statement explaining the 1997 boycott, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that "during the period from 1989 to 1993, the 11th parliamentary session witnessed a democratic awakening which became evident by issuance of a host of laws that established grounds for a more advanced political life, such as the law of political parties, the 1993 press and publication law, the law of the state of the security court, the law of municipalities and the abolition of marital law."

[94] Interview with author, March 2009.

held under martial law, which had been in place since 1967, and without formal political parties. The strength of the 1989 parliament is evident in the range of important political reforms that were enacted in the three years that followed, including the end of martial law, the legalization of political parties, and the expansion of media and press freedoms. Following the legalization of political parties in 1992, a number of parties registered, including the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the official political party of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The political reforms seemed to mark a watershed in political freedom and democratic transition in Jordan. There were, however, other forces of change operating within the 11th parliament. The driving force behind many changes was the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies, which between them controlled a plurality of parliamentary seats while regime loyalists remained a minority (Mufti 1999:109). The growing strength and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen in Prime Minister Mudar Badran's decision to offer the Muslim Brotherhood five cabinet positions in 1991. The Brotherhood took responsibility for the portfolios of education, health, justice, social affairs, and Awqaf (religious affairs, endowments).[95] Furthermore, the Brotherhood gave its vote of confidence to the Badran government conditional on the satisfaction of a number of policy objectives, including the establishment of an Islamic faculty at Yarmuk University and an end to the sale and service of alcohol in public institutions.[96] Finally, in 1991, a National Charter was adopted that outlined "the parameters of future political practice" (Mufti 1999:114).

With hindsight, it is perhaps not surprising that on 4 August 1993, King Hussein dismissed parliament and 13 days later issued a temporary electoral law.[97] The new law

[95] Since 1993, no prime minister has asked IAF members to participate in the government.

[96] Several of IAF's desired social reforms were blocked, including banning male hairdressers in women's salons and segregating children's sporting events so that even fathers could not attend their daughters' events.

[97] Although the temporary election law governing elections in Jordan has been revised several times (and most notably reissued in May 2010), it has remained a provisional law since 1993 because it has not yet

changed the electoral system from a Block Vote to a Single Non-Transferable Vote system (or *sawt wahid* – one man, one vote – as it is called in Jordan). The law is widely recognized as having deliberately disadvantaged the Muslim Brotherhood and engineered a parliament loyal to the regime.[98] Those in the opposition as well as independent journalists and academics vehemently opposed both the new electoral law and its enactment by decree. The law itself, even today, remains a major point of contention between opposition groups and the regime.[99] In addition to the electoral formula (*sawt wahid*), the opposition contests the highly disproportional allocation of parliamentary seats, which over represents rural-tribal loyalist areas in comparison to urban and Palestinian areas.

In the context of this anger and frustration with the new electoral rules, the IAF, the Muslim Brotherhood,[100] and other opposition parties discussed the possibility of boycotting the 1993 elections. On hearing of these deliberations, the King called on the IAF to participate and "assume its historical responsibility." The IAF Shura council voted 85% in favor of participating in the elections. In 1993, the Muslim Brotherhood and its independent Islamist allies captured 18 seats, a marked decline from the 34 seats won in

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been approved by parliament. Each time the law has been revised, it has always been during times when parliament was suspended.

[98] The Single Non-Transferable Vote system is an electoral system in which a citizen has one vote despite living in multiple member districts, as opposed to having as many votes as there are representatives to be elected from your district. As noted by Baaklini et al (1999), "the new election law granted each person only one vote, giving a clear advantage to those candidates who could best deliver services while creating a major hurdle for 'ideological' candidates such as leftists and Islamists" (157). (See also Mufti 1999:107-108 and 118 on this point).

[99] The law not only raised concern amongst Jordanian civil society but also amongst international NGOs. The law has been the subject of much discussion about how it increases tribal identities, weakens political parties, takes away Palestinian voices, and poses a major obstacle to political reform in Jordan. In 2003, for example, 62.8% of votes were wasted (i.e. 62.8% voted for a candidate who was not elected) (FROM DRI, Electoral Framework).

[100] The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front are separate bodies. Some members of the Islamic Action Front are not members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, there are strong links between the two groups, as members of the Muslim Brotherhood established the IAF. In addition, the IAF has struggled to act, and develop an identity, independently of the Brotherhood, and it is often suggested the IAF is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.

1989. This was despite the fact that the IAF's share of the vote remained the same (Mufti 1999:120). In effect, the King's effort to engineer a more loyal parliament was already succeeding.

In 1997, with the electoral law still unchanged, the Islamic Action Front and other opposition parties decided to boycott the parliamentary elections. Their stated reasons for boycotting were first and foremost the electoral rule followed by the peace treaty with Israel and the 1997 Press and Publication Law. After the 1997 election boycott, the government chose to ignore the demands of the boycotting opposition and did not undertake reform of any kind. The opposition, despite the lack of meaningful reform on any of these three grievances in the years following the 1997 election,[101] chose to participate in both the 2003 and 2007 elections. In May 2010 the government implemented a new temporary electoral law that left the fundamental electoral rule structure intact, but switched the number of districts and adjusted the number of representatives elected in each district. Associated adjustments included an increase in the lower house from 110 to 120 seats, 12 of which are now reserved for women. Again, citing the electoral law, the IAF adopted the strategy of boycott for a second time in 2010. The government again chose to ignore the demands to change the electoral law. This time, however, the opposition triggered a crisis.

6.2 The 1993 Elections

Given that the opposition participated in the 1989 election, we begin evaluation of the model from a participation equilibrium. From Chapter 2 we know that the opposition will participate in equilibrium if the following condition holds:

$$\hat{o} < \bar{\alpha} \text{ with } \hat{o} = \frac{C_t}{\lambda x_O^2}$$

[101] In fact, the Press and Publication Law passed in 1998 by parliament was even worse then the temporary enacted by decree in 1997, which was later ruled unconstitutional.

and where $\bar{\alpha} = \rho\alpha^K + (1-\rho)$ determines the line between boycotting and participation. Thus to move from a participation equilibrium to a boycott equilibrium, one (or more) of three things can occur: the costs of triggering a crisis (C_t) can decrease; the ideological divergence between the government and the opposition can increase (x_O), and/or the legitimacy of the regime (represented by ρ, λ, and α) can decrease.[102] Importantly, changing from participation to boycotting does not depend on π, the probability of the government winning the election (see Figure 3.2).

Opposition participation in the 1993 election is a great illustration of the model's benefits. The strategy of participation employed by the opposition parties in the 1993 elections does indeed fit with the model's predictions. Although the change in the electoral law has been cited as the grievance that drove the opposition's decision to boycott in 1997 and 2010, at the time of the 1993 election, this new electoral law did not in fact result in an election boycott. Instead, decisions by the regime, particularly in relation to the First Gulf War, allowed it to maintain its perceived legitimacy. There were, of course, voices within the Islamic Movement[103] calling for an election boycott in 1993, citing the new electoral law and the handicap it posed to their ability to win seats in parliament.[104] Even still, the majority within the Islamic Movement favored participation, as did other opposition political parties.

As noted above, one way to shift from a participation equilibrium to a boycott equilibrium is to increase the legitimacy of the regime. For such a shift to occur, the

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[102] Although analytically distinct, we can consider changes in these parameters together. To see this rewrite the condition of interest such that the legitimacy parameters are all on the right side: $\frac{C_t}{x_o^2} > \lambda^\kappa \left[\rho\alpha^\kappa + (1-\rho)\right]$. From this rewritten condition we can see that as legitimacy increases (α and λ decrease, and ρ increases), boycotting becomes less likely in equilibrium.

[103] The Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are often referred together as the Islamic Movement.

[104] For example, Interview 12 argued that it would have been better to boycott before the peace treaty in 1993.

opposition must believe that the regime is less legitimate. If anything, however, the legitimacy of the regime increased between 1989 and 1993. "Indeed, in some respects, Jordan's general circumstances a year after the end of the Gulf War were better than they were a year before" (Garfinkle 1993:102).[105] As a result of the strengthened position of the Jordanian regime following the first Gulf War, we again observe participation. Several key factors contributed to the regime's increased legitimacy at this time. First, although the relationship between Jordan and the US, its primary patron, was strained following King Hussein's decision not to join the US-led coalition against Iraq, by 1993, relations were improving and, most importantly, the US had resumed its foreign aid to Jordan. Therefore, the probability that the US would come to the aid of Jordan by 1993 remained much same. In fact, by the 1993 elections, Jordan was also being offered economic incentives from the US to normalize relations with Israel. Together with the mended relationship, US support of the regime was unquestionable by the election.

Second, general economic conditions had improved dramatically since the 1989 election. This economic improvement has important implications for how opposition parties perceive the probability (represented by λ) that societal centers of power – in this case Transjordanians and Palestinians – would continue to support the regime if its authority was challenged. During the Gulf War, Jordan suffered two economic costs in addition to losing various sources of aid. First, Iraq was Jordan's largest trading partner: 17% of Jordan's imports came from Iraq and sent 23% of its exports to Iraq (Ryan 2002:75). Until his fall in 2003, Saddam Hussein sold Jordan oil at well below market prices, which lowered the price of oil and gas to Jordanian citizens.

Jordan's GDP was also negatively affected by a dramatic reduction in remittances from Jordanians working in other Gulf States. Prior to the Gulf War, these remittances

[105] As noted by Ryan (2002), between 1992 and 1994, "the kingdom had realigned just as dramatically: stabilizing its economic situation, abandoning its political alignment with Iraq, achieving rapprochement with the United States and most Gulf States, and finally signing a peace treaty with Israel" (54).

comprised a sizable portion of Jordan's GDP. However, Jordan's decision to align itself with Iraq alienated these host countries, which had until this time allowed Jordanian nationals to work in the Gulf. Thus in addition to losing its largest trading partner, Jordan faced serious economic hardship from other sources as well. As Ryan succinctly explains, "by maintaining alignment with Iraq, the Kingdom alienated its other key economic allies, each of which delivered a sharp economic blow: the United States ceased its foreign aid to the kingdom temporarily, while Saudi Arabia and other GCC states cut off aid and oil supplies, and then deported hundreds of thousands of Jordanian and Palestinians laborers" (Ryan 2002:75).

The return of hundreds of thousands of Jordanians and Palestinians from the Gulf threatened an increased economic burden for an already shaken Jordanian economy. Surprisingly, however, their return in fact stimulated economic growth through increased domestic consumption spending.[106] Although GDP per capita growth rate was negative in 1991, per capita GDP growth in 1992 was 12.69% and remained positive until 1996.[107] By the 1993 elections, it appeared that the return of these workers was not the economic burden that had been assumed, as "returnees to Jordan were slowly but surely finding work" (Garfinkle 1993:102).

Finally, King Hussein's decision to not join the US-led coalition against Iraq was very popular in the Arab street. Because Saddam Hussein was popular amongst a significant portion of the population across the Middle East, the public, including both Transjordanians and Palestinians, greeted King's Hussein decision favorably. King Hussein's public image received a sustained benefit for a number of subsequent years. As

[106] The *Shari'at Garden* area in Amman developed as direct result of the returnees from the Gulf. "Economically, Jordan soon recovered from the loss of foreign aid, of remittances and of the transit trade with Iraq. New foreign aid was supplied by Japan and the EC (especially Germany) and the 300,000 refugees from Kuwayt proved to be much less of a burden than had been supposed because their arrival stimulated a boom in construction. And although relations with Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia long remained cool, Jordan's good relations with other Arab states and with the great powers were quickly restored" (Yapp 1996:472).

[107] GDP per capita growth rates for 1993, 1994, and 1995 were 0, 0.98, and 2.79 respectively.

noted by Garfinkle "The king's nationalist credentials, even among Palestinians, never shined more brightly, whereas Arafat's position had never been worse" (102). Furthermore, King Hussein's decision to appoint a Palestinian, Tahir al-Masri, as prime minister also increased his standing among Palestinians living in Jordan.[108]

Taken together these factors boosted the perceived legitimacy of the regime. As such, there is significant evidence that the legitimacy parameters certainly did not decline and may have even increased over this period. Thus, even at a most conservative estimate (no change in perceived legitimacy), we would not predict a boycott given no change in the two other key parameters (C_t and x_O). However, as outlined above, an increase in the legitimacy of the regime is more likely, thus predicting participation. Such changes in the legitimacy parameters were indeed enough to overcome the impact of the electoral law, as evidenced by the opposition's participation in the 1993 elections. In a 1993 statement to the press, the head of the Shura Council in the IAF, 'Abd al-Majid Thunaybat, confirms this assessment:

> Therefore and despite our great reservations towards the current electoral law and the way it was introduced [and the fact that] it aims to limit the presence of the Islamic movement and its representation in the next parliament, [the Brothers] out of their feeling of responsibility to their calling, their homeland, and their citizens, and out of concern for the sensitive developments in our nation at this time, have decided to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[109]

6.3 The Boycott of 1997

Four years later, the IAF and other opposition parties decided to boycott the 1997 lections.[110] This shift in strategy from participation in 1993 to boycotting in 1997 was not

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[108] "When the king wished to conciliate the Palestinians and the secular left he chose Tahir Nash'at al-Masri (June to November 1990), a Palestinian who had previously been associated with a policy of close links with Iraq. And when the issue of peace with Israel became dominant Husayn fell back on another member of an old East Bank family, 'Abd al-Salam Majali (1993-5), who pushed the necessary legislation through parliament in 1995" (Yapp 473).

[109] "85% of Islamists front council vote in favour of participating in elections," *Jordan Times*, 1993.

[110] Several small parties did participate, most notably the National Constitutional Party.

limited to opposition parties; several high-level independent politicians also boycotted the elections. Following the boycott, the government chose to ignore the opposition's demands for reform. After being ignored by the government, the opposition chose not to trigger a crisis. The model sheds light on this movement from opposition participation to boycott. Again, a shift from a participation equilibrium to a boycotting equilibrium can result from a decrease in the legitimacy of the regime, a decrease in the costs of triggering a crisis, and/or an increase in the ideological divergence between the government and the regime. Several political and economic conditions in Jordan leading up to the elections in 1997 suggest that the legitimacy of the regime had decreased since 1993. In terms of the formal model, two events in particular occurred between 1993 and 1997 that strongly suggested to the IAF a likely increase in the regime's failure rate (λ) and a decrease in the opposition's prior beliefs (ρ) concerning the regime's legitimacy.

First, and most importantly, is the signing of the peace treaty with Israel. The Wadi Araba Treaty, signed in 1994, was wildly unpopular amongst Jordanians of both Transjordanian and Palestinian origin. "The treaty was indeed expedited by the Hashemite regime itself, but with little warning or preparation within Jordanian domestic politics. The treaty even today appears to have far more critics than supporters within Jordan" (Ryan 2002:78). Ryan (2002) further notes that by 1994, "The regime saw the treaty as essential to the full restoration of its political-economic ties to the world's most powerful states and institutions. A regime much 'recovered' and strengthened since its 1989 scare then overrode public opinion—at least the opinion in opposition to the treaty—to secure longer-term economic gains and regime security" (79).

The peace treaty with Israel had not brought the "investment and trade boon" that people had expected (Ryan 2002:58). Although the treaty was sold to the Jordanian public as bringing great economic benefits to Jordan through increased ties to Israel, "the expected great upsurge in economic well-being, however, never happened" (Ryan 2002:79). Opposition to the treaty cannot be overstated—there was a continual public

tirade against the treaty in the popular press and by opposition parties. In response to this public criticism, the regime further agitated public opinion by enacting the restrictive 1997 Press and Publication Law aimed at silencing dissent in the run-up to the elections (Ryan 2002:79). The 1997 boycott, then, represented tandem protests against the temporary electoral law of 1993, the newly decreed Press and Publication Law, and most importantly, to the 1994 treaty and the regime's efforts to normalize relations with Israel.

In addition to the public outrage created by the peace treaty, a series of economic challenges created further public dissatisfaction with the regime. Salaries had not kept up with the cost of living, and an effort to reduce the budget deficit had resulted in fewer government jobs and reduced government spending. The contraction in domestic economic opportunity and rising living costs were exacerbated by the fact that Jordanians were no longer able to migrate to other Gulf States in search of employment. This was another unfortunate consequence of the first Gulf War. With the domestic economy contracting and more vulnerable than it had been in previous years, the regime committed to another round of economic reforms in 1996. Although satisfying some of Jordan's obligations to the International Monetary Fund, these economic policy adjustments again, as in 1989, created a period of price volatility precisely at a time of rising public frustration. As in 1989, the program required the reduction and/or elimination of subsidies on many staples. In an attempt to prevent the price changes, the IAF organized a boycott of a parliamentary session in August 1996 in which 23 deputies participated to protest the price hikes.[111] However, the boycott of the parliamentary session was unsuccessful and the price reforms were introduced.

In order to soften the impact of the economic reforms, the government introduced various forms of state-subsidized living allowances. For example, members of the Armed Forces and the government workers were paid a cost of living allowance directly by the

[111] Opposing price cuts and other IMF mandated austerity programs has been a mainstay of the IAF platform.

government while Jordanians not employed in the public sector were paid their allowances through the Supply Ministry, or even Jordanian banks (Ryan 2002:56). Despite these efforts to cushion the economic blow, Jordanians were severely affected by the price increases. The price of bread more than doubled and animal fodder, and thus dairy prices, increased significantly as well. As with the 1989 economic reforms and subsequent price volatility, riots broke out within days of the 1996 price increases.

Again the riots were centered in areas of monarchy strongholds, with riots beginning in Karak and spreading to Ma'an and Tafileh. The government called in the army and imposed a curfew in Karak. These events likely affected the opposition's perception of the government's legitimacy. Even though the government's response in 1996 was markedly different than in 1989, the events suggested to the opposition that the government was more vulnerable. The potential gravity of the unrest for the government is captured by a statement from Ahmed Yussef of the Jordanian Democratic People's Party (Hashid). Yussef maintains that those constituencies regarded as government strongholds are significant indicators of public frustration that the government must take seriously. While unrest in the refugee camps might be overlooked, the Transjordanians are a voice that must be listened to:

> Here in Jordan the government is only affected by the Jordanians. For example, if the southern provinces of Ma'an or Karak moved and rejected some case then this may affect the decision of the system. But if the Baqa'a Camp did, they do nothing about it.[112]

In terms of the formal model, these riots and associated events can be interpreted as a signal to the opposition groups that the government is weakened, its legitimacy is in question, and the boycott strategy can be used to achieve reform. The influence of the riots on the opposition's prior beliefs was amplified by historical experience. Just seven years had passed since riots in Ma'an, Tafileh, and Karak had led to the reinstatement of

[112] Interview with author, May 2009.

elections and to a period of political liberalization. With this precedent in mind, the opposition began to regard a boycott strategy more favorably.

The opposition would have seen further indication of the regime's weakening legitimacy (and hence the reduction in the value of ρ) in the government response to the opposition's boycott. Upon learning of the pending boycott, the government held meetings with members of the opposition, primarily the Islamic Movement, to discuss the upcoming elections and the opposition's decision to boycott. King Hussein, in particular, asked the Islamic Action Front to reconsider its decision and participate in the elections. However, the opposition felt the King wanted them to participate only to "make a nice image" (I18). "Why did the government ask us to participate?" said Jamil Abu Bakr, spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood. "Because it is very important to the government to have the opposition in the elections, to gain more credibility in front of the whole world."[113] Mustafa Hamarneh, an independent politicians and chairman of the board of the newspaper *As-Sijil* echoed this sentiment: "Their participation gives the elections more legitimacy. If the opposition boycotts, the elections will look fabricated and not representative."[114]

Given these events, the predictions of the model are informative in understanding the change in opposition strategy from participation to boycott. The unrest amongst a societal power center (Transjordanians) in their likely support of the regime was a strong indicator to the opposition that the failure rate was increasing. The peace treaty with Israel and the domestic unrest resulting from austerity measures combined with the King's overtures to the Islamic Movement strongly suggested to the opposition that the regime was vulnerable and needed their participation.

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[113] Interview with author, June 2009.

[114] Interview with author, February 2009. Even government officials thought similarly: Dr. Abdallah Ensour noted that if the IAF does not participate, "it means something is wrong. [Their absence] reflects poorly on the government and the credibility of parliament" (interview with author, March 2009).

Due to the perceived weakened position of the regime, the Islamic Movement "did not feel it had to make compromise with the government."[115] As a result, the opposition in Jordan undertook the boycott in the hopes of achieving a change in the government's policies and a resumption of the liberalization process, which by 1997 had stalled. As noted by Hamzeh Mansour, the current head (as of 2011) of the IAF, the boycott "is a peaceful tool of pressure on the government to draw the public opinion's attention towards the government's undemocratic and unfair procedures."[116] According to Rohile Gharaibeh, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, "We thought that the public's pressure would force the higher political bodies to back away from conducting restrictions and move ahead with the democracy march. However, they didn't have any concern for the public or the figures, and kept their same tactics." He continues, "We wanted to embarrass the government in front of the West, the United States and the European Union who support the government in its approach." Consequently, the opposition shifted strategy from participation in 1993 to boycott in 1997.

