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Motivating parliament : the policy consequences of party strategy

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MOTIVATING PARLIAMENT:

THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY STRATEGY

by

Zachary David Greene

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Political Science in
the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2012

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Jae-Jae Spoon

Scholars of party strategy and government accountability rarely directly connect the priorities of parties' principals, groups seeking to influence parties, to their theories of electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and policy outputs. I develop a theory of strategic issue balancing that links parties' goals to their behaviors in three areas: electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and government policies. I build on previous theories by focusing on the issues discussed by their principals.

In particular, I conceptualize policy platforms as a balance between parties' policy and electoral goals. I distinguish between statements reflecting these goals by considering the effect of the electoral context on the intra-party groups' policy approach. My theory predicts that party leaders add issues to their electoral platforms when conditions lead intra-party groups to be pragmatic. They decrease the number of issues in the platform when electoral conditions lead intra-party groups to be more ideologically rigid. Parties performing well in the previous election or that expect voters to reward them for their participation in government cause intra-party groups to act more pragmatically. However, these groups become more ideologically rigid when the party lost seats in previous elections or expect punishment for their economic record in office.

Upon taking office, I theorize that parliamentary leaders use procedures that both highlight and constrain information about their policy priorities to build the party's image of accountability with voters. Government leaders limit information to voters on issues important to their ideologically motivated intra-party groups, but protect their image with intra-party groups by discussing information about their policy agenda at the party's national meetings. Finally, I predict that ideologically cohesive governments dedicate greater more laws to the priorities of their intra-party groups than to voters' goals because

intra-party groups have greater information about the government's behavior and can replace party leaders through national congresses more frequently than voters.

I test my theory using a mixed-methods approach. In particular, I test my theory quantitatively in three sections. Using data on 24 countries between 1962 and 2008 from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the OECD, I first predict the number of issues in parties' platforms based on the electoral context. I then use the results from this analysis to predict the application of legislative procedures and the amount of legislation on issues for parties' principals in the French *Assemblée Nationale* from 1978 through 2007 with data from the Comparative Agendas Project. Throughout these large-N analyses I find evidence in favor of the theory; parties' platforms respond to electoral conditions, government leaders use procedures on issues important to both groups and ideologically cohesive governments devote a larger number of laws to intra-party groups.

Finally, following the logic of a nested-analysis, I undertake case studies of the French *Parti Socialiste*'s organizational behavior leading up to elections in 1993 and 1997 and its behavior in office following the 1997 election. I use evidence from news reports, party congress and legislative debates, party newsletters, and personal interviews. The analysis indicates that intra-party groups influence parties' electoral and legislative strategies. The results suggest that intra-party politics hold broad consequences for parties' behavior in office.

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
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Graduate College
The University of Iowa
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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
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PH.D. THESIS
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This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis of

Zachary David Greene

has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of
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To my parents, Gail and Dan.

ABSTRACT

Scholars of party strategy and government accountability rarely directly connect the priorities of parties' principals, groups seeking to influence parties, to their theories of electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and policy outputs. I develop a theory of strategic issue balancing that links parties' goals to their behaviors in three areas: electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and government policies. I build on previous theories by focusing on the issues discussed by their principals.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Assemblée Nationale	AN
Parti Communiste Française	PCF
Parti Socialiste	PS
Rassemblement pour le Republique	RPR
Union pour la Démocratie Française	UDF

CHAPTER 1
STRATEGIC ISSUE BALANCING AND ACCOUNTABIILITY: A
THEORY OF PARY ELECTORAL STRATEGY, GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIVENESS, AND POLICY OUTCOMES

Following French President Jacque Chirac's call for a snap election in 1997, the major political parties in France prepared their political campaigns for elections. Faced with high levels of unemployment, low economic growth and low approval ratings in the polls, the two parties in the governing coalition changed their electoral platforms in opposing ways ("A Tough Time for an Election" 1997); although both the *Rassemblement pour le Republique* (RPR) and the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) moved their policy statements closer towards the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), the RPR decreased the number of issues addressed in its policy platform, while the UDF increased the number of issues addressed in its platform. The primary opposition parties adopted similar strategies; both the *PS* and the *Parti Communiste* (PCF) moderated their policy proposals and drastically reduced the number of issues in their policy platforms (Klingemann et al. 2006).

Leading up to the election, some observers expected the results to be close due to the low approval ratings for the PS and the PCF, despite a weak economy ("Crossed Fingers in France" April 26, 1997). However, the results of the election overwhelmingly benefited the PS at the expense of the governing parties: the RPR and the UDF. In addition to the economic failures of the conservative coalition, many citizens suggested that the government's losses could be blamed on the inability of the conservative prime minister and president to articulate a clear economic policy program, as well as the electorate's general perception that the government's muddled economic austerity-

focused policy program was at odds with many of the goals included its previous electoral platform ("Poor France" June 7, 1997).

Although the post-election commentary provides some direction for explaining the conservative government's electoral strategy and losses, the political science literature suggests additional insight into the government's electoral performance and strategic behavior. For example, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) might explain the governing parties' choice to moderate their policy positions as a strategy to compensate for the government's poor economic performance. Somer-Topcu (2009) would potentially add that the election results were determined by the weak economy because voters likely did not perceive the parties' policy changes in the 1997 election. Scholars of government accountability – the degree to which elected officials uphold their electoral promises in office – would argue that voters choose to punish the conservative government for their inability to grow the economy (Lewis-Beck 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Anderson 2007)

In addition to the insights provided by the post-election commentary and the political science literature, a number of unanswered questions about the 1997 election in France remain. For example, why did the RPR decrease and the UDF increase the number of issues in their campaigns when faced with similar electoral prospects? Similarly, why did the government's economic policy strategy appear muddled or at odds with its previous electoral statements? Further, did the electorate's perceptions of the government's policies match its actual policy activities? In this dissertation, I propose a theory of strategic issue balancing and issue accountability that provides answers to each

of these questions by linking parties' goals for policy and office to their behaviors in three distinct areas: electoral strategy, behavior in parliament and policy outcomes.

I answer these questions by linking intra-party group priorities for policy or office goals to their electoral strategies and platforms. I add to our understanding of party strategy and policy change in cases such as the French parliamentary elections in 1997 by developing a theory focused on the number of issues parties address. In particular, the theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability suggests that the internal distribution of groups in the RPR and the UDF may explain their divergent behavior. Similar to spatial models of party platforms, I contend that party policy platforms reflect both parties' policy and electoral goals. I distinguish between statements that reflect these goals by focusing on parties' projected electoral success and the effect of the electoral context on the types of groups attracted to parties. Parties that performed well in the past or expect to be rewarded for their participation in government expand the number of issues in their platforms to pragmatically attract voters. However, parties that lost seats in previous elections or expect to be punished for their economic record in office focus or narrow their attention to issues important to ideologically motivated groups within the party.

Because intra-party groups can remove party leaders and vote on parties' electoral platforms in national congresses, party leaders construct their electoral platforms to balance the goals of the groups that participate and vote in the party's national meetings. Following from Kitschelt (1989), I distinguish between ideologically pragmatic and rigid intra-party groups. Expecting the policy process to require policy compromises, ideologically pragmatic groups are willing to compromise their policy goals to increase

the party's likelihood of controlling government in the future. Parties that include a greater number of groups that favor more compromise and incremental approaches to policy are also more willing to compromise their policy statements to further strategic electoral goals. Conversely, ideologically rigid groups seek to avoid policy compromises instead favoring ideological purity over incremental policy gains. Parties which have a greater number of ideologically rigid groups will favor less compromise and are less willing to modify their policy statements for electoral purposes. Parties' experience in government, public opinion, and their previous electoral successes determine the types of groups attracted to the parties and thus impact the relative distribution of rigid and compromising intra-party groups. Because party leaders and platforms are chosen from and by intra-party groups at national meetings, party leaders' relative priority for policy or office goals in their electoral campaigns depends not only on their electoral context, but also on the relative number of ideologically rigid and compromising supporters within the party. Therefore, party leaders choose the number of issues in their electoral campaigns to balance the goals and the distribution of intra-party groups.[1]

Following from parties' electoral behavior, I add that parties' relative priorities for policy and office goals also influence their choice between techniques for implementing their platforms in office. The difference between these tactics depends on the amount of information publicized to voter groups. Whereas one legislative method

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[1] The recent literature on political parties and elections has focused a lot of attention on actors balancing their goals. For example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1994) suggest that voters balance parties in office to moderate policy outputs. Kedar (2009) finds that voters choose the parties they support at different levels of government and in coalitions to balance out policy outcomes. Similarly, Spoon (2011) describes the tradeoffs small party leaders face in balancing their goals for policy and votes. My theory adds an additional way that parties seek to balance their goals for policy and office, rather than focusing on only their policy goals or their office goals.

may encourage debate and media attention, the other discourages public discourse. On the one hand, party leaders use procedures that encourage an image of policy accountability on issues voters support because voters have otherwise limited information about government policies, but are necessary to win elections. On the other hand, party leaders limit public discourse on policies supported by intra-party groups to minimize voters' negative reaction because intra-party groups have additional information about government policies due to their relative proximity to party leaders. From this perspective, the electorate's unclear image of the French government's policies prior to the 1997 election was a product of the government's policy-making strategy.

Finally, I link parties' electoral behavior and approach to policy-making to the policies that governing parties pass. In particular, governing parties' policy strategies may free the government to focus its legislative resources on issues favored by the intra-party groups while minimizing the negative reputational impacts of addressing these policies among supportive voters. Government policies should be weighted more towards the priorities of the intra-party groups relative to voters because these groups have greater information and ability to punish government leaders for their policies. Ultimately, I expect that most of the policies the French government passed prior to the 1997 election pertained to issues important to the parties' activists and not the issues most important to voters.

In this chapter, I develop my theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability and describe my approach for testing the theory. I begin by outlining a principal-agent framework connecting parties and their principals to parties' behavior both in and out of parliament. Following from a discussion of political parties and

accountability, I consider links between parties' electoral strategies and their party platforms. I then discuss the theory in three primary sections as the theory relates to party platforms, party behavior in parliament and policy outcomes. In the first of these sections, I focus on the number of issues in party policy platforms as a balance between potential benefits offered to the multiple groups seeking to influence parties' behavior. In this section, I propose a set of hypotheses connecting electoral conditions to the number of issues parties address by considering parties' strategies for attracting and mobilizing potentially supportive voters or rewarding the party's activists. The discussion of party platforms and electoral strategies then leads into the propositions for parties' policy-making strategies. In the second major section, I consider the principal agent framework and the policy-making strategies that parties in government use to increase or limit information about the implementation of their policy platforms to voters. In the final major section, I propose a set of hypotheses in the third section that link the effect of competing principals', voter and intra-party groups, knowledge of the policy process to the distribution of laws of parties' create in government. I conclude the chapter by discussing my research design to test the hypotheses on party strategies in the electorate and in government using a cross-national analysis of 24 OECD countries from 1962-2008 and a case study of French parliamentary behavior from 1978-2007.

<div align="center">Political Parties and Accountability</div>

Political parties are involved in principal-agent relationships with voters and other groups that try to influence the behavior of the party's elected officials. Previous scholars using a principal-agent approach theorize that an actor (the principal) seeks to influence the behavior of some other political actor (the agent) (Lupia and McCubbins 1994, 1998

and 2000; Lupia 1998; Carey 2009). Agents are considered accountable to their principal if they act in a manner consistent with the preferences of the principal. Moreover, agents act accountably if they share similar preferences with their principals, there are negative costs associated with deviating from the principals' preferences and if the principal is able to clearly monitor the agent's behavior (Carey 2009).

According to many principal-agent accounts of government policy, political parties work to maintain an image of accountability in office because they seek to win elections in the future. Consistent with the definition used by previous studies of policy representation, I define accountability as the degree to which parties as agents act in accordance with their principals' goals (Carey 2009). Since voters primarily value policy goals, they will not vote for a party they believe is untrustworthy regardless of the party's policy statements or electoral strategies. Models of party strategy and voting behavior generally assume that parties produce policies consistent with their electoral promises or the goals of their constituents upon winning office so that they might win future elections (Downs 1957; Carey 2009). In this dissertation, I seek to better understand government accountability by exploring parties' strategies for attracting voters, for constructing an image of policy accountability with voters and for allocating their legislative resources in office on issues they include in their electoral platforms.

Previous studies of party accountability use a comparable approach focusing instead on the relative difference in the location of parties' preferences, but ignore the types of issues the parties address and the relative importance parties give to each issue. According to these accounts, individual citizens vote for the party with policy preferences closest to their own with the expectation that they will develop policies that reflect those

preferences in office (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 2001). Once in office, governing parties theoretically develop policies in line with voters' preferences to avoid a negative reputation (Downs 1957). Voters then punish unaccountable parties in the next election by voting for an alternative party (Lewis-Beck 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Carey 2009). Based on this simple account of party and voter behavior, scholars suggest a number of factors that complicate this relationship including multiple principals (Carey 2009), unclear policy signals (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999) and uninformed voters with weak control mechanisms (Lupia and McCubbins 1994; 1998 and 2000).

Treating parties as unitary agents, multiple principals may seek to influence the party and legislators including voters, party leaders, popularly elected executives, and multiple branches of the party in multi-level systems. As a primary component of a democracy, voters choose between parties at regular intervals in elections. The link between voters and parties has been greatly studied provoking debate over the degree to which voters delegate or abdicate their authority to parties (Lupia and McCubbins 1994, 1998, and 2000, Lupia 2003, Carey 2009, Samuels and Shugart 2010). Scholars also study party leaders' ability to control representatives that might vote against the party's policies in parliament. They find that party leaders are more successful in parliamentary systems and when they have greater control over the selection of the party's electoral candidates (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 2000).

Building on studies that only consider the influence of voters on party behavior, Carey (2009) provides evidence that popularly elected presidents and multi-leveled party

structures exert influence on legislators and the party leadership to follow their policy priorities in office. Carey's (2009) addition of multi-leveled party structures for systems with federal or multiple levels of governance incorporates multiple, conflicting principles within the party structure. However, he does not directly account for the influence of intra-party factions that are divided over policy preferences or issue emphasis on party leaders' behavior. Intra-party variation in policy goals occurs even at the level of the party leadership, and shifts in the dominance of intra-party factions or groups may lead to changes in the party's policy platform (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003). As an important influence on party platforms, I theorize that these intra-party factions also seek to influence party leaders' behavior.

Therefore, these studies indicate that party leaders have multiple principles seeking to influence their behavior in elections and in government. In this dissertation, I focus on the ability of voters and intra-party groups to influence party platforms, parliamentary behavior and policy. Under contexts with multiple principals, agents may be able to play principals off of each other to achieve the agent's distinct goals. While party leaders may be able to play voters and intra-party groups against each other, party leaders primarily motivated to win elections generally balance the goals of their principals. In particular, party leaders propose policy platforms expressing preferences that will maximize their votes while not alienating party activists and supporters necessary to mobilize for elections (Schofield and Sened 2006). In addition, party leaders may reward their principals with policy when they have enough information to punish or reward the party leadership (Carey 2009).

In principal-agent models, the need for a principal to monitor an agent is limited when the principal and agent have similar preferences, but becomes important when their preferences diverge (Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Voters generally face the choice of parties with preferences that diverge from their own (Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Although they must choose between parties with more extreme preferences, voters expect that the party they vote for will not be capable of fully attaining its policy goals in office (Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Kedar 2005). Because party leaders seek to accommodate both voters and intra-party groups with their statements of policy preferences, models of party policy change and stability suggest the mechanisms party leaders use, as agents, to balance the preferences of their competing principals. In the following section, I further discuss the relationship between party policy statements and electoral strategy.

Electoral Strategy and Party Policy

Scholars first explored the link between electoral strategy and party policy following Downs' (1957) theoretical proposal that parties use policy as a product to sell to voters. Based on the median voter theorem (Black 1948), Downs argued that the preferences of office-motivated parties competing in single member district electoral systems with two parties should converge towards the position of the median voter because the parties require the median voter's support to win an election. According to Downs, party preferences should not converge under proportional electoral rules or when there are more than two parties in single member district elections.

Since Downs' theoretical contribution, scholars have explored the relationship between party policy and electoral strategy finding that parties do not usually converge

on the median voter in most contexts. For example, Wittman (1973) suggests that policy motivated parties generally do not converge to the position of the median voter even if the parties seek to control office instrumentally to pass policies. Similarly, Adams (1999) indicates that even vote motivated parties should not converge on the median voter in contexts with more than two candidates or parties. Adams and Merrill (1999) demonstrate empirically that parties do not converge on the ideological center in proportional elections.

In addition, scholars have considered the dynamic contexts under which parties shift their policy preferences rather than the expectation of parties' constant convergence on the median voter. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) demonstrate that parties shift the location of their preferences when their votes decreased in a previous election. Parties also shift their preferences in response to public opinion (Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009), although voters do not respond to these strategic shifts until later elections (Somer-Topcu 2009).

The literature on party electoral strategy provides some evidence that parties use policy platforms as a tool to attract voters and activists in some contexts. However, this literature leaves the degree to which parties choose the number and types of issues to attract groups unclear because of its limited conception of party strategy: a shift in the relative location of a party's preferences. This limited theoretical focus on the relative spatial location of party preferences contrasts with some studies of policy accountability

that suggest parties purposefully focus on some specific issues based on the goals of their primary supporters (Hibbs 1977; Budge and Farlie 1983; Kitschelt 1989).[2]

Comparable to studies of government accountability, Hibbs (1978) finds that parties focus on the issues most important to the party's key constituencies. Thus, socialist parties tend to focus on issues important to labor groups and conservative parties tend to address issues important to business groups. Budge and Farlie (1983) extend this perspective, suggesting that parties from different historical party families benefit from addressing specific issues associated with their traditional electoral constituencies. For example, parties historically belonging to the socialist party family gain votes when they focus more of their attention on labor and welfare issues. Kitschelt (1989) adds that the degree to which parties focus their platforms on electoral or policy goals depends on the party's previous electoral success and the goals of activists that are prominent in the party organization. Also, vote maximizing parties strategically choose between appeals to their core constituency or the broader electorate (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).

Furthermore, many studies of party policy statements assume only that parties prefer maximizing votes or policy, but do not fully specify the underlying mechanisms motivating party behavior from a dynamic and longitudinal perspective (Strøm 1990). Studies using these assumptions have provided insightful spatial models of party strategies. Parties' relative priority for policy or office goals likely changes between elections depending on the party's governing status and the state's current policies. Therefore, the electoral context in which parties compete may influence the degree to

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[2] There are a number of scholars currently working on different conceptualizations of party policy change. For example, DeVries and Hobolt (2012) consider the conditions under which parties act as issue entrepreneurs, discussing issues which had not previously been considered by parties in the country.

which parties will seek to represent their primary constituents or marginal supporters in the electorate and the degree to which intra-party groups with different policy goals or strategies may be involved in leading the party (Kitschelt 1989). By treating parties' prioritization of these goals as static, previous studies may have ignored parties' dynamic electoral strategies. Building on Strøm's (1990) and Müller and Strøm's (1999) perspective, I propose that the degree to which party leaders *prioritize* office or policy goals in their policy manifestos depends on the leaders' expectations for future electoral success and the effect of these expectations on the distribution of groups voting in the party's national meetings. By focusing on parties' relative priorities, I explore the dynamic relationship between party goals for policy and office.

In the following section, I outline my theory of strategic issue balancing, which predicts the number or breadth of issues parties address in their electoral platforms. According to the theory, party leaders increase the number of issues that the party covers in its platform to attract new supporters. Conversely, parties decrease the number of issues to maintain the support of ideologically rigid party activists.[3] The theory suggests that parties balance the number of issues in their platforms depending on the party's priorities for pure policy goals or pragmatically, controlling office.

The Number of Issues and the Strategic Scope of Conflict

In this section, I propose an issue balancing approach to party policy strategy and change. Previous studies studying issue salience indicate that parties respond to the

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[3] I define activists and intra-party groups more broadly than Kitschelt (1989). I use the term ' intra-party group' to refer to all individuals seeking to influence the party's platform and leadership who are actively involved in the party's organization. This includes representatives elected on the party's label, activists, and members. Throughout the dissertation, I refer to intra-party groups interchangeably with activists and members.

economic goals of their primary supporters (Hibbs 1977) and that parties emphasize issues that they have 'ownership' over to gain votes (Budge and Farlie 1983). I expand upon these studies by focusing on the number and relative importance of issues parties focused on prior to elections. Similar to spatial studies of party policy change, I argue that parties use their statements to attract voters when political conditions lead them to be more vote maximizing and to focus on the goals of the ideologically rigid party activists when these intra-party groups dominate the party.

In contrast to spatial models, the strategic issue balancing approach may be more instructive for predicting parties' goals to satisfy or attract distinct groups that hold similar preferences spatially, but disagree on which issues should take priority. Indeed, Downs (1957) and Carey (2009) suggest that parties should maintain similar preferences spatially between elections to avoid seeming unaccountable or fickle to the electorate. Parties may be able to include unaddressed policies to attract support from otherwise unmotivated voters holding issue-specific policy goals, rather than shifting their position towards the ideological center.

Schattschneider's (1960) description of conflict between elites and the scope of conflict provides a similar logic. Schattschneider proposed that in modern democracies with full enfranchisement, elites address new issues to attract and mobilize supporters. By addressing new issues, elites eventually increase the scope of the conflict as their competitors respond to address the issue as well. Political elites seek to increase the scope of conflict when they are beleaguered by their opponent or expect to lose. By increasing the scope of conflict, political leaders draw support from previously unattached and inactive bystanders that value those issues. Since bystanders to the

conflict value specific issues, these bystanders indicate their support for parties advocating for their particular issue.

This framework easily maps onto electoral competition between political parties. Political parties write electoral platforms to attract both voters and mobilize the support of the primary constituents and party membership (Kitschelt 1989, Harmel and Janda 1994). Assuming that parties seek to win elections, Schattschneider's approach indicates that parties use their policy platforms to mobilize unattached or disinterested voters when they have information suggesting that they will perform badly in an upcoming election. Therefore, parties mobilize on new issues to attract voters when they expect to perform poorly in an election.

Indeed, increasing the number of issues in the party's platform may be an electorally safer strategy than shifting the location of the party's ideological preferences. On the one hand, parties that change the location of their preferences frequently or dramatically may gain a reputation for inconsistency (Downs 1957). Because voters are policy motivated, they avoid parties that gain a reputation for frequent seemingly insincere policy changes. Common political terms, such as to "flip-flop", "U-Turn" or "backflip" exemplify the image parties seek to avoid.[4] As assumed by most models of party strategy and accountability, voters should not vote for inconsistent or unaccountable parties (Downs 1957, Lupia and McCubbins 2000, Carey 2009).

On the other hand, increasing or decreasing the number of issues the party addresses avoids the critique of unaccountability. Including or excluding an issue does

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[4] For example, John Kerry was frequently accused of 'flip-flopping' in the 2004 US Presidential election (Lempert 2011). In the UK, Margaret Thatcher famously accused her opponent for party leader of a 'U-turn' in her 1980 speech to the Conservative Party Conference (Kettle 2009). Finally, the term to 'backflip' is frequently applied to candidates in Australia (Sharpe 2010).

not inherently demonstrate an inconsistency in a party's preferences between elections. Voters may be less concerned or aware of parties' exact policy locations if they rely on the party label as the primary information about parties' policy goals (Lupia and McCubbins 1994, 2000; Lupia 1998). In addition, the directional voting literature suggests that voters may be less capable of identifying the exact location of parties' preferences than traditional spatial models suggest (Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Kedar 2005). Instead, voters select parties that they expect to move policy in their preferred direction. While parties may be able to attract new voters by shifting their proposals towards the median voter in the electorate, mobilizing marginally supportive voters by increasing the number of issues the party addresses may be a more appealing strategy because it is likely more salient to voters concerned with a particular issue who want policy moved in a certain direction and is potentially less damaging to the party's overall reputation.

Like Schattschneider's perspective (1960), I expect that elites or party leaders seek to expand the scope of conflict when they expect to be electoral losers. Party leaders are electoral losers when they lose control of government or decrease their votes between elections. However, parties may not always choose to maximize votes when they are electoral losers or choose to maximize votes even when they are not electoral losers because party leaders must also balance the goals of intra-party groups that could remove them from leadership positions. Party leaders may act more vote-maximizing when intra-party groups expect them to seek to control government or less vote maximizing when the party is dominated by more ideologically rigid groups.

Therefore, the intra-party groups may also influence the degree to which party leaders' are more vote or policy maximizing because they can support or remove party leaders through the party organization. Like Kitschelt (1989), I argue that the party's leadership and its broader political goals depend on the preferences of the activists attracted to and influential within the party in that election. Kitschelt identifies two types of activists based on their approach to the policy process: ideologues and pragmatists. Ideologues highly value their ideological goals and avoid compromising their goals to gain political power; pragmatists, however, are willing to compromise their policy goals to control office and to develop supportive legislation incrementally, although they may have similar spatial preferences to the ideologues. For example, many European green parties in the 1980s were divided between the *fundi* activists seeking to avoid compromise and the *realo* activists that are willing to compromise to be part of the policy process (Kitschelt 1989).

Based on Kitschelt's (1989) perspective, I expect that the groups that join parties and seek to influence the party's direction through national meetings hold preferences on the party's approach towards the policy process. Unlike Kitschelt's dichotomous classification of activists as either ideologically rigid or pragmatic, I expect that these groups' willingness to compromise is distributed on a continuum with some groups preferring more compromise than others. The influence of these groups on the party's leadership and platform at national meetings depends on the exact distribution of these groups' willingness to compromise and the party's voting rules for party leaders and the party platform.

According to Kitschelt (1989), the distribution of activists depends on the conditions favoring or attracting each activist group to the party. The political context and the party's previous behavior determine the type of activists attracted to the party. In particular, he finds that the type of activists attracted to the party depend on how salient the party's primary cleavage is in the electorate, current government policy on an issue and the party's previous electoral success. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) describe political cleavages as the organized divisions within society that separate people by class, religion, political status or ethnicity on which groups mobilize for elections. For example, socialist and conservative parties historically represent the conflicting class divisions in society: labor and the owners of capital. Following from Kitschelt's perspective, traditional parties in Western Europe attract ideologically rigid activists when issues of class are more important. While there is evidence that the most important cleavage has remained somewhat stable since the 1920s in many European democracies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967[5]), the salience of the issues associated with those cleavages varies between countries and has declined across elections within many countries (Dalton 2008). Further, the rise of parties organized to compete on post-material issues accompanied the development of a post-materialist cleavage in the second half of the 20th century in many European democracies (Inglehart 1977).

Kitschelt (1989) expects that the relative importance of these divisions and the issues associated with them in the electorate influences the groups motivated to join political parties. In particular, parties attract groups that are more ideologically rigid

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[5] Lipset and Rokkan (1967) hypothesized that the primary cleavage in European democracies had frozen around class divisions in the 1920s. More recent evidence suggests that these cleavages are not as firm as Lipset and Rokkan suggest, but that class issues are still important in most European democracies (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 2008).

when the divisions and issues that the party represents are more salient in the electorate. Parties attract more pragmatic groups as these divisions become less salient. Therefore, socialist parties should attract more ideologically rigid groups as issues traditionally associated with labor groups, such as labor rights and unemployment become more important to the electorate.

In addition, parties benefiting or expecting to benefit from the spoils of office attract more office-motivated and pragmatic groups to governing parties (Kitschelt 1989). For example, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) demonstrate this process in socialist parties across Europe. These parties attracted more pragmatic activists over the course of the 20th century as they became accustomed to participation in government. However, governing parties' attractiveness to potential activists and supporters also depends on whether it implements its policy goals. Parties that seem unaccountable or irresponsible lose their ability to mobilize either voters or activists in the future. Although parties may be unaccountable in many different ways, scholars note that voters frequently hold governing parties accountable for the economy while they are in office. In particular, voters punish or reward governing parties for the state of the economy prior to an election (Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Anderson 2007).

Therefore, governing parties may attract more pragmatic groups when voters will likely reward them for the economy. On the other hand, more ideologically rigid groups seek to take control of the party leadership to focus on the party's message when they expect to be punished for the economy (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and Janda 1994). Similarly, the extent to which governing parties are perceived to be accountable for their policy statements may also influence the relative willingness to compromise of the

groups attracted to opposition parties. Parties that expect to benefit from the government's lack of accountability will attract more pragmatic groups as they expect the party to gain the spoils of office in the future. Groups joining opposition parties will see little reason to compromise their policy goals when they expect the government to be rewarded for a strong economy.

Finally, parties with some degree of previous electoral success will attract more pragmatic activists and supporters in the future. As a party demonstrates its ability to win votes and potentially control government, more pragmatic groups may be attracted to the party because they expect it to perform well in the future (Kitschelt 1989). Therefore, as parties increased their votes, they should attract more pragmatic groups in the future, while parties that decreased their votes are less likely to attract pragmatic groups.

By linking the willingness to compromise of intra-party groups to Schattschneider's scope of conflict perspective, I expect that political parties will increase the number of issues in their platforms when the distribution of those groups voting at party meetings is more vote maximizing. Because parties' relative priorities for votes or policy goals depends on the relative number of pragmatic and ideologically rigid members at these meetings, the number of issues a party campaigns on should be linked to the conditions attracting each type of group to the party. The conditions attracting more pragmatic members likely lead parties to increase the number of issues in their platforms, while the conditions motivating more ideologically rigid members should lead parties to decrease the number of issues. Therefore, I propose that the number of issues a party includes in its electoral manifesto should depend on the conditions influencing the type of groups attracted to the party. These conditions are the salience of the party's

primary issue cleavage in the electorate, the party's role in the current government, the economy, and finally, the party's previous electoral success.

In particular, as a party's primary issue cleavage becomes more important in an election, the party should attract more ideologically rigid groups motivated by that issue. I expect that citizens motivated to become active in politics by a specific issue join a party that is viewed as having 'ownership' over that issue because these activists view the party as the most direct route to influence policy on that issue. Because these issues motivate groups that are more ideologically rigid to join the party, they will seek to influence the party's leadership through their participation at national meetings. Hoping to protect their positions at the top of the party, the party leadership will increase the priority of these issues in the party's electoral platform. This leads the total number of issues in the platform to decrease as issues less important to the greater number of ideologically rigid member issues decrease in their relative importance or are dropped from the platform altogether. Therefore, I hypothesize that increasing issue salience on the party's primary issues leads parties to decrease the number of issues in their platforms.

H1a) Political parties decrease the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when their primary issues become more salient to the public.

On the other hand, governing parties should attract more pragmatic activists and supporters that are motivated by the rewards of office. Because these groups expect voters to reward the party in the future, they will be attracted more strongly when the economy does well. However, more ideologically rigid groups seek to regain control of the party when they expect the party to be punished. To the extent that scholars have

linked government accountability to electoral behavior, they have found that voters punish or reward governing parties for the economy immediately prior to an election (Lewis-Beck 1990; Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Anderson 2007). Although voters' ability to hold governing parties accountable is limited for numerous issues (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Carey 2009), voters punish governments when they perceive that it is performing badly by voting for an opposition party (Lewis-Beck 1990; Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Anderson 2007).

Thus, the number of issues governing parties address depends on the state of the economy prior to the election because of the distribution of pragmatic and ideologically rigid groups present at the party's national meetings. As the party leadership prioritizes gaining votes or controlling office when more pragmatic groups attend the party's national congress, the party should increase the number of issues in its platform. Reacting to the increase of more ideologically rigid groups attending the party's national congress, party leaders should prioritize policy goals and decrease the number of issues in the party's platform. Therefore, I hypothesize that economic conditions influence the number of issues in governing parties' platforms.

> *H1b) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms relative to opposition parties.*

> *H1c) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when the economy is performing well.*

While governing parties attract more pragmatic groups when the economy performs well, the relationship between the economy and the groups that join opposition parties reverses. The relationship reverses because opposition parties' chances at

controlling office in the next election decrease as the government's increase because of economic conditions (Anderson 2007). Therefore, opposition parties attract more ideologically rigid groups when voters will likely reward the government for the economy. However, opposition parties become more attractive when the economy performs badly. Expecting them to benefit in the future, more pragmatic groups will find opposition parties more attractive when the economy performs poorly. As the economy sours and groups more willing to compromise their policy goals for the rewards of office join the party, opposition party leaders prioritize their electoral goals. In particular, I predict that opposition parties will increase the number of issues in their platforms when the economy is performing poorly.

> *H1d) Opposition parties increase the number of issues they include in their*
>
> *electoral platforms when the economy is performing badly.*

In addition to the party's government or opposition status, the type of groups attracted to parties also depends on the parties' previous electoral success. Observing a party increase its vote in the prior election, more pragmatic groups likely expect the party to perform well in the future and potentially gain the rewards of controlling office. Parties that increased their votes in a previous election attract groups more pragmatic groups. As the relative number of pragmatic groups participating at the national congress increases, party leaders prioritize more vote-motivated goals. Therefore, parties that attracted votes in the previous election should increase the number of issues in the following election.

> *H1e) Political parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral*
>
> *platforms when their vote share increase in the previous election.*

Because parties are dynamic organizations, the balance of intra-party groups' willingness to compromise can change between elections. Parties can attract more ideologues in one election and more pragmatists in the next or attract pragmatic groups because of the economy and ideologues because of public opinion. Parties change their platforms frequently between elections and these strategies may be cyclical. A party may increase the number of issues it addresses in one election and decrease the number of issues in the next election. The conditions leading parties to increase or decrease the number of issues in their platforms are summarized in Table 1.1 at the end of this chapter. In review, I predict that the degree to which parties choose one strategy over another depends on how the political context including the issues important in the electorate, the parties in government, the economy and parties' previous electoral success influence the type of groups attracted to the party.

Following an election, parties participating in the new government develop policies. In government, both voter groups and intra-party group expect the party leaders to focus on the issues that mobilized them. Similar to the assumptions used in previous studies of party strategy (Downs 1957), I assume that parties desire to avoid *appearing* unaccountable to either of these groups once to avoid being punished by them. In the next section, I return to the principal-agent model to consider the control mechanisms principals have to reward and punish parties for acting unaccountably and the mechanisms parties use to construct an image of accountability. I then address the problem of multiple, competing principals and offer predictions about how this competition impacts the policies parties develop in government

Principals and Control Mechanisms

Although multiple principals seek to influence party behavior, the control

mechanisms available to each principal vary in the strength and frequency that they can

be applied. Control mechanisms can be either ex ante – occurring before the agent acts –

or ex post – occurring after the agent acts. Ex ante mechanisms, such as providing

detailed instructions, selecting an agent with similar goals (or becoming the agent), and

setting up mechanisms to monitor the agents' behavior, are complemented by ex post

mechanisms that follow after the agent's actions. Ex post mechanisms can include

constant monitoring, or imposing a cost for non-compliance. Despite control

mechanisms, agents may be able to play competing principals' preferences against each

other and to pick their own most preferred policies, although principals' preferences limit

the range of policies (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

Voters primarily control parties at election time. As a control mechanism, voting

acts as both an ex ante and ex post mechanism of control. As an ex ante control, voters

cast their ballots for the party or candidate that most closely fulfills their policy goals and

thus ensure that the party will work towards furthering their interests. Similarly, voting is

also an ex post control because citizens can punish governing parties that do not act

accountably or generate some form of cost relative to a status quo policy (Lupia and

McCubbins 1998, 2000; Lupia 2003).

Citizens face numerous limitations to controlling parties through voting, however.

Different voting systems change the level at which the principal conveys its authority

from the individual legislator, as in single member district electoral systems, to the party

in closed list proportional systems (Farrell 2001). In addition, voters often do not choose

one party to have a simple majority or mandate from the electorate to govern in

parliamentary democracies (Lupia 2003). Voters' ability to make informed choices

between policies or parties may be limited as well because of their inability to process

information. For example, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) find that citizens do not

recognize shifts in parties' platforms in the same electoral cycle that it occurred. Party

cues may help alleviate that lack of information, but partisan cues likely will not assist

citizens in recognizing subtle or even major shifts in parties' policies (Lupia and

McCubbins 1998).

Contrasting the controls voters have to influence party behavior, party leaders

have multiple tools to induce legislator behavior, such as legislators' placement on

electoral lists, and the use of legislative procedures that control the legislative agenda,

text of legislation and the governmental repercussions of support for legislation (Huber

1996; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Döring 2003; Döring and

Hallerberg 2004). Control over list placements and candidate selections for districts can

act as both ex ante and ex post mechanisms while legislative procedures primarily act as

ex ante mechanisms for ensuring supportive behavior (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 2000;

Carey 2009). Carey (2009) adds that popularly elected presidents can help influence

political support for policies and in some cases can even veto policies to influence

legislator behavior. Similarly, national party leaders in federal systems face demands

from the representatives and organizations at lower levels of government (Carey 2009,

Samuels and Shugart 2010).

Finally, factional divisions competing within parties to control the leadership exist

in numerous advanced democracies. For example, Japan's historically dominant Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) is notoriously factionalized. Until recently, numerous political outcomes such as electoral reforms, selection of the prime minister and even policy directions were highly determined by the relative strength of the LDP's factions seeking to influence the party in parliament, rather than by competition between the LDP and other parties (Richardson 2001, McElwain 2008). Although less prominent than factions within the LDP, factions in numerous advanced democracies also influence party policies. Harmel and Tan (2003), for example, demonstrate that changes in dominant factions of parties within the UK and Germany had substantial impacts on the specific policy proposals parties include in their platforms.

Regardless of factions' level of institutionalization within political parties, their mechanisms for influencing the parliamentary party and party leadership largely rest in their ability to win internal party votes and to control leadership positions. Although internal party votes usually occur at more frequent intervals, political parties usually hold a national party congress or convention prior to an election. In these national party congresses, parties frequently vote on proposals for the party's electoral platform and directly select the party's leadership and candidates; however, the degree to which party members directly propose and vote on proposals varies across parties and elections. (Hazan and Rahat 2006). For example, the PS in France meets at a national convention at least every three years and before elections to vote on the party's direction and leadership including representatives from each region proportional to the size of the membership from that region ("Statuts du Parti Socialiste: Mis à jour après le Congrès du Mans").

Therefore, I argue that the degree to which intra-party groups control their leaders and candidates depends on their relative importance in the party decision-making

structure (Harmel and Janda 1994). When party members directly propose and choose the party's electoral platforms and leadership, there exists the potential for party members to influence their officials through both ex ante and ex post controls. Party members can impose ex ante control based on their ability to choose a platform and leaders with similar goals. In particular, I expect that party factions within the membership will propose leaders and candidates with similar policy goals. By selecting leadership with similar goals, these factions decrease the chance that the leader will seek policy goals different from his/her own. Similarly, party members can impose ex post controls over their leaders in party congresses by choosing new leaders or platforms in the following party convention (Hazan and Rahat 2006).