The domestic opposition to the peace treaty, as well as the domestic unrest resulting from the price increases, suggested to the IAF that they could use the boycott to get reform. The objective of the boycott strategy, both in terms of the formal model and in the empirical case of the 1997 Jordanian election, was to obtain concessions and political reform. In response to the opposition boycott, the regime had indeed made repeated promises of reform. The IAF and other moderates placed faith in the government's assurances[117] but did not obtain the reforms in any of the three main areas

[115] Mustafa Hamarneh, interview with author, February 2009

[116] Interview with author, April 2009.

[117] Mustafa Hamarneh, interview with author, February 2009. According to Mohammad Al-Haj, a former IAF member, "This situation continued till 2003 when the King gave positive signs on the neutrality of the government in this field. No reform of the electoral law but promises from the King that will be done under his rule" (interview with author, April 2009).

of grievance that led to the boycott.[118] Nor, however, did the opposition parties choose to trigger a political crisis to challenge the authority of the government. Thus the question becomes: Why, after boycotting the election, did the government choose not to reform and the opposition not to pursue these an even more aggressive political strategy?

There are a number of issues that might explain the decision of opposition parties to refrain from a continued political challenge to the regime and suggest the opposition was not in a situation in which it would always trigger a crisis ($\hat{o} < \alpha^K$). First, it is likely that the cost to the regime of fighting a challenge from the opposition had decreased. The increased payoff from a crisis to the regime would, in turn, decrease the frequency with which the opposition chose to trigger. In both 1989 and 1996, the public blamed the prime minister for their economic hardship induced by IMF reform obligations; there were, in both years, widespread calls for the prime minister's resignation. In 1989, the King responded to this sentiment by dismissing Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i and appointing Zayd bin Shakir, who was considered an intermediary between the hardliners who opposed elections and the reformers who felt that elections represented the best way forward.[119] The response of King Hussein in 1996 was quite the opposite. Not only did the King refuse to yield to the public's widespread calls for Prime Minister Karabiti's resignation, but also publically defended him. King Hussein appointed Karabiti, who had been considered a reformer, in 1996. According to Ryan (2002), his "appointment also coincided with the regime's clear intent to increase the role of the Mukharabat in public life (in the aftermath of the peace treaty and opposition hostility to it)" (Ryan 29). King Hussein took a strong public position in a number of significant fronts after the August

[118]The opposition believed it might get reform. This is a strong indication that it is unlikely to be Equilibrium IV under which both legitimate and illegitimate governments do not reform.

[119] Intermediates, like Zayd bin Shakir, fell between the Hardliners who wanted to "initiate stopgap economic reforms and prosecute corrupt cabinet officials [and] avoid elections that could produce a Palestinian-dominated parliament and/or spiral out of control" and the Reformers who wanted to "initiate elections to avoid resort to further violence and provide an outlet for the legal expression of current and future dissent" (Schwedler 2006:49, see also Mufti 1999).

1996 price increases. First, he expressed his support for both the prime minister and the unpopular economic policies that had caused the volatile price changes, "suggesting that the previous years of bread subsidies had been 'a mistake'" (59). Second, the king gave a televised address in which he claimed that he was prepared to use an "iron fist" and "any other means necessary to restore order" (Ryan 58). These actions indicate a newfound preparedness to confront the domestic challenge directly and push back against the demands of reform pursued by the opposition.

There is another indication that the government's cost of fighting had decreased. Between 1994 and 1998, the US debt forgiveness to Jordan totaled some US$700 million (Prados 2003:13). Moreover, in 1996 Jordan was a "leading recipient of free weapons" through the US excess defense articles (EDA) program[120] and in November 1997 the US Congress, through foreign aid appropriations act H.R. 2159 allocated Jordan US$75 million in grant military aid for the fiscal year 1998, and a further US$1.7 million in military training assistance. This made Jordan the largest recipient of US military training grant assistance in 1998. During this period, Jordan also benefitted from an extensive military drawdown from the US:

> A special $100M U.S. military drawdown for Jordan was authorized in the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Section 572, P.L. 104-207). It has been used to provide M60A3 tanks, CUCV's (Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles), UH-1H helicopters, 40-foot personnel boats, a 65-foot air-sea rescue boat, and night vision devices. Deliveries in December 1996 culminated over one year's worth of work on the program. Of particular significance was that all equipment arrived fully capable (Taylor et al 1997:4)

Finally, in 1996, President Bill Clinton designated Jordan as a major NATO ally.

The second reason behind the lack of reform and opposition trigger is that the government had signs that the opposition's payoff to triggering a crisis had likely

[120] Other leading recipients in 1996 were Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Egypt, Israel, Bahrain, and Turkey (http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/WaysandMeans.html). "Since 1990, the Pentagon [through the EDA program] has offered approximately $8 billion of excess military equipment to foreign militaries, including nearly 4,000 heavy tanks, over 500 bombers and more than 300,000 pistols, rifles and machine guns."

decreased. In the terms of the formal model, a decrease in the payoff to triggering a political crisis would decrease the probabilities that the government would reform and that the opposition would trigger a crisis. In other words, it is unlikely that $\hat{o} < \alpha^K$ such that the opposition would always be willing to trigger a crisis. The first indication that the payoff from triggering a crisis may have decreased was that there were some high-level defections within the opposition groups. Two IAF members, Abdul Rahim Al-Akour and Abdullah Akaylah, chose to defy the party's decision and contest the 1997 elections. Another member of the IAF, Bassam Amoush, published an article in *Al-Rai* newspaper "refuting" the decision to boycott.[121] All three members were subsequently expelled from the Islamic Movement. Most importantly, according to Abdullah Ensour, the government received signals that the rank-and-file membership was highly critical of the IAF leadership for this decision.[122]

The second indication that the opposition's payoff had decreased was that the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood did not ask their supporters to boycott in 1997. Some years later, in 2010, the boycott was an undertaking to which they were highly committed. They used an extensive boycott campaign, including IAF posters and pamphlets distributed to the public, to encourage people to support the opposition by boycotting the polls.[123] During the 1997 boycott, by contrast, the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood did not call on their own supporters or voters at large to boycott the elections. When asked why, they said that they wanted to avoid a confrontation with the government. Nabil al-Kofahi: "We did not ask people to share in boycott because we did not want to break our relation with King."[124] Rohile Gharaibeh echoes a similar sentiment, "The IAF thought

[121] And according to Jamil Abu Bakr, the internal struggle was worse after boycott: "The boycott also left marks of the inner disagreement between the people with and against the boycott but they are not serious marks, but the harmony was better before the boycott."

[122] Interview with author, March 2009.

[123] IAF and MB members very visible campaigning for voters to boycott polls. In 2010 slogan was: "Yes to true elections; No to sham elections."

[124] Interview with author, February 2009.

that embarrassing the government would provoke anger and indignation towards them." These statements suggest that the Islamic Movement's perceived payoff to triggering a crisis was lower in 1997 than it would be during later elections. In addition, the IAF did not even participate in the 1996 riots. Instead the group confined itself, according to Abu Rumman (2007), to a "minimum degree of protest" (24).

Another factor supports the hypothesis that the Jordanian government interpreted the costs of a challenge to be decreasing at this time. Participation in rural areas was seemingly unaffected by the boycott strategy, including in locations of traditional monarchy support such as Ma'an and Tafileh. According to the Minister of Political Development, Musa Maaytah, "Intellectuals, political parties, civil society organizations [NGOs], and political personalities are the ones criticizing law, not normal people."[125] He continued, "56% agree with one-man, one-vote. The opposition to the law [the IAF] is a minority." The opposition's skepticism regarding its ability to challenge the government can be seen in a statement by Ahmed Yussef of the Hashid Party,

> Do we have to make popular revolution to make the Government change the law? I don't think that people will do this for the sake of the elections law. They may for earning a living or for their livelihood or for a significant political issue related to Palestine. The referendums still show that 50% of the society accepts the electoral law, and the tribal groups are content with this Parliament for the services they get.[126]

Finally, although fighting back against the opposition risked further erosion of its domestically based power centers, i.e., Jordanians and Palestinians, at this time the regime's legitimacy appears to have been well-anchored by its international center of power: the United States. Given the United States' strong support for the regime at that time, it is possible that the regime thought domestic challenges to its authority were less costly to quash than previously believed during the immediate aftermath of the 1989 riots. As noted by Ryan earlier, the government, at least with regard to the Wadi Araba

[125] Interview with author, May 2009.

[126] Interview with author, June 2009.

treaty, had chosen to ignore public opinion. Mustafa Hamarneh echoed this sentiment: "In 1997, it was obvious that peace process was more important than democracy to the government--they were less sensitive to opposition." The responses of opposition parties when asked why the government did not reform are particularly strong illustrations of both the model and of Stinchcombe's conceptualization of legitimacy. The IAF and other opposition parties and figures concluded that both domestic and international pressure was insufficient. For example, Nabil al-Kofahi, an IAF member of parliament elected in 2007, said that the government did not reform because the "USA didn't have any desire for reform."[127] Reflecting on why there was no reform, Jamil Abu Bakr, of the Muslim Brotherhood, offered a clear example of the choices that the opposition makes:

> The public pressure was not sufficient. Many people acted but all the actions were insufficient. There was also no pressure from outside. In developing countries, change can only be done by strong and hard efforts and perhaps we needed to go out in the streets, which may actually cause violent actions. It is the nature of unjust systems.[128]

Finally, a strong indication of the mixed strategy equilibrium is that Equilibrium II is the only equilibrium in which the opposition could be worse off than if they had participated. Members of the IAF and other observers repeatedly expressed this. Hamzeh Mansour, of the IAF, states the following on the IAF's decision to return to participation in 2003:

> We decided to choose the best of two bad choices. We believed that it would be worse to boycott these elections, to isolate ourselves from the public by not presenting our agenda in the electoral campaign and losing our voice inside the lower house.[129]

Two main reasons were cited by IAF members and others (e.g., academics, journalists, other politicians) for the return to participation in 2003. The first stated reason

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[127] Interview with author, February 2009. Mustafa Hamarneh echoes this sentiment: "Pressure from West and internal pressure for reform not strong enough" (interview with author, February 2009).

[128] Interview with author, June 2009.

[129] Interview with author, April 2009.

for the change in strategy was that the 1997 boycott was not successful in achieving the very reforms it had sought. Indeed, the boycott failed to elicit reforms to either the Press and Publication Law or the Temporary Electoral Law, and did not result in a change in the government's position vis-à-vis the peace process. Furthermore, what the Islamic Action Front might have gained through the 1997 boycott strategy seemed to be less than it had lost in influence since the election. IAF members and others repeatedly claimed that, as a result of the boycott, the IAF had become isolated, losing their voice in both parliament and broader electoral campaigning, and thus restricting their ability to publicize themselves and their agenda.

There was also a common view among the opposition parties that the regime's own objectives were more easily obtained without the presence of the opposition in parliament. The most salient example of this was, of course, the 1998 Press and Publication Law. Zuhair Abu al-Raghreb claims that the government had exploited the IAF's absence, citing the more than 200 temporary laws passed by his cousin's government between 2001 and 2003 when parliament was out of session.[130] The boycott of the 1997 elections resulted in a parliament of independent tribal loyalists and greatly weakened parliament in terms of skill and experience. Parliament ultimately became a "follower" of the executive, and this accommodation of the regime's objectives, further strengthened the executive.[131] Reflecting on the decision to boycott, and its aftermath, journalist Yassir al-Hilaleh stated, "The boycott was the highest level of pressure on the government to amend the elections law. Of course this attempt failed and the situation became even worse afterwards."[132]

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[130] Interview with author, March 2009.

[131] Interview with author, April 2009.

[132] Interview with author, May 2009.

6.4 Back to Participation: The Elections of 2003 and 2007

The opposition returned to participation in 2003. Changes in the legitimacy parameters and the costs of triggering a crisis can explain the shift from Equilibrium II in 1997, in which the opposition boycotted, the government did not reform and the opposition did not trigger a crisis, to an equilibrium in which the opposition participates (Equilibrium V). Again from Figure 3.2, we can see that as the failure rate decreases and the cost to triggering a crisis increases, we move towards the region in which $\hat{o} > \bar{\alpha}$.

As in 1993 and 1997, the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood debated whether to participate in or boycott the 2003 and 2007 elections. As noted above, the majority of IAF members believed they had lost from the 1997 boycott. The sentiments expressed by the IAF and the subsequent change in electoral strategy by the opposition parties can be interpreted through the formal model in a number of ways. In particular, their concern over a loss of voice is particularly significant when we consider the feasibility of a boycott strategy. A boycott strategy can be undermined by a loss of communication to the broader public. What the IAF members felt they had lost was an important voice both in parliament and through elections. They saw parliament and elections as a way to communicate with their supporters and the wider public, and the boycott strategy of 1997 had deprived them of this main arena to discuss and debate ideas. Most importantly, they realized that without a recognized forum to communicate with the public, it would be more difficult to mobilize support.

Mobilization of supporters and the public at large is fundamental in the ability to trigger a crisis. If the costs of mobilization increase, then the second leg of the boycott strategy – triggering a crisis – becomes much more difficult to achieve. The loss of parliamentary voice was therefore important in reducing the IAF's ability to communicate with the general public, and in turn reduced their ability to use the trigger strategy effectively. As the following statement makes clear, they not only lost a crucial

platform, but also the accompanying media coverage of their activities; both important for remaining connected to the people. According to journalist Jamil Nimri,

> Did party lost support from boycotting? Yes. Because citizens want to deal with the people who represent them, care about them, speak in the name of them. When you boycott the election, you put yourself outside. These years between 1997 and 2003, the Islamic movement became more weak and lost presence in front of the people—when the IAF was in parliament, you saw them everyday. You saw them questioning government actions and making speeches.[133]

The IAF, therefore, lost support because they could not as easily be heard. They had become cut off from many of their supporters and from the people at large. According to the Brotherhood's Rohile Gharaibeh, "our popularity among the people lasted for only a few months after the boycott. People forgot us since our voice was not being heard in the Parliament."[134] In this way, the IAF's ability to mobilize the people had markedly decreased. As the formal model implies, the boycott strategy is more difficult to achieve in equilibrium if the cost of triggering a crisis is too high.

The second way C_t increased is through increased restrictions on freedoms. Although Jordan's High Court ruled the 1997 Press and Publication Law unconstitutional in 1998, the 1998 Press and Publication Law that followed was actually more restrictive. As Ryan (2002) has noted, "The 1998 law was seen as so restrictive that Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the senate speaker, Zayd al-Rifa'i, protesting the bill" (120-121). A report from the International Centre Against Censorship stated, "The draft PPL, in fact, while replicating most of the restrictions contained in the May 1997 amendments, includes significant additional restrictions and so constitutes an even greater threat to freedom of expression in Jordan."[135] Vaguely worded to provide maximum latitude for government interpretation, the law grants extensive government control over regulation and content in addition to instituting strict censorship and licensing requirements. Again,

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[133] Interview with author, February 2009.

[134] Interview with author, March 2009.

[135] Report available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/jordan-press-law.pdf

these changes directly increase the costs of triggering a crisis for the opposition. Such legal adjustments restrict the freedom of opposition groups to mobilize their support base and instigate a crisis trigger on a large scale.

An important predictor of strategy in the model is the legitimacy parameters, determining the perceived probability of regime failure, and thus informing the effectiveness of the boycott strategy. Adjustments in these parameters have the potential to change the preferred strategy. In 2003, as compared to 1997, a series of political changes had transpired in Jordan. In the words of journalist Jamil Nimri, the "political environment was different." There is significant reason to believe that these changes in the political climate had in fact raised the perceived legitimacy of the regime, making the boycott strategy less attractive. Significant domestic changes and the further strengthening of international relationships contributed to a likely increase in the legitimacy parameters of the model.

King Hussein died in 1999, thus ending one of the longest reigns of any leader the world over. His eldest son, Abdullah, was crowned king shortly after his father's death, on 7 February 1999. In many ways, King Abdullah II represented a stark contrast to his father: he was young (only 37 upon ascension), Western-educated, and married to a Palestinian (Her Majesty Queen Rania). With the new King came hopes of reform.[136] According to journalist Yassir al-Hilaleh, "There was a theory that there is a new King and a new era and now a real opportunity for reform."[137] Politician Mustafa Harmarneh similarly argued that the new king brought renewed hopes for reform. "Abdullah was proclaimed king after his father's death a few days later and, to judge from some of his initial actions, was well aware of the popular criticisms of the system which had surfaced

[136] More general problem Owen on Arab regime's confrontation with domestic situations: "And all this in the context of continuing criticisms from their Islamist opposition as well as, in the case of Syria, Jordan and Morocco, of having to dampen down expectations of reform raised by a new ruler" (Owen 222).

[137] Interview with author, May 2009.

in Hussein's last years, offering the possibility of amendments to both the electoral law of 1997 and the repressive press law of 1998."[138] IAF member, Nabil al-Kofahi, insisted, "After six years [in 2003], the IAF had a new evaluation. In spite of the same electoral law, the leadership said to participate. Jordan had a new king and a new impression of the king that he would be willing to reform. So we said let us not be far from him."[139]

In keeping with the enthusiasm and hope that greeted his ascendency to the crown, the king made regular assurances of reform to the opposition. A significant example of how King Abdullah II seemed to confirm the hopes for reform was his creation of the Ministry of Political Development in 2003. King Abdullah appointed Faisal Al Fayez, a noted leftist, as the first minister of the new body. The creation of the ministry and the appointment of Al-Fayez to the new body both confirmed the sentiments.

The second significant change in the political environment was the US decision to wage war against Iraq in March 2003. This act, in turn, required the assistance of US allies in the region, which put Jordan in a challenging position. As Owen (2004) explains, the new king was mindful of his own father's policies in the similar events 13 years prior: "It was the Jordanian regime which found itself in the most difficult position of all, with the new king determined not to repeat what he saw as his father's mistake in opposing the anti-Iraq coalition in 1990/1" (221). In return for supporting the United States, the king and the regime received significant support from the US in the form of increased aid. For example, during 2002, US aid to Jordan increased from US$190 million to US$343 million. Yet aid increased even more drastically from 2002 to 2003, as Jordan received approximately one billion US dollars in aid from the United States.

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[138] Interview with author, February 2009.

[139] Interview with author, February 2009.

The sources of increased legitimacy were not limited to these political developments, as the economic conditions in 2003 were much improved when compared to 1997. Per capita GDP growth rate averaged 3.34% per year from 1998 through 2007, and over 5% for the four years between 2004 and 2007.[140] Overall, the advent of a new king promising reforms to the opposition and the improved relationship with and financial support of the United States represent increases in the probability that the centers of power will aid the regime if challenged. The combined effect of this increase in perceived legitimacy on the one hand and the increased costs of triggering a crisis on the other, is expressed by Jamil Abu Bakr,

> It was a new stage after the changes in the region and the re-evaluation of the boycott, after considering the new political system in Jordan, the new King, then the issue of Iraq and its occupation, that Islamic movement also faced more restrictions since 1997 so it was necessary to find new forums and methods to express itself and realize its political actions, the boycott is a temporal political action.[141]

The choice of participation strategy for the 2003 elections is therefore consistent with the predictions of the formal model. Given no change in the perceived legitimacy of the regime and/or no decrease in the costs of triggering a crisis, the model would also predict a participation strategy again for 2007. This is precisely what transpired. However, in 2007 we saw a further increase in the cost of triggering, which needs to be appreciated in order to understand the participation strategy across these two elections.

Despite no change in the electoral law and severe election fraud during the 2007 municipal elections, the Islamic Action Front and other opposition parties chose to participate in the 2007 parliamentary elections. After repeated and consistent claims of fraud from media outlets, on noon the day of the municipal elections in 2007 the Islamic Action Front announced it was boycotting. Despite the highly dubious conduct of these

[140] GDP grew an average of 5.85% from 1998 through 2007, and around 8% for four consecutive years from 2004 to 2007.

[141] Interview with author, June 2009.

municipal elections, the Islamic Movement and other opposition parties decided to participate in the parliamentary elections.

The consistency in the main predictors of the model across the time period of 2003 to 2007 are confirmed by the lack of evidence for any significant political or economic changes that suggest otherwise. Moreover, between the 2003 and 2007 elections, the economy remained strong, and there were no indicators to suggest a change in the legitimacy parameters. Both domestic and international centers of power remained strong for the regime. Thus, the observed participation in 2007 is again consistent with the model's prediction. Moreover, the costs of triggering a crisis during this period, despite the opposition's return to parliament and increased public voice, increased.

Two factors, state control over the Islamists' activities and internal party conflict, suggest an increase in the cost of triggering. First, during this period the state tightened its control over the activity of the Islamic Movement banning its members from working in state mosques and restricting their activities in universities. According to al-Momani (2007a) the government of Jordan was "abandoning its traditional approach [towards the Islamists] in favor of a more Egyptian-style aggressive approach of imprisoning, rejecting, and isolating Islamists with no regard for their demands" (2-3). Most importantly, the government took over the Islamic Center Society run by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic Center Society is a large NGO providing health, education, and social services to Jordanians. Its activities are wide-ranging and provided the Muslim Brotherhood an important forum through which to interact with the broader population. "It runs 14 health care centers and two large hospitals in Amman and Aqaba, 50 schools at all levels catering to 16,000 students, and 56 centers for 12,000 orphans, compared to the Ministry of Social Development's responsibility for 3,000 orphans."[142] The Islamic Charity Society was also important for fundraising, and the loss of the center to the

[142]Report available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/jordan1207/3.htm#_ftnref101. Accessed 29 March 2011.

abilities of the Islamic Movement to mobilize support cannot be underestimated. In 2006, the government, claiming to be investigating corruption, dismissed the Islamic Center Society board, which had been composed of all Muslim Brotherhood members. The government installed new management, retaining only one Muslim Brotherhood member. The government takeover of the Islamic Center Society, together with other restrictions faced by Muslim Brotherhood members, meant that the Islamic Movement's abilities to mobilize supporters were severely hampered, as is discussed by Abu Rumman (2007):

> Prior to the shutdown of the Islamic Center Society, the Brotherhood's activities in universities were also greatly reduced and its members were banned from working in mosques run by the government. The center and these kinds of activities have been essential for enabling the Brotherhood to communicate and interact with the Jordanian public and for maintaining a wide social network. They have also allowed the Brotherhood to maintain a concrete presence in volunteer-based charitable societies, paralleling the state's social welfare system and offering much needed aid and assistance to the needy. In the 2007 elections, the direct impact of the diminished capacity of the Brotherhood's social work and network began to take effect, creating a "missing link" in their communication and connection with the masses (69).

Second, internal divisions within the Islamic Movement further increased the costs of triggering a crisis. Although there have always been different factions within the Islamic Movement, in 2007 the internal debate between moderates and radicals in the movement spilled over very publically. Mobilizing as a united front against the regime would no doubt become more difficult when the party was itself bitterly and internally divided. Internal party struggles can affect the popularity of a party by inhibiting the development or adoption of new policies. The internal divisions within the Islamic Action Front were one explanation that observers offered for the IAF's poor showing in the 2007 parliamentary elections. The Secretary General of the IAF, Zaki Bani Irsheid, publically protested the candidate lists and did not endorse some of the IAF's chosen candidates. Other members not chosen as candidates also did not support the IAF candidates who had been chosen. In fact, as noted by al-Momani (2007b), "hardliners not only deferred from campaigning with the IAF candidates, but often campaigned

against them by arguing that the purpose of moderates' candidacy was solely to please the government" (2). Mustafa Hamarneh underscores the importance of party discipline in an election: "If the party does not have unity, this will be reason to lose [as] moderates lost in 2007 because [of divided] support."[143]

6.5 The Boycott of 2010

On 31 July 2010 the Shura council of the Islamic Action Front voted in favor of boycotting the 2010 parliamentary elections. Although not unanimous, this decision did indeed reflect the sentiment of a large majority, as only eighteen of 120 members of the council voted in favor of participation. Furthermore, the Shura council's decision followed consultation with party members at all levels, who overwhelming favored boycotting.[144] The Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party (known as Al Wihda) also chose to boycott the party. The Wihda Party organized the group Boycotters for Change to involve youths in the boycott campaign. The general purpose of a return to this strategy, as succinctly stated by a member of the Wihda Party, was again "political reform"[145] and, in particular, reform of the electoral system.

The IAF had tried in 2003 and 2007 to achieve political reforms inside parliament (i.e. through participation). However, as noted by Zuhair Abu al-Raghreb, "the IAF's demands to the government for political reform, our requests to amend the public meetings law and the election law, were never considered. The government never met these demands, and the base of the party decided to not participate in the elections."[146] In the lead up to the 2010 election, the IAF conditioned their participation on a revision of the electoral law, in addition to guarantees for a free and fair poll. In particular, they wanted the establishment of an independent body to supervise the elections. Perhaps reflecting their frustration with the failure of their parliamentary attempts at reform, the

[143] Interview with author.

IAF said it would reconsider its decision to boycott only if they received concrete guarantees and "not only talks for the sake of talks."[147]

The initial response from the regime to this threat of boycott indicated its preference for IAF participation. As was the case in the 1997 election boycotts, the government actively engaged with the IAF encouraging the party to reconsider its decision. The IAF met with Prime Minister Samir Rifa'i, as well as King Abdullah. This was particularly significant, as it was the first time King Abdullah had met personally with the IAF since coming to power in 1999. Mohammed Abu Rumman (2010) notes that the government was "eager" for the IAF to participate due to its fear that low turnout and the absence of the one opposition party with any popular support boycott would endanger the credibility of the elections. Despite the government's desire for the participation of the IAF, an agreement could not be reached, and the IAF reverted to the strategy of boycott for the 2010 elections.

On the surface, there are a number of reasons that might be offered to explain this return to return to the boycott strategy. The decision to boycott was understandable given the close vote inside the Shura Council in favor of participating in the 2007 election, the subsequent conduct of the election,[148] and the poor showing of Islamic Action Front candidates in 2007. The IAF won only six seats, a dramatic drop in its presence in parliament, stunning even the most pessimistic observers. Both the 2007 municipal elections, from which the IAF withdrew midway through election day, and the parliamentary elections held several months later, are widely acknowledged to have been

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[144] According to Abu Rumman (2010), a majority of 73% of the party's membership preferred boycotting to participation.

[145] Interview with author, November 2010.

[146] Interview with author, October 2010.

[147] Hammam Saeed quoted in article in the Jordan Times. Mohammad Ben Hussein. "Islamists outline demands for participation in polls." 3 Aug 2010. Accessed online 21 October 2010.

[148] It is interesting to note that the boycott literature regarding fraud, 2007 would have been the election predicted by those theories.

rife with fraud. The results and conduct of the 2007 elections would have strengthened the position of those like Zaki Bani Irsheid who had favored boycotting the 2007 elections. Mustafa Hamarneh notes that the government's conduct in the 2007 elections gave the extremists evidence that their position was right.[149]

On the other hand, the boycott was surprising given the result of the 1997 boycott. The 1997 boycott was not successful in that it did not achieve the desired reforms. Many in the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood felt that they had not gained from the 1997 boycott and were actually worse off because of it. Abdul Majid Thunaybat insists that:

> The boycott was considered useless by a majority. It did not lead to reasonable positive results or pressure on the government. The government continued issuing its laws and decrees and we were kept away from parliament. The evaluation of the boycott revealed that we lost in the boycott and won nothing. This is why we participated again in 2003….We returned back to participation and we concluded a rule that we originally intended to participate and the boycott was an exception.[150]

The sense of the boycott's failure stretched beyond the Islamic Movement; many observers felt that because the boycott had failed to elicit reforms, the opposition would not boycott again. As noted by Oraib Al-Rantawi, director of the Al Quds Research Center in Amman,

> According to their assessment, the Islamic Movement lost a lot. One of the major tools they used to introduce themselves, to promote their ideas and policies was parliament. Therefore, when they assessed the boycott after 1997, they decided they should participate again. Being represented in parliament is much better than to leave this stage to others and to be absent. This was their major conclusion.[151]

The election boycott of 2010 presents another puzzle, as again the electoral law remained the same. Moreover, the evaluations of the 1997 boycott by many, including the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood, indicated that they would be unlikely to boycott the

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[149] Interview with author, February 2009.

[150] Interview with author, June 2009.

[151] Interview with author, March 2009.

parliamentary elections again. Indeed, despite the claims of fraud of the 2007 elections, and the poor result of the IAF candidates, the loss of political voice incurred by not participating in the 1997 elections seemed an important consideration for the IAF even in 2009. As they had learnt previously, it is more difficult to alert the public to government corruption and oppression without the exposure offered by parliamentary representation. The question this section seeks to answer, therefore, is: What changed to make the opposition decide to adopt a political strategy that, even only a year before, was perceived to be a bad one? Using the model developed in Chapter 2, we can explain this shift from participation to boycott by focusing on changes in the costs of triggering and the legitimacy parameters. Tracking changes in domestic (societal) and international centers of power, can lead us to explain the IAF's decision to boycott in 2010.

According to members in the IAF, economic, social, and political conditions between the previous two elections in 2003 and 2007 differed from those of 2010. The deterioration in the economic, social, and political environment was precisely what the IAF believed made the boycott a viable strategy in 2010 despite the perceived failure of the 1997 boycott. As expressed by Zaki Bani Irsheid of the IAF,

> We think that the regional and international change, besides the political system, may provide good conditions to fulfill our goals. We may succeed in making a change…We expect the new amendments to the election law [sub-districts] to cause social problems, violence, and unwanted events which the government may control or not….So the opportunity to change the law is bigger than ever, and if we believed we could not make change this time, we would keep up our work and keenness towards political reform.[152]

It will be argued here that these sentiments reflect perceived changes in the parameter the legitimacy of the regime. More specifically, the parameter λ had altered between the 2007 and 2010 elections, and was perceived by the IAF to have increased (decrease in ρ). Furthermore, these changes identified by the IAF, were a central motivation in their decision to return to the boycott strategy.

[152] Interview with author, October 2009.

The most salient domestic channel by which the regime's legitimacy began to decrease was through adjustments in economic conditions. These changes in economic conditions had the effect of unsettling the support for the regime provided by the two domestic (societal) centers of power: the Transjordanian population, and Jordan's Palestinian population. Difficult economic conditions increased the frustration of these citizens, and further strained the regime's ability to offer economic incentives for their continued support. To state it plainly, the regime was less able to placate the citizenry through economic reward. As explained below, two economic problems in particular impacted the support for the regime and its ability to "buy-off" its constituents: rising national debt and rising prices.

Beginning in 2005, increases in oil prices and decreases in external grants began to hurt the Jordanian economy. The international financial crisis that followed in 2008 and 2009 only exacerbated an already vulnerable economic situation in Jordan (Jaradat 2010). According to official measures, unemployment in 2009 was approximately 13%, although unofficial levels are presumed to be as high as 30%. Excluding external grants, the budget deficit was 10.3% of GDP in 2009. That same year, according to Jaradat, domestic revenues covered only 69% of total expenditures, down from 80% between 2006 and 2008. Jordan's total debt reached 55% of GDP in 2009 and 57% in 2010. Such conditions forced the government to cut food subsidy expenditures from US$715 million in 2007 to US$263 million in 2009. Concurrent with this spiral in national indebtedness, the prices of daily staples were continuing to increase dramatically. The price of tomatoes, a central component of the Jordanian diet, shot up from 0.35 JD per kilo to over 1JD per kilo in the month of September 2010 alone.[153] A sharp increase in such a short period would have a significant and daily impact on Jordanian consumer habits.

[153] This was also a wider regional concern as the analogy of "shopping for tomatoes, shopping for politicians" was made in Jordan and Egypt. The NDP candidates in Egypt were providing tomatoes at lower prices prior to their parliamentary elections in November (Yasmine Saleh, "Tomatoes beat manifestos in Egypt election race," *The Jordan Times*, 29 October 2010).

In terms of the formal model, these changes in economic conditions reduced the probability of these societal centers of power coming to the aid of a challenged regime. Importantly, this deterioration in economic conditions, and the reduction in the regime's ability to appease the citizens via economic relief, was indeed noticed by the opposition. A leader of the Wihda party said that because of the global economic crisis the government had been unable to fulfill its commitment towards its "coalitions," which had long been dependent on a system of patronage and bureaucracy. "We witnessed for the first time in Jordan's history a strike held by workers; this had never happened before; we witnessed a series of strikes held by day-to-day workers."[154] He noted further that such workers, such social groups (teachers), are historically considered part of the government's key base (coalition).

A further reduction in the societal center of power for the regime, and also related to the deterioration in economics conditions, was an increase in domestic conflict. The economic downturn exacerbated tensions among Transjordanians, and tensions between Transjordanians and Palestinians, the two societal centers of power. In August 2009, approximately 15 months before parliamentary elections were to be held, a wave of inter-tribal violence began. The Public Security Department (PSD) said that the number of violent clan-based conflicts in 2009 was 229, a "marked increase" from the previous year.[155] The chief of the PSD, Mzain al-Qadi, noted, "the year 2009 witnessed a marked increase in the number and form of brawls with a social background in an unprecedented manner in Jordanian society."[156] According to Schwedler, some Jordanians blame the economy for the increased violence between tribes, while others blame the electoral

[154] Interview with author, November 2010.

[155] Jillian Schwedler, "Jordan's Risky Business As Usual," Middle East Report Online, 30 June 2010.

[156] Quoted in Jillian Schwedler, "Jordan's Risky Business As Usual," Middle East Report Online, 30 June 2010.

system, which has disadvantaged weakened political parties "at the expense of the regime's 'loyal tribal support base.'"

In addition to the inter-tribal violence, Schwedler further notes that there was also "heightened tensions between Jordanians of Palestinian and Transjordanian origin." She argues that, "a more virulent strain of Jordanian nationalism has emerged. The nationalist hardliners are critical of the Palestinian majority and of the regime for its supposed support for them. These views have proponents in high places, resulting in such policies as the seemingly arbitrary revocation of passports for some Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin."[157] The conflicts within one center of power, and across the two societal centers of power, have significant implications for the regime. In particular, these conflicts influence the probability of these two centers of power aiding a challenged regime, and thus pose a serious problem for the regime. In terms of the formal model, such conflicts within and across the centers of power increase λ, and, in so doing, increase the payoff to the opposition of triggering a crisis, and boycotting the election.

In addition to the adjustment in economic conditions and associated changes in societal centers of power, by 2010 political conditions had also adjusted, both domestically and internationally. At the heart of this political adjustment was the experience of the 2007 municipal and parliamentary elections, which had been tarnished by widespread accusations of election fraud. Although the government would never admit it publically, it was widely understood that the government had misbehaved, and they stopped just short of admitting fraudulent behavior in both elections. Indeed, it was widely suspected that there had been significant government interference, including the backing candidates from the same tribe as a candidate already running, turning a blind eye to vote buying, and allowing soldiers to vote and even telling them for whom to vote.[158] According to Rohile Gharaibeh, widespread acknowledgement, even at high

[157] Jillian Schwedler, "Jordan's Risky Business As Usual," Middle East Report Online, 30 June 2010.

[158] The army is forbidden by law to vote in parliamentary elections

levels of the government, of the fraud in the 2007 elections gave "rise to a general feeling of frustration."[159] Public confidence in the parliament and its ability was low. In the context of this, the king dismissed parliament after only two years, a move supported by a large majority of Jordanians.

Furthermore, Jordan was also facing increased international scrutiny, and not only for the fraudulent conduct of the 2007 elections. Freedom House downgraded the Jordanian regime from 'Partly Free' to 'Not Free', and both Transparency International and the Global Integrity Report downgraded Jordan's corruption rating.[160] According to the Global Integrity Report, the integrity of Jordanian governance was considered 'moderate' in 2007 (score of 72 of 100), 'weak' in 2008 (60/100) and 'very weak' in 2009 (55/100). Moreover, the Corruption Perception Index, administered by Transparency International, which relies on citizens' subjective assessments of corruption in their country, suggested that Jordanian citizens were themselves perceiving greater corruption than observed in the previous indices.

With regard to Jordan's primary external center of power, the United States, the IAF's perception was that the regime might not be able to count on US support. Although the relationship had not officially changed, there are several factors that suggested to the IAF a potential change in the United States' willingness to aid a challenged Jordanian regime. The first factor was the new presidency of Barack Obama. After the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush had said that the US would bring democracy to the region. President Obama, however, stated that he would not interfere with the process of

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[159] Interview with author, November 2010.

[160] Freedom House's explanation for downgrade: "Jordan's political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 and its status from Partly Free to Not Free due to King Abdullah's dismissal of the parliament and his announcement that elections would not be held until the end of 2010, as well as the security forces' increased influence over political life"

(From http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7849). The report also mentions the 2007 elections were marred by fraud and the arrest of nine IAF members prior to the municipal and parliamentary elections for "threatening national security."

democratic transition, signaling a potential change in US policy.[161] Second, the US was currently winding down operations in Iraq; operations for which Jordan was a key regional ally. Third, a number of USAID projects in Jordan were being concluded in 2010. These USAID projects were significant injections to the Jordanian budget, as it received on average US$200 million in cash transfers per year. Furthermore, according to USAID, Jordan had received an additional US$700 million in 2003 to "offset the economic effects of the Iraq War."[162]

This political pressure, both domestic and international, represents a further erosion of the regimes centers of power. Taken together, these economic, social, and political conditions combined with increased international pressure on Jordan—as seen in the downgrading of its freedom and corruption ratings—suggested to the IAF that perhaps this time the boycott could bring about reform. In terms of the formal model, these pressures amount to changes in perceived legitimacy, and therefore are one important impetus for a change in strategy from participation to boycott.

The second parameter that had altered in the period between the 2007 and 2010 elections was the costs of triggering a crisis. These costs decreased in two ways. First, the blatant electoral fraud in the municipal and parliamentary elections in 2007 can, as argued by Tucker (2007), lower the perceived costs, and increase the expected benefits, of challenging a regime. More specifically, the widespread observation of electoral fraud can provide a focal point (solve the collective action problem) that coalesces a group such that individuals do not believe they are likely to be individually punished for their protestations. The electoral fraud of 2007 had indeed provided a common point of focus

[161] An additional signal of change mentioned was Obama's consideration of Charles Freeman to head the National Intelligence Council. The potential appointment would have signaled a shift as Freeman is considered to be an outspoken critic of Israel.

[162] Available at http://jordan.usaid.gov/sectors.cfm?inSector=23.

for opposition parties, and the citizenry. The involvement of the general public in any boycott strategy would be much easier to encourage under these circumstances.

Furthermore, Abu Rumman notes that the fraud in the 2007 elections, as well as a 2008 struggle for power between the palace and the state intelligence agency, generated new beliefs that there was in fact a crisis within the regime.[163] The parliament that was generated by the 2007 elections, and the fact that King Abdullah had terminated the parliament after only two years, further heightened the public awareness of the regime's failings. These events created a general mood of protestation across society, as summarized by Abu Rumman, quoted in the *Jordan Times*, "The problem is related to mounting frustration over the years as well as the impact of the recent [2007] elections on the general mood of the party members."[164]

The second way that the costs of mobilization had decreased was not only that the Islamists believed themselves more popular at this time, but also perhaps more importantly, there was now greater support for their continued demands to change the electoral law and end corruption. According to journalist Naseem Tarawnah one of the reasons that public demands for reform can be ineffective is that momentum for change can often dwindle when "people are not directly impacted by events that are happening."[165] In 1997, there was a lack of knowledge about the law itself and about its effects. This challenge had been overcome in 2010, as people had observed the failure of the 2007 parliamentary elections and the resulting parliament. This is echoed by Tayseer

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[163] Muhammad Abu Rumman, "Jordan's Parliamentary Elections and the Islamist Boycott." Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=41769. Accessed 21 October 2010.

[164] Mohammad Ben Hussein "Islamists to boycott November elections" *Jordan Times*. 1 August 2010. Accessed online 21 Oct 2010.

[165] Interview with author, February 2009.

Al-Fityani of the IAF who argued that "the citizens lost faith" in the government as a result of its conduct in the 2007 election.[166]

Finally, there was also evidence that $\hat{o} < \alpha^K$ (i.e. the costs of triggering a crisis were low enough such that the opposition would always trigger a crisis). This difference can be detected in comparison to the 1997 election. In 1997, not wanting to instigate a confrontation with the government, the IAF did not ask voters and its supporters to join with its boycott. During the 2010 elections, in contrast, the boycott parties undertook a massive campaign to encourage voters to also boycott the elections. This campaign was overt; fliers were printed and put up and public meetings held encouraging citizens to abstain from the polls. In addition, according to Abu Rumman (2010), "This time the Brotherhood is determined not to repeat that experience but to transform the boycott into a political platform, a course of action that will inevitably mean an escalation in the showdown with the government." The IAF formed an alliance with the opposition the Wihda Party, as well as a broader national pro-reform coalition. Two days before the election, on 7 November, the IAF and the Wihda parties staged a "sit-in" outside parliament, calling for citizens to support a "Boycott For Change." The protest occurred despite the lack of official permission for the event.[167] A member of the Wihda party echoed the IAF's sentiment in saying, "I want to struggle in order to change this reality [this economic, social and political crisis] and I will pay the price, for each action has a political cost—nothing is free in this world."[168] Again, this sentiment suggests that the opposition would always trigger a crisis if ignored.