Essentially, both voters and intra-party groups control party leaders and candidates through elections. I argue that the primary difference between these controls is the frequency with which they occur. In contrast to voter controls of party leaders, party members are given the opportunity to vote on the party's priorities, leaders and candidates prior to an election and at regular intervals between national elections through national party congresses, similar to party members of the PS in France. Party members also influence the party's goals and learn about the party's activities through local and regional meetings that occur more frequently (Hazan and Rahat 2006). In the following section, I discuss the principal-agent model when there are multiple agents and consider the importance of an information asymmetry between principals. I then explain the implications of this asymmetry for how parties develop legislation and take advantage of this information asymmetry through legislative signals.

Principals, Information and the Policy Process

Under the principal-agent framework, the ability of a principal to punish agents acting unaccountably through an ex post control mechanism largely depends on the amount of information the principal has about the agent's behavior. Importantly, a principal without any information of the agent's behavior will be unable to punish or threaten to punish an agent for errant behavior (McCarty and Meirowitz 2009). While both voters and intra-party groups use elections to influence party behavior, political parties have a greater informational advantage over voters than they do over internal factions. In particular, the information asymmetry between party leaders and voters is greater than the asymmetry between party leaders and intra-party groups. In a principal-agent framework, an information asymmetry is when the agent has greater information about the agent's behavior than the principal. Differences in the information asymmetries between principals and agents can lead one principal to have greater influence over the agent's behavior because the principal with greater information will be able to more accurately punish or reward the agent for their behavior (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Carey 2009).

Although voters have access to multiple sources of information about government behavior, they tend to be uninformed. For example, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) find evidence that voters rely foremost on partisan cues for information about their representatives. Many scholars argue, however, that legislative voting records are a potential source of information about legislator behavior for more informed voters (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Carey 2009). In particular, Carey (2009) argues that legislative voting records provide voters with information about government behavior.

While voters may use public voting records as a source of information about government behavior, legislative voting records do not present a full picture of the parliament's activities. There are several factors that indicate public or roll-call votes may not be as directly representative of the legislature's activities as these studies suggest. In particular, roll call votes are not utilized systematically on a representative sample of the total legislation, their use varies widely across democracies, and representatives can often abstain or simply not show up to avoid voting on contentious bills (Loewenberg 2008; Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Carruba et al. 2009; Clinton and Lapinsky 2009). Therefore, public vote records are not a representative sample of the legislation governing parties propose and may mislead voters on the representatives' and the government's actual activities (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Carey 2009).

Although public votes may be a biased indicator of the parliament's greater legislative agenda (Loewenberg 2008), voters may use them to assess the parliament's legislative activities (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). If voters use public votes as their primary source of information, legislative leaders should purposefully use public votes to develop an image separate from the greater legislative agenda. However, Carey (2009) notes that opposition parties frequently frustrate government attempts to develop a specific image by calling for public votes on issues the government prefers to avoid publicizing.

In addition to roll-call voting procedures, I expect that governing parties maintain a larger set of tools to develop and pass legislation that also provide information about its priorities. Other legislative procedures may convey information about the relative preferences of the parties in parliament through encouraging debate and highlighting the

government's proposals (Döring 2001). For example, the French constitution permits for the *vote bloqué* or the package vote, which allows the prime minister to submit legislation to parliament for an up or down vote without the addition of any opposition amendments. As an electoral strategy, prime ministers in France have allowed representatives supporting the government to distinguish their exact preferences by using roll call votes on amendments first, before forcing a final vote on the prime minister's most preferred legislation (Huber 1996).

On the other hand, some procedures limit the degree to which legislation is discussed or emphasized by avoiding debate through control of the legislative voting order, time for debate, or the details of the legislation. For example, the guillotine procedure available to the prime minister of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom strictly limits the voting order and period for discussion of legislation (Döring 2003). While substantial literature details the behavior of legislative leaders to secure their most preferred policies using legislative procedures, the extent to which parties strategically use the full range of their procedures to limit or broadcast information about their legislative agendas to their principals is a relatively unexplored topic.

I theorize that parliamentary leaders choose between legislative procedures intended to develop and pass legislation based on the information those procedures make available to their principals. Whereas legislation passed with few or no legislative procedures reflects the everyday business of running government, parliamentary leaders have good reason to cultivate an image with their principals to avoid future punishment. I expect that parliamentary leaders choose among legislative procedures to highlight or de-emphasize legislation to their principals.

In particular, I add that legislative procedures have two roles in conveying information about government policy: information generation or protection. Information generating procedures that draw attention to the government may increase the saliency of a set of policies or an issue. For example, roll-call voting procedures provide opposition parties with the chance to highlight the legislative process through amendments and debate (Döring 2001). The media may also report on the application of these legislative procedures, highlighting the legislative disagreement in the process. For example, prominent newspapers in France, such as *Le Monde*, frequently report on the usage of the public votes used in affiliation with the package vote.

I label these legislative tools, such as roll call votes, *information generating procedures* because they allow for and encourage debate with opposition groups and frequently attract media attention on the issues the government addresses. Political parties may invoke or encourage legislative procedures to provide information about their activities in government to voters. Huber's (1996) approach suggests a similar process in which legislative procedures are used to protect legislative coalitions from defections for electoral reasons by allowing dissenting members to express disagreement through roll call votes before being forced to vote for the legislation through the procedure.

Although many studies of legislative accountability focus on the information that roll-call votes provide to uninformed citizens (Döring1995; Loewenberg 2008; Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Carruba et al. 2009; Clinton and Lapinsky 2009), fewer scholars consider the degree to which procedures can also limit the information available. Some legislative procedures leave less legislative space for public contestation and debate. I propose that procedures that delegate powers to the government (away from the broader

parliament), limit debate or that limit the ability of the opposition to propose and force a vote on amendments, may serve similar bargaining purposes as other procedures such as resolving tough legislative disagreements within parties (or within a coalition) without highlighting the disagreements and sending information about unpopular legislative outcomes.

I label these procedures *information protecting procedures* because they suppress the ability of the opposition and the media to seize on these issues by avoiding open debate on the details of legislation. The closed rule limiting amendments to legislation passed from committees in the US Congress, legislative decree rules allowing the executive to set details of laws in France, and more generally laws limiting the role of individual legislators in the legislative process protect legislative bargains within and between parties without allowing for divisive debates.[6] Like information generating procedures, information protecting procedures provide the governing parties substantial control over the details of policy, but without facing potentially embarrassing policy debates and highlighting the government's behavior to the otherwise relatively unengaged voters. In addition to providing means to pass legislation that protects legislative bargains from potential opposition groups (Huber 1996; Döring 2003) these procedures also limit information about the details of the legislation being passed by reducing the length and the subject of the debate and essentially de-politicizing or delegating the details of the legislation.

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[6] This distinction is similar to Cox's (2000) and Döring's (1995) discussion of the type of agenda control. Control over the voting order of the plenary agenda, including the period for debate, constrains the information available about the legislative process more than blunt controls over the details of the amendments adopted.

The key distinguishing feature between information generating and protecting procedures is that the first set of procedures highlights the policy debates by providing the opposition parties and groups a forum to publicize and critique the details of the legislative process. Protective procedures, on the other hand, minimize the potential for critiquing the details of legislation. These laws limit the ability of the opposition to publicize specific policies during the legislative process. I expect that strict agenda control and delegation powers minimize the appearance of public conflict while the imposition of rules such as roll-call vote procedures increases the visibility of legislation.

Assuming that legislative procedures have a key role in signaling information about the government's legislative behavior, I argue that governing parties can use legislative procedures to send signals to their principals. The choice of signals depends on the information asymmetry between the principals. If an information asymmetry exists between the party and its principals than governing parties may be able to foster a positive reputation for policy accountability with less informed principals through the signals they send about their legislative activities, regardless of their actual level of accountability (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Carey 2009). For example, a party may pass legislation addressing some environmental reforms using an information generating procedure to appease voter groups, while focusing most of their legislative resources on other policy areas such as health care or education policies.

Using legislative procedures as signals, governing parties can foster a reputation for policy accountability with their less informed principals (voters), through the more blunt information generating procedures, while working on policies to satisfy its more informed principals (party activists) through information protecting procedures by not

encouraging public debate. Thus, political parties can provide different messages about the parties' legislative priorities and activities to their principals through the strategic use of legislative procedures.

Following from the theory, I argue that political parties use legislative procedures to construct an image of accountability. Because voter groups are less informed and connected to parties' behavior in government, I expect that governing parties use information generating procedures to highlight their legislative activities on issues that they addressed to attract voter support. I summarize this logic in the following hypothesis.

H2a) Political parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to their voters.

While the government maintains the sole authority to implement many procedures, opposition parties can call for public votes in most parliaments (Loewenberg 2008; Carey 2009). I expect that opposition parties also take advantage of information generating procedures to broadcast their policy agendas to voters. Although opposition parties may have little role in crafting policy or the greater policy agenda in some parliaments, I hypothesize that they still seek to demonstrate their accountability on issues that they use to attract voter support.

H2b) Opposition parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to government party activists.

Similar to Carey (2009), I also expect that opposition parties will use information generating procedures to highlight aspects of the government's agenda that might harm its image of accountability with voters. Unlike Carey (2009), I argue that governing

parties can limit the damage from opposition behaviors if the parliamentary rules include information protecting procedures. In particular, governing parties decrease the effect of opposition- led information generating procedures by minimizing public details of the legislation through information generating procedures. Because intra-party groups have greater information about the party's behavior, parties will provide more direct information to party activists at party meetings and through party newsletters about their policy activities. Therefore, I predict that governing parties will utilize information protecting procedures to pass legislation on issues important to party activists. Because opposition parties use information generating procedures to highlight government's lack of accountability with voter goals, opposition parties invoke information generating procedures on issues that governing parties address to motivate party activists.

However, many information protecting procedures such as executive orders or ordinances that delegate authority to an executive also reduce the permanency of legislation on an issue because they do not require new legislation for a future executive to over-turn that policy. For example, Huber and Shipan (2002) indicate that parties resort to executive orders and delegation more when they expect to be in office in the future. When parties expect to not be in the next government, they are more likely to write the details of legislation into law. If the information protecting procedures limit the long-term effectiveness of legislation, I argue that parties will only seek to limit information about a policy if they expect the opposition to highlight it. Thus;

H2c) Governing parties utilize information protecting procedures on issues important to party activists.

H2d) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues highlighted previously by information generating procedures.

H2e) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues important to opposition party voters.

Finally, the discussion of legislative procedures up to this point has assumed that the government consists of one or only a few parties with similar policy goals. In most parliamentary democracies this is unrealistic because governments frequently include multiple political parties with diverse political goals that support the prime minister and the cabinet. Further, in diverse coalitions with high levels of ideological disagreement, governing parties may be incapable of passing legislation on a number of issues, much less agree on which issues to publicize or de-emphasize (Tsebelis 2002).

I expect that coalition governments will be less capable of purposefully constructing their image through information generating and protecting procedures controlled by the government. The extent to which coalitions can agree to use procedures will depend on the relative disagreement between coalition parties. Coalition governments that hold relatively similar ideologies will use procedures to construct the parties' image more easily than coalitions with more divergent ideologies. Both to avoid seeming unaccountable and to avoid large policy compromise, ideological divergent coalitions should generate little output. Coalition parties should seek to avoid publicizing information about government policy as the coalition party preferences diverge. The following hypothesis summarizes the effect of ideological disagreement on coalition government behavior.

H2f) Coalition governments utilize fewer procedures as the level of ideological

disagreement increases between coalition parties.

The preceding hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.2 at the end of the chapter.

Because governing parties craft an image of accountability with voters through the

selective use of legislative procedures, parties focus their attention more directly on the

issues motivating party activists. In the next section, I discuss the role of information

asymmetries and competing principals for the types of policy government's address.

Competing Principals and Policy Outcomes

In a world with infinite resources and time, governing parties may be able to

create legislation to accommodate all issues in their manifestos, provided none of the

stated policies are directly contradictory. Legislatures, however, are limited in their

capacity to enact legislation in terms of resources; legislative resources include time,

staff, and access to information (Döring 1995, 2001, and 2003; Squire and Hamm 2005).

While access to information and staff can be bolstered through money and by bringing in

informants, such as interest groups, the amount of time a legislature meets is often

substantially limited (between mandatory elections at a maximum). Indeed, the length of

the legislative session is also limited by practical concerns including the amount of time

individuals can continue working and rules regulating how the time will be used.

Although legislative procedures increase the amount of information available to voters,

Döring (1995 and 2001) notes that procedures allowing for debate and amendments

provide the potential for legislative delays caused by opposition party behavior.

Starting with the assumption that legislatures are limited in the policies they can

generate in office by time and resources, a governing party can purposefully allocate its

legislative time and resources. I expect that governing parties face the choice of devoting time and resources to policies on some issues to the detriment of others. The limits placed on the government's agenda likely force governing parties to choose between the policy goals of multiple principals with differing levels of information. Since governing parties can signal their policies to voters through legislative procedures, I predict that their underlying agenda may more closely reflect the policy goals of better informed principals: party activists. Because the government can send selective information to voters about the legislative process, it is possible that governing parties will devote most of its resources to other issues. A governing party may generate the appearance of focusing their attention on a certain set of issues by using information generating procedures for voters while devoting most of its resources on legislation intended to satisfy other groups.

If legislative procedures act as signals to voters and intra-party groups, the amount of legislation devoted to an issue will likely favor issues addressed to satisfy intra-party principals because of their decreased information asymmetry. Issues intended to satisfy voters may be associated with great clamor and media attention, but do not need to include substantial detail for the implementation and enforcement of the legislation because voters pay less attention than party leaders to the details of the legislation. Instead, voter knowledge of legislation is limited to general summaries and media sound bites (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). From the perspective of governing parties, I expect that the executive and the bureaucracy can use their resources to fill in the detailed minutia of enacting legislation leaving the governing party with the capacity to focus on other policies by ignoring the details on these issues.

On the other hand, issues the party addresses to appease activist groups likely require greater resources because they are more attentive to the enactment and enforcement of legislation. Informed factional leaders and activists observing the political process expect policies to have long term effects and may desire to avoid delegating authority on policies where the executive may be controlled by a political opponents in the future (Huber and Shipan 2002). In general, I argue that the amount of legislation will reflect the knowledge of the intended principal: voters or party activists. Following from Huber and Shipan's (2002) perspective, I expect that parties may be less willing to delegate authority when they expect the executive to be controlled by an opposition party in the short-term future.

In summary, political parties change their policies to accommodate multiple principals with different levels of information about politics. When they enter into government, I expect that parties prefer to present an image of consistency to voters and use legislative procedures that encourage debate and media attention to highlight the work consistent with their party platform to voters. Alternatively, governing parties use legislative procedures that avoid debate and attention to downplay policies that might be inconsistent with their platform or outside of the image the party prefers to promote to voters. Under parliaments where governing parties do not have information protecting procedures or where all issues can be emphasized through the use of information generating procedures, I expect that the government focuses its legislative resources on issues it addressed to attract voter support because the details of all legislation are publically available, decreasing the information asymmetry between voters and activists.

However, in contexts with a greater range of procedural tools, governing parties should focus their legislative resources on issues that are important to better informed groups because they can construct their image using these procedures. The greater the detail included in legislation, the more difficult it will be for future governments to repeal the law (Huber and Shipan 2002). More legislative detail makes it more difficult for bureaucrats to ignore the government's goals. Therefore, I expect that in contexts where parliamentary leaders utilize both information generating and protecting procedures, the governing party or parties will develop more policy on issues that are more closely and frequently monitored by their principals. In particular, I argue that governing parties will develop more legislation on issues monitored by party activists than issues supported by voters. Therefore;

H3a) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to their party activists than to their voters.

While governing parties may seek to produce legislation for both their principals, their ability to pass legislation also depends on their coalition status (Tsebelis 2002). Similar to a veto player perspective, I expect that coalitions with divergent policy goals avoid passing legislation on issues that they strongly disagree. Legislation produced on issues on which the coalition parties disagree should reflect only the areas on which the coalition can find agreement.

Otherwise, legislative bargains require more time and resources to develop when coalition partners disagree. For example, Martin and Vanberg (2008) find that debates on contentious issues require greater time as coalition parties use the time to communicate their specific policy goals to their principals. As legislation requires a greater amount of

time to develop and parties' ability to limit information about their policy agenda through information protecting procedures decreases, I expect that the asymmetric effect of party principals' goals on government policy disappears or reverses as ideological disagreement between coalition parties increases. Governing parties may limit legislation on issues important to their ideologically rigid principals altogether if those policies require substantial compromises. Following this logic, I predict the following hypotheses.

> *H3b) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to party activists than to voters when there is little ideological disagreement.*
>
> *H3c) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to their voters than to their activists as ideological disagreement increases.*

These hypotheses suggest that the effect of parties' issues depends on the levels of ideological disagreement between coalition partners. The hypotheses for government policy outcomes are listed in Table 1.3 at the end of the chapter.

In summary, my theory of strategic issue balancing and issue accountability posits that political parties increase the number of issues in their manifestos to attract potentially supportive, issue-focused voters. They decrease the number of issues in their manifestos to maintain and mobilize party activists. Once in office, governments produce legislation using legislative procedures that craft an image of accountability to voters while simultaneously focusing their legislative resources on issues important to party activists. Finally, policy outcomes from the legislative process better reflect the goals of party activists than voters because of their greater ability to monitor and punish party leaders. In the following section, I present a multi-method approach to testing the theory and discuss the chapter outline for the remainder of the dissertation.

Research Design and Chapter Outline

To test my theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability, I use a multi-method approach. In particular, I develop a series of tests of the theory following a nested analysis approach (Lieberman's 2005). In a nested analysis, the researcher first confirms the generalizability of a theory through a large-N statistical analysis demonstrating that the proposed correlations between aggregate indicators exist. Once the researcher assesses the theory's external validity through these large-N tests, she/he then turns his/her focus towards establishing the theory's internal validity or the degree to which the general measures accurately explain the underlying processes and logic using multiple sources and types of data. Lieberman (2005) advocates either focusing on a case or set of cases that are well explained by correlations in the large-N analysis to focus on the supporting the internal validity or by focusing on an outlier or deviant case to seek out novel explanations for how the general theory can be revised to better explain the specific case for future analyses.

As the first assessment of the theory's external validity, I begin in Chapter 2 with an examination of strategic issue balancing using a large-N cross-national time-series analysis. In particular, I predict the relative number of issues parties include in their platforms based on the electoral context. These tests are designed to examine the degree to which electoral conditions influence the number of issues in parties' platforms focusing only on the conditions predicted to influence intra-party politics and the party's platform. The empirical tests in Chapter 2 assess the support for the hypotheses summarized in Table 1.1. To implement the test, I use data on elections and party platforms from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 1998 and 2006;

Volkens et al. 2011) and economic indicators from the OECD. I propose a measure of the

effective number of manifesto issues as an indicator of the number of issues parties

address. The results of this analysis demonstrate support for the external validity of the

theory of strategic issue balancing in 24 advanced industrial democracies from 1962-

2008. By beginning with a large-N test of the theory, I not only demonstrate support for

the theory's generalizability to many advanced industrial democracies, but I also link the

theory to traditional studies of party strategy that focus on party policies in these same

democracies.

To examine the remaining hypotheses summarized in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3, I

develop a series of tests of political party behavior in government. Although a more

rigorous test of external validity of the theory would entail a cross-national analysis of

party behavior and policy outputs, data on parties' behavior in government and policy

outputs is currently limited to a small number of countries and time periods.[7] Based on

the logic of Liebermann's nested analysis approach, I narrow the analysis in Chapters 3, 4

and 5 to a country included in the analysis in Chapter 2 that contains parties that follow

the expectations from my theory. The results from the statistical analysis in Chapter 2

indicate that French political party strategic electoral behavior matches the hypotheses

summarized in Table 1.1. For this reason, I have chosen the French Fifth Republic as my

primary case.

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[7] In future extensions of this project, I intend to extend the analysis to a larger cross-national sample of
parties and parliaments. Data collection of this sort is being undertaken by the Comparative Agendas
Project, but is not yet complete. Further information about the Comparative Agendas Project can be found
at their website http://www.comparativeagendas.org/.

By selecting a set of parties that reflect the predictions from the statistical analysis in Chapter 2, the analyses in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 demonstrate the link between parties' strategic electoral behavior to their legislative behavior and output. The relationship between parties' principals and legislative behavior has been previously explored (Carey 2009), but scholars have not directly linked principals' specific policy demands to legislative behaviors. To test the predictions from the hypotheses on legislative behavior, I combine data on party policy change, legislative procedures, and the policy content of legislation passed by the French *Assemblée Nationale* from 1978-2007.

Although parties in the French Fifth Republic match the hypotheses tested in Chapter 2, I add that parties in France match many of Eckstein's (1975) criteria for a critical case or George and Bennett's (2005) least likely case because political party behavior in France is complicated by a number of factors. According to George and Bennet (2005), a least likely case is one in which there are numerous alternative factors that might explain the phenomenon under study. The logic follows that if a researcher finds that the theory is true for a least likely case, then the theory should hold for cases that have fewer complicating factors.

I argue that political party behavior in France is a least likely case or a difficult first test of the theory for a number of reasons. First, French party affiliations tend to be volatile relative to other advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 2008). This volatility may make cues to intra-party factions less likely, since those citizens and activists affiliated with the party are less likely to stay with the party in the future, regardless of the party's level of accountability. Second, political parties in the French *Assemblée*

Nationale traditionally exhibit lower levels of party voting or discipline and higher levels of absenteeism than other European democracies (Sauger 2009). Thus, any cues to party members, despite disunity among the parliamentary parties, should be considered strong evidence for this hypothesis. Third, by focusing on France 1978-2007, I will be able to test the hypotheses with respect to multiple partisan and institutional configurations such as coalition governments and the presence of cohabitation (where the prime minister in parliament is from a different party than the president) that might limit the ability of a parliamentary government to send signals to their principals.[8] [9] Fourth, the legislative context is relatively clear, since the constitution of the Fifth Republic provides the government with procedures that allow for information production – roll-call votes – and suppression – Article Article 38 /Empowerment statutes, *vote bloqué* and Article 49.3 confidence procedures. In addition, bills tend to be relatively non-complex in terms of the issues they contain making it easy to classify them according to single or a limited number of issue areas (Baumgartner , Broaurd and Grossman 2009; Döring 2003).[10]

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[8] France is a semi-presidential regime. Similar to Elgie (2004) I define a semi-presidential state as one in which a "popularly-elected, fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament." (Elgie 2004, 317). Similarly, "Cohabitation is the situation where a president from one party or coalition shares power with a prime minister from an opposing party or coalition." (Elgie 2004, 328).

[9] The constitution of the French Fifth Republic explicitly includes provisions for the prime minister to influence the parliamentary agenda in the *Assemblée Nationale*. In particular, Article 44.3 provides the prime minister with the *vote bloqué*. The constitution provides that the parliament must have an up or down vote on the exact text of legislation the prime minister submits. Article 49.3 of the constitution allows the prime minister to attach votes of confidence to any legislation proposed by the prime minister and his cabinet. Finally, although Article 38 and 10 empowers the parliament to delegate the implementation of policy on issues related to European policy to the prime minister and cabinet, parliament has generally interpreted Article 38 to include nearly any set of policies.

[10] I am extremely grateful to Sylvain Broaurd, Emiliano Grossman and the French Comparative Agenda's Project for graciously providing me with data on legislative procedures and the issue content of French legislation.

In Chapter 3, I further discuss the legislative procedures used in the French *Assemblée Nationale* and classify them according to their information providing properties to test the hypotheses in Table 1.2. The statistical results from Chapter 2 also provide a means to classify the proposals in party electoral platforms as either oriented towards voters or party activists. Thus, I use predictions from this analysis as the primary independent variables predicting the application of parliamentary procedures and policy. Based on the classification of statements in party platforms as either voter or activist issues, I provide a series of statistical tests of the hypotheses predicting the application of legislative procedures in the *Assemblée Nationale*. Consistent with the results from previous analyses, the evidence indicates that both governing and opposition parties use roll-call votes to publicize issues. I also find evidence, however, that parties use information protecting procedures to limit information about issues they emphasize to support party activist policy goals.

Building on the analyses from Chapter 2 and 3, I develop a final set of statistical models in Chapter 4 to predict the policy implications of information asymmetries between competing principals summarized in Table 1.3 for policy outcomes from the *Assemblée Nationale*. The analysis suggests that parties reward better informed principals differently than those that are less informed. This difference fades, however, when the party expects to lose control of government in the future and for parliamentary sessions immediately prior to the next constitutionally mandated legislative elections.

Following the statistical analyses in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I demonstrate the theory's internal validity through a series of case studies of legislation in France in Chapter 5. Using logic the logic of Liebermann's (2005) nested analysis, I focus on the

PS' intra-party debates leading up to elections in 1993 and 1997 in France. The large-N results from Chapter 2 indicate that the PS' platform in 1993 is closely explained by the theory and the platform in 1997 is explained less well. However, in both cases the evidence in Chapter 5 indicates that party leaders balanced the goals of intra-party groups and voters in developing their electoral platforms.

I further extend the analysis of the PS' behavior following the 1997 election to explore the motives behind the PS' priorities in office. In particular, I review the debates on the use of an information protecting procedure to suggest that the procedure has the intended effect of limiting information about the government's policy priorities. In these case studies, I use evidence from multiple qualitative sources including news reports, legislative debates, party newsletters, and personal interviews with party members. By including several forms of data, I am able to further bolster the internal validity of the study by indicating that the results can be verified using multiple sources (Gerring 2004). In addition, by tracing the issue balancing and accountability process over time in a single party, I am able to evaluate the logic underlying the theory longitudinally as well as across cases (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). The results from the multiple levels of analysis offer strong support of the theory.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I consider several additional extensions for my theory of strategic issue balance and accountability and consider additional cases in other advanced industrial democracies that would provide strong tests of my theory. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of the theory. The results of the analyses offer a number of implications for the traditional political science literature on party strategy and government accountability by providing a unified framework linking

party electoral strategies to government behavior and outcomes. Although scholars frequently study party electoral strategies and government accountability in relative isolation, my theory suggests that the elements of Key's (1955) tri-partite framework of party behaviors are intertwined. Similar to Key's perspective, I expect that scholars must also consider parties' electoral strategies and political parties' organizational structures, to understand government policies.

In particular, this dissertation demonstrates that political parties use their statements of policy to satisfy multiple groups. Although previous work indicates elites address issues to win elections (Schattschneider 1960; Hibbs 1977; Budge and Farlie 1986), I add that political parties purposefully use this strategy not when they are political losers, but when the party organization is willing. This theory offers an explanation of the underlying mechanism between strategic party policy change and voter behavior (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). If parties have multiple electoral strategies, than incorporating their multiple strategies may lead to more conclusive theories of party behavior.

In contrast to the expectations from my theory, studies of government accountability frequently conclude that voters can accurately control their representatives through elections (Anderson 2007; Carey 2009). However, I add that parties' electoral strategies and government institutions limit their ability to punish or reward governing parties. Although a lack of accountability to voters may be normatively negative from the perspective of democratic theory (Anderson 2007), it may illustrate why voters do not uniformly punish governments during a bad economy. My theory also highlights the

conditions that should lead to greater voter accountability: when parliament cannot limit information about the policy process.

Finally, my findings have practical implications for citizens seeking to influence government policy on an issue. On the one hand, citizens may be successful at encouraging parties to develop legislation on a given issue by voting for the party that discusses it during an election. On the other hand, the results indicate that citizens will be more influential towards generating extensive, detailed and lasting policy on an issue by seeking to influence the party's policy goals from inside.

Table 1.1 Hypotheses on Party Electoral Strategy

Electoral Conditions	→	Effect on Intra-party Groups	→	Number of Issues in the Party Platform
Increasing Issue Salience (H1a) Opposition Parties and positive economic conditions (H1d) Previous Electoral loss (H1e)	→	Ideologically Rigid Activists	→	Decrease
Government Parties (H1b) Government Parties and Positive Economic Conditions (H1c) Opposition Parties and Negative Economic Conditions (H1d) Previous Electoral Success (H1e)	→	Ideologically Pragmatic Activists	→	Increase

Table 1.2 Hypotheses on Party's Parliamentary Behavior

Independent Variable		Dependent Variable
Government Parties Government Party Voter issues (H2a) Ideologically Cohesive Coalition (H2f) *Opposition Parties* Government Party Activist Issues (H2b)	→	Information Generating Procedures
Government Parties Govern Party Activist Issues (H2c) Issues Highlighted by Information Generating Procedures (H2d) Opposition Party Voter Issues (H2e) Ideologically Cohesive Coalition (H2f)	→	Information Protecting Procedures

Table 1.3 Hypotheses on Policy Outcomes

Independent Variable		Dependent Variable
Government Party Activist issues with no ideological disagreement (H3a and H3b)	→	More Legislation
Government Party Voter issues with no ideological disagreement (H3a and H3b)	→	Less legislation
Government Party Activist issues + Ideological Disagreement (H3c)	→	Less legislation
Government Party Voter issues + Ideological Disagreement (H3c)	→	More legislation

CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIC ISSUE BALANCING: AN ANALYSIS OF PARTY
ELECTORAL STATEGY AND ISSUE COMPETITION

> Obviously, however, the cleavage between the sixty million and the forty million could be exploited by a new kind of political effort devoted to the development of an array of issues now submerged....The root of the problem of nonvoting is to be found in the way in which the alternatives in American politics are defined, the way in which issues get referred to the public, the scale of competition and organization, and above all by *what* issues are developed.

> E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*

As Schattschneider (1960) suggests, parties and candidates win electoral competitions in developed democracies by mobilizing voters with the issues on which they campaign. Although parties mobilize their traditional electoral supporters (Hibbs 1977) and party activists (Harmel and Janda 1994) by focusing on issues historically important to the party, Schattschneider (1960) indicates that the relatively large non-voting public may be inactive because the issues they most value are not important to the parties in the system. He expects that a party can activate these groups of potentially supportive voters by campaigning on these issues. In this chapter, I extend Schattschneider's perspective to consider the conditions that direct party leaders to purposefully include new issues to attract voters or to narrow the parties' electoral campaigns to issues primarily important to party activists.

In particular, I conceptualize party electoral manifestos[11] as a balance between the goals of ideologically rigid party activists and issues important to voter groups. Party leaders balance the goals of both groups because their support is necessary to stay in their leadership positions within the party and to win elections to government. The party's

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[11] Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms manifesto and party platform interchangeably to mean the documents parties publish prior to an election listing the party's policy goals.

membership and the conditions that influence the party's internal dynamics determine the platform party leaders' select. Under conditions that attract more ideologically rigid activists, party leaders narrow or decrease the number of issues in the party's platform. Under conditions that attract more pragmatic and compromising activists, party leaders are free to incorporate issues into the party's platform. In particular, electoral conditions indirectly determine party leaders' balance of priorities at any given moment.

In this chapter, I further develop my theory of strategic issue balancing by considering the conditions that influence the relationship between party leaders and activists. For the analyses presented in this chapter, I assume that intra-party dynamics are the mechanism that connects electoral conditions to the party's platform so that I can focus the empirical tests in this chapter on analyzing the broader connection between electoral conditions and the party's platform. I further explore the effects of electoral conditions on intra-party politics in Chapter 5.

Following the discussion of my theory, I propose the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) as a new measure of parties' policy statements. It measures the increase or decrease in the number of issues in party platforms over time by weighting the attention given to each issue in the electoral platform. After a section describing the data and methods, I present my analysis of the strategic issue balancing theory by predicting the ENMI for parties in 24 OECD countries from 1962-2008. The results from the empirical tests suggest that my theory of issue balancing better explains the relationship between electoral conditions and the number of issues in party platforms than explanations that assume that parties are unitary actors or that parties are strictly motivated by a desire to win elections.

Party Strategy and Issue Balancing

Scholars have long speculated about the relationship between the issues parties address and their electoral success. For example, Schattschneider's (1960) metaphorical boxing match expects political contests to be driven and won by competition over issues. Schattschneider argued that elites campaign on new issues to attract potential supporters. As competitors respond to the opposition's issues, elites increase the scope of the conflict among themselves. Political leaders seek to mobilize new groups when they are beleaguered by their opponent or expect to lose. By increasing the scope of conflict, elites can draw support from previously uninterested bystanders that value those issues. Since bystanders to the conflict value specific issues, a political leader draws the support of previously uninvolved observers, such as unmotivated voters, by including issues important to this group in their campaign message.

I contend that Schattschneider's metaphor provides insights for electoral competition between political parties. Political parties expand the scope of conflict by writing electoral platforms or manifestos to attract both voters and to mobilize the support of their primary constituents and party membership (Kitschelt 1989, Harmel and Janda 1994). Previous studies of party electoral strategy assume that unitary, rational, vote-seeking parties use their policy platforms to attract voters when they have information suggesting that they will perform badly in an upcoming election (Adams 1999; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Whereas the literature suggests that parties shift their policy platforms towards a hypothetical median voter under this circumstance (Downs 1957, Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009), I add that these vote-seeking parties have multiple strategies in their electoral toolbox to counter

conditions that would lead them to potentially lose an election. In particular,

Schattschneider's perspective indicates that increasing the number or breadth of issues

parties address may serve as an alternative strategy.

Political parties do not uniformly act as if they are only vote seeking, unitary

actors. Since Downs' (1957) spatial description of party electoral strategy, scholars have

developed numerous theories suggesting that parties are either primarily policy motivated

actors (Wittman 1973) or balance their goals for policy and office (Strøm 1990; Müller

and Strøm 1999). Focusing on parties' strategic spatial shifts, studies that assume a

balance or a mixture of party goals have provided insight into party electoral strategies.

For example, Adams, Haupt and Stoll (2009) find evidence that parties do not always

moderate their policy platforms in response to economic and public opinion data

indicating that they will perform poorly. Further, mainstream parties that strategically

change their platforms only benefit from small increases in their vote shares (Adams and

Merrill 1999 and 2005; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005) and the benefit may not

emerge for some time (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Similarly, niche or small-parties

frequently lose electoral support if they deviate from their traditional policy preferences

(Adams et al. 2006).

Scholars also suggest that parties do not act as if they are unitary actors in most

settings. They find that intra-party divisions and politics influence party behavior, leading

parties to follow strategies that are not strictly vote motivated. For example, Harmel and

Janda (1994) theorize that changes in the party organizational structure and the party

membership influence outcomes such as party platforms, leadership and government

policies. Harmel and Tan (2003) demonstrate that changes in factional dominance in

German and British political parties lead to shifts in parties' electoral platforms. Finally, Laver (1999) shows that intra-party divisions frequently lead to policy shirking by parties in coalition governments.

Further, Kitschelt (1989) suggests that parties differ in the types of activists and politicians that join the party. In particular, he demonstrates that parties attract two types of activists. Activists are ideologically rigid and uncompromising or they are more pragmatic, accepting policy compromises to win votes and seek to implement incremental policy changes. Activists' willingness to compromise may influence the strategies and approaches of the party leadership, although they may hold similar policy goals. Party activists play an important role in parties by running the party organization for electoral campaigns and forming the pool from which parties recruit electoral candidates (Kitschelt 1989). Also, activists frequently vote on the parties' leadership and its electoral platforms prior to elections (Harmel and Janda 1994).

Following from these studies of intra-party decision-making and party politics, I argue that party activists and their divisions over policy or office goals influence leaders' priorities for maintaining policy purity or controlling office. Although the party leaders play an important role in proposing and determining the parties' policy and electoral strategies, party activists are also frequently involved in the decision-making process through national conventions and party primaries (Harmel and Janda 1994). Measures of party activist goals and approaches are limited primarily to case studies of a small number of parties and to limited time ranges (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and Tan 2003). However, the literature on party organizational dynamics indicates a strategy for determining the influence of party activists on leaders' goals by focusing on the

conditions that influence intra-party dynamics (Kitschelt 1989, Harmel and Janda 1994). Therefore, I predict that party leaders alter the number of issues in their platforms in response to the conditions that influence the party's activists.

In particular, Kitschelt (1989) describes the conditions influencing the activists' decision to join a party. He suggests that public opinion, current government policy and the party's previous electoral results determine the type of activists attracted to the party. More ideologically rigid activists join when the issues the party historically 'owns" are more important to the public. Parties 'own' issues that were originally core elements of their platforms and are associated with specific constituencies and politically important ideological divisions in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Budge and Farlie 1983). On the other hand, as these issues become less important, less ideologically pure activists are attracted to the party. Focusing on party platforms and parties' experience in government, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) suggest that parties may deviate away from these core issues important to their traditional constituents after their experiences controlling government. Studying socialist parties in Europe over the course of the 20th century, Przeworski and Sprague find evidence that parties may increase their electoral support by adding new issues to their platforms, but these parties also lose support from their traditional constituencies in society by acting more strategically.

Kitschelt (1989) indicates that when there is an increase in an issue's salience in society, there will be an increase in the number of people that are driven to influence policy on that issue. These motivated citizens then choose between parties that can represent their preferences on this issue. According to Kitschelt, issue motivated citizens join parties based on their reputation for working on an issue. These citizens are more

ideologically rigid in their approach to the policy process because they are primarily motivated by policy goals. For example, socialist parties in Europe have 'ownership' over labor issues because they historically organized and mobilized on these issues (Budge and Farlie 1983). Following from Kitschelt's perspective, socialist parties attract more ideologically rigid activists as issues traditionally associated with labor groups, such as labor rights, become more important or salient to the electorate.

Therefore, I expect that change in the salience of issues historically important to the party will alter the activists that join that party and the distribution of activists within the party. A party attracts more ideologically rigid activists as the party's primary issues become more salient to the public. An influx of more ideologically rigid activists will seek to make the party's leadership and policy statements more ideologically pure (Harmel and Janda 1994). For example, the Tea Party movement in the United States forced the Republican Party to focus on issues of taxation and deficit reduction leading up to the 2010 election (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011; Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel *Forthcoming*). I argue that the party leadership prioritizes these activists' ideologically rigid policy goals by focusing its attention on these important issues and by decreasing the number of more peripheral issues in their platform. Linking issue salience to parties' platforms leads to my first hypothesis.

> *H2a) Political parties decrease the number of issues they include in their*
>
> *electoral platforms when their primary issue becomes more salient to the public.*

In addition, Kitschelt (1989) indicates that governing parties draw more pragmatic activists that are attracted by the spoils of office and the potential to influence policy. For example, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) demonstrate that socialist parties attracted more

pragmatic activists over the course of the 20th century as they frequently participated in government. However, Harmel and Janda (1994) add that perceptions of governing parties' policy accountability or success also influences the parties' attractiveness to activists and voters. They suggest that activists seek to change the party's direction when they are unsuccessful at attaining their goals either for policy or office.

Although they may perceive parties to be unaccountable on any policy area, voters most frequently punish or reward the government for the state of the economy. Scholars find that voters generally hold governing parties accountable for the state of the economy prior to an election (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Anderson 2007). In particular, citizens may reward governing parties with their vote when the economy grows, but give their vote to opposition parties when the economy shrinks (Anderson 2007). Activists seeking to influence parties may also react to the economy as an indication of the parties' policy accountability and future electoral success. In addition, the full theory of issue accountability developed in Chapter 1 indicates that the economy is a clearer predictor of citizens' perception of the government's accountability than the actual policy content if governing parties construct an image of accountability different from their actual policy output.