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[166] Interview with author, October 2010. Similarly, Abdullah Ensour argued in 2009 that more and more of the public will be (or turn) against the election law as the lack of efficiency is clearer than ever (interview with author, March 2009).

[167] According to Journalist Thameen Kheeten of the Jordan Times, the authorities tolerated the protest because of the presence of international observers in Jordan to monitor the elections. "Activists stage sit-in outside Parliament." 7 Nov 2010. Retrieved 4 May 2011 from Jordan Times online.

[168] Interview with author, November 2010.

The elections went ahead on 9 November without IAF participation. Turnout was officially reported to be around 53% (with lows of approximately 30% in Amman and Zarqa, and highs of roughly 80 % in Bedouin Badia districts). Despite the opposition questioning the official figures, the new parliament was inducted on 28 November 2010. The government, as in 1997, chose to ignore the demands for reform emanating from the opposition. This time, however, the opposition chose to trigger a crisis.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided an explanation for the variation in opposition strategies observed in Jordan despite the constancy of the purported motivation (the electoral system) for the election boycott. This case study highlighted the centrality of the effect of legitimacy on opposition party strategy. Specifically, the variation in opposition strategy in Jordan appears largely driven by beliefs (and changes in such beliefs) in the legitimacy of the regime. The 1993 election is a particular strong testament to the model as it was before this election that the electoral system was changed to disadvantage the opposition. Despite the electoral system change, the opposition participated. Moreover, through its detailed analysis of the case of Jordan, this chapter illustrated how Stinchcombe's conceptualization of legitimacy can be used to understand not only opposition strategy, but also the regime's response (reform or ignore) and its ability to withstand a crisis. In the next chapter we turn to the case of Algeria to further explore the model and its predictions.

Table 6.1. Elections in Jordan Since 1989

	1993	1997[1]	2003	2007	2010[1]
Equilibrium Outcome	*Participation*	*Boycott, Ignore, Back Down*	*Participation*	*Participation*	*Boycott, Ignore, Trigger*

[1] Strategies of actors listed in following order: Opposition, Government, Opposition

CHAPTER 7
ALGERIA

This chapter presents a detailed study of recent election boycotts in Algeria. The purpose is to further test the predictions of the formal model in its ability to explain the decisions by opposition parties to adopt particular strategies. For these purposes, Algeria is an important case to compare against Jordan. Although the two countries share important similarities, it is the differences from which we will gain leverage in making causal inferences. First, both Algeria and Jordan are electoral authoritarian regimes so that both cases satisfy Condition I discussed in Chapter 3. Second, Pastor (1999) and Bratton (1998) argue that opposition parties boycott elections in which they expect to do poorly (i.e. boycotts are attempts to "save face"). However, an important result of the formal model was that electoral prospects, which are themselves influenced, in part, by electoral systems, do not affect the opposition's decision to boycott, participate or trigger a crisis (i.e. π does not impact strategic decisions of the opposition in authoritarian regimes). Thus, Algeria's use of proportional representation for its legislative elections, as well as the holding of presidential elections (majoritarian in nature), provides us with cross-case and within case variation on this variable.

Importantly, unlike Jordan, there was a boycott every election in the four Algerian elections we will examine. The relevant elections for the case of Algeria are the 1999 presidential, 2002 legislative, 2004 presidential, and 2007 legislative elections. For the most part, these elections follow the predictions of the model, and are consistent with the experience of Jordan discussed in Chapter 6. However, the Algerian case also raises some questions about the model's assumptions and encourages consideration of how the formal representation of opposition strategy might be adjusted. In particular, the 2004 and 2007 elections are slight departures from the expectations of the model, in that there is a variation in the strategies pursued by the "opposition." To put it simply, some parties

that boycotted in both 1999 and 2002 returned to participation in the subsequent two elections, while others did not. The challenge posed by this variation in strategies is that the economic and political conditions that affect the opposition's beliefs about the failure rate (λ), while not identical, are similar across all four elections. This prompts an extended discussion about how we might account for these differences in strategy.

To evaluate the model, this chapter will follow three sets of actors: (1) the opposition; (2) the regime; and (3) the centers of power. In the next section I will provide a brief outline of the early process of political liberalization in Algeria. Section 7.2 will discuss the elections and the opposition's strategy in much the same way as in Chapter 6. Focusing on the 1999 and 2002 elections, this section will show that these elections are consistent with the predictions of the formal model.

Section 7.3 will then examine the challenging cases of the 2002 and 2004 elections in Algeria. While similar in economic and political context, the strategies of the political parties diverge in these election years. This section diverges from the analysis in the previous section and Chapter 6 for two reasons. First, this chapter relies predominately on data collected from newspaper archives; no elite interviews of opposition party members were conducted. This limits our ability assess why the FFS boycotted all four elections and other boycotting parties in 1999 and 2002 returned to participation in 2004 and 2007. Secondly, at first glance it appears that the later elections pose a challenge to the predictions of the model. Upon closer examination, however, we find that only one party (the FFS) is considered a "true" opposition. Section 7.3, therefore, shows that the case of Algeria does in fact further support the results of the model. The conclusion, in Section 7.4, will consider alternative interpretations in an effort to highlight those features of the model that might be adjusted in order to provide a better account of more "difficult" cases in the future.

Since the return of multiparty politics in Algeria in 1997, there have been few analytic studies of this specific aspect of Algerian political history (i.e. of elections and

political parties over this time period). Thus, in addition to its provision of an explanation for opposition behavior during elections between 1999 and 2007, this chapter adds to our knowledge of the socio-economic and political context against which the four elections took place, and importantly, the opposition made its strategic decisions.

7.1 Political Liberalization in Algeria

Algeria began a process of political liberalization in the late 1980s in response to domestic unrest over economic and political conditions. Like the case of Jordan explored in Chapter 6, these efforts at political liberalization followed a period of economic decline and political mismanagement. As Quandt (1998) explains, "the 1980s were generally regarded as a 'black decade' due to the disengagement of the state, the impoverishment of the population, the increase in corruption and the contestation of power by Islamists movements" (36). Although this so called "black decade" of the 1980s began with the cultural movement known as the Berber Spring in 1980,[169] it was the October 1988 youth riots that prompted President Chadli to initiate the process of political reform.

In response to the protest and riots, a new constitution was drafted, and passed by referendum in 1989. This new political framework represented a departure from Algeria's previous experience in its omission of references to the ruling party since independence, the FLN, and also the socialist economic structure.[170] Furthermore, political parties were legalized and Algeria's first multiparty elections for the national legislature were held in December of 1991.

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[169] After a Berber writer was prevented from giving a lecture on Berber culture at the university in Tizi Ouzou, students went on strike. The regime responded harshly and violently and, in so doing, laid the "groundwork for an outspoken Berber cultural movement with the potential of rallying support from some 10 to 20 percent of the society" (Quandt 1998:36). The primary demand of the Berber movement was greater democracy.

[170] The 1976 constitution made explicit references to both the socialist economic structure of the country and the FLN as sole party.

This process of political liberalization was, however, short-lived. Following the overwhelming victory of the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) in the first round of the legislative elections in 1991, the military intervened in January of 1992 and the second round of elections. A period of direct military rule, via *Haut Comité d'Etat* (HCE), began, which lasted until 1995. Although multiparty elections resumed in 1995 at the presidential level, and in 1997 for the legislature, Algeria never completed a successful transition to democracy. Like Jordan, it remains today an electoral authoritarian regime.

To understand the recent opposition strategies in Algeria, it is worthwhile to consider the decade of tumultuous political activity that preceded them. In this section, I will briefly outline the economic pressures of the 1980s that led to the first multiparty legislative elections. I will then briefly discuss the return to multiparty politics in 1995 and 1997.

As in Jordan the economic crisis was precipitated by the sharp decline in oil prices. Algeria had adopted a largely socialist economic system, including the centralized planning of the economy, a reliance on public provision of most services, a policy of import-substitution, and also extensive land nationalizations. This set of public sector commitments had been financed by healthy hydrocarbon receipts throughout the oil boom of the 1970s, which had "generated sufficient domestic savings to avoid large accumulation of external debt until the early 1980s" (Nashashibi et al 1998:3). It was during this period of declining oil prices and falling revenues that the weaknesses of this centrally planned system began to surface. As explained by Nashashibi et al, "the rigidities and weaknesses of the centrally planned system became much more apparent when the reverse oil shock of 1986 caused both Algeria's terms of trade and hydrocarbon budgetary revenues to drop by about 50%" (4).[171]

[171] Weaknesses that became apparent in early 1980s were: (1) State farms were not improving yields and Algeria rapidly increasing dependence on food imports; (2) Long lags for completing investment projects meant that "capital was being immobilized for long periods without generating any income;" (3) Industrial plants were running below capacity; and (4) Demand fueled by "consumption subsidies and high money growth" (overvalued Algerian Dinar) led to shortages, rationing (3-4).

With declining oil revenues, Algeria began to "borrow heavily" as had Jordan. The price of oil dropped to $10 a barrel in 1986, as compared to $30 in 1982 (Quandt 1998:38). Foreign exchange earnings dropped by a massive 80% between 1985 and 1991. Obviously, the state would have to cut spending. It could not maintain the extensive commitments that the socialist economic structure demanded.

The social unrest and riots that erupted in October 1988, however, were not just a result of the drop in oil prices and a reduction in public expenditures. It is important to emphasize a significant change in population demographics that exacerbated this economic crisis. Like many Middle Eastern countries (See Chapter 5), Algeria had undergone a massive socio-economic transformation since independence. Again like Jordan, it had experienced a huge demographic adjustment, and in particular a rising population growth rate, which resulted in 60% of the population being under the age of 20 in 1988.[172] Long-term economic and political mismanagement meant that the socialist economy had not kept pace with the surging population growth and the socio-economic transformation of the population. This young population, with little economic opportunity, soon became frustrated. The collision of demographic pressures and socio-economic pressures soon erupted. As noted by Le Sueur (2010),

> When the labor and youth movements began to surge in October, the Algerian state's cumulative socio-economic and political failures could no longer be hidden from the public, especially after the full consequences of the 1986 collapse of the world oil market hit Algeria two years later. Unable to assist a growing and desperate population on virtually any level, the state was forced to enact dramatic cutbacks in daily provisions….Government support for basic goods simply disappeared. Food prices soared, a black market flourished, the already chronic housing shortage grew worse, and unemployment overwhelmed an already battered population (33).

[172] Quandt (1998) notes that the transformation of Algerian society, largely due to the states education and health care policies as well as "bureaucratization and rapid urbanization," created pressures on the Algerian regime for change: "A middle class of sorts was emerging, and with it some expectations of an easing of the strictures on political life. Also, the new generation, educated entirely since independence, and increasingly in Arabic, no longer showed automatic deference to the nationalists and revolutionaries who had won the country's freedoms" (34).

The unrest of 1988 was predominately characterized by young men (*hittistes*) driven by the depressed economy and a reduction in public services such as free education and healthcare. At the center of this protest movement were Islamist activists who, and as noted by Quandt (1998), "appeared on the scene and seemed to take charge" (39). Most importantly, the regime was now unable to continue its strategy of placating the public through these public expenditures. Their ability to "manage" the Islamic movement was also under stress, as the drop in oil prices and declining foreign exchange earnings cited above, made the regime's strategy of pitting the secular mobilized groups against the Islamists, and the associated strategy of "buying off or manipulating protesters" entirely untenable (Quandt 1998:38).

When riots broke out, the Algerian regime at first reacted very differently than did the Jordanian regime under King Hussein in 1989. The military was called in to impose control, and ultimately fired on protesters. This was the first time the military had fired on unarmed civilians in post-independence Algeria (Quandt 1998:39). At the conclusion of the October 1988 riots, the army had killed some 500 people. Following the military's confrontation with its own people, and the tragic loss of life, attention was directed toward the regime and its legitimacy was quickly under threat. Until this time the FLN, like many authoritarian one-party states, had legitimized its rule by claiming that this single-party state and controlled economic structure was the best way for Algeria to develop. In Stinchcombe's terms, the role of the FLN in the War of Liberation, and its more recent provision of economic services to the population were the doctrines of legitimacy that helped maintain its centers of power.[173] For almost thirty years since independence, multiparty politics had been outlawed in Algeria and formal political

[173] "The regime's legitimacy rested mainly on historical grounds, particularly the role that the FLN played during the War of Liberation (1954–62). But with the massive population growth, it also depended on the state's ability to provide for most of its citizens' economic and social needs. Healthy hydrocarbon revenues enabled the state to invest in social programmes such as free education, health care and cheap housing." (Bouandel 2003:5).

opposition parties banned. The sole legal party, the FLN, was largely blamed for the bad economic and social conditions.

Only a few days after the riots on 10 October, Chadli gave a speech promising sweeping reforms. A new constitution was passed by referendum, without debate, in 1989 and, according to Quandt (1998), this "was a major step in the direction of liberalization" (46). The regime legalized political parties in July of 1989 and military officers "were obliged to leave the party [the FLN]" (47).[174] "In the late 1980s Algeria was suddenly the most free, most pluralistic, and most enthusiastic defender of democracy in the Arab World" (5). The first multiparty elections for the national parliament were held in December of 1991.

The 1991 legislative elections used the two round majority system, akin to the one used in France. After the first round of elections on 26 December 1991, FIS was set to win a large majority. Fearing an Islamist controlled parliament, the army intervened in 11 January 1992, cancelling the second round of elections. The coup abruptly ended the process of reform after only a short period (1988 to 1992).

The military ruled through their establishment of the High State Council (HCE), a group of five men,[175] through which it would rule for a transitional period of two years. In 1993, the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) and other armed Islamist groups challenged the rule of the HCE and a period of sustained violence began, claiming the lives of approximately 200 Algerians each week between 1992 and 1998 (Quandt 1998:66). In total more than 150,000 people killed in Algeria's civil war.

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[174] The law on political parties prohibited parties being based on religion, language, or regionalism (i.e. Islam or Berber based parties). "This provision could have been used to prohibit parties claiming to be based on Islam or which demanded Berber cultural rights. But instead of such a restrictive interpretation, the government of Kasdi Merbah, widely viewed as lukewarm towards reforms, went ahead and recognized" the RCD and FIS (Quandt 48).

[175] Five men: Mohamed Boudiaf (named president, but assassinated shortly after), Ali Haroun (minister of justice), Tidjani Haddam (former minister of religious affairs), Khaled Nezzar (minister of defense), and Ali Kafi (the general secretary of veteran affairs). Boudiaf, after his assassination on 29 June 1992, was replaced by Ali Kafi as president. Redha Malek replaced Kafi and Belaïd Abdessalam appointed prime minister.

In 1994, after two years of this "collective rule," and at the end of their stated two-year transitional rule, the HCE appointed Liamine Zéroual as president of Algeria. The 1995 elections were the first multiparty presidential elections held in Algeria. Liamine Zéroual won with approximately 61% of the vote.[176] Surprisingly, Mahfoud Nannah of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) won some 20% of the vote. As in Jordan, the first elections were "carried out in reasonably honest conditions" (Quandt 1998:73). Although the FFS boycotted the election, most observers say the 1995 election was "clean" and Zéroual undoubtedly the winner. It was also characterized by a remarkably high turnout (74.92%).[177] For a brief moment, it brought hope to many Algerians who thought that Zéroual would be able to move toward a solution of the crisis" (73).

If the elections did not mark another beginning of genuine political liberalization, they did reestablish semblance of the democratic process, and spurred a period of reform. After Zéroual's election as president of Algeria, he set about "reconstructing political institutions" (Quandt 1998:72). In 1996 another constitution passed by referendum and it appeared this second wave of reforms was gaining momentum and sustained political liberalization was on its way (Bouandel 2003:14). In the midst of these political changes, 1995 saw the implementation of debt rescheduling, and the West no longer believed (or feared) the regime would collapse or be overrun by Islamists.[178]

Presidential elections in 1995 were followed by legislative elections two years later, marking a relative return to civilian rule. Although taking place against a backdrop of civil war, the 1997 elections were, by regional standards, "reasonably competitive" (Quandt 1998: 76). All legal opposition parties contested, including the FFS, who had boycotted both the presidential election in 1995 as well as the constitutional referendum

[176] Amnay Idir, "Les consultations par les chiffres," *El Watan*, 18 April 1999, pg. 3

[177] Amnay Idir, "Les consultations par les chiffres," *El Watan*, 18 April 1999, pg. 3

[178] Yahia Zoubir, interview with author, May 2011.

in 1996. New hopes were, however, shattered in aftermath of the 1997 elections. Zéroual's party, National Rally for Democracy (RND), won a plurality of seats despite its established just months prior to the elections. "All major parties except the RND voiced outrage" (Quandt 1998:77).[179] Although Algerian maintained a relatively free press and a dynamic opposition, by the end of 1997, "the continuing violence, and the deep social and economic problems that faced the country, cast a dark shadow over the country" (72).

7.2 The Elections of 1999 and 2002: The Boycott Years

The 1999 and 2002 elections in Algeria closely resemble the events discussed in the case of Jordan, and were characterized by opposition boycotts. The regime, in both cases, ignored the opposition demands and the opposition subsequently triggered a crisis. The conditions under which the elections were held were marked by social discontent and unrest, just as cases of boycott in Jordan. As in Jordan, the opposition boycotts appear to be driven largely by decrease in the perceived legitimacy of the regime. That is, in terms of the formal model, changes in the legitimacy parameters (λ, α, ρ) Moreover, as in Jordan, the previous domestic unrest that led to reform in 1988 shaped the opposition's prior beliefs about the prospect of obtaining reform from the regime.

7.2.1 The Presidential Elections of 1999

Just three years into his five-year term, President Zéroual announced his resignation on 11 September 1998. New presidential elections would be held in early 1999. In his resignation, Zéroual claimed a need for a real, democratic, and peaceful transition of power and that new presidential elections would provide such an opportunity. Although his resignation was said to be in the name of democracy, it was widely believed that he had been forced out. According to Le Sueur (2010), "there was

[179] Accusations of fraud were confirmed in 1998. The commission charged with investigating fraud in the last legislative elections confirmed the accusations of parties of election irregularities (S.B., "La fraude electorale confirmee, et apres?," *El Watan*, 20 November 1998).

initially great excitement about the upcoming presidential election" largely because it was the "first opportunity to elect a president not directly related to the HCE and the 1992 coup" (75). This opportunity, however, was marred by an electoral boycott by the opposition and accusations of electoral misconduct.

The question to be address in this section is: What prompted the decision to boycott the 1999 election after the decision to participate just two years earlier in 1997? All boycotting parties referred to the "crisis" facing the country, and its multifaceted nature. Algerians use the word "crisis" to refer to domestic conditions, including the socio-economic, political, and security conditions in the country.[180] The opposition repeatedly expressed concerns over the holding of elections given the deteriorating socio-economic, security and political conditions. Indeed, the multidimensional crisis facing Algeria was reflected in daily strikes across economic sectors, including transport, all levels of the education system, metal workers and mechanics. They also raised concerns over the ability of a government (under the direction of Prime Minister Ouyahia) to organize free, fair and transparent elections when it itself had been under elected through fraud.[181]

One source of this multidimensional crisis was economic reforms. Algeria's economic reforms were put on hold following the coup in 1992 due to the "political uncertainties, civil strife, and dwindling access to external financing" (Nashishibi et al 1998:6). Under an IMF-backed program, economic liberalization plans were restarted in 1994, and the process was sped up under President Zéroual and Prime Minister Ouyahia, following the elections in 1995 and 1997. In addition to standard structural adjustment reforms, economic liberalization also entailed the privatization of many state-owned

[180] It is equally common to refer to solutions to exit the crisis. A number of statements from the opposition phrase their discontent with the *pouvoir* as not resolving the crisis or not implanting policies that will help Algeria to exit the crisis.

[181] S.B., "La fraude electorale confirmee, et apres?," *El Watan*, 30 November 1998, pg. 3. "The commission charged with investigating fraud in the last legislative elections confirmed the accusations of parties of election irregularities."

enterprises, and like Jordan, the reduction in subsidies and price liberalization. This latter component of economic adjustment required an approximate 200 percent increase in food and petroleum products between 1994 and 1996. Obviously, these changes had a significant impact on the lives of many Algerians.