Therefore, I argue that governing parties attract more pragmatic activists when potential activists perceive that voters reward the party for the economy. Under positive economic conditions, more activists expect voters to reward the government in an upcoming election. Noting the government's potential success, activists motivated by the spoils of office and the future ability to influence policy will join governing parties. Following a similar logic, governing parties will generally attract more pragmatic

supporters than opposition parties because they have greater access to the rewards of office. Pragmatic activists and party leaders that hope to continue to enjoy the rewards of office will see little reason to change their policy strategy when they expect voters to reward them for it. When the economy is strong, party leaders will increase the number of issues because of the increase in activists favoring compromise and pragmatic policy goals.

Similar to Harmel and Janda (1994), however, I predict that activists will change the party's direction when they judge the party to be unaccountable for their goals. In particular, ideologically rigid activists will take over the party leadership and refocus the party's message when the party is unsuccessful at implementing its goals. Observing the party's failure to manage the economy and expecting the party to decrease its ability to attract voters in the upcoming election, the ideologically rigid activists already within the party will reject the parties' previous pragmatic electoral strategies. These activists will focus more on the parties' core policy goals. Party leaders will focus their policy goals on the party's tradition, core issues and abandon more fringe issues to accommodate the increased prominence of the ideologically rigid activists.

Thus, the number of issues governing parties include in their platforms depends on the economy prior to the election and its impact on governing parties' activists. As the economy improves, the party leadership prioritizes gaining votes or controlling office because of the increase in pragmatic activists attracted to the party. Governing parties with a strong economy will thus increase the number of issues. Declining economic conditions will lead to an increase in the number and importance of more ideologically rigid activists. Reacting to this increase, party leaders will prioritize policy goals and

decrease the number of issues. This logic leads to the following hypotheses addressing the behavior of governing parties.

> *H2b) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms relative to opposition parties.*
>
> *H2c) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when the economy is performing well.*

In addition, I expect that public perceptions of government parties' accountability for their policy statements and the economy may also influence the activists that join opposition parties. Attracted to the potential spoils of office and the ability to influence policy, more pragmatic activists join opposition parties when they believe those parties will control or influence government following an election. Expecting voters to punish the government, pragmatic activists may join prominent opposition parties under the belief that the opposition will have a higher likelihood of controlling government after the election. The logic follows that as the economy goes sour and more pragmatic activists join the party, opposition party leaders prioritize electoral goals and increase the number of issues in their platforms.

However, this relationship reverses when the economy is stronger. Assuming that voters will reward the government for a strong economy, pragmatic activists see little incentive to work for an opposition party that is unlikely to have much of an influence on the policy process. As more pragmatic activists dedicate their time and resources to alternative means of influencing policy, ideological rigid activists take over the party leadership and narrow the party's policy goals to a smaller number of issues. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis for opposition parties' behavior.

H2d) Opposition parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when the economy is performing well.

Finally, as a party demonstrates its ability to win votes and potentially control government, more pragmatic activists may find the party attractive. Activists expect these parties to perform well in the future because of the success of parties' previous campaigns (Kitschelt 1989). Predicting benefits from controlling office in the future, pragmatic activists find joining these parties attractive. As the relative number of pragmatic activists in the party increases, party leaders prioritize more vote-motivated goals. Parties that performed well in the previous election will increase the number of issues in the following election. This leads to my next hypothesis.

H2e) Political parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when they increase their votes in the previous election.

By considering the electoral context and intra-party politics, I build on Schattschneider's framework by adding that party electoral strategy also depends on the electoral context influencing the distribution of activists within the party. For Schattschneider, party leaders are primarily seeking to win elections to government positions. However, I expect that party leaders also must consider the priorities of the party's organization for intra-party elections. Activists are the underlying mechanism that influences the number of issues in the platform. The situations that attract activists to a party influence the number of issues that party includes in its electoral campaign. The circumstances attracting more pragmatic activists lead party leaders to increase the number of issues in their platforms, while those motivating more ideologically rigid activists cause party leaders to decrease the number of issues.

In conclusion, my theory predicts that parties increase the issues in their platforms under the following conditions: when the party's core issues are less salient; when the party controls government under a strong economy; when the party is in the opposition and the economy is weak; or when the party gained votes in the previous election. Parties decrease the number of issues in their platforms under alternative circumstances: when its core issues are more salient or it controls government with a weak economy; when it is in the opposition under a strong economy or when lost votes in the last election.

Because parties are dynamic organizations, they may attract more ideologues in one election and more pragmatists in the next. Parties change their platforms frequently between elections and these strategies may be cyclical. A party may increase the number of issues it addresses in one election and decrease the number of issues in the next election only to increase them again in a subsequent election. In summary, I argue that the degree to which parties choose one strategy over another depends on how the political context, including the issues important to the electorate, the parties in government, the economy and parties' previous electoral success, influences the underlying distribution of activists motivated by strict policy or office goals

Data and Methods

In this section, I propose a test for my theory of strategic issue balancing using my new dependent variable, the Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (ENMI). In particular, I test my theory using data on parties from 24 OECD countries from 1962-2008. The sample includes every party and election from an advanced industrial democracy for which there are publically available data available from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 1998, 2006 and Volkens et al. 2011), the Parliamentary and

Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow 2010), and economic data from

the UN Statistical Database. The resulting sample for the economic and electoral data

includes 209 parties in 279 elections totaling 1415 party-election year observations.[12]

In contrast to spatial analyses of party platforms, I operationalize the dependent

variable as the effective number of manifesto issues. The literature on party policy

preferences largely focuses on aggregated left-right positions of the party's platform

either from content analyses of parties' policy platforms (Klingemann et al. 1998, 2006

and Volkens et al. 2011) or from expert surveys (Laver and Hunt 1992). Neither of these

data sources is ideal for generating measures of left-right placements. For example,

expert surveys are limited over time and are not measures generated directly by the party.

Similarly, there is some debate about the exact preferred method of transforming the

results from the content analyses to generate left-right scales of policy platforms (Benoit

and Laver 2007, Martin and Vanberg 2007a and 2007b, Lowe et al. 2011). While left-

right placements provide valuable information about the party's policy preferences, they

may not be ideal for indicating parties' purposeful attempts to mobilize voters and

activists with specific issues (Ignazio 2003, Lowe et al. 2011).

Following from the strategic issue balancing perspective, I argue that shifts in the

left-right placement may be a limited way to focus on party strategy because measures of

parties' ideal points may reflect numerous motivations and do not provide a clear

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[12] The sample includes parties from Australia(1969-2007), Austria(1962- 2002), Belgium (1965-1999), Canada (1962-2006), Denmark (1964-2007), Finland (1962-2003), France (1962-2003), Germany (1972-2002), Greece (1981-2000), Iceland(1963-2003), Ireland (1965-2002), Israel(1965-1996), Italy (1963-2006), Japan (1967- 2003), Luxembourg (1964-1999), the Netherlands (1963-2003), New Zealand (1963-2008), Norway (1965-2001), Portugal (1979-2002), Spain (1982-2000), Sweden (1964-2006), Switzerland (1963-2003), the United Kingdom (1964-2005), and the United States (1964-2008) . The addition of the survey data results in the reduction of observations from every country prior to 1970 and most non-European cases including those from Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States.

measure of the number of issues parties address (Strøm 1990, Harmel and Janda 1994, Strøm and Muller 1999, Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2009). Additional problems arise because the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) includes two types of issues: confrontational and non-positional. Confrontational issues are those where the CMP separately coded the number of statements that are positive towards a given issue and the statements that are negative towards that issue, such as the categories "Military: Positive" and "Military: Negative". Non-positional issues are those where all sentences in that issue fit into one category. For example, the CMP includes all statements about the environment in one category because there are not positive and negative codes for non-positional issues. (Lowe et al. 2011). Values in non-positional categories mean more or less attention to the issue regardless of the ideological direction.

Therefore, aggregate measures of parties' ideal points may appear stable when a party drastically shifts the number of issues it focuses on, so long as the party maintains a similar balance of issues that are coded as left or right in its manifesto. A change in a party's position on an estimated left-right scale could be driven by a shift in the issues the party addresses rather than a true change in the party's ideal point because of the non-positional nature of some issues coded in the CMP (Meguid 2005; Lowe et al. 2011). Alternatively, measuring an expansion or contraction of the issues in a party's manifesto reflects a change in the amount of attention the party gives to each issue because each category measures the relative salience of these issues to the party. Therefore, I use a weighted count of the number of issues the party addresses in an election as my dependent variable.

Based on the CMP's coding, I measure the dependent variable by constructing the effective number of issues that a party includes in its manifesto using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) formula for the effective number of parties. In particular, I begin by finding the percent of the party's manifesto dedicated to each issue. The CMP's original coding includes 56 issue codes. For the 14 confrontational issue codes indicated by Lowe et al. (2011), I sum each of the confrontational pairings in the CMP so that they measure the total percentage of the platform dedicated to each of the seven issues they reflect, regardless of ideological direction. [13] Confrontational categories measure the number of sentences on a topic in separate indicators.[14] Following from Lowe et al.'s (2011) perspective, I argue that leaving the categories in each pair of confrontational issues as distinct categories would over-predict the number of issues for parties that balance their positive and negative statements on a confrontational issue.

I then use the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to both the combined confrontational categories and non-positional issues to develop the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI). After summing the 14 confrontational categories into seven issues, the maximum possible number of issues would be 49 based on the original 56

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[13] Confrontational issues are issues about which it is possible to make both positive and negative statements. These issues are included in multiple variables in the CMP data. For example, I sum categories "Military: Positive" and "Military: Negative" to measure the amount of attention a party gives the "Military" as a single issue.

[14] Like the analysis in Lowe et al. (2011), I consider the 14 confrontational categories in the CMP to include the follow categories: "Foreign Special Relationships: positive", "Foreign Special Relationships: negative", "Military: positive", "Military: negative", "Internationalism: positive", "Internationalism: negative", "European Community: positive", "European Community: negative", "Constitutionalism: positive", "Constitutionalism: negative", "Decentralisation", "Centralisation", "Protectionism: Positive", "Protectionism: negative", "Welfare State Expansion", "Welfare State Limitation", "Education Expansion", "Education Limitation", "National Way of Life: positive", "National Way of Life: negative", "Traditional Morality: positive" , "Traditional Morality: negative", "Multiculturalism: positive", "Multiculturalism: negative", "Labour Groups: positive" and "Labour Groups: negative"

CMP categories. The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to each issue reflects its salience to the party and is not a left-right issue position. Using the formula below, I find each party's ENMI. I define m_i as the percentage of statements about an issue, i. I then square each m_i and find the sum of all these terms.[15]

$$ENMI = \frac{1}{\sum(m_i^2)}$$

$$ENMI = \frac{1}{\sum(.5_1^2 + .5_2^2 + 0_3^2 + \cdots + 0_{49}^2)}$$

$$ENMI = 2$$

For example, the second equation above demonstrates the situation in which a party's platform contains exactly two statements dedicated to two separate non-confrontational issues. This results in an ENMI of 2.

Higher values of the ENMI indicate less focus on a specific issue and a greater distribution of attention across a greater number of issues. If the hypothetical party with an ENMI of 2 added a third sentence on a new issue, the ENMI would increase to 3. The party's relative focus on each of the first two issues drops from 50% of its platform to 33.33% of its platform as the party's message broadens to include the new issue.[16] While this change is relatively small, parties increasing their ENMI more dramatically water down the relative importance of the issues that are already in the party's platform as they draw attention to additional issues. On average, parties in OECD countries have an ENMI

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[15] Laakso and Taagapera's (1979) measure was originally developed to measure the number of parties that won votes or seats in an election from Rae's (1967) fractionalization index. Rae's (1967) index was equivalent to one minus a Herfindahl index of fractionalization and represented the "frequency with which pairs of voters would disagree if an entire electorate interacted randomly." (Rae 1967, 55-56; Lijphart 1994, 68).

[16] Interestingly, the effective number of issues measure proposed here is negatively correlated with the CMP's left-right scale and Lowe et al.'s (2011) modified version. Because smaller values suggest that the party is further left and larger values towards the right, the negative correlations suggest that parties on the ideological left tend to include more issues than the ideological right.

of 13.13. In my sample, the French Gaullist Party in 1962 has the maximum observed ENMI of 28.6. In 1999, the ultra-orthodox religious Israeli Shas party had the smallest ENMI of 1.53.

Figure 2.1 presents the average ENMI for each party family over the range of the sample period. This figure illustrates a number of dynamics that indicate that the ENMI is appropriate to test the theory. First, the parties that traditionally control government, such as the socialist, liberal, conservative and Christian democratic parties have the highest ENMI. These parties would traditionally be considered the most likely to be catch-all parties, or parties make their political appeals to all constituencies rather than a specific, limited group (Kirchheimer 1966). Presumably, catch-all parties include a greater number of issues in their platforms than other parties to attract a greater number of supporters. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) may have expected, socialist parties have slightly increased ENMI over the course of the twentieth century.[17] Further, the number of issues in communist party platforms varies more than some of the other older parties, reflecting their electoral fluctuations and changing priorities since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Finally, both green and nationalist parties have lower ENMIs than the traditional, mainstream parties. This may indicate that these niche or issue-focused parties include more ideologically rigid activists than the mainstream parties.

To rigorously test the hypotheses, I develop a multivariate model. I operationalize the primary independent variables using a variety of sources. First, I measure party issue salience by combining data from the Eurobaromoter, the Comparative Study of Electoral

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[17] This effect is clearer if the time-series used to average the number of issues on which socialist parties campaign is extended to back to the 1940s.

Systems (CSES), the World Values Survey (WVS), and various national election surveys.[18] Each of these surveys asks questions about the issues that the respondent considers most important prior to an election. Although some surveys such as the New Zealand Election Survey allow open-ended responses to these questions, most of the surveys limit the range of responses. A common question across the range of surveys, however, asks candidates how important a certain set of issues are related to their broader value orientation.

For example, the World Values Survey asks respondents the following question; "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? 1) Maintaining order in the nation, 2) Giving people more to say in important government decisions, 3) Fighting rising prices, [or] 4) Protecting freedom of speech". According to Inglehart (1971 and 1997; Dalton 2008), these potential responses allow survey respondents to indicate their broader value orientation towards materialist versus post-materialist issues. Respondents could answer either one or three indicating that they value issues related to human security and economic well-being. If a respondent answered two or four they suggest that they hold preferences for greater self-expression. Therefore, these questions will provide a strong indication of how important the more materialist or post-materialist issues are in an election.

Although the percent of respondents that consider materialist values most important is not a direct measure of respondents' goals for specific issues, it is a reasonable indicator of the importance of economic issues more generally because they

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[18] I supplement the cross-national measures with data from the Canadian National Election Study and the New Zealand Election Survey. Future versions of this chapter will integrate additional National Election Studies to extend the breadth of this variable.

are highly correlated (Dalton 2008). Because the traditional, mainstream parties 'own' the economic issues in most advanced industrial democracies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Budge and Farlie 1983), I expect that the percentage of respondents that consider materialist issues as the most important in an election roughly indicates the salience of the specific issues on which the mainstream parties campaign. The logic follows that as the economic cleavage and the issues contained within it are more important to the public, each of the parties associated with the traditional economic, material issues will react. Similarly, parties associated with the rise of post-materialist issues, react in an opposing manner to the relative importance of material issues, such as green parties and nationalist parties.

Based on Inglehart's (1971) scheme, I operationalize the salience of the parties' primary issues by measuring the relative importance of material issues in each country. According to H1a, a higher percentage of the public supporting the material issues in responses one and three indicate stronger support for the issues important to the traditionally material focused parties: communist, socialist, liberal, conservative and Christian democratic parties.[19] However, the theory suggests that the effect of this variable is reversed for parties that are divided along post-material issues, such as green and nationalist parties because these parties' focus their platforms primarily along post-materialist issues, such as the environment or human rights. To allow the effect of issue

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[19] Each of these surveys includes the following question "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?" "Maintaining order in the nation" "Giving people more to say in important government decisions" "Fighting rising prices" or "Protecting freedom of speech". Based on Inglehart's (1971) coding, I sum the percentage of respondents choosing maintaining order and fighting rising prices as an indication of the importance of traditional material issues.

salience to be different for green and nationalist parties, I include an interaction term that multiplies a dummy variable for parties that are classified as green and nationalist parties according to the CMP and issue salience.

Data on public opinion is limited cross-nationally and over the period of time included in the sample. Therefore, I perform the analysis both with and without the measure of issue salience. The sample is reduced to 529 observations in 17 countries when the measure of issue salience is included.

Second, I use the Parliamentary and Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow 2010) to determine which parties were in the government cabinet. I create an indicator variable that is equal to one if the party was in the last non-caretaker cabinet. For the only non-parliamentary country in the sample, the United States, I treat the party of the president as the incumbent government. Approximately, 32% of observations in the sample are classified as incumbent parties. To test the predictions for economic conditions, I operationalize the expected economic growth as an indicator for government success. In particular, I use GDP growth from the UN Statistical Database to measure the difference in the expected economic conditions. Similar to Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten and Palmer (1999), I measure the difference between each country's GDP growth and the average OECD performance for that year. According to Powell and Whitten (1993), this measures the difference between the economic growth citizens expected versus the country's actual growth. The measure reflects the country's growth relative to the greater OECD to account for differences in the overall sizes of the economies of each country. Higher values indicate that the country's GDP is increasing at a faster rate than the OECD as a whole and lower rates suggest that the country's GDP

decreased more than or increased more slowly than other OECD countries. On average, the economy of each country in the sample grew at .16% more than the OECD average growth in the sample.

Finally, to test hypothesis H1e, I include the proportion of seats the party controlled in the lower house of parliament immediately following the previous election.[20] All data on electoral results comes from the CMP (Klingemann et al. 1998, 2006 and Volkens et al. 2011). In the sample, parties held an average of 18.4% seats in the lower house of parliament prior to an election.

To test potential alternative explanations of parties' ENMI, I also control for variables traditionally considered important in studies of party electoral strategy. In particular, party leaders face the choice between electoral strategies and may use one strategy as an alternative or to supplement the other. Therefore, I measure shifts in parties' ideological preferences using Lowe et al.'s (2011) log scale of party positions.[21] I generate a dummy variable equal to one if parties' relative preferences are less than the mean party position in the sample. I multiply this dummy variable with shifts in parties' preference between elections to generate an interaction variable that distinguishes between shifts towards or away from more extreme values on the ideological left or right. If parties increase their ENMI as a supplement to shifts in their preferences, then shifts away from the extremes will increase ENMI. On the other hand, if ENMI and preference

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[20] I operationalize this hypothesis using seats rather than votes because it is a clearer indicator of the party's success in the election than vote totals that are translated differently depending on the electoral rules. This choice does not directly influence the outcome of the analysis. I have rerun the analysis including the percentage of votes the party received for elections to the lower house of parliament rather than seats and the results are similar.

[21] The choice between Lowe et al.'s (2011) log score and the CMP's original Left-Right issue position (Klingemann et al. 1998) does not influence results of the analysis.

shifts are alternative strategies, moderating shifts in parties' preference will decrease the party's ENMI.

To account for influences from competing parties' strategies, I also include the country's mean party system ENMI in the previous election. Similar to Somer-Topcu (2009), I control for the electoral rules in the country with a dummy variable indicating majoritarian electoral rules. I also control for the party system by measuring the effective number of parties in parliament. Following Powell and Whitten (1990) and Whitten and Palmer (1999), I also include an indicator for minority governments to account for how clearly the government can be punished based on the economic voting models. Data on electoral rules and government composition come from the Parliamentary and Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow 2010). Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.

Because of the structure of the data, I use a time-series cross-sectional analysis with panel corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). I measure the independent variables as the change from the previous election to the current election so that the coefficients reflect the temporal variation in the independent variables between elections, rather than the differences between panels (Beck and Katz 1995).[22] In the following section, I discuss the results from my analysis of the factors that predict a party's ENMI.

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[22]Because the dependent variable is potentially censored at 1 and 49, I rerun the analyses using a cross-sectional time series Tobit model with random effects and a lagged dependent variable. The results from the analyses are listed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. In Table 2.2, an observed variable is censored when the range of the latent, underlying variable it is meant to operationalize is truncated (Long 1997). In theory, parties should be able to include an infinite number of issues or include zero issues. Therefore, the ENMI truncates the underlying number of issues that a party could discuss to a range of 1 through 49.

Analysis

In Table 2.1, I present the results from the analysis. The first hypothesis predicts that parties decrease the number of issues in their platforms when the issue that the party 'owns' becomes more important to the public. The results from Models 2 and 4 indicate little support for the effect of issue salience. In contrast to the theory's prediction, the coefficients for issue salience are not statistically different from zero and are in the wrong direction for both models. Although the interaction term for niche parties and issue salience are in the expected direction, they are not statistically different from zero. In the sample, all parties increase their ENMI as materialist issues become more salient in the public, although the interaction indicates that niche parties increase their ENMI at a much higher rate when materialist issues become more important.

In contrast to the first hypothesis, the results better support the predictions linking parties' incumbent status and the economy to their ENMI as predicted in Hypotheses H1b, H1c, and H1d. As predicted by H1b, the indicator variable for government incumbency has a positive and statistically significant effect in each model. Government parties include a larger number of issues in their platforms than opposition parties. In the sample, government parties include 14 issues on average and opposition parties 12.7. The inclusion of additional controls in Model 2, 3, and 4 increases the substantive magnitude and the level of significance for the effect of parties' incumbent status. In Model 4, the coefficient for the incumbent parties indicates that incumbent parties increase the number of issues in their platform by almost 1.4 with a neutral economy.

The results from the analyses are nearly identical to the analysis using OLS, although the substantive impact of a number of variables is slightly lower. The similarity between the results is unsurprising because no observation in the sample is actually censored. Future analyses may find that censoring is a larger issue. The CMP includes parties with an ENMI of 1, although they are not included in this analysis. I

In addition, the results in Table 2.1 indicate that economic conditions influence parties' ENMI. The coefficients for economic change and its interaction with government incumbency are statistically different from zero and in the expected direction in Models 1 and 3. The constitutive term for change in economic growth barely falls below the 90% confidence level with a p-value of .102 in Model 4, although the interaction term is significant with 94.7% confidence and has the largest substantive impact of any of the models. The results from the models support my hypotheses, but the use of interactions terms direct interpretation of the coefficients complex. Therefore, I present the marginal effect on opposition and government parties' ENMI of change in the countries' economic conditions relative to the OECD average in Figure 2.2. The 90% confidence intervals in Figure 2.2 are simulated using 1000 draws of the coefficient estimates from the variance covariance matrix from Model 3.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the conditional effect of economic conditions on parties' ENMI. Consistent with the theory of issue balancing, government parties increase their ENMI relative to opposition parties. However, governing parties increase their ENMI more dramatically when the nation's economic growth relative to the OECD average improves between elections. A change in the relative GDP growth between elections of one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, leads to a .38 increase in a governing parties' ENMI or a 3% increase relative to the mean predicted ENMI. This change is similar to the behavior of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prior to the election in 1986. Japan's GDP improved by approximately 2.23% more than the OECD average, or the magnitude of one standard

deviation, between elections in 1983 and 1986. Similar to the predicted increase of .19 from Model 3, the LDP increased its ENMI by approximately .23.

In addition to the evidence for government parties, Figure 2.2 also presents evidence for opposition parties as predicted by H3d. Opposition parties decrease their ENMI when the countries' economic growth relative to the OECD average decreases between elections. Conversely, they increase their ENMI when economic growth stalls. A decrease in the relative GDP growth between elections of one standard deviation above the mean to one standard deviation below the mean, leads to an increase of nearly 1 in an opposition parties' ENMI or a 7.3% increase relative to the mean predicted ENMI. The effect of the economy is much stronger on opposition parties than on governing parties. In particular, Figure 2.2 shows that weak economic conditions lead opposition parties to increase their ENMI more than governing parties. In general, the evidence in Figure 2.2 demonstrates clear support for H1b, H1c and H1d.

Finally, I find less support for Hypothesis H1e that parties decrease their ENMI when they have lost seats in the previous election in Table 1. The coefficients are in the correct direction for each model, but none of them are statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The effect of parties' seat share is almost statistically different from zero in Model 1 with 87.4% confidence from a two-tailed test.[23] The effect of changing the parties' proportion of seats is weakly significant in a one-tailed test with greater than 93% confidence.

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[23] Replicating this model under conditions used in other models of party strategy influence the effect of this variable. For example, the change in the logged proportion of seats becomes significant with 90% confidence when I exclude parties that receive less than 5% of the vote in the previous election, similar to the models reported by Somer-Topcu (2009).

Figure 2.3 shows the predicted effect of parties' previous electoral success with 90% confidence intervals. The predicted effect in this figure demonstrates the change in ENMI from parties' change in electoral fortunes based on the estimates in Model 1. An increase of 13% seats (two standard deviations) in the previous election increases a party's ENMI by approximately .3: approximately 2% change from the mean ENMI.

In addition to the primary independent variables, many of the control variables perform as expected. In particular, an increase in the effective number of parliamentary parties has a statistically significant and negative effect on ENMI in Model 3, but does not quite reach significance in Model 4. Minority governments decrease the ENMI with greater than 99.99% confidence in both Model 3 and 4. Parties in countries with majoritarian elections also have higher ENMI than in countries with more proportional elections.

There is a statistically significant relationship between parties' shifts in preferences and their ENMI in Model 3, but not Model 4. The interaction and the constitutive terms for parties' preferences indicate that parties increase their ENMI at the same time that they move their ideological preferences towards the mean ideological preference. Including the country's average change in ENMI in the previous election adds little explanatory value in Model 3 or 4. Finally, the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in each model. The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable hovers around .5 in each model. Because the coefficient is less than one, parties generally decrease their ENMI between elections, holding the other independent variables constant.

Discussion

Like Schattschneider's (1960) perspective summarized in the chapter introduction, I find that political parties use the number of issues they address as an electoral tool. Unlike Schattschneider, I demonstrate that political party behavior is more complicated. Parties do not respond to their electoral context as if they are unitary, strategic actors. My results are consistent with an alternative explanation that assumes that party activists' behavior mediates the impact of the electoral context on party platforms. Although I do not directly test predictions on activist behavior in this chapter, previous studies on the determinants of intra-party politics indicate that electoral conditions influence intra-party dynamics (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003).

I summarize the results from the analysis in Table 2.3. I find that party leaders' strategies depend on the electoral context. In particular, the party's governing status, the economy, and the parties' previous electoral performance influence the number of issues in party platforms. Governing parties increase the number of issues in their platforms when the economy is performing well, and opposition parties decrease the number of issues in their platforms relative to parties in government. Similarly, party leaders increase the ENMI when they increased their proportion of the vote in the last election. The results of my analysis indicate that by assuming a link between electoral conditions and intra-party politics, I better explain parties' ENMI than approaches assuming that intra-party politics do not influence their electoral platforms. My focus returns to analyze evidence of the activist link through a series of case studies in Chapter 5.

Although previous studies of party electoral strategy find some evidence that parties use their policy platforms to attract voters in elections, they struggle to relate measures of issue salience and the economy to parties' strategic electoral decisions (Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009). The results from my analysis indicate that the relationship between economic conditions and party electoral strategy is more complicated. I find evidence consistent with my theory that suggests intra-party politics' moderate the impact of the electoral context. Therefore, intra-party politics may help explain previous scholars' null findings relating the economy to party platforms.

Consistent with previous studies of party strategy (Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009), I find null results for the effect of issue salience, contrasting the prediction in H1a. My analysis does not indicate that parties decrease their ENMI as the issues they 'own' become more important in the electorate. This finding may be a measurement problem because the analysis lacks a cross-national measure of issue salience for each party. This result may also be related to my operationalization of issue 'ownership'. Based on Budge and Farlie's (1983) analysis, I impose an objective indicator of issue 'ownership' that may not reflect citizens' individual assessments cross-nationally (Bélanger and Meguid 2008).

On the other hand, the results suggest that public opinion or issue salience may not directly impact the issues parties address in their platforms. V.O. Key (1966) described the electorate's issue preferences as an echo-chamber for elites. The analysis of issue salience may indicate a similar dynamic. In particular, the results show that parties include fewer issues when their traditional issues are less salient with the public. Instead,

the broader electorate potentially responds to parties' previous platforms, but party leaders and activists are less reactive to the issues important to the electorate.

Using my measure for the ENMI, the analysis finds that political parties are motivated to change the issues in their platforms at similar times and for similar reasons as other traditionally studied electoral strategies. In addition, there is little reason to believe that adding or removing issues from the parties' electoral campaigns will face the same harsh criticisms that they face by shifting the spatial location of their statements of preferences on an issue. The results imply that extant studies may under-predict parties' strategic behaviors by focusing solely on parties' left-right issue positions.

Finally, scholars frequently study party organizational behavior and electoral strategies in relative isolation. As argued in the broader theory in this dissertation, I expect that parties' organizational behavior and electoral strategies also influence their behavior in government and policy outcomes. The results from this analysis provide a method to connect parties' electoral platforms to their broader priorities for policy and office. Using the ENMI, it is possible to link the issues parties include in their platforms to satisfy the multiple groups seeking to influence their behavior. As parties' ENMI increases, the issues they add to their platforms are those they add to attract voter groups, but are less important to the parties' activists. However, parties that decrease their ENMI focus their attention on issues meant to satisfy their activists. Similar to Key (1955), I argue that scholars must consider parties' electoral strategies and political parties' organizational structures, to understand government policies. Therefore, in the following chapter I explore how party organization and strategy affects parties' parliamentary behavior.

Figure 2.1 Change in the dependent variable by party family in 24 OECD countries

Figure 2.2 Marginal effect of GDP and cabinet incumbency

Figure 2.3 Marginal effect of previous electoral success

Marginal Effect of Parliamentary Seat Change

NOTE: 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance covariance matrix. Predictions are based on the estimates in Model 1.

Table 2.1. Cross-sectional time series results predicting ENMI in 24 OECD countries

	Model 1 B *P*	Model 2 β *P*	Model 3 β *P*	Model 4 β *P*
Δ % Seats $_{(t-1)}$	2.294 *0.126*	2.518 *0.330*	1.295 *0.384*	0.862 *0.735*
Incumbent party	0.415* *0.080*	0.645*** *0.090*	0.798*** *0.002*	1.393*** *0.002*
Δ expected GDP growth	-0.254*** *0.000*	-0.249 *0.114*	-0.209*** *0.001*	-0.230 *0.102*
Δ expected GDP growth X Incumbent Party	0.273*** *0.008*	0.248 *0.247*	0.292*** *0.003*	0.404* *0.053*
Δ Issue Salience		3.736 *0.451*		2.087 *0.643*
Δ Issue Salience X Niche Party		3.370 *0.772*		2.207 *0.859*
Niche Party		-0.785 *0.281*		-0.894 *0.183*
Δ Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties$_{(t-1)}$			-0.355* *0.054*	-0.233 *0.334*
Minority Incumbent Cabinet			-1.075** *0.015*	-2.704*** *0.000*
Δ Right-Left position X Left Party			-1.235** *0.019*	-0.573 *0.509*
Δ Right-Left position			1.336*** *0.001*	0.541 *0.408*
Left Party			1.978*** *0.000*	1.915*** *0.000*
Majoritarian elections			0.756* *0.084*	1.750** *0.034*
Δ Mean Country ENMI$_{(t-1)}$			-0.062 *0.321*	-0.047 *0.620*
ENMI$_{(t-1)}$	0.584*** *0.000*	0.559*** *0.000*	0.520*** *0.000*	0.449*** *0.000*
Constant	5.448*** *0.000*	6.277*** *0.000*	5.323*** *0.000*	6.615*** *0.000*
Root Mean Squared Error	3.818	3.786	3.648	3.602
R^2	0.379	0.371	0.436	0.438
χ^2	440.760***	143.248***	710.931***	253.532***
N	1415	529	1415	529

Note: Estimates use panel corrected standard errors and include a lag of the dependent variable of one election to correct for autocorrelation. Standard errors are corrected using the party as the panel variable. The independent variables are measured as the difference in the variables value between elections. The estimated p-values are included underneath the coefficient estimates. Two-tailed significance tests indicate significance at * p<.1, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01.

Table 2.2 Cross-Sectional Time Series Tobit Results for ENMI

	Model 5 β *P*	Model 6 β *P*	Model 7 B *P*	Model 8 β *P*
Δ % Seats (t-1)	2.369 *0.131*	2.383 *0.374*	1.395 *0.352*	0.927 *0.717*
Incumbent party	0.418* *0.059*	0.657* *0.072*	0.749*** *0.001*	1.258*** *0.001*
Δ expected GDP growth	-0.254*** *0.000*	-0.252** *0.027*	-0.210*** *0.000*	-0.235** *0.031*
Δ expected GDP growth X Incumbent Party	0.273*** 0.004	0.251 *0.178*	0.302*** *0.001*	0.419** *0.020*
Δ Issue Salience		3.771 *0.277*		2.339 *0.483*
Δ Issue Salience X Niche Party		3.326 *0.785*		2.299 *0.843*
Niche Party		-0.779 *0.236*		-0.872 *0.162*
Δ Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties(t-1)			-0.365** *0.010*	-0.226 *0.221*
Minority Incumbent Cabinet			-1.297*** *0.009*	-2.883*** *0.000*
Δ Right-Left position X Left Party			-1.238*** *0.009*	-0.590 *0.418*
Δ Right-Left position			1.342*** *0.000*	0.545 *0.360*
Left Party			1.966*** *0.000*	1.961*** *0.000*
Majoritarian elections			0.772*** *0.004*	1.680*** *0.002*
Δ Mean Country ENMI(t-1)			-0.062 *0.129*	-0.059 *0.393*
ENMI(t-1)	0.584*** *0.000*	0.56*** *0.000*	0.522*** *0.000*	0.456*** *0.000*
Constant	5.438*** *0.000*	6.255*** *0.000*	5.3*** *0.000*	6.500*** *0.000*
χ^2	674.116	244.856	809.821	302.9638
N	1415	529	1415	529

Estimates use cross-sectional time series standard errors and include a lag of the dependent variable of one election to correct for autocorrelation. Standard errors are corrected using the random effects treating the party as the panel variable. The independent variables are measured as the difference in the variables value between elections. The estimated p-values are included underneath the coefficient estimates. Two-tailed significance tests indicate significance at * p<.1, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01.

Table 2.3 Hypotheses and supporting evidence

Hypothesis	Supportive evidence
H2a) Political parties decrease the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when their primary issue becomes more salient to the public.	Not supported
H2b) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms relative to opposition parties.	Supported
H2c) Government parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when the economy is performing well.	Supported
H2d) Opposition parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when the economy is performing well.	Supported
H2e) Political parties increase the number of issues they include in their electoral platforms when they increase their votes in the previous election.	Supported

CHAPTER 3
JANUS FACED PARTIES? HOW PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS USE
PROCEDURAL RULES TO CONSTRUCT AND IMAGE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY

> …[I]ncumbents would do well to maintain symbolic visibility but to diffuse political responsibility. In the election debates, they can then obscure the weaknesses of their incumbency by blaming them on others who shared power.

> Powell, Bingham and Guy Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context."

> If politicians consider detailed policy provisions in an open legislative assembly… voters will be in a position to learn far more about the policy positions of various actors than if vague legislative statutes push the actual details of policy choice in to the less open forum of the executive.

> John Huber and Charles Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion*

Following the 1997 parliamentary elections in France, the PS leader, Lionel Jospin formed a governing coalition with the other parties of the left. Although the two major coalition parties, the PCF and the PS, disagreed on how quickly they should enact their policy agenda, the coalition began quickly creating legislation in its first year (Hainsworth 1998, Lazardeux 2009). The coalition lasted until the next parliamentary election scheduled in 2002, despite policy disagreements between coalition parties and President Chirac. In contrast to expectations from traditional theories of legislative behavior, the "Plural Left" coalition made relatively infrequent use of legislative procedures to pass legislation and the opposition called for few public votes. Unlike the position of the conservative government headed into the 1997 election, the parties of the left had only rarely used the prominent package vote or vote of confidence instead relying on a procedure that clearly limited the details of policies.[24] Jospin's government

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[24] Jospin's government did not use the package vote or the vote of confidence to ensure legislation throughout the government's term. 9.4% of legislation used urgency procedures and 9.9% were passed using the public or roll-call voting procedures.

contrasted the previous conservative government headed by Alain Juppé which made slightly more extensive use of more contentious procedures, but also faced greater criticisms for acting unaccountably (Hainsworth 1998). As suggested by the introductory quotes by Powell and Whitten (1993) and Huber and Shipan (2002), I predict that parliamentary leaders such as Juppé and Jospin use legislative debates and procedures in parliament for electoral purposes to create an image of accountability.

In this chapter, I explain the logic behind these parliamentary strategies by reviewing my theory of party issue balancing and procedural choice. I then test hypotheses with data from the French *Assemblée Nationale* from 1978-2007. I focus the theory on the incentives parties face to choose between legislative procedures intended to enforce party discipline, advance legislation, and produce information about the legislation. I argue that governing parties construct an image of policy accountability with voters and activist groups by linking the issues they strategically included in their electoral platforms to the types of procedures they employ. On the one hand, governing parties utilize procedures that highlight the legislative process on issues that they seek to emphasize to voters as their legislative priorities. On the other hand, governing parties employ procedures that limit information about the legislative process on legislative initiatives important to ideologically rigid intra-party groups. My theory adds that some procedures limit information about parliament's activities and that these procedures can be linked to the issues debated on in intra-party debates.

Following a discussion of the theory, I develop tests of hypotheses from the theory by linking data on party policy change to the application of legislative procedures in France from 1978 through 2007. The results from this chapter build on the analysis

presented in Chapter 2 through connecting party leaders' approaches towards the policy process to the issues the leaders' principals support in their electoral platforms. Results from the analysis suggest that party leaders choose between procedures that aid them in passing legislation and enforcing party discipline by considering the image those procedures construct. My analysis builds on previous accounts of procedural choice by directly operationalizing the role of parties' electoral strategies and intra-party policy debates and by considering a fuller range of procedures available to parliamentary leaders.

In the following section, I outline my theory of issue accountability and procedural choice that I develop more extensively in Chapter 1. I begin by describing the principal-agent model and reviewing the mechanisms parties' principals have to influence party leaders' behavior.

Principals and Control Mechanisms

As the analysis in Chapter 2 demonstrates, party platforms reflect the goals of voter groups through the influence of ideologically pragmatic activists and party activists with rigid preferences for policy on specific issues. Party leaders respond to these activists and members because they select the parties' leadership. They respond to voters' priorities to win elections. Once in parliament, party leaders respond to these groups differently because of the frequency that voters and activists can utilize control mechanisms or remove the parliamentary leaders from power. In this section, I outline the tools available to voters and party activists before considering the methods parliamentary leaders use to respond to both groups' demands.

Multiple principals seek to influence party behavior; however, the control mechanisms available to each principal vary in the depth and frequency that they can be used. Control mechanisms can be either ex ante – occurring before the agent acts – or ex post – occurring after the agent acts. Ex ante mechanisms, such as providing detailed instructions, selecting an agent with similar goals (or becoming the agent), and setting up mechanisms to monitor the agents' behavior, are complemented by ex post mechanisms that follow after the agent's actions. Ex post mechanisms can include constant monitoring, or imposing a cost for non-compliance. Despite control mechanisms, agents may be able to play competing principals' preferences against each other and to pick their own most preferred policies, although principals' preferences limit the range of policies (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

Voters primarily control parties at election time. As a control mechanism, voting acts as both an ex ante and ex post mechanism of control. As an ex ante control, voters cast their ballots for the party or candidate that most closely fulfills their policy goals and thus ensure that the party will work towards furthering their interests. Similarly, voting is also an ex post control because citizens can punish governing parties that do not act accountably or generate some form of cost relative to a status quo policy (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Lupia 2003). For example, voters may have punished President Sarkozy and the UMP in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections in France for a weak economy and high unemployment rate by voting for PS or the PCF. I expect that parties' behavior in office is largely intended to avoid future, ex post punishments from voters.

In addition to voters, party activists and members also control party leaders by engaging in party decisions through internal party votes and national party congresses. Although internal party votes can occur at more frequent intervals, political parties usually hold a national party congress or convention prior to an election. In these national party congresses, the membership frequently votes on proposals for the party's electoral platform and directly selects the party's leadership and candidates. The extent to which party members directly participate in the party's decision making process varies across parties and elections (Hazan and Rahat 2006). For example, the PS in France meets at a national convention at least every three years and before elections to vote on the party's direction and leadership including representatives from each region proportional to the size of the membership from that region ("Statuts du Parti Socialiste: Mis à jour après le Congrès du Mans").

Through institutionalized or less formal factions, intra-party groups influence the selection of leaders and party platforms on a regular interval in numerous countries. For example, multiple political outcomes such as electoral reforms, selection of the prime minister and even policy directions were highly determined by the relative strength of factions in Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (Richardson 2001, McElwain 2008). Factions in numerous advanced democracies also influence party policies. In particular, Harmel and Tan (2003) demonstrate that changes in dominant factions of parties within the UK and Germany had a substantial influence on the policy proposals parties included in their platforms.

Therefore, the degree to which party activists control their leaders and candidates depends on their relative importance in the party decision-making structure. When party

members directly propose and choose the party's electoral platforms and leadership, there exists the potential for party members to influence their officials through both ex ante and ex post controls. Party members can impose ex ante control based on their ability to choose a platform and leaders with similar goals. In particular, I expect that party factions within the membership will propose leaders and candidates with similar policy goals. By selecting leadership with similar goals, these factions decrease the chance that the leader will seek policy goals different from their own. Party members can also impose ex post controls over their leaders in party congresses by choosing new leaders or platforms in the following party convention (Hazan and Rahat 2006). Party members also influence the party's goals and learn about the party's activities through local and regional meetings that occur more frequently (Hazan and Rahat 2006).

Generally, both voters and party activists control party leaders and candidates through elections. The primary difference between these controls is the frequency with which they occur and the number of options they are offered. While voters can only choose to cast a vote for a party with a pre-written platform and selected leader, party activists have the opportunity to vote on the party's priorities, leaders and candidates. Intra-party votes occur prior to an election and at regular intervals between national elections through national party congresses, as discussed in the French PS.

In the following section, I discuss the principal-agent model when there are multiple agents and consider the importance of an information asymmetry between principals. I then explain the implications of this asymmetry for how parties develop legislation and take advantage of this information asymmetry through legislative signals.

Principals, Information and the Policy Process

Following from the principal-agent framework, the ability of a principal to punish agents acting unaccountably through an ex post control mechanism largely depends on the amount of information the principal has about the agent's behavior. A principal without information of the agent's behavior will be unable to accurately punish or threaten to punish an agent for errant behavior (McCarty and Meirowitz 2009). While both voters and intra-party groups use elections to influence party behavior, party leaders have a greater informational advantage over voters than they do over internal factions.

In a principal-agent framework, an information asymmetry is when the agent has greater information about the agent's behavior than the principal. Differences in the information asymmetries between principals and agents leads to greater influence over the agent's behavior because the principal with greater information will be able to more accurately punish or reward the agent for their behavior (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Carey 2009).

Although voters have access to multiple sources of information about government behavior, they tend to be uninformed. For example, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) find evidence that voters rely foremost on partisan cues for information about their representatives. Many scholars find evidence, however, that legislative voting records are a potential source of information about legislator behavior for more informed voters (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Carey 2009). In particular, Carey (2009) argues that legislative voting records provide voters with information about government behavior.

While voters may use public voting records as a source of information about government behavior, legislative voting records do not present a full picture of the

parliament's activities. Several factors indicate public or roll-call votes may not be as directly representative of the legislature's activities as some studies suggest. Roll call votes are not utilized systematically on a representative sample of the total legislation; their use varies widely across democracies, and representatives can often abstain or simply not show up to avoid voting (Loewenberg 2008; Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Carruba et al. 2009; Clinton and Lapinsky 2009). Therefore, public vote records are not necessarily a representative sample of the legislation governing parties propose and may mislead voters on the government's actual activities (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Carey 2009).

However, voters may use roll call votes to assess the parliament's legislative activities anyways (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). If voters use public votes as their primary source of information, legislative leaders should purposefully use public votes to develop an image separate from the greater legislative agenda. Carey (2009) notes that opposition parties frequently frustrate government attempts to develop a specific image by calling for public votes on legislation the government prefers to avoid publicizing.

While most research on parliamentary procedures and position taking focus on roll-call voting procedures, parliamentary rules provide additional tools to develop and pass legislation that also shape information about its priorities. Other legislative procedures convey information about the relative preferences of the parties in parliament. These rules and procedures allow for debate, force parties and representatives to vote on a substantial number of detailed amendments, and highlight the government's proposals (Döring 2001). For example, the rules in the French *Assemblée Nationale* place few limits on the number and type of amendments opposition parties can submit to vote on.

Therefore, the opposition can use roll call votes and amendment procedures to highlight

parliaments work on legislation (Huber 1996).

   The French constitution also provides for the *vote bloqué* or the package vote,

which allows the prime minister to submit legislation to parliament for an up or down

vote without the addition of opposition amendments. However, the constitution forces the

parliament to first vote on each of the previously proposed amendments. As an electoral

strategy, prime ministers in France have allowed representatives supporting the

government to distinguish their exact preferences by voting on amendments, before

forcing a final vote on the prime minister's most preferred legislation (Huber 1996).

While the roll call votes and amendment procedures may increase the information about

parties' preferences, party leaders can then contain the ability of the opposition to

highlight the government's behavior by voting on a larger more complex law.

   Like the package vote, some procedures limit the degree to which the details of

legislation are discussed or emphasized. These procedures avoid debate through control

of the legislative voting order, time for debate, or the details of the legislation. For

example, the guillotine procedure available to the prime minister of the House of

Commons in the United Kingdom strictly limits the voting order and period for

discussion of legislation (Döring 2003). Delegating the details of legislation to the

executive limits the opposition's ability to amend or highlight those policies (Huber and

Shipan 2002). While substantial literature details the behavior of legislative leaders to

secure their most preferred policies using legislative procedures, the extent to which party

leaders use these procedures to limit or broadcast information about their legislative

agendas to their principals is a relatively unexplored topic.

I argue that parliamentary leaders choose between legislative procedures intended to develop and pass legislation based on the information those procedures make available to their principals. Whereas legislation passed with few or no legislative procedures reflects the everyday business of running government, parliamentary leaders have good reason to cultivate an image with their principals to avoid future punishment. I expect that parliamentary leaders choose among legislative procedures to highlight or de-emphasize legislation to their principals.

In particular, legislative procedures have two roles in conveying information about government policy: information generation and information protection. Information generating procedures that draw attention to the government may increase the saliency of a set of policies or an issue. For example, roll-call voting procedures provide opposition parties with the chance to highlight the legislative process and force parties to reveal their detailed preferences on the minutiae of legislation through the amendment process (Döring 2001). The media may also report on the application of these legislative procedures, highlighting the legislative disagreement in the process.

I label these legislative tools, such as the roll call vote, *information generating procedures* because they allow for and encourage debate with opposition groups and frequently attract media attention on the issues the government addresses. By anticipating reactions from opposition parties and media attention, parties can bring attention to the issues they seek to emphasize to voters. Political parties may invoke procedures to provide information about their activities or their opposition's activities in government to voters. Huber's (1996) approach suggests a similar process in which legislative procedures are used to protect legislative coalitions from defections for electoral reasons

by allowing dissenting members to express disagreement before being forced to vote for legislation using the package vote.

Although many studies of legislative accountability focus on the information that roll-call votes provide to uninformed citizens (Döring1995; Loewenberg 2008; Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Carruba et al. 2009; Clinton and Lapinsky 2009), fewer scholars consider the degree to which procedures can also limit the information available. Other legislative procedures, however, leave less legislative space for public contestation and debate. I propose that procedures that delegate powers to the government (away from the broader parliament), limit debate, or limit the details of legislation to be voted on may serve similar bargaining purposes as other procedures. These procedures help resolve tough legislative disagreements within parties (or within a coalition) without highlighting the disagreements and sending information about unpopular legislative outcomes.

I label these procedures *information protecting procedures* because they suppress the ability of parties to seize on these issues by avoiding open debate on the details of legislation. The closed rule limiting amendments to legislation passed from committees in the US Congress, executive decrees in many presidential systems, legislative decree rules allowing the executive to set details of laws in France, and more generally laws limiting the role of individual legislators in the legislative process protect legislative bargains within and between parties without allowing for divisive debates.[25] Similar to information generating procedures, information protecting procedures provide the governing parties substantial control over the details of policy, but without facing

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[25] This distinction is similar to Cox's (2000) and Döring's (1995) discussion of the type of agenda control. Control over the voting order of the plenary agenda, including the period for debate, constrains the information available about the legislative process more than blunt controls over the details of the amendments adopted.

potentially embarrassing policy debates and highlighting the government's behavior to relatively uninterested voters. In addition to providing means to pass legislation that protects legislative bargains from potential opposition groups (Huber 1996; Döring 2003), these procedures also limit information about the details of the legislation passed to voters by reducing the length and the subject of the debate or delegating the details of the legislation.

The key distinguishing feature between information generating and protecting procedures is that the first set of procedures highlights policy debates by providing the opposition parties and groups a forum to publicize and critique the legislative process. On the other hand, protective procedures minimize the potential for critiquing policies during the legislative process by controlling or obscuring the voting process. I contend that strict agenda control and delegation powers minimize the appearance of public conflict while the imposition of rules, such as roll-call procedures increase the visibility of legislation and the parliament's preferences. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis;

> *H3a) Political parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to their voters.*

Assuming that legislative procedures have a key role in signaling information about the government's legislative behavior, governing parties can use legislative procedures to send signals to their principals. I expect that the choice of signals depends on the information asymmetry between the principals. If an information asymmetry exists between the party and its principals then governing parties may be able to foster a positive reputation for policy accountability with less informed principals through the signals they send about their legislative activities, regardless of their actual policy

accountability (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Carey 2009). For example, a party may pass legislation addressing some environmental reforms using an information generating procedure to appease voter groups, while focusing most of their legislative resources on other policy areas such as health care or education policies.

Following from the theory, I argue that political parties use legislative procedures to construct an image of accountability. Because voter groups are less informed and connected to parties' behavior in government, I expect that governing parties use information generating procedures to highlight their legislative activities on issues that they addressed to attract voter support. While the government maintains the sole authority to implement many procedures, opposition parties can call for public votes in most parliaments (Loewenberg 2008; Carey 2009). Opposition parties can also take advantage of information generating procedures to broadcast their policy agendas to voters. Although opposition parties may have little role in crafting policy or the greater policy agenda in some parliaments, I predict that they still seek to demonstrate their accountability on issues that they use to attract voter support.

Therefore, I also expect that opposition parties use information generating procedures to highlight aspects of the government's agenda that might harm their image of accountability with voters. Unlike Carey (2009), I argue that governing parties can limit the damage from opposition supported roll-call votes through information protecting procedures. In particular, governing parties decrease the effect of opposition-led information generating procedures by minimizing public details of the legislation. Because intra-party groups have greater access to information about the party's behavior, parties will provide more direct information to party activists at party meetings and

newsletters about their policy activities. Therefore, I predict that governing parties will utilize information protecting procedures to pass legislation on issues important to party activists. Because opposition parties use information generating procedures to highlight government's lack of accountability with voter goals, opposition parties invoke information generating procedures on issues that governing parties address to motivate party activists. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis;

> *H3b) Opposition parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to government party activists.*

> *H3c) Governing parties utilize information protecting procedures on issues important to party activists.*

While opposition parties may use information generating procedures to highlight their own platforms and to embarrass governing parties, the government has the ability through information protecting procedures to reduce the impact of those procedures as well. Governing parties may seek to limit the details of legislation highlighted through an information generating procedure to avoid appearing unaccountable. Government leaders may also to keep opposition parties from being able to highlight their goals from voters. Therefore, I expect the following to hold;

> *H3d) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues highlighted previously by information generating procedures.*

> *H3e) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues important to opposition party voters.*

Finally, the discussion of legislative procedures up to this point has largely assumed that the government consists of one or only a few parties with similar policy

goals. In most parliamentary democracies this is unrealistic because governments frequently include multiple political parties with diverse political preferences that support the prime minister and the cabinet. Further, in diverse coalitions with high levels of ideological disagreement, governing parties may be incapable of passing legislation on a number of issues, much less agree on which issues to publicize or de-emphasize (Tsebelis 2002).

I expect that coalition governments will be less capable of purposefully constructing their image through information generating and protecting procedures controlled by the government. The extent to which coalitions can agree to use procedures will depend on the relative disagreement between coalition parties. Coalition governments that hold relatively similar ideologies will use procedures to construct the parties' image more easily than coalitions with more divergent ideologies. Both to avoid seeming unaccountable and to avoid large policy compromise, ideological divergent coalitions should generate little output. Coalition parties should seek to avoid publicizing information about government policy as the coalition party preferences diverge. For example, based on the theory, I predict that the grand coalition in Germany between the two largest ideological competitors Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) starting in 2005 would use fewer procedures than a more ideological cohesive coalition, such as the coalition that formed in 2009 between the economically liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the conservative CDU. Therefore, this logic leads to the following hypothesis;

> *H3f) Coalition governments utilize fewer procedures as the level of ideological disagreement increases between coalition parties.*

Data and Methods

To test the hypotheses, I combine data on party policy change, legislative

procedures, and the policy content of legislation in France from 1978-2007. I argue that

France is an appropriate, although difficult, first test of the theory for a number of

reasons. First, the electoral and party context provides sufficient variation on the

important independent and dependent variables to isolate the effects of the proposed

independent variables. Second, French party affiliations tend to be volatile relative to

other advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 2008). This volatility may make cues to

party members less likely, since people affiliated with the party are less likely to stay

with the party in the future, regardless of the party's level of accountability. Third,

political parties in the French *Assemblée Nationale* traditionally exhibit low levels of

party voting or discipline relative to other Western European democracies (Sauger 2009).

Therefore, any cues to party members, despite disunity among the parliamentary parties,

should be considered strong evidence for this hypothesis. Fourth, by focusing on France

1981-2007, I will be able to test the hypotheses with respect to multiple partisan and

institutional configurations such as coalition governments and the presence of

cohabitation (where the prime minister in parliament is from a different party than the

president). Finally, the legislative context is relatively clear, since the French Constitution

provides the parliament with procedures that clearly allow for information production –

roll-call votes – and suppression – the *vote bloqué,* Article 49.3/confidence procedures,

and Article 38/Empowerment statutes). In addition, bills tend to be relatively non-

complex or limited in the number of issues they contain making it easy to classify them

according to a single issue area (Baumgartner, Broaurd and Grossman 2009, Doring 2003).

Roll-call votes can be requested by any party group in the *Assemblée Nationale*. Therefore, both the government and the opposition can use roll-call votes to highlight its legislative agenda to its electoral constituents. Roll- call votes were held 601 times or on roughly 20% of the total bills passed between 1978 and 2007. The package vote, *vote bloqué* or Article 44.3 of the constitution, has historically played an important role in policy formation in France. The *vote bloqué* allows the government to "decide by a single vote on all or part of the text under discussion, on the sole basis of the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government" (Grossman 2009, 50).

Similar to previous studies (Huber 1996), I classify the package vote as an information protecting procedure because it is used to obscure representatives' preferences for legislation and following the amendment process (Doring 2003).The vote of confidence (Article 49.3 of the French Constitution) is similar to confidence procedures in other legislative contexts. Article 49.9 of the French Constitution allows the parliament's confidence in the governing cabinet to be attached to any legislation. Although votes of confidence have been noted to have an electoral dimension, they obscure information about the governing parties' preferences by making the vote over the parliament's confidence in the government rather than the specifics of the legislation (Huber 1996, Grossman 2009). Confidence votes were held 35 times in the sample whereas package votes were used 93 times.

Empowerment statutes or Article 38 of the French Constitution provide the government with a tool to avoid setting and debating the details of legislation in

parliament. The French Constitution allows for empowerment statutes on issues where parliament temporarily (although often for an unclear amount of time) delegates authority to the executive to legislate on certain issues. After the parliament passes an empowerment statute, the prime minister can then write and implement laws on that issue by writing legislative *ordonnances.* An *ordonnance* is a law that is written by the parliamentary executive that must eventually be voted on by parliament. Following an empowerment statute, the cabinet can write *ordonnances* and immediately begin implementing the policy before receiving parliamentary approval of the text. I classify it as an information protecting procedure because it minimizes the role parliament plays in creating and discussing the details of the policy. While the increasingly common usage of empowerment statutes tends to be viewed as of questionable constitutionality by French legal scholars, they have taken on great importance over the last decade as governments have gone from approximately one statute per annual legislative session to over 10 in the 12th legislature (Grossman 2009). Interestingly, Grossman (2009) notes that "there have been more empowerment statutes adopted in Parliament since 2000 than between 1958 and 2000" (53).

Initially, empowerment statutes allowed under Article 38 of the French constitution were intended to be used as a means to transpose EU directives and to implement policy, but have increasingly become a tool used by the executive to deal with issues of implementation. This has led Grossman (2009) to suggest that empowerment statutes that lead to *ordonnances* to enact specific details of legislation may be replacing the *vote bloqué* as a means for the government to secure its most preferred policy. Importantly, empowerment statutes can be quite general allowing the government to

formulate the details of legislation. The *Assemblée Nationale* has authorized

empowerment statutes for the government to enact *ordonnances* 59 times in the sample.

These empowerment statutes have led to over 339 *ordonnances* in the 5th Republic,

although substantially fewer of these *ordonnances* have been approved as law at the end

of the legislation session.[26] In addition, to roll call votes, the package vote and votes of

confidence, the analysis focuses on the empowerment statutes as a dependent variable

because they allow the *Assemblée Nationale* to delegate this authority to the government.

For further details of the legislative procedures included in the French constitution see

Appendix B.

Figure 3.1 presents the frequency of use of each procedure between the 6th-12th

legislative sessions in France that began in 1978 and ended in 2007. Although the French

constitution limits the legislative term to five years, legislative sessions are occassionally

shorter because popularly elected presidents can dissolve the assembly and hold new

elections well before the five year limit.[27] As can be seen from Figure 3.1, roll-call votes

vary substantially across legislative sessions, whereas both confidence votes and the

package vote are used relatively infrequently. Empowerment statutes also tend to be used

less frequently than roll-call votes, although the number increased over the sample

period.

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[26] There are only 45 bills ratifying *ordonnances* in the sample, although each bill ratifies multiple *ordonnances*.

[27] For example, exercising his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament, Socialist President Francois Mitterrand immediately dissolved the conservative controlled parliament following his electoral victory in 1981. Similarly, President Jacques Chirac held early elections in 1997 with the hope of earning an electoral mandate for many of his policy proposals. Parliamentary elections were held before the constitutionally mandated date in 1962, 1968, 1981, 1988 and 1997 (Bergounioux and Grunberg. 2005).

To test the hypotheses on the application of legislative procedures, I analyze four separate dichotomous dependent variables intended to reflect the application of information generating and protecting procedures on a piece of legislation. The unit of analysis is at the level of the individual bill. The dependent variables are the application of roll-call votes, the package vote, the vote of confidence, or an empowerment statute. The first dependent variable is intended to test the hypotheses with respect to information generating procedures, while the three other dependent variables are information protecting procedures. The dependent variables are coded for whether or not a legislative procedure was applied as the bill made its way through parliament. Out of the total 2722 laws voted on in the sample period, the *Assemblée Nationale* held 601 roll call votes, passed 59 empowerment statutes, 35 votes of confidence, and 93 package votes.

Although the dependent variables are relatively straightforward to operationalize, the primary independent variables are somewhat more complicated. Previous scholars that link voter or intra-party groups to specific policies in party platforms use qualitative assessments of each group's goals, surveys of members of parliament, or they avoid explicitly operationalizing intra-party groups' preferences altogether. For example, Harmel and Tan (2003) use secondary literature and party documents to assess whether parties experienced change across 17 issue variables, but avoid explicitly linking party factions with specific policies. Kam (2009) measures ideological diversity within parties' members of parliament in multiple countries with surveys of the membership. These surveys allow for the analysis of a cross-section of parliaments, but limit the analysis to a single point in time. Finally, Carey (2009) includes dummy variables to account for the influence of intra-party organizations at regional levels that may hold distinct regional

preferences or popularly elected presidents from the same party that may hold distinct preferences from the party's leadership.

I build upon these studies by using the theory of strategic issue balancing to create more nuanced measures of principals' goals. In particular, I use the number of issues in the party's platform and my theory of strategic issue balancing to determine which issues are added to mobilize voters or activists. This approach allows me to directly associate specific issues with parties' principals, voters or activists, and to then predict party leaders' actions on these issues in parliament.

Based on the analysis from Chapter 2, I operationalize the primary independent variables from parties' electoral platforms. I construct measures for the primary independent variables as a series of dummy variables based on parties' Effective Number of Manifesto Issues and the change in attention the party gives to an issue in an election year. Data on parties' platforms comes from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al. 1998, 2006 and Volkens et al. 2011). The Comparative Manifestos Project measures the percentage of statements parties include across 56 issues in their platforms. I operationalize the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) based on Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) function for measuring the number and distribution of votes or seats parties receive in an election. The ENMI indicates the number of issues parties include statements on in their electoral platforms and the relative distribution of these statements across issues.[28] Parties that increase the number of issues they discuss in their electoral platforms increase their ENMI, whereas parties that decrease the number of issues decrease their ENMI. When parties' ENMI increases, party platforms include a

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[28] For a detailed explanation of the operationalization of parties' ENMI, see the discussion in Chapter 2.

larger number of issues or a greater distribution of statements across each issue in the platform. The method I outline below identifies activists and voter issues differently when the ENMI increases or the ENMI decreases.

As I show in Chapter 2, parties increase their ENMI to follow ideologically pragmatic strategies to attract voters. Therefore, the issues parties add to their platforms when they increase the number of issues are intended to mobilize voters. I operationalize these *voter issues* as equal to 1 if the party increased the effective number of issues in its platform prior to an election and that specific issue was one of the issues whose percentage of the platform increased. For example, the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) increased the number of issues in its platform in 1993. I categorize "Political Authority" (CMP code 305) as a voter issue for the PS in 1993 because the number of statements in its platform increased by 1.7% (from zero).

While new issues are coded as voter issues when the ENMI is increasing, parties also include issues that are ideologically motivated by the party's activists in their platform. The issues parties remove or water down when the party increases the number of issues are those that are important to the party's activists. I operationalize these *activist issues* as equal to 1 if the party increased the effective number of issues in its platform prior to an election and the specific issue was one of the issues whose percentage of the platform decreased. This operationalization is similar to Przeworski and Sprague's (1986) logic that issues important to parties' activists become watered down when party leaders expand their platforms to attract voters. For the PS' 1993 platform, I code "education" (CMP codes 506 and 506) as an activist issue because its percentage of the platform decreased from 5.9% in 1988 to 4.8%.

As I argue in Chapter 2, parties narrow or decrease the number of issues in their platforms (ENMI) to accommodate ideologically rigid intra-party groups. Contrasting voter issues, I also operationalize activist issues as equal to 1 if the party decreased the ENMI in its platform prior to an election and the specific issue was one of the issues whose percentage of the platform increased. When the ENMI shrinks, issues that parties leave out or decrease in their platforms are thus less central to the party's primary goals and are thus voter-motivated issues. Therefore, I operationalize voter issues as equal to 1 if the party decreased the effective number of issues in its platform prior to an election and that specific issue was one of the issues whose percentage of the platform decreased.

In 1997, the PS' ENMI decreased. Therefore, I code issues that increase in the party's platform in that year as activist issues and those that decreased in the party's platform as voter issues. For example, I classify "Environmental Protection" (CMP code 501) as an activist issue because the PS increased its statements from 3.2% in 1993 to 4.2% of its platform in 1997. I categorize "Welfare State Expansion" and "Limitation" as a voter issue for the PS in 1997 because it decreased from 8.8 to 4.9.

The following formulas summarize my operationalization of the primary independent variables where subscript, *i* refers to individual issues in the party's platform, *t* refers to the most recent election, and *m* is equal to the percentage of the manifesto discussing the given issue.

$$Voter\ Issue_i = 1\ if\ ENMI_{t-1} - ENMI_t > 0\ and\ m_{i,t-1} - m_{i,t} > 0$$

$$or\ ENMI_{t-1} - ENMI_t < 0\ and\ m_{i,t-1} - m_{i,t} < 0$$

$$Activist\ Issue_i = 1\ if\ ENMI_{t-1} - ENMI_t < 0\ and\ m_{i,t-1} - m_{i,t} > 0$$

$$or\ ENMI_{t-1} - ENMI_t > 0\ and\ m_{i,t-1} - m_{i,t} < 0$$

My approach to operationalizing parties' principals to specific issues in party platforms is similar to previous studies of party electoral platforms. In particular, my measures follows the logic of Przeworski and Sprague (1986) who indicate that socialist parties across Europe add issues to their electoral platforms as they seek to attract voter groups, watering down the issues important to their more ideologically rigid activists. In addition, Sened and Schofield (2005) link shifts in party preferences on multiple ideological dimensions as intended to attract voters, whereas party activists motivate traditional ideological dimensions emphasized in the party's previous platforms. Therefore, the measures of voter and activist issues reflect topics the party includes in its electoral platform and the principals that motivated statements on those topics.

To connect the measures of voter and activist issues to legislation, I code each party according to its role in each legislative session: the prime minister's party, coalition party, or opposition party. In each parliament, I operationalize the prime minister (PM) party's voter and activist issues, the largest coalition party's (CP) voter and activist issues, and the two primary opposition (OP I and OP II) parties' voter and activist issues. This scheme does not preclude one issue from being classified as a voter issue for all parties or as an activist issue for some parties and a voter issue for others. While there are other parties that played important roles as coalition or opposition parties in the sample period, these are the parties whose platforms are coded in the CMP throughout the sample years.[29]

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[29] I exclude *Les Verts* in the 11th parliament (1997-2002) because of the small size of its parliamentary delegation. The coalition government could have easily formed without the support of *Les Verts*. This is the only context in which there were three coalition parties (PS, PCF, LV).

Finally, to link the data on parties' platforms to specific bills, I connect the categories in the CMP to their closest counterpart in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). Similar to the CMP, the CAP codes the text of legislation in France in terms of the percentage of quasi-sentences or separate policy arguments dedicated to an issue. Unlike the CMP, the CAP uses a slightly different set of issue codes and does not to account for the direction of legislation. Instead, the CAP addresses the government's legislative focus. Based on the CAP's coding scheme, each bill is coded according to the legislative text's primary issue focus (Baumgartner, Broaurd and Grossman 2009; and Lazardeux 2009).[30] The CMP and CAP do not use exactly the same issue codes. Therefore, I use the closest categories from the CMP to link to the CAP data.[31] Table B1 in the Appendix lists the issue areas I use from the CAP linked to the CMP issue areas.

To operationalize the hypothesis on opposition attempts to highlight government parties' activist issues (H3f) I include an indicator variable for whether there was a roll call vote on a bill as an independent variable for the three information protecting models. In addition, I include a measure of the ideological disagreement between the coalition parties based on Lowe et al.'s (2011) log transformation of the CMP right-left measure to account for hypothesis H2f. Table B2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and primary independent variables in the Appendix B.

In addition to the primary independent variables, I control for the complexity of the legislation by including a dummy variable if more than one issue is addressed in the

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[30] For more information on the Comparative Agenda's Project, see the following web address: http://www.comparativeagendas.org/.

[31] I treat the CAP as the more complete set of codes. Some CAP codes have multiple CMP codes and CMP codes are sometimes applied to multiple CAP codes when the CMP code includes multiple topics.

legislation as measured by the CAP (Huber 1996). I account for temporal dynamics by

including a measure of the number of days that have passed since the beginning of the

legislative session to account for Huber's (1996) suggestion that procedures may become

more likely near the end of the legislative cycle. I also control for the presence of

cohabitation (when the president and prime minister are from different parties) because

the presence of cohabitation may alter the legislative bargaining context.[32] There are

three periods of cohabitation in the sample: 1986-88, 1993-95, and 1997-2002. In

addition, based on Tsebelis and Money's (1997) analysis, I include a dummy variable for

whether the government includes the Socialist Party, since the Socialist Party will more

likely use legislative procedures to avoid having to contend with dilatory tactics from the

otherwise weak upper house. Finally, I include the percentage of seats controlled by the

governing party or coalition to account for the relative strength of the government

because governments with smaller majorities may face greater difficulty maintaining

discipline and therefore require the use of procedures intended to strengthen legislative

discipline (Huber 1996, Doring 2003).

Based on the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, I use a series of logit

models with panel corrected standard errors treating the legislative session as the panel

variable. For each of the four dependent variables, I run the analysis for each relevant

hypothesis individually before undertaking a joint test of all the hypotheses at once. I

then include a final model that adds control variables to account for additional,

potentially spurious relationships. The results from each of these 24 models are presented

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[32] Additional measures for coalition and minority governments were tested for, but the models failed to
converge because of large multicollinearity with other independent variables and because of the limited
number of positive observations for the information generating procedures.

in the Appendix. I present the results from the joint test of the hypotheses for each dependent variable as the predicted first differences with 95% confidence intervals in Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

Analysis

Information Generating Procedures: Roll Call Votes

To test the hypotheses, Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present the results for each of the procedures. The models in Table 3.1 predict roll call votes, the only information generating procedure in the analysis. In general, any party can request roll call votes or public votes on any amendment or law to be voted on in the AN. The theory predicts that parties use these procedures to emphasize legislation on specific issues. In particular, I expect that both government and opposition parties hold roll call votes to highlight legislation on issues important to each parties' voters (H3a). I also predict that parties in the opposition request roll call votes to highlight legislation on issues important to the government parties' activists to suggest to voters that the government is focusing its resources on issues unimportant to voters (H3b).

The results in Table 3.1 provide suggestive evidence for the theory. First, there is some evidence that governing parties emphasize issues to voters using roll call votes (H3a). In models 1, 5 and 6, the PM party voter issues are positively associated with the likelihood of a roll call vote. The coefficients for these issues are significantly different from zero in both models 5 and 6 with greater than 96.9% confidence. For example, prior to the 12th legislature, the UMP included statements on issues related to commercial protections and business regulations to attract voters. The UMP requested roll call votes on a number of bills on these topics, such as Loi 845-2005 modifying bankruptcy laws to

allow the head of a bankrupt industry to remain in charge throughout the companies

bankruptcy proceedings. Based on Model 6, a PM voter issue has a .96 predicted

increase in the likelihood of a roll call vote over non issues.

Based on the results in Model 6, Figure 3.2 presents the predicted marginal effect

of each independent variable on the likelihood of a roll call vote along with 95%

confidence intervals. The dot in the center for each variable represents the predicted

effect on the likelihood of a procedure from an increase in the independent variable of 0

to 1 for all of the variables except ideological disagreement. I present the predicted effect

of increasing ideological disagreement from the minimum to the mean value. The

perpendicular line bisecting the predicted first difference effect indicates whether the

95% confidence intervals overlap with a null effect. The predicted effects in Figure 3.2

indicate that the marginal effect of a prime minister party's (PM) voter issues is positive

and different from zero with at least 95% confidence.

In addition, the coefficients for coalition party voter issues are positively related

to roll call votes in Models 5 and 6. However, none of the coefficients for coalition party

(CP) voter issues are significant and the coefficient in Model 1 is negative and nearly

significant from zero with more than 89.8% confidence. The 95% confidence intervals

for the marginal effect of a coalition party (CP) voter issue in Figure 5 overlaps the line at

zero. This signifies that, although the coefficient is positive in Model 6, the effect is not

statistically different from zero. The lack of significance may suggest the relative

contribution the coalition partners provide in seats to the importance of the coalition

partner. For five out of the seven legislatures in the analysis, the prime minister's party

controlled more than 42% of the seats in the legislature. In contexts where coalition

parties are generally closer in size, each coalition party's voter issues may be more important.[33] Similarly, this difference between the prime minister party's voter issues and its largest coalition partner's issues may reflect the agenda setting powers of the prime minister on the cabinet and broader parliament.

Table 3.1 offers evidence for the second hypothesis on the role of opposition parties (OP I and OP II) and information generating procedures. According to Hypothesis H3b, opposition parties use roll call votes on issues important to government parties' activists. In Models 2, 5 and 6, issues important to the largest opposition party's (OP Voter Issue I) voters have an increased likelihood of leading to roll call votes with at least 97.7% confidence. Figure 3.2 presents the predict effect of opposition party voter issues on the likelihood of a roll call vote based on estimates from Model 6. While the 95% confidence interval appears close to a null effect, the confidence intervals do not overlap the center line at zero.

In the sample, roll call votes are frequently held on opposition party voter issues. For example, the PS requested a public vote on law number 2005-380 reforming the school system while in the opposition during the 12th legislature. The law had an increased likelihood of a roll call vote for a number of reasons including that issues related to education reform were important to both the PC and the PS voters and as an issue important to the activists for both governing parties, the UMP and the UDF.[34]

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[33] A sub-sample analysis of the 422 bills voted on in the 6th (1978-1981) and 8th (1986-1988) legislatures indicate a positive and significant effect of coalition party voter issues on the likelihood of a roll call vote. PM voter issues are positive, but not significant in this analysis.

[34] "Explications de vote et vote par scrutin public: 1re séance du mercredi 2 mars 2005: Compte Rendu Intégral." http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/avenir_ecole.asp#avenir_ecole, Accessed 2/8/2012.

Following from the example of education reform in the 12th legislature (2002-2007), there is some evidence that opposition parties request roll call votes on issues important to government party activists as a tool to highlight the government's activities on issues unrelated to voter issues. In particular, the coefficients for issues important to the activists of the both the prime minister's (PM activist issue) party and the largest coalition party (CP activist issue) are significantly more likely to have roll-call votes requested in Models 3, 5 and 6. The results are statistically different from zero with greater than 95% confidence in both Models 5 and 6. Similarly, the predicted effects with 95% confidence intervals for both PM activist issues and the CP activist issues are both positive and significant in Figure 3.2. As suggested by the education law, government party activists' issues have an increased likelihood of a roll call vote.

Finally, there is some evidence in Table 3.1, that greater ideological disagreement between coalition parties decreases the likelihood of information generating procedures. Hypothesis H3f predicts that ideological disagreement limits the ability of government parties to use procedures for the purpose of constructing an image of accountability. While the measure is static across issues for each legislature, the coefficients for this measure in Models 4, 5 and 6 suggest that the greater ideological disagreement leads a decrease in likelihood for roll call votes. The coefficients are significant from zero at greater than 95% in each of the models. This likely reflects the desire of coalition parties to avoid issues that might make future collaboration difficult. Despite large confidence intervals in Figure 3.2, the predicted effect of ideological disagreement is negative and large for a change to the mean level of disagreement from a single party government or no disagreement between government parties.

Information Protecting Procedures: The Vote of Confidence

Similar to the results for information generating procedures, there is some evidence that parties take advantage of information protecting procedures in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. In particular, parties make use of the vote of confidence, empowerment statutes and the package vote to craft information about the parliament's activities. However, the results are not equivalent for each procedure, as their primary purposes somewhat differ.

Similar to roll call votes, any party can request that a vote of confidence be attached to the vote on a law. When votes of confidence are requested, the vote becomes particularly important to the members of the government parties. A vote of confidence that fails to gain a majority of the AN's support leads to new elections and the end of that government's control of the executive.

Table 3.2 provides mixed evidence for the hypotheses on information protecting procedures. For example, governing parties use votes of confidence on issues important to the PM party's activists, consistent with H3c. The coefficients for the prime minister's activists are positive in each of the models, but the effect is only statistically different from zero in Model 7. The evidence for the vote of confidence is somewhat weak, as the coefficients for CP party's activist issues are in the wrong direction and significant in Models 11 and 12. The marginal effects for both PM and CP activist issues each of variables from the joint test in Model 11 are not quite significant at the 95% confidence level in Figure 3.3.

While there is weak evidence that governing parties use information protecting issues to work on their activists' issues (H3c), the results suggest more strongly that

governing parties use information protecting procedures to limit the ability of some

opposition parties to influence their policy images (H3d). In particular, governments use

the vote of confidence on issues important to the second largest opposition party (OP

Voter Issue II). The coefficients for this party are positive, large and significant in

Models 8, 11 and 12. The marginal effects from Model 11 in Figure 3.3 demonstrate its

relatively large impact. This positive effect may suggest that opposition party position-

taking amendments may lead the government to limit the information about that

procedure through the vote of confidence. Although the effect is positive and significant

for the second largest opposition party (OP II Voter Issue), the effect is negative for the

largest opposition party (OP Voter Issue I). The difference between the government's

treatments of the opposition parties' voter issues may reflect the governing parties'

perceived threat of these parties on the legislative process. The largest opposition party

may make use of roll call votes more to emphasize their voter issues because of their

relative size, whereas smaller opposition parties may focus more energy on the

amendment process to distinguish themselves from the larger opposition party. As Huber

(1996) indicates, the government may collaborate more with smaller opposition parties to

ensure the passage of legislation or in the case of the minority government in the 9th

legislature (1988-1993) relied upon these smaller opposition parties to maintain

confidence throughout the legislative session.[35]

In contrast to the theory, there is little evidence that governing parties make use of

confidence votes on issues previously highlighted by roll call votes (H3e). The

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[35] A sub-sample analysis of the 438 laws passed and the 17 votes of confidence in the 9th legislature
indicates that the effect of these smaller opposition parties' voter issues is stronger in this period. The
coefficient is reduced by half and drops below conventional levels of significance if the analysis excludes
the 9th legislature.

coefficients for roll call votes are positive in Models 9, 11 and 12, but fail to meet conventional levels of significance in any of the models. On the other hand, cabinet ideological disagreement decreases the likelihood of a vote of confidence, as suggested by H3f.[36] As the marginal effect of increasing disagreement changes from zero to its mean level of disagreement, the chance of votes of confidence decreases. This is similar to the difference between the Socialist minority government in the 9th legislature (1988-1993) that used the vote of confidence 17 times and the coalition between the PS and the PCF in the 7th legislature (1981-1986) that only used the vote of confidence 5 times. However, the rather large range covered by the 95% confidence intervals for cabinet ideological disagreement in Figure 3.3 suggests that the results are relatively uncertain about the magnitude of its effect.