Following the return of these structural economic adjustments, the late 1990s were difficult times for Algerians, and many blamed the government's commitment to economic liberalization for the increased hardship. A significant proportion of the unemployed had held positions in the public sector, and had subsequently lost their jobs in the privatization process. Unemployment during the 1990s in Algeria was higher than in the previous two decades, and even higher than the average across MENA countries (Kpodar 2007). "Unemployment escalated from 10 percent in 1985 to 25 percent in 1995" (Nashishibi et al 1998:42). By 1999 unemployment had risen to a shocking 30%. Furthermore, from April 1998 to April 1999 the Algerian Dinar lost 20% of its value against the US dollar.[182]

The price of oil exacerbated the effects of the structural adjustments. The price of oil had yet to recover to its pre-1986 level, and continued its steady decline observed since 1990.[183] In fact, the oil price in late 1998 and early 1999 was still lower than in the 1980s, and by December 1998 it was at its lowest price value in the three-decade period from 1980 to 2010 (at US$8.64 per barrel). This presented further difficulties for public finances, as the Algerian government passes its budgets based on a specified price of oil per barrel. In 1999 it had, perhaps naively, hoped for an increase that would improve its fiscal position. At the close of 1998, Algeria's exterior debt was already approximately US$30.5 billion.[184]

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[182] Nordine Grim, "Le dinar a perdu 20% de sa valeur," *El Watan*, 29 April 1999, Front Page.

[183] Historic oil prices available at, http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm, retrieved 22 April 2011.

[184] Lies Sahar, "Dette Exterieure: La situaton reste critique," *El Watan*, 10 March 1999, Front Page.

Algerians also faced chronic and severe housing shortages, an unresolved problem dating from the Boumedienne period (1965-1978). This situation arose not only because of rapid population and urbanization growth rates, but also because of a "sluggish" response and delivery by the government (Bellal 2009:102). This led to overcrowding and squatting. The chronic shortage in housing was compounded by the slow completion of new housing projects and by the allocation of completed housing, which was often hampered by corruption.

Beyond economic sources of social discontent, there were also political and security sources of public frustration. There was a significant deterioration in the level of security at this time. The regime seemed unable to cope with the level of violence, and may have been complicit in some instances. As declared by Aït Ahmed, "Since 1995, there has been more deaths, more orphans, more disappeared and a lot of misery."[185] There was also rising concern over human rights violations, abuses of power, and treatment of the imprisoned, the missing and those persons who had disappeared. The government increasingly threatened the independence and freedom of the press and, according to Quandt (1998), Zéroual had gave the military a "carte blanche" in their attempts to maintain order.

Further discontent emerged from the Berber region of Kabylia comprised primarily of three *wilayas* (states or provinces): Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, and Bouira. President Zéroual in July of 1998 passed the Algerian Arabic Language Generalization Law, which would make Arabic the only official language to be used in public, business, and government. This Arabization policy drew criticisms from numerous actors, including the FFS and RCD, but also journalists and French speakers more generally. In particular, this frustrated the Berber population, especially in Kabylia, who had long demanded their language (Tamazight) be given national and official status along with

[185] "Ait Ahmed: la prochaine election 'une chance a saisir'," *El Watan*, 3 March 1999, pg. 3.

Arabic. The timing of this change could not have been worse, as the situation in Kabylia was already volatile following the assassination of the popular Berber singer, Lounes Matoub.

The multifaceted crisis facing Algeria signaled to the opposition a decreasing probability the societal centers of power would aid the regime if challenged. The regime was suffering from a both an economic and political crisis, and the conditions of which were ripe for a social explosion.[186] For example, the FFS said that the pauperization of society, unemployment, the downsizing and the sale of public enterprises, are the indicators of a "rentrée de toute les explosions."[187] As such, the opposition believing the failure rate to be increasing against this backdrop of social unrest undertook a boycott of the presidential elections.

The presidential elections held 15 April 1999 featured a boycott by the opposition. Although seven candidates entered the presidential race, and were cleared by the Constitutional Council to participate, six candidates (referred to as the "Group of 6") withdrew from the race on 14 April.[188] The withdrawal of the Group of 6 left Abdelaziz Bouteflika to be elected essentially unopposed.[189] The Rally for Culture and Democracy ("RCD") announced in February its decision to boycott the election.[190] In all cases, boycotting candidates and parties raised concerns over the fact that free and fair elections could not be guaranteed. The boycotting parties had concerns that Bouteflika was the

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[186] Lies Sahar, L'UGTA bandit la menance d'une greve generale," *El Watan*, 27 August 1998, Front Page. "L'UGTA fait un constat severe de la situation economique et sociale. Tous les ingrediantes d'une explosion social sont reunis."

[187] Assia T., "Dure epreuve pour Ouyahia," *El Watan*, 7 Sept 1998, Front Page.

[188] The six candidates were Aït Ahmed (of the FFS), Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Mouloud Hamrouche, Adballah Djaballah (of the Movement for National Reform), Mokdad Sifi, and Youcef Khatib.

[189] Due to the last minute withdrawal and subsequent call to boycott of the remaining 6 presidential candidates, their names remained on the ballot and received votes.

[190] The Worker's Party (PT) called on supporters to cast blank (protest) ballots after the party's candidate, Louisa Hanoune, was rejected by the Constitutional Council for failing to obtain a sufficient number of signatures for her candidacy.

"consensus candidate" and, more importantly, the candidate of the army. In particular, they also had concerns with the election law, which they argued favored fraud as it allowed special *bureaux des votes* (polling stations) for the army, emigrants, and the nomadic populations. In addition, authorities refused to invite international observers, which multiple political parties desired as a concrete guarantee for transparent elections. The candidates also asked for polling stations to be open to representatives of the candidates in order to monitor the polling process.

In addition to the claimed non-transparency of the elections, the RCD raised concerns over the potential for the election to rehabilitate the FIS. On its boycott, the RCD stated, "We are certain that this election is technically flawed and politically dangerous."[191] As voting got underway in the special *bureaux des votes*, the Group of Six asked for an urgent meeting with President Zéroual to demand the annulment of the results. After President Zéroual refused, the Group of Six withdrew from the elections stating that they had confirmation of fraud in the special *bureaux des votes* and of concrete measures taken by the *pouvoir* to commit massive fraud in favor of Bouteflika.[192] The Group of 6 subsequently called on their supporters to boycott the elections. The boycotting actors said they would not participate in a "*masquerade électorale*." As Hocine Nia, RCD vice president and deputy, put it, "We will not serve as the alibi to an electoral masquerade."[193]

Despite the Group's hope that the election would be postponed following their withdrawal, the election went ahead with Bouteflika as the sole candidate—he won with 73% of the vote. The boycott did have some impact on public participation, as turnout was only 60%, which was substantially lower than in previous three elections.[194] There

[191] Souhila H., "Rejet d'un jeu electoral verrouille," *El Watan*, 6 Feb 1999.

[192] Youcef Bouandel notes that Bouteflika conditioned his acceptance of candidacy that he would be guaranteed to receive more than President Zéroual in 1995 (interview with author, April 2011).

[193] S.B., "Le RCD interpelle l'Armée," *El Watan*, 23 December 1998, pg. 3.

[194] Amnay Idir, "Les consultations par les chiffres," *El Watan*, 18 April 1999, pg. 3.

was some debate about the precise level of voter turnout, as the Constitutional Council, the body responsible for vetting candidates, clearing lists and verifying results, claimed the participation rate was 73.79%.[195] The opposition decried these official estimates calling them an "outrageous overestimation."

The Group of Six triggered a crisis and was determined to maintain pressure, saying it would engage in a "showdown" (*le bras de fer*) against the *pouvoir*. The Group further claimed popular legitimacy and warned against any limits imposed on freedom of expression and the press. In a statement on the relevance of such freedoms for their claims, they said, "We are able to prove our strength, to justify our quality as the true opposition, as long as the media, especially those of the State are not closed again."[196] Only days after the election, they planned a nationwide walkout to be held on inauguration day (27 April), calling on all Algerians to stop their activities, work, and close shops at 11 a.m. The candidates connected with local party offices and support groups across the country in an effort to maintain local contact, and to encourage local groups to take the initiative in organizing demonstrations.

The Group of Six wanted to continue their appeal to the people of Algeria that Bouteflika was illegitimate. In terms of the theoretical model, this represents the decision to trigger a crisis. The purpose of the march, according to Seddki Debaïli of the FFS, was to show proof that Bouteflika does not have popular legitimacy. The Group also viewed the demonstration as way to reject the results of the presidential election, and to call popular domestic opinion and international attention to the massive fraud that everyone denounced as a "palpable reality."

Although there was a desire to continue to maintain the pressure on the regime, and to continue denouncing the fraudulent nature of the election and its results, there was

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[195] Souhila H., "Les resultants officiels proclames aujourd'hui," *El Watan*, 20 April 1999, Front Page.

[196] Lyes Bendaoud, "Mise en garde des 'six'," *El Watan*, 22 April 1999, Front Page.

speculation about the Group's capacity to sustain their challenge. For one, the Group of Six was comprised of a diverse set of politicians with different ideologies. Questions were already being raised about one's, Mokdad Sifi, commitment to the group. Moreover, individual candidates were taking their own steps outside the activities of the Group, such as Mouloud Hamrouche who was attempting to establish a political party.

Moreover, the ability of the group to sustain pressure was put in check by the regime. The march planned for Bouteflika's inauguration day was prohibited, in clear violation of the law. In addition, FFS members in Oran were also refused permission to hold demonstrations. The Group of Six still hoped to orchestrate the protest. However, on the day the *pouvoir* heavily controlled all routes into Algiers, and within Algiers, all routes leading to the famous 1 Mai plaza were closed. The police had been instructed to close the plaza to prevent any rallies or gatherings. On that particular day, there was a heavy police presence, including riot police, and all travelers were subject to interrogations by the police and the gendarmerie. The Group of Six said that many of their members had been prevented from reaching Algiers, and that Algiers was isolated. The attempt to hold the demonstration failed; only journalists and police were to be found in the plaza.[197]

Despite this setback, in a joint statement, the reaffirmed their determination to continue their activities. To do this, a new application to organize another march on May 16 was submitted for authorization. Further demonstrations in early May were also prohibited, as was access to meeting halls. A communiqué from the Ministry of the Interior issued against a 5 May demonstration said that no demonstrations would be tolerated at this time.[198] Such formal prohibitions, and the ability of the regime to prevent

[197] This was in contrast to 16 April when even the citizens had tried to defy the ban (Ali. T., "Les 'six' isoles a Alger," *El Watan*, 27 April 1999, Front Page.

[198] A.T., "Encore une march interdite," *El Watan*, 5 May 1999, pg. 3. No valuable reason was provided to justify prohibiting this demonstration. The communiqué said that no demonstrations would be tolerated during this precise period. To the Group of 6, it appeared the sole reason for their refusal was the regime's desire to prevent all forms of political opposition.

the opposition movement from gathering in defiance of the laws, raised serious doubts about the real political freedom in the aftermath of the election. The regime made their commitment to retain control unmistakable, but the opposition still desired to continue their challenge against the regime. As noted by Samir Bouakouir, the FFS' national secretary for information, "We will never give up and we will continue to corner the *pouvoir* to impose upon it democratic principles" said .[199]

Given the decision of the regime to ignore the boycotters, and the subsequent decision of the opposition to trigger a crisis, the question becomes why did the regime survive this challenge? The answer lies in the examination of the support Bouteflika received from its centers of power. In the days and weeks following the elections, the centers of power, which would continue to support the regime became apparent. Bouteflika certainly maintained a range of support, but given the serious questioning of the election result, it was far from incomprehensible that some of his domestic and external supports would withdraw. This is likely how the opposition groups perceived the situation.

In terms of domestic centers of power, Bouteflika's campaign was actually supported by wide set of actors. This support included the three ruling coalition parties (FLN, MSP, and RND), and the UGTA, the Council of Mujahidin, as well as a number of *anciens*, such as Mohamed Chief Messdia, whose re-emergence onto the political scene characterized Bouteflika's campaign (i.e. the nationalists). The support of MSP was particularly surprising. The Constitutional Council refused the candidacy of Mafoud Nahnah—the leader of the MSP—on the dubious grounds that he had not fought in the War of Independence.[200] Moreover, Nahnah had received some 20% of the vote in the 1995 presidential election, and, if that number remained an accurate indication of his

[199] Ali T., "Les 'six' isoles a Alger," *El Watan*, 26 April 1999, Front Page.

[200] In fact, although he did not fight, he was exempt by Article 73 of the Constitution because he was born prior to July of 1942.

support in 1999, he remained a viable candidate. These details, therefore, make the last minute decision of the MSP to support Bouteflika all the more suggestive.

Given the unusual mix of coalition partners supporting Bouteflika, it is again not surprising that after the election there was some indication the coalition was beginning to "crack." In the days following the results, it emerged that a part of the MSP had in fact voted for Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, thus ignoring the decision taken by the party's Shura council.[201] In reality, however, the potential, and seemingly imminent, collapse of domestic support for the regime failed to eventuate. Even in spite of the crisis triggered by the opposition, the regime managed to retain its domestic centers of power. Explanations for this continued support rest largely on Bouteflika's campaign for peace and stability, which engendered popular support for his candidacy. The people wanted stability and peace—they wanted an exit to the crisis—and saw a candidate backed by the army as the best way forward. Although many people were dissatisfied with the regime's performance, the hope of stability, and an exit to the prolonged crisis, was enough for Bouteflika to retain domestic support.

It was similarly unclear whether Algeria's external centers of power would come to the aid of the regime. Initial international reactions to the presidential election in Algeria were largely critical. The US, for example, formally said it was "disappointed." However, in the period following Bouteflika's election and inauguration, international support for Bouteflika came clear into view. "Less than a week after the inauguration of the new President of the Republic, international opinion has adapted to the evolving situation that resulted from the election on April 15, 1999.[202] Paris in early May expressed a desire to reconcile, while Lionel Jospin, the prime minister, said in Cairo that

[201] Ziad Salah, "Doute sur l'engagement de la base du MSP," *El Watan*, 21 April 1999, pg. 3.

[202] Lies Sahar, "Paris veut se reconcilier avec Bouteflika," *El Watan* 3 May 1999, pg. 2.

the Group of Six's allegations against the legitimacy of President Bouteflika were unlikely to have "any echo internationally."[203]

Algeria also affirmed its desire for "cooperation and dialogue" with the EU, provided that relations were based on "shared interest" and "mutual respect."[204] In early May, reports emerged that the EU and Algeria were to resume negotiations, which had been interrupted in May of 1997, over an association accord, similar to those the EU had signed with Morocco and Tunisia.[205] In early November 1999, EU officials, including Javier Solana (High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and Chris Patton (the European Commissioner for External Relations), met Bouteflika in Algeria.

In the weeks following Bouteflika's presidential election, Algeria also received visitors from several key states. In early May, Molly Williamson, the US deputy assistant secretary of commerce, visited Algeria under the *Eizenstat Initiative* in the hopes of closer US-Algeria cooperation in commerce. Portuguese, French, Belgian and Lebanese delegations followed. According to El Watan journalist, Lies Sahar, the post-election period in Algeria was characterized by a reprisal in business relations between Algeria and the international community.[206] On 5 May 1999, Algeria's state-owned Sonelgaz received a 98 million dollar loan from the Arab Fund for Social and Political Development to build a power plant in Algiers.[207] Moreover, the IMF granted Algeria a US$300 million loan. under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility, to cover "export shortfalls."

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[203] Lies Sahar, "Paris veut se reconcilier avec Bouteflika," *El Watan* 3 May 1999, pg. 2.

[204] AGENCE France Presse—English, 02 Nov 1999, 13:44 GMT, retrieved via LexisNexis 24 April 2011

[205] Amnay Idir, "Les consultations par les chiffres," *El Watan*, 18 April 1999, pg. 3

[206] Lies Sahar, "Intensification des relations avec l'etranger," 9 May 1999, pg. 3.

[207] A.T., "Pret de 98 millions de dollars pour Sonelgaz," 6 May 1999, pg. 2.

In the period following the election, Bouteflika's support from both domestic and external centers of power became clear. Moreover, Bouteflika was the candidate of the army (a center of power), and as noted by Youcef Bouandel, "when the army is behind you, no one can do anything."[208] The use of repression by the regime against those who attempted to challenge it, proved overwhelming, and the Group of Six's activities petered out. Without an anchorage in societal groups across the public, the opposition could not challenge the regime, and the public was tired.[209] Bouteflika won over the electorate with prospects for peace through amnesty.[210] Thus, despite their initial determination, the Group of 6 failed in its challenge: "It is true that the undivided today are not reassuring in that any democratic expression risks being stifled."[211]

7.2.2 The 2002 Legislative Elections

As in 1999, the opposition boycotted the 2002 election, the government chose not to reform, and again the opposition triggered a crisis. Similarly, the elections took place within the broader scenery of massive social unrest, including demonstrations, protests, strikes, riots and increased violence from armed Islamist groups. Strikes and riots in 1988 had led to a remarkable liberalization, and, as in Jordan, the experience of the earlier unrest in spurring reform would have impacted the beliefs of the 2002 opposition groups about the potential for concessions. Fayçal Metaoui notes that facing protests, sit-ins, strikes, marches and riots, "Bouteflika and his entourage were locked in a deep silence. The credit given to Bouteflika the beginning of his tenure has largely deteriorated."[212]

This time five political parties boycotted the elections: The FFS, RCD, the Republic National Alliance (ANR), the Movement for Democrats and Socialists

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[208] Interview with author, April 2011.

[209] Le Sueur, interview with author April 2011.

[210] Zoubir, interview with author, May 2011.

[211] A.T., "Encore une marche interdite," *El Watan*, 5 May 1999, pg. 2.

[212] Fayçal Metaoui, "A quelle strategie obeit l'aveuglement du gouvernement?," *El Watan*, 21 May 2001, pg. 3.

(hereafter the MDS), and the Socialist Workers' Party (PST). In addition, many prominent personalities and civil society organizations called for boycotting the election, most notably the *Coordination Inter-wilayas des 'aarch, daïras et communes* (the *archs*), the umbrella organization behind the Kabylia uprising. In fact, the uprising in Kabylia, combined with the more general socio-economic unrest throughout the country, was now a driving reason behind the boycott. Again, the parties refused to participate in what they termed another electoral masquerade. In regards to the unrest in Kabylia, the parties were concerned about the "dangerous evolution of the situation" and the regime's failure to take any measures to return calm to the region.[213] The *archs*, as well as other parties, conditioned their participation upon concrete steps towards the satisfaction of the El Kseur platform adopted in June of 2001.[214] The *archs* stated that the elections were "an alibi for the *pouvoir* to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis international public opinion wanting to give the image of a democratic regime, ignoring the political, socio-economic and democratic impasse in the country."[215] The opposition more generally emphasized the "impasse" at which Algeria found itself, resulting from the inability of authorities to resolve the crisis. According to a spokesman form RCD, "the *pouvoir* is at an impasse which commands the overthrow of the system in place. Change can only come from the mobilization of democratic forces."[216]

The opposition also alleged that the previous two elections in 1997 and 1999 had been wrought with fraud, and they expected this election to be no different. The boycotters again cited the election law and the special *bureaux des votes* as a source of

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[213] Faouzia Ababsa, "FFS rejette le processus electoral," *La Tribune*, 30 March 2002, Front Page.

[214] The El Kseur platform outlined the movement's 15 demands, including the officialization and nationalization of the Tamazight language along with Arabic, the release of all those detained since the uprising began in April 2001, and holding those responsible accountable for the death of protesters and, in particular, Guermah Massinissa. The platform not only included Berber-specific demands, but also extended to wider concerns facing citizens across the country.

[215] Mourad Hachid, "Le rejet des elections prend forme en Kabylie," *El Watan*, 27 February 2002, pg. 3.

[216] D. Tamani, "FFS et RCD opposes aux elections," *El Watan*, 14 February 2002, pg. 2.

fraud. As in 1999, the boycotting parties questioned the *pouvoir's* ability to engage in political solutions to the crisis (i.e. conduct free and fair elections) while at the same time engaging in massive repression against the citizens' movement. Questioning the ability of the regime to organize transparent elections at this time, Ahmed Djeddaï of the FFS said, "Despite the crisis we are undergoing, they impose on us elections at the moment when Algerians are preoccupied with other things" (daily living conditions and the deteriorating security situation across the country).[217] In its decision to boycott the elections, the FFS cited a survey conducted by the State which found that only 18% of Algerians were ready to, or even thinking about, voting.[218] In addition, the boycotting parties raised concerns about the deterioration in democratic freedoms (as the IAF had in 1997 and 2010). The RCD's communiqué, for example, said that the party is concerned about the "stifling" of democratic freedoms, as well as the continued harassment against the press. It called on citizens to reject "a failed system that has blocked the evolution of Algeria's destiny."[219]

Because of the unrest against which the elections were set to take place, a number of political parties, including those boycotting, called for a postponement. An indication of how widespread was the feeling of unpreparedness for the elections, is the fact that even the FLN said it was willing to consider a postponement. In spite of these, perhaps sensible, calls for delaying the process, the regime refused and elections went ahead on 30 May 2002.

Common between the elections of 1999 and 2002 were high levels of unemployment, poverty, economic hardship, marginalized populations (e.g., youths, Berbers), housing shortages, and the continued social, economic and political crisis.

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[217] Faouzia Ababsa, "Entretien avec Ahmed Djeddai", *La Tribune*, pg. 5.

[218] Faouzia Ababsa, "FFS rejette le processus electoral," *La Tribune*, 30 March 2002, Front Page.

[219] Faouzia Ababsa, "Le RCD dans la logique du rejet des elections legislatives," *La Tribune*, 7 March 2002, Front Page.

Across this whole period, the *colère* of the population persisted. As in 1999, the social, economic, and political crisis was intensified by a problem of security across the country. At the heart of the conflict was social justice—it was perceived an uprising against unemployment, corruption, and *la hogra*. In 2002, the massive unrest in Kabylia was coupled with mobilization against the penal code interspliced with labor strikes. Overall, it is obvious that the 2002 legislative elections in Algeria took place in an atmosphere of massive social unrest, and an upsurge in terrorist violence. The various social problems leading into the 2002 elections would again affect the opposition's beliefs about the probability that at least one center of power would come to the aid of the regime if challenged.

Despite 2002 being a good year for petroleum revenue, daily economic conditions for many Algerians remained dire. Inflation was increasing dramatically—in a space of 12 months, according to the Bank of Algeria, inflation increased from .8% to 4.5%.[220] There was considerable decline in purchasing power with increasing prices of fruits and vegetables.[221] During the month of Ramadan, the price of dates increased by 200%. The effect of high, and rising prices, was "close to traumatizing" for the Algerian population.[222] This situation was compounded by an ineffectual economic stimulus plan, raising questions about where the money from the thriving hydrocarbon industry was going. The public provision of various utilities was also failing: citizens faced daily problems with electricity, potable water and gas. Due to a period of sustained drought, Algeria was also facing water shortages and, in particular, Algiers faced severe water shortages.[223]

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[220] Nordine Grim, "Un nouveau bond de l'inflation," *El Watan*, 28 March 2002, pg. 4.

[221] C'est sur le terrain economique que Bouteflika etait surtout le plus attendu par la population algerienne terriblement eprouvee par le chomage, l'erosion du pouvoir d'achat et la crise du logement.

[222] D.T., "Terreur sur les marches," *El Watan*, 9 December 2001, pg. 4.

[223] In addition to the deterioration in socio-economic conditions that characterized daily life, Algerians suffered further after a terrible monsoon killed 1,000 people in Algiers alone, and inflicted massive infrastructure destruction.

The whole summer of 2001 was marked by violence, riots and almost daily marches of students, Berbers, lawyers and journalists. There were multiple strikes, work stoppages, and walkouts, and this intensification of industrial action with the existing social discontent across the country seemed to worry the government. The regime gave instructions to relevant ministers to investigate the strikes and threats in their own specific sectors and to apply the economic stimulus plan wherever possible to increase economic opportunities.[224] The relevant ministers invited unions to dialogue giving the impression to the public that the demands of the socio-professional workers had credence.[225] Moreover, it suggested that the government was in fact worried about the unrest in various economic sectors, and perhaps even in Kabylia.[226] The government also tried to make amends with UGTA, initiating a deal on the electricity law, and agreeing to pay back salaries of employees by the close of the year. A move likely intended to diffuse at least one social front at risk of erupting.[227]

Beyond the socio-economic discontent that characterized both the 1999 and 2002 elections, in this latter election there was also a popular uprising in the Berber region of Kabylia. After the arrest and subsequent death of a Berber youth, Guermah Massinissa, at the hands of the gendarmerie wide scale riots erupted. Strikes of workers intertwined with marches, rallies and riots. The demonstrations and the riots were not limited to Kabylia: political parties and civil society organizations held demonstrations and marches in solidarity across the country. It was clear there existed wide support for the Berber

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[224] Fayçal Metaoui, "Les wilayas mises sous controle," *El Watan*, 24 October 2001, pg. 5.

[225] S.T., "Le pouvoir joue l'appaisement," *El Watan*, 26 February 2002, pg. 2.

[226] This point is underscored by journalist Fayçal Metaoui who questions Bouteflika's popularity. He writes, "No accurate poll has been conducted to know this information. By engaging in international activities like the New Africa Initiative (NEPAD), the man gives the impression of wanting to escape from the difficult internal climate. In spite of this situation, the tenant of El Mouraida [presidential residence] refused to forge alliances with institutions such as parliament or the political parties ("Une guerre d'usure," *El Watan*, 15 April 2002, pg. 3).

[227] Abdelkrim A., "Les salaires de 40,000 travailleurs verses avant decembre: Benflis fait un geste," *El Watan*, 14 October 2001, pg. 5.

discontent against the regime. The situation in Kabylia oscillated between riots and occasional calm through 2004. The grievances espoused extended beyond Berber specific demands to wider socio-economic and political claims affecting the rest of the country. Students at universities across the country marched in solidarity with the Kabylia protesters, citing many common frustrations.

Paralleling the mobilization in support of the Kabylie cause and the El Kseur platform was a broad campaign against the amendments to the penal code. The changes to the penal code were widely opposed by lawyers and journalists as well as other civil society groups for imposing restrictions on freedoms of expression and the press. Moreover, in violation of the International Labor Organization's standards, the government cracked down on the right to strike—health workers who were striking were docked pay—and the more general rights to association.

The pre-election environment in Algeria was also plagued by an upsurge in terrorist violence and, as a result, concerns were raised over the amnesty agreement (*concorde civile*) and its effectiveness. Just four months after Bouteflika took office, the amnesty agreement passed by an overwhelming majority in September 1999.[228] The agreement allowed members of armed groups to surrender without facing prosecution and to reintegrate into society. The amnesty created tensions between Bouteflika and the Military; the Military did not support amnesty as a means to end the State's war against the armed Islamist groups. To appease the military concerns, the army would be immune from interrogations or prosecutions for its actions during the civil war and fight against terrorism. Prior to the legislative elections in 2002 speculation about the relationship between President Bouteflika and the military began to surface, although this conflict would not become clear until 2004. There was a large spike in number of deaths by

[228] Zéroual had attempted to negotiate amnesty deal in 1997 with AIS (Yahia Zoubir, interview with author).

terrorist attacks with over 1,000 people killed between January and September.[229] The spike in attacks called into question the effectiveness of the amnesty agreement, but Bouteflika maintained strong support for his *concorde civile* as the best way for Algeria to end the violence.

The regime's response to this unrest was remarkable in that it was at times strong and repressive, while at other times conciliatory. To begin, President Bouteflika remained silent about the unrest engulfing the Kabylia region and many economic sectors. After weeks of this silence, the president suddenly made a speech using strong, even "aggressive," language. Bouteflika stated: "The events are meaningless. Violence begets violence. No citizen has the right to engage in destroying the country's wealth, whether public or private. Those who were (overwhelmed) by the war of National Liberation today revolt against whom? Against What?"[230] According to journalists, Bouteflika's speech was interpreted as giving the green light for continued suppression of the youth uprising, and the government continued its heavy surveillance of activists.

The protest marches continued through April of 2002. Since the start of the Kabylie uprising in April, "not a Thursday passed without political parties, national organizations or professional, or student, groups marching for the rehabilitation of the Tamazight language, and identity, and free expression."[231] The *pouvoir* kept a nervous and watchful eye on the protest movement, and like it had after the 1999 elections, began officially prohibiting demonstrations. The Minister of the Interior, Zerhouni, refused authorization for a march to be held on 7 June 2001, which was organized and supported by more than 30 groups. In spite of the refusal, the organizers and their supporters marched anyway. In July of 2001, per the Minister of Interior's wishes, all

[229] Salmia Tlemçani, "Plus d'un millier de victimes en neuf mois," *El Watan*, 30 October 2001, pg. 5.

[230] Kamel Medjdoub, "La cises s'aggrave dans toute les domains," *El Watan*, 31 January 2002, pg. 2.

[231] Assia T., "Profitant d'un retour au calme en Kabilye: le pouvoir ferme le jeu," 10 June 2001, Front Page.

demonstrations were officially banned in Algiers. Authorizations for marches elsewhere in the country were also withheld.

The increasingly heavy-handed response to the protest also included reports that the gendarmerie and police were using real bullets against unarmed protesters. Human rights groups immediately condemned the actions of the regime. The regime also arrested large numbers of demonstrators in Kabylia, undertaking two significant waves of arrests in October 2001 and March of 2002. Many of those detained waited long periods before seeing a judge, and the lawyers of detainees complained that they did not receive access to their own clients' dossiers. These repressive actions, particularly in Kabylia, received criticism on multiple fronts. Bouteflika, however, did not replace either the Prime Minister or the Minister of Interior, who were both heavily criticized for the handling of situation in Kabylia.[232]

The regime's commitment to strong-armed tactics in response to protests, many of which appeared to be advancing legitimate grievances, suggests a confidence in their position (i.e. low costs of triggering a crisis). On the other hand, it was also the case that Bouteflika did give way on some issues. Indeed, despite the regime's clearly repressive response, it did offer some concessions to both workers and the Kabylie movement. As noted above, Bouteflika did engage the UGTA and the two actors compromised on their disagreements over the electricity law as well as the payment of back salaries. The president also tried to engage the political parties on the elections after the announcements to boycott. However, it was on the cultural issues related to the

[232] Other actions that would suggest a low cost of fighting were: (1) Maintained state of emergency for ninth year without approval of parliament and despite improvement in security situation and despite much discussion about the lack of need for it dating at least back to the 1999 presidential election. Several high-ranking members of the military said it would be reasonable thing to do. (2) There was number of actions taken by Minister of Interior, including banning or refusing to authorize demonstrations done without explanation. No political party, for example, was approved to form in 2001, including Taleb Ibrahimi's Wafa party—again no reason was given for denying the right of al-Wafa to officially establish itself as political party.

Tamazight language and the presence in Kabylia that Bouteflika appeared to give the most ground.

In March 2002, Bouteflika announced his intention to amend the constitution without referendum to include the Tamazight language as a national language. Consistent with his pledge, the constitution was quickly amended in April 2002. The *archs* movement, however, considered this as only a partial satisfaction of one of the El Kseur demands: the nationalization of the language was not the same thing as making it an official language of the state of Algeria along with Arabic.[233] In January 2002, Bouteflika also agreed to a partial withdrawal of the gendarmerie brigades in Kabylia.[234] This move came despite early statements by the president that all 15 points of the El Kseur platform were open for negotiation, except for the withdrawal of the brigades. After the elections, in early August, Bouteflika announced the liberalization of detainees, primarily those youths who had been arrested since riots erupted across the country in satisfaction of the fifth demand of the El Kseur platform. A communiqué released by the President announced the liberalization of the detainees, "The President of the Republic, who attaches great importance to the holding of the next elections [local elections in October 2002] under the best possible conditions, is keen to make every effort to restore social peace in all regions of the country."[235]

A final example of the repressive-then-conciliatory nature of Bouteflika's actions: at the same time the gendarmerie was withdrawing from Tizi Ouzou and other areas in Kabylia, the number of arrests was increasing in most of the *wilayas* across the region. The last and most extensive wave of arrests in March 2002 coincided with the withdrawal

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[233] The demand as put forth in platform was: "To meet the Amazigh [Berber] demand in all its (identity, civilization, linguistic and cultural) dimensions without a referendum or conditions; and the recognition of Tamazight as a national and official language."

[234] The platform had demanded the full and immediate departure of the gendarmerie brigades and the CNS (riot police) reinforcements.

[235] Fayçal Metaoui, "Bouteflika libere les detenus," *El* Watan, 5 August 2002, Front Page.

of the gendarmerie. In addition, the courts were handing down harsh sentences to demonstrators simultaneously as the gendarmerie was departing.

The regime's response to the unrest, however, did not seem to affect its relationship with its foreign partners.[236] Under Bouteflika, Algeria's reentrance into the international arena after decades of isolation continued. According to Werenfels (2007), one of the reasons the military chose him in 1999 was his diplomatic experience and range of international contacts. Since his election, Bouteflika had cultivated growing ties with the international community, specifically with the EU (through the association accord), the US, and NATO. Throughout much of the unrest, the EU and Algeria had continued negotiations regarding the association agreement, which was finally signed in April 2002. In the same year, Algeria also concluded a deal with NATO.

In addition to these agreements with international bodies such as the EU and NATO, Algeria enjoyed increased cooperation with the US, specifically in relation to counter-terrorism and commercial interests. In July 2001, President Bouteflika became the third Algerian president, and the first since 1986, to visit the United States. During this visit, the two countries signed an accord for commerce and investment. In November of 2001, Bouteflika made his third trip to the US, during which he met with important groups specializing in military and aeronautics.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US changed the perceptions of Western countries about terrorism, and in Algeria's case, the regime's war against it. In 2002, the "US lifted its ten-year arms embargo against Algeria" (Le Sueur, 2010:86). At the same time, commercial ties with American investors had been increasing, as more that US$5 billion was invested into Algeria over the previous five years. According to journalist Lies Sahar, it was American petrol companies who helped engender a *rapprochement*

[236] Journalist Mohand Afroukh notes: For the Western oil companies in Algeria, the situation (unrest) actually made no difference ("Les societies petrolieres etrangeres confiantes," *El Watan*, 8 July 2001, pg. 4.)

between Washington and Algiers.[237] After September 11th, "Western countries, particularly the US, were now directly concerned with the stability of the Algerian regime and needed the cooperation that the Algerians could provide" (Cavatorta, 2009: 152).

These series of improved relations with the international community represent an enormous source of support from the regime's external centers of power. In each case, the EU, NATO, and the US, each committed to improved relations with Algeria, precisely during a period where domestic conditions were likely raising questions about the regime's support base. Thus, we can again observe a mix in the centers of power for the regime, as the societal centers seem under pressure, the international centers seem to improve. The prior beliefs of the opposition (ρ) about the type of regime it was facing (Legitimate or Illegitimate) would have been informed by its experience, as was the case in Jordan: wide scale unrest in 1988 led to remarkable political liberalization in Algeria. Possessing imperfect information about λ together with its historical experience, the opposition undertook a boycott.

The boycotting actors did trigger a crisis, but just as in 1999 it was quickly quashed. A group consisting of Ali Yahia Abdennour, Rachid Benyellès, Hocine Aït Ahmed (FFS) and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi (referred to as the "Group of Four") made a public calling to mobilize in order to reject the results of the legislative elections. As representative of the group's intentions to trigger a crisis, Ahmed Djeddaï of the FFS summarized their activities: "At present, there is no reason to forbid us to go on the ground. In any case, this initiative falls beyond 30 May [the date of the election]. The Four will be closer to the population through a number of planned actions. Soon there will be a meeting to discuss the options."[238] The *archs* also announced that it, too, would continue to fight.

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[237] Lies Sahar, "Le petrole rapproche Alger et Washington," *El Watan*, 12 July 2010, pg. 2.

[238] D. Tamani, "Entretien with Ahmed Djeddai," *El Watan*, 16 June 2002, pg. 3.

Despite this commitment, the actions of the government, however, made it increasingly difficult for the opposition to mobilize against the regime. As in 1999, public television and public meeting halls remained closed to the boycotting parties. In addition, there were increased restrictions on democratic freedoms both before and after the election. As reported by journalist Fayçal Metaoui, 2001 was an "année noire" with a number of democratic freedoms in decline. As before, the regime banned demonstrations in Algiers and refused to authorize demonstrations in other areas of the country. In 2001, the government passed an amendment to the penal code that added a clause prohibiting attacks against the State's institutions. In reality, this amendment was a direct challenge to the right to free expression. Threats and intimidation were imposed against members of the press, and the International Federation of Journalists office was closed in Algiers. A number of academics and intellectuals (political elite) were prosecuted for their opinions, such as lawyer Ali Mabroukine who was detained by the military for unknown reasons.[239] The regime extended their repression, according to Ahmed Djeddaï, by targeting FFS members across the country.

Although a cycle of calm and unrest continued in Kabylia through 2004, it never reached the level of confrontation witnessed during 2001 and 2002 prior to elections.[240] The government's harsh repression of the movement and the wave of arrests in October 2001 and March 2002 seemed to restrain the protest. Moreover, the movement, even prior to the election had become divided over whether to engage in dialogue with the regime. There was also growing suspicions of "rats" in the organization – a tactic used by the regime against the armed Islamic groups in the 1990s.[241] Through these ploys, the regime was again successful in slowly draining momentum from the protest, such that a

[239] Fayçal Metaoui, "Une année noire." *El Watan*. 2 January 2002, pg. 2.

[240] Mourad Hachid, "Le mouvement a la croisee des chemins," *El Watan*, 18 November 2002, pg. 2.

[241] 11 July 2002. M. Slimani. "La quete d'un second soufflé." *El Watan*, pg. 2.

few months after the elections, it had been largely quelled. This is summed up by Werenfels (2007):

> Once the opportunity structures changed (i.e. elections had finished, an agreement with the EU had been reached, international media attention became monopolized by the developments in Iraq), the movement lost much of its nuisance power. In addition, the movement's heterogeneous structures and internal squabbles significantly contributed to its loss of impact (73).

7.3 The 2004 and 2007 Elections: Some Limits of the Model

While both the 1999 presidential election and the 2002 legislative elections closely resemble the case of Jordan, the 2004 and 2007 Algerian elections seemingly diverge from the predictions of the model. The case of study of these Algerian elections is particularly valuable in the fact that it highlights some of potential limits of the formal model developed in Chapter 2. Potential limitations relate not to the incentives and motivations behind the various political strategies, but instead the integration of more than one opposition party into the structure. Specifically, in 2004 and 2007 we observe a situation of multiple "opposition" political parties and divergent strategies amongst them (i.e. some chose to boycott, while others did not). This is a key difference from the earlier elections. In the 1999 and 2002 elections, although there were multiple parties, it did not expose the limits of the model because the "opposition" parties adopted the same strategy.

In a number of ways, the social, economic and political conditions in Algeria during the 2004 presidential elections and the 2007 legislative elections were very similar to those experienced during the previous two elections. As noted by Bouandel, the elections in 2004 were "held against backdrop of instability, mistrust in the state's institutions and an atmosphere of fear" (2004:1527). Despite the similarities between the environments in which the elections occurred, in 2004, only the FFS, MDS and the *archs* called for boycott; the remaining boycotting parties returned to participation. The FFS

boycotted again in 2007. This section will first discuss the background of the election to illustrate the continued existence of the "crisis" which had motivated boycotts in 1999 and 2004 and shaped the perceptions of the legitimacy of the regime. I will then discuss two explanations for why we observe the divergence strategies in the latter two elections and thus why, upon closer examination, the Algeria further supports the predictions of the model.

7.3.1 Background to the Elections

The year 2003 saw the continued integration of Algeria into the world economy, and brought increasing levels of foreign direct investment and some improvements in general macroeconomic indicators. Algeria was now able, for example, to pay down "its-once crippling debt" (Roberts 2007:2). The improved macroeconomic conditions were in large part due to the historic rise in the price of oil per barrel. The macroeconomic improvements failed to benefit most Algerians, who remained frustrated with limited employment prospects. Again, there was a feeling that the government had somehow squandered opportunities for the average Algerian. Writing in 2009, Cavatorta notes, "despite the enormous wealth generated over the last decade, the social situation remains explosive with unemployment steady at around official figures of 20 per cent and emigration remaining the priority of the vast majority of young people" (177, citing Semiane 2005:76).

The official unemployment rate was approximately 16% between 2003 and 2007, though actual unemployment rates are suspected to be much larger, especially among youths aged 15 to 24. Again, the combined high rates of urbanization and population growth, with the lack of urban planning and policy, also continued to plague large sections of the population, with housing and water shortages remaining severe and chronic problems. Moreover, as the newspaper, *El Watan*, put it, "the population has the impression of being abandoned." Still in 2007, the *pouvoir* had yet to implement any sort

of plan that would allow citizens to obtain a share of the nation's growing oil and gas revenues.[242]

In addition, strikes continued throughout 2003 and 2004. In 2003 Algeria experienced a particularly crippling series of strikes by education workers (*enseignants*). The *pouvoir* again used repression in response to the *enseignant* strikers, as well as against the continued unrest in Kabylia. There was a continued regression in democratic freedoms, and one frequent news item was the continued harassment of journalists, who were often questioned and detained by the police. During the 2004 presidential elections the volatile situation in Kabylia remained unresolved. By 2007, however, relative calm and stability had returned to Kabylia after more than three years of continued unrest (2001-2004). The government agreed to hold another set of local elections for the state assemblies and communes in Kabylia. Moreover, since 2004 the regime had tried to discredit the movement, with measured success, by branding it a regionalist movement backed by foreign forces (Bouandel 2004:1527). This campaign, essentially a government public relations effort, was successful in convincing much of the rest of country that the Kabylia movement was now some sort of threat.[243]

Algeria was a more peaceful place by 2004, in comparison to the 1990s. The decrease in violence was due primarily to two factors. First, the amnesty agreement (*concorde civile*) passed in 1999 encouraged many members of the armed groups to surrender. Although this amnesty agreement did decrease levels of violence, it was far from eradicated. The media reported regularly on terrorist attacks and assassinations, and "many parts of the country remained unstable" (Bouandel 2004:1527). Since Bouteflika took office approximately 50,000 additional Algerians were "victims of civil strife" (Tlemçani 2008:6). Second, the military offensive against the *Groupe Islamique Armé*

[242] "Chronic unemployment, poverty, and housing shortages have raised public bitterness, particularly during a period of higher income from Algeria's oil and natural gas reserves" (Zisenwine 2007:2).