Empowerment Statutes

In addition, the results indicate that government parties use empowerment statutes on legislation consistent with the theory of issue accountability. Based on Article 38 of the French Constitution, parliament can authorize the government to legislate using *ordonnances*. These *ordonnances* must eventually be approved by the parliament, but the government can set the details of the legislation without allowing the opposition the ability to amend or directly discuss the details in advance. However, parliament frequently avoids votes to approve the *ordonnances* for multiple years, long after the government has enacted the *ordonnances*.

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[36] This effect may be largely caused by the one single-party government in the sample, which also happens to be the only minority government in the sample. When a dummy variable for the 9th legislature is included, ideological disagreement is still significant in the joint and the bivariate tests, but does not quite reach standard levels of significance with additional controls.

Consistent with Hypothesis H3c, the evidence in Models 13-18 suggests that government parties authorize *ordonnances* on some activist issues. In Models 13, 17 and 18, the coefficients for both government parties' activist issues are positive. While the coefficients are not statistically different from zero in most of the models, they are statistically significant in Model 13 for the Prime Minister's (PM) activist issues. However, the coefficient for the prime minister' party is not different from zero once control variables are added.

Anecdotally, there is evidence that governing parties authorize *ordonnances* using empowerment statutes on issues important to government activists. For example, parliament authorized the government to legislate by *ordonnance* three separate times (laws 1998-145, 1998-899 and 2001-503) under the 11th legislature to reform the laws for its overseas colonies after the PCF included nearly 10% of its platform to issues linked to the overseas colonies and government reform.[37] The parliament passed an empowerment statute in law number 2006-1640 to pay for the state's work healthcare and benefits after the UMP dedicated nearly 5% of its platform to issues of work protections and salaries.[38] Consistent with H3c, the marginal effects for the PM party and the CP party activist issues presented in Figure 3.4 are positive based on Model 17, but the 95% confidence intervals clearly overlap the null effect.

Governing parties also authorize empowerment statutes on issues important to opposition voters (H2d). The coefficients for both the largest and the second largest opposition party voter issues are positive and the effect is statistically significant from

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[37] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/documents/index-*ordonnances*-11leg.asp, Accessed 2/13/2012

[38] "Sécurité sociale : projet de loi de financement pour 2007" from http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/plfss2007.asp, Accessed 2/13/2012.

zero for the largest opposition party issues (OP Voter Issues I). As the marginal effects in Figure 3.4 suggest, OP Voter Issues I have an increased likelihood of an empowerment statute with greater than 95% confidence based on Model 17. The lack of significance of the smaller opposition party (OP Voter Issue II) likely reflects a preoccupation of the government with its largest electoral competitor near the center of the ideological spectrum.

As predicted by the theory, the results in Table 3.3 indicate that governing parties also use empowerment statutes to contain the effects of roll call votes (H2e). In particular, the coefficients for whether a roll call vote was used in models 15, 17 and 18 are positive and significant at more than 95% confidence. The marginal effect based on Model 17 in Figure 3.4 demonstrates the increased likelihood of an empowerment statute when a roll call vote is used.

In contrast to the theory, ideologically cohesive governments use empowerment statutes at similar rates to more ideologically contentious governments (H3f). Although the coefficient for cabinet ideological disagreement is negative in Models 16, 17 and 18, the coefficients are well below standard levels of significance. The marginal effect of increasing ideological disagreement based on Model 17 presented in Figure 3.4 is negative, but the 95% confidence intervals include both positive and negative values.

The Vote Bloqué or the Package Vote

Finally, the package vote also offers some mixed evidence that government parties strategically use information protecting procedures. According to Article 44.3 of the French Constitution, the Prime Minister can use the vote bloqué or the package vote to offer a text of a law for a final up or down vote with only the amendments that the

Prime Minister approves. I expect that governing parties will utilize the package vote to limit information about individual members' preferences, particularly following information generating procedures (Huber 1996).

In contrast to Hypothesis H3c, Prime Minister (PM) activist issues are positive, but not significant in each of the models in Table 3.4. However, coalition party (CP) activist issues are negative and significant in many of the models. Thus, there is little evidence that government parties use the package vote on government parties' activist issues.

Government parties, however, use the package vote to limit information on issues highlighted by votes of confidence and important to opposition party voters. Suggesting additional evidence for the theory (H3d), the coefficients for roll call votes in Models 22, 23 and 24 are even larger than those for empowerment statutes and are statistically different from zero at the 99.99% confidence levels. Roll call votes greatly increase the likelihood of the package vote, as Huber's (1996) study might suggest. The marginal effects based on Model 23 in Figure 3.5 suggest that roll call votes greatly increase the likelihood of a package vote.

Governing parties also utilize the package vote to limit information about opposition party voter issues, as suggested by H3e. In particular, governing parties limit information on the largest opposition party's (OP I) voter issues with at least 99.6% confidence. Similar to the vote of confidence, this likely reflects the opposition party's attempt to amend and embarrass the government on issues important to the opposition party's voters. However, the coefficients for the second largest opposition party (OP Voter Issues II) are negative, but only significant in Model 20. The marginal effects

based on Model 23 in Figure 3.5 indicate that opposition voter issues are positively associated with the package vote with greater than 95% confidence. Similar to empowerment statutes, the use of the package vote on the largest opposition party's (OP I) voter issues likely reflects the governments electoral concerns with the largest party near the ideological center.

Lastly, there is little evidence from Table 3.4 that ideologically contentious governments use package votes more or less than more ideologically cohesive coalitions. Although the predicted effect is in the correct direction, the large confidence interval for cabinet ideological disagreement in Figure 3.5 demonstrates large uncertainty.

Discussion

As the statistical analysis suggests, the French government parties use multiple legislative procedures to implement their most preferred policies to construct their images of accountability. The specific procedure used, however, reflects both the informational impact of the procedure and the legislative needs of the government. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1. While procedures have been long noted to be used to maintain legislative discipline and to expedite the legislative process (Huber 1996; Döring 2001 and 2003), I find evidence here that parties in governments are aware of the role procedures play in constructing an image of accountability with multiple extra-legislative groups, or principals.

Governments choose between legislative procedures that allow them to influence legislation based on the information those procedures provide to groups important to the future electoral, governing and policy success of the party. While others have sought to develop the degree to which parties are accountable to their principals (for example, see

Carey 2009), this analysis suggests that parties use a broader range of legislative procedures than previous studies suggest. In addition, I add that the specific issues important to parties' principals can be linked to parties' attempts to construct an image of accountability.

For example, all parties in parliament use roll call votes to increase information about their voters' issues. While there is clearer evidence of the theory in terms of roll call votes, the results for each procedure indicate a somewhat complex relationship between the issues in parties' platforms and their use of information generating or protecting procedures. Similarly, opposition parties may seek to highlight coalition parties' activist issues to embarrass the government, as shown by the PS' and PCF's requests for roll call votes on education policies in the 12th legislature.

In contrast to roll call votes, governing parties have greater control over the usage of information protecting procedures. To limit information about their policies for party activists, governing parties use both votes of confidence and empowerment statutes to limit information about these issues to voters. While votes of confidence allow the government to change the topic of the vote from policy to the confidence in the government, the vote of confidence allows governing parties to obscure information about their behavior. Governments can use empowerment statutes to have a more subtle effect delegating the powers to the cabinet to create *ordonnances*. Although these *ordonnances* may eventually be ratified in a public vote, the details of the legislation are enacted long before they are voted on and provide the government a means to create its most preferred policy out of the public's eye.

Both the package vote and empowerment statutes tend to be used to limit information about the opposition's activities and to reduce information on issues highlighted by roll call votes. This effect is particularly interesting in terms of its relation to government accountability. If the government can limit the opposition's ability to highlight issues to its own voters and to embarrass the government with roll call votes, then policy outcomes may be less accountable than voters perceive and many models of legislative accountability predict (for example, see Loewenberg 2008 and Carey 2009). Both of these procedures provide a means to avoid and limit the opposition's influence on the legislative process and thus the information they can highlight.

As the discussion of the principal-agent model above suggested, the ability of principals to hold agents accountable depends on the principal's information about the agent's behavior. Voters that seek to influence governing parties' behavior, therefore, may seek out information from roll call votes (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). However, parties in parliament do not provide a representative image of their behavior through roll call votes (Loewenberg 2008). Moreover, this analysis suggests that this information is further diluted or manipulated by empowerment statutes and package votes.

The evidence in support of the hypotheses on information protecting procedures suggests that voters will not be able to accurately hold governing parties accountable for the issues they address in office. While party activists are also limited by the information provided by legislative procedures, their direct connection to the party organization and leadership likely compensates for this limitation. The method employed here of estimating the party's ideological priorities as a means to predict legislative behavior may provide a means to begin to disentangle individual MP's' roll-call voting behavior from

their parties' preferences and to assess the degree to which parties are accountable on voter and activist issues.

This method may also shed light on the relationship between government accountability and ideological disagreement between coalition partners. For example, the effect of cabinet ideological disagreement on information protecting procedures appears to be more subtle than the theory suggests, as cabinet ideological disagreement may be more important under alternative legislative contexts where coalition partners control a similar percentage of seats. It is not surprising that ideological disagreement decreases the likelihood of votes of confidence, given that ideological disagreement may lead the government to fail in this context. The willingness of ideologically contentious coalitions to use empowerment statutes and package votes at the same rate as less contentious coalitions suggests that governments are quite willing to use procedures to limit information about their policy activities, regardless of ideological differences. Increasing the ideological diversity of coalitions does not completely limit the ability of governments to construct an image of accountability with their principals.

These initial results find suggestive evidence for the theory of issue accountability in France. As the introductory quotes by Whitten and Powell (1993) and Huber and Shipan (2002) suggest, parties in the French parliament seek to create an image of accountability with voters and use legislative procedures that delegate the details of policy to the executive to limit information about their policy agendas. Other legislative settings likely construct similar incentives for parliamentary leaders. For example, the British Prime Minister can ensure its policy goals and limit information about its legislative agenda using its version of the guillotine procedure (Döring 2003). Based on

the support for my theory of issue accountability and parliamentary procedures, I expect that other parliaments can limit information about the government's policy priorities by taking advantage of the institutional rules. For example, parliaments may be able to limit information about their policy agendas by providing legislative committees with substantial powers, delegating authority to popularly elected executives or prime ministers, or by delegating authority to regional or federal parliaments.

In addition, the results from the analysis also link to studies of political party goals. Scholars of party politics argue for parties' varied motivations for changes to statements of party preferences cross-nationally for electoral and party focused reasons (Downs 1957, Harmel and Janda 1994, Adams et al 2006, Meguid 2005 and 2008). Based on this analysis, party behavior will reflect these motivations once they enter into government because party leaders hoping to win future elections and control government seek to win elections and stay in the party leadership. It will be easiest to observe these strategic cues where there are clear information generating and protecting procedures. On the other hand, governing parties may use other tools to provide information about their behavior if legislative procedures do not provide this information. Additionally, the choice of legislative procedures for information purposes may lead to additional impacts on legislation itself.

Finally, these results provide some evidence to suggest that it is necessary to further consider the links between party ideological preferences, legislative behavior and policy outcomes. In particular, information protecting procedures and the principals motivating statements of preferences may undermine traditional models of legislative accountability by decreasing information about the government's behavior. Without a

representative image of the government's policy agenda, voters may be incapable of accurately punishing or rewarding parties for their behavior in government. In turn, uninformed voters may allow the government to focus on alternative policy priorities. In Chapter 4, I pick up where this chapter leaves off. In the following chapter, I analyze the degree to which the distribution of government policies reflects the policy goals of their principals in light of information generating and protecting procedures.

Figure 3.1 Change in the dependent variable between 1978 and 2002

Parliamentary Procedures
In the French Fifth Republic, 1978-2002

NOTE: Note: Figure 4 presents the number of occurrences of each procedure in the legislative sessions starting in the year listed on the x-axis. Figure 4 does not include the total population of bills passed during this period. According to annual reports, there are more empowerment statutes and package votes than I include in the sample. The sample is based on each instance of the procedure in which it was reported in the official session overview published at http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/. Any unreported usages are not included in the analysis.

Figure 3.2 Likelihood of a Roll Call Vote

Note: The figure presents the predicted Marginal Effect of an increase in each independent variable on the likelihood of the application of a roll call vote. The change in the independent variables presents a difference from zero to one for dummy variables and from the minimum to the mean value for Cabinet Disagreement. Results are estimated from Model 6.

Figure 3.3 Likelihood of a Vote of Confidence

Figure 3.4 Likelihood of Empowerment Statutes

Figure 3.5 Likelihood of the Package Vote

Note: The figure presents the predicted Marginal Effect of an increase in each independent variable on the likelihood of the application of the package vote. The change in the independent variables presents a difference from zero to one for dummy variables and from the minimum to the mean value for Cabinet Disagreement. Results are estimated from Model 23

Table 3.1 Roll Call Votes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	B	β	β	β	β	β
	p-value	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*
PM Voter Issue	0.109				0.533**	0.455**
	0.319				*0.011*	*0.031*
Coalition Party Voter Issue	-0.201				0.097	0.128
	0.102				*0.606*	*0.489*
Opposition Voter Issue I		0.315***			0.242**	0.241**
		0.004			*0.036*	*0.038*
Opposition Voter Issue II		0.033			-0.105	-0.113
		0.764			*0.376*	*0.343*
PM Activist Issue			0.064		0.493**	0.456**
			0.554		*0.020*	*0.032*
CP Activist Issue			0.352***		0.450**	0.456**
			0.005		*0.025*	*0.022*
Cabinet Disagreement				-2.809**	-3.251**	-2.752**
				0.036	*0.016*	*0.013*
Days in Office						0.0003**
						0.024
Multiple Issues in Legislation						0.459***
						0.001
Cohabitation						0.897***
						0.001
Left Government						0.484
						0.113
% Government Seats						0.330
						0.826
Constant	-1.628***	-1.803***	-1.783***	-1.268***	-1.903***	-2.771***
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.004*
AIC	2355.448	2350.554	2350.545	2353.260	2343.886	2327.674
BIC	2379.084	2374.190	2374.182	2370.988	2397.068	2410.401
Log-Likelihood	-1173.724	-1171.277	-1171.273	-1173.63	-1162.943	-1149.837
N	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722

Note: Models in Table 3.1 predict the likelihood of a roll call vote. All significance tests are two tailed tests of the hypotheses. Significance * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. See the Data and Methods section for operationalizations of the hypotheses. Coefficient estimates predict the likelihood of an information generating procedure being used by the government to pass a legislative item. The analysis uses panel corrected standard errors with random effects treating the legislative session as the panel variable.

Table 3.2 Vote of Confidence

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	B	B	β	β	β	B
	p-value	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*
PM Activist Issue	0.681*				0.533	0.505
	0.056				*0.144*	0.172
CP Activist Issue	-0.788				-1.112*	-1.133*
	0.219				*0.088*	*0.079*
Opposition Voter Issue I		-0.130			-0.055	-0.063
		0.733			*0.888*	*0.873*
Opposition Voter Issue II		1.018***			1.037***	1.013***
		0.005			*0.004*	*0.005*
Roll Call Vote			0.389		0.384	0.389
			0.332		*0.342*	*0.337*
Cabinet Disagreement				-6.659**	-5.921**	-5.638***
				0.011	*0.013*	*0.005*
Days in Office						0.0005
						0.256
Multiple Issue in Legislation						0.353
						0.421
Cohabitation						-0.016
						0.979
Left Government						0.368
						0.424
% Government Seats						-1.624
						0.580
Constant	-4.877***	-5.138***	-4.746***	-3.780***	-4.493***	*-3.373*
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.079*
AIC	358.383	355.760	361.074	356.777	352.291	360.115
BIC	382.019	379.397	378.802	374.505	399.564	436.933
Log-Likelihood	-175.191	-173.880	-177.537	-175.389	-168.145	-167.057
N	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722

Note: Models in Table 3.2 predict the likelihood of a vote of confidence. All significance tests are two tailed tests of the hypotheses. Significance * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. See the Data and Methods section for operationalizations of the hypotheses. Coefficient estimates predict the likelihood of an information protecting procedure being used by the government to pass a legislative item. The analysis uses panel corrected standard errors with random effects treating the legislative session as the panel variable.

Table 3.3 Article 38

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
	β	β	B	β	β	β
	p-value	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*	*p-value*
PM Activist Issue	0.634**				0.236	0.269
	0.020				*0.442*	*0.387*
CP Activist Issue	0.378				0.166	0.098
	0.219				*0.623*	*0.775*
Opposition Voter Issue I		0.911***			0.754**	0.695**
		0.002			*0.018*	*0.032*
Opposition Voter Issue II		0.357			0.265	0.301
		0.187			*0.378*	*0.320*
Roll Call Vote			0.852***		0.705**	0.665**
			0.007		*0.030*	*0.041*
Cabinet Disagreement				-0.689	-0.534	-2.357
				0.807	*0.852*	*0.446*
Days in Office						0.0001
						0.520
Cohabitation						-1.329
						0.273
Multiple Issues						0.641*
						0.040
Minority Government						-0.859
						0.506
Left Government						-0.520
						0.578
% Government Seats						-0.032
						0.994
Constant	-4.832***	-4.981***	-4.582***	-4.270***	-5.107***	-4.493*
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.094*
AIC	524.007	518.776	522.429	528.748	521.131	526.626
BIC	547.643	542.413	540.157	546.475	568.404	609.353
Log-Likelihood	-258.003	-255.388	-258.215	-261.374	-252.566	-249.313
N	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722

Note: Models in Table 3.3 predict the likelihood of the application of an empowerment statute. All significance tests are two tailed tests of the hypotheses. Significance * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. See the Data and Methods section for operationalizations of the hypotheses. Coefficient estimates predict the likelihood of an information protecting procedure being used by the government to pass a legislative item. The analysis uses panel corrected standard errors with random effects treating the legislative session as the panel variable.

Table 3.4 Package Vote

	Model 19 β p-value	Model 20 β p-value	Model 21 β p-value	Model 22 β p-value	Model 23 β p-value	Model 24 β p-value
PM Activist Issue	0.042 *0.845*				0.196 *0.400*	0.210 *0.372*
CP Activist Issue	-0.654* *0.056*				-0.726** *0.044*	-0.784** *0.031*
Opposition Voter Issue I		0.566** *0.014*			0.629** *0.011*	0.616** *0.013*
Opposition Voter Issue II		-0.413* *0.083*			-0.348 *0.162*	-0.336 *0.179*
Roll Call Vote			1.985*** *0.000*		1.963*** *0.000*	1.918*** *0.000*
Cabinet Disagreement				-2.285 *0.339*	-0.769 *0.767*	1.233 *0.602*
Multiple Issues						0.492* *0.066*
Cohabitation						-0.423 *0.493*
Days in Office						0.0002 *0.552*
Left Government						-0.907 *0.195*
% Government Seats						-6.699** *0.044*
Constant	-3.350*** *0.000*	-3.586*** *0.000*	-4.127*** *0.000*	-3.144*** *0.000*	-4.128*** *0.000*	0.128 *0.952*
AIC	776.385	772.554	705.028	777.693	702.565	705.361
BIC	800.021	796.190	722.755	795.421	749.838	782.180
Log-Likelihood	-384.192	-382.277	-349.514	-385.847	-343.283	-339.681
N	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722	2722

Note: Models in Table 3.4 predict the likelihood of the package vote. All significance tests are two tailed tests of the hypotheses. Significance * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. See the Data and Methods section for operationalizations of the hypotheses. Coefficient estimates predict the likelihood of an information protecting procedure being used by the government to pass a legislative item. The analysis uses panel corrected standard errors with random effects treating the legislative session as the panel variable.

Table 3.5 Hypothesis Table

Hypothesis	Roll Call Vote	Vote of Confidence (Art. 49.1)	Empowerment statutes (Art. 38)	Package Vote (Art. 44.3)
H3a) Parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to their voters.	*Yes*	*N/A*	*N/A*	*N/A*
H3b) Opposition parties utilize information generating procedures in parliament on issues important to government activists.	*Yes*	*N/A*	*N/A*	*N/A*
H3c) Governing parties utilize information protecting procedures on issues important to their activists.	*N/A*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*
H3d) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues important to opposition voters	*N/A*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
H3e) Governing parties invoke information protecting procedures on issues highlighted by information generating procedures.	*N/A*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
H3f) Coalition governments utilize fewer procedures on issues important to both party activists and to voters as the level of ideological disagreement increases between coalition parties.	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*	*No*

CHAPTER 4
ASSYMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE?

> It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
>
> The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects."

> James Madison, *Federalist #10*

Theories of democracy have long focused on the degree to which elected representatives accurately represent citizens' goals. For example, Madison explains in Federalist #10 that democratic institutions can be used to prevent representatives from focusing on the narrow interests of factional groups. Madison emphasizes that the size of electoral districts, institutional checks and balances and competition between parties reduce the impact of representatives' parochial, factional interests. Following from this early perspective, scholars have further looked into the institutions that limit or control the policies representatives pursue.

Although specific institutions and party competition can increase the degree of representation, alternative political arrangements may also decrease the representativeness of political parties. In Chapter 3, I showed that parliamentary procedures provide tools for leaders to limit information about their policy activities in the French *Assemblé Nationale*. My theory of issue accountability expects that in an institutional context, such as the AN, policy outcomes will better reflect parties' more parochial interests, rather than the broader goals of the electorate because the government

leaders can obscure their parliamentary activities using legislative procedures. In this chapter, I build upon the results from Chapter 3 to explore the relationship between parties' principals and the overall amount of legislation that governing parties create to reward their principals. I predict that parliament passes more legislation on issues important to the government parties' activists than to their voters because party activists are more accurately able to sanction party leaders for acting unaccountably than voters.

In this chapter, I first review the expectations of my theory of issue accountability for governing parties that have a larger information asymmetry over one group than another. I expect that intra-party groups, as principals with greater access to information about the party's behavior in office, will benefit from more legislation than principals with less information, such as voters. I then test predictions from my theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability on the amount of legislation that governing parties create to reward their principals. In particular, I use a Negative Binomial Regression Model to predict the number of bills on an issue based on the issues parties use to either attract voters or appease ideologically rigid party activists in France from 1978-2007.

The results indicate that parties pass bills to appease both groups, although the degree to which they favor one group over the other depends on the government's ideological diversity. Under single-party and ideologically cohesive governments, the number of policies on each issue reflects the goals of the prime minister's party activists, while policies from ideologically divisive governments better reflect the goals of voter groups. These results suggest that bargains between coalition parties force them to better represent voter interests over intra-party goals. The evidence also indicates that the prime

minister's party, as the agenda setter, is in a better position to reward its principals than its coalition partners.

In Federalist #10, Madison expressed his fear that party leaders in contexts without institutional checks would be able to create policies without regard to minority interests. The results of this chapter indicate that coalition governments may serve as an additional check on party leaders. However, party leaders in single party governments can focus their legislative resources on policies important to the party's more parochial interests, ignoring the priorities of the broader electorate.

In the following section, I describe the connections between parties' principals and their policy outputs in office. I emphasize principals' information about the governments' activities and the government parties' tools for conveying information about their policy priorities. This discussion highlights the incentives parties face in government to balance their policy agenda between their principals.

Limited Resources, Information Asymmetries
and Policy Outcomes

Parties seek to reward their principals by providing them with supportive legislation. In Chapter 3, I find evidence that parties use parliamentary procedures to emphasize or constrain information available to its principals to maintain an image of accountability. These procedures allow governing parties to maintain an image of accountability with less informed principals. I argue that parties' image of accountability allows them to focus on alternative policy demands without fear of punishment from less informed groups. In this chapter, I add that governing parties dedicate more legislative

resources and legislation on issues for principals with greater information because they seek to reward principals that are more likely to punish them for acting unaccountably.

Faced with unlimited resources and time, legislative leaders may seek to enact legislation on each issue in their party's platform. However, government leaders must divide their legislative resources between legislation important to their principals. As finite resources, time in session, legislative staff and information allow governing parties to not only attain their legislative goals, but also limit parties' legislative activities (Döring 1995, 2001, and 2003; Squire and Hamm 2005). Party leaders can increase both access to staff and information by paying for larger staff and by bringing in informants, such as interest groups. In contrast to staff and information, legislative sessions are substantially limited (between mandatory elections at a maximum) and are frequently called earlier than constitutions mandate (Strom and Swindle 2002, Doring 2003). Practical concerns such as the amount of time individuals can work, as well as, rules directing how time will be used in session also limits the legislative agenda. For example, parliaments such as those in the France and the UK schedule time to allow individual members of parliament and opposition parties to ask the cabinet questions in the prime minister's question time. Although legislative procedures increase the amount of information available to voters, Döring (1995 and 2001) notes that procedures allowing for debate and amendments provide the potential for legislative delays caused by opposition party behavior.

Similar to Döring (1995 and 2001), I assume that legislatures face limits on the number of policies they can generate in office by time and resources. Knowing that they have limited time in office, governing parties can thus purposefully allocate their

legislative time and resources. Through legislative procedures and control of the legislative agenda, I expect that governing parties, in general, and the prime minister's party, in particular, tradeoff time and resources for policies on some issues to the detriment of other issues. Parties must choose between devoting time and resources to the policy goals of multiple principals with differing levels of information (Carey 2009).

As established in Chapter 3, I argue that voters and intra-party groups are involved in a principal-agent framework with party leaders. Both groups seek to influence the issues parties discuss in their platforms and the policies they pursue in parliament. The distinguishing features between voter and party activists' relationships with party leaders is the size of the information asymmetry between the each principal and the agent, party leaders, and the frequency that the principals can punish party leaders. An information asymmetry is when the agent has greater information about the agent's behavior than the principal. Principals with greater information (greater information symmetry) about the agent's behavior will be able to punish or reward agent behavior more accurately than principals with less information or a greater information asymmetry (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Carey 2009).

Voters and party activists both have access to multiple sources of information about the government's behavior, although voters tend to be less informed (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Numerous studies suggest that voters use party cues and legislative voting records as sources of information about their representatives (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Carey 2009). However, legislative voting records may not be a complete source of party and candidate behavior in office. The

results of Chapter 3 corroborate an increasing amount of research that finds that roll call

votes are not utilized systematically on a representative sample of the total legislation

(Loewenberg 2008; Gabel and Hug 2008; Carey 2009; Carruba et al. 2009; Clinton and

Lapinsky 2009). While opposition parties may be able to use roll call votes to highlight

policies that the government would like to deemphasize (Huber 1996; Carey 2009), I add

that voters' information about government policies is further limited by the governments

use of information protecting procedures.

On the other hand, party activists have a smaller information asymmetry with

party leaders. In particular, through local and national party meetings and party

newsletters, activists have frequent and direct communication with party leaders.

Similarly, party members and activists are directly involved in the selection of party

leaders at the party's national congresses. By selecting leaders with similar priorities to

their own, party activists can directly choose an agent that will see less incentive to

deviate from their own goals (Harmel and Tan 2003; Hazan and Rahat 2006; Schofield

and Sened 2006).

In Chapter 3, I showed that government leaders purposefully construct

information about the legislative process through the use of information generating and

protecting procedures. I find that parties emphasize or deemphasize information about

their policy preferences using both types of procedures. Therefore, it is possible that

governing parties will devote most of their resources to issues unrelated to their

principals' policy goals, but still maintain an image of accountability. Building on

Chapter 3, I predict that a governing party may generate the appearance of focusing its

policy attention on a certain set of issues by using information generating procedures for voters while devoting most of its resources on legislation intended to satisfy other groups.

Following from a principal-agent framework, I theorize that an agent will focus its attention on issues important to the principal with greater information symmetry and ability to sanction (McCarty and Meirowitz 2009). Whereas voters tend to be uninformed and rely on roll call vote records (Lupia and McCubbins 1998), intra-party groups have direct access to party leaders and can punish or reward them regularly at the party's national congress prior to the general elections (Harmel and Janda 1994). Therefore, I propose that the amount of legislation devoted to an issue will likely favor groups that have greater access to the government process or alternative sources of information because government leaders use legislative procedures to construct an image of their priorities to voters and intra-party groups.

I assume that party activists have greater information symmetry with party leaders relative to voters based on party activists' direct access to representatives through the party organization. In general, members and activists within the party gain information about the government's activities through the party's national congress, local and regional organizations with ties to the leadership, and party publications. For example, many parties hold national congresses that meet more frequently than national elections that allow the party's membership to ask questions, and vote on the party's electoral platform and leadership (Harmel and Janda 1994). Therefore, government leaders should emphasize issues addressed to satisfy activist principals because of their decreased information asymmetry.

Although voters have a larger asymmetry with party leaders than activists, they also expect the government to act accountably. Citizens will punish government parties they deem to be unaccountable in the next election (Lewis-Beck 1990; Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000; Anderson 2007). Issues that the government focused policy on to satisfy voters may be associated with great clamor and media attention, but do not need to include substantial details for the implementation and enforcement of the legislation because voters pay less attention than party activists to the details of the legislation. Instead, voters' knowledge of legislation is limited to general summaries and media sound bites (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). From the perspective of governing parties, I expect that the executive and the bureaucracy can use their resources to provide solutions to the detailed minutia of enacting legislation. This allows government parties to focus on other policies by ignoring the details of these issues.

On the other hand, issues important to ideologically rigid activists likely require greater resources because they are more attentive to the enactment and enforcement of legislation. Informed intra-party groups observing the political process expect policies to have long term effects and may wish to avoid delegating authority on policies where the executive may be controlled by political opponents in the future (Huber and Shipan 2002). In general, I argue that the amount of legislation on an issue will reflect the knowledge or information asymmetry of the intended principal with the agent: uninformed voters or attentive activists.

In summary, party leaders change their policies to accommodate multiple principals that hold different information asymmetries with the leadership. When parties enter into government, I expect that they prefer to present an image of consistency or

accountability to voters. Governing parties construct this image by using legislative

procedures that either highlight or deemphasize their policy activities. In particular,

governing parties use legislative procedures that encourage debate and media attention to

highlight the work consistent with their party platform to voters. Governing parties also

use legislative procedures that limit public information about the policy details. These

procedures downplay policies that might be viewed as inconsistent with their platform or

counter to the image the party seeks to promote to voters.

Parliamentary leaders with a greater range of procedural tools focus their

legislative resources on issues that are important to groups with small information

asymmetries because they can avoid punishment from groups with larger asymmetries

through legislative procedures. Future governments find legislation with greater detail

more difficult to repeal (Huber and Shipan 2002). Similarly, more legislative detail

makes it more difficult for bureaucrats to ignore the government's goals.

Therefore, I expect that in contexts where parliamentary leaders utilize both

information generating and protecting procedures, the governing party or parties will

develop more policy on issues that are more closely and frequently monitored by their

principals with small information asymmetries. In particular, I argue that governing

parties will develop more legislation on issues monitored by party activists than issues

supported by voters. This leads to my first hypothesis:

> *H3a) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to*
> *party activists than to voters.*

While governing parties may seek to produce legislation for both their principals,

their ability to pass legislation also depends on their ability to coordinate with their

coalition parties (Tsebelis 2002). Similar to a veto player perspective, I expect that governing coalitions with divergent policy goals avoid passing legislation on issues on which they strongly disagree. Ideological disagreement between coalition partners influences a number of other political outcomes. For example, ideological disagreement decreases the likelihood of coalition formation (Laver and Shepsle 1996), increases the amount of time it takes to negotiate coalition agreements (Martin and Stevenson 2001), increases the likelihood of a coalition agreement (Timmermans 2006; Strøm and Müller 2008), decreases coalition duration (Warwick 1994), and increases the likelihood that coalition partners monitor each other's cabinet ministers with junior ministerial appointments (Strøm 2000; Thies 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Gianetti and Laver 2005; Kim and Loewenberg 2005). In addition, ideologically divergent coalition partners will likely find little common ground to develop legislation on issues that they hold strong, ideologically divergent preferences.

Following from a veto players perspective, studies of policy outputs take party preferences at face value. They find that more ideologically divergent coalition partners pass less legislation (Huber and Shipan 2002, Tsebelis 2002). Building on this approach, I expect that the effect of ideological disagreement between coalition parties on an issue will depend on the principals motivating parties' statements on those issues. Ideological disagreement increases the time and resources necessary to develop legislation on an issue. For example, Martin and Vanberg (2008) find that debates on contentious issues require greater resources and legislative sessions to discuss as coalition parties use the time to communicate their specific policy goals to their principals.

The analysis in Chapter 3 found that ideological disagreement decreased the ability of the government to construct its image of accountability with voters. Coalition parties that find it difficult to agree on the details of legislation on an issue are also incapable of purposefully coordinating their use of procedures to shape information about their policy priorities. Therefore, I expect that the asymmetric effect of party principals' goals on government policy disappears or reverses as ideological disagreement between coalition parties increases. Indeed, governing parties may avoid legislation on issues important to their ideologically-rigid principals altogether if those policies require substantial compromises. Therefore, I predict the following hypotheses;

> *H3b) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to party activists than to voters when there is little ideological disagreement.*
>
> *H3c) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to their voters than to their activists as ideological disagreement increases.*

In summary, my theory of strategic issue balancing and issue accountability posits that political parties increase the number of issues in their manifestos to attract potentially supportive, issue-focused voters. They decrease the number of issues in their manifestos to maintain and mobilize party activists. Once in office, parties produce legislation on issues important to both party activists and voters to construct an image of accountability. Governments pass laws using parliamentary procedures that craft an image of accountability to voters while simultaneously focusing their legislative resources on issues important to party activists. Finally, the amount of policy the government parties pass on an issue is commensurate with the amount of information the principal supporting that issue has about the government process. Ideologically rigid party

activists have a great deal of information and influence within the party, whereas voters tend to have less information about the legislative process. However, ideologically rigid activists may also decrease the government's ability to act in a coalition setting. Because the activists are less compromising on policy, ideological disagreement with coalition partners on an issue will lead to less legislation. In the following section, I propose a method for testing these hypotheses that follows directly from the analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Data and Methods

Similar to the previous chapter, I construct the dependent variable with data from the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) (Baumgartner, Broaurd and Grossman 2009). In particular, the dependent variable is the number of bills on an issue in a legislative year based on the topics coding from the CAP. The CAP codes each law passed by the French AN for the primary issue that the legislation addresses. For example, a law that primarily addresses the production of nuclear energy would be classified as "Energy Policy." For election years, I separate the year into two segments for the parliament prior to and the parliament following the election. The sample includes 36 legislative years and 24 issues for a total of 864 observations. The average number of bills on an issue in a year is 3.15, ranging from 0 to 36 bills. Additional descriptive statistics are included in Table C1 in the Appendix C.

I operationalize the primary independent variables based on measures derived from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al. 1998, 2006 and Volkens et al. 2011). In particular, I code the percent of the manifesto dedicated to activist and voter issues based on changes in the party's Effective Number of Manifesto

Issues (ENMI) and whether or not that issue increases or decreases as the ENMI increases or decreases. The ENMI measures the number and relative distribution of a party's platform dedicated to each issues coded by the CMP.

In my broader theory of strategic issue balancing, I argue that parties add issues to their platforms to attract voter groups before an election. However, the party decreases the number of issues in its manifesto when the party is controlled by ideologically rigid intra-party groups. In Chapter 2, I find evidence that parties increase the number of issues in their platforms under conditions where the party's leadership is more focused on their electoral goals. Similarly parties decrease the number of issues when electoral conditions lead party leaders to focus more on the goals of the party's ideological base.

Therefore, parties indicate information about the policy priorities of their principals on the specific issues they add or remove when they increase or decrease number of issues in their platform. I use this information to construct measures of the party's policy priorities and the principals seeking to influence the party's policy goals. Unlike Chapter 3, I use the percentage of the party's platform rather than a dummy variable on each type of issue. This continuous measure allows me to determine whether issues given greater weight in the platform lead to a larger number of laws than issues given less attention.

The total number of issues in the party's platform indicates whether the party prioritizes voter or activist goals. The party is more motivated by attracting voters when it increases the number of issues in the platform and is more motivated by its activists' policy goals when it decreases the number of issues in the platform. Therefore, the issues parties add to their platforms when they increase the total number of issues reflect the

priorities of the party's voters. The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to each of these issues increases when the ENMI or the total number of issues in the platform increases. This logic leads me to operationalize voter issues as those that increase in the platform when the number of issues in the entire platform increases. On the other hand, issues that are diluted in the party's platform when new issues are added play an important role in the party's platform, but make up a relatively smaller percentage of the platform as the party pragmatically adds issues to attract voter groups. Because these issues are watered down or are diluted as the party expands the platform for electoral reasons, I operationalize those issues that decrease as a percentage of the platform when the party increases the total number of issues as activist issues. In addition, the party decreases the number of issues in its platform as it focuses its priorities on the goals of its activist base. This leads each activist issue to take up a larger percentage of the platform as the party decreases its ENMI or removes issues unimportant to the activists. Therefore, I also operationalize activist issues as those issues that the percentage of the platform dedicated to them increases when the total number of issues included in the platform decreases. Because the party's priorities have shifted towards activist groups within the party when the total number of issues in the platform decreases, the specific issues the party decreases or removes are issues that they previously included in their platforms to attract voters. Issues that decrease in the party platform as the ENMI decreases are also operationalized as voter issues. I summarize the conditions for the operationalization of voter and activists issues in Table 4.1.

To allow for the potential agenda setting powers of the prime minister's party, I organize each party's voter and activist issues according to the party's role in the

legislature. In particular, I code voter and activist issues in terms of the party's position as the prime minister's party or the largest coalition party. While I expect the hypotheses to hold for all coalition parties, the results should be clearest for the prime minister's party because of the party's relative size advantage in the legislature and control over the cabinet's agenda. On average, the prime minister's party dedicated an average of 3.5% of its platform to each activist issue and 2.1% to each voter issue. The largest coalition party gave similar amounts of attention to each type of issue including an average of 3.1% to each activist issue and 1.8% to each voter issue.