[243] Youcef Bouandel, interview with author, April 2011.

(GIA), and any remaining combatants who refused to come in under the amnesty, eliminated an estimated 2120 terrorists, and largely destroyed the GIA. Thus by 2004, the *Armée Islamique du Salut* (AIS) was given amnesty and the GIA destroyed (Tlemçani 2007:11).

The passage of the *concorde civile* in 1999, by a huge margin, was actually the beginning of a period where Bouteflika had public support.[244] During both presidential election campaigns (1999 and 2004) Bouteflika emphasized peace and stability, and the need for amnesty and national reconciliation to end the violence. This message was popular across much of the population (especially amongst the older generations), and Bouteflika used it to his advantage.[245] Algerians were tired of the violence and were thus prepared to believe Bouteflika's promises that amnesty would indeed bring an end to the conflict. As Szmolka (2006) summarizes, "many Algerians have viewed Bouteflika as the architect of stability and peace in Algeria in recent years. In fact, Islamist violence declined during his first term of office" (52).

In 2004 internal divisions began to emerge among some of Bouteflika's support base. In fact, by 2004 it appeared that Bouteflika had lost support from the FLN and the military, both of which supported his candidacy in 1999. The cause of this division was disagreement between Bouteflika and a key member of the FLN, Ali Benflis. Under Bouteflika's presidency, Ali Benflis had been the prime minister since 2000. Benflis had become highly critical of Bouteflika to such an extent that the leader of the RCD declared the president and the majority party were at "open war."[246] Not surprisingly, Benflis was fired in May 2003. This conflict, and Benflis' ambitions, created a split within the FLN with one group supporting Benflis, the other Bouteflika (Bouandel 2004:1531). In

[244] William Quandt, interview with author, May 2011.

[245] This is a widespread opinion about Bouteflika during the 1999 and 2004 elections, namely that he did in fact have popular support for his promises to bring peace and stability through amnesty and national reconciliation.

[246] Farid Alilat et N. Sebti, "Said Sadi A Liberte," *Liberte*, 16 Oct 2003, pg. 5.

addition, Benflis was later encouraged to run against Bouteflika by certain members of the military.[247] Benflis was considered Bouteflika's strongest challenger and received open support from two powerful retired generals (Rachid Benyelles and Khaled Nezzar) who had also both spoken out against Bouteflika.

Rumors of conflict between the military and Bouteflika had surfaced prior to the 2002 election. The tension arose over the amnesty agreement and Bouteflika's attempts to civilianize power by reconcentrating power in the presidency. While Bouteflika was the army's candidate in 1999, "he soon found himself in a tug-of-war with the general command which, along with part of the Algerian political establishment, was wary of his own strong authoritarian ambitions" (Werenfels 2007:58). Bouteflika viewed the military as threat to him, and rightly so.[248] Both former presidents Chadli and Zéroual had been removed from power for their (unsuccessful) attempts to distance themselves from the military.

The military had opposed amnesty for fear the agreement could expose their activities during the "dirty war," including the use of torture and extrajudicial killings. However, as noted by Le Sueur, "the 1999 law did not mention the role of the Algerian authorities, especially the state security forces. The government had no intention of opening this discussion, or yielding calls for inquiries into crimes committed by the state" (2010:80). Moreover, the second amnesty, the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, made it criminal to "undermine the good reputation of agents who honorably served the country to tarnish the image of Algeria internationally" (in Tlemçani 2008:9). Thus, although the military had opposed the two amnesty agreements, Bouteflika provided a major concession by allowing them impunity and shielding them from prosecution, or even investigation.

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[247] Yahia Zoubir, interview with author, May 2011.

[248] Le Sueur, Interview with author, April 2011.

The military was not the only group opposed to the *concorde civile* and the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Both agreements raised the ire of domestic and international human rights groups, as well as the FFS. The amnesty agreements, according to Le Sueur, "represented a major departure from what is often called the 'truth model' of reconciliation" (79). In 2003, families of the "disappeared" held weekly sit-ins to demand information about their missing family members. Under the amnesty agreement passed in 1999, there would be no investigations into the disappeared nor information released about their remains (Tlemçani 2008:7). In 2007, an uptick in violence raised further criticisms of the new reconciliation charter. From the summer of 2006 to well into 2007, terrorist activity continued to increase, which was, according to Roberts (2007), a "striking—and quite unexpected—recrudescence in terrorist activity" (2). The increase in violence came only months after the new charter for peace and national reconciliation, and thus called into question Bouteflika's public support.

Given the strain between president Bouteflika and the military, and his efforts to distance himself from them, how can we how can we explain Bouteflika's resilience in retaining power? Despite losing an important center of power in terms of the military, and even part of the FLN, Bouteflika retained support from a number of other groups, including the RND, MSP, the UGTA, the dissidents of the FLN, and the Zaouïas (religious brotherhoods). Bouteflika also continued to consolidate further ties with international community[249] and he was the favored candidate of Western powers. According to Szmolka (2006), "his re-election was legitimized, especially by the USA and France. These two countries hurried to congratulate Bouteflika, even before the Algerian Constitutional Council officially declared him the PR [president]" (53).

[249] For example, in 2003 via International Military Education and Training program, Algeria received $600,000, receiving only $30,000 in 2002 (Entelis 2005:544).

The forced retirement of several high-ranking members of the military, such as General Mohammed Lamari, in the summer of 2004, was an important indicator of Bouteflika's efforts to restore power to the presidency.[250] Moreover, Bouteflika did retain the support from the powerful Department of Intelligence and Security headed by Mohammed Modiène ("Toufik"). Furthermore, notes Werenfels, Bouteflika was credited with a victory over armed Islamist groups, and this gave him the ability withstand potential crises despite his stand against the military:

> The principle reason for Bouteflika's emergence as a powerful and (somewhat) independent actor and a decideur, however, was the fact that he was credited nationally and internationally with having put an end to much of the violence by armed (Islamist) groups and with having relieved Algeria of the international isolation that developed during the civil war…Overall Bouteflika managed to overcome what Martinez (2003:17) so poignantly termed l'embargo moral'. This can be seen as a main reason for the army not being able to dispose of him despite increasing divergences (2007:58).

The credit that Bouteflika received in the international arena also presented the military with unexpected benefits. After 9/11 Algeria became a US ally in the War on Terror and through its closer cooperation with the US, and NATO, the military received aid, training and modern equipment. Moreover, the military enjoys an unlimited budget and control over "much of the country's economy" (Cavatorta 2009:178). These gains are associated with Bouteflika, as the military interprets these opportunities as the product of his good relations with other world leaders, and his international reputation. In the eyes of the military: "he has fulfilled his task of making Algeria accepted and acceptable abroad" (178).

In sum, it is clear that the two elections of 2004 and 2007, as in the preceding elections of 1999 and 2002, took place under the cloud of socioeconomic unrest. By 2007, the situation in Kabylia had stabilized somewhat, but was replaced by a new

[250] Since he took office in 1999, as noted by Tlemçani (2008), "Bouteflika gradually replaced senior officers with people loyal to him and reduced the military's political role. The April 2004 elections demonstrated that he had largely succeed" (13).

security challenge in the form of a resurgence in terrorist attacks. Although there was dissent within Bouteflika's own ranks, he was not as vulnerable as it first might appear: the military, much of the general public, and even the international community, had given him credit for a victory over terrorism, and for drawing Algeria back into world affairs. In the next section, we will try to understand why the opposition parties adapted different strategies, and why we observe the FFS boycotting both the 2004 and 2007 elections.

7.3.2 Why the Divergence in Opposition Strategies?

The FFS boycotted both the 2004 presidential and 2007 legislative elections. It continued to insist, as in previous boycotts, that the regime had failed to resolve the broader socioeconomic crisis and that any elections could not be held freely and fairly.[251] The RCD, a party that also boycotted the 1999 and 2002 elections, returned to participation in 2004, and participated again in 2007. In 2004, while still recognizing the continuation of the crisis, the RCD returned to participation because the elections, according to leader Saïd Sadi, presented an opportunity for the country to "exit the crisis if fundamental changes accompany the election."[252] Given that both parties boycotted the 1999 and 2002 elections, how can we explain the divergence in strategies for these two parties in the later elections?

The strongest explanation for the divergence in strategies between the parties is that the FFS is the only "true" opposition party.[253] According to Addi (2009), there are six parties on the "political scene": the FLN, RND, MSP, MNR, FFS, and RCD (14). Of the six, the FLN, RND and MSP comprise the presidential coalition, and are not opposition parties. Furthermore, both Islamist parties, the MSP and MNR, are actually allies of the regime. The remaining parties, notes Addi, "are sometimes solicited only for

[251] Interview with author, April 2011. Bouandel also notes that Aït Ahmed was offered the presidency in 1992, but refused.

[252] Arab Chih, "Pourquoi Sadi est candidat," *Liberte*, 10 Jan 2004, pg 3.

[253] Roberts (2007) refers to the FFS as the "principled" opposition, Bouandel does not consider either the PT or the RCD to be "proper" opposition (interview with author, April 2011).

reinforcing the pluralist image of the regime" (Addi 2009:10). Louisa Hanoune's Workers Party (PT), for examples, is considered by many to one such party. Bouandel considers the PT to be in "the pocket of regime" and Louisa Hanoune to be a token figure for the outside world (i.e. a superficial indicator of women's progress in Algeria).[254] In 1999, she failed to obtain the minimum number of signatures required to qualify to for the presidential race. In 2004 she did qualify to run for president, but several others who had qualified in 1999, notably Mouloud Hamrouche and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, did not. This has led many people to speculate that she received help from the regime. According to Bouandel, the regime gave local governments strict instructions to help her get the required 75,000 signatures in 24 departments.[255]

The RCD, despite seeming to oscillate between ally and opposition, has essentially been co-opted by the regime. Although the RCD is often referred to as the rival Berber party to the FFS in Kabylia, its leader—Saïd Sadi—lacks the national respect commanded by Aït Ahmed. After boycotting the presidential elections in 1999, the RCD supported Bouteflika's *concorde civile* and campaigned for its supporters to vote "yes" in the September 1999 referendum. This campaign in favor of amnesty was unusual given what Addi calls the RCD's "virulent anti-Islamism" (8).[256] The party later joined the governing coalition and was even offered two ministerial portfolios "in exchange for his [Saïd Sadi's] support for repression and violations of human rights" (9). Only after the unrest in Kabylia began in April 2001 did the RCD withdraw from the government apparently "afraid of cutting itself off definitively from what it considered to be its potential stronghold" (9).

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[254] Interview with author, April 2011.

[255] Interview with author, April 2011.

[256] According to Bouandel (2003), "had political parties been required to declare a commitment to democratic principles and compromise on their positions towards particular issues, as in Spain for example, parties such as FIS and the RCD would never had been legalised" (10). The RCD also declined to participate in the Saint Egidio meetings for peace and "engaged in conflict with the opposition rather than concentrating on opposition the regime itself" (14).

Commenting on political parties in Algeria, Addi (2009) states, "the system of parties has been fashioned in such a way that it is integrated into the regime and not the society" (15). The FFS, however, refuses to be integrated—it "refuses any flirtation with the pouvoir."[257] The FFS is the oldest opposition party in Algeria. Established in 1963 by Hocine Aït Ahmed, who remains the leader to this day. It was forced underground after only two years in 1965, but continued to operate clandestinely until finally becoming a legal party in 1989. Illegal or legal, the party "remains loyal to the ideals, the political ethic and the intellectual honesty of its founders."[258] "It rejects the established order" and continues to "pleads for the advent of the second republic."[259] According to Bouandel, the FFS has always been a party of the opposition and has always held the same view towards participation, makings its decision to boycott the four elections under study consistent with the predictions of the model.[260]

The FFS was one of the only groups to oppose the military takeovers in 1962 and 1992, and was the "only legal party that demanded the return of the army to the barracks" after the 1992 coup (Addi 2009:8). Again, it was the only party to denounce the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation and, as stated by Karim Tabou of the FFS, "the only party to organize a debate on the charter for peace and reconciliation to call attention to the perversion of the text."[261] The party has consistently opposed economic reforms (liberalization and privatization) implemented by the government, and it has cited the

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[257] M.A.O., "Le FFS ou l'opposition sans concession our système," *El* Watan, 4 April 2006. Front page.

[258] Ghada Hamrouche, "43 ans après sa creation: une opposition nommé FFS," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 7.

[259] M.A.O., "Le FFS ou l'opposition sans concession our système," *El* Watan, 4 April 2006. Front page.

[260] Interview with author, April 2011. Bouandel notes that even in 2007, the attitude of the FFS was the same: elections cannot be held freely and fairly under such conditions (i.e. under the "crisis"). Interestingly, Bouandel also notes that Aït Ahmed was offered the presidency in 1992, but refused as the FFS opposed the military takeover.

[261] Ghada Hamrouche, "Entretien avec Karim Tabou," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 8.

proposed hydrocarbon law as a prime example of how the regime is depriving the Algerian citizens of their country's riches.[262]

For its position as the one true opposition, the party has attracted the hostility of the regime causing the party to endure large hardships.[263] Karim Tabou, spokesman of the FFS, notes, "Since 1999, the *pouvoir* has not ceased its attacks against the FFS, notably in regards to its policy propositions."[264] In his words,

> This war against the party against the backdrop of ambient violence will end up killing the Algerian dream and any possible political alternative. We refuse to let the dream be confiscated. We will fight so that Algerians can continue to dream. This is why the FFS is a permanent target of the *pouvoir*, which tries periodically to foment internal crises within the party.[265]

A second explanation for the divergence in strategies adopted by the FFS and the RCD is the FFS does not view parliament in the same way as the IAF in Jordan. On the FFS' decision to boycott the 2007 elections, journalist Ali Bahmane asserted, "The price of a empty chair is the lack of a voice."[266] The FFS, however, does not seem to agree. The party does not feel its absence from parliament really penalizes them in the same way the IAF concluded. The FFS operated clandestinely for close over 20 years, remaining active enough to win close to 25% of the vote in the first round of the 1991 legislative elections. This ability of the party to remain viable and competitive despite its absence from parliament is argued by Karim Tabou:

> If we should slip away and artificial institutions remain closed to the population, we can not be that confident. We must remember that the FFS has traditions. Living 24 years underground, is not to say we have gone. After 1989, there were

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[262] Ghada Hamrouche, "Entretien avec Karim Tabou," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 8.

[263] James Le Sueur, Interview with author, April 2011.

[264] Ghada Hamrouche, "Entretien avec Karim Tabou," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 8. In particular, Tabou discusses the policy of national reconciliation, which the *pouvoir* "seized to give birth to reconciliation 'amnesia.'"

[265] Ghada Hamrouche, "43 ans après sa creation: une opposition nommé FFS," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 7.

[266] Ali Bahmane, "Les choix du FFS," *El Watan*, 12 March 2007.

> polls in which we were not involved, but this did not prevent the party from expanding and having a wider audience.

One potential reason for the differing assessments of the benefits to being in parliament is that the FFS is active, and influential, in communes and state assemblies. In 2006, the FFS had 890 elected deputies across the country.[267] "Of all the elections in which it took part in Kabylia, the FFS has always emerged victorious. With the exception of the 1997 legislative elections when it was forced to share the 14 deputies with its rival, the RCD, the party of Aït Ahmed has dominated all other elections."[268]

Not only is the party active, but also influential at the local level, the following proclamations are typical of their independence: "We were the only ones to hold a vote inside the state Assemblies to support the Lebanese people [after 2006 war with Israel] and send them aid. In brief, we have done our best to exist on a constrained political scene."[269] Furthermore, the party seems to privilege local elections over legislative elections as a way to be close to the population. After boycotting the 2007 legislative elections, the party participated in the local elections for communes and state assemblies only several months later. The party appears to have determined that it is best to focus its "investments in the national democratic landscape" on local elections rather than legislative elections (i.e. biases local over legislative elections).[270] In short, one reason the costs of its absence from the national parliament is lower is that the state assemblies and communes appear to supplement the role of parliament in keeping the party close to its supporters. Thus, their absence from parliament does not appear increase its costs to triggering as the IAF felt its absence had between 1997 and 2003.

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[267] M.A.O., "Le FFS ou l'opposition sans concession our système," *El* Watan, 4 April 2006. Front page.

[268] Ahmed Benabi, "Les partielles en Kabylie: Le FFS," *La Dépeche Kabylie*, 20 October 2005. pg. 2.

[269] Ghada Hamrouche, "Entretien avec Karim Tabou," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 8.

[270] "La participation aux échéances électorales de 2007 demeure liée aux resolutions du congrès." Abdelhalim Benyelles. *La Tribune*. 18 November 2006. Pg. 14. Also , "It [the FFS] is suspected to privilege this vote [local elections] over the legislative elections as it sees the only way to ensure that the placing its self in an elected body (Ali Bahmane, "Les choix du FFS," *El Watan*, 12 March 2007)

A second potential reason for the differing assessment of the importance of parliament may stem from the decreased benefits of being in parliament in Algeria. Unlike Jordan, Algeria has never lifted its state of emergency. In Jordan martial law was lifted in 1991 before the second elections in 1993.[271] Moreover, under Bouteflika the presidency has become increasingly authoritarian and the already constitutionally limited power of the parliament has diminished in practice. In 2007, the FFS said it would not participate because the vote is staged, the citizens are absent, and the Assembly is a rubber stamp.[272] In addition to reducing the military's role in politics, Bouteflika has "asserted his primacy over other components of the political system. The stature of the country's parliament was correspondingly diminished, and it was increasingly viewed as a rubber stamp for approving presidential policies" (Zisenwine 2007:2). A recent indication of Bouteflika's imposition over the parliament is that in 2008 he amended the constitution so he could run for a third term, thereby slowly inching closer to status a president for life.

Unlike other parties, the FFS no longer considers elections as a political priority. The party, according to the head of the important FFS section in Sétif, "will continue to represent a force (*force de proposition*) with its presence on the ground 'close to civil society', but without dealing with the coalition parties in the *pouvoir* and their 'sham democracy' project."[273]

7.4 Conclusion

The case study of Algeria raises some interesting questions about the assumptions of the model and encourage its extension. First, the presidential elections of 1999 and

[271] It is unclear whether this in fact would be a factor as the king in Jordan retains extensive executive powers, including the right to rule by decree.

[272] Ali Bahmane, "Les choix du FFS," *El Watan*, 12 March 2007.

[273] Abdelhalim Benyelles, "La participation aux écheances électorales de 2007 demeure lié aux résolutions du congrès," *La Tribune*, 18 November 2006, pg. 14.

2004 raise a question about whether individual centers of power are in fact sufficient. That is, the only way to lose power is to lose the support of all *K* centers of power, and to sustain its rule, a regime only needs to retain the support of at least one of the *K* centers of power. According to statements made by the RCD, the party chose to boycott the 1999 presidential election, in part, because Bouteflika was the "consensus candidate." More specifically, it was clear to the RCD, as well as the other candidates, that Bouteflika was the chosen candidate of the military. In contrast to 1999, in the 2004 election there was open conflict between the military and Bouteflika. One of the reasons, according to Saïd Sadi, the RCD participated in the 2004 presidential election was the lack of a consensus candidate.[274] Given that an individually sufficient center of power supported Bouteflika in 1999, why did the RCD choose to boycott? By 2004, Bouteflika appeared to have lost the support of not only the military but also the support of half the FLN (another center of power).

The RCD appeared in 2004 to also believe that the support of Bouteflika from two additional centers of power (the public and foreign partners) was tenuous. From an interview with the leader of the RCD prior to the election, Saïd Sadi stated,

> I know, not having the respect and esteem of his fellow citizens, the president is trying to engender respectability by manipulating the authority of our [foreign] partners. A good way to assess the credibility of a government is to evaluate foreign direct investments, excluding hydrocarbons. They are virtually nil under President Bouteflika.[275]

Thus, the RCD participated in an election which, *ceteris paribus*, the model would have predicted a boycott (increase in λ, the failure rate).

The first explanation outlined in Section 7.3 to account for the RCD's choices is that the RCD is not in fact an opposition party. Another potential explanation suggested by the remarks of the RCD is that the "presidential election is not like the legislative and

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[274] A.Bahmane et A. Merad, "Entretien avec Said Sadi," *El Watan*, 23 Feb 2004, pg. 2.

[275] "Entretien avec Said Sadi. A.Bahmane et A. Merad, 23 Feb 2004, *El Watan,* pg 2.

local elections. It is a contract between the candidate and the people".[276] In other words, perhaps presidential and legislative elections are different games.[277] In an interview on why the RCD chose to participate in the 2004 poll after boycotting the 2002 legislative elections, Saïd Sadi replied, "Be serious. The absence of a region will not prevent a presidential election. Except for wanting to give a boost to Bouteflika, a regional boycott means nothing in this kind of poll."[278]

The decision to boycott is of course driven by parameters other than λ and ρ (the legitimacy parameters), namely C_t and x_O. It is possible therefore that the RCD's shift in strategies across the two presidential elections was not primarily driven by λ and ρ, which appears to largely drive the IAF's and FFS' strategic choices, but by changes in the costs of trigger and ideological divergence. In 1999, the RCD conditioned its participation on changes in electoral law and guarantees to ensure the free and fair conduct of the elections. Prior to the 2004 elections, the election law was changed reducing the number of special *bureaux des votes*, including eliminating all army polling stations, allowing international observers to monitor the elections as well as allowing representatives of candidates to be present in polling stations and during the ballot counting process. After the 2004 election in September 2004, Sadi said that there was a crackdown on the opposition and its activities, suggesting an increase in its cost of triggering a crisis. He said, "The administrative and political repression that has affected our members, punishes the opposition in its most elementary activities….The media censorship, which is stifling all dissenting voices, is backed by social and economic pressures."[279]

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[276] "Pourquoi Sadi est candidat" Arab Chih, 10 Jan 2004, Liberte, pg 3.

[277] That is, presidential and legislative elections follow different logic, perhaps due to the winner-take-all nature of the presidential race (i.e. there can only be one president).

[278] "Entretien avec Said Sadi. A.Bahmane et A. Merad, 23 Feb 2004, *El Watan*, pg 2.

[279] Université d'été du RCD", El Watan, Am. H. 4 September 2004, pg 3

The case of Algeria also raises an interesting point about C_t. One thing that characterizes the case of Algeria, as opposed to Jordan, is the lower costs of mobilization. In Algeria, civil society is uncommonly vibrant relative to its regional neighbors (lowering the costs of mobilization). Bellin (2005) notes, "Low levels of popular mobilization are a reality in the MENA region. They lower the costs of repression for the coercive apparatus and increase the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to force to thwart reform initiatives" (35). The strength of Algerian civil society is reflected in the number of strikes, sit-ins, marches and demonstrations organized and carried out in Algeria (and not just in the major cities) throughout the period under study. The demonstrations throughout Algeria following the killing of Guermah Massinissa are a strong testament to Algeria's high level of mobilization and strong civil society.

In addition, Algeria has a relatively free press (again relative to regional standards) despite the curbing of press freedoms since Bouteflika took office. The press regularly criticizes the government, the army and the elites, as well as its handling of sensitive issues such as the Kabylia uprising. Moreover, the local and national activities of political parties are regularly reported in both the national and local media. As noted by Addi (2009), "The political influence of these social groups [the non-Islamist parties] does not stem from their numbers but rather from their functions in the administration, the public sector, and the press, where they have great visibility" (7). Entelis emphasizes the unique vibrancy of civil society in Algeria.[280] Moreover, he notes that the social, economic and political conditions facing a majority of Algerians—the youths—have made ripe the population for mobilization:

> Such conditions of political oppression, social marginalization, economic deprivation, and cultural alienation, whether perceived or real, have created a wide-ranging landscape of disaffected young people ever ready to engage in militant activity often catalyzed by religious invocation and Islamist appeal,

[280] John Entelis, interview with author, April 2011.

> inspiring, among the most fanatical among them, a sense of martyrdom justifying the use of terror including suicide bombing (2005:538-539).

The high level of mobilization evident in Algeria appears to lower the upper bound of C_t compared to other countries in the region, particularly Jordan.[281] This may be one reason why we observe more boycotts in Algeria compared to the case of Jordan.

Although the case of Algeria seemed, at first glance, to challenge the model, our analysis reveals that the FFS is the one "true" opposition party. Nevertheless, the case of Algeria raises questions about how the existence of multiple opposition parties would influence the decision to adopt particular strategies (e.g. to boycott, participate, trigger). For example, if the Ennahda party boycotted, perhaps its supporters would choose to vote for another Islamic party (e.g. the MSP), rather than choosing to boycott.[282] The existence of multiple opposition parties would likely, as suggested by Lust-Okar (2005), influence the costs of triggering a crisis to the opposition. Lust-Okar further argues that multiple opposition parties will not only affect the costs but also the willingness of particular opposition groups to mobilize against the regime. In other words, relaxing the unified opposition assumption might affect the costs, and likelihood of success, of triggering a crisis. Moreover, multiple opposition parties could also affect the willingness of particular opposition groups to adopt more confrontational strategies, such as boycotting an election and triggering a crisis.

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[281] A member of the Wihda party noted that the teachers' strikes in 2010 were highly unprecedented in Jordan (see Chapter 6).

[282] This issue of course relates back to institutions in that the electoral system influences the number of parties: majoritarian systems (put) strong reductive pressure on the number of parties (Duverger's law and hypothesis). This, however, also raises issues of war of attrition nature of candidate entry and exit decision.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

On October 30, 1974 in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Muhammad Ali beat George Foreman for the heavyweight title. The fight defied expectations in many respects. Most thought Ali would lose. George Foreman was not only the reigning heavyweight champion but was stronger, younger and punched harder. During the fight Ali used a seemingly "irrational" strategy: the "rope-a-dope." In the second round, when he went to the ropes all onlookers assumed this was the end of Ali. For three rounds Muhammad Ali stayed against the ropes using the strength of the ropes to endure Foreman's punches. By the middle of the fifth round Foreman was tired. It was at this moment that Ali began to fight back and everyone "suddenly realized there was design in this madness."[283] Ali had a strategy. In the eighth round, Foreman went down.

What I like about this perhaps "indecent" analogy, as Slovaj Zizek might call it, is its lesson for how we interpret the decisions and strategies of actors, and specifically, in regard to opposition behavior in electoral authoritarian regimes. To seasoned observers of the Ali-Foreman fight, the decision of Ali to go to the ropes, and stay there for multiple rounds, could not have been intentional, and if it was intentional, it was only because "the fix was in." It was only after Ali came off the ropes in the fifth, and ultimately knocked out Foreman in the eighth, did the realization settle on observers that Ali had made a strategic decision. By staying against the ropes, Ali had tired out a bigger, stronger and younger boxer.

For some, opposition participation in authoritarian elections is like the "rope-a-dope;" others consider boycotting to be such a strategy. Election behavior in authoritarian elections, and in particular the strategies of opposition parties, have long been dismissed as unimportant and meaningless. As Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) describe, authoritarian

[283] *When we Were Kings*, dir. by Leon Gast (1996; Gramercy Pictures).

elections, much like Ali's decision to go to the ropes, are "often understood as a monolithic, infrequent phenomenon somewhat incompatible with stable dictatorship." Gandhi and Lust, however, continue, arguing that, "a cursory examination of the practice of such elections around the world reveals a very different picture" (404). One of the main contributions of this dissertation is its provision of an explanation for why rational actors would participate in authoritarian elections *and* why these same actors would also boycott. The dissertation underscores Gandhi and Lust's point showing that upon systematic examination we can, in fact, make meaningful inferences about the significance of the opposition strategies of participation and boycott.

A statement from Rohile Gharaibeh of the IAF further underscores this contribution. Commenting on the IAF's decision to participate in the 2007 legislative elections, he explains that participation was not necessarily the "preferred" option, but it was the best option given the conditions for the party. He notes, "It was only an option imposed on us at this time and it does not necessarily expression our satisfaction. The same was true in 2003. All experiences are different."[284]

This dissertation adopts a non-traditional definition of legitimacy outlined by Stinchcombe (1968). This definition conceptualizes legitimacy as the probability a regime will receive support from a sufficient set of centers of power when its authority is challenged. Using Stinchcombe's definition, this dissertation demonstrates that not only should political scientists *not* abandon the concept of legitimacy, but also that legitimacy is fundamental to understanding the strategic choices of opposition parties in authoritarian elections.

Incorporating Stinchcombe's definition into a formal model of political opposition, this dissertation provides a framework for explaining the opposition's choice of strategies. It also identifies the set of conditions under which we expect the opposition to

[284] Interview with author, November 2010.

adopt these particular strategies, and the government to reform following an election boycott. Although the focus of the dissertation was the opposition's decision to participate or boycott, the model developed is a more general theory of opposition politics, allowing us to understand when opposition groups will mobilize against the regime and why such mobilizations will sometimes result in dramatic change.

The dissertation began considering authoritarian elections, and the dilemma such elections pose for opposition parties, in addition to the puzzle authoritarian elections present to political scientists. In particular, it focused on the role of regime legitimacy on the strategic decisions of the opposition. Using a strategy – boycotting – that occurs predominately in authoritarian regimes, this dissertation illuminates how legitimacy influences party strategy. The value of the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3 was most clearly illustrated in the analysis of elections and opposition strategies in Jordan and Algeria.

The application of the formal model to the cases of Jordan and Algeria provides an explanation for the recent strategy choices of the opposition in Jordan and Algeria. In Jordan, the dissertation demonstrates how the opposition's shifting perceptions of regime legitimacy drove changes in the strategies it adopted across the five elections studied. In Algeria, the divergence in "opposition" strategies, at first examination, appeared to represent a significant challenge to the theory. Upon closer examination, however, we find that the FFS to be the one "true" opposition party and, as in Jordan, beliefs about the regime's legitimacy were the primary impetus behind the FFS' decision to boycott.

Opposition groups in both Jordan and Algeria emphasized how the propensity to boycott may shift over time according to such "conditions." In particular, the opposition in both countries made reference to the social, economic and political "crises" facing their countries at the time the decisions to boycott the elections were taken. For example, Hammam Saeed, a leader in the IAF, notes that the decision to boycott the 2010 legislative

elections was taken "in light of the political, economic and social crisis in Jordan."[285] Similarly, speaking on the decision to boycott, Ahmed Djeddaï of the FFS in Algeria states, "Just because we boycotted one time, does not mean we will always boycott. Politics is the consideration of the evolution of the situation."[286]

Legitimacy has been a central concept used to explain a wide-range of political behaviors and, importantly, the stability of regimes. As succinctly put by Brynen et al (1995), "Every political elite needs of a basis of legitimacy" (209). While regime legitimacy has been an important object of study in political science, a "universally accepted" definition has thus far remained elusive (2001). Although I do not contend to have provided such a definition, this dissertation has shown the value in expanding our conceptualization of legitimacy beyond public support. Specifically, the use of Stinchcombe's definition has allowed us to explain the behavior of both governments and the opposition in authoritarian regimes across time and across countries. Moreover, identifying a regime's set of sufficient centers of power and tracking how their willingness to aid the regime changes overtime, we can better understand not only the opposition's behavior, but also the behavior of the regime, and ultimately its legitimacy. As such, this dissertation offers new insights in to the remarkable stability of the authoritarian regimes and the Middle East.

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[285] Interview with author, October 2010. Similarly, According to a member of the Wihda party: "The people are currently suffering worse economic and social conditions, and the absence of prospects for political and economic reforms; so we are now witnessing a real and serious crisis facing the people. And this crisis requires this stance [a boycott]" (Interview with author, October 2010).

[286] Hamid Saïdani et Lyes Bendaoud, "Entretien avec Ahmed Djeddaï," *Liberte*, 19 Septemebr 2002, pg. 2.

APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF EQUILIBRIA

Equilibrium I: If $\frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \alpha^K$ and $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \alpha^K$, then the following strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium to the game:

1. *O* always Boycotts
2. Both G_I and G_L Reform
3. *O* Triggers a crisis
4. $0 \le \beta \le 1$

Proof of Equilibrium I: Given both government types Reform, posterior beliefs (β) are not constrained by Bayes' Rule. Given this, *O* will weakly prefer to Trigger a crisis when

$$-x_O^2 \le \rho\left[-(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] + (1-\rho)\left[-(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] \Rightarrow C_t \le \lambda^K x_O^2\left[\rho\alpha^K + (1-\rho)\right]$$

By definition $\alpha^K < \bar{\alpha}$ and by assumption $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \alpha^K$. Thus, *O* will strictly prefer Triggering a crisis to Not Triggering a crisis. The Legitimate type will weakly prefer Reform as long as $-\alpha^K\lambda^K - C_t \le -x_R^2$. Since by assumption $\frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda x_O^2} < \alpha^K$, it follows that G_L strictly prefers Reform. Because the failure rate for the Illegitimate type is higher, G_I will also strictly prefer Reform. Thus, the expected payoff of boycotting to *O* is $-(x_R - x_O)^2$.

Equilibrium II: Define $\hat{\alpha}^K = \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2}$, then if $\frac{C_f - x_O^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < 1$ and $\alpha^K < \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \bar{\alpha}$, then the following strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium of the game:

1. *O* always Boycotts
2. G_L always Ignores; G_I Reforms with probability $\sigma = \left(\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}\right)\left(\frac{\hat{\alpha}^K - \alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right)$
3. *O* Triggers a crisis with probability $\tau = \frac{x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2 + C_f}$
4. $0 \le \beta \le 1$, where $\beta = \frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}$

Proof of Equilibrium II: *O* will be indifferent between Triggering and Not Triggering a crisis when

$$-x_O^2 = \beta\left[-(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] + (1-\beta)\left[(-(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] \Rightarrow \beta = \left(\frac{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}{1-\alpha^K}\right).$$

Illegitimate types will be indifferent between Reform and Ignore as long as

$$\tau(-\lambda^K x_O^2 - C_f) + (1-\tau)(0) = -x_R^2 \Rightarrow \tau = \frac{x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2 + C_f}.$$

By Bayes' Rule, $\beta = \frac{\rho}{\rho + (1-\rho)\sigma} \Rightarrow \sigma = \frac{\rho(1-\beta)}{(1-\rho)\beta} = \frac{\rho}{1-\rho}\left[\frac{1-\left(\frac{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}{1-\alpha^K}\right)}{\left(\frac{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}{1-\alpha^K}\right)}\right] \Rightarrow$

$$\sigma = \frac{\rho}{1-\rho}\left(\frac{\hat{\alpha}^K - \alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right).$$

Equilibrium III: If $\alpha^K < \frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < 1$ and $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \alpha^K$, then the following strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium of the game:

1. *O* always Boycotts
2. G_I Reforms, G_L Ignores
3. *O* Triggers a crisis
4. $\beta = 1$

Proof of Equilibrium III: Given Legitimate types Ignore and Illegitimate types Reform, posterior beliefs that *O* is facing a Legitimate type after being ignored are thus equal to 1: $\beta = 1$. Given this, we know from Equilibrium I that if $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \alpha^K$, *O* will strictly prefer to Trigger a crisis. An Illegitimate type weakly prefers Reform when $-\lambda^K x_O^2 - C_f \leq -x_R^2$. Since by assumption $1 > \frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2}$, it follows that Illegitimate types strictly prefer reform. Legitimate types weakly prefer Ignore when $-x_R \leq -\alpha^K \lambda^K (x_O^2)$. Since by assumption $\alpha^K < \frac{C_t - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2}$, Legitimate types strictly prefer Ignore to Reform. Thus, *O*'s expected to boycotting is $\rho\left[-(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] + (1-\rho)\left[-(x_R - x_O)^2\right]$.

Equilibrium IV: If $\frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} > \alpha^K$ and $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \bar{\alpha}$, then the following strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium of the game.

1. *O* always Boycotts
2. Both G_I and G_L Ignore
3. *O* Triggers a crisis
4. $\beta = \rho$

Proof of Equilibrium IV: Given both G_I and G_L select Ignore, posterior beliefs equal prior beliefs: $\beta = \rho$. Given this, *O* will weakly prefer Triggering a crisis as long as

$$-x_O^2 \leq \rho\left[-(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] + (1-\rho)\left[-(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] \Rightarrow \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} \leq \rho\alpha^K + (1-\rho) = \bar{\alpha}.$$

Since by assumption, $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \bar{\alpha}$, it follows that *O* strictly prefers to Trigger over doing nothing. The Illegitimate type weakly prefers Ignore when

$-x_R^2 \leq -\lambda^K x_O^2 - C_f \Rightarrow \frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} \geq 1$. By assumption $\frac{C_f - x_R^2}{\lambda^K x_O^2} > 1$, it follows therefore that Illegitimate types strictly prefer Ignore to Reform. Since the failure rate for Legitimate types is strictly less than the failure rate for Illegitimate types, it follows that if Illegitimate types strictly prefer Ignore, Legitimate types strictly prefer Ignore to Reform as well. And thus, *O*'s expected payoff to boycott is

$\rho(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 + (1-\rho)(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t$.

Equilibrium V: If $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} > \bar{\alpha}$, then the following strategies and beliefs characterize an equilibrium of the game:

1. *O* always Participates
2. Both G_I and G_L Ignore
3. *O* chooses Not Trigger
4. $\beta = \rho$.

Proof of Equilibrium V: Given both types of governments select Ignore, posterior beliefs are equal to prior beliefs: $\beta = \rho$. Given this, *O* will weakly prefer to not trigger a crisis as long as $-x_O^2 \geq \rho\left[-(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] + (1-\rho)\left[-(1-\lambda^K)x_O^2 - C_t\right] \Rightarrow C_t \geq \lambda^K x_O^2 \bar{\alpha}$

Since by assumption $\frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} > \bar{\alpha}$, it follows that *O* will strictly prefer to Not Trigger a crisis. Given that *O* will strictly prefer Not Trigger, both G_I and G_L prefer Ignore since 0 (the payoff to ignoring) is always great than $-x_R^2$ (the payoff from reforming). Thus, both types of governments will always Ignore. *O* will then weakly prefer Participation to Boycott when $-\pi x_O^2 \geq -x_O^2 \Rightarrow \pi \leq 1$. By definition $\pi < 1$, therefore, *O* strictly prefers to Participate. It follows from this result that there is no equilibria in which *O* selects Not Trigger *and* Boycott.

Proposition 1: If $\pi > \rho\left[\frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right]$, then every equilibrium in which $\hat{o} = \frac{C_t}{\lambda^K x_O^2} < \bar{\alpha}$ is characterized by the Opposition boycotting.

Proof of Proposition I: The conditions under which *O* will weakly prefer boycotting to participating in the four equilibria (I-IV) are:

1. Equilibrium I: $\pi \geq \frac{(x_R - x_O)^2}{x_O^2}$. Define $\tilde{\pi} = \frac{(x_R - x_O)^2}{x_O^2}$ (2.4)
2. Equilibrium II: $\pi \geq \left[\rho + (1-\rho)\sigma\right] + (1-\rho)(1-\sigma)\tilde{\pi}$ (2.5)
3. Equilibrium III: $\pi \geq \rho(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K) + \frac{\rho C_t}{x_O^2} + (1-\rho)\tilde{\pi}$ (2.6)
4. Equilibrium IV: $\pi \geq \rho(1-\alpha^K\lambda^K) + (1-\rho)(1-\lambda^K) + \frac{C_t}{x_O^2}$ (2.7)

Then, $-\pi x_O^2 < \min\{(2.4),(2.5),(2.6),(2.7)\}$. The minimum is (2.5): the expected utility associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium of Equilibrium II is strictly less than *O*'s expected utility of boycotting from Equilibrium I, Equilibrium III, and Equilibrium IV. If the expect utility of Equilibrium IV is the minimum, we need π to be greater than or equal to:

$\pi \geq [\rho + (1-\rho)\sigma] + (1-\rho)(1-\sigma)\tilde{\pi}$. We know $(1-\rho)(1-\sigma)(x_R - x_O)^2 > x_O^2$ and suppose further that $-\pi x_O^2 \leq -x_O^2[\rho + (1-\rho)\sigma]$ (i.e. the expected utility from boycotting is now less than the minimum). Then, $\pi \geq \rho + (1-\rho)\left[\frac{\hat{\alpha}^K - \alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right]\left[\frac{\rho}{(1-\rho)}\right] \Rightarrow \left[\frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right]\rho$.

Thus, we set $\pi > \left[\frac{1-\alpha^K}{1-\hat{\alpha}^K}\right]\rho$.

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