To indicate the amount of disagreement between coalition parties, I use Lowe et al.'s (2011) transformation of the CMP's right-left ideological scale.[39] I measure the distance between the coalition party's ideological positions to indicate the coalition's level of ideological disagreement. I use the absolute value of this disagreement so that larger values mean greater disagreement and lower values indicate less. I include an interaction of this measure with the measures of voter and activist issues to demonstrate the impact of ideological disagreement on government parties' policy outputs.

In addition, I include controls for a number of potential confounding variables. Similar to Chapter 3, I add an indicator variable that measures cohabitation between the popularly elected president and parliament. I also measure the percentage of the seats controlled by the coalition parties to account for the government's ability to win

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[39] Lowe et al. (2011) transform the CMP's left-right scale of party positions to a logged scale to account for some of the issues with the CMP's measure. Lowe et al. (2011) described two major issues with the CMP's measure of parties' left-right ideological position. First the measure was capped on both ends at -1 and 1, so parties were limited in terms of how extreme their position on an issue could be. Second, the impact of each additional statement on an issue is counted the same regardless of how many other statements the party has already made. For example, the addition of an additional statement as positive or negative would have the same impact on the overall position regardless of whether the party had already made 100 similar statements or no similar statements.

important votes in parliament (Döring 2003). I also use a dummy variable to measure whether the government includes the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party will more likely use legislative procedures to avoid having to contend with tactics designed to slow down the legislative process from the weak upper house (Tsebelis and Money 1997). Finally, I account for dynamics caused by the length of the legislation session by measuring the number of years that the parliament has been in session. Similar to Huber (1996), I expect for parties to increase the amount of legislation it passes near the end of the legislative cycle, although I also expect that parties will pass a large amount of legislation near the beginning of the legislative cycle to counter much of the previous government's legislation (Martin and Vanberg 2011). Therefore, I include the years in session and a squared version of the years in office to allow for this non-proportionality. I predict that the first and the last year in session will include a larger amount of legislation than the years in between.

As the dependent variable is a count of the number of bills passed in a year, I use a Negative Binomial Regression Model to test the hypotheses (Long 1997). The alpha parameter for each model indicates that the dependent variable is over-dispersed with greater than 99% confidence. This suggests that the Negative Binomial is more appropriate for testing hypotheses than the Poisson Regression Model (Long 1997). In the analysis, I account for heterogeneity caused by the legislative session by including random effects for the legislative year. I present the analysis in four separate regression models in Table 4.2. The first two models show the results of the tests of the individual hypotheses. Model 3 is a joint test of the hypotheses without any controls and Model 4 adds control variables to the joint test.

Analysis

The results from the analysis are presented in Table 4.2. At first glance, there is evidence across the models that the government passes more legislation on issues important to government parties' principals than on issues they do not discuss in their platforms. In particular, the coefficients for voter and activist issues for both parties are positive and statistically different from zero with over 99.9% confidence level for three out of the four coefficients in Model 1. In this uncontrolled, simple model, coalition party activist issues are negative, although not quite statistically different from zero. The coefficients for these variables from the more complex models are also positive, although both the magnitude of the coefficients and the levels of significance decrease once the interactions and controls are included. Both the PM party's activist issues and its coalition partner's voter issues have a positive effect on the number of bills on those topics in each of the models.

Unsurprisingly, the basic results suggest that parties create legislation on issues included in their platforms. However, the evidence for the theory from hypothesis H3a is a little less clear. Government parties do not always focus more legislation on issues important to their activists. Reflecting the more complex relationship predicted in H3b and H3c, the coefficient for the prime minister party's activist issues is smaller than voter issues in Model 1 and only larger than voter issues in Model 3 and Model 4, once the interactions are included. For the largest coalition partner, there is even less evidence for H3a. The coefficient for the primary coalition party's voter issues is positive and significant in each model, whereas the size of the coefficient for the activist issues is smaller and not statistically different from zero in any of the models.

While there is little evidence that parties create more policies on activist issues than on voter issues in the simplest model, Model 1, the results in Models 3 and 4 indicate that the relationship between parties' platforms, their principals and policy outcomes is more complicated than the relationship argued for in H3a. The interaction terms in Models 3 and 4 account for the moderating effect of ideological disagreement hypothesized in H3b and H3c. Consistent with Hypothesis H4b, the constitutive terms for activist issues are positive for both the coalition partner and the prime minister's party and statistically different from zero for the PM party in Models 3 and 4. However, the constitutive term for voter issues is also positive and significant in these models. For the PM party, the magnitude of the effect of voter issues is smaller than activist issues in both models, but is only statistically different from zero in Model 3. In contrast to hypothesis H3b, the coefficients for voter issues are much larger than activist issues and statistically different from zero in both models for the coalition partner. This result likely indicates the importance of the prime minister's agenda setting powers in a coalition setting.

To aid in the substantive interpretation of these results, I follow Kam and Franzese's (2007) recommendation to plot predicted effects. The predicted results in Figure 4.1 illustrate support for Hypothesis H3b by plotting the effect of increasing the percentage of manifesto on an activist and a voter issue from the prime minister's party on the number of laws on each issue when there is no disagreement between coalition parties. I simulate 90% confidence intervals from 1000 draws of the coefficient estimates from the variance-covariance matrix used in Model 4. Although the effect is positive for both types of issues, the substantive impact is greater for activist issues, as predicted by

H3b. However, activist issues only lead to a greater number of policies with low levels of ideological disagreement for the prime minister's party.

Based on the predicted effects in Figure 4.1, an increase in the percentage of the prime minister party's manifesto on an activist issue leads to an increase in the expected number of laws. A similar increase for voter issues in the party's manifesto leads to a smaller change in the expected number of laws. An increase of one standard deviation (.061) in the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to an issue increases the expected number of laws on activist issues by 11%. The change for a voter issue of the same magnitude is only an increase in the expected number of laws by 1.47 % increase.

The 9th (1988-1993) legislature is a clear case where there is no direct disagreement between coalition partners, as the Socialist party led a single-party minority government throughout this period. Prior to the 1988 election, the *Parti Socialiste* increased the percentage of its platform on health policies up to almost 6%. Based on Model 4, this increase should lead to an increase in the expected number of laws on health policy in the 9th legislature by a factor of 1.1 or approximately 10.8%. On average, the Socialist-led coalition passed 3.6 laws on issues related to health policy each year of the 9th legislature.

Similar to health policies, the PS also dedicated approximately 6% of its platform to issues related to education policy, a voter issue in this election. According to Model 4, this amount of attention should increase the expected number of laws by a factor of 1.014, or a 1.43% increase. On average, the PS passed 1.4 education laws each year of the 9th legislature. These examples suggest that the number of laws for health and

education policies during the 9th legislature follow the expectations from Hypothesis H3b.

Consistent with the expectation that the prime minister's party has greater influence over the legislative agenda, the impact of issue type reverses for the coalition partner when there is no ideological disagreement. The coefficient for voter issues is positive, statistically different from zero, and substantially larger than the coefficient for activist issues in each of the models. Activist issues have the largest impact in Model 4, although the coefficients are never statistically different from zero. In contrast to the expectation from H3b, an increase in the percentage of the manifesto of one standard deviation on an activist issue (.068) increases the expected number of laws by just over 8%, although the predicted effect is not statistically different from zero. An increase of one standard deviation for a voter issue (.034) increases the expected number of laws by 29%. The smallest level of disagreement for a multi-party government in the sample is .014, suggesting that these numbers may be different if there were a coalition government with no disagreement.

The theory of issue accountability predicts, however, that the balance between voter and activist issues changes in contexts where there is large ideological disagreement. There is some evidence supporting hypothesis H3c. The coefficients for the interaction between parties' voter and activist issues with the coalition's ideological disagreement is positive for both sets of issues and is significant or nearly statistically different from zero in Models 3 and 4. Consistent with the Hypothesis H3c, the coefficients representing voter issues for the prime minister's party are substantially larger than the coefficients for activist issues.

To graphically present the results for H3c, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate the predicted change in the expected number of laws on an issue from an increase in the percentage of the manifesto for activist and voter issues at multiple levels of government disagreement. The top row of graphs in each figure presents activist issues and the bottom row of graphs shows voter issues. While Figure 4.1 shows that activist issues have a slightly larger effect on the expected number of laws than voter issues when there is no ideological disagreement between the coalition partners (H3b), Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the size of the effect evens out or becomes stronger for voter issues as coalition partners' level of disagreement increases. The number of bills on both types of issues increases for the prime minister's party as the level of ideological disagreement with its coalition partner increases. As H3c predicts, the effect of voter issues on the number of bills is slightly greater than activist issues at the largest levels of ideological disagreement for the prime minister's party.

Interestingly, these results do not follow the expectations from the traditional veto player literature. This literature argues that the total number of bills decreases as ideological disagreement increases between coalition partners. Instead, I find that the number of bills on the PM party's issues increases as ideological disagreement increases. This counterintuitive result may reflect the decreased use of legislative procedures that shape the party's image when coalition partners disagree, as suggested by the evidence in Chapter 3. More ideologically cohesive coalitions use procedures such as the package vote or delegate the authority to the executive through *ordonnances* that decrease the need for multiple separate legislative bills. These procedures reduce the need for additional legislation on these issues. For example, the single-party minority government

in the 9th legislature (1988-1993) used the package vote multiple times to bundle together extensive, detailed legislation. Similarly, the relatively cohesive (.036) 12th legislature (2002-2007) extensively used legislative *ordonnances*. Therefore, these parliaments may not have passed as many separate laws on these issues as they would have without these procedures.

The explanation for these counterintuitive results for the PM party's issues is similar to the results for the coalition partner. Taking advantage of its position as the legislative agenda setter, the PM party may seek to limit the ability of more ideologically contentious coalition partners to generate an image of accountability. This logic is consistent the results in Models 3 and 4. In particular, the coefficients from these models indicate that the impact of the coalition partner's voter and activist issues decreases the expected number of bills at higher levels of coalition disagreement.

The predicted effects of the coalition partner's issues in Figure 4.3 further illustrate this dynamic. The coalition partner's activist issues never significantly impact the expected number of bills on an issue. However, the coalition partner's voter issues increase the expected number of laws when there is little disagreement. At higher levels of coalition disagreement, the effect of the coalition partner's voter issues on the expected number of bills diminishes. For example, at the mean level of disagreement (.147), a standard deviation increase in the percentage of the manifesto on voter issues (.034) increases the expected number of laws by 18%. At the maximum value of ideological disagreement, the effect of a voter issue only influences the expected number of laws by 3.87%.

Finally, the controls included in Model 4 mostly match predictions from the previous literature. During periods of cohabitation, the expected number of bills increases. As Döring (2003) suggests, the government passes more legislation when it controls a greater number of seats. As Tsebelis and Money (1998) might anticipate, Socialist-led governments pass more legislation than governments led by conservative parties to over-rule the more conservative *Sénat*. The coefficients for the year in office and its squared term predicts that parties increase the number of laws they pass each year, but eventually decrease the number towards the end of the legislative session. In contrast to Huber's (1996) perspective, these results suggest that parties may purposefully time most legislation to occur in the middle of the parliamentary session. However, the current results do not directly indicate which issues the party chooses to focus on at the beginning and end of the legislative session.

Discussion

The results from the analysis in this chapter provide some compelling evidence for the theory. They indicate that the principals supporting issues parties discuss in their platform influence government policies. As H3b predicts, single-party and ideologically cohesive governments focus legislation on issues primarily important to the PM party's ideologically rigid activist base. The results also support the logic from H3c. Ideologically divisive coalition governments take a mixed approach and actually focus more on issues important to the prime minister party's voters. However, coalitions decrease the amount of legislation on issues important to the coalition partner's voters.

These results complement the results from Chapter 3, which demonstrate that parties use legislative procedures to construct an image of accountability. Although

voters' image of parties' accountability may be important to parties' future electoral success, their large information asymmetry with party leaders may make their perception of parties' accountability easily influenced by parties' use of legislative procedures. Instead, parties reward their principals with a smaller information asymmetry by focusing their legislative efforts on the issues important to the party's ideological base.

Government parties' ability to use procedures that constrain information about their legislative agenda in ideologically cohesive coalitions allows parties to construct their image of accountability. However, ideological disagreement between coalition parties can decrease their ability to coordinate their legislative strategies. This effect may actually lead to an increase in the total number of laws as governing parties write out the details of legislation rather than bundling legislation together through the package vote or delegating authority on the issue through legislative *ordonnances*.

While previous scholars of government accountability suggest that opposition parties use public votes to highlight government policies (Carey 2009), coalition parties may also serve in this capacity for their own electoral gain. The combined findings of chapters 3 and 4 indicate that coalition governments limit the ability of party leaders to construct an image of accountability different from their actual policy activities and force party leaders to focus their policies more on voter issues than on those primarily important for party activists. However, coalition partners' ability to influence the legislative agenda on issues important to their voter or activists is limited under ideologically contentious coalitions. In divisive coalitions, scholars should look to the priorities of the prime minister party's voters to predict the government's legislative agenda.

Single party and ideologically cohesive governments face fewer incentives to be completely transparent about their policy priorities. Instead, single party governments can focus their legislative resources primarily on the issues important to intra-party groups and only dedicate a limited amount of resources to those important to voters. Coalition partners in ideologically cohesive cabinets also gain some benefits influencing the legislative agenda to address a greater number of issues linked to the coalition partner's voters, but not activists.

For scholars interested in the contexts that lead parties to act accountably with voters, the results from the analyses may suggest that coalition governments between somewhat ideologically diverse parties may increase government transparency. This result is similar to previous studies that indicate that increasing ideological disagreement between veto players in coalition governments tend to moderate spending changes (Bawn 1999; Tsebelis 2002; Ha 2008).

To limit the fractionalization of parliament created by the institutions of the French 4th Republic, the Constitution in the French 5th Republic gives the prime minister's party substantial parliamentary powers. These powers contrast the institutional checks imagined by Madison in the introductory quote. Because of the lack of institutional checks on the French prime minister, a PM that controls a majority of parliament cannot only focus his policy attention on the interests of his own party, but also use the institutional rules to maintain an image of accountability with voters.

As Madison may have expected, a party leader may focus his resources and attention on his own faction or party's interest when there are no institutional or other checks on the party. The results of this chapter suggest that these powers can be used to

create an image of accountability separate from the party's parliamentary record. However, coalition governance may perform as an additional means of controlling the effects of factions described by Madison. Coalition governance and ideological disagreement between coalition parties decreases the prime minister's party's ability to obscure its parliamentary record.

In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have presented large-N quantitative evidence that supports the generalizability of my theory of issue balancing and accountability at multiple stages. Thus far, evidence for the underlying mechanism connecting these stages is somewhat limited. I provide little direct evidence in these chapters that party activists or intra-party groups moderate the effect of electoral conditions on party election campaigns or that they seek to hold their leaders accountable for these issues once they enter into office. In the following chapter, I delve deeper into the data to search for qualitative evidence for my broader theory of party issue balancing and accountability.

I begin by discussing the intra-party politics and national congresses of the French *Parti Socialiste* in the campaigns leading up to the elections in 1993 and 1997. Following the discussion of the Socialist Party's electoral platforms, I explore the PS' use of empowerment statutes to limit information about its party's activist issues during the 11th legislature. Based on news reports, intra-party debates, party newsletters, the text of electoral platforms, parliamentary debates, personal interviews and a variety of secondary sources, I illustrate the impact of intra-party politics on party electoral platforms, the party's leadership and the party's legislative approach.

Figure 4.1 The Marginal Effect of Issues for Single Party Governments

Figure 4.2 The Marginal Effect of Issues for the Prime Minister's Party

Figure 4.3 The Marginal Effect of Issues for the Largest Coalition Party

NOTE: 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance covariance matrix. Predictions are based on the estimates in Model 5.

Table 4.1 The Operationalization of the Primary Independent Variables

	ENMI	% of platform on the issue
Voter Issue	Increases	Increases
	Decreases	Decreases
Activist Issue	Decreases	Increases
	Increases	Decreases

Table 4.2 Negative Binomial Estimates of Laws Passed

	Model 1 β p-value	Model 2 B p-value	Model 3 β p-value	Model 4 β p-value
PM Party Activist Issue	2.692*** 0.000		2.278*** 0.010	1.720** 0.045
PM Party Voter Issue	3.145*** 0.000		2.187** 0.049	0.213 0.857
Coalition Party Activist Issue	-0.965 0.169		0.266 0.838	1.353 0.257
Coalition Party Voter Issue	5.240*** 0.000		6.747*** 0.000	7.571*** 0.000
Cabinet Disagreement		-0.377 0.356	-0.115 0.816	0.195 0.782
PM Party Activist Issue X Disagreement			9.569 0.124	12.053** 0.047
PM Party Voter Issue X Disagreement			19.377** 0.023	26.317*** 0.003
Coalition Party Activist Issue X Disagreement			-13.779* 0.051	-17.640*** 0.010
Coalition Party Voter Issue X Disagreement			-21.411** 0.032	-24.177** 0.015
Cohabitation				1.766*** 0.000
Minority Government				0.372 0.153
Government Percent Seats				1.290* 0.098
Socialist Government				0.360* 0.059
Years in Office				0.434*** 0.002
Years in Office^2				-0.084*** 0.003
Constant	-0.394*** 0.000	-0.178* 0.061	-0.359*** 0.002	-1.788*** 0.001
AIC	3844.536	3894.833	3847.896	3781.63
BIC	3877.867	3913.88	3905.035	3867.339
Log-Likelihood	-1915.27	-1943.42	-1911.95	-1872.82
N	864	864	864	864

Note: Models in Table 4.2 predict the number laws pass on each topic in a legislative year using a Negative Binomial Regression Model. All significance tests are two tailed tests of the hypotheses. Significance * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Coefficient estimates predict the change in the expected number of laws on an issue. The analysis uses panel corrected standard errors with random effects treating the legislative session as the panel variable.

Table 4.3 Hypothesis Table

Hypothesis	Support
H3a) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to party activists than to voters.	Yes
H3b) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to party activists than to voters when there is little ideological disagreement.	Yes
H3c) Governing parties produce a greater number of laws on issues important to their voters than to their activists as ideological disagreement increases.	Yes

CHAPTER 5
ISSUE BALANCING, LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY AND ISSUE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE *PARTI SOCIALISTE*

The analyses in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have tested the external validity of a theory that answers a number of questions about parties' electoral strategies and their behavior in parliament. The theory offers explanations of the following questions; why do parties choose the number and range of issues that they include in their electoral platforms? How do voters' perceptions of the government's accountability influence parties' strategies? And in parliament, why does the government focus its attention on certain issues and not others? In this chapter, I respond to each of these questions by focusing on the role of intra-party politics in the theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability developed in Chapter 1. Building on the results from previous chapters, I construct a series of case studies of the *Parti Socialiste*'s behavior in the French Fifth Republic. These case studies illustrate the role of intra-party politics on party leaders' electoral and parliamentary strategies.

In my theory of strategic issue balancing and issue accountability, I predict that parties add issues to their platforms to attract voters when intra-party politics allow leaders act more pragmatically and decrease the number of issues when the intra-party groups are more ideologically rigid. In government, parties then focus on the issues important to intra-party groups and voters using procedures that help construct an image of accountability with voters. To bolster their image with voters, party leaders use procedures to purposefully limit information about intra-party issues. They cultivate their image of accountability with intra-party groups through the party organization. Finally, ideologically cohesive or single-party governments dedicate greater resources to the goals

of their intra-party groups over those of voters because intra-party groups are better informed of the government party's priorities.

In previous chapters, I examine the theory using large-N statistical tests to assess the evidence for the theory at key points: party platforms, legislative behavior and policy outputs. I argue that intra-party bargaining acts as an underlying process that explains these empirical results. I predict that the balance of ideologically rigid and pragmatic groups at parties' national congresses determines parties' electoral strategies, choice of legislative procedures and policy priorities in office. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I demonstrate that parties act consistently with the predictions from theory. However, these analyses have not yet demonstrated the direct impact of intra-party politics on party leaders' behavior.

In this chapter, I explore the relationship between intra-party politics and party leaders' behavior by focusing on the biggest winner of Chirac's early election, the French *Parti Socialiste* (PS). I expect that the debates at the PS' party congresses will exhibit greater intra-party divisions under conditions that lead the party's leadership to be more pragmatic, but that the intra-party groups will act more cohesively when conditions lead the party leaders to act more ideologically rigid. The primary goal of this chapter is to illustrate the intra-party decision-making processes that lead up to the PS' strategies before parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1997 and then to highlight the impact of these decision on the parties' behavior in the *Assemblée Nationale* (AN) after the 1997 election. I add to the previous analyses evidence that intra-party politics, specifically members' and leaders' preferences for ideologically rigid or pragmatic policy outcomes, directed party leaders' choice of electoral and parliamentary strategies. The analysis

extends the theory to suggest that the party's organizational structure plays an important role in linking the party members' preferences to party leaders. Following the logic of my theory, the case study of the PS pieces together a dynamic story of intra-party debates, leader issue balancing, legislative strategy and issue accountability.

In the following section, I review the basic outline of the issue balancing and accountability theory and discuss the results from Chapter 2, 3 and 4. I then briefly describe the history of the PS in the French Fifth Republic. To connect the results from Chapter 2 to the Socialist's behavior in the Fifth Republic, I then focus on the PS' participation in government, electoral conditions and intra-party debates between 1978 and 2002.

Following from this discussion, I narrow the analysis of the party's strategy to the parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1997. This section first demonstrates that the key elements discussed in the decisive meetings of the party's members and leaders are determined by the primary independent variables from Chapter 2: participation in government and economic conditions. Next, I discuss the links between intra-party debates at these meetings to the PS' electoral strategies and platforms in 1993 and 1997 to illustrate the importance of intra-party groups on the leadership's decisions.

In the final section, I then turn my attention to the Socialist's time controlling parliament from 1997 to 2002. Previous studies describe the ways that procedures can be used to increase or highlight information about legislation (Carey 2009), my theory adds that parties may also use parliamentary procedures to decrease information about their parliamentary agendas. Parliamentary leaders focus these procedures on issues important to intra-party groups because they can protect their image of accountability through their

activities at party congresses. In Chapters 3 and 4, I find evidence that governing parties use procedures on legislation about which they may want to constrain information. In this section, I highlight evidence that intra-party groups benefit from access to the government leadership and its detailed legislative agenda through the party organization. Similarly, the analysis suggests that the Jospin government used legislative *ordonnances,* an information protecting procedure, in the French *Assemblée Nationale* to limit information about its policy agenda.

In each section, I use primary sources including transcripts of party debates, party platforms, news reports, party websites, party journals, personal interviews and secondary sources to describe the PS' behavior. My approach in this chapter uses a similar logic to Liebermann's (2005) nested analysis where cases are selected for their apparent resemblance or lack of semblance to the large-N expectations from the theory. Liebermann (2005) argues that in depth study of a small number of cases can both illustrate the causal mechanisms underlying the trends from large-N analyses and can also be used to inductively determine the reasons for any shortcomings of the previous analysis. Therefore, I select the Socialist Party's platform in 1993 for its similarity to the theory and in 1997 because the quantitative analysis under-predicts the change. By comparing evidence from the same party over time, I can explore the impact of changing electoral conditions at multiple points as they unfold on the party's strategy (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). In both cases, I find evidence that the underlying mechanism moderating the Socialist leadership's behavior derives from internal politics. Finally, the analysis of legislative procedures in the 11th parliament extends the logic of a nested analysis to determine the validity of the quantitative analyses in Chapters 3 and 4.

In each of the analyses in this chapter, I find evidence that intra-party politics influences party leaders' strategies. Outcomes such as electoral platforms, parliamentary behavior and government policies reflect party leaders' attempts to manage or balance the goals of the party's primary principals: intra-party factions and voter groups.

Issue Balancing and

Parliamentary Accountability Reviewed

Since Downs' (1957) influential study of party preferences, scholars of party electoral strategy have focused on the relative location of party preferences on the most important issue dimension in most modern democracies: economic policy (see Adams et al. 2006; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009). However, there is less research indicating why parties include the number and range of issues they include in their platforms. Budge and Farlie (1983) suggest that parties benefit from focusing on issues most important to their primary constituency. For example, Socialist parties tend to benefit when they focus their attention on issues related to labor rights and unemployment. However, their study does not provide an indication of why parties include a larger number of issues.

From a theoretical perspective, Schattschneider (1960) proposed that candidates and parties will benefit by addressing a larger number of issues. In particular, he suggested that voters are motivated by specific issues. Candidates that focus on these issues and expand the scope of the political conflict may be able to mobilize moderately supportive voters that otherwise would not have participated in the election. However, Schattschneider expected that parties and candidates would only expand the scope of

conflict when they were electoral losers because they have little incentive to change their platforms when they are electoral winners.

My theory builds on Schattschneider's perspective by arguing that that party electoral platforms and strategies are the products of intra-party decisions because party leaders and platforms are subject to the approval of the party's membership (Kitschelt 1989, Harmel and Janda 1994). While party leaders generally favor strategies that maximize their electoral prospects, they balance their goals with those of the party's membership to protect their leadership positions (Sened and Schofield 2005). Accounts of parties' membership and activists suggest that they tend to be motivated primarily by attaining their policy goals (Whitely and Seyd 1990; Sened and Schofield 2006).

However, party members' approach to the policy process differs in terms of their willingness to compromise their policy goals (Kitschelt 1989). Ideologically pragmatic members are willing to compromise their short term policy goals to forward the goal of winning elected office, whereas ideologically rigid members avoid any compromises to their policy goals. Parties include members with differing degrees of willingness to compromise (Kitschelt 1989). Because members select the party's leadership and platform at party congresses, I propose that party leaders' approach to the party platform and the policy process reflects the balance of party members' willingness to compromise their policy goals at these meetings (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and Janda 1994).

Therefore, I argue that the conditions that influence the balance of more ideologically rigid and pragmatic members that participate in the party prior to an election predict the number of issues the party includes in its electoral platforms. When the balance is more ideologically rigid, party leaders decrease the number of issues in

their platform. When the party becomes more pragmatic, party leaders increase the number of issues to attract the support of a larger number of voters. Following from Kitschelt (1989), I expect that more ideologically rigid activists and supporters become more influential when parties lose control of office, lose votes in an election, or expect to perform poorly in an election because of the current economic conditions.

The analysis in Chapter 2 finds evidence that the conditions Kitschelt (1989) identifies that increase the number of ideologically pragmatic activists also lead parties to increase the number of issues in their platforms. Conditions that increase the number of ideologically rigid groups lead to a decrease in the number of issues parties include in their platforms. In particular, parties in government have a larger number of issues than opposition parties and government parties increase the number of issues in their platforms when the economy is stronger. However, parties decrease the number of issues in their platforms when they lost seats in the last election or are in the opposition and during a growing economy.

These previous results demonstrate that electoral conditions lead to party platforms that are consistent with the theory of issue balancing. However, Chapter 2 does not include any evidence for or against the expectation that intra-party groups are the mechanism that directly impacts the party's platform. In this chapter, I predict that intra-party politics moderates the impact of electoral conditions on party leaders' strategies. The party's organization and membership influences party leaders directly through elections at the party's national congresses. In this chapter, I present evidence to suggest that party leaders and the party platform are products of these intra-party decisions and the overall orientation of the party's membership present at the party's major meetings.

In addition, I predict that parties which control government also respond to intra-party, as well as voter demands. Upon taking office, government parties seek to shape their image of accountability with the groups seeking to influence the party leadership's behavior. Although voters tend to have low levels of information about the government's policy agenda (Lupia and McCubbins), previous studies have found evidence that parties use legislative procedures, such as roll call votes, to highlight information for their electoral supporters (Carey 2009). I add that parties may also work to limit information about their policy priorities to voters on issues important to other groups. In particular, I predict that parties also use procedures that limit the details and information about the policy process to the public on issues important to intra-party groups.

Although party activists and members also expect party leaders to act accountably on issues important to them, I predict that they have greater information about the party leaders' activities in office. Intra-party groups attain this additional information through the party organization's national meetings where party and government leaders discuss their policy priorities. In Chapter 3, I find evidence consistent with the theory that governments in France use information generating procedures on issues that they seek to highlight to voters and information protecting procedures on issues they seek to limit voter information on.

Following from these results, the theory adds that parties should produce a larger amount of policy on issues important to intra-party groups because they have higher levels of information about the government's policy priorities. While voters may perceive the government to be accountable because it highlighted legislation on issues important to them, government parties can mask their legislation to reward party

members and activists. The analysis in Chapter 4 provides evidence that single-party and ideologically cohesive governments produce a greater number of laws on issues important to their activists than to their voters. Ideologically contentious coalitions focus more on issues important to their voters.

The results in Chapters 3 and 4, suggest that parties use legislative procedures and dedicate legislation on issues consistent with the broader theory. However, neither chapter demonstrates evidence that party activists can gain information from, and influence, party leaders once they are in government. Similarly, Chapter 3 only assumes that information protecting procedures limit the information available to the public.

In the rest of this chapter, I present evidence on the Socialist Party's behavior in the French Fifth Republic. I build on previous chapters by focusing on the role of intra-party politics and debates to illustrate their ability to influence party leaders before elections and the role of party congresses as a means to increase information about the party's activities in government. I then provide evidence to illustrate that legislative *ordonnances* limit information to voters about the government's policy activities. In the following section, I begin by providing a brief description of the *Parti Socialiste*'s experiences in the French Fifth Republic as a background to the party's electoral strategies in 1993 and 1997.

The *Parti Socialiste* in the French Fifth Republic

Prior to 1981, the PS's experience in the French Fifth Republic was characterized as oppositional in nature because of its inability to win elections for the presidency and to become a member of a coalition government. Although the PS had been involved extensively in coalition governments during the Fourth Republic which ended in 1958,

the institutional changes adopted along with the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic initially led to a limited governmental role for the PS (previously known as the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*). The PS consistently attracted votes at the national level and controlled a large number of local offices, but it did not play an active role in controlling government until François Mitterand won the Presidency in 1981 (Knapp and Wright 2006). Tables D1 and D2 in Appendix D list the prime ministers (Table D1) and presidents (Table D2) of the Fifth Republic.

The PS' poor electoral performance following the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958 was marked by the initial need to seek out electoral and political alliances. Along with the addition of a popularly elected president and changes to the executive's parliamentary powers, the new republic created two ballot electoral rules for seats to the *Assemblée Nationale*. Under these new electoral rules, the candidate that won a majority of votes in the first round was elected. If no candidate received a majority of votes in the first round, any candidate that won more than 5% of the vote in the first round of voting progressed to the second round two weeks later. The 5% threshold was increased to 10% and later to 12.5%. Only the two candidates with the most votes advance to the second round in the presidential elections (Knapp and Wright 2006).

During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), the parliament never included a majority party. Instead, parties organized coalitions to form governments that were frequently incapable of influencing the majority of the vote in the parliament for very long. This changed along with the new electoral rules. Many of the smaller parties under the Fourth Republic disappeared as the party system decreased in size. This consolidation of parties in the Fifth Republic eventually benefitted the center right and center left

parties, including the PS; however, the *Parti Communiste Française* (PCF) (which was to the economic left of the PS) attracted much of the vote as the largest opposition party of the until the late 1960s. Due to the decrease in the number of parties, elections for the AN in the Fifth Republic regularly have led to coalition governments with the support of a majority of seats in the parliament. Along with the new powers provided to the parliamentary cabinet, the new parliamentary context left opposition parties with little influence on government.

The presidential election in 1969 marked a nadir in the Socialist party's support. The PS candidate, Gaston Deferre, received only 5% of the vote in the first round without any electoral alliances, losing to the successor of the previous President's party, Georges Pompidou. The following year, François Mitterand successfully won election to the party's top position, First Secretary, and began to reform the party's direction. In contrast to previous strategies pursued by the Socialists, Mitterand prioritized electoral alliances with other parties of the left. One year later (1972), the PS had signed an alliance with the PCF under the Common Program or in French "Programme Commune". Many voters rewarded the party's new approach in the following presidential elections, although Mitterand did not win the election.

As the PS' presidential candidate in 1974, Mitterand made it into the second round of voting, but lost with just over 49% of the vote. The PS also performed well in the parliamentary elections in 1978 and then won majorities in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1981. As listed in Table D1, Pierre Mauroy acted as the Prime Minister in the new Socialist led government until an economic downturn forced the

government to change its direction in 1983.To highlight the PS' policy shift, Mitterand replaced Mauroy with Laurent Fabius as the new Prime Minister.

Following the economic downturn and a shift to proportional electoral rules, the Socialists lost their majority in parliamentary elections in 1986. The resulting conservative government reinstated the double ballot electoral rules, which had been in place prior to 1986. However, the PS returned to power in the parliamentary elections called by Mitterand immediately after winning his reelection bid for a second seven year term for President in 1988, as illustrated in Table D2.

Following a series of minority governments led by the PS, the party suffered a historic defeat in 1993, losing most of its parliamentary delegation and then losing the presidential election in 1995. However, the party returned to power along with its electoral allies (the "Gauche Plurielle") with the PCF, the Greens (G) and the *Parti Radical de Guache* (PRG) in 1997 before losing control of parliament again in 2002. Throughout this period, the PS experimented with numerous electoral strategies that resulted in mixed levels of success. The choice among the party's strategies, however, depended not only on exogenous political conditions, but also the divisions within the PS. In the next section, I describe the internal structure of the Socialist Party to illustrate the methods that intra-party groups can use to exert their influence on the party's electoral platform and leadership.

The Party Organization

Throughout the Fifth Republic, the Socialist Party held a national congress at least once every three years. All party members are welcome to participate and vote in the Congress. The specific speakers and proposal on which participants vote are organized by

the 306 member national council. The national council consists of 204 members elected by the party congress and the 102 first secretaries of the federal organizations. The first secretaries from the federal organizations are selected by all active members of the local party organizations (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005, Lefebvre 2009).

The national council meets numerous times throughout the year to approve important decisions made by the two other leadership organizations: the national office and the national secretariat. The national office (54 members) is also selected by the party congress. The national secretariat is chosen by the national council and is directed by the party's first secretary. Together these organizations manage the party and implement the decisions made by the party congress in between meetings.

Before the national congresses, members of the National Secretariat solicit opinions from party members on their policy goals. Party leaders then organize these opinions into a single document to propose as the party's platform at the national congress. Any party leader can create proposals to be voted on. Prior to 1995, the first secretary was also selected in the same vote as the party's platform. At the party congress, the platform with the plurality of the vote wins. At most congresses, members only vote on two proposals, one from the national council and a single alternative (Lefebvre 2009). In the following section, I review the primary findings from Chapter 2 for the PS in the French Fifth Republic and discuss the impact of the primary independent variables on the Socialist party's membership before the 1993 and 1997 elections (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005, Lefebvre 2009).

The *Parti Socialiste* and Electoral Strategy

According to my theory of strategic issue balancing outlined in Chapter 1, parties add and remove issues in their platforms to reward their principals: intra-party groups and voters. The link between electoral conditions and party strategies depends on the principals influencing the party's leadership through the party congresses prior to an election. More pragmatic activists and leaders add issues to attract potentially supportive voters, whereas more ideologically rigid ones narrow the party's focus on a smaller number of issues. I predict that the influence of these groups is determined by which groups are attracted to the party because of the electoral conditions.

Because previous chapters present limited evidence for the effect of electoral conditions on the party's platform, an in depth analysis of the electoral results and intra-party debates leading to each party platform will be instructive for highlighting the underlying mechanisms. According to the logic of a nested-analysis, an in depth study of a case can be used to both illustrate the causal mechanisms underlying the trends found in regression results. Case studies can also be used to better understand the failings of the previous analysis (Liebermann 2005). In the following analyses, I illustrate the reasons that the large-N results explain the PS' behavior better in some elections than others. In this section, I first review the large-N evidence and its links to intra- party debates prior to the elections in 1993 and 1997.

The results from Chapter 2 suggest that the electoral context substantially influences the number of issues in the party's platform. In particular, I find that economic growth, whether the party is in government, and its previous electoral success lead to changes in the number of issues parties include in their platform. I expect that the

specific reason that these conditions impact the party's platform is because they first influence the activists and representatives that join the party and participate in the party's national congress. The primary impact of intra-party divisions (between more ideologically pragmatic and rigid groups) is that when the party has been successful at gaining votes, controlling office, or expects to be rewarded for performing well in office, leaders propose more pragmatic platforms. Party leaders respond to more ideologically rigid groups when they perceive that the party's more pragmatic strategies have failed. Ideologically rigid supporters become more influential when the party loses votes in the previous election, is in the opposition and expects the government to be rewarded for its positive economic performance.

The history of the PS during the Fifth Republic indicates support for this perspective, although I find that the story behind its strategies is more complex than the theory initially suggests. Here I will discuss the post-1969 context for the PS to illustrate these dynamics.[40] After the presidential elections in 1969, there were seven parliamentary and five presidential elections. The PS wrote manifestos for each of the parliamentary elections. Figure 12 presents the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) in the PS platform for each election in the Fifth Republic.[41] Based on the

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[40] The discussion focuses on the period in which the PS is the largest party of the left in Fifth Republic. Prior to 1969, the PCF attracted a greater number of votes and won more seats to parliament than the PS.

[41] I operationalize the effective number of manifesto issues using Laakso and Taagepera's function for the effective number of parties. I use the formula below to compute each party's ENMI in an election where i refers to the specific issue and m refers to the percentage of the party's platform dedicated to that issue. The ENMI theoretically ranges from 1 to 49 because of the number of categories included in the Comparative Manifestos Project.

$$ENMI = \frac{1}{\sum(m_i^2)}$$

operationalization in Chapter 2, the ENMI is a weighted measure of the number of issues parties include in their platforms. In Figure 5.1, the number of issues in the election is indicated as an X during the years where the party controlled the Prime Minister and is listed as a dot otherwise.

The PS increased the number of issues in its platform in 1968, 1975, 1978, 1988 and 1993, while it decreased the number in 1963, 1981, 1986 and 1997. Based on the PS' role in government and the economy, the PS should have increased the number of issues in its platform when the economy performed worse than the OECD average and the party was in the opposition. The theory also predicts that the Socialist Party would add issues when the party was in government and the economy performed better than the OECD average.

Based on this large-N evidence, the economy was a major factor in some of these elections. In 1973, 1978 and 1988, France's economy grew at a negative rate relative to the OECD average as shown in Figure 5.2. As predicted by the theory, the PS increased the number of issues in its platform in each of these elections. The PS increased the number of issues in its platforms while in the opposition in 1973, 1978, 1988, and in 2007. When the economy was growing and the PS was in the opposition, the PS decreased the number of issues in 1981 and 1997, but in contrast to the theory increased the number of issues in 2007.

For the most part, the results support the theory for the PS's time in office. The issue balancing theory predicts that the party will increase the number of issues when it is in office and will increase the number more if the economy is performing well. The party

increased the number of issues in 1993 and 2002. However, it decreased the number in 1986 even though the economy was slightly better off than the OECD average.

The intra-party dynamics leading up to the elections in 1993 and 1997 provide some evidence that the economy played an important part of the PS' strategies in those years. The debates at the party congresses prior to the legislative elections included some discussions of the economy. At the last party congress prior to the election in 1993, the 1992 Congrés de Bordeaux, most references to the economy were linked to specific policy proposals with few direct references to the party's strategy and the actual state of the economy. For example, the first direct statement on the general economy at the Congrés de Bordeaux suggested that the party should renew its message by "…bringing together the activities related to the world of work, the economy, society and [the PS'] relationship with labor unions" (Jacques Hableau, July 10, 1992, 23).

While it is hard to see the direct impact of the economy on the PS' strategy in 1992, the party focused much of its attention on other issues presumably because it did not worry about voters holding them accountable for a poor economic record in 1993. Most of these discussions suggest that the PS should protect the mixed economy and the role of workers in the French economy. For example, Gerard Lindeperg, a member of the Party Secretariat from the Loire valley region in 1992 and 1993, stated that "…we should place employment at the center of our debates" (July 10-12, 1992, 34). Thierry Mandon, the party's speaker on social policy added later that "…we will have to explain to the French that our top priority, the primary objective of our efforts is to sustainably reduce unemployment" (July 10-12, 84).

Others related the economy to the broader globalization movement, the European

Union, the failure of communism, the environment, or foreign aid.[42] In particular, Louis

Mermaz, the Minister of Agriculture from 1988 to 1992, described other issues as

extensions of the Socialist Party's focus on regulating the economy.

> "We also know that the state must play its role in the economy, again as a
> regulator and sometimes as a stakeholder…. We need to analyze, we must
> explain, we need to invent, build on what we've done for ten years: social laws,
> the promotion of human rights, international politics, international action…."
> (Louis Mermaz, July 10, 1992, 66)

The attention given to many of these issues, including globalization, defense, and

environmental policy, increased in the party's platform in 1993, but the PS did not

directly discuss foreign aid in its electoral platform. Consistent with the role of the

economy suggested by the theory, the party discussed the economy in this election as it

links to each of these issues while they are in government and that the individual speakers

used the economy to support their own pet issues.

In addition, members of the government cabinet present commented on the

opposition's critiques of the Socialist government's economic record. In particular,

Thierry Mandon mentioned that the parties of the right would argue that that the "cost of

work" and production in France was too high and that France's inability to create jobs

was caused by these high costs. (Thierry Mandon, July 10-12 1992, 85). Similarly, Pierre

Bérégovoy, the Prime Minister at the end of 1992, critiqued the goals of the parties of the

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[42] The PS increased the focus on the following topics: Macroeconomic Policy(1), Health (3), Agriculture
(4), Environment (7), Energy (8), Justice and Crime (12), Urban and Territorial Housing (14), Economic
Regulations and Consumer Protections (15), Defense(16), Foreign Trade (18), Government Operations
Policy (20), Public Lands and Water Management (21), and Local Politics (24). They decreased the
percentage of the platform addressing these issues: Human Rights (2), Worker Protections (5), Education
(6), Transport (10), Social Policy (13), Space, Science, Technology and Communication (17), International
Affairs and Foreign Aid (19), Culture (23), and Sports(29).

right "to liberate society from its rules, even more to dismantle the collective social protections…" (Pierre Bérégovoy, July 10-12 1992, 118).

Finally, there is some direct discussion that suggests that the economy should be a consideration in the party's electoral strategy. For example, the Minister of Agriculture, Louis Mermaz commented that the PS should not "…forget the way to defend our record, the success of the French economy, inflation controlled, the trade balance adjusted, growth resumed and that this puts us in the top of OECD countries…" (Louis Mermaz, July 10-12 1992, 65). Mermaz's list continues by describing a number of additional policy successes, indicating that the economy was viewed as a policy success that should be linked to the PS' other policy priorities. Another speaker suggested that the economy could be used to encourage participation of young people, but primarily by increasing the number of jobs available (Yannick Bodin, July 10 1992, 30).

Consistent with the party's role in the opposition, the debate prior to the election in 1997 took a markedly different tone in its approach to the economy. These discussions focused instead on using the economy as a means to distinguish the PS from the parties of the economic right. Now in the opposition, the Socialist Party was freed to discuss the negatives associated with the economy. In 1997, the economy became more of a central issue in the PS' platform. For example, the party's First Secretary, Lionel Jospin, suggested that the economy should serve as the primary division between the PS and the conservative government. Following a discussion of the economy, Jospin stated that "We must feel and express the aspirations for change, to take our distance from the behavior of the right, clearly mark our differences with her." (Jospin, February 8 1997, 41).

In the final meeting of the party's National Council prior to the election, Jospin's language further highlighted this approach. Although Jospin's focus on the economy decreased somewhat from the previous national convention most of his statements included the following sentiment:

> "The right fails in the economy, it leads a national, European and strategic plan (when you see [the right's] attitude toward the United States and NATO), which weakens the state's economic and social defense of the country and, also, in some ways affects its identity." (Jospin March 22, 1997, 7).

Most of the speakers' comments on the economy at this meeting were negative and used the issue as a starting point to describe how the Socialist Party would offer a solution that protected a large majority of citizens.

These statements suggest that the economy played a central role in determining the party's approach to its electoral strategy. In 1993, the party was liberated from focusing on its economic priorities because of the economy's moderate growth and used the success of the economy as a way to create positive links with its previous policies. In 1997, the economy became more central to the party's platform as a means to distinguish itself from the opposition. The PS linked the economy to the conservative government's platform by demonstrating the slower growth the economy had relative to the previous election.

In 1997, the PS used the economy as an issue during its national convention to highlight factors that decreased within their platform, such as national defense and consumer protections, as well as some issues that they increased within their platform, such as social policies.[43] The theory of issue balancing predicts that a slightly positive

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[43] Based on the coding from Chapter 3, the PS targeted voter groups on issues related to macroeconomic (1), health (3), urban and territorial housing (14), economic regulation (15), defense (16), and government operations policy (20). Human Rights (2), Agriculture (4), Education (6), Environment (7), Energy (8),

economy would lead the PS to attract a larger number of ideologically rigid activists and focus its platform on the issues important to these groups. Expecting voters to reward the government for positive economic growth, more pragmatic groups will see little reason to dedicate its resources to a party in the opposition.

The specific language the Socialist leaders used suggests that its discussion of the economy was still linked to the issues important to voter groups in both electoral contexts. In 1993, competing factions used the economy to support their own pet issues, whereas in 1997, the party's leadership used the country's slower growth levels as a way to distinguish itself from the economic priorities of the sitting government parties. While the leadership's discussion of these issues suggests that there is an electoral connection between the economy and voter issues, the party's platform reduced the relative focus on these issues, such as macroeconomic policy and economic regulations, while focusing greater attention on issues such as human rights agriculture or education.

This evidence provides limited evidence of a direct link between the economy and the type of activists attracted to the party. In contrast to the Jospin's statements, party leaders may focus their attention on non-economic issues to avoid reminding voters of the somewhat positive economic growth. However, this situation also allows the party leaders to focus their attention in greater detail on issues important to groups within the party that are normally overwhelmed by voters' economic priorities.

In addition to the economic context, I also find some evidence in Chapter 2 that the party's previous electoral success influences the party's policy platform, although the

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Transport (10), Justice and Crime (12), Social Policy (13), space, science, technology and communication (17), international affairs and foreign aid (19), Public lands and water management (21) and cultural policies are all labeled as activist issues.

results are relatively weak. In particular, the PS' electoral results suggest an unclear link between the Socialist party's previous electoral success and their policy platforms. I predict that parties that increased their seats in the previous election attract more pragmatic groups and increase the number of issues in their platforms in the following election. The PS gained seats in 1978, 1981, 1988 and 1997, but only increased the number of issues in two of the elections that follow these gains.

Because the evidence for the effect of previous electoral results on the party's platform is mixed for the Socialist Party, an in depth analysis of the electoral results and intra-party debates leading to each party platform will be instructive for highlighting the underlying mechanisms. Using the logic of a nested-analysis, the following in depth case study first illustrates the causal mechanism, intra-party politics, underlying the regression results from Chapter 2 using the election in 1993 (Liebermann 2005). I then study the period between 1993 and 1997 to better understand why the large-N results under predict the change to the 1997 platform. In the following section, I provide a brief description of the PS' experience in power from 1981 leading up to its major electoral defeat in 1993. I then focus my discussion on the intra-party debates and factors leading up to the elections in 1993 and 1997.

The 1993 Electoral Defeat and 1997 Reversal

By 1993, the PS had controlled the presidency since 1981 and the parliament for all but two years (1986-1988) in the same period. During this time, the Socialist Party changed from a party of the opposition to a party accustomed to participation in government. The PS came to power in 1981 at a point in the party's history in which it was dominated largely by the party's ideological left. Prior to Mitterand's election in

1981, the party had abandoned earlier moves towards the ideological center as the major

faction (known as a *courant*) of the left, the Committee for Socialist Education and

Research (CERES), hoped to form a joint program with the PCF. Leaders of the party's

ideological right were mostly absent from the party. For example, Guy Mollet, a leader

of the *courant* of the party's ideological right, had been marginalized in the party

congresses in 1973 and 1975. In the 1978 party congress, Guy Mollet's *courant* largely

disappeared following his death and Michel Rocard, who had just recently rejoined the

party, began to organize a new courant near the ideological center (Bergounioux and

Grunberg 2005, 309-310).[44]

Consistent with the makeup of the party prior to 1981, the PS quickly began to

implement its policy goals once in office, nationalizing most of the major banks and

reforming the labor laws: such as reducing the maximum hours an individual can work in

a week, protecting paid leave, and increasing the minimum wage (Bergounioux and

Grunberg 2005, 324-326). The Socialist Party's plans, however, were short-lived. In the

fall of 1981, France's decreasing exports and increasing government deficit led to a

weakening of the franc and an increase in government debts (327). In response to the

worsening economic situation, the government refocused its policy goals on stopping

inflation and managing the economy. In 1984, the Socialist party moderated many of its

policy goals and President Mitterand replaced the parliamentary cabinet selecting

Laurent Fabius as the new prime minister. At the same time, the PS published a statement

on its changing approach toward the economy. Its position had shifted from a "rupture

with capitalism" to a "modernization" of it (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005, 328).

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[44] Rocard founded the PSU as a division from the SFIO in 1957 over disagreements with the SFIO's
position on the Algerian war. He rejoined Socialist Party under Mitterand's renewed direction in 1974.

Under the leadership of President Mitterrand as both the popularly elected President and the party's First Secretary, the party maintained this position largely until the late 1980s. Throughout this period, the party became increasingly hierarchically organized and dominated by Mitterrand as it moved away from the more extreme left positions of the CERES. Similarly, the party's membership and activists began to face a malaise as the party became more 'presidentialized' despite its previous criticisms of the conservative parties' centralization (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005, 338). Following his re-election in 1988, however, the leaders loyal to Mitterrand splintered into 3 groups led by Laurent Fabius, Lionel Jospin and Michel Rocard (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005, 339).

While Fabius had the support of Mitterrand and the political baggage directly associated with Mitterrand's policy reversals, Jospin organized an alternative courant antagonistic to many of Mitterrand's policy reforms. Jospin called for renewed reforms of the 'inflexible' institutions of the Fifth Republic. In particular, Jospin sought to reunify the executive (similar to the fourth republic) and to provide the executive with a greater connection to the legislature by tying the single executive to parliamentary approval. Further, he hoped to link the discussion of increasing 'presidentialisation' within the party to the broader context of the institutions of the Fifth Republic. On the other hand, Mitterrand's repeated endorsements of Fabius in the party Congrésses in 1988 and again in 1990 linked Fabius to the party's experiences under Mitterrand (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005).

The trend towards greater hierarchy and political pragmatism within the party increased under Mitterrand until disagreements between the party's leaders came to a

head during the Congrés de Rennes in 1990. At this party Congréss, the party voted on an unusually large number of proposals for the party's platform and leadership that were divided between Mitterand's two successors: Fabius and Jospin. In previous party congresses, only one or two proposals for the party platform linked to a particular First Secretary are put to a vote. The final vote of the membership determined both the party's platform and the party's leadership positions. While there may be competing proposals in most party congresses, they rarely gain more than a small percentage of the vote relative to the proposal by the leadership which regularly receives greater than 85% of the vote (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005; Oral interview with Pierre Kanuty, party historian on 08/18/2008).

At the Congrés de Rennes, however, seven leaders submitted distinct proposals that would determine the party's leadership and the party's priorities for the 1993 election. Although Fabius and Jospin largely agreed on their relative preferences, the large number of proposals suggested the importance of the party's leadership and the belief that the party leader would then likely become the next presidential candidate. The ultimate winning proposal was viewed as a synthesis developed by Jospin of the proposals by Mitterand's chosen successor, Laurent Fabius and the more extreme position of Pierre Mauray. In particular, the ultimate vote came down to proposals by Fabius and Jospin and was decided by less than one percent of the party vote. Breaking with Fabius and Mitterand, Jospin organized this new coalition into a new, lasting courant. By incorporating a large number of intra-party groups that had previously been associated with alternative courants, Jospin's new courant was able to outvote Fabius' supporters (Congrés de Rennes, March 15-18 1990). This highly contested vote illustrates

the large number of groups seeking to control the party's leadership and the need for the new party leader to balance the goals of these groups.

This vote laid the groundwork for the larger change in priorities that occurred following the electoral defeat in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Jospin's proposal may have won, but the pragmatic compromise also reflected the synthesis of Mitterrand's and Fabius' priorities with Jospin's new supporters. The shift in priorities would not be completely evident until the development of electoral platforms for the presidential election in 1995 and the parliamentary election in 1997.

Interestingly, the Congrés de Rennes represented a disappearance of the most ideologically left faction within the party. News reports of the congress noted the absence of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the leader of the courant farthest to the ideological left. For example, *Le Monde* sarcastically described the winning proposal as a moral victory for Chevènement's faction as his courant voted against the winning platform. Indeed, the Congrés de Rennes marked the final decline of his faction as Chevènement declared that he would not put himself forward as a candidate in the future and his faction lacked any new "présidentiable" candidates as his previous supporters and friends had already left the party (Andreani 1990).

Further, Jospin's new faction represented a break between older factions linked to Mitterand (represented by Fabius) and Chevènement. This new faction took a pragmatic, but more direct approach, towards issues previously downplayed in the party's platform, such as expanding France's participation in the EU and the centralization of the party (Andreani 1990). This new approach reflected many of the issues that the PS had been forced to confront in government over the previous decade, since the party's pragmatic

change in direction beginning in 1983 (Andreani 1990). Similarly, the compromise that

emerged in 1990 reflected a final break from the coordination Mitterand had previously

organized with the ideological left of the party and the PCF.

To summarize, the Congrés de Rennes included a proliferation of new factions

and saw the disappearance of older, more ideologically partisan factions. It continued the

trend started by Mitterand of focusing more on the party's electoral and presidential

goals, but abandoned more traditional linkages with the other parties of the left. While

there were two more party congresses prior to the next election, the new factional balance

within the PS remained until the disastrous elections of 1993.

The final platform and leadership for the 1993 election was developed at the

Congrés de Bordeaux in 1992. At this party congress, the debates focused more on

reforms to the party structure and on ways to open the party structure towards greater

participation. Similar to the logic of the theory, the expectation of the leadership was that

in order to maintain electoral success, the party had to be open to groups with diverse

interests. Although there were divisions between the courants, the leaders viewed those

divisions as inevitable from the presidentialization of the party as well as the party's

"pluralism" (Daniel Vaillant, Congrés de Bordeaux, July 10-12 1992, 5). These structural

reforms were intended to make the party more democratic and accessible to individual

members.

Near the conclusion of the Congrés de Bordeaux, Jean Crusol, an academic and

member of the government cabinet, presciently described his reservations with the

platform that was going to be adopted. He focused his comments on the role of the

party's program and the activists' levels of mobilization. In particular, Crusol argued that

the parties' platforms, although clear and appropriate, did not engage the party's

supporters or the "majority of citizens" (July 10 1992, 200). Further, the parties' activists

are not engaged by the program for the following reasons;

> "…because the language used in the platforms is too sophisticated and
> excessively technocratic, the texts are too long, because our proposals relate only
> distantly to the real problems citizens face in their every-day life, and because
> these proposals are not sufficiently relevant to their specific situation in the
> district, in the city, in the rural commune, in the departments and the regions.
> Finally, when these proposals are in the right direction, they do not go through
> and are not acted upon [by the party leaders in government]." (Crusol, 200)

Crusol's comments suggest that the party's program had increasingly become

disconnected from the party's traditional activist base. Although he does not directly

discuss the number of issues included the platform, his specific criticism links to my

contention that the platform relates to a broad class of groups that are not the traditional

focus of the party's activist base. This suggests that the platform in 1993 increasingly

reflected diverse electoral interests and not the goals of the party's activist supporters.

Following from the logic of the theory advanced in Chapter 2, the new, more

moderate and ideologically pragmatic party dominance should have led the party to

increase the number of issues in its platform. The PS had gained seats in the previous

election, controlled the prime minister and expected to benefit from positive economic

growth. Its platform followed this expectation. The Socialist Party continued its earlier

strategy from 1988 of expanding the number of issues in its platform. The party's 1993

platform covered both a wide range of issues, but gave little attention to any of them.[45]

According to the Comparative Manifesto Project, the PS dedicated an average of 1.61%

of its platform to each issue. The party dedicated over 5% of its platform to only two

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[45] In an analysis of the substance of the party's platform, I find that a major section of the platform focused
on the government's accomplishments in office.

issues: social justice and expansion of the welfare state. In total, the 1993 platform

dedicated only 9 and 11 sentences to these topics (Klingemann et al. 2006).

In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the PS faced a historic defeat, losing nearly

all of its parliamentary delegation (from 260 to 53 seats). The 1993 parliamentary

election was preceded by large losses in regional and cantonal elections the prior year and

was followed by losses in European elections in 1994. By 1995, the PS began to change

its strategy in response to these failures. While the party increased the number of issues in

the previous election, the strategy had changed by the 1995 and 1997 elections when the

party decreased the number of issues in its platform by refocusing its message on core

issues central to the party's platform.

Following its rebuke in the 1993 elections, the party held a number of meetings to

determine the roots of its electoral defeat. The general sense from these meetings was that

the party had lost its connection with its membership and activist base. For example,

Daniel Percheron, the organizer and President of the Congress and the first speaker at the

Congrés de Liéven, began by describing the large range of groups present before

suggesting that the primary method to keep the party's diverse interests together would

be through its decentralized federal structure. Percheron stated that the groups contained

within the Socialist party "…would not have happened without the opportunities

provided by decentralization" (Percheron, November 18-20, 1994, 4). Countering the

divisions generated in 1993, Henri Emmanuelli, the party's First Secretary at the time,

suggested that the party needed to appear to be "a united party, while the right sinks into

a battle between its leaders, which I believe is devastating itself at the moment and gives

the worst image towards public opinion." (November 18-20, 1994, 16).

The timing of the movement towards limiting divisions occurred at a time that benefitted Jospin's priorities because the leadership bodies, which had been selected at earlier party congresses, were largely dominated by Jospin and his supporters. Under the influence of Jospin, the party's new set of priorities reflected his courant's policy additions from the platform developed in 1993. According to the theory, more pragmatic activists and members should have seen little reason to stay within the party and the party leaders should have needed to focus their attention on the goals of the activist base to stay in power. From a practical standpoint, many of the previous elected officials were no longer in office, as the party lost over half its vote (from 36.56% to 17.6%) and a larger percentage of seats (from 260 seats to 54) from its parliamentary delegation and many more at the local and regional levels. The party leaders after 1993 had to balance a new set of priorities within the party. The supporters that remained with the party largely reflected its new priorities and the coalition of supporters organized by Jospin (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005).

In the first National Council meeting following the 1993 defeat, Fabius explained that the critiques of the party's policy behaviors and the economy "…would have been less strong if we had evidence of a stronger social boldness and in the treatment of unemployment" (National Council, April 3 1993, 7). He goes on to list a number of specific failures in the party's policies towards economic growth, social justice and working conditions. As a member of the older courant that had become marginalized within the party, Fabius' suggestions largely focused on issues that had decreased in attention in the 1993 platform.

Although Jospin lost to Chirac in the presidential election held in 1995, the party regained much of its footing attaining a respectable 45% of the vote. Unlike 1993, the party faced little internal debate leading up to the 1997 election. Jospin assigned members of his courant to write the platform for the party. Following the failure of Mitterand's pragmatic approach in 1993, the party congress held in 1994 set out a new direction. Where intra-party divisions characterized the votes at the Congrés de Rennes, the Congrés de Liéven in 1994 provided a clearer direction than previous national meetings. The motion deposited by Henri Emmanuelli to return to the heart of the socialist discussion, the "indispensable redistribution of wealth," gained over 92.5% of the vote (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005).

By 1997, the platform the parliamentary election reflected a paired down set of priorities, but with substantially more detail. The program itself had been primarily written by a supporter of Jospin's courant, Pierre Moscovici, to reflect the party's renewed focus; however, Jospin was also involved in writing the program (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005). None of the *courants* opposed to Jospin presented serious challenges to Jospin in the lead up to the presidential election in 1995 or the program written for the parliamentary election in 1997. Similarly, the motion by François Hollande, Jospin's handpicked successor to be the First Secretary in 1997 following the Congrés de Brest, met little resistance and gained over 84 % of the vote.[46]

In the 1997 election, the party's platform was no longer weighed down by the party's defense of its policies from nearly a decade in office. The 1997 platform began with the statement "We change the future, we change the majority." The introduction

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[46] http://www.france-politique.fr/congres-ps.htm Accessed 5/14/2012

immediately contrasted the 1993 platform. The previous manifesto focused on the party's

prior achievements in office and described the issues on which it hoped to expand future

policies. Instead, the 1997 platform stated that "… we want for this campaign to allow a

true discussion of ideas that provides a fully well-informed choice." Following from this

statement the discussion of specific issues forms the bulk of the 1997 platform. For

example, the PS included almost 12% or 17 statements each on the European Community

and social justice issues (Klingemann et al. 2006). Following the logic of the issue

balancing theory, these issues were of particular importance to Jospin's courant

(Andreani 1990).

The selection of these issues relates to the intra-party discussions following

Jospin's selection as the First Secretary in 1995. In the first PS National Council meeting

following his selection in December 1995, Jospin laid out his policy priorities and

directly linked them to the goals of the party's activists and members:

> "… New economic policy, financial reform, city politics and inclusion of youth:
> for these issues I plan to create a council of mayors in liaison Bernard Poignant
> and the FNESR [National Federation of Elected Socialists and Republicans] and
> renew our policies on Europe, defense and modernization of public services in
> France and Europe. These are the subjects that among the others in which the
> *Parti Socialiste* will redefine the positions and arrange our strongest case in the
> next confrontation with the people. Isn't this what the party membership would
> want?" (Jospin, December 16, 1995, 12)

His final statement indicates that these issues should be of primary importance to

the party's supporters. Following this National Council meeting, Jospin called for the

organization of a number of working groups that specifically tackled each of these issues

and allowed the party's activists and members to provide comments. For example, Pierre

Moscovici, a supporter of Jospin's courant, led a committee to further research the PS's

position on the European Union. Muscovici presented the committee's proposals at the subsequent National Council meeting March 2-3, 1996. At the March meeting, the PS' central debates centered on his comments to which the priorities of the membership were then added.[47] By the end of March, the party's members voted in support of Jospin's proposal with over 92% of the vote.

   Similarly, other committees were formed to discuss employment and social actions, defense, local politics, globalization, the federal treasury, agriculture and social movements. National officials also attended meetings at the local level on education, the definition of Europe, industry and the left and the nation. These meetings set the primary topics for the national council meetings and the party dedicated a number of special editions of "Vendredi" the party's newsletter to these same issues.[48]

   These discussions were important because they represented the party leadership's attempts to work with the party membership to build the party's policy goals on these issues. These meetings also allowed the leadership to evaluate each issue's support and integrate the party's regional organizations by bringing members from each regional grouping together. Importantly, these discussions were being held years in advance of the next scheduled election. While the PS had numerous meetings leading up to first the Party Congréss in 1992, the discussions centered mostly on internal reforms and strategy. The primary debates addressed how to reform the party's organization to allow for more democratic procedures, to energize both "activists and sympathizers" (Gisèle Stievenard, Congrés de Bordeaux, July 10-12 1992, 15).

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[47] Parti Socialiste Conseil Nationale (December 2-3, 1996).

[48] Parti Socialiste Conseil Nationale (March 2-3, May 11, June 8, September 21 and Novermber 9, 1996).

This detailed approach had influenced the substance of the party's platform. For example, the PS increased the number of issue statements in its platform on the environment from two statements in 1988 to three statements in 1993; "[The PS will] move towards environmentally sustainable growth: promote clean technologies, renewable energy, develop new services in the field of the natural environment and life." In 1997, the discussion of the environment became much more specific. The 1997 manifesto included the following statements:

> "Economic policy must be respectful of the major ecological balance. We want economic development that is sustainable. Our collective responsibility is committed to future generations. We will give priority to public transport through the development of public rail, the development of public transport in the city, and by encouraging goods to be carried by rail. We will rebalance the taxation of different fuels based on their character as more or less polluting. We will refocus the energy policy of France by introducing a moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors, by increasing incentives to energy saving and the development of renewable energy. We will close the megawatt 'Super Phoenix'. We will abandon the canal project that will only hold small boats in the Rhine, Rhône, Saône." (Klingemann et al. 2006)

Although neither discussion of environmental policies is very long, the 1997 manifesto reflects a longer discussion with specific and detailed policy proposals. This length and detail reflects the party leadership's increased focus on a smaller number of issues.

These policy proposals directly reflect the intra-party divisions and external conditions leading up to the 1997 platform. For example, the motion that served as the basis for the platform used in 1993 was first set out at the Congrés de Rennes in 1990. Out of the seven proposals, three of them received over 20% of the internal vote.[49] The

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[49] http://www.france-politique.fr/congres-ps.htm, Accessed 5/14/2012

voting members at the party Congress are selected as representatives for each of the regional departments for the party (Pierre Kanuty, personal interview). This division reflected not only real disagreements over who would lead the party next, but also both the policy priorities of the party and even the issues the party would discuss. The party's previous successes in office and the breakdown of Mitterand's dominance forced party leaders to garner support from as many groups within the party as possible, reflecting the party leaders' willingness to be pragmatic when the party expected to do well.

The situation changed following the electoral defeats at the local, regional and parliamentary elections between 1992 and 1994. The number of motions proposed by party leaders and voting members of the party congress decreased drastically with only one coming from the party leadership and only one or two proposals from small factions at Lieven in 1994 and then at Brest in 1997. There are some important conclusions to take away from the debates leading up to both of these elections. In particular, factional disputes tended to occur in the debates following the previous election. The new dominant faction within the party was determined in response to previous electoral conditions. However, the platform that emerged immediately prior to the election was initially a compromise between the leading factions at that time.

By the PS' 1997 electoral success, the organization and policy proposals reflected a greatly changed party. Prior to the 1993 election, the PS was hierarchical, divided on strategic lines and paid little attention to policy details in their proposals. In 1997, the PS reformed its organization, was mostly dominated by a single faction supporting Jospin, and focused substantial attention on its policy proposals. The debates in the party's national congresses and National Council meetings indicate that the changes in the

party's approach largely resulted from the effects of its experience in government, previous electoral losses, and the party's potential future electoral success on the willingness of intra-party groups to be pragmatic. This evidence also adds to the theory of strategic issue balancing that the party's organizational structure and rules play an important role in determining the impact of each intra-party group on the leaders' choices. In the following section, I build on this story of party strategy by discussing the links between the Socialist Party's electoral strategy and its behavior upon entering office.

<center>**Socialists in Power 1997-2002: The Activists'**</center>

<center>**Veiled Influence**</center>

After the parliamentary elections in 1997, the PS completely reversed its electoral fortunes from the previous election. Not only had the PS increased its percentage of the vote and number of seats in the AN, but also was able to easily form a majority government along with the support of the PCF and *Les Verts*. In the French Fifth Republic, the President selects the cabinet, which is then approved by the AN. Under situations where the President is from a different party than the parliamentary majority, the President generally selects the head of the largest party in parliament as the Prime Minister. Following the 1997 election, the PS now controlled the parliament, but it still had to contend with a conservative, popularly elected President Chirac that could call for new elections after a year.

Following the theory and results from Chapters 3 and 4, the PS focused its policy attention on issues important to its principals, voters and party activists, in the AN. The large-N results indicated that the PS passed legislation for both voters and intra-party

groups using a range of legislative procedures. The theory of issue accountability

developed in Chapter 1 and analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4 predicts that parties use

legislative procedures to construct an image of accountability with voters by using

procedures that highlight issues important to voter groups and using procedures that limit

information about policy activities on issues important to other groups. I expect that

voters have a larger information asymmetry with parties than intra-party groups and are

therefore more susceptible to the influence of parties' procedural strategies.

The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that parties use legislative procedures to

construct their image. These chapters link the issues parties discuss in their platforms to

the parties' use of legislative procedures and the amount of legislation on an issue the

government passes. The results, however, do not fully line up with the theory. In

particular, parties use procedures to highlight voter issues for the members of the

government, but mostly use procedures to limit information on issues that have been

highlighted by procedures already. Governing parties inconsistently use information

protecting procedures to limit information on issues important to their intra-party groups.

In this section, I build on this analysis by further exploring the motives behind the

use of information protecting procedures. In particular, I follow Liebermann's (2005)

recommendation to review the theory in a representative case. The goal of this analysis is

to review the underlying mechanism and to determine whether the logic of the theory is

valid for these cases. I focus this discussion on two points which the analyses in Chapters

3 and 4 do not fully address. First, the theory of issue accountability assumes that intra-

party groups have a smaller information asymmetry than the information asymmetry

voters have with government leaders. I predict that intra-party groups' source of

information is through party congresses and that intra-party groups can use party congresses to directly discuss their concerns and even hold leaders accountable at these meetings. Second, the analysis in Chapter 3 fails to find evidence that parties use more information protecting procedures on issues important to intra-party groups. In contrast to information generating procedures, such as roll call votes, that highlight information about specific policies, I argue that information protecting procedures limit information about specific policies. For example, legislative *ordonnances* limit the opposition's ability to directly debate and critique the details of the government's policies until long after they have been implemented by delegating the legislative details to the executive. According to Article 38 of the French Constitution, parliament can delegate the authority to write the details of legislation to the Prime Minister and governing cabinet through legislative *ordonnances*. These *ordonnances* must eventually be approved by parliament, but are frequently left unapproved. While I find evidence that the government uses these procedures to shape the information about issues highlighted by other procedures, the motive for using information protecting procedures is less clear. In this section, I seek to find additional evidence for the theory of issue accountability by describing the PS' intra-party debates immediately before and after the 1997 election. I find evidence that party leaders, both those holding government positions and those not in the government, sought to use the party's national congress at the end of 1997 to inform and interact with the party's diverse activist and supporter groups from across the country.

Next, I review the parliamentary debate surrounding the use of legislative *ordonnances* following the 1997 election. Although parliament had previously allowed the government to use legislative *ordonnances* on occasion*,* the government headed by

Prime Minister Lionel Jospin passed a greater number of *ordonnances* than any previous

government. The AN choose to debate the ethics of using this procedure on a law in 1997

that was listed as a voter issue in the analysis in Chapter 3. To better understand the

government's motive for using information protecting procedures on this law, I review

the main debates concerning the law and determine that the theory's predictions better

explain the situation than the large-N analysis in Chapter 3 suggested. I conclude that the

debates related to the usage of *ordonnances* suggest that members of the AN shared

concerns about the usage of *ordonnances* to limit information to voters. These concerns

highlight additional support for the logic behind the theory of issue accountability.

In the following discussion of the PS' experience in office during this period, I

demonstrate that parliamentary leaders maintain connections with intra-party groups to

maintain an image of accountability with these groups and find that parliamentary leaders

use legislative tools to de-emphasize legislation important to these same intra-party

groups. I begin by providing some evidence that the informational advantage party

leaders shared over intra-party groups was smaller than their advantage with voter groups

because of the parties' national conventions and party congresses.

I then review the PS' use of *ordonnances* and decrees during the 11th legislature.

Both the government and opposition parties can highlight legislation through roll call

votes. However, only the government can use legislative *ordonnances* to limit

information about the details of their policy agenda. Unlike Chapter 3, I find that

government parties use *ordonnances* on issues important to intra-party factions in

addition to issues highlighted by opposition parties. In the following discussion, I begin

by describing the connections between the party's legislative strategy and intra-party groups before specifically analyzing the PS's use of legislative *ordonnances*.

Shortly after the 1997 election, the newly chosen Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, spoke at a meeting of the PS National Council outlining his approach for his policy strategy in government. Although he only briefly mentioned his specific policy goals, he described his priorities as dealing with social and economic demands such as "economic growth, development, employment, the fight against inequalities that are the economic realities and not a social supplement" (Jospin 1997, 5). Jospin also discussed his priorities as reviewing France's relation to the European Union, reconsidering immigration policy and reforming the institutions of the French Fifth Republic.

Notably, these issues are split between those important to the parties' voters and intra-party groups based on the analysis from Chapter 3. Prior to the 1997 election, the party included the following issues to attract voter groups: macroeconomic, health, urban and territorial housing, economic regulation, defense, and government operations policy. The following issues were important to groups within the PS: human rights, agriculture, education, environment, energy, transport, justice and crime, social policy, space, science, technology and communication, international affairs and foreign aid, public lands and water management and cultural policies are all labeled as activist issues.

Somewhat more important than the specific issues Jospin mentioned, he described his relationship with the Socialist Party from his new perspective as the Prime Minister. In particular, Jospin delegated the position of First Secretary to François Hollande – who later went on to receive the support of the membership in the following party congress – and called for a regular liaison between the new government and the party leadership.

Hollande further elaborated that the party's commissions and committees would regularly

work with the parliamentary delegation and that the party's policy committees should

work alongside the parliamentary committees. For example, he states that:

> "the parliamentary groups…, but also the party committees should have a role in the development of [any significant] legislation. I think we cannot leave the Government alone to develop these principles." (Hollande, June 14, 1997, 15)

He later stated more forcefully that the party:

> "… demands to participate in the development of our policy choices. The Socialist Party is not an observer, it is not confined to the role of zealous applause for each statement [from the government] and it must be an actor, it means that the party must participate… in the development of the [government's] policy choices." (Hollande, July 5, 1997, 9).

> Later, Henri Emannuelli (1997, 25), the party's previous First Secretary and the

losing candidate for the party's presidential nomination in 1995, suggested that the

national congress be held sooner than it was originally scheduled. He added that:

> "I want this conference to be held as quickly in the fall as possible. Then we do not let the activist Socialists, for three years, be deprived of any opportunity to debate, to make a judgment on what is being done, and exercise. I dare not utter the word "Control" because it would be legally improper to say that the party controls the government - I am not going to say this, but I say, …that the activists should have the opportunity and ability to assess government policy…." (Emannuelli, June 14, 1997, 25)[50]

> These statements all indicate that national congress served as a way for the party

activists and membership to review and guide the representatives. While Jospin may have

been selected to be the Prime Minister, intra-party groups could remove or influence the

selection of leaders and platforms in the future.

> During the next meeting of the National Council on July 5th, Daniel Vaillant

began with a presentation in his new capacity as the National Secretary of Coordination

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[50] This quote may suggest that parliamentary leaders should be timing their policy goals around party conferences in similar ways to how we would expect party leaders to time them with national elections.

between the party and its parliamentary delegation. In his description of the parliament's activities, he described first how the specific activist groups' proposals had been integrated into the government's social and economic policies before elaborating on the success of passing an immigration bill submitted by a parliamentary member (Vailant, July 5, 1997).

At this same meeting, Jospin described his strategy for the timing of his legislative agenda. He stated that "I also want a government strategy that is sustainable based on the calendar, a pace of reforms compatible with economic and social realities, but also compatible with the parliamentary calendar, with the goal of success" (Jospin, National Council July 5 1997, 6). Central to his goals was developing a budget and legislation that makes clear "that employment is our priority." (Jospin, National Council July 5 1997, 9)

In Jospin's opening comments to the AN on June 19, 1997, he directly discussed his approach to the legislative process. In his opening speech, he explained that his government would respect the demands of the French people for specific and detailed policies as well as a transparent policy process. In particular, he stated that the French people had expressed a number of specific demands on the new government. According to Jospin, the French people;

> "Demand respect, starting with giving them our word. The commitments made to the French people during the campaign will be honored. The French people demand efficiency. Gradual, controlled, and recorded over time. The approach that I assign to my Government is essential to me, because it determines the effectiveness of its action. The French people demand understanding. Our attitude towards the French people must be that of continuing dialogue, scrupulous attention and constant accessibility. Finally, the French people demand change. The new majority was chosen by the French because they thought it is best able to

embody not "change" in general, but a specific change, which is important to outline the undertaking." (Jospin, June 19 1997)

These statements in parliament indicate that Jospin's priority would be organizing legislative resources in such a way to prioritize French voters' priorities.

Based on the analysis in Chapter 4, I find that Jospin's broader policy agenda reflects the goals of both intra-party groups and voters. In addition, the results in Chapter 3 demonstrate that Jospin's government used roll call votes to highlight the PS's voter issues and delegated policy details to the executive using *ordonnances* on issues highlighted by roll call votes. Further, the results in Chapter 4 indicate that coalition parties generate more legislation on issues important to the intra-party factions, particularly when the party is unconstrained by the ideology of its coalition partner. Before discussing the 11th parliament's behavior, I first describe the primary information protecting procedure used in the AN: legislative *ordonnances*.

Using Article 38 of the French Constitution, parliament can delegate the power to make and enforce policies to the Prime Minister and the government cabinet. These empowerment statutes provide the government with substantial leeway to develop policy without direct interference from parliament until the government deposits the individual *ordonnance* to the parliament for discussion and parliamentary approval. While they are required to be deposited in parliament after they are put into effect, many *ordonnances* are not voted on until many years after they have been implemented. Similarly, multiple *ordonnances* on different topics are frequently bundled together to be approved all at once.

In 1997, the governing coalition led by Jospin also included the PCF and the Greens. Although neither party contributed a large number of seats, their ideological

constraints should have decreased the likelihood of the PS focusing solely on issues important to its activists. The Socialist Party had formed pre-electoral coalitions with both the PCF and the Greens to limit the chance that the presence of multiple candidates from the left in a district would split the vote and prevent any of them from advancing to the second, decisive round of voting (Blais and Indridason 2007; Spoon 2007, 2011). The pre-electoral coalitions organized between these parties may have provided them with an organizational method to negotiate their policy differences, although these coalitions may have had little impact on the government's ability or willingness to use *ordonnances* because of the coalition parties' larger ideological differences.

Based on the government's policy proposals, the AN delegated the authority to create *ordonnances* or decrees on a number of issues between 1997 and 2002. In particular, the 11th legislature enabled *ordonnances* on three laws on macroeconomic policy, justice and crime, and government operations. On each of these issues, most of the bills on which the PS voted were also highlighted using roll call votes. This fits clearly with the results from Chapter 4, suggesting that the government should use *ordonnances* to limit and control the impact of information generating procedures.

The details of the legislation that empowered the government with the authority to write *ordonnances* provide some evidence that the PS used *ordonnances* to limit information about their legislative agenda. In particular, the Socialist Party not only used *ordonnances* to control information about highlighted legislation, but also to focus it on the details of issues important to intra-party groups. In particular, Loi 99-1071 on justice and crime suggests that the issues delegated are meant to control the information about the government's priorities.

Passed in one session on November 23, 1999, Loi 1071 led to a series of debates. While I argued the role of Article 38 was to limit the information about the specific policy, it seems that the process is somewhat more complex. During the debate leading up to its adoption, speakers for each party in parliament expressed large reservations regarding the use of *ordonnances* for the PS' expressed purposes. The supposed explanation for delegating authority was to expedite and avoid the proliferation of governmental code that had arisen from previous reforms.

Although the coding used in Chapter 3 provides some support for the theory, 99-1071 suggests that the government's use of *ordonnances* is actually more complicated than the coding initially suggests. This law actually authorized nine *ordonnances* on varied issues. The topics of these *ordonnances* were rural land management and agriculture, education, public health, commerce, the environment, justice, roads, social action and the monetary and financial codes. Six of these issues were considered activist issues in the party's platform and the other three were voter issues. This specific piece of legislation suggests that the government uses *ordonnances* on its policy priorities to both voter and activist groups. Consistent with the hypotheses tested in Chapter 3, the parliament empowered the government to create *ordonnances* on mostly on issues important to intra-party groups.

Following from the theory, the critics of this specific legislation suggested that these *ordonnances* would limit information about the government's activities, despite the speaker's insistence to the contrary. Both opposition and coalition parties expressed major reservations about these empowerments. For example, the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) believed that this usage of Article 38 was counter to the

Constitution. This law eventually went to the Constitutional Council and was approved.[51]

The UDF also argued that the major issue with this usage of Article 38 is that it reduced

the role of parliament in the legislative process. From the perspective of the UDF

speaker, Christine Boutin, this application of Article 38 is equivalent to assigning the

government a "blank check" to re-write previous laws (November 23, 1999).

The PCF's speaker, Patrice Carvalho, (November 23, 1999) stated that despite the

government's contention that its use would clarify law, it would actually make it more

difficult for citizens to understand. Speaking for the PCF, Carvalho agreed with the

position of a previous parliamentary review of these procedures. He stated that

"confusion for voters would be likely… [and would lead to] legal uncertainty…"

(November 23, 1999, 6).

Following the parliament's support of these empowerments, the government

wrote 10 separate *ordonnances* on these issues. In particular, the government created

specific *ordonnances* associated with social and family actions, monetary and finance

policy, the environment, commerce, public health, justice, rural land management and

two *ordonnances* on road policy. Most of these *ordonnances* were approved by

parliament at some point, although most of them were not approved until after the new,

conservative government took over in the 12th legislature.

By not approving these *ordonnances*, the Jospin government essentially avoided

direct debate in parliament on many of these issues prior to the election in 2002. The

stated intent of the *ordonnances* was to make the legislative code more direct and

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[51] After parliament has passed a law, members of parliament can request that the Constitutional
Council determine whether that law fits within the legal confines of the constitution. The
Constitutional Council can block or return laws to parliament that it considers unconstitutional.

efficient. However, the use of Article 38 allowed the government's ministers in each

policy area to re-write the legislative code on that policy to make it more direct

presumably so that citizens could more easily understand the code. The *ordonnances* also

allowed the government to legislate on those topics without having to reference each

previous and relevant law. Further, the cabinet ministers in each policy area were

delegated to undertake these revisions.

While the revisions to these codes were not necessarily intended to influence the

substance of the legislation, the clarification of the codes allowed ministers in each area

to more clearly enforce existing laws and make future alterations.[52] For example, the

ordonnance on environmental issues was delegated to the environmental minister,

Dominique Voynet, the one green party member of the cabinet. While much of the

previous code was directly referenced to make the new code, some of it was paraphrased

or re-written. In accordance with the constitution, Voynet deposited a law to ratify the

ordonnance two months following its publication on November 15, 2000. Similarly, the

law was deposited to be ratified by the *Sénat* in February, 2001.

The law was never voted on by itself as it remained at the committee level in the

Sénat for the rest of the 11th legislature.[53] However, the *ordonnance* was eventually

ratified during the 12th legislature along with additional modifications on April 19,

2003.[54] The outcome of the vote suggests that the final bill adopted was less reflective of

the PS's goals than in its initial form, as the party voted against the larger bill. The PS's

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[52] www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/documents/index-*ordonnances*-11leg.asp#codes_hab, Accessed 5/23/2012.

[53] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/projets/pl2705.asp, Accessed 5/23/2012.

[54] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/ta/ta0132.asp, Accessed 5/23/2012.

choice to not force a vote on this legislation and its eventual rejection of the legislation in

the following parliament suggests that the reforms to this legislation were not just to

simplify the legislation on the books, but to actually cover the details of the legislation on

an issue important to intra-party groups in the PS and the primary issue important to one

of the PS' coalition members.

Discussion

In this chapter, I presented qualitative evidence for my theory of issue balancing

and parliamentary accountability. In the first section, I considered the history and

electoral strategies of the PS in the French Fifth Republic. By taking a deeper look at the

topics and details of the Socialist Party's national congresses and meetings of their

national leadership, I presented evidence that intra-party politics greatly influences the

party's strategies prior to and following elections. Consistent with the theory of party

issue balancing, the PS was divided into numerous courants that had to be reconciled in

1993, but the number of groups and the dominance of Jospin's courant within the party

consolidated before the election in 1997.

The large-N analysis predicted an increase in the number of issues in the party's

platform in 1993 and a decrease in the number of issues in 1997; however, the analysis in

Chapter 2 under-predicted the degree of consolidation in the party's message in 1997.

The qualitative evidence suggests that in both cases, the underlying mechanism projected

by the theory is correct. Intra-party politics and debates influenced the platform

eventually adopted by the party's leaders. Party leaders balance intra-party groups'

differences over the party's approach towards the policy process because they are forced

to form intra-party policy coalitions to win intra-party votes.

In the case of the 1997 platform, a number of additional elements may have exacerbated the factors influencing intra-party politics that were not directly captured in the large-N analysis. For example, the electoral losses that the PS suffered in local, regional and parliamentary elections between 1992 through 1994 was only represented by the number of seats lost in the 1993 election. Incorporating regional and supranational elections into the analysis may better capture this dynamic. In addition, the rules determining the ability of the intra-party groups to select the party's leadership and platform also influence the extent of the party organization's impact. The PS' move towards allowing greater participation by groups in the party's 1997 platform may help explain the larger than predicted change. This suggests that the party's organizational rules should be added to future analyses.

In addition, election timing may have played an important role in the 1997 election. The theory did not directly consider the role of election timing in previous chapters because it is unclear how the timing of elections would influence the activists and supporters attracted to the party. However, it is possible that Chirac's early election left the PS' leaders unprepared to offer a more comprehensive platform. Rather than quickly take an unpopular or unprepared position on an issue, the PS leadership may have chosen to exclude that issue. Following the five year electoral calendar set out in the Constitution, the Socialist Party's leaders expected elections to be held as initially scheduled in 1998 rather than 1997. Chirac's dissolution of parliament may have caught the Socialists off guard. Similarly, the PS' party congress was scheduled for November 1997, well after the actual elections took place. Future analysis should consider the links between strategic electoral timing, intra-party politics and the number of issues in parties'

platforms. Finally, the analysis of specific issues within the PS manifesto indicates that the measures used in Chapter 2 to operationalize the number of issues in the platform have some face validity.

The second section focused on the PS's experience in office following the 1997 election and sought to establish support for two assumptions in the large-N analysis. First, the party's activists and membership influenced the party's direction through national congresses and conventions while in office. Jospin and other leaders' comments immediately following the 1997 election suggest that the party leaders were concerned with the supporters within the party. By setting up a liaison with Daniel Vaillant and considering the proposals to be voted on for the Congrés de Brest in 1997, Jospin sought to maintain a link with the party's organization that could serve to inform intra-party groups of the government's behavior. Further, these actions suggest that Jospin was concerned about maintaining the support of the membership.

Finally, the PS's behavior in office following the 1997 election reflects the party's goals of representing issues important to both voters and intra-party groups. While the party focused its attention on issues salient to both groups, a detailed review of the *ordonnances* passed during the 11th legislature suggests that these *ordonnances* were held mostly on issues important to Jospin's faction within the party and that many interpreted these *ordonnances* as attempts to limit information about those policy areas. A closer reading of the legislation also suggests that the analysis in Chapter 3 may have ignored this potential by focusing only on the predominant issue discussed in the legislation. This finding may be less surprising if the party purposefully tried to downplay these priorities by grouping them into one piece of legislation.

In conclusion, the case studies in this chapter indicate support for the logic underlying my theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability. Party leaders' decisions are influenced by intra-party factions and their priorities in office may more closely reflect the goals of this group than those of their more tenuous supporters, voters. The support for the logic behind the theory in this dissertation, however, provides ample questions for future analyses of parties' electoral strategies and their behavior in elected office. In the final chapter, I review the primary findings from each chapter before discussing some additional research suggested by the theory and evidence in this dissertation. I also review a number of important implications from the theory for parties' behavior in office, citizens' understanding of their behavior, and representation more generally.

Figure 5.1 The *Parti Socialiste*'s Effective Number of Manifesto Issues, 1973-2007


Figure 5.2 Relative GDP Growth in France, 1973-2007

CHAPTER 6
BEYOND STRATEGIC ISSUE BALANCING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Although studies of party election strategy and government accountability provide

important insights for understanding political party behavior, there are still a number of

unanswered questions. For example, why do political parties add or remove issues to

their electoral programs? How do government parties use their behavior in parliament to

highlight or limit information about policies on these issues? Which groups and issues do

governing parties better represent? In this dissertation, I have developed a theory of

strategic issue balancing and accountability that answers each of these questions by

linking the groups seeking to influence parties' behavior in three areas: parties' electoral

campaigns, parliamentary strategies and their legislative agendas. The theory of strategic

issue balancing and accountability predicts that the Socialist Party leaders preparing for

the elections in 1997 balanced their own pragmatic goals for controlling office with the

more ideologically rigid policy goals of its membership. The electoral context and the

policy approach of the groups mobilized to join the parties prior to the election

determined the degree to which the leadership represented the group's goals in its

electoral messages.

Upon taking office, the theory hypothesizes that party leaders use procedures that

both highlight and limit information about their policy activities to construct an image of

accountability with voters. To limit information to voters, government leaders use

procedures that constrain information about their policy activities on issues important to

their ideologically motivated intra-party groups. However, governing parties maintain a

positive image of accountability with intra-party groups through information conveyed at

meetings of the party's organization. Finally, unconstrained government leaders focus greater attention on the priorities of their intra-party groups than of voters' goals because intra-party groups have greater information about the government's policy agenda and can punish the government leaders for acting unaccountably more frequently than voters.

In this chapter, I review the empirical evidence for the theory from Chapters 2-5 and discuss their implications for the study of party electoral strategy, parliamentary behavior and government accountability. I first discuss parties' electoral strategies based on the results from Chapters 2 and 5. I then consider parties' legislative strategies and their implications for parties' accountability with their principals following the results of Chapters 3-5. In both sections, I consider empirical and theoretical extensions of my theory for understanding parties' electoral and parliamentary strategies in additional contexts. Finally, I conclude by discussing some of the implications of these results for government accountability for parties, activists and voters.

Parties' Electoral Strategies: Strategic Issue Balancing

Based on the theory of strategic issue balancing, I predict that parties use the issues in their platforms to mobilize voters and intra-party groups. Both groups can punish or reward the party's leadership through elections to government or to party leadership positions. However, platforms more closely reflect the party's activists' and members' priorities and approach because they can regularly remove or select leaders and the platform at national congresses. Therefore, the conditions that influence whether the party's membership at these meetings is more ideologically rigid or pragmatic determine the number of issues in the platform. I hypothesize that the party adds issues to attract

voters when its membership is more pragmatic and narrows its platform to a smaller number of issues when the national congresses are more ideologically rigid.

In Chapter 2, using cross-national data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and economic indicators from the OECD for 24 OECD countries from 1962-2008, I find that the number of issues in parties' platforms is based on the electoral conditions such as economic conditions, which parties are in government, and their previous electoral success. The electoral conditions I expect to attract more pragmatic supporters to parties result in party platforms with a larger number of issues. For example, government parties' manifestos have a larger number of issues than opposition parties and increase the number of issues in their platforms when the economy is growing. Opposition parties, on the other hand, decrease the number of issues in their platforms in a growing economy. Parties also respond to their previous electoral successes, or increases in the percentage of parliamentary seats they control, by increasing the number of issues in their platforms in the next election.

However, I find little support in Chapter 2 for the link between issue salience and the number of issues in party platforms. I argue that these weak results suggest that public opinion may not directly lead to changes in which issues appear in parties' platforms, but that the relationship may be reversed, as V.O. Key (1966) expected. Issues become more important to the public in opinion polls when parties address issues important to those groups. Scholars focusing on shifts in the relative location of parties' preferences as an electoral strategy have found at best weak evidence that parties' preferences respond to public opinion (Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009). However, there is clearer evidence that voters respond to parties' changes in preferences (Adams et al. 2006; Adams and Somer-

Topcu 2009), although voters' response to parties' change in preferences may not occur until later elections (Somer-Topcu 2009). Future analyses should further consider the link between public opinion and the issues parties use to mobilize voters.

Building on the results in Chapter 2, the qualitative case study of the French *Parti Socialiste* in Chapter 5 shows that the divisions between intra-party groups played a role in determining changes to the party's platform. In 1993, the incumbent PS confronted a growing economy and had gained seats in the previous election. The National Congresses leading up to the election illustrated a party divided by diverse groups hoping to take control of the party's leadership and platform. Observing the need to appeal to the largest number of groups in the party, party leaders increased the number of issues in the platform. Essentially, intra-party groups vying for the party's leadership had to offer a proposal that appealed to the largest number of groups to win the intra-party elections at the National Congress.

By 1997, however, the Socialist Party's repeated electoral defeats led to a major shift in approach. The party leaders held numerous meetings prior to the 1997 elections to discuss in detail the party's policy goals. In the opposition, the moderately positive economic growth led intra-party groups to emphasize other topics during intra-party debates. The PS' massive electoral defeats in regional, European and parliamentary elections led it to refocus on the party's core, central issues. In sum, the results in Chapters 2 and 5 indicate that party's electoral platforms are by-products of both the current electoral conditions and the party's internal political divisions.

Although my theory of intra-party politics and issue balancing is based on previous more general studies of party organizational behavior (for example, Kitschelt

1989; Harmel and Janda 1994, Harmel and Tan 2003), the analysis in Chapter 5 leaves unresolved the degree to which intra-party political divisions depend on the specific context of the French parties' organizations. According to my theory, the primary mechanism that parties have for influencing party leaders is intra-party elections. The analysis from Chapter 5 suggests that parties that have an internal structure in which intra-party groups can influence the selection of party leaders and the party platform through elections will also likely demonstrate similar dynamics to the French PS. Future large-N analyses or comparative case studies that make focused comparisons between parties with and without clear mechanisms for intra-party influence would provide a useful additional test of the theory's external validity.

Going Beyond Strategic Issue Balancing Implications

for Party Electoral Strategy and Voter Behavior

The theory of strategic issue balancing predicts that parties add issues to their platform to pragmatically attract issue-focused voter groups. The findings of the analyses in Chapters 2 and 5 suggest a number of implications for voters' behavior. For example, voters that care intensely about an issue may be more likely to vote for a party if the party increases its attention to an issue prior to an election. I predict that citizens with relatively similar preferences to a party or close to multiple parties may be motivated to vote for a party that discusses issues important to them when other parties do not.

This perspective parallels that of theories developed in studies of directional voting. According to this perspective, voters decide which party to support in an election based on the relative direction the party would shift policy on an issue if it controlled government. Voters select parties or candidates that have more extreme or intense

preferences than their own goals on an issue, assuming that parties are unable to attain their true policy preferences because they are forced to compromise in government (Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Kedar 2005). Support for my prediction would suggest that parties should include issues in their platforms with greater support in the public.

Like Schattschneider's (1960) standpoint, the theory suggests that the winners and losers of elections may be determined not only by parties' relative preferences, but also by which groups of voters are motivated to turnout based on the issues included in major parties' electoral campaigns. If Schattschneider is correct, I expect that parties which purposefully add a salient issue to their platform will likely benefit from this addition. When a large number of parties in a system increase the total number of issues in their platforms, this may lead to an increase in overall levels of voter turnout, particularly in systems with a large number of parties with diverse ideological preferences. I predict that systems in which parties include a broader number of issues in their platforms will offer voters a greater range of choices on those issues

In addition to showing how intra-party politics influenced the PS' platform, the results in Chapter 5 add a number of additional factors that influenced the issues in the Socialist Party's platform. In particular, I find evidence of a number of elements that may have motivated the PS to decrease its number of platform issues in 1997. For example, the measure of the PS' parliamentary seat loss in 1993 did not fully convey the Socialist Party's electoral losses in regional and supranational elections before the 1997 election. The analysis in Chapter 5 indicates that by focusing only on parliamentary elections in Chapter 2, I under-predict the extent of the Socialist Party's losses prior to the 1997 elections. The fact that Chirac called the election early may have also limited the number

of issues the party added to its platform in 1997. Future studies of party electoral platforms should consider regional and supranational electoral results as well as the impact of election timing on parties' strategies to determine the external validity of these factors on parties' electoral strategies.

Consistent with Meguid's (2005, 2008) perspective, the theory of strategic issue balancing also may indicate that parties' electoral strategies interact with the behavior of their electoral competitors. The results from Chapter 2 provide some evidence that parties increase the number of issues in their platforms when the other parties in the system do. They may also respond to their competitors' previous strategies over the course of multiple elections. Finally, parties may adopt strategies from parties in other countries that face similar political or economic conditions (Brooks 2007). The degree to which parties respond to their competitors' strategies or learn from other parties requires additional research.

Parties' Legislative Strategies: Procedural Choice and

Parliamentary Signals

In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyze the issue balancing theory's predictions for parties' behavior in office. Upon entering office, parties' principals – voters and activists – expect party leaders to implement policy on the issues important to them that are included in their policy platforms. Parties in government value maintaining their image of accountability with both these groups for the same reasons that their issues are included in the parties' platforms. This image consists of citizens' perception of the degree to which a party passes legislation consistent with its policy platform. Both intra-party

groups and voters can punish party leaders either by removing them from party leadership positions or by voting them out of office.

However, the theory adds that the ability of voters and intra-party group to hold party leaders accountable depends on their information about the policy process. Voters tend to be uninformed about the government's legislative agenda. On the other hand, intra-party groups stay abreast of the government's behavior through meetings of the party organization.

Voters' primary source of information about the policy process comes from party cues and roll call votes (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). While roll call votes may increase the amount of information available to voters, they may not convey a complete image of the parliament's activities. Similarly, I predict that government parties may be able to constrain information about their policy priorities to voters by using procedures that limit the details of legislation or obscure the primary issue to be voted on in legislation. The evidence in Chapter 3 suggests that parties use procedures in the French Fifth Republic on issues important to both voters and intra-party groups.

In particular, the analysis in Chapter 3 builds on the results from Chapter 2 by linking each issue in the parties' platforms to the groups (voters and activists) seeking to influence their platforms. Unlike previous analyses (Carey 2009), I measure the issue preferences of parties' principals by classifying statements in parties' platforms using my theory of party issue balancing. By connecting the principals' preferences with the use of legislative procedures in the French *Assemblée Nationale (*AN), I find evidence the parties use roll call votes on issues important to their voters. In addition, opposition parties request roll call votes on issues to embarrass the government.

However, government parties use additional procedures on issues important to *their* activists. For example, the analysis in Chapter 5 adds evidence that the Jospin government in 1997 used legislative *ordonnances* on issues important to the Socialist activists.[55] Similarly, the parliamentary debate leading to the votes that authorized these *ordonnances* indicated that this procedure limited information about the government's policy activities both to voters and to parliament. Consistent with the theory, the results from Chapters 3 and 5 add that government parties use legislative procedures to construct an image of accountability with voters. They also suggest that parliamentary procedures which limit information about the government's policies play a key role in constructing this image.

Going Beyond Asymmetric Influence: Implications of
Parliamentary Strategy and Information Asymmetries

If parties can construct an image of accountability that deviates from their actual agenda with voter groups than the theory of issue accountability predicts that the government's policy priorities reflect other groups seeking to influence their policy outputs. Unlike voters, intra-party groups have more frequent access to party leaders through their National Congresses. In addition to providing a means to reward and punish their leaders, these meetings also offer intra-party groups a source of information about the party's leadership. By reviewing the transcripts of intra-party discussions at meetings of their National Congress and of their national executive bodies, I find evidence in Chapter 5 that the PS' leadership purposefully set up close connections with the party's

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[55] Article 38 of the French Constitution allows the parliament to delegate the details of legislation to the prime minister and the cabinet. The cabinet can then create legislation via *ordonnances* that must eventually be approved by parliament.

membership through meetings of the National Congress to keep them informed and to solicit their opinions.

Building on principal-agent accounts (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1990; Lupia and McCubbins 1994, 1998 and 2000; Lupia 1998; Carey 2009; McCarty and Meirowitz 2009), the theory of issue accountability posits that a principal with greater information and ability to punish and reward an agent will have greater influence over the agent's behavior. Therefore, a government party with the ability to protect its image of accountability has little reason to worry about voters' punishment for its policy activities. Using evidence of the number of laws passed by the AN from 1978 to 2007, I find evidence in support of the theory that government parties reward activist groups with a larger number of laws on issues important to them than issues important to voter groups. Consistent with a veto players perspective (Tsebelis 2002), I also find evidence that more ideologically contentious coalitions are less capable of purposefully managing their image of accountability. In this setting, the government represents voters at a similar level as activists.

However, the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest an additional agenda setting dynamic for coalition governments that favors the prime minister's (PM) party. While the PM's party passes laws on issues important to both its activists and voters in coalition settings, the government only develops legislation on issues important to the primary coalition partner's voters. However, the amount of legislation for the coalition partner's voter groups also decreases with higher levels of ideological disagreement between coalition partners.

I argue that this difference in representation stems from the agenda setting powers of the PM. Although I assume the primary coalition partner seeks to implement its agenda like the prime minister's party, I find evidence that the largest coalition partner focuses its attention on the goals of its voters. I expect that coalition partners' have fewer resources and mechanisms to influence the PM party's agenda and therefore, focus on the goal of winning control of office in the future. I show that coalition partners negotiate with the PM's party to gain some policy benefits from joining a coalition.

Single-party governments are uncommon in many democracies. Therefore, I predict that ideologically similar parties may be willing to compromise some of their policy goals so that their coalition partner may be able to gain support in future elections. In parliaments that provide the executive with information protecting procedures, parties may also then use these procedures once these policy disagreements have been highlighted to assure the PM party's ideal policy preference on that issue. I find that the prime minister's willingness to assist its coalition partner(s) for electoral reasons decreases as the ideological distance increases. Future analyses on the role of information protecting and generating procedures and intra-coalition dynamics would lead to a better understanding of the exact methods that the PM party uses to attain more supportive legislation than its coalition partners. Similarly, comparisons between parliaments with and without information protecting procedures would extend the external validity of my theory.

The multi-method research design I employ throughout these chapters provides multiple types of data and cases to test and illustrate the issue accountability theory's internal and external validity within France. However, the external validity of the

theory's predictions for activists' influence is unknown outside of France. Like Huber (1996), I chose the French AN because it is a most difficult test of the theory (Eckstein 1975). Relative to parties in other parliaments, the parties in the AN change frequently and the parliamentary groups show less voting cohesion than other parliaments (Döring 2003). The logic of the most difficult case study suggests that parties should better represent the goals of activist groups in parliaments with greater party stability and voting cohesion, such as the British House of Commons (Eckstein 1975).

Going Beyond Issue Accountability: Implications of
Party Policy Strategies and Issue Accountability

Following from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, the existence of an image of accountability may help explain why voters primarily hold parties accountable for the economy. While many issues have clear and immediately observable consequences, it may be difficult for voters to directly associate policies with parties in government, particularly where there are multiple institutional or partisan veto players. However, voters may find their broader impressions of the economy to be a clearer image of the government's accountability than the signals they receive from roll call votes. Voters may perceive the economy to be a broader measure of how accountable government parties policies are towards the traditional economic left-right division, the primary issue dividing the mainstream parties of most advanced industrial democracies (Lipset and Rokan 1957; Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2008),

The results from the analysis suggest a number of implications for parties' behavior in government. The evidence from Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that parties use legislative procedures to influence their image of accountability. The approach that I use

to link issues to intra-party and voter groups provides a tool to establish whether intra-party groups have asymmetric influence in a number of additional areas of party behavior such as coalition bargaining, government oversight of the bureaucracy and their coalition partners, international treaty negotiations, and the implementation of European Union directives.

For example, I predict that parties dedicate greater resources to the oversight of issues important to the party's activists than to voter groups. Using a similar approach to the analysis in Chapter 3 and evidence from seven Western European democracies between 1960 and 1998, Greene and Jensen (2012) find evidence that parties are more likely to use junior ministers to oversee the behavior of cabinet ministers controlled by their coalition partners on issues important to parties' activists than on other issues. Greene (2012) finds evidence that coalition governments in 11 Western European democracies from 1960 to 1998 which contain parties with a larger number of issues in their platforms have longer coalition durations in the face of ideological disagreement than coalition governments comprised of parties with a smaller number of issues. Both studies suggest further evidence that the issues parties include when they increase the number of issues in their platforms are primarily added for pragmatic reasons, not ideologically rigid policy goals.

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Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies:

Implications for Voters, Activists, and Parties

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The theory of strategic issue balancing and accountability suggest a series of considerations for citizens, activists and parties. Decrying voters' lack of information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998), observers of legislative behavior suggest that citizens can

gain information about their representatives by observing roll call votes (Carey 2009).

Citizens can then control their representatives through elections (Anderson 2007; Carey

2009). The evidence from this dissertation suggests that voters have some influence over

parties' behavior in government, but that their influence is not as strong as the impact

from other groups in contexts where parties can limit information about their policy

agendas. Given the choice between issues important to voters and intra-party groups,

party leaders dedicate greater resources to issues important to intra-party groups in this

context.

Although the results of the analysis suggest that parties do not completely ignore

voters' goals, parties' image of accountability may be more positive than their full record

warrants. From the perspective of a democratic reformer, there may be institutional

solutions to correct for the difference in voters' perceptions and the government's actual

levels of accountability. Following from Madison's perspective, institutional reforms that

limit the ability of one party or leader to dominate the policy process may limit the ability

of one party to set the entire legislative agenda. Procedures such as *ordonnances* in

France and executive decrees in presidential systems limit the ability of opposition

groups to highlight the policies to voters which would damage the government parties'

image of accountability by directly discussing, amending and voting on the legislation.

On the other hand, the theory indicates an alternative strategy for citizens seeking

to influence policy on an issue. Rather than simply voting for the party that discusses

their issues the most, citizens can actively join parties and stay involved in them. When

they control government, parties dedicate greater resources to the issues that stay in the

party's platforms over multiple elections. In addition, intra-party groups gain significant

information about the parties' policy activities through their access to party leaders at national meetings.

This conception of citizen participation implies that those groups most willing to dedicate their personal resources and time to an issue and a party have the most influence over the government's activities. This theoretical perspective may not be beneficial for groups with little resources or for those that conceive of the requirements of a good citizen as limited to regularly voting. However, democratic theorists may argue that it is normatively good that citizens who seek policy on an issue can potentially gain detailed and lasting policy by working within a party organization. This implies that a more active and partisan citizenry may lead to a more representative democracy.

Finally, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the specific parties in government have consequences for policy outputs. Parties develop legislation that is important to *their* principals. Scholars lament the decline of party organizations and the number of partisans in the electorate across the democratic world (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), these results add to previous research that shows that parties still organize parliaments and government (Hibbs 1978; Hicks and Swank 1992, Thies 2002, Caul and Gray 2002, Jensen and Spoon 2010). In addition, if the primary strategy for groups seeking to influence government priorities is through the party organization, my theory suggests that parties' seeking to make themselves more relevant as an organization and to increase partisan identification in the electorate may benefit from courting groups with specific policy goals on an issue over the course of numerous elections. The current decline in both partisan identification and in party organizations may reverse cyclically as

groups find that they are able to have more influence as activists and members within

party organizations than as independent voters.

APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 2

Table A1 Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 2

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Maximum
ENMI	13.135	4.836	1.528	28.6
Δ % Seats $_{(t-1)}$	-0.001	0.066	-0.566	0.396
Incumbent party	0.322	0.468	0	1
Δ expected GDP growth	0.067	2.307	-8.698	10.573
Δ Issue Salience	-0.005	0.050	-0.235	0.161
Niche Party	0.072	0.258	0	1
Δ Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties$_{(t-1)}$	0.06	0.689	-2.856	2.961
Minority Incumbent Cabinet	0.044	0.205	0	1
Δ Right-Left position X Left Party	0.095	0.327	-0.949	3.143
Δ Right-Left position	0.076	0.432	-0.996	3.143
Left Party	0.416	0.493	0	1
Majoritarian Elections	0.158	0.3652	0	1
Δ Mean Country ENMI$_{(t-1)}$	0.161	2.453	-11.246	16.273
ENMI$_{(t-1)}$	12.971	4.954	1.576	28.6

Note: The sample size for most of the variables is 1415 observations. The measure of change in issue salience is only for a reduced sample 529 observations in 15 countries. For the measure of incumbent cabinet party and niche party, the mean column lists the percentage of the observations that are incumbent parties or niche parties. The analysis seeks to account for some of the missing data by using values of issue salience from one year before or after the election, if available. The coefficient for issue salience and its interactions are not significant for any of the analyses if values for issue salience are used from up to 5 years prior or after the election. I expect that as I include additional surveys to extend the time-series and cross-section, the measure of issue salience will not be significant.

APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 3

Table B1 Issue areas used to link the CMP to the CAP

CAP Topics	CMP Codes
Macroeconomic policy	404 Economic Planning 408 Economic Goals 410 Productivity 415 Marxist Analysis 416 Anti-Growth Economy
Human Rights	201 Freedom and Human Rights 202 Democracy 503 Social Justice
Health	504 Welfare State Expansion 505 Welfare State Limitation
Agriculture	703 Agriculture
Labor and employment	701 Labour Groups: positive 702 Labour Groups: negative 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups
Education	506 Education Expansion 507 Education Limitation
Environment	416 Anti-Growth Economy 501 Environmental Protection
Energy	501 Environmental Protection
Immigration	601 National Way of Life: positive 602 National Way of Life: negative 607 Multiculturalism: positive 608 Multiculturalism: negative
Transport	411 Technology and Infrastructure
Criminality and Justice	605 Law and Order
Social Politics	503 Social Justice 504 Welfare State Expansion 505 Welfare State Limitation 705 Minority Groups 706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups
Housing	504 Welfare State Expansion 505 Welfare State Limitation
Economic Regulation	401 Free Enterprise 402 Incentives 403 Market Regulation 405 Corporatism 409 Keynesian Demand Management 412 Controlled Economy 414 Economic Orthodoxy
Defense	103 Anti-Imperialism 104 Military: positive 105 Military: negative 106 Peace
Space, Tech, Science, andCommunication	411 Technology and Infrastructure
Exterior Commerce	406 Protectionism: positive 407 Protectionism: negative

Table B1 Cont.

CAP Topics	CMP Codes
International Affairs and Foreign Aid	101 Foreign Special Relationships: positive 102 Foreign Special Relationships: negative 107 Internationalism: positive 108 European Community: positive 109 Internationalism: negative 110 European Community: negative
Government Affairs	203 Constitutionalism: positive 204 Constitutionalism: negative 301 Decentralisation 302 Centralisation 303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 304 Political Corruption 305 Political Authority 413 Nationalisation
Public Lands and Water Management	501 Environmental Protection
Culture	502 Culture 601 National Way of Life: positive 602 National Way of Life: negative 603 Traditional Morality: positive 604 Traditional Morality: negative 606 Social Harmony 607 Multiculturalism: positive 608 Multiculturalism: negative
local or regional issues	301 Decentralisation 302 Centralisation
Natural Disasters	None
Accidents	None
Sports	502 Culture

Table B2 Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 3

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Roll Call Votes	0.165	0.371	0	1
Vote of Confidence	0.012	0.110	0	1
Empowerment Statutes	0.020	0.139	0	1
Package Vote	0.030	0.170	0	1
PM Voter Issue	0.442	0.497	0	1
CP Voter Issue	0.414	0.493	0	1
Opposition Party Voter Issue I	0.407	0.491	0	1
Opposition Party Voter Issue II	0.390	0.488	0	1
PM Activist Issue	0.459	0.498	0	1
CP Activist Issue	0.258	0.438	0	1
Cabinet Disagreement	0.147	0.133	0	0.349

APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 4

Table C1 Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 4

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Number of Laws	3.150	0.358	0	36
PM Party Activist Issue	0.035	0.061	0	0.283
PM Party Voter Issue	0.021	0.041	0	0.269
Coalition Party Activist Issue	0.031	0.063	0	0.339
Coalition Party Voter Issue	0.018	0.034	0	0.179
Cabinet Disagreement	0.147	0.136	0	0.349
Cohabitation	0.069	0.254	0	1
Minority Government	0.167	0.373	0	1
Government Percent Seats	0.604	0.107	0.490	0.797
Year in office	2.194	1.631	0	5

APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 5

Table D1 Prime Ministers in the French Fifth Republic

Prime Minister	Dates in Office	Party Name
Michel Debré	1/8/1959- 4/14/1962	Union for the New Republic
Georges Pompidou	4/14/1962 - 7/10/1968	Union for the New Republic
Maurice Couve de Murville	7/10/1968 - 6/20/1969	Union of Democrats for the Republic
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	6/20/1969 - 7/6/1972	Union of Democrats for the Republic
Pierre Messmer	7/6/1972 - 5/27/1974	Union of Democrats for the Republic
Jacques Chirac	5/27/1974 - 8/26/1976	Union of Democrats for the Republic
Raymond Barre	8/26/1976 - 5/21/1981	Union for French Democracy
Pierre Mauroy	5/21/1981 - 7/17/1984	Socialist Party
Laurent Fabius	7/17/1984 - 3/20/1986	Socialist Party
Jacques Chirac	3/20/1986 - 5/10/1988	Rally for the Republic
Michel Rocard	5/10/1988 - 5/15/1991	Socialist Party
Édith Cresson	5/15/1991 - 4/2/1992	Socialist Party
Pierre Bérégovoy	4/2/1992 - 3/29/93	Socialist Party
Édouard Balladur	3/29/1993 - 5/18/1995	Rally for the Republic
Alain Juppé	5/18/1995 - 6/3/1997	Rally for the Republic
Lionel Jospin	6/3/1997 - 5/6/2002	Socialist Party
Jean-Pierre Raffarin	5/6/2002 - 5/31/2005	Union for a Presidential Majority (later changed to Union for a Popular Movement)
Dominique de Villepin	5/31/2005 - 5/17/2007	Union for a Popular Movement
François Fillon	5/17/2007 - 5/15/2012	Union for a Popular Movement
Jean-Marc Ayrault	5/15/2012 - 7/2012	Socialist Party

Table D2 Presidents in the French Fifth Republic

President	Dates	Party
Charles de Gaulle	1/8/1959 - 4/28/1969	Union for the New Republic
Alain Poher	4/28/1969 - 6/15/1969	Progress and Modern Democracy
Georges Pompidou	6/15/1969- 4/2/1974	Union of Democrats for the Republic
Alain Poher	4/2/1974 - 5/19/1974	Progress and Modern Democracy
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	5/19/1974 - 5/21/1981	Union for French Democracy
François Mitterrand	5/21/1981 - 5/17/1995	Socialist
Jacques Chirac	5/17/1995 - 5/16/2007	Rally for the Republic
Nicolas Sarkozy	5/16/2007 - 5/15/2012	Union for a Popular Movement
François Hollande	5/15/2012 – present	Socialist

NOTES

Survey Questions for the Analysis in Chapter 2

Canadian National Election Study

"Here's a list of FOUR goals. Which goal is MOST important to you personally?

1 fighting crime

2 giving people more say in important government decisions,

3 maintaining economic growth

4 protecting freedom of speech

8 don't know

9 refused"

Eurobarometer

There is a lot of talk these days about what this country's coals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority (show card).

Would you please say which one of them you yourself consider the most important in the long run? (Show the card) (One answer only).

1. Maintaining order in the nation

2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions

3. Fighting rising prices

4. Protecting freedom of speech

0. DK/NA"

World Values Survey

"If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?" "Maintaining order in the nation" "Giving people more to say in important government decisions" "Fighting rising prices" or "Protecting freedom of speech".

New Zealand National Election Survey

Survey questions in the New Zealand National Election Survey are based on Inglehart's (1977) questions used in the World Values Survey. The exact question wording is not available on the NZES website. For 1993, 1996, and 1999, I use responses to the following question "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?" "Maintaining order in the nation" "Giving people more to say in important government decisions" "Fighting rising prices" or "Protecting freedom of speech".

The NZES did not include this survey question in the 2002 and 2005 national election surveys. Instead, I use responses to the open-ended question on what is the most important issue in the election. The question wording is not available from the NZES, but asks respondents what is the most important issue that comes to mind in this election.

Constitutional provisions for legislative procedures

in the French Vth Republic

Vote of Confidence

Article 49.1 The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may make the Government's program or possibly a general policy statement an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly.

Package vote

Article 44.3 Members of Parliament and the Government shall have the right of amendment. This right may be used in plenary sitting or in committee under the conditions set down by the Rules of Procedure of the Houses, according to the framework determined by an Institutional Act. Once debate has begun, the Government may object to the consideration of any amendment which has not previously been referred to committee. If the Government so requests, the House before which the Bill is tabled shall proceed to a single vote on all or part of the text under debate, on the sole basis of the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government.

Ordinance/ Empowerment statutes

Article 38. In order to implement its program, the Government may ask Parliament for authorization, for a limited period, to take measures by Ordinance that are normally the preserve of statute law. Ordinances shall be issued in the Council of Ministers, after consultation with the *Conseil d'État*. They shall come into force upon publication, but shall lapse in the event of failure to table before Parliament the Bill to ratify them by the date set by the Enabling Act. They may only be ratified in explicit terms. At the end of the period referred to in the first paragraph hereinabove Ordinances may be amended solely by an Act of Parliament in those areas governed by statute law (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#IV, Accessed 6/21/2012).

